{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_4723/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_4723","id":"gutenberg_4723","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4723","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Idealism","Knowledge, Theory of","Philosophy","Soul"],"text":"Produced by Col Choat.  HTML version by Al Haines.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nA Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge\n\n\nby\n\nGeorge Berkeley (1685-1753)\n\n\nWHEREIN THE CHIEF CAUSES OF ERROR AND DIFFICULTY IN THE SCIENCES,\nWITH THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM, ATHEISM, AND IRRELIGION,\nARE INQUIRED INTO.\n\n\n\n\nDEDICATION\n\n\n\n  To the Right Honourable\n  THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE, &C.,\n  Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter and one of\n  the Lords of Her Majesty's most honourable privy council.\n\nMy Lord,\n\nYou will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who has not the honour to\nbe known to your lordship, should presume to address you in this manner.\nBut that a man who has written something with a design to promote Useful\nKnowledge and Religion in the world should make choice of your lordship\nfor his patron, will not be thought strange by any one that is not\naltogether unacquainted with the present state of the church and\nlearning, and consequently ignorant how great an ornament and support you\nare to both. Yet, nothing could have induced me to make you this present\nof my poor endeavours, were I not encouraged by that candour and native\ngoodness which is so bright a part in your lordship's character. I might\nadd, my lord, that the extraordinary favour and bounty you have been\npleased to show towards our Society gave me hopes you would not be\nunwilling to countenance the studies of one of its members. These\nconsiderations determined me to lay this treatise at your lordship's\nfeet, and the rather because I was ambitious to have it known that I am\nwith the truest and most profound respect, on account of that learning\nand virtue which the world so justly admires in your lordship, MY LORD,\nYour lordship's most humble and most devoted servant,\n\n\nGEORGE BERKELEY\n\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n  PREFACE\n  INTRODUCTION\n  OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nWhat I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry, seemed\nto me evidently true and not unuseful to be known--particularly to those\nwho are tainted with Scepticism, or want a demonstration of the existence\nand immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the soul. Whether\nit be so or no I am content the reader should impartially examine; since\nI do not think myself any farther concerned for the success of what I\nhave written than as it is agreeable to truth. But, to the end this may\nnot suffer, I make it my request that the reader suspend his judgment\ntill he has once at least read the whole through with that degree of\nattention and thought which the subject-matter shall seem to deserve.\nFor, as there are some passages that, taken by themselves, are very\nliable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation, and to be\ncharged with most absurd consequences, which, nevertheless, upon an\nentire perusal will appear not to follow from them; so likewise, though\nthe whole should be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, it is\nvery probable my sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking reader, I\nflatter myself it will be throughout clear and obvious. As for the\ncharacters of novelty and singularity which some of the following notions\nmay seem to bear, it is, I hope, needless to make any apology on that\naccount. He must surely be either very weak, or very little acquainted\nwith the sciences, who shall reject a truth that is capable of\ndemonstration, for no other reason but because it is newly known, and\ncontrary to the prejudices of mankind. Thus much I thought fit to\npremise, in order to prevent, if possible, the hasty censures of a sort\nof men who are too apt to condemn an opinion before they rightly\ncomprehend it.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\n1. Philosophy being nothing else but THE STUDY OF WISDOM AND TRUTH, it\nmay with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and pains\nin it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater\nclearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts\nand difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk\nof mankind that walk the high-road of plain common sense, and are\ngoverned by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and\nundisturbed. To them nothing THAT IS FAMILIAR appears unaccountable or\ndifficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of evidence in\ntheir senses, and are out of all danger of becoming SCEPTICS. But no\nsooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a\nsuperior principle, to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of\nthings, but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds concerning those\nthings which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors\nof sense do from all parts discover themselves to our view; and,\nendeavouring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn into\nuncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and\ngrow upon us as we advance in speculation, till at length, having\nwandered through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we\nwere, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism.\n\n2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or the\nnatural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is said, the\nfaculties we have are few, and those designed by nature for the SUPPORT\nand comfort of life, and not to penetrate into the INWARD ESSENCE and\nconstitution of things. Besides, the mind of man being finite, when it\ntreats of things which partake of infinity, it is not to be wondered at\nif it run into absurdities and contradictions, out of which it is\nimpossible it should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of\ninfinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite.\n\n3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault\noriginally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of\nthem. IT IS A HARD THING TO SUPPOSE THAT RIGHT DEDUCTIONS FROM TRUE\nPRINCIPLES SHOULD EVER END IN CONSEQUENCES WHICH CANNOT BE MAINTAINED or\nmade consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully\nwith the sons of men than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge\nwhich he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to\nthe wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appetites it\nmay have implanted in the creatures, doth usually furnish them with such\nmeans as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the\nwhole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of\nthose difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked\nup the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves--that we have\nfirst raised a dust and then complain we cannot see.\n\n4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those\nPrinciples are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and\nuncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects\nof philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance\nincurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation\nof our faculties. And surely it is a work well deserving our pains to\nmake a strict inquiry concerning the First Principles of Human Knowledge,\nto sift and examine them on all sides, especially since there may be some\ngrounds to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which stay and\nembarrass the mind in its search after truth, do not spring from any\ndarkness and intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the\nunderstanding, so much as from false Principles which have been insisted\non, and might have been avoided.\n\n5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I\nconsider how many great and extraordinary men have gone before me in the\nlike designs, yet I am not without some hopes--upon the consideration\nthat the largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is\nshort--sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may,\nperhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far\nbetter eyes.\n\n6. A CHIEF SOURCE OF ERROR IN ALL PARTS OF KNOWLEDGE.--In order to\nprepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving what\nfollows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction,\nconcerning the nature and abuse of Language. But the unravelling this\nmatter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice\nof what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate\nand perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties\nin almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion that the mind\nhas a power of framing ABSTRACT IDEAS or notions of things. He who is\nnot a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers must\nneeds acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract\nideas. These are in a more especial manner thought to be the object of\nthose sciences which go by the name of LOGIC and METAPHYSICS, and of all\nthat which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime\nlearning, in all which one shall scarce find any question handled in such\na manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is\nwell acquainted with them.\n\n7. PROPER ACCEPTATION OF ABSTRACTION.--It is agreed on all hands that the\nqualities or modes of things do never REALLY EXIST EACH OF THEM APART BY\nITSELF, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and\nblended together, several in the same object. But, we are told, the mind\nbeing able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other\nqualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to itself\nabstract ideas. For example, there is perceived by sight an object\nextended, coloured, and moved: this mixed or compound idea the mind\nresolving into its simple, constituent parts, and viewing each by itself,\nexclusive of the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour,\nand motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without\nextension; but only that the mind can frame to itself by ABSTRACTION the\nidea of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of both\ncolour and extension.\n\n8. OF GENERALIZING [Note].--Again, the mind having observed that in the\nparticular extensions perceived by sense there is something COMMON and\nalike IN ALL, and some other things peculiar, as this or that figure or\nmagnitude, which distinguish them one from another; it considers apart or\nsingles out by itself that which is common, making thereof a most abstract\nidea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, nor has any\nfigure or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded from all these. So\nlikewise the mind, by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by\nsense that which distinguishes them one from another, and retaining that\nonly which is COMMON TO ALL, makes an idea of colour in abstract which is\nneither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate colour. And,\nin like manner, by considering motion abstractedly not only from the body\nmoved, but likewise from the figure it describes, and all particular\ndirections and velocities, the abstract idea of motion is framed; which\nequally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may be\nperceived by sense.\n\n[Note: Vide Reid, on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay V,\nchap iii. sec. 1, edit. 1843]\n\n9. OF COMPOUNDING.--And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of\nqualities or MODES, so does it, by the same precision or mental\nseparation, attain abstract ideas of the more compounded BEINGS\nwhich include several coexistent qualities. For example, the mind\nhaving observed that Peter, James, and John resemble each other\nin certain common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves\nout of the complex or compounded idea it has of Peter, James, and\nany other particular man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining\nonly what is common to all, and so makes an abstract idea wherein\nall the particulars equally partake--abstracting entirely from\nand cutting off all those circumstances and differences which might\ndetermine it to any particular existence. And after this manner it is\nsaid we come by the abstract idea of MAN, or, if you please, humanity, or\nhuman nature; wherein it is true there is included colour, because there\nis no man but has some colour, but then it can be neither white, nor\nblack, nor any particular colour, because there is no one particular\ncolour wherein all men partake. So likewise there is included stature,\nbut then it is neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet middle\nstature, but something abstracted from all these. And so of the rest.\nMoreover, their being a great variety of other creatures that partake in\nsome parts, but not all, of the complex idea of MAN, the mind, leaving\nout those parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only which\nare common to all the living creatures, frames the idea of ANIMAL, which\nabstracts not only from all particular men, but also all birds, beasts,\nfishes, and insects. The constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal\nare body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By BODY is meant body\nwithout any particular shape or figure, there being no one shape or\nfigure common to all animals, without covering, either of hair, or\nfeathers, or scales, &c., nor yet naked: hair, feathers, scales, and\nnakedness being the distinguishing properties of particular animals, and\nfor that reason left out of the ABSTRACT IDEA. Upon the same account the\nspontaneous motion must be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping; it\nis nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is it is not easy to\nconceive[Note.].\n\n[Note: Vide Hobbes' Tripos, ch. v. sect. 6.]\n\n10. TWO OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF ABSTRACT IDEAS.--Whether\nothers have this wonderful faculty of ABSTRACTING THEIR IDEAS,\nthey best can tell: for myself, I find indeed I have a faculty of\nimagining, or representing to myself, the ideas of those particular\nthings I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them.\nI can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to\nthe body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by\nitself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then\nwhatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and\ncolour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of\na white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a\nlow, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive\nthe abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me to\nform the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which\nis neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may\nbe said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I\nown myself able to abstract IN ONE SENSE, as when I consider some\nparticular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though\nthey are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist\nwithout them. But I deny that I can abstract from one another, or\nconceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist\nso separated; or that I can frame a general notion, by abstracting from\nparticulars in the manner aforesaid--which last are the two proper\nacceptations of ABSTRACTION. And there are grounds to think most men will\nacknowledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men which are\nsimple and illiterate never pretend to ABSTRACT NOTIONS. It is said\nthey are difficult and not to be attained without pains and study; we may\ntherefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are confined\nonly to the learned.\n\n11. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in DEFENCE OF THE DOCTRINE\nOF ABSTRACTION, and try if I can discover what it is that inclines the\nmen of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote from common sense as\nthat seems to be. There has been a late deservedly esteemed philosopher\nwho, no doubt, has given it very much countenance, by seeming to think\nthe having abstract general ideas is what puts the widest difference in\npoint of understanding betwixt man and beast. \"The having of general\nideas,\" saith he, \"is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man\nand brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no\nmeans attain unto. For, it is evident we observe no foot-steps in them of\nmaking use of general signs for universal ideas; from which we have\nreason to imagine that they have not the FACULTY OF ABSTRACTING, or\nmaking general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other\ngeneral signs.\" And a little after: \"Therefore, I think, we may suppose\nthat it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from men,\nand it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and\nwhich at last widens to so wide a distance. For, if they have any ideas\nat all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them), we cannot\ndeny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do,\nsome of them, in certain instances reason as that they have sense; but it\nis only in particular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses.\nThey are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have\nnot (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of\nABSTRACTION.\" Essay on Human Understanding, II. xi. 10 and 11. I readily\nagree with this learned author, that the faculties of brutes can by no\nmeans attain to ABSTRACTION. But then if this be made the distinguishing\nproperty of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of those that pass\nfor men must be reckoned into their number. The reason that is here\nassigned why we have no grounds to think brutes have abstract general\nideas is, that we observe in them no use of words or any other general\nsigns; which is built on this supposition--that the making use of words\nimplies the having general ideas. From which it follows that men who use\nlanguage are able to ABSTRACT or GENERALIZE their ideas. That this is the\nsense and arguing of the author will further appear by his answering the\nquestion he in another place puts: \"Since all things that exist are only\nparticulars, how come we by general terms?\" His answer is: \"Words become\ngeneral by being made the signs of general ideas.\"--Essay on Human\nUnderstanding, IV. iii. 6. But [Note. 1] it seems that a word becomes\ngeneral by being made the sign, not of an ABSTRACT general idea, but of\nseveral particular ideas [Note. 2], any one of which it indifferently\nsuggests to the mind. For example, when it is said \"the change of motion\nis proportional to the impressed force,\" or that \"whatever has extension\nis divisible,\" these propositions are to be understood of motion\nand extension in general; and nevertheless it will not follow that\nthey suggest to my thoughts an idea of motion without a body moved,\nor any determinate direction and velocity, or that I must conceive\nan abstract general idea of extension, which is neither line, surface,\nnor solid, neither great nor small, black, white, nor red, nor of any\nother determinate colour. It is only implied that whatever particular\nmotion I consider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular,\nhorizontal, or oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning\nit holds equally true. As does the other of every particular extension,\nit matters not whether line, surface, or solid, whether of this or\nthat magnitude or figure.\n\n[Note 1: \"TO THIS I CANNOT ASSENT, BEING OF OPINION,\" edit of 1710.]\n\n[Note 2: Of the same sort.]\n\n12. EXISTENCE OF GENERAL IDEAS ADMITTED.--By observing how ideas\nbecome general we may the better judge how words are made so.\nAnd here it is to be noted that I do not deny absolutely there\nare general ideas, but only that there are any ABSTRACT GENERAL\nIDEAS; for, in the passages we have quoted wherein there is\nmention of general ideas, it is always supposed that they are formed by\nABSTRACTION, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9. Now, if we\nwill annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can\nconceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which, considered\nin itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or\nstand for all other particular ideas of the SAME SORT. To make this plain\nby an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of\ncutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line\nof an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular line, is\nnevertheless with regard to its signification general, since, as it is\nthere used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; so that what\nis demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words,\nof a line in general. And, as that particular line becomes general by\nbeing made a sign, so the name LINE, which taken absolutely is\nPARTICULAR, by being a sign is made GENERAL. And as the former owes its\ngenerality not to its being the sign of an abstract or general line, but\nof ALL PARTICULAR right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter must\nbe thought to derive its generality from the same cause, namely, the\nVARIOUS PARTICULAR lines which it indifferently denotes. [Note.]\n\n[Note: \"I look upon this (doctrine) to be one of the greatest and most\nvaluable discoveries that have been made of late years in the republic\nof letters.\"--Treatise of Human Nature, book i, part i, sect. 7. Also\nStewart's Philosophy of the Mind, part i, chapt. iv. sect. iii. p. 99.]\n\n13. ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS NECESSARY, ACCORDING TO LOCKE.--To give\nthe reader a yet clearer view of the nature of abstract ideas,\nand the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one more\npassage out of the Essay on Human Understanding, (IV. vii. 9) which is as\nfollows: \"ABSTRACT IDEAS are not so obvious or easy to children or the\nyet unexercised mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men it\nis only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For, when\nwe nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that general ideas are\nfictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them,\nand do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For\nexample, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general\nidea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract,\ncomprehensive, and difficult); for it must be neither oblique nor\nrectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but ALL AND\nNONE of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot\nexist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and INCONSISTENT\nideas are put together. It is true the mind in this imperfect state has\nneed of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the\nCONVENIENCY OF COMMUNICATION AND ENLARGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE, to both which\nit is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect\nsuch ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this is enough to show\nthat the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is\nfirst and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest knowledge\nis conversant about.\"--If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind\nsuch an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend\nto dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is that\nthe reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such\nan idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task for anyone to\nperform. What more easy than for anyone to look a little into his own\nthoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea\nthat shall correspond with the description that is here given of the\ngeneral idea of a triangle, which is NEITHER OBLIQUE NOR RECTANGLE,\nEQUILATERAL, EQUICRURAL NOR SCALENON, BUT ALL AND NONE OF THESE AT ONCE?\n\n14. BUT THEY ARE NOT NECESSARY FOR COMMUNICATION.--Much is here\nsaid of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with them, and\nthe pains and skill requisite to the forming them. And it is on\nall hands agreed that there is need of great toil and labour of the mind,\nto emancipate our thoughts from particular objects, and raise them to\nthose sublime speculations that are conversant about abstract ideas. From\nall which the natural consequence should seem to be, that so DIFFICULT a\nthing as the forming abstract ideas was not necessary for COMMUNICATION,\nwhich is so EASY and familiar to ALL SORTS OF MEN. But, we are told, if\nthey seem obvious and easy to grown men, IT IS ONLY BECAUSE BY CONSTANT\nAND FAMILIAR USE THEY ARE MADE SO. Now, I would fain know at what time it\nis men are employed in surmounting that difficulty, and furnishing\nthemselves with those necessary helps for discourse. It cannot be when\nthey are grown up, for then it seems they are not conscious of any such\npainstaking; it remains therefore to be the business of their childhood.\nAnd surely the great and multiplied labour of framing abstract notions\nwill be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to\nimagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of their\nsugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till they\nhave first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed in\ntheir minds ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS, and annexed them to every common name\nthey make use of?\n\n15. NOR FOR THE ENLARGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE.--Nor do I think them\na whit more needful for the ENLARGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE than for\nCOMMUNICATION. It is, I know, a point much insisted on, that\nall knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to\nwhich I fully agree: but then it doth not appear to me that those notions\nare formed by ABSTRACTION in the manner PREMISED--UNIVERSALITY, so far as\nI can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, POSITIVE nature or\nconception of anything, but in the RELATION it bears to the particulars\nsignified or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things,\nnames, or notions, being in their own nature PARTICULAR, are rendered\nUNIVERSAL. Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition concerning triangles,\nit is to be supposed that I have in view the universal idea of a\ntriangle; which ought not to be understood as if I could frame an idea of\na triangle which was neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural;\nbut only that the particular triangle I consider, whether of this or that\nsort it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all rectilinear\ntriangles whatsoever, and is in that sense UNIVERSAL. All which seems\nvery plain and not to include any difficulty in it.