{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_47025/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_47025","id":"gutenberg_47025","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/47025","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Christianity -- Controversial literature","Religion -- Philosophy"],"text":"THE\n ENGLISH AND FOREIGN\n PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY.\n\n BY\n LUDWIG FEUERBACH.\n\n TRANSLATED FROM THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION\n\n BY\n MARIAN EVANS,\n TRANSLATOR OF \"STRAUSS'S LIFE OF JESUS.\"\n\n\n Second Edition.\n\n LONDON:\n KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TR\u00dcBNER, & CO., Ltd.\n 1890.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPUBLISHERS' NOTE.\n\n\nThe first edition of this work was published in 1854, and, although\na large one, has been long out of print. Many inquiries having been\nmade for it since the recent lamented death of the translator, the\npublishers have determined to offer a second edition to the public,\nand have been advised to give it a place in their \"English and Foreign\nPhilosophical Library.\" It is an exact reprint of the first edition,\nand they trust it will be received with equal favour.\n\n\nLondon, June 1881.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. [1]\n\n\nThe clamour excited by the present work has not surprised me,\nand hence it has not in the least moved me from my position. On the\ncontrary, I have once more, in all calmness, subjected my work to the\nseverest scrutiny, both historical and philosophical; I have, as far as\npossible, freed it from its defects of form, and enriched it with new\ndevelopments, illustrations, and historical testimonies,--testimonies\nin the highest degree striking and irrefragable. Now that I have thus\nverified my analysis by historical proofs, it is to be hoped that\nreaders whose eyes are not sealed will be convinced and will admit,\neven though reluctantly, that my work contains a faithful, correct\ntranslation of the Christian religion out of the Oriental language of\nimagery into plain speech. And it has no pretension to be anything\nmore than a close translation, or, to speak literally, an empirical\nor historico-philosophical analysis, a solution of the enigma of the\nChristian religion. The general propositions which I premise in the\nIntroduction are no \u00e0 priori, excogitated propositions, no products\nof speculation; they have arisen out of the analysis of religion;\nthey are only, as indeed are all the fundamental ideas of the work,\ngeneralisations from the known manifestations of human nature, and\nin particular of the religious consciousness,--facts converted into\nthoughts, i.e., expressed in general terms, and thus made the property\nof the understanding. The ideas of my work are only conclusions,\nconsequences, drawn from premisses which are not themselves mere\nideas, but objective facts either actual or historical--facts which\nhad not their place in my head simply in virtue of their ponderous\nexistence in folio. I unconditionally repudiate absolute, immaterial,\nself-sufficing speculation--that speculation which draws its material\nfrom within. I differ toto coelo from those philosophers who pluck\nout their eyes that they may see better; for my thought I require the\nsenses, especially sight; I found my ideas on materials which can be\nappropriated only through the activity of the senses. I do not generate\nthe object from the thought, but the thought from the object; and I\nhold that alone to be an object which has an existence beyond one's own\nbrain. I am an idealist only in the region of practical philosophy,\nthat is, I do not regard the limits of the past and present as the\nlimits of humanity, of the future; on the contrary, I firmly believe\nthat many things--yes, many things--which with the short-sighted,\npusillanimous practical men of to-day, pass for flights of imagination,\nfor ideas never to be realised, for mere chimeras, will to-morrow,\ni.e., in the next century,--centuries in individual life are days\nin the life of humanity,--exist in full reality. Briefly, the \"Idea\"\nis to me only faith in the historical future, in the triumph of truth\nand virtue; it has for me only a political and moral significance;\nfor in the sphere of strictly theoretical philosophy, I attach myself,\nin direct opposition to the Hegelian philosophy, only to realism,\nto materialism in the sense above indicated. The maxim hitherto\nadopted by speculative philosophy: All that is mine I carry with\nme, the old omnia mea mecum porto, I cannot, alas! appropriate. I\nhave many things outside myself, which I cannot convey either in my\npocket or my head, but which nevertheless I look upon as belonging\nto me, not indeed as a mere man--a view not now in question--but\nas a philosopher. I am nothing but a natural philosopher in the\ndomain of mind; and the natural philosopher can do nothing without\ninstruments, without material means. In this character I have\nwritten the present work, which consequently contains nothing else\nthan the principle of a new philosophy verified practically, i.e.,\nin concreto, in application to a special object, but an object which\nhas a universal significance: namely, to religion, in which this\nprinciple is exhibited, developed, and thoroughly carried out. This\nphilosophy is essentially distinguished from the systems hitherto\nprevalent, in that it corresponds to the real, complete nature of\nman; but for that very reason it is antagonistic to minds perverted\nand crippled by a superhuman, i.e., anti-human, anti-natural religion\nand speculation. It does not, as I have already said elsewhere, regard\nthe pen as the only fit organ for the revelation of truth, but the eye\nand ear, the hand and foot; it does not identify the idea of the fact\nwith the fact itself, so as to reduce real existence to an existence\non paper, but it separates the two, and precisely by this separation\nattains to the fact itself; it recognises as the true thing, not the\nthing as it is an object of the abstract reason, but as it is an object\nof the real, complete man, and hence as it is itself a real, complete\nthing. This philosophy does not rest on an Understanding per se, on\nan absolute, nameless understanding, belonging one knows not to whom,\nbut on the understanding of man;--though not, I grant, on that of\nman enervated by speculation and dogma;--and it speaks the language\nof men, not an empty, unknown tongue. Yes, both in substance and in\nspeech, it places philosophy in the negation of philosophy, i.e.,\nit declares that alone to be the true philosophy which is converted\nin succum et sanguinem, which is incarnate in Man; and hence it finds\nits highest triumph in the fact that to all dull and pedantic minds,\nwhich place the essence of philosophy in the show of philosophy,\nit appears to be no philosophy at all.\n\nThis philosophy has for its principle, not the Substance\nof Spinoza, not the ego of Kant and Fichte, not the Absolute\nIdentity of Schelling, not the Absolute Mind of Hegel, in short,\nno abstract, merely conceptional being, but a real being, the true\nEns realissimum--man; its principle, therefore, is in the highest\ndegree positive and real. It generates thought from the opposite\nof thought, from Matter, from existence, from the senses; it has\nrelation to its object first through the senses, i.e., passively,\nbefore defining it in thought. Hence my work, as a specimen of\nthis philosophy, so far from being a production to be placed in the\ncategory of Speculation,--although in another point of view it is the\ntrue, the incarnate result of prior philosophical systems,--is the\ndirect opposite of speculation, nay, puts an end to it by explaining\nit. Speculation makes religion say only what it has itself thought,\nand expressed far better than religion; it assigns a meaning to\nreligion without any reference to the actual meaning of religion; it\ndoes not look beyond itself. I, on the contrary, let religion itself\nspeak; I constitute myself only its listener and interpreter, not its\nprompter. Not to invent, but to discover, \"to unveil existence,\" has\nbeen my sole object; to see correctly, my sole endeavour. It is not I,\nbut religion that worships man, although religion, or rather theology,\ndenies this; it is not I, an insignificant individual, but religion\nitself that says: God is man, man is God; it is not I, but religion\nthat denies the God who is not man, but only an ens rationis,--since it\nmakes God become man, and then constitutes this God, not distinguished\nfrom man, having a human form, human feelings, and human thoughts,\nthe object of its worship and veneration. I have only found the key to\nthe cipher of the Christian religion, only extricated its true meaning\nfrom the web of contradictions and delusions called theology;--but\nin doing so I have certainly committed a sacrilege. If therefore\nmy work is negative, irreligious, atheistic, let it be remembered\nthat atheism--at least in the sense of this work--is the secret of\nreligion itself; that religion itself, not indeed on the surface, but\nfundamentally, not in intention or according to its own supposition,\nbut in its heart, in its essence, believes in nothing else than\nthe truth and divinity of human nature. Or let it be proved that the\nhistorical as well as the rational arguments of my work are false; let\nthem be refuted--not, however, I entreat, by judicial denunciations,\nor theological jeremiads, by the trite phrases of speculation, or\nother pitiful expedients for which I have no name, but by reasons,\nand such reasons as I have not already thoroughly answered.\n\nCertainly, my work is negative, destructive; but, be it observed,\nonly in relation to the unhuman, not to the human elements of\nreligion. It is therefore divided into two parts, of which the\nfirst is, as to its main idea, positive, the second, including the\nAppendix, not wholly, but in the main, negative; in both, however,\nthe same positions are proved, only in a different or rather opposite\nmanner. The first exhibits religion in its essence, its truth, the\nsecond exhibits it in its contradictions; the first is development,\nthe second polemic; thus the one is, according to the nature of the\ncase, calmer, the other more vehement. Development advances gently,\ncontest impetuously; for development is self-contented at every\nstage, contest only at the last blow. Development is deliberate, but\ncontest resolute. Development is light, contest fire. Hence results a\ndifference between the two parts even as to their form. Thus in the\nfirst part I show that the true sense of Theology is Anthropology,\nthat there is no distinction between the predicates of the divine and\nhuman nature, and, consequently, no distinction between the divine and\nhuman subject: I say consequently, for wherever, as is especially the\ncase in theology, the predicates are not accidents, but express the\nessence of the subject, there is no distinction between subject and\npredicate, the one can be put in the place of the other; on which point\nI refer the reader to the Analytics of Aristotle, or even merely to\nthe Introduction of Porphyry. In the second part, on the other hand,\nI show that the distinction which is made, or rather supposed to be\nmade, between the theological and anthropological predicates resolves\nitself into an absurdity. Here is a striking example. In the first part\nI prove that the Son of God is in religion a real son, the son of God\nin the same sense in which man is the son of man, and I find therein\nthe truth, the essence of religion, that it conceives and affirms a\nprofoundly human relation as a divine relation; on the other hand,\nin the second part I show that the Son of God--not indeed in religion,\nbut in theology, which is the reflection of religion upon itself,--is\nnot a son in the natural, human sense, but in an entirely different\nmanner, contradictory to Nature and reason, and therefore absurd, and\nI find in this negation of human sense and the human understanding,\nthe negation of religion. Accordingly the first part is the direct,\nthe second the indirect proof, that theology is anthropology: hence\nthe second part necessarily has reference to the first; it has no\nindependent significance; its only aim is to show that the sense in\nwhich religion is interpreted in the previous part of the work must be\nthe true one, because the contrary is absurd. In brief, in the first\npart I am chiefly concerned with religion, in the second with theology:\nI say chiefly, for it was impossible to exclude theology from the first\npart, or religion from the second. A mere glance will show that my\ninvestigation includes speculative theology or philosophy, and not,\nas has been here and there erroneously supposed, common theology\nonly, a kind of trash from which I rather keep as clear as possible,\n(though, for the rest, I am sufficiently well acquainted with it),\nconfining myself always to the most essential, strict and necessary\ndefinition of the object, [2] and hence to that definition which\ngives to an object the most general interest, and raises it above\nthe sphere of theology. But it is with theology that I have to do,\nnot with theologians; for I can only undertake to characterise what\nis primary,--the original, not the copy, principles, not persons,\nspecies, not individuals, objects of history, not objects of the\nchronique scandaleuse.\n\nIf my work contained only the second part, it would be perfectly just\nto accuse it of a negative tendency, to represent the proposition:\nReligion is nothing, is an absurdity, as its essential purport. But I\nby no means say (that were an easy task!): God is nothing, the Trinity\nis nothing, the Word of God is nothing, &c. I only show that they are\nnot that which the illusions of theology make them,--not foreign, but\nnative mysteries, the mysteries of human nature; I show that religion\ntakes the apparent, the superficial in Nature and humanity for the\nessential, and hence conceives their true essence as a separate,\nspecial existence: that consequently, religion, in the definitions\nwhich it gives of God, e.g., of the Word of God,--at least in those\ndefinitions which are not negative in the sense above alluded to,--only\ndefines or makes objective the true nature of the human word. The\nreproach that according to my book religion is an absurdity, a nullity,\na pure illusion, would be well founded only if, according to it, that\ninto which I resolve religion, which I prove to be its true object and\nsubstance, namely, man,--anthropology, were an absurdity, a nullity,\na pure illusion. But so far from giving a trivial or even a subordinate\nsignificance to anthropology,--a significance which is assigned to\nit only just so long as a theology stands above it and in opposition\nto it,--I, on the contrary, while reducing theology to anthropology,\nexalt anthropology into theology, very much as Christianity, while\nlowering God into man, made man into God; though, it is true, this\nhuman God was by a further process made a transcendental, imaginary\nGod, remote from man. Hence it is obvious that I do not take the word\nanthropology in the sense of the Hegelian or of any other philosophy,\nbut in an infinitely higher and more general sense.\n\nReligion is the dream of the human mind. But even in dreams we do not\nfind ourselves in emptiness or in heaven, but on earth, in the realm\nof reality; we only see real things in the entrancing splendour of\nimagination and caprice, instead of in the simple daylight of reality\nand necessity. Hence I do nothing more to religion--and to speculative\nphilosophy and theology also--than to open its eyes, or rather to turn\nits gaze from the internal towards the external, i.e., I change the\nobject as it is in the imagination into the object as it is in reality.\n\nBut certainly for the present age, which prefers the sign to the thing\nsignified, the copy to the original, fancy to reality, the appearance\nto the essence, this change, inasmuch as it does away with illusion,\nis an absolute annihilation, or at least a reckless profanation;\nfor in these days illusion only is sacred, truth profane. Nay,\nsacredness is held to be enhanced in proportion as truth decreases\nand illusion increases, so that the highest degree of illusion comes\nto be the highest degree of sacredness. Religion has disappeared, and\nfor it has been substituted, even among Protestants, the appearance\nof religion--the Church--in order at least that \"the faith\" may\nbe imparted to the ignorant and indiscriminating multitude; that\nfaith being still the Christian, because the Christian churches\nstand now as they did a thousand years ago, and now, as formerly,\nthe external signs of the faith are in vogue. That which has no\nlonger any existence in faith (the faith of the modern world is only\nan ostensible faith, a faith which does not believe what it fancies\nthat it believes, and is only an undecided, pusillanimous unbelief)\nis still to pass current as opinion: that which is no longer sacred\nin itself and in truth is still at least to seem sacred. Hence the\nsimulated religious indignation of the present age, the age of shows\nand illusion, concerning my analysis, especially of the Sacraments. But\nlet it not be demanded of an author who proposes to himself as his\ngoal not the favour of his contemporaries, but only the truth, the\nunveiled, naked truth, that he should have or feign respect towards\nan empty appearance, especially as the object which underlies this\nappearance is in itself the culminating point of religion, i.e.,\nthe point at which the religious slides into the irreligious. Thus\nmuch in justification, not in excuse, of my analysis of the Sacraments.\n\nWith regard to the true bearing of my analysis of the Sacraments,\nespecially as presented in the concluding chapter, I only remark,\nthat I therein illustrate by a palpable and visible example the\nessential purport, the peculiar theme of my work; that I therein call\nupon the senses themselves to witness to the truth of my analysis\nand my ideas, and demonstrate ad oculos, ad tactum, ad gustum, what\nI have taught ad captum throughout the previous pages. As, namely,\nthe water of Baptism, the wine and bread of the Lord's Supper, taken\nin their natural power and significance, are and effect infinitely\nmore than in a supernaturalistic, illusory significance; so the\nobject of religion in general, conceived in the sense of this work,\ni.e., the anthropological sense, is infinitely more productive and\nreal, both in theory and practice, than when accepted in the sense\nof theology. For as that which is or is supposed to be imparted in\nthe water, bread, and wine, over and above these natural substances\nthemselves, is something in the imagination only, but in truth, in\nreality, nothing; so also the object of religion in general, the Divine\nessence, in distinction from the essence of Nature and Humanity,--that\nis to say, if its attributes, as understanding, love, &c., are and\nsignify something else than these attributes as they belong to man\nand Nature,--is only something in the imagination, but in truth\nand reality nothing. Therefore--this is the moral of the fable--we\nshould not, as is the case in theology and speculative philosophy,\nmake real beings and things into arbitrary signs, vehicles, symbols,\nor predicates of a distinct, transcendent, absolute, i.e., abstract\nbeing; but we should accept and understand them in the significance\nwhich they have in themselves, which is identical with their qualities,\nwith those conditions which make them what they are:--thus only do we\nobtain the key to a real theory and practice. I, in fact, put in the\nplace of the barren baptismal water, the beneficent effect of real\nwater. How \"watery,\" how trivial! Yes, indeed, very trivial. But\nso Marriage, in its time, was a very trivial truth, which Luther,\non the ground of his natural good sense, maintained in opposition to\nthe seemingly holy illusion of celibacy. But while I thus view water\nas a real thing, I at the same time intend it as a vehicle, an image,\nan example, a symbol, of the \"unholy\" spirit of my work, just as the\nwater of Baptism--the object of my analysis--is at once literal and\nsymbolical water. It is the same with bread and wine. Malignity has\nhence drawn the conclusion that bathing, eating, and drinking are the\nsumma summarum, the positive result of my work. I make no other reply\nthan this: If the whole of religion is contained in the Sacraments,\nand there are consequently no other religious acts than those which\nare performed in Baptism and the Lord's Supper; then I grant that the\nentire purport and positive result of my work are bathing, eating,\nand drinking, since this work is nothing but a faithful, rigid,\nhistorico-philosophical analysis of religion--the revelation of\nreligion to itself, the awakening of religion to self-consciousness.\n\nI say an historico-philosophical analysis, in distinction from a merely\nhistorical analysis of Christianity. The historical critic--such\na one, for example, as Daumer or Ghillany--shows that the Lord's\nSupper is a rite lineally descended from the ancient cultus of human\nsacrifice; that once, instead of bread and wine, real human flesh\nand blood were partaken. I, on the contrary, take as the object of my\nanalysis and reduction only the Christian significance of the rite,\nthat view of it which is sanctioned Christianity, and I proceed\non the supposition that only that significance which a dogma or\ninstitution has in Christianity (of course in ancient Christianity,\nnot in modern), whether it may present itself in other religions\nor not, is also the true origin of that dogma or institution in\nso far as it is Christian. Again, the historical critic, as, for\nexample, L\u00fctzelberger, shows that the narratives of the miracles\nof Christ resolve themselves into contradictions and absurdities,\nthat they are later fabrications, and that consequently Christ was\nno miracle-worker, nor, in general, that which he is represented\nto be in the Bible. I, on the other hand, do not inquire what the\nreal, natural Christ was or may have been in distinction from what\nhe has been made or has become in Supernaturalism; on the contrary,\nI accept the Christ of religion, but I show that this superhuman being\nis nothing else than a product and reflex of the supernatural human\nmind. I do not ask whether this or that, or any miracle can happen\nor not; I only show what miracle is, and I show it not \u00e0 priori,\nbut by examples of miracles narrated in the Bible as real events;\nin doing so, however, I answer or rather preclude the question as\nto the possibility or reality of necessity of miracle. Thus much\nconcerning the distinction between me and the historical critics\nwho have attacked Christianity. As regards my relation to Strauss\nand Bruno Bauer, in company with whom I am constantly named, I\nmerely point out here that the distinction between our works is\nsufficiently indicated by the distinction between their objects,\nwhich is implied even in the title-page. Bauer takes for the object\nof his criticism the evangelical history, i.e., biblical Christianity,\nor rather biblical theology; Strauss, the System of Christian Doctrine\nand the Life of Jesus (which may also be included under the title of\nChristian Doctrine), i.e., dogmatic Christianity, or rather dogmatic\ntheology; I, Christianity in general, i.e., the Christian religion,\nand consequently only Christian philosophy or theology. Hence I take\nmy citations chiefly from men in whom Christianity was not merely a\ntheory or a dogma, not merely theology, but religion. My principal\ntheme is Christianity, is Religion, as it is the immediate object,\nthe immediate nature, of man. Erudition and philosophy are to me only\nthe means by which I bring to light the treasure hid in man.\n\nI must further mention that the circulation which my work has had\namongst the public at large was neither desired nor expected by\nme. It is true that I have always taken as the standard of the mode\nof teaching and writing, not the abstract, particular, professional\nphilosopher, but universal man, that I have regarded man as the\ncriterion of truth, and not this or that founder of a system, and\nhave from the first placed the highest excellence of the philosopher\nin this, that he abstains, both as a man and as an author, from the\nostentation of philosophy, i.e., that he is a philosopher only in\nreality, not formally, that he is a quiet philosopher, not a loud\nand still less a brawling one. Hence, in all my works, as well as\nin the present one, I have made the utmost clearness, simplicity,\nand definiteness a law to myself, so that they may be understood,\nat least in the main, by every cultivated and thinking man. But\nnotwithstanding this, my work can be appreciated and fully understood\nonly by the scholar, that is to say, by the scholar who loves truth,\nwho is capable of forming a judgment, who is above the notions\nand prejudices of the learned and unlearned vulgar; for although a\nthoroughly independent production, it has yet its necessary logical\nbasis in history. I very frequently refer to this or that historical\nphenomenon without expressly designating it, thinking this superfluous;\nand such references can be understood by the scholar alone. Thus,\nfor example, in the very first chapter, where I develop the necessary\nconsequences of the standpoint of Feeling, I allude to Jacobi and\nSchleiermacher; in the second chapter I allude chiefly to Kantism,\nScepticism, Theism, Materialism and Pantheism; in the chapter on the\n\"Standpoint of Religion,\" where I discuss the contradictions between\nthe religious or theological and the physical or natural-philosophical\nview of Nature, I refer to philosophy in the age of orthodoxy, and\nespecially to the philosophy of Descartes and Leibnitz, in which\nthis contradiction presents itself in a peculiarly characteristic\nmanner. The reader, therefore, who is unacquainted with the historical\nfacts and ideas presupposed in my work, will fail to perceive on what\nmy arguments and ideas hinge; no wonder if my positions often appear\nto him baseless, however firm the footing on which they stand. It\nis true that the subject of my work is of universal human interest;\nmoreover, its fundamental ideas, though not in the form in which they\nare here expressed, or in which they could be expressed under existing\ncircumstances, will one day become the common property of mankind:\nfor nothing is opposed to them in the present day but empty, powerless\nillusions and prejudices in contradiction with the true nature of\nman. But in considering this subject in the first instance, I was under\nthe necessity of treating it as a matter of science, of philosophy; and\nin rectifying the aberrations of Religion, Theology, and Speculation,\nI was naturally obliged to use their expressions, and even to appear\nto speculate, or--which is the same thing--to turn theologian myself,\nwhile I nevertheless only analyse speculation, i.e., reduce theology\nto anthropology. My work, as I said before, contains, and applies in\nthe concrete, the principle of a new philosophy suited--not to the\nschools, but--to man. Yes, it contains that principle, but only by\nevolving it out of the very core of religion; hence, be it said in\npassing, the new philosophy can no longer, like the old Catholic and\nmodern Protestant scholasticism, fall into the temptation to prove\nits agreement with religion by its agreement with Christian dogmas;\non the contrary, being evolved from the nature of religion, it has\nin itself the true essence of religion,--is, in its very quality as\na philosophy, a religion also. But a work which considers ideas in\ntheir genesis and explains and demonstrates them in strict sequence,\nis, by the very form which this purpose imposes upon it, unsuited to\npopular reading.\n\nLastly, as a supplement to this work with regard to many\napparently unvindicated positions, I refer to my articles in the\nDeutsches Jahrbuch, January and February 1842, to my critiques\nand Charakteristiken des modernen After-christenthums, in previous\nnumbers of the same periodical, and to my earlier works, especially the\nfollowing:--P. Bayle. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie und\nMenschheit, Ausbach, 1838, and Philosophie und Christenthum, Mannheim,\n1839. In these works I have sketched, with a few sharp touches, the\nhistorical solution of Christianity, and have shown that Christianity\nhas in fact long vanished, not only from the reason but from the life\nof mankind, that it is nothing more than a fixed idea, in flagrant\ncontradiction with our fire and life assurance companies, our railroads\nand steam-carriages, our picture and sculpture galleries, our military\nand industrial schools, our theatres and scientific museums.\n\n\nLUDWIG FEUERBACH.\n\nBruckberg, Feb. 14, 1843.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\nCHAPTER PAGE\n\n I. \u00a7 1. The Essential Nature of Man 1\n \u00a7 2. The Essence of Religion Considered Generally 12\n\n\nPart I.\n\nTHE TRUE OR ANTHROPOLOGICAL ESSENCE OF RELIGION.\n\n II. God as a Being of the Understanding 33\n III. God as a Moral Being or Law 44\n IV. The Mystery of the Incarnation; or, God as Love,\n as a Being of the Heart 50\n V. The Mystery of the Suffering God 59\n VI. The Mystery of the Trinity and the Mother of God 65\n VII. The Mystery of the Logos and Divine Image 74\n VIII. The Mystery of the Cosmogonical Principle in God 80\n IX. The Mystery of Mysticism, or of Nature in God 87\n X. The Mystery of Providence and Creation out of\n Nothing 101\n XI. The Significance of the Creation in Judaism 112\n XII. The Omnipotence of Feeling, or the Mystery of\n Prayer 120\n XIII. The Mystery of Faith--The Mystery of Miracle 126\n XIV. The Mystery of the Resurrection and of the\n Miraculous Conception 135\n XV. The Mystery of the Christian Christ, or the\n Personal God 140\n XVI. The Distinction between Christianity and Heathenism 150\n XVII. The Significance of Voluntary Celibacy and\n Monachism 160\n XVIII. The Christian Heaven, or Personal Immortality 170\n\n\nPart II.\n\nTHE FALSE OR THEOLOGICAL ESSENCE OF RELIGION.\n\n XIX. The Essential Standpoint of Religion 185\n XX. The Contradiction in the Existence of God 197\n XXI. The Contradiction in the Revelation of God 204\n XXII. The Contradiction in the Nature of God in General 213\n XXIII. The Contradiction in the Speculative Doctrine of\n God 226\n XXIV. The Contradiction in the Trinity 232\n XXV. The Contradiction in the Sacraments 236\n XXVI. The Contradiction of Faith and Love 247\n XXVII. Concluding Application 270\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\nSECTION\n\n 1. The Religious Emotions Purely Human 281\n 2. God is Feeling Released from Limits 283\n 3. God is the Highest Feeling of Self 284\n 4. Distinction between the Pantheistic and Personal God 285\n 5. Nature without Interest for Christians 287\n 6. In God Man is his Own Object 289\n 7. Christianity the Religion of Suffering 292\n 8. Mystery of the Trinity 293\n 9. Creation out of Nothing 297\n 10. Egoism of the Israelitish Religion 298\n 11. The Idea of Providence 299\n 12. Contradiction of Faith and Reason 304\n 13. The Resurrection of Christ 306\n 14. The Christian a Supermundane Being 307\n 15. The Celibate and Monachism 308\n 16. The Christian Heaven 315\n 17. What Faith Denies on Earth it Affirms in Heaven 316\n 18. Contradictions in the Sacraments 317\n 19. Contradiction of Faith and Love 320\n 20. Results of the Principle of Faith 326\n 21. Contradiction of the God-Man 332\n 22. Anthropology the Mystery of Theology 336\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTHE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY.\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. The Essential Nature of Man.\n\nReligion has its basis in the essential difference between man and\nthe brute--the brutes have no religion. It is true that the old\nuncritical writers on natural history attributed to the elephant,\namong other laudable qualities, the virtue of religiousness; but\nthe religion of elephants belongs to the realm of fable. Cuvier,\none of the greatest authorities on the animal kingdom, assigns,\non the strength of his personal observations, no higher grade of\nintelligence to the elephant than to the dog.\n\nBut what is this essential difference between man and the brute? The\nmost simple, general, and also the most popular answer to this\nquestion is--consciousness:--but consciousness in the strict sense;\nfor the consciousness implied in the feeling of self as an individual,\nin discrimination by the senses, in the perception and even judgment\nof outward things according to definite sensible signs, cannot\nbe denied to the brutes. Consciousness in the strictest sense is\npresent only in a being to whom his species, his essential nature,\nis an object of thought. The brute is indeed conscious of himself\nas an individual--and he has accordingly the feeling of self as the\ncommon centre of successive sensations--but not as a species: hence,\nhe is without that consciousness which in its nature, as in its name,\nis akin to science. Where there is this higher consciousness there\nis a capability of science. Science is the cognisance of species. In\npractical life we have to do with individuals; in science, with\nspecies. But only a being to whom his own species, his own nature,\nis an object of thought, can make the essential nature of other things\nor beings an object of thought.\n\nHence the brute has only a simple, man a twofold life: in the brute,\nthe inner life is one with the outer; man has both an inner and an\nouter life. The inner life of man is the life which has relation to\nhis species, to his general, as distinguished from his individual,\nnature. Man thinks--that is, he converses with himself. The brute can\nexercise no function which has relation to its species without another\nindividual external to itself; but man can perform the functions\nof thought and speech, which strictly imply such a relation, apart\nfrom another individual. Man is himself at once I and thou; he can\nput himself in the place of another, for this reason, that to him\nhis species, his essential nature, and not merely his individuality,\nis an object of thought.\n\nReligion being identical with the distinctive characteristic of man,\nis then identical with self-consciousness--with the consciousness\nwhich man has of his nature. But religion, expressed generally,\nis consciousness of the infinite; thus it is and can be nothing\nelse than the consciousness which man has of his own--not finite\nand limited, but infinite nature. A really finite being has not\neven the faintest adumbration, still less consciousness, of an\ninfinite being, for the limit of the nature is also the limit of the\nconsciousness. The consciousness of the caterpillar, whose life is\nconfined to a particular species of plant, does not extend itself\nbeyond this narrow domain. It does, indeed, discriminate between\nthis plant and other plants, but more it knows not. A consciousness\nso limited, but on account of that very limitation so infallible,\nwe do not call consciousness, but instinct. Consciousness, in\nthe strict or proper sense, is identical with consciousness of the\ninfinite; a limited consciousness is no consciousness; consciousness\nis essentially infinite in its nature. [3] The consciousness of the\ninfinite is nothing else than the consciousness of the infinity of\nthe consciousness; or, in the consciousness of the infinite, the\nconscious subject has for his object the infinity of his own nature.\n\nWhat, then, is the nature of man, of which he is conscious, or what\nconstitutes the specific distinction, the proper humanity of man? [4]\nReason, Will, Affection. To a complete man belong the power of thought,\nthe power of will, the power of affection. The power of thought is\nthe light of the intellect, the power of will is energy of character,\nthe power of affection is love. Reason, love, force of will, are\nperfections--the perfections of the human being--nay, more, they are\nabsolute perfections of being. To will, to love, to think, are the\nhighest powers, are the absolute nature of man as man, and the basis of\nhis existence. Man exists to think, to love, to will. Now that which\nis the end, the ultimate aim, is also the true basis and principle of\na being. But what is the end of reason? Reason. Of love? Love. Of\nwill? Freedom of the will. We think for the sake of thinking;\nlove for the sake of loving; will for the sake of willing--i.e.,\nthat we may be free. True existence is thinking, loving, willing\nexistence. That alone is true, perfect, divine, which exists for its\nown sake. But such is love, such is reason, such is will. The divine\ntrinity in man, above the individual man, is the unity of reason,\nlove, will. Reason, Will, Love, are not powers which man possesses,\nfor he is nothing without them, he is what he is only by them; they\nare the constituent elements of his nature, which he neither has\nnor makes, the animating, determining, governing powers--divine,\nabsolute powers--to which he can oppose no resistance. [5]\n\nHow can the feeling man resist feeling, the loving one love,\nthe rational one reason? Who has not experienced the overwhelming\npower of melody? And what else is the power of melody but the power\nof feeling? Music is the language of feeling; melody is audible\nfeeling--feeling communicating itself. Who has not experienced the\npower of love, or at least heard of it? Which is the stronger--love\nor the individual man? Is it man that possesses love, or is it not\nmuch rather love that possesses man? When love impels a man to suffer\ndeath even joyfully for the beloved one, is this death-conquering power\nhis own individual power, or is it not rather the power of love? And\nwho that ever truly thought has not experienced that quiet, subtle\npower--the power of thought? When thou sinkest into deep reflection,\nforgetting thyself and what is around thee, dost thou govern reason,\nor is it not reason which governs and absorbs thee? Scientific\nenthusiasm--is it not the most glorious triumph of intellect over\nthee? The desire of knowledge--is it not a simply irresistible, and\nall-conquering power? And when thou suppressest a passion, renouncest a\nhabit, in short, achievest a victory over thyself, is this victorious\npower thy own personal power, or is it not rather the energy of will,\nthe force of morality, which seizes the mastery of thee, and fills\nthee with indignation against thyself and thy individual weaknesses?\n\nMan is nothing without an object. The great models of humanity,\nsuch men as reveal to us what man is capable of, have attested the\ntruth of this proposition by their lives. They had only one dominant\npassion--the realisation of the aim which was the essential object\nof their activity. But the object to which a subject essentially,\nnecessarily relates, is nothing else than this subject's own, but\nobjective, nature. If it be an object common to several individuals of\nthe same species, but under various conditions, it is still, at least\nas to the form under which it presents itself to each of them according\nto their respective modifications, their own, but objective, nature.\n\nThus the Sun is the common object of the planets, but it is an object\nto Mercury, to Venus, to Saturn, to Uranus, under other conditions\nthan to the Earth. Each planet has its own sun. The Sun which lights\nand warms Uranus has no physical (only an astronomical, scientific)\nexistence for the Earth; and not only does the Sun appear different,\nbut it really is another sun on Uranus than on the Earth. The relation\nof the Sun to the Earth is therefore at the same time a relation of\nthe Earth to itself, or to its own nature, for the measure of the\nsize and of the intensity of light which the Sun possesses as the\nobject of the Earth is the measure of the distance which determines\nthe peculiar nature of the Earth. Hence each planet has in its sun\nthe mirror of its own nature.\n\nIn the object which he contemplates, therefore, man becomes\nacquainted with himself; consciousness of the objective is the\nself-consciousness of man. We know the man by the object, by his\nconception of what is external to himself; in it his nature becomes\nevident; this object is his manifested nature, his true objective\nego. And this is true not merely of spiritual, but also of sensuous\nobjects. Even the objects which are the most remote from man, because\nthey are objects to him, and to the extent to which they are so,\nare revelations of human nature. Even the moon, the sun, the stars,\ncall to man Gnothi seauton. That he sees them, and so sees them,\nis an evidence of his own nature. The animal is sensible only of the\nbeam which immediately affects life; while man perceives the ray,\nto him physically indifferent, of the remotest star. Man alone has\npurely intellectual, disinterested joys and passions; the eye of man\nalone keeps theoretic festivals. The eye which looks into the starry\nheavens, which gazes at that light, alike useless and harmless, having\nnothing in common with the earth and its necessities--this eye sees\nin that light its own nature, its own origin. The eye is heavenly in\nits nature. Hence man elevates himself above the earth only with the\neye; hence theory begins with the contemplation of the heavens. The\nfirst philosophers were astronomers. It is the heavens that admonish\nman of his destination, and remind him that he is destined not merely\nto action, but also to contemplation.\n\nThe absolute to man is his own nature. The power of the object over\nhim is therefore the power of his own nature. Thus the power of the\nobject of feeling is the power of feeling itself; the power of the\nobject of the intellect is the power of the intellect itself; the\npower of the object of the will is the power of the will itself. The\nman who is affected by musical sounds is governed by feeling; by the\nfeeling, that is, which finds its corresponding element in musical\nsounds. But it is not melody as such, it is only melody pregnant\nwith meaning and emotion, which has power over feeling. Feeling\nis only acted on by that which conveys feeling, i.e., by itself,\nits own nature. Thus also the will; thus, and infinitely more, the\nintellect. Whatever kind of object, therefore, we are at any time\nconscious of, we are always at the same time conscious of our own\nnature; we can affirm nothing without affirming ourselves. And since\nto will, to feel, to think, are perfections, essences, realities,\nit is impossible that intellect, feeling, and will should feel or\nperceive themselves as limited, finite powers, i.e., as worthless, as\nnothing. For finiteness and nothingness are identical; finiteness is\nonly a euphemism for nothingness. Finiteness is the metaphysical, the\ntheoretical--nothingness the pathological, practical expression. What\nis finite to the understanding is nothing to the heart. But it is\nimpossible that we should be conscious of will, feeling, and intellect,\nas finite powers, because every perfect existence, every original\npower and essence, is the immediate verification and affirmation of\nitself. It is impossible to love, will, or think, without perceiving\nthese activities to be perfections--impossible to feel that one is\na loving, willing, thinking being, without experiencing an infinite\njoy therein. Consciousness consists in a being becoming objective\nto itself; hence it is nothing apart, nothing distinct from the\nbeing which is conscious of itself. How could it otherwise become\nconscious of itself? It is therefore impossible to be conscious of\na perfection as an imperfection, impossible to feel feeling limited,\nto think thought limited.\n\nConsciousness is self-verification, self-affirmation, self-love, joy\nin one's own perfection. Consciousness is the characteristic mark\nof a perfect nature; it exists only in a self-sufficing, complete\nbeing. Even human vanity attests this truth. A man looks in the glass;\nhe has complacency in his appearance. This complacency is a necessary,\ninvoluntary consequence of the completeness, the beauty of his form. A\nbeautiful form is satisfied in itself; it has necessarily joy in\nitself--in self-contemplation. This complacency becomes vanity only\nwhen a man piques himself on his form as being his individual form,\nnot when he admires it as a specimen of human beauty in general. It\nis fitting that he should admire it thus: he can conceive no form more\nbeautiful, more sublime than the human. [6] Assuredly every being loves\nitself, its existence--and fitly so. To exist is a good. Quidquid\nessentia dignum est, scientia dignum est. Everything that exists\nhas value, is a being of distinction--at least this is true of the\nspecies: hence it asserts, maintains itself. But the highest form of\nself-assertion, the form which is itself a superiority, a perfection,\na bliss, a good, is consciousness.\n\nEvery limitation of the reason, or in general of the nature of man,\nrests on a delusion, an error. It is true that the human being,\nas an individual, can and must--herein consists his distinction\nfrom the brute--feel and recognise himself to be limited; but he\ncan become conscious of his limits, his finiteness, only because\nthe perfection, the infinitude of his species, is perceived by him,\nwhether as an object of feeling, of conscience, or of the thinking\nconsciousness. If he makes his own limitations the limitations of\nthe species, this arises from the mistake that he identifies himself\nimmediately with the species--a mistake which is intimately connected\nwith the individual's love of ease, sloth, vanity, and egoism. For\na limitation which I know to be merely mine humiliates, shames, and\nperturbs me. Hence to free myself from this feeling of shame, from this\nstate of dissatisfaction, I convert the limits of my individuality\ninto the limits of human nature in general. What is incomprehensible\nto me is incomprehensible to others; why should I trouble myself\nfurther? It is no fault of mine; my understanding is not to blame,\nbut the understanding of the race. But it is a ludicrous and even\nculpable error to define as finite and limited what constitutes the\nessence of man, the nature of the species, which is the absolute\nnature of the individual. Every being is sufficient to itself. No\nbeing can deny itself, i.e., its own nature; no being is a limited\none to itself. Rather, every being is in and by itself infinite--has\nits God, its highest conceivable being, in itself. Every limit of a\nbeing is cognisable only by another being out of and above him. The\nlife of the ephemera is extraordinarily short in comparison with\nthat of longer-lived creatures; but nevertheless, for the ephemera\nthis short life is as long as a life of years to others. The leaf on\nwhich the caterpillar lives is for it a world, an infinite space.\n\nThat which makes a being what it is, is its talent, its power,\nits wealth, its adornment. How can it possibly hold its existence\nnon-existence, its wealth poverty, its talent incapacity? If the\nplants had eyes, taste, and judgment, each plant would declare its\nown flower the most beautiful; for its comprehension, its taste,\nwould reach no farther than its natural power of production. What\nthe productive power of its nature has brought forth as the highest,\nthat must also its taste, its judgment, recognise and affirm as the\nhighest. What the nature affirms, the understanding, the taste, the\njudgment, cannot deny; otherwise the understanding, the judgment, would\nno longer be the understanding and judgment of this particular being,\nbut of some other. The measure of the nature is also the measure of\nthe understanding. If the nature is limited, so also is the feeling,\nso also is the understanding. But to a limited being its limited\nunderstanding is not felt to be a limitation; on the contrary,\nit is perfectly happy and contented with this understanding; it\nregards it, praises and values it, as a glorious, divine power; and\nthe limited understanding, on its part, values the limited nature\nwhose understanding it is. Each is exactly adapted to the other;\nhow should they be at issue with each other? A being's understanding\nis its sphere of vision. As far as thou seest, so far extends thy\nnature; and conversely. The eye of the brute reaches no farther than\nits needs, and its nature no farther than its needs. And so far as\nthy nature reaches, so far reaches thy unlimited self-consciousness,\nso far art thou God. The discrepancy between the understanding and the\nnature, between the power of conception and the power of production\nin the human consciousness, on the one hand, is merely of individual\nsignificance and has not a universal application; and, on the other\nhand, it is only apparent. He who, having written a bad poem, knows\nit to be bad, is in his intelligence, and therefore in his nature,\nnot so limited as he who, having written a bad poem, admires it and\nthinks it good.\n\nIt follows that if thou thinkest the infinite, thou perceivest and\naffirmest the infinitude of the power of thought; if thou feelest the\ninfinite, thou feelest and affirmest the infinitude of the power of\nfeeling. The object of the intellect is intellect objective to itself;\nthe object of feeling is feeling objective to itself. If thou hast no\nsensibility, no feeling for music, thou perceivest in the finest music\nnothing more than in the wind that whistles by thy ear, or than in the\nbrook which rushes past thy feet. What, then, is it which acts on thee\nwhen thou art affected by melody? What dost thou perceive in it? What\nelse than the voice of thy own heart? Feeling speaks only to feeling;\nfeeling is comprehensible only by feeling, that is, by itself--for this\nreason, that the object of feeling is nothing else than feeling. Music\nis a monologue of emotion. But the dialogue of philosophy also is\nin truth only a monologue of the intellect; thought speaks only to\nthought. The splendours of the crystal charm the sense, but the\nintellect is interested only in the laws of crystallisation. The\nintellectual only is the object of the intellect. [7]\n\nAll therefore which, in the point of view of metaphysical,\ntranscendental speculation and religion, has the significance only\nof the secondary, the subjective, the medium, the organ--has in\ntruth the significance of the primary, of the essence, of the object\nitself. If, for example, feeling is the essential organ of religion,\nthe nature of God is nothing else than an expression of the nature\nof feeling. The true but latent sense of the phrase, \"Feeling is the\norgan of the divine,\" is, feeling is the noblest, the most excellent,\ni.e., the divine, in man. How couldst thou perceive the divine by\nfeeling, if feeling were not itself divine in its nature? The divine\nassuredly is known only by means of the divine--God is known only by\nhimself. The divine nature which is discerned by feeling is in truth\nnothing else than feeling enraptured, in ecstasy with itself--feeling\nintoxicated with joy, blissful in its own plenitude.\n\nIt is already clear from this that where feeling is held to be\nthe organ of the infinite, the subjective essence of religion,--the\nexternal data of religion lose their objective value. And thus, since\nfeeling has been held the cardinal principle in religion, the doctrines\nof Christianity, formerly so sacred, have lost their importance. If,\nfrom this point of view, some value is still conceded to Christian\nideas, it is a value springing entirely from the relation they bear to\nfeeling; if another object would excite the same emotions, it would be\njust as welcome. But the object of religious feeling is become a matter\nof indifference, only because when once feeling has been pronounced to\nbe the subjective essence of religion, it in fact is also the objective\nessence of religion, though it may not be declared, at least directly,\nto be such. I say directly; for indirectly this is certainly admitted,\nwhen it is declared that feeling, as such, is religious, and thus\nthe distinction between specifically religious and irreligious, or at\nleast non-religious, feelings is abolished--a necessary consequence\nof the point of view in which feeling only is regarded as the organ\nof the divine. For on what other ground than that of its essence,\nits nature, dost thou hold feeling to be the organ of the infinite,\nthe divine being? And is not the nature of feeling in general also the\nnature of every special feeling, be its object what it may? What, then,\nmakes this feeling religious? A given object? Not at all; for this\nobject is itself a religious one only when it is not an object of the\ncold understanding or memory, but of feeling. What then? The nature of\nfeeling--a nature of which every special feeling, without distinction\nof objects, partakes. Thus, feeling is pronounced to be religious,\nsimply because it is feeling; the ground of its religiousness is its\nown nature--lies in itself. But is not feeling thereby declared to\nbe itself the absolute, the divine? If feeling in itself is good,\nreligious, i.e., holy, divine, has not feeling its God in itself?\n\nBut if, notwithstanding, thou wilt posit an object of feeling,\nbut at the same time seekest to express thy feeling truly, without\nintroducing by thy reflection any foreign element, what remains\nto thee but to distinguish between thy individual feeling and the\ngeneral nature of feeling;--to separate the universal in feeling from\nthe disturbing, adulterating influences with which feeling is bound up\nin thee, under thy individual conditions? Hence what thou canst alone\ncontemplate, declare to be the infinite, and define as its essence,\nis merely the nature of feeling. Thou hast thus no other definition\nof God than this: God is pure, unlimited, free Feeling. Every other\nGod, whom thou supposest, is a God thrust upon thy feeling from\nwithout. Feeling is atheistic in the sense of the orthodox belief,\nwhich attaches religion to an external object; it denies an objective\nGod--it is itself God. In this point of view only the negation of\nfeeling is the negation of God. Thou art simply too cowardly or too\nnarrow to confess in words what thy feeling tacitly affirms. Fettered\nby outward considerations, still in bondage to vulgar empiricism,\nincapable of comprehending the spiritual grandeur of feeling, thou\nart terrified before the religious atheism of thy heart. By this fear\nthou destroyest the unity of thy feeling with itself, in imagining\nto thyself an objective being distinct from thy feeling, and thus\nnecessarily sinking back into the old questions and doubts--is there a\nGod or not?--questions and doubts which vanish, nay, are impossible,\nwhere feeling is defined as the essence of religion. Feeling is thy\nown inward power, but at the same time a power distinct from thee,\nand independent of thee; it is in thee, above thee; it is itself\nthat which constitutes the objective in thee--thy own being which\nimpresses thee as another being; in short, thy God. How wilt thou,\nthen, distinguish from this objective being within thee another\nobjective being? How wilt thou get beyond thy feeling?\n\nBut feeling has here been adduced only as an example. It is\nthe same with every other power, faculty, potentiality, reality,\nactivity--the name is indifferent--which is defined as the essential\norgan of any object. Whatever is a subjective expression of a nature\nis simultaneously also its objective expression. Man cannot get\nbeyond his true nature. He may indeed by means of the imagination\nconceive individuals of another so-called higher kind, but he can\nnever get loose from his species, his nature; the conditions of\nbeing, the positive final predicates which he gives to these other\nindividuals, are always determinations or qualities drawn from his\nown nature--qualities in which he in truth only images and projects\nhimself. There may certainly be thinking beings besides men on the\nother planets of our solar system. But by the supposition of such\nbeings we do not change our standing point--we extend our conceptions\nquantitatively not qualitatively. For as surely as on the other planets\nthere are the same laws of motion, so surely are there the same laws of\nperception and thought as here. In fact, we people the other planets,\nnot that we may place there different beings from ourselves, but more\nbeings of our own or of a similar nature. [8]\n\n\n\n\u00a7 2. The Essence of Religion Considered Generally.\n\nWhat we have hitherto been maintaining generally, even with regard\nto sensational impressions, of the relation between subject and\nobject, applies especially to the relation between the subject and\nthe religious object.\n\nIn the perceptions of the senses consciousness of the object\nis distinguishable from consciousness of self; but in religion,\nconsciousness of the object and self-consciousness coincide. The\nobject of the senses is out of man, the religious object is within\nhim, and therefore as little forsakes him as his self-consciousness\nor his conscience; it is the intimate, the closest object. \"God,\" says\nAugustine, for example, \"is nearer, more related to us, and therefore\nmore easily known by us, than sensible, corporeal things.\" [9]\nThe object of the senses is in itself indifferent--independent of\nthe disposition or of the judgment; but the object of religion is a\nselected object; the most excellent, the first, the supreme being;\nit essentially presupposes a critical judgment, a discrimination\nbetween the divine and the non-divine, between that which is worthy of\nadoration and that which is not worthy. [10] And here may be applied,\nwithout any limitation, the proposition: the object of any subject is\nnothing else than the subject's own nature taken objectively. Such\nas are a man's thoughts and dispositions, such is his God; so much\nworth as a man has, so much and no more has his God. Consciousness\nof God is self-consciousness, knowledge of God is self-knowledge. By\nhis God thou knowest the man, and by the man his God; the two are\nidentical. Whatever is God to a man, that is his heart and soul; and\nconversely, God is the manifested inward nature, the expressed self\nof a man,--religion the solemn unveiling of a man's hidden treasures,\nthe revelation of his intimate thoughts, the open confession of his\nlove-secrets.\n\nBut when religion--consciousness of God--is designated as the\nself-consciousness of man, this is not to be understood as affirming\nthat the religious man is directly aware of this identity; for, on\nthe contrary, ignorance of it is fundamental to the peculiar nature of\nreligion. To preclude this misconception, it is better to say, religion\nis man's earliest and also indirect form of self-knowledge. Hence,\nreligion everywhere precedes philosophy, as in the history of the\nrace, so also in that of the individual. Man first of all sees his\nnature as if out of himself, before he finds it in himself. His\nown nature is in the first instance contemplated by him as that\nof another being. Religion is the childlike condition of humanity;\nbut the child sees his nature--man--out of himself; in childhood a\nman is an object to himself, under the form of another man. Hence\nthe historical progress of religion consists in this: that what by\nan earlier religion was regarded as objective, is now recognised as\nsubjective; that is, what was formerly contemplated and worshipped as\nGod is now perceived to be something human. What was at first religion\nbecomes at a later period idolatry; man is seen to have adored his own\nnature. Man has given objectivity to himself, but has not recognised\nthe object as his own nature: a later religion takes this forward step;\nevery advance in religion is therefore a deeper self-knowledge. But\nevery particular religion, while it pronounces its predecessors\nidolatrous, excepts itself--and necessarily so, otherwise it would no\nlonger be religion--from the fate, the common nature of all religions:\nit imputes only to other religions what is the fault, if fault it be,\nof religion in general. Because it has a different object, a different\ntenor, because it has transcended the ideas of preceding religions,\nit erroneously supposes itself exalted above the necessary eternal\nlaws which constitute the essence of religion--it fancies its object,\nits ideas, to be superhuman. But the essence of religion, thus hidden\nfrom the religious, is evident to the thinker, by whom religion is\nviewed objectively, which it cannot be by its votaries. And it is our\ntask to show that the antithesis of divine and human is altogether\nillusory, that it is nothing else than the antithesis between the\nhuman nature in general and the human individual; that, consequently,\nthe object and contents of the Christian religion are altogether human.\n\nReligion, at least the Christian, is the relation of man to himself,\nor more correctly to his own nature (i.e., his subjective nature);\n[11] but a relation to it, viewed as a nature apart from his own. The\ndivine being is nothing else than the human being, or, rather, the\nhuman nature purified, freed from the limits of the individual man,\nmade objective--i.e., contemplated and revered as another, a distinct\nbeing. All the attributes of the divine nature are, therefore,\nattributes of the human nature. [12]\n\nIn relation to the attributes, the predicates, of the Divine Being,\nthis is admitted without hesitation, but by no means in relation\nto the subject of these predicates. The negation of the subject is\nheld to be irreligion, nay, atheism; though not so the negation of\nthe predicates. But that which has no predicates or qualities, has no\neffect upon me; that which has no effect upon me has no existence for\nme. To deny all the qualities of a being is equivalent to denying the\nbeing himself. A being without qualities is one which cannot become an\nobject to the mind, and such a being is virtually non-existent. Where\nman deprives God of all qualities, God is no longer anything more\nto him than a negative being. To the truly religious man, God is\nnot a being without qualities, because to him he is a positive,\nreal being. The theory that God cannot be defined, and consequently\ncannot be known by man, is therefore the offspring of recent times,\na product of modern unbelief.\n\nAs reason is and can be pronounced finite only where man regards\nsensual enjoyment, or religious emotion, or \u00e6sthetic contemplation,\nor moral sentiment, as the absolute, the true; so the proposition that\nGod is unknowable or undefinable, can only be enunciated and become\nfixed as a dogma, where this object has no longer any interest for the\nintellect; where the real, the positive, alone has any hold on man,\nwhere the real alone has for him the significance of the essential,\nof the absolute, divine object, but where at the same time, in\ncontradiction with this purely worldly tendency, there yet exist some\nold remains of religiousness. On the ground that God is unknowable, man\nexcuses himself to what is yet remaining of his religious conscience\nfor his forgetfulness of God, his absorption in the world: he denies\nGod practically by his conduct,--the world has possession of all his\nthoughts and inclinations,--but he does not deny him theoretically, he\ndoes not attack his existence; he lets that rest. But this existence\ndoes not affect or incommode him; it is a merely negative existence,\nan existence without existence, a self-contradictory existence,--a\nstate of being which, as to its effects, is not distinguishable from\nnon-being. The denial of determinate, positive predicates concerning\nthe divine nature is nothing else than a denial of religion, with,\nhowever, an appearance of religion in its favour, so that it is not\nrecognised as a denial; it is simply a subtle, disguised atheism. The\nalleged religious horror of limiting God by positive predicates is\nonly the irreligious wish to know nothing more of God, to banish God\nfrom the mind. Dread of limitation is dread of existence. All real\nexistence, i.e., all existence which is truly such, is qualitative,\ndeterminative existence. He who earnestly believes in the Divine\nexistence is not shocked at the attributing even of gross sensuous\nqualities to God. He who dreads an existence that may give offence,\nwho shrinks from the grossness of a positive predicate, may as well\nrenounce existence altogether. A God who is injured by determinate\nqualities has not the courage and the strength to exist. Qualities\nare the fire, the vital breath, the oxygen, the salt of existence. An\nexistence in general, an existence without qualities, is an insipidity,\nan absurdity. But there can be no more in God than is supplied by\nreligion. Only where man loses his taste for religion, and thus\nreligion itself becomes insipid, does the existence of God become an\ninsipid existence--an existence without qualities.\n\nThere is, however, a still milder way of denying the divine\npredicates than the direct one just described. It is admitted that the\npredicates of the divine nature are finite, and, more particularly,\nhuman qualities, but their rejection is rejected; they are even\ntaken under protection, because it is necessary to man to have a\ndefinite conception of God and since he is man he can form no other\nthan a human conception of him. In relation to God, it is said, these\npredicates are certainly without any objective validity; but to me,\nif he is to exist for me, he cannot appear otherwise than as he does\nappear to me, namely, as a being with attributes analogous to the\nhuman. But this distinction between what God is in himself, and what\nhe is for me destroys the peace of religion, and is besides in itself\nan unfounded and untenable distinction. I cannot know whether God is\nsomething else in himself or for himself than he is for me; what he is\nto me is to me all that he is. For me, there lies in these predicates\nunder which he exists for me, what he is in himself, his very nature;\nhe is for me what he can alone ever be for me. The religious man finds\nperfect satisfaction in that which God is in relation to himself;\nof any other relation he knows nothing, for God is to him what he can\nalone be to man. In the distinction above stated, man takes a point\nof view above himself, i.e., above his nature, the absolute measure\nof his being; but this transcendentalism is only an illusion; for I\ncan make the distinction between the object as it is in itself, and\nthe object as it is for me, only where an object can really appear\notherwise to me, not where it appears to me such as the absolute\nmeasure of my nature determines it to appear--such as it must appear\nto me. It is true that I may have a merely subjective conception,\ni.e., one which does not arise out of the general constitution of my\nspecies; but if my conception is determined by the constitution of\nmy species, the distinction between what an object is in itself, and\nwhat it is for me ceases; for this conception is itself an absolute\none. The measure of the species is the absolute measure, law, and\ncriterion of man. And, indeed, religion has the conviction that its\nconceptions, its predicates of God, are such as every man ought to\nhave, and must have, if he would have the true ones--that they are\nthe conceptions necessary to human nature; nay, further, that they\nare objectively true, representing God as he is. To every religion\nthe gods of other religious are only notions concerning God, but its\nown conception of God is to it God himself, the true God--God such as\nhe is in himself. Religion is satisfied only with a complete Deity,\na God without reservation; it will not have a mere phantasm of God; it\ndemands God himself. Religion gives up its own existence when it gives\nup the nature of God; it is no longer a truth when it renounces the\npossession of the true God. Scepticism is the arch-enemy of religion;\nbut the distinction between object and conception--between God as he\nis in himself, and God as he is for me--is a sceptical distinction,\nand therefore an irreligious one.\n\nThat which is to man the self-existent, the highest being, to which he\ncan conceive nothing higher--that is to him the Divine Being. How then\nshould he inquire concerning this being, what he is in himself? If God\nwere an object to the bird, he would be a winged being: the bird knows\nnothing higher, nothing more blissful, than the winged condition. How\nludicrous would it be if this bird pronounced: To me God appears\nas a bird, but what he is in himself I know not. To the bird the\nhighest nature is the bird-nature; take from him the conception of\nthis, and you take from him the conception of the highest being. How,\nthen, could he ask whether God in himself were winged? To ask whether\nGod is in himself what he is for me, is to ask whether God is God,\nis to lift oneself above one's God, to rise up against him.\n\nWherever, therefore, this idea, that the religious predicates are\nonly anthropomorphisms, has taken possession of a man, there has\ndoubt, has unbelief, obtained the mastery of faith. And it is only\nthe inconsequence of faint-heartedness and intellectual imbecility\nwhich does not proceed from this idea to the formal negation of\nthe predicates, and from thence to the negation of the subject\nto which they relate. If thou doubtest the objective truth of the\npredicates, thou must also doubt the objective truth of the subject\nwhose predicates they are. If thy predicates are anthropomorphisms,\nthe subject of them is an anthropomorphism too. If love, goodness,\npersonality, &c., are human attributes, so also is the subject which\nthou presupposest, the existence of God, the belief that there is a\nGod, an anthropomorphism--a presupposition purely human. Whence knowest\nthou that the belief in a God at all is not a limitation of man's mode\nof conception? Higher beings--and thou supposest such--are perhaps so\nblest in themselves, so at unity with themselves, that they are not\nhung in suspense between themselves and a yet higher being. To know\nGod and not oneself to be God, to know blessedness and not oneself\nto enjoy it, is a state of disunity, of unhappiness. Higher beings\nknow nothing of this unhappiness; they have no conception of that\nwhich they are not.\n\nThou believest in love as a divine attribute because thou thyself\nlovest; thou believest that God is a wise, benevolent being\nbecause thou knowest nothing better in thyself than benevolence\nand wisdom; and thou believest that God exists, that therefore he\nis a subject--whatever exists is a subject, whether it be defined\nas substance, person, essence, or otherwise--because thou thyself\nexistest, art thyself a subject. Thou knowest no higher human good than\nto love, than to be good and wise; and even so thou knowest no higher\nhappiness than to exist, to be a subject; for the consciousness of\nall reality, of all bliss, is for thee bound up in the consciousness\nof being a subject, of existing. God is an existence, a subject to\nthee, for the same reason that he is to thee a wise, a blessed, a\npersonal being. The distinction between the divine predicates and the\ndivine subject is only this, that to thee the subject, the existence,\ndoes not appear an anthropomorphism, because the conception of it is\nnecessarily involved in thy own existence as a subject, whereas the\npredicates do appear anthropomorphisms, because their necessity--the\nnecessity that God should be conscious, wise, good, &c.,--is not an\nimmediate necessity, identical with the being of man, but is evolved by\nhis self-consciousness, by the activity of his thought. I am a subject,\nI exist, whether I be wise or unwise, good or bad. To exist is to man\nthe first datum; it constitutes the very idea of the subject; it is\npresupposed by the predicates. Hence man relinquishes the predicates,\nbut the existence of God is to him a settled, irrefragable, absolutely\ncertain, objective truth. But, nevertheless, this distinction is\nmerely an apparent one. The necessity of the subject lies only in the\nnecessity of the predicate. Thou art a subject only in so far as thou\nart a human subject; the certainty and reality of thy existence lie\nonly in the certainty and reality of thy human attributes. What the\nsubject is lies only in the predicate; the predicate is the truth of\nthe subject--the subject only the personified, existing predicate,\nthe predicate conceived as existing. Subject and predicate are\ndistinguished only as existence and essence. The negation of the\npredicates is therefore the negation of the subject. What remains of\nthe human subject when abstracted from the human attributes? Even\nin the language of common life the divine predicates--Providence,\nOmniscience, Omnipotence--are put for the divine subject.\n\nThe certainty of the existence of God, of which it has been said that\nit is as certain, nay, more certain to man than his own existence,\ndepends only on the certainty of the qualities of God--it is in\nitself no immediate certainty. To the Christian the existence of the\nChristian God only is a certainty; to the heathen that of the heathen\nGod only. The heathen did not doubt the existence of Jupiter, because\nhe took no offence at the nature of Jupiter, because he could conceive\nof God under no other qualities, because to him these qualities were\na certainty, a divine reality. The reality of the predicate is the\nsole guarantee of existence.\n\nWhatever man conceives to be true, he immediately conceives to be\nreal (that is, to have an objective existence), because, originally,\nonly the real is true to him--true in opposition to what is merely\nconceived, dreamed, imagined. The idea of being, of existence, is the\noriginal idea of truth; or, originally, man makes truth dependent\non existence, subsequently, existence dependent on truth. Now God\nis the nature of man regarded as absolute truth,--the truth of man;\nbut God, or, what is the same thing, religion, is as various as are\nthe conditions under which man conceives this his nature, regards\nit as the highest being. These conditions, then, under which man\nconceives God, are to him the truth, and for that reason they are\nalso the highest existence, or rather they are existence itself;\nfor only the emphatic, the highest existence, is existence, and\ndeserves this name. Therefore, God is an existent, real being, on\nthe very same ground that he is a particular, definite being; for\nthe qualities of God are nothing else than the essential qualities of\nman himself, and a particular man is what he is, has his existence,\nhis reality, only in his particular conditions. Take away from the\nGreek the quality of being Greek, and you take away his existence. On\nthis ground it is true that for a definite positive religion--that\nis, relatively--the certainty of the existence of God is immediate;\nfor just as involuntarily, as necessarily, as the Greek was a Greek,\nso necessarily were his gods Greek beings, so necessarily were they\nreal, existent beings. Religion is that conception of the nature of the\nworld and of man which is essential to, i.e., identical with, a man's\nnature. But man does not stand above this his necessary conception;\non the contrary, it stands above him; it animates, determines, governs\nhim. The necessity of a proof, of a middle term to unite qualities\nwith existence, the possibility of a doubt, is abolished. Only that\nwhich is apart from my own being is capable of being doubted by\nme. How then can I doubt of God, who is my being? To doubt of God\nis to doubt of myself. Only when God is thought of abstractly, when\nhis predicates are the result of philosophic abstraction, arises the\ndistinction or separation between subject and predicate, existence\nand nature--arises the fiction that the existence or the subject is\nsomething else than the predicate, something immediate, indubitable,\nin distinction from the predicate, which is held to be doubtful. But\nthis is only a fiction. A God who has abstract predicates has also\nan abstract existence. Existence, being, varies with varying qualities.\n\nThe identity of the subject and predicate is clearly evidenced by\nthe progressive development of religion, which is identical with\nthe progressive development of human culture. So long as man is\nin a mere state of nature, so long is his god a mere nature-god--a\npersonification of some natural force. Where man inhabits houses, he\nalso encloses his gods in temples. The temple is only a manifestation\nof the value which man attaches to beautiful buildings. Temples in\nhonour of religion are in truth temples in honour of architecture. With\nthe emerging of man from a state of savagery and wildness to one of\nculture, with the distinction between what is fitting for man and\nwhat is not fitting, arises simultaneously the distinction between\nthat which is fitting and that which is not fitting for God. God is\nthe idea of majesty, of the highest dignity: the religious sentiment\nis the sentiment of supreme fitness. The later more cultured artists\nof Greece were the first to embody in the statues of the gods the\nideas of dignity, of spiritual grandeur, of imperturbable repose\nand serenity. But why were these qualities in their view attributes,\npredicates of God? Because they were in themselves regarded by the\nGreeks as divinities. Why did those artists exclude all disgusting\nand low passions? Because they perceived them to be unbecoming,\nunworthy, unhuman, and consequently ungodlike. The Homeric gods\neat and drink;--that implies eating and drinking is a divine\npleasure. Physical strength is an attribute of the Homeric gods:\nZeus is the strongest of the gods. Why? Because physical strength,\nin and by itself, was regarded as something glorious, divine. To\nthe ancient Germans the highest virtues were those of the warrior;\ntherefore their supreme god was the god of war, Odin,--war, \"the\noriginal or oldest law.\" Not the attribute of the divinity, but\nthe divineness or deity of the attribute, is the first true Divine\nBeing. Thus what theology and philosophy have held to be God, the\nAbsolute, the Infinite, is not God; but that which they have held not\nto be God is God: namely, the attribute, the quality, whatever has\nreality. Hence he alone is the true atheist to whom the predicates of\nthe Divine Being,--for example, love, wisdom, justice,--are nothing;\nnot he to whom merely the subject of these predicates is nothing. And\nin no wise is the negation of the subject necessarily also a negation\nof the predicates considered in themselves. These have an intrinsic,\nindependent reality; they force their recognition upon man by their\nvery nature; they are self-evident truths to him; they prove, they\nattest themselves. It does not follow that goodness, justice, wisdom,\nare chim\u00e6ras because the existence of God is a chim\u00e6ra, nor truths\nbecause this is a truth. The idea of God is dependent on the idea of\njustice, of benevolence; a God who is not benevolent, not just, not\nwise, is no God; but the converse does not hold. The fact is not that\na quality is divine because God has it, but that God has it because\nit is in itself divine: because without it God would be a defective\nbeing. Justice, wisdom, in general every quality which constitutes\nthe divinity of God, is determined and known by itself independently,\nbut the idea of God is determined by the qualities which have thus\nbeen previously judged to be worthy of the divine nature; only in\nthe case in which I identify God and justice, in which I think of\nGod immediately as the reality of the idea of justice, is the idea\nof God self-determined. But if God as a subject is the determined,\nwhile the quality, the predicate, is the determining, then in truth the\nrank of the godhead is due not to the subject, but to the predicate.\n\nNot until several, and those contradictory, attributes are united in\none being, and this being is conceived as personal--the personality\nbeing thus brought into especial prominence--not until then is\nthe origin of religion lost sight of, is it forgotten that what\nthe activity of the reflective power has converted into a predicate\ndistinguishable or separable from the subject, was originally the true\nsubject. Thus the Greeks and Romans deified accidents as substances;\nvirtues, states of mind, passions, as independent beings. Man,\nespecially the religious man, is to himself the measure of all things,\nof all reality. Whatever strongly impresses a man, whatever produces\nan unusual effect on his mind, if it be only a peculiar, inexplicable\nsound or note, he personifies as a divine being. Religion embraces\nall the objects of the world: everything existing has been an object\nof religious reverence; in the nature and consciousness of religion\nthere is nothing else than what lies in the nature of man and in his\nconsciousness of himself and of the world. Religion has no material\nexclusively its own. In Rome even the passions of fear and terror\nhad their temples. The Christians also made mental phenomena into\nindependent beings, their own feelings into qualities of things, the\npassions which governed them into powers which governed the world,\nin short, predicates of their own nature, whether recognised as such\nor not, into independent subjective existences. Devils, cobolds,\nwitches, ghosts, angels, were sacred truths as long as the religious\nspirit held undivided sway over mankind.\n\nIn order to banish from the mind the identity of the divine and human\npredicates, and the consequent identity of the divine and human nature,\nrecourse is had to the idea that God, as the absolute, real Being,\nhas an infinite fulness of various predicates, of which we here know\nonly a part, and those such as are analogous to our own; while the\nrest, by virtue of which God must thus have quite a different nature\nfrom the human or that which is analogous to the human, we shall only\nknow in the future--that is, after death. But an infinite plenitude\nor multitude of predicates which are really different, so different\nthat the one does not immediately involve the other, is realised\nonly in an infinite plenitude or multitude of different beings or\nindividuals. Thus the human nature presents an infinite abundance\nof different predicates, and for that very reason it presents an\ninfinite abundance of different individuals. Each new man is a new\npredicate, a new phasis of humanity. As many as are the men, so many\nare the powers, the properties of humanity. It is true that there\nare the same elements in every individual, but under such various\nconditions and modifications that they appear new and peculiar. The\nmystery of the inexhaustible fulness of the divine predicates is\ntherefore nothing else than the mystery of human nature considered\nas an infinitely varied, infinitely modifiable, but, consequently,\nphenomenal being. Only in the realm of the senses, only in space\nand time, does there exist a being of really infinite qualities or\npredicates. Where there are really different predicates there are\ndifferent times. One man is a distinguished musician, a distinguished\nauthor, a distinguished physician; but he cannot compose music,\nwrite books, and perform cures in the same moment of time. Time,\nand not the Hegelian dialectic, is the medium of uniting opposites,\ncontradictories, in one and the same subject. But distinguished and\ndetached from the nature of man, and combined with the idea of God,\nthe infinite fulness of various predicates is a conception without\nreality, a mere phantasy, a conception derived from the sensible\nworld, but without the essential conditions, without the truth of\nsensible existence, a conception which stands in direct contradiction\nwith the Divine Being considered as a spiritual, i.e., an abstract,\nsimple, single being; for the predicates of God are precisely of\nthis character, that one involves all the others, because there\nis no real difference between them. If, therefore, in the present\npredicates I have not the future, in the present God not the future\nGod, then the future God is not the present, but they are two distinct\nbeings. [13] But this distinction is in contradiction with the unity\nand simplicity of the theological God. Why is a given predicate a\npredicate of God? Because it is divine in its nature, i.e., because it\nexpresses no limitation, no defect. Why are other predicates applied\nto him? Because, however various in themselves, they agree in this,\nthat they all alike express perfection, unlimitedness. Hence I can\nconceive innumerable predicates of God, because they must all agree\nwith the abstract idea of the Godhead, and must have in common that\nwhich constitutes every single predicate a divine attribute. Thus it is\nin the system of Spinoza. He speaks of an infinite number of attributes\nof the divine substance, but he specifies none except Thought and\nExtension. Why? Because it is a matter of indifference to know them;\nnay, because they are in themselves indifferent, superfluous; for\nwith all these innumerable predicates, I yet always mean to say the\nsame thing as when I speak of Thought and Extension. Why is Thought\nan attribute of substance? Because, according to Spinoza, it is\ncapable of being conceived by itself, because it expresses something\nindivisible, perfect, infinite. Why Extension or Matter? For the same\nreason. Thus, substance can have an indefinite number of predicates,\nbecause it is not their specific definition, their difference, but\ntheir identity, their equivalence, which makes them attributes of\nsubstance. Or rather, substance has innumerable predicates only because\n(how strange!) it has properly no predicate; that is, no definite,\nreal predicate. The indefinite unity which is the product of thought,\ncompletes itself by the indefinite multiplicity which is the product of\nthe imagination. Because the predicate is not multum, it is multa. In\ntruth, the positive predicates are Thought and Extension. In these two\ninfinitely more is said than in the nameless innumerable predicates;\nfor they express something definite--in them I have something. But\nsubstance is too indifferent, too apathetic to be something; that is,\nto have qualities and passions; that it may not be something, it is\nrather nothing.\n\nNow, when it is shown that what the subject is lies entirely in\nthe attributes of the subject; that is, that the predicate is the\ntrue subject; it is also proved that if the divine predicates are\nattributes of the human nature, the subject of those predicates is also\nof the human nature. But the divine predicates are partly general,\npartly personal. The general predicates are the metaphysical, but\nthese serve only as external points of support to religion; they are\nnot the characteristic definitions of religion. It is the personal\npredicates alone which constitute the essence of religion--in which\nthe Divine Being is the object of religion. Such are, for example,\nthat God is a Person, that he is the moral Lawgiver, the Father\nof mankind, the Holy One, the Just, the Good, the Merciful. It is,\nhowever, at once clear, or it will at least be clear in the sequel,\nwith regard to these and other definitions, that, especially as\napplied to a personality, they are purely human definitions, and that\nconsequently man in religion--in his relation to God--is in relation\nto his own nature; for to the religious sentiment these predicates\nare not mere conceptions, mere images, which man forms of God,\nto be distinguished from that which God is in himself, but truths,\nfacts, realities. Religion knows nothing of anthropomorphisms; to it\nthey are not anthropomorphisms. It is the very essence of religion,\nthat to it these definitions express the nature of God. They are\npronounced to be images only by the understanding, which reflects on\nreligion, and which while defending them yet before its own tribunal\ndenies them. But to the religious sentiment God is a real Father,\nreal Love and Mercy; for to it he is a real, living, personal being,\nand therefore his attributes are also living and personal. Nay, the\ndefinitions which are the most sufficing to the religious sentiment\nare precisely those which give the most offence to the understanding,\nand which in the process of reflection on religion it denies. Religion\nis essentially emotion; hence, objectively also, emotion is to it\nnecessarily of a divine nature. Even anger appears to it an emotion\nnot unworthy of God, provided only there be a religious motive at\nthe foundation of this anger.\n\nBut here it is also essential to observe, and this phenomenon is an\nextremely remarkable one, characterising the very core of religion,\nthat in proportion as the divine subject is in reality human, the\ngreater is the apparent difference between God and man; that is,\nthe more, by reflection on religion, by theology, is the identity of\nthe divine and human denied, and the human, considered as such, is\ndepreciated. [14] The reason of this is, that as what is positive in\nthe conception of the divine being can only be human, the conception\nof man, as an object of consciousness, can only be negative. To\nenrich God, man must become poor; that God may be all, man must be\nnothing. But he desires to be nothing in himself, because what he takes\nfrom himself is not lost to him, since it is preserved in God. Man has\nhis being in God; why then should he have it in himself? Where is the\nnecessity of positing the same thing twice, of having it twice? What\nman withdraws from himself, what he renounces in himself, he only\nenjoys in an incomparably higher and fuller measure in God.\n\nThe monks made a vow of chastity to God; they mortified the sexual\npassion in themselves, but therefore they had in heaven, in the\nVirgin Mary, the image of woman--an image of love. They could\nthe more easily dispense with real woman in proportion as an ideal\nwoman was an object of love to them. The greater the importance they\nattached to the denial of sensuality, the greater the importance of\nthe heavenly virgin for them: she was to them in the place of Christ,\nin the stead of God. The more the sensual tendencies are renounced,\nthe more sensual is the God to whom they are sacrificed. For whatever\nis made an offering to God has an especial value attached to it; in it\nGod is supposed to have especial pleasure. That which is the highest\nin the estimation of man is naturally the highest in the estimation\nof his God; what pleases man pleases God also. The Hebrews did not\noffer to Jehovah unclean, ill-conditioned animals; on the contrary,\nthose which they most highly prized, which they themselves ate,\nwere also the food of God (Cibus Dei, Lev. iii. 2). Wherever,\ntherefore, the denial of the sensual delights is made a special\noffering, a sacrifice well-pleasing to God, there the highest value is\nattached to the senses, and the sensuality which has been renounced\nis unconsciously restored, in the fact that God takes the place\nof the material delights which have been renounced. The nun weds\nherself to God; she has a heavenly bridegroom, the monk a heavenly\nbride. But the heavenly virgin is only a sensible presentation of\na general truth, having relation to the essence of religion. Man\ndenies as to himself only what he attributes to God. Religion\nabstracts from man, from the world; but it can only abstract from\nthe limitations, from the phenomena; in short, from the negative,\nnot from the essence, the positive, of the world and humanity: hence,\nin the very abstraction and negation it must recover that from which\nit abstracts, or believes itself to abstract. And thus, in reality,\nwhatever religion consciously denies--always supposing that what is\ndenied by it is something essential, true, and consequently incapable\nof being ultimately denied--it unconsciously restores in God. Thus,\nin religion man denies his reason; of himself he knows nothing of God,\nhis thoughts are only worldly, earthly; he can only believe what God\nreveals to him. But on this account the thoughts of God are human,\nearthly thoughts: like man, he has plans in his mind, he accommodates\nhimself to circumstances and grades of intelligence, like a tutor\nwith his pupils; he calculates closely the effect of his gifts and\nrevelations; he observes man in all his doings; he knows all things,\neven the most earthly, the commonest, the most trivial. In brief,\nman in relation to God denies his own knowledge, his own thoughts,\nthat he may place them in God. Man gives up his personality; but in\nreturn, God, the Almighty, infinite, unlimited being, is a person;\nhe denies human dignity, the human ego; but in return God is to him\na selfish, egoistical being, who in all things seeks only himself,\nhis own honour, his own ends; he represents God as simply seeking\nthe satisfaction of his own selfishness, while yet he frowns on that\nof every other being; his God is the very luxury of egoism. [15]\nReligion further denies goodness as a quality of human nature; man\nis wicked, corrupt, incapable of good; but, on the other hand, God is\nonly good--the Good Being. Man's nature demands as an object goodness,\npersonified as God; but is it not hereby declared that goodness is an\nessential tendency of man? If my heart is wicked, my understanding\nperverted, how can I perceive and feel the holy to be holy, the\ngood to be good? Could I perceive the beauty of a fine picture if\nmy mind were \u00e6sthetically an absolute piece of perversion? Though I\nmay not be a painter, though I may not have the power of producing\nwhat is beautiful myself, I must yet have \u00e6sthetic feeling, \u00e6sthetic\ncomprehension, since I perceive the beauty that is presented to me\nexternally. Either goodness does not exist at all for man, or, if it\ndoes exist, therein is revealed to the individual man the holiness\nand goodness of human nature. That which is absolutely opposed to\nmy nature, to which I am united by no bond of sympathy, is not even\nconceivable or perceptible by me. The holy is in opposition to me\nonly as regards the modifications of my personality, but as regards my\nfundamental nature it is in unity with me. The holy is a reproach to\nmy sinfulness; in it I recognise myself as a sinner; but in so doing,\nwhile I blame myself, I acknowledge what I am not, but ought to be,\nand what, for that very reason, I, according to my destination, can be;\nfor an \"ought\" which has no corresponding capability does not affect\nme, is a ludicrous chim\u00e6ra without any true relation to my mental\nconstitution. But when I acknowledge goodness as my destination, as my\nlaw, I acknowledge it, whether consciously or unconsciously, as my own\nnature. Another nature than my own, one different in quality, cannot\ntouch me. I can perceive sin as sin, only when I perceive it to be a\ncontradiction of myself with myself--that is, of my personality with\nmy fundamental nature. As a contradiction of the absolute, considered\nas another being, the feeling of sin is inexplicable, unmeaning.\n\nThe distinction between Augustinianism and Pelagianism consists only\nin this, that the former expresses after the manner of religion what\nthe latter expresses after the manner of Rationalism. Both say the\nsame thing, both vindicate the goodness of man; but Pelagianism does it\ndirectly, in a rationalistic and moral form; Augustinianism indirectly,\nin a mystical, that is, a religious form. [16] For that which is given\nto man's God is in truth given to man himself; what a man declares\nconcerning God, he in truth declares concerning himself. Augustinianism\nwould be a truth, and a truth opposed to Pelagianism, only if man\nhad the devil for his God, and, with the consciousness that he was\nthe devil, honoured, reverenced, and worshipped him as the highest\nbeing. But so long as man adores a good being as his God, so long\ndoes he contemplate in God the goodness of his own nature.\n\nAs with the doctrine of the radical corruption of human nature, so is\nit with the identical doctrine, that man can do nothing good, i.e.,\nin truth, nothing of himself--by his own strength. For the denial of\nhuman strength and spontaneous moral activity to be true, the moral\nactivity of God must also be denied; and we must say, with the Oriental\nnihilist or pantheist: the Divine being is absolutely without will or\naction, indifferent, knowing nothing of the discrimination between evil\nand good. But he who defines God as an active being, and not only so,\nbut as morally active and morally critical,--as a being who loves,\nworks, and rewards good, punishes, rejects, and condemns evil,--he who\nthus defines God only in appearance denies human activity, in fact,\nmaking it the highest, the most real activity. He who makes God act\nhumanly, declares human activity to be divine; he says: A god who is\nnot active, and not morally or humanly active, is no god; and thus\nhe makes the idea of the Godhead dependent on the idea of activity,\nthat is, of human activity, for a higher he knows not.\n\nMan--this is the mystery of religion--projects his being into\nobjectivity, [17] and then again makes himself an object to this\nprojected image of himself thus converted into a subject; he thinks of\nhimself, is an object to himself, but as the object of an object, of\nanother being than himself. Thus here. Man is an object to God. That\nman is good or evil is not indifferent to God; no! He has a lively,\nprofound interest in man's being good; he wills that man should be\ngood, happy--for without goodness there is no happiness. Thus the\nreligious man virtually retracts the nothingness of human activity,\nby making his dispositions and actions an object to God, by making\nman the end of God--for that which is an object to the mind is\nan end in action; by making the divine activity a means of human\nsalvation. God acts, that man may be good and happy. Thus man, while\nhe is apparently humiliated to the lowest degree, is in truth exalted\nto the highest. Thus, in and through God, man has in view himself\nalone. It is true that man places the aim of his action in God, but\nGod has no other aim of action than the moral and eternal salvation\nof man: thus man has in fact no other aim than himself. The divine\nactivity is not distinct from the human.\n\nHow could the divine activity work on me as its object, nay, work\nin me, if it were essentially different from me; how could it have\na human aim, the aim of ameliorating and blessing man, if it were\nnot itself human? Does not the purpose determine the nature of\nthe act? When man makes his moral improvement an aim to himself,\nhe has divine resolutions, divine projects; but also, when God seeks\nthe salvation of man, he has human ends and a human mode of activity\ncorresponding to these ends. Thus in God man has only his own activity\nas an object. But for the very reason that he regards his own activity\nas objective, goodness only as an object, he necessarily receives\nthe impulse, the motive not from himself, but from this object. He\ncontemplates his nature as external to himself, and this nature as\ngoodness; thus it is self-evident, it is mere tautology to say that\nthe impulse to good comes only from thence where he places the good.\n\nGod is the highest subjectivity of man abstracted from himself;\nhence man can do nothing of himself, all goodness comes from God. The\nmore subjective God is, the more completely does man divest himself\nof his subjectivity, because God is, per se, his relinquished self,\nthe possession of which he however again vindicates to himself. As\nthe action of the arteries drives the blood into the extremities,\nand the action of the veins brings it back again, as life in general\nconsists in a perpetual systole and diastole; so is it in religion. In\nthe religious systole man propels his own nature from himself, he\nthrows himself outward; in the religious diastole he receives the\nrejected nature into his heart again. God alone is the being who\nacts of himself,--this is the force of repulsion in religion; God is\nthe being who acts in me, with me, through me, upon me, for me, is\nthe principle of my salvation, of my good dispositions and actions,\nconsequently my own good principle and nature,--this is the force of\nattraction in religion.\n\nThe course of religious development which has been generally indicated\nconsists specifically in this, that man abstracts more and more from\nGod, and attributes more and more to himself. This is especially\napparent in the belief in revelation. That which to a later age or a\ncultured people is given by nature or reason, is to an earlier age,\nor to a yet uncultured people, given by God. Every tendency of man,\nhowever natural--even the impulse to cleanliness, was conceived by\nthe Israelites as a positive divine ordinance. From this example\nwe again see that God is lowered, is conceived more entirely on\nthe type of ordinary humanity, in proportion as man detracts from\nhimself. How can the self-humiliation of man go further than when he\ndisclaims the capability of fulfilling spontaneously the requirements\nof common decency? [18] The Christian religion, on the other hand,\ndistinguished the impulses and passions of man according to their\nquality, their character; it represented only good emotions, good\ndispositions, good thoughts, as revelations, operations--that is,\nas dispositions, feelings, thoughts,--of God; for what God reveals is\na quality of God himself: that of which the heart is full overflows\nthe lips; as is the effect such is the cause; as the revelation,\nsuch the being who reveals himself. A God who reveals himself in\ngood dispositions is a God whose essential attribute is only moral\nperfection. The Christian religion distinguishes inward moral purity\nfrom external physical purity; the Israelites identified the two. [19]\nIn relation to the Israelitish religion, the Christian religion is\none of criticism and freedom. The Israelite trusted himself to do\nnothing except what was commanded by God; he was without will even\nin external things; the authority of religion extended itself even\nto his food. The Christian religion, on the other hand, in all these\nexternal things made man dependent on himself, i.e., placed in man\nwhat the Israelite placed out of himself in God. Israel is the most\ncomplete presentation of Positivism in religion. In relation to the\nIsraelite, the Christian is an esprit fort, a free-thinker. Thus do\nthings change. What yesterday was still religion is no longer such\nto-day; and what to-day is atheism, to-morrow will be religion.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPART I.\n\nTHE TRUE OR ANTHROPOLOGICAL ESSENCE OF RELIGION.\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nGOD AS A BEING OF THE UNDERSTANDING.\n\n\nReligion is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him\nas the antithesis of himself. God is not what man is--man is not what\nGod is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect,\nman imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak;\nGod holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely\npositive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative,\ncomprehending all negations.\n\nBut in religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it must\nbe shown that this antithesis, this differencing of God and man, with\nwhich religion begins, is a differencing of man with his own nature.\n\nThe inherent necessity of this proof is at once apparent from\nthis,--that if the divine nature, which is the object of religion,\nwere really different from the nature of man, a division, a disunion\ncould not take place. If God is really a different being from myself,\nwhy should his perfection trouble me? Disunion exists only between\nbeings who are at variance, but who ought to be one, who can be one,\nand who consequently in nature, in truth, are one. On this general\nground, then, the nature with which man feels himself in disunion\nmust be inborn, immanent in himself, but at the same time it must be\nof a different character from that nature or power which gives him\nthe feeling, the consciousness of reconciliation, of union with God,\nor, what is the same thing, with himself.\n\nThis nature is nothing else than the intelligence--the reason\nor the understanding. God as the antithesis of man, as a being\nnot human, i.e., not personally human, is the objective nature\nof the understanding. The pure, perfect divine nature is the\nself-consciousness of the understanding, the consciousness which\nthe understanding has of its own perfection. The understanding\nknows nothing of the sufferings of the heart; it has no desires,\nno passions, no wants, and, for that reason, no deficiencies and\nweaknesses, as the heart has. Men in whom the intellect predominates,\nwho, with one-sided but all the more characteristic definiteness,\nembody and personify for us the nature of the understanding, are free\nfrom the anguish of the heart, from the passions, the excesses of\nthe man who has strong emotions; they are not passionately interested\nin any finite, i.e., particular object; they do not give themselves\nin pledge; they are free. \"To want nothing, and by this freedom from\nwants to become like the immortal gods;\"--\"not to subject ourselves\nto things, but things to us;\"--\"all is vanity;\"--these and similar\nsayings are the mottoes of the men who are governed by abstract\nunderstanding. The understanding is that part of our nature which\nis neutral, impassible, not to bribed, not subject to illusions--the\npure, passionless light of the intelligence. It is the categorical,\nimpartial consciousness of the fact as fact, because it is itself of\nan objective nature. It is the consciousness of the uncontradictory,\nbecause it is itself the uncontradictory unity, the source of\nlogical identity. It is the consciousness of law, necessity, rule,\nmeasure, because it is itself the activity of law, the necessity\nof the nature of things under the form of spontaneous activity, the\nrule of rules, the absolute measure, the measure of measures. Only\nby the understanding can man judge and act in contradiction with\nhis dearest human, that is, personal feelings, when the God of the\nunderstanding,--law, necessity, right,--commands it. The father who,\nas a judge, condemns his own son to death because he knows him to be\nguilty, can do this only as a rational, not as an emotional being. The\nunderstanding shows us the faults and weaknesses even of our beloved\nones; it shows us even our own. It is for this reason that it so\noften throws us into painful collision with ourselves, with our\nown hearts. We do not like to give reason the upper hand: we are\ntoo tender to ourselves to carry out the true, but hard, relentless\nverdict of the understanding. The understanding is the power which has\nrelation to species: the heart represents particular circumstances,\nindividuals,--the understanding, general circumstances, universals;\nit is the superhuman, i.e., the impersonal power in man. Only by and\nin the understanding has man the power of abstraction from himself,\nfrom his subjective being,--of exalting himself to general ideas\nand relations, of distinguishing the object from the impressions\nwhich it produces on his feelings, of regarding it in and by itself\nwithout reference to human personality. Philosophy, mathematics,\nastronomy, physics, in short, science in general, is the practical\nproof, because it is the product of this truly infinite and divine\nactivity. Religious anthropomorphisms, therefore, are in contradiction\nwith the understanding; it repudiates their application to God; it\ndenies them. But this God, free from anthropomorphisms, impartial,\npassionless, is nothing else than the nature of the understanding\nitself regarded as objective.\n\nGod as God, that is, as a being not finite, not human, not materially\nconditioned, not phenomenal, is only an object of thought. He is\nthe incorporeal, formless, incomprehensible--the abstract, negative\nbeing: he is known, i.e., becomes an object, only by abstraction\nand negation (vi\u00e2 negationis). Why? Because he is nothing but the\nobjective nature of the thinking power, or in general of the power or\nactivity, name it what you will, whereby man is conscious of reason,\nof mind, of intelligence. There is no other spirit, that is (for the\nidea of spirit is simply the idea of thought, of intelligence, of\nunderstanding, every other spirit being a spectre of the imagination),\nno other intelligence which man can believe in or conceive than that\nintelligence which enlightens him, which is active in him. He can\ndo nothing more than separate the intelligence from the limitations\nof his own individuality. The \"infinite spirit,\" in distinction\nfrom the finite, is therefore nothing else than the intelligence\ndisengaged from the limits of individuality and corporeality,--for\nindividuality and corporeality are inseparable,--intelligence posited\nin and by itself. God, said the schoolmen, the Christian fathers,\nand long before them the heathen philosophers,--God is immaterial\nessence, intelligence, spirit, pure understanding. Of God as God no\nimage can be made; but canst thou frame an image of mind? Has mind a\nform? Is not its activity the most inexplicable, the most incapable\nof representation? God is incomprehensible; but knowest thou the\nnature of the intelligence? Hast thou searched out the mysterious\noperation of thought, the hidden nature of self-consciousness? Is not\nself-consciousness the enigma of enigmas? Did not the old mystics,\nschoolmen, and fathers, long ago compare the incomprehensibility of the\ndivine nature with that of the human intelligence, and thus, in truth,\nidentify the nature of God with the nature of man? [20] God as God--as\na purely thinkable being, an object of the intellect--is thus nothing\nelse than the reason in its utmost intensification become objective\nto itself. It is asked what is the understanding or the reason? The\nanswer is found in the idea of God. Everything must express itself,\nreveal itself, make itself objective, affirm itself. God is the\nreason expressing, affirming itself as the highest existence. To the\nimagination, the reason is the revelation of God; but to the reason,\nGod is the revelation of the reason; since what reason is, what it can\ndo, is first made objective in God. God is a need of the intelligence,\na necessary thought--the highest degree of the thinking power. \"The\nreason cannot rest in sensuous things;\" it can find contentment\nonly when it penetrates to the highest, first necessary being,\nwhich can be an object to the reason alone. Why? Because with the\nconception of this being it first completes itself, because only\nin the idea of the highest nature is the highest nature of reason\nexistent, the highest step of the thinking power attained: and it is\na general truth, that we feel a blank, a void, a want in ourselves,\nand are consequently unhappy and unsatisfied, so long as we have not\ncome to the last degree of a power, to that quo nihil majus cogitari\npotest,--so long as we cannot bring our inborn capacity for this or\nthat art, this or that science, to the utmost proficiency. For only in\nthe highest proficiency is art truly art; only in its highest degree\nis thought truly thought, reason. Only when thy thought is God dost\nthou truly think, rigorously speaking; for only God is the realised,\nconsummate, exhausted thinking power. Thus in conceiving God, man first\nconceives reason as it truly is, though by means of the imagination\nhe conceives this divine nature as distinct from reason, because\nas a being affected by external things he is accustomed always to\ndistinguish the object from the conception of it. And here he applies\nthe same process to the conception of the reason, thus for an existence\nin reason, in thought, substituting an existence in space and time,\nfrom which he had, nevertheless, previously abstracted it. God, as\na metaphysical being, is the intelligence satisfied in itself, or\nrather, conversely, the intelligence, satisfied in itself, thinking\nitself as the absolute being, is God as a metaphysical being. Hence\nall metaphysical predicates of God are real predicates only when\nthey are recognised as belonging to thought, to intelligence, to\nthe understanding.