{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_48433/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_48433","id":"gutenberg_48433","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/48433","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Judgment (Aesthetics)","Judgment (Logic)","Teleology"],"text":"Transcriber's note: Boldface text is enclosed in =equals signs=;\n italicized text is enclosed in _underscores_. Other notes will be\n found at the end of this eBook.\n\n\n\n\n KANT\u2019S\n CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT\n\n\n MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED\n LONDON \u00b7 BOMBAY \u00b7 CALCUTTA\n MELBOURNE\n\n THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n NEW YORK \u00b7 BOSTON \u00b7 CHICAGO\n DALLAS \u00b7 SAN FRANCISCO\n\n THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.\n TORONTO\n\n\n\n\n KANT\u2019S CRITIQUE OF\n JUDGEMENT\n\n TRANSLATED\n WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES\n\n BY\n\n J. H. BERNARD, D.D., D.C.L.\n BISHOP OF OSSORY\n\n SOMETIME FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, AND ARCHBISHOP KING\u2019S PROFESSOR\n OF DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN\n\n\n _SECOND EDITION, REVISED_\n\n\n MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED\n ST. MARTIN\u2019S STREET, LONDON\n 1914\n\n\n\n\nCOPYRIGHT\n\n _First Edition 1892_\n _Second Edition 1914_\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n PAGE\n EDITOR\u2019S INTRODUCTION xi\n\n PREFACE 1\n\n INTRODUCTION 7\n\n I. Of the division of Philosophy 7\n\n II. Of the realm of Philosophy in general 11\n\n III. Of the Critique of Judgement as a means of combining the\n two parts of Philosophy into a whole 14\n\n IV. Of Judgement as a faculty legislating _a priori_ 17\n\n V. The principle of the formal purposiveness of nature is a\n transcendental principle of Judgement 20\n\n VI. Of the combination of the feeling of pleasure with the\n concept of the purposiveness of nature 27\n\n VII. Of the aesthetical representation of the purposiveness of\n nature 30\n\n VIII. Of the logical representation of the purposiveness of\n nature 35\n\n IX. Of the connexion of the legislation of Understanding with\n that of Reason by means of the Judgement 39\n\n\n FIRST PART.--CRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENT 43\n\n =First Division.=--Analytic of the Aesthetical Judgement 45\n\n _First Book._--Analytic of the Beautiful 45\n\n _First Moment_ of the judgement of taste, according to quality\n 45\n\n \u00a7 1. The judgement of taste is aesthetical 45\n\n \u00a7 2. The satisfaction which determines the judgement of taste is\n disinterested 46\n\n \u00a7 3. The satisfaction in the pleasant is bound up with interest 48\n\n \u00a7 4. The satisfaction in the good is bound up with interest 50\n\n \u00a7 5. Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of\n satisfaction 53\n\n _Second Moment_ of the judgement of taste, viz. according to\n quantity 55\n\n \u00a7 6. The Beautiful is that which apart from concepts is\n represented as the object of a universal satisfaction 55\n\n \u00a7 7. Comparison of the Beautiful with the Pleasant and the Good\n by means of the above characteristic 57\n\n \u00a7 8. The universality of the satisfaction is represented in a\n judgement of Taste only as subjective 59\n\n \u00a7 9. Investigation of the question whether in a judgement of\n taste the feeling of pleasure precedes or follows the\n judging of the object 63\n\n _Third Moment_ of judgements of taste according to the relation\n of the purposes which are brought into consideration therein 67\n\n \u00a7 10. Of purposiveness in general 67\n\n \u00a7 11. The judgement of taste has nothing at its basis but the\n form of the purposiveness of an object (or of its mode of\n representation) 69\n\n \u00a7 12. The judgement of taste rests on _a priori_ grounds 70\n\n \u00a7 13. The pure judgement of taste is independent of charm and\n emotion 72\n\n \u00a7 14. Elucidation by means of examples 73\n\n \u00a7 15. The judgement of taste is quite independent of the concept\n of perfection 77\n\n \u00a7 16. The judgement of taste, by which an object is declared to\n be beautiful under the condition of a definite concept,\n is not pure 81\n\n \u00a7 17. Of the Ideal of Beauty 84\n\n _Fourth Moment_ of the judgement of taste, according to the\n modality of the satisfaction in the object 91\n\n \u00a7 18. What the modality in a judgement of taste is 91\n\n \u00a7 19. The subjective necessity which we ascribe to the judgement\n of taste is conditioned 92\n\n \u00a7 20. The condition of necessity which a judgement of taste\n asserts is the Idea of a common sense 92\n\n \u00a7 21. Have we ground for presupposing a common sense? 93\n\n \u00a7 22. The necessity of the universal agreement that is thought\n in a judgement of taste is a subjective necessity, which\n is represented as objective under the presupposition of a\n common sense 94\n\n _General remark_ on the first section of the Analytic 96\n\n _Second Book._--Analytic of the Sublime 101\n\n \u00a7 23. Transition from the faculty which judges of the Beautiful\n to that which judges of the Sublime 101\n\n \u00a7 24. Of the divisions of an investigation into the feeling of\n the Sublime 105\n\n A.--Of the Mathematically Sublime 106\n\n \u00a7 25. Explanation of the term \u201cSublime\u201d 106\n\n \u00a7 26. Of that estimation of the magnitude of natural things\n which is requisite for the Idea of the Sublime 110\n\n \u00a7 27. Of the quality of the satisfaction in our judgements upon\n the Sublime 119\n\n B.--Of the Dynamically Sublime in Nature 123\n\n \u00a7 28. Of Nature regarded as Might 123\n\n \u00a7 29. Of the modality of the judgement upon the sublime in\n nature 130\n\n _General remark_ upon the exposition of the aesthetical\n reflective Judgement 132\n\n _Deduction_ of [pure] aesthetical judgements 150\n\n \u00a7 30. The Deduction of aesthetical judgements on the objects of\n nature must not be directed to what we call Sublime in\n nature, but only to the Beautiful 150\n\n \u00a7 31. Of the method of deduction of judgements of taste 152\n\n \u00a7 32. First peculiarity of the judgement of taste 154\n\n \u00a7 33. Second peculiarity of the judgement of taste 157\n\n \u00a7 34. There is no objective principle of taste possible 159\n\n \u00a7 35. The principle of Taste is the subjective principle of\n Judgement in general 161\n\n \u00a7 36. Of the problem of a Deduction of judgements of Taste 162\n\n \u00a7 37. What is properly asserted _a priori_ of an object in a\n judgement of taste 164\n\n \u00a7 38. Deduction of judgements of taste 165\n\n \u00a7 39. Of the communicability of a sensation 167\n\n \u00a7 40. Of taste as a kind of _sensus communis_ 169\n\n \u00a7 41. Of the empirical interest in the Beautiful 173\n\n \u00a7 42. Of the intellectual interest in the Beautiful 176\n\n \u00a7 43. Of Art in general 183\n\n \u00a7 44. Of beautiful Art 185\n\n \u00a7 45. Beautiful art is an art in so far as it seems like nature 187\n\n \u00a7 46. Beautiful art is the art of genius 188\n\n \u00a7 47. Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation of\n Genius 190\n\n \u00a7 48. Of the relation of Genius to Taste 193\n\n \u00a7 49. Of the faculties of the mind that constitute Genius 197\n\n \u00a7 50. Of the combination of Taste with Genius in the products of\n beautiful Art 205\n\n \u00a7 51. Of the division of the beautiful arts 206\n\n \u00a7 52. Of the combination of beautiful arts in one and the same\n product 214\n\n \u00a7 53. Comparison of the respective aesthetical worth of the\n beautiful arts 215\n\n \u00a7 54. Remark 220\n\n =Second Division.=--Dialectic of the Aesthetical Judgement 229\n\n \u00a7 55. 229\n\n \u00a7 56. Representation of the antinomy of Taste 230\n\n \u00a7 57. Solution of the antinomy of Taste 231\n\n \u00a7 58. Of the Idealism of the purposiveness of both Nature and Art\n as the unique principle of the aesthetical Judgement 241\n\n \u00a7 59. Of Beauty as the symbol of Morality 248\n\n \u00a7 60. =Appendix=:--Of the method of Taste 253\n\n\n SECOND PART.--CRITIQUE OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT 257\n\n \u00a7 61. Of the objective purposiveness of Nature 259\n\n =First Division.=--Analytic of the Teleological Judgement 262\n\n \u00a7 62. Of the objective purposiveness which is merely formal as\n distinguished from that which is material 262\n\n \u00a7 63. Of the relative, as distinguished from the inner,\n purposiveness of nature 268\n\n \u00a7 64. Of the peculiar character of things as natural purposes 272\n\n \u00a7 65. Things regarded as natural purposes are organised beings 275\n\n \u00a7 66. Of the principle of judging of internal purposiveness in\n organised beings 280\n\n \u00a7 67. Of the principle of the teleological judging of nature in\n general as a system of purposes 282\n\n \u00a7 68. Of the principle of Teleology as internal principle of\n natural science 287\n\n =Second Division.=--Dialectic of the Teleological Judgement 292\n\n \u00a7 69. What is an antinomy of the Judgement? 292\n\n \u00a7 70. Representation of this antinomy 293\n\n \u00a7 71. Preliminary to the solution of the above antinomy 296\n\n \u00a7 72. Of the different systems which deal with the purposiveness\n of Nature 298\n\n \u00a7 73. None of the above systems give what they pretend 302\n\n \u00a7 74. The reason that we cannot treat the concept of a Technic\n of nature dogmatically is the fact that a natural purpose\n is inexplicable 306\n\n \u00a7 75. The concept of an objective purposiveness of nature is a\n critical principle of Reason for the reflective\n Judgement 309\n\n \u00a7 76. Remark 313\n\n \u00a7 77. Of the peculiarity of the human Understanding, by means of\n which the concept of a natural purpose is possible 319\n\n \u00a7 78. Of the union of the principle of the universal mechanism of\n matter with the teleological principle in the Technic of\n nature 326\n\n =Appendix.=--Methodology of the Teleological Judgement 334\n\n \u00a7 79. Whether Teleology must be treated as if it belonged to the\n doctrine of nature 334\n\n \u00a7 80. Of the necessary subordination of the mechanical to the\n teleological principle in the explanation of a thing as\n a natural purpose 336\n\n \u00a7 81. Of the association of mechanism with the teleological\n principle in the explanation of a natural purpose as a\n natural product 342\n\n \u00a7 82. Of the teleological system in the external relations of\n organised beings 346\n\n \u00a7 83. Of the ultimate purpose of nature as a teleological system 352\n\n \u00a7 84. Of the final purpose of the existence of a world, _i.e._\n of creation itself 359\n\n \u00a7 85. Of Physico-theology 362\n\n \u00a7 86. Of Ethico-theology 370\n\n \u00a7 87. Of the moral proof of the Being of God 377\n\n \u00a7 88. Limitation of the validity of the moral proof 384\n\n \u00a7 89. Of the use of the moral argument 392\n\n \u00a7 90. Of the kind of belief in a teleological proof of the Being\n of God 395\n\n \u00a7 91. Of the kind of belief produced by a practical faith 403\n\n _General remark_ on Teleology 414\n\n\n\n\nEDITOR\u2019S INTRODUCTION\n\n\nThere are not wanting indications that public interest in the Critical\nPhilosophy has been quickened of recent days in these countries, as\nwell as in America. To lighten the toil of penetrating through the\nwilderness of Kant\u2019s long sentences, the English student has now many\naids, which those who began their studies fifteen or twenty years\nago did not enjoy. Translations, paraphrases, criticisms, have been\npublished in considerable numbers; so that if it is not yet true that\n\u201che who runs may read,\u201d it may at least be said that a patient student\nof ordinary industry and intelligence has his way made plain before\nhim. And yet the very number of aids is dangerous. Whatever may be the\nvalue of short and easy handbooks in other departments of science,\nit is certain that no man will become a philosopher, no man will\neven acquire a satisfactory knowledge of the history of philosophy,\nwithout personal and prolonged study of the _ipsissima verba_ of the\ngreat masters of human thought. \u201cAbove all,\u201d said Schopenhauer, \u201cmy\ntruth-seeking young friends, beware of letting our professors tell\nyou what is contained in the Critique of the Pure Reason\u201d; and the\nadvice has not become less wholesome with the lapse of years. The fact,\nhowever, that many persons have not sufficient familiarity with German\nto enable them to study German Philosophy in the original with ease,\nmakes translations an educational necessity; and this translation of\nKant\u2019s Critique of the faculty of Judgement has been undertaken in the\nhope that it may promote a more general study of that masterpiece. If\nany reader wishes to follow Schopenhauer\u2019s advice, he has only to omit\nthe whole of this prefatory matter and proceed at once to the Author\u2019s\nlaborious Introduction.\n\nIt is somewhat surprising that the Critique of Judgement has never\nyet been made accessible to the English reader. Dr. Watson has indeed\ntranslated a few selected passages, so also has Dr. Caird in his\nvaluable account of the Kantian philosophy, and I have found their\nrenderings of considerable service; but the space devoted by both\nwriters to the Critique of Judgement is very small in comparison\nwith that given to the Critiques of Pure and Practical Reason. And\nyet the work is not an unimportant one. Kant himself regarded it as\nthe coping-stone of his critical edifice; it even formed the point\nof departure for his successors, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, in the\nconstruction of their respective systems. Possibly the reason of\nits comparative neglect lies in its repulsive style. Kant was never\ncareful of style, and in his later years he became more and more\nenthralled by those technicalities and refined distinctions which deter\nso many from the Critical Philosophy even in its earlier sections.\nThese \u201csymmetrical architectonic amusements,\u201d as Schopenhauer called\nthem, encumber every page of Kant\u2019s later writings, and they are a\nconstant source of embarrassment to his unhappy translator. For, as\nevery translator knows, no single word in one language exactly covers\nany single word in another; and yet if Kant\u2019s distinctions are to be\npreserved it is necessary to select with more or less arbitrariness\nEnglish equivalents for German technical terms, and retain them all\nthrough. Instances of this will be given later on; I only remark\nhere on the fact that Kant\u2019s besetting sin of over-technicality is\nespecially conspicuous in this treatise.\n\nAnother fault--an old fault of Kant--apparent after reading even a few\npages, is that repetitions are very frequent of the same thought in but\nslightly varied language. Arguments are repeated over and over again\nuntil they become quite wearisome; and then when the reader\u2019s attention\nhas flagged, and he is glancing cursorily down the page, some important\nnew point is introduced without emphasis, as if the author were really\nanxious to keep his meaning to himself at all hazards. A book written\nin such fashion rarely attracts a wide circle of readers. And yet, not\nonly did Goethe think highly of it, but it received a large measure\nof attention in France as well as in Germany on its first appearance.\nOriginally published at Berlin in 1790, a Second Edition was called\nfor in 1793; and a French translation was made by Imhoff in 1796. Other\nFrench versions are those by Keratry and Weyland in 1823, and by Barni\nin 1846. This last I have had before me while performing my task, but\nI have not found it of much service; the older French translations\nI have not seen. The existence of these French versions, when taken\nin connexion with the absence until very recently of any systematic\naccount of the Critique of Judgement in English, may be perhaps\nexplained by the lively interest that was taken on the Continent in the\nPhilosophy of Art in the early part of the century; whereas scientific\nstudies on this subject received little attention in England during the\nsame period.\n\nThe student of the Critique of Pure Reason will remember how closely,\nin his Transcendental Logic, Kant follows the lines of the ordinary\nlogic of the schools. He finds his whole plan ready made for him, as\nit were; and he proceeds to work out the metaphysical principles which\nunderlie the process of syllogistic reasoning. And as there are three\npropositions in every syllogism, he points out that, in correspondence\nwith this triplicity, the higher faculties of the soul may be regarded\nas threefold. The Understanding or the faculty of concepts gives us our\nmajor premise, as it supplies us in the first instance with a general\nnotion. By means of the Judgement we see that a particular case comes\nunder the general rule, and by the Reason we draw our conclusion.\nThese, as three distinct movements in the process of reasoning,\nare regarded by Kant as indicating three distinct faculties, with\nwhich the Analytic of Concepts, the Analytic of Principles, and the\nDialectic are respectively concerned. The full significance of this\nimportant classification does not seem, however, to have occurred\nto Kant at the time, as we may see from the order in which he wrote\nhis great books.[1] The first problem which arrests the attention\nof all modern philosophers is, of course, the problem of knowledge,\nits conditions and its proper objects. And in the Critique of Pure\nReason this is discussed, and the conclusion is reached that nature\nas phenomenon is the only object of which we can hope to acquire any\nexact knowledge. But it is apparent that there are other problems which\nmerit consideration; a complete philosophy includes practice as well\nas theory; it has to do not only with logic, but with life. And thus\nthe Critique of Practical Reason was written, in which is unfolded\nthe doctrine of man\u2019s freedom standing in sharp contrast with the\nnecessity of natural law. Here, then, it seems at first sight as if we\nhad covered the whole field of human activity. For we have investigated\nthe sources of knowledge, and at the same time have pointed out the\nconditions of practical life, and have seen that the laws of freedom\nare just as true in their own sphere as are the laws of nature.\n\nBut as we reflect on our mental states we find that here no proper\naccount has been given of the phenomena of _feeling_, which play so\nlarge a part in experience. And this Kant saw before he had proceeded\nvery far with the Critique of Practical Reason; and in consequence\nhe adopted a threefold classification of the higher mental faculties\nbased on that given by previous psychologists. Knowledge, feeling,\ndesire, these are the three ultimate modes of consciousness, of which\nthe second has not yet been described. And when we compare this with\nthe former triple division which we took up from the Aristotelian\nlogic, we see that the parallelism is significant. Understanding is\n_par excellence_ the faculty of knowledge, and Reason the faculty of\ndesire (these points are developed in Kant\u2019s first two Critiques). And\nthis suggests that the Judgement corresponds to the feeling of pleasure\nand pain; it occupies a position intermediate between Understanding\nand Reason, just as, roughly speaking, the feeling of pleasure is\nintermediate between our perception of an object and our desire to\npossess it.\n\nAnd so the Critique of Judgement completes the whole undertaking\nof criticism; its endeavour is to show that there are _a priori_\nprinciples at the basis of Judgement just as there are in the case\nof Understanding and of Reason; that these principles, like the\nprinciples of Reason, are not constitutive but only regulative of\nexperience, _i.e._ that they do not teach us anything positive about\nthe characteristics of objects, but only indicate the conditions under\nwhich we find it necessary to view them; and lastly, that we are thus\nfurnished with an _a priori_ philosophy of pleasure.\n\nThe fundamental principle underlying the procedure of the Judgement is\nseen to be that of the purposiveness of Nature; nature is everywhere\nadapted to ends or purposes, and thus constitutes a \u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, a\nwell-ordered whole. By this means, nature is regarded by us as if\nits particular empirical laws were not isolated and disparate, but\nconnected and in relation, deriving their unity in seeming diversity\nfrom an intelligence which is at the source of nature. It is only\nby the assumption of such a principle that we can construe nature\nto ourselves; and the principle is then said to be a transcendental\ncondition of the exercise of our judging faculty, but valid only for\nthe reflective, not for the determinant Judgement. It gives us pleasure\nto view nature in this way; just as the contemplation of chaos would be\npainful.\n\nBut this purposiveness may be only formal and subjective, or real\nand objective. In some cases the purposiveness resides in the felt\nharmony and accordance of the form of the object with the cognitive\nfaculties; in others the form of the object is judged to harmonise\nwith the purpose in view in its existence. That is to say, in the one\ncase we judge the form of the object to be purposive, as in the case\nof a flower, but could not explain any purpose served by it; in the\nother case we have a definite notion of what it is adapted for. In the\nformer case the aesthetical Judgement is brought to bear, in the latter\nthe teleological; and it thus appears that the Critique of Judgement\nhas two main divisions; it treats first of the philosophy of Taste, the\nBeautiful and the Sublime in Nature; and secondly, of the Teleology of\nnature\u2019s working. It is a curious literary parallel that St. Augustine\nhints (_Confessions_ iv. 15) that he had written a book, _De Pulchro\net \u00c1pto_, in which these apparently distinct topics were combined;\n\u201cpulchrum esse, quod per se ipsum; aptum, autem, quod ad aliquid\naccommodatum deceret.\u201d A beautiful object has no purpose external to\nitself and the observer; but a useful object serves further ends. Both,\nhowever, may be brought under the higher category of things that are\nreckoned _purposive_ by the Judgement.\n\nWe have here then, in the first place, a basis for an _a priori_\nPhilosophy of Taste; and Kant works out its details with great\nelaboration. He borrowed little from the writings of his predecessors,\nbut struck out, as was ever his plan, a line of his own. He quotes\nwith approval from Burke\u2019s _Treatise on the Sublime and Beautiful_,\nwhich was accessible to him in a German translation; but is careful to\nremark that it is as psychology, not as philosophy, that Burke\u2019s work\nhas value. He may have read in addition Hutcheson\u2019s _Inquiry_ which\nhad also been translated into German; and he was complete master of\nHume\u2019s opinions. Of other writers on Beauty, he only names Batteux and\nLessing. Batteux was a French writer of repute who had attempted a\ntwofold arrangement of the Arts as they may be brought under Space and\nunder Time respectively, a mode of classification which would naturally\nappeal to Kant. He does not seem, however, to have read the ancient\ntext-book on the subject, Aristotle\u2019s _Poetics_, the principles of\nwhich Lessing declared to be as certain as Euclid.\n\nFollowing the guiding thread of the categories, he declares that\nthe aesthetical judgement about Beauty is according to _quality_\ndisinterested; a point which had been laid down by such different\nwriters as Hutcheson and Moses Mendelssohn. As to _quantity_, the\njudgement about beauty gives universal satisfaction, although it is\nbased on no definite concept. The universality is only subjective; but\nstill it is there. The maxim _Trahit sua quemque voluptas_ does not\napply to the pleasure afforded by a pure judgement about beauty. As to\n_relation_, the characteristic of the object called beautiful is that\nit betrays a purposiveness without definite purpose. The pleasure is\n_a priori_, independent on the one hand of the charms of sense or the\nemotions of mere feeling, as Winckelmann had already declared; and\non the other hand is a pleasure quite distinct from that taken which\nwe feel when viewing perfection, with which Wolff and Baumgarten had\nidentified it. By his distinction between free and dependent beauty,\nwhich we also find in the pages of Hutcheson, Kant further develops\nhis doctrine of the freedom of the pure judgement of taste from the\nthraldom of concepts.\n\nFinally, the satisfaction afforded by the contemplation of a beautiful\nobject is a necessary satisfaction. This necessity is not, to be sure,\ntheoretical like the necessity attaching to the Law of Causality; nor\nis it a practical necessity as is the need to assume the Moral Law as\nthe guiding principle of conduct. But it may be called _exemplary_;\nthat is, we may set up our satisfaction in a beautiful picture as\nsetting an example to be followed by others. It is plain, however,\nthat this can only be assumed under certain presuppositions. We must\npresuppose the idea of a _sensus communis_ or common sense in which all\nmen share. As knowledge admits of being communicated to others, so also\ndoes the feeling for beauty. For the relation between the cognitive\nfaculties requisite for Taste is also requisite for Intelligence or\nsound Understanding, and as we always presuppose the latter to be the\nsame in others as in ourselves, so may we presuppose the former.\n\nThe analysis of the Sublime which follows that of the Beautiful is\ninteresting and profound; indeed Schopenhauer regarded it as the\nbest part of the Critique of the Aesthetical Judgement. The general\ncharacteristics of our judgements about the Sublime are similar to\nthose already laid down in the case of the Beautiful; but there\nare marked differences in the two cases. If the pleasure taken in\nbeauty arises from a feeling of the purposiveness of the object in\nits relation to the subject, that in sublimity rather expresses a\npurposiveness of the subject in respect of the object. Nothing in\nnature is sublime; and the sublimity really resides in the mind and\nthere alone. Indeed, as true Beauty is found, properly speaking, only\nin beauty of form, the idea of sublimity is excited rather by those\nobjects which are formless and exhibit a violation of purpose.\n\nA distinction not needed in the case of the Beautiful becomes\nnecessary when we proceed to further analyse the Sublime. For in\naesthetical judgements about the Beautiful the mind is in _restful_\ncontemplation; but in the case of the Sublime a mental _movement_ is\nexcited (pp. 105 and 120). This movement, as it is pleasing, must\ninvolve a purposiveness in the harmony of the mental powers; and the\npurposiveness may be either in reference to the faculty of cognition\nor to that of desire. In the former case the sublime is called the\nMathematically Sublime--the sublime of mere magnitude--the absolutely\ngreat; in the latter it is the sublime of power, the Dynamically\nSublime. Gioberti, an Italian writer on the philosophy of Taste, has\npushed this distinction so far as to find in it an explanation of the\nrelation between Beauty and Sublimity. \u201cThe dynamical Sublime,\u201d he\nsays, \u201ccreates the Beautiful; the mathematical Sublime contains it,\u201d a\nremark with which probably Kant would have no quarrel.\n\nIn both cases, however, we find that the feeling of the Sublime awakens\nin us a feeling of the supersensible destination of man. \u201cThe very\ncapacity of conceiving the sublime,\u201d he tells us, \u201cindicates a mental\nfaculty that far surpasses every standard of sense.\u201d And to explain\nthe necessity belonging to our judgements about the sublime, Kant\npoints out that as we find ourselves compelled to postulate a _sensus\ncommunis_ to account for the agreement of men in their appreciation of\nbeautiful objects, so the principle underlying their consent in judging\nof the sublime is \u201cthe presupposition of the moral feeling in man.\u201d The\nfeeling of the sublimity of our own moral destination is the necessary\nprerequisite for forming such judgements. The connexion between Beauty\nand Goodness involved to a Greek in the double sense of the word \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03cc\u03bd\nis developed by Kant with keen insight. To feel interest in the beauty\nof Nature he regards as a mark of a moral disposition, though he will\nnot admit that the same inference may be drawn as to the character\nof the art connoisseur (\u00a7 42). But it is specially with reference to\nthe connexion between the capacity for appreciating the Sublime, and\nthe moral feeling, that the originality of Kant\u2019s treatment becomes\napparent.\n\nThe objects of nature, he continues, which we call sublime, inspire us\nwith a feeling of pain rather than of pleasure; as Lucretius has it--\n\n Me quaedam divina voluptas\n Percipit atque horror.\n\nBut this \u201chorror\u201d must not inspire actual fear. As no extraneous\ncharm must mingle with the satisfaction felt in a beautiful object,\nif the judgement about beauty is to remain pure; so in the case of\nthe sublime we must not be afraid of the object which yet in certain\naspects is fearful.\n\nThis conception of the feelings of sublimity excited by the loneliness\nof an Alpine peak or the grandeur of an earthquake is now a familiar\none; but it was not so in Kant\u2019s day. Switzerland had not then become\nthe recreation-ground of Europe; and though natural beauty was a\nfamiliar topic with poets and painters it was not generally recognised\nthat taste has also to do with the sublime. De Saussure\u2019s _Travels_,\nHaller\u2019s poem _Die Alpen_, and this work of Kant\u2019s mark the beginning\nof a new epoch in our ways of looking at the sublime and terrible\naspects of Nature. And it is not a little remarkable that the man who\ncould write thus feelingly about the emotions inspired by grand and\nsavage scenery, had never seen a mountain in his life. The power and\nthe insight of his observations here are in marked contrast to the\npoverty of some of his remarks about the characteristics of beauty. For\ninstance, he puts forward the curious doctrine that colour in a picture\nis only an extraneous charm, and does not really add to the beauty\nof the form delineated, nay rather distracts the mind from it. His\ncriticisms on this point, if sound, would make Flaxman a truer artist\nthan Titian or Paolo Veronese. But indeed his discussion of Painting or\nMusic is not very appreciative; he was, to the end, a creature of pure\nReason.\n\nUpon the analysis he gives of the Arts, little need be said here. Fine\nArt is regarded as the Art of Genius, \u201cthat innate mental disposition\nthrough which Nature gives the rule to Art\u201d (\u00a7 46). Art differs\nfrom Science in the absence of definite concepts in the mind of the\nartist. It thus happens that the great artist can rarely communicate\nhis methods; indeed he cannot explain them even to himself. _Poeta\nnascitur, non fit_; and the same is true in every form of fine art.\nGenius is, in short, the faculty of presenting aesthetical Ideas; an\naesthetical Idea being an intuition of the Imagination, to which no\nconcept is adequate. And it is by the excitation of such ineffable\nIdeas that a great work of art affects us. As Bacon tells us, \u201cthat is\nthe best part of Beauty which a picture cannot express; no, nor the\nfirst sight of the eye.\u201d This characteristic of the artistic genius\nhas been noted by all who have thought upon art; more is present in\nits productions than can be perfectly expressed in language. As Pliny\nsaid of Timanthus the painter of Iphigenia, \u201cIn omnibus ejus operibus\nintelligitur plus super quam pingitur.\u201d But this genius requires to be\nkept in check by taste; quite in the spirit of the \u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7 of the\nbest Greek art, Kant remarks that if in a work of art some feature must\nbe sacrificed, it is better to lose something of genius than to violate\nthe canons of taste. It is in this self-mastery that \u201cthe sanity of\ntrue genius\u201d expresses itself.\n\nThe main question with which the Critique of Judgement is concerned\nis, of course, the question as to the purposiveness, the\n_Zweckm\u00e4ssigkeit_, exhibited by nature. That nature appears to be\nfull of purpose is mere matter of fact. It displays purposiveness\nin respect of our faculties of cognition, in those of its phenomena\nwhich we designate beautiful. And also in its organic products we\nobserve methods of operation which we can only explain by describing\nthem as processes in which means are used to accomplish certain\nends, as processes that are _purposive_. In our observation of\nnatural phenomena, as Kuno Fischer puts it, we judge their _forms_\naesthetically, and their _life_ teleologically.\n\nAs regards the first kind of _Zweckm\u00e4ssigkeit_, that which is _ohne\nZweck_--the purposiveness of a beautiful object which does not seem to\nbe directed to any external end--there are two ways in which we may\naccount for it. We may either say that it was actually designed to\nbe beautiful by the Supreme Force behind Nature, or we may say that\npurposiveness is not really resident in nature, but that our perception\nof it is due to the subjective needs of our judging faculty. We have\nto contemplate beautiful objects _as if_ they were purposive, but they\nmay not be so in reality. And this latter idealistic doctrine is what\nKant falls back upon. He appeals in support of it, to the phenomena of\ncrystallisation (pp. 243 _sqq._), in which many very beautiful forms\nseem to be produced by merely mechanical processes. The beauty of a\nrock crystal is apparently produced without any forethought on the\npart of nature, and he urges that we are not justified in asserting\ndogmatically that any laws distinct from those of mechanism are needed\nto account for beauty in other cases. Mechanism can do so much; may it\nnot do all? And he brings forward as a consideration which ought to\nsettle the question, the fact that in judging of beauty \u201cwe invariably\nseek its gauge _in ourselves a priori_\u201d; we do not learn from nature,\nbut from ourselves, what we are to find beautiful. Mr. Kennedy in his\nDonnellan Lectures has here pointed out several weak spots in Kant\u2019s\narmour. In the first place, the fact that we seek the gauge of beauty\nin our own mind \u201cmay be shown from his own definition to be a necessary\nresult of the very nature of beauty.\u201d[2] For Kant tells us that the\naesthetical judgement about beauty always involves \u201ca reference of the\nrepresentation to the subject\u201d; and this applies equally to judgements\nabout the beautiful in Art and the beautiful in Nature. But no one\ncould maintain that from this definition it follows that we are not\ncompelled to postulate design in the mind of the artist who paints a\nbeautiful picture. And thus as the fact that \u201cwe always seek the gauge\nof beauty\u201d in ourselves does not do away with the belief in a designing\nmind when we are contemplating works of art, it cannot be said to\nexclude the belief in a Master Hand which moulded the forms of Nature.\nAs Cicero has it, nature is \u201cnon artificiosa solum, sed plane artifex.\u201d\nBut the cogency of this reasoning, for the details of which I must\nrefer the reader to Mr. Kennedy\u2019s pages, becomes more apparent when\nwe reflect on that second form of purposiveness, viz. adaptation to\ndefinite ends, with which we meet in the phenomena of organic life.\n\nIf we watch, _e.g._ the growth of a tree we perceive that its various\nparts are not isolated and unconnected, but that on the contrary they\nare only possible by reference to the idea of the whole. Each limb\naffects every other, and is reciprocally affected by it; in short \u201cin\nsuch a product of nature every part not only exists _by means of_ the\nother parts, but is thought as existing _for the sake of_ the others\nand the whole\u201d (p. 277). The operations of nature in organised bodies\nseem to be of an entirely different character from mere mechanical\nprocesses; we cannot construe them to ourselves except under the\nhypothesis that nature in them is working towards a designed end.\nThe distinction between nature\u2019s \u201cTechnic\u201d or purposive operation,\nand nature\u2019s Mechanism is fundamental for the explanation of natural\nlaw. The language of biology eloquently shows the impossibility of\neliminating at least the _idea_ of purpose from our investigations into\nthe phenomena of life, growth, and reproduction. And Kant dismisses\nwith scant respect that cheap and easy philosophy which would fain\ndeny the distinctiveness of nature\u2019s purposive operation. A doctrine,\nlike that of Epicurus, in which every natural phenomenon is regarded\nas the result of the blind drifting of atoms in accordance with purely\nmechanical laws, really explains nothing, and least of all explains\nthat illusion in our teleological judgements which leads us to assume\npurpose where really there is none.\n\nIt has been urged by Kirchmann and others that this distinction\nbetween Technic and Mechanism, on which Kant lays so much stress,\nhas been disproved by the progress of modern science. The doctrines,\nusually associated with the name of Darwin, of Natural Selection and\nSurvival of the Fittest, quite sufficiently explain, it is said, on\nmechanical principles the semblance of purpose with which nature mocks\nus. The presence of order is not due to any purpose behind the natural\noperation, but to the inevitable disappearance of the disorderly. It\nwould be absurd, of course, to claim for Kant that he anticipated the\nDarwinian doctrines of development; and yet passages are not wanting\nin his writings in which he takes a view of the continuity of species\nwith which modern science would have little fault to find. \u201cNature\norganises itself and its organised products in every species, no\ndoubt after one general pattern but yet with suitable deviations,\nwhich self-preservation demands according to circumstances\u201d (p. 279).\n\u201cThe analogy of forms, which with all their differences seem to have\nbeen produced according to a common original type, strengthens our\nsuspicions of an actual relationship between them in their production\nfrom a common parent, through the gradual approximation of one animal\ngenus to another--from those in which the principle of purposes seems\nto be best authenticated, _i.e._ from man, down to the polype and again\nfrom this down to mosses and lichens, and finally to crude matter.\nAnd so the whole Technic of nature, which is so incomprehensible to\nus in organised beings that we believe ourselves compelled to think a\ndifferent principle for it, seems to be derived from matter and its\npowers according to mechanical laws (like those by which it works in\nthe formation of crystals)\u201d (p. 337). Such a theory he calls \u201ca daring\nventure of reason,\u201d and its coincidences with modern science are real\nand striking. But he is careful to add that such a theory, even if\nestablished, would not eliminate purpose from the universe; it would\nindeed suggest that certain special processes having the semblance of\npurpose may be elucidated on mechanical principles, but on the whole,\npurposive operation on the part of Mother Nature it would still be\nneedful to assume (p. 338). \u201cNo finite Reason can hope to understand\nthe production of even a blade of grass by mere mechanical causes\u201d\n(p. 326). \u201cIt is absurd to hope that another Newton will arise in the\nfuture who shall make comprehensible by us the production of a blade of\ngrass according to natural laws which no design has ordered\u201d (p. 312).\n\nCrude materialism thus affording no explanation of the purposiveness\nin nature, we go on to ask what other theories are logically possible.\nWe may dismiss at once the doctrine of Hylozoism, according to which\nthe purposes in nature are explained in reference to a world-soul,\nwhich is the inner principle of the material universe and constitutes\nits life. For such a doctrine is self-contradictory, inasmuch as\nlifelessness, _inertia_, is the essential characteristic of matter,\nand to talk of living matter is absurd (p. 304). A much more plausible\nsystem is that of Spinoza, who aimed at establishing the ideality\nof the principle of natural purposes. He regarded the world whole\nas a complex of manifold determinations inhering in a single simple\nsubstance; and thus reduced our concepts of the purposive in nature to\nour own consciousness of existing in an all-embracing Being. But on\nreflection we see that this does not so much explain as explain away\nthe purposiveness of nature; it gives us an unity of inherence _in_ one\nSubstance, but not an unity of causal dependence _on_ one Substance (p.\n303). And this latter would be necessary in order to explain the unity\nof purpose which nature exhibits in its phenomenal working. Spinozism,\ntherefore, does not give what it pretends to give; it puts us off with\na vague and unfruitful unity of ground, when what we seek is a unity\nthat shall itself contain the causes of the differences manifest in\nnature.\n\nWe have left then as the only remaining possible doctrine, Theism,\nwhich represents natural purposes as produced in accordance with the\nWill and Design of an Intelligent Author and Governor of Nature.\nThis theory is, in the first place, \u201csuperior to all other grounds\nof explanation\u201d (p. 305), for it gives a full solution of the\nproblem before us and enables us to maintain the reality of the\n_Zweckm\u00e4ssigkeit_ of nature. \u201cTeleology finds the consummation of its\ninvestigations only in Theology\u201d (p. 311). To represent the world\nand the natural purposes therein as produced by an intelligent Cause\nis \u201ccompletely satisfactory from every human point of view for both\nthe speculative and practical use of our Reason\u201d (p. 312). Thus the\ncontemplation of natural purposes, _i.e._ the common Argument from\nDesign, enables us to reach a highest Understanding as Cause of the\nworld \u201cin accordance with the principles of the reflective Judgement,\n_i.e._ _in accordance with the constitution of our human faculty of\ncognition_\u201d (p. 416).\n\nIt is in this qualifying clause that Kant\u2019s negative attitude in\nrespect of Theism betrays itself. He regards it as a necessary\nassumption for the guidance of scientific investigation, no less than\nfor the practical needs of morals; but he does not admit that we can\nclaim for it objective validity. In the language of the Critique of\nPure Reason, the Idea of God furnishes a regulative, not a constitutive\nprinciple of Reason; or as he prefers to put it in the present work, it\nis valid only for the reflective, not for the determinant Judgement. We\nare not justified, Kant maintains, in asserting dogmatically that God\nexists; there is only permitted to us the limited formula \u201cWe cannot\notherwise conceive the purposiveness which must lie at the basis of our\ncognition of the internal possibility of many natural things, than by\nrepresenting it and the world in general as produced by an intelligent\ncause, _i.e._ a God\u201d (p. 312).\n\nWe ask then, whence arises this impossibility of objective statement?\nIt is in the true Kantian spirit to assert that no synthetical\nproposition can be made with reference to what lies above and behind\nthe world of sense; but there is a difficulty in carrying out this\nprinciple into details. Kant\u2019s refusal to infer a designing Hand behind\nthe apparent order of nature is based, he tells us, on the fact that\nthe concept of a \u201cnatural purpose\u201d is one that cannot be justified to\nthe speculative Reason. For all we know it may only indicate our way of\nlooking at things, and may point to no corresponding objective reality.\nThat we are forced by the limited nature of our faculties to view\nnature as working towards ends, as purposive, does not prove that it is\nreally so. We cannot justify such pretended insight into what is behind\nthe veil.\n\nIt is to be observed, however, that precisely similar arguments might\nbe urged against our affirmation of purpose, design, will, as the\nspring of the actions of other human beings.[3] For let us consider\nwhy it is that, mind being assumed as the basis of our own individual\nconsciousness, we go on to attribute minds of like character to other\nmen. We see that the external behaviour of other men is similar to our\nown, and that the most reasonable way of accounting for such behaviour\nis to suppose that they have minds like ourselves, that they are\npossessed of an active and spontaneously energising faculty, which is\nthe seat of their personality. But it is instructive to observe that\nneither on Kantian principles nor on any other can we _demonstrate_\nthis; to cross the chasm which separates one man\u2019s personality from\nanother\u2019s requires a venture of faith just as emphatically as any\ntheological formula. I can by no means _prove_ to the determinant\nJudgement that the complex of sensations which I constantly experience,\nand which I call the Prime Minister, is anything more than a\nwell-ordered machine. It is improbable that this is the case--highly\nimprobable; but the falsity of such an hypothesis cannot be proved in\nthe same way that we would prove the falsity of the assertion that two\nand two make five. But then though the hypothesis cannot be thus ruled\nout of court by demonstration of its absurdity, it is not the simplest\nhypothesis, nor is it that one which best accounts for the facts. The\nassumption, on the other hand, that the men whom I meet every day have\nminds like my own, perfectly accounts for all the facts, and is a very\nsimple assumption. It merely extends by induction the sphere of a force\nwhich I already know to exist. Or in other words, crude materialism not\ngiving me an intelligent account of my own individual consciousness,\nI recognise mind, \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, as a _vera causa_, as something which really\ndoes produce effects in the field of experience, and which therefore I\nmay legitimately put forward as the cause of those actions of other\nmen which externally so much resemble my own. But, as has been said\nbefore, this argument, though entirely convincing to any sane person,\nis not demonstrative; in Kantian language and on Kantian principles\nthe reasoning here used would seem to be valid only for the reflective\nand not for the determinant Judgement. If the principle of design or\nconscious adaptation of means to ends be not a constitutive principle\nof experience, but only a regulative principle introduced to account\nfor the facts, what right have we to put it forward dogmatically as\naffording an explanation of the actions of other human beings?\n\nIt cannot be said that Kant\u2019s attempted answer to such a defence of\nthe Design Argument is quite conclusive. In \u00a7 90 of the _Methodology_\n(p. 399) he pleads that though it is perfectly legitimate to argue by\nanalogy from our own minds to the minds of other men,--nay further,\nalthough we may conclude from those actions of the lower animals\nwhich display plan, that they are not, as Descartes alleged, mere\nmachines--yet it is not legitimate to conclude from the apparent\npresence of design in the operations of nature that a conscious mind\ndirects those operations. For, he argues, that in comparing the actions\nof men and the lower animals, or in comparing the actions of one man\nwith those of another, we are not pressing our analogy beyond the\nlimits of experience. Men and beasts alike are finite living beings,\nsubject to the limitations of finite existence; and hence the law which\ngoverns the one series of operations may be regarded by analogy as\nsufficiently explaining the other series. But the power at the basis of\nNature is utterly above definition or comprehension, and we are going\nbeyond our legitimate province if we venture to ascribe to it a mode\nof operation with which we are only conversant in the case of beings\nsubject to the conditions of space and time. He urges in short that\nwhen speaking about man and his mind we thoroughly understand what we\nare talking about; but in speaking of the Mind of Deity we are dealing\nwith something of which we have no experience, and of which therefore\nwe have no right to predicate anything.\n\nBut it is apparent that, as has been pointed out, even when we infer\nthe existence of another finite mind from certain observed operations,\nwe are making an inference about something which is as mysterious an\n_x_ as anything can be. Mind is not a thing that is subject to the\nlaws and conditions of the world of sense; it is \u201c_in_ the world but\nnot _of_ the world.\u201d And so to infer the existence of the mind of any\nindividual except myself is a quite different kind of inference from\nthat by which, for example, we infer the presence of an electro-magnet\nin a given field. The action of the latter we understand to a large\nextent; but we do not understand the action of mind, which yet we\nknow from daily experience of ourselves does produce effects in the\nphenomenal world, often permanent and important effects. Briefly,\nthe action of mind upon matter (to use the ordinary phraseology for\nthe sake of clearness) is--we may assume for our present purpose--an\nestablished fact. Hence the causality of mind is a _vera causa_; we\nbring it in to account for the actions of other human beings, and by\nprecisely the same process of reasoning we invoke it to explain the\noperations of nature.\n\nAnd it is altogether beside the point to urge, as Kant does\nincessantly, that in the latter case the intelligence inferred is\n_infinite_; in the former only _finite_. All that the Design Argument\nundertakes to prove is that mind lies at the basis of nature. It\nis quite beyond its province to say whether this mind is finite or\ninfinite; and thus Kant\u2019s criticisms on p. 364 are somewhat wide of\nthe mark. There is always a difficulty in any argument which tries to\nestablish the operation of mind anywhere, for mind cannot be seen or\ntouched or felt; but the difficulty is not peculiar to that particular\nform of argument with which theological interests are involved.\n\nThe real plausibility of this objection arises from a vague idea,\noften present to us when we speak of _infinite_ wisdom or _infinite_\nintelligence, namely that the epithet _infinite_ in some way alters\nthe meaning of the attributes to which it is applied. But the truth is\nthat the word _infinite_, when applied to wisdom or knowledge or any\nother intellectual or moral quality, can only properly have reference\nto the number of acts of wisdom or knowledge that we suppose to have\nbeen performed. The only sense in which we have any right to speak of\n_infinite_ wisdom is that it is that which performs an infinite number\nof wise acts. And so when we speak of infinite _intelligence_, we have\nnot the slightest warrant, either in logic or in common sense, for\nsupposing that such intelligence is not similar in kind to that finite\nintelligence which we know in man.\n\nTo understand Kant\u2019s attitude fully, we must also take into\nconsideration the great weight that he attaches to the Moral Argument\nfor the existence of God. The positive side of his teaching on Theism\nis summed up in the following sentence (p. 388): \u201cFor the theoretical\nreflective Judgement physical Teleology sufficiently proves from the\npurposes of Nature an intelligent world-cause; for the practical\nJudgement moral Teleology establishes it by the concept of a final\npurpose, which it is forced to ascribe to creation.\u201d That side of his\nsystem which is akin to Agnosticism finds expression in his determined\nrefusal to admit anything more than this. The existence of God is for\nhim a \u201cthing of faith\u201d; and is not a fact of knowledge, strictly so\ncalled. \u201cFaith\u201d he holds (p. 409) \u201cis the moral attitude of Reason as\nto belief in that which is unattainable by theoretical cognition. It\nis therefore the constant principle of the mind to assume as true that\nwhich it is necessary to presuppose as condition of the possibility of\nthe highest moral final purpose.\u201d As he says elsewhere (Introduction\nto Logic, ix. p. 60), \u201cThat man is morally _unbelieving_ who does not\naccept that which, though _impossible_ to know, is _morally necessary_\nto suppose.\u201d And as far as he goes a Theist may agree with him, and he\nhas done yeoman\u2019s service to Theism by his insistence on the absolute\nimpossibility of any other working hypothesis as an explanation of the\nphenomena of nature. But I have endeavoured to indicate at what points\nhe does not seem to me to have gone as far as even his own declared\nprinciples would justify him in going. If the existence of a Supreme\nMind be a \u201cthing of faith,\u201d this may with equal justice be said of the\nfinite minds of the men all around us; and his attempt to show that the\nargument from analogy is here without foundation is not convincing.\n\nKant, however, in the Critique of Judgement is sadly fettered by\nthe chains that he himself had forged, and frequently chafes under\nthe restraints they impose. He indicates more than once a point of\nview higher than that of the Critique of Pure Reason, from which\nthe phenomena of life and mind may be contemplated. He had already\nhinted in that work that the supersensible substrate of the ego and\nthe non-ego might be identical. \u201cBoth kinds of objects differ from\neach other, not internally, but only so far as the one _appears_\nexternal to the other; possibly what is at the basis of phenomenal\nmatter as a thing in itself may not be so heterogeneous after all\nas we imagine.\u201d[4] This hypothesis which remains a bare undeveloped\npossibility in the earlier work is put forward as a positive doctrine\nin the Critique of Judgement. \u201cThere must,\u201d says Kant, \u201cbe a ground\nof the _unity_ of the supersensible, which lies at the basis of\nnature, with that which the concept of freedom practically contains\u201d\n(Introduction, p. 13). That is to say, he maintains that to explain\nthe phenomena of organic life and the purposiveness of nature we must\nhold that the world of sense is not disparate from and opposed to the\nworld of thought, but that _nature is the development of freedom_.\nThe connexion of nature and freedom is suggested by, nay is involved\nin, the notion of natural adaptation; and although we can arrive\nat no knowledge of the supersensible substrate of both, yet such a\ncommon ground there must be. This principle is the starting-point of\nthe systems which followed that of Kant; and the philosophy of later\nIdealism is little more than a development of the principle in its\nconsequences.\n\nHe approaches the same doctrine by a different path in the Critique of\nthe Teleological Judgement (\u00a7 77), where he argues that the distinction\nbetween the mechanical and the teleological working of nature, upon\nwhich so much stress has been justly laid, depends for its validity\nupon the peculiar character of our Understanding. When we give what may\nbe called a mechanical elucidation of any natural phenomenon, we begin\nwith its parts, and from what we know of them we explain the whole. But\nin the case of certain objects, _e.g._ organised bodies, this cannot be\ndone. In their case we can only account for the parts by a reference to\nthe whole. Now, were it possible for us to perceive a whole before its\nparts and derive the latter from the former,[5] then an organism would\nbe capable of being understood and would be an object of knowledge in\nthe strictest sense. But our Understanding is not able to do this, and\nits inadequacy for such a task leads us to conceive the possibility of\nan Understanding, not discursive like ours, but intuitive, for which\nknowledge of the whole would precede that of the parts. \u201cIt is at\nleast possible to consider the material world as mere phenomenon, and\nto think as its substrate something like a thing in itself (which is\nnot phenomenon), and to attach to this a corresponding intellectual\nintuition. Thus there would be, although incognisable by us, a\nsupersensible real ground for nature, to which we ourselves belong\u201d\n(p. 325). Hence, although Mechanism and Technic must not be confused\nand must ever stand side by side in our scientific investigation of\nnatural law, yet must they be regarded as coalescing in a single higher\nprinciple incognisable by us. The ground of union is \u201cthe supersensible\nsubstrate of nature of which we can determine nothing positively,\nexcept that it is the being in itself of which we merely know the\nphenomenon.\u201d Thus, then, it appears that the whole force of Kant\u2019s\nmain argument has proceeded upon an assumption, viz. the permanent\nopposition between Sense and Understanding, which the progress of the\nargument has shown to be unsound. \u201cKant seems,\u201d says Goethe,[6] \u201cto\nhave woven a certain element of irony into his method. For, while at\none time he seemed to be bent on limiting our faculties of knowledge in\nthe narrowest way, at another time he pointed, as it were with a side\ngesture, beyond the limits which he himself had drawn.\u201d The fact of\nadaptation of means to ends observable in nature seems to break down\nthe barrier between Nature and Freedom; and if we once relinquish the\ndistinction between Mechanism and Technic in the operations of nature\nwe are led to the Idea of an absolute Being, who manifests Himself by\naction which, though necessary, is yet the outcome of perfect freedom.\n\nKant, however, though he approaches such a position more than once,\ncan never be said to have risen to it. He deprecates unceasingly the\nattempt to combine principles of nature with the principles of freedom\nas a task beyond the modest capacity of human reason; and while\nstrenuously insisting on the practical force of the Moral Argument for\nthe Being of God, which is found in the witness of man\u2019s conscience,\nwill not admit that it can in any way be regarded as strengthening the\ntheoretical arguments adduced by Teleology. The two lines of proof, he\nholds, are quite distinct; and nothing but confusion and intellectual\ndisaster can result from the effort to combine them. The moral proof\nstands by itself, and it needs no such crutches as the argument\nfrom Design can offer. But, as Mr. Kennedy has pointed out in his\nacute criticism[7] of the Kantian doctrine of Theism, it would not\nbe possible to combine a theoretical _disbelief_ in God with a frank\nacceptance of the practical belief of His existence borne in upon us\nby the Moral Law. Kant himself admits this: \u201cA dogmatical _unbelief_,\u201d\nhe says (p. 411), \u201ccannot subsist together with a moral maxim dominant\nin the mental attitude.\u201d That is, though the theoretical argument be\nincomplete, we cannot reject the conclusion to which it leads, for this\nis confirmed by the moral necessities of conscience.\n\nKant\u2019s position, then, seems to come to this, that though he never\ndoubts the existence of God, he has very grave doubts that He can\nbe theoretically known by man. _That_ He is, is certain; _what_ He\nis, we cannot determine. It is a position not dissimilar to current\nAgnostic doctrines; and as long as the antithesis between Sense and\nUnderstanding, between Matter and Mind, is insisted upon as expressing\na real and abiding truth, Kant\u2019s reasoning can hardly be refuted\nwith completeness. No doubt it may be urged that since the practical\nand theoretical arguments both arrive at the same conclusion, the\ncogency of our reasoning in the latter should confirm our trust in\nthe former. But true conclusions may sometimes seem to follow from\nquite insufficient premises; and Kant is thus justified in demanding\nthat each argument shall be submitted to independent tests. I have\nendeavoured to show above that he has not treated the theoretical line\nof reasoning quite fairly, and that he has underestimated its force;\nbut its value _as an argument_ is not increased by showing that another\nentirely different process of thought leads to the same result. And\nthat the witness of conscience affords the most powerful and convincing\nargument for the existence of a Supreme Being, the source of law as of\nlove, is a simple matter of experience. Induction, syllogism, analogy,\ndo not really generate belief in God, though they may serve to justify\nto reason a faith that we already possess. The poet has the truth of it:\n\n Wer Gott nicht f\u00fchlt in sich und allen Lebenskreisen,\n Dem werdet Ihr Ihn nicht beweisen mit Beweisen.\n\n * * * * *\n\nI give at the end of this Introduction a Glossary of the chief\nphilosophical terms used by Kant; I have tried to render them by the\nsame English equivalents all through the work, in order to preserve,\nas far as may be, the exactness of expression in the original. I am\nconscious that this makes the translation clumsy in many places, but\nhave thought it best to sacrifice elegance to precision. This course\nis the more necessary to adopt, as Kant cannot be understood unless\nhis nice verbal distinctions be attended to. Thus _real_ means quite\na different thing from _wirklich_; _Hang_ from _Neigung_; _R\u00fchrung_\nfrom _Affekt_ or _Leidenschaft_; _Anschauung_ from _Empfindung_\nor _Wahrnehmung_; _Endzweck_ from _letzter Zweck_; _Idee_ from\n_Vorstellung_; _Eigenschaft_ from _Attribut_ or _Beschaffenheit_;\n_Schranke_ from _Grenze_; _\u00fcberreden_ from _\u00fcberzeugen_, etc. I am not\nsatisfied with \u201cgratification\u201d and \u201cgrief\u201d as the English equivalents\nfor _Vergn\u00fcgen_ and _Schmerz_; but it is necessary to distinguish these\nwords from _Lust_ and _Unlust_, and \u201cmental pleasure,\u201d \u201cmental pain,\u201d\nwhich would nearly hit the sense, are awkward. Again, the constant\nrendering of _sch\u00f6n_ by beautiful involves the expression \u201cbeautiful\nart\u201d instead of the more usual phrase \u201cfine art.\u201d _Purposive_ is an\nugly word, but it has come into use lately; and its employment enables\nus to preserve the connexion between _Zweck_ and _zweckm\u00e4ssig_. I\nhave printed _Judgement_ with a capital letter when it signifies\nthe _faculty_, with a small initial when it signifies the _act_, of\njudging. And in like manner I distinguish _Objekt_ from _Gegenstand_,\nby printing the word \u201cObject,\u201d when it represents the former, with a\nlarge initial.\n\nThe text I have followed is, in the main, that printed by Hartenstein;\nbut occasionally Rosenkranz preserves the better reading. All important\nvariants between the First and Second Editions have been indicated at\nthe foot of the page. A few notes have been added, which are enclosed\nin square brackets, to distinguish them from those which formed part\nof the original work. I have in general quoted Kant\u2019s _Introduction to\nLogic_ and _Critique of Practical Reason_ in Dr. Abbott\u2019s translations.\n\nMy best thanks are due to Rev. J. H. Kennedy and Mr. F. Purser for much\nvaluable aid during the passage of this translation through the press.\nAnd I am under even greater obligations to Mr. Mahaffy, who was good\nenough to read through the whole of the proof; by his acute and learned\ncriticisms many errors have been avoided. Others I have no doubt still\nremain, but for these I must be accounted alone responsible.\n\n J. H. BERNARD.\n\n TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN,\n _May 24, 1892_.\n\n * * * * *\n\nMore than twenty-one years have passed since the first edition of this\nTranslation was published, and during that time much has been written,\nboth in Germany and in England, on the subject of Kant\u2019s _Critique\nof Judgement_. In particular, the German text has been critically\ndetermined by the labours of Professor Windelband, whose fine edition\nforms the fifth volume of Kant\u2019s Collected Works as issued by the Royal\nPrussian Academy of Sciences (Berlin, 1908). It will be indispensable\nto future students. An excellent account of the significance, in the\nKantian system, of the _Urtheilskraft_, by Mr. R.\u00a0A.\u00a0C. Macmillan,\nappeared in 1912; and Mr. J.\u00a0C. Meredith has published recently an\nEnglish edition of the _Critique of Aesthetical Judgement_, with notes\nand essays, dealing with the philosophy of art, which goes over the\nground very fully.\n\nSome critics of my first edition took exception to the clumsiness\nof the word \u201crepresentation\u201d as the equivalent of _Vorstellung_, but\nI have made no change in this respect, as it seems to me (and so far\nas I have observed to others who have worked on the _Critique of\nJudgement_), that it is necessary to preserve in English the relation\nbetween the noun _Vorstellung_ and the verb _vorstellen_, if Kant\u2019s\nreasoning is to be exhibited clearly. I have, however, abandoned the\nattempt to preserve the word _Kritik_ in English, and have replaced it\nby _Critique_ or _criticism_, throughout. The other changes that have\nbeen made are mere corrections or emendations of faulty or obscure\nrenderings, with a few additional notes. I have left my original\nIntroduction as it was written in 1892, without attempting any fresh\nexamination of the problems that Kant set himself.\n\n JOHN OSSORY.\n\n THE PALACE, KILKENNY,\n _January 6, 1914_.\n\n\n\n\nGLOSSARY OF KANT\u2019S PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS\n\n\n Absicht; _design_.\n Achtung; _respect_.\n Affekt; _affection_.\n Angenehm; _pleasant_.\n Anschauung; _intuition_.\n Attribut; _attribute_.\n Aufkl\u00e4rung; _enlightenment_.\n\n Begehr; _desire_.\n Begriff; _concept_.\n Beschaffenheit; _constitution_ or _characteristic_.\n Bestimmen; _to determine_.\n\n Darstellen; _to present_.\n Dasein; _presence_ or _being_.\n\n Eigenschaft; _property_.\n Empfindung; _sensation_.\n Endzweck; _final purpose_.\n Erkenntniss; _cognition_ or _knowledge_.\n Erkl\u00e4rung; _explanation_.\n Erscheinung; _phenomenon_.\n Existenz; _existence_.\n\n F\u00fcrwahrhalten; _belief_.\n\n Gebiet; _realm_.\n Gef\u00fchl; _feeling_.\n Gegenstand; _object_.\n Geist; _spirit_.\n Geniessen; _enjoyment_.\n Geschicklichkeit; _skill_.\n Geschmack; _Taste_.\n Gesetzm\u00e4ssigkeit; _conformity to law_.\n Gewalt; _dominion_ or _authority_.\n Glaube; _faith_.\n Grenze; _bound_.\n Grundsatz; _fundamental proposition_ or _principle_.\n\n Hang; _propension_.\n\n Idee; _Idea_.\n\n Leidenschaft; _passion_.\n Letzter Zweck; _ultimate purpose_.\n Lust; _pleasure_.\n\n Meinen; _opinion_.\n\n Neigung; _inclination_.\n\n Objekt; _Object_.\n\n Prinzip; _principle_.\n\n Real; _real_.\n Reich; _kingdom_.\n Reiz; _charm_.\n R\u00fchrung; _emotion_.\n\n Schein; _illusion_.\n Schmerz; _grief_.\n Sch\u00f6n; _beautiful_.\n Schranke; _limit_.\n Schw\u00e4rmerei; _fanaticism_.\n Seele; _soul_.\n\n Ueberreden; _to persuade_.\n Ueberschw\u00e4nglich; _transcendent_.\n Ueberzeugen; _to convince_.\n Unlust; _pain_.\n Urtheil; _judgement_.\n Urtheilskraft; _Judgement_.\n\n Verbindung; _combination_.\n Vergn\u00fcgen; _gratification_.\n Verkn\u00fcpfung; _connexion_.\n Verm\u00f6gen; _faculty_.\n Vernunft; _Reason_.\n Vern\u00fcnftelei; _sophistry_ or _subtlety_.\n Verstand; _Understanding_.\n Vorstellung; _representation_.\n\n Wahrnehmung; _perception_.\n Wesen; _being_.\n Willk\u00fchr; _elective will_.\n Wirklich; _actual_.\n Wohlgefallen; _satisfaction_.\n\n Zufriedenheit; _contentment_.\n Zweck; _purpose_.\n Zweckm\u00e4ssig; _purposive_.\n Zweckverbindung; _purposive combination_, etc.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nWe may call the faculty of cognition from principles _a priori_, _pure\nReason_, and the inquiry into its possibility and bounds generally the\nCritique of pure Reason, although by this faculty we only understand\nReason in its theoretical employment, as it appears under that name\nin the former work; without wishing to inquire into its faculty, as\npractical Reason, according to its special principles. That [Critique]\ngoes merely into our faculty of knowing things _a priori_, and busies\nitself therefore only with the _cognitive faculty_ to the exclusion\nof the feeling of pleasure and pain and the faculty of desire; and of\nthe cognitive faculties it only concerns itself with _Understanding_,\naccording to its principles _a priori_, to the exclusion of _Judgement_\nand _Reason_ (as faculties alike belonging to theoretical cognition),\nbecause it is found in the sequel that no other cognitive faculty but\nthe Understanding can furnish constitutive principles of cognition _a\npriori_. The Critique, then, which sifts them all, as regards the share\nwhich each of the other faculties might pretend to have in the clear\npossession of knowledge from its own peculiar root, leaves nothing but\nwhat the _Understanding_ prescribes _a priori_ as law for nature as\nthe complex of phenomena (whose form also is given _a priori_). It\nrelegates all other pure concepts under Ideas, which are transcendent\nfor our theoretical faculty of cognition, but are not therefore useless\nor to be dispensed with. For they serve as regulative principles;\npartly to check the dangerous pretensions of Understanding, as if\n(because it can furnish _a priori_ the conditions of the possibility\nof all things which it can know) it had thereby confined within\nthese bounds the possibility of all things in general; and partly to\nlead it to the consideration of nature according to a principle of\ncompleteness, although it can never attain to this, and thus to further\nthe final design of all knowledge.\n\nIt was then properly the _Understanding_ which has its special realm in\nthe _cognitive faculty_, so far as it contains constitutive principles\nof cognition _a priori_, which by the Critique, comprehensively called\nthe Critique of pure Reason, was to be placed in certain and sole\npossession[8] against all other competitors. And so also to _Reason_,\nwhich contains constitutive principles _a priori_ nowhere except simply\nin respect of the _faculty of desire_, should be assigned its place in\nthe Critique of practical Reason.\n\nWhether now the _Judgement_, which in the order of our cognitive\nfaculties forms a mediating link between Understanding and Reason, has\nalso principles _a priori_ for itself; whether these are constitutive\nor merely regulative (thus indicating no special realm); and whether\nthey give a rule _a priori_ to the feeling of pleasure and pain, as the\nmediating link between the cognitive faculty and the faculty of desire\n(just as the Understanding prescribes laws _a priori_ to the first,\nReason to the second); these are the questions with which the present\nCritique of Judgement is concerned.\n\nA Critique of pure Reason, _i.e._ of our faculty of judging _a priori_\naccording to principles, would be incomplete, if the Judgement, which\nas a cognitive faculty also makes claim to such principles, were not\ntreated as a particular part of it; although its principles in a\nsystem of pure Philosophy need form no particular part between the\ntheoretical and the practical, but can be annexed when needful to one\nor both as occasion requires. For if such a system is one day to be\ncompleted under the general name of Metaphysic (which it is possible\nto achieve quite completely, and which is supremely important for the\nuse of Reason in every reference), the soil for the edifice must be\nexplored by Criticism as deep down as the foundation of the faculty of\nprinciples independent of experience, in order that it may sink in no\npart, for this would inevitably bring about the downfall of the whole.\n\nWe can easily infer from the nature of the Judgement (whose right use\nis so necessarily and so universally requisite, that by the name of\nsound Understanding nothing else but this faculty is meant), that it\nmust be attended with great difficulties to find a principle peculiar\nto it; (some such it must contain _a priori_ in itself, for otherwise\nit would not be set apart by the commonest Criticism as a special\ncognitive faculty). This principle must not be derived _a priori_ from\nconcepts, for these belong to the Understanding, and Judgement is only\nconcerned with their application. It must, therefore, furnish of itself\na concept, through which, properly speaking, no thing is cognised,\nbut which only serves as a rule, though not an objective one to which\nit can adapt its judgement; because for this latter another faculty\nof Judgement would be requisite, in order to be able to distinguish\nwhether [any given case] is or is not the case for the rule.\n\nThis perplexity about a principle (whether it is subjective or\nobjective) presents itself mainly in those judgements that we call\naesthetical, which concern the Beautiful and the Sublime of Nature or\nof Art. And, nevertheless, the critical investigation of a principle\nof Judgement in these is the most important part in a Critique of\nthis faculty. For although they do not by themselves contribute to\nthe knowledge of things, yet they belong to the cognitive faculty\nalone, and point to an immediate reference of this faculty to the\nfeeling of pleasure or pain according to some principle _a priori_;\nwithout confusing this with what may be the determining ground of the\nfaculty of desire, which has its principles _a priori_ in concepts\nof Reason.--In the logical judging of nature, experience exhibits a\nconformity to law in things, to the understanding or to the explanation\nof which the general concept of the sensible does not attain; here the\nJudgement can only derive from itself a principle of the reference of\nthe natural thing to the unknowable supersensible (a principle which it\nmust only use from its own point of view for the cognition of nature).\nAnd so, though in this case such a principle _a priori_ can and must be\napplied to the _cognition_ of the beings of the world, and opens out\nat the same time prospects which are advantageous for the practical\nReason, yet it has no immediate reference to the feeling of pleasure\nand pain. But this reference is precisely the puzzle in the principle\nof Judgement, which renders a special section for this faculty\nnecessary in the Critique; since the logical judging according to\nconcepts (from which an immediate inference can never be drawn to the\nfeeling of pleasure and pain) along with their critical limitation, has\nat all events been capable of being appended to the theoretical part of\nPhilosophy.\n\nThe examination of the faculty of taste, as the aesthetical Judgement,\nis not here planned in reference to the formation or the culture of\ntaste (for this will take its course in the future as in the past\nwithout any such investigations), but merely in a transcendental point\nof view. Hence, I trust that as regards the deficiency of the former\npurpose it will be judged with indulgence, though in the latter point\nof view it must be prepared for the severest scrutiny. But I hope that\nthe great difficulty of solving a problem so involved by nature may\nserve as excuse for some hardly avoidable obscurity in its solution, if\nonly it be clearly established that the principle is correctly stated.\nI grant that the mode of deriving the phenomena of the Judgement from\nit has not all the clearness which might be rightly demanded elsewhere,\nviz. in the case of cognition according to concepts; but I believe that\nI have attained to it in the second part of this work.\n\nHere then I end my whole critical undertaking. I shall proceed without\ndelay to the doctrinal [part] in order to profit, as far as is\npossible, by the more favourable moments of my increasing years. It is\nobvious that in this [part] there will be no special section for the\nJudgement, because in respect of this faculty Criticism serves instead\nof Theory; but, according to the division of Philosophy (and also of\npure Philosophy) into theoretical and practical, the Metaphysic of\nNature and of Morals will complete the undertaking.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nI. OF THE DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n\nWe proceed quite correctly if, as usual, we divide Philosophy, as\ncontaining the principles of the rational cognition of things by means\nof concepts (not merely, as logic does, principles of the form of\nthought in general without distinction of Objects), into _theoretical_\nand _practical_. But then the concepts, which furnish their Object\nto the principles of this rational cognition, must be specifically\ndistinct; otherwise they would not justify a division, which always\npresupposes a contrast between the principles of the rational cognition\nbelonging to the different parts of a science.\n\nNow there are only two kinds of concepts, and these admit as many\ndistinct principles of the possibility of their objects, viz. _natural\nconcepts_ and the _concept of freedom_. The former render possible\n_theoretical_ cognition according to principles _a priori_; the latter\nin respect of this theoretical cognition only supplies in itself a\nnegative principle (that of mere contrast), but on the other hand it\nfurnishes fundamental propositions which extend the sphere of the\ndetermination of the will and are therefore called practical. Thus\nPhilosophy is correctly divided into two parts, quite distinct in\ntheir principles; the theoretical part or _Natural Philosophy_, and\nthe practical part or _Moral Philosophy_ (for that is the name given\nto the practical legislation of Reason in accordance with the concept\nof freedom). But up to the present a gross misuse of these expressions\nhas prevailed, both in the division of the different principles and\nconsequently also of Philosophy itself. For what is practical according\nto natural concepts has been identified with the practical according\nto the concept of freedom; and so with the like titles, \u2018theoretical\u2019\nand \u2018practical\u2019 Philosophy, a division has been made, by which in\nfact nothing has been divided (for both parts might in such case have\nprinciples of the same kind).\n\nThe will, regarded as the faculty of desire, is (in this view) one\nof the many natural causes in the world, viz. that cause which acts\nin accordance with concepts. All that is represented as possible (or\nnecessary) by means of a will is called practically possible (or\nnecessary); as distinguished from the physical possibility or necessity\nof an effect, whose cause is not determined to causality by concepts\n(but in lifeless matter by mechanism and in animals by instinct).\nHere, in respect of the practical, it is left undetermined whether the\nconcept which gives the rule to the causality of the will, is a natural\nconcept or a concept of freedom.\n\nBut the last distinction is essential. For if the concept which\ndetermines the causality is a natural concept, then the principles are\n_technically practical_; whereas, if it is a concept of freedom they\nare _morally practical_. And as the division of a rational science\ndepends on the distinction between objects whose cognition needs\ndistinct principles, the former will belong to theoretical Philosophy\n(doctrine of Nature), but the latter alone will constitute the second\npart, viz. practical Philosophy (doctrine of Morals).\n\nAll technically practical rules (_i.e._ the rules of art and skill\ngenerally, or of prudence regarded as skill in exercising an influence\nover men and their wills), so far as their principles rest on concepts,\nmust be reckoned only as corollaries to theoretical Philosophy. For\nthey concern only the possibility of things according to natural\nconcepts, to which belong not only the means which are to be met\nwith in nature, but also the will itself (as a faculty of desire\nand consequently a natural faculty), so far as it can be determined\nconformably to these rules by natural motives. However, practical\nrules of this kind are not called laws (like physical laws), but only\nprecepts; because the will does not stand merely under the natural\nconcept, but also under the concept of freedom, in relation to which\nits principles are called laws. These with their consequences alone\nconstitute the second or practical part of Philosophy.\n\nThe solution of the problems of pure geometry does not belong to a\nparticular part of the science; mensuration does not deserve the\nname of practical, in contrast to pure, geometry, as a second part\nof geometry in general; and just as little ought the mechanical\nor chemical art of experiment or observation to be reckoned as a\npractical part of the doctrine of Nature. Just as little, in fine,\nought housekeeping, farming, statesmanship, the art of conversation,\nthe prescribing of diet, the universal doctrine of happiness itself,\nor the curbing of the inclinations and checking of the affections\nfor the sake of happiness, to be reckoned as practical Philosophy,\nor taken to constitute the second part of Philosophy in general.\nFor all these contain only rules of skill (and are consequently only\ntechnically practical) for bringing about an effect that is possible\naccording to the natural concepts of causes and effects, which, since\nthey belong to theoretical Philosophy, are subject to those precepts\nas mere corollaries from it (viz. natural science), and can therefore\nclaim no place in a special Philosophy called practical. On the other\nhand, the morally practical precepts, which are altogether based on the\nconcept of freedom to the complete exclusion of the natural determining\ngrounds of the will, constitute a quite special class. These, like the\nrules which nature obeys, are called simply laws, but they do not, like\nthem, rest on sensuous conditions but on a supersensible principle;\nand accordingly they require for themselves a quite different part of\nPhilosophy, called practical, corresponding to its theoretical part.\n\nWe hence see that a complex of practical precepts given by Philosophy\ndoes not constitute a distinct part of Philosophy, as opposed to the\ntheoretical part, because these precepts are practical; for they might\nbe that, even if their principles were derived altogether from the\ntheoretical cognition of nature (as technically practical rules). [A\ndistinct branch of Philosophy is constituted only] if their principle,\nas it is not borrowed from the natural concept, which is always\nsensuously conditioned, rests on the supersensible, which alone makes\nthe concept of freedom cognisable by formal laws. These precepts are\nthen morally practical, _i.e._ not merely precepts or rules in this\nor that aspect, but, without any preceding reference to purposes and\ndesigns, are laws.\n\n\nII. OF THE REALM OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL\n\nSo far as our concepts have _a priori_ application, so far extends\nthe use of our cognitive faculty according to principles, and with it\nPhilosophy.\n\nBut the complex of all objects, to which those concepts are referred,\nin order to bring about a knowledge of them where it is possible,\nmay be subdivided according to the adequacy or inadequacy of our\n[cognitive] faculty to this design.\n\nConcepts, so far as they are referred to objects, independently of the\npossibility or impossibility of the cognition of these objects, have\ntheir field which is determined merely according to the relation that\ntheir Object has to our cognitive faculty in general. The part of this\nfield in which knowledge is possible for us is a ground or territory\n(_territorium_) for these concepts and the requisite cognitive faculty.\nThe part of this territory, where they are legislative, is the realm\n(_ditio_) of these concepts and of the corresponding cognitive\nfaculties. Empirical concepts have, therefore, their territory in\nnature, as the complex of all objects of sense, but no realm, only\na dwelling-place (_domicilium_); for though they are produced in\nconformity to law they are not legislative, but the rules based on them\nare empirical and consequently contingent.\n\nOur whole cognitive faculty has two realms, that of natural concepts\nand that of the concept of freedom; for through both it is legislative\n_a priori_. In accordance with this, Philosophy is divided into\ntheoretical and practical. But the territory to which its realm extends\nand in which its legislation is _exercised_, is always only the complex\nof objects of all possible experience, so long as they are taken for\nnothing more than mere phenomena; for otherwise no legislation of the\nUnderstanding in respect of them is conceivable.\n\nLegislation through natural concepts is carried on by means of the\nUnderstanding and is theoretical. Legislation through the concept of\nfreedom is carried on by the Reason and is merely practical. It is\nonly in the practical [sphere] that the Reason can be legislative;\nin respect of theoretical cognition (of nature) it can merely (as\nacquainted with law by the Understanding) deduce from given laws\nconsequences which always remain within [the limits of] nature. But on\nthe other hand, Reason is not always therefore _legislative_, where\nthere are practical rules, for they may be only technically practical.\n\nUnderstanding and Reason exercise, therefore, two distinct legislations\nin regard to one and the same territory of experience, without\nprejudice to each other. The concept of freedom as little disturbs\nthe legislation of nature, as the natural concept influences the\nlegislation through the former.--The possibility of at least thinking\nwithout contradiction the co-existence of both legislations, and of\nthe corresponding faculties in the same subject, has been shown in the\nCritique of pure Reason; for it annulled the objections on the other\nside by exposing the dialectical illusion which they contain.\n\nThese two different realms then do not limit each other in their\nlegislation, though they perpetually do so in the world of sense.