{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_4724/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_4724","id":"gutenberg_4724","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4724","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Harvard Classics","Idealism","Philosophy","Soul"],"text":"Produced by Col Choat.  HTML version by Al Haines.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n  THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS,\n  IN OPPOSITION TO SCEPTICS AND ATHEISTS\n\n\nby\n\nGeorge Berkeley (1685-1753)\n\n\n\n\nTHE FIRST DIALOGUE\n\n\nPHILONOUS.  Good morrow, Hylas: I did not expect to find you abroad so\nearly.\n\nHYLAS.  It is indeed something unusual; but my thoughts were so taken up\nwith a subject I was discoursing of last night, that finding I could not\nsleep, I resolved to rise and take a turn in the garden.\n\nPHIL.  It happened well, to let you see what innocent and agreeable\npleasures you lose every morning. Can there be a pleasanter time of the\nday, or a more delightful season of the year? That purple sky, those wild\nbut sweet notes of birds, the fragrant bloom upon the trees and flowers,\nthe gentle influence of the rising sun, these and a thousand nameless\nbeauties of nature inspire the soul with secret transports; its faculties\ntoo being at this time fresh and lively, are fit for those meditations,\nwhich the solitude of a garden and tranquillity of the morning naturally\ndispose us to. But I am afraid I interrupt your thoughts: for you seemed\nvery intent on something.\n\nHYL.  It is true, I was, and shall be obliged to you if you will permit\nme to go on in the same vein; not that I would by any means deprive\nmyself of your company, for my thoughts always flow more easily in\nconversation with a friend, than when I am alone: but my request is, that\nyou would suffer me to impart my reflexions to you.\n\nPHIL.  With all my heart, it is what I should have requested myself if\nyou had not prevented me.\n\nHYL.  I was considering the odd fate of those men who have in all ages,\nthrough an affectation of being distinguished from the vulgar, or some\nunaccountable turn of thought, pretended either to believe nothing at\nall, or to believe the most extravagant things in the world. This however\nmight be borne, if their paradoxes and scepticism did not draw after them\nsome consequences of general disadvantage to mankind. But the mischief\nlieth here; that when men of less leisure see them who are supposed\nto have spent their whole time in the pursuits of knowledge professing an\nentire ignorance of all things, or advancing such notions as are\nrepugnant to plain and commonly received principles, they will be tempted\nto entertain suspicions concerning the most important truths, which they\nhad hitherto held sacred and unquestionable.\n\nPHIL.  I entirely agree with you, as to the ill tendency of the affected\ndoubts of some philosophers, and fantastical conceits of others. I am\neven so far gone of late in this way of thinking, that I have quitted\nseveral of the sublime notions I had got in their schools for vulgar\nopinions. And I give it you on my word; since this revolt from\nmetaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature and common sense, I\nfind my understanding strangely enlightened, so that I can now easily\ncomprehend a great many things which before were all mystery and riddle.\n\nHYL.  I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I heard of you.\n\nPHIL.  Pray, what were those?\n\nHYL.  You were represented, in last night's conversation, as one who\nmaintained the most extravagant opinion that ever entered into the mind\nof man, to wit, that there is no such thing as MATERIAL SUBSTANCE in\nthe world.\n\nPHIL.  That there is no such thing as what PHILOSOPHERS CALL MATERIAL\nSUBSTANCE, I am seriously persuaded: but, if I were made to see anything\nabsurd or sceptical in this, I should then have the same reason to\nrenounce this that I imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion.\n\nHYL.  What I can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant to Common\nSense, or a more manifest piece of Scepticism, than to believe there is\nno such thing as MATTER?\n\nPHIL.  Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you, who hold\nthere is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater sceptic, and maintain\nmore paradoxes and repugnances to Common Sense, than I who believe no\nsuch thing?\n\nHYL.  You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater than the whole,\nas that, in order to avoid absurdity and Scepticism, I should ever be\nobliged to give up my opinion in this point.\n\nPHIL.  Well then, are you content to admit that opinion for true, which\nupon examination shall appear most agreeable to Common Sense, and remote\nfrom Scepticism?\n\nHYL.  With all my heart. Since you are for raising disputes about\nthe plainest things in nature, I am content for once to hear what you\nhave to say.\n\nPHIL.  Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a SCEPTIC?\n\nHYL.  I mean what all men mean--one that doubts of everything.\n\nPHIL.  He then who entertains no doubts concerning some particular\npoint, with regard to that point cannot be thought a sceptic.\n\nHYL.  I agree with you.\n\nPHIL.  Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the affirmative or\nnegative side of a question?\n\nHYL.  In neither; for whoever understands English cannot but know that\nDOUBTING signifies a suspense between both.\n\nPHIL.  He then that denies any point, can no more be said to doubt of\nit, than he who affirmeth it with the same degree of assurance.\n\nHYL.  True.\n\nPHIL.  And, consequently, for such his denial is no more to be esteemed\na sceptic than the other.\n\nHYL.  I acknowledge it.\n\nPHIL.  How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you pronounce me A\nSCEPTIC, because I deny what you affirm, to wit, the existence of\nMatter? Since, for aught you can tell, I am as peremptory in my denial,\nas you in your affirmation.\n\nHYL.  Hold, Philonous, I have been a little out in my definition; but\nevery false step a man makes in discourse is not to be insisted on. I\nsaid indeed that a SCEPTIC was one who doubted of everything; but I\nshould have added, or who denies the reality and truth of things.\n\nPHIL.  What things? Do you mean the principles and theorems of sciences?\nBut these you know are universal intellectual notions, and consequently\nindependent of Matter. The denial therefore of this doth not imply the\ndenying them.\n\nHYL.  I grant it. But are there no other things? What think you of\ndistrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of sensible things,\nor pretending to know nothing of them. Is not this sufficient to\ndenominate a man a SCEPTIC?\n\nPHIL.  Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that denies the\nreality of sensible things, or professes the greatest ignorance of them;\nsince, if I take you rightly, he is to be esteemed the greatest\nSCEPTIC?\n\nHYL.  That is what I desire.\n\nPHIL.  What mean you by Sensible Things?\n\nHYL.  Those things which are perceived by the senses. Can you imagine\nthat I mean anything else?\n\nPHIL.  Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to apprehend your\nnotions, since this may much shorten our inquiry. Suffer me then to ask\nyou this farther question. Are those things only perceived by the senses\nwhich are perceived immediately? Or, may those things properly be said to\nbe SENSIBLE which are perceived mediately, or not without the\nintervention of others?\n\nHYL.  I do not sufficiently understand you.\n\nPHIL.  In reading a book, what I immediately perceive are the letters;\nbut mediately, or by means of these, are suggested to my mind the notions\nof God, virtue, truth, &c. Now, that the letters are truly sensible\nthings, or perceived by sense, there is no doubt: but I would know\nwhether you take the things suggested by them to be so too.\n\nHYL.  No, certainly: it were absurd to think GOD or VIRTUE sensible\nthings; though they may be signified and suggested to the mind by\nsensible marks, with which they have an arbitrary connexion.\n\nPHIL.  It seems then, that by SENSIBLE THINGS you mean those only\nwhich can be perceived IMMEDIATELY by sense?\n\nHYL.  Right.\n\nPHIL.  Doth it not follow from this, that though I see one part of the\nsky red, and another blue, and that my reason doth thence evidently\nconclude there must be some cause of that diversity of colours, yet that\ncause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of\nseeing?\n\nHYL.  It doth.\n\nPHIL.  In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, yet I cannot be\nsaid to hear the causes of those sounds?\n\nHYL.  You cannot.\n\nPHIL.  And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot and heavy, I\ncannot say, with any truth or propriety, that I feel the cause of its\nheat or weight?\n\nHYL.  To prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell you once for\nall, that by SENSIBLE THINGS I mean those only which are perceived by\nsense; and that in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not\nperceive IMMEDIATELY: for they make no inferences. The deducing\ntherefore of causes or occasions from effects and appearances, which\nalone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason.\n\nPHIL.  This point then is agreed between us--That SENSIBLE THINGS ARE\nTHOSE ONLY WHICH ARE IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVED BY SENSE. You will farther\ninform me, whether we immediately perceive by sight anything beside\nlight, and colours, and figures; or by hearing, anything but sounds; by\nthe palate, anything beside tastes; by the smell, beside odours; or by\nthe touch, more than tangible qualities.\n\nHYL.  We do not.\n\nPHIL.  It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible\nqualities, there remains nothing sensible?\n\nHYL.  I grant it.\n\nPHIL.  Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many\nsensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities?\n\nHYL.  Nothing else.\n\nPHIL.  HEAT then is a sensible thing?\n\nHYL.  Certainly.\n\nPHIL.  Doth the REALITY of sensible things consist in being perceived?\nor, is it something distinct from their being perceived, and that bears\nno relation to the mind?\n\nHYL.  To EXIST is one thing, and to be PERCEIVED is another.\n\nPHIL.  I speak with regard to sensible things only. And of these I ask,\nwhether by their real existence you mean a subsistence exterior to the\nmind, and distinct from their being perceived?\n\nHYL.  I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and without any\nrelation to, their being perceived.\n\nPHIL.  Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must exist without\nthe mind?\n\nHYL.  It must.\n\nPHIL.  Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally compatible to all\ndegrees of heat, which we perceive; or is there any reason why we should\nattribute it to some, and deny it to others? And if there be, pray let me\nknow that reason.\n\nHYL.  Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may be sure the\nsame exists in the object that occasions it.\n\nPHIL.  What! the greatest as well as the least?\n\nHYL.  _I_ tell you, the reason is plainly the same in respect of both.\nThey are both perceived by sense; nay, the greater degree of heat is more\nsensibly perceived; and consequently, if there is any difference,\nwe are more certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality\nof a lesser degree.\n\nPHIL.  But is not the most vehement and intense degree of heat a very\ngreat pain?\n\nHYL.  No one can deny it.\n\nPHIL.  And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or pleasure?\n\nHYL.  No, certainly.\n\nPHIL.  Is your material substance a senseless being, or a being endowed\nwith sense and perception?\n\nHYL.  It is senseless without doubt.\n\nPHIL.  It cannot therefore be the subject of pain?\n\nHYL.  By no means.\n\nPHIL.  Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by sense, since\nyou acknowledge this to be no small pain?\n\nHYL.  I grant it.\n\nPHIL.  What shall we say then of your external object; is it a material\nSubstance, or no?\n\nHYL.  It is a material substance with the sensible qualities inhering in\nit.\n\nPHIL.  How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own it cannot in\na material substance? I desire you would clear this point.\n\nHYL.  Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding intense heat to be a\npain. It should seem rather, that pain is something distinct from heat,\nand the consequence or effect of it.\n\nPHIL.  Upon putting your hand near the fire, do you perceive one simple\nuniform sensation, or two distinct sensations?\n\nHYL.  But one simple sensation.\n\nPHIL.  Is not the heat immediately perceived?\n\nHYL.  It is.\n\nPHIL.  And the pain?\n\nHYL.  True.\n\nPHIL.  Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived at the same\ntime, and the fire affects you only with one simple or uncompounded idea,\nit follows that this same simple idea is both the intense heat\nimmediately perceived, and the pain; and, consequently, that the intense\nheat immediately perceived is nothing distinct from a particular sort of\npain.\n\nHYL.  It seems so.\n\nPHIL.  Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can conceive a\nvehement sensation to be without pain or pleasure.\n\nHYL.  I cannot.\n\nPHIL.  Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible pain or pleasure\nin general, abstracted from every particular idea of heat, cold, tastes,\nsmells? &c.\n\nHYL.  I do not find that I can.\n\nPHIL.  Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is nothing\ndistinct from those sensations or ideas, in an intense degree?\n\nHYL.  It is undeniable; and, to speak the truth, I begin to suspect a\nvery great heat cannot exist but in a mind perceiving it.\n\nPHIL.  What! are you then in that sceptical state of suspense, between\naffirming and denying?\n\nHYL.  I think I may be positive in the point. A very violent and painful\nheat cannot exist without the mind.\n\nPHIL.  It hath not therefore according to you, any REAL being?\n\nHYL.  I own it.\n\nPHIL.  Is it therefore certain, that there is no body in nature really\nhot?\n\nHYL.  I have not denied there is any real heat in bodies. I only say,\nthere is no such thing as an intense real heat.\n\nPHIL.  But, did you not say before that all degrees of heat were equally\nreal; or, if there was any difference, that the greater were more\nundoubtedly real than the lesser?\n\nHYL.  True: but it was because I did not then consider the ground there\nis for distinguishing between them, which I now plainly see. And it is\nthis: because intense heat is nothing else but a particular kind of\npainful sensation; and pain cannot exist but in a perceiving being; it\nfollows that no intense heat can really exist in an unperceiving\ncorporeal substance. But this is no reason why we should deny heat in an\ninferior degree to exist in such a substance.\n\nPHIL.  But how shall we be able to discern those degrees of heat which\nexist only in the mind from those which exist without it?\n\nHYL.  That is no difficult matter. You know the least pain cannot exist\nunperceived; whatever, therefore, degree of heat is a pain exists only in\nthe mind. But, as for all other degrees of heat, nothing obliges us to\nthink the same of them.\n\nPHIL.  I think you granted before that no unperceiving being was capable\nof pleasure, any more than of pain.\n\nHYL.  I did.\n\nPHIL.  And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree of heat than what\ncauses uneasiness, a pleasure?\n\nHYL.  What then?\n\nPHIL.  Consequently, it cannot exist without the mind in an unperceiving\nsubstance, or body.\n\nHYL.  So it seems.\n\nPHIL.  Since, therefore, as well those degrees of heat that are not\npainful, as those that are, can exist only in a thinking substance; may\nwe not conclude that external bodies are absolutely incapable of any\ndegree of heat whatsoever?\n\nHYL.  On second thoughts, I do not think it so evident that warmth is a\npleasure as that a great degree of heat is a pain.\n\nPHIL.  _I_ do not pretend that warmth is as great a pleasure as heat is\na pain. But, if you grant it to be even a small pleasure, it serves to\nmake good my conclusion.\n\nHYL.  I could rather call it an INDOLENCE. It seems to be nothing more\nthan a privation of both pain and pleasure. And that such a quality or\nstate as this may agree to an unthinking substance, I hope you will not\ndeny.\n\nPHIL.  If you are resolved to maintain that warmth, or a gentle degree\nof heat, is no pleasure, I know not how to convince you otherwise than by\nappealing to your own sense. But what think you of cold?\n\nHYL.  The same that I do of heat. An intense degree of cold is a pain;\nfor to feel a very great cold, is to perceive a great uneasiness: it\ncannot therefore exist without the mind; but a lesser degree of cold may,\nas well as a lesser degree of heat.\n\nPHIL.  Those bodies, therefore, upon whose application to our own, we\nperceive a moderate degree of heat, must be concluded to have a moderate\ndegree of heat or warmth in them; and those, upon whose application we\nfeel a like degree of cold, must be thought to have cold in them.\n\nHYL.  They must.\n\nPHIL.  Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a man into an\nabsurdity?\n\nHYL.  Without doubt it cannot.\n\nPHIL.  Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing should be at\nthe same time both cold and warm?\n\nHYL.  It is.\n\nPHIL.  Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other cold, and that\nthey are both at once put into the same vessel of water, in an\nintermediate state; will not the water seem cold to one hand, and warm to\nthe other?\n\nHYL.  It will.\n\nPHIL.  Ought we not therefore, by your principles, to conclude it is\nreally both cold and warm at the same time, that is, according to your\nown concession, to believe an absurdity?\n\nHYL.  I confess it seems so.\n\nPHIL.  Consequently, the principles themselves are false, since you have\ngranted that no true principle leads to an absurdity.\n\nHYL.  But, after all, can anything be more absurd than to say, THERE IS\nNO HEAT IN THE FIRE?\n\nPHIL.  To make the point still clearer; tell me whether, in two cases\nexactly alike, we ought not to make the same judgment?\n\nHYL.  We ought.\n\nPHIL.  When a pin pricks your finger, doth it not rend and divide the\nfibres of your flesh?\n\nHYL.  It doth.\n\nPHIL.  And when a coal burns your finger, doth it any more?\n\nHYL.  It doth not.\n\nPHIL.  Since, therefore, you neither judge the sensation itself\noccasioned by the pin, nor anything like it to be in the pin; you should\nnot, conformably to what you have now granted, judge the sensation\noccasioned by the fire, or anything like it, to be in the fire.\n\nHYL.  Well, since it must be so, I am content to yield this point, and\nacknowledge that heat and cold are only sensations existing in our minds.\nBut there still remain qualities enough to secure the reality of external\nthings.\n\nPHIL.  But what will you say, Hylas, if it shall appear that the case is\nthe same with regard to all other sensible qualities, and that they can\nno more be supposed to exist without the mind, than heat and cold?\n\nHYL.  Then indeed you will have done something to the purpose; but that\nis what I despair of seeing proved.\n\nPHIL.  Let us examine them in order. What think you of TASTES, do they\nexist without the mind, or no?\n\nHYL.  Can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is sweet, or\nwormwood bitter?\n\nPHIL.  Inform me, Hylas. Is a sweet taste a particular kind of pleasure\nor pleasant sensation, or is it not?\n\nHYL.  It is.\n\nPHIL.  And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or pain?\n\nHYL.  I grant it.\n\nPHIL.  If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking corporeal\nsubstances existing without the mind, how can sweetness and bitterness,\nthat is, Pleasure and pain, agree to them?\n\nHYL.  Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was delude time. You asked\nwhether heat and cold, sweetness at were not particular sorts of pleasure\nand pain; to which simply, that they were. Whereas I should have thus\ndistinguished: those qualities, as perceived by us, are pleasures or pair\nexisting in the external objects. We must not therefore conclude\nabsolutely, that there is no heat in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar,\nbut only that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the fire\nor sugar. What say you to this?\n\nPHIL.  I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse proceeded\naltogether concerning sensible things, which you defined to be, THE\nTHINGS WE IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVE BY OUR SENSES. Whatever other qualities,\ntherefore, you speak of as distinct from these, I know nothing of them,\nneither do they at all belong to the point in dispute. You may, indeed,\npretend to have discovered certain qualities which you do not perceive,\nand assert those insensible qualities exist in fire and sugar. But what\nuse can be made of this to your present purpose, I am at a loss to\nconceive. Tell me then once more, do you acknowledge that heat and cold,\nsweetness and bitterness (meaning those qualities which are perceived by\nthe senses), do not exist without the mind?\n\nHYL.  I see it is to no purpose to hold out, so I give up the cause as\nto those mentioned qualities. Though I profess it sounds oddly, to say\nthat sugar is not sweet.\n\nPHIL.  But, for your farther satisfaction, take this along with you:\nthat which at other times seems sweet, shall, to a distempered palate,\nappear bitter. And, nothing can be plainer than that divers persons\nperceive different tastes in the same food; since that which one man\ndelights in, another abhors. And how could this be, if the taste was\nsomething really inherent in the food?\n\nHYL.  I acknowledge I know not how.\n\nPHIL.  In the next place, ODOURS are to be considered. And, with\nregard to these, I would fain know whether what hath been said of\ntastes doth not exactly agree to them? Are they not so many pleasing or\ndispleasing sensations?\n\nHYL.  They are.\n\nPHIL.  Can you then conceive it possible that they should exist in an\nunperceiving thing?\n\nHYL.  I cannot.\n\nPHIL.  Or, can you imagine that filth and ordure affect those brute\nanimals that feed on them out of choice, with the same smells which we\nperceive in them?\n\nHYL.  By no means.\n\nPHIL.  May we not therefore conclude of smells, as of the other\nforementioned qualities, that they cannot exist in any but a perceiving\nsubstance or mind?\n\nHYL.  I think so.\n\nPHIL.  Then as to SOUNDS, what must we think of them: are they\naccidents really inherent in external bodies, or not?\n\nHYL.  That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain from hence:\nbecause a bell struck in the exhausted receiver of an air-pump sends\nforth no sound. The air, therefore, must be thought the subject of sound.\n\nPHIL.  What reason is there for that, Hylas?\n\nHYL.  Because, when any motion is raised in the air, we perceive a sound\ngreater or lesser, according to the air's motion; but without some motion\nin the air, we never hear any sound at all.\n\nPHIL.  And granting that we never hear a sound but when some motion is\nproduced in the air, yet I do not see how you can infer from thence, that\nthe sound itself is in the air.\n\nHYL.  It is this very motion in the external air that produces in the\nmind the sensation of SOUND. For, striking on the drum of the ear, it\ncauseth a vibration, which by the auditory nerves being communicated to\nthe brain, the soul is thereupon affected with the sensation called\nSOUND.\n\nPHIL.  What! is sound then a sensation?\n\nHYL.  I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular sensation in\nthe mind.\n\nPHIL.  And can any sensation exist without the mind?\n\nHYL.  No, certainly.\n\nPHIL.  How then can sound, being a sensation, exist in the air, if by\nthe AIR you mean a senseless substance existing without the mind?\n\nHYL.  You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as it is\nperceived by us, and as it is in itself; or (which is the same thing)\nbetween the sound we immediately perceive, and that which exists without\nus. The former, indeed, is a particular kind of sensation, but the latter\nis merely a vibrative or undulatory motion the air.\n\nPHIL.  I thought I had already obviated that distinction, by answer I\ngave when you were applying it in a like case before. But, to say no more\nof that, are you sure then that sound is really nothing but motion?\n\nHYL.  I am.\n\nPHIL.  Whatever therefore agrees to real sound, may with truth be\nattributed to motion?\n\nHYL.  It may.\n\nPHIL.  It is then good sense to speak of MOTION as of a thing that is\nLOUD, SWEET, ACUTE, or GRAVE.\n\nHYL.  _I_ see you are resolved not to understand me. Is it not evident\nthose accidents or modes belong only to sensible sound, or SOUND in the\ncommon acceptation of the word, but not to sound in the real and\nphilosophic sense; which, as I just now told you, is nothing but a\ncertain motion of the air?\n\nPHIL.  It seems then there are two sorts of sound--the one vulgar, or\nthat which is heard, the other philosophical and real?\n\nHYL.  Even so.\n\nPHIL.  And the latter consists in motion?\n\nHYL.  I told you so before.\n\nPHIL.  Tell me, Hylas, to which of the senses, think you, the idea of\nmotion belongs? to the hearing?\n\nHYL.  No, certainly; but to the sight and touch.\n\nPHIL.  It should follow then, that, according to you, real sounds may\npossibly be SEEN OR FELT, but never HEARD.\n\nHYL.  Look you, Philonous, you may, if you please, make a jest of my\nopinion, but that will not alter the truth of things. I own, indeed, the\ninferences you draw me into sound something oddly; but common language,\nyou know, is framed by, and for the use of the vulgar: we must not\ntherefore wonder if expressions adapted to exact philosophic notions seem\nuncouth and out of the way.\n\nPHIL.  