\n\n16. OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But here it will be demanded, HOW WE CAN KNOW ANY\nPROPOSITION TO BE TRUE OF ALL PARTICULAR TRIANGLES, EXCEPT we have first\nseen it DEMONSTRATED OF THE ABSTRACT IDEA OF A TRIANGLE which equally\nagrees to all? For, because a property may be demonstrated to agree to\nsome one particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally\nbelongs to any other triangle, which in all respects is not the same with\nit. For example, having demonstrated that the three angles of an isosceles\nrectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I cannot therefore\nconclude this affection agrees to all other triangles which have neither\na right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore that, to be certain\nthis proposition is universally true, we must either make a particular\ndemonstration for every particular triangle, which is impossible, or once\nfor all demonstrate it of the ABSTRACT IDEA OF A TRIANGLE, in which all\nthe particulars do indifferently partake and by which they are all\nequally represented. To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in\nview whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an\nisosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate length, I\nmay nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear\ntriangles, of what sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the\nright angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at\nall concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have in view\nincludes all these particulars, but then there is not the least mention\nmade of them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said the three\nangles are equal to two right ones, because one of them is a right angle,\nor because the sides comprehending it are of the same length. Which\nsufficiently shows that the right angle might have been oblique, and the\nsides unequal, and for all that the demonstration have held good. And for\nthis reason it is that I conclude that to be true of any obliquangular or\nscalenon which I had demonstrated of a particular right--angled\nequicrural triangle, and not because I demonstrated the proposition of\nthe abstract idea of a triangle And here it must be acknowledged that a\nman may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the\nparticular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far he\nmay abstract; but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract,\ngeneral, inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may consider\nPeter so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal without framing the\nfore-mentioned abstract idea, either of man or of animal, inasmuch as all\nthat is perceived is not considered.\n\n17. ADVANTAGE OF INVESTIGATING THE DOCTRINE OF ABSTRACT GENERAL\nIDEAS.--It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the\nSCHOOLMEN, those great masters of abstraction, through all the manifold\ninextricable labyrinths of error and dispute which their doctrine of\nabstract natures and notions seems to have led them into. What bickerings\nand controversies, and what a learned dust have been raised about those\nmatters, and what mighty advantage has been from thence derived to\nmankind, are things at this day too clearly known to need being insisted\non. And it had been well if the ill effects of that doctrine were\nconfined to those only who make the most avowed profession of it. When\nmen consider the great pains, industry, and parts that have for so many\nages been laid out on the cultivation and advancement of the sciences,\nand that notwithstanding all this the far greater part of them remains\nfull of darkness and uncertainty, and disputes that are like never to\nhave an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by the most\nclear and cogent demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which are\nperfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men, and that, taking\nall together, a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit\nto mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion and\namusement--I say the consideration of all this is apt to throw them into\na despondency and perfect contempt of all study. But this may perhaps\ncease upon a view of the false principles that have obtained in the\nworld, amongst all which there is none, methinks, has a more wide and\nextended sway over the thoughts of speculative men than [Note.] this of\nabstract general ideas.\n\n[Note: \"That we have been endeavouring to overthrow.\"--Edit 1710.]\n\n18. I come now to consider the SOURCE OF THIS PREVAILING NOTION, and that\nseems to me to be LANGUAGE. And surely nothing of less extent than reason\nitself could have been the source of an opinion so universally received.\nThe truth of this appears as from other reasons so also from the plain\nconfession of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas, who acknowledge that\nthey are made in order to naming; from which it is a clear consequence\nthat if there had been no such things as speech or universal signs there\nnever had been any thought of abstraction. See III. vi. 39, and elsewhere\nof the Essay on Human Understanding. Let us examine the manner wherein\nwords have contributed to the origin of that mistake.--First\n[Vide sect. xix.] then, it is thought that every name has, or\nought to have, ONE ONLY precise and settled signification, which\ninclines men to think there are certain ABSTRACT, DETERMINATE IDEAS\nthat constitute the true and only immediate signification of each\ngeneral name; and that it is by the mediation of these abstract\nideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing.\nWhereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and definite\nsignification annexed to any general name, they all signifying\nindifferently a great number of particular ideas. All which doth\nevidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly appear\nto anyone by a little reflexion. To this it will be OBJECTED that every\nname that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain\nsignification. For example, a TRIANGLE is defined to be A PLAIN SURFACE\nCOMPREHENDED BY THREE RIGHT LINES, by which that name is limited to\ndenote one certain idea and no other. To which I answer, that in the\ndefinition it is not said whether the surface be great or small, black or\nwhite, nor whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal, nor\nwith what angles they are inclined to each other; in all which there may\nbe great variety, and consequently there is NO ONE SETTLED IDEA which\nlimits the signification of the word TRIANGLE. It is one thing for to\nkeep a name constantly to the same definition, and another to make it\nstand everywhere for the same idea; the one is necessary, the other\nuseless and impracticable.\n\n19. SECONDLY, But, to give a farther account how WORDS came to PRODUCE THE\nDOCTRINE OF ABSTRACT IDEAS, it must be observed that it is a received\nopinion that language has NO OTHER END but the communicating our ideas,\nand that every significant name stands for an idea. This being so, and it\nbeing withal certain that names which yet are not thought altogether\ninsignificant do not always mark out PARTICULAR conceivable ideas, it is\nstraightway concluded that THEY STAND FOR ABSTRACT NOTIONS. That there are\nmany names in use amongst speculative men which do not always suggest to\nothers determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what\nnobody will deny. And a little attention will discover that it is not\nnecessary (even in the strictest reasonings) significant names which\nstand for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the\nunderstanding the ideas they are made to stand for--in reading and\ndiscoursing, names being for the most part used as letters are in\nALGEBRA, in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter,\nyet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter\nsuggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to\nstand for.[Note.]\n\n[Note: Language has become the source or origin of abstract general ideas\non account of a twofold error.--(1.) That every word has only one\nsignification. (2.) That the only end of language is the communication\nof our ideas--Ed.]\n\n20. SOME OF THE ENDS OF LANGUAGE.--Besides, the communicating of ideas\nmarked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is\ncommonly supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some\npassion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting\nthe mind in some particular disposition--to which the former is\nin many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted,\nwhen these can be obtained without it, as I think does not unfrequently\nhappen in the familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to\nreflect with himself, and see if it doth not often happen, either in\nhearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred,\nadmiration, disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind upon the\nperception of certain words, without any ideas coming between. At first,\nindeed, the words might have occasioned ideas that were fitting to\nproduce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that,\nwhen language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds or sight\nof the characters is oft immediately attended with those passions which\nat first were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas that are\nnow quite omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with the promise\nof a GOOD THING, though we have not an idea of what it is? Or is not the\nbeing threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we\nthink not of any particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to\nourselves an idea of danger in abstract? If any one shall join ever so\nlittle reflexion of his own to what has been said, I believe that it will\nevidently appear to him that general names are often used in the\npropriety of language without the speaker's designing them for marks of\nideas in his own, which he would have them raise in the mind of the\nhearer. Even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken with a\ndesign to bring into our view the ideas of those individuals that are\nsupposed to be marked by them. For example, when a schoolman tells me\n\"Aristotle has said it,\" all I conceive he means by it is to dispose me\nto embrace his opinion with the deference and submission which custom has\nannexed to that name. And this effect is often so instantly produced in\nthe minds of those who are accustomed to resign their judgment to\nauthority of that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea either of his\nperson, writings, or reputation should go before [Note.]. Innumerable\nexamples of this kind may be given, but why should I insist on those\nthings which every one's experience will, I doubt not, plentifully\nsuggest unto him?\n\n[Note: \"So close and immediate a connection may custom establish betwixt\nthe very word ARISTOTLE, and the motions of assent and reverence\nin the minds of some men.\"--Edit 1710.]\n\n21. CAUTION IN THE USE OF LANGUAGE NECESSARY.--We have, I think,\nshown the impossibility of ABSTRACT IDEAS. We have considered\nwhat has been said for them by their ablest patrons; and endeavored\nto show they are of no use for those ends to which they are thought\nnecessary. And lastly, we have traced them to the source from\nwhence they flow, which appears evidently to be language.--It cannot be\ndenied that words are of excellent use, in that by their means all that\nstock of knowledge which has been purchased by the joint labours of\ninquisitive men in all ages and nations may be drawn into the view and\nmade the possession of one single person. But at the same time it must be\nowned that most parts of knowledge have been strangely perplexed and\ndarkened by the abuse of words, and general ways of speech wherein they\nare delivered.[Note 1.] Since therefore words are so apt to impose on the\nunderstanding[Note 2.], whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to\ntake them bare and naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts so far\nas I am able, those names which long and constant use has so strictly\nunited with them; from which I may expect to derive the following\nadvantages:\n\n[Note 1: \"That it may almost be made a question, whether language\nhas contributed more to the hindrance or advancement of the\nsciences.\"--Edit 1710.]\n\n[Note 2: \"I am resolved in my inquiries to make as little use of them\nas possibly I can.\"--Edit 1710.]\n\n22. FIRST, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies PURELY\nVERBAL--the springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences has\nbeen a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound knowledge.\nSECONDLY, this seems to be a sure way to extricate myself out of that\nfine and subtle net of ABSTRACT IDEAS which has so miserably perplexed\nand entangled the minds of men; and that with this peculiar circumstance,\nthat by how much the finer and more curious was the wit of any man, by so\nmuch the deeper was he likely to be ensnared and faster held therein.\nTHIRDLY, so long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas divested of\nwords, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider,\nI clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an\nidea which I have not. It is not possible for me to imagine that any of\nmy own ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so. To discern the\nagreements or disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what ideas\nare included in any compound idea and what not, there is nothing more\nrequisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my own\nunderstanding.\n\n23. But the attainment of all THESE ADVANTAGES doth PRESUPPOSE AN ENTIRE\nDELIVERANCE FROM THE DECEPTION OF WORDS, which I dare hardly promise\nmyself; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an union so early begun,\nand confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas. Which\ndifficulty seems to have been very much increased by the doctrine of\nABSTRACTION. For, so long as men thought abstract ideas were annexed to\ntheir words, it doth not seem strange that they should use words for\nideas--it being found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word, and\nRETAIN THE ABSTRACT IDEA IN THE MIND, WHICH IN ITSELF WAS PERFECTLY\nINCONCEIVABLE. This seems to me the principal cause why those men who\nhave so emphatically recommended to others the laying aside all use of\nwords in their meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas, have yet\nfailed to perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of\nthe absurd opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out of the\nabuse of words. And, in order to remedy these evils, they advise well,\nthat we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from\nthe words which signify them. But, how good soever this advice may be\nthey have given others, it is plain they could not have a due regard to\nit themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate use of words\nwas to signify ideas, and that the immediate signification of every\ngeneral name was a DETERMINATE ABSTRACT IDEA.\n\n24. But, THESE BEING KNOWN TO BE MISTAKES, A MAN MAY with greater ease\nPREVENT HIS BEING IMPOSED ON BY WORDS. He that knows he has no other than\nparticular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and\nconceive the abstract idea annexed to any name. And he that knows names\ndo not always stand for ideas will spare himself the labour of looking\nfor ideas where there are none to be had. It were, therefore, to be\nwished that everyone would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear\nview of the ideas he would consider, separating from them all that dress\nand incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind the judgment\nand divide the attention. In vain do we extend our view into the heavens\nand pry into the entrails of the earth, in vain do we consult the\nwritings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity--we\nneed only draw the curtain of words, to hold the fairest tree of\nknowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand.\n\n25. Unless we take care TO CLEAR THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE FROM\nTHE embarras and DELUSION OF WORDS, we may make infinite reasonings upon\nthem to no purpose; we may draw consequences from consequences, and be\nnever the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose ourselves the more\nirrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes.\nWhoever therefore designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him to\nmake my words the occasion of his own thinking, and endeavour to attain\nthe same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them. By this\nmeans it will be easy for him to discover the truth or falsity of what I\nsay. He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words, and I do\nnot see how he can be led into an error by considering his own naked,\nundisguised ideas.\n\n\n\n\nOF THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE\n\n\n1. OBJECTS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.--It is evident to any one who takes a\nsurvey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either IDEAS\nactually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by\nattending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas\nformed by help of memory and imagination--either compounding, dividing,\nor barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.\nBy sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees\nand variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion\nand resistance, and of all these more and less either as to quantity or\ndegree. Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes; and\nhearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and\ncomposition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each\nother, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one\nthing. Thus, for example a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and\nconsistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one\ndistinct thing, signified by the name APPLE. Other collections of ideas\nconstitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things--which\nas they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love,\nhatred, joy, grief, and so forth.\n\n2. MIND--SPIRIT--SOUL.--But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or\nobjects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives\nthem, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering,\nabout them. This perceiving, active being is what I call MIND, SPIRIT,\nSOUL, or MYSELF. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a\nthing entirely distinct from them, WHEREIN THEY EXIST, or, which is the\nsame thing, whereby they are perceived--for the existence of an idea\nconsists in being perceived.\n\n3. HOW FAR THE ASSENT OF THE VULGAR CONCEDED.--That neither our thoughts,\nnor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist WITHOUT the mind,\nis what EVERYBODY WILL ALLOW. And it seems no less evident that the\nvarious sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended\nor combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose),\ncannot exist otherwise than IN a mind perceiving them. I think an\nintuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by any one that shall\nattend to WHAT IS MEANT BY THE TERM EXIST, when applied to sensible\nthings. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel\nit; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed--meaning\nthereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other\nspirit actually does perceive it.[Note.] There was an odour, that is, it\nwas smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure,\nand it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand\nby these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute\nexistence of unthinking things without any relation to their being\nperceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their ESSE is PERCIPI,\nnor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or\nthinking things which perceive them.\n\n[Note: First argument in support of the author's theory.]\n\n4. THE VULGAR OPINION INVOLVES A CONTRADICTION.--It is indeed\nan opinion STRANGELY prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains,\nrivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence,\nnatural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the\nunderstanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever\nthis principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in\nhis heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to\ninvolve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the fore-mentioned\nobjects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we PERCEIVE\nBESIDES OUR OWN IDEAS OR SENSATIONS? and is it not plainly repugnant that\nany one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?\n\n5. CAUSE OF THIS PREVALENT ERROR.--If we thoroughly examine this\ntenet it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine\nof ABSTRACT IDEAS. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction\nthan to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their\nbeing perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived?\nLight and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures--in a\nword the things we see and feel--what are they but so many sensations,\nnotions, ideas, or impressions on the sense? and is it possible to\nseparate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I\nmight as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in my\nthoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which, perhaps\nI never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I imagine the trunk of a\nhuman body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without\nthinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not deny, I can abstract--if\nthat may properly be called ABSTRACTION which extends only to the\nconceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist or\nbe actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does\nnot extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence,\nas it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual\nsensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my\nthoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or\nperception of it.[Note.]\n\n[Note: \"In truth the object and the sensation are the same thing, and\ncannot therefore be abstracted from each other--Edit 1710.\"]\n\n6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need\nonly open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be,\nviz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word\nall those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not\nany subsistence without a mind, that their BEING (ESSE) is to be perceived\nor known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by\nme, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other CREATED SPIRIT, they\nmust either have no existence at all, OR ELSE SUBSIST IN THE MIND OF SOME\nETERNAL SPIRIT--it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the\nabsurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an\nexistence independent of a spirit [Note.]. To be convinced of which, the\nreader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the\nbeing of a sensible thing from its being perceived.\n\n[Note: \"To make this appear with all the light and evidence of an axiom,\nit seems sufficient if I can but awaken the reflection of the reader,\nthat he may take an impartial view of his own meaning, and in turn his\nthoughts upon the subject itself, free and disengaged from all embarrass\nof words and prepossession in favour of received mistakes.\"--Edit 1710]\n\n7. SECOND ARGUMENT.[Note.]--From what has been said it follows there is\nNOT ANY OTHER SUBSTANCE THAN SPIRIT, or that which perceives. But, for the\nfuller proof of this point, let it be considered the sensible qualities\nare colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, etc., i.e. the ideas perceived\nby sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a\nmanifest contradiction, for TO HAVE AN IDEA IS ALL ONE AS TO PERCEIVE;\nthat therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities exist must\nperceive them; hence it is clear there can be no UNTHINKING substance or\nSUBSTRATUM of those ideas.\n\n[Note: Vide sect. iii. and xxv.]\n\n8. OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not\nexist without the mind, yet there may be things LIKE them, whereof they\nare copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an\nunthinking substance. I ANSWER, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a\ncolour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we\nlook but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible\nfor us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask\nwhether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas\nare the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If\nthey are, THEN THEY ARE IDEAS and we have gained our point; but if you say\nthey are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour\nis like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which\nis intangible; and so of the rest.\n\n9. THE PHILOSOPHICAL NOTION OF MATTER INVOLVES A CONTRADICTION.--Some\nthere are who make a DISTINCTION betwixt PRIMARY and SECONDARY\nqualities. By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest,\nsolidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all\nother sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The\nideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of\nanything existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have\nour ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things\nwhich exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call\nMATTER. By MATTER, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseless\nsubstance, in which extension, figure, and motion DO ACTUALLY SUBSIST.\nBut it is evident from what we have already shown, that extension,\nfigure, and motion are ONLY IDEAS EXISTING IN THE MIND, and that an idea\ncan be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they\nnor their archetypes can exist in an UNPERCEIVING substance. Hence, it is\nplain that the very notion of what is called MATTER or CORPOREAL\nSUBSTANCE, involves a contradiction in it.[Note.]\n\n[Note: \"Insomuch that I should not think it necessary to spend more time\nin exposing its absurdity. But because the tenet of the existence of\nmatter seems to have taken so deep a root in the minds of philosophers,\nand draws after it so many ill consequences, I choose rather to be\nthought prolix and tedious, than omit anything that might conduce to\nthe full discovery and extirpation of the prejudice.