\nThat they do not constitute _one_ realm, arises from this, that the\nnatural concept represents its objects in intuition, not as things\nin themselves, but as mere phenomena; the concept of freedom, on the\nother hand, represents in its Object a thing in itself, but not in\nintuition. Hence, neither of them can furnish a theoretical knowledge\nof its Object (or even of the thinking subject) as a thing in itself;\nthis would be the supersensible, the Idea of which we must indeed make\nthe basis of the possibility of all these objects of experience, but\nwhich we can never extend or elevate into a cognition.\n\nThere is, then, an unbounded but also inaccessible field for our whole\ncognitive faculty--the field of the supersensible--wherein we find no\nterritory, and, therefore, can have in it, for theoretical cognition,\nno realm either for concepts of Understanding or Reason. This field we\nmust indeed occupy with Ideas on behalf of the theoretical as well as\nthe practical use of Reason, but we can supply to them in reference to\nthe laws [arising] from the concept of freedom no other than practical\nreality, by which our theoretical cognition is not extended in the\nslightest degree towards the supersensible.\n\nNow even if an immeasurable gulf is fixed between the sensible realm\nof the concept of nature and the supersensible realm of the concept of\nfreedom, so that no transition is possible from the first to the second\n(by means of the theoretical use of Reason), just as if they were two\ndifferent worlds of which the first could have no influence upon the\nsecond, yet the second is _meant_ to have an influence upon the first.\nThe concept of freedom is meant to actualise in the world of sense\nthe purpose proposed by its laws, and consequently nature must be so\nthought that the conformity to law of its form, at least harmonises\nwith the possibility of the purposes to be effected in it according to\nlaws of freedom.--There must, therefore, be a ground of the _unity_\nof the supersensible, which lies at the basis of nature, with that\nwhich the concept of freedom practically contains; and the concept\nof this ground, although it does not attain either theoretically or\npractically to a knowledge of the same, and hence has no peculiar\nrealm, nevertheless makes possible the transition from the mode of\nthought according to the principles of the one to that according to the\nprinciples of the other.\n\n\nIII. OF THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT AS A MEANS OF COMBINING THE TWO PARTS\nOF PHILOSOPHY INTO A WHOLE.\n\nThe Critique of the cognitive faculties, as regards what they can\nfurnish _a priori_, has properly speaking no realm in respect of\nObjects, because it is not a doctrine, but only has to investigate\nwhether and how, in accordance with the state of these faculties, a\ndoctrine is possible by their means. Its field extends to all their\npretensions, in order to confine them within their legitimate bounds.\nBut what cannot enter into the division of Philosophy may yet enter,\nas a chief part, into the Critique of the pure faculty of cognition in\ngeneral, viz. if it contains principles which are available neither for\ntheoretical nor for practical use.\n\nThe natural concepts, which contain the ground of all\ntheoretical knowledge _a priori_, rest on the legislation of the\nUnderstanding.--The concept of freedom, which contains the ground of\nall sensuously-unconditioned practical precepts _a priori_, rests on\nthe legislation of the Reason. Both faculties, therefore, besides being\ncapable of application as regards their logical form to principles of\nwhatever origin, have also as regards their content, their special\nlegislations above which there is no other (_a priori_); and hence the\ndivision of Philosophy into theoretical and practical is justified.\n\nBut in the family of the higher cognitive faculties there is a middle\nterm between the Understanding and the Reason. This is the _Judgement_,\nof which we have cause for supposing according to analogy that it\nmay contain in itself, if not a special legislation, yet a special\nprinciple of its own to be sought according to laws, though merely\nsubjective _a priori_. This principle, even if it have no field of\nobjects as its realm, yet may have somewhere a territory with a certain\ncharacter, for which no other principle can be valid.\n\nBut besides (to judge by analogy) there is a new ground for bringing\nthe Judgement into connexion with another arrangement of our\nrepresentative faculties, which seems to be of even greater importance\nthan that of its relationship with the family of the cognitive\nfaculties. For all faculties or capacities of the soul can be reduced\nto three, which cannot be any further derived from one common ground:\nthe _faculty of knowledge_, the _feeling of pleasure and pain_, and the\n_faculty of desire_.[9] For the faculty of knowledge the Understanding\nis alone legislative, if (as must happen when it is considered by\nitself without confusion with the faculty of desire) this faculty is\nreferred to nature as the faculty of _theoretical knowledge_; for in\nrespect of nature (as phenomenon) it is alone possible for us to give\nlaws by means of natural concepts _a priori_, _i.e._ by pure concepts\nof Understanding.--For the faculty of desire, as a higher faculty\naccording to the concept of freedom, the Reason (in which alone this\nconcept has a place) is alone _a priori_ legislative.--Now between the\nfaculties of knowledge and desire there is the feeling of pleasure,\njust as the Judgement is intermediate between the Understanding and\nthe Reason. We may therefore suppose provisionally that the Judgement\nlikewise contains in itself an _a priori_ principle. And as pleasure\nor pain is necessarily combined with the faculty of desire (either\npreceding this principle as in the lower desires, or following it as\nin the higher, when the desire is determined by the moral law), we may\nalso suppose that the Judgement will bring about a transition from the\npure faculty of knowledge, the realm of natural concepts, to the realm\nof the concept of freedom, just as in its logical use it makes possible\nthe transition from Understanding to Reason.\n\nAlthough, then, Philosophy can be divided only into two main parts,\nthe theoretical and the practical, and although all that we may be\nable to say of the special principles of Judgement must be counted as\nbelonging in it to the theoretical part, _i.e._ to rational cognition\nin accordance with natural concepts; yet the Critique of pure Reason,\nwhich must decide all this, as regards the possibility of the system\nbefore undertaking it, consists of three parts; the Critique of pure\nUnderstanding, of pure Judgement, and of pure Reason, which faculties\nare called pure because they are legislative _a priori_.\n\n\nIV. OF JUDGEMENT AS A FACULTY LEGISLATING _A PRIORI_\n\nJudgement in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as\ncontained under the Universal. If the universal (the rule, the\nprinciple, the law) be given, the Judgement which subsumes the\nparticular under it (even if, as transcendental Judgement, it furnishes\n_a priori_, the conditions in conformity with which subsumption under\nthat universal is alone possible) is _determinant_. But if only the\nparticular be given for which the universal has to be found, the\nJudgement is merely _reflective_.\n\nThe determinant Judgement only subsumes under universal transcendental\nlaws given by the Understanding; the law is marked out for it, _a\npriori_, and it has therefore no need to seek a law for itself in\norder to be able to subordinate the particular in nature to the\nuniversal.--But the forms of nature are so manifold, and there\nare so many modifications of the universal transcendental natural\nconcepts left undetermined by the laws given, _a priori_, by the pure\nUnderstanding,--because these only concern the possibility of a nature\nin general (as an object of sense),--that there must be laws for these\n[forms] also. These, as empirical, may be contingent from the point\nof view of _our_ Understanding, and yet, if they are to be called\nlaws (as the concept of a nature requires), they must be regarded as\nnecessary in virtue of a principle of the unity of the manifold, though\nit be unknown to us.--The reflective Judgement, which is obliged to\nascend from the particular in nature to the universal, requires on that\naccount a principle that it cannot borrow from experience, because its\nfunction is to establish the unity of all empirical principles under\nhigher ones, and hence to establish the possibility of their systematic\nsubordination. Such a transcendental principle, then, the reflective\nJudgement can only give as a law from and to itself. It cannot derive\nit from outside (because then it would be the determinant Judgement);\nnor can it prescribe it to nature, because reflection upon the laws\nof nature adjusts itself by nature, and not nature by the conditions\naccording to which we attempt to arrive at a concept of it which is\nquite contingent in respect of these.\n\nThis principle can be no other than the following: As universal laws\nof nature have their ground in our Understanding, which prescribes\nthem to nature (although only according to the universal concept of\nit as nature); so particular empirical laws, in respect of what is in\nthem left undetermined by these universal laws, must be considered in\naccordance with such a unity as they would have if an Understanding\n(although not our Understanding) had furnished them to our cognitive\nfaculties, so as to make possible a system of experience according\nto particular laws of nature. Not as if, in this way, such an\nUnderstanding must be assumed as actual (for it is only our reflective\nJudgement to which this Idea serves as a principle--for reflecting, not\nfor determining); but this faculty thus gives a law only to itself and\nnot to nature.\n\nNow the concept of an Object, so far as it contains the ground of\nthe actuality of this Object, is the _purpose_; and the agreement\nof a thing with that constitution of things, which is only possible\naccording to purposes, is called the _purposiveness_ of its form. Thus\nthe principle of Judgement, in respect of the form of things of nature\nunder empirical laws generally, is the _purposiveness of nature_ in its\nmanifoldness. That is, nature is represented by means of this concept,\nas if an Understanding contained the ground of the unity of the\nmanifold of its empirical laws.\n\nThe purposiveness of nature is therefore a particular concept, _a\npriori_, which has its origin solely in the reflective Judgement. For\nwe cannot ascribe to natural products anything like a reference of\nnature in them to purposes; we can only use this concept to reflect\nupon such products in respect of the connexion of phenomena which is\ngiven in nature according to empirical laws. This concept is also quite\ndifferent from practical purposiveness (in human art or in morals),\nthough it is certainly thought according to the analogy of these last.\n\n\nV. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FORMAL PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE IS A\nTRANSCENDENTAL PRINCIPLE OF JUDGEMENT.\n\nA transcendental principle is one by means of which is represented, _a\npriori_, the universal condition under which alone things can be in\ngeneral Objects of our cognition. On the other hand, a principle is\ncalled metaphysical if it represents the _a priori_ condition under\nwhich alone Objects, whose concept must be empirically given, can be\nfurther determined _a priori_. Thus the principle of the cognition of\nbodies as substances, and as changeable substances, is transcendental,\nif thereby it is asserted that their changes must have a cause; it is\nmetaphysical if it asserts that their changes must have an _external_\ncause. For in the former case bodies need only be thought by means\nof ontological predicates (pure concepts of Understanding), _e.g._\nsubstance, in order to cognise the proposition _a priori_; but in\nthe latter case the empirical concept of a body (as a movable thing\nin space) must lie at the basis of the proposition, although once\nthis basis has been laid down, it may be seen completely _a priori_\nthat this latter predicate (motion only by external causes) belongs\nto body.--Thus, as I shall presently show, the principle of the\npurposiveness of nature (in the manifoldness of its empirical laws) is\na transcendental principle. For the concept of Objects, so far as they\nare thought as standing under this principle, is only the pure concept\nof objects of possible empirical cognition in general and contains\nnothing empirical. On the other hand, the principle of practical\npurposiveness, which must be thought in the Idea of the _determination_\nof a free _will_, is a metaphysical principle; because the concept of a\nfaculty of desire as a will must be given empirically (_i.e._ does not\nbelong to transcendental predicates). Both principles are, however, not\nempirical, but _a priori_; because for the combination of the predicate\nwith the empirical concept of the subject of their judgements no\nfurther experience is needed, but it can be apprehended completely _a\npriori_.\n\nThat the concept of a purposiveness of nature belongs to transcendental\nprinciples can be sufficiently seen from the maxims of the Judgement,\nwhich lie at the basis of the investigation of nature _a priori_,\nand yet do not go further than the possibility of experience, and\nconsequently of the cognition of nature--not indeed nature in general,\nbut nature as determined through a variety of particular laws. These\nmaxims present themselves in the course of this science often enough,\nthough in a scattered way, as sentences of metaphysical wisdom,\nwhose necessity we cannot demonstrate from concepts. \u201cNature takes\nthe shortest way (_lex parsimoniae_); at the same time it makes no\nleaps, either in the course of its changes or in the juxtaposition\nof specifically different forms (_lex continui in natura_); its\ngreat variety in empirical laws is yet unity under a few principles\n(_principia praeter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda_),\u201d etc.\n\nIf we propose to set forth the origin of these fundamental propositions\nand try to do so by the psychological method, we violate their sense.\nFor they do not tell us what happens, _i.e._ by what rule our cognitive\npowers actually operate, and how we judge, but how we ought to judge;\nand this logical objective necessity does not emerge if the principles\nare merely empirical. Hence that purposiveness of nature for our\ncognitive faculties and their use, which is plainly apparent from them,\nis a transcendental principle of judgements, and needs therefore also a\nTranscendental Deduction, by means of which the ground for so judging\nmust be sought in the sources of cognition _a priori_.\n\nWe find in the grounds of the possibility of an experience in the\nvery first place something necessary, viz. the universal laws without\nwhich nature in general (as an object of sense) cannot be thought;\nand these rest upon the Categories, applied to the formal conditions\nof all intuition possible for us, so far as it is also given _a\npriori_. Now under these laws the Judgement is determinant, for it\nhas nothing to do but to subsume under given laws. For example, the\nUnderstanding says that every change has its cause (universal law of\nnature); the transcendental Judgement has nothing further to do than\nto supply _a priori_ the condition of subsumption under the concept\nof the Understanding placed before it, _i.e._ the succession [in\ntime] of the determinations of one and the same thing. For nature in\ngeneral (as an object of possible experience) that law is cognised as\nabsolutely necessary.--But now the objects of empirical cognition are\ndetermined in many other ways than by that formal time-condition,\nor, at least as far as we can judge _a priori_, are determinable.\nHence specifically different natures can be causes in an infinite\nvariety of ways, as well as in virtue of what they have in common\nas belonging to nature in general; and each of these modes must (in\naccordance with the concept of a cause in general) have its rule, which\nis a law and therefore brings necessity with it, although we do not\nat all comprehend this necessity, in virtue of the constitution and\nthe limitations of our cognitive faculties. We must therefore think\nin nature, in respect of its merely empirical laws, a possibility of\ninfinitely various empirical laws, which are, as far as our insight\ngoes, contingent (cannot be cognised _a priori_), and in respect of\nwhich we judge nature, according to empirical laws and the possibility\nof the unity of experience (as a system according to empirical laws),\nto be contingent. But such a unity must be necessarily presupposed and\nassumed, for otherwise there would be no thoroughgoing connexion of\nempirical cognitions in a whole of experience. The universal laws of\nnature no doubt furnish such a connexion of things according to their\nkind as things of nature in general, but not specifically, as such\nparticular beings of nature. Hence the Judgement must assume for its\nspecial use this principle _a priori_, that what in the particular\n(empirical) laws of nature is from the human point of view contingent,\nyet contains a unity of law in the combination of its manifold into an\nexperience possible in itself--a unity not indeed to be fathomed by us,\nbut yet thinkable. Consequently as the unity of law in a combination,\nwhich we cognise as contingent in itself, although in conformity with\na necessary design (a need) of Understanding, is represented as the\npurposiveness of Objects (here of nature); so must the Judgement, which\nin respect of things under possible (not yet discovered) empirical\nlaws is merely reflection, think of nature in respect of the latter\naccording to _a principle of purposiveness_ for our cognitive faculty,\nwhich then is expressed in the above maxims of the Judgement. This\ntranscendental concept of a purposiveness of nature is neither a\nnatural concept nor a concept of freedom, because it ascribes nothing\nto the Object (of nature), but only represents the peculiar way in\nwhich we must proceed in reflection upon the objects of nature in\nreference to a thoroughly connected experience, and is consequently a\nsubjective principle (maxim) of the Judgement. Hence, as if it were a\nlucky chance favouring our design, we are rejoiced (properly speaking,\nrelieved of a want), if we meet with such systematic unity under merely\nempirical laws; although we must necessarily assume that there is such\na unity without our comprehending it or being able to prove it.\n\nIn order to convince ourselves of the correctness of this Deduction\nof the concept before us, and the necessity of assuming it as a\ntranscendental principle of cognition, just consider the magnitude of\nthe problem. The problem, which lies _a priori_ in our Understanding,\nis to make a connected experience out of given perceptions of a nature\ncontaining at all events an infinite variety of empirical laws. The\nUnderstanding is, no doubt, in possession _a priori_ of universal laws\nof nature, without which nature could not be an object of experience;\nbut it needs in addition a certain order of nature in its particular\nrules, which can only be empirically known and which are, as regards\nthe Understanding, contingent. These rules, without which we could\nnot proceed from the universal analogy of a possible experience in\ngeneral to the particular, must be thought by it as laws (_i.e._ as\nnecessary), for otherwise they would not constitute an order of nature;\nalthough their necessity can never be cognised or comprehended by\nit. Although, therefore, the Understanding can determine nothing _a\npriori_ in respect of Objects, it must, in order to trace out these\nempirical so-called laws, place at the basis of all reflection upon\nObjects an _a priori_ principle, viz. that a cognisable order of nature\nis possible in accordance with these laws. The following propositions\nexpress some such principle. There is in nature a subordination of\ngenera and species comprehensible by us. Each one approximates to some\nother according to a common principle, so that a transition from one to\nanother and so on to a higher genus may be possible. Though it seems at\nthe outset unavoidable for our Understanding to assume different kinds\nof causality for the specific differences of natural operations, yet\nthese different kinds may stand under a small number of principles,\nwith the investigation of which we have to busy ourselves. This harmony\nof nature with our cognitive faculty is presupposed _a priori_ by the\nJudgement, on behalf of its reflection upon nature in accordance with\nits empirical laws; whilst the Understanding at the same time cognises\nit objectively as contingent, and it is only the Judgement that\nascribes it to nature as a trancendental purposiveness (in relation to\nthe cognitive faculty of the subject). For without this presupposition\nwe should have no order of nature in accordance with empirical laws,\nand consequently no guiding thread for an experience ordered by these\nin all their variety, or for an investigation of them.\n\nFor it might easily be thought that, in spite of all the uniformity of\nnatural things according to the universal laws, without which we should\nnot have the form of an empirical cognition in general, the specific\nvariety of the empirical laws of nature including their effects might\nyet be so great, that it would be impossible for our Understanding, to\ndetect in nature a comprehensible order; to divide its products into\ngenera and species, so as to use the principles which explain and make\nintelligible one for the explanation and comprehension of another; or\nout of such confused material (strictly we should say, so infinitely\nvarious and not to be measured by our faculty of comprehension) to make\na connected experience.\n\nThe Judgement has therefore also in itself a principle _a priori_ of\nthe possibility of nature, but only in a subjective aspect; by which\nit prescribes, not to nature (autonomy), but to itself (heautonomy)\na law for its reflection upon nature. This we might call the _law of\nthe specification of nature_ in respect of its empirical laws. The\nJudgement does not cognise this _a priori_ in nature, but assumes it\non behalf of a natural order cognisable by our Understanding in the\ndivision which it makes of the universal laws of nature when it wishes\nto subordinate to these the variety of particular laws. If then we say\nthat nature specifies its universal laws according to the principles of\npurposiveness for our cognitive faculty, _i.e._ in accordance with the\nnecessary business of the human Understanding of finding the universal\nfor the particular which perception offers it, and again of finding\nconnexion for the diverse (which however is a universal for each\nspecies) in the unity of a principle,--we thus neither prescribe to\nnature a law, nor do we learn one from it by observation (although such\na principle may be confirmed by this means). For it is not a principle\nof the determinant but merely of the reflective Judgement. We only\nrequire that, be nature disposed as it may as regards its universal\nlaws, investigation into its empirical laws may be carried on in\naccordance with that principle and the maxims founded thereon, because\nit is only so far as that holds that we can make any progress with the\nuse of our Understanding in experience, or gain knowledge.\n\n\nVI. OF THE COMBINATION OF THE FEELING OF PLEASURE WITH THE CONCEPT OF\nTHE PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE.\n\nThe thought harmony of nature in the variety of its particular laws\nwith our need of finding universality of principles for it, must\nbe judged as contingent in respect of our insight, but yet at the\nsame time as indispensable for the needs of our Understanding, and\nconsequently as a purposiveness by which nature is harmonised with our\ndesign, which, however, has only knowledge for its aim. The universal\nlaws of the Understanding, which are at the same time laws of nature,\nare just as necessary (although arising from spontaneity) as the\nmaterial laws of motion. Their production presupposes no design on the\npart of our cognitive faculty, because it is only by means of them\nthat we, in the first place, attain a concept of what the cognition\nof things (of nature) is, and attribute them necessarily to nature as\nObject of our cognition in general. But, so far as we can see, it is\ncontingent that the order of nature according to its particular laws,\nin all its variety and heterogeneity possibly at least transcending\nour comprehension, should be actually conformable to these [laws]. The\ndiscovery of this [order] is the business of the Understanding which\nis designedly borne towards a necessary purpose, viz. the bringing of\nunity of principles into nature, which purpose then the Judgement must\nascribe to nature, because the Understanding cannot here prescribe any\nlaw to it.\n\nThe attainment of that design is bound up with the feeling of pleasure,\nand since the condition of this attainment is a representation\n_a priori_,--as here a principle for the reflective Judgement in\ngeneral,--therefore the feeling of pleasure is determined by a ground\n_a priori_ and valid for every man, and that merely by the reference of\nthe Object to the cognitive faculty, the concept of purposiveness here\nnot having the least reference to the faculty of desire. It is thus\nquite distinguished from all practical purposiveness of nature.\n\nIn fact, although from the agreement of perceptions with laws in\naccordance with universal natural concepts (the categories), we do not\nand cannot find in ourselves the slightest effect upon the feeling of\npleasure, because the Understanding necessarily proceeds according to\nits nature without any design; yet, on the other hand, the discovery\nthat two or more empirical heterogeneous laws of nature may be combined\nunder one principle comprehending them both, is the ground of a very\nmarked pleasure, often even of an admiration, which does not cease,\nthough we may be already quite familiar with the objects of it. We no\nlonger find, it is true, any marked pleasure in the comprehensibility\nof nature and in the unity of its divisions into genera and species,\nwhereby are possible all empirical concepts, through which we cognise\nit according to its particular laws. But this pleasure has certainly\nbeen present at one time, and it is only because the commonest\nexperience would be impossible without it that it is gradually\nconfounded with mere cognition and no longer arrests particular\nattention. There is then something in our judgements upon nature which\nmakes us attentive to its purposiveness for our Understanding--an\nendeavour to bring, where possible, its dissimilar laws under higher\nones, though still always empirical--and thus, if successful, makes\nus feel pleasure in that harmony of these with our cognitive faculty,\nwhich harmony we regard as merely contingent. On the other hand, a\nrepresentation of nature would altogether displease, by which it\nshould be foretold to us that in the smallest investigation beyond the\ncommonest experience we should meet with a heterogeneity of its laws,\nwhich would make the union of its particular laws under universal\nempirical laws impossible for our Understanding. For this would\ncontradict the principle of the subjectively-purposive specification of\nnature in its genera, and also of our reflective Judgement in respect\nof such principle.\n\nThis presupposition of the Judgement is, however, at the same time so\nindeterminate as to how far that ideal purposiveness of nature for\nour cognitive faculty should be extended, that if we were told that\na deeper or wider knowledge of nature derived from observation must\nlead at last to a variety of laws, which no human Understanding could\nreduce to a principle, we should at once acquiesce. But still we more\ngladly listen to one who offers hope that the more we know nature\ninternally, and can compare it with external members now unknown to\nus, the more simple shall we find it in its principles, and that the\nfurther our experience reaches the more uniform shall we find it amid\nthe apparent heterogeneity of its empirical laws. For it is a mandate\nof our Judgement to proceed according to the principle of the harmony\nof nature with our cognitive faculty so far as that reaches, without\ndeciding (because it is not the determinant Judgement which gives us\nthis rule) whether or not it is bounded anywhere. For although in\nrespect of the rational use of our cognitive faculty we can determine\nsuch bounds, this is not possible in the empirical field.\n\n\nVII. OF THE AESTHETICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE.\n\nThat which in the representation of an Object is merely subjective,\n_i.e._ which decides its reference to the subject, not to the object,\nis its aesthetical character; but that which serves or can be used\nfor the determination of the object (for cognition), is its logical\nvalidity. In the cognition of an object of sense both references\npresent themselves. In the sense-representation of external things\nthe quality of space wherein we intuite them is the merely subjective\n[element] of my representation (by which it remains undecided what\nthey may be in themselves as Objects), on account of which reference\nthe object is thought thereby merely as phenomenon. But space,\nnotwithstanding its merely subjective quality, is at the same time\nan ingredient in the cognition of things as phenomena. _Sensation_,\nagain (_i.e._ external sensation), expresses the merely subjective\n[element] of our representations of external things, but it is also the\nproper material (reale) of them (by which something existing is given),\njust as space is the mere form _a priori_ of the possibility of their\nintuition. Nevertheless, however, sensation is also employed in the\ncognition of external Objects.\n\nBut the subjective [element] in a representation _which cannot be\nan ingredient of cognition_, is the _pleasure_ or _pain_ which is\nbound up with it; for through it I cognise nothing in the object of\nthe representation, although it may be the effect of some cognition.\nNow the purposiveness of a thing, so far as it is represented in\nperception, is no characteristic of the Object itself (for such cannot\nbe perceived), although it may be inferred from a cognition of things.\nThe purposiveness, therefore, which precedes the cognition of an\nObject, and which, even without our wishing to use the representation\nof it for cognition, is, at the same time, immediately bound up\nwith it, is that subjective [element] which cannot be an ingredient\nin cognition. Hence the object is only called purposive, when its\nrepresentation is immediately combined with the feeling of pleasure;\nand this very representation is an aesthetical representation of\npurposiveness.--The only question is whether there is, in general, such\na representation of purposiveness.\n\nIf pleasure is bound up with the mere apprehension (_apprehensio_) of\nthe form of an object of intuition, without reference to a concept for\na definite cognition, then the representation is thereby not referred\nto the Object, but simply to the subject; and the pleasure can express\nnothing else than its harmony with the cognitive faculties which come\ninto play in the reflective Judgement, and so far as they are in play;\nand hence can only express a subjective formal purposiveness of the\nObject. For that apprehension of forms in the Imagination can never\ntake place without the reflective Judgement, though undesignedly,\nat least comparing them with its faculty of referring intuitions to\nconcepts. If now in this comparison the Imagination (as the faculty of\n_a priori_ intuitions) is placed by means of a given representation\nundesignedly in agreement with the Understanding, as the faculty of\nconcepts, and thus a feeling of pleasure is aroused, the object must\nthen be regarded as purposive for the reflective Judgement. Such a\njudgement is an aesthetical judgement upon the purposiveness of the\nObject, which does not base itself upon any present concept of the\nobject, nor does it furnish any such. In the case of an object whose\nform (not the matter of its representation, as sensation), in the mere\nreflection upon it (without reference to any concept to be obtained\nof it), is judged as the ground of a pleasure in the representation\nof such an Object, this pleasure is judged as bound up with the\nrepresentation necessarily; and, consequently, not only for the subject\nwhich apprehends this form, but for every judging being in general. The\nobject is then called beautiful; and the faculty of judging by means\nof such a pleasure (and, consequently, with universal validity) is\ncalled Taste. For since the ground of the pleasure is placed merely in\nthe form of the object for reflection in general--and, consequently,\nin no sensation of the object, and also without reference to any\nconcept which anywhere involves design--it is only the conformity\nto law in the empirical use of the Judgement in general (unity of\nthe Imagination with the Understanding) in the subject, with which\nthe representation of the Object in reflection, whose conditions are\nuniversally valid _a priori_, harmonises. And since this harmony of the\nobject with the faculties of the subject is contingent, it brings about\nthe representation of its purposiveness in respect of the cognitive\nfaculties of the subject.\n\nHere now is a pleasure, which, like all pleasure or pain that is not\nproduced through the concept of freedom (_i.e._ through the preceding\ndetermination of the higher faculties of desire by pure Reason), can\nnever be comprehended from concepts, as necessarily bound up with the\nrepresentation of an object. It must always be cognised as combined\nwith this only by means of reflective perception; and, consequently,\nlike all empirical judgements, it can declare no objective necessity\nand lay claim to no _a priori_ validity. But the judgement of taste\nalso claims, as every other empirical judgement does, to be valid\nfor every one; and in spite of its inner contingency this is always\npossible. The strange and irregular thing is that it is not an\nempirical concept, but a feeling of pleasure (consequently not a\nconcept at all), which by the judgement of taste is attributed to every\none,--just as if it were a predicate bound up with the cognition of the\nObject--and which is connected with the representation thereof.\n\nA singular judgement of experience, _e.g._, when we perceive a moveable\ndrop of water in an ice-crystal, may justly claim that every one\nelse should find it the same; because we have formed this judgement,\naccording to the universal conditions of the determinant faculty of\nJudgement, under the laws of a possible experience in general. Just\nin the same way he who feels pleasure in the mere reflection upon\nthe form of an object without respect to any concept, although this\njudgement be empirical and singular, justly claims the agreement\nof every one; because the ground of this pleasure is found in the\nuniversal, although subjective, condition of reflective judgements,\nviz., the purposive harmony of an object (whether a product of nature\nor of art) with the mutual relations of the cognitive faculties (the\nImagination and the Understanding), a harmony which is requisite for\nevery empirical cognition. The pleasure, therefore, in the judgement\nof taste is dependent on an empirical representation, and cannot be\nbound up _a priori_ with any concept (we cannot determine _a priori_\nwhat object is or is not according to taste; that we must find out\nby experiment). But the pleasure is the determining ground of this\njudgement only because we are conscious that it rests merely on\nreflection and on the universal though only subjective conditions\nof the harmony of that reflection with the cognition of Objects in\ngeneral, for which the form of the Object is purposive.\n\nThus the reason why judgements of taste according to their possibility\nare subjected to a Critique is that they presuppose a principle _a\npriori_, although this principle is neither one of cognition for the\nUnderstanding nor of practice for the Will, and therefore is not in any\nway determinant _a priori_.\n\nSusceptibility to pleasure from reflection upon the forms of things (of\nNature as well as of Art), indicates not only a purposiveness of the\nObjects in relation to the reflective Judgement, conformably to the\nconcept of nature in the subject; but also conversely a purposiveness\nof the subject in respect of the objects according to their form or\neven their formlessness, in virtue of the concept of freedom. Hence\nthe aesthetical judgement is not only related as a judgement of taste\nto the beautiful, but also as springing from a spiritual feeling is\nrelated to the _sublime_; and thus the Critique of the aesthetical\nJudgement must be divided into two corresponding sections.\n\n\nVIII. OF THE LOGICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PURPOSIVENESS OF NATURE\n\nPurposiveness may be represented in an object given in experience\non a merely subjective ground, as the harmony of its form,--in the\n_apprehension_ (_apprehensio_) of it prior to any concept,--with the\ncognitive faculties, in order to unite the intuition with concepts\nfor a cognition generally. Or it may be represented objectively as\nthe harmony of the form of the object with the possibility of the\nthing itself, according to a concept of it which precedes and contains\nthe ground of this form. We have seen that the representation of\npurposiveness of the first kind rests on the immediate pleasure\nin the form of the object in the mere reflection upon it. But the\nrepresentation of purposiveness of the second kind, since it refers\nthe form of the Object, not to the cognitive faculties of the subject\nin the apprehension of it, but to a definite cognition of the object\nunder a given concept, has nothing to do with a feeling of pleasure in\nthings, but only with the Understanding in its judgement upon them.\nIf the concept of an object is given, the business of the Judgement\nin the use of the concept for cognition consists in _presentation_\n(_exhibitio_), _i.e._ in setting a corresponding intuition beside the\nconcept. This may take place either through our own Imagination, as\nin Art when we realise a preconceived concept of an object which is\na purpose of ours; or through Nature in its Technic (as in organised\nbodies) when we supply to it our concept of its purpose in order\nto judge of its products. In the latter case it is not merely the\n_purposiveness_ of nature in the form of the thing that is represented,\nbut this its product is represented as a _natural purpose_.--Although\nour concept of a subjective purposiveness of nature in its forms\naccording to empirical laws is not a concept of the Object, but only\na principle of the Judgement for furnishing itself with concepts amid\nthe immense variety of nature (and thus being able to ascertain its\nown position), yet we thus ascribe to nature as it were a regard to\nour cognitive faculty according to the analogy of purpose. Thus we can\nregard _natural beauty_ as the _presentation_ of the concept of the\nformal (merely subjective) purposiveness, and _natural purposes_ as\nthe presentation of the concept of a real (objective) purposiveness.\nThe former of these we judge of by Taste (aesthetically, by the medium\nof the feeling of pleasure), the latter by Understanding and Reason\n(logically, according to concepts).\n\nOn this is based the division of the Critique of Judgement into the\nCritique of _aesthetical_ and of _teleological_ Judgement. By the\nfirst we understand the faculty of judging of the formal purposiveness\n(otherwise called subjective) of Nature by means of the feeling of\npleasure or pain; by the second the faculty of judging its real\n(objective) purposiveness by means of Understanding and Reason.\n\nIn a Critique of Judgement the part containing the aesthetical\nJudgement is essential, because this alone contains a principle\nwhich the Judgement places quite _a priori_ at the basis of its\nreflection upon nature; viz., the principle of a formal purposiveness\nof nature, according to its particular (empirical) laws, for our\ncognitive faculty, without which the Understanding could not find\nitself in nature. On the other hand no reason _a priori_ could be\nspecified,--and even the possibility of a reason would not be apparent\nfrom the concept of nature as an object of experience whether general\nor particular,--why there should be objective purposes of nature,\n_i.e._ things which are only possible as natural purposes; but the\nJudgement, without containing such a principle _a priori_ in itself,\nin given cases (of certain products), in order to make use of the\nconcept of purposes on behalf of Reason, would only contain the rule\naccording to which that transcendental principle has already prepared\nthe Understanding to apply to nature the concept of a purpose (at least\nas regards its form).\n\nBut the transcendental principle which represents a purposiveness of\nnature (in subjective reference to our cognitive faculty) in the form\nof a thing as a principle by which we judge of nature, leaves it quite\nundetermined where and in what cases I have to judge of a product\naccording to a principle of purposiveness, and not rather according to\nuniversal natural laws. It leaves it to the _aesthetical_ Judgement\nto decide by taste the harmony of this product (of its form) with our\ncognitive faculty (so far as this decision rests not on any agreement\nwith concepts but on feeling). On the other hand, the Judgement\nteleologically employed furnishes conditions determinately under which\nsomething (_e.g._ an organised body) is to be judged according to\nthe Idea of a purpose of nature; but it can adduce no fundamental\nproposition from the concept of nature as an object of experience\nauthorising it to ascribe to nature _a priori_ a reference to purposes,\nor even indeterminately to assume this of such products in actual\nexperience. The reason of this is that we must have many particular\nexperiences, and consider them under the unity of their principle, in\norder to be able to cognise, even empirically, objective purposiveness\nin a certain object.--The aesthetical Judgement is therefore a special\nfaculty for judging of things according to a rule, but not according\nto concepts. The teleological Judgement is not a special faculty, but\nonly the reflective Judgement in general, so far as it proceeds, as it\nalways does in theoretical cognition, according to concepts; but in\nrespect of certain objects of nature according to special principles,\nviz., of a merely reflective Judgement, and not of a Judgement that\ndetermines Objects. Thus as regards its application it belongs to\nthe theoretical part of Philosophy; and on account of its special\nprinciples which are not determinant, as they must be in Doctrine, it\nmust constitute a special part of the Critique. On the other hand, the\naesthetical Judgement contributes nothing towards the knowledge of\nits objects, and thus must be reckoned as belonging to the criticism\nof the judging subject and its cognitive faculties, _only_ so far as\nthey are susceptible of _a priori_ principles, of whatever other use\n(theoretical or practical) they may be. This is the propaedeutic of all\nPhilosophy.\n\n\nIX. OF THE CONNEXION OF THE LEGISLATION OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THAT OF\nREASON BY MEANS OF THE JUDGEMENT\n\nThe Understanding legislates _a priori_ for nature as an Object of\nsense--for a theoretical knowledge of it in a possible experience.\nReason legislates _a priori_ for freedom and its peculiar casuality;\nas the supersensible in the subject, for an unconditioned practical\nknowledge. The realm of the natural concept under the one legislation\nand that of the concept of freedom under the other are entirely removed\nfrom all mutual influence which they might have on one another (each\naccording to its fundamental laws) by the great gulf that separates\nthe supersensible from phenomena. The concept of freedom determines\nnothing in respect of the theoretical cognition of nature; and the\nnatural concept determines nothing in respect of the practical laws of\nfreedom. So far then it is not possible to throw a bridge from the one\nrealm to the other. But although the determining grounds of causality\naccording to the concept of freedom (and the practical rules which it\ncontains) are not resident in nature, and the sensible cannot determine\nthe supersensible in the subject, yet this is possible conversely (not,\nto be sure, in respect of the cognition of nature, but as regards\nthe effects of the supersensible upon the sensible). This in fact is\ninvolved in the concept of a causality through freedom, the _effect_\nof which is to take place in the world according to its formal laws.\nThe word _cause_, of course, when used of the supersensible only\nsignifies the _ground_ which determines the causality of natural\nthings to an effect in accordance with their proper natural laws,\nalthough harmoniously with the formal principle of the laws of\nReason. Although the possibility of this cannot be comprehended, yet\nthe objection of a contradiction alleged to be found in it can be\nsufficiently answered.[10]--The effect in accordance with the concept\nof freedom is the final purpose which (or its phenomenon in the world\nof sense) ought to exist; and the condition of the possibility of this\nis presupposed in nature (in the nature of the subject as a sensible\nbeing, that is, as man). The Judgement presupposes this _a priori_ and\nwithout reference to the practical; and thus furnishes the mediating\nconcept between the concepts of nature and that of freedom. It makes\npossible the transition from the conformity to law in accordance with\nthe former to the final purpose in accordance with the latter, and this\nby the concept of a _purposiveness_ of nature. For thus is cognised\nthe possibility of the final purpose which alone can be actualised in\nnature in harmony with its laws.\n\nThe Understanding by the possibility of its _a priori_ laws for\nnature, gives a proof that nature is only cognised by us as phenomenon;\nand implies at the same time that it has a supersensible substrate,\nthough it leaves this quite _undetermined_. The Judgement by its _a\npriori_ principle for the judging of nature according to its possible\nparticular laws, makes the supersensible substrate (both in us and\nwithout us) _determinable by means of the intellectual faculty_. But\nthe Reason by its practical _a priori_ law _determines_ it; and thus\nthe Judgement makes possible the transition from the realm of the\nconcept of nature to that of the concept of freedom.\n\nAs regards the faculties of the soul in general, in their higher\naspect, as containing an autonomy; the Understanding is that which\ncontains the _constitutive_ principles _a priori_ for the _cognitive\nfaculty_ (the theoretical cognition of nature). For the _feeling of\npleasure and pain_ there is the Judgement, independently of concepts\nand sensations which relate to the determination of the faculty of\ndesire and can thus be immediately practical. For the _faculty of\ndesire_ there is the Reason which is practical without the mediation\nof any pleasure whatever. It determines for the faculty of desire,\nas a superior faculty, the final purpose which carries with it the\npure intellectual satisfaction in the Object.--The concept formed by\nJudgement of a purposiveness of nature belongs to natural concepts,\nbut only as a regulative principle of the cognitive faculty; although\nthe aesthetical judgement upon certain objects (of Nature or Art)\nwhich occasions it is, in respect of the feeling of pleasure or pain,\na constitutive principle. The spontaneity in the play of the cognitive\nfaculties, the harmony of which contains the ground of this pleasure,\nmakes the above concept [of the purposiveness of nature] fit to be the\nmediating link between the realm of the natural concept and that of the\nconcept of freedom in its effects; whilst at the same time it promotes\nthe sensibility of the mind for moral feeling.--The following table may\nfacilitate the review of all the higher faculties according to their\nsystematic unity.[11]\n\n _All the faculties of the mind_\n Cognitive faculties. Faculties of desire.\n Feeling of pleasure and pain.\n\n _Cognitive faculties_\n Understanding. Judgement. Reason.\n\n _A priori principles_\n Conformity to law. Purposiveness. Final purpose.\n\n _Application to_\n Nature. Art. Freedom.\n\n\n\n\nTHE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT\n\nPART I\n\nCRITIQUE OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENT\n\n\n\n\nFIRST DIVISION\n\nANALYTIC OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENT\n\n\n\n\nFIRST BOOK\n\nANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL\n\n\n\n\nFIRST MOMENT\n\nOF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE[12] ACCORDING TO QUALITY\n\n\n\u00a7 1. _The judgement of taste is aesthetical_\n\nIn order to decide whether anything is beautiful or not, we refer the\nrepresentation, not by the Understanding to the Object for cognition\nbut, by the Imagination (perhaps in conjunction with the Understanding)\nto the subject, and its feeling of pleasure or pain. The judgement of\ntaste is therefore not a judgement of cognition, and is consequently\nnot logical but aesthetical, by which we understand that whose\ndetermining ground can be _no other than subjective_. Every reference\nof representations, even that of sensations, may be objective (and\nthen it signifies the real in an empirical representation); save only\nthe reference to the feeling of pleasure and pain, by which nothing in\nthe Object is signified, but through which there is a feeling in the\nsubject, as it is affected by the representation.\n\nTo apprehend a regular, purposive building by means of one\u2019s\ncognitive faculty (whether in a clear or a confused way of\nrepresentation) is something quite different from being conscious of\nthis representation as connected with the sensation of satisfaction.\nHere the representation is altogether referred to the subject and\nto its feeling of life, under the name of the feeling of pleasure\nor pain. This establishes a quite separate faculty of distinction\nand of judgement, adding nothing to cognition, but only comparing\nthe given representation in the subject with the whole faculty of\nrepresentations, of which the mind is conscious in the feeling of\nits state. Given representations in a judgement can be empirical\n(consequently, aesthetical); but the judgement which is formed by means\nof them is logical, provided they are referred in the judgement to the\nObject. Conversely, if the given representations are rational, but are\nreferred in a judgement simply to the subject (to its feeling), the\njudgement is so far always aesthetical.\n\n\n\u00a7 2. _The satisfaction which determines the judgement of taste is\ndisinterested_\n\nThe satisfaction which we combine with the representation of the\nexistence of an object is called interest. Such satisfaction always\nhas reference to the faculty of desire, either as its determining\nground or as necessarily connected with its determining ground. Now\nwhen the question is if a thing is beautiful, we do not want to know\nwhether anything depends or can depend on the existence of the thing\neither for myself or for any one else, but how we judge it by mere\nobservation (intuition or reflection). If any one asks me if I find\nthat palace beautiful which I see before me, I may answer: I do not\nlike things of that kind which are made merely to be stared at. Or I\ncan answer like that Iroquois _sachem_ who was pleased in Paris by\nnothing more than by the cook-shops. Or again after the manner of\n_Rousseau_ I may rebuke the vanity of the great who waste the sweat of\nthe people on such superfluous things. In fine I could easily convince\nmyself that if I found myself on an uninhabited island without the\nhope of ever again coming among men, and could conjure up just such\na splendid building by my mere wish, I should not even give myself\nthe trouble if I had a sufficiently comfortable hut. This may all be\nadmitted and approved; but we are not now talking of this. We wish\nonly to know if this mere representation of the object is accompanied\nin me with satisfaction, however indifferent I may be as regards the\nexistence of the object of this representation. We easily see that\nin saying it is _beautiful_ and in showing that I have taste, I am\nconcerned, not with that in which I depend on the existence of the\nobject, but with that which I make out of this representation in\nmyself. Every one must admit that a judgement about beauty, in which\nthe least interest mingles, is very partial and is not a pure judgement\nof taste. We must not be in the least prejudiced in favour of the\nexistence of the things, but be quite indifferent in this respect, in\norder to play the judge in things of taste.\n\nWe cannot, however, better elucidate this proposition, which is of\ncapital importance, than by contrasting the pure disinterested[13]\nsatisfaction in judgements of taste, with that which is bound up with\nan interest, especially if we can at the same time be certain that\nthere are no other kinds of interest than those which are now to be\nspecified.\n\n\n\u00a7 3. _The satisfaction in the_ PLEASANT _is bound up with interest_\n\n_That which pleases the senses in sensation is_ PLEASANT. Here the\nopportunity presents itself of censuring a very common confusion of\nthe double sense which the word sensation can have, and of calling\nattention to it. All satisfaction (it is said or thought) is itself\nsensation (of a pleasure). Consequently everything that pleases is\npleasant because it pleases (and according to its different degrees\nor its relations to other pleasant sensations it is _agreeable_,\n_lovely_, _delightful_, _enjoyable_, etc.). But if this be admitted,\nthen impressions of Sense which determine the inclination, fundamental\npropositions of Reason which determine the Will, mere reflective forms\nof intuition which determine the Judgement, are quite the same, as\nregards the effect upon the feeling of pleasure. For this would be\npleasantness in the sensation of one\u2019s state, and since in the end all\nthe operations of our faculties must issue in the practical and unite\nin it as their goal, we could suppose no other way of estimating things\nand their worth than that which consists in the gratification that\nthey promise. It is of no consequence at all how this is attained, and\nsince then the choice of means alone could make a difference, men could\nindeed blame one another for stupidity and indiscretion, but never for\nbaseness and wickedness. For all, each according to his own way of\nseeing things, seek one goal, that is, gratification.\n\nIf a determination of the feeling of pleasure or pain is called\nsensation, this expression signifies something quite different from\nwhat I mean when I call the representation of a thing (by sense, as a\nreceptivity belonging to the cognitive faculty) sensation. For in the\nlatter case the representation is referred to the Object, in the former\nsimply to the subject, and is available for no cognition whatever, not\neven for that by which the subject _cognises_ itself.\n\nIn the above elucidation we understand by the word sensation,\nan objective representation of sense; and in order to avoid\nmisinterpretation, we shall call that, which must always remain merely\nsubjective and can constitute absolutely no representation of an\nobject, by the ordinary term \u201cfeeling.\u201d The green colour of the meadows\nbelongs to _objective_ sensation, as a perception of an object of\nsense; the pleasantness of this belongs to _subjective_ sensation by\nwhich no object is represented, _i.e._ to feeling, by which the object\nis considered as an Object of satisfaction (which does not furnish a\ncognition of it).\n\nNow that a judgement about an object, by which I describe it as\npleasant, expresses an interest in it, is plain from the fact that by\nsensation it excites a desire for objects of that kind; consequently\nthe satisfaction presupposes not the mere judgement about it, but the\nrelation of its existence to my state, so far as this is affected\nby such an Object. Hence we do not merely say of the pleasant, _it\npleases_; but, _it gratifies_. I give to it no mere approval, but\ninclination is aroused by it; and in the case of what is pleasant\nin the most lively fashion, there is no judgement at all upon the\ncharacter of the Object, for those who always lay themselves out only\nfor enjoyment (for that is the word describing intense gratification)\nwould fain dispense with all judgement.\n\n\n\u00a7 4. _The satisfaction in the_ GOOD _is bound up with interest_\n\nWhatever by means of Reason pleases through the mere concept is GOOD.\nThat which pleases only as a means we call _good for something_ (the\nuseful); but that which pleases for itself is _good in itself_. In both\nthere is always involved the concept of a purpose, and consequently\nthe relation of Reason to the (at least possible) volition, and thus a\nsatisfaction in the _presence_ of an Object or an action, _i.e._ some\nkind of interest.\n\nIn order to find anything good, I must always know what sort of a\nthing the object ought to be, _i.e._ I must have a concept of it. But\nthere is no need of this, to find a thing beautiful. Flowers, free\ndelineations, outlines intertwined with one another without design\nand called foliage, have no meaning, depend on no definite concept,\nand yet they please. The satisfaction in the beautiful must depend\non the reflection upon an object, leading to any concept (however\nindefinite); and it is thus distinguished from the pleasant which rests\nentirely upon sensation.\n\nIt is true, the Pleasant seems in many cases to be the same as the\nGood. Thus people are accustomed to say that all gratification\n(especially if it lasts) is good in itself; which is very much the\nsame as to say that lasting pleasure and the good are the same. But\nwe can soon see that this is merely a confusion of words; for the\nconcepts which properly belong to these expressions can in no way be\ninterchanged. The pleasant, which, as such, represents the object\nsimply in relation to Sense, must first be brought by the concept of\na purpose under principles of Reason, in order to call it good, as an\nobject of the Will. But that there is [involved] a quite different\nrelation to satisfaction in calling that which gratifies at the same\ntime _good_, may be seen from the fact that in the case of the good the\nquestion always is, whether it is mediately or immediately good (useful\nor good in itself); but on the contrary in the case of the pleasant\nthere can be no question about this at all, for the word always\nsignifies something which pleases immediately. (The same is applicable\nto what I call beautiful.)\n\nEven in common speech men distinguish the Pleasant from the Good.\nOf a dish which stimulates the taste by spices and other condiments\nwe say unhesitatingly that it is pleasant, though it is at the same\ntime admitted not to be good; for though it immediately _delights_\nthe senses, yet mediately, _i.e._ considered by Reason which looks to\nthe after results, it displeases. Even in the judging of health we\nmay notice this distinction. It is immediately pleasant to every one\npossessing it (at least negatively, _i.e._ as the absence of all bodily\npains). But in order to say that it is good, it must be considered\nby Reason with reference to purposes; viz. that it is a state which\nmakes us fit for all our business. Finally in respect of happiness\nevery one believes himself entitled to describe the greatest sum of\nthe pleasantnesses of life (as regards both their number and their\nduration) as a true, even as the highest, good. However Reason is\nopposed to this. Pleasantness is enjoyment. And if we were concerned\nwith this alone, it would be foolish to be scrupulous as regards the\nmeans which procure it for us, or [to care] whether it is obtained\npassively by the bounty of nature or by our own activity and work.\nBut Reason can never be persuaded that the existence of a man who\nmerely lives for _enjoyment_ (however busy he may be in this point of\nview), has a worth in itself; even if he at the same time is conducive\nas a means to the best enjoyment of others, and shares in all their\ngratifications by sympathy. Only what he does, without reference to\nenjoyment, in full freedom and independently of what nature can procure\nfor him passively, gives an [absolute[14]] worth to his being, as the\nexistence of a person; and happiness, with the whole abundance of its\npleasures, is far from being an unconditioned good.[15]\n\nHowever, notwithstanding all this difference between the pleasant and\nthe good, they both agree in this that they are always bound up with an\ninterest in their object. [This is true] not only of the pleasant(\u00a7 3),\nand the mediate good (the useful) which is pleasing as a means towards\npleasantness somewhere, but also of that which is good absolutely and\nin every aspect, viz. moral good, which brings with it the highest\ninterest. For the good is the Object of will (_i.e._ of a faculty of\ndesire determined by Reason). But to will something, and to have a\nsatisfaction in its existence, _i.e._ to take an interest in it, are\nidentical.\n\n\n\u00a7 5. _Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of\nsatisfaction_\n\nThe pleasant and the good have both a reference to the faculty\nof desire; and they bring with them--the former a satisfaction\npathologically conditioned (by impulses, _stimuli_)--the latter a\npure practical satisfaction, which is determined not merely by the\nrepresentation of the object, but also by the represented connexion\nof the subject with the existence of the object. [It is not merely\nthe object that pleases, but also its existence.[16]] On the other\nhand, the judgement of taste is merely _contemplative_; _i.e._ it is\na judgement which, indifferent as regards the being of an object,\ncompares its character with the feeling of pleasure and pain. But this\ncontemplation itself is not directed to concepts; for the judgement of\ntaste is not a cognitive judgement (either theoretical or practical),\nand thus is not _based_ on concepts, nor has it concepts as its\n_purpose_.\n\nThe Pleasant, the Beautiful, and the Good, designate then, three\ndifferent relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and\npain, in reference to which we distinguish from each other objects or\nmethods of representing them. And the expressions corresponding to\neach, by which we mark our complacency in them, are not the same. That\nwhich GRATIFIES a man is called _pleasant_; that which merely PLEASES\nhim is _beautiful_; that which is ESTEEMED [or _approved_[17]] by\nhim, _i.e._ that to which he accords an objective worth, is _good_.\nPleasantness concerns irrational animals also; but Beauty only\nconcerns men, _i.e._ animal, but still rational, beings--not merely\n_qu\u00e2_ rational (_e.g._ spirits), but _qu\u00e2_ animal also; and the Good\nconcerns every rational being in general. This is a proposition which\ncan only be completely established and explained in the sequel. We may\nsay that of all these three kinds of satisfaction, that of taste in\nthe Beautiful is alone a disinterested and _free_ satisfaction; for no\ninterest, either of Sense or of Reason, here forces our assent. Hence\nwe may say of satisfaction that it is related in the three aforesaid\ncases to _inclination_, to _favour_, or to _respect_. Now _favour_ is\nthe only free satisfaction. An object of inclination, and one that\nis proposed to our desire by a law of Reason, leave us no freedom in\nforming for ourselves anywhere an object of pleasure. All interest\npresupposes or generates a want; and, as the determining ground of\nassent, it leaves the judgement about the object no longer free.\n\nAs regards the interest of inclination in the case of the Pleasant,\nevery one says that hunger is the best sauce, and everything that is\neatable is relished by people with a healthy appetite; and thus a\nsatisfaction of this sort does not indicate choice directed by taste.\nIt is only when the want is appeased that we can distinguish which of\nmany men has or has not taste. In the same way there may be manners\n(conduct) without virtue, politeness without goodwill, decorum without\nmodesty, etc. For where the moral law speaks there is no longer,\nobjectively, a free choice as regards what is to be done; and to\ndisplay taste in its fulfilment (or in judging of another\u2019s fulfilment\nof it) is something quite different from manifesting the moral attitude\nof thought. For this involves a command and generates a want, whilst\nmoral taste only plays with the objects of satisfaction, without\nattaching itself to one of them.\n\n\nEXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL RESULTING FROM THE FIRST MOMENT\n\n_Taste_ is the faculty of judging of an object or a method of\nrepresenting it by an _entirely disinterested_ satisfaction\nor dissatisfaction. The object of such satisfaction is called\n_beautiful_.[18]\n\n\n\n\nSECOND MOMENT\n\nOF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE, VIZ. ACCORDING TO QUANTITY\n\n\n\u00a7 6. _The beautiful is that which apart from concepts is represented as\nthe object of a universal satisfaction_\n\nThis explanation of the beautiful can be derived from the preceding\nexplanation of it as the object of an entirely disinterested\nsatisfaction. For the fact of which every one is conscious, that the\nsatisfaction is for him quite disinterested, implies in his judgement a\nground of satisfaction for every one. For since it does not rest on any\ninclination of the subject (nor upon any other premeditated interest),\nbut since he who judges feels himself quite _free_ as regards the\nsatisfaction which he attaches to the object, he cannot find the ground\nof this satisfaction in any private conditions connected with his own\nsubject; and hence it must be regarded as grounded on what he can\npresuppose in every other man. Consequently he must believe that he has\nreason for attributing a similar satisfaction to every one. He will\ntherefore speak of the beautiful, as if beauty were a characteristic\nof the object and the judgement logical (constituting a cognition of\nthe Object by means of concepts of it); although it is only aesthetical\nand involves merely a reference of the representation of the object to\nthe subject. For it has this similarity to a logical judgement that we\ncan presuppose its validity for every one. But this universality cannot\narise from concepts; for from concepts there is no transition to the\nfeeling of pleasure or pain (except in pure practical laws, which bring\nan interest with them such as is not bound up with the pure judgement\nof taste). Consequently the judgement of taste, accompanied with the\nconsciousness of separation from all interest, must claim validity for\nevery one, without this universality depending on Objects. That is,\nthere must be bound up with it a title to subjective universality.\n\n\n\u00a7 7. _Comparison of the Beautiful with the Pleasant and the Good by\nmeans of the above characteristic_\n\nAs regards the Pleasant every one is content that his judgement, which\nhe bases upon private feeling, and by which he says of an object that\nit pleases him, should be limited merely to his own person. Thus he\nis quite contented that if he says \u201cCanary wine is pleasant,\u201d another\nman may correct his expression and remind him that he ought to say \u201cIt\nis pleasant _to me_.\u201d And this is the case not only as regards the\ntaste of the tongue, the palate, and the throat, but for whatever is\npleasant to any one\u2019s eyes and ears. To one violet colour is soft and\nlovely, to another it is faded and dead. One man likes the tone of wind\ninstruments, another that of strings. To strive here with the design of\nreproving as incorrect another man\u2019s judgement which is different from\nour own, as if the judgements were logically opposed, would be folly.\nAs regards the pleasant therefore the fundamental proposition is valid,\n_every one has his own taste_ (the taste of Sense).\n\nThe case is quite different with the Beautiful. It would (on the\ncontrary) be laughable if a man who imagined anything to his own taste,\nthought to justify himself by saying: \u201cThis object (the house we see,\nthe coat that person wears, the concert we hear, the poem submitted\nto our judgement) is beautiful _for me_.\u201d For he must not call it\n_beautiful_ if it merely pleases himself. Many things may have for\nhim charm and pleasantness; no one troubles himself at that; but if\nhe gives out anything as beautiful, he supposes in others the same\nsatisfaction--he judges not merely for himself, but for every one,\nand speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things. Hence he says\n\u201cthe _thing_ is beautiful\u201d; and he does not count on the agreement of\nothers with this his judgement of satisfaction, because he has found\nthis agreement several times before, but he _demands_ it of them. He\nblames them if they judge otherwise and he denies them taste, which he\nnevertheless requires from them. Here then we cannot say that each man\nhas his own particular taste. For this would be as much as to say that\nthere is no taste whatever; _i.e._ no aesthetical judgement, which can\nmake a rightful claim upon every one\u2019s assent.\n\nAt the same time we find as regards the Pleasant that there is an\nagreement among men in their judgements upon it, in regard to which\nwe deny Taste to some and attribute it to others; by this not meaning\none of our organic senses, but a faculty of judging in respect of the\npleasant generally. Thus we say of a man who knows how to entertain\nhis guests with pleasures (of enjoyment for all the senses), so that\nthey are all pleased, \u201che has taste.\u201d But here the universality is only\ntaken comparatively; and there emerge rules which are only _general_\n(like all empirical ones), and not _universal_; which latter the\njudgement of Taste upon the beautiful undertakes or lays claim to. It\nis a judgement in reference to sociability, so far as this rests on\nempirical rules. In respect of the Good it is true that judgements make\nrightful claim to validity for every one; but the Good is represented\nonly _by means of a concept_ as the Object of a universal satisfaction,\nwhich is the case neither with the Pleasant nor with the Beautiful.\n\n\n\u00a7 8. _The universality of the satisfaction is represented in a\njudgement of Taste only as subjective_\n\nThis particular determination of the universality of an aesthetical\njudgement, which is to be met with in a judgement of taste, is\nnoteworthy, not indeed for the logician, but for the transcendental\nphilosopher. It requires no small trouble to discover its origin, but\nwe thus detect a property of our cognitive faculty which without this\nanalysis would remain unknown.\n\nFirst, we must be fully convinced of the fact that in a judgement\nof taste (about the Beautiful) the satisfaction in the object is\nimputed to _every one_, without being based on a concept (for then\nit would be the Good). Further, this claim to universal validity so\nessentially belongs to a judgement by which we describe anything as\n_beautiful_, that if this were not thought in it, it would never come\ninto our thoughts to use the expression at all, but everything which\npleases without a concept would be counted as pleasant. In respect\nof the latter every one has his own opinion; and no one assumes, in\nanother, agreement with his judgement of taste, which is always the\ncase in a judgement of taste about beauty. I may call the first the\ntaste of Sense, the second the taste of Reflection; so far as the\nfirst lays down mere private judgements, and the second judgements\nsupposed to be generally valid (public), but in both cases aesthetical\n(not practical) judgements about an object merely in respect of the\nrelation of its representation to the feeling of pleasure and pain.\nNow here is something strange. As regards the taste of Sense not only\ndoes experience show that its judgement (of pleasure or pain connected\nwith anything) is not valid universally, but every one is content not\nto impute agreement with it to others (although actually there is\noften found a very extended concurrence in these judgements). On the\nother hand, the taste of Reflection has its claim to the universal\nvalidity of its judgements (about the beautiful) rejected often\nenough, as experience teaches; although it may find it possible (as it\nactually does) to represent judgements which can demand this universal\nagreement. In fact for each of its judgements of taste it imputes\nthis to every one, without the persons that judge disputing as to the\npossibility of such a claim; although in particular cases they cannot\nagree as to the correct application of this faculty.\n\nHere we must, in the first place, remark that a universality which\ndoes not rest on concepts of Objects (not even on empirical ones) is\nnot logical but aesthetical, _i.e._ it involves no objective quantity\nof the judgement but only that which is subjective. For this I use\nthe expression _general validity_ which signifies the validity of the\nreference of a representation, not to the cognitive faculty but, to the\nfeeling of pleasure and pain for every subject. (We can avail ourselves\nalso of the same expression for the logical quantity of the judgement,\nif only we prefix _objective_ to \u201cuniversal validity,\u201d to distinguish\nit from that which is merely subjective and aesthetical.)\n\nA judgement with _objective universal validity_ is also always valid\nsubjectively; _i.e._ if the judgement holds for everything contained\nunder a given concept, it holds also for every one who represents an\nobject by means of this concept. But from a _subjective universal\nvalidity_, _i.e._ aesthetical and resting on no concept, we cannot\ninfer that which is logical; because that kind of judgement does not\nextend to the Object. Hence the aesthetical universality which is\nascribed to a judgement must be of a particular kind, because it does\nnot unite the predicate of beauty with the concept of the _Object_,\nconsidered in its whole logical sphere, and yet extends it to the whole\nsphere of judging persons.\n\nIn respect of logical quantity all judgements of taste are _singular_\njudgements. For because I must refer the object immediately to my\nfeeling of pleasure and pain, and that not by means of concepts, they\ncannot have the quantity of objective generally valid judgements.\nNevertheless if the singular representation of the Object of the\njudgement of taste in accordance with the conditions determining the\nlatter, were transformed by comparison into a concept, a logically\nuniversal judgement could result therefrom. _E.g._ I describe by\na judgement of taste the rose, that I see, as beautiful. But the\njudgement which results from the comparison of several singular\njudgements, \u201cRoses in general are beautiful\u201d is no longer described\nsimply as aesthetical, but as a logical judgement based on an\naesthetical one. Again the judgement \u201cThe rose is pleasant\u201d (to smell)\nis, although aesthetical and singular, not a judgement of Taste but\nof Sense. It is distinguished from the former by the fact that the\njudgement of Taste carries with it an _aesthetical quantity_ of\nuniversality, _i.e._ of validity for every one; which cannot be found\nin a judgement about the Pleasant. It is only judgements about the Good\nwhich--although they also determine satisfaction in an object,--have\nlogical and not merely aesthetical universality; for they are valid of\nthe Object, as cognitive of it, and thus are valid for every one.\n\nIf we judge Objects merely according to concepts, then all\nrepresentation of beauty is lost. Thus there can be no rule according\nto which any one is to be forced to recognise anything as beautiful.\nWe cannot press [upon others] by the aid of any reasons or fundamental\npropositions our judgement that a coat, a house, or a flower is\nbeautiful. We wish to submit the Object to our own eyes, as if the\nsatisfaction in it depended on sensation; and yet if we then call the\nobject beautiful, we believe that we speak with a universal voice, and\nwe claim the assent of every one, although on the contrary all private\nsensation can only decide for the observer himself and his satisfaction.\n\nWe may see now that in the judgement of taste nothing is postulated but\nsuch a _universal voice_, in respect of the satisfaction without the\nintervention of concepts; and thus the _possibility_ of an aesthetical\njudgement that can, at the same time, be regarded as valid for every\none. The judgement of taste itself does not _postulate_ the agreement\nof every one (for that can only be done by a logically universal\njudgement because it can adduce reasons); it only _imputes_ this\nagreement to every one, as a case of the rule in respect of which it\nexpects, not confirmation by concepts, but assent from others. The\nuniversal voice is, therefore, only an Idea (we do not yet inquire\nupon what it rests). It may be uncertain whether or not the man, who\nbelieves that he is laying down a judgement of taste, is, as a matter\nof fact, judging in conformity with that Idea; but that he refers his\njudgement thereto, and, consequently, that it is intended to be a\njudgement of taste, he announces by the expression \u201cbeauty.\u201d He can\nbe quite certain of this for himself by the mere consciousness of the\nseparation of everything belonging to the Pleasant and the Good from\nthe satisfaction which is left; and this is all for which he promises\nhimself the agreement of every one--a claim which would be justifiable\nunder these conditions, provided only he did not often make mistakes,\nand thus lay down an erroneous judgement of taste.\n\n\n\u00a7 9. _Investigation of the question whether in the judgement of taste\nthe feeling of pleasure precedes or follows the judging of the object_\n\nThe solution of this question is the key to the Critique of Taste, and\nso is worthy of all attention.\n\nIf the pleasure in the given object precedes, and it is only its\nuniversal communicability that is to be acknowledged in the judgement\nof taste about the representation of the object, there would be a\ncontradiction. For such pleasure would be nothing different from the\nmere pleasantness in the sensation, and so in accordance with its\nnature could have only private validity, because it is immediately\ndependent on the representation through which the object _is given_.\n\nHence, it is the universal capability of communication of the mental\nstate in the given representation which, as the subjective condition of\nthe judgement of taste, must be fundamental, and must have the pleasure\nin the object as its consequent. But nothing can be universally\ncommunicated except cognition and representation, so far as it belongs\nto cognition. For it is only thus that this latter can be objective;\nand only through this has it a universal point of reference, with\nwhich the representative power of every one is compelled to harmonise.\nIf the determining ground of our judgement as to this universal\ncommunicability of the representation is to be merely subjective,\n_i.e._ is conceived independently of any concept of the object, it can\nbe nothing else than the state of mind, which is to be met with in the\nrelation of our representative powers to each other, so far as they\nrefer a given representation to _cognition in general_.\n\nThe cognitive powers, which are involved by this representation,\nare here in free play, because no definite concept limits them to a\nparticular[19] rule of cognition. Hence, the state of mind in this\nrepresentation must be a feeling of the free play of the representative\npowers in a given representation with reference to a cognition in\ngeneral. Now a representation by which an object is given, that is\nto become a cognition in general, requires _Imagination_, for the\ngathering together the manifold of intuition, and _Understanding_, for\nthe unity of the concept uniting the representations. This state of\n_free play_ of the cognitive faculties in a representation by which an\nobject is given, must be universally communicable; because cognition,\nas the determination of the Object with which given representations\n(in whatever subject) are to agree, is the only kind of representation\nwhich is valid for every one.\n\nThe subjective universal communicability of the mode of representation\nin a judgement of taste, since it is to be possible without\npresupposing a definite concept, can refer to nothing else than the\nstate of mind in the free play of the Imagination and the Understanding\n(so far as they agree with each other, as is requisite for _cognition\nin general_). We are conscious that this subjective relation, suitable\nfor cognition in general, must be valid for every one, and thus must\nbe universally communicable, just as if it were a definite cognition,\nresting always on that relation as its subjective condition.\n\nThis merely subjective (aesthetical) judging of the object, or of the\nrepresentation by which it is given, precedes the pleasure in it,\nand is the ground of this pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive\nfaculties; but on the universality of the subjective conditions for\njudging of objects is alone based the universal subjective validity of\nthe satisfaction bound up by us with the representation of the object\nthat we call beautiful.\n\nThe power of communicating one\u2019s state of mind, even though only in\nrespect of the cognitive faculties, carries a pleasure with it, as we\ncan easily show from the natural propension of man towards sociability\n(empirical and psychological). But this is not enough for our design.\nThe pleasure that we feel is, in a judgement of taste, necessarily\nimputed by us to every one else; as if, when we call a thing beautiful,\nit is to be regarded as a characteristic of the object which is\ndetermined in it according to concepts; though beauty, without a\nreference to the feeling of the subject, is nothing by itself. But we\nmust reserve the examination of this question until we have answered\nanother, viz. \u201cIf and how aesthetical judgements are possible _a\npriori_?\u201d\n\nWe now occupy ourselves with the easier question, in what way we are\nconscious of a mutual subjective harmony of the cognitive powers\nwith one another in the judgement of taste; is it aesthetically by\nmere internal sense and sensation? or is it intellectually by the\nconsciousness of our designed activity, by which we bring them into\nplay?\n\nIf the given representation, which occasions the judgement of taste,\nwere a concept uniting Understanding and Imagination in the judging\nof the object, into a cognition of the Object, the consciousness of\nthis relation would be intellectual (as in the objective schematism\nof the Judgement of which the Critique[20] treats). But then the\njudgement would not be laid down in reference to pleasure and pain, and\nconsequently would not be a judgement of taste. But the judgement of\ntaste, independently of concepts, determines the Object in respect of\nsatisfaction and of the predicate of beauty. Therefore that subjective\nunity of relation can only make itself known by means of sensation.\nThe excitement of both faculties (Imagination and Understanding) to\nindeterminate, but yet, through the stimulus of the given sensation,\nharmonious activity, viz. that which belongs to cognition in general,\nis the sensation whose universal communicability is postulated by the\njudgement of taste. An objective relation can only be thought, but\nyet, so far as it is subjective according to its conditions, can be\nfelt in its effect on the mind; and, of a relation based on no concept\n(like the relation of the representative powers to a cognitive faculty\nin general), no other consciousness is possible than that through the\nsensation of the effect, which consists in the more lively play of both\nmental powers (the Imagination and the Understanding) when animated by\nmutual agreement. A representation which, as singular and apart from\ncomparison with others, yet has an agreement with the conditions of\nuniversality which it is the business of the Understanding to supply,\nbrings the cognitive faculties into that proportionate accord which\nwe require for all cognition, and so regard as holding for every one\nwho is determined to judge by means of Understanding and Sense in\ncombination (_i.e._ for every man).\n\n\nEXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL RESULTING FROM THE SECOND MOMENT\n\nThe _beautiful_ is that which pleases universally, without a concept.\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD MOMENT\n\nOF JUDGEMENTS OF TASTE, ACCORDING TO THE RELATION OF THE PURPOSES WHICH\nARE BROUGHT INTO CONSIDERATION THEREIN.\n\n\n\u00a7 10. _Of purposiveness in general_\n\nIf we wish to explain what a purpose is according to its transcendental\ndeterminations (without presupposing anything empirical like the\nfeeling of pleasure) [we say that] the purpose is the object of a\nconcept, in so far as the concept is regarded as the cause of the\nobject (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a\n_concept_ in respect of its _Object_ is its purposiveness (_forma\nfinalis_). Where then not merely the cognition of an object, but the\nobject itself (its form and existence) is thought as an effect only\npossible by means of the concept of this latter, there we think a\npurpose. The representation of the effect is here the determining\nground of its cause and precedes it. The consciousness of the causality\nof a representation, for _maintaining_ the subject in the same state,\nmay here generally denote what we call pleasure; while on the other\nhand pain is that representation which contains the ground of the\ndetermination of the state of representations into their opposite [of\nrestraining or removing them[21]].