Is it come to that? I assure you, I imagine myself to have gained\nno small point, since you make so light of departing from common phrases\nand opinions; it being a main part of our inquiry, to examine whose\nnotions are widest of the common road, and most repugnant to the\ngeneral sense of the world. But, can you think it no more than a\nphilosophical paradox, to say that REAL SOUNDS ARE NEVER HEARD, and\nthat the idea of them is obtained by some other sense? And is there\nnothing in this contrary to nature and the truth of things?\n\nHYL.  To deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And, after the concessions\nalready made, I had as well grant that sounds too have no real being\nwithout the mind.\n\nPHIL.  And I hope you will make no difficulty to acknowledge the same of\nCOLOURS.\n\nHYL.  Pardon me: the case of colours is very different. Can anything be\nplainer than that we see them on the objects?\n\nPHIL.  The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal Substances\nexisting without the mind?\n\nHYL.  They are.\n\nPHIL.  And have true and real colours inhering in them?\n\nHYL.  Each visible object hath that colour which we see in it.\n\nPHIL.  How! is there anything visible but what we perceive by sight?\n\nHYL.  There is not.\n\nPHIL.  And, do we perceive anything by sense which we do not perceive\nimmediately?\n\nHYL.  How often must I be obliged to repeat the same thing? I tell you,\nwe do not.\n\nPHIL.  Have patience, good Hylas; and tell me once more, whether there\nis anything immediately perceived by the senses, except sensible\nqualities. I know you asserted there was not; but I would now be\ninformed, whether you still persist in the same opinion.\n\nHYL.  I do.\n\nPHIL.  Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible quality, or\nmade up of sensible qualities?\n\nHYL.  What a question that is! who ever thought it was?\n\nPHIL.  My reason for asking was, because in saying, EACH VISIBLE OBJECT\nHATH THAT COLOUR WHICH WE SEE IN IT, you make visible objects to be\ncorporeal substances; which implies either that corporeal substances are\nsensible qualities, or else that there is something besides sensible\nqualities perceived by sight: but, as this point was formerly agreed\nbetween us, and is still maintained by you, it is a clear consequence,\nthat your CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE is nothing distinct from SENSIBLE\nQUALITIES.\n\nHYL.  You may draw as many absurd consequences as you please, and\nendeavour to perplex the plainest things; but you shall never persuade me\nout of my senses. I clearly understand my own meaning.\n\nPHIL.  I wish you would make me understand it too. But, since you are\nunwilling to have your notion of corporeal substance examined, I shall\nurge that point no farther. Only be pleased to let me know, whether the\nsame colours which we see exist in external bodies, or some other.\n\nHYL.  The very same.\n\nPHIL.  What! are then the beautiful red and purple we see on yonder\nclouds really in them? Or do you imagine they have in themselves any\nother form than that of a dark mist or vapour?\n\nHYL.  I must own, Philonous, those colours are not really in the clouds\nas they seem to be at this distance. They are only apparent colours.\n\nPHIL.  APPARENT call you them? how shall we distinguish these apparent\ncolours from real?\n\nHYL.  Very easily. Those are to be thought apparent which, appearing\nonly at a distance, vanish upon a nearer approach.\n\nPHIL.  And those, I suppose, are to be thought real which are discovered\nby the most near and exact survey.\n\nHYL.  Right.\n\nPHIL.  Is the nearest and exactest survey made by the help of a\nmicroscope, or by the naked eye?\n\nHYL.  By a microscope, doubtless.\n\nPHIL.  But a microscope often discovers colours in an object different\nfrom those perceived by the unassisted sight. And, in case we had\nmicroscopes magnifying to any assigned degree, it is certain that no\nobject whatsoever, viewed through them, would appear in the same colour\nwhich it exhibits to the naked eye.\n\nHYL.  And what will you conclude from all this? You cannot argue that\nthere are really and naturally no colours on objects: because by\nartificial managements they may be altered, or made to vanish.\n\nPHIL.  I think it may evidently be concluded from your own concessions,\nthat all the colours we see with our naked eyes are only apparent as\nthose on the clouds, since they vanish upon a more close and accurate\ninspection which is afforded us by a microscope. Then' as to what you say\nby way of prevention: I ask you whether the real and natural state\nof an object is better discovered by a very sharp and piercing sight, or\nby one which is less sharp?\n\nHYL.  By the former without doubt.\n\nPHIL.  Is it not plain from DIOPTRICS that microscopes make the sight\nmore penetrating, and represent objects as they would appear to the eye\nin case it were naturally endowed with a most exquisite sharpness?\n\nHYL.  It is.\n\nPHIL.  Consequently the microscopical representation is to be thought\nthat which best sets forth the real nature of the thing, or what it is in\nitself. The colours, therefore, by it perceived are more genuine and real\nthan those perceived otherwise.\n\nHYL.  I confess there is something in what you say.\n\nPHIL.  Besides, it is not only possible but manifest, that there\nactually are animals whose eyes are by nature framed to perceive those\nthings which by reason of their minuteness escape our sight. What think\nyou of those inconceivably small animals perceived by glasses? must we\nsuppose they are all stark blind? Or, in case they see, can it be\nimagined their sight hath not the same use in preserving their bodies\nfrom injuries, which appears in that of all other animals? And if it\nhath, is it not evident they must see particles less than their own\nbodies; which will present them with a far different view in each object\nfrom that which strikes our senses? Even our own eyes do not always\nrepresent objects to us after the same manner. In the jaundice every one\nknows that all things seem yellow. Is it not therefore highly probable\nthose animals in whose eyes we discern a very different texture from that\nof ours, and whose bodies abound with different humours, do not see the\nsame colours in every object that we do? From all which, should it not\nseem to follow that all colours are equally apparent, and that none of\nthose which we perceive are really inherent in any outward object?\n\nHYL.  It should.\n\nPHIL.  The point will be past all doubt, if you consider that, in case\ncolours were real properties or affections inherent in external bodies,\nthey could admit of no alteration without some change wrought in the very\nbodies themselves: but, is it not evident from what hath been said that,\nupon the use of microscopes, upon a change happening in the burnouts of\nthe eye, or a variation of distance, without any manner of real\nalteration in the thing itself, the colours of any object are\neither changed, or totally disappear? Nay, all other circumstances\nremaining the same, change but the situation of some objects, and they\nshall present different colours to the eye. The same thing happens upon\nviewing an object in various degrees of light. And what is more known\nthan that the same bodies appear differently coloured by candle-light\nfrom what they do in the open day? Add to these the experiment of a prism\nwhich, separating the heterogeneous rays of light, alters the colour of\nany object, and will cause the whitest to appear of a deep blue or red to\nthe naked eye. And now tell me whether you are still of opinion that\nevery body hath its true real colour inhering in it; and, if you think it\nhath, I would fain know farther from you, what certain distance and\nposition of the object, what peculiar texture and formation of the eye,\nwhat degree or kind of light is necessary for ascertaining that true\ncolour, and distinguishing it from apparent ones.\n\nHYL.  I own myself entirely satisfied, that they are all equally\napparent, and that there is no such thing as colour really inhering in\nexternal bodies, but that it is altogether in the light. And what\nconfirms me in this opinion is, that in proportion to the light colours\nare still more or less vivid; and if there be no light, then are there no\ncolours perceived. Besides, allowing there are colours on external\nobjects, yet, how is it possible for us to perceive them? For no external\nbody affects the mind, unless it acts first on our organs of sense. But\nthe only action of bodies is motion; and motion cannot be communicated\notherwise than by impulse. A distant object therefore cannot act on the\neye; nor consequently make itself or its properties perceivable to the\nsoul. Whence it plainly follows that it is immediately some contiguous\nsubstance, which, operating on the eye, occasions a perception of\ncolours: and such is light.\n\nPHIL.  Howl is light then a substance?\n\nHYL. . I tell you, Philonous, external light is nothing but a thin fluid\nsubstance, whose minute particles being agitated with a brisk motion, and\nin various manners reflected from the different surfaces of outward\nobjects to the eyes, communicate different motions to the optic nerves;\nwhich, being propagated to the brain, cause therein various impressions;\nand these are attended with the sensations of red, blue, yellow, &c.\n\nPHIL.  It seems then the light doth no more than shake the optic nerves.\n\nHYL.  Nothing else.\n\nPHIL.  And consequent to each particular motion of the nerves, the mind\nis affected with a sensation, which is some particular colour.\n\nHYL.  Right.\n\nPHIL.  And these sensations have no existence without the mind.\n\nHYL.  They have not.\n\nPHIL.  How then do you affirm that colours are in the light; since by\nLIGHT you understand a corporeal substance external to the mind?\n\nHYL.  Light and colours, as immediately perceived by us, I grant cannot\nexist without the mind. But in themselves they are only the motions and\nconfigurations of certain insensible particles of matter.\n\nPHIL.  Colours then, in the vulgar sense, or taken for the immediate\nobjects of sight, cannot agree to any but a perceiving substance.\n\nHYL.  That is what I say.\n\nPHIL.  Well then, since you give up the point as to those sensible\nqualities which are alone thought colours by all mankind beside, you may\nhold what you please with regard to those invisible ones of the\nphilosophers. It is not my business to dispute about THEM; only I would\nadvise you to bethink yourself, whether, considering the inquiry we are\nupon, it be prudent for you to affirm--THE RED AND BLUE WHICH WE SEE ARE\nNOT REAL COLOURS, BUT CERTAIN UNKNOWN MOTIONS AND FIGURES WHICH NO MAN\nEVER DID OR CAN SEE ARE TRULY SO. Are not these shocking notions, and\nare not they subject to as many ridiculous inferences, as those you were\nobliged to renounce before in the case of sounds?\n\nHYL.  I frankly own, Philonous, that it is in vain to longer. Colours,\nsounds, tastes, in a word all those termed SECONDARY QUALITIES, have\ncertainly no existence without the mind. But by this acknowledgment I\nmust not be supposed to derogate, the reality of Matter, or external\nobjects; seeing it is no more than several philosophers maintain, who\nnevertheless are the farthest imaginable from denying Matter. For the\nclearer understanding of this, you must know sensible qualities are by\nphilosophers divided into PRIMARY and SECONDARY. The former are\nExtension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest; and these\nthey hold exist really in bodies. The latter are those above enumerated;\nor, briefly, ALL SENSIBLE QUALITIES BESIDE THE PRIMARY; which they\nassert are only so many sensations or ideas existing nowhere but in the\nmind. But all this, I doubt not, you are apprised of. For my part, I have\nbeen a long time sensible there was such an opinion current among\nphilosophers, but was never thoroughly convinced of its truth until now.\n\nPHIL.  You are still then of opinion that EXTENSION and FIGURES are\ninherent in external unthinking substances?\n\nHYL.  I am.\n\nPHIL.  But what if the same arguments which are brought against\nSecondary Qualities will hold good against these also?\n\nHYL.  Why then I shall be obliged to think, they too exist only in the\nmind.\n\nPHIL.  Is it your opinion the very figure and extension which you\nperceive by sense exist in the outward object or material substance?\nHYL.  It is.\n\nPHIL.  Have all other animals as good grounds to think the same of the\nfigure and extension which they see and feel?\n\nHYL.  Without doubt, if they have any thought at all.\n\nPHIL.  Answer me, Hylas. Think you the senses were bestowed upon all\nanimals for their preservation and well-being in life? or were they given\nto men alone for this end?\n\nHYL.  I make no question but they have the same use in all other\nanimals.\n\nPHIL.  If so, is it not necessary they should be enabled by them to\nperceive their own limbs, and those bodies which are capable of harming\nthem?\n\nHYL.  Certainly.\n\nPHIL.  A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own foot, and things\nequal or even less than it, as bodies of some considerable dimension;\nthough at the same time they appear to you scarce discernible, or at best\nas so many visible points?\n\nHYL.  I cannot deny it.\n\nPHIL.  And to creatures less than the mite they will seem yet larger?\n\nHYL.  They will.\n\nPHIL.  Insomuch that what you can hardly discern will to another\nextremely minute animal appear as some huge mountain?\n\nHYL.  All this I grant.\n\nPHIL.  Can one and the same thing be at the same time in itself of\ndifferent dimensions?\n\nHYL.  That were absurd to imagine.\n\nPHIL.  But, from what you have laid down it follows that both the\nextension by you perceived, and that perceived by the mite itself, as\nlikewise all those perceived by lesser animals, are each of them the true\nextension of the mite's foot; that is to say, by your own principles you\nare led into an absurdity.\n\nHYL.  There seems to be some difficulty in the point.\n\nPHIL.  Again, have you not acknowledged that no real inherent property\nof any object can be changed without some change in the thing itself?\n\nHYL.  I have.\n\nPHIL.  But, as we approach to or recede from an object, the visible\nextension varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred times greater\nthan another. Doth it not therefore follow from hence likewise that it is\nnot really inherent in the object?\n\nHYL.  I own I am at a loss what to think.\n\nPHIL.  Your judgment will soon be determined, if you will venture to\nthink as freely concerning this quality as you have done concerning the\nrest. Was it not admitted as a good argument, that neither heat nor cold\nwas in the water, because it seemed warm to one hand and cold to the\nother?\n\nHYL.  It was.\n\nPHIL.  Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude, there is no\nextension or figure in an object, because to one eye it shall seem\nlittle, smooth, and round, when at the same time it appears to the other,\ngreat, uneven, and regular?\n\nHYL.  The very same. But does this latter fact ever happen?\n\nPHIL.  You may at any time make the experiment, by looking with one eye\nbare, and with the other through a microscope.\n\nHYL.  I know not how to maintain it; and yet I am loath to give up\nEXTENSION, I see so many odd consequences following upon such a\nconcession.\n\nPHIL.  Odd, say you? After the concessions already made, I hope you will\nstick at nothing for its oddness. But, on the other hand, should it not\nseem very odd, if the general reasoning which includes all other\nsensible qualities did not also include extension? If it be allowed that\nno idea, nor anything like an idea, can exist in an unperceiving\nsubstance, then surely it follows that no figure, or mode of extension,\nwhich we can either perceive, or imagine, or have any idea of, can be\nreally inherent in Matter; not to mention the peculiar difficulty there\nmust be in conceiving a material substance, prior to and distinct from\nextension to be the SUBSTRATUM of extension. Be the sensible quality\nwhat it will--figure, or sound, or colour, it seems alike impossible it\nshould subsist in that which doth not perceive it.\n\nHYL.  I give up the point for the present, reserving still a right to\nretract my opinion, in case I shall hereafter discover any false step in\nmy progress to it.\n\nPHIL.  That is a right you cannot be denied. Figures and extension being\ndespatched, we proceed next to MOTION. Can a real motion in any\nexternal body be at the same time very swift and very slow?\n\nHYL.  It cannot.\n\nPHIL.  Is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal proportion to\nthe time it takes up in describing any given space? Thus a body that\ndescribes a mile in an hour moves three times faster than it would in\ncase it described only a mile in three hours.\n\nHYL.  I agree with you.\n\nPHIL.  And is not time measured by the succession of ideas in our minds?\n\nHYL.  It is.\n\nPHIL.  And is it not possible ideas should succeed one another twice as\nfast in your mind as they do in mine, or in that of some spirit of\nanother kind?\n\nHYL.  I own it.\n\nPHIL.  Consequently the same body may to another seem to perform its\nmotion over any space in half the time that it doth to you. And the same\nreasoning will hold as to any other proportion: that is to say, according\nto your principles (since the motions perceived are both really in the\nobject) it is possible one and the same body shall be really moved the\nsame way at once, both very swift and very slow. How is this consistent\neither with common sense, or with what you just now granted?\n\nHYL.  I have nothing to say to it.\n\nPHIL.  Then as for SOLIDITY; either you do not mean any sensible\nquality by that word, and so it is beside our inquiry: or if you do, it\nmust be either hardness or resistance. But both the one and the other are\nplainly relative to our senses: it being evident that what seems hard to\none animal may appear soft to another, who hath greater force and\nfirmness of limbs. Nor is it less plain that the resistance I feel is not\nin the body.\n\nHYL.  I own the very SENSATION of resistance, which is all you\nimmediately perceive, is not in the body; but the CAUSE of that\nsensation is.\n\nPHIL.  But the causes of our sensations are not things immediately\nperceived, and therefore are not sensible. This point I thought had been\nalready determined.\n\nHYL.  I own it was; but you will pardon me if I seem a little\nembarrassed: I know not how to quit my old notions.\n\nPHIL.  To help you out, do but consider that if EXTENSION be once\nacknowledged to have no existence without the mind, the same must\nnecessarily be granted of motion, solidity, and gravity; since they all\nevidently suppose extension. It is therefore superfluous to inquire\nparticularly concerning each of them. In denying extension, you have\ndenied them all to have any real existence.\n\nHYL.  I wonder, Philonous, if what you say be true, why those\nphilosophers who deny the Secondary Qualities any real existence should\nyet attribute it to the Primary. If there is no difference between them,\nhow can this be accounted for?\n\nPHIL.  It is not my business to account for every opinion of the\nphilosophers. But, among other reasons which may be assigned for this, it\nseems probable that pleasure and pain being rather annexed to the former\nthan the latter may be one. Heat and cold, tastes and smells, have\nsomething more vividly pleasing or disagreeable than the ideas of\nextension, figure, and motion affect us with. And, it being too visibly\nabsurd to hold that pain or pleasure can be in an unperceiving substance,\nmen are more easily weaned from believing the external existence of the\nSecondary than the Primary Qualities. You will be satisfied there is\nsomething in this, if you recollect the difference you made between an\nintense and more moderate degree of heat; allowing the one a real\nexistence, while you denied it to the other. But, after all, there is no\nrational ground for that distinction; for, surely an indifferent\nsensation is as truly a SENSATION as one more pleasing or\npainful; and consequently should not any more than they be supposed to\nexist in an unthinking subject.\n\nHYL.  It is just come into my head, Philonous, that I have somewhere\nheard of a distinction between absolute and sensible extension. Now,\nthough it be acknowledged that GREAT and SMALL, consisting merely in\nthe relation which other extended beings have to the parts of our own\nbodies, do not really inhere in the substances themselves; yet nothing\nobliges us to hold the same with regard to ABSOLUTE EXTENSION, which is\nsomething abstracted from GREAT and SMALL, from this or that\nparticular magnitude or figure. So likewise as to motion; SWIFT and\nSLOW are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in our own\nminds. But, it doth not follow, because those modifications of motion\nexist not without the mind, that therefore absolute motion abstracted\nfrom them doth not.\n\nPHIL.  Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or one part of\nextension, from another? Is it not something sensible, as some degree of\nswiftness or slowness, some certain magnitude or figure peculiar to each?\n\nHYL.  I think so.\n\nPHIL.  These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible properties,\nare without all specific and numerical differences, as the schools call\nthem.\n\nHYL.  They are.\n\nPHIL.  That is to say, they are extension in general, and motion in\ngeneral.\n\nHYL.  Let it be so.\n\nPHIL.  But it is a universally received maxim that EVERYTHING WHICH\nEXISTS IS PARTICULAR. How then can motion in general, or extension in\ngeneral, exist in any corporeal substance?\n\nHYL.  I will take time to solve your difficulty.\n\nPHIL.  But I think the point may be speedily decided. Without doubt you\ncan tell whether you are able to frame this or that idea. Now I am\ncontent to put our dispute on this issue. If you can frame in your\nthoughts a distinct ABSTRACT IDEA of motion or extension, divested of\nall those sensible modes, as swift and slow, great and small, round and\nsquare, and the like, which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I\nwill then yield the point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be\nunreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have no\nnotion of.\n\nHYL.  To confess ingenuously, I cannot.\n\nPHIL.  Can you even separate the ideas of extension and motion from the\nideas of all those qualities which they who make the distinction term\nSECONDARY?\n\nHYL.  What! is it not an easy matter to consider extension and motion by\nthemselves, abstracted from all other sensible qualities? Pray how do the\nmathematicians treat of them?\n\nPHIL.  I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general\npropositions and reasonings about those qualities, without mentioning any\nother; and, in this sense, to consider or treat of them abstractedly.\nBut, how doth it follow that, because I can pronounce the word MOTION\nby itself, I can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive of body? or,\nbecause theorems may be made of extension and figures, without any\nmention of GREAT or SMALL, or any other sensible mode or quality,\nthat therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of extension, without\nany particular size or figure, or sensible quality, should be\ndistinctly formed, and apprehended by the mind? Mathematicians treat of\nquantity, without regarding what other sensible qualities it is attended\nwith, as being altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when\nlaying aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I believe you\nwill find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas of extension.\n\nHYL.  But what say you to PURE INTELLECT? May not abstracted ideas be\nframed by that faculty?\n\nPHIL.  Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is plain I cannot\nframe them by the help of PURE INTELLECT; whatsoever faculty you\nunderstand by those words. Besides, not to inquire into the nature of\npure intellect and its spiritual objects, as VIRTUE, REASON, GOD,\nor the like, thus much seems manifest--that sensible things are only to\nbe perceived by sense, or represented by the imagination. Figures,\ntherefore, and extension, being originally perceived by sense, do not\nbelong to pure intellect: but, for your farther satisfaction, try if you\ncan frame the idea of any figure, abstracted from all particularities of\nsize, or even from other sensible qualities.\n\nHYL.  Let me think a little--I do not find that I can.\n\nPHIL.  And can you think it possible that should really exist in nature\nwhich implies a repugnancy in its conception?\n\nHYL.  By no means.\n\nPHIL.  Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind to disunite\nthe ideas of extension and motion from all other sensible qualities, doth\nit not follow, that where the one exist there necessarily the other exist\nlikewise?\n\nHYL.  It should seem so.\n\nPHIL.  Consequently, the very same arguments which you admitted as\nconclusive against the Secondary Qualities are, without any farther\napplication of force, against the Primary too. Besides, if you will trust\nyour senses, is it not plain all sensible qualities coexist, or to them\nappear as being in the same place? Do they ever represent a motion, or\nfigure, as being divested of all other visible and tangible qualities?\n\nHYL.  You need say no more on this head. I am free to own, if there be\nno secret error or oversight in our proceedings hitherto, that all\nsensible qualities are alike to be denied existence without the mind.\nBut, my fear is that I have been too liberal in my former concessions, or\noverlooked some fallacy or other. In short, I did not take time to think.\n\nPHIL.  For that matter, Hylas, you may take what time you please in\nreviewing the progress of our inquiry. You are at liberty to recover any\nslips you might have made, or offer whatever you have omitted which makes\nfor your first opinion.\n\nHYL.  One great oversight I take to be this--that I did not sufficiently\ndistinguish the OBJECT from the SENSATION. Now, though this latter\nmay not exist without the mind, yet it will not thence follow that the\nformer cannot.\n\nPHIL.  What object do you mean? the object of the senses?\n\nHYL.  The same.\n\nPHIL.  It is then immediately perceived?\n\nHYL.  Right.\n\nPHIL.  