\"--Edit 1710.]\n\n10. ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM.--They who assert that figure, motion, and the\nrest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind in\nunthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours,\nsounds, heat cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not--which they\ntell us are sensations existing IN THE MIND ALONE, that depend on and are\noccasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute\nparticles of matter. This they take for an undoubted truth, which they can\ndemonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that those\noriginal qualities ARE INSEPARABLY UNITED WITH THE OTHER SENSIBLE\nQUALITIES, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted\nfrom them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind.\nBut I desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by any\nabstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a\nbody without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see\nevidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body\nextended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other\nsensible quality which is ACKNOWLEDGED to exist only in the mind. In\nshort, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other\nqualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible\nqualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere\nelse.\n\n11. A SECOND ARGUMENT AD HOMINEM.--Again, GREAT and SMALL, SWIFT and SLOW,\nARE ALLOWED TO EXIST NOWHERE WITHOUT THE MIND, being entirely\nRELATIVE, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of\nsense varies. The extension therefore which exists without the\nmind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow,\nthat is, they are nothing at all. But, say you, they are extension\nin general, and motion in general: thus we see how much the tenet\nof extended movable substances existing without the mind depends on\nthe strange doctrine of ABSTRACT IDEAS. And here I cannot but remark how\nnearly the vague and indeterminate description of Matter or corporeal\nsubstance, which the modern philosophers are run into by their own\nprinciples, resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of\nMATERIA PRIMA, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers. Without\nextension solidity cannot be conceived; since therefore it has been shown\nthat extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the same must also\nbe true of solidity.\n\n12. That NUMBER is entirely THE CREATURE OF THE MIND, even though the\nother qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever\nconsiders that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as\nthe mind views it with different respects. Thus, the same extension is\none, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind considers it with\nreference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relative,\nand dependent on men's understanding, that it is strange to think how any\none should give it an absolute existence without the mind. We say one\nbook, one page, one line, etc.; all these are equally units, though some\ncontain several of the others. And in each instance, it is plain, the\nunit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put\ntogether by the mind.\n\n13. UNITY I know some will have to be A SIMPLE OR UNCOMPOUNDED IDEA,\naccompanying all other ideas into the mind. That I have any such idea\nanswering the word UNITY I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could\nnot miss finding it: on the contrary, it should be the most familiar to\nmy understanding, since it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to\nbe perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflexion. To say no more,\nit is an ABSTRACT IDEA.\n\n14. A THIRD ARGUMENT AD HOMINEM.--I shall farther add, that, after\nthe same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible\nqualities to have no existence in Matter, or without the mind,\nthe same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities\nwhatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold are\naffections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings,\nexisting in the corporeal substances which excite them, for that\nthe same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another.\nNow, why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not\npatterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter, because to the\nsame eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at the\nsame station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images of\nanything SETTLED AND DETERMINATE WITHOUT THE MIND? Again, it is proved\nthat SWEETNESS is not really in the sapid thing, because the thing\nremaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a\nfever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say that\nMOTION is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the\nmind become swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower\nwithout any alteration in any external object?\n\n15. NOT CONCLUSIVE AS TO EXTENSION.--In short, let any one consider\nthose arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colours\nand taste exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with\nequal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure,\nand motion. Though it must be confessed this method of arguing\ndoes not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in\nan outward object, as that we do not know by SENSE which is the TRUE\nextension or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing plainly\nshow it to be impossible that any colour or extension at all, or other\nsensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an UNTHINKING subject\nwithout the mind, or in truth, that there should be any such thing as an\noutward object.\n\n16. But let us examine a little the received opinion.--It is said\nEXTENSION is a MODE or accident OF MATTER, and that Matter is the\nSUBSTRATUM that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain to me\nwhat is meant by Matter's SUPPORTING extension. Say you, I have no idea\nof Matter and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have no\npositive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, you must at least have a\nrelative idea of Matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must be\nsupposed to know what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant\nby its supporting them. It is evident SUPPORT cannot here be taken in\nits usual or literal sense--as when we say that pillars support a\nbuilding; in what sense therefore must it be taken? [Note.]\n\n[Note: \"For my part, I am not able to discover any sense at all that can\nbe applicable to it.\"--Edit 1710.]\n\n17. PHILOSOPHICAL MEANING OF \"MATERIAL SUBSTANCE\" DIVISIBLE INTO TWO\nPARTS.--If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare\nthemselves to mean by MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, we shall find them acknowledge\nthey have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of BEING\nIN GENERAL, together WITH THE RELATIVE NOTION OF ITS SUPPORTING\nACCIDENTS. The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract\nand incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting accidents,\nthis, as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common\nsense of those words; it must therefore be taken in some other sense, but\nwhat that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the TWO PARTS\nor branches which make the signification of the words MATERIAL SUBSTANCE,\nI am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why\nshould we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material\nSUBSTRATUM or support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities?\nDoes it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not\nthis a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?\n\n18. THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL BODIES WANTS PROOF.--But, though it\nwere possible that solid, figured, movable substances may exist\nwithout the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies,\nyet HOW IS IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO KNOW THIS? Either we must know it by\nsense or by reason. As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge ONLY\nOF OUR SENSATIONS, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived\nby sense, call them what you will: but they do not inform us that things\nexist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are\nperceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains\ntherefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it\nmust be by REASON, inferring their existence from what is immediately\nperceived by sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the\nexistence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the\nvery patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is ANY NECESSARY\nCONNEXION BETWIXT THEM AND OUR IDEAS? I say it is granted on all hands\n(and what happens in dreams, phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond\ndispute) that IT IS POSSIBLE WE MIGHT BE AFFECTED WITH ALL THE IDEAS WE\nHAVE NOW, THOUGH THERE WERE NO BODIES EXISTING WITHOUT RESEMBLING THEM.\nHence, it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary\nfor the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced\nsometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the same order, we\nsee them in at present, without their concurrence.\n\n19.  THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL BODIES AFFORDS NO EXPLICATION OF THE\nMANNER IN WHICH OUR IDEAS ARE PRODUCED.--But, though we might possibly\nhave all our sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought\nEASIER to conceive and explain the MANNER of their production,\nby supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise;\nand so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies\nthat excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said;\nfor, though we give the materialists their external bodies, they\nby their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas\nare produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in\nwhat manner BODY CAN ACT UPON SPIRIT, or how it is possible it should\nimprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production of ideas\nor sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose Matter\nor corporeal substances, SINCE THAT IS ACKNOWLEDGED TO REMAIN EQUALLY\nINEXPLICABLE WITH OR WITHOUT THIS SUPPOSITION. If therefore it were\npossible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so,\nmust needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without\nany reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings THAT ARE\nENTIRELY USELESS, AND SERVE TO NO MANNER OF PURPOSE.\n\n20. DILEMMA.--In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we\nshould ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very\nsame reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose--what no one\ncan deny possible--an intelligence without the help of external bodies, to\nbe affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are,\nimprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask\nwhether that intelligence has not all the reason to believe the\nexistence of corporeal substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting\nthem in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same\nthing? Of this there can be no question--which one consideration were\nenough to make any reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever\narguments be may think himself to have, for the existence of bodies\nwithout the mind.\n\n21. Were it necessary to add any FURTHER PROOF AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF\nMATTER after what has been said, I could instance several of those errors\nand difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from that\ntenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in\nphilosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. But I shall\nnot enter into the detail of them in this place, as well because I think\narguments A POSTERIORI are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I\nmistake not, sufficiently demonstrated A PRIORI, as because I shall\nhereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them.\n\n22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly prolix in\nhandling this subject. For, to what purpose is it to dilate on that which\nmay be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one\nthat is capable of the least reflexion? It is but looking into your own\nthoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound,\nor figure, or motion, or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived.\nThis easy trial may perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a\ndownright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon\nthis issue:--If you can but CONCEIVE it possible for one extended movable\nsubstance, or, in general, for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to\nexist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the\ncause. And, as for all that COMPAGES of external bodies you contend for,\nI shall grant you its existence, THOUGH (1.) YOU CANNOT EITHER GIVE ME ANY\nREASON WHY YOU BELIEVE IT EXISTS [Vide sect. lviii.], OR (2.) ASSIGN ANY\nUSE TO IT WHEN IT IS SUPPOSED TO EXIST [Vide sect. lx.]. I say, the bare\npossibility of your opinions being true shall pass for an argument that\nit is so. [Note: i.e. although your argument be deficient in the two\nrequisites of an hypothesis.--Ed.]\n\n23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine\ntrees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody\nby to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it;\nbut what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind\ncertain ideas which you call BOOKS and TREES, and the same time omitting\nto frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? BUT DO NOT YOU\nYOURSELF PERCEIVE OR THINK OF THEM ALL THE WHILE? This therefore is\nnothing to the purpose; it only shows you have the power of imagining or\nforming ideas in your mind: but it does not show that you can conceive it\npossible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make\nout this, IT IS NECESSARY THAT YOU CONCEIVE THEM EXISTING UNCONCEIVED OR\nUNTHOUGHT OF, WHICH IS A MANIFEST REPUGNANCY. When we do our utmost to\nconceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only\ncontemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is\ndeluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or\nwithout the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or\nexist in itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth\nand evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on\nany other proofs against the existence of material substance.\n\n24. THE ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OF UNTHINKING THINGS ARE WORDS WITHOUT\nA MEANING.--It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our thoughts,\nto know whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by the\nABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OF SENSIBLE OBJECTS IN THEMSELVES, OR WITHOUT THE MIND.\nTo me it is evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or\nelse nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier or\nfairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own\nthoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those\nexpressions does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for the\nconviction. It is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the\nABSOLUTE existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning, or\nwhich include a contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and\nearnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader.\n\n25. THIRD ARGUMENT.[Note: Vide sect. iii. and vii.]--REFUTATION\nOF LOCKE.--All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we\nperceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly\ninactive--there is nothing of power or agency included in them. So that\nONE IDEA or object of thought CANNOT PRODUCE or make ANY ALTERATION IN\nANOTHER. To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else\nrequisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they and every\npart of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in\nthem but what is perceived: but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether\nof sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or activity;\nthere is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little\nattention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies\npassiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an\nidea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything:\nneither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is\nevident from sect. 8. Whence it plainly follows that extension,\nfigure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say,\ntherefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting from the\nconfiguration, number, motion, and size of corpuscles, must certainly\nbe false. [Note: Vide sect. cii.]\n\n26. CAUSE OF IDEAS.--We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are\nanew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore\nsome cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and\nchanges them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination\nof ideas, is clear from the preceding section. It must therefore be a\nsubstance; but it has been shown that there is no corporeal or material\nsubstance: it remains therefore that the CAUSE OF IDEAS is an incorporeal\nactive substance or Spirit.\n\n27. NO IDEA OF SPIRIT.--A spirit is one simple, undivided, active\nbeing--as it perceives ideas it is called the UNDERSTANDING, and as it\nproduces or otherwise operates about them it is called the WILL. Hence\nthere can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever,\nbeing passive and inert (vide sect. 25), they cannot represent unto us,\nby way of image or LIKENESS, that which acts. A little attention will make\nit plain to any one, that to have an idea which shall be like that active\nprinciple of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is\nthe nature of SPIRIT, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself\nperceived, BUT ONLY BY THE EFFECTS WHICH IT PRODUCETH. If any man shall\ndoubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try\nif he can frame the idea of any power or active being, and whether he has\nideas of two principal powers, marked by the names WILL and UNDERSTANDING,\ndistinct from each other as well as from a third idea of Substance or\nBeing in general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the\nsubject of the aforesaid powers--which is signified by the name SOUL or\nSPIRIT. This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words\nWILL [Note: \"Understanding, mind.\"--Edit 1710.], SOUL, SPIRIT, do not stand\nfor different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something\nwhich is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be\nlike unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. Though it must be owned\nat the same time that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the\noperations of the mind: such as willing, loving, hating--inasmuch as we\nknow or understand the meaning of these words.\n\n28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift\nthe scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and\nstraightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power\nit is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of\nideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain\nand grounded on experience; but when we think of unthinking agents or of\nexciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with words.\n\n29. IDEAS OF SENSATION DIFFER FROM THOSE OF REFLECTION OR MEMORY.--But,\nwhatever power I may have over MY OWN thoughts, I find the ideas\nactually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When\nin broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether\nI shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present\nthemselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other\nsenses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There\nis THEREFORE SOME OTHER WILL OR SPIRIT that PRODUCES THEM.\n\n30. LAWS OF NATURE.--The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and\nDISTINCT than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness,\norder, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are\nthe effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series,\nthe admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and\nbenevolence of its Author. Now THE SET RULES OR ESTABLISHED METHODS\nWHEREIN THE MIND WE DEPEND ON EXCITES IN US THE IDEAS OF SENSE, ARE CALLED\nTHE LAWS OF NATURE; and these we learn by experience, which teaches us\nthat such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in\nthe ordinary course of things.\n\n31. KNOWLEDGE OF THEM NECESSARY FOR THE CONDUCT OF WORLDLY AFFAIRS.--This\ngives us a sort of foresight which enables us to regulate our\nactions for the benefit of life. And without this we should be eternally\nat a loss; we could not know how to act anything that might procure us\nthe least pleasure, or remove the least pain of sense. That food\nnourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; that to sow in the\nseed-time is the way to reap in the harvest; and in general that to\nobtain such or such ends, such or such means are conducive--all this we\nknow, NOT BY DISCOVERING ANY NECESSARY CONNEXION BETWEEN OUR IDEAS, but\nonly by the observation of the settled laws of nature, without which we\nshould be all in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more know\nhow to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born.\n\n32. And yet THIS consistent UNIFORM WORKING, which so evidently displays\nthe goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constitutes\nthe laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that it\nrather SENDS THEM A WANDERING AFTER SECOND CAUSES. For, when we perceive\ncertain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other ideas and WE KNOW\nTHIS IS NOT OF OUR OWN DOING, we forthwith attribute power and agency to\nthe ideas themselves, and make one the cause of another, than which\nnothing can be more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having\nobserved that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure\nwe at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called HEAT,\nwe do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like\nmanner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended with\nsound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect of the former.\n\n33. OF REAL THINGS AND IDEAS OR CHIMERAS.--The ideas imprinted on the\nSenses by the Author of nature are called REAL THINGS; and those\nexcited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant,\nare more properly termed IDEAS, or IMAGES OF THINGS, which they\ncopy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid\nand distinct, are nevertheless IDEAS, that is, they exist in the\nmind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing.\nThe ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to\nbe more (1)STRONG, (2)ORDERLY, and (3)COHERENT than the creatures of the\nmind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are\nalso (4)LESS DEPENDENT ON THE SPIRIT [Note: Vide sect. xxix.--Note.],\nor thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by\nthe will of another and more powerful spirit; yet still they are IDEAS,\nand certainly no IDEA, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than\nin a mind perceiving it.\n\n34. FIRST GENERAL OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Before we proceed any farther\nit is necessary we spend some time in answering objections which\nmay probably be made against the principles we have hitherto laid\ndown. In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to those of quick\napprehensions, I hope it may be pardoned, since all men do not\nequally apprehend things of this nature, and I am willing to be\nunderstood by every one.\n\nFIRST, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles ALL\nTHAT IS REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL IN NATURE IS BANISHED OUT OF THE WORLD, and\ninstead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place. All things that\nexist, exist only in the mind, that is, they are purely notional. What\ntherefore becomes of the sun, moon and stars? What must we think of\nhouses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies?\nAre all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy? To all\nwhich, and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I ANSWER, that\nby the principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in\nnature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or anywise conceive or understand\nremains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a RERUM\nNATURA, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its\nfull force. This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have\nshown what is meant by REAL THINGS in opposition to CHIMERAS or ideas of\nour own framing; but then they both equally exist in the mind, and in\nthat sense they are alike IDEAS.\n\n35. THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER, AS UNDERSTOOD BY PHILOSOPHERS,\nDENIED.[Vide sect. lxxxiv.]--I do not argue against the existence of\nany one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflexion.\nThat the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist,\nreally exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose\nexistence we deny IS THAT WHICH PHILOSOPHERS CALL MATTER or corporeal\nsubstance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the rest\nof mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist indeed\nwill want the colour of an empty name to support his impiety; and\nthe Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great handle for\ntrifling and disputation.\n\n36. READILY EXPLAINED.--If any man thinks this detracts from the existence\nor reality of things, he is very far from understanding what has been\npremised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here an\nabstract of what has been said:--There are spiritual substances,\nminds, or human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves at\npleasure; but these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of\nothers they perceive by sense--which, being impressed upon them\naccording to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the\neffects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. These\nlatter are said to have more REALITY in them than the former:--by\nwhich is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct,\nand that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them. And\nin this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I\nimagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here given of\nREALITY it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general\neach part of the mundane system, is as much a REAL BEING by our\nprinciples as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the term\nREALITY different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own\nthoughts and see.