{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_48027/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_48027","id":"gutenberg_48027","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/48027","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ethics","Ethics, Evolutionary"],"text":"Transcriber's Note:\n\nA catalog of publications was included at the end of the text.\n\nWhere words occur in Greek script, (~transliterations~) have been\nadded.\n\n\n * * * * *\n\n\n Shaw Fellowship Lectures, 1884\n\n\n ON THE\n ETHICS OF NATURALISM\n\n BY\n W. R. SORLEY, M.A.\n\n FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE; AND EXAMINER IN\n PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH\n\n\n WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS\n EDINBURGH AND LONDON\n MDCCCLXXXV\n\n\n _All Rights reserved_\n\n\n\n\nPREFATORY NOTE.\n\n\nThe Deed of Foundation of the Shaw Fellowship provides that \"it\nshall be in the power of the Senatus Academicus of the University of\nEdinburgh to require the holder of the Shaw Philosophical Fellowship,\nduring the fourth or fifth year of his tenure of it, to deliver in\nthe University of Edinburgh a course of Lectures, not exceeding four,\non any of the subjects for the encouragement of the study of which\nthe Fellowship has been founded.\" The following pages consist of four\nlectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh, in accordance with\nthis provision, in the month of January 1884.\n\nSince their delivery, the argument of the lectures has been revised,\nand in some places enlarged. I have also thought it better to modify\ntheir original form by dividing the discussion into chapters.\n\n W. R. S.\n\n\n\n\n CONTENTS.\n\n\n CHAPTER I.\n\n ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS.\n PAGE\n 1. Connection of ethics with theoretical philosophy, 1\n (_a_) Dependence of ethical on theoretical points of view, 1\n (_b_) Ethics necessary to complete philosophy, 3\n 2. The inquiry into the ethical end, 5\n (_a_) Fundamental, 5\n (_b_) Implies a new point of view, 7\n (_c_) Distinct from other ethical questions, 9\n (\u03b1) From the inquiry into the methods of ethics, 10\n (\u03b2) From moral psychology and sociology, 13\n 3. Scope of the present inquiry, 14\n\n\n PART I.\n\n THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.\n\n CHAPTER II.\n\n EGOISM.\n\n Definition of Naturalism, 20\n Psychological hedonism, 21\n 1. Its theory of action ambiguous, 22\n Referring to--\n (_a_) Actual consequences of action, 23\n (_b_) Or its expected consequences, 23\n (_c_) Or its present characteristics, 24\n 2. Ethical inferences from this theory, 25\n 3. Transition from psychological to ethical hedonism, 31\n 4. Possible objections considered, 37\n\n\n CHAPTER III.\n\n THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM.\n\n 1. Difference of the standpoints of individual and State, 41\n 2. Connection between egoism and utilitarianism according to Bentham, 45\n (_a_) Utilitarianism not a political duty, 46\n (_b_) Nor a moral duty, 47\n (_c_) Nor insisted on as a religious duty, 49\n (_d_) Nor sufficiently motived in private ethics, 50\n 3. Exhaustive character of Bentham's treatment from his point of\n view, 51\n (_a_) The religious sanction (Paley), 53\n (_b_) Limits of the political sanction, 54\n (_c_) Uncertainty of the social sanction, 55\n (_d_) And of the internal sanction so far as a result of the\n social, 56\n 4. Mill's logical defence of utilitarianism, 57\n (_a_) Distinction of kinds of pleasure, 58\n (_b_) Ambiguities in his proof, 60\n 5. Actual transition to utilitarianism, 62\n (_a_) Recognition of sympathy, 64\n (_b_) The idea of equality, 69\n 6. The two sides of utilitarian theory without logical connection, 73\n 7. Summary of the ethical consequences of psychological hedonism, 75\n\n\n CHAPTER IV.\n\n MORAL SENTIMENT.\n\n 1. A uniform psychological theory not supplied by the opponents of\n ethical hedonism, 78\n 2. The non-hedonistic theory of action, 84\n 3. Ethics made to depend on the moral sense, 89\n (_a_) As harmony of impulses, 90\n (_b_) As a separate sensitive faculty, 92\n (_c_) As an internal law, 100\n 4. The ethics of moral sentiment a mediating theory, 105\n\n\n PART II.\n\n THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.\n\n CHAPTER V.\n\n THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY.\n\n 1. General characteristics of the theory of evolution, 107\n An assertion of the unity of life, 109\n Primarily historical, but capable of ethical application, 110\n 2. The development of morality, 116\n (_a_) Historical psychology, 116\n Its difficulties, 117\n Its result, 123\n (_b_) Development of society, 124\n\n\n CHAPTER VI.\n\n EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES.\n\n Bearing of the theory of evolution, 126\n 1. On theories depending on moral sentiment or intuition, 127\n (_a_) Ethical value of moral sentiments affected by their\n origin, 130\n (_b_) Organic character of moral sentiments, 132\n Resultant attitude of evolutionism to intuitionism, 133\n 2. On egoism: relation of egoism to altruism, 134\n (_a_) Social nature of the individual, 135\n (_b_) Limits to conciliation of egoism and altruism, 141\n (\u03b1) Continued existence of competition, 142\n (\u03b2) Different and conflicting degrees of altruism, 143\n (\u03b3) Altruism of interest and altruism of motive, 143\n (\u03b4) Weakness of altruistic feelings, 146\n (_c_) Tendency of evolution opposed to egoism, 148\n Evolution not the basis of psychological hedonism, 148\n Nor of ethical hedonism, 150\n 3. On utilitarianism, 152\n Modification of the utilitarian method, 153\n And of its principle, 155\n Evolutionist objections to utilitarianism, 155\n (_a_) As prescribing an unprogressive ideal, 156\n (_b_) As a theory of consequences, 160\n (_c_) As related solely to sensibility, 161\n\n\n CHAPTER VII.\n\n HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM.\n\n 1. Alliance of evolutionism and hedonism, 164\n (_a_) From interpreting greatest happiness by the laws of\n life, 164\n (_b_) From interpreting life by pleasure, 165\n 2. Evolutionist argument for concomitance of life and pleasure, 167\n 3. Objections to this argument, 168\n (_a_) That life cannot bring more pleasure than pain, 169\n (\u03b1) From the negative nature of pleasure, 171\n (\u03b2) From the facts of human life, 172\n (_b_) That the evolution of life does not uniformly tend to\n pleasure, 172\n (\u03b1) Incompleteness of the evolutionist argument, 173\n (\u03b2) The pessimist doctrine that life tends to misery, 175\n (_aa_) The hypothesis of the unconscious, 176\n (_bb_) The nature of volition, 177\n (_cc_) The facts of human progress, 179\n Individual progress, 179\n Social progress, 181\n 4. The psychological analysis of pleasure and pain in relation\n to evolutionist ethics, 186\n (_a_) The subjective nature of pleasure and pain, 187\n (_b_) The conditions of pleasure and pain, 190\n (_c_) Application of the theory of evolution, 197\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII.\n\n THE EVOLUTIONIST END.\n\n Necessity of inquiring into the ethical end suggested by the theory\n of evolution, 201\n 1. Adaptation to environment, 203\n (_a_) As the end for present conduct, 207\n Opposed to progress, 207\n Does not fully represent evolution, 209\n (_b_) As describing the ultimate condition of life, 210\n Resultant absolute code, 211\n (\u03b1) Abstract principles of social relation, 212\n (\u03b2) Personal end only defined as adaptation, 213\n (\u03b3) Cannot be shown to lead to happiness, 213\n (_c_) Insufficiency of adaptation as evolutionist end, 217\n 2. End suggested by the tendency to variation, 221\n (_a_) Prescribes self-development rather than self-preservation, 222\n (_b_) Standard for measuring development found in complexity\n of act and motive, 227\n (\u03b1) Antinomy between social and individual ends, 231\n (\u03b2) Psychological defects, 232\n 3. Development or increase of life as the end, 236\n (_a_) Subjective standard: most persistent impulses, 242\n Cannot define life without an objective standard, 244\n (_b_) Objective standard: defined in two ways, 247\n (\u03b1) Conformity to the type, 248\n Which can be reduced to--\n (\u03b2) Abundance and variety of vital power, 251\n That is, to the subjective standard, 253\n Summary as to the evolutionist end, 256\n (_a_) Difficulty of reconciling individual and social ends, 256\n (_b_) Hedonistic interpretation of evolution not possible, 257\n (_c_) No independent ethical ideal, 259\n\n\n CHAPTER IX.\n\n ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.\n\n 1. Principles involved in theory of evolution, 263\n 2. Unsuccessful application of these principles to ethics, 264\n (_a_) The principles being treated empirically, 265\n (_b_) No logical transition having been effected from efficient\n to final cause, 267\n 3. Difference between causality and teleology, 269\n 4. Reference to self-consciousness implied in evolution, 277\n (_a_) Attempt to trace the genesis of self-consciousness, 278\n (_b_) Attempt to trace morality from reflex action, 283\n 5. The unity of self-consciousness, 284\n (_a_) As making possible the transition from knowledge to\n morality, 284\n (_b_) As determining the character of the ethical end, 286\n (_c_) As showing that the realisation of the end must be\n progressive, 291\n\n\n\n\nTHE ETHICS OF NATURALISM.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS.\n\n\n[Sidenote: 1. Connection of ethics with theoretical philosophy.]\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) Dependence of ethical on theoretical points of view]\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) teleological,]\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) jural,]\n\n[Sidenote: (_c_) empirical:]\n\nIt is a common remark that a writer's ethical doctrine is throughout\nconditioned by his attitude to the problems of theoretical\nphilosophy. The main lines of dispute in questions of ethics may\nbe regarded as prolongations of the controversies which arise in\nmetaphysics and psychology. The Realism or Idealism which marks a\nspeculative system reappears in its ethics, whilst differences in the\npsychological analysis of mental states, or concerning the relation\nof pleasure to desire, are grounds of distinction between schools\nof moralists. And not only are the special controversies of ethics\ndecided in different ways, but the scope of the whole science is\ndifferently conceived, as the speculative standpoint changes. Thus,\nnot for one school only, but for a whole period in the history\nof reflection, ethics was regarded as an inquiry into the highest\nhuman good. Opposed schools agreed in looking from this point of\nview, however much they might differ from one another in defining\nthe nature of that highest good. At other times, according to the\nprevailing view, to investigate and systematise the rules of conduct\nhas exhausted the scope of ethics--controversies being carried on as\nto the nature of those rules, and their source in external authority\nor in the internal revelation of conscience. Again, ethical inquiry\nhas been apparently identified with the analysis and history of\nthe moral affections and sentiments; while a purely external point\nof view seems to be sometimes adopted, and ethics held to be an\ninvestigation of the historical results of action, and of the forms,\ncustomary and institutional, in which those results find permanent\nexpression.\n\n[Sidenote: to be connected by philosophy.]\n\nThese different ways of looking at the whole subject proceed from\npoints of view whose effects are not confined to ethics, but may be\nfollowed out in other lines of investigation. They correspond to\nideas which dominate different types of thought and form different\nphilosophical standpoints. The first starts from a teleological\nconception of human nature, as an organism consciously striving\ntowards its end. The second assimilates ethics to a system of\nlegal enactments, and is connected with the jural conceptions of\ntheology and law. The two last are concerned to show that the\nsubject-matter of ethics are facts which have to be treated by the\nordinary inductive and historical methods. These different points\nof view, however, are to be regarded as complementary rather than\nas conflicting, although their complete synthesis must be worked\nout in the region of general philosophy, and not on purely ethical\nground. Philosophy has thus to deal with the notions which determine\nthe scope and character of ethical thought; and in this way it\nmust necessarily pass from the purely speculative to the practical\npoint of view. If it is the business of philosophy to bring into\nrational order the material supplied by experience, cosmical and\nanthropological, it cannot be without bearing on the function of man\nas a source of action in the world. The question, What are the ends\nman is naturally fitted to attain? or--if we prefer so to express\nit--What are the ends he ought to pursue? is not merely as natural\nas the question, What can a man know of the world and of himself?\nBut the two questions are inseparably connected. To know man is to\nknow him not only as a thinking but also as an active being; while to\nsolve the problem of the ends of man implies knowledge both of his\nnature and of the sphere of his activity.\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) Ethics necessary to complete philosophy.]\n\nMuch distrust is often expressed of metaphysics. But it is not denied\nthat the philosophy--whether metaphysical or not--in which our\nmost comprehensive view of the world finds its reasoned expression,\ncannot neglect that aspect of things in which man is related to his\nsurroundings as a source of action. Recent ethical literature is\nitself a proof of this fact. In its speculative developments, both\nrealistic and idealistic, the philosophy of the present day has made\nthe endeavour to connect its conceptions of the world of thought and\nnature with the ends contemplated as to be realised in the realm of\naction. Whatever difficulties may be involved in the transition from\nthe \"is\" to the \"ought to be,\" it is yet implied that the transition\nrequires to be made, not merely in order that human activity may be\nshown to be rational, but that reason itself may be justified by\nleaving nothing outside its sphere.\n\nWe must make no attempt, therefore, to draw a line of absolute\nseparation between the first two of the three questions in which,\nas Kant says,[1] all the interests of our reason centre. The \"What\nought I to do?\" of ethics is for ever falling back on the \"What can I\nknow?\" of metaphysics. The question of practice must accordingly be\ntreated throughout in connection with the question of knowledge. If\nwe use Kant's distinction between speculative and practical reason,\nwe must always bear in mind that it is the same reason which is in\none reference speculative, in another practical.[2] We are not at\nliberty to assume with Butler[3] that \"morality ... must be somewhat\nplain and easy to be understood: it must appeal to what we call\ncommon-sense.\" Nor may we presuppose, as Hutcheson did,[4] that it is\na subject \"about which a little reflection will discover the truth.\"\nThe question must be looked upon not so much as one of immediate\npractical as of scientific interest, and reason is to be regarded as\nthe only court of appeal.\n\n[Sidenote: 2. The inquiry into the ethical end]\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) fundamental,]\n\nThe form just quoted, in which Kant states the problem, is not\naltogether free from ambiguity. \"What ought I to do?\" may be taken\nto signify, What means should I adopt for the attainment of some end\npresupposed, perhaps unconsciously, as the end to be sought? But\nit is evident, not only that this is not what Kant himself meant\nby the question, but that, as thus put, it necessarily implies a\nfurther and deeper question. Not the discovery of the means, but the\ndetermination of the end itself--the end which cannot be interpreted\nas a mere means to some further end--is the fundamental question of\nethics. It is only by misconception that this can be thought to be\na trivial question. To say, as a recent scientific writer does,[5]\n\"that happiness in one disguise or another is the end of human life\nis common ground for all the schools,\" is either to ignore what the\nschools have taught,[6] or else to use the word \"happiness\" merely\nas another name for the highest good. But, even were it still the\ncase, as it was in the time of Aristotle, that nearly all men were\nagreed as to the name of the highest good, and that the common\npeople and the cultured alike called it happiness, the difference as\nto what they meant by the term would still remain. To say that the\nethical end is happiness is, to use Locke's terminology, a \"trifling\nproposition\"; for in so doing we merely give it a name[7]--and one\nwhich the controversies of philosophy have surrounded with confusion.\nThat the end is happiness in any definite sense, for example, as the\ngreatest balance of pleasure over pain, _may_ be perfectly true, but\nstands very much in need of proof. That happiness is the highest\nethical end can be assumed as true only when \"happiness\" is nothing\nmore than an abbreviated expression for \"the highest ethical end.\"\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) implies a new point of view,]\n\nA difficulty of a more radical kind meets us, at the very outset\nof our inquiry, in the distinctively ethical notion expressed by\nthe word \"ought.\" Various attempts have been made to surmount or\ncircumvent this difficulty; and some of these will come under\nconsideration in the sequel. The very notion of conscious activity\ncontains the idea of bringing about something which does not yet\nexist. It involves a purpose or end. The notion \"ought,\" it is true,\nmeans more than this: it implies an obligation to pursue a definite\nend or conform to definite rules, regarded generally as coming from\nan authoritative source. In this clear and full sense, \"oughtness\"\nor duty is a comparatively recent notion, foreign to the classical\nperiod of Greek ethics. The force and definiteness belonging to the\nmodern conception of it are due to the juridical aspect which the\nStoic philosophy, Roman law, and Christian theology combined to\nimpress upon morality. But even the notion of purpose or end implies\na \"preference\" of the end sought: the state to be realised is looked\nupon as \"better\" or \"more to be desired\" than the existing state.\nWe may ask for the reason of this superior desirableness; but the\nanswer must soon fall back upon the assertion of something held to be\ndesirable in itself. The question which we are always asking, and\ncannot help asking, \"Why is such and such an end to be pursued by\nme?\" or \"Why ought I to follow such and such a course of conduct?\"\nmust soon lead to the assertion of an ultimate end.\n\n[Sidenote: the transition to which requires investigation;]\n\nThis end, therefore, must not be sought for some ulterior end, nor\ndesired as a means to satisfy any other desire. But it is still\nnecessary to inquire into the way in which the end, held to be\nultimate in a practical regard, stands related to the constitution\nof man and his environment. And the question to which I would draw\nattention, as the fundamental problem of ethics, is, What is that\nwhich men have variously called happiness, the highest good, the\nethical end? or, more precisely, How can a transition be made from\nthe notions of theoretical philosophy to the determination of that\nethical end? No assumption is made, at starting, as to the nature\nof this end, or the manner of arriving at it. It may be a transient\nstate of feeling, or a permanent type of character; or it may by its\nvery nature defy exact definition,--the idea itself being perfected\nas its realisation is progressively approached. In any case it\nrequires to be brought into connection with the ultimate conceptions\nof thought and existence.\n\nThis question of the ethical end _or_ highest good is thus\nfundamental in ethical science, and upon it all other questions in\nethics finally depend. But it is easy to see that it does not cover\nthe whole field, and that the other points of view already referred\nto have a legitimate application. Ethics has not only to determine\nthe end, but to apply it to practice, and so to decide as to what\nis right or wrong in particular actions, and virtuous or vicious in\ncharacter. And, in addition to the two questions thus implied--the\nquestion as to the ethical end, and that as to the application of it\nto practical affairs--there is another department of inquiry which\nhas had a place assigned to it in most ethical systems, and which has\na right to be regarded as belonging to ethics. We may investigate\nthe place, in the individual and the community respectively, both of\nthe sentiments and ideas and of the social institutions and customs\nthrough which morality is manifested; and this inquiry covers the\ntwofold ground of what may be called moral psychology and moral\nsociology.\n\n[Sidenote: (_c_) distinct from other ethical questions:]\n\nOf these three questions, the first forms the subject of inquiry\nin the following pages. It seems to me that a great part of the\nobscurity which surrounds ethical argument is due to confounding\nthese different questions. It is true that no one of them is\nwithout bearing on the others; but it is none the less necessary,\nin discussing any one of them, to keep its distinctness from those\nothers well in view. In inquiring into the foundation on which the\nethical end is based, I do not intend to develop a code of rules for\npractical conduct or a theory of human virtue; nor shall I attempt\nto trace the origin and nature of moral sentiments and ideas, or of\nthe social institutions and customs connected with morality. If these\nsubjects have to be introduced at all, it will be only in so far as\nthey may be thought to decide, or tend to decide, the question more\nimmediately in view.\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b1) from inquiry into the methods of ethics.]\n\n[Sidenote: Limitation of this inquiry]\n\n[Sidenote: (_aa_) from necessity of investigating all logical\nalternatives,]\n\nThus it forms no part of the present inquiry to follow out the\napplication to conduct of different ethical ends, or to exhibit the\ndifferent practical systems to which different ends naturally lead.\nIt might seem indeed, at first sight, as if the development of their\npractical consequences might solve the question as to the nature of\nthe ends themselves. If we assume certain possible and _prim\u00e2 facie_\nreasonable ethical ends, and then see what codes of morality they\nwill yield, surely (it may be thought) that one which affords the\nmost consistent and harmonious code for the guidance of life will be\nthe end to be sought in preference to all others. But in order that\nthe criticism of what Professor Sidgwick has called the methods of\nethics may be able to answer the question as to the end or principle\nof ethics, certain conditions must first be complied with. In the\nfirst place, it is necessary that the ends or principles whose\napplications to conduct are to be examined must not be uncritically\naccepted from the fluctuating morality of common-sense nor from the\ncommonplaces of the schools, but must be shown to be \"alternatives\nbetween which the human mind\" is \"necessarily forced to choose when\nit attempts to frame a complete synthesis of practical maxims, and to\nact in a perfectly rational manner.\"[8]\n\n[Sidenote: (_bb_) from more than one self-consistent code being\npossible,]\n\nBut although this requisite is complied with, it will still\nremain possible, in the second place, that two or more of the\nassumed principles may yield systems of practical rules perfectly\nself-consistent, and yet inconsistent with one another.[9] It\nwould be very hard indeed to show that both the theory of Egoistic\nHedonism, and what is generally called Utilitarianism, do not\nsucceed in doing so: and thus the examination of methods is not of\nitself sufficient to settle the question of the end of conduct. And\nsince--to quote Mr Sidgwick[10]--it is \"a fundamental postulate of\nethics that either these methods must be reconciled and harmonised,\nor all but one of them rejected,\" it follows that the criticism of\nmethods leads naturally up to an independent criticism of principles,\nunless indeed it can be shown that one method only yields a\nconsistent code of practical rules.\n\n[Sidenote: (_cc_) from its assumption that the true end must give\nperfectly consistent rules.]\n\nEven in this case, however, if it led to the adoption of the end\nin question, it must be borne in mind that the postulate would be\nimplied that the true ethical end must be able to yield a consistent\nand harmonious system of rules for practical life. Without altogether\ndenying this postulate, it yet seems to me that it stands in need\nof qualification. For in different circumstances, and at different\nstages of individual and social development, the application of the\nsame ethical end may naturally produce different and conflicting\ncourses of conduct. We must not start with any such assumption as\nthat the rationality of the end consists in some sort of mathematical\nequality which ignores alike the different environment with which one\nage and another surround different generations, and the different\nfunctions which one individual and another have to perform in the\nsocial whole. We must leave open the possibility that what is right\nnow may be wrong in another age; we must remember that everybody may\nnot count for one, and that some people may count for more than one;\nwe must admit that we may have sometimes to do to others what we\nwould not that others should do to us. The only consistency we have\na right to demand must leave room for such a variety of different\nconditions as to be, by itself, a very insecure guide.\n\nFrom the difficulty of complying with the above conditions, it\nseems practically impossible for the criticism of ethical methods to\ndecide the question of the ethical end. Even if the application to\nconduct of every important end has been taken account of, we are met\nwith the difficulty that two or more mutually antagonistic though\nself-consistent practical codes may probably have been developed,\nwhile we are not even justified in assuming that inability to yield\na system which will fit the complex circumstances of life in a\nperfectly harmonious manner is sufficient ground for rejecting an end\nshown in some other way to be reasonable.\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b2) distinct from moral psychology and sociology.]\n\nThe last department of ethics referred to--that which has to do with\nthe origin and nature of moral sentiments and social customs--has a\nbearing on the question of the end of conduct in some respects more\nimportant than the investigation of ethical methods. For, whereas the\nlatter expressly assumes certain ends as _prim\u00e2 facie_ reasonable,\nthe former inquiry, on the contrary, is now frequently understood\nto be able, without presupposing any ethical relations whatever,\nto trace the way in which, from primitive feelings and customs,\nmorality itself has been evolved. The psychological side of ethical\ninquiry has always had an important place with English moralists.\nAt times, indeed, the question of the \"moral faculty\" has excited\nso much interest as to divert attention from the nature of morality\nitself. Moral truth has been supposed to be something known and\nindisputable, the only question being how we came to know it. But the\npsychology of ethics, reinforced by the knowledge sociology gives of\nthe development of morality, rises now to larger issues. It attempts\nto show the genesis of the moral from the non-moral, to account thus\nfor the origin of ethical ideas, and even to determine what kinds of\nends are to be striven after. In this way, a theory of the origin\nand growth of moral sentiments and institutions is made to render\nimportant help to more than one of the theories which will fall to be\nconsidered in the sequel.\n\n[Sidenote: 3. Present inquiry limited]\n\n[Sidenote: to theories depending on the human constitution,]\n\nThe present Essay has to inquire into the way in which we may\ndetermine what the end of human conduct is,--into the basis of\nethics, therefore. But I do not propose to offer an exhaustive\ninvestigation of all the theories which have been or may be started\nin solution of the problem. On the contrary, I will begin by\nexcluding from the inquiry all theories which seek the basis of\nethics in something outside the constitution of man as a feeling\nand reasoning agent:[11] not because I contend that all such\ntheories are _prim\u00e2 facie_ unreasonable, but because it is at any\nrate the more obvious course to seek to determine the function of an\norganism by studying its inner constitution, than by having regard\nto something which is external to it, and does not act upon and\nmodify it as a necessary part of its environment. It is only when\nthis method has been tried and has failed that we should seek outside\nus for some guide as to the part we ought to play in the universe.\nFor this reason I shall not take into consideration the views of the\nbasis of ethics which find it in positive law either divine or human,\nexcept in so far as they are shown to follow from the nature of man.\nIt is not necessary for me to deny that the source of all moral\nobligation may be the will of God, or the commands of the sovereign,\nor the opinion of society, and that the highest moral ideal may be\nobedience to such a rule. But theories of this kind make ethics\nmerely an application of positive theology, or of legislation, or of\nsocial sentiment, and seem only to have an appropriate place when we\nhave failed to find an independent basis for action.\n\nThe question which remains to be put may be expressed in these terms:\nCan we find in human nature (taken either alone or in connection with\nits environment) any indications of the end of human conduct, or, in\nother words, of the principle on which human beings \"ought\" to act?\nand if so, in what direction do these indications point, and what is\ntheir significance? The answer to this question will thus necessarily\ndepend on the view we take of the constitution of man and his\nrelation to his environment. And I purpose to bring this discussion\nwithin the necessary limits by considering the ethical consequences\nof one only of the two views into which philosophical opinion is\ndivided.\n\n[Sidenote: and here to ethics of Naturalism,]\n\n[Sidenote: as distinguished from Rational ethics.]\n\n[Sidenote: Naturalism either individualistic]\n\n[Sidenote: or historical.]\n\nNow the fundamental principle of division in philosophical opinion\nlies in the place assigned to reason in human nature.[12] According\nto one theory, man is essentially a sensitive subject, though able\nto reason about his sensations--that is, to associate, compound, and\ncompare them. He is supposed to be built up of sense-presentations\nassociated with feelings of pleasure and pain. Recipient of external\nimpressions which persist in idea and are accompanied by pleasure or\npain on his part, and thus followed by other ideas and impressions,\nman's mental constitution is explained without attributing to reason\nany spontaneous or productive function.[13] The other view differs\nfrom this in attributing spontaneity to reason--making it, in one way\nor another, the source of forms of thought, principles, or ideas. The\nformer may be called the Naturalistic, the latter the Rationalistic\nview of man: from that follows a Naturalistic or Natural ethics, from\nthis a Rationalistic or Rational ethics. Into both these theories, in\na theoretical as well as in an ethical aspect, the historical turn\nof thought which has characterised recent inquiry has introduced a\nprofound modification. On the basis of Naturalism, we may either look\nupon man as an individual distinct from other individuals, as was\ndone by Epicurus and Hobbes and the materialists of the eighteenth\ncentury, or we may consider the race as itself an organism, apart\nfrom which the individual is unintelligible, and look upon human\nnature as having become what it now is through a long process of\ninteraction between organism and environment, in which social as well\nas psychical and physical facts have influenced the result. This is\nthe view to the elaboration of which Comte and Darwin and Spencer\nhave in different ways contributed.[14] What makes the historical\nmethod of importance philosophically, is not the mere fact that it\ntraces a sequence of events in time, but the fact that, by doing\nso, it is able to look upon each link in the chain of events as\nnecessarily connected with every other, and thus to regard as a\nsystem--or, rather, as an organism--what previous empirical theories\nhad left without any principle of unity.\n\n[Sidenote: Rationalism either individualistic]\n\n[Sidenote: or universalistic.]\n\nA similar movement of thought has introduced a like modification\ninto the Rationalistic theory. According to older doctrines, the\nindividual reason is mysteriously charged with certain _\u00e0 priori_\nprinciples which are to us laws of knowledge and of action; whereas\nthe form of Rationalism which is now in the ascendant resembles the\ntheory of natural evolution in this, that as the latter finds the\nrace more real than the individual, and the individual to exist only\nin the race, so the former looks upon the individual reason as but a\nfinite manifestation of the universal reason, and attempts to show\nthe principles or constitutive elements of this universal reason\nor consciousness in their logical or necessary connection--leaving\nopen to empirical investigation the way in which they have gradually\ndisclosed themselves in the individual human subject, and in the\nexpression of the collective life of the race. Thus, as Natural\nEthics is divided into an individualistic and an historical view,\na similar distinction might be made in Rational Ethics, though in\nthis case it would be more difficult to follow out the distinction\nin detail; and many ethical systems cannot be said to have kept\nconsistently either to one side of it or to the other.\n\nIn the following discussion I shall investigate the ethical theory\nwhich is founded on the basis of Naturalism--working out and\ncriticising in somewhat greater detail that form of the theory which,\nfrom the agreement it lays claim to with the results of modern\nscience, plays so important a part in contemporary philosophical\nthought.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] Werke, ed. Hartenstein (1867), iii. 532.\n\n[2] Cf. Kant, Werke, iv. 237.\n\n[3] Sermons, v., towards the end.\n\n[4] Essay on the Passions and Affections, p. iv.\n\n[5] W. H. Rolph, Biologische Probleme, zugleich als Versuch zur\nEntwicklung einer rationellen Ethik, 2d ed., p. 21.\n\n[6] Not to mention Kant, the consistent opponent of every\neud\u00e6monistic principle, or the doctrines of a political idealist such\nas Mazzini (see Life and Writings (1867), iv. 223), reference may be\nmade to a writer like W. K. Clifford, who looks from the scientific\npoint of view, and yet holds that \"happiness is not to be desired for\nits own sake.\"--Lectures and Essays (1879), ii. 121, 173.\n\n[7] \"Auch dieser Begriff [Gl\u00fcckseligkeit] ist an sich ein bloss\nformaler, der jede beliebige materiale Bestimmung zul\u00e4sst.\"--Zeller,\nUeber Begriff und Begr\u00fcndung der sittlichen Gesetze (1883), p. 23.\n\n[8] Methods of Ethics, book i. chap. i. \u00a7 5, 3d ed., p. 11.\n\n[9] \"The rule, 'Let every one care for me,' is quite as simple, and,\nin a logical point of view, defines conduct as consistently and\nreasonably as the rule, 'Love your neighbour as yourself.'\"--Leslie\nStephen, Science of Ethics (1882), p. 73.\n\n[10] Methods of Ethics, I. i. 3, p. 6.\n\n[11] The difference between Aristotle and Kant in ethics is sometimes\nexpressed (see Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitr\u00e4ge zur Phil., iii. 171\nff.) as if it consisted in the fact that the former investigated\nhuman nature in order to find its \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 (~telos~), whereas the latter\nsought the standard of action in a transcendental ground. There is\nreason for this distinction in Kant's manner of statement. But both\nmay be regarded as investigating human nature. Their difference\nrather consists in the different position and function assigned to\nreason in man. It is because Kant is for the moment looking upon\nreason as something distinct from human nature that he says that\n\"the ground of obligation is to be sought, not in the nature of man\nor in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but _\u00e0\npriori_ simply in the notions of pure reason\" (Werke, iv. 237). His\n\"metaphysical\" view of ethics, however, follows from the rational\nconstitution of the human subject and his experience, and does not\ndepend on any source that really \"transcends\" the reason of man.\n\n[12] Opinion is also divided according to the place assigned to\nreason in the world,--this principle of division corresponding almost\nexactly with the former.\n\n[13] Thus it is the object of Helv\u00e9tius's first _discours_ \"De\nl'esprit\" to prove that physical sensibility and memory are the only\nproductive causes of our ideas.\n\n[14] Comte, by connecting ethics with biology; Darwin and Spencer, by\nthe doctrine of evolution.\n\n\n\n\nPART I.\n\nTHE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nEGOISM.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Definition of Naturalism.]\n\nIt is difficult to give an exact definition or even description of\nwhat I have called the \"natural\" view of man. Perhaps it may be\nbest defined, negatively, as the view which denies to reason any\nspontaneous or creative function in the human constitution. For this\ndefinition, if it still leaves the positive description wanting,\nwill at least make the classification into \"natural\" and \"rational\"\nexhaustive and mutually exclusive. At the same time it is to be\nnoted that, on the theory of Naturalism, reason is not supposed to\nbe excluded from all share in determining questions of conduct or\nthe choice of ends. It would, indeed, be impossible to have even\nthe pretence of an ethical theory without a certain use of reason.\nBut its function, in this case, is limited to the merely formal one\nof bringing different presentations (or objects) and feelings into\nconnection, and comparing the different states of mind thus formed\nwith one another, not with a reason-given standard.\n\n[Sidenote: Psychological hedonism.]\n\nSince the function of reason is thus restricted, and its competency\nto supply an end for, or principle of, action is denied, we must\nseek this end either in the feelings of pleasure and pain which\naccompany both sensory and motor presentations,--perceptions, that\nis to say, and actions,--or in the more complex, or apparently\nmore complex, emotions of the mind. And the latter may either be\nthemselves reducible to feelings of pleasure or pain accompanying\npresentations directly pleasurable or painful, and thence transferred\nby association to other presentations, or they may be regarded as\nsomehow motives to action which may be or ought to be followed on\ntheir own account. The Individualistic Theory, therefore, is not\nnecessarily hedonistic. It admits of a twofold view of the \"natural\"\nman: one which looks upon him as in essence a pleasure-seeking,\npain-avoiding animal; another which regards him as having a variety\nof impulses, some of which are not directed to his own pleasure or\navoidance of pain.\n\n[Sidenote: 1. Its theory of action]\n\n[Sidenote: ambiguous,]\n\n[Sidenote: referring to]\n\nThe former view--psychological hedonism, as it is called--claims\nto be an exhaustive analysis of the motives of human conduct,\nperfectly general indeed, but yet valid for every case of action.\nIt denies the possibility of a man acting from any other principle\nthan desire of pleasure or aversion from pain. The theory is, that\nit is a psychological law that action is motived by pleasure and\npain, and that nothing else has motive-power over it. If, then, one\npleasure (or avoidance of pain) is chosen in preference to another,\nit must be either by chance,--an alternative which has no ethical\nsignificance--no significance, that is, for the guidance of voluntary\nconduct,--or because the one course promises, or seems to promise,\nthe attainment of a greater balance of pleasure than the other, or\nis actually at the time more pleasant than that other. Thus the\nview that pleasure is the _only_ motive of human action is really\nidentical, for ethical purposes, with the theory loosely expressed\nin the law that action follows the _greatest_ pleasure.[15] I say\n\"loosely expressed\"; for the law as thus stated really admits of\nthree quite different interpretations, not always distinguished with\nthe precision which such subjects require.\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) actual consequences of action,]\n\n[Sidenote: or (_b_) its expected consequences,]\n\n[Sidenote: or (_c_) its present characteristics.]\n\n(_a_) In the first place, the law might mean that action always\nfollows the course which, as a matter of fact, will in the long-run\nbring the greatest balance of pleasure to the agent. It is evident\nthat there is no ground in psychology for maintaining this view. Yet\nit is a fair interpretation of the \"law\" of psychological hedonism,\nas commonly stated; and it is at least an admissible supposition\nthat this meaning of the phrase has not been without effect upon\nthe uses to which the law has been put by some of its upholders.\nThe second interpretation of the law--namely (_b_), that action is\nalways in the direction which seems to the agent most likely to\nbring him the greatest balance of pleasure, whether it actually\nbrings it or not--is the sense in which it appears to have been most\ncommonly taken when expressed with any degree of accuracy. It is in\nthis sense that--in language which ascribes greater consistency to\nmen's conduct than it usually displays--\"interest\" is asserted by\nthe author of the 'Syst\u00e8me de la nature' to be \"the sole motive of\nhuman action.\"[16] The same view is adopted by Bentham;[17] and both\nJames Mill and John Stuart Mill identify desire with pleasure, or an\n\"idea\" of pleasure, in terms which are sufficiently sweeping, if not\nvery carefully weighed;[18] while the will is said to follow desire,\nor only to pass out of its power when coming under the sway of\nhabit.[19] Still another meaning may, however, be given to the \"law\"\nof psychological hedonism, according to which the doubtful reference\nto the manifold pleasures and pains, contemplated as resulting from\nan action, is got rid of, and (_c_) the agent is asserted always to\nchoose that action or forbearance which is actually most pleasant,\nor least painful, to him at the time--taking account, of course,\nof imaginative pleasures and pains, as well as of those which are\nimmediately connected with the senses. It is in this interpretation\nof its law that psychological hedonism seems to be most capable of\ndefence, and in this sense it has been more than once stated and\ndefended.[20]\n\n[Sidenote: 2. Ethical inferences from this theory,]\n\nThe ethics of the form of Naturalism which is now under examination\nmust be inferred from the \"law\" that human action follows the\ngreatest pleasure, in one or other of the above meanings which that\nlaw admits of. The law is the datum or premiss from which we are\nto advance to an ethical conclusion. The \"right\" is to be evolved\nfrom the pleasurable; and the pleasurable, consequently, cannot be\nmade to depend upon the right. It is certainly true of the conduct\nof most men, \"that our prospect of pleasure resulting from any\ncourse of conduct may largely depend on our conception of it as\nright or otherwise.\"[21] But this presupposes that there is a right\nindependent of one's own pleasure, and therefore does not apply to\nan ethics based on the simple theory of human nature put forward by\npsychological hedonism.\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) in its first meaning,]\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_)in its second meaning:]\n\n[Sidenote: private ethics and legislation,]\n\n[Sidenote: (_c_) in its third meaning.]\n\nIt is scarcely necessary to discuss the first alternative (_a_),\nas no psychologist would seriously maintain it. A society composed\nof men constituted in the way it supposes men to be constituted,\nwould be a collection of rational egoists, omniscient in all that\nconcerned the results of action, and each adopting unerringly at\nevery moment the course of conduct which would increase his own\npleasure the most. The conduct of any member of such a society\ncould only be modified when--and would always be modified when--the\nmodified conduct actually brought pleasurable results to the agent:\nnever so as to make him prefer the public good to his own. The\nsecond alternative (_b_) admits of such modification taking place\nonly when it seems to the individual that this modified action will\nproduce a greater balance of pleasure or smaller balance of pain\nthan any other course of action. Under this theory an individual\nmight indeed prefer the public good or another man's good to his\nown, but only through his being deceived as to the actual results of\nhis course of action. Ethics as determining an end for conduct is\nput out of court; though the statesman or the educator may modify\nthe actions of others by providing appropriate motives. If the \"two\nsovereign masters, pain and pleasure,\" \"determine what we shall do,\"\nit is hardly necessary for them also \"to point out what we ought to\ndo.\"[22] The end is already given in the nature of action, though an\nenlightened understanding will teach men how the greatest balance of\npleasure may be obtained. We can only get at a rule prescribing an\nend by changing our point of view from the individual to the state.\nIt is best for the state that each individual should aim at the\ncommon happiness; but, when we talk of this as a moral duty for the\nindividual, all we can mean is that the state will punish a breach\nof it. In the words of Helv\u00e9tius,[23] \"pain and pleasure are the\nbonds by which we can always unite personal interest to the interest\nof the nation.... The sciences of morals and legislation can be\nonly deductions from this simple principle.\" According to Bentham's\npsychology, a man is necessitated by his mental and physical nature\nto pursue at every moment, not the greatest happiness of the greatest\nnumber, but what seems to him his own greatest happiness. And what\nthe legislator has to do is, by judiciously imposed rewards and\npunishments, especially the latter, to make it for the greatest\nhappiness of each to pursue the greatest happiness of all.[24] As\ndistinguished from this \"art of legislation,\" \"private ethics\"\nconsists only of prudential rules prescribing the best means to an\nend predetermined by nature as the only possible end of human action:\nit \"teaches how each man may dispose himself to pursue the course\nmost conducive to his own happiness.\"[25] The consequences to the\ntheory of action of the third alternative (_c_) are similar: it only\nstates the law with more appearance of psychological accuracy. If\na man always follows that course of action which will give him at\nthe time the greatest (real and imaginative) satisfaction, it is\nimpossible for us to infer from his nature an ethical law prescribing\nsome other end, without admitting a fundamental contradiction in\nhuman nature; while to say that he ought to seek the end he always\ndoes and cannot help seeking, is unnecessary and even unmeaning.\nModification of character may of course be still brought about,\nsince the kinds of action in which an individual takes pleasure\nmay be varied almost indefinitely. But the motive made use of in\nthis educative process must be personal pleasure; and the end the\nlegislator has in view in his work must be the same,[26] though it\nis often quietly assumed that for him personal pleasure has become\nidentified with the wider interests of the community.\n\n[Sidenote: Result of this ambiguity,]\n\n[Sidenote: ethical hedonism.]\n\nThe different significations of which it admits show that the\npsychological law that action follows the greatest pleasure is by no\nmeans so clear as it may at first sight appear. Probably it is the\nvery ambiguity of the law that has made it appear to provide a basis\nfor an ethical system. When it is said that greatest pleasure is the\nmoral end of action, this \"greatest pleasure\" is looked upon as the\ngreatest possible balance of pleasurable over painful states for the\nprobable duration of life: on the egoistic theory, of the life of the\nindividual; on the utilitarian theory, of the aggregate lives of all\nmen or even of all sentient beings. But when it is said that greatest\npleasure is, as a matter of fact, always the motive of action, it is\nobvious that \"greatest pleasure\" has changed its signification. For\nif the same meaning were kept to, not only would the psychological\nlaw as thus stated be openly at variance with facts, but its validity\nwould render the moral precept unnecessary. It is even unmeaning to\nsay that a man \"ought\" to do that which he always does and cannot\nhelp doing.[27] On the other hand, if the double meaning of the\nphrase had been clearly stated, we should at once have seen the\nhiatus in the proof of egoistic hedonism--the gap between the present\n(or apparent) pleasure for which one does act, and the greatest\npleasure of a lifetime for which one ought to act--as well as the\nadditional difficulty of passing from egoism to utilitarianism. If\ngreatest apparent pleasure--or greatest present pleasure--is by an\ninexorable law of human nature always sought, how can it be shown\nthat we ought to sacrifice the apparent to the real--the present\npleasure that is small to the greater future pleasure? If the\nindividual necessarily pursues his own pleasure, how can we show that\nhe ought to subordinate it to the pleasures of the \"greatest number\"?\n\n[Sidenote: 3. Transition from psychological to ethical hedonism.\nRight action will imply]\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) correct estimate of consequences of action,]\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) and corresponding strength of feeling.]\n\nIt is a matter of fact, however, that the psychologists who maintain\nthat action follows the greatest pleasure--meaning by that, greatest\napparent or greatest present pleasure--have in their ethics made the\ntransition to an enlightened Egoism, or even to Utilitarianism. The\nnature of the transition thus requires to be more clearly pointed\nout. If the former interpretation of the law of psychological\nhedonism could be accepted, and a man's motive for action were always\nwhat seemed to him likely to bring him the greatest pleasure on the\nwhole, ethics--what Bentham calls private ethics--could be reduced\n(as Bentham finally reduces it) to certain maxims of prudence. To\nbe fully acquainted with the sources of pleasure and pain, and to\nestimate them correctly, would imply possession of the highest\n(egoistic) morality. If men could be made to think rightly as to what\ntheir greatest pleasure consisted in, then right action on their\npart--that is to say, the pursuit of their greatest pleasure--would\n(according to Bentham's psychology) follow as a matter of course.\nRight conduct, however, is not so purely an affair of the intellect\nas this would make it. Indeed, Bentham's psychological assumption\nrequires only to be plainly stated for its inconsistency with\nthe facts of human action to become apparent. The \"video meliora\nproboque, deteriora sequor\" expresses too common an experience to be\nso easily explained away. The impulses by which action is governed\nare not always in accordance with what the intellect decides to\nbe best on a survey of the whole life and its varied chances. In\njudging the consequences of action, a future good is compared with a\npresent, regardless of the mere difference of time by which they are\nseparated. But the springs which move the will are often at variance\nwith the decisions of the understanding; and many men are unable to\nresist the strength of the impulse to act for the pleasure of the\nmoment, though they foresee that a greater future satisfaction would\nfollow from present self-denial.\n\nIt would seem, then, that the facts of experience are sufficient to\nshow that a man's conduct does not always follow the course which\nhe thinks likely to bring him the greatest pleasure on the whole.\nBut the view that a man always acts for what is most pleasant--or\nleast painful--at the time cannot be dismissed so easily. It is not\nenough simply to point to the facts of human action in order to show\nthat this hypothesis is inconsistent with them. If we instanced the\nself-restraint in which so many pass their lives from day to day, it\nmight perhaps be answered that there is a persistent idea of duty, or\nlove of reputation, or fear of social stigma, the repression of which\nwould be more painful than the restraint it puts upon other impulses.\nEven the martyr who deliberately parts with life itself for the\nsake of an ideal, may be said to choose death as the least painful\ncourse open to him at the time. It should be borne in mind, however,\nthat Professor Bain, the most thorough psychologist of Bentham's\nschool, refuses to admit this line of defence for psychological\nhedonism, and holds that, in actions such as those referred to,\nmen are really carried out of the circle of their self-regarding\ndesires.[28] But my present purpose is not to discuss the merits\nof any such psychological theory, but rather to investigate its\nethical consequences. And for this purpose the question requires to\nbe put, how a passage is effected from psychological hedonism to an\negoistic--and even to a utilitarian--theory of ethics.\n\n[Sidenote: The postulate that action can be rationalised]\n\n[Sidenote: involves these conditions,]\n\nIf a man always acts for his greatest present pleasure, real and\nimaginary, it seems a far step to say that he \"ought\" to act--or in\nany way to expect that he will act--at each moment for the greatest\nsum of pleasure attainable in the probable duration of his life.\nBut on reflection, this may turn out to follow if we postulate that\nconduct can be rationalised. What is meant by this egoistic \"ought\"\nmay be said to be simply that to the eye of reason the pleasure of\nany one moment cannot be regarded as more valuable than the equal\npleasure of any other moment, if it is equally certain; and that\ntherefore to act as if it were is to act unreasonably. Man fails in\nacting up to reason in this sense, because his action is not motived\nby reason, but directly by pleasure and pain; and not by a mere\nestimate of pleasure and pain, but by pleasure and pain themselves.\nThe psychological hedonist must maintain that the estimates of future\npleasure and pain only become motives by being not merely recognised\n(intellectually) but felt (emotionally)--that is, by themselves\nbecoming pleasurable or painful. If the Egoist calls any action\nirrational, it cannot be because the motive which produced it was not\nthe greatest pleasure in consciousness at the time. It can only be on\nthe ground that the greatest pleasure in consciousness at the time\nis likely to lead to a sacrifice of greater pleasure in the future;\nand this must be due either to intellectual misapprehension or to\nthe imagined fruition of future pleasure not being strong enough to\noutweigh the pleasure which comes from a present stimulus, and to the\nimagined fruition of the more distant being weaker than that of the\nless distant pleasure. It is owing to a defect of the imagination\non a man's part that even with complete information he does not act\n\"up to his lights\"--irrational action being partly a consequence of\ninsufficient acquaintance with the normal results of conduct, partly\ndue to defective imagination. Were a man's imagination of future\npleasure and pain as strong as his experience of present pleasure and\npain, and did he correctly appreciate the results of his conduct,\nthen his action would, of psychological necessity, harmonise with the\nprecepts of egoistic hedonism.\n\n[Sidenote: the latter of which]\n\n[Sidenote: is inconsistent with the nature of voluntary action.]\n\nEgoistic hedonism may therefore, in a certain sense, be said to be a\n\"reasonable\" end of conduct on the theory of psychological hedonism;\nit is the end which will be made his own by that ideally perfect man\nwhose intellect can clearly see the issues of conduct, and whose\nimagination of the future causes of sensibility is so vivid that the\npleasure or pain got from anticipating them is as great as if they\nwere present, or only less lively in proportion as there is a risk of\ntheir not being realised. Conversely it would seem that only that man\ncan act \"reasonably\" in whom imagination of pleasure (or of pain) is\nalready of equal strength with the actual experience of it. But, if\nthe \"pleasures of the imagination\" are as strong as those of sense or\nof reality, the latter obviously become superfluous; and it follows\nthat the ideally perfect man is left without any motive to aim at the\nreal thing, since he can obtain as much pleasure by imagining it. The\ncultured hedonist must, it would seem, be able to--\n\n \"Hold a fire in his hand\n By thinking on the frosty Caucasus,\n Or cloy the hungry edge of appetite\n By bare imagination of a feast.\"\n\nSo far as feeling or motive to action goes, no difference must exist\nfor him between reality and imagination. And thus, although we may\nadmit that, on this psychological basis, conduct when rationalised\nagrees with that prescribed by egoistic hedonism, yet it can only be\nrationalised by a development of the strength of the imagination,\nwhich would make the feeling which it brings with it as strong as\nthat which accompanies a real object, and hence take away the motive\nfor the pursuit of the latter. The discrepancy between representation\nand presentation which is necessary for the state of desire,[29]\nis no longer present. Hedonism vindicates its rationality only on\nconditions which imply the futility of action altogether. It is not\nmerely that the attainment of the hedonistic end in practical conduct\nimplies a strength of imagination of which no one is capable, but\nthe conditions of acting both rationally and hedonistically, are\nconditions which would paralyse all activity.