Make me to understand the difference between what is immediately\nperceived and a sensation.\n\nHYL.  The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; besides\nwhich, there is something perceived; and this I call the OBJECT. For\nexample, there is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the act of\nperceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the tulip.\n\nPHIL.  What tulip do you speak of? Is it that which you see?\n\nHYL.  The same.\n\nPHIL.  And what do you see beside colour, figure, and extension?\n\nHYL.  Nothing.\n\nPHIL.  What you would say then is that the red and yellow are coexistent\nwith the extension; is it not?\n\nHYL.  That is not all; I would say they have a real existence without\nthe mind, in some unthinking substance.\n\nPHIL.  That the colours are really in the tulip which I see is manifest.\nNeither can it be denied that this tulip may exist independent of your\nmind or mine; but, that any immediate object of the senses,--that is, any\nidea, or combination of ideas--should exist in an unthinking substance,\nor exterior to ALL minds, is in itself an evident contradiction. Nor\ncan I imagine how this follows from what you said just now, to wit, that\nthe red and yellow were on the tulip you SAW, since you do not pretend\nto SEE that unthinking substance.\n\nHYL.  You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our inquiry from\nthe subject.\n\nPHIL.  I see you have no mind to be pressed that way. To return then to\nyour distinction between SENSATION and OBJECT; if I take you right,\nyou distinguish in every perception two things, the one an action of the\nmind, the other not.\n\nHYL.  True.\n\nPHIL.  And this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any unthinking\nthing; but, whatever beside is implied in a perception may?\n\nHYL.  That is my meaning.\n\nPHIL.  So that if there was a perception without any act of the mind, it\nwere possible such a perception should exist in an unthinking substance?\n\nHYL.  I grant it. But it is impossible there should be such a\nperception.\n\nPHIL.  When is the mind said to be active?\n\nHYL.  When it produces, puts an end to, or changes, anything.\n\nPHIL.  Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change anything, but by an\nact of the will?\n\nHYL.  It cannot.\n\nPHIL.  The mind therefore is to be accounted ACTIVE in its perceptions\nso far forth as VOLITION is included in them?\n\nHYL.  It is.\n\nPHIL.  In plucking this flower I am active; because I do it by the\nmotion of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition; so likewise in\napplying it to my nose. But is either of these smelling?\n\nHYL.  NO.\n\nPHIL.  I act too in drawing the air through my nose; because my\nbreathing so rather than otherwise is the effect of my volition. But\nneither can this be called SMELLING: for, if it were, I should smell\nevery time I breathed in that manner?\n\nHYL.  True.\n\nPHIL.  Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this?\n\nHYL.  It is.\n\nPHIL.  But I do not find my will concerned any farther. Whatever more\nthere is--as that I perceive such a particular smell, or any smell at\nall--this is independent of my will, and therein I am altogether passive.\nDo you find it otherwise with you, Hylas?\n\nHYL.  No, the very same.\n\nPHIL.  Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power to open your eyes, or\nkeep them shut; to turn them this or that way?\n\nHYL.  Without doubt.\n\nPHIL.  But, doth it in like manner depend on YOUR will that in looking\non this flower you perceive WHITE rather than any other colour? Or,\ndirecting your open eyes towards yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid\nseeing the sun? Or is light or darkness the effect of your volition?\n\nHYL.  No, certainly.\n\nPHIL.  You are then in these respects altogether passive?  HYL.\nI am.\n\nPHIL.  Tell me now, whether SEEING consists in perceiving light and\ncolours, or in opening and turning the eyes?\n\nHYL.  Without doubt, in the former.\n\nPHIL.  Since therefore you are in the very perception of light and\ncolours altogether passive, what is become of that action you were\nspeaking of as an ingredient in every sensation? And, doth it not follow\nfrom your own concessions, that the perception of light and colours,\nincluding no action in it, may exist in an unperceiving substance? And is\nnot this a plain contradiction?\n\nHYL.  I know not what to think of it.\n\nPHIL.  Besides, since you distinguish the ACTIVE and PASSIVE in\nevery perception, you must do it in that of pain. But how is it possible\nthat pain, be it as little active as you please, should exist in an\nunperceiving substance? In short, do but consider the point, and then\nconfess ingenuously, whether light and colours, tastes, sounds, &c. are\nnot all equally passions or sensations in the soul. You may indeed call\nthem EXTERNAL OBJECTS, and give them in words what subsistence you\nplease. But, examine your own thoughts, and then tell me whether it be\nnot as I say?\n\nHYL.  I acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair observation of what\npasses in my mind, I can discover nothing else but that I am a thinking\nbeing, affected with variety of sensations; neither is it possible to\nconceive how a sensation should exist in an unperceiving substance. But\nthen, on the other hand, when I look on sensible things in a different\nview, considering them as so many modes and qualities, I find it\nnecessary to suppose a MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM, without which they cannot\nbe conceived to exist.\n\nPHIL.  MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM call you it? Pray, by which of your senses\ncame you acquainted with that being?\n\nHYL.  It is not itself sensible; its modes and qualities only being\nperceived by the senses.\n\nPHIL.  I presume then it was by reflexion and reason you obtained\nthe idea of it?\n\nHYL.  I do not pretend to any proper positive IDEA of it. However, I\nconclude it exists, because qualities cannot be conceived to exist\nwithout a support.\n\nPHIL.  It seems then you have only a relative NOTION of it, or that\nyou conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving the relation it bears to\nsensible qualities?\n\nHYL.  Right.\n\nPHIL.  Be pleased therefore to let me know wherein that relation\nconsists.\n\nHYL.  Is it not sufficiently expressed in the term SUBSTRATUM, or\nSUBSTANCE?\n\nPHIL.  If so, the word SUBSTRATUM should import that it is spread\nunder the sensible qualities or accidents?\n\nHYL.  True.\n\nPHIL.  And consequently under extension?\n\nHYL.  I own it.\n\nPHIL.  It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely distinct\nfrom extension?\n\nHYL.  I tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter is something that\nsupports modes. And is it not evident the thing supported is different\nfrom the thing supporting?\n\nPHIL.  So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, extension is\nsupposed to be the SUBSTRATUM of extension?\n\nHYL.  Just so.\n\nPHIL.  Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread without extension? or is\nnot the idea of extension necessarily included in SPREADING?\n\nHYL.  It is.\n\nPHIL.  Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under anything must have\nin itself an extension distinct from the extension of that thing under\nwhich it is spread?\n\nHYL.  It must.\n\nPHIL.  Consequently, every corporeal substance, being the SUBSTRATUM\nof extension, must have in itself another extension, by which it is\nqualified to be a SUBSTRATUM: and so on to infinity. And I ask whether\nthis be not absurd in itself, and repugnant to what you granted just now,\nto wit, that the SUBSTRATUM was something distinct from and exclusive\nof extension?\n\nHYL.  Aye but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I do not mean that Matter\nis SPREAD in a gross literal sense under extension. The word\nSUBSTRATUM is used only to express in general the same thing with\nSUBSTANCE.\n\nPHIL.  Well then, let us examine the relation implied in the term\nSUBSTANCE. Is it not that it stands under accidents?\n\nHYL.  The very same.\n\nPHIL.  But, that one thing may stand under or support another, must it\nnot be extended?\n\nHYL.  It must.\n\nPHIL.  Is not therefore this supposition liable to the same absurdity\nwith the former?\n\nHYL.  You still take things in a strict literal sense. That is not fair,\nPhilonous.\n\nPHIL.  I am not for imposing any sense on your words: you are at liberty\nto explain them as you please. Only, I beseech you, make me understand\nsomething by them. You tell me Matter supports or stands under accidents.\nHow! is it as your legs support your body?\n\nHYL.  No; that is the literal sense.\n\nPHIL.  Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you\nunderstand it in.--How long must I wait for an answer, Hylas?\n\nHYL.  I declare I know not what to say. I once thought I understood well\nenough what was meant by Matter's supporting accidents. But now, the more\nI think on it the less can I comprehend it: in short I find that I know\nnothing of it.\n\nPHIL.  It seems then you have no idea at all, neither relative nor\npositive, of Matter; you know neither what it is in itself, nor what\nrelation it bears to accidents?\n\nHYL.  I acknowledge it.\n\nPHIL.  And yet you asserted that you could not conceive how qualities or\naccidents should really exist, without conceiving at the same time a\nmaterial support of them?\n\nHYL.  I did.\n\nPHIL.  That is to say, when you conceive the real existence of\nqualities, you do withal conceive Something which you cannot conceive?\n\nHYL.  It was wrong, I own. But still I fear there is some fallacy or\nother. Pray what think you of this? It is just come into my head that the\nground of all our mistake lies in your treating of each quality by\nitself. Now, I grant that each quality cannot singly subsist without the\nmind. Colour cannot without extension, neither can figure without some\nother sensible quality. But, as the several qualities united or blended\ntogether form entire sensible things, nothing hinders why such things may\nnot be supposed to exist without the mind.\n\nPHIL.  Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad memory. Though\nindeed we went through all the qualities by name one after another, yet\nmy arguments or rather your concessions, nowhere tended to prove that the\nSecondary Qualities did not subsist each alone by itself; but, that they\nwere not AT ALL without the mind. Indeed, in treating of figure\nand motion we concluded they could not exist without the mind, because it\nwas impossible even in thought to separate them from all secondary\nqualities, so as to conceive them existing by themselves. But then this\nwas not the only argument made use of upon that occasion. But (to pass by\nall that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will\nhave it so) I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can\nconceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any\nsensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it\nactually to be so.\n\nHYL.  If it comes to that the point will soon be decided. What more easy\nthan to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and\nunperceived by, any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive\nthem existing after that manner.\n\nPHIL.  How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time\nunseen?\n\nHYL.  No, that were a contradiction.\n\nPHIL.  Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of CONCEIVING a\nthing which is UNCONCEIVED?\n\nHYL.  It is.\n\nPHIL.  The tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by\nyou?\n\nHYL.  How should it be otherwise?\n\nPHIL.  And what is conceived is surely in the mind?\n\nHYL.  Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.\n\nPHIL.  How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing\nindependent and out of all minds whatsoever?\n\nHYL.  That was I own an oversight; but stay, let me consider what led me\ninto it.--It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was thinking of a tree in\na solitary place, where no one was present to see it, methought that was\nto conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of; not\nconsidering that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly\nsee that all I can do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed\nconceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a\nmountain, but that is all. And this is far from proving that I can\nconceive them EXISTING OUT OF THE MINDS OF ALL SPIRITS.\n\nPHIL.  You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive how any\none corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in the mind?\n\nHYL.  I do.\n\nPHIL.  And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which\nyou cannot so much as conceive?\n\nHYL.  I profess I know not what to think; but still there are some\nscruples remain with me. Is it not certain I SEE THINGS at a distance?\nDo we not perceive the stars and moon, for example, to be a great way\noff? Is not this, I say, manifest to the senses?\n\nPHIL.  Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like objects?\n\nHYL.  I do.\n\nPHIL.  And have they not then the same appearance of being distant?\n\nHYL.  They have.\n\nPHIL.  But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a dream to be\nwithout the mind?\n\nHYL.  By no means.\n\nPHIL.  You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are\nwithout the mind, from their appearance, or manner wherein they are\nperceived.\n\nHYL.  I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in those cases?\n\nPHIL.  By no means. The idea or thing which you immediately perceive,\nneither sense nor reason informs you that it actually exists without the\nmind. By sense you only know that you are affected with such certain\nsensations of light and colours, &c. And these you will not say are\nwithout the mind.\n\nHYL.  True: but, beside all that, do you not think the sight suggests\nsomething of OUTNESS OR DISTANCE?\n\nPHIL.  Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible size and figure\nchange perpetually, or do they appear the same at all distances?\n\nHYL.  They are in a continual change.\n\nPHIL.  Sight therefore doth not suggest, or any way inform you, that the\nvisible object you immediately perceive exists at a distance, or will be\nperceived when you advance farther onward; there being a continued series\nof visible objects succeeding each other during the whole time of your\napproach.\n\nHYL.  It doth not; but still I know, upon seeing an object, what object\nI shall perceive after having passed over a certain distance: no\nmatter whether it be exactly the same or no: there is still something of\ndistance suggested in the case.\n\nPHIL.  Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the point, and then tell\nme whether there be any more in it than this: from the ideas you actually\nperceive by sight, you have by experience learned to collect what other\nideas you will (according to the standing order of nature) be affected\nwith, after such a certain succession of time and motion.\n\nHYL.  Upon the whole, I take it to be nothing else.\n\nPHIL.  Now, is it not plain that if we suppose a man born blind was on a\nsudden made to see, he could at first have no experience of what may be\nSUGGESTED by sight?\n\nHYL.  It is.\n\nPHIL.  He would not then, according to you, have any notion of distance\nannexed to the things he saw; but would take them for a new set of\nsensations, existing only in his mind?\n\nHYL.  It is undeniable.\n\nPHIL.  But, to make it still more plain: is not DISTANCE a line turned\nendwise to the eye?\n\nHYL.  It is.\n\nPHIL.  And can a line so situated be perceived by sight?\n\nHYL.  It cannot.\n\nPHIL.  Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not properly and\nimmediately perceived by sight?\n\nHYL.  It should seem so.\n\nPHIL.  Again, is it your opinion that colours are at a distance?\n\nHYL.  It must be acknowledged they are only in the mind.\n\nPHIL.  But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting in the same\nplace with extension and figures?\n\nHYL.  They do.\n\nPHIL.  How can you then conclude from sight that figures exist without,\nwhen you acknowledge colours do not; the sensible appearance being the\nvery same with regard to both?\n\nHYL.  I know not what to answer.\n\nPHIL.  But, allowing that distance was truly and immediately perceived\nby the mind, yet it would not thence follow it existed out of the mind.\nFor, whatever is immediately perceived is an idea: and can any idea exist\nout of the mind?\n\nHYL.  To suppose that were absurd: but, inform me, Philonous, can we\nperceive or know nothing beside our ideas?\n\nPHIL.  As for the rational deducing of causes from effects, that\nis beside our inquiry. And, by the senses you can best tell whether you\nperceive anything which is not immediately perceived. And I ask you,\nwhether the things immediately perceived are other than your own\nsensations or ideas? You have indeed more than once, in the course of\nthis conversation, declared yourself on those points; but you seem, by\nthis last question, to have departed from what you then thought.\n\nHYL.  To speak the truth, Philonous, I think there are two kinds of\nobjects:--the one perceived immediately, which are likewise called\nIDEAS; the other are real things or external objects, perceived by the\nmediation of ideas, which are their images and representations. Now, I\nown ideas do not exist without the mind; but the latter sort of objects\ndo. I am sorry I did not think of this distinction sooner; it would\nprobably have cut short your discourse.\n\nPHIL.  Are those external objects perceived by sense or by some other\nfaculty?\n\nHYL.  They are perceived by sense.\n\nPHIL.  Howl Is there any thing perceived by sense which is not\nimmediately perceived?\n\nHYL.  Yes, Philonous, in some sort there is. For example, when I look on\na picture or statue of Julius Caesar, I may be said after a manner to\nperceive him (though not immediately) by my senses.\n\nPHIL.  It seems then you will have our ideas, which alone are\nimmediately perceived, to be pictures of external things: and that these\nalso are perceived by sense, inasmuch as they have a conformity or\nresemblance to our ideas?\n\nHYL.  That is my meaning.\n\nPHIL.  And, in the same way that Julius Caesar, in himself invisible, is\nnevertheless perceived by sight; real things, in themselves\nimperceptible, are perceived by sense.\n\nHYL.  In the very same.\n\nPHIL.  Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the picture of Julius Caesar, do\nyou see with your eyes any more than some colours and figures, with a\ncertain symmetry and composition of the whole?\n\nHYL.  Nothing else.\n\nPHIL.  And would not a man who had never known anything of Julius Caesar\nsee as much?\n\nHYL.  He would.\n\nPHIL.  Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it, in as perfect\na degree as you?\n\nHYL.  I agree with you.\n\nPHIL.  Whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed to the Roman\nemperor, and his are not? This cannot proceed from the sensations or\nideas of sense by you then perceived; since you acknowledge you have no\nadvantage over him in that respect. It should seem therefore to proceed\nfrom reason and memory: should it not?\n\nHYL.  It should.\n\nPHIL.  Consequently, it will not follow from that instance that anything\nis perceived by sense which is not, immediately perceived. Though I grant\nwe may, in one acceptation, be said to perceive sensible things mediately\nby sense: that is, when, from a frequently perceived connexion, the\nimmediate perception of ideas by one sense SUGGESTS to the mind others,\nperhaps belonging to another sense, which are wont to be connected with\nthem. For instance, when I hear a coach drive along the streets,\nimmediately I perceive only the sound; but, from the experience I have\nhad that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the\ncoach. It is nevertheless evident that, in truth and strictness, nothing\ncan be HEARD BUT SOUND; and the coach is not then properly perceived by\nsense, but suggested from experience. So likewise when we are said to see\na red-hot bar of iron; the solidity and heat of the iron are not the\nobjects of sight, but suggested to the imagination by the colour and\nfigure which are properly perceived by that sense. In short, those things\nalone are actually and strictly perceived by any sense, which would have\nbeen perceived in case that same sense had then been first conferred on\nus. As for other things, it is plain they are only suggested to the mind\nby experience, grounded on former perceptions. But, to return to your\ncomparison of Caesar's picture, it is plain, if you keep to that, you\nmust hold the real things, or archetypes of our ideas, are not perceived\nby sense, but by some internal faculty of the soul, as reason or memory.\nI would therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from reason for\nthe existence of what you call REAL THINGS OR MATERIAL OBJECTS. Or,\nwhether you remember to have seen them formerly as they are in\nthemselves; or, if you have heard or read of any one that did.\n\nHYL.  I see, Philonous, you are disposed to raillery; but that will\nnever convince me.\n\nPHIL.  My aim is only to learn from you the way to come at the knowledge\nof MATERIAL BEINGS. Whatever we perceive is perceived immediately or\nmediately: by sense, or by reason and reflexion. But, as you have\nexcluded sense, pray shew me what reason you have to believe their\nexistence; or what MEDIUM you can possibly make use of to prove it,\neither to mine or your own understanding.\n\nHYL.  To deal ingenuously, Philonous, now I consider the point, I do not\nfind I can give you any good reason for it. But, thus much seems pretty\nplain, that it is at least possible such things may really exist. And, as\nlong as there is no absurdity in supposing them, I am resolved to believe\nas I did, till you bring good reasons to the contrary.\n\nPHIL.  What! Is it come to this, that you only BELIEVE the existence\nof material objects, and that your belief is founded barely on the\npossibility of its being true? Then you will have me bring reasons\nagainst it: though another would think it reasonable the proof should lie\non him who holds the affirmative. And, after all, this very point which\nyou are now resolved to maintain, without any reason, is in effect what\nyou have more than once during this discourse seen good reason to give\nup. But, to pass over all this; if I understand you rightly, you say our\nideas do not exist without the mind, but that they are copies, images, or\nrepresentations, of certain originals that do?\n\nHYL.  You take me right.\n\nPHIL.  They are then like external things?\n\nHYL.  They are.\n\nPHIL.  Have those things a stable and permanent nature, independent of\nour senses; or are they in a perpetual change, upon our producing any\nmotions in our bodies--suspending, exerting, or altering, our faculties\nor organs of sense?\n\nHYL.  Real things, it is plain, have a fixed and real nature, which\nremains the same notwithstanding any change in our senses, or in the\nposture and motion of our bodies; which indeed may affect the ideas in\nour minds, but it were absurd to think they had the same effect on things\nexisting without the mind.\n\nPHIL.  How then is it possible that things perpetually fleeting and\nvariable as our ideas should be copies or images of anything fixed and\nconstant? Or, in other words, since all sensible qualities, as\nsize, figure, colour, &c., that is, our ideas, are continually changing,\nupon every alteration in the distance, medium, or instruments of\nsensation; how can any determinate material objects be properly\nrepresented or painted forth by several distinct things, each of which is\nso different from and unlike the rest? Or, if you say it resembles some\none only of our ideas, how shall we be able to distinguish the true copy\nfrom all the false ones?\n\nHYL.  I profess, Philonous, I am at a loss. I know not what to say to\nthis.\n\nPHIL.  But neither is this all. Which are material objects in\nthemselves--perceptible or imperceptible?\n\nHYL.  Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but ideas. All\nmaterial things, therefore, are in themselves insensible, and to be\nperceived only by our ideas.\n\nPHIL.  Ideas then are sensible, and their archetypes or originals\ninsensible?\n\nHYL.  Right.\n\nPHIL.  But how can that which is sensible be like that which is\ninsensible? Can a real thing, in itself INVISIBLE, be like a COLOUR;\nor a real thing, which is not AUDIBLE, be like a SOUND? In a word,\ncan anything be like a sensation or idea, but another sensation or idea?\n\nHYL.  I must own, I think not.\n\nPHIL.  Is it possible there should be any doubt on the point? Do you\nnot perfectly know your own ideas?\n\nHYL.  I know them perfectly; since what I do not perceive or know can be\nno part of my idea.\n\nPHIL.  Consider, therefore, and examine them, and then tell me if there\nbe anything in them which can exist without the mind: or if you can\nconceive anything like them existing without the mind.\n\nHYL.  Upon inquiry, I find it is impossible for me to conceive or\nunderstand how anything but an idea can be like an idea. And it is most\nevident that NO IDEA CAN EXIST WITHOUT THE MIND.\n\nPHIL.  You are therefore, by your principles, forced to deny the\nREALITY of sensible things; since you made it to consist in an absolute\nexistence exterior to the mind. That is to say, you are a downright\nsceptic. So I have gained my point, which was to shew your principles led\nto Scepticism.\n\nHYL.  For the present I am, if not entirely convinced, at least\nsilenced.\n\nPHIL.  I would fain know what more you would require in order to a\nperfect conviction. Have you not had the liberty of explaining yourself\nall manner of ways? Were any little slips in discourse laid hold and\ninsisted on? Or were you not allowed to retract or reinforce anything you\nhad offered, as best served your purpose? Hath not everything you could\nsay been heard and examined with all the fairness imaginable? In a word\nhave you not in every point been convinced out of your own mouth? And, if\nyou can at present discover any flaw in any of your former concessions,\nor think of any remaining subterfuge, any new distinction, colour, or\ncomment whatsoever, why do you not produce it?