\n\n37. THE PHILOSOPHIC, NOT THE VULGAR SUBSTANCE, TAKEN AWAY.--I will\nbe urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take\naway all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word\nSUBSTANCE be taken in the vulgar sense--for a combination of sensible\nqualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like--this we\ncannot be accused of taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophic\nsense--for the SUPPORT of accidents or QUALITIES WITHOUT THE MIND--then\nindeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take\naway that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination.\n\n38. But, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink\nideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so--the word\nIDEA not being used in common discourse to signify the several\ncombinations of sensible qualities which are called THINGS; and it is\ncertain that any expression which varies from the familiar use of\nlanguage will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern the\ntruth of the proposition, which in other words is no more than to say, we\nare fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by\nour senses. The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure,\nor suchlike qualities, which combined together constitute the several\nsorts of victuals and apparel, have been shown to exist only in the mind\nthat perceives them; and this is all that is meant by calling them IDEAS;\nwhich word if it was as ordinarily used as THING, would sound no harsher\nnor more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing about the propriety,\nbut the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree with me that we\neat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense, which\ncannot exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall readily grant it is\nmore proper or conformable to custom that they should be called things\nrather than ideas.\n\n39. THE TERM IDEA PREFERABLE TO THING.--If it be demanded why I make\nuse of the word IDEA, and do not rather in compliance with custom\ncall them THINGS. I answer, I do it for two reasons:--first, because\nthe term THING in contra-distinction to IDEA, is generally supposed\nto denote somewhat existing without the mind; secondly, because\nTHING has a more comprehensive signification than IDEA, including\nSPIRIT or thinking things as well as IDEAS. Since therefore the\nobjects of sense exist only in the mind, and are withal thoughtless\nand inactive, I chose to mark them by the word IDEA, which implies\nthose properties.\n\n40. THE EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES NOT DISCREDITED.--But, say what we can,\nsome one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still believe his\nsenses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible soever,\nto prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so; assert the evidence\nof sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the same.\nThat what I see, hear, and feel DOTH EXIST, THAT IS to say, IS PERCEIVED\nBY ME, I no more doubt than I do of my own being. But I do not see how\nthe testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of\nanything which is not perceived by sense. We are not for having any man\nturn SCEPTIC and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give them all\nthe stress and assurance imaginable; nor are there any principles more\nopposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down [Note.], as shall be\nhereafter clearly shown.\n\n[Note: They extirpate the very root of scepticism, \"the fallacy\nof the senses.\"--Ed.]\n\n41. SECOND OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Secondly, it will be OBJECTED\nthat there is a great difference betwixt real fire for instance,\nand the idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt,\nand actually being so: if you suspect it to be only the idea of\nfire which you see, do but put your hand into it and you will be\nconvinced with a witness. This and the like may be urged in opposition\nto our tenets. To all which the ANSWER is evident from what has\nbeen already said; and I shall only add in this place, that if real\nfire be very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain\nthat it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, and yet\nnobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in an\nunperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than its idea.\n\n42. THIRD OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Thirdly, it will be objected that\nwe see things actually without or at distance from us, and which\nconsequently do not exist in the mind; it being absurd that those\nthings which are seen at the distance of several miles should be\nas near to us as our own thoughts. In answer to this, I desire it\nmay be considered that in a DREAM we do oft perceive things as\nexisting at a great distance off, and yet for all that, those things\nare acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind.\n\n43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth while to\nconsider how it is that we perceive distance and things placed at a\ndistance by sight. For, that we should in truth see EXTERNAL space, and\nbodies actually existing in it, some nearer, others farther off, seems to\ncarry with it some opposition to what has been said of their existing\nnowhere without the mind. The consideration of this difficulty it was\nthat gave birth to my \"Essay towards a New Theory of Vision,\" which was\npublished not long since, wherein it is shown (1) that DISTANCE or outness\nis NEITHER IMMEDIATELY of itself PERCEIVED by sight, nor yet apprehended\nor judged of by lines and angles, or anything that has a necessary\nconnexion with it; but (2) that it is ONLY SUGGESTED to our thoughts by\ncertain visible ideas and sensations attending vision, which in their own\nnature have no manner of similitude or relation either with distance or\nthings placed at a distance; but, by a connexion taught us BY EXPERIENCE,\nthey come to signify and suggest them to us, after the same manner that\nWORDS of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for;\ninsomuch that a man BORN blind and afterwards made to see, would not, at\nfirst sight, think the things he saw to be without his mind, or at any\ndistance from him. See sect. 41 of the fore-mentioned treatise.\n\n44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely distinct and\nheterogeneous. THE FORMER ARE MARKS AND PROGNOSTICS OF THE LATTER. That\nthe proper objects of sight neither exist without mind, nor are the\nimages of external things, was shown even in that treatise. Though\nthroughout the same the contrary be supposed true of tangible\nobjects--not that to suppose that vulgar error was necessary for\nestablishing the notion therein laid down, but because it was beside my\npurpose to examine and refute it in a discourse concerning VISION. So\nthat in strict truth the ideas of sight, when we apprehend by them\ndistance and things placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark out to\nus things ACTUALLY existing at a distance, but only admonish us what\nideas of touch will be imprinted in our minds at such and such distances\nof time, and in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say,\nevident from what has been said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise,\nand in sect. 147 and elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that\nvisible ideas are the Language whereby the governing Spirit on whom we\ndepend informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in\ncase we excite this or that motion in our own bodies. But for a fuller\ninformation in this point I refer to the Essay itself.\n\n45. FOURTH OBJECTION, FROM PERPETUAL ANNIHILATION AND\nCREATION.--ANSWER.--Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing\nprinciples it follows things are every moment annihilated and created\nanew. The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees\ntherefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer than\nwhile there is somebody by to perceive them. Upon SHUTTING MY EYES all\nthe furniture in the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening\nthem it is again created. In ANSWER to all which, I refer the reader to\nwhat has been said in sect. 3, 4, &c., and desire he will consider\nwhether he means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct\nfrom its being perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could\nmake, I am not able to discover that anything else is meant by those\nwords; and I once more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts, and\nnot suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If he can conceive it\npossible either for his ideas or their archetypes to exist without being\nperceived, then I give up the cause; but if he cannot, he will\nacknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of he knows\nnot what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity the not assenting\nto those propositions which at bottom have no meaning in them.\n\n46. ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM.--It will not be amiss to observe how far\nthe received principles of philosophy are themselves chargeable\nwith those pretended absurdities. (1) It is thought strangely absurd\nthat upon closing my eyelids all the visible objects around me\nshould be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what philosophers\ncommonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands that light and\ncolours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight,\nare mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived?\n(2)Again, it may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things should\nbe every moment creating, yet this very notion is commonly taught in the\nschools. For the SCHOOLMEN, though they acknowledge the existence of\nMatter, and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are\nnevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine\nconservation, which by them is expounded to be a continual creation.\n\n47. (3) Further, a little thought will discover to us that though we allow\nthe existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will unavoidably\nfollow, FROM THE PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE NOW GENERALLY ADMITTED, that the\nPARTICULAR bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them exist whilst they\nare not perceived. For, it is evident from sect. II and the following\nsections, that the Matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehensible\nsomewhat, WHICH HAS NONE OF THOSE PARTICULAR QUALITIES WHEREBY THE\nBODIES FALLING UNDER OUR SENSES ARE DISTINGUISHED ONE FROM ANOTHER.\n(2) But, to make this more plain, it must be remarked that the infinite\ndivisibility of Matter is now universally allowed, at least by the most\napproved and considerable philosophers, who on the received principles\ndemonstrate it beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there is an\ninfinite number of parts in each particle of Matter which are not\nperceived by sense. The reason therefore that any particular body seems\nto be of a finite magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of parts to\nsense, is, not because it contains no more, since in itself it contains\nan infinite number of parts, BUT BECAUSE THE SENSE IS NOT ACUTE ENOUGH TO\nDISCERN THEM. In proportion therefore as the sense is rendered more\nacute, it perceives a greater number of parts in the object, that is, the\nobject appears greater, and its figure varies, those parts in its\nextremities which were before unperceivable appearing now to bound it in\nvery different lines and angles from those perceived by an obtuser sense.\nAnd at length, after various changes of size and shape, when the sense\nbecomes infinitely acute the body shall seem infinite. During all which\nthere is no alteration in the body, but only in the sense. EACH BODY\nTHEREFORE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, IS INFINITELY EXTENDED, AND CONSEQUENTLY\nVOID OF ALL SHAPE OR FIGURE. From which it follows that, though we should\ngrant the existence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is withal as\ncertain, the materialists themselves are by their own principles forced\nto acknowledge, that neither the particular bodies perceived by sense,\nnor anything like them, exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each\nparticle thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless, AND IT IS\nTHE MIND THAT FRAMES ALL THAT VARIETY OF BODIES WHICH COMPOSE THE VISIBLE\nWORLD, ANY ONE WHEREOF DOES NOT EXIST LONGER THAN IT IS PERCEIVED.\n\n48. If we consider it, the objection proposed in sect. 45 will not be\nfound reasonably charged on the principles we have premised, so as in\ntruth to make any objection at all against our notions. For, though we\nhold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which\ncannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have no\nexistence except only while they are perceived by US, since THERE MAY BE\nSOME OTHER SPIRIT THAT PERCEIVES THEM THOUGH WE DO NOT. Wherever bodies\nare said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood\nto mean this or that particular mind, but ALL MINDS WHATSOEVER. It does\nnot therefore follow from the foregoing principles that bodies are\nannihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during the\nintervals between our perception of them.\n\n49. FIFTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Fifthly, it may perhaps be OBJECTED\nthat if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows\nthat the mind is extended and figured; since extension is a mode or\nattribute which (to speak with the schools) is predicated of the\nsubject in which it exists. I ANSWER, (1) Those qualities are in the\nmind ONLY AS THEY ARE PERCEIVED BY IT--that is, not by way of MODE\nor ATTRIBUTE, but only by way of IDEA; and it no more follows the\nsoul or mind is extended, because extension exists in it alone,\nthan it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are ON\nALL HANDS acknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere else. (2) As to what\nphilosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless and\nunintelligible. For instance, in this proposition \"a die is hard,\nextended, and square,\" they will have it that the word die denotes a\nsubject or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure\nwhich are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot\ncomprehend: to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things\nwhich are termed its modes or accidents. And, to say a die is hard,\nextended, and square is not to attribute those qualities to a subject\ndistinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning\nof the word DIE.\n\n50. SIXTH OBJECTION, FROM NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.--ANSWER.--Sixthly,\nyou will say there have been a great many things explained by\nmatter and motion; take away these and you destroy the whole\ncorpuscular philosophy, and undermine those mechanical principles which\nhave been applied with so much success to account for the PHENOMENA. In\nshort, whatever advances have been made, either by ancient or modern\nphilosophers, in the study of nature do all proceed on the supposition\nthat corporeal substance or Matter doth really exist. To this I ANSWER\nthat there is not any one PHENOMENON explained on that supposition which\nmay not as well be explained without it, as might easily be made appear\nby an INDUCTION OF PARTICULARS. To explain the PHENOMENA, is all one as\nto show why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected with such and\nsuch ideas. But (1) how Matter should operate on a Spirit, or produce any\nidea in it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it is\ntherefore evident there can be no use of Matter in natural philosophy.\nBesides, (2) they who attempt to account for things do it not by CORPOREAL\nSUBSTANCE, but by figure, motion, and other qualities, which are in truth\nno more than mere ideas, and, therefore, cannot be the cause of anything,\nas has been already shown. See sect. 25.\n\n51. SEVENTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Seventhly, it will upon this be\ndemanded whether it does not seem ABSURD TO TAKE AWAY NATURAL CAUSES,\nAND ASCRIBE EVERYTHING TO THE IMMEDIATE OPERATION OF SPIRITS? We\nmust no longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water\ncools, but that a Spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be\ndeservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I ANSWER,\nhe would so; in such things we ought to THINK WITH THE LEARNED,\nAND SPEAK WITH THE VULGAR. They who to demonstration are convinced\nof the truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say \"the sun\nrises,\" \"the sun sets,\" or \"comes to the meridian\"; and if they\naffected a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt appear\nvery ridiculous. A little reflexion on what is here said will make it\nmanifest that the common use of language would receive no manner of\nalteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenets.\n\n52. IN THE ORDINARY AFFAIRS OF LIFE, ANY PHRASES MAY BE RETAINED, so long\nas they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in such a\nmanner as is necessary for our WELL-BEING, how false soever they may be\nif taken in a strict and SPECULATIVE SENSE. Nay, this is unavoidable,\nsince, propriety being regulated by CUSTOM, language is suited to the\nRECEIVED opinions, which are not always the truest. Hence it is\nimpossible, even in the most rigid, philosophic reasonings, so far to\nalter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak, as never to give a\nhandle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. But, a\nfair and ingenuous reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenor\nand connexion of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate\nmodes of speech which use has made inevitable.\n\n53. As to the OPINION THAT THERE ARE NO CORPOREAL CAUSES, this has been\nheretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by\nothers among the modern philosophers, who though they allow Matter to\nexist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all\nthings. These men saw that amongst all the objects of sense there was\nnone which had any power or activity included in it; and that by\nconsequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies they supposed to\nexist without the mind, like unto the immediate objects of sense. But\nthen, that they should suppose an innumerable multitude of created\nbeings, which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one\neffect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose,\nsince God might have done everything as well without them: this I say,\nthough we should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable and\nextravagant supposition.\n\n54. EIGHTH OBJECTION.--TWOFOLD ANSWER.--In the eighth place, the\nuniversal concurrent assent of mankind may be thought by some\nan invincible argument in behalf of Matter, or the existence of\nexternal things. Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken?\nAnd if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant\nan error? I answer, FIRST, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will\nnot perhaps be found so many as is imagined do really believe the\nexistence of Matter or things without the mind. Strictly speaking, to\nbelieve that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it, is\nimpossible; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort, I\nrefer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one sense,\nindeed, men may be said to believe that Matter exists, that is, they ACT\nas if the immediate cause of their sensations, which affects them every\nmoment, and is so nearly present to them, were some senseless unthinking\nbeing. But, that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by\nthose words, and form thereof a settled SPECULATIVE opinion, is what I am\nnot able to conceive. This is not the only instance wherein men impose\nupon themselves, by imagining they believe those propositions which they\nhave often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them.\n\n55. But SECONDLY, though we should grant a notion to be never so\nuniversally and steadfastly adhered to, yet this is weak argument of its\ntruth to whoever considers what a vast number of prejudices and false\nopinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, by the\nunreflecting (which are the far greater) part of mankind. There was a\ntime when the antipodes and motion of the earth were looked upon as\nmonstrous absurdities even by men of learning: and if it be considered\nwhat a small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find\nthat at this day those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable\nfooting in the world.\n\n56. NINTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But it is demanded that we assign\nA CAUSE OF THIS PREJUDICE, and account for its obtaining in the\nworld. To this I ANSWER, that men knowing they perceived several\nideas, WHEREOF THEY THEMSELVES WERE NOT THE AUTHORS--as not being\nexcited from within nor depending on the operation of their wills--this\nmade them maintain those ideas, or objects of perception had an\nEXISTENCE INDEPENDENT OF AND WITHOUT THE MIND, without ever dreaming\nthat a contradiction was involved in those words. But, philosophers\nhaving plainly seen that the immediate objects of perception do\nnot exist without the mind, THEY IN SOME DEGREE CORRECTED the\nmistake of the vulgar; but at the same time run into another which\nseems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really\nexisting without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from being\nperceived, OF WHICH OUR IDEAS ARE ONLY IMAGES or resemblances, imprinted\nby those objects on the mind. And this notion of the philosophers owes\nits origin to the same cause with the former, namely, their being\nconscious that they were not the authors of their own sensations, which\nthey evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which therefore must\nhave some cause distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted.\n\n57. BUT WHY THEY SHOULD SUPPOSE THE IDEAS OF SENSE TO BE EXCITED IN US BY\nTHINGS IN THEIR LIKENESS, and not rather have recourse to SPIRIT which\nalone can act, may be accounted for, FIRST, because they were not aware\nof the repugnancy there is, (1) as well in supposing things like unto our\nideas existing without, as in (2) attributing to them POWER OR ACTIVITY.\nSECONDLY, because the Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in our\nminds, is not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite\ncollection of sensible ideas, as human agents are by their size,\ncomplexion, limbs, and motions. And thirdly, because His operations are\nregular and uniform. Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by a\nmiracle, men are ready to own the presence of a superior agent. But, when\nwe see things go on in the ordinary course they do not excite in us any\nreflexion; their order and concatenation, though it be an argument of the\ngreatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their creator, is yet so constant\nand familiar to us that we do not think them the immediate effects of a\nFree Spirit; especially since inconsistency and mutability in acting,\nthough it be an imperfection, is looked on as a mark of freedom.\n\n58. TENTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Tenthly, it will be objected that\nthe notions we advance are inconsistent with several sound truths\nin philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion of the earth\nis now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on\nthe clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing\nprinciples, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only an\nidea, it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not; but the\nmotion of the earth is not perceived by sense. I answer, that tenet,\nif rightly understood, will be found to agree with the principles\nwe have premised; for, the question whether the earth moves or no\namounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have\nreason to conclude, from what has been observed by astronomers, that\nif we were placed in such and such circumstances, and such or such a\nposition and distance both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the\nformer to move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all\nrespects like one of them; and this, by the established rules of nature\nwhich we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the\nphenomena.\n\n59. We may, from the experience we have had of the train and succession\nof ideas in our minds, often make, I will not say uncertain conjectures,\nbut sure and well--grounded predictions concerning the ideas we shall be\naffected with pursuant to a great train of actions, and be enabled to\npass a right judgment of what would have appeared to us, in case we were\nplaced in circumstances very different from those we are in at present.\nHerein consists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve its use and\ncertainty very consistently with what has been said. It will be easy to\napply this to whatever objections of the like sort may be drawn from the\nmagnitude of the stars, or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature.\n\n60. ELEVENTH OBJECTION.--In the eleventh place, it will be demanded\nto what purpose serves that curious organization of plants, and the\nanimal mechanism in the parts of animals; might not vegetables grow,\nand shoot forth leaves of blossoms, and animals perform all their\nmotions as well without as with all that variety of internal parts\nso elegantly contrived and put together; which, being ideas, have\nnothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary connexion\nwith the effects ascribed to them? If it be a Spirit that immediately\nproduces every effect by a fiat or act of his will, we must think all\nthat is fine and artificial in the works, whether of man or nature,\nto be made in vain. By this doctrine, though an artist has made the\nspring and wheels, and every movement of a watch, and adjusted them\nin such a manner as he knew would produce the motions he designed,\nyet he must think all this done to no purpose, and that it is an\nIntelligence which directs the index, and points to the hour of the\nday. If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the\npains of making the movements and putting them together? Why does not an\nempty case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass that\nwhenever there is any fault in the going of a watch, there is some\ncorresponding disorder to be found in the movements, which being mended\nby a skilful hand all is right again? The like may be said of all the\nclockwork of nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle\nas scarce to be discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will be\nasked, how, upon our principles, any tolerable account can be given, or\nany final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies and\nmachines, framed with the most exquisite art, which in the common\nphilosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain\nabundance of phenomena?