\n\nThe faculty of desire, so far as it is determinable only through\nconcepts, _i.e._ to act in conformity with the representation of a\npurpose, would be the Will. But an Object, or a state of mind, or even\nan action, is called purposive, although its possibility does not\nnecessarily presuppose the representation of a purpose, merely because\nits possibility can be explained and conceived by us only so far as we\nassume for its ground a causality according to purposes, _i.e._ a will\nwhich would have so disposed it according to the representation of a\ncertain rule. There can be, then, purposiveness without[22] purpose,\nso far as we do not place the causes of this form in a will, but yet\ncan only make the explanation of its possibility intelligible to\nourselves by deriving it from a will. Again, we are not always forced\nto regard what we observe (in respect of its possibility) from the\npoint of view of Reason. Thus we can at least observe a purposiveness\naccording to form, without basing it on a purpose (as the material of\nthe _nexus finalis_), and we can notice it in objects, although only\nby reflection.\n\n\n\u00a7 11. _The judgement of taste has nothing at its basis but the_ form of\nthe purposiveness _of an object (or of its mode of representation)_\n\nEvery purpose, if it be regarded as a ground of satisfaction, always\ncarries with it an interest--as the determining ground of the\njudgement--about the object of pleasure. Therefore no subjective\npurpose can lie at the basis of the judgement of taste. But neither\ncan the judgement of taste be determined by any representation of an\nobjective purpose, _i.e._ of the possibility of the object itself in\naccordance with principles of purposive combination, and consequently\nit can be determined by no concept of the good; because it is an\naesthetical and not a cognitive judgement. It therefore has to do with\nno _concept_ of the character and internal or external possibility of\nthe object by means of this or that cause, but merely with the relation\nof the representative powers to one another, so far as they are\ndetermined by a representation.\n\nNow this relation in the determination of an object as beautiful\nis bound up with the feeling of pleasure, which is declared by the\njudgement of taste to be valid for every one; hence a pleasantness,\naccompanying the representation, can as little contain the determining\nground [of the judgement] as the representation of the perfection of\nthe object and the concept of the good can. Therefore it can be nothing\nelse than the subjective purposiveness in the representation of an\nobject without any purpose (either objective or subjective); and thus\nit is the mere form of purposiveness in the representation by which\nan object is _given_ to us, so far as we are conscious of it, which\nconstitutes the satisfaction that we without a concept judge to be\nuniversally communicable; and, consequently, this is the determining\nground of the judgement of taste.\n\n\n\u00a7 12. _The judgement of taste rests on_ a priori _grounds_\n\nTo establish _a priori_ the connexion of the feeling of a pleasure\nor pain as an effect, with any representation whatever (sensation or\nconcept) as its cause, is absolutely impossible; for that would be a\n[particular][23] causal relation which (with objects of experience)\ncan always only be cognised _a posteriori_, and through the medium\nof experience itself. We actually have, indeed, in the Critique of\npractical Reason, derived from universal moral concepts _a priori_ the\nfeeling of respect (as a special and peculiar modification of feeling\nwhich will not strictly correspond either to the pleasure or the pain\nthat we get from empirical objects). But there we could go beyond\nthe bounds of experience and call in a causality which rested on a\nsupersensible attribute of the subject, viz. freedom. And even there,\nproperly speaking, it was not this _feeling_ which we derived from the\nIdea of the moral as cause, but merely the determination of the will.\nBut the state of mind which accompanies any determination of the will\nis in itself a feeling of pleasure and identical with it, and therefore\ndoes not follow from it as its effect. This last must only be assumed\nif the concept of the moral as a good precede the determination of the\nwill by the law; for in that case the pleasure that is bound up with\nthe concept could not be derived from it as from a mere cognition.\n\nNow the case is similar with the pleasure in aesthetical judgements,\nonly that here it is merely contemplative and does not bring about\nan interest in the Object, which on the other hand in the moral\njudgement it is practical.[24] The consciousness of the mere formal\npurposiveness in the play of the subject\u2019s cognitive powers, in a\nrepresentation through which an object is given, is the pleasure\nitself; because it contains a determining ground of the activity of\nthe subject in respect of the excitement of its cognitive powers,\nand therefore an inner causality (which is purposive) in respect of\ncognition in general without however being limited to any definite\ncognition; and consequently contains a mere form of the subjective\npurposiveness of a representation in an aesthetical judgement. This\npleasure is in no way practical, neither like that arising from the\npathological ground of pleasantness, nor that from the intellectual\nground of the represented good. But yet it involves causality, viz. of\n_maintaining_ the state of the representation itself, and the exercise\nof the cognitive powers without further design. We _linger_ over the\ncontemplation of the beautiful, because this contemplation strengthens\nand reproduces itself, which is analogous to (though not of the same\nkind as) that lingering which takes place when a [physical] charm in\nthe representation of the object repeatedly arouses the attention, the\nmind being passive.\n\n\n\u00a7 13. _The pure judgement of taste is independent of charm and emotion_\n\nEvery interest spoils the judgement of taste and takes from its\nimpartiality, especially if the purposiveness is not, as with the\ninterest of Reason, placed before the feeling of pleasure but grounded\non it. This last always happens in an aesthetical judgement upon\nanything so far as it gratifies or grieves us. Hence judgements so\naffected can lay no claim at all to a universally valid satisfaction,\nor at least so much the less claim, in proportion as there are\nsensations of this sort among the determining grounds of taste.\nThat taste is still barbaric which needs a mixture of _charms_ and\n_emotions_ in order that there may be satisfaction, and still more so\nif it make these the measure of its assent.\n\nNevertheless charms are often not only taken account of in the case\nof beauty (which properly speaking ought merely to be concerned with\nform) as contributory to the aesthetical universal satisfaction; but\nthey are passed off as in themselves beauties, and thus the matter of\nsatisfaction is substituted for the form. This misconception, however,\nlike so many others which have something true at their basis, may be\nremoved by a careful definition of these concepts.\n\nA judgement of taste on which charm and emotion have no influence\n(although they may be bound up with the satisfaction in the\nbeautiful),--which therefore has as its determining ground merely the\npurposiveness of the form,--is a _pure judgement of taste_.\n\n\n\u00a7 14. _Elucidation by means of examples_\n\nAesthetical judgements can be divided just like theoretical (logical)\njudgements into empirical and pure. The first assert pleasantness or\nunpleasantness; the second assert the beauty of an object or of the\nmanner of representing it. The former are judgements of Sense (material\naesthetical judgements); the latter [as formal[25]] are alone strictly\njudgements of Taste.\n\nA judgement of taste is therefore pure, only so far as no merely\nempirical satisfaction is mingled with its determining ground. But this\nalways happens if charm or emotion have any share in the judgement by\nwhich anything is to be described as beautiful.\n\nNow here many objections present themselves, which fallaciously put\nforward charm not merely as a necessary ingredient of beauty, but\nas alone sufficient [to justify] a thing\u2019s being called beautiful.\nA mere colour, _e.g._ the green of a grass plot, a mere tone (as\ndistinguished from sound and noise) like that of a violin, are by most\npeople described as beautiful in themselves; although both seem to\nhave at their basis merely the matter of representations, viz. simply\nsensation, and therefore only deserve to be called pleasant. But we\nmust at the same time remark that the sensations of colours and of tone\nhave a right to be regarded as beautiful only in so far as they are\n_pure_. This is a determination which concerns their form, and is the\nonly [element] of these representations which admits with certainty of\nuniversal communicability; for we cannot assume that the quality of\nsensations is the same in all subjects, and we can hardly say that the\npleasantness of one colour or the tone of one musical instrument is\njudged preferable to that of another in the same[26] way by every one.\n\nIf we assume with _Euler_ that colours are isochronous vibrations\n(_pulsus_) of the aether, as sounds are of the air in a state of\ndisturbance, and,--what is most important,--that the mind not only\nperceives by sense the effect of these in exciting the organ, but also\nperceives by reflection the regular play of impressions (and thus the\nform of the combination of different representations) which I still\ndo not doubt[27]--then colours and tone cannot be reckoned as mere\nsensations, but as the formal determination of the unity of a manifold\nof sensations, and thus as beauties in themselves.\n\nBut \u201cpure\u201d in a simple mode of sensation means that its uniformity is\ntroubled and interrupted by no foreign sensation, and it belongs merely\nto the form; because here we can abstract from the quality of that\nmode of sensation (abstract from the colours and tone, if any, which\nit represents). Hence all simple colours, so far as they are pure,\nare regarded as beautiful; composite colours have not this advantage,\nbecause, as they are not simple, we have no standard for judging\nwhether they should be called pure or not.\n\nBut as regards the beauty attributed to the object on account of its\nform, to suppose it to be capable of augmentation through the charm\nof the object is a common error, and one very prejudicial to genuine,\nuncorrupted, well-founded taste. We can doubtless add these charms to\nbeauty, in order to interest the mind by the representation of the\nobject, apart from the bare satisfaction [received]; and thus they may\nserve as a recommendation of taste and its cultivation, especially when\nit is yet crude and unexercised. But they actually do injury to the\njudgement of taste if they draw attention to themselves as the grounds\nfor judging of beauty. So far are they from adding to beauty that they\nmust only be admitted by indulgence as aliens; and provided always that\nthey do not disturb the beautiful form, in cases when taste is yet weak\nand untrained.\n\nIn painting, sculpture, and in all the formative arts--in architecture,\nand horticulture, so far as they are beautiful arts--the _delineation_\nis the essential thing; and here it is not what gratifies in sensation\nbut what pleases by means of its form that is fundamental for taste.\nThe colours which light up the sketch belong to the charm; they may\nindeed enliven[28] the object for sensation, but they cannot make it\nworthy of contemplation and beautiful. In most cases they are rather\nlimited by the requirements of the beautiful form; and even where charm\nis permissible it is ennobled solely by this.\n\nEvery form of the objects of sense (both of external sense and also\nmediately of internal) is either _figure_ or _play_. In the latter case\nit is either play of figures (in space, viz. pantomime and dancing), or\nthe mere play of sensations (in time). The _charm_ of colours or of the\npleasant tones of an instrument may be added; but the _delineation_\nin the first case and the composition in the second constitute the\nproper object of the pure judgement of taste. To say that the purity\nof colours and of tones, or their variety and contrast, seems to add\nto beauty, does not mean that they supply a homogeneous addition to\nour satisfaction in the form because they are pleasant in themselves;\nbut they do so, because they make the form more exactly, definitely,\nand completely, intuitible, and besides by their charm [excite the\nrepresentation, whilst they[29]] awaken and fix our attention on the\nobject itself.\n\nEven what we call _ornaments_ [parerga[29]], _i.e._ those things which\ndo not belong to the complete representation of the object internally\nas elements but only externally as complements, and which augment the\nsatisfaction of taste, do so only by their form; as for example [the\nframes of pictures,[29] or] the draperies of statues or the colonnades\nof palaces. But if the ornament does not itself consist in beautiful\nform, and if it is used as a golden frame is used, merely to recommend\nthe painting by its _charm_, it is then called _finery_ and injures\ngenuine beauty.\n\n_Emotion_, _i.e._ a sensation in which pleasantness is produced by\nmeans of a momentary checking and a consequent more powerful outflow of\nthe vital force, does not belong at all to beauty. But sublimity [with\nwhich the feeling of emotion is bound up[29]] requires a different\nstandard of judgement from that which is at the foundation of taste;\nand thus a pure judgement of taste has for its determining ground\nneither charm nor emotion, in a word, no sensation as the material of\nthe aesthetical judgement.\n\n\n\u00a7 15. _The judgement of taste is quite independent of the concept of\nperfection_\n\n_Objective_ purposiveness can only be cognised by means of the\nreference of the manifold to a definite purpose, and therefore only\nthrough a concept. From this alone it is plain that the Beautiful, the\njudging of which has at its basis a merely formal purposiveness, _i.e._\na purposiveness without purpose, is quite independent of the concept of\nthe Good; because the latter presupposes an objective purposiveness,\n_i.e._ the reference of the object to a definite purpose.\n\nObjective purposiveness is either external, _i.e._ the _utility_, or\ninternal, _i.e._ the _perfection_ of the object. That the satisfaction\nin an object, on account of which we call it beautiful, cannot rest on\nthe representation of its utility, is sufficiently obvious from the two\npreceding sections; because in that case it would not be an immediate\nsatisfaction in the object, which is the essential condition of a\njudgement about beauty. But objective internal purposiveness, _i.e._\nperfection, comes nearer to the predicate of beauty; and it has been\nregarded by celebrated philosophers[30] as the same as beauty, with the\nproviso, _if it is thought in a confused way_. It is of the greatest\nimportance in a Critique of Taste to decide whether beauty can thus\nactually be resolved into the concept of perfection.\n\nTo judge of objective purposiveness we always need not only the\nconcept of a purpose, but (if that purposiveness is not to be external\nutility but internal) the concept of an internal purpose which shall\ncontain the ground of the internal possibility of the object. Now\nas a purpose in general is that whose _concept_ can be regarded as\nthe ground of the possibility of the object itself; so, in order to\nrepresent objective purposiveness in a thing, the concept of _what sort\nof thing it is to be_ must come first. The agreement of the manifold\nin it with this concept (which furnishes the rule for combining the\nmanifold) is the _qualitative perfection_ of the thing. Quite different\nfrom this is _quantitative_ perfection, the completeness of a thing\nafter its kind, which is a mere concept of magnitude (of totality).[31]\nIn this _what the thing ought to be_ is conceived as already\ndetermined, and it is only asked if it has _all_ its requisites. The\nformal [element] in the representation of a thing, _i.e._ the agreement\nof the manifold with a unity (it being undetermined what this ought\nto be), gives to cognition no objective purposiveness whatever. For\nsince abstraction is made of this unity as _purpose_ (what the thing\nought to be), nothing remains but the subjective purposiveness of\nthe representations in the mind of the intuiting subject. And this,\nalthough it furnishes a certain purposiveness of the representative\nstate of the subject, and so a facility of apprehending a given form\nby the Imagination, yet furnishes no perfection of an Object, since\nthe Object is not here conceived by means of the concept of a purpose.\nFor example, if in a forest I come across a plot of sward, round which\ntrees stand in a circle, and do not then represent to myself a purpose,\nviz. that it is intended to serve for country dances, not the least\nconcept of perfection is furnished by the mere form. But to represent\nto oneself a formal _objective_ purposiveness without purpose, _i.e._\nthe mere form of a _perfection_ (without any matter and without\nthe _concept_ of that with which it is accordant, even if it were\nmerely the Idea of conformity to law in general[32]) is a veritable\ncontradiction.\n\nNow the judgement of taste is an aesthetical judgement, _i.e._ such\nas rests on subjective grounds, the determining ground of which\ncannot be a concept, and consequently cannot be the concept of a\ndefinite purpose. Therefore in beauty, regarded as a formal subjective\npurposiveness, there is in no way thought a perfection of the object,\nas a would-be formal purposiveness, which yet is objective. And thus to\ndistinguish between the concepts of the Beautiful and the Good, as if\nthey were only different in logical form, the first being a confused,\nthe second a clear concept of perfection, but identical in content and\norigin, is quite fallacious. For then there would be no _specific_\ndifference between them, but a judgement of taste would be as much a\ncognitive judgement as the judgement by which a thing is described as\ngood; just as when the ordinary man says that fraud is unjust he bases\nhis judgement on confused grounds, whilst the philosopher bases it\non clear grounds, but both on identical principles of Reason. I have\nalready, however, said that an aesthetical judgement is unique of its\nkind, and gives absolutely no cognition (not even a confused cognition)\nof the Object; this is only supplied by a logical judgement. On the\ncontrary, it simply refers the representation, by which an Object is\ngiven, to the subject; and brings to our notice no characteristic\nof the object, but only the purposive form in the determination of\nthe representative powers which are occupying themselves therewith.\nThe judgement is called aesthetical just because its determining\nground is not a concept, but the feeling (of internal sense) of that\nharmony in the play of the mental powers, so far as it can be felt in\nsensation. On the other hand, if we wish to call confused concepts and\nthe objective judgement based on them, aesthetical, we shall have an\nUnderstanding judging sensibly or a Sense representing its Objects by\nmeans of concepts [both of which are contradictory.[33]] The faculty\nof concepts, be they confused or clear, is the Understanding; and\nalthough Understanding has to do with the judgement of taste, as an\naesthetical judgement (as it has with all judgements), yet it has to\ndo with it not as a faculty by which an object is cognised, but as the\nfaculty which determines the judgement and its representation (without\nany concept) in accordance with its relation to the subject and the\nsubject\u2019s internal feeling, in so far as this judgement may be possible\nin accordance with a universal rule.\n\n\n\u00a7 16. _The judgement of taste, by which an object is declared to be\nbeautiful under the condition of a definite concept, is not pure_\n\nThere are two kinds of beauty; free beauty (_pulchritudo vaga_)\nor merely dependent beauty (_pulchritudo adhaerens_). The first\npresupposes no concept of what the object ought to be; the second\ndoes presuppose such a concept and the perfection of the object in\naccordance therewith. The first is called the (self-subsistent)\nbeauty of this or that thing; the second, as dependent upon a concept\n(conditioned beauty), is ascribed to Objects which come under the\nconcept of a particular purpose.\n\nFlowers are free natural beauties. Hardly any one but a botanist\nknows what sort of a thing a flower ought to be; and even he, though\nrecognising in the flower the reproductive organ of the plant, pays no\nregard to this natural purpose if he is passing judgement on the flower\nby Taste. There is then at the basis of this judgement no perfection\nof any kind, no internal purposiveness, to which the collection of the\nmanifold is referred. Many birds (such as the parrot, the humming bird,\nthe bird of paradise), and many sea shells are beauties in themselves,\nwhich do not belong to any object determined in respect of its purpose\nby concepts, but please freely and in themselves. So also delineations\n_\u00e0 la grecque_, foliage for borders or wall-papers, mean nothing\nin themselves; they represent nothing--no Object under a definite\nconcept,--and are free beauties. We can refer to the same class what\nare called in music phantasies (_i.e._ pieces without any theme), and\nin fact all music without words.\n\nIn the judging of a free beauty (according to the mere form) the\njudgement of taste is pure. There is presupposed no concept of any\npurpose, for which the manifold should serve the given Object, and\nwhich therefore is to be represented therein. By such a concept the\nfreedom of the Imagination which disports itself in the contemplation\nof the figure would be only limited.\n\nBut human beauty (_i.e._ of a man, a woman, or a child), the beauty of\na horse, or a building (be it church, palace, arsenal, or summer-house)\npresupposes a concept of the purpose which determines what the thing is\nto be, and consequently a concept of its perfection; it is therefore\nadherent beauty. Now as the combination of the Pleasant (in sensation)\nwith Beauty, which properly is only concerned with form, is a hindrance\nto the purity of the judgement of taste; so also is its purity injured\nby the combination with Beauty of the Good (viz. that manifold which is\ngood for the thing itself in accordance with its purpose).\n\nWe could add much to a building which would immediately please the eye,\nif only it were not to be a church. We could adorn a figure with all\nkinds of spirals and light but regular lines, as the New Zealanders do\nwith their tattooing, if only it were not the figure of a human being.\nAnd again this could have much finer features and a more pleasing and\ngentle cast of countenance provided it were not intended to represent a\nman, much less a warrior.\n\nNow the satisfaction in the manifold of a thing in reference to the\ninternal purpose which determines its possibility is a satisfaction\ngrounded on a concept; but the satisfaction in beauty is such as\npresupposes no concept, but is immediately bound up with the\nrepresentation through which the object is given (not through which it\nis thought). If now the judgement of Taste in respect of the beauty\nof a thing is made dependent on the purpose in its manifold, like a\njudgement of Reason, and thus limited, it is no longer a free and pure\njudgement of Taste.\n\nIt is true that taste gains by this combination of aesthetical with\nintellectual satisfaction, inasmuch as it becomes fixed; and though\nit is not universal, yet in respect to certain purposively determined\nObjects it becomes possible to prescribe rules for it. These, however,\nare not rules of taste, but merely rules for the unification of Taste\nwith Reason, _i.e._ of the Beautiful with the Good, by which the former\nbecomes available as an instrument of design in respect of the latter.\nThus the tone of mind which is self-maintaining and of subjective\nuniversal validity is subordinated to the way of thinking which can\nbe maintained only by painful resolve, but is of objective universal\nvalidity. Properly speaking, however, perfection gains nothing by\nbeauty or beauty by perfection; but, when we compare the representation\nby which an object is given to us with the Object (as regards what it\nought to be) by means of a concept, we cannot avoid considering along\nwith it the sensation in the subject. And thus when both states of mind\nare in harmony our _whole faculty_ of representative power gains.\n\nA judgement of taste, then, in respect of an object with a definite\ninternal purpose, can only be pure, if either the person judging\nhas no concept of this purpose, or else abstracts from it in his\njudgement. Such a person, although forming an accurate judgement of\ntaste in judging of the object as free beauty, would yet by another\nwho considers the beauty in it only as a dependent attribute (who looks\nto the purpose of the object) be blamed, and accused of false taste;\nalthough both are right in their own way, the one in reference to what\nhe has before his eyes, the other in reference to what he has in his\nthought. By means of this distinction we can settle many disputes about\nbeauty between judges of taste; by showing that the one is speaking of\nfree, the other of dependent, beauty,--that the first is making a pure,\nthe second an applied, judgement of taste.\n\n\n\u00a7 17. _Of the Ideal of beauty_\n\nThere can be no objective rule of taste which shall determine by\nmeans of concepts what is beautiful. For every judgement from this\nsource is aesthetical; _i.e._ the feeling of the subject, and not\na concept of the Object, is its determining ground. To seek for a\nprinciple of taste which shall furnish, by means of definite concepts,\na universal criterion of the beautiful, is fruitless trouble; because\nwhat is sought is impossible and self-contradictory. The universal\ncommunicability of sensation (satisfaction or dissatisfaction) without\nthe aid of a concept--the agreement, as far as is possible, of all\ntimes and peoples as regards this feeling in the representation of\ncertain objects--this is the empirical criterion, although weak and\nhardly sufficing for probability, of the derivation of a taste, thus\nconfirmed by examples, from the deep-lying grounds of agreement common\nto all men, in judging of the forms under which objects are given to\nthem.\n\nHence, we consider some products of taste as _exemplary_. Not that\ntaste can be acquired by imitating others; for it must be an original\nfaculty. He who imitates a model shows, no doubt, in so far as he\nattains to it, skill; but only shows taste in so far as he can judge\nof this model itself.[34] It follows from hence that the highest\nmodel, the archetype of taste, is a mere Idea, which every one must\nproduce in himself; and according to which he must judge every Object\nof taste, every example of judgement by taste, and even the taste\nof every one. _Idea_ properly means a rational concept, and _Ideal_\nthe representation of an individual being, regarded as adequate to\nan Idea.[35] Hence that archetype of taste, which certainly rests on\nthe indeterminate Idea that Reason has of a maximum, but which cannot\nbe represented by concepts, but only in an individual presentation,\nis better called the Ideal of the beautiful. Although we are not in\npossession of this, we yet strive to produce it in ourselves. But\nit can only be an Ideal of the Imagination, because it rests on a\npresentation and not on concepts, and the Imagination is the faculty of\npresentation.--How do we arrive at such an Ideal of beauty? _A priori_,\nor empirically? Moreover, what species of the beautiful is susceptible\nof an Ideal?\n\nFirst, it is well to remark that the beauty for which an Ideal is to\nbe sought cannot be _vague_ beauty, but is _fixed_ by a concept of\nobjective purposiveness; and thus it cannot appertain to the Object\nof a quite pure judgement of taste, but to that of a judgement of\ntaste which is in part intellectual. That is, in whatever grounds of\njudgement an Ideal is to be found, an Idea of Reason in accordance with\ndefinite concepts must lie at its basis; which determines _a priori_\nthe purpose on which the internal possibility of the object rests.\nAn Ideal of beautiful flowers, of a beautiful piece of furniture,\nof a beautiful view, is inconceivable. But neither can an Ideal be\nrepresented of a beauty dependent on definite purposes, _e.g._ of a\nbeautiful dwelling-house, a beautiful tree, a beautiful garden, etc.;\npresumably because their purpose is not sufficiently determined and\nfixed by the concept, and thus the purposiveness is nearly as free as\nin the case of _vague_ beauty. The only being which has the purpose of\nits existence in itself is _man_, who can determine his purposes by\nReason; or, where he must receive them from external perception, yet\ncan compare them with essential and universal purposes, and can judge\nthis their accordance aesthetically. This _man_ is, then, alone of all\nobjects in the world, susceptible of an Ideal of _beauty_; as it is\nonly _humanity_ in his person, as an intelligence, that is susceptible\nof the Ideal of _perfection_.\n\nBut there are here two elements. _First_, there is the aesthetical\n_normal Idea_, which is an individual intuition (of the Imagination),\nrepresenting the standard of our judgement [upon man] as a thing\nbelonging to a particular animal species. _Secondly_, there is the\n_rational Idea_ which makes the purposes of humanity, so far as they\ncannot be sensibly represented, the principle for judging of a figure\nthrough which, as their phenomenal effect, those purposes are revealed.\nThe normal Idea of the figure of an animal of a particular race must\ntake its elements from experience. But the greatest purposiveness\nin the construction of the figure, that would be available for the\nuniversal standard of aesthetical judgement upon each individual of\nthis species--the image which is as it were designedly at the basis of\nnature\u2019s Technic, to which only the whole race and not any isolated\nindividual is adequate--this lies merely in the Idea of the judging\n[subject]. And this, with its proportions, as an aesthetical Idea, can\nbe completely presented _in concreto_ in a model. In order to make\nintelligible in some measure (for who can extract her whole secret\nfrom nature?) how this comes to pass, we shall attempt a psychological\nexplanation.\n\nWe must remark that, in a way quite incomprehensible by us, the\nImagination can not only recall, on occasion, the signs for concepts\nlong past, but can also reproduce the image of the figure of the object\nout of an unspeakable number of objects of different kinds or even of\nthe same kind. Further, if the mind is concerned with comparisons, the\nImagination can, in all probability, actually though unconsciously let\none image glide into another, and thus by the concurrence of several of\nthe same kind come by an average, which serves as the common measure\nof all. Every one has seen a thousand full-grown men. Now if you wish\nto judge of their normal size, estimating it by means of comparison,\nthe Imagination (as I think) allows a great number of images (perhaps\nthe whole thousand) to fall on one another. If I am allowed to apply\nhere the analogy of optical presentation, it is in the space where\nmost of them are combined and inside the contour, where the place is\nilluminated with the most vivid colours, that the _average size_ is\ncognisable; which, both in height and breadth, is equally far removed\nfrom the extreme bounds of the greatest and smallest stature. And this\nis the stature of a beautiful man. (We could arrive at the same thing\nmechanically, by adding together all thousand magnitudes, heights,\nbreadths, and thicknesses, and dividing the sum by a thousand. But the\nImagination does this by means of a dynamical effect, which arises\nfrom the various impressions of such figures on the organ of internal\nsense.) If now in a similar way for this average man we seek the\naverage head, for this head the average nose, etc., such figure is at\nthe basis of the normal Idea in the country where the comparison is\ninstituted. Thus necessarily under these empirical conditions a negro\nmust have a different normal Idea of the beauty of the [human figure]\nfrom a white man, a Chinaman a different normal Idea from a European,\netc. And the same is the case with the model of a beautiful horse or\ndog (of a certain breed).--This _normal Idea_ is not derived from\nproportions got from experience [and regarded] _as definite rules_; but\nin accordance with it rules for judging become in the first instance\npossible. It is the image for the whole race, which floats among all\nthe variously different intuitions of individuals, which nature takes\nas archetype in her productions of the same species, but which seems\nnot to be fully reached in any individual case. It is by no means the\nwhole _archetype of beauty_ in the race, but only the form constituting\nthe indispensable condition of all beauty, and thus merely\n_correctness_ in the [mental] presentation of the race. It is, like the\ncelebrated _Doryphorus_ of _Polycletus_,[36] the _rule_ (_Myron\u2019s_[37]\nCow might also be used thus for its kind). It can therefore contain\nnothing specifically characteristic, for otherwise it would not be\nthe _normal Idea_ for the race. Its presentation pleases, not by its\nbeauty, but merely because it contradicts no condition, under which\nalone a thing of this kind can be beautiful. The presentation is merely\ncorrect.[38]\n\nWe must yet distinguish the _normal Idea_ of the beautiful from the\n_Ideal_, which latter, on grounds already alleged, we can only expect\nin the _human_ figure. In this the Ideal consists in the expression\nof the _moral_, without which the object would not please universally\nand thus positively (not merely negatively in a correct presentation).\nThe visible expression of moral Ideas that rule men inwardly, can\nindeed only be got from experience; but to make its connexion with\nall which our Reason unites with the morally good in the Idea of the\nhighest purposiveness,--goodness of heart, purity, strength, peace,\netc.,--visible as it were in bodily manifestation (as the effect of\nthat which is internal), requires a union of pure Ideas of Reason with\ngreat imaginative power, even in him who wishes to judge of it, still\nmore in him who wishes to present it. The correctness of such an Ideal\nof beauty is shown by its permitting no sensible charm to mingle with\nthe satisfaction in the Object and yet allowing us to take a great\ninterest therein. This shows that a judgement in accordance with such\na standard can never be purely aesthetical, and that a judgement in\naccordance with an Ideal of beauty is not a mere judgement of taste.\n\n\nEXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL DERIVED FROM THIS THIRD MOMENT\n\n_Beauty_ is the form of the _purposiveness_ of an object, so far as\nthis is perceived in it _without any representation of a purpose_.[39]\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH MOMENT\n\nOF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE, ACCORDING TO THE MODALITY OF THE\nSATISFACTION IN THE OBJECT\n\n\n\u00a7 18. _What the modality in a judgement of taste is_\n\nI can say of every representation that it is at least _possible_\nthat (as a cognition) it should be bound up with a pleasure. Of a\nrepresentation that I call _pleasant_ I say that it _actually_ excites\npleasure in me. But the _beautiful_ we think as having a _necessary_\nreference to satisfaction. Now this necessity is of a peculiar kind.\nIt is not a theoretical objective necessity; in which case it would be\ncognised _a priori_ that every one _will feel_ this satisfaction in\nthe object called beautiful by me. It is not a practical necessity;\nin which case, by concepts of a pure rational will serving as a rule\nfor freely acting beings, the satisfaction is the necessary result of\nan objective law and only indicates that we absolutely (without any\nfurther design) ought to act in a certain way. But the necessity which\nis thought in an aesthetical judgement can only be called _exemplary_;\n_i.e._ a necessity of the assent of _all_ to a judgement which is\nregarded as the example of a universal rule that we cannot state. Since\nan aesthetical judgement is not an objective cognitive judgement, this\nnecessity cannot be derived from definite concepts, and is therefore\nnot apodictic. Still less can it be inferred from the universality of\nexperience (of a complete agreement of judgements as to the beauty\nof a certain object). For not only would experience hardly furnish\nsufficiently numerous vouchers for this; but also, on empirical\njudgements we can base no concept of the necessity of these judgements.\n\n\n\u00a7 19. _The subjective necessity, which we ascribe to the judgement of\ntaste, is conditioned_\n\nThe judgement of taste requires the agreement of every one; and he\nwho describes anything as beautiful claims that every one _ought_\nto give his approval to the object in question and also describe it\nas beautiful. The _ought_ in the aesthetical judgement is therefore\npronounced in accordance with all the data which are required for\njudging and yet is only conditioned. We ask for the agreement of every\none else, because we have for it a ground that is common to all; and we\ncould count on this agreement, provided we were always sure that the\ncase was correctly subsumed under that ground as rule of assent.\n\n\n\u00a7 20. _The condition of necessity which a judgement of taste asserts is\nthe Idea of a common sense_\n\nIf judgements of taste (like cognitive judgements) had a definite\nobjective principle, then the person who lays them down in accordance\nwith this latter would claim an unconditioned necessity for his\njudgement. If they were devoid of all principle, like those of the\nmere taste of sense, we would not allow them in thought any necessity\nwhatever. Hence they must have a subjective principle which determines\nwhat pleases or displeases only by feeling and not by concepts, but\nyet with universal validity. But such a principle could only be\nregarded as a _common sense_, which is essentially different from\ncommon Understanding which people sometimes call common Sense (_sensus\ncommunis_); for the latter does not judge by feeling but always\nby concepts, although ordinarily only as by obscurely represented\nprinciples.\n\nHence it is only under the presupposition that there is a common sense\n(by which we do not understand an external sense, but the effect\nresulting from the free play of our cognitive powers)--it is only under\nthis presupposition, I say, that the judgement of taste can be laid\ndown.\n\n\n\u00a7 21. _Have we ground for presupposing a common sense?_\n\nCognitions and judgements must, along with the conviction that\naccompanies them, admit of universal communicability; for otherwise\nthere would be no harmony between them and the Object, and they would\nbe collectively a mere subjective play of the representative powers,\nexactly as scepticism would have it. But if cognitions are to admit of\ncommunicability, so must also the state of mind,--_i.e._ the accordance\nof the cognitive powers with a cognition generally, and that proportion\nof them which is suitable for a representation (by which an object is\ngiven to us) in order that a cognition may be made out of it--admit of\nuniversal communicability. For without this as the subjective condition\nof cognition, knowledge as an effect could not arise. This actually\nalways takes place when a given object by means of Sense excites the\nImagination to collect the manifold, and the Imagination in its turn\nexcites the Understanding to bring about a unity of this collective\nprocess in concepts. But this accordance of the cognitive powers has\na different proportion according to the variety of the Objects which\nare given. However, it must be such that this internal relation, by\nwhich one mental faculty is excited by another, shall be generally the\nmost beneficial for both faculties in respect of cognition (of given\nobjects); and this accordance can only be determined by feeling (not\naccording to concepts). Since now this accordance itself must admit\nof universal communicability, and consequently also our feeling of it\n(in a given representation), and since the universal communicability\nof a feeling presupposes a common sense, we have grounds for assuming\nthis latter. And this common sense is assumed without relying on\npsychological observations, but simply as the necessary condition of\nthe universal communicability of our knowledge, which is presupposed in\nevery Logic and in every principle of knowledge that is not sceptical.\n\n\n\u00a7 22. _The necessity of the universal agreement that is thought in a\njudgement of taste is a subjective necessity, which is represented as\nobjective under the presupposition of a common sense_\n\nIn all judgements by which we describe anything as beautiful, we\nallow no one to be of another opinion; without however grounding our\njudgement on concepts but only on our feeling, which we therefore\nplace at its basis not as a private, but as a communal feeling.[40]\nNow this common sense cannot be grounded on experience; for it aims at\njustifying judgements which contain an _ought_. It does not say that\nevery one _will_ agree with my judgement, but that he _ought_. And so\ncommon sense, as an example of whose judgement I here put forward my\njudgement of taste and on account of which I attribute to the latter an\n_exemplary_ validity, is a mere ideal norm, under the supposition of\nwhich I have a right to make into a rule for every one a judgement that\naccords therewith, as well as the satisfaction in an Object expressed\nin such judgement. For the principle, which concerns the agreement of\ndifferent judging persons, although only subjective, is yet assumed as\nsubjectively universal (an Idea necessary for every one); and thus can\nclaim universal assent (as if it were objective) provided we are sure\nthat we have correctly subsumed [the particulars] under it.\n\nThis indeterminate norm of a common sense is actually presupposed by\nus; as is shown by our claim to lay down judgements of taste. Whether\nthere is in fact such a common sense, as a constitutive principle of\nthe possibility of experience, or whether a yet higher principle of\nReason makes it only into a regulative principle for producing in us\na common sense for higher purposes: whether therefore Taste is an\noriginal and natural faculty, or only the Idea of an artificial one yet\nto be acquired, so that a judgement of taste with its assumption of a\nuniversal assent in fact, is only a requirement of Reason for producing\nsuch harmony of sentiment; whether the \u201cought,\u201d _i.e._ the objective\nnecessity of the confluence of the feeling of any one man with that of\nevery other, only signifies the possibility of arriving at this accord,\nand the judgement of taste only affords an example of the application\nof this principle: these questions we have neither the wish nor the\npower to investigate as yet; we have now only to resolve the faculty of\ntaste into its elements in order to unite them at last in the Idea of\na common sense.\n\n\nEXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL RESULTING FROM THE FOURTH MOMENT\n\nThe _beautiful_ is that which without any concept is cognised as the\nobject of a _necessary_ satisfaction.\n\n\nGENERAL REMARK ON THE FIRST SECTION OF THE ANALYTIC\n\nIf we seek the result of the preceding analysis we find that everything\nruns up into this concept of Taste, that it is a faculty for judging\nan object in reference to the Imagination\u2019s _free conformity to law_.\nNow if in the judgement of taste the Imagination must be considered in\nits freedom, it is in the first place not regarded as reproductive,\nas it is subject to the laws of association, but as productive and\nspontaneous (as the author of arbitrary forms of possible intuition).\nAnd although in the apprehension of a given object of sense it is\ntied to a definite form of this Object, and so far has no free play\n(such as that of poetry) yet it may readily be conceived that the\nobject can furnish it with such a form containing a collection of\nthe manifold, as the Imagination itself, if it were left free, would\nproject in accordance with the _conformity to law of the Understanding_\nin general. But that the _imaginative power_ should be _free_ and yet\n_of itself conformed to law_, _i.e._ bringing autonomy with it, is a\ncontradiction. The Understanding alone gives the law. If, however,\nthe Imagination is compelled to proceed according to a definite law,\nits product in respect of form is determined by concepts as to what\nit ought to be. But then, as is above shown, the satisfaction is not\nthat in the Beautiful, but in the Good (in perfection, at any rate\nin mere formal perfection); and the judgement is not a judgement of\ntaste. Hence it is a conformity to law without a law; and a subjective\nagreement of the Imagination and Understanding,--without such an\nobjective agreement as there is when the representation is referred\nto a definite concept of an object,--can subsist along with the\nfree conformity to law of the Understanding (which is also called\npurposiveness without purpose) and with the peculiar feature of a\njudgement of taste.\n\nNow geometrically regular figures, such as a circle, a square, a\ncube, etc., are commonly adduced by critics of taste as the simplest\nand most indisputable examples of beauty; and yet they are called\nregular, because we can only represent them by regarding them as mere\npresentations of a definite concept which prescribes the rule for the\nfigure (according to which alone it is possible). One of these two must\nbe wrong, either that judgement of the critic which ascribes beauty to\nthe said figures, or ours, which regards purposiveness apart from a\nconcept as requisite for beauty.\n\nHardly any one will say that a man must have taste in order that he\nshould find more satisfaction in a circle than in a scrawled outline,\nin an equilateral and equiangular quadrilateral than in one which is\noblique, irregular, and as it were deformed, for this belongs to the\nordinary Understanding and is not Taste at all. Where, _e.g._ our\ndesign is to judge of the size of an area, or to make intelligible\nthe relation of the parts of it, when divided, to one another and\nto the whole, then regular figures and those of the simplest kind\nare needed, and the satisfaction does not rest immediately on\nthe aspect of the figure, but on its availability for all kinds\nof possible designs. A room whose walls form oblique angles, or a\nparterre of this kind, even every violation of symmetry in the figure\nof animals (_e.g._ being one-eyed), of buildings, or of flower beds,\ndispleases, because it contradicts the purpose of the thing, not only\npractically in respect of a definite use of it, but also when we pass\njudgement on it as regards any possible design. This is not the case\nin the judgement of taste, which when pure combines satisfaction\nor dissatisfaction,--without any reference to its use or to a\npurpose,--with the mere _consideration_ of the object.\n\nThe regularity which leads to the concept of an object is indeed the\nindispensable condition (_conditio sine qua non_) for grasping the\nobject in a single representation and determining the manifold in its\nform. This determination is a purpose in respect of cognition, and\nin reference to this it is always bound up with satisfaction (which\naccompanies the execution of every, even problematical, design). There\nis here, however, merely the approval of the solution satisfying a\nproblem, and not a free and indefinite purposive entertainment of the\nmental powers with what we call beautiful, where the Understanding is\nat the service of Imagination and not _vice versa_.\n\nIn a thing that is only possible by means of design,--a building, or\neven an animal,--the regularity consisting in symmetry must express\nthe unity of the intuition that accompanies the concept of purpose,\nand this regularity belongs to cognition. But where only a free play\nof the representative powers (under the condition, however, that the\nUnderstanding is to suffer no shock thereby) is to be kept up, in\npleasure gardens, room decorations, all kinds of tasteful furniture,\netc., regularity that shows constraint is avoided as much as possible.\nThus in the English taste in gardens, or in bizarre taste in furniture,\nthe freedom of the Imagination is pushed almost near to the grotesque,\nand in this separation from every constraint of rule we have the case,\nwhere taste can display its greatest perfection in the enterprises of\nthe Imagination.\n\nAll stiff regularity (such as approximates to mathematical regularity)\nhas something in it repugnant to taste; for our entertainment in\nthe contemplation of it lasts for no length of time, but it rather,\nin so far as it has not expressly in view cognition or a definite\npractical purpose, produces weariness. On the other hand that with\nwhich Imagination can play in an unstudied and purposive manner\nis always new to us, and one does not get tired of looking at it.\n_Marsden_ in his description of Sumatra makes the remark that the\nfree beauties of nature surround the spectator everywhere and thus\nlose their attraction for him.[41] On the other hand a pepper-garden,\nwhere the stakes on which this plant twines itself form parallel rows,\nhad much attractiveness for him, if he met with it in the middle of a\nforest. And hence he infers that wild beauty, apparently irregular,\nonly pleases as a variation from the regular beauty of which one has\nseen enough. But he need only have made the experiment of spending\none day in a pepper-garden, to have been convinced that, once the\nUnderstanding, by the aid of this regularity, has put itself in accord\nwith the order that it always needs, the object will not entertain for\nlong,--nay rather it will impose a burdensome constraint upon the\nImagination. On the other hand, nature, which there is prodigal in\nits variety even to luxuriance, that is subjected to no constraint of\nartificial rules, can supply constant food for taste.--Even the song\nof birds, which we can bring under no musical rule, seems to have more\nfreedom, and therefore more for taste, than a song of a human being\nwhich is produced in accordance with all the rules of music; for we\nvery much sooner weary of the latter, if it is repeated often and at\nlength. Here, however, we probably confuse our participation in the\nmirth of a little creature that we love, with the beauty of its song;\nfor if this were exactly imitated by man (as sometimes the notes of the\nnightingale are)[42] it would seem to our ear quite devoid of taste.\n\nAgain, beautiful objects are to be distinguished from beautiful\nviews of objects (which often on account of their distance cannot be\nclearly recognised). In the latter case taste appears not so much in\nwhat the Imagination _apprehends_ in this field, as in the impulse it\nthus gets to _fiction_, _i.e._ in the peculiar fancies with which the\nmind entertains itself, whilst it is continually being aroused by the\nvariety which strikes the eye. An illustration is afforded, _e.g._\nby the sight of the changing shapes of a fire on the hearth or of a\nrippling brook; neither of these has beauty, but they bring with them a\ncharm for the Imagination, because they entertain it in free play.\n\n\n\n\nSECOND BOOK\n\nANALYTIC OF THE SUBLIME\n\n\n\u00a7 23. _Transition from the faculty which judges of the Beautiful to\nthat which judges of the Sublime_\n\nThe Beautiful and the Sublime agree in this, that both please in\nthemselves. Further, neither presupposes a judgement of sense nor\na judgement logically determined, but a judgement of reflection.\nConsequently the satisfaction [belonging to them] does not depend\non a sensation, as in the case of the Pleasant, nor on a definite\nconcept, as in the case of the Good; but it is nevertheless referred\nto concepts although indeterminate ones. And so the satisfaction is\nconnected with the mere presentation [of the object] or with the\nfaculty of presentation; so that in the case of a given intuition this\nfaculty or the Imagination is considered as in agreement with the\n_faculty of concepts_ of Understanding or Reason (in its furtherance of\nthese latter). Hence both kinds of judgements are _singular_, and yet\nannounce themselves as universally valid for every subject; although\nthey lay claim merely to the feeling of pleasure and not to any\nknowledge of the object.\n\nBut there are also remarkable differences between the two. The\nBeautiful in nature is connected with the form of the object, which\nconsists in having boundaries. The Sublime, on the other hand, is to\nbe found in a formless object, so far as in it or by occasion of it\n_boundlessness_ is represented, and yet its totality is also present to\nthought. Thus the Beautiful seems to be regarded as the presentation\nof an indefinite concept of Understanding; the Sublime as that of a\nlike concept of Reason. Therefore the satisfaction in the one case is\nbound up with the representation of _quality_, in the other with that\nof _quantity_. And the latter satisfaction is quite different in kind\nfrom the former, for this [the Beautiful[43]] directly brings with\nit a feeling of the furtherance of life, and thus is compatible with\ncharms and with the play of the Imagination. But the other [the feeling\nof the Sublime[43]] is a pleasure that arises only indirectly; viz.\nit is produced by the feeling of a momentary checking of the vital\npowers and a consequent stronger outflow of them, so that it seems to\nbe regarded as emotion,--not play, but earnest in the exercise of the\nImagination.--Hence it is incompatible with charms; and as the mind\nis not merely attracted by the object but is ever being alternately\nrepelled, the satisfaction in the sublime does not so much involve a\npositive pleasure as admiration or respect, which rather deserves to be\ncalled negative pleasure.\n\nBut the inner and most important distinction between the Sublime\nand Beautiful is, certainly, as follows. (Here, as we are entitled\nto do, we only bring under consideration in the first instance the\nsublime in natural Objects; for the sublime of Art is always limited\nby the conditions of agreement with Nature.) Natural beauty (which is\nself-subsisting) brings with it a purposiveness in its form by which\nthe object seems to be, as it were, pre-adapted to our Judgement, and\nthus constitutes in itself an object of satisfaction. On the other\nhand, that which excites in us, without any reasoning about it, but in\nthe mere apprehension of it, the feeling of the sublime, may appear as\nregards its form to violate purpose in respect of the Judgement, to be\nunsuited to our presentative faculty, and, as it were, to do violence\nto the Imagination; and yet it is judged to be only the more sublime.\n\nNow from this we may see that in general we express ourselves\nincorrectly if we call any _object of nature_ sublime, although we can\nquite correctly call many objects of nature beautiful. For how can that\nbe marked by an expression of approval, which is apprehended in itself\nas being a violation of purpose? All that we can say is that the object\nis fit for the presentation of a sublimity which can be found in the\nmind; for no sensible form can contain the sublime properly so-called.\nThis concerns only Ideas of the Reason, which, although no adequate\npresentation is possible for them, by this inadequacy that admits of\nsensible presentation, are aroused and summoned into the mind. Thus the\nwide ocean, agitated by the storm, cannot be called sublime. Its aspect\nis horrible; and the mind must be already filled with manifold Ideas\nif it is to be determined by such an intuition to a feeling itself\nsublime, as it is incited to abandon sensibility and to busy itself\nwith Ideas that involve higher purposiveness.\n\nSelf-subsisting natural beauty discovers to us a Technic of nature,\nwhich represents it as a system in accordance with laws, the principle\nof which we do not find in the whole of our faculty of Understanding.\nThat principle is the principle of purposiveness, in respect of the use\nof our Judgement in regard to phenomena; [which requires] that these\nmust not be judged as merely belonging to nature in its purposeless\nmechanism, but also as belonging to something analogous to art. It,\ntherefore, actually extends, not indeed our cognition of natural\nObjects, but our concept of nature; [which is now not regarded] as\nmere mechanism but as art. This leads to profound investigations as to\nthe possibility of such a form. But in what we are accustomed to call\nsublime there is nothing at all that leads to particular objective\nprinciples and forms of nature corresponding to them; so far from it\nthat for the most part nature excites the Ideas of the sublime in its\nchaos or in its wildest and most irregular disorder and desolation,\nprovided size and might are perceived. Hence, we see that the concept\nof the Sublime is not nearly so important or rich in consequences\nas the concept of the Beautiful; and that in general it displays\nnothing purposive in nature itself, but only in that possible use of\nour intuitions of it by which there is produced in us a feeling of\na purposiveness quite independent of nature. We must seek a ground\nexternal to ourselves for the Beautiful of nature; but seek it for\nthe Sublime merely in ourselves and in our attitude of thought which\nintroduces sublimity into the representation of nature. This is a\nvery needful preliminary remark, which quite separates the Ideas of\nthe sublime from that of a purposiveness of _nature_, and makes the\ntheory of the sublime a mere appendix to the aesthetical judging of\nthat purposiveness; because by means of it no particular form is\nrepresented in nature, but there is only developed a purposive use\nwhich the Imagination makes of its representation.\n\n\n\u00a7 24. _Of the divisions of an investigation into the feeling of the\nsublime_\n\nAs regards the division of the moments of the aesthetical judging of\nobjects in reference to the feeling of the sublime, the Analytic can\nproceed according to the same principle as was adapted in the analysis\nof judgements of taste. For as an act of the aesthetical reflective\nJudgement, the satisfaction in the Sublime must be represented just as\nin the case of the Beautiful,--according to _quantity_ as universally\nvalid, according to _quality_ as devoid of _interest_, according to\n_relation_ as subjective purposiveness, and according to _modality_ as\nnecessary. And so the method here will not diverge from that of the\npreceding section; unless, indeed, we count it a difference that in\nthe case where the aesthetical Judgement is concerned with the form of\nthe Object we began with the investigation of its quality, but here,\nin view of the formlessness which may belong to what we call sublime,\nwe shall begin with quantity, as the first moment of the aesthetical\njudgement as to the sublime. The reason for this may be seen from the\npreceding paragraph.\n\nBut the analysis of the Sublime involves a division not needed in the\ncase of the Beautiful, viz. a division into the _mathematically_ and\nthe _dynamically sublime_.\n\nFor the feeling of the Sublime brings with it as its characteristic\nfeature a _movement_ of the mind bound up with the judging of the\nobject, while in the case of the Beautiful taste presupposes and\nmaintains the mind in _restful_ contemplation. Now this movement\nought to be judged as subjectively purposive (because the sublime\npleases us), and thus it is referred through the Imagination either\nto the _faculty of cognition_ or of _desire_. In either reference\nthe purposiveness of the given representation ought to be judged\nonly in respect of this _faculty_ (without purpose or interest); but\nin the first case it is ascribed to the Object as a _mathematical_\ndetermination of the Imagination, in the second as _dynamical_. And\nhence we have this twofold way of representing the sublime.\n\n\nA.--OF THE MATHEMATICALLY SUBLIME\n\n\n\u00a7 25. _Explanation of the term \u201csublime\u201d_\n\nWe call that _sublime_ which is _absolutely great_. But to be great,\nand to be a great something are quite different concepts (_magnitudo_\nand _quantitas_). In like manner to _say simply_ (_simpliciter_)\nthat anything is _great_ is quite different from saying that it is\n_absolutely great_ (_absolute, non comparative magnum_). The latter\nis _what is great beyond all comparison_.--What now is meant by the\nexpression that anything is great or small or of medium size? It is not\na pure concept of Understanding that is thus signified; still less is\nit an intuition of Sense, and just as little is it a concept of Reason,\nbecause it brings with it no principle of cognition. It must therefore\nbe a concept of Judgement or derived from one; and a subjective\npurposiveness of the representation in reference to the Judgement must\nlie at its basis. That anything is a magnitude (_quantum_) may be\ncognised from the thing itself, without any comparison of it with other\nthings; viz. if there is a multiplicity of the homogeneous constituting\none thing. But to cognise _how great_ it is always requires some other\nmagnitude as a measure. But because the judging of magnitude depends\nnot merely on multiplicity (number), but also on the magnitude of the\nunit (the measure), and since, to judge of the magnitude of this latter\nagain requires another as measure with which it may be compared, we\nsee that the determination of the magnitude of phenomena can supply no\nabsolute concept whatever of magnitude, but only a comparative one.\n\nIf now I say simply that anything is great, it appears that I have no\ncomparison in view, at least none with an objective measure; because\nit is thus not determined at all how great the object is. But although\nthe standard of comparison is merely subjective, yet the judgement none\nthe less claims universal assent; \u201cthis man is beautiful,\u201d and \u201che is\ntall,\u201d are judgements not limited merely to the judging subject, but,\nlike theoretical judgements, demanding the assent of every one.\n\nIn a judgement by which anything is designated simply as great, it\nis not merely meant that the object has a magnitude, but that this\nmagnitude is superior to that of many other objects of the same kind,\nwithout, however, any exact determination of this superiority. Thus\nthere is always at the basis of our judgement a standard which we\nassume as the same for every one; this, however, is not available for\nany logical (mathematically definite) judging of magnitude, but only\nfor aesthetical judging of the same, because it is a merely subjective\nstandard lying at the basis of the reflective judgement upon\nmagnitude. It may be empirical, as, _e.g._ the average size of the men\nknown to us, of animals of a certain kind, trees, houses, mountains,\netc. Or it may be a standard given _a priori_, which through the\ndefects of the judging subject is limited by the subjective conditions\nof presentation _in concreto_; as, _e.g._ in the practical sphere, the\ngreatness of a certain virtue, or of the public liberty and justice in\na country; or, in the theoretical sphere, the greatness of the accuracy\nor the inaccuracy of an observation or measurement that has been made,\netc.\n\nHere it is remarkable that, although we have no interest whatever in an\nObject,--_i.e._ its existence is indifferent to us,--yet its mere size,\neven if it is considered as formless, may bring a satisfaction with it\nthat is universally communicable, and that consequently involves the\nconsciousness of a subjective purposiveness in the use of our cognitive\nfaculty. This is not indeed a satisfaction in the Object (because\nit may be formless), as in the case of the Beautiful, in which the\nreflective Judgement finds itself purposively determined in reference\nto cognition in general; but [a satisfaction] in the extension of the\nImagination by itself.\n\nIf (under the above limitation) we say simply of an object \u201cit is\ngreat,\u201d this is no mathematically definite judgement but a mere\njudgement of reflection upon the representation of it, which is\nsubjectively purposive for a certain use of our cognitive powers in\nthe estimation of magnitude; and we always then bind up with the\nrepresentation a kind of respect, as also a kind of contempt for what\nwe simply call \u201csmall.\u201d Further, the judging of things as great or\nsmall extends to everything, even to all their characteristics; thus\nwe describe beauty as great or small. The reason of this is to be\nsought in the fact that whatever we present in intuition according to\nthe precept of the Judgement (and thus represent aesthetically) is\nalways a phenomenon and thus a quantum.\n\nBut if we call anything not only great, but absolutely great in every\npoint of view (great beyond all comparison), _i.e._ sublime, we soon\nsee that it is not permissible to seek for an adequate standard of this\noutside itself, but merely in itself. It is a magnitude which is like\nitself alone. It follows hence that the sublime is not to be sought in\nthe things of nature, but only in our Ideas; but in which of them it\nlies must be reserved for the Deduction.\n\nThe foregoing explanation can be thus expressed: _the sublime is that\nin comparison with which everything else is small_. Here we easily see\nthat nothing can be given in nature, however great it is judged by us\nto be, which could not if considered in another relation be reduced\nto the infinitely small; and conversely there is nothing so small,\nwhich does not admit of extension by our Imagination to the greatness\nof a world, if compared with still smaller standards. Telescopes have\nfurnished us with abundant material for making the first remark,\nmicroscopes for the second. Nothing, therefore, which can be an object\nof the senses, is, considered on this basis, to be called sublime.\nBut because there is in our Imagination a striving towards infinite\nprogress, and in our Reason a claim for absolute totality, regarded as\na real Idea, therefore this very inadequateness for that Idea in our\nfaculty for estimating the magnitude of things of sense, excites in\nus the feeling of a supersensible faculty. And it is not the object\nof sense, but the use which the Judgement naturally makes of certain\nobjects on behalf of this latter feeling, that is absolutely great; and\nin comparison every other use is small. Consequently it is the state\nof mind produced by a certain representation with which the reflective\nJudgement is occupied, and not the Object, that is to be called sublime.\n\nWe may therefore append to the preceding formulas explaining the\nsublime this other: _the sublime is that, the mere ability to think\nwhich, shows a faculty of the mind surpassing every standard of Sense_.\n\n\n\u00a7 26. _Of that estimation of the magnitude of natural things which is\nrequisite for the Idea of the Sublime_\n\nThe estimation of magnitude by means of concepts of number (or their\nsigns in Algebra) is mathematical; but that in mere intuition (by the\nmeasurement of the eye) is aesthetical. Now we can come by definite\nconcepts of _how great_ a thing is, [only][44] by numbers, of which the\nunit is the measure (at all events by series of numbers progressing\nto infinity); and so far all logical estimation of magnitude is\nmathematical. But since the magnitude of the measure must then be\nassumed known, and this again is only to be estimated mathematically\nby means of numbers,--the unit of which must be another [smaller]\nmeasure,--we can never have a first or fundamental measure, and\ntherefore can never have a definite concept of a given magnitude. So\nthe estimation of the magnitude of the fundamental measure must consist\nin this, that we can immediately apprehend it in intuition and use it\nby the Imagination for the presentation of concepts of number. That\nis, all estimation of the magnitude of the objects of nature is in the\nend aesthetical (_i.e._ subjectively and not objectively determined).\n\nNow for the mathematical estimation of magnitude there is, indeed, no\nmaximum (for the power of numbers extends to infinity); but for its\naesthetical estimation there is always a maximum, and of this I say\nthat if it is judged as the absolute measure than which no greater is\npossible subjectively (for the judging subject), it brings with it the\nIdea of the sublime and produces that emotion which no mathematical\nestimation of its magnitude by means of numbers can bring about (except\nso far as the aesthetical fundamental measure remains vividly in the\nImagination). For the former only presents relative magnitude by means\nof comparison with others of the same kind; but the latter presents\nmagnitude absolutely, so far as the mind can grasp it in an intuition.\n\nIn receiving a quantum into the Imagination by intuition, in order\nto be able to use it for a measure or as a unit for the estimation\nof magnitude by means of numbers, there are two operations of\nthe Imagination involved: _apprehension_ (_apprehensio_) and\n_comprehension_ (_comprehensio aesthetica_). As to apprehension there\nis no difficulty, for it can go on _ad infinitum_; but comprehension\nbecomes harder the further apprehension advances, and soon attains to\nits maximum, viz. the aesthetically greatest fundamental measure for\nthe estimation of magnitude. For when apprehension has gone so far that\nthe partial representations of sensuous intuition at first apprehended\nbegin to vanish in the Imagination, whilst this ever proceeds to the\napprehension of others, then it loses as much on the one side as it\ngains on the other; and in comprehension there is a maximum beyond\nwhich it cannot go.\n\nHence can be explained what _Savary_[45] remarks in his account of\nEgypt, viz. that we must keep from going very near the Pyramids just\nas much as we keep from going too far from them, in order to get the\nfull emotional effect from their size. For if we are too far away,\nthe parts to be apprehended (the stones lying one over the other) are\nonly obscurely represented, and the representation of them produces no\neffect upon the aesthetical judgement of the subject. But if we are\nvery near, the eye requires some time to complete the apprehension of\nthe tiers from the bottom up to the apex; and then the first tiers are\nalways partly forgotten before the Imagination has taken in the last,\nand so the comprehension of them is never complete.--The same thing\nmay sufficiently explain the bewilderment or, as it were, perplexity\nwhich, it is said, seizes the spectator on his first entrance into\nSt. Peter\u2019s at Rome. For there is here a feeling of the inadequacy\nof his Imagination for presenting the Ideas of a whole, wherein the\nImagination reaches its maximum, and, in striving to surpass it, sinks\nback into itself, by which, however, a kind of emotional satisfaction\nis produced.\n\nI do not wish to speak as yet of the ground of this satisfaction,\nwhich is bound up with a representation from which we should least\nof all expect it, viz. a representation which lets us remark its\ninadequacy and consequently its subjective want of purposiveness for\nthe Judgement in the estimation of magnitude. I only remark that if\nthe aesthetical judgement is pure (i.e. _mingled with no teleological\njudgement_ or judgement of Reason) and is to be given as a completely\nsuitable example of the Critique of the _aesthetical_ Judgement, we\nmust not exhibit the sublime in products of art (_e.g._ buildings,\npillars, etc.) where human purpose determines the form as well as\nthe size; nor yet in things of nature _the concepts of which bring\nwith them a definite purpose_ (_e.g._ animals with a known natural\ndestination); but in rude nature (and in this only in so far as it\ndoes not bring with it any charm or emotion produced by actual danger)\nmerely as containing magnitude. For in this kind of representation\nnature contains nothing monstrous (either magnificent or horrible);\nthe magnitude that is apprehended may be increased as much as you\nwish provided it can be comprehended in a whole by the Imagination.\nAn object is _monstrous_ if by its size it destroys the purpose which\nconstitutes the concept of it. But the mere presentation of a concept\nis called _colossal_, which is almost too great for any presentation\n(bordering on the relatively monstrous); because the purpose of\nthe presentation of a concept is made harder [to realise] by the\nintuition of the object being almost too great for our faculty of\napprehension.--A pure judgement upon the sublime must, however, have\nno purpose of the Object as its determining ground, if it is to be\naesthetical and not mixed up with any judgement of Understanding or\nReason.\n\n * * * * *\n\nBecause everything which is to give disinterested pleasure to the\nmerely reflective Judgement must bring with the representation\nof it, subjective and, as subjective, universally valid\npurposiveness--although no purposiveness of the _form_ of the\nobject lies (as in the case of the Beautiful) at the ground of the\njudgement--the question arises \u201cwhat is this subjective purposiveness?\u201d\nAnd how does it come to be prescribed as the norm by which a ground\nfor universally valid satisfaction is supplied in the mere estimation\nof magnitude, even in that which is forced up to the point where our\nfaculty of Imagination is inadequate for the presentation of the\nconcept of magnitude?\n\nIn the process of combination requisite for the estimation of\nmagnitude, the Imagination proceeds of itself to infinity without\nanything hindering it; but the Understanding guides it by means\nof concepts of number, for which the Imagination must furnish the\nschema. And in this procedure, as belonging to the logical estimation\nof magnitude, there is indeed something objectively purposive,--in\naccordance with the concept of a purpose (as all measurement is),--but\nnothing purposive and pleasing for the aesthetical Judgement. There is\nalso in this designed purposiveness nothing which would force us to\npush the magnitude of the measure, and consequently the _comprehension_\nof the manifold in an intuition, to the bounds of the faculty of\nImagination, or as far as ever this can reach in its presentations.\nFor in the estimation of magnitude by the Understanding (Arithmetic)\nwe only go to a certain point whether we push the comprehension of\nthe units up to the number 10 (as in the decimal scale) or only up to\n4 (as in the quaternary scale); the further production of magnitude\nproceeds by combination or, if the quantum is given in intuition, by\napprehension, but merely by way of progression (not of comprehension)\nin accordance with an assumed principle of progression. In this\nmathematical estimation of magnitude the Understanding is equally\nserved and contented whether the Imagination chooses for unit a\nmagnitude that we can take in in a glance, _e.g._ a foot or rod, or a\nGerman mile or even the earth\u2019s diameter,--of which the apprehension\nis indeed possible, but not the comprehension in an intuition of the\nImagination (not possible by _comprehensio aesthetica_, although quite\npossible by _comprehensio logica_ in a concept of number). In both\ncases the logical estimation of magnitude goes on without hindrance to\ninfinity.\n\nBut now the mind listens to the voice of Reason which, for every given\nmagnitude,--even for those that can never be entirely apprehended,\nalthough (in sensible representation) they are judged as entirely\ngiven,--requires totality. Reason consequently desires comprehension in\n_one_ intuition, and so the _presentation_ of all these members of a\nprogressively increasing series. It does not even exempt the infinite\n(space and past time) from this requirement; it rather renders it\nunavoidable to think the infinite (in the judgement of common Reason)\nas _entirely given_ (according to its totality).\n\nBut the infinite is absolutely (not merely comparatively) great.\nCompared with it everything else (of the same kind of magnitudes) is\nsmall. And what is most important is that to be able only to think it\nas _a whole_ indicates a faculty of mind which surpasses every standard\nof Sense. For [to represent it sensibly] would require a comprehension\nhaving for unit a standard bearing a definite relation, expressible\nin numbers, to the infinite; which is impossible. Nevertheless, _the\nbare capability of thinking_ this infinite without contradiction\nrequires in the human mind a faculty itself supersensible. For it\nis only by means of this faculty and its Idea of a noumenon,--which\nadmits of no intuition, but which yet serves as the substrate for the\nintuition of the world, as a mere phenomenon,--that the infinite of\nthe world of sense, in the pure intellectual estimation of magnitude,\ncan be _completely_ comprehended _under_ a concept, although in the\nmathematical estimation of magnitude by means of _concepts of number_\nit can never be completely thought. The faculty of being able to think\nthe infinite of supersensible intuition as given (in its intelligible\nsubstrate), surpasses every standard of sensibility, and is great\nbeyond all comparison even with the faculty of mathematical estimation;\nnot of course in a theoretical point of view and on behalf of the\ncognitive faculty, but as an extension of the mind which feels itself\nable in another (practical) point of view to go beyond the limit of\nsensibility.\n\nNature is therefore sublime in those of its phenomena, whose intuition\nbrings with it the Idea of their infinity. This last can only come by\nthe inadequacy of the greatest effort of our Imagination to estimate\nthe magnitude of an object. But now in mathematical estimation of\nmagnitude the Imagination is equal to providing a sufficient measure\nfor every object; because the numerical concepts of the Understanding,\nby means of progression, can make any measure adequate to any given\nmagnitude. Therefore it must be the _aesthetical_ estimation of\nmagnitude in which it is felt that the effort towards comprehension\nsurpasses the power of the Imagination to grasp in a whole of intuition\nthe progressive apprehension; and at the same time is perceived the\ninadequacy of this faculty, unbounded in its progress, for grasping\nand using, for the estimation of magnitude, a fundamental measure\nwhich could be made available by the Understanding with little\ntrouble. Now the proper unchangeable fundamental measure of nature is\nits absolute whole; which, regarding nature as a phenomenon, would\nbe infinity comprehended. But since this fundamental measure is a\nself-contradictory concept (on account of the impossibility of the\nabsolute totality of an endless progress), that magnitude of a natural\nObject, on which the Imagination fruitlessly spends its whole faculty\nof comprehension, must carry our concept of nature to a supersensible\nsubstrate (which lies at its basis and also at the basis of our faculty\nof thought). As this, however, is great beyond all standards of sense,\nit makes us judge as _sublime_, not so much the object, as our own\nstate of mind in the estimation of it.\n\nTherefore, just as the aesthetical Judgement in judging the Beautiful\nrefers the Imagination in its free play to the _Understanding_, in\norder to harmonise it with the _concepts_ of the latter in general\n(without any determination of them); so does the same faculty when\njudging a thing as Sublime refer itself to the _Reason_ in order that\nit may subjectively be in accordance with its _Ideas_ (no matter what\nthey are):--_i.e._ that it may produce a state of mind conformable\nto them and compatible with that brought about by the influence of\ndefinite (practical) Ideas upon feeling.\n\nWe hence see also that true sublimity must be sought only in the mind\nof the [subject] judging, not in the natural Object, the judgement upon\nwhich occasions this state. Who would call sublime, _e.g._ shapeless\nmountain masses piled in wild disorder upon each other with their\npyramids of ice, or the gloomy raging sea? But the mind feels itself\nelevated in its own judgement if, while contemplating them without\nany reference to their form, and abandoning itself to the Imagination\nand to the Reason--which although placed in combination with the\nImagination without any definite purpose, merely extends it--it yet\nfinds the whole power of the Imagination inadequate to its Ideas.\n\nExamples of the mathematically Sublime of nature in mere intuition are\nall the cases in which we are given, not so much a larger numerical\nconcept as a large unit for the measure of the Imagination (for\nshortening the numerical series). A tree, [the height of] which we\nestimate with reference to the height of a man, at all events gives\na standard for a mountain; and if this were a mile high, it would\nserve as unit for the number expressive of the earth\u2019s diameter, so\nthat the latter might be made intuitible. The earth\u2019s diameter [would\nsupply a unit] for the known planetary system; this again for the\nMilky Way; and the immeasurable number of milky way systems called\nnebulae,--which presumably constitute a system of the same kind among\nthemselves--lets us expect no bounds here. Now the Sublime in the\naesthetical judging of an immeasurable whole like this lies not so much\nin the greatness of the number [of units], as in the fact that in our\nprogress we ever arrive at yet greater units. To this the systematic\ndivision of the universe contributes, which represents every magnitude\nin nature as small in its turn; and represents our Imagination with\nits entire freedom from bounds, and with it Nature, as a mere nothing\nin comparison with the Ideas of Reason, if it is sought to furnish a\npresentation which shall be adequate to them.\n\n\n\u00a7 27. _Of the quality of the satisfaction in our judgements upon the\nSublime_\n\nThe feeling of our incapacity to attain to an Idea, _which is a law for\nus_, is RESPECT. Now the Idea of the comprehension of every phenomenon\nthat can be given us in the intuition of a whole, is an Idea prescribed\nto us by a law of Reason, which recognises no other measure, definite,\nvalid for every one, and invariable, than the absolute whole. But\nour Imagination, even in its greatest efforts, in respect of that\ncomprehension, which we expect from it, of a given object in a whole of\nintuition (and thus with reference to the presentation of the Idea of\nReason), exhibits its own limits and inadequacy; although at the same\ntime it shows that its destination is to make itself adequate to this\nIdea regarded as a law. Therefore the feeling of the Sublime in nature\nis respect for our own destination, which by a certain subreption we\nattribute to an Object of nature (conversion of respect for the Idea of\nhumanity in our own subject into respect for the Object). This makes\nintuitively evident the superiority of the rational determination of\nour cognitive faculties to the greatest faculty of our Sensibility.\n\nThe feeling of the Sublime is therefore a feeling of pain, arising\nfrom the want of accordance between the aesthetical estimation of\nmagnitude formed by the Imagination and the estimation of the same\nformed by Reason. There is at the same time a pleasure thus excited,\narising from the correspondence with rational Ideas of this very\njudgement of the inadequacy of our greatest faculty of Sense; in so\nfar as it is a law for us to strive after these Ideas. In fact it is\nfor us a law (of Reason), and belongs to our destination, to estimate\nas small, in comparison with Ideas of Reason, everything which nature,\nregarded as an object of Sense, contains that is great for us; and\nthat which arouses in us the feeling of this supersensible destination\nagrees with that law. Now the greatest effort of the Imagination in\nthe presentation of the unit for the estimation of magnitude indicates\na reference to something _absolutely great_; and consequently a\nreference to the law of Reason, which bids us take this alone as\nthe supreme measure of magnitude. Therefore the inner perception of\nthe inadequacy of all sensible standards for rational estimation of\nmagnitude indicates a correspondence with rational laws; it involves a\npain, which arouses in us the feeling of our supersensible destination,\naccording to which it is purposive and therefore pleasurable to find\nevery standard of Sensibility inadequate to the Ideas of Understanding.\n\nThe mind feels itself _moved_ in the representation of the Sublime\nin nature; whilst in aesthetical judgements about the Beautiful it\nis in _restful_ contemplation. This movement may (especially in\nits beginnings) be compared to a vibration, _i.e._ to a quickly\nalternating attraction towards, and repulsion from, the same Object.