\n\n[Sidenote: 4. Possible objections to preceding argument:]\n\nThe foregoing argument may perhaps be objected to on two grounds. On\nthe one hand, it may be said that it ignores the vast complexity of\nhuman motive, and treats action as if it were a simple and abstract\nthing. On the other hand, we may be reminded of the fact that, while\nall men act for pleasure, the moral quality of their conduct does not\ndepend on this fact, but on the _kind_ of things in which they take\npleasure.\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) complexity of motive; but it is psychological\nhedonism which ignores this.]\n\nSo far as the first objection is concerned, it seems to me that\nthe fault belongs to the psychological theory of human action, the\nethical consequences of which are under investigation. It is this\ntheory which asserts that, however interwoven the threads of impulse,\naversion, and habit may be, their most complex relations can be\nreduced to the formula, \"greatest pleasure, or least pain, prevails.\"\nIt is not necessary, indeed, that every action should be the\nconscious pursuit of a pleasurable object already before the mind in\nidea. But the theory, if consistently carried out, implies that the\naction which follows in the line of a previously formed habit, does\nso because the discomfort or pain of breaking through the habit would\nbe sufficient to counter-balance any satisfaction that might result.\nThe objection, therefore, of excessive simplicity or \"abstractness,\"\nis one which cannot have greater force than when urged against the\ntheory of psychological hedonism.\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) difference in kind of pleasurable objects;]\n\n[Sidenote: but this involves a reference to something else than\npleasure,]\n\n[Sidenote: which psychological hedonism does not admit of.]\n\nFurther--and this is the second objection--the above analysis may\nbe considered by some not to have taken sufficient account of the\ndifference in the objects in which a human being can take pleasure,\nand of the fact that the moral quality of men differs, not according\nas they act for pleasure or not, but according to the kind of actions\nand sufferances in which they find pleasure. There can be no doubt\nof the importance of this distinction for questions of practical\nmorals. The man in whom \"selfishness takes the shape of benevolence,\"\nas it did in Bentham, is infinitely better than the man in whom it\nretains the form of selfishness. But the consideration is important\njust because it goes on the implied assumption that the hedonistic\nis not the chief aspect of conduct, and that there is a difference\nbetween courses of action more fundamental than the pleasurable or\npainful feeling attendant on them. If the principles on which the\nobjection is founded were consistently adhered to and followed out,\nthey would make not pleasure, but something else--that, namely,\nby which pleasures differ from one another in kind--the ethical\nstandard. But if, in ultimate analysis, it is the pleasure felt or\nexpected that moves to action, it would seem that there is no way\nin which the conclusion of the preceding argument can be avoided.\nIf pleasure is the motive, it must be _qu\u00e2_ pleasure--that is to\nsay, either the greatest apparent pleasure, or the greatest present\npleasure, is the motive. If difference of quality be admitted, we\nare introducing a determining factor other than pleasure. Certain\nkinds of pleasure may be better than others for the race or for the\nstate. But these differences must be reducible to terms of individual\npleasure admitting of purely quantitative comparisons, before they\nbecome motives to action.[30] From the point of view of the whole,\nwe may say that one action leads to a greater sum of pleasure than\nanother. But, in judging the action of individuals, all that we can\nsay of it is, that to one man one class of actions gives pleasure,\nto another another: each man is equally following the course of\naction which either (_a_) will bring, or (_b_) seems to him likely\nto bring, the greatest pleasure, or (_c_) is actually most pleasant\nat the time. From the nature of the individual we can evolve no end\nbeyond egoistic hedonism. And even this end can only be made his\nat each occurrence of action (assuming the first alternative (_a_)\nto be incorrect) by enlightening his intellect so that (_b_) will\ncorrespond with the actual greatest pleasure, or by also enlivening\nhis imagination of future pleasures and pains so that (_c_) will\ncorrespond with it; and this, as has been shown, could only be\neffected under conditions which are inconsistent with the principles\nof human action.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[15] Meaning by \"greatest pleasure,\" greatest balance of pleasure\nover pain, and thus inclusive of the meaning \"least pain.\" It is the\nexpression in terms of feeling of the statement sometimes preferred,\nthat \"action follows the line of least resistance\"--a statement to\nwhich no exception can be taken, nor any importance allowed, till it\nbe translated into definite psychological language.\n\n[16] \"Ainsi lorsque nous disons que _l'int\u00e9r\u00eat est l'unique mobile\ndes actions humaines_, nous voulons indiquer par l\u00e0 que chaque\nhomme travaille \u00e0 sa mani\u00e8re \u00e0 son propre bonheur, qu'il place dans\nquelqu'objet soit visible, soit cach\u00e9, soit r\u00e9el, soit imaginaire, et\nque tout le syst\u00e8me de sa conduite tend \u00e0 l'obtenir.\"--Syst\u00e8me de la\nnature (1781), i. 268.\n\n[17] \"On the occasion of every act he exercises, every human being is\nled to pursue that line of conduct which, according to his view of\nthe case taken by him at the moment, will be in the highest degree\ncontributory to his own greatest happiness.\"--Constitutional Code,\nbook i. \u00a7 2; Works, ix. 5. The continued existence of the species is,\nBentham thinks, a conclusive proof of this proposition.\n\n[18] Thus, according to James Mill, \"the terms 'idea of pleasure'\nand 'desire' are but two names; the thing named, the state of\nconsciousness is one and the same. The word Desire is commonly used\nto mark the idea of a pleasurable sensation when the future is\nassociated with it.\"--Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind,\nJ. S. Mill's edit., ii. 192; cf. Fragment on Mackintosh (1835), p.\n389 f. To the same effect J. S. Mill says: \"Desiring a thing and\nfinding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful,\nare phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same\nphenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming\nthe same psychological fact.\"--Utilitarianism, 7th ed., p. 58.\n\n[19] \"Will is the child of desire, and passes out of the dominion of\nits parent only to come under that of habit.\"--Utilitarianism, p. 60.\n\n[20] Thus Jonathan Edwards says: \"When I say that the Will is as the\ngreatest apparent good, or (as I have explained it) that volition has\nalways for its object the thing which appears most agreeable, it must\nbe carefully observed, to avoid confusion and needless objection,\nthat I speak of the _direct_ and immediate object of the act of\nvolition, and not some object to which the act of will has only an\nindirect and remote respect.\"--On the Freedom of the Will, part i. \u00a7\n2; Works, i. 133. The matter is put still more clearly by the late\nAlfred Barratt: \"Action does not always follow knowledge. Of course\nnot: but the doctrine [Hedonism] does not require that it should; for\nit says, not that we follow what _is_ our greatest possible pleasure,\nor what we know or 'think' to be so, but what at the moment of action\nis most desired.\"--Mind, vol. ii. 173; cf. Physical Ethics, p. 52 ff.\nSo Mr Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 47: \"It is more accurate to say\nthat my conduct is determined by the pleasantest judgment, than to\nsay that it is determined by my judgment of what is pleasantest.\" The\nnegative side of the same view was expressed by Locke in his doctrine\nthat action is moved by the most pressing uneasiness (Essay, II. xxi.\n29, 31), and distinguished by him from the former view (b), that the\n\"greater visible good\" is the motive (II. xxi. 35, 44).\n\n[21] Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 3d ed., p. 40.\n\n[22] Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. i., Works,\ni. 1. With this statement may be compared the assertion of Helv\u00e9tius:\n\"Il semble que, dans l'univers moral comme dans l'univers physique,\nDieu n'est mis qu'un seul principe dans tous ce qui a \u00e9t\u00e9.... Il\nsemble qu'il ait dit pareillement \u00e0 l'homme: ... Je te mets sous la\ngarde du plaisir et de la douleur: l'un et l'autre veilleront \u00e0 tes\npens\u00e9es, \u00e0 tes actions; engendreront tes passions, exciteront tes\naversions, tes amiti\u00e9s, tes tendresses, tes fureurs; allumeront tes\nd\u00e9sirs, tes craintes, tes esp\u00e9rances, te d\u00e9voileront des v\u00e9rit\u00e9s; te\nplongeront dans des erreurs; et apr\u00e8s t'avoir fait enfanter mille\nsyst\u00e8mes absurdes et diff\u00e9rens de morale et de l\u00e9gislation, te\ndecouvriront un jour les principes simples, au d\u00e9veloppement desquels\nest attach\u00e9 l'ordre et le bonheur du monde moral.\"--De l'esprit, III.\nix, \u0152uvres (ed. of 1818), i. 293.\n\n[23] De l'homme, concl. g\u00e9n., \u0152uvres, ii. 608.\n\n[24] Cf. Syst\u00e8me de la nature, i. 120: \"La politique devrait \u00eatre\nl'art de r\u00e9gler les passions des hommes et de les diriger vers le\nbien de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9.\"\n\n[25] Bentham, _op. cit._, chap. xix. (xvii. in the reprint of 1879),\n\u00a7 20; Works, i. 148.\n\n[26] Cf. Bentham, Works, ix. 5.\n\n[27] Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, I. iv. 1, 3d ed., p. 41; cf. Green,\nProlegomena to Ethics, p. 9: \"To a being who is simply a result of\nnatural forces, an injunction to conform to their laws is unmeaning.\"\n\n[28] Cf. The Emotions and the Will, 3d ed., p. 293 ff.\n\n[29] Cf. Sully, Outlines of Psychology, p. 577.\n\n[30] Cf. J. Grote, 'Utilitarian Philosophy,' p. 20, note: \"One kind\nof pleasure may be, systematically, to be preferred to another, but\nit must be because the pleasures classified under it generally exceed\nthose under the other in intensity, or some other of the elements of\nvalue.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nTHE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM.\n\n\n[Sidenote: 1. Different standpoints of individual and state]\n\nIt still remains possible, of course, to fix an ethical end in some\nother way than by studying individual human nature. We may, for\ninstance, looking from the point of view of the community, fix its\ngreatest happiness, instead of his own, as the individual's end. But\nthe difficulty then arises of persuading the individual--or, indeed,\nmaking it possible for him--to regard this impersonal goal as the\nend of his conduct. For this purpose, Bentham seemed to look to the\nexercise of administrative control which, by a system of rewards\nand punishments, will make the greatest happiness of the individual\ncoincide so far as possible with that of the community.[31] J. S.\nMill, on the other hand, with his eyes turned to the subjective\nsprings of action, saw in the gradual growth of sympathetic pleasures\nand pains the means by which an individual's desires would cease to\nconflict with those of his neighbours.\n\nIt is in some such way that the transition is made from Egoism to\nUtilitarianism. The transition is made: Bentham and his school are\nan evidence of the fact. But it is not therefore logical. It is,\nindeed, important to notice that we only pass from the one theory to\nthe other by changing our original individualistic point of view.\nHaving already fixed an end for conduct regardless of the difference\nbetween the individual at the time of acting and at subsequent times,\nwe proceed to take the much longer step of ignoring the difference\nbetween the agent and other individuals. The question is no longer,\nWhat is good or desirable for the person who is acting? but, What is\nbest on the whole for all those whom his action may affect--that is\nto say, for the community?\n\n[Sidenote: cannot be logically connected]\n\n[Sidenote: through analogy of state to individual.]\n\n[Sidenote: Difference between one's own pleasure and the pleasure of\nothers]\n\nBut while it is comparatively easy to see how this transition\nis effected as a matter of fact, it is difficult to establish\nany logical connection between its different stages, or to offer\nany considerations fitted to convince the individual that it is\nreasonable for him to seek the happiness of the community rather than\nhis own. Only that conduct, it may seem, can be reasonable which\ndirects and perfects the natural striving of each organism towards\nits own pleasure. We may, of course, let our point of view shift from\nthe individual to the social \"organism.\" And in this case, if the\n\"natural\" end of each human being is his own greatest pleasure, the\nend of the community, or organised body of pleasure-seekers, will\nnaturally be concluded to be the greatest aggregate pleasure of its\nmembers. Thus, if we can hypostatise the community, and treat it as\nan individual with magnified but human wants and satisfactions, then,\nfor this leviathan, the ethical end will correspond to what is called\nUtilitarianism or Universalistic Hedonism. But, when we remember\nthat the community is made up of units distinct from one another\nin feeling and action, the difficulty arises of establishing it as\nthe natural end, or as a reasonable end, for each of these units to\nstrive after the greatest pleasure of all. For it is evident that the\npursuit of the greatest aggregate pleasure may often interfere with\nthe attainment by the individual of his own greatest pleasure. On the\nother hand, the self-seeking action of the individual may no doubt\nlead to a loss of pleasure on the whole; but then it is not his own\npleasure that is lost, only other people's. To the outsider--as to\nthe community--it may seem irrational that a small increase in the\npleasure of one unit should be allowed at the expense of a loss of\ngreater pleasure on the part of other units. But it seems irrational\nonly because the outsider naturally puts himself in the place of\nthe community; and neither takes account of the fact that to the\nindividual agent there is a fundamental difference between his own\npleasure and any one else's pleasure: for him the former is, and the\nlatter is not, pleasure at all.[32]\n\n[Sidenote: overlooked in arguing from egoism to utilitarianism.]\n\nThis fundamental difference seems to be overlooked when the attempt\nis made to argue logically from egoistic psychology (or even from\negoistic ethics) to utilitarianism. Indeed, the hiatus in logical\nproof is often only concealed by a confusion of standpoints; and\nJ. S. Mill, while emphasising the distinction between modern\nUtilitarianism and the older Epicureanism, has even allowed his\nofficial \"proof\" of utilitarianism--such proof, that is, as he\nthinks the principle of Utility to be susceptible of--to rest on the\nambiguity between individual and social happiness.\n\n[Sidenote: 2. Connection between egoism and utilitarianism according\nto Bentham:]\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) Utilitarianism not a political duty,]\n\nThis ambiguity does not seem to have been consistently avoided\neven by Bentham. For the most part, indeed, nothing can exceed\nthe clearness with which he recognises the twofold and possibly\nconflicting interests involved in almost every action. There is the\ninterest of the agent, and the interest of others whom his action\nmay affect. And he also holds that, in the case of divergence of\ninterests, the individual will act for his own. \"The happiness of the\nindividuals,\" he says,[33] \"of whom a community is composed,--that\nis, their pleasures, and their security,--is the end, and the sole\nend, which the legislator ought to have in view--the sole standard\nin conformity to which each individual ought, as far as depends upon\nthe legislator, to be _made_ to fashion his conduct. But whether it\nbe this or anything else that is to be _done_, there is nothing by\nwhich a man can ultimately be _made_ to do it, but either pain or\npleasure\"--that is, of course, his own pain or pleasure. Here, then,\nethical Utilitarianism and psychological Egoism are both plainly\ninvolved. A man, it is said, can only pursue general happiness by its\nbeing identical with his own happiness. And as it is evident, and\nadmitted, that these two happinesses often diverge in the courses\nof action naturally leading to them, a man can only be beneficent,\nrather than selfish, through some artificial arrangement which makes\nbeneficence to be for his interest:[34] in plain language (since\nrewards are only of exceptional applicability), through his being\npunished for not being beneficent.[35] But, as Bentham clearly shows,\nmany cases of action cannot be safely touched by the legislator's\nart. Such cases \"unmeet for punishment\" include not only the actions\nwhich are beneficial or neutral in their results, but also actions\nhurtful to the community, though they may elude such vigilance as the\nstate can contrive, or their restraint by punishment inflicted by the\nstate may constitute a greater evil than the offence.[36] _Probity_\nmay be exacted by the \"persons stated and _certain_\" who happen to be\npolitical superiors: except in rare instances, positive _beneficence_\ncan not. Utilitarian conduct, therefore, is not a \"political duty,\"\nbecause it is not fully enforced by definite punishment. The \"art\nof legislation\" is indeed said to teach \"how a multitude of men,\ncomposing a community, may be disposed to pursue that course which\nupon the whole is the most conducive to the happiness of the whole\ncommunity, by means of motives to be applied by the legislator.\"[37]\nBut the means here indicated are such as cannot fully compass the\nattainment of the end. For the motives applied by the legislator\neither cannot reach a large part of the extra-regarding conduct of\nindividuals, or could only reach it by entailing greater evils than\nthose they would be used to prevent.\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) nor a moral duty,]\n\n[Sidenote: (_c_) nor insisted on as a religious duty,]\n\nBut if utilitarian conduct is not a political duty, it may seem\nevident that it is at least a moral duty. Now a moral duty is said\nby Bentham[38] to be \"created by a kind of motive which, from the\n_un_certainty of the _persons_ to apply it, and of the _species_ and\n_degree_ in which it will be applied, has hardly yet got the name of\npunishment: by various mortifications resulting from the ill-will of\npersons _un_certain and variable,--the community in general; that is,\nsuch individuals of that community as he whose duty is in question\nshall happen to be connected with.\" In plain language, then, moral\nduty simply means the ill-will of a man's neighbours which follows\nhis conduct in so far as that conduct affects them disagreeably.\nSuch ill-will on the part of a man's neighbours may result from\nsuccess or from failure on his part, from a breach of etiquette, from\nrefusal to sacrifice to the caprice of those neighbours the wider\ngood of the society whom his conduct affects (but to whom it may\nbe unknown), from deception or from telling the truth. In a word,\nthe duty--that is, the punishment--is entirely uncertain: not only\nas regards the persons applying it, its nature and its amount, but\nalso as regards the kind of actions to which it applies. They will\nbe actions unpleasant to the people who inflict the punishment, but\nnot necessarily hurtful to the common weal: since the immediate\neffects of an action are easily recognised, while its wider and\nmore lasting consequences are neither so apparent nor appeal so\nsurely to the interest of those who are cognisant of the action\nand immediately affected by it. Moral duty, therefore, as Bentham\ndefines it, depending on, or rather identical with, the ill-will\nof one's neighbours, is indefinite and limited in its nature, and\ncan command or sanction no such definite and wide-reaching rule for\nconduct as that a man should always act for the greatest happiness of\nthe greatest number of people whom his action may affect. Utilitarian\nconduct, therefore, is neither a political duty nor a moral duty;\nnor does Bentham follow Paley in insisting upon it as a religious\nduty \"created by punishment; by punishment expected at the hands\nof a person _certain_--the Supreme Being.\" And \"if he persists in\nasserting it to be a duty--but without meaning it to be understood\nthat it is on any one of these three accounts that he looks upon it\nas such--all he then asserts is his own internal _sentiment_; all he\nmeans then is that he feels himself _pleased_ or _displeased_ at the\nthoughts of the point of conduct in question, but without being able\nto tell _why_. In this case he should e'en say so; and not seek to\ngive an undue influence to his own single suffrage, by delivering it\nin terms that purport to declare the voice either of God, or of the\nlaw, or of the people.\"[39]\n\n[Sidenote: (_d_) nor sufficiently motived in private ethics,]\n\n[Sidenote: which can be reduced to prudence.]\n\nThis plain piece of advice which Bentham gives to Blackstone is\nnot often neglected by himself. The motive, he once said, of his\nown exceptional devotion to the interests of the community was\nthat it pleased him. \"I am a selfish man,\" he wrote, \"as selfish\nas any man can be. But in me, somehow or other, so it happens,\nselfishness has taken the shape of benevolence.\"[40] But when the\nmatter is thus brought back from the regions of political, moral,\nand religious duty, to the individual ground of \"private ethics,\"\nwe have still to refer to Bentham's own discussion of the question,\n\"What motives (independent of such as legislation and religion may\nchance to furnish) can one man have to consult the happiness of\nanother?\"[41] Bentham at once replies--and indeed the answer on his\nprinciples is obvious enough--that there is no motive which always\ncontinues _adequate_. But yet there are, he says, \"no occasions\nin which a man has not some motives for consulting the happiness\nof other men.\" Such are \"the purely-social motive of sympathy or\nbenevolence,\" and \"the semi-social motives of love of amity and love\nof reputation.\" A man is directly moved to promote the happiness of\nothers through the sympathetic feelings which make the happiness of\nothers in some degree pleasurable to himself; and he is indirectly\nmoved to promote their happiness through his desire of their\nfriendship and good opinion. So far, therefore, it is quite true that\n\"private ethics\"--or what Bentham regards as such--\"concerns every\nmember--that is, the happiness and the actions of every member of\nany community that can be proposed.\"[42] It certainly concerns their\nhappiness, but only in so far as this is a means to the happiness\nof the agent. So that when Bentham says that \"there is no case in\nwhich a private man ought not to direct his own conduct to the\nproduction of his own happiness and of that of his fellow-creatures,\"\nhe should rather say that a man will[43] only direct his conduct to\nthe happiness of his fellow-creatures in so far as such action leads\nto his own happiness. Private ethics, therefore, has to do with the\nhappiness of others only so far as this reacts on the happiness\nof self; or, as Bentham ultimately defines it, in terms to which\nno exception can be taken: \"Private ethics teaches how each man\nmay dispose himself to pursue the course most conducive to his own\nhappiness by means of such motives as offer of themselves.\"[44]\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: 3. Bentham's treatment exhaustive from his point of view.]\n\nUnder Bentham's hands \"private ethics\" is thus reduced to prudence,\nat the same time that the author has failed to show why the general\nhappiness is to be aimed at by the individual as a religious or\npolitical or moral duty. Nor is this failure due to any lack of skill\nin following out the consequences which his premisses involved. The\narguments used against him have thus an equally valid application to\nall who adopt the same general line of thought. For Bentham appears\nto have seen as clearly as any of his disciples the difficulty of\nbringing the egoistic basis of his theory of human nature into\nharmony with the universal reference required by his ethics. And the\ncriticism already offered of the way in which Bentham attempts to\nbring about this connection may be shown not to be restricted to his\nspecial way of putting the case.\n\nIt is necessary to remember that throughout this chapter we are\nlooking from the individual's point of view, and inquiring how far it\nis possible to work from it in the direction of utilitarianism. Now\nit is admitted that, in pursuing his own happiness, he is sometimes\nled, and may be led on the whole, to neglect the general happiness.\nA sufficient reason for following the latter--or an obligation to do\nit--can therefore only come either from the supreme power or from\none's fellow-men, and from the latter either as organised in the\nState, and expressing themselves by its constituted authorities,\nor else by the vaguer method of social praise and blame. Bentham's\nclassification of the possible sources or kinds of duty into\nreligious, political, and moral [or social], is therefore a natural\nconsequence of the individualistic system.\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) The religious sanction,]\n\n[Sidenote: relied on by Paley,]\n\n[Sidenote: inverts the relation between ethics and theology.]\n\nThe first of these possible sources of duty is indeed only mentioned\nby Bentham, and then passed by. And yet it might seem that the\nreligious sanction is a more efficient motive-power than the social,\nwhile it applies to regions of conduct which legal enactment cannot\nreach. Without question, the operation of such a motive is capable of\nbringing egoistic conduct into harmony with utilitarianism, or with\nany other principle of action to which the sanction may be attached.\n\"Private happiness is our motive, and the will of God our rule,\"\nsays Paley;[45] and in this case such conduct will be obligatory as\nthe rule may arbitrarily determine; while, whatever it may be, there\nwill be a strong enough motive to follow it. The whole fabric of a\nmoral philosophy such as Paley's, therefore, rests on two theological\npropositions--that God has ordained the general happiness as the\nrule of human conduct, and that He will punish in another life those\nwho disregard that rule. The basis of morality is laid in a divine\ncommand enforced by a divine threat. Perhaps it will be generally\nagreed that Bentham acted wisely in not laying stress on this\napplication of the \"religious sanction.\" Even those least inclined\nto theological agnosticism would reject any such rough-and-ready\nsolution of the problem which deals with the relation of morality\nto the divine nature. Paley's method of treatment, they would say,\ninverts the relation in which theism stands to morality. The divine\nwill cannot be thus arbitrarily connected with the moral law. It can\nbe conceived to approve and sanction such an object as the happiness\nof mankind only when God is first of all regarded as a moral\nbeing, and the happiness of mankind as an object of moral action.\nIf any relation of consequence can be asserted between them, the\ngeneral happiness is to be regarded as a moral duty first, and only\nafterwards as a religious duty.\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) Limits of the political sanction.]\n\nWhen he comes to the political sanction, Bentham's treatment wants\nnothing in respect of fulness, and even those who do not agree\nwith his estimate of the infelicific character of many existing\ninstitutions and enactments will admit that even the best-intentioned\nlegislator cannot make utilitarian conduct a political duty. We must\nbear in mind here, also, the effect which individual desires and\nopinions have not only on social judgments, but also on statute-law.\nIn arguing on the relation of the individual to the State, we are\ntoo ready to forget that the State is represented by a legislator\nor body of legislators, and that we can never assume that in their\ncases private interest has already become identified with the\nlarger interests of the community.[46] For were this the case, the\naccusation of class-legislation or private interest would not be\nheard so often as it is.\n\n[Sidenote: (_c_) Uncertainty of the social sanction,]\n\nA modern disciple of Bentham would thus be compelled, just as\nBentham himself was, to make utilitarianism neither a political nor\nreligious but a \"moral\" duty, enforced by and founded on the shifting\nand uncertain punishments or sanctions of society--what Professor\nBain describes as \"the unofficial expressions of disapprobation\nand the exclusion from social good offices.\"[47] But as a logical\nproof of utilitarianism, this means is, if possible, weaker than the\npreceding; for social opinion, though of somewhat wider applicability\nthan legal enactment, has probably been, for the most part, in even\nless exact correspondence than it with the general happiness. The\nsocial sanction is strict on indifferent points of etiquette, does\nnot consult the general interests of mankind on points of honour, and\nis lenient towards acts that the utilitarian moralist condemns.[48]\n\n[Sidenote: (_d_) and of the internal sanction so far as a result of\nthe social.]\n\nProfessor Bain, however, advances from the external disapprobation to\nan internal sanction--looking upon conscience as one of the powers\nwhich inflicts punishment, and lies at the source of the feeling of\nobligation. But if conscience is only \"an ideal resemblance of public\nauthority, growing up in the same individual mind, and working to the\nsame end,\" it can, as little as its archetype, point to the maxim\nof utilitarianism. According to Professor Bain, it is through this\nsentiment--at first a mere imitation of external authority--that the\nindividual becomes a law to himself, on recognising the utilities\nthat led to the imposition of the law.[49] But on this theory, in so\nfar as conscience continues to point to the conduct impressed upon it\nby its external pattern, it fails to correspond with the utilitarian\nmaxim. If, on the other hand, it is modified by the comprehensive\nand unselfish view of the effects of conduct which utilitarianism\ndemands, it must be at the expense of correcting its original\nedicts, and so far discrediting its authoritative claims.\n\n[Sidenote: Value of the social sanction]\n\n[Sidenote: apart from logical proof of utilitarianism.]\n\nThe \"social sanction\" would be of much greater service if used to\nshow how a solidarity is brought about between the interests and\nfeelings of the individual and those of his neighbours, from which\nthe utilitarian maxim may be arrived at by a generalisation of his\nprinciple of conduct as modified by the social impulse. But this\nwould not constitute a logical justification of utilitarianism: it\nwould show how the principle has been arrived at, but without giving\na sufficient reason to the individual for adopting it. And this is\nreally the tendency of much recent discussion--of Professor Bain's\ntheory of conscience as a reflex of the external order, of George\nGrote's analysis of the moral sentiment, and of Mill's doctrine of\nthe progressive identification of the individual's feelings with\nthose of his neighbours through the gradual increase of sympathetic\npleasures and pains: for it was to this source that Mill looked for\nthe practical solution of the antinomy between his psychological and\nethical theories, though he himself tried to pass from one position\nto the other by means of the \"highway in the air\" constructed by his\nown logic.\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: 4. Mill's logical defence of utilitarianism:]\n\nMill's attempt to pass by a logical method from psychological\nhedonism to utilitarianism is an instructive commentary on the\ndifficulties which beset the transition. His work may be described\nas a vindication of the utilitarian morality, first, from the charge\nof sensualism; and secondly, from that of selfishness. And it is\nlargely owing to his polemic that utilitarianism is no longer looked\nupon as either a sensual or a selfish theory. It is not sensual,\nunless, indeed, the pleasures of most men are of a sensual kind. So\nfar from being selfish, it is almost stoical in the subordination of\nindividual desires it enjoins. But Mill wished to do more than clear\nthe character of utilitarian ethics. He wished to show a logical\nreason for utilitarians pursuing elevated pleasures rather than base\nones, and to demonstrate the connection of his moral imperative with\nthe principles which the school he belonged to laid down for human\nmotives. In both these respects his failure is conspicuous.\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) distinction of kinds of pleasure,]\n\n[Sidenote: determined by authority,]\n\n[Sidenote: either can be reduced to difference of quantity, or leads\nto non-hedonistic standard;]\n\nIn the former endeavour, he went against Bentham by attempting to\ndraw a distinction in kind amongst pleasures--a distinction not\nreducible to quantitative measurement. A higher degree of quality in\nthe pleasure sought was to outweigh any difference in its amount or\nquantity. With this modification, utilitarianism is made to require\na subordination of the lower or sensuous nature to the higher or\nintellectual nature. Pleasure, indeed, is still the end; but the\n\"higher\" pleasure takes precedence over the \"lower,\" irrespective\nof the amount of pleasant feeling that results. Pleasure is still\nthe standard, but not the ultimate standard; for a further appeal\nhas to be made to the criterion that distinguishes one pleasure from\nanother, not as merely greater or less, but as higher or lower. As is\nwell known, Mill did not look either to the action or to the feeling\nitself for this criterion. To have done so would have implied an\nacknowledgment that pleasure was no longer regarded as the ultimate\nstandard. He found the criterion of superiority simply in the\nopinion people of experience have about the relative desirability\nof various sorts of pleasure. But such a criterion only pushes the\nfinal question of the standard one step farther back. Those people\nof experience to whom Mill refers--who have tried both kinds of\npleasure, and prefer one of them[50]--can they give no reason for, no\naccount of, their preference? If so, to trust them is to appeal to\nblind authority, and to relinquish anything like a science of ethics.\nBut, if Mill's authorities can reflect on their feelings, as well as\nfeel, they can only tell us one or other of two things. Either the\nso-called \"higher\" pleasure is actually, as pleasure, so preferable\nto that called \"lower,\" that the smallest amount of the one would be\nmore pleasurable than the largest amount of the other; or else the\nhigher is called higher, and is to be preferred to the lower--even\nalthough the latter may be greater as pleasure--because of a quality\nbelonging to it over and above its character as pleasant feeling.\nThe former verdict would be in the first place paradoxical, and, in\nthe second place, would give up Mill's case, by reducing quality to\na quantitative standard. Besides, it would be no valid ground of\npreference for men in general; since the pleasure of various actions\nand states differs according to the susceptibility of the subject.\nAccording to the latter verdict, the characteristic upon which the\ndistinction of quality depends, and not pleasure itself, becomes the\nethical standard.\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) ambiguities in his proof of utilitarianism.]\n\nIn respect of his main contention, that utilitarianism is a theory of\nbeneficence, and not of prudence or of selfishness, Mill emphasised\neven more strongly than Bentham has done the distinction between the\negoism which seeks its own things, and the utilitarianism according\nto which everybody counts for one, and nobody for more than one.\nBut when he attempted to connect this doctrine logically with the\npsychological postulates of his school, he committed a double error.\nIn the first place, he confused the purely psychological question\nof the motives that influence human conduct with the ethical\nquestion of the end to which conduct ought to be directed; and, in\nthe second place, he disregarded the difference of end there may\nbe for society as a collective whole, and for each member of the\nsociety individually. \"There is in reality,\" he says,[51] \"nothing\ndesired except happiness;\" and this psychological theory is too\nhastily identified with the ethical principle that happiness alone\nis desirable, or what ought to be desired and pursued. Moreover,\n\"no reason,\" he says, \"can be given why the general happiness is\ndesirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be\nattainable, desires his own happiness.\" And this admission, which\nseems as good as saying that no reason at all can be given why the\nindividual should desire the general happiness, is only held to be\na sufficient reason for it, through assuming that what is good for\nall as an aggregate is good for each member of the aggregate: \"That\neach person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general\nhappiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.\"[52]\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: Imperfect coherence of ethical and theoretical philosophy.]\n\nIt may appear strange to offer the preceding as the logical basis\nof an ethical principle which has had so wide and, on the whole,\nbeneficial an influence as utilitarianism. The explanation is to\nbe found in the want of full coherence which often exists, and\nis nowhere commoner than in English ethics, between an author's\npractical view of life and the foundation of psychology or\nmetaphysics with which it is connected. It would certainly be wrong\nto imagine that Bentham's self-denying labours rested on a confusion\nof standpoints, or that Mill's moral enthusiasm had no other support\nthan a logical quibble. To both of them, and to many others,\nutilitarianism was an ethical creed influencing their lives, which\nwas scarcely connected with the attempt to justify it logically. Such\nreasons in its favour as they adduced were rather after-thoughts for\nthe defence of their creed than the foundations on which it was built.\n\n[Sidenote: 5. Actual transition to utilitarianism.]\n\nThe formula of utilitarianism cannot be expressed as the conclusion\nof a syllogism or of an inductive inference. It seems rather to\nhave been arrived at by the production--or the recognition--of a\nsympathetic or \"altruistic\" sentiment, which was made to yield a\ngeneral principle for the guidance of conduct This process involves\ntwo steps, which are consecutive and complementary, although the\npositions they connect are not necessarily related. The first step is\nto overcome the selfish principle of action in the individual; the\nsecond to generalise it and obtain a principle for the non-selfish\naction that results. Mill seems to be the only recent writer who,\nin making this transition, adheres strictly to the psychological\nhedonism distinctive of his school. He looks to the influence of\neducation in increasing the feeling of unity between one man and his\nneighbours, till individual action becomes merged in altruistic or\nsocial action. \"The social state,\" he says, \"is at once so natural,\nso necessary, and so habitual to man, that, except in some unusual\ncircumstances, or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never\nconceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body.\"[53] This\nis perfectly true, but does not imply a sublation of selfishness. A\nman \"never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body;\"\nbut it does not follow from this that he will subordinate his own\ninterests to the interests of the other members when the two clash.\nIn cases of conflict the individual often tends to sacrifice the\ngood of his neighbours to his own good; and he may do so although he\nfully recognises the social consequences of action, just because he\nstill remains at the ethical standpoint which treats private good\nas superior to public. It is true, as Mill contends, that, \"in an\nimproving state of the human mind, the influences are constantly on\nthe increase, which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of\nunity with all the rest; which feeling, if perfect, would make him\nnever think of, or desire, any beneficial condition for himself, in\nthe benefits of which they are not included.\"[54] But this is not\nsufficient to connect the two antagonistic poles of Mill's system.\nIt starts with assuming the notion of an \"improving state\" of the\nhuman mind, as determined according to an ethical standard not yet\narrived at; and it gives no valid account of the means by which\nthe improvement is to be brought about. It is prophetic of a time\nwhen the motives of human nature will have been so modified that\nthe antagonism between self and others will be no longer felt; but\nit offers no practical solution of the antinomy suited to present\ncircumstances.\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) recognition of Sympathy]\n\n[Sidenote: as disinterested, by Bain,]\n\nThe basis of the ethical sentiment by which the desires and actions\nof a man are to be brought into harmony with those of his fellows\nis investigated in a more thorough manner by Professor Bain and by\nGeorge Grote. But both of these writers stand on a somewhat different\nplatform from the strict psychological hedonism which Mill never\nrelinquished. Thus Grote enumerates as \"elementary tendencies of\nthe mind,\" which ethical sentiment presupposes, and out of which it\nis compounded, self-regarding tendencies, sympathetic tendencies,\nbenevolent affections, malevolent affections, and (though in a\nsmaller degree) love and hatred of those who cause pleasure and\npain to others;[55] and this without interpreting sympathy, in the\nway that Mill does, as having for its end the pleasures which come\nwith the gratification of the sympathetic impulse, or the removal of\nthe pain caused by its restraint. As Professor Bain argues, this\nposition of Mill's \"is tenable only on the ground that the _omission_\nof a disinterested act that we are inclined to, would give us so much\n_pain_ that it is on the whole for our comfort that we should make\nthe requisite sacrifice. There is plausibility in this supposition.\"\nBut \"the doctrine breaks down when we try it upon extreme cases....\nAll that people usually suffer from stifling a generous impulse\nis too slight and transient to be placed against any important\nsacrifice.\"[56] In recognising sympathy as a \"purely disinterested\"\nimpulse,[57] Mr Bain breaks loose at an important point from the\npsychology of Bentham. He is indeed only kept from a complete break\nwith it by the position he ascribes to sympathy as outside of the\nordinary sphere of voluntary action. Above all things, it would seem\nto be necessary that nothing should conflict with \"our character as\nrational beings, which is to desire everything exactly according to\nits pleasure-value.\"[58] But sympathy obviously \"clashes with the\nregular outgoings of the will in favour of our pleasures;\" so that it\nought to be placed outside voluntary action, and regarded simply as\n\"a remarkable and crowning instance of the Fixed Idea.\"[59]\n\n[Sidenote: without being applied to determine the ethical end,]\n\nIt is owing to its exclusion, as a fixed idea, from the sphere of\nvoluntary conduct, that sympathetic appropriation of the feelings\nof others has little or no place assigned it by Professor Bain,\nwhen he goes on[60] to describe the way in which the moral opinions\nof men have actually originated. They have, he holds, a twofold\nsource--the one arising from the necessity for public security, the\nother being of sentimental origin. The former makes society ordain\nthose acts and services required for its own preservation. The\nlatter leads to the confusion of this necessary element of morality\nwith the sentimental likes and dislikes which may be characteristic\nof different people. These are \"mixed up in one code with the\nimperative duties that hold society together;\" and it is only when\n\"we disentangle this complication, and refer each class of duties to\ntheir proper origin,\" that we can \"obtain a clear insight into the\nfoundations of morality.\"[61] Morality, therefore, is that which is\nimposed by society for its own preservation and security, and which\nis sanctioned by the punishments of society either in its \"public\njudicial acts,\" or \"by the unofficial expressions of disapprobation\nand the exclusion from social good offices.\"[62] Of this external\nlaw the moral sense or conscience is merely a subjective mirror\nor copy. The duty of unselfishness is not connected with the\ndisinterested impulse of sympathy, but is traced to the external\norder of society, which has found it necessary to restrain the\nself-seeking action of individuals--a restraint which has come to be\ntransferred to the consciences of the members of the society.\n\nMr Bain's theory falls back in this way upon external authority, just\nas Bentham's did; and, for the same reasons, they are neither of\nthem able to prescribe the utilitarian principle of conduct. But, in\nhis assertion of the disinterested nature of sympathy, Mr Bain has\nintroduced--though he has not himself utilised--a fruitful principle,\nby means of which a basis of moral sentiment may be found by means of\nwhich it is possible to escape from ethical as well as psychological\negoism.\n\n[Sidenote: and by Grote.]\n\nThis element of sympathy is most fully recognised in the instructive\nanalysis of ethical sentiment by the late George Grote. At the same\ntime, Grote does not, like Adam Smith, for instance, attempt to\nevolve the material characteristics of approbation and disapprobation\nfrom this source. The mere putting of one's self in the place of a\nspectator--or in that of the patient--instead of that of the agent,\nis only a formal change, which will modify our judgments or feelings\nwithout accounting for their actual content. But a uniform formal\nelement in all ethical sentiment is, according to Grote, a man's\n\"constant habit of viewing and judging of circumstances around\nhim,\" both from the point of view of the agent and from that of the\npatient.[63] This twofold position is occupied by every individual.\nHe is an agent, and in that position his own interests and feelings\nare separate from, and often at variance with, those of others. But\nhe is also a patient in respect of the actions of others, and in\nthat position his interests and his feelings are commonly in unison\nwith those of the majority. Hence a man is led constantly to adopt\nideally the point of view which is not actually his own at the time,\nso that \"the idea of the judgment which others will form becomes\nconstantly and indissolubly associated with the idea of action in\nthe mind of every agent.\" In every community, certain actions are\nvisited with the admiration, esteem, and protection of the society;\ncertain other actions with the opposite feelings and results: so that\nthere arises \"an association in my mind of a certain line of conduct\non the part both of myself and of any other individual agent, with\na certain sentiment resulting from such conduct, and excited by it,\nin the minds of the general public around us. It is a sentiment of\n_regulated social reciprocity_ as between the agent and the society\namongst which he lives.\" And this sentiment, when enforced by a\nsanction, constitutes the complete form of ethical sentiment.\n\nAs a complete explanation of the moral sentiments and judgments of\nmen, this theory does not seem to be above criticism. It requires\nnot only an association between every personal action and the\nfeelings--sympathetically imagined by the agent--with which the\naction will be regarded by others, but it also implies that this\nassociation has become so inseparable that the feeling appears as\nan individual or personal one, distinguished by the subject from\nother sentiments which he has on consciously imagining himself in\nthe position of others. But it is referred to here as illustrating\nwhat we find in Mill, and, in a different way, in Professor Bain,\nthat the first real step towards the utilitarian standard is to make\nthe individual pass somehow or other to a standpoint outside his own\nnature. In Mill this is done mainly by the assertion of the social\nnature of man, in Grote by showing how a moral sentiment may be\narrived at by the combined action of sympathy and association.\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) The idea of Equality]\n\n[Sidenote: necessary to regulate sympathy;]\n\nThe further influence required in the transition to utilitarianism\nis the idea of equality. The best expression of utilitarian doctrine\nfollowed soon after the assertion of the equal rights of men which\nsignalised the politics of the end of last century in the French and\nAmerican revolutions. Bentham was permeated by the spirit of this\nmovement, however far he might be from accepting its abstractions\nabout natural rights. In his hands, too, utilitarianism was a\npolitical rather than an ethical doctrine. \"Everybody to count\nfor one and nobody for more than one\" follows naturally from the\nphrase, \"the greatest happiness of the greatest number.\" Without\nthis assertion of the necessity of an equal distribution, there is\nno safeguard against sympathy being restricted and partial in its\noperation. Indeed the feeling of sympathy in itself is naturally\nstrongest towards those with whom one is in most frequent relation,\nor connected by numerous associative ties; and if left to itself,\nit might therefore be expected to give rise to the extended\nselfishness of class or family interest, only relieved by a spasmodic\nhumanitarianism. This tendency is corrected by the dogma of human\nequality, which had been formulated as a juridical maxim in the Roman\n_Jus Gentium_, but afterwards passed into a political creed, and\nfound vent in the literature of the eighteenth century and in the\npublic events which marked its close.\n\n[Sidenote: influence of the idea on Bentham.]\n\nThe change which this notion of human equality--passed through has\nbeen traced by Sir Henry Maine. \"Where the Roman jurisconsult had\nwritten '\u00e6quales sunt,' meaning exactly what he said, the modern\ncivilian wrote 'all men are equal' in the sense of 'all men ought to\nbe equal.' The peculiar Roman idea that natural law coexisted with\ncivil law and gradually absorbed it, had evidently been lost sight\nof, or had become unintelligible, and the words that had at most\nconveyed a theory concerning the origin, composition, and development\nof human institutions, were beginning to express the sense of a great\nstanding wrong suffered by mankind.\"[64] Now Bentham, however far\nhe may have been from trusting to the system of 'natural law,'[65]\nwas certainly not beyond the influence of the idea of human equality\nwhich it carried in its train; and, from his own point of view, he\nlaboured to defend it. In assimilating this idea, utilitarianism has\npreserved one of the best results of the old \"law of nature,\" without\nthe ambiguity with which it had formerly been used,[66] if in a sense\nwhich admits of a somewhat narrow and abstract interpretation.\n\nIt is true that this does not give exactly the result which is\nusually described as utilitarianism. I have spoken of the notion of\nequality as the regulator of sympathy--a canon in accordance with\nwhich the sympathetic impulse is to be guided. Sympathy impels us\nto relieve the pains and increase the pleasures of our fellow-men.\nThe principle of equality dictates that this sympathetic activity is\nto be directed to the happiness of all men equally. Every one whom\nour conduct may be made to affect is to count as a unit, and a unit\nonly. The distribution is not to be according to kinship of blood\nor social ties, though it is so much more in our power to promote\nthe happiness of those closely connected with us, that it may fairly\noccupy a larger share of our thought and energy than the happiness\nof other people does. Utilitarianism carries the application of the\nprinciple of equality still farther, by looking upon self as a unit\nwhose happiness is to be regarded as of exactly equal value with that\nof any one else. With every individual reduced to the same ethical\nworth, happiness is declared to be the end of moral action, and\nequality of distribution the rule for deciding between the claims of\ncompeting individuals.\n\n[Sidenote: 6. The two sides of utilitarian theory not logically\nconnected.]\n\nIt seems to me, therefore, that utilitarianism is a theory compounded\nout of two quite different elements. On the one side the basis of the\ntheory has been laid by Bentham and Mill in a naturalistic psychology\nwhich looks upon pleasure as the only object of desire. To this\nthere is superadded the idea of equality, which is the distinctively\nethical element in the theory. But it is only by confusion that\nthe idea of equality--which Bentham expresses by the proposition\nthat the happiness of one man is to count for no more than the\nhappiness of another--can be supposed to be derived from the same\ntheory of human nature as that which identifies pleasure and desire.\nUtilitarianism only becomes a practicable end for individual conduct\nwhen psychological hedonism has been given up. It is futile to say\nthat one ought to pursue the greatest happiness of the greatest\nnumber, unless it is possible for the individual to act for something\nelse than his own pleasure--that is, for an end which is for him\nnot pleasure at all. In a word, utilitarianism, while maintaining\nthat the only thing worth desiring is pleasure, must at the same\ntime admit that pleasure is not the only object that can be or is\ndesired: otherwise, it can never advance from the egoistic to the\nuniversalistic form.\n\nThis view receives confirmation from the way in which utilitarianism\nis held by the most eminent of living moralists. In the 'Methods\nof Ethics,' the tradition of Bentham is expressly united with the\ndoctrines of Butler and Clarke. Professor Sidgwick agrees with\nBentham, and the long line of moralists from Epicurus downwards,\nin maintaining the doctrine of ethical hedonism, that pleasure is\nthe only thing ultimately desirable; but, with Butler, he rejects\nthe psychological hedonism, according to which pleasure is the only\nobject of desire. So far from these two positions being inconsistent,\nit is only through the second that the first can be held in its\nuniversalistic form. The problem is, however, how to unite them. In\nProfessor Sidgwick's theory, they are connected by the application\nof the ethical maxims of benevolence and equity, which an exhaustive\nexamination of ethical intuitions has left standing as axioms of\nthe practical reason. Though utilitarianism, therefore, is still\nadhered to, it is on an expressly Rational ground, not on the basis\nof Naturalism.\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: 7. Summary of ethical consequences of psychological\nhedonism:]\n\nIn this and the previous chapter, I have looked at human nature from\nthe point of view of psychological hedonism, and have endeavoured to\nshow what ethical principles that theory leads to, or is consistent\nwith. The theory does not deny that there is a great diversity\nof capacities and interests in man. But it holds that, so far as\nconcerns conduct, they admit of being brought under one general\nlaw--that every action is subject to the rule of the \"two sovereign\nmasters, pleasure and pain.\" It is evident, therefore, that if ethics\nis to be connected at all with psychology--if what ought to be\ndone is in any degree what can be done--the end of conduct must be\nhedonistic. The psychological fact cannot indeed be without more ado\nturned into a moral imperative. Yet this much may be admitted, that\nif this interpretation of action leaves room for ethics at all, the\nend prescribed can be nothing else than pleasure, or the avoidance of\npain.\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) no logical connection with utilitarianism;]\n\nThe question, therefore, was how to determine the pleasure which\nis to be sought? And I have tried to show, in the chapter just\nconcluded, that utilitarianism does not admit of being logically\narrived at from this point of view. It may indeed, under certain\ncircumstances,[67] be the guide of political or social enactments;\nbut these can only be made to bear upon the conduct of individuals\nby the sanctions which the State or Society has at its command. The\nindividual can have as his maxim of conduct an end which corresponds\nwith utilitarianism in two events only: when he is so constituted\nas to find his pleasure in the greatest aggregate pleasure of\nmankind, or when the political and social sanctions are so complete\nand searching as to make his individual interest and the collective\ninterest coincide. The former event is unfortunately too rare to be\ntaken into account in establishing a theory; the latter would imply\nan interference with individual liberty so impracticable that it\nis not contemplated even in the most comprehensive of socialistic\nschemes.\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) admits of rational egoism]\n\n[Sidenote: only under impossible conditions.]