\n\nThe understanding is that which conditionates and co-ordinates all\nthings, that which places all things in reciprocal dependence and\nconnection, because it is itself immediate and unconditioned; it\ninquires for the cause of all things, because it has its own ground\nand end in itself. Only that which itself is nothing deduced, nothing\nderived, can deduce and construct, can regard all besides itself as\nderived; just as only that which exists for its own sake can view\nand treat other things as means and instruments. The understanding\nis thus the original, primitive being. The understanding derives all\nthings from God as the first cause; it finds the world, without an\nintelligent cause, given over to senseless, aimless chance; that is,\nit finds only in itself, in its own nature, the efficient and the final\ncause of the world--the existence of the world is only then clear and\ncomprehensible when it sees the explanation of that existence in the\nsource of all clear and intelligible ideas, i.e., in itself. The being\nthat works with design towards certain ends, i.e., with understanding,\nis alone the being that to the understanding has immediate certitude,\nself-evidence. Hence that which of itself has no designs, no purpose,\nmust have the cause of its existence in the design of another, and\nthat an intelligent being. And thus the understanding posits its own\nnature as the causal, first, premundane existence--i.e., being in rank\nthe first but in time the last, it makes itself the first in time also.\n\nThe understanding is to itself the criterion of all reality. That which\nis opposed to the understanding, that which is self-contradictory,\nis nothing; that which contradicts reason contradicts God. For\nexample, it is a contradiction of reason to connect with the idea\nof the highest reality the limitations of definite time and place;\nand hence reason denies these of God as contradicting his nature. The\nreason can only believe in a God who is accordant with its own nature,\nin a God who is not beneath its own dignity, who, on the contrary,\nis a realisation of its own nature: i.e., the reason believes only\nin itself, in the absolute reality of its own nature. The reason\nis not dependent on God, but God on the reason. Even in the age\nof miracles and faith in authority, the understanding constitutes\nitself, at least formally, the criterion of divinity. God is all\nand can do all, it was said, by virtue of his omnipotence; but\nnevertheless he is nothing and he can do nothing which contradicts\nhimself, i.e., reason. Even omnipotence cannot do what is contrary\nto reason. Thus above the divine omnipotence stands the higher power\nof reason; above the nature of God the nature of the understanding,\nas the criterion of that which is to be affirmed and denied of God,\nthe criterion of the positive and negative. Canst thou believe in\na God who is an unreasonable and wicked being? No, indeed; but why\nnot? Because it is in contradiction with thy understanding to accept a\nwicked and unreasonable being as divine. What then dost thou affirm,\nwhat is an object to thee, in God? Thy own understanding. God is thy\nhighest idea, the supreme effort of thy understanding, thy highest\npower of thought. God is the sum of all realities, i.e., the sum of\nall affirmations of the understanding. That which I recognise in the\nunderstanding as essential I place in God as existent: God is what\nthe understanding thinks as the highest. But in what I perceive to\nbe essential is revealed the nature of my understanding, is shown\nthe power of my thinking faculty.\n\nThus the understanding is the ens realissimum, the most real being\nof the old onto-theology. \"Fundamentally,\" says onto-theology, \"we\ncannot conceive God otherwise than by attributing to him without\nlimit all the real qualities which we find in ourselves.\" [21]\nOur positive, essential qualities, our realities, are therefore\nthe realities of God, but in us they exist with, in God without,\nlimits. But what then withdraws the limits from the realities,\nwhat does away with the limits? The understanding. What, according\nto this, is the nature conceived without limits, but the nature of\nthe understanding releasing, abstracting itself from all limits? As\nthou thinkest God, such is thy thought;--the measure of thy God is\nthe measure of thy understanding. If thou conceivest God as limited,\nthy understanding is limited; if thou conceivest God as unlimited,\nthy understanding is unlimited; If, for example, thou conceivest God\nas a corporeal being, corporeality is the boundary, the limit of thy\nunderstanding; thou canst conceive nothing without a body. If, on the\ncontrary, thou deniest corporeality of God, this is a corroboration\nand proof of the freedom of thy understanding from the limitation of\ncorporeality. In the unlimited divine nature thou representest only\nthy unlimited understanding. And when thou declarest this unlimited\nbeing the ultimate essence, the highest being, thou sayest in reality\nnothing else than this: the \u00eatre supr\u00eame, the highest being, is the\nunderstanding.\n\nThe understanding is further the self-subsistent and independent\nbeing. That which has no understanding is not self-subsistent, is\ndependent. A man without understanding is a man without will. He who\nhas no understanding allows himself to be deceived, imposed upon,\nused as an instrument by others. How shall he whose understanding\nis the tool of another have an independent will? Only he who thinks\nis free and independent. It is only by the understanding that man\nreduces the things around and beneath him to mere means of his own\nexistence. In general, that only is self-subsistent and independent\nwhich is an end to itself, an object to itself. That which is an end\nand object to itself is for that very reason--in so far as it is an\nobject to itself--no longer a means and object for another being. To\nbe without understanding is, in one word, to exist for another,--to\nbe an object: to have understanding is to exist for oneself,--to\nbe a subject. But that which no longer exists for another, but for\nitself, rejects all dependence on another being. It is true we, as\nphysical beings, depend on the beings external to us, even as to the\nmodifications of thought; but in so far as we think, in the activity of\nthe understanding as such, we are dependent on no other being. Activity\nof thought is spontaneous activity. \"When I think, I am conscious that\nmy ego in me thinks, and not some other thing. I conclude, therefore,\nthat this thinking in me does not inhere in another thing outside of\nme, but in myself, consequently that I am a substance, i.e., that I\nexist by myself, without being a predicate of another being.\" [22]\nAlthough we always need the air, yet as natural philosophers we\nconvert the air from an object of our physical need into an object\nof the self-sufficing activity of thought, i.e., into a mere thing\nfor us. In breathing I am the object of the air, the air the subject;\nbut when I make the air an object of thought, of investigation, when\nI analyse it, I reverse this relation,--I make myself the subject,\nthe air an object. But that which is the object of another being is\ndependent. Thus the plant is dependent on air and light, that is,\nit is an object for air, and light, not for itself. It is true that\nair and light are reciprocally an object for the plant. Physical\nlife in general is nothing else than this perpetual interchange\nof the objective and subjective relation. We consume the air and\nare consumed by it; we enjoy and are enjoyed. The understanding\nalone enjoys all things without being itself enjoyed; it is the\nself-enjoying, self-sufficing existence--the absolute subject--the\nsubject which cannot be reduced to the object of another being,\nbecause it makes all things objects, predicates of itself,--which\ncomprehends all things in itself, because it is itself not a thing,\nbecause it is free from all things.\n\nThat is dependent the possibility of whose existence lies out\nof itself; that is independent which has the possibility of its\nexistence in itself. Life therefore involves the contradiction of\nan existence at once dependent and independent,--the contradiction\nthat its possibility lies both in itself and out of itself. The\nunderstanding alone is free from this and other contradictions of\nlife; it is the essence perfectly self-subsistent, perfectly at one\nwith itself, perfectly self-existent. [23] Thinking is existence in\nself; life, as differenced from thought, existence out of self: life\nis to give from oneself; thought is to take into oneself. Existence\nout of self is the world; existence in self is God. To think is to\nbe God. The act of thought, as such, is the freedom of the immortal\ngods from all external limitations and necessities of life.\n\nThe unity of the understanding is the unity of God. To the\nunderstanding the consciousness of its unity and universality\nis essential; the understanding is itself nothing else than the\nconsciousness of itself as absolute identity, i.e., that which is\naccordant with the understanding is to it an absolute, universally\nvalid, law; it is impossible to the understanding to think that what\nis self-contradictory, false, irrational, can anywhere be true, and,\nconversely, that what is true, rational, can anywhere be false and\nirrational. \"There may be intelligent beings who are not like me,\nand yet I am certain that there are no intelligent beings who know\nlaws and truths different from those which I recognise; for every\nmind necessarily sees that two and two make four, and that one must\nprefer one's friend to one's dog.\" [24] Of an essentially different\nunderstanding from that which affirms itself in man, I have not the\nremotest conception, the faintest adumbration. On the contrary,\nevery understanding which I posit as different from my own, is\nonly a position of my own understanding, i.e., an idea of my own, a\nconception which falls within my power of thought, and thus expresses\nmy understanding. What I think, that I myself do, of course only in\npurely intellectual matters; what I think of as united, I unite; what\nI think of as distinct, I distinguish; what I think of as abolished,\nas negatived, that I myself abolish and negative. For example, if\nI conceive an understanding in which the intuition or reality of\nthe object is immediately united with the thought of it, I actually\nunite it; my understanding or my imagination is itself the power of\nuniting these distinct or opposite ideas. How would it be possible\nfor me to conceive them united--whether this conception be clear or\nconfused--if I did not unite them in myself? But whatever may be the\nconditions of the understanding which a given human individual may\nsuppose as distinguished from his own, this other understanding is only\nthe understanding which exists in man in general--the understanding\nconceived apart from the limits of this particular individual. Unity is\ninvolved in the idea of the understanding. The impossibility for the\nunderstanding to think two supreme beings, two infinite substances,\ntwo Gods, is the impossibility for the understanding to contradict\nitself, to deny its own nature, to think of itself as divided.\n\nThe understanding is the infinite being. Infinitude is immediately\ninvolved in unity, and finiteness in plurality. Finiteness--in the\nmetaphysical sense--rests on the distinction of the existence from\nthe essence, of the individual from the species; infinitude, on the\nunity of existence and essence. Hence, that is finite which can be\ncompared with other beings of the same species; that is infinite\nwhich has nothing like itself, which consequently does not stand as\nan individual under a species, but is species and individual in one,\nessence and existence in one. But such is the understanding; it has\nits essence in itself, consequently it has nothing, together with or\nexternal to itself, which can be ranged beside it; it is incapable of\nbeing compared, because it is itself the source of all combinations\nand comparisons; immeasurable, because it is the measure of all\nmeasures,--we measure all things by the understanding alone; it can\nbe circumscribed by no higher generalisation, it can be ranged under\nno species, because it is itself the principle of all generalising, of\nall classification, because it circumscribes all things and beings. The\ndefinitions which the speculative philosophers and theologians give\nof God, as the being in whom existence and essence are not separable,\nwho himself is all the attributes which he has, so that predicate\nand subject are with him identical,--all these definitions are thus\nideas drawn solely from the nature of the understanding.\n\nLastly, the understanding or the reason is the necessary being. Reason\nexists because only the existence of the reason is reason; because,\nif there were no reason, no consciousness, all would be nothing;\nexistence would be equivalent to non-existence. Consciousness first\nfounds the distinction between existence and non-existence. In\nconsciousness is first revealed the value of existence, the value\nof nature. Why, in general, does something exist? why does the world\nexist? on the simple ground that if something did not exist, nothing\nwould exist; if reason did not exist, there would be only unreason;\nthus the world exists because it is an absurdity that the world should\nnot exist. In the absurdity of its non-existence is found the true\nreason of its existence, in the groundlessness of the supposition\nthat it were not the reason that it is. Nothing, non-existence,\nis aimless, nonsensical, irrational. Existence alone has an aim,\na foundation, rationality; existence is, because only existence is\nreason and truth; existence is the absolute necessity. What is the\ncause of conscious existence, of life? The need of life. But to whom\nis it a need? To that which does not live. It is not a being who saw\nthat made the eye: to one who saw already, to what purpose would be\nthe eye? No! only the being who saw not needed the eye. We are all\ncome into the world without the operation of knowledge and will; but\nwe are come that knowledge and will may exist. Whence, then, came the\nworld? Out of necessity; not out of a necessity which lies in another\nbeing distinct from itself--that is a pure contradiction,--but out of\nits own inherent necessity; out of the necessity of necessity; because\nwithout the world there would be no necessity; without necessity, no\nreason, no understanding. The nothing, out of which the world came,\nis nothing without the world. It is true that thus, negativity,\nas the speculative philosophers express themselves--nothing is the\ncause of the world;--but a nothing which abolishes itself, i.e., a\nnothing which could not have existed if there had been no world. It\nis true that the world springs out of a want, out of privation, but\nit is false speculation to make this privation an ontological being:\nthis want is simply the want which lies in the supposed non-existence\nof the world. Thus the world is only necessary out of itself and\nthrough itself. But the necessity of the world is the necessity of\nreason. The reason, as the sum of all realities,--for what are all the\nglories of the world without light, much more external light without\ninternal light?--the reason is the most indispensable being--the\nprofoundest and most essential necessity. In the reason first lies\nthe self-consciousness of existence, self-conscious existence; in the\nreason is first revealed the end, the meaning of existence. Reason is\nexistence objective to itself as its own end; the ultimate tendency\nof things. That which is an object to itself is the highest, the\nfinal being; that which has power over itself is almighty.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nGOD AS A MORAL BEING, OR LAW.\n\n\nGod as God--the infinite, universal, non-anthropomorphic being of the\nunderstanding, has no more significance for religion than a fundamental\ngeneral principle has for a special science; it is merely the ultimate\npoint of support,--as it were, the mathematical point of religion. The\nconsciousness of human limitation or nothingness which is united with\nthe idea of this being, is by no means a religious consciousness;\non the contrary, it characterises sceptics, materialists, and\npantheists. The belief in God--at least in the God of religion--is\nonly lost where, as in scepticism, pantheism, and materialism, the\nbelief in man is lost, at least in man such as he is presupposed in\nreligion. As little then as religion has any influential belief in the\nnothingness of man, [25] so little has it any influential belief in\nthat abstract being with which the consciousness of this nothingness\nis united. The vital elements of religion are those only which make\nman an object to man. To deny man is to deny religion.\n\nIt certainly is the interest of religion that its object should\nbe distinct from man; but it is also, nay, yet more, its interest\nthat this object should have human attributes. That he should be\na distinct being concerns his existence only; but that he should\nbe human concerns his essence. If he be of a different nature, how\ncan his existence or non-existence be of any importance to man? How\ncan he take so profound an interest in an existence in which his own\nnature has no participation?\n\nTo give an example. \"When I believe that the human nature alone\nhas suffered for me, Christ is a poor Saviour to me: in that case,\nhe needs a Saviour himself.\" And thus, out of the need for salvation\nis postulated something transcending human nature, a being different\nfrom man. But no sooner is this being postulated than there arises\nthe yearning of man after himself, after his own nature, and man\nis immediately re-established. \"Here is God, who is not man and\nnever yet became man. But this is not a God for me.... That would\nbe a miserable Christ to me, who ... should be nothing but a purely\nseparate God and divine person ... without humanity. No, my friend;\nwhere thou givest me God, thou must give me humanity too.\" [26]\n\nIn religion man seeks contentment; religion is his highest good. But\nhow could he find consolation and peace in God if God were an\nessentially different being? How can I share the peace of a being if\nI am not of the same nature with him? If his nature is different from\nmine, his peace is essentially different,--it is no peace for me. How\nthen can I become a partaker of his peace if I am not a partaker of\nhis nature? but how can I be a partaker of his nature if I am really\nof a different nature? Every being experiences peace only in its own\nelement, only in the conditions of its own nature. Thus, if man feels\npeace in God, he feels it only because in God he first attains his\ntrue nature, because here, for the first time, he is with himself,\nbecause everything in which he hitherto sought peace, and which he\nhitherto mistook for his nature, was alien to him. Hence, if man\nis to find contentment in God, he must find himself in God. \"No one\nwill taste of God but as he wills, namely--in the humanity of Christ;\nand if thou dost not find God thus, thou wilt never have rest.\" [27]\n\"Everything finds rest on the place in which it was born. The place\nwhere I was born is God. God is my fatherland. Have I a father in\nGod? Yes, I have not only a father, but I have myself in him; before\nI lived in myself, I lived already in God.\" [28]\n\nA God, therefore, who expresses only the nature of the understanding\ndoes not satisfy religion, is not the God of religion. The\nunderstanding is interested not only in man, but in the things out of\nman, in universal nature. The intellectual man forgets even himself\nin the contemplation of nature. The Christians scorned the pagan\nphilosophers because, instead of thinking of themselves, of their\nown salvation, they had thought only of things out of themselves. The\nChristian thinks only of himself. By the understanding an insect is\ncontemplated with as much enthusiasm as the image of God--man. The\nunderstanding is the absolute indifference and identity of all things\nand beings. It is not Christianity, not religious enthusiasm, but the\nenthusiasm of the understanding that we have to thank for botany,\nmineralogy, zoology, physics, and astronomy. The understanding\nis universal, pantheistic, the love of the universe; but the grand\ncharacteristic of religion, and of the Christian religion especially,\nis that it is thoroughly anthropotheistic, the exclusive love of man\nfor himself, the exclusive self-affirmation of the human nature, that\nis, of subjective human nature; for it is true that the understanding\nalso affirms the nature of man, but it is his objective nature,\nwhich has reference to the object for the sake of the object, and\nthe manifestation of which is science. Hence it must be something\nentirely different from the nature of the understanding which is\nan object to man in religion, if he is to find contentment therein,\nand this something will necessarily be the very kernel of religion.\n\nOf all the attributes which the understanding assigns to God, that\nwhich in religion, and especially in the Christian religion, has\nthe pre-eminence, is moral perfection. But God as a morally perfect\nbeing is nothing else than the realised idea, the fulfilled law of\nmorality, the moral nature of man posited as the absolute being;\nman's own nature, for the moral God requires man to be as he himself\nis: Be ye holy for I am holy; man's own conscience, for how could he\notherwise tremble before the Divine Being, accuse himself before him,\nand make him the judge of his inmost thoughts and feelings?\n\nBut the consciousness of the absolutely perfect moral nature,\nespecially as an abstract being separate from man, leaves us cold\nand empty, because we feel the distance, the chasm between ourselves\nand this being;--it is a dispiriting consciousness, for it is the\nconsciousness of our personal nothingness, and of the kind which is\nthe most acutely felt--moral nothingness. The consciousness of the\ndivine omnipotence and eternity in opposition to my limitation in\nspace and time does not afflict me: for omnipotence does not command\nme to be myself omnipotent, eternity, to be myself eternal. But I\ncannot have the idea of moral perfection without at the same time\nbeing conscious of it as a law for me. Moral perfection depends,\nat least for the moral consciousness, not on the nature, but on the\nwill--it is a perfection of will, perfect will. I cannot conceive\nperfect will, the will which is in unison with law, which is itself\nlaw, without at the same time regarding it is an object of will, i.e.,\nas an obligation for myself. The conception of the morally perfect\nbeing is no merely theoretical, inert conception, but a practical\none, calling me to action, to imitation, throwing me into strife,\ninto disunion with myself; for while it proclaims to me what I ought\nto be, it also tells me to my face, without any flattery, what I am\nnot. [29] And religion renders this disunion all the more painful,\nall the more terrible, that it sets man's own nature before him as\na separate nature, and moreover as a personal being, who hates and\ncurses sinners, and excludes them from his grace, the source of all\nsalvation and happiness.\n\nNow, by what means does man deliver himself from this state of disunion\nbetween himself and the perfect being, from the painful consciousness\nof sin, from the distressing sense of his own nothingness? How does\nhe blunt the fatal sting of sin? Only by this; that he is conscious of\nlove as the highest, the absolute power and truth, that he regards the\nDivine Being not only as a law, as a moral being, as a being of the\nunderstanding; but also as a loving, tender, even subjective human\nbeing (that is, as having sympathy with individual man).\n\nThe understanding judges only according to the stringency of law; the\nheart accommodates itself, is considerate, lenient, relenting, kat'\nanthropon. No man is sufficient for the law which moral perfection\nsets before us; but, for that reason, neither is the law sufficient for\nman, for the heart. The law condemns; the heart has compassion even on\nthe sinner. The law affirms me only as an abstract being,--love, as a\nreal being. Love gives me the consciousness that I am a man; the law\nonly the consciousness that I am a sinner, that I am worthless. [30]\nThe law holds man in bondage; love makes him free.\n\nLove is the middle term, the substantial bond, the principle of\nreconciliation between the perfect and the imperfect, the sinless and\nsinful being, the universal and the individual, the divine and the\nhuman. Love is God himself, and apart from it there is no God. Love\nmakes man God and God man. Love strengthens the weak and weakens the\nstrong, abases the high and raises the lowly, idealises matter and\nmaterialises spirit. Love is the true unity of God and man, of spirit\nand nature. In love common nature is spirit, and the pre-eminent spirit\nis nature. Love is to deny spirit from the point of view of spirit,\nto deny matter from the point of view of matter. Love is materialism;\nimmaterial love is a chim\u00e6ra. In the longing of love after the distant\nobject, the abstract idealist involuntarily confirms the truth of\nsensuousness. But love is also the idealism of nature--love is also\nspirit, esprit. Love alone makes the nightingale a songstress; love\nalone gives the plant its corolla. And what wonders does not love\nwork in our social life! What faith, creed, opinion separates, love\nunites. Love even, humorously enough, identifies the high noblesse with\nthe people. What the old mystics said of God, that he is the highest\nand yet the commonest being, applies in truth to love, and that not\na visionary, imaginary love--no! a real love, a love which has flesh\nand blood, which vibrates as an almighty force through all living.\n\nYes, it applies only to the love which has flesh and blood, for\nonly this can absolve from the sins which flesh and blood commit. A\nmerely moral being cannot forgive what is contrary to the law of\nmorality. That which denies the law is denied by the law. The moral\njudge, who does not infuse human blood into his judgment judges\nthe sinner relentlessly, inexorably. Since, then, God is regarded\nas a sin-pardoning being, he is posited, not indeed as an unmoral,\nbut as more than a moral being--in a word, as a human being. The\nnegation or annulling of sin is the negation of abstract moral\nrectitude,--the positing of love, mercy, sensuous life. Not abstract\nbeings--no! only sensuous, living beings are merciful. Mercy is the\njustice of sensuous life. [31] Hence God does not forgive the sins\nof men as the abstract God of the understanding, but as man, as the\nGod made flesh, the visible God. God as man sins not, it is true, but\nhe knows, he takes on himself, the sufferings, the wants, the needs\nof sensuous beings. The blood of Christ cleanses us from our sins in\nthe eyes of God; it is only his human blood that makes God merciful,\nallays his anger; that is, our sins are forgiven us because we are\nno abstract beings, but creatures of flesh and blood. [32]\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nTHE MYSTERY OF THE INCARNATION; OR, GOD AS LOVE, AS A BEING OF\nTHE HEART.\n\n\nIt is the consciousness of love by which man reconciles himself with\nGod, or rather with his own nature as represented in the moral law. The\nconsciousness of the divine love, or what is the same thing, the\ncontemplation of God as human, is the mystery of the Incarnation. The\nIncarnation is nothing else than the practical, material manifestation\nof the human nature of God. God did not become man for his own sake;\nthe need, the want of man--a want which still exists in the religious\nsentiment--was the cause of the Incarnation. God became man out of\nmercy: thus he was in himself already a human God before he became\nan actual man; for human want, human misery, went to his heart. The\nIncarnation was a tear of the divine compassion, and hence it was only\nthe visible advent of a Being having human feelings, and therefore\nessentially human.\n\nIf in the Incarnation we stop short at the fact of God becoming\nman, it certainly appears a surprising, inexplicable, marvellous\nevent. But the incarnate God is only the apparent manifestation of\ndeified man; for the descent of God to man is necessarily preceded by\nthe exaltation of man to God. Man was already in God, was already God\nhimself, before God became man, i.e., showed himself as man. [33] How\notherwise could God have become man? The old maxim, ex nihilo nihil\nfit, is applicable here also. A king who has not the welfare of his\nsubjects at heart, who, while seated on his throne, does not mentally\nlive with them in their dwellings, who, in feeling, is not, as the\npeople say, \"a common man,\" such a king will not descend bodily from\nhis throne to make his people happy by his personal presence. Thus,\nhas not the subject risen to be a king before the king descends to be\na subject? And if the subject feels himself honoured and made happy\nby the personal presence of his king, does this feeling refer merely\nto the bodily presence, and not rather to the manifestation of the\ndisposition, of the philanthropic nature which is the cause of the\nappearance? But that which in the truth of religion is the cause,\ntakes in the consciousness of religion the form of a consequence;\nand so here the raising of man to God is made a consequence of the\nhumiliation or descent of God to man. God, says religion, made himself\nhuman that he might make man divine. [34]\n\nThat which is mysterious and incomprehensible, i.e., contradictory,\nin the proposition, \"God is or becomes a man,\" arises only from the\nmingling or confusion of the idea or definitions of the universal,\nunlimited, metaphysical being with the idea of the religious God,\ni.e., the conditions of the understanding with the conditions of\nthe heart, the emotive nature; a confusion which is the greatest\nhindrance to the correct knowledge of religion. But, in fact, the\nidea of the Incarnation is nothing more than the human form of a God,\nwho already in his nature, in the profoundest depths of his soul,\nis a merciful and therefore a human God.\n\nThe form given to this truth in the doctrine of the Church is, that\nit was not the first person of the Godhead who was incarnate, but the\nsecond, who is the representative of man in and before God; the second\nperson being however in reality, as will be shown, the sole, true,\nfirst person in religion. And it is only apart from this distinction\nof persons that the God-man appears mysterious, incomprehensible,\n\"speculative;\" for, considered in connection with it, the Incarnation\nis a necessary, nay, a self-evident consequence. The allegation,\ntherefore, that the Incarnation is a purely empirical fact, which could\nbe made known only by means of a revelation in the theological sense,\nbetrays the most crass religious materialism; for the Incarnation is\na conclusion which rests on a very comprehensible premiss. But it is\nequally perverse to attempt to deduce the Incarnation from purely\nspeculative, i.e., metaphysical, abstract grounds; for metaphysics\napply only to the first person of the Godhead, who does not become\nincarnate, who is not a dramatic person. Such a deduction would at\nthe utmost be justifiable if it were meant consciously to deduce from\nmetaphysics the negation of metaphysics.\n\nThis example clearly exhibits the distinction between the method of our\nphilosophy and that of the old speculative philosophy. The former does\nnot philosophise concerning the Incarnation, as a peculiar, stupendous\nmystery, after the manner of speculation dazzled by mystical splendour;\non the contrary, it destroys the illusive supposition of a peculiar\nsupernatural mystery; it criticises the dogma and reduces it to its\nnatural elements, immanent in man, to its originating principle and\ncentral point--love.\n\nThe dogma presents to us two things--God and love. God is love: but\nwhat does that mean? Is God something besides love? a being distinct\nfrom love? Is it as if I said of an affectionate human being, he\nis love itself? Certainly; otherwise I must give up the name God,\nwhich expresses a special personal being, a subject in distinction\nfrom the predicate. Thus love is made something apart. God out of\nlove sent his only-begotten Son. Here love recedes and sinks into\ninsignificance in the dark background--God. It becomes merely a\npersonal, though an essential, attribute; hence it receives both in\ntheory and in feeling, both objectively and subjectively, the rank\nsimply of a predicate, not that of a subject, of the substance;\nit shrinks out of observation as a collateral, an accident; at one\nmoment it presents itself to me as something essential, at another,\nit vanishes again. God appears to me in another form besides that of\nlove; in the form of omnipotence, of a severe power not bound by love;\na power in which, though in a smaller degree, the devils participate.\n\nSo long as love is not exalted into a substance, into an essence, so\nlong there lurks in the background of love a subject who even without\nlove is something by himself, an unloving monster, a diabolical being,\nwhose personality, separable and actually separated from love, delights\nin the blood of heretics and unbelievers,--the phantom of religious\nfanaticism. Nevertheless the essential idea of the Incarnation,\nthough enveloped in the night of the religious consciousness, is\nlove. Love determined God to the renunciation of his divinity. [35]\nNot because of his Godhead as such, according to which he is the\nsubject in the proposition, God is love, but because of his love,\nof the predicate, is it that he renounced his Godhead; thus love is\na higher power and truth than deity. Love conquers God. It was love\nto which God sacrificed his divine majesty. And what sort of love\nwas that? another than ours? than that to which we sacrifice life\nand fortune? Was it the love of himself? of himself as God? No! it\nwas love to man. But is not love to man human love? Can I love man\nwithout loving him humanly, without loving him as he himself loves,\nif he truly loves? Would not love be otherwise a devilish love? The\ndevil too loves man, but not for man's sake--for his own; thus\nhe loves man out of egotism, to aggrandise himself, to extend his\npower. But God loves man for man's sake, i.e., that he may make him\ngood, happy, blessed. Does he not then love man as the true man loves\nhis fellow? Has love a plural? Is it not everywhere like itself? What\nthen is the true unfalsified import of the Incarnation but absolute,\npure love, without adjunct, without a distinction between divine and\nhuman love? For though there is also a self-interested love among\nmen, still the true human love, which is alone worthy of this name,\nis that which impels the sacrifice of self to another. Who then is our\nSaviour and Redeemer? God or Love? Love; for God as God has not saved\nus, but Love, which transcends the difference between the divine and\nhuman personality. As God has renounced himself out of love, so we,\nout of love, should renounce God; for if we do not sacrifice God to\nlove, we sacrifice love to God, and, in spite of the predicate of love,\nwe have the God--the evil being--of religious fanaticism.\n\nWhile, however, we have laid open this nucleus of truth in the\nIncarnation, we have at the same time exhibited the dogma in its\nfalsity; we have reduced the apparently supernatural and super-rational\nmystery to a simple truth inherent in human nature:--a truth which\ndoes not belong to the Christian religion alone, but which, implicitly\nat least, belongs more or less to every religion as such. For every\nreligion which has any claim to the name presupposes that God is not\nindifferent to the beings who worship him, that therefore what is\nhuman is not alien to him, that, as an object of human veneration, he\nis a human God. Every prayer discloses the secret of the Incarnation,\nevery prayer is in fact an incarnation of God. In prayer I involve\nGod in human distress, I make him a participator in my sorrows and\nwants. God is not deaf to my complaints; he has compassion on me;\nhence he renounces his divine majesty, his exaltation above all that is\nfinite and human; he becomes a man with man; for if he listens to me,\nand pities me, he is affected by my sufferings. God loves man--i.e.,\nGod suffers from man. Love does not exist without sympathy, sympathy\ndoes not exist without suffering in common. Have I any sympathy for\na being without feeling? No! I feel only for that which has feeling,\nonly for that which partakes of my nature, for that in which I feel\nmyself, whose sufferings I myself suffer. Sympathy presupposes a like\nnature. The Incarnation, Providence, prayer, are the expression of\nthis identity of nature in God and man. [36]\n\nIt is true that theology, which is pre-occupied with the metaphysical\nattributes of eternity, unconditionedness, unchangeableness,\nand the like abstractions, which express the nature of the\nunderstanding,--theology denies the possibility that God should\nsuffer, but in so doing it denies the truth of religion. [37] For\nreligion--the religious man in the act of devotion believes in a real\nsympathy of the divine being in his sufferings and wants, believes\nthat the will of God can be determined by the fervour of prayer, i.e.,\nby the force of feeling, believes in a real, present fulfilment of\nhis desire, wrought by prayer. The truly religious man unhesitatingly\nassigns his own feelings to God; God is to him a heart susceptible\nto all that is human. The heart can betake itself only to the heart;\nfeeling can appeal only to feeling; it finds consolation in itself,\nin its own nature alone.\n\nThe notion that the fulfilment of prayer has been determined from\neternity, that it was originally included in the plan of creation,\nis the empty, absurd fiction of a mechanical mode of thought, which\nis in absolute contradiction with the nature of religion. \"We need,\"\nsays Lavater somewhere, and quite correctly according to the religious\nsentiment, \"an arbitrary God.\" Besides, even according to this fiction,\nGod is just as much a being determined by man, as in the real, present\nfulfilment consequent on the power of prayer; the only difference is,\nthat the contradiction with the unchangeableness and unconditionedness\nof God--that which constitutes the difficulty--is thrown back into the\ndeceptive distance of the past or of eternity. Whether God decides\non the fulfilment of my prayer now, on the immediate occasion of my\noffering it, or whether he did decide on it long ago, is fundamentally\nthe same thing.\n\nIt is the greatest inconsequence to reject the idea of a God who\ncan be determined by prayer, that is, by the force of feeling, as an\nunworthy anthropomorphic idea. If we once believe in a being who is\nan object of veneration, an object of prayer, an object of affection,\nwho is providential, who takes care of man,--in a Providence, which is\nnot conceivable without love,--in a being, therefore, who is loving,\nwhose motive of action is love; we also believe in a being, who has,\nif not an anatomical, yet a psychical human heart. The religious mind,\nas has been said, places everything in God, excepting that alone which\nit despises. The Christians certainly gave their God no attributes\nwhich contradicted their own moral ideas, but they gave him without\nhesitation, and of necessity, the emotions of love, of compassion. And\nthe love which the religious mind places in God is not an illusory,\nimaginary love, but a real, true love. God is loved and loves again;\nthe divine love is only human love made objective, affirming itself. In\nGod love is absorbed in itself as its own ultimate truth.\n\nIt may be objected to the import here assigned to the Incarnation,\nthat the Christian Incarnation is altogether peculiar, that at least\nit is different (which is quite true in certain respects, as will\nhereafter be apparent) from the incarnations of the heathen deities,\nwhether Greek or Indian. These latter are mere products of men or\ndeified men; but in Christianity is given the idea of the true God;\nhere the union of the divine nature with the human is first significant\nand \"speculative.\" Jupiter transforms himself into a bull; the heathen\nincarnations are mere fancies. In paganism there is no more in the\nnature of God than in his incarnate manifestation; in Christianity,\non the contrary, it is God, a separate, superhuman being, who appears\nas man. But this objection is refuted by the remark already made,\nthat even the premiss of the Christian Incarnation contains the human\nnature. God loves man; moreover God has a Son; God is a father; the\nrelations of humanity are not excluded from God; the human is not\nremote from God, not unknown to him. Thus here also there is nothing\nmore in the nature of God than in the incarnate manifestation of\nGod. In the Incarnation religion only confesses, what in reflection\non itself, as theology, it will not admit; namely, that God is an\naltogether human being. The Incarnation, the mystery of the \"God-man,\"\nis therefore no mysterious composition of contraries, no synthetic\nfact, as it is regarded by the speculative religious philosophy,\nwhich has a particular delight in contradiction; it is an analytic\nfact,--a human word with a human meaning. If there be a contradiction\nhere, it lies before the incarnation and out of it; in the union of\nprovidence, of love, with deity; for if this love is a real love,\nit is not essentially different from our love,--there are only our\nlimitations to be abstracted from it; and thus the Incarnation is only\nthe strongest, deepest, most palpable, open-hearted expression of this\nprovidence, this love. Love knows not how to make its object happier\nthan by rejoicing it with its personal presence, by letting itself be\nseen. To see the invisible benefactor face to face is the most ardent\ndesire of love. To see is a divine act. Happiness lies in the mere\nsight of the beloved one. The glance is the certainty of love. And\nthe Incarnation has no other significance, no other effect, than the\nindubitable certitude of the love of God to man. Love remains, but the\nIncarnation upon the earth passes away: the appearance was limited by\ntime and place, accessible to few; but the essence, the nature which\nwas manifested, is eternal and universal. We can no longer believe\nin the manifestation for its own sake, but only for the sake of the\nthing manifested; for to us there remains no immediate presence but\nthat of love.\n\nThe clearest, most irrefragable proof that man in religion contemplates\nhimself as the object of the Divine Being, as the end of the divine\nactivity, that thus in religion he has relation only to his own nature,\nonly to himself,--the clearest, most irrefragable proof of this is\nthe love of God to man, the basis and central point of religion. God,\nfor the sake of man, empties himself of his Godhead, lays aside his\nGodhead. Herein lies the elevating influence of the Incarnation; the\nhighest, the perfect being humiliates, lowers himself for the sake\nof man. Hence in God I learn to estimate my own nature; I have value\nin the sight of God; the divine significance of my nature is become\nevident to me. How can the worth of man be more strongly expressed\nthan when God, for man's sake, becomes a man, when man is the end,\nthe object of the divine love? The love of God to man is an essential\ncondition of the Divine Being: God is a God who loves me--who loves\nman in general. Here lies the emphasis, the fundamental feeling of\nreligion. The love of God makes me loving; the love of God to man is\nthe cause of man's love to God; the divine love causes, awakens human\nlove. \"We love God because he first loved us.\" What, then, is it that I\nlove in God? Love: love to man. But when I love and worship the love\nwith which God loves man, do I not love man; is not my love of God,\nthough indirectly, love of man? If God loves man, is not man, then,\nthe very substance of God? That which I love, is it not my inmost\nbeing? Have I a heart when I do not love? No! love only is the heart\nof man. But what is love without the thing loved? Thus what I love is\nmy heart, the substance of my being, my nature. Why does man grieve,\nwhy does he lose pleasure in life when he has lost the beloved\nobject? Why? because with the beloved object he has lost his heart,\nthe activity of his affections, the principle of life. Thus if God\nloves man, man is the heart of God--the welfare of man his deepest\nanxiety. If man, then, is the object of God, is not man, in God,\nan object to himself? is not the content of the divine nature the\nhuman nature? If God is love, is not the essential content of this\nlove man? Is not the love of God to man--the basis and central point\nof religion--the love of man to himself made an object, contemplated\nas the highest objective truth, as the highest being to man? Is not\nthen the proposition, \"God loves man\" an orientalism (religion is\nessentially oriental), which in plain speech means, the highest is\nthe love of man?\n\nThe truth to which, by means of analysis, we have here reduced the\nmystery of the Incarnation, has also been recognised even in the\nreligious consciousness. Thus Luther, for example, says, \"He who\ncan truly conceive such a thing (namely, the incarnation of God)\nin his heart, should, for the sake of the flesh and blood which\nsits at the right hand of God, bear love to all flesh and blood here\nupon the earth, and never more be able to be angry with any man. The\ngentle manhood of Christ our God should at a glance fill all hearts\nwith joy, so that never more could an angry, unfriendly thought come\ntherein--yea, every man ought, out of great joy, to be tender to his\nfellow-man for the sake of that our flesh and blood.\" \"This is a fact\nwhich should move us to great joy and blissful hope that we are thus\nhonoured above all creatures, even above the angels, so that we can\nwith truth boast, My own flesh and blood sits at the right hand of\nGod and reigns over all. Such honour has no creature, not even an\nangel. This ought to be a furnace that should melt us all into one\nheart, and should create such a fervour in us men that we should\nheartily love each other.\" But that which in the truth of religion\nis the essence of the fable, the chief thing, is to the religious\nconsciousness only the moral of the fable, a collateral thing.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nTHE MYSTERY OF THE SUFFERING GOD.\n\n\nAn essential condition of the incarnate, or, what is the same thing,\nthe human God, namely, Christ, is the Passion. Love attests itself by\nsuffering. All thoughts and feelings which are immediately associated\nwith Christ concentrate themselves in the idea of the Passion. God as\nGod is the sum of all human perfection; God as Christ is the sum of all\nhuman misery. The heathen philosophers celebrated activity, especially\nthe spontaneous activity of the intelligence, as the highest, the\ndivine; the Christians consecrated passivity, even placing it in\nGod. If God as actus purus, as pure activity, is the God of abstract\nphilosophy; so, on the other hand, Christ, the God of the Christians,\nis the passio pura, pure suffering--the highest metaphysical thought,\nthe \u00eatre supr\u00eame of the heart. For what makes more impression on the\nheart than suffering? especially the suffering of one who considered\nin himself is free from suffering, exalted above it;--the suffering\nof the innocent, endured purely for the good of others, the suffering\nof love,--self-sacrifice? But for the very reason that the history\nof the Passion is the history which most deeply affects the human\nheart, or let us rather say the heart in general--for it would be a\nludicrous mistake in man to attempt to conceive any other heart than\nthe human,--it follows undeniably that nothing else is expressed in\nthat history, nothing else is made an object in it, but the nature\nof the heart,--that it is not an invention of the understanding\nor the poetic faculty, but of the heart. The heart, however, does\nnot invent in the same way as the free imagination or intelligence;\nit has a passive, receptive relation to what it produces; all that\nproceeds from it seems to it given from without, takes it by violence,\nworks with the force of irresistible necessity. The heart overcomes,\nmasters man; he who is once in its power is possessed as it were by\nhis demon, by his God. The heart knows no other God, no more excellent\nbeing than itself, than a God whose name may indeed be another, but\nwhose nature, whose substance is the nature of the heart. And out of\nthe heart, out of the inward impulse to do good, to live and die for\nman, out of the divine instinct of benevolence which desires to make\nall happy, and excludes none, not even the most abandoned and abject,\nout of the moral duty of benevolence in the highest sense, as having\nbecome an inward necessity, i.e., a movement of the heart,--out of\nthe human nature, therefore, as it reveals itself through the heart,\nhas sprung what is best, what is true in Christianity--its essence\npurified from theological dogmas and contradictions.\n\nFor, according to the principles which we have already developed, that\nwhich in religion is the predicate we must make the subject, and that\nwhich in religion is a subject we must make a predicate, thus inverting\nthe oracles of religion; and by this means we arrive at the truth. God\nsuffers--suffering is the predicate--but for men, for others, not for\nhimself. What does that mean in plain speech? Nothing else than this:\nto suffer for others is divine; he who suffers for others, who lays\ndown his life for them, acts divinely, is a God to men. [38]\n\nThe Passion of Christ, however, represents not only moral, voluntary\nsuffering, the suffering of love, the power of sacrificing self for\nthe good of others; it represents also suffering as such, suffering\nin so far as it is an expression of passibility in general. The\nChristian religion is so little superhuman that it even sanctions\nhuman weakness. The heathen philosopher, on hearing tidings of the\ndeath of his child exclaims: \"I knew that he was mortal.\" Christ, on\nthe contrary,--at least in the Bible,--sheds tears over the death of\nLazarus, a death which he nevertheless knew to be only an apparent\none. While Socrates empties the cup of poison with unshaken soul,\nChrist exclaims, \"If it be possible, let this cup pass from me.\" [39]\nChrist is in this respect the self-confession of human sensibility. In\nopposition to the heathen, and in particular the stoical principle,\nwith its rigorous energy of will and self-sustainedness, the Christian\ninvolves the consciousness of his own sensitiveness and susceptibility\nin the consciousness of God; he finds it, if only it be no sinful\nweakness, not denied, not condemned in God.\n\nTo suffer is the highest command of Christianity--the history of\nChristianity is the history of the Passion of Humanity. While amongst\nthe heathens the shout of sensual pleasure mingled itself in the\nworship of the gods, amongst the Christians, we mean of course the\nancient Christians, God is served with sighs and tears. [40] But as\nwhere sounds of sensual pleasure make a part of the cultus, it is a\nsensual God, a God of life, who is worshipped, as indeed these shouts\nof joy are only a symbolical definition of the nature of the gods to\nwhom this jubilation is acceptable; so also the sighs of Christians are\ntones which proceed from the inmost soul, the inmost nature of their\nGod. The God expressed by the cultus, whether this be an external,\nor, as with the Christians, an inward spiritual worship,--not the God\nof sophistical theology,--is the true God of man. But the Christians,\nwe mean of course the ancient Christians, believed that they rendered\nthe highest honour to their God by tears, the tears of repentance and\nyearning. Thus tears are the light-reflecting drops which mirror the\nnature of the Christian's God. But a God who has pleasure in tears,\nexpresses nothing else than the nature of the heart. It is true that\nthe theory of the Christian religion says: Christ has done all for\nus, has redeemed us, has reconciled us with God; and from hence the\ninference may be drawn: Let us be of a joyful mind and disposition;\nwhat need have we to trouble ourselves as to how we shall reconcile\nourselves with God? we are reconciled already. But the imperfect\ntense in which the fact of suffering is expressed makes a deeper,\na more enduring impression, than the perfect tense which expresses\nthe fact of redemption. The redemption is only the result of the\nsuffering; the suffering is the cause of the redemption. Hence the\nsuffering takes deeper root in the feelings; the suffering makes\nitself an object of imitation;--not so the redemption. If God himself\nsuffered for my sake, how can I be joyful, how can I allow myself\nany gladness, at least on this corrupt earth, which was the theatre\nof his suffering? [41] Ought I to fare better than God? Ought I not,\nthen, to make his sufferings my own? Is not what God my Lord does my\nmodel? Or shall I share only the gain and not the cost also? Do I know\nmerely that he has redeemed me? Do I not also know the history of his\nsuffering? Should it be an object of cold remembrance to me, or even\nan object of rejoicing, because it has purchased my salvation? Who\ncan think so--who can wish to be exempt from the sufferings of his God?\n\nThe Christian religion is the religion of suffering. [42] The images of\nthe crucified one which we still meet with in all churches, represent\nnot the Saviour, but only the crucified, the suffering Christ. Even\nthe self-crucifixions among the Christians are, psychologically, a\ndeep-rooted consequence of their religious views. How should not he\nwho has always the image of the crucified one in his mind, at length\ncontract the desire to crucify either himself or another? At least\nwe have as good a warrant for this conclusion as Augustine and other\nfathers of the Church for their reproach against the heathen religion,\nthat the licentious religious images of the heathens provoked and\nauthorised licentiousness.\n\nGod suffers, means in truth nothing else than: God is a heart. The\nheart is the source, the centre of all suffering. A being without\nsuffering is a being without a heart. The mystery of the suffering\nGod is therefore the mystery of feeling, sensibility. A suffering\nGod is a feeling, sensitive God. [43] But the proposition: God is a\nfeeling Being, is only the religious periphrase of the proposition:\nfeeling is absolute, divine in its nature.\n\nMan has the consciousness not only of a spring of activity, but also\nof a spring of suffering in himself. I feel; and I feel feeling (not\nmerely will and thought, which are only too often in opposition to me\nand my feelings), as belonging to my essential being, and, though the\nsource of all sufferings and sorrows, as a glorious, divine power and\nperfection. What would man be without feeling? It is the musical power\nin man. But what would man be without music? Just as man has a musical\nfaculty and feels an inward necessity to breathe out his feelings\nin song; so, by a like necessity, he in religious sighs and tears\nstreams forth the nature of feeling as an objective, divine nature.\n\nReligion is human nature reflected, mirrored in itself. That which\nexists has necessarily a pleasure, a joy in itself, loves itself,\nand loves itself justly; to blame it because it loves itself is\nto reproach it because it exists. To exist is to assert oneself,\nto affirm oneself, to love oneself; he to whom life is a burthen\nrids himself of it. Where, therefore, feeling is not depreciated\nand repressed, as with the Stoics, where existence is awarded to it,\nthere also is religious power and significance already conceded to it,\nthere also is it already exalted to that stage in which it can mirror\nand reflect itself, in which it can project its own image as God. God\nis the mirror of man.\n\nThat which has essential value for man, which he esteems the perfect,\nthe excellent, in which he has true delight,--that alone is God\nto him. If feeling seems to thee a glorious attribute, it is then,\nper se, a divine attribute to thee. Therefore, the feeling, sensitive\nman believes only in a feeling, sensitive God, i.e., he believes only\nin the truth of his own existence and nature, for he can believe in\nnothing else than that which is involved in his own nature. His faith\nis the consciousness of that which is holy to him; but that alone is\nholy to man which lies deepest within him, which is most peculiarly\nhis own, the basis, the essence of his individuality. To the feeling\nman a God without feeling is an empty, abstract, negative God, i.e.,\nnothing; because that is wanting to him which is precious and sacred\nto man. God is for man the commonplace book where he registers his\nhighest feelings and thoughts, the genealogical tree on which are\nentered the names that are dearest and most sacred to him.\n\nIt is a sign of an undiscriminating good-nature, a womanish instinct,\nto gather together and then to preserve tenaciously all that we\nhave gathered, not to trust anything to the waves of forgetfulness,\nto the chance of memory, in short not to trust ourselves and learn\nto know what really has value for us. The freethinker is liable to\nthe danger of an unregulated, dissolute life. The religious man who\nbinds together all things in one, does not lose himself in sensuality;\nbut for that reason he is exposed to the danger of illiberality, of\nspiritual selfishness and greed. Therefore, to the religious man at\nleast, the irreligious or un-religious man appears lawless, arbitrary,\nhaughty, frivolous; not because that which is sacred to the former is\nnot also in itself sacred to the latter, but only because that which\nthe un-religious man holds in his head merely, the religious man\nplaces out of and above himself as an object, and hence recognises\nin himself the relation of a formal subordination. The religious\nman having a commonplace book, a nucleus of aggregation, has an aim,\nand having an aim he has firm standing-ground. Not mere will as such,\nnot vague knowledge--only activity with a purpose, which is the union\nof theoretic and practical activity, gives man a moral basis and\nsupport, i.e., character. Every man, therefore, must place before\nhimself a God, i.e., an aim, a purpose. The aim is the conscious,\nvoluntary, essential impulse of life, the glance of genius, the focus\nof self-knowledge,--the unity of the material and spiritual in the\nindividual man. He who has an aim has a law over him; he does not\nmerely guide himself; he is guided. He who has no aim, has no home,\nno sanctuary; aimlessness is the greatest unhappiness. Even he who has\nonly common aims gets on better, though he may not be better, than\nhe who has no aim. An aim sets limits; but limits are the mentors\nof virtue. He who has an aim, an aim which is in itself true and\nessential, has, eo ipso, a religion, if not in the narrow sense of\ncommon pietism, yet--and this is the only point to be considered--in\nthe sense of reason, in the sense of the universal, the only true love.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nTHE MYSTERY OF THE TRINITY AND THE MOTHER OF GOD.\n\n\nIf a God without feeling, without a capability of suffering, will not\nsuffice to man as a feeling, suffering being, neither will a God with\nfeeling only, a God without intelligence and will. Only a being who\ncomprises in himself the whole man can satisfy the whole man. Man's\nconsciousness of himself in his totality is the consciousness of the\nTrinity. The Trinity knits together the qualities or powers which\nwere before regarded separately into unity, and thereby reduces the\nuniversal being of the understanding, i.e., God as God, to a special\nbeing, a special faculty.\n\nThat which theology designates as the image, the similitude of the\nTrinity, we must take as the thing itself, the essence, the archetype,\nthe original; by this means we shall solve the enigma. The so-called\nimages by which it has been sought to illustrate the Trinity, and\nmake it comprehensible, are principally: mind, understanding, memory,\nwill, love--mens, intellectus, memoria, voluntas, amor or caritas.\n\nGod thinks, God loves; and, moreover, he thinks, he loves himself;\nthe object thought, known, loved, is God himself. The objectivity\nof self-consciousness is the first thing we meet with in the\nTrinity. Self-consciousness necessarily urges itself upon man as\nsomething absolute. Existence is for him one with self-consciousness;\nexistence with self-consciousness is for him existence simply. If\nI do not know that I exist, it is all one whether I exist or\nnot. Self-consciousness is for man--is, in fact, in itself--absolute. A\nGod who knows not his own existence, a God without consciousness, is\nno God. Man cannot conceive himself as without consciousness; hence\nhe cannot conceive God as without it. The divine self-consciousness\nis nothing else than the consciousness of consciousness as an absolute\nor divine essence.\n\nBut this explanation is by no means exhaustive. On the contrary,\nwe should be proceeding very arbitrarily if we sought to reduce\nand limit the mystery of the Trinity to the proposition just laid\ndown. Consciousness, understanding, will, love, in the sense of\nabstract essences or qualities, belong only to abstract philosophy. But\nreligion is man's consciousness of himself in his concrete or living\ntotality, in which the identity of self-consciousness exists only as\nthe pregnant, complete unity of I and thou.\n\nReligion, at least the Christian, is abstraction from the world; it is\nessentially inward. The religious man leads a life withdrawn from the\nworld, hidden in God, still, void of worldly joy. He separates himself\nfrom the world, not only in the ordinary sense, according to which\nthe renunciation of the world belongs to every true, earnest man,\nbut also in that wider sense which science gives to the word, when\nit calls itself world-wisdom (welt-weisheit); but he thus separates\nhimself only because God is a being separate from the world, an\nextra and supramundane being,--i.e., abstractly and philosophically\nexpressed, the non-existence of the world. God, as an extramundane\nbeing, is however nothing else than the nature of man withdrawn from\nthe world and concentrated in itself, freed from all worldly ties\nand entanglements, transporting itself above the world, and positing\nitself in this condition as a real objective being; or, nothing else\nthan the consciousness of the power to abstract oneself from all that\nis external, and to live for and with oneself alone, under the form\nwhich this power takes in religion, namely, that of a being distinct,\napart from man. [44] God as God, as a simple being, is the being\nabsolutely alone, solitary--absolute solitude and self-sufficingness;\nfor that only can be solitary which is self-sufficing. To be able to\nbe solitary is a sign of character and thinking power. Solitude is\nthe want of the thinker, society the want of the heart. We can think\nalone, but we can love only with another. In love we are dependent,\nfor it is the need of another being; we are independent only in the\nsolitary act of thought. Solitude is self-sufficingness.\n\nBut from a solitary God the essential need of duality, of love,\nof community, of the real, completed self-consciousness, of the\nalter ego, is excluded. This want is therefore satisfied by religion\nthus: in the still solitude of the Divine Being is placed another,\na second, different from God as to personality, but identical with\nhim in essence,--God the Son, in distinction from God the Father. God\nthe Father is I, God the Son Thou. The I is understanding, the Thou\nlove. But love with understanding and understanding with love is mind,\nand mind is the totality of man as such--the total man.\n\nParticipated life is alone true, self-satisfying, divine life:--this\nsimple thought, this truth, natural, immanent in man, is the secret,\nthe supernatural mystery of the Trinity. But religion expresses\nthis truth, as it does every other, in an indirect manner, i.e.,\ninversely, for it here makes a general truth into a particular one,\nthe true subject into a predicate, when it says: God is a participated\nlife, a life of love and friendship. The third Person in the Trinity\nexpresses nothing further than the love of the two divine Persons\ntowards each other; it is the unity of the Son and the Father, the\nidea of community, strangely enough regarded in its turn as a special\npersonal being.\n\nThe Holy Spirit owes its personal existence only to a name, a word. The\nearliest Fathers of the Church are well known to have identified\nthe Spirit with the Son. Even later, its dogmatic personality wants\nconsistency. He is the love with which God loves himself and man,\nand, on the other hand, he is the love with which man loves God and\nmen. Thus he is the identity of God and man, made objective according\nto the usual mode of thought in religion, namely, as in itself a\ndistinct being. But for us this unity or identity is already involved\nin the idea of the Father, and yet more in that of the Son. Hence we\nneed not make the Holy Spirit a separate object of our analysis. Only\nthis one remark further. In so far as the Holy Spirit represents the\nsubjective phase, he is properly the representation of the religious\nsentiment to itself, the representation of religious emotion, of\nreligious enthusiasm, or the personification, the rendering objective\nof religion in religion. The Holy Spirit is therefore the sighing\ncreature, the yearning of the creature after God.\n\nBut that there are in fact only two Persons in the Trinity, the\nthird representing, as has been said, only love, is involved in\nthis, that to the strict idea of love two suffice. With two we have\nthe principle of multiplicity and all its essential results. Two\nis the principle of multiplicity, and can therefore stand as its\ncomplete substitute. If several Persons were posited, the force\nof love would only be weakened--it would be dispersed. But love\nand the heart are identical; the heart is no special power; it is\nthe man who loves, and in so far as he loves. The second Person is\ntherefore the self-assertion of the human heart as the principle of\nduality, of participated life,--it is warmth; the Father is light,\nalthough light was chiefly a predicate of the Son, because in him the\nGodhead first became clear, comprehensible. But notwithstanding this,\nlight as a superterrestrial element may be ascribed to the Father,\nthe representative of the Godhead as such, the cold being of the\nintelligence; and warmth, as a terrestrial element, to the Son. God\nas the Son first gives warmth to man; here God, from an object of\nthe intellectual eye, of the indifferent sense of light, becomes\nan object of feeling, of affection, of enthusiasm, of rapture;\nbut only because the Son is himself nothing else than the glow of\nlove, enthusiasm. [45] God as the Son is the primitive incarnation,\nthe primitive self-renunciation of God, the negation of God in God;\nfor as the Son he is a finite being, because he exists ab alio, he\nhas a source, whereas the Father has no source, he exists \u00e0 se. Thus\nin the second Person the essential attribute of the Godhead, the\nattribute of self-existence, is given up. But God the Father himself\nbegets the Son; thus he renounces his rigorous, exclusive divinity;\nhe humiliates, lowers himself, evolves within himself the principle\nof finiteness, of dependent existence; in the Son he becomes man,\nnot indeed, in the first instance, as to the outward form, but as\nto the inward nature. And for this reason it is as the Son that God\nfirst becomes the object of man, the object of feeling, of the heart.\n\nThe heart comprehends only what springs from the heart. From\nthe character of the subjective disposition and impressions the\nconclusion is infallible as to the character of the object. The\npure, free understanding denies the Son,--not so the understanding\ndetermined by feeling, overshadowed by the heart; on the contrary,\nit finds in the Son the depths of the Godhead, because in him it\nfinds feeling, which in and by itself is something dark, obscure,\nand therefore appears to man a mystery. The Son lays hold on the\nheart, because the true Father of the Divine Son is the human heart,\n[46] and the Son himself nothing else than the divine heart, i.e.,\nthe human heart become objective to itself as a Divine Being.\n\nA God who has not in himself the quality of finiteness, the principle\nof concrete existence, the essence of the feeling of dependence, is\nno God for a finite, concrete being. The religious man cannot love a\nGod who has not the essence of love in himself, neither can man, or,\nin general, any finite being, be an object to a God who has not in\nhimself the ground, the principle of finiteness. To such a God there is\nwanting the sense, the understanding, the sympathy for finiteness. How\ncan God be the Father of men, how can he love other beings subordinate\nto himself, if he has not in himself a subordinate being, a Son, if\nhe does not know what love is, so to speak, from his own experience,\nin relation to himself? The single man takes far less interest in the\nfamily sorrows of another than he who himself has family ties. Thus\nGod the Father loves men only in the Son and for the sake of the\nSon. The love to man is derived from the love to the Son.\n\nThe Father and Son in the Trinity are therefore father and son not\nin a figurative sense, but in a strictly literal sense. The Father\nis a real father in relation to the Son, the Son is a real son\nin relation to the Father, or to God as the Father. The essential\npersonal distinction between them consists only in this, that the one\nbegets, the other is begotten. If this natural empirical condition is\ntaken away, their personal existence and reality are annihilated. The\nChristians--we mean of course the Christians of former days, who would\nwith difficulty recognise the worldly, frivolous, pagan Christians\nof the modern world as their brethren in Christ--substituted for\nthe natural love and unity immanent in man a purely religious love\nand unity; they rejected the real life of the family, the intimate\nbond of love which is naturally moral, as an undivine, unheavenly,\ni.e., in truth, a worthless thing. But in compensation they had a\nFather and Son in God, who embraced each other with heartfelt love,\nwith that intense love which natural relationship alone inspires. On\nthis account the mystery of the Trinity was to the ancient Christians\nan object of unbounded wonder, enthusiasm, and rapture, because here\nthe satisfaction of those profoundest human wants which in reality,\nin life, they denied, became to them an object of contemplation in\nGod. [47]\n\nIt was therefore quite in order that, to complete the divine\nfamily, the bond of love between Father and Son, a third, and that\na feminine person, was received into heaven; for the personality of\nthe Holy Spirit is a too vague and precarious, a too obviously poetic\npersonification of the mutual love of the Father and Son, to serve as\nthe third complementary being. It is true that the Virgin Mary was not\nso placed between the Father and Son as to imply that the Father had\nbegotten the Son through her, because the sexual relation was regarded\nby the Christians as something unholy and sinful; but it is enough\nthat the maternal principle was associated with the Father and Son.\n\nIt is, in fact, difficult to perceive why the Mother should be\nsomething unholy, i.e., unworthy of God, when once God is Father\nand Son. Though it is held that the Father is not a father in the\nnatural sense--that, on the contrary, the divine generation is quite\ndifferent from the natural and human--still he remains a Father, and a\nreal, not a nominal or symbolical Father in relation to the Son. And\nthe idea of the Mother of God, which now appears so strange to us,\nis therefore not really more strange or paradoxical, than the idea\nof the Son of God, is not more in contradiction with the general,\nabstract definition of God than the Sonship. On the contrary, the\nVirgin Mary fits in perfectly with the relations of the Trinity, since\nshe conceives without man the Son whom the Father begets without woman;\n[48] so that thus the Holy Virgin is a necessary, inherently requisite\nantithesis to the Father in the bosom of the Trinity. Moreover we have,\nif not in concreto and explicitly, yet in abstracto and implicitly,\nthe feminine principle already in the Son. The Son is the mild, gentle,\nforgiving, conciliating being--the womanly sentiment of God. God, as\nthe Father, is the generator, the active, the principle of masculine\nspontaneity; but the Son is begotten without himself begetting, Deus\ngenitus, the passive, suffering, receptive being; he receives his\nexistence from the Father. The Son, as a son, of course not as God,\nis dependent on the Father, subject to his authority. The Son is thus\nthe feminine feeling of dependence in the Godhead; the Son implicitly\nurges upon us the need of a real feminine being. [49]\n\nThe son--I mean the natural, human son--considered as such, is an\nintermediate being between the masculine nature of the father and the\nfeminine nature of the mother; he is, as it were, still half a man,\nhalf a woman, inasmuch as he has not the full, rigorous consciousness\nof independence which characterises the man, and feels himself drawn\nrather to the mother than to the father. The love of the son to the\nmother is the first love of the masculine being for the feminine. The\nlove of man to woman, the love of the youth for the maiden, receives\nits religious--its sole truly religious consecration in the love of the\nson to the mother; the son's love for his mother is the first yearning\nof man towards woman--his first humbling of himself before her.\n\nNecessarily, therefore, the idea of the Mother of God is associated\nwith the idea of the Son of God,--the same heart that needed the one\nneeded the other also. Where the Son is, the Mother cannot be absent;\nthe Son is the only-begotten of the Father, but the Mother is the\nconcomitant of the Son. The Son is a substitute for the Mother to the\nFather, but not so the Father to the Son. To the Son the Mother is\nindispensable; the heart of the Son is the heart of the Mother. Why\ndid God become man only through woman? Could not the Almighty have\nappeared as a man amongst men in another manner--immediately? Why\ndid the Son betake himself to the bosom of the Mother? [50] For what\nother reason than because the Son is the yearning after the Mother,\nbecause his womanly, tender heart found a corresponding expression\nonly in a feminine body? It is true that the Son, as a natural\nman, dwells only temporarily in the shrine of this body, but the\nimpressions which he here receives are inextinguishable; the Mother\nis never out of the mind and heart of the Son. If then the worship\nof the Son of God is no idolatry, the worship of the Mother of God\nis no idolatry. If herein we perceive the love of God to us, that he\ngave us his only-begotten Son, i.e., that which was dearest to him,\nfor our salvation,--we can perceive this love still better when we\nfind in God the beating of a mother's heart. The highest and deepest\nlove is the mother's love. The father consoles himself for the loss\nof his son; he has a stoical principle within him. The mother, on the\ncontrary, is inconsolable; she is the sorrowing element, that which\ncannot be indemnified--the true in love.\n\nWhere faith in the Mother of God sinks, there also sinks faith in the\nSon of God, and in God as the Father. The Father is a truth only where\nthe Mother is a truth. Love is in and by itself essentially feminine in\nits nature. The belief in the love of God is the belief in the feminine\nprinciple as divine.* Love apart from living nature is an anomaly,\na phantom. Behold in love the holy necessity and depth of Nature!\n\nProtestantism has set aside the Mother of God; but this deposition\nof woman has been severely avenged. [51] The arms which it has used\nagainst the Mother of God have turned against itself, against the\nSon of God, against the whole Trinity. He who has once offered up the\nMother of God to the understanding, is not far from sacrificing the\nmystery of the Son of God as an anthropomorphism. The anthropomorphism\nis certainly veiled when the feminine being is excluded, but only\nveiled--not removed. It is true that Protestantism had no need of\nthe heavenly bride, because it received with open arms the earthly\nbride. But for that very reason it ought to have been consequent and\ncourageous enough to give up not only the Mother, but the Son and the\nFather. Only he who has no earthly parents needs heavenly ones. The\ntriune God is the God of Catholicism; he has a profound, heartfelt,\nnecessary, truly religious significance, only in antithesis to the\nnegation of all substantial bonds, in antithesis to the life of the\nanchorite, the monk, and the nun. [52] The triune God has a substantial\nmeaning only where there is an abstraction from the substance of\nreal life. The more empty life is, the fuller, the more concrete is\nGod. The impoverishing of the real world and the enriching of God\nis one act. Only the poor man has a rich God. God springs out of the\nfeeling of a want; what man is in need of, whether this be a definite\nand therefore conscious, or an unconscious need,--that is God. Thus\nthe disconsolate feeling of a void, of loneliness, needed a God in\nwhom there is society, a union of beings fervently loving each other.\n\nHere we have the true explanation of the fact that the Trinity has in\nmodern times lost first its practical, and ultimately its theoretical\nsignificance.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nTHE MYSTERY OF THE LOGOS AND DIVINE IMAGE.\n\n\nThe essential significance of the Trinity is, however, concentrated\nin the idea of the second Person. The warm interest of Christians\nin the Trinity has been, in the main, only an interest in the Son\nof God. [53] The fierce contention concerning the Homousios and\nHomoiousios was not an empty one, although it turned upon a letter. The\npoint in question was the co-equality and divine dignity of the second\nPerson, and therefore the honour of the Christian religion itself;\nfor its essential, characteristic object is the second Person;\nand that which is essentially the object of a religion is truly,\nessentially its God. The real God of any religion is the so-called\nMediator, because he alone is the immediate object of religion. He\nwho, instead of applying to God, applies to a saint, does so only on\nthe assumption that the saint has all power with God, that what he\nprays for, i.e., wishes and wills, God readily performs; that thus\nGod is entirely in the hands of the saint. Supplication is the means,\nunder the guise of humility and submission, of exercising one's power\nand superiority over another being. That to which my mind first turns\nis also, in truth, the first being to me. I turn to the saint, not\nbecause the saint is dependent on God, but because God is dependent\non the saint, because God is determined and ruled by the prayers,\ni.e., by the wish or heart of the saint. The distinctions which the\nCatholic theologians made between latreia, doulia, and hyperdoulia,\nare absurd, groundless sophisms. The God in the background of the\nMediator is only an abstract, inert conception, the conception or\nidea of the Godhead in general; and it is not to reconcile us with\nthis idea, but to remove it to a distance, to negative it, because\nit is no object for religion, that the Mediator interposes. [54]\nGod above the Mediator is nothing else than the cold understanding\nabove the heart, like Fate above the Olympic gods.\n\nMan, as an emotional and sensuous being, is governed and made happy\nonly by images, by sensible representations. Mind presenting itself as\nat once type-creating, emotional, and sensuous, is the imagination. The\nsecond Person in God, who is in truth the first person in religion, is\nthe nature of the imagination made objective. The definitions of the\nsecond Person are principally images or symbols; and these images do\nnot proceed from man's incapability of conceiving the object otherwise\nthan symbolically,--which is an altogether false interpretation,--but\nthe thing cannot be conceived otherwise than symbolically because the\nthing itself is a symbol or image. The Son is, therefore, expressly\ncalled the Image of God; his essence is that he is an image--the\nrepresentation of God, the visible glory of the invisible God. The\nSon is the satisfaction of the need for mental images, the nature of\nthe imaginative activity in man made objective as an absolute, divine\nactivity. Man makes to himself an image of God, i.e., he converts\nthe abstract being of the reason, the being of the thinking power,\ninto an object of sense or imagination. [55] But he places this image\nin God himself, because his want would not be satisfied if he did not\nregard this image as an objective reality, if it were nothing more\nfor him than a subjective image, separate from God,--a mere figment\ndevised by man. And it is in fact no devised, no arbitrary image;\nfor it expresses the necessity of the imagination, the necessity of\naffirming the imagination as a divine power. The Son is the reflected\nsplendour of the imagination, the image dearest to the heart; but\nfor the very reason that he is only an object of the imagination,\nhe is only the nature of the imagination made objective. [56]\n\nIt is clear from this how blinded by prejudice dogmatic speculation\nis, when, entirely overlooking the inward genesis of the Son of God\nas the Image of God, it demonstrates the Son as a metaphysical ens,\nas an object of thought, whereas the Son is a declension, a falling\noff from the metaphysical idea of the Godhead;--a falling off, however,\nwhich religion naturally places in God himself, in order to justify it,\nand not to feel it as a falling off. The Son is the chief and ultimate\nprinciple of image-worship, for he is the image of God; and the image\nnecessarily takes the place of the thing. The adoration of the saint\nin his image is the adoration of the image as the saint. Wherever the\nimage is the essential expression, the organ of religion, there also\nit is the essence of religion.\n\nThe Council of Nice adduced, amongst other grounds for the religious\nuse of images, the authority of Gregory of Nyssa, who said that he\ncould never look at an image which represented the sacrifice of Isaac\nwithout being moved to tears, because it so vividly brought before\nhim that event in sacred history. But the effect of the represented\nobject is not the effect of the object as such, but the effect of\nthe representation. The holy object is simply the haze of holiness in\nwhich the image veils its mysterious power. The religious object is\nonly a pretext, by means of which art or imagination can exercise its\ndominion over men unhindered. For the religious consciousness, it is\ntrue, the sacredness of the image is associated, and necessarily so,\nonly with the sacredness of the object; but the religious consciousness\nis not the measure of truth. Indeed, the Church itself, while insisting\non the distinction between the image and the object of the image,\nand denying that the worship is paid to the image, has at the same\ntime made at least an indirect admission of the truth, by itself\ndeclaring the sacredness of the image. [57]\n\nBut the ultimate, highest principle of image-worship is the worship of\nthe Image of God in God. The Son, who is the \"brightness of his glory,\nthe express image of his person,\" is the entrancing splendour of the\nimagination, which only manifests itself in visible images. Both\nto inward and outward contemplation the representation of Christ,\nthe Image of God, was the image of images. The images of the saints\nare only optical multiplications of one and the same image. The\nspeculative deduction of the Image of God is therefore nothing more\nthan an unconscious deduction and establishing of image-worship: for\nthe sanction of the principle is also the sanction of its necessary\nconsequences; the sanction of the archetype is the sanction of its\nsemblance. If God has an image of himself, why should not I have\nan image of God? If God loves his Image as himself, why should not\nI also love the Image of God as I love God himself? If the Image of\nGod is God himself, why should not the image of the saint be the saint\nhimself? If it is no superstition to believe that the image which God\nmakes of himself is no image, no mere conception, but a substance,\na person, why should it be a superstition to believe that the image\nof the saint is the sensitive substance of the saint? The Image of\nGod weeps and bleeds; why then should not the image of a saint also\nweep and bleed? Does the distinction lie in the fact that the image\nof the saint is a product of the hands? Why, the hands did not make\nthis image, but the mind which animated the hands, the imagination;\nand if God makes an image of himself, that also is only a product\nof the imagination. Or does the distinction proceed from this, that\nthe Image of God is produced by God himself, whereas the image of\nthe saint is made by another? Why, the image of the saint is also\na product of the saint himself: for he appears to the artist; the\nartist only represents him as he appears.\n\nConnected with the nature of the image is another definition of the\nsecond Person, namely, that he is the Word of God.\n\nA word is an abstract image, the imaginary thing, or, in so far as\neverything is ultimately an object of the thinking power, it is the\nimagined thought: hence men, when they know the word, the name for a\nthing, fancy that they know the thing also. Words are a result of the\nimagination. Sleepers who dream vividly and invalids who are delirious\nspeak. The power of speech is a poetic talent. Brutes do not speak\nbecause they have no poetic faculty. Thought expresses itself only by\nimages; the power by which thought expresses itself is the imagination;\nthe imagination expressing itself is speech. He who speaks, lays\nunder a spell, fascinates those to whom he speaks; but the power of\nwords is the power of the imagination. Therefore to the ancients,\nas children of the imagination, the Word was a being--a mysterious,\nmagically powerful being. Even the Christians, and not only the vulgar\namong them, but also the learned, the Fathers of the Church, attached\nto the mere name Christ, mysterious powers of healing. [58] And in\nthe present day the common people still believe that it is possible to\nbewitch men by mere words. Whence comes this ascription of imaginary\ninfluences to words? Simply from this, that words themselves are only\na result of the imagination, and hence have the effect of a narcotic\non man, imprison him under the power of the imagination. Words possess\na revolutionising force; words govern mankind. Words are held sacred;\nwhile the things of reason and truth are decried.\n\nThe affirming or making objective of the nature of the imagination is\ntherefore directly connected with the affirming or making objective\nof the nature of speech, of the word. Man has not only an instinct, an\ninternal necessity, which impels him to think, to perceive, to imagine;\nhe has also the impulse to speak, to utter, impart his thoughts. A\ndivine impulse this--a divine power, the power of words. The word is\nthe imaged, revealed, radiating, lustrous, enlightening thought. The\nword is the light of the world. The word guides to all truth, unfolds\nall mysteries, reveals the unseen, makes present the past and the\nfuture, defines the infinite, perpetuates the transient. Men pass\naway, the word remains; the word is life and truth. All power is\ngiven to the word: the word makes the blind see and the lame walk,\nheals the sick, and brings the dead to life;--the word works miracles,\nand the only rational miracles. The word is the gospel, the paraclete\nof mankind. To convince thyself of the divine nature of speech, imagine\nthyself alone and forsaken, yet acquainted with language; and imagine\nthyself further hearing for the first time the word of a human being:\nwould not this word seem to thee angelic? would it not sound like\nthe voice of God himself, like heavenly music? Words are not really\nless rich, less pregnant than music, though music seems to say more,\nand appears deeper and richer than words, for this reason simply,\nthat it is invested with that prepossession, that illusion.\n\nThe word has power to redeem, to reconcile, to bless, to make free. The\nsins which we confess are forgiven us by virtue of the divine power of\nthe word. The dying man who gives forth in speech his long-concealed\nsins departs reconciled. The forgiveness of sins lies in the confession\nof sins. The sorrows which we confide to our friend are already half\nhealed. Whenever we speak of a subject, the passions which it has\nexcited in us are allayed; we see more clearly; the object of anger,\nof vexation, of sorrow, appears to us in a light in which we perceive\nthe unworthiness of those passions. If we are in darkness and doubt\non any matter, we need only speak of it;--often in the very moment in\nwhich we open our lips to consult a friend, the doubts and difficulties\ndisappear. The word makes man free. He who cannot express himself is\na slave. Hence, excessive passion, excessive joy, excessive grief, are\nspeechless. To speak is an act of freedom; the word is freedom. Justly\ntherefore is language held to be the root of culture; where language\nis cultivated, man is cultivated. The barbarism of the Middle Ages\ndisappeared before the revival of language.\n\nAs we can conceive nothing else as a Divine Being than the Rational\nwhich we think, the Good which we love, the Beautiful which we\nperceive; so we know no higher spiritually operative power and\nexpression of power than the power of the Word. [59] God is the sum of\nall reality. All that man feels or knows as a reality he must place\nin God or regard as God. Religion must therefore be conscious of the\npower of the word as a divine power. The Word of God is the divinity\nof the word, as it becomes an object to man within the sphere of\nreligion,--the true nature of the human word. The Word of God is\nsupposed to be distinguished from the human word in that it is no\ntransient breath, but an imparted being. But does not the word of man\nalso contain the being of man, his imparted self,--at least when it\nis a true word? Thus religion takes the appearance of the human word\nfor its essence; hence it necessarily conceives the true nature of\nthe Word to be a special being, distinct from the human word.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nTHE MYSTERY OF THE COSMOGONICAL PRINCIPLE IN GOD.\n\n\nThe second Person, as God revealing, manifesting, declaring himself\n(Deus se dicit), is the world-creating principle in God. But this\nmeans nothing else than that the second Person is intermediate between\nthe noumenal nature of God and the phenomenal nature of the world,\nthat he is the divine principle of the finite, of that which is\ndistinguished from God. The second Person as begotten, as not \u00e0 se,\nnot existing of himself, has the fundamental condition of the finite\nin himself. [60] But at the same time, he is not yet a real finite\nBeing, posited out of God; on the contrary, he is still identical\nwith God,--as identical as the son is with the father, the son being\nindeed another person, but still of like nature with the father. The\nsecond Person, therefore, does not represent to us the pure idea of\nthe Godhead, but neither does he represent the pure idea of humanity,\nor of reality in general: he is an intermediate Being between the\ntwo opposites. The opposition of the noumenal or invisible divine\nnature and the phenomenal or visible nature of the world, is, however,\nnothing else than the opposition between the nature of abstraction\nand the nature of perception; but that which connects abstraction\nwith perception is the imagination: consequently, the transition from\nGod to the world by means of the second Person, is only the form in\nwhich religion makes objective the transition from abstraction to\nperception by means of the imagination. It is the imagination alone by\nwhich man neutralises the opposition between God and the world. All\nreligious cosmogonies are products of the imagination. Every being,\nintermediate between God and the world, let it be defined how it may,\nis a being of the imagination. The psychological truth and necessity\nwhich lies at the foundation of all these theogonies and cosmogonies\nis the truth and necessity of the imagination as a middle term between\nthe abstract and concrete. And the task of philosophy in investigating\nthis subject is to comprehend the relation of the imagination to\nthe reason,--the genesis of the image by means of which an object of\nthought becomes an object of sense, of feeling.\n\nBut the nature of the imagination is the complete, exhaustive truth\nof the cosmogonic principle, only where the antithesis of God and the\nworld expresses nothing but the indefinite antithesis of the noumenal,\ninvisible, incomprehensible being, God, and the visible, tangible\nexistence of the world. If, on the other hand, the cosmogonic being\nis conceived and expressed abstractly, as is the case in religious\nspeculation, we have also to recognise a more abstract psychological\ntruth as its foundation.\n\nThe world is not God; it is other than God, the opposite of God, or at\nleast that which is different from God. But that which is different\nfrom God cannot have come immediately from God, but only from a\ndistinction of God in God. The second Person is God distinguishing\nhimself from himself in himself, setting himself opposite to himself,\nhence being an object to himself. The self-distinguishing of God\nfrom himself is the ground of that which is different from himself,\nand thus self-consciousness is the origin of the world. God first\nthinks the world in thinking himself: to think oneself is to beget\noneself, to think the world is to create the world. Begetting precedes\ncreating. The idea of the production of the world, of another being\nwho is not God, is attained through the idea of the production of\nanother being who is like God.\n\nThis cosmogonical process is nothing else than the mystic paraphrase of\na psychological process, nothing else than the unity of consciousness\nand self-consciousness made objective. God thinks himself:--thus he\nis self-conscious. God is self-consciousness posited as an object,\nas a being; but inasmuch as he knows himself, thinks himself, he also\nthinks another than himself; for to know oneself is to distinguish\noneself from another, whether this be a possible, merely conceptional,\nor a real being. Thus the world--at least the possibility, the idea of\nthe world--is posited with consciousness, or rather conveyed in it. The\nSon, i.e., God thought by himself, objective to himself, the original\nreflection of God, the other God, is the principle of creation. The\ntruth which lies at the foundation of this is the nature of man: the\nidentity of his self-consciousness with his consciousness of another\nwho is identical with himself, and of another who is not identical\nwith himself. And the second, the other who is of like nature, is\nnecessarily the middle term between the first and third. The idea\nof another in general, of one who is essentially different from me,\narises to me first through the idea of one who is essentially like me.\n\nConsciousness of the world is the consciousness of my limitation:\nif I knew nothing of a world, I should know nothing of limits; but\nthe consciousness of my limitation stands in contradiction with the\nimpulse of my egoism towards unlimitedness. Thus from egoism conceived\nas absolute (God is the absolute Self) I cannot pass immediately to\nits opposite; I must introduce, prelude, moderate this contradiction\nby the consciousness of a being who is indeed another, and in so far\ngives me the perception of my limitation, but in such a way as at\nthe same time to affirm my own nature, make my nature objective to\nme. The consciousness of the world is a humiliating consciousness;\nthe creation was an \"act of humility;\" but the first stone against\nwhich the pride of egoism stumbles is the thou, the alter ego. The\nego first steels its glance in the eye of a thou before it endures\nthe contemplation of a being which does not reflect its own image. My\nfellow-man is the bond between me and the world. I am, and I feel\nmyself, dependent on the world, because I first feel myself dependent\non other men. If I did not need man, I should not need the world. I\nreconcile myself with the world only through my fellow-man. Without\nother men, the world would be for me not only dead and empty, but\nmeaningless. Only through his fellow does man become clear to himself\nand self-conscious; but only when I am clear to myself does the\nworld become clear to me. A man existing absolutely alone would lose\nhimself without any sense of his individuality in the ocean of Nature;\nhe would neither comprehend himself as man nor Nature as Nature. The\nfirst object of man is man. The sense of Nature, which opens to us\nthe consciousness of the world as a world, is a later product; for it\nfirst arises through the distinction of man from himself. The natural\nphilosophers of Greece were preceded by the so-called seven Sages,\nwhose wisdom had immediate reference to human life only.\n\nThe ego, then, attains to consciousness of the world through\nconsciousness of the thou. Thus man is the God of man. That he\nis, he has to thank Nature; that he is man, he has to thank man;\nspiritually as well as physically he can achieve nothing without\nhis fellow-man. Four hands can do more than two, but also four eyes\ncan see more than two. And this combined power is distinguished not\nonly in quantity but also in quality from that which is solitary. In\nisolation human power is limited, in combination it is infinite. The\nknowledge of a single man is limited, but reason, science, is\nunlimited, for it is a common act of mankind; and it is so, not only\nbecause innumerable men co-operate in the construction of science,\nbut also in the more profound sense, that the scientific genius of\na particular age comprehends in itself the thinking powers of the\npreceding age, though it modifies them in accordance with its own\nspecial character. Wit, acumen, imagination, feeling as distinguished\nfrom sensation, reason as a subjective faculty,--all these so-called\npowers of the soul are powers of humanity, not of man as an individual;\nthey are products of culture, products of human society. Only where\nman has contact and friction with his fellow-man are wit and sagacity\nkindled; hence there is more wit in the town than in the country,\nmore in great towns than in small ones. Only where man suns and warms\nhimself in the proximity of man arise feeling and imagination. Love,\nwhich requires mutuality, is the spring of poetry; and only where man\ncommunicates with man, only in speech, a social act, awakes reason. To\nask a question and to answer are the first acts of thought. Thought\noriginally demands two. It is not until man has reached an advanced\nstage of culture that he can double himself, so as to play the part of\nanother within himself. To think and to speak are therefore, with all\nancient and sensuous nations, identical; they think only in speaking;\ntheir thought is only conversation. The common people, i.e., people\nin whom the power of abstraction has not been developed, are still\nincapable of understanding what is written if they do not read it\naudibly, if they do not pronounce what they read. In this point of view\nHobbes correctly enough derives the understanding of man from his ears!\n\nReduced to abstract logical categories, the creative principle in\nGod expresses nothing further than the tautological proposition:\nthe different can only proceed from a principle of difference,\nnot from a simple being. However the Christian philosophers and\ntheologians insisted on the creation of the world out of nothing,\nthey were unable altogether to evade the old axiom--\"Nothing comes\nfrom nothing,\" because it expresses a law of thought. It is true that\nthey supposed no real matter as the principle of the diversity of\nmaterial things, but they made the divine understanding (and the Son\nis the wisdom, the science, the understanding of the Father)--as that\nwhich comprehends within itself all things as spiritual matter--the\nprinciple of real matter. The distinction between the heathen eternity\nof matter and the Christian creation in this respect is only that the\nheathens ascribed to the world a real, objective eternity, whereas\nthe Christians gave it an invisible, immaterial eternity. Things were\nbefore they existed positively,--not, indeed, as an object of sense,\nbut of the subjective understanding. The Christians, whose principle\nis that of absolute subjectivity, conceive all things as effected only\nthrough this principle. The matter posited by their subjective thought,\nconceptional, subjective matter, is therefore to them the first\nmatter,--far more excellent than real, objective matter. Nevertheless,\nthis distinction is only a distinction in the mode of existence. The\nworld is eternal in God. Or did it spring up in him as a sudden idea,\na caprice? Certainly man can conceive this too; but, in doing so, he\ndeifies nothing but his own irrationality. If, on the contrary, I abide\nby reason, I can only derive the world from its essence, its idea,\ni.e., one mode of its existence from another mode; in other words,\nI can derive the world only from itself. The world has its basis in\nitself, as has everything in the world which has a claim to the name\nof species. The differentia specifica, the peculiar character, that\nby which a given being is what it is, is always in the ordinary sense\ninexplicable, undeducible, is through itself, has its cause in itself.\n\nThe distinction between the world and God as the creator of the world\nis therefore only a formal one. The nature of God--for the divine\nunderstanding, that which comprehends within itself all things,\nis the divine nature itself; hence God, inasmuch as he thinks and\nknows himself, thinks and knows at the same time the world and all\nthings--the nature of God is nothing else than the abstract, thought\nnature of the world; the nature of the world nothing else than the\nreal, concrete, perceptible nature of God. Hence creation is nothing\nmore than a formal act; for that which, before the creation, was an\nobject of thought, of the understanding, is by creation simply made an\nobject of sense, its ideal contents continuing the same; although it\nremains absolutely inexplicable how a real material thing can spring\nout of a pure thought. [61]\n\nSo it is with plurality and difference--if we reduce the world to\nthese abstract categories--in opposition to the unity and identity\nof the Divine nature. Real difference can be derived only from a\nbeing which has a principle of difference in itself. But I posit\ndifference in the original being, because I have originally found\ndifference as a positive reality. Wherever difference is in itself\nnothing, there also no difference is conceived in the principle of\nthings. I posit difference as an essential category, as a truth,\nwhere I derive it from the original being, and vice vers\u00e2: the\ntwo propositions are identical. The rational expression is this:\nDifference lies as necessarily in the reason as identity.\n\nBut as difference is a positive condition of the reason, I cannot\ndeduce it without presupposing it; I cannot explain it except by\nitself, because it is an original, self-luminous, self-attesting\nreality. Through what means arises the world, that which is\ndistinguished from God? through the distinguishing of God from\nhimself in himself. God thinks himself, he is an object to himself;\nhe distinguishes himself from himself. Hence this distinction, the\nworld, arises only from a distinction of another kind, the external\ndistinction from an internal one, the static distinction from a dynamic\none,--from an act of distinction: thus I establish difference only\nthrough itself, i.e., it is an original concept, a ne plus ultra of\nmy thought, a law, a necessity, a truth. The last distinction that\nI can think is the distinction of a being from and in itself. The\ndistinction of one being from another is self-evident, is already\nimplied in their existence, is a palpable truth: they are two. But I\nfirst establish difference for thought when I discern it in one and\nthe same being, when I unite it with the law of identity. Herein lies\nthe ultimate truth of difference. The cosmogonic principle in God,\nreduced to its last elements, is nothing else than the act of thought\nin its simplest forms made objective. If I remove difference from\nGod, he gives me no material for thought; he ceases to be an object\nof thought; for difference is an essential principle of thought. And\nif I consequently place difference in God, what else do I establish,\nwhat else do I make an object, than the truth and necessity of this\nprinciple of thought?\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nTHE MYSTERY OF MYSTICISM, OR OF NATURE IN GOD.\n\n\nInteresting material for the criticism of cosmogonic and theogonic\nfancies is furnished in the doctrine--revived by Schelling and drawn\nfrom Jacob B\u00f6hme--of eternal Nature in God.\n\nGod is pure spirit, clear self-consciousness, moral personality;\nNature, on the contrary, is, at least partially, confused,\ndark, desolate, immoral, or to say no more, unmoral. But it is\nself-contradictory that the impure should proceed from the pure,\ndarkness from light. How then can we remove these obvious difficulties\nin the way of assigning a divine origin to Nature? Only by positing\nthis impurity, this darkness in God, by distinguishing in God himself\na principle of light and a principle of darkness. In other words,\nwe can only explain the origin of darkness by renouncing the idea of\norigin, and presupposing darkness as existing from the beginning. [62]\n\nBut that which is dark in Nature is the irrational, the material,\nNature strictly, as distinguished from intelligence. Hence the simple\nmeaning of this doctrine is, that Nature, Matter, cannot be explained\nas a result of intelligence; on the contrary, it is the basis of\nintelligence, the basis of personality, without itself having any\nbasis; spirit without Nature is an unreal abstraction; consciousness\ndevelops itself only out of Nature. But this materialistic doctrine is\nveiled in a mystical yet attractive obscurity, inasmuch as it is not\nexpressed in the clear, simple language of reason, but emphatically\nenunciated in that consecrated word of the emotions--God. If the\nlight in God springs out of the darkness in God, this is only because\nit is involved in the idea of light in general, that it illuminates\ndarkness, thus presupposing darkness, not making it. If then God is\nonce subjected to a general law,--as he must necessarily be unless\nhe be made the arena of conflict for the most senseless notions,--if\nself-consciousness in God as well as in itself, as in general, is\nevolved from a principle in Nature, why is not this natural principle\nabstracted from God? That which is a law of consciousness in itself\nis a law for the consciousness of every personal being, whether man,\nangel, demon, God, or whatever else thou mayest conceive to thyself as\na being. To what then, seen in their true light, do the two principles\nin God reduce themselves? The one to Nature, at least to Nature as\nit exists in the conception, abstracted from its reality; the other\nto mind, consciousness, personality. The one half, the reverse side,\nthou dost not name God, but only the obverse side, on which he presents\nto thee mind, consciousness: thus his specific essence, that whereby\nhe is God, is mind, intelligence, consciousness. Why then dost thou\nmake that which is properly the subject in God as God, i.e., as mind,\ninto a mere predicate, as if God existed as God apart from mind,\nfrom consciousness? Why, but because thou art enslaved by mystical\nreligious speculation, because the primary principle in thee is the\nimagination, thought being only secondary and serving but to throw\ninto formul\u00e6 the products of the imagination,--because thou feelest\nat ease and at home only in the deceptive twilight of mysticism.