\n\n61. ANSWER.--To all which I answer, first, that though there were some\ndifficulties relating to the administration of Providence, and the uses\nby it assigned to the several parts of nature, which I could not solve by\nthe foregoing principles, yet this objection could be of small weight\nagainst the truth and certainty of those things which may be proved a\npriori, with the utmost evidence and rigor of demonstration. Secondly,\nbut neither are the received principles free from the like difficulties;\nfor, it may still be demanded to what end God should take those\nroundabout methods of effecting things by instruments and machines, which\nno one can deny might have been effected by the mere command of His will\nwithout all that apparatus; nay, if we narrowly consider it, we shall\nfind the objection may be retorted with greater force on those who hold\nthe existence of those machines without of mind; for it has been made\nevident that solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like have no\nactivity or efficacy in them, so as to be capable of producing any one\neffect in nature. See sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes them to exist\n(allowing the supposition possible) when they are not perceived does it\nmanifestly to no purpose; since the only use that is assigned to them, as\nthey exist unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable effects\nwhich in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit.\n\n62. (FOURTHLY.)--But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed\nthat though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not\nabsolutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary\nto the producing of things in a constant regular way according to\nthe laws of nature. There are certain general laws that run through\nthe whole chain of natural effects; these are learned by the observation\nand study of nature, and are by men applied as well to the framing\nartificial things for the use and ornament of life as to the\nexplaining various phenomena--which explication consists only in\nshowing the conformity any particular phenomenon has to the general\nlaws of nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering the\nuniformity there is in the production of natural effects; as will\nbe evident to whoever shall attend to the several instances wherein\nphilosophers pretend to account for appearances. That there is a\ngreat and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods of\nworking observed by the Supreme Agent has been shown in sect. 31.\nAnd it is no less visible that a particular size, figure, motion,\nand disposition of parts are necessary, though not absolutely to\nthe producing any effect, yet to the producing it according to the\nstanding mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot be\ndenied that God, or the Intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary\ncourse of things, might if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all\nthe motions on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the\nmovements and put them in it: but yet, if He will act agreeably to the\nrules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends established and maintained in\nthe creation, it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker,\nwhereby he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the\nproduction of the aforesaid motions; as also that any disorder in them be\nattended with the perception of some corresponding disorder in the\nmovements, which being once corrected all is right again.\n\n63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the Author of\nnature display His overruling power in producing some appearance out of\nthe ordinary series of things. Such exceptions from the general rules of\nnature are proper to surprise and awe men into an acknowledgement of the\nDivine Being; but then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is\na plain reason why they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems to\nchoose the convincing our reason of His attributes by the works of\nnature, which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make, and\nare such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author,\nrather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being by anomalous and\nsurprising events.\n\n64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe that what\nhas been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no more than\nthis:--ideas are not anyhow and at random produced, there being a certain\norder and connexion between them, like to that of cause and effect; there\nare also several combinations of them made in a very regular and\nartificial manner, which seem like so many instruments in the hand of\nnature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes, have a secret\noperation in producing those appearances which are seen on the theatre of\nthe world, being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the\nphilosopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to what\npurpose is that connexion? And, since those instruments, being barely\ninefficacious perceptions in the mind, are not subservient to the\nproduction of natural effects, it is demanded why they are made; or, in\nother words, what reason can be assigned why God should make us, upon a\nclose inspection into His works, behold so great variety of ideas so\nartfully laid together, and so much according to rule; it not being\ncredible that He would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of all\nthat art and regularity to no purpose.\n\n65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of ideas does\nnot imply the relation of cause and effect, but only of a mark or sign\nwith the thing signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of the\npain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of\nit. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this or\nthat motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof.\nSecondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is,\nartificial and regular combinations, is the same with that for combining\nletters into words. That a few original ideas may be made to signify a\ngreat number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be variously\ncombined together. And, to the end their use be permanent and universal,\nthese combinations must be made by rule, and with wise contrivance. By\nthis means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning what\nwe are to expect from such and such actions and what methods are proper\nto be taken for the exciting such and such ideas; which in effect is all\nthat I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said that, by\ndiscerning a figure, texture, and mechanism of the inward parts of\nbodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to know the several\nuses and properties depending thereon, or the nature of the thing.\n\n66. PROPER EMPLOYMENT OF THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHER.--Hence, it is evident\nthat those things which, under the notion of a cause co-operating\nor concurring to the production of effects, are altogether inexplicable,\nand run us into great absurdities, may be very naturally explained,\nand have a proper and obvious use assigned to them, when they are\nconsidered only as marks or signs for our information. And it is\nthe searching after and endeavouring to understand those signs\ninstituted by the Author of Nature, that ought to be the employment of\nthe natural philosopher; and not the pretending to explain things by\ncorporeal causes, which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the\nminds of men from that active principle, that supreme and wise Spirit \"in\nwhom we live, move, and have our being.\"\n\n67. TWELFTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--In the twelfth place, it may perhaps\nbe objected that--though it be clear from what has been said that\nthere can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid,\nfigured, movable substance existing without the mind, such as\nphilosophers describe Matter--yet, if any man shall leave out of\nhis idea of matter the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity\nand motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert,\nsenseless substance, that exists without the mind or unperceived,\nwhich is the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is\npleased to excite ideas in us: it doth not appear but that Matter taken\nin this sense may possibly exist. In answer to which I say, first, that\nit seems no less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents, than it\nis to suppose accidents without a substance. But secondly, though we\nshould grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it\nbe supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind is agreed; and that it\nexists not in place is no less certain--since all place or extension\nexists only in the mind, as has been already proved. It remains\ntherefore that it exists nowhere at all.\n\n68. MATTER SUPPORTS NOTHING, AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ITS EXISTENCE.--Let us\nexamine a little the description that is here given us of\nmatter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived; for this is all\nthat is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance;\nwhich is a definition entirely made up of negatives, excepting only the\nrelative notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it must be\nobserved that it supports nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to\nthe description of a nonentity I desire may be considered. But, say you,\nit is the unknown occasion, at the presence of which ideas are excited in\nus by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything can be present\nto us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion, nor capable\nof producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor has any\nform, nor exists in any place. The words \"to be present,\" when thus\napplied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning, and\nwhich I am not able to comprehend.\n\n69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion. So far as I can\ngather from the common use of language, that word signifies either the\nagent which produces any effect, or else something that is observed to\naccompany or go before it in the ordinary course of things. But when it\nis applied to Matter as above described, it can be taken in neither of\nthose senses; for Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot\nbe an agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoid\nof all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our\nperceptions in the latter sense: as when the burning my finger is said to\nbe the occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant\nby calling matter an occasion? The term is either used in no sense at\nall, or else in some very distant from its received signification.\n\n70. You will Perhaps say that Matter, though it be not perceived by us,\nis nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting\nideas in our minds. For, say you, since we observe our sensations to be\nimprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable to\nsuppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of their being\nproduced. That is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct\nparcels of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not\nexcite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as being\naltogether passive and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to God,\nby whom they art perceived, as it were so many occasions to remind Him\nwhen and what ideas to imprint on our minds; that so things may go on in\na constant uniform manner.\n\n71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter is here\nstated, the question is no longer concerning the existence of a thing\ndistinct from Spirit and idea, from perceiving and being perceived; but\nwhether there are not certain ideas of I know not what sort, in the mind\nof God which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to produce\nsensations in our minds in a constant and regular method--much after the\nsame manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce\nthat harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a tune,\nthough they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be\nentirely ignorant of them. But, this notion of Matter seems too\nextravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in effect no\nobjection against what we have advanced, viz. that there is no senseless\nunperceived substance.\n\n72. THE ORDER OF OUR PERCEPTIONS SHOWS THE GOODNESS OF GOD, BUT\nAFFORDS NO PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER.--If we follow the light\nof reason, we shall, from the constant uniform method of our\nsensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who\nexcites them in our minds; but this is all that I can see reasonably\nconcluded from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that the being of a\nspirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful is abundantly sufficient to\nexplain all the appearances of nature. But, as for inert, senseless\nMatter, nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion with it, or\nleads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one explain any the\nmeanest phenomenon in nature by it, or show any manner of reason, though\nin the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for its existence, or\neven make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition. For, as to\nits being an occasion, we have, I think, evidently shown that with regard\nto us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that it must be, if at all,\nthe occasion to God of exciting ideas in us; and what this amounts to we\nhave just now seen.\n\n73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which induced\nmen to suppose the existence of material substance; that so having\nobserved the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons,\nwe may proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded on them.\nFirst, therefore, it was thought that colour, figure, motion, and the\nrest of the sensible qualities or accidents, did really exist without the\nmind; and for this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking\nsubstratum or substance wherein they did exist, since they could not be\nconceived to exist by themselves. Afterwards, in process of time, men\nbeing convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible,\nsecondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped this\nsubstratum or material substance of those qualities, leaving only the\nprimary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike, which they still conceived to\nexist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material\nsupport. But, it having been shown that none even of these can possibly\nexist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them it follows\nthat we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter; nay,\nthat it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing, so long as\nthat word is taken to denote an unthinking substratum of qualities or\naccidents wherein they exist without the mind.\n\n74. But though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that Matter\nwas thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents, and, the reason\nentirely ceasing, one might expect the mind should naturally, and without\nany reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely grounded\nthereon; yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply in our thoughts, that we\ncan scarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since\nthe thing itself is indefensible, at least to retain the name, which we\napply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being, or\noccasion, though without any show of reason, at least so far as I can\nsee. For, what is there on our part, or what do we perceive, amongst all\nthe ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on our minds, either\nby sense or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence of an\ninert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and, on the other hand, on the\npart of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should make us\nbelieve or even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion to excite\nideas in our minds?\n\n75. ABSURDITY OF CONTENDING FOR THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER AS THE OCCASION\nOF IDEAS.--It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice,\nand much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness,\nagainst all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless somewhat, by\nthe interposition whereof it would as it were screen itself from the\nProvidence of God, and remove it farther off from the affairs of the\nworld. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of\nMatter, though, when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our\nopinion on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge\nourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to\nmake out that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is, that there are\ncertain unknown Ideas in the mind of God; for this, if anything, is all\nthat I conceive to be meant by occasion with regard to God. And this at\nthe bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the name.\n\n76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, and\nwhether they may be called by the name Matter, I shall not dispute. But,\nif you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of\nextension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most\nevidently impossible there should be any such thing, since it is a plain\nrepugnancy that those qualities should exist in or be supported by an\nunperceiving substance.\n\n77. THAT A SUBSTRATUM NOT PERCEIVED, MAY EXIST, UNIMPORTANT.--But,\nsay you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless support\nof extension and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive,\nyet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance or\nsubstratum of some other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours\nare to a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to them.\nBut, if we had a new sense, we should possibly no more doubt of their\nexistence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and\ncolours. I answer, first, if what you mean by the word Matter be only the\nunknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there is\nsuch a thing or no, since it no way concerns us; and I do not see the\nadvantage there is in disputing about what we know not what, and we know\nnot why.\n\n78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could only furnish us with\nnew ideas or sensations; and then we should have the same reason against\ntheir existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already offered\nwith relation to figure, motion, colour and the like. Qualities, as has\nbeen shown, are nothing else but sensations or ideas, which exist only in\na mind perceiving them; and this is true not only of the ideas we are\nacquainted with at present, but likewise of all possible ideas\nwhatsoever.\n\n79. But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to believe the\nexistence of Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it or explain\nanything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that word? yet still it\nis no contradiction to say that Matter exists, and that this Matter is in\ngeneral a substance, or occasion of ideas; though indeed to go about to\nunfold the meaning or adhere to any particular explication of those words\nmay be attended with great difficulties. I answer, when words are used\nwithout a meaning, you may put them together as you please without danger\nof running into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that twice two\nis equal to seven, so long as you declare you do not take the words of\nthat proposition in their usual acceptation but for marks of you know not\nwhat. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an inert thoughtless\nsubstance without accidents which is the occasion of our ideas. And we\nshall understand just as much by one proposition as the other.\n\n80. In the last place, you will say, what if we give up the cause of\nmaterial Substance, and stand to it that Matter is an unknown\nsomewhat--neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea, inert,\nthoughtless, indivisible, immovable, unextended, existing in no place.\nFor, say you, whatever may be urged against substance or occasion, or any\nother positive or relative notion of Matter, has no place at all, so\nlong as this negative definition of Matter is adhered to. I answer, you\nmay, if so it shall seem good, use the word \"Matter\" in the same sense as\nother men use \"nothing,\" and so make those terms convertible in your\nstyle. For, after all, this is what appears to me to be the result of\nthat definition, the parts whereof when I consider with attention, either\ncollectively or separate from each other, I do not find that there is any\nkind of effect or impression made on my mind different from what is\nexcited by the term nothing.\n\n81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the fore-said definition is included\nwhat doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing--the positive abstract\nidea of quiddity, entity, or existence. I own, indeed, that those who\npretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as if\nthey had such an idea, which is, say they, the most abstract and general\nnotion of all; that is, to me, the most incomprehensible of all others.\nThat there are a great variety of spirits of different orders and\ncapacities, whose faculties both in number and extent are far exceeding\nthose the Author of my being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny.\nAnd for me to pretend to determine by my own few, stinted narrow inlets\nof perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit\nmay imprint upon them were certainly the utmost folly and\npresumption--since there may be, for aught that I know, innumerable sorts\nof ideas or sensations, as different from one another, and from all that\nI have perceived, as colours are from sounds. But, how ready soever I may\nbe to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension with regard to the\nendless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any\none to pretend to a notion of Entity or Existence, abstracted from spirit\nand idea, from perceived and being perceived, is, I suspect, a downright\nrepugnancy and trifling with words.--It remains that we consider the\nobjections which may possibly be made on the part of Religion.\n\n82. OBJECTIONS DERIVED FROM THE SCRIPTURES ANSWERED.--Some there are\nwho think that, though the arguments for the real existence of\nbodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed not to amount to\ndemonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point as\nwill sufficiently convince every good Christian that bodies do really\nexist, and are something more than mere ideas; there being in Holy Writ\ninnumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber\nand stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies. To which I\nanswer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, which use\nthose and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have a\nmeaning in them, are in danger of having their truth called in question\nby our doctrine. That all those things do really exist, that there are\nbodies, even corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense, has\nbeen shown to be agreeable to our principles; and the difference betwixt\nthings and ideas, realities and chimeras, has been distinctly explained.\nSee sect. 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what\nphilosophers call Matter, or the existence of objects without the mind,\nis anywhere mentioned in Scripture.\n\n83. NO OBJECTION AS TO LANGUAGE TENABLE.--Again, whether there can\nbe or be not external things, it is agreed on all hands that the\nproper use of words is the marking our conceptions, or things only\nas they are known and perceived by us; whence it plainly follows\nthat in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing inconsistent\nwith the right use and significancy of language, and that discourse,\nof what kind soever, so far as it is intelligible, remains undisturbed.\nBut all this seems so manifest, from what has been largely set forth\nin the premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it.\n\n84. But, secondly it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much\nof their stress and import by our principles. What must we think of Moses'\nrod? was it not really turned into a serpent; or was there only a change\nof ideas in the minds of the spectators? And, can it be supposed that our\nSaviour did no more at the marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the\nsight, and smell, and taste of the guests, so as to create in them the\nappearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said of all other\nmiracles; which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must be\nlooked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy. To this I\nreply, that the rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water into\nreal wine. That this does not in the least contradict what I have\nelsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of\nreal and imaginary has been already so plainly and fully explained, and\nso often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily\nanswered from what has gone before, that it were an affront to the\nreader's understanding to resume the explication of it in its place. I\nshall only observe that if at table all who were present should see, and\nsmell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me\nthere could be no doubt of its reality; so that at bottom the scruple\nconcerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on the\nreceived principles, and consequently makes rather for than against what\nhas been said.\n\n85. CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRECEDING TENETS.