\n\nHYL.  A little patience, Philonous. I am at present so amazed to see\nmyself ensnared, and as it were imprisoned in the labyrinths you have\ndrawn me into, that on the sudden it cannot be expected I should find my\nway out. You must give me time to look about me and recollect myself.\n\nPHIL.  Hark; is not this the college bell?\n\nHYL.  It rings for prayers.\n\nPHIL.  We will go in then, if you please, and meet here again tomorrow\nmorning. In the meantime, you may employ your thoughts on this morning's\ndiscourse, and try if you can find any fallacy in it, or invent any new\nmeans to extricate yourself.\n\nHYL.  Agreed.\n\n\n\n\nTHE SECOND DIALOGUE\n\n\nHYL.  I beg your pardon, Philonous, for not meeting you sooner. All\nthis morning my head was so filled with our late conversation that I had\nnot leisure to think of the time of the day, or indeed of anything else.\n\nPHILONOUS.  I am glad you were so intent upon it, in hopes if there were\nany mistakes in your concessions, or fallacies in my reasonings from\nthem, you will now discover them to me.\n\nHYL.  I assure you I have done nothing ever since I saw you but search\nafter mistakes and fallacies, and, with that view, have minutely examined\nthe whole series of yesterday's discourse: but all in vain, for the\nnotions it led me into, upon review, appear still more clear and evident;\nand, the more I consider them, the more irresistibly do they force my\nassent.\n\nPHIL.  And is not this, think you, a sign that they are genuine, that\nthey proceed from nature, and are conformable to right reason? Truth and\nbeauty are in this alike, that the strictest survey sets them both off to\nadvantage; while the false lustre of error and disguise cannot endure\nbeing reviewed, or too nearly inspected.\n\nHYL.  I own there is a great deal in what you say. Nor can any one be\nmore entirely satisfied of the truth of those odd consequences, so long\nas I have in view the reasonings that lead to them. But, when these are\nout of my thoughts, there seems, on the other hand, something so\nsatisfactory, so natural and intelligible, in the modern way of\nexplaining things that, I profess, I know not how to reject it.\n\nPHIL.  I know not what way you mean.\n\nHYL.  I mean the way of accounting for our sensations or ideas.\n\nPHIL.  How is that?\n\nHYL.  It is supposed the soul makes her residence in some part of the\nbrain, from which the nerves take their rise, and are thence extended to\nall parts of the body; and that outward objects, by the different\nimpressions they make on the organs of sense, communicate certain\nvibrative motions to the nerves; and these being filled with spirits\npropagate them to the brain or seat of the soul, which, according\nto the various impressions or traces thereby made in the brain, is\nvariously affected with ideas.\n\nPHIL.  And call you this an explication of the manner whereby we are\naffected with ideas?\n\nHYL.  Why not, Philonous? Have you anything to object against it?\n\nPHIL.  I would first know whether I rightly understand your hypothesis.\nYou make certain traces in the brain to be the causes or occasions of our\nideas. Pray tell me whether by the BRAIN you mean any sensible thing.\n\nHYL.  What else think you I could mean?\n\nPHIL.  Sensible things are all immediately perceivable; and those things\nwhich are immediately perceivable are ideas; and these exist only in the\nmind. Thus much you have, if I mistake not, long since agreed to.\n\nHYL.  I do not deny it.\n\nPHIL.  The brain therefore you speak of, being a sensible thing, exists\nonly in the mind. Now, I would fain know whether you think it reasonable\nto suppose that one idea or thing existing in the mind occasions all\nother ideas. And, if you think so, pray how do you account for the origin\nof that primary idea or brain itself?\n\nHYL.  I do not explain the origin of our ideas by that brain which is\nperceivable to sense--this being itself only a combination of sensible\nideas--but by another which I imagine.\n\nPHIL.  But are not things imagined as truly IN THE MIND as things\nperceived?\n\nHYL.  I must confess they are.\n\nPHIL.  It comes, therefore, to the same thing; and you have been all\nthis while accounting for ideas by certain motions or impressions of the\nbrain; that is, by some alterations in an idea, whether sensible or\nimaginable it matters not.\n\nHYL.  I begin to suspect my hypothesis.\n\nPHIL.  Besides spirits, all that we know or conceive are our own ideas.\nWhen, therefore, you say all ideas are occasioned by impressions in the\nbrain, do you conceive this brain or no? If you do, then you talk of\nideas imprinted in an idea causing that same idea, which is absurd. If\nyou do not conceive it, you talk unintelligibly, instead of forming a\nreasonable hypothesis.\n\nHYL.  I now clearly see it was a mere dream. There is nothing in it.\n\nPHIL.  You need not be much concerned at it; for after all, this way of\nexplaining things, as you called it, could never have satisfied any\nreasonable man. What connexion is there between a motion in the nerves,\nand the sensations of sound or colour in the mind? Or how is it possible\nthese should be the effect of that?\n\nHYL.  But I could never think it had so little in it as now it seems to\nhave.\n\nPHIL.  Well then, are you at length satisfied that no sensible things\nhave a real existence; and that you are in truth an arrant sceptic?\n\nHYL.  It is too plain to be denied.\n\nPHIL.  Look! are not the fields covered with a delightful verdure? Is\nthere not something in the woods and groves, in the rivers and clear\nsprings, that soothes, that delights, that transports the soul? At the\nprospect of the wide and deep ocean, or some huge mountain whose top is\nlost in the clouds, or of an old gloomy forest, are not our minds filled\nwith a pleasing horror? Even in rocks and deserts is there not an\nagreeable wildness? How sincere a pleasure is it to behold the natural\nbeauties of the earth! To preserve and renew our relish for them, is not\nthe veil of night alternately drawn over her face, and doth she not\nchange her dress with the seasons? How aptly are the elements disposed!\nWhat variety and use in the meanest productions of nature! What\ndelicacy, what beauty, what contrivance, in animal and vegetable bodies I\nHow exquisitely are all things suited, as well to their particular ends,\nas to constitute opposite parts of the whole I And, while they mutually\naid and support, do they not also set off and illustrate each other?\nRaise now your thoughts from this ball of earth to all those glorious\nluminaries that adorn the high arch of heaven. The motion and situation\nof the planets, are they not admirable for use and order? Were those\n(miscalled ERRATIC) globes once known to stray, in their repeated\njourneys through the pathless void? Do they not measure areas round the\nsun ever proportioned to the times? So fixed, so immutable are the laws\nby which the unseen Author of nature actuates the universe. How\nvivid and radiant is the lustre of the fixed stars! How magnificent and\nrich that negligent profusion with which they appear to be scattered\nthroughout the whole azure vault! Yet, if you take the telescope, it\nbrings into your sight a new host of stars that escape the naked eye.\nHere they seem contiguous and minute, but to a nearer view immense orbs\nof fight at various distances, far sunk in the abyss of space. Now you\nmust call imagination to your aid. The feeble narrow sense cannot descry\ninnumerable worlds revolving round the central fires; and in those worlds\nthe energy of an all-perfect Mind displayed in endless forms. But,\nneither sense nor imagination are big enough to comprehend the boundless\nextent, with all its glittering furniture. Though the labouring mind\nexert and strain each power to its utmost reach, there still stands out\nungrasped a surplusage immeasurable. Yet all the vast bodies that compose\nthis mighty frame, how distant and remote soever, are by some secret\nmechanism, some Divine art and force, linked in a mutual dependence and\nintercourse with each other; even with this earth, which was almost slipt\nfrom my thoughts and lost in the crowd of worlds. Is not the whole system\nimmense, beautiful, glorious beyond expression and beyond thought! What\ntreatment, then, do those philosophers deserve, who would deprive these\nnoble and delightful scenes of all REALITY? How should those Principles\nbe entertained that lead us to think all the visible beauty of the\ncreation a false imaginary glare? To be plain, can you expect this\nScepticism of yours will not be thought extravagantly absurd by all men\nof sense?\n\nHYL.  Other men may think as they please; but for your part you have\nnothing to reproach me with. My comfort is, you are as much a sceptic as\nI am.\n\nPHIL.  There, Hylas, I must beg leave to differ from you.\n\nHYL.  What! Have you all along agreed to the premises, and do you now\ndeny the conclusion, and leave me to maintain those paradoxes by myself\nwhich you led me into? This surely is not fair.\n\nPHIL.  _I_ deny that I agreed with you in those notions that led to\nScepticism. You indeed said the REALITY of sensible things consisted in\nAN ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OUT OF THE MINDS OF SPIRITS, or distinct from\ntheir being perceived. And pursuant to this notion of reality, YOU are\nobliged to deny sensible things any real existence: that is,\naccording to your own definition, you profess yourself a sceptic. But I\nneither said nor thought the reality of sensible things was to be defined\nafter that manner. To me it is evident for the reasons you allow of, that\nsensible things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence I\nconclude, not that they have no real existence, but that, seeing they\ndepend not on my thought, and have all existence distinct from being\nperceived by me, THERE MUST BE SOME OTHER MIND WHEREIN THEY EXIST. As\nsure, therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an\ninfinite omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports it.\n\nHYL.  What! This is no more than I and all Christians hold; nay, and all\nothers too who believe there is a God, and that He knows and comprehends\nall things.\n\nPHIL.  Aye, but here lies the difference. Men commonly believe that all\nthings are known or perceived by God, because they believe the being of a\nGod; whereas I, on the other side, immediately and necessarily conclude\nthe being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by Him.\n\nHYL.  But, so long as we all believe the same thing, what matter is it\nhow we come by that belief?\n\nPHIL.  But neither do we agree in the same opinion. For philosophers,\nthough they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be perceived by God, yet\nthey attribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct from their being\nperceived by any mind whatever; which I do not. Besides, is there no\ndifference between saying, THERE IS A GOD, THEREFORE HE PERCEIVES ALL\nTHINGS; and saying, SENSIBLE THINGS DO REALLY EXIST; AND, IF THEY\nREALLY EXIST, THEY ARE NECESSARILY PERCEIVED BY AN INFINITE MIND:\nTHEREFORE THERE IS AN INFINITE MIND OR GOD? This furnishes you with a\ndirect and immediate demonstration, from a most evident principle, of the\nBEING OF A GOD. Divines and philosophers had proved beyond all\ncontroversy, from the beauty and usefulness of the several parts of the\ncreation, that it was the workmanship of God. But that--setting aside all\nhelp of astronomy and natural philosophy, all contemplation of the\ncontrivance, order, and adjustment of things--an infinite Mind should be\nnecessarily inferred from the bare EXISTENCE OF THE SENSIBLE WORLD, is\nan advantage to them only who have made this easy reflexion: that the\nsensible world is that which we perceive by our several senses; and that\nnothing is perceived by the senses beside ideas; and that no idea\nor archetype of an idea can exist otherwise than in a mind. You may now,\nwithout any laborious search into the sciences, without any subtlety of\nreason, or tedious length of discourse, oppose and baffle the most\nstrenuous advocate for Atheism. Those miserable refuges, whether in an\neternal succession of unthinking causes and effects, or in a fortuitous\nconcourse of atoms; those wild imaginations of Vanini, Hobbes, and\nSpinoza: in a word, the whole system of Atheism, is it not entirely\noverthrown, by this single reflexion on the repugnancy included in\nsupposing the whole, or any part, even the most rude and shapeless, of\nthe visible world, to exist without a mind? Let any one of those abettors\nof impiety but look into his own thoughts, and there try if he can\nconceive how so much as a rock, a desert, a chaos, or confused jumble of\natoms; how anything at all, either sensible or imaginable, can exist\nindependent of a Mind, and he need go no farther to be convinced of his\nfolly. Can anything be fairer than to put a dispute on such an issue, and\nleave it to a man himself to see if he can conceive, even in thought,\nwhat he holds to be true in fact, and from a notional to allow it a real\nexistence?\n\nHYL.  It cannot be denied there is something highly serviceable to\nreligion in what you advance. But do you not think it looks very like a\nnotion entertained by some eminent moderns, of SEEING ALL THINGS IN\nGOD?\n\nPHIL.  I would gladly know that opinion: pray explain it to me.\n\nHYL.  They conceive that the soul, being immaterial, is incapable of\nbeing united with material things, so as to perceive them in themselves;\nbut that she perceives them by her union with the substance of God,\nwhich, being spiritual, is therefore purely intelligible, or capable of\nbeing the immediate object of a spirit's thought. Besides the Divine\nessence contains in it perfections correspondent to each created being;\nand which are, for that reason, proper to exhibit or represent them to\nthe mind.\n\nPHIL.  I do not understand how our ideas, which are things altogether\npassive and inert, can be the essence, or any part (or like any part) of\nthe essence or substance of God, who is an impassive, indivisible,\npure, active being. Many more difficulties and objections there are which\noccur at first view against this hypothesis; but I shall only add that it\nis liable to all the absurdities of the common hypothesis, in making a\ncreated world exist otherwise than in the mind of a Spirit. Besides all\nwhich it hath this peculiar to itself; that it makes that material world\nserve to no purpose. And, if it pass for a good argument against other\nhypotheses in the sciences, that they suppose Nature, or the Divine\nwisdom, to make something in vain, or do that by tedious roundabout\nmethods which might have been performed in a much more easy and\ncompendious way, what shall we think of that hypothesis which supposes\nthe whole world made in vain?\n\nHYL.  But what say you? Are not you too of opinion that we see all\nthings in God? If I mistake not, what you advance comes near it.\n\nPHIL.  Few men think; yet all have opinions. Hence men's opinions are\nsuperficial and confused. It is nothing strange that tenets which in\nthemselves are ever so different, should nevertheless be confounded with\neach other, by those who do not consider them attentively. I shall not\ntherefore be surprised if some men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm\nof Malebranche; though in truth I am very remote from it. He builds on\nthe most abstract general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He asserts an\nabsolute external world, which I deny. He maintains that we are deceived\nby our senses, and, know not the real natures or the true forms and\nfigures of extended beings; of all which I hold the direct contrary. So\nthat upon the whole there are no Principles more fundamentally opposite\nthan his and mine. It must be owned that I entirely agree with what\nthe holy Scripture saith, \"That in God we live and move and have our\nbeing.\" But that we see things in His essence, after the manner above set\nforth, I am far from believing. Take here in brief my meaning:--It is\nevident that the things I perceive are my own ideas, and that no idea can\nexist unless it be in a mind: nor is it less plain that these ideas or\nthings by me perceived, either themselves or their archetypes, exist\nindependently of my mind, since I know myself not to be their author, it\nbeing out of my power to determine at pleasure what particular ideas I\nshall be affected with upon opening my eyes or ears: they must therefore\nexist in some other Mind, whose Will it is they should be exhibited\nto me. The things, I say, immediately perceived are ideas or sensations,\ncall them which you will. But how can any idea or sensation exist in, or\nbe produced by, anything but a mind or spirit? This indeed is\ninconceivable. And to assert that which is inconceivable is to talk\nnonsense: is it not?\n\nHYL.  Without doubt.\n\nPHIL.  But, on the other hand, it is very conceivable that they should\nexist in and be produced by a spirit; since this is no more than I daily\nexperience in myself, inasmuch as I perceive numberless ideas; and, by an\nact of my will, can form a great variety of them, and raise them up in my\nimagination: though, it must be confessed, these creatures of the fancy\nare not altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid, and permanent, as those\nperceived by my senses--which latter are called RED THINGS. From all\nwhich I conclude, THERE IS A MIND WHICH AFFECTS ME EVERY MOMENT WITH ALL\nTHE SENSIBLE IMPRESSIONS I PERCEIVE. AND, from the variety, order, and\nmanner of these, I conclude THE AUTHOR OF THEM TO BE WISE, POWERFUL,\nAND GOOD, BEYOND COMPREHENSION. MARK it well; I do not say, I see\nthings by perceiving that which represents them in the intelligible\nSubstance of God. This I do not understand; but I say, the things by me\nperceived are known by the understanding, and produced by the will of an\ninfinite Spirit. And is not all this most plain and evident? Is there any\nmore in it than what a little observation in our own minds, and that\nwhich passeth in them, not only enables us to conceive, but also obliges\nus to acknowledge.\n\nHYL.  I think I understand you very clearly; and own the proof you give\nof a Deity seems no less evident than it is surprising. But, allowing\nthat God is the supreme and universal Cause of an things, yet, may there\nnot be still a Third Nature besides Spirits and Ideas? May we not admit a\nsubordinate and limited cause of our ideas? In a word, may there not for\nall that be MATTER?\n\nPHIL.  How often must I inculcate the same thing? You allow the things\nimmediately perceived by sense to exist nowhere without the mind; but\nthere is nothing perceived by sense which is not perceived immediately:\ntherefore there is nothing sensible that exists without the mind. The\nMatter, therefore, which you still insist on is something intelligible, I\nsuppose; something that may be discovered by reason, and not by sense.\n\nHYL.  You are in the right.\n\nPHIL.  Pray let me know what reasoning your belief of Matter is grounded\non; and what this Matter is, in your present sense of it.\n\nHYL.  I find myself affected with various ideas, whereof I know I am not\nthe cause; neither are they the cause of themselves, or of one another,\nor capable of subsisting by themselves, as being altogether inactive,\nfleeting, dependent beings. They have therefore SOME cause distinct\nfrom me and them: of which I pretend to know no more than that it is THE\nCAUSE OF MY IDEAS. And this thing, whatever it be, I call Matter.\n\nPHIL.  Tell me, Hylas, hath every one a liberty to change the current\nproper signification attached to a common name in any language? For\nexample, suppose a traveller should tell you that in a certain country\nmen pass unhurt through the fire; and, upon explaining himself, you found\nhe meant by the word fire that which others call WATER. Or, if he\nshould assert that there are trees that walk upon two legs, meaning men\nby the term TREES. Would you think this reasonable?\n\nHYL.  No; I should think it very absurd. Common custom is the standard\nof propriety in language. And for any man to affect speaking improperly\nis to pervert the use of speech, and can never serve to a better purpose\nthan to protract and multiply disputes, where there is no difference in\nopinion.\n\nPHIL.  And doth not MATTER, in the common current acceptation of the\nword, signify an extended, solid, moveable, unthinking, inactive\nSubstance?\n\nHYL.  It doth.\n\nPHIL.  And, hath it not been made evident that no SUCH substance can\npossibly exist? And, though it should be allowed to exist, yet how can\nthat which is INACTIVE be a CAUSE; or that which is UNTHINKING be a\nCAUSE OF THOUGHT? You may, indeed, if you please, annex to the word\nMATTER a contrary meaning to what is vulgarly received; and tell me you\nunderstand by it, an unextended, thinking, active being, which is the\ncause of our ideas. But what else is this than to play with words, and\nrun into that very fault you just now condemned with so much reason? I do\nby no means find fault with your reasoning, in that you collect a cause\nfrom the PHENOMENA: BUT I deny that THE cause deducible by reason\ncan properly be termed Matter.\n\nHYL.  There is indeed something in what you say. But I am afraid\nyou do not thoroughly comprehend my meaning. I would by no means be\nthought to deny that God, or an infinite Spirit, is the Supreme Cause of\nall things. All I contend for is, that, subordinate to the Supreme Agent,\nthere is a cause of a limited and inferior nature, which CONCURS in the\nproduction of our ideas, not by any act of will, or spiritual efficiency,\nbut by that kind of action which belongs to Matter, viz. MOTION.\n\nPHIL.  I find you are at every turn relapsing into your old exploded\nconceit, of a moveable, and consequently an extended, substance, existing\nwithout the mind. What! Have you already forgotten you were convinced; or\nare you willing I should repeat what has been said on that head? In truth\nthis is not fair dealing in you, still to suppose the being of that which\nyou have so often acknowledged to have no being. But, not to insist\nfarther on what has been so largely handled, I ask whether all your ideas\nare not perfectly passive and inert, including nothing of action in them.\n\nHYL.  They are.\n\nPHIL.  And are sensible qualities anything else but ideas?\n\nHYL.  How often have I acknowledged that they are not.\n\nPHIL.  But is not MOTION a sensible quality?\n\nHYL.  It is.\n\nPHIL.  Consequently it is no action?\n\nHYL.  I agree with you. And indeed it is very plain that when I stir my\nfinger, it remains passive; but my will which produced the motion is\nactive.\n\nPHIL.  Now, I desire to know, in the first place, whether, motion being\nallowed to be no action, you can conceive any action besides volition:\nand, in the second place, whether to say something and conceive nothing\nbe not to talk nonsense: and, lastly, whether, having considered the\npremises, you do not perceive that to suppose any efficient or active\nCause of our ideas, other than SPIRIT, is highly absurd and\nunreasonable?\n\nHYL.  I give up the point entirely. But, though Matter may not be a\ncause, yet what hinders its being an INSTRUMENT, subservient to the\nsupreme Agent in the production of our ideas?\n\nPHIL.  An instrument say you; pray what may be the figure, springs,\nwheels, and motions, of that instrument?\n\nHYL.  Those I pretend to determine nothing of, both the substance and\nits qualities being entirely unknown to me.\n\nPHIL.  What? You are then of opinion it is made up of unknown\nparts, that it hath unknown motions, and an unknown shape?\n\nHYL.  I do not believe that it hath any figure or motion at all, being\nalready convinced, that no sensible qualities can exist in an\nunperceiving substance.\n\nPHIL.  But what notion is it possible to frame of an instrument void of\nall sensible qualities, even extension itself?\n\nHYL.  I do not pretend to have any notion of it.\n\nPHIL.  And what reason have you to think this unknown, this\ninconceivable Somewhat doth exist? Is it that you imagine God cannot act\nas well without it; or that you find by experience the use of some such\nthing, when you form ideas in your own mind?\n\nHYL.  You are always teasing me for reasons of my belief. Pray what\nreasons have you not to believe it?\n\nPHIL.  It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence of\nanything, if I see no reason for believing it. But, not to insist on\nreasons for believing, you will not so much as let me know WHAT IT IS\nyou would have me believe; since you say you have no manner of notion of\nit. After all, let me entreat you to consider whether it be like a\nphilosopher, or even like a man of common sense, to pretend to believe\nyou know not what and you know not why.\n\nHYL.  Hold, Philonous. When I tell you Matter is an INSTRUMENT, I do\nnot mean altogether nothing. It is true I know not the particular kind of\ninstrument; but, however, I have some notion of INSTRUMENT IN GENERAL,\nwhich I apply to it.\n\nPHIL.  But what if it should prove that there is something, even in the\nmost general notion of INSTRUMENT, as taken in a distinct sense from\nCAUSE, which makes the use of it inconsistent with the Divine\nattributes?\n\nHYL.  Make that appear and I shall give up the point.\n\nPHIL.  What mean you by the general nature or notion of INSTRUMENT?\n\nHYL.  That which is common to all particular instruments composeth the\ngeneral notion.\n\nPHIL.  Is it not common to all instruments, that they are applied to the\ndoing those things only which cannot be performed by the mere act of our\nwills? Thus, for instance, I never use an instrument to move my finger,\nbecause it is done by a volition. But I should use one if I were to\nremove part of a rock, or tear up a tree by the roots. Are you of the\nsame mind? Or, can you shew any example where an instrument is made\nuse of in producing an effect IMMEDIATELY depending on the will of the\nagent?\n\nHYL.  I own I cannot.\n\nPHIL.  How therefore can you suppose that an All-perfect Spirit, on\nwhose Will all things have an absolute and immediate dependence, should\nneed an instrument in his operations, or, not needing it, make use of it?