\n\nMysticism is deuteroscopy--a fabrication of phrases having a double\nmeaning. The mystic speculates concerning the essence of Nature or of\nman, but under, and by means of, the supposition that he is speculating\nconcerning another, a personal being, distinct from both. The mystic\nhas the same objects as the plain, self-conscious thinker; but the\nreal object is regarded by the mystic, not as itself, but as an\nimaginary being, and hence the imaginary object is to him the real\nobject. Thus here, in the mystical doctrine of the two principles\nin God, the real object is pathology, the imaginary one, theology;\ni.e., pathology is converted into theology. There would be nothing to\nurge against this, if consciously real pathology were recognised and\nexpressed as theology; indeed, it is precisely our task to show that\ntheology is nothing else than an unconscious, esoteric pathology,\nanthropology, and psychology, and that therefore real anthropology,\nreal pathology, and real psychology have far more claim to the name of\ntheology than has theology itself, because this is nothing more than\nan imaginary psychology and anthropology. But this doctrine or theory\nis supposed--and for this reason it is mystical and fantastic--to\nbe not pathology, but theology, in the old or ordinary sense of the\nword; it is supposed that we have here unfolded to us the life of\na Being distinct from us, while nevertheless it is only our own\nnature which is unfolded, though at the same time again shut up\nfrom us by the fact that this nature is represented as inhering in\nanother being. The mystic philosopher supposes that in God, not in us\nhuman individuals,--that would be far too trivial a truth,--reason\nfirst appears after the Passion of Nature;--that not man, but God,\nhas wrestled himself out of the obscurity of confused feelings and\nimpulses into the clearness of knowledge; that not in our subjective,\nlimited mode of conception, but in God himself, the nervous tremors\nof darkness precede the joyful consciousness of light; in short, he\nsupposes that his theory presents not a history of human throes, but a\nhistory of the development, i.e., the throes of God--for developments\n(or transitions) are birth-struggles. But, alas! this supposition\nitself belongs only to the pathological element.\n\nIf, therefore, the cosmogonic process presents to us the Light\nof the power of distinction as belonging to the divine essence;\nso, on the other hand, the Night or Nature in God represents to us\nthe Pens\u00e9es confuses of Leibnitz as divine powers. But the Pens\u00e9es\nconfuses--confused, obscure conceptions and thoughts, or more correctly\nimages--represent the flesh, matter;--a pure intelligence, separate\nfrom matter, has only clear, free thoughts, no obscure, i.e., fleshly\nideas, no material images, exciting the imagination and setting the\nblood in commotion. The Night in God, therefore, implies nothing else\nthan this: God is not only a spiritual, but also a material, corporeal,\nfleshly being; but as man is man, and receives his designation, in\nvirtue not of his fleshly nature, but of his mind, so is it with God.\n\nBut the mystic philosopher expresses this only in obscure, mystical,\nindefinite, dissembling images. Instead of the rude, but hence all\nthe more precise and striking expression, flesh, it substitutes\nthe equivocal, abstract words nature and ground. \"As nothing is\nbefore or out of God, he must have the ground of his existence in\nhimself. This all philosophies say, but they speak of this ground\nas a mere idea, without making it something real. This ground\nof his existence which God has in himself, is not God considered\nabsolutely, i.e., in so far as he exists; it is only the ground of his\nexistence. It is Nature--in God; an existence inseparable from him,\nit is true, but still distinct. Analogically (?), this relation may\nbe illustrated by gravitation and light in Nature.\" But this ground\nis the non-intelligent in God. \"That which is the commencement of an\nintelligence (in itself) cannot also be intelligent.\" \"In the strict\nsense, intelligence is born of this unintelligent principle. Without\nthis antecedent darkness there is no reality of the Creator.\" \"With\nabstract ideas of God as actus purissimus, such as were laid down\nby the older philosophy, or such as the modern, out of anxiety to\nremove God far from Nature, is always reproducing, we can effect\nnothing. God is something more real than a mere moral order of\nthe world, and has quite another and a more living motive power in\nhimself than is ascribed to him by the jejune subtilty of abstract\nidealists. Idealism, if it has not a living realism as its basis, is as\nempty and abstract a system as that of Leibnitz or Spinoza, or as any\nother dogmatic system.\" \"So long as the God of modern theism remains\nthe simple, supposed purely essential, but in fact non-essential\nBeing that all modern systems make him, so long as a real duality is\nnot recognised in God, and a limiting, negativing force, opposed to\nthe expansive affirming force, so long will the denial of a personal\nGod be scientific honesty.\" \"All consciousness is concentration, is a\ngathering together, a collecting of oneself. This negativing force, by\nwhich a being turns back upon itself, is the true force of personality,\nthe force of egoism.\" \"How should there be a fear of God if there\nwere no strength in him? But that there should be something in God\nwhich is mere force and strength cannot be held astonishing if only\nit be not maintained that he is this alone and nothing besides.\" [63]\n\nBut what then is force and strength which is merely such, if\nnot corporeal force and strength? Dost thou know any power which\nstands at thy command, in distinction from the power of kindness and\nreason, besides muscular power? If thou canst effect nothing through\nkindness and the arguments of reason, force is what thou must take\nrefuge in. But canst thou \"effect\" anything without strong arms and\nfists? Is there known to thee, in distinction from the power of the\nmoral order of the world, \"another and more living motive power\" than\nthe lever of the criminal court? Is not Nature without body also an\n\"empty, abstract\" idea, a \"jejune subtilty\"? Is not the mystery of\nNature the mystery of corporeality? Is not the system of a \"living\nrealism\" the system of the organised body? Is there, in general,\nany other force, the opposite of intelligence, than the force of\nflesh and blood,--any other strength of Nature than the strength of\nthe fleshly impulses? And the strongest of the impulses of Nature,\nis it not the sexual feeling? Who does not remember the old proverb:\n\"Amare et sapere vix Deo competit?\" So that if we would posit in God\na nature, an existence opposed to the light of intelligence,--can we\nthink of a more living, a more real antithesis, than that of amare\nand sapere, of spirit and flesh, of freedom and the sexual impulse?\n\nPersonality, individuality, consciousness, without Nature, is\nnothing; or, which is the same thing, an empty, unsubstantial\nabstraction. But Nature, as has been shown and is obvious, is nothing\nwithout corporeality. The body alone is that negativing, limiting,\nconcentrating, circumscribing force, without which no personality is\nconceivable. Take away from thy personality its body, and thou takest\naway that which holds it together. The body is the basis, the subject\nof personality. Only by the body is a real personality distinguished\nfrom the imaginary one of a spectre. What sort of abstract, vague,\nempty personalities should we be, if we had not the property of\nimpenetrability,--if in the same place, in the same form in which we\nare, others might stand at the same time? Only by the exclusion of\nothers from the space it occupies does personality prove itself to\nbe real. But a body does not exist without flesh and blood. Flesh and\nblood is life, and life alone is corporeal reality. But flesh and blood\nis nothing without the oxygen of sexual distinction. The distinction\nof sex is not superficial, or limited to certain parts of the body;\nit is an essential one: it penetrates bones and marrow. The substance\nof man is manhood; that of woman, womanhood. However spiritual and\nsupersensual the man may be, he remains always a man; and it is the\nsame with the woman. Hence personality is nothing without distinction\nof sex; personality is essentially distinguished into masculine and\nfeminine. Where there is no thou, there is no I; but the distinction\nbetween I and thou, the fundamental condition of all personality,\nof all consciousness, is only real, living, ardent, when felt as the\ndistinction between man and woman. The thou between man and woman\nhas quite another sound than the monotonous thou between friends.\n\nNature in distinction from personality can signify nothing else than\ndifference of sex. A personal being apart from Nature is nothing\nelse than a being without sex, and conversely. Nature is said to\nbe predicated of God, \"in the sense in which it is said of a man\nthat he is of a strong, healthy nature.\" But what is more feeble,\nwhat more insupportable, what more contrary to Nature, than a person\nwithout sex, or a person who in character, manners, or feelings denies\nsex? What is virtue, the excellence of man as man? Manhood. Of man as\nwoman? Womanhood. But man exists only as man and woman. The strength,\nthe healthiness of man consists therefore in this: that as a woman,\nhe be truly woman; as man, truly man. Thou repudiatest \"the horror\nof all that is real, which supposes the spiritual to be polluted by\ncontact with the real.\" Repudiate then, before all, thy own horror for\nthe distinction of sex. If God is not polluted by Nature, neither is he\npolluted by being associated with the idea of sex. In renouncing sex,\nthou renouncest thy whole principle. A moral God apart from Nature\nis without basis; but the basis of morality is the distinction of\nsex. Even the brute is capable of self-sacrificing love in virtue of\nthe sexual distinction. All the glory of Nature, all its power, all\nits wisdom and profundity, concentrates and individualises itself in\ndistinction of sex. Why then dost thou shrink from naming the nature\nof God by its true name? Evidently, only because thou hast a general\nhorror of things in their truth and reality; because thou lookest at\nall things through the deceptive vapours of mysticism. For this very\nreason then, because Nature in God is only a delusive, unsubstantial\nappearance, a fantastic ghost of Nature,--for it is based, as we have\nsaid, not on flesh and blood, not on a real ground,--this attempt to\nestablish a personal God is once more a failure, and I, too, conclude\nwith the words, \"The denial of a personal God will be scientific\nhonesty:\"--and, I add, scientific truth, so long as it is not declared\nand shown in unequivocal terms, first \u00e0 priori, on speculative grounds,\nthat form, place, corporeality, and sex do not contradict the idea of\nthe Godhead; and secondly, \u00e0 posteriori,--for the reality of a personal\nbeing is sustained only on empirical grounds,--what sort of form God\nhas, where he exists,--in heaven,--and lastly, of what sex he is.\n\nLet the profound, speculative religious philosophers of Germany\ncourageously shake off the embarrassing remnant of rationalism\nwhich yet clings to them, in flagrant contradiction with their\ntrue character; and let them complete their system, by converting\nthe mystical \"potence\" of Nature in God into a really powerful,\ngenerating God.\n\n\n\nThe doctrine of Nature in God is borrowed from Jacob B\u00f6hme. But in\nthe original it has a far deeper and more interesting significance\nthan in its second modernised and emasculated edition. Jacob B\u00f6hme\nhas a profoundly religious mind. Religion is the centre of his life\nand thought. But at the same time, the significance which has been\ngiven to Nature in modern times--by the study of natural science,\nby Spinozism, materialism, empiricism--has taken possession of his\nreligious sentiment. He has opened his senses to Nature, thrown a\nglance into her mysterious being; but it alarms him, and he cannot\nharmonise this terror at Nature with his religious conceptions. \"When I\nlooked into the great depths of this world, and at the sun and stars,\nalso at the clouds, also at the rain and snow, and considered in my\nmind the whole creation of this world; then I found in all things evil\nand good, love and anger,--in unreasoning things, such as wood, stone,\nearth, and the elements, as well as in men and beasts.... But because\nI found that in all things there was good and evil, in the elements\nas well as in the creatures, and that it goes as well in the world\nwith the godless as with the pious, also that the barbarous nations\npossess the best lands, and have more prosperity than the godly; I\nwas therefore altogether melancholy and extremely troubled, and the\nScriptures could not console me, though almost all well known to me;\nand therewith assuredly the devil was not idle, for he often thrust\nupon me heathenish thoughts, of which I will here be silent.\" [64]\nBut while his mind seized with fearful earnestness the dark side\nof Nature, which did not harmonise with the religious idea of a\nheavenly Creator, he was on the other hand rapturously affected by\nher resplendent aspects. Jacob B\u00f6hme has a sense for Nature. He\npreconceives, nay, he feels the joys of the mineralogist, of the\nbotanist, of the chemist--the joys of \"godless natural science.\" He is\nenraptured by the splendour of jewels, the tones of metals, the hues\nand odours of plants, the beauty and gentleness of many animals. In\nanother place, speaking of the revelation of God in the phenomena of\nlight, the process by which \"there arises in the Godhead the wondrous\nand beautiful structure of the heavens in various colours and kinds,\nand every spirit shows itself in its form specially,\" he says, \"I can\ncompare it with nothing but with the noblest precious stones, such as\nthe ruby, emerald, epidote, onyx, sapphire, diamond, jasper, hyacinth,\namethyst, beryl, sardine, carbuncle, and the like.\" Elsewhere: \"But\nregarding the precious stones, such as the carbuncle, ruby, emerald,\nepidote, onyx, and the like, which are the very best, these have the\nvery same origin--the flash of light in love. For that flash is born\nin tenderness, and is the heart in the centre of the Fountain-spirit,\nwherefore those stones also are mild, powerful, and lovely.\" It is\nevident that Jacob B\u00f6hme had no bad taste in mineralogy; that he had\ndelight in flowers also, and consequently a faculty for botany, is\nproved by the following passages among others:--\"The heavenly powers\ngave birth to heavenly joy-giving fruits and colours, to all sorts\nof trees and shrubs, whereupon grows the beauteous and lovely fruit\nof life: also there spring up in these powers all sorts of flowers\nwith beauteous heavenly colours and scents. Their taste is various,\nin each according to its quality and kind, altogether holy, divine,\nand joy-giving.\" \"If thou desirest to contemplate the heavenly,\ndivine pomp and glory, as they are, and to know what sort of products,\npleasure, or joys there are above: look diligently at this world, at\nthe varieties of fruits and plants that grow upon the earth,--trees,\nshrubs, vegetables, roots, flowers, oils, wines, corn, and everything\nthat is there, and that thy heart can search out. All this is an\nimage of the heavenly pomp.\" [65]\n\nA despotic fiat could not suffice as an explanation of the origin\nof Nature to Jacob B\u00f6hme; Nature appealed too strongly to his\nsenses, and lay too near his heart; hence he sought for a natural\nexplanation of Nature; but he necessarily found no other ground of\nexplanation than those qualities of Nature which made the strongest\nimpression on him. Jacob B\u00f6hme--this is his essential character--is a\nmystical natural philosopher, a theosophic Vulcanist and Neptunist,\n[66] for according to him \"all things had their origin in fire and\nwater.\" Nature had fascinated Jacob's religious sentiments,--not\nin vain did he receive his mystical light from the shining of tin\nutensils; but the religious sentiment works only within itself;\nit has not the force, not the courage, to press forward to the\nexamination of things in their reality; it looks at all things\nthrough the medium of religion, it sees all in God, i.e., in\nthe entrancing, soul-possessing splendour of the imagination, it\nsees all in images and as an image. But Nature affected his mind\nin an opposite manner; hence he must place this opposition in God\nhimself,--for the supposition of two independently existing, opposite,\noriginal principles would have afflicted his religious sentiment;--he\nmust distinguish in God himself a gentle, beneficent element, and a\nfierce consuming one. Everything fiery, bitter, harsh, contracting,\ndark, cold, comes from a divine harshness and bitterness; everything\nmild, lustrous, warming, tender, soft, yielding, from a mild, soft,\nluminous quality in God. \"Thus are the creatures on the earth, in the\nwater, and in the air, each creature out of its own science, out of\ngood and evil.... As one sees before one's eyes that there are good\nand evil creatures; as venomous beasts and serpents from the centre\nof the nature of darkness, from the power of the fierce quality,\nwhich only want to dwell in darkness, abiding in caves and hiding\nthemselves from the sun. By each animal's food and dwelling we see\nwhence they have sprang, for every creature needs to dwell with its\nmother, and yearns after her, as is plain to the sight.\" \"Gold, silver,\nprecious stones, and all bright metal, has its origin in the light,\nwhich appeared before the times of anger,\" &c. \"Everything which in\nthe substance of this world is yielding, soft, and thin, is flowing,\nand gives itself forth, and the ground and origin of it is in the\neternal Unity, for unity ever flows forth from itself; for in the\nnature of things not dense, as water and air, we can understand no\nsusceptibility or pain, they being one in themselves. [67] In short,\nheaven is as rich as the earth. Everything that is on this earth is\nin heaven, [68] all that is in Nature is in God. But in the latter\nit is divine, heavenly; in the former, earthly, visible, external,\nmaterial, but yet the same.\" \"When I write of trees, shrubs and fruits,\nthou must not understand me of earthly things, such as are in this\nworld; for it is not my meaning that in heaven there grows a dead,\nhard, wooden tree, or a stone of earthly qualities. No: my meaning is\nheavenly and spiritual, but yet truthful and literal; thus, I mean no\nother things than what I write in the letters of the alphabet;\" i.e.,\nin heaven there are the same trees and flowers, but the trees in heaven\nare the trees which bloom and exhale in my imagination, without making\ncoarse material impressions upon me; the trees on earth are the trees\nwhich I perceive through my senses. The distinction is the distinction\nbetween imagination and perception. \"It is not my undertaking,\" says\nJacob B\u00f6hme himself, \"to describe the course of all stars, their place\nand name, or how they have yearly their conjunction or opposition,\nor quadrate, or the like,--what they do yearly and hourly,--which\nthrough long years has been discovered by wise, skilful, ingenious\nmen, by diligent contemplation and observation, and deep thought and\ncalculation. I have not learned and studied these things, and leave\nscholars to treat of them, but my undertaking is to write according\nto the spirit and thought, not according to sight.\" [69]\n\nThe doctrine of Nature in God aims, by naturalism, to establish\ntheism, especially the theism which regards the Supreme Being as\na personal being. But personal theism conceives God as a personal\nbeing, separate from all material things; it excludes from him all\ndevelopment, because that is nothing else than the self-separation of\na being from circumstances and conditions which do not correspond to\nits true idea. And this does not take place in God, because in him\nbeginning, end, middle, are not to be distinguished,--because he is\nat once what he is, is from the beginning what he is to be, what he\ncan be; he is the pure unity of existence and essence, reality and\nidea, act and will. Deus suum Esse est. Herein theism accords with\nthe essence of religion. All religions, however positive they may be,\nrest on abstraction; they are distinguished only in that from which\nthe abstraction is made. Even the Homeric gods, with all their living\nstrength and likeness to man, are abstract forms; they have bodies,\nlike men, but bodies from which the limitations and difficulties of the\nhuman body are eliminated. The idea of a divine being is essentially\nan abstracted, distilled idea. It is obvious that this abstraction\nis no arbitrary one, but is determined by the essential stand-point\nof man. As he is, as he thinks, so does he make his abstraction.\n\nThe abstraction expresses a judgment,--an affirmative and a\nnegative one at the same time, praise and blame. What man praises\nand approves, that is God to him; [70] what he blames, condemns, is\nthe non-divine. Religion is a judgment. The most essential condition\nin religion--in the idea of the divine being--is accordingly the\ndiscrimination of the praiseworthy from the blameworthy, of the perfect\nfrom the imperfect; in a word, of the positive from the negative. The\ncultus itself consists in nothing else than in the continual renewal\nof the origin of religion--a solemnising of the critical discrimination\nbetween the divine and the non-divine.\n\nThe Divine Being is the human being glorified by the death of\nabstraction; it is the departed spirit of man. In religion man frees\nhimself from the limits of life; he here lets fall what oppresses him,\nobstructs him, affects him repulsively; God is the self-consciousness\nof man freed from all discordant elements; man feels himself free,\nhappy, blessed in his religion, because he only here lives the life\nof genius, and keeps holiday. The basis of the divine idea lies for\nhim outside of that idea itself; its truth lies in the prior judgment,\nin the fact that all which he excludes from God is previously judged\nby him to be non-divine, and what is non-divine to be worthless,\nnothing. If he were to include the attaining of this idea in the idea\nitself, it would lose its most essential significance, its true value,\nits beatifying charm. The divine being is the pure subjectivity of\nman, freed from all else, from everything objective, having relation\nonly to itself, enjoying only itself, reverencing only itself--his\nmost subjective, his inmost self. The process of discrimination, the\nseparating of the intelligent from the non-intelligent, of personality\nfrom Nature, of the perfect from the imperfect, necessarily therefore\ntakes place in the subject, not in the object, and the idea of God\nlies not at the beginning but at the end of sensible existence, of\nthe world, of Nature. \"Where Nature ceases, God begins,\" because God\nis the ne plus ultra, the last limit of abstraction. That from which\nI can no longer abstract is God, the last thought which I am capable\nof grasping--the last, i.e., the highest. Id quo nihil majus cogitari\npotest, Deus est. That this Omega of sensible existence becomes an\nAlpha also, is easily comprehensible; but the essential point is, that\nhe is the Omega. The Alpha is primarily a consequence; because God is\nthe last or highest, he is also the first. And this predicate--the\nfirst Being, has by no means immediately a cosmogonic significance,\nbut only implies the highest rank. The creation in the Mosaic religion\nhas for its end to secure to Jehovah the predicate of the highest\nand first, the true and exclusive God in opposition to idols.\n\nThe effort to establish the personality of God through Nature has\ntherefore at its foundation an illegitimate, profane mingling of\nphilosophy and religion, a complete absence of criticism and knowledge\nconcerning the genesis of the personal God. Where personality is held\nthe essential attribute of God, where it is said--an impersonal God is\nno God; there personality is held to be in and by itself the highest\nand most real thing, there it is presupposed that everything which\nis not a person is dead, is nothing, that only personal existence is\nreal, absolute existence, is life and truth--but Nature is impersonal,\nand is therefore a trivial thing. The truth of personality rests\nonly on the untruth of Nature. To predicate personality of God is\nnothing else than to declare personality as the absolute essence;\nbut personality is only conceived in distinction, in abstraction\nfrom Nature. Certainly a merely personal God is an abstract God;\nbut so he ought to be--that is involved in the idea of him; for he is\nnothing else than the personal nature of man positing itself out of all\nconnection with the world, making itself free from all dependence on\nnature. In the personality of God man consecrates the supernaturalness,\nimmortality, independence, unlimitedness of his own personality.\n\nIn general, the need of a personal God has its foundation in this, that\nonly in the attribute of personality does the personal man meet with\nhimself, find himself. Substance, pure spirit, mere reason, does not\nsatisfy him, is too abstract for him, i.e., does not express himself,\ndoes not lead him back to himself. And man is content, happy, only when\nhe is with himself, with his own nature. Hence, the more personal a\nman is, the stronger is his need of a personal God. The free, abstract\nthinker knows nothing higher than freedom; he does not need to attach\nit to a personal being; for him freedom in itself, as such, is a\nreal positive thing. A mathematical, astronomical mind, a man of pure\nunderstanding, an objective man, who is not shut up in himself, who\nfeels free and happy only in the contemplation of objective rational\nrelations, in the reason which lies in things in themselves--such\na man will regard the substance of Spinoza, or some similar idea,\nas his highest being, and be full of antipathy towards a personal,\ni.e., subjective God. Jacobi therefore was a classic philosopher,\nbecause (in this respect, at least) he was consistent, he was at\nunity with himself; as was his God, so was his philosophy--personal,\nsubjective. The personal God cannot be established otherwise than as\nhe is established by Jacobi and his disciples. Personality is proved\nonly in a personal manner.\n\nPersonality may be, nay, must be, founded on a natural basis; but\nthis natural basis is attained only when I cease to grope in the\ndarkness of mysticism, when I step forth into the clear daylight of\nreal Nature, and exchange the idea of the personal God for the idea\nof personality in general. But into the idea of the personal God,\nthe positive idea of whom is liberated, disembodied personality,\nreleased from the limiting force of Nature, to smuggle again this very\nNature, is as perverse as if I were to mix Brunswick mum with the\nnectar of the gods, in order to give the ethereal beverage a solid\nfoundation. Certainly the ingredients of animal blood are not to be\nderived from the celestial juice which nourishes the gods. But the\nflower of sublimation arises only through the evaporation of matter;\nwhy, then, wilt thou mix with the sublimate that very matter from\nwhich thou hast disengaged it? Certainly, the impersonal existence of\nNature is not to be explained by the idea of personality; but where\npersonality is a truth, or, rather, the absolute truth, Nature has\nno positive significance, and consequently no positive basis. The\nliteral creation out of nothing is here the only sufficient ground of\nexplanation; for it simply says this: Nature is nothing;--and this\nprecisely expresses the significance which Nature has for absolute\npersonality.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\nTHE MYSTERY OF PROVIDENCE, AND CREATION OUT OF NOTHING.\n\n\nCreation is the spoken word of God; the creative, cosmogonic fiat is\nthe tacit word, identical with the thought. To speak is an act of the\nwill; thus, creation is a product of the Will: as in the Word of God\nman affirms the divinity of the human word, so in creation he affirms\nthe divinity of the Will: not, however, the will of the reason, but the\nwill of the imagination--the absolutely subjective, unlimited will. The\nculminating point of the principle of subjectivity is creation out of\nnothing. [71] As the eternity of the world or of matter imports nothing\nfurther than the essentiality of matter, so the creation of the world\nout of nothing imports simply the non-essentiality, the nothingness\nof the world. The commencement of a thing is immediately connected,\nin idea if not in time, with its end. \"Lightly come, lightly go.\" The\nwill has called it into existence--the will calls it back again into\nnothing. When? The time is indifferent: its existence or non-existence\ndepends only on the will. But this will is not its own will:--not only\nbecause a thing cannot will its non-existence, but for the prior reason\nthat the world is itself destitute of will. Thus the nothingness of the\nworld expresses the power of the will. The will that it should exist\nis, at the same time, the will--at least the possible will--that it\nshould not exist. The existence of the world is therefore a momentary,\narbitrary, unreliable, i.e., unreal existence.\n\nCreation out of nothing is the highest expression of omnipotence:\nbut omnipotence is nothing else than subjectivity exempting itself\nfrom all objective conditions and limitations, and consecrating this\nexemption as the highest power and reality: nothing else than the\nability to posit everything real as unreal--everything conceivable as\npossible: nothing else than the power of the imagination, or of the\nwill as identical with the imagination, the power of self-will. [72]\nThe strongest and most characteristic expression of subjective\narbitrariness is, \"it has pleased;\"--the phrase, \"it has pleased\nGod to call the world of bodies and spirits into existence,\" is\nthe most undeniable proof that individual subjectivity, individual\narbitrariness, is regarded as the highest essence--the omnipotent\nworld-principle. On this ground, creation out of nothing as a work\nof the Almighty Will falls into the same category with miracle, or\nrather it is the first miracle, not only in time but in rank also;--the\nprinciple of which all further miracles are the spontaneous result. The\nproof of this is history itself; all miracles have been vindicated,\nexplained, and illustrated by appeal to the omnipotence which created\nthe world out of nothing. Why should not He who made the world out of\nnothing, make wine out of water, bring human speech from the mouth of\nan ass, and charm water out of a rock? But miracle is, as we shall see\nfurther on, only a product and object of the imagination, and hence\ncreation out of nothing, as the primitive miracle, is of the same\ncharacter. For this reason the doctrine of creation out of nothing has\nbeen pronounced a supernatural one, to which reason of itself could\nnot have attained; and in proof of this, appeal has been made to the\nfact that the pagan philosophers represented the world to have been\nformed by the Divine Reason out of already existing matter. But this\nsupernatural principle is no other than the principle of subjectivity,\nwhich in Christianity exalted itself to an unlimited, universal\nmonarchy; whereas the ancient philosophers were not subjective enough\nto regard the absolutely subjective being as the exclusively absolute\nbeing, because they limited subjectivity by the contemplation of the\nworld or reality--because to them the world was a truth.\n\nCreation out of nothing, as identical with miracle, is one with\nProvidence; for the idea of Providence--originally, in its true\nreligious significance, in which it is not yet infringed upon and\nlimited by the unbelieving understanding--is one with the idea of\nmiracle. The proof of Providence is miracle. [73] Belief in Providence\nis belief in a power to which all things stand at command to be used\naccording to its pleasure, in opposition to which all the power\nof reality is nothing. Providence cancels the laws of Nature; it\ninterrupts the course of necessity, the iron bond which inevitably\nbinds effects to causes; in short, it is the same unlimited,\nall-powerful will, that called the world into existence out of\nnothing. Miracle is a creatio ex nihilo. He who turns water into\nwine, makes wine out of nothing, for the constituents of wine are\nnot found in water; otherwise, the production of wine would not be a\nmiraculous, but a natural act. The only attestation, the only proof of\nProvidence is miracle. Thus Providence is an expression of the same\nidea as creation out of nothing. Creation out of nothing can only be\nunderstood and explained in connection with Providence; for miracle\nproperly implies nothing more than that the miracle worker is the same\nas he who brought forth all things by his mere will--God the Creator.\n\nBut Providence has relation essentially to man. It is for man's sake\nthat Providence makes of things whatever it pleases: it is for man's\nsake that it supersedes the authority and reality of a law otherwise\nomnipotent. The admiration of Providence in Nature, especially in\nthe animal kingdom, is nothing else than an admiration of Nature,\nand therefore belongs merely to naturalism, though to a religious\nnaturalism; [74] for in Nature is revealed only natural, not divine\nProvidence--not Providence as it is an object to religion. Religious\nProvidence reveals itself only in miracles--especially in the miracle\nof the Incarnation, the central point of religion. But we nowhere\nread that God, for the sake of brutes, became a brute--the very idea\nof this is, in the eyes of religion, impious and ungodly; or that\nGod ever performed a miracle for the sake of animals or plants. On\nthe contrary, we read that a poor fig-tree, because it bore no fruit\nat a time when it could not bear it, was cursed, purely in order to\ngive men an example of the power of faith over Nature;--and again,\nthat when the tormenting devils were driven out of men, they were\ndriven into brutes. It is true we also read: \"No sparrow falls to the\nground without your Father;\" but these sparrows have no more worth and\nimportance than the hairs on the head of a man, which are all numbered.\n\nApart from instinct, the brute has no other guardian spirit, no other\nProvidence, than its senses or its organs in general. A bird which\nloses its eyes has lost its guardian angel; it necessarily goes to\ndestruction if no miracle happens. We read indeed that a raven brought\nfood to the prophet Elijah, but not (at least to my knowledge) that an\nanimal was supported by other than natural means. But if a man believes\nthat he also has no other Providence than the powers of his race--his\nsenses and understanding,--he is in the eyes of religion, and of all\nthose who speak the language of religion, an irreligious man; because\nhe believes only in a natural Providence, and a natural Providence is\nin the eyes of religion as good as none. Hence Providence has relation\nessentially to men, and even among men only to the religious. \"God\nis the Saviour of all men, but especially of them that believe.\" It\nbelongs, like religion, only to man; it is intended to express the\nessential distinction of man from the brute, to rescue man from the\ntyranny of the forces of Nature. Jonah in the whale, Daniel in the den\nof lions, are examples of the manner in which Providence distinguishes\n(religious) men from brutes. If therefore the Providence which\nmanifests itself in the organs with which animals catch and devour\ntheir prey, and which is so greatly admired by Christian naturalists,\nis a truth, the Providence of the Bible, the Providence of religion,\nis a falsehood; and vice vers\u00e2. What pitiable and at the same time\nludicrous hypocrisy is the attempt to do homage to both, to Nature,\nand the Bible at once! How does Nature contradict the Bible! How\ndoes the Bible contradict Nature! The God of Nature reveals himself\nby giving to the lion strength and appropriate organs in order that,\nfor the preservation of his life, he may in case of necessity kill\nand devour even a human being; the God of the Bible reveals himself\nby interposing his own aid to rescue the human being from the jaws\nof the lion! [75]\n\nProvidence is a privilege of man. It expresses the value of man,\nin distinction from other natural beings and things; it exempts him\nfrom the connection of the universe. Providence is the conviction of\nman of the infinite value of his existence,--a conviction in which he\nrenounces faith in the reality of external things; it is the idealism\nof religion. Faith in Providence is therefore identical with faith in\npersonal immortality; save only, that in the latter the infinite value\nof existence is expressed in relation to time, as infinite duration. He\nwho prefers no special claims, who is indifferent about himself, who\nidentifies himself with the world, who sees himself as a part merged in\nthe whole,--such a one believes in no Providence, i.e., in no special\nProvidence; but only special Providence is Providence in the sense of\nreligion. Faith in Providence is faith in one's own worth, the faith\nof man in himself; hence the beneficent consequences of this faith,\nbut hence also false humility, religious arrogance, which, it is true,\ndoes not rely on itself, but only because it commits the care of itself\nto the blessed God. God concerns himself about me; he has in view my\nhappiness, my salvation; he wills that I shall be blest; but that is my\nwill also: thus, my interest is God's interest, my own will is God's\nwill, my own aim is God's aim,--God's love for me nothing else than\nmy self-love deified. Thus when I believe in Providence, in what do\nI believe but in the divine reality and significance of my own being?\n\nBut where Providence is believed in, belief in God is made dependent on\nbelief in Providence. He who denies that there is a Providence, denies\nthat there is a God, or--what is the same thing--that God is God; for a\nGod who is not the Providence of man, is a contemptible God, a God who\nis wanting in the divinest, most adorable attribute. Consequently,\nthe belief in God is nothing but the belief in human dignity,\n[76] the belief in the absolute reality and significance of the\nhuman nature. But belief in a (religious) Providence is belief in\ncreation out of nothing, and vice vers\u00e2; the latter, therefore, can\nhave no other significance than that of Providence as just developed,\nand it has actually no other. Religion sufficiently expresses this\nby making man the end of creation. All things exist, not for their\nown sake, but for the sake of man. He who, like the pious Christian\nnaturalists, pronounces this to be pride, declares Christianity itself\nto be pride; for to say that the material world exists for the sake of\nman, implies infinitely less than to say that God--or at least, if we\nfollow Paul, a being who is almost God, scarcely to be distinguished\nfrom God--becomes man for the sake of men.\n\nBut if man is the end of creation, he is also the true cause of\ncreation, for the end is the principle of action. The distinction\nbetween man as the end of creation, and man as its cause, is only\nthat the cause is the latent, inner man, the essential man, whereas\nthe end is the self-evident, empirical, individual man,--that man\nrecognises himself as the end of creation, but not as the cause,\nbecause he distinguishes the cause, the essence from himself as\nanother personal being. [77] But this other being, this creative\nprinciple, is in fact nothing else than his subjective nature\nseparated from the limits of individuality and materiality, i.e.,\nof objectivity, unlimited will, personality posited out of all\nconnection with the world,--which by creation, i.e., the positing\nof the world, of objectivity, of another, as a dependent, finite,\nnon-essential existence, gives itself the certainty of its exclusive\nreality. The point in question in the Creation is not the truth and\nreality of the world, but the truth and reality of personality, of\nsubjectivity in distinction from the world. The point in question is\nthe personality of God; but the personality of God is the personality\nof man freed from all the conditions and limitations of Nature. Hence\nthe fervent interest in the Creation, the horror of all pantheistic\ncosmogonies. The Creation, like the idea of a personal God in general,\nis not a scientific, but a personal matter; not an object of the free\nintelligence, but of the feelings; for the point on which it hinges\nis only the guarantee, the last conceivable proof and demonstration\nof personality or subjectivity as an essence quite apart, having\nnothing in common with Nature, a supra- and extra-mundane entity. [78]\n\nMan distinguishes himself from Nature. This distinction of his\nis his God: the distinguishing of God from Nature is nothing\nelse than the distinguishing of man from Nature. The antithesis\nof pantheism and personalism resolves itself into the question:\nIs the nature of man transcendental or immanent, supranaturalistic\nor naturalistic? The speculations and controversies concerning the\npersonality or impersonality of God are therefore fruitless, idle,\nuncritical, and odious; for the speculatists, especially those who\nmaintain the personality, do not call the thing by the right name;\nthey put the light under a bushel. While they in truth speculate only\nconcerning themselves, only in the interest of their own instinct of\nself-preservation; they yet will not allow that they are splitting\ntheir brains only about themselves; they speculate under the delusion\nthat they are searching out the mysteries of another being. Pantheism\nidentifies man with Nature, whether with its visible appearance, or its\nabstract essence. Personalism isolates, separates, him from Nature;\nconverts him from a part into the whole, into an absolute essence by\nhimself. This is the distinction. If, therefore, you would be clear\non these subjects, exchange your mystical, perverted anthropology,\nwhich you call theology, for real anthropology, and speculate in\nthe light of consciousness and Nature concerning the difference\nor identity of the human essence with the essence of Nature. You\nyourselves admit that the essence of the pantheistical God is nothing\nbut the essence of Nature. Why, then, will you only see the mote in\nthe eyes of your opponents, and not observe the very obvious beam\nin your own eyes? why make yourselves an exception to a universally\nvalid law? Admit that your personal God is nothing else than your own\npersonal nature, that while you believe in and construct your supra-\nand extra-natural God, you believe in and construct nothing else than\nthe supra- and extra-naturalism of your own self.\n\nIn the Creation, as everywhere else, the true principle is concealed\nby the intermingling of universal, metaphysical, and even pantheistic\ndefinitions. But one need only be attentive to the closer definitions\nto convince oneself that the true principle of creation is the\nself-affirmation of subjectivity in distinction from Nature. God\nproduces the world outside himself; at first it is only an idea, a\nplan, a resolve; now it becomes an act, and therewith it steps forth\nout of God as a distinct and, relatively at least, a self-subsistent\nobject. But just so subjectivity in general, which distinguishes\nitself from the world, which takes itself for an essence distinct from\nthe world, posits the world out of itself as a separate existence,\nindeed, this positing out of self, and the distinguishing of self,\nis one act. When therefore the world is posited outside of God, God\nis posited by himself, is distinguished from the world. What else\nthen is God but your subjective nature, when the world is separated\nfrom it? [79] It is true that when astute reflection intervenes,\nthe distinction between extra and intra is disavowed as a finite and\nhuman (?) distinction. But to the disavowal by the understanding,\nwhich in relation to religion is pure misunderstanding, no credit\nis due. If it is meant seriously, it destroys the foundation of\nthe religious consciousness; it does away with the possibility,\nthe very principle of the creation, for this rests solely on the\nreality of the above-mentioned distinction. Moreover, the effect of\nthe creation, all its majesty for the feelings and the imagination,\nis quite lost, if the production of the world out of God is not taken\nin the real sense. What is it to make, to create, to produce, but\nto make that which in the first instance is only subjective, and so\nfar invisible, non-existent, into something objective, perceptible,\nso that other beings besides me may know and enjoy it, and thus to\nput something out of myself, to make it distinct from myself? Where\nthere is no reality or possibility of an existence external to me,\nthere can be no question of making or creating. God is eternal, but\nthe world had a commencement; God was, when as yet the world was not;\nGod is invisible, not cognisable by the senses, but the world is\nvisible, palpable, material, and therefore outside of God; for how\ncan the material as such, body, matter, be in God? The world exists\noutside of God, in the same sense in which a tree, an animal, the\nworld in general, exists outside of my conception, outside of myself,\nis an existence distinct from subjectivity. Hence, only when such an\nexternal existence is admitted, as it was by the older philosophers\nand theologians, have we the genuine, unmixed doctrine of the religious\nconsciousness. The speculative theologians and philosophers of modern\ntimes, on the contrary, foist in all sorts of pantheistic definitions,\nalthough they deny the principle of pantheism; and the result of this\nprocess is simply an absolutely self-contradictory, insupportable\nfabrication of their own.\n\nThus the creation of the world expresses nothing else than\nsubjectivity, assuring itself of its own reality and infinity\nthrough the consciousness that the world is created, is a product\nof will, i.e., a dependent, powerless, unsubstantial existence. The\n\"nothing\" out of which the world was produced, is a still inherent\nnothingness. When thou sayest the world was made out of nothing, thou\nconceivest the world itself as nothing, thou clearest away from thy\nhead all the limits to thy imagination, to thy feelings, to thy will,\nfor the world is the limitation of thy will, of thy desire; the world\nalone obstructs thy soul; it alone is the wall of separation between\nthee and God,--thy beatified, perfected nature. Thus, subjectively,\nthou annihilatest the world; thou thinkest God by himself, i.e.,\nabsolutely unlimited subjectivity, the subjectivity or soul which\nenjoys itself alone, which needs not the world, which knows nothing\nof the painful bonds of matter. In the inmost depths of thy soul\nthou wouldest rather there were no world, for where the world is,\nthere is matter, and where there is matter there is weight and\nresistance, space and time, limitation and necessity. Nevertheless,\nthere is a world, there is matter. How dost thou escape from the\ndilemma of this contradiction? How dost thou expel the world from thy\nconsciousness, that it may not disturb thee in the beatitude of the\nunlimited soul? Only by making the world itself a product of will, by\ngiving it an arbitrary existence always hovering between existence\nand non-existence, always awaiting its annihilation. Certainly\nthe act of creation does not suffice to explain the existence of\nthe world or matter (the two are not separable), but it is a total\nmisconception to demand this of it, for the fundamental idea of the\ncreation is this: there is to be no world, no matter; and hence its\nend is daily looked forward to with longing. The world in its truth\ndoes not here exist at all, it is regarded only as the obstruction,\nthe limitation of subjectivity; how could the world in its truth and\nreality be deduced from a principle which denies the world?\n\nIn order to recognise the above developed significance of the creation\nas the true one, it is only necessary seriously to consider the fact,\nthat the chief point in the creation is not the production of earth\nand water, plants and animals, for which indeed there is no God,\nbut the production of personal beings--of spirits, according to the\nordinary phrase. God is the idea of personality as itself a person,\nsubjectivity existing in itself apart from the world, existing for self\nalone, without wants, posited as absolute existence, the me without\na thee. But as absolute existence for self alone contradicts the idea\nof true life, the idea of love; as self-consciousness is essentially\nunited with the consciousness of a thee, as solitude cannot, at least\nin perpetuity, preserve itself from tedium and uniformity; thought\nimmediately proceeds from the divine Being to other conscious beings,\nand expands the idea of personality which was at first condensed in\none being to a plurality of persons. [80] If the person is conceived\nphysically, as a real man, in which form he is a being with wants, he\nappears first at the end of the physical world, when the conditions\nof his existence are present,--as the goal of creation. If, on the\nother hand, man is conceived abstractly as a person, as is the case in\nreligious speculation, this circuit is dispensed with, and the task\nis the direct deduction of the person, i.e., the self-demonstration,\nthe ultimate self-verification of the human personality. It is true\nthat the divine personality is distinguished in every possible way\nfrom the human in order to veil their identity; but these distinctions\nare either purely fantastic, or they are mere assertions, devices\nwhich exhibit the invalidity of the attempted deduction. All positive\ngrounds of the creation reduce themselves only to the conditions,\nto the grounds, which urge upon the me the consciousness of the\nnecessity of another personal being. Speculate as much as you will,\nyou will never derive your personality from God, if you have not\nbeforehand introduced it, if God himself be not already the idea of\nyour personality, your own subjective nature.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nTHE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CREATION IN JUDAISM.\n\n\nThe doctrine of the Creation sprang out of Judaism; indeed, it is the\ncharacteristic, the fundamental doctrine of the Jewish religion. The\nprinciple which lies at its foundation is, however, not so much the\nprinciple of subjectivity as of egoism. The doctrine of the Creation\nin its characteristic significance arises only on that stand-point\nwhere man in practice makes Nature merely the servant of his will\nand needs, and hence in thought also degrades it to a mere machine,\na product of the will. Now its existence is intelligible to him,\nsince he explains and interprets it out of himself, in accordance with\nhis own feelings and notions. The question, Whence is Nature or the\nworld? presupposes wonder that it exists, or the question, Why does\nit exist? But this wonder, this question, arises only where man has\nseparated himself from Nature and made it a mere object of will. The\nauthor of the Book of Wisdom says truly of the heathens, that, \"for\nadmiration of the beauty of the world they did not raise themselves\nto the idea of the Creator.\" To him who feels that Nature is lovely,\nit appears an end in itself, it has the ground of its existence in\nitself: in him the question, Why does it exist? does not arise. Nature\nand God are identified in his consciousness, his perception, of the\nworld. Nature, as it impresses his senses, has indeed had an origin,\nhas been produced, but not created in the religious sense, is not\nan arbitrary product. And by this origin he implies nothing evil;\noriginating involves for him nothing impure, undivine; he conceives\nhis gods themselves as having had an origin. The generative force\nis to him the primal force: he posits, therefore, as the ground of\nNature, a force of Nature,--a real, present, visibly active force, as\nthe ground of reality. Thus does man think where his relation to the\nworld is \u00e6sthetic or theoretic (for the theoretic view was originally\nthe \u00e6sthetic view, the prima philosophia), where the idea of the world\nis to him the idea of the cosmos, of majesty, of deity itself. Only\nwhere such a theory was the fundamental principle could there be\nconceived and expressed such a thought as that of Anaxagoras:--Man\nis born to behold the world. [81] The standpoint of theory is the\nstandpoint of harmony with the world. The subjective activity, that\nin which man contents himself, allows himself free play, is here\nthe sensuous imagination alone. Satisfied with this, he lets Nature\nsubsist in peace, and constructs his castles in the air, his poetical\ncosmogonies, only out of natural materials. When, on the contrary,\nman places himself only on the practical standpoint and looks at the\nworld from thence, making the practical standpoint the theoretical\none also, he is in disunion with Nature; he makes Nature the abject\nvassal of his selfish interest, of his practical egoism. The theoretic\nexpression of this egoistical, practical view, according to which\nNature is in itself nothing, is this: Nature or the world is made,\ncreated, the product of a command. God said, Let the world be, and\nstraightway the world presented itself at his bidding. [82]\n\nUtilism is the essential theory of Judaism. The belief in a special\nDivine Providence is the characteristic belief of Judaism; belief\nin Providence is belief in miracle; but belief in miracle exists\nwhere Nature is regarded only as an object of arbitrariness, of\negoism, which uses Nature only as an instrument of its own will and\npleasure. Water divides or rolls itself together like a firm mass,\ndust is changed into lice, a staff into a serpent, rivers into blood,\na rock into a fountain; in the same place it is both light and dark\nat once, the sun now stands still, now goes backward. And all these\ncontradictions of Nature happen for the welfare of Israel, purely at\nthe command of Jehovah, who troubles himself about nothing but Israel,\nwho is nothing but the personified selfishness of the Israelitish\npeople, to the exclusion of all other nations,--absolute intolerance,\nthe secret essence of monotheism.\n\nThe Greeks looked at Nature with the theoretic sense; they heard\nheavenly music in the harmonious course of the stars; they saw Nature\nrise from the foam of the all-producing ocean as Venus Anadyomene. The\nIsraelites, on the contrary, opened to Nature only the gastric sense;\ntheir taste for Nature lay only in the palate; their consciousness\nof God in eating manna. The Greek addicted himself to polite studies,\nto the fine arts, to philosophy; the Israelite did not rise above the\nalimentary view of theology. \"At even ye shall eat flesh, and in the\nmorning ye shall be filled with bread; and ye shall know that I am\nthe Lord your God.\" [83] \"And Jacob vowed a vow, saying, If God will\nbe with me, and will keep me in this way that I go, and will give me\nbread to eat and raiment to put on, so that I come again to my father's\nhouse in peace, then shall the Lord be my God.\" [84] Eating is the\nmost solemn act or the initiation of the Jewish religion. In eating,\nthe Israelite celebrates and renews the act of creation; in eating,\nman declares Nature to be an insignificant object. When the seventy\nelders ascended the mountain with Moses, \"they saw God; and when they\nhad seen God, they ate and drank.\" [85] Thus with them what the sight\nof the Supreme Being heightened was the appetite for food.\n\nThe Jews have maintained their peculiarity to this day. Their\nprinciple, their God, is the most practical principle in the\nworld,--namely, egoism; and moreover egoism in the form of\nreligion. Egoism is the God who will not let his servants come to\nshame. Egoism is essentially monotheistic, for it has only one, only\nself, as its end. Egoism strengthens cohesion, concentrates man on\nhimself, gives him a consistent principle of life; but it makes him\ntheoretically narrow, because indifferent to all which does not relate\nto the well-being of self. Hence science, like art, arises only out of\npolytheism, for polytheism is the frank, open, unenvying sense of all\nthat is beautiful and good without distinction, the sense of the world,\nof the universe. The Greeks looked abroad into the wide world that they\nmight extend their sphere of vision; the Jews to this day pray with\ntheir faces turned towards Jerusalem. In the Israelites, monotheistic\negoism excluded the free theoretic tendency. Solomon, it is true,\nsurpassed \"all the children of the East\" in understanding and wisdom,\nand spoke (treated, agebat) moreover \"of trees, from the cedar that\nis in Lebanon, even unto the hyssop that springeth out of the wall,\"\nand also of \"beasts and of fowl, and of creeping things and of fishes\"\n(1 Kings iv. 30, 34). But it must be added that Solomon did not serve\nJehovah with his whole heart; he did homage to strange gods and strange\nwomen; and thus he had the polytheistic sentiment and taste. The\npolytheistic sentiment, I repeat, is the foundation of science and art.\n\nThe significance which Nature in general had for the Hebrews is one\nwith their idea of its origin. The mode in which the genesis of a\nthing is explained is the candid expression of opinion, of sentiment\nrespecting it. If it be thought meanly of, so also is its origin. Men\nused to suppose that insects, vermin, sprang from carrion and other\nrubbish. It was not because they derived vermin from so uninviting a\nsource that they thought contemptuously of them, but, on the contrary,\nbecause they thought thus, because the nature of vermin appeared to\nthem so vile, they imagined an origin corresponding to this nature,\na vile origin. To the Jews Nature was a mere means towards achieving\nthe end of egoism, a mere object of will. But the ideal, the idol\nof the egoistic will is that Will which has unlimited command, which\nrequires no means in order to attain its end, to realise its object,\nwhich immediately by itself, i.e., by pure will, calls into existence\nwhatever it pleases. It pains the egoist that the satisfaction of\nhis wishes and need is only to be attained immediately, that for him\nthere is a chasm between the wish and its realisation, between the\nobject in the imagination and the object in reality. Hence, in order\nto relieve this pain, to make himself free from the limits of reality,\nhe supposes as the true, the highest being, One who brings forth an\nobject by the mere I will. For this reason, Nature, the world, was\nto the Hebrews the product of a dictatorial word, of a categorical\nimperative, of a magic fiat.\n\nTo that which has no essential existence for me in theory I assign\nno theoretic, no positive ground. By referring it to Will I only\nenforce its theoretic nullity. What we despise we do not honour with\na glance: that which is observed has importance: contemplation is\nrespect. Whatever is looked at fetters by secret forces of attraction,\noverpowers by the spell which it exercises upon the eye, the criminal\narrogance of that Will which seeks only to subject all things to\nitself. Whatever makes an impression on the theoretic sense, on the\nreason, withdraws itself from the dominion of the egoistic Will:\nit reacts, it presents resistance. That which devastating egoism\ndevotes to death, benignant theory restores to life.\n\nThe much-belied doctrine of the heathen philosophers concerning\nthe eternity of matter, or the world, thus implies nothing more\nthan that Nature was to them a theoretic reality. [86] The heathens\nwere idolaters, that is, they contemplated Nature; they did nothing\nelse than what the profoundly Christian nations do at this day\nwhen they make Nature an object of their admiration, of their\nindefatigable investigation. \"But the heathens actually worshipped\nnatural objects.\" Certainly; for worship is only the childish,\nthe religious form of contemplation. Contemplation and worship are\nnot essentially distinguished. That which I contemplate I humble\nmyself before, I consecrate to it my noblest possession, my heart,\nmy intelligence, as an offering. The natural philosopher also falls\non his knees before Nature when, at the risk of his life, he snatches\nfrom some precipice a lichen, an insect, or a stone, to glorify it in\nthe light of contemplation, and give it an eternal existence in the\nmemory of scientific humanity. The study of Nature is the worship of\nNature--idolatry in the sense of the Israelitish and Christian God;\nand idolatry is simply man's primitive contemplation of Nature; for\nreligion is nothing else than man's primitive, and therefore childish,\npopular, but prejudiced, unemancipated consciousness of himself and\nof Nature. The Hebrews, on the other hand, raised themselves from\nthe worship of idols to the worship of God, from the creature to\nthe Creator; i.e., they raised themselves from the theoretic view\nof Nature, which fascinated the idolaters, to the purely practical\nview which subjects Nature only to the ends of egoism. \"And lest\nthou lift up thine eyes unto heaven, and when thou seest the sun,\nthe moon, and the stars, even all the host of heaven, shouldst be\ndriven to worship them and serve them, which the Lord thy God hath\ndivided unto (i.e., bestowed upon, largitus est) all nations under\nthe whole heaven.\" [87] Thus the creation out of nothing, i.e.,\nthe creation as a purely imperious act, had its origin only in the\nunfathomable depth of Hebrew egoism.\n\nOn this ground, also, the creation out of nothing is no object of\nphilosophy;--at least in any other way than it is so here;--for it cuts\naway the root of all true speculation, presents no grappling-point\nto thought, to theory; theoretically considered, it is a baseless\nair-built doctrine, which originated solely in the need to give\na warrant to utilism, to egoism, which contains and expresses\nnothing but the command to make Nature--not an object of thought,\nof contemplation, but--an object of utilisation. The more empty\nit is, however, for natural philosophy, the more profound is its\n\"speculative\" significance; for just because it has no theoretic\nfulcrum, it allows to the speculatist infinite room for the play of\narbitrary, groundless interpretation.\n\nIt is in the history of dogma and speculation as in the history of\nstates. World-old usages, laws, and institutions continue to drag out\ntheir existence long after they have lost their true meaning. What\nhas once existed will not be denied the right to exist for ever; what\nwas once good, claims to be good for all times. At this period of\nsuperannuation come the interpreters, the speculatists, and talk of\nthe profound sense, because they no longer know the true one. [88]\nThus religious speculation deals with the dogmas torn from the\nconnection in which alone they have any true meaning; instead of\ntracing them back critically to their true origin, it makes the\nsecondary primitive, and the primitive secondary. To it God is\nthe first, man the second. Thus it inverts the natural order of\nthings. In reality, the first is man, the second the nature of man\nmade objective, namely, God. Only in later times, in which religion\nis already become flesh and blood, can it be said--As God is, so is\nman; although, indeed, this proposition never amounts to anything\nmore than tautology. But in the origin of religion it is otherwise;\nand it is only in the origin of a thing that we can discern its true\nnature. Man first unconsciously and involuntarily creates God in his\nown image, and after this God consciously and voluntarily creates man\nin his own image. This is especially confirmed by the development\nof the Israelitish religion. Hence the position of theological\none-sidedness, that the revelation of God holds an even pace with\nthe development of the human race. Naturally; for the revelation of\nGod is nothing else than the revelation, the self-unfolding of human\nnature. The supranaturalistic egoism of the Jews did not proceed\nfrom the Creator, but conversely, the latter from the former; in the\ncreation the Israelite justified his egoism at the bar of his reason.\n\nIt is true, and it may be readily understood on simply practical\ngrounds, that even the Israelite could not, as a man, withdraw himself\nfrom the theoretic contemplation and admiration of Nature. But in\ncelebrating the power and greatness of Nature, he celebrates only\nthe power and greatness of Jehovah. And the power of Jehovah has\nexhibited itself with the most glory in the miracles which it has\nwrought in favour of Israel. Hence, in the celebration of this power,\nthe Israelite has always reference ultimately to himself; he extols\nthe greatness of Nature only for the same reason that the conqueror\nmagnifies the strength of his opponent, in order thereby to heighten\nhis own self-complacency, to make his own fame more illustrious. Great\nand mighty is Nature, which Jehovah has created, but yet mightier,\nyet greater, is Israel's self-estimation. For his sake the sun stands\nstill; for his sake, according to Philo, the earth quaked at the\ndelivery of the law; in short, for his sake all Nature alters its\ncourse. \"For the whole creature in his proper kind was fashioned again\nanew, serving the peculiar commandments that were given unto them,\nthat thy children might be kept without hurt.\" [89] According to Philo,\nGod gave Moses power over the whole of Nature; all the elements obeyed\nhim as the Lord of Nature. [90] Israel's requirement is the omnipotent\nlaw of the world, Israel's need the fate of the universe. Jehovah is\nIsrael's consciousness of the sacredness and necessity of his own\nexistence,--a necessity before which the existence of Nature, the\nexistence of other nations, vanishes into nothing; Jehovah is the salus\npopuli, the salvation of Israel, to which everything that stands in its\nway must be sacrificed; Jehovah is exclusive, monarchical arrogance,\nthe annihilating flash of anger in the vindictive glance of destroying\nIsrael; in a word, Jehovah is the ego of Israel, which regards itself\nas the end and aim, the Lord of Nature. Thus, in the power of Nature\nthe Israelite celebrates the power of Jehovah, and in the power of\nJehovah the power of his own self-consciousness. \"Blessed be God! God\nis our help, God is our salvation.\"--\"Jehovah is my strength.\"--\"God\nhimself hearkened to the word of Joshua, for Jehovah himself fought\nfor Israel.\"--\"Jehovah is a God of war.\"\n\nIf, in the course of time, the idea of Jehovah expanded itself in\nindividual minds, and his love was extended, as by the writer of the\nBook of Jonah, to man in general, this does not belong to the essential\ncharacter of the Israelitish religion. The God of the fathers, to whom\nthe most precious recollections are attached, the ancient historical\nGod, remains always the foundation of a religion. [91]\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nTHE OMNIPOTENCE OF FEELING, OR THE MYSTERY OF PRAYER.\n\n\nIsrael is the historical definition of the specific nature of the\nreligious consciousness, save only that here this consciousness\nwas circumscribed by the limits of a particular, a national\ninterest. Hence, we need only let these limits fall, and we have the\nChristian religion. Judaism is worldly Christianity; Christianity,\nspiritual Judaism. The Christian religion is the Jewish religion\npurified from national egoism, and yet at the same time it is certainly\nanother, a new religion; for every reformation, every purification,\nproduces--especially in religious matters, where even the trivial\nbecomes important--an essential change. To the Jew, the Israelite\nwas the mediator, the bond between God and man; in his relation to\nJehovah he relied on his character of Israelite; Jehovah himself was\nnothing else than the self-consciousness of Israel made objective\nas the absolute being, the national conscience, the universal law,\nthe central point of the political system. [92] If we let fall the\nlimits of nationality, we obtain--instead of the Israelite--man. As in\nJehovah the Israelite personified his national existence, so in God\nthe Christian personified his subjective human nature, freed from\nthe limits of nationality. As Israel made the wants of his national\nexistence the law of the world, as, under the dominance of these wants,\nhe deified even his political vindictiveness; so the Christian made\nthe requirements of human feeling the absolute powers and laws of the\nworld. The miracles of Christianity, which belong just as essentially\nto its characterisation as the miracles of the Old Testament to\nthat of Judaism, have not the welfare of a nation for their object,\nbut the welfare of man:--that is, indeed, only of man considered\nas Christian; for Christianity, in contradiction with the genuine\nuniversal human heart, recognised man only under the condition,\nthe limitation, of belief in Christ. But this fatal limitation will\nbe discussed further on. Christianity has spiritualised the egoism\nof Judaism into subjectivity (though even within Christianity this\nsubjectivity is again expressed as pure egoism), has changed the\ndesire for earthly happiness, the goal of the Israelitish religion,\ninto the longing for heavenly bliss, which is the goal of Christianity.\n\nThe highest idea, the God of a political community, of a people\nwhose political system expresses itself in the form of religion,\nis Law, the consciousness of the law as an absolute divine power;\nthe highest idea, the God of unpolitical, unworldly feeling is Love;\nthe love which brings all the treasures and glories in heaven and\nupon earth as an offering to the beloved, the love whose law is the\nwish of the beloved one, and whose power is the unlimited power of\nthe imagination, of intellectual miracle-working.\n\nGod is the Love that satisfies our wishes, our emotional wants; he\nis himself the realised wish of the heart, the wish exalted to the\ncertainty of its fulfilment, of its reality, to that undoubting\ncertainty before which no contradiction of the understanding,\nno difficulty of experience or of the external world, maintains\nits ground. Certainty is the highest power for man; that which is\ncertain to him is the essential, the divine. \"God is love:\" this,\nthe supreme dictum of Christianity, only expresses the certainty\nwhich human feeling has of itself, as the alone essential, i.e.,\nabsolute divine power, the certainty that the inmost wishes of the\nheart have objective validity and reality, that there are no limits,\nno positive obstacles to human feeling, that the whole world, with\nall its pomp and glory, is nothing weighed against human feeling. God\nis love: that is, feeling is the God of man, nay, God absolutely,\nthe Absolute Being. God is the nature of human feeling, unlimited,\npure feeling, made objective. God is the optative of the human heart\ntransformed into the tempus finitum, the certain, blissful \"IS,\"--the\nunrestricted omnipotence of feeling, prayer hearing itself, feeling\nperceiving itself, the echo of our cry of anguish. Pain must give\nitself utterance; involuntarily the artist seizes the lute that he\nmay breathe out his sufferings in its tones. He soothes his sorrow\nby making it audible to himself, by making it objective; he lightens\nthe burden which weighs upon his heart by communicating it to the air,\nby making his sorrow a general existence. But nature listens not to the\nplaints of man, it is callous to his sorrows. Hence man turns away from\nNature, from all visible objects. He turns within, that here, sheltered\nand hidden from the inexorable powers, he may find audience for his\ngriefs. Here he utters his oppressive secrets; here he gives vent to\nhis stifled sighs. This open-air of the heart, this outspoken secret,\nthis uttered sorrow of the soul, is God. God is a tear of love, shed\nin the deepest concealment over human misery. \"God is an unutterable\nsigh, lying in the depths of the heart;\" [93] this saying is the most\nremarkable, the profoundest, truest expression of Christian mysticism.\n\nThe ultimate essence of religion is revealed by the simplest act of\nreligion--prayer; an act which implies at least as much as the dogma\nof the Incarnation, although religious speculation stands amazed\nat this, as the greatest of mysteries. Not, certainly, the prayer\nbefore and after meals, the ritual of animal egoism, but the prayer\npregnant with sorrow, the prayer of disconsolate love, the prayer\nwhich expresses the power of the heart that crushes man to the ground,\nthe prayer which begins in despair and ends in rapture.\n\nIn prayer, man addresses God with the word of intimate affection--Thou;\nhe thus declares articulately that God is his alter ego; he confesses\nto God, as the being nearest to him, his most secret thoughts, his\ndeepest wishes, which otherwise he shrinks from uttering. But he\nexpresses these wishes in the confidence, in the certainty that they\nwill be fulfilled. How could he apply to a being that had no ear for\nhis complaints? Thus what is prayer but the wish of the heart expressed\nwith confidence in its fulfilment? [94] what else is the being that\nfulfils these wishes but human affection, the human soul, giving ear\nto itself, approving itself, unhesitatingly affirming itself? The man\nwho does not exclude from his mind the idea of the world, the idea\nthat everything here must be sought intermediately, that every effect\nhas its natural cause, that a wish is only to be attained when it is\nmade an end and the corresponding means are put into operation--such a\nman does not pray: he only works; he transforms his attainable wishes\ninto objects of real activity; other wishes which he recognises as\npurely subjective he denies, or regards as simply subjective, pious\naspirations. In other words, he limits, he conditionates his being\nby the world, as a member of which he conceives himself; he bounds\nhis wishes by the idea of necessity. In prayer, on the contrary,\nman excludes from his mind the world, and with it all thoughts of\nintermediateness and dependence; he makes his wishes--the concerns\nof his heart, objects of the independent, omnipotent, absolute being,\ni.e., he affirms them without limitation. God is the affirmation [95]\nof human feeling; prayer is the unconditional confidence of human\nfeeling in the absolute identity of the subjective and objective,\nthe certainty that the power of the heart is greater than the power of\nNature, that the heart's need is absolute necessity, the fate of the\nworld. Prayer alters the course of Nature; it determines God to bring\nforth an effect in contradiction with the laws of Nature. Prayer is the\nabsolute relation of the human heart to itself, to its own nature;\nin prayer, man forgets that there exists a limit to his wishes,\nand is happy in this forgetfulness.\n\nPrayer is the self-division of man into two beings,--a dialogue\nof man with himself, with his heart. It is essential to the\neffectiveness of prayer that it be audibly, intelligibly, energetically\nexpressed. Involuntarily prayer wells forth in sound; the struggling\nheart bursts the barrier of the closed lips. But audible prayer\nis only prayer revealing its nature; prayer is virtually, if not\nactually, speech,--the Latin word oratio signifies both: in prayer,\nman speaks undisguisedly of that which weighs upon him, which affects\nhim closely; he makes his heart objective;--hence the moral power\nof prayer. Concentration, it is said, is the condition of prayer;\nbut it is more than a condition; prayer is itself concentration,--the\ndismissal of all distracting ideas, of all disturbing influences from\nwithout, retirement within oneself, in order to have relation only\nwith one's own being. Only a trusting, open, hearty, fervent prayer is\nsaid to help; but this help lies in the prayer itself. As everywhere\nin religion the subjective, the secondary, the conditionating, is the\nprima causa, the objective fact; so here, these subjective qualities\nare the objective nature of prayer itself. [96]\n\nIt is an extremely superficial view of prayer to regard it as an\nexpression of the sense of dependence. It certainly expresses such a\nsense, but the dependence is that of man on his own heart, on his own\nfeeling. He who feels himself only dependent, does not open his mouth\nin prayer; the sense of dependence robs him of the desire, the courage\nfor it, for the sense of dependence is the sense of need. Prayer has\nits root rather in the unconditional trust of the heart, untroubled\nby all thought of compulsive need, that its concerns are objects\nof the Absolute Being, that the almighty, infinite nature of the\nFather of men is a sympathetic, tender, loving nature, and that thus\nthe dearest, most sacred emotions of man are divine realities. But\nthe child does not feel itself dependent on the father as a father;\nrather, he has in the father the feeling of his own strength, the\nconsciousness of his own worth, the guarantee of his existence,\nthe certainty of the fulfilment of his wishes; on the father rests\nthe burden of care; the child, on the contrary, lives careless and\nhappy in reliance on the father, his visible guardian spirit, who\ndesires nothing but the child's welfare and happiness. The father\nmakes the child an end, and himself the means of its existence. The\nchild, in asking something of its father, does not apply to him as\na being distinct from itself, a master, a person in general, but it\napplies to him in so far as he is dependent on, and determined by\nhis paternal feeling, his love for his child. [97] The entreaty is\nonly an expression of the force which the child exercises over the\nfather; if, indeed, the word force is appropriate here, since the\nforce of the child is nothing more than the force of the father's own\nheart. Speech has the same form both for entreaty and command, namely,\nthe imperative. And the imperative of love has infinitely more power\nthan that of despotism. Love does not command; love needs but gently\nto intimate its wishes to be certain of their fulfilment; the despot\nmust throw compulsion even into the tones of his voice in order to\nmake other beings, in themselves uncaring for him, the executors of\nhis wishes. The imperative of love works with electro-magnetic power;\nthat of despotism with the mechanical power of a wooden telegraph. The\nmost intimate epithet of God in prayer is the word \"Father;\" the most\nintimate, because in it man is in relation to the absolute nature\nas to his own; the word \"Father\" is the expression of the closest,\nthe most intense identity,--the expression in which lies the pledge\nthat my wishes will be fulfilled, the guarantee of my salvation. The\nomnipotence to which man turns in prayer is nothing but the Omnipotence\nof Goodness, which, for the sake of the salvation of man, makes the\nimpossible possible;--is, in truth, nothing else than the omnipotence\nof the heart, of feeling, which breaks through all the limits of\nthe understanding, which soars above all the boundaries of Nature,\nwhich wills that there be nothing else than feeling, nothing that\ncontradicts the heart. Faith in omnipotence is faith in the unreality\nof the external world, of objectivity,--faith in the absolute reality\nof man's emotional nature: the essence of omnipotence is simply the\nessence of feeling. Omnipotence is the power before which no law,\nno external condition, avails or subsists; but this power is the\nemotional nature, which feels every determination, every law, to be\na limit, a restraint, and for that reason dismisses it. Omnipotence\ndoes nothing more than accomplish the will of the feelings. In prayer\nman turns to the Omnipotence of Goodness;--which simply means, that in\nprayer man adores his own heart, regards his own feelings as absolute.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nTHE MYSTERY OF FAITH--THE MYSTERY OF MIRACLE.\n\n\nFaith in the power of prayer--and only where a power, an objective\npower, is ascribed to it, is prayer still a religious truth--is\nidentical with faith in miraculous power; and faith in miracles is\nidentical with the essence of faith in general. Faith alone prays;\nthe prayer of faith is alone effectual. But faith is nothing else\nthan confidence in the reality of the subjective in opposition to\nthe limitations or laws of Nature and reason,--that is, of natural\nreason. The specific object of faith, therefore, is miracle;\nfaith is the belief in miracle; faith and miracle are absolutely\ninseparable. That which is objectively miracle or miraculous power\nis subjectively faith; miracle is the outward aspect of faith, faith\nthe inward soul of miracle; faith is the miracle of mind, the miracle\nof feeling, which merely becomes objective in external miracles. To\nfaith nothing is impossible, and miracle only gives actuality to\nthis omnipotence of faith: miracles are but a visible example of\nwhat faith can effect. Unlimitedness, supernaturalness, exaltation of\nfeeling,--transcendence is therefore the essence of faith. Faith has\nreference only to things which, in contradiction with the limits or\nlaws of Nature and reason, give objective reality to human feelings\nand human desires. Faith unfetters the wishes of subjectivity from the\nbonds of natural reason; it confers what Nature and reason deny; hence\nit makes man happy, for it satisfies his most personal wishes. And\ntrue faith is discomposed by no doubt. Doubt arises only where I go\nout of myself, overstep the bounds of my personality, concede reality\nand a right of suffrage to that which is distinct from myself;--where\nI know myself to be a subjective, i.e., a limited being, and seek to\nwiden my limits by admitting things external to myself. But in faith\nthe very principle of doubt is annulled; for to faith the subjective\nis in and by itself the objective--nay, the absolute. Faith is nothing\nelse than belief in the absolute reality of subjectivity.\n\n\"Faith is that courage in the heart which trusts for all good to\nGod. Such a faith, in which the heart places its reliance on God alone,\nis enjoined by God in the first commandment, where he says, I am the\nLord thy God.... That is, I alone will be thy God; thou shalt seek\nno other God; I will help thee out of all trouble. Thou shalt not\nthink that I am an enemy to thee, and will not help thee. When thou\nthinkest so, thou makest me in thine heart into another God than I\nam. Wherefore hold it for certain that I am willing to be merciful\nto thee.\"--\"As thou behavest thyself, so does God behave. If thou\nthinkest that he is angry with thee, he is angry; if thou thinkest\nthat he is unmerciful and will cast thee into hell, he is so. As thou\nbelievest of God, so is he to thee.\"--\"If thou believest it, thou hast\nit; but if thou believest not, thou hast none of it.\"--\"Therefore,\nas we believe so does it happen to us. If we regard him as our God,\nhe will not be our devil. But if we regard him not as our God, then\ntruly he is not our God, but must be a consuming fire.\"--\"By unbelief\nwe make God a devil.\" [98] Thus, if I believe in a God, I have a God,\ni.e., faith in God is the God of man. If God is such, whatever it\nmay be, as I believe him, what else is the nature of God than the\nnature of faith? Is it possible for thee to believe in a God who\nregards thee favourably, if thou dost not regard thyself favourably,\nif thou despairest of man, if he is nothing to thee? What else then\nis the being of God but the being of man, the absolute self-love\nof man? If thou believest that God is for thee, thou believest\nthat nothing is or can be against thee, that nothing contradicts\nthee. But if thou believest that nothing is or can be against thee,\nthou believest--what?--nothing less than that thou art God. [99]\nThat God is another being is only illusion, only imagination. In\ndeclaring that God is for thee, thou declarest that he is thy own\nbeing. What then is faith but the infinite self-certainty of man, the\nundoubting certainty that his own subjective being is the objective,\nabsolute being, the being of beings?\n\nFaith does not limit itself by the idea of a world, a universe,\na necessity. For faith there is nothing but God, i.e., limitless\nsubjectivity. Where faith rises the world sinks, nay, has already\nsunk into nothing. Faith in the real annihilation of the world--in an\nimmediately approaching, a mentally present annihilation of this world,\na world antagonistic to the wishes of the Christian, is therefore\na phenomenon belonging to the inmost essence of Christianity;\na faith which is not properly separable from the other elements\nof Christian belief, and with the renunciation of which, true,\npositive Christianity is renounced and denied. [100] The essence\nof faith, as may be confirmed by an examination of its objects down\nto the minutest speciality, is the idea that that which man wishes\nactually is: he wishes to be immortal, therefore he is immortal;\nhe wishes for the existence of a being who can do everything which\nis impossible to Nature and reason, therefore such a being exists;\nhe wishes for a world which corresponds to the desires of the heart,\na world of unlimited subjectivity, i.e., of unperturbed feeling,\nof uninterrupted bliss, while nevertheless there exists a world\nthe opposite of that subjective one, and hence this world must pass\naway,--as necessarily pass away as God, or absolute subjectivity,\nmust remain. Faith, love, hope, are the Christian Trinity. Hope has\nrelation to the fulfilment of the promises, the wishes which are not\nyet fulfilled, but which are to be fulfilled; love has relation to\nthe Being who gives and fulfils these promises; faith to the promises,\nthe wishes, which are already fulfilled, which are historical facts.\n\nMiracle is an essential object of Christianity, an essential article of\nfaith. But what is miracle? A supranaturalistic wish realised--nothing\nmore. The Apostle Paul illustrates the nature of Christian faith by\nthe example of Abraham. Abraham could not, in a natural way, ever hope\nfor posterity; Jehovah nevertheless promised it to him out of special\nfavour, and Abraham believed in spite of Nature. Hence this faith was\nreckoned to him as righteousness, as merit; for it implies great force\nof subjectivity to accept as certain something in contradiction with\nexperience, at least with rational, normal experience. But what was\nthe object of this divine promise? Posterity, the object of a human\nwish. And in what did Abraham believe when he believed in Jehovah? In\na Being who can do everything, and can fulfil all wishes. \"Is anything\ntoo hard for the Lord?\" [101]\n\nBut why do we go so far back as to Abraham? We have the most striking\nexamples much nearer to us. Miracle feeds the hungry, cures men born\nblind, deaf, and lame, rescues from fatal diseases, and even raises\nthe dead at the prayer of relatives. Thus it satisfies human wishes,\nand wishes which, though not always intrinsically like the wish for the\nrestoration of the dead, yet in so far as they appeal to miraculous\npower, to miraculous aid, are transcendental, supranaturalistic. But\nmiracle is distinguished from that mode of satisfying human wishes\nand needs which is in accordance with Nature and reason, in this\nrespect, that it satisfies the wishes of men in a way corresponding\nto the nature of wishes--in the most desirable way. Wishes own\nno restraint, no law, no time; they would be fulfilled without\ndelay on the instant. And behold! miracle is as rapid as a wish is\nimpatient. Miraculous power realises human wishes in a moment, at\none stroke, without any hindrance. That the sick should become well\nis no miracle; but that they should become so immediately, at a mere\nword of command,--that is the mystery of miracle. Thus it is not in\nits product or object that miraculous agency is distinguished from\nthe agency of Nature and reason, but only in its mode and process;\nfor if miraculous power were to effect something absolutely new,\nnever before beheld, never conceived, or not even conceivable, it\nwould be practically proved to be an essentially different, and at\nthe same time objective, agency. But the agency which in essence,\nin substance, is natural and accordant with the forms of the senses,\nand which is supernatural, supersensual, only in the mode or process,\nis the agency of the imagination. The power of miracle is therefore\nnothing else than the power of the imagination.\n\nMiraculous agency is agency directed to an end. The yearning after the\ndeparted Lazarus, the desire of his relatives to possess him again,\nwas the motive of the miraculous resuscitation; the satisfaction of\nthis wish, the end. It is true that the miracle happened \"for the\nglory of God, that the Son of God might be glorified thereby;\" but\nthe message sent to the Master by the sisters of Lazarus, \"Behold,\nhe whom thou lovest is sick,\" and the tears which Jesus shed,\nvindicate for the miracle a human origin and end. The meaning is:\nto that power which can awaken the dead no human wish is impossible\nto accomplish. [102] And the glory of the Son consists in this: that\nhe is acknowledged and reverenced as the being who is able to do what\nman is unable but wishes to do. Activity towards an end is well known\nto describe a circle: in the end it returns upon its beginning. But\nmiraculous agency is distinguished from the ordinary realisation\nof an object in that it realises the end without means, that it\neffects an immediate identity of the wish and its fulfilment; that\nconsequently it describes a circle, not in a curved, but in a straight\nline, that is, the shortest line. A circle in a straight line is the\nmathematical symbol of miracle. The attempt to construct a circle\nwith a straight line would not be more ridiculous than the attempt\nto deduce miracle philosophically. To reason, miracle is absurd,\ninconceivable; as inconceivable as wooden iron or a circle without\na periphery. Before it is discussed whether a miracle can happen,\nlet it be shown that miracle, i.e., the inconceivable, is conceivable.\n\nWhat suggests to man the notion that miracle is conceivable is\nthat miracle is represented as an event perceptible by the senses,\nand hence man cheats his reason by material images which screen the\ncontradiction. The miracle of the turning of water into wine, for\nexample, implies in fact nothing else than that water is wine,--nothing\nelse than that two absolutely contradictory predicates or subjects\nare identical; for in the hand of the miracle-worker there is no\ndistinction between the two substances; the transformation is only\nthe visible appearance of this identity of two contradictories. But\nthe transformation conceals the contradiction, because the natural\nconception of change is interposed. Here, however, is no gradual, no\nnatural, or, so to speak, organic change; but an absolute, immaterial\none; a pure creatio ex nihilo. In the mysterious and momentous act of\nmiraculous power, in the act which constitutes the miracle, water is\nsuddenly and imperceptibly wine: which is equivalent to saying that\niron is wood, or wooden iron.\n\nThe miraculous act--and miracle is only a transient act--is therefore\nnot an object of thought, for it nullifies the very principle of\nthought; but it is just as little an object of sense, an object of\nreal or even possible experience. Water is indeed an object of sense,\nand wine also; I first see water and then wine; but the miracle itself,\nthat which makes this water suddenly wine,--this, not being a natural\nprocess, but a pure perfect without any antecedent imperfect, without\nany modus, without way or means, is no object of real, or even of\npossible experience. Miracle is a thing of the imagination; and on that\nvery account is it so agreeable: for the imagination is the faculty\nwhich alone corresponds to personal feeling, because it sets aside\nall limits, all laws which are painful to the feelings, and thus makes\nobjective to man the immediate, absolutely unlimited satisfaction of\nhis subjective wishes. [103] Accordance with subjective inclination\nis the essential characteristic of miracle. It is true that miracle\nproduces also an awful, agitating impression, so far as it expresses a\npower which nothing can resist,--the power of the imagination. But this\nimpression lies only in the transient miraculous act; the abiding,\nessential impression is the agreeable one. At the moment in which\nthe beloved Lazarus is raised up, the surrounding relatives and\nfriends are awestruck at the extraordinary, almighty power which\ntransforms the dead into the living; but soon the relatives fall\ninto the arms of the risen one, and lead him with tears of joy to\nhis home, there to celebrate a festival of rejoicing. Miracle springs\nout of feeling, and has its end in feeling. Even in the traditional\nrepresentation it does not deny its origin; the representation which\ngratifies the feelings is alone the adequate one. Who can fail to\nrecognise in the narrative of the resurrection of Lazarus the tender,\npleasing, legendary tone? [104] Miracle is agreeable, because, as\nhas been said, it satisfies the wishes of man without labour, without\neffort. Labour is unimpassioned, unbelieving, rationalistic; for man\nhere makes his existence dependent on activity directed to an end,\nwhich activity again is itself determined solely by the idea of the\nobjective world. But feeling does not at all trouble itself about\nthe objective world; it does not go out of or beyond itself; it is\nhappy in itself. The element of culture, the Northern principle of\nself-renunciation, is wanting to the emotional nature. The Apostles\nand Evangelists were no scientifically cultivated men. Culture, in\ngeneral, is nothing else than the exaltation of the individual above\nhis subjectivity to objective universal ideas, to the contemplation\nof the world. The Apostles were men of the people; the people live\nonly in themselves, in their feelings; therefore Christianity took\npossession of the people. Vox populi vox Dei. Did Christianity conquer\na single philosopher, historian, or poet of the classical period? The\nphilosophers who went over to Christianity were feeble, contemptible\nphilosophers. All who had yet the classic spirit in them were hostile,\nor at least indifferent to Christianity. The decline of culture was\nidentical with the victory of Christianity. The classic spirit, the\nspirit of culture, limits itself by laws,--not indeed by arbitrary,\nfinite laws, but by inherently true and valid ones; it is determined\nby the necessity, the truth of the nature of things; in a word, it is\nthe objective spirit. In place of this, there entered with Christianity\nthe principle of unlimited, extravagant, fanatical, supranaturalistic\nsubjectivity; a principle intrinsically opposed to that of science,\nof culture. [105] With Christianity man lost the capability of\nconceiving himself as a part of Nature, of the universe. As long as\ntrue, unfeigned, unfalsified, uncompromising Christianity existed,\nas long as Christianity was a living, practical truth, so long did\nreal miracles happen; and they necessarily happened, for faith in\ndead, historical, past miracles is itself a dead faith, the first\nstep towards unbelief, or rather the first and therefore the timid,\nuncandid, servile mode in which unbelief in miracle finds vent. But\nwhere miracles happen, all definite forms melt in the golden haze\nof imagination and feeling; there the world, reality, is no truth;\nthere the miracle-working, emotional, i.e., subjective being, is held\nto be alone the objective, real being.\n\nTo the merely emotional man the imagination is immediately, without his\nwilling or knowing it, the highest, the dominant activity; and being\nthe highest, it is the activity of God, the creative activity. To\nhim feeling is an immediate truth and reality; he cannot abstract\nhimself from his feelings, he cannot get beyond them: and equally\nreal is his imagination. The imagination is not to him what it is\nto us men of active understanding, who distinguish it as subjective\nfrom objective cognition; it is immediately identical with himself,\nwith his feelings; and since it is identical with his being, it is\nhis essential, objective, necessary view of things. For us, indeed,\nimagination is an arbitrary activity; but where man has not imbibed\nthe principle of culture, of theory, where he lives and moves only\nin his feelings, the imagination is an immediate, involuntary activity.\n\nThe explanation of miracles by feeling and imagination is regarded\nby many in the present day as superficial. But let any one transport\nhimself to the time when living, present miracles were believed in;\nwhen the reality of things without us was as yet no sacred article of\nfaith; when men were so void of any theoretic interest in the world,\nthat they from day to day looked forward to its destruction; when\nthey lived only in the rapturous prospect and hope of heaven, that\nis, in the imagination of it (for whatever heaven may be, for them,\nso long as they were on earth, it existed only in the imagination);\nwhen this imagination was not a fiction but a truth, nay, the eternal,\nalone abiding truth, not an inert, idle source of consolation,\nbut a practical moral principle determining actions, a principle to\nwhich men joyfully sacrificed real life, the real world with all its\nglories;--let him transport himself to those times and he must himself\nbe very superficial to pronounce the psychological genesis of miracles\nsuperficial. It is no valid objection that miracles have happened,\nor are supposed to have happened, in the presence of whole assemblies:\nno man was independent, all were filled with exalted supranaturalistic\nideas and feelings; all were animated by the same faith, the same\nhope, the same hallucinations. And who does not know that there are\ncommon or similar dreams, common or similar visions, especially among\nimpassioned individuals who are closely united and restricted to their\nown circle? But be that as it may. If the explanation of miracles by\nfeeling and imagination is superficial, the charge of superficiality\nfalls not on the explainer, but on that which he explains, namely,\non miracle; for, seen in clear daylight, miracle presents absolutely\nnothing else than the sorcery of the imagination, which satisfies\nwithout contradiction all the wishes of the heart. [106]\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nTHE MYSTERY OF THE RESURRECTION AND OF THE MIRACULOUS CONCEPTION.\n\n\nThe quality of being agreeable to subjective inclination belongs not\nonly to practical miracles, in which it is conspicuous, as they have\nimmediate reference to the interest or wish of the human individual;\nit belongs also to theoretical, or more properly dogmatic miracles,\nand hence to the Resurrection and the Miraculous Conception.\n\nMan, at least in a state of ordinary well-being, has the wish\nnot to die. This wish is originally identical with the instinct of\nself-preservation. Whatever lives seeks to maintain itself, to continue\nalive, and consequently not to die. Subsequently, when reflection and\nfeeling are developed under the urgency of life, especially of social\nand political life, this primary negative wish becomes the positive\nwish for a life, and that a better life, after death. But this wish\ninvolves the further wish for the certainty of its fulfilment. Reason\ncan afford no such certainty. It has therefore been said that all\nproofs of immortality are insufficient, and even that unassisted reason\nis not capable of apprehending it, still less of proving it. And with\njustice; for reason furnishes only general proofs; it cannot give\nthe certainty of any personal immortality, and it is precisely this\ncertainty which is desired. Such a certainty requires an immediate\npersonal assurance, a practical demonstration. This can only be given\nto me by the fact of a dead person, whose death has been previously\ncertified, rising again from the grave; and he must be no indifferent\nperson, but, on the contrary, the type and representative of all\nothers, so that his resurrection also may be the type, the guarantee\nof theirs. The resurrection of Christ is therefore the satisfied\ndesire of man for an immediate certainty of his personal existence\nafter death,--personal immortality as a sensible, indubitable fact.\n\nImmortality was with the heathen philosophers a question in which\nthe personal interest was only a collateral point. They concerned\nthemselves chiefly with the nature of the soul, of mind, of the vital\nprinciple. The immortality of the vital principle by no means involves\nthe idea, not to mention the certainty, of personal immortality. Hence\nthe vagueness, discrepancy, and dubiousness with which the ancients\nexpress themselves on this subject. The Christians, on the contrary,\nin the undoubting certainty that their personal, self-flattering wishes\nwill be fulfilled, i.e., in the certainty of the divine nature of their\nemotions, the truth and unassailableness of their subjective feelings,\nconverted that which to the ancients was a theoretic problem into an\nimmediate fact,--converted a theoretic, and in itself open question,\ninto a matter of conscience, the denial of which was equivalent to\nthe high treason of atheism. He who denies the resurrection denies the\nresurrection of Christ, but he who denies the resurrection of Christ\ndenies Christ himself, and he who denies Christ denies God. Thus did\n\"spiritual\" Christianity unspiritualise what was spiritual! To the\nChristians the immortality of the reason, of the soul, was far too\nabstract and negative; they had at heart only a personal immortality,\nsuch as would gratify their feelings, and the guarantee of this lies\nin a bodily resurrection alone. The resurrection of the body is the\nhighest triumph of Christianity over the sublime but certainly abstract\nspirituality and objectivity of the ancients. For this reason the\nidea of the resurrection could never be assimilated by the pagan mind.\n\nAs the Resurrection, which terminates the sacred history (to the\nChristian not a mere history, but the truth itself), is a realised\nwish, so also is that which commences it, namely, the Miraculous\nConception, though this has relation not so much to an immediately\npersonal interest as to a particular subjective feeling.\n\nThe more man alienates himself from Nature, the more subjective,\ni.e., supranatural or antinatural, is his view of things, the\ngreater the horror he has of Nature, or at least of those natural\nobjects and processes which displease his imagination, which affect\nhim disagreeably. [107] The free, objective man doubtless finds\nthings repugnant and distasteful in Nature, but he regards them as\nnatural, inevitable results, and under this conviction he subdues\nhis feeling as a merely subjective and untrue one. On the contrary,\nthe subjective man, who lives only in the feelings and imagination,\nregards these things with a quite peculiar aversion. He has the eye of\nthat unhappy foundling, who even in looking at the loveliest flower\ncould pay attention only to the little \"black beetle\" which crawled\nover it, and who by this perversity of perception had his enjoyment\nin the sight of flowers always embittered. Moreover, the subjective\nman makes his feelings the measure, the standard of what ought to\nbe. That which does not please him, which offends his transcendental,\nsupranatural, or antinatural feelings, ought not to be. Even if that\nwhich pleases him cannot exist without being associated with that which\ndispleases him, the subjective man is not guided by the wearisome\nlaws of logic and physics, but by the self-will of the imagination;\nhence he drops what is disagreeable in a fact, and holds fast alone\nwhat is agreeable. Thus the idea of the pure, holy Virgin pleases\nhim; still he is also pleased with the idea of the Mother, but only\nof the Mother who already carries the infant on her arms.\n\nVirginity in itself is to him the highest moral idea, the cornu copi\u00e6\nof his supranaturalistic feelings and ideas, his personified sense\nof honour and of shame before common nature. [108] Nevertheless,\nthere stirs in his bosom a natural feeling also, the compassionate\nfeeling which makes the Mother beloved. What then is to be done in\nthis difficulty of the heart, in this conflict between a natural and\na supranatural feeling? The supranaturalist must unite the two, must\ncomprise in one and the same subject two predicates which exclude each\nother. [109] Oh, what a plenitude of agreeable, sweet, supersensual,\nsensual emotions lies in this combination!\n\nHere we have the key to the contradiction in Catholicism, that at\nthe same time marriage is holy and celibacy is holy. This simply\nrealises, as a practical contradiction, the dogmatic contradiction of\nthe Virgin Mother. But this wondrous union of virginity and maternity,\ncontradicting Nature and reason, but in the highest degree accordant\nwith the feelings and imagination, is no product of Catholicism; it\nlies already in the twofold part which marriage plays in the Bible,\nespecially in the view of the Apostle Paul. The supernatural conception\nof Christ is a fundamental doctrine of Christianity, a doctrine which\nexpresses its inmost dogmatic essence, and which rests on the same\nfoundation as all other miracles and articles of faith. As death,\nwhich the philosopher, the man of science, the free objective thinker\nin general, accepts as a natural necessity, and as indeed all the\nlimits of nature, which are impediments to feeling, but to reason\nare rational laws, were repugnant to the Christians, and were set\naside by them through the supposed agency of miraculous power; so,\nnecessarily, they had an equal repugnance to the natural process of\ngeneration, and superseded it by miracle. The Miraculous Conception is\nnot less welcome than the Resurrection to all believers; for it was\nthe first step towards the purification of mankind, polluted by sin\nand Nature. Only because the God-man was not infected with original\nsin, could he, the pure one, purify mankind in the eyes of God, to\nwhom the natural process of generation was an object of aversion,\nbecause he himself is nothing else but supranatural feeling.\n\nEven the arid Protestant orthodoxy, so arbitrary in its criticism,\nregarded the conception of the God-producing Virgin as a great,\nadorable, amazing, holy mystery of faith, transcending reason. [110]\nBut with the Protestants, who confined the speciality of the Christian\nto the domain of faith, and with whom, in life, it was allowable\nto be a man, even this mystery had only a dogmatic, and no longer\na practical significance; they did not allow it to interfere with\ntheir desire of marriage. With the Catholics, and with all the old,\nuncompromising, uncritical Christians, that which was a mystery of\nfaith was a mystery of life, of morality. [111] Catholic morality is\nChristian, mystical; Protestant morality was, in its very beginning,\nrationalistic. Protestant morality is and was a carnal mingling of\nthe Christian with the man, the natural, political, civil, social\nman, or whatever else he may be called in distinction from the\nChristian; Catholic morality cherished in its heart the mystery of\nthe unspotted virginity. Catholic morality was the Mater dolorosa;\nProtestant morality a comely, fruitful matron. Protestantism is\nfrom beginning to end the contradiction between faith and love; for\nwhich very reason it has been the source, or at least the condition,\nof freedom. Just because the mystery of the Virgo Deipara had with\nthe Protestants a place only in theory, or rather in dogma, and no\nlonger in practice, they declared that it was impossible to express\noneself with sufficient care and reserve concerning it, and that it\nought not to be made an object of speculation. That which is denied in\npractice has no true basis and durability in man, is a mere spectre\nof the mind; and hence it is withdrawn from the investigation of the\nunderstanding. Ghosts do not brook daylight.\n\nEven the later doctrine (which, however, had been already enunciated\nin a letter to St. Bernard, who rejects it), that Mary herself was\nconceived without taint of original sin, is by no means a \"strange\nschool-bred doctrine,\" as it is called by a modern historian. That\nwhich gives birth to a miracle, which brings forth God, must itself\nbe of miraculous divine origin or nature. How could Mary have had\nthe honour of being overshadowed by the Holy Ghost if she had not\nbeen from the first pure? Could the Holy Ghost take up his abode in\na body polluted by original sin? If the principle of Christianity,\nthe miraculous birth of the Saviour, does not appear strange to you,\nwhy think strange the na\u00efve, well-meaning inferences of Catholicism?\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\nTHE MYSTERY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHRIST, OR THE PERSONAL GOD.