\nThe transcendent (towards which the Imagination is impelled in its\napprehension of intuition) is for the Imagination like an abyss in\nwhich it fears to lose itself; but for the rational Idea of the\nsupersensible it is not transcendent but in conformity with law to\nbring about such an effort of the Imagination, and consequently here\nthere is the same amount of attraction as there was of repulsion for\nthe mere Sensibility. But the judgement itself always remains in this\ncase only aesthetical, because--without having any determinate concept\nof the Object at its basis--it merely represents the subjective play\nof the mental powers (Imagination and Reason) as harmonious through\ntheir very contrast. For just as Imagination and _Understanding_, in\njudging of the Beautiful, generate a subjective purposiveness of the\nmental powers by means of their harmony, so [here[46]] Imagination and\n_Reason_ do so by means of their conflict. That is, they bring about a\nfeeling that we possess pure self-subsistent Reason, or a faculty for\nthe estimation of magnitude, whose pre-eminence can be made intuitively\nevident only by the inadequacy of that faculty [Imagination] which\nis itself unbounded in the presentation of magnitudes (of sensible\nobjects).\n\nThe measurement of a space (regarded as apprehension) is at the same\ntime a description of it, and thus an objective movement in the act\nof Imagination and a progress. On the other hand, the comprehension\nof the manifold in the unity,--not of thought but of intuition,--and\nconsequently the comprehension of the successively apprehended\n[elements] in one glance, is a regress, which annihilates the condition\nof time in this progress of the Imagination and makes _coexistence_\nintuitible.[47] It is therefore (since the time-series is a condition\nof the internal sense and of an intuition) a subjective movement of\nthe Imagination, by which it does violence to the internal sense;\nthis must be the more noticeable, the greater the quantum is which the\nImagination comprehends in one intuition. The effort, therefore, to\nreceive in one single intuition a measure for magnitudes that requires\nan appreciable time to apprehend, is a kind of representation, which,\nsubjectively considered, is contrary to purpose: but objectively, as\nrequisite for the estimation of magnitude, it is purposive. Thus that\nvery violence which is done to the subject through the Imagination is\njudged as purposive _in reference to the whole determination_ of the\nmind.\n\nThe _quality_ of the feeling of the Sublime is that it is a feeling\nof pain in reference to the faculty by which we judge aesthetically\nof an object, which pain, however, is represented at the same time as\npurposive. This is possible through the fact that the very incapacity\nin question discovers the consciousness of an unlimited faculty of\nthe same subject, and that the mind can only judge of the latter\naesthetically by means of the former.\n\nIn the logical estimation of magnitude the impossibility of ever\narriving at absolute totality, by means of the progress of the\nmeasurement of things of the sensible world in time and space, was\ncognised as objective, _i.e._ as an impossibility of _thinking_ the\ninfinite as entirely given; and not as merely subjective or that there\nwas only an incapacity to _grasp_ it. For there we have not to do with\nthe degree of comprehension in an intuition, regarded as a measure,\nbut everything depends on a concept of number. But in aesthetical\nestimation of magnitude the concept of number must disappear or be\nchanged, and the comprehension of the Imagination in reference to the\nunit of measure (thus avoiding the concepts of a law of the successive\nproduction of concepts of magnitude) is alone purposive for it.--If now\na magnitude almost reaches the limit of our faculty of comprehension\nin an intuition, and yet the Imagination is invited by means of\nnumerical magnitudes (in respect of which we are conscious that our\nfaculty is unbounded) to aesthetical comprehension in a greater unit,\nthen we mentally feel ourselves confined aesthetically within bounds.\nBut nevertheless the pain in regard to the necessary extension of the\nImagination for accordance with that which is unbounded in our faculty\nof Reason, viz. the Idea of the absolute whole, and consequently the\nvery unpurposiveness of the faculty of Imagination for rational Ideas\nand the arousing of them, are represented as purposive. Thus it is that\nthe aesthetical judgement itself is subjectively purposive for the\nReason as the source of Ideas, _i.e._ as the source of an intellectual\ncomprehension for which all aesthetical comprehension is small; and\nthere accompanies the reception of an object as sublime a pleasure,\nwhich is only possible through the medium of a pain.\n\n\nB.--OF THE DYNAMICALLY SUBLIME IN NATURE\n\n\n\u00a7 28. _Of Nature regarded as Might_\n\n_Might_ is that which is superior to great hindrances. It is called\n_dominion_ if it is superior to the resistance of that which itself\npossesses might. Nature considered in an aesthetical judgement as might\nthat has no dominion over us, is _dynamically sublime_.\n\nIf nature is to be judged by us as dynamically sublime, it must be\nrepresented as exciting fear (although it is not true conversely\nthat every object which excites fear is regarded in our aesthetical\njudgement as sublime). For in aesthetical judgements (without the aid\nof concepts) superiority to hindrances can only be judged according\nto the greatness of the resistance. Now that which we are driven to\nresist is an evil, and, if we do not find our faculties a match for it,\nis an object of fear. Hence nature can be regarded by the aesthetical\nJudgement as might, and consequently as dynamically sublime, only so\nfar as it is considered an object of fear.\n\nBut we can regard an object as _fearful_, without being afraid _of_\nit; viz. if we judge of it in such a way that we merely _think_ a case\nin which we would wish to resist it, and yet in which all resistance\nwould be altogether vain. Thus the virtuous man fears God without being\nafraid of Him; because to wish to resist Him and His commandments, he\nthinks is a case as to which _he_ need not be anxious. But in every\nsuch case that he thinks as not impossible, he cognises Him as fearful.\n\nHe who fears can form no judgement about the Sublime in nature; just\nas he who is seduced by inclination and appetite can form no judgement\nabout the Beautiful. The former flies from the sight of an object which\ninspires him with awe; and it is impossible to find satisfaction in\na terror that is seriously felt. Hence the pleasurableness arising\nfrom the cessation of an uneasiness is _a state of joy_. But this, on\naccount of the deliverance from danger [which is involved], is a state\nof joy conjoined with the resolve not to expose ourselves to the danger\nagain; we cannot willingly look back upon our sensations [of danger],\nmuch less seek the occasion for them again.\n\nBold, overhanging, and as it were threatening, rocks; clouds piled up\nin the sky, moving with lightning flashes and thunder peals; volcanoes\nin all their violence of destruction; hurricanes with their track\nof devastation; the boundless ocean in a state of tumult; the lofty\nwaterfall of a mighty river, and such like; these exhibit our faculty\nof resistance as insignificantly small in comparison with their might.\nBut the sight of them is the more attractive, the more fearful it\nis, provided only that we are in security; and we readily call these\nobjects sublime, because they raise the energies of the soul above\ntheir accustomed height, and discover in us a faculty of resistance of\na quite different kind, which gives us courage to measure ourselves\nagainst the apparent almightiness of nature.\n\nNow, in the immensity of nature, and in the inadequacy of our faculties\nfor adopting a standard proportionate to the aesthetical estimation of\nthe magnitude of its _realm_, we find our own limitation; although at\nthe same time in our rational faculty we find a different, non-sensuous\nstandard, which has that infinity itself under it as a unit, and in\ncomparison with which everything in nature is small. Thus in our mind\nwe find a superiority to nature even in its immensity. And so also\nthe irresistibility of its might, while making us recognise our own\n[physical[48]] impotence, considered as beings of nature, discloses\nto us a faculty of judging independently of, and a superiority over,\nnature; on which is based a kind of self-preservation, entirely\ndifferent from that which can be attacked and brought into danger by\nexternal nature. Thus, humanity in our person remains unhumiliated,\nthough the individual might have to submit to this dominion. In this\nway nature is not judged to be sublime in our aesthetical judgements,\nin so far as it excites fear; but because it calls up that power in\nus (which is not nature) of regarding as small the things about which\nwe are solicitous (goods, health, and life), and of regarding its\nmight (to which we are no doubt subjected in respect of these things),\nas nevertheless without any dominion over us and our personality to\nwhich we must bow where our highest fundamental propositions, and\ntheir assertion or abandonment, are concerned. Therefore nature is\nhere called sublime merely because it elevates the Imagination to a\npresentation of those cases in which the mind can make felt the proper\nsublimity of its destination, in comparison with nature itself.\n\nThis estimation of ourselves loses nothing through the fact that\nwe must regard ourselves as safe in order to feel this inspiriting\nsatisfaction; and that hence, as there is no seriousness in the\ndanger, there might be also (as might seem to be the case) just as\nlittle seriousness in the sublimity of our spiritual faculty. For\nthe satisfaction here concerns only the _destination_ of our faculty\nwhich discloses itself in such a case, so far as the tendency to this\ndestination lies in our nature, whilst its development and exercise\nremain incumbent and obligatory. And in this there is truth, however\nconscious the man may be of his present actual powerlessness, when he\nstretches his reflection so far.\n\nNo doubt this principle seems to be too far-fetched and too subtly\nreasoned, and consequently seems to go beyond the scope of an\naesthetical judgement; but observation of men proves the opposite, and\nshows that it may lie at the root of the most ordinary judgements,\nalthough we are not always conscious of it. For what is that which is,\neven to the savage, an object of the greatest admiration? It is a man\nwho shrinks from nothing, who fears nothing, and therefore does not\nyield to danger, but rather goes to face it vigorously with the fullest\ndeliberation. Even in the most highly civilised state this peculiar\nveneration for the soldier remains, though only under the condition\nthat he exhibit all the virtues of peace, gentleness, compassion, and\neven a becoming care for his own person; because even by these it\nis recognised that his mind is unsubdued by danger. Hence whatever\ndisputes there may be about the superiority of the respect which is\nto be accorded them, in the comparison of a statesman and a general,\nthe aesthetical judgement decides for the latter. War itself, if it\nis carried on with order and with a sacred respect for the rights of\ncitizens, has something sublime in it, and makes the disposition of the\npeople who carry it on thus, only the more sublime, the more numerous\nare the dangers to which they are exposed, and in respect of which\nthey behave with courage. On the other hand, a long peace generally\nbrings about a predominant commercial spirit, and along with it, low\nselfishness, cowardice, and effeminacy, and debases the disposition of\nthe people.[49]\n\nIt appears to conflict with this solution of the concept of the\nsublime, so far as sublimity is ascribed to might, that we are\naccustomed to represent God as presenting Himself in His wrath and\nyet in His sublimity, in the tempest, the storm, the earthquake, etc.;\nand that it would be foolish and criminal to imagine a superiority of\nour minds over these works of His, and, as it seems, even over the\ndesigns of such might. Hence it would appear that no feeling of the\nsublimity of our own nature, but rather subjection, abasement, and a\nfeeling of complete powerlessness, is a fitting state of mind before\nthe manifestation of such an object, and this is generally bound up\nwith the Idea of it during natural phenomena of this kind. Generally in\nreligion, prostration, adoration with bent head, with contrite, anxious\ndemeanour and voice, seems to be the only fitting behaviour in presence\nof the Godhead; and hence most peoples have adopted and still observe\nit. But this state of mind is far from being necessarily bound up with\nthe Idea of the _sublimity_ of a religion and its object. The man who\nis actually afraid, because he finds reasons for fear in himself,\nwhilst conscious by his culpable disposition of offending against a\nMight whose will is irresistible and at the same time just, is not in\nthe frame of mind for admiring the divine greatness. For this a mood of\ncalm contemplation and a quite free judgement are needed. Only if he is\nconscious of an upright disposition pleasing to God do those operations\nof might serve to awaken in him the Idea of the sublimity of this\nBeing, for then he recognises in himself a sublimity of disposition\nconformable to His will; and thus he is raised above the fear of such\noperations of nature, which he no longer regards as outbursts of His\nwrath. Even humility, in the shape of a stern judgement upon his own\nfaults,--which otherwise, with a consciousness of good intentions,\ncould be easily palliated from the frailty of human nature,--is a\nsublime state of mind, consisting in a voluntary subjection of himself\nto the pain of remorse, in order that its causes may be gradually\nremoved. In this way religion is essentially distinguished from\nsuperstition. The latter establishes in the mind, not reverence for the\nSublime, but fear and apprehension of the all-powerful Being to whose\nwill the terrified man sees himself subject, without according Him any\nhigh esteem. From this nothing can arise but a seeking of favour, and\nflattery, instead of a religion which consists in a good life.[50]\n\nSublimity, therefore, does not reside in anything of nature, but only\nin our mind, in so far as we can become conscious that we are superior\nto nature within, and therefore also to nature without us (so far\nas it influences us). Everything that excites this feeling in us,\n_e.g._ the _might_ of nature which calls forth our forces, is called\nthen (although improperly) sublime. Only by supposing this Idea in\nourselves, and in reference to it, are we capable of attaining to the\nIdea of the sublimity of that Being, which produces respect in us, not\nmerely by the might that it displays in nature, but rather by means\nof the faculty which resides in us of judging it fearlessly and of\nregarding our destination as sublime in respect of it.\n\n\n\u00a7 29. _Of the modality of the judgement upon the sublime in nature_\n\nThere are numberless beautiful things in nature about which we can\nassume and even expect, without being far mistaken, the harmony of\nevery one\u2019s judgement with our own. But in respect of our judgement\nupon the sublime in nature, we cannot promise ourselves so easily\nthe accordance of others. For a far greater culture, as well of the\naesthetical Judgement as of the cognitive faculties which lie at its\nbasis, seems requisite in order to be able to pass judgement on this\npre-eminent quality of natural objects.\n\nThat the mind be attuned to feel the sublime postulates a\nsusceptibility of the mind for Ideas. For in the very inadequacy of\nnature to these latter, and thus only by presupposing them and by\nstraining the Imagination to use nature as a schema for them, is to\nbe found that which is terrible to sensibility and yet is attractive.\n[It is attractive] because Reason exerts a dominion over sensibility\nin order to extend it in conformity with its own realm (the practical)\nand to make it look out into the Infinite, which is for it an abyss. In\nfact, without development of moral Ideas, that which we, prepared by\nculture, call sublime, presents itself to the uneducated man merely as\nterrible. In the indications of the dominion of nature in destruction,\nand in the great scale of its might, in comparison with which his own\nis a vanishing quantity, he will only see the misery, danger, and\ndistress which surround the man who is exposed to it. So the good,\nand indeed intelligent, Savoyard peasant (as Herr von _Saussure_[51]\nrelates) unhesitatingly called all lovers of snow-mountains fools. And\nwho knows, whether he would have been so completely wrong, if Saussure\nhad undertaken the danger to which he exposed himself merely, as most\ntravellers do, from amateur curiosity, or that he might be able to give\na pathetic account of them? But his design was the instruction of men;\nand this excellent man gave the readers of his Travels, soul-stirring\nsensations such as he himself had, into the bargain.\n\nBut although the judgement upon the Sublime in nature needs culture\n(more than the judgement upon the Beautiful), it is not therefore\nprimarily produced by culture and introduced in a merely conventional\nway into society. Rather has it root in human nature, even in that\nwhich, alike with common Understanding, we can impute to and expect of\nevery one, viz. in the tendency to the feeling for (practical) Ideas,\n_i.e._ to the moral feeling.\n\nHereon is based the necessity of that agreement of the judgement of\nothers about the sublime with our own which we include in the latter.\nFor just as we charge with want of _taste_ the man who is indifferent\nwhen passing judgement upon an object of nature that we regard as\nbeautiful; so we say of him who remains unmoved in the presence of that\nwhich we judge to be sublime, he has no _feeling_. But we claim both\nfrom every man, and we presuppose them in him if he has any culture at\nall; only with the difference, that we expect the former directly of\nevery one, because in it the Judgement refers the Imagination merely to\nthe Understanding, the faculty of concepts; but the latter, because\nin it the Imagination is related to the Reason, the faculty of Ideas,\nonly under a subjective presupposition (which, however, we believe we\nare authorised in imputing to every one), viz. the presupposition of\nthe moral feeling [in man.[52]] Thus it is that we ascribe necessity to\nthis aesthetical judgement also.\n\nIn this modality of aesthetical judgements, viz. in the necessity\nclaimed for them, lies an important moment of the Critique of\nJudgement. For it enables us to recognise in them an _a priori_\nprinciple, and raises them out of empirical psychology, in which\notherwise they would remain buried amongst the feelings of\ngratification and grief (only with the unmeaning addition of being\ncalled _finer_ feelings). Thus it enables us too to place the Judgement\namong those faculties that have _a priori_ principles at their basis,\nand so to bring it into Transcendental Philosophy.\n\n\n\n\nGENERAL REMARK UPON THE EXPOSITION OF THE AESTHETICAL REFLECTIVE\nJUDGEMENT\n\n\nIn reference to the feeling of pleasure an object is to be classified\nas either _pleasant_, or _beautiful_, or _sublime_, or _good_\n(absolutely), (_jucundum_, _pulchrum_, _sublime_, _honestum_).\n\nThe _pleasant_, as motive of desire, is always of one and the same\nkind, no matter whence it comes and however specifically different\nthe representation (of sense, and sensation objectively considered)\nmay be. Hence in judging its influence on the mind, account is taken\nonly of the number of its charms (simultaneous and successive), and\nso only of the mass, as it were, of the pleasant sensation; and this\ncan be made intelligible only by _quantity_. It has no reference\nto culture, but belongs to mere enjoyment.--On the other hand, the\n_beautiful_ requires the representation of a certain _quality_ of\nthe Object, that can be made intelligible and reduced to concepts\n(although it is not so reduced in an aesthetical judgement); and it\ncultivates us, in that it teaches us to attend to the purposiveness\nin the feeling of pleasure.--The _sublime_ consists merely in the\n_relation_ by which the sensible in the representation of nature is\njudged available for a possible supersensible use.--The _absolutely\ngood_, subjectively judged according to the feeling that it inspires\n(the Object of the moral feeling), as capable of determining the powers\nof the subject through the representation of an _absolutely compelling_\nlaw, is specially distinguished by the _modality_ of a necessity that\nrests _a priori_ upon concepts. This necessity involves not merely\na _claim_, but a _command_ for the assent of every one, and belongs\nin itself to the pure intellectual, rather than to the aesthetical\nJudgement; and is by a determinant and not a mere reflective judgement\nascribed not to Nature but to Freedom. But the _determinability of\nthe subject_ by means of this Idea, and especially of a subject\nthat can feel _hindrances_ in sensibility, and at the same time its\nsuperiority to them by their subjugation involving a _modification of\nits state_--_i.e._ the moral feeling,--is yet so far cognate to the\naesthetical Judgement and its formal conditions that it can serve to\nrepresent the conformity to law of action from duty as aesthetical,\n_i.e._ as sublime or even as beautiful, without losing its purity. This\nwould not be so, if we were to put it in natural combination with the\nfeeling of the pleasant.\n\nIf we take the result of the foregoing exposition of the two kinds\nof aesthetical judgements, there arise therefrom the following short\nexplanations:\n\nThe _Beautiful_ is what pleases in the mere judgement (and therefore\nnot by the medium of sensation in accordance with a concept of the\nUnderstanding). It follows at once from this that it must please apart\nfrom all interest.\n\nThe _Sublime_ is what pleases immediately through its opposition to the\ninterest of sense.\n\nBoth, as explanations of aesthetical universally valid judging,\nare referred to subjective grounds; in the one case to grounds of\nsensibility, in favour of the contemplative Understanding; in the other\ncase _in opposition to_ sensibility, but on behalf of the purposes\nof practical Reason. Both, however, united in the same subject, are\npurposive in reference to the moral feeling. The Beautiful prepares\nus to love disinterestedly something, even nature itself; the Sublime\nprepares us to esteem something highly even in opposition to our own\n(sensible) interest.\n\nWe may describe the Sublime thus: it is an object (of nature)\n_the representation of which determines the mind to think the\nunattainability of nature regarded as a presentation of Ideas_.\n\nLiterally taken and logically considered, Ideas cannot be presented.\nBut if we extend our empirical representative faculty (mathematically\nor dynamically) to the intuition of nature, Reason inevitably\nintervenes, as the faculty expressing the independence of absolute\ntotality,[53] and generates the effort of the mind, vain though it\nbe, to make the representation of the senses adequate to this. This\neffort,--and the feeling of the unattainability of the Idea by means\nof the Imagination,--is itself a presentation of the subjective\npurposiveness of our mind in the employment of the Imagination for\nits supersensible destination; and forces us, subjectively, to\n_think_ nature itself in its totality as a presentation of something\nsupersensible, without being able _objectively_ to arrive at this\npresentation.\n\nFor we soon see that nature in space and time entirely lacks the\nunconditioned, and, consequently, that absolute magnitude, which yet is\ndesired by the most ordinary Reason. It is by this that we are reminded\nthat we only have to do with nature as phenomenon, and that it must\nbe regarded as the mere presentation of a nature in itself (of which\nReason has the Idea). But this Idea of the supersensible, which we can\nno further determine,--so that we cannot _know_ but only _think_ nature\nas its presentation,--is awakened in us by means of an object, whose\naesthetical appreciation strains the Imagination to its utmost bounds,\nwhether of extension (mathematical) or of its might over the mind\n(dynamical). And this judgement is based upon a feeling of the mind\u2019s\ndestination, which entirely surpasses the realm of the former (_i.e._\nupon the moral feeling), in respect of which the representation of the\nobject is judged as subjectively purposive.\n\nIn fact, a feeling for the Sublime in nature cannot well be thought\nwithout combining therewith a mental disposition which is akin to the\nMoral. And although the immediate pleasure in the Beautiful of nature\nlikewise presupposes and cultivates a certain _liberality_ in our\nmental attitude, _i.e._ a satisfaction independent of mere sensible\nenjoyment, yet freedom is thus represented as in _play_ rather than\nin that law-directed _occupation_ which is the genuine characteristic\nof human morality, in which Reason must exercise dominion over\nSensibility. But in aesthetical judgements upon the Sublime this\ndominion is represented as exercised by the Imagination, regarded as an\ninstrument of Reason.\n\nThe satisfaction in the Sublime of nature is then only _negative_\n(whilst that in the Beautiful is _positive_); viz. a feeling that the\nImagination is depriving itself of its freedom, while it is purposively\ndetermined according to a different law from that of its empirical\nemployment. It thus acquires an extension and a might greater than it\nsacrifices,--the ground of which, however, is concealed from itself;\nwhilst yet it _feels_ the sacrifice or the deprivation and, at the\nsame time, the cause to which it is subjected. _Astonishment_, that\nborders upon terror, the dread and the holy awe which seizes the\nobserver at the sight of mountain peaks rearing themselves to heaven,\ndeep chasms and streams raging therein, deep-shadowed solitudes that\ndispose one to melancholy meditations--this, in the safety in which we\nknow ourselves to be, is not actual fear, but only an attempt to feel\nfear by the aid of the Imagination; that we may feel the might of this\nfaculty in combining with the mind\u2019s repose the mental movement thereby\nexcited, and being thus superior to internal nature,--and therefore\nto external,--so far as this can have any influence on our feeling of\nwell-being. For the Imagination by the laws of Association makes our\nstate of contentment dependent on physical [causes]; but it also,\nby the principles of the Schematism of the Judgement (being so far,\ntherefore, ranked under freedom), is the instrument of Reason and its\nIdeas, and, as such, has might to maintain our independence of natural\ninfluences, to regard as small what in reference to them is great, and\nso to place the absolutely great only in the proper destination of the\nsubject. The raising of this reflection of the aesthetical Judgement\nso as to be adequate to Reason (though without a definite concept of\nReason) represents the object as subjectively purposive, even by the\nobjective want of accordance between the Imagination in its greatest\nextension and the Reason (as the faculty of Ideas).\n\nWe must here, generally, attend to what has been already noted, that\nin the Transcendental Aesthetic of Judgement we must speak solely of\npure aesthetical judgements; consequently our examples are not to be\ntaken from such beautiful or sublime objects of Nature as presuppose\nthe concept of a purpose. For, if so, the purposiveness would be\neither teleological, or would be based on mere sensations of an object\n(gratification or grief); and thus would be in the former case not\naesthetical, in the latter not merely formal. If then we call the sight\nof the starry heaven _sublime_, we must not place at the basis of our\njudgement concepts of worlds inhabited by rational beings, and regard\nthe bright points, with which we see the space above us filled, as\ntheir suns moving in circles purposively fixed with reference to them;\nbut we must regard it, just as we see it, as a distant, all-embracing\nvault. Only under such a representation can we range that sublimity\nwhich a pure aesthetical judgement ascribes to this object. And in\nthe same way, if we are to call the sight of the ocean sublime, we\nmust not _think_ of it as we [ordinarily] do, endowed as we are with\nall kinds of knowledge (not contained, however, in the immediate\nintuition). For example, we sometimes think of the ocean as a vast\nkingdom of aquatic creatures; or as the great source of those vapours\nthat fill the air with clouds for the benefit of the land; or again\nas an element which, though dividing continents from each other, yet\npromotes the greatest communication between them: but these furnish\nmerely teleological judgements. To call the ocean sublime we must\nregard it as poets do, merely by what strikes the eye; if it is at\nrest, as a clear mirror of water only bounded by the heaven; if it is\nrestless, as an abyss threatening to overwhelm everything. The like is\nto be said of the Sublime and Beautiful in the human figure. We must\nnot regard as the determining grounds of our judgement the concepts\nof the purposes which all our limbs serve, and we must not allow this\ncoincidence to _influence_ our aesthetical judgement (for then it would\nno longer be pure); although it is certainly a necessary condition of\naesthetical satisfaction that there should be no conflict between them.\nAesthetical purposiveness is the conformity to law of the Judgement in\nits _freedom_. The satisfaction in the object depends on the relation\nin which we wish to place the Imagination; always provided that it by\nitself entertains the mind in free occupation. If, on the other hand,\nthe judgement be determined by anything else,--whether sensation or\nconcept,--although it may be conformable to law, it cannot be the act\nof a _free_ Judgement.\n\nIf then we speak of intellectual beauty or sublimity, these expressions\nare, _first_, not quite accurate, because beauty and sublimity are\naesthetical modes of representation, which would not be found in us at\nall if we were pure intelligences (or even regarded ourselves as such\nin thought). _Secondly_, although both, as objects of an intellectual\n(moral) satisfaction, are so far compatible with aesthetical\nsatisfaction that they _rest_ upon no interest, yet they are difficult\nto unite with it, because they are meant to _produce_ an interest.\nThis, if its presentation is to harmonise with the satisfaction in the\naesthetical judgement, could only arise by means of a sensible interest\nthat we combine with it in the presentation; and thus damage would be\ndone to the intellectual purposiveness, and it would lose its purity.\n\nThe object of a pure and unconditioned intellectual satisfaction is\nthe Moral Law in that might which it exercises in us over all mental\nmotives _that precede it_. This might only makes itself aesthetically\nknown to us through sacrifices (which causing a feeling of deprivation,\nthough on behalf of internal freedom, in return discloses in us an\nunfathomable depth of this supersensible faculty, with consequences\nextending beyond our ken); thus the satisfaction on the aesthetical\nside (in relation to sensibility) is negative, _i.e._ against this\ninterest, but regarded from the intellectual side it is positive and\ncombined with an interest. Hence it follows that the intellectual,\nin itself purposive, (moral) good, aesthetically judged, must be\nrepresented as sublime rather than beautiful, so that it rather awakens\nthe feeling of respect (which disdains charm) than that of love and\nfamiliar inclination; for human nature does not attach itself to this\ngood spontaneously, but only by the authority which Reason exercises\nover Sensibility. Conversely also, that which we call sublime in\nnature, whether external or internal (_e.g._ certain affections), is\nonly represented as a might in the mind to overcome [_certain_][54]\nhindrances of the Sensibility by means of moral fundamental\npropositions, and only thus does it interest.\n\nI will dwell a moment on this latter point. The Idea of the Good\nconjoined with affection is called _enthusiasm_. This state of mind\nseems to be sublime, to the extent that we commonly assert that\nnothing great could be done without it. Now every affection[55] is\nblind, either in the choice of its purpose, or, if this be supplied\nby Reason, in its accomplishment; for it is a mental movement which\nmakes it impossible to exercise a free deliberation about fundamental\npropositions so as to determine ourselves thereby. It can therefore in\nno way deserve the approval of the Reason. Nevertheless, aesthetically,\nenthusiasm is sublime, because it is a tension of forces produced\nby Ideas, which give an impulse to the mind, that operates far more\npowerfully and lastingly than the impulse arising from sensible\nrepresentations. But (which seems strange) the _absence of affection_\n(_apatheia, phlegma in significatu bono_) in a mind that vigorously\nfollows its unalterable principles is sublime, and in a far preferable\nway, because it has also on its side the satisfaction of pure\nReason.[56] It is only a mental state of this kind that is called\nnoble; and this expression is subsequently applied to things, _e.g._ a\nbuilding, a garment, literary style, bodily presence, etc., when these\ndo not so much arouse _astonishment_ (the affection produced by the\nrepresentation of novelty exceeding our expectations), as _admiration_\n(astonishment that does not cease when the novelty disappears); and\nthis is the case when Ideas agree in their presentation undesignedly\nand artlessly with the aesthetical satisfaction.\n\nEvery affection of the STRENUOUS kind (viz. that excites the\nconsciousness of our power to overcome every obstacle--_animi strenui_)\nis _aesthetically sublime_, _e.g._ wrath, even despair (_i.e._ the\ndespair of _indignation_, not of _faintheartedness_). But affections of\nthe LANGUID kind (which make the very effort of resistance an object\nof pain--_animum languidum_) have nothing _noble_ in themselves, but\nthey may be reckoned under the sensuously beautiful. _Emotions_,\nwhich may rise to the strength of affections, are very different.\nWe have both _spirited_ and _tender_ emotions. The latter, if they\nrise to the height of affections, are worthless; the propensity to\nthem is called _sentimentality_. A sympathetic grief that will not\nadmit of consolation, or one referring to imaginary evils to which\nwe deliberately surrender ourselves--being deceived by fancy--as if\nthey were actual, indicates and produces a tender,[57] though weak,\nsoul--which shows a beautiful side and which can be called fanciful,\nthough not enthusiastic. Romances, lacrymose plays, shallow moral\nprecepts, which toy with (falsely) so-called moral dispositions, but\nin fact make the heart languid, insensible to the severe precept of\nduty, and incapable of all respect for the worth of humanity in our\nown person, and for the rights of men (a very different thing from\ntheir happiness), and in general incapable of all steady principle;\neven a religious discourse,[58] which recommends a cringing, abject\nseeking of favour and ingratiation of ourselves, which proposes the\nabandonment of all confidence in our own faculties in opposition to\nthe evil within us, instead of a sturdy resolution to endeavour to\novercome our inclinations by means of those powers which with all our\nfrailty yet remain to us; that false humility which sets the only\nway of pleasing the Supreme Being in self-depreciation, in whining\nhypocritical repentance and in a mere passive state of mind--these are\nnot compatible with any frame of mind that can be counted beautiful,\nstill less with one which is to be counted sublime.\n\nBut even stormy movements of mind which may be connected under the\nname of edification with Ideas of religion, or--as merely belonging\nto culture--with Ideas containing a social interest, can in no way,\nhowever they strain the Imagination, lay claim to the honour of\nbeing _sublime_ presentations, unless they leave after them a mental\nmood which, although only indirectly, has influence upon the mind\u2019s\nconsciousness of its strength, and its resolution in reference to that\nwhich involves pure intellectual purposiveness (the supersensible). For\notherwise all these emotions belong only to _motion_, which one would\nfain enjoy for the sake of health. The pleasant exhaustion, consequent\nupon such disturbance produced by the play of the affections, is an\nenjoyment of our well-being arising from the restored equilibrium of\nthe various vital forces. This in the end amounts to the same thing as\nthat state which Eastern voluptuaries find so delightful, when they\nget their bodies as it were kneaded and all their muscles and joints\nsoftly pressed and bent; only that in this case the motive principle\nis for the most part external, in the other case it is altogether\ninternal. Many a man believes himself to be edified by a sermon, when\nindeed there is no edification at all (no system of good maxims); or\nto be improved by a tragedy, when he is only glad at his ennui being\nhappily dispelled. So the Sublime must always have reference to the\n_disposition_, _i.e._ to the maxims which furnish to the intellectual\n[part] and to the Ideas of Reason a superiority over sensibility.\n\nWe need not fear that the feeling of the sublime will lose by so\nabstract a mode of presentation,--which is quite negative in respect\nof what is sensible,--for the Imagination, although it finds nothing\nbeyond the sensible to which it can attach itself, yet feels itself\nunbounded by this removal of its limitations; and thus that very\nabstraction is a presentation of the Infinite, which can be nothing\nbut a mere negative presentation, but which yet expands the soul.\nPerhaps there is no sublimer passage in the Jewish Law than the\ncommand, _Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven image, nor the\nlikeness of anything which is in heaven or on the earth or under the\nearth_, etc. This command alone can explain the enthusiasm that the\nJewish people in their moral period felt for their religion, when they\ncompared themselves with other peoples; or explain the pride which\nMahommedanism inspires. The same is true of the moral law and of the\ntendency to morality in us. It is quite erroneous to fear that if we\ndeprive this [tendency] of all that can recommend it to sense it will\nonly involve a cold lifeless assent and no moving force or emotion. It\nis quite the other way, for where the senses see nothing more before\nthem, and the unmistakable and indelible Idea of morality remains,\nit would be rather necessary to moderate the impetus of an unbounded\nImagination, to prevent it from rising to enthusiasm, than through fear\nof the powerlessness of these Ideas to seek aid for them in images and\nchildish ritual. Thus governments have willingly allowed religion to be\nabundantly provided with the latter accessories; and seeking thereby\nto relieve their subjects of trouble, they have also sought to deprive\nthem of the faculty of extending their spiritual powers beyond the\nlimits that are arbitrarily assigned to them, and by means of which\nthey can be the more easily treated as mere passive[59] beings.\n\nThis pure, elevating, merely negative presentation of morality brings\nwith it, on the other hand, no danger of _fanaticism_, which is _a\ndelusion that we can will ourselves to see something beyond all bounds\nof sensibility_, _i.e._ to dream in accordance with fundamental\npropositions (or to go mad with Reason); and this is so just because\nthis presentation is merely negative. For the _inscrutableness of the\nIdea of Freedom_ quite cuts it off from any positive presentation; but\nthe moral law is in itself sufficiently and originally determinant\nin us, so that it does not permit us to cast a glance at any ground\nof determination external to itself. If enthusiasm is comparable to\n_madness_, fanaticism is comparable to _monomania_; of which the latter\nis least of all compatible with the sublime, because in its detail it\nis ridiculous. In enthusiasm, regarded as an affection, the Imagination\nis without bridle; in fanaticism, regarded as an inveterate, brooding\npassion, it is without rule. The first is a transitory accident which\nsometimes befalls the soundest Understanding; the second is a disease\nwhich unsettles it.\n\n_Simplicity_ (purposiveness without art) is as it were the style of\nNature in the sublime, and so also of Morality which is a second\n(supersensible) nature; of which we only know the laws without being\nable to reach by intuition that supersensible faculty in ourselves\nwhich contains the ground of the legislation.\n\nNow the satisfaction in the Beautiful, like that in the Sublime,\nis not alone distinguishable from other aesthetical judgements by\nits universal _communicability_, but also because, through this\nvery property, it acquires an interest in reference to society (in\nwhich this communication is possible). We must, however, remark that\n_separation from all society_ is regarded as sublime, if it rests\nupon Ideas that overlook all sensible interest. To be sufficient for\noneself, and consequently to have no need of society, without at the\nsame time being unsociable, _i.e._ without flying from it, is something\nbordering on the sublime; as is any dispensing with wants. On the other\nhand, to fly from men from _misanthropy_, because we bear ill-will to\nthem, or from _anthropophoby_ (shyness), because we fear them as foes,\nis partly hateful, partly contemptible. There is indeed a misanthropy\n(very improperly so-called), the tendency to which frequently appears\nwith old age in many right-thinking men; which is philanthropic enough\nas far as _goodwill_ to men is concerned, but which through long and\nsad experience is far removed from _satisfaction_ with men. Evidence of\nthis is afforded by the propensity to solitude, the fantastic wish for\na secluded country seat, or (in the case of young persons) by the dream\nof the happiness of passing one\u2019s life with a little family upon some\nisland unknown to the rest of the world; a dream of which story-tellers\nor writers of Robinsonades know how to make good use. Falsehood,\ningratitude, injustice, the childishness of the purposes regarded by\nourselves as important and great, in the pursuit of which men inflict\nupon each other all imaginable evils, are so contradictory to the Idea\nof what men might be if they would, and conflict so with our lively\nwish to see them better, that, in order that we may not hate them\n(since we cannot love them), the renunciation of all social joys seems\nbut a small sacrifice. This sadness--not the sadness (of which sympathy\nis the cause) for the evils which fate brings upon others,--but for\nthose things which men do to one another (which depends upon an\nantipathy in fundamental propositions), is sublime, because it rests\nupon Ideas, whilst the former can only count as beautiful.--The\nbrilliant and thorough _Saussure_,[60] in his account of his Alpine\ntravels, says of one of the Savoy mountains, called _Bonhomme_, \u201cThere\nreigns there a certain _insipid sadness_.\u201d He therefore recognised an\n_interesting_ sadness, that the sight of a solitude might inspire, to\nwhich men might wish to transport themselves that they might neither\nhear nor experience any more of the world; which, however, would not\nbe quite so inhospitable that it would offer only an extremely painful\nretreat.--I make this remark solely with the design of indicating\nagain that even depression (not dejected sadness) may be counted among\nthe _sturdy_ affections, if it has its ground in moral Ideas. But if it\nis grounded on sympathy and, as such, is amiable, it belongs merely to\nthe _languid_ affections. [I make this remark] to call attention to the\nstate of mind which is _sublime_ only in the first case.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWe can now compare the above Transcendental Exposition of aesthetical\njudgements with the Physiological worked out by _Burke_ and by many\nclear-headed men among us, in order to see whither a merely empirical\nexposition of the Sublime and Beautiful leads. _Burke_, who deserves\nto be regarded as the most important author who adopts this mode of\ntreatment, infers by this method \u201cthat the feeling of the Sublime\nrests on the impulse towards self-preservation and on _fear_, _i.e._\non a pain, which not going so far as actually to derange the parts of\nthe body, produces movements which, since they purify the finer or\ngrosser vessels of dangerous or troublesome stoppages, are capable\nof exciting pleasant sensations; not indeed pleasure, but a kind of\nsatisfying horror, a certain tranquillity tinged with terror.\u201d[61] The\nBeautiful, which he founded on love (which he wishes to keep quite\nseparate from desire), he reduces to \u201cthe relaxing, slackening, and\nenervating of the fibres of the body, and a consequent weakening,\nlanguor, and exhaustion, a fainting, dissolving, and melting away for\nenjoyment.\u201d[62] And he confirms this explanation not only by cases in\nwhich the Imagination in combination with the Understanding can excite\nin us the feeling of the Beautiful or of the Sublime, but by cases in\nwhich it is combined with sensation.--As psychological observations,\nthese analyses of the phenomena of our mind are exceedingly beautiful,\nand afford rich material for the favourite investigations of empirical\nanthropology. It is also not to be denied that all representations\nin us, whether, objectively viewed, they are merely sensible or are\nquite intellectual, may yet subjectively be united to gratification\nor grief, however imperceptible either may be; because they all\naffect the feeling of life, and none of them, so far as it is a\nmodification of the subject, can be indifferent. And so, as Epicurus\nmaintained, all _gratification_ or _grief_ may ultimately be corporeal,\nwhether it arises from the representations of the Imagination or the\nUnderstanding; because life without a feeling of bodily organs would be\nmerely a consciousness of existence, without any feeling of well-being\nor the reverse, _i.e._ of the furthering or the checking of the vital\npowers. For the mind is by itself alone life (the principle of life),\nand hindrances or furtherances must be sought outside it and yet in\nthe man, consequently in union with his body.\n\nIf, however, we place the satisfaction in the object altogether in\nthe fact that it gratifies us by charm or emotion, we must not assume\nthat any _other_ man agrees with the aesthetical judgement which _we_\npass; for as to these each one rightly consults his own individual\nsensibility. But in that case all censorship of taste would disappear,\nexcept indeed the example afforded by the accidental agreement of\nothers in their judgements were regarded as _commanding_ our assent;\nand this principle we should probably resist, and should appeal to the\nnatural right of subjecting the judgement, which rests on the immediate\nfeeling of our own well-being, to our own sense and not to that of any\nother man.\n\nIf then the judgement of taste is not to be valid merely\n_egoistically_, but according to its inner nature,--_i.e._ on account\nof itself and not on account of the examples that others give of their\ntaste,--to be necessarily valid _pluralistically_, if we regard it\nas a judgement which may exact the adhesion of every one; then there\nmust lie at its basis some _a priori_ principle (whether objective or\nsubjective) to which we can never attain by seeking out the empirical\nlaws of mental changes. For these only enable us to know how we judge,\nbut do not prescribe to us how we ought to judge. They do not supply an\n_unconditioned_ command,[63] such as judgements of taste presuppose,\ninasmuch as they require that the satisfaction be _immediately_\nconnected with the representation. Thus the empirical exposition of\naesthetical judgements may be a beginning of a collection of materials\nfor a higher investigation; but a transcendental discussion of this\nfaculty is also possible, and is an essential part of the Critique of\nTaste. For if it had not _a priori_ principles, it could not possibly\npass sentence on the judgements of others, and it could not approve or\nblame them with any appearance of right.\n\nThe remaining part of the Analytic of the Aesthetical Judgement\ncontains first the\n\n\nDEDUCTION OF [PURE[64]] AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENTS\n\n\u00a7 30. _The Deduction of aesthetical judgements on the objects of nature\nmust not be directed to what we call Sublime in nature, but only to the\nBeautiful._\n\nThe claim of an aesthetical judgement to universal validity for every\nsubject requires, as a judgement resting on some _a priori_ principle,\na Deduction (or legitimatising of its pretensions) in addition to its\nExposition; if it is concerned with satisfaction or dissatisfaction\nin the _form of the Object_. Of this kind are judgements of taste\nabout the Beautiful in Nature. For in that case the purposiveness\nhas its ground in the Object and in its figure, although it does not\nindicate the reference of this to other objects according to concepts\n(for a cognitive judgement), but merely has to do in general with the\napprehension of this form, so far as it shows itself conformable in the\nmind to the _faculty_ of concepts and to that of their presentation\n(which is identical with that of apprehension). We can thus, in respect\nof the Beautiful in nature, suggest many questions touching the cause\nof this purposiveness of their forms, _e.g._ to explain why nature has\nscattered abroad beauty with such profusion, even in the depth of the\nocean, where the human eye (for which alone that purposiveness exists)\nbut seldom penetrates.\n\nBut the Sublime in nature--if we are passing upon it a pure aesthetical\njudgement, not mixed up with any concepts of perfection or objective\npurposiveness, in which case it would be a teleological judgement--may\nbe regarded as quite formless or devoid of figure, and yet as the\nobject of a pure satisfaction; and it may display a subjective\npurposiveness in the given representation. And we ask if, for an\naesthetical judgement of this kind,--over and above the Exposition\nof what is thought in it,--a Deduction also of its claim to any\n(subjective) _a priori_ principle may be demanded?\n\nTo which we may answer that the Sublime in nature is improperly so\ncalled, and that properly speaking the word should only be applied\nto a state of mind, or rather to its foundation in human nature. The\napprehension of an otherwise formless and unpurposive object gives\nmerely the occasion, through which we become conscious of such a state;\nthe object is thus _employed_ as subjectively purposive, but is not\njudged as such _in itself_ and on account of its form (it is, as it\nwere, a _species finalis accepta, non data_). Hence our Exposition of\njudgements concerning the Sublime in nature was at the same time their\nDeduction. For when we analysed the reflection of the Judgement in such\nacts, we found in them a purposive relation of the cognitive faculties,\nwhich must be ascribed ultimately to the faculty of purposes (the\nwill), and hence is itself purposive _a priori_. This then immediately\ninvolves the Deduction, _i.e._ the justification of the claim of such a\njudgement to universal and necessary validity.\n\nWe shall therefore only have to seek for the deduction of judgements\nof Taste, _i.e._ of judgements about the Beauty of natural things;\nwe shall thus treat satisfactorily the problem with which the whole\nfaculty of aesthetical Judgement is concerned.\n\n\n\u00a7 31. _Of the method of deduction of judgements of Taste_\n\nA Deduction, _i.e._ the guarantee of the legitimacy of a class\nof judgements, is only obligatory if the judgement lays claim to\nnecessity. This it does, if it demands even subjective universality or\nthe agreement of every one, although it is not a judgement of cognition\nbut only one of pleasure or pain in a given object; _i.e._ it assumes a\nsubjective purposiveness thoroughly valid for every one, which must not\nbe based on any concept of the thing, because the judgement is one of\ntaste.\n\nWe have before us in the latter case no cognitive judgement--neither a\ntheoretical one based on the concept of a _Nature_ in general formed\nby the Understanding, nor a (pure) practical one based on the Idea of\n_Freedom_, as given _a priori_ by Reason. Therefore we have to justify\n_a priori_ the validity neither of a judgement which represents what\na thing is, nor of one which prescribes that I ought to do something\nin order to produce it. We have merely to prove for the Judgement\ngenerally the _universal validity_ of a singular judgement that\nexpresses the subjective purposiveness of an empirical representation\nof the form of an object; in order to explain how it is possible that\na thing can please in the mere act of judging it (without sensation or\nconcept), and how the satisfaction of one man can be proclaimed as a\nrule for every other; just as the act of judging of an object for the\nsake of a _cognition_ in general has universal rules.\n\nIf now this universal validity is not to be based on any collecting of\nthe suffrages of others, or on any questioning of them as to the kind\nof sensations they have, but is to rest, as it were, on an autonomy of\nthe judging subject in respect of the feeling of pleasure (in the given\nrepresentation), _i.e._ on his own taste, and yet is not to be derived\nfrom concepts; then a judgement like this--such as the judgement of\ntaste is, in fact--has a twofold logical peculiarity. _First_, there is\nits _a priori_ universal validity, which is not a logical universality\nin accordance with concepts, but the universality of a singular\njudgement. _Secondly_, it has a necessity (which must always rest on\n_a priori_ grounds), which however does not depend on any _a priori_\ngrounds of proof, through the representation of which the assent that\nevery one concedes to the judgement of taste could be exacted.\n\nThe solution of these logical peculiarities, wherein a judgement\nof taste is different from all cognitive judgements--if we at the\noutset abstract from all content, viz. from the feeling of pleasure,\nand merely compare the aesthetical form with the form of objective\njudgements as logic prescribes it--is sufficient by itself for the\ndeduction of this singular faculty. We shall then represent and\nelucidate by examples these characteristic properties of taste.\n\n\n\u00a7 32. _First peculiarity of the judgement of Taste_\n\nThe judgement of taste determines its object in respect of satisfaction\n(in its beauty) with an accompanying claim for the assent of _every\none_, just as if it were objective.\n\nTo say that \u201cthis flower is beautiful\u201d is the same as to assert its\nproper claim to satisfy every one. By the pleasantness of its smell\nit has no such claim. A smell which one man enjoys gives another a\nheadache. Now what are we to presume from this except that beauty is\nto be regarded as a property of the flower itself, which does not\naccommodate itself to any diversity of persons or of their sensitive\norgans, but to which these must accommodate themselves if they are to\npass any judgement upon it? And yet this is not so. For a judgement\nof taste consists in calling a thing beautiful just because of that\ncharacteristic in respect of which it accommodates itself to our mode\nof apprehension.\n\nMoreover, it is required of every judgement which is to prove the\ntaste of the subject, that the subject shall judge by himself, without\nneeding to grope about empirically among the judgements of others, and\nacquaint himself previously as to their satisfaction or dissatisfaction\nwith the same object; thus his judgement should be pronounced _a\npriori_, and not be a mere imitation because the thing actually gives\nuniversal pleasure. One would think, however, that an _a priori_\njudgement must contain a concept of the Object, for the cognition of\nwhich it contains the principle; but the judgement of taste is not\nbased upon concepts at all, and is in general not a cognitive but an\naesthetical judgement.\n\nThus a young poet does not permit himself to be dissuaded from his\nconviction that his poem is beautiful, by the judgement of the public\nor of his friends; and if he gives ear to them he does so, not because\nhe now judges differently, but because, although (in regard to him)\nthe whole public has false taste, in his desire for applause he finds\nreason for accommodating himself to the common error (even against his\njudgement). It is only at a later time, when his Judgement has been\nsharpened by exercise, that he voluntarily departs from his former\njudgements; just as he proceeds with those of his judgements which rest\nupon Reason. Taste [merely][65] claims autonomy. To make the judgements\nof others the determining grounds of his own would be heteronomy.\n\nThat we, and rightly, recommend the works of the ancients as models\nand call their authors classical, thus forming among writers a kind\nof noble class who give laws to the people by their example, seems\nto indicate _a posteriori_ sources of taste, and to contradict the\nautonomy of taste in every subject. But we might just as well say\nthat the old mathematicians,--who are regarded up to the present day\nas supplying models not easily to be dispensed with for the supreme\nprofundity and elegance of their synthetical methods,--prove that our\nReason is only imitative, and that we have not the faculty of producing\nfrom it in combination with intuition rigid proofs by means of the\nconstruction of concepts.[66] There is no use of our powers, however\nfree, no use of Reason itself (which must create all its judgements\n_a priori_ from common sources) which would not give rise to faulty\nattempts, if every subject had always to begin anew from the rude basis\nof his natural state, and if others had not preceded him with their\nattempts. Not that these make mere imitators of those who come after\nthem, but rather by their procedure they put others on the track of\nseeking in themselves principles and so of pursuing their own course,\noften a better one. Even in religion--where certainly every one has\nto derive the rule of his conduct from himself, because he remains\nresponsible for it and cannot shift the blame of his transgressions\nupon others, whether his teachers or his predecessors--there is never\nas much accomplished by means of universal precepts, either obtained\nfrom priests or philosophers or got from oneself, as by means of\nan example of virtue or holiness which, exhibited in history, does\nnot dispense with the autonomy of virtue based on the proper and\noriginal Idea of morality (_a priori_), or change it into a mechanical\nimitation. _Following_, involving something precedent, not \u201cimitation,\u201d\nis the right expression for all influence that the products of an\nexemplary author may have upon others. And this only means that we\ndraw from the same sources as our predecessor did, and learn from him\nonly the way to avail ourselves of them. But of all faculties and\ntalents Taste, because its judgement is not determinable by concepts\nand precepts, is just that one which most needs examples of what has\nin the progress of culture received the longest approval; that it may\nnot become again uncivilised and return to the crudeness of its first\nessays.\n\n\n\u00a7 33. _Second peculiarity of the judgement of Taste_\n\nThe judgement of taste is not determinable by grounds of proof, just as\nif it were merely _subjective_.\n\nIf a man, _in the first place_, does not find a building, a prospect,\nor a poem beautiful, a hundred voices all highly praising it will not\nforce his inmost agreement. He may indeed feign that it pleases him in\norder that he may not be regarded as devoid of taste; he may even begin\nto doubt whether he has formed his taste on a knowledge of a sufficient\nnumber of objects of a certain kind (just as one, who believes that\nhe recognises in the distance as a forest, something which all others\nregard as a town, doubts the judgement of his own sight). But he\nclearly sees that the agreement of others gives no valid proof of the\njudgement about beauty. Others might perhaps see and observe for him;\nand what many have seen in one way, although he believes that he has\nseen it differently, might serve him as an adequate ground of proof\nof a theoretical and consequently logical judgement. But that a thing\nhas pleased others could never serve as the basis of an aesthetical\njudgement. A judgement of others which is unfavourable to ours may\nindeed rightly make us scrutinise our own with care, but it can never\nconvince us of its incorrectness. There is therefore no empirical\n_ground of proof_ which would force a judgement of taste upon any one.\n\nStill less, _in the second place_, can an _a priori_ proof determine\naccording to definite rules a judgement about beauty. If a man reads\nme a poem of his or brings me to a play, which does not after all suit\nmy taste, he may bring forward in proof of the beauty of his poem\n_Batteux_[67] or _Lessing_ or still more ancient and famous critics\nof taste, and all the rules laid down by them; certain passages which\ndisplease me may agree very well with rules of beauty (as they have\nbeen put forth by these writers and are universally recognised): but\nI stop my ears, I will listen to no arguments and no reasoning; and I\nwill rather assume that these rules of the critics are false, or at\nleast that they do not apply to the case in question, than admit that\nmy judgement should be determined by grounds of proof _a priori_. For\nit is to be a judgement of Taste and not of Understanding or Reason.\n\nIt seems that this is one of the chief reasons why this aesthetical\nfaculty of judgement has been given the name of Taste. For though a\nman enumerate to me all the ingredients of a dish, and remark that\neach is separately pleasant to me and further extol with justice the\nwholesomeness of this particular food--yet am I deaf to all these\nreasons; I try the dish with _my_ tongue and my palate, and thereafter\n(and not according to universal principles) do I pass my judgement.\n\nIn fact the judgement of Taste always takes the form of a singular\njudgement about an Object. The Understanding can form a universal\njudgement by comparing the Object in point of the satisfaction it\naffords with the judgement of others upon it: _e.g._ \u201call tulips are\nbeautiful.\u201d But then this is not a judgement of taste but a logical\njudgement, which takes the relation of an Object to taste as the\npredicate of things of a certain species. That judgement, however, in\nwhich I find an individual given tulip beautiful, _i.e._ in which\nI find my satisfaction in it to be universally valid, is alone a\njudgement of taste. Its peculiarity consists in the fact that, although\nit has merely subjective validity, it claims the assent of _all_\nsubjects, exactly as it would do if it were an objective judgement\nresting on grounds of knowledge, that could be established by a proof.\n\n\n\u00a7 34. _There is no objective principle of Taste possible_\n\nBy a principle of taste I mean a principle under the condition of\nwhich we could subsume the concept of an object and thus infer by\nmeans of a syllogism that the object is beautiful. But that is\nabsolutely impossible. For I must feel the pleasure immediately in the\nrepresentation of the object, and of that I can be persuaded by no\ngrounds of proof whatever. Although, as _Hume_ says,[68] all critics\ncan reason more plausibly than cooks, yet the same fate awaits them.\nThey cannot expect the determining ground of their judgement [to be\nderived] from the force of the proofs, but only from the reflection\nof the subject upon its own proper state (of pleasure or pain), all\nprecepts and rules being rejected.\n\nBut although critics can and ought to pursue their reasonings so that\nour judgements of taste may be corrected and extended, it is not with\na view to set forth the determining ground of this kind of aesthetical\njudgements in a universally applicable formula, which is impossible;\nbut rather to investigate the cognitive faculties and their exercise in\nthese judgements, and to explain by examples the reciprocal subjective\npurposiveness, the form of which, as has been shown above, in a given\nrepresentation, constitutes the beauty of the object. Therefore the\nCritique of Taste is only subjective as regards the representation\nthrough which an Object is given to us; viz. it is the art or science\nof reducing to rules the reciprocal relation between the Understanding\nand the Imagination in the given representation (without reference\nto any preceding sensation or concept). That is, it is the art or\nscience of reducing to rules their accordance or discordance, and of\ndetermining them with regard to their conditions. It is an _art_, if\nit only shows this by examples; it is a _science_ if it derives the\npossibility of such judgements from the nature of these faculties,\nas cognitive faculties in general. We have here, in Transcendental\nCriticism, only to do with the latter. It should develop and justify\nthe subjective principle of taste, as an _a priori_ principle of\nthe Judgement. This Critique, as an art, merely seeks to apply, in\nthe judging of objects, the physiological (here psychological), and\ntherefore empirical rules, according to which taste actually proceeds\n(without taking any account of their possibility); and it criticises\nthe products of beautiful art just as, regarded as a science, it\ncriticises the faculty by which they are judged.\n\n\n\u00a7 35. _The principle of Taste is the subjective principle of Judgement\nin general_\n\nThe judgement of taste is distinguished from a logical judgement in\nthis, that the latter subsumes a representation under the concept\nof the Object, while the former does not subsume it under any\nconcept; because otherwise the necessary universal agreement [in\nthese judgements] would be capable of being enforced by proofs.\nNevertheless it is like the latter in this, that it claims universality\nand necessity, though not according to concepts of the Object, and\nconsequently a merely subjective necessity. Now, because the concepts\nin a judgement constitute its content (what belongs to the cognition\nof the Object), but the judgement of taste is not determinable by\nconcepts, it is based only on the subjective formal condition of a\njudgement in general. The subjective condition of all judgements is\nthe faculty of Judgement itself. This when used with reference to a\nrepresentation by which an object is given, requires the accordance\nof two representative powers: viz. Imagination (for the intuition and\ncomprehension of the manifold) and Understanding (for the concept as\na representation of the unity of this comprehension). Now because no\nconcept of the Object lies here at the basis of the judgement, it can\nonly consist in the subsumption of the Imagination itself (in the case\nof a representation by which an object is given) under the conditions\nthat the Understanding requires to pass from intuition to concepts.\nThat is, because the freedom of the Imagination consists in the fact\nthat it schematises without any concept, the judgement of taste must\nrest on a mere sensation of the reciprocal activity of the Imagination\nin its _freedom_ and the Understanding with its _conformity to law_.\nIt must therefore rest on a feeling, which makes us judge the object\nby the purposiveness of the representation (by which an object is\ngiven) in respect of the furtherance of the cognitive faculty in its\nfree play. Taste, then, as subjective Judgement, contains a principle\nof subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts, but of the _faculty_\nof intuitions or presentations (_i.e._ the Imagination) under the\n_faculty_ of the concepts (_i.e._ the Understanding); so far as the\nformer _in its freedom_ harmonises with the latter _in its conformity\nto law_.\n\nIn order to discover this ground of legitimacy by a Deduction of the\njudgements of taste we can only take as a clue the formal peculiarities\nof this kind of judgements, and consequently can only consider their\nlogical form.\n\n\n\u00a7 36. _Of the problem of a Deduction of judgements of Taste_\n\nThe concept of an Object in general can immediately be combined with\nthe perception of an object, containing its empirical predicates, so\nas to form a cognitive judgement; and it is thus that a judgement\nof experience is produced.[69] At the basis of this lie _a priori_\nconcepts of the synthetical unity of the manifold of intuition, by\nwhich the manifold is thought as the determination of an Object. These\nconcepts (the Categories) require a Deduction, which is given in the\nCritique of pure Reason; and by it we can get the solution of the\nproblem, how are synthetical _a priori_ cognitive judgements possible?\nThis problem concerns then the _a priori_ principles of the pure\nUnderstanding and its theoretical judgements.\n\nBut with a perception there can also be combined a feeling of pleasure\n(or pain) and a satisfaction, that accompanies the representation\nof the Object and serves instead of its predicate; thus there can\nresult an aesthetical non-cognitive judgement. At the basis of\nsuch a judgement--if it is not a mere judgement of sensation but a\nformal judgement of reflection, which imputes the same satisfaction\nnecessarily to every one,--must lie some _a priori_ principle; which\nmay be merely subjective (if an objective one should prove impossible\nfor judgements of this kind), but also as such may need a Deduction,\nthat we may thereby comprehend how an aesthetical judgement can lay\nclaim to necessity. On this is founded the problem with which we are\nnow occupied, how are judgements of taste possible? This problem\nthen has to do with the _a priori_ principles of the pure faculty of\nJudgement in _aesthetical_ judgements; _i.e._ judgements in which it\nhas not (as in theoretical ones) merely to subsume under objective\nconcepts of Understanding, and in which it is subject to a law, but in\nwhich it is, itself, subjectively, both object and law.\n\nThis problem then may be thus represented: how is a judgement possible,\nin which merely from _our own_ feeling of pleasure in an object,\nindependently of its concept, we judge that this pleasure attaches to\nthe representation of the same Object _in every other subject_, and\nthat _a priori_ without waiting for the accordance of others?\n\nIt is easy to see that judgements of taste are synthetical, because\nthey go beyond the concept and even beyond the intuition of the\nObject, and add to that intuition as predicate something that is not a\ncognition, viz. a feeling of pleasure (or pain). Although the predicate\n(of the _personal_ pleasure bound up with the representation) is\nempirical, nevertheless, as concerns the required assent of _every one_\nthe judgements are _a priori_, or desire to be regarded as such; and\nthis is already involved in the expressions of this claim. Thus this\nproblem of the Critique of Judgement belongs to the general problem of\ntranscendental philosophy, how are synthetical _a priori_ judgements\npossible?\n\n\n\u00a7 37. _What is properly asserted a priori of an object in a judgement\nof Taste_\n\nThat the representation of an object is immediately bound up with\npleasure can only be internally perceived, and if we did not wish to\nindicate anything more than this it would give a merely empirical\njudgement. For I cannot combine a definite feeling (of pleasure or\npain) with any representation except where there is at bottom an _a\npriori_ principle in the Reason determining the Will. In that case the\npleasure (in the moral feeling) is the consequence of the principle,\nbut cannot be compared with the pleasure in taste, because it requires\na definite concept of a law; and the latter pleasure, on the contrary,\nmust be bound up with the mere act of judging, prior to all concepts.\nHence also all judgements of taste are singular judgements, because\nthey do not combine their predicate of satisfaction with a concept,\nbut with a given individual empirical representation.\n\nAnd so it is not the pleasure, but the _universal validity of this\npleasure_, perceived as mentally bound up with the mere judgement upon\nan object, which is represented _a priori_ in a judgement of taste as\na universal rule for the Judgement and valid for every one. It is an\nempirical judgement [to say] that I perceive and judge an object with\npleasure. But it is an _a priori_ judgement [to say] that I find it\nbeautiful, _i.e._ I attribute this satisfaction necessarily to every\none.\n\n\n\u00a7 38. _Deduction of judgements of Taste_\n\nIf it be admitted that in a pure judgement of taste the satisfaction\nin the object is combined with the mere act of judging its form, it is\nnothing else than its subjective purposiveness for the Judgement which\nwe feel to be mentally combined with the representation of the object.\nThe Judgement, as regards the formal rules of its action, apart from\nall matter (whether sensation or concept), can only be directed to the\nsubjective conditions of its employment in general (it is applied[70]\nneither to a particular mode of sense nor to a particular concept of\nthe Understanding); and consequently to that subjective [element] which\nwe can presuppose in all men (as requisite for possible cognition in\ngeneral). Thus the agreement of a representation with these conditions\nof the Judgement must be capable of being assumed as valid _a priori_\nfor every one. _I.e._ we may rightly impute to every one the pleasure\nor the subjective purposiveness of the representation for the relation\nbetween the cognitive faculties in the act of judging a sensible object\nin general.[71]\n\n\n_Remark_\n\nThis Deduction is thus easy, because it has no need to justify the\nobjective reality of any concept, for Beauty is not a concept of the\nObject and the judgement of taste is not cognitive. It only maintains\nthat we are justified in presupposing universally in every man those\nsubjective conditions of the Judgement which we find in ourselves; and\nfurther, that we have rightly subsumed the given Object under these\nconditions. The latter has indeed unavoidable difficulties which do\nnot beset the logical Judgement. There we subsume under concepts,\nbut in the aesthetical Judgement under a merely sensible relation\nbetween the Imagination and Understanding mutually harmonising in\nthe representation of the form of the Object,--in which case the\nsubsumption may easily be fallacious. Yet the legitimacy of the\nclaim of the Judgement in counting upon universal assent is not thus\nannulled; it reduces itself merely to the correctness of the principle\nof judging validly for every one from subjective grounds. For as to\nthe difficulty or doubt concerning the correctness of the subsumption\nunder that principle, it makes the legitimacy of the claim of an\naesthetical judgement in general to such validity and the principle\nof the same, as little doubtful, as the like faulty (though neither\nso commonly nor readily faulty) subsumption of the logical Judgement\nunder its principle can make the latter, an objective principle,\ndoubtful. But if the question were to be, how is it possible to assume\nnature _a priori_ to be a complex of objects of taste? this problem\nhas reference to Teleology, because it must be regarded as a purpose\nof nature essentially belonging to its concept to exhibit forms that\nare purposive for our Judgement. But the correctness of this latter\nassumption is very doubtful, whereas the efficacy of natural beauties\nis patent to experience.\n\n\n\u00a7 39. _Of the communicability of a Sensation_\n\nIf sensation, as the real in perception, is related to knowledge, it\nis called sensation of the senses; and its specific quality may be\nrepresented as generally communicable in a uniform way, if we assume\nthat every one has senses like our own. But this cannot at all be\npresupposed of any single sensation. To a man who is deficient in the\nsense of smell, this kind of sensation cannot be communicated; and\neven if it is not wholly deficient, we cannot be certain that he gets\nexactly the same sensation from a flower that we have. But even more\nmust we represent men as differing in respect of the _pleasantness_\nor _unpleasantness_ involved in the sensation from the same object of\nsense; and it is absolutely not to be required that every man should\ntake pleasure in the same objects. Pleasure of this kind, because it\ncomes into the mind through the senses, in respect of which therefore\nwe are passive, we may call the pleasure of _enjoyment_.\n\nSatisfaction in an action because of its moral character is on the\nother hand not the pleasure of enjoyment, but of spontaneity and its\naccordance with the Idea of its destination. But this feeling, called\nmoral, requires concepts, and presents not free purposiveness, but\npurposiveness that is conformable to law; it therefore admits of being\nuniversally communicated only by means of Reason, and, if the pleasure\nis to be homogeneous for every one, by very definite practical concepts\nof Reason.\n\nPleasure in the Sublime in nature, regarded as a pleasure of rational\ncontemplation, also makes claim to universal participation; but\nit presupposes, besides, a different feeling, viz. that of our\nsupersensible destination, which, however obscurely, has a moral\nfoundation. But that other men will take account of it, and will find\na satisfaction in the consideration of the wild greatness of nature\n(that certainly cannot be ascribed to its aspect, which is rather\nterrifying), I am not absolutely justified in supposing. Nevertheless,\nin consideration of the fact that on every suitable occasion regard\nshould be had to these moral dispositions, I can impute such\nsatisfaction to every man, but only by means of the moral law which on\nits side again is based on concepts of Reason.\n\nOn the contrary, pleasure in the Beautiful is neither a pleasure\nof enjoyment nor of a law-abiding activity, nor even of rational\ncontemplation in accordance with Ideas, but of mere reflection. Without\nhaving as rule any purpose or fundamental proposition, this pleasure\naccompanies the ordinary apprehension of an object by the Imagination,\nas faculty of intuition, in relation with the Understanding, as faculty\nof concepts, by means of a procedure of the Judgement which it must\nalso exercise on behalf of the commonest experience; only that in\nthe latter case it is in order to perceive an empirical objective\nconcept, in the former case (in aesthetical judgements) merely to\nperceive the accordance of the representation with the harmonious\n(subjectively purposive) activity of both cognitive faculties in their\nfreedom, _i.e._ to feel with pleasure the mental state produced by\nthe representation. This pleasure must necessarily depend for every\none on the same conditions, for they are subjective conditions of the\npossibility of a cognition in general; and the proportion between\nthese cognitive faculties requisite for Taste is also requisite for\nthat ordinary sound Understanding which we have to presuppose in\nevery one. Therefore he who judges with taste (if only he does not go\nastray in this act of consciousness and mistake matter for form or\ncharm for beauty) may impute to every one subjective purposiveness,\n_i.e._ his satisfaction in the Object, and may assume his feeling to be\nuniversally communicable and that without the mediation of concepts.\n\n\n\u00a7 40. _Of Taste as a kind of_ sensus communis\n\nWe often give to the Judgement, if we are considering the result rather\nthan the act of its reflection, the name of a sense, and we speak of\na sense of truth, or of a sense of decorum, of justice, etc. And yet\nwe know, or at least we ought to know, that these concepts cannot\nhave their place in Sense, and further, that Sense has not the least\ncapacity for expressing universal rules; but that no representation\nof truth, fitness, beauty, or justice, and so forth, could come into\nour thoughts if we could not rise beyond Sense to higher faculties\nof cognition. _The common Understanding of men_, which, as the mere\nsound (not yet cultivated) Understanding, we regard as the least to\nbe expected from any one claiming the name of man, has therefore the\ndoubtful honour of being given the name of common sense (_sensus\ncommunis_); and in such a way that by the name _common_ (not merely\nin our language, where the word actually has a double signification,\nbut in many others) we understand _vulgar_, that which is everywhere\nmet with, the possession of which indicates absolutely no merit or\nsuperiority.\n\nBut under the _sensus communis_ we must include the Idea of a\n_communal_ sense, _i.e._ of a faculty of judgement, which in its\nreflection takes account (_a priori_) of the mode of representation\nof all other men in thought; in order _as it were_ to compare its\njudgement with the collective Reason of humanity, and thus to escape\nthe illusion arising from the private conditions that could be so\neasily taken for objective, which would injuriously affect the\njudgement. This is done by comparing our judgement with the possible\nrather than the actual judgements of others, and by putting ourselves\nin the place of any other man, by abstracting from the limitations\nwhich contingently attach to our own judgement. This, again, is\nbrought about by leaving aside as much as possible the matter of our\nrepresentative state, _i.e._ sensation, and simply having respect to\nthe formal peculiarities of our representation or representative state.\nNow this operation of reflection seems perhaps too artificial to be\nattributed to the faculty called _common_ sense; but it only appears\nso, when expressed in abstract formulae. In itself there is nothing\nmore natural than to abstract from charm or emotion if we are seeking a\njudgement that is to serve as a universal rule.\n\nThe following Maxims of common human Understanding do not properly\ncome in here, as parts of the Critique of Taste; but yet they may\nserve to elucidate its fundamental propositions. They are: 1\u00b0 to\nthink for oneself; 2\u00b0 to put ourselves in thought in the place of\nevery one else; 3\u00b0 always to think consistently. The first is the\nmaxim of _unprejudiced_ thought; the second of _enlarged_ thought;\nthe third of _consecutive_ thought.[72] The first is the maxim of a\nReason never _passive_. The tendency to such passivity, and therefore\nto heteronomy of the Reason, is called _prejudice_; and the greatest\nprejudice of all is to represent nature as not subject to the rules\nthat the Understanding places at its basis by means of its own\nessential law, _i.e._ is _superstition_. Deliverance from superstition\nis called _enlightenment_;[73] because although this name belongs to\ndeliverance from prejudices in general, yet superstition specially\n(_in sensu eminenti_) deserves to be called a prejudice. For the\nblindness in which superstition places us, which it even imposes on\nus as an obligation, makes the need of being guided by others, and\nthe consequent passive state of our Reason, peculiarly noticeable. As\nregards the second maxim of the mind, we are otherwise wont to call\nhim limited (_born\u00e9_, the opposite of _enlarged_) whose talents attain\nto no great use (especially as regards intensity). But here we are not\nspeaking of the faculty of cognition, but of the _mode of thought_\nwhich makes a purposive use thereof. However small may be the area\nor the degree to which a man\u2019s natural gifts reach, yet it indicates\na man of _enlarged thought_ if he disregards the subjective private\nconditions of his own judgement, by which so many others are confined,\nand reflects upon it from a _universal standpoint_ (which he can only\ndetermine by placing himself at the standpoint of others). The third\nmaxim, viz. that of _consecutive_ thought, is the most difficult to\nattain, and can only be attained by the combination of both the former,\nand after the constant observance of them has grown into a habit. We\nmay say that the first of these maxims is the maxim of Understanding,\nthe second of Judgement, and the third of Reason.\n\nI take up again the threads interrupted by this digression, and I say\nthat Taste can be called _sensus communis_ with more justice than sound\nUnderstanding can; and that the aesthetical Judgement rather than the\nintellectual may bear the name of a communal sense,[74] if we are\nwilling to use the word \u201csense\u201d of an effect of mere reflection upon\nthe mind: for then we understand by sense the feeling of pleasure. We\ncould even define Taste as the faculty of judging of that which makes\n_universally communicable_, without the mediation of a concept, our\nfeeling in a given representation.\n\nThe skill that men have in communicating their thoughts requires also\na relation between the Imagination and the Understanding in order to\nassociate intuitions with concepts, and concepts again with those\nconcepts, which then combine in a cognition. But in that case the\nagreement of the two mental powers is _according to law_, under the\nconstraint of definite concepts. Only where the Imagination in its\nfreedom awakens the Understanding, and is put by it into regular play\nwithout the aid of concepts, does the representation communicate itself\nnot as a thought but as an internal feeling of a purposive state of the\nmind.\n\nTaste is then the faculty of judging _a priori_ of the communicability\nof feelings that are bound up with a given representation (without the\nmediation of a concept).\n\nIf we could assume that the mere universal communicability of a feeling\nmust carry in itself an interest for us with it (which, however, we are\nnot justified in concluding from the character of a merely reflective\nJudgement), we should be able to explain why the feeling in the\njudgement of taste comes to be imputed to every one, so to speak, as a\nduty.