\nThus it seems to me that you are obliged to own the use of a lifeless\ninactive instrument to be incompatible with the infinite perfection of\nGod; that is, by your own confession, to give up the point.\n\nHYL.  It doth not readily occur what I can answer you.\n\nPHIL.  But, methinks you should be ready to own the truth, when it has\nbeen fairly proved to you. We indeed, who are beings of finite powers,\nare forced to make use of instruments. And the use of an instrument\nsheweth the agent to be limited by rules of another's prescription, and\nthat he cannot obtain his end but in such a way, and by such conditions.\nWhence it seems a clear consequence, that the supreme unlimited agent\nuseth no tool or instrument at all. The will of an Omnipotent Spirit is\nno sooner exerted than executed, without the application of means; which,\nif they are employed by inferior agents, it is not upon account of any\nreal efficacy that is in them, or necessary aptitude to produce any\neffect, but merely in compliance with the laws of nature, or those\nconditions prescribed to them by the First Cause, who is Himself above\nall limitation or prescription whatsoever.\n\nHYL.  I will no longer maintain that Matter is an instrument. However, I\nwould not be understood to give up its existence neither; since,\nnotwithstanding what hath been said, it may still be an OCCASION.\n\nPHIL.  How many shapes is your Matter to take? Or, how often must it be\nproved not to exist, before you are content to part with it? But, to say\nno more of this (though by all the laws of disputation I may justly blame\nyou for so frequently changing the signification of the principal\nterm)--I would fain know what you mean by affirming that matter is an\noccasion, having already denied it to be a cause. And, when you have\nshewn in what sense you understand OCCASION, pray, in the next place,\nbe pleased to shew me what reason induceth you to believe there is such\nan occasion of our ideas?\n\nHYL.  As to the first point: by OCCASION I mean an inactive\nunthinking being, at the presence whereof God excites ideas in our minds.\n\nPHIL.  And what may be the nature of that inactive unthinking being?\n\nHYL.  I know nothing of its nature.\n\nPHIL.  Proceed then to the second point, and assign some reason why we\nshould allow an existence to this inactive, unthinking, unknown thing.\n\nHYL.  When we see ideas produced in our minds, after an orderly and\nconstant manner, it is natural to think they have some fixed and regular\noccasions, at the presence of which they are excited.\n\nPHIL.  You acknowledge then God alone to be the cause of our ideas, and\nthat He causes them at the presence of those occasions.\n\nHYL.  That is my opinion.\n\nPHIL.  Those things which you say are present to God, without doubt He\nperceives.\n\nHYL.  Certainly; otherwise they could not be to Him an occasion of acting.\n\nPHIL.  Not to insist now on your making sense of this hypothesis, or\nanswering all the puzzling questions and difficulties it is liable to: I\nonly ask whether the order and regularity observable in the series of our\nideas, or the course of nature, be not sufficiently accounted for by the\nwisdom and power of God; and whether it doth not derogate from those\nattributes, to suppose He is influenced, directed, or put in mind, when\nand what He is to act, by an unthinking substance? And, lastly, whether,\nin case I granted all you contend for, it would make anything to your\npurpose; it not being easy to conceive how the external or absolute\nexistence of an unthinking substance, distinct from its being perceived,\ncan be inferred from my allowing that there are certain things perceived\nby the mind of God, which are to Him the occasion of producing ideas in\nus?\n\nHYL.  I am perfectly at a loss what to think, this notion of OCCASION\nseeming now altogether as groundless as the rest.\n\nPHIL.  Do you not at length perceive that in all these different\nacceptations of MATTER, you have been only supposing you know not what,\nfor no manner of reason, and to no kind of use?\n\nHYL.  I freely own myself less fond of my notions since they have been\nso accurately examined. But still, methinks, I have some confused\nperception that there is such a thing as MATTER.\n\nPHIL.  Either you perceive the being of Matter immediately or mediately.\nIf immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive it. If\nmediately, let me know by what reasoning it is inferred from those things\nwhich you perceive immediately. So much for the perception. Then for the\nMatter itself, I ask whether it is object, SUBSTRATUM, cause,\ninstrument, or occasion? You have already pleaded for each of these,\nshifting your notions, and making Matter to appear sometimes in one\nshape, then in another. And what you have offered hath been disapproved\nand rejected by yourself. If you have anything new to advance I would\ngladly bear it.\n\nHYL.  I think I have already offered all I had to say on those heads. I\nam at a loss what more to urge.\n\nPHIL.  And yet you are loath to part with your old prejudice. But, to\nmake you quit it more easily, I desire that, beside what has been\nhitherto suggested, you will farther consider whether, upon supposition\nthat Matter exists, you can possibly conceive how you should be affected\nby it. Or, supposing it did not exist, whether it be not evident you\nmight for all that be affected with the same ideas you now are, and\nconsequently have the very same reasons to believe its existence that you\nnow can have.\n\nHYL.  I acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all things just as\nwe do now, though there was no Matter in the world; neither can I\nconceive, if there be Matter, how it should produce' any idea in our\nminds. And, I do farther grant you have entirely satisfied me that it is\nimpossible there should be such a thing as matter in any of the foregoing\nacceptations. But still I cannot help supposing that there is MATTER in\nsome sense or other. WHAT THAT IS I do not indeed pretend to determine.\n\nPHIL.  I do not expect you should define exactly the nature of that\nunknown being. Only be pleased to tell me whether it is a Substance; and\nif so, whether you can suppose a Substance without accidents; or, in case\nyou suppose it to have accidents or qualities, I desire you will let me\nknow what those qualities are, at least what is meant by Matter's\nsupporting them?\n\nHYL.  We have already argued on those points. I have no more to say to\nthem. But, to prevent any farther questions, let me tell you I at present\nunderstand by MATTER neither substance nor accident, thinking nor\nextended being, neither cause, instrument, nor occasion, but Something\nentirely unknown, distinct from all these.\n\nPHIL.  It seems then you include in your present notion of Matter\nnothing but the general abstract idea of ENTITY.\n\nHYL.  Nothing else; save only that I super-add to this general idea the\nnegation of all those particular things, qualities, or ideas, that I\nperceive, imagine, or in anywise apprehend.\n\nPHIL.  Pray where do you suppose this unknown Matter to exist?\n\nHYL.  Oh Philonous! now you think you have entangled me; for, if I say\nit exists in place, then you will infer that it exists in the mind, since\nit is agreed that place or extension exists only in the mind. But I am\nnot ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not where it exists; only I am\nsure it exists not in place. There is a negative answer for you. And you\nmust expect no other to all the questions you put for the future about\nMatter.\n\nPHIL.  Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased to inform\nme after what manner you suppose it to exist, or what you mean by its\nEXISTENCE?\n\nHYL.  It neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives nor is perceived.\n\nPHIL.  But what is there positive in your abstracted notion of its\nexistence?\n\nHYL.  Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any positive notion\nor meaning at all. I tell you again, I am not ashamed to own my\nignorance. I know not what is meant by its EXISTENCE, or how it exists.\n\nPHIL.  Continue, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous part, and tell me\nsincerely whether you can frame a distinct idea of Entity in general,\nprescinded from and exclusive of all thinking and corporeal beings, all\nparticular things whatsoever.\n\nHYL.  Hold, let me think a little--I profess, Philonous, I do not find\nthat I can. At first glance, methought I had some dilute and airy notion\nof Pure Entity in abstract; but, upon closer attention, it hath quite\nvanished out of sight. The more I think on it, the more am I confirmed in\nmy prudent resolution of giving none but negative answers, and not\npretending to the least degree of any positive knowledge or conception of\nMatter, its WHERE, its HOW, its ENTITY, or anything belonging to\nit.\n\nPHIL.  When, therefore, you speak of the existence of Matter, you have\nnot any notion in your mind?\n\nHYL.  None at all.\n\nPHIL.  Pray tell me if the case stands not thus--At first, from a belief\nof material substance, you would have it that the immediate objects\nexisted without the mind; then that they are archetypes; then causes;\nnext instruments; then occasions: lastly SOMETHING IN GENERAL, which\nbeing interpreted proves NOTHING. So Matter comes to nothing. What\nthink you, Hylas, is not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding?\n\nHYL.  Be that as it will, yet I still insist upon it, that our not being\nable to conceive a thing is no argument against its existence.\n\nPHIL.  That from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other\ncircumstance, there may reasonably be inferred the existence of a thing\nnot immediately perceived; and that it were absurd for any man to argue\nagainst the existence of that thing, from his having no direct and\npositive notion of it, I freely own. But, where there is nothing of all\nthis; where neither reason nor revelation induces us to believe the\nexistence of a thing; where we have not even a relative notion of it;\nwhere an abstraction is made from perceiving and being perceived, from\nSpirit and idea: lastly, where there is not so much as the most\ninadequate or faint idea pretended to--I will not indeed thence conclude\nagainst the reality of any notion, or existence of anything; but my\ninference shall be, that you mean nothing at all; that you employ words\nto no manner of purpose, without any design or signification whatsoever.\nAnd I leave it to you to consider how mere jargon should be treated.\n\nHYL.  To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your arguments seem in\nthemselves unanswerable; but they have not so great an effect on me as to\nproduce that entire conviction, that hearty acquiescence, which attends\ndemonstration. I find myself relapsing into an obscure surmise of I know\nnot what, MATTER.\n\nPHIL.  But, are you not sensible, Hylas, that two things must concur to\ntake away all scruple, and work a plenary assent in the mind? Let a\nvisible object be set in never so clear a light, yet, if there is any\nimperfection in the sight, or if the eye is not directed towards it, it\nwill not be distinctly seen. And though a demonstration be never so well\ngrounded and fairly proposed, yet, if there is withal a stain of\nprejudice, or a wrong bias on the understanding, can it be expected on a\nsudden to perceive clearly, and adhere firmly to the truth? No; there is\nneed of time and pains: the attention must be awakened and detained by a\nfrequent repetition of the same thing placed oft in the same, oft in\ndifferent lights. I have said it already, and find I must still repeat\nand inculcate, that it is an unaccountable licence you take, in\npretending to maintain you know not what, for you know not what reason,\nto you know not what purpose. Can this be paralleled in any art or\nscience, any sect or profession of men? Or is there anything so\nbarefacedly groundless and unreasonable to be met with even in the lowest\nof common conversation? But, perhaps you will still say, Matter may\nexist; though at the same time you neither know WHAT IS MEANT by\nMATTER, or by its EXISTENCE. This indeed is surprising, and the more\nso because it is altogether voluntary and of your own head, you not\nbeing led to it by any one reason; for I challenge you to shew me that\nthing in nature which needs Matter to explain or account for it.\n\nHYL.  THE REALITY of things cannot be maintained without supposing the\nexistence of Matter. And is not this, think you, a good reason why I\nshould be earnest in its defence?\n\nPHIL.  The reality of things! What things? sensible or intelligible?\n\nHYL.  Sensible things.\n\nPHIL.  My glove for example?\n\nHYL.  That, or any other thing perceived by the senses.\n\nPHIL.  But to fix on some particular thing. Is it not a sufficient\nevidence to me of the existence of this GLOVE, that I see it, and feel\nit, and wear it? Or, if this will not do, how is it possible I should be\nassured of the reality of this thing, which I actually see in this place,\nby supposing that some unknown thing, which I never did or can see,\nexists after an unknown manner, in an unknown place, or in no place at\nall? How can the supposed reality of that which is intangible be a proof\nthat anything tangible really exists? Or, of that which is invisible,\nthat any visible thing, or, in general of anything which is\nimperceptible, that a perceptible exists? Do but explain this and I shall\nthink nothing too hard for you.\n\nHYL.  Upon the whole, I am content to own the existence of matter is\nhighly improbable; but the direct and absolute impossibility of it does\nnot appear to me.\n\nPHIL.  But granting Matter to be possible, yet, upon that account\nmerely, it can have no more claim to existence than a golden mountain, or\na centaur.\n\nHYL.  I acknowledge it; but still you do not deny it is possible; and\nthat which is possible, for aught you know, may actually exist.\n\nPHIL.  I deny it to be possible; and have, if I mistake not,\nevidently proved, from your own concessions, that it is not. In the\ncommon sense of the word MATTER, is there any more implied than an\nextended, solid, figured, moveable substance, existing without the mind?\nAnd have not you acknowledged, over and over, that you have seen evident\nreason for denying the possibility of such a substance?\n\nHYL.  True, but that is only one sense of the term MATTER.\n\nPHIL.  But is it not the only proper genuine received sense? And, if\nMatter, in such a sense, be proved impossible, may it not be thought with\ngood grounds absolutely impossible? Else how could anything be proved\nimpossible? Or, indeed, how could there be any proof at all one way or\nother, to a man who takes the liberty to unsettle and change the common\nsignification of words?\n\nHYL.  I thought philosophers might be allowed to speak more accurately\nthan the vulgar, and were not always confined to the common acceptation\nof a term.\n\nPHIL.  But this now mentioned is the common received sense among\nphilosophers themselves. But, not to insist on that, have you not been\nallowed to take Matter in what sense you pleased? And have you not used\nthis privilege in the utmost extent; sometimes entirely changing, at\nothers leaving out, or putting into the definition of it whatever, for\nthe present, best served your design, contrary to all the known rules of\nreason and logic? And hath not this shifting, unfair method of yours spun\nout our dispute to an unnecessary length; Matter having been particularly\nexamined, and by your own confession refuted in each of those senses? And\ncan any more be required to prove the absolute impossibility of a thing,\nthan the proving it impossible in every particular sense that either you\nor any one else understands it in?\n\nHYL.  But I am not so thoroughly satisfied that you have proved the\nimpossibility of Matter, in the last most obscure abstracted and\nindefinite sense.\n\nPHIL. . When is a thing shewn to be impossible?\n\nHYL.  When a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas comprehended\nin its definition.\n\nPHIL.  But where there are no ideas, there no repugnancy can be\ndemonstrated between ideas?\n\nHYL.  I agree with you.\n\nPHIL.  Now, in that which you call the obscure indefinite sense of the\nword MATTER, it is plain, by your own confession, there was\nincluded no idea at all, no sense except an unknown sense; which is the\nsame thing as none. You are not, therefore, to expect I should prove a\nrepugnancy between ideas, where there are no ideas; or the impossibility\nof Matter taken in an UNKNOWN sense, that is, no sense at all. My\nbusiness was only to shew you meant NOTHING; and this you were brought\nto own. So that, in all your various senses, you have been shewed either\nto mean nothing at all, or, if anything, an absurdity. And if this be not\nsufficient to prove the impossibility of a thing, I desire you will let\nme know what is.\n\nHYL.  I acknowledge you have proved that Matter is impossible; nor do I\nsee what more can be said in defence of it. But, at the same time that I\ngive up this, I suspect all my other notions. For surely none could be\nmore seemingly evident than this once was: and yet it now seems as false\nand absurd as ever it did true before. But I think we have discussed the\npoint sufficiently for the present. The remaining part of the day I would\nwillingly spend in running over in my thoughts the several heads of this\nmorning's conversation, and tomorrow shall be glad to meet you here again\nabout the same time.\n\nPHIL.  I will not fail to attend you.\n\n\n\n\nTHE THIRD DIALOGUE\n\n\nPHILONOUS.  Tell me, Hylas, what are the fruits of yesterday's\nmeditation? Has it confirmed you in the same mind you were in at parting?\nor have you since seen cause to change your opinion?\n\nHYLAS.  Truly my opinion is that all our opinions are alike vain and\nuncertain. What we approve to-day, we condemn to-morrow. We keep a stir\nabout knowledge, and spend our lives in the pursuit of it, when, alas I\nwe know nothing all the while: nor do I think it possible for us ever to\nknow anything in this life. Our faculties are too narrow and too few.\nNature certainly never intended us for speculation.\n\nPHIL.  What! Say you we can know nothing, Hylas?\n\nHYL.  There is not that single thing in the world whereof we can know\nthe real nature, or what it is in itself.\n\nPHIL.  Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or water is?\n\nHYL.  You may indeed know that fire appears hot, and water fluid; but\nthis is no more than knowing what sensations are produced in your own\nmind, upon the application of fire and water to your organs of sense.\nTheir internal constitution, their true and real nature, you are utterly\nin the dark as to THAT.\n\nPHIL.  Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand on, and that\nwhich I see before my eyes to be a real tree?\n\nHYL.  KNOW? No, it is impossible you or any man alive should know it.\nAll you know is, that you have such a certain idea or appearance in your\nown mind. But what is this to the real tree or stone? I tell you that\ncolour, figure, and hardness, which you perceive, are not the real\nnatures of those things, or in the least like them. The same may be said\nof all other real things, or corporeal substances, which compose the\nworld. They have none of them anything of themselves, like those sensible\nqualities by us perceived. We should not therefore pretend to affirm or\nknow anything of them, as they are in their own nature.\n\nPHIL.  But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for example,\nfrom iron: and how could this be, if I knew not what either truly was?\n\nHYL.  Believe me, Philonous, you can only distinguish between your own\nideas. That yellowness, that weight, and other sensible qualities, think\nyou they are really in the gold? They are only relative to the senses,\nand have no absolute existence in nature. And in pretending to\ndistinguish the species of real things, by the appearances in your mind,\nyou may perhaps act as wisely as he that should conclude two men were of\na different species, because their clothes were not of the same colour.\n\nPHIL.  It seems, then, we are altogether put off with the appearances of\nthings, and those false ones too. The very meat I eat, and the cloth I\nwear, have nothing in them like what I see and feel.\n\nHYL.  Even so.\n\nPHIL.  But is it not strange the whole world should be thus imposed on,\nand so foolish as to believe their senses? And yet I know not how it is,\nbut men eat, and drink, and sleep, and perform all the offices of life,\nas comfortably and conveniently as if they really knew the things they\nare conversant about.\n\nHYL.  They do so: but you know ordinary practice does not require a\nnicety of speculative knowledge. Hence the vulgar retain their mistakes,\nand for all that make a shift to bustle through the affairs of life. But\nphilosophers know better things.\n\nPHIL.  You mean, they KNOW that they KNOW NOTHING.\n\nHYL.  That is the very top and perfection of human knowledge.\n\nPHIL.  But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you\nseriously persuaded that you know nothing real in the world? Suppose you\nare going to write, would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, like\nanother man; and do you not know what it is you call for?\n\nHYL.  How often must I tell you, that I know not the real nature of any\none thing in the universe? I may indeed upon occasion make use of pen,\nink, and paper. But what any one of them is in its own true nature, I\ndeclare positively I know not. And the same is true with regard to every\nother corporeal thing. And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the\ntrue and real nature of things, but even of their existence. It cannot be\ndenied that we perceive such certain appearances or ideas; but it cannot\nbe concluded from thence that bodies really exist. Nay, now I think\non it, I must, agreeably to my former concessions, farther declare that\nit is impossible any REAL corporeal thing should exist in nature.\n\nPHIL.  You amaze me. Was ever anything more wild and extravagant than\nthe notions you now maintain: and is it not evident you are led into all\nthese extravagances by the belief of MATERIAL SUBSTANCE? This makes you\ndream of those unknown natures in everything. It is this occasions your\ndistinguishing between the reality and sensible appearances of things. It\nis to this you are indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else\nknows perfectly well. Nor is this all: you are not only ignorant of the\ntrue nature of everything, but you know not whether anything really\nexists, or whether there are any true natures at all; forasmuch as you\nattribute to your material beings an absolute or external existence,\nwherein you suppose their reality consists. And, as you are forced in the\nend to acknowledge such an existence means either a direct repugnancy, or\nnothing at all, it follows that you are obliged to pull down your own\nhypothesis of material Substance, and positively to deny the real\nexistence of any part of the universe. And so you are plunged into the\ndeepest and most deplorable scepticism that ever man was. Tell me, Hylas,\nis it not as I say?\n\nHYL.  I agree with you. MATERIAL SUBSTANCE was no more than an\nhypothesis; and a false and groundless one too. I will no longer spend my\nbreath in defence of it. But whatever hypothesis you advance, or\nwhatsoever scheme of things you introduce in its stead, I doubt not it\nwill appear every whit as false: let me but be allowed to question you\nupon it. That is, suffer me to serve you in your own kind, and I warrant\nit shall conduct you through as many perplexities and contradictions, to\nthe very same state of scepticism that I myself am in at present.\n\nPHIL.  I assure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to frame any hypothesis at\nall. I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave\nthings as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion that the real things\nare those very things I see, and feel, and perceive by my senses. These I\nknow; and, finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life,\nhave no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings. A piece\nof sensible bread, for instance, would stay my stomach better than ten\nthousand times as much of that insensible, unintelligible, real bread you\nspeak of. It is likewise my opinion that colours and other sensible\nqualities are on the objects. I cannot for my life help thinking\nthat snow is white, and fire hot. You indeed, who by SNOW and fire mean\ncertain external, unperceived, unperceiving substances, are in the right\nto deny whiteness or heat to be affections inherent in THEM. But I, who\nunderstand by those words the things I see and feel, am obliged to think\nlike other folks. And, as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature of\nthings, so neither am I as to their existence. That a thing should be\nreally perceived by my senses, and at the same time not really exist, is\nto me a plain contradiction; since I cannot prescind or abstract, even in\nthought, the existence of a sensible thing from its being perceived.\nWood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the like things, which I name\nand discourse of, are things that I know. And I should not have known\nthem but that I perceived them by my senses; and things perceived by the\nsenses are immediately perceived; and things immediately perceived are\nideas; and ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence therefore\nconsists in being perceived; when, therefore, they are actually perceived\nthere can be no doubt of their existence. Away then with all that\nscepticism, all those ridiculous philosophical doubts. What a jest is it\nfor a philosopher to question the existence of sensible things, till he\nhath it proved to him from the veracity of God; or to pretend our\nknowledge in this point falls short of intuition or demonstration! I\nmight as well doubt of my own being, as of the being of those things I\nactually see and feel.\n\nHYL.  Not so fast, Philonous: you say you cannot conceive how sensible\nthings should exist without the mind. Do you not?