\n\n\nThe fundamental dogmas of Christianity are realised wishes of\nthe heart;--the essence of Christianity is the essence of human\nfeeling. It is pleasanter to be passive than to act, to be redeemed\nand made free by another than to free oneself; pleasanter to make\none's salvation dependent on a person than on the force of one's\nown spontaneity; pleasanter to set before oneself an object of love\nthan an object of effort; pleasanter to know oneself beloved by God\nthan merely to have that simple, natural self-love which is innate\nin all beings; pleasanter to see oneself imaged in the love-beaming\neyes of another personal being, than to look into the concave mirror\nof self or into the cold depths of the ocean of Nature; pleasanter,\nin short, to allow oneself to be acted on by one's own feeling,\nas by another, but yet fundamentally identical being, than to\nregulate oneself by reason. Feeling is the oblique case of the ego,\nthe ego in the accusative. The ego of Fichte is destitute of feeling,\nbecause the accusative is the same as the nominative, because it is\nindeclinable. But feeling or sentiment is the ego acted on by itself,\nand by itself as another being,--the passive ego. Feeling changes the\nactive in man into the passive, and the passive into the active. To\nfeeling, that which thinks is the thing thought, and the thing thought\nis that which thinks. Feeling is the dream of Nature; and there is\nnothing more blissful, nothing more profound than dreaming. But what\nis dreaming? The reversing of the waking consciousness. In dreaming,\nthe active is the passive, the passive the active; in dreaming, I\ntake the spontaneous action of my own mind for an action upon me from\nwithout, my emotions for events, my conceptions and sensations for true\nexistences apart from myself. I suffer what I also perform. Dreaming\nis a double refraction of the rays of light; hence its indescribable\ncharm. It is the same ego, the same being in dreaming as in waking;\nthe only distinction is, that in waking, the ego acts on itself;\nwhereas in dreaming it is acted on by itself as by another being. I\nthink myself--is a passionless, rationalistic position; I am thought by\nGod, and think myself only as thought by God--is a position pregnant\nwith feeling, religious. Feeling is a dream with the eyes open;\nreligion the dream of waking consciousness: dreaming is the key to\nthe mysteries of religion.\n\nThe highest law of feeling is the immediate unity of will and deed,\nof wishing and reality. This law is fulfilled by the Redeemer. As\nexternal miracles, in opposition to natural activity, realise\nimmediately the physical wants and wishes of man; so the Redeemer,\nthe Mediator, the God-man, in opposition to the moral spontaneity of\nthe natural or rationalistic man, satisfies immediately the inward\nmoral wants and wishes, since he dispenses man on his own side from\nany intermediate activity. What thou wishest is already effected. Thou\ndesirest to win, to deserve happiness. Morality is the condition,\nthe means of happiness. But thou canst not fulfil this condition;\nthat is, in truth, thou needest not. That which thou seekest to do has\nalready been done. Thou hast only to be passive, thou needest only\nbelieve, only enjoy. Thou desirest to make God favourable to thee,\nto appease his anger, to be at peace with thy conscience. But this\npeace exists already; this peace is the Mediator, the God-man. He\nis thy appeased conscience; he is the fulfilment of the law, and\ntherewith the fulfilment of thy own wish and effort.\n\nTherefore it is no longer the law, but the fulfiller of the law,\nwho is the model, the guiding thread, the rule of thy life. He who\nfulfils the law annuls the law. The law has authority, has validity,\nonly in relation to him who violates it. But he who perfectly fulfils\nthe law says to it: What thou willest I spontaneously will, and\nwhat thou commandest I enforce by deeds; my life is the true, the\nliving law. The fulfiller of the law, therefore, necessarily steps\ninto the place of the law; moreover he becomes a new law, one whose\nyoke is light and easy. For in place of the merely imperative law,\nhe presents himself as an example, as an object of love, of admiration\nand emulation, and thus becomes the Saviour from sin. The law does not\ngive me the power to fulfil the law; no! it is hard and merciless;\nit only commands, without troubling itself whether I can fulfil it,\nor how I am to fulfil it; it leaves me to myself, without counsel\nor aid. But he who presents himself to me as an example lights up my\npath, takes me by the hand, and imparts to me his own strength. The law\nlends no power of resisting sin, but example works miracles. The law is\ndead; but example animates, inspires, carries men involuntarily along\nwith it. The law speaks only to the understanding, and sets itself\ndirectly in opposition to the instincts; example, on the contrary,\nappeals to a powerful instinct immediately connected with the activity\nof the senses, that of involuntary imitation. Example operates on\nthe feelings and imagination. In short, example has magical, i.e.,\nsense-affecting powers; for the magical or involuntary force of\nattraction is an essential property, as of matter in general, so in\nparticular of that which affects the senses.\n\nThe ancients said that if virtue could become visible, its beauty\nwould win and inspire all hearts. The Christians were so happy as\nto see even this wish fulfilled. The heathens had an unwritten, the\nJews a written law; the Christians had a model--a visible, personal,\nliving law, a law made flesh. Hence the joyfulness especially of\nthe primitive Christians, hence the glory of Christianity that it\nalone contains and bestows the power to resist sin. And this glory\nis not to be denied it. Only, it is to be observed that the power\nof the exemplar of virtue is not so much the power of virtue as the\npower of example in general; just as the power of religious music is\nnot the power of religion, but the power of music; [112] and that\ntherefore, though the image of virtue has virtuous actions as its\nconsequences, these actions are destitute of the dispositions and\nmotives of virtue. But this simple and true sense of the redeeming\nand reconciling power of example in distinction from the power of\nlaw, to which we have reduced the antithesis of the law and Christ,\nby no means expresses the full religious significance of the Christian\nredemption and reconciliation. In this everything reduces itself to the\npersonal power of that miraculous intermediate being who is neither\nGod alone nor man alone, but a man who is also God, and a God who is\nalso man, and who can therefore only be comprehended in connection\nwith the significance of miracle. In this, the miraculous Redeemer\nis nothing else than the realised wish of feeling to be free from the\nlaws of morality, i.e., from the conditions to which virtue is united\nin the natural course of things; the realised wish to be freed from\nmoral evils instantaneously, immediately, by a stroke of magic, that\nis, in an absolutely subjective, agreeable way. \"The word of God,\"\nsays Luther, for example, \"accomplishes all things swiftly, brings\nforgiveness of sins, and gives thee eternal life, and costs nothing\nmore than that thou shouldst hear the word, and when thou hast heard\nit shouldst believe. If thou believest, thou hast it without pains,\ncost, delay, or difficulty.\" [113] But that hearing of the word of\nGod which is followed by faith is itself a \"gift of God.\" Thus faith\nis nothing else than a psychological miracle, a supernatural operation\nof God in man, as Luther likewise says. But man becomes free from sin\nand from the consciousness of guilt only through faith,--morality is\ndependent on faith, the virtues of the heathens are only splendid sins;\nthus he becomes morally free and good only through miracle.\n\nThat the idea of miraculous power is one with the idea of the\nintermediate being, at once divine and human, has historical proof\nin the fact that the miracles of the Old Testament, the delivery of\nthe law, providence--all the elements which constitute the essence of\nreligion, were in the later Judaism attributed to the Logos. In Philo,\nhowever, this Logos still hovers in the air between heaven and earth,\nnow as abstract, now as concrete; that is, Philo vacillates between\nhimself as a philosopher and himself as a religious Israelite--between\nthe positive element of religion and the metaphysical idea of deity;\nbut in such a way that even the abstract element is with him more\nor less invested with imaginative forms. In Christianity this Logos\nfirst attained perfect consistence, i.e., religion now concentrated\nitself exclusively on that element, that object, which is the basis\nof its essential difference. The Logos is the personified essence of\nreligion. Hence the definition of God as the essence of feeling has\nits complete truth only in the Logos.\n\nGod as God is feeling as yet shut up, hidden; only Christ is the\nunclosed, open feeling or heart. In Christ feeling is first perfectly\ncertain of itself, and assured beyond doubt of the truth and divinity\nof its own nature; for Christ denies nothing to feeling; he fulfils\nall its prayers. In God the soul is still silent as to what affects\nit most closely,--it only sighs; but in Christ it speaks out fully;\nhere it has no longer any reserves. To him who only sighs, wishes\nare still attended with disquietude; he rather complains that what\nhe wishes is not, than openly, positively declares what he wishes;\nhe is still in doubt whether his wishes have the force of law. But\nin Christ all anxiety of the soul vanishes; he is the sighing soul\npassed into a song of triumph over its complete satisfaction; he is\nthe joyful certainty of feeling that its wishes hidden in God have\ntruth and reality, the actual victory over death, over all the powers\nof the world and Nature, the resurrection no longer merely hoped for,\nbut already accomplished; he is the heart released from all oppressive\nlimits, from all sufferings,--the soul in perfect blessedness, the\nGodhead made visible. [114]\n\nTo see God is the highest wish, the highest triumph of the\nheart. Christ is this wish, this triumph, fulfilled. God, as an object\nof thought only, i.e., God as God, is always a remote being; the\nrelation to him is an abstract one, like that relation of friendship\nin which we stand to a man who is distant from us, and personally\nunknown to us. However his works, the proofs of love which he gives us,\nmay make his nature present to us, there always remains an unfilled\nvoid,--the heart is unsatisfied, we long to see him. So long as we\nhave not met a being face to face, we are always in doubt whether\nhe be really such as we imagine him; actual presence alone gives\nfinal confidence, perfect repose. Christ is God known personally;\nChrist, therefore, is the blessed certainty that God is what the\nsoul desires and needs him to be. God, as the object of prayer,\nis indeed already a human being, since he sympathises with human\nmisery, grants human wishes; but still he is not yet an object to\nthe religious consciousness as a real man. Hence, only in Christ\nis the last wish of religion realised, the mystery of religious\nfeeling solved:--solved however in the language of imagery proper\nto religion, for what God is in essence, that Christ is in actual\nappearance. So far the Christian religion may justly be called the\nabsolute religion. That God, who in himself is nothing else than the\nnature of man, should also have a real existence as such, should be\nas man an object to the consciousness--this is the goal of religion;\nand this the Christian religion has attained in the incarnation of\nGod, which is by no means a transitory act, for Christ remains man\neven after his ascension,--man in heart and man in form, only that\nhis body is no longer an earthly one, liable to suffering.\n\nThe incarnations of the Deity with the Orientals--the Hindoos, for\nexample--have no such intense meaning as the Christian incarnation;\njust because they happen often they become indifferent, they lose\ntheir value. The manhood of God is his personality; the proposition,\nGod is a personal being, means: God is a human being, God is a\nman. Personality is an abstraction, which has reality only in an actual\nman. [115] The idea which lies at the foundation of the incarnations\nof God is therefore infinitely better conveyed by one incarnation,\none personality. Where God appears in several persons successively,\nthese personalities are evanescent. What is required is a permanent,\nan exclusive personality. Where there are many incarnations, room is\ngiven for innumerable others; the imagination is not restrained; and\neven those incarnations which are already real pass into the category\nof the merely possible and conceivable, into the category of fancies\nor of mere appearances. But where one personality is exclusively\nbelieved in and contemplated, this at once impresses with the power of\nan historical personality; imagination is done away with, the freedom\nto imagine others is renounced. This one personality presses on me\nthe belief in its reality. The characteristic of real personality is\nprecisely exclusiveness,--the Leibnitzian principle of distinction,\nnamely, that no one existence is exactly like another. The tone,\nthe emphasis, with which the one personality is expressed, produces\nsuch an effect on the feelings, that it presents itself immediately\nas a real one, and is converted from an object of the imagination\ninto an object of historical knowledge.\n\nLonging is the necessity of feeling, and feeling longs for a personal\nGod. But this longing after the personality of God is true, earnest,\nand profound only when it is the longing for one personality, when\nit is satisfied with one. With the plurality of persons the truth\nof the want vanishes, and personality becomes a mere luxury of the\nimagination. But that which operates with the force of necessity,\noperates with the force of reality on man. That which to the feelings\nis a necessary being, is to them immediately a real being. Longing\nsays: There must be a personal God, i.e., it cannot be that there is\nnot; satisfied feeling says: He is. The guarantee of his existence\nlies for feeling in its sense of the necessity of his existence the\nnecessity of the satisfaction in the force of the want. Necessity\nknows no law besides itself; necessity breaks iron. Feeling knows\nno other necessity than its own, than the necessity of feeling,\nthan longing; it holds in extreme horror the necessity of Nature,\nthe necessity of reason. Thus to feeling, a subjective, sympathetic,\npersonal God is necessary; but it demands one personality alone, and\nthis an historical, real one. Only when it is satisfied in the unity\nof personality has feeling any concentration; plurality dissipates it.\n\nBut as the truth of personality is unity, and as the truth of unity is\nreality, so the truth of real personality is--blood. The last proof,\nannounced with peculiar emphasis by the author of the fourth Gospel,\nthat the visible person of God was no phantasm, no illusion, but\na real man, is that blood flowed from his side on the cross. If the\npersonal God has a true sympathy with distress, he must himself suffer\ndistress. Only in his suffering lies the assurance of his reality;\nonly on this depends the impressiveness of the incarnation. To see God\ndoes not satisfy feeling; the eyes give no sufficient guarantee. The\ntruth of vision is confirmed only by touch. But as subjectively\ntouch, so objectively the capability of being touched, palpability,\npassibility, is the last criterion of reality; hence the passion\nof Christ is the highest confidence, the highest self-enjoyment,\nthe highest consolation of feeling; for only in the blood of Christ\nis the thirst for a personal, that is, a human, sympathising, tender\nGod allayed.\n\n\"Wherefore we hold it to be a pernicious error when such (namely,\ndivine) majesty is taken away from Christ according to his manhood,\nthereby depriving Christians of their highest consolation, which they\nhave in ... the promise of the presence of their Head, King and High\nPriest, who has promised them that not his mere Godhead, which to us\npoor sinners is as a consuming fire to dry stubble, but he--he the\nMan--who has spoken with us, who has proved all sorrows in the human\nform which he took upon him, who therefore can have fellow-feeling\nwith us as his brethren,--that he will be with us in all our need,\naccording to the nature whereby he is our brother and we are flesh\nof his flesh.\" [116]\n\nIt is superficial to say that Christianity is not the religion of one\npersonal God, but of three personalities. These three personalities\nhave certainly an existence in dogma; but even there the personality\nof the Holy Spirit is only an arbitrary decision which is contradicted\nby impersonal definitions; as, for example, that the Holy Spirit is\nthe gift of the Father and Son. [117] Already the very \"procession\"\nof the Holy Ghost presents an evil prognostic for his personality, for\na personal being is produced only by generation, not by an indefinite\nemanation or by spiratio. And even the Father, as the representative of\nthe rigorous idea of the Godhead, is a personal being only according\nto opinion and assertion, not according to his definitions; he is\nan abstract idea, a purely rationalistic being. Only Christ is the\nplastic personality. To personality belongs form; form is the reality\nof personality. Christ alone is the personal God; he is the real\nGod of Christians, a truth which cannot be too often repeated. [118]\nIn him alone is concentrated the Christian religion, the essence of\nreligion in general. He alone meets the longing for a personal God;\nhe alone is an existence identical with the nature of feeling; on\nhim alone are heaped all the joys of the imagination, and all the\nsufferings of the heart; in him alone are feeling and imagination\nexhausted. Christ is the blending in one of feeling and imagination.\n\nChristianity is distinguished from other religions by this, that in\nother religions the heart and imagination are divided, in Christianity\nthey coincide. Here the imagination does not wander, left to itself; it\nfollows the leadings of the heart; it describes a circle, whose centre\nis feeling. Imagination is here limited by the wants of the heart,\nit only realises the wishes of feeling, it has reference only to the\none thing needful; in brief, it has, at least generally, a practical,\nconcentric tendency, not a vagrant, merely poetic one. The miracles of\nChristianity--no product of free, spontaneous activity, but conceived\nin the bosom of yearning, necessitous feeling--place us immediately\non the ground of common, real life; they act on the emotional man with\nirresistible force, because they have the necessity of feeling on their\nside. The power of imagination is here at the same time the power of\nthe heart,--imagination is only the victorious, triumphant heart. With\nthe Orientals, with the Greeks, imagination, untroubled by the wants of\nthe heart, revelled in the enjoyment of earthly splendour and glory;\nin Christianity, it descended from the palace of the gods into the\nabode of poverty, where only want rules,--it humbled itself under\nthe sway of the heart. But the more it limited itself in extent, the\nmore intense became its strength. The wantonness of the Olympian gods\ncould not maintain itself before the rigorous necessity of the heart;\nbut imagination is omnipotent when it has a bond of union with the\nheart. And this bond between the freedom of the imagination and the\nnecessity of the heart is Christ. All things are subject to Christ;\nhe is the Lord of the world, who does with it what he will; but this\nunlimited power over Nature is itself again subject to the power of\nthe heart;--Christ commands raging Nature to be still, but only that\nhe may hear the sighs of the needy.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\n\nTHE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CHRISTIANITY AND HEATHENISM.\n\n\nChrist is the omnipotence of subjectivity, the heart released from\nall the bonds and laws of Nature, the soul excluding the world,\nand concentrated only on itself, the reality of all the heart's\nwishes, the Easter festival of the heart, the ascent to heaven of\nthe imagination:--Christ therefore is the distinction of Christianity\nfrom heathenism.\n\nIn Christianity, man was concentrated only on himself, he unlinked\nhimself from the chain of sequences in the system of the universe,\nhe made himself a self-sufficing whole, an absolute, extra- and\nsupra-mundane being. Because he no longer regarded himself as a being\nimmanent in the world, because he severed himself from connection\nwith it, he felt himself an unlimited being--(for the sole limit\nof subjectivity is the world, is objectivity),--he had no longer\nany reason to doubt the truth and validity of his subjective wishes\nand feelings.\n\nThe heathens, on the contrary, not shutting out Nature by retreating\nwithin themselves, limited their subjectivity by the contemplation\nof the world. Highly as the ancients estimated the intelligence, the\nreason, they were yet liberal and objective enough, theoretically as\nwell as practically, to allow that which they distinguished from mind,\nnamely, matter, to live, and even to live eternally; the Christians\nevinced their theoretical as well as practical intolerance in their\nbelief that they secured the eternity of their subjective life\nonly by annihilating, as in the doctrine of the destruction of the\nworld, the opposite of subjectivity--Nature. The ancients were free\nfrom themselves, but their freedom was that of indifference towards\nthemselves; the Christians were free from Nature, but their freedom\nwas not that of reason, not true freedom, which limits itself by\nthe contemplation of the world, by Nature,--it was the freedom of\nfeeling and imagination, the freedom of miracle. The ancients were so\nenraptured by the cosmos, that they lost sight of themselves, suffered\nthemselves to be merged in the whole; the Christians despised the\nworld;--what is the creature compared with the Creator? what are sun,\nmoon, and earth compared with the human soul? [119] The world passes\naway, but man, nay, the individual, personal man, is eternal. If the\nChristians severed man from all community with Nature, and hence fell\ninto the extreme of an arrogant fastidiousness, which stigmatised the\nremotest comparison of man with the brutes as an impious violation\nof human dignity; the heathens, on the other hand, fell into the\nopposite extreme, into that spirit of depreciation which abolishes\nthe distinction between man and the brute, or even, as was the case,\nfor example, with Celsus, the opponent of Christianity, degrades man\nbeneath the brute.\n\nBut the heathens considered man not only in connection with the\nuniverse; they considered the individual man, in connection with other\nmen, as member of a commonwealth. They rigorously distinguished the\nindividual from the species, the individual as a part from the race as\na whole, and they subordinated the part to the whole. Men pass away,\nbut mankind remains, says a heathen philosopher. \"Why wilt thou grieve\nover the loss of thy daughter?\" writes Sulpicius to Cicero. \"Great,\nrenowned cities and empires have passed away, and thou behavest thus\nat the death of an homunculus, a little human being! Where is thy\nphilosophy?\" The idea of man as an individual was to the ancients a\nsecondary one, attained through the idea of the species. Though they\nthought highly of the race, highly of the excellences of mankind,\nhighly and sublimely of the intelligence, they nevertheless thought\nslightly of the individual. Christianity, on the contrary, cared\nnothing for the species, and had only the individual in its eye and\nmind. Christianity--not, certainly, the Christianity of the present\nday, which has incorporated with itself the culture of heathenism,\nand has preserved only the name and some general positions of\nChristianity--is the direct opposite of heathenism, and only when\nit is regarded as such is it truly comprehended, and untravestied\nby arbitrary speculative interpretation; it is true so far as its\nopposite is false, and false so far as its opposite is true. The\nancients sacrificed the individual to the species; the Christians\nsacrificed the species to the individual. Or, heathenism conceived\nthe individual only as a part in distinction from the whole of the\nspecies; Christianity, on the contrary, conceived the individual only\nin immediate, undistinguishable unity with the species.\n\nTo Christianity the individual was the object of an immediate\nprovidence, that is, an immediate object of the Divine Being. The\nheathens believed in a providence for the individual only through his\nrelation to the race, through law, through the order of the world,\nand thus only in a mediate, natural, and not miraculous providence;\n[120] but the Christians left out the intermediate process, and placed\nthemselves in immediate connection with the prescient, all-embracing,\nuniversal Being; i.e., they immediately identified the individual\nwith the universal Being.\n\n\n\nBut the idea of deity coincides with the idea of humanity. All divine\nattributes, all the attributes which make God God, are attributes of\nthe species--attributes which in the individual are limited, but the\nlimits of which are abolished in the essence of the species, and even\nin its existence, in so far as it has its complete existence only in\nall men taken together. My knowledge, my will, is limited; but my limit\nis not the limit of another man, to say nothing of mankind; what is\ndifficult to me is easy to another; what is impossible, inconceivable,\nto one age, is to the coming age conceivable and possible. My life is\nbound to a limited time; not so the life of humanity. The history of\nmankind consists of nothing else than a continuous and progressive\nconquest of limits, which at a given time pass for the limits of\nhumanity, and therefore for absolute insurmountable limits. But\nthe future always unveils the fact that the alleged limits of the\nspecies were only limits of individuals. The most striking proofs\nof this are presented by the history of philosophy and of physical\nscience. It would be highly interesting and instructive to write a\nhistory of the sciences entirely from this point of view, in order to\nexhibit in all its vanity the presumptuous notion of the individual\nthat he can set limits to his race. Thus the species is unlimited;\nthe individual alone limited.\n\nBut the sense of limitation is painful, and hence the individual\nfrees himself from it by the contemplation of the perfect Being;\nin this contemplation he possesses what otherwise is wanting to\nhim. With the Christians God is nothing else than the immediate\nunity of species and individuality, of the universal and individual\nbeing. God is the idea of the species as an individual--the idea\nor essence of the species, which as a species, as universal being,\nas the totality of all perfections, of all attributes or realities,\nfreed from all the limits which exist in the consciousness and feeling\nof the individual, is at the same time again an individual, personal\nbeing. Ipse suum esse est. Essence and existence are in God identical;\nwhich means nothing else than that he is the idea, the essence of the\nspecies, conceived immediately as an existence, an individual. The\nhighest idea on the standpoint of religion is: God does not love,\nhe is himself love; he does not live, he is life; he is not just, but\njustice itself; not a person, but personality itself,--the species,\nthe idea, as immediately a concrete existence. [121]\n\nBecause of this immediate unity of the species with individuality,\nthis concentration of all that is universal and real in one personal\nbeing, God is a deeply moving object, enrapturing to the imagination;\nwhereas, the idea of humanity has little power over the feelings,\nbecause humanity is only an abstraction; and the reality which\npresents itself to us in distinction from this abstraction is the\nmultitude of separate, limited individuals. In God, on the contrary,\nfeeling has immediate satisfaction, because here all is embraced in\none, i.e., because here the species has an immediate existence,--is\nan individuality. God is love, is justice, as itself a subject; he\nis the perfect universal being as one being, the infinite extension\nof the species as an all-comprehending unity. But God is only man's\nintuition of his own nature; thus the Christians are distinguished from\nthe heathens in this, that they immediately identify the individual\nwith the species--that with them the individual has the significance\nof the species, the individual by himself is held to be the perfect\nrepresentative of the species--that they deify the human individual,\nmake him the absolute being.\n\nEspecially characteristic is the difference between Christianity\nand heathenism concerning the relation of the individual to the\nintelligence, to the understanding, to the nous. The Christians\nindividualised the understanding, the heathens made it a universal\nessence. To the heathens, the understanding, the intelligence, was the\nessence of man; to the Christians, it was only a part of themselves. To\nthe heathens therefore only the intelligence, the species, to the\nChristians, the individual, was immortal, i.e., divine. Hence follows\nthe further difference between heathen and Christian philosophy.\n\nThe most unequivocal expression, the characteristic symbol of this\nimmediate identity of the species and individuality in Christianity is\nChrist, the real God of the Christians. Christ is the ideal of humanity\nbecome existent, the compendium of all moral and divine perfections\nto the exclusion of all that is negative; pure, heavenly, sinless\nman, the typical man, the Adam Kadmon; not regarded as the totality\nof the species, of mankind, but immediately as one individual, one\nperson. Christ, i.e., the Christian, religious Christ, is therefore\nnot the central, but the terminal point of history. The Christians\nexpected the end of the world, the close of history. In the Bible,\nChrist himself, in spite of all the falsities and sophisms of our\nexegetists, clearly prophesies the speedy end of the world. History\nrests only on the distinction of the individual from the race. Where\nthis distinction ceases, history ceases; the very soul of history is\nextinct. Nothing remains to man but the contemplation and appropriation\nof this realised Ideal, and the spirit of proselytism, which seeks\nto extend the prevalence of a fixed belief,--the preaching that God\nhas appeared, and that the end of the world is at hand.\n\nSince the immediate identity of the species and the individual\noversteps the limits of reason and Nature, it followed of course that\nthis universal, ideal individual was declared to be a transcendent,\nsupernatural, heavenly being. It is therefore a perversity to\nattempt to deduce from reason the immediate identity of the species\nand individual, for it is only the imagination which effects this\nidentity, the imagination to which nothing is impossible, and which\nis also the creator of miracles; for the greatest of miracles is the\nbeing who, while he is an individual, is at the same time the ideal,\nthe species, humanity in the fulness of its perfection and infinity,\ni.e., the Godhead. Hence it is also a perversity to adhere to the\nbiblical or dogmatic Christ, and yet to thrust aside miracles. If\nthe principle be retained, wherefore deny its necessary consequences?\n\nThe total absence of the idea of the species in Christianity is\nespecially observable in its characteristic doctrine of the universal\nsinfulness of men. For there lies at the foundation of this doctrine\nthe demand that the individual shall not be an individual, a demand\nwhich again is based on the presupposition that the individual by\nhimself is a perfect being, is by himself the adequate presentation\nor existence of the species. [122] Here is entirely wanting the\nobjective perception, the consciousness, that the thou belongs to the\nperfection of the I, that men are required to constitute humanity,\nthat only men taken together are what man should and can be. All\nmen are sinners. Granted; but they are not all sinners in the same\nway; on the contrary, there exists a great and essential difference\nbetween them. One man is inclined to falsehood, another is not; he\nwould rather give up his life than break his word or tell a lie; the\nthird has a propensity to intoxication, the fourth to licentiousness;\nwhile the fifth, whether by favour of Nature, or from the energy of\nhis character, exhibits none of these vices. Thus, in the moral as\nwell as the physical and intellectual elements, men compensate for\neach other, so that, taken as a whole, they are, as they should be,\nthey present the perfect man.\n\nHence intercourse ameliorates and elevates; involuntarily and\nwithout disguise, man is different in intercourse from what he is\nwhen alone. Love especially works wonders, and the love of the sexes\nmost of all. Man and woman are the complement of each other, and\nthus united they first present the species, the perfect man. [123]\nWithout species, love is inconceivable. Love is nothing else than the\nself-consciousness of the species as evolved within the difference\nof sex. In love, the reality of the species, which otherwise is\nonly a thing of reason, an object of mere thought, becomes a matter\nof feeling, a truth of feeling; for in love, man declares himself\nunsatisfied in his individuality taken by itself, he postulates the\nexistence of another as a need of the heart; he reckons another as\npart of his own being; he declares the life which he has through\nlove to be the truly human life, corresponding to the idea of man,\ni.e., of the species. The individual is defective, imperfect, weak,\nneedy; but love is strong, perfect, contented, free from wants,\nself-sufficing, infinite; because in it the self-consciousness of the\nindividuality is the mysterious self-consciousness of the perfection\nof the race. But this result of love is produced by friendship also,\nat least where it is intense, where it is a religion, [124] as it was\nwith the ancients. Friends compensate for each other; friendship is\na means of virtue, and more: it is itself virtue, dependent however\non participation. Friendship can only exist between the virtuous,\nas the ancients said. But it cannot be based on perfect similarity;\non the contrary, it requires diversity, for friendship rests on a\ndesire for self-completion. One friend obtains through the other what\nhe does not himself possess. The virtues of the one atone for the\nfailings of the other. Friend justifies friend before God. However\nfaulty a man may be, it is a proof that there is a germ of good in him\nif he has worthy men for his friends. If I cannot be myself perfect,\nI yet at least love virtue, perfection in others. If therefore I am\ncalled to account for any sins, weaknesses, and faults, I interpose\nas advocates, as mediators, the virtues of my friend. How barbarous,\nhow unreasonable would it be to condemn me for sins which I doubtless\nhave committed, but which I have myself condemned in loving my friends,\nwho are free from these sins!\n\nBut if friendship and love, which themselves are only subjective\nrealisations of the species, make out of singly imperfect beings an at\nleast relatively perfect whole, how much more do the sins and failings\nof individuals vanish in the species itself, which has its adequate\nexistence only in the sum total of mankind, and is therefore only\nan object of reason! Hence the lamentation over sin is found only\nwhere the human individual regards himself in his individuality as\na perfect, complete being, not needing others for the realisation of\nthe species, of the perfect man; where instead of the consciousness\nof the species has been substituted the exclusive self-consciousness\nof the individual; where the individual does not recognise himself\nas a part of mankind, but identifies himself with the species, and\nfor this reason makes his own sins, limits and weaknesses, the sins,\nlimits, and weaknesses of mankind in general. Nevertheless man cannot\nlose the consciousness of the species, for his self-consciousness is\nessentially united to his consciousness of another than himself. Where\ntherefore the species is not an object to him as a species, it\nwill be an object to him as God. He supplies the absence of the\nidea of the species by the idea of God, as the being who is free\nfrom the limits and wants which oppress the individual, and, in\nhis opinion (since he identifies the species with the individual),\nthe species itself. But this perfect being, free from the limits of\nthe individual, is nothing else than the species, which reveals the\ninfinitude of its nature in this, that it is realised in infinitely\nnumerous and various individuals. If all men were absolutely alike,\nthere would then certainly be no distinction between the race and\nthe individual. But in that case the existence of many men would be\na pure superfluity; a single man would have achieved the ends of the\nspecies. In the one who enjoyed the happiness of existence all would\nhave had their complete substitute.\n\nDoubtless the essence of man is one, but this essence is infinite;\nits real existence is therefore an infinite, reciprocally compensating\nvariety, which reveals the riches of this essence. Unity in essence is\nmultiplicity in existence. Between me and another human being--and this\nother is the representative of the species, even though he is only one,\nfor he supplies to me the want of many others, has for me a universal\nsignificance, is the deputy of mankind, in whose name he speaks to me,\nan isolated individual, so that, when united only with one, I have a\nparticipated, a human life;--between me and another human being there\nis an essential, qualitative distinction. The other is my thou,--the\nrelation being reciprocal,--my alter ego, man objective to me, the\nrevelation of my own nature, the eye seeing itself. In another I\nfirst have the consciousness of humanity; through him I first learn,\nI first feel, that I am a man: in my love for him it is first clear to\nme that he belongs to me and I to him, that we two cannot be without\neach other, that only community constitutes humanity. But morally,\nalso, there is a qualitative, critical distinction between the I and\nthou. My fellow-man is my objective conscience; he makes my failings\na reproach to me; even when he does not expressly mention them, he\nis my personified feeling of shame. The consciousness of the moral\nlaw, of right, of propriety, of truth itself, is indissolubly united\nwith my consciousness of another than myself. That is true in which\nanother agrees with me,--agreement is the first criterion of truth;\nbut only because the species is the ultimate measure of truth. That\nwhich I think only according to the standard of my individuality\nis not binding on another; it can be conceived otherwise; it is an\naccidental, merely subjective view. But that which I think according\nto the standard of the species, I think as man in general only can\nthink, and consequently as every individual must think if he thinks\nnormally, in accordance with law, and therefore truly. That is true\nwhich agrees with the nature of the species, that is false which\ncontradicts it. There is no other rule of truth. But my fellow-man is\nto me the representative of the species, the substitute of the rest,\nnay, his judgment may be of more authority with me than the judgment\nof the innumerable multitude. Let the fanatic make disciples as the\nsand on the sea-shore; the sand is still sand; mine be the pearl--a\njudicious friend. The agreement of others is therefore my criterion\nof the normalness, the universality, the truth of my thoughts. I\ncannot so abstract myself from myself as to judge myself with perfect\nfreedom and disinterestedness; but another has an impartial judgment;\nthrough him I correct, complete, extend my own judgment, my own\ntaste, my own knowledge. In short, there is a qualitative, critical\ndifference between men. But Christianity extinguishes this qualitative\ndistinction; it sets the same stamp on all men alike, and regards\nthem as one and the same individual, because it knows no distinction\nbetween the species and the individual: it has one and the same means\nof salvation for all men, it sees one and the same original sin in all.\n\nBecause Christianity thus, from exaggerated subjectivity, knows nothing\nof the species, in which alone lies the redemption, the justification,\nthe reconciliation and cure of the sins and deficiencies of the\nindividual, it needed a supernatural and peculiar, nay, a personal,\nsubjective aid in order to overcome sin. If I alone am the species,\nif no other, that is, no qualitatively different men exist, or, which\nis the same thing, if there is no distinction between me and others,\nif we are all perfectly alike, if my sins are not neutralised by\nthe opposite qualities of other men: then assuredly my sin is a\nblot of shame which cries up to heaven; a revolting horror which\ncan be exterminated only by extraordinary, superhuman, miraculous\nmeans. Happily, however, there is a natural reconciliation. My\nfellow-man is per se the mediator between me and the sacred idea of\nthe species. Homo homini Deus est. My sin is made to shrink within\nits limits, is thrust back into its nothingness, by the fact that it\nis only mine, and not that of my fellows.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII.\n\nTHE CHRISTIAN SIGNIFICANCE OF VOLUNTARY CELIBACY AND MONACHISM.\n\n\nThe idea of man as a species, and with it the significance of the\nlife of the species, of humanity as a whole, vanished as Christianity\nbecame dominant. Herein we have a new confirmation of the position\nadvanced, that Christianity does not contain within itself the\nprinciple of culture. Where man immediately identifies the species\nwith the individual, and posits this identity as his highest being,\nas God, where the idea of humanity is thus an object to him only as\nthe idea of Godhead, there the need of culture has vanished; man has\nall in himself, all in his God, consequently he has no need to supply\nhis own deficiencies by others as the representatives of the species,\nor by the contemplation of the world generally; and this need is alone\nthe spring of culture. The individual man attains his end by himself\nalone; he attains it in God,--God is himself the attained goal, the\nrealised highest aim of humanity; but God is present to each individual\nseparately. God only is the want of the Christian; others, the human\nrace, the world, are not necessary to him; he is not the inward need\nof others. God fills to me the place of the species, of my fellow-men;\nyes, when I turn away from the world, when I am in isolation, I first\ntruly feel my need of God, I first have a lively sense of his presence,\nI first feel what God is, and what he ought to be to me. It is true\nthat the religious man has need also of fellowship, of edification in\ncommon; but this need of others is always in itself something extremely\nsubordinate. The salvation of the soul is the fundamental idea,\nthe main point in Christianity; and this salvation lies only in God,\nonly in the concentration of the mind on him. Activity for others is\nrequired, is a condition of salvation; but the ground of salvation is\nGod, immediate reference in all things to God. And even activity for\nothers has only a religious significance, has reference only to God,\nas its motive and end, is essentially only an activity for God,--for\nthe glorifying of his name, the spreading abroad of his praise. But\nGod is absolute subjectivity,--subjectivity separated from the world,\nabove the world, set free from matter, severed from the life of the\nspecies, and therefore from the distinction of sex. Separation from\nthe world, from matter, from the life of the species, is therefore\nthe essential aim of Christianity. [125] And this aim had its visible,\npractical realisation in Monachism.\n\nIt is a self-delusion to attempt to derive monachism from the East. At\nleast, if this derivation is to be accepted, they who maintain\nit should be consistent enough to derive the opposite tendency of\nChristendom, not from Christianity, but from the spirit of the Western\nnations, the occidental nature in general. But how, in that case,\nshall we explain the monastic enthusiasm of the West? Monachism\nmust rather be derived directly from Christianity itself: it was\nnecessary consequence of the belief in heaven promised to mankind\nby Christianity. Where the heavenly life is a truth, the earthly\nlife is a lie; where imagination is all, reality is nothing. To him\nwho believes in an eternal heavenly life, the present life loses\nits value,--or rather, it has already lost its value: belief in the\nheavenly life is belief in the worthlessness and nothingness of this\nlife. I cannot represent to myself the future life without longing\nfor it, without casting down a look of compassion or contempt on this\npitiable earthly life, and the heavenly life can be no object, no law\nof faith, without, at the same time, being a law of morality: it must\ndetermine my actions, [126] at least if my life is to be in accordance\nwith my faith: I ought not to cleave to the transitory things of this\nearth. I ought not;--but neither do I wish; for what are all things\nhere below compared with the glory of the heavenly life? [127]\n\nIt is true that the quality of that life depends on the quality, the\nmoral condition of this; but morality is itself determined by the faith\nin eternal life. The morality corresponding to the super-terrestrial\nlife is simply separation from the world, the negation of this life;\nand the practical attestation of this spiritual separation is the\nmonastic life. [128] Everything must ultimately take an external form,\nmust present itself to the senses. An inward disposition must become\nan outward practice. The life of the cloister, indeed ascetic life in\ngeneral, is the heavenly life as it is realised and can be realised\nhere below. If my soul belongs to heaven, ought I, nay, can I belong to\nthe earth with my body? The soul animates the body. But if the soul is\nin heaven, the body is forsaken, dead, and thus the medium, the organ\nof connection between the world and the soul is annihilated. Death,\nthe separation of the soul from the body, at least from this gross,\nmaterial, sinful body, is the entrance into heaven. But if death is\nthe condition of blessedness and moral perfection, then necessarily\nmortification is the one law of morality. Moral death is the necessary\nanticipation of natural death; I say necessary, for it would be the\nextreme of immorality to attribute the obtaining of heaven to physical\ndeath, which is no moral act, but a natural one common to man and the\nbrute. Death must therefore be exalted into a moral, a spontaneous\nact. \"I die daily,\" says the apostle, and this dictum Saint Anthony,\nthe founder of monachism, [129] made the theme of his life.\n\nBut Christianity, it is contended, demanded only a spiritual\nfreedom. True; but what is that spiritual freedom which does not\npass into action, which does not attest itself in practice? Or dost\nthou believe that it only depends on thyself, on thy will, on thy\nintention, whether thou be free from anything? If so, thou art greatly\nin error, and hast never experienced what it is to be truly made\nfree. So long as thou art in a given rank, profession, or relation,\nso long art thou, willingly or not, determined by it. Thy will,\nthy determination, frees thee only from conscious limitations and\nimpressions, not from the unconscious ones which lie in the nature\nof the case. Thus we do not feel at home, we are under constraint,\nso long as we are not locally, physically separated from one with whom\nwe have inwardly broken. External freedom is alone the full truth of\nspiritual freedom. A man who has really lost spiritual interest in\nearthly treasures soon throws them out at window, that his heart may\nbe thoroughly at liberty. What I no longer possess by inclination is\na burden to me; so away with it! What affection has let go, the hand\nno longer holds fast. Only affection gives force to the grasp; only\naffection makes possession sacred. He who having a wife is as though he\nhad her not, will do better to have no wife at all. To have as though\none had not, is to have without the disposition to have, is in truth\nnot to have. And therefore he who says that one ought to have a thing\nas though one had it not, merely says in a subtle, covert, cautious\nway, that one ought not to have it at all. That which I dismiss from\nmy heart is no longer mine,--it is free as air. St. Anthony took the\nresolution to renounce the world when he had once heard the saying,\n\"If thou wilt be perfect, go thy way, sell that thou hast and give to\nthe poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come and follow\nme.\" St. Anthony gave the only true interpretation of this text. He\nwent his way, and sold his possessions, and gave the proceeds to the\npoor. Only thus did he prove his spiritual freedom from the treasures\nof this world. [130]\n\nSuch freedom, such truth, is certainly in contradiction with the\nChristianity of the present day, according to which the Lord has\nrequired only a spiritual freedom, i.e., a freedom which demands\nno sacrifice, no energy,--an illusory, self-deceptive freedom;--a\nfreedom from earthly good, which consists in its possession and\nenjoyment! For certainly the Lord said, \"My yoke is easy.\" How harsh,\nhow unreasonable would Christianity be if it exacted from man the\nrenunciation of earthly riches! Then assuredly Christianity would\nnot be suited to this world. So far from this, Christianity is in\nthe highest degree practical and judicious; it defers the freeing\noneself from the wealth and pleasures of this world to the moment of\nnatural death (monkish mortification is an unchristian suicide);--and\nallots to our spontaneous activity the acquisition and enjoyment\nof earthly possessions. Genuine Christians do not indeed doubt\nthe truth of the heavenly life,--God forbid! Therein they still\nagree with the ancient monks; but they await that life patiently,\nsubmissive to the will of God, i.e., to their own selfishness,\nto the agreeable pursuit of worldly enjoyment. [131] But I turn\naway with loathing and contempt from modern Christianity, in which\nthe bride of Christ readily acquiesces in polygamy, at least in\nsuccessive polygamy, and this in the eyes of the true Christian\ndoes not essentially differ from contemporaneous polygamy; but yet\nat the same time--oh! shameful hypocrisy!--swears by the eternal,\nuniversally binding, irrefragable sacred truth of God's Word. I turn\nback with reverence to the misconceived truth of the chaste monastic\ncell, where the soul betrothed to heaven did not allow itself to be\nwooed into faithlessness by a strange earthly body!\n\nThe unworldly, supernatural life is essentially also an unmarried\nlife. The celibate lies already, though not in the form of a law,\nin the inmost nature of Christianity. This is sufficiently declared\nin the supernatural origin of the Saviour,--a doctrine in which\nunspotted virginity is hallowed as the saving principle, as the\nprinciple of the new, the Christian world. Let not such passages as,\n\"Be fruitful and multiply,\" or, \"What God has joined together let\nnot man put asunder,\" be urged as a sanction of marriage. The first\npassage relates, as Tertullian and Jerome have already observed,\nonly to the unpeopled earth, not to the earth when filled with men,\nonly to the beginning, not to the end of the world, an end which\nwas initiated by the immediate appearance of God upon earth. And\nthe second also refers only to marriage as an institution of the Old\nTestament. Certain Jews proposed the question whether it were lawful\nfor a man to separate from his wife; and the most appropriate way of\ndealing with this question was the answer above cited. He who has once\nconcluded a marriage ought to hold it sacred. Marriage is intrinsically\nan indulgence to the weakness or rather the strength of the flesh,\nan evil which therefore must be restricted as much as possible. The\nindissolubleness of marriage is a nimbus, a sacred irradiance, which\nexpresses precisely the opposite of what minds, dazzled and perturbed\nby its lustre, seek beneath it. Marriage in itself is, in the sense\nof perfected Christianity, a sin, [132] or rather a weakness which\nis permitted and forgiven thee only on condition that thou for ever\nlimitest thyself to a single wife. In short, marriage is hallowed\nonly in the Old Testament, but not in the New. The New Testament\nknows a higher, a supernatural principle, the mystery of unspotted\nvirginity. [133] \"He who can receive it let him receive it.\" \"The\nchildren of this world marry, and are given in marriage: but they which\nshall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection\nfrom the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage: neither can\nthey die any more: for they are equal unto the angels; and are the\nchildren of God, being the children of the resurrection.\" Thus in\nheaven there is no marriage; the principle of sexual love is excluded\nfrom heaven as an earthly, worldly principle. But the heavenly life is\nthe true, perfected, eternal life of the Christian. Why then should\nI, who am destined for heaven, form a tie which is unloosed in my\ntrue destination? Why should I, who am potentially a heavenly being,\nnot realise this possibility even here? [134] Marriage is already\nproscribed from my mind, my heart, since it is expelled from heaven,\nthe essential object of my faith, hope, and life. How can an earthly\nwife have a place in my heaven-filled heart? How can I divide my\nheart between God and man? [135] The Christian's love to God is not\nan abstract or general love such as the love of truth, of justice, of\nscience; it is a love to a subjective, personal God, and is therefore\na subjective, personal love. It is an essential attribute of this love\nthat it is an exclusive, jealous love, for its object is a personal\nand at the same time the highest being, to whom no other can be\ncompared. \"Keep close to Jesus [Jesus Christ is the Christian's God],\nin life and in death; trust his faithfulness: he alone can help thee,\nwhen all else leaves thee. Thy beloved has this quality, that he will\nsuffer no rival; he alone will have thy heart, will rule alone in\nthy soul as a king on his throne.\"--\"What can the world profit thee\nwithout Jesus? To be without Christ is the pain of hell; to be with\nChrist, heavenly sweetness.\"--\"Thou canst not live without a friend:\nbut if the friendship of Christ is not more than all else to thee,\nthou wilt be beyond measure sad and disconsolate.\"--\"Love everything\nfor Jesus' sake, but Jesus for his own sake. Jesus Christ alone is\nworthy to be loved.\"--\"My God, my love [my heart]: thou art wholly\nmine, and I am wholly thine.\"--\"Love hopes and trusts ever in God,\neven when God is not gracious to it [or tastes bitter, non sapit];\nfor we cannot live in love without sorrow.... For the sake of the\nbeloved, the loving one must accept all things, even the hard and\nbitter.\"--\"My God and my all, ... in thy presence everything is\nsweet to me, in thy absence everything is distasteful.... Without\nthee nothing can please me.\"--\"Oh, when at last will that blessed,\nlonged-for hour appear, when thou wilt satisfy me wholly, and be\nall in all to me? So long as this is not granted me, my joy is only\nfragmentary.\"--\"When was it well with me without thee? or when was\nit ill with me in thy presence? I will rather be poor for thy sake,\nthan rich without thee. I will rather be a pilgrim on earth with thee,\nthan the possessor of heaven without thee. Where thou art is heaven;\ndeath and hell where thou art not. I long only for thee.\"--\"Thou\ncanst not serve God and at the same time have thy joys in earthly\nthings: thou must wean thyself from all acquaintances and friends,\nand sever thy soul from all temporal consolation. Believers in\nChrist should regard themselves, according to the admonition of the\nApostle Peter, only as strangers and pilgrims on the earth.\" [136]\nThus love to God as a personal being is a literal, strict, personal,\nexclusive love. How then can I at once love God and a mortal wife? Do\nI not thereby place God on the same footing with my wife? No! to a\nsoul which truly loves God, the love of woman is an impossibility,\nis adultery. \"He that is unmarried,\" says the Apostle Paul, \"careth\nfor the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please the Lord;\nbut he that is married careth for the things that are of the world,\nhow he may please his wife.\"\n\nThe true Christian not only feels no need of culture, because this\nis a worldly principle and opposed to feeling; he has also no need\nof (natural) love. God supplies to him the want of culture, and in\nlike manner God supplies to him the want of love, of a wife, of a\nfamily. The Christian immediately identifies the species with the\nindividual; hence he strips off the difference of sex as a burdensome,\naccidental adjunct. [137] Man and woman together first constitute\nthe true man; man and woman together are the existence of the race,\nfor their union is the source of multiplicity, the source of other\nmen. Hence the man who does not deny his manhood, is conscious that\nhe is only a part of a being, which needs another part for the making\nup of the whole of true humanity. The Christian, on the contrary,\nin his excessive, transcendental subjectivity, conceives that he is,\nby himself, a perfect being. But the sexual instinct runs counter to\nthis view; it is in contradiction with his ideal: the Christian must\ntherefore deny this instinct.\n\nThe Christian certainly experienced the need of sexual love, but only\nas a need in contradiction with his heavenly destination, and merely\nnatural, in the depreciatory, contemptuous sense which this word\nhad in Christianity,--not as a moral, inward need--not, if I may so\nexpress myself, as a metaphysical, i.e., an essential need, which man\ncan experience only where he does not separate difference of sex from\nhimself, but, on the contrary, regards it as belonging to his inmost\nnature. Hence marriage is not holy in Christianity; at least it is so\nonly apparently, illusively; for the natural principle of marriage,\nwhich is the love of the sexes,--however civil marriage may in endless\ninstances contradict this,--is in Christianity an unholy thing, and\nexcluded from heaven. [138] But that which man excludes from heaven he\nexcludes from his true nature. Heaven is his treasure-casket. Believe\nnot in what he establishes on earth, what he permits and sanctions\nhere: here he must accommodate himself; here many things come athwart\nhim which do not fit into his system; here he shuns thy glance,\nfor he finds himself among strangers who intimidate him. But watch\nfor him when he throws off his incognito, and shows himself in his\ntrue dignity, his heavenly state. In heaven he speaks as he thinks;\nthere thou hearest his true opinion. Where his heaven is, there is his\nheart,--heaven is his heart laid open. Heaven is nothing but the idea\nof the true, the good, the valid,--of that which ought to be; earth,\nnothing but the idea of the untrue, the unlawful, of that which ought\nnot to be. The Christian excludes from heaven the life of the species:\nthere the species ceases, there dwell only pure sexless individuals,\n\"spirits;\" there absolute subjectivity reigns:--thus the Christian\nexcludes the life of the species from his conception of the true\nlife; he pronounces the principle of marriage sinful, negative;\nfor the sinless, positive life is the heavenly one. [139]\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII.\n\nTHE CHRISTIAN HEAVEN, OR PERSONAL IMMORTALITY.\n\n\nThe unwedded and ascetic life is the direct way to the heavenly,\nimmortal life, for heaven is nothing else than life liberated from\nthe conditions of the species, supernatural, sexless, absolutely\nsubjective life. The belief in personal immortality has at its\nfoundation the belief that difference of sex is only an external\nadjunct of individuality, that in himself the individual is a sexless,\nindependently complete, absolute being. But he who belongs to no sex\nbelongs to no species; sex is the cord which connects the individuality\nwith the species, and he who belongs to no species, belongs only to\nhimself, is an altogether independent, divine, absolute being. Hence\nonly when the species vanishes from the consciousness is the heavenly\nlife a certainty. He who lives in the consciousness of the species,\nand consequently of its reality, lives also in the consciousness of\nthe reality of sex. He does not regard it as a mechanically inserted,\nadventitious stone of stumbling, but as an inherent quality, a chemical\nconstituent of his being. He indeed recognises himself as a man in\nthe broader sense, but he is at the same time conscious of being\nrigorously determined by the sexual distinction, which penetrates not\nonly bones and marrow, but also his inmost self, the essential mode\nof his thought, will, and sensation. He therefore who lives in the\nconsciousness of the species, who limits and determines his feelings\nand imagination by the contemplation of real life, of real man, can\nconceive no life in which the life of the species, and therewith the\ndistinction of sex, is abolished; he regards the sexless individual,\nthe heavenly spirit, as an agreeable figment of the imagination.\n\nBut just as little as the real man can abstract himself from the\ndistinction of sex, so little can he abstract himself from his moral or\nspiritual constitution, which indeed is profoundly connected with his\nnatural constitution. Precisely because he lives in the contemplation\nof the whole, he also lives in the consciousness that he is himself\nno more than a part, and that he is what he is only by virtue of the\nconditions which constitute him a member of the whole, or a relative\nwhole. Every one, therefore, justifiably regards his occupation, his\nprofession, his art or science, as the highest; for the mind of man\nis nothing but the essential mode of his activity. He who is skilful\nin his profession, in his art, he who fills his post well, and is\nentirely devoted to his calling, thinks that calling the highest and\nbest. How can he deny in thought what he emphatically declares in act\nby the joyful devotion of all his powers? If I despise a thing, how can\nI dedicate to it my time and faculties? If I am compelled to do so in\nspite of my aversion, my activity is an unhappy one, for I am at war\nwith myself. Work is worship. But how can I worship or serve an object,\nhow can I subject myself to it, if it does not hold a high place in\nmy mind? In brief, the occupations of men determine their judgment,\ntheir mode of thought, their sentiments. And the higher the occupation,\nthe more completely does a man identify himself with it. In general,\nwhatever a man makes the essential aim of his life, he proclaims to\nbe his soul; for it is the principle of motion in him. But through\nhis aim, through the activity in which he realises this aim, man\nis not only something for himself, but also something for others,\nfor the general life, the species. He therefore who lives in the\nconsciousness of the species as a reality, regards his existence\nfor others, his relation to society, his utility to the public, as\nthat existence which is one with the existence of his own essence--as\nhis immortal existence. He lives with his whole soul, with his whole\nheart, for humanity. How can he hold in reserve a special existence\nfor himself, how can he separate himself from mankind? How shall he\ndeny in death what he has enforced in life? And in life his faith is\nthis: Nec sibi sed toti genitum se credere mundo.\n\nThe heavenly life, or what we do not here distinguish from it--personal\nimmortality, is a characteristic doctrine of Christianity. It is\ncertainly in part to be found among the heathen philosophers; but\nwith them it had only the significance of a subjective conception,\nbecause it was not connected with their fundamental view of things. How\ncontradictory, for example, are the expressions of the Stoics on this\nsubject! It was among the Christians that personal immortality first\nfound that principle, whence it follows as a necessary and obvious\nconsequence. The contemplation of the world, of Nature, of the race,\nwas always coming athwart the ancients; they distinguished between the\nprinciple of life and the living subject, between the soul, the mind,\nand self: whereas the Christian abolished the distinction between soul\nand person, species and individual, and therefore placed immediately\nin self what belongs only to the totality of the species. But the\nimmediate unity of the species and individuality is the highest\nprinciple, the God of Christianity,--in it the individual has the\nsignificance of the absolute being,--and the necessary, immanent\nconsequence of this principle is personal immortality.\n\nOr rather: the belief in personal immortality is perfectly identical\nwith the belief in a personal God;--i.e., that which expresses the\nbelief in the heavenly, immortal life of the person, expresses God\nalso, as he is an object to Christians, namely, as absolute, unlimited\npersonality. Unlimited personality is God; but heavenly personality, or\nthe perpetuation of human personality in heaven, is nothing else than\npersonality released from all earthly encumbrances and limitations;\nthe only distinction is, that God is heaven spiritualised, while heaven\nis God materialised, or reduced to the forms of the senses: that what\nin God is posited only in abstracto is in heaven more an object of\nthe imagination. God is the implicit heaven; heaven is the explicit\nGod. In the present, God is the kingdom of heaven; in the future,\nheaven is God. God is the pledge, the as yet abstract presence and\nexistence of heaven; the anticipation, the epitome of heaven. Our own\nfuture existence, which, while we are in this world, in this body, is a\nseparate, objective existence,--is God: God is the idea of the species,\nwhich will be first realised, individualised in the other world. God\nis the heavenly, pure, free essence, which exists there as heavenly\npure beings, the bliss which there unfolds itself in a plenitude of\nblissful individuals. Thus God is nothing else than the idea or the\nessence of the absolute, blessed, heavenly life, here comprised in\nan ideal personality. This is clearly enough expressed in the belief\nthat the blessed life is unity with God. Here we are distinguished and\nseparated from God, there the partition falls; here we are men, there\ngods; here the Godhead is a monopoly, there it is a common possession;\nhere it is an abstract unity, there a concrete multiplicity. [140]\n\nThe only difficulty in the recognition of this is created by\nthe imagination, which, on the one hand by the conception of the\npersonality of God, on the other by the conception of the many\npersonalities which it places in a realm ordinarily depicted in the\nhues of the senses, hides the real unity of the idea. But in truth\nthere is no distinction between the absolute life which is conceived\nas God and the absolute life which is conceived as heaven, save that\nin heaven we have stretched into length and breadth what in God is\nconcentrated in one point. The belief in the immortality of man is the\nbelief in the divinity of man, and the belief in God is the belief\nin pure personality, released from all limits, and consequently eo\nipso immortal. The distinctions made between the immortal soul and\nGod are either sophistical or imaginative; as when, for example, the\nbliss of the inhabitants of heaven is again circumscribed by limits,\nand distributed into degrees, in order to establish a distinction\nbetween God and the dwellers in heaven.\n\nThe identity of the divine and heavenly personality is apparent even\nin the popular proofs of immortality. If there is not another and a\nbetter life, God is not just and good. The justice and goodness of God\nare thus made dependent on the perpetuity of individuals; but without\njustice and goodness God is not God;--the Godhead, the existence of\nGod, is therefore made dependent on the existence of individuals. If\nI am not immortal, I believe in no God; he who denies immortality\ndenies God. But that is impossible to me: as surely as there is a God,\nso surely is there an immortality. God is the certainty of my future\nfelicity. The interest I have in knowing that God is, is one with the\ninterest I have in knowing that I am, that I am immortal. God is my\nhidden, my assured existence; he is the subjectivity of subjects,\nthe personality of persons. How then should that not belong to\npersons which belongs to personality? In God I make my future into a\npresent, or rather a verb into a substantive; how should I separate\nthe one from the other? God is the existence corresponding to my\nwishes and feelings: he is the just one, the good, who fulfils my\nwishes. Nature, this world, is an existence which contradicts my\nwishes, my feelings. Here it is not as it ought to be; this world\npasses away; but God is existence as it ought to be. God fulfils my\nwishes;--this is only a popular personification of the position: God is\nthe fulfiller, i.e., the reality, the fulfilment of my wishes. [141]\nBut heaven is the existence adequate to my wishes, my longing; [142]\nthus there is no distinction between God and heaven. God is the power\nby which man realises his eternal happiness; God is the absolute\npersonality in which all individual persons have the certainty of\ntheir blessedness and immortality; God is to subjectivity the highest,\nlast certainty of its absolute truth and essentiality.\n\nThe doctrine of immortality is the final doctrine of religion; its\ntestament, in which it declares its last wishes. Here therefore it\nspeaks out undisguisedly what it has hitherto suppressed. If elsewhere\nthe religious soul concerns itself with the existence of another\nbeing, here it openly considers only its own existence; if elsewhere\nin religion man makes his existence dependent on the existence of God,\nhe here makes the reality of God dependent on his own reality; and\nthus what elsewhere is a primitive, immediate truth to him, is here\na derivative, secondary truth: if I am not immortal, God is not God;\nif there is no immortality, there is no God;--a conclusion already\ndrawn by the Apostle Paul. If we do not rise again, then Christ is\nnot risen, and all is vain. Let us eat and drink. It is certainly\npossible to do away with what is apparently or really objectionable\nin the popular argumentation, by avoiding the inferential form; but\nthis can only be done by making immortality an analytic instead of a\nsynthetic truth, so as to show that the very idea of God as absolute\npersonality or subjectivity is per se the idea of immortality. God\nis the guarantee of my future existence, because he is already the\ncertainty and reality of my present existence, my salvation, my\ntrust, my shield from the forces of the external world; hence I need\nnot expressly deduce immortality, or prove it as a separate truth,\nfor if I have God, I have immortality also. Thus it was with the\nmore profound Christian mystics; to them the idea of immortality was\ninvolved in the idea of God; God was their immortal life,--God himself\ntheir subjective blessedness: he was for them, for their consciousness,\nwhat he is in himself, that is, in the essence of religion.\n\nThus it is shown that God is heaven; that the two are identical. It\nwould have been easier to prove the converse, namely, that heaven is\nthe true God of men. As man conceives his heaven, so he conceives his\nGod; the content of his idea of heaven is the content of his idea of\nGod, only that what in God is a mere sketch, a concept, is in heaven\ndepicted and developed in the colours and forms of the senses. Heaven\nis therefore the key to the deepest mysteries of religion. As heaven\nis objectively the displayed nature of God, so subjectively it is the\nmost candid declaration of the inmost thoughts and dispositions of\nreligion. For this reason, religions are as various as are the kingdoms\nof heaven, and there are as many different kingdoms of heaven as there\nare characteristic differences among men. The Christians themselves\nhave very heterogeneous conceptions of heaven. [143]\n\nThe more judicious among them, however, think and say nothing definite\nabout heaven or the future world in general, on the ground that it is\ninconceivable, that it can only be thought of by us according to the\nstandard of this world, a standard not applicable to the other. All\nconceptions of heaven here below are, they allege, mere images,\nwhereby man represents to himself that future, the nature of which\nis unknown to him, but the existence of which is certain. It is just\nso with God. The existence of God, it is said, is certain; but what\nhe is, or how he exists, is inscrutable. But he who speaks thus has\nalready driven the future world out of his head; he still holds it\nfast, either because he does not think at all about such matters, or\nbecause it is still a want of his heart; but, preoccupied with real\nthings, he thrusts it as far as possible out of his sight; he denies\nwith his head what he affirms with his heart; for it is to deny the\nfuture life, to deprive it of the qualities by which alone it is a real\nand effective object for man. Quality is not distinct from existence;\nquality is nothing but real existence. Existence without quality is a\nchimera, a spectre. Existence is first made known to me by quality;\nnot existence first, and after that quality. The doctrines that God\nis not to be known or defined, and that the nature of the future life\nis inscrutable, are therefore not originally religious doctrines;\non the contrary, they are the products of irreligion while still in\nbondage to religion, or rather hiding itself behind religion; and\nthey are so for this reason, that originally the existence of God is\nposited only with a definite conception of God, the existence of a\nfuture life only with a definite conception of that life. Thus to the\nChristian, only his own paradise, the paradise which has Christian\nqualities, is a certainty, not the paradise of the Mahometan or the\nElysium of the Greeks. The primary certainty is everywhere quality;\nexistence follows of course when once quality is certain. In the New\nTestament we find no proofs or general propositions such as: there\nis a God, there is a heavenly life; we find only qualities of the\nheavenly life adduced;--\"in heaven they marry not.\" Naturally;--it\nmay be answered,--because the existence of God and of heaven is\npresupposed. But here reflection introduces a distinction of which\nthe religious sentiment knows nothing. Doubtless the existence is\npresupposed, but only because the quality is itself existence, because\nthe inviolate religious feeling lives only in the quality, just as to\nthe natural man the real existence, the thing in itself, lies only in\nthe quality which he perceives. Thus in the passage above cited from\nthe New Testament, the virgin or rather sexless life is presupposed\nas the true life, which, however, necessarily becomes a future one,\nbecause the actual life contradicts the ideal of the true life. But\nthe certainty of this future life lies only in the certainty of its\nqualities, as those of the true, highest life, adequate to the ideal.\n\nWhere the future life is really believed in, where it is a certain\nlife, there, precisely because it is certain, it is also definite. If\nI know not now what and how I shall be; if there is an essential,\nabsolute difference between my future and my present; neither shall I\nthen know what and how I was before, the unity of consciousness is at\nan end, personal identity is abolished, another being will appear in my\nplace; and thus my future existence is not in fact distinguished from\nnon-existence. If, on the other hand, there is no essential difference,\nthe future is to me an object that may be defined and known. And so\nit is in reality. I am the abiding subject under changing conditions;\nI am the substance which connects the present and the future into a\nunity. How then can the future be obscure to me? On the contrary,\nthe life of this world is the dark, incomprehensible life, which\nonly becomes clear through the future life; here I am in disguise;\nthere the mask will fall; there I shall be as I am in truth. Hence the\nposition that there indeed is another, a heavenly life, but that what\nand how it is must here remain inscrutable, is only an invention of\nreligious scepticism, which, being entirely alien to the religious\nsentiment, proceeds upon a total misconception of religion. That\nwhich irreligious-religious reflection converts into a known image\nof an unknown yet certain thing, is originally, in the primitive,\ntrue sense of religion, not an image, but the thing itself. Unbelief,\nin the garb of belief, doubts the existence of the thing, but it is too\nshallow or cowardly directly to call it in question; it only expresses\ndoubt of the image or conception, i.e., declares the image to be only\nan image. But the untruth and hollowness of this scepticism has been\nalready made evident historically. Where it is once doubted that the\nimages of immortality are real, that it is possible to exist as faith\nconceives, for example, without a material, real body, and without\ndifference of sex; there the future existence in general is soon a\nmatter of doubt. With the image falls the thing, simply because the\nimage is the thing itself.\n\nThe belief in heaven, or in a future life in general, rests on a mental\njudgment. It expresses praise and blame; it selects a wreath from the\nflora of this world, and this critical florilegium is heaven. That\nwhich man thinks beautiful, good, agreeable, is for him what alone\nought to be; that which he thinks bad, odious, disagreeable, is\nwhat ought not to be; and hence, since it nevertheless exists, it is\ncondemned to destruction, it is regarded as a negation. Where life is\nnot in contradiction with a feeling, an imagination, an idea, and where\nthis feeling, this idea, is not held authoritative and absolute, the\nbelief in another and a heavenly life does not arise. The future life\nis nothing else than life in unison with the feeling, with the idea,\nwhich the present life contradicts. The whole import of the future\nlife is the abolition of this discordance, and the realisation of a\nstate which corresponds to the feelings, in which man is in unison\nwith himself. An unknown, unimagined future is a ridiculous chimera:\nthe other world is nothing more than the reality of a known idea,\nthe satisfaction of a conscious desire, the fulfilment of a wish;\n[144] it is only the removal of limits which here oppose themselves\nto the realisation of the idea. Where would be the consolation, where\nthe significance of a future life, if it were midnight darkness to\nme? No! from yonder world there streams upon me with the splendour\nof virgin gold what here shines only with the dimness of unrefined\nore. The future world has no other significance, no other basis of\nits existence, than the separation of the metal from the admixture\nof foreign elements, the separation of the good from the bad,\nof the pleasant from the unpleasant, of the praiseworthy from the\nblamable. The future world is the bridal in which man concludes\nhis union with his beloved. Long has he loved his bride, long has\nhe yearned after her; but external relations, hard reality, have\nstood in the way of his union to her. When the wedding takes place,\nhis beloved one does not become a different being; else how could he\nso ardently long for her? She only becomes his own; from an object\nof yearning and affectionate desire she becomes an object of actual\npossession. It is true that here below, the other world is only an\nimage, a conception; still it is not the image of a remote, unknown\nthing, but a portrait of that which man loves and prefers before all\nelse. What man loves is his soul. The heathens enclosed the ashes of\nthe beloved dead in an urn; with the Christian the heavenly future\nis the mausoleum in which he enshrines his soul.\n\nIn order to comprehend a particular faith, or religion in general,\nit is necessary to consider religion in its rudimentary stages,\nin its lowest, rudest condition. Religion must not only be traced\nin an ascending line, but surveyed in the entire course of its\nexistence. It is requisite to regard the various earlier religions as\npresent in the absolute religion, and not as left behind it in the\npast, in order correctly to appreciate and comprehend the absolute\nreligion as well as the others. The most frightful \"aberrations,\"\nthe wildest excesses of the religious consciousness, often afford the\nprofoundest insight into the mysteries of the absolute religion. Ideas,\nseemingly the rudest, are often only the most childlike, innocent, and\ntrue. This observation applies to the conceptions of a future life. The\n\"savage,\" whose consciousness does not extend beyond his own country,\nwhose entire being is a growth of its soil, takes his country with him\ninto the other world, either leaving Nature as it is, or improving it,\nand so overcoming in the idea of the other life the difficulties he\nexperiences in this. [145] In this limitation of uncultivated tribes\nthere is a striking trait. With them the future expresses nothing\nelse than home-sickness. Death separates man from his kindred, from\nhis people, from his country. But the man who has not extended his\nconsciousness, cannot endure this separation; he must come back again\nto his native land. The negroes in the West Indies killed themselves\nthat they might come to life again in their fatherland. And, according\nto Ossian's conception, \"the spirits of those who die in a strange\nland float back towards their birthplace.\" [146] This limitation is\nthe direct opposite of imaginative spiritualism, which makes man a\nvagabond, who, indifferent even to the earth, roams from star to star;\nand certainly there lies a real truth at its foundation. Man is what\nhe is through Nature, however much may belong to his spontaneity;\nfor even his spontaneity has its foundation in Nature, of which his\nparticular character is only an expression. Be thankful to Nature! Man\ncannot be separated from it. The German, whose God is spontaneity,\nowes his character to Nature just as much as the Oriental. To find\nfault with Indian art, with Indian religion and philosophy, is to find\nfault with Indian Nature. You complain of the reviewer who tears a\npassage in your works from the context that he may hand it over to\nridicule. Why are you yourself guilty of that which you blame in\nothers? Why do you tear the Indian religion from its connection,\nin which it is just as reasonable as your absolute religion?\n\nFaith in a future world, in a life after death, is therefore with\n\"savage\" tribes essentially nothing more than direct faith in the\npresent life--immediate unbroken faith in this life. For them,\ntheir actual life, even with its local limitations, has all, has\nabsolute value; they cannot abstract from it, they cannot conceive its\nbeing broken off; i.e., they believe directly in the infinitude, the\nperpetuity of this life. Only when the belief in immortality becomes a\ncritical belief, when a distinction is made between what is to be left\nbehind here, and what is in reserve there, between what here passes\naway, and what there is to abide, does the belief in life after death\nform itself into the belief in another life; but this criticism, this\ndistinction, is applied to the present life also. Thus the Christians\ndistinguish between the natural and the Christian life, the sensual or\nworldly and the spiritual or holy life. The heavenly life is no other\nthan that which is, already here below, distinguished from the merely\nnatural life, though still tainted with it. That which the Christian\nexcludes from himself now--for example, the sexual life--is excluded\nfrom the future: the only distinction is, that he is there free from\nthat which he here wishes to be free from, and seeks to rid himself\nof by the will, by devotion, and by bodily mortification. Hence this\nlife is, for the Christian, a life of torment and pain, because he\nis here still beset by a hostile power, and has to struggle with the\nlusts of the flesh and the assaults of the devil.\n\nThe faith of cultured nations is therefore distinguished from\nthat of the uncultured in the same way that culture in general is\ndistinguished from inculture: namely, that the faith of culture is\na discriminating, critical, abstract faith. A distinction implies a\njudgment; but where there is a judgment there arises the distinction\nbetween positive and negative. The faith of savage tribes is a\nfaith without a judgment. Culture, on the contrary, judges: to the\ncultured man only cultured life is the true life; to the Christian\nonly the Christian life. The rude child of Nature steps into the other\nlife just as he is, without ceremony: the other world is his natural\nnakedness. The cultivated man, on the contrary, objects to the idea of\nsuch an unbridled life after death, because even here he objects to\nthe unrestricted life of Nature. Faith in a future life is therefore\nonly faith in the true life of the present; the essential elements of\nthis life are also the essential elements of the other: accordingly,\nfaith in a future life is not faith in another unknown life; but in\nthe truth and infinitude, and consequently in the perpetuity, of that\nlife which already here below is regarded as the authentic life.\n\n\n\nAs God is nothing else than the nature of man purified from that\nwhich to the human individual appears, whether in feeling or thought,\na limitation, an evil; so the future life is nothing else than the\npresent life freed from that which appears a limitation or an evil. The\nmore definitely and profoundly the individual is conscious of the limit\nas a limit, of the evil as an evil, the more definite and profound is\nhis conviction of the future life, where these limits disappear. The\nfuture life is the feeling, the conception of freedom from those\nlimits which here circumscribe the feeling of self, the existence of\nthe individual. The only difference between the course of religion and\nthat of the natural or rational man is, that the end which the latter\narrives at by a straight line, the former only attains by describing\na curved line--a circle. The natural man remains at home because he\nfinds it agreeable, because he is perfectly satisfied; religion which\ncommences with a discontent, a disunion, forsakes its home and travels\nfar, but only to feel the more vividly in the distance the happiness\nof home. In religion man separates himself from himself, but only to\nreturn always to the same point from which he set out. Man negatives\nhimself, but only to posit himself again, and that in a glorified form:\nhe negatives this life, but only, in the end, to posit it again in\nthe future life. [147] The future life is this life once lost, but\nfound again, and radiant with all the more brightness for the joy of\nrecovery. The religious man renounces the joys of this world, but only\nthat he may win in return the joys of heaven; or rather he renounces\nthem because he is already in the ideal possession of heavenly joys;\nand the joys of heaven are the same as those of earth, only that they\nare freed from the limits and contrarieties of this life. Religion\nthus arrives, though by a circuit, at the very goal, the goal of joy,\ntowards which the natural man hastens in a direct line. To live in\nimages or symbols is the essence of religion. Religion sacrifices\nthe thing itself to the image. The future life is the present in the\nmirror of the imagination: the enrapturing image is in the sense of\nreligion the true type of earthly life,--real life only a glimmer of\nthat ideal, imaginary life. The future life is the present embellished,\ncontemplated through the imagination, purified from all gross matter;\nor, positively expressed, it is the beauteous present intensified.\n\nEmbellishment, emendation, presupposes blame, dissatisfaction. But\nthe dissatisfaction is only superficial. I do not deny the thing to\nbe of value; just as it is, however, it does not please me; I deny\nonly the modification, not the substance, otherwise I should urge\nannihilation. A house which absolutely displeases me I cause to be\npulled down, not to be embellished. To the believer in a future\nlife joy is agreeable--who can fail to be conscious that joy is\nsomething positive?--but it is disagreeable to him that here joy\nis followed by opposite sensations, that it is transitory. Hence he\nplaces joy in the future life also, but as eternal, uninterrupted,\ndivine joy (and the future life is therefore called the world of joy),\nsuch as he here conceives it in God; for God is nothing but eternal,\nuninterrupted joy, posited as a subject. Individuality or personality\nis agreeable to him, but only as unencumbered by objective forces;\nhence, he includes individuality also, but pure, absolutely subjective\nindividuality. Light pleases him; but not gravitation, because this\nappears a limitation of the individual; not night, because in it man\nis subjected to Nature: in the other world, there is light, but no\nweight, no night,--pure, unobstructed light. [148]\n\nAs man in his utmost remoteness from himself, in God, always returns\nupon himself, always revolves round himself; so in his utmost\nremoteness from the world, he always at last comes back to it. The\nmore extra- and supra-human God appears at the commencement, the more\nhuman does he show himself to be in the subsequent course of things,\nor at the close: and just so, the more supernatural the heavenly life\nlooks in the beginning or at a distance, the more clearly does it,\nin the end or when viewed closely, exhibit its identity with the\nnatural life,--an identity which at last extends even to the flesh,\neven to the body. In the first instance the mind is occupied with the\nseparation of the soul from the body, as in the conception of God\nthe mind is first occupied with the separation of the essence from\nthe individual;--the individual dies a spiritual death, the dead\nbody which remains behind is the human individual; the soul which\nhas departed from it is God. But the separation of the soul from\nthe body, of the essence from the individual, of God from man, must\nbe abolished again. Every separation of beings essentially allied\nis painful. The soul yearns after its lost half, after its body;\nas God, the departed soul yearns after the real man. As, therefore,\nGod becomes a man again, so the soul returns to its body, and the\nperfect identity of this world and the other is now restored. It\nis true that this new body is a bright, glorified, miraculous body,\nbut--and this is the main point--it is another and yet the same body,\n[149] as God is another being than man, and yet the same. Here we\ncome again to the idea of miracle, which unites contradictories. The\nsupernatural body is a body constructed by the imagination, for which\nvery reason it is adequate to the feelings of man: an unburdensome,\npurely subjective body. Faith in the future life is nothing else than\nfaith in the truth of the imagination, as faith in God is faith in\nthe truth and infinity of human feeling. Or: as faith in God is only\nfaith in the abstract nature of man, so faith in the heavenly life\nis only faith in the abstract earthly life.\n\nBut the sum of the future life is happiness, the everlasting bliss of\npersonality, which is here limited and circumscribed by Nature. Faith\nin the future life is therefore faith in the freedom of subjectivity\nfrom the limits of Nature; it is faith in the eternity and infinitude\nof personality, and not of personality viewed in relation to the idea\nof the species, in which it for ever unfolds itself in new individuals,\nbut of personality as belonging to already existing individuals:\nconsequently, it is the faith of man in himself. But faith in the\nkingdom of heaven is one with faith in God--the content of both\nideas is the same; God is pure absolute subjectivity released from\nall natural limits; he is what individuals ought to be and will be:\nfaith in God is therefore the faith of man in the infinitude and truth\nof his own nature; the Divine Being is the subjective human being in\nhis absolute freedom and unlimitedness.\n\nOur most essential task is now fulfilled. We have reduced the\nsupermundane, supernatural, and superhuman nature of God to the\nelements of human nature as its fundamental elements. Our process\nof analysis has brought us again to the position with which we set\nout. The beginning, middle and end of religion is Man.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPART II.\n\nTHE FALSE OR THEOLOGICAL ESSENCE OF RELIGION.\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX.\n\nTHE ESSENTIAL STANDPOINT OF RELIGION.\n\n\nThe essential standpoint of religion is the practical or\nsubjective. The end of religion is the welfare, the salvation, the\nultimate felicity of man; the relation of man to God is nothing else\nthan his relation to his own spiritual good; God is the realised\nsalvation of the soul, or the unlimited power of effecting the\nsalvation, the bliss of man. [150] The Christian religion is specially\ndistinguished from other religions in this,--that no other has given\nequal prominence to the salvation of man. But this salvation is not\ntemporal earthly prosperity and well-being. On the contrary, the most\ngenuine Christians have declared that earthly good draws man away from\nGod, whereas adversity, suffering, afflictions lead him back to God,\nand hence are alone suited to Christians. Why? Because in trouble\nman is only practically or subjectively disposed; in trouble he has\nresource only to the one thing needful; in trouble God is felt to be a\nwant of man. Pleasure, joy, expands man; trouble, suffering, contracts\nand concentrates him; in suffering man denies the reality of the world;\nthe things that charm the imagination of the artist and the intellect\nof the thinker lose their attraction for him, their power over him; he\nis absorbed in himself, in his own soul. The soul thus self-absorbed,\nself-concentrated, seeking satisfaction in itself alone, denying the\nworld, idealistic in relation to the world, to Nature in general,\nbut realistic in relation to man, caring only for its inherent need\nof salvation,--this soul is God. God, as the object of religion,--and\nonly as such is he God,--God in the sense of a nomen proprium, not of a\nvague, metaphysical entity, is essentially an object only of religion,\nnot of philosophy,--of feeling, not of the intellect,--of the heart's\nnecessity, not of the mind's freedom: in short, an object which is\nthe reflex not of the theoretical but of the practical tendency in man.\n\nReligion annexes to its doctrines a curse and a blessing, damnation\nand salvation. Blessed is he that believeth, cursed is he that\nbelieveth not. Thus it appeals not to reason, but to feeling, to\nthe desire of happiness, to the passions of hope and fear. It does\nnot take the theoretic point of view; otherwise it must have been\nfree to enunciate its doctrines without attaching to them practical\nconsequences, without to a certain extent compelling belief in them;\nfor when the case stands thus: I am lost if I do not believe,--the\nconscience is under a subtle kind of constraint; the fear of hell urges\nme to believe. Even supposing my belief to be in its origin free,\nfear inevitably intermingles itself; my conscience is always under\nconstraint; doubt, the principle of theoretic freedom, appears to me\na crime. And as in religion the highest idea, the highest existence\nis God, so the highest crime is doubt in God, or the doubt that God\nexists. But that which I do not trust myself to doubt, which I cannot\ndoubt without feeling disturbed in my soul, without incurring guilt;\nthat is no matter of theory, but a matter of conscience, no being of\nthe intellect, but of the heart.\n\nNow as the sole standpoint of religion is the practical or subjective\nstandpoint, as therefore to religion the whole, the essential man is\nthat part of his nature which is practical, which forms resolutions,\nwhich acts in accordance with conscious aims, whether physical or\nmoral, and which considers the world not in itself, but only in\nrelation to those aims or wants: the consequence is that everything\nwhich lies behind the practical consciousness, but which is the\nessential object of theory--theory in its most original and general\nsense, namely, that of objective contemplation and experience, of\nthe intellect, of science [151]--is regarded by religion as lying\noutside man and Nature, in a special, personal being. All good, but\nespecially such as takes possession of man apart from his volition,\nsuch as does not correspond with any resolution or purpose, such as\ntranscends the limits of the practical consciousness, comes from God;\nall wickedness, evil, but especially such as overtakes him against\nhis will in the midst of his best moral resolutions, or hurries him\nalong with terrible violence, comes from the devil. The scientific\nknowledge of the essence of religion includes the knowledge of the\ndevil, of Satan, of demons. [152] These things cannot be omitted\nwithout a violent mutilation of religion. Grace and its works\nare the antitheses of the devil and his works. As the involuntary,\nsensual impulses which flash out from the depths of the nature, and,\nin general, all those phenomena of moral and physical evil which are\ninexplicable to religion, appear to it as the work of the Evil Being;\nso the involuntary movements of inspiration and ecstasy appear to it as\nthe work of the Good Being, God, of the Holy Spirit or of grace. Hence\nthe arbitrariness of grace--the complaint of the pious that grace at\none time visits and blesses them, at another forsakes and rejects\nthem. The life, the agency of grace, is the life, the agency of\nemotion. Emotion is the Paraclete of Christians. The moments which\nare forsaken by divine grace are the moments destitute of emotion\nand inspiration.\n\nIn relation to the inner life, grace may be defined as religious\ngenius; in relation to the outer life as religious chance. Man is\ngood or wicked by no means through himself, his own power, his\nwill; but through that complete synthesis of hidden and evident\ndeterminations of things which, because they rest on no evident\nnecessity, we ascribe to the power of \"chance.\" Divine grace is the\npower of chance beclouded with additional mystery. Here we have again\nthe confirmation of that which we have seen to be the essential law\nof religion. Religion denies, repudiates chance, making everything\ndependent on God, explaining everything by means of him; but this\ndenial is only apparent; it merely gives chance the name of the\ndivine sovereignty. For the divine will, which, on incomprehensible\ngrounds, for incomprehensible reasons, that is, speaking plainly,\nout of groundless, absolute arbitrariness, out of divine caprice, as\nit were, determines or predestines some to evil and misery, others\nto good and happiness, has not a single positive characteristic to\ndistinguish it from the power of chance. The mystery of the election\nof grace is thus the mystery of chance. I say the mystery of chance;\nfor in reality chance is a mystery, although slurred over and ignored\nby our speculative religious philosophy, which, as in its occupation\nwith the illusory mysteries of the Absolute Being, i.e., of theology,\nit has overlooked the true mysteries of thought and life, so also\nin the mystery of divine grace or freedom of election, has forgotten\nthe profane mystery of chance. [153]\n\nBut to return. The devil is the negative, the evil, that springs from\nthe nature, but not from the will; God is the positive, the good, which\ncomes from the nature, but not from the conscious action of the will;\nthe devil is involuntary, inexplicable wickedness; God involuntary,\ninexplicable goodness. The source of both is the same, the quality only\nis different or opposite. For this reason, the belief in a devil was,\nuntil the most recent times, intimately connected with the belief\nin God, so that the denial of the devil was held to be virtually as\natheistic as the denial of God. Nor without reason; for when men once\nbegin to derive the phenomena of evil from natural causes, they at\nthe same time begin to derive the phenomena of good, of the divine,\nfrom the nature of things, and come at length either to abolish the\nidea of God altogether, or at least to believe in another God than\nthe God of religion. In this case it most commonly happens that they\nmake the Deity an idle inactive being, whose existence is equivalent\nto non-existence, since he no longer actively interposes in life,\nbut is merely placed at the summit of things, at the beginning of\nthe world, as the First Cause. God created the world: this is all\nthat is here retained of God. The past tense is necessary; for since\nthat epoch the world pursues its course like a machine. The addition:\nHe still creates, he is creating at this moment, is only the result\nof external reflection; the past tense adequately expresses the\nreligious idea in this stage; for the spirit of religion is gone\nwhen the operation of God is reduced to a fecit or creavit. It is\notherwise when the genuine religious consciousness says: The fecit\nis still to-day a facit. This, though here also it is a product of\nreflection, has nevertheless a legitimate meaning, because by the\nreligious spirit God is really thought of as active.\n\nReligion is abolished where the idea of the world, of so-called\nsecond causes, intrudes itself between God and man. Here a foreign\nelement, the principle of intellectual culture, has insinuated itself,\npeace is broken, the harmony of religion, which lies only in the\nimmediate connection of man with God, is destroyed. Second causes are\na capitulation of the unbelieving intellect with the still believing\nheart. It is true that, according to religion also, God works on man\nby means of other things and beings. But God alone is the cause, he\nalone is the active and efficient being. What a fellow-creature does\nis in the view of religion done not by him, but by God. The other\nis only an appearance, a medium, a vehicle, not a cause. But the\n\"second cause\" is a miserable anomaly, neither an independent nor a\ndependent being: God, it is true, gives the first impulse, but then\nensues the spontaneous activity of the second cause. [154]\n\nReligion of itself, unadulterated by foreign elements, knows nothing\nof the existence of second causes; on the contrary, they are a stone\nof stumbling to it; for the realm of second causes, the sensible\nworld, Nature, is precisely what separates man from God, although\nGod as a real God, i.e., an external being, is supposed himself to\nbecome in the other world a sensible existence. [155] Hence religion\nbelieves that one day this wall of separation will fall away. One day\nthere will be no Nature, no matter, no body, at least none such as\nto separate man from God: then there will be only God and the pious\nsoul. Religion derives the idea of the existence of second causes,\nthat is, of things which are interposed between God and man, only\nfrom the physical, natural, and hence the irreligious or at least\nnon-religious theory of the universe: a theory which it nevertheless\nimmediately subverts by making the operations of Nature operations\nof God. But this religious idea is in contradiction with the natural\nsense and understanding, which concedes a real, spontaneous activity\nto natural things. And this contradiction of the physical view with\nthe religious theory, religion resolves by converting the undeniable\nactivity of things into an activity of God. Thus, on this view,\nthe positive idea is God; the negative, the world.\n\nOn the contrary, where second causes, having been set in motion, are,\nso to speak, emancipated, the converse occurs; Nature is the positive,\nGod a negative idea. The world is independent in its existence, its\npersistence; only as to its commencement is it dependent. God is here\nonly a hypothetical Being, an inference, arising from the necessity of\na limited understanding, to which the existence of a world viewed by\nit as a machine is inexplicable without a self-moving principle;--he\nis no longer an original, absolutely necessary Being. God exists not\nfor his own sake, but for the sake of the world,--merely that he may,\nas a First Cause, explain the existence of the world. The narrow\nrationalising man takes objection to the original self-subsistence\nof the world, because he looks at it only from the subjective,\npractical point of view, only in its commoner aspect, only as a piece\nof mechanism, not in its majesty and glory, not as the Cosmos. He\nconceives the world as having been launched into existence by an\noriginal impetus, as, according to mathematical theory, is the case\nwith matter once set in motion and thenceforth going on for ever:\nthat is, he postulates a mechanical origin. A machine must have a\nbeginning; this is involved in its very idea; for it has not the\nsource of motion in itself.\n\nAll religious speculative cosmogony is tautology, as is apparent from\nthis example. In cosmogony man declares or realises the idea he has\nof the world; he merely repeats what he has already said in another\nform. Thus here, if the world is a machine, it is self-evident that it\ndid not make itself, that, on the contrary, it was created, i.e., had\na mechanical origin. Herein, it is true, the religious consciousness\nagrees with the mechanical theory, that to it also the world is a mere\nfabric, a product of Will. But they agree only for an instant, only\nin the moment of creation; that moment past, the harmony ceases. The\nholder of the mechanical theory needs God only as the creator of\nthe world; once made, the world turns its back on the Creator,\nand rejoices in its godless self-subsistence. But religion creates\nthe world only to maintain it in the perpetual consciousness of its\nnothingness, its dependence on God. [156] To the mechanical theorist,\nthe creation is the last thin thread which yet ties him to religion;\nthe religion to which the nothingness of the world is a present truth\n(for all power and activity is to it the power and activity of God),\nis with him only a surviving reminiscence of youth; hence he removes\nthe creation of the world, the act of religion, the non-existence\nof the world (for in the beginning, before the creation, there was\nno world, only God), into the far distance, into the past, while\nthe self-subsistence of the world, which absorbs all his senses and\nendeavours, acts on him with the force of the present. The mechanical\ntheorist interrupts and cuts short the activity of God by the activity\nof the world. With him God has indeed still an historical right,\nbut this is in contradiction with the right he awards to Nature;\nhence he limits as much as possible the right yet remaining to God,\nin order to gain wider and freer play for his natural causes, and\nthereby for his understanding.\n\nWith this class of thinkers the creation holds the same position as\nmiracles, which also they can and actually do acquiesce in, because\nmiracles exist, at least according to religious opinion. But not\nto say that he explains miracles naturally, that is, mechanically,\nhe can only digest them when he relegates them to the past; for the\npresent he begs to be excused from believing in them, and explains\neverything to himself charmingly on natural principles. When a\nbelief has departed from the reason, the intelligence, when it is no\nlonger held spontaneously, but merely because it is a common belief,\nor because on some ground or other it must be held; in short, when\na belief is inwardly a past one; then externally also the object\nof the belief is referred to the past. Unbelief thus gets breathing\nspace, but at the same time concedes to belief at least an historical\nvalidity. The past is here the fortunate means of compromise between\nbelief and unbelief: I certainly believe in miracles, but, nota bene,\nin no miracles which happen now--only in those which once happened,\nwhich, thank God! are already plus quam perfecta. So also with\nthe creation. The creation is an immediate act of God, a miracle,\nfor there was once nothing but God. In the idea of the creation man\ntranscends the world, he rises into abstraction from it; he conceives\nit as non-existent in the moment of creation; thus he dispels from\nhis sight what stands between himself and God, the sensible world;\nhe places himself in immediate contact with God. But the mechanical\nthinker shrinks from this immediate contact with God; hence he at\nonce makes the pr\u00e6sens, if indeed he soars so high, into a perfectum;\nhe interposes millenniums between his natural or materialistic view\nand the thought of an immediate operation of God.\n\nTo the religious spirit, on the contrary, God alone is the cause\nof all positive effects, God alone the ultimate and also the sole\nground wherewith it answers, or rather repels, all questions which\ntheory puts forward; for the affirmative of religion is virtually\na negative; its answer amounts to nothing, since it solves the\nmost various questions always with the same answer, making all the\noperations of Nature immediate operations of God, of a designing,\npersonal, extra-natural or supranatural Being. God is the idea which\nsupplies the lack of theory. The idea of God is the explanation of\nthe inexplicable,--which explains nothing because it is supposed to\nexplain everything without distinction; he is the night of theory,\na night, however, in which everything is clear to religious feeling,\nbecause in it the measure of darkness, the discriminating light of the\nunderstanding, is extinct; he is the ignorance which solves all doubt\nby repressing it, which knows everything because it knows nothing\ndefinite, because all things which impress the intellect disappear\nbefore religion, lose their individuality, in the eyes of divine\npower are nothing. Darkness is the mother of religion.