\n\nHedonism in psychology, therefore, means egoism in ethics. But\neven this theory, as the previous chapter has shown, has its own\ndifficulties to meet. The antagonism of individual and universal has\nnot yet been got rid of. The difficulty is no longer caused by the\nconflict between one man and his neighbours: it is the difference\nbetween the feeling and action of a moment, and the sum of feelings\nand actions which makes up a lifetime. It is true that, if we\nadmit that pleasure is the only thing worth pursuing, and that by\n\"pleasure\" a man means \"his own pleasure,\" there is so far no reason\nfor preferring the pleasure of one moment to that of another, except\nas more certain or of greater amount or degree;[68] but this is to\nstart with ascribing a value to pleasure, and not with the simple\nfact that pleasure is desired. If psychological hedonism is our\nstarting-point--and we give to the theory the interpretation that\nhas the greatest verisimilitude--it is the greatest present pleasure\nthat rules. And, although the man of reflection will no doubt attempt\nto estimate the future pleasure at its true value in comparison\nwith the pleasure actually present, this can never have full effect\nupon his will. It has been shown, indeed, that the realisation of\negoistic hedonism is not merely unattainable from the point of view\nof psychological hedonism, but that it would involve conditions\ninconsistent with the nature of desire.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[31] Professor Bain distinguishes with greater clearness than his\npredecessors, first, legal duty, or that the contravention of which\nis punished by the ministers of the state; secondly, moral duty,\nenforced by the unofficial punishment of social disapprobation; and\nthirdly, the conduct which society leaves to individual choice,\nwithout censuring either its commission or omission. Moral duty is\nfurther distinguished by him from the meritorious, or conduct which\nsociety encourages by approval, without censuring its omission.\n\n[32] Mr Gurney's attempt (Mind, vii. 349 ff.) to rationalise the\nutilitarian \"ought\" depends upon the assumption that the individual\nfeels a desire (not only for his own, but) for other people's\npleasure (p. 352). From the point of view of the psychological\nhedonist, however, this desire is only secondary and derivative,\ndepending upon the fact that it increases the pleasure of the\nsubject. \"Your pleasure,\" the psychological hedonist would say,\n\"is desired by me _qu\u00e2_ my pleasure.\" If, on the other hand, it is\nadmitted that the individual has other ends than his own pleasure,\nthere seems no ground in psychological fact for limiting these ends\nto something aimed at because pleasurable to others. From this point\nof view the first step in the establishment of an ethical theory\nwould be an attempt to find a principle of unity in the various ends\nactually aimed at by individuals, and recognised by them as \"good.\"\nThis is made by Professor Sidgwick, who, while allowing that \"it is\npossible to hold that the objective relations of conscious minds\nwhich we call cognition of Truth, contemplation of Beauty, Freedom of\naction, &c., are good, independently of the pleasures that we derive\nfrom them,\" maintains that \"we can only justify to ourselves the\nimportance that we attach to any of these objects by considering its\nconduciveness, in one way or another, to the happiness of conscious\n(or sentient) beings\" (Methods of Ethics, iii. xiv. 3, 3d ed., p.\n398). But Mr Sidgwick's Utilitarianism depends on a Rational view of\nhuman nature which is beyond the scope of the present discussion. See\nbelow, p. 74.\n\n[33] Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. iii. \u00a7 1; Works, i.\n14.\n\n[34] As Paley put it, with characteristic plainness of statement, \"We\ncan be obliged to nothing, but what we ourselves are to gain or lose\nsomething by.\"--Moral and Political Philosophy, book ii. chap. ii.\n\n[35] Cf. Bain, Emotions, p. 264: \"I consider that the proper\nmeaning or import of these terms [Morality, Duty, Obligation, or\nRight] refers to the class of actions enforced by the sanction of\n_punishment_.\"\n\n[36] Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. xix.\n(xvii.), \u00a7 9 ff; Works, i. 144 ff.\n\n[37] Ibid., \u00a7 20, p. 148.\n\n[38] Fragment on Government, chap. v.; Works, i. 293. Cf. Principles\nof Morals and Legislation, ch. iii. \u00a7 5, p. 14, where the Moral\nSanction is said to proceed from \"such _chance_ persons in the\ncommunity as the person in question may happen in the course of his\nlife to have concerns with.\"\n\n[39] Bentham, Fragment on Government, _loc. cit._\n\n[40] Works, xi. 95; cf. J. Grote, Utilitarian Philosophy, p. 137.\n\n[41] Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. xix. (xvii.), \u00a7 7 ff.\n\n[42] _Loc. cit._, \u00a7 8, p. 144.\n\n[43] \"Ought\" is inappropriate here according to Bentham's principles,\nsince there is no question of punishment inflicted by a political or\nsocial or religious superior.\n\n[44] _Loc. cit._, \u00a7 20, p. 148.\n\n[45] Moral and Political Philosophy, book ii. chap. iii.\n\n[46] This is clearly recognised by Bentham: \"The _actual_ end [as\ndistinguished from the right and proper end] of government is,\"\nhe says, \"in every political community, the greatest happiness of\nthose, whether one or many, by whom the powers of government are\nexercised.\"--Constitutional Code, book i., Introd., \u00a7 2; Works, ix. 5.\n\n[47] The Emotions and the Will, p. 264.\n\n[48] Cf. Bain, The Emotions and the Will, p. 287. Professor Bain says\n(Emotions, p. 276 n.), \"we ought to have a written code of public\nmorality, or of the duties imposed by society, over and above what\nparliament imposes, and this should not be a loosely written moral\ntreatise, but a strict enumeration of what society requires under\npain of punishment by excommunication or otherwise,--the genuine\noffences that are not passed over.\" This would certainly be very\ndesirable, were it not from the nature of the case impracticable.\nPopular judgment as to a man's conduct,--what society imposes,--is\none of the things most difficult to predict: it is under the\ninfluence of most heterogeneous causes, personal, industrial,\nreligious, political, &c. I do not think, for instance, that any one\ncould safely undertake to describe exactly the kind of actions which\nwill infallibly call forth the censure of British public opinion, or\nthat of the smaller and intersecting groups into which society is\ndivided.\n\n[49] Emotions, p. 288.\n\n[50] I have spoken, for simplicity's sake, as if there were two kinds\nof pleasure easily distinguishable. But the question is really much\nmore complicated.\n\n[51] Utilitarianism, p. 57.\n\n[52] Ibid., p. 53.\n\n[53] Utilitarianism, p. 46. But no statement of the sociality of man\ncould be more explicit or satisfactory than that of Butler, Sermons,\ni.\n\n[54] Utilitarianism, p. 48.\n\n[55] Fragments on Ethical Subjects (1876), p. 6.\n\n[56] The Emotions and the Will, 3d ed., p. 295.\n\n[57] Ibid., p. 111; cf. Mind, viii. 55: \"The important exceptions to\nthe law of Pleasure and Pain are (1) Fixed Ideas, (2) Habits, and (3)\nDisinterested action for others.\"\n\n[58] Emotions, p. 438.\n\n[59] Emotions, p. 121.\n\n[60] Ibid., p. 271 ff.\n\n[61] Ibid., p. 273.\n\n[62] Ibid., p. 264.\n\n[63] Fragments on Ethical Subjects, p. 8 f.\n\n[64] Ancient Law, 8th ed., p. 93.\n\n[65] Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. ii. \u00a7 14 n.\n\n[66] The ambiguity of the phrase is explained in an interesting\nway in Sir H. Maine's account of the change from its juridical to\na political or ethical meaning. In some writers it seems to have a\nthird and still different signification. We must thus distinguish\n(1) the juridical meaning, originating in the Roman \"law common to\nall nations,\" which had arisen through the \"constant _levelling_ or\nremoval of irregularities which went on wherever the pr\u00e6torian system\nwas applied to the cases of foreign litigants,\" modified subsequently\nby the Greek conception of \u1f30\u03c3\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 (~isot\u00eas~). (2) The political\nmeaning, that all men ought to be equal, arose from the preceding.\nBut its notion of \"ought\" seems often to depend on an idea of the\nconstitution of nature according to which all men are actually born\nequal--not only in rights, soon to be obscured by human convention,\nbut also in power or faculty, afterwards unequally developed by\neducation. Hence (3) the natural meaning. The doctrines of evolution\nand heredity have made this view seem as strange to us now as it\nwould have done to the Romans from whom it was illegitimately\nderived. Yet at one time it seems to have been assumed, almost\nwithout question, that there is but little difference in the natural\nendowments of different men. This assumption lay at the basis of\nHobbes's political theory--Leviathan, I. xiii. p. 60,--was stated\nin a more guarded form by Locke--On Education, \u00a7 1; Works, ed. of\n1824, i. 6,--and adopted almost without qualification by Helv\u00e9tius,\nwho, carrying out Locke's metaphor of the soul as, at birth, a\n\"tabula rasa,\" afterwards written over with the pen of experience,\nsays: \"Quintilien, Locke, et moi, disons: L'in\u00e9galit\u00e9 des esprits\nest l'effet d'une cause connue, et cette cause est la diff\u00e9rence de\nl'\u00e9ducation\"--the causes of the existing inequality being afterwards\nstated as twofold: first, the difference of environment, which may be\ncalled chance; and secondly, the difference of strength in the desire\nfor instruction.--De l'homme, II. i., III. i., IV. xxii.; \u0152uvres, ii.\n71, 91, 280. (Quintilian's statement, however, is even more guarded\nthan Locke's. Cf. Opera, ed. Spalding, i. 47.)\n\n[67] That is, when (1) the legislature accurately expresses\nthe average feeling of all the members of the State; or (2)\nthe legislators happen to be fully intelligent people in whom\n\"selfishness\" has taken the shape of benevolence.\n\n[68] Although, as is well known, propinquity was held by Bentham to\nbe an independent ground of distinction and preference.--Principles\nof Morals and Legislation, chap. iv, sect. 2.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nMORAL SENTIMENT.\n\n\n[Sidenote: 1. A uniform theory such as psychological hedonism]\n\nPsychological hedonism possesses the merit of offering a simple and\nuniform theory of mental action. It may admit conflicting accounts of\nthe kinds of action and sufferance which actually give men pleasure\nand pain,--a point on which, for example, Hobbes and J. S. Mill\ndiffer widely. But it has one general formula for the relation of\nfeeling to action, which has been precise and clear enough to attract\nmany psychologists. The ethical consequences of the theory have,\nindeed, turned out--if the argument of the preceding chapters is\nvalid--to be neither so obvious nor so satisfactory as its adherents\nhave commonly supposed. But it must nevertheless be admitted that, if\npsychology shows pleasure to be, as a matter of fact, the constant\nend of action, it will be useless--even if it is not impossible--for\nethics to prescribe any other end.\n\n[Sidenote: not supplied by the opponents of ethical hedonism,]\n\nThe opponents of ethical hedonism have thus uniformly insisted that\nthe theory which makes pleasure the end and motive of all conscious\nactivity is imperfect; and this psychological question has been the\nbattle-field of many of the controversies, at any rate, of English\nethics. Psychological hedonism has not, however, been confronted by\nthe English moralists with an opposed theory of equal simplicity,\nnor can the controversy be said to have led to a thorough analysis\nof action. The psychological investigation has, in most cases,\nbeen carried no farther than the ethical interests at stake seemed\nto require; and the predominance of these interests has perhaps\nprevented the inquiry from being carried out with complete freedom\nfrom preconception on either side.\n\nA uniform theory under which our various particular desires might\nbe brought may, indeed, be said to have been suggested by Butler.\nHe meets the hedonistic proposition that all desire is for personal\npleasure, by the doctrine that no particular desire has pleasure as\nits end, since all pleasure presupposes a previous desire in the\nsatisfaction of which it consists.[69] This theory, which may have\nbeen derived from Plato,[70] and was afterwards used by Schopenhauer\nto prove the negative nature of pleasure and consequent worthlessness\nof life, is, however, a generalisation which cannot be made to\ninclude the whole facts to be taken account of.[71] Many pleasures\noccur independently of any precedent desire. And what Butler had\nto show--and was really concerned to show--was that desire was not\nexclusively directed to objects thus independently found to be\npleasurable: the contradictory, that is to say, and not the contrary,\nof psychological hedonism.\n\n[Sidenote: in maintaining the reality of non-hedonistic activity.]\n\nFor this purpose Butler pointed to the whole class of affections\nwhich, although they may also tend to private interest, have an\nimmediate reference to the good of others; and, in addition to\nthese, he contended for an original principle of benevolence towards\nothers in human nature, as well as of self-love or care for one's\nown interests and happiness. This latter, he held, so far from being\nthe sole principle of action, implied the existence of a number of\nparticular passions and affections, directed immediately to external\nobjects--the satisfaction of these desires giving pleasure, though\npleasure was not the end they aimed at. Voluntary action is thus not\nbrought under any common rubric; for, at the same time that the calm\nprinciple of self-love is directed to the agent's greatest pleasure,\nthe object of hunger, for example, is said to be not pleasure but\nfood, that of benevolence not personal pleasure but the good of\nothers.\n\n[Sidenote: Non-hedonistic action generalised by Herbart,]\n\n[Sidenote: from the tendency of ideas to self-realisation.]\n\nThe attempt to give unity to the non-hedonistic view of desire has\ncome from a different quarter. Uninfluenced by the exigencies of\nethical controversy, which formed the entire motive of Butler's\ninvestigation, Herbart and his school have worked out a theory of\ndesire, which has many points of comparison with that of Butler.\nHowever much they may differ from the English moralist--of whose\nexistence they are mostly ignorant--they are at one with him in\nrejecting the maxim of psychological hedonism, _nihil appetimus nisi\nsub specie boni_; and their differences from him are largely due\nto their having gone further in their analysis of the facts, and\nendeavoured to bring them under a general principle.\n\nButler's view of the object of desire is distinguished from the\nHerbartian chiefly in two respects. In the first place, he identifies\nthat object with the external or real thing, whereas Herbart is\ncareful to point out that it is a presentation or idea. In the\nsecond place, while Butler is content to postulate an original\ntendency of our nature towards certain objects, Herbart attempts\nto get behind this tendency, and explain the phenomena of striving\nfrom the interaction of presentations. Over and above the ordinary\nhypothesis of natural realism, Butler's theory implies a sort of\npre-established harmony between our active tendencies and things\noutside the mind, in virtue of which some of these things do, and\nsome do not, attract our desires. Herbart, on the other hand,\nattempts nothing less than a complete genetic account of mental\nphenomena, explaining the facts of presentation, desire, and feeling\nthrough \"the persistence of presentation in consciousness and their\nrise into clearer consciousness.\"[72] The phenomena of desire and\nfeeling are both accounted for by this mechanism of impelling and\ninhibiting forces.[73]\n\n[Sidenote: This tendency recognised in the doctrine of fixed ideas]\n\nIt would be beyond the scope of this Essay to examine the above view\nof the active side of mental phenomena. For present purposes it is\nenough to draw attention to the fact that the common deduction of\nthe phenomena of desire and will from the feelings of pleasure and\npain is not the only \"scientific\" theory of human action, and that\nit is rejected on its merits by writers who have no hankering after\nwhat the psychological hedonist would call the mystical element of\nfree-will. It is of interest to note, too, that Professor Bain,\nin whose works the traditions of psychological hedonism find\ntheir most careful expression, has modified the doctrine so as\nto allow of desire of pleasure and avoidance of pain explaining\nless than had been formerly required of them. Outside the circle\nof hedonistically-determined motives, he recognises the influence\nof the presentation or idea as a self-realising element in the\nindividual consciousness, apart from its pleasurable or painful\ncharacteristics.[74] Those \"fixed ideas,\" as Mr Bain calls them,\ntend both to persist in the mind, and to project themselves into\naction, independently of pleasure and pain--or at least with a force\nwhich is out of proportion to the pleasure they bring. As has been\nalready seen, it is by means of this doctrine that he explains \"the\ngreat fact of our nature denominated sympathy, fellow-feeling, pity,\ncompassion, disinterestedness.\"[75] To the same category belongs\n\"much of the ambition and the aspirations of human beings.... A\ncertain notion--say of power, wealth, grandeur--has fixed itself in\nour mind and keeps a persistent hold there.\" It is asserted, indeed,\nthat the action of such fixed ideas \"perverts the regular operation\nof the will which would lead us to renounce whatever is hopeless or\nnot worth the cost.\" And, certainly, their admission among mental\nphenomena seems to imply the superposition of a new theory of action\nupon the old theory of psychological hedonism. There is no disguising\nthe importance of the modification thus introduced. The name \"fixed\nidea\" is misleading if it be taken to imply that persistency and\ntendency to action are properties belonging to a certain class of\nideas only. Mr Bain's doctrine is founded on the hypothesis of the\nidentity of the nervous centres which function in representation\nand in sensation, and is therefore valid of all representations\nor ideas. The characteristics of persistency, and of tendency to\naction, are therefore normal characteristics of presentations,\nthough they may belong in an unusual degree to some ideas from\nthe relation these hold to the dominant cluster of ideas in the\nindividual consciousness. And if we thus attribute to all ideas\nwithout exception the tendency to self-realisation, and recognise--as\nwe must--the relation of mutual assistance or inhibition which ideas\nbear to one another in virtue of their being \"presented\" to the same\nsubject, we have granted the material out of which, in Herbart's\nskilful \"Mechanik des Geistes,\" the phenomena of feeling and desire\nare woven.\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: 2. The non-hedonistic theory of action.]\n\nThe view of individual human nature, which holds that all its desires\nare not directed to personal pleasure, thus claims consideration.\nWith its less restricted theory of action, this doctrine may\nseem to offer a larger means of determining the appropriate end\nof human conduct. In particular, the suggestion naturally occurs\nthat the ethical end will, on this theory, be something else than\npleasure.[76] But there is, nevertheless, no contradiction in\nholding--as Mr Sidgwick does--that although other objects than\npleasure are actually desired, there is nothing else which can be\nheld to be ultimately desirable, or the tendency to which can be said\nto have moral worth.\n\n[Sidenote: Difficulty of unifying the various impulses it implies,]\n\nThe ethical barrenness of psychological hedonism has been seen to\nresult from its narrow and inflexible view of human nature. But\ntheories such as those now to be considered have, in an ethical\nregard, to overcome a difficulty of another kind in the variety of\nimpulses which they admit upon the stage. The \"objects\" to which\nthese impulses or desires relate have as yet received no further\ncharacterisation than that they are objects of desire. And the\ndifficulty of finding a principle by which some order of precedence\nor value amongst them may be determined is just, in other words, the\ndifficulty of obtaining a moral standard.\n\n[Sidenote: so as to determine a standard for action.]\n\nThe question does not ordinarily arise in the above form, because\nthe moral standard is commonly taken for granted, and the various\nimpulses, affections, and dispositions are made to derive their\nethical rank from their relation to that standard. But this method is\nobviously inappropriate when the standard is still to be ascertained,\nits determination being the object of inquiry. And it may seem that\nthe constitution of man contains in itself a means of distinguishing\nthe moral value of its various elements, or of the actions to which\nthey lead, and thus furnishing a moral standard or end for conduct.\nThis purpose seems to have been to some extent, though not quite\nclearly, kept in view by the writers who, in last century, contended\nagainst the selfish theory which had been so crudely enunciated by\nHobbes. They attempted to show that selfishness was not the only, nor\neven the most prominent, principle of action; and, from the system of\ndiverse principles which they found implanted in human nature, they\nendeavoured to work out a theory of conduct.\n\n[Sidenote: This attempted by the English moralists,]\n\n[Sidenote: but along with a utilitarian criterion,]\n\n[Sidenote: and with egoistic arguments.]\n\nEspecially amongst the later English moralists--Adam Smith, for\ninstance--the question of the end or standard came almost to drop\nout of sight in the midst of the controversy regarding the nature\nof the \"moral sense\" or \"moral faculty\"--the way, that is, in which\nwe become aware of the difference between right and wrong. But in\nShaftesbury, Butler, and Hutcheson--the writers who formulated this\ndoctrine of the moral sense--the attempt is made to connect a theory\nof the criterion of morality with the source of our knowledge of it.\nShaftesbury and Hutcheson both looked upon social welfare or the\ngeneral happiness as the end of moral conduct, and the criterion in\naccordance with which moral character is ascribed to actions; at the\nsame time that their main contention was for the immediateness of the\n\"sense\" by which we perceive these moral qualities. And they sought\nto establish the connection of the two doctrines by means of the\nbenevolent feelings--which they held to be original and independent\nof private interest--and their immediate approval by the reflex or\nmoral sense of the individual man. Similar ideas appear in Butler, at\nthe same time that he tended to make conscience or the moral sense\nthe standard of morality, as well as the source of our knowledge of\nit. They, as well as he, however, found it necessary to come back\nfrom the social or political to the individual point of view. Even\nif their conception of \"the good\" was not evolved from the nature\nof the individual man, their philosophical standpoint required them\nto leave broader ground, and show it to be the individual's natural\ngoal. And in doing this, their constant tendency is to revert to\negoistic arguments--demonstrating the complete harmony of virtue and\ninterest, or attempting to prove to the individual that his own\nhappiness consists in the exercise of the social affections. Thus\nShaftesbury tries to show, by an empirical collection of results,\nthat to have the \"natural\" (or social) affections too weak, or the\nprivate affections too strong, is a source of misery,[77] as well as\nthe chief source of vice; and that, largely owing to the pleasure of\nvirtuous action, it is \"to the private interest and good of every\none to work to the general good.\"[78] Hutcheson, again, devotes a\nlarge portion of his most mature work to allay the suspicion \"that in\nfollowing the impulse of our kind affections and the moral faculty\nwe are counteracting our interests, and abandoning what may be of\nmore consequence to our happiness than either this self-approbation\nor the applauses of others;\"[79] while Butler, referring to virtuous\nconduct, says, in a well-known passage, that \"when we sit down in\na cool hour we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other\npursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or\nat least not contrary to it.\"[80] Opposed as the whole school were to\nthe selfish theory of human action, they never spoke of any sacrifice\nof private happiness as a thing to be looked for, or in any way taken\ninto account, in conduct which is the result of calm deliberation.\nIt is difficult, therefore, to avoid the judgment passed upon them\nby Schleiermacher, that \"the English school of Shaftesbury, with all\ntheir talk about virtue, are really given up to pleasure.\"[81]\n\n[Sidenote: 3. Ethics may be made to depend on the moral sense.]\n\nAt the same time, their writings constantly suggest a theory of\nmorals which is neither obliged to adopt off-hand a utilitarian\ncriterion of virtue, nor forced to fall back upon the egoistic\nsanctions of personal pleasure and pain. Their psychological theory\npoints to an ethical doctrine in which pleasure is neither the sole\nend of action, nor its sole motive. They do not, indeed, make quite\nclear the transition from the psychological to the ethical point\nof view; and critics are still fond of confronting Butler with the\nobjection he anticipated--Why ought I to obey my conscience? The\napparent _petitio principii_ of Butler's answer, Because it is the\nlaw of your nature, is due to the way in which the teleological\nstandpoint is introduced. The purpose of which (according to Butler)\nman is the vehicle or realising organism is spoken of as a law\nexternally imposed, and deriving its authority, not from its own\nnature, but from the nature of its origin.\n\n[Sidenote: Different views of the nature of the moral sense.]\n\nThere would seem to be one way only to surmount the difficulty\narising from the variety of impulses of which the nature of man is\nmade up, and that is by consistently following out the teleological\npoint of view. But what, the question is, is the final or\ncomprehensive end to which human nature points amidst this diversity\nof objects of striving? The doctrine of the \"moral sense\" attempts\nto answer the question. Now this moral sense may either be regarded\nas not itself a separate faculty, but simply an expression for the\nharmony of human tendencies; or it may be looked upon as a separate\nand superior capacity, which, again, may either be interpreted in\nterms of sense, or of the understanding--the former interpretation\nleading to its identification with pleasure, the latter to its being\nconceived as law.\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) The harmony of impulses. Shaftesbury's theory.]\n\nThese different methods were attempted by the English moralists--the\nfirst, however, to a less extent than the others. But it inspired\nmuch of Shaftesbury's work, though it cannot be said to have been\nconsistently developed by him. The conflict of impulses in man\nwas too obvious a fact not to be apparent even in Shaftesbury's\nroseate view of life. He recognised, indeed, not only private\nor self-affections, promoting the good of the individual, and\n\"natural\" or social affections, which led to the public good, but\nalso \"unnatural affections,\" which tended to no good whatever.[82]\nThe reference to consequences is thus made prominent at once.\nThe last class of affections is condemned outright because of\nits infelicific results; while an attempt is made to prove from\nexperience that the courses of conduct to which the two former lead\ncoincide. Shaftesbury contended for a real organic union between the\nindividual and society; but, when he came to establish its nature,\nhe made it consist in an asserted harmony of interests, while the\nobligation to virtue was allowed to rest on its conduciveness to\npersonal pleasure. He sometimes spoke of virtue as identical with the\nharmonious development of the affections of the individual man;[83]\nbut he expressly defined it as consisting in the individual \"having\nall his inclinations and affections ... agreeing with the good of\nhis kind or of that system in which he is included, and of which he\nconstitutes a part.\"[84] And the two views can only be connected by\nproving that the harmonious development of an individual's affections\nwill lead to the good of the species: the proof of this depending\non a one-sided summation of consequences. Shaftesbury does, indeed,\nthrow out the idea that both the self-affections and the \"natural\" or\nsocial affections become self-destructive when carried out so as to\ninterfere with one another. But this, again, has only the previous\ncalculus of the results of conduct to support it. He cannot show\nthat the contradiction in the conception of a completely solitary\nbeing belongs also to the conception of a judiciously selfish\nbeing. The latter being loses the pleasures of virtuous action;\nbut perhaps he may gain greater pleasures in their room. He does\nnot develop his whole nature; but if that nature contains totally\ninfelicific passions, the development of the whole nature is not to\nbe recommended.\n\nThus Shaftesbury is unable to reach a conception of man's nature\nas a harmony of impulses just on account of the external point of\nview which makes him treat it as an aggregate, though he contends\nthat it is an organism. His ingenious and subtle account of the\nrelations between the individual and society does not really go to\nthe root of the matter, because, after all, it remains a calculus\nof the results of action, not an analysis of its nature. And his\nview of the affections constituting the individual system leaves\nthem wanting in the unity of organic connection. An effort is made,\nhowever, to supply this defect by means of the reflex affections\ncalled the \"moral sense,\" to which he ascribes an oversight over the\nother affections and their resultant actions. In what way, then, must\nwe regard the nature of this faculty and the important functions\nassigned to it?\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) A separate faculty. Hutcheson.]\n\n[Sidenote: Two questions regarding it:]\n\nIt was left to Shaftesbury's disciple, Francis Hutcheson, to\nelaborate with thoroughness this conception of the moral sense as\na separate faculty. Hutcheson did not make any important addition\nto the ideas of Shaftesbury and Butler. But he worked them out\nmore systematically; and in his last work, the 'System of Moral\nPhilosophy,' the protest against the egoism of Hobbes has found\nexpression in a complete theory of human nature, in which the\n\"moral sense\" is supreme, and the ends of conduct independent of\nself-interest. Hutcheson, too, keeps more closely than either of his\nimmediate predecessors to the way of looking at human nature which\nis spoken of in this volume as \"naturalistic.\" He rejects even more\ndecidedly than Shaftesbury--much more so than Butler--any creative\nfunction of reason in determining the constitution and direction of\nthe moral sense.[85] The questions thus arise--(_a_) What is the\nmoral sense when not regarded as a rational determination of the\nends of conduct? and (_b_) To what determination of ends or other\ndistinction between right and wrong in action does it lead? On both\nthese points there is a difference between his early 'Inquiry into\nthe Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue' (1725), and the more\nmature 'System,' published in 1755, eight years after his death.\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b1) Nature of this faculty: not reason;]\n\n[Sidenote: at first defined as feeling of pleasure or pain,]\n\nHutcheson is in earnest with the rejection of reason as a creative\nforce. The moral sense is not, he says, a source of new ideas.\nIts objects are received in the ordinary ways by which, through\n\"sensation and reflection,\" we come by our knowledge.[86] But just\nas we have a sense of beauty in the forms of sensible objects, so\nthere is a moral sense given us from which, in the contemplation\nof our actions, we derive \"still nobler pleasures\" than those of\nphysical sensation. This moral sense is \"a determination of our minds\nto receive amiable or disagreeable ideas of actions.\"[87] So far,\ntherefore, it seems to be simply a pleasure in the contemplation of\ncertain actions which, we say, have \"an immediate goodness.\" \"By\na superior sense,\" says Hutcheson, \"which I call a moral one, we\nperceive pleasure in the contemplation of such actions in others,\nand are determined to love the agent (and much more do we perceive\npleasure in being conscious of having done such actions ourselves)\nwithout any view of further natural advantage from them.\"[88] The\nsignificance of this position is easily seen. It is not only meant\nto give a criterion of moral action; it is also a short cut to the\nconclusion that virtue is for our private interest. The disquieting\nsuspicion that morality may involve a sacrifice of individual\nhappiness \"must be entirely removed, if we have a moral sense and\npublic affections, whose gratifications are constituted by nature\nour most intense and durable pleasures.\"[89] The elaborate analysis\nof conduct and enumeration of the pleasures which various affections\nand actions bring in their train, which Hutcheson gave in his latest\nwork, were thus unnecessary as long as the position was maintained\nthat the moral sense is emphatically a pleasure or pain, and that the\npleasures it gives are the most intense and durable we have.\n\nThere was only an apparent contradiction in this theory which\nplaced the test of morality in a pleasure consequent upon moral\naction, and yet held that such actions were not performed from\ninterested motives. In the spirit of Butler's psychology, Hutcheson\ncontends[90] that virtue is pleasant only because we have a natural\nand immediate tendency towards virtuous action; our true motive is\n\"some determination of our nature to study the good of others;\" and\nthis, although not always immediately pleasant in itself, is yet\nsucceeded by the calm satisfaction of the moral sense. The real\nweakness of Hutcheson's position is the fatal one that he cannot show\nthat it corresponds with facts; that the pleasures incidental to the\nmoral sense outweigh all others. Indeed, he defends his opinion in\ntheir favour only, in a way which reminds one of Mill's method in the\n'Utilitarianism,' by making every juror stand aside unless he has\npledged himself to morality.[91] It is open to any one, however, to\nhold that the pleasures of benevolent action and the \"relish\" of the\nmoral sense are not of sufficient hedonistic value to make up for\nthe restraints they put upon conduct and the enjoyments they oblige\none to forego. Even if this position be not correct, it is merely a\nmistake in estimating doubtful quantities. The man who chooses the\nsmaller pleasure will be the loser by his mistake; but we cannot say\nthat the selfish man is to blame for not being benevolent, because\nthe pleasures of benevolence and the moral sense are greatest, any\nmore than we could blame the benevolent man for not being selfish,\nif selfishness should turn out on the whole to leave a greater\nhedonistic balance at the individual's credit.\n\n[Sidenote: afterwards spoken of as a judgment,]\n\n[Sidenote: but this judgment allowed to depend on feeling.]\n\nA more objective determination of the moral sense is afterwards given\nby Hutcheson. Without professedly changing ground, he ceases to speak\nof it as a mere feeling of pleasure, and calls it a judgment of\napprobation or disapprobation. \"It is,\" he says,[92] \"a natural and\nimmediate determination to approve certain affections and actions\nconsequent upon them; or a natural sense of immediate excellence\nin them, not referred to any other quality perceivable by our\nother senses or by reasoning.\" Nor is this judgment of approbation\nconsequent upon the feeling of pleasure the affection or action\nproduces in us. The action is not \"judged good because it gains to\nthe agent the pleasure of self-approbation, but it gains to him this\npleasure because it was antecedently good, or had that quality which,\nby the constitution of this sense, we must approve.\"[93] But, in\nattempting to make clear the nature of this judgment, Hutcheson seems\nto return, though not in so many words, to his earlier position.\nTo seek a basis for the judgment in reason would have been to make\nthe \"moral sense\" what Kant afterwards made it, simply practical\nreason. This, however, would have been a \"metaphysic of ethics\"\ninconsistent with Hutcheson's whole position. He had always opposed\nthe narrowly intellectual view of morality in Clarke and Wollaston,\nand he had no conception of the function of reason which would admit\nof an interpretation of the judgment of approbation by an appeal\nto a rational determination, depending upon an idea conceived as\ninherent in the human constitution, and to be realised in action.\nThe judgment, therefore, is referred to a \"taste or relish\"[94]\nfor certain affections and actions, and this he takes no pains to\ndistinguish from pleasure.\n\nThe analogy he seeks to draw between the moral sense and our other\npowers does not really favour a distinction of it from pleasure. \"To\neach of our powers,\" he says, \"we seem to have a corresponding taste\nor sense, recommending the proper use of it to the agent, and making\nhim relish or value the like exercise of it by another. This we see\nas to the powers of voice, of imitation, designing, or machinery,\nmotion, reasoning; there is a sense discerning or recommending the\nproper exercise of them.\"[95] That is to say, besides the sense of\nhearing, which has to do with sounds, there must needs be another\nsense which has to do with our way of hearing sounds; besides the\nsense of sight, which has to do with form and colour, there must\nneeds be another sense which has to do with our way of perceiving\nform and colour; and so with every other activity, especially those\nwhich proceed from our \"highest powers.\" A doctrine such as this sets\nno limits to the manufacture of additional senses. The whole view of\nhuman nature upon which it proceeds is one of meaningless complexity,\nwhich serves the one good purpose only of showing how much ethics has\nsuffered from a defective psychology.\n\nThe mental objects or presentations which are distinguished from\none another by the difference of their characteristic qualities,\nand which we therefore call colours, or sounds, or movements, are\naccompanied by varying degrees of pleasurable or painful feeling;\nand it is possible to hold that the moral sense is a name for such\nfeelings following in the train of those complexes of presentations\nto which we give the name of actions, or of those other recurring\ncomplexes we call affections. This, practically, was the position\nwith which Hutcheson started in the 'Inquiry.' Benevolence pleased us\nand selfishness pained us; just as the taste of sugar was pleasant,\nand that of wormwood disagreeable. Perhaps Hutcheson departed from\nthis theory, because he saw that if conduct was made a matter of\ntaste, there would be no sufficient reason for condemning selfishness\nany more than an unusual taste. He therefore relinquished, or seems\nto have relinquished, the view of the moral sense as a feeling of\npleasure or pain; and under the influence, no doubt, of Butler,\nspoke of it as a judgment of approbation or disapprobation. But he\nfell back on his original theory by making this judgment depend on\n\"a taste or relish,\" which only lends itself to interpretation as a\npeculiar feeling of pleasure.\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b2) The objects of the moral sense: first said to be\nactions;]\n\n[Sidenote: afterwards to be affections;]\n\nThe reflex nature of the moral sense is brought out more distinctly\nin the 'System' than in the 'Inquiry.' In his earlier work, Hutcheson\nhad spoken of it as directly related to _actions_. But it was more\nconsistent with his maturer thought to regard it as having to do\nwith mental powers or \"affections\" in the first instance, and with\nactions only indirectly or mediately. \"The object of this sense,\"\nhe says,[96] \"is not any external motion or action, but the inward\naffections or dispositions;\" and this is made by him to account for\nthe discrepancy which the deliverances of the moral sense show in\nregard to actions. It \"seems ever to approve and condemn uniformly\nthe same immediate objects, the same affections and dispositions;\nthough we reason very differently about the actions which evidence\ncertain dispositions or their contraries.\" This distinction is\napplied with unlimited confidence in its efficacy. By means of it\nhe would explain the most fundamental differences in the moral code\nof men and nations. Thus people unacquainted with the industrial\nimprovements which give the character of permanence to property,\nmay \"see no harm in depriving men of their artificial acquisitions\nand stores beyond their present use,\"--that is to say, \"no evil may\nappear in theft.\"[97]\n\nBut it is more important in another respect; for it enables the\nauthor to avoid the difficulty of finding any principle according\nto which the moral sense may be related to the empirical content of\naction. As long as the moral sense was simply spoken of as a feeling\nof pleasure, it could be conveniently regarded as the consequent\nof external actions. But if it is an internal sense distinct from\npleasure, it is easier to relate it to what he calls our internal\npowers or affections than to action. The moral sense, then, is to\nbe the regulator of all our powers; and by means of it Hutcheson\nattempts to reduce human nature to a scale of morality.\n\n[Sidenote: but its grounds of preference]\n\n[Sidenote: mainly depend not on the nature of the affection, but on\nits objects.]\n\nIt is to be noted that, in the classification he offers,[98]\nwhat are commonly called the virtues of candour, veracity, &c.,\nare not accounted virtues at all, but only immediately connected\nwith virtuous affections: these are identified with the \"kind\" or\nbenevolent affections, directed to the happiness of sentient beings.\nWithin the latter there are two grounds of preference: the deliberate\naffections are preferred to the passionate; those which are more\nextensive in the range of their objects to the less extensive.\nWith regard to the former ground of preference, the \"moral sense\"\nof the community has perhaps undergone some modification since\nHutcheson's time, and looks upon enthusiasm with less suspicion than\nit formerly did. The other ground of preference ascribed to the\nmoral sense refers not so much to the affection itself--which is\nthe direct or immediate object of the moral sense--as to the way in\nwhich the affection is applied, the number of the objects to which\nit is directed. The affection of benevolence is the same in nature\nwhether its object be wide or restricted; though difference in this\nrespect profoundly influences the actions to which it leads. The\nobject approved or most approved by the moral sense is therefore,\naccording to Hutcheson, utilitarian conduct, or rather, as he would\nsay, the calm disposition leading thereto.[99] In this way he obtains\na principle for determining the morality of actions; but only through\nthe arbitrary assertion that this principle is immediately approved\nby the moral sense. The connection of the moral sense with an object\nsuch as universal benevolence could only be made out by showing\na rational, or at any rate an organic union between individual\nsentiment and social wellbeing; and Hutcheson, like Shaftesbury,\nhas no conception of attempting this in any other way than the\ntraditional one of exhibiting the personal advantages of benevolent\nconduct, and the disadvantages that accompany selfishness.\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: (_c_) Third view of the moral sense.]\n\n[Sidenote: Butler.]\n\n[Sidenote: Conscience an authoritative law,]\n\nBoth Shaftesbury and Hutcheson were often led astray by a tendency\nto interpret facts as they wished them to be, rather than as they\nwere. Their view of the consequences of action was coloured by their\noptimism. Butler, too, in spite of the difference in his general\nattitude to the value of human life, was not altogether free from\na similar error. He thinks that Shaftesbury \"has shown beyond all\ncontradiction that virtue is naturally the interest of happiness,\nand vice the misery of such a creature as man.\"[100] But, in view of\nparticular exceptions, or of any one not being convinced of \"this\nhappy tendency of virtue,\" he thinks it necessary to emphasise the\n\"natural authority of the principle of reflection.\" Conscience is,\nhe holds, a part of our inward nature; but it differs from the other\nparts of our nature inasmuch as it is not related immediately to an\nexternal object, but to the actions dealing with such objects, and\nto the dispositions leading to those actions. It is a principle of\n\"reflex approbation or disapprobation,\" which is said to have equal\nrespect to both public and private good. This tendency, however,\nwould seem to be ascertained empirically. The deliverances of\nconscience are immediate judgments as to the morality of actions and\naffections (for Butler speaks of it as referring to both equally);\nand its reference to the ends which those actions or the exercise of\nthese affections may ultimately tend to would, therefore, seem to be\nindirect.[101] Butler was careful, moreover, not to speak of it as\nan \u00e6sthetic or sensitive faculty, but as a judgment. It is not a\nfeeling of pleasure, but the revelation of law.\n\n[Sidenote: and the criterion of morality.]\n\nThe approval of conscience is thus made the criterion of morality.\nBut a difficulty arises as to the way in which we are to regard the\nauthority which conscience is said to carry along with it. Butler's\nutterances here commonly imply a teleological reference to an end\nimplanted in human nature, and to be discovered by observing that\nnature--the realisation of the end being obligatory, because it is\nshown to be the purpose which the author of nature had in view in\nmaking man as he is.[102] The authority of conscience thus seems to\nbe derived from the divine purpose which it displays. It carries\nwithin itself a claim to obedience; but the justification of this\nclaim depends on a theological basis. And hence the question of\nthe nature and origin of conscience is at once raised, in order to\ndetermine the legitimacy of its claim to be, rather than any other\npart of our constitution, a divinely-implanted guide.\n\n[Sidenote: Teleological and jural views not reconciled, nor fully\ndeveloped.]\n\nBut more than one current of thought runs through Butler's ethical\ntreatise. The theological reference is sometimes so used as to\nmake the obligation to morality, and even the nature of morality,\ndepend on the will of God: though hardly according to Paley's crude\nmethod of seeking in the external revelation of the divine command\na means of uniting the divergent interests of the individual and\nof society. In general, Butler's ruling idea is the idea of the\nsystem or unity of human nature, for which he was largely indebted\nto Shaftesbury's revival of the Platonic conception. Conscience is\nregarded by him as the expression of this unity. But its nature is\nnever more deeply probed. Its deliverances are justified now by\nits supernatural mission, and now by the more prosaic fact that it\nleads to our individual interest[103]--at any rate, \"if we take in\nthe future\"--while it could not be recommended as a guide if it\ndid not.[104] On one side, therefore, Butler tends to a form of\ntheological utilitarianism, such as was common in his own day, and\nwas afterwards formulated by Paley.[105] On the other hand, his\nethics more naturally allies itself with a different theory, in which\nthe moral law is conceived as having its source in practical reason,\nand the naturalistic basis of ethics is definitely abandoned.\n\n[Sidenote: 4. The ethics of moral sentiment a mediating theory;]\n\n[Sidenote: explanation of its facts attempted by theory of evolution.]\n\nOn the whole, it would appear that the psychological ethics worked\nout by Shaftesbury and his school occupies an insecure position\nbetween the view discussed in the two preceding chapters and that\nwhich ascribes to reason a function in the formation of objects of\ndesire. Shaftesbury and his followers tried to strike out a middle\ncourse between the theory that ends of action may be determined by\nreason, and that which looks upon all desires as being desires for\nobjects as pleasurable. They made the attempt to found a system of\nethics on human nature, and they held that that nature could not be\naccounted for by the simple psychological analysis of the Epicurean\nschool as then represented by Hobbes. On the other hand, they did\nnot see their way to adopt the \"rational\" ethics only known to them\nin the abstract form it had received at the hands of Clarke and\nWollaston. But their own theory of human nature requires a principle\nof harmony and co-ordination among the various impulses which they\nwere unable to give a satisfactory account of. It may seem, however,\nthat the idea of the development of man with which we are now\nfamiliar, may enable us to overcome the difficulties which formerly\nappeared insurmountable--showing the unity of human nature, and the\ntendency of its activity. The general course of evolution, to which\nall life has been subject, is thought to have brought about a harmony\nbetween individual and social feelings, as well as between individual\nand social interests, and thus to have removed the obstacles in\nthe way of founding morality on the basis of Naturalism. It is,\ntherefore, of importance to examine with care the ethical bearings of\nthe theory of evolution.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[69] \"The very idea of an interested pursuit necessarily presupposes\nparticular passions or appetites; since the very idea of interest or\nhappiness consists in this, that an appetite or affection enjoys its\nobject.\"--Sermons, Pref.; cf. Serm. xi.\n\n[70] Phil., 31 ff.; cf. Gorg., 495 f.; Rep., ix. 585.\n\n[71] Cf. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, I. iv. 2, 3d ed., p. 44.\n\n[72] Herbart, Psychologie als Wissenschaft, \u00a7 104, Werke, vi. 74;\ncf. Waitz, Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft, \u00a7 40, p.\n418: \"It is not difficult to recognise the basis of desire in the\npresentations brought forward by reproduction, and, at the same time,\nheld back by an inhibition.\"\n\n[73] With Herbart's doctrine may be compared Mr H. Spencer's view\nof the genesis of feeling and voluntary action, Principles of\nPsychology, 2d ed., part iv. chaps. viii. and ix.\n\n[74] Cf. note to James Mill's Analysis, ii. 383 f.\n\n[75] The Senses and the Intellect, 3d ed., p. 344; cf. Mental and\nMoral Science, pp. 90, 91.\n\n[76] \"If there be any principles or affections in the mind of man\ndistinct from self-love, that the things those principles tend\ntowards, or the objects of those affections are, each of them in\nthemselves eligible to be pursued upon its own account, and to be\nrested in as an end, is implied in the very idea of such principle or\naffection.\"--Butler, Sermons, Pref.\n\n[77] Inquiry concerning Virtue, II. i. 3.\n\n[78] Ibid., II. ii., conclusion.\n\n[79] System of Moral Philosophy, i. 99.\n\n[80] Sermons, xi.\n\n[81] Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre (1803), p. 54.\n\n[82] Inquiry, II. i. 3.\n\n[83] Inquiry, II. i. 3; II. ii. 2.\n\n[84] Ibid., II. i. 1.\n\n[85] \"What is Reason but that sagacity we have in prosecuting any\nend? The ultimate end proposed by the common moralists is the\nhappiness of the agent himself, and this certainly he is determined\nto pursue from instinct. Now may not another instinct towards the\npublic, or the good of others, be as proper a principle of virtue as\nthe instinct toward private happiness?\"--Hutcheson, Inquiry, p. 115.\n\n[86] Cf. System, i. 97; Inquiry, p. 124.\n\n[87] Inquiry, p. 124.\n\n[88] Ibid., p. 106.\n\n[89] Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections,\nwith Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728), p. xix.\n\n[90] Cf. Inquiry, p. 140 ff.\n\n[91] Introduction to Moral Philosophy, translated from the Latin, 2d\ned., 1753, p. 43; cf. Essay on the Passions and Affections, &c., p.\n128.\n\n[92] System, i. 58.\n\n[93] System, i. 53.\n\n[94] Ibid., i. 59.\n\n[95] System, i. 59.\n\n[96] System, i. 97.\n\n[97] System, i. 93.\n\n[98] System, i. 68 ff. With this may be compared the elaborate\nclassification of motives, according to their moral quality, in Dr\nMartineau's 'Types of Ethical Theory,' ii. 176 ff.\n\n[99] System, i. 50.\n\n[100] Sermons, Pref.\n\n[101] Although it is not \"at all doubtful in the general, what course\nof action this faculty or practical discerning power within us,\napproves.... It is ... justice, veracity, and regard to the common\ngood.\"--Dissertation on Virtue.\n\n[102] Sermons, ii. iii.\n\n[103] Sermons, iii. v.\n\n[104] Ibid., xi.\n\n[105] Cf. Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik, i. 192.\n\n\n\n\nPART II.\n\nTHE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nTHE THEORY OF EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY.\n\n\n[Sidenote: 1. General characteristics of the theory of evolution:]\n\nTo relinquish the individualistic theory of ethics does not\nnecessarily imply a recourse to evolution. It may still be possible\nto rest the foundation of ethics on the state, without that view of\nthe growth of the community and of its connection with the individual\nwhich the theory of evolution involves. This, as has already been\npointed out, was, in part, what Bentham did; while an attempt--in\nsome respects more elaborate still--to deduce morality from society\nwas made by Hobbes. The theory of Bentham, and of his successor\nProfessor Bain, is indeed partly individualistic, partly social.[106]\nIn the former reference, ethics becomes a theory of prudence; in\nthe latter, a part of legislation. With Hobbes, on the other hand,\nthe identification of individual and social interests is supposed\nto be brought about by the absolute necessity, in order to personal\nsecurity, of a supreme political power, into the hands of which all\nmen have agreed to transfer their rights to all things. But both\nHobbes and Professor Bain might have avoided obvious difficulties had\nthey had the theory of evolution to assist them, and had they thought\nthemselves justified in making use of it.[107] For want of it the\nformer has to explain morality and its binding force by means of the\nfiction of an \"original contract\"; while the latter has to account by\nthe associations of a few years for the harmony of feeling between\nthe individual and the whole, and for the good of the community\ncoming to be so faithfully reflected in the consciences of its\nmembers. The theory of evolution, by its doctrine of the hereditary\ntransmission of acquired modifications, gives a scientific basis for\nthis existing solidarity between man and society.\n\nThe great consensus of opinion amongst those who are best qualified\nto judge--amongst those who alone are qualified to judge--may be\nregarded as having established the claim of the theory of evolution\nto give the most satisfactory account of all forms of natural life.\nAnd it may seem only advancing the theory a step further, or only\ndeveloping one of its applications, to make it yield a complete\nexplanation of human nature, mental as well as physical. If ethics,\nthen, is to be founded on a \"natural\" basis, no theory would seem to\nbe complete which leaves evolution out of account.\n\n[Sidenote: an assertion of the unity of life;]\n\nIn general, the theory of evolution is an assertion of the unity of\nlife, or, in its widest form, of the unity of existence. Progressive\nmodifications and hereditary transmission of such modifications\nare, it is contended, sufficient to explain the different forms\nand species which life now manifests. The assumption is specially\ndiscarded that there are fixed differences between kinds of living\nthings making it impossible for them all to have developed from\nsimple germs, originally of like constitution, which have, in the\ncourse of time, become more heterogeneous and complex, and so given\nrise to the wealth of organic life. But this general doctrine, held\n(wholly or in part) in modern times by Kant, Wolff, and Lamarck,\nneeded to be supplemented by a definite view of the way in which\nthe progressive modifications took place; and this required to be\nestablished as a really operative cause, before evolution could\nreceive scientific proof. This more special element of the theory\nwas Darwin's contribution to the subject. Evolution, he showed,--and\nherein consists his theoretical advance on Lamarck,--has taken place\nby the \"natural selection\" of organisms, so modified as to fit them\nfor survival in the struggle for existence. Organisms in which\nadvantageous modifications have been produced tend to survive, and\nto transmit their modified structure to descendants, while organisms\nin which such modifications have not been produced, are less able to\npreserve their life and to hand it on to successors. Older types, it\nis true, remain, but only in circumstances in which their continued\nexistence does not seriously interfere with the organisms which, in\nthe struggle for life, have developed a structure better suited to\ntheir environment: when more perfect and less perfect forms cannot\nexist together, only the better adapted survive.\n\n[Sidenote: in first instance, historical;]\n\n[Sidenote: but implies a teleological aspect, which may have ethical\nconsequences.]\n\nThe theory of evolution is thus primarily the history of an order of\nsequent facts and relations. It is an account of the origin or growth\nof things, which attempts to explain their nature and constitution\nby showing how they have come to be what they are. But, in so doing,\nit naturally reveals the method and tendency of this order. And it\nis by means of this its teleological aspect that we see how it may\nbe possible for it not merely to trace the development of historical\nfacts, such as the feelings and customs of men, but at the same\ntime to make a more real contribution to ethics by pointing out the\ncourse of action to which human nature is adapted. It does not,\nlike the old teleology, attempt to show that each thing has been\nformed with the design of subserving some particular purpose. On the\ncontrary, it reverses this way of looking at things. The fitness of\nan organism to fulfil any definite end comes to be regarded as the\nresult not of a conscious design, independent of the environment, but\nof the modifications produced on the organism through the necessity\nlaid upon it by its surroundings of adapting itself to them or\nelse disappearing. What the theory does show is, that adaptation\nto environment is necessary for life, and that organisms unable to\nadapt themselves pass away. Adaptation to environment will thus be\nimplied in, or be an essential means towards, self-preservation\nand race-preservation, self-development and race-development. And\nshould this preservation or development be looked upon as the end of\nconduct, the adaptation to environment it implies may help to define\nand characterise the end.