\n\nPHIL.  I do.\n\nHYL.  Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it possible\nthat things perceivable by sense may still exist?\n\nPHIL.  _I_ can; but then it must be in another mind. When I deny\nsensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in\nparticular, but all minds. Now, it is plain they have an existence\nexterior to my mind; since I find them by experience to be independent of\nit. There is therefore some other Mind wherein they exist, during the\nintervals between the times of my perceiving them: as likewise they\ndid before my birth, and would do after my supposed annihilation. And, as\nthe same is true with regard to all other finite created spirits, it\nnecessarily follows there is an OMNIPRESENT ETERNAL MIND, which knows\nand comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a\nmanner, and according to such rules, as He Himself hath ordained, and are\nby us termed the LAWS OF NATURE.\n\nHYL.  Answer me, Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly inert beings? Or\nhave they any agency included in them?\n\nPHIL.  They are altogether passive and inert.\n\nHYL.  And is not God an agent, a being purely active?\n\nPHIL.  I acknowledge it.\n\nHYL.  No idea therefore can be like unto, or represent the nature of\nGod?\n\nPHIL.  It cannot.\n\nHYL.  Since therefore you have no IDEA of the mind of God, how can you\nconceive it possible that things should exist in His mind? Or, if you can\nconceive the mind of God, without having an idea of it, why may not I be\nallowed to conceive the existence of Matter, notwithstanding I have no\nidea of it?\n\nPHIL.  As to your first question: I own I have properly no IDEA,\neither of God or any other spirit; for these being active, cannot be\nrepresented by things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do\nnevertheless know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as\ncertainly as I know my ideas exist. Farther, I know what I mean by the\nterms I AND MYSELF; and I know this immediately or intuitively, though\nI do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a sound. The\nMind, Spirit, or Soul is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks,\nacts, and perceives. I say INDIVISIBLE, because unextended; and\nUNEXTENDED, because extended, figured, moveable things are ideas; and\nthat which perceives ideas, which thinks and wills, is plainly itself no\nidea, nor like an idea. Ideas are things inactive, and perceived. And\nSpirits a sort of beings altogether different from them. I do not\ntherefore say my soul is an idea, or like an idea. However, taking the\nword IDEA in a large sense, my soul may be said to furnish me with an\nidea, that is, an image or likeness of God--though indeed extremely\ninadequate. For, all the notion I have of God is obtained by reflecting\non my own soul, heightening its powers, and removing its\nimperfections. I have, therefore, though not an inactive idea, yet in\nMYSELF some sort of an active thinking image of the Deity. And, though\nI perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a notion of Him, or know Him by\nreflexion and reasoning. My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate\nknowledge of; and, by the help of these, do mediately apprehend the\npossibility of the existence of other spirits and ideas. Farther, from my\nown being, and from the dependency I find in myself and my ideas, I do,\nby an act of reason, necessarily infer the existence of a God, and of all\ncreated things in the mind of God. So much for your first question. For\nthe second: I suppose by this time you can answer it yourself. For you\nneither perceive Matter objectively, as you do an inactive being or idea;\nnor know it, as you do yourself, by a reflex act, neither do you\nmediately apprehend it by similitude of the one or the other; nor yet\ncollect it by reasoning from that which you know immediately. All which\nmakes the case of MATTER widely different from that of the DEITY.\n\nHYL.  You say your own soul supplies you with some sort of an idea or\nimage of God. But, at the same time, you acknowledge you have, properly\nspeaking, no IDEA of your own soul. You even affirm that spirits are a\nsort of beings altogether different from ideas. Consequently that no idea\ncan be like a spirit. We have therefore no idea of any spirit. You admit\nnevertheless that there is spiritual Substance, although you have no idea\nof it; while you deny there can be such a thing as material Substance,\nbecause you have no notion or idea of it. Is this fair dealing? To act\nconsistently, you must either admit Matter or reject Spirit. What say you\nto this?\n\nPHIL.  _I_ say, in the first place, that I do not deny the existence of\nmaterial substance, merely because I have no notion of it' but because\nthe notion of it is inconsistent; or, in other words, because it is\nrepugnant that there should be a notion of it. Many things, for aught I\nknow, may exist, whereof neither I nor any other man hath or can have any\nidea or notion whatsoever. But then those things must be possible, that\nis, nothing inconsistent must be included in their definition. I\nsay, secondly, that, although we believe things to exist which we do not\nperceive, yet we may not believe that any particular thing exists,\nwithout some reason for such belief: but I have no reason for believing\nthe existence of Matter. I have no immediate intuition thereof: neither\ncan I immediately from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or\npassions, infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance--either\nby probable deduction, or necessary consequence. Whereas the being of my\nSelf, that is, my own soul, mind, or thinking principle, I evidently know\nby reflexion. You will forgive me if I repeat the same things in answer\nto the same objections. In the very notion or definition of MATERIAL\nSUBSTANCE, there is included a manifest repugnance and inconsistency.\nBut this cannot be said of the notion of Spirit. That ideas should exist\nin what doth not perceive, or be produced by what doth not act, is\nrepugnant. But, it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing should\nbe the subject of ideas, or an active thing the cause of them. It is\ngranted we have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative\nknowledge of the existence of other finite spirits; but it will not\nthence follow that such spirits are on a foot with material substances:\nif to suppose the one be inconsistent, and it be not inconsistent to\nsuppose the other; if the one can be inferred by no argument, and there\nis a probability for the other; if we see signs and effects indicating\ndistinct finite agents like ourselves, and see no sign or symptom\nwhatever that leads to a rational belief of Matter. I say, lastly, that I\nhave a notion of Spirit, though I have not, strictly speaking, an idea of\nit. I do not perceive it as an idea, or by means of an idea, but know it\nby reflexion.\n\nHYL.  Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that, according\nto your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your own principles,\nit should follow that YOU are only a system of floating ideas, without\nany substance to support them. Words are not to be used without a\nmeaning. And, as there is no more meaning in SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE than\nin MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, the one is to be exploded as well as the other.\n\nPHIL.  How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of my own\nbeing; and that _I_ MYSELF am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a\nthinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates\nabout ideas. I know that I, one and the same self, perceive both\ncolours and sounds: that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a\ncolour: that I am therefore one individual principle, distinct from\ncolour and sound; and, for the same reason, from aft other sensible\nthings and inert ideas. But, I am not in like manner conscious either of\nthe existence or essence of Matter. On the contrary, I know that nothing\ninconsistent can exist, and that the existence of Matter implies an\ninconsistency. Farther, I know what I mean when I affirm that there is a\nspiritual substance or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and\nperceives ideas. But, I do not know what is meant when it is said that an\nunperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or\nthe archetypes of ideas. There is therefore upon the whole no parity of\ncase between Spirit and Matter.\n\nHYL.  I own myself satisfied in this point. But, do you in earnest think\nthe real existence of sensible things consists in their being actually\nperceived? If so; how comes it that all mankind distinguish between them?\nAsk the first man you meet, and he shall tell you, TO BE PERCEIVED is\none thing, and TO EXIST is another.\n\nPHIL.  _I_ am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common sense of the world\nfor the truth of my notion. Ask the gardener why he thinks yonder\ncherry-tree exists in the garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees\nand feels it; in a word, because he perceives it by his senses. Ask him\nwhy he thinks an orange-tree not to be there, and he shall tell you,\nbecause he does not perceive it. What he perceives by sense, that he\nterms a real, being, and saith it IS OR EXISTS; but, that which is not\nperceivable, the same, he saith, hath no being.\n\nHYL.  Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible thing consists\nin being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived.\n\nPHIL.  And what is perceivable but an idea? And can an idea exist\nwithout being actually perceived? These are points long since agreed\nbetween us.\n\nHYL.  But, be your opinion never so true, yet surely you will not deny\nit is shocking, and contrary to the common sense of men. Ask the\nfellow whether yonder tree hath an existence out of his mind: what answer\nthink you he would make?\n\nPHIL.  The same that I should myself, to wit, that it doth exist out of\nhis mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say,\nthe real tree, existing without his mind, is truly known and comprehended\nby (that is EXISTS IN) the infinite mind of God. Probably he may not at\nfirst glance be aware of the direct and immediate proof there is of this;\ninasmuch as the very being of a tree, or any other sensible thing,\nimplies a mind wherein it is. But the point itself he cannot deny. The\nquestion between the Materialists and me is not, whether things have a\nREAL existence out of the mind of this or that person, but whether they\nhave an ABSOLUTE existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and\nexterior to all minds. This indeed some heathens and philosophers have\naffirmed, but whoever entertains notions of the Deity suitable to the\nHoly Scriptures will be of another opinion.\n\nHYL.  But, according to your notions, what difference is there between\nreal things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a\ndream--since they are all equally in the mind?\n\nPHIL.  The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct;\nthey have, besides, an entire dependence on the will. But the ideas\nperceived by sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear; and,\nbeing imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not the\nlike dependence on our will. There is therefore no danger of confounding\nthese with the foregoing: and there is as little of confounding them with\nthe visions of a dream, which are dim, irregular, and confused. And,\nthough they should happen to be never so lively and natural, yet, by\ntheir not being connected, and of a piece with the preceding and\nsubsequent transactions of our lives, they might easily be distinguished\nfrom realities. In short, by whatever method you distinguish THINGS FROM\nCHIMERAS on your scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon\nmine. For, it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference; and I am\nnot for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive.\n\nHYL.  But still, Philonous, you hold, there is nothing in the world but\nspirits and ideas. And this, you must needs acknowledge, sounds very\noddly.\n\nPHIL.  I own the word IDEA, not being commonly used for THING,\nsounds something out of the way. My reason for using it was, because a\nnecessary relation to the mind is understood to be implied by that\nterm; and it is now commonly used by philosophers to denote the immediate\nobjects of the understanding. But, however oddly the proposition may\nsound in words, yet it includes nothing so very strange or shocking in\nits sense; which in effect amounts to no more than this, to wit, that\nthere are only things perceiving, and things perceived; or that every\nunthinking being is necessarily, and from the very nature of its\nexistence, perceived by some mind; if not by a finite created mind, yet\ncertainly by the infinite mind of God, in whom \"we five, and move, and\nhave our being.\" Is this as strange as to say, the sensible qualities are\nnot on the objects: or that we cannot be sure of the existence of things,\nor know any thing of their real natures--though we both see and feel\nthem, and perceive them by all our senses?\n\nHYL.  And, in consequence of this, must we not think there are no such\nthings as physical or corporeal causes; but that a Spirit is the\nimmediate cause of all the phenomena in nature? Can there be anything\nmore extravagant than this?\n\nPHIL.  Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say--a thing which is\ninert operates on the mind, and which is unperceiving is the cause of our\nperceptions, without any regard either to consistency, or the old known\naxiom, NOTHING CAN GIVE TO ANOTHER THAT WHICH IT HATH NOT ITSELF.\nBesides, that which to you, I know not for what reason, seems so\nextravagant is no more than the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred\nplaces. In them God is represented as the sole and immediate Author of\nall those effects which some heathens and philosophers are wont to\nascribe to Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthinking principle. This\nis so much the constant language of Scripture that it were needless to\nconfirm it by citations.\n\nHYL.  You are not aware, Philonous, that in making God the immediate\nAuthor of all the motions in nature, you make Him the Author of murder,\nsacrilege, adultery, and the like heinous sins.\n\nPHIL.  In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputation of guilt\nis the same, whether a person commits an action with or without an\ninstrument. In case therefore you suppose God to act by the mediation of\nan instrument or occasion, called MATTER, you as truly make Him the\nauthor of sin as I, who think Him the immediate agent in all those\noperations vulgarly ascribed to Nature. I farther observe that sin or\nmoral turpitude doth not consist in the outward physical action or\nmotion, but in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason\nand religion. This is plain, in that the killing an enemy in a battle, or\nputting a criminal legally to death, is not thought sinful; though the\noutward act be the very same with that in the case of murder. Since,\ntherefore, sin doth not consist in the physical action, the making God an\nimmediate cause of all such actions is not making Him the Author of sin.\nLastly, I have nowhere said that God is the only agent who produces all\nthe motions in bodies. It is true I have denied there are any other\nagents besides spirits; but this is very consistent with allowing to\nthinking rational beings, in the production of motions, the use of\nlimited powers, ultimately indeed derived from God, but immediately under\nthe direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to\nall the guilt of their actions.\n\nHYL.  But the denying Matter, Philonous, or corporeal Substance; there\nis the point. You can never persuade me that this is not repugnant to the\nuniversal sense of mankind. Were our dispute to be determined by most\nvoices, I am confident you would give up the point, without gathering the\nvotes.\n\nPHIL.  I wish both our opinions were fairly stated and submitted to the\njudgment of men who had plain common sense, without the prejudices of a\nlearned education. Let me be represented as one who trusts his senses,\nwho thinks he knows the things he sees and feels, and entertains no\ndoubts of their existence; and you fairly set forth with all your doubts,\nyour paradoxes, and your scepticism about you, and I shall willingly\nacquiesce in the determination of any indifferent person. That there is\nno substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to me evident. And\nthat the objects immediately perceived are ideas, is on all hands agreed.\nAnd that sensible qualities are objects immediately perceived no one can\ndeny. It is therefore evident there can be no SUBSTRATUM of those\nqualities but spirit; in which they exist, not by way of mode or\nproperty, but as a thing perceived in that which perceives it. I deny\ntherefore that there is ANY UNTHINKING-SUBSTRATUM of the objects of\nsense, and IN THAT ACCEPTATION that there is any material substance.\nBut if by MATERIAL SUBSTANCE is meant only SENSIBLE BODY, THAT\nwhich is seen and felt (and the unphilosophical part of the world, I dare\nsay, mean no more)--then I am more certain of matter's existence than you\nor any other philosopher pretend to be. If there be anything which makes\nthe generality of mankind averse from the notions I espouse, it is\na misapprehension that I deny the reality of sensible things. But, as it\nis you who are guilty of that, and not I, it follows that in truth their\naversion is against your notions and not mine. I do therefore assert that\nI am as certain as of my own being, that there are bodies or corporeal\nsubstances (meaning the things I perceive by my senses); and that,\ngranting this, the bulk of mankind will take no thought about, nor think\nthemselves at all concerned in the fate of those unknown natures, and\nphilosophical quiddities, which some men are so fond of.\n\nHYL.  What say you to this? Since, according to you, men judge of the\nreality of things by their senses, how can a man be mistaken in thinking\nthe moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot in diameter; or a square\ntower, seen at a distance, round; or an oar, with one end in the water,\ncrooked?\n\nPHIL.  He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually\nperceives, but in the inference he makes from his present perceptions.\nThus, in the case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is\ncertainly crooked; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence\nconclude that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the\nsame crookedness; or that it would affect his touch as crooked things are\nwont to do: in that he is mistaken. In like manner, if he shall conclude\nfrom what he perceives in one station, that, in case he advances towards\nthe moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like ideas, he is\nmistaken. But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately, and\nat present, (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err\nin respect of that) but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the\nideas he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived: or,\nconcerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines\nwould be perceived in other circumstances. The case is the same with\nregard to the Copernican system. We do not here perceive any motion of\nthe earth: but it were erroneous thence to conclude, that, in case we\nwere placed at as great a distance from that as we are now from the other\nplanets, we should not then perceive its motion.\n\nHYL.  I understand you; and must needs own you say things plausible\nenough. But, give me leave to put you in mind of one thing. Pray,\nPhilonous, were you not formerly as positive that Matter existed, as you\nare now that it does not?\n\nPHIL.  I was. But here lies the difference. Before, my positiveness was\nfounded, without examination, upon prejudice; but now, after inquiry,\nupon evidence.\n\nHYL.  After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words than things.\nWe agree in the thing, but differ in the name. That we are affected with\nideas FROM WITHOUT is evident; and it is no less evident that there\nmust be (I will not say archetypes, but) Powers without the mind,\ncorresponding to those ideas. And, as these Powers cannot subsist by\nthemselves, there is some subject of them necessarily to be admitted;\nwhich I call MATTER, and you call SPIRIT. This is all the difference.\n\nPHIL.  Pray, Hylas, is that powerful Being, or subject of powers,\nextended?\n\nHYL.  It hath not extension; but it hath the power to raise in you the\nidea of extension.\n\nPHIL.  It is therefore itself unextended?\n\nHYL.  I grant it.\n\nPHIL.  Is it not also active?\n\nHYL.  Without doubt. Otherwise, how could we attribute powers to it?\n\nPHIL.  Now let me ask you two questions: FIRST, Whether it be\nagreeable to the usage either of philosophers or others to give the name\nMATTER to an unextended active being? And, SECONDLY, Whether it be\nnot ridiculously absurd to misapply names contrary to the common use of\nlanguage?\n\nHYL.  Well then, let it not be called Matter, since you will have it so,\nbut some THIRD NATURE distinct from Matter and Spirit. For what reason\nis there why you should call it Spirit? Does not the notion of spirit\nimply that it is thinking, as well as active and unextended?\n\nPHIL.  My reason is this: because I have a mind to have some notion of\nmeaning in what I say: but I have no notion of any action distinct from\nvolition, neither can I conceive volition to be anywhere but in a\nspirit: therefore, when I speak of an active being, I am obliged to mean\na Spirit. Beside, what can be plainer than that a thing which hath no\nideas in itself cannot impart them to me; and, if it hath ideas, surely\nit must be a Spirit. To make you comprehend the point still more\nclearly if it be possible, I assert as well as you that, since we are\naffected from without, we must allow Powers to be without, in a Being\ndistinct from ourselves. So far we are agreed. But then we differ as to\nthe kind of this powerful Being. I will have it to be Spirit, you Matter,\nor I know not what (I may add too, you know not what) Third Nature. Thus,\nI prove it to be Spirit. From the effects I see produced, I conclude\nthere are actions; and, because actions, volitions; and, because there\nare volitions, there must be a WILL. Again, the things I perceive must\nhave an existence, they or their archetypes, out of MY mind: but, being\nideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than in an\nunderstanding; there is therefore an UNDERSTANDING. But will and\nunderstanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. The\npowerful cause, therefore, of my ideas is in strict propriety of speech a\nSPIRIT.\n\nHYL.  And now I warrant you think you have made the point very clear,\nlittle suspecting that what you advance leads directly to a\ncontradiction. Is it not an absurdity to imagine any imperfection in God?\n\nPHIL.  Without a doubt.\n\nHYL.  To suffer pain is an imperfection?\n\nPHIL.  It is.\n\nHYL.  Are we not sometimes affected with pain and uneasiness by some\nother Being?\n\nPHIL.  We are.\n\nHYL.  And have you not said that Being is a Spirit, and is not that\nSpirit God?\n\nPHIL.  I grant it.\n\nHYL.  But you have asserted that whatever ideas we perceive from without\nare in the mind which affects us. The ideas, therefore, of pain and\nuneasiness are in God; or, in other words, God suffers pain: that is to\nsay, there is an imperfection in the Divine nature: which, you\nacknowledged, was absurd. So you are caught in a plain contradiction.\n\nPHIL.  That God knows or understands all things, and that He knows,\namong other things, what pain is, even every sort of painful sensation,\nand what it is for His creatures to suffer pain, I make no question. But,\nthat God, though He knows and sometimes causes painful sensations in us,\ncan Himself suffer pain, I positively deny. We, who are limited and\ndependent spirits, are liable to impressions of sense, the effects of an\nexternal Agent, which, being produced against our wills, are\nsometimes painful and uneasy. But God, whom no external being can affect,\nwho perceives nothing by sense as we do; whose will is absolute and\nindependent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or resisted by\nnothing: it is evident, such a Being as this can suffer nothing, nor be\naffected with any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at all. We\nare chained to a body: that is to say, our perceptions are connected with\ncorporeal motions. By the law of our nature, we are affected upon every\nalteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body; which sensible\nbody, rightly considered, is nothing but a complexion of such qualities\nor ideas as have no existence distinct from being perceived by a mind. So\nthat this connexion of sensations with corporeal motions means no more\nthan a correspondence in the order of nature, between two sets of ideas,\nor things immediately perceivable. But God is a Pure Spirit, disengaged\nfrom all such sympathy, or natural ties. No corporeal motions are\nattended with the sensations of pain or pleasure in His mind. To know\neverything knowable, is certainly a perfection; but to endure, or suffer,\nor feel anything by sense, is an imperfection. The former, I say, agrees\nto God, but not the latter. God knows, or hath ideas; but His ideas are\nnot conveyed to Him by sense, as ours are. Your not distinguishing, where\nthere is so manifest a difference, makes you fancy you see an absurdity\nwhere there is none.\n\nHYL.  But, all this while you have not considered that the quantity of\nMatter has been demonstrated to be proportioned to the gravity of bodies.\nAnd what can withstand demonstration?\n\nPHIL.  Let me see how you demonstrate that point.\n\nHYL.  