\n\nThe essential act of religion, that in which religion puts into\naction what we have designated as its essence, is prayer. Prayer\nis all-powerful. What the pious soul entreats for in prayer God\nfulfils. But he prays not for spiritual gifts [157] alone, which\nlie in some sort in the power of man; he prays also for things which\nlie out of him, which are in the power of Nature, a power which it\nis the very object of prayer to overcome; in prayer he lays hold\non a supernatural means, in order to attain ends in themselves\nnatural. God is to him not the causa remota but the causa proxima,\nthe immediate, efficient cause of all natural effects. All so-called\nsecondary forces and second causes are nothing to him when he prays;\nif they were anything to him, the might, the fervour of prayer would\nbe annihilated. But in fact they have no existence for him; otherwise\nhe would assuredly seek to attain his end only by some intermediate\nprocess. But he desires immediate help. He has recourse to prayer in\nthe certainty that he can do more, infinitely more, by prayer, than\nby all the efforts of reason and all the agencies of Nature,--in\nthe conviction that prayer possesses superhuman and supernatural\npowers. [158] But in prayer he applies immediately to God. Thus God\nis to him the immediate cause, the fulfilment of prayer, the power\nwhich realises prayer. But an immediate act of God is a miracle;\nhence miracle is essential to the religious view. Religion explains\neverything miraculously. That miracles do not always happen is indeed\nobvious, as that man does not always pray. But the consideration that\nmiracles do not always happen lies outside the nature of religion, in\nthe empirical or physical mode of view only. Where religion begins,\nthere also begins miracle. Every true prayer is a miracle, an act\nof the wonder-working power. External miracles themselves only make\nvisible internal miracles, that is, they are only a manifestation in\ntime and space, and therefore as a special fact, of what in and by\nitself is a fundamental position of religion, namely, that God is,\nin general, the supernatural, immediate cause of all things. The\nmiracle of fact is only an impassioned expression of religion, a\nmoment of inspiration. Miracles happen only in extraordinary crises,\nin which there is an exaltation of the feelings: hence there are\nmiracles of anger. No miracle is wrought in cold blood. But it\nis precisely in moments of passion that the latent nature reveals\nitself. Man does not always pray with equal warmth and power. Such\nprayers are therefore ineffective. Only ardent prayer reveals the\nnature of prayer. Man truly prays when he regards prayer as in itself\na sacred power, a divine force. So it is with miracles. Miracles\nhappen--no matter whether few or many--wherever there is, as a basis\nfor them, a belief in the miraculous. But the belief in miracle\nis no theoretic or objective mode of viewing the world and Nature;\nmiracle realises practical wants, and that in contradiction with the\nlaws which are imperative to the reason; in miracle man subjugates\nNature, as in itself a nullity, to his own ends, which he regards\nas a reality; miracle is the superlative expression of spiritual or\nreligious utilitarianism; in miracle all things are at the service\nof necessitous man. It is clear from this, that the conception of\nthe world which is essential to religion is that of the practical\nor subjective standpoint, that God--for the miracle-working power\nis identical with God--is a purely practical or subjective Being,\nserving, however, as a substitute for a theoretic view, and is thus\nno object of thought, of the knowing faculty, any more than miracle,\nwhich owes its origin to the negation of thought. If I place myself\nin the point of view of thought, of investigation, of theory, in\nwhich I consider things in themselves, in their mutual relations,\nthe miracle-working being vanishes into nothing, miracle disappears;\ni.e., the religious miracle, which is absolutely different from the\nnatural miracle, though they are continually interchanged, in order\nto stultify reason, and, under the appearance of natural science, to\nintroduce religious miracle into the sphere of rationality and reality.\n\nBut for this very reason--namely, that religion is removed from the\nstandpoint, from the nature of theory--the true, universal essence\nof Nature and humanity, which as such is hidden from religion and\nis only visible to the theoretic eye, is conceived as another, a\nmiraculous and supernatural essence; the idea of the species becomes\nthe idea of God, who again is himself an individual being, but is\ndistinguished from human individuals in this, that he possesses their\nqualities according to the measure of the species. Hence, in religion\nman necessarily places his nature out of himself, regards his nature\nas a separate nature; necessarily, because the nature which is the\nobject of theory lies outside of him, because all his conscious\nexistence spends itself in his practical subjectivity. God is his\nalter ego, his other lost half; God is the complement of himself;\nin God he is first a perfect man. God is a need to him; something is\nwanting to him without his knowing what it is--God is this something\nwanting, indispensable to him; God belongs to his nature. The world\nis nothing to religion, [159]--the world, which is in truth the sum\nof all reality, is revealed in its glory only by theory. The joys of\ntheory are the sweetest intellectual pleasures of life; but religion\nknows nothing of the joys of the thinker, of the investigator of\nNature, of the artist. The idea of the universe is wanting to it,\nthe consciousness of the really infinite, the consciousness of the\nspecies. God only is its compensation for the poverty of life, for\nthe want of a substantial import, which the true life of rational\ncontemplation presents in unending fulness. God is to religion the\nsubstitute for the lost world,--God is to it in the stead of pure\ncontemplation, the life of theory.\n\nThat which we have designated as the practical or subjective view\nis not pure, it is tainted with egoism, for therein I have relation\nto a thing only for my own sake; neither is it self-sufficing,\nfor it places me in relation to an object above my own level. On\nthe contrary, the theoretic view is joyful, self-sufficing, happy;\nfor here the object calls forth love and admiration; in the light of\nthe free intelligence it is radiant as a diamond, transparent as a\nrock-crystal. The theoretic view is \u00e6sthetic, whereas the practical\nis un\u00e6sthetic. Religion therefore finds in God a compensation for\nthe want of an \u00e6sthetic view. To the religious spirit the world\nis nothing in itself; the admiration, the contemplation of it is\nidolatry; for the world is a mere piece of mechanism. [160] Hence\nin religion it is God that serves as the object of pure, untainted,\ni.e., theoretic or \u00e6sthetic contemplation. God is the existence to\nwhich the religious man has an objective relation; in God the object\nis contemplated by him for its own sake. God is an end in himself;\ntherefore in religion he has the significance which in the theoretic\nview belongs to the object in general. The general being of theory\nis to religion a special being. It is true that in religion man,\nin his relation to God, has relation to his own wants as well in a\nhigher as in the lower sense: \"Give us this day our daily bread;\"\nbut God can satisfy all wants of man only because he in himself has\nno wants,--because he is perfect blessedness.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX.\n\nTHE CONTRADICTION IN THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.\n\n\nReligion is the relation of man to his own nature,--therein lies\nits truth and its power of moral amelioration;--but to his nature\nnot recognised as his own, but regarded as another nature, separate,\nnay, contradistinguished from his own: herein lies its untruth, its\nlimitation, its contradiction to reason and morality; herein lies\nthe noxious source of religious fanaticism, the chief metaphysical\nprinciple of human sacrifices, in a word, the prima materia of all\nthe atrocities, all the horrible scenes, in the tragedy of religious\nhistory.\n\nThe contemplation of the human nature as another, a separately\nexistent nature, is, however, in the original conception of religion\nan involuntary, childlike, simple act of the mind, that is, one which\nseparates God and man just as immediately as it again identifies\nthem. But when religion advances in years, and, with years, in\nunderstanding; when, within the bosom of religion, reflection on\nreligion is awakened, and the consciousness of the identity of the\ndivine being with the human begins to dawn,--in a word, when religion\nbecomes theology, the originally involuntary and harmless separation\nof God from man becomes an intentional, excogitated separation, which\nhas no other object than to banish again from the consciousness this\nidentity which has already entered there.\n\nHence the nearer religion stands to its origin, the truer, the more\ngenuine it is, the less is its true nature disguised; that is to\nsay, in the origin of religion there is no qualitative or essential\ndistinction whatever between God and man. And the religious man is\nnot shocked at this identification; for his understanding is still\nin harmony with his religion. Thus in ancient Judaism, Jehovah\nwas a being differing from the human individual in nothing but in\nduration of existence; in his qualities, his inherent nature, he was\nentirely similar to man,--had the same passions, the same human, nay,\neven corporeal properties. Only in the later Judaism was Jehovah\nseparated in the strictest manner from man, and recourse was had\nto allegory in order to give to the old anthropomorphisms another\nsense than that which they originally had. So again in Christianity:\nin its earliest records the divinity of Christ is not so decidedly\nstamped as it afterwards became. With Paul especially, Christ is\nstill an undefined being, hovering between heaven and earth, between\nGod and man, or in general, one amongst the existences subordinate to\nthe highest,--the first of the angels, the first created, but still\ncreated; begotten indeed for our sake; but then neither are angels and\nmen created, but begotten, for God is their Father also. The Church\nfirst identified him with God, made him the exclusive Son of God,\ndefined his distinction from men and angels, and thus gave him the\nmonopoly of an eternal, uncreated existence.\n\nIn the genesis of ideas, the first mode in which reflection on\nreligion, or theology, makes the divine being a distinct being,\nand places him outside of man, is by making the existence of God the\nobject of a formal proof.\n\nThe proofs of the existence of God have been pronounced contradictory\nto the essential nature of religion. They are so, but only in their\nform as proofs. Religion immediately represents the inner nature of\nman as an objective, external being. And the proof aims at nothing\nmore than to prove that religion is right. The most perfect being is\nthat than which no higher can be conceived: God is the highest that man\nconceives or can conceive. This premiss of the ontological proof--the\nmost interesting proof, because it proceeds from within--expresses\nthe inmost nature of religion. That which is the highest for man,\nfrom which he can make no further abstraction, which is the positive\nlimit of his intellect, of his feeling, of his sentiment, that is to\nhim God--id quo nihil majus cogitari potest. But this highest being\nwould not be the highest if he did not exist; we could then conceive\na higher being who would be superior to him in the fact of existence;\nthe idea of the highest being directly precludes this fiction. Not to\nexist is a deficiency; to exist is perfection, happiness, bliss. From\na being to whom man gives all, offers up all that is precious to him,\nhe cannot withhold the bliss of existence. The contradiction to the\nreligious spirit in the proof of the existence of God lies only in\nthis, that the existence is thought of separately, and thence arises\nthe appearance that God is a mere conception, a being existing in\nidea only,--an appearance, however, which is immediately dissipated;\nfor the very result of the proof is, that to God belongs an existence\ndistinct from an ideal one, an existence apart from man, apart from\nthought,--a real self-existence.\n\nThe proof therefore is only thus far discordant with the spirit of\nreligion, that it presents as a formal deduction the implicit enthymeme\nor immediate conclusion of religion, exhibits in logical relation,\nand therefore distinguishes, what religion immediately unites; for to\nreligion God is not a matter of abstract thought,--he is a present\ntruth and reality. But that every religion in its idea of God makes\na latent, unconscious inference, is confessed in its polemic against\nother religions. \"Ye heathens,\" says the Jew or the Christian, \"were\nable to conceive nothing higher as your deities because ye were sunk\nin sinful desires. Your God rests on a conclusion, the premisses of\nwhich are your sensual impulses, your passions. You thought thus: the\nmost excellent life is to live out one's impulses without restraint;\nand because this life was the most excellent, the truest, you made it\nyour God. Your God was your carnal nature, your heaven only a free\ntheatre for the passions which, in society and in the conditions\nof actual life generally, had to suffer restraint.\" But, naturally,\nin relation to itself no religion is conscious of such an inference,\nfor the highest of which it is capable is its limit, has the force of\nnecessity, is not a thought, not a conception, but immediate reality.\n\nThe proofs of the existence of God have for their aim to make the\ninternal external, to separate it from man. [161] His existence being\nproved, God is no longer a merely relative, but a noumenal being\n(Ding an sich): he is not only a being for us, a being in our faith,\nour feeling, our nature, he is a being in himself, a being external\nto us,--in a word, not merely a belief, a feeling, a thought, but\nalso a real existence apart from belief, feeling, and thought. But\nsuch an existence is no other than a sensational existence; i.e.,\nan existence conceived according to the forms of our senses.\n\nThe idea of sensational existence is indeed already involved in\nthe characteristic expression \"external to us.\" It is true that a\nsophistical theology refuses to interpret the word \"external\" in\nits proper, natural sense, and substitutes the indefinite expression\nof independent, separate existence. But if the externality is only\nfigurative, the existence also is figurative. And yet we are here\nonly concerned with existence in the proper sense, and external\nexistence is alone the definite, real, unshrinking expression for\nseparate existence.\n\nReal, sensational existence is that which is not dependent on my\nown mental spontaneity or activity, but by which I am involuntarily\naffected, which is when I am not, when I do not think of it or feel\nit. The existence of God must therefore be in space--in general, a\nqualitative, sensational existence. But God is not seen, not heard,\nnot perceived by the senses. He does not exist for me, if I do not\nexist for him; if I do not believe in a God, there is no God for me. If\nI am not devoutly disposed, if I do not raise myself above the life\nof the senses, he has no place in my consciousness. Thus he exists\nonly in so far as he is felt, thought, believed in;--the addition\n\"for me\" is unnecessary. His existence therefore is a real one, yet\nat the same time not a real one;--a spiritual existence, says the\ntheologian. But spiritual existence is only an existence in thought,\nin feeling, in belief; so that his existence is a medium between\nsensational existence and conceptional existence, a medium full of\ncontradiction. Or: he is a sensational existence, to which however all\nthe conditions of sensational existence are wanting:--consequently an\nexistence at once sensational and not sensational, an existence which\ncontradicts the idea of the sensational, or only a vague existence in\ngeneral, which is fundamentally a sensational one, but which, in order\nthat this may not become evident, is divested of all the predicates\nof a real, sensational existence. But such an \"existence in general\"\nis self-contradictory. To existence belongs full, definite reality.\n\nA necessary consequence of this contradiction is Atheism. The existence\nof God is essentially an empirical existence, without having its\ndistinctive marks; it is in itself a matter of experience, and yet\nin reality no object of experience. It calls upon man to seek it\nin Reality: it impregnates his mind with sensational conceptions\nand pretensions; hence, when these are not fulfilled--when, on the\ncontrary, he finds experience in contradiction with these conceptions,\nhe is perfectly justified in denying that existence.\n\nKant is well known to have maintained, in his critique of the proofs\nof the existence of God, that that existence is not susceptible of\nproof from reason. He did not merit, on this account, the blame\nwhich was cast on him by Hegel. The idea of the existence of God\nin those proofs is a thoroughly empirical one; but I cannot deduce\nempirical existence from an \u00e0 priori idea. The only real ground of\nblame against Kant is, that in laying down this position he supposed\nit to be something remarkable, whereas it is self-evident. Reason\ncannot constitute itself an object of sense. I cannot, in thinking,\nat the same time represent what I think as a sensible object, external\nto me. The proof of the existence of God transcends the limits of the\nreason; true; but in the same sense in which sight, hearing, smelling\ntranscend the limits of the reason. It is absurd to reproach reason\nthat it does not satisfy a demand which can only address itself\nto the senses. Existence, empirical existence, is proved to me by\nthe senses alone; and in the question as to the being of God, the\nexistence implied has not the significance of inward reality, of truth,\nbut the significance of a formal, external existence. Hence there is\nperfect truth in the allegation that the belief that God is or is not\nhas no consequence with respect to inward moral dispositions. It is\ntrue that the thought: There is a God, is inspiring; but here the is\nmeans inward reality; here the existence is a movement of inspiration,\nan act of aspiration. Just in proportion as this existence becomes\na prosaic, an empirical truth, the inspiration is extinguished.\n\nReligion, therefore, in so far as it is founded on the existence of\nGod as an empirical truth, is a matter of indifference to the inward\ndisposition. As, necessarily, in the religious cultus, ceremonies,\nobservances, sacraments, apart from the moral spirit or disposition,\nbecome in themselves an important fact: so also, at last, belief in\nthe existence of God becomes, apart from the inherent quality, the\nspiritual import of the idea of God, a chief point in religion. If\nthou only believest in God--believest that God is, thou art already\nsaved. Whether under this God thou conceivest a really divine being\nor a monster, a Nero or a Caligula, an image of thy passions, thy\nrevenge, or ambition, it is all one,--the main point is that thou\nbe not an atheist. The history of religion has amply confirmed\nthis consequence which we here draw from the idea of the divine\nexistence. If the existence of God, taken by itself, had not rooted\nitself as a religious truth in minds, there would never have been\nthose infamous, senseless, horrible ideas of God which stigmatise the\nhistory of religion and theology. The existence of God was a common,\nexternal, and yet at the same time a holy thing:--what wonder, then,\nif on this ground the commonest, rudest, most unholy conceptions and\nopinions sprang up!\n\nAtheism was supposed, and is even now supposed, to be the negation\nof all moral principle, of all moral foundations and bonds: if\nGod is not, all distinction between good and bad, virtue and vice,\nis abolished. Thus the distinction lies only in the existence of\nGod; the reality of virtue lies not in itself, but out of it. And\nassuredly it is not from an attachment to virtue, from a conviction\nof its intrinsic worth and importance, that the reality of it is\nthus bound up with the existence of God. On the contrary, the belief\nthat God is the necessary condition of virtue is the belief in the\nnothingness of virtue in itself.\n\nIt is indeed worthy of remark that the idea of the empirical\nexistence of God has been perfectly developed in modern times,\nin which empiricism and materialism in general have arrived at\ntheir full blow. It is true that even in the original, simple\nreligious mind, God is an empirical existence to be found in a place,\nthough above the earth. But here this conception has not so naked,\nso prosaic a significance; the imagination identifies again the\nexternal God with the soul of man. The imagination is, in general,\nthe true place of an existence which is absent, not present to\nthe senses, though nevertheless sensational in its essence. [162]\nOnly the imagination solves the contradiction in an existence which\nis at once sensational and not sensational; only the imagination\nis the preservative from atheism. In the imagination existence has\nsensational effects,--existence affirms itself as a power; with the\nessence of sensational existence the imagination associates also the\nphenomena of sensational existence. Where the existence of God is a\nliving truth, an object on which the imagination exercises itself,\nthere also appearances of God are believed in. [163] Where, on the\ncontrary, the fire of the religious imagination is extinct, where\nthe sensational effects or appearances necessarily connected with an\nessentially sensational existence cease, there the existence becomes\na dead, self-contradictory existence, which falls irrecoverably into\nthe negation of atheism.\n\nThe belief in the existence of God is the belief in a special\nexistence, separate from the existence of man and Nature. A special\nexistence can only be proved in a special manner. This faith is\ntherefore only then a true and living one when special effects,\nimmediate appearances of God, miracles, are believed in. Where, on the\nother hand, the belief in God is identified with the belief in the\nworld, where the belief in God is no longer a special faith, where\nthe general being of the world takes possession of the whole man,\nthere also vanishes the belief in special effects and appearances\nof God. Belief in God is wrecked, is stranded on the belief in the\nworld, in natural effects as the only true ones. As here the belief\nin miracles is no longer anything more than the belief in historical,\npast miracles, so the existence of God is also only an historical,\nin itself atheistic conception.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI.\n\nTHE CONTRADICTION IN THE REVELATION OF GOD.\n\n\nWith the idea of the existence of God is connected the idea of\nrevelation. God's attestation of his existence, the authentic testimony\nthat God exists, is revelation. Proofs drawn from reason are merely\nsubjective; the objective, the only true proof of the existence of God,\nis his revelation. God speaks to man; revelation is the word of God;\nhe sends forth a voice which thrills the soul, and gives it the joyful\ncertainty that God really is. The word is the gospel of life,--the\ncriterion of existence and non-existence. Belief in revelation is the\nculminating point of religious objectivism. The subjective conviction\nof the existence of God here becomes an indubitable, external,\nhistorical fact. The existence of God, in itself, considered simply\nas existence, is already an external, empirical existence; still,\nit is as yet only thought, conceived, and therefore doubtful; hence\nthe assertion that all proofs produce no satisfactory certainty. This\nconceptional existence converted into a real existence, a fact, is\nrevelation. God has revealed himself, has demonstrated himself: who\nthen can have any further doubt? The certainty of the existence of God\nis involved for me in the certainty of the revelation. A God who only\nexists without revealing himself, who exists for me only through my own\nmental act, such a God is a merely abstract, imaginary, subjective God;\na God who gives me a knowledge of himself through his own act is alone\na God who truly exists, who proves himself to exist,--an objective\nGod. Faith in revelation is the immediate certainty of the religious\nmind, that what it believes, wishes, conceives, really is. Religion\nis a dream, in which our own conceptions and emotions appear to us as\nseparate existences, beings out of ourselves. The religious mind does\nnot distinguish between subjective and objective,--it has no doubts;\nit has the faculty, not of discerning other things than itself, but of\nseeing its own conceptions out of itself as distinct beings. What is\nin itself a mere theory is to the religious mind a practical belief,\na matter of conscience,--a fact. A fact is that which from being an\nobject of the intellect becomes a matter of conscience; a fact is that\nwhich one cannot criticise or attack without being guilty of a crime;\n[164] a fact is that which one must believe nolens volens; a fact is a\nphysical force, not an argument,--it makes no appeal to the reason. O\nye shortsighted religious philosophers of Germany, who fling at our\nheads the facts of the religious consciousness, to stun our reason and\nmake us the slaves of your childish superstition,--do you not see that\nfacts are just as relative, as various, as subjective, as the ideas\nof the different religions? Were not the gods of Olympus also facts,\nself-attesting existences? [165] Were not the ludicrous miracles of\npaganism regarded as facts? Were not angels and demons historical\npersons? Did they not really appear to men? Did not Balaam's ass\nreally speak? Was not the story of Balaam's ass just as much believed\neven by enlightened scholars of the last century, as the Incarnation\nor any other miracle? A fact, I repeat, is a conception about the\ntruth of which there is no doubt, because it is no object of theory,\nbut of feeling, which desires that what it wishes, what it believes,\nshould be true. A fact is that, the denial of which is forbidden,\nif not by an external law, yet by an internal one. A fact is every\npossibility which passes for a reality, every conception which,\nfor the age wherein it is held to be a fact, expresses a want, and\nis for that reason an impassable limit of the mind. A fact is every\nwish that projects itself on reality: in short, it is everything that\nis not doubted simply because it is not--must not be--doubted.\n\nThe religious mind, according to its nature as hitherto unfolded,\nhas the immediate certainty that all its involuntary, spontaneous\naffections are impressions from without, manifestations of another\nbeing. The religious mind makes itself the passive, God the active\nbeing. God is activity; but that which determines him to activity,\nwhich causes his activity (originally only omnipotence, potentia)\nto become real activity, is not himself,--he needs nothing,--but man,\nthe religious subject. At the same time, however, man is reciprocally\ndetermined by God; he views himself as passive; lie receives from God\ndeterminate revelations, determinate proofs of his existence. Thus in\nrevelation man determines himself as that which determines God, i.e.,\nrevelation is simply the self-determination of man, only that between\nhimself the determined, and himself the determining, he interposes an\nobject--God, a distinct being. God is the medium by which man brings\nabout the reconciliation of himself with his own nature: God is the\nbond, the vinculum substantiale, between the essential nature--the\nspecies--and the individual.\n\nThe belief in revelation exhibits in the clearest manner the\ncharacteristic illusion of the religious consciousness. The general\npremiss of this belief is: man can of himself know nothing of God; all\nhis knowledge is merely vain, earthly, human. But God is a superhuman\nbeing; God is known only by himself. Thus we know nothing of God beyond\nwhat he reveals to us. The knowledge imparted by God is alone divine,\nsuperhuman, supernatural knowledge. By means of revelation, therefore,\nwe know God through himself; for revelation is the word of God--God\ndeclaring himself. Hence, in the belief in revelation man makes himself\na negation, he goes out of and above himself; he places revelation\nin opposition to human knowledge and opinion; in it is contained a\nhidden knowledge, the fulness of all supersensuous mysteries; here\nreason must hold its peace. But nevertheless the divine revelation is\ndetermined by the human nature. God speaks not to brutes or angels,\nbut to men; hence he uses human speech and human conceptions. Man\nis an object to God, before God perceptibly imparts himself to man;\nhe thinks of man; he determines his action in accordance with the\nnature of man and his needs. God is indeed free in will; he can\nreveal himself or not; but he is not free as to the understanding;\nhe cannot reveal to man whatever he will, but only what is adapted to\nman, what is commensurate with his nature such as it actually is; he\nreveals what he must reveal, if his revelation is to be a revelation\nfor man, and not for some other kind of being. Now what God thinks in\nrelation to man is determined by the idea of man--it has arisen out of\nreflection on human nature. God puts himself in the place of man, and\nthinks of himself as this other being can and should think of him; he\nthinks of himself, not with his own thinking power, but with man's. In\nthe scheme of his revelation God must have reference not to himself,\nbut to man's power of comprehension. That which comes from God to man,\ncomes to man only from man in God, that is, only from the ideal nature\nof man to the phenomenal man, from the species to the individual. Thus,\nbetween the divine revelation and the so-called human reason or nature,\nthere is no other than an illusory distinction;--the contents of the\ndivine revelation are of human origin, for they have proceeded not\nfrom God as God, but from God as determined by human reason, human\nwants, that is, directly from human reason and human wants. And so in\nrevelation man goes out of himself, in order, by a circuitous path, to\nreturn to himself! Here we have a striking confirmation of the position\nthat the secret of theology is nothing else than anthropology--the\nknowledge of God nothing else than a knowledge of man!\n\nIndeed, the religious consciousness itself admits, in relation to past\ntimes, the essentially human quality of revelation. The religious\nconsciousness of a later age is no longer satisfied with a Jehovah\nwho is from head to foot a man, and does not shrink from becoming\nvisible as such. It recognises that those were merely images in which\nGod accommodated himself to the comprehension of men in that age,\nthat is, merely human images. But it does not apply this mode of\ninterpretation to ideas accepted as revelation in the present age,\nbecause it is yet itself steeped in those ideas. Nevertheless,\nevery revelation is simply a revelation of the nature of man to\nexisting men. In revelation man's latent nature is disclosed to\nhim, because an object to him. He is determined, affected by his\nown nature as by another being; he receives from the hands of God\nwhat his own unrecognised nature entails upon him as a necessity,\nunder certain conditions of time and circumstance. Reason, the mind\nof the species, operates on the subjective, uncultured man only under\nthe image of a personal being. Moral laws have force for him only\nas the commandments of a Divine Will, which has at once the power\nto punish and the glance which nothing escapes. That which his own\nnature, his reason, his conscience says to him, does not bind him,\nbecause the subjective, uncultured man sees in conscience, in reason,\nso far as he recognises it as his own, no universal objective power;\nhence he must separate from himself that which gives him moral laws,\nand place it in opposition to himself, as a distinct personal being.\n\nBelief in revelation is a childlike belief, and is only respectable so\nlong as it is childlike. But the child is determined from without, and\nrevelation has for its object to effect by God's help what man cannot\nattain by himself. Hence revelation has been called the education of\nthe human race. This is correct; only revelation must not be regarded\nas outside the nature of man. There is within him an inward necessity\nwhich impels him to present moral and philosophical doctrines in the\nform of narratives and fables, and an equal necessity to represent that\nimpulse as a revelation. The mythical poet has an end in view--that of\nmaking men good and wise; he designedly adopts the form of fable as\nthe most appropriate and vivid method of representation; but at the\nsame time, he is himself urged to this mode of teaching by his love\nof fable, by his inward impulse. So it is with a revelation enunciated\nby an individual. This individual has an aim; but at the same time he\nhimself lives in the conceptions by means of which he realises this\naim. Man, by means of the imagination, involuntarily contemplates his\ninner nature; he represents it as out of himself. The nature of man,\nof the species--thus working on him through the irresistible power\nof the imagination, and contemplated as the law of his thought and\naction--is God.\n\nHerein lie the beneficial moral effects of the belief in revelation.\n\nBut as Nature \"unconsciously produces results which look as if they\nwere produced consciously,\" so revelation generates moral actions,\nwhich do not, however, proceed from morality;--moral actions, but\nno moral dispositions. Moral rules are indeed observed, but they are\nsevered from the inward disposition, the heart, by being represented\nas the commandments of an external lawgiver, by being placed in the\ncategory of arbitrary laws, police regulations. What is done is done\nnot because it is good and right, but because it is commanded by\nGod. The inherent quality of the deed is indifferent; whatever God\ncommands is right. [166] If these commands are in accordance with\nreason, with ethics, it is well; but so far as the idea of revelation\nis concerned, it is accidental. The ceremonial laws of the Jews were\nrevealed, divine, though in themselves adventitious and arbitrary. The\nJews received from Jehovah the command to steal;--in a special case,\nit is true.\n\nBut the belief in revelation not only injures the moral sense\nand taste,--the \u00e6sthetics of virtue; it poisons, nay it destroys,\nthe divinest feeling in man--the sense of truth, the perception and\nsentiment of truth. The revelation of God is a determinate revelation,\ngiven at a particular epoch: God revealed himself once for all in the\nyear so and so, and that, not to the universal man, to the man of all\ntimes and places, to the reason, to the species, but to certain limited\nindividuals. A revelation in a given time and place must be fixed in\nwriting, that its blessings may be transmitted uninjured. Hence the\nbelief in revelation is, at least for those of a subsequent age, belief\nin a written revelation; but the necessary consequence of a faith in\nwhich an historical book, necessarily subject to all the conditions\nof a temporal, finite production, is regarded as an eternal, absolute,\nuniversally authoritative word, is--superstition and sophistry.\n\nFaith in a written revelation is a real, unfeigned, and so far\nrespectable faith, only where it is believed that all in the sacred\nwritings is significant, true, holy, divine. Where, on the contrary,\nthe distinction is made between the human and divine, the relatively\ntrue and the absolutely true, the historical and the permanent,--where\nit is not held that all without distinction is unconditionally true;\nthere the verdict of unbelief, that the Bible is no divine book, is\nalready introduced into the interpretation of the Bible,--there, at\nleast indirectly, that is, in a crafty, dishonest way, its title to the\ncharacter of a divine revelation is denied. Unity, unconditionality,\nfreedom from exceptions, immediate certitude, is alone the character of\ndivinity. A book that imposes on me the necessity of discrimination,\nthe necessity of criticism, in order to separate the divine from\nthe human, the permanent from the temporary, is no longer a divine,\ncertain, infallible book,--it is degraded to the rank of profane\nbooks; for every profane book has the same quality, that together\nwith or in the human it contains the divine, that is, together with\nor in the individual it contains the universal and eternal. But that\nonly is a truly divine book in which there is not merely something\ngood and something bad, something permanent and something temporary,\nbut in which all comes as it were from one crucible, all is eternal,\ntrue and good. What sort of a revelation is that in which I must\nfirst listen to the apostle Paul, then to Peter, then to James,\nthen to John, then to Matthew, then to Mark, then to Luke, until\nat last I come to a passage where my soul, athirst for God, can cry\nout: Eureka! here speaks the Holy Spirit himself! here is something\nfor me, something for all times and men. How true, on the contrary,\nwas the conception of the old faith, when it extended inspiration\nto the very words, to the very letters of Scripture! The word is\nnot a matter of indifference in relation to the thought; a definite\nthought can only be rendered by a definite word. Another word, another\nletter--another sense. It is true that such faith is superstition;\nbut this superstition is alone the true, undisguised, open faith,\nwhich is not ashamed of its consequences. If God numbers the hairs\non the head of a man, if no sparrow falls to the ground without his\nwill, how could he leave to the stupidity and caprice of scribes his\nWord--that Word on which depends the everlasting salvation of man? Why\nshould he not dictate his thoughts to their pen in order to guard\nthem from the possibility of disfiguration? \"But if man were a mere\norgan of the Holy Spirit, human freedom would be abolished!\" [167] Oh,\nwhat a pitiable argument! Is human freedom, then, of more value than\ndivine truth? Or does human freedom consist only in the distortion\nof divine truth?\n\nAnd just as necessarily as the belief in a determinate historical\nrevelation is associated with superstition, so necessarily is it\nassociated with sophistry. The Bible contradicts morality, contradicts\nreason, contradicts itself, innumerable times; and yet it is the Word\nof God, eternal truth, and \"truth cannot contradict itself.\" [168]\nHow does the believer in revelation elude this contradiction between\nthe idea in his own mind of revelation as divine, harmonious truth,\nand this supposed actual revelation? Only by self-deception, only\nby the silliest subterfuges, only by the most miserable, transparent\nsophisms. Christian sophistry is the necessary product of Christian\nfaith, especially of faith in the Bible as a divine revelation.\n\nTruth, absolute truth, is given objectively in the Bible, subjectively\nin faith; for towards that which God himself speaks I can only be\nbelieving, resigned, receptive. Nothing is left to the understanding,\nthe reason, but a formal, subordinate office; it has a false position,\na position essentially contradictory to its nature. The understanding\nin itself is here indifferent to truth, indifferent to the distinction\nbetween the true and the false; it has no criterion in itself;\nwhatever is found in revelation is true, even when it is in direct\ncontradiction with reason. The understanding is helplessly given\nover to the haphazard of the most ignoble empiricism;--whatever\nI find in divine revelation I must believe, and if necessary, my\nunderstanding must defend it; the understanding is the watchdog of\nrevelation; it must let everything without distinction be imposed\non it as truth,--discrimination would be doubt, would be a crime:\nconsequently, nothing remains to it but an adventitious, indifferent,\ni.e., disingenuous, sophistical, tortuous mode of thought, which\nis occupied only with groundless distinctions and subterfuges, with\nignominious tricks and evasions. But the more man, by the progress of\ntime, becomes estranged from revelation, the more the understanding\nripens into independence,--the more glaring, necessarily, appears the\ncontradiction between the understanding and belief in revelation. The\nbeliever can then prove revelation only by incurring contradiction\nwith himself, with truth, with the understanding, only by the most\nimpudent assumptions, only by shameless falsehoods, only by the sin\nagainst the Holy Ghost.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII.\n\nTHE CONTRADICTION IN THE NATURE OF GOD IN GENERAL.\n\n\nThe grand principle, the central point of Christian sophistry, is\nthe idea of God. God is the human being, and yet he must be regarded\nas another, a superhuman being. God is universal, abstract Being,\nsimply the idea of Being; and yet he must be conceived as a personal,\nindividual being;--or God is a person, and yet he must be regarded as\nGod, as universal, i.e., not as a personal being. God is; his existence\nis certain, more certain than ours; he has an existence distinct from\nus and from things in general, i.e., an individual existence; and yet\nhis existence must be held a spiritual one, i.e., an existence not\nperceptible as a special one. One half of the definition is always in\ncontradiction with the other half: the statement of what must be held\nalways annihilates the statement of what is. The fundamental idea is\na contradiction which can be concealed only by sophisms. A God who\ndoes not trouble himself about us, who does not hear our prayers,\nwho does not see us and love us, is no God; thus humanity is made\nan essential predicate of God;--but at the same time it is said:\nA God who does not exist in and by himself, out of men, above men,\nas another being, is a phantom; and thus it is made an essential\npredicate of God that he is non-human and extra-human. A God who is\nnot as we are, who has not consciousness, not intelligence, i.e., not\na personal understanding, a personal consciousness (as, for example,\nthe \"substance\" of Spinoza), is no God. Essential identity with us is\nthe chief condition of deity; the idea of deity is made dependent on\nthe idea of personality, of consciousness, quo nihil majus cogitari\npotest. But it is said in the same breath, a God who is not essentially\ndistinguished from us is no God.\n\nThe essence of religion is the immediate, involuntary, unconscious\ncontemplation of the human nature as another, a distinct nature. But\nwhen this projected image of human nature is made an object of\nreflection, of theology, it becomes an inexhaustible mine of\nfalsehoods, illusions, contradictions, and sophisms.\n\nA peculiarly characteristic artifice and pretext of Christian sophistry\nis the doctrine of the unsearchableness, the incomprehensibility\nof the divine nature. But, as will be shown, the secret of this\nincomprehensibility is nothing further than that a known quality\nis made into an unknown one, a natural quality into a supernatural,\ni.e., an unnatural one, so as to produce the appearance, the illusion,\nthat the divine nature is different from the human, and is eo ipso\nan incomprehensible one.\n\nIn the original sense of religion, the incomprehensibility of\nGod has only the significance of an impassioned expression. Thus,\nwhen we are affected by a surprising phenomenon, we exclaim: It\nis incredible, it is beyond conception! though afterwards, when we\nrecover our self-possession, we find the object of our astonishment\nnothing less than incomprehensible. In the truly religious sense,\nincomprehensibility is not the dead full stop which reflection places\nwherever understanding deserts it, but a pathetic note of exclamation\nmarking the impression which the imagination makes on the feelings. The\nimagination is the original organ of religion. Between God and man,\nin the primitive sense of religion, there is on the one hand only a\ndistinction in relation to existence, according to which God, as a\nself-subsistent being, is the antithesis of man as a dependent being;\non the other hand, there is only a quantitative distinction, i.e.,\na distinction derived from the imagination, for the distinctions\nof the imagination are only quantitative. The infinity of God in\nreligion is quantitative infinity; God is and has all that man has,\nbut in an infinitely greater measure. The nature of God is the nature\nof the imagination unfolded, made objective. [169] God is a being\nconceived under the forms of the senses, but freed from the limits\nof sense,--a being at once unlimited and sensational. But what is the\nimagination?--limitless activity of the senses. God is eternal, i.e.,\nhe exists at all times; God is omnipresent, i.e., he exists in all\nplaces; God is the omniscient being, i.e., the being to whom every\nindividual thing, every sensible existence, is an object without\ndistinction, without limitation of time and place.\n\nEternity and omnipresence are sensational qualities, for in them\nthere is no negation of existence in time and space, but only of\nexclusive limitation to a particular time, to a particular place. In\nlike manner omniscience is a sensational quality, a sensational\nknowledge. Religion has no hesitation in attributing to God himself\nthe nobler senses: God sees and hears all things. But the divine\nomniscience is a power of knowing through the senses while yet the\nnecessary quality, the essential determination of actual knowledge\nthrough the senses is denied to it. My senses present sensible\nobjects to me only separately and in succession; but God sees all\nsensible things at once, all locality in an unlocal manner, all\ntemporal things in an untemporal manner, all objects of sense in an\nunsensational manner. [170] That is to say: I extend the horizon of\nmy senses by the imagination; I form to myself a confused conception\nof the whole of things; and this conception, which exalts me above the\nlimited standpoint of the senses, and therefore affects me agreeably,\nI posit as a divine reality. I feel the fact that my knowledge is tied\nto a local standpoint, to sensational experience, as a limitation;\nwhat I feel as a limitation I do away with in my imagination, which\nfurnishes free space for the play of my feelings. This negativing of\nlimits by the imagination is the positing of omniscience as a divine\npower and reality. But at the same time there is only a quantitative\ndistinction between omniscience and my knowledge; the quality of\nthe knowledge is the same. In fact, it would be impossible for me\nto predicate omniscience of an object or being external to myself,\nif this omniscience were essentially different from my own knowledge,\nif it were not a mode of perception of my own, if it had nothing in\ncommon with my own power of cognition. That which is recognised by the\nsenses is as much the object and content of the divine omniscience as\nof my knowledge. Imagination does away only with the limit of quantity,\nnot of quality. The proposition that our knowledge is limited, means:\nwe know only some things, a few things, not all.\n\nThe beneficial influence of religion rests on this extension of the\nsensational consciousness. In religion man is in the open air, sub\ndeo; in the sensational consciousness he is in his narrow confined\ndwelling-house. Religion has relation essentially, originally--and\nonly in its origin is it something holy, true, pure, and good--to the\nimmediate sensational consciousness alone; it is the setting aside of\nthe limits of sense. Isolated, uninstructed men and nations preserve\nreligion in its original sense, because they themselves remain in\nthat mental state which is the source of religion. The more limited\na man's sphere of vision, the less he knows of history, Nature,\nphilosophy--the more ardently does he cling to his religion.\n\nFor this reason the religious man feels no need of culture. Why\nhad the Hebrews no art, no science, as the Greeks had? Because they\nfelt no need of it. To them this need was supplied by Jehovah. In\nthe divine omniscience man raises himself above the limits of his\nown knowledge; [171] in the divine omnipresence, above the limits\nof his local standpoint; in the divine eternity, above the limits\nof his time. The religious man is happy in his imagination; he has\nall things in nuce; his possessions are always portable. Jehovah\naccompanies me everywhere; I need not travel out of myself; I have\nin my God the sum of all treasures and precious things, of all that\nis worth knowledge and remembrance. But culture is dependent on\nexternal things; it has many and various wants, for it overcomes the\nlimits of sensational consciousness and life by real activity, not by\nthe magical power of the religious imagination. Hence the Christian\nreligion also, as has been often mentioned already, has in its essence\nno principle of culture, for it triumphs over the limitations and\ndifficulties of earthly life only through the imagination, only in\nGod, in heaven. God is all that the heart needs and desires--all\ngood things, all blessings. \"Dost thou desire love, or faithfulness,\nor truth, or consolation, or perpetual presence?--this is always in\nhim without measure. Dost thou desire beauty?--he is the supremely\nbeautiful. Dost thou desire riches?--all riches are in him. Dost thou\ndesire power?--he is supremely powerful. Or whatever thy heart desires,\nit is found a thousandfold in Him, in the best, the single good,\nwhich is God.\" [172] But how can he who has all in God, who already\nenjoys heavenly bliss in the imagination, experience that want, that\nsense of poverty, which is the impulse to all culture? Culture has\nno other object than to realise an earthly heaven; and the religious\nheaven is only realised or won by religious activity.\n\nThe difference, however, between God and man, which is originally only\nquantitative, is by reflection developed into a qualitative difference;\nand thus what was originally only an emotional impression, an immediate\nexpression of admiration, of rapture, an influence of the imagination\non the feelings, has fixity given to it as an objective quality, as\nreal incomprehensibility. The favourite expression of reflection in\nrelation to this subject is, that we can indeed know concerning God\nthat he has such and such attributes, but not how he has them. For\nexample, that the predicate of the Creator essentially belongs to God,\nthat he created the world, and not out of matter already existing,\nbut out of nothing, by an act of almighty power,--this is clear,\ncertain--yes, indubitable; but how this is possible naturally passes\nour understanding. That is to say: the generic idea is clear, certain,\nbut the specific idea is unclear, uncertain.\n\nThe idea of activity, of making, of creation, is in itself a divine\nidea; it is therefore unhesitatingly applied to God. In activity, man\nfeels himself free, unlimited, happy; in passivity, limited, oppressed,\nunhappy. Activity is the positive sense of one's personality. That is\npositive which in man is accompanied with joy; hence God is, as we\nhave already said, the idea of pure, unlimited joy. We succeed only\nin what we do willingly; joyful effort conquers all things. But that\nis joyful activity which is in accordance with our nature, which we do\nnot feel as a limitation, and consequently not as a constraint. And the\nhappiest, the most blissful activity is that which is productive. To\nread is delightful, reading is passive activity; but to produce what\nis worthy to be read is more delightful still. It is more blessed to\ngive than to receive. Hence this attribute of the species--productive\nactivity--is assigned to God; that is, realised and made objective\nas divine activity. But every special determination, every mode of\nactivity is abstracted, and only the fundamental determination, which,\nhowever, is essentially human, namely, production of what is external\nto self, is retained. God has not, like man, produced something in\nparticular, this or that, but all things; his activity is absolutely\nuniversal, unlimited. Hence it is self-evident, it is a necessary\nconsequence, that the mode in which God has produced the All is\nincomprehensible, because this activity is no mode of activity,\nbecause the question concerning the how is here an absurdity,\na question which is excluded by the fundamental idea of unlimited\nactivity. Every special activity produces its effects in a special\nmanner, because there the activity itself is a determinate mode of\nactivity; and thence necessarily arises the question: How did it\nproduce this? But the answer to the question: How did God make the\nworld? has necessarily a negative issue, because the world-creating\nactivity in itself negatives every determinate activity, such as would\nalone warrant the question, every mode of activity connected with a\ndeterminate medium, i.e., with matter. This question illegitimately\nfoists in between the subject or producing activity, and the object\nor thing produced, an irrelevant, nay, an excluded intermediate idea,\nnamely, the idea of particular, individual existence. The activity in\nquestion has relation only to the collective--the All, the world; God\ncreated all things, not some particular thing; the indefinite whole,\nthe All, as it is embraced by the imagination,--not the determinate,\nthe particular, as, in its particularity, it presents itself to the\nsenses, and as, in its totality as the universe, it presents itself\nto the reason. Every particular thing arises in a natural way;\nit is something determinate, and as such it has--what it is only\ntautology to state--a determinate cause. It was not God, but carbon\nthat produced the diamond; a given salt owes its origin, not to God,\nbut to the combination of a particular acid with a particular base. God\nonly created all things together without distinction.\n\nIt is true that according to the religious conception, God has created\nevery individual thing, as included in the whole;--but only indirectly;\nfor he has not produced the individual in an individual manner,\nthe determinate in a determinate manner; otherwise he would be a\ndeterminate or conditioned being. It is certainly incomprehensible\nhow out of this general, indeterminate, or unconditioned activity\nthe particular, the determinate, can have proceeded; but it is\nso only because I here intrude the object of sensational, natural\nexperience, because I assign to the divine activity another object\nthan that which is proper to it. Religion has no physical conception\nof the world; it has no interest in a natural explanation, which can\nnever be given but with a mode of origin. Origin is a theoretical,\nnatural-philosophical idea. The heathen philosophers busied themselves\nwith the origin of things. But the Christian religious consciousness\nabhorred this idea as heathen, irreligious, and substituted the\npractical or subjective idea of creation, which is nothing else than\na prohibition to conceive things as having arisen in a natural way,\nan interdict on all physical science. The religious consciousness\nconnects the world immediately with God; it derives all from God,\nbecause nothing is an object to him in its particularity and reality,\nnothing is to him as it presents itself to our reason. All proceeds\nfrom God:--that is enough, that perfectly satisfies the religious\nconsciousness. The question, how did God create? is an indirect doubt\nthat he did create the world. It was this question which brought man\nto atheism, materialism, naturalism. To him who asks it, the world\nis already an object of theory, of physical science, i.e., it is an\nobject to him in its reality, in its determinate constituents. It\nis this mode of viewing the world which contradicts the idea of\nunconditioned, immaterial activity: and this contradiction leads to\nthe negation of the fundamental idea--the creation.\n\nThe creation by omnipotence is in its place, is a truth, only when\nall the phenomena of the world are derived from God. It becomes, as\nhas been already observed, a myth of past ages where physical science\nintroduces itself, where man makes the determinate causes, the how of\nphenomena, the object of investigation. To the religious consciousness,\ntherefore, the creation is nothing incomprehensible, i.e.,\nunsatisfying; at least it is so only in moments of irreligiousness,\nof doubt, when the mind turns away from God to actual things; but it\nis highly unsatisfactory to reflection, to theology, which looks with\none eye at heaven and with the other at earth. As the cause, so is\nthe effect. A flute sends forth the tones of a flute, not those of a\nbassoon or a trumpet. If thou hearest the tones of a bassoon, but hast\nnever before seen or heard any wind-instrument but the flute, it will\ncertainly be inconceivable to thee how such tones can come out of a\nflute. Thus it is here:--the comparison is only so far inappropriate\nas the flute itself is a particular instrument. But imagine, if it\nbe possible, an absolutely universal instrument, which united in\nitself all instruments, without being in itself a particular one;\nthou wilt then see that it is an absurd contradiction to desire a\nparticular tone which only belongs to a particular instrument, from\nan instrument which thou hast divested precisely of that which is\ncharacteristic in all particular instruments.\n\nBut there also lies at the foundation of this dogma of\nincomprehensibility the design of keeping the divine activity apart\nfrom the human, of doing away with their similarity, or rather their\nessential identity, so as to make the divine activity essentially\ndifferent from the human. This distinction between the divine and\nhuman activity is \"nothing.\" God makes,--he makes something external\nto himself, as man does. Making is a genuine human idea. Nature gives\nbirth to, brings forth; man makes. Making is an act which I can omit,\na designed, premeditated, external act;--an act in which my inmost\nbeing is not immediately concerned, in which, while active, I am not\nat the same time passive, carried away by an internal impulse. On\nthe contrary, an activity which is identical with my being is not\nindifferent, is necessary to me, as, for example, intellectual\nproduction, which is an inward necessity to me, and for that reason\nlays a deep hold on me, affects me pathologically. Intellectual\nworks are not made,--making is only the external activity applied\nto them;--they arise in us. To make is an indifferent, therefore a\nfree, i.e., optional activity. Thus far then--that he makes--God is\nentirely at one with man, not at all distinguished from him; but an\nespecial emphasis is laid on this, that his making is free, arbitrary,\nat his pleasure. \"It has pleased God\" to create a world. Thus man\nhere deifies satisfaction in self-pleasing, in caprice and groundless\narbitrariness. The fundamentally human character of the divine activity\nis by the idea of arbitrariness degraded into a human manifestation\nof a low kind; God, from a mirror of human nature, is converted into\na mirror of human vanity and self-complacency.\n\nAnd now all at once the harmony is changed into discord; man, hitherto\nat one with himself, becomes divided:--God makes out of nothing;\nhe creates,--to make out of nothing is to create,--this is the\ndistinction. The positive condition--the act of making--is a human\none; but inasmuch as all that is determinate in this conception is\nimmediately denied, reflection steps in and makes the divine activity\nnot human. But with this negation, comprehension, understanding\ncomes to a stand; there remains only a negative, empty notion,\nbecause conceivability is already exhausted, i.e., the distinction\nbetween the divine and human determination is in truth a nothing,\na nihil negativum of the understanding. The na\u00efve confession of this\nis made in the supposition of \"nothing\" as an object.\n\nGod is Love, but not human love; Understanding, but not human\nunderstanding,--no! an essentially different understanding. But wherein\nconsists this difference? I cannot conceive an understanding which\nacts under other forms than those of our own understanding; I cannot\nhalve or quarter understanding so as to have several understandings;\nI can only conceive one and the same understanding. It is true that\nI can and even must conceive understanding in itself, i.e., free from\nthe limits of my individuality; but in so doing I only release it from\nlimitations essentially foreign to it; I do not set aside its essential\ndeterminations or forms. Religious reflection, on the contrary,\ndenies precisely that determination or quality which makes a thing\nwhat it is. Only that in which the divine understanding is identical\nwith the human is something, is understanding, is a real idea; while\nthat which is supposed to make it another--yes, essentially another\nthan the human--is objectively nothing, subjectively a mere chimera.\n\nIn all other definitions of the Divine Being the \"nothing\" which\nconstitutes the distinction is hidden; in the creation, on the\ncontrary, it is an evident, declared, objective nothing;--and is\ntherefore the official, notorious nothing of theology in distinction\nfrom anthropology.\n\nBut the fundamental determination by which man makes his own nature\na foreign, incomprehensible nature is the idea of individuality\nor--what is only a more abstract expression--personality. The\nidea of the existence of God first realises itself in the idea of\nrevelation, and the idea of revelation first realises itself in\nthe idea of personality. God is a personal being:--this is the\nspell which charms the ideal into the real, the subjective into\nthe objective. All predicates, all attributes of the Divine Being\nare fundamentally human; but as attributes of a personal being, and\ntherefore of a being distinct from man and existing independently,\nthey appear immediately to be really other than human, yet so as\nthat at the same time the essential identity always remains at the\nfoundation. Hence reflection gives rise to the idea of so-called\nanthropomorphisms. Anthropomorphisms are resemblances between God\nand man. The attributes of the divine and of the human being are not\nindeed the same, but they are analogous.\n\nThus personality is the antidote to pantheism; i.e., by the idea of\npersonality religious reflection expels from its thought the identity\nof the divine and human nature. The rude but characteristic expression\nof pantheism is: Man is an effluence or a portion of the Divine Being;\nthe religious expression is: Man is the image of God, or a being akin\nto God;--for according to religion man does not spring from Nature, but\nis of divine race, of divine origin. But kinship is a vague, evasive\nexpression. There are degrees of kinship, near and distant. What sort\nof kinship is intended? For the relation of man to God there is but\none form of kinship which is appropriate,--the nearest, profoundest,\nmost sacred that can be conceived,--the relation of the child to the\nfather. According to this, God is the father of man, man the son, the\nchild of God. Here is posited at once the self-subsistence of God and\nthe dependence of man, and posited as an immediate object of feeling;\nwhereas in pantheism the part appears just as self-subsistent as the\nwhole, since this is represented as made up of its parts. Nevertheless\nthis distinction is only an appearance. The father is not a father\nwithout the child; both together form a correlated being. In love\nman renounces his independence, and reduces himself to a part; a\nself-humiliation which is only compensated by the fact that the one\nwhom he loves at the same time voluntarily becomes a part also; that\nthey both submit to a higher power, the power of the spirit of family,\nthe power of love. Thus there is here the same relation between God\nand man as in pantheism, save that in the one it is represented as\na personal, patriarchal relation, in the other as an impersonal,\ngeneral one,--save that pantheism expresses logically and therefore\ndefinitely, directly, what religion invests with the imagination. The\ncorrelation, or rather the identity of God and man is veiled in\nreligion by representing both as persons or individuals, and God as\na self-subsistent, independent being apart from his paternity:--an\nindependence which, however, is only apparent, for he who, like the\nGod of religion, is a father from the depths of the heart, has his\nvery life and being in his child.\n\nThe reciprocal and profound relation of dependence between God as\nfather and man as child cannot be shaken by the distinction that\nonly Christ is the true, natural son of God, and that men are but his\nadopted sons; so that it is only to Christ as the only-begotten Son,\nand by no means to men, that God stands in an essential relation\nof dependence. For this distinction is only a theological, i.e., an\nillusory one. God adopts only men, not brutes. The ground of adoption\nlies in the human nature. The man adopted by divine grace is only\nthe man conscious of his divine nature and dignity. Moreover, the\nonly-begotten Son himself is nothing else than the idea of humanity,\nthan man preoccupied with himself, man hiding from himself and the\nworld in God,--the heavenly man. The Logos is latent, tacit man;\nman is the revealed, expressed Logos. The Logos is only the prelude\nof man. That which applies to the Logos applies also to the nature\nof man. [173] But between God and the only-begotten Son there is no\nreal distinction,--he who knows the Son knows the Father also,--and\nthus there is none between God and man.\n\nIt is the same with the idea that man is the image of God. The\nimage is here no dead, inanimate thing, but a living being. \"Man is\nthe image of God,\" means nothing more than that man is a being who\nresembles God. Similarity between living beings rests on natural\nrelationship. The idea of man being the image of God reduces itself\ntherefore to kinship; man is like God, because he is the child of\nGod. Resemblance is only kinship presented to the senses; from the\nformer we infer the latter.\n\nBut resemblance is just as deceptive, illusory, evasive an idea as\nkinship. It is only the idea of personality which does away with the\nidentity of nature. Resemblance is identity which will not admit\nitself to be identity, which hides itself behind a dim medium,\nbehind the vapour of the imagination. If I disperse this vapour,\nI come to naked identity. The more similar beings are, the less are\nthey to to be distinguished; if I know the one, I know the other. It\nis true that resemblance has its degrees. But also the resemblance\nbetween God and man has its degrees. The good, pious man is more\nlike God than the man whose resemblance to Him is founded only on\nthe nature of man in general. And even with the pious man there is a\nhighest degree of resemblance to be supposed, though this may not be\nobtained here below, but only in the future life. But that which man\nis to become belongs already to him, at least so far as possibility is\nconcerned. The highest degree of resemblance is that where there is no\nfurther distinction between two individuals or beings than that they\nare two. The essential qualities, those by which we distinguish things\nfrom each other, are the same in both. Hence I cannot distinguish them\nin thought, by the reason,--for this all data are wanting;--I can\nonly distinguish them by figuring them as visible in my imagination\nor by actually seeing them. If my eyes do not say, There are really\ntwo separately existent beings, my reason will take both for one\nand the same being. Nay, even my eyes may confound the one with the\nother. Things are capable of being confounded with each other which\nare distinguishable by the sense and not by the reason, or rather\nwhich are different only as to existence, not as to essence. Persons\naltogether alike have an extraordinary attraction not only for each\nother, but for the imagination. Resemblance gives occasion to all\nkinds of mystifications and illusions, because it is itself only an\nillusion; my eyes mock my reason, for which the idea of an independent\nexistence is always allied to the idea of a determinate difference.\n\nReligion is the mind's light, the rays of which are broken by the\nmedium of the imagination and the feelings, so as to make the same\nbeing appear a double one. Resemblance is to the Reason identity,\nwhich in the realm of reality is divided or broken up by immediate\nsensational impressions, in the sphere of religion by the illusions\nof the imagination; in short, that which is identical to the reason\nis made separate by the idea of individuality or personality. I can\ndiscover no distinction between father and child, archetype and image,\nGod and man, if I do not introduce the idea of personality. Resemblance\nis here the external guise of identity;--the identity which reason,\nthe sense of truth, affirms, but which the imagination denies; the\nidentity which allows an appearance of distinction to remain,--a mere\nphantasm, which says neither directly yes, nor directly no.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII.\n\nTHE CONTRADICTION IN THE SPECULATIVE DOCTRINE OF GOD.\n\n\nThe personality of God is thus the means by which man converts the\nqualities of his own nature into the qualities of another being,--of\na being external to himself. The personality of God is nothing else\nthan the projected personality of man.\n\nOn this process of projecting self outwards rests also the Hegelian\nspeculative doctrine, according to which man's consciousness of\nGod is the self-consciousness of God. God is thought, cognised by\nus. According to speculation, God, in being thought by us, thinks\nhimself or is conscious of himself; speculation identifies the two\nsides which religion separates. In this it is far deeper than religion,\nfor the fact of God being thought is not like the fact of an external\nobject being thought. God is an inward, spiritual being; thinking,\nconsciousness, is an inward, spiritual act; to think God is therefore\nto affirm what God is, to establish the being of God as an act. That\nGod is thought, cognised, is essential; that this tree is thought, is\nto the tree accidental, unessential. God is an indispensable thought,\na necessity of thought. But how is it possible that this necessity\nshould simply express the subjective, and not the objective also?--how\nis it possible that God--if he is to exist for us, to be an object to\nus--must necessarily be thought, if he is in himself like a block,\nindifferent whether he be thought, cognised or not? No! it is not\npossible. We are necessitated to regard the fact of God being thought\nby us, as his thinking himself, or his self-consciousness.\n\nReligious objectivism has two passives, two modes in which God\nis thought. On the one hand, God is thought by us, on the other,\nhe is thought by himself. God thinks himself, independently of his\nbeing thought by us: he has a self-consciousness distinct from,\nindependent of, our consciousness. This is certainly consistent\nwhen once God is conceived as a real personality; for the real human\nperson thinks himself, and is thought by another; my thinking of him\nis to him an indifferent, external fact. This is the last degree of\nanthropopathism. In order to make God free and independent of all that\nis human, he is regarded as a formal, real person, his thinking is\nconfined within himself, and the fact of his being thought is excluded\nfrom him, and is represented as occurring in another being. This\nindifference or independence with respect to us, to our thought,\nis the attestation of a self-subsistent, i.e., external, personal\nexistence. It is true that religion also makes the fact of God being\nthought into the self-thinking of God; but because this process goes\nforward behind its consciousness, since God is immediately presupposed\nas a self-existent personal being, the religious consciousness only\nembraces the indifference of the two facts.\n\nEven religion, however, does not abide by this indifference of the\ntwo sides. God creates in order to reveal himself: creation is the\nrevelation of God. But for stones, plants, and animals there is no\nGod, but only for man; so that Nature exists for the sake of man,\nand man purely for the sake of God. God glorifies himself in man:\nman is the pride of God. God indeed knows himself even without man;\nbut so long as there is no other me, so long is he only a possible,\nconceptional person. First when a difference from God, a non-divine\nis posited, is God conscious of himself; first when he knows what\nis not God, does he know what it is to be God, does he know the\nbliss of his Godhead. First in the positing of what is other than\nhimself, of the world, does God posit himself as God. Is God almighty\nwithout creation? No! Omnipotence first realises, proves itself in\ncreation. What is a power, a property, which does not exhibit, attest\nitself? What is a force which affects nothing? a light that does not\nilluminate? a wisdom which knows nothing, i.e., nothing real? And what\nis omnipotence, what all other divine attributes, if man does not\nexist? Man is nothing without God; but also, God is nothing without\nman; [174] for only in man is God an object as God; only in man is\nhe God. The various qualities of man first give difference, which\nis the ground of reality in God. The physical qualities of man make\nGod a physical being--God the Father, who is the creator of Nature,\ni.e., the personified, anthropomorphised essence of Nature; [175]\nthe intellectual qualities of man make God an intellectual being, the\nmoral, a moral being. Human misery is the triumph of divine compassion;\nsorrow for sin is the delight of the divine holiness. Life, fire,\nemotion comes into God only through man. With the stubborn sinner\nGod is angry; over the repentant sinner he rejoices. Man is the\nrevealed God: in man the divine essence first realises and unfolds\nitself. In the creation of Nature God goes out of himself, he has\nrelation to what is other than himself, but in man he returns into\nhimself:--man knows God, because in him God finds and knows himself,\nfeels himself as God. Where there is no pressure, no want, there is no\nfeeling;--and feeling is alone real knowledge. Who can know compassion\nwithout having felt the want of it? justice without the experience\nof injustice? happiness without the experience of distress? Thou\nmust feel what a thing is; otherwise thou wilt never learn to know\nit. It is in man that the divine properties first become feelings,\ni.e., man is the self-feeling of God;--and the feeling of God is the\nreal God; for the qualities of God are indeed only real qualities,\nrealities, as felt by man,--as feelings. If the experience of human\nmisery were outside of God, in a being personally separate from him,\ncompassion also would not be in God, and we should hence have again\nthe Being destitute of qualities, or more correctly the nothing, which\nGod was before man or without man. For example:--Whether I be a good\nor sympathetic being--for that alone is good which gives, imparts\nitself, bonum est communicativum sui,--is unknown to me before the\nopportunity presents itself of showing goodness to another being. Only\nin the act of imparting do I experience the happiness of beneficence,\nthe joy of generosity, of liberality. But is this joy apart from\nthe joy of the recipient? No; I rejoice because he rejoices. I feel\nthe wretchedness of another, I suffer with him; in alleviating his\nwretchedness, I alleviate my own;--sympathy with suffering is itself\nsuffering. The joyful feeling of the giver is only the reflex,\nthe self-consciousness of the joy in the receiver. Their joy is a\ncommon feeling, which accordingly makes itself visible in the union\nof hands, of lips. So it is here. Just as the feeling of human misery\nis human, so the feeling of divine compassion is human. It is only\na sense of the poverty of finiteness that gives a sense of the bliss\nof infiniteness. Where the one is not, the other is not. The two are\ninseparable,--inseparable the feeling of God as God, and the feeling\nof man as man, inseparable the knowledge of man and the self-knowledge\nof God. God is a Self only in the human self,--only in the human power\nof discrimination, in the principle of difference that lies in the\nhuman being. Thus compassion is only felt as a me, a self, a force,\ni.e., as something special, through its opposite. The opposite of God\ngives qualities to God, realises him, makes him a Self. God is God,\nonly through that which is not God. Herein we have also the mystery\nof Jacob B\u00f6hme's doctrine. It must only be borne in mind that Jacob\nB\u00f6hme, as a mystic and theologian, places outside of man the feelings\nin which the divine being first realises himself, passes from nothing\nto something, to a qualitative being apart from the feelings of man\n(at least in imagination),--and that he makes them objective in the\nform of natural qualities, but in such a way that these qualities still\nonly represent the impressions made on his feelings. It will then be\nobvious that what the empirical religious consciousness first posits\nwith the real creation of Nature and of man, the mystical consciousness\nplaces before the creation in the premundane God, in doing which,\nhowever, it does away with the reality of the creation. For if God\nhas what is not-God, already in himself, he has no need first to\ncreate what is not-God in order to be God. The creation of the world\nis here a pure superfluity, or rather an impossibility; this God\nfor very reality does not come to reality; he is already in himself\nthe full and restless world. This is especially true of Schelling's\ndoctrine of God, who though made up of innumerable \"potences\" is yet\nthoroughly impotent. Far more reasonable, therefore, is the empirical\nreligious consciousness, which makes God reveal, i.e., realise himself\nin real man, real nature, and according to which man is created purely\nfor the praise and glory of God. That is to say, man is the mouth of\nGod, which articulates and accentuates the divine qualities as human\nfeelings. God wills that he be honoured, praised. Why? because the\npassion of man for God is the self-consciousness of God. Nevertheless,\nthe religious consciousness separates these two properly inseparable\nsides, since by means of the idea of personality it makes God and\nman independent existences. Now the Hegelian speculation identifies\nthe two sides, but so as to leave the old contradiction still at\nthe foundation;--it is therefore only the consistent carrying out,\nthe completion of a religious truth. The learned mob was so blind\nin its hatred towards Hegel as not to perceive that his doctrine, at\nleast in this relation, does not in fact contradict religion;--that\nit contradicts it only in the same way as, in general, a developed,\nconsequent process of thought contradicts an undeveloped, inconsequent,\nbut nevertheless radically identical conception.\n\nBut if it is only in human feelings and wants that the divine\n\"nothing\" becomes something, obtains qualities, then the being\nof man is alone the real being of God,--man is the real God. And\nif in the consciousness which man has of God first arises the\nself-consciousness of God, then the human consciousness is, per\nse, the divine consciousness. Why then dost thou alienate man's\nconsciousness from him, and make it the self-consciousness of a being\ndistinct from man, of that which is an object to him? Why dost thou\nvindicate existence to God, to man only the consciousness of that\nexistence? God has his consciousness in man, and man his being in\nGod? Man's knowledge of God is God's knowledge of himself? What\na divorcing and contradiction! The true statement is this: man's\nknowledge of God is man's knowledge of himself, of his own nature. Only\nthe unity of being and consciousness is truth. Where the consciousness\nof God is, there is the being of God,--in man, therefore; in the being\nof God it is only thy own being which is an object to thee, and what\npresents itself before thy consciousness is simply what lies behind\nit. If the divine qualities are human, the human qualities are divine.\n\nOnly when we abandon a philosophy of religion, or a theology, which is\ndistinct from psychology and anthropology, and recognise anthropology\nas itself theology, do we attain to a true, self-satisfying identity\nof the divine and human being, the identity of the human being with\nitself. In every theory of the identity of the divine and human\nwhich is not true identity, unity of the human nature with itself,\nthere still lies at the foundation a division, a separation into two,\nsince the identity is immediately abolished, or rather is supposed\nto be abolished. Every theory of this kind is in contradiction with\nitself and with the understanding,--is a half measure--a thing of\nthe imagination--a perversion, a distortion; which, however, the more\nperverted and false it is, all the more appears to be profound.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIV.\n\nTHE CONTRADICTION IN THE TRINITY.\n\n\nReligion gives reality or objectivity not only to the human or divine\nnature in general as a personal being; it further gives reality to\nthe fundamental determinations or fundamental distinctions of that\nnature as persons. The Trinity is therefore originally nothing else\nthan the sum of the essential fundamental distinctions which man\nperceives in the human nature. According as the mode of conceiving\nthis nature varies, so also the fundamental determinations on which\nthe Trinity is founded vary. But these distinctions, perceived in one\nand the same human nature, are hypostasised as substances, as divine\npersons. And herein, namely, that these different determinations\nare in God, hypostases, subjects, is supposed to lie the distinction\nbetween these determinations as they are in God, and as they exist\nin man,--in accordance with the law already enunciated, that only\nin the idea of personality does the human personality transfer and\nmake objective its own qualities. But the personality exists only in\nthe imagination; the fundamental determinations are therefore only\nfor the imagination hypostases, persons; for reason, for thought,\nthey are mere relations or determinations. The idea of the Trinity\ncontains in itself the contradiction of polytheism and monotheism,\nof imagination and reason, of fiction and reality. Imagination gives\nthe Trinity, reason the Unity of the persons. According to reason, the\nthings distinguished are only distinctions; according to imagination,\nthe distinctions are things distinguished, which therefore do away\nwith the unity of the divine being. To the reason, the divine persons\nare phantoms, to the imagination realities. The idea of the Trinity\ndemands that man should think the opposite of what he imagines,\nand imagine the opposite of what he thinks,--that he should think\nphantoms realities. [176]\n\nThere are three Persons, but they are not essentially\ndistinguished. Tres person\u00e6, but una essentia. So far the conception is\na natural one. We can conceive three and even more persons, identical\nin essence. Thus we men are distinguished from one another by personal\ndifferences, but in the main, in essence, in humanity we are one. And\nthis identification is made not only by the speculative understanding,\nbut even by feeling. A given individual is a man as we are; punctum\nsatis; in this feeling all distinctions vanish,--whether he be\nrich or poor, clever or stupid, culpable or innocent. The feeling\nof compassion, sympathy, is therefore a substantial, essential,\nspeculative feeling. But the three or more human persons exist apart\nfrom each other, have a separate existence, even when they verify\nand confirm the unity of their nature by fervent love. They together\nconstitute, through love, a single moral personality, but each has\na physical existence for himself. Though they may be reciprocally\nabsorbed in each other, may be unable to dispense with each other,\nthey have yet always a formally independent existence. Independent\nexistence, existence apart from others, is the essential characteristic\nof a person, of a substance. It is otherwise in God, and necessarily\nso; for while his personality is the same as that of man, it is\nheld to be the same with a difference, on the ground simply of this\npostulate: there must be a difference. The three Persons in God have\nno existence out of each other; else there would meet us in the heaven\nof Christian dogmatics, not indeed many gods, as in Olympus, but at\nleast three divine Persons in an individual form, three Gods. The gods\nof Olympus were real persons, for they existed apart from each other,\nthey had the criterion of real personality in their individuality,\nthough they were one in essence, in divinity; they had different\npersonal attributes, but were each singly a god, alike in divinity,\ndifferent as existing subjects or persons; they were genuine\ndivine personalities. The three Persons of the Christian Godhead,\non the contrary, are only imaginary, pretended persons, assuredly\ndifferent from real persons, just because they are only phantasms,\nshadows of personalities, while, notwithstanding, they are assumed to\nbe real persons. The essential characteristic of personal reality,\nthe polytheistic element, is excluded, denied as non-divine. But by\nthis negation their personality becomes a mere phantasm. Only in the\ntruth of the plural lies the truth of the Persons. The three persons\nof the Christian Godhead are not tres Dii, three Gods;--at least they\nare not meant to be such;--but unus Deus, one God. The three Persons\nend, not, as might have been expected, in a plural, but in a singular;\nthey are not only Unum--the gods of Olympus are that--but Unus. Unity\nhas here the significance not of essence only, but also of existence;\nunity is the existential form of God. Three are one: the plural is\na singular. God is a personal being consisting of three persons. [177]\n\nThe three persons are thus only phantoms in the eyes of reason, for\nthe conditions or modes under which alone their personality could\nbe realised, are done away with by the command of monotheism. The\nunity gives the lie to the personality; the self-subsistence of the\npersons is annihilated in the self-subsistence of the unity--they\nare mere relations. The Son is not without the Father, the Father\nnot without the Son: the Holy Spirit, who indeed spoils the symmetry,\nexpresses nothing but the relation of the two to each other. But the\ndivine persons are distinguished from each other only by that which\nconstitutes their relation to each other. The essential in the Father\nas a person is that he is a Father, of the Son that he is a Son. What\nthe Father is over and above his fatherhood, does not belong to his\npersonality; therein he is God, and as God identical with the Son as\nGod. Therefore it is said: God the Father, God the Son, and God the\nHoly Ghost:--God is in all three alike. \"There is one person of the\nFather, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost. But the\nGodhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all\none;\" i.e., they are distinct persons, but without distinction of\nsubstance. The personality, therefore, arises purely in the relation\nof the Fatherhood; i.e., the idea of the person is here only a\nrelative idea, the idea of a relation. Man as a father is dependent,\nhe is essentially the correlative of the son; he is not a father\nwithout the son; by fatherhood man reduces himself to a relative,\ndependent, impersonal being. It is before all things necessary not\nto allow oneself to be deceived by these relations as they exist in\nreality, in men. The human father is, over and above his paternity,\nan independent personal being; he has at least a formal existence for\nhimself, an existence apart from his son; he is not merely a father,\nwith the exclusion of all the other predicates of a real personal\nbeing. Fatherhood is a relation which the bad man can make quite an\nexternal one, not touching his personal being. But in God the Father,\nthere is no distinction between God the Father and God the Son as\nGod; the abstract fatherhood alone constitutes his personality, his\ndistinction from the Son, whose personality likewise is founded only\non the abstract sonship.\n\nBut at the same time these relations, as has been said, are maintained\nto be not mere relations, but real persons, beings, substances. Thus\nthe truth of the plural, the truth of polytheism is again affirmed,\n[178] and the truth of monotheism is denied. To require the reality of\nthe persons is to require the unreality of the unity, and conversely,\nto require the reality of the unity is to require the unreality of the\npersons. Thus in the holy mystery of the Trinity,--that is to say,\nso far as it is supposed to represent a truth distinct from human\nnature,--all resolves itself into delusions, phantasms, contradictions,\nand sophisms. [179]\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXV.\n\nTHE CONTRADICTION IN THE SACRAMENTS.\n\n\nAs the objective essence of religion, the idea of God, resolves itself\ninto mere contradictions, so also, on grounds easily understood,\ndoes its subjective essence.\n\nThe subjective elements of religion are on the one hand Faith and Love;\non the other hand, so far as it presents itself externally in a cultus,\nthe sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper. The sacrament of Faith\nis Baptism, the sacrament of Love is the Lord's Supper. In strictness\nthere are only two sacraments, as there are two subjective elements\nin religion, Faith and Love: for Hope is only faith in relation to\nthe future; so that there is the same logical impropriety in making\nit a distinct mental act as in making the Holy Ghost a distinct being.\n\nThe identity of the sacraments with the specific essence of religion as\nhitherto developed is at once made evident, apart from other relations,\nby the fact that they have for their basis natural materials or\nthings, to which, however, is attributed a significance and effect\nin contradiction with their nature. Thus the material of baptism\nis water, common, natural water, just as the material of religion\nin general is common, natural humanity. But as religion alienates\nour own nature from us, and represents it as not ours, so the water\nof baptism is regarded as quite other than common water; for it has\nnot a physical but a hyperphysical power and significance; it is the\nLavacrum regenerationis, it purifies man from the stains of original\nsin, expels the inborn devil, and reconciles with God. Thus it is\nnatural water only in appearance; in truth it is supernatural. In\nother words: the baptismal water has supernatural effects (and that\nwhich operates supernaturally is itself supernatural) only in idea,\nonly in the imagination.\n\nAnd yet the material of Baptism is said to be natural water. Baptism\nhas no validity and efficacy if it is not performed with\nwater. Thus the natural quality of water has in itself value and\nsignificance, since the supernatural effect of baptism is associated\nin a supernatural manner with water only, and not with any other\nmaterial. God, by means of his omnipotence, could have united the same\neffect to anything whatever. But he does not; he accommodates himself\nto natural qualities; he chooses an element corresponding, analogous\nto his operation. Thus the natural is not altogether set aside; on the\ncontrary, there always remains a certain analogy with the natural, an\nappearance of naturalness. In like manner wine represents blood; bread,\nflesh. [180] Even miracle is guided by analogies; water is changed into\nwine or blood, one species into another, with the retention of the\nindeterminate generic idea of liquidity. So it is here. Water is the\npurest, clearest of liquids; in virtue of this its natural character\nit is the image of the spotless nature of the Divine Spirit. In short,\nwater has a significance in itself, as water; it is on account of its\nnatural quality that it is consecrated and selected as the vehicle\nof the Holy Spirit. So far there lies at the foundation of Baptism a\nbeautiful, profound natural significance. But, at the very same time,\nthis beautiful meaning is lost again because water has a transcendental\neffect,--an effect which it has only through the supernatural power of\nthe Holy Spirit, and not through itself. The natural quality becomes\nindifferent: he who makes wine out of water, can at will unite the\neffects of baptismal water with any material whatsoever.\n\nBaptism cannot be understood without the idea of miracle. Baptism\nis itself a miracle. The same power which works miracles, and by\nmeans of them, as a proof of the divinity of Christ, turns Jews and\nPagans into Christians,--this same power has instituted baptism and\noperates in it. Christianity began with miracles, and it carries\nitself forward with miracles. If the miraculous power of baptism\nis denied, miracles in general must be denied. The miracle-working\nwater of baptism springs from the same source as the water which at\nthe wedding at Cana in Galilee was turned into wine.\n\nThe faith which is produced by miracle is not dependent on me, on\nmy spontaneity, on freedom of judgment and conviction. A miracle\nwhich happens before my eyes I must believe, if I am not utterly\nobdurate. Miracle compels me to believe in the divinity of the\nmiracle-worker. [181] It is true that in some cases it presupposes\nfaith, namely, where it appears in the light of a reward; but\nwith that exception it presupposes not so much actual faith as a\nbelieving disposition, willingness, submission, in opposition to an\nunbelieving, obdurate, and malignant disposition, like that of the\nPharisees. The end of miracle is to prove that the miracle-worker\nis really that which he assumes to be. Faith based on miracle is the\nonly thoroughly warranted, well-grounded, objective faith. The faith\nwhich is presupposed by miracle is only faith in a Messiah, a Christ\nin general; but the faith that this very man is Christ--and this is\nthe main point--is first wrought by miracle as its consequence. This\npresupposition even of an indeterminate faith is, however, by no\nmeans necessary. Multitudes first became believers through miracles;\nthus miracle was the cause of their faith. If then miracles do not\ncontradict Christianity,--and how should they contradict it?--neither\ndoes the miraculous efficacy of baptism contradict it. On the\ncontrary, if baptism is to have a Christian significance it must\nof necessity have a supernaturalistic one. Paul was converted by a\nsudden miraculous appearance, when he was still full of hatred to\nthe Christians. Christianity took him by violence. It is in vain to\nallege that with another than Paul this appearance would not have\nhad the same consequences, and that therefore the effect of it must\nstill be attributed to Paul. For if the same appearance had been\nvouchsafed to others, they would assuredly have become as thoroughly\nChristian as Paul. Is not divine grace omnipotent? The unbelief\nand non-convertibility of the Pharisees is no counter-argument;\nfor from them grace was expressly withdrawn. The Messiah must\nnecessarily, according to a divine decree, be betrayed, maltreated\nand crucified. For this purpose there must be individuals who should\nmaltreat and crucify him: and hence it was a prior necessity that\nthe divine grace should be withdrawn from those individuals. It\nwas not indeed totally withdrawn from them, but this was only in\norder to aggravate their guilt, and by no means with the earnest\nwill to convert them. How would it be possible to resist the will\nof God, supposing of course that it was his real will, not a mere\nvelleity? Paul himself represents his conversion as a work of divine\ngrace thoroughly unmerited on his part; [182] and quite correctly. Not\nto resist divine grace, i.e., to accept divine grace, to allow it\nto work upon one, is already something good, and consequently is an\neffect of the Holy Spirit. Nothing is more perverse than the attempt\nto reconcile miracle with freedom of inquiry and thought, or grace\nwith freedom of will. In religion the nature of man is regarded as\nseparate from man. The activity, the grace of God is the projected\nspontaneity of man, Free Will made objective. [183]\n\nIt is the most flagrant inconsequence to adduce the experience that\nmen are not sanctified, not converted by baptism, as an argument\nagainst its miraculous efficacy, as is done by rationalistic orthodox\ntheologians; [184] for all kinds of miracles, the objective power\nof prayer, and in general all the supernatural truths of religion,\nalso contradict experience. He who appeals to experience renounces\nfaith. Where experience is a datum, there religious faith and feeling\nhave already vanished. The unbeliever denies the objective efficacy\nof prayer only because it contradicts experience; the atheist goes\nyet further,--he denies even the existence of God, because he does\nnot find it in experience. Inward experience creates no difficulty\nto him; for what thou experiencest in thyself of another existence,\nproves only that there is something in thee which thou thyself art\nnot, which works upon thee independently of thy personal will and\nconsciousness, without thy knowing what this mysterious something\nis. But faith is stronger than experience. The facts which contradict\nfaith do not disturb it; it is happy in itself; it has eyes only for\nitself, to all else it is blind.\n\nIt is true that religion, even on the standpoint of its mystical\nmaterialism, always requires the co-operation of subjectivity, and\ntherefore requires it in the sacraments; but herein is exhibited its\ncontradiction with itself. And this contradiction is particularly\nglaring in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper; for baptism is given\nto infants,--though even in them, as a condition of its efficacy, the\nco-operation of subjectivity is insisted on, but, singularly enough,\nis supplied in the faith of others, in the faith of the parents,\nor of their representatives, or of the church in general. [185]\n\nThe object in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper is the body of\nChrist,--a real body; but the necessary predicates of reality are\nwanting to it. Here we have again, in an example presented to the\nsenses, what we have found in the nature of religion in general. The\nobject or subject in the religious syntax is always a real human or\nnatural subject or predicate; but the closer definition, the essential\npredicate of this predicate is denied. The subject is sensuous,\nbut the predicate is not sensuous, i.e., is contradictory to the\nsubject. I distinguish a real body from an imaginary one only by this,\nthat the former produces corporeal effects, involuntary effects, upon\nme. If therefore the bread be the real body of God, the partaking of\nit must produce in me immediate, involuntary sanctifying effects;\nI need to make no special preparation, to bring with me no holy\ndisposition. If I eat an apple, the apple of itself gives rise to\nthe taste of apple. At the utmost I need nothing more than a healthy\nstomach to perceive that the apple is an apple. The Catholics require\na state of fasting as a condition of partaking the Lord's Supper. This\nis enough. I take hold of the body with my lips, I crush it with my\nteeth, by my oesophagus it is carried into my stomach; I assimilate\nit corporeally, not spiritually. [186] Why are its effects not held\nto be corporeal? Why should not this body, which is a corporeal,\nbut at the same time heavenly, supernatural substance, also bring\nforth in me corporeal and yet at the same time holy, supernatural\neffects? If it is my disposition, my faith, which alone makes the\ndivine body a means of sanctification to me, which transubstantiates\nthe dry bread into pneumatic animal substance, why do I still need an\nexternal object? It is I myself who give rise to the effect of the\nbody on me, and therefore to the reality of the body; I am acted on\nby myself. Where is the objective truth and power? He who partakes\nthe Lord's Supper unworthily has nothing further than the physical\nenjoyment of bread and wine. He who brings nothing, takes nothing\naway. The specific difference of this bread from common natural bread\nrests therefore only on the difference between the state of mind at\nthe table of the Lord, and the state of mind at any other table. \"He\nthat eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation\nto himself, not discerning the Lord's body.\" [187] But this mental\nstate itself is dependent only on the significance which I give to\nthis bread. If it has for me the significance not of bread, but of\nthe body of Christ, then it has not the effect of common bread. In\nthe significance attached to it lies its effect. I do not eat to\nsatisfy hunger; hence I consume only a small quantity. Thus to go no\nfurther than the quantity taken, which in every other act of taking\nfood plays an essential part, the significance of common bread is\nexternally set aside.\n\nBut this supernatural significance exists only in the imagination;\nto the senses, the wine remains wine, the bread, bread. The Schoolmen\ntherefore had recourse to the precious distinction of substance and\naccidents. All the accidents which constitute the nature of wine and\nbread are still there; only that which is made up by these accidents,\nthe subject, the substance, is wanting, is changed into flesh and\nblood. But all the properties together, whose combination forms this\nunity, are the substance itself. What are wine and bread if I take\nfrom them the properties which make them what they are? Nothing. Flesh\nand blood have therefore no objective existence; otherwise they must\nbe an object to the unbelieving senses. On the contrary: the only\nvalid witnesses of an objective existence--taste, smell, touch,\nsight--testify unanimously to the reality of the wine and bread,\nand nothing else. The wine and bread are in reality natural, but in\nimagination divine substances.\n\nFaith is the power of the imagination, which makes the real unreal,\nand the unreal real: in direct contradiction with the truth of the\nsenses, with the truth of reason. Faith denies what objective reason\naffirms, and affirms what it denies. [188] The mystery of the Lord's\nSupper is the mystery of faith: [189]--hence the partaking of it is the\nhighest, the most rapturous, blissful act of the believing soul. The\nnegation of objective truth which is not gratifying to feeling,\nthe truth of reality, of the objective world and reason,--a negation\nwhich constitutes the essence of faith,--reaches its highest point\nin the Lord's Supper; for faith here denies an immediately present,\nevident, indubitable object, maintaining that it is not what the reason\nand senses declare it to be, that it is only in appearance bread,\nbut in reality flesh. The position of the Schoolmen, that according\nto the accidents it is bread, and according to the substance flesh,\nis merely the abstract, explanatory, intellectual expression of what\nfaith accepts and declares, and has therefore no other meaning than\nthis: to the senses or to common perception it is bread, but in truth,\nflesh. Where therefore the imaginative tendency of faith has assumed\nsuch power over the senses and reason as to deny the most evident\nsensible truths, it is no wonder if believers can raise themselves\nto such a degree of exaltation as actually to see blood instead of\nwine. Such examples Catholicism has to show. Little is wanting in order\nto perceive externally what faith and imagination hold to be real.\n\nSo long as faith in the mystery of the Lord's Supper as a holy, nay\nthe holiest, highest truth, governed man, so long was his governing\nprinciple the imagination. All criteria of reality and unreality, of\nunreason and reason, had disappeared: anything whatever that could\nbe imagined passed for real possibility. Religion hallowed every\ncontradiction of reason, of the nature of things. Do not ridicule the\nabsurd questions of the Schoolmen! They were necessary consequences\nof faith. That which is only a matter of feeling had to be made a\nmatter of reason, that which contradicts the understanding had to be\nmade not to contradict it. This was the fundamental contradiction of\nScholasticism, whence all other contradictions followed of course.\n\nAnd it is of no particular importance whether I believe the Protestant\nor the Catholic doctrine of the Lord's Supper. The sole distinction\nis, that in Protestantism it is only on the tongue, in the act of\npartaking, that flesh and blood are united in a thoroughly miraculous\nmanner with bread and wine; [190] while in Catholicism, it is before\nthe act of partaking, by the power of the priest,--who however here\nacts only in the name of the Almighty,--that bread and wine are really\ntransmuted into flesh and blood. The Protestant prudently avoids a\ndefinite explanation; he does not lay himself open, like the pious,\nuncritical simplicity of Catholicism, whose God, as an external object,\ncan be devoured by a mouse: he shuts up his God within himself, where\nhe can no more be torn from him, and thus secures him as well from the\npower of accident as from that of ridicule; yet, notwithstanding this,\nhe just as much as the Catholic consumes real flesh and blood in the\nbread and wine. Slight indeed was the difference at first between\nProtestants and Catholics in the doctrine of the Lord's Supper! Thus\nat Anspach there arose a controversy on the question--\"whether the body\nof Christ enters the stomach, and is digested like other food?\" [191]\n\nBut although the imaginative activity of faith makes the objective\nexistence the mere appearance, and the emotional, imaginary existence\nthe truth and reality; still, in itself or in truth, that which is\nreally objective is only the natural elements. Even the host in the pyx\nof the Catholic priest is in itself only to faith a divine body,--this\nexternal thing, into which he transubstantiates the divine being, is\nonly a thing of faith; for even here the body is not visible, tangible,\ntasteable as a body. That is: the bread is only in its significance\nflesh. It is true that to faith this significance has the sense of\nactual existence;--as, in general, in the ecstasy of fervid feeling\nthat which signifies becomes the thing signified;--it is held not to\nsignify, but to be flesh. But this state of being flesh is not that of\nreal flesh; it is a state of being which is only believed in, imagined,\ni.e., it has only the value, the quality, of a significance, a truth\nconveyed in a symbol. [192] A thing which has a special significance\nfor me, is another thing in my imagination than in reality. The\nthing signifying is not itself that which is signified. What it is,\nis evident to the senses; what it signifies, is only in my feelings,\nconception, imagination,--is only for me, not for others, is not\nobjectively present. So here. When therefore Zwinglius said that\nthe Lord's Supper has only a subjective significance, he said the\nsame thing as his opponents; only he disturbed the illusion of the\nreligious imagination; for that which \"is\" in the Lord's Supper, is\nonly an illusion of the imagination, but with the further illusion\nthat it is not an illusion. Zwinglius only expressed simply, nakedly,\nprosaically, rationalistically, and therefore offensively, what the\nothers declared mystically, indirectly,--inasmuch as they confessed\n[193] that the effect of the Lord's Supper depends only on a worthy\ndisposition or on faith; i.e., that the bread and wine are the flesh\nand blood of the Lord, are the Lord himself, only for him for whom\nthey have the supernatural significance of the divine body, for on\nthis alone depends the worthy disposition, the religious emotion. [194]\n\nBut if the Lord's Supper effects nothing, consequently is nothing,--for\nonly that which produces effects, is,--without a certain state of mind,\nwithout faith, then in faith alone lies its reality; the entire event\ngoes forward in the feelings alone. If the idea that I here receive\nthe real body of the Saviour acts on the religious feelings, this\nidea itself arises from the feelings; it produces devout sentiments,\nbecause it is itself a devout idea. Thus here also the religious\nsubject is acted on by himself as if by another being, through the\nconception of an imaginary object. Therefore the process of the\nLord's Supper can quite well, even without the intermediation of\nbread and wine, without any church ceremony, be accomplished in the\nimagination. There are innumerable devout poems, the sole theme of\nwhich is the blood of Christ. In these we have a genuinely poetical\ncelebration of the Lord's Supper. In the lively representation of the\nsuffering, bleeding Saviour, the soul identifies itself with him;\nhere the saint in poetic exaltation drinks the pure blood, unmixed\nwith any contradictory, material elements; here there is no disturbing\nobject between the idea of the blood and the blood itself.