--Having done with the\nObjections, which I endeavoured to propose in the clearest light,\nand gave them all the force and weight I could, we proceed in the\nnext place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences.\nSome of these appear at first sight--as that several difficult and\nobscure questions, on which abundance of speculation has been\nthrown away, are entirely banished from philosophy. \"Whether\ncorporeal substance can think,\" \"whether Matter be infinitely divisible,\"\nand \"how it operates on spirit\"--these and like inquiries have given\ninfinite amusement to philosophers in all ages; but depending on the\nexistence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our principles.\nMany other advantages there are, as well with regard to religion as the\nsciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce from what has been\npremised; but this will appear more plainly in the sequel.\n\n86. THE REMOVAL OF MATTER GIVES CERTAINTY TO KNOWLEDGE.--From the\nprinciples we have laid down it follows human knowledge may naturally\nbe reduced to two heads--that of ideas and that of spirits. Of each\nof these I shall treat in order.\n\nAnd first as to ideas or unthinking things. Our knowledge of these has\nbeen very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very\ndangerous errors, by supposing a twofold existence of the objects of\nsense--the one intelligible or in the mind, the other real and without\nthe mind; whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural\nsubsistence of their own distinct from being perceived by spirits. This,\nwhich, if I mistake not, has been shown to be a most groundless and\nabsurd notion, is the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as men\nthought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their\nknowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real\nthings, it follows they could not be certain they had any real knowledge\nat all. For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are\nconformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind?\n\n87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as\nso many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing\nin them which is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or\nimages, referred to things or archetypes existing without the mind, then\nare we involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not\nthe real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or\nmotion of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible\nfor us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our\nsenses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or\neven whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really\nexisting in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for\naught we know, all we see, hear, and feel may be only phantom and vain\nchimera, and not at all agree with the real things existing in rerum\nnatura. All this scepticism follows from our supposing a difference\nbetween things and ideas, and that the former have a subsistence without\nthe mind or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, and show\nhow the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition\nof external objects.\n\n88. IF THERE BE EXTERNAL MATTER, NEITHER THE NATURE NOR EXISTENCE\nOF THINGS CAN BE KNOWN.--So long as we attribute a real existence to\nunthinking things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not\nonly impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real\nunthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence it is that we see\nphilosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of the existence of\nheaven and earth, of everything they see or feel, even of their own\nbodies. And, after all their labour and struggle of thought, they\nare forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative\nknowledge of the existence of sensible things. But, all this doubtfulness,\nwhich so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes philosophy\nridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if we annex a meaning\nto our words, and not amuse ourselves with the terms \"absolute,\"\n\"external,\" \"exist,\" and such-like, signifying we know not what. I can as\nwell doubt of my own being as of the being of those things which I\nactually perceive by sense; it being a manifest contradiction that any\nsensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at\nthe same time have no existence in nature, since the very existence of an\nunthinking being consists in being perceived.\n\n89. OF THING OR BEING.--Nothing seems of more importance towards\nerecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be\nproof against the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the beginning\nin a distinct explication of what is meant by thing, reality,\nexistence; for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence\nof things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have\nnot fixed the meaning of those words. Thing or Being is the most\ngeneral name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds entirely\ndistinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the\nname. viz. spirits and ideas. The former are active, indivisible\nsubstances: the latter are inert, fleeting, dependent beings, which\nsubsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds or\nspiritual substances. We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling\nor reflexion, and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have\nsome knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings,\nwhereof in a strict sense we have not ideas. In like manner, we know and\nhave a notion of relations between things or ideas--which relations are\ndistinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be\nperceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that\nideas, spirits, and relations are all in their respective kinds the\nobject of human knowledge and subject of discourse; and that the term\nidea would be improperly extended to signify everything we know or have\nany notion of.\n\n90. EXTERNAL THINGS EITHER IMPRINTED BY OR PERCEIVED BY SOME OTHER\nMIND.--Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really exist;\nthis we do not deny, but we deny they can subsist without the minds which\nperceive them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing\nwithout the mind; since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in\nbeing perceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the\nthings perceived by sense may be termed external, with regard to their\norigin--in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself,\nbut imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them.\nSensible objects may likewise be said to be \"without the mind\" in another\nsense, namely when they exist in some other mind; thus, when I shut my\neyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in another mind.\n\n91. SENSIBLE QUALITIES REAL.--It were a mistake to think that what\nis here said derogates in the least from the reality of things.\nIt is acknowledged, on the received principles, that extension,\nmotion, and in a word all sensible qualities have need of a support,\nas not being able to subsist by themselves. But the objects perceived\nby sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities,\nand consequently cannot subsist by themselves. Thus far it is agreed\non all hand. So that in denying the things perceived by sense an\nexistence independent of a substance of support wherein they may\nexist, we detract nothing from the received opinion of their reality, and\nare guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the difference is that,\naccording to us, the unthinking beings perceived by sense have no\nexistence distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in\nany other substance than those unextended indivisible substances or\nspirits which act and think and perceive them; whereas philosophers\nvulgarly hold that the sensible qualities do exist in an inert, extended,\nunperceiving substance which they call Matter, to which they attribute a\nnatural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or distinct from\nbeing perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the eternal mind of the\nCreator, wherein they suppose only ideas of the corporeal substances\ncreated by him; if indeed they allow them to be at all created.\n\n92. OBJECTIONS OF ATHEISTS OVERTURNED.--For, as we have shown the\ndoctrine of Matter or corporeal substance to have been the main\npillar and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundation\nhave been raised all the impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion.\nNay, so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matter\nproduced out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient\nphilosophers, even of those who maintained the being of a God,\nhave thought Matter to be uncreated and co-eternal with Him. How\ngreat a friend material substance has been to Atheists in all ages were\nneedless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and\nnecessary a dependence on it that, when this corner-stone is once\nremoved, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground, insomuch\nthat it is no longer worth while to bestow a particular consideration on\nthe absurdities of every wretched sect of Atheists.\n\n93. AND OF FATALISTS ALSO.--That impious and profane persons should\nreadily fall in with those systems which favour their inclinations,\nby deriding immaterial substance, and supposing the soul to be\ndivisible and subject to corruption as the body; which exclude all\nfreedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of things,\nand instead thereof make a self--existent, stupid, unthinking\nsubstance the root and origin of all beings; that they should\nhearken to those who deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior\nMind over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series\nof events either to blind chance or fatal necessity arising from\nthe impulse of one body or another--all this is very natural. And,\non the other hand, when men of better principles observe the enemies\nof religion lay so great a stress on unthinking Matter, and all\nof them use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it,\nmethinks they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support,\nand driven from that only fortress, without which your Epicureans,\nHobbists, and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence, but\nbecome the most cheap and easy triumph in the world.\n\n94. OF IDOLATORS.--The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived,\nhas not only been the main support of Atheists and Fatalists,\nbut on the same principle doth Idolatry likewise in all its various\nforms depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars,\nand every other object of the senses are only so many sensations\nin their minds, which have no other existence but barely being\nperceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship their\nown ideas, but rather address their homage to that ETERNAL INVISIBLE MIND\nwhich produces and sustains all things.\n\n95. AND SOCINIANS.--The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with\nthe articles of our faith, has occasioned no small difficulties to\nChristians. For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples and\nobjections have been raised by Socinians and others? But do not the\nmost plausible of them depend on the supposition that a body is\ndenominated the same, with regard not to the form or that which is\nperceived by sense, but the material substance, which remains the\nsame under several forms? Take away this material substance, about\nthe identity whereof all the dispute is, and mean by body what every\nplain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is\nimmediately seen and felt, which is only a combination of sensible\nqualities or ideas, and then their most unanswerable objections\ncome to nothing.\n\n96. SUMMARY OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXPELLING MATTER.--Matter being once\nexpelled out of nature drags with it so many sceptical and impious\nnotions, such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions,\nwhich have been thorns in the sides of divines as well as philosophers,\nand made so much fruitless work for mankind, that if the arguments\nwe have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration\n(as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge,\npeace, and religion have reason to wish they were.\n\n97. Beside the external existence of the objects of perception, another\ngreat source of errors and difficulties with regard to ideal knowledge is\nthe doctrine of abstract ideas, such as it has been set forth in the\nIntroduction. The plainest things in the world, those we are most\nintimately acquainted with and perfectly know, when they are considered\nin an abstract way, appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible.\nTime, place, and motion, taken in particular or concrete, are what\neverybody knows, but, having passed through the hands of a metaphysician,\nthey become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary\nsense. Bid your servant meet you at such a time in such a place, and he\nshall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those words; in\nconceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by which he is\nto get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if time be taken\nexclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that diversify the\nday, merely for the continuation of existence or duration in abstract,\nthen it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it.\n\n98. DILEMMA.--For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea\nof time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows\nuniformly and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in\ninextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all, only I hear\nothers say it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such a manner\nas leads me to entertain odd thoughts of my existence; since that\ndoctrine lays one under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he\npasses away innumerable ages without a thought, or else that he is\nannihilated every moment of his life, both which seem equally absurd.\nTime therefore being nothing, abstracted from the sucession of ideas in\nour minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be\nestimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that\nsame spirit or mind. Hence, it is a plain consequence that the soul\nalways thinks; and in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his\nthoughts, or abstract the existence of a spirit from its cogitation,\nwill, I believe, find it no easy task.\n\n99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and motion from all\nother qualities, and consider them by themselves, we presently lose sight\nof them, and run into great extravagances. All which depend on a twofold\nabstraction; first, it is supposed that extension, for example, may be\nabstracted from all other sensible qualities; and secondly, that the\nentity of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived. But,\nwhoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he says, will, if\nI mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike\nsensations and alike real; that where the extension is, there is the\ncolour, too, i.e., in his mind, and that their archetypes can exist only\nin some other mind; and that the objects of sense are nothing but those\nsensations combined, blended, or (if one may so speak) concreted\ntogether; none of all which can be supposed to exist unperceived.\n\n100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every one may\nthink he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded\nfrom all particular pleasure, or of goodness from everything that is\ngood, this is what few can pretend to. So likewise a man may be just and\nvirtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion\nthat those and the like words stand for general notions, abstracted from\nall particular persons and actions, seems to have rendered morality very\ndifficult, and the study thereof of small use to mankind. And in effect\nthe doctrine of abstraction has not a little contributed towards spoiling\nthe most useful parts of knowledge.\n\n101. OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY AND MATHEMATICS.--The two great provinces\nof speculative science conversant about ideas received from sense,\nare Natural Philosophy and Mathematics; with regard to each of these\nI shall make some observations. And first I shall say somewhat of\nNatural Philosophy. On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph.\nAll that stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties\nand make mankind appear ignorant and low, are drawn principally\nfrom this head, namely, that we are under an invincible blindness\nas to the true and real nature of things. This they exaggerate,\nand love to enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they, by our\nsenses, and amused only with the outside and show of things. The real\nessence, the internal qualities and constitution of every the meanest\nobject, is hid from our view; something there is in every drop of water,\nevery grain of sand, which it is beyond the power of human understanding\nto fathom or comprehend. But, it is evident from what has been shown that\nall this complaint is groundless, and that we are influenced by false\nprinciples to that degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we know\nnothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend.\n\n102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the\nnature of things is the current opinion that everything includes within\nitself the cause of its properties; or that there is in each object an\ninward essence which is the source whence its discernible qualities flow,\nand whereon they depend. Some have pretended to account for appearances\nby occult qualities, but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical\ncauses, to wit, the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, of\ninsensible particles; whereas, in truth, there is no other agent or\nefficient cause than spirit, it being evident that motion, as well as all\nother ideas, is perfectly inert. See sect. 25. Hence, to endeavour to\nexplain the production of colours or sounds, by figure, motion,\nmagnitude, and the like, must needs be labour in vain. And accordingly we\nsee the attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory. Which may be\nsaid in general of those instances wherein one idea or quality is\nassigned for the cause of another. I need not say how many hypotheses and\nspeculations are left out, and how much the study of nature is abridged\nby this doctrine.\n\n103. ATTRACTION SIGNIFIES THE EFFECT, NOT THE MANNER OR CAUSE.--The great\nmechanical principle now in vogue is attraction. That a stone\nfalls to the earth, or the sea swells towards the moon, may to some\nappear sufficiently explained thereby. But how are we enlightened by\nbeing told this is done by attraction? Is it that that word signifies the\nmanner of the tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of bodies\ninstead of their being impelled or protruded towards each other? But,\nnothing is determined of the manner or action, and it may as truly (for\naught we know) be termed \"impulse,\" or \"protrusion,\" as \"attraction.\"\nAgain, the parts of steel we see cohere firmly together, and this also is\naccounted for by attraction; but, in this as in the other instances, I do\nnot perceive that anything is signified besides the effect itself; for as\nto the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the cause which\nproduces it, these are not so much as aimed at.\n\n104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena, and compare them\ntogether, we may observe some likeness and conformity between them. For\nexample, in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the rising of the\nsea towards the moon, in cohesion, crystallization, etc, there is\nsomething alike, namely, an union or mutual approach of bodies. So that\nany one of these or the like phenomena may not seem strange or surprising\nto a man who has nicely observed and compared the effects of nature. For\nthat only is thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself, and out\nof the ordinary course of our observation. That bodies should tend\ntowards the centre of the earth is not thought strange, because it is\nwhat we perceive every moment of our lives. But, that they should have a\nlike gravitation towards the centre of the moon may seem odd and\nunaccountable to most men, because it is discerned only in the tides. But\na philosopher, whose thoughts take in a larger compass of nature, having\nobserved a certain similitude of appearances, as well in the heavens as\nthe earth, that argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendency\ntowards each other, which he denotes by the general name \"attraction,\"\nwhatever can be reduced to that he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he\nexplains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous globe towards the\nmoon, which to him does not appear odd or anomalous, but only a\nparticular example of a general rule or law of nature.\n\n105. If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural\nphilosophers and other men, with regard to their knowledge of the\nphenomena, we shall find it consists not in an exacter knowledge of the\nefficient cause that produces them--for that can be no other than the\nwill of a spirit--but only in a greater largeness of comprehension,\nwhereby analogies, harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the works\nof nature, and the particular effects explained, that is, reduced to\ngeneral rules, see sect. 62, which rules, grounded on the analogy and\nuniformness observed in the production of natural effects, are most\nagreeable and sought after by the mind; for that they extend our prospect\nbeyond what is present and near to us, and enable us to make very\nprobable conjectures touching things that may have happened at very great\ndistances of time and place, as well as to predict things to come; which\nsort of endeavour towards omniscience is much affected by the mind.\n\n106. CAUTION AS TO THE USE OF ANALOGIES.--But we should proceed warily\nin such things, for we are apt to lay too great stress on analogies,\nand, to the prejudice of truth, humour that eagerness of the mind\nwhereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into general theorems.\nFor example, in the business of gravitation or mutual attraction,\nbecause it appears in many instances, some are straightway for\npronouncing it universal; and that to attract and be attracted\nby every other body is an essential quality inherent in all bodies\nwhatsoever. Whereas it is evident the fixed stars have no such\ntendency towards each other; and, so far is that gravitation from being\nessential to bodies that in some instances a quite contrary principle\nseems to show itself; as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the\nelasticity of the air. There is nothing necessary or essential in the\ncase, but it depends entirely on the will of the Governing Spirit, who\ncauses certain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each other\naccording to various laws, whilst He keeps others at a fixed distance;\nand to some He gives a quite contrary tendency to fly asunder just as He\nsees convenient.\n\n107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay down the following\nconclusions. First, it is plain philosophers amuse themselves in vain,\nwhen they inquire for any natural efficient cause, distinct from a mind\nor spirit. Secondly, considering the whole creation is the workmanship of\na wise and good Agent, it should seem to become philosophers to employ\ntheir thoughts (contrary to what some hold) about the final causes of\nthings; and I confess I see no reason why pointing out the various ends\nto which natural things are adapted, and for which they were originally\nwith unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought one good way of\naccounting for them, and altogether worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, from\nwhat has been premised no reason can be drawn why the history of nature\nshould not still be studied, and observations and experiments made,\nwhich, that they are of use to mankind, and enable us to draw any general\nconclusions, is not the result of any immutable habitudes or relations\nbetween things themselves, but only of God's goodness and kindness to men\nin the administration of the world. See sect. 30 and 31 Fourthly, by a\ndiligent observation of the phenomena within our view, we may discover\nthe general laws of nature, and from them deduce the other phenomena; I\ndo not say demonstrate, for all deductions of that kind depend on a\nsupposition that the Author of nature always operates uniformly, and in a\nconstant observance of those rules we take for principles: which we\ncannot evidently know.\n\n108. THREE ANALOGIES.--Those men who frame general rules from the\nphenomena and afterwards derive the phenomena from those rules, seem\nto consider signs rather than causes. A man may well understand\nnatural signs without knowing their analogy, or being able to say\nby what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is very possible to\nwrite improperly, through too strict an observance of general grammar\nrules; so, in arguing from general laws of nature, it is not impossible\nwe may extend the analogy too far, and by that means run into mistakes.\n\n109. As in reading other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts\non the sense and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical\nremarks on the language; so, in perusing the volume of nature, it seems\nbeneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each\nparticular phenomenon to general rules, or showing how it follows from\nthem. We should propose to ourselves nobler views, namely, to recreate\nand exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty, order. extent, and\nvariety of natural things: hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our\nnotions of the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator; and\nlastly, to make the several parts of the creation, so far as in us lies,\nsubservient to the ends they were designed for, God's glory, and the\nsustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures.\n\n110. The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural Science will be\neasily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise of Mechanics. In\nthe entrance of which justly admired treatise, Time, Space, and Motion\nare distinguished into absolute and relative, true and apparent,\nmathematical and vulgar; which distinction, as it is at large explained\nby the author, does suppose these quantities to have an existence without\nthe mind; and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to\nsensible things, to which nevertheless in their own nature they bear no\nrelation at all.