I lay it down for a principle, that the moments or quantities of\nmotion in bodies are in a direct compounded reason of the velocities and\nquantities of Matter contained in them. Hence, where the velocities are\nequal, it follows the moments are directly as the quantity of Matter in\neach. But it is found by experience that all bodies (bating the small\ninequalities, arising from the resistance of the air) descend with an\nequal velocity; the motion therefore of descending bodies, and\nconsequently their gravity, which is the cause or principle of that\nmotion, is proportional to the quantity of Matter; which was to be\ndemonstrated.\n\nPHIL.  You lay it down as a self-evident principle that the quantity of\nmotion in any body is proportional to the velocity and MATTER\ntaken together; and this is made use of to prove a proposition from\nwhence the existence of MATTER is inferred. Pray is not this arguing in\na circle?\n\nHYL.  In the premise I only mean that the motion is proportional to the\nvelocity, jointly with the extension and solidity.\n\nPHIL.  But, allowing this to be true, yet it will not thence follow that\ngravity is proportional to MATTER, in your philosophic sense of the\nword; except you take it for granted that unknown SUBSTRATUM, or\nwhatever else you call it, is proportional to those sensible qualities;\nwhich to suppose is plainly begging the question. That there is magnitude\nand solidity, or resistance, perceived by sense, I readily grant; as\nlikewise, that gravity may be proportional to those qualities I will not\ndispute. But that either these qualities as perceived by us, or the\npowers producing them, do exist in a MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM; this is what\nI deny, and you indeed affirm, but, notwithstanding your demonstration,\nhave not yet proved.\n\nHYL.  I shall insist no longer on that point. Do you think, however, you\nshall persuade me that the natural philosophers have been dreaming all\nthis while? Pray what becomes of all their hypotheses and explications of\nthe phenomena, which suppose the existence of Matter?\n\nPHIL.  What mean you, Hylas, by the PHENOMENA?\n\nHYL.  I mean the appearances which I perceive by my senses.\n\nPHIL.  And the appearances perceived by sense, are they not ideas?\n\nHYL.  I have told you so a hundred times.\n\nPHIL.  Therefore, to explain the phenomena, is, to shew how we come to\nbe affected with ideas, in that manner and order wherein they are\nimprinted on our senses. Is it not?\n\nHYL.  It is.\n\nPHIL.  Now, if you can prove that any philosopher has explained the\nproduction of any one idea in our minds by the help of MATTER, I shall\nfor ever acquiesce, and look on all that hath been said against it as\nnothing; but, if you cannot, it is vain to urge the explication of\nphenomena. That a Being endowed with knowledge and will should produce or\nexhibit ideas is easily understood. But that a Being which is utterly\ndestitute of these faculties should be able to produce ideas, or in any\nsort to affect an intelligence, this I can never understand. This I say,\nthough we had some positive conception of Matter, though we knew\nits qualities, and could comprehend its existence, would yet be so far\nfrom explaining things, that it is itself the most inexplicable thing in\nthe world. And yet, for all this, it will not follow that philosophers\nhave been doing nothing; for, by observing and reasoning upon the\nconnexion of ideas, they discover the laws and methods of nature, which\nis a part of knowledge both useful and entertaining.\n\nHYL.  After all, can it be supposed God would deceive all mankind? Do\nyou imagine He would have induced the whole world to believe the being of\nMatter, if there was no such thing?\n\nPHIL.  That every epidemical opinion, arising from prejudice, or\npassion, or thoughtlessness, may be imputed to God, as the Author of it,\nI believe you will not affirm. Whatsoever opinion we father on Him, it\nmust be either because He has discovered it to us by supernatural\nrevelation; or because it is so evident to our natural faculties, which\nwere framed and given us by God, that it is impossible we should withhold\nour assent from it. But where is the revelation? or where is the evidence\nthat extorts the belief of Matter? Nay, how does it appear, that Matter,\nTAKEN FOR SOMETHING DISTINCT FROM WHAT WE PERCEIVE BY OUR SENSES, is\nthought to exist by all mankind; or indeed, by any except a few\nphilosophers, who do not know what they would be at? Your question\nsupposes these points are clear; and, when you have cleared them, I shall\nthink myself obliged to give you another answer. In the meantime, let it\nsuffice that I tell you, I do not suppose God has deceived mankind at\nall.\n\nHYL.  But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty! There lies the danger.\nNew notions should always be discountenanced; they unsettle men's minds,\nand nobody knows where they will end.\n\nPHIL.  Why the rejecting a notion that has no foundation, either in\nsense, or in reason, or in Divine authority, should be thought to\nunsettle the belief of such opinions as are grounded on all or any of\nthese, I cannot imagine. That innovations in government and religion are\ndangerous, and ought to be discountenanced, I freely own. But is there\nthe like reason why they should be discouraged in philosophy? The making\nanything known which was unknown before is an innovation in knowledge:\nand, if all such innovations had been forbidden, men would have\nmade a notable progress in the arts and sciences. But it is none of my\nbusiness to plead for novelties and paradoxes. That the qualities we\nperceive are not on the objects: that we must not believe our senses:\nthat we know nothing of the real nature of things, and can never be\nassured even of their existence: that real colours and sounds are nothing\nbut certain unknown figures and motions: that motions are in themselves\nneither swift nor slow: that there are in bodies absolute extensions,\nwithout any particular magnitude or figure: that a thing stupid,\nthoughtless, and inactive, operates on a spirit: that the least particle\nof a body contains innumerable extended parts:--these are the novelties,\nthese are the strange notions which shock the genuine uncorrupted\njudgment of all mankind; and being once admitted, embarrass the mind with\nendless doubts and difficulties. And it is against these and the like\ninnovations I endeavour to vindicate Common Sense. It is true, in doing\nthis, I may perhaps be obliged to use some AMBAGES, and ways of speech\nnot common. But, if my notions are once thoroughly understood, that which\nis most singular in them will, in effect, be found to amount to no more\nthan this.--that it is absolutely impossible, and a plain contradiction,\nto suppose any unthinking Being should exist without being perceived by a\nMind. And, if this notion be singular, it is a shame it should be so, at\nthis time of day, and in a Christian country.\n\nHYL.  As for the difficulties other opinions may be liable to, those\nare out of the question. It is your business to defend your own opinion.\nCan anything be plainer than that you are for changing all things into\nideas? You, I say, who are not ashamed to charge me WITH SCEPTICISM.\nThis is so plain, there is no denying it.\n\nPHIL.  You mistake me. I am not for changing things into ideas, but\nrather ideas into things; since those immediate objects of perception,\nwhich, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the\nreal things themselves.\n\nHYL.  Things! You may pretend what you please; but it is certain you\nleave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside only which\nstrikes the senses.\n\nPHIL.  What you call the empty forms and outside of things seem to me\nthe very things themselves. Nor are they empty or incomplete, otherwise\nthan upon your supposition--that Matter is an essential part of all\ncorporeal things. We both, therefore, agree in this, that we perceive\nonly sensible forms: but herein we differ--you will have them to be empty\nappearances, I, real beings. In short, you do not trust your senses, I\ndo.\n\nHYL.  You say you believe your senses; and seem to applaud yourself that\nin this you agree with the vulgar. According to you, therefore, the true\nnature of a thing is discovered by the senses. If so, whence comes that\ndisagreement? Why is not the same figure, and other sensible qualities,\nperceived all manner of ways? and why should we use a microscope the\nbetter to discover the true nature of a body, if it were discoverable to\nthe naked eye?\n\nPHIL.  Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we\nfeel; neither is the same object perceived by the microscope which was by\nthe naked eye. But, in case every variation was thought sufficient to\nconstitute a new kind of individual, the endless number of confusion of\nnames would render language impracticable. Therefore, to avoid this, as\nwell as other inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought, men\ncombine together several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or by the\nsame sense at different times, or in different circumstances, but\nobserved, however, to have some connexion in nature, either with respect\nto co-existence or succession; all which they refer to one name, and\nconsider as one thing. Hence it follows that when I examine, by my other\nsenses, a thing I have seen, it is not in order to understand better the\nsame object which I had perceived by sight, the object of one sense not\nbeing perceived by the other senses. And, when I look through a\nmicroscope, it is not that I may perceive more clearly what I perceived\nalready with my bare eyes; the object perceived by the glass being quite\ndifferent from the former. But, in both cases, my aim is only to know\nwhat ideas are connected together; and the more a man knows of the\nconnexion of ideas, the more he is said to know of the nature of things.\nWhat, therefore, if our ideas are variable; what if our senses are not in\nall circumstances affected with the same appearances. It will not thence\nfollow they are not to be trusted; or that they are inconsistent either\nwith themselves or anything else: except it be with your preconceived\nnotion of (I know not what) one single, unchanged, unperceivable, real\nNature, marked by each name. Which prejudice seems to have taken its rise\nfrom not rightly understanding the common language of men, speaking\nof several distinct ideas as united into one thing by the mind. And,\nindeed, there is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits of the\nphilosophers are owing to the same original: while they began to build\ntheir schemes not so much on notions as on words, which were framed by\nthe vulgar, merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common actions of\nlife, without any regard to speculation.\n\nHYL.  Methinks I apprehend your meaning.\n\nPHIL.  It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our senses are not\nreal things, but images or copies of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is\nno farther real than as our ideas are the true REPRESENTATIONS OF THOSE\nORIGINALS. But, as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown,\nit is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them; or whether they\nresemble them at all. We cannot, therefore, be sure we have any real\nknowledge. Farther, as our ideas are perpetually varied, without any\nchange in the supposed real things, it necessarily follows they cannot\nall be true copies of them: or, if some are and others are not, it is\nimpossible to distinguish the former from the latter. And this plunges us\nyet deeper in uncertainty. Again, when we consider the point, we cannot\nconceive how any idea, or anything like an idea, should have an absolute\nexistence out of a mind: nor consequently, according to you, how there\nshould be any real thing in nature. The result of all which is that we\nare thrown into the most hopeless and abandoned scepticism. Now, give me\nleave to ask you, First, Whether your referring ideas to certain\nabsolutely existing unperceived substances, as their originals, be not\nthe source of all this scepticism? Secondly, whether you are informed,\neither by sense or reason, of the existence of those unknown originals?\nAnd, in case you are not, whether it be not absurd to suppose them?\nThirdly, Whether, upon inquiry, you find there is anything distinctly\nconceived or meant by the ABSOLUTE OR EXTERNAL EXISTENCE OF UNPERCEIVING\nSUBSTANCES? Lastly, Whether, the premises considered, it be not the\nwisest way to follow nature, trust your senses, and, laying aside all\nanxious thought about unknown natures or substances, admit with the\nvulgar those for real things which are perceived by the senses?\n\nHYL.  For the present, I have no inclination to the answering part. I\nwould much rather see how you can get over what follows. Pray are not the\nobjects perceived by the SENSES of one, likewise perceivable to\nothers present? If there were a hundred more here, they would all see the\ngarden, the trees, and flowers, as I see them. But they are not in the\nsame manner affected with the ideas I frame in my IMAGINATION. Does not\nthis make a difference between the former sort of objects and the latter?\n\nPHIL.  I grant it does. Nor have I ever denied a difference between the\nobjects of sense and those of imagination. But what would you infer from\nthence? You cannot say that sensible objects exist unperceived, because\nthey are perceived by many.\n\nHYL.  I own I can make nothing of that objection: but it hath led me\ninto another. Is it not your opinion that by our senses we perceive only\nthe ideas existing in our minds?\n\nPHIL.  It is.\n\nHYL.  But the SAME idea which is in my mind cannot be in yours, or in\nany other mind. Doth it not therefore follow, from your principles, that\nno two can see the same thing? And is not this highly, absurd?\n\nPHIL.  If the term SAME be taken in the vulgar acceptation, it is\ncertain (and not at all repugnant to the principles I maintain) that\ndifferent persons may perceive the same thing; or the same thing or idea\nexist in different minds. Words are of arbitrary imposition; and, since\nmen are used to apply the word SAME where no distinction or variety is\nperceived, and I do not pretend to alter their perceptions, it follows\nthat, as men have said before, SEVERAL SAW THE SAME THING, so they may,\nupon like occasions, still continue to use the same phrase, without any\ndeviation either from propriety of language, or the truth of things. But,\nif the term SAME be used in the acceptation of philosophers, who\npretend to an abstracted notion of identity, then, according to their\nsundry definitions of this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that\nphilosophic identity consists), it may or may not be possible for divers\npersons to perceive the same thing. But whether philosophers shall think\nfit to CALL a thing the SAME or no, is, I conceive, of small\nimportance. Let us suppose several men together, all endued with the same\nfaculties, and consequently affected in like sort by their senses, and\nwho had yet never known the use of language; they would, without\nquestion, agree in their perceptions. Though perhaps, when they came to\nthe use of speech, some regarding the uniformness of what was perceived,\nmight call it the SAME thing: others, especially regarding the\ndiversity of persons who perceived, might choose the denomination of\nDIFFERENT things. But who sees not that all the dispute is about a\nword? to wit, whether what is perceived by different persons may yet\nhave the term SAME applied to it? Or, suppose a house, whose walls or\noutward shell remaining unaltered, the chambers are all pulled down, and\nnew ones built in their place; and that you should call this the SAME,\nand I should say it was not the SAME house.--would we not, for all\nthis, perfectly agree in our thoughts of the house, considered in itself?\nAnd would not all the difference consist in a sound? If you should say,\nWe differed in our notions; for that you super-added to your idea of the\nhouse the simple abstracted idea of identity, whereas I did not; I would\ntell you, I know not what you mean by THE ABSTRACTED IDEA OF IDENTITY;\nand should desire you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure you\nunderstood yourself.--Why so silent, Hylas? Are you not yet satisfied men\nmay dispute about identity and diversity, without any real difference in\ntheir thoughts and opinions, abstracted from names? Take this farther\nreflexion with you: that whether Matter be allowed to exist or no, the\ncase is exactly the same as to the point in hand. For the Materialists\nthemselves acknowledge what we immediately perceive by our senses to be\nour own ideas. Your difficulty, therefore, that no two see the same\nthing, makes equally against the Materialists and me.\n\nHYL.  Ay, Philonous, but they suppose an external archetype, to\nwhich referring their several ideas they may truly be said to perceive\nthe same thing.\n\nPHIL.  And (not to mention your having discarded those archetypes) so\nmay you suppose an external archetype on my principles;--EXTERNAL, _I_\nMEAN, TO YOUR OWN MIND: though indeed it must be' supposed to exist in\nthat Mind which comprehends all things; but then, this serves all the\nends of IDENTITY, as well as if it existed out of a mind. And I am sure\nyou yourself will not say it is less intelligible.\n\nHYL.  You have indeed clearly satisfied me--either that there is no\ndifficulty at bottom in this point; or, if there be, that it makes\nequally against both opinions.\n\nPHIL.  But that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions\ncan be a proof against neither.\n\nHYL.  I acknowledge it. But, after all, Philonous, when I consider\nthe substance of what you advance against SCEPTICISM, it amounts to no\nmore than this: We are sure that we really see, hear, feel; in a word,\nthat we are affected with sensible impressions.\n\nPHIL.  And how are WE concerned any farther? I see this cherry, I feel\nit, I taste it: and I am sure NOTHING cannot be seen, or felt, or\ntasted: it is therefore real. Take away the sensations of softness,\nmoisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it is\nnot a being distinct from sensations. A cherry, I say, is nothing but a\ncongeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses:\nwhich ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by\nthe mind, because they are observed to attend each other. Thus, when the\npalate is affected with such a particular taste, the sight is affected\nwith a red colour, the touch with roundness, softness, &c. Hence, when I\nsee, and feel, and taste, in such sundry certain manners, I am sure the\ncherry exists, or is real; its reality being in my opinion nothing\nabstracted from those sensations. But if by the word CHERRY, you mean\nan unknown nature, distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by its\nEXISTENCE something distinct from its being perceived; then, indeed, I\nown, neither you nor I, nor any one else, can be sure it exists.\n\nHYL.  But, what would you say, Philonous, if I should bring the very\nsame reasons against the existence of sensible things IN A MIND, which\nyou have offered against their existing IN A MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM?\n\nPHIL.  When I see your reasons, you shall hear what I have to say to\nthem.\n\nHYL.  Is the mind extended or unextended?\n\nPHIL.  Unextended, without doubt.\n\nHYL.  Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind?\n\nPHIL.  They are.\n\nHYL.  Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible impressions?\n\nPHIL.  I believe you may.\n\nHYL.  Explain to me now, O Philonous! how it is possible there should be\nroom for all those trees and houses to exist in your mind. Can extended\nthings be contained in that which is unextended? Or, are we to imagine\nimpressions made on a thing void of all solidity? You cannot say objects\nare in your mind, as books in your study: or that things are imprinted on\nit, as the figure of a seal upon wax. In what sense, therefore, are we to\nunderstand those expressions? Explain me this if you can: and I shall\nthen be able to answer all those queries you formerly put to me about my\nSUBSTRATUM.\n\nPHIL.  Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind,\nor imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in the gross\nliteral sense; as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to\nmake an impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends\nor perceives them; and that it is affected from without, or by some being\ndistinct from itself. This is my explication of your difficulty; and how\nit can serve to make your tenet of an unperceiving material SUBSTRATUM\nintelligible, I would fain know.\n\nHYL.  Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use can be made\nof it. But are you not guilty of some abuse of language in this?\n\nPHIL.  None at all. It is no more than common custom, which you know is\nthe rule of language, hath authorised: nothing being more usual, than for\nphilosophers to speak of the immediate objects of the understanding as\nthings existing in the mind. 'Nor is there anything in this but what is\nconformable to the general analogy of language; most part of the mental\noperations being signified by words borrowed from sensible things; as is\nplain in the terms COMPREHEND, reflect, DISCOURSE, &C., which,\nbeing applied to the mind, must not be taken in their gross, original\nsense.\n\nHYL.  You have, I own, satisfied me in this point. But there still\nremains one great difficulty, which I know not how you will get over.\nAnd, indeed, it is of such importance that if you could solve all others,\nwithout being able to find a solution for this, you must never expect to\nmake me a proselyte to your principles.\n\nPHIL.  Let me know this mighty difficulty.\n\nHYL.  The Scripture account of the creation is what appears to me\nutterly irreconcilable with your notions. Moses tells us of a creation: a\ncreation of what? of ideas? No, certainly, but of things, of real things,\nsolid corporeal substances. Bring your principles to agree with this, and\nI shall perhaps agree with you.\n\nPHIL.  Moses mentions the sun, moon, and stars, earth and sea, plants\nand animals. That all these do really exist, and were in the beginning\ncreated by God, I make no question. If by IDEAS you mean fictions\nand fancies of the mind, then these are no ideas. If by IDEAS you mean\nimmediate objects of the understanding, or sensible things, which cannot\nexist unperceived, or out of a mind, then these things are ideas. But\nwhether you do or do not call them IDEAS, it matters little. The\ndifference is only about a name. And, whether that name be retained or\nrejected, the sense, the truth, and reality of things continues the same.\nIn common talk, the objects of our senses are not termed IDEAS, but\nTHINGS. Call them so still: provided you do not attribute to them any\nabsolute external existence, and I shall never quarrel with you for a\nword. The creation, therefore, I allow to have been a creation of things,\nof REAL things. Neither is this in the least inconsistent with my\nprinciples, as is evident from what I have now said; and would have been\nevident to you without this, if you had not forgotten what had been so\noften said before. But as for solid corporeal substances, I desire you to\nshow where Moses makes any mention of them; and, if they should be\nmentioned by him, or any other inspired writer, it would still be\nincumbent on you to shew those words were not taken in the vulgar\nacceptation, for things falling under our senses, but in the philosophic\nacceptation, for Matter, or AN UNKNOWN QUIDDITY, WITH AN ABSOLUTE\nEXISTENCE. When you have proved these points, then (and not till then)\nmay you bring the authority of Moses into our dispute.\n\nHYL.  It is in vain to dispute about a point so clear. I am content to\nrefer it to your own conscience. Are you not satisfied there is some\npeculiar repugnancy between the Mosaic account of the creation and your\nnotions?\n\nPHIL.  If all possible sense which can be put on the first chapter of\nGenesis may be conceived as consistently with my principles as any other,\nthen it has no peculiar repugnancy with them. But there is no sense you\nmay not as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, besides spirits, all\nyou conceive are ideas; and the existence of these I do not deny. Neither\ndo you pretend they exist without the mind.\n\nHYL.  Pray let me see any sense you can understand it in.\n\nPHIL.  Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the creation, I\nshould have seen things produced into being--that is become\nperceptible--in the order prescribed by the sacred historian. I ever\nbefore believed the Mosaic account of the creation, and now find no\nalteration in my manner of believing it. When things are said to begin or\nend their existence, we do not mean this with regard to God, but\nHis creatures. All objects are eternally known by God, or, which is the\nsame thing, have an eternal existence in His mind: but when things,\nbefore imperceptible to creatures, are, by a decree of God, perceptible\nto them, then are they said to begin a relative existence, with respect\nto created minds. Upon reading therefore the Mosaic account of the\ncreation, I understand that the several parts of the world became\ngradually perceivable to finite spirits, endowed with proper faculties;\nso that, whoever such were present, they were in truth perceived by them.\nThis is the literal obvious sense suggested to me by the words of the\nHoly Scripture: in which is included no mention, or no thought, either of\nSUBSTRATUM, INSTRUMENT, OCCASION, or ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. And, upon\ninquiry, I doubt not it will be found that most plain honest men, who\nbelieve the creation, never think of those things any more than I. What\nmetaphysical sense you may understand it in, you only can tell.\n\nHYL.  But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that you allow created\nthings, in the beginning, only a relative, and consequently hypothetical\nbeing: that is to say, upon supposition there were MEN to perceive\nthem; without which they have no actuality of absolute existence, wherein\ncreation might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to you, plainly\nimpossible the creation of any inanimate creatures should precede that of\nman? And is not this directly contrary to the Mosaic account?