\n\nBut though the Lord's Supper, or a sacrament in general, is nothing\nwithout a certain state of mind, without faith, nevertheless\nreligion presents the sacrament at the same time as something in\nitself real, external, distinct from the human being, so that in the\nreligious consciousness the true thing, which is faith, is made only\na collateral thing, a condition, and the imaginary thing becomes the\nprincipal thing. And the necessary, immanent consequences and effects\nof this religious materialism, of this subordination of the human to\nthe supposed divine, of the subjective to the supposed objective,\nof truth to imagination, of morality to religion,--the necessary\nconsequences are superstition and immorality: superstition, because\na thing has attributed to it an effect which does not lie in its\nnature, because a thing is held up as not being what it in truth is,\nbecause a mere conception passes for objective reality; immorality,\nbecause necessarily, in feeling, the holiness of the action as such\nis separated from morality, the partaking of the sacrament, even\napart from the state of mind, becomes a holy and saving act. Such,\nat least, is the result in practice, which knows nothing of the\nsophistical distinctions of theology. In general: wherever religion\nplaces itself in contradiction with reason, it places itself also\nin contradiction with the moral sense. Only with the sense of truth\ncoexists the sense of the right and good. Depravity of understanding is\nalways depravity of heart. He who deludes and cheats his understanding\nhas not a veracious, honourable heart; sophistry corrupts the whole\nman. And the doctrine of the Lord's Supper is sophistry.\n\nThe Truth of the disposition, or of faith as a requisite to communion,\ninvolves the Untruth of the bodily presence of God; and again the\nTruth of the objective existence of the divine body involves the\nUntruth of the disposition.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVI.\n\nTHE CONTRADICTION OF FAITH AND LOVE.\n\n\nThe Sacraments are a sensible presentation of that contradiction\nof idealism and materialism, of subjectivism and objectivism,\nwhich belongs to the inmost nature of religion. But the sacraments\nare nothing without Faith and Love. Hence the contradiction in the\nsacraments carries us back to the primary contradiction of Faith\nand Love.\n\nThe essence of religion, its latent nature, is the identity of the\ndivine being with the human; but the form of religion, or its apparent,\nconscious nature, is the distinction between them. God is the human\nbeing; but he presents himself to the religious consciousness as a\ndistinct being. Now, that which reveals the basis, the hidden essence\nof religion, is Love; that which constitutes its conscious form is\nFaith. Love identifies man with God and God with man, consequently it\nidentifies man with man; faith separates God from man, consequently it\nseparates man from man, for God is nothing else than the idea of the\nspecies invested with a mystical form,--the separation of God from\nman is therefore the separation of man from man, the unloosening of\nthe social bond. By faith religion places itself in contradiction with\nmorality, with reason, with the unsophisticated sense of truth in man;\nby love, it opposes itself again to this contradiction. Faith isolates\nGod, it makes him a particular, distinct being: love universalises;\nit makes God a common being, the love of whom is one with the love of\nman. Faith produces in man an inward disunion, a disunion with himself,\nand by consequence an outward disunion also; but love heals the wounds\nwhich are made by faith in the heart of man. Faith makes belief in\nits God a law: love is freedom,--it condemns not even the atheist,\nbecause it is itself atheistic, itself denies, if not theoretically,\nat least practically, the existence of a particular, individual God,\nopposed to man. Love has God in itself: faith has God out of itself;\nit estranges God from man, it makes him an external object.\n\nFaith, being inherently external, proceeds even to the adoption\nof outward fact as its object, and becomes historical faith. It is\ntherefore of the nature of faith that it can become a totally external\nconfession; and that with mere faith, as such, superstitious, magical\neffects are associated. [195] The devils believe that God is, without\nceasing to be devils. Hence a distinction has been made between faith\nin God, and belief that there is a God. [196] But even with this bare\nbelief in the existence of God, the assimilating power of love is\nintermingled;--a power which by no means lies in the idea of faith\nas such, and in so far as it relates to external things.\n\nThe only distinctions or judgments which are immanent to faith, which\nspring out of itself, are the distinctions of right or genuine, and\nwrong or false faith; or in general, of belief and unbelief. Faith\ndiscriminates thus: This is true, that is false. And it claims truth\nto itself alone. Faith has for its object a definite, specific truth,\nwhich is necessarily united with negation. Faith is in its nature\nexclusive. One thing alone is truth, one alone is God, one alone has\nthe monopoly of being the Son of God; all else is nothing, error,\ndelusion. Jehovah alone is the true God; all other gods are vain idols.\n\nFaith has in its mind something peculiar to itself; it rests on a\npeculiar revelation of God; it has not come to its possessions in an\nordinary way, that way which stands open to all men alike. What stands\nopen to all is common, and for that reason cannot form a special object\nof faith. That God is the creator, all men could know from Nature;\nbut what this God is in person, can be known only by special grace,\nis the object of a special faith. And because he is only revealed\nin a peculiar manner, the object of this faith is himself a peculiar\nbeing. The God of the Christians is indeed the God of the heathens,\nbut with a wide difference:--just such a difference as there is between\nme as I am to a friend, and me as I am to a stranger, who only knows\nme at a distance. God as he is an object to the Christians, is quite\nanother than as he is an object to the heathens. The Christians\nknow God personally, face to face. The heathens know only--and\neven this is too large an admission--\"what,\" and not \"who,\" God\nis; for which reason they fell into idolatry. The identity of the\nheathens and Christians before God is therefore altogether vague;\nwhat the heathens have in common with the Christians--if indeed\nwe consent to be so liberal as to admit anything in common between\nthem--is not that which is specifically Christian, not that which\nconstitutes faith. In whatsoever the Christians are Christians,\ntherein they are distinguished from the heathens; [197] and they are\nChristians in virtue of their special knowledge of God; thus their\nmark of distinction is God. Speciality is the salt which first gives a\nflavour to the common being. What a being is in special, is the being\nitself; he alone knows me, who knows me in specie. Thus the special\nGod, God as he is an object to the Christians, the personal God, is\nalone God. And this God is unknown to heathens, and to unbelievers\nin general; he does not exist for them. He is, indeed, said to exist\nfor the heathens; but mediately, on condition that they cease to be\nheathens, and become Christians. Faith makes man partial and narrow;\nit deprives him of the freedom and ability to estimate duly what\nis different from himself. Faith is imprisoned within itself. It is\ntrue that the philosophical, or, in general, any scientific theorist,\nalso limits himself by a definite system. But theoretic limitation,\nhowever fettered, short-sighted and narrow-hearted it may be, has\nstill a freer character than faith, because the domain of theory\nis in itself a free one, because here the ground of decision is the\nnature of things, argument, reason. But faith refers the decision to\nconscience and interest, to the instinctive desire of happiness; for\nits object is a special, personal Being, urging himself on recognition,\nand making salvation dependent on that recognition.\n\nFaith gives man a peculiar sense of his own dignity and importance. The\nbeliever finds himself distinguished above other men, exalted above\nthe natural man; he knows himself to be a person of distinction, in\nthe possession of peculiar privileges; believers are aristocrats,\nunbelievers plebeians. God is this distinction and pre-eminence\nof believers above unbelievers, personified. [198] Because faith\nrepresents man's own nature as that of another being, the believer\ndoes not contemplate his dignity immediately in himself, but in this\nsupposed distinct person. The consciousness of his own pre-eminence\npresents itself as a consciousness of this person; he has the sense of\nhis own dignity in this divine personality. [199] As the servant feels\nhimself honoured in the dignity of his master, nay, fancies himself\ngreater than a free, independent man of lower rank than his master,\nso it is with the believer. [200] He denies all merit in himself,\nmerely that he may leave all merit to his Lord, because his own\ndesire of honour is satisfied in the honour of his Lord. Faith is\narrogant, but it is distinguished from natural arrogance in this,\nthat it clothes its feeling of superiority, its pride, in the idea\nof another person, for whom the believer is an object of peculiar\nfavour. This distinct person, however, is simply his own hidden self,\nhis personified, contented desire of happiness: for he has no other\nqualities than these, that he is the benefactor, the Redeemer, the\nSaviour--qualities in which the believer has reference only to himself,\nto his own eternal salvation. In fact, we have here the characteristic\nprinciple of religion, that it changes that which is naturally active\ninto the passive. The heathen elevates himself, the Christian feels\nhimself elevated. The Christian converts into a matter of feeling,\nof receptivity, what to the heathen is a matter of spontaneity. The\nhumility of the believer is an inverted arrogance,--an arrogance\nnone the less because it has not the appearance, the external\ncharacteristics of arrogance. He feels himself pre-eminent: this\npre-eminence, however, is not a result of his activity, but a matter\nof grace; he has been made pre-eminent; he can do nothing towards\nit himself. He does not make himself the end of his own activity,\nbut the end, the object of God.\n\nFaith is essentially determinate, specific. God according to the\nspecific view taken of him by faith, is alone the true God. This\nJesus, such as I conceive him, is the Christ, the true, sole prophet,\nthe only-begotten Son of God. And this particular conception thou\nmust believe, if thou wouldst not forfeit thy salvation. Faith is\nimperative. It is therefore necessary--it lies in the nature of\nfaith--that it be fixed as dogma. Dogma only gives a formula to\nwhat faith had already on its tongue or in its mind. That when once\na fundamental dogma is established, it gives rise to more special\nquestions, which must also be thrown into a dogmatic form, that hence\nthere results a burdensome multiplicity of dogmas,--this is certainly\na fatal consequence, but does not do away with the necessity that\nfaith should fix itself in dogmas, in order that every one may know\ndefinitely what he must believe and how he can win salvation.\n\nThat which in the present day, even from the standpoint of believing\nChristianity, is rejected, is compassionated as an aberration, as a\nmisinterpretation, or is even ridiculed, is purely a consequence of the\ninmost nature of faith. Faith is essentially illiberal, prejudiced;\nfor it is concerned not only with individual salvation, but with\nthe honour of God. And just as we are solicitous as to whether we\nshow due honour to a superior in rank, so it is with faith. The\napostle Paul is absorbed in the glory, the honour, the merits of\nChrist. Dogmatic, exclusive, scrupulous particularity, lies in the\nnature of faith. In food and other matters, indifferent to faith,\nit is certainly liberal; but by no means in relation to objects\nof faith. He who is not for Christ is against him; that which is\nnot christian is antichristian. But what is christian? This must be\nabsolutely determined, this cannot be free. If the articles of faith\nare set down in books which proceed from various authors, handed\ndown in the form of incidental, mutually contradictory, occasional\ndicta,--then dogmatic demarcation and definition are even an external\nnecessity. Christianity owes its perpetuation to the dogmatic formulas\nof the Church.\n\nIt is only the believing unbelief of modern times which hides\nitself behind the Bible, and opposes the biblical dicta to dogmatic\ndefinitions, in order that it may set itself free from the limits\nof dogma by arbitrary exegesis. But faith has already disappeared,\nis become indifferent, when the determinate tenets of faith are\nfelt as limitations. It is only religious indifference under the\nappearance of religion that makes the Bible, which in its nature and\norigin is indefinite, a standard of faith, and under the pretext of\nbelieving only the essential, retains nothing which deserves the name\nof faith;--for example, substituting for the distinctly characterised\nSon of God, held up by the Church, the vague negative definition of a\nSinless Man, who can claim to be the Son of God in a sense applicable\nto no other being,--in a word, of a man, whom one may not trust oneself\nto call either a man or a God. But that it is merely indifference\nwhich makes a hiding-place for itself behind the Bible, is evident\nfrom the fact that even what stands in the Bible, if it contradicts\nthe standpoint of the present day, is regarded as not obligatory,\nor is even denied; nay, actions which are essentially Christian,\nwhich are the logical consequences of faith, such as the separation\nof believers from unbelievers, are now designated as unchristian.\n\nThe Church was perfectly justified in adjudging damnation to heretics\nand unbelievers, [201] for this condemnation is involved in the nature\nof faith. Faith at first appears to be only an unprejudiced separation\nof believers from unbelievers; but this separation is a highly\ncritical distinction. The believer has God for him, the unbeliever,\nagainst him;--it is only as a possible believer that the unbeliever\nhas God not against him;--and therein precisely lies the ground of\nthe requirement that he should leave the ranks of unbelief. But\nthat which has God against it is worthless, rejected, reprobate;\nfor that which has God against it is itself against God. To believe,\nis synonymous with goodness; not to believe, with wickedness. Faith,\nnarrow and prejudiced refers all unbelief to the moral disposition. In\nits view the unbeliever is an enemy to Christ out of obduracy, out\nof wickedness. [202] Hence faith has fellowship with believers only;\nunbelievers it rejects. It is well-disposed towards believers, but\nill-disposed towards unbelievers. In faith there lies a malignant\nprinciple.\n\nIt is owing to the egoism, the vanity, the self-complacency of\nChristians, that they can see the motes in the faith of non-christian\nnations, but cannot perceive the beam in their own. It is only in\nthe mode in which faith embodies itself that Christians differ from\nthe followers of other religions. The distinction is founded only\non climate or on natural temperament. A warlike or ardently sensuous\npeople will naturally attest its distinctive religious character by\ndeeds, by force of arms. But the nature of faith as such is everywhere\nthe same. It is essential to faith to condemn, to anathematise. All\nblessings, all good it accumulates on itself, on its God, as the\nlover on his beloved; all curses, all hardship and evil it casts on\nunbelief. The believer is blessed, well-pleasing to God, a partaker\nof everlasting felicity; the unbeliever is accursed, rejected of God\nand abjured by men: for what God rejects man must not receive, must\nnot indulge;--that would be a criticism of the divine judgment. The\nTurks exterminate unbelievers with fire and sword, the Christians with\nthe flames of hell. But the fires of the other world blaze forth into\nthis, to glare through the night of unbelief. As the believer already\nhere below anticipates the joys of heaven, so the flames of the abyss\nmust be seen to flash here as a foretaste of the awaiting hell,--at\nleast in the moments when faith attains its highest enthusiasm. [203]\nIt is true that Christianity ordains no persecution of heretics, still\nless conversion by force of arms. But so far as faith anathematises,\nit necessarily generates hostile dispositions,--the dispositions\nout of which the persecution of heretics arises. To love the man who\ndoes not believe in Christ, is a sin against Christ, is to love the\nenemy of Christ, [204] That which God, which Christ does not love,\nman must not love; his love would be a contradiction of the divine\nwill, consequently a sin. God, it is true, loves all men; but only\nwhen and because they are Christians, or at least may be and desire\nto be such. To be a Christian is to be beloved by God; not to be a\nChristian is to be hated by God, an object of the divine anger. [205]\nThe Christian must therefore love only Christians--others only\nas possible Christians; he must only love what faith hallows and\nblesses. Faith is the baptism of love. Love to man as man is only\nnatural love. Christian love is supernatural, glorified, sanctified\nlove; therefore it loves only what is Christian. The maxim, \"Love\nyour enemies,\" has reference only to personal enemies, not to public\nenemies, the enemies of God, the enemies of faith, unbelievers. He\nwho loves the men whom Christ denies, does not believe Christ, denies\nhis Lord and God. Faith abolishes the natural ties of humanity;\nto universal, natural unity, it substitutes a particular unity.\n\nLet it not be objected to this, that it is said in the Bible, \"Judge\nnot, that ye be not judged;\" and that thus, as faith leaves to God\nthe judgment, so it leaves to him the sentence of condemnation. This\nand other similar sayings have authority only as the private law of\nChristians, not as their public law; belong only to ethics, not to\ndogmatics. It is an indication of indifference to faith, to introduce\nsuch sayings into the region of dogma. The distinction between the\nunbeliever and the man is a fruit of modern philanthropy. To faith,\nthe man is merged in the believer; to it, the essential difference\nbetween man and the brute rests only on religious belief. Faith\nalone comprehends in itself all virtues which can make man pleasing\nto God; and God is the absolute measure, his pleasure the highest\nlaw: the believer is thus alone the legitimate, normal man, man as\nhe ought to be, man as he is recognised by God. Wherever we find\nChristians making a distinction between the man and the believer,\nthere the human mind has already severed itself from faith; there man\nhas value in himself, independently of faith. Hence faith is true,\nunfeigned, only where the specific difference of faith operates in\nall its severity. If the edge of this difference is blunted, faith\nitself naturally becomes indifferent, effete. Faith is liberal only in\nthings intrinsically indifferent. The liberalism of the apostle Paul\npresupposes the acceptance of the fundamental articles of faith. Where\neverything is made to depend on the fundamental articles of faith,\nthere arises the distinction between essential and non-essential\nbelief. In the sphere of the non-essential there is no law,--there\nyou are free. But obviously it is only on condition of your leaving\nthe rights of faith intact, that faith allows you freedom.\n\nIt is therefore an altogether false defence to say, that faith leaves\njudgment to God. It leaves to him only the moral judgment with respect\nto faith, only the judgment as to its moral character, as to whether\nthe faith of Christians be feigned or genuine. So far as classes\nare concerned, faith knows already whom God will place on the right\nhand, and whom on the left; in relation to the persons who compose\nthe classes faith is uncertain; but that believers are heirs of the\nEternal Kingdom is beyond all doubt. Apart from this, however, the God\nwho distinguishes between believers and unbelievers, the condemning and\nrewarding God, is nothing else than faith itself. What God condemns,\nfaith condemns, and vice vers\u00e2. Faith is a consuming fire to its\nopposite. [206] This fire of faith regarded objectively, is the anger\nof God, or what is the same thing, hell; for hell evidently has its\nfoundation in the anger of God. But this hell lies in faith itself, in\nits sentence of damnation. The flames of hell are only the flashings of\nthe exterminating, vindictive glance which faith casts on unbelievers.\n\nThus faith is essentially a spirit of partisanship. He who is\nnot for Christ is against him. [207] Faith knows only friends or\nenemies, it understands no neutrality; it is preoccupied only with\nitself. Faith is essentially intolerant; essentially, because with\nfaith is always associated the illusion that its cause is the cause\nof God, its honour his honour. The God of faith is nothing else than\nthe objective nature of faith--faith become an object to itself. Hence\nin the religious consciousness also the cause of faith and the cause\nof God are identified. God himself is interested: the interest of\nfaith is the nearest interest of God. \"He who toucheth you,\" says the\nprophet Zachariah, \"toucheth the apple of His eye.\" [208] That which\nwounds faith, wounds God, that which denies faith, denies God himself.\n\nFaith knows no other distinction than that between the service of God\nand the service of idols. Faith alone gives honour to God; unbelief\nwithdraws from God that which is due to him. Unbelief is an injury to\nGod, religious high treason. The heathens worship demons; their gods\nare devils. \"I say that the things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they\nsacrifice to devils, and not to God: and I would not that ye should\nhave fellowship with devils.\" [209] But the devil is the negation of\nGod; he hates God, wills that there should be no God. Thus faith is\nblind to what there is of goodness and truth lying at the foundation\nof heathen worship; it sees in everything which does not do homage\nto its God, i.e., to itself, a worship of idols, and in the worship\nof idols only the work of the devil. Faith must therefore, even in\nfeeling, be only negative towards this negation of God: it is by\ninherent necessity intolerant towards its opposite, and in general\ntowards whatever does not thoroughly accord with itself. Tolerance\non its part would be intolerance towards God, who has the right to\nunconditional, undivided sovereignty. Nothing ought to subsist,\nnothing to exist, which does not acknowledge God, which does not\nacknowledge faith:--\"That at the name of Jesus every knee should bow,\nof things in heaven and things on earth, and things under the earth;\nand that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to\nthe glory of the Father.\" [210] Therefore faith postulates a future,\na world where faith has no longer an opposite, or where at least\nthis opposite exists only in order to enhance the self-complacency\nof triumphant faith. Hell sweetens the joys of happy believers. \"The\nelect will come forth to behold the torments of the ungodly, and at\nthis spectacle they will not be smitten with sorrow; on the contrary,\nwhile they see the unspeakable sufferings of the ungodly, they,\nintoxicated with joy, will thank God for their own salvation.\" [211]\n\nFaith is the opposite of love. Love recognises virtue even in\nsin, truth in error. It is only since the power of faith has been\nsupplanted by the power of the natural unity of mankind, the power\nof reason, of humanity, that truth has been seen even in polytheism,\nin idolatry generally,--or at least that there has been any attempt\nto explain on positive grounds what faith, in its bigotry, derives\nonly from the devil. Hence love is reconcilable with reason alone,\nnot with faith; for as reason, so also love is free, universal, in its\nnature; whereas faith is narrow-hearted, limited. Only where reason\nrules, does universal love rule; reason is itself nothing else than\nuniversal love. It was faith, not love, not reason, which invented\nHell. To love, Hell is a horror; to reason, an absurdity. It would\nbe a pitiable mistake to regard Hell as a mere aberration of faith,\na false faith. Hell stands already in the Bible. Faith is everywhere\nlike itself; at least positive religious faith, faith in the sense in\nwhich it is here taken, and must be taken unless we would mix with it\nthe elements of reason, of culture,--a mixture which indeed renders\nthe character of faith unrecognisable.\n\nThus if faith does not contradict Christianity, neither do those\ndispositions which result from faith, neither do the actions which\nresult from those dispositions. Faith condemns, anathematises; all the\nactions, all the dispositions, which contradict love, humanity, reason,\naccord with faith. All the horrors of Christian religious history,\nwhich our believers aver not to be due to Christianity, have truly\narisen out of Christianity, because they have arisen out of faith. This\nrepudiation of them is indeed a necessary consequence of faith; for\nfaith claims for itself only what is good, everything bad it casts on\nthe shoulders of unbelief, or of misbelief, or of men in general. But\nthis very denial of faith that it is itself to blame for the evil in\nChristianity, is a striking proof that it is really the originator\nof that evil, because it is a proof of the narrowness, partiality,\nand intolerance which render it well-disposed only to itself, to its\nown adherents, but ill-disposed, unjust towards others. According to\nfaith, the good which Christians do, is not done by the man, but by\nthe Christian, by faith; but the evil which Christians do, is not done\nby the Christian, but by the man. The evil which faith has wrought in\nChristendom thus corresponds to the nature of faith,--of faith as it\nis described in the oldest and most sacred records of Christianity,\nof the Bible. \"If any man preach any other gospel unto you than that\nye have received, let him be accursed,\" [212] anathema esto,\nGal. i. 9. \"Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers:\nfor what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? and\nwhat communion hath light with darkness? And what concord hath\nChrist with Belial? or what part hath he that believeth with an\ninfidel? And what agreement hath the temple of God with idols? for ye\nare the temple of the living God; as God hath said, I will dwell in\nthem and walk in them; and I will be their God, and they shall be my\npeople. Wherefore come out from among them, and be ye separate, saith\nthe Lord, and touch not the unclean thing; and I will receive you,\"\n2 Cor. iv. 14-17. \"When the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven\nwith his mighty angels, in flaming fire taking vengeance on them that\nknow not God, and that obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ:\nwho shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence\nof the Lord, and from the glory of his power; when he shall come to\nbe glorified in his saints, and admired in all them that believe,\"\n2 Thess. i. 7-10. \"Without faith it is impossible to please God,\"\nHeb. xi. 6. \"God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten\nSon, that whosoever believeth in him, should not perish, but have\neverlasting life,\" John iii. 16. \"Every spirit that confesseth that\nJesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God: and every spirit that\nconfesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is not of God:\nand this is the spirit of antichrist,\" 1 John iv. 2, 3. \"Who is a\nliar, but he that denieth that Jesus is the Christ? He is antichrist\nthat denieth the Father and the Son,\" 1 John ii. 22. \"Whosoever\ntransgresseth, and abideth not in the doctrine of Christ, hath not\nGod: he that abideth in the doctrine of Christ, he hath both the\nFather and the Son. If there come any unto you, and bring not this\ndoctrine, receive him not into your house, neither bid him God speed:\nfor he that biddeth him God speed, is partaker of his evil deeds,\"\n2 John ix. 11. Thus speaks the apostle of love. But the love which\nhe celebrates is only the brotherly love of Christians. \"God is the\nSaviour of all men, specially of those that believe,\" 1 Tim. iv. 10. A\nfatal \"specially!\" \"Let us do good unto all men, especially unto them\nwho are of the household of faith,\" Gal. vi. 10. An equally pregnant\n\"especially!\" \"A man that is a heretic, after the first and second\nadmonition reject; knowing that he that is such is subverted, and\nsinneth, being condemned of himself,\" [213] Titus iii. 10, 11. \"He\nthat believeth on the Son hath everlasting life: and he that believeth\nnot the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him,\"\n[214] John iii. 36. \"And whosoever shall offend one of these little\nones that believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone\nwere hanged about his neck, and that he were cast into the sea,\" Mark\nix. 42; Matt, xviii. 6. \"He that believeth and is baptized shall be\nsaved; but he that believeth not shall be damned,\" Mark xvi. 16. The\ndistinction between faith as it is expressed in the Bible and faith\nas it has exhibited itself in later times, is only the distinction\nbetween the bud and the plant. In the bud I cannot so plainly see\nwhat is obvious in the matured plant; and yet the plant lay already\nin the bud. But that which is obvious, sophists of course will not\ncondescend to recognise; they confine themselves to the distinction\nbetween explicit and implicit existence,--wilfully overlooking their\nessential identity.\n\nFaith necessarily passes into hatred, hatred into persecution, where\nthe power of faith meets with no contradiction, where it does not\nfind itself in collision with a power foreign to faith, the power\nof love, of humanity, of the sense of justice. Faith left to itself\nnecessarily exalts itself above the laws of natural morality. The\ndoctrine of faith is the doctrine of duty towards God,--the highest\nduty of faith. By how much God is higher than man, by so much higher\nare duties to God than duties towards man; and duties towards God\nnecessarily come into collision with common human duties. God is not\nonly believed in, conceived as the universal being, the Father of men,\nas Love:--such faith is the faith of love;--he is also represented as\na personal being, a being by himself. And so far as God is regarded as\nseparate from man, as an individual being, so far are duties to God\nseparated from duties to man:--faith is, in the religious sentiment,\nseparated from morality, from love. [215] Let it not be replied\nthat faith in God is faith in love, in goodness itself; and that\nthus faith is itself an expression of a morally good disposition. In\nthe idea of personality, ethical definitions vanish; they are only\ncollateral things, mere accidents. The chief thing is the subject,\nthe divine Ego. Love to God himself, since it is love to a personal\nbeing, is not a moral but a personal love. Innumerable devout hymns\nbreathe nothing but love to the Lord; but in this love there appears\nno spark of an exalted moral idea or disposition.\n\nFaith is the highest to itself, because its object is a divine\npersonality. Hence it makes salvation dependent on itself, not on\nthe fulfilment of common human duties. But that which has eternal\nsalvation as its consequence, necessarily becomes in the mind of\nman the chief thing. As therefore inwardly morality is subordinate\nto faith, so it must also be outwardly, practically subordinate,\nnay, sacrificed, to faith. It is inevitable that there should be\nactions in which faith exhibits itself in distinction from morality,\nor rather in contradiction with it;--actions which are morally bad,\nbut which according to faith are laudable, because they have in view\nthe advantage of faith. All salvation depends on faith: it follows that\nall again depends on the salvation of faith. If faith is endangered,\neternal salvation and the honour of God are endangered. Hence\nfaith absolves from everything; for, strictly considered, it is the\nsole subjective good in man, as God is the sole good and positive\nbeing:--the highest commandment therefore is: Believe! [216]\n\nFor the very reason that there is no natural, inherent connection\nbetween faith and the moral disposition, that, on the contrary, it\nlies in the nature of faith that it is indifferent to moral duties,\n[217] that it sacrifices the love of man to the honour of God,--for\nthis reason it is required that faith should have good works as its\nconsequence, that it should prove itself by love. Faith destitute of\nlove, or indifferent to love, contradicts the reason, the natural sense\nof right in man, moral feeling, on which love immediately urges itself\nas a law. Hence faith, in contradiction with its intrinsic character,\nhas limits imposed on it by morality: a faith which effects nothing\ngood, which does not attest itself by love, comes to be held as not a\ntrue and living faith. But this limitation does not arise out of faith\nitself. It is the power of love, a power independent of faith, which\ngives laws to it; for moral character is here made the criterion of\nthe genuineness of faith, the truth of faith is made dependent on the\ntruth of ethics:--a relation which, however, is subversive of faith.\n\nFaith does indeed make man happy; but thus much is certain: it infuses\ninto him no really moral dispositions. If it ameliorate man, if it\nhave moral dispositions as its consequence, this proceeds solely\nfrom the inward conviction of the irreversible reality of morals:--a\nconviction independent of religious faith. It is morality alone, and\nby no means faith, that cries out in the conscience of the believer:\nthy faith is nothing, if it does not make thee good. It is not to be\ndenied that the assurance of eternal salvation, the forgiveness of\nsins, the sense of favour and release from all punishment, inclines\nman to do good. The man who has this confidence possesses all things;\nhe is happy; [218] he becomes indifferent to the good things of\nthis world; no envy, no avarice, no ambition, no sensual desire, can\nenslave him; everything earthly vanishes in the prospect of heavenly\ngrace and eternal bliss. But in him good works do not proceed from\nessentially virtuous dispositions. It is not love, not the object\nof love, man, the basis of all morality, which is the motive of his\ngood works. No! he does good not for the sake of goodness itself,\nnot for the sake of man, but for the sake of God;--out of gratitude\nto God, who has done all for him, and for whom therefore he must on\nhis side do all that lies in his power. He forsakes sin, because it\nwounds God, his Saviour, his Benefactor. [219] The idea of virtue is\nhere the idea of compensatory sacrifice. God has sacrificed himself\nfor man; therefore man must sacrifice himself to God. The greater the\nsacrifice the better the deed. The more anything contradicts man and\nNature, the greater the abnegation, the greater is the virtue. This\nmerely negative idea of goodness has been especially realised and\ndeveloped by Catholicism. Its highest moral idea is that of sacrifice;\nhence the high significance attached to the denial of sexual love,--to\nvirginity. Chastity, or rather virginity, is the characteristic virtue\nof the Catholic faith,--for this reason, that it has no basis in\nNature. It is the most fanatical, transcendental, fantastical virtue,\nthe virtue of supranaturalistic faith;--to faith, the highest virtue,\nbut in itself no virtue at all. Thus faith makes that a virtue which\nintrinsically, substantially, is no virtue; it has therefore no sense\nof virtue; it must necessarily depreciate true virtue because it so\nexalts a merely apparent virtue, because it is guided by no idea but\nthat of the negation, the contradiction of human nature.\n\nBut although the deeds opposed to love which mark Christian religious\nhistory, are in accordance with Christianity, and its antagonists\nare therefore right in imputing to it the horrible actions resulting\nfrom dogmatic creeds; those deeds nevertheless at the same time\ncontradict Christianity, because Christianity is not only a religion\nof faith, but of love also,--pledges us not only to faith, but to\nlove. Uncharitable actions, hatred of heretics, at once accord and\nclash with Christianity? how is that possible? Perfectly. Christianity\nsanctions both the actions that spring out of love, and the actions\nthat spring from faith without love. If Christianity had made love\nonly its law, its adherents would be right,--the horrors of Christian\nreligious history could not be imputed to it; if it had made faith only\nits law, the reproaches of its antagonists would be unconditionally,\nunrestrictedly true. But Christianity has not made love free; it has\nnot raised itself to the height of accepting love as absolute. And\nit has not given this freedom, nay, cannot give it, because it is a\nreligion,--and hence subjects love to the dominion of faith. Love is\nonly the exoteric, faith the esoteric doctrine of Christianity; love\nis only the morality, faith the religion of the Christian religion.\n\nGod is love. This is the sublimest dictum of Christianity. But\nthe contradiction of faith and love is contained in the very\nproposition. Love is only a predicate, God the subject. What, then,\nis this subject in distinction from love? And I must necessarily ask\nthis question, make this distinction. The necessity of the distinction\nwould be done away with only if it were said conversely: Love is\nGod, love is the absolute being. Thus love would take the position\nof the substance. In the proposition \"God is love,\" the subject is\nthe darkness in which faith shrouds itself; the predicate is the\nlight, which first illuminates the intrinsically dark subject. In\nthe predicate I affirm love, in the subject faith. Love does not\nalone fill my soul: I leave a place open for my uncharitableness by\nthinking of God as a subject in distinction from the predicate. It is\ntherefore inevitable that at one moment I lose the thought of love,\nat another the thought of God, that at one moment I sacrifice the\npersonality of God to the divinity of love, at another the divinity of\nlove to the personality of God. The history of Christianity has given\nsufficient proof of this contradiction. Catholicism, especially, has\ncelebrated Love as the essential deity with so much enthusiasm, that\nto it the personality of God has been entirely lost in this love. But\nat the same time it has sacrificed love to the majesty of faith. Faith\nclings to the self-subsistence of God; love does away with it. \"God\nis love,\" means, God is nothing by himself: he who loves, gives up\nhis egoistical independence; he makes what he loves indispensable,\nessential to his existence. But while Self is being sunk in the\ndepths of love, the idea of the Person rises up again and disturbs\nthe harmony of the divine and human nature which had been established\nby love. Faith advances with its pretensions, and allows only just so\nmuch to Love as belongs to a predicate in the ordinary sense. It does\nnot permit love freely to unfold itself; it makes love the abstract,\nand itself the concrete, the fact, the basis. The love of faith is\nonly a rhetorical figure, a poetical fiction of faith,--faith in\necstasy. If faith comes to itself, Love is fled.\n\nThis theoretic contradiction must necessarily manifest itself\npractically. Necessarily; for in Christianity love is tainted by faith,\nit is not free, it is not apprehended truly. A love which is limited\nby faith is an untrue love. [220] Love knows no law but itself; it is\ndivine through itself; it needs not the sanction of faith; it is its\nown basis. The love which is bound by faith is a narrow-hearted, false\nlove, contradicting the idea of love, i.e., self-contradictory,--a love\nwhich has only a semblance of holiness, for it hides in itself the\nhatred that belongs to faith; it is only benevolent so long as faith\nis not injured. Hence, in this contradiction with itself, in order\nto retain the semblance of love, it falls into the most diabolical\nsophisms, as we see in Augustine's apology for the persecution of\nheretics. Love is limited by faith; hence it does not regard even\nthe uncharitable actions which faith suggests as in contradiction\nwith itself; it interprets the deeds of hatred which are committed\nfor the sake of faith as deeds of love. And it necessarily falls\ninto such contradictions, because the limitation of love by faith is\nitself a contradiction. If it once is subjected to this limitation,\nit has given up its own judgment, its inherent measure and criterion,\nits self-subsistence; it is delivered up without power of resistance\nto the promptings of faith.\n\nHere we have again an example, that much which is not found in the\nletter of the Bible, is nevertheless there in principle. We find the\nsame contradictions in the Bible as in Augustine, as in Catholicism\ngenerally; only that in the latter they are definitely declared,\nthey are developed into a conspicuous, and therefore revolting\nexistence. The Bible curses through faith, blesses through love. But\nthe only love it knows is a love founded on faith. Thus here already\nit is a love which curses, an unreliable love, a love which gives\nme no guarantee that it will not turn into hatred; for if I do not\nacknowledge the articles of faith, I am out of the sphere of love, a\nchild of hell, an object of anathema, of the anger of God, to whom the\nexistence of unbelievers is a vexation, a thorn in the eye. Christian\nlove has not overcome hell, because it has not overcome faith. Love\nis in itself unbelieving, faith unloving. And love is unbelieving\nbecause it knows nothing more divine than itself, because it believes\nonly in itself as absolute truth.\n\nChristian love is already signalised as a particular, limited love, by\nthe very epithet, Christian. But love is in its nature universal. So\nlong as Christian love does not renounce its qualification of\nChristian, does not make love, simply, its highest law, so long is it a\nlove which is injurious to the sense of truth, for the very office of\nlove is to abolish the distinction between Christianity and so-called\nheathenism;--so long is it a love which by its particularity is in\ncontradiction with the nature of love, an abnormal, loveless love,\nwhich has therefore long been justly an object of sarcasm. True love is\nsufficient to itself; it needs no special title, no authority. Love is\nthe universal law of intelligence and Nature;--it is nothing else than\nthe realisation of the unity of the species through the medium of moral\nsentiment. To found this love on the name of a person, is only possible\nby the association of superstitious ideas, either of a religious or\nspeculative character. For with superstition is always associated\nparticularism, and with particularism, fanaticism. Love can only be\nfounded on the unity of the species, the unity of intelligence--on\nthe nature of mankind; then only is it a well-grounded love, safe\nin its principle, guaranteed, free, for it is fed by the original\nsource of love, out of which the love of Christ himself arose. The\nlove of Christ was itself a derived love. He loved us not out of\nhimself, by virtue of his own authority, but by virtue of our common\nhuman nature. A love which is based on his person is a particular,\nexclusive love, which extends only so far as the acknowledgment of\nthis person extends, a love which does not rest on the proper ground\nof love. Are we to love each other because Christ loved us? Such\nlove would be an affected, imitative love. Can we truly love each\nother only if we love Christ? Is Christ the cause of love? Is he not\nrather the apostle of love? Is not the ground of his love the unity\nof human nature? Shall I love Christ more than mankind? Is not such\nlove a chimerical love? Can I step beyond the idea of the species? Can\nI love anything higher than humanity? What ennobled Christ was love;\nwhatever qualities he had, he held in fealty to love; he was not the\nproprietor of love, as he is represented to be in all superstitious\nconceptions. The idea of love is an independent idea; I do not first\ndeduce it from the life of Christ; on the contrary, I revere that\nlife only because I find it accordant with the law, the idea of love.\n\nThis is already proved historically by the fact that the idea of love\nwas by no means first introduced into the consciousness of mankind with\nand by Christianity,--is by no means peculiarly Christian. The horrors\nof the Roman Empire present themselves with striking significance\nin company with the appearance of this idea. The empire of policy\nwhich united men after a manner corresponding with its own idea, was\ncoming to its necessary end. Political unity is a unity of force. The\ndespotism of Rome must turn in upon itself, destroy itself. But\nit was precisely through this catastrophe of political existence\nthat man released himself entirely from the heart-stifling toils\nof politics. In the place of Rome appeared the idea of humanity;\nto the idea of dominion succeeded the idea of love. Even the Jews,\nby imbibing the principle of humanity contained in Greek culture, had\nby this time mollified their malignant religious separatism. Philo\ncelebrates love as the highest virtue. The extinction of national\ndifferences lay in the idea of humanity itself. Thinking minds had\nvery early overstepped the civil and political separation of man\nfrom man. Aristotle distinguishes the man from the slave, and places\nthe slave, as a man, on a level with his master, uniting them in\nfriendship. Epictetus, the slave, was a Stoic; Antoninus, the emperor,\nwas a Stoic also: thus did philosophy unite men. The Stoics taught\n[221] that man was not born for his own sake, but for the sake of\nothers, i.e., for love: a principle which implies infinitely more\nthan the celebrated dictum of the Emperor Antoninus, which enjoined\nthe love of enemies. The practical principle of the Stoics is so\nfar the principle of love. The world is to them one city, men its\ncitizens. Seneca, in the sublimest sayings, extols love, clemency,\nhumanity, especially towards slaves. Thus political rigour and\npatriotic narrowness were on the wane.\n\nChristianity was a peculiar manifestation of these human tendencies;--a\npopular, consequently a religious, and certainly a most intense\nmanifestation of this new principle of love. That which elsewhere\nmade itself apparent in the process of culture, expressed itself\nhere as religious feeling, as a matter of faith. Christianity thus\nreduced a general unity to a particular one, it made love collateral\nto faith; and by this means it placed itself in contradiction with\nuniversal love. The unity was not referred to its true origin. National\ndifferences indeed disappeared; but in their place difference of faith,\nthe opposition of Christian and un-Christian, more vehement than a\nnational antagonism, and also more malignant, made its appearance\nin history.\n\nAll love founded on a special historical phenomenon contradicts,\nas has been said, the nature of love, which endures no limits,\nwhich triumphs over all particularity. Man is to be loved for man's\nsake. Man is an object of love because he is an end in himself,\nbecause he is a rational and loving being. This is the law of the\nspecies, the law of the intelligence. Love should be immediate,\nundetermined by anything else than its object;--nay, only as such\nis it love. But if I interpose between my fellow-man and myself\nthe idea of an individuality, in whom the idea of the species is\nsupposed to be already realised, I annihilate the very soul of love,\nI disturb the unity by the idea of a third external to us; for in that\ncase my fellow-man is an object of love to me only on account of his\nresemblance or relation to this model, not for his own sake. Here all\nthe contradictions reappear which we have in the personality of God,\nwhere the idea of the personality by itself, without regard to the\nqualities which render it worthy of love and reverence, fixes itself\nin the consciousness and feelings. Love is the subjective reality of\nthe species, as reason is its objective reality. In love, in reason,\nthe need of an intermediate person disappears. Christ is nothing\nbut an image, under which the unity of the species has impressed\nitself on the popular consciousness. Christ loved men: he wished to\nbless and unite them all without distinction of sex, age, rank, or\nnationality. Christ is the love of mankind to itself embodied in an\nimage--in accordance with the nature of religion as we have developed\nit--or contemplated as a person, but a person who (we mean, of course,\nas a religious object) has only the significance of an image, who is\nonly ideal. For this reason love is pronounced to be the characteristic\nmark of the disciples. But love, as has been said, is nothing else than\nthe active proof, the realisation of the unity of the race, through the\nmedium of the moral disposition. The species is not an abstraction;\nit exists in feeling, in the moral sentiment, in the energy of\nlove. It is the species which infuses love into me. A loving heart\nis the heart of the species throbbing in the individual. Thus Christ,\nas the consciousness of love, is the consciousness of the species. We\nare all one in Christ. Christ is the consciousness of our identity. He\ntherefore who loves man for the sake of man, who rises to the love of\nthe species, to universal love, adequate to the nature of the species,\n[222] he is a Christian, is Christ himself. He does what Christ did,\nwhat made Christ Christ. Thus, where there arises the consciousness\nof the species as a species, the idea of humanity as a whole, Christ\ndisappears, without, however, his true nature disappearing; for he\nwas the substitute for the consciousness of the species, the image\nunder which it was made present to the people, and became the law of\nthe popular life.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVII.\n\nCONCLUDING APPLICATION.\n\n\nIn the contradiction between Faith and Love which has just been\nexhibited, we see the practical, palpable ground of necessity that\nwe should raise ourselves above Christianity, above the peculiar\nstand-point of all religion. We have shown that the substance and\nobject of religion is altogether human; we have shown that divine\nwisdom is human wisdom; that the secret of theology is anthropology;\nthat the absolute mind is the so-called finite subjective mind. But\nreligion is not conscious that its elements are human; on the contrary,\nit places itself in opposition to the human, or at least it does\nnot admit that its elements are human. The necessary turning-point of\nhistory is therefore the open confession, that the consciousness of God\nis nothing else than the consciousness of the species; that man can\nand should raise himself only above the limits of his individuality,\nand not above the laws, the positive essential conditions of his\nspecies; that there is no other essence which man can think, dream of,\nimagine, feel, believe in, wish for, love and adore as the absolute,\nthan the essence of human nature itself. [223]\n\nOur relation to religion is therefore not a merely negative, but a\ncritical one; we only separate the true from the false;--though we\ngrant that the truth thus separated from falsehood is a new truth,\nessentially different from the old. Religion is the first form\nof self-consciousness. Religions are sacred because they are the\ntraditions of the primitive self-consciousness. But that which in\nreligion holds the first place--namely, God--is, as we have shown,\nin itself and according to truth, the second, for it is only the\nnature of man regarded objectively; and that which to religion is the\nsecond--namely, man--must therefore be constituted and declared the\nfirst. Love to man must be no derivative love; it must be original. If\nhuman nature is the highest nature to man, then practically also the\nhighest and first law must be the love of man to man. Homo homini Deus\nest:--this is the great practical principle:--this is the axis on which\nrevolves the history of the world. The relations of child and parent,\nof husband and wife, of brother and friend--in general, of man to\nman--in short, all the moral relations are per se religious. Life as\na whole is, in its essential, substantial relations, throughout of a\ndivine nature. Its religious consecration is not first conferred by\nthe blessing of the priest. But the pretension of religion is that\nit can hallow an object by its essentially external co-operation;\nit thereby assumes to be itself the only holy power; besides itself\nit knows only earthly, ungodly relations; hence it comes forward in\norder to consecrate them and make them holy.\n\nBut marriage--we mean, of course, marriage as the free bond of love\n[224]--is sacred in itself, by the very nature of the union which is\ntherein effected. That alone is a religious marriage, which is a true\nmarriage, which corresponds to the essence of marriage--of love. And\nso it is with all moral relations. Then only are they moral,--then\nonly are they enjoyed in a moral spirit, when they are regarded as\nsacred in themselves. True friendship exists only when the boundaries\nof friendship are preserved with religious conscientiousness, with\nthe same conscientiousness with which the believer watches over the\ndignity of his God. Let friendship be sacred to thee, property sacred,\nmarriage sacred,--sacred the well-being of every man; but let them\nbe sacred in and by themselves.\n\nIn Christianity the moral laws are regarded as the commandments\nof God; morality is even made the criterion of piety; but ethics\nhave nevertheless a subordinate rank, they have not in themselves a\nreligious significance. This belongs only to faith. Above morality\nhovers God, as a being distinct from man, a being to whom the\nbest is due, while the remnants only fall to the share of man. All\nthose dispositions which ought to be devoted to life, to man--all\nthe best powers of humanity, are lavished on the being who wants\nnothing. The real cause is converted into an impersonal means, a\nmerely conceptional, imaginary cause usurps the place of the true\none. Man thanks God for those benefits which have been rendered to\nhim even at the cost of sacrifice by his fellow-man. The gratitude\nwhich he expresses to his benefactor is only ostensible; it is\npaid, not to him, but to God. He is thankful, grateful to God,\nbut unthankful to man. [225] Thus is the moral sentiment subverted\ninto religion! Thus does man sacrifice man to God! The bloody human\nsacrifice is in fact only a rude, material expression of the inmost\nsecret of religion. Where bloody human sacrifices are offered to God,\nsuch sacrifices are regarded as the highest thing, physical existence\nas the chief good. For this reason life is sacrificed to God, and it\nis so on extraordinary occasions; the supposition being that this is\nthe way to show him the greatest honour. If Christianity no longer, at\nleast in our day, offers bloody sacrifices to its God, this arises, to\nsay nothing of other reasons, from the fact that physical existence is\nno longer regarded as the highest good. Hence the soul, the emotions\nare now offered to God, because these are held to be something\nhigher. But the common case is, that in religion man sacrifices some\nduty towards man--such as that of respecting the life of his fellow,\nof being grateful to him--to a religious obligation,--sacrifices\nhis relation to man to his relation to God. The Christians, by\nthe idea that God is without wants, and that he is only an object\nof pure adoration, have certainly done away with many pernicious\nconceptions. But this freedom from wants is only a metaphysical idea,\nwhich is by no means part of the peculiar nature of religion. When\nthe need for worship is supposed to exist only on one side, the\nsubjective side, this has the invariable effect of one-sidedness,\nand leaves the religious emotions cold; hence, if not in express\nwords, yet in fact, there must be attributed to God a condition\ncorresponding to the subjective need, the need of the worshipper, in\norder to establish reciprocity. [226] All the positive definitions\nof religion are based on reciprocity. The religious man thinks of\nGod because God thinks of him; he loves God because God has first\nloved him. God is jealous of man; religion is jealous of morality;\n[227] it sucks away the best forces of morality; it renders to man\nonly the things that are man's, but to God the things that are God's;\nand to him is rendered true, living emotion,--the heart.\n\nWhen in times in which peculiar sanctity was attached to religion,\nwe find marriage, property, and civil law respected, this has not\nits foundation in religion, but in the original, natural sense of\nmorality and right, to which the true social relations are sacred\nas such. He to whom the Right is not holy for its own sake will\nnever be made to feel it sacred by religion. Property did not become\nsacred because it was regarded as a divine institution, but it was\nregarded as a divine institution because it was felt to be in itself\nsacred. Love is not holy because it is a predicate of God, but it is\na predicate of God because it is in itself divine. The heathens do\nnot worship the light or the fountain because it is a gift of God,\nbut because it has of itself a beneficial influence on man, because\nit refreshes the sufferer; on account of this excellent quality they\npay it divine honours.\n\nWherever morality is based on theology, wherever the right is made\ndependent on divine authority, the most immoral, unjust, infamous\nthings can be justified and established. I can found morality on\ntheology only when I myself have already defined the Divine Being by\nmeans of morality. In the contrary case, I have no criterion of the\nmoral and immoral, but merely an unmoral, arbitrary basis, from which I\nmay deduce anything I please. Thus, if I would found morality on God,\nI must first of all place it in God: for Morality, Right, in short,\nall substantial relations, have their only basis in themselves, can\nonly have a real foundation--such as truth demands--when they are thus\nbased. To place anything in God, or to derive anything from God, is\nnothing more than to withdraw it from the test of reason, to institute\nit as indubitable, unassailable, sacred, without rendering an account\nwhy. Hence self-delusion, if not wicked, insidious design, is at the\nroot of all efforts to establish morality, right, on theology. Where\nwe are in earnest about the right we need no incitement or support\nfrom above. We need no Christian rule of political right: we need only\none which is rational, just, human. The right, the true, the good,\nhas always its ground of sacredness in itself, in its quality. Where\nman is in earnest about ethics, they have in themselves the validity\nof a divine power. If morality has no foundation in itself, there is\nno inherent necessity for morality; morality is then surrendered to\nthe groundless arbitrariness of religion.\n\nThus the work of the self-conscious reason in relation to religion\nis simply to destroy an illusion:--an illusion, however, which is\nby no means indifferent, but which, on the contrary, is profoundly\ninjurious in its effect on mankind; which deprives man as well of the\npower of real life as of the genuine sense of truth and virtue; for\neven love, in itself the deepest, truest emotion, becomes by means\nof religiousness merely ostensible, illusory, since religious love\ngives itself to man only for God's sake, so that it is given only in\nappearance to man, but in reality to God.\n\nAnd we need only, as we have shown, invert the religious\nrelations--regard that as an end which religion supposes to be a\nmeans--exalt that into the primary which in religion is subordinate,\nthe accessory, the condition,--at once we have destroyed the illusion,\nand the unclouded light of truth streams in upon us. The sacraments\nof Baptism and the Lord's Supper, which are the characteristic symbols\nof the Christian religion, may serve to confirm and exhibit this truth.\n\nThe Water of Baptism is to religion only the means by which the Holy\nSpirit imparts itself to man. But by this conception it is placed\nin contradiction with reason, with the truth of things. On the one\nhand, there is virtue in the objective, natural quality of water;\non the other, there is none, but it is a merely arbitrary medium of\ndivine grace and omnipotence. We free ourselves from these and other\nirreconcilable contradictions, we give a true significance to Baptism,\nonly by regarding it as a symbol of the value of water itself. Baptism\nshould represent to us the wonderful but natural effect of water on\nman. Water has, in fact, not merely physical effects, but also, and\nas a result of these, moral and intellectual effects on man. Water\nnot only cleanses man from bodily impurities, but in water the scales\nfall from his eyes: he sees, he thinks more clearly; he feels himself\nfreer; water extinguishes the fire of appetite. How many saints have\nhad recourse to the natural qualities of water in order to overcome\nthe assaults of the devil! What was denied by Grace has been granted\nby Nature. Water plays a part not only in dietetics, but also in moral\nand mental discipline. To purify oneself, to bathe, is the first,\nthough the lowest of virtues. [228] In the stream of water the fever of\nselfishness is allayed. Water is the readiest means of making friends\nwith Nature. The bath is a sort of chemical process, in which our\nindividuality is resolved into the objective life of Nature. The man\nrising from the water is a new, a regenerate man. The doctrine that\nmorality can do nothing without means of grace has a valid meaning if,\nin place of imaginary, supernatural means of grace, we substitute\nnatural means. Moral feeling can effect nothing without Nature; it\nmust ally itself with the simplest natural means. The profoundest\nsecrets lie in common everyday things, such as supranaturalistic\nreligion and speculation ignore, thus sacrificing real mysteries\nto imaginary, illusory ones; as here, for example, the real power\nof water is sacrificed to an imaginary one. Water is the simplest\nmeans of grace or healing for the maladies of the soul as well as of\nthe body. But water is effectual only where its use is constant and\nregular. Baptism, as a single act, is either an altogether useless\nand unmeaning institution, or, if real effects are attributed to it,\na superstitious one. But it is a rational, a venerable institution,\nif it is understood to typify and celebrate the moral and physical\ncurative virtues of water.\n\nBut the sacrament of water required a supplement. Water, as a universal\nelement of life, reminds us of our origin from Nature, an origin\nwhich we have in common with plants and animals. In Baptism we bow\nto the power of a pure Nature-force; water is the element of natural\nequality and freedom, the mirror of the golden age. But we men are\ndistinguished from the plants and animals, which together with the\ninorganic kingdom we comprehend under the common name of Nature;--we\nare distinguished from Nature. Hence we must celebrate our distinction,\nour specific difference. The symbols of this our difference are bread\nand wine. Bread and wine are, as to their materials, products of\nNature; as to their form, products of man. If in water we declare:\nMan can do nothing without Nature; by bread and wine we declare:\nNature needs man, as man needs Nature. In water, human mental activity\nis nullified; in bread and wine it attains self-satisfaction. Bread\nand wine are supernatural products,--in the only valid and true sense,\nthe sense which is not in contradiction with reason and Nature. If in\nwater we adore the pure force of Nature, in bread and wine we adore\nthe supernatural power of mind, of consciousness, of man. Hence this\nsacrament is only for man matured into consciousness; while baptism is\nimparted to infants. But we at the same time celebrate here the true\nrelation of mind to Nature: Nature gives the material, mind gives the\nform. The sacrament of Baptism inspires us with thankfulness towards\nNature, the sacrament of bread and wine with thankfulness towards\nman. Bread and wine typify to us the truth that Man is the true God\nand Saviour of man.\n\nEating and drinking is the mystery of the Lord's Supper;--eating\nand drinking is, in fact, in itself a religious act; at least, ought\nto be so. [229] Think, therefore, with every morsel of bread which\nrelieves thee from the pain of hunger, with every draught of wine\nwhich cheers thy heart, of the God who confers these beneficent gifts\nupon thee,--think of man! But in thy gratitude towards man forget not\ngratitude towards holy Nature! Forget not that wine is the blood of\nplants, and flour the flesh of plants, which are sacrificed for thy\nwell-being! Forget not that the plant typifies to thee the essence of\nNature, which lovingly surrenders itself for thy enjoyment! Therefore\nforget not the gratitude which thou owest to the natural qualities of\nbread and wine! And if thou art inclined to smile that I call eating\nand drinking religious acts, because they are common everyday acts, and\nare therefore performed by multitudes without thought, without emotion;\nreflect, that the Lord's Supper is to multitudes a thoughtless,\nemotionless act, because it takes place often; and, for the sake of\ncomprehending the religious significance of bread and wine, place\nthyself in a position where the daily act is unnaturally, violently\ninterrupted. Hunger and thirst destroy not only the physical but also\nthe mental and moral powers of man; they rob him of his humanity--of\nunderstanding, of consciousness. Oh! if thou shouldst ever experience\nsuch want, how wouldst thou bless and praise the natural qualities of\nbread and wine, which restore to thee thy humanity, thy intellect! It\nneeds only that the ordinary course of things be interrupted in order\nto vindicate to common things an uncommon significance, to life,\nas such, a religious import. Therefore let bread be sacred for us,\nlet wine be sacred, and also let water be sacred! Amen.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\nEXPLANATIONS--REMARKS--ILLUSTRATIVE CITATIONS.\n\n\n\u00a7 1.\n\nMan has his highest being, his God, in himself; not in himself as an\nindividual, but in his essential nature, his species. No individual\nis an adequate representation of his species, but only the human\nindividual is conscious of the distinction between the species and\nthe individual; in the sense of this distinction lies the root of\nreligion. The yearning of man after something above himself is nothing\nelse than the longing after the perfect type of his nature, the\nyearning to be free from himself, i.e., from the limits and defects\nof his individuality. Individuality is the self-conditionating,\nthe self-limitation of the species. Thus man has cognisance of\nnothing above himself, of nothing beyond the nature of humanity;\nbut to the individual man this nature presents itself under the\nform of an individual man. Thus, for example, the child sees the\nnature of man above itself in the form of its parents, the pupil\nin the form of his tutor. But all feelings which man experiences\ntowards a superior man, nay, in general, all moral feelings which\nman has towards man, are of a religious nature. [230] Man feels\nnothing towards God which he does not also feel towards man. Homo\nhomini deus est. Want teaches prayer; but in misfortune, in sorrow,\nman kneels to entreat help of man also. Feeling makes God a man, but\nfor the same reason it makes man a God. How often in deep emotion,\nwhich alone speaks genuine truth, man exclaims to man: Thou art,\nthou hast been my redeemer, my saviour, my protecting spirit, my\nGod! We feel awe, reverence, humility, devout admiration, in thinking\nof a truly great, noble man; we feel ourselves worthless, we sink\ninto nothing, even in the presence of human greatness. The purely,\ntruly human emotions are religious; but for that reason the religious\nemotions are purely human: the only difference is, that the religious\nemotions are vague, indefinite; but even this is only the case when\nthe object of them is indefinite. Where God is positively defined,\nis the object of positive religion, there God is also the object\nof positive, definite human feelings, the object of fear and love,\nand therefore he is a positively human being; for there is nothing\nmore in God than what lies in feeling. If in the heart there is fear\nand terror, in God there is anger; if in the heart there is joy, hope,\nconfidence, in God there is love. Fear makes itself objective in anger;\njoy in love, in mercy. \"As it is with me in my heart, so is it with\nGod.\" \"As my heart is, so is God.\"--Luther (Th. i. p. 72). But a\nmerciful and angry God--Deus vere irascitur (Melancthon)--is a God\nno longer distinguishable from the human feelings and nature. Thus\neven in religion man bows before the nature of man under the form\nof a personal human being; religion itself expressly declares--and\nall anthropomorphisms declare this in opposition to Pantheism.--quod\nsupra nos nihil ad nos; that is, a God who inspires us with no human\nemotions, who does not reflect our own emotions, in a word, who is\nnot a man,--such a God is nothing to us, has no interest for us,\ndoes not concern us. (See the passages cited in this work from Luther.)\n\nReligion has thus no dispositions and emotions which are peculiar\nto itself; what it claims as belonging exclusively to its object,\nare simply the same dispositions and emotions that man experiences\neither in relation to himself (as, for example, to his conscience),\nor to his fellow-man, or to Nature. You must not fear men, but God;\nyou must not love man,--i.e., not truly, for his own sake,--but God;\nyou must not humble yourselves before human greatness, but only before\nthe Lord; not believe and confide in man, but only in God. Hence\ncomes the danger of worshipping false gods in distinction from the\ntrue God. Hence the \"jealousy\" of God. \"Ego Jehova, Deus tuus, Deus\nsum zelotypus. Ut zelotypus vir dicitur, qui rivalem pati nequit:\nsic Deus socium in cultu, quem ab hominibus postulat, ferre non\npotest.\" (Clericus, Comment. in Exod. c. 20, v. 5.) Jealousy arises\nbecause a being preferred and loved by me directs to another the\nfeelings and dispositions which I claim for myself. But how could I be\njealous if the impressions and emotions which I excite in the beloved\nbeing were altogether peculiar and apart, were essentially different\nfrom the impressions which another can make on him? If, therefore,\nthe emotions of religion were objectively, essentially different\nfrom those which lie out of religion, there would be no possibility\nof idolatry in man or of jealousy in God. As the flute has another\nsound to me than the trumpet, and I cannot confound the impressions\nproduced by the former with the impressions produced by the latter;\nso I could not transfer to a natural or human being the emotions of\nreligion, if the object of religion, God, were specifically different\nfrom the natural or human being, and consequently the impressions\nwhich he produced on me were specific, peculiar.\n\n\n\n\u00a7 2.\n\nFeeling alone is the object of feeling. Feeling is sympathy; feeling\narises only in the love of man to man. Sensations man has in isolation;\nfeelings only in community. Only in sympathy does sensation rise into\nfeeling. Feeling is \u00e6sthetic, human sensation; only what is human is\nthe object of feeling. In feeling man is related to his fellow-man as\nto himself; he is alive to the sorrows, the joys of another as his\nown. Thus only by communication does man rise above merely egoistic\nsensation into feeling;--participated sensation is feeling. He who\nhas no need of participating has no feeling. But what does the hand,\nthe kiss, the glance, the voice, the tone, the word--as the expression\nof emotion--impart? Emotion. The very same thing which, pronounced or\nperformed without the appropriate tone, without emotion, is only an\nobject of indifferent perception, becomes, when uttered or performed\nwith emotion, an object of feeling. To feel is to have a sense of\nsensations, to have emotion in the perception of emotion. Hence the\nbrutes rise to feeling only in the sexual relation, and therefore\nonly transiently; for here the being experiences sensation not in\nrelation to itself taken alone, or to an object without sensation,\nbut to a being having like emotions with itself,--not to another as a\ndistinct object, but to an object which in species is identical. Hence\nNature is an object of feeling to me only when I regard it as a being\nakin to me and in sympathy with me.\n\nIt is clear from what has been said, that only where in truth, if not\naccording to the subjective conception, the distinction between the\ndivine and human being is abolished, is the objective existence of God,\nthe existence of God as an objective, distinct being, abolished:--only\nthere, I say, is religion made a mere matter of feeling, or conversely,\nfeeling the chief point in religion. The last refuge of theology\ntherefore is feeling. God is renounced by the understanding; he has\nno longer the dignity of a real object, of a reality which imposes\nitself on the understanding; hence he is transferred to feeling;\nin feeling his existence is thought to be secure. And doubtless this\nis the safest refuge; for to make feeling the essence of religion is\nnothing else than to make feeling the essence of God. And as certainly\nas I exist, so certainly does my feeling exist; and as certainly as\nmy feeling exists, so certainly does my God exist. The certainty of\nGod is here nothing else than the self-certainty of human feeling, the\nyearning after God is the yearning after unlimited, uninterrupted, pure\nfeeling. In life the feelings are interrupted; they collapse; they are\nfollowed by a state of void, of insensibility. The religious problem,\ntherefore, is to give fixity to feeling in spite of the vicissitudes of\nlife, and to separate it from repugnant disturbances and limitations:\nGod himself is nothing else than undisturbed, uninterrupted feeling,\nfeeling for which there exists no limits, no opposite. If God were\na being distinct from thy feeling, he would be known to thee in some\nother way than simply in feeling; but just because thou perceivest him\nonly by feeling, he exists only in feeling--he is himself only feeling.\n\n\n\n\u00a7 3.\n\nGod is man's highest feeling of self, freed from all contrarieties\nor disagreeables. God is the highest being; therefore, to feel God is\nthe highest feeling. But is not the highest feeling also the highest\nfeeling of self? So long as I have not had the feeling of the highest,\nso long I have not exhausted my capacity of feeling, so long I do\nnot yet fully know the nature of feeling. What, then, is an object to\nme in my feeling of the highest being? Nothing else than the highest\nnature of my power of feeling. So much as a man can feel, so much is\n(his) God. But the highest degree of the power of feeling is also the\nhighest degree of the feeling of self. In the feeling of the low I feel\nmyself lowered, in the feeling of the high I feel myself exalted. The\nfeeling of self and feeling are inseparable, otherwise feeling would\nnot belong to myself. Thus God, as an object of feeling, or what is\nthe same thing, the feeling of God, is nothing else than man's highest\nfeeling of self. But God is the freest, or rather the absolutely\nonly free being; thus God is man's highest feeling of freedom. How\ncouldst thou be conscious of the highest being as freedom, or freedom\nas the highest being, if thou didst not feel thyself free? But when\ndost thou feel thyself free? When thou feelest God. To feel God is\nto feel oneself free. For example, thou feelest desire, passion, the\nconditions of time and place, as limits. What thou feelest as a limit\nthou strugglest against, thou breakest loose from, thou deniest. The\nconsciousness of a limit, as such, is already an anathema, a sentence\nof condemnation pronounced on this limit, for it is an oppressive,\ndisagreeable, negative consciousness. Only the feeling of the good,\nof the positive, is itself good and positive--is joy. Joy alone\nis feeling in its element, its paradise, because it is unrestricted\nactivity. The sense of pain in an organ is nothing else than the sense\nof a disturbed, obstructed, thwarted activity; in a word, the sense\nof something abnormal, anomalous. Hence thou strivest to escape from\nthe sense of limitation into unlimited feeling. By means of the will,\nor the imagination, thou negativest limits, and thus obtainest the\nfeeling of freedom. This feeling of freedom is God. God is exalted\nabove desire and passion, above the limits of space and time. But\nthis exaltation is thy own exaltation above that which appears to\nthee as a limit. Does not this exaltation of the divine being exalt\nthee? How could it do so, if it were external to thee? No; God is\nan exalted being only for him who himself has exalted thoughts and\nfeelings. Hence the exaltation of the divine being varies according to\nthat which different men or nations perceive as a limitation to the\nfeeling of self, and which they consequently negative or eliminate\nfrom their ideal.\n\n\n\n\u00a7 4.\n\nThe distinction between the \"heathen,\" or philosophic, and the\nChristian God--the non-human, or pantheistic, and the human, personal\nGod--reduces itself only to the distinction between the understanding\nor reason and the heart or feelings. Reason is the self-consciousness\nof the species, as such; feeling is the self-consciousness of\nindividuality; the reason has relation to existences, as things;\nthe heart to existences, as persons. I am is an expression of the\nheart; I think, of the reason. Cogito, ergo sum? No! Sentio, ergo\nsum. Feeling only is my existence; thinking is my non-existence,\nthe negation of my individuality, the positing of the species; reason\nis the annihilation of personality. To think is an act of spiritual\nmarriage. Only beings of the same species understand each other;\nthe impulse to communicate thought is the intellectual impulse of\nsex. Reason is cold, because its maxim is, audiatur et altera pars,\nbecause it does not interest itself in man alone; but the heart is\na partisan of man. Reason loves all impartiality, but the heart only\nwhat is like itself. It is true that the heart has pity also on the\nbrutes, but only because it sees in the brute something more than the\nbrute. The heart loves only what it identifies with itself. It says:\nWhatsoever thou dost to this being, thou dost to me. The heart loves\nonly itself; does not get beyond itself, beyond man. The superhuman\nGod is nothing else than the supernatural heart; the heart does not\ngive us the idea of another, of a being different from ourselves. \"For\nthe heart, Nature is an echo, in which it hears only itself. Emotion,\nin the excess of its happiness, transfers itself to external things. It\nis the love which can withhold itself from no existence, which gives\nitself forth to all; but it only recognises as existing that which\nit knows to have emotion.\" [231] Reason, on the contrary, has pity\non animals, not because it finds itself in them, or identifies them\nwith man, but because it recognises them as beings distinct from man,\nnot existing simply for the sake of man, but also as having rights\nof their own. The heart sacrifices the species to the individual,\nthe reason sacrifices the individual to the species. The man without\nfeeling has no home, no private hearth. Feeling, the heart, is the\ndomestic life; the reason is the res publica of man. Reason is the\ntruth of Nature, the heart is the truth of man. To speak popularly,\nreason is the God of Nature, the heart the God of man;--a distinction\nhowever which, drawn thus sharply, is, like the others, only admissible\nin antithesis. Everything which man wishes, but which reason, which\nNature denies, the heart bestows. God, immortality, freedom, in the\nsupranaturalistic sense, exist only in the heart. The heart is itself\nthe existence of God, the existence of immortality. Satisfy yourselves\nwith this existence! You do not understand your heart; therein lies\nthe evil. You desire a real, external, objective immortality, a God\nout of yourselves. Here is the source of delusion.\n\nBut as the heart releases man from the limits, even the essential\nlimits of Nature; reason, on the other hand, releases Nature from\nthe limits of external finiteness. It is true that Nature is the\nlight and measure of reason;--a truth which is opposed to abstract\nIdealism. Only what is naturally true is logically true; what has no\nbasis in Nature has no basis at all. That which is not a physical\nlaw is not a metaphysical law. Every true law in metaphysics can\nand must be verified physically. But at the same time reason is\nalso the light of Nature;--and this truth is the barrier against\ncrude materialism. Reason is the nature of things come fully to\nitself, re-established in its entireness. Reason divests things of\nthe disguises and transformations which they have undergone in the\nconflict and agitation of the external world, and reduces them to\ntheir true character. Most, indeed nearly all, crystals--to give\nan obvious illustration--appear in Nature under a form altogether\ndifferent from their fundamental one; nay, many crystals never have\nappeared in their fundamental form. Nevertheless, the mineralogical\nreason has discovered that fundamental form. Hence nothing is more\nfoolish than to place Nature in opposition to reason, as an essence in\nitself incomprehensible to reason. If reason reduces transformations\nand disguises to their fundamental forms, does it not effect that which\nlies in the idea of Nature itself, but which, prior to the operation of\nreason, could not be effected on account of external hindrances? What\nelse then does reason do than remove external disturbances, influences,\nand obstructions, so as to present a thing as it ought to be, to make\nthe existence correspond to the idea; for the fundamental form is\nthe idea of the crystal. Another popular example. Granite consists of\nmica, quartz, and feldspar. But frequently other kinds of stone are\nmingled with it. If we had no other guide and tutor than the senses,\nwe should without hesitation reckon as constituent parts of granite\nall the kinds of stone which we ever find in combination with it;\nwe should say yes to everything the senses told us, and so never\ncome to the true idea of granite. But reason says to the credulous\nsenses: Quod non. It discriminates; it distinguishes the essential\nfrom the accidental elements. Reason is the midwife of Nature;\nit explains, enlightens, rectifies and completes Nature. Now that\nwhich separates the essential from the non-essential, the necessary\nfrom the accidental, what is proper to a thing from what is foreign,\nwhich restores what has been violently sundered to unity, and what has\nbeen forcibly united to freedom,--is not this divine? Is not such an\nagency as this the agency of the highest, of divine love? And how would\nit be possible that reason should exhibit the pure nature of things,\nthe original text of the universe, if it were not itself the purest,\nmost original essence? But reason has no partiality for this or that\nspecies of things. It embraces with equal interest the whole universe;\nit interests itself in all things and beings without distinction,\nwithout exception;--it bestows the same attention on the worm which\nhuman egoism tramples under its feet, as on man, as on the sun in\nthe firmament. Reason is thus the all-embracing, all-compassionating\nbeing, the love of the universe to itself. To reason alone belongs\nthe great work of the resurrection and restoration of all things\nand beings--universal redemption and reconciliation. Not even the\nunreasoning animal, the speechless plant, the unsentient stone,\nshall be excluded from this universal festival. But how would it be\npossible that reason should interest itself in all beings without\nexception, if reason were not itself universal and unlimited in its\nnature? Is a limited nature compatible with unlimited interest, or an\nunlimited interest with a limited nature? By what dost thou recognise\nthe limitation of a being but by the limitation of his interest? As\nfar as the interest extends, so far extends the nature. The desire of\nknowledge is infinite; reason then is infinite. Reason is the highest\nspecies of being;--hence it includes all species in the sphere of\nknowledge. Reason cannot content itself in the individual; it has\nits adequate existence only when it has the species for its object,\nand the species not as it has already developed itself in the past and\npresent, but as it will develop itself in the unknown future. In the\nactivity of reason I feel a distinction between myself and reason in\nme; this distinction is the limit of the individuality; in feeling I\nam conscious of no distinction between myself and feeling; and with\nthis absence of distinction there is an absence also of the sense of\nlimitation. Hence it arises that to so many men reason appears finite,\nand only feeling infinite. And, in fact, feeling, the heart of man\nas a rational being, is as infinite, as universal as reason; since\nman only truly perceives and understands that for which he has feeling.\n\nThus reason is the essence of Nature and Man, released from\nnon-essential limits, in their identity; it is the universal being,\nthe universal God. The heart, considered in its difference from the\nreason, is the private God of man; the personal God is the heart of\nman, emancipated from the limits or laws of Nature. [232]\n\n\n\n\u00a7 5.\n\nNature, the world, has no value, no interest for Christians. The\nChristian thinks only of himself and the salvation of his soul. \"A\nte incipiat cogitatio tua et in te finiatur, nec frustra in alia\ndistendaris, te neglecto. Praeter salutem tuam nihil cogites. De\ninter. Domo. (Among the spurious writings of St. Bernard.) Si\nte vigilanter homo attendas, mirum est, si ad aliud unquam\nintendas.--Divus Bernardus. (Tract. de XII grad. humil. et\nsup.).... Orbe sit sol major, an pedis unius latitudine\nmetiatur? alieno ex lumine an propriis luceat fulgoribus luna? quae\nneque scire compendium, neque ignorare detrimentum est ullum.... Res\nvestra in ancipiti sita est: salus dico animarum vestrarum.--Arnobius\n(adv. gentes, l. ii. c. 61). Quaero igitur ad quam rem scientia\nreferenda sit; si ad causas rerum naturalium, quae beatitudo erit mihi\nproposita, si sciero unde Nilus oriatur, vel quicquid de coelo Physici\ndelirant?--Lactantius (Instit. div. l. iii. c. 8). Etiam curiosi\nesse prohibemur.... Sunt enim qui desertis virtutibus et nescientes\nquid sit Deus ... magnum aliquid se agere putant, si universam istam\ncorporis molem, quam mundum nuncupamus, curiosissime intentissimeque\nperquirant.... Reprimat igitur se anima ab hujusmodi vanae cognitionis\ncupiditate, si se castam Deo servare disposuit. Tali enim amore\nplerumque decipitur, ut (aut) nihil putet esse nisi corpus.--Augustinus\n(de Mor. Eccl. cath. l. i. c. 21). De terrae quoque vel qualitate\nvel positione tractare, nihil prosit ad spem futuri, cum satis sit\nad scientiam, quod scripturarum divinarum series comprehendit,\nquod Deus suspendit terram in nihilo.--Ambrosius (Hexaemeron,\nl. i. c. 6). Longe utique praestantius est, nosse resurrecturam carnem\nac sine fine victuram, quam quidquid in ea medici, scrutando discere\npotuerunt.--Augustinus (de Anima et ejus orig. l. iv. c. 10).\" \"Let\nnatural science alone.... It is enough that thou knowest fire is hot,\nwater cold and moist.... Know how thou oughtest to treat thy field,\nthy cow, thy house and child--that is enough of natural science\nfor thee. Think how thou mayest learn Christ, who will show thee\nthyself, who thou art, and what is thy capability. Thus wilt thou\nlearn God and thyself, which no natural master or natural science\never taught.\"--Luther (Th. xiii. p. 264).\n\nSuch quotations as these, which might be multiplied indefinitely,\nshow clearly enough that true, religious Christianity has within\nit no principle of scientific and material culture, no motive to\nit. The practical end and object of Christians is solely heaven,\ni.e., the realised salvation of the soul. The theoretical end and\nobject of Christians is solely God, as the being identical with\nthe salvation of the soul. He who knows God knows all things; and\nas God is infinitely more than the world, so theology is infinitely\nmore than the knowledge of the world. Theology makes happy, for its\nobject is personified happiness. Infelix homo, qui scit illa omnia\n(created things) te autem nescit, Beatus autem qui te scit, etiam si\nilla nesciat.--Augustin (Confess. l. v. c. 4). Who then would, who\ncould exchange the blessed Divine Being for the unblessed worthless\nthings of this world? It is true that God reveals himself in Nature,\nbut only vaguely, dimly, only in his most general attributes;\nhimself, his true personal nature, he reveals only in religion,\nin Christianity. The knowledge of God through Nature is heathenism;\nthe knowledge of God through himself, through Christ, in whom dwelt\nthe fulness of the Godhead bodily, is Christianity. What interest,\ntherefore, should Christians have in occupying themselves with\nmaterial, natural things? Occupation with Nature, culture in general,\npresupposes, or, at least, infallibly produces, a heathenish, mundane,\nanti-theological, anti-supranaturalistic sentiment and belief. Hence\nthe culture of modern Christian nations is so little to be derived\nfrom Christianity, that it is only to be explained by the negation of\nChristianity, a negation which certainly was, in the first instance,\nonly practical. It is indeed necessary to distinguish between what\nthe Christians were as Christians and what they were as heathens,\nas natural men, and thus between that which they have said and done\nin agreement, and that which they have said and done in contradiction\nwith their faith. (See on this subject the author's P. Bayle.)\n\nHow frivolous, therefore, are modern Christians when they deck\nthemselves in the arts and sciences of modern nations as products\nof Christianity! How striking is the contrast in this respect\nbetween these modern boasters and the Christians of older times! The\nlatter knew of no other Christianity than that which is contained\nin the Christian faith, in faith in Christ; they did not reckon\nthe treasures and riches, the arts and sciences of this world as\npart of Christianity. In all these points, they rather conceded the\npre-eminence to the ancient heathens, the Greeks and Romans. \"Why\ndost thou not also wonder, Erasmus, that from the beginning of the\nworld there have always been among the heathens higher, rarer people,\nof greater, more exalted understanding, more excellent diligence and\nskill in all arts, than among Christians or the people of God? Christ\nhimself says that the children of this world are wiser than the\nchildren of light. Yea, who among the Christians could we compare\nfor understanding or application to Cicero (to say nothing of the\nGreeks, Demosthenes and others)?\"--Luther (Th. xix. p. 37). Quid\nigitur nos antecellimus? Num ingenio, doctrina, morum moderatione\nillos superamus? Nequaquam. Sed vera Dei agnitione, invocatione et\ncelebratione pr\u00e6stamus.--Melancthonis (et al. Declam. Th. iii. de\nvera invocat. Dei).\n\n\n\n\u00a7 6.\n\nIn religion man has in view himself alone, or, in regarding himself as\nthe object of God, as the end of the divine activity, he is an object\nto himself, his own end and aim. The mystery of the incarnation is\nthe mystery of the love of God to man, and the mystery of the love\nof God to man is the love of man to himself. God suffers--suffers for\nme--this is the highest self-enjoyment, the highest self-certainty of\nhuman feeling. \"God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten\nSon.\"--John iii. 16. \"If God be for us, who can be against us? He\nthat spared not his own Son, but gave him up for us all, how shall\nhe not with him also freely give us all things?\"--Rom. viii. 31,\n32. \"God commendeth his love towards us, in that, while we were\nyet sinners, Christ died for us.\"--Rom. v. 8. \"The life which I now\nlive in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved\nme, and gave himself for me.\"--Gal. ii. 20. See also Titus iii. 4;\nHeb. ii. 11. \"Credimus in unum Deum patrem ... et in unum Dominum\nJesum Christum filium Dei ... Deum ex Deo ... qui propter nos homines\net propter nostram salutem descendit et incarnatus et homo factus\nest passus.\"--Fides Nicaenae Synodi. \"Servator ... ex praeexcellenti\nin homines charitate non despexit carnis humanae imbecillitatem,\nsed ea indutus ad communem venit hominum salutem.\"--Clemens\nAlex. (Stromata, l. vii. ed. Wirceb. 1779). \"Christianos autem\nhaec universa docent, providentiam esse, maxime vero divinissimum et\npropter excellentiam amoris erga homines incredibilissimum providentiae\nopus, dei incarnatio, quae propter nos facta est.\"--Gregorii Nysseni\n(Philosophiae, l. viii. de Provid. c. i. 1512. B. Rhenanus. Jo. Cono\ninterp.) \"Venit siquidem universitatis creator et Dominus: venit\nad homines, venit propter homines, venit homo.\"--Divus Bernardus\nClarev. (de Adventu Domini, Basil, 1552). \"Videte, Fratres, quantum se\nhumiliavit propter homines Deus.... Unde non se ipse homo despiciat,\npropter quem utique ista subire dignatus est Deus.\"--Augustinus\n(Sermones ad pop. S. 371, c. 3). \"O homo propter quem Deus factus est\nhomo, aliquid magnum te credere debes.\" (S. 380, c. 2). \"Quis de se\ndesperet pro quo tam humilis esse voluit Filius Dei?\" Id. (de Agone\nChr. c. 11). \"Quis potest odire hominem cujus naturam et similitudinem\nvidet in humanitate Dei? Revera qui odit illum, odit Deum.\"--(Manuale,\nc. 26. Among the spurious writings of Augustine.) \"Plus nos amat\nDeus quam filium pater.... Propter nos filio non pepercit. Et quid\nplus addo? et hoc filio justo et hoc filio unigenito et hoc filio\nDeo. Et quid dici amplius potest? et hoc pro nobis, i.e. pro malis,\netc.\"--Salvianus (de gubernatione Dei. Rittershusius, 1611, pp. 126,\n127). \"Quid enim mentes nostras tantum erigit et ab immortalitatis\ndesperatione liberat, quam quod tanti nos fecit Deus, ut Dei\nfilius ... dignatus nostrum inire consortium mala nostra moriendo\nperferret.\"--Petrus Lomb. (lib. iii. dist. 20, c. 1). \"Attamen si\nilla quae miseriam nescit, misericordia non praecessisset, ad hanc\ncujus mater est miseria, non accessisset.\"--D. Bernardus (Tract. de\nXII. gradibus hum. et sup.) \"Ecce omnia tua sunt, quae habeo et\nunde tibi servio. Verum tamen vice versa tu magis mihi servis, quam\nego tibi. Ecce coelum et terra quae in ministerium hominis creasti,\npraesto sunt et faciunt quotidie quaecunque mandasti. Et hoc parum\nest: quin etiam Angelos in ministerium hominis ordinasti. Transcendit\nautem omnia, quia tu ipse homini servire dignatus es et te ipsum\ndaturum ei promisisti.\"--Thomas \u00e0 Kempis (de Imit. l. iii. c. 10). \"Ego\nomnipotens et altissimus, qui cuncta creavi ex nihilo me homini propter\nte humiliter subjeci.... Pepercit tibi oculus meus, quia pretiosa\nfuit anima tua in conspectu meo\" (ibid. c. 13). \"Fili ego descendi\nde coelo pro salute tua, suscepi tuas miserias, non necessitate,\nsed charitate trahente\" (ibid. c. 18). \"Si consilium rei tantae\nspectamus, quod totum pertinet, ut s. litterae demonstrant. ad salutem\ngeneris humani, quid potest esse dignius Deo, quam illa tanta hujus\nsalutis cura, et ut ita dicamus, tantus in ea re sumptus?... Itaque\nJesus Christus ipse cum omnibus Apostolis ... in hoc mysterio Filii\nDei en sarki phanerothentos angelis hominibusque patefactam esse\ndicunt magnitudinem sapientis bonitatis divinae.\"--J. A. Ernesti\n(Dignit. et verit. inc. Filii Dei asserta. Opusc. Theol. Lipsiae,\n1773, pp. 404, 405. How feeble, how spiritless compared with the\nexpressions of the ancient faith!) \"Propter me Christus suscepit\nmeas infirmitates, mei corporis subiit passiones, pro me peccatum\nh. e. pro omni homine, pro me maledictum factus est, etc. Ille flevit,\nne tu homo diu fleres. Ille injurias passus est, ne tu injuriam tuam\ndoleres.\"--Ambrosius (de fide ad Gratianum, l. ii. c. 4). \"God is\nnot against us men. For if God had been against us and hostile to us,\nhe would not assuredly have taken the poor wretched human nature on\nhimself.\" \"How highly our Lord God has honoured us, that he has caused\nhis own Son to become man! How could he have made himself nearer to\nus?\"--Luther (Th. xvi. pp. 533, 574). \"It is to be remarked that he\n(Stephen) is said to have seen not God himself but the man Christ,\nwhose nature is the dearest and likest and most consoling to man,\nfor a man would rather see a man than an angel or any other creature,\nespecially in trouble.\"--Id. (Th. xiii. p. 170). \"It is not thy\nkingly rule which draws hearts to thee, O wonderful heart!--but\nthy having become a man in the fulness of time, and thy walk upon\nthe earth, full of weariness.\" \"Though thou guidest the sceptre of\nthe starry realm, thou art still our brother; flesh and blood never\ndisowns itself.\" \"The most powerful charm that melts my heart is\nthat my Lord died on the cross for me.\" \"That it is which moves me;\nI love thee for thy love, that thou, the creator, the supreme prince,\nbecamest the Lamb of God for me.\" \"Thanks be to thee, dear Lamb of God,\nwith thousands of sinners' tears; thou didst die for me on the cross\nand didst seek me with yearning.\" \"Thy blood it is which has made\nme give myself up to thee, else I had never thought of thee through\nmy whole life.\" \"If thou hadst not laid hold upon me, I should never\nhave gone to seek thee.\" \"O how sweetly the soul feeds on the passion\nof Jesus! Shame and joy are stirred, O thou son of God and of man,\nwhen in spirit we see thee so willingly go to death on the cross for\nus, and each thinks: for me.\" \"The Father takes us under his care,\nthe Son washes us with his blood, the Holy Spirit is always labouring\nthat he may guide and teach us.\" \"Ah! King, great at all times, but\nnever greater than in the blood-stained robe of the martyr.\" \"My\nfriend is to me and I to him as the Cherubim over the mercy-seat:\nwe look at each other continually. He seeks repose in my heart, and\nI ever hasten towards his: he wishes to be in my soul, and I in the\nwound in his side.\" These quotations are taken from the Moravian\nhymn-book (Gesangbuch der Evangelischen Br\u00fcdergemeine. Gnadau,\n1824). We see clearly enough from the examples above given, that\nthe deepest mystery of the Christian religion resolves itself into\nthe mystery of human self-love, but that religious self-love is\ndistinguished from natural in this, that it changes the active into\nthe passive. It is true that the more profound, mystical religious\nsentiment abhors such naked, undisguised egoism as is exhibited in\nthe Herrnhut hymns; it does not in God expressly have reference to\nitself; it rather forgets, denies itself, demands an unselfish,\ndisinterested love of God, contemplates God in relation to God,\nnot to itself. \"Causa diligendi Deum, Deus est. Modus sine modo\ndiligere.... Qui Domino confitetur, non quoniam sibi bonus est, sed\nquoniam bonus est, hic vere diligit Deum propter Deum et non propter\nseipsum. Te enim quodammodo perdere, tanquam qui non sis et omnino non\nsentire te ipsum et a temetipso exinaniri et pene annullari, coelestis\nest conversationis, non humanae affectionis\" (thus the ideal of love,\nwhich, however, is first realised in heaven).--Bernhardus, Tract. de\ndilig. Deo (ad Haymericum). But this free, unselfish love is only the\nculmination of religious enthusiasm, in which the subject is merged\nin the object. As soon as the distinction presents itself--and it\nnecessarily does so--so soon does the subject have reference to itself\nas the object of God. And even apart from this: the religious subject\ndenies its ego, its personality, only because it has the enjoyment of\nblissful personality in God--God per se the realised salvation of the\nsoul, God the highest self-contentment, the highest rapture of human\nfeeling. Hence the saying: \"Qui Deum non diligit, seipsum non diligit.\"\n\n\n\n\u00a7 7.\n\nBecause God suffers man must suffer. The Christian religion is\nthe religion of suffering. \"Videlicet vestigia Salvatoris sequimur\nin theatris. Tale nobis scilicet Christus reliquit exemplum, quem\nflerisse legimus, risisse non legimus.\"--Salvianus (l. c. l. vi. \u00a7\n181). \"Christianorum ergo est pressuram pati in hoc saeculo et\nlugere, quorum est aeterna vita.\"--Origenes (Explan. in Ep. Pauli\nad Rom. l. ii. c. ii. interp. Hieronymo). \"Nemo vitam aeternam,\nincorruptibilem, immortalemque desiderat, nisi eum vitae hujus\ntemporalis, corruptibilis, mortalisque poeniteat.... Quid ergo cupimus,\nnisi ita non esse ut nunc sumus? Et quid ingemiscimus, nisi poenitendo,\nquia ita summus?\"--Augustinus (Sermones ad pop. S. 351, c. 3). \"Si\nquidem aliquid melius et utilius saluti hominum quam pati fuisset,\nChristus utique verbo et exemplo ostendisset.... Quoniam per multas\ntribulationes oportet nos intrare in regnum Dei.\"--Thomas \u00e0 Kempis\n(de Imit. l. ii. c. 12). When, however, the Christian religion\nis designated as the religion of suffering, this of course\napplies only to the Christianity of the \"mistaken\" Christians\nof old times. Protestantism, in its very beginning, denied the\nsufferings of Christ as constituting a principle of morality. It is\nprecisely the distinction between Catholicism and Protestantism,\nin relation to this subject, that the latter, out of self-regard,\nattached itself only to the merits of Christ, while the former,\nout of sympathy, attached itself to his sufferings. \"Formerly in\nPopery the sufferings of the Lord were so preached, that it was\nonly pointed out how his example should be imitated. After that,\nthe time was filled up with the sufferings and sorrows of Mary,\nand the compassion with which Christ and his mother were bewailed;\nand the only aim was how to make it piteous, and move the people\nto compassion and tears, and he who could do this well was held the\nbest preacher for Passion-Week. But we preach the Lord's sufferings\nas the Holy Scripture teaches us.... Christ suffered for the praise\nand glory of God ... but to me, and thee, and all of us, he suffered\nin order to bring redemption and blessedness.... The cause and\nend of the sufferings of Christ is comprised in this--he suffered\nfor us. This honour is to be given to no other suffering.\"--Luther\n(Th. xvi. p. 182). \"Lamb! I weep only for joy over thy suffering;\nthe suffering was thine, but thy merit is mine!\" \"I know of no joys\nbut those which come from thy sufferings.\" \"It remains ever in my\nmind that it cost thee thy blood to redeem me.\" \"O my Immanuel! how\nsweet is it to my soul when thou permittest me to enjoy the outpouring\nof thy blood.\" \"Sinners are glad at heart that they have a Saviour\n... it is wondrously beautiful to them to see Jesus on the Cross\"\n(Moravian hymn-book). It is therefore not to be wondered at if\nChristians of the present day decline to know anything more of the\nsufferings of Christ. It is they, forsooth, who have first made out\nwhat true Christianity is--they rely solely on the divine word of the\nHoly Scriptures. And the Bible, as every one knows, has the valuable\nquality that everything may be found in it which it is desired to\nfind. What once stood there, of course now stands there no longer. The\nprinciple of stability has long vanished from the Bible. Divine\nrevelation is as changing as human opinion. Tempora mutantur.\n\n\n\n\u00a7 8.\n\nThe mystery of the Trinity is the mystery of participated, social\nlife--the mystery of I and thou. \"Unum Deum esse confitemur. Non sic\nunum Deum, quasi solitarium, nec eundem, qui ipse sibi pater, sit\nipse filius, sed patrem verum, qui genuit filium verum, i.e. Deum\nex Deo ... non creatum, sed genitum.\"--Concil. Chalced. (Carranza\nSumma, 1559. p. 139). \"Si quis quod scriptum est: Faciamus hominem,\nnon patrem ad filium dicere, sed ipsum ad semetipsum asserit dixisse\nDeum, anathema sit.\"--Concil. Syrmiense (ibid. p. 68). \"Jubet\nautem his verbis: Faciamus hominem, prodeat herba. Ex quibus\napparet, Deum cum aliquo sibi proximo sermones his de rebus\nconserere. Necesse est igitur aliquem ei adfuisse, cum quo\nuniversa condens, colloquium miscebat.\"--Athanasius (Contra Gentes\nOrat. Ath. Opp. Parisiis, 1627, Th. i. p. 51). \"Professio enim\nconsortii sustulit intelligentiam singularitatis, quod consortium\naliquid nec potest esse sibi ipsi solitario, neque rursum solitudo\nsolitarii recipit: faciamus.... Non solitario convenit dicere:\nfaciamus et nostram.\"--Petrus Lomb. (l. i. dist. 2, c. 3, e.). The\nProtestants explain the passage in the same way. \"Quod profecto\naliter intelligi nequit, quam inter ipsas trinitatis personas\nquandam de creando homine institutam fuisse consultationem.\"--Buddeus\n(comp. Inst. Theol. dog. cur. J. G. Walch. l. ii. c. i. \u00a7 45). \"'Let\nus make' is the word of a deliberative council. And from these words\nit necessarily follows again, that in the Godhead there must be more\nthan one person.... For the little word 'us' indicates that he who\nthere speaks is not alone, though the Jews make the text ridiculous\nby saying that there is a way of speaking thus, even where there is\nonly one person.\"--Luther (Th. i. p. 19). Not only consultations,\nbut compacts take place between the chief persons in the Trinity,\nprecisely as in human society. \"Nihil aliud superest, quam ut consensum\nquemdam patris ac filii adeoque quoddam velut pactum (in relation,\nnamely, to the redemption of men) inde concludamus.\"--Buddeus\n(Comp. l. iv. c. i. \u00a7 4, note 2). And as the essential bond of the\nDivine Persons is love, the Trinity is the heavenly type of the closest\nbond of love--marriage. \"Nunc Filium Dei ... precemur, ut spiritu\nsancto suo, qui nexus est et vinculum mutui amoris inter aeternum\npatrem ac filium, sponsi et spons\u00e6 pectora conglutinet.\"--Or. de\nConjugio (Declam. Melancth. Th. iii. p. 453).\n\nThe distinctions in the Divine essence of the Trinity are\nnatural, physical distinctions. \"Jam de proprietatibus personarum\nvideamus.... Et est proprium solius patris, non quod non est\nnatus ipse, sed quod unum filium genuerit, propriumque solius\nfilii, non quod ipse non genuit, sed quod de patris essentia\nnatus est.\"--Hylarius in l. iii. de Trinitate. \"Nos filii Dei\nsumus, sed non talis hic filius. Hic enim verus et proprius\nest filius origine, non adoptione, veritate, non nuncupatione,\nnativitate, non creatione.\"--Petrus L. (l. i. dist. 26, cc. 2,\n4). \"Quodsi dum eum aeternum confitemur, profitemur ipsum Filium\nex Patre, quomodo is, qui genitus est, genitoris frater esse\npoterit?... Non enim ex aliquo principio praeexistente Pater et\nFilius procreati sunt, ut fratres existimari queant, sed Pater\nprincipium Filii et genitor est: et Pater Pater est neque ullius\nFilius fuit, et Filius Filius est et non frater.\"--Athanasius\n(Contra Arianos. Orat. II. Ed. c. T. i. p. 320). \"Qui (Deus)\ncum in rebus quae nascuntur in tempore, sua bonitate effecerit,\nut suae substantiae prolem quaelibet res gignat, sicut homo gignit\nhominem, non alterius naturae, sed ejus cujus ipse est, vide quam\nimpie dicatur ipse non gennisse id quod ipse est.\"--Augustinus\n(Ep. 170, \u00a7 6. ed. Antwp. 1700). \"Ut igitur in natura hominum filium\ndicimus genitum de substantia patris, similem patri: ita secunda\npersona Filius dicitur, quia de substantia Patris natus est et\nejus est imago.\"--Melancthon (Loci praecipui Theol. Witebergae,\n1595, p. 30). \"As a corporeal son has his flesh and blood and\nnature from his father, so also the Son of God, born of the\nFather, has his divine nature from the Father of Eternity.\"--Luther\n(Th. ix. p. 408). H. A. Roel, a theologian of the school of Descartes\nand Coccejus, had advanced this thesis: \"Filium Dei, Secundam Deitatis\npersonam improprie dici genitam.\" This was immediately opposed by\nhis colleague, Camp. Vitringa, who declared it an unheard-of thesis,\nand maintained: \"Generationem Filii Dei ab aeterno propriissime\nenunciari.\" Other theologians also contended against Roel, and\ndeclared: \"Generationem in Deo esse maxime veram et propriam.\"--(Acta\nErudit. Supplem. T. i. S. vii. p. 377, etc.). That in the Bible\nalso the Filius Dei signifies a real son is unequivocally implied in\nthis passage: \"God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten\nSon.\" If the love of God, which this passage insists upon, is to be\nregarded as a truth, then the Son also must be a truth, and, in plain\nlanguage, a physical truth. On this lies the emphasis that God gave\nhis own Son for us--in this alone the proof of his great love. Hence\nthe Herrnhut hymn-book correctly apprehends the sense of the Bible\nwhen it says of \"the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is also\nour Father:\" \"His Son is not too dear. No! he gives him up for me,\nthat he may save me from the eternal fire by his dear blood. Thou\nhast so loved the world that thy heart consents to give up the Son,\nthy joy and life, to suffering and death.\"\n\nGod is a threefold being, a trinity of persons, means: God is not\nonly a metaphysical, abstract, spiritual, but a physical being. The\ncentral point of the Trinity is the Son, for the Father is Father only\nthrough the Son; but the mystery of the generation of the Son is the\nmystery of physical nature. The Son is the need of sensuousness,\nor of the heart, satisfied in God; for all wishes of the heart,\neven the wish for a personal God and for heavenly felicity,\nare sensuous wishes;--the heart is essentially materialistic, it\ncontents itself only with an object which is seen and felt. This is\nespecially evident in the conception that the Son, even in the midst\nof the Divine Trinity, has the human body as an essential, permanent\nattribute. Ambrosius: \"Scriptum est Ephes. i.: Secundum carnem igitur\nomnia ipsi subjecta traduntur.\" Chrysostomus: \"Christum secundum carnem\npater jussit a cunctis angelis adorari.\" Theodoretus: \"Corpus Dominicum\nsurrexit quidem a mortuis, divina glorificata gloria ... corpus\ntamen est et habet, quam prius habuit, circumscriptionem.