\n\n\n\u00a7 41. _Of the empirical interest in the Beautiful_\n\nThat the judgement of taste by which something is declared beautiful\nmust have no interest _as its determining ground_ has been sufficiently\nestablished above. But it does not follow that after it has been\ngiven as a pure aesthetical judgement, no interest can be combined\nwith it. This combination, however, can only be indirect, _i.e._ taste\nmust first of all be represented as combined with something else, in\norder that we may unite with the satisfaction of mere reflection upon\nan object a _pleasure in its existence_ (as that wherein all interest\nconsists). For here also in aesthetical judgements what we say in\ncognitive judgements (of things in general) is valid; _a posse ad esse\nnon valet consequentia_. This something else may be empirical, viz. an\ninclination proper to human nature, or intellectual, as the property\nof the Will of being capable of _a priori_ determination by Reason.\nBoth these involve a satisfaction in the presence of an Object, and so\ncan lay the foundation for an interest in what has by itself pleased\nwithout reference to any interest whatever.\n\nEmpirically the Beautiful interests only in _society_. If we admit\nthe impulse to society as natural to man, and his fitness for it, and\nhis propension towards it, _i.e._ _sociability_, as a requisite for\nman as a being destined for society, and so as a property belonging\nto _humanity_, we cannot escape from regarding taste as a faculty for\njudging everything in respect of which we can communicate our _feeling_\nto all other men, and so as a means of furthering that which every\none\u2019s natural inclination desires.\n\nA man abandoned by himself on a desert island would adorn neither his\nhut nor his person; nor would he seek for flowers, still less would he\nplant them, in order to adorn himself therewith. It is only in society\nthat it occurs to him to be not merely a man, but a refined man after\nhis kind (the beginning of civilisation). For such do we judge him to\nbe who is both inclined and apt to communicate his pleasure to others,\nand who is not contented with an Object if he cannot feel satisfaction\nin it in common with others. Again, every one expects and requires from\nevery one else this reference to universal communication [of pleasure],\nas it were from an original compact dictated by humanity itself. Thus,\ndoubtless, in the beginning only those things which attracted the\nsenses, _e.g._ colours for painting oneself (roucou among the Carabs\nand cinnabar among the Iroquois), flowers, mussel shells, beautiful\nfeathers, etc.,--but in time beautiful forms also (_e.g._ in their\ncanoes, and clothes, etc.), which bring with them no gratification, or\nsatisfaction of enjoyment--were important in society, and were combined\nwith great interest. Until at last civilisation, having reached its\nhighest point, makes out of this almost the main business of refined\ninclination; and sensations are only regarded as of worth in so far as\nthey can be universally communicated. Here, although the pleasure which\nevery one has in such an object is inconsiderable and in itself without\nany marked interest, yet the Idea of its universal communicability\nincreases its worth in an almost infinite degree.\n\nBut this interest that indirectly attaches to the Beautiful through\nour inclination to society, and consequently is empirical, is of no\nimportance for us here; because we have only to look to what may have\na reference, although only indirectly, to the judgement of taste _a\npriori_. For if even in this form an interest bound up therewith should\ndiscover itself, taste would discover a transition of our judging\nfaculty from sense-enjoyment to moral feeling; and so not only would\nwe be the better guided in employing taste purposively, but there\nwould be thus presented a link in the chain of the human faculties _a\npriori_, on which all legislation must depend. We can only say thus\nmuch about the empirical interest in objects of taste and in taste\nitself. Since it is subservient to inclination, however refined the\nlatter may be, it may easily be confounded with all the inclinations\nand passions, which attain their greatest variety and highest degree in\nsociety; and the interest in the Beautiful, if it is grounded thereon,\ncan only furnish a very ambiguous transition from the Pleasant to the\nGood. But whether this can or cannot be furthered by taste, taken in\nits purity, is what we now have to investigate.\n\n\n\u00a7 42. _Of the intellectual interest in the Beautiful_\n\nWith the best intentions those persons who refer all activities, to\nwhich their inner natural dispositions impel men, to the final purpose\nof humanity, viz. the morally good, have regarded the taking an\ninterest in the Beautiful in general as a mark of good moral character.\nBut it is not without reason that they have been contradicted by others\nwho rely on experience; for this shows that connoisseurs in taste,\nnot only often but generally, are given up to idle, capricious, and\nmischievous passions, and that they could perhaps make less claim than\nothers to any pre-eminent attachment to moral principles. Thus it would\nseem that the feeling for the Beautiful is not only (as actually is\nthe case) specifically different from the Moral feeling; but that the\ninterest which can be bound up with it is hardly compatible with moral\ninterest, and certainly has no inner affinity therewith.\n\nNow I admit at once that the interest in the _Beautiful of Art_ (under\nwhich I include the artificial use of natural beauties for adornment\nand so for vanity) furnishes no proof whatever of a disposition\nattached to the morally good or even inclined thereto. But on the\nother hand, I maintain that to take an _immediate interest_ in the\nBeauty of Nature (not merely to have taste in judging it) is always\na mark of a good soul; and that when this interest is habitual it at\nleast indicates a frame of mind favourable to the moral feeling, if it\nis voluntarily bound up with the _contemplation of nature_. It is to\nbe remembered, however, that I here speak strictly of the beautiful\n_forms_ of Nature, and I set aside the _charms_, that she is wont to\ncombine so abundantly with them; because, though the interest in the\nlatter is indeed immediate, it is only empirical.\n\nHe who by himself (and without any design of communicating his\nobservations to others) regards the beautiful figure of a wild flower,\na bird, an insect, etc., with admiration and love--who would not\nwillingly miss it in Nature, although it may bring him some hurt, who\nstill less wants any advantage from it--_he_ takes an immediate and\nalso an intellectual interest in the beauty of Nature. _I.e._ it is not\nmerely the form of the product of nature which pleases him, but its\nvery presence pleases him, the charms of sense having no share in this\npleasure and no purpose whatever being combined with it.\n\nBut it is noteworthy that if we secretly deceived this lover of the\nbeautiful by planting in the ground artificial flowers (which can be\nmanufactured exactly like natural ones), or by placing artificially\ncarved birds on the boughs of trees, and he discovered the deceit, the\nimmediate interest that he previously took in them would disappear\nat once; though, perhaps, a different interest, viz. the interest of\nvanity in adorning his chamber with them for the eyes of others, would\ntake its place. This thought then must accompany our intuition and\nreflection on beauty, viz. that nature has produced it; and on this\nalone is based the immediate interest that we take in it. Otherwise,\nthere remains a mere judgement of taste, either devoid of all interest,\nor bound up with a mediate interest, viz. in that it has reference to\nsociety; which latter [interest] furnishes no certain indications of a\nmorally good disposition.\n\nThis superiority of natural to artificial beauty in that it alone\narouses an immediate interest, although as regards form the first\nmay be surpassed by the second, harmonises with the refined and\nwell-grounded habit of thought of all men who have cultivated their\nmoral feeling. If a man who has taste enough to judge of the products\nof beautiful Art with the greatest accuracy and refinement willingly\nleaves a chamber where are to be found those beauties that minister to\nvanity or to any social joys, and turns to the beautiful in Nature in\norder to find, as it were, delight for his spirit in a train of thought\nthat he can never completely evolve, we will regard this choice of his\nwith veneration, and attribute to him a beautiful soul, to which no\nconnoisseur or lover [of Art] can lay claim on account of the interest\nhe takes in his [artistic] objects.--What now is the difference in\nour estimation of these two different kinds of Objects, which in the\njudgement of mere taste it is hard to compare in point of superiority?\n\nWe have a faculty of mere aesthetical Judgement by which we judge forms\nwithout the aid of concepts, and find a satisfaction in this mere act\nof judgement; this we make into a rule for every one, without this\njudgement either being based on or producing any interest.--On the\nother hand, we have also a faculty of intellectual Judgement which\ndetermines an _a priori_ satisfaction for the mere forms of practical\nmaxims (so far as they are in themselves qualified for universal\nlegislation); this we make into a law for every one, without our\njudgement being based on any interest whatever, _though in this case\nit produces such an interest_. The pleasure or pain in the former\njudgement is called that of taste, in the latter, that of moral feeling.\n\nBut it also interests Reason that the Ideas (for which in moral feeling\nit arouses an immediate interest) should have objective reality; _i.e._\nthat nature should at least show a trace or give an indication that\nit contains in itself some ground for assuming a regular agreement of\nits products with our entirely disinterested satisfaction (which we\nrecognise _a priori_ as a law for every one, without being able to base\nit upon proofs). Hence Reason must take an interest in every expression\non the part of nature of an agreement of this kind. Consequently, the\nmind cannot ponder upon the beauty of _Nature_ without finding itself\nat the same time interested therein. But this interest is akin to\nmoral, and he who takes such an interest in the beauties of nature\ncan do so only in so far as he previously has firmly established his\ninterest in the morally good. If, therefore, the beauty of Nature\ninterests a man immediately we have reason for attributing to him, at\nleast, a basis for a good moral disposition.\n\nIt will be said that this account of aesthetical judgements, as akin\nto the moral feeling, seems far too studied to be regarded as the\ntrue interpretation of that cipher through which Nature speaks to us\nfiguratively in her beautiful forms. However, in the first place,\nthis immediate interest in the beautiful is actually not common; but\nis peculiar to those whose mental disposition either has already been\ncultivated in the direction of the good or is eminently susceptible\nof such cultivation. In that case the analogy between the pure\njudgement of taste which, independently of any interest, causes us to\nfeel a satisfaction, and also represents it _a priori_ as suitable\nto humanity in general, and the moral judgement that does the same\nthing from concepts without any clear, subtle, and premeditated\nreflection--this analogy leads to a similar immediate interest in the\nobjects of the former as in those of the latter; only that in the\none case the interest is free, in the other it is based on objective\nlaws. To this is to be added our admiration for Nature, which displays\nitself in its beautiful products as Art, not merely by chance, but\nas it were designedly, in accordance with a regular arrangement, and\nas purposiveness without purpose. This latter, as we never meet with\nit outside ourselves, we naturally seek in ourselves; and, in fact,\nin that which constitutes the ultimate purpose of our being, viz.\nour moral destination. (Of this question as to the ground of the\npossibility of such natural purposiveness we shall first speak in the\nTeleology.)\n\nIt is easy to explain why the satisfaction in the pure aesthetical\njudgement in the case of beautiful Art is not combined with an\nimmediate interest as it is in the case of beautiful Nature. For the\nformer is either such an imitation of the latter that it reaches the\npoint of deception and then produces the same effect as natural beauty\n(for which it is taken); or it is an art obviously directed designedly\nto our satisfaction. In the latter case the satisfaction in the product\nwould, it is true, be brought about immediately by taste, but it would\nbe only a mediate interest in the cause lying at its root, viz. an art\nthat can only interest by means of its purpose and never in itself.\nIt will, perhaps, be said that this is also the case, if an Object\nof nature interests us by its beauty only so far as it is associated\nwith a moral Idea. But it is not the Object itself which immediately\ninterests us, but its character in virtue of which it is qualified for\nsuch association, which therefore essentially belongs to it.\n\nThe charms in beautiful Nature, which are so often found, as it\nwere, blended with beautiful forms, may be referred to modifications\neither of light (colours) or of sound (tones). For these are the only\nsensations that imply not merely a sensible feeling but also reflection\nupon the form of these modifications of Sense; and thus they involve\nin themselves as it were a language by which nature speaks to us,\nwhich thus seems to have a higher sense. Thus the white colour of\nlilies seems to determine the mind to Ideas of innocence; and the seven\ncolours in order from the red to the violet seem to suggest the Ideas\nof (1) Sublimity, (2) Intrepidity, (3) Candour, (4) Friendliness, (5)\nModesty, (6) Constancy, (7) Tenderness. The song of birds proclaims\ngladsomeness and contentment with existence. At least so we interpret\nnature, whether it have this design or not. But the interest which\nwe here take in beauty has only to do with the beauty of Nature; it\nvanishes altogether as soon as we notice that we are deceived and\nthat it is only Art--vanishes so completely that taste can no longer\nfind the thing beautiful or sight find it charming. What is more\nhighly praised by poets than the bewitching and beautiful note of the\nnightingale in a lonely copse on a still summer evening by the soft\nlight of the moon? And yet we have instances of a merry host, where no\nsuch songster was to be found, deceiving to their great contentment\nthe guests who were staying with him to enjoy the country air, by\nhiding in a bush a mischievous boy who knew how to produce this sound\nexactly like nature (by means of a reed or a tube in his mouth). But\nas soon as we are aware that it is a cheat, no one will remain long\nlistening to the song which before was counted so charming. And it is\njust the same with the songs of all other birds. It must be Nature or\nbe regarded as Nature, if we are to take an immediate _interest_ in the\nBeautiful as such; and still more is this the case if we can require\nthat others should take an interest in it too. This happens as a matter\nof fact when we regard as coarse and ignoble the mental attitude of\nthose persons who have no _feeling_ for beautiful Nature (for thus we\ndescribe a susceptibility to interest in its contemplation), and who\nconfine themselves to eating and drinking--to the mere enjoyments of\nsense.\n\n\n\u00a7 43. _Of Art in general_\n\n(1). _Art_ is distinguished from Nature, as doing (_facere_) is\ndistinguished from acting or working generally (_agere_), and as the\nproduct or result of the former is distinguished as _work_ (_opus_)\nfrom the working (_effectus_) of the latter.\n\nBy right we ought only to describe as Art, production through freedom,\n_i.e._ through a will that places Reason at the basis of its actions.\nFor although we like to call the product of bees (regularly built\ncells of wax) a work of art, this is only by way of analogy: as soon\nas we feel that this work of theirs is based on no proper rational\ndeliberation, we say that it is a product of Nature (of instinct), and\nas Art only ascribe it to their Creator.\n\nIf, as sometimes happens, in searching through a bog we come upon a bit\nof shaped wood, we do not say: this is a product of Nature, but, of\nArt. Its producing cause has conceived a purpose to which the bit of\nwood owes its form. Elsewhere too we should see art in everything which\nis made so that a representation of it in its cause must have preceded\nits actuality (as even in the case of the bees), though the effect\ncould not have been _thought_ by the cause. But if we call anything\nabsolutely a work of art in order to distinguish it from a natural\neffect, we always understand by that a work of man.\n\n(2). _Art_ regarded as human skill differs from _science_ (as _can_\nfrom _know_) as a practical faculty does from a theoretical, as Technic\ndoes from Theory (as mensuration from geometry). And so what we _can_\ndo, as soon as we merely _know_ what ought to be done and therefore\nare sufficiently cognisant of the desired effect, is not called\nArt. Only that which a man, even if he knows it completely, may not\ntherefore have the skill to accomplish, belongs to Art. _Camper_[75]\ndescribes very exactly how the best shoes must be made, but he\ncertainly could not make one.[76]\n\n(3). _Art_ also differs from _handicraft_; the first is called _free_,\nthe other may be called mercenary. We regard the first as if it could\nonly prove purposive as play, _i.e._ as occupation that is pleasant in\nitself. But the second is regarded as if it could only be compulsorily\nimposed upon one as work, _i.e._ as occupation which is unpleasant (a\ntrouble) in itself, and which is only attractive on account of its\neffect (_e.g._ the wage). Whether or not in the graded list of the\nprofessions we ought to count watchmakers as artists, but smiths only\nas handicraftsmen, would require another point of view from which to\njudge than that which we are here taking up; viz. [we should have to\nconsider] the proportion of talents which must be assumed requisite in\nthese several occupations. Whether or not, again, under the so-called\nseven free arts some may be included which ought to be classed as\nsciences, and many that are akin rather to handicraft, I shall not\nhere discuss. But it is not inexpedient to recall that in all free\narts there is yet requisite something compulsory, or, as it is called,\n_mechanism_, without which the _spirit_, which must be free in art and\nwhich alone inspires the work, would have no body and would evaporate\naltogether; _e.g._ in poetry there must be an accuracy and wealth of\nlanguage, and also prosody and metre. [It is not inexpedient, I say,\nto recall this], for many modern educators believe that the best way\nto produce a free art is to remove it from all constraint, and thus to\nchange it from work into mere play.\n\n\n\u00a7 44. _Of beautiful Art_\n\nThere is no Science of the Beautiful, but only a Critique of it; and\nthere is no such thing as beautiful Science, but only beautiful Art.\nFor as regards the first point, if it could be decided scientifically,\n_i.e._ by proofs, whether a thing was to be regarded as beautiful or\nnot, the judgement upon beauty would belong to science and would not\nbe a judgement of taste. And as far as the second point is concerned,\na science which should be beautiful as such is a nonentity. For if\nin such a science we were to ask for grounds and proofs, we would be\nput off with tasteful phrases (bon-mots).--The source of the common\nexpression, _beautiful science_, is without doubt nothing else than\nthis, as it has been rightly remarked, that for beautiful art in its\nentire completeness much science is requisite; _e.g._ a knowledge\nof ancient languages, a learned familiarity with classical authors,\nhistory, a knowledge of antiquities, etc. And hence these historical\nsciences, because they form the necessary preparation and basis for\nbeautiful art, and also partly because under them is included the\nknowledge of the products of beautiful art (rhetoric and poetry), have\ncome to be called beautiful sciences by a confusion of words.\n\nIf art which is adequate to the _cognition_ of a possible object\nperforms the actions requisite therefore merely in order to make it\nactual, it is _mechanical_ art; but if it has for its immediate design\nthe feeling of pleasure, it is called _aesthetical_ art. This is again\neither _pleasant_ or _beautiful_. It is the first, if its purpose is\nthat the pleasure should accompany the representations [of the object]\nregarded as mere _sensations_; it is the second if they are regarded as\n_modes of cognition_.\n\nPleasant arts are those that are directed merely to enjoyment. Of\nthis class are all those charming arts that can gratify a company at\ntable; _e.g._ the art of telling stories in an entertaining way, of\nstarting the company in frank and lively conversation, of raising them\nby jest and laugh to a certain pitch of merriment;[77] when, as people\nsay, there may be a great deal of gossip at the feast, but no one\nwill be answerable for what he says, because they are only concerned\nwith momentary entertainment, and not with any permanent material\nfor reflection or subsequent discussion. (Among these are also to be\nreckoned the way of arranging the table for enjoyment, and, at great\nfeasts, the management of the music. This latter is a wonderful thing.\nIt is meant to dispose to gaiety the minds of the guests, regarded\nsolely as a pleasant noise, without any one paying the least attention\nto its composition; and it favours the free conversation of each\nwith his neighbour.) Again, to this class belong all games which\nbring with them no further interest than that of making the time pass\nimperceptibly.\n\nOn the other hand, beautiful art is a mode of representation which is\npurposive for itself, and which, although devoid of [definite] purpose,\nyet furthers the culture of the mental powers in reference to social\ncommunication.\n\nThe universal communicability of a pleasure carries with it in its very\nconcept that the pleasure is not one of enjoyment, from mere sensation,\nbut must be derived from reflection; and thus aesthetical art, as\nthe art of beauty, has for standard the reflective Judgement and not\nsensation.\n\n\n\u00a7 45. _Beautiful Art is an art, in so far as it seems like nature_\n\nIn a product of beautiful art we must become conscious that it is Art\nand not Nature; but yet the purposiveness in its form must seem to be\nas free from all constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a product\nof mere nature. On this feeling of freedom in the play of our cognitive\nfaculties, which must at the same time be purposive, rests that\npleasure which alone is universally communicable, without being based\non concepts. Nature is beautiful because it looks like Art; and Art can\nonly be called beautiful if we are conscious of it as Art while yet it\nlooks like Nature.\n\nFor whether we are dealing with natural or with artificial beauty we\ncan say generally: _That is beautiful which pleases in the mere act of\njudging it_ (not in the sensation of it, or by means of a concept). Now\nart has always a definite design of producing something. But if this\nsomething were bare sensation (something merely subjective), which is\nto be accompanied with pleasure, the product would please in the act\nof judgement only by mediation of sensible feeling. And again, if the\ndesign were directed towards the production of a definite Object, then,\nif this were attained by art, the Object would only please by means of\nconcepts. But in both cases the art would not please _in the mere act\nof judging_; _i.e._ it would not please as beautiful, but as mechanical.\n\nHence the purposiveness in the product of beautiful art, although it\nis designed, must not seem to be designed; _i.e._ beautiful art must\n_look_ like nature, although we are conscious of it as art. But a\nproduct of art appears like nature when, although its agreement with\nthe rules, according to which alone the product can become what it\nought to be, is _punctiliously_ observed, yet this is not _painfully_\napparent; [the form of the schools does not obtrude itself][78]--it\nshows no trace of the rule having been before the eyes of the artist\nand having fettered his mental powers.\n\n\n\u00a7 46. _Beautiful Art is the art of genius_\n\n_Genius_ is the talent (or natural gift) which gives the rule to Art.\nSince talent, as the innate productive faculty of the artist, belongs\nitself to Nature, we may express the matter thus: _Genius_ is the\ninnate mental disposition (_ingenium_) _through which_ Nature gives the\nrule to Art.\n\nWhatever may be thought of this definition, whether it is merely\narbitrary or whether it is adequate to the concept that we are\naccustomed to combine with the word _genius_ (which is to be examined\nin the following paragraphs), we can prove already beforehand that\naccording to the signification of the word here adopted, beautiful arts\nmust necessarily be considered as arts of _genius_.\n\nFor every art presupposes rules by means of which in the first instance\na product, if it is to be called artistic, is represented as possible.\nBut the concept of beautiful art does not permit the judgement upon the\nbeauty of a product to be derived from any rule, which has a _concept_\nas its determining ground, and therefore has at its basis a concept\nof the way in which the product is possible. Therefore, beautiful art\ncannot itself devise the rule according to which it can bring about its\nproduct. But since at the same time a product can never be called Art\nwithout some precedent rule, Nature in the subject must (by the harmony\nof its faculties) give the rule to Art; _i.e._ beautiful Art is only\npossible as a product of Genius.\n\nWe thus see (1) that genius is a _talent_ for producing that for which\nno definite rule can be given; it is not a mere aptitude for what can\nbe learnt by a rule. Hence _originality_ must be its first property.\n(2) But since it also can produce original nonsense, its products\nmust be models, _i.e._ _exemplary_; and they consequently ought not\nto spring from imitation, but must serve as a standard or rule of\njudgement for others. (3) It cannot describe or indicate scientifically\nhow it brings about its products, but it gives the rule just as nature\ndoes. Hence the author of a product for which he is indebted to his\ngenius does not himself know how he has come by his Ideas; and he has\nnot the power to devise the like at pleasure or in accordance with a\nplan, and to communicate it to others in precepts that will enable them\nto produce similar products. (Hence it is probable that the word genius\nis derived from _genius_, that peculiar guiding and guardian spirit\ngiven to a man at his birth, from whose suggestion these original\nIdeas proceed.) (4) Nature by the medium of genius does not prescribe\nrules to Science, but to Art; and to it only in so far as it is to be\nbeautiful Art.\n\n\n\u00a7 47. _Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation of Genius_\n\nEvery one is agreed that genius is entirely opposed to the _spirit of\nimitation_. Now since learning is nothing but imitation, it follows\nthat the greatest ability and teachableness (capacity) regarded _qu\u00e2_\nteachableness, cannot avail for genius. Even if a man thinks or invents\nfor himself, and does not merely take in what others have taught,\neven if he discovers many things in art and science, this is not the\nright ground for calling such a (perhaps great) _head_, a genius (as\nopposed to him who because he can only learn and imitate is called a\n_shallow-pate_). For even these things could be learned, they lie in\nthe natural path of him who investigates and reflects according to\nrules; and they do not differ specifically from what can be acquired\nby industry through imitation. Thus we can readily learn all that\n_Newton_ has set forth in his immortal work on the Principles of\nNatural Philosophy, however great a head was required to discover it;\nbut we cannot learn to write spirited poetry, however express may be\nthe precepts of the art and however excellent its models. The reason\nis that _Newton_ could make all his steps, from the first elements\nof geometry to his own great and profound discoveries, intuitively\nplain and definite as regards consequence, not only to himself but\nto every one else. But a _Homer_ or a _Wieland_ cannot show how his\nIdeas, so rich in fancy and yet so full of thought, come together in\nhis head, simply because he does not know and therefore cannot teach\nothers. In Science then the greatest discoverer only differs in degree\nfrom his laborious imitator and pupil; but he differs specifically\nfrom him whom Nature has gifted for beautiful Art. And in this there\nis no depreciation of those great men to whom the human race owes so\nmuch gratitude, as compared with nature\u2019s favourites in respect of\nthe talent for beautiful art. For in the fact that the former talent\nis directed to the ever-advancing greater perfection of knowledge and\nevery advantage depending on it, and at the same time to the imparting\nthis same knowledge to others--in this it has a great superiority\nover [the talent of] those who deserve the honour of being called\ngeniuses. For art stands still at a certain point; a boundary is set to\nit beyond which it cannot go, which presumably has been reached long\nago and cannot be extended further. Again, artistic skill cannot be\ncommunicated; it is imparted to every artist immediately by the hand\nof nature; and so it dies with him, until nature endows another in the\nsame way, so that he only needs an example in order to put in operation\nin a similar fashion the talent of which he is conscious.\n\nIf now it is a natural gift which must prescribe its rule to art (as\nbeautiful art), of what kind is this rule? It cannot be reduced to\na formula and serve as a precept, for then the judgement upon the\nbeautiful would be determinable according to concepts; but the rule\nmust be abstracted from the fact, _i.e._ from the product, on which\nothers may try their own talent by using it as a model, not to be\n_copied_ but to be _imitated_. How this is possible is hard to explain.\nThe Ideas of the artist excite like Ideas in his pupils if nature has\nendowed them with a like proportion of their mental powers. Hence\nmodels of beautiful art are the only means of handing down these Ideas\nto posterity. This cannot be done by mere descriptions, especially not\nin the case of the arts of speech, and in this latter classical models\nare only to be had in the old dead languages, now preserved only as\n\u201cthe learned languages.\u201d\n\nAlthough mechanical and beautiful art are very different, the first\nbeing a mere art of industry and learning and the second of genius, yet\nthere is no beautiful art in which there is not a mechanical element\nthat can be comprehended by rules and followed accordingly, and in\nwhich therefore there must be something _scholastic_ as an essential\ncondition. For [in every art] some purpose must be conceived; otherwise\nwe could not ascribe the product to art at all, and it would be a mere\nproduct of chance. But in order to accomplish a purpose, definite rules\nfrom which we cannot dispense ourselves are requisite. Now since the\noriginality of the talent constitutes an essential (though not the\nonly) element in the character of genius, shallow heads believe that\nthey cannot better show themselves to be full-blown geniuses than by\nthrowing off the constraint of all rules; they believe, in effect, that\none could make a braver show on the back of a wild horse than on the\nback of a trained animal. Genius can only furnish rich _material_ for\nproducts of beautiful art; its execution and its _form_ require talent\ncultivated in the schools, in order to make such a use of this material\nas will stand examination by the Judgement. But it is quite ridiculous\nfor a man to speak and decide like a genius in things which require\nthe most careful investigation by Reason. One does not know whether to\nlaugh more at the impostor who spreads such a mist round him that we\ncannot clearly use our Judgement and so use our Imagination the more,\nor at the public which na\u00efvely imagines that his inability to cognise\nclearly and to comprehend the masterpiece before him arises from new\ntruths crowding in on him in such abundance that details (duly weighed\ndefinitions and accurate examination of fundamental propositions) seem\nbut clumsy work.\n\n\n\u00a7 48. _Of the relation of Genius to Taste_\n\nFor _judging_ of beautiful objects as such, _taste_ is requisite;\nbut for beautiful art, _i.e._ for the _production_ of such objects,\n_genius_ is requisite.\n\nIf we consider genius as the talent for beautiful art (which the\nspecial meaning of the word implies) and in this point of view analyse\nit into the faculties which must concur to constitute such a talent, it\nis necessary in the first instance to determine exactly the difference\nbetween natural beauty, the judging of which requires only Taste, and\nartificial beauty, whose possibility (to which reference must be made\nin judging such an object) requires Genius.\n\nA natural beauty is a _beautiful thing_; artificial beauty is a\n_beautiful representation_ of a thing.\n\nIn order to judge of a natural beauty as such I need not have\nbeforehand a concept of what sort of thing the object is to be; _i.e._\nI need not know its material purposiveness (the purpose), but its mere\nform pleases by itself in the act of judging it without any knowledge\nof the purpose. But if the object is given as a product of art, and as\nsuch is to be declared beautiful, then, because art always supposes a\npurpose in the cause (and its causality), there must be at bottom in\nthe first instance a concept of what the thing is to be. And as the\nagreement of the manifold in a thing with its inner destination, its\npurpose, constitutes the perfection of the thing, it follows that in\njudging of artificial beauty the perfection of the thing must be taken\ninto account; but in judging of natural beauty (as _such_) there is no\nquestion at all about this.--It is true that in judging of objects of\nnature, especially objects endowed with life, _e.g._ a man or a horse,\ntheir objective purposiveness also is commonly taken into consideration\nin judging of their beauty; but then the judgement is no longer purely\naesthetical, _i.e._ a mere judgement of taste. Nature is no longer\njudged inasmuch as it appears like art, but in so far as it _is_ actual\n(although superhuman) art; and the teleological judgement serves as the\nbasis and condition of the aesthetical, as a condition to which the\nlatter must have respect. In such a case, _e.g._ if it is said \u201cthat is\na beautiful woman,\u201d we think nothing else than this: nature represents\nin her figure the purposes in view in the shape of a woman\u2019s figure.\nFor we must look beyond the mere form to a concept, if the object\nis to be thought in such a way by means of a logically conditioned\naesthetical judgement.\n\nBeautiful art shows its superiority in this, that it describes as\nbeautiful things which may be in nature ugly or displeasing.[79]\nThe Furies, diseases, the devastations of war, etc., may [even\nregarded as calamitous],[80] be described as very beautiful, and even\nrepresented in a picture. There is only one kind of ugliness which\ncannot be represented in accordance with nature, without destroying\nall aesthetical satisfaction and consequently artificial beauty;\nviz. that which excites _disgust_. For in this peculiar sensation,\nwhich rests on mere imagination, the object is represented as it\nwere obtruding itself for our enjoyment while we strive against it\nwith all our might. And the artistic representation of the object\nis no longer distinguished from the nature of the object itself in\nour sensation, and thus it is impossible that it can be regarded as\nbeautiful. The art of sculpture again, because in its products art is\nalmost interchangeable with nature, excludes from its creations the\nimmediate representation of ugly objects; _e.g._ it represents death\nby a beautiful genius, the warlike spirit by Mars, and permits [all\nsuch things] to be represented only by an allegory or attribute[81]\nthat has a pleasing effect, and thus only indirectly by the aid of the\ninterpretation of Reason, and not for the mere aesthetical Judgement.\n\nSo much for the beautiful representation of an object, which is\nproperly only the form of the presentation of a concept, and the means\nby which the latter is communicated universally.--But to give this form\nto the product of beautiful art, mere taste is requisite. By taste,\nafter he has exercised and corrected it by manifold examples from art\nor nature, the artist checks his work; and after many, often toilsome,\nattempts to content taste he finds the form which satisfies him. Hence\nthis form is not, as it were, a thing of inspiration or the result of a\nfree swing of the mental powers, but of a slow and even painful process\nof improvement, by which he seeks to render it adequate to his thought,\nwithout detriment to the freedom of the play of his powers.\n\nBut taste is merely a judging and not a productive faculty; and what\nis appropriate to it is not therefore a work of beautiful art. It\nmay be only a product belonging to useful and mechanical art or even\nto science, produced according to definite rules that can be learned\nand must be exactly followed. But the pleasing form that is given to\nit is only the vehicle of communication, and a mode, as it were, of\npresenting it, in respect of which we remain free to a certain extent,\nalthough it is combined with a definite purpose. Thus we desire that\ntable appointments, a moral treatise, even a sermon, should have\nin themselves this form of beautiful art, without it seeming to be\n_sought_: but we do not therefore call these things works of beautiful\nart. Under the latter class are reckoned a poem, a piece of music, a\npicture gallery, etc.; and in some would-be works of beautiful art\nwe find genius without taste, while in others we find taste without\ngenius.\n\n\n\u00a7 49. _Of the faculties of the mind that constitute Genius_\n\nWe say of certain products of which we expect that they should at\nleast in part appear as beautiful art, they are without _spirit_[82];\nalthough we find nothing to blame in them on the score of taste. A poem\nmay be very neat and elegant, but without spirit. A history may be\nexact and well arranged, but without spirit. A festal discourse may be\nsolid and at the same time elaborate, but without spirit. Conversation\nis often not devoid of entertainment, but yet without spirit: even of\na woman we say that she is pretty, an agreeable talker, and courteous,\nbut without spirit. What then do we mean by spirit?\n\n_Spirit_, in an aesthetical sense, is the name given to the animating\nprinciple of the mind. But that whereby this principle animates the\nsoul, the material which it applies to that [purpose], is that which\nputs the mental powers purposively into swing, _i.e._ into such a\nplay as maintains itself and strengthens the [mental] powers in their\nexercise.\n\nNow I maintain that this principle is no other than the faculty of\npresenting _aesthetical Ideas_. And by an aesthetical Idea I understand\nthat representation of the Imagination which occasions much thought,\nwithout, however, any definite thought, _i.e._ any _concept_, being\ncapable of being adequate to it; it consequently cannot be completely\ncompassed and made intelligible by language.--We easily see that it is\nthe counterpart (pendant) of a _rational Idea_, which conversely is a\nconcept to which no _intuition_ (or representation of the Imagination)\ncan be adequate.\n\nThe Imagination (as a productive faculty of cognition) is very powerful\nin creating another nature, as it were, out of the material that\nactual nature gives it. We entertain ourselves with it when experience\nproves too commonplace, and by it we remould experience, always indeed\nin accordance with analogical laws, but yet also in accordance with\nprinciples which occupy a higher place in Reason (laws too which are\njust as natural to us as those by which Understanding comprehends\nempirical nature). Thus we feel our freedom from the law of association\n(which attaches to the empirical employment of Imagination), so that\nthe material which we borrow from nature in accordance with this law\ncan be worked up into something different which surpasses nature.\n\nSuch representations of the Imagination we may call _Ideas_, partly\nbecause they at least strive after something which lies beyond the\nbounds of experience, and so seek to approximate to a presentation of\nconcepts of Reason (intellectual Ideas), thus giving to the latter the\nappearance of objective reality,--but especially because no concept can\nbe fully adequate to them as internal intuitions. The poet ventures to\nrealise to sense, rational Ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom of\nthe blessed, hell, eternity, creation, etc.; or even if he deals with\nthings of which there are examples in experience,--_e.g._ death, envy\nand all vices, also love, fame, and the like,--he tries, by means of\nImagination, which emulates the play of Reason in its quest after a\nmaximum, to go beyond the limits of experience and to present them\nto Sense with a completeness of which there is no example in nature.\nIt is, properly speaking, in the art of the poet, that the faculty\nof aesthetical Ideas can manifest itself in its full measure. But\nthis faculty, considered in itself, is properly only a talent (of the\nImagination).\n\nIf now we place under a concept a representation of the Imagination\nbelonging to its presentation, but which occasions solely by itself\nmore thought than can ever be comprehended in a definite concept,\nand which therefore enlarges aesthetically the concept itself in an\nunbounded fashion,--the Imagination is here creative, and it brings\nthe faculty of intellectual Ideas (the Reason) into movement; _i.e._ a\nmovement, occasioned by a representation, towards more thought (though\nbelonging, no doubt, to the concept of the object) than can be grasped\nin the representation or made clear.\n\nThose forms which do not constitute the presentation of a given concept\nitself but only, as approximate representations of the Imagination,\nexpress the consequences bound up with it and its relationship to\nother concepts, are called (aesthetical) _attributes_ of an object,\nwhose concept as a rational Idea cannot be adequately presented.\nThus Jupiter\u2019s eagle with the lightning in its claws is an attribute\nof the mighty king of heaven, as the peacock is of its magnificent\nqueen. They do not, like _logical attributes_, represent what lies in\nour concepts of the sublimity and majesty of creation, but something\ndifferent, which gives occasion to the Imagination to spread itself\nover a number of kindred representations, that arouse more thought\nthan can be expressed in a concept determined by words. They furnish\nan _aesthetical Idea_, which for that rational Idea takes the place\nof logical presentation; and thus as their proper office they enliven\nthe mind by opening out to it the prospect into an illimitable field\nof kindred representations. But beautiful art does this not only in\nthe case of painting or sculpture (in which the term \u201cattribute\u201d is\ncommonly employed): poetry and rhetoric also get the spirit that\nanimates their works simply from the aesthetical attributes of the\nobject, which accompany the logical and stimulate the Imagination, so\nthat it thinks more by their aid, although in an undeveloped way, than\ncould be comprehended in a concept and therefore in a definite form of\nwords.-- For the sake of brevity I must limit myself to a few examples\nonly.\n\nWhen the great King[83] in one of his poems expresses himself as\nfollows:\n\n \u201cOui, finissons sans trouble et mourons sans regrets,\n En laissant l\u2019univers combl\u00e9 de nos bienfaits.\n Ainsi l\u2019astre du jour au bout de sa carri\u00e8re,\n R\u00e9pand sur l\u2019horizon une douce lumi\u00e8re;\n Et les derniers rayons qu\u2019il darde dans les airs,\n Sont les derniers soupirs qu\u2019il donne \u00e0 l\u2019univers;\u201d\n\nhe quickens his rational Idea of a cosmopolitan disposition at the end\nof life by an attribute which the Imagination (in remembering all the\npleasures of a beautiful summer day that are recalled at its close\nby a serene evening) associates with that representation, and which\nexcites a number of sensations and secondary representations for which\nno expression is found. On the other hand, an intellectual concept may\nserve conversely as an attribute for a representation of sense and\nso can quicken this latter by means of the Idea of the supersensible;\nbut only by the aesthetical [element], that subjectively attaches to\nthe concept of the latter, being here employed. Thus, for example, a\ncertain poet[84] says, in his description of a beautiful morning:\n\n \u201cThe sun arose\n As calm from virtue springs.\u201d\n\nThe consciousness of virtue, even if one only places oneself in\nthought in the position of a virtuous man, diffuses in the mind a\nmultitude of sublime and restful feelings and a boundless prospect of\na joyful future, to which no expression measured by a definite concept\ncompletely attains.[85]\n\nIn a word the aesthetical Idea is a representation of the Imagination\nassociated with a given concept, which is bound up with such a\nmultiplicity of partial representations in its free employment, that\nfor it no expression marking a definite concept can be found; and such\na representation, therefore, adds to a concept much ineffable thought,\nthe feeling of which quickens the cognitive faculties, and with\nlanguage, which is the mere letter, binds up spirit also.\n\nThe mental powers, therefore, whose union (in a certain relation)\nconstitutes _genius_ are Imagination and Understanding. In the\nemployment of the Imagination for cognition it submits to the\nconstraint of the Understanding and is subject to the limitation of\nbeing conformable to the concept of the latter. On the other hand, in\nan aesthetical point of view it is free to furnish unsought, over and\nabove that agreement with a concept, abundance of undeveloped material\nfor the Understanding; to which the Understanding paid no regard in its\nconcept, but which it applies, though not objectively for cognition,\nyet subjectively to quicken the cognitive powers and therefore also\nindirectly to cognitions. Thus genius properly consists in the happy\nrelation [between these faculties], which no science can teach and no\nindustry can learn, by which Ideas are found for a given concept; and\non the other hand, we thus find for these Ideas the _expression_, by\nmeans of which the subjective state of mind brought about by them,\nas an accompaniment of the concept, can be communicated to others.\nThe latter talent is properly speaking what is called spirit; for\nto express the ineffable element in the state of mind implied by a\ncertain representation and to make it universally communicable--whether\nthe expression be in speech or painting or statuary--this requires\na faculty of seizing the quickly passing play of Imagination and of\nunifying it in a concept (which is even on that account original\nand discloses a new rule that could not have been inferred from any\npreceding principles or examples), that can be communicated without any\nconstraint [of rules].[86]\n\n * * * * *\n\nIf after this analysis we look back to the explanation given above\nof what is called _genius_, we find: _first_, that it is a talent for\nArt, not for Science, in which clearly known rules must go beforehand\nand determine the procedure. _Secondly_, as an artistic talent it\npresupposes a definite concept of the product, as the purpose, and\ntherefore Understanding; but it also presupposes a representation\n(although an indeterminate one) of the material, _i.e._ of the\nintuition, for the presentment of this concept; and, therefore, a\nrelation between the Imagination and the Understanding. _Thirdly_, it\nshows itself not so much in the accomplishment of the proposed purpose\nin a presentment of a definite _concept_, as in the enunciation or\nexpression of _aesthetical Ideas_, which contain abundant material for\nthat very design; and consequently it represents the Imagination as\nfree from all guidance of rules and yet as purposive in reference to\nthe presentment of the given concept. Finally, in the _fourth_ place,\nthe unsought undesigned subjective purposiveness in the free accordance\nof the Imagination with the legality of the Understanding presupposes\nsuch a proportion and disposition of these faculties as no following of\nrules, whether of science or of mechanical imitation, can bring about,\nbut which only the nature of the subject can produce.\n\nIn accordance with these suppositions genius is the exemplary\noriginality of the natural gifts of a subject in the _free_ employment\nof his cognitive faculties. In this way the product of a genius (as\nregards what is to be ascribed to genius and not to possible learning\nor schooling) is an example, not to be imitated (for then that which\nin it is genius and constitutes the spirit of the work would be lost),\nbut to be followed, by another genius; whom it awakens to a feeling of\nhis own originality and whom it stirs so to exercise his art in freedom\nfrom the constraint of rules, that thereby a new rule is gained for\nart, and thus his talent shows itself to be exemplary. But because a\ngenius is a favourite of nature and must be regarded by us as a rare\nphenomenon, his example produces for other good heads a school, _i.e._\na methodical system of teaching according to rules, so far as these can\nbe derived from the peculiarities of the products of his spirit. For\nsuch persons beautiful art is so far imitation, to which nature through\nthe medium of a genius supplied the rule.\n\nBut this imitation becomes a mere _aping_, if the scholar _copies_\neverything down to the deformities, which the genius must have let\npass only because he could not well remove them without weakening his\nIdea. This mental characteristic is meritorious only in the case of\na genius. A certain _audacity_ in expression--and in general many a\ndeparture from common rules--becomes him well, but it is in no way\nworthy of imitation; it always remains a fault in itself which we\nmust seek to remove, though the genius is as it were privileged to\ncommit it, because the inimitable rush of his spirit would suffer\nfrom over-anxious carefulness. _Mannerism_ is another kind of aping,\nviz. of mere _peculiarity_ (originality) in general; by which a man\nseparates himself as far as possible from imitators, without however\npossessing the talent to be at the same time _exemplary_.--There\nare indeed in general two ways (_modi_) in which such a man may put\ntogether his notions of expressing himself; the one is called a\n_manner_ (_modus aestheticus_), the other a _method_ (_modus logicus_).\nThey differ in this, that the former has no other standard than the\n_feeling_ of unity in the presentment, but the latter follows definite\n_principles_; hence the former alone avails for beautiful art. But an\nartistic product is said to show _mannerism_ only when the exposition\nof the artist\u2019s Idea is _founded_ on its very singularity, and is not\nmade appropriate to the Idea itself. The ostentatious (_pr\u00e9cieux_),\ncontorted, and affected [manner, adopted] to differentiate oneself from\nordinary persons (though devoid of spirit) is like the behaviour of a\nman of whom we say, that he hears himself talk, or who stands and moves\nabout as if he were on a stage in order to be stared at; this always\nbetrays a bungler.\n\n\n\u00a7 50. _Of the combination of Taste with Genius in the products of\nbeautiful Art_\n\nTo ask whether it is more important for the things of beautiful art\nthat Genius or Taste should be displayed, is the same as to ask whether\nin it more depends on Imagination or on Judgement. Now, since in\nrespect of the first an art is rather said to be _full of spirit_, but\nonly deserves to be called a _beautiful_ art on account of the second;\nthis latter is at least, as its indispensable condition (_conditio sine\nqua non_), the most important thing to which one has to look in the\njudging of art as beautiful art. Abundance and originality of Ideas\nare less necessary to beauty than the accordance of the Imagination in\nits freedom with the conformity to law of the Understanding. For all\nthe abundance of the former produces in lawless freedom nothing but\nnonsense; on the other hand, the Judgement is the faculty by which it\nis adjusted to the Understanding.\n\nTaste, like the Judgement in general, is the discipline (or training)\nof Genius; it clips its wings closely, and makes it cultured and\npolished; but, at the same time, it gives guidance as to where and\nhow far it may extend itself, if it is to remain purposive. And while\nit brings clearness and order into the multitude of the thoughts, it\nmakes the Ideas susceptible of being permanently and, at the same time,\nuniversally assented to, and capable of being followed by others, and\nof an ever-progressive culture. If, then, in the conflict of these two\nproperties in a product something must be sacrificed, it should be\nrather on the side of genius; and the Judgement, which in the things of\nbeautiful art gives its decision from its own proper principles, will\nrather sacrifice the freedom and wealth of the Imagination than permit\nanything prejudicial to the Understanding.\n\nFor beautiful art, therefore, _Imagination_, _Understanding_, _Spirit_,\nand _Taste_ are requisite.[87]\n\n\n\u00a7 51. _Of the division of the beautiful arts_\n\nWe may describe beauty in general (whether natural or artificial) as\nthe _expression_ of aesthetical Ideas; only that in beautiful Art this\nIdea must be occasioned by a concept of the Object; whilst in beautiful\nNature the mere reflection upon a given intuition, without any concept\nof what the object is to be, is sufficient for the awakening and\ncommunicating of the Idea of which that Object is regarded as the\n_expression_.\n\nIf, then, we wish to make a division of the beautiful arts, we\ncannot choose a more convenient principle, at least tentatively,\nthan the analogy of art with the mode of expression of which men\navail themselves in speech, in order to communicate to one another\nas perfectly as possible not merely their concepts but also their\nsensations.[88]--This is done by _word_, _deportment_, and _tone_\n(articulation, gesticulation, and modulation). It is only by the\ncombination of these three kinds of expression that communication\nbetween the speaker [and his hearers] can be complete. For thus\nthought, intuition, and sensation are transmitted to others\nsimultaneously and conjointly.\n\nThere are, therefore, only three kinds of beautiful arts; the arts of\n_speech_, the _formative_ arts, and the art of the _play of sensations_\n(as external sensible impressions). We may also arrange a division by\ndichotomy; thus beautiful art may be divided into the art of expression\nof thoughts and of intuitions; and these further subdivided in\naccordance with their form or their matter (sensation). But this would\nappear to be too abstract, and not so accordant with ordinary concepts.\n\n(1) The arts of SPEECH are _rhetoric_ and _poetry_. _Rhetoric_ is the\nart of carrying on a serious business of the Understanding as if it\nwere a free play of the Imagination; _poetry_, the art of conducting a\nfree play of the Imagination as if it were a serious business of the\nUnderstanding.\n\nThe _orator_, then, promises a serious business, and in order to\nentertain his audience conducts it as if it were a mere _play_ with\nIdeas. The _poet_ merely promises an entertaining play with Ideas,\nand yet it has the same effect upon the Understanding as if he had\nonly intended to carry on its business. The combination and harmony of\nboth cognitive faculties, Sensibility and Understanding, which cannot\ndispense with one another, but which yet cannot well be united without\nconstraint and mutual prejudice, must appear to be undesigned and so\nto be brought about by themselves: otherwise it is not _beautiful_\nart. Hence, all that is studied and anxious must be avoided in it, for\nbeautiful art must be free art in a double sense. It is not a work like\nthat of a tradesman, the magnitude of which can be judged, exacted, or\npaid for, according to a definite standard; and again, though the mind\nis occupied, still it feels itself contented and stimulated, without\nlooking to any other purpose (independently of reward.)\n\nThe orator therefore gives something which he does not promise, viz.\nan entertaining play of the Imagination; but he also fails to supply\nwhat he did promise, which is indeed his announced business, viz. the\npurposive occupation of the Understanding. On the other hand, the poet\npromises little and announces a mere play with Ideas; but he supplies\nsomething which is worth occupying ourselves with, because he provides\nin this play food for the Understanding, and by the aid of Imagination\ngives life to his concepts. [Thus the orator on the whole gives less,\nthe poet more, than he promises.][89]\n\n(2) The FORMATIVE arts, or those by which expression is found for Ideas\nin _sensible intuition_ (not by representations of mere Imagination\nthat are aroused by words), are either arts of _sensible truth_ or\nof _sensible illusion_. The former is called _Plastic_, the latter\n_Painting_. Both express Ideas by figures in space; the former makes\nfigures cognisable by two senses, sight and touch (although not by\nthe latter as far as beauty is concerned); the latter only by one,\nthe first of these. The aesthetical Idea (the archetype or original\nimage) is fundamental for both in the Imagination, but the figure which\nexpresses this (the ectype or copy) is either given in its bodily\nextension (as the object itself exists), or as it paints itself on the\neye (according to its appearance when projected on a flat surface). In\nthe first case[90] the condition given to reflection may be either the\nreference to an actual purpose or only the semblance of it.\n\nTo _Plastic_, the first kind of beautiful formative Art, belong\n_Sculpture_ and _Architecture_. The _first_ presents corporeally\nconcepts of things, _as they might have existed in nature_ (though\nas beautiful art it has regard to aesthetical purposiveness). The\n_second_ is the art of presenting concepts of things that are possible\n_only through Art_, and whose form has for its determining ground not\nnature but an arbitrary purpose, with the view of presenting them with\naesthetical purposiveness. In the latter the chief point is a certain\n_use_ of the artistic object, by which condition the aesthetical Ideas\nare limited. In the former the main design is the mere _expression_ of\naesthetical Ideas. Thus statues of men, gods, animals, etc., are of\nthe first kind; but temples, splendid buildings for public assemblies,\neven dwelling-houses, triumphal arches, columns, mausoleums, and the\nlike, erected in honourable remembrance, belong to Architecture. Indeed\nall house furniture (upholsterer\u2019s work and such like things which are\nfor use) may be reckoned under this art; because the suitability of a\nproduct for a certain use is the essential thing in an _architectural\nwork_. On the other hand, a mere _piece of sculpture_, which is simply\nmade for show and which is to please in itself, is as a corporeal\npresentation a mere imitation of nature, though with a reference to\naesthetical Ideas; in it _sensible truth_ is not to be carried so far\nthat the product ceases to look like art and looks like a product of\nthe elective will.\n\n_Painting_, as the second kind of formative art, which presents a\n_sensible illusion_ artificially combined with Ideas, I would divide\ninto the art of the beautiful _depicting of nature_ and that of the\nbeautiful _arrangement of its products_. The first is _painting\nproper_, the second is the art of _landscape gardening_. The first\ngives only the illusory appearance of corporeal extension; the second\ngives this in accordance with truth, but only the appearance of\nutility and availableness for other purposes than the mere play of\nthe Imagination in the contemplation of its forms.[91] This latter is\nnothing else than the ornamentation of the soil with a variety of\nthose things (grasses, flowers, shrubs, trees, even ponds, hillocks,\nand dells) which nature presents to an observer, only arranged\ndifferently and in conformity with certain Ideas. But, again, the\nbeautiful arrangement of corporeal things is only apparent to the\neye, like painting; the sense of touch cannot supply any intuitive\npresentation of such a form. Under painting in the wide sense I would\nreckon the decoration of rooms by the aid of tapestry, bric-a-brac, and\nall beautiful furniture which is merely available to be _looked_ at;\nand the same may be said of the art of tasteful dressing (with rings,\nsnuff-boxes, etc.). For a bed of various flowers, a room filled with\nvarious ornaments (including under this head even ladies\u2019 finery), make\nat a f\u00eate a kind of picture; which, like pictures properly so-called\n(that are not intended to _teach_ either history or natural science),\nhas in view merely the entertainment of the Imagination in free play\nwith Ideas, and the occupation of the aesthetical Judgement without\nany definite purpose. The detailed work in all this decoration may be\nquite distinct in the different cases and may require very different\nartists; but the judgement of taste upon whatever is beautiful in\nthese various arts is always determined in the same way: viz. it only\njudges the forms (without any reference to a purpose) as they present\nthemselves to the eye either singly or in combination, according to the\neffect they produce upon the Imagination.--But that formative art may\nbe compared (by analogy) with deportment in speech is justified by the\nfact that the spirit of the artist supplies by these figures a bodily\nexpression to his thought and its mode, and makes the thing itself as\nit were speak in mimic language. This is a very common play of our\nfancy, which attributes to lifeless things a spirit suitable to their\nform by which they speak to us.\n\n(3) The art of the BEAUTIFUL PLAY OF SENSATIONS (externally\nstimulated), which admits at the same time of universal communication,\ncan be concerned with nothing else than the proportion of the\ndifferent degrees of the disposition (tension) of the sense, to which\nthe sensation belongs, _i.e._ with its tone. In this far-reaching\nsignification of the word it may be divided into the artistic play of\nthe sensations of hearing and sight, _i.e._ into _Music_ and the _Art\nof colour_.--It is noteworthy that these two senses, besides their\nsusceptibility for impressions so far as these are needed to gain\nconcepts of external objects, are also capable of a peculiar sensation\nbound up therewith, of which we cannot strictly decide whether it is\nbased on sense or reflection. This susceptibility may sometimes be\nwanting, although in other respects the sense, as regards its use for\nthe cognition of Objects, is not at all deficient but is peculiarly\nfine. That is, we cannot say with certainty whether colours or tones\n(sounds) are merely pleasant sensations or whether they form in\nthemselves a beautiful play of sensations, and as such bring with them\nin aesthetical judgement a satisfaction in their form. If we think\nof the velocity of the vibrations of light, or in the second case\nof the air, which probably far surpasses all our faculty of judging\nimmediately in perception the time interval between them, we must\nbelieve that it is only the _effect_ of these vibrations upon the\nelastic parts of our body that is felt, but that the _time interval_\nbetween them is not remarked or brought into judgement; and thus that\nonly pleasantness and not beauty of composition is bound up with\ncolours and tones. But on the other hand, _first_, we think of the\nmathematical [element] which enables us to pronounce on the proportion\nbetween these oscillations in music and thus to judge of them; and by\nanalogy with which we easily may judge of the distinctions between\ncolours. _Secondly_, we recall instances (although they are rare) of\nmen who with the best sight in the world cannot distinguish colours,\nand with the sharpest hearing cannot distinguish tones; whilst for\nthose who can do this the perception of an altered quality (not merely\nof the degree of sensation) in the different intensities in the scale\nof colours and tones is definite; and further, the very number of these\nis fixed by _intelligible_ differences. Thus we may be compelled to see\nthat both kinds of sensations are to be regarded not as mere sensible\nimpressions, but as the effects of a judgement passed upon the form\nin the play of divers sensations. The difference in our definition,\naccording as we adopt the one or the other opinion in judging of the\ngrounds of Music, would be just this: either, as we have done, we\nmust explain it as the beautiful play of sensations (of hearing), or\nelse as a play of _pleasant_ sensations. According to the former mode\nof explanation music is represented altogether as a _beautiful_ art;\naccording to the latter, as a _pleasant_ art (at least in part).\n\n\n\u00a7 52. _Of the combination of beautiful arts in one and the same product_\n\nRhetoric may be combined with a pictorial presentation of its subjects\nand objects in a _theatrical piece_; poetry may be combined with music\nin a _song_, and this again with pictorial (theatrical) presentation in\nan _opera_; the play of sensations in music may be combined with the\nplay of figures in the _dance_, and so on. Even the presentation of\nthe sublime, so far as it belongs to beautiful art, may combine with\nbeauty in a _tragedy in verse_, in a _didactic poem_, in an _oratorio_;\nand in these combinations beautiful art is yet more artistic. Whether\nit is also more beautiful may in some of these cases be doubted (since\nso many different kinds of satisfaction cross one another). Yet in\nall beautiful art the essential thing is the form, which is purposive\nas regards our observation and judgement, where the pleasure is at\nthe same time cultivation and disposes the spirit to Ideas, and\nconsequently makes it susceptible of still more of such pleasure and\nentertainment. The essential element is not the matter of sensation\n(charm or emotion), which has only to do with enjoyment; this leaves\nbehind nothing in the Idea, and it makes the spirit dull, the object\ngradually distasteful, and the mind, on account of its consciousness of\na disposition that conflicts with purpose in the judgement of Reason,\ndiscontented with itself and peevish.\n\nIf the beautiful arts are not brought into more or less close\ncombination with moral Ideas, which alone bring with them a\nself-sufficing satisfaction, this latter fate must ultimately be\ntheirs. They then serve only as a distraction, of which we are the\nmore in need the more we avail ourselves of them to disperse the\ndiscontent of the mind with itself; so that we thus render ourselves\never more useless and ever more discontented. The beauties of nature\nare generally of most benefit in this point of view, if we are early\naccustomed to observe, appreciate, and admire them.\n\n\n\u00a7 53. _Comparison of the respective aesthetical worth of the beautiful\narts_\n\nOf all the arts _poetry_ (which owes its origin almost entirely to\ngenius and will least be guided by precept or example) maintains\nthe first rank. It expands the mind by setting the Imagination at\nliberty; and by offering within the limits of a given concept amid\nthe unbounded variety of possible forms accordant therewith, that\nwhich unites the presentment of this concept with a wealth of thought,\nto which no verbal expression is completely adequate; and so rising\naesthetically to Ideas. It strengthens the mind by making it feel its\nfaculty--free, spontaneous and independent of natural determination--of\nconsidering and judging nature as a phenomenon in accordance with\naspects which it does not present in experience either for Sense or\nUnderstanding, and therefore of using it on behalf of, and as a sort\nof schema for, the supersensible. It plays with illusion, which it\nproduces at pleasure, but without deceiving by it; for it declares\nits exercise to be mere play, which however can be purposively used\nby the Understanding.--Rhetoric, in so far as this means the art of\npersuasion, _i.e._ of deceiving by a beautiful show (_ars oratoria_),\nand not mere elegance of speech (eloquence and style), is a Dialectic,\nwhich borrows from poetry only so much as is needful to win minds\nto the side of the orator before they have formed a judgement, and\nto deprive them of their freedom; it cannot therefore be recommended\neither for the law courts or for the pulpit. For if we are dealing\nwith civil law, with the rights of individual persons, or with lasting\ninstruction and determination of people\u2019s minds to an accurate\nknowledge and a conscientious observance of their duty, it is unworthy\nof so important a business to allow a trace of any exuberance of wit\nand imagination to appear, and still less any trace of the art of\ntalking people over and of captivating them for the advantage of any\nchance person. For although this art may sometimes be directed to\nlegitimate and praiseworthy designs, it becomes objectionable, when in\nthis way maxims and dispositions are spoiled in a subjective point of\nview, though the action may objectively be lawful. It is not enough to\ndo what is right; we should practise it solely on the ground that it\nis right. Again, the mere concept of this species of matters of human\nconcern, when clear and combined with a lively presentation of it in\nexamples, without any offence against the rules of euphony of speech\nor propriety of expression, has by itself for Ideas of Reason (which\ncollectively constitute eloquence), sufficient influence upon human\nminds; so that it is not needful to add the machinery of persuasion,\nwhich, since it can be used equally well to beautify or to hide vice\nand error, cannot quite lull the secret suspicion that one is being\nartfully overreached. In poetry everything proceeds with honesty and\ncandour. It declares itself to be a mere entertaining play of the\nImagination, which wishes to proceed as regards form in harmony with\nthe laws of the Understanding; and it does not desire to steal upon\nand ensnare the Understanding by the aid of sensible presentation.[92]\n\nAfter poetry, _if we are to deal with charm and mental movement_, I\nwould place that art which comes nearest to the art of speech and can\nvery naturally be united with it, viz. _the art of tone_. For although\nit speaks by means of mere sensations without concepts, and so does\nnot, like poetry, leave anything over for reflection, it yet moves\nthe mind in a greater variety of ways and more intensely, although\nonly transitorily. It is, however, rather enjoyment than culture (the\nplay of thought that is incidentally excited by its means is merely\nthe effect of a kind of mechanical association); and in the judgement\nof Reason it has less worth than any other of the beautiful arts.\nHence, like all enjoyment, it desires constant change, and does not\nbear frequent repetition without producing weariness. Its charm, which\nadmits of universal communication, appears to rest on this, that every\nexpression of speech has in its context a tone appropriate to the\nsense. This tone indicates more or less an affection of the speaker,\nand produces it also in the hearer; which affection excites in its\nturn in the hearer the Idea that is expressed in speech by the tone\nin question. Thus as modulation is as it were a universal language of\nsensations intelligible to every man, the art of tone employs it by\nitself alone in its full force, viz. as a language of the affections,\nand thus communicates universally according to the laws of association\nthe aesthetical Ideas naturally combined therewith. Now these\naesthetical Ideas are not concepts or determinate thoughts. Hence the\nform of the composition of these sensations (harmony and melody) only\nserves instead of the form of language, by means of their proportionate\naccordance, to express the aesthetical Idea of a connected whole of an\nunspeakable wealth of thought, corresponding to a certain theme which\nproduces the dominating affection in the piece. This can be brought\nmathematically under certain rules, because it rests in the case of\ntones on the relation between the number of vibrations of the air in\nthe same time, so far as these tones are combined simultaneously or\nsuccessively. To this mathematical form, although not represented by\ndeterminate concepts, alone attaches the satisfaction that unites\nthe mere reflection upon such a number of concomitant or consecutive\nsensations with this their play, as a condition of its beauty valid for\nevery man. It is this alone which permits Taste to claim in advance a\nrightful authority over every one\u2019s judgement.\n\nBut in the charm and mental movement produced by Music, Mathematic\nhas certainly not the slightest share. It is only the indispensable\ncondition (_conditio sine qua non_) of that proportion of the\nimpressions in their combination and in their alternation by which\nit becomes possible to gather them together and prevent them from\ndestroying one another, and to harmonise them so as to produce a\ncontinual movement and animation of the mind, by means of affections\nconsonant therewith, and thus a delightful personal enjoyment.\n\nIf, on the other hand, we estimate the worth of the Beautiful Arts\nby the culture they supply to the mind, and take as a standard\nthe expansion of the faculties which must concur in the Judgement\nfor cognition, Music will have the lowest place among them (as\nit has perhaps the highest among those arts which are valued for\ntheir pleasantness), because it merely plays with sensations. The\nformative arts are far before it in this point of view; for in putting\nthe Imagination in a free play, which is also accordant with the\nUnderstanding, they at the same time carry on a serious business.\nThis they do by producing a product that serves for concepts as a\npermanent self-commendatory vehicle for promoting their union with\nsensibility and thus, as it were, the urbanity of the higher cognitive\npowers. These two species of art take quite different courses; the\nfirst proceeds from sensations to indeterminate Ideas, the second\nfrom determinate Ideas to sensations. The latter produce _permanent_,\nthe former only _transitory_ impressions. The Imagination can recall\nthe one and entertain itself pleasantly therewith; but the other\neither vanish entirely, or if they are recalled involuntarily by the\nImagination they are rather wearisome than pleasant.[93] Besides,\nthere attaches to Music a certain want of urbanity from the fact\nthat, chiefly from the character of its instruments, it extends its\ninfluence further than is desired (in the neighbourhood), and so as it\nwere obtrudes itself, and does violence to the freedom of others who\nare not of the musical company. The Arts which appeal to the eyes do\nnot do this; for we need only turn our eyes away, if we wish to avoid\nbeing impressed. The case of music is almost like that of the delight\nderived from a smell that diffuses itself widely. The man who pulls his\nperfumed handkerchief out of his pocket attracts the attention of all\nround him, even against their will, and he forces them, if they are to\nbreathe at all, to enjoy the scent; hence this habit has gone out of\nfashion.[94]\n\nAmong the formative arts I would give the palm to painting; partly\nbecause as the art of delineation it lies at the root of all the other\nformative arts, and partly because it can penetrate much further\ninto the region of Ideas, and can extend the field of intuition in\nconformity with them further than the others can.\n\n\n\u00a7 54. _Remark_\n\nAs we have often shown, there is an essential difference between _what\nsatisfies simply in the act of judging it_, and that which _gratifies_\n(pleases in sensation). We cannot ascribe the latter to every one,\nas we can the former. Gratification (the causes of which may even\nbe situate in Ideas) appears always to consist in a feeling of the\nfurtherance of the whole life of the man, and consequently, also of his\nbodily well-being, _i.e._ his health; so that _Epicurus_, who gave out\nthat all gratification was at bottom bodily sensation, may, perhaps,\nnot have been wrong, but only misunderstood himself when he reckoned\nintellectual and even practical satisfaction under gratification. If we\nhave this distinction in view we can explain how a gratification may\ndissatisfy the man who sensibly feels it (_e.g._ the joy of a needy but\nwell-meaning man at becoming the heir of an affectionate but penurious\nfather); or how a deep grief may satisfy the person experiencing it\n(the sorrow of a widow at the death of her excellent husband); or how\na gratification can in addition satisfy (as in the sciences that we\npursue); or how a grief (_e.g._ hatred, envy, revenge) can moreover\ndissatisfy. The satisfaction or dissatisfaction here depends on Reason,\nand is the same as _approbation_ or _disapprobation_; but gratification\nand grief can only rest on the feeling or prospect of a possible (on\nwhatever grounds) _well-being_ or _its opposite_.\n\nAll changing free play of sensations (that have no design at their\nbasis) gratifies, because it promotes the feeling of health. In the\njudgement of Reason we may or may not have any satisfaction in its\nobject or even in this gratification; and this latter may rise to the\nheight of an affection, although we take no interest in the object,\nat least none that is proportionate to the degree of the affection.\nWe may subdivide this free play of sensations into the _play of\nfortune_ [games of chance], the _play of tone_ [music], and the _play\nof thought_ [wit]. The _first_ requires an _interest_, whether of\nvanity or of selfishness; which, however, is not nearly so great as the\ninterest that attaches to the way in which we are striving to procure\nit. The _second_ requires merely the change of _sensations_, all of\nwhich have a relation to affection, though they have not the degree of\naffection, and excite aesthetical Ideas. The _third_ springs merely\nfrom the change of representations in the Judgement; by it, indeed, no\nthought that brings an interest with it is produced, but yet the mind\nis animated thereby.\n\nHow much gratification games must afford, without any necessity of\nplacing at their basis an interested design, all our evening parties\nshow; for hardly any of them can be carried on without a game. But the\naffections of hope, fear, joy, wrath, scorn, are put in play by them,\nalternating every moment; and they are so vivid that by them, as by\na kind of internal motion, all the vital processes of the body seem\nto be promoted, as is shown by the mental vivacity excited by them,\nalthough nothing is gained or learnt thereby. But as the beautiful does\nnot enter into games of chance, we will here set them aside. On the\nother hand, music and that which excites laughter are two different\nkinds of play with aesthetical Ideas, or with representations of the\nUnderstanding through which ultimately nothing is thought; and yet\nthey can give lively gratification merely by their changes. Thus we\nrecognise pretty clearly that the animation in both cases is merely\nbodily, although it is excited by Ideas of the mind; and that the\nfeeling of health produced by a motion of the intestines corresponding\nto the play in question makes up that whole gratification of a gay\nparty, which is regarded as so refined and so spiritual. It is not the\njudging the harmony in tones or sallies of wit,--which serves only\nin combination with their beauty as a necessary vehicle,--but the\nfurtherance of the vital bodily processes, the affection that moves\nthe intestines and the diaphragm, in a word, the feeling of health\n(which without such inducements one does not feel) that makes up the\ngratification felt by us; so that we can thus reach the body through\nthe soul and use the latter as the physician of the former.\n\nIn music this play proceeds from bodily sensations to aesthetical Ideas\n(the Objects of our affections), and then from these back again to the\nbody with redoubled force. In the case of jokes (the art of which,\njust like music, should rather be reckoned as pleasant than beautiful)\nthe play begins with the thoughts which together occupy the body, so\nfar as they admit of sensible expression; and as the Understanding\nstops suddenly short at this presentment, in which it does not find\nwhat it expected, we feel the effect of this slackening in the body\nby the oscillation of the organs, which promotes the restoration of\nequilibrium and has a favourable influence upon health.\n\nIn everything that is to excite a lively convulsive laugh there must\nbe something absurd (in which the Understanding, therefore, can find\nno satisfaction). _Laughter is an affection arising from the sudden\ntransformation of a strained expectation into nothing._[95] This\ntransformation, which is certainly not enjoyable by the Understanding,\nyet indirectly gives it very active enjoyment for a moment. Therefore\nits cause must consist in the influence of the representation upon the\nbody, and the reflex effect of this upon the mind; not, indeed, through\nthe representation being objectively an object of gratification[96]\n(for how could a delusive expectation gratify?), but simply through it\nas a mere play of representations bringing about an equilibrium of the\nvital powers in the body.\n\nSuppose this story to be told: An Indian at the table of an Englishman\nin Surat, when he saw a bottle of ale opened and all the beer turned\ninto froth and overflowing, testified his great astonishment with many\nexclamations. When the Englishman asked him, \u201cWhat is there in this\nto astonish you so much?\u201d he answered, \u201cI am not at all astonished\nthat it should flow out, but I do wonder how you ever got it in.\u201d At\nthis story we laugh, and it gives us hearty pleasure; not because\nwe deem ourselves cleverer than this ignorant man, or because of\nanything else in it that we note as satisfactory to the Understanding,\nbut because our expectation was strained [for a time] and then was\nsuddenly dissipated into nothing. Again: The heir of a rich relative\nwished to arrange for an imposing funeral, but he lamented that he\ncould not properly succeed; \u201cfor\u201d (said he) \u201cthe more money I give\nmy mourners to look sad, the more cheerful they look!\u201d[97] When we\nhear this story we laugh loud, and the reason is that an expectation\nis suddenly transformed into nothing. We must note well that it\ndoes not transform itself into the positive opposite of an expected\nobject--for then there would still be something, which might even be\na cause of grief--but it must be transformed into nothing. For if a\nman arouses great expectations in us when telling a story, and at the\nend we see its falsehood immediately, it displeases us; _e.g._ the\nstory of the people whose hair in consequence of great grief turned\ngray in one night. But if a wag, to repair the effect of this story,\ndescribes very circumstantially the grief of the merchant returning\nfrom India to Europe with all his wealth in merchandise who was forced\nto throw it overboard in a heavy storm, and who grieved thereat so\nmuch that his _wig_ turned gray the same night--we laugh and it gives\nus gratification. For we treat our own mistake in the case of an\nobject otherwise indifferent to us, or rather the Idea which we are\nfollowing out, as we treat a ball which we knock to and fro for a\ntime, though our only serious intention is to seize it and hold it\nfast. It is not the mere rebuff of a liar or a simpleton that arouses\nour gratification; for the latter story told with assumed seriousness\nwould set a whole company in a roar of laughter, while the former would\nordinarily not be regarded as worth attending to.\n\nIt is remarkable that in all such cases the jest must contain something\nthat is capable of deceiving for a moment. Hence, when the illusion is\ndissipated, the mind turns back to try it once again, and thus through\na rapidly alternating tension and relaxation it is jerked back and\nput into a state of oscillation. This, because the strain on the cord\nas it were is suddenly (and not gradually) relaxed, must occasion a\nmental movement, and an inner bodily movement harmonising therewith,\nwhich continues involuntarily and fatigues, even while cheering us (the\neffects of a motion conducive to health).\n\nFor if we admit that with all our thoughts is harmonically combined\na movement in the organs of the body, we shall easily comprehend how\nto this sudden transposition of the mind, now to one now to another\nstandpoint in order to contemplate its object, may correspond an\nalternating tension and relaxation of the elastic portions of our\nintestines, which communicates itself to the diaphragm (like that which\nticklish people feel). In connexion with this the lungs expel the\nair at rapidly succeeding intervals, and thus bring about a movement\nbeneficial to health; which alone, and not what precedes it in the\nmind, is the proper cause of the gratification in a thought that at\nbottom represents nothing.--_Voltaire_ said that heaven had given us\ntwo things to counterbalance the many miseries of life, _hope_ and\n_sleep_.