\n\nAgain: when an organism adapts itself to its environment, it does so\nby some modification being produced in its structure corresponding\nto the modified function required by the conditions of life. In this\nway, one organism increases in complexity in a certain direction,\nwhile another organism, in different circumstances, also develops\na more complicated structure, though one of a different kind. Thus\norganisms, alike to begin with, become heterogeneous in nature\nthrough exposure to different surroundings. At the same time, by\nconstant interaction with their environments, they become more\ndefinite and coherent in structure. Incipient modifications are\ndeveloped and defined in different ways by different circumstances,\nand the parts of a living being are brought into closer reciprocal\nrelations, and thus welded into a coherent organic whole. This\nis what Mr Spencer means when he says that evolution implies a\ntransition from \"an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite\ncoherent heterogeneity\":[108] the whole process being interconnected\nin such a way that these different aspects of it--definiteness,\ncoherence, heterogeneity--increase together and imply one another. By\nthis the inference would appear to be suggested that, if conduct is\nto harmonise with the conditions of evolution, this characteristic\nfeature of it must be recognised in the ethical end.\n\n[Sidenote: Distinction of its historical and ethical aspects.]\n\nIn saying this, I am perhaps anticipating results. But it is well to\nshow at the outset how the essentially historical inquiry carried\nout by the evolutionists may suggest conclusions which are ethical\nin their nature. To some, indeed, it will appear superfluous to have\nspent even a sentence in suggesting a _prim\u00e2 facie_ case for the\nethical importance of evolution. If there is one subject more than\nanother, it may be thought, which has secured a place for itself in\nthe scientific consciousness of the day, it is the evolution-theory\nof ethics. Without question, the phrase has been received into the\nscientific vocabulary; but there is a good deal, even in the official\nliterature on the question, to make one doubt whether it is always\nused with a distinct conception of its meaning. When reference is\nmade to the \"ethics of evolution,\" no more is sometimes meant--though\na great deal more should be meant--than an historical account of the\ngrowth of moral ideas and customs, which may provide (as Mr Stephen\nexpresses it) \"a new armoury wherewith to encounter certain plausible\nobjections of the so-called Intuitionists.\" This, however, would only\naffect the ethical psychology of an opposed school. The profounder\nquestion still remains, What bearing has the theory of evolution,\nor its historical psychology and sociology, on the nature of the\nethical end, or on the standard for distinguishing right and wrong in\nconduct? The answer to this question will be the \"reconstruction\"\nand \"deeper change\" which Mr Stephen holds to be necessary.[109] It\nis the ambiguity of the subject--or rather its twofold range--which\nhas made the application of evolution to ethics look so obvious,\nand made a discussion of the easier question frequently do duty\nfor a solution of the more difficult. The ethical writings of the\nevolutionists, indeed, often confuse the problems of history and\ntheory in a way which presents the same difficulty to the critic as\nthe works of the corresponding school in jurisprudence. In both, the\nwriters seem disinclined fairly to put to themselves the question as\nto the kind of subjects to which so fruitful a method as that which\nhas fallen into their hands is appropriate: what its conditions are,\nand whether it has any limits at all. Every one is now familiar with\nthe evils of hypothetical history, and with the iniquity of the\nproverbial philosophic offence of constructing facts out of one's\ninner consciousness. The historical jurists deserve no little credit\nfor the thoroughness with which this has been enforced by them;\nperhaps, too, the same lesson may be learned from the facts of the\ndevelopment of morality. But it may be questioned whether we are\nnot at the present time more apt to confuse fact and theory in the\nopposite way: whether the science of law is not sometimes lost sight\nof in the history of legal institutions, and ethics in danger of\nbeing identified with the development of moral sentiments and customs.\n\nWe may naturally expect the theory of evolution to throw light on\nsuch questions as the growth of moral feelings and ideas, and of\nthe customs and institutions in which morality is expressed and\nembodied. But to show the process morality has passed through in\nthe individual mind and in society still leaves the question as to\nthe end of conduct unanswered. It is necessary, therefore, to keep\nclearly before us the distinction between the historical and the\nethical problem, if we would successfully attack the subject of the\nbearing of the theory of evolution on this fundamental question of\nethics. To the theory of evolution we are indebted for the opening\nup of a new field of investigation--the historical treatment of\nconduct. But it is one thing to describe the way in which men have\nacted in the past: to determine the end for their action now is quite\na different problem; and there is no reason why the distinction\nshould be overlooked. The interest which belongs to the history of\nmorality is not solely nor mainly due to its bearing on questions\nbeyond the historical sphere. That its results will not be without\nrelation--and that of an important kind--to questions of theory may\nwell be expected. But it can only tend to confusion if we treat the\ndevelopment of morality, in the human mind and in society, from a\npreconceived attitude--dogmatic or agnostic--towards the central\nproblem of ethics.\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: 2. The development of morality: (_a_) historical\npsychology.]\n\nThe way in which the theory of evolution is applied to ethical\npsychology is easy enough to understand in principle, though complex\nand obscure in many of its details. We have only to postulate that\nmental as well as bodily traits admit of modification, and that\nmodifications once produced can be transmitted to descendants,[110]\nand it at once follows that sentiments and ideas leading to actions\nwhich promote life will be encouraged and developed by natural\nselection. Thus parental and filial feelings, once originated, may\nhave been developed through those families and tribes in which they\nwere strongest, presenting a more united, and therefore stronger,\nfront against hostile influences. The feelings of tribal sympathy\nand patriotism, too, may have had a similar history. Those races in\nwhich they were strongest would, other things being equal, obtain\nthe mastery over and exterminate other races in which they were\nrelatively weak. The compactness of the community would even be\npromoted by that fear of the political and of the religious control\nin which the feeling of obligation is said to have had its root.\nIn general, benevolence and sympathy amongst a people give it a\nsolidarity from which it derives a stronger position, so that in turn\nthe benevolent and sympathetic feelings gain free scope to develop\nand expand.\n\n[Sidenote: Its difficulties: the origin of new feelings,]\n\n[Sidenote: and of the moral consciousness;]\n\nBut the working out of this theory is not without its own\ndifficulties. In the first place, the factor in the theory of\nevolution which can be most clearly traced--the principle of natural\nselection--is not itself a source of change or of the production\nof new results. It is only the means by which advantageous changes\nare preserved and disadvantageous changes passed by. The initiative\nin these changes comes either from the unequal pressure of the\nenvironment or from some tendency to vary in the organism itself.\nNow, if we suppose certain moral relations and the feelings\ncorresponding to them to exist in a society, and to tend to greater\ncertainty and fulness of life on the part of those who possess them,\nsuch relations and feelings will be favoured by the operation of\nnatural selection, and will gradually be assimilated into the tissue\nof the social organism. But this does not account for the origin of\nmorality generally nor of any particular moral relation; it merely\nshows how, having been somehow originated, it has naturally come\nto persist. There are thus really two points to be considered in\ntracing the development of moral ideas--the question of origin and\nthe question of persistence. The latter is accounted for by natural\nselection; the former must be brought under the obscure laws of\nvariation, laws so obscure that variations in nature are frequently\nspoken of as if they took place by chance. These two questions\nare involved at each stage in the progress of morality. But it is\nat the initial stage that the question of origin is of greatest\nimportance: when the attempt is made to show how, in the course of\ntime, and by the aid of purely physical and biological laws, feelings\nand conduct, from being merely natural and reflex, have acquired a\nmoral character--when, in a word, the moral is being evolved out of\nthe non-moral. A difficulty comes to the front here which scarcely\narises when we are simply tracing the various phases through which\nthe moral consciousness has passed, and the various forms in which\nmoral conduct and feelings have expressed and embodied themselves.\nThe latter subject is obviously within the scope of the theory of\nevolution, if that theory applies to the processes of the human mind\nand society as well as to those of external nature. And, although\neach stage involves a modification to be accounted for not by natural\nselection, but by the laws of variation, yet the variation is within\nfacts of the same order, and creates no more difficulty than the\nsuccessive modifications of living tissue which have been implied\nin the evolution of organic nature. But the transition from the\nnon-moral to the moral is a transition to a different order of facts\nor--perhaps we should rather say--to a different way of looking at\nfacts, and should not be assumed to be a process of the same kind and\nexplicable by the same method of investigation as the passage from\none fact to the similar fact which immediately follows it. It may be\ncompared, perhaps, to the transition from the sphere of inorganic\nmatter to that of life. At the same time, it is frequently maintained\nthat we unduly limit the application of the law of evolution if we\ndeny its power to show how morality has developed out of customs\nand institutions whose origin can be traced to purely natural or\nnon-moral causes. And, for present purposes, it is sufficient to have\npointed out that this does not necessarily follow from the admission\nthat evolution applies to mental and social processes as well as\nto the facts of external nature. It is not my object to criticise\nany doctrine of the development of morality; but, starting with the\nposition taken up with regard to it by the theory of evolution, to\ninquire what conclusions it may lead to as to the end of action.\n\n[Sidenote: the development of feelings apart from natural selection.]\n\nA further difficulty has to be met by the theory of the development\nof morality, which is in a sense complementary of the initial\ndifficulty encountered in differentiating the moral from the\nnon-moral. This further difficulty awaits it at a subsequent stage\nof development when the extension and refinement of moral feeling\nseem to have gone on in circumstances where there is no room for\nnatural selection to work. Thus it has been admitted that the feeling\nof sympathy, and the habitual exercise of mutual good offices among\nmembers of a community, strengthen that society, and make it fit to\nprevail in the struggle for existence over other similar societies,\nthe members of which are not so much at one amongst themselves in\nfeeling and in act.\n\nBut as benevolence and sympathy widen, and become less closely\nconnected with a definite association of individuals, such as the\nfamily or tribe, and there ceases to be a particular body to the\nwelfare of which these social feelings contribute, the operation of\nthe law of natural selection becomes less certain. This law only\ntends to conserve and perfect the feelings in question, in virtue of\nthe fact that the associations to whose good they lead are successful\nin the struggle for life over other associations the members of which\nare not animated by like feelings. The one association lives and\nexpands, while the others are unable to maintain themselves against\nthe encroachments of their neighbours, and thus fall to pieces. The\nlaw of natural selection, therefore, comes into play only when there\nare competing organisms struggling against one another for the means\nof subsistence and development. Not only is it the case, therefore,\nthat the sympathy which aids the weak who are unable to take care of\nthemselves, does not seem to be of the kind that would contribute\nto success in the struggle for existence; but the more general and\ncatholic our sympathies are, the less will the law of evolution\nhelp to preserve and develop them--because the less will they tend\nto promote the welfare of one rival association rather than that of\nanother. Thus the growth of really unrestricted sympathy with men\nas men cannot have been promoted in this way. The \"enthusiasm of\nhumanity\" which animated the early Christians, the self-renouncing\nbrotherhood of Buddha, the \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03af\u03b1 (~philanthr\u00f4pia~) attributed\nto men like Xenocrates[111] who had freed themselves from the\naristocratic prejudices of Athens, the \"caritas generis humani\" of\nthe Stoics,--such feelings as these could not have been encouraged,\nany more than they could have been produced, by the operation of\nnatural selection. For, however much they tend to elevate the human\ncharacter, and to promote human happiness, they do not advance the\nwelfare of one body of men to the exclusion of some other competitor\nin the struggle for existence.[112]\n\nBut, although the law of natural evolution cannot account, by\nsurvival of the fittest, for any progress made by universal\nbenevolence, yet it may explain the value ascribed to the feeling\nof benevolence, when its object is the family or the community.\nBesides--as has already been pointed out--natural selection always\nimplies an initiative got from elsewhere: it does not itself produce\nmodifications; it only chooses out favourable ones and adds them\ntogether when produced. It always implies an independent modification\nof the organism; its part is to select the modifications best\nfitted to promote life. Hence the mere fact of benevolence being\nuniversalised is not in itself an anomaly on the theory of natural\nselection, any more than is the fact of its being extended from the\nfamily to the tribe. Only, the latter extension is one which it\nperpetuates, the former is not. No aspect of the theory of evolution\nseems able to account for an extension of the feeling of universal\nbenevolence among different people or throughout different societies.\nThis feeling has neither tended to promote the welfare of the race\nanimated by it to the exclusion of other competing races--for there\nare no competing races whom it could affect--nor can it be shown that\nit makes the individuals possessing it fitter to wage successful war\nagainst opposing forces, than other individuals.[113]\n\n[Sidenote: Its result: shows the social nature of the individual.]\n\nApart from such special difficulties, however, comparative psychology\nhas shed a new light on the mental structure of the individual.\nThe facts it brings forward show that the nature of the individual\nman cannot be explained without taking into account the relations\nin which he stands to society by birth, education, and business.\nHe is, from the first, surrounded by, and dependent upon, other\nindividuals, and by a set of established usages and institutions\nwhich modify his life; and he is connected with these in such a way\nthat it is impossible to consider him as merely acted upon by them\nand influencing them in turn. He has been produced by, and has become\na part of them. His physical and mental structure bears the marks of\nthe same influences as those by which his so-called environment has\nbeen formed. He is cell in the \"tissue\" of which the body social\nis composed. This was partly recognised, it is true, before the\ntheory of evolution had been elaborated. But the organic nature of\nthe social union is confirmed by that theory, and erected into a\nscientific view of human life.\n\n[Sidenote: (b) Development of society.]\n\nNow the various sentiments which bring one man into mental union with\nothers act with greatest facility when men are connected with one\nanother by some definite mutual bond such as that which forms the\nfamily, the clan, or the nation. The individual's feeling of sympathy\nwith his neighbours both promotes this social union and depends upon\nit. But it is characteristic of the theory of evolution to put the\nexternal aspect first--the social customs and institutions--and to\nevolve from them the corresponding sentiments and ideas. Not word\nor thought or power, it holds, is to be regarded as the origin of\nmorality: \"Im Anfang war die That.\" The whole composed of these units\nbound together by reciprocity of feeling and function is termed the\n\"social organism\"; and what has been called moral sociology shows the\nway in which the outward forms which express and embody morality have\ngrown up and become part of it.\n\nIn this connection, the theory of natural evolution traces the\nprocess by which, from the rudimentary beginnings of society, the\nmembers composing it have gradually become more coherent amongst one\nanother, related in definite ways instead of merely by chance, and\nmore differentiated in function. Certain rudimentary forms--such as\nthe family (in its rudest structure)--and the corresponding instincts\nare presupposed. And from this basis the origin of institutions\nand customs, political, religious, and industrial, is traced. In\ndeveloping these various customs and institutions, along with the\ncorresponding sentiments, the course of social evolution has had\nthe effect of gradually bringing out and cultivating those feelings\nand tendencies in the individual which promote the welfare of the\norganism, while other individual tendencies, hostile to social\nwelfare, have been repressed. Not sympathy and benevolence only,\nbut honesty, temperance, justice, and all the ordinary social\nand personal virtues, may have their natural history traced in\nthis way--by showing how they have contributed to the life of the\nindividual, or of the society, or of both.[114] Through the operation\nof purely natural laws, the wicked are \"cut off from the earth,\"\nwhile the \"perfect remain in it\" and leave their possessions to their\nchildren. This is an obvious result of natural selection. For those\ncommunities are always fittest to survive in which each member, in\nfeeling and in act, is most at one with the whole. The _tendency_ of\nevolution seems to be to produce not merely an ideal but an actual\nidentification of individual and social interests, in which each man\nfinds his own good in that of the state.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[106] The social basis of ethics is emphasised by Professor Bain in\nhis Practical Essays (1884), p. 155: \"'How is society to be held\ntogether?' is the first consideration; and the sociologist--as\nconstitution-builder, administrator, judge--is the person to\ngrapple with the problem. It is with him that law, obligation,\nright, command, obedience, sanction, have their origin and their\nexplanation. Ethics is an important supplement to social or political\nlaw. But it is still a department of law. In any other view it is a\nmaze, a mystery, a hopeless embroilment.\"\n\n[107] Without denying that it is possible to apply the theory of\nevolution to mind, Professor Bain holds that, as a fact, moral\nsentiment has not become organic and hereditary--\"that there are no\nmoral instincts properly so called.\"--The Emotions and the Will, 3d\ned., p. 56.\n\n[108] First Principles, 4th ed., p. 380.\n\n[109] Science of Ethics, p. vi.\n\n[110] It would seem that the transmission of mental qualities only\ntakes place in the form of modified physical structure (cf. G. H.\nLewes, Problems of Life and Mind, 1st series, i. 164). But, if we\nregard it as established that every mental change has a structural\nmodification corresponding to it, the possibility of mental evolution\nand inheritance presents no new difficulty.\n\n[111] \u00c6lian, V. H., xiii. 30.\n\n[112] If conscience has no other function than that assigned to it by\nClifford, Lectures and Essay, ii. 169, \"the preservation of society\nin the struggle for existence,\" then it can never reach universal\nbenevolence or prescribe \"duties towards all mankind.\"\n\n[113] A difficulty of another kind is suggested by Professor\nBain, who holds that the \"pleasure of malevolence\" is not only a\nreal element in the human constitution, but greater than would be\nnaturally called forth by the conditions and course of development.\n\"It is remarked by Mr Spencer,\" he says, \"that it was necessary for\nthe progress of the race that destructive activity should not be\npainful, but on the whole pleasurable. In point of fact, however,\nthe pleasure of destruction has gone much beyond what these words\nexpress, and much beyond what is advantageous to the collective\ninterest of animals and of human beings alike. The positive delight\nin suffering has been at all stages too great.\"--The Emotions and\nthe Will, p. 66. So far from adopting this argument, however, I must\nconfess myself still amongst the unconvinced regarding the \"pleasure\nof malevolence.\"\n\n[114] This subject is carefully discussed in Mr Stephen's 'Science of\nEthics.'\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nEVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Bearing of the theory of evolution on previous ethical\ntheories.]\n\nBefore going on to inquire into the positive contributions to\nethics which the theory of evolution has to offer, it is necessary\nto consider the relation it bears to the preceding individualistic\nsystems of morals. It was by way of investigations in psychology and\nin the theory of society, that it first began to influence ethical\nthought. And, at first sight, it appeared to come as a natural ally\nof one of the opposed schools, dreaded by the side it opposed,[115]\nwelcomed with open arms by that favoured with its friendship. But\nsince the first shock of pained and pleased surprise, there have\nbeen rumours of dissension in the allies' camp; and the distribution\nof parties has now become a matter of difficulty. The doctrine of\nevolution, first seized upon for rebutting the arguments of the\nintuitional moralists, has been found to transform rather than to\ndestroy their system; and the utilitarianism in whose interests the\nnew controversial weapon was employed, seems to have been subjected\nto a parallel process of transformation. The bearing of evolution on\negoism may appear to be even more fundamental. For the inheritance\nby an individual of the qualities acquired by his ancestors may be\nthought to establish scientifically the theory of the unity of the\nrace, and, in doing so, to make the selfish system of conduct an\nanachronism.\n\n[Sidenote: 1. On theories depending on moral sentiment or intuition.]\n\nIt is not necessary to examine at any length the application of\nevolution to the theories which construct ethical principles on the\nbasis of moral sentiment, because these theories have been found\neither to resolve themselves into a subtle form of egoistic hedonism,\nor else to rest their ethical system on a teleological conception,\nwhich transcends the \"naturalistic\" view of man. Evolution has its\nown explanation to give of the seemingly intuitive character of moral\nideas--showing how their immediate necessity for the individual of\nthe present day may be reconciled with their empirical origin in the\nmental history of the race. It attempts thus to supplant both egoism\nand intuitionism by the same doctrine of the organic union between\nindividuals.\n\nThe phenomena of conscience and the moral sentiments had been brought\nforward to show that the origin of morality was independent of the\nexperience of the pleasurable or painful results of action: that\ncertain actions and traits of character were immediately approved\nand pronounced to be right by the individual conscience, and certain\nothers as inexplicably but infallibly disapproved and pronounced to\nbe wrong. This phenomenon of moral approbation or disapprobation had\nindeed been thought by some--as has been already seen--to be only\na special feeling of pleasure or pain. Even as such, however, it\npointed to a peculiar harmony or sympathy between the feelings of\nthe individual and the fortunes of society. For the pleasure or pain\nof the individual was seen to be excited by actions and dispositions\nwhich might be shown to involve the common interests, but were\nwithout relation to his own.\n\n[Sidenote: Origin and history of moral sentiments and intuitions\ntraced by evolution.]\n\nEven on the \"empirical\" interpretation of them, such facts of the\nindividual mind were in need of explanation; and the theory of\nevolution has taken in hand to show how the pre-established harmony\ngrew up. The results of this explanation are, of course, not put\nforward as explaining the facts away, or depriving them of reality,\nbut as enabling us to see their true place and bearing in the\neconomy of human nature. In tracing the origin and history of the\n\"altruistic\" and \"moral\" sentiments of the individual, the theory of\nevolution has this end in view. It offers--so it is often said--terms\nof compromise between the \"intuitional\" and the \"empirical\"\npsychology of morals. It will admit the immediate and intuitive\ncharacter in the individual of the sentiments which older empiricism\nhad tried to make out to be composite, growing up in each person out\nof the materials afforded by his environment, and the experiences\nto which he was subjected. The theory of evolution contends for an\nempiricism on a larger scale, which will more closely connect the\nindividual with the race, and both with their environment.\n\n[Sidenote: Bearing of this on their validity:]\n\nThe question thus arises, What bearing has this psychological or\n\"psychogonical\" theory on the ethical validity of moral intuitions\nand sentiments? It certainly does not follow that they are of no\nmoral value, merely because their origin can be traced to simpler\nelements of experience. They would lose ethical importance only if\nit were first of all shown that their validity depended on their\nnot being derived from, or compounded out of, other elements. As\nProfessor Sidgwick says, \"Those who dispute the authority of moral or\nother intuitions on the ground of their derivation, must be required\nto show, not merely that they are the effects of certain causes,\nbut that these causes are of a kind that tend to produce invalid\nbelief.\"[116]\n\nBut what the theory of evolution has to determine with regard to\nmoral intuitions or sensibilities would seem to be not so much their\nethical validity or invalidity, as the range and manner of their\nethical application. It attempts to show that particular moral\nbeliefs or feelings have been originated and formed by certain\nexternal customs belonging to the conditions of social or family\nlife. These customs have impressed themselves upon the mental\nstructure, and reappear in the individual in the shape of organic\ntendencies to certain actions, or classes of actions, and of aversion\nto other actions, accompanied by a corresponding mental sentiment--or\njudgment--of approbation or disapprobation. Thus the individual\ncomes instinctively to feel--or to judge,--\"A ought to be done,\" \"B\nought not to be done.\" Now the evolutionist, as I conceive, does\nnot proceed to infer that such judgments are invalid because he has\nshown how they originated--does not conclude (to use Mr Sidgwick's\nwords) that \"_all_ propositions of the form 'X is right' or 'good,'\nare untrustworthy;\" but he does ask in what way the history of these\njudgments affects their application.[117]\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) different social conditions from which they may have\nresulted,]\n\n(_a_) He recognises, in the first place, that all such judgments are\nthe natural result of a certain social condition, and that there\nis, therefore, some probability that the same kind of social state\ncould not continue to exist were those moral judgments habitually\ndisregarded in conduct. They have resulted from a certain state\nof society, and have been assumed--after insufficient experience,\nperhaps--to be required for the stability of that state, so that\nevery action opposed to these moral judgments will probably tend\nto weaken social bonds. But the evolutionist's conclusions are not\nrestricted to such generalities. He may show that certain moral\njudgments or sentiments have had their origin from the habits of\nunion between individuals, and of respect for the rights of property,\nwhich have obtained in every relatively permanent society, and which\nmay therefore be inferred to be probably necessary for the continued\nexistence of any community; that certain other sentiments or\nintuitions have descended to present individuals from customs which\nhave not been so universal in the history of societies, although the\ncommunities possessing them have shown greater power of vitality\nthan those in which they were absent; while others, again, may be\ntraced to institutions which, from their occasional and unprogressive\ncharacter, may be shown to be neither necessary nor beneficial.\n\n[Sidenote: and consequent difference in their value for conduct;]\n\nThe evolutionist will therefore contend that different degrees\nof value for the regulation of conduct belong to different\nmoral intuitions or classes of them. If one class is habitually\ndisregarded, he may assert that historical evidence goes to show\nthat society will fall to pieces, and the life of man become, in\nthe expressive words of Hobbes, \"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and\nshort.\" The disregard of another class will probably lead to a more\nprecarious existence, or one less filled with the experiences which\nmake up life; while opposition to a third class, so far from being\nhurtful or dangerous, may remove unnecessary restrictions, and aid\nthe development both of the individual and of society.\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) their organic character.]\n\n(_b_) There is a second point which will also be recognised by the\nevolutionist. Although these intuitions have been derived, they\nare now organic, and their disappearance from the human mind as\ninstinctive tendencies towards or against action can only be slow\nand painful. The process must involve a certain amount of loss: at\nthe same time, it is not a process that can be easily avoided. As\nsoon as the reason of the instinctive tendency is inquired into, it\nis weakened as instinct. We pass from the action itself to the end\nit is fitted to subserve; and, if the instinctive action is not the\nmost appropriate, or has hurtful results, we have already reached the\nstage in which the instinct is checked, and begins to yield to action\ndirected by a principle. Yet it dies out only gradually, and, so to\nspeak, after a struggle. Nor does it seem possible to assert with\nconfidence, as mitigating this struggle, that the strongest impulses\nwill always be those which are necessary or advantageous to the\nexistence of society. For it is a common experience that the moral\nintuitions which lead to conduct that has ceased to serve a purpose,\nand the internal sanctions which follow disregard of them, are often\neven more powerful than those which protect such virtues as justice\nor veracity.\n\n[Sidenote: Resultant attitude of evolutionism to intuitionism.]\n\nFrom the preceding argument it follows that it cannot be held that\nmoral intuitions are invalid because evolved. The evolutionist\nwill certainly go very far wrong, as Mr Sidgwick points out, if\nhe maintains that a \"general demonstration of the derivedness\nor developedness of our moral faculty is an adequate ground for\ndistrusting it.\" Instead of holding that, if we succeed in tracing\nthe origin of an intuition, it is thereby discredited, he will admit\nthat the mere fact of our possessing any moral intuition shows that\nthe habits of action from which it was derived have been permanent\nenough to leave their traces on the mental structure, and that the\nconduct to which it leads, like the custom from which it came, will\nnot destroy society, but, on the contrary, will probably tend to its\npermanence. The general attitude of the evolution-theory to moral\nintuitions is therefore, after all, very similar to that which Mr\nSidgwick has reached as a result of his elaborate examination of\nthe maxims of common-sense. It is an attitude of trust modified by\ncriticism. In both an appeal is made from the axioms themselves: in\nthe one case, to their historical genesis and the facts in which\nthey originated; in the other, to the searching test of logical\nconsistency, and their capability of being applied to conduct. But\nthe theory of evolution, if it succeeds in tracing the origin of our\nmoral intuitions, does seem to involve the abandonment of the old\nintuitional method which accepted them as rules of conduct from which\nno appeal could be taken.\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: 2. Bearing of the theory of evolution on egoism.]\n\nThe theory of evolution transforms intuitionism by the way in which\nit connects the individual with the race. Its first effect upon\negoism is similar. The nature of the individual man as now exhibited\nis widely different from that which the older individualistic theory\nused to deal with. The latter is typified by the marble statue\nto which Condillac[118] compares the percipient subject, as yet\nunaffected by sense-impressions. The variety of mental life which\nis actually met with is accounted for by the different kinds of\nexperiences different men pass through; and the consequent difference\nin the sources of pleasure and pain accounts for the diverse lines of\nactivity which human beings follow out. But the theory of evolution\nshows that human nature is infinitely varied, not only through the\nvariety of circumstances, but through the variety of inherited\ndispositions. One individual is not merely connected with others\nthrough considerable similarity of experience built upon an equally\ncharacterless basis; but he is organically related to all the members\nof the race, not only bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh,\nbut mind of their mind. He is connected with others by a thousand\nsubtly interwoven threads of emotion which enter into his life, and\nunite his desires and activities with the functions of the larger\norganism of which he is a member.\n\n[Sidenote: Relation of egoism to altruism as affected by it: (_a_)\nnature of the individual social,]\n\n[Sidenote: but not completely social.]\n\nThe theory of evolution has thus an important contribution to make\nto the question of the relation between egoism and altruism. It\nhas remained for it to show historically how the individual is so\nconnected with the community that the good, or the pleasure, of the\none cannot be considered apart from that of the other. From the\nnon-evolutionist point of view it was always open to show how the\nindividual depended on society, how his wants could only be supplied\nby it, and how the security and happiness of every one were bound up\nwith those of his fellows. The individualistic theory was thus able\nto give all sorts of egoistic reasons why people should indulge in\nwhat is now called altruistic conduct. Self was seen to be \"a poor\ncentre for a man's actions,\" and only chosen by the short-sighted\nperson, who thereby missed both the good to himself that followed\nfrom his neighbours' wellbeing, and the peculiar pleasure of sympathy\nand benevolent action. But the theory of evolution has shown how the\ntwo things have developed together in the race: first, the actual\nsolidarity between the individual and the whole; and secondly, the\nsubjective reflection of the same fact, sympathy with the feelings\nof others. When we ask, therefore, whether it is our own pleasure\n(or good) or that of others that we ought to aim at, we are pointed\nto the gradual obliteration of the distinction between the interest\nand feelings of the individual and those of the whole. Were this\ncompletely accomplished, there need be no more question about the\nmatter. If conduct with an egoistic motive or aim always resulted\nin altruistic equally with egoistic effects, and if altruistic\nconduct had always egoistic equally with altruistic consequences,\nit would even then be little more than vain subtlety to ask whether\negoism or altruism was to be the real end of conduct. But if, in\naddition to the identity of interests, there were also an identity\nof motive or feeling,[119] the question would be no longer in place\nat all. For there would cease to be either a subjective distinction\nin motive between egoism and altruism, or an objective distinction\nin the courses of conduct to which they led. And it is just because\nthis identification is manifestly incomplete--because neither the\ninterests nor the desires of the individual harmonise with any degree\nof exactness with those of his fellows--that we must examine how far\nthe conception of the social organism is a true expression for the\nconnection of individuals.\n\n[Sidenote: Difference between the individual and social organisms]\n\nAt most, the theory of organic evolution can make out that there\nis a tendency towards the identification of the interests of the\nindividual with those of society. It cannot demonstrate a complete\nidentification. The community has indeed been called an organism,\nand the individual spoken of as a cell in the tissue of which it is\ncomposed; but we must avoid pressing this analogy to the point of\nbreaking. Among so many points of similarity between society and an\nindividual organism, there is one essential distinction,--the social\norganism has no feelings and thoughts but those of its individual\nmembers--the conscious centre is in the unit, not in the whole;\nwhereas, when we regard the individual organism and its constituent\nmembers, consciousness is seen to exist only in the whole, not in\neach several unit. The absence of a \"social sensorium\"[120] should,\ntherefore, make us hesitate to identify the ends of individual with\nthose of collective action. Every cell in the individual body has\na life-history of its own, besides partaking of the life of the\norganism; and, did it possess the reason which \"looks before and\nafter,\" it might probably adopt an egoistic attitude, and object to\nthe subordination of its private interests to the good of the whole.\nIn the same way, the many individual lives which make up the social\norganism--since each of them possesses a separate consciousness--are\napt to disregard the life of the larger whole whose members they are.\nNow what the theory of utilitarianism requires is, that the happiness\nor pleasurable consciousness of the community or of the race, not\nthat of the individual, be made the end; and those who make egoism\nthe end of ethics, commonly maintain that the general happiness is\nthe end of politics.[121] The individual is not indeed required to be\nentirely unselfish or \"altruistic\" in action. He is not altogether\nforbidden to seek his own things, nor enjoined to seek only the\nthings of others; and evolutionist utilitarianism, indeed, would tell\nhim to seek his own happiness in the happiness of the community. But\nthe obvious remark must be borne in mind, that society, the social\norganism, cannot experience happiness. However it may resemble the\nindividual organism in the manner of its growth, the modes of its\nactivity, and even its relation to its component members, yet it\ncannot feel pleasure or pain as an individual does. The \"happiness of\nthe community\" does not mean the happiness of the social organism,\nbut is only a concise formula for the aggregate happinesses of the\nindividuals composing it.\n\n[Sidenote: in respect of feeling.]\n\nWhen it is said, therefore--either as a political or an ethical\ntheory--that the happiness of society is the end for conduct, the\nend prescribed is altruistic rather than social. Its object is not\nan organism, but an aggregate of individuals. A certain organisation\nof society may lead to an increase in this aggregate happiness, and\nso be necessary for the attainment of the end; but if the end is\nhappiness, the social organism and its wellbeing are no longer the\nthing cared for, but the greatest aggregate of pleasures on the part\nof its members.\n\n[Sidenote: Theory of obligation simplified, if universalistic end\narrived at.]\n\nSo long, therefore, as the end is pleasure, it must have reference\nto individuals. The utilitarian may try to persuade the agent to\nseek the pleasures of others as if they were his own--requiring\nhim thus to seek his end out of himself, and the circle of his own\npleasures. And, while we continue to hold pleasure to be the end,\nthe evolution-theory can go no further than this. It seemed to have\nmade out an organic unity between different individuals, through\nwhich it might be possible to effect a reconciliation between the\nrival ethical principles of egoism and altruism. But the feeling of\npleasure is just the point where individualism is strongest, and in\nregard to which mankind, instead of being an organism in which each\npart but subserves the purposes of the whole, must rather be regarded\nas a collection of competing and co-operating units. It is true that\nthe social factor in the individual life is brought into scientific\ncognisance by the theory of evolution. It shows the way in which\nhis interests and feelings depend upon others. And if, through the\ninfluence of a political standpoint, or of some intuition of reason,\na universalistic ethics has been already arrived at, it can bring\nforward the organic union of individual and society as a means of\nenforcing the social end upon the individual agent. In this way the\ntheory of evolution makes a contribution to ethics at a critical\npoint where the individualist theory failed. For ethics must not rest\ncontent with pointing out an end for conduct or standard of morality,\nwithout giving a reason to the individual why he should make this\nend his own--that is, developing a doctrine of obligation. In many\ncurrent theories, notably in the common forms of utilitarianism, the\ntwo things are not necessarily connected, since the standard is fixed\nfrom the point of view of the whole, and obligation has reference to\nthe individual. The development of morality may appear to show how\nthe two standpoints can be connected. If it could be made out that\nthe happiness of the community and of the individual are identical,\na standard of morality which made the aggregate happiness the end\nmight be regarded as carrying its own obligation within itself:\npolitics and ethics would (on the hedonistic theory) be harmonised.\nAnd, in so far as evolution has brought the individual and society\ninto closer reciprocal dependence, it has lessened the practical\ndifficulty of bringing about this conciliation, or--to speak with the\nutilitarians--of making the standard of morality supply a doctrine\nof obligation. At present, however, the course of human development\nis far from having reached the point at which actual harmony between\nthe race and each member of it is established; and it would therefore\nstill be a subject for inquiry whether the theory of evolution could\nprovide a basis for moral obligation, even were the moral standard or\nthe end for conduct satisfactorily established. But, in determining\nthis latter question, we find that the above psychological and\nsociological investigations have no longer the same degree of value\nas before. In the theory of obligation, every fact brought forward by\nevolution to show the harmony of individual and social welfare makes\nthe way easier for establishing the reasonableness of the pursuit\nof social ends by the individual. But from these facts of past\ndevelopment we have also to determine an end for present and future\naction. And this question cannot be solved merely by showing how\nmorality has developed, though that development may form an important\npart of the evidence from which our conclusions are to be drawn.\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) Limits to complete conciliation of egoism and\naltruism:]\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b1) continued existence of competition;]\n\nThe harmony of interests and the harmony of feelings required for\nthe empirical reconciliation of egoism and altruism is a condition\nwhich needs only to be stated to show how far it is from being\nrealised in present circumstances. The constant struggle involved in\nthe course of evolution throws doubt even on its ultimate attainment.\nThe rule has always been that the better-equipped organism asserts\nand maintains its supremacy only by vanquishing the organisms which\nare not so well equipped. Conflict and competition have been constant\nfactors in development. The present circumstances of the individual\nhave been determined for him by the war of hostile interests between\ndifferent communities, and between different members of the same\ncommunity; and his mental inheritance has been largely formed by\nthe emotions corresponding to this rivalry. Perhaps the necessity\nfor conflict has diminished with the advance of evolution; but it\nis still sufficiently great to make competition one of the chief\nformative influences in industrial and political life. And the causes\nfrom which the struggle of interests arises are so constant--the\nmultiplication of desires and of desiring individuals keeps so well\nin advance of the means of satisfying desires--that it is doubtful\nwhether the course of evolution is fitted to bring about complete\nharmony between different individuals. It would almost seem that the\n\"moving equilibrium\" in human conduct, in which there is no clash of\ndiverse interests, cannot be expected to be brought about much before\nthe time when the physical factors of the universe have reached the\nstage in which evolution ends.\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b2) different and conflicting degrees of altruism;]\n\nBesides, it does not do to speak as if the only alternative to egoism\nwere a comprehensive altruism. Man is a member of a family, a tribe,\na nation, the race. His altruism, therefore, may take the narrow\nform of family feeling, or it may extend to tribal feeling, or to\npatriotism, or even rise to devotion to humanity. And these do not\nmerely supplement one another: they are often conflicting principles\nof conduct. Action for the sake of the family may frequently be most\nunsocial; the keen patriot ignores the rights of other peoples;\nthe \"citizen of the world\" is too often a stranger to the national\nspirit. Further, when civilisation grows complex, the same man is a\nmember of many intersecting societies--a church, a trade, a party\norganisation[122]--and has to balance the claims which each of\nthese has upon him. The sublation of egoism would still leave to be\ndetermined the different shares which these various social wholes\nhave in a man's sympathies, and their different claims upon his\nconduct.\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b3) the altruism of interest and the altruism of motive;]\n\nAny theory of society will show how the good of the individual is\nnot merely a part of the good of the whole, but reacts in various\nways upon the organism of which he is a member. But, in the case of\nany one individual, the results of acts done for his own good (or\npleasure), and the results of those done for the good (or pleasure)\nof the whole, do not correspond with any exactness, and often widely\ndiverge. If, then, the individual is consciously aiming at his own\ngood (or pleasure), it is--if we look from the point of view of\nindividualistic ethics--only an incidental and fortuitous result of\nthe action when it promotes the common good. When we recognise the\nsocial factor in the individual, this judgment must be modified. The\nevolution-theory shows how he has become so constituted that much\nthat pleases him individually, must of necessity benefit society at\nlarge. But there are obvious limits to the harmony. The pleasure or\ninterest of the individual is often the reverse of advantageous to\nsociety. It may be the case that in seeking his own private ends, he\nis yet, to use the words of Adam Smith, \"led by an invisible hand\nto promote an end which was no part of his intention.\"[123] But,\nif so, the end is invisible as well as the hand that points to it.\nAnd the good of society can be said to be the natural and uniform\nconsequence of the individual's action, only when he consciously\nmakes it his end. In a word, the true altruism--or, as we might call\nit, using a word appropriated to another purpose--the true socialism\nis when the good of others or of society is pursued for its own\nsake; and this is to be distinguished from the false or imperfect\naltruism, in which the same outward result is aimed at, because it\nis seen to be the most prudent way of promoting one's own good.\nThus Mr Spencer's elaborate argument[124] to show that conduct of\npurely egoistic tendency, equally with conduct of purely altruistic\ntendency, is insufficient and self-destructive, does not reach beyond\nthe external results of action, and leaves it possible for both end\nand motive to be still egoistic. If \"morality is internal,\"[125]\nthe discussion proves no ethical proposition at all. The egoism of\nexternal prudence may indeed be transcended by recognising that the\npleasures and pains of others are sources of sympathetic feeling\nin ourselves. But a subjective or emotional egoism remains. And if\nthe fact that we \"receive pleasure from the pleasure of another\nman\"[126] is our reason for seeking his pleasure, we shall cease to\nseek it when a means of greater pleasure offers. In human life as at\npresent constituted, no secure principle of conduct can be based on\nthe agreement of individual with social good; for, if they diverge,\nas they often do, there is no standard left for determining their\ncompeting claims.\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b4) altruistic feelings weak,]\n\nIt will not do to divide all men, as Mr Stephen seems to do,[127]\ninto two classes, typified by the reasonable and therefore\nsympathetic man who has struck a bargain with society to take \"common\nstock of pains and pleasures,\" and the systematically selfish man\nwho \"must be an idiot.\" For most men belong to neither of those two\nclasses: their bargain with society has not been fully completed, and\ncan be withdrawn from temporarily when circumstances make withdrawal\nconvenient, though this process cannot be carried on indefinitely\nwithout greatly weakening the sympathetic feelings. The majority\nof men are neither entirely sympathetic nor yet \"systematically\nselfish\": they are unsystematically sympathetic and unsystematically\nselfish. Such men have the sensibilities that give \"leverage\"\nto the moralist.[128] But it is futile to tell them to be more\nsympathetic, or entirely sympathetic. For sympathetic feelings cannot\nbe produced at will: they can only come with that slow modification\nof the character brought about by conduct. Shall we then say that\na man should in all cases of conduct prefer the pleasure of the\nwhole or of others to his own pleasure? If a man were to do so,\nthen perhaps, by consistent self-abnegation, altruism might become\npleasant, and both the man himself and his descendants become\nmore sympathetically constituted? This perfection of altruistic\nsympathies is looked forward to by Mr Spencer as characteristic of a\nsubsequent--the final--stage of evolution. When that period comes,\nmen will compete with one another for the few remaining opportunities\nof self-sacrifice.[129] At present, Mr Spencer argues, pure altruism\nis suicidal. The individual whose sympathetic nature is undeveloped\nmay, however, go further, and ask what right we have to say that \"the\nmoral law\" is \"conformity to the conditions of social welfare,\"[130]\nrather than to those of individual welfare? Evolution, it would seem,\ndoes not suffice to prove this proposition, which appears, on the\ncontrary, to be a survival of the social or political way of looking\nat things inherited from the utilitarian theory. But the point to be\nproved is why I ought to adopt this standpoint when considering what\nthe end of my action is to be. And this point stands in need of proof\nhere as much as in utilitarianism, and seems almost equally destitute\nof it.\n\n[Sidenote: and may be restrained by reflection.]\n\nFeelings leading to altruistic conduct are undoubtedly possessed by\nthe average man at his present stage of development. Yet the being\nwho is able to reflect on the feelings possessed by him, and compare\nthe characteristics of different emotional states, and the activities\nfollowing from them, has already before him the possibility of\ntranscending them. He is able to estimate their value in terms of\nsimpler--or of other--feelings; and the man who rigorously does so by\nthe test of personal pleasure and pain manifests the spirit of the\negoistic hedonist--a spirit which the theory of empirical evolution\ndoes not seem able to exorcise.\n\n[Sidenote: (_c_) Tendency of evolution to supplant egoism. Evolution\nnot the basis of psychological hedonism,]\n\nAt the same time the _tendency_ of the evolution-theory is not to\nsupport but to supplant egoism. Neither the basis of psychological\nhedonism on which egoism is usually made to rest, nor the independent\narguments which have been urged for its ethical theory, are drawn\nfrom the facts of development. The theory of evolution may, indeed,\nbe made to suggest that non-hedonistic action has arisen out of\nhedonistic: \"That all affections are generated by association\nwith experienced pleasure--only that the association is mainly\n_ancestral_ in the case of 'affections' proper. The dim remembrance\nof ancestral pleasures, the force of ancestral habit, produces that\npropension of which Butler speaks, disproportionate to (distinct)\nexpectation and (personal) experience of pleasure.\"[131] But this\nview will be rejected by the pure egoist,[132] who must maintain\nthat the pain of acting contrary to ancestral habit would in every\ncase be greater than the expected pleasure foregone by following\nit. According to the view suggested, all deliberate volition would\nstill be regarded as hedonistically determined, though other motives\nthan pleasure may affect action through having been inherited\nfrom cases of ancestral conduct in which they tended to personal\npleasure. Even were it shown, however, that altruistic conduct has\nbeen developed out of egoistic, the fact of its development would\nnot alter its present characteristic. If action now is not always\nmoved by pleasure and pain alone, it becomes a question of merely\nhistorical interest to trace its genesis to conduct to which our\nancestors were hedonistically impelled. The fact remains that the\noriginal simplicity of motive has been broken into, and something\nelse than personal pleasure admitted to have sway. But it does not\nseem to have been made out that action in the early stages of human\nlife was completely egoistic, any more than that it is so now. \"From\nfirst to last,\" as Mr Spencer puts it,[133] self-sacrifice seems to\nhave been involved in the preservation of each successive generation\nof individuals. We inherit propensities to action which have been\nevolved from an initial stage in which there was no conscious\ndistinction between egoism and altruism, though both tendencies\nwere present and were necessary for the continued existence of the\nspecies. The feelings inherited by the egoistic hedonist are assessed\nby him at their pleasure-value. But such feelings would never have\nbeen acquired by his ancestors, had they tested each germinal emotion\nin the same way, and so restrained self-sacrifice for offspring and\nfellow-men. Perhaps they did not clearly see or realise what their\npleasure consisted in, or accurately distinguish it from family or\ntribal welfare; but, through this deficiency of imagination, the\nfeelings were able to grow and perpetuate themselves, which have\ntended to the preservation and consolidation of society.\n\n[Sidenote: nor of ethical hedonism.]\n\nNor can we gather from evolution any ethical argument leading to\negoism as the principle or end for conduct; and it is worthy of\nremark that the proof attempted by the late Mr Barratt is unaffected\nby his recognition of the theory of evolution as applied to mind,\ndepending on definitions and axioms which hold (if at all) for\nthe individual man. Pleasure is defined by him as \"that state of\nconsciousness which follows upon the unimpeded performance (as such)\nof its function by one or more of the parts of our organism;\"[134]\nand the good is forthwith identified with pleasure, by its being\nshown that it is a \"state of consciousness,\" and that it \"results\nfrom the due performance of function (as such).