\" (See\nConcordienbuchs-anhang. \"Zeugnisse der h. Schrift und Altv\u00e4ter von\nChristo,\" and Petrus L. l. iii. dist. 10, cc. 1, 2. See also on this\nsubject Luther, Th. xix. pp. 464-468.) In accordance with this the\nUnited Brethren say: \"I will ever embrace thee in love and faith,\nuntil, when at length my lips are pale in death, I shall see thee\nbodily.\" \"Thy eyes, thy mouth, the body wounded for us, on which we\nso firmly rely,--all that I shall behold.\"\n\nHence the Son of God is the darling of the human heart, the bridegroom\nof the soul, the object of a formal, personal love. \"O Domine Jesu,\nsi adeo sunt dulces istae lachrymae, quae ex memoria et desiderio tui\nexcitantur, quam dulce erit gaudium, quod ex manifesta tui visione\ncapietur? Si adeo dulce est flere pro te, quam dulce erit gaudere de\nte. Sed quid hujusmodi secreta colloquia proferimus in publicum? Cur\nineffabiles et innarrabiles affectus communibus verbis conamur\nexprimere? Inexperti talia non intelligunt. Zelotypus est sponsus\niste.... Delicatus est sponsus iste.\"--Scala Claustralium (sive de modo\norandi. Among the spurious writings of St. Bernard). \"Luge propter\namorem Jesu Christi, sponsi tui, quosque eum videre possis.\"--(De\nmodo bene vivendi. Sermo x. id.) \"Adspectum Christi, qui adhuc\ninadspectabilis et absens amorem nostrum meruit et exercuit,\nfrequentius scripturae commemorant. Joh. xiv. 3; 1 Joh. iii. 1;\n1 Pet. i. 8; 1 Thess. iv. 17. Ac quis non jucundum credat videre\ncorpus illud, cujus velut instrumento usus est filius Dei ad\nexpianda peccata, et absentem tandem amicum salutare?\"--Doederlein\n(Inst. Theol. Chr. l. ii. P. ii. C. ii. Sect. ii. \u00a7 302. Obs. 3). \"Quod\noculis corporis Christum visuri simus, dubio caret.\"--J. Fr. Buddeus\n(Comp. Inst. Theol. Dogm. l. ii. c. iii. \u00a7 10).\n\nThe distinction between God with the Son, or the sensuous God, and God\nwithout the Son, or God divested of sensuousness, is nothing further\nthan the distinction between the mystical and the rational man. The\nrational man lives and thinks; with him life is the complement of\nthought, and thought the complement of life, both theoretically,\ninasmuch as he convinces himself of the reality of sensuousness through\nthe reason itself, and practically, inasmuch as he combines activity\nof life with activity of thought. That which I have in life, I do not\nneed to posit beyond life, in spirit, in metaphysical existence, in\nGod; love, friendship, perception, the world in general, give me what\nthought does not, cannot give me, nor ought to give me. Therefore I\ndismiss the needs of the heart from the sphere of thought, that reason\nmay not be clouded by desires;--in the demarcation of activities\nconsists the wisdom of life and thought;--I do not need a God who\nsupplies by a mystical, imaginary physicalness or sensuousness\nthe absence of the real. My heart is satisfied before I enter into\nintellectual activity; hence my thought is cold, indifferent, abstract,\ni.e., free, in relation to the heart, which oversteps its limits,\nand improperly mixes itself with the affairs of the reason. Thus I\ndo not think in order to satisfy my heart, but to satisfy my reason,\nwhich is not satisfied by the heart; I think only in the interest\nof reason, from pure desire of knowledge, I seek in God only the\ncontentment of the pure, unmixed intelligence. Necessarily, therefore,\nthe God of the rational thinker is another than the God of the heart,\nwhich in thought, in reason, only seeks its own satisfaction. And\nthis is the aim of the mystic, who cannot endure the luminous fire\nof discriminating and limiting criticism; for his mind is always\nbeclouded by the vapours which rise from the unextinguished ardour\nof his feelings. He never attains to abstract, i.e., disinterested,\nfree thought, and for that reason he never attains to the perception\nof things in their naturalness, truth, and reality.\n\nOne more remark concerning the Trinity. The older theologians said\nthat the essential attributes of God as God were made manifest by\nthe light of natural reason. But how is it that reason can know the\nDivine Being, unless it be because the Divine Being is nothing else\nthan the objective nature of the intelligence itself? Of the Trinity,\non the other hand, they said that it could only be known through\nrevelation. Why not through reason; because it contradicts reason,\ni.e., because it does not express a want of the reason, but a sensuous,\nemotional want. In general, the proposition that an idea springs from\nrevelation means no more than that it has come to us by the way of\ntradition. The dogmas of religion have arisen at certain times out\nof definite wants, under definite relations and conceptions; for this\nreason, to the men of a later time, in which these relations, wants,\nconceptions, have disappeared, they are something unintelligible,\nincomprehensible, only traditional, i.e., revealed. The antithesis\nof revelation and reason reduces itself only to the antithesis of\nhistory and reason, only to this, that mankind at a given time is no\nlonger capable of that which at another time it was quite capable of;\njust as the individual man does not unfold his powers at all times\nindifferently, but only in moments of special appeal from without or\nincitement from within. Thus the works of genius arise only under\naltogether special inward and outward conditions which cannot thus\ncoincide more than once; they are apax legomena. \"Einmal ist alles\nwahre nur.\" The true is born but once. Hence a man's own works often\nappear to him in later years quite strange and incomprehensible. He no\nlonger knows how he produced them or could produce them, i.e., he can\nno longer explain them out of himself, still less reproduce them. And\njust as it would be folly if, in riper years, because the productions\nof our youth have become strange and inexplicable to us in their tenor\nand origin, we were to refer them to a special inspiration from above;\nso it is folly, because the doctrines and ideas of a past age are\nno longer recognised by the reason of a subsequent age, to claim for\nthem a supra- and extra-human, i.e., an imaginary, illusory origin.\n\n\n\n\u00a7 9.\n\nThe creation out of nothing expresses the non-divineness,\nnon-essentiality, i.e., the nothingness of the world.\n\nThat is created which once did not exist, which some time will\nexist no longer, to which, therefore, it is possible not to exist,\nwhich we can think of as not existing, in a word, which has not its\nexistence in itself, is not necessary. \"Cum enim res producantur ex suo\nnon-esse, possunt ergo absolute non-esse, adeoque implicat, quod non\nsunt necessari\u00e6.\"--Duns Scotus (ap. Rixner, B. ii. p. 78). But only\nnecessary existence is existence. If I am not necessary, do not feel\nmyself necessary, I feel that it is all one whether I exist or not,\nthat thus my existence is worthless, nothing. \"I am nothing,\" and \"I\nam not necessary,\" is fundamentally the same thing. \"Creatio non est\nmotus, sed simplicis divinae voluntatis vocatio ad esse eorum, quae\nantea nihil fuerunt et secundum se ipsa et nihil sunt et ex nihilo\nsunt.\"--Albertus M. (de. Mirab. Scient. Dei P. ii. Tr. i. Qu. 4,\nArt. 5, memb. ii.) But the position that the world is not necessary,\nhas no other bearing than to prove that the extra- and supra-mundane\nbeing (i.e., in fact, the human being) is the only necessary, only\nreal being. Since the one is non-essential and temporal, the other is\nnecessarily the essential, existent, eternal. The creation is the proof\nthat God is, that he is exclusively true and real. \"Sanctus Dominus\nDeus omnipotens in principio, quod est in te, in sapientia tua, quae\nnata est de substantia tua, fecisti aliquid et de nihilo. Fecisti enim\ncoelum et terram non de te, nam esset aequale unigenito tuo, ac per hoc\net tibi, et nullo modo justum esset, ut aequale tibi esset, quod in te\nnon esset. Et aliud praeter te non erat, unde faceres ea Deus.... Et\nideo de nihilo fecisti coelum et terram.\"--Augustinus (Confessionum\nl. xii c. 7). \"Vere enim ipse est, quia incommutabilis est. Omnis enim\nmutatio facit non esse quod erat.... Ei ergo qui summe est, non potest\nesse contrarium nisi quod non est.--Si solus ipse incommutabilis, omnia\nquae fecit, quia ex nihilo id est ex eo quod omnino non est--fecit,\nmutabilia sunt.\"--Augustin (de nat. boni adv. Manich. cc. 1,\n19). \"Creatura in nullo debet parificari Deo, si autem non habuisset\ninitium durationis et esse, in hoc parificaretur Deo.\"--(Albertus\nM. l. c. Quaest. incidens 1). The positive, the essential in the\nworld is not that which makes it a world, which distinguishes it from\nGod--this is precisely its finiteness and nothingness--but rather that\nin it which is not itself, which is God. \"All creatures are a pure\nnothing ... they have no essential existence, for their existence\nhangs on the presence of God. If God turned himself away a moment,\nthey would fall to nothing.\"--(Predigten vor. u. zu. Tauleri Zeiten,\ned. c. p. 29. See also Augustine, e.g. Confess. l. vii. c. 11). This\nis quite correctly said from the standpoint of religion, for God\nis the principle of existence, the being of the world, though he\nis represented as a personal being distinct from the world. The\nworld lasts so long as God wills. The world is transient, but man\neternal. \"Quamdiu vult, omnia ejus virtute manent atque consistunt,\net finis eorum in Dei voluntatem recurrit, et ejus arbitrio\nresolvuntur.\"--Ambrosius (Hexaemeron. l. i. c. 5). \"Spiritus\nenim a Deo creati nunquam esse desinunt.... Corpora coelestia\ntam diu conservantur, quamdiu Deus ea vult permanere.\"--Buddeus\n(Comp. l. ii. c. ii. \u00a7 47). \"The dear God does not alone create,\nbut what he creates he keeps with his own being, until he wills that\nit shall be no longer. For the time will come when the sun, moon,\nand stars shall be no more.\"--Luther (Th. ix. s. 418). \"The end will\ncome sooner than we think.\"--Id. (Th. xi. s. 536). By means of the\ncreation out of nothing man gives himself the certainty that the world\nis nothing, is powerless against man. \"We have a Lord who is greater\nthan the whole world; we have a Lord so powerful, that when he only\nspeaks all things are born.... Wherefore should we fear, since he is\nfavourable to us?\"--Id. (Th. vi. p. 293). Identical with the belief in\nthe creation out of nothing is the belief in the eternal life of man,\nin the victory over death, the last constraint which nature imposes\non man--in the resurrection of the dead. \"Six thousand years ago\nthe world was nothing; and who has made the world?... The same God\nand Creator can also awake thee from the dead; he will do it, and\ncan do it.\"--Id. (Th. xi. p. 426. See also 421, &c.) \"We Christians\nare greater and more than all creatures, not in or by ourselves, but\nthrough the gift of God in Christ, against whom the world is nothing,\nand can do nothing.\"--Id. (Th. xi. p. 377).\n\n\n\n\u00a7 10.\n\nThe Creation in the Israelitish religion has only a particular,\negoistic aim and purport. The Israelitish religion is the religion of\nthe most narrow-hearted egoism. Even the later Israelites, scattered\nthroughout the world, persecuted and oppressed, adhered with immovable\nfirmness to the egoistic faith of their forefathers. \"Every Israelitish\nsoul by itself is, in the eyes of the blessed God, dearer and more\nprecious than all the souls of a whole nation besides.\" \"The Israelites\nare among the nations what the heart is among the members.\" \"The end\nin the creation of the world was Israel alone. The world was created\nfor the sake of the Israelites; they are the fruit, other nations\nare their husks.\" \"All the heathens are nothing for him (God); but\nfor the Israelites God has a use.... They adore and bless the name\nof the holy and blessed God every day, therefore they are numbered\nevery hour, and made as (numerous as) the grains of corn.\" \"If the\nIsraelites were not, there would fall no rain on the world, and the sun\nwould not rise but for their sakes.\" \"He (God) is our kinsman, and we\nare his kindred.... No power or angel is akin to us, for the Lord's\nportion is his people\" (Deut. xxxii. 9). \"He who rises up against\nan Israelite (to injure him), does the same thing as if he rose up\nagainst God.\" \"If anyone smite an Israelite on the cheek, it is the\nsame as if he smote the cheek of the divine majesty.\"--Eisenmengers\n(Entdecktes Judenthum, T. i. Kap. 14). The Christians blamed the\nJews for this arrogance, but only because the kingdom of God was\ntaken from them and transferred to the Christians. Accordingly,\nwe find the same thoughts and sentiments in the Christians as in\nthe Israelites. \"Know that God so takes thee unto himself that\nthy enemies are his enemies.\"--Luther (T. vi. p. 99). \"It is the\nChristians for whose sake God spares the whole world.... The Father\nmakes his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on\nthe just and on the unjust. Yet this happens only for the sake of the\npious and thankful.\" (T. xvi. p. 506.) \"He who despises me despises\nGod.\" (T. xi. p. 538.) \"God suffers, and is despised and persecuted,\nin us.\" (T. iv. p. 577.) Such declarations as these are, I should\nthink, argumenta ad hominem for the identity of God and man.\n\n\n\n\u00a7 11.\n\nThe idea of Providence is the religious consciousness of man's\ndistinction from the brutes, from Nature in general. \"Doth God take\ncare for oxen?\" (1 Cor. ix. 9.) \"Nunquid curae est Deo bobus? inquit\nPaulus. Ad nos ea cura dirigitur, non ad boves, equos, asinos, qui\nin usum nostrum sunt conditi.\"--J. L. Vivis Val. (de Veritate Fidei\nChr. Bas. 1544, p. 108). \"Providentia Dei in omnibus aliis creaturis\nrespicit ad hominem tanquam ad metam suam. Multis passeribus vos pluris\nestis. Matth. x. 31. Propter peccatum hominis natura subjecta est\nvanitati. Rom. viii. 20.\"--M. Chemnitii (Loci theol. Francof. 1608,\nP. i. p. 312). \"Nunquid enim cura est Deo de bobus? Et sicut non\nest cura Deo de bobus, ita nec de aliis irrationalibus. Dicit tamen\nscriptura (Sapient. vi.) quia ipsi cura est de omnibus. Providentiam\nergo et curam universaliter de cunctis, quae condidit, habet.... Sed\nspecialem providentiam atque curam habet de rationalibus.\"--Petrus\nL. (l. i. dist. 39, c. 3). Here we have again an example how Christian\nsophistry is a product of Christian faith, especially of faith in the\nBible as the word of God. First we read that God cares not for oxen;\nthen that God cares for everything, and therefore for oxen. That is\na contradiction; but the word of God must not contradict itself. How\ndoes faith escape from this contradiction? By distinguishing between a\ngeneral and a special providence. But general providence is illusory,\nis in truth no providence. Only special providence is providence in\nthe sense of religion.\n\nGeneral providence--the providence which extends itself equally to\nirrational and rational beings, which makes no distinction between\nman and the lilies of the field or the fowls of the air, is nothing\nelse than the idea of Nature--an idea which man may have without\nreligion. The religious consciousness admits this when it says:\nhe who denies providence abolishes religion, places man on a level\nwith the brutes;--thus declaring that the providence in which the\nbrutes have a share is in truth no providence. Providence partakes of\nthe character of its object; hence the providence which has plants\nand animals for its object is in accordance with the qualities and\nrelations of plants and animals. Providence is nothing else than\nthe inward nature of a thing; this inward nature is its genius,\nits guardian spirit--the necessity of its existence. The higher,\nthe more precious a being is,--the more ground of existence it has,\nthe more necessary it is, the less is it open to annihilation. Every\nbeing is necessary only through that by which it is distinguished\nfrom other beings; its specific difference is the ground of its\nexistence. So man is necessary only through that by which he is\ndistinguished from the brutes; hence providence is nothing else\nthan man's consciousness of the necessity of his existence, of the\ndistinction between his nature and that of other beings; consequently\nthat alone is the true providence in which this specific difference\nof man becomes an object to him. But this providence is special,\ni.e., the providence of love, for only love interests itself in\nwhat is special to a being. Providence without love is a conception\nwithout basis, without reality. The truth of providence is love. God\nloves men, not brutes, not plants; for only for man's sake does he\nperform extraordinary deeds, deeds of love--miracles. Where there\nis no community there is no love. But what bond can be supposed to\nunite brutes, or natural things in general, with God? God does not\nrecognise himself in them, for they do not recognise him;--where I\nfind nothing of myself, how can I love? \"God who thus promises, does\nnot speak with asses and oxen, as Paul says: Doth God take care for\noxen? but with rational creatures made in his likeness, that they may\nlive for ever with him.\" Luther (Th. ii. s. 156). God is first with\nhimself in man; in man first begins religion, providence; for the\nlatter is not something different from the former, on the contrary,\nreligion is itself the providence of man. He who loses religion, i.e.,\nfaith in himself, faith in man, in the infinite significance of his\nbeing, in the necessity of his existence, loses providence. He alone is\nforsaken who forsakes himself; he alone is lost who despairs; he alone\nis without God who is without faith, i.e., without courage. Wherein\ndoes religion place the true proof of providence? in the phenomena\nof Nature, as they are objects to us out of religion,--in astronomy,\nin physics, in natural history? No! In those appearances which are\nobjects of religion, of faith only, which express only the faith\nof religion in itself, i.e., in the truth and reality of man,--in\nthe religious events, means, and institutions which God has ordained\nexclusively for the salvation of man, in a word, in miracles; for the\nmeans of grace, the sacraments, belong to the class of providential\nmiracles. \"Quamquam autem haec consideratio universae naturae nos\nadmonet de Deo ... tamen nos referamus initio mentem et oculos ad\nomnia testimonia, in quibus se Deus ecclesiae patefecit ad eductionem\nex Aegypto, ad vocem sonantem in Sinai, ad Christum resuscitantem\nmortuos et resuscitatum, etc.... Ideo semper defixae sint mentes\nin horum testimoniorum cogitationem et his confirmatae articulum de\nCreatione meditentur, deinde considerent etiam vestigia Dei impressae\nnaturae.\"--Melancthon (Loci de Creat. p. 62, ed. cit.). \"Mirentur\nalii creationem, mihi magis libet mirari redemptionem. Mirabile est,\nquod caro nostra et ossa nostra a Deo nobis sunt formata, mirabilius\nadhuc est, quod ipse Deus caro de carne nostra et os de ossibus nostris\nfieri voluit.\"--J. Gerhard (Med. s. M. 15). \"The heathens know God\nno further than that he is a Creator.\"--Luther (T. ii. p. 327). That\nprovidence has only man for its essential object is evident from this,\nthat to religious faith all things and beings are created for the sake\nof man. \"We are lords not only of birds, but of all living creatures,\nand all things are given for our service, and are created only for\nour sake.\"--Luther (T. ix. p. 281). But if things are created only\nfor the sake of man, they are also preserved only for the sake of\nman. And if things are mere instruments of man, they stand under\nthe protection of no law, they are, in relation to man, without\nrights. This outlawing of things explains miracle.\n\nThe negation of providence is the negation of God. \"Qui ergo\nprovidentiam tollit, totum Dei substantiam tollit et quid dicit\nnisi Deum non esse?... Si non curat humana, sive nesciens, cessat\nomnis causa pietatis, cum sit spes nulla salutis.\"--Joa. Trithemius\n(Tract. de Provid. Dei). \"Nam qui nihil aspici a Deo affirmant prope\nest ut cui adspectum adimunt, etiam substantiam tollant.\"--Salvianus\n(l. c. l. iv.). \"Aristotle almost falls into the opinion that\nGod--though he does not expressly name him a fool--is such a one that\nhe knows nothing of our affairs, nothing of our designs, understands,\nsees, regards nothing but himself.... But what is such a God or Lord\nto us? of what use is he to us?\"--Luther (in Walch's Philos. Lexikon,\nart. Vorsehung). Providence is therefore the most undeniable, striking\nproof that in religion, in the nature of God himself, man is occupied\nonly with himself, that the mystery of theology is anthropology, that\nthe substance, the content of the infinite being, is the \"finite\"\nbeing. \"God sees men,\" means: in God man sees only himself; \"God\ncares for man,\" means: a God who is not active is no real God. But\nthere is no activity without an object: it is the object which first\nconverts activity from a mere power into real activity. This object is\nman. If man did not exist, God would have no cause for activity. Thus\nman is the motive principle, the soul of God. A God who does not see\nand hear man, who has not man in himself, is blind and deaf, i.e.,\ninert, empty, unsubstantial. Thus the fulness of the divine nature\nis the fulness of the human; thus the Godhead of God is humanity. I\nfor myself, is the comfortless mystery of epicureanism, stoicism,\npantheism; God for me, this is the consolatory mystery of religion,\nof Christianity. Is man for God's sake, or God for man's? It is true\nthat in religion man exists for God's sake, but only because God\nexists for man's sake. I am for God because God is for me.\n\nProvidence is identical with miraculous power, supernaturalistic\nfreedom from Nature, the dominion of arbitrariness over law. \"Etsi\n(sc. Deus) sustentat naturam, tamen contra ordinem jussit aliquando\nSolem regredi, etc.... Ut igitur invocatio vere fieri possit,\ncogitemus Deum sic adesse suo opificio, non, ut Stoici fingunt,\nalligatum secundis causis, sed sustentantem naturam et multa suo\nliberrimo consilio moderantem.... Multa facit prima causa praeter\nsecundas, quia est agens liberum.\"--Melancthon (Loci de Caus\u00e2\nPeccati, pp. 82, 83, ed. cit.) \"Scriptura vero tradit, Deum in\nactione providentiae esse agens liberum, qui ut plurimum quidem\nordinem sui operis servet, illi tamen ordini non sit alligatus,\nsed 1) quicquid facit per causas secundas, illud possit etiam sine\nillis per se solum facere 2) quod ex causis secundis possit alium\neffectum producere, quam ipsarum dispositio et natura ferat 3)\nquod positis ausis secundis in actu, Deus tamen effectum possit\nimpedire, mutare, mitigare, exasperare.... Non igitur est connexio\ncausarum Stoica in actionibus providentiae Dei.\"--M. Chemnitius\n(l. c. pp. 316, 317). \"Liberrime Deus imperat naturae--Naturam saluti\nhominum attemperat propter Ecclesiam.... Omnino tribuendus est Deo hic\nhonos, quod possit et velit opitulari nobis, etiam cum a tota natura\ndestituimur, contra seriem omnium secundarum causarum.... Et multa\naccidunt plurimis hominibus, in quibus mirandi eventus fateri eos\ncogunt, se a Deo sine causis secundis servatos esse.\"--C. Peucerus\n(de Praecip. Divinat. gen. Servestae, 1591, p. 44). \"Ille tamen qui\nomnium est conditor, nullis instrumentis indiget. Nam si id continuo\nfit, quicquid ipse vult, velle illius erit author atque instrumentum;\nnec magis ad haec regenda astris indiget, quam cum luto aperuit\noculos coeci, sicut refert historia Evangelica. Lutum enim magis\nvidebatur obturaturum oculos, quam aperturum. Sed ipse ostendere nobis\nvoluit omnem naturam esse sibi instrumentum ad quidvis, quantumcunque\nalienum.\"--J. L. Vives (l. c. 102). \"How is this to be reconciled? The\nair gives food and nourishment, and here stones or rocks flow with\nwater; it is a marvellous gift. And it is also strange and marvellous\nthat corn grows out of the earth. Who has this art and this power? God\nhas it, who can do such unnatural things, that we may thence imagine\nwhat sort of a God he is and what sort of power he has, that we may\nnot be terrified at him nor despair, but firmly believe and trust him,\nthat he can make the leather in the pocket into gold, and can make dust\ninto corn on the earth, and the air a cellar for me full of wine. He\nis to be trusted, as having such great power, and we may know that we\nhave a God who can perform these deeds of skill, and that around him\nit rains and snows with miraculous works.\"--Luther (T. iii. p. 594).\n\nThe omnipotence of Providence is the omnipotence of human feeling\nreleasing itself from all conditions and laws of Nature. This\nomnipotence is realised by prayer. Prayer is Almighty. \"The prayer\nof faith shall save the sick.... The effectual fervent prayer of a\nrighteous man availeth much. Elias was a man subject to like passions\nas we are, and he prayed earnestly that it might not rain; and it\nrained not on the earth by the space of three years and six months. And\nhe prayed again, and the heavens gave rain and the earth brought forth\nher fruit.\"--James v. 15-18. \"If ye have faith and doubt not, ye shall\nnot only do this which is done to the fig-tree, but also if ye shall\nsay unto this mountain, Be thou removed and be thou cast into the sea,\nit shall be done, and all things whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer,\nbelieving, ye shall receive.\"--Matt. xxi. 21, 22. That under this\nmountain which the power of faith is to overcome are to be understood\nnot only very difficult things--res difficillimae, as the exegetists\nsay, who explain this passage as a proverbial, hyperbolical mode of\nspeech among the Jews, but rather things which according to Nature and\nreason are impossible, is proved by the case of the instantaneously\nwithered fig-tree, to which the passage in question refers. Here\nindubitably is declared the omnipotence of prayer, of faith, before\nwhich the power of Nature vanishes into nothing. \"Mutanturquoque\nad preces ea quae ex naturae causis erant sequutura, quemadmodum\nin Ezechia contigit, rege Juda, cui, quod naturales causarum\nprogressus mortem minabantur, dictum est a propheta Dei: Morieris\net non vives; sed is decursus naturae ad regis preces mutatus est et\nmutaturum se Deus praeviderat.\"--J. L. Vives (l. c. p. 132). \"Saepe\nfatorum saevitiam lenit Deus, placatus piorum votis.\"--Melancthon\n(Epist. Sim. Grynaeo). \"Cedit natura rerum precibus Moysi. Eliae,\nElisaei, Jesaiae et omnium piorum, sicut Christus inquit Matt. 21:\nOmnia quae petetis, credentes accipietis.\"--Id. (Loci de Creat. p. 64,\ned. cit.). Celsus calls on the Christians to aid the Emperor and not to\ndecline military service. Whereupon Origen answers. \"Precibus nostris\nprofligantes omnes bellorum excitatores daemonas et perturbatores\npacis ac foederum plus conferimus regibus, quam qui arma gestant pro\nRepublica.\"--Origenes (adv. Celsum. S. Glenio int. l. viii.). Human\nneed is the necessity of the Divine Will. In prayer man is the active,\nthe determining, God the passive, the determined. God does the will of\nman. \"God does the will of those that fear him, and he gives his will\nup to ours.... For the text says clearly enough, that Lot was not to\nstay in all the plain, but to escape to the mountain. But this his\nwish God changes, because Lot fears him and prays to him.\" \"And we\nhave other testimonies in the Scriptures which prove that God allows\nhimself to be turned and subjects his will to our wish.\" \"Thus it was\naccording to the regular order of God's power that the sun should\nmaintain its revolution and wonted course; but when Joshua in his\nneed called on the Lord and commanded the sun that it should stand\nstill, it stood still at Joshua's word. How great a miracle this was,\nask the astronomers.\"--Luther (T. ii. p. 226). \"Lord, I am here and\nthere in great need and danger of body and soul, and therefore want\nthy help and comfort. Item: I must have this and that; therefore I\nentreat thee that thou give it me.\" \"He who so prays and perseveres\nunabashed does right, and our Lord God is well pleased with him,\nfor he is not so squeamish as we men.\"--Id. (T. xvi. p. 150).\n\n\n\n\u00a7 12.\n\nFaith is the freedom and blessedness which feeling finds in\nitself. Feeling objective to itself and active in this freedom,\nthe reaction of feeling against Nature, is the arbitrariness\nof the imagination. The objects of faith therefore necessarily\ncontradict Nature, necessarily contradict Reason, as that\nwhich represents the nature of things. \"Quid magis contra\nfidem, quam credere nolle, quidquid non possit ratione\nattingere?... Nam illam quae in Deum est fides, beatus papa\nGregorius negat plane habere meritum, si ei humana ratio praebeat\nexperimentum.\"--Bernardus (contr. Abelard. Ep. ad. Dom. Papam\nInnocentium). \"Partus virginis nec ratione colligitur,\nnec exemplo monstratur. Quodsi ratione colligitur non erit\nmirabile.\"--Conc. Toletan. XI. Art. IV. (Summa. Carranza.) \"Quid\nautem incredibile, si contra usum originis naturalis peperit Maria et\nvirgo permanet: quando contra usum naturae mare vidit et fugit atque\nin fontem suum Jordanis fluenta remearunt? Non ergo excedit fidem,\nquod virgo peperit, quando legimus, quod petra vomuit aquas et in\nmontis speciem maris unda solidata est. Non ergo excedit fidem,\nquod homo exivit de virgine, quando petra profluit, scaturivit\nferrum supra aquas, ambulavit homo supra aquas.\"--Ambrosius\n(Epist. L. x. Ep. 81. edit. Basil. Amerbach. 1492 et 1516). \"Mira\nsunt fratres, quae de isto sacramento dicuntur.... Haec sunt quae\nfidem necessario exigunt, rationem omnino non admittunt.\"--Bernardus\n(de Coena Dom.). \"Quid ergo hic quaeris naturae ordinem in Christi\ncorpore, cum praeter naturam sit ipse partus ex virgine.\"--Petrus\nLomb. (l. iv. dist. 10, c. 2). \"Laus fidei est credere quod\nest supra rationem, ubi homo abnegat intellectum et omnes\nsensus.\" (Addit. Henrici de Vurimaria. ibid. dist. 12, c. 5.) \"All the\narticles of our faith appear foolish and ridiculous to reason.\" ... \"We\nChristians seem fools to the world for believing that Mary was the true\nmother of this child, and was nevertheless a pure virgin. For this is\nnot only against all reason, but also against the creation of God,\nwho said to Adam and Eve, 'Be fruitful and multiply.'\" \"We ought not\nto inquire whether a thing be possible, but we should say, God has\nsaid it, therefore it will happen, even if it be impossible. For\nalthough I cannot see or understand it, yet the Lord can make the\nimpossible possible, and out of nothing can make all things.\"--Luther\n(T. xvi. pp. 148, 149, 570). \"What is more miraculous than that God and\nman is one Person? that he is the Son of God and the Son of Mary, and\nyet only one Son? Who will comprehend this mystery in all eternity,\nthat God is man, that a creature is the Creator, and the Creator\na creature?\"--Id. (T. vii. p. 128). The essential object of faith,\ntherefore, is miracle; but not common, visible miracle, which is an\nobject even to the bold eye of curiosity and unbelief in general;\nnot the appearance, but the essence of miracle; not the fact, but\nthe miraculous power, the Being who works miracles, who attests and\nreveals himself in miracle. And this miraculous power is to faith\nalways present; even Protestantism believes in the uninterrupted\nperpetuation of miraculous power; it only denies the necessity that\nit should still manifest itself in special visible signs, for the\nfurtherance of dogmatic ends. \"Some have said that signs were the\nrevelation of the Spirit in the commencement of Christianity and have\nnow ceased. That is not correct; for there is even now such a power,\nand though it is not used, that is of no importance. For we have still\nthe power to perform such signs.\" \"Now, however, that Christianity\nis spread abroad and made known to all the world, there is no need\nto work miracles, as in the times of the apostles. But if there were\nneed for it, if the Gospel were oppressed and persecuted, we must\ntruly apply ourselves to this, and must also work miracles.\"--Luther\n(Th. xiii. pp. 642, 648). Miracle is so essential, so natural to\nfaith, that to it even natural phenomena are miracles, and not in the\nphysical sense, but in the theological, supranaturalistic sense. \"God,\nin the beginning, said: Let the earth bring forth grass and herbs,\n&c. That same word which the Creator spoke brings the cherry out of\nthe dry bough and the cherry-tree out of the little kernel. It is\nthe omnipotence of God which makes young fowls and geese come out\nof the eggs. Thus God preaches to us daily of the resurrection of\nthe dead, and has given us as many examples and experiences of this\narticle as there are creatures.\"--Luther (Th. x. p. 432. See also\nTh. iii. pp. 586, 592, and Augustine, e.g., Enarr. in Ps. 90, Sermo\nii. c. 6). If, therefore, faith desires and needs no special miracle,\nthis is only because to it everything is fundamentally miracle,\neverything an effect of divine, miraculous power. Religious faith\nhas no sense, no perception for Nature. Nature, as it exists for us,\nhas no existence for faith. To it the will of God is alone the ground,\nthe bond, the necessity of things. \"God ... could indeed have made us\nmen, as he did Adam and Eve, by himself, without father and mother,\nas he could reign without princes, as he could give light without\nsun and stars, and bread without fields and ploughs and labour. But\nit is not his will to do thus.\"--Luther (Th. xvi. p. 614). It is true\n\"God employs certain means, and so conducts his miraculous works as to\nuse the service of Nature and instruments.\" Therefore we ought--truly\non very natural grounds--\"not to despise the means and instruments of\nNature.\" \"Thus it is allowable to use medicine, nay, it ought to be\nused, for it is a means created in order to preserve health.\"--Luther\n(Th. i. p. 508). But--and that alone is decisive--it is not necessary\nthat I should use natural means in order to be cured; I can be cured\nimmediately by God. What God ordinarily does by means of Nature,\nhe can also do without, nay, in opposition to Nature, and actually\ndoes it thus, in extraordinary cases, when he will. \"God,\" says\nLuther in the same place, \"could indeed easily have preserved Noah\nand the animals through a whole year without food, as he preserved\nMoses, Elijah, and Christ forty days without any food.\" Whether he\ndoes it often or seldom is indifferent; it is enough if he only\ndoes it once; what happens once can happen innumerable times. A\nsingle miracle has universal significance--the significance of an\nexample. \"This deed, the passage through the Red Sea, happened as a\nfigure and example, to show us that it will be so with us.\"--Luther\n(Th. iii. p. 596). \"These miracles are written for us, who are\nchosen.\"--Ib. (Th. ix. p. 142). The natural means which God employs\nwhen he does no miracle, have no more significance than those which\nhe employs when he performs miracles. If the animals, God so willing\nit, can live as well without food as with it, food is in itself\nas unnecessary for the preservation of life, as indifferent, as\nnon-essential, as arbitrary, as the clay with which Christ anointed\nthe eyes of the blind man to whom he restored sight, as the staff\nwith which Moses divided the sea (\"God could have done it just as\nwell without the staff\"). \"Faith is stronger than heaven and earth,\nor all creatures.\" \"Faith turns water into stones; out of fire it\ncan bring water, and out of water fire.\"--Luther (Th. iii. pp. 564,\n565). That is to say, for faith there exists no limit, no law, no\nnecessity, no Nature; there exists only the will of God, against which\nall things and powers are nothing. If therefore the believer, when in\nsickness and distress, has recourse notwithstanding to natural means,\nhe only follows the voice of his natural reason. The one means of\ncure which is congruous with faith, which does not contradict faith,\nwhich is not thrust upon it, whether consciously and voluntarily\nor not, from without,--the one remedy for all evil and misery is\nprayer; for \"prayer is almighty.\"--Luther (Th. iv. p. 27). Why then\nuse a natural means also? For even in case of its application, the\neffect which follows is by no means its own, but the effect of the\nsupernatural will of God, or rather the effect of faith, of prayer;\nfor prayer, faith determines the will of God. \"Thy faith hath saved\nthee.\" Thus the natural means which faith recognises in practice it\nnullifies in theory, since it makes the effect of such means an effect\nof God,--i.e., an effect which could have taken place just as well\nwithout this means. The natural effect is therefore nothing else than\na circumstantial, covert, concealed miracle; a miracle however which\nhas not the appearance of a miracle, but can only be perceived as\nsuch by the eyes of faith. Only in expression, not in fact, is there\nany difference between an immediate and mediate, a miraculous and\nnatural operation of God. When faith makes use of a natural means, it\nspeaks otherwise than it thinks; when it supposes a miracle it speaks\nas it thinks, but in both cases it thinks the same. In the mediate\nagency of God faith is in disunion with itself, for the senses here\ndeny what faith affirms; in miracle, on the contrary, it is at one\nwith itself, for there the appearance coincides with the reality,\nthe senses with faith, the expression with the fact. Miracle is the\nterminus technicus of faith.\n\n\n\n\u00a7 13.\n\nThe Resurrection of Christ is bodily, i.e., personal immortality,\npresented as a sensible indubitable fact.\n\n\"Resurrexit Christus, absoluta res est.--Ostendit se ipsum\ndiscipulis et fidelibus suis, contrectata est soliditas\ncorporis.... Confirmata fides est non solum in cordibus, sed\netiam in oculis hominum.\"--Augustinus (Sermones ad Pop. S. 242,\nc. I. S. 361, c. S. See also on this subject Melancthon, Loci: de\nResurr. Mort.). \"The philosophers ... held that by death the soul\nwas released from the body, and that after it was thus set free from\nthe body, as from a prison, it came into the assembly of the gods,\nand was relieved from all corporeal burthens. Of such an immortality\nthe philosophers allowed men to dream, though they did not hold it to\nbe certain, nor could defend it. But the Holy Scriptures teach of the\nresurrection and eternal life in another manner, and place the hope\nof it so certainly before our eyes, that we cannot doubt it.\"--Luther\n(Th. i. p. 549).\n\n\n\n\u00a7 14.\n\nChristianity made man an extramundane, supernatural being. \"We have\nhere no abiding city, but we seek one to come.\"--Heb. xiii. 14. \"Whilst\nwe are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord.\"--2\nCor. v. 6. \"If in this body, which is properly our own, we\nare strangers, and our life in this body is nothing else than\na pilgrimage; how much more then are the possessions which we\nhave for the sake of the body, such as fields, houses, gold, &c.,\nnothing else than idle, strange things, to be used as if we were on\na pilgrimage?\" \"Therefore we must in this life live like strangers\nuntil we reach the true fatherland, and receive a better life which\nis eternal.\"--Luther (Th. ii. pp. 240, 370 a). \"Our conversation\n(politeuma, civitas aut jus civitatis) is in heaven, from whence\nalso we look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall change\nour vile body that it may be like unto his glorious body, according\nto the working whereby he is able even to subdue all things unto\nhimself.\"--Phil. iii. 20, 21. \"Neque mundus generat hominem, neque\nmundi homo pars est.\"--Lactantius (Div. Inst. l. ii. c. 6). \"Coelum\nde mundo: homo supra mundum.\"--Ambrosius (Epist. l. vi. Ep. 38,\ned. cit.). \"Agnosce o homo dignitatem tuam, agnosce gloriam\nconditionis humanae. Est enim tibi cum mundo corpus ... sed est\ntibi etiam sublimius aliquid, nec omnino comparandus es caeteris\ncreaturis.\"--Bernardus (Opp. Basil. 1552, p. 79). \"At Christianus\n... ita supra totum mundum ascendit, nec consistit in coeli convexis,\nsed transcensis mente locis supercoelestibus ductu divini spiritus\nvelut jam extra mundum raptus offert Deo preces.\"--Origenes (contra\nCelspum. ed. Hoeschelio, p. 370). \"Totus quidem iste mundus ad unius\nanimae pretium aestimari non potest. Non enim pro toto mundo Deus\nanimam suam dare voluit, quam pro anima humana dedit. Sublimius\nest ergo animae pretium, quae non nisi sanguine Christi redimi\npotest.\"--Medit. devotiss. c. ii. (Among the spurious writings of\nSt. Bernard.) \"Sapiens anima ... Deum tantummodo sapiens hominem\nin homine exuit, Deoque plene et in omnibus affecta, omnem infra\nDeum creaturam non aliter quam Deus attendit. Relicto ergo corpore\net corporeis omnibus curis et impedimentis omnium quae sunt praeter\nDeum obliviscitur, nihilque praeter Deum attendens quasi se solam,\nsolumque Deum existimans,\" etc.--De Nat. et Dign. Amoris Divini,\ncc. 14, 15. (Ib.) \"Quid agis frater in saeculo, qui major es\nmundo?\"--Hieronymus (ad Heliod. de Laude Vitae solit.).\n\n\n\n\u00a7 15.\n\nThe celibate and monachism--of course only in their original,\nreligious significance and form--are sensible manifestations, necessary\nconsequences, of the supranaturalistic, extramundane character of\nChristianity. It is true that they also contradict Christianity;\nthe reason of this is shown by implication in the present work; but\nonly because Christianity is itself a contradiction. They contradict\nexoteric, practical, but not esoteric, theoretical Christianity;\nthey contradict Christian love so far as this love relates to man,\nbut not Christian faith, not Christian love so far as it loves man\nonly for God's sake. There is certainly nothing concerning celibacy\nand monachism in the Bible; and that is very natural. In the beginning\nof Christianity the great matter was the recognition of Jesus as the\nChrist, the Messiah--the conversion of the heathens and Jews. And this\nconversion was the more pressing, the nearer the Christians supposed\nthe day of judgment and the destruction of the world;--periculum\nin mora. There was not time or opportunity for a life of quietude,\nfor the contemplation of monachism. Hence there necessarily reigned\nat that time a more practical and even liberal sentiment than at a\nlater period, when Christianity had attained to worldly dominion,\nand thus the enthusiasm of proselytism was extinguished. \"Apostoli\n(says the Church, quite correctly: Carranza, l. c. p. 256) cum fides\ninciperet, ad fidelium imbecillitatem se magis demittebant, cum autem\nevangelii praedicatio sit magis ampliata, oportet et Pontifices ad\nperfectam continentiam vitam suam dirigere.\" When once Christianity\nrealised itself in a worldly form, it must also necessarily develop\nthe supranaturalistic, supramundane tendency of Christianity\ninto a literal separation from the world. And this disposition to\nseparation from life, from the body, from the world,--this first\nhyper-cosmic then anti-cosmic tendency, is a genuinely biblical\ndisposition and spirit. In addition to the passages already cited,\nand others universally known, the following may stand as examples:\n\"He that hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life\neternal.\" \"I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good\nthing.\"--Rom. vii. 18. (\"Veteres enim omnis vitiositatis in agendo\norigenes ad corpus referebant.\"--J. G. Rosenm\u00fcller Scholia.) \"Forasmuch\nthen as Christ hath suffered for us in the flesh, arm yourselves also\nwith the same mind; for he that hath suffered in the flesh hath ceased\nfrom sin.\"--1 Pet. iv. 1. \"I have a desire to depart, and to be with\nChrist.\"--Phil. i. 23. \"We are confident and willing rather to be\nabsent from the body and present with the Lord.\"--2 Cor. v. 8. Thus,\naccording to these passages, the partition-wall between God and man\nis the body (at least the fleshly, actual body); thus the body as a\nhindrance to union with God is something worthless, to be denied. That\nby the world, which is denied in Christianity, is by no means to be\nunderstood a life of mere sensuality, but the real objective world,\nis to be inferred in a popular manner from the belief that at the\nadvent of the Lord, i.e., the consummation of the Christian religion,\nheaven and earth will pass away.\n\nThe difference between the belief of the Christians and that of\nthe heathen philosophers as to the destruction of the world is not\nto be overlooked. The Christian destruction of the world is only\na crisis of faith,--the separation of the Christian from all that\nis anti-christian, the triumph of faith over the world, a judgment\nof God, an anti-cosmical, supernaturalistic act. \"But the heavens\nand the earth which are now, by the same word are kept in store,\nreserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of\nungodly men.\"--2 Pet. iii. 7. The heathen destruction of the world is\na crisis of the cosmos itself, a process which takes place according\nto law, which is founded in the constitution of Nature. \"Sic origo\nmundi, non minus solem et lunam et vices siderum et animalium ortus,\nquam quibus mutarentur terrena, continuit. In his fuit inundatio,\nquae non secus quam hiems, quam aestas, lege mundi venit.\"--Seneca\n(Nat. Qu. l. iii. c. 29). It is the principle of life immanent in the\nworld, the essence of the world itself, which evolves this crisis\nout of itself. \"Aqua et ignis terrenis dominantur. Ex his ortus et\nex his interitus est.\"--(Ibid. c. 28.) \"Quidquid est, non erit; nec\nperibit, sed resolvetur.\"--(Idem. Epist. 71.) The Christians excluded\nthemselves from the destruction of the world. \"And he shall send\nhis angels with a great sound of a trumpet; and they shall gather\ntogether his elect from the four winds, from one end of heaven to\nthe other.\"--Matt. xxiv. 31. \"But there shall not a hair of your head\nperish.... And then shall they see the Son of Man coming in a cloud\nwith power and great glory. And when these things begin to come to\npass, then look up and lift up your heads; for your redemption draweth\nnigh.\"--Luke xxi. 18, 27, 28. \"Watch ye therefore and pray always, that\nye may be accounted worthy to escape all these things that shall come\nto pass, and to stand before the Son of Man.\"--Ib. 36. The heathens,\non the contrary, identified their fate with the fate of the world. \"Hoc\nuniversum, quod omnia divina humanaque complectitur ... dies aliquis\ndissipabit et in confusionem veterem tenebrasque demerget. Eat\nnunc aliquis et singulas comploret animas. Quis tam superbae\nimpotentisque arrogantiae est, ut in hac naturae necessitate, omnia\nad eundem finem revocantis, se unum ac suos seponi velit.\"--Seneca\n(Cons. ad Polyb. cc. 20, 21). \"Ergo quandoque erit terminus rebus\nhumanis.... Non muri quenquam, non turres tuebuntur. Non proderunt\ntempla supplicibus.\"--(Nat. Qu. L. iii. c. 29.) Thus here we have again\nthe characteristic distinction between heathenism and Christianity. The\nheathen forgot himself in the world, the Christian forgot the world\nin himself. And as the heathen identified his destruction with the\ndestruction of the world, so he identified his immortality with\nthe immortality of the world. To the heathen, man was a common,\nto the Christian, a select being; to the latter immortality was a\nprivilege of man, to the former a common good which he vindicated\nto himself only because, and in so far as, he assigned to other\nbeings a share in it also. The Christians expected the destruction\nof the world immediately, because the Christian religion has in it\nno cosmical principle of development:--all which developed itself in\nChristendom developed itself only in contradiction with the original\nnature of Christianity;--because by the existence of God in the flesh,\ni.e., by the immediate identity of the species with the individual,\neverything was attained, the thread of history was cut short, no\nother thought of the future remained than the thought of a repetition\nof the second coming of the Lord. The heathens, on the contrary,\nplaced the destruction of the world in the distant future, because,\nliving in the contemplation of the universe, they did not set heaven\nand earth in motion on their own account,--because they extended and\nfreed their self-consciousness by the consciousness of the species,\nplaced immortality only in the perpetuation of the species, and thus\ndid not reserve the future to themselves, but left it to the coming\ngenerations. \"Veniet tempus quo posteri nostri tam aperta nos nescisse\nmirentur.\"--Seneca (Nat. Qu. l. vii. c. 25). He who places immortality\nin himself abolishes the principle of historical development. The\nChristians did indeed, according to Peter, expect a new heaven and\na new earth. But with this Christian, i.e., superterrestrial earth,\nthe theatre of history is for ever closed, the end of the actual\nworld is come. The heathens, on the contrary, set no limits to the\ndevelopment of the cosmos; they supposed the world to be destroyed\nonly to arise again renovated as a real world; they granted it eternal\nlife. The Christian destruction of the world was a matter of feeling,\nan object of fear and longing; the heathen, a matter of reason,\nan inference from the contemplation of nature.\n\nUnspotted Virginity is the principle of Salvation, the principle of\nthe regenerate Christian world. \"Virgo genuit mundi salutem; virgo\npeperit vitam universorum.... Virgo portavit, quem mundus iste\ncapere aut sustinere non potest.... Per virum autem et mulierem\ncaro ejecta de paradiso: per virginem juncta est Deo.\"--Ambrosius\n(Ep. L. x. Ep. 82). \"Jure laudatur bona uxor, sed melius pia\nvirgo praefertur, dicente Apostolo (1 Cor. vii.). Bonum conjugium,\nper quod est inventa posteritas successionis humanae; sed melius\nvirginitas, per quam regni coelestis haereditas acquisita et\ncoelestium meritorum reperta successio. Per mulierem cura successit:\nper virginem salus evenit.\"--(Id. Ep. 81.) \"Castitas jungit hominem\ncoelo.... Bona est castitas conjugalis, sed melior est continentia\nvidualis. Optima vero integritas virginalis.\"--De modo bene vivendi,\nSermo 22. (Among the spurious writings of Bernard.) \"Pulchritudinem\nhominis non concupiscas.\"--(Ibid. S. 23.) \"Fornicatio major est\nomnibus peccatis.... Audi beati Isidori verba: Fornicatione coinquinari\ndeterius est omni peccato.\"--(Ibid.) \"Virginitas cui gloriae merito non\npraefertur? Angelicae? Angelus habet virginitatem, sed non carnem,\nsane felicior, quam fortior in hac parte.\"--Bernardus (Ep. 113,\nad Sophiam Virginem). \"Memento semper, quod paradisi colonum de\npossessione sua mulier ejecerit.\"--Hieronymus (Ep. Nepotiano). \"In\nparadiso virginitas conversabatur.... Ipse Christus virginitatis\ngloria non modo ex patre sine initio et sine duorum concursu genitus,\nsed et homo secundum nos factus, super nos ex virgine sine alieno\nconsortio incarnatus est. Et ipse virginitatem veram et perfectam\nesse, in se ipso demonstravit. Unde hanc nobis legem non statuit\n(non enim omnes capiunt verbum hoc, ut ipse dixit) sed opere nos\nerudivit.\"--Joan. Damasc. (Orthod. Fidei, l. iv. c. 25).\n\nNow if abstinence from the satisfaction of the sensual impulse,\nthe negation of difference of sex and consequently of sexual\nlove,--for what is this without the other?--is the principle of the\nChristian heaven and salvation; then necessarily the satisfaction\nof the sexual impulse, sexual love, on which marriage is founded,\nis the source of sin and evil. And so it is held. The mystery of\noriginal sin is the mystery of sexual desire. All men are conceived\nin sin because they were conceived with sensual, i.e., natural\npleasure. The act of generation, as an act of sensual enjoyment,\nis sinful. Sin is propagated from Adam down to us, simply because\nits propagation is the natural act of generation. This is the\nmystery of Christian original sin. \"Atque hic quam alienus a vero\nsit, etiam hic reprehenditur, quod voluptatem in homine Deo authore\ncreatam asserit principaliter. Sed hoc divinae scriptura redarguit,\nquae serpentis insidiis atque illecebris infusam Adae atque Evae\nvoluptatem docet, siquidem ipse serpens voluptas sit.... Quomodo\nigitur voluptas ad paradisum revocare nos potest, quae sola nos\nparadiso exuit?\"--Ambrosius (Ep. L. x. Ep. 82). \"Voluptas ipsa\nsine culpa nullatenus esse potest.\"--Petrus L. (l. iv. dist. 31,\nc. 5). \"Omnes in peccatis nati sumus, et ex carnis delectatione\nconcepti culpam originalem nobiscum traximus.\"--Gregorius (Petrus\nL. l. ii. dist. 30, c. 2). \"Firmissime tene et nullatenus dubites,\nomnem hominem, qui per concubitum viri et mulieris concipitur,\ncum originali peccato nasci.... Ex his datur intelligi, quid sit\noriginale peccatum, scl. vitium concupiscentiae, quod in omnes\nconcupiscentialiter natos per Adam intravit.\"--(Ibid. c. 3, see\nalso dist. 31, c. 1.) \"Peccati causa ex carne est.\"--Ambrosius\n(ibid.) \"Christus peccatum non habet, nec originale traxit, nec suum\naddidit: extra voluptatem carnalis libidinis venit, non ibi fuit\ncomplexus maritalis.... Omnis generatus, damnatus.\"--Augustinus\n(Serm. ad Pop. S. 294, cc. 10, 16). \"Homo natus de muliere et ob\nhoc cum reatu.\"--Bernardus (de Consid. l. ii.). \"Peccatum quomodo\nnon fuit, ubi libido non defuit?... Quo pacto, inquam, aut sanctus\nasseretur conceptus, qui de spiritus non est, ne dicam de peccato\nest?\"--Id. (Epist. 174, edit. cit.). \"All that is born into the world\nof man and woman is sinful, under God's anger and curse, condemned to\ndeath.\" \"All men born of a father and mother are children of wrath\nby nature, as St. Paul testifies, Ephes. ii.\" \"We have by nature a\ntainted, sinful conception and birth.\"--Luther (Th. xvi. 246, 573). It\nis clear from these examples, that \"carnal intercourse\"--even a kiss is\ncarnal intercourse--is the radical sin, the radical evil of mankind;\nand consequently the basis of marriage, the sexual impulse, honestly\noutspoken, is a product of the devil. It is true that the creature\nas the work of God is good, but it has long ceased to exist as it was\ncreated. The devil has alienated the creature from God and corrupted\nit to the very foundation. \"Cursed be the ground for thy sake.\" The\nfall of the creature, however, is only an hypothesis by which faith\ndrives from its mind the burdensome, disquieting contradiction,\nthat Nature is a product of God, and yet, as it actually is, does\nnot harmonise with God, i.e., with the Christian sentiment.\n\nChristianity certainly did not pronounce the flesh as flesh,\nmatter as matter, to be something sinful, impure; on the contrary,\nit contended vehemently against the heretics who held this opinion\nand rejected marriage. (See for example Augustin. contra Faustum,\nl. 29, c. 4, l. 30, c. 6. Clemens Alex. Stromata, lib. iii. and\nBernard. Super Cantica, Sermo 66.) But quite apart from the hatred\nto heretics which so inspired the holy Christian Church and made\nit so politic, this protest rested on grounds which by no means\ninvolved the recognition of Nature as such, and under limitations,\ni.e., negations, which make the recognition of Nature merely apparent\nand illusory. The distinction between the heretics and the orthodox\nis only this, that the latter said indirectly, covertly, secretly,\nwhat the former declared plainly, directly, but for that very reason\noffensively. Pleasure is not separable from matter. Material pleasure\nis nothing further, so to speak, than the joy of matter in itself,\nmatter proving itself by activity. Every joy is self-activity, every\npleasure a manifestation of force, energy. Every organic function is,\nin a normal condition, united with enjoyment; even breathing is a\npleasurable act, which is not perceived as such only because it is an\nuninterrupted process. He therefore who declares generation, fleshly\nintercourse, as such, to be pure, but fleshly intercourse united with\nsensual pleasure to be a consequence of original sin and consequently\nitself a sin, acknowledges only the dead, not the living flesh--he\nraises a mist before us, he condemns, rejects the act of generation,\nand matter in general, though under the appearance of not rejecting\nit, of acknowledging it. The unhypocritical, honest acknowledgment\nof sensual life is the acknowledgment of sensual pleasure. In brief,\nhe who, like the Bible, like the Church, does not acknowledge fleshly\npleasure--that, be it understood, which is natural, normal, inseparable\nfrom life--does not acknowledge the flesh. That which is not recognised\nas an end in itself (it by no means follows that it should be the\nultimate end) is in truth not recognised at all. Thus he who allows\nme wine only as medicine forbids me the enjoyment of wine. Let not\nthe liberal supply of wine at the wedding at Cana be urged. For that\nscene transports us, by the metamorphosis of water into wine, beyond\nNature into the region of supernaturalism. Where, as in Christianity,\na supernatural, spiritual body is regarded as the true, eternal body,\ni.e., a body from which all objective, sensual impulses, all flesh,\nall nature, is removed, there real, i.e., sensual fleshly matter is\ndenied, is regarded as worthless, nothing.\n\nCertainly Christianity did not make celibacy a law (save at a later\nperiod for the priests). But for the very reason that chastity,\nor rather privation of marriage, of sex, is the highest, the most\ntranscendent, supernaturalistic, heavenly virtue, it cannot and must\nnot be lowered into a common object of duty; it stands above the\nlaw, it is the virtue of Christian grace and freedom. \"Christus\nhortatur idoneos ad coelibatum, ut donum recte tueantur;\nidem Christus iis, qui puritatem extra conjugium non, retinent,\npraecipit, ut pure in conjugio vivant.\"--Melancthon. (Responsio ad\nColonienses. Declam. T. iii.). \"Virginitas non est jussa, sed admonita,\nquia nimis est excelsa.\"--De modo bene viv. (Sermo 21). \"Et qui\nmatrimonio jungit virginem suam, benefacit, et qui non jungit, melius\nfacit. Quod igitur bonum est, non vitandum est, et quod est melius\neligendum est. Itaque non imponitur, sed proponitur. Et ideo bene\nApostolus dixit: De virginibus autem praeceptum non habeo, consilium\nautem do. Ubi praeceptum est, ibi lex est, ubi consilium, ibi gratia\nest.... Praeceptum enim castitatis est, consilium integritatis.... Sed\nnec vidua praeceptum accipit, sed consilium. Consilium autem non semel\ndatum, sed saepe repetitum.\"--Ambrosius (Liber. de viduis). That is to\nsay: celibacy, abstinence from marriage, is no law in the common or\nJewish sense, but a law in the Christian sense, or for the Christian\nsentiment, which takes Christian virtue and perfection as the rule\nof conscience, as the ideal of feeling,--no despotic but a friendly\nlaw, no public but a secret, esoteric law--a mere counsel, i.e.,\na law which does not venture to express itself as a law, a law for\nthose of finer feelings, not for the great mass. Thou mayst marry;\nyes indeed! without any fear of committing a sin, i.e., a public,\nexpress, plebeian sin; but thou dost all the better if thou dost not\nmarry; meanwhile this is only my undictatorial, friendly advice. Omnia\nlicent, sed omnia non expediunt. What is allowed in the first member\nof the sentence is retracted in the second. Licet, says the man;\nnon expedit, says the Christian. But only that which is good for the\nChristian is for the man, so far as he desires to be a Christian, the\nstandard of doing and abstaining. \"Quae non expediunt, nec licent,\"\nsuch is the conclusion arrived at by the sentiment of Christian\nnobility. Marriage is therefore only an indulgence to the weakness, or\nrather the strength of the flesh, a taint of nature in Christianity,\na falling short of the genuine, perfect Christian sentiment; being,\nhowever, nevertheless good, laudable, even holy, in so far as it is the\nbest antidote to fornication. For its own sake, as the self-enjoyment\nof sexual love, it is not acknowledged, not consecrated; thus the\nholiness of marriage in Christianity is only an ostensible holiness,\nonly illusion, for that which is not acknowledged for its own sake\nis not acknowledged at all, while yet there is a deceitful show of\nacknowledgment. Marriage is sanctioned not in order to hallow and\nsatisfy the flesh, but to restrict the flesh, to repress it, to kill\nit--to drive Beelzebub out by Beelzebub. \"Quae res et viris et feminis\nomnibus adest ad matrimonium et stuprum? Commixtio carnis scilicet,\ncujus concupiscentiam Dominus stupro adaequavit.... Ideo virginis\nprincipalis sanctitas, quia caret stupri affinitati.\"--Tertullianus\n(de Exhort. Cast. c. 9). \"Et de ipso conjugis melius aliquid, quam\nconcessisti, monuisti.\"--Augustinus (Confess. x. c. 30). \"It is\nbetter to marry than to burn.\"--I Cor. vii. 9. But how much better\nis it, says Tertullian, developing this text, neither to marry nor to\nburn.... \"Possum dicere, quod permittitur bonum non est.\"--(Ad Uxorem,\nl. i. c. 3.) \"De minoribus bonis est conjugiam, quod non meretur\npalmam, sed est in remedium.... Prima institutio habuit praeceptum,\nsecunda indulgentiam. Didicimus enim ab Apostolo, humano generi\npropter vitandam fornicationem indultum esse conjugium.\"--Petrus\nLomb. (l. iv. dist. 26, c. 2). \"The Master of the Sentences says\nrightly, that in Paradise marriage was ordained as service, but\nafter sin as medicine.\"--Luther (Th. i. p. 349). \"Where marriage\nand virginity are compared, certainly chastity is a nobler gift\nthan marriage.\"--Id. (Th. i. p. 319). \"Those whom the weakness\nof nature does not compel to marriage, but who are such that\nthey can dispense with marriage, these do rightly to abstain from\nmarriage.\"--Id. (Th. v. p. 538). Christian sophistry will reply to\nthis, that only marriage which is not Christian, only that which is\nnot consecrated by the spirit of Christianity, i.e., in which Nature\nis not veiled in pious images, is unholy. But if marriage, if Nature\nis first made holy by relation to Christ, it is not the holiness of\nmarriage which is declared, but of Christianity; and marriage, Nature,\nin and by itself, is unholy. And what is the semblance of holiness\nwith which Christianity invests marriage, in order to becloud the\nunderstanding, but a pious illusion? Can the Christian fulfil his\nmarriage duties without surrendering himself, willingly or not, to\nthe passion of love? Yes indeed. The Christian has for his object the\nreplenishing of the Christian Church, not the satisfaction of love. The\nend is holy, but the means in itself unholy. And the end sanctifies,\nexculpates the means. \"Conjugalis concubitus generandi gratia non\nhabet culpam.\" Thus the Christian, at least the true Christian,\ndenies, or at least is bound to deny Nature, while he satisfies it;\nhe does not wish for, he rather contemns the means in itself; he seeks\nonly the end in abstracto; he does with religious, supranaturalistic\nhorror what he does, though against his will, with natural, sensual\npleasure. The Christian does not candidly confess his sensuality, he\ndenies Nature before his faith, and his faith before Nature, i.e.,\nhe publicly disavows what he privately does. Oh, how much better,\ntruer, purer-hearted in this respect were the heathens, who made no\nsecret of their sensuality, than the Christians, who, while gratifying\nthe flesh, at the same time deny that they gratify it! To this day\nthe Christians adhere theoretically to their heavenly origin and\ndestination; to this day, out of supranaturalistic affectation,\nthey deny their sex, and turn away with mock modesty from every\nsensuous picture, every naked statue, as if they were angels; to\nthis day they repress, even by legal force, every open-hearted,\ningenuous self-confession even of the most uncorrupt sensuality,\nonly stimulating by this public prohibition the secret enjoyment\nof sensuality. What then, speaking briefly and plainly, is the\ndistinction between Christians and heathens in this matter? The\nheathens confirmed, the Christians contradicted their faith by their\nlives. The heathens do what they mean to do, the Christians what they\ndo not mean: the former, where they sin, sin with their conscience,\nthe latter against their conscience; the former sin simply, the\nlatter doubly; the former from hypertrophy, the latter from atrophy\nof the flesh. The specific crime of the heathens is the ponderable,\npalpable crime of licentiousness, that of the Christians is the\nimponderable, theological crime of hypocrisy,--that hypocrisy of\nwhich Jesuitism is indeed the most striking, world-historical,\nbut nevertheless only a particular manifestation. \"Theology makes\nsinners,\" says Luther--Luther, whose positive qualities, his heart\nand understanding, so far as they applied themselves to natural\nthings, were not perverted by theology. And Montesquieu gives the\nbest commentary on this saying of Luther's when he says: \"La d\u00e9votion\ntrouve, pour faire de mauvaises actions, des raisons, qu'un simple\nhonn\u00eate homme ne saurait trouver.\"--(Pens\u00e9es Diverses.)\n\n\n\n\u00a7 16.\n\nThe Christian heaven is Christian truth. That which its excluded from\nheaven is excluded from true Christianity. In heaven the Christian is\nfree from that which he wishes to be free from here--free from the\nsexual impulse, free from matter, free from Nature in general. \"In\nthe resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but\nare as the angels of God in heaven.\"--Matt. xxii. 30. \"Meats for the\nbelly, and the belly for meats; but God shall destroy (katargesei,\nmake useless) both it and them.\"--1 Cor. vi. 13. \"Now this I say,\nbrethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of heaven,\nneither doth corruption inherit incorruption.\"--Ib. xv. 50. \"They\nshall hunger no more, neither thirst any more; neither shall the\nsun light on them, nor any heat.\"--Rev. vii. 16. \"And there shall\nbe no night there; and they need no candle, neither light of the\nsun.\"--Ib. xxii. 5. \"Comedere, bibere, vigilare, dormire, quiescere,\nlaborare et caeteris necessitatibus naturae subjacere, vere magna\nmiseria est et afflictio homini devoto, qui libenter esset absolutus\net liber ab omni peccato. Utinam non essent istae necessitates,\nsed solum spirituales animae refectiones, quas heu! satis raro\ndegustamus.\"--Thomas \u00e0 K. (de Imit. 1. i. cc. 22, 25). See also on this\nsubject S. Gregorii Nyss. de Anima et Resurr., Lipsiae, 1837, pp. 98,\n144, 153). It is true that the Christian immortality, in distinction\nfrom the heathen, is not the immortality of the soul, but that of\nthe flesh, that is, of the whole man. \"Scientia immortalis visa est\nres illis (the heathen philosophers) atque incorruptibilis. Nos\nautem, quibus divina revelatio illuxit ... novimus, non solum\nmentem, sed affectus perpurgatos, neque animam tantum, sed etiam\ncorpus ad immortalitatem assumptum iri suo tempore.\"--Baco de\nVerul. (de Augm. Scien. 1. i.). On this account Celsus reproached\nthe Christians with a desiderium corporis. But this immortal body\nis, as has been already remarked, an immaterial, i.e., a thoroughly\nfanciful, subjective body--a body which is the direct negation of\nthe real, natural body. The ideal on which this faith hinges is not\nthe recognition or glorification of nature, of matter as such, but\nrather the reality of the emotive imagination, the satisfaction of\nthe unlimited, supranaturalistic desire of happiness, to which the\nactual, objective body is a limitation.\n\nAs to what the angels strictly are, whom heavenly souls will be like,\nthe Bible is as far from giving us any definite information as on\nother weighty subjects; it only calls them pneumata, spirits, and\ndeclares them to be higher than men. The later Christians expressed\nthemselves more definitely on this subject; more definitely,\nbut variously. Some assigned bodies to the angels, others not;\na difference which, however, is only apparent, since the angelic\nbody is only a phantasmal one. But concerning the human body of\nthe resurrection, they had not only different, but even opposite,\nconceptions; indeed, these contradictions lay in the nature of the\ncase, necessarily resulted from the fundamental contradiction of the\nreligious consciousness which, as we have shown, exhibits itself in\nthe incompatible propositions that the body which is raised is the\nsame individual body which we had before the resurrection, and that\nnevertheless it is another. It is the same body even to the hair,\n\"cum nec periturus sit capillus, ut ait Dominus: Capillus de capite\nvestro non peribit.\"--Augustinus und Petrus, L. l. iv. dist. 44,\nc. 1. Nevertheless it is the same in such a way that everything\nburdensome, everything contradictory to transcendental feeling,\nis removed. \"Immo sicut dicit Augustinus: Detrahentur vitia et\nremanebit natura. Superexcrescentia autem capillorum et unguium\nest de superfluitate et vitio naturae. Si enim non peccasset homo,\ncrescerent ungues et capilli ejus usque ad determinatam quantitatem,\nsicut in leonibus et avibus.\"--(Addit. Henrici ab Vurimaria,\nibid. edit. Basiliae, 1513.) What a specific, na\u00efve, ingenuous,\nconfident, harmonious faith! The risen body, as the same and yet\nanother, a new body, has hair and nails, otherwise it would be a\nmaimed body, deprived of an essential ornament, and consequently the\nresurrection would not be a restitutio in integrum; moreover they are\nthe same hair and nails as before, but yet so modified that they are\nin accordance with the body. Why do not the believing theologians\nof modern times enter into such specialities as occupied the older\ntheologians? Because their faith is itself only general, indefinite,\ni.e., a faith which they only suppose themselves to possess; because,\nfrom fear of their understanding, which has long been at issue with\ntheir faith, from fear of risking their feeble faith by bringing\nit to the light, that is, considering it in detail, they suppress\nthe consequences, the necessary determinations of their faith, and\nconceal them from their understanding.\n\n\n\n\u00a7 17.\n\nWhat faith denies on earth it affirms in heaven; what it renounces\nhere it recovers a hundred-fold there. In this world, faith occupies\nitself with nullifying the body; in the other world, with establishing\nit. Here the main point is the separation of the soul from the body,\nthere the main point is the reunion of the body with the soul. \"I\nwould live not only according to the soul, but according to the body\nalso. I would have the corpus with me; I would that the body should\nreturn to the soul and be united with it.\"--Luther (Th. vii. p. 90). In\nthat which is sensuous, Christ is supersensuous; but for that reason,\nin the supersensuous he is sensuous. Heavenly bliss is therefore by\nno means merely spiritual, it is equally corporeal, sensuous--a state\nin which all wishes are fulfilled. \"Whatever thy heart seeks joy and\npleasure in, that shall be there in abundance. For it is said, God\nshall be all in all. And where God is, there must be all good things\nthat can ever be desired.\" \"Dost thou desire to see acutely, and to\nhear through walls, and to be so light that thou mayst be wherever\nthou wilt in a moment, whether here below on the earth, or above in\nthe clouds, that shall all be, and what more thou canst conceive, which\nthou couldst have in body and soul, thou shalt have abundantly if thou\nhast him.\"--Luther (Th. x. pp. 380, 381). Certainly eating, drinking,\nand marriage find no place in the Christian heaven, as they do in the\nMohammedan; but only because with these enjoyments want is associated,\nand with want matter, i.e., passion, dependence, unhappiness. \"Illic\nipsa indigentia morietur. Tunc vere dives eris, quando nullius indigens\neris.\"--Augustin. (Serm. ad Pop. p. 77, c. 9). The pleasures of this\nearth are only medicines, says the same writer; true health exists only\nin immortal life--\"vera sanitas, nisi quando vera immortalitas.\" The\nheavenly life, the heavenly body, is as free and unlimited as\nwishes, as omnipotent as imagination. \"Futurae ergo resurrectionis\ncorpus imperfectae felicitatis erit, si cibos sumere non potuerit,\nimperfectae felicitatis, si cibus eguerit.\"--Augustin. (Epist. 102,\n\u00a7 6, edit. cit). Nevertheless, existence in a body without fatigue,\nwithout heaviness, without disagreeables, without disease, without\nmortality, is associated with the highest corporeal well-being. Even\nthe knowledge of God in heaven is free from any effort of thought or\nfaith, is sensational, immediate knowledge--intuition. The Christians\nare indeed not agreed whether God, as God, the essentia Dei, will\nbe visible to bodily eyes. (See, for example, Augustin. Serm. ad\nPop. p. 277, and Buddeus, Comp. Inst. Th. l. ii. c. 3, \u00a7 4.) But\nin this difference we again have only the contradiction between the\nabstract and the real God; the former is certainly not an object of\nvision, but the latter is so. \"Flesh and blood is the wall between\nme and Christ, which will be torn away.... There everything will\nbe certain. For in that life the eyes will see, the mouth taste,\nand the nose smell it; the treasure will shine into the soul and\nlife.... Faith will cease, and I shall behold with my eyes.\"--Luther\n(Th. ix. p. 595). It is clear from this again, that God, as he is\nan object of religious sentiment, is nothing else than a product\nof the imagination. The heavenly beings are supersensuous sensuous,\nimmaterial material beings, i.e., beings of the imagination; but they\nare like God, nay, identical with God, consequently God also is a\nsupersensuous sensuous, an immaterial material being.\n\n\n\n\u00a7 18.\n\nThe contradiction in the Sacraments is the contradiction of\nnaturalism and supernaturalism. In the first place the natural\nqualities of water are pronounced essential to Baptism. \"Si quis\ndixerit aquam veram et naturalem non esse de necessitate Baptismi\natque ideo verba illa domini nostri Jesu Christi: Nisi quis renatus\nfuerit ex aqua et Spiritu sancto, ad metamorpham aliquam detorserit,\nanathema sit.--Concil. Trident. (Sessio vii. Can. ii. de Bapt.) De\nsubstantia hujus sacramenti sunt verbum et elementum.... Non ergo\nin alio liquore potest consecrari baptismus nisi in aqua.--Petrus\nLomb. (l. iv. dist. 3, c. l. c. 5). Ad certitudinem baptismi requiritur\nmajor quam unius guttae quantitas.... Necesse est ad valorem baptismi\nfieri contactum physicum inter aquam et corpus baptizati, ita ut non\nsufficiat, vestes tantum ipsius aqua tingi.... Ad certitudinem baptismi\nrequiritur, ut saltem talis pars corporis abluatur, ratione cujus homo\nsolet dici vere ablutus, v. 6, collum, humeri, pectus et praesertim\ncaput.--Theolog. Schol. (P. Mezger. Aug. Vind. 1695, Th. iv. pp. 230,\n231). Aquam, eamque veram ac naturalem in baptismo adhibendam esse,\nexemplo Joannis ... non minus vero et Apostolorum Act. viii. 36, x. 47,\npatet.--F. Buddeus (Com. Inst. Th. dog. l. iv. c. i. \u00a7 5).\" Thus water\nis essential. But now comes the negation of the natural qualities\nof water. The significance of Baptism is not the natural power of\nwater, but the supernatural, almighty power of the Word of God,\nwho instituted the use of water as a sacrament, and now by means of\nthis element imparts himself to man in a supernatural, miraculous\nmanner, but who could just as well have chosen any other element\nin order to produce the same effect. So Luther, for example, says:\n\"Understand the distinction, that Baptism is quite another thing than\nall other water, not on account of its natural quality, but because\nhere something more noble is added. For God himself brings hither\nhis glory, power, and might ... as St. Augustine also hath taught:\n'accedat verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum.'\" \"Baptize them\nin the name of the Father, &c. Water without these words is mere\nwater.... Who will call the baptism of the Father, Son, and Holy\nGhost mere water? Do we not see what sort of spice God puts into\nthis water? When sugar is thrown into water it is no longer water,\nbut a costly claret or other beverage. Why then do we here separate\nthe word from the water and say, it is mere water; as if the word of\nGod, yea, God himself, were not with and in the water.... Therefore,\nthe water of Baptism is such a water as takes away sin, death, and\nunhappiness, helps us in heaven and to everlasting life. It is become\na precious sugared water, aromaticum, and restorative, since God has\nmingled himself therewith.\"--Luther (Th. xvi. p. 105).\n\nAs with the water in Baptism, which sacrament is nothing without\nwater, though this water is nevertheless in itself indifferent, so\nis it with the wine and bread in the Eucharist, even in Catholicism,\nwhere the substance of bread and wine is destroyed by the power of\nthe Almighty. \"Accidentia eucharistica tamdiu continent Christum,\nquamdiu retinent illud temperamentum, cum quo connaturaliter\npanis et vini substantia permaneret: ut econtra, quando tanta fit\ntemperamenti dissolutio, illorumque corruptio, ut sub iis substantia\npanis et vini naturaliter remanere non posset, desinunt continere\nChristum.\"--Theol. Schol. (Mezger. l. c. p. 292). That is to say: so\nlong as the bread remains bread, so long does the bread remain flesh;\nwhen the bread is gone, the flesh is gone. Therefore a due portion\nof bread, at least enough to render bread recognisable as such, must\nbe present, for consecration to be possible.--(Ib. p. 284.) For the\nrest, Catholic transubstantiation, the conversio realis et physica\ntotius panis in corpus Christi, is only a consistent continuation of\nthe miracles of the Old and New Testaments. By the transformation of\nwater into wine, of a staff into a serpent, of stones into brooks\n(Ps. cxiv.) by these biblical transubstantiations the Catholics\nexplained and proved the turning of bread into flesh. He who does not\nstumble at those transformations, has no right, no reason to hesitate\nat accepting this. The Protestant doctrine of the Lord's Supper is\nnot less in contradiction with reason than the Catholic. \"The body of\nChrist cannot be partaken otherwise than in two ways, spiritually or\nbodily. Again, this bodily partaking cannot be visible or perceptible,\"\ni.e., is not bodily, \"else no bread would remain. Again, it cannot\nbe mere bread; otherwise it would not be a bodily communion of the\nbody of Christ, but of bread. Therefore the bread broken must also\nbe truly and corporeally the body of Christ, although invisibly\"\n(i.e., incorporeally).--Luther (Th. xix. p. 203). The difference is,\nthat the Protestant gives no explanation concerning the mode in which\nbread can be flesh and wine blood. \"Thereupon we stand, believe,\nand teach, that the body of Christ is truly and corporeally taken\nand eaten in the Lord's Supper. But how this takes place, or how he\nis in the bread, we know not, and are not bound to know.\"--Id. (ut\nsup. p. 393). \"He who will be a Christian must not ask, as our\nfanatics and factionaries do, how it can be that bread is the body of\nChrist and wine the blood of Christ.\"--Id. (Th. xvi. p. 220). \"Cum\nretineamus doctrinam de praesentia corporis Christi, quid opus est\nquaerere de modo?\"--Melancthon (Vita Mel. Camerarius, ed. Strobel,\nHalae, 1777, p. 446). Hence the Protestants as well as the Catholics\ntook refuge in Omnipotence, the grand source of ideas contradictory\nto reason.--(Concord. Summ. Beg. Art. 7, Aff. 3, Negat. 13. See also\nLuther, e.g., Th. xix. p. 400.)\n\n\n\nAn instructive example of theological incomprehensibleness and\nsupernaturalness is afforded by the distinction, in relation to the\nEucharist (Concordienb. Summ. Beg. art. 7), between partaking with\nthe mouth and partaking in a fleshly or natural manner. \"We believe,\nteach, and confess that the body of Christ is taken in the bread and\nwine, not alone spiritually by faith, but also with the mouth, yet not\nin a Capernaitic, but a supernatural heavenly manner, for the sake\nof sacramental union.\" \"Probe namque discrimen inter manducationem\noralem et naturalem tenendum est. Etsi enim oralem manducationem\nadseramus atque propugnemus, naturalem tamen non admittimus.... Omnis\nequidem manducatio naturalis etiam oralis est, sed non vicissim oralis\nmanducatio statim est naturalis.... Unicus itaque licet sit actus,\nunicumque organum, quo panem et corpus Christi, itemque vinum et\nsanguinem Christi accipimus, modus (yes, truly, the mode) nihilominus\nmaximopere differt, cum panem et vinum modo naturali et sensibili,\ncorpus et sanguinem Christi simul equidem cum pane et vino, at modo\nsupernaturali et insensibili, qui adeo etiam a nemine mortalium (nor,\nassuredly, by any God) explicare potest, revera interim et ore corporis\naccipiamus.\"--Jo. Fr. Buddeus (l. c. Lib. v. c. i. \u00a7 15).\n\n\n\n\u00a7 19.\n\nDogma and Morality, Faith and Love, contradict each other in\nChristianity. It is true that God, the object of faith, is in himself\nthe idea of the species in a mystical garb--the common Father of\nmen--and so far love to God is mystical love to man. But God is not\nonly the universal being; he is also a peculiar, personal being,\ndistinguished from love. Where the being is distinguished from\nlove arises arbitrariness. Love acts from necessity, personality\nfrom will. Personality proves itself as such only by arbitrariness;\npersonality seeks dominion, is greedy of glory; it desires only to\nassert itself, to enforce its own authority. The highest worship of God\nas a personal being is therefore the worship of God as an absolutely\nunlimited, arbitrary being. Personality, as such, is indifferent to\nall substantial determinations which lie in the nature of things;\ninherent necessity, the coercion of natural qualities, appears to it\na constraint. Here we have the mystery of Christian love. The love of\nGod, as the predicate of a personal being, has here the significance\nof grace, favour: God is a gracious master, as in Judaism he was a\nsevere master. Grace is arbitrary love,--love which does not act from\nan inward necessity of the nature, but which is equally capable of not\ndoing what it does, which could, if it would, condemn its object; thus\nit is a groundless, unessential, arbitrary, absolutely subjective,\nmerely personal love. \"He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy,\nand whom he will he hardeneth (Rom. ix. 18).... The king does what\nhe will. So is it with the will of God. He has perfect right and\nfull power to do with us and all creatures as he will. And no wrong\nis done to us. If his will had a measure or rule, a law, ground, or\ncause, it would not be the divine will. For what he wills is right,\nbecause he wills it. Where there is faith and the Holy Spirit ... it\nis believed that God would be good and kind even if he consigned all\nmen to damnation. 'Is not Esau Jacob's brother? said the Lord. Yet\nI have loved Jacob and hated Esau.'\"--Luther (Th. xix. pp. 83, 87,\n90, 91, 97). Where love is understood in this sense, jealous watch\nis kept that man attribute nothing to himself as merit, that the\nmerit may lie with the divine personality alone; there every idea\nof necessity is carefully dismissed, in order, through the feeling\nof obligation and gratitude, to be able to adore and glorify the\npersonality exclusively. The Jews deified the pride of ancestry;\nthe Christians, on the other hand, interpreted and transformed\nthe Jewish aristocratic principle of hereditary nobility into the\ndemocratic principle of nobility of merit. The Jew makes salvation\ndepend on birth, the Catholic on the merit of works, the Protestant\non the merit of faith. But the idea of obligation and meritoriousness\nallies itself only with a deed, a work, which cannot be demanded of me,\nor which does not necessarily proceed from my nature. The works of\nthe poet, of the philosopher, can be regarded in the light of merit\nonly as considered externally. They are works of genius--inevitable\nproducts: the poet must bring forth poetry, the philosopher must\nphilosophise. They have the highest satisfaction in the activity of\ncreation, apart from any collateral or ulterior purpose. And it is\njust so with a truly noble moral action. To the man of noble feeling,\nthe noble action is natural: he does not hesitate whether he should do\nit or not, he does not place it in the scales of choice; he must do\nit. Only he who so acts is a man to be confided in. Meritoriousness\nalways involves the notion that a thing is done, so to speak, out of\nluxury, not out of necessity. The Christians indeed celebrated the\nhighest act in their religion, the act of God becoming man, as a work\nof love. But Christian love in so far as it reposes on faith, on the\nidea of God as a master, a Dominus, has the significance of an act\nof grace, of a love in itself superfluous. A gracious master is one\nwho foregoes his rights, a master who does out of graciousness what,\nas a master, he is not bound to do--what goes beyond the strict idea\nof a master. To God, as a master, it is not even a duty to do good\nto man; he has even the right--for he is a master bound by no law--to\nannihilate man if he will. In fact, mercy is optional, non-necessary\nlove, love in contradiction with the essence of love, love which\nis not an inevitable manifestation of the nature, love which the\nmaster, the subject, the person (personality is only an abstract,\nmodern expression for sovereignty) distinguishes from himself as a\npredicate which he can either have or not have without ceasing to be\nhimself. This internal contradiction necessarily manifested itself\nin the life, in the practice of Christianity; it gave rise to the\npractical separation of the subject from the predicate, of faith from\nlove. As the love of God to man was only an act of grace, so also the\nlove of man to man was only an act of favour or grace on the part of\nfaith. Christian love is the graciousness of faith, as the love of\nGod is the graciousness of personality or supremacy. (On the divine\narbitrariness, see also J. A. Ernesti's treatise previously cited:\n\"Vindici\u00e6 arbitrii divini.\")\n\nFaith has within it a malignant principle. Christian faith, and nothing\nelse, is the ultimate ground of Christian persecution and destruction\nof heretics. Faith recognises man only on condition that he recognises\nGod, i.e., faith itself. Faith is the honour which man renders to\nGod. And this honour is due unconditionally. To faith the basis of all\nduties is faith in God: faith is the absolute duty; duties to men are\nonly derivative, subordinate. The unbeliever is thus an outlaw [233]--a\nman worthy of extermination. That which denies God must be itself\ndenied. The highest crime is the crime laesae majestatis Dei. To faith\nGod is a personal being--the supremely personal, inviolable, privileged\nbeing. The acme of personality is honour; hence an injury towards\nthe highest personality is necessarily the highest crime. The honour\nof God cannot be disavowed as an accidental, rude, anthropomorphic\nconception. For is not the personality, even the existence of God,\na sensuous, anthropomorphic conception? Let those who renounce the\nhonour be consistent enough to renounce the personality. From the idea\nof personality results the idea of honour, and from this again the idea\nof religious offences. \"Quicunque Magistratibus male precatus fuerit,\npro eorum arbitrio poenas luito; quicunque vero idem scelus erga Deum\nadmiserit ... lapidibus blasphemiae causa obruitur.\"--(Lev. xxiv. 15,\n16. See also Deut. xii., whence the Catholics deduce the right to\nkill heretics. Boehmer, l. c. l. v. Th. vii. \u00a7 44.) \"Eos autem merito\ntorqueri, qui Deum nesciunt, ut impios, ut injustos, nisi profanus\nnemo deliberat: quum parentem omnium et dominum omnium non minus\nsceleris sit ignorare, quam laedere.\"--Minucii Fel. Oct. c. 35. \"Ubi\nerunt legis praecepta divinae, quae dicunt: honora patrem et matrem,\nsi vocabulum patris, quod in homine honorari praecipitur, in Deo impune\nviolatur?\"--Cypriani Epist. 73 (ed. Gersdorf). \"Cur enim, cum datum\nsit divinitus homini liberum arbitrium, adulteria legibus puniantur\net sacrilegia permittantur? An fidem non servare levius est animam\nDeo, quam feminam viro?\"--Augustinus (de Correct. Donatist. lib. ad\nBonifacium, c. 5). \"Si hi qui nummos adulterant morte mulctantur, quid\nde illis statuendum censemus, qui fidem pervertere conantur?\"--Paulus\nCortesius (in Sententias (Petri L.) iii. l. dist. vii.). \"Si enim\nillustrem ac praepotentem virum nequaquam exhonorari a quoquam licet,\net si quisquam exhonoraverit, decretis legalibus reus sistitur et\ninjuriarum auctor jure damnatur: quanto utique majoris piaculi crimen\nest, injuriosum quempiam Deo esse? Semper enim per dignitatem injuriam\nperferentis crescit culpa facientis, quia necesse est, quanto major\nest persona ejus qui contumeliam patitur, tanto major sit noxa ejus,\nqui facit.\" Thus speaks Salvianus (de Gubernat. Dei, l. vi. p. 218,\nedit. cit.)--Salvianus, who is called Magistrum Episcoporum, sui\nsaeculi Jeremiam, Scriptorem Christianissimum, Orbis christiani\nmagistrum. But heresy, unbelief in general--heresy is only a definite,\nlimited unbelief--is blasphemy, and thus is the highest, the most\nflagitious crime. Thus to cite only one among innumerable examples,\nJ. Oecolampadius writes to Servetus: \"Dum non summam patientiam prae\nme fero, dolens Jesum Christum filium Dei sic dehonestari, parum\nchristiane tibi agere videor. In aliis mansuetus ero: in blasphemiis\nquae in Christum, non item.\"--(Historia Mich. Serveti. H. ab Allwoerden\nHelmstadii, 1737, p. 13). For what is blasphemy? Every negation of\nan idea, of a definition, in which the honour of God, the honour\nof faith is concerned. Servetus fell as a sacrifice to Christian\nfaith. Calvin said to Servetus two hours before his death: \"Ego vero\ningenue praefatus, me nunquam privatus injurias fuisse persecutum,\"\nand parted from him with a sense of being thoroughly sustained by the\nBible: \"Ab haeretico homine, qui autokatakritos peccabat, secundum\nPauli praeceptum discessi.\"--(Ibid. p. 120.) Thus it was by no means\na personal hatred, though this may have been conjoined,--it was a\nreligious hatred which brought Servetus to the stake--the hatred which\nsprings from the nature of unchecked faith. Even Melancthon is known\nto have approved the execution of Servetus. The Swiss theologians,\nwhose opinion was asked by the Genevans, very subtilely abstained, in\ntheir answer, from mentioning the punishment of death, [234] but agreed\nwith the Genevans in this--\"Horrendos Serveti errores detestandos esse,\nseveriusque idcirco in Servetum animadvertendum.\" Thus there is no\ndifference as to the principle, only as to the mode of punishment. Even\nCalvin himself was so Christian as to desire to alleviate the horrible\nmode of death to which the Senate of Geneva condemned Servetus. (See on\nthis subject, e.g., M. Adami, Vita Calvini, p. 90; Vita Bezae, p. 207;\nVitae Theol. Exter. Francof. 1618.) We have, therefore, to consider\nthis execution as an act of general significance--as a work of faith,\nand that not of Roman Catholic, but of reformed, biblical, evangelical\nfaith. That heretics must not be compelled to a profession of the faith\nby force was certainly maintained by most of the lights of the Church,\nbut there nevertheless lived in them the most malignant hatred of\nheretics. Thus, for example, St. Bernard says (Super Cantica, \u00a7 66)\nin relation to heretics: \"Fides suadenda est, non imponenda,\" but he\nimmediately adds: \"Quamquam melius procul dubio gladio coercerentur,\nillius videlicet, qui non sine causa gladium portat, quam in suum\nerrorem multos trajicere permittantur.\" If the faith of the present\nday no longer produces such flagrant deeds of horror, this is due\nonly to the fact that the faith of this age is not an uncompromising,\nliving faith, but a sceptical, eclectic, unbelieving faith, curtailed\nand maimed by the power of art and science. Where heretics are no\nlonger burned either in the fires of this world or of the other,\nthere faith itself has no longer any fire, any vitality. The faith\nwhich allows variety of belief renounces its divine origin and rank,\ndegrades itself to a subjective opinion. It is not to Christian faith,\nnot to Christian love (i.e., love limited by faith); no! it is to\ndoubt of Christian faith, to the victory of religious scepticism,\nto free-thinkers, to heretics, that we owe tolerance, freedom of\nopinion. It was the heretics, persecuted by the Christian Church, who\nalone fought for freedom of conscience. Christian freedom is freedom\nin non-essentials only: on the fundamental articles of faith freedom\nis not allowed. When, however, Christian faith--faith considered in\ndistinction from love, for faith is not one with love, \"potestis habere\nfidem sine caritate\" (Augustinus, Serm. ad Pop. \u00a7 90)--is pronounced\nto be the principle, the ultimate ground of the violent deeds of\nChristians towards heretics (that is, such deeds as arose from real\nbelieving zeal), it is obviously not meant that faith could have these\nconsequences immediately and originally, but only in its historical\ndevelopment. Still, even to the earliest Christians the heretic was\nan antichrist, and necessarily so--\"adversus Christum sunt haeretici\"\n(Cyprianus, Epist. 76, \u00a7 14, edit. cit.)--accursed--\"apostoli ... in\nepistolis haereticos exsecrati sunt\" (Cyprianus, ib. \u00a7 6)--a lost\nbeing, doomed by God to hell and everlasting death. \"Thou hearest that\nthe tares are already condemned and sentenced to the fire. Why then\nwilt thou lay many sufferings on a heretic? Dost thou not hear that\nhe is already judged to a punishment heavier than he can bear? Who\nart thou, that thou wilt interfere and punish him who has already\nfallen under the punishment of a more powerful master? What would I do\nagainst a thief already sentenced to the gallows?... God has already\ncommanded his angels, who in his own time will be the executioners\nof heretics.\"--Luther (Th. xvi. p. 132). When therefore the State,\nthe world, became Christian, and also, for that reason, Christianity\nbecame worldly, the Christian religion a State religion; then it was\na necessary consequence that the condemnation of heretics, which was\nat first only religious or dogmatic, became a political, practical\ncondemnation, and the eternal punishment of hell was anticipated by\ntemporal punishment. If, therefore, the definition and treatment of\nheresy as a punishable crime is in contradiction with the Christian\nfaith, it follows that a Christian king, a Christian State, is in\ncontradiction with it; for a Christian State is that which executes\nthe Divine judgments of faith with the sword, which makes earth a\nheaven to believers, a hell to unbelievers. \"Docuimus ... pertinere\nad reges religiosos, non solum adulteria vel homicidia vel hujusmodi\nalia flagitia seu facinora, verum etiam sacrilegia severitate\ncongrua cohibere.\"--Augustinus (Epist. ad Dulcitium). \"Kings ought\nthus to serve the Lord Christ by helping with laws that his honour\nbe furthered. Now when the temporal magistracy finds scandalous\nerrors, whereby the honour of the Lord Christ is blasphemed and\nmen's salvation hindered, and a schism arises among the people\n... where such false teachers will not be admonished and cease\nfrom preaching, there ought the temporal magistracy confidently\nto arm itself, and know that nothing else befits its office but to\napply the sword and all force, that doctrine may be pure and God's\nservice genuine and unperverted, and also that peace and unity may\nbe preserved.\"--Luther (Th. xv. pp. 110, 111). Let it be further\nremarked here, that Augustine justifies the application of coercive\nmeasures for the awaking of Christian faith by urging that the Apostle\nPaul was converted to Christianity by a deed of force--a miracle. (De\nCorrect. Donat. c. 6.) The intrinsic connection between temporal and\neternal, i.e., political and spiritual punishment, is clear from this,\nthat the same reasons which have been urged against the temporal\npunishment of heresy are equally valid against the punishment of\nhell. If heresy or unbelief cannot be punished here because it is a\nmere mistake, neither can it be punished by God in hell. If coercion\nis in contradiction with the nature of faith, so is hell; for the\nfear of the terrible consequence of unbelief, the torments of hell,\nurge to belief against knowledge and will. Boehmer, in his Jus. Eccl.,\nargues that heresy and unbelief should be struck out of the category\nof crimes, that unbelief is only a vitium theologicum, a peccatum\nin Deum. But God, in the view of faith, is not only a religious,\nbut a political, juridical being, the King of kings, the true head\nof the State. \"There is no power but of God ... it is the minister of\nGod\"--Rom. xiii. 1, 4. If, therefore, the juridical idea of majesty, of\nkingly dignity and honour, applies to God, sin against God, unbelief,\nmust by consequence come under the definition of crime. And as with\nGod, so with faith. Where faith is still a truth, and a public truth,\nthere no doubt is entertained that it can be demanded of every one,\nthat every one is bound to believe. Be it further observed, that the\nChristian Church has gone so far in its hatred against heretics,\nthat according to the canon law even the suspicion of heresy is\na crime, \"ita ut de jure canonico revera crimen suspecti detur,\ncujus existentiam frustra in jure civili quaerimus.\"--Boehmer\n(l. c. v. Tit. vii. \u00a7\u00a7 23-42).\n\nThe command to love enemies extends only to personal enemies, not to\nthe enemies of God, the enemies of faith. \"Does not the Lord Christ\ncommand that we should love even our enemies? How then does David\nhere boast that he hates the assembly of the wicked, and sits not\nwith the ungodly?... For the sake of the person I should love them;\nbut for the sake of the doctrine I should hate them. And thus I must\nhate them or hate God, who commands and wills that we should cleave to\nhis word alone.... What I cannot love with God, I must hate; if they\nonly preach something which is against God, all love and friendship\nis destroyed;--thereupon I hate thee, and do thee no good. For\nfaith must be uppermost, and where the word of God is attacked, hate\ntakes the place of love.... And so David means to say: I hate them,\nnot because they have done injury and evil to me and led a bad and\nwicked life, but because they despise, revile, blaspheme, falsify,\nand persecute the word of God.\" \"Faith and love are two things. Faith\nendures nothing, love endures all things. Faith curses, love blesses:\nfaith seeks vengeance and punishment, love seeks forbearance and\nforgiveness.\" \"Rather than God's word should fall and heresy stand,\nfaith would wish all creatures to be destroyed; for through heresy\nmen lose God himself.\"--Luther (Th. vi. p. 94; Th. v. pp. 624,\n630). See also, on this subject, my treatise in the Deutsches\nJahrb. and Augustini Enarrat. in Psalm cxxxviii. (cxxxix.). As Luther\ndistinguishes the person from the enemy of God, so Augustine here\ndistinguishes the man from the enemy of God, from the unbeliever, and\nsays: We should hate the ungodliness in the man, but love the humanity\nin him. But what, then, in the eyes of faith, is the man in distinction\nfrom faith, man without faith, i.e., without God? Nothing: for the sum\nof all realities, of all that is worthy of love, of all that is good\nand essential, is faith, as that which alone apprehends and possesses\nGod. It is true that man as man is the image of God, but only of the\nnatural God, of God as the Creator of Nature. But the Creator is only\nGod as he manifests himself outwardly; the true God, God as he is in\nhimself, the inward essence of God, is the triune God, is especially\nChrist. (See Luther, Th. xiv. pp. 2, 3, and Th. xvi. p. 581.) And the\nimage of this true, essential, Christian God, is only the believer,\nthe Christian. Moreover, man is not to be loved for his own sake,\nbut for God's. \"Diligendus est propter Deum, Deus vero propter se\nipsum.\"--Augustinus (de Doctrina Chr. 1. i. cc. 22, 27). How, then,\nshould the unbelieving man, who has no resemblance to the true God,\nbe an object of love?\n\n\n\n\u00a7 20.\n\nFaith separates man from man, puts in the place of the natural\nunity founded in Nature and Love a supernatural unity--the unity\nof Faith. \"Inter Christianum et gentilem non fides tantum debet,\nsed etiam vita distinguere.... Nolite, ait Apostolus, jugum\nducere cum infidelibus.... Sit ergo inter nos et illos maxima\nseparatio.\"--Hieronymus (Epist. Caelanti\u00e6 matronae).... \"Prope\nnihil gravius quam copulari alienigeniae.... Nam cum ipsum conjugium\nvelamine sacerdotali et benedictione sanctificari oporteat: quomodo\npotest conjugium dici, ubi non est fidei concordia?... Saepe plerique\ncapti amore feminarum fidem suam prodiderunt.\"--Ambrosius (Ep. 70,\nLib. ix.). \"Non enim licet christiano cum gentili vel judaeo inire\nconjugium.\"--Petrus L. (l. iv. dist. 39, c. 1). And this separation is\nby no means unbiblical. On the contrary, we find that, in support of\nit, the Fathers appeal directly to the Bible. The well-known passage\nof the Apostle Paul concerning marriage between heathens and Christians\nrelates only to marriages which had taken place before conversion, not\nto those which were yet to be contracted. Let the reader refer to what\nPeter Lombard says in the book already cited. \"The first Christians\ndid not acknowledge, did not once listen to, all those relatives who\nsought to turn them away from the hope of the heavenly reward. This\nthey did through the power of the Gospel, for the sake of which all\nlove of kindred was to be despised; inasmuch as ... the brotherhood\nof Christ far surpassed natural brotherhood. To us the Fatherland and\na common name is not so dear, but that we have a horror even of our\nparents, if they seek to advise something against the Lord.\"--G. Arnold\n(Wahre Abbild. der ersten Christen. B. iv. c. 2). \"Qui amat patrem\net matrem plus quam me, non est me dignus Matth. x. ... in hoc\nvos non agnosco parentes, sed hostes.... Alioquin quid mihi et\nvobis? Quid a vobis habeo nisi peccatum et miseriam?\"--Bernardus\n(Epist. iii. Ex persona Heliae monachi ad parentes suos). \"Etsi\nimpium est, contemnere matrem, contemnere tamen propter Christum\npiissimum est.\"--Bernardus (Ep. 104. See also Ep. 351, ad Hugonem\nnovitium). \"Audi sententiam Isidori: multi canonicorum, monachorum\n... temporali salute suorum parentum perdunt animas suas.... Servi\nDei qui parentum suorum utilitatem procurant a Dei amore se\nseparant.\"--De modo bene vivendi (S. vii.). \"Omnem hominem fidelem\njudica tuum esse fratrem.\"--(Ibid. Sermo 13). \"Ambrosius dicit,\nlonge plus nos debere diligere filios quos de fonte levamus,\nquam quos carnaliter (genuimus.\"--Petrus L. (l. iv. dist. 6,\nc. 5, addit. Henr. ab Vurim.). \"Infantes nascuntur cum peccato,\nnec fiunt haeredes vitae aeternae sine remissione peccati.... Cum\nigitur dubium non sit in infantibus esse peccatum, debet aliquod\nesse discrimen infantium Ethnicorum, qui manent rei, et infantium in\nEcclesia, qui recipiuntur a Deo per ministerium.\"--Melancthon (Loci de\nbapt. inf. Argum. II. Compare with this the passage above cited from\nBuddeus, as a proof of the narrowness of the true believer's love). \"Ut\nEpiscopi vel Clerici in eos, qui Catholici Christiani non sunt, etiam\nsi consanguinei fuerint, nec per donationes rerum suarum aliquid\nconferant.\"--Concil. Carthag. III. can. 13 (Summa Carranza). \"Cum\nhaereticis nec orandum, nec psallendum.\"--Concil. Carthag. IV. can. 72\n(ibid.).\n\nFaith has the significance of religion, love only that of\nmorality. This has been declared very decidedly by Protestantism. The\ndoctrine that love does not justify in the sight of God, but only\nfaith, expresses nothing further than that love has no religious\npower and significance. (Apol. Augsb. Confess. art. 3. Of Love and\nthe Fulfilment of the Law.) It is certainly here said: \"What the\nscholastic writers teach concerning the love of God is a dream, and\nit is impossible to know and love God before we know and lay hold\non mercy through faith. For then first does God become objectum\namabile, a lovable, blissful object of contemplation.\" Thus here\nmercy, love is made the proper object of faith. And it is true\nthat faith is immediately distinguished from love only in this,\nthat faith places out of itself what love places in itself. \"We\nbelieve that our justification, salvation, and consolation, lie out\nof ourselves.\"--Luther (Th. xvi. p. 497; see also Th. ix. p. 587). It\nis true that faith in the Protestant sense is faith in the forgiveness\nof sins, faith in mercy, faith in Christ, as the God who suffered and\ndied for men, so that man, in order to attain everlasting salvation,\nhas nothing further to do on his side than believingly to accept this\nsacrifice of God for him. But it is not as love only that God is an\nobject of faith. On the contrary, the characteristic object of faith\nas faith is God as a subject, a person. And is a God who accords no\nmerit to man, who claims all exclusively for himself, who watches\njealously over his honour--is a self-interested, egoistic God like\nthis a God of love?\n\nThe morality which proceeds from faith has for its principle\nand criterion only the contradiction of Nature, of man. As the\nhighest object of faith is that which most contradicts reason,\nthe Eucharist, so necessarily the highest virtue of the morality\nwhich is true and obedient to faith is that which most contradicts\nNature. Dogmatic miracles have therefore moral miracles as their\nconsequence. Antinatural morality is the twin sister of supernatural\nfaith. As faith vanquishes Nature outside of man, so the morality of\nfaith vanquishes Nature within man. This practical supernaturalism,\nthe summit of which is \"virginity, the sister of the angels, the queen\nof virtues, the mother of all good\" (see A. v. Buchers: Geistliches\nSuchverloren. (S\u00e4mmtl. W. B. vi. 151), has been specially developed\nby Catholicism; for Protestantism has held fast only the principle of\nChristianity, and has arbitrarily eliminated its logical consequences;\nit has embraced only Christian faith and not Christian morality. In\nfaith, Protestantism has brought man back to the standpoint of\nprimitive Christianity; but in life, in practice, in morality, it has\nrestored him to the pre-Christian, the Old Testament, the heathen,\nAdamitic, natural standpoint. God instituted marriage in paradise;\ntherefore even in the present day, even to Christians, the command\nMultiply! is valid. Christ advises those only not to marry who\n\"can receive\" this higher rule. Chastity is a supernatural gift;\nit cannot therefore be expected of every one. But is not faith also\na supernatural gift, a special gift of God, a miracle, as Luther\nsays innumerable times, and is it not nevertheless commanded to us\nall? Are not all men included in the command to mortify, blind, and\ncontemn the natural reason? Is not the tendency to believe and accept\nnothing which contradicts reason as natural, as strong, as necessary\nin us, as the sexual impulse? If we ought to pray to God for faith\nbecause by ourselves we are too weak to believe, why should we not\non the same ground entreat God for chastity? Will he deny us this\ngift if we earnestly implore him for it? Never! Thus we may regard\nchastity as a universal command equally with faith, for what we\ncannot do of ourselves, we can do through God. What speaks against\nchastity speaks against faith also, and what speaks for faith speaks\nfor chastity. One stands and falls with the other; with a supernatural\nfaith is necessarily associated a supernatural morality. Protestantism\ntore this bond asunder: in faith it affirmed Christianity; in life, in\npractice, it denied Christianity, acknowledged the autonomy of natural\nreason, of man,--restored man to his original rights. Protestantism\nrejected celibacy, chastity, not because it contradicted the Bible,\nbut because it contradicts man and nature. \"He who will be single\nrenounces the name of man, and proves or makes himself an angel or\nspirit.... It is pitiable folly to wonder that a man takes a wife,\nor for any one to be ashamed of doing so, since no one wonders that\nmen are accustomed to eat and drink.\"--Luther (Th. xix. pp. 368,\n369). Does this unbelief as to the possibility and reality of chastity\naccord with the Bible, where celibacy is eulogised as a laudable,\nand consequently a possible, attainable state? No! It is in direct\ncontradiction with the Bible. Protestantism, in consequence of its\npractical spirit, and therefore by its own inherent force, repudiated\nChristian supranaturalism in the sphere of morality. Christianity\nexists for it only in faith--not in law, not in morality, not in the\nState. It is true that love (the compendium of morality) belongs\nessentially to the Christian, so that where there is no love,\nwhere faith does not attest itself by love, there is no faith, no\nChristianity. Nevertheless love is only the outward manifestation of\nfaith, only a consequence, and only human. \"Faith alone deals with\nGod,\" \"faith makes us gods;\" love makes us merely men, and as faith\nalone is for God, so God is for faith alone, i.e., faith alone is\nthe divine, the Christian in man. To faith belongs eternal life, to\nlove only this temporal life. \"Long before Christ came God gave this\ntemporal, earthly life to the whole world, and said that man should\nlove him and his neighbour. After that he gave the world to his Son\nChrist, that we through and by him should have eternal life.... Moses\nand the law belong to this life, but for the other life we must have\nthe Lord.\"--Luther (Th. xvi. p. 459). Thus although love belongs to\nthe Christian, yet is the Christian a Christian only through this,\nthat he believes in Christ. It is true that to serve one's neighbour,\nin whatever way, rank, or calling, is to serve God. But the God whom I\nserve in fulfilling a worldly or natural office is only the universal,\nmundane, natural, pre-Christian God. Government, the State, marriage,\nexisted prior to Christianity, was an institution, an ordinance\nof God, in which he did not as yet reveal himself as the true God,\nas Christ. Christ has nothing to do with all these worldly things;\nthey are external, indifferent to him. But for this very reason, every\nworldly calling and rank is compatible with Christianity; for the true,\nChristian service of God is faith alone, and this can be exercised\neverywhere. Protestantism binds men only in faith, all the rest it\nleaves free, but only because all the rest is external to faith.