[98] He could have added _laughter_, if the means of exciting\nit in reasonable men were only as easily attainable, and the requisite\nwit or originality of humour were not so rare, as the talent is common\nof imagining things which _break one\u2019s head_, as mystic dreamers do, or\nwhich _break one\u2019s neck_, as your genius does, or which _break one\u2019s\nheart_, as sentimental romance-writers (and even moralists of the same\nkidney) do.\n\nWe may therefore, as it seems to me, readily concede to _Epicurus_\nthat all gratification, even that which is occasioned through concepts,\nexcited by aesthetical Ideas, is _animal_, _i.e._ bodily sensation;\nwithout the least prejudice to the _spiritual_ feeling of respect for\nmoral Ideas, which is not gratification at all but an esteem for self\n(for humanity in us), that raises us above the need of gratification,\nand even without the slightest prejudice to the less noble [feeling] of\n_taste_.\n\nWe find a combination of these two last in _naivet\u00e9_, which is the\nbreaking out of the sincerity originally natural to humanity in\nopposition to that art of dissimulation which has become a second\nnature. We laugh at the simplicity that does not understand how\nto dissemble; and yet we are delighted with the simplicity of the\nnature which thwarts that art. We look for the commonplace manner of\nartificial utterance devised with foresight to make a fair show; and\nbehold! it is the unspoiled innocent nature which we do not expect to\nfind, and which he who displays it did not think of disclosing. That\nthe fair but false show which generally has so much influence upon\nour judgement is here suddenly transformed into nothing, so that, as\nit were, the rogue in us is laid bare, produces a movement of the\nmind in two opposite directions, which gives a wholesome shock to the\nbody. But the fact that something infinitely better than all assumed\nmanner, viz. purity of disposition (or at least the tendency thereto),\nis not quite extinguished yet in human nature, blends seriousness and\nhigh esteem with this play of the Judgement. But because it is only\na transitory phenomenon and the veil of dissimulation is soon drawn\nover it again, there is mingled therewith a compassion which is an\nemotion of tenderness; this, as play, readily admits of combination\nwith a good-hearted laugh, and ordinarily is actually so combined, and\nwithal is wont to compensate him who supplies its material for the\nembarrassment which results from not yet being wise after the manner\nof men.--An art that is to be _naive_ is thus a contradiction; but the\nrepresentation of naivet\u00e9 in a fictitious personage is quite possible,\nand is a beautiful though a rare art. Naivet\u00e9 must not be confounded\nwith open-hearted simplicity, which does not artificially spoil nature\nsolely because it does not understand the art of social intercourse.\n\nThe _humorous_ manner again may be classified as that which, as\nexhilarating us, is near akin to the gratification that proceeds\nfrom laughter; and belongs to the originality of spirit, but not to\nthe talent of beautiful art. _Humour_ in the good sense means the\ntalent of being able voluntarily to put oneself into a certain mental\ndisposition, in which everything is judged quite differently from the\nordinary method (reversed, in fact), and yet in accordance with certain\nrational principles in such a frame of mind. He who is involuntarily\nsubject to such mutations is called _a man of humours_ [launisch]; but\nhe who can assume them voluntarily and purposively (on behalf of a\nlively presentment brought about by the aid of a contrast that excites\na laugh)--he and his manner of speech are called _humorous_ [launigt].\nThis manner, however, belongs rather to pleasant than to beautiful art,\nbecause the object of the latter must always exhibit intrinsic worth,\nand hence requires a certain seriousness in the presentation, as taste\ndoes in the act of judgement.\n\n\n\n\nSECOND DIVISION\n\nDIALECTIC OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENT\n\n\n\u00a7 55\n\nA faculty of Judgement that is to be dialectical must in the\nfirst place be rationalising, _i.e._ its judgements must claim\nuniversality[99] and that _a priori_; for it is in the opposition of\nsuch judgements that Dialectic consists. Hence the incompatibility of\naesthetical judgements of Sense (about the pleasant and the unpleasant)\nis not dialectical. And again, the conflict between judgements of\nTaste, so far as each man depends merely on his own taste, forms no\nDialectic of taste; because no one proposes to make his own judgement a\nuniversal rule. There remains therefore no other concept of a Dialectic\nwhich has to do with taste than that of a Dialectic of the _Critique_\nof taste (not of taste itself) in respect of its _principles_; for\nhere concepts that contradict one another (as to the ground of\nthe possibility of judgements of taste in general) naturally and\nunavoidably present themselves. The transcendental Critique of taste\nwill therefore contain a part which can bear the name of a Dialectic\nof the aesthetical Judgement, only if and so far as there is found an\nantinomy of the principles of this faculty which renders its conformity\nto law, and consequently also its internal possibility, doubtful.\n\n\n\u00a7 56. _Representation of the antinomy of Taste_\n\nThe first commonplace of taste is contained in the proposition, with\nwhich every tasteless person proposes to avoid blame: _every one has\nhis own taste_. That is as much as to say that the determining ground\nof this judgement is merely subjective (gratification or grief), and\nthat the judgement has no right to the necessary assent of others.\n\nThe second commonplace invoked even by those who admit for judgements\nof taste the right to speak with validity for every one is: _there\nis no disputing about taste_. That is as much as to say that the\ndetermining ground of a judgement of taste may indeed be objective, but\nthat it cannot be reduced to definite concepts, and that consequently\nabout the judgement itself nothing can be _decided_ by proofs, although\nmuch may rightly be _contested_. For _contesting_ [quarrelling] and\n_disputing_ [controversy] are doubtless the same in this, that by means\nof the mutual opposition of judgements they seek to produce their\naccordance; but different in that the latter hopes to bring this about\naccording to definite concepts as determining grounds, and consequently\nassumes _objective concepts_ as grounds of the judgement. But where\nthis is regarded as impracticable, controversy is regarded as alike\nimpracticable.\n\nWe easily see that between these two commonplaces there is a\nproposition wanting, which, though it has not passed into a proverb,\nis yet familiar to every one, viz. _there may be a quarrel about\ntaste_ (although there can be no controversy). But this proposition\ninvolves the contradictory of the former one. For wherever quarrelling\nis permissible, there must be a hope of mutual reconciliation; and\nconsequently we can count on grounds of our judgement that have not\nmerely private validity, and therefore are not merely subjective. And\nto this the proposition, _every one has his own taste_, is directly\nopposed.\n\nThere emerges therefore in respect of the principle of taste the\nfollowing Antinomy:--\n\n(1) _Thesis._ The judgement of taste is not based upon concepts; for\notherwise it would admit of controversy (would be determinable by\nproofs).\n\n(2) _Antithesis._ The judgement of taste is based on concepts; for\notherwise, despite its diversity, we could not quarrel about it (we\ncould not claim for our judgement the necessary assent of others).\n\n\n\u00a7 57. _Solution of the antinomy of Taste_\n\nThere is no possibility of removing the conflict between these\nprinciples that underlie every judgement of taste (which are nothing\nelse than the two peculiarities of the judgement of taste exhibited\nabove in the Analytic), except by showing that the concept to which we\nrefer the Object in this kind of judgement is not taken in the same\nsense in both maxims of the aesthetical Judgement. This twofold sense\nor twofold point of view is necessary to our transcendental Judgement;\nbut also the illusion which arises from the confusion of one with the\nother is natural and unavoidable.\n\nThe judgement of taste must refer to some concept; otherwise it could\nmake absolutely no claim to be necessarily valid for every one. But\nit is not therefore capable of being proved _from_ a concept; because\na concept may be either determinable or in itself undetermined and\nundeterminable. The concepts of the Understanding are of the former\nkind; they are determinable through predicates of sensible intuition\nwhich can correspond to them. But the transcendental rational concept\nof the supersensible, which lies at the basis of all sensible\nintuition, is of the latter kind, and therefore cannot be theoretically\ndetermined further.\n\nNow the judgement of taste is applied to objects of Sense, but not with\na view of determining a _concept_ of them for the Understanding; for\nit is not a cognitive judgement. It is thus only a private judgement,\nin which a singular representation intuitively perceived is referred\nto the feeling of pleasure; and so far would be limited as regards its\nvalidity to the individual judging. The object is _for me_ an object of\nsatisfaction; by others it may be regarded quite differently--every one\nhas his own taste.\n\nNevertheless there is undoubtedly contained in the judgement of taste\na wider reference of the representation of the Object (as well as of\nthe subject), whereon we base an extension of judgements of this kind\nas necessary for every one. At the basis of this there must necessarily\nbe a concept somewhere; though a concept which cannot be determined\nthrough intuition. But through a concept of this sort we know nothing,\nand consequently it can _supply no proof_ for the judgement of taste.\nSuch a concept is the mere pure rational concept of the supersensible\nwhich underlies the object (and also the subject judging it), regarded\nas an Object of sense and thus as phenomenon.[100] For if we do\nnot admit such a reference, the claim of the judgement of taste to\nuniversal validity would not hold good. If the concept on which it is\nbased were only a mere confused concept of the Understanding, like that\nof perfection, with which we could bring the sensible intuition of the\nBeautiful into correspondence, it would be at least possible in itself\nto base the judgement of taste on proofs; which contradicts the thesis.\n\nBut all contradiction disappears if I say: the judgement of taste is\nbased on a concept (viz. the concept of the general ground of the\nsubjective purposiveness of nature for the Judgement); from which,\nhowever, nothing can be known and proved in respect of the Object,\nbecause it is in itself undeterminable and useless for knowledge. Yet\nat the same time and on that very account the judgement has validity\nfor every one (though of course for each only as a singular judgement\nimmediately accompanying his intuition); because its determining ground\nlies perhaps in the concept of that which may be regarded as the\nsupersensible substrate of humanity.\n\nThe solution of an antinomy only depends on the possibility of showing\nthat two apparently contradictory propositions do not contradict\none another in fact, but that they may be consistent; although the\nexplanation of the possibility of their concept may transcend our\ncognitive faculties. That this illusion is natural and unavoidable\nby human Reason, and also why it is so, and remains so, although it\nceases to deceive after the analysis of the apparent contradiction, may\nbe thus explained.\n\nIn the two contradictory judgements we take the concept, on which the\nuniversal validity of a judgement must be based, in the same sense; and\nyet we apply to it two opposite predicates. In the Thesis we mean that\nthe judgement of taste is not based upon _determinate_ concepts; and\nin the Antithesis that the judgement of taste is based upon a concept,\nbut an _indeterminate_ one (viz. of the supersensible substrate of\nphenomena). Between these two there is no contradiction.\n\nWe can do nothing more than remove this conflict between the claims and\ncounter-claims of taste. It is absolutely impossible to give a definite\nobjective principle of taste, in accordance with which its judgements\ncould be derived, examined, and established; for then the judgement\nwould not be one of taste at all. The subjective principle, viz. the\nindefinite Idea of the supersensible in us, can only be put forward as\nthe sole key to the puzzle of this faculty whose sources are hidden\nfrom us: it can be made no further intelligible.\n\nThe proper concept of taste, that is of a merely reflective aesthetical\nJudgement, lies at the basis of the antinomy here exhibited and\nadjusted. Thus the two apparently contradictory principles are\nreconciled--_both can be true_; which is sufficient. If, on the other\nhand, we assume, as some do, _pleasantness_ as the determining ground\nof taste (on account of the singularity of the representation which\nlies at the basis of the judgement of taste), or, as others will\nhave it, the principle of perfection (on account of the universality\nof the same), and settle the definition of taste accordingly; then\nthere arises an antinomy which it is absolutely impossible to adjust\nexcept by showing that _both_ the contrary (though not contradictory)\n_propositions are false_. And this would prove that the concept on\nwhich they are based is self-contradictory. Hence we see that the\nremoval of the antinomy of the aesthetical Judgement takes a course\nsimilar to that pursued by the Critique in the solution of the\nantinomies of pure theoretical Reason. And thus here, as also in the\nCritique of practical Reason, the antinomies force us against our will\nto look beyond the sensible and to seek in the supersensible the point\nof union for all our _a priori_ faculties; because no other expedient\nis left to make our Reason harmonious with itself.\n\n\n_Remark I._\n\nAs we so often find occasion in Transcendental Philosophy for\ndistinguishing Ideas from concepts of the Understanding, it may be of\nuse to introduce technical terms to correspond to this distinction.\nI believe that no one will object if I propose some.--In the most\nuniversal signification of the word, Ideas are representations referred\nto an object, according to a certain (subjective or objective)\nprinciple, but so that they can never become a cognition of it.\nThey are either referred to an intuition, according to a merely\nsubjective principle of the mutual harmony of the cognitive powers\n(the Imagination and the Understanding), and they are then called\n_aesthetical_; or they are referred to a concept according to an\nobjective principle, although they can never furnish a cognition of\nthe object and are called _rational Ideas_. In the latter case the\nconcept is a _transcendent_ one, which is different from a concept of\nthe Understanding, to which an adequately corresponding experience can\nalways be supplied, and which therefore is called _immanent_.\n\nAn _aesthetical Idea_ cannot become a cognition, because it is an\n_intuition_ (of the Imagination) for which an adequate concept can\nnever be found. A _rational Idea_ can never become a cognition, because\nit involves a concept (of the supersensible), corresponding to which an\nintuition can never be given.\n\nNow I believe we might call the aesthetical Idea an _inexponible_\nrepresentation of the Imagination, and a rational Idea an\n_indemonstrable_ concept of Reason. It is assumed of both that they are\nnot generated without grounds, but (according to the above explanation\nof an Idea in general) in conformity with certain principles of the\ncognitive faculties to which they belong (subjective principles in the\none case, objective in the other).\n\n_Concepts of the Understanding_ must, as such, always be demonstrable\n[if by demonstration we understand, as in anatomy, merely\n_presentation_];[101] _i.e._ the object corresponding to them must\nalways be capable of being given in intuition (pure or empirical); for\nthus alone could they become cognitions. The concept of _magnitude_\ncan be given _a priori_ in the intuition of space, _e.g._ of a right\nline, etc.; the concept of _cause_ in impenetrability, in the collision\nof bodies, etc. Consequently both can be authenticated by means of\nan empirical intuition, _i.e._ the thought of them can be proved\n(demonstrated, verified) by an example; and this must be possible,\nfor otherwise we should not be certain that the concept was not empty,\n_i.e._ devoid of any _Object_.\n\nIn Logic we ordinarily use the expressions demonstrable or\nindemonstrable only in respect of _propositions_, but these might\nbe better designated by the titles respectively of _mediately and\nimmediately certain_ propositions; for pure Philosophy has also\npropositions of both kinds, _i.e._ true propositions, some of which\nare susceptible of proof and others not. It can, as philosophy, prove\nthem on _a priori_ grounds, but it cannot demonstrate them; unless\nwe wish to depart entirely from the proper meaning of this word,\naccording to which _to demonstrate_ (_ostendere_, _exhibere_) is\nequivalent to presenting a concept in intuition (whether in proof or\nmerely in definition). If the intuition is _a priori_ this is called\nconstruction; but if it is empirical, then the Object is displayed by\nmeans of which objective reality is assured to the concept. Thus we say\nof an anatomist that he demonstrates the human eye, if by a dissection\nof this organ he makes intuitively evident the concept which he has\npreviously treated discursively.\n\nIt hence follows that the rational concept of the supersensible\nsubstrate of all phenomena in general, or even of that which must be\nplaced at the basis of our arbitrary will in respect of the moral law,\nviz. of transcendental freedom, is already, in kind, an indemonstrable\nconcept and a rational Idea; while virtue is so, in degree. For there\ncan be given in experience, as regards its quality, absolutely nothing\ncorresponding to the former; whereas in the latter case no empirical\nproduct attains to the degree of that causality, which the rational\nIdea prescribes as the rule.\n\nAs in a rational Idea the _Imagination_ with its intuitions does\nnot attain to the given concept, so in an aesthetical Idea the\n_Understanding_ by its concepts never attains completely to that\ninternal intuition which the Imagination binds up with a given\nrepresentation. Since, now, to reduce a representation of the\nImagination to concepts is the same thing as to _expound_ it, the\naesthetical Idea may be called an _inexponible_ representation of the\nImagination (in its free play). I shall have occasion in the sequel to\nsay something more of Ideas of this kind; now I only note that both\nkinds of Ideas, rational and aesthetical, must have their principles;\nand must have them in Reason--the one in the objective, the other in\nthe subjective principles of its employment.\n\nWe can consequently explain _genius_ as the faculty of _aesthetical\nIdeas_; by which at the same time is shown the reason why in the\nproducts of genius it is the nature (of the subject) and not a\npremeditated purpose that gives the rule to the art (of the production\nof the beautiful). For since the beautiful must not be judged by\nconcepts, but by the purposive attuning of the Imagination to agreement\nwith the faculty of concepts in general, it cannot be rule and precept\nwhich can serve as the subjective standard of that aesthetical but\nunconditioned purposiveness in beautiful art, that can rightly claim\nto please every one. It can only be that in the subject which is\nnature and cannot be brought under rules or concepts, _i.e._ the\nsupersensible substrate of all his faculties (to which no concept of\nthe Understanding extends), and consequently that with respect to which\nit is the final purpose given by the intelligible [part] of our nature\nto harmonise all our cognitive faculties. Thus alone is it possible\nthat there should be _a priori_ at the basis of this purposiveness, for\nwhich we can prescribe no objective principle, a principle subjective\nand yet of universal validity.\n\n\n_Remark II._\n\nThe following important remark occurs here: There are _three kinds of\nAntinomies_ of pure Reason, which, however, all agree in this, that\nthey compel us to give up the otherwise very natural hypothesis that\nobjects of sense are things in themselves, and force us to regard them\nmerely as phenomena, and to supply to them an intelligible substrate\n(something supersensible of which the concept is only an Idea, and\nsupplies no proper knowledge). Without such antinomies Reason could\nnever decide upon accepting a principle narrowing so much the field of\nits speculation, and could never bring itself to sacrifices by which so\nmany otherwise brilliant hopes must disappear. For even now when, by\nway of compensation for these losses, a greater field in a practical\naspect opens out before it, it appears not to be able without grief to\npart from those hopes, and disengage itself from its old attachment.\n\nThat there are three kinds of antinomies has its ground in this, that\nthere are three cognitive faculties,--Understanding, Judgement, and\nReason; of which each (as a superior cognitive faculty) must have\nits _a priori_ principles. For Reason, in so far as it judges of\nthese principles and their use, inexorably requires, in respect of\nthem all, the unconditioned for the given conditioned; and this can\nnever be found if we consider the sensible as belonging to things\nin themselves, and do not rather supply to it, as mere phenomenon,\nsomething supersensible (the intelligible substrate of nature both\nexternal and internal) as the reality in itself [Sache an sich selbst].\nThere are then: (1) _For the cognitive faculty_ an antinomy of Reason\nin respect of the theoretical employment of the Understanding extended\nto the unconditioned; (2) _for the feeling of pleasure and pain_ an\nantinomy of Reason in respect of the aesthetical employment of the\nJudgement; and (3) _for the faculty of desire_ an antinomy in respect\nof the practical employment of the self-legislative Reason; so far as\nall these faculties have their superior principles _a priori_, and, in\nconformity with an inevitable requirement of Reason, must judge and be\nable to determine their Object, _unconditionally_ according to those\nprinciples.\n\nAs for the two antinomies of the theoretical and practical employment\nof the superior cognitive faculties, we have already shown their\n_unavoidableness_, if judgements of this kind are not referred to\na supersensible substrate of the given Objects, as phenomena; and\nalso the _possibility of their solution_, as soon as this is done.\nAnd as for the antinomies in the employment of the Judgement, in\nconformity with the requirements of Reason, and their solution which\nis here given, there are only two ways of avoiding them. _Either_:\nwe must deny that any _a priori_ principle lies at the basis of the\naesthetical judgement of taste; we must maintain that all claim to\nnecessary universal agreement is a groundless and vain fancy, and that\na judgement of taste only deserves to be regarded as correct because\n_it happens_ that many people agree about it; and this, not because we\n_assume_ an _a priori_ principle behind this agreement, but because\n(as in the taste of the palate) of the contingent similar organisation\nof the different subjects. _Or_: we must assume that the judgement of\ntaste is really a disguised judgement of Reason upon the perfection\ndiscovered in a thing and the reference of the manifold in it to a\npurpose, and is consequently only called aesthetical on account of the\nconfusion here attaching to our reflection, although it is at bottom\nteleological. In the latter case we could declare the solution of the\nantinomies by means of transcendental Ideas to be needless and without\npoint, and thus could harmonise these laws of taste with Objects of\nsense, not as mere phenomena but as things in themselves. But we have\nshown in several places in the exposition of judgements of taste how\nlittle either of these expedients will satisfy.\n\nHowever, if it be granted that our deduction at least proceeds by the\nright method, although it be not yet plain enough in all its parts,\nthree Ideas manifest themselves. _First_, there is the Idea of the\nsupersensible in general, without any further determination of it, as\nthe substrate of nature. _Secondly_, there is the Idea of the same\nas the principle of the subjective purposiveness of nature for our\ncognitive faculty. And _thirdly_, there is the Idea of the same as the\nprinciple of the purposes of freedom, and of the agreement of freedom\nwith its purposes in the moral sphere.\n\n\n\u00a7 58. _Of the Idealism of the purposiveness of both Nature and Art as\nthe unique principle of the aesthetical Judgement_\n\nTo begin with, we can either place the principle of taste in the fact\nthat it always judges in accordance with grounds which are empirical\nand therefore are only given _a posteriori_ by sense, or concede that\nit judges on _a priori_ grounds. The former would be the _empiricism_\nof the Critique of Taste; the latter its _rationalism_. According to\nthe _former_ the Object of our satisfaction would not differ from\nthe _pleasant_; according to the latter, if the judgement rests on\ndefinite concepts, it would not differ from the _good_. Thus all\n_beauty_ would be banished from the world, and only a particular name,\nexpressing perhaps a certain mingling of the two above-named kinds of\nsatisfaction, would remain in its place. But we have shown that there\nare also _a priori_ grounds of satisfaction which can subsist along\nwith the principle of rationalism, although they cannot be comprehended\nin _definite concepts_.\n\nOn the other hand, the rationalism of the principle of taste is either\nthat of the _realism_ of the purposiveness, or of its _idealism_.\nBecause a judgement of taste is not a cognitive judgement, and beauty\nis not a characteristic of the Object, considered in itself, the\nrationalism of the principle of taste can never be placed in the fact\nthat the purposiveness in this judgement is thought as objective,\n_i.e._ that the judgement theoretically, and therefore also logically\n(although only in a confused way), refers to the perfection of the\nObject. It only refers _aesthetically_ to the agreement of the\nrepresentation of the Object in the Imagination with the essential\nprinciples of Judgement in general in the subject. Consequently, even\naccording to the principle of rationalism, the judgement of taste\nand the distinction between its realism and idealism can only be\nsettled thus. Either in the first case, this subjective purposiveness\nis assumed as an actual (designed) _purpose_ of nature (or art)\nharmonising with our Judgement; or, in the second case, as a purposive\nharmony with the needs of Judgement, in respect of nature and its forms\nproduced according to particular laws, which shows itself, without\npurpose, spontaneously, and contingently.\n\nThe beautiful formations in the kingdom of organised nature speak\nloudly for the realism of the aesthetical purposiveness of nature;\nsince we might assume that behind the production of the beautiful there\nis an Idea of the beautiful in the producing cause, viz. a _purpose_\nin respect of our Imagination. Flowers, blossoms, even the shapes\nof entire plants; the elegance of animal formations of all kinds,\nunneeded for their proper use, but, as it were, selected for our taste;\nespecially the charming variety so satisfying to the eye and the\nharmonious arrangement of colours (in the pheasant, in shell-fish, in\ninsects, even in the commonest flowers), which, as it only concerns the\nsurface and not the figure of these creations (though perhaps requisite\nin regard of their internal purposes), seems to be entirely designed\nfor external inspection; these things give great weight to that mode of\nexplanation which assumes actual purposes of nature for our aesthetical\nJudgement.\n\nOn the other hand, not only is Reason opposed to this assumption in\nits maxims, which bid us always avoid as far as possible unnecessary\nmultiplication of principles; but nature everywhere shows in its\nfree formations much mechanical tendency to the productions of forms\nwhich seem, as it were, to be made for the aesthetical exercise of\nour Judgement, without affording the least ground for the supposition\nthat there is need of anything more than its mechanism, merely as\nnature, according to which, without any Idea lying at their root,\nthey can be purposive for our judgement. But I understand by _free\nformations_ of nature _those_ whereby from a _fluid at rest_, through\nthe volatilisation or separation of a portion of its constituents\n(sometimes merely of caloric), the remainder in becoming solid\nassumes a definite shape or tissue (figure or texture), which is\ndifferent according to the specific difference of the material, but\nin the same material is constant. Here it is always presupposed that\nwe are speaking of a perfect fluid, _i.e._ that the material in it\nis completely dissolved, and that it is not a mere medley of solid\nparticles in a state of suspension.\n\nFormation, then, takes place by a _shooting together_, _i.e._ by a\nsudden solidification, not by a gradual transition from the fluid to\nthe solid state, but all at once by a _saltus_; which transition is\nalso called _crystallisation_. The commonest example of this kind of\nformation is the freezing of water, where first icicles are produced,\nwhich combine at angles of 60\u00b0, while others attach themselves to each\nvertex, until it all becomes ice; and so that, while this is going\non, the water does not gradually become viscous, but is as perfectly\nfluid as if its temperature were far higher, although it is absolutely\nice-cold. The matter that disengages itself, which is dissipated\nsuddenly at the moment of solidification, is a considerable quantum\nof caloric, the disappearance of which, as it was only required for\npreserving fluidity, leaves the new ice not in the least colder than\nthe water which shortly before was fluid.\n\nMany salts, and also rocks, of a crystalline figure, are produced thus\nfrom a species of earth dissolved in water, we do not exactly know\nhow. Thus are formed the glandular configurations of many minerals,\nthe cubical sulphide of lead, the ruby silver ore, etc., in all\nprobability in water and by the shooting together of particles, as they\nbecome forced by some cause to dispense with this vehicle and to unite\nin definite external shapes.\n\nBut also all kinds of matter, which have been kept in a fluid state\nby heat, and have become solid by cooling, show internally, when\nfractured, a definite texture. This makes us judge that if their own\nweight or the disturbance of the air had not prevented it, they would\nalso have exhibited on the outer surface their specifically peculiar\nshapes. This has been observed in some metals on their inner surface,\nwhich have been hardened externally by fusion but are fluid in the\ninterior, by the drawing off the internal fluid and the consequent\nundisturbed crystallisation of the remainder. Many of these mineral\ncrystallisations, such as spars, hematite, arragonite, etc., often\npresent beautiful shapes, the like of which art can only conceive; and\nthe halo in the cavern of Antiparos[102] is merely produced by water\ntrickling down strata of gypsum.\n\nThe fluid state is, to all appearance, older than the solid state, and\nplants as well as animal bodies are fashioned out of fluid nutritive\nmatter, so far as this forms itself in a state of rest. This last\nof course primarily combines and forms itself in freedom according\nto a certain original disposition directed towards purposes (which,\nas will be shown in Part II., must not be judged aesthetically but\nteleologically according to the principle of realism), but also perhaps\nin conformity with the universal law of the affinity of materials.\nAgain, the watery fluids dissolved in an atmosphere that is a mixture\nof different gases, if they separate from the latter on account of\ncooling, produce snow figures, which in correspondence with the\ncharacter of the special mixture of gases, often seem very artistic and\nare extremely beautiful. So, without detracting from the teleological\nprinciple by which we judge of organisation, we may well think that\nthe beauty of flowers, of the plumage of birds, or of shell-fish,\nboth in shape and colour, may be ascribed to nature and its faculty\nof producing forms in an aesthetically purposive way, in its freedom,\nwithout particular purposes adapted thereto, according to chemical laws\nby the arrangement of the material requisite for the organisation in\nquestion.\n\nBut what shows the principle of the _Ideality_ of the purposiveness in\nthe beauty of nature, as that which we always place at the basis of\nan aesthetical judgement, and which allows us to employ, as a ground\nof explanation for our representative faculty, no realism of purpose,\nis the fact that in judging beauty we invariably seek its gauge in\nourselves _a priori_, and that our aesthetical Judgement is itself\nlegislative in respect of the judgement whether anything is beautiful\nor not. This could not be, on the assumption of the Realism of the\npurposiveness of nature; because in that case we must have learned from\nnature what we ought to find beautiful, and the aesthetical judgement\nwould be subjected to empirical principles. For in such an act of\njudging the important point is not, what nature is, or even, as a\npurpose, is in relation to us, but how we take it. There would be an\nobjective purposiveness in nature if it had fashioned its forms for our\nsatisfaction; and not a subjective purposiveness which depended upon\nthe play of the Imagination in its freedom, where it is we who receive\nnature with favour, not nature which shows us favour. The property\nof nature that gives us occasion to perceive the inner purposiveness\nin the relation of our mental faculties in judging certain of its\nproducts--a purposiveness which is to be explained on supersensible\ngrounds as necessary and universal--cannot be a natural purpose or be\njudged by us as such; for otherwise the judgement hereby determined\nwould not be free, and would have at its basis heteronomy, and not, as\nbeseems a judgement of taste, autonomy.\n\nIn beautiful Art the principle of the Idealism of purposiveness\nis still clearer. As in the case of the beautiful in Nature, an\naesthetical Realism of this purposiveness cannot be perceived by\nsensations (for then the art would be only pleasant, not beautiful).\nBut that the satisfaction produced by aesthetical Ideas must not depend\non the attainment of definite purposes (as in mechanically designed\nart), and that consequently, in the very rationalism of the principle,\nthe ideality of the purposes and not their reality must be fundamental,\nappears from the fact that beautiful Art, as such, must not be\nconsidered as a product of Understanding and Science, but of Genius,\nand therefore must get its rule through _aesthetical_ Ideas, which are\nessentially different from rational Ideas of definite purposes.\n\nJust as the _ideality_ of the objects of sense as phenomena is the only\nway of explaining the possibility of their forms being susceptible\nof _a priori_ determination, so the _idealism_ of purposiveness, in\njudging the beautiful in nature and art, is the only hypothesis under\nwhich Criticism can explain the possibility of a judgement of taste\nwhich demands _a priori_ validity for every one (without grounding on\nconcepts the purposiveness that is represented in the Object).\n\n\n\u00a7 59. _Of Beauty as the symbol of Morality_\n\nIntuitions are always required to establish the reality of our\nconcepts. If the concepts are empirical, the intuitions are called\n_examples_. If they are pure concepts of Understanding, the intuitions\nare called _schemata_. If we desire to establish the objective reality\nof rational concepts, _i.e._ of Ideas, on behalf of theoretical\ncognition, then we are asking for something impossible, because\nabsolutely no intuition can be given which shall be adequate to them.\n\nAll _hypotyposis_ (presentation, _subjectio sub adspectum_), or\nsensible illustration, is twofold. It is either _schematical_, when to\na concept comprehended by the Understanding the corresponding intuition\nis given _a priori_; or it is _symbolical_. In the latter case to a\nconcept only thinkable by the Reason, to which no sensible intuition\ncan be adequate, an intuition is supplied with which accords a\nprocedure of the Judgement analogous to what it observes in schematism:\nit accords with it, that is, in respect of the rule of this procedure\nmerely, not of the intuition itself; consequently in respect of the\nform of reflection merely, and not of its content.\n\nThere is a use of the word _symbolical_ that has been adopted by modern\nlogicians, which is misleading and incorrect, _i.e._ to speak of the\n_symbolical_ mode of representation as if it were opposed to the\n_intuitive_; for the symbolical is only a mode of the intuitive. The\nlatter (the intuitive), that is, may be divided into the _schematical_\nand the _symbolical_ modes of representation. Both are hypotyposes,\n_i.e._ presentations (_exhibitiones_); not mere _characterisations_, or\ndesignations of concepts by accompanying sensible signs which contain\nnothing belonging to the intuition of the Object, and only serve as a\nmeans for reproducing the concepts, according to the law of association\nof the Imagination, and consequently in a subjective point of view.\nThese are either words, or visible (algebraical, even mimetical) signs,\nas mere expressions for concepts.[103]\n\nAll intuitions, which we supply to concepts _a priori_, are therefore\neither _schemata_ or _symbols_, of which the former contain direct,\nthe latter indirect, presentations of the concept. The former do\nthis demonstratively; the latter by means of an analogy (for which\nwe avail ourselves even of empirical intuitions) in which the\nJudgement exercises a double function; first applying the concept\nto the object of a sensible intuition, and then applying the mere\nrule of the reflection made upon that intuition to a quite different\nobject of which the first is only the symbol. Thus a monarchical\nstate is represented by a living body, if it is governed by national\nlaws, and by a mere machine (like a hand-mill) if governed by an\nindividual absolute will; but in both cases only _symbolically_.\nFor between a despotic state and a hand-mill there is, to be sure,\nno similarity; but there is a similarity in the rules according to\nwhich we reflect upon these two things and their causality. This\nmatter has not been sufficiently analysed hitherto, for it deserves\na deeper investigation; but this is not the place to linger over it.\nOur language [_i.e._ German] is full of indirect presentations of\nthis sort, in which the expression does not contain the proper schema\nfor the concept, but merely a symbol for reflection. Thus the words\n_ground_ (support, basis), _to depend_ (to be held up from above), to\n_flow_ from something (instead of, to follow), _substance_ (as _Locke_\nexpresses it, the support of accidents), and countless others, are not\nschematical but symbolical hypotyposes and expressions for concepts,\nnot by means of a direct intuition, but only by analogy with it,\n_i.e._ by the transference of reflection upon an object of intuition\nto a quite different concept to which perhaps an intuition can never\ndirectly correspond. If we are to give the name of cognition to a mere\nmode of representation (which is quite permissible if the latter is\nnot a principle of the theoretical determination of what an object is\nin itself, but of the practical determination of what the Idea of it\nshould be for us and for its purposive use), then all our knowledge\nof God is merely symbolical; and he who regards it as schematical,\nalong with the properties of Understanding, Will, etc., which only\nestablish their objective reality in beings of this world, falls into\nAnthropomorphism, just as he who gives up every intuitive element\nfalls into Deism, by which nothing at all is cognised, not even in a\npractical point of view.\n\nNow I say the Beautiful is the symbol of the morally Good, and that it\nis only in this respect (a reference which is natural to every man and\nwhich every man postulates in others as a duty) that it gives pleasure\nwith a claim for the agreement of every one else. By this the mind\nis made conscious of a certain ennoblement and elevation above the\nmere sensibility to pleasure received through sense, and the worth of\nothers is estimated in accordance with a like maxim of their Judgement.\nThat is the _intelligible_, to which, as pointed out in the preceding\nparagraph, Taste looks; with which our higher cognitive faculties are\nin accord; and without which a downright contradiction would arise\nbetween their nature and the claims made by taste. In this faculty the\nJudgement does not see itself, as in empirical judging, subjected to\na heteronomy of empirical laws; it gives the law to itself in respect\nof the objects of so pure a satisfaction, just as the Reason does in\nrespect of the faculty of desire. Hence, both on account of this inner\npossibility in the subject and of the external possibility of a nature\nthat agrees with it, it finds itself to be referred to something within\nthe subject as well as without him, something which is neither nature\nnor freedom, but which yet is connected with the supersensible ground\nof the latter. In this supersensible ground, therefore, the theoretical\nfaculty is bound together in unity with the practical, in a way which\nthough common is yet unknown. We shall indicate some points of this\nanalogy, while at the same time we shall note the differences.\n\n(1) The beautiful pleases _immediately_ (but only in reflective\nintuition, not, like morality, in its concept). (2) It pleases _apart\nfrom any interest_ (the morally good is indeed necessarily bound up\nwith an interest, though not with one which precedes the judgement upon\nthe satisfaction, but with one which is first of all produced by it).\n(3) The _freedom_ of the Imagination (and therefore of the sensibility\nof our faculty) is represented in judging the beautiful as harmonious\nwith the conformity to law of the Understanding (in the moral judgement\nthe freedom of the will is thought as the harmony of the latter with\nitself according to universal laws of Reason). (4) The subjective\nprinciple in judging the beautiful is represented as _universal_,\n_i.e._ as valid for every man, though not cognisable through any\nuniversal concept. (The objective principle of morality is also\nexpounded as universal, _i.e._ for every subject and for every action\nof the same subject, and thus as cognisable by means of a universal\nconcept). Hence the moral judgement is not only susceptible of definite\nconstitutive principles, but is possible _only_ by grounding its maxims\non these in their universality.\n\nA reference to this analogy is usual even with the common Understanding\n[of men], and we often describe beautiful objects of nature or art by\nnames that seem to put a moral appreciation at their basis. We call\nbuildings or trees majestic and magnificent, landscapes laughing and\ngay; even colours are called innocent, modest, tender, because they\nexcite sensations which have something analogous to the consciousness\nof the state of mind brought about by moral judgements. Taste makes\npossible the transition, without any violent leap, from the charm of\nSense to habitual moral interest; for it represents the Imagination\nin its freedom as capable of purposive determination for the\nUnderstanding, and so teaches us to find even in objects of sense a\nfree satisfaction apart from any charm of sense.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX\n\n\n\u00a7 60. _Of the method of Taste_\n\nThe division of a Critique into Elementology and Methodology, as\npreparatory to science, is not applicable to the Critique of taste,\nbecause there neither is nor can be a science of the Beautiful, and\nthe judgement of taste is not determinable by means of principles. As\nfor the scientific element in every art, which regards _truth_ in the\npresentation of its Object, this is indeed the indispensable condition\n(_conditio sine qua non_) of beautiful art, but not beautiful art\nitself. There is therefore for beautiful art only a _manner_ (_modus_),\nnot a _method of teaching_ (_methodus_). The master must show what the\npupil is to do and how he is to do it; and the universal rules, under\nwhich at last he brings his procedure, serve rather for bringing the\nmain points back to his remembrance when occasion requires, than for\nprescribing them to him. Nevertheless regard must be had here to a\ncertain ideal, which art must have before its eyes, although it cannot\nbe completely attained in practice. It is only through exciting the\nImagination of the pupil to accordance with a given concept, by making\nhim note the inadequacy of the expression for the Idea, to which the\nconcept itself does not attain because it is an aesthetical Idea, and\nby severe criticism, that he can be prevented from taking the examples\nset before him as types and models for imitation, to be subjected to\nno higher standard or independent judgement. It is thus that genius,\nand with it the freedom of the Imagination, is stifled by its very\nconformity to law; and without these no beautiful art, and not even an\naccurately judging individual taste, is possible.\n\nThe propaedeutic to all beautiful art, regarded in the highest degree\nof its perfection, seems to lie, not in precepts, but in the culture\nof the mental powers by means of those elements of knowledge called\n_humaniora_, probably because _humanity_ on the one side indicates\nthe universal _feeling of sympathy_, and on the other the faculty\nof being able to _communicate_ universally our inmost [feelings].\nFor these properties taken together constitute the characteristic\nsocial spirit[104] of humanity by which it is distinguished from the\nlimitations of animal life. The age and peoples, in which the impulse\ntowards a _law-abiding_ social life, by which a people becomes a\npermanent community, contended with the great difficulties presented by\nthe difficult problem of uniting freedom (and therefore equality also)\nwith compulsion (rather of respect and submission from a sense of duty\nthan of fear)--such an age and such a people naturally first found out\nthe art of reciprocal communication of Ideas between the cultivated\nand uncultivated classes and thus discovered how to harmonise the\nlarge-mindedness and refinement of the former with the natural\nsimplicity and originality of the latter. In this way they first found\nthat mean between the higher culture and simple nature which furnishes\nthat true standard for taste as a sense common to all men which no\nuniversal rules can supply.\n\nWith difficulty will a later age dispense with those models, because\nit will be always farther from nature; and in fine, without having\npermanent examples before it, a concept will hardly be possible, in one\nand the same people, of the happy union of the law-abiding constraint\nof the highest culture with the force and truth of free nature which\nfeels its own proper worth.\n\nNow taste is at bottom a faculty for judging of the sensible\nillustration of moral Ideas (by means of a certain analogy involved\nin our reflection upon both these); and it is from this faculty also\nand from the greater susceptibility grounded thereon for the feeling\narising from the latter (called moral feeling), that the pleasure is\nderived which taste regards as valid for mankind in general and not\nmerely for the private feeling of each. Hence it appears plain that the\ntrue propaedeutic for the foundation of taste is the development of\nmoral Ideas and the culture of the moral feeling; because it is only\nwhen sensibility is brought into agreement with this that genuine taste\ncan assume a definite invariable form.\n\n\n\n\nTHE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT\n\nPART II\n\nCRITIQUE OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT\n\n\n\u00a7 61. _Of the objective purposiveness of Nature_\n\nWe have on transcendental principles good ground to assume a subjective\npurposiveness in nature, in its particular laws, in reference to its\ncomprehensibility by human Judgement and to the possibility of the\nconnexion of particular experiences in a system. This may be expected\nas possible in many products of nature, which, as if they were devised\nquite specially for our Judgement, contain a specific form conformable\nthereto; which through their manifoldness and unity serve at once to\nstrengthen and to sustain the mental powers (that come into play in the\nemployment of this faculty); and to which therefore we give the name of\n_beautiful_ forms.\n\nBut that the things of nature serve one another as means to purposes,\nand that their possibility is only completely intelligible through\nthis kind of causality--for this we have absolutely no ground in the\nuniversal Idea of nature, as the complex of the objects of sense. In\nthe above-mentioned case, the representation of things, because it\nis something in ourselves, can be quite well thought _a priori_ as\nsuitable and useful for the internally purposive determination of our\ncognitive faculties; but that purposes, which neither are our own\nnor belong to nature (for we do not regard nature as an intelligent\nbeing), could or should constitute a particular kind of causality, at\nleast a quite special conformity to law,--this we have absolutely no\n_a priori_ reason for presuming. Yet more, experience itself cannot\nprove to us the actuality of this; there must then have preceded a\nrationalising subtlety which only sportively introduces the concept of\npurpose into the nature of things, but which does not derive it from\nObjects or from their empirical cognition. To this latter it is of\nmore service to make nature comprehensible according to analogy with\nthe subjective ground of the connexion of our representations, than to\ncognise it from objective grounds.\n\nFurther, objective purposiveness, as a principle of the possibility of\nthings of nature, is so far removed from _necessary_ connexion with\nthe concept of nature, that it is much oftener precisely that upon\nwhich one relies to prove the contingency of nature and of its form.\nWhen, _e.g._ we adduce the structure of a bird, the hollowness of its\nbones, the disposition of its wings for motion and of its tail for\nsteering, _etc._, we say that all this is contingent in the highest\ndegree according to the mere _nexus effectivus_ of nature, without\ncalling in the aid of a particular kind of causality, namely that of\npurpose (_nexus finalis_). In other words, nature, considered as mere\nmechanism, could have produced its forms in a thousand other ways\nwithout stumbling upon the unity which is in accordance with such a\nprinciple. It is not in the concept of nature but quite apart from it\nthat we can hope to find the least ground _a priori_ for this.\n\nNevertheless the teleological act of judgement is rightly brought to\nbear, at least problematically, upon the investigation of nature;\nbut only in order to bring it under principles of observation and\ninquiry according to the _analogy_ with the causality of purpose,\nwithout any pretence to _explain_ it thereby. It belongs therefore to\nthe reflective and not to the determinant judgement. The concept of\ncombinations and forms of nature in accordance with purposes is then\nat least _one principle more_ for bringing its phenomena under rules\nwhere the laws of simply mechanical causality do not suffice. For we\nbring in a teleological ground, where we attribute causality in respect\nof an Object to the concept of an Object, as if it were to be found in\nnature (not in ourselves); or rather when we represent to ourselves the\npossibility of the Object after the analogy of that causality which\nwe experience in ourselves, and consequently think nature technically\nas through a special faculty. If we did not ascribe to it such a\nmethod of action, its causality would have to be represented as blind\nmechanism. If, on the contrary, we supply to nature causes acting\n_designedly_, and consequently place at its basis teleology, not merely\nas a _regulative_ principle for the mere _judging_ of phenomena, to\nwhich nature can be thought as subject in its particular laws, but as a\n_constitutive_ principle of the _derivation_ of its products from their\ncauses; then would the concept of a natural purpose no longer belong\nto the reflective but to the determinant Judgement. Then, in fact, it\nwould not belong specially to the Judgement (like the concept of beauty\nregarded as formal subjective purposiveness), but as a rational concept\nit would introduce into natural science a new causality, which we only\nborrow from ourselves and ascribe to other beings, without meaning to\nassume them to be of the same kind with ourselves.\n\n\n\n\nFIRST DIVISION\n\nANALYTIC OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT\n\n\n\u00a7 62. _Of the objective purposiveness which is merely formal as\ndistinguished from that which is material_\n\nAll geometrical figures drawn on a principle display a manifold,\noft admired, objective purposiveness; _i.e._ in reference to\ntheir usefulness for the solution of several problems by a single\nprinciple, or of the same problem in an infinite variety of ways. The\npurposiveness is here obviously objective and intellectual, not merely\nsubjective and aesthetical. For it expresses the suitability of the\nfigure for the production of many intended figures, and is cognised\nthrough Reason. But this purposiveness does not make the concept of the\nobject itself possible, _i.e._ it is not regarded as possible merely\nwith reference to this use.\n\nIn so simple a figure as the circle lies the key to the solution of a\nmultitude of problems, each of which would demand various appliances;\nwhereas the solution results of itself, as it were, as one of the\ninfinite number of elegant properties of this figure. Are we, for\nexample, asked to construct a triangle, being given the base and\nvertical angle? The problem is indeterminate, _i.e._ it can be solved\nin an infinite number of ways. But the circle embraces them altogether\nas the geometrical locus of the vertices of triangles satisfying\nthe given conditions. Again, suppose that two lines are to cut one\nanother so that the rectangle under the segments of the one should be\nequal to the rectangle under the segments of the other; the solution\nof the problem from this point of view presents much difficulty. But\nall chords intersecting inside a circle divide one another in this\n_proportion_. Other curved lines suggest other purposive solutions\nof which nothing was thought in the rule that furnished their\nconstruction. All conic sections in themselves and when compared with\none another are fruitful in principles for the solution of a number of\npossible problems, however simple is the definition which determines\ntheir concept.--It is a true joy to see the zeal with which the old\ngeometers investigated the properties of lines of this class, without\nallowing themselves to be led astray by the questions of narrow-minded\npersons, as to what use this knowledge would be. Thus they worked out\nthe properties of the parabola without knowing the law of gravitation,\nwhich would have suggested to them its application to the trajectory of\nheavy bodies (for the motion of a heavy body can be seen to be parallel\nto the curve of a parabola). Again, they found out the properties\nof an ellipse without surmising that any of the heavenly bodies had\nweight, and without knowing the law of force at different distances\nfrom the point of attraction, which causes it to describe this curve\nin free motion. While they thus unconsciously worked for the science\nof the future, they delighted themselves with a purposiveness in\nthe [essential] being of things which yet they were able to present\ncompletely _a priori_ in its necessity. _Plato_, himself master of\nthis science, hinted at such an original constitution of things in\nthe discovery of which we can dispense with all experience, and at\nthe power of the mind to produce from its supersensible principle the\nharmony of beings (where the properties of number come in, with which\nthe mind plays in music). This [he touches upon] in the inspiration\nthat raised him above the concepts of experience to Ideas, which seem\nto him to be explicable only through an intellectual affinity with the\norigin of all beings. No wonder that he banished from his school the\nman who was ignorant of geometry, since he thought he could derive\nfrom pure intuition, which has its home in the human spirit, that\nwhich _Anaxagoras_ drew from empirical objects and their purposive\ncombination. For in the very necessity of that which is purposive,\nand is constituted just as if it were designedly intended for our\nuse,--but at the same time seems to belong originally to the being\nof things without any reference to our use--lies the ground of our\ngreat admiration of nature, and that not so much external as in our\nown Reason. It is surely excusable that this admiration should through\nmisunderstanding gradually rise to the height of fanaticism.\n\nBut this intellectual purposiveness, although no doubt objective (not\nsubjective like aesthetical purposiveness), is in reference to its\npossibility merely formal (not real). It can only be conceived as\npurposiveness in general without any [definite] purpose being assumed\nas its basis, and consequently without teleology being needed for it.\nThe figure of a circle is an intuition which is determined by means\nof the Understanding according to a principle. The unity of this\nprinciple which I arbitrarily assume and use as fundamental concept,\napplied to a form of intuition (space) which is met with in myself as\na representation and yet _a priori_, renders intelligible the unity of\nmany rules resulting from the construction of that concept, which are\npurposive for many possible designs. But this purposiveness does not\nimply a _purpose_ or any other ground whatever. It is quite different\nif I meet with order and regularity in complexes of _things_, external\nto myself, enclosed within certain boundaries; as, _e.g._ in a garden,\nthe order and regularity of the trees, flower-beds, and walks. These\nI cannot expect to derive _a priori_ from my bounding of space made\nafter a rule of my own; for this order and regularity are existing\nthings which must be given empirically in order to be known, and not\na mere representation in myself determined _a priori_ according to a\nprinciple. So then the latter (empirical) purposiveness, as _real_, is\ndependent on the concept of a purpose.\n\nBut the ground of admiration for a perceived purposiveness, although\nit be in the being of things (so far as their concepts can be\nconstructed), may very well be seen, and seen to be legitimate.\nThe manifold rules whose unity (derived from a principle) excites\nadmiration, are all synthetical and do not follow from the _concept_\nof the Object, _e.g._ of a circle; but require this Object to be\ngiven in intuition. Hence this unity gets the appearance of having\nempirically an external basis of rules distinct from our representative\nfaculty; as if therefore the correspondence of the Object to that\nneed of rules which is proper to the Understanding were contingent in\nitself, and therefore only possible by means of a purpose expressly\ndirected thereto. Now because this harmony, notwithstanding all\nthis purposiveness, is not cognised empirically but _a priori_, it\nshould bring us of itself to this point--that space, through whose\ndetermination (by means of the Imagination, in accordance with a\nconcept) the Object is alone possible, is not a characteristic of\nthings external to me, but a mere mode of representation in myself.\nHence, in the figure which I draw _in conformity with a concept_,\n_i.e._ in my own mode of representing that which is given to me\nexternally, whatever it may be in itself, _it is I that introduce\nthe purposiveness_; I get no empirical instruction from the Object\nabout the purposiveness, and so I require in it no particular purpose\nexternal to myself. But because this consideration already calls for\na critical employment of Reason, and consequently cannot be involved\nin the judging of the Object according to its properties; so this\nlatter [judging] suggests to me immediately nothing but the unification\nof heterogeneous rules (even according to their very diversity) in\na principle. This principle, without requiring any particular _a\npriori_ basis external to my concept, or indeed, generally speaking,\nto my representation, is yet cognised _a priori_ by me as true. Now\n_wonder_ is a shock of the mind arising from the incompatibility of a\nrepresentation, and the rule given by its means, with the principles\nalready lying at its basis; which provokes a doubt as to whether\nwe have rightly seen or rightly judged. _Admiration_, however, is\nwonder which ever recurs, despite the disappearance of this doubt.\nConsequently the latter is a quite natural effect of that observed\npurposiveness in the being of things (as phenomena). It cannot\nindeed be censured, whilst the unification of the form of sensible\nintuition (space)--with the faculty of concepts (the Understanding)--is\ninexplicable to us; and that not only on account of the union being\njust of the kind that it is, but because it is enlarging for the mind\nto surmise [the existence of] something lying outside our sensible\nrepresentations in which, although unknown to us, the ultimate\nground of that agreement may be met with. We are, it is true, not\nnecessitated to cognise this if we have only to do _a priori_ with the\nformal purposiveness of our representations; but the fact that we are\ncompelled to look out beyond it inspires at the same time an admiration\nfor the object that impels us thereto.\n\nWe are accustomed to speak of the above-mentioned properties of\ngeometrical figures or of numbers as _beautiful_, on account of a\ncertain _a priori_ purposiveness they have for all kinds of cognitive\nuses, this purposiveness being quite unexpected on account of the\nsimplicity of the construction. We speak, _e.g._ of this or that\n_beautiful_ property of the circle, which was discovered in this or\nthat way. But there is no aesthetical act of judgement through which we\nfind it purposive, no act of judgement without a concept which renders\nnoticeable a mere _subjective_ purposiveness in the free play of our\ncognitive faculties; but an intellectual act according to concepts\nwhich enables us clearly to cognise an objective purposiveness,\n_i.e._ availableness for all kinds of (infinitely manifold) purposes.\nWe must rather call this _relative perfection_ than a beauty of the\nmathematical figure. To speak thus of an _intellectual beauty_ cannot\nin general be permissible; for otherwise the word beauty would lose\nall determinate significance, or the intellectual satisfaction all\nsuperiority over the sensible. We should rather call a _demonstration_\nof such properties beautiful, because through it the Understanding\nas the faculty of concepts, and the Imagination as the faculty of\npresenting them, feel themselves strengthened _a priori_. (This, when\nviewed in connexion with the precision introduced by Reason, is spoken\nof as elegant.) Here, however, the satisfaction, although it is based\non concepts, is subjective; while perfection brings with itself an\nobjective satisfaction.\n\n\n\u00a7 63. _Of the relative, as distinguished from the inner, purposiveness\nof nature_\n\nExperience leads our Judgement to the concept of an objective and\nmaterial purposiveness, _i.e._ to the concept of a purpose of nature,\nonly when[105] we have to judge of a relation of cause to effect which\nwe find ourselves able to apprehend as legitimate only by presupposing\nthe Idea of the effect of the causality of the cause as the fundamental\ncondition, in the cause, of the possibility of the effect. This can\ntake place in two ways. We may regard the effect directly as an art\nproduct, or only as material for the art of other possible natural\nbeings; in other words, either as a purpose or as a means towards the\npurposive employment of other causes. This latter purposiveness is\ncalled utility (for man) or mere advantage (for other creatures), and\nis merely relative; while the former is an inner purposiveness of the\nnatural being.\n\nFor example, rivers bring down with them all kinds of earth serviceable\nfor the growth of plants which sometimes is deposited inland, often\nalso at their mouths. The tide brings this mud to many coasts over\nthe land or deposits it on the shore; and so, more especially if men\ngive their aid so that the ebb shall not carry it back again, the\nfruit-bearing land increases in area, and the vegetable kingdom gains\nthe place which formerly was the habitation of fish and shells. In\nthis way has nature itself brought about most of the extensions of the\nland, and still continues to do so, although very slowly.--Now the\nquestion is whether this is to be judged a purpose of nature, because\nit contains utility for men. We cannot put it down to the account of\nthe vegetable kingdom, because just as much is subtracted from sea-life\nas is added to land-life.\n\nOr, to give an example of the advantageousness of certain natural\nthings as means for other creatures (if we suppose them to be means),\nno soil is more suitable to pine trees than a sandy soil. Now the deep\nsea, before it withdrew from the land, left behind large tracts of sand\nin our northern regions, so that on this soil, so unfavourable for all\ncultivation, widely extended pine forests were enabled to grow, for the\nunreasoning destruction of which we frequently blame our ancestors.\nWe may ask if this original deposit of tracts of sand was a purpose\nof nature for the benefit of the possible pine forests? So much is\nclear, that if we regard this as a purpose of nature, we must also\nregard the sand as a relative purpose, in reference to which the ocean\nstrand and its withdrawal were means: for in the series of the mutually\nsubordinated members of a purposive combination, every member must be\nregarded as a purpose (though not as a final purpose), to which its\nproximate cause is the means. So too if cattle, sheep, horses, etc.,\nare to exist, there must be grass on the earth, but there must also\nbe saline plants in the desert if camels are to thrive; and again\nthese and other herbivorous animals must be met with in numbers if\nthere are to be wolves, tigers, and lions. Consequently the objective\npurposiveness, which is based upon advantage, is not an objective\npurposiveness of things in themselves; as if the sand could not be\nconceived for itself as an effect of a cause, viz. the sea, without\nattributing to the latter a purpose, and regarding the effect, namely,\nthe sand, as a work of art. It is a merely relative purposiveness\ncontingent upon the thing to which it is ascribed; and although in the\nexamples we have cited, the different kinds of grass are to be judged\nas in themselves organised products of nature, and consequently as\nartificial, yet are they to be regarded, in reference to the beasts\nwhich feed upon them, as mere raw material.\n\nBut above all, though man, through the freedom of his causality, finds\ncertain natural things of advantage for his designs--designs often\nfoolish, such as using the variegated plumage of birds to adorn his\nclothes, or coloured earths and the juices of plants for painting his\nface; often again reasonable as when the horse is used for riding, the\nox or (as in Minorca) the ass or pig for ploughing--yet we cannot even\nhere assume a relative natural purpose. For his Reason knows how to\ngive things a conformity with his own arbitrary fancies for which he\nwas not at all predestined by nature. Only, _if_ we assume that men are\nto live upon the earth, then the means must be there without which they\ncould not exist as animals, and even as rational animals (in however\nlow a degree of rationality); and thereupon those natural things,\nwhich are indispensable in this regard, must be considered as natural\npurposes.\n\nWe can hence easily see that external purposiveness (advantage of one\nthing in respect of others) can be regarded as an external natural\npurpose only under the condition, that the existence of that [being],\nto which it is immediately or distantly advantageous, is in itself a\npurpose of nature. Since that can never be completely determined by\nmere contemplation of nature, it follows that relative purposiveness,\nalthough it hypothetically gives indications of natural purposes, yet\njustifies no absolute teleological judgement.\n\nSnow in cold countries protects the crops from the frost; it makes\nhuman intercourse easier (by means of sleighs). The Laplander finds in\nhis country animals by whose aid this intercourse is brought about,\n_i.e._ reindeer, who find sufficient sustenance in a dry moss which\nthey have to scratch out for themselves from under the snow, and who\nare easily tamed and readily permit themselves to be deprived of that\nfreedom in which they could have remained if they chose. For other\npeople in the same frozen regions marine animals afford rich stores;\nin addition to the food and clothing which are thus supplied, and the\nwood which is floated in by the sea to their dwellings, these marine\nanimals provide material for fuel by which their huts are warmed. Here\nis a wonderful concurrence of many references of nature to one purpose;\nand all this applies to the cases of the Greenlander, the Lapp, the\nSamoyede, the inhabitant of Yakutsk, etc. But then we do not see why,\ngenerally, men must live there at all. Therefore to say that vapour\nfalls out of the atmosphere in the form of snow, that the sea has its\ncurrents which float down wood that has grown in warmer lands, and that\nthere are in it great sea monsters filled with oil, _because_ the idea\nof advantage for certain poor creatures is fundamental for the cause\nwhich collects all these natural products, would be a very venturesome\nand arbitrary judgement. For even if there were none of this natural\nutility, we should miss nothing as regards the adequateness of natural\ncauses to nature\u2019s constitution; much more even to desire such a\ntendency in, and to attribute such a purpose to, nature would be the\npart of a presumptuous and inconsiderate fancy. For indeed it might be\nobserved that it could only have been the greatest unsociability among\nmen which thus scattered them into such inhospitable regions.\n\n\n\u00a7 64. _Of the peculiar character of things as natural purposes_\n\nIn order to see that a thing is only possible as a purpose, that is,\nto be forced to seek the causality of its origin not in the mechanism\nof nature but in a cause whose faculty of action is determined through\nconcepts, it is requisite that its form be not possible according to\nmere natural laws, _i.e._ laws which can be cognised by us through the\nUnderstanding alone when applied to objects of Sense; but that even the\nempirical knowledge of it as regards its cause and effect presupposes\nconcepts of Reason. This _contingency_ of its form in all empirical\nnatural laws in reference to Reason affords a ground for regarding its\ncausality as possible only through Reason. For Reason, which must\ncognise the necessity of every form of a natural product in order to\ncomprehend even the conditions of its genesis, cannot assume such\n[natural] necessity in that particular given form. The causality of its\norigin is then referred to the faculty of acting in accordance with\npurposes (a will); and the Object which can only thus be represented as\npossible is represented as a purpose.\n\nIf in a seemingly uninhabited country a man perceived a geometrical\nfigure, say a regular hexagon, inscribed on the sand, his reflection\nbusied with such a concept would attribute, although obscurely, the\nunity in the principle of its genesis to Reason, and consequently would\nnot regard as a ground of the possibility of such a shape the sand, or\nthe neighbouring sea, or the winds, or beasts with familiar footprints,\nor any other irrational cause. For the chance against meeting with\nsuch a concept, which is only possible through Reason, would seem so\ninfinitely great, that it would be just as if there were no natural\nlaw, no cause in the mere mechanical working of nature capable of\nproducing it; but as if only the concept of such an Object, as a\nconcept which Reason alone can supply and with which it can compare the\nthing, could contain the causality for such an effect. This then would\nbe regarded as a purpose, but as a product of _art_, not as a natural\npurpose (_vestigium hominis video_).[106]\n\nBut in order to regard a thing cognised as a natural product as a\npurpose also--consequently as a _natural purpose_, if this is not a\ncontradiction--something more is required. I would say provisionally:\na thing exists as a natural purpose, if it is [although in a double\nsense][107] both _cause and effect of itself_. For herein lies a\ncausality the like of which cannot be combined with the mere concept\nof a nature without attributing to it a purpose; it can certainly be\nthought without contradiction, but cannot be comprehended. We shall\nelucidate the determination of this Idea of a natural purpose by an\nexample, before we analyse it completely.\n\nIn the first place, a tree generates another tree according to a\nknown natural law. But the tree produced is of the same genus; and so\nit produces itself _generically_. On the one hand, as effect it is\ncontinually self-produced; on the other hand, as cause it continually\nproduces itself, and so perpetuates itself generically.\n\nSecondly, a tree produces itself as an _individual_. This kind of\neffect no doubt we call growth; but it is quite different from any\nincrease according to mechanical laws, and is to be reckoned as\ngeneration, though under another name. The matter that the tree\nincorporates it previously works up into a specifically peculiar\nquality, which natural mechanism external to it cannot supply; and\nthus it develops itself by aid of a material which, as compounded,\nis its own product. No doubt, as regards the constituents got from\nnature without, it must only be regarded as an educt; but yet in\nthe separation and recombination of this raw material we see such\nan originality in the separating and formative faculty of this kind\nof natural being, as is infinitely beyond the reach of art, if the\nattempt is made to reconstruct such vegetable products out of elements\nobtained by their dissection or material supplied by nature for their\nsustenance.\n\n_Thirdly_, each part of a tree generates itself in such a way that the\nmaintenance of any one part depends reciprocally on the maintenance of\nthe rest. A bud of one tree engrafted on the twig of another produces\nin the alien stock a plant of its own kind, and so also a scion\nengrafted on a foreign stem. Hence we may regard each twig or leaf of\nthe same tree as merely engrafted or inoculated into it, and so as an\nindependent tree attached to another and parasitically nourished by\nit. At the same time, while the leaves are products of the tree they\nalso in turn give support to it; for the repeated defoliation of a tree\nkills it, and its growth thus depends on the action of the leaves upon\nthe stem. The self-help of nature in case of injury in the vegetable\ncreation, when the want of a part that is necessary for the maintenance\nof its neighbours is supplied by the remaining parts; and the abortions\nor malformations in growth, in which certain parts, on account of\ncasual defects or hindrances, form themselves in a new way to maintain\nwhat exists, and so produce an anomalous creature, I shall only mention\nin passing, though they are among the most wonderful properties of\norganised creatures.\n\n\n\u00a7 65. _Things regarded as natural purposes are organised beings_\n\nAccording to the character alleged in the preceding section, a thing,\nwhich, though a natural product, is to be cognised as only possible as\na natural purpose, must bear itself alternately as cause and as effect.\nThis, however, is a somewhat inexact and indeterminate expression\nwhich needs derivation from a determinate concept.\n\nCausal combination as thought merely by the Understanding is a\nconnexion constituting an ever-progressive series (of causes and\neffects); and things which as effects presuppose others as causes\ncannot be reciprocally at the same time causes of these. This sort\nof causal combination we call that of effective causes (_nexus\neffectivus_). But on the other hand, a causal combination according to\na concept of Reason (of purposes) can also be thought, which regarded\nas a series would lead either forwards or backwards; in this the thing\nthat has been called the effect may with equal propriety be termed the\ncause of that of which it is the effect. In the practical department of\nhuman art we easily find connexions such as this; _e.g._ a house, no\ndoubt, is the cause of the money received for rent, but also conversely\nthe representation of this possible income was the cause of building\nthe house. Such a causal connexion we call that of final causes (_nexus\nfinalis_). We may perhaps suitably name the first the connexion of\nreal causes, the second of those which are ideal; because from this\nnomenclature it is at once comprehended that there can be no more than\nthese two kinds of causality.\n\nFor a thing to be a natural purpose in the _first_ place it is\nrequisite that its parts (as regards their being and their form) are\nonly possible through their reference to the whole. For the thing\nitself is a purpose and so is comprehended under a concept or an Idea\nwhich must determine _a priori_ all that is to be contained in it.\nBut so far as a thing is only thought as possible in this way, it is\na mere work of art; _i.e._ a product of one rational cause distinct\nfrom the matter (of the parts), whose causality (in the collection and\ncombination of the parts) is determined through its Idea of a whole\npossible by their means (and consequently not through external nature).\n\nBut if a thing as a natural product is to involve in itself and in its\ninternal possibility a reference to purposes,--_i.e._ to be possible\nonly as a natural purpose, and without the causality of the concepts of\nrational beings external to itself,--then it is requisite _secondly_\nthat its parts should so combine in the unity of a whole that they are\nreciprocally cause and effect of each other\u2019s form. Only in this way\ncan the Idea of the whole conversely (reciprocally) determine the form\nand combination of all the parts; not indeed as cause--for then it\nwould be an artificial product--but as the ground of cognition, for him\nwho is judging it, of the systematic unity and combination of all the\nmanifold contained in the given material.\n\nFor a body then which is to be judged in itself and its internal\npossibility as a natural purpose, it is requisite that its parts\nmutually depend upon each other both as to their form and their\ncombination, and so produce a whole by their own causality; while\nconversely the concept of the whole may be regarded as its cause\naccording to a principle (in a being possessing a causality according\nto concepts adequate to such a product). In this case then the\nconnexion of _effective causes_ may be judged as an _effect through\nfinal causes_.\n\nIn such a product of nature every part not only exists _by means\nof_ the other parts, but is thought as existing _for the sake of_\nthe others and the whole, that is as an (organic) instrument. Thus,\nhowever, it might be an artificial instrument, and so might be\nrepresented only as a purpose that is possible in general; but also\nits parts are all organs reciprocally _producing_ each other. This can\nnever be the case with artificial instruments, but only with nature\nwhich supplies all the material for instruments (even for those of\nart). Only a product of such a kind can be called a _natural purpose_,\nand this because it is an _organised_ and _self-organising being_.\n\nIn a watch one part is the instrument for moving the other parts, but\nthe wheel is not the effective cause of the production of the others;\nno doubt one part is for the sake of the others, but it does not exist\nby their means. In this case the producing cause of the parts and of\ntheir form is not contained in the nature (of the material), but is\nexternal to it in a being which can produce effects according to Ideas\nof a whole possible by means of its causality. Hence a watch wheel\ndoes not produce other wheels, still less does one watch produce other\nwatches, utilising (organising) foreign material for that purpose;\nhence it does not replace of itself parts of which it has been\ndeprived, nor does it make good what is lacking in a first formation by\nthe addition of the missing parts, nor if it has gone out of order does\nit repair itself--all of which, on the contrary, we may expect from\norganised nature.--An organised being is then not a mere machine, for\nthat has merely _moving_ power, but it possesses in itself _formative_\npower of a self-propagating kind which it communicates to its materials\nthough they have it not of themselves; it organises them, in fact, and\nthis cannot be explained by the mere mechanical faculty of motion.\n\nWe say of nature and its faculty in organised products far too little\nif we describe it as an _analogon of art_; for this suggests an\nartificer (a rational being) external to it. Much rather does it\norganise itself and its organised products in every species, no doubt\nafter one general pattern but yet with suitable deviations, which\nself-preservation demands according to circumstances. We perhaps\napproach nearer to this inscrutable property, if we describe it as\nan _analogon of life_; but then we must either endow matter, as mere\nmatter, with a property which contradicts its very being (hylozoism),\nor associate therewith an alien principle _standing in communion_ with\nit (a soul). But in the latter case we must, if such a product is to be\na natural product, either presuppose organised matter as the instrument\nof that soul, which does not make the soul a whit more comprehensible;\nor regard the soul as artificer of this structure and so remove\nthe product from (corporeal) nature. To speak strictly, then, the\norganisation of nature has in it nothing analogous to any causality we\nknow.[108] Beauty in nature can be rightly described as an analogon of\nart, because it is ascribed to objects only in reference to reflection\nupon their _external_ aspect, and consequently only on account of the\nform of their external surface. But _internal natural perfection_,\nas it belongs to those things which are only possible as _natural\npurposes_, and are therefore called organised beings, is not analogous\nto any physical, _i.e._ natural, faculty known to us; nay even,\nregarding ourselves as, in the widest sense, belonging to nature, it\nis not even thinkable or explicable by means of any exactly fitting\nanalogy to human art.\n\nThe concept of a thing as in itself a natural purpose is therefore no\nconstitutive concept of Understanding or of Reason, but it can serve\nas a regulative concept for the reflective Judgement, to guide our\ninvestigation about objects of this kind by a distant analogy with our\nown causality according to purposes generally, and in our meditations\nupon their ultimate ground. This latter use, however, is not in\nreference to the knowledge of nature or of its original ground, but\nrather to our own practical faculty of Reason, in analogy with which we\nconsidered the cause of that purposiveness.\n\nOrganised beings are then the only beings in nature which, considered\nin themselves and apart from any relation to other things, can be\nthought as possible only as purposes of nature. Hence they first\nafford objective reality to the concept of a _purpose of nature_, as\ndistinguished from a practical purpose; and so they give to the science\nof nature the basis for a teleology, _i.e._ a mode of judgement about\nnatural Objects according to a special principle which otherwise we\nshould in no way be justified in introducing (because we cannot see _a\npriori_ the possibility of this kind of causality).\n\n\n\u00a7 66. _Of the principle of judging of internal purposiveness in\norganised beings_\n\nThis principle, which is at the same time a definition, is as follows:\n_An organised product of nature is one in which every part is\nreciprocally purpose, [end] and means._ In it nothing is vain, without\npurpose, or to be ascribed to a blind mechanism of nature.\n\nThis principle, as regards its occasion, is doubtless derived from\nexperience, viz. from that methodised experience called observation;\nbut on account of the universality and necessity which it ascribes to\nsuch purposiveness it cannot rest solely on empirical grounds, but\nmust have at its basis an _a priori_ principle, although it be merely\nregulative and these purposes lie only in the idea of the judging\n[subject] and not in an effective cause. We may therefore describe\nthe aforesaid principle as a _maxim_ for judging of the internal\npurposiveness of organised beings.\n\nIt is an acknowledged fact that the dissectors of plants and animals,\nin order to investigate their structure and to find out the reasons,\nwhy and for what end such parts, such a disposition and combination\nof parts, and just such an internal form have been given them, assume\nas indisputably necessary the maxim that nothing in such a creature\nis _vain_; just as they lay down as the fundamental proposition of\nthe universal science of nature, that _nothing_ happens _by chance_.