\"[135] But the\n\"due[136] performance of function\" is itself a state or states\nof consciousness; and in it, not in any sequent or concomitant\ncircumstances, the good may consist. The good, we may say, is not\npleasure, but the \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 (~energeia~) of which pleasure is only the\nconsequent or completion. This is not a mere question of words. For\n\"due performance of function\" cannot be measured by the resultant\nor accompanying feeling of pleasure: the most perfect functioning,\njust because it has become habitual, has often the slightest\naccompaniment of pleasant feeling. The way in which the argument\nis put in 'Physical Ethics' is thus well fitted to bring out the\nfundamental antithesis between ethical systems according as they\nplace the good in the active element of function, or in the passive\nelement of pleasurable feeling which accompanies functioning. The\ntheory of evolution seems to have led many of the writers who have\napplied it to ethics to the other side of the antithesis than that\nadhered to by Mr Barratt. They recognise ethical value as belonging\nto \"due performance of function,\" rather than to the pleased states\nof consciousness which follow; and in this way their theory leads\nthem beyond hedonistic ethics.[137]\n\n[Sidenote: 3. Bearing of the theory of evolution on utilitarianism]\n\nIt has been argued that the theory of evolution is, in tendency,\nhostile to the egoistic principle. Had egoism been consistently\nrecognised and acted upon during the course of human development,\nthe features of social life which most promote co-operation and\nprogress would never have become persistent. But the same objection\ncannot be urged against universalistic hedonism. It is true that\nthis has not been the end consistently aimed at in the past. Those\nfrom whom our social instincts are inherited cannot be credited with\nhaving had either the general happiness or social evolution in view.\nSociety and institutions furthering the common good were not the\nwork of primitive utilitarians plotting for the greatest happiness\nof the greatest number. They have come down to us from times when\nsocial organisation was forced upon men by the rude logic of facts\nwhich exterminated tribes in which the bond of union was weak;\nand they have been gradually modified by the pressure of external\ncircumstances and the growing influence of mental conceptions of\nwhat is best. But the adoption of general happiness as the end of\naction would not have had the same effect on social evolution, as the\nadoption of personal happiness as the end would have had. It would\nhave aided and not have hindered the growth of the feeling of unity\namong the members of a tribe or state, as well as have led to the\nrecognition of the individual as subordinate to the social organism.\nIt may thus seem quite natural to look to utilitarianism as giving\nthe end for reflective action, and yet to hold along with it what is\nloosely called the ethics of evolution.\n\n[Sidenote: has led to its modification]\n\n[Sidenote: in method,]\n\nBut this first attitude of evolution to utilitarianism was not fitted\nto be permanent; and the \"start\"[138] Mr Spencer got on being classed\nwith anti-utilitarians must have been repeated in the experience\nof other moralists as they found themselves drifting from their\nancient moorings. Mr Spencer's difference from the utilitarians is\nnot such as to lead him to reject or modify their principle. He\nmaintains, as strongly as they do, that \"the ultimately supreme end\"\nis \"happiness special and general.\"[139] But he disagrees with them\nin method, holding that, owing to the incommensurability of a man's\ndifferent pleasures and pains, and to the incommensurability of the\npleasures and pains of one man with those of others, coupled with the\nindeterminateness of the means required to reach so indeterminate an\nend, happiness is not fitted to be the immediate aim of conduct.[140]\nBut another method is open to us. For \"since evolution has been,\nand is still, working towards the highest life, it follows that\nconforming to those principles by which the highest life is achieved,\nis furthering that end.\"[141] It is possible \"to deduce, from the\nlaws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action\nnecessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce\nunhappiness.\"[142] Greatest pleasure, that is to say, is the end. But\nit is so impossible to compare different kinds of pleasure, different\npeople's pleasure, and different means for obtaining a maximum of it,\nthat it is not a practical end for aiming at. No doubt is expressed\nthat greatest happiness is the ultimate end; although no good reason\nis given for holding that it is. But it is an indeterminate end, and\nneeds to be interpreted by the course of evolution which is held to\ntend to it. It is not too much to say, therefore, that Mr Spencer is\nonly nominally a utilitarian. His ethical principles are not arrived\nat by an estimate of the consequences of action, but by deduction\nfrom the laws of that \"highest life\" which is now in process of\nevolution. This alliance between evolutionism and hedonism will be\nexamined in the following chapter. At present it is necessary to\nconsider the reasons which have led other evolutionists to look upon\nthe new morality as superseding the utilitarian end.\n\n[Sidenote: and in principle.]\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) Ideal of utilitarianism objected to as\nunprogressive.]\n\nMr Spencer's \"dissent from the doctrine of utility, as commonly\nunderstood, concerns,\" he tells us,[143] \"not the object to be\nreached by men, but the method of reaching it.\" In other writers,\nhowever, the theory of evolution has not only supplanted the method\nof utilitarianism, but also led to a modification of its principle.\nThe objections they have taken to it may perhaps be summed up by\nsaying that they consider utilitarianism to look upon conduct\nfrom a mechanical, instead of from an organic point of view. It\nprescribed conduct to a man as if he were a machine with a certain\nkind and quantity of work to turn out. His nature was looked upon\nby it as fixed, and his social conditions as unvarying; and the\nideal set before him was therefore unprogressive--something that\nhe was to do or to get, not something that he was to become. \"If\nconsistently applied,\" it has been recently argued, \"utilitarianism\nseems irrevocably committed to a stereotyped and unprogressive\nideal.\"[144] According to Mr Stephen, it \"considers society to be\nformed of an aggregate of similar human beings. The character of\neach molecule is regarded as constant.\" It can, therefore, give a\ntest which is \"approximately accurate\" only, which does not allow\nfor the variation of character and of social relations.[145] To\nthe same effect Miss Simcox maintains that it \"might pass muster\nin a theory of social statics, but it breaks down altogether if we\nseek its help to construct a theory of social dynamics.\"[146] These\nwriters do not seem to have made it quite clear, however, in what\nway utilitarianism assumes a stationary condition of human nature,\nand so formulates conduct in a way unsuited to a progressive state.\nTo say simply that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is\nthe end, is not in itself inconsistent with a progressive state of\nhuman nature. It is true that, in all the enthusiasm for and belief\nin progress to be seen in a writer such as J. S. Mill, there is a\nconstant goal always set to it in the possible maximum of pleasant\nfeeling. It would not have been inconsistent for him, however, to\nlook upon human nature as capable of developing new susceptibilities\nfor pleasure. Progress is made by increasing the amount of pleasure\nactually got. And so far, the ideal itself is certainly fixed, while\nprogress consists in its gradual realisation. But there is no special\nvirtue in having an ideal which is itself progressive. A progressive\nideal simply means an ideal which is incompletely comprehended, and\nthe comprehension of which proceeds gradually with its realisation.\nAt any time the definition of such an ideal can only be tentative:\nwith the actual assimilation of character to it, the intellect comes\nto grasp its nature with increasing clearness. I do not myself think\nthat we can expect to have more than such a tentative and progressive\ncomprehension of the moral ideal of humanity. But we must not take\nobjection to a theory because it gives at once a clear and definite\nview of the final end of conduct: though we must not refrain from\ninquiring how the end is known.\n\n[Sidenote: Force of the objection when attempt made to interpret\ngreatest happiness,]\n\n[Sidenote: by showing the way in which men can obtain happiness,]\n\nBut the bearing of the objection to utilitarianism becomes apparent\nwhen we try to give some definite meaning to the end greatest\nhappiness. If we are content to receive it as simply a very\ngeneral--or rather abstract--expression for our ideal, nothing need\nbe said, except to put the question, which has been already asked,\nHow we came by such an ideal? The difficulty arises when we attempt\nto apply the ideal to practice. With men of fixed character in an\nunchanging society, our way might be comparatively clear. But,\nwhen both character and social relations vary, and their variation\nextends to susceptibility to pleasure and pain, and depends on the\nactions adopted to obtain the end, utilitarianism may well appear\nto be without a principle by which to determine between different\nkinds of conduct. To an objection similar to this, but taken from the\nold point of view, that we have no time before acting to sum up the\npleasurable and painful consequences of our actions, Mill replied\nthat there had been \"ample time--namely, the whole past duration\nof the human species\"[147]--in which to estimate the felicific\nresults of conduct. The variability of faculty and function makes\nthis answer lack convincing power. Yet, perhaps, we are apt at\npresent to disregard the real value of this collective experience\nof the race. True, human nature is not a constant; yet certain of\nits qualities are persistent and constant enough not to leave us\nin doubt as to whether, say, murder and theft are beneficial or\ninjurious to happiness. There are at least certain actions, and,\nstill more, certain abstentions, upon which human security--the basis\nof happiness--depends. But it would seem that those \"secondary laws\"\nmay be more properly regarded as conditions of life than means to\npleasure.\n\n[Sidenote: and a maximum of it.]\n\nThe difficulty, however, comes most clearly to the front when we\nattempt to define the maximum, and that not for an individual or\ngeneration only, but for the race. It is not happiness merely, but\ngreatest happiness, that is the utilitarian end. Is there any way,\nthen, of determining how the maximum of happiness is to be obtained\nfor generations whose characters, though inherited from present\nindividuals, may be modified almost indefinitely? The very existence\nand numbers of these future generations are problematic; and Mill,\nas is well known, spent much of his energy in trying to convince\nthe present generation to restrict the numbers of the next. Even on\nthe fundamental question as to whether happiness is to be obtained\nby the restriction of desires or by the satisfaction which leads to\ntheir recurrence and increase, no principle can be extracted from\nutilitarian ethics. The theory of evolution has shown how desires\nmay be uprooted in the character of the race, though they remain to\nthe end in the present individuals; but in each case utilitarianism\nwould require us to sum up and estimate the relative advantages of\nrenunciation and satisfaction,--a problem which the modifiability of\nhuman character seems to make impracticable. Thus, even if certain\nrules of living may be ascertained, and justified by the utilitarian\nprinciple, it would seem that the end of greatest happiness for\nthe race of man, or the sentient creation generally, must remain\n\"abstract.\" There seems no principle through which it may be applied\nto conduct--no hope of an accurate estimate of results--when the\nvariability of the individual and of social relations is taken into\naccount.\n\n[Sidenote: (b) Objection to utilitarianism as a theory of\nconsequences;]\n\nConnected with this is the assertion that morality must have an\ninward, not an external standard. The evolutionists are inclined\nto condemn utilitarianism as a theory of consequences, dealing\nsolely with work produced. According to Mill, \"utilitarian moralists\nhave gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive\nhas nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much\nwith the worth of the agent.\"[148] And this seems to be just what\nevolutionism objects to. Even the worth of the agent is, according to\nutilitarianism, only a tendency to perform the actions called moral:\n\"a good or a bad disposition\" is said to be \"a bent of character from\nwhich useful or from which hurtful actions are likely to arise.\"[149]\nAgainst this view Mr Stephen maintains that \"the attempt to secure\nan absolute and immutable moral law in its external shape must be\nillusory. The moral law can be stated unconditionally when it is\nstated in the form 'Be this,' but not when it is stated in the form\n'Do this.'\"[150] This, however, appears to express the matter in a\nway not free from difficulty. The organic view of conduct will object\nnot only to considering action apart from character, but also to\nconsidering character apart from action. We must treat conduct as a\nwhole: and, in order to do so, we must treat it as both arising out\nof and forming character; and we must treat character not as mere\npotentiality, but as it realises itself in conduct. The weakness of\nthe utilitarian theory is its method of treating actions merely in\nrespect of their results: the evolutionist must show how results are\nconnected with motives,--how character and conduct are different\naspects of a whole.\n\n[Sidenote: (c) and as related solely to sensibility,]\n\n[Sidenote: of which there is no common measure.]\n\nThe difference of the evolutionist view from utilitarianism comes\nout at another point. The latter places the standard and test of\nconduct in its effects on the sensibility. The best is that which\nbrings most pleasure. Utilitarians are now, for the most part, ready\nto admit that, to be in earnest with their theory, they must reject\nMill's attempt to distinguish qualities among pleasures. \"If morality\nis to be defined by happiness, we must, of course, allow all kinds\nof happiness to count, and to count equally so far as they are\nactually equal. We must reckon the pleasures of malevolence as well\nas those of benevolence.\"[151] Of his own pleasures--of the relative\namounts of pleasure he gets from various sources--each man is the\nfinal judge. One man prefers \"push-pin\" to poetry, another poetry to\n\"push-pin\"; and neither has a right to call the other mistaken. If\nwe are to aim at the greatest maximum pleasure, therefore, we must\nnot strive for what are commonly called \"high\" pleasures rather than\n\"low\" pleasures, except as greater in intensity. If we must have a\nstandard, the judgment of the \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 (~phronimos~) for which Mill\ncontended must be superseded by the judgment of the average man. If\npleasure is the only end, and satisfaction is simply another name\nfor it, then it is plainly incorrect to say that \"it is better to\nbe a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be\nSocrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.\"[152] As has been urged\nfrom the evolutionist point of view, \"there is no common measure of\nhappiness to enable us to say that the more perfect being enjoys\nmore of it than the less.\"[153] There seems one way only in which\nutilitarianism can bring its moral ideal into harmony with the\nupward tendency claimed for itself by evolutionist ethics--and that\nis, by maintaining that the pleasures incident to what are regarded\nas the higher functions are the pleasures which excel others in\nrespect of \"fecundity\": they are the source of future pleasures,\nand are frequently inexclusive even in their present enjoyment. The\ndifficulty in making this assertion is just that these \"higher\"\npleasures are but slightly appreciated by the majority of men, and\ncan hardly be said to be pleasures for them at all. But here the\ntheory of evolution, whose adherents have been acting the part of\nthe candid friend to utilitarianism, must come to its aid, and admit\nthat human nature may be so modified in the future as to allow of the\n\"highest\" becoming also the \"greatest\" of pleasures. The argument in\nthe mouth of the utilitarian is perhaps a somewhat arbitrary one,\nsince it could be applied equally well to any class of pleasures.\nThe notion of \"higher,\" as applied either to conduct or to pleasure,\nhas been accepted from current moral opinion. But the theory of\nevolution has set itself to explain this notion, and to develop a\ntheory of morality in harmony with its own scientific positions, and\nfree from the defects which it has found in other systems. How far\nit contributes to the determination of the ethical end will form the\nsubject of investigation in the following chapters.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[115] Cf. Miss Cobbe, in 'Darwinism in Morals, and other Essays'\n(1872), p. 5.\n\n[116] Methods of Ethics, III. i. 4, 3d ed., p. 211.\n\n[117] Cf. Professor F. Pollock, \"Evolution and Ethics\"--Mind, i. pp.\n335 ff. Apart from the bearing of a utilitarian test on inherited\ninstincts, to which Mr Pollock refers, I have tried to show what\nmeaning they will have for the evolutionist who judges them solely\nfrom the point of view of his theory.\n\n[118] Trait\u00e9 des sensations, \u0152uvres (1798), vol. iii.\n\n[119] It is to a condition of this sort that a phrase such as\nClifford's \"tribal self\" (Lectures and Essays, ii. 111) would apply.\n\n[120] Cf. Spencer, Principles of Sociology, i. 479.\n\n[121] Cf. Barratt, \"Ethics and Politics\"--Mind, ii. 453 ff.\n\n[122] Cf. Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 113.\n\n[123] Wealth of Nations, book iv. ch. ii.\n\n[124] Data of Ethics, chap. xiii.\n\n[125] Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 155; cf. Spencer, Data of\nEthics, p. 120.\n\n[126] Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 226.\n\n[127] Science of Ethics, p. 263.\n\n[128] Cf. Ibid., p. 442.\n\n[129] Data of Ethics, p. 253\n\n[130] Science of Ethics, p. 349.\n\n[131] F. Y. Edgeworth, Old and New Methods of Ethics (1877), p. 11.\n\n[132] Cf. A. Barratt, Mind, iii. 280.\n\n[133] Data of Ethics, chap. xii.\n\n[134] Physical Ethics, p. 12.\n\n[135] Ibid., p. 17.\n\n[136] In the word \"due\" an idea of worth is involved. Probably\nMr Barratt meant by \"due performance\" one which made the faculty\ncorrespond with its medium (cf. Physical Ethics, p. 9); but this\nintroduces a new standard of value.\n\n[137] The transition involved in passing from \"pleasure\" to\n\"performance of function\" or \"life\" as the end of conduct, may be\nillustrated by the following passage from Mr Pater's 'Marius the\nEpicurean' (1885, i. 163): \"Really, to the phase of reflection\nthrough which Marius was then passing, the charge of 'hedonism,'\nwhatever its real weight might be, was not properly applicable at\nall. Not pleasure, but fulness of life, and 'insight' as conducting\nto that fulness--energy, choice and variety of experience--including\nnoble pain and sorrow even--loves such as those in the exquisite\nold story of Apuleius; such sincere and strenuous forms of the\nmoral life, as Seneca and Epictetus--whatever form of human life,\nin short, was impassioned and ideal: it was from this that the\n'new Cyrenaicism' of Marius took its criterion of values. It was a\ntheory, indeed, which might rightly be regarded as in a great degree\ncoincident with the main principle of the Stoics themselves, and a\nversion of the precept 'Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with\nall thy might'--a doctrine so widely applicable among the nobler\nspirits of that time; and as with that its mistaken tendency would\nlie in the direction of a kind of idolatry of mere life, or natural\ngift or strength--_l'idol\u00e2trie des talents_.\"\n\n[138] \"The note in question greatly startled me by implicitly\nclassing me with anti-utilitarians. I have never regarded myself as\nan anti-utilitarian.\"--Mr Spencer's letter to J. S. Mill, printed in\nBain's Mental and Moral Science, p. 721.\n\n[139] Data of Ethics, p. 173; cf. p. 30.\n\n[140] Ibid., pp. 154, 155.\n\n[141] Ibid., p. 171.\n\n[142] Letter to J. S. Mill, in Data of Ethics, p. 57.\n\n[143] Letter to J. S. Mill, in Bain's Mental and Moral Science, p.\n721.\n\n[144] J. T. Punnet, \"Ethical Alternatives\"--Mind, x. 95.\n\n[145] Science of Ethics, p. 363.\n\n[146] Natural Law: An Essay in Ethics (1877), p. 101.\n\n[147] Utilitarianism, p. 34.\n\n[148] Utilitarianism, p. 26.\n\n[149] Ibid., p. 27 n.\n\n[150] Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 385.\n\n[151] Ibid., p. 361.\n\n[152] Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 14.\n\n[153] Simcox, Natural Law, p. 101.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nHEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM.\n\n\n[Sidenote: 1. Alliance of evolutionism and hedonism effected in two\nways:]\n\nThe alliance between Evolutionism and Hedonism may be arrived at\nfrom either of the two points of view which are being brought into\nconnection: may be either an attempt to bring the hedonistic end into\nthe definite region of law revealed by the evolution of life; or may\nresult from the endeavour to give clearness and persuasiveness to an\nethical end which evolution itself seems to point to.\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) greatest happiness to be obtained by conforming to\nlaws of life or of evolution;]\n\nThe former point of view is represented in Mr Spencer's rejection\nof empirical utilitarianism, and substitution for it of a practical\nend which is not enunciated in terms of pleasure. Happiness is still\nregarded by him as the supreme end; but the tendency to it is not\nto be adopted as the end in practical morality. There are certain\nconditions to social equilibrium which \"must be fulfilled before\ncomplete life--that is, greatest happiness--can be obtained in any\nsociety.\"[154] Thus the form of \"rational utilitarianism\" which he\nendeavours to establish \"does not take welfare for its immediate\nobject of pursuit,\" but \"conformity to certain principles which,\nin the nature of things, causally determine welfare.\"[155] Having\ndeduced \"from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what\nkinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds\nto produce unhappiness,\" we are to recognise these deductions \"as\nlaws of conduct ... irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness\nor misery.\"[156] The assumption is thus distinctly made that the\ntendency of life is to happiness, and that the laws of its evolution\nyield practical principles by following out which the greatest\nhappiness may be obtained, without attempting the impossible task of\nestimating directly the felicific and infelicific results of conduct.\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) ethical end of evolution interpreted by pleasure.]\n\nStarting with the evolutionist point of view, but with an opposite\nestimate of the relative value for practice of the ends supplied by\nevolutionism and by hedonism, a like identification of them might\nseem advisable. The \"increase of life\" to which evolution tends\nmay be regarded as not merely an account of the actual process of\nexistence, but as a principle of action for a conscious being. In\nthis way some such ethical imperative as \"Be a self-conscious agent\nin the evolution of the universe\"[157] may be formulated. Yet as\nthe \"evolution of the universe\" is a somewhat large conception,\nand its laws are not clear to every one, it may seem necessary that\nthe end should be explained by translation into better-known terms.\nAnd this may be done if the conduct which promotes life most is, at\nthe same time, the conduct which increases pleasure most. In this\nway, although the ultimate end is life, or, in vaster phrase, \"the\nevolution of the universe,\" the practical end is pleasure. The moral\nvalue of conduct will depend on its tendency to increase the balance\nof pleasure over pain. The ethics of evolution will be reduced to\nhedonism.\n\nThis way of determining the evolutionist end is put forward as\na logical possibility rather than as representing the views of\nany party. The contribution which the theory of evolution has to\noffer towards the determination of the ethical end, has not yet\nreceived that definite expression which would justify our passing\nby any logical interpretation of it, on the ground of its not\nbeing actually adopted by ethical writers. Yet it would seem that\nthe above point of view is not altogether foreign to evolutionist\nmorality. The preservation or development of the individual--or of\nthe race--which is put forward as an expression both for the actual\ncourse of evolution and the subjective impulse corresponding to it,\nis often assumed to agree at each step with the desire for pleasure,\nand, when the stage of reflective consciousness is reached, to be\nidentical with the pursuit of a maximum of pleasure.[158] In this\nway it is assumed that the preservation and development of life tend\nalways to pleasure, and that the end or tendency of evolution is\nbeing fulfilled when the greatest pleasure is wisely sought. It is\ntherefore necessary to inquire how far the correspondence between\nlife and pleasure, or between development and pleasure, actually\nholds, that we may see whether it is possible for the one to take the\nplace of the other in determining the end for conduct.\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: 2. Evolutionist argument for concomitance of life and\npleasure.]\n\nNow it is argued, from the point of view of evolution, that, taking\nfor granted that pleasure motives action, the organisms in which\npleasurable acts coincided with life-preserving or health-promoting\nacts must have survived in the struggle for existence at the\nexpense of those organisms whose pleasurable activity tended to\ntheir destruction or to the hindrance of their efficiency.[159] The\nassumption in this argument, in addition to the constant postulate\nof natural selection, is simply that pleasure is a chief motive of\naction; the conclusion to which it leads is, that there is a broad\ncorrespondence between life-preserving and pleasurable acts--that the\npreservation and development of life are pleasurable. It is necessary\nto examine with care the validity of this important argument with\nreference to the attacks that may be made on it from the pessimist\npoint of view; and, if its doctrine of the correspondence of life\nand pleasure is not entirely erroneous, to inquire further whether\nthis correspondence can be made to establish an end for conduct, in\naccordance with the theory of evolution, by measuring life in terms\nof pleasure.\n\n[Sidenote: 3. Objections to this argument:]\n\nWhat then is to be said of the supposed \"conflict between Eud\u00e6monism\n[Hedonism] and Evolutionism\" which v. Hartmann[160] opposes to the\noptimist doctrine that evolution has tended to make life and pleasure\ncoincide?\n\nThe problem of Pessimism resolves itself into two questions which\nadmit of being kept distinct: (_a_) The first is, Does life on\nthe whole give, or can it give, a balance of pleasure? This is\nthe fundamental question of the value of life as put by those,\nwhether optimists or pessimists, who assume that \"value\" means\n\"pleasure-value.\" If it be answered in the negative, the hedonistic\nideal must be the reduction of the adverse balance to the zero-point\nof feeling striven after by Eastern ascetics, but, to all appearance,\nobtained only and most easily by death.[161] (_b_) The second\nquestion is, Does the evolution of life lead to an increase of\npleasure and diminution of pain? This is the question brought into\nprominence in recent discussions, and of most importance for the\npresent inquiry; and upon an affirmative answer to it Evolutionist\nHedonism is plainly dependent. To both questions v. Hartmann gives an\nanswer in the negative.\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) that life cannot bring more pleasure than pain;]\n\n(_a_) If the pessimist view of life is correct, Mr Spencer\nholds,[162] then \"the ending of an undesirable existence being the\nthing to be wished, that which causes the ending of it must be\napplauded.\" And this is so far true, though not necessarily true in\nthe way Mr Spencer thinks. For this undesirable existence cannot,\nperhaps, be brought to a final conclusion merely by ending the\nindividual life: this would only leave room for other individuals\nto fill the vacant places. Annihilation is the end not directly for\nthe individual, but for the race. Not life itself, according to\nSchopenhauer, but the will to live, is to be killed in the individual\nman. Even this code of morals, Hartmann thinks, is a remnant of\nthe false, pre-evolutionist individualism, and would hinder the\ncourse of the universe, by leaving the game to be played out by the\nremaining individuals whose wills were not strong enough to curb or\nkill themselves. It is a mistake to think that the will to live which\npulses through all existence can be annihilated by the phenomenal\nindividual. The individual's duty is not to seek for himself the\npainlessness of annihilation or passionless Nirw\u00e2na, but to join in\nthe ceaseless painful striving of nature, and, by contributing to the\ndevelopment of life, to hasten its arrival once more at the goal of\nunconsciousness. The self-destruction, not of the individual will,\nbut of the cosmic or universal will, is the final end of action.\n\nApart from the metaphysical view of things with which this estimate\nof the value of life is connected, and which may be regarded perhaps\nas its consequent rather than its cause,[163] the pessimist doctrine\nhas a double foundation, in psychology and in the facts of life.\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b1) from the negative nature of pleasure,]\n\nPsychologically, it seems to be best supported by Schopenhauer's\ndoctrine of will or desire as an incessant painful striving, pleasure\nbeing merely the negative of this pain, and always coming short of\ncompletely satisfying it. But this position involves a double error\nin psychological analysis, and is relinquished even by Hartmann,\nthough he still regards pleasure as in all cases satisfaction of\ndesire. Desire is itself merely a secondary or derived fact in human\nnature, consequent on the inhibition of volitional energy.[164] The\npleasures we call passive are independent of it; and those which\nattend upon activity, but are not themselves part of the end of\naction, are also enjoyed without being striven after in order to\nsatisfy a want. Further, it is a mistake to look upon the pleasure\nof attainment as a mere negation of the pain of desire. The painful\nelement in desire comes from the inhibition of the attempted\nrealisation of an ideal object. In unsatisfied desires, it is true,\nthe pain is in proportion to the strength of the restrained longing.\nBut, if the inhibition is overcome, the pain is not equal to the\nstrength of the desire, but only to the amount of opposition that has\nto be conquered in satisfying it. Hence, not only are there other\npleasures than those of satisfied desire, but even the pleasure got\nfrom such satisfaction is something more than a mere recompense for\nthe pain accompanying the desire.\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b2) from the facts of human life;]\n\nThe support got by pessimism from the facts of human life is\nmore difficult to estimate at its true value. It is obvious that\npleasure and pain are intermingled in almost every experience; and\nthe proportion in which they are mixed varies greatly in different\ncircumstances and according to the susceptibilities of different\npersons. If we ask a number of people whether life is on the whole\npleasant to them, not only do we receive a variety of answers which\nit is hard to sum up and average, but the answers we get are apt\nto reflect the feeling of the moment rather than to represent an\nimpartial estimate of the pleasure and pain of a lifetime. Thus\nexperience seems unable to give us a trustworthy answer as to the\naverage pleasure-value of life; but, if its verdict is correct, that\nto some life is pleasant, though to many painful, this shows that a\nsurplus of pain does not follow from the nature of life, and thus\ndestroys the position of thoroughgoing pessimism, which looks upon\nthis as the worst of all possible worlds.\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) that the evolution of life does not tend to\npleasure.]\n\n(_b_) It may still be maintained, however--and this is the position\nwhich chiefly concerns us here--that the course of evolution does\nnot tend to increase the pleasure in life at the expense of the pain\nin it, and that, therefore, even although pleasure and evolution may\nboth of them be possible ends of conduct, they are ends which point\nin different directions and lead to different courses of action.\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b1) Incompleteness of the evolutionist argument.]\n\nIt is necessary for the evolutionist who holds that the development\nof life does not tend to increased pleasure, to meet the argument\nalready adduced[165] to show their correspondence. Nor does that\nargument seem to be altogether beyond criticism. To compare progress\nor development with pleasure, we ought to know exactly what is\nmeant by both terms. Yet it is impossible to have a clear notion of\nprogress without an idea of the end to which it tends, and this has\nnot yet been obtained. It is largely on account of the difficulty\nof obtaining such an idea that some evolutionists seem to have been\ndriven to measure progress in terms of pleasure, just as, owing to\nthe difficulty of estimating and summing up pleasures, some hedonists\nhave been induced to measure them by the progress of evolution. What\nwe have now to see is whether the correspondence assumed between\nprogress and pleasure actually exists. And, to avoid the tautology of\nsaying that progress is increase of life, we must judge of it simply\nby empirical observation of the nature of human activity and of the\ncourse of human affairs.\n\nNow the attempted identification of pleasurable and life-promoting\nactivities rests on an incomplete account of the motives and results\nof action. For, in the first place, even admitting that pleasure and\navoidance of pain are the only motives to action, the influence of\nnatural selection has not prevented actions hurtful to life being\nsometimes accompanied by pleasant sensations. Its tendency to do\nso has been much more effective in the lower orders of animal life\nthan in the higher. The latter, especially man, possess the power of\nrepresenting ideal states in the imagination, and are thus able to\navoid actions hurtful to life, although these actions are pleasant\nat the time. For the hurtful consequences of the action may be so\nvividly represented in idea as to outweigh the influence of the\npresent pleasure which could be got from its enjoyment.[166]\n\nAnd further, the analysis of volition involved in the argument seems\nto be insufficient. For there are other springs of action to be\ntaken account of than pleasure and its opposite. Habit, imitation,\nand interests of a more comprehensive kind than desire of pleasant\nfeeling, are all motives to action. It is true that pleasure is\nalways felt in the successful performance of an action, and it is\nalso true that the inhibition of will is always painful; but it\nis none the less incorrect to look either upon the pleasure that\nfollows from the action, or the pain that would be the result of\nits inhibition as, in ordinary cases, the motive. It is motives of\na different kind than pleasure, such as imitation[167] and the\ninfluence of ideal ends, which most often lead to progress. And\nthe progress that is due to such motives cannot be measured by its\neffect in increasing pleasure, nor assumed to make pleasure and\nlife correspond. Other activities less advantageous in nature in\nall respects but this, might, so far as the reasoning goes, lead to\nequal or to more pleasurable consequences. At the best, therefore,\nthe above argument only proves a general tendency towards the\ncoincidence of pleasurable actions with actions which promote life;\nit does not show that the increase of life can be accurately measured\nby pleasure. The process of natural selection might kill off all\norganisms whose desires led them normally to action hurtful to life.\nBut sufficient evidence has not been brought forward to show that\nit is fitted to produce an exact proportion between progress and\npleasure.\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b2) The pessimist doctrine that life tends to misery:]\n\n[Sidenote: (_aa_) the hypothesis of the unconscious;]\n\nHartmann, however, attempts to strike a more fundamental blow than\nthis at the presupposition involved in the argument for evolutionist\nhedonism. For he contends that, throughout all life, the great pulse\nof progress is neither, on the one hand, desire for pleasure, nor,\non the other, the more complex and varied motives just referred to,\nbut that it is the incessant striving towards fulness of life by a\nuniversal unconscious will, which is manifested in all things, and\nwhich is for ever pressing onwards towards conscious realisation,\nregardless of the increase of pain which the course of evolution\nimplies. But this hypothesis of unconscious will is not a justifiable\nmetaphysical principle got at by the analysis of experience, and\nnecessary for its explanation, though lying beyond it. It is a\n\"metempirical,\" or rather mythical, cause interpolated into the\nprocesses of experience. Hence the antagonism in which it stands to\npsychological fact: its disregard of the effect of pleasure as a\npowerful motive in volition; and its neglect of the obvious truth\nthat function so reacts upon organ that all actions have simply\nby continuance a tendency to be performed with greater ease, and\ntherefore to yield in their performance increase of pleasure. The\nsmoothness and precision with which it works may, indeed, lead to\na function being performed unconsciously, and thus without either\npain or pleasure. But the normal exercise of conscious activity is\nuniformly pleasurable.[168]\n\n[Sidenote: (_bb_) the nature of volition;]\n\nWhile giving up Schopenhauer's doctrine of the merely negative\ncharacter of pleasure, Hartmann yet contends that \"eternal limits\"\nare set by the very nature of volition, which make it impossible\nto have a world with more pleasure in it than pain. But his\narguments[169] come very far short of proving his case. For, in the\nfirst place, to say that the stimulation and wearying of the nerves\nimply the necessity of a cessation of pleasure as well as of pain,\nis to confuse complete states of consciousness with the subjective\nfeeling which accompanies each state. It is not true that one ever\nbecomes weary of pleasure: to talk as if there were one class of\nnerves for pleasure, and another for pain, is absurd. But every\nmental state, however pleasurable to start with, tends to become\nmonotonous, wearisome, or painful. Pleasure thus requires a change\nfrom one mental state to another: to say that it requires a change\nfrom pleasure to something else is a contradiction in terms. It is\nthe objects or activity that require to be varied, not the feeling\nof pleasure. Again, in the second place, it is true that pleasure\nis to be regarded as indirect _in so far as_ it is entirely due\nto the cessation of a pain, and not to instantaneous satisfaction\nof will. But it does not do to regard the pleasure as altogether\nindirect when, although the cessation of a pain is necessary for its\nproduction, it is itself something more than this cessation. The\ninhibition of will often prevents the realisation of an object which\nis very much more than a recompense in pleasurable quality for the\npain of the restraint; and although the pleasure only arises from\nthe removal of this painful state of inhibition, there is a direct\nand positive gain over and above the gratification of having pain\nremoved. In the third place, Hartmann argues that the satisfaction\nof will is often unconscious, whereas pain is _eo ipso_ conscious.\nBut, even admitting the reality of unconscious will or desire, which\nthis argument involves, it does not follow that pleasure and pain are\ndifferently affected in regard to it. If pain is _eo ipso_ conscious,\nso also is pleasure; if the satisfaction of unconscious desire gives\nno pleasure, neither does the absence of such satisfaction give\npain.[170] It is true, as Hartmann adds in the fourth place, that\ndesire is often long and the joy of satisfaction fleeting; but this\nrefers not so much to mental pleasures as to those connected with\nphysical appetite. Of them it is true that\n\n \"These violent delights have violent ends,\n And in their triumph die.\"\n\nBut in the higher pleasures with more permanent objects of pursuit,\nalthough the desire may be long-continued, the pleasure does not\ndisappear in the moment of gratification.\n\nIt would seem, therefore, that the pessimist psychology, in treating\npleasure in a different way from pain, mistakes the true nature\nof both as simply \"polar extremes\"[171] of feeling, and prevents\nthe argument being faced which has been brought forward to show the\nincreasing correspondence of pleasure and life.\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: (_cc_) the facts of human progress:]\n\nThe failure of the psychological argument makes the whole burden of\nthe proof of pessimism rest upon the argument from historical facts.\nAnd the attempt has been definitely made to show, from observation\nof the course of human affairs, that the progress of the world\ntends to misery. It is necessary, therefore, to ask whether it can\nbe established that the facts included under the vague term \"human\nprogress\" have a normal tendency either to increase pleasure or to\nact in the opposite way. Now progress is a characteristic both of the\nindividual and of society; but pleasure only belongs to the former,\nso that an answer to the question whether individual progress tends\nto increase the surplus of pleasure over pain, still leaves unsettled\nthe question as to the effect of social progress.\n\n[Sidenote: individual progress;]\n\nIt seems evident that both the physical and mental development of the\nindividual imply greater adaptability to, and correspondence with,\nthe external world, and that, on account of this development, there\nis less unpleasant friction between outer and inner relations, and\nmeans are at hand for obtaining objects of desire with less exertion\nthan formerly. But, at the same time, the increase of knowledge and\nof skill always implies not merely the means of satisfying old wants,\nbut the creation of new ones: we see more of the evil in the world\nthan our forefathers did, and there are more avenues by which it\ncan approach us, if we have also more effective means for avoiding\nwhat we dislike. And, although knowledge brings with it not only the\npleasure of gratified curiosity, but that recognition of a universal\norder which frees the mind from the evils bred by a belief in the\nfickleness of nature, yet this all-pervading sense of law has so\nregulated our beliefs and methods of research that science itself may\nseem to have lost the peculiar freshness of interest that belonged\nto its earlier stages; while the feelings called forth by a vision\nof the divine presence in the world, find but a poor substitute\nin the sublime region of \"cosmic emotion.\" Further, the widening\nof the sympathetic feelings and their consequent activities, and\nthe refinement of the whole sensitive nature by which it responds\nmore quickly and accurately to emotional stimuli, have made the\npresent generation more susceptible to both pain and pleasure than\nits predecessors. But Hartmann's argument that the duller nervous\nsystem of the savage races (Naturv\u00f6lker) makes them happier than the\ncivilised (Culturv\u00f6lker),[172] leaves out of sight the new sources of\npleasure as well as pain that are opened up to a refined sensibility.\nAccording to Hartmann, the \u00e6sthetic sensibilities may be a source\nof painless pleasure: yet even their cultivation cannot be said to\nbe matter of pure gain to their possessors; for the pain of discord\nis to be set against--in his opinion, it outweighs--the pleasure of\nharmony. On the whole, then, it would appear that the evolution of\nthe individual leads to greater possibilities both of pleasure and of\npain. The refinement of the intellectual and emotional nature opens\nup wider ranges of both kinds of feeling; and we are driven to look\nmainly to the improvement of the social environment for the means of\nincreasing pleasure and diminishing pain.\n\n[Sidenote: social progress:]\n\n[Sidenote: industrial,]\n\nBut to estimate the hedonistic value of social progress is a still\nmore difficult task than the preceding. For the march of affairs has\noften little regard to its effect on the happiness of the greater\nnumber of people concerned. Industrially, it may be thought that\nthe increase in the amount of wealth produced affords a vastly\ngreater means of comfort and luxury. Yet, it is doubtful whether\nthis increase has always been sufficient to keep pace with the\ngrowth of population; and it is certain that every society whose\nterritory is limited, must, when its numbers have increased beyond\na certain point, begin to experience the diminishing returns which\nnature yields for the labour expended upon it. Indeed, the tendency\nto an excess in the rate of increase of population over that of\nmeans of subsistence is one of the chief causes which make it so\ndifficult to assert that civilisation tends to greater happiness.\nBut, even although the average quantity of wealth be greater now than\nbefore, it must be remembered that wealth is measured by its amount,\nwhereas happiness depends on the equality with which that amount\nis distributed.[173] Yet the present industrial _r\u00e9gime_ tends to\nthe accumulation of immense wealth in a few hands, rather than to\nits proportionate increase throughout the community. The industrial\nprogress which increases the wealth of the rich, has little to\nrecommend it if it leaves the \"labouring poor\" at a starvation-wage.\n\n \"And what if Trade sow cities\n Like shells along the shore,\n And thatch with towns the prairie broad\n With railways ironed o'er,\"--\n\nif the population can be divided into plutocrats and proletariate?\nMoreover, the very nature of economic production seems to imply an\nopposition between social progress and individual wellbeing. For\nthe former, in demanding the greatest possible amount of produce,\nrequires an excessive and increasing specialisation of labour.\nEach worker must perform that operation only to which he has\nbeen specially trained, or which he can do best. And in this way\nindustrialism tends to occupy the greater part of the waking hours\nof an increasing proportion of human lives in the repetition of a\nshort series of mechanical movements which call out a bare minimum\nof the faculties of the worker, dwarf his nature, and reduce his\nlife to a mere succession of the same monotonous sensation.[174] In\nspite, therefore, of immense improvements in the general conditions\nof wellbeing, it is still difficult to say that the happiness of the\naverage human life has been much increased by the march of industrial\nprogress.\n\n[Sidenote: and political.]\n\nA more hopeful view may, perhaps, be taken of the effect of political\nprogress. The increase of popular government gratifies the desire for\npower, and, in some cases, even tends to a more efficient management\nof affairs. Still more important in its effect on happiness is\nthe greater security for life and property which the gradual\nconsolidation of political control has brought about. It would seem,\ntoo, that the harsher features of the struggle by which this advance\ntakes place have been modified; and that the war of politics has\nabated in fury more than the war of trade. On the whole, therefore,\nthe tendency of modern political rule appears to be towards an almost\nunmixed gain in respect of happiness,--by the security it affords for\nlife and property, by its wide distribution of political power, and\nby the room it gives for individual freedom. Yet the last of these\nresults--in the _laissez-faire_ system of industrialism to which it\nhas led, and which, in spite of many modifications, is still in the\nascendant--has effects of a more doubtful character.\n\nThis mere reference to one or two of the leading features of\nprogress would not be sufficient to support a thesis either as to\nits beneficial or baneful tendency. But evidence enough has been\nled to show that the effects on pleasure of individual and social\ndevelopment are of a mixed kind,--that culture and civilisation\nhave neither the tendency to misery which Hartmann follows Rousseau\nin attributing to them,[175] nor, on the other hand, that steady\ncorrespondence with increasing pleasure which would be required to\nestablish the position of evolutionist hedonism.\n\n[Sidenote: Necessity of choosing between evolutionism and hedonism.]\n\nIt follows, therefore, that, without adopting a pessimist view, we\nmust still make our choice between evolutionism and hedonism. The\ncourse of evolution--so far as experience helps us to understand\nit--cannot be measured by increase of pleasure. Nothing is said here\nto show that it is not perfectly consistent to hold that the moral\nfeelings and ideas, the customs to which they have given rise, and\nthe institutions in which they are embodied, have been produced by\nthe ordinary laws of evolution, and yet to maintain that the moral\nend for reflective beings is the hedonistic or utilitarian end. It\nmay be possible, that is to say, to be an evolutionist in psychology\nand sociology, at the same time that one is a hedonist in ethics. But\nit is not allowable to adopt pleasure as the end, and yet speak of it\nas determined by evolution. Evolution can determine no such end until\nit be shown that the progress it connotes implies a proportionate\nincrease of pleasure.\n\nSuch is the conclusion to which we are led by a consideration of the\nbearings of evolution upon the increase of pleasure and pain. But\nthis argument requires to be supplemented by the more satisfactory\nmethod of an independent analysis of pleasure in relation to the\ndevelopment of human nature; and from this analysis we may hope to\ndiscover how far the theory of evolution is consistent with the\nethics of hedonism.\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: 4. The psychological analysis of pleasure and pain in\nrelation to the ethics of evolution.]\n\nThe relative and transient nature of pleasure has been urged as an\nobjection against any form of hedonism by many philosophers since\nthe time of Plato. And the argument has of late years been brought\nforward in a way which shows that the calculus of \"pleasures\" and\n\"pains\" which Bentham's ethics implies is much less certain and\neasy than its author supposed. This has been made clear both by the\nsubtle analysis carried out by the late Professor Green, and by\nProfessor Sidgwick's examination of the difficulties which beset the\n\"hedonistic calculus.\" It does not appear, however, to have been made\nout that the nature of pleasure proves hedonism to be impossible as\nthe end of conduct. But it may, perhaps, appear that the case is\naltered when we consider the matter in the light of the evolutionist\nform of hedonism now under examination, and estimate from this point\nof view the ethical bearings of the psychological analysis of feeling.\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) The purely subjective nature of pleasure;]\n\n[Sidenote: its connection with objective states of mind,]\n\n[Sidenote: through which it may be made the end of conduct.]\n\nThe difficulty of defining pleasure or pain is not the same as the\ndifficulty or impossibility of defining any elementary sensation.\nFor the latter is connected in definite ways with other similar\nsensations, can be compared and associated with them, and by\nsuch association go to make up an object or thing. But pleasure\nand pain are neither objects nor parts of objects: they cannot\nbe distinguished from or associated with the impressions of the\nsenses so as to constitute an object. They can only be spoken of\nas an affection of the percipient and active subject, different\nin kind both from the objects it knows and the acts it performs:\neach can only be defined as the opposite of the other. Pleasure and\npain are not real phenomena with a distinguishable existence of\ntheir own, like sensations, conceptions, or actions; they have no\ntrace of objectivity whatever, but are, as Hamilton puts it,[176]\n\"subjectively subjective\": \"pleasure is not a fact, nor is pain a\nfact, but one fact is pleasurable, another painful.\"[177] Pleasure,\ntherefore, is a mere feeling of the subject, concomitant with the\nsensory or motor presentations which, by reason of their presence\nto consciousness, we call objects or actions. It is not something\nby itself which we can choose rather than something else, as we may\nselect a peach instead of an apple. It can only be made the end of\nconduct in an indirect way. We must aim not at pleasure _per se_, but\nat objects which we have reason to believe will be accompanied by\npleasurable feeling. Pleasure and pain, as it has been urged,[178]\nare not quantities that can be added and subtracted. It is not the\npleasurable or painful feeling, but the perceptional or cognitive\nelements in the mental state of which it is an element, that admit of\nplurality and measurement. But we may foresee that one mental state\nwill be accompanied by pleasurable, another by painful feeling, and,\non that account, we may choose the former. In a great number of cases\nwe are further able to make a quantitative estimate, and to say that\nthe pleasurable feeling accompanying one object or action is more\nintense than that accompanying another, and thus to choose one object\nrather than another, not merely because one is pleasurable while the\nother is painful, but (in cases where both are pleasurable) because\nit is supposed that the one will yield more intense or more prolonged\npleasure than the other. If this be true, the purely subjective\nnature of pleasure does not make it impossible for it to be taken\nas the practical end of conduct for the individual--however inexact\nand tentative many of its estimates must be--though it will shortly\nappear that its nature unfits it to be the end on the theory of\nevolution.\n\nThe difficulty arises when we attempt to interpret, by means of\npleasure, the increase and development of life to which the course\nof evolution tends, and which is sometimes put forward as the end\nwhich the evolution-theory prescribes for conduct. And the difficulty\nalso meets us when we seek to explain the conception of a maximum of\npleasures as the end, by means of the conception of evolution.\n\nAs long as we are content to look upon human nature as consisting\nof constant sources of activity and enjoyment, and having fixed\nsusceptibilities for pleasure and pain, it is easy to adopt the\nincrease of pleasure and diminution of pain as our aim. But the\ncase is altered when we take into consideration the fact that man's\nactions and sensibilities are subject to indefinite modification.\nPleasure, as we have seen, is a feeling of the subject dependent upon\nthe objects, sensory and motor, present at any time to consciousness.\nThese objects alone can be our end; but we may aim at certain of\nthem rather than others, simply on account of their pleasurable\naccompaniment. It may happen, however, that an object or action at\none time pleasurable becomes painful at another time, and that what\nis now painful ceases to be so and becomes pleasurable. In this case\nour course of action, if motived by pleasure, would have to be\nentirely changed, our practical ethics revised and reversed. And,\nalthough no sudden alteration such as this ever takes place, the\ntheory of evolution shows that a gradual modification of the kind is\ngoing on.\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) The conditions of pleasure and pain:]\n\nThe conditions of pleasure and pain, physiological and psychological,\nare matter of dispute; and the dispute is complicated by the\nconfusion of the physiological with the psychological problem.\nIt will be evident, however,--if only we keep different things\nclear of each other,--that both kinds of explanation are possible,\nand that they are distinct from one another. The question of the\nnervous antecedents and concomitants of feeling is one thing, and\nquite distinct from the question which now arises of the mental\nantecedents or concomitants of feeling. And here the theories which\nhave attempted a generalisation of the phenomena are, in the light\nof recent inquiry, mainly two: the theory that pleasure follows,\nor is the sense of, increase of life, and that which holds it to\nbe the concomitant of unimpeded conscious functioning or of medium\nactivities.\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b1) Pleasure not definable as the sense of increased\nvitality;]\n\nThe former theory[179] might be put forward as indicating how it is\npossible to institute a connection between pleasure and evolution.\nBut it has been already shown that neither the actual facts of life,\nnor the tendencies to action, can be so interpreted as to make their\nnature and development correspond, with any degree of exactness,\nwith pleasure and its increase.