\n\n111. As for Time, as it is there taken in an absolute or abstracted\nsense, for the duration or perseverance of the existence of things, I\nhave nothing more to add concerning it after what has been already said\non that subject. Sect. 97 and 98. For the rest, this celebrated author\nholds there is an absolute Space, which, being unperceivable to sense,\nremains in itself similar and immovable; and relative space to be the\nmeasure thereof, which, being movable and defined by its situation in\nrespect of sensible bodies, is vulgarly taken for immovable space. Place\nhe defines to be that part of space which is occupied by any body; and\naccording as the space is absolute or relative so also is the place.\nAbsolute Motion is said to be the translation of a body from absolute\nplace to absolute place, as relative motion is from one relative place to\nanother. And, because the parts of absolute space do not fall under our\nsenses, instead of them we are obliged to use their sensible measures,\nand so define both place and motion with respect to bodies which we\nregard as immovable. But, it is said in philosophical matters we must\nabstract from our senses, since it may be that none of those bodies which\nseem to be quiescent are truly so, and the same thing which is moved\nrelatively may be really at rest; as likewise one and the same body may\nbe in relative rest and motion, or even moved with contrary relative\nmotions at the same time, according as its place is variously defined.\nAll which ambiguity is to be found in the apparent motions, but not at\nall in the true or absolute, which should therefore be alone regarded in\nphilosophy. And the true as we are told are distinguished from apparent\nor relative motions by the following properties.--First, in true or\nabsolute motion all parts which preserve the same position with respect\nof the whole, partake of the motions of the whole. Secondly, the place\nbeing moved, that which is placed therein is also moved; so that a body\nmoving in a place which is in motion doth participate the motion of its\nplace. Thirdly, true motion is never generated or changed otherwise than\nby force impressed on the body itself. Fourthly, true motion is always\nchanged by force impressed on the body moved. Fifthly, in circular motion\nbarely relative there is no centrifugal force, which, nevertheless, in\nthat which is true or absolute, is proportional to the quantity of\nmotion.\n\n112. MOTION, WHETHER REAL OR APPARENT, RELATIVE.--But, notwithstanding\nwhat has been said, I must confess it does not appear to me that\nthere can be any motion other than relative; so that to conceive\nmotion there must be at least conceived two bodies, whereof the\ndistance or position in regard to each other is varied. Hence, if there\nwas one only body in being it could not possibly be moved. This seems\nevident, in that the idea I have of motion doth necessarily include\nrelation.\n\n113. APPARENT MOTION DENIED.--But, though in every motion it be\nnecessary to conceive more bodies than one, yet it may be that one\nonly is moved, namely, that on which the force causing the change\nin the distance or situation of the bodies, is impressed. For, however\nsome may define relative motion, so as to term that body moved\nwhich changes its distance from some other body, whether the force\nor action causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet as\nrelative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded in\nthe ordinary affairs of life, it should seem that every man of common\nsense knows what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now, I ask any\none whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets, the\nstones he passes over may be said to move, because they change distance\nwith his feet? To me it appears that though motion includes a relation of\none thing to another, yet it is not necessary that each term of the\nrelation be denominated from it. As a man may think of somewhat which\ndoes not think, so a body may be moved to or from another body which is\nnot therefore itself in motion.\n\n114. As the place happens to be variously defined, the motion which is\nrelated to it varies. A man in a ship may be said to be quiescent with\nrelation to the sides of the vessel, and yet move with relation to the\nland. Or he may move eastward in respect of the one, and westward in\nrespect of the other. In the common affairs of life men never go beyond\nthe earth to define the place of any body; and what is quiescent in\nrespect of that is accounted absolutely to be so. But philosophers, who\nhave a greater extent of thought, and juster notions of the system of\nthings, discover even the earth itself to be moved. In order therefore to\nfix their notions they seem to conceive the corporeal world as finite,\nand the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby\nthey estimate true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I believe we\nmay find all the absolute motion we can frame an idea of to be at bottom\nno other than relative motion thus defined. For, as has been already\nobserved, absolute motion, exclusive of all external relation, is\nincomprehensible; and to this kind of relative motion all the\nabove-mentioned properties, causes, and effects ascribed to absolute\nmotion will, if I mistake not, be found to agree. As to what is said of\nthe centrifugal force, that it does not at all belong to circular\nrelative motion, I do not see how this follows from the experiment which\nis brought to prove it. See Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica,\nin Schol. Def. VIII. For the water in the vessel at that time wherein it\nis said to have the greatest relative circular motion, has, I think, no\nmotion at all; as is plain from the foregoing section.\n\n115. For, to denominate a body moved it is requisite, first, that it\nchange its distance or situation with regard to some other body; and\nsecondly, that the force occasioning that change be applied to it. If\neither of these be wanting, I do not think that, agreeably to the sense\nof mankind, or the propriety of language, a body can be said to be in\nmotion. I grant indeed that it is possible for us to think a body which\nwe see change its distance from some other to be moved, though it have no\nforce applied to it (in which sense there may be apparent motion), but\nthen it is because the force causing the change of distance is imagined\nby us to be applied or impressed on that body thought to move; which\nindeed shows we are capable of mistaking a thing to be in motion which is\nnot, and that is all.\n\n116. ANY IDEA OF PURE SPACE RELATIVE.--From what has been said it follows\nthat the philosophic consideration of motion does not imply the\nbeing of an absolute Space, distinct from that which is perceived\nby sense and related bodies; which that it cannot exist without the\nmind is clear upon the same principles that demonstrate the like\nof all other objects of sense. And perhaps, if we inquire narrowly,\nwe shall find we cannot even frame an idea of pure Space exclusive\nof all body. This I must confess seems impossible, as being a most\nabstract idea. When I excite a motion in some part of my body,\nif it be free or without resistance, I say there is Space; but if I\nfind a resistance, then I say there is Body; and in proportion as the\nresistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more or\nless pure. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, it is not to be\nsupposed that the word \"space\" stands for an idea distinct from or\nconceivable without body and motion--though indeed we are apt to think\nevery noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separated\nfrom all others; which has occasioned infinite mistakes. When, therefore,\nsupposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say\nthere still remains pure Space, thereby nothing else is meant but only\nthat I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on all\nsides without the least resistance, but if that, too, were annihilated\nthen there could be no motion, and consequently no Space. Some, perhaps,\nmay think the sense of seeing doth furnish them with the idea of pure\nspace; but it is plain from what we have elsewhere shown, that the ideas\nof space and distance are not obtained by that sense. See the Essay\nconcerning Vision.\n\n117. What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those disputes and\ndifficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the\nnature of pure Space. But the chief advantage arising from it is that we\nare freed from that dangerous dilemma, to which several who have employed\ntheir thoughts on that subject imagine themselves reduced, to wit, of\nthinking either that Real Space is God, or else that there is something\nbeside God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable.\nBoth which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is\ncertain that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of great note,\nhave, from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or\nannihilation of space, concluded it must be divine. And some of late have\nset themselves particularly to show the incommunicable attributes of God\nagree to it. Which doctrine, how unworthy soever it may seem of the\nDivine Nature, yet I do not see how we can get clear of it, so long as we\nadhere to the received opinions.\n\n118. THE ERRORS ARISING FROM THE DOCTRINES OF ABSTRACTION AND EXTERNAL\nMATERIAL EXISTENCES, INFLUENCE MATHEMATICAL REASONINGS.--Hitherto of\nNatural Philosophy: we come now to make some inquiry concerning\nthat other great branch of speculative knowledge, to wit, Mathematics.\nThese, how celebrated soever they may be for their clearness and\ncertainty of demonstration, which is hardly anywhere else to be\nfound, cannot nevertheless be supposed altogether free from mistakes, if\nin their principles there lurks some secret error which is common to the\nprofessors of those sciences with the rest of mankind. Mathematicians,\nthough they deduce their theorems from a great height of evidence, yet\ntheir first principles are limited by the consideration of quantity: and\nthey do not ascend into any inquiry concerning those transcendental\nmaxims which influence all the particular sciences, each part whereof,\nMathematics not excepted, does consequently participate of the errors\ninvolved in them. That the principles laid down by mathematicians are\ntrue, and their way of deduction from those principles clear and\nincontestible, we do not deny; but, we hold there may be certain\nerroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of Mathematics, and\nfor that reason not expressly mentioned, though tacitly supposed\nthroughout the whole progress of that science; and that the ill effects\nof those secret unexamined errors are diffused through all the branches\nthereof. To be plain, we suspect the mathematicians are as well as other\nmen concerned in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general\nideas, and the existence of objects without the mind.\n\n119. Arithmetic has been thought to have for its object abstract ideas of\nNumber; of which to understand the properties and mutual habitudes, is\nsupposed no mean part of speculative knowledge. The opinion of the pure\nand intellectual nature of numbers in abstract has made them in esteem\nwith those philosophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness\nand elevation of thought. It has set a price on the most trifling\nnumerical speculations which in practice are of no use, but serve only\nfor amusement; and has therefore so far infected the minds of some, that\nthey have dreamed of mighty mysteries involved in numbers, and attempted\nthe explication of natural things by them. But, if we inquire into our\nown thoughts, and consider what has been premised, we may perhaps\nentertain a low opinion of those high flights and abstractions, and look\non all inquiries, about numbers only as so many difficiles nugae, so far\nas they are not subservient to practice, and promote the benefit of life.\n\n120. Unity in abstract we have before considered in sect. 13, from which\nand what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly follows there is\nnot any such idea. But, number being defined a \"collection of units,\" we\nmay conclude that, if there be no such thing as unity or unit in\nabstract, there are no ideas of number in abstract denoted by the numeral\nnames and figures. The theories therefore in Arithmetic, if they are\nabstracted from the names and figures, as likewise from all use and\npractice, as well as from the particular things numbered, can be supposed\nto have nothing at all for their object; hence we may see how entirely\nthe science of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune and\ntrifling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speculation.\n\n121. However, since there may be some who, deluded by the specious show\nof discovering abstracted verities, waste their time in arithmetical\ntheorems and problems which have not any use, it will not be amiss if we\nmore fully consider and expose the vanity of that pretence; and this will\nplainly appear by taking a view of Arithmetic in its infancy, and\nobserving what it was that originally put men on the study of that\nscience, and to what scope they directed it. It is natural to think that\nat first, men, for ease of memory and help of computation, made use of\ncounters, or in writing of single strokes, points, or the like, each\nwhereof was made to signify an unit, i.e., some one thing of whatever\nkind they had occasion to reckon. Afterwards they found out the more\ncompendious ways of making one character stand in place of several\nstrokes or points. And, lastly, the notation of the Arabians or Indians\ncame into use, wherein, by the repetition of a few characters or figures,\nand varying the signification of each figure according to the place it\nobtains, all numbers may be most aptly expressed; which seems to have\nbeen done in imitation of language, so that an exact analogy is observed\nbetwixt the notation by figures and names, the nine simple figures\nanswering the nine first numeral names and places in the former,\ncorresponding to denominations in the latter. And agreeably to those\nconditions of the simple and local value of figures, were contrived\nmethods of finding, from the given figures or marks of the parts, what\nfigures and how placed are proper to denote the whole, or vice versa. And\nhaving found the sought figures, the same rule or analogy being observed\nthroughout, it is easy to read them into words; and so the number becomes\nperfectly known. For then the number of any particular things is said to\nbe known, when we know the name of figures (with their due arrangement)\nthat according to the standing analogy belong to them. For, these signs\nbeing known, we can by the operations of arithmetic know the signs of any\npart of the particular sums signified by them; and, thus computing in\nsigns (because of the connexion established betwixt them and the distinct\nmultitudes of things whereof one is taken for an unit), we may be able\nrightly to sum up, divide, and proportion the things themselves that we\nintend to number.\n\n122. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the things, but the signs,\nwhich nevertheless are not regarded for their own sake, but because they\ndirect us how to act with relation to things, and dispose rightly of\nthem. Now, agreeably to what we have before observed of words in general\n(sect. 19, Introd.) it happens here likewise that abstract ideas are\nthought to be signified by numeral names or characters, while they do not\nsuggest ideas of particular things to our minds. I shall not at present\nenter into a more particular dissertation on this subject, but only\nobserve that it is evident from what has been said, those things which\npass for abstract truths and theorems concerning numbers, are in reality\nconversant about no object distinct from particular numeral things,\nexcept only names and characters, which originally came to be considered\non no other account but their being signs, or capable to represent aptly\nwhatever particular things men had need to compute. Whence it follows\nthat to study them for their own sake would be just as wise, and to as\ngood purpose as if a man, neglecting the true use or original intention\nand subserviency of language, should spend his time in impertinent\ncriticisms upon words, or reasonings and controversies purely verbal.\n\n123. From numbers we proceed to speak of Extension, which, considered as\nrelative, is the object of Geometry. The infinite divisibility of finite\nextension, though it is not expressly laid down either as an axiom or\ntheorem in the elements of that science, yet is throughout the same\neverywhere supposed and thought to have so inseparable and essential a\nconnexion with the principles and demonstrations in Geometry, that\nmathematicians never admit it into doubt, or make the least question of\nit. And, as this notion is the source from whence do spring all those\namusing geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to the\nplain common sense of mankind, and are admitted with so much reluctance\ninto a mind not yet debauched by learning; so it is the principal\noccasion of all that nice and extreme subtilty which renders the study of\nMathematics so difficult and tedious. Hence, if we can make it appear\nthat no finite extension contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely\ndivisible, it follows that we shall at once clear the science of Geometry\nfrom a great number of difficulties and contradictions which have ever\nbeen esteemed a reproach to human reason, and withal make the attainment\nthereof a business of much less time and pains than it hitherto has been.\n\n124. Every particular finite extension which may possibly be the object\nof our thought is an idea existing only in the mind, and consequently\neach part thereof must be perceived. If, therefore, I cannot perceive\ninnumerable parts in any finite extension that I consider, it is certain\nthey are not contained in it; but, it is evident that I cannot\ndistinguish innumerable parts in any particular line, surface, or solid,\nwhich I either perceive by sense, or figure to myself in my mind:\nwherefore I conclude they are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer\nto me than that the extensions I have in view are no other than my own\nideas; and it is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas\ninto an infinite number of other ideas, that is, that they are not\ninfinitely divisible. If by finite extension be meant something distinct\nfrom a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot\naffirm or deny anything of it. But if the terms \"extension,\" \"parts,\"\n&c., are taken in any sense conceivable, that is, for ideas, then to say\na finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number is so\nmanifest a contradiction, that every one at first sight acknowledges it\nto be so; and it is impossible it should ever gain the assent of any\nreasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees,\nas a converted Gentile to the belief of transubstantiation. Ancient and\nrooted prejudices do often pass into principles; and those propositions\nwhich once obtain the force and credit of a principle, are not only\nthemselves, but likewise whatever is deducible from them, thought\nprivileged from all examination. And there is no absurdity so gross,\nwhich, by this means, the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow.\n\n125. He whose understanding is possessed with the doctrine of abstract\ngeneral ideas may be persuaded that (whatever be thought of the ideas of\nsense) extension in abstract is infinitely divisible. And one who thinks\nthe objects of sense exist without the mind will perhaps in virtue\nthereof be brought to admit that a line but an inch long may contain\ninnumerable parts--really existing, though too small to be discerned.\nThese errors are grafted as well in the minds of geometricians as of\nother men, and have a like influence on their reasonings; and it were no\ndifficult thing to show how the arguments from Geometry made use of to\nsupport the infinite divisibility of extension are bottomed on them. At\npresent we shall only observe in general whence it is the mathematicians\nare all so fond and tenacious of that doctrine.\n\n126. It has been observed in another place that the theorems and\ndemonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal ideas (sect.\n15, Introd.); where it is explained in what sense this ought to be\nunderstood, to wit, the particular lines and figures included in the\ndiagram are supposed to stand for innumerable others of different sizes;\nor, in other words, the geometer considers them abstracting from their\nmagnitude--which does not imply that he forms an abstract idea, but only\nthat he cares not what the particular magnitude is, whether great or\nsmall, but looks on that as a thing different to the demonstration. Hence\nit follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be spoken of\nas though it contained ten thousand parts, since it is regarded not in\nitself, but as it is universal; and it is universal only in its\nsignification, whereby it represents innumerable lines greater than\nitself, in which may be distinguished ten thousand parts or more, though\nthere may not be above an inch in it. After this manner, the properties\nof the lines signified are (by a very usual figure) transferred to the\nsign, and thence, through mistake, though to appertain to it considered\nin its own nature.\n\n127. Because there is no number of parts so great but it is possible\nthere may be a line containing more, the inch-line is said to contain\nparts more than any assignable number; which is true, not of the inch\ntaken absolutely, but only for the things signified by it. But men, not\nretaining that distinction in their thoughts, slide into a belief that\nthe small particular line described on paper contains in itself parts\ninnumerable. There is no such thing as the ten--thousandth part of an\ninch; but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, which may be\nsignified by that inch. When therefore I delineate a triangle on paper,\nand take one side not above an inch, for example, in length to be the\nradius, this I consider as divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts or more;\nfor, though the ten-thousandth part of that line considered in itself is\nnothing at all, and consequently may be neglected without an error or\ninconveniency, yet these described lines, being only marks standing for\ngreater quantities, whereof it may be the ten--thousandth part is very\nconsiderable, it follows that, to prevent notable errors in practice, the\nradius must be taken of 10,000 parts or more.\n\n128. LINES WHICH ARE INFINITELY DIVISIBLE.--From what has been said\nthe reason is plain why, to the end any theorem become universal in\nits use, it is necessary we speak of the lines described on paper\nas though they contained parts which really they do not. In doing\nof which, if we examine the matter thoroughly, we shall perhaps\ndiscover that we cannot conceive an inch itself as consisting of,\nor being divisible into, a thousand parts, but only some other line which\nis far greater than an inch, and represented by it; and that when we say\na line is infinitely divisible, we must mean a line which is infinitely\ngreat. What we have here observed seems to be the chief cause why, to\nsuppose the infinite divisibility of finite extension has been thought\nnecessary in geometry.\n\n129. The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed from this\nfalse principle might, one would think, have been esteemed so many\ndemonstrations against it. But, by I know not what logic, it is held that\nproofs a posteriori are not to be admitted against propositions relating\nto infinity, as though it were not impossible even for an infinite mind\nto reconcile contradictions; or as if anything absurd and repugnant could\nhave a necessary connexion with truth or flow from it. But, whoever\nconsiders the weakness of this pretence will think it was contrived on\npurpose to humour the laziness of the mind which had rather acquiesce in\nan indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through with a severe\nexamination of those principles it has ever embraced for true.\n\n130. Of late the speculations about Infinities have run so high, and\ngrown to such strange notions, as have occasioned no small scruples and\ndisputes among the geometers of the present age. Some there are of great\nnote who, not content with holding that finite lines may be divided into\nan infinite number of parts, do yet farther maintain that each of those\ninfinitesimals is itself subdivisible into an infinity of other parts or\ninfinitesimals of a second order, and so on ad infinitum. These, I say,\nassert there are infinitesimals of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c.,\nwithout ever coming to an end; so that according to them an inch does not\nbarely contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of an\ninfinity of an infinity ad infinitum of parts. Others there be who hold\nall orders of infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at all;\nthinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is any positive\nquantity or part of extension which, though multiplied infinitely, can\nnever equal the smallest given extension. And yet on the other hand it\nseems no less absurd to think the square, cube or other power of a\npositive real root, should itself be nothing at all; which they who hold\ninfinitesimals of the first order, denying all of the subsequent orders,\nare obliged to maintain.\n\n131. OBJECTION OF MATHEMATICIANS.--ANSWER.--Have we not therefore\nreason to conclude they are both in the wrong, and that there is\nin effect no such thing as parts infinitely small, or an infinite\nnumber of parts contained in any finite quantity? But you will\nsay that if this doctrine obtains it will follow the very foundations\nof Geometry are destroyed, and those great men who have raised\nthat science to so astonishing a height, have been all the while\nbuilding a castle in the air. To this it may be replied that whatever is\nuseful in geometry, and promotes the benefit of human life, does still\nremain firm and unshaken on our principles; that science considered as\npractical will rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what has\nbeen said. But to set this in a due light may be the proper business of\nanother place. For the rest, though it should follow that some of the\nmore intricate and subtle parts of Speculative Mathematics may be pared\noff without any prejudice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will be\nthence derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to be\nwished that men of great abilities and obstinate application would draw\noff their thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in the study of\nsuch things as lie nearer the concerns of life, or have a more direct\ninfluence on the manners.