\n\nIt is true that we are bound by the commandments of Christian morality,\nas, for example, \"Avenge not yourselves,\" &c., but they have validity\nfor us only as private, not as public persons. The world is governed\naccording to its own laws. Catholicism \"mingled together the worldly\nand spiritual kingdoms,\" i.e., it sought to govern the world by\nChristianity. But \"Christ did not come on earth to interfere in the\ngovernment of the Emperor Augustus and teach him how to reign.\"--Luther\n(Th. xvi. p. 49). Where worldly government begins Christianity ends;\nthere worldly justice, the sword, war, litigation, prevail. As a\nChristian I let my cloak be stolen from me without resistance, but\nas a citizen I seek to recover it by law. \"Evangelium non abolet jus\nnatur\u00e6.\"--Melancthon (de Vindicta Loci. See also on this subject\nM. Chemnitii Loci Theol. de Vindicta). In fact, Protestantism is\nthe practical negation of Christianity, the practical assertion of\nthe natural man. It is true that Protestantism also commands the\nmortifying of the flesh, the negation of the natural man; but apart\nfrom the fact that this negation has for Protestantism no religious\nsignificance and efficacy, does not justify, i.e., make acceptable\nto God, procure salvation; the negation of the flesh in Protestantism\nis not distinguished from that limitation of the flesh which natural\nreason and morality enjoin on man. The necessary practical consequences\nof the Christian faith Protestantism has relegated to the other world,\nto heaven--in other words, has denied them. la heaven first ceases\nthe worldly standpoint of Protestantism; there we no longer marry,\nthere first we are new creatures; but here everything remains as of old\n\"until that life; there the external life will be changed, for Christ\ndid not come to change the creature.\"--Luther (Th. xv. p. 62). Here\nwe are half heathens, half Christians; half citizens of the earth,\nhalf citizens of heaven. Of this division, this disunity, this chasm,\nCatholicism knows nothing. What it denies in heaven, i.e., in faith, it\ndenies, also, as far as possible, on earth, i.e., in morality. \"Grandis\nigitur virtutis est et sollicitate diligentiae, superare quod nata sis:\nin carne non carnaliter vivere, tecum pugnare quotidie.\"--Hieronymus\n(Ep. Furiae Rom. nobilique viduae). \"Quanto igitur natura amplius\nvincitur et premitur, tanto major gratia infunditur.\"--Thomas \u00e0\nK. (Imit. l. iii. c. 54). \"Esto robustus tam in agendo, quam in\npatiendo naturae contraria.\"--(Ibid. c. 49.) \"Beatus ille homo, qui\npropter te, Domine, omnibus creaturis licentiam abeundi tribuit,\nqui naturae vim facit et concupiscentias carnis fervore spiritus\ncrucifigit\" (c. 48). \"Adhuc proh dolor! vivit in me verus homo, non est\ntotus crucifixus.\"--(Ibid. c. 34, l. iii. c. 19, l. ii. c. 12.) And\nthese dicta by no means emanate simply from the pious individuality\nof the author of the work De Imitatione Christi; they express the\ngenuine morality of Catholicism, that morality which the saints\nattested by their lives, and which was sanctioned even by the Head of\nthe Church, otherwise so worldly. Thus it is said, for example, in\nthe Canonizatio S. Bernhardi Abbatis per Alexandrum papam III. anno\nCh. 1164. Litt. apost ... primo ad. Praelatos Eccles. Gallic.:\n\"In afflictione vero corporis sui usque adeo sibi mundum, seque\nmundo reddidit crucifixum, ut confidamus martyrum quoque eum merita\nobtinere sanctorum, etc.\" It was owing to this purely negative moral\nprinciple that there could be enunciated within Catholicism itself the\ngross opinion that mere martyrdom, without the motive of love to God,\nobtains heavenly blessedness.\n\nIt is true that Catholicism also in practice denied the\nsupranaturalistic morality of Christianity; but its negation has\nan essentially different significance from that of Protestantism;\nit is a negation de facto but not de jure. The Catholic denied in\nlife what he ought to have affirmed in life,--as, for example, the\nvow of chastity,--what he desired to affirm, at least if he was a\nreligious Catholic, but which in the nature of things he could not\naffirm. Thus he gave validity to the law of Nature, he gratified the\nflesh, in a word, he was a man, in contradiction with his essential\ncharacter, his religious principle and conscience. Adhuc proh\ndolor! vivit in me verus homo. Catholicism has proved to the world\nthat the supernatural principle of faith in Christianity, applied to\nlife, made a principle of morals, has immoral, radically corrupting\nconsequences. This experience Protestantism made use of, or rather\nthis experience called forth Protestantism. It made the illegitimate,\npractical negation of Christianity--illegitimate in the sense of\ntrue Catholicism, though not in that of the degenerate Church--the\nlaw, the norm of life. You cannot in life, at least in this life,\nbe Christians, peculiar, superhuman beings, therefore ye ought not\nto be such. And it legitimised this negation of Christianity before\nits still Christian conscience, by Christianity itself, pronounced\nit to be Christian;--no wonder, therefore, that now at last modern\nChristianity not only practically but theoretically represents\nthe total negation of Christianity as Christianity. When, however,\nProtestantism is designated as the contradiction, Catholicism as\nthe unity of faith and practice, it is obvious that in both cases we\nrefer only to the essence, to the principle.\n\nFaith sacrifices man to God. Human sacrifice belongs to the very idea\nof religion. Bloody human sacrifices only dramatise this idea. \"By\nfaith Abraham offered up Isaac.\"--Heb. xi. 17. \"Quanto major Abraham,\nqui unicum filium voluntate jugulavit.... Jepte obtulit virginem filiam\net idcirco in enumeratione sanctorum ab Apostolo ponitur.\"--Hieronymus\n(Epist. Juliano). On the human sacrifices in the Jewish religion\nwe refer the reader to the works of Daumer and Ghillany. In the\nChristian religion also it is only blood, the sacrifice of the Son of\nMan, which allays God's anger and reconciles him to man. Therefore\na pure, guiltless man must fall a sacrifice. Such blood alone is\nprecious, such alone has reconciling power. And this blood, shed on\nthe cross for the allaying of the divine anger, Christians partake\nin the Lord's Supper, for the strengthening and sealing of their\nfaith. But why is the blood taken under the form of wine, the flesh\nunder the form of bread? That it may not appear as if Christians ate\nreal human flesh and drank human blood, that the natural man may not\nshrink from the mysteries of the Christian faith. \"Etenim ne humana\ninfirmitas esum carnis et potum sanguinis in sumptione horreret,\nChristus velari et palliari illa duo voluit speciebus panis et\nvini.\"--Bernard. (edit. cit. pp. 189-191). \"Sub alia autem specie\ntribus de causis carnem et sanguinem tradit Christus et deinceps\nsumendum instituit. Ut fides scil. haberet meritum, quae est de\nhis quae non videntur, quod fides non habet meritum, ubi humana\nratio praebet experimentum. Et ideo etiam ne abhorreret animus quod\ncerneret oculus; quod non habemus in usu carnem crudam comedere\net sanguinem bibere.... Et etiam ideo ne ab incredulis religioni\nchristianae insultaretur. Unde Augustinus: Nihil rationabilius,\nquam ut sanguinis similitudinem sumamus, ut et ita veritas non desit\net ridiculum nullum fiat a paganis, quod cruorem occisi hominis\nbibamus.\"--Petrus Lomb. (Sent. lib. iv. dist. ii. c. 4).\n\nBut as the bloody human sacrifice, while it expresses the utmost\nabnegation of man, is at the same time the highest assertion of\nhis value;--for only because human life is regarded as the highest,\nbecause the sacrifice of it is the most painful, costs the greatest\nconquest over feeling, is it offered to God;--so the contradiction\nof the Eucharist with human nature is only apparent. Apart from the\nfact that flesh and blood are, as St. Bernard says, clothed with\nbread and wine, i.e., that in truth it is not flesh but bread, not\nblood but wine, which is partaken,--the mystery of the Eucharist\nresolves itself into the mystery of eating and drinking. \"All\nancient Christian doctors ... teach that the body of Christ is\nnot taken spiritually alone by faith, which happens also out of\nthe Sacraments, but also corporeally; not alone by believers,\nby the pious, but also by unworthy, unbelieving, false and wicked\nChristians.\" \"There are thus two ways of eating Christ's flesh, one\nspiritual ... such spiritual eating however is nothing else than\nfaith.... The other way of eating the body of Christ is to eat it\ncorporeally or sacramentally.\"--(Concordienb. Erkl. art. 7). \"The\nmouth eats the body of Christ bodily.\"--Luther (against the\n\"fanatics.\" Th. xix. p. 417). What then forms the specific difference\nof the Eucharist? Eating and drinking. Apart from the Sacrament,\nGod is partaken of spiritually; in the Sacrament he is partaken of\nmaterially, i.e., he is eaten and drunken, assimilated by the body. But\nhow couldst thou receive God into thy body, if it were in thy esteem\nan organ unworthy of God? Dost thou pour wine into a water-cask? Dost\nthou not declare thy hands and lips holy when by means of them thou\ncomest in contact with the Holy One? Thus if God is eaten and drunken,\neating and drinking is declared to be a divine act; and this is what\nthe Eucharist expresses, though in a self-contradictory, mystical,\ncovert manner. But it is our task to express the mystery of religion,\nopenly and honourably, clearly and definitely. Life is God; the\nenjoyment of life is the enjoyment of God; true bliss in life is true\nreligion. But to the enjoyment of life belongs the enjoyment of eating\nand drinking. If therefore life in general is holy, eating and drinking\nmust be holy. Is this an irreligious creed? Let it be remembered that\nthis irreligion is the analysed, unfolded, unequivocally expressed\nmystery of religion itself. All the mysteries of religion ultimately\nresolve themselves, as we have shown, into the mystery of heavenly\nbliss. But heavenly bliss is nothing else than happiness freed from\nthe limits of reality. The Christians have happiness for their object\njust as much as the heathens; the only difference is, that the heathens\nplace heaven on earth, the Christians place earth in heaven. Whatever\nis, whatever is really enjoyed, is finite; that which is not, which\nis believed in and hoped for, is infinite.\n\n\n\n\u00a7 21.\n\nThe Christian religion is a contradiction. It is at once the\nreconciliation and the disunion, the unity and the opposition, of God\nand man. This contradiction is personified in the God-man. The unity\nof the Godhead and manhood is at once a truth and an untruth. We\nhave already maintained that if Christ was God, if he was at\nonce man and another being conceived as incapable of suffering,\nhis suffering was an illusion. For his suffering as man was no\nsuffering to him as God. No! what he acknowledged as man he denied\nas God. He suffered only outwardly, not inwardly, i.e., he suffered\nonly apparently, not really; for he was man only in appearance,\nin form, in the external; in truth, in essence, in which alone he\nwas an object to the believer, he was God. It would have been true\nsuffering only if he had suffered as God also. What he did not\nexperience in his nature as God, he did not experience in truth,\nin substance. And, incredible as it is, the Christians themselves\nhalf directly, half indirectly, admit that their highest, holiest\nmystery is only an illusion, a simulation. This simulation indeed\nlies at the foundation of the thoroughly unhistorical, [235]\ntheatrical, illusory Gospel of John. One instance, among others,\nin which this is especially evident, is the resurrection of Lazarus,\nwhere the omnipotent arbiter of life and death evidently sheds tears\nonly in ostentation of his manhood, and expressly says: \"Father,\nI thank thee that thou hast heard me, and I know that thou hearest\nme always, but for the sake of the people who stand round I said it,\nthat they may believe in thee.\" The simulation thus indicated in the\nGospel has been developed by the Church into avowed delusion. \"Si\ncredas susceptionem corporis, adjungas divinitatis compassionem,\nportionem utique perfidiae, non perfidiam declinasti. Credis enim,\nquod tibi prodesse praesumis, non credis quod Deo dignum est.... Idem\nenim patiebatur et non patiebatur.... Patiebatur secundum corporis\nsusceptionem, ut suscepti corporis veritas crederetur et non patiebatur\nsecundum verbi impassibilem divinitatem.... Erat igitur immortalis\nin morte, impassibilis in passione.... Cur divinitati attribuis\naerumnas corporis et infirmum doloris humani divinae connectis\nnaturae?\"--Ambrosius (de incarnat. domin. sacr. cc. 4, 5). \"Juxta\nhominis naturam proficiebat sapientia, non quod ipse sapientior esset\nex tempore ... sed eandem, qua plenus erat, sapientiam caeteris ex\ntempore paulatim demonstrabat.... In aliis ergo non in se proficiebat\nsapientia et gratia.\"--Gregorius in homil. quadam (ap. Petrus\nLomb. l. iii. dist. 13, c. 1). \"Proficiebat ergo humanus sensus in eo\nsecundum ostensionem et aliorum hominum opinionem. Ita enim patrem et\nmatrem dicitur ignorasse in infantia, quia ita se gerebat et habebat\nac si agnitionis expers esset.\"--Petrus L. (ibid. c. 2). \"Ut homo ergo\ndubitat, ut homo locutus est.\"--Ambrosius. \"His verbis innui videtur,\nquod Christus non inquantum Deus vel Dei filius, sed inquantum homo\ndubitaverit affectu humano. Quod ea ratione dictum accipi potest: non\nquod ipse dubitaverit, sed quod modum gessit dubitantis et hominibus\ndubitare videbatur.\"--Petrus L. (ibid. dist. 17, c. 2). In the first\npart of the present work we have exhibited the truth, in the second\npart the untruth of religion, or rather of theology. The truth is only\nthe identity of God and man. Religion is truth only when it affirms\nhuman attributes as divine, falsehood when, in the form of theology,\nit denies these attributes, separating God from man as a different\nbeing. Thus, in the first part we had to show the truth of God's\nsuffering; here we have the proof of its untruth, and not a proof\nwhich lies in our own subjective view, but an objective proof--the\nadmission of theology itself, that its highest mystery, the Passion of\nGod, is only a deception, an illusion. It is therefore in the highest\ndegree uncritical, untruthful, and arbitrary to explain the Christian\nreligion, as speculative philosophy has done, only as the religion of\nreconciliation between God and man, and not also as the religion of\ndisunion between the divine and human nature,--to find in the God-man\nonly the unity, and not also the contradiction of the divine and\nhuman nature. Christ suffered only as man, not as God. Capability of\nsuffering is the sign of real humanity. It was not as God that he was\nborn, that he increased in wisdom, and was crucified; i.e., all human\nconditions remained foreign to him as God. \"Si quis non confitetur\nproprie et vere substantialem differentiam naturarum post ineffabilem\nunionem, ex quibus unus et solus extitit Christus, in ea salvatum, sit\ncondemnatus.\"--Concil. Later. I. can. 7 (Carranza). The divine nature,\nnotwithstanding the position that Christ was at once God and man,\nis just as much dissevered from the human nature in the incarnation\nas before it, since each nature excludes the conditions of the other,\nalthough both are united in one personality, in an incomprehensible,\nmiraculous, i.e., untrue manner, in contradiction with the relation in\nwhich, according to their definition, they stand to each other. Even\nthe Lutherans, nay, Luther himself, however strongly he expresses\nhimself concerning the community and union of the human and divine\nnature in Christ, does not escape from the irreconcilable division\nbetween them. \"God is man, and man is God, but thereby neither the\nnatures nor their attributes are confounded, but each nature retains\nits essence and attributes.\" \"The Son of God himself has truly suffered\nand truly died, but according to the human nature which he had assumed;\nfor the divine nature can neither suffer nor die.\" \"It is truly said,\nthe Son of God suffers. For although the one part (so to speak), as\nthe Godhead, does not suffer, still the person who is God suffers in\nthe other half, the manhood; for in truth the Son of God was crucified\nfor us, that is, the person who is God; for the person is crucified\naccording to his manhood.\" \"It is the person that does and suffers all,\none thing according to this nature, another according to that nature,\nall which the learned well know.\"--(Concordienb. Erkl\u00e4r. art. 8.) \"The\nSon of God and God himself is killed and murdered, for God and man is\none person. Therefore God was crucified, and died, and became man;\nnot God apart from humanity, but united with it; not according\nto the Godhead, but according to the human nature which he had\nassumed.\"--Luther (Th. iii. p. 502). Thus only in the person, i.e.,\nonly in a nomen proprium, not in essence, not in truth, are the two\nnatures united. \"Quando dicitur: Deus est homo vel homo est Deus,\npropositio ejusmodi vocatur personalis. Ratio est, quia unionem\npersonalem in Christo supponit. Sine tali enim naturarum in Christo\nunione nunquam dicere potuissem, Deum esse hominem aut hominem esse\nDeum.... Abstracta autem naturae de se invicem enuntiari non posse,\nlonge est manifestissimum.... Dicere itaque non licet, divina natura\nest humana aut deitas est humanitas et vice versa.\"--J. F. Buddeus\n(Comp. Inst. Theol. Dogm. l. iv. c. ii. \u00a7 11). Thus the union of the\ndivine and human natures in the incarnation is only a deception, an\nillusion. The old dissidence of God and man lies at the foundation of\nthis dogma also, and operates all the more injuriously, is all the more\nodious, that it conceals itself behind the appearance, the imagination\nof unity. Hence Socinianism, far from being superficial when it denied\nthe Trinity and the God-man, was only consistent, only truthful. God\nwas a triune being, and yet he was to be held purely simple,\nabsolute unity, an ens simplicissimum; thus the Unity contradicted the\nTrinity. God was God-man, and yet the Godhead was not to be touched or\nannulled by the manhood, i.e., it was to be essentially distinct; thus\nthe incompatibility of the divine and human attributes contradicted the\nunity of the two natures. According to this, we have in the very idea\nof the God-man the arch-enemy of the God-man,--rationalism, blended,\nhowever, with its opposite--mysticism. Thus Socinianism only denied\nwhat faith itself denied, and yet, in contradiction with itself,\nat the same time affirmed; it only denied a contradiction, an untruth.\n\nNevertheless the Christians have celebrated the incarnation as a\nwork of love, as a self-renunciation of God, an abnegation of his\nmajesty--Amor triumphat de Deo; for the love of God is an empty word\nif it is understood as a real abolition of the distinction between him\nand man. Thus we have, in the very central point of Christianity, the\ncontradiction of Faith and Love developed in the close of the present\nwork. Faith makes the suffering of God a mere appearance, love makes\nit a truth. Only on the truth of the suffering rests the true positive\nimpression of the incarnation. Strongly, then, as we have insisted on\nthe contradiction and division between the divine and the human nature\nin the God-man, we must equally insist on their community and unity,\nin virtue of which God is really man and man is really God. Here then\nwe have the irrefragable and striking proof that the central point,\nthe supreme object of Christianity, is nothing else than man, that\nChristians adore the human individual as God, and God as the human\nindividual. \"This man born of the Virgin Mary is God himself, who has\ncreated heaven and earth.\"--Luther (Th. ii. p. 671). \"I point to the\nman Christ and say: That is the Son of God.\"--(Th. xix. p. 594.) \"To\ngive life, to have all power in heaven and earth, to have all things\nin his hands, all things put under his feet, to purify from sin,\nand so on, are divine, infinite attributes, which, according to the\ndeclaration of the Holy Scriptures, are given and imparted to the\nman Christ.\" \"Therefore we believe, teach, and confess that the Son\nof Man ... now not only as God, but also as man, knows all things,\ncan do all things, is present with all creatures.\" \"We reject and\ncondemn the doctrine that he (the Son of God) is not capable according\nto his human nature of omnipotence and other attributes of the divine\nnature.\"--(Concordienb. Summar. Begr. u. Erkl\u00e4r. art. 8.) \"Unde et\nsponte sua fluit, Christo etiam qua humanam naturam spectato cultum\nreligiosum deberi.\"--Buddeus (l. c. l. iv. c. ii. \u00a7 17). The\nsame is expressly taught by the Fathers and the Catholics,\ne.g., \"Eadem adoratione adoranda in Christo est divinitas et\nhumanitas.... Divinitas intrinsece inest humanitati per unionem\nhypostaticam: ergo humanitas Christi seu Christus ut homo potest\nadorari absoluto cultu latriae.\"--Theol. Schol. (sec. Thomam\nAq. P. Metzger. iv. p. 124). It is certainly said that it is not\nman, not flesh and blood by itself, which is worshipped, but the\nflesh united with God, so that the cultus applies not to the flesh,\nor man, but to God. But it is here as with the worship of saints and\nimages. As the saint is adored in the image and God in the saint,\nonly because the image and the saint are themselves adored, so God is\nworshipped in the human body only because the human flesh is itself\nworshipped. God becomes flesh, man, because man is in truth already\nGod. How could it enter into thy mind to bring the human flesh into\nso close a relation and contact with God if it were something impure,\ndegrading, unworthy of God? If the value, the dignity of the human\nflesh does not lie in itself, why dost thou not make other flesh--the\nflesh of brutes the habitation of the Divine Spirit? True it is said:\nMan is only the organ in, with, and by which the Godhead works, as\nthe soul in the body. But this pretext also is refuted by what has\nbeen said above. God chose man as his organ, his body, because only in\nman did he find an organ worthy of him, suitable, pleasing to him. If\nthe nature of man is indifferent, why did not God become incarnate in\na brute? Thus God comes into man only out of man. The manifestation\nof God in man is only a manifestation of the divinity and glory of\nman. \"Noscitur ex alio, qui non cognoscitur ex se\"--this trivial\nsaying is applicable here. God is known through man, whom he honours\nwith his personal presence and indwelling, and known as a human being,\nfor what any one prefers, selects, loves, in his objective nature; and\nman is known through God, and known as a divine being, for only that\nwhich is worthy of God, which is divine, can be the object, organ,\nand habitation of God. True it is further said: It is Jesus Christ\nalone, and no other man, who is worshipped as God. But this argument\nalso is idle and empty. Christ is indeed one only, but he is one who\nrepresents all. He is a man as we are, \"our brother, and we are flesh\nof his flesh and bone of his bone.\" \"In Jesus Christ our Lord every\none of us is a portion of flesh and blood. Therefore where my body is,\nthere I believe that I myself reign. Where my flesh is glorified,\nthere I believe that I am myself glorious. Where my blood rules,\nthere I hold that I myself rule.\"--Luther (Th. xvi. p. 534). This\nthen is an undeniable fact: Christians worship the human individual\nas the supreme being, as God. Not indeed consciously, for it is\nthe unconsciousness of this fact which constitutes the illusion of\nthe religious principle. But in this sense it may be said that the\nheathens did not worship the statues of the gods; for to them also\nthe statue was not a statue, but God himself. Nevertheless they did\nworship the statue; just as Christians worship the human individual,\nthough, naturally, they will not admit it.\n\n\n\n\u00a7 22.\n\nMan is the God of Christianity, Anthropology the mystery of Christian\nTheology. The history of Christianity has had for its grand result\nthe unveiling of this mystery--the realisation and recognition of\ntheology as anthropology. The distinction between Protestantism and\nCatholicism--the old Catholicism, which now exists only in books,\nnot in actuality--consists only in this, that the latter is Theology,\nthe former Christology, i.e., (religious) Anthropology. Catholicism\nhas a supranaturalistic, abstract God, a God who is other than human, a\nnot human, a superhuman being. The goal of Catholic morality, likeness\nto God, consists therefore in this, to be not a man, but more than a\nman--a heavenly abstract being, an angel. Only in its morality does\nthe essence of a religion realise, reveal itself: morality alone\nis the criterion, whether a religious dogma is felt as a truth or\nis a mere chimera. Thus the doctrine of a superhuman, supernatural\nGod is a truth only where it has as its consequence a superhuman,\nsupernatural, or rather antinatural morality. Protestantism, on the\ncontrary, has not a supranaturalistic but a human morality, a morality\nof and for flesh and blood; consequently its God, at least its true,\nreal God, is no longer an abstract, supranaturalistic being, but a\nbeing of flesh and blood. \"This defiance the devil hears unwillingly,\nthat our flesh and blood is the Son of God, yea, God himself,\nand reigns in heaven over all.\"--Luther (Th. xvi. p. 573). \"Out\nof Christ there is no God, and where Christ is, there is the whole\nGodhead.\"--Id. (Th. xix. p. 403). Catholicism has, both in theory and\npractice, a God who, in spite of the predicate of love, exists for\nhimself, to whom therefore man only comes by being against himself,\ndenying himself, renouncing his existence for self; Protestantism,\non the contrary, has a God who, at least practically, virtually,\nhas not an existence for himself, but exists only for man, for the\nwelfare of man. Hence in Catholicism the highest act of the cultus,\n\"the mass of Christ,\" is a sacrifice of man,--the same Christ, the\nsame flesh and blood, is sacrificed to God in the Host as on the\ncross; in Protestantism, on the contrary, it is a sacrifice, a gift\nof God: God sacrifices himself, surrenders himself to be partaken\nby man. (See Luther, e.g., Th. xx. p. 259; Th. xvii. p. 529.) In\nCatholicism manhood is the property, the predicate of the Godhead (of\nChrist)--God is man; in Protestantism, on the contrary, Godhead is\nthe property, the predicate of manhood (Christ)--man is God. \"This,\nin time past, the greatest theologians have done--they have fled\nfrom the manhood of Christ to his Godhead, and attached themselves\nto that alone, and thought that we should not know the manhood of\nChrist. But we must so rise to the Godhead of Christ, and hold by\nit in such a way, as not to forsake the manhood of Christ and come\nto the Godhead alone. Thou shouldst know of no God, nor Son of God,\nsave him who was born of the Virgin Mary and became man. He who\nreceives his manhood has also his Godhead.\"--Luther (Th. ix. pp. 592,\n598). [236] Or, briefly thus: in Catholicism, man exists for God;\nin Protestantism, God exists for man. [237] \"Jesus Christ our Lord\nwas conceived for us, born for us, suffered for us, was crucified,\ndied, and was buried for us. Our Lord rose from the dead for our\nconsolation, sits for our good at the right hand of the Almighty\nFather, and is to judge the living and the dead for our comfort. This\nthe holy Apostles and beloved Fathers intended to intimate in their\nconfession by the words: Us and our Lord--namely, that Jesus Christ\nis ours, whose office and will it is to help us ... so that we should\nnot read or speak the words coldly, and interpret them only of Christ,\nbut of ourselves also.\"--Luther (Th. xvi. p. 538). \"I know of no God\nbut him who gave himself for me. Is not that a great thing that God\nis man, that God gives himself to man and will be his, as man gives\nhimself to his wife and is hers? But if God is ours, all things are\nours.\"--(Th. xii. p. 283.) \"God cannot be a God of the dead, who are\nnothing, but is a God of the living. If God were a God of the dead,\nhe would be as a husband who had no wife, or as a father who had\nno son, or as a master who had no servant. For if he is a husband,\nhe must have a wife. If he is a father, he must have a son. If he is\na master, he must have a servant. Or he would be a fictitious father,\na fictitious master, that is, nothing. God is not a God like the idols\nof the heathens, neither is he an imaginary God, who exists for himself\nalone, and has none who call upon him and worship him. A God is he\nfrom whom everything is to be expected and received.... If he were God\nfor himself alone in heaven, and we had no good to rely on from him,\nhe would be a God of stone or straw.... If he sat alone in heaven\nlike a clod, he would not be God.\"--(Th. xvi. p. 465). \"God says:\nI the Almighty Creator of heaven and earth am thy God.... To be a God\nmeans to redeem us from all evil and trouble that oppresses us, as sin,\nhell, death, &c.\"--(Th. ii. p. 327.) \"All the world calls that a God\nin whom man trusts in need and danger, on whom he relies, from whom\nall good is to be had and who can help. Thus reason describes God,\nthat he affords help to man, and does good to him, bestows benefits\nupon him. This thou seest also in this text: 'I am the Lord thy God,\nwho brought thee out of the land of Egypt.' There we are taught what\nGod is, what is his nature, and what are his attributes,--namely,\nthat he does good, delivers from dangers, and helps out of trouble\nand all calamities.\"--(Th. iv. pp. 236, 237.) But if God is a living,\ni.e., real God, is God in general, only in virtue of this--that he is\na God to man, a being who is useful, good, beneficent to man; then, in\ntruth, man is the criterion, the measure of God, man is the absolute,\ndivine being. The proposition: A God existing only for himself is\nno God--means nothing else than that God without man is not God;\nwhere there is no man there is no God; if thou takest from God the\npredicate of humanity, thou takest from him the predicate of deity;\nif his relation to man is done away with, so also is his existence.\n\nNevertheless Protestantism, at least in theory, has retained\nin the background of this human God the old supranaturalistic\nGod. Protestantism is the contradiction of theory and practice; it has\nemancipated the flesh, but not the reason. According to Protestantism,\nChristianity, i.e., God, does not contradict the natural impulses of\nman:--\"Therefore we ought now to know that God does not condemn or\nabolish the natural tendency in man which was implanted in Nature\nat the creation, but that he awakens and preserves it.\"--Luther\n(Th. iii. p. 290). But it contradicts reason, and is therefore,\ntheoretically, only an object of faith. We have shown, however,\nthat the nature of faith, the nature of God, is itself nothing else\nthan the nature of man placed out of man, conceived as external to\nman. The reduction of the extrahuman, supernatural, and antirational\nnature of God to the natural, immanent, inborn nature of man,\nis therefore the liberation of Protestantism, of Christianity in\ngeneral, from its fundamental contradiction, the reduction of it to\nits truth,--the result, the necessary, irrepressible, irrefragable\nresult of Christianity.\n\n\n THE END.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNOTES\n\n[1] The opening paragraphs of this Preface are omitted, as having\ntoo specific a reference to transient German polemics to interest\nthe English reader.\n\n[2] For example, in considering the sacraments, I limit myself to two;\nfor in the strictest sense (see Luther, T. xvii. p. 558), there are\nno more.\n\n[3] \"Objectum intellectus esse illimitatum sive omne verum ac, ut\nloquuntur, omne ens ut ens, ex eo constat, quod ad nullum non genus\nrerum extenditur, nullumque est, cujus cognoscendi capax non sit,\nlicet ob varia obstacula multa sint, qu\u00e6 re ipsa non norit.\"--Gassendi\n(Opp. Omn. Phys.).\n\n[4] The obtuse Materialist says: \"Man is distinguished from the brute\nonly by consciousness--he is an animal with consciousness superadded;\"\nnot reflecting, that in a being which awakes to consciousness,\nthere takes place a qualitative change, a differentiation of the\nentire nature. For the rest, our words are by no means intended to\ndepreciate the nature of the lower animals. This is not the place to\nenter further into that question.\n\n[5] \"Toute opinion est assez forte pour se faire exposer au prix de\nla vie.\"--Montaigne.\n\n[6] Homini homine nihil pulchrius. (Cic. de Nat. D. l. i.) And this\nis no sign of limitation, for he regards other beings as beautiful\nbesides himself; he delights in the beautiful forms of animals, in\nthe beautiful forms of plants, in the beauty of nature in general. But\nonly the absolute, the perfect form, can delight without envy in the\nforms of other beings.\n\n[7] \"The understanding is percipient only of understanding, and\nwhat proceeds thence.\"--Reimarus (Wahrh. der Nat\u00fcrl. Religion,\niv. Abth. \u00a7 8).\n\n[8] \"Verisimile est, non minus quam geometri\u00e6, etiam music\u00e6\noblectationem ad plures quam ad nos pertinere. Positis enim aliis\nterris atque animalibus ratione et auditu pollentibus, cur tantum\nhis nostris contigisset ea voluptas, qu\u00e6 sola ex sono percipi\npotest?\"--Christ. Hugenius (Cosmotheor., l. i.).\n\n[9] De Genesi ad litteram, l. v. c. 16.\n\n[10] \"Unusquisque vestrum non cogitat, prius se debere Deum nosse,\nquam colere.\"--M. Minucii Felicis Octavianus, c. 24.\n\n[11] The meaning of this parenthetic limitation will be clear in\nthe sequel.\n\n[12] \"Les perfections de Dieu sont celles de nos \u00e2mes, mais il les\npossede sans bornes--il y a en nous quelque puissance, quelque\nconnaissance quelque bont\u00e9, mais elles sont toutes enti\u00e8res en\nDieu.\"--Leibnitz (Th\u00e9od. Preface). \"Nihil in anima esse putemus\neximium, quod non etiam divin\u00e6 natur\u00e6 proprium sit--Quidquid a Deo\nalienum extra definitionem anim\u00e6\"--St. Gregorius Nyss. \"Est ergo,\nut videtur, disciplinarum omnium pulcherrima et maxima se ipsum\nnosse; si quis enim se ipsum norit, Deum cognoscet.\"--Clemens\nAlex. (P\u00e6d. 1. iii. c. 1).\n\n[13] For religious faith there is no other distinction between the\npresent and future God than that the former is an object of faith,\nof conception, of imagination, while the latter is to be an object of\nimmediate, that is, personal, sensible perception. In this life and\nin the next he is the same God; but in the one he is incomprehensible,\nin the other comprehensible.\n\n[14] Inter creatorem et creaturam non potest\ntanta similitudo notari, quin inter eos major sit\ndissimilitudo notanda.--Later. Conc. can. 2. (Summa\nOmn. Conc. Carranza. Antw. 1559. p. 326.) The last distinction between\nman and God, between the finite and infinite nature, to which the\nreligious speculative imagination soars, is the distinction between\nSomething and Nothing, Ens and Non-Ens; for only in Nothing is all\ncommunity with other beings abolished.\n\n[15] Gloriam suam plus amat Deus quam omnes creaturas. \"God can\nonly love himself, can only think of himself, can only work for\nhimself. In creating man, God seeks his own ends, his own glory,\"\n&c.--Vide P. Bayle, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philos. u. Menschh.,\npp. 104-107.\n\n[16] Pelagianism denies God, religion--isti tantam tribuunt\npotestatem voluntati, ut pietati auferant orationem. (Augustin de\nNat. et Grat. cont. Pelagium, c. 58.) It has only the Creator, i.e.,\nNature, as a basis, not the Saviour, the true God of the religious\nsentiment--in a word, it denies God; but, as a consequence of this,\nit elevates man into a God, since it makes him a being not needing\nGod, self-sufficing, independent. (See on this subject Luther against\nErasmus and Augustine, l. c. c. 33.) Augustinianism denies man; but,\nas a consequence of this, it reduces God to the level of man, even\nto the ignominy of the cross, for the sake of man. The former puts\nman in the place of God, the latter puts God in the place of man;\nboth lead to the same result--the distinction is only apparent,\na pious illusion. Augustinianism is only an inverted Pelagianism;\nwhat to the latter is a subject, is to the former an object.\n\n[17] The religious, the original mode in which man becomes objective\nto himself, is (as is clearly enough, explained in this work) to\nbe distinguished from the mode in which this occurs in reflection\nand speculation; the latter is voluntary, the former involuntary,\nnecessary--as necessary as art, as speech. With the progress of time,\nit is true; theology coincides with religion.\n\n[18] Deut. xxiii. 12, 13.\n\n[19] See, for example, Gen. xxxv. 2; Levit. xi. 44; xx. 26; and the\nCommentary of Le Clerc on these passages.\n\n[20] Augustine, in his work Contra Academicos, which he wrote when\nhe was still in some measure a heathen, says (l. iii. c. 12) that the\nhighest good of man consists in the mind or in the reason. On the other\nhand, in his Libr. Retractationum, which he wrote as a distinguished\nChristian and theologian, he revises (l. i. c. 1) this declaration\nas follows:--Verius dixissem in Deo. Ipso enim mens fruitur, ut beata\nsit, tanquam summo bono suo. But is there any distinction here? Where\nmy highest good is, is not there my nature also?\n\n[21] Kant, Vorles. \u00fcber d. philos. Religionsl., Leipzig, 1817, p. 39.\n\n[22] Kant, l. c., p. 80.\n\n[23] To guard against mistake, I observe that I do not apply to the\nunderstanding the expression self-subsistent essence, and other\nterms of a like character, in my own sense, but that I am here\nplacing myself on the standpoint of onto-theology, of metaphysical\ntheology in general, in order to show that metaphysics is resolvable\ninto psychology, that the onto-theological predicates are merely\npredicates of the understanding.\n\n[24] Malebranche. (See the author's Geschichte der Philos., 1\nBd. p. 322.) \"Exstaretne alibi diversa ab hac ratio? censereturque\ninjustum aut scelestum in Jove aut Marte, quod apud nos\njustum ac pr\u00e6clarum habetur? Certe nec verisimile nec omnino\npossibile.\"--Chr. Hugenii (Cosmotheoros, lib. i.).\n\n[25] In religion, the representation or expression of the nothingness\nof man before God is the anger of God; for as the love of God is\nthe affirmation, his anger is the negation of man. But even this\nanger is not taken in earnest. \"God ... is not really angry. He is\nnot thoroughly in earnest even when we think that he is angry, and\npunishes.\"--Luther (Th. viii. p. 208).\n\n[26] Luther, Concordienbuch, Art. 8, Erkl\u00e4r.\n\n[27] Luther, S\u00e4mmtliche Schriften und Werke, Leipzig, 1729,\nfol. Th. iii. p. 589. It is according to this edition that references\nare given throughout the present work.\n\n[28] Predigten etzlicher Lehrer vor und zu Tauleri Zeiten, Hamburg,\n1621, p. 81.\n\n[29] \"That which, in our own judgment, derogates from our self-conceit,\nhumiliates us. Thus the moral law inevitably humiliates every man\nwhen he compares with it the sensual tendency of his nature.\"--Kant,\nKritik der prakt. Vernunft, 4th edition, p. 132.\n\n[30] \"Omnes peccavimus.... Parricide cum lega c\u00e6perunt et illis\nfacinus poena monstravit.\"--Seneca. \"The law destroys us.\"--Luther\n(Th. xvi. s. 320).\n\n[31] \"Das Rechtsgef\u00fchl der Sinnlichkeit.\"\n\n[32] \"This, my God and Lord, has taken upon him my nature, flesh\nand blood such as I have, and has been tempted and has suffered in\nall things like me, but without sin; therefore he can have pity on\nmy weakness.--Hebrews v. Luther (Th. xvi. s. 533). \"The deeper we\ncan bring Christ into the flesh the better.\"--(Ibid. s. 565.) \"God\nhimself, when he is dealt with out of Christ, is a terrible\nGod, for no consolation is found in him, but pure anger and\ndisfavour.\"--(Th. xv. s. 298.)\n\n[33] \"Such descriptions as those in which the Scriptures speak of God\nas of a man, and ascribe to him all that is human, are very sweet and\ncomforting--namely, that he talks with us as a friend, and of such\nthings as men are wont to talk of with each other; that he rejoices,\nsorrows, and suffers, like a man, for the sake of the mystery of the\nfuture humanity of Christ.\"--Luther (Th. ii. p. 334).\n\n[34] \"Deus homo factus est, ut homo Deus fieret.\"--Augustinus (Serm. ad\nPop. p. 371, c. 1). In Luther, however (Th. i. p. 334), there is a\npassage which indicates the true relation. When Moses called man\n\"the image of God, the likeness of God,\" he meant, says Luther,\nobscurely to intimate that \"God was to become man.\" Thus here the\nincarnation of God is clearly enough represented as a consequence of\nthe deification of man.\n\n[35] It was in this sense that the old uncompromising enthusiastic\nfaith celebrated the Incarnation. \"Amor triumphat de Deo,\" says\nSt. Bernard. And only in the sense of a real self-renunciation,\nself-negation of the Godhead, lies the reality, the vis of the\nIncarnation; although this self-negation is in itself merely a\nconception of the imagination, for, looked at in broad daylight,\nGod does not negative himself in the Incarnation, but he shows\nhimself as that which he is, as a human being. The fabrications which\nmodern rationalistic orthodoxy and pietistic rationalism have advanced\nconcerning the Incarnation, in opposition to the rapturous conceptions\nand expressions of ancient faith, do not deserve to be mentioned,\nstill less controverted.\n\n[36] \"Nos scimus affici Deum misericordia nostri et non solum\nrespicere lacrymas nostras, sed etiam numerare stillulas, sicut\nscriptum in Psalmo LVI. Filius Dei vere afficitur sensu miseriarum\nnostrarum.\"--Melancthonis et aliorum (Declam. Th. iii. p. 286, p. 450).\n\n[37] St. Bernard resorts to a charmingly sophistical play of\nwords:--\"Impassibilis est Deus, sed non incompassibilis, cui proprium\nest misereri semper et parcere.\"--(Sup. Cant. Sermo 26.) As if\ncompassion were not suffering--the suffering of love, it is true, the\nsuffering of the heart. But what does suffer if not thy sympathising\nheart? No love, no suffering. The material, the source of suffering,\nis the universal heart, the common bond of all beings.\n\n[38] Religion speaks by example. Example is the law of religion. What\nChrist did is law. Christ suffered for others; therefore, we should do\nlikewise. \"Qu\u00e6 necessitas fuit ut sic exinaniret se, sic humiliaret\nse, sic abbreviaret se Dominus majestatis; nisi ut vos similiter\nfaciatis?\"--Bernardus (in Die nat. Domini). \"We ought studiously to\nconsider the example of Christ.... That would move us and incite us,\nso that we from our hearts should willingly help and serve other\npeople, even though it might be hard, and we must suffer on account\nof it.\"--Luther (Th. xv. p. 40).\n\n[39] \"H\u00e6rent plerique hoc loco. Ego autem non solum excusandum\nnon puto, sed etiam nusquam magis pietatem ejus majestatemque\ndemiror. Minus enim contulerat mihi, nisi meum suscepisset\naffectum. Ergo pro me doluit, qui pro se nihil habuit, quod\ndoleret.\"--Ambrosius (Exposit. in Luc\u00e6 Ev. l. x. c. 22).\n\n[40] \"Quando enim illi (Deo) appropinquare auderemus in sua\nimpassibilitate manenti?\"--Bernardus (Tract. de xii. Grad. Humil. et\nSuperb.).\n\n[41] \"Deus meus pendet in patibulo et ego voluptati operam\ndabo?\"--(Form. Hon. Vit\u00e6. Among the spurious writings of\nSt. Bernard.) \"Memoria crucifixi crucifigat in te carnem\ntuam.\"--Joh. Gerhard (Medit. Sacr\u00e6, M. 37).\n\n[42] \"It is better to suffer evil than to do good.\"--Luther\n(Th. iv. s. 15).\n\n[43] \"Pati voluit, ut compati disceret, miser fieri, ut misereri\ndisceret.\"--Bernhard (de Grad.). \"Miserere nostri, quoniam\ncarnis imbecillitatem, tu ipse eam passus, expertus es.\"--Clemens\nAlex. P\u00e6dag. l. i. c. 8.\n\n[44] \"Dei essentia est extra omnes creaturas, sicut ab \u00e6terno fuit Deus\nin se ipso; ab omnibus ergo creaturis amorem tuum abstrahas.\"--John\nGerhard (Medit. Sacr\u00e6, M. 31). \"If thou wouldst have the Creator,\nthou must do without the creature. The less of the creature,\nthe more of God. Therefore, abjure all creatures, with all their\nconsolations.\"--J. Tauler (Postilla. Hamburg, 1621, p. 312). \"If a\nman cannot say in his heart with truth: God and I are alone in the\nworld--there is nothing else,--he has no peace in himself.\"--G. Arnold\n(Von Verschm\u00e4hung der Welt. Wahre Abbild der Ersten Christen, L. 4,\nc. 2, \u00a7 7).\n\n[45] \"Exigit ergo Deus timeri ut Dominus, honorari ut pater, ut\nsponsus amari. Quid in his pr\u00e6stat, quid eminet?--Amor.\" Bernardus\n(Sup. Cant. Serm. 83).\n\n[46] Just as the feminine spirit of Catholicism--in distinction from\nProtestantism, whose principle is the masculine God, the masculine\nspirit--is the Mother of God.\n\n[47] \"Dum Patris et Filii proprietates communionemque delectabilem\nintueor, nihil delectabilius in illis invenio, quam mutuum amoris\naffectum.\"--Anselmus (in Rixner's Gesch. d. Phil. II. B. Anh. p. 18).\n\n[48] \"Natus est de Patre semper et matre semel; de Patre sine sexu,\nde matre sine usu. Apud patrem quippe defuit concipientis uterus; apud\nmatrem defuit seminantis amplexus.\"--Augustinus (Serm. ad Pop. p. 372,\nc. 1, ed. Bened. Antw. 1701).\n\n[49] In Jewish mysticism, God, according to one school, is a\nmasculine, the Holy Spirit a feminine principle, out of whose\nintermixture arose the Son, and with him the world. Gfr\u00f6rer,\nJahrb. d. H. i. Abth. pp. 332-334. The Herrnhuters also called the\nHoly Spirit the mother of the Saviour.\n\n[50] \"For it could not have been difficult or impossible to God to\nbring his Son into the world without a mother; but it was his will\nto use the woman for that end.\"--Luther (Th. ii. p. 348).\n\n[51] In the Concordienbuch, Erkl\u00e4r. Art. 8, and in the Apol. of\nthe Augsburg Confession, Mary is nevertheless still called the\n\"Blessed Virgin, who was truly the Mother of God, and yet remained\na virgin,\"--\"worthy of all honour.\"\n\n[52] \"Sit monachus quasi Melchisedec sine patre,\nsine matre, sine genealogia: neque patrem sibi vocet\nsuper terram. Imo sic existimet, quasi ipse sit solus et\nDeus. (Specul. Monach. Pseudo-Bernard.) Melchisedec ... refertur\nad exemplum, ut tanquam sine patre et sine matre sacerdos esse\ndebeat.\"--Ambrosius.\n\n[53] \"Negas ergo Deum, si non omnia filio, qu\u00e6 Dei sunt,\ndeferentur.\"--Ambrosius de Fide ad Gratianum, l. iii. c. 7. On the same\nground the Latin Church adhered so tenaciously to the dogma that the\nHoly Spirit proceeded not from the Father alone, as the Greek Church\nmaintained, but from the Son also. See on this subject J. G. Walchii,\nHist. Contr. Gr. et Lat. de Proc. Spir. S. Jen\u00e6, 1751.\n\n[54] This is expressed very significantly in the Incarnation. God\nrenounces, denies his majesty, power, and affinity, in order to\nbecome a man; i.e., man denies the God who is not himself a man, and\nonly affirms the God who affirms man. Exinanivit, says St. Bernard,\nmajestate et potentia, non bonitate et misericordia. That which cannot\nbe renounced, cannot be denied, is thus the Divine goodness and mercy,\ni.e., the self-affirmation of the human heart.\n\n[55] It is obvious that the Image of God has also another\nsignification, namely, that the personal, visible man is God\nhimself. But here the image is considered simply as an image.\n\n[56] Let the reader only consider, for example, the Transfiguration,\nthe Resurrection, and the Ascension of Christ.\n\n[57] \"Sacram imaginem Domini nostri Jesu Christi et omnium\nSalvatoris \u00e6quo honore cum libro sanctorum evangeliorum adorari\ndecernimus.... Dignum est enim ut ... propter honorem qui ad\nprincipia refertur, etiam derivative imagines honorentur et\nadorentur.\"--Gener. Const. Conc. viii. Art. 10, Can. 3.\n\n[58] \"Tanta certe vis nomini Jesu inest contra d\u00e6mones, ut nonnunquam\netiam a malis nominatum sit efficax.\"--Origenes adv. Celsum, l. i;\nsee also l. iii.\n\n[59] \"God reveals himself to us, as the Speaker, who has, in himself,\nan eternal uncreated Word, whereby he created the world and all things,\nwith slight labour, namely, with speech, so that to God it is not more\ndifficult to create than it is to us to name.\"--Luther, Th. i. p. 302.\n\n[60] \"Hylarius ... Si quis innascibilem et sine initio dicat filium,\nquasi duo sine principio et duo innascibilia, et duo innata dicens,\nduos faciat Deos, anathema sit. Caput autem quod est principium\nChristi, Deus.... Filium innascibilem confiteri impiissimum\nest.\"--Petrus Lomb. Sent. l. i. dist. 31, c. 4.\n\n[61] It is therefore mere self-delusion to suppose that the hypothesis\nof a creation explains the existence of the world.\n\n[62] It is beside our purpose to criticise this crass mystical\ntheory. We merely remark here, that darkness can be explained only\nwhen it is derived from light; that the derivation of the darkness\nin Nature from light appears an impossibility only when it is not\nperceived that even in darkness there is a residue of light, that\nthe darkness in Nature is not an absolute, but a modified darkness,\ntempered by light.\n\n[63] Schelling, Ueber das Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit, 429, 432,\n427. Denkmal Jacobi's, s. 82, 97-99.\n\n[64] Kernhafter Auszug ... J. B\u00f6hme: Amsterdam, 1718, p. 58.\n\n[65] L. c. pp. 480, 338, 340, 323.\n\n[66] The Philosophus teutonicus walked physically as well as mentally\non volcanic ground. \"The town of G\u00f6rlitz is paved throughout with pure\nbasalt.\"--Charpentier, Mineral. Geographie der Churs\u00e4chsischen Lande,\np. 19.\n\n[67] L. c. pp. 468, 617, 618.\n\n[68] According to Swedenborg, the angels in heaven have clothes\nand dwellings. \"Their dwellings are altogether such as the\ndwellings or houses on earth, but far more beautiful; there are\napartments, rooms, and sleeping chambers therein in great number,\nand entrance-courts, and round about gardens, flowers, meadows, and\nfields.\" (E. v. S. Auserlesene Schriften, 1 Th. Frankf. a. M. 1776,\np. 190, and 96.) Thus to the mystic this world is the other world;\nbut for that reason the other world is this world.\n\n[69] L. c. p. 339, p. 69.\n\n[70] \"Quidquid enim unus quisque super c\u00e6tera colit: hoc illi Deus\nest.\"--Origines Explan. in Epist. Pauli ad Rom. c. l.\n\n[71] \"Quare fecit Deus coelum et terram? Quia voluit. Voluntas enim Dei\ncausa est coeli et terr\u00e6 et ideo major est voluntas Dei quam coelum et\nterra. Qui autem dicit: quare voluit facere coelum et terram? majus\naliquid qu\u00e6rit, quam est voluntas Dei, nihil enim majus invenire\npotest.\"--Augustinus (de Genesi adv. Manich. l. i. c. 2).\n\n[72] A more profound origin of the creation out of nothing lies in\nthe emotional nature, as is both directly and indirectly declared in\nthis work. But arbitrariness is, in fact, the will of the emotions,\ntheir external manifestation of force.\n\n[73] \"Certissimum divin\u00e6 providenti\u00e6; testimonium pr\u00e6bent\nmiracula.\"--H. Grotius (de Verit. Rel. Christ. l. i. \u00a7 13).\n\n[74] It is true that religious naturalism, or the acknowledgment of\nthe Divine in Nature, is also an element of the Christian religion,\nand yet more of the Mosaic, which was so friendly to animals. But\nit is by no means the characteristic, the Christian tendency of\nthe Christian religion. The Christian, the religious Providence,\nis quite another than that which clothes the lilies and feeds the\nravens. The natural Providence lets a man sink in the water, if he\nhas not learned to swim; but the Christian, the religious Providence,\nleads him with the hand of omnipotence over the water unharmed.\n\n[75] In this contrast of the religious, or biblical, and the natural\nProvidence, the author had especially in view the vapid, narrow\ntheology of the English natural philosophers.\n\n[76] \"Qui Deos negant, nobilitatem generis humani destruunt.\"--Bacon\n(Serm. Fidel. 16).\n\n[77] In Clemens Alex. (Coh. ad Gentes) there is an interesting\npassage. It runs in the Latin translation (the bad Augsburg edition,\n1778) thus:--\"At nos ante mundi constitutionem fuimus, ratione futur\u00e6\nnostr\u00e6 productionis, in ipso Deo quodammodo tum pr\u00e6existentes. Divini\nigitur Verbi sive Rationis, nos creatur\u00e6 rationales sumus, et per\neum primi esse dicimur, quoniam in principio erat verbum.\" Yet more\ndecidedly, however, has Christian mysticism declared the human nature\nto be the creative principle, the ground of the world. \"Man, who,\nbefore time was, existed in eternity, works with God all the works\nthat God wrought a thousand years ago, and now, after a thousand\nyears, still works.\" \"All creatures have sprung forth through\nman.\"--Predigten, vor u. zu Tauleri Zeiten (Ed. c. p. 5, p. 119).\n\n[78] Hence is explained why all attempts of speculative theology and of\nits kindred philosophy to make the transition from God to the world,\nor to derive the world from God, have failed and must fail. Namely,\nbecause they are fundamentally false, from being made in ignorance\nof the idea on which the Creation really turns.\n\n[79] It is not admissible to urge against this the omnipresence of\nGod, the existence of God in all things, or the existence of things in\nGod. For, apart from the consideration that the future destruction of\nthe world expresses clearly enough its existence outside of God, i.e.,\nits non-divineness, God is in a special manner only in man; but I am at\nhome only where I am specially at home. \"Nowhere is God properly God,\nbut in the soul. In all creatures there is something of God; but in the\nsoul God exists completely, for it is his resting-place.\"--Predigten\netzlicher Lehrer, &c., p. 19. And the existence of things in God,\nespecially where it has no pantheistic significance, and any such\nis here excluded, is equally an idea without reality, and does not\nexpress the special sentiments of religion.\n\n[80] Here is also the point where the Creation represents to us\nnot only the Divine power, but also the Divine love. \"Quia bonus\nest (Deus), sumus\" (Augustin). In the beginning, before the world,\nGod was alone. \"Ante omnia Deus erat solus, ipsi sibi et mundus et\nlocus et omnia. Solus autem; quia nihil extrinsecus pr\u00e6ter ipsum\"\n(Tertullian). But there is no higher happiness than to make another\nhappy, bliss lies in the act of imparting. And only joy, only\nlove imparts. Hence man conceives imparting love as the principle\nof existence. \"Extasis bono non sinit ipsum manere in se ipso\"\n(Dionysius A.). Everything positive establishes, attests itself, only\nby itself. The divine love is the joy of life, establishing itself,\naffirming itself. But the highest self-consciousness of life, the\nsupreme joy of life is the love which confers happiness. God is the\nbliss of existence.\n\n[81] In Diogenes (L. 1. ii. c. iii. \u00a7 6), it is literally, \"for the\ncontemplation of the sun, the moon and the heavens.\" Similar ideas were\nheld by other philosophers. Thus the Stoics also said:--\"Ipse autem\nhomo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum.\"--Cic. (de Nat.).\n\n[82] \"Hebr\u00e6i numen verbo quidquid videtur efficiens describunt\net quasi imperio omnia creata tradunt, ut facilitatem in\neo quod vult efficiendo, summamque ejus in omnia potentiam\nostendant.\"--Ps. xxxiii. 6. \"Verbo Jehov\u00e6 coeli facti\nsunt.\"--Ps. cxlviii. 5. \"Ille jussit eaque creata sunt.\"--J. Clericus\n(Comment, in Mosem. Genes, i. 3).\n\n[83] Exod. xvi. 12.\n\n[84] Gen. xxviii. 20.\n\n[85] Exod. xxiv. 10, 11. \"Tantum abest ut mortui sint, ut contra\nconvivium hilares celebrarint.\"--Clericus.\n\n[86] It is well known, however, that their opinions on this point\nwere various. (See e.g. Aristoteles de Coelo, 1. i. c. 10.) But their\ndifference is a subordinate one, since the creative agency itself is\nwith them a more or less cosmical being.\n\n[87] Deut. iv. 19. \"Licet enim ea, qu\u00e6 sunt in coelo, non sint hominum\nartificia, at hominum tamen gratia condita fuerunt. Ne quis igitur\nsolem adoret, sed solis effectorem desideret.\"--Clemens Alex. (Coh. ad\nGentes).\n\n[88] But of course they only do this in the case of the \"absolute\nreligion;\" for with regard to other religions they hold up the ideas\nand customs which are foreign to us, and of which we do not know the\noriginal meaning and purpose, as senseless and ludicrous. And yet, in\nfact, to worship the urine of cows, which the Parsees and Hindoos drink\nthat they may obtain forgiveness of sins, is not more ludicrous than\nto worship the comb or a shred of the garment of the Mother of God.\n\n[89] Wisd. xix. 6.\n\n[90] See Gfr\u00f6rer's Philo.\n\n[91] We may here observe, that certainly the admiration of the power\nand glory of God in general, and so of Jehovah, as manifested in\nNature, is in fact, though not in the consciousness of the Israelite,\nonly admiration of the power and glory of Nature. (See, on this\nsubject, P. Bayle, Ein Beitrag, &c., pp. 25-29.) But to prove this\nformally lies out of our plan, since we here confine ourselves to\nChristianity, i.e., the adoration of God in man (Deum colimus per\nChristum. Tertullian, Apolog. c. 21). Nevertheless, the principle of\nthis proof is stated in the present work.\n\n[92] \"The greater part of Hebrew poetry, which is often held to be\nonly spiritual, is political.\"--Herder.\n\n[93] Sebastian Frank von W\u00f6rd in Zinkgrefs Apophthegmata deutscher\nNation.\n\n[94] It would be an imbecile objection to say that God fulfils only\nthose wishes, those prayers, which are uttered in his name, or in\nthe interest of the Church of Christ, in short, only the wishes which\nare accordant with his will; for the will of God is the will of man,\nor rather God has the power, man the will: God makes men happy, but\nman wills that he may be happy. A particular wish may not be granted;\nbut that is of no consequence, if only the species, the essential\ntendency is accepted. The pious soul whose prayer has failed consoles\nhimself, therefore, by thinking that its fulfilment would not have been\nsalutary for him. \"Nullo igitur modo vota aut preces sunt irrit\u00e6 aut\ninfrugifer\u00e6 et recte dicitur, in petitione rerum corporalium aliquando\nDeum exaudire nos, non ad voluntatem nostram, sed ad salutem.\"--Oratio\nde Precatione, in Declamat. Melancthonis, Th. iii.\n\n[95] Ja-wort.\n\n[96] Also, on subjective grounds, social prayer is more effectual\nthan isolated prayer. Community enhances the force of emotion,\nheightens confidence. What we are unable to do alone we are able to\ndo with others. The sense of solitude is the sense of limitation:\nthe sense of community is the sense of freedom. Hence it is that\nmen, when threatened by the destructive powers of Nature, crowd\ntogether. \"Multorum preces impossibile est, ut non impetrent, inquit\nAmbrosius.... Sanct\u00e6 orationis fervor quanto inter plures collectior\ntanto ardet diutius ac intensius cor divinum penetrat.... Negatur\nsingularitati, quod conceditur charitati.\"--Sacra Hist. de Gentis\nHebr. ortu. P. Paul. Mezger. Aug. Vind. 1700, pp. 668, 669.\n\n[97] In the excellent work, Theanthropos, eine Reihe von Aphorismen\n(Zurich, 1838), the idea of the sense of dependence, of omnipotence,\nof prayer, and of love, is admirably developed.\n\n[98] Luther (Th. xv. p. 282; Th. xvi. pp. 491-493).\n\n[99] \"God is Almighty; but he who believes is a God.\" Luther (in\nChr. Kapps Christus u. die Weltgeschichte, s. 11). In another place\nLuther calls faith the \"Creator of the Godhead;\" it is true that he\nimmediately adds, as he must necessarily do on his standpoint, the\nfollowing limitation:--\"Not that it creates anything in the Divine\nEternal Being, but that it creates that Being in us\" (Th. xi. p. 161).\n\n[100] This belief is so essential to the Bible, that without it the\nbiblical writers can scarcely be understood. The passage 2 Pet. iii. 8,\nas is evident from the tenor of the whole chapter, says nothing\nin opposition to an immediate destruction of the world; for though\nwith the Lord a thousand years are as one day, yet at the same time\none day is as a thousand years, and therefore the world may, even by\nto-morrow, no longer exist. That in the Bible a very near end of the\nworld is expected and prophesied, although the day and hour are not\ndetermined, only falsehood or blindness can deny. (See on this subject\nL\u00fctzelberger.) Hence religious Christians, in almost all times, have\nbelieved that the destruction of the world is near at hand--Luther,\nfor example, often says that \"The last day is not far off\" (e.g.,\nTh. xvi. p. 26);--or at least their souls have longed for the end of\nthe world, though they have prudently left it undecided whether it\nbe near or distant. See Augustin (de Fine S\u00e6culi ad Hesychium, c. 13).\n\n[101] Gen. xviii. 14.\n\n[102] \"To the whole world it is impossible to raise the dead, but\nto the Lord Christ, not only is it not impossible, but it is no\ntrouble or labour to him.... This Christ did as a witness and a sign\nthat he can and will raise from death. He does it not at all times\nand to every one.... It is enough that he has done it a few times;\nthe rest he leaves to the last day.\"--Luther (Th. xvi. p. 518). The\npositive, essential significance of miracle is therefore that the\ndivine nature is the human nature. Miracles confirm, authenticate\ndoctrine. What doctrine? Simply this, that God is a Saviour of men,\ntheir Redeemer out of all trouble, i.e., a being corresponding to\nthe wants and wishes of man, and therefore a human being. What the\nGod-man declares in words, miracle demonstrates ad oculos by deeds.\n\n[103] This satisfaction is certainly so far limited, that it is united\nto religion, to faith in God: a remark which however is so obvious\nas to be superfluous. Hut this limitation is in fact no limitation,\nfor God himself is unlimited, absolutely satisfied, self-contented\nhuman feeling.\n\n[104] The legends of Catholicism--of course only the best, the really\npleasing ones--are, as it were, only the echo of the keynote which\npredominates in this New Testament narrative. Miracle might be fitly\ndefined as religious humour. Catholicism especially has developed\nmiracle on this its humorous side.\n\n[105] Culture in the sense in which it is here taken. It is highly\ncharacteristic of Christianity, and a popular proof of our positions,\nthat the only language in which the Divine Spirit was and is held\nto reveal himself in Christianity is not the language of a Sophocles\nor a Plato, of art and philosophy, but the vague, unformed, crudely\nemotional language of the Bible.\n\n[106] Many miracles may realty have had originally a physical\nor physiological phenomenon as their foundation. But we are here\nconsidering only the religious significance and genesis of miracle.\n\n[107] \"If Adam had not fallen into sin, nothing would have been known\nof the cruelty of wolves, lions, bears, &c., and there would not have\nbeen in all creation anything vexatious and dangerous to man ...;\nno thorns, or thistles, or diseases ...; his brow would not have\nbeen wrinkled; no foot, or hand, or other member of the body would\nhave been feeble or infirm.\"--\"But now, since the Fall, we all know\nand feel what a fury lurks in our flesh, which not only burns and\nrages with lust and desire, but also loathes, when once obtained,\nthe very thing it has desired. But this is the fault of original sin,\nwhich has polluted all creatures; wherefore I believe that before the\nFall the sun was much brighter, water much clearer, and the land much\nricher, and fuller of all sorts of plants.\"--Luther (Th. i. s. 322,\n323, 329, 337).\n\n[108] \"Tantum denique abest incesti cupido, ut nonnullis rubori sit\netiam pudica conjunctio.\"--M. Felicis, Oct. c. 31. One Father was so\nextraordinarily chaste that he had never seen a woman's face, nay, he\ndreaded even touching himself, \"se quoque ipsum attingere quodammodo\nhorrebat.\" Another Father had so fine an olfactory sense in this\nmatter, that on the approach of an unchaste person he perceived an\ninsupportable odour.--Bayle (Dict. Art. Mariana Rem. C.). But the\nsupreme, the divine principle of this hyperphysical delicacy is the\nVirgin Mary; hence the Catholics name her Virginum Gloria, Virginitatis\ncorona, Virginitatis typus et forma puritatis, Virginum vexillifera,\nVirginitatis magistra, Virginum prima, Virginitatis primiceria.\n\n[109] \"Salve sancta parens, enixa puerpera Regem,\n Gaudia matris habens cum virginitatis honore.\"\n\nTheol. Schol. Mezger. t. iv. p. 132.\n\n[110] See e.g. J. D. Winckler, Philolog. Lactant. s. Brunsvig\u00e6, 1754,\npp. 247-254.\n\n[111] See on this subject Philos. und Christenthum, by L. Feuerbach.\n\n[112] In relation to this, the confession of Augustine\nis interesting: \"Ita fluctuo inter periculum voluptatis et\nexperimentum salubritatis: magisque adducor ... cantandi cousuetudinem\napprobare in ecclesia, ut per oblectamenta aurium infirmior animus\nin affectum pietatis assurgat. Tamen cum mihi accidit, ut nos\namplius cantus, quam res qu\u00e6 canitur moveat, poenaliter me peccare\nconfiteor.\"--Confess. l. x. c. 33.\n\n[113] Th. xvi. p. 490.\n\n[114] \"Because God has given us his Son, he has with him given\nus everything, whether it be called devil, sin, hell, heaven,\nrighteousness, life; all, all must be ours, because the Son is ours as\na gift, in whom all else is included.\"--Luther (Th. xv. p. 311). \"The\nbest part of the resurrection has already happened; Christ, the\nhead of all Christendom, has passed through death and risen from\nthe dead. Moreover, the most excellent part of me, my soul, has\nlikewise passed through death, and is with Christ in the heavenly\nbeing. What harm, then, can death and the grave do me?\"--Luther\n(Th. xvi. p. 235). \"A Christian man has equal power with Christ, has\nfellowship with him and a common tenure.\" (Th. xiii. p. 648.) \"Whoever\ncleaves to Christ has as much as he.\" (Th. xvi. p. 574.)\n\n[115] This exhibits clearly the untruthfulness and vanity of the modern\nspeculations concerning the personality of God. If you are not ashamed\nof a personal God, do not be ashamed of a corporeal God. An abstract\ncolourless personality, a personality without flesh and blood, is an\nempty shade.\n\n[116] Concordienb. Erkl\u00e4r. Art. 8.\n\n[117] This was excellently shown by Faustus Socinus. See his\nDefens. Animadv. in Assert. Theol. Coll. Posnan. de trino et uno\nDeo. Irenopoli, 1656, c. 11.\n\n[118] Let the reader examine, with reference to this, the writings of\nthe Christian orthodox theologians against the heterodox; for example,\nagainst the Socinians. Modern theologians, indeed, agree with the\nlatter, as is well known, in pronouncing the divinity of Christ as\naccepted by the Church to be unbiblical; but it is undeniably the\ncharacteristic principle of Christianity, and even if it does not\nstand in the Bible in the form which is given to it by dogma, it is\nnevertheless a necessary consequence of what is found in the Bible. A\nbeing who is the fulness of the Godhead bodily, who is omniscient (John\nxvi. 30) and almighty (raises the dead, works miracles), who is before\nall things, both in time and rank, who has life in himself (though an\nimparted life) like as the Father has life in himself,--what, if we\nfollow out the consequences, can such a being be, but God? \"Christ is\none with the Father in will;\"--but unity of will presupposes unity of\nnature. \"Christ is the ambassador, the representative of God;\"--but\nGod can only be represented by a divine being. I can only choose as\nmy representative one in whom I find the same or similar qualities\nas in myself; otherwise I belie myself.\n\n[119] \"How much better is it that I should lose the whole world\nthan that I should lose God, who created the world, and can create\ninnumerable worlds, who is better than a hundred thousand, than\ninnumerable worlds? For what sort of a comparison is that of the\ntemporal with the eternal?... One soul is better than the whole\nworld.\"--Luther (Th. xix. p. 21).\n\n[120] It is true that the heathen philosophers also,\nas Plato, Socrates, the Stoics (see e.g. J. Lipsius,\nPhysiol. Stoic. l. i. diss. xi.), believed that the divine providence\nextended not merely to the general, but also to the particular,\nthe individual; but they identified providence with Nature, law,\nnecessity. The Stoics, who were the orthodox speculatists of\nheathenism, did indeed believe in miracles wrought by providence\n(Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. ii. and De Divinat. l. i.); but their miracles\nhad no such supranaturalistic significance as those of Christianity,\nthough they also appealed to the supranaturalistic axiom: \"Nihil est\nquod Deus efficere non possit.\"\n\n[121] \"Dicimur amare et Deus; dicimur nosse et Deus. Et multa in hunc\nmodum. Sed Deus amat ut charitas, novit ut veritas, etc.\"--Bernard,\n(de Consider. l. v.).\n\n[122] It is true that in one sense the individual is the absolute--in\nthe phraseology of Leibnitz, the mirror of the universe, of the\ninfinite. But in so far as there are many individuals, each is only\na single, and, as such, a finite mirror of the infinite. It is true\nalso, in opposition to the abstraction of a sinless man, that each\nindividual regarded in himself is perfect, and only by comparison\nimperfect, for each is what alone he can be.\n\n[123] With the Hindoos (Inst. of Menu) he alone is \"a perfect man\nwho consists of three united persons, his wife, himself, and his\nson. For man and wife, and father and son, are one.\" The Adam of the\nOld Testament also is incomplete without woman; he feels his need of\nher. But the Adam of the New Testament, the Christian, heavenly Adam,\nthe Adam who is constituted with a view to the destruction of this\nworld, has no longer any sexual impulses or functions.\n\n[124] \"H\u00e6 sane vires amiciti\u00e6 mortis contemptum ingenerare\n... potuerunt: quibus pene tantum venerationis, quantum Deorum\nimmortalium ceremoniis debetur. Illis enim publica salus, his privata\ncontinetur.\"--Valerius Max. l. iv. c. 7.\n\n[125] \"The life for God is not this natural life, which is subject\nto decay.... Ought we not then to sigh after future things, and be\naverse to all these temporal things?... Wherefore we should find\nconsolation in heartily despising this life and this world, and from\nour hearts sigh for and desire the future honour and glory of eternal\nlife.\"--Luther (Th. i. s. 466, 467).\n\n[126] \"Eo dirigendus est spiritus, quo aliquando est\niturus.\"--Meditat. Sacr\u00e6 Joh. Gerhardi. Med. 46.\n\n[127] \"Affectanti coelestia, terrena non sapiunt. \u00c6ternis inhianti,\nfastidio sunt transitoria.\"--Bernard. (Epist. Ex Persona Heli\u00e6\nMonachi ad Parentes). \"Nihil nostra refert in hoc \u00e6vo, nisi de\neo quam celeriter excedere.\"--Tertullian (Apol. adv. Gentes,\nc. 41). \"Wherefore a Christian man should rather be advised to\nbear sickness with patience, yea, even to desire that death should\ncome,--the sooner the better. For, as St. Cyprian says, nothing is\nmore for the advantage of a Christian than soon to die. But we rather\nlisten to the pagan Juvenal when he says: 'Orandum est ut sit mens\nsana in corpore sano.'\"--Luther (Th. iv. s. 15).\n\n[128] \"Ille perfectus est qui mente et corpore a seculo est\nelongatus.\"--De Modo Bene Vivendi ad Sororem, s. vii. (Among the\nspurious writings of St. Bernard.)\n\n[129] On this subject see \"Hieronymus, de Vita Pauli Primi Eremit\u00e6.\"\n\n[130] Naturally Christianity had only such power when, as Jerome\nwrites to Demetrius, Domini nostri adhuc calebat cruor et fervebat\nrecens in credentibus fides. See also on this subject G. Arnold.--Von\nder ersten Christen Gen\u00fcgsamkeit u. Verschm\u00e4hung alles Eigennutzes,\nl. c. B. iv. c. 12, \u00a7 7-16.\n\n[131] How far otherwise the ancient Christians! \"Difficile,\nimo impossibile est, ut et pr\u00e6sentibus quis et futuris fruatur\nbonis.\"--Hieronymus (Epist. Juliano). \"Delicatus es, frater, si et hic\nvis gaudere cum seculo et postea regnare cum Christo.\"--Ib. (Epist. ad\nHeliodorum). \"Ye wish to have both God and the creature together,\nand that is impossible. Joy in God and joy in the creature cannot\nsubsist together.\"--Tauler (ed. c. p. 334). But they were abstract\nChristians. And we live now in the age of conciliation. Yes, truly!\n\n[132] \"Perfectum autem esse nolle delinquere est.\"--Hieronymus\n(Epist. ad Heliodorum de laude Vit\u00e6 solit.). Let me observe once\nfor all that I interpret the biblical passages concerning marriage\nin the sense in which they have been interpreted by the history\nof Christianity.\n\n[133] \"The marriage state is nothing new or unwonted, and is\nlauded and held good even by heathens according to the judgment of\nreason.\"--Luther (Th. ii. p. 377a).\n\n[134] \"Pr\u00e6sumendum est hos qui intra paradisum recipi volunt debere\ncessare ab ea re, a qua paradisus intactus est.\"--Tertullian\n(de Exhort. cast. c. 13). \"Coelibatus angelorum est\nimitatio.\"--Jo. Damasceni (Orthod. Fidei, l. iv. c. 25).\n\n[135] \"Qu\u00e6 non nubit, soli Deo dat operam et ejus cura non\ndividitur; pudica autem, qu\u00e6 nupsit, vitam cum Deo et cum marito\ndividit.\"--Clemens Alex. (P\u00e6dag. l. ii.).\n\n[136] Thomas \u00e0 Kempis de Imit. (l. ii. c. 7, c. 8, l. iii. c. 5,\nc. 34, c. 53, c. 59). \"Felix illa conscientia et beata virginitas,\nin cujus corde pr\u00e6ter amorem Christi ... nullus alius versatur\namor.\"--Hieronymus (Demetriadi, Virgini Deo consecrat\u00e6).\n\n[137] \"Divisa est ... mulier et virgo. Vide quant\u00e6 felicitatis sit,\nqu\u00e6 et nomen sexus amiserit. Virgo jam mulier non vocatur.\"--Hieronymus\n(adv. Helvidium de perpet. Virg. p. 14. Th. ii. Erasmus).\n\n[138] This may be expressed as follows: Marriage has in Christianity\nonly a moral, no religious significance, no religious principle and\nexemplar. It is otherwise with the Greeks, where, for example, \"Zeus\nand Here are the great archetype of every marriage\" (Creuzer, Symbol.);\nwith the ancient Parsees, where procreation, as \"the multiplication\nof the human race, is the diminution of the empire of Ahriman,\" and\nthus a religious art and duty (Zend-Avesta); with the Hindoos, where\nthe son is the regenerated father. Among the Hindoos no regenerate\nman could assume the rank of a Sanyassi, that is, of an anchorite\nabsorbed in God, if he had not previously paid three debts, one of\nwhich was that he had had a legitimate son. Amongst the Christians,\non the contrary, at least the Catholics, it was a true festival of\nreligious rejoicing when betrothed or even married persons--supposing\nthat it happened with mutual consent--renounced the married state\nand sacrificed conjugal to religious love.\n\n[139] Inasmuch as the religious consciousness restores everything which\nit begins by abolishing, and the future life is ultimately nothing\nelse than the present life re-established, it follows that sex must\nbe re-established. \"Erunt ... similes angelorum. Ergo homines non\ndesinent ... ut apostolus apostolus sit et Maria Maria.\"--Hieronymus\n(ad Theodorum Viduam). But as the body in the other world is an\nincorporeal body, so necessarily the sex there is one without\ndifference, i.e., a sexless sex.\n\n[140] \"Bene dicitur, quod tunc plene videbimus eum sicuti est, cum\nsimiles ei erimus, h. e. erimus quod ipse est. Quibus enim potestas\ndata est filios Dei fieri, data est potestas, non quidem ut sint Deus,\nsed sint tamen quod Deus est: sint sancti, futuri plene beati, quod\nDeus est. Nec aliunde hic sancti. nec ibi futuri beati, quam ex Deo\nqui eorum et sanctitas et beatitudo est.\"--De Vita solitar a (among\nthe spurious writings of St. Bernard). \"Finis autem bon\u00e6 voluntatis\nbeatitudo est: vita \u00e6terna ipse Deus.\"--Augustin. (ap. Petrus\nLomb. l. ii. dist. 38, c. 1). \"The other man will be renovated in\nthe spiritual life, i.e., will become a spiritual man, when he shall\nbe restored into the image of God. For he will be like God, in life,\nin righteousness, glory, and wisdom.\"--Luther (Th. i. p. 324).\n\n[141] \"Si bonum est habere corpus incorruptible, quare hoc\nfacturum Deum volumus dasperere?\"--Augustinus (Opp. Antwerp, 1700,\nTh. v. p. 698).\n\n[142] \"Quare dicitur spiritale corpus, nisi quia ad nutum spiritus\nserviet? Nihil tibi contradicet ex te, nihil in te rebellabit adversus\nte.... Ubi volueris, eris.... Credere enim debemus talia corpora nos\nhabituros, ut ubi velimus, quando voluerimus, ibi simus.\"--Augustinus\n(l. c. pp. 703, 705). \"Nihil indecorum ibi erit, summma pax erit,\nnihil discordans, nihil montruosum, nihil quod offendat adspectum\"\n(l. c. 707). \"Nisi beatus, non vivit ut vult.\" (De Civ. Dei, l. 14,\nc. 25.)\n\n[143] And their conceptions of God are just as heterogeneous. The\npious Germans have a German God, the pious Spaniards a Spanish God,\nthe French a French God. The French actually have the proverb:\n\"Le bon Dieu est Fran\u00e7ais.\" In fact, polytheism must exist so long\nas there are various nations. The real God of a people is the point\nd'honneur of its nationality.\n\n[144] \"Ibi nostra spes erit res.\"--Augustin. \"Therefore we have the\nfirst fruits of immortal life in hope, until perfection comes at the\nlast day, wherein we shall see and feel the life we have believed in\nand hoped for.\"--Luther (Th. i. s. 459).\n\n[145] According to old books of travel, however, there are many\ntribes which do not believe that the future is identical with the\npresent, or that it is better, but that it is even worse. Parny\n(OEuv. Chois. t. i. Melang.) tells of a dying negro-slave who refused\nthe inauguration to immortality by baptism in these words: \"Je ne veux\npoint d'une autre vie, car peut-\u00eatre y serais-je encore votre esclave.\"\n\n[146] Ahlwardt (Ossian Anm. zu Carthonn.).\n\n[147] There everything will be restored. \"Qui modo vivit, erit,\nnec me vel dente, vel ungue fraudatum revomet patefacti fossa\nsepulchri.\"--Aurelius Prud. (Apotheos. de Resurr. Carnis Hum.). And\nthis faith, which you consider rude and carnal, and which you therefore\ndisavow, is the only consistent, honest, and true faith. To the\nidentity of the person belongs the identity of the body.\n\n[148] \"Neque enim post resurrectionem tempus diebus\nac noctibus numerabitur. Erit magis una dies sine\nvespere.\"--Joh. Damascen. (Orth. Fidei l. ii. c. 1).\n\n[149] \"Ipsum (corpus) erit et non ipsum erit.\"--Augustinus\n(v. J. Ch. Doederlein, Inst. Theol. Christ. Altorf, 1781, \u00a7 280).\n\n[150] \"Pr\u00e6ter salutem tuam nihil cogites; solum qu\u00e6 Dei\nsunt cures.\"--Thomas \u00e0 K. (de Imit. l. i. c. 23). \"Contra\nsalutem proprium cogites nihil. Minus dixi: contra,\npr\u00e6ter dixisse debueram.\"--Bernhardus (de Consid. ad Eugenium\nPontif. Max. l. ii.). \"Qui Deum qu\u00e6rit, de propria salute sollicitus\nest.\"--Clemens Alex. (Cohort. ad Gent.).\n\n[151] Here and in other parts of this work, theory is taken in the\nsense in which it is the source of true objective activity,--the\nscience which gives birth to art,--for man can do only so much as he\nknows: \"tantum potest quantum scit.\"\n\n[152] Concerning the biblical conceptions of Satan, his power and\nworks, see L\u00fctzelberger's \"Grundz\u00fcge der Paulinischen Glaubenslehre,\"\nand G. Ch. Knapp's \"Vorles. \u00fcber d. Christl. Glaubensl.,\" \u00a7 62-65. To\nthis subject belongs demoniacal possession, which also has its\nattestation in the Bible. See Knapp (\u00a7 65, iii. 2, 3).\n\n[153] Doubtless, this unveiling of the mystery of predestination\nwill be pronounced atrocious, impious, diabolical. I have nothing to\nallege against this; I would rather be a devil in alliance with truth,\nthan an angel in alliance with falsehood.\n\n[154] A kindred doctrine is that of the Concursus Dei, according to\nwhich, God not only gives the first impulse, but also co-operates in\nthe agency of the second cause. For the rest, this doctrine is only a\nparticular form of the contradictory dualism between God and Nature,\nwhich runs through the history of Christianity. On the subject of\nthis remark, as of the whole paragraph, see Strauss: Die Christliche\nGlaubenslehre, B. ii. \u00a7 75, 76.\n\n[155] \"Dum sumus in hoc corpore, peregrinamur ab eo qui summe\nest.\"--Bernard. Epist. 18 (ed. Basle, 1552). \"As long as we live, we\nare in the midst of death.\"--Luther (Th. i. p. 331). The idea of the\nfuture life is therefore nothing else than the idea of true, perfected\nreligion, freed from the limits and obstructions of this life,--the\nfuture life, as has been already said, nothing but the true opinion\nand disposition, the open heart, of religion. Here we believe--there\nwe behold; i.e., there there is nothing besides God, and thus nothing\nbetween God and the soul; but only for this reason, that there ought\nto be nothing between them, because the immediate union of God and the\nsoul is the true opinion and desire of religion. \"We have as yet so to\ndo with God as with one hidden from us, and it is not possible that in\nthis life we should hold communion with him face to face. All creatures\nare now nothing else than vain masks, under which God conceals himself,\nand by which he deals with us.\"--Luther (Th. xi. p. 70). \"If thou\nwert only free from the images of created things, thou mightest have\nGod without intermission.\"--Tauler (l. c. p. 313).\n\n[156] \"Voluntate igitur Dei immobilis manet et stat in seculum terra\n... et voluntate Dei movetur et nutat. Non ergo fundamentis suis nixa\nsubsistit, nec fulcris suis stabilis perseverat, sed Dominus statuit\neam et firmamento voluntatis su\u00e6 continet, quia in manu ejus omnes\nfines terr\u00e6.\"--Ambrosius (Hex\u00e6meron. l. i. c. 61).\n\n[157] It is only unbelief in the efficacy of prayer which has subtly\nlimited prayer to spiritual matters.\n\n[158] According to the notion of barbarians, therefore, prayer is a\ncoercive power, a charm. But this conception is an unchristian one\n(although even among many Christians the idea is accepted that prayer\nconstrains God); for in Christianity God is essentially feeling\nsatisfied in itself, Almighty goodness, which denies nothing to\n(religious) feeling. The idea of coercion presupposes an unfeeling God.\n\n[159] \"Natura enim remota providentia et potestate divina prorsus\nnihil est.\"--Lactantius (Div. Inst. lib. 3, c. 28). \"Omnia qu\u00e6 creata\nsunt, quamvis ea Deus fecerit valde bona, Creatori tamen comparata,\nnec bona sunt, cui comparata nec sunt; altissime quippe et proprio\nmodo quodam de se ipso dixit: Ego sum, qui sum.\"--Augustinus (de\nPerfectione Just. Hom. c. 14).\n\n[160] \"Pulchras formas et varias, nitidos et amoenos colores amant\noculi. Non teneant h\u00e6c animam meam; teneat eam Deus qui h\u00e6c fecit,\nbona quidem valde, sed ipse est bonum meum, non h\u00e6c.\"--Augustinus\n(Confess. l. x. c. 34). \"Vetiti autem sumus (2 Cor. iv. 18.) converti\nad ea qu\u00e6 videntur.... Amandus igitur solus Deus est: omnis vero iste\nmundus, i.e. omnia sensibilia contemnenda, utendum autem his ad hujus\nvit\u00e6 necessitatem.\"--Ib. de Moribus Eccl. Cathol. l. i. c. 20.\n\n[161] At the same time, however, their result is to prove the nature of\nman. The various proofs of the existence of God are nothing else than\nvarious highly interesting forms in which the human nature affirms\nitself. Thus, for example, the physico-theological proof (or proof\nfrom design) is the self-affirmation of the calculated activity\nof the understanding. Every philosophic system is, in this sense,\na proof of the existence of God.\n\n[162] \"Christ is ascended on high, ... that is, he not only sits\nthere above, but he is also here below. And he is gone thither to\nthe very end that he might be here below, and fill all things, and\nbe in all places, which he could not do while on earth, for here he\ncould not be seen by all bodily eyes. Therefore he sits above, where\nevery man can see him, and he has to do with every man.\"--Luther\n(Th. xiii. p. 643). That is to say: Christ or God is an object, an\nexistence, of the imagination; in the imagination he is limited to no\nplace,--he is present and objective to every one. God exists in heaven,\nbut is for that reason omnipresent; for this heaven is the imagination.\n\n[163] \"Thou hast not to complain that thou art less experienced\nthan was Abraham or Isaac. Thou also hast appearances.... Thou hast\nholy baptism, the supper of the Lord, the bread and wine, which are\nfigures and forms, under and in which the present God speaks to thee,\nand acts upon thee, in thy ears, eyes, and heart.... He appears to\nthee in baptism, and it is he himself who baptizes thee, and speaks\nto thee.... Everything is full of divine appearances and utterances,\nif he is on thy side.\"--Luther (Th. ii. p. 466. See also on this\nsubject, Th. xix. p. 407).\n\n[164] The denial of a fact is not a matter of indifference; it\nis something morally evil,--a disowning of what is known to be\ntrue. Christianity made its articles of faith objective, i.e.,\nundeniable, unassailable facts, thus overpowering the reason, and\ntaking the mind prisoner by the force of external reality: herein\nwe have the true explanation why and how Christianity, Protestant\nas well as Catholic, enunciated and enforced with all solemnity the\nprinciple, that heresy--the denial of an idea or a fact which forms\nan article of faith--is an object of punishment by the temporal\npower, i.e., a crime. What in theory is an external fact becomes in\npractice an external force. In this respect Christianity is far below\nMohammedanism, to which the crime of heresy is unknown.\n\n[165] \"Pr\u00e6sentiam s\u00e6pe divi suam declarant.\"--Cicero (de\nNat. D. 1. ii.). Cicero's works (de Nat. D. and de Divinatione)\nare especially interesting, because the arguments there used for the\nreality of the objects of pagan faith are virtually the same as those\nurged in the present day by theologians and the adherents of positive\nreligion generally for the reality of the objects of Christian faith.\n\n[166] \"Quod crudeliter ab hominibus sine Dei jussu fieret aut\nfactum est, id debuit ab Hebrais fieri, quia a deo vit\u00e6 et necis\nsummo arbitrio, jussi bellum ita gerebant.\"--J. Clericus (Comm. in\nMos. Num. c. 31, 7). \"Multa gessit Samson, qu\u00e6 vix possent\ndefendi, nisi Dei, a quo homines pendent, instrumentum fuisse\ncenseatur.\"--Ib. (Comm. in Judicum, c. 14, 19). See also Luther,\ne.g. (Th. i. p. 339, Th. xvi. p. 495).\n\n[167] It was very justly remarked by the Jansenists against the\nJesuits: \"Vouloir reconnoitre dans l'Ecriture quelque chose de la\nfoiblesse et de l'esprit naturel de l'homme, c'est donner la libert\u00e9\n\u00e0 chacun d'en faire le discernment et de rejetter ce qui lui plaira\nde l'Ecriture, comme venant pl\u00fbtot de la foiblesse de l'homme que de\nl'esprit de Dieu.\"--B\u00e2yle (Dict. art. Adam (Jean) Rem. E.).\n\n[168] \"Nec in scriptura divina fas sit sentire aliquid\ncontrarietatis.\"--Petrus L. (l. ii. dist. ii. c. i.). Similar thoughts\nare found in the Fathers.\n\n[169] This is especially apparent in the superlative, and the\npreposition super, hyper, which distinguish the divine predicates, and\nwhich very early--as, for example, with the Neo-Platonists, the\nChristians among heathen philosophers--played a chief part in theology.\n\n[170] \"Scit itaque Deus, quanta sit multitudo pulicum, culicum,\nmuscarum et piscium et quot nascantur, quotve moriantur, sed non\nscit hoc per momenta singula, imo simul et semel omnia.\"--Petrus\nL. (l. i. dist. 39, c. 3).\n\n[171] \"Qui scientem cuncta sciunt, quid nescire nequeunt?\"--Liber\nMeditat. c. 26 (among the spurious writings of Augustine).\n\n[172] Tauler, l. c. p. 312.\n\n[173] \"The closest union which Christ possessed with the Father, it\nis possible for me to win.... All that God gave to his only-begotten\nSon, he has given to me as perfectly as to him.\"--Predigten etzlicher\nLehrer vor und zu Tauleri Zeiten. Hamburg, 1621, p. 14. \"Between the\nonly-begotten Son and the soul there is no distinction.\"--Ib. p. 68.\n\n[174] \"God can as little do without us as we without him.\"--Predigten\netzlicher Lehrer, &c., p. 16. See also on this subject--Strauss,\nChristl. Glaubensl. B. i. \u00a7 47, and the author's work entitled,\nP. Bayle, pp. 104, 107.\n\n[175] \"This temporal, transitory life in this world (i.e., natural\nlife) we have through God, who is the almighty Creator of heaven and\nearth. But the eternal untransitory life we have through the Passion\nand Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ.... Jesus Christ a Lord\nover that life.\"--Luther (Th. xvi. s. 459).\n\n[176] It is curious to observe how the speculative religious\nphilosophy undertakes the defence of the Trinity against the godless\nunderstanding, and yet, by doing away with the personal substances,\nand explaining the relation of Father and Son as merely an inadequate\nimage borrowed from organic life, robs the Trinity of its very heart\nand soul. Truly, if the cabalistic artifices which the speculative\nreligious philosophy applies in the service of the absolute religion\nwere admissible in favour of finite religions, it would not be\ndifficult to squeeze the Pandora's box of Christian dogmatics out\nof the horns of the Egyptian Apis. Nothing further would be needed\nfor this purpose than the ominous distinction of the understanding\nfrom the speculative reason,--a distinction which is adapted to the\njustification of every absurdity.\n\n[177] The unity has not the significance of genus, not of unum but of\nunus. (See Augustine and Petrus Lomb. l. i. dist. 19, c. 7, 8, 9.) \"Hi\nergo tres, qui unum sunt propter ineffabilem conjunctionem deitatis qua\nineffabiliter copulantur, unus Deus est.\" (Petrus L. l. c. c. 6.) \"How\ncan reason bring itself into accord with this, or believe, that three\nis one and one is three?\"--Luther (Th. x. iv. p. 13).\n\n[178] \"Quia ergo pater Deus et filius Deus et spiritus s. Deus cur\nnon dicuntur tres Dii? Ecce proposuit hanc propositionem (Augustinus)\nattende quid respondeat ... Si autem dicerem: tres Deos, contradiceret\nscriptura dicens: Audi Israel: Deus tuus unus est. Ecce absolutio\nqu\u00e6stionis: quare potius dicamus tres personas quam tres Deos, quia\nscil. illud non contradicit scriptura.\"--Petrus L. (l. i. dist. 23,\nc. 3). How much did even Catholicism repose upon Holy Writ!\n\n[179] A truly masterly presentation of the overwhelming contradictions\nin which the mystery of the Trinity involves the genuine religious\nsentiment, is to be found in the work already cited--Theanthropos. Eine\nReihe von Aphorismen--which expresses in the form of the religious\nsentiment what in the present work is expressed in the form of the\nreason; and which is therefore especially to be recommended to women.\n\n[180] \"Sacramentum ejus rei similitudinem gerit, cujus signum\nest.\"--Petrus Lomb. (l. iv. dist. 1, c. 1).\n\n[181] In relation to the miracle-worker faith (confidence in God's aid)\nis certainly the causa efficiens of the miracle. (See Matt. xvii. 20;\nActs vi. 8.) But in relation to the spectators of the miracle--and\nit is they who are in question here--miracle is the causa efficiens\nof faith.\n\n[182] \"Here we see a miracle surpassing all miracles, that Christ\nshould have so mercifully converted his greatest enemy.\"--Luther\n(Th. xvi. p. 560).\n\n[183] Hence it is greatly to the honour of Luther's understanding\nand sense of truth that, particularly when writing against Erasmus,\nhe unconditionally denied the free will of man as opposed to divine\ngrace. \"The name Free Will,\" says Luther, quite correctly from the\nstandpoint of religion, \"is a divine title and name, which none ought\nto bear but the Divine Majesty alone.\" (Th. xix. p. 28).\n\n[184] Experience indeed extorted even from the old theologians,\nwhose faith was an uncompromising one, the admission that\nthe effects of baptism are, at least in this life, very\nlimited. \"Baptismus non aufert omnes poenalitates hujus\nvit\u00e6.\"--Mezger. Theol. Schol. Th. iv. p. 251. See also Petrus\nL. l. iv. dist. 4, c. 4; l. ii. dist. 32, c. 1.\n\n[185] Even in the absurd fiction of the Lutherans, that \"infants\nbelieve in baptism,\" the action of subjectivity reduces itself\nto the faith of others, since the faith of infants is \"wrought by\nGod through the intercession of the god-parents and their bringing\nup of the children in the faith of the Christian Church.\"--Luther\n(Th. xiii. pp. 360, 361). \"Thus the faith of another helps me to\nobtain a faith of my own.\"--Ib. (T. xiv. p. 347a).\n\n[186] \"This,\" says Luther, \"is in summa our opinion, that in and\nwith the bread, the body of Christ is truly eaten; thus, that all\nwhich the bread undergoes and effects, the body of Christ undergoes\nand effects; that it is divided, eaten and chewed with the teeth\npropter unionem, sacramentalem.\" (Plank's Gesch. der Entst. des\nprotest. Lehrbeg. B. viii. s. 369). Elsewhere, it is true, Luther\ndenies that the body of Christ, although it is partaken of corporeally,\n\"is chewed and digested like a piece of beef.\" (Th. xix. p. 429.) No\nwonder; for that which is partaken of is an object without objectivity,\na body without corporeality, flesh without the qualities of flesh;\n\"spiritual flesh,\" as Luther says, i.e., imaginary flesh. Be it\nobserved further, that the Protestants also take the Lord's Supper\nfasting, but this is merely a custom with them, not a law. (See Luther,\nTh. xviii. p. 200, 201.)\n\n[187] 1 Cor. xi. 29.\n\n[188] \"Videtur enim species vini et panis, et substantia panis et\nvini non creditur. Creditur autem substantia corporis et sanguinis\nChristi et tamen species non cernitur.\"--Bernardus (ed. Bas. 1552,\npp. 189-191).\n\n[189] It is so in another relation not developed here, but which may\nbe mentioned in a note: namely, the following. In religion, in faith,\nman is an object to himself as the object, i.e., the end or determining\nmotive, of God. Man is occupied with himself in and through God. God\nis the means of human existence and happiness. This religious truth,\nembodied in a cultus, in a sensuous form, is the Lord's Supper. In this\nsacrament man feeds upon God--the Creator of heaven and earth--as on\nmaterial food; by the act of eating and drinking he declares God to\nbe a mere means of life to man. Here man is virtually supposed to be\nthe God of God: hence the Lord's Supper is the highest self-enjoyment\nof human subjectivity. Even the Protestant--not indeed in words, but\nin truth--transforms God into an external thing, since he subjects\nHim to himself as an object of sensational enjoyment.\n\n[190] \"Nostrates, pr\u00e6sentiam realem consecrationis effectum\nesse, adfirmant; idque ita, ut tum se exserat, cum usus legitimus\naccedit. Nec est quod regeras, Christum h\u00e6c verba: hoc est corpus\nmeum, protulisse, antequam discipuli ejus comederent, adeoque panem\njam ante usum corpus Christi fuisse.\"--Buddeus (l. c. l. v. c. l, \u00a7\u00a7\n13, 17). See, on the other hand, Concil. Trident. Sessio 13, cc. 3,\n8, Can. 4.\n\n[191] Apologie Melancthon. Strobel. N\u00fcrnb. 1783, p. 127.\n\n[192] \"The fanatics, however, believe that it is mere bread and wine,\nand it is assuredly so as they believe; they have it so, and eat mere\nbread and wine.\"--Luther (Th. xix. p. 432). That is to say, if thou\nbelievest, representest to thyself, conceivest, that the bread is not\nbread, but the body of Christ, it is not bread; but if thou dost not\nbelieve so, it is not so. What it is in thy belief that it actually is.\n\n[193] Even the Catholics also. \"Hujus sacramenti effectus,\nquem in anima operatur digne sumentis, est adunatio hominis ad\nChristum.\"--Concil. Florent. de S. Euchar.\n\n[194] \"If the body of Christ is in the bread and is eaten with faith,\nit strengthens the soul, in that the soul believes that it is the\nbody of Christ which the mouth eats.\"--Luther (Th. xix. p. 433; see\nalso p. 205). \"For what we believe that we receive, that we receive\nin truth.\"--Ib. (Th. xvii. p. 557).\n\n[195] Hence the mere name of Christ has miraculous powers.\n\n[196] \"Gott glauben und an Gott glauben.\"\n\n[197] \"If I wish to be a Christian, I must believe and do what other\npeople do not believe or do.\"--Luther (Th. xvi. p. 569).\n\n[198] Celsus makes it a reproach to the Christians that\nthey boast: \"Est Deus et post illum nos.\" (Origenes\nadv. Cels. ed. Hoeschelius. Aug. Vind. 1605, p. 182).\n\n[199] \"I am proud and exulting on account of my blessedness and the\nforgiveness of my sins, but through what? Through the glory and pride\nof another, namely, the Lord Christ.\"--Luther (Th. ii. p. 344). \"He\nthat glorieth let him glory in the Lord.\"--1 Cor. i. 31.\n\n[200] A military officer who had been adjutant of the Russian general\nM\u00fcnnich said: \"When I was his adjutant I felt myself greater than\nnow that I command.\"\n\n[201] To faith, so long as it has any vital heat, any character,\nthe heretic is always on a level with the unbeliever, with the atheist.\n\n[202] Already in the New Testament the idea of disobedience\nis associated with unbelief. \"The cardinal wickedness is\nunbelief.\"--Luther (xiii. p. 647).\n\n[203] God himself by no means entirely reserves the punishment of\nblasphemers, of unbelievers, of heretics, for the future; he often\npunishes them in this life also, \"for the benefit of Christendom and\nthe strengthening of faith:\" as, for example, the heretics Cerinthus\nand Arius. See Luther (Th. xiv. p. 13).\n\n[204] \"Si quis spiritum Dei habet, illius versiculi recordetur: Nonne\nqui oderunt te, Domine, oderam?\" (Psal. cxxxix. 21); Bernhardus,\nEpist. (193) ad magist. Yvonem Cardin.\n\n[205] \"Qui Christum negat, negatur a Christo.\"--Cyprian (Epist. E. 73,\n\u00a7 18, edit. Gersdorf.).\n\n[206] Thus the apostle Paul cursed \"Elymas the sorcerer\" with\nblindness, because he withstood the faith.--Acts xiii. 8-11.\n\n[207] Historically considered, this saying, as well as the others\ncited pp. 384, 385, may be perfectly justified. But the Bible is not\nto be regarded as an historical or temporal, but as an eternal book.\n\n[208] \"Tenerrimam partem humani corporis nominavit, ut apertissime\nintelligeremus, eum (Deum) tam parva Sanctorum suorum contumelia l\u00e6di,\nquam parvi verberis tactu humani visus acies l\u00e6ditur.\"--Salvianus,\nl. 8, de Gubern. Dei.\n\n[209] 1 Cor. x. 20.\n\n[210] Phil. ii. 10, 11. \"When the name of Jesus Christ is heard,\nall that is unbelieving and ungodly in heaven or on earth shall be\nterrified.\"--Luther (Th. xvi. p. 322). \"In morte pagani Christianus\ngloriatur, quia Christus glorificatur.\"--Divus Bernardus. Sermo\nexhort. ad Milites Templi.\n\n[211] Petrus L. 1. iv. dist. 50, c.4. But this passage is by no means\na declaration of Peter Lombard himself. He is far too modest, timid,\nand dependent on the authorities of Christianity to have ventured\nto advance such a tenet on his own account. No! This position is\na universal declaration, a characteristic expression of Christian,\nof believing love. The doctrine of some Fathers of the Church, e.g.,\nof Origen and Gregory of Nyssa, that the punishment of the damned\nwould have an end, sprung not out of Christian or Church doctrine,\nbut out of Platonism. Hence the doctrine that the punishment of\nhell is finite, was rejected not only by the Catholic but also by the\nProtestant church. (Augsb. Confess. art. 17). A precious example of the\nexclusive, misanthropical narrowness of Christian love, is the passage\ncited from Buddeus by Strauss (Christl. Glaubensl. B. ii. s. 547),\naccording to which not infants in general, but those of Christians\nexclusively, would have a share in the divine grace and blessings if\nthey died unbaptized.\n\n[212] \"Fugite, abhorrete hunc doctorem.\" But why should I flee from\nhim? because the anger, i.e., the curse of God rests on his head.\n\n[213] There necessarily results from this a sentiment which, e.g.,\nCyprian expresses: \"Si vero ubique h\u00e6retici nihil aliud quam adversarii\net antichristi nominantur, si vitandi et perversi et a semet ipsis\ndamnati pronuntiantur; quale est ut videantur damnandi a nobis non\nesse, quos constat apostolica contestatione a semet ipsis damnatos\nesse.\" Epistol. 74. (Edit, cit.)\n\n[214] The passage Luke ix. 56, as the parallel of which is cited John\niii. 17, receives its completion and rectification in the immediately\nfollowing v. 18: \"He that believeth in him is not condemned; but he\nthat believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed\nin the name of the only begotten Son of God.\"\n\n[215] Faith, it is true, is not \"without good works,\" nay, according to\nLuther's declaration, it is as impossible to separate faith from works\nas to separate heat and light from fire. Nevertheless, and this is the\nmain point, good works do not belong to the article of justification\nbefore God, i.e., men are justified and \"saved without works, through\nfaith alone.\" Faith is thus expressly distinguished from good works;\nfaith alone avails before God, not good works; faith alone is the\ncause of salvation, not virtue; thus faith alone has substantial\nsignificance, virtue only accidental; i.e., faith alone has religious\nsignificance, divine authority--and not morality. It is well known that\nmany have gone so far as to maintain that good works are not necessary,\nbut are even \"injurious, obstructive to salvation.\" Quite correctly.\n\n[216] \"Causa fidei ... exorbitantem et irregularem prorsus favorem\nhabet et ab omni jure deviare, omnem captivare rationem, nec judiciis\nlaicorum ratione corrupta utentium subjecta creditur. Etenim\nCausa fidei ad multa obligat, qu\u00e6 alias sunt voluntaria, multa,\nimo infinita remittit, qu\u00e6 alias pr\u00e6cepta; qu\u00e6 alius valide gesta\nannullat, et contra qu\u00e6 alias nulla et irrita, fiunt valida ... ex\njure canonico.\"--J. H. Boehmeri (Jus Eccles. lib. v. tit. vii. \u00a7\n32. See also \u00a7 44 et seq.).\n\n[217] \"Placetta de Fide, ii. Il ne faut pas chercher dans la nature\ndes choses m\u00eames la veritable cause de l'inseparabilit\u00e9 de la foi\net de la piet\u00e9. Il faut, si je ne me trompe, la chercher uniquement\ndans la volont\u00e9 de Dieu.... Bene facit et nobiscum sentit, cum illam\nconjunctionem (i.e., of sanctity or virtue with faith) a benifica Dei\nvoluntate et dispositione repetit; nec id novum est ejus inventum, sed\ncum antiquioribus Theologis nostris commune.\"--J. A. Ernesti. (Vindici\u00e6\narbitrii divini. Opusc. theol. p. 297.) \"Si quis dixerit ... qui\nfidem sine charitate habet, Christianum non esse, anathema\nsit.\"--Concil. Trid. (Sess. vi. de Justif. can. 28).\n\n[218] See on this subject Luther, e.g., T. xiv. p. 286.\n\n[219] \"Therefore good works must follow faith, as an expression of\nthankfulness to God.\"--Apol. der Augs. Conf. art. 3. \"How can I make\na return to thee for thy deeds of love in works? yet it is something\nacceptable to thee, if I quench and tame the lusts of the flesh, that\nthey may not anew inflame my heart with fresh sins.\" \"If sin bestirs\nitself, I am not overcome; a glance at the cross of Jesus destroys its\ncharms.\"--Gesangbuch der Evangel. Br\u00fcdergemeinen (Moravian Hymn-book).\n\n[220] The only limitation which is not contradictory to the nature\nof love is the self-limitation of love by reason, intelligence. The\nlove which despises the stringency, the law of the intelligence,\nis theoretically false and practically noxious.\n\n[221] The Peripatetics also; who founded love, even that towards all\nmen, not on a particular, religious, but a natural principle.\n\n[222] Active love is and must of course always be particular and\nlimited, i.e., directed to one's neighbour. But it is yet in its\nnature universal, since it loves man for man's sake, in the name of\nthe race. Christian love, on the contrary, is in its nature exclusive.\n\n[223] Including external nature; for as man belongs to the essence\nof Nature,--in opposition to common materialism; so Nature belongs\nto the essence of man,--in opposition to subjective idealism;\nwhich is also the secret of our \"absolute\" philosophy, at least in\nrelation to Nature. Only by uniting man with Nature can we conquer\nthe supranaturalistic egoism of Christianity.\n\n[224] Yes, only as the free bond of love; for a marriage the bond\nof which is merely an external restriction, not the voluntary,\ncontented self-restriction of love, in short, a marriage which is\nnot spontaneously concluded, spontaneously willed, self-sufficing,\nis not a true marriage, and therefore not a truly moral marriage.\n\n[225] \"Because God does good through government, great men and\ncreatures in general, people rush into error, lean on creatures\nand not on the Creator;--they do not look from the creature to the\nCreator. Hence it came that the heathens made gods of kings.... For\nthey cannot and will not perceive that the work or the benefit comes\nfrom God, and not merely from the creature, though the latter is a\nmeans, through which God works, helps us, and gives to us.\"--Luther\n(T. iv. p. 237).\n\n[226] \"They who honour me, I will honour, and they who despise me\nshall be lightly esteemed.\"--1 Sam. ii. 30. \"Jam se, o bone pater,\nvermis vilissimus et odio dignissimus sempiterno, tamen confidit\namari, quoniam se sentit amare, imo quia se amari pr\u00e6sentit, non\nredamare confunditur.... Nemo itaque se amari diffidat, qui jam\namat.\"--Bernardus ad Thomam (Epist. 107). A very fine and pregnant\nsentence. If I exist not for God, God exists not for me; if I do not\nlove, I am not loved. The passive is the active certain of itself,\nthe object is the subject certain of itself. To love is to be man,\nto be loved is to be God. I am loved, says God; I love, says man. It\nis not until later that this is reversed, that the passive transforms\nitself into the active, and conversely.\n\n[227] \"The Lord spake to Gideon: The people are too many that are\nwith thee, that I should give Midian into their hands; Israel\nmight glorify itself against me and say: My hand has delivered\nme,\"--i.e., \"Ne Israel sibi tribuat, qu\u00e6 mihi debentur.\" Judges\nvii. 2. \"Thus saith the Lord: Cursed is the man that trusteth in\nman. But blessed is the man that trusteth in the Lord and whose\nhope is in the Lord.\"--Jer. xvii. 5. \"God desires not our gold,\nbody and possessions, but has given these to the emperor (that is,\nto the representative of the world, of the state), and to us through\nthe emperor. But the heart, which is the greatest and best in man,\nhe has reserved for himself;--this must be our offering to God--that\nwe believe in him.\"--Luther (xvi. p. 505).\n\n[228] Christian baptism also is obviously only a relic of the\nancient Nature-worship, in which, as in the Persian, water was a\nmeans of religious purification. (S. Rhode: Die heilige Sage, &c.,\npp. 305, 426.) Here, however, water baptism had a much truer, and\nconsequently a deeper meaning, than with the Christians, because\nit rested on the natural power and value of water. But indeed for\nthese simple views of Nature which characterised the old religions,\nour speculative as well as theological supranaturalism has neither\nsense nor understanding. When therefore the Persians, the Hindoos,\nthe Egyptians, the Hebrews, made physical purity a religious duty,\nthey were herein far wiser than the Christian saints, who attested\nthe supranaturalistic principle of their religion by physical\nimpurity. Supranaturalism in theory becomes anti-naturalism in\npractice. Supranaturalism is only a euphemism for anti-naturalism.\n\n[229] \"Eating and drinking is the easiest of all work, for men like\nnothing better: yea, the most joyful work in the whole world is eating\nand drinking, as it is commonly said: Before eating no dancing, and,\nOn a full stomach stands a merry head. In short, eating and drinking\nis a pleasant necessary work;--that is a doctrine soon learned and\nmade popular. The same pleasant necessary work takes our blessed Lord\nChrist and says: 'I have prepared a joyful, sweet and pleasant meal,\nI will lay on you no hard heavy work ... I institute a supper,'\n&c.\"--Luther (xvi. 222).\n\n[230] \"Manifestum igitur est tantum religionis sanguini et affinitati,\nquantum ipsis Diis immortalibus tributum: quia inter ista tam sancta\nvincula non magis, quam in aliquo loco sacrato nudare se, nefas esse\ncredebatur.\"--Valer. Max. (l. ii. c. i.)\n\n[231] See the author's \"Leibnitz.\"\n\n[232] [Here follows in the original a distinction between Herz,\nor feeling directed towards real objects, and therefore practically\nsympathetic; and Gem\u00fcth, or feeling directed towards imaginary objects,\nand therefore practically unsympathetic, self-absorbed. But the verbal\ndistinction is not adhered to in the ordinary use of the language,\nor, indeed, by Feuerbach himself; and the psychological distinction\nis sufficiently indicated in other parts of the present work. The\npassage is therefore omitted, as likely to confuse the reader.--Tr.]\n\n[233] \"Haereticus usu omnium jurium destitutus est, ut\ndeportatus.\"--J. H. Boehmer (l. c. l. v. Tit. vii. \u00a7 223. See also\nTit. vi.)\n\n[234] Very many Christians rejected the punishment of death,\nbut other criminal punishments of heretics, such as banishment,\nconfiscation--punishments which deprive of life indirectly--they did\nnot find in contradiction with their Christian faith. See on this\nsubject J. H. Boehmer, Jus. Eccl. Protest. l. v. Tit. vii. e.g. \u00a7\u00a7\ni. 155, 157, 162, 163.\n\n[235] On this subject I refer to L\u00fctzelberger's work: \"Die Kirchliche\nTradition \u00fcber den Apostel Johannes und seine Schriften in ihrer\nGrundlosigkeit nachgewiesen,\" and to Bruno Bauer's \"Kritik der\nEvangelischen Geschichte der Synoptiker und des Johannes\" (B. iii.).\n\n[236] In another place Luther praises St. Bernard and Bonaventura\nbecause they laid so much stress on the manhood of Christ.\n\n[237] It is true that in Catholicism also--in Christianity generally,\nGod exists for man; but it was Protestantism which first drew from\nthis relativity of God its true result--the absoluteness of man.","title":"The Essence of Christianity: Translated from the second German edition","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":147636}