[180] Nor is it possible to make out\nthat every pain corresponds to a loss of vitality, every pleasure\nheightens it. On the contrary, the assertion that pleasure-giving\nactions and life-preserving actions coincide, is due to a hasty\ngeneralisation which cannot include all the facts. That it holds\nthroughout a considerable extent is true. Pleasure is, at any rate,\na usual accompaniment of the normal processes of the development of\nlife; and pain reaches its climax in death. But yet there is a broad\nmargin of experience for which the generalisation is incorrect. There\nare numerous cases of painful and pleasurable sensations which cannot\nbe shown to be, respectively, destructive of, and beneficial to,\nvitality. As Mr Bain, who always keeps the facts in view, admits,\nwith regard to the feelings connected with the five senses, \"we\ncannot contend that the degree of augmented vital energy corresponds\nalways with the degree of the pleasure.\"[181] The same discrepancy\nmay be observed in more complex experiences. The effort after a\nfuller life, whether physical or mental, even when its ultimate\nsuccess is not doubtful, may bring more pain than pleasure; while the\nlife which never strains its powers towards the limits of endurance,\nmay experience almost uninterrupted pleasure: but such pleasure is\nthe sure herald of the process of degeneration.\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b2) may be held to depend on medium or normal functioning.]\n\nThe theory that pleasure follows increased vitality, and pain\ndecreased vitality, is supplemented or opposed in modern psychology\nby the theory that feeling depends on function: that pleasure is the\nconcomitant of medium activities,[182] or of conscious functioning,\nwhich is unimpeded and not overstrained[183]--pain accompanying the\nopposite condition. The objection urged against this view, that it\nleaves the so-called \"passive pleasures\" out of account, seems to be\nmade without sufficient consideration of what is meant by attributing\npassivity to pleasure. All that such an expression can denote, would\nappear to be that, in the pleasurable experience referred to, no\nexercise of the muscles is implied, not that such an experience can\ntake place without any conscious activity on the part of the subject.\nAt the same time, the theory that pleasure in all cases depends\nupon function, must be admitted to be obliged to call in the aid of\nhypothesis in order to explain all the facts. If the generalisation\nrequired by the theory can be made out, it must be by emphasising\nthe fact that feeling is never properly regarded as purely passive,\nbut implies subjective reaction; and by supposing that the variation\nof feeling between pleasure and pain depends on a difference in the\ncharacter of this subjective reaction. At the same time, the complete\naccuracy of this generalisation is not of vital importance here, as\nit is mainly with the feeling which manifestly results from activity\nor functioning that we are concerned.\n\n[Sidenote: Modification of pleasurable characteristics of objects]\n\nWhether pleasure depends upon increase of vital energy, or upon\nunimpeded or medium functioning, it must be subject to modification\nalong with the conditions under which life may continue and increase,\nor the modes of activity which may be carried on without opposition\nand in moderation. This constant modification of the objects in\nwhich one takes pleasure, or which give one pain, is, indeed, a fact\nwhich must be admitted by any theory of feeling. A state of mind may\nbe at first pleasurable; but, if it be long-continued, the pleasure\nwill give way to the pain of monotony. The same is true of a painful\nstate of mind: its continuance does not prolong the same intensity\nof painful consciousness, but the sensibility becomes dulled and\nthe pain diminishes. The transition is still more striking in the\ncase of motor activities. In learning to walk, or to ride, or to\nplay any instrument, the first experiences are those of painful\neffort. Gradually, however, the co-ordinations of movement required\nentail less and less pain, till the feeling passes over into its\nopposite, and we have a pleasurable sense of successful effort and\nwell-adapted functioning. But, just as pain gave way to pleasure, so\npleasure itself subsides, the action becomes merely reflex and passes\nout of consciousness altogether, unless it be so long continued as\nto produce fatigue--that is, pain. Habit, as Dumont remarks,[184]\nintensifies perceptions, but weakens pleasure and pain.\n\n[Sidenote: suggests that feeling depends on objective intensity.]\n\nThese are psychological facts--not mere theories--which hold true\neven of the individual experience. But they have led psychologists\nto the theory, supported by a vast amount of direct experiment, that\nthere is no object or action which can be said to be absolutely and\nin itself either pleasant or painful.[185] The feeling of pleasure\nor pain accompanying the object is a function of its intensity in\nrelation to the subject. This proposition cannot, indeed, be fully\ndemonstrated regarding each simple sensation: to the emotions\ninto which intricate relations of perceptions enter, it does not\napply, till their complexity has been reduced. Some sensations and\nperceptions are certainly felt as painful in any intensity in which\nthey are distinctly present to consciousness. But, although this\nis a real difficulty, it does not seem insuperable. The instances\nwhich Mill cites[186] to throw doubt on the generalisation that\nquality of feeling depends on intensity are unfortunately chosen for\nhis purpose. For--to take his example--the taste of rhubarb is to\nmany not painful but pleasant; and, indeed, every case of acquired\ntaste shows that pleasure and pain can be modified through habit and\ncustom, and suggests that, even in the case of those sensations which\nare painful in any form we have been able to experience them, there\nis a degree of intensity below which they would, if experienced, be\npleasant. Experiment has proved of the majority even of sensible\nqualities, and analogy leads us to conclude of all, that there is a\ndegree in which each may be pleasant, and a degree in which each\nmay be painful, and, between them, a--real or imaginary--zero-point\nof feeling, where there is neither pleasure nor pain. This must, it\nis true, be received as a hypothesis only; but it is a hypothesis\nwhich is suggested by a wide range of facts, and which is able to\ninclude even those facts with which it is seemingly inconsistent,\nby supposing that could their intensity be indefinitely diminished\nwithout their passing out of consciousness, these sensations would\nreach a point after which they would be felt as pleasant and not as\npainful. Further, experiment shows that this dividing-point which\nseparates the two poles of feeling is not always placed at the same\ndegree of intensity, that it differs not only for every object,\nbut for each individual subject as well, and that it undergoes\nmodification in the course of the subject's development.[187]\n\nWhat is true of sense-perception is still more evident regarding\nthose experiences in which the activity of the subject is more\nobviously involved. As any function may, if carried beyond a certain\ndegree of intensity, be painful, so any function consistent with life\nmay be a source of pleasure.\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: (_c_) Application of the theory of evolution:]\n\n[Sidenote: any conduct consistent with conditions of life will come\nto be pleasurable;]\n\nFrom the preceding discussion two things may be inferred: first, the\ndependence of pleasure and pain on the subject-activity, whether the\nactivity be that of perception or of what is specifically called\naction; and secondly, the modification of pleasure and pain, and\ntransition from one to the other, along with the modification of\nthat subject-activity. To the application of both these conclusions\nthere may be limits; but their general accuracy does not seem\ndoubtful. What the doctrine of evolution adds to this is its\nproof of the indefinite modifiability of human function. \"It is\nan essential principle of life,\" Mr Spencer wrote,[188] before he\nhad arrived at his general theory of evolution, \"that a faculty to\nwhich circumstances do not allow full exercise diminishes; and that\na faculty on which circumstances make excessive demands increases;\"\nand to this we must now add, \"that, supposing it consistent with\nmaintenance of life, there is no kind of activity which will not\nbecome a source of pleasure if continued; and that therefore\npleasure will eventually accompany every mode of action demanded\nby social conditions.\"[189] It is, he holds, a \"biological truth,\"\nthat \"everywhere faculties adjust themselves to the conditions\nof existence in such wise that the activities those conditions\nrequire become pleasurable.\"[190] The vast periods of time over\nwhich evolution stretches are scarcely needed to show how pleasure\nmay be made to follow from almost any course of action consistent\nwith the continuance of life. The change of habits which often\ntakes place in the history of a nation, and even in the life of an\nindividual, makes this sufficiently obvious. But, if we still think\nof making attainment of pleasure the end of conduct, the doctrine of\nevolution must give us pause. It has been already argued that, given\ncertain sources of, and susceptibilities for, pleasure, the course\nof evolution has not been such as to produce an exact coincidence\nbetween them and the actions which further life. But it would seem\nthat, given habits of acting which are consistent with the conditions\nof life, and which are systematically carried out, these will not\nfail to grow pleasant as the organism becomes adapted to them. At the\nbest, it is difficult enough to say, even for the individual, whether\none imagined object or course of action will exceed another in\npleasurable feeling or not. But, when we remember that function and\nfeeling may be modified indefinitely, it is impossible to say what\ncourse of conduct will produce the greatest amount of pleasure for\nthe race. Taking in all its effects, we cannot say that one way of\nseeking pleasure is better--that is, will bring more pleasure--than\nanother. Bearing in mind the modifications which evolution produces,\nit seems impossible to guide the active tendencies of mankind towards\nthe goal of greatest pleasure, except by saying that the greatest\npleasure will be got from the greatest amount of successful, or of\nunrestrained, or of medium activity.\n\n[Sidenote: maximum pleasure only definable in terms of life.]\n\nIf, then, we have been seeking to define the evolutionist end by\ninterpreting it in terms of pleasure, it appears that we have only\nsucceeded in making the round of a circle: pleasure as the end is\nseen to be only definable as life or activity, although it was\nadopted as the end in order that by its help we might discover what\nlife or activity meant as the end for conduct. We may, perhaps, still\nbe able to hold to a form of hedonism, if we turn our attention from\nthe race to a small portion of present mankind. In spite of the\nmodifiability of function and its parasite feeling, we may still be\nable to say that such and such a course of action is likely to bring\nmost pleasure to the individual or even to the family. But we cannot\nextend such a means of interpreting the ethics of evolution to the\nrace, where the possibility of modification is indefinitely great,\nand the pain incurred in initiating a change counts for little in\ncomparison with its subsequent results. If we continue to look from\nthe evolutionist point of view, the question, What conduct will on\nthe whole bring most pleasure? can only be answered by saying that\nit is the conduct which will most promote life--an answer which\nmight have been more satisfactory had it not been to give meaning\nto this end \"promotion of life\" that it was interpreted in terms of\ngreatest pleasure. The evolution-theory of ethics is thus seen to\noscillate from the theory which looks upon the _summum bonum_ as\npleasure, to that which finds it in activity. It contains elements\nwhich make it impossible for it to adhere to the former alternative.\nThe comprehensiveness of its view of life makes it unable to adopt\npleasure as the end, since pleasure changes with every modification\nof function. And it has now to be seen whether the empirical method\nof interpretation to which it adheres will allow of its notion of\nlife or activity affording a satisfactory end for conduct.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[154] Data of Ethics, p. 171.\n\n[155] Data of Ethics, p. 162.\n\n[156] Ibid., p. 57.\n\n[157] Cf. A. Barratt, in Mind, ii. 172 n.\n\n[158] As illustrating this I may refer to G. v. Gi\u017aycki, Philosophische\nConsequenzen der Lamarck-Darwin'schen Entwicklungstheorie (1876),\np. 27: \"Wir haben oben die Erhaltung und F\u00f6rderung des Lebens des\nIndividuums und der Gattung als das eine Ziel der Einrichtung des\ngeistigen Organismus gekennzeichnet.\" P. 58: \"Auf das Streben nach in\nsich befriedigtem psychischen Leben [that is to say, pleasure] sind\nalle animalen Organismen angelegt.\" In his popular essay, 'Grundz\u00fcge\nder Moral' (1883), Dr Gi\u017aycki's principle and method are utilitarian.\nWith the above may be compared Guyau, Esquisse d'une morale sans\nobligation ni sanction (1885), p. 15: \"L'action sort naturellement\ndu fonctionnement de la vie, en grande partie inconscient; elle\nentre aussit\u00f4t dans le domaine de la conscience et de la jouissance,\nmais elle n'en vient pas. La tendance de l'\u00eatre \u00e0 pers\u00e9v\u00e9rer dans\nl'\u00eatre est le fond de tout d\u00e9sir sans constituer elle-m\u00eame un d\u00e9sir\nd\u00e9termin\u00e9.\"\n\n[159] Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 82 f; Principles of Psychology,\n\u00a7 125, 3d ed., i. 280; Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 83. The\nsimplicity of this argument will be appreciated if we consider the\ndifficulty Comte experienced in trying to reach a similar conclusion.\nSee Positive Philosophy, Miss Martineau's translation, ii. 87 ff.\n\n[160] Cf. Ph\u00e4nomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins, pp. 701, 708.\n\n[161] Cf. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 3d ed., p. 127.\n\n[162] Data of Ethics, p. 26.\n\n[163] Cf. Vaihinger, Hartmann, D\u00fchring und Lange (1876), p. 124.\n\n[164] Cf. Sully, Pessimism, p. 216.\n\n[165] See above, p. 167 f.\n\n[166] Cf. Fiske, Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy (1874), ii. 332 f.\n\n[167] \"Imitation,\" according to Kant (Grundlegung zur Met. d. Sitten,\nWerke, iv. 257), \"has no place at all in morals;\" and this is true\nif the naked law of duty--or respect for it--is the sole ethical\nmotive. But if morality consists in the attainment of an ideal which\nis being gradually realised in man, moral value will not be denied to\nthe motive which leads the individual to fashion his own nature after\nthat in which morality has attained more complete realisation.\n\n[168] See the concluding pages of this chapter.\n\n[169] Philosophie des Unbewussten, 6th ed., p. 660 ff.\n\n[170] Cf. Sully, Pessimism, p. 226 n.\n\n[171] Cf. J. Ward, Journal of Speculative Philosophy, xvi. (1882),\n377.\n\n[172] Phil. d. Unbewussten, p. 747.\n\n[173] Bentham, Theory of Legislation (by Dumont, 1876), p. 103 ff.\nWundt, Physiologische Psychologie, 2d ed., p. 469, finds in this\nan instance of Weber's law. Thus, the man with \u00a3100 receives the\nsame pleasure on receipt of \u00a31, as the possessor of \u00a31000 does on\nreceiving \u00a310. As Wundt remarks, however, this is only true within\ncertain limits. Sixpence may give more pleasure to a beggar who is\nnever far from the starvation-point, than the clearing of a million\nto Baron Rothschild. Further than this, the law only states an\n\"abstract\" truth. For the susceptibility to pleasure is not only\nvery different in different individuals, but this difference depends\non many other circumstances than the amount of wealth already in\npossession,--such as original emotional susceptibility, &c.\n\n[174] Cf. Comte, Positive Philosophy, ii. 144.\n\n[175] Ph\u00e4n. d. s. B., p. 640.\n\n[176] Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. 432.\n\n[177] L. Dumont, Th\u00e9orie scientifique de la sensibilit\u00e9, 2d ed., p.\n83; cf. F. Bouillier, Du plaisir et de la douleur, 2d ed., p. 29 ff.\nReference may also be made to the leading psychological text-book.\n\"Das Gef\u00fchl,\" says Volkmann (Lehrbuch der Psychologie, \u00a7 127, 3d ed.,\nii. 300), \"ist n\u00e4mlich keine eigene Vorstellung neben den anderen\n(es gibt keine eigenen 'Gef\u00fchlsvorstellungen'), ja \u00fcberhaupt gar\nkeine Vorstellung.\" Professor Bain's view is different, but does\nnot altogether prevent him from acknowledging the subjectivity of\nfeeling: \"Without intellectual images clearly recollected, we do not\nremember feelings; the reproduction of feeling is an intellectual\nfact, and the groundwork is intellectual imagery.\"--Emotions, p. 63.\n\n[178] Cf. Green, Introduction to Hume, ii. \u00a7 7.\n\n[179] Cf. Spinoza, Ethica, iii. 11, schol.; Hobbes, Leviathan, i. 6,\np. 25; Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, p. 283. Professor Bain's\nstatement is carefully guarded: \"A very considerable number of the\nfacts may be brought under the following principle--namely, that\nstates of pleasure are connected with an increase, and states of pain\nwith an abatement, of some, or all, of the vital functions.\"\n\n[180] As Mr Spencer allows, Psychology, \u00a7 126, i. 284: \"In the case\nof mankind, then, there has arisen, and must long continue, a deep\nand involved derangement of the natural connections between pleasures\nand beneficial actions, and between pains and detrimental actions.\"\n\n[181] The Senses and the Intellect, p. 286. The Law of Conservation\nis incomplete, Mr Bain holds, and must be supplemented by the Law of\nStimulation (p. 294).\n\n[182] Spencer, Psychology, \u00a7 123, i. 277: \"Generally speaking,\nthen, pleasures are the concomitants of medium activities, where\nthe activities are of kinds liable to be in excess or in defect;\nand where they are of kinds not liable to be excessive, pleasure\nincreases as the activity increases, except where the activity is\neither constant or involuntary.\"\n\n[183] Hamilton, Lectures, ii. 440: \"Pleasure is the reflex of the\nspontaneous and unimpeded exertion of a power of whose energies\nwe are conscious. Pain, a reflex of the overstrained or repressed\nexertion of such a power.\" Cf. Aristotle, Eth. N., vii. 12, p. 1153 a\n14, x. 4, p. 1174 b 20.\n\n[184] Th\u00e9orie scientifique, p. 78.\n\n[185] Cf. Wundt, Physiol. Psych., p. 470; Fechner, Vorschule der\nAesthetik, ii. 243 f.\n\n[186] Exam. of Hamilton's Philosophy, 5th ed., p. 559.\n\n[187] See Fechner, _loc. cit._\n\n[188] Social Statics, p. 79.\n\n[189] Data of Ethics, p. 186.\n\n[190] Mind, vi. 85.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nTHE EVOLUTIONIST END.\n\n\n[Sidenote: Want of harmony between evolutionism and hedonism.]\n\nIn showing the important bearing which evolution has on the causes\nof pleasure, the argument of the preceding chapter has also made\nclear that the ends of evolutionism and of hedonism cannot be made\nto explain one another. The theory which starts with a maximum of\npleasure as the ultimate end, but points to the course of evolution\nas showing how that end is to be realised, is confronted by the\nfact that the development of life does not always tend to increased\npleasure, and that the laws of its development cannot therefore be\nsafely adopted as maxims for the attainment of pleasure. The same\nobjection may be taken to the method of interpreting the evolutionist\nend by means of the pleasurable results of conduct. The two do not\ncorrespond with that exactness which would admit of one doing duty\nfor the other as a practical guide. And a further difficulty has been\nshown to stand in the way of this method. For, on coming to analyse\npleasure, we find that it may, by habituation, arise from any--or\nalmost any--course of conduct which the conditions of existence admit\nof. The evolutionist, therefore, can have no surer idea of greatest\npleasure--even although this may not be a very sure one--than that\nit will follow in the train of the greatest or most varied activity\nwhich harmonises with the laws of life.\n\n[Sidenote: Necessity of investigating independent evolutionist end.]\n\nWe must therefore forsake the method of eclecticism, and inquire\nwhether the theory of evolution can make any independent contribution\ntowards determining an end for conduct. We are frequently told that\nit prescribes as the end \"preservation,\" or \"development,\" or \"the\nhealth of the society.\" But to obtain a clear meaning for such\nnotions, we must see what definite content the theory of evolution\ncan give them,--without considering, at present, the grounds for\ntransforming them into ethical precepts. Now, it may be thought--and\nthe suggestion deserves careful examination--that we may find in the\ncharacteristics of evolution itself[191] an indication of the end\nwhich organisms produced by and subject to evolution are naturally\nfitted to attain. These characteristics must therefore be passed\nunder review, that their ethical bearings may be seen.\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: 1. Adaptation to environment: necessary for life;]\n\n1. The first condition of development, and even of life, is\ncorrespondence between an organism and its environment. The waste\nimplied in the processes which constitute the life of an organised\nbody has to be supplied by nutriment got from surrounding objects.\nIt requires food, air, light, and heat in due proportions in order\nthat its various organs may do their work. When these circumstances\nchange, either it adapts itself to the new conditions or death\nensues. Thus \"we find that every animal is limited to a certain\nrange of climate; every plant to certain zones of latitude and\nelevation,\"[192]--though nothing differs more among different species\nthan the extent of an organism's adaptability to varying conditions.\nA definite organism and a medium suitable to it are called by Comte\nthe two \"fundamental correlative conditions of life\"; according to Mr\nSpencer they constitute life. \"Conformity\" is absolutely necessary\nbetween \"the vital functions of any organism and the conditions in\nwhich it is placed.\" In this conformity there are varying degrees,\nand \"the completeness of the life will be proportionate to the\ncompleteness of the correspondence.\"[193] Even when life is not\naltogether extinguished, it is impeded by imperfect adaptation.\nWhere external circumstances make the attainment of nourishment\ndifficult and precarious, life is shortened in extent, and, within\nits limits, more occupied with simply maintaining its necessary\nfunctions--less full, varied, and active. The same holds good whether\nthe external circumstances are natural or social,--applies equally\nto those whose energies are exhausted in the production of a bare\nlivelihood from a niggard soil and unpropitious climate, and to\nthose who, under changed conditions, feel the hardship of adapting\nthemselves to a new social medium.\n\n[Sidenote: spoken of as the ethical end;]\n\n[Sidenote: defines the notion of self-preservation.]\n\nShall we say, then, that the end of human conduct is adaptation\nto environment? This seems to be the position taken up by some\nevolutionists. In the language of von Baer,[194] \"the end of ends\nis always that the organic body be adapted to the conditions of the\nearth, its elements and means of nutriment;\" and Mr Spencer holds\n\"that all evil results from the non-adaptation of constitution to\ncondition.\"[195] The hedonism which Mr Spencer definitely accepts\nas his ethical principle prevents him, indeed, from fully adopting\nthe theory of human action which von Baer seems to regard as the\nresult of the doctrine of evolution. Yet complete adaptation of\nconstitution to condition is held by him to be characteristic of that\nperfect form of life to which evolution tends, and the laws of which\nare to be our guides in our present imperfect social condition. In\nworking out his theory of ethics, he describes acts as \"good or bad\naccording as they are well or ill adjusted to ends,\" identifying\nthe good with \"the conduct furthering self-preservation,\" and the\nbad with \"the conduct tending to self-destruction.\"[196] The notion\nof self-preservation thus introduced is naturally suggested as the\nend subserved by the activity of an organism being adjusted to\nsurrounding conditions. Self-preservation, therefore, rather than\nadaptation to environment, will be regarded as the end, with which\nadaptation will be connected as the essential means.\n\nThis notion of self-preservation has played a remarkable part in\nethical and psychological discussion since the time of the Stoics.\nIt withdraws attention from the relative and transient feeling of\npleasure to the permanence of the living being. Thus, with the\nStoics, the notion of self-preservation was accompanied by an\nethics hostile to indulgence in pleasure; while, on the other hand,\nin Spinoza and in Hobbes, pleasure was recognised as the natural\nconsequence of self-preserving acts--the former defining it as\na transition from less to greater perfection, the latter as the\nsense of what helps the vital functions. The theory of evolution\nhas, of course, not only its distinctive contribution to make to\nthe connection between self-preservation and pleasure--a subject\nalready referred to,--but also shows how an increasing harmony has\nbeen produced between acts which tend to self-preservation and\nthose which tend to social-preservation. With Mr Spencer these two\npoints are united. His doctrine that the \"conduct which furthers\nrace-maintenance evolves hand-in-hand with the conduct which\nfurthers self-maintenance\"[197] is preliminary to the establishment\nof the proposition that the highest life is one in which egoistic\nand \"altruistic\" acts harmonise with one another and with external\nconditions: \"the life called moral is one in which this moving\nequilibrium reaches completeness or approaches most nearly to\ncompleteness.\"[198]\n\n[Sidenote: Self-preservation and social-preservation.]\n\nAs has been already pointed out,[199] it is not the case, in\nthe present state of human life, that egoistic and altruistic\ntendencies, even when properly understood, always lead to the\nsame course of conduct; and even the theory of evolution does not\ndo away with the necessity for a \"compromise\" between them. But,\neven had the theory of evolution overcome the opposition between\nthe individual and social standpoints, much would still remain to\nbe done for the purpose of constructing a system of ethics, or\ndetermining the ethical end. It seems better, therefore, to pass\nover at present the conflict of competing interests. According to\nPascal, \"the entire succession of men, the whole course of ages,\nis to be regarded as one man always living and always learning.\"\nAnd this is a suggestion which the theory of evolution only states\nmore definitely, though it cannot completely vindicate it. On this\nsupposition, self-preservation _is_ social-preservation, and the\npossibly divergent interests of the individual and the whole are left\nout of account. The end for the race then is, according to the theory\nmost explicitly stated by von Baer, a state of \"moving equilibrium\":\nand to this state of affairs we are at least, Mr Spencer holds,\nindubitably tending. In the final stage of human development, man\nwill be perfectly adapted to the conditions of his environment, so\nthat, to each change without, there will be an answering organic\nchange. The ideal which seems to be held up to us is that of a time\nin which there will be no more irksome fretting in the machinery\nof life, and circumstances will never be unpropitious, because the\norganism will never be wanting in correspondence with them.\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) As the end for present conduct: opposed to progress;]\n\nIf this adaptation be adopted as the practical end for conduct\nunder present conditions, and not merely as describing a far-off\nideal to which we are supposed to be tending, man may continue to\nmanifest a law of progress, but its initiation will be from external\nconditions. If \"adaptation to environment\" is consistently made the\nend, activity will have to be restricted to suiting one's powers\nto an external order of nature, and desire will have to be curbed\nwhen it does not bring the means of satisfaction along with it.\n\"Bene latere\" will again be an equivalent for \"bene vivere,\" and\nhappiness will have to be sought in withdrawal from the distractions\nof political life, and in the restriction of desire. It is strange\nto see the theory which is supposed to be based upon and to account\nfor progress, returning in this way to an ideal similar to that in\nwhich the post-Aristotelian schools took refuge amid the decline of\npolitical and intellectual life in Greece. The end which Stoic and\nEpicurean alike sought in complete emancipation from the conditions\nof the external world,[200] is now, in more scientific phrase, made\nto consist in complete harmony with these conditions. But, in their\npractical results, the two theories would seem scarcely to differ. It\nis not astonishing, therefore, if this gospel of renunciation finds\nlittle favour among practical men in our day. It is seen that, if a\nman has not wants, he will make no efforts, and that, if he make no\nefforts, his condition can never be bettered. Thus social reformers\nhave often found that the classes they have tried to elevate did not\nfeel the evil of their lot as their benefactors saw it, and they have\nhad to create wants before attempting to satisfy them.[201] And the\npractical tendency finds its counterpart in speculative opinion, so\nthat, whereas Epicurus placed happiness in freedom from wants, modern\nhedonism usually considers a man the happier the more wants he has\nand is able to supply.[202]\n\n[Sidenote: does not fully represent the theory of evolution.]\n\nThis practical tendency brings out the truth that it is not only by\nthe subordination of self to circumstances, and the restriction of\ndesire to present means of satisfaction, that the required harmony\nbetween outer and inner relations can be brought about. The other\nalternative is open: circumstances may be subordinated to self. For\nthis latter alternative the theory of evolution seems really to leave\nroom as much as for the former. It is excluded only when a one-sided\nemphasis is laid on the necessity of adaptation to environment. For\nevolution implies a gradually increasing heterogeneity of structure\nas the prelude to perfect agreement with circumstances: \"the limit\nof heterogeneity towards which every aggregate progresses is the\nformation of as many specialisations and combinations of parts as\nthere are specialised and combined forces to be met.\"[203] The end\nof evolution is a correspondence between inner and outer which is\nnot produced by the easy method of both being very simple, but\nwhich is consistent with, and indeed requires, the complexity and\nheterogeneity produced in both by constant interaction.[204] The\ngreater this complexity, the more filled with sensation, emotion, and\nthought life is, the greater is what Mr Spencer calls its \"breadth.\"\nBut, if \"adaptation\" is still regarded as expressing the end, then,\nthe more perfect this adaptation is, the less room seems left for\nprogress, and the end of human conduct is placed in a state of moving\nequilibrium in which action takes place without a jar and without\ndisturbing the play of external conditions.[205]\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) As describing the ultimate condition of life,]\n\nThis end of \"adaptation\" is looked upon by Mr Spencer not as\nrepresenting the conduct prescribed by morality in present\ncircumstances, but as describing the ultimate condition of human\nlife. As such, it is the foundation of his Absolute Ethics--that\n\"final permanent code\" which \"alone admits of being definitely\nformulated, and so constituting ethics as a science in contrast with\nempirical ethics.\"[206] The \"philosophical moralist,\" he tells us,\n\"treats solely of the _straight_ man. He determines the properties of\nthe straight man; describes how the straight man comports himself;\nshows in what relationship he stands to other straight men; shows\nhow a community of straight men is constituted. Any deviation\nfrom strict rectitude he is obliged wholly to ignore. It cannot be\nadmitted into his premisses without vitiating all his conclusions.\nA problem in which a _crooked_ man forms one of the elements is\ninsoluble by him.\"[207]\n\n[Sidenote: complete correspondence with environment.]\n\n[Sidenote: Resultant absolute code of ethics]\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b1) lays down abstract principles for relation of\nindividual to society;]\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b2) farther only defines end of conduct as adaptation;]\n\nHow, then, are we to conceive the nature or conduct of the \"straight\nman\"? To begin with, it is made clear that his dealings are only with\nstraight men; for there are no \"crooked men\" in the ideal community.\n\"The coexistence of a perfect man and an imperfect society is\nimpossible; and could the two coexist the resulting conduct would not\nfurnish the ethical standard sought.\"[208] \"The ultimate man is one\nin whom this process [of adaptation to the social state] has gone so\nfar as to produce a correspondence between all the promptings of his\nnature and all the requirements of his life as carried on in society.\nIf so, it is a necessary implication that there exists an ideal code\nof conduct formulating the behaviour of the completely-adapted man in\nthe completely-evolved society.\" This is the code of Absolute Ethics,\nwhose injunctions alone are \"absolutely right,\" and which, \"as a\nsystem of ideal conduct, is to serve as a standard for our guidance\nin solving, as well as we can, the problems of real conduct.\"[209]\nAt the outset, we were required to \"interpret the more developed\nby the less developed;\" [210] the conclusion sets forth that the\nless developed is to be guided by the more developed, the real by\nthe ideal. Now, ethics \"includes all conduct which furthers or\nhinders, in either direct or indirect ways, the welfare of self\nor others.\"[211] Thus Absolute Ethics, like Relative Ethics, has\ntwo divisions, personal and social. As to the latter, Mr Spencer\nformulates certain principles of justice, negative beneficence, and\npositive beneficence,[212] which describe the harmonious co-operation\nof ideal men in the ideal state. These principles may perhaps be\ncapable of a modified application to the present state of society,\nin which there is a conflict of interests: although Mr Spencer's\nrepresentation of them--which is still, however, incomplete--suggests\nthe belief that they are not so much guides which the ideal gives to\nthe real, as suggestions for the construction of a Utopia gathered\nfrom the requirements of present social life. But, supposing the\n\"harmonious co-operation\" of individuals to be thus provided for,\nwhat is the personal end? and what, it might be added, is the social\nend, if society has any further function than regulating the relation\nof its units to one another? Absolute ethics does not seem to be able\nto give much guidance here. \"A code of perfect personal conduct,\"\nwe are told, \"can never be made definite.\"[213] There are various\ntypes of activities, all of which may belong to lives \"complete\nafter their kinds.\" But yet \"perfection of individual life\" does\nimply \"certain modes of action which are approximately alike in all\ncases, and which, therefore, become part of the subject-matter of\nethics.\" We cannot lay down \"precise rules for private conduct,\"\nbut only \"general requirements.\" And these are: to maintain the\nbalance between waste and nutrition, to observe a relation between\nactivity and rest, to marry and have children.[214] This is \"how the\nstraight man comports himself.\" Apart, therefore, from the suggestion\nthrown out that a man's function may be the realisation of a type of\nactivity complete after its kind--a suggestion to be considered in\nthe sequel--all that we can say of the \"completely-adapted man\" would\nseem to be that he will be adapted to his circumstances.\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b3) cannot be shown to lead to happiness.]\n\nWe have a right to demur if the pleasures of the final condition of\nequilibrium be held up to our imagination as a reason for aiming at\nit. That it is \"the establishment of the greatest perfection and\nmost complete happiness,\"[215] seems an unwarrantable assumption.\nYet it is through this assumption that an apparent harmony between\nMr Spencer's hedonistic ethics and his view of the tendency of\nevolution is brought about. It is not at all certain that the result\nof perfectly adapted function is great increase of pleasure. It\nis true that all the pains of disharmony between inner desire or\nfeeling and outer circumstances would, in such a case, disappear;\nbut with them also there would be lost the varied pleasures of\npursuit and successful struggle. It cannot even be assumed that\nother pleasures would continue as intense as before. For, as acts\nare performed more easily, and thus with less conscious volition,\nthey gradually pass into the background of consciousness, or out of\nconsciousness altogether; and the pleasure accompanying them fades\ngradually away as they cease to occupy the attention. \"Where action\nis perfectly automatic, feeling does not exist.\"[216] The so-called\npassive pleasures might still remain. But the fact of effort being\nno longer necessary for the adjustment of inner to outer relations\nmight have the effect of making the \"moving equilibrium\" still called\n\"life\" automatic in every detail. Indeed, if the suggestions of the\n'First Principles' are to be carried out, it would seem that the\nmoving equilibrium is \"a transitional state on the way to complete\nequilibrium,\"[217] which is another name for death.[218] So far,\ntherefore, from heightened pleasure being the result of completely\nperfect adjustment of inner to outer relations, this adjustment would\nseem to reach its natural goal in unconsciousness--a conclusion which\nmay commend itself to those of Mr Spencer's disciples who take a less\noptimist view of life than their master.\n\nIt seems evident, therefore, that to take adaptation to environment,\nor self-preservation as interpreted by adaptation, as the end of\nconduct, is to adopt an end which cannot be shown to be desirable\non the ground of yielding a maximum of happiness or pleasure. And\nit is almost with a feeling of relief that one finds Mr Spencer's\nconfidence in the tendency of evolution so far shaken as to admit\nof his saying that \"however near to completeness the adaptation\nof human nature to the conditions of existence at large, physical\nand social, may become, it can never reach completeness.\"[219]\n\"Adaptation to environment\" must, at any rate, be kept quite distinct\nfrom any theory of ethics which takes pleasure as the end of life;\nand it cannot consistently determine any result as of ethical value\non account of its pleasurable consequences. The goal it sets before\nus, and in which human progress ends, is conformity with an external\norder. The modification of these external conditions by human\neffort is to be justified ethically by the opportunity it gives for\nbringing about a fuller agreement between the individual or race and\nits environment. The result is a stationary state of human conduct,\ncorresponding with, or a part of, that general \"equilibration\" to\nwhich, according to Mr Spencer, all evolution tends. But this theory,\nwhich places the goal of conduct in what seems to be the actual\ntendency of evolution, gains no real support from this apparent\nharmony of ethics with general philosophy. It may be granted that\nthe evidence of physical laws goes to show that the evolution of\nthe solar, or even stellar, system is towards a condition in which\nthe \"moving equilibrium\" will at last pass into a form in which\nthere is no further sensible motion, and the concentration of matter\nis complete. But to infer from this that the theory which places\nthe end of conduct in a similar equilibrium shows the harmony of\nmorality with the tendency of existence in general, would really\ninvolve a confusion of the two different meanings of \"end.\" The end\nor termination of all things may be equilibrium, motionlessness, or\ndissolution, but this is no reason why the end or aim of conduct\nshould be a similar equilibrium.\n\nIndeed, to say that we ought to promote the end of evolution, and\nthat this end is annihilation, is inconsistent with the postulate\nalways implied by the ethics of evolution--the postulate that\nconduct should promote evolution because life is desirable,[220] and\nincrease of life comes with the progress of evolution. Nor is it of\nany assistance to reply to this by saying that the dissolution in\nwhich evolution ends may be only the prelude to another process of\nevolution in which life will gradually progress till it again reaches\nequilibrium. For, in the first place, this is only a problematical\nsuggestion--is not, to speak in Mr Spencer's language, \"demonstrable\n_\u00e0 priori_ by deduction from the persistence of force,\" as the\ntendency of present evolution to equilibrium is held to be; and\nsecondly, the new process, if it were to come about, would have\nto begin again the slow ascent from the lowest rung of the ladder\nof existence: so that, in aiding evolution towards the goal of\nequilibrium, we should be only guiding it to the old starting-point\nwhich has now, after many a painful struggle, been left far behind.\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: (_c_) Insufficiency of adaptation as evolutionist end:]\n\n[Sidenote: tendency to variation in all organisms,]\n\nBut further, it would seem that the theory of evolution itself is not\nfairly represented by a view which emphasises the fact of adaptation\nto environment to the exclusion of that of variation. The latter is\nas necessary to progressive development as the former. Adaptation\nto environment might seem to be most nearly complete when organism\nand environment were both so simple as to be hardly separate. The\npolype, which is scarcely different from the sea-water it inhabits,\nmight seem by correspondence with its medium to be near the maximum\nof adaptation, though at the very beginning of life. It may be solely\nbecause the environment is subject to numerous changes that the\norganism of simple structure cannot maintain life. But it is only\nthrough its own inherent power of variation that progress in organic\nlife is possible. Perfect correspondence with the environment was\nnot reached by simple organisms, not only on account of the want of\nuniformity in their surroundings, but also because there is in every\norganism a tendency to variation through which the modifications are\nproduced which natural selection takes hold of. Did organisms not\ntend to vary in function and structure, no progressive modification\nwould be possible. Those fittest to live would be selected once for\nall, and all but those adapted to the environment weeded out.\n\nIt is not necessary for our present purpose to have any definite\ntheory of the obscure laws by which this variability is\ngoverned.[221] It is enough that natural selection requires the\nstriking out of new modifications as well as the transmission of\nthose already produced.[222] It may be the fact that variation is,\nin the last resort, due to changes in surrounding circumstances,\nto the unequal incidence of external forces upon a finite\naggregate.[223] But, with living bodies as now constituted, it has,\nat any rate as proximate cause, a twofold source. It may be due to\nthe direct effect of external forces, or it may be caused by the\nenergy stored up in the organism in growth.[224]\n\n[Sidenote: consciously directed in man.]\n\nIn man the outgo of this force is conscious; and, by means of his\nconscious or intelligent volition, governed by interests of various\nkinds, he can anticipate and modify the action of natural selection.\nThe law that the fittest organism survives may perhaps work in man\nas in the lower animals, if only we give a wide enough meaning to\n\"fittest,\" so as to admit even of the weak being made fit through the\nsympathy and help of the strong. Natural selection becomes dependent\nupon variations of a kind different from those in the merely animal\nworld, so that its practical effect may be in some cases apparently\nreversed. We thus see how it is that even Darwin holds that in\nmoralised societies \"natural selection apparently effects but\nlittle,\"[225] at the same time that we may not be inclined to deny\nthe truth of Sch\u00e4ffle's contention[226] that, although circumstances\ndiffer, the law of action remains the same. Sch\u00e4ffle points out how,\nas we rise in the scale of life, especially as it is manifested in\nhuman society, the organisation becomes more delicate, and other than\nmerely natural facts have to be taken account of, so that the fittest\nto live in the new social and intellectual environment is no longer\nthe man of greatest physical strength and skill.\n\nThe theory of natural selection as applied to the ordinary spheres\nof plant and animal life, may perhaps, for some purposes, neglect\nconsideration of the fact that it presupposes a tendency to variation\nin the organisms whose growth it describes. But, when the variation\nin the behaviour of the organism becomes conscious and designed,\nthere is thereby produced a preliminary indication or determination\nof the lines on which natural selection is to work. And, before the\ntheory of evolution can give a full account of the ethical in man, it\nmust distinguish consciously-determined from merely natural action,\nand give an analysis of what is implied in the former. We must bear\nin mind that it may be the case that the ground and possibility of\nprogress and of the efficiency of ideal ends in human conduct--which\n\"adaptation to environment\" has been unable logically to explain or\nleave room for--are to be found in this differentiating fact of\nconscious activity. But we must first of all see whether, from the\nempirical characteristics of variation, we can extract an ethical end\nor any guide for conduct.\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: 2. End suggested by this tendency to variation]\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) prescribes self-development rather than\nself-preservation,]\n\n2. \"The lower animals,\" says a writer on biology, \"are just as well\norganised for the purposes of their life as the higher are for\ntheirs. The tape-worm is relatively quite as perfect as the man,\nand distinguished from him by many superior capabilities.\"[227] It\nis incorrect to look upon the evolution of animal life as working\nupon one line, so that the different kinds of living beings can be\narranged, as it were, in an order of merit, in which the organisation\nof the higher animal plainly excels that of the lower. The conditions\nof life are manifold and various enough to permit of the existence of\nmany species equally perfect in relation to their environments. The\nfact that we are still able to speak of one species or one animal as\nhigher than another, is not owing to the one being better adapted to\nits environment than the other, but is supposed rather to be due to\nthe higher forms having \"their organs more distinctly specialised for\ndifferent functions.\"[228] Even Mr Spencer, for whom equilibrium is\nthe goal of life, implicitly admits that \"adaptation\" alone is not\nthe end of human action, by his doctrine that the degree of evolution\nmay be measured by the complexity of the adjustments it effects\nbetween organism and environment. The end, therefore, it may be\nsaid, is no longer the mere \"self-preservation\" found in adaptation\nto environment, but the \"self-development\" which implies temporary\ndisharmony between organism and surroundings.\n\nFor \"self-preservation\" and \"self-development,\" though frequently\nspoken of as identical, are really distinct and often opposed\nnotions--the former denoting a tendency to persist in one's present\nstate of being, while the latter implies more or less change. It may\nbe held, however, that for an organism such as man to persist in\nhis state of being, implies modification of his faculties, and that\nthis modification involves development. For any organism to exist\napart from change is, of course, impossible. Life is only known to\nus as a series of changes. But that change does not necessarily mean\ndevelopment or \"change to a higher condition.\" Degradation is as\nwell known a fact as development; and between the two, there is room\nfor a state of existence of which it is difficult to say whether it\nimproves or deteriorates. And whatever may be intended by the phrase,\n\"self-preservation\" points to a state of this kind rather than to an\nimproving condition. The notion of \"self-development\" has therefore\na richer content than that of \"self-preservation\"; but just on this\naccount it cannot be explained by a reference to the nature of things\nas they are.\n\n[Sidenote: thus taking account of variability]\n\nIt is true that self-development can only go on by a continuous\nprocess of adjustment; but it is also necessary for it that this\ntendency to adaptation should be continually hindered from becoming\ncomplete or lapsing into equilibrium. It is here that the function\nof variation comes in. On the one side there is this tendency to\nvary after a fashion often without any apparent regard to external\nconditions; on the other side, there is the action of the external\nconditions selecting and favouring those variations which bring the\norganism into closer correspondence with them. The wide range over\nwhich the theory of natural selection applies is due to the fact\nthat the environment is never uniform and never constant, so that\nmodifications on the part of the organism have a chance of suiting\nits varied and changing character. Its changes, moreover, are often\nthe result not so much of any absolute alteration in external\ncircumstances, as of a new relation between them and living beings\nhaving been brought about. For the enormous reproductive faculty\nof most organisms makes them multiply so rapidly as to press ever\nmore and more closely against the limit of subsistence, and thus to\nproduce competition for the means of living. Hence the fresh lines\nof development originated by each organism have to be tested by\ntheir correspondence with a constantly changing medium. The altered\ncircumstances give the modifications which organisms are for ever\nstriking out an opportunity of perpetuating themselves.\n\n[Sidenote: which complicates the tendency to correspondence with\nenvironment,]\n\nBy each new variation the existing relation between organism and\nenvironment is disturbed. The variation may, however, prove its\nutility at once by a more exact correspondence than before with\nthe requirements of external conditions. But, in what are called\nthe higher grades of life, variations from the type are sometimes\nnot immediately useful, although they may ultimately become\nmost advantageous.[229] Were it not for the remarkable power of\npersistence possessed by the higher animals, the modified organism\nwould be unable to hold its own. The great majority of such eccentric\nor extraordinary variations do, as a matter of fact, soon disappear,\nbecause unable to prove their utility. But others of them, either by\nthe power they give the organism to mould circumstances to itself,\nor by their appropriateness to the greater complexity which comes\nwith the increased number of living organisms, and the more delicate\nreadjustment it requires, prove themselves to be fitter to live than\nif no variation had taken place and the preceding state of relative\nequilibrium had been maintained. The higher adjustment of life to\nits surroundings, which marks each stage of advancing evolution, had\nits beginning in the rupture of the original simpler harmony that\npreviously existed.\n\n[Sidenote: especially in human conduct.]\n\nIf we compare human conduct with that of animals lower in the organic\nscale, it becomes evident that there is a broad difference between\nthe two in this, that actions in the former are purposed, performed\nwith a definite end in view; whereas, in the latter, they seem to be\nthe blind result of impulse, and there are slight, if any, traces of\npurpose. In activity of the latter kind, natural selection works in\nthe ordinary way by choosing for survival the animals which behave so\nas best to suit their environment. But actions done with a view to an\nend may anticipate the verdict of this natural law. The agent may see\nthat conduct of a particular kind would conduce to the promotion of\nlife, while conduct of a different kind would render him less fit to\nlive; and, as a consequence, the former action may be chosen. In this\nway development may be anticipated, and the present order of affairs\nmay be disturbed, more or less forcibly, in order to bring about a\nforeseen better state of things.\n\nWe are thus able to see more clearly how it is that the theory of\nevolution may be thought to give rise to two different ethical ends.\nThe first of these is the theory already criticised, \"adaptation to\nenvironment,\" which corresponds to the notion of self-preservation.\nBut this end, as we have seen, only takes one side of the theory of\nevolution into consideration--neglects the tendency to variation\nwhich evolution postulates, and which, in the higher organisms,\nbecomes purposed. The other end which seems to be suggested by the\ntheory of evolution takes account of this tendency to variation, and\nmay be said to correspond to the notion of self-development; but\nthis end it is harder to define. Adaptation we can easily understand\nby a reference to the environment to which life is to be adapted.\nThis involves a knowledge of the conditions of the environment, but\nnothing more. Development can be measured by no such standard. On\nthe one hand it implies an independent, or relatively independent,\ntendency to variation. On the other hand, however, it is necessary\nthat the disharmony with environment, in which this tendency to\nvariation may begin, should not be excessive and should not be\npermanent; for without a certain amount of adaptation to environment\nno organism can live. The extent of initial disharmony which is\npossible, or is useful, varies according to the versatility of the\nfaculties of each individual organism, and to its place in the\nscale of being; but throughout all existence it is true that want\nof adaptation beyond a certain varying degree is fatal: \"a mode of\naction entirely alien to the prevailing modes of action, cannot\nbe successfully persisted in--must eventuate in death of self, or\nposterity, or both.\"[230]\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) Standard for measuring development]\n\nBy what standard, then, can we measure development? We have\nalready seen, from the \"formula,\" as it is called, or definition,\nof evolution, that it implies an advance to a state of increased\ncoherence, definiteness, and heterogeneity, by the double process\nof differentiation of parts, and integration of these parts into a\nwhole by the formation of definite relations to one another. The\nnotions of coherence amongst parts and of increased definiteness of\nfunction and structure are easily understood. But the heterogeneity\npostulated is a more complex notion,--has, in the first place, a\ndouble reference, \"is at the same time a differentiation of the parts\nfrom each other and a differentiation of the consolidated whole from\nthe environment;\"[231] and secondly, is manifested in living beings\nin increased complexity of every kind--of structure, form, chemical\ncomposition, specific gravity, temperature, and self-mobility.[232]\nCan we then apply this at once to ethics, and say that the most\ndeveloped--that is, the most moral--conduct is that which is most\ndefinite, coherent, and heterogeneous? This doctrine has at least the\nmerit of not leaving out of sight so fundamental a characteristic\nof evolution as the tendency to variation; and, without being\nconsistently held to, it is the burden of much of Mr Spencer's 'Data\nof Ethics,' where it is illustrated and defended with great ingenuity.\n\n[Sidenote: found in degree of complexity of act and motive.]\n\nThat moral conduct is distinguished by definiteness and\ncoherence--that it works towards a determinate end, and that its\nvarious actions are in agreement with one another and parts of\na whole--may be admitted. But this is at most a merely formal\ndescription of what is meant by morality in conduct. To say that\nconduct must be a coherent whole, and must seek a determinate end\nby appropriate means, leaves unsettled the question as to what this\nend should be, or what means are best fitted to attain it. But, when\nwe go on to say that as conduct is more varied in act,[233] more\nheterogeneous in motive,[234] it is higher in the moral scale,\nwe seem to have got hold of something which may be a guide for\ndetermining the ethical end. The mark of what is higher in evolution,\nand consequently in morality, will be greater heterogeneity or\ncomplexity.[235]\n\n[Sidenote: Difficulties of the theory:]\n\nThis conclusion follows from an attempt not merely to treat \"moral\nphenomena as phenomena of evolution,\" but also to find the \"ultimate\ninterpretations\" of ethics \"only in those fundamental truths which\nare common to all\" the sciences, physical, biological, psychological,\nsociological.[236] Now the fundamental truths which these sciences\nhave in common are those only which are most abstract. But as we\npass from mere relations between matter and motion to life, and\nfrom life to self-consciousness, we have something different from\nthese fundamental truths with the addition of certain others not\nfundamental: we find that things are not merely more complex; but\nare changed in aspect and nature. Even though it be true that the\nnew phenomena may still admit of analysis into the old simpler\nterms, and that life, mind, and society may be interpreted as\nredistributions of matter and motion,[237] it must yet at least be\nadmitted that the change passed through is one similar to those which\nMill compared to chemical composition: the new compound differs\nfundamentally in mode of action from the elements out of which it was\nformed. Now, in saying that the most complex adjustments of acts to\nends are the highest kinds of conduct, and that we should be guided\nby the more complex in preference to simpler motives, this obvious\ndifficulty is passed over. It is true that Mr Spencer, in chapters\nrich in suggestion, and filled with skilfully chosen illustrations,\nhas passed in review the various aspects of conduct according as we\nlook at it from the point of view of the physical environment, of\nlife, of mind, or of society. But when these different aspects are\nbrought together and compared, it becomes clear that the attempt to\njudge conduct by reference to the \"fundamental truth\" that evolution\nimplies an advance towards greater complexity, must necessarily end\nin failure.