\n\nPHIL.  In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might begin to\nexist in the mind of other created intelligences, beside men. You will\nnot therefore be able to prove any contradiction between Moses and my\nnotions, unless you first shew there was no other order of finite created\nspirits in being, before man. I say farther, in case we conceive the\ncreation, as we should at this time, a parcel of plants or vegetables of\nall sorts produced, by an invisible Power, in a desert where nobody was\npresent--that this way of explaining or conceiving it is consistent with\nmy principles, since they deprive you of nothing, either sensible or\nimaginable; that it exactly suits with the common, natural, and\nundebauched notions of mankind; that it manifests the dependence of all\nthings on God; and consequently hath all the good effect or influence,\nwhich it is possible that important article of our faith should have in\nmaking men humble, thankful, and resigned to their great Creator. I\nsay, moreover, that, in this naked conception of things, divested\nof words, there will not be found any notion of what you call the\nACTUALITY OF ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. You may indeed raise a dust with those\nterms, and so lengthen our dispute to no purpose. But I entreat you\ncalmly to look into your own thoughts, and then tell me if they are not a\nuseless and unintelligible jargon.\n\nHYL.  I own I have no very clear notion annexed to them. But what say\nyou to this? Do you not make the existence of sensible things consist in\ntheir being in a mind? And were not all things eternally in the mind of\nGod? Did they not therefore exist from all eternity, according to you?\nAnd how could that which was eternal be created in time? Can anything be\nclearer or better connected than this?\n\nPHIL.  And are not you too of opinion, that God knew all things from\neternity?\n\nHYL.  I am.\n\nPHIL.  Consequently they always had a being in the Divine intellect.\n\nHYL.  This I acknowledge.\n\nPHIL.  By your own confession, therefore, nothing is new, or begins to\nbe, in respect of the mind of God. So we are agreed in that point.\n\nHYL.  What shall we make then of the creation?\n\nPHIL.  May we not understand it to have been entirely in respect of\nfinite spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may properly be said\nto begin their existence, or be created, when God decreed they should\nbecome perceptible to intelligent creatures, in that order and manner\nwhich He then established, and we now call the laws of nature? You may\ncall this a RELATIVE, or HYPOTHETICAL EXISTENCE if you please. But,\nso long as it supplies us with the most natural, obvious, and literal\nsense of the Mosaic history of the creation; so long as it answers all\nthe religious ends of that great article; in a word, so long as you can\nassign no other sense or meaning in its stead; why should we reject this?\nIs it to comply with a ridiculous sceptical humour of making everything\nnonsense and unintelligible? I am sure you cannot say it is for the glory\nof God. For, allowing it to be a thing possible and conceivable that the\ncorporeal world should have an absolute existence extrinsical to the mind\nof God, as well as to the minds of all created spirits; yet how could\nthis set forth either the immensity or omniscience of the Deity, or the\nnecessary and immediate dependence of all things on Him? Nay, would\nit not rather seem to derogate from those attributes?\n\nHYL.  Well, but as to this decree of God's, for making things\nperceptible, what say you, Philonous? Is it not plain, God did either\nexecute that decree from all eternity, or at some certain time began to\nwill what He had not actually willed before, but only designed to will?\nIf the former, then there could be no creation, or beginning of\nexistence, in finite things. If the latter, then we must acknowledge\nsomething new to befall the Deity; which implies a sort of change: and\nall change argues imperfection.\n\nPHIL.  Pray consider what you are doing. Is it not evident this\nobjection concludes equally against a creation in any sense; nay, against\nevery other act of the Deity, discoverable by the light of nature? None\nof which can WE conceive, otherwise than as performed in time, and\nhaving a beginning. God is a Being of transcendent and unlimited\nperfections: His nature, therefore, is incomprehensible to finite\nspirits. It is not, therefore, to be expected, that any man, whether\nMaterialist or Immaterialist, should have exactly just notions of the\nDeity, His attributes, and ways of operation. If then you would infer\nanything against me, your difficulty must not be drawn from the\ninadequateness of our conceptions of the Divine nature, which is\nunavoidable on any scheme; but from the denial of Matter, of which there\nis not one word, directly or indirectly, in what you have now objected.\n\nHYL.  I must acknowledge the difficulties you are concerned to clear are\nsuch only as arise from the non-existence of Matter, and are peculiar to\nthat notion. So far you are in the right. But I cannot by any means bring\nmyself to think there is no such peculiar repugnancy between the creation\nand your opinion; though indeed where to fix it, I do not distinctly\nknow.\n\nPHIL.  What would you have? Do I not acknowledge a twofold state of\nthings--the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal? The\nformer was created in time; the latter existed from everlasting in the\nmind of God. Is not this agreeable to the common notions of divines? or,\nis any more than this necessary in order to conceive the creation? But\nyou suspect some peculiar repugnancy, though you know not where it lies.\nTo take away all possibility of scruple in the case, do but consider this\none point. Either you are not able to conceive the Creation on any\nhypothesis whatsoever; and, if so, there is no ground for dislike or\ncomplaint against any particular opinion on that score: or you are able\nto conceive it; and, if so, why not on my Principles, since thereby\nnothing conceivable is taken away? You have all along been allowed the\nfull scope of sense, imagination, and reason. Whatever, therefore, you\ncould before apprehend, either immediately or mediately by your senses,\nor by ratiocination from your senses; whatever you could perceive,\nimagine, or understand, remains still with you. If, therefore, the notion\nyou have of the creation by other Principles be intelligible, you have it\nstill upon mine; if it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion\nat all; and so there is no loss of it. And indeed it seems to me very\nplain that the supposition of Matter, that is a thing perfectly unknown\nand inconceivable, cannot serve to make us conceive anything. And, I hope\nit need not be proved to you that if the existence of Matter doth not\nmake the creation conceivable, the creation's being without it\ninconceivable can be no objection against its non-existence.\n\nHYL.  I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me in this point\nof the creation.\n\nPHIL.  I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied. You tell me\nindeed of a repugnancy between the Mosaic history and Immaterialism: but\nyou know not where it lies. Is this reasonable, Hylas? Can you expect I\nshould solve a difficulty without knowing what it is? But, to pass by all\nthat, would not a man think you were assured there is no repugnancy\nbetween the received notions of Materialists and the inspired writings?\n\nHYL.  And so I am.\n\nPHIL.  Ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood in a\nplain obvious sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical and out of the\nway?\n\nHYL.  In the plain sense, doubtless.\n\nPHIL.  When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as having been\ncreated by God; think you not the sensible things commonly signified by\nthose words are suggested to every unphilosophical reader?\n\nHYL.  I cannot help thinking so.\n\nPHIL.  And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be denied\na real existence by the doctrine of the Materialist?\n\nHYL.  This I have already acknowledged.\n\nPHIL.  The creation, therefore, according to them, was not the\ncreation of things sensible, which have only a relative being, but of\ncertain unknown natures, which have an absolute being, wherein creation\nmight terminate?\n\nHYL.  True.\n\nPHIL.  Is it not therefore evident the assertors of Matter destroy the\nplain obvious sense of Moses, with which their notions are utterly\ninconsistent; and instead of it obtrude on us I know not what; something\nequally unintelligible to themselves and me?\n\nHYL.  I cannot contradict you.\n\nPHIL.  Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? of unknown\nquiddities, of occasions, or SUBSTRATUM? No, certainly; but of things\nobvious to the senses. You must first reconcile this with your notions,\nif you expect I should be reconciled to them.\n\nHYL.  I see you can assault me with my own weapons.\n\nPHIL.  Then as to ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE; was there ever known a more\njejune notion than that? Something it is so abstracted and unintelligible\nthat you have frankly owned you could not conceive it, much less explain\nanything by it. But allowing Matter to exist, and the notion of absolute\nexistence to be clear as light; yet, was this ever known to make the\ncreation more credible? Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and\ninfidels of all ages with the most plausible arguments against a\ncreation? That a corporeal substance, which hath an absolute existence\nwithout the minds of spirits, should be produced out of nothing, by the\nmere will of a Spirit, hath been looked upon as a thing so contrary to\nall reason, so impossible and absurd! that not only the most celebrated\namong the ancients, but even divers modern and Christian philosophers\nhave thought Matter co-eternal with the Deity. Lay these things together,\nand then judge you whether Materialism disposes men to believe the\ncreation of things.\n\nHYL.  I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the CREATION is\nthe last objection I can think of; and I must needs own it hath been\nsufficiently answered as well as the rest. Nothing now remains to be\novercome but a sort of unaccountable backwardness that I find in myself\ntowards your notions.\n\nPHIL.  When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side of the\nquestion, can this, think you, be anything else but the effect of\nprejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted notions? And\nindeed in this respect I cannot deny the belief of Matter to have very\nmuch the advantage over the contrary opinion, with men of a learned\neducation.\n\nHYL.  I confess it seems to be as you say.\n\nPHIL.  As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, let us\nthrow into the scale the great advantages that arise from the belief of\nImmaterialism, both in regard to religion and human learning. The being\nof a God, and incorruptibility of the soul, those great articles of\nreligion, are they not proved with the clearest and most immediate\nevidence? When I say the being of a God, I do not mean an obscure general\nCause of things, whereof we have no conception, but God, in the strict\nand proper sense of the word. A Being whose spirituality, omnipresence,\nprovidence, omniscience, infinite power and goodness, are as conspicuous\nas the existence of sensible things, of which (notwithstanding the\nfallacious pretences and affected scruples of Sceptics) there is no more\nreason to doubt than of our own being.--Then, with relation to human\nsciences. In Natural Philosophy, what intricacies, what obscurities, what\ncontradictions hath the belief of Matter led men into! To say nothing of\nthe numberless disputes about its extent, continuity, homogeneity,\ngravity, divisibility, &c.--do they not pretend to explain all things by\nbodies operating on bodies, according to the laws of motion? and yet, are\nthey able to comprehend how one body should move another? Nay, admitting\nthere was no difficulty in reconciling the notion of an inert being with\na cause, or in conceiving how an accident might pass from one body to\nanother; yet, by all their strained thoughts and extravagant\nsuppositions, have they been able to reach the MECHANICAL production of\nany one animal or vegetable body? Can they account, by the laws of\nmotion, for sounds, tastes, smells, or colours; or for the regular course\nof things? Have they accounted, by physical principles, for the aptitude\nand contrivance even of the most inconsiderable parts of the universe?\nBut, laying aside Matter and corporeal, causes, and admitting only the\nefficiency of an All-perfect Mind, are not all the effects of nature easy\nand intelligible? If the PHENOMENA are nothing else but IDEAS; God is\na SPIRIT, but Matter an unintelligent, unperceiving being. If they\ndemonstrate an unlimited power in their cause; God is active and\nomnipotent, but Matter an inert mass. If the order, regularity, and\nusefulness of them can never be sufficiently admired; God is\ninfinitely wise and provident, but Matter destitute of all contrivance\nand design. These surely are great advantages in PHYSICS. Not to\nmention that the apprehension of a distant Deity naturally disposes men\nto a negligence in their moral actions; which they would be more cautious\nof, in case they thought Him immediately present, and acting on their\nminds, without the interposition of Matter, or unthinking second\ncauses.--Then in METAPHYSICS: what difficulties concerning entity in\nabstract, substantial forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures,\nsubstance and accident, principle of individuation, possibility of\nMatter's thinking, origin of ideas, the manner how two independent\nsubstances so widely different as SPIRIT AND MATTER, should mutually\noperate on each other? what difficulties, I say, and endless\ndisquisitions, concerning these and innumerable other the like points, do\nwe escape, by supposing only Spirits and ideas?--Even the MATHEMATICS\nthemselves, if we take away the absolute existence of extended things,\nbecome much more clear and easy; the most shocking paradoxes and\nintricate speculations in those sciences depending on the infinite\ndivisibility of finite extension; which depends on that supposition--But\nwhat need is there to insist on the particular sciences? Is not that\nopposition to all science whatsoever, that frenzy of the ancient and\nmodern Sceptics, built on the same foundation? Or can you produce so much\nas one argument against the reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of\nthat avowed utter ignorance of their natures, which doth not suppose\ntheir reality to consist in an external absolute existence? Upon this\nsupposition, indeed, the objections from the change of colours in a\npigeon's neck, or the appearance of the broken oar in the water, must be\nallowed to have weight. But these and the like objections vanish, if we\ndo not maintain the being of absolute external originals, but place the\nreality of things in ideas, fleeting indeed, and changeable;--however,\nnot changed at random, but according to the fixed order of nature. For,\nherein consists that constancy and truth of things which secures all the\nconcerns of life, and distinguishes that which is real from the\nIRREGULAR VISIONS of the fancy.\n\nHYL.  I agree to all you have now said, and must own that nothing can\nincline me to embrace your opinion more than the advantages I see it is\nattended with. I am by nature lazy; and this would be a mighty abridgment\nin knowledge. What doubts, what hypotheses, what labyrinths of amusement,\nwhat fields of disputation, what an ocean of false learning, may be\navoided by that single notion of IMMATERIALISM!\n\nPHIL.  After all, is there anything farther remaining to be done? You\nmay remember you promised to embrace that opinion which upon examination\nshould appear most agreeable to Common Sense and remote from Scepticism.\nThis, by your own confession, is that which denies Matter, or the\nABSOLUTE existence of corporeal things. Nor is this all; the same\nnotion has been proved several ways, viewed in different lights, pursued\nin its consequences, and all objections against it cleared. Can there be\na greater evidence of its truth? or is it possible it should have all the\nmarks of a true opinion and yet be false?\n\nHYL.  I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all respects.\nBut, what security can I have that I shall still continue the same full\nassent to your opinion, and that no unthought-of objection or difficulty\nwill occur hereafter?\n\nPHIL.  Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a point is once\nevidently proved, withhold your consent on account of objections or\ndifficulties it may be liable to? Are the difficulties that attend the\ndoctrine of incommensurable quantities, of the angle of contact, of the\nasymptotes to curves, or the like, sufficient to make you hold out\nagainst mathematical demonstration? Or will you disbelieve the Providence\nof God, because there may be some particular things which you know not\nhow to reconcile with it? If there are difficulties ATTENDING\nIMMATERIALISM, there are at the same time direct and evident proofs of\nit. But for the existence of Matter there is not one proof, and far more\nnumerous and insurmountable objections lie against it. But where are\nthose mighty difficulties you insist on? Alas! you know not where or what\nthey are; something which may possibly occur hereafter. If this be a\nsufficient pretence for withholding your full assent, you should never\nyield it to any proposition, how free soever from exceptions, how clearly\nand solidly soever demonstrated.\n\nHYL.  You have satisfied me, Philonous.\n\nPHIL.  But, to arm you against all future objections, do but consider:\nThat which bears equally hard on two contradictory opinions can be\nproof against neither. Whenever, therefore, any difficulty occurs, try if\nyou can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the MATERIALISTS.\nBe not deceived by words; but sound your own thoughts. And in case you\ncannot conceive it easier by the help of MATERIALISM, it is plain it\ncan be no objection against IMMATERIALISM. Had you proceeded all along\nby this rule, you would probably have spared yourself abundance of\ntrouble in objecting; since of all your difficulties I challenge you to\nshew one that is explained by Matter: nay, which is not more\nunintelligible with than without that supposition; and consequently makes\nrather AGAINST than FOR it. You should consider, in each particular,\nwhether the difficulty arises from the NON-EXISTENCE OF MATTER. If it\ndoth not, you might as well argue from the infinite divisibility of\nextension against the Divine prescience, as from such a difficulty\nagainst IMMATERIALISM. And yet, upon recollection, I believe you will\nfind this to have been often, if not always, the case. You should\nlikewise take heed not to argue on a PETITIO PRINCIPII. One is apt to\nsay--The unknown substances ought to be esteemed real things, rather than\nthe ideas in our minds: and who can tell but the unthinking external\nsubstance may concur, as a cause or instrument, in the productions of our\nideas? But is not this proceeding on a supposition that there are such\nexternal substances? And to suppose this, is it not begging the question?\nBut, above all things, you should beware of imposing on yourself by that\nvulgar sophism which is called IGNORATIO ELENCHI. You talked often as\nif you thought I maintained the non-existence of Sensible Things. Whereas\nin truth no one can be more thoroughly assured of their existence than I\nam. And it is you who doubt; I should have said, positively deny it.\nEverything that is seen, felt, heard, or any way perceived by the senses,\nis, on the principles I embrace, a real being; but not on yours.\nRemember, the Matter you contend for is an Unknown Somewhat (if indeed it\nmay be termed SOMEWHAT), which is quite stripped of all sensible\nqualities, and can neither be perceived by sense, nor apprehended by the\nmind. Remember I say, that it is not any object which is hard or soft,\nhot or cold, blue or white, round or square, &c. For all these things I\naffirm do exist. Though indeed I deny they have an existence distinct\nfrom being perceived; or that they exist out of all minds whatsoever.\nThink on these points; let them be attentively considered and still kept\nin view. Otherwise you will not comprehend the state of the question;\nwithout which your objections will always be wide of the mark, and,\ninstead of mine, may possibly be directed (as more than once they have\nbeen) against your own notions.\n\nHYL.  I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept me from\nagreeing with you more than this same MISTAKING THE QUESTION. In\ndenying Matter, at first glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the\nthings we see and feel: but, upon reflexion, find there is no ground for\nit. What think you, therefore, of retaining the name MATTER, and\napplying it to SENSIBLE THINGS? This may be done without any change in\nyour sentiments: and, believe me, it would be a means of reconciling them\nto some persons who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than in\nopinion.\n\nPHIL.  With all my heart: retain the word MATTER, and apply it to the\nobjects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them\nany subsistence distinct from their being perceived. I shall never\nquarrel with you for an expression. MATTER, or MATERIAL SUBSTANCE,\nare terms introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply a sort\nof independency, or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a\nmind: but are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify\nthe immediate objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as\nthe names of all particular things, with the TERMS SENSIBLE,\nSUBSTANCE, BODY, STUFF, and the like, are retained, the word\nMATTER should be never missed in common talk. And in philosophical\ndiscourses it seems the best way to leave it quite out: since there is\nnot, perhaps, any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the\ndepraved bent of the mind towards Atheism than the use of that general\nconfused term.\n\nHYL.  Well but, Philonous, since I am content to give up the notion of\nan unthinking substance exterior to the mind, I think you ought not to\ndeny me the privilege of using the word MATTER as I please, and\nannexing it to a collection of sensible qualities subsisting only in the\nmind. I freely own there is no other substance, in a strict sense, than\nSPIRIT. But I have been so long accustomed to the term MATTER that I\nknow not how to part with it: to say, there is no MATTER in the world,\nis still shocking to me. Whereas to say--There is no MATTER, if by that\nterm be meant an unthinking substance existing without the mind; but if\nby MATTER is meant some sensible thing, whose existence consists in\nbeing perceived, then there is MATTER:--THIS distinction gives it\nquite another turn; and men will come into your notions with small\ndifficulty, when they are proposed in that manner. For, after all, the\ncontroversy about MATTER in the strict acceptation of it, lies\naltogether between you and the philosophers: whose principles, I\nacknowledge, are not near so natural, or so agreeable to the common sense\nof mankind, and Holy Scripture, as yours. There is nothing we either\ndesire or shun but as it makes, or is apprehended to make, some part of\nour happiness or misery. But what hath happiness or misery, joy or grief,\npleasure or pain, to do with Absolute Existence; or with unknown\nentities, ABSTRACTED FROM ALL RELATION TO US? It is evident, things\nregard us only as they are pleasing or displeasing: and they can please\nor displease only so far forth as they are perceived. Farther, therefore,\nwe are not concerned; and thus far you leave things as you found them.\nYet still there is something new in this doctrine. It is plain, I do not\nnow think with the Philosophers; nor yet altogether with the vulgar. I\nwould know how the case stands in that respect; precisely, what you have\nadded to, or altered in my former notions.\n\nPHIL.  I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. My endeavours\ntend only to unite, and place in a clearer light, that truth which was\nbefore shared between the vulgar and the philosophers:--the former being\nof opinion, that THOSE THINGS THEY IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVE ARE THE REAL\nTHINGS; and the latter, that THE THINGS IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVED ARE\nIDEAS, WHICH EXIST ONLY IN THE MIND. Which two notions put together,\ndo, in effect, constitute the substance of what I advance.\n\nHYL.  I have been a long time distrusting my senses: methought I saw\nthings by a dim light and through false glasses. Now the glasses are\nremoved and a new light breaks in upon my understanding. I am clearly\nconvinced that I see things in their native forms, and am no longer in\npain about their UNKNOWN NATURES OR ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. This is the\nstate I find myself in at present; though, indeed, the course that\nbrought me to it I do not yet thoroughly comprehend. You set out upon the\nsame principles that Academics, Cartesians, and the like sects usually\ndo; and for a long time it looked as if you were advancing their\nphilosophical Scepticism: but, in the end, your conclusions are directly\nopposite to theirs.\n\nPHIL.  You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is forced\nupwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at which it\nbreaks, and falls back into the basin from whence it rose: its ascent, as\nwell as descent, proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of\nGRAVITATION. just so, the same Principles which, at first view, lead to\nScepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to Common Sense.","title":"Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous in Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":36487}