\n\n132. SECOND OBJECTION OF MATHEMATICIANS.--ANSWER.--If it be said\nthat several theorems undoubtedly true are discovered by methods\nin which infinitesimals are made use of, which could never have\nbeen if their existence included a contradiction in it; I answer\nthat upon a thorough examination it will not be found that in any\ninstance it is necessary to make use of or conceive infinitesimal parts\nof finite lines, or even quantities less than the minimum sensible; nay,\nit will be evident this is never done, it being impossible.\n\n133. IF THE DOCTRINE WERE ONLY AN HYPOTHESIS IT SHOULD BE RESPECTED\nFOR ITS CONSEQUENCES.--By what we have premised, it is plain that very\nnumerous and important errors have taken their rise from those false\nPrinciples which were impugned in the foregoing parts of this treatise;\nand the opposites of those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be\nmost fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable consequences\nhighly advantageous to true philosophy, as well as to religion.\nParticularly Matter, or the absolute existence of corporeal objects, has\nbeen shown to be that wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of\nall knowledge, whether human or divine, have ever placed their chief\nstrength and confidence. And surely, if by distinguishing the real\nexistence of unthinking things from their being perceived, and allowing\nthem a subsistance of their own out of the minds of spirits, no one thing\nis explained in nature, but on the contrary a great many inexplicable\ndifficulties arise; if the supposition of Matter is barely precarious, as\nnot being grounded on so much as one single reason; if its consequences\ncannot endure the light of examination and free inquiry, but screen\nthemselves under the dark and general pretence of \"infinites being\nincomprehensible\"; if withal the removal of this Matter be not attended\nwith the least evil consequence; if it be not even missed in the world,\nbut everything as well, nay much easier conceived without it; if, lastly,\nboth Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced upon supposing only\nspirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable both\nto Reason and Religion: methinks we may expect it should be admitted and\nfirmly embraced, though it were proposed only as an hypothesis, and the\nexistence of Matter had been allowed possible, which yet I think we have\nevidently demonstrated that it is not.\n\n134. True it is that, in consequence of the foregoing principles, several\ndisputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean parts of learning,\nare rejected as useless. But, how great a prejudice soever against our\nnotions this may give to those who have already been deeply engaged, and\nmake large advances in studies of that nature, yet by others we hope it\nwill not be thought any just ground of dislike to the principles and\ntenets herein laid down, that they abridge the labour of study, and make\nhuman sciences far more clear, compendious and attainable than they were\nbefore.\n\n135. Having despatched what we intended to say concerning the knowledge\nof IDEAS, the method we proposed leads us in the next place to treat of\nSPIRITS--with regard to which, perhaps, human knowledge is not so\ndeficient as is vulgarly imagined. The great reason that is assigned for\nour being thought ignorant of the nature of spirits is our not having an\nidea of it. But, surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a\nhuman understanding that it does not perceive the idea of spirit, if it\nis manifestly impossible there should be any such idea. And this if I\nmistake not has been demonstrated in section 27; to which I shall here\nadd that a spirit has been shown to be the only substance or support\nwherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist; but that this substance\nwhich supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea or like an\nidea is evidently absurd.\n\n136. OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--It will perhaps be said that we want a sense\n(as some have imagined) proper to know substances withal, which,\nif we had, we might know our own soul as we do a triangle. To this\nI answer, that, in case we had a new sense bestowed upon us, we\ncould only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas of sense.\nBut I believe nobody will say that what he means by the terms soul\nand substance is only some particular sort of idea or sensation.\nWe may therefore infer that, all things duly considered, it is\nnot more reasonable to think our faculties defective, in that they do not\nfurnish us with an idea of spirit or active thinking substance, than it\nwould be if we should blame them for not being able to comprehend a round\nsquare.\n\n137. From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of an\nidea or sensation have risen many absurd and heterodox tenets, and much\nscepticism about the nature of the soul. It is even probable that this\nopinion may have produced a doubt in some whether they had any soul at\nall distinct from their body since upon inquiry they could not find they\nhad an idea of it. That an idea which is inactive, and the existence\nwhereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness of\nan agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other refutation than\nbarely attending to what is meant by those words. But, perhaps you will\nsay that though an idea cannot resemble a spirit in its thinking, acting,\nor subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects; and it is not\nnecessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original.\n\n138. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible it\nshould represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the power of\nwilling, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else\nwherein the idea can be like a spirit. For, by the word spirit we mean\nonly that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone,\nconstitutes the signification of the term. If therefore it is impossible\nthat any degree of those powers should be represented in an idea, it is\nevident there can be no idea of a spirit.\n\n139. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea signified by the\nterms soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have\nno meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real\nthing, which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which\nperceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them. What I am myself,\nthat which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul\nor spiritual substance. If it be said that this is only quarreling at a\nword, and that, since the immediately significations of other names are\nby common consent called ideas, no reason can be assigned why that which\nis signified by the name spirit or soul may not partake in the same\nappellation. I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in\nthat they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in\nbeing perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose\nexistence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and\nthinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and\nconfounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish\nbetween spirit and idea. See sect. 27.\n\n140. OUR IDEA OF SPIRIT.--In a large sense, indeed, we may be said\nto have an idea or rather a notion of spirit; that is, we understand\nthe meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny\nanything of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the\nminds of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be\nresemblances of them; so we know other spirits by means of our own\nsoul--which in that sense is the image or idea of them; it having\na like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me perceived\nhas to those ideas perceived by another.\n\n141. THE NATURAL IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL IS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE\nOF THE FOREGOING DOCTRINE.--It must not be supposed that they who\nassert the natural immortality of the soul are of opinion that it\nis absolutely incapable of annihilation even by the infinite power\nof the Creator who first gave it being, but only that it is not\nliable to be broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature\nor motion. They indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thin\nvital flame, or system of animal spirits, make it perishing and\ncorruptible as the body; since there is nothing more easily dissipated\nthan such a being, which it is naturally impossible should survive\nthe ruin of the tabernacle wherein it is enclosed. And this notion\nhas been greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind,\nas the most effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue\nand religion. But it has been made evident that bodies, of what frame or\ntexture soever, are barely passive ideas in the mind, which is more\ndistant and heterogeneous from them than light is from darkness. We have\nshown that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is\nconsequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer than that the motions,\nchanges, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural\nbodies (and which is what we mean by the course of nature) cannot\npossibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance; such a being\ntherefore is indissoluble by the force of nature; that is to say, \"the\nsoul of man is naturally immortal.\"\n\n142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that our souls are\nnot to be known in the same manner as senseless, inactive objects, or by\nway of idea. Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different, that when\nwe say \"they exist,\" \"they are known,\" or the like, these words must not\nbe thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing\nalike or common in them: and to expect that by any multiplication or\nenlargement of our faculties we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do\na triangle, seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound. This is\ninculcated because I imagine it may be of moment towards clearing several\nimportant questions, and preventing some very dangerous errors concerning\nthe nature of the soul. We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an\nidea of an active being, or of an action, although we may be said to have\na notion of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my mind, and its\nacts about ideas, inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these\nwords. What I know, that I have some notion of. I will not say that the\nterms idea and notion may not be used convertibly, if the world will have\nit so; but yet it conduceth to clearness and propriety that we\ndistinguish things very different by different names. It is also to be\nremarked that, all relations including an act of the mind, we cannot so\nproperly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of the relations\nand habitudes between things. But if, in the modern way, the word idea is\nextended to spirits, and relations, and acts, this is, after all, an\naffair of verbal concern.\n\n143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of abstract ideas has\nhad no small share in rendering those sciences intricate and obscure\nwhich are particularly conversant about spiritual things. Men have\nimagined they could frame abstract notions of the powers and acts of the\nmind, and consider them prescinded as well from the mind or spirit\nitself, as from their respective objects and effects. Hence a great\nnumber of dark and ambiguous terms, presumed to stand for abstract\nnotions, have been introduced into metaphysics and morality, and from\nthese have grown infinite distractions and disputes amongst the learned.\n\n144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men in\ncontroversies and mistakes with regard to the nature and operations of\nthe mind, than the being used to speak of those things in terms borrowed\nfrom sensible ideas. For example, the will is termed the motion of the\nsoul; this infuses a belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion,\nimpelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that\nis by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors of\ndangerous consequence in morality. All which, I doubt not, may be\ncleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but\nphilosophers be prevailed on to retire into themselves, and attentively\nconsider their own meaning.\n\n145. KNOWLEDGE OF SPIRITS NOT IMMEDIATE.--From what has been said,\nit is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits\notherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them excited\nin us. I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas,\nthat inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself,\nwhich accompany them and concur in their production. Hence, the\nknowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the\nknowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me\nreferred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or\nconcomitant signs.\n\n146. But, though there be some things which convince us human agents are\nconcerned in producing them; yet it is evident to every one that those\nthings which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greater\npart of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or\ndependent on, the wills of men. There is therefore some other Spirit that\ncauses them; since it is repugnant that they should subsist by\nthemselves. See sect. 29. But, if we attentively consider the constant\nregularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising\nmagnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite\ncontrivance of the smaller parts of creation, together with the exact\nharmony and correspondence of the whole, but above all the\nnever-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or\nnatural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals; I say if we\nconsider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and\nimport of the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and\nPerfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid\nSpirit, \"who works all in all,\" and \"by whom all things consist.\"\n\n147. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD MORE EVIDENT THAN THAT OF MAN.--Hence,\nit is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as\nany other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may\neven assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived\nthan the existence of men; because the effects of nature are infinitely\nmore numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents. There\nis not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which\ndoes not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author\nof Nature. For, it is evident that in affecting other persons the will of\nman has no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body;\nbut that such a motion should be attended by, or excite any idea in the\nmind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it\nis who, \"upholding all things by the word of His power,\" maintains that\nintercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the\nexistence of each other. And yet this pure and clear light which\nenlightens every one is itself invisible.\n\n148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they\ncannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a man, we\nshould believe that He is, and believing obey His commands. But alas, we\nneed only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things, with a\nmore full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow--creatures. Not\nthat I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and\nimmediate view; or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing\nthat which represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine is, I\nmust confess, to me incomprehensible. But I shall explain my meaning;--A\nhuman spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea;\nwhen therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we\nperceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; and\nthese being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve\nto mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like\nourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man--if by man is meant that\nwhich lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do--but only such a\ncertain collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct\nprinciple of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and\nrepresented by it. And after the same manner we see God; all the\ndifference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of\nideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view,\nwe do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the\nDivinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense,\nbeing a sign or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those\nvery motions which are produced by men.\n\n149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one\nthat is capable of the least reflexion than the existence of God, or a\nSpirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that\nvariety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom we\nhave an absolute and entire dependence, in short \"in whom we live, and\nmove, and have our being.\" That the discovery of this great truth, which\nlies so near and obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the reason\nof so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of\nmen, who, though they are surrounded with such clear manifestations of\nthe Deity, are yet so little affected by them that they seem, as it were,\nblinded with excess of light.\n\n150. OBJECTION ON BEHALF OF NATURE.--ANSWER.--But you will say,\nhas Nature no share in the production of natural things, and must\nthey be all ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of God?\nI answer, if by Nature is meant only the visible series of effects\nor sensations imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixed\nand general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense,\ncannot produce anything at all. But, if by Nature is meant some being\ndistinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature, and things\nperceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound\nwithout any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this\nacceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not\njust notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But, it\nis more unaccountable that it should be received among Christians,\nprofessing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those\neffects to the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont\nto impute to Nature. \"The Lord He causeth the vapours to ascend; He\nmaketh lightnings with rain; He bringeth forth the wind out of his\ntreasures.\" Jerem. 10. 13. \"He turneth the shadow of death into the\nmorning, and maketh the day dark with night.\" Amos, 5. 8. \"He visiteth\nthe earth, and maketh it soft with showers: He blesseth the springing\nthereof, and crowneth the year with His goodness; so that the pastures\nare clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn.\" See\nPsalm 65. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant language of\nScripture, yet we have I know not what aversion from believing that God\nconcerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a\ngreat distance off, and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in His\nstead, though (if we may believe Saint Paul) \"He be not far from every\none of us.\"\n\n151. OBJECTION TO THE HAND OF GOD BEING THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE,\nTHREEFOLD.--ANSWER.--It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow and\ngradual methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem\nto have for their cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent. Besides,\nmonsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in\ndesert places, miseries incident to human life, and the like, are so many\narguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and\nsuperintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer\nto this objection is in a good measure plain from sect. 62; it being\nvisible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary, in\norder to working by the most simple and general rules, and after a steady\nand consistent manner; which argues both the wisdom and goodness of God.\nSuch is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that,\nwhilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand\nwhich actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and\nblood. \"Verily\" (saith the prophet) \"thou art a God that hidest thyself.\"\nIsaiah, 45. 15. But, though the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the\nsensual and lazy, who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to\nan unbiased and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible than\nthe intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates and\nsustains the whole system of beings. It is clear, from what we have\nelsewhere observed, that the operating according to general and stated\nlaws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, and letting\nus into the secret of nature, that without it all reach and compass of\nthought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of\npurpose; it were even impossible there should be any such faculties or\npowers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantly\noutbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise.\n\n152. We should further consider that the very blemishes and defects of\nnature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of\nvariety, and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in\na picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We\nwould likewise do well to examine whether our taxing the waste of seeds\nand embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, before\nthey come to full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be\nnot the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent\nand saving mortals. In man indeed a thrifty management of those things\nwhich he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed\nwisdom. But, we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an\nanimal or vegetable costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble in\nits production than a pebble does; nothing being more evident than that\nan Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere fiat\nor act of His will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion of\nnatural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the\nagent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the\nriches of His power.\n\n153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world,\npursuant to the general laws of nature, and the actions of finite,\nimperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is\nindispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are too\nnarrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular pain into\nour thoughts, and account it evil; whereas, if we enlarge our view, so as\nto comprehend the various ends, connexions, and dependencies of things,\non what occasions and in what proportions we are affected with pain and\npleasure, the nature of human freedom, and the design with which we are\nput into the world; we shall be forced to acknowledge that those\nparticular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil,\nhave the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole system\nof beings.\n\n154. ATHEISM AND MANICHEISM WOULD HAVE FEW SUPPORTERS IF MANKIND WERE\nIN GENERAL ATTENTIVE.--From what has been said, it will be manifest\nto any considering person, that it is merely for want of attention\nand comprehensiveness of mind that there are any favourers of Atheism\nor the Manichean Heresy to be found. Little and unreflecting souls\nmay indeed burlesque the works of Providence, the beauty and order\nwhereof they have not capacity, or will not be at the pains, to\ncomprehend; but those who are masters of any justness and extent\nof thought, and are withal used to reflect, can never sufficiently\nadmire the divine traces of Wisdom and Goodness that shine throughout\nthe Economy of Nature. But what truth is there which shineth so\nstrongly on the mind that by an aversion of thought, a wilful shutting\nof the eyes, we may not escape seeing it? Is it therefore to be wondered\nat, if the generality of men, who are ever intent on business or\npleasure, and little used to fix or open the eye of their mind, should\nnot have all that conviction and evidence of the Being of God which might\nbe expected in reasonable creatures?\n\n155. We should rather wonder that men can be found so stupid as to\nneglect, than that neglecting they should be unconvinced of such an\nevident and momentous truth. And yet it is to be feared that too many of\nparts and leisure, who live in Christian countries, are, merely through a\nsupine and dreadful negligence, sunk into Atheism. Since it is downright\nimpossible that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough sense of\nthe omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that Almighty Spirit should\npersist in a remorseless violation of His laws. We ought, therefore,\nearnestly to meditate and dwell on those important points; that so we may\nattain conviction without all scruple \"that the eyes of the Lord are in\nevery place beholding the evil and the good; that He is with us and\nkeepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat and\nraiment to put on\"; that He is present and conscious to our innermost\nthoughts; and that we have a most absolute and immediate dependence on\nHim. A clear view of which great truths cannot choose but fill our hearts\nwith an awful circumspection and holy fear, which is the strongest\nincentive to Virtue, and the best guard against Vice.\n\n156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies is the\nconsideration of GOD and our DUTY; which to promote, as it was the main\ndrift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless\nand ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire my readers with\na pious sense of the Presence of God; and, having shown the falseness or\nvanity of those barren speculations which make the chief employment of\nlearned men, the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the\nsalutary truths of the Gospel, which to know and to practice is the\nhighest perfection of human nature.","title":"A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":37206}