[238]\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b1) antinomy produced by it between the social and\nindividual ends;]\n\nIn the first place, there is a notable discrepancy between the\nbiological and the sociological aspect. For the complete development\nof the individual life implies that every function should be\nfulfilled, and that its fulfilment should interfere with the\nperformance of no other function. \"The performance of every function\nis, in a sense, a moral obligation.\" \"The ideally moral man ... is\none in whom the functions of all kinds are duly fulfilled,\"--that is\nto say, \"discharged in degrees duly adjusted to the conditions of\nexistence.\"[239] A fully evolved life is marked by multiplicity and\ncomplexity of function. And, if from the individual we pass to the\nsocial organism, we find that the same truth holds. The state, or\norganised body of individuals, has many functions to perform; but it\ncan only perform them in the most efficient way through the functions\nof its individual members being specialised. From the social point\nof view, therefore, the greatest possible division of labour is a\nmark of the most evolved and perfect community. And this division\nof labour implies that each individual, instead of performing\nevery function of which he is capable, should be made to restrict\nhimself to that at which he is best, so that the community may be\nthe gainer from the time and exertion that are saved, and the skill\nthat is produced, by the most economic expenditure of individual\ntalent. Thus social perfection appears to imply a condition of\nthings inconsistent with that development of one's whole nature\nwhich, from the biological point of view, has just been defined as a\ncharacteristic of the ideally moral man. It seems, indeed, inevitable\nthat any such abstract preliminary notion of development as that\nwhich would test it by increase of complexity must fail in such a\ncase as this where there is no question between the competing claims\nof two phenomena on the same level, but where harmony is wanted\nbetween the different aspects the same phenomena present when looked\nat from the point of view of the individual and from the point of\nview of the whole.\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b2) its psychological aspect]\n\n[Sidenote: confounds complexity of structure with indirectness of\norigin,]\n\nThere is still greater difficulty in applying this criterion, when\nwe come to the psychological aspect of morality--the aspect most\nprominent in modern philosophy from the revival of independent\nethical speculation till the time of Kant. According to Mr Spencer,\n\"the acts characterised by the more complex motives and the more\ninvolved thoughts, have all along been of higher authority for\nguidance.\"[240] But the later or more advanced in mental evolution\nis not always more complex in structure; for it is a characteristic\nof mental development that the processes by which a result has\nbeen arrived at gradually disappear on account of the diminished\nattention they receive, so that there remains what is, so far as\npsychical structure is concerned, a simple mental state. Complexity\nof structure and indirectness of origin are thus really two different\ncharacteristics of states of mind, which frequently go together, but\nfrequently part company.[241] When Mr Spencer, accordingly, goes on\nto say[242] that \"for the better preservation of life the primitive\nsimple presentative feelings must be controlled by the later-evolved\ncompound and representative feelings,\" he is really passing to a\ndifferent standard without giving up the former. The sympathy with\ninjured Zulus or Afghans which would be approved by Mr Spencer[243]\nmay be a more indirect, representative, or re-representative feeling,\nthan the sentiments which led to British invasion, and, as such, may\nbe more to be commended. But it would be rash to say that sympathy\nwith the \"British interests\" supposed to be at stake--interests of\ncommerce, and of the balance of political power, as well as those\narising from the subtle effect of national prestige--is less complex\nthan the feeling of sympathy with a people dispossessed of its\nterritory. The latter feeling may be more indirect or representative,\nas implying an imaginative appropriation of the circumstances of\nanother community; but, so far as structure is concerned, it is\ncomposed of far fewer and simpler component elements than the feeling\nfor British interests.\n\n[Sidenote: neither of which can serve as an ethical standard.]\n\nNor, on the other hand, can we allow ourselves to take refuge in the\nconclusion that, if the more complex emotion cannot be held to be\nbetter morally, then that which is later in evolution may at least\nbe regarded as of higher authority than the earlier evolved feeling.\nAccording to Mr Spencer, the man who obtains by fraud the money to\nsupport his family is to be condemned, because, although we admit the\nclaim his family have upon him, \"we regard as of superior authority\nthe feelings which respond to men's proprietary claims--feelings\nwhich are re-representative in a higher degree and refer to more\nremote diffused consequences.\"[244] But were this the ground of\ndistinction, we ought also to regard the feelings prompting a man\nto distribute his fortune in any foolish enterprise \"as of superior\nauthority\" to those which prompt him to support his family, if only\nthe former are \"re-representative in a higher degree,\" and their\nconsequences more \"remote\" and \"diffused.\" Many of the greatest\nevils which infect social life and warp the moral feelings of\nmen, are evils which are only possible as the result of a highly\nadvanced civilisation and a refined and delicate organisation of\nthe mind. The factitious sentiments raised by a subtle casuistry\nwith the effect of confusing the ordinary distinctions of right and\nwrong are, in almost all cases, more indirect and re-representative\nthan the feelings in harmony with the moral consciousness of the\ncommunity which they set aside in the individual conscience. So\nobvious, indeed, are objections of this kind--objections, that is\nto say, taken from the impossibility of so applying the criterion\nas to construct a workable system of morals--that Mr Spencer\nvirtually relinquishes his own theory, talking of it as true only\n\"on the average,\"[245] and even allowing that it is in some cases\nsuicidal.[246]\n\nAs it cannot be held that the more complex in evolution is of greater\nauthority than the less complex, nor that the later in evolution has\nsuch authority over the earlier, we must admit that the so-called\n\"fundamental characteristics\" of evolution, which find a place in\nits definition or \"formula,\" are unable to determine its value in an\nethical regard. The richness of life, physical, intellectual, and\nsocial, has indeed been produced only as the result of a long course\nof development, and by the assimilation of many various elements\ninto a complex organisation; but its value cannot be measured either\nby the test of mechanical complexity, or by the length of time it\nhas taken to evolve. We must therefore seek some other method of\ngiving a meaning to evolution in the region of moral values; and we\nfind Mr Spencer himself really falling back in his discussion on\nthe more general answer to our question, that the end of evolution\nis life: \"evolution becomes the highest possible when the conduct\nsimultaneously achieves the greatest totality of life in self,\noffspring, and fellow-men.\"[247] Since it appears, then, that the\ncharacteristic of complexity or variety is as unsatisfactory a\ncriterion of morality, as the notion of \"adaptation to environment\"\nwas found to be, we must ask for some further interpretation of the\nnotion of \"development\" or \"increase of life\" when regarded as the\nend of conduct.\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: 3. Further attempt to define development or increase of\nlife as the end.]\n\n[Sidenote: Biological definition of life insufficient.]\n\n3. The ethics of evolution--in whatever form we have as yet found\nit--has always proceeded on the assumption that life is desirable,\nand that it has a value which makes its pursuit and promotion a\nreasonable moral end. How this fundamental ethical assumption[248]\nis to be justified, I do not at present inquire. But the question\nmust now be faced--What is meant by \"life\" when we say that\nits \"increase\" or \"development\" is the moral end, and speak of\nits \"greatest totality\" in a way that implies that it admits of\nquantitative measurement? The biological definition of life is\nitself matter of dispute. But, even were such a definition as that\nproposed by Mr Spencer agreed to, it would be insufficient to provide\na standard for human conduct. The very generality which may make it\nfit to stand as a definition, or at least abstract description, of\nlife, renders it at the same time incapable of serving as a criterion\nby which the various modes of the manifestation of life may be\njudged. One point, however, generally emphasised by the theory of\nevolution, may be admitted. The life which human conduct \"ought\" to\nincrease is not merely that of one individual man, but the whole\nlife of the community--\"self, offspring, and fellow-men\"--with which\nthe individual life is bound up. Evolution has shown how the growth\nof the individual has been so dependent upon that of the whole body\nof society that it is impossible to separate their interests. At\nthe same time, no complete identity has been brought about, and it\nremains one of the greatest difficulties of any empirical theory to\nharmonise their competing claims. For argument's sake, however, and\nto admit of the quality of the end being investigated apart from\nconsiderations as to the method of distribution, the question may be\ndiscussed as if natural selection had produced complete solidarity\nbetween the life of the individual and that of the race.\n\nWhat criterion have we, then, of the development of human nature or\nlife? The answer at once suggests itself that the higher evolution\nof life can be accurately measured by the amount of pleasure got\nby living beings. But this view has been examined in the preceding\nchapter, and found to be unsupported by sufficient evidence; so that\nwe are driven to seek for some non-hedonistic criterion that will\ngive meaning to the phrase \"development\" or \"increase of life,\" when\nprescribed as the ethical end.\n\n[Sidenote: Health as the end either used to interpret pleasure,]\n\nNor is the matter made any clearer by saying that the \"health\" of\nsociety is the end we ought to promote.[249] This has been put\nforward as an interpretation of the hedonistic principle, which\nbrings that principle into accord with the theory of evolution.\nAs such, however, it seems open to fatal objections. Given as\nan explanation of \"pleasure,\" it falls back upon the notion of\n\"life\"; for health can only be defined as that which conduces to\ncontinued and energetic life. Further than this, there is a special\ndifficulty in adopting health as the proximate end where pleasure\nis the ultimate end. Even if we could assert that health always\nleads to pleasure, it is not evident that it is better known, or\nmore easily made the end, than pleasure. For of present pleasure\nwe have a standard in our own consciousness from which there is no\nappeal. And, although the value of a series of pleasures is much\nharder to estimate, there is also no slight difficulty in saying\nwhat will promote the efficiency or health of an organism. Besides,\nthe question arises whether health really corresponds with pleasure;\nand this is, in another form, the question which has been already\nanswered in the negative,--whether life can be measured by pleasure.\n\n[Sidenote: or falls back on the notion of life.]\n\nOn the other hand, if \"health\" is to be taken not as an explanation\nof or means to pleasure, but as a substitute for the notion of\n\"life,\" then we hardly get beyond our original terms. \"Health\" must\nbe interpreted simply as that which leads to strong and continued\nlife: so that the only information to be got from the new term is\nthat the life we are to promote must be vigorous and long; and this\nwas already implied in saying that it is the increase or development\nof life that is the end. It will not do to identify the notion\nwith the mere balance of physiological functions which, in common\nlanguage, appropriates to itself the term \"health.\" We must include\nthe health of the soul as well as the health of the body, and the\nhealth of society as well as the health of the soul. The balance of\nmental and social, as well as of physiological, functions, is implied\nin the complex life of whose evolution we form a part. To say that we\nare to promote this balance of various functions, is to say nothing\nmore than that we are to promote the life into which physical and\nmental and social factors enter. The attempt to arrive at an end for\nconduct, by consideration of the characteristics of evolution, has\nbeen made without success. It has been found, too, that \"development\"\nor \"increase of life\" does not admit of translation into the language\nof hedonism: and the question thus arises, how we are to define this\nend, which we are unable to interpret in terms of pleasure.\n\n[Sidenote: Ways of determining increase of life or natural good,]\n\nWhat meaning can be given to the notion \"increase of life\" as the\nend of conduct, without interpreting life in terms of pleasure? Can\nwe, the question may be put, reach a \"natural\" good as distinct from\n\"sensible good\" or pleasure? We must discard at the outset any such\n\"rational\" view of nature as gave colour to the Stoic doctrine by\nidentifying nature with the universal reason. And we must equally\navoid the doctrine that reason regulative of conduct is manifested\nin the constitution of man either in a distinct faculty, such as\n\"conscience,\" or in the due regulation of the various impulses.\nTrendelenburg's teleological conception of human nature, for\ninstance, implies a rational element which could not be got from\nthe causal sequence traced by evolution.[250] For he determines the\nessence of man by reference to the inner end of his constitution,\nand postulates an organic unity of impulses which, in the form of\nconscience, protests against self-seeking action on the part of any\nsingle impulse. But no other hierarchy of motives can be admitted\nhere than that produced by the natural law of evolution; and this\nlaw can only show how one impulse, or class of impulses, has become\nmore authoritative, by showing how it has become stronger or more\npersistent: the other methods of evolving this authority on the\nbasis of naturalism, do so by means of the pleasurable or painful\nconsequences of motives and actions.\n\n[Sidenote: either subjective or objective.]\n\nThere are two ways in which, on most or all ethical theories, the\nattempt may be made to distinguish \"good\" from \"bad\" conduct. We\nmay either look to a subjective motive or impulse as giving the\nmeans of distinction, or we may test conduct by its conformity\nwith an objective standard. If we like to make use of the terms\nself-preservation and self-development, then these may refer either\nto the subjective impulse which urges man to preserve or develop\nhis life, or to some objective standard for estimating actions\naccording as they actually tend to prolong life or enrich it. Both\nthese possibilities are open to the theory of evolution. Although\nthe subjective impulse is, of course, a property of the individual,\nit may be the result of the whole course of social development, and\nthus take in others as well as self in the range of its application.\nIt is therefore necessary to examine both methods of determination\nwith some care, especially as we are in no little danger of reaching\nan illusory appearance of conclusiveness by allowing the subjective\nstandard to rest on the objective, and the objective, in turn, on the\nsubjective.\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) Subjective standard: most persistent impulses;]\n\nTo begin with the subjective side. It may be thought that we can\npoint to some impulse, tendency, motive, or class of motives in\nthe individual mind by following which the evolution of life will\nbe promoted, and that we are thus able to solve the question of\npractical ethics, though our conception of what the evolution of life\nconnotes may still be in want of exact definition. As already pointed\nout, such an impulse (unless it depends on an objective standard)\nmust carry its own authority with it by its strength or persistency.\nThe case would, of course, be perfectly simple, if we could assert\nthat the carrying out of all impulses in one's nature was to be\napproved as tending to the development of life. Could this assertion\nbe made, there might be no difficulty in ethics, or rather, there\nmight be no ethics at all, because there would be no difficulty in\nconduct. It is obvious, however, that the development of one natural\ntendency often conflicts with that of another in the same individual,\nas well as with the tendencies of other individuals. The course of\nevolution has no doubt tended to modify, though it has not rooted\nout, the impulses which are most prejudicial to individual and social\nwelfare. But the increase of wants as well as satisfactions which it\nhas brought about in human nature, makes it doubtful whether it has\non the whole tended to diminish the conflict of motives.\n\n[Sidenote: implies distinction between permanent and transient self;]\n\nAgain, when it is said that a man should \"be himself,\" or that this\nis his \"strongest tendency,\"[251] there is an implicit reference\nto a distinction between a permanent and a transient, or a better\nand a worse self, and it seems to be imagined that this distinction\ncan be reduced to difference in degrees of strength. But evolution\nhas not enabled us to obviate Butler's objection to taking the\n\"strongest tendency\"--meaning by this the tendency which is at any\ntime strongest--as representing \"nature.\" For it is an undeniable\nfact that the tendency which for a time is the strongest--it may even\nbe that which is strongest throughout an individual life--frequently\nleads to a diminution of vital power on the part of the agent, as\nwell as to interference with the free exercise of the vital powers\nof others. Some advantage is gained, perhaps, by substituting for\n\"strongest\" the nearly equivalent phrase \"most persistent\" tendency.\nAll those impulses which have in the past served to promote life\nhave been chosen out and stored up as a sort of permanent basis for\nthe human fabric; whereas other impulses, not so advantageous in\ntheir effects, have a less permanent influence, though they are not\nless real. The more regular or persistent class of impulses may,\ntherefore, (the idea is) be taken as representing the course of the\nevolution by which they have been produced.\n\n[Sidenote: but includes non-moral impulses in the former,]\n\nTo a large extent this distinction of two classes of impulses is\njustified. There seems no doubt that the social, and what are usually\ntermed moral, feelings have a tendency to return into consciousness\nafter any temporary depression or exclusion, which is not shared\nby some of the feelings with which they most commonly conflict.\nOther impulses, not usually classed as moral, no doubt share this\ncharacteristic of persistency or recurrence. \"The wish for another\nman's property,\" says Darwin, \"is as persistent a desire as any that\ncan be named.\" The selfish feelings have obviously this persistent\ncharacter. But an evolutionist may perhaps maintain that it is one\nof the defects of ordinary moral opinion that it depreciates the\nnecessity and value for life of the selfish feelings, just because\nthey are so strong as to stand in need of no encouragement. And it\nis not necessary that the evolutionist morality should agree at all\npoints with ordinary moral opinion or moral intuition. It recognises,\nor ought to recognise the agency of immoral as well as moral forces,\nadmitting that it is by the action of both of these that man as he is\nat present has been produced, although the principle of the survival\nof the fittest has tended, though by no means uniformly, towards the\nelimination of the immoral factor. We may admit, therefore, that\nthere is a pressure on the will of the average individual towards\ncertain kinds of conduct rather than others, or, put more precisely,\nthat while all acts are performed in consequence of pressure on the\nwill, the pressure towards certain kinds of acts is a permanent force\nwhich, although overcome for the time, always tends to reassert\nitself, while the tendency towards other acts inconsistent with these\nis more intermittent and variable, and does not reassert itself\nin the same way. But this subjective experience is so limited in\naccuracy and extent as to be an unfit test of morality.\n\n[Sidenote: is restricted to previous habits of acting,]\n\n[Sidenote: and cannot define nature of morality.]\n\nIn the first place, selfish conduct is as necessary for the\npreservation and development of man as \"altruistic\" conduct, and must\ntherefore have given rise to an equally great and persistent pressure\non the will: so that the subjective criterion of persistency leaves\nuntouched what is often regarded as the most difficult question of\nmorals, the balance of social and individual claims. In the second\nplace, this subjective tendency is only a recurrence of antecedent\nadvantageous characteristics, and does not lead us beyond the _status\nquo_, so that, if any progress is to be made in the future, it will\nbe only possible through the pressure of new external conditions: no\nfunction is left for any ethical ideal which points beyond past and\npresent habits of action. In the third place, subjective tendency\nonly enables us to say generally that some acts or tendencies are\nmore persistent than others, without giving any further description\nof what sort of acts these are. Were these tendencies or impulses a\nperfect guide to conduct, this defect would be of little practical\nconsequence. It would prevent our having a definite ethical theory\nonly in circumstances in which no ethical theory would be likely\nto be asked for. But the line between the more and less persistent\nmotives is a narrow and shifting one. The impulses which are the\nresidua of advantageous ancestral actions are counteracted by other\nimpulses, residua of actions which would not be counted as moral,\nthough we inherit tendencies to them because they formed a real\npart of our ancestral activity. We therefore stand in need of some\ncharacteristic by which to distinguish the one class of tendencies\nfrom the other. And as the only subjective characteristic is that of\nstrength or persistency, and this has been found insufficient, an\nobjective standard is shown to be necessary.\n\n[Sidenote: Thus subjective standard acknowledged to depend on]\n\nThe impossibility of the subjective test doing duty alone without\nsupport from some objective criterion, is practically acknowledged by\nthe writer who has discussed this part of the subject with greater\npenetration than any other investigator on the same lines. \"The\naverage man,\" it is said, \"feels the pressure upon his own individual\nwill of all the unknown natural sequence of motive which caused his\nancestors to do on the whole more often the right thing than the\nwrong\"[252]--or, as we must read it without objective assumption, \"to\ndo on the whole more often one class of acts than another.\" The right\nmust be defined simply as that to which this \"special feeling in the\nsubject is directed,\" and it therefore becomes necessary \"to discover\nwhat descriptions of acts inspire this feeling.\"[253] Thus, with\ngreater facility than would be permitted to a critic, we are made to\npass from the subjective to the objective method of determination.\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) Objective standard:]\n\nThe question, What is right? is thus relinquished for the question,\nWhat is good? Good is said to be of three kinds--natural, sensible,\nand moral. But as by sensible good is meant pleasure,[254] and\npleasure is not the end, and as by moral good is meant \"the pursuit\nof natural good under difficulties,\"[255] it follows that natural\ngood is the end we seek. We have thus to determine, as exactly\nas may be, this objective standard called natural good. It is\ninterpreted in two ways, which, however, may be \"not necessarily\ninconsistent\": (\u03b1) \"the perfection of the type as it is,\" and (\u03b2)\n\"the absolute abundance and variety of vital power.\"[256]\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b1) Conformity to the type.]\n\n[Sidenote: The type defined as what best serves its purpose]\n\nThis phrase, \"the perfection of the type as it is,\" is somewhat\nmisleading. When \"the perfection of the type\" is said to be the end,\nwe naturally regard the type as something that needs to be brought to\nperfection, and _ex hypothesi_ is not perfect at present, or \"as it\nis.\" But if \"the perfection of the type _as it is_\" is the standard,\nthis implies, unless the standard itself is faulty, that the type is\nalready perfect, and, therefore, that the perfection spoken of is\nthe characteristic of a thing which conforms to the type, and not\nsomething to which the type has to conform. This interpretation is\nconfirmed by the fact that imperfection is defined as \"only departure\nfrom the class type.\"[257] Plainly, then, the objective standard\nmeant is conformity to the type. What, then, is the type? Concerning\nthings made by art the answer is easy. The type, as Mr Stephen puts\nit, represents the \"maximum of efficiency,\"[258] or, as we may say,\nis that which most fully realises the purpose for which the thing\nwas formed. The best bow is that which shoots truest and farthest\nwith a relatively small expenditure of strength by the archer; that\nwhich best realises the purpose of a bow is the typical bow. A\nsimilar explanation of types may be given regarding animals modified\nby artificial selection. The typical pointer or hunter can be defined\nfrom this teleological point of view; and, as long as people lived\nin the belief that all things were made for man, it was natural to\nfix the type of each class by reference to the human purpose it\ncould best subserve. So also, as long as people think that, whether\nall things were made for man or not, all things may be made use of\nby him, there will be a tendency towards the same anthropomorphic\ninterpretation of types. If, then, the typical products of art, and,\nto a large extent, the typical products of nature, are those which\nbest serve human purposes, or best correspond with human ideals, how\nshall we define the typical man himself--the type which it is our\nperfection to conform to? \"Every reasoning agent,\" it may perhaps\nbe allowed,[259] \"represents a certain type;\" but the type can no\nlonger be defined merely as \"maximum of efficiency,\" for it is the\nend or purpose of this efficiency which now requires determination.\nIn defining the typical man, we must have no idea of final cause or\npurpose which is not rooted in the nature of his organism.\n\nHow, then, shall we now determine the type in conformity to which\nperfection consists?[260]\n\n[Sidenote: or as the normal,]\n\n[Sidenote: or as what has strongest vitality or aids development,\nthat is,]\n\nThe first answer to this seems to be, that the type is what is\nnormal,--\"what we have learned to regard as the normal development\nof objects belonging to\" the class.[261] But the normal may have\neither of two meanings--it may, in the first place, mean the usual\nor customary. This, however, would make the typical man mean the\nordinary or average man; and the ideal of conformity to the type\nwould be reduced to doing the customary thing, and not trying to be\nbetter than one's neighbours. But it is evident that this stationary\nmorality does not represent properly what is fundamental in the\ntheory of evolution: \"whatever other duties men may acknowledge,\nthey do not look upon it as a duty to preserve the species _in\nstatu quo_.\"[262] If natural science teaches one thing more clearly\nthan another, it is that the type, like the individual, is not\npermanent, but the subject of gradual modifications. If the type\nis what is normal, we must mean by \"normal\" something else than\ncustomary. But the only other meaning of the word seems to imply a\nreference to a rule--either a rule imposed from without, or an inner\nconstitution or order. If the former alternative is adopted, then\nwe may use another definition of Mr Stephen's, and say that \"the\ntypical organism is ... that organism which is best fitted for all\nthe conditions of life, or, in other words, which has the strongest\nvitality;\"[263] and thus have to fall back either on the notion of\n\"adaptation to environment,\" or on that of \"strongest vitality\"--the\nnotion we are seeking to interpret. If the other meaning, which the\nreference to a rule may convey, be adopted, then we are met by the\nfact that the inner order or constitution which is to be our guide,\ncan (from our present empirical point of view) mean nothing different\nfrom the line of development. And as we have already seen that it\nis unsatisfactory to interpret this as equivalent to adaptation\nto environment, or to increase of definiteness, coherence, and\nheterogeneity, this principle of conformity to the type is reduced to\nthe general principle which we have been attempting to define more\nexactly--increase of life.\n\n[Sidenote: (\u03b2) Abundance and variety of vital power,]\n\n[Sidenote: which falls back on the subjective standard.]\n\nThus the first determination of natural good as \"perfection of the\ntype\" is seen to reduce itself to the second, \"absolute abundance\nand variety of vital power.\" For the additional statement, which\nmakes the highest excellence consist in \"conformity to the type as\nit is going to be, but as, except in a few chosen specimens, it is\nnot yet discernible to be,\"[264] is unsatisfactory. For to those\n\"few chosen specimens\" the end would seem to be simply to remain as\nthey are--a conclusion which is hardly consistent for a writer who\nregards morality as a continual progress towards a higher life, a\nprocess of \"climbing.\"[265] And, for the generality of men, there\nmust be some standard for determining what is \"going to be,\" and for\ncertifying that the \"few chosen specimens\" have realised this state\nin its perfect form. Thus \"conformity to the type as it is going\nto be,\" equally with \"perfection of [conformity to] the type as it\nis,\" seems to be but another way of saying \"abundance and variety\nof vital power,\" or, more fully stated, \"the possession of abundant\nfaculties, active and passive, fully developed, and in regular and\nequal exercise.\"[266] The question thus comes to be how we are to\ndetermine this \"abundance of faculties.\" We cannot do so by reference\nto such characteristics as increase in the number and complexity of\nthese faculties; for a criterion of this kind, as we have seen, is of\nno assistance in deciding the most fundamental ethical questions.\nTo say that these faculties must be \"regular and equal\" in their\nexercise, is to give a merely formal canon. For how the equality\nand regularity are to be brought about,--which faculties are to be\nsupreme and which subordinate--what meaning equality can have in\nview of the admitted diversity in a man's nature,--are questions\nleft altogether undetermined. And to describe the ideal or perfect\nuniverse as one in which there is no conflict or collision,[267] is\nto give a description which is negative as well as merely formal.\nWe are thus obliged to fall back on a subjective criterion, and say\nthat the abundant life which it is the end of conduct to promote\nis a man's strongest tendencies, or the greatest number of these.\nNatural good is determined by \"preferring out of all the rudimentary\npossibilities existing in nature, the combination that harmonises\nthe greatest number of the strongest tendencies.\"[268] We set out,\nbe it remembered, to obtain a characterisation of those acts to\nwhich the most persistent tendencies of human nature lead us; and\nthe conclusion we have arrived at is, that they are the acts which\nharmonise the greatest number of the strongest tendencies. The\nobjective standard is thus reduced to the subjective standard, which\nit was brought in to explain and support.\n\n[Sidenote: Strongest tendencies the result of past activities,]\n\nNow these strongest tendencies, in the harmonious play of which\nnatural good or perfection is said to consist, are themselves the\nresult of the courses of conduct which have been most vigorous\nand successful in ancestral organisms, and they may therefore,\nperhaps, be taken as a survival and index of the antecedent state\nof human nature. The realisation--or, rather, continuation--of\nhuman nature as it has been and is, seems thus to be the ideal\nwhich empirical evolution is able to set before conduct,--with this\nformal modification, that, while the various impulses are, so far as\npossible, to have free play given them, they should be developed in\na harmonious manner. It seems doubtful how far this tendency towards\nharmony is properly suggested by, or consistent with, evolution,\nwhich has implied a ceaseless struggle of opposing forces. At any\nrate, evolution does not seem competent to give any principle of\nrelative subordination between the various impulses, such as might\nadd reality to the formal principle of harmony. But what it is\nessential to lay stress on here is, that the only end which empirical\nevolution seems able to establish is conformity to human nature as it\nis--the tendencies in it which are strongest and most persistent.\n\n[Sidenote: and thus give no ideal for progress.]\n\nWe thus see that the attempt to explain on empirical grounds what\nis meant by positing \"life,\" or \"increase and variety of life,\"\nas the end of action, is practically reduced to making the most\npersistent impulses of human nature the guide of conduct. But these\nimpulses, it has been shown, are only the survival or remnant of\npast stages in the course of development, not anticipations of\nfuture stages: so that evolution is in this way incapable of giving\nan ideal of progress as the end for conduct, and the last word it\nseems able to give us as a guide for action is that we should tread\nin the places where the footprints of ancestral conduct have left\nthe deepest impress. The ideal of such a system is summed up in\nthe new Beatitude, \"Blessed is he that continueth where he is.\" It\nis probably just because the empirical aspect of evolution seems\nso little able to yield an end for human conduct corresponding to\nthe actual course of evolution--which has been progress--that no\nthorough attempt has been made to develop a system of morals from the\nprinciple just reached. It is true that systems have been worked out\nby moralists who have taken human nature as their standard, and that\nTrendelenburg, at any rate, expressly includes historical development\nin his conception of man. But both Trendelenburg and a moralist like\nButler (who has as yet no conception of the gradual modifications of\nhuman character and tendencies produced by evolution) have a view\nof human nature essentially distinct from that which has been called\nthe \"naturalistic\" view.[269] For both assume a definite rational\norganisation of impulses similar to that taught in Plato's analogy\nbetween the individual man and a political constitution, so that the\nwhole nature, or human nature as a whole, cannot be identified with\nthe impulses which strength at any time makes most persistent, but\ndepends upon the rational allotment of function and measure to each.\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Sidenote: Summary.]\n\n[Sidenote: Difficulty of reconciling individual and social ends.]\n\nIn summing up the argument of the preceding chapters, it is necessary\nto refer again to the discussion carried on in chapter vi. on the\nrelation between egoism and altruism as affected by the theory of\nevolution. This discussion was not inserted in order to throw an\nadditional obstacle in the way of obtaining an ethical end from the\nempirical theory of evolution. It is an integral part of an attempt\nto estimate the ethical value of the evolution-theory. The antinomy\nbetween the individual and social standpoints cannot be solved by\na theory of morality which does not recognise that the individual,\nin his rational nature, is not opposed to other individuals, but\nin reality one with them. The theory of evolution certainly seems\nto go a long way towards establishing the unity of the individual\nwith the race, and in substituting an organic connection between\nthem, in place of the almost contingent reciprocal relations spoken\nof in earlier empirical theories. But when we come to inquire into\nthis unity of organic connection, attempting still to keep to the\npurely empirical point of view, we find that the old difficulties\nreturn, that it must be recognised that the connection is empirically\nincomplete, and that it gives way at the very places where a firm\nbasis for the theory of morals is required. It was in this way that,\nquite apart from this opposition between the individual and the\nwhole, the empirical character of the theory prevented our getting\nfrom it any clear and consistent notion of the ethical end it leads\nto.\n\n[Sidenote: Hedonistic interpretation of evolution not possible.]\n\nIt appeared at first that the ethics of evolution, when interpreted\nempirically, might be easily reconciled with the older theory of\nhedonism, by identifying life with pleasure--holding that the\nhighest or most evolved life is that which contains most pleasure,\nand that increase of pleasure is therefore the end of conduct. In\nthis way the end of evolutionism would be reduced to the end of\nutilitarianism. Some utilitarians, on the other hand, sought to get\nrid of the difficulties of their calculus, by the assumption that\nthe greatest pleasure would be found by following the direction of\nevolution. But, around both points of view, and the correspondence\nthey assumed to exist between pleasure and evolution, special\ndifficulties were seen to gather. Any hedonistic theory might be\nmet by the assertion that life is essentially a painful experience,\nand pleasure unattainable; and although the grounds on which this\nassertion was made seemed to be distinctly erroneous, and hedonism\ndid not appear to be an impossible theory of conduct, yet a similar\nobjection told with greater force against the combination of\nevolutionism and hedonism. For it holds the double position that the\nend is to promote life, and that life is to be promoted by adding to\npleasure; or else, that the end is pleasure, but that pleasure is to\nbe got by following evolution. It postulates, therefore, that the\nprogress of life tends, and tends even in a proportionate degree,\nto the increase of pleasure. Yet we could obtain no proof that this\nprogress does, as a matter of fact, increase pleasure in any regular\nway. On the contrary, the facts of experience seemed to show that\nlife and pleasure do not advance proportionately, nor even always\nconcomitantly. But a still more important and fundamental objection\nto the hedonistic form of evolutionism was deduced from the nature\nof pleasure itself; for it can be modified indefinitely, and always\nfollows in the wake of function. Thus the sole intelligible account\nwe can give of what conduct will bring the greatest pleasure is, that\nit is the conduct which calls forth the greatest amount of successful\nenergising, that which employs the greatest number and the strongest\nof the human faculties. Hence, instead of being able to measure life\nby pleasure, we were driven to interpret pleasure in terms of life.\n\n[Sidenote: No independent ethical ideal afforded by the theory of\nevolution.]\n\nAnd perhaps at first sight it seemed that the theory of evolution\ncould lead us beyond the pleasure-basis of older Naturalism. But,\nwhen the matter was examined more closely, without departing from the\nempirical point of view, it was found that the notions put forward\nwere unsatisfactory, that they did not represent the progressive\nnature of the course of evolution, and that their apparent force\nfell away before logical analysis. It became evident, in the first\nplace, that no appropriate end of human conduct could be derived\nfrom the nature of evolution in general. It is true that adaptation\nto environment is necessary for life; but to put forward such\nadaptation as the end for action, is to set up a practical goal which\ncorresponds but ill with the facts from which it professes to be\ntaken, making the theory which is supposed to account for progress\nestablish no end by pursuit of which progress becomes possible for\nhuman action. Further than this, it neglects a factor in evolution\nas necessary to it as is adaptation to environment--the element,\nnamely, of variation. A theory which took the latter as well as the\nformer of these factors into account seemed, in the next place, to\nbe given by those general characteristics which are said to mark all\nprogress--increase of definiteness, coherence, and heterogeneity.\nBut from these, again, it was found impossible to elicit a coherent\nand consistent rule for determining right and wrong in conduct, or\na definite end for action: they were too abstract and mechanical to\nsuit the living organism of human conduct; and we were thus driven\nback on the more general statement that \"life\" or the \"increase of\nlife\" is the end after which we should strive. In inquiring into the\nmeaning which could be given to this end, without interpreting it\nas pleasure, it was found, after tracing it through various forms\nof expression, that it reduced itself to making a man's strongest\nand most persistent impulses both standard and end. And this proved\nto be not only an uncertain and shifting guide for conduct, but\nan imperfect representation of what was to be expected from a\nprogressive, because evolutionist, ethics. For these persistent\nimpulses could only be regarded as the survival of past activities,\nand consequently, contained no ideal beyond that of continuing in\nthe old paths, and re-treading an already well-beaten course. Just\nas from the external end of adaptation to environment, so from this\ninternal or subjective principle, no ideal for progress, nor any\ndefinite end of action, could be obtained.\n\nIt would appear, therefore, that the theory of evolution--however\ngreat its achievements in the realm of natural science--is almost\nresultless in ethics. It only remains now to inquire whether this\nwant of competency to determine practical ends may not be due to the\nsuperficiality of the ordinary empirical interpretation of evolution,\nwhich has hitherto been adhered to.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[191] Taking evolution in its widest sense, since the theory of\nevolution does not \"imply some intrinsic proclivity in every species\ntowards a higher form.\"--Spencer, First Principles, App. p. 574;\nPrinciples of Sociology, i. 106.\n\n[192] Spencer, Principles of Biology, i. 73.\n\n[193] Ibid., i. 82.\n\n[194] Reden (1876), ii. 332.\n\n[195] Social Statics (1850), p. 77.\n\n[196] Data of Ethics, p. 25.\n\n[197] Data of Ethics, p. 16.\n\n[198] Ibid., p. 71.\n\n[199] See above, chap. vi. p. 137 ff.\n\n[200] Zeller, Phil. d. Griechen, 3d ed., III. i. 454, 470.\n\n[201] Lassalle's tirade against the \"verdammte Bed\u00fcrfnisslosigkeit\"\nof the German workman is a case in point.\n\n[202] Lange, Gesch. d. Materialismus, 2d ed., ii. 458.\n\n[203] Spencer, First Principles, p. 490.\n\n[204] An aspect of Mr Spencer's ethical theory which will be\nconsidered in the sequel: p. 228 ff.\n\n[205] Cf. A. Barratt, Physical Ethics, p. 294, where morality is\nplaced in \"reasonable obedience to the physical laws of nature.\"\n\n[206] Data of Ethics, p. 148.\n\n[207] Social Statics, quoted in Data of Ethics, p. 271.\n\n[208] Data of Ethics, p. 279.\n\n[209] Ibid., p. 275.\n\n[210] Data of Ethics, p. 7.\n\n[211] Ibid., p. 281.\n\n[212] These are examined by Mr F. W. Maitland, in an incisive\ncriticism of \"Mr H. Spencer's Theory of Society,\" Mind, viii. 354\nff., 506 ff.\n\n[213] Data of Ethics, p. 282.\n\n[214] Ibid., p. 283.\n\n[215] First Principles, p. 517.\n\n[216] Spencer, Psychology, \u00a7 212, i. 478.\n\n[217] First Principles, p. 489.\n\n[218] \"A complete equilibrium of the aggregate is without life, and\na moving equilibrium of the aggregate is living.\"--Principles of\nSociology, i. 106.\n\n[219] Data of Ethics, p. 254.\n\n[220] Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 26.\n\n[221] Darwin, Origin of Species (1859), pp. 43, 131, 466.\n\n[222] Spencer, Biology, i. 257.\n\n[223] First Principles, p. 404 f.\n\n[224] Cf. Clifford, Lectures and Essays, i. 101.\n\n[225] Descent of Man, 2d ed., p. 137, cf. pp. 198, 618; cf. A. R.\nWallace, Contributions (1870), p. 330.\n\n[226] Vierteljahrsschrift f. wiss. Phil., i. (1877), 543 ff.\n\n[227] Rolph, Biol. Probl., p. 33.\n\n[228] Darwin, Origin of Species, p. 336.\n\n[229] Thus Darwin, Descent of Man, p. 51, speaking of the \"advantage\nto man\" it must have been \"to become a biped,\" says: \"The hands and\narms could hardly have become perfect enough to have manufactured\nweapons, or to have hurled stones and spears with a true aim, as long\nas they were habitually used for locomotion and for supporting the\nwhole weight of the body; or, as before remarked, as long as they\nwere especially fitted for climbing trees.\" The hands had to lose\ntheir dexterity for the latter purposes before they could acquire\nthe more delicate adjustments necessary for skill in the former. The\ntransition was of course a gradual one; but the initial variations\nrequired would seem to have been at first unfavourable to man's\nchances in the struggle for existence, though it was through them\nthat he rose to his place at the summit of the organic scale.\n\n[230] Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 280.\n\n[231] Spencer, Biology, i. 149.\n\n[232] ibid., i. 144.\n\n[233] Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 71: \"Briefly, then, if the conduct\nis the best possible on every occasion, it follows that as the\noccasions are endlessly varied the acts will be endlessly varied\nto suit--the heterogeneity in the combination of motions will be\nextreme.\"\n\n[234] Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 106: \"The acts characterised by the\nmore complex motives and the more involved thoughts, have all along\nbeen of higher authority for guidance.\"\n\n[235] Cf. Clifford, Lectures and Essays, i. 94 f., where a similar\ndefinition is given in answer to the question, \"What is the meaning\nof _better_?\"\n\n[236] Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 63.\n\n[237] Cf. Spencer, First Principles, p. 566.\n\n[238] So far as the following criticism may appear to apply to Mr\nSpencer, and not merely to a possible way of defining moral conduct,\nit is necessary to bear in mind the words of his preface to the 'Data\nof Ethics': \"With a view to clearness, I have treated separately some\ncorrelative aspects of conduct, drawing conclusions either of which\nbecomes untrue if divorced from the other.\"\n\n[239] Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 75 f.\n\n[240] Data of Ethics, p. 106.\n\n[241] Although Mr Spencer holds that representativeness varies as\ndefiniteness, and measures complexity, including that complexity\nimplied by increasing heterogeneity.--Principles of Psychology, ii.\n516 f.\n\n[242] Data of Ethics, p. 113.\n\n[243] Cf. Principles of Sociology, ii. 725.\n\n[244] Data of Ethics, p. 123.\n\n[245] Data of Ethics, pp. 107, 129.\n\n[246] Ibid., p. 110.\n\n[247] Data of Ethics, p. 25; cf. Lange, Ges. d. Mat., ii. 247.\nLange's statement is noteworthy: \"Die menschliche Vernunft kennt kein\nanderes Ideal, als die m\u00f6glichste Erhaltung und Vervollkommnung des\nLebens, welches einmal begonnen hat, verbunden mit der Einschr\u00e4nkung\nvon Geburt und Tod.\"\n\n[248] The \"endeavour to further evolution, especially that of\nthe human race,\" is put forward as a \"new duty\" by Mr F. Galton,\nInquiries into Human Faculty and its Development (1883), p. 337.\n\n[249] Darwin, Descent of Man, p. 121; Stephen, Science of Ethics,\np. 366. Earlier than either of these writers, Dr Hutchison Stirling\nsuggested Health as a practical principle to be set against the\nanarchy of individualism. But with him, it is not an empirical\ngeneralisation of the tendency of evolution. It is as \"the outward\nsign of freedom, the realisation of the universal will,\" that \"health\nmay be set at once as sign and as goal of the harmonious operation\nof the whole system--as sign and as goal of a realisation of\nlife.\"--Secret of Hegel, ii. 554.\n\n[250] Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik, 2d ed., 1868.\n\n[251] Cf. E. Simcox, Natural Law, p. 97.\n\n[252] Simcox, Natural Law, p. 86.\n\n[253] Ibid., p. 87.\n\n[254] Ibid., p. 90.\n\n[255] Ibid., p. 99.\n\n[256] Simcox, Natural Law, p. 104.\n\n[257] Ibid., p. 87.\n\n[258] Science of Ethics, p. 76.\n\n[259] Science of Ethics, p. 74.\n\n[260] Even were we to succeed in getting a satisfactory view of the\ntype, we should still have to leave room for the individuality of\neach person, which is such that his function must differ in a manner\ncorresponding to his peculiar nature and surroundings (cf. Lotze,\nGrundz\u00fcge der praktischen Phil., p. 13 f.)\n\n[261] Simcox, Natural Law, p. 88.\n\n[262] Ibid., p. 100.\n\n[263] Science of Ethics, p. 120.\n\n[264] Simcox, Natural Law, p. 104.\n\n[265] Ibid., p. 103.\n\n[266] Ibid., p. 89; cf. J. T. Punnet, Mind, x. 91: \"What the\nprogress-principle makes its aim and end is not complexity, but the\nhighest and choicest fruits of complexity--the harmonious unfolding\nof all the latent capacities of man.\"\n\n[267] \"Of real tendencies\"--Natural Law, p. 98. But what tendencies\nare not real?\n\n[268] Natural Law, p. 98.\n\n[269] Cf. Trendelenburg, Naturrecht, p. 45: \"Von der philosophischen\nSeite kann es kein anderes Princip der Ethik geben als das\nmenschliche Wesen an sich, d. h., das menschliche Wesen in der Tiefe\nseiner Idee und im Reichthum seiner historischen Entwickelung. Beides\ngeh\u00f6rt zusammen. Denn das nur Historische w\u00fcrde blind und das nur\nIdeale leer.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.\n\n\nThe peculiarity of the conclusion we have reached is, that the theory\nwhich is used to explain the nature of progress, seems unable to give\nany canon or end for conduct which points out the way for progressive\nadvance. The view of human nature became unsatisfactory just at the\ncritical point--when we attempted to get at a knowledge of its end\nor final cause, which would give unity and purpose to action. To say\nthat the end is increase of life or function appeared a merely formal\nnotion unless we defined life as pleasure, while pleasure itself\nwas found to be unintelligible except as performance of function.\nThis uncertainty seems to indicate a certain superficiality in the\nordinary empirical way of looking at evolution.[270]\n\n[Sidenote: 1. Principles involved in the theory of evolution.]\n\nThe principles involved in the theory of evolution are, in brief,\nas follows. In the first place, it shows that there is a tendency,\nbrought about by natural selection, for organisms to harmonise with\nor become adapted to their environment--a tendency, that is to\nsay, towards unity of organism and environment, and, in so far as\nexternal conditions are uniform, towards a general unity of life.\nIn the second place, the theory implies variation in organisms,\nproduced either by the unequal incidence of external forces, or by\nthe spontaneous action of the organism, or by both causes combined.\nThe mere increase in the number of living organisms leads to a\nmodification of the conditions of life by which new variations are\nencouraged. And this tendency to variation in organisms--not merely\nthe diversity of external environment--is perpetually complicating\nthe conditions which the former tendency, that towards unity, helps\nto bring into harmony. It thus happens that there is, in the third\nplace, a continual process of readjustment and oscillation between\nthe tendency towards unity and that towards variety, which, through\nopposition and conciliation, produces continuity in nature. Each\nnewly formed unity between organism and environment is broken by a\nnew variation of the organism or of the environment, which further\ncomplicates the problem to be solved by the unifying process, and\ngives scope for a more intricate and more comprehensive readjustment.\nUnity, Variety, and Continuity are thus the three principles implied\nin the theory of evolution.[271]\n\n[Sidenote: 2. Unsuccessful application of these principles to ethics;]\n\nIt is from these principles that the attempt has been made to show\nthe ethical bearing of evolution. The first of them, Unity, is\nrepresented in the theory that would make adaptation to environment\nthe end of conduct; and the second is represented ethically in\nthe doctrine suggested by Mr Spencer, that the degree of morality\ndepends on the degree of complexity in act and motive. But both of\nthese views are obviously one-sided, even from the point of view of\nempirical evolution. Taken together, the principles on which they\ndepend make up that law of continuous and progressive advance which\nmay be regarded as expressing the essential characteristic of the\ntheory. And from this more general and accurate expression of it,\nwe might have expected to have been able to elicit the contribution\nwhich evolution has to make to the determination of the ethical end.\nBut after examining the various forms which it may take, we have\nbeen unable to obtain from it a principle of action.\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) the principles being treated as derived from\nexperience,]\n\nIn inquiring into the reason which has made the theory of evolution\nseemingly so barren in its ethical consequences, the first point\nwhich requires attention is that the characteristics of Unity,\nVariety, and Continuity are treated by it not as principles involved\nin development, but as theories inferred from, or superinduced upon,\nthe facts of development. We are led by facts to suppose certain\nhypothetical laws--namely, that organisms tend to harmony with their\nenvironment, but that there are certain causes promoting variation,\nand, consequently, that the history of all life is that of a\ncontinuous process towards more comprehensive uniformities, passing\nalways into more intricate variations. Additional facts are compared\nwith these hypothetical causes, and, by their ability to explain such\nfacts, the hypotheses are raised to the position of laws of nature,\nand are confidently applied to account for new phenomena of the same\nkind. But when we pass beyond facts lying immediately on the plane\nof those from which our laws have been gathered, it is to follow an\ninsufficient analogy if we interpret them by theories only shown to\nbelong to the former order. And this becomes still more obvious when\nthe change is not merely to a different order of facts, but to a\ndifferent way of looking at facts, as is the case in the transition\nfrom the point of view of knowledge to that of action.\n\n[Sidenote: not as depending on a principle implied in experience;]\n\nBut there is another way in which the principles of Unity,\nVariety, and Continuity may be regarded. Instead of being simply\ngeneralisations gathered from experience and depending upon it,\nthey may be founded on a principle which is itself the basis of the\npossibility of experience. Of course, no one would think of denying\nthat it is to the accumulated mass of experienced facts that these\nlaws owe their prominence in modern scientific opinion, and their\nacceptance by the judgment of the best scientists. But the process by\nwhich a man has been led to lay hold of such principles is one thing;\ntheir logical position in relation to experience quite another. Our\ndefinite recognition of the laws may very well be the result of\nexperience, at the same time that the principle of Continuity is\npresupposed in our having experience at all. As long as we kept to\nthe ground from which we started, and did not attempt to get beyond\nthe categories of causality and reciprocity, our progress might\nseem to be easy enough. Although their logical relations may be\nmisconceived, the laws are, of course, actually there, in experience:\ntheir application to the successive phenomena of nature remains the\nsame, and may be duly apprehended. The extension of facts into laws\nis explained by the scientific imagination, and we do not stay to\ninquire into the conditions on which the scientific imagination\nworks and has applicability to experience. But, when we try to\npass from efficient cause to the notion of purpose or of morality,\nwe find ourselves driven back on the fundamental constitution of\nknowledge, and see that it is only through the unifying and relating\naction of a self-conscious subject that knowledge is possible or\nthings exist for us at all. And this is the reason why we are able\nto say that the Unity or Continuity of nature is a principle or law\nof experience.[272] Were that principle not involved in knowledge,\nthere would be no world of nature for us at all. The empirical\ninterpretation of evolution, which has been hitherto adopted, has\nmade the negative side of this truth sufficiently evident: it has\nshown that we cannot, on empirical ground, reach the end or purpose\nof human nature. The question thus arises, whether what may be called\nthe \"metaphysical\" or \"transcendental\" interpretation of evolution\ncan show the reason of this defect and suggest a remedy.