\nIn fact, they can as little free themselves from this teleological\nproposition as from the universal physical proposition; for as without\nthe latter we should have no experience at all, so without the former\nwe should have no guiding thread for the observation of a species of\nnatural things which we have thought teleologically under the concept\nof natural purposes.\n\nNow this concept brings the Reason into a quite different order of\nthings from that of a mere mechanism of nature, which is no longer\nsatisfying here. An Idea is to be the ground of the possibility\nof the natural product. But because this is an absolute unity of\nrepresentation, instead of the material being a plurality of things\nthat can supply by itself no definite unity of composition,--if that\nunity of the Idea is to serve at all as the _a priori_ ground of\ndetermination of a natural law of the causality of such a form of\ncomposition,--the purpose of nature must be extended to _everything_\nincluded in its product. For if we once refer action of this sort _on\nthe whole_ to any supersensible ground of determination beyond the\nblind mechanism of nature, we must judge of it altogether according to\nthis principle; and we have then no reason to regard the form of such\na thing as partly dependent on mechanism--for by such mixing up of\ndisparate principles no certain rule of judging would be left.\n\nFor example, it may be that in an animal body many parts can be\nconceived as concretions according to mere mechanical laws (as the\nhide, the bones, the hair). And yet the cause which brings together the\nrequired matter, modifies it, forms it, and puts it in its appropriate\nplace, must always be judged of teleologically; so that here everything\nmust be considered as organised, and everything again in a certain\nrelation to the thing itself is an organ.\n\n\n\u00a7 67. _Of the principle of the teleological judging of nature in\ngeneral as a system of purposes_\n\nWe have already said above that the _external_ purposiveness of natural\nthings affords no sufficient warrant for using them as purposes of\nnature in order to explain their presence, and for regarding their\ncontingently purposive effects as the grounds of their presence\naccording to the principle of final causes. Thus we cannot take\nfor natural purposes, _rivers_ because they promote intercourse\namong inland peoples, _mountains_ because they contain the sources\nof the rivers and for their maintenance in rainless seasons have a\nstore of snow, or the _slope_ of the land which carries away the\nwater and leaves the country dry; because although this shape of the\nearth\u2019s surface be very necessary for the origin and maintenance of\nthe vegetable and animal kingdoms, it has nothing in itself for the\npossibility of which we are forced to assume a causality according to\npurposes. The same is true of plants which man uses for his needs or\nhis pleasures; of beasts, the camel, the ox, the horse, dog, etc.,\nwhich are indispensable to him as well for food as because they are\nused in his service in many different ways. In the case of things\nwhich we have no reason for regarding in themselves as purposes, such\nexternal relation can only be hypothetically judged as purposive.\n\nTo judge of a thing as a natural purpose on account of its internal\nform is something very different from taking the existence of that\nthing to be a purpose of nature. For the latter assertion we require\nnot merely the concept of a possible purpose, but the knowledge of\nthe final purpose (_scopus_) of nature. But this requires a reference\nof such knowledge to something supersensible far transcending all our\nteleological knowledge of nature, for the purpose of [the existence\nof][109] nature must itself be sought beyond nature. The internal form\nof a mere blade of grass is sufficient to show that for our human\nfaculty of judgement its origin is possible only according to the\nrule of purposes. But if we change our point of view and look to the\nuse which other natural beings make of it, abandon the consideration\nof its internal organisation and only look to its externally purposive\nreferences, we shall arrive at no categorical purpose; all this\npurposive reference rests on an ever more distant condition, which, as\nunconditioned (the presence of a thing as final purpose), lies quite\noutside the physico-teleological view of the world. For example, grass\nis needful for the ox, which again is needful for man as a means of\nexistence, but then we do not see why it is necessary that men should\nexist (a question this, which we shall not find so easy to answer if we\nsometimes cast our thoughts on the New Hollanders or the inhabitants\nof Tierra del Fuego). So conceived, the thing is not even a natural\npurpose, for neither it (nor its whole genus) is to be regarded as a\nnatural product.\n\nHence it is only so far as matter is organised that it necessarily\ncarries with it the concept of a natural purpose, because this its\nspecific form is at the same time a product of nature. But this concept\nleads necessarily to the Idea of collective nature as a system in\naccordance with the rule of purposes, to which Idea all the mechanism\nof nature must be subordinated according to principles of Reason (at\nleast in order to investigate natural phenomena therein). The principle\nof Reason belongs to it only as a subjective principle or a maxim: viz.\neverything in the World is some way good for something; nothing is vain\nin it. By the example that nature gives us in its organic products we\nare justified, nay called upon, to expect of it and of its laws nothing\nthat is not purposive on the whole.\n\nIt is plain that this is not a principle for the determinant but\nonly for the reflective Judgement; that it is regulative and not\nconstitutive; and that we derive from it a clue by which we consider\nnatural things in reference to an already given ground of determination\naccording to a new law-abiding order; and extend our natural science\naccording to a different principle, viz. that of final causes, but\nyet without prejudice to the principle of mechanical causality.\nFurthermore, it is in no wise thus decided, whether anything of which\nwe judge by this principle, is a _designed_ purpose of nature; whether\nthe grass is for the ox or the sheep, or whether these and the other\nthings of nature are here for men. It is well also from this side\nto consider the things which are unpleasant to us and are contrary\nto purpose in particular references. Thus, for example, we can say:\nThe vermin that torment men in their clothes, their hair, or their\nbeds, may be, according to a wise appointment of nature, a motive to\ncleanliness which is in itself an important means for the preservation\nof health. Or again the mosquitoes and other stinging insects that\nmake the wildernesses of America so oppressive to the savages, may be\nso many goads to activity for these primitive men, [inducing them] to\ndrain the marshes and bring light into the forests which intercept\nevery breath of air, and in this way, as well as by cultivating the\nsoil, to make their habitations more healthy. The same thing, which\nappears to men contradictory to nature in its inner organisation, if\nviewed in this light gives an entertaining, sometimes an instructive,\noutlook into a teleological order of things, to which, without such\na principle, mere physical observation would not lead us by itself.\nThus some persons regard the tapeworm as given to the men or animals\nin whom it resides, as a kind of set-off for some defect in their\nvital organs; now I would ask if dreams (without which we never sleep,\nthough we seldom remember them) may not be a purposive ordinance of\nnature? For during the relaxation of all the moving powers of the body,\nthey serve to excite internally the vital organs by the medium of the\nImagination and its great activity (which in this state generally rises\nto the height of affection). During sleep the Imagination commonly is\nmore actively at play when the stomach is overloaded, in which case\nthis excitement is the more necessary. Consequently, then, without this\ninternal power of motion and this fatiguing unrest, on account of which\nwe complain about our dreams (though in fact they are rather remedial),\nsleep even in a sound state of health would be a complete extinction of\nlife.\n\nAlso the beauty of nature, _i.e._ its connexion with the free play of\nour cognitive faculties in apprehending and judging of its appearance,\ncan be regarded as a kind of objective purposiveness of nature in its\nwhole [content] as a system of which man is a member; if once the\nteleological judging of the same by means of the natural purposes which\norganised beings suggest to us, has justified for us the Idea of a\ngreat system of purposes of nature. We can regard it as a favour[110]\nwhich nature has felt for us, that in addition to what is useful it\nhas so profusely dispensed beauty and charm; and we can therefore love\nit, as well as regard it with respect on account of its immensity,\nand feel ourselves ennobled by such regard; just as if nature had\nestablished and adorned its splendid theatre precisely with this view.\n\nWe shall say only one thing more in this paragraph. If we have once\ndiscovered in nature a faculty of bringing forth products that can\nonly be thought by us in accordance with the concept of final causes,\nwe go further still. We venture to judge that things belong to a\nsystem of purposes, which yet do not (either in themselves or in their\npurposive relations) necessitate our seeking for any principle of\ntheir possibility beyond the mechanism of causes working blindly. For\nthe first Idea, as concerns its ground, already brings us beyond the\nworld of sense; since the unity of the supersensible principle must be\nregarded as valid in this way not merely for certain species of natural\nbeings, but for the whole of nature as a system.\n\n\n\u00a7 68. _Of the principle of Teleology as internal principle of natural\nscience_\n\nThe principles of a science are either internal to it and are then\ncalled domestic (_principia domestica_), or are based on concepts that\ncan only find their place outside it and so are _foreign_ principles\n(_peregrina_). Sciences that contain the latter, place at the basis of\ntheir doctrines auxiliary propositions (_lemmata_), _i.e._ they borrow\nsome concept, and with it a ground of arrangement, from another science.\n\nEvery science is in itself a system, and it is not enough in it to\nbuild in accordance with principles and thus to employ a technical\nprocedure, but we must go to work with it architectonically, as a\nbuilding subsisting for itself; we must not treat it as an additional\nwing or part of another building, but as a whole in itself, although we\nmay subsequently make a passage from it into that other or conversely.\n\nIf then we introduce into the context of natural science the concept of\nGod in order to explain the purposiveness in nature, and subsequently\nuse this purposiveness to prove that there is a God, there is no\ninternal consistency in either science [_i.e._ either in natural\nscience or theology]; and a delusive circle brings them both into\nuncertainty, because they have allowed their boundaries to overlap.\n\nThe expression, a purpose of nature, already sufficiently prevents the\nconfusion of mixing up natural science and the occasion that it gives\nfor judging _teleologically_ of its objects, with the consideration of\nGod, and so of a _theological_ derivation of them. We must not regard\nit as insignificant, if one interchanges this expression with that of\na divine purpose in the ordering of nature, or gives out the latter\nas more suitable and proper for a pious soul, because it must come in\nthe end to deriving these purposive forms in nature from a wise author\nof the world. On the contrary, we must carefully and modestly limit\nourselves to the expression, a purpose of nature, which asserts exactly\nas much as we know. Before we ask after the cause of nature itself, we\nfind in nature, and in the course of its development, products of the\nsame kind which are developed in it according to known empirical laws,\nin accordance with which natural science must judge of its objects,\nand, consequently, must seek in nature their causality according to\nthe rule of purposes. So then it must not transgress its bounds in\norder to introduce into itself as a domestic principle that, to whose\nconcept no experience can be commensurate, upon which we are only\nentitled to venture after the completion of natural science.\n\nNatural characteristics which demonstrate themselves _a priori_, and\nconsequently admit of insight into their possibility from universal\nprinciples without any admixture of experience, although they carry\nwith them a technical purposiveness, yet cannot, because they are\nabsolutely necessary, be referred to the Teleology of nature, as to a\nmethod belonging to Physic for solving its problems. Arithmetical or\ngeometrical analogies, as well as universal mechanical laws,--however\nstrange and admirable may seem to us the union of different rules,\nquite independent of one another according to all appearance, in a\nsingle principle,--possess on that account no claim to be teleological\ngrounds of explanation in Physic. Even if they deserve to be brought\ninto consideration in the universal theory of the purposiveness\nof things of nature, yet they belong to another [science], _i.e._\nMetaphysic, and constitute no internal principle of natural science;\nas with the empirical laws of natural purposes in organised beings, it\nis not only permissible but unavoidable to use the teleological _mode\nof judging_ as a principle of the doctrine of nature in regard to a\nparticular class of its objects.\n\nSo to the end that Physic may keep within its own bounds, it\nabstracts itself entirely from the question, whether natural purposes\nare _designed_ or _undesigned_; for that would be to meddle in an\nextraneous business, in Metaphysic. It is enough that there are\nobjects, alone _explicable_ according to natural laws which we\ncan only think by means of the Idea of purposes as principle, and\nalso alone internally _cognisable_ as concerns their internal form,\nin this way. In order, therefore, to remove the suspicion of the\nslightest assumption,--as if we wished to mix with our grounds\nof cognition something not belonging to Physic at all, viz. a\nsupernatural cause,--we speak in Teleology, indeed, of nature as if the\npurposiveness therein were designed, but in such a way that this design\nis ascribed to nature, _i.e._ to matter. Now in this way there can be\nno misunderstanding, because no design in the proper meaning of the\nword can possibly be ascribed to inanimate matter; we thus give notice\nthat this word here only expresses a principle of the reflective not of\nthe determinant Judgement, and so is to introduce no particular ground\nof causality; but only adds for the use of the Reason a different kind\nof investigation from that according to mechanical laws, in order to\nsupplement the inadequacy of the latter even for empirical research\ninto all particular laws of nature. Hence we speak quite correctly\nin Teleology, so far as it is referred to Physic, of the wisdom, the\neconomy, the forethought, the beneficence of Nature, without either\nmaking an intelligent being of it, for that would be preposterous; or\neven without presuming to place another intelligent Being above it as\nits Architect, for that would be presumptuous.[111] But there should\nbe only signified thereby a kind of causality of nature after the\nanalogy of our own in the technical use of Reason, in order to have\nbefore us the rule according to which certain products of nature must\nbe investigated.\n\nBut now why is it that Teleology usually forms no proper part of\ntheoretical natural science, but is regarded as a propaedeutic or\ntransition to Theology? This is done in order to restrict the study\nof nature, mechanically considered, to that which we can so subject\nto observation or experiment that we are able to produce it ourselves\nas nature does, or at least by similar laws. For we see into a thing\ncompletely only so far as we can make it in accordance with our\nconcepts and bring it to completion. But organisation, as an inner\npurpose of nature, infinitely surpasses all our faculty of presenting\nthe like by means of art. And as concerns the external contrivances\nof nature regarded as purposive (wind, rain, etc.), Physic, indeed,\nconsiders their mechanism, but it cannot at all present their reference\nto purposes, so far as this is a condition necessarily belonging to\ncause; for this necessity of connexion has to do altogether with the\ncombination of our concepts and not with the constitution of things.\n\n\n\n\nSECOND DIVISION\n\nDIALECTIC OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT\n\n\n\u00a7 69. _What is an antinomy of the Judgement?_\n\nThe _determinant_ Judgement has for itself no principles which are\nthe foundation of _concepts of Objects_. It has no autonomy, for it\n_subsumes_ only under given laws or concepts as principles. Hence it\nis exposed to no danger of an antinomy of its own or to a conflict of\nits principles. So [we saw that] the transcendental Judgement which\ncontains the conditions of subsuming under categories was for itself\nnot _nomothetic_, but that it only indicated the conditions of sensuous\nintuition, under which reality (application) can be supplied to a given\nconcept, as law of the Understanding, whereby the Judgement could never\nfall into discord with itself (at least as far as its principles are\nconcerned).\n\nBut the _reflective_ Judgement must subsume under a law, which is not\nyet given, and is therefore in fact only a principle of reflection\nupon objects, for which we are objectively quite in want of a law or\nof a concept of an Object that would be adequate as a principle for\nthe cases that occur. Since now no use of the cognitive faculties\ncan be permitted without principles, the reflective Judgement must\nin such cases serve as a principle for itself. This, because it is\nnot objective and can supply no ground of cognition of the Object\nadequate for design, must serve as a mere subjective principle, for the\npurposive employment of our cognitive faculties, _i.e._ for reflecting\nupon a class of objects. Therefore in reference to such cases the\nreflective Judgement has its maxims--necessary maxims--on behalf of\nthe cognition of natural laws in experience, in order to attain by\ntheir means to concepts, even concepts of Reason; since it has absolute\nneed of such in order to learn merely to cognise nature according to\nits empirical laws.--Between these necessary maxims of the reflective\nJudgement there may be a conflict and consequently an antinomy, upon\nwhich a Dialectic bases itself. If each of two conflicting maxims has\nits ground in the nature of the cognitive faculties, this may be called\na natural Dialectic, and an unavoidable illusion which we must expose\nand resolve in our Critique, to the end that it may not deceive us.\n\n\n\u00a7 70. _Representation of this antinomy_\n\nSo far as Reason has to do with nature, as the complex of objects\nof external sense, it can base itself partly upon laws which the\nUnderstanding itself prescribes _a priori_ to nature, partly upon\nlaws which it can extend indefinitely by means of the empirical\ndeterminations occurring in experience. To apply the former kind of\nlaws, _i.e._ the _universal_ laws of material nature in general, the\nJudgement needs no special principle of reflection, since it is there\ndeterminant because an objective principle is given to it through\nUnderstanding. But as regards the particular laws that can only be made\nknown to us through experience, there can be under them such great\nmanifoldness and diversity, that the Judgement must serve as its own\nprinciple in order to investigate and search into the phenomena of\nnature in accordance with a law. Such a guiding thread is needed, if\nwe are only to hope for a connected empirical cognition according to\na thoroughgoing conformity of nature to law, even its unity according\nto empirical laws. In this contingent unity of particular laws it may\nvery well happen that the Judgement in its reflection proceeds from\ntwo maxims. One of these is suggested to it _a priori_ by the mere\nUnderstanding; but the other is prompted by particular experiences,\nwhich bring the Reason into play in order to form a judgement upon\ncorporeal nature and its laws in accordance with a particular\nprinciple. Hence it comes about that these two kinds of maxims seem to\nbe incapable of existing together, and consequently a Dialectic arises\nwhich leads the Judgement into error in the principle of its reflection.\n\nThe _first maxim_ of Judgement is the _proposition_: all production of\nmaterial things and their forms must be judged to be possible according\nto merely mechanical laws.\n\nThe _second maxim_ is the _counter-proposition_: some products of\nmaterial nature cannot be judged to be possible according to merely\nmechanical laws. (To judge them requires quite a different law of\ncausality, namely, that of final causes.)\n\nIf these regulative principles of investigation be converted into\nconstitutive principles of the possibility of Objects, they will run\nthus:\n\n_Proposition_: All production of material things is possible according\nto merely mechanical laws.\n\n_Counter-proposition_: Some production of material things is not\npossible according to merely mechanical laws.\n\nIn this latter aspect, as objective principles for the determinant\nJudgement, they would contradict each other; and consequently one of\nthe two propositions must necessarily be false. We shall then, it is\ntrue, have an antinomy, but not of Judgement; there will be a conflict\nin the legislation of Reason. Reason, however, can prove neither the\none nor the other of these fundamental propositions, because we can\nhave _a priori_ no determinant principle of the possibility of things\naccording to mere empirical laws of nature.\n\nOn the other hand, as regards the first-mentioned maxims of a\nreflective Judgement, they involve no contradiction in fact. For if\nI say, I must _judge_, according to merely mechanical laws, of the\npossibility of all events in material nature, and consequently of all\nforms regarded as its products, I do not therefore say: _They are\npossible in this way alone_ (apart from any other kind of causality).\nAll that is implied is: I _must_ always _reflect_ upon them _according\nto the principle_ of the mere mechanism of nature, and consequently\ninvestigate this as far as I can; because unless this lies at the\nbasis of investigation, there can be no proper knowledge of nature at\nall. But this does not prevent us, if occasion offers, from following\nout the second maxim in the case of certain natural forms (and even\nby occasion of these in the whole of nature), in order to reflect\nupon them according to the principle of final causes, which is quite\na different thing from explaining them according to the mechanism of\nnature. Reflection in accordance with the first maxim is thus not\nabrogated; on the contrary, we are told to follow it as far as we can.\nNor is it said that these forms would not be possible in accordance\nwith the mechanism of nature. It is only asserted that _human Reason_\nin following up this maxim and in this way could never find the least\nground for that which constitutes the specific [character] of a natural\npurpose, although it would increase its knowledge of natural laws.\nThus it is left undecided whether or not in the unknown inner ground\nof nature, physico-mechanical and purposive combination may be united\nin the same things in one principle. We only say that our Reason is\nnot in a position so to unite them; and that therefore the Judgement\n(as _reflective_--from subjective grounds, not as determinant, in\nconsequence of an objective principle of the possibility of things in\nthemselves) is compelled to think a different principle from that of\nnatural mechanism as the ground of the possibility of certain forms in\nnature.\n\n\n\u00a7 71. _Preliminary to the solution of the above antinomy_\n\nWe can in no way prove the impossibility of the production of organised\nnatural products by the mere mechanism of nature, because we cannot\nsee into the first inner ground of the infinite multiplicity of the\nparticular laws of nature, which are contingent for us since they\nare only empirically known; and so we cannot arrive at the inner\nall-sufficient principle of the possibility of a nature (a principle\nwhich lies in the supersensible). Whether therefore the productive\nfaculty of nature is sufficient for that which we judge to be formed\nor combined in accordance with the Idea of purposes, as well as\nfor that which we believe to require merely a mechanical system\n[Maschinenwesen] of nature; or whether there lies at the basis of\nthings which we must necessarily judge as properly natural purposes,\na quite different kind of original causality, which cannot be\ncontained in material nature or in its intelligible substrate, viz. an\narchitectonic Understanding--this is a question to which our Reason,\nvery narrowly limited in respect of the concept of causality if it\nis to be specified _a priori_, can give no answer whatever.--But it\nis just as certain and beyond doubt that, in regard to our cognitive\nfaculties, the mere mechanism of nature can furnish no ground of\nexplanation of the production of organised beings. _For the reflective\nJudgement_ it is therefore a quite correct fundamental proposition,\nthat for that connexion of things according to final causes which is\nso plain, there must be thought a causality distinct from that of\nmechanism, viz. that of an (intelligent) cause of the world acting in\naccordance with purposes; but _for the determinant Judgement_ this\nwould be a hasty and unprovable proposition. In the first case it is a\nmere maxim of the Judgement, wherein the concept of that causality is\na mere Idea, to which we by no means undertake to concede reality, but\nwhich we use as a guide to reflection, which remains thereby always\nopen to all mechanical grounds of explanation and does not withdraw\nout of the world of Sense. In the second case the proposition would be\nan objective principle prescribed by Reason, to which the determinant\nJudgement must subject itself, whereby however it withdraws beyond the\nworld of Sense into the transcendent and perhaps is led into error.\n\nAll appearance of an antinomy between the maxims of the proper\nphysical (mechanical) and the teleological (technical) methods of\nexplanation rests therefore on this; that we confuse a fundamental\nproposition of the reflective with one of the determinant Judgement,\nand the _autonomy_ of the first (which has mere subjective validity for\nour use of Reason in respect of particular empirical laws) with the\n_heteronomy_ of the second, which must regulate itself according to\nlaws (universal or particular) given to it by the Understanding.\n\n\n\u00a7 72. _Of the different systems which deal with the purposiveness of\nnature_\n\nNo one has ever doubted the correctness of the proposition that\njudgement must be passed upon certain things of nature (organised\nbeings) and their possibility in accordance with the concept of final\ncauses, even if we only desire a _guiding thread_ to learn how to\ncognise their constitution through observation, without aspiring to an\ninvestigation into their first origin. The question therefore can only\nbe: whether this fundamental proposition is merely subjectively valid,\n_i.e._ is a mere maxim of our Judgement; or whether it is an objective\nprinciple of nature, in accordance with which, apart from its mechanism\n(according to the mere laws of motion), quite a different kind of\ncausality attaches to it, viz. that of final causes, under which these\nlaws (of moving forces) stand only as intermediate causes.\n\nWe could leave this question or problem quite undecided and unsolved\nspeculatively; because if we content ourselves with speculation\nwithin the bounds of mere natural knowledge, we have enough in these\nmaxims for the study of nature and for the tracking out of its hidden\nsecrets, as far as human powers reach. There is then indeed a certain\npresentiment of our Reason or a hint as it were given us by nature,\nthat, by means of this concept of final causes, we go beyond nature,\nand could unite it to the highest point in the series of causes, if we\nwere to abandon or at least to lay aside for a time the investigation\nof nature (although we may not have advanced far in it), and seek\nthenceforth to find out whither this stranger in natural science, viz.\nthe concept of natural purposes, would lead us.\n\nBut here these undisputed maxims pass over into problems opening out\na wide field for difficulties. Does purposive connexion in nature\n_prove_ a particular kind of causality? Or is it not rather, considered\nin itself and in accordance with objective principles, similar to the\nmechanism of nature, resting on one and the same ground? Only, as\nthis ground in many natural products is often hidden too deep for our\ninvestigation, we make trial of a subjective principle, that of art,\n_i.e._ of causality according to Ideas, and we ascribe it to nature\nby analogy. This expedient succeeds in many cases, but seems in some\nto mislead, and in no case does it justify us in introducing into\nnatural science a particular kind of operation quite distinct from the\ncausality according to the mere mechanical laws of nature. We give\nthe name of _Technic_ to the procedure (the causality) of nature, on\naccount of the appearance of purpose that we find in its products; and\nwe shall divide this into _designed_ (_technica intentionalis_) and\n_undesigned_ (_technica naturalis_). The first is meant to signify\nthat the productive faculty of nature according to final causes must\nbe taken for a particular kind of causality; the second that it is\nat bottom quite similar to the mechanism of nature, and that its\ncontingent agreement with our artistic concepts and their rules should\nbe explained as a mere subjective condition of judging it, and not,\nfalsely, as a particular kind of natural production.\n\nIf we now speak of systems explanatory of nature in regard of final\ncauses, it must be remarked that they all controvert each other\ndogmatically, _i.e._ as to objective principles of the possibility of\nthings, whether there are causes which act designedly or whether they\nare quite without design. They do not dispute as to the subjective\nmaxims, by which we merely judge of the causes of such purposive\nproducts. In this latter case _disparate_ principles could very well\nbe unified; but in the former, contradictorily opposed laws annul each\nother and cannot subsist together.\n\nThere are two sorts of systems as to the Technic of nature, _i.e._\nits productive power in accordance with the rule of purposes; viz.\n_Idealism_ or _Realism_ of natural purposes. The first maintains that\nall purposiveness of nature is _undesigned_; the second that some (in\norganised beings) is _designed_. From this latter the hypothetical\nconsequence can be deduced that the Technic of Nature, as concerns\nall its other products in reference to the whole of nature, is also\ndesigned, _i.e._ is a purpose.\n\n(1) The _Idealism_ of purposiveness (I always understand here by\nthis, objective purposiveness) is either that of the _casuality_ or\nthe _fatality_ of the determination of nature in the purposive form\nof its products. The former principle treats of the reference of\nmatter to the physical basis of its form, viz. the laws of motion;\nthe second, its reference to the _hyperphysical_ basis of itself and\nof the whole of nature. The system of _casuality_ that is ascribed to\n_Epicurus_ or _Democritus_ is, taken literally, so plainly absurd\nthat it need not detain us. Opposed to this is the system of fatality,\nof which _Spinoza_ is taken as the author, although it is much\nolder according to all appearance. This, as it appeals to something\nsupersensible to which our insight does not extend, is not so easy to\ncontrovert; but that is because its concept of the original Being is\nnot possible to understand. But so much is clear, that on this theory\nthe purposive combination in the world must be taken as undesigned;\nfor although derived from an original Being, it is not derived from\nits Understanding or from any design on its part, but rather from\nthe necessity of its nature and of the world-unity which emanates\ntherefrom. Consequently the Fatalism of purposiveness is at the same\ntime an Idealism.\n\n(2) The _Realism_ of the purposiveness of nature is also either\nphysical or hyperphysical. The _former_ bases the purposes in nature,\nby the analogy of a faculty acting with design, on the _life of matter_\n(either its own or the life of an inner principle in it, a world-soul)\nand is called _Hylozoism_. The _latter_ derives them from the original\nground of the universe, as from an intelligent Being (originally\nliving), who produces them with design, and is _Theism_.[112]\n\n\n\u00a7 73. _None of the above systems give what they pretend_\n\nWhat do all these systems desire? They desire to explain our\nteleological judgements about nature, and they go so to work therewith\nthat some deny their truth and, consequently, explain them as an\nIdealism of Nature (represented as Art); others recognise them as true,\nand promise to establish the possibility of a nature in accordance with\nthe Idea of final causes.\n\n(1) The systems which defend the Idealism of final causes in nature\ngrant, it is true, on the one hand to their principle a causality in\naccordance with the laws of motion (through which [causality] natural\nthings exist purposively); but they deny to it _intentionality_, _i.e._\nthat it designedly determines itself to this its purposive production;\nin other words, they deny that the cause is a purpose. This is\n_Epicurus\u2019s_ method of explanation, according to which the distinction\nbetween a Technic of nature and mere mechanism is altogether denied.\nBlind chance is taken as the explanatory ground not only of the\nagreement of the developed products with our concepts of the purpose,\nand consequently of [nature\u2019s] Technic; but also of the determination\nof the causes of this production in accordance with the laws of motion,\nand consequently of their mechanism. Thus nothing is explained, not\neven the illusion in our teleological judgements, and consequently, the\nwould-be Idealism of these in no way established.\n\nOn the other hand, _Spinoza_ wishes to dispense with all inquiries into\nthe ground of the possibility of purposes of nature, and to take away\nall reality from this Idea. He allows their validity in general not as\nproducts but as accidents inhering in an original Being; and to this\nBeing, as substrate of those natural things, he ascribes not causality\nin regard to them but mere subsistence. On account of its unconditioned\nnecessity, and also that of all natural things as accidents inhering\nin it, he secures, it is true, to the forms of nature that unity of\nground which is requisite for all purposiveness; but at the same time\nhe tears away their contingence, without which no _unity of purpose_\ncan be thought, and with it all _design_, inasmuch as he takes away all\nintelligence from the original ground of natural things.\n\nBut Spinozism does not furnish what it desires. It desires to afford\nan explanatory ground of the purposive connexion (which it does not\ndeny) of the things of nature, and it merely speaks of the unity of the\nsubject in which they all inhere. But even if we concede to it that\nthe beings of the world exist in this way, such ontological unity is\nnot therefore a _unity of purpose_, and does not make this in any way\ncomprehensible. For this latter is a quite particular kind of unity\nwhich does not follow from the connexion of things (the beings of\nthe world) in a subject (the original Being), but implies in itself\nreference to a _cause_ which has Understanding; and even if we unite\nall these things in a simple subject, this never exhibits a purposive\nreference. For we do not think of them, first, as the inner _effects_\nof the substance, as if it were a _cause_; nor, secondly, of this\ncause as a cause producing effects _by means of its Understanding_.\nWithout these formal conditions all unity is mere natural necessity;\nand, if it is ascribed as well to things which we represent as\nexternal to one another, blind necessity. But if we wish to give the\nname of purposiveness of nature to that which the schoolmen call the\ntranscendental perfection of things (in reference to their proper\nbeing), according to which everything has in itself that which is\nrequisite to make it one thing and not another, then we are only like\nchildren playing with words instead of concepts. For if all things\nmust be thought as purposes, then to be a thing is the same as to be a\npurpose, and there is at bottom nothing which specially deserves to be\nrepresented as a purpose.\n\nWe hence see at once that Spinoza by his reducing our concepts of\nthe purposive in nature to our own consciousness of existing in an\nall-embracing (though simple) Being, and by his seeking that form\nmerely in the unity of this Being, must have intended to maintain not\nthe realism, but the idealism of its purposiveness. Even this he was\nnot able to accomplish, because the mere representation of the unity of\nthe substrate cannot bring about the Idea of a purposiveness, even that\nwhich is only undesigned.\n\n(2) Those who not only maintain the _Realism_ of natural purposes, but\nalso set about explaining it, believe that they can comprehend, at\nleast as regards its possibility, a practical kind of causality, viz.\nthat of causes working designedly; otherwise they could not undertake\nto supply this explanation. For to authorise even the most daring of\nhypotheses, at least the _possibility_ of what we assume as basis must\nbe _certain_, and we must be able to assure objective reality to its\nconcept.\n\nBut the possibility of living matter cannot even be thought; its\nconcept involves a contradiction because lifelessness, _inertia_,\nconstitutes the essential character of matter. The possibility of\nmatter endowed with life, and of collective nature regarded as an\nanimal, can only be used in an inadequate way (in the interests of\nthe hypothesis of purposiveness in the whole of nature), so far as it\nis manifested by experience in the organisation of nature on a small\nscale; but in no way can we have insight into its possibility _a\npriori_. There must then be a circle in the explanation, if we wish to\nderive the purposiveness of nature in organised beings from the life\nof matter, and yet only know this life in organised beings, and can\nform no concept of its possibility without experience of this kind.\nHylozoism, therefore, does not furnish what it promises.\n\nFinally, _Theism_ can just as little establish dogmatically the\npossibility of natural purposes as a key to Teleology; although it\ncertainly is superior to all other grounds of explanation in that,\nthrough the Understanding which it ascribes to the original Being, it\nrescues in the best way the purposiveness of nature from Idealism, and\nintroduces a causality acting with design for its production.\n\nBut we must first prove satisfactorily to the determinant Judgement the\nimpossibility of the unity of purpose in matter resulting from its mere\nmechanism, before we are justified in placing the ground of this beyond\nnature in a determinate way. We can, however, advance no further than\nthis. In accordance with the constitution and limits of our cognitive\nfaculties (whilst we do not comprehend even the first inner ground\nof this mechanism) we must in no wise seek in matter a principle of\ndeterminate purposive references; but no other way of judging of the\norigination of its products as natural purposes remains to us than\nthat by means of a supreme Understanding as cause of the world. But\nthis is only a ground for the reflective, not for the determinant\nJudgement, and can justify absolutely no objective assertion.\n\n\n\u00a7 74. _The reason that we cannot treat the concept of a Technic of\nnature dogmatically is the fact that a natural purpose is inexplicable_\n\nWe deal with a concept dogmatically (even though it should be\nempirically conditioned) if we consider it as contained under another\nconcept of the Object which constitutes a principle[113] of Reason,\nand determine it in conformity with this. But we deal with it merely\ncritically, if we consider it only in reference to our cognitive\nfaculties and consequently to the subjective conditions of thinking\nit, without undertaking to decide anything about its Object. Dogmatic\nprocedure with a concept is then that which is conformable to law\nfor the determinant Judgement, critical procedure for the reflective\nJudgement.\n\nNow the concept of a thing as a natural purpose is a concept which\nsubsumes nature under a causality only thinkable through Reason,\nin order to judge in accordance with this principle about that\nwhich is given of the Object in experience. But in order to use it\ndogmatically for the determinant Judgement, we must be assured first\nof the objective reality of this concept, because otherwise we could\nsubsume no natural thing under it. Again, the concept of a thing as\na natural purpose is, no doubt, empirically conditioned, _i.e._ only\npossible under certain conditions given in experience, though not to be\nabstracted therefrom; but it is a concept only possible in accordance\nwith a rational principle in the judgement about the object. Its\nobjective reality, therefore (_i.e._ that an object in conformity with\nit is possible), cannot be comprehended and dogmatically established as\nsuch a principle; and we do not know whether it is merely a sophistical\nand objectively empty concept (_conceptus ratiocinans_), or a rational\nconcept, establishing a cognition and confirmed by Reason (_conceptus\nratiocinatus_).[114] Therefore it cannot be dogmatically treated for\nthe determinant Judgement, _i.e._ it is not only impossible to decide\nwhether or not things of nature considered as natural purposes require\nfor their production a causality of a quite peculiar kind (that acting\non design); but the question cannot even be put, because the concept of\na natural purpose is simply not susceptible of proof through Reason as\nregards its objective reality. That is, it is not constitutive for the\ndeterminant Judgement, but merely regulative for the reflective.\n\nThat it is not susceptible of proof is clear because (as concept of\na _natural product_) it embraces in itself natural necessity, and at\nthe same time (as purpose) a contingency of the form of the Object (in\nreference to the mere laws of nature) in the very same thing. Hence,\nif there is to be no contradiction here it must contain a ground for\nthe possibility of the thing in nature, and also a ground of the\npossibility of this nature itself and of its reference to something\nwhich, not being empirically cognisable nature (supersensible), is\ntherefore for us not cognisable at all. [This is requisite] if it is\nto be judged according to a different kind of causality from that\nof natural mechanism when we wish to establish its possibility. The\nconcept of a thing, then, as a natural purpose, is transcendent _for\nthe determinant Judgement_, if we consider the Object through Reason\n(although for the reflective Judgement it certainly may be immanent in\nrespect of the objects of experience). Hence for determinant judgements\nobjective reality cannot be supplied to it; and so it is intelligible\nhow all systems that one may project for the dogmatic treatment of\nthe concept of natural purposes and of nature itself [considered]\nas a whole connected together by means of final causes, can decide\nnothing either by objective affirmation or by objective denial. For if\nthings be subsumed under a concept that is merely problematical, its\nsynthetical predicates (_e.g._ in the question whether the purpose of\nnature which we conceive for the production of things is designed or\nundesigned) can furnish only problematical judgements of the Object,\nwhether affirmative or negative; and we do not know whether we are\njudging about something or about nothing. The concept of a causality\nthrough purposes (of art) has at all events objective reality, and\nalso the concept of a causality according to the mechanism of nature.\nBut the concept of a causality of nature according to the rule of\npurposes,--still more of a Being such as cannot be given us in\nexperience, a Being who is the original cause of nature,--though it\ncan be thought without contradiction, yet is of no avail for dogmatic\ndeterminations. For, since it cannot be derived from experience,\nand also is not requisite for the possibility thereof, its objective\nreality can in no way be assured. But even if this could be done, how\ncan I number among the products of nature things which are definitely\naccounted products of divine art, when it is just the incapacity of\nnature to produce such things according to its own laws that made it\nnecessary to invoke a cause different from it?\n\n\n\u00a7 75. _The concept of an objective purposiveness of nature is a\ncritical principle of Reason for the reflective Judgement_\n\nIt is then one thing to say, \u201cthe production of certain things of\nnature or that of collective nature is only possible through a cause\nwhich determines itself to action according to design\u201d; and quite\nanother to say, \u201cI can _according to the peculiar constitution of my\ncognitive faculties_ judge concerning the possibility of these things\nand their production, in no other fashion than by conceiving for this a\ncause working according to design, _i.e._ a Being which is productive\nin a way analogous to the causality of an intelligence.\u201d In the former\ncase I wish to establish something concerning the Object, and am\nbound to establish the objective reality of an assumed concept; in\nthe latter, Reason only determines the use of my cognitive faculties,\nconformably to their peculiarities and to the essential conditions\nof their range and their limits. Thus the former principle is an\nobjective proposition for the determinant Judgement, the latter merely\na subjective proposition for the reflective Judgement, _i.e._ a maxim\nwhich Reason prescribes to it.\n\nWe are in fact indispensably obliged to ascribe the concept of design\nto nature if we wish to investigate it, though only in its organised\nproducts, by continuous observation; and this concept is therefore an\nabsolutely necessary maxim for the empirical use of our Reason. It\nis plain that once such a guiding thread for the study of nature is\nadmitted and verified, we must at least try the said maxim of Judgement\nin nature as a whole; because thereby many of nature\u2019s laws might\ndiscover themselves, which otherwise, on account of the limitation\nof our insight into its inner mechanism, would remain hidden. But\nthough in regard to this latter employment that maxim of Judgement is\ncertainly useful, it is not indispensable, for nature as a whole is not\ngiven as organised (in the narrow sense of the word above indicated).\nOn the other hand, in regard to those natural products, which must\nbe judged of as designed and not formed otherwise (if we are to have\nempirical knowledge of their inner constitution), this maxim of the\nreflective Judgement is essentially necessary; because the very thought\nof them as organised beings is impossible without combining therewith\nthe thought of their designed production.\n\nNow the concept of a thing whose existence or form we represent to\nourselves as possible under the condition of a purpose is inseparably\nbound up with the concept of its contingency (according to natural\nlaws). Hence the natural things that we find possible only as purposes\nsupply the best proof of the contingency of the world-whole; to the\ncommon Understanding and to the philosopher alike they are the only\nvalid ground of proof for its dependence on and origin from a Being\nexisting outside the world--a Being who must also be intelligent on\naccount of that purposive form. Teleology then finds the consummation\nof its investigations only in Theology.\n\nBut what now in the end does the most complete Teleology prove? Does\nit prove that there is such an intelligent Being? No. It only proves\nthat according to the constitution of our cognitive faculties and in\nthe consequent combination of experience with the highest principles of\nReason, we can form absolutely no concept of the possibility of such a\nworld [as this] save by thinking a _designedly-working_ supreme cause\nthereof. Objectively we cannot therefore lay down the proposition,\nthere is an intelligent original Being; but only subjectively, for the\nuse of our Judgement in its reflection upon the purposes in nature,\nwhich can be thought according to no other principle than that of a\ndesigning causality of a highest cause.\n\nIf we wished to establish on teleological grounds the above proposition\ndogmatically we should be beset with difficulties from which we could\nnot extricate ourselves. For then the proposition must at bottom be\nreduced to the conclusion, that the organised beings in the world\nare no otherwise possible than by a designedly-working cause. And we\nshould unavoidably have to assert that, because we can follow up these\nthings in their causal combination only under the Idea of purposes, and\ncognise them only according to their conformity to law, we are thereby\njustified in assuming this as a condition necessary for every thinking\nand cognising being--a condition consequently attaching to the Object\nand not merely to our subject. But such an assertion we do not succeed\nin sustaining. For, since we do not, properly speaking, _observe_ the\npurposes in nature as designed, but only in our reflection upon its\nproducts _think_ this concept as a guiding thread for our Judgement,\nthey are not given to us through the Object. It is quite impossible for\nus _a priori_ to vindicate, as capable of assumption, such a concept\naccording to its objective reality. It remains therefore a proposition\nabsolutely resting upon subjective conditions alone, viz. of the\nJudgement reflecting in conformity with our cognitive faculties. If\nwe expressed this proposition dogmatically as objectively valid, it\nwould be: \u201cThere is a God.\u201d But for us men there is only permissible\nthe limited formula: \u201cWe cannot otherwise think and make comprehensible\nthe purposiveness which must lie at the bottom of our cognition of\nthe internal possibility of many natural things, than by representing\nit and the world in general as a product of an intelligent cause, [a\nGod].\u201d[115]\n\nNow if this proposition, based on an inevitably necessary maxim of our\nJudgement, is completely satisfactory from every _human_ point of view\nfor both the speculative and practical use of our Reason, I should like\nto know what we lose by not being able to prove it as also valid for\nhigher beings, from objective grounds (which unfortunately are beyond\nour faculties). It is indeed quite certain that we cannot adequately\ncognise, much less explain, organised beings and their internal\npossibility, according to mere mechanical principles of nature; and we\ncan say boldly it is alike certain that it is absurd for men to make\nany such attempt or to hope that another _Newton_ will arise in the\nfuture, who shall make comprehensible by us the production of a blade\nof grass according to natural laws which no design has ordered.[116]\nWe must absolutely deny this insight to men. But then how do we know\nthat in nature, if we could penetrate to the principle by which it\nspecifies the universal laws known to us, there _cannot_ lie hidden (in\nits mere mechanism) a sufficient ground of the possibility of organised\nbeings without supposing any design in their production? would it\nnot be judged by us presumptuous to say this? Probabilities here are\nof no account when we have to do with judgements of pure Reason.--We\ncannot therefore judge objectively, either affirmatively or negatively,\nconcerning the proposition: \u201cDoes a Being acting according to design\nlie at the basis of what we rightly call natural purposes, as the cause\nof the world (and consequently as its author)?\u201d So much only is sure,\nthat if we are to judge according to what is permitted us to see by\nour own proper nature (the conditions and limitations of our Reason),\nwe can place at the basis of the possibility of these natural purposes\nnothing else than an intelligent Being. This alone is in conformity\nwith the maxim of our reflective Judgement and therefore with a ground\nwhich, though subjective, is inseparably attached to the human race.\n\n\n\u00a7 76. _Remark_\n\nThis consideration, which very well deserves to be worked out in\ndetail in Transcendental Philosophy, can come in here only in passing,\nby way of elucidation (not as a proof of what is here proposed).\n\nReason is a faculty of principles and proceeds in its extremest advance\nto the unconditioned; on the other hand, the Understanding stands at\nits service always only under a certain condition which must be given.\nBut without concepts of Understanding, to which objective reality\nmust be given, the Reason cannot form any objective (synthetical)\njudgement; and contains in itself, as theoretical Reason, absolutely\nno constitutive but merely regulative principles. We soon see that\nwhere the Understanding cannot follow, the Reason is transcendent, and\nshows itself in Ideas formerly established (as regulative principles),\nbut not in objectively valid concepts. But the Understanding which\ncannot keep pace with Reason but yet is requisite for the validity of\nObjects, limits the validity of these Ideas to the subject, although\n[extending it] generally to all [subjects] of this kind. That is, the\nUnderstanding limits their validity to the condition, that according\nto the nature of our (human) cognitive faculties, or, generally,\naccording to the concept which we _ourselves_ can _make_ of the faculty\nof a finite intelligent being, nothing else can or must be thought;\nthough this is not to assert that the ground of such a judgement lies\nin the Object. We shall adduce some examples which, though they are\ntoo important and difficult to impose them on the reader as proved\npropositions, yet will give him material for thought and may serve to\nelucidate what we are here specially concerned with.\n\nIt is indispensably necessary for the human Understanding to\ndistinguish between the possibility and the actuality of things. The\nground for this lies in the subject and in the nature of our cognitive\nfaculties. Such a distinction (between the possible and the actual)\nwould not be given were there not requisite for knowledge two quite\ndifferent elements, Understanding for concepts and sensible intuition\nfor Objects corresponding to them. If our Understanding were intuitive\nit would have no objects but those which are actual. Concepts (which\nmerely extend to the possibility of an object) and sensible intuitions\n(which give us something without allowing us to cognise it thus as an\nobject) would both disappear. But now the whole of our distinction\nbetween the merely possible and the actual rests on this, that the\nformer only signifies the positing of the representation of a thing\nin respect of our concept, and, in general, in respect of the faculty\nof thought; while the latter signifies the positing of the thing in\nitself [outside this concept].[117] The distinction, then, of possible\nthings from actual is one which has merely subjective validity for the\nhuman Understanding, because we can always have a thing in our thoughts\nalthough it is [really] nothing, or we can represent a thing as given\nalthough we have no concept of it. The propositions therefore--that\nthings can be possible without being actual, and that consequently no\nconclusion can be drawn as to actuality from mere possibility--are\nquite valid for human Reason, without thereby proving that this\ndistinction lies in things themselves. That this does not follow, and\nthat consequently these propositions, though valid of Objects (in\nso far as our cognitive faculty, as sensuously conditioned, busies\nitself with Objects of sense), do not hold for things in general,\nappears from the irrepressible demand of Reason to assume something\n(the original ground) necessarily existing as unconditioned, in which\npossibility and actuality should no longer be distinguished, and\nfor which Idea our Understanding has absolutely no concept; _i.e._\nit can find no way of representing such a thing and its manner of\nexistence. For if the Understanding _thinks_ such a thing (which it\nmay do at pleasure), the thing is merely represented as possible. If\nit is conscious of it as given in intuition, then is it actual; but\nnothing as to its possibility is thus thought. Hence the concept of\nan absolutely necessary Being is no doubt an indispensable Idea of\nReason, but yet it is a problematical concept unattainable by the human\nUnderstanding. It is indeed valid for the employment of our cognitive\nfaculties in accordance with their peculiar constitution, but not\nvalid of the Object. Nor is it valid for every knowing being, because\nI cannot presuppose in every such being thought and intuition as two\ndistinct conditions of the exercise of its cognitive faculties, and\nconsequently as conditions of the possibility and actuality of things.\nAn Understanding into which this distinction did not enter, might\nsay: All Objects that I know _are_, _i.e._ exist; and the possibility\nof some, which yet do not exist (_i.e._ the contingency or the\ncontrasted necessity of those which do exist), might never come into\nthe representation of such a being at all. But what makes it difficult\nfor our Understanding to treat its concepts here as Reason does, is\nmerely that for it, as human Understanding, that is transcendent\n(_i.e._ impossible for the subjective conditions of its cognition)\nwhich Reason makes into a principle appertaining to the Object.--Here\nthe maxim always holds, that all Objects whose cognition surpasses\nthe faculty of the Understanding are thought by us according to the\nsubjective conditions of the exercise of that faculty which necessarily\nattach to our (human) nature. If judgements laid down in this way (and\nthere is no other alternative in regard to transcendent concepts)\ncannot be constitutive principles determining the Object as it is, they\nwill remain regulative principles adapted to the human point of view,\nimmanent in their exercise and sure.\n\nJust as Reason in the theoretical consideration of nature must assume\nthe Idea of an unconditioned necessity of its original ground, so also\nit presupposes in the practical [sphere] its own (in respect of nature)\nunconditioned causality, or freedom, in that it is conscious of its\nown moral command. Here the objective necessity of the act, as a duty,\nis opposed to that necessity which it would have as an event, if its\nground lay in nature and not in freedom (_i.e._ in the causality of\nReason). The morally absolutely necessary act is regarded as physically\nquite contingent, since that which _ought_ necessarily to happen often\ndoes not happen. It is clear then that it is owing to the subjective\nconstitution of our practical faculty that the moral laws must be\nrepresented as commands, and the actions conforming to them as duties;\nand that Reason expresses this necessity not by an \u201c_is_\u201d (happens),\nbut by an \u201cought to be.\u201d This would not be the case were Reason\nconsidered as in its causality independent of sensibility (as the\nsubjective condition of its application to objects of nature), and so\nas cause in an intelligible world entirely in agreement with the moral\nlaw. For in such a world there would be no distinction between \u201cought\nto do\u201d and \u201cdoes,\u201d between a practical law of that which is possible\nthrough us, and the theoretical law of that which is actual through\nus. Though, therefore, an intelligible world in which everything would\nbe actual merely because (as something good) it is possible, together\nwith freedom as its formal condition, is for us a transcendent concept,\nnot available as a constitutive principle to determine an Object and\nits objective reality; yet, because of the constitution of our (in\npart sensuous) nature and faculty it is, so far as we can represent\nit in accordance with the constitution of our Reason, for us and for\nall rational beings that have a connexion with the world of sense, a\nuniversal _regulative principle_. This principle does not objectively\ndetermine the constitution of freedom, as a form of causality, but it\nmakes the rule of actions according to that Idea a command for every\none, with no less validity than if it did so determine it.\n\nIn the same way we may concede thus much as regards the case in hand.\nBetween natural mechanism and the Technic of nature, _i.e._ its\npurposive connexion, we should find no distinction, were it not that\nour Understanding is of the kind that must proceed from the universal\nto the particular. The Judgement then in respect of the particular can\ncognise no purposiveness and, consequently, can form no determinant\njudgements, without having a universal law under which to subsume that\nparticular. Now the particular, as such, contains something contingent\nin respect of the universal, while yet Reason requires unity and\nconformity to law in the combination of particular laws of nature.\nThis conformity of the contingent to law is called purposiveness; and\nthe derivation of particular laws from the universal, as regards their\ncontingent element, is impossible _a priori_ through a determination\nof the concept of the Object. Hence, the concept of the purposiveness\nof nature in its products is necessary for human Judgement in respect\nof nature, but has not to do with the determination of Objects. It is,\ntherefore, a subjective principle of Reason for the Judgement, which\nas regulative (not constitutive) is just as necessarily valid for our\n_human Judgement_ as if it were an objective principle.\n\n\n\u00a7 77. _Of the peculiarity of the human Understanding, by means of which\nthe concept of a natural purpose is possible_\n\nWe have brought forward in the _Remark_ peculiarities of our cognitive\nfaculties (even the higher ones) which we are easily led to transfer as\nobjective predicates to the things themselves. But they concern Ideas,\nno object adequate to which can be given in experience, and they could\nonly serve as regulative principles in the pursuit of experience. This\nis the case with the concept of a natural purpose, which concerns the\ncause of the possibility of such a predicate, which cause can only lie\nin the Idea. But the result corresponding to it (_i.e._ the product)\nis given in nature; and the concept of a causality of nature as of a\nbeing acting according to purposes seems to make the Idea of a natural\npurpose into a constitutive principle, which Idea has thus something\ndifferent from all other Ideas.\n\nThis difference consists, however, in the fact that the Idea in\nquestion is not a rational principle for the Understanding but\nfor the Judgement. It is, therefore, merely the application of an\nUnderstanding in general to possible objects of experience, in cases\nwhere the judgement can only be reflective, not determinant, and where,\nconsequently, the object, although given in experience, cannot be\n_determinately judged_ in conformity with the Idea (not to say with\ncomplete adequacy), but can only be reflected on.\n\nThere emerges, therefore, a peculiarity of _our_ (human) Understanding\nin respect of the Judgement in its reflection upon things of nature.\nBut if this be so, the Idea of a possible Understanding different\nfrom the human must be fundamental here. (Just so in the Critique\nof Pure Reason we must have in our thoughts another possible [kind\nof] intuition, if ours is to be regarded as a particular species\nfor which objects are only valid as phenomena.) And so we are able\nto say: Certain natural products, from the special constitution of\nour Understanding, _must be considered by us_, in regard to their\npossibility, as if produced designedly and as purposes. But we\ndo not, therefore, demand that there should be actually given a\nparticular cause which has the representation of a purpose as its\ndetermining ground; and we do not deny that an Understanding, different\nfrom (_i.e._ higher than) the human, might find the ground of the\npossibility of such products of nature in the mechanism of nature,\n_i.e._ in a causal combination for which an Understanding is not\nexplicitly assumed as cause.\n\nWe have now to do with the relation of _our_ Understanding to the\nJudgement; viz. we seek for a certain contingency in the constitution\nof our Understanding, to which we may point as a peculiarity\ndistinguishing it from other possible Understandings.\n\nThis contingency is found, naturally enough, in the _particular_,\nwhich the Judgement is to bring under the _universal_ of the concepts\nof Understanding. For the universal of _our_ (human) Understanding does\nnot determine the particular, and it is contingent in how many ways\ndifferent things which agree in a common characteristic may come before\nour perception. Our Understanding is a faculty of concepts, _i.e._ a\ndiscursive Understanding, for which it obviously must be contingent\nof what kind and how very different the particular may be that can be\ngiven to it in nature and brought under its concepts. But now intuition\nalso belongs to knowledge, and a faculty of a _complete spontaneity\nof intuition_ would be a cognitive faculty distinct from sensibility,\nand quite independent of it, in other words, an Understanding in the\nmost general sense. Thus we can think an _intuitive_ Understanding\n[negatively, merely as not discursive[118]], which does not proceed\nfrom the universal to the particular, and so to the individual (through\nconcepts). For it that contingency of the accordance of nature in its\nproducts according to _particular_ laws with the Understanding would\nnot be met with; and it is this contingency that makes it so hard for\nour Understanding to reduce the manifold of nature to the unity of\nknowledge. This reduction our Understanding can only accomplish by\nbringing natural characteristics into a very contingent correspondence\nwith our faculty of concepts, of which an intuitive Understanding would\nhave no need.\n\nOur Understanding has then this peculiarity as concerns the Judgement,\nthat in cognition by it the particular is not determined by the\nuniversal and cannot therefore be derived from it; but at the same\ntime this particular in the manifold of nature must accord with the\nuniversal (by means of concepts and laws) so that it may be capable\nof being subsumed under it. This accordance under such circumstances\nmust be very contingent and without definite principle as concerns the\nJudgement.\n\nIn order now to be able at least to think the possibility of such an\naccordance of things of nature with our Judgement (which accordance\nwe represent as contingent and consequently as only possible by means\nof a purpose directed thereto), we must at the same time think of\nanother Understanding, by reference to which and apart from any purpose\nascribed to it, we may represent as _necessary_ that accordance of\nnatural laws with our Judgement, which for our Understanding is only\nthinkable through the medium of purposes.\n\nIn fact our Understanding has the property of proceeding in\nits cognition, _e.g._ of the cause of a product, from the\n_analytical-universal_ (concepts) to the particular (the given\nempirical intuition). Thus as regards the manifold of the latter it\ndetermines nothing, but must await this determination by the Judgement,\nwhich subsumes the empirical intuition (if the object is a natural\nproduct) under the concept. We can however think an Understanding\nwhich, being, not like ours, discursive, but intuitive, proceeds from\nthe _synthetical-universal_ (the intuition of a whole as such) to the\nparticular, _i.e._ from the whole to the parts. The _contingency_\nof the combination of the parts, in order that a definite form of\nthe whole shall be possible, is not implied by such an Understanding\nand its representation of the whole. Our Understanding requires this\nbecause it must proceed from the parts as universally conceived\ngrounds to different forms possible to be subsumed under them, as\nconsequences. According to the constitution of our Understanding a\nreal whole of nature is regarded only as the effect of the concurrent\nmotive powers of the parts. Suppose then that we wish not to represent\nthe possibility of the whole as dependent on that of the parts (after\nthe manner of our discursive Understanding), but according to the\nstandard of the intuitive (original) Understanding to represent\nthe possibility of the parts (according to their constitution and\ncombination) as dependent on that of the whole. In accordance with the\nabove peculiarity of our Understanding it cannot happen that the whole\nshall contain the ground of the possibility of the connexion of the\nparts (which would be a contradiction in discursive cognition), but\nonly that the _representation_ of a whole may contain the ground of the\npossibility of its form and the connexion of the parts belonging to it.\nNow such a whole would be an effect (_product_) the _representation_ of\nwhich is regarded as the _cause_ of its possibility; but the product\nof a cause whose determining ground is merely the representation of\nits effect is called a purpose. Hence it is merely a consequence of\nthe particular constitution of our Understanding, that it represents\nproducts of nature as possible, according to a different kind of\ncausality from that of the natural laws of matter, namely, that of\npurposes and final causes. Hence also this principle has not to do\nwith the possibility of such things themselves (even when considered\nas phenomena) according to the manner of their production, but merely\nwith the judgement upon them which is possible to our Understanding.\nHere we see at once why it is that in natural science we are not\nlong contented with an explanation of the products of nature by a\ncausality according to purposes. For there we desire to judge of\nnatural production merely in a manner conformable to our faculty of\njudging, _i.e._ to the reflective Judgement, and not in reference to\nthings themselves on behalf of the determinant Judgement. It is here\nnot at all requisite to prove that such an _intellectus archetypus_ is\npossible, but only that we are led to the Idea of it,--which contains\nno contradiction,--in contrast to our discursive Understanding which\nhas need of images (_intellectus ectypus_) and to the contingency of\nits constitution.\n\nIf we consider a material whole, according to its form, as a product\nof the parts with their powers and faculties of combining with one\nanother (as well as of bringing in foreign materials), we represent to\nourselves a mechanical mode of producing it. But in this way no concept\nemerges of a whole as purpose, whose internal possibility presupposes\nthroughout the Idea of a whole on which depend the constitution and\nmode of action of the parts, as we must represent to ourselves an\norganised body. It does not follow indeed, as has been shown, that\nthe mechanical production of such a body is impossible; for to say so\nwould be to say that it would be impossible (contradictory) for _any\nUnderstanding_ to represent to itself such a unity in the connexion of\nthe manifold, without the Idea of the unity being at the same time its\nproducing cause, _i.e._ without designed production. This, however,\nwould follow in fact if we were justified in regarding material beings\nas things in themselves. For then the unity that constitutes the\nground of the possibility of natural formations would be simply the\nunity of space. But space is no real ground of the products, but only\ntheir formal condition, although it has this similarity to the real\nground which we seek that in it no part can be determined except in\nrelation to the whole (the representation of which therefore lies at\nthe ground of the possibility of the parts). But now it is at least\npossible to consider the material world as mere phenomenon, and to\nthink as its substrate something like a thing in itself (which is\nnot phenomenon), and to attach to this a corresponding intellectual\nintuition (even though it is not ours). Thus there would be, although\nincognisable by us, a supersensible real ground for nature, to which\nwe ourselves belong. In this we consider according to mechanical laws\nwhat is necessary in nature regarded as an object of Sense; but we\nconsider according to teleological laws the agreement and unity of its\nparticular laws and its forms--which in regard to mechanism we must\njudge contingent--regarded as objects of Reason (in fact the whole\nof nature as a system). Thus we should judge nature according to two\ndifferent kinds of principles without the mechanical way of explanation\nbeing shut out by the teleological, as if they contradicted one another.\n\nFrom this we are enabled to see what otherwise, though we could easily\nsurmise it, could with difficulty be maintained with certainty and\nproved, viz. that the principle of a mechanical derivation of purposive\nnatural products is consistent with the teleological, but in no way\nenables us to dispense with it. In a thing that we must judge as a\nnatural purpose (an organised being) we can no doubt try all the known\nand yet to be discovered laws of mechanical production, and even hope\nto make good progress therewith; but we can never get rid of the call\nfor a quite different ground of production for the possibility of such\na product, viz. causality by means of purposes. Absolutely no human\nReason (in fact no finite Reason like ours in quality, however much it\nmay surpass it in degree) can hope to understand the production of even\na blade of grass by mere mechanical causes. As regards the possibility\nof such an object, the teleological connexion of causes and effects\nis quite indispensable for the Judgement, even for studying it by the\nclue of experience. For external objects as phenomena an adequate\nground related to purposes cannot be met with; this, although it lies\nin nature, must only be sought in the supersensible substrate of\nnature, from all possible insight into which we are cut off. Hence it\nis absolutely impossible for us to produce from nature itself grounds\nof explanation for purposive combinations; and it is necessary by the\nconstitution of the human cognitive faculties to seek the supreme\nground of these purposive combinations in an original Understanding as\nthe cause of the world.\n\n\n\u00a7 78. _Of the union of the principle of the universal mechanism of\nmatter with the teleological principle in the Technic of nature_\n\nIt is infinitely important for Reason not to let slip the mechanism\nof nature in its products, and in their explanation not to pass it\nby, because without it no insight into the nature of things can be\nattained. Suppose it admitted that a supreme Architect immediately\ncreated the forms of nature as they have been from the beginning, or\nthat He predetermined those which in the course of nature continually\nform themselves on the same model. Our knowledge of nature is not thus\nin the least furthered, because we cannot know the mode of action of\nthat Being and the Ideas which are to contain the principles of the\npossibility of natural beings, and we cannot by them explain nature\nas from above downwards (_a priori_). And if, starting from the forms\nof the objects of experience, from below upwards (_a posteriori_),\nwe wish to explain the purposiveness, which we believe is met with\nin experience, by appealing to a cause working in accordance with\npurposes, then is our explanation quite tautological and we are only\nmocking Reason with words. Indeed when we lose ourselves with this way\nof explanation in the transcendent, whither natural knowledge cannot\nfollow, Reason is seduced into poetical extravagance, which it is its\npeculiar destination to avoid.\n\nOn the other hand, it is just as necessary a maxim of Reason not\nto pass by the principle of purposes in the products of nature.\nFor, although it does not make their mode of origination any more\ncomprehensible, yet it is a heuristic principle for investigating the\nparticular laws of nature; supposing even that we wish to make no use\nof it for explaining nature itself,--in which we still always speak\nonly of natural purposes, although it apparently exhibits a designed\nunity of purpose,--_i.e._ without seeking beyond nature the ground of\nthe possibility of these particular laws. But since we must come in\nthe end to this latter question, it is just as necessary to think for\nnature a particular kind of causality which does not present itself in\nit, as the mechanism of natural causes which does. To the receptivity\nof several forms, different from those of which matter is susceptible\nby mechanism, must be added a spontaneity of a cause (which therefore\ncannot be matter), without which no ground can be assigned for those\nforms. No doubt Reason, before it takes this step, must proceed with\ncaution, and not try to explain teleologically every Technic of nature,\n_i.e._ every productive faculty of nature which displays in itself (as\nin regular bodies) purposiveness of figure to our mere apprehension;\nbut must always regard such as so far mechanically possible. But on\nthat account to wish entirely to exclude the teleological principle,\nand to follow simple mechanism only--in cases where, in the rational\ninvestigation of the possibility of natural forms through their causes,\npurposiveness shows itself quite undeniably as the reference to a\ndifferent kind of causality--to do this must make Reason fantastic, and\nsend it wandering among chimeras of unthinkable natural faculties; just\nas a mere teleological mode of explanation which takes no account of\nnatural mechanism makes it visionary.\n\nIn the same natural thing both principles cannot be connected as\nfundamental propositions of explanation (deduction) of one by the\nother, _i.e._ they do not unite for the determinant Judgement as\ndogmatical and constitutive principles of insight into nature. If I\nchoose, _e.g._ to regard a maggot as the product of the mere mechanism\nof nature (of the new formation that it produces of itself, when\nits elements are set free by corruption), I cannot derive the same\nproduct from the same matter as from a causality that acts according\nto purposes. Conversely, if I regard the same product as a natural\npurpose, I cannot count on any mechanical mode of its production and\nregard this as the constitutive principle of my judgement upon its\npossibility, and so unite both principles. One method of explanation\nexcludes the other; even supposing that objectively both grounds of\nthe possibility of such a product rested on a single ground, to which\nwe did not pay attention. The principle which should render possible\nthe compatibility of both in judging of nature must be placed in\nthat which lies outside both (and consequently outside the possible\nempirical representation of nature), but yet contains their ground,\n_i.e._ in the supersensible; and each of the two methods of explanation\nmust be referred thereto. Now of this we can have no concept but the\nindeterminate concept of a ground, which makes the judging of nature\nby empirical laws possible, but which we cannot determine more nearly\nby any predicate. Hence the union of both principles cannot rest upon\na ground of _explanation_ of the possibility of a product according to\ngiven laws, for the _determinant_ Judgement, but only upon a ground\nof its _exposition_ for the _reflective_ Judgement.--To explain is to\nderive from a principle, which therefore we must clearly know and of\nwhich we can give an account. No doubt the principle of the mechanism\nof nature and that of its causality in one and the same natural product\nmust coalesce in a single higher principle, which is their common\nsource, because otherwise they could not subsist side by side in the\nobservation of nature. But if this principle, objectively common to\nthe two, which therefore warrants the association of the maxims of\nnatural investigation depending on both, be such that, though it\ncan be pointed to, it cannot be determinately known nor clearly put\nforward for use in cases which arise, then from such a principle we\ncan draw no explanation, _i.e._ no clear and determinate derivation\nof the possibility of a natural product in accordance with those\ntwo heterogeneous principles. But now the principle common to the\nmechanical and teleological derivations is the _supersensible_, which\nwe must place at the basis of nature, regarded as phenomenon. And of\nthis, in a theoretical point of view, we cannot form the smallest\npositive determinate concept. It cannot, therefore, in any way be\nexplained how, according to it as principle, nature (in its particular\nlaws) constitutes for us one system, which can be cognised as possible\neither by the principle of physical development or by that of final\ncauses. If it happens that objects of nature present themselves which\ncannot be thought by us, as regards their possibility, according to\nthe principle of mechanism (which always has a claim on a natural\nbeing), without relying on teleological propositions, we can only make\nan hypothesis. Namely, we suppose that we may hopefully investigate\nnatural laws with reference to both (according as the possibility of\nits product is cognisable by our Understanding by one or the other\nprinciple), without stumbling at the apparent contradiction which comes\ninto view between the principles by which they are judged. For at least\nthe possibility is assured that both may be united objectively in one\nprinciple, since they concern phenomena that presuppose a supersensible\nground.\n\nMechanism, then, and the teleological (designed) Technic of nature,\nin respect of the same product and its possibility, may stand under\na common supreme principle of nature in particular laws. But since\nthis principle is _transcendent_ we cannot, because of the limitation\nof our Understanding, unite both principles _in the explanation_ of\nthe same production of nature even if the inner possibility of this\nproduct is only _intelligible_ [verst\u00e4ndlich] through a causality\naccording to purposes (as is the case with organised matter). We\nrevert then to the above fundamental proposition of Teleology.\nAccording to the constitution of the human Understanding, no other\nthan designedly-working causes can be assumed for the possibility of\norganised beings in nature; and the mere mechanism of nature cannot\nbe adequate to the explanation of these its products. But we do not\nattempt to decide anything by this fundamental proposition as to the\npossibility of such things themselves.\n\nThis is only a maxim of the reflective, not of the determinant\nJudgement; consequently only subjectively valid for us, not objectively\nfor the possibility of things themselves of this kind (in which both\nkinds of production may well cohere in one and the same ground).\nFurther, without any concept,--besides the teleologically conceived\nmethod of production,--of a simultaneously presented mechanism of\nnature, no judgement can be passed on this kind of production as a\nnatural product. Hence the above maxim leads to the necessity of\nan unification of both principles in judging of things as natural\npurposes in themselves, but does not lead us to substitute one for\nthe other either altogether or in certain parts. For in the place of\nwhat is thought (at least by us) as possible only by design we cannot\nset mechanism, and in the place of what is cognised as mechanically\nnecessary we cannot set contingency, which would need a purpose as its\ndetermining ground; but we can only subordinate the one (Mechanism)\nto the other (designed Technic), which may quite well be the case\naccording to the transcendental principle of the purposiveness of\nnature.\n\nFor where purposes are thought as grounds of the possibility of certain\nthings, we must assume also means, whose law of working requires _for\nitself_ nothing presupposing a purpose,--a mechanical law--and yet\ncan be a subordinate cause of designed effects. Thus--in the organic\nproducts of nature, and specially when prompted by their infinite\nnumber, we assume (at least as a permissible hypothesis) design in\nthe combination of natural causes by particular laws as a _universal\nprinciple_ of the reflective Judgement for the whole of nature (the\nworld),--we can think a great and indeed universal combination of\nmechanical with teleological laws in the productions of nature, without\ninterchanging the principles by which they are judged or putting one\nin the place of the other. For, in a teleological judgement, the\nmatter, even if the form that it assumes be judged possible only by\ndesign, can also, conformably to the mechanical laws of its nature,\nbe subordinated as a means to the represented purpose. But, since the\nground of this compatibility lies in that which is neither one nor\nthe other (neither mechanism nor purposive combination), but is the\nsupersensible substrate of nature of which we know nothing, the two\nways of representing the possibility of such Objects are not to be\nblended together by our (human) Reason. However, we cannot judge of\ntheir possibility otherwise than by judging them as ultimately resting\non a supreme Understanding by the connexion of final causes; and thus\nthe teleological method of explanation is not eliminated.