\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) no logical transition being effected from efficient\nto final cause.]\n\nThe insufficiency of the empirical way of looking at things is seen\nmost clearly when we attempt to make the transition just referred\nto, and determine an end for conduct. It seems often to be thought\nthat, in pointing out the tendency of affairs, we are, at the same\ntime, prescribing the end towards which human endeavour ought to\nbe directed. Now, it is very difficult to say how far an empirical\nmethod enables us to anticipate tendencies of this kind at all. Even\nfrom the historical point of view the conditioning circumstances are\nso complicated that it is by no means easy to predict the result of\ntheir combination. It is argued, however, by Sch\u00e4ffle,[273] that we\nare at least able to see as far as the next stage in the series of\nhistorical progress, and this is thought to lead to the conclusion\nthat we should make this next stage of development our end: further\nthan it we cannot see, and therefore need not provide. If, then, we\nhave no ultimate end for conduct, at least we need never be without\na proximate end--and one which is always changing with the course of\nevents. Instead, therefore, of saying that we should take no thought\nfor the morrow, the contention would seem to be that we should live\nfor the morrow but take no thought for the day after. But here the\naltered point of view is scarcely concealed. From the discussion of\nefficient causes we proceed all at once to decide upon ends or final\ncauses. We have shown (let it be granted) that, taking account of\nthe present position and mode of action of the forces we are able to\nexamine, they will modify the present state of affairs in a certain\nknown manner. To-day we are in state A; to-morrow we shall be in, or\nwell on the way towards, state Ab; therefore, runs the conclusion,\nimplied or expressed, we ought to make Ab our end. But this is more\nthan a fallacy due to the confusion of the two meanings of \"end.\" The\nconclusion to which it leads is inconsistent with, or at least shows\nthe one-sidedness of, the premisses from which it was drawn. For, if\nAb is really the next term in the series of historical progress, our\nmaking it our end can neither help nor hinder its realisation. If, on\nthe other hand, there is really a meaning in our making the world-end\nour own, then we cannot bring that end, the realisation of which is\nconceived as still in the future, under the category of efficient\ncausality, and say with confidence that it is the next stage in the\ncourse of events.\n\n[Sidenote: 3. Difference between causality and teleology.]\n\nThe idea does not work itself out in the same way as an efficient\ncause works in the processes of nature. We might indeed\nspeak--perhaps with some intelligible meaning--of the tendency of\nevolution becoming conscious in man, and then working towards its own\nrealisation as a fixed idea. So far as the simpler representations\nare concerned, this mode of action has been clearly illustrated\nin Mr Bain's writings; and the characteristic is not limited to\nthe less complex kinds of mental objects. The idea is, in its own\nnature, a force tending both to exist in consciousness and to realise\nitself through the motor energies.[274] Consciousness of an end is\na motive to action. Thus the notion of final cause includes that of\nefficient cause; but the two are not convertible. The idea of an end,\nbeing conceived by reason, cannot be described simply as a tendency\nbecome conscious. It has passed into the region in which various\nconceptions are, or may be, competing against one another, and the\nresultant is decided on upon grounds which may be called subjective\nsince they proceed from conscious determination. However the laws of\nthis conscious determination may be expressed, they are not to be\nidentified with the natural sequence of events as it may be conceived\nto exist independently of the individual consciousness. What seems\nthe tendency of things may be altered or modified upon some ground\nof preference by the conscious subject. In passing therefore to the\nworking out of a rational or mental idea--such as is implied in the\nconception of an end--we can no longer fully represent our notions by\nmeans of the determined temporal succession called causality.\n\n[Sidenote: These notions unconnected by empiricism,]\n\nThus the empirical standpoint leaves the case incomplete. A man\nmight quite reasonably ask why he should adopt as maxims of conduct\nthe laws seen to operate in nature. The end, in this way, is not\nmade to follow from the natural function of man. It is simply a mode\nin which the events of the world occur; and we must, therefore,\ngive a reason why it should be adopted as his end by the individual\nagent. To him there may be no sufficient grounds of inducement to\nbecome \"a self-conscious agent in the evolution of the universe.\"\nFrom the purely evolutionist point of view, no definite attempt has\nbeen made to solve the difficulty. It seems really to go no deeper\nthan Dr Johnson's reply to Boswell, when the latter plagued him to\ngive a reason for action: \"'Sir,' said he, in an animated tone, 'it\nis driving on the system of life.'\"[275] When any further answer is\nattempted now to the question, it appears to be on hedonistic grounds.\n\n[Sidenote: even with the assistance of hedonism.]\n\nBut it is not certain that the next stage of development will bring\nmore pleasure along with it than the present. Enough has already been\nsaid of the difficulties and uncertainties which surround any attempt\nto interpret evolution as tending constantly to increased pleasure.\nIt may be thought, however, that, if neither optimism nor pessimism\nis the conclusion to which we are led, the modified doctrine of what\nis called Meliorism may be accepted. And this theory--which holds\nthat the world is improving, that the balance of good over evil, or\nthat of pleasure over pain, is on the increase--might seem to form\na convenient support to the present doctrine. For it may appear to\nfollow from it that, if the next stage in the world-process--that\ntowards which evolution is tending--is known, then we should make\nit our end to accelerate this stage, as it will be one which brings\nwith it a better state of affairs than the present. But not even the\nmost enthusiastic \"meliorist\" has tried to show anything more than\nthat his doctrine holds true in general, and that, although progress\nhas many receding waves, the tide of human happiness is rising. But\nwe cannot tell how great these receding waves may be; nor may we\nsay that our action can have no power to check them. It follows,\ntherefore, that, in judging of any special and temporary movement\nof events (and it is not pretended that our anticipatory knowledge\nof the future can extend far), we cannot assume that the second\nstage will be better than the first, or that voluntary modification\nof it--if that be possible--might not improve both the immediate\nresult and its later consequences. It becomes necessary, therefore,\nto compare the value of the two by the directly pleasurable effects\nthey may be expected to have, so that we are driven back to test the\ncourse of evolution by reference to some other principle. The further\nwe go in examining an empirical theory, the clearer does it become\nthat it can make no nearer approach to the discovery of an ethical\nend, than to point out what courses of action are likely to be the\npleasantest, or what tendencies to action the strongest: while this\ncan only be done within certain limits. The doctrine of evolution\nitself, when added to empirical morality, only widens our view of the\nold landscape--does not enable us to pass from \"is\" to \"ought,\" or\nfrom efficient to final cause, any more than the telescope can point\nbeyond the sphere of spatial quantity.\n\n[Sidenote: New point of view introduced by teleology]\n\nWe are endeavouring to get at the idea or end of human nature in an\nimpossible way when we attempt to reach it on purely empirical lines,\nand think that, if we work long enough on them, we are sure to come\nto it. In the same way it was formerly thought by physiologists that,\nif we thoroughly examined the brain with microscope and scalpel, we\nshould come upon the seat of the soul at last, while psychologists\nwere fain to believe that, in addition to all our presentations\nof objects, we had also a presentation of the subject or thinking\nbeing. The mistake of both was in imagining that the soul was a thing\namongst other things, or a presentation amongst other presentations,\ninstead of the subject and condition of there being either things or\nthoughts at all. Of a similar character is the attempt to get at an\nend or final cause without leaving the point of view of efficient\ncausality. Were it successful, it would reduce final cause to\nmechanism. To look upon man or upon nature as manifesting an end\nimplies an idea or notion of the object as a whole, over and above\nthe mutual determination of its various parts, and thus necessitates\nthe contemplation of it \"as though an understanding contained the\nground of the unity of the multiplicity of its empirical laws.\"[276]\nIt is the attempt to get at an external purpose for objects of\nexperience that has made teleology be looked upon askance by men of\nscience. A conception of this kind went far to vitiate physics in\nthe middle ages, till it was, with justice, strictly excluded from\nthe scientific interpretation of nature by the leaders of modern\nphilosophy.[277] But teleology does not stand or fall with this\nexternal form of it, which takes its illustrations from the products\nof the factory, not from the manifestations of life,[278] and which\nis really only mechanism misunderstood.\n\n[Sidenote: necessary in considering life,]\n\nThe conception of an end is forced upon us in considering life,\nbecause then it is necessary to take account of the being as\norganised, and therefore as a whole. In the investigation of nature,\non the other hand, things may be apprehended without relation to\nthe conception of the whole; and teleology, therefore, seems to be\nunnecessary. The notion of purpose, it is often said, is essential\nto biology, but out of place in physical science. But when we\nlook on the world as a whole, the notion of end or purpose is\nintroduced, and the functions of its various parts conceived from a\nnew point of view. And the end of an organism can only be partially\nunderstood, when that organism is conceived as a whole apart from\nits environment. It is only a partial manifestation or example of\nthe more perfect reality in which things are to be regarded as not\nmerely conditioned and conditioning, but as revelations of purpose.\nBut, although the notion of purpose cannot be dispensed with in\nconsidering organic nature, the teleological notions we form of\nliving things are imperfect and \"abstract.\" Thus the organism is\noften, more or less explicitly, judged by its utility for some human\npurpose. In these cases the end is clearly an external and dependent\none. And, when the adaptation of its parts is spoken of in relation\nto its type or perfect form, a conception is involved over and above\nwhat can be inferred from the nature of the organism in itself. The\nnotion of the end depends upon a rational ideal, which passes beyond\nthe causal interrelation of parts to the conception of the organism\nas a whole, whose function is necessarily related to its environment.\n\n[Sidenote: and life directly known only as self-conscious.]\n\nOur knowledge of the ends of the lower animals is really much more\nimperfect than our knowledge of the human end. For the only life\nwe really know is self-conscious life, and that we are unable to\nattribute to them. We know their life only by conjecture, our\nknowledge of it being but an abstraction from our own consciousness.\nThe ethical, as Trendelenburg puts it,[279] is the higher stage of\nthe process, a lower stage of which is the organic. The purpose,\nwhich is conceived as blind or unconscious in nature, becomes\nconscious and voluntary in man. But our notion of the former\nis simply an abstraction from the free and conscious purpose\nwhich characterises our own activity. The conception of life is\nonly known to us as--is only--an element or moment in our own\nself-consciousness. And life which is not self-conscious can only\nbe judged in relation to the self-consciousness which contains in\nitself the explanation both of life and of nature. The germ of truth\nin the old mechanical teleology may perhaps be seen in this way. For\nit had right on its side in so far as it referred everything to the\nself-consciousness manifested in man; it was mistaken only in so far\nas it made things relative to his needs and desires. The teleological\nanthropomorphism which judges all things according to their\ncorrespondence with human purposes, must be transcended, equally\nwith the speculative anthropomorphism which frames the unseen world\nin the likeness of the phenomena of our present experience. But to\nattempt to escape from what is sometimes called anthropomorphism--the\nreference of the nature and purpose of things to self-consciousness,\nas expressive of the ultimate reality--is to attempt to escape from\nthought itself, and makes one's thinking from the beginning void and\ncontradictory.\n\n[Sidenote: 4. Reference to self-consciousness implied in evolution,]\n\nNow this reference to self has been omitted in our consideration\nof empirical evolution. We have taken the purely objective ground\nof science, and we have admitted what science has told us of how\nall sorts of things came to be,--how man appeared on the earth,\ngradually adapted himself to his surroundings and modified them--how\nsentiments expanded, customs grew, and one institution developed\nout of another. But science shows us all this only as an external\nprocess of events in space and time--a process in which the\npreceding determines each succeeding state, and all parts are united\ntogether. It does not show us the process from the inside. And, in\nthe end, it can do no more than point towards, without reaching,\nthe comprehensive idea of a whole, by reference to which idea all\nthe members of the whole are determined, in such a way that it is\ninsufficient to look upon one as causing another, and with the others\nmaking up the aggregate; since each member only exists for the sake\nof the whole, and the idea of the whole precedes the parts which\nconstitute it.[280] The teleological conception thus necessarily\nleads us beyond the ordinary categories of science, by which all\nthings are conceived as connected causally in space and time. But the\nscientific theories that we have been discussing do not recognise\nthis altered point of view; and, without giving any justification\nfor the change of standpoint, lay down the moral law that we ought\nto aim at the realisation of something which can only be described\nas a mental conception or idea. Here a double change in point of\nview is involved. We are no longer considering a process going on\noutside us, in which the reference to self may be fairly ignored, but\nwe put ourselves in relation to this external order: and we do so,\nnot merely as cognitive, but as active--as the potential source of\nactions which we say \"ought\" to be performed by us.\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) made clear in the attempt to trace the genesis of\nself-consciousness.]\n\nThe assumption involved in the former change is that made by\ncomparative or evolutionist psychology, when it attempts to play the\npart of a theory of knowledge. The development of impressions and\nideas is made to pass upwards to more complicated stages, till it\nreaches the point at which the individual, conceived as determined\nby external forces and reacting upon them, becomes conscious\nof itself as a subject of knowledge and source of action. This\ntransition from the category of causality to self-consciousness is,\nin some systems--that of Mr Spencer, for example--either concealed\nor held to with no firm grasp. Throughout his objective treatment\nof psychology, it would seem that Mr Spencer is evolving mind or\nself-consciousness out of the process in which simple relations of\nmatter and motion form the lowest stage, and reflex action is that\nwhich approaches most nearly to having mental characteristics. And,\nfrom this objective point of view, he speaks of his philosophy as\nan interpretation of \"the detailed phenomena of life, mind, and\nsociety, in terms of matter, motion, and force.\"[281] But when he\ndiscusses the subjective side, he admits that it is entirely unique\nand _sui generis_,[282] and adopts what is known as the \"two aspects\"\ntheory--the theory that mind cannot be accounted for as derived from\nmatter, any more than matter can be accounted for as derived from\nmind, but that they are both phases of one ultimate and unknown\nreality.[283] This admission involves a practical acknowledgment\nthat it is impossible to arrive at consciousness or at subjectivity\nby a process of natural development. We must, it affirms, postulate\ntwo aspects or phases of existence, or two lines of development,\nconnected probably in their ultimate reality, but, as known to us,\ndistinct from one another, and without mutual influence.\n\n[Sidenote: Reference to self-consciousness,]\n\nThe doctrine that a reference to self-consciousness is implied in\nexperience, may perhaps be made clearer by considering a criticism\nto which it has recently been subjected by an able psychological\nwriter. Professor W. James writes as follows:--\n\n \"The doctrine of the post-Kantians, that all knowledge\n is also self-knowledge, seems to flow from this\n confusion [between the psychologist's standpoint\n and the standpoint of the feeling upon which he is\n supposed to be making his report]. Empirically, of\n course, an awareness of self accompanies most of\n our thinking. But that it should be needed to make\n that thinking 'objective' is quite another matter.\n 'Green-after-red-and-other-than-it' is an absolutely\n complete object of thought, ideally considered, and\n needs no added element. The fallacy seems to arise\n from some such reflection as this, that since the\n feeling _is_ what it feels itself to be, so it must\n feel itself to be what it _is_--namely, related to each\n of its objects. That the last _is_ covers much more\n ground than the first, the philosopher here does not\n notice. The first _is_ signifies only the feeling's\n inward quality; the last _is_ covers all possible facts\n _about_ the feeling,--relational facts, which can only\n be known from outside points of view, like that of the\n philosopher himself.\"[284]\n\n[Sidenote: though not itself a part of experience,]\n\n[Sidenote: logically implied by experience.]\n\nNow it seems to me that the real confusion here is between the\npoint of view of experience, and the point of view of reflection\non experience, and that it is not the \"post-Kantians\" who confuse\nthe two points of view. The \"post-Kantians\"--by whom Professor\nJames means T. H. Green and the writers commonly associated with\nhim--habitually occupy the latter standpoint. They do not hold\nthat \"all knowledge is also self-knowledge,\" in the sense that\n\"an awareness of self accompanies most [or all] of our thinking.\"\nWhen we have this empirical \"awareness of self,\" our object is\nthe more or less distinct contents of perception, &c., which make\nup the empirical ego. But this knowledge of the empirical ego,\nequally with knowledge of external nature, implies logically the\naction of self-consciousness. When we reflect upon experience, one\nconstant element is seen to be implied in it--the reference to a\nsubject of knowledge and feeling. Certainly \"post-Kantians\" do not\nimagine--as Professor James seems himself to imagine and to think\nthey do--that a feeling feels itself, or an object knows itself.\n\"Green-after-red-and-other-than-it\" is for them, as for him, if not\n\"an absolutely complete object of thought,\" yet relatively complete.\nIt may be apprehended alone as a part of experience. But reflection\non experience shows that it, like any other object of thought,\ndepends upon a knowing subject. The \"post-Kantians\" do not assert\nthat knowing an object involves for the individual knower actual\nconsciousness of what his knowledge implies, any more than they would\nsay that the \"plain man\" is already a metaphysician. But they hold\nthat reflection on experience shows that self-reference, or reference\nto a subject, is a logical condition of there being experience\nat all. So far from confusing the two standpoints, they require\ncarefully to emphasise their difference, lest the actual content of a\nstate of consciousness in the individual man be held to be equivalent\nto the grounds or conditions of that state of consciousness.\n\nThe reason why there is even an apparent plausibility in the\nattempt to get at a natural development of self-consciousness, is\nthat the reference to self is, from the outset, implicitly, but\nlogically, assumed in tracing the sequence of events which forms\nthe subject-matter of the theory of evolution, while the course of\ndevelopment does nothing more than render its implication explicit.\nSelf-consciousness is not something that exists apart from the\nworld of known and knowable objects, any more than it is itself a\nspecial department of this world of objects distinguishable from, and\ndetermined by, its surroundings. It is, on the contrary, the supreme\ncondition of the world of objects having any existence whatever.\nIt is only through objects being brought into relation with the\nidentical and permanent subject of knowledge, that there is unity in\nnature, or, in other words, that there is a known world of nature or\nexperience at all. The evolution of mind or self-consciousness out of\nexperience is, therefore, not merely to be rejected as a problem too\nintricate for psychological analysis. It is a mistake to think that\nit is a possible problem at all; for it attempts to make experience\naccount for and originate the principles on which its own possibility\ndepends.\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) made clear in the attempt to trace morality from\nreflex action.]\n\nBut it is the second change in point of view which needs special\nemphasis here--the change from the point of view of science to\nthat of morality. Taken in its bare form, this is perhaps little\nmore than a confusion of thought. The fact of things being of a\ncertain constitution, and of their progress tending in a certain\ndirection, cannot of itself supply a law for the exercise of our\nactivity. But the view is associated with a theory of the nature\nof human action which seeks to bring it into the strict line of\nnatural development. Just as empirical psychology attempted to\ntreat self-consciousness as a stage in the evolution of experience\nor knowledge, so the empirical theory of morality, aided by the\ndoctrine of evolution, tries to show how the action which is called\nmoral has been developed out of purely physical or reflex action.\nBut this theory of the development of moral action is really open to\nthe same objection as that which was urged against the theory which\nevolves self-consciousness from the unconscious. The objection to the\nlatter was, that experience, itself constituted by consciousness, is\nmade to produce the condition of its own possibility; and a similar\nconfusion is involved in attempting to develop moral action out of\nmerely physical or reflex action. The only case of true psychical or\nconscious action is that in which there is a conscious determination\nof end and means; and action of this kind implies the same relation\nto self-consciousness as that by which knowledge is constituted.\nThe relation is, however, manifested in a different way: it is not\nan apprehension of the manifold of impression into the unity of\nconsciousness, but the externalisation of self-consciousness in\nrealising a conceived end or idea. Now, in so far as physical and\npsychical facts are phenomena of experience--and they have no other\nexistence, at least none that can have any intelligible meaning given\nto it--they presuppose self-consciousness; for it is only in relation\nto it that experience is possible. That is to say, their existence\nlogically implies a reference to a subject whose active externalising\nmanifestation is the determination of means and end which constitutes\nmoral (as distinguished from merely natural) action. So far,\ntherefore, from our being able to trace the development of moral\naction from the simpler phenomena of natural action, we find that\nthese, in their most rudimentary form, by virtue of their being\nphenomena of experience, imply and receive their reality from the\nself-consciousness which is the differentiating quality both of\nknowledge and of moral action.\n\n[Sidenote: 5. The unity of self-consciousness:]\n\n[Sidenote: (_a_) as making possible the transition from knowledge to\nmorality;]\n\nFrom this it follows that, although, empirically, the change\nfrom the point of view of science to that of morality is a\ntransition to a different order of facts, yet the passage may\nbe possible transcendentally through self-consciousness. For in\nself-consciousness we reach the element of identity between knowledge\nand action. It is, therefore, of importance to understand the\nnature of this self-conscious activity in relation to knowledge\nand to action. If the fundamental characteristic of knowledge is\nthe bringing into relation to consciousness, then all conscious\naction has this characteristic; for it determines self towards some\nparticular line of activity--that is to say, towards an object or end\nwhich is thereby related to consciousness. Action therefore, we may\nsay, is knowledge. And in the same way, on the other hand, since the\nrelating to consciousness which constitutes knowledge can only be\nregarded as originated by the subject, it follows, conversely, that\nknowledge is action.[285] \"We act,\" says Spinoza, \"only in so far as\nwe know or understand.\" Action is but one aspect or manifestation of\nthat which, in another aspect or manifestation, is knowledge. But\nthe aspect of self-consciousness we call knowledge and that we call\naction are different from one another. In the former the relating\nto consciousness in the definite forms of thought and perception is\nthe prominent thing. In the latter it is the realising energy of the\nself-conscious subject. The ordinary distinction between knowledge\nand action is therefore correct, if not pushed to the extent of\nmaking an absolute separation between them: in the former we idealise\nthe real, in the latter we realise the ideal. But they are at one in\nthis, that both involve self-conscious activity.\n\n[Sidenote: (_b_) as determining the character of the ethical end,]\n\nThe self-consciousness which in one relation is knowledge, in\nanother action, is thus the fundamental fact of human nature; and\non it, therefore, the ethical end must be based, if that end can\nbe disclosed by the nature of man, and is to express what is most\nfundamental in his nature. Now, as knowledge finds its completion\nwhen all things are connected with one another and the subject in a\ndefinite system of relations, the end of completed self-conscious\nactivity cannot be different. In their final perfection, as in their\nfundamental nature, the two are at one. As Kant puts it,[286] the\nspeculative and the practical reason are reconciled in the notion of\nend. However virtue may differ from knowledge in the processes of\nordinary experience, the distinction only belongs to their finite\nrealisation. An intuitive understanding, or understanding which, in\nknowing, creates the objects of knowledge, is the highest conception\nof reason. Yet the very notion of a finite self implies that neither\nsuch knowledge nor such activity belongs to it. In knowledge and\naction, as properties of the ultimate self-consciousness, human\nbeings only participate. It is only by means of the laborious methods\nof observation and inference that they approach the intuition of all\nthings as a unity in which perfect knowledge consists; and, in the\nsame way, it is only by the gradual volitional adaptation of means\nto end that they are able, in some measure, to contribute to the\nrealisation of self-consciousness in the world.\n\n[Sidenote: as self-realisation,]\n\nAn end can only be made our own when conceived as necessary for\nrealising or completing our idea of self. Conscious volition\nonly follows a conceived want, or recognition that the self as\nimagined--the ideal self--is not realised in the actual self. The\naction is towards a fuller working out of the idea of self; and the\nend may therefore, in all cases of conscious action, be said to be\nself-realisation, though the nature of this end differs according\nto each man's conception of self. This may be expressed, as Green\nexpresses it, by saying that \"self-satisfaction is the form of\nevery object willed; but ... it is on the specific difference of\nthe objects willed under the general form of self-satisfaction\nthat the quality of the will must depend.\"[287] It appears to\nme, however, that this statement requires to be guarded by an\nexplanation. The self-satisfaction sought must not be looked upon as\na feeling,--for if it is, it can only be interpreted psychologically\nas pleasure--but as simply conscious self-realisation. And this\nself-realisation is the objective consciousness of an attained\nend, which is accompanied by, but is not the same as, the feeling\nof pleasure. Self-realisation is the end, not the pleasurable\nfeeling which follows it; self-satisfaction, not the \"pleasure of\nself-satisfaction.\" In this way, the common experience \"that the\nobjects with which we seek to satisfy ourselves do not turn out\ncapable of satisfying us,\"[288] might be expressed by saying that\nthe method adopted for the realisation of self is often found in its\nresult to lead to incomplete, or even to illusory, self-realisation.\n\nThe question thus arises, What is the true self that is to be\nrealised, and what is meant by the realisation of it? The will that\nwills itself is as bare a notion in ethics, as the thought that\nthinks itself is in metaphysics. The \"good will,\" which Kant rightly\nheld to be the only ultimate good, never altogether escaped this\nformality in Kant's own treatment of it. His idea of humanity as a\nrealm of ends was limited by his formal conception of the function\nof reason, though it suggests the way by which the mere tautology\nof will may be transcended. It is of the essence of a finite will\nthat its end is different from the realisation of the end. But the\nrationality of the will implies that it must aim at nothing less\nthan the harmonious articulation of its whole activity in the unity\nof self-consciousness.\n\n[Sidenote: but as transcending egoism;]\n\nIt has been argued above that both knowledge and morality are\nexpressions of self-conscious activity: in it these different\nmanifestations find an element of fundamental identity. But it may be\nmaintained, further, that this \"unity of self-consciousness\" is not\nmerely the unity of the different states of an individual, but that\nit is an element which transcends the difference by which concrete\nindividuals are distinguished from one another. If this view can be\ncarried out, it seems to lead us to attribute to other men something\nmore than a \"similar consciousness\"[289] to our own, and to make us\nlook on all self-conscious beings as sharing in, or manifesting,\nin various imperfect ways, one identical self-consciousness. From\nthis point of view, self-realisation would be established as no mere\nindividual end. The first law of morality would be not the \"natural\"\nimpulse for each to take care of himself in the struggle for life,\nbut, on the contrary, the sublation of that distinction between the\nparticular ego and other individuals which would admit of the one\nusing the others as mere means to his own advancement. His true end\nis the same as theirs: the realisation of the self-consciousness\nin which both partake--its realisation, that is to say, not in\none individual only, but wherever it is manifested.[290] This is\nthe rationale of what the empirical theory of evolution tries to\nestablish by pointing to the growing harmony in feeling and interest\nbetween the individual and society. What evolution really shows is\nthe gradual manifestation in actual volition of the identity of\nnature in all men.[291] I do not say that this fundamental identity\nof nature does away with all conflict between self-realisation in\none's self and in others; but it does much, if it establishes the\nprinciple that the realisation of one's own nature involves the\nrealisation of that of others. As Sch\u00e4ffle says, \"the moral law is\nthe direction of the will to the genuinely human as humanity;\" and\n\"this is a transcendental element embedded in the hearts of all\nmen--though in its basis only, for it is developed and ripened in the\ncourse of history.\"[292] And the more fully self-consciousness is\nrealised, the clearer does it become that its complete realisation\nimplies that \"kingdom of ends\" spoken of by Kant, in which all\nself-conscious beings are at once subjects and sovereign.\n\n[Sidenote: (_c_) as showing that the realisation of the end must be\nprogressive.]\n\nFurther, self-realisation in both its aspects--as individual and as\nsocial--is necessarily progressive. It is only at the highest stage\nof its development that nature becomes the organ of intelligence and\nmorality.[293] And, just as knowledge expresses itself through the\nforms of space and time, and, therefore, by gradual colligations of\nfacts, so the conscious determination of activity is manifested in\nthe world in an order of consecutive acts, and is therefore subject,\nin its manifestation, to the laws of temporal succession. It is the\npart of a system of metaphysics--at any rate, it does not belong to\nthe present inquiry--to show how reason manifests itself in space\nand time, and how, through the rationality of this manifestation,\neverything in space is and acts only in relation to its environment,\nand through it, to the rest of the world, and how each event in time\nis the result of preceding events, and determines those which follow\nit. What it thus shows the necessity of is the process of evolution;\nand it is because this process is determined by reason that the world\nis the object of knowledge and the sphere of moral action. Evolution\nis thus not the foundation of morality, but the manifestation of the\nprinciple on which it depends. Morality cannot be explained by means\nof its own development, without reference to the self-consciousness\nwhich makes that development possible. However valuable may be the\ninformation we get from experience as to the gradual evolution of\nconduct, its nature and end can only be explained by a principle that\ntranscends experience.\n\n THE END.\n\n PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[270] The empirical interpretation of evolution is that adopted by\nthe majority of evolutionists, but is not essential to the truth of\nthe theory. A protest against it is entered by Mr Wallace, though in\nthe somewhat crude form of postulating supernatural interference for\nthe production of certain classes of phenomena (cf. Contributions to\nthe Theory of Natural Selection, p. 359), at the same time that his\nconception of nature does not seem to differ otherwise from that of\nH\u00e4ckel.\n\n[271] The reference in the above to Kant, Werke, iii. 438 ff., is\nobvious; but it is nevertheless a true account of the principles\ninvolved in the theory of evolution.\n\n[272] Cf. Stirling, Secret of Hegel, ii. 615: \"One grand system,\nunity of type, all this must be postulated from the very constitution\nof human reason; but from the very constitution of experience as\nwell, it can never be realised in experience.\"\n\n[273] Bau und Leben des socialen K\u00f6rpers, ii. 68.\n\n[274] Cf. Fouill\u00e9e, Critique des syst\u00e8mes de morale contemporains, p.\n13 ff.\n\n[275] Boswell's Life of Johnson, chap. liv.\n\n[276] Kant, Werke, v. 187 (Kr. d. Urt., Einl. iv.)\n\n[277] Descartes, Princ. phil., iii. 3, i. 28; Bacon, De augm., iii.\n5, Novum organum, ii. 2.\n\n[278] Cf. Kant, Werke, v. 387 (Kr. d. Urt., \u00a7 65).\n\n[279] Historische Beitr\u00e4ge zur Philosophie, iii. 165.\n\n[280] Cf. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, iii. 228.\n\n[281] First Principles, \u00a7 194, p. 556.\n\n[282] Principles of Psychology, \u00a7 56, i. 140.\n\n[283] Ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 272, 273, i. 624 ff.\n\n[284] Mind, ix. 21.\n\n[285] From \"action\" in this its ultimate meaning as equivalent to\norigination by the subject, it is necessary to distinguish \"action\"\nas a phenomenon in the external world. The latter is one of the\nmodes in which the relation of objects is known to us, the former a\ncharacteristic of knowing. The active nature of knowledge is worked\nout in an interesting way in Professor S. S. Laurie's 'Metaphysica\nnova et vetusta,' by \"Scotus Novanticus\" (1884).\n\n[286] Werke, iii. 538; cf. Adamson, Philosophy of Kant, p. 138.\n\n[287] Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 161.\n\n[288] Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 165.\n\n[289] Sidgwick, \"Green's Ethics,\" Mind, ix. 180.\n\n[290] This is implied in Hegel's well-known imperative, \"Be a person\nand respect others as persons.\"--Phil. d. Rechts, p. 73.\n\n[291] Thus H\u00f6ffding maintains that \"the highest ethical idea\" is \"the\nidea of the human race as a realm of personalities.\"--Grundlage der\nhumanen Ethik (aus dem d\u00e4nischen), p. 74.\n\n[292] Bau und Leben des socialen K\u00f6rpers, i. 173.\n\n[293] Cf. H. 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The Roman Breviary: Reformed by Order of the Holy \u0152cumenical\nCouncil of Trent; Published by Order of Pope St Pius V.; and Revised\nby Clement VIII. and Urban VIII.; together with the Offices since\ngranted. Translated out of Latin into English by JOHN, Marquess of\nBute, K.T. In 2 vols., crown 8vo, cloth boards, edges uncut. \u00a32, 2s.\n\n---- The Altus of St Columba. With a Prose Paraphrase and Notes. In\npaper cover, 2s. 6d.\n\nBUTLER. Pompeii: Descriptive and Picturesque. By W. BUTLER. Post 8vo,\n5s.\n\nBUTT. Miss Molly. By BEATRICE MAY BUTT. Cheap Edition, 2s.\n\n---- Eugenie. Crown 8vo, 6s. 6d.\n\n---- Elizabeth, and Other Sketches. Crown 8vo, 6s.\n\n---- Novels. New and Uniform Edition. Crown 8vo, each 2s. 6d.\nDelicia. _Now ready._\n\nCAIRD. Sermons. By JOHN CAIRD, D.D., Principal of the University of\nGlasgow. Sixteenth Thousand. Fcap. 8vo, 5s.\n\n---- Religion in Common Life. A Sermon preached in Crathie Church,\nOctober 14, 1855, before Her Majesty the Queen and Prince Albert.\nPublished by Her Majesty's Command. Cheap Edition, 3d.\n\nCAMPBELL. Critical Studies in St Luke's Gospel: Its Demonology and\nEbionitism. By COLIN CAMPBELL, B.D., Minister of the Parish of\nDundee, formerly Scholar and Fellow of Glasgow University. Author of\nthe 'Three First Gospels in Greek, arranged in parallel columns.'\nPost 8vo, 7s. 6d.\n\nCAMPBELL. Sermons Preached before the Queen at Balmoral. By the Rey.\nA. A. CAMPBELL, Minister of Crathie. Published by Command of Her\nMajesty. Crown 8vo, 4s. 6d.\n\nCAMPBELL. Records of Argyll. Legends, Traditions, and Recollections\nof Argyllshire Highlanders, collected chiefly from the Gaelic. With\nNotes on the Antiquity of the Dress, Clan Colours or Tartans of the\nHighlanders. By LORD ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL. Illustrated with Nineteen\nfull-page Etchings. 4to, printed on hand-made paper, \u00a33, 3s.\n\nCANTON. A Lost Epic, and other Poems. By WILLIAM CANTON. Crown 8vo,\n5s.\n\nCARRICK. Koumiss; or, Fermented Mare's Milk: and its Uses in the\nTreatment and Cure of Pulmonary Consumption, and other Wasting\nDiseases. With an Appendix on the best Methods of Fermenting Cow's\nMilk. By GEORGE L. CARRICK, M.D., L.R.C.S.E. and L.R.C.P.E.,\nPhysician to the British Embassy, St Petersburg, &c. Crown 8vo, 10s.\n6d.\n\nCARSTAIRS. British Work in India. By R. CARSTAIRS. Cr. 8vo, 6s.\n\nCAUVIN. A Treasury of the English and German Languages. Compiled from\nthe best Authors and Lexicographers in both Languages. By JOSEPH\nCAUVIN, LL.D. and Ph.D., of the University of G\u00f6ttingen, &c. Crown\n8vo, 7s. 6d.\n\nCAVE-BROWN. Lambeth Palace and its Associations. By J. CAVE-BROWN,\nM.A., Vicar of Detling, Kent, and for many years Curate of Lambeth\nParish Church. With an Introduction by the Archbishop of Canterbury.\nSecond Edition, containing an additional Chapter on Medieval Life in\nthe Old Palaces. 8vo, with Illustrations, 21s.\n\nCHARTERIS. Canonicity; or, Early Testimonies to the Existence and\nUse of the Books of the New Testament. Based on Kirchhoffer's\n'Quellensammlung.' Edited by A. H. CHARTERIS, D.D., Professor of\nBiblical Criticism in the University of Edinburgh. 8vo, 18s.\n\nCHRISTISON. Life of Sir Robert Christison, Bart., M.D., D.C.L. Oxon.,\nProfessor of Medical Jurisprudence in the University of Edinburgh.\nEdited by his SONS. In two vols. 8vo. Vol. I.--Autobiography. 16s.\nVol. II.--Memoirs. 16s.\n\nCHURCH SERVICE SOCIETY. A Book of Common Order: Being Forms of\nWorship issued by the Church Service Society. Sixth Edition. Crown,\n8vo, 6s. Also in 2 vols, crown 8vo, 6s. 6d.\n\nCLELAND. Too Apt a Pupil. By ROBERT CLELAND. Author of 'Barbara\nAllan, the Provost's Daughter.' Crown 8vo, 6s.\n\nCLOUSTON. Popular Tales and Fictions: their Migrations and\nTransformations. By W. A. CLOUSTON, Editor of 'Arabian Poetry for\nEnglish Readers,' &c. 2 vols. post 8vo, roxburghe binding, 25s.\n\nCOBBAN. Master of his Fate. By J. MACLAREN COBBAN, Author of 'The\nCure of Souls,' 'Tinted Vapours,' &c. New and Cheaper Edition. Crown\n8vo, paper cover, 1s. Cloth, bevelled boards, 3s. 6d.\n\nCOCHRAN. A Handy Text-Book of Military Law. Compiled chiefly to\nassist Officers preparing for Examination; also for all Officers of\nthe Regular and Auxiliary Forces. Comprising also a Synopsis of part\nof the Army Act. By Major F. COCHRAN, Hampshire Regiment Garrison\nInstructor, North British District. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.\n\nCOLQUHOUN. The Moor and the Loch. Containing Minute Instructions in\nall Highland Sports, with Wanderings over Crag and Corrie, Flood and\nFell. By JOHN COLQUHOUN. Seventh Edition. With Illustrations. 8vo,\n21s.\n\nCOTTERILL. Suggested Reforms in Public Schools. By C. C. COTTERILL,\nM.A. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.\n\nCRANSTOUN. The Elegies of Albius Tibullus. Translated into English\nVerse, with Life of the Poet, and Illustrative Notes. By JAMES\nCRANSTOUN, LL.D., Author of a Translation of 'Catullus.' Crown 8vo,\n6s. 6d.\n\n---- The Elegies of Sextus Propertius. Translated into English Verse,\nwith Life of the Poet, and Illustrative Notes. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.\n\nCRAWFORD. Saracinesca. By F. MARION CRAWFORD, Author of 'Mr Isaacs,'\n'Dr Claudius,' 'Zoroaster,' &c. &c. Fifth Ed. Crown 8vo, 6s.\n\nCRAWFORD. The Doctrine of Holy Scripture respecting the Atonement.\nBy the late THOMAS J. CRAWFORD, D.D., Professor of Divinity in the\nUniversity of Edinburgh. Fifth Edition. 8vo, 12s.\n\n---- The Fatherhood of God, Considered in its General and Special\nAspects. Third Edition, Revised and Enlarged. 8vo, 9s.\n\n---- The Preaching of the Cross, and other Sermons. 8vo, 7s. 6d.\n\n---- The Mysteries of Christianity. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.\n\nCRAWFORD. An Atonement of East London, and other Poems. By HOWARD\nCRAWFORD, M.A. Crown 8vo, 5s.\n\nCUSHING. The Blacksmith of Voe. By PAUL CUSHING, Author of 'The Bull\ni' th' Thorn.' Cheap Edition. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.\n\n---- Cut with his own Diamond. A Novel. 3 vols. cr. 8vo, 25s. 6d.\n\nDAVIES. Norfolk Broads and Rivers; or, The Waterways, Lagoons, and\nDecoys of East Anglia. By G. CHRISTOPHER DAVIES. Illustrated with\nSeven full-page Plates. New and Cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s.\n\n---- Our Home in Aveyron. Sketches of Peasant Life in Aveyron and the\nLot. By G. CHRISTOPHER DAVIES and Mrs BROUGHALL. Illustrated with\nfull-page Illustrations. 8vo, 15s. Cheap Edition, 7s. 6d.\n\nDAYNE. In the Name of the Tzar. A Novel. By J. BELFORD DAYNE. Crown\n8vo, 6s.\n\n---- Tribute to Satan. A Novel. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d.\n\nDE LA WARR. An Eastern Cruise in the 'Edeline.' By the Countess DE LA\nWARR. In Illustrated Cover. 2s.\n\nDESCARTES. The Method, Meditations, and Principles of Philosophy of\nDescartes. Translated from the Original French and Latin. With a\nNew Introductory Essay, Historical and Critical, on the Cartesian\nPhilosophy. By Professor VEITCH, LL.D., Glasgow University. Ninth\nEdition. 6s. 6d.\n\nDICKSON. Gleanings from Japan. By W. G. DICKSON, Author of 'Japan:\nBeing a Sketch of its History, Government, and Officers of the\nEmpire.' With Illustrations. 8vo, 16s.\n\nDOGS, OUR DOMESTICATED: Their Treatment in reference to Food,\nDiseases, Habits, Punishment, Accomplishments. By 'MAGENTA.' Crown\n8vo, 2s. 6d.\n\nDOMESTIC EXPERIMENT, A. By the Author of 'Ideala: A Study from Life.'\nCrown 8vo, 6s.\n\nDR HERMIONE. By the Author of 'Lady Bluebeard,' 'Zit and Xoe.' Crown\n8vo, 6s.\n\nDU CANE. The Odyssey of Homer, Books I.-XII. Translated into English\nVerse. By Sir CHARLES DU CANE, K.C.M.G. 8vo, 10s. 6d.\n\nDUDGEON. History of the Edinburgh or Queen's Regiment Light Infantry\nMilitia, now 3rd Battalion The Royal Scots; with an Account of the\nOrigin and Progress of the Militia, and a Brief Sketch of the old\nRoyal Scots. By Major R. C. DUDGEON, Adjutant 3rd Battalion The Royal\nScots. Post 8vo, with Illustrations, 10s. 6d.\n\nDUNCAN. Manual of the General Acts of Parliament relating to the\nSalmon Fisheries of Scotland from 1828 to 1882. By J. BARKER DUNCAN.\nCrown 8vo, 5s.\n\nDUNSMORE. Manual of the Law of Scotland as to the Relations between\nAgricultural Tenants and their Landlords, Servants, Merchants, and\nBowers. By W. DUNSMORE. 8vo, 7s. 6d.\n\nDUPR\u00c8. Thoughts on Art, and Autobiographical Memoirs of Giovanni\nDupr\u00e8. Translated from the Italian by E. M. PERUZZI, with the\npermission of the Author. New Edition. With an Introduction by W. W.\nSTORY. Crown 8vo, 10s. 6d.\n\nELIOT. George Eliot's Life, Related in her Letters and Journals.\nArranged and Edited by her husband, J. W. CROSS. With Portrait and\nother Illustrations. Third Edition. 3 vols. post 8vo, 42s.\n\n---- George Eliot's Life. (Cabinet Edition.) With Portrait and other\nIllustrations. 3 vols. crown 8vo, 15s.\n\n---- George Eliot's Life. With Portrait and other Illustrations. New\nEdition, in one volume. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.\n\n---- Works of George Eliot (Cabinet Edition). Handsomely printed in a\nnew type, 21 volumes, crown 8vo, price, \u00a35, 5s. The Volumes are also\nsold separately, price 5s. each, viz.:--\n\n Romola. 2 vols.--Silas Marner, The Lifted Veil, Brother\n Jacob. 1 vol.--Adam Bede. 2 vols.--Scenes of Clerical\n Life. 2 vols.--The Mill on the Floss. 2 vols.--Felix\n Holt. 2 vols.--Middlemarch. 3 vols.--Daniel Deronda.\n 3 vols.--The Spanish Gypsy. 1 vol.--Jubal, and other\n Poems, Old and New. 1 vol.--Theophrastus Such. 1\n vol.--Essays. 1 vol.\n\n---- Novels by GEORGE ELIOT. Cheap Edition. Adam Bede. Illustrated.\n3s. 6d., cloth.--The Mill on the Floss. Illustrated. 3s. 6d.,\ncloth.--Scenes of Clerical Life. Illustrated. 3s., cloth.--Silas\nMarner: the Weaver of Raveloe. Illustrated. 2s. 6d., cloth.--Felix\nHolt, the Radical. Illustrated. 3s. 6d., cloth.--Romola. With\nVignette. 3s. 6d., cloth.\n\n---- Middlemarch. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.\n\n---- Daniel Deronda. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.\n\n---- Essays. New Edition. Crown 8vo, 5s.\n\n---- Impressions of Theophrastus Such. New Ed. Cr. 8vo, 5s.\n\n---- The Spanish Gypsy. New Edition. Crown 8vo, 5s.\n\n---- The Legend of Jubal, and other Poems, Old and New. New Edition.\nCrown 8vo, 5s.\n\n---- Wise, Witty, and Tender Sayings, in Prose and Verse. Selected\nfrom the Works of GEORGE ELIOT. Eighth Edition. Fcap. 8vo 6s.\n\n---- The George Eliot Birthday Book. Printed on fine paper, with red\nborder, and handsomely bound in cloth, gilt. Fcap. 8vo, cloth, 3s.\n6d. And in French morocco or Russia, 5s.\n\nESSAYS ON SOCIAL SUBJECTS. Originally published in the 'Saturday\nReview.' New Ed. First & Second Series. 2 vols. cr. 8vo, 6s. each.\n\nEWALD. The Crown and its Advisers; or, Queen, Ministers, Lords and\nCommons. By ALEXANDER CHARLES EWALD, F.S.A. Crown 8vo, 5s.\n\nFAITHS OF THE WORLD, The. A Concise History of the Great Religious\nSystems of the World. By various Authors. Crown 8vo, 5s.\n\nFARRER. A Tour in Greece in 1880. By RICHARD RIDLEY FARRER. With\nTwenty-seven full-page Illustrations by LORD WINDSOR. Royal 8vo, with\na Map, 21s.\n\nFERRIER. Philosophical Works of the late James F. Ferrier, B.A.\nOxon., Professor of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy, St\nAndrews. New Edition. Edited by Sir ALEX. GRANT, Bart., D.C.L., and\nProfessor LUSHINGTON. 3 vols. crown 8vo, 34s. 6d.\n\n---- Institutes of Metaphysic. Third Edition. 10s. 6d.\n\n---- Lectures on the Early Greek Philosophy. 3d Ed. 10s. 6d.\n\n---- Philosophical Remains, including the Lectures on Early Greek\nPhilosophy. 2 vols., 24s.\n\nFITZROY. Dogma and the Church of England. By A. I. FITZROY. Post 8vo,\n7s. 6d.\n\nFLINT. The Philosophy of History in Europe. By ROBERT FLINT, D.D.,\nLL.D., Professor of Divinity, University of Edinburgh. 2 vols. 8vo.\n\n [_New Edition in preparation._\n\n---- Theism. Being the Baird Lecture for 1876. Seventh Edition. Crown\n8vo, 7s. 6d.\n\n---- Anti-Theistic Theories. Being the Baird Lecture for 1877. Fourth\nEdition. Crown 8vo, 10s. 6d.\n\n---- Agnosticism. Being the Croall Lectures for 1887-88.\n\n [_In the press._\n\nFORBES. Insulinde: Experiences of a Naturalist's Wife in the Eastern\nArchipelago. By Mrs H. O. FORBES. Crown 8vo, with a Map. 4s. 6d.\n\nFOREIGN CLASSICS FOR ENGLISH READERS. Edited by Mrs OLIPHANT. Price\n2s. 6d. _For List of Volumes published, see page 2._\n\nFOSTER. The Fallen City, and Other Poems. By WILL FOSTER. In 1 vol.\nCrown 8vo.\n\n [_Immediately._\n\nFULLARTON. Merlin: A Dramatic Poem. By RALPH MACLEOD FULLARTON. Crown\n8vo, 5s.\n\nGALT. Novels by JOHN GALT. Fcap. 8vo, boards, 2s.; cloth, 2s. 6d.\nAnnals of the Parish.--The Provost.--Sir Andrew Wylie.--The Entail.\n\nGENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND.\n\n---- Prayers for Social and Family Worship. Prepared by a Special\nCommittee of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. Entirely\nNew Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Fcap. 8vo red edges, 2s.\n\n---- Prayers for Family Worship. A Selection from the complete book.\nFcap. 8vo, red edges, price 1s.\n\n---- Scottish Hymnal, with Appendix Incorporated. Published for Use\nin Churches by Authority of the General Assembly. 1. Large type,\ncloth, red edges, 2s. 6d.; French morocco, 4s. 2. Bourgeois type,\nlimp cloth, 1s.; French morocco, 2s. 3. Nonpareil type, cloth,\nred edges, 6d.; French morocco, 1s. 4d. 4. Paper covers, 3d. 5.\nSunday-School Edition, paper covers, 1d. No. 1, bound with the Psalms\nand Paraphrases, French morocco, 8s. No. 2, bound with the Psalms and\nParaphrases, cloth, 2s.; French morocco, 3s.\n\nGERARD. Reata: What's in a Name. By E. D. GERARD. New Edition. Crown\n8vo, 6s.\n\n---- Beggar my Neighbour. Cheap Edition. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.\n\n---- The Waters of Hercules. Cheap Edition. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.\n\nGERARD. The Land beyond the Forest. Facts, Figures, and Fancies\nfrom Transylvania. By E. GERARD. In Two Volumes. With Maps and\nIllustrations. 25s.\n\n---- Bis: Some Tales Retold. Crown 8vo, 6s.\n\n---- A Secret Mission. 2 vols. crown 8vo, 17s.\n\nGERARD. Lady Baby. By DOROTHEA GERARD, Author of 'Orthodox.' Cheap\nEdition. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.\n\n---- Recha. Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s.\n\nGERARD. Stonyhurst Latin Grammar. By Rev. JOHN GERARD. Fcap. 8vo, 3s.\n\nGILL. Free Trade: an Inquiry into the Nature of its Operation. By\nRICHARD GILL. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.\n\n---- Free Trade under Protection. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.\n\nGOETHE'S FAUST. Translated into English Verse by Sir THEODORE MARTIN,\nK.C.B. Part I. Second Edition, post 8vo, 6s. Ninth Edition, fcap.,\n3s. 6d. Part II. Second Edition, revised. Fcap. 8vo, 6s.\n\nGOETHE. Poems and Ballads of Goethe. Translated by Professor AYTOUN\nand Sir THEODORE MARTIN, K.C.B. Third Edition, fcap. 8vo, 6s.\n\nGOODALL. Juxta Crucem. Studies of the Love that is over us. By the\nlate Rev. CHARLES GOODALL, B.D., Minister of Barr. With a Memoir by\nRev. Dr Strong, Glasgow, and Portrait. Crown 8vo, 6s.\n\nGORDON CUMMING. Two Happy Years in Ceylon. By C. F. GORDON CUMMING.\nWith 15 full-page Illustrations and a Map. 2 vols. 8vo, 30s.\n\n---- At Home in Fiji. Fourth Edition, post 8vo. With Illustrations\nand Map. 7s. 6d.\n\n---- A Lady's Cruise in a French Man-of-War. New and Cheaper Edition.\n8vo. With Illustrations and Map. 12s. 6d.\n\n---- Fire-Fountains. The Kingdom of Hawaii: Its Volcanoes, and the\nHistory of its Missions. With Map and Illustrations. 2 vols. 8vo, 25s.\n\n---- Wanderings in China. New and Cheaper Edition. 8vo, with\nIllustrations, 10s.\n\n---- Granite Crags: The Y\u014d-semit\u00e9 Region of California. Illustrated\nwith 8 Engravings. New and Cheaper Edition. 8vo, 8s. 6d.\n\nGRAHAM. The Life and Work of Syed Ahmed Khan, C.S.I. By\nLieut.-Colonel G. F. I. GRAHAM, B.S.C. 8vo, 14s.\n\nGRAHAM. Manual of the Elections (Scot.) (Corrupt and Illegal\nPractices) Act, 1890. With Analysis, Relative Act of Sederunt,\nAppendix containing the Corrupt Practices Acts of 1883 and 1885, and\nCopious Index. By J. EDWARD GRAHAM, Advocate. 8vo, 4s. 6d.\n\nGRANT. Bush-Life in Queensland. By A. C. GRANT. New Edition. Crown\n8vo, 6s.\n\nGRIFFITHS. Locked Up. By Major ARTHUR GRIFFITHS, Author of 'The Wrong\nRoad,' 'Chronicles of Newgate,' &c. With Illustrations by C. J.\nSTANILAND, R.I. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d.\n\nGUTHRIE-SMITH. Crispus: A Drama. By H. GUTHRIE-SMITH. In one volume.\nFcap. 4to, 5s.\n\nHAINES. Unless! A Romance. By RANDOLPH HAINES. Crown 8vo, 6s.\n\nHALDANE. Subtropical Cultivations and Climates. A Handy Book for\nPlanters, Colonists, and Settlers. By R. C. HALDANE. Post 8vo, 9s.\n\nHALLETT. A Thousand Miles on an Elephant in the Shan States. By HOLT\nS. HALLETT, M. Inst. C.E., F.R.G.S., M.R.A.S., Hon. Member Manchester\nand Tyneside Geographical Societies. 8vo, with Maps and numerous\nIllustrations, 21s.\n\nHAMERTON. Wenderholme: A Story of Lancashire and Yorkshire Life. By\nPHILIP GILBERT HAMERTON, Author of 'A Painter's Camp.' A New Edition.\nCrown 8vo. 6s.\n\nHAMILTON. Lectures on Metaphysics. By Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart.,\nProfessor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh.\nEdited by the Rev. H. L. MANSEL, B.D., LL.D., Dean of St Paul's; and\nJOHN VEITCH, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Logic and Rhetoric, Glasgow.\nSeventh Edition. 2 vols. 8vo, 24s.\n\n---- Lectures on Logic. Edited by the SAME. Third Edition. 2 vols.,\n24s.\n\n---- Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and\nUniversity Reform. Third Edition, 8vo, 21s.\n\n---- Memoir of Sir William Hamilton, Bart., Professor of Logic and\nMetaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. By Professor VEITCH, of\nthe University of Glasgow. 8vo, with Portrait, 18s.\n\n---- Sir William Hamilton: The Man and his Philosophy. Two Lectures\ndelivered before the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution, January and\nFebruary 1883. By the SAME. Crown 8vo, 2s.\n\nHAMLEY. The Operations of War Explained and Illustrated. By General\nSir EDWARD BRUCE HAMLEY, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., M.P. Fifth Edition,\nrevised throughout. 4to, with numerous Illustrations, 30s.\n\n---- National Defence; Articles and Speeches. Post 8vo, 6s.\n\n---- Shakespeare's Funeral, and other Papers. Post 8vo, 7s. 6d.\n\n---- Thomas Carlyle: An Essay. Second Ed. Cr. 8vo, 2s. 6d.\n\n---- On Outposts. Second Edition. 8vo, 2s.\n\n---- Wellington's Career; A Military and Political Summary. Crown\n8vo, 2s.\n\n---- Lady Lee's Widowhood. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d.\n\n---- Our Poor Relations. A Philozoic Essay. With Illustrations,\nchiefly by Ernest Griset. Crown 8vo, cloth gilt, 3s. 6d.\n\nHAMLEY. Guilty, or Not Guilty? A Tale. By Major-General W. G. HAMLEY,\nlate of the Royal Engineers. New Edition. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.\n\nHARRISON. The Scot in Ulster. The Story of the Scottish Settlement\nin Ulster. By JOHN HARRISON, Author of 'Oure Tounis Colledge.' Crown\n8vo, 2s. 6d.\n\nHASELL. Bible Partings. By E. J. HASELL. Crown 8vo, 6s.\n\n---- Short Family Prayers. Cloth, 1s.\n\nHAY. The Works of the Right Rev. Dr George Hay, Bishop of Edinburgh.\nEdited under the Supervision of the Right Rev. Bishop STRAIN. With\nMemoir and Portrait of the Author. 5 vols. crown 8vo, bound in extra\ncloth, \u00a31, 1s. The following Volumes may be had separately--viz.:\n\n The Devout Christian Instructed in the Law of Christ\n from the Written Word. 2 vols., 8s.--The Pious\n Christian Instructed in the Nature and Practice of the\n Principal Exercises of Piety. 1 vol. 3s.\n\nHEATLEY. 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By Captain A. C. YATE, Bombay\nStaff Corps. 8vo, with Maps and Illustrations, 21s.\n\nYATE. Northern Afghanistan; or, Letters from the Afghan Boundary\nCommission. By Major C. E. YATE, C.S.I., C.M.G. Bombay Staff Corps,\nF.R.G.S. 8vo, with Maps. 18s.\n\nYOUNG. A Story of Active Service in Foreign Lands. Compiled from\nletters sent home from South Africa, India, and China, 1856-1882. By\nSurgeon-General A. GRAHAM YOUNG, Author of 'Crimean Cracks.' Crown\n8vo, Illustrated, 7s. 6d.\n\nYULE. Fortification: for the Use of Officers in the Army, and Readers\nof Military History. By Col. YULE, Bengal Engineers. 8vo, with\nnumerous Illustrations, 10s. 6d.","title":"On the Ethics of Naturalism","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":85219}