\n\nNow it is quite indeterminate, and for our Understanding always\nindeterminable, how much the mechanism of nature does as a means\ntowards each final design in nature. However, on account of the\nabove-mentioned intelligible principle of the possibility of a nature\nin general, it may be assumed that it is possible throughout according\nto the two kinds of universally accordant laws (the physical and\nthose of final causes), although we cannot see into the way how this\ntakes place. Hence we do not know how far the mechanical method of\nexplanation which is possible for us may extend. So much only is\ncertain that, so far as we can go in this direction, it must always\nbe inadequate for things that we once recognise as natural purposes;\nand therefore we must, by the constitution of our Understanding,\nsubordinate these grounds collectively to a teleological principle.\n\nHereon is based a privilege, and on account of the importance which the\nstudy of nature by the principle of mechanism has for the theoretical\nuse of our Reason, also an appeal. We should explain all products\nand occurrences in nature, even the most purposive, by mechanism as\nfar as is in our power (the limits of which we cannot specify in\nthis kind of investigation). But at the same time we are not to lose\nsight of the fact that those things which we cannot even state for\ninvestigation except under the concept of a purpose of Reason, must, in\nconformity with the essential constitution of our Reason, mechanical\ncauses notwithstanding, be subordinated by us finally to causality in\naccordance with purposes.\n\n\n\n\nMETHODOLOGY OF THE TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT.[119]\n\n\n\u00a7 79. _Whether teleology must be treated as if it belonged to the\ndoctrine of nature_\n\nEvery science must have its definite position in the encyclopaedia of\nall the sciences. If it is a philosophical science its position must be\neither in the theoretical or practical part. If again it has its place\nin the former of these, it must be either in the doctrine of nature, so\nfar as it concerns that which can be an object of experience (in the\ndoctrine of bodies, the doctrine of the soul, or the universal science\nof the world), or in the doctrine of God (the original ground of the\nworld as the complex of all objects of experience).\n\nNow the question is, what place is due to Teleology? Does it belong\nto Natural Science (properly so called) or to Theology? One of the\ntwo it must be; for no science belongs to the transition from one to\nthe other, because this transition only marks the articulation or\norganisation of the system, and not a place in it.\n\nThat it does not belong to Theology as a part thereof, although it may\nbe made of the most important use therein, is self-evident. For it has\nas its objects, natural productions, and their cause, and although it\nrefers at the same time to the latter as to a ground lying outside of\nand beyond nature (a Divine Author), yet it does not do this for the\ndeterminant but only for the reflective Judgement in the consideration\nof nature (in order to guide our judgement on things in the world by\nmeans of such an Idea as a regulative principle, in conformity with the\nhuman Understanding).\n\nBut it appears to belong just as little to Natural Science, which needs\ndeterminant and not merely reflective principles in order to supply\nobjective grounds for natural effects. In fact, nothing is gained for\nthe theory of nature or the mechanical explanation of its phenomena\nby means of its effective causes, by considering them as connected\naccording to the relation of purposes. The exhibition of the purposes\nof nature in its products, so far as they constitute a system according\nto teleological concepts, properly belongs only to a description of\nnature which is drawn up in accordance with a particular guiding\nthread. Here Reason, no doubt, accomplishes a noble work, instructive\nand practically purposive in many points of view; but it gives no\ninformation as to the origin and the inner possibility of these\nforms, which is the special business of theoretical Natural Science.\nTeleology, therefore, as science, belongs to no Doctrine, but only to\nCriticism; and to the criticism of a special cognitive faculty, viz.\nJudgement. But so far as it contains principles _a priori_, it can and\nmust furnish the method by which nature must be judged according to the\nprinciple of final causes. Hence its Methodology has at least negative\ninfluence upon the procedure in theoretical Natural Science, and also\nupon the relation which this can have in Metaphysic to Theology as its\npropaedeutic.\n\n\n\u00a7 80. _Of the necessary subordination of the mechanical to the\nteleological principle in the explanation of a thing as a natural\npurpose_\n\nThe _privilege of aiming at_ a merely mechanical method of explanation\nof all natural products is in itself quite unlimited; but the _faculty\nof attaining_ thereto is by the constitution of our Understanding, so\nfar as it has to do with things as natural purposes, not only very much\nlimited but also clearly bounded. For, according to a principle of the\nJudgement, by this process alone nothing can be accomplished towards\nan explanation of these things; and consequently the judgement upon\nsuch products must always be at the same time subordinated by us to a\nteleological principle.\n\nIt is therefore rational, even meritorious, to pursue natural\nmechanism, in respect of the explanation of natural products, so far\nas can be done with probability; and if we give up the attempt it is\nnot because it is impossible _in itself_ to meet in this path with the\npurposiveness of nature, but only because it is impossible _for us_\nas men. For there would be required for that an intuition other than\nsensuous, and a determinate knowledge of the intelligible substrate\nof nature from which a ground could be assigned for the mechanism of\nphenomena according to particular laws, which quite surpasses our\nfaculties.\n\nHence if the naturalist would not waste his labour he must in judging\nof things, the concept of any of which is indubitably established\nas a natural purpose (organised beings), always lay down as basis an\noriginal organisation, which uses that very mechanism in order to\nproduce fresh organised forms or to develop the existing ones into new\nshapes (which, however, always result from that purpose and conformably\nto it).\n\nIt is praiseworthy by the aid of comparative anatomy to go through the\ngreat creation of organised natures, in order to see whether there may\nnot be in it something similar to a system and also in accordance with\nthe principle of production. For otherwise we should have to be content\nwith the mere principle of judgement (which gives no insight into\ntheir production) and, discouraged, to give up all claim to _natural\ninsight_ in this field. The agreement of so many genera of animals\nin a certain common schema, which appears to be fundamental not only\nin the structure of their bones but also in the disposition of their\nremaining parts,--so that with an admirable simplicity of original\noutline, a great variety of species has been produced by the shortening\nof one member and the lengthening of another, the involution of this\npart and the evolution of that,--allows a ray of hope, however faint,\nto penetrate into our minds, that here something may be accomplished\nby the aid of the principle of the mechanism of nature (without\nwhich there can be no natural science in general). This analogy of\nforms, which with all their differences seem to have been produced\naccording to a common original type, strengthens our suspicions of an\nactual relationship between them in their production from a common\nparent, through the gradual approximation of one animal-genus to\nanother--from those in which the principle of purposes seems to be\nbest authenticated, _i.e._ from man, down to the polype, and again from\nthis down to mosses and lichens, and finally to the lowest stage of\nnature noticeable by us, viz. to crude matter. And so the whole Technic\nof nature, which is so incomprehensible to us in organised beings that\nwe believe ourselves compelled to think a different principle for it,\nseems to be derived from matter and its powers according to mechanical\nlaws (like those by which it works in the formation of crystals).\n\nHere it is permissible for the _archaeologist_ of nature to derive\nfrom the surviving traces of its oldest revolutions, according to all\nits mechanism known or supposed by him, that great family of creatures\n(for so we must represent them if the said thoroughgoing relationship\nis to have any ground). He can suppose the bosom of mother earth, as\nshe passed out of her chaotic state (like a great animal), to have\ngiven birth in the beginning to creatures of less purposive form, that\nthese again gave birth to others which formed themselves with greater\nadaptation to their place of birth and their relations to each other;\nuntil this womb becoming torpid and ossified, limited its births to\ndefinite species not further modifiable, and the manifoldness remained\nas it was at the end of the operation of that fruitful formative\npower.--Only he must still in the end ascribe to this universal mother\nan organisation purposive in respect of all these creatures; otherwise\nit would not be possible to think the possibility of the purposive form\nof the products of the animal and vegetable kingdoms.[120] He has then\nonly pushed further back the ground of explanation and cannot pretend\nto have made the development of those two kingdoms independent of the\ncondition of final causes.\n\nEven as concerns the variation to which certain individuals of\norganised genera are accidentally subjected, if we find that the\ncharacter so changed is hereditary and is taken up into the generative\npower, then we cannot pertinently judge the variation to be anything\nelse than an occasional development of purposive capacities originally\npresent in the species with a view to the preservation of the race.\nFor in the complete inner purposiveness of an organised being, the\ngeneration of its like is closely bound up with the condition of taking\nnothing up into the generative power which does not belong, in such\na system of purposes, to one of its undeveloped original capacities.\nIndeed, if we depart from this principle, we cannot know with certainty\nwhether several parts of the form which is now apparent in a species\nhave not a contingent and unpurposive origin; and the principle of\nTeleology, to judge nothing in an organised being as unpurposive\nwhich maintains it in its propagation, would be very unreliable in its\napplication and would be valid solely for the original stock (of which\nwe have no further knowledge).\n\n_Hume_[121] takes exception to those who find it requisite to\nassume for all such natural purposes a teleological principle of\njudgement, _i.e._ an architectonic Understanding. He says that it may\nfairly be asked: how is such an Understanding possible? How can the\nmanifold faculties and properties that constitute the possibility\nof an Understanding, which has at the same time executive force,\nbe found so purposively together in one Being? But this objection\nis without weight. For the whole difficulty which surrounds the\nquestion concerning the first production of a thing containing in\nitself purposes and only comprehensible by means of them, rests on\nthe further question as to the unity of the ground of the combination\nin this product of the various elements [des Mannichfaltigen] which\nare _external to one another_. For if this ground be placed in the\nUnderstanding of a producing cause as simple substance, the question,\nso far as it is teleological, is sufficiently answered; but if the\ncause be sought merely in matter as an aggregate of many substances\nexternal to one another, the unity of the principle is quite\nwanting for the internally purposive form of its formation, and the\n_autocracy_ of matter in productions which can only be conceived by our\nUnderstanding as purposes is a word without meaning.\n\nHence it comes to pass that those who seek a supreme ground of\npossibility for the objectively-purposive forms of matter, without\nattributing to it Understanding, either make the world-whole into\na single all-embracing substance (Pantheism), or (which is only a\nmore determinate explanation of the former) into a complex of many\ndeterminations inhering in a single _simple substance_ (Spinozism);\nmerely in order to satisfy that condition of all purposiveness--the\n_unity_ of ground. Thus they do justice indeed to _one_ condition of\nthe problem, viz. the unity in the purposive combination, by means\nof the mere ontological concept of a simple substance; but they\nadduce nothing for the _other_ condition, viz. the relation of this\nsubstance to its result as _purpose_, through which relation that\nontological ground is to be more closely determined in respect of\nthe question at issue. Hence they answer _the whole_ question in no\nway. It remains absolutely unanswerable (for our Reason) if we do\nnot represent that original ground of things, as simple _substance_;\nits property which has reference to the specific constitution of the\nforms of nature grounded thereon, viz. its purposive unity, as the\nproperty of an intelligent substance; and the relation of these forms\nto this intelligence (on account of the contingency which we ascribe\nto everything that we think possible only as a purpose) as that of\n_causality_.\n\n\n\u00a7 81. _Of the association of mechanism with the teleological principle\nin the explanation of a natural purpose as a natural product_\n\nAccording to the preceding paragraphs the mechanism of nature alone\ndoes not enable us to think the possibility of an organised being;\nbut (at least according to the constitution of our cognitive faculty)\nit must be originally subordinated to a cause working designedly.\nBut, just as little is the mere teleological ground of such a being\nsufficient for considering it and judging it as a product of nature,\nif the mechanism of the latter be not associated with the former,\nlike the instrument of a cause working designedly, to whose purposes\nnature is subordinated in its mechanical laws. The possibility of such\na unification of two quite different kinds of causality,--of nature\nin its universal conformity to law with an Idea which limits it to a\nparticular form, for which it contains no ground in itself--is not\ncomprehended by our Reason. It lies in the supersensible substrate\nof nature, of which we can determine nothing positively, except that\nit is the being in itself of which we merely know the phenomenon.\nBut the principle, \u201call that we assume as belonging to this nature\n(_phenomenon_) and as its product, must be thought as connected\ntherewith according to mechanical laws,\u201d has none the less force,\nbecause without this kind of causality organised beings (as purposes of\nnature) would not be natural products.\n\nNow if the teleological principle of the production of these beings\nbe assumed (as is inevitable), we can place at the basis of the\ncause of their internally purposive form either _Occasionalism_ or\n_Pre-established Harmony_. According to the former the Supreme Cause\nof the world would, conformably to its Idea, furnish immediately the\norganic formation on the occasion of every union of intermingling\nmaterials. According to the latter it would, in the original products\nof its wisdom, only have supplied the capacity by means of which\nan organic being produces another of like kind, and the species\nperpetually maintains itself; whilst the loss of individuals is\ncontinually replaced by that nature which at the same time works\ntowards their destruction. If we assume the Occasionalism of the\nproduction of organised beings, all nature is quite lost, and with\nit all employment of Reason in judging of the possibility of such\nproducts; hence we may suppose that no one will adopt this system, who\nhas anything to do with philosophy.\n\n[The theory of] _Pre-established Harmony_ may proceed in two different\nways. It regards every organised being as generated by one of like\nkind, either as an _educt_ or a _product_. The system which regards\ngenerations as mere educts is called the theory of _individual\npreformation_ or the theory of _evolution_: that which regards them\nas products is entitled the system of _epigenesis_. This latter may\nalso be entitled the system of _generic preformation_, because the\nproductive faculty of the generator and consequently the specific\nform would be _virtually_ performed according to the inner purposive\ncapacities which are part of its stock. In correspondence with this the\nopposite theory of individual preformations would be better entitled\nthe _theory of involution_.\n\nThe advocates of the _theory of evolution_, who remove every\nindividual from the formative power of nature, in order to make\nit come immediately from the hand of the Creator, would, however,\nnot venture to regard this as happening according to the hypothesis\nof Occasionalism. For according to this the copulation is a mere\nformality, _\u00e0 propos_ of which a supreme intelligent Cause of the\nworld has concluded to form a fruit immediately by his hand, and only\nto leave to the mother its development and nourishment. They declare\nthemselves for preformation; as if it were not all the same, whether\na supernatural origin is assigned to these forms in the beginning\nor in the course of the world. On the contrary, a great number of\nsupernatural arrangements would be spared by occasional creation,\nwhich would be requisite, in order that the embryo formed in the\nbeginning of the world might not be injured throughout the long period\nof its development by the destructive powers of nature, and might keep\nitself unharmed; and there would also be requisite an incalculably\ngreater number of such preformed beings than would ever be developed,\nand with them many creations would be made without need and without\npurpose. They would, however, be willing to leave at least something\nto nature, so as not to fall into a complete Hyperphysic which can\ndispense with all natural explanations. It is true, they hold so\nfast by their Hyperphysic that they find even in abortions (which\nit is quite impossible to take for purposes of nature) an admirable\npurposiveness; though it be only directed to the fact that an anatomist\nwould take exception to it as a purposeless purposiveness, and would\nfeel a disheartened wonder thereat. But the production of hybrids\ncould absolutely not be accommodated with the system of preformation;\nand to the seeds of the male creature, to which they had attributed\nnothing but the mechanical property of serving as the first means of\nnourishment for the embryo, they must attribute in addition a purposive\nformative power, which in the case of the product of two creatures of\nthe same genus they would concede to neither parent.\n\nOn the other hand, even if we do not recognise the great superiority\nwhich the theory of _Epigenesis_ has over the former as regards the\nempirical grounds of its proof, still prior to proof Reason views this\nway of explanation with peculiar favour. For in respect of the things\nwhich we can only represent as possible originally according to the\ncausality of purposes, at least as concerns their propagation, this\ntheory regards nature as self-producing, not merely as self-evolving:\nand so with the least expenditure of the supernatural leaves to nature\nall that follows after the first beginning (though without determining\nanything about this first beginning by which Physic generally is\nthwarted, however it may essay its explanation by a chain of causes).\n\nAs regards this theory of Epigenesis, no one has contributed more\neither to its proof or to the establishment of the legitimate\nprinciples of its application,--partly by the limitation of a too\npresumptuous employment of it,--than Herr Hofr. _Blumenbach_.[122]\nIn all physical explanations of these formations he starts from\norganised matter. That crude matter should have originally formed\nitself according to mechanical laws, that life should have sprung from\nthe nature of what is lifeless, that matter should have been able to\ndispose itself into the form of a self-maintaining purposiveness--this\nhe rightly declares to be contradictory to Reason. But at the same\ntime he leaves to natural mechanism under this to us indispensable\n_principle_ of an original _organisation_, an undeterminable but yet\nunmistakeable element, in reference to which the faculty of matter in\nan organised body is called by him a _formative impulse_ (in contrast\nto, and yet standing under the higher guidance and direction of, that\nmerely mechanical _formative power_ universally resident in matter).\n\n\n\u00a7 82. _Of the teleological system in the external relations of\norganised beings_\n\nBy external purposiveness I mean that by which one thing of nature\nserves another as means to a purpose. Now things which have no internal\npurposiveness and which presuppose none for their possibility, _e.g._\nearth, air, water, etc., may at the same time be very purposive\nexternally, _i.e._ in relation to other beings. But these latter\nmust be organised beings, _i.e._ natural purposes, for otherwise the\nformer could not be judged as means to them. Thus water, air, and\nearth cannot be regarded as means to the raising of mountains, because\nmountains contain nothing in themselves that requires a ground of their\npossibility according to purposes, in reference to which therefore\ntheir cause can never be represented under the predicate of a means (as\nuseful therefor).\n\nExternal purposiveness is a quite different concept from that of\ninternal purposiveness, which is bound up with the possibility of an\nobject irrespective of its actuality being itself a purpose. We can ask\nabout an organised being the question: What is it for? But we cannot\neasily ask this about things in which we recognise merely the working\nof nature\u2019s mechanism. For in the former, as regards their internal\npossibility, we represent a causality according to purposes, a creative\nUnderstanding, and we refer this active faculty to its determining\nground, viz. design. There is only one external purposiveness which\nis connected with the internal purposiveness of organisation, and yet\nserves in the external relation of a means to a purpose, without the\nquestion necessarily arising, as to what end this being so organised\nmust have existed for. This is the organisation of both sexes in their\nmutual relation for the propagation of their kind; since here we can\nalways ask, as in the case of an individual, why must such a pair\nexist? The answer is: This pair first constitutes an _organising_\nwhole, though not an organised whole in a single body.\n\nIf we now ask, wherefore anything is, the answer is either: Its\npresence and its production have no reference at all to a cause working\naccording to design, and so we always refer its origin to the mechanism\nof nature, or: There is somewhere a designed ground of its presence\n(as a contingent natural being). This thought we can hardly separate\nfrom the concept of an organised thing; for, since we must place at\nthe basis of its internal possibility a causality of final causes and\nan Idea lying at the ground of this, we cannot think the existence\nof this product except as a purpose. For the represented effect, the\nrepresentation of which is at the same time the determining ground\nof the intelligent cause working towards its production, is called a\n_purpose_. In this case therefore we can either say: The purpose of\nthe existence of such a natural being is in itself; _i.e._ it is not\nmerely a purpose but a _final purpose_, or: This is external to it in\nanother natural being, _i.e._ it exists purposively not as a final\npurpose, but necessarily as a means.\n\nBut if we go through the whole of nature we find in it, as nature,\nno being which could make claim to the eminence of being the final\npurpose of creation; and we can even prove _a priori_ that what might\nbe for nature an _ultimate purpose_, according to all the thinkable\ndeterminations and properties wherewith one could endow it, could yet\nas a natural thing never be a _final purpose_.\n\nIf we consider the vegetable kingdom we might at first sight, on\naccount of the immeasurable fertility with which it spreads itself\nalmost on every soil, be led to take it for a mere product of that\nmechanism which nature displays in the formations of the mineral\nkingdom. But a more intimate knowledge of its indescribably wise\norganisation does not permit us to hold to this thought, but prompts\nthe question: What are these things created for? If it is answered:\nFor the animal kingdom, which is thereby nourished and has thus been\nable to spread over the earth in genera so various, then the further\nquestion comes: What are these plant-devouring animals for? The answer\nwould be something like this: For beasts of prey, which can only be\nnourished by that which has life. Finally we have the question: What\nare these last, as well as the first-mentioned natural kingdoms, good\nfor? For man, in reference to the manifold use which his Understanding\nteaches him to make of all these creatures. He is the ultimate purpose\nof creation here on earth, because he is the only being upon it who\ncan form a concept of purposes, and who can by his Reason make out of\nan aggregate of purposively formed things a system of purposes.\n\nWe might also with the chevalier _Linnaeus_[123] go the apparently\nopposite way and say: The herbivorous animals are there to moderate\nthe luxurious growth of the vegetable kingdom, by which many of its\nspecies are choked. The carnivora are to set bounds to the voracity of\nthe herbivora. Finally man, by his pursuit of these and his diminution\nof their numbers, preserves a certain equilibrium between the producing\nand the destructive powers of nature. And so man, although in a certain\nreference he might be esteemed a purpose, yet in another has only the\nrank of a means.\n\nIf an objective purposiveness in the variety of the genera of creatures\nand their external relations to one another, as purposively constructed\nbeings, be made a principle, then it is conformable to Reason to\nconceive in these relations a certain organisation and a system of all\nnatural kingdoms according to final causes. Only here experience seems\nflatly to contradict the maxims of Reason, especially as concerns an\nultimate purpose of nature, which is indispensable for the possibility\nof such a system and which we can put nowhere else but in man. For\nregarding him as one of the many animal genera, nature has not in the\nleast excepted him from its destructive or its productive powers, but\nhas subjected everything to a mechanism thereof without any purpose.\n\nThe first thing that must be designedly prepared in an arrangement\nfor a purposive complex of natural beings on the earth would be their\nplace of habitation, the soil and the element on and in which they\nare to thrive. But a more exact knowledge of the constitution of\nthis basis of all organic production indicates no other causes than\nthose working quite undesignedly, causes which rather destroy than\nfavour production, order, and purposes. Land and sea not only contain\nin themselves memorials of ancient mighty desolations which have\nconfounded them and all creatures that are in them; but their whole\nstructure, the strata of the one and the boundaries of the other, have\nquite the appearance of being the product of the wild and violent\nforces of a nature working in a state of chaos. Although the figure,\nthe structure, and the slope of the land might seem to be purposively\nordered for the reception of water from the air, for the welling\nup of streams between strata of different kinds (for many kinds of\nproducts), and for the course of rivers--yet a closer investigation\nshows that they are merely the effects of volcanic eruptions or of\ninundations of the ocean, as regards not only the first production of\nthis figure, but, above all, its subsequent transformation, as well as\nthe disappearance of its first organic productions.[124] Now if the\nplace of habitation of all these creatures, the soil (of the land)\nor the bosom (of the sea), indicates nothing but a quite undesigned\nmechanism of its production, how and with what right can we demand and\nmaintain a different origin for these latter products? The closest\nexamination, indeed (in _Camper\u2019s_[125] judgement), of the remains\nof the aforesaid devastations of nature seems to show that man was\nnot comprehended in these revolutions; but yet he is so dependent on\nthe remaining creatures that, if a universally directing mechanism of\nnature be admitted in the case of the others, he must also be regarded\nas comprehended under it; even though his Understanding (for the most\npart at least) has been able to deliver him from these devastations.\n\nBut this argument seems to prove more than was intended by it. It seems\nto prove not merely that man cannot be the ultimate purpose of nature,\nand that on the same grounds the aggregate of the organised things of\nnature on the earth cannot be a system of purposes; but also that the\nnatural products formerly held to be natural purposes have no other\norigin than the mechanism of nature.\n\nBut in the solution given above of the Antinomy of the principles\nof the mechanical and teleological methods of production of organic\nbeings of nature, we have seen that they are merely principles of\nthe reflective Judgement in respect of nature as it produces forms\nin accordance with particular laws (for the systematic connexion of\nwhich we have no key). They do not determine the origin of these\nbeings in themselves; but only say that we, by the constitution of\nour Understanding and our Reason, cannot conceive it in this kind of\nbeing except according to final causes. The greatest possible effort,\neven audacity, in the attempt to explain them mechanically is not only\npermitted, but we are invited to it by Reason; notwithstanding that\nwe know from the subjective grounds of the particular species and\nlimitations of our Understanding (not _e.g._ because the mechanism\nof production would contradict in itself an origin according to\npurposes) that we can never attain thereto. Finally, the compatibility\nof both ways of representing the possibility of nature may lie in\nthe supersensible principle of nature (external to us, as well as in\nus); whilst the method of representation according to final causes\nmay be only a subjective condition of the use of our Reason, when it\nnot merely wishes to form a judgement upon objects as phenomena, but\ndesires to refer these phenomena together with their principles to\ntheir supersensible substrate, in order to find certain laws of their\nunity possible, which it cannot represent to itself except through\npurposes (of which the Reason also has such as are supersensible).\n\n\n\u00a7 83. _Of the ultimate purpose of nature as a teleological system_\n\nWe have shown in the preceding that, though not for the determinant but\nfor the reflective Judgement, we have sufficient cause for judging man\nto be, not merely like all organised beings a _natural purpose_, but\nalso the _ultimate purpose_ of nature here on earth; in reference to\nwhom all other natural things constitute a system of purposes according\nto fundamental propositions of Reason. If now that must be found in\nman himself, which is to be furthered as a purpose by means of his\nconnexion with nature, this purpose must either be of a kind that\ncan be satisfied by nature in its beneficence; or it is the aptitude\nand skill for all kinds of purposes for which nature (external and\ninternal) can be used by him. The first purpose of nature would be\nman\u2019s _happiness_, the second his _culture_.\n\nThe concept of happiness is not one that man derives by abstraction\nfrom his instincts and so deduces from his animal nature; but it is a\nmere _Idea_ of a state, that he wishes to make adequate to the Idea\nunder merely empirical conditions (which is impossible). This Idea he\nprojects in such different ways on account of the complication of his\nUnderstanding with Imagination and Sense, and changes so often, that\nnature, even if it were entirely subjected to his elective will, could\nreceive absolutely no determinate, universal and fixed law, so as to\nharmonise with this vacillating concept and thus with the purpose which\neach man arbitrarily sets before himself. And even if we reduce this\nto the true natural wants as to which our race is thoroughly agreed,\nor on the other hand, raise ever so high man\u2019s skill to accomplish his\nimagined purposes; yet, even thus, what man understands by happiness,\nand what is in fact his proper, ultimate, natural purpose (not purpose\nof freedom), would never be attained by him. For it is not his nature\nto rest and be contented with the possession and enjoyment of anything\nwhatever. On the other side, too, there is something wanting. Nature\nhas not taken him for her special darling and favoured him with benefit\nabove all animals. Rather, in her destructive operations,--plague,\nhunger, perils of waters, frost, assaults of other animals great and\nsmall, etc.,--in these things has she spared him as little as any other\nanimal. Further, the inconsistency of his own _natural dispositions_\ndrives him into self-devised torments, and also reduces others of his\nown race to misery, by the oppression of lordship, the barbarism of\nwar, and so forth; he, himself, as far as in him lies, works for the\ndestruction of his own race; so that even with the most beneficent\nexternal nature, its purpose, if it were directed to the happiness\nof our species, would not be attained in an earthly system, because\nour nature is not susceptible of it. Man is then always only a link\nin the chain of natural purposes; a principle certainly in respect\nof many purposes, for which nature seems to have destined him in her\ndisposition, and towards which he sets himself, but also a means for\nthe maintenance of purposiveness in the mechanism of the remaining\nlinks. As the only being on earth which has an Understanding and,\nconsequently, a faculty of setting arbitrary purposes before itself, he\nis certainly entitled to be the lord of nature; and if it be regarded\nas a teleological system he is, by his destination, the ultimate\npurpose of nature. But this is subject to the condition of his having\nan Understanding and the Will to give to it and to himself such a\nreference to purposes, as can be self-sufficient independently of\nnature, and, consequently, can be a final purpose; which, however, must\nnot be sought in nature itself.\n\nBut in order to find out where in man we have to place that _ultimate\npurpose_ of nature, we must seek out what nature can supply to prepare\nhim for what he must do himself in order to be a final purpose, and\nwe must separate it from all those purposes whose possibility depends\nupon things that one can expect only from nature. Of the latter\nkind is earthly happiness, by which is understood the complex of all\nman\u2019s purposes possible through nature, whether external nature or\nman\u2019s nature; _i.e._ the matter of all his earthly purposes, which,\nif he makes it his whole purpose, renders him incapable of positing\nhis own existence as a final purpose, and being in harmony therewith.\nThere remains therefore of all his purposes in nature only the formal\nsubjective condition; viz. the aptitude of setting purposes in\ngeneral before himself, and (independent of nature in his purposive\ndetermination) of using nature, conformably to the maxims of his free\npurposes in general, as a means. This nature can do in regard to the\nfinal purpose that lies outside it, and it therefore may be regarded\nas its ultimate purpose. The production of the aptitude of a rational\nbeing for arbitrary purposes in general (consequently in his freedom)\nis _culture_. Therefore, culture alone can be the ultimate purpose\nwhich we have cause for ascribing to nature in respect to the human\nrace (not man\u2019s earthly happiness or the fact that he is the chief\ninstrument of instituting order and harmony in irrational nature\nexternal to himself).\n\nBut all culture is not adequate to this ultimate purpose of nature. The\nculture of _skill_ is indeed the chief subjective condition of aptitude\nfor furthering one\u2019s purposes in general; but it is not adequate to\nfurthering the _will_[126] in the determination and choice of purposes,\nwhich yet essentially belongs to the whole extent of an aptitude for\npurposes. The latter condition of aptitude, which we might call the\nculture of training (discipline), is negative, and consists in the\nfreeing of the will from the despotism of desires. By these, tied as\nwe are to certain natural things, we are rendered incapable even of\nchoosing, while we allow those impulses to serve as fetters, which\nNature has given us as guiding threads that we should not neglect or\nviolate the destination of our animal nature--we being all the time\nfree enough to strain or relax, to extend or diminish them, according\nas the purposes of Reason require.\n\nSkill cannot be developed in the human race except by means of\ninequality among men; for the great majority provide the necessities\nof life, as it were, mechanically, without requiring any art in\nparticular, for the convenience and leisure of others who work at the\nless necessary elements of culture, science and art. In an oppressed\ncondition they have hard work and little enjoyment, although much of\nthe culture of the higher classes gradually spreads to them. Yet with\nthe progress of this culture (the height of which is called luxury,\nreached when the propensity to what can be done without begins to be\ninjurious to what is indispensable), their calamities increase equally\nin two directions, on the one hand through violence from without, on\nthe other hand through internal discontent; but still this splendid\nmisery is bound up with the development of the natural capacities of\nthe human race, and the purpose of nature itself, although not our\npurpose, is thus attained. The formal condition under which nature\ncan alone attain this its final design, is that arrangement of men\u2019s\nrelations to one another, by which lawful authority in a whole,\nwhich we call a _civil community_, is opposed to the abuse of their\nconflicting freedoms; only in this can the greatest development\nof natural capacities take place. For this also there would be\nrequisite,--if men were clever enough to find it out and wise enough\nto submit themselves voluntarily to its constraint,--a _cosmopolitan_\nwhole, _i.e._ a system of all states that are in danger of acting\ninjuriously upon each other.[127] Failing this, and with the obstacles\nwhich ambition, lust of dominion, and avarice, especially in those\nwho have the authority in their hands, oppose even to the possibility\nof such a scheme, there is, inevitably, _war_ (by which sometimes\nstates subdivide and resolve themselves into smaller states, sometimes\na state annexes other smaller states and strives to form a greater\nwhole). Though war is an undesigned enterprise of men (stirred up by\ntheir unbridled passions), yet is it [perhaps][128] a deep-hidden\nand designed enterprise of supreme wisdom for preparing, if not for\nestablishing, conformity to law amid the freedom of states, and with\nthis a unity of a morally grounded system of those states. In spite of\nthe dreadful afflictions with which it visits the human race, and the\nperhaps greater afflictions with which the constant preparation for it\nin time of peace oppresses them, yet is it (although the hope for a\nrestful state of popular happiness is ever further off) a motive for\ndeveloping all talents serviceable for culture, to the highest possible\npitch.[129]\n\nAs concerns the discipline of the inclinations,--for which our\nnatural capacity in regard of our destination as an animal race is\nquite purposive, but which render the development of humanity very\ndifficult,--there is manifest in respect of this second requirement for\nculture a purposive striving of nature to a cultivation which makes us\nreceptive of higher purposes than nature itself can supply. We cannot\nstrive against the preponderance of evil, which is poured out upon us\nby the refinement of taste pushed to idealisation, and even by the\nluxury of science as affording food for pride, through the insatiable\nnumber of inclinations thus aroused. But yet we cannot mistake the\npurpose of nature--ever aiming to win us away from the rudeness and\nviolence of those inclinations (inclinations to enjoyment) which belong\nrather to our animality, and for the most part are opposed to the\ncultivation of our higher destiny, and to make way for the development\nof our humanity. The beautiful arts and the sciences which, by their\nuniversally-communicable pleasure, and by the polish and refinement\nof society, make man more civilised, if not morally better, win us in\nlarge measure from the tyranny of sense-propensions, and thus prepare\nmen for a lordship, in which Reason alone shall have authority;\nwhilst the evils with which we are visited, partly by nature, partly\nby the intolerant selfishness of men, summon, strengthen, and harden\nthe powers of the soul not to submit to them, and so make us feel an\naptitude for higher purposes, which lies hidden in us.[130]\n\n\n\u00a7 84. _Of the final purpose of the existence of a world, i.e. of\ncreation itself_\n\nA _final purpose_ is that purpose which needs no other as condition of\nits possibility.\n\nIf the mere mechanism of nature be assumed as the ground of explanation\nof its purposiveness, we cannot ask: what are things in the world\nthere for? For according to such an idealistic system it is only the\nphysical possibility of things (to think which as purposes would be\nmere subtlety without any Object) that is under discussion; whether we\nrefer this form of things to chance or to blind necessity, in either\ncase the question would be vain. If, however, we assume the purposive\ncombination in the world to be real and to be [brought about] by a\nparticular kind of causality, viz. that of a _designedly-working_\ncause, we cannot stop at the question: why have things of the world\n(organised beings) this or that form? why are they placed by nature\nin this or that relation to one another? But once an Understanding\nis thought that must be regarded as the cause of the possibility of\nsuch forms as are actually found in things, it must be also asked\non objective grounds: Who could have determined this productive\nUnderstanding to an operation of this kind? This being is then the\nfinal purpose in reference to which such things are there.\n\nI have said above that the final purpose is not a purpose which nature\nwould be competent to bring about and to produce in conformity with\nits Idea, because it is unconditioned. For there is nothing in nature\n(regarded as a sensible being) for which the determining ground present\nin itself would not be always conditioned; and this holds not merely of\nexternal (material) nature, but also of internal (thinking) nature--it\nbeing of course understood that I only am considering that in myself\nwhich is nature. But a thing that is to exist necessarily, on account\nof its objective constitution, as the final purpose of an intelligent\ncause, must be of the kind that in the order of purposes it is\ndependent on no further condition than merely its Idea.\n\nNow we have in the world only one kind of beings whose causality\nis teleological, _i.e._ is directed to purposes and is at the same\ntime so constituted that the law according to which they have to\ndetermine purposes for themselves is represented as unconditioned and\nindependent of natural conditions, and yet as in itself necessary. The\nbeing of this kind is man, but man considered as noumenon; the only\nnatural being in which we can recognise, on the side of its peculiar\nconstitution, a supersensible faculty (_freedom_) and also the law of\ncausality, together with its Object, which this faculty may propose to\nitself as highest purpose (the highest good in the world).\n\nNow of man (and so of every rational creature in the World) as a moral\nbeing it can no longer be asked: why (_quem in finem_) he exists? His\nexistence involves the highest purpose to which, as far as is in his\npower, he can subject the whole of nature; contrary to which at least\nhe cannot regard himself as subject to any influence of nature.--If now\nthings of the world, as beings dependent in their existence, need a\nsupreme cause acting according to purposes, man is the final purpose of\ncreation; since without him the chain of mutually subordinated purposes\nwould not be complete as regards its ground. Only in man, and only in\nhim as subject of morality, do we meet with unconditioned legislation\nin respect of purposes, which therefore alone renders him capable of\nbeing a final purpose, to which the whole of nature is teleologically\nsubordinated.[131]\n\n\n\u00a7 85. _Of Physico-theology_\n\n_Physico-theology_ is the endeavour of Reason to infer the Supreme\nCause of nature and its properties from the _purposes_ of nature (which\ncan only be empirically known). _Moral theology_ (ethico-theology)\nwould be the endeavour to infer that Cause and its properties from\nthe moral purpose of rational beings in nature (which can be known _a\npriori_).\n\nThe former naturally precedes the latter. For if we wish to infer a\nWorld Cause _teleologically_ from the things in the world, purposes\nof nature must first be given, for which we afterwards have to seek\na final purpose, and for this the principle of the causality of this\nSupreme Cause.\n\nMany investigations of nature can and must be conducted according to\nthe teleological principle, without our having cause to inquire into\nthe ground of the possibility of purposive working with which we meet\nin various products of nature. But if we wish to have a concept of this\nwe have absolutely no further insight into it than the maxim of the\nreflective Judgement affords: viz. if only a single organic product of\nnature were given to us, by the constitution of our cognitive faculty\nwe could think no other ground for it than that of a cause of nature\nitself (whether the whole of nature or only this bit of it) which\ncontains the causality for it through Understanding. This principle of\njudging, though it does not bring us any further in the explanation of\nnatural things and their origin, yet discloses to us an outlook over\nnature, by which perhaps we may be able to determine more closely the\nconcept, otherwise so unfruitful, of an Original Being.\n\nNow I say that Physico-theology, however far it may be pursued, can\ndisclose to us nothing of a _final purpose_ of creation; for it does\nnot even extend to the question as to this. It can, it is true, justify\nthe concept of an intelligent World Cause, as a subjective concept\n(only available for the constitution of our cognitive faculty) of\nthe possibility of things that we can make intelligible to ourselves\naccording to purposes; but it cannot determine this concept further,\neither in a theoretical or a practical point of view. Its endeavour\ndoes not come up to its design of being the basis of a Theology, but\nit always remains only a physical Teleology; because the purposive\nreference therein is and must be always considered only as conditioned\nin nature, and it consequently cannot inquire into the purpose for\nwhich nature itself exists (for which the ground must be sought outside\nnature),--notwithstanding that it is upon the determinate Idea of this\nthat the determinate concept of that Supreme Intelligent World Cause,\nand the consequent possibility of a Theology, depend.\n\nWhat the things in the world are mutually useful for; what good the\nmanifold in a thing does for the thing; how we have ground to assume\nthat nothing in the world is in vain, but that everything _in nature_\nis good for something,--the condition being granted that certain things\nare to exist (as purposes), whence our Reason has in its power for\nthe Judgement no other principle of the possibility of the Object,\nwhich it inevitably judges teleologically, than that of subordinating\nthe mechanism of nature to the Architectonic of an intelligent Author\nof the world--all this the teleological consideration of the world\nsupplies us with excellently and to our extreme admiration. But\nbecause the data, and so the principles, for _determining_ that concept\nof an intelligent World Cause (as highest artist) are merely empirical,\nthey do not enable us to infer any of its properties beyond those which\nexperience reveals in its effects. Now experience, since it can never\nembrace collective nature as a system, must often (apparently) happen\nupon this concept (and by mutually conflicting grounds of proof); but\nit can never, even if we had the power of surveying empirically the\nwhole system as far as it concerns mere nature, raise us above nature\nto the purpose of its existence, and so to the determinate concept of\nthat supreme Intelligence.\n\nIf we lessen the problem with the solution of which Physico-theology\nhas to do, its solution appears easy. If we reduce the concept of a\n_Deity_ to that of an intelligent being thought by us, of which there\nmay be one or more, which possesses many and very great properties,\nbut not all the properties which are requisite for the foundation of a\nnature in harmony with the greatest possible purpose; or if we do not\nscruple in a theory to supply by arbitrary additions what is deficient\nin the grounds of proof, and so, where we have only ground for assuming\n_much_ perfection (and what is \u201cmuch\u201d for us?), consider ourselves\nentitled to presuppose _all possible_ perfection; thus indeed physical\nTeleology may make weighty claims to the distinction of being the basis\nof a Theology. But if we are desired to point out what impels and\nmoreover authorises us to add these supplements, then we shall seek in\nvain for a ground of justification in the principles of the theoretical\nuse of Reason, which is ever desirous in the explanation of an Object\nof experience to ascribe to it no more properties than those for which\nempirical data of possibility are to be found. On closer examination\nwe should see that properly speaking an Idea of a Supreme Being, which\nrests on a quite different use of Reason (the practical use), lies in\nus fundamentally _a priori_, impelling us to supplement, by the concept\nof a Deity, the defective representation, supplied by a physical\nTeleology, of the original ground of the purposes in nature; and we\nshould not falsely imagine that we had worked out this Idea, and with\nit a Theology by means of the theoretical use of Reason in the physical\ncognition of the world--much less that we had proved its reality.\n\nOne cannot blame the ancients much, if they thought of their gods as\ndiffering much from each other both as regards their faculties and as\nregards their designs and volitions, but yet thought of all of them,\nthe Supreme One not excepted, as always limited after human fashion.\nFor if they considered the arrangement and the course of things in\nnature, they certainly found ground enough for assuming something\nmore than mechanism as its cause, and for conjecturing behind the\nmachinery of this world designs of certain higher causes, which they\ncould not think otherwise than superhuman. But because they met with\ngood and evil, the purposive and the unpurposive, mingled together (at\nleast as far as our insight goes), and could not permit themselves\nto assume nevertheless that wise and benevolent purposes of which\nthey saw no proof lay hidden at bottom, on behalf of the arbitrary\nIdea of a supremely perfect original Author, their judgement upon\nthe supreme World Cause could hardly have been other than it was, so\nlong as they proceeded consistently according to maxims of the mere\ntheoretical use of Reason. Others, who wished to be theologians as\nwell as physicists, thought to find contentment for the Reason by\nproviding for the absolute unity of the principle of natural things\nwhich Reason demands, the Idea of a Being of which as sole Substance\nthe things would be all only inherent determinations. This Substance\nwould not be Cause of the World by means of intelligence, but in it all\nthe intelligences of the beings in the world would be comprised. This\nBeing consequently would produce nothing according to purposes; but in\nit all things, on account of the unity of the subject of which they are\nmere determinations, must necessarily relate themselves purposively to\none another, though without purpose and design. Thus they introduced\nthe Idealism of final causes, by changing the unity (so difficult to\nexplain) of a number of purposively combined substances, from being\nthe unity of causal dependence _on one_ Substance to be the unity of\ninherence _in one_. This system--which in the sequel, considered on the\nside of the inherent world beings, becomes _Pantheism_, and (later) on\nthe side of the Subject subsisting by itself as Original Being, becomes\n_Spinozism_,--does not so much resolve as explain away into nothing the\nquestion of the first ground of the purposiveness of nature; because\nthis latter concept, bereft of all reality, must be taken for a mere\nmisinterpretation of a universal ontological concept of a thing in\ngeneral.\n\nHence the concept of a Deity, which would be adequate for our\nteleological judging of nature, can never be derived from mere\ntheoretical principles of the use of Reason (on which Physico-theology\nalone is based). For as one alternative we may explain all Teleology\nas a mere deception of the Judgement in its judging of the causal\ncombination of things, and fly to the sole principle of a mere\nmechanism of nature, which merely seems to us, on account of the unity\nof the Substance of whose determinations nature is but the manifold,\nto contain a universal reference to purposes. Or if, instead of this\nIdealism of final causes, we wish to remain attached to the principle\nof the Realism of this particular kind of causality, we may set\nbeneath natural purposes many intelligent original beings or only a\nsingle one. But so far as we have for the basis of this concept [of\nRealism] only empirical principles derived from the actual purposive\ncombination in the world, we cannot on the one hand find any remedy for\nthe discordance that nature presents in many examples in respect of\nunity of purpose; and on the other hand, as to the concept of a single\nintelligent Cause, so far as we are authorised by mere experience, we\ncan never draw it therefrom in a manner sufficiently determined for any\nserviceable Theology whatever (whether theoretical or practical).\n\nPhysical Teleology impels us, it is true, to seek a Theology; but it\ncannot produce one, however far we may investigate nature by means of\nexperience and, in reference to the purposive combination apparent in\nit, call in Ideas of Reason (which must be theoretical for physical\nproblems). What is the use, one might well complain, of placing at the\nbasis of all these arrangements a great Understanding incommensurable\nby us, and supposing it to govern the world according to design, if\nnature does not and cannot tell us anything of the final design? For\nwithout this we cannot refer all these natural purposes to any common\npoint, nor can we form any teleological principle, sufficient either\nfor cognising the purposes collected in a system, or for forming a\nconcept of the Supreme Understanding, as Cause of such a nature, that\ncould serve as a standard for our Judgement reflecting teleologically\nthereon. I should thus have an _artistic Understanding_ for scattered\npurposes, but no _Wisdom_ for a final purpose, in which final purpose\nnevertheless must be contained the determining ground of the said\nUnderstanding. But in the absence of a final purpose which pure Reason\nalone can supply (because all purposes in the world are empirically\nconditioned, and can contain nothing absolutely good but only what is\ngood for this or that regarded as a contingent design), and which alone\nwould teach me what properties, what degree, and what relation of the\nSupreme Cause to nature I have to think in order to judge of nature as\na teleological system; how and with what right do I dare to extend at\npleasure my very limited concept of that original Understanding (which\nI can base on my limited knowledge of the world), of the Might of that\noriginal Being in actualising its Ideas, and of its Will to do so, and\ncomplete this into the Idea of an Allwise, Infinite Being? If this is\nto be done theoretically, it would presuppose omniscience in me, in\norder to see into the purposes of nature in their whole connexion, and\nin addition the power of conceiving all possible plans, in comparison\nwith which the present plan would be judged on [sufficient] grounds\nas the best. For without this complete knowledge of the effect I can\narrive at no determinate concept of the Supreme Cause, which can only\nbe found in the concept of an Intelligence infinite in every respect,\n_i.e._ the concept of a Deity, and so I can supply no foundation for\nTheology.\n\nHence, with every possible extension of physical Teleology, according\nto the propositions above laid down we may say: By the constitution\nand the principles of our cognitive faculty we can think of nature, in\nits purposive arrangements which have become known to us, in no other\nway than as the product of an Understanding to which it is subject.\nBut the theoretical investigation of nature can never reveal to us\nwhether this Understanding may not also, with the whole of nature and\nits production, have had a final design (which would not lie in the\nnature of the sensible world). On the contrary, with all our knowledge\nof nature it remains undecided whether that Supreme Cause is its\noriginal ground according to a final purpose, or not rather by means\nof an Understanding determined by the mere necessity of its nature to\nproduce certain forms (according to the analogy of what we call the\nart-instinct in animals); without it being necessary to ascribe to\nit even wisdom, much less the highest wisdom combined with all other\nproperties requisite for the perfection of its product.\n\nHence Physico-theology is a misunderstood physical Teleology, only\nserviceable as a preparation (propaedeutic) for Theology; and it is\nonly adequate to this design by the aid of a foreign principle on which\nit can rely, and not in itself, as its name would intimate.\n\n\n\u00a7 86. _Of Ethico-theology_\n\nThe commonest Understanding, if it thinks over the presence of things\nin the world, and the existence of the world itself, cannot forbear\nfrom the judgement that all the various creatures, no matter how great\nthe art displayed in their arrangement, and how various their purposive\nmutual connexion,--even the complex of their numerous systems (which\nwe incorrectly call worlds),--would be for nothing, if there were not\nalso men (rational beings in general). Without men the whole creation\nwould be a mere waste, in vain, and without final purpose. But it is\nnot in reference to man\u2019s cognitive faculty (theoretical Reason) that\nthe being of everything else in the world gets its worth; he is not\nthere merely that there may be some one to _contemplate_ the world.\nFor if the contemplation of the world only afforded a representation\nof things without any final purpose, no worth could accrue to its\nbeing from the mere fact that it is known; we must presuppose for it\na final purpose, in reference to which its contemplation itself has\nworth. Again it is not in reference to the feeling of pleasure, or to\nthe sum of pleasures, that we think a final purpose of creation as\ngiven; _i.e._ we do not estimate that absolute worth by well-being or\nby enjoyment (whether bodily or mental), or in a word, by happiness.\nFor the fact that man, if he exists, takes this for his final design,\ngives us no concept as to why in general he should exist, and as to\nwhat worth he has in himself to make his existence pleasant. He must,\ntherefore, be supposed to be the final purpose of creation, in order\nto have a rational ground for holding that nature must harmonise with\nhis happiness, if it is considered as an absolute whole according\nto principles of purposes.--Hence there remains only the faculty of\ndesire; not, however, that which makes man dependent (through sensuous\nimpulses) upon nature, nor that in respect of which the worth of his\nbeing depends upon what he receives and enjoys. But the worth which\nhe alone can give to himself, and which consists in what he does, how\nand according to what principles he acts, and that not as a link in\nnature\u2019s chain but in the _freedom_ of his faculty of desire--_i.e._ a\ngood will--is that whereby alone his being can have an absolute worth,\nand in reference to which the being of the world can have a _final\npurpose_.\n\nThe commonest judgement of healthy human Reason completely accords\nwith this, that it is only as a moral being that man can be a final\npurpose of creation; if we but direct men\u2019s attention to the question\nand incite them to investigate it. What does it avail, one will say,\nthat this man has so much talent, that he is so active therewith, and\nthat he exerts thereby a useful influence over the community, thus\nhaving a great worth both in relation to his own happy condition and\nto the benefit of others, if he does not possess a good will? He is a\ncontemptible Object considered in respect of his inner self; and if the\ncreation is not to be without any final purpose at all, he, who as man\nbelongs to it, must, in a world under moral laws, inasmuch as he is a\nbad man, forfeit his subjective purpose (happiness). This is the only\ncondition under which his existence can accord with the final purpose.\n\nIf now we meet with purposive arrangements in the world and, as Reason\ninevitably requires, subordinate the purposes that are only conditioned\nto an unconditioned, supreme, _i.e._ final, purpose; then we easily see\nin the first place that we are thus concerned not with a purpose of\nnature (internal to itself), so far as it exists, but with the purpose\nof its existence along with all its ordinances, and, consequently, with\nthe ultimate _purpose of creation_, and specially with the supreme\ncondition under which can be posited a final purpose (_i.e._ the ground\nwhich determines a supreme Understanding to produce the beings of the\nworld).\n\nSince now it is only as a moral being that we recognise man as the\npurpose of creation, we have in the first place a ground (at least, the\nchief condition) for regarding the world as a whole connected according\nto purposes, and as a _system_ of final causes. And, more especially,\nas regards the reference (necessary for us by the constitution of our\nReason) of natural purposes to an intelligent World Cause, we have _one\nprinciple_ enabling us to think the nature and properties of this First\nCause as supreme ground in the kingdom of purposes, and to determine\nits concept. This physical Teleology could not do; it could only lead\nto indeterminate concepts thereof, unserviceable alike in theoretical\nand in practical use.\n\nFrom the principle, thus determined, of the causality of the Original\nBeing we must not think Him merely as Intelligence and as legislative\nfor nature, but also as legislating supremely in a moral kingdom of\npurposes. In reference to the _highest good_, alone possible under\nHis sovereignty, viz. the existence of rational beings under moral\nlaws, we shall think this Original Being as _all-knowing_: thus our\ninmost dispositions (which constitute the proper moral worth of the\nactions of rational beings of the world) will not be hid from Him.\nWe shall think Him as _all-mighty_: thus He will be able to make the\nwhole of nature accord with this highest purpose. We shall think Him\nas _all-good_, and at the same time as _just_: because these two\nproperties (which when united constitute _Wisdom_) are the conditions\nof the causality of a supreme Cause of the world, as highest good,\nunder moral laws. So also all the other transcendental properties,\nsuch as _Eternity_, _Omnipresence_, etc. [for goodness and justice are\nmoral properties[132]], which are presupposed in reference to such a\nfinal purpose, must be thought in Him.--In this way _moral Teleology_\nsupplies the deficiency in _physical Teleology_, and first establishes\na _Theology_; because the latter, if it did not borrow from the former\nwithout being observed, but were to proceed consistently, could only\nfound a _Demonology_, which is incapable of any definite concept.\n\nBut the principle of the reference of the world to a supreme Cause, as\nDeity, on account of the moral purposive destination of certain beings\nin it, does not accomplish this by completing the physico-teleological\nground of proof and so taking this necessarily as its basis. It is\nsufficient _in itself_ and directs attention to the purposes of\nnature and the investigation of that incomprehensible great art lying\nhidden behind its forms, in order to confirm incidentally by means of\nnatural purposes the Ideas that pure practical Reason furnishes. For\nthe concept of beings of the world under moral laws is a principle\n(_a priori_) according to which man must of necessity judge himself.\nFurther, if there is in general a World Cause acting designedly and\ndirected towards a purpose, this moral relation must be just as\nnecessarily the condition of the possibility of a creation, as that\nin accordance with physical laws (if, that is, this intelligent Cause\nhas also a final purpose). This is regarded _a priori_ by Reason as a\nnecessary fundamental proposition for it in its teleological judging\nof the existence of things. It now only comes to this, whether we have\nsufficient ground for Reason (either speculative or practical) to\nascribe to the supreme Cause, acting in accordance with purposes, a\n_final purpose_. For it may _a priori_ be taken by us as certain that\nthis, by the subjective constitution of our Reason and even of the\nReason of other beings as far as we can think it, can be nothing else\nthan _man under moral laws_: since otherwise the purposes of nature in\nthe physical order could not be known _a priori_, especially as it can\nin no way be seen that nature could not exist without such purposes.\n\n\n_Remark_\n\nSuppose the case of a man at the moment when his mind is disposed to a\nmoral sensation. If surrounded by the beauties of nature, he is in a\nstate of restful, serene enjoyment of his being, he feels a want, viz.\nto be grateful for this to some being or other. Or if another time he\nfinds himself in the same state of mind when pressed by duties that he\ncan and will only adequately discharge by a voluntary sacrifice, he\nagain feels in himself a want, viz. to have thus executed a command\nand obeyed a Supreme Lord. Or, again; if he has in some heedless way\ntransgressed his duty, but without becoming answerable to men, his\nsevere self-reproach will speak to him with the voice of a judge to\nwhom he has to give account. In a word, he needs a moral Intelligence,\nin order to have a Being for the purpose of his existence, which may\nbe, conformably to this purpose, the cause of himself and of the\nworld. It is vain to assign motives behind these feelings, for they\nare immediately connected with the purest moral sentiment, because\n_gratitude_, _obedience_, and _humiliation_ (submission to deserved\nchastisement) are mental dispositions that make for duty; and the mind\nwhich is inclined towards a widening of its moral sentiment here only\nvoluntarily conceives an object that is not in the world in order where\npossible to render its duty before such an one. It is therefore at\nleast possible and grounded too in our moral disposition to represent\na pure moral need of the existence of a Being, by which our morality\ngains strength or even (at least according to our representation) more\nscope, viz. a new object for its exercise. That is, [there is a need]\nto assume a morally-legislating Being outside the world, without any\nreference to theoretical proofs, still less to self-interest, from pure\nmoral grounds free from all foreign influence (and consequently only\nsubjective), on the mere recommendation of a pure practical Reason\nlegislating by itself alone. And although such a mental disposition\nmight seldom occur or might not last long, but be transient and without\npermanent effect, or might even pass away without any meditation on the\nobject represented in such shadowy outline, or without care to bring\nit under clear concepts--there is yet here unmistakably the ground why\nour moral capacity, as a subjective principle, should not be contented\nin its contemplation of the world with its purposiveness by means of\nnatural causes, but should ascribe to it a supreme Cause governing\nnature according to moral principles.--In addition, we feel ourselves\nconstrained by the moral law to strive for a universal highest purpose\nwhich yet we, in common with the rest of nature, are incapable of\nattaining; and it is only so far as we strive for it that we can judge\nourselves to be in harmony with the final purpose of an intelligent\nWorld Cause (if such there be). Thus is found a pure moral ground\nof practical Reason for assuming this Cause (since it can be done\nwithout contradiction), in order that we may no more regard that effort\nof Reason as quite idle, and so run the risk of abandoning it from\nweariness.\n\nWith all this, so much only is to be said, that though _fear_ first\nproduces _gods_ (demons), it is _Reason_ by means of its moral\nprinciples that can first produce the concept of _God_ (even when, as\ncommonly is the case, one is unskilled in the Teleology of nature,\nor is very doubtful on account of the difficulty of adjusting by\na sufficiently established principle its mutually contradictory\nphenomena). Also, the inner _moral_ purposive destination of man\u2019s\nbeing supplies that in which natural knowledge is deficient, by\ndirecting us to think, for the final purpose of the being of all things\n(for which no other principle than an _ethical_ one is satisfactory to\nReason), the supreme Cause [as endowed] with properties, whereby it is\nable to subject the whole of nature to that single design (for which\nnature is merely the instrument),--_i.e._ to think it as a _Deity_.\n\n\n\u00a7 87. _Of the moral proof of the Being of God_\n\nThere is a _physical Teleology_, which gives sufficient ground of\nproof to our theoretical reflective Judgement to assume the being of\nan intelligent World-Cause. But we find also in ourselves and still\nmore in the concept of a rational being in general endowed with freedom\n(of his causality) a _moral Teleology_. However, as the purposive\nreference, together with its law, is determined _a priori_ in ourselves\nand therefore can be cognised as necessary, this internal conformity\nto law requires no intelligent cause external to us; any more than we\nneed look to a highest Understanding as the source of the purposiveness\n(for every possible exercise of art) that we find in the geometrical\nproperties of figures. But this moral Teleology concerns us as beings\nof the world, and therefore as beings bound up with other things in the\nworld; upon which latter, whether as purposes or as objects in respect\nof which we ourselves are final purpose, the same moral laws require\nus to pass judgement. This moral Teleology, then, has to do with the\nreference of our own causality to purposes and even to a final purpose\nthat we must aim at in the world, as well as with the reciprocal\nreference of the world to that moral purpose, and the external\npossibility of its accomplishment (to which no physical Teleology can\nlead us). Hence the question necessarily arises, whether it compels\nour rational judgement to go beyond the world and seek an intelligent\nsupreme principle for that reference of nature to the moral in us; in\norder to represent nature as purposive even in reference to our inner\nmoral legislation and its possible accomplishment. There is therefore\ncertainly a moral Teleology, which is connected on the one hand with\nthe _nomothetic_ of freedom and on the other with that of nature; just\nas necessarily as civil legislation is connected with the question\nwhere the executive authority is to be sought, and in general in every\ncase [with the question] wherein Reason is to furnish a principle\nof the actuality of a certain regular order of things only possible\naccording to Ideas.-- We shall first set forth the progress of Reason\nfrom that moral Teleology and its reference to physical, to _Theology_;\nand then make some observations upon the possibility and the validity\nof this way of reasoning.\n\nIf we assume the being of certain things (or even only certain forms of\nthings) to be contingent and so to be possible only through something\nelse which is their cause, we may seek for the unconditioned ground of\nthis causality of the supreme (and so of the conditioned) either in\nthe physical or the teleological order (either according to the _nexus\neffectivus_ or the _nexus finalis_). That is, we may either ask, what\nis the supreme productive cause of these things; or what is their\nsupreme (absolutely unconditioned) purpose, _i.e._ the final purpose of\nthat cause in its production of this or all its products generally? In\nthe second case it is plainly presupposed that this cause is capable\nof representing purposes to itself, and consequently is an intelligent\nBeing; at least it must be thought as acting in accordance with the\nlaws of such a being.\n\nIf we follow the latter order, it is a FUNDAMENTAL PROPOSITION to\nwhich even the commonest human Reason is compelled to give immediate\nassent, that if there is to be in general a _final purpose_ furnished\n_a priori_ by Reason, this can be no other than _man_ (every rational\nbeing of the world) _under moral laws_.[133] For (and so every one\njudges) if the world consisted of mere lifeless, or even in part of\nliving but irrational, beings, its existence would have no worth\nbecause in it there would be no being who would have the least concept\nof what worth is. Again, if there were intelligent beings, whose\nReason were only able to place the worth of the existence of things\nin the relation of nature to themselves (their well-being), but not\nto furnish of itself an original worth (in freedom), then there would\ncertainly be (relative) purposes in the world, but no (absolute) final\npurpose, because the existence of such rational beings would be always\npurposeless. But the moral laws have this peculiar characteristic that\nthey prescribe to Reason something as a purpose without any condition,\nand consequently exactly as the concept of a final purpose requires.\nThe existence of a Reason that can be for itself the supreme law in the\npurposive reference, in other words the existence of rational beings\nunder moral laws, can therefore alone be thought as the final purpose\nof the being of a world. If on the contrary this be not so, there would\nbe either no purpose at all in the cause of its being, or there would\nbe purposes, but no final purpose.\n\nThe moral law as the formal rational condition of the use of our\nfreedom obliges us by itself alone, without depending on any purpose as\nmaterial condition; but it nevertheless determines for us, and indeed\n_a priori_, a final purpose towards which it obliges us to strive;\nand this purpose is the _highest good in the world_ possible through\nfreedom.\n\nThe subjective condition under which man (and, according to all our\nconcepts, every rational finite being) can set a final purpose before\nhimself under the above law is happiness. Consequently, the highest\nphysical good possible in the world, to be furthered as a final purpose\nas far as in us lies, is _happiness_, under the objective condition of\nthe harmony of man with the law of _morality_ as worthiness to be happy.\n\nBut it is impossible for us in accordance with all our rational\nfaculties to represent these two requirements of the final purpose\nproposed to us by the moral law, as _connected_ by merely natural\ncauses, and yet as conformable to the Idea of that final purpose. Hence\nthe concept of the _practical necessity_ of such a purpose through\nthe application of our powers does not harmonise with the theoretical\nconcept of the _physical possibility_ of working it out, if we connect\nwith our freedom no other causality (as a means) than that of nature.\n\nConsequently, we must assume a moral World-Cause (an Author of the\nworld), in order to set before ourselves a final purpose consistently\nwith the moral law; and in so far as the latter is necessary, so far\n(_i.e._ in the same degree and on the same ground) the former also must\nbe necessarily assumed; _i.e._ we must admit that there is a God.[134]\n\nThis proof, to which we can easily give the form of logical precision,\ndoes not say: it is as necessary to assume the Being of God as to\nrecognise the validity of the moral law; and consequently he who\ncannot convince himself of the first, can judge himself free from the\nobligations of the second. No! there must in such case only be given\nup the _aiming at_ the final purpose in the world, to be brought about\nby the pursuit of the second (viz. a happiness of rational beings\nin harmony with the pursuit of moral laws, regarded as the highest\ngood). Every rational being would yet have to cognise himself as\nstraitly bound by the precepts of morality, for its laws are formal\nand command unconditionally without respect to purposes (as the matter\nof volition). But the one requisite of the final purpose, as practical\nReason prescribes it to beings of the world, is an irresistible purpose\nimposed on them by their nature (as finite beings), which Reason wishes\nto know as subject only to the moral law as inviolable _condition_, or\neven as universally set up in accordance with it. Thus Reason takes for\nfinal purpose the furthering of happiness in harmony with morality. To\nfurther this so far as is in our power (_i.e._ in respect of happiness)\nis commanded us by the moral law; be the issue of this endeavour what\nit may. The fulfilling of duty consists in the form of the earnest\nwill, not in the intermediate causes of success.\n\nSuppose then that partly through the weakness of all the speculative\narguments so highly extolled, and partly through many irregularities\nin nature and the world of sense which come before him, a man is\npersuaded of the proposition, There is no God; he would nevertheless be\ncontemptible in his own eyes if on that account he were to imagine the\nlaws of duty as empty, invalid and inobligatory, and wished to resolve\nto transgress them boldly. Such an one, even if he could be convinced\nin the sequel of that which he had doubted at the first, would always\nbe contemptible while having such a disposition, although he should\nfulfil his duty as regards its [external] effect as punctiliously\nas could be desired, for [he would be acting] from fear or from the\naim at recompense, without the sentiment of reverence for duty. If,\nconversely, as a believer [in God] he performs his duty according\nto his conscience, uprightly and disinterestedly, and nevertheless\nbelieves that he is free from all moral obligation so soon as he is\nconvinced that there is no God, this could accord but badly with an\ninner moral disposition.\n\nWe may then suppose the case of a righteous man [_e.g. Spinoza_],[135]\nwho holds himself firmly persuaded that there is no God, and also\n(because in respect of the Object of morality a similar consequence\nresults) no future life; how is he to judge of his own inner purposive\ndestination, by means of the moral law, which he reveres in practice?\nHe desires no advantage to himself from following it, either in this\nor another world; he wishes, rather, disinterestedly to establish\nthe good to which that holy law directs all his powers. But his\neffort is bounded; and from nature, although he may expect here and\nthere a contingent accordance, he can never expect a regular harmony\nagreeing according to constant rules (such as his maxims are and must\nbe, internally), with the purpose that he yet feels himself obliged\nand impelled to accomplish. Deceit, violence, and envy will always\nsurround him, although he himself be honest, peaceable, and kindly; and\nthe righteous men with whom he meets will, notwithstanding all their\nworthiness of happiness, be yet subjected by nature which regards not\nthis, to all the evils of want, disease, and untimely death, just like\nthe beasts of the earth. So it will be until one wide grave engulfs\nthem together (honest or not, it makes no difference), and throws\nthem back--who were able to believe themselves the final purpose of\ncreation--into the abyss of the purposeless chaos of matter from which\nthey were drawn.-- The purpose, then, which this well-intentioned\nperson had and ought to have before him in his pursuit of moral laws,\nhe must certainly give up as impossible. Or else, if he wishes to\nremain dependent upon the call of his moral internal destination,\nand not to weaken the respect with which the moral law immediately\ninspires him, by assuming the nothingness of the single, ideal, final\npurpose adequate to its high demand (which cannot be brought about\nwithout a violation of moral sentiment), he must, as he well can--since\nthere is at least no contradiction from a practical point of view in\nforming a concept of the possibility of a morally prescribed final\npurpose--assume the being of a _moral_ author of the world, that is, a\nGod.\n\n\n\u00a7 88. _Limitation of the validity of the moral proof_\n\nPure Reason, as a practical faculty, _i.e._ as the faculty of\ndetermining the free use of our causality by Ideas (pure rational\nconcepts), not only comprises in the moral law a regulative principle\nof our actions, but supplies us at the same time with a subjective\nconstitutive principle in the concept of an Object which Reason\nalone can think, and which is to be actualised by our actions in\nthe world according to that law. The Idea of a final purpose in the\nemployment of freedom according to moral laws has therefore subjective\n_practical_ reality. We are _a priori_ determined by Reason to promote\nwith all our powers the _summum bonum_ [Weltbeste] which consists in\nthe combination of the greatest welfare of rational beings with the\nhighest condition of the good in itself, _i.e._ in universal happiness\nconjoined with morality most accordant to law. In this final purpose\nthe possibility of one part, happiness, is empirically conditioned,\n_i.e._ dependent on the constitution of nature (which may or may not\nagree with this purpose) and is in a theoretical aspect problematical;\nwhilst the other part, morality, in respect of which we are free from\nthe effects of nature, stands fast _a priori_ as to its possibility,\nand is dogmatically certain. It is then requisite for the objective\ntheoretical reality of the concept of the final purpose of rational\nbeings, that we should not only have _a priori_ presupposed a final\npurpose for ourselves, but also that the creation, _i.e._ the world\nitself, should have as regards its existence a final purpose, which if\nit could be proved _a priori_ would add objectivity to the subjective\nreality of the final purpose [of rational beings]. For if the creation\nhas on the whole a final purpose, we cannot think it otherwise than as\nharmonising with the moral purpose (which alone makes the concept of a\npurpose possible). Now we find without doubt purposes in the world, and\nphysical Teleology exhibits them in such abundance, that if we judge\nin accordance with Reason, we have ground for assuming as a principle\nin the investigation of nature that nothing in nature is without a\npurpose; but the final purpose of nature we seek there in vain. This\ncan and must therefore, as its Idea only lies in Reason, be sought as\nregards its objective possibility only in rational beings. And the\npractical Reason of these latter not only supplies this final purpose;\nit also determines this concept in respect of the conditions under\nwhich alone a final purpose of creation can be thought by us.\n\nThe question is now, whether the objective reality of the concept\nof a final purpose of creation cannot be exhibited adequately to the\ntheoretical requirements of pure Reason--if not apodictically for the\ndeterminant Judgement yet adequately for the maxims of the theoretical\nreflective Judgement? This is the least one could expect from\ntheoretical philosophy, which undertakes to combine the moral purpose\nwith natural purposes by means of the Idea of one single purpose; but\nyet this little is far more than it can accomplish.\n\nAccording to the principle of the theoretical reflective Judgement we\nshould say: if we have ground for assuming for the purposive products\nof nature a supreme Cause of nature--whose causality in respect of the\nactuality of creation is of a different kind from that required for\nthe mechanism of nature, _i.e._ must be thought as the causality of\nan Understanding--we have also sufficient ground for thinking in this\noriginal Being not merely the purposes everywhere in nature but also\na final purpose. This is not indeed a final purpose by which we can\nexplain the presence of such a Being, but one of which we may at least\nconvince ourselves (as was the case in physical Teleology) that we can\nmake the possibility of such a world conceivable, not merely according\nto purposes, but only through the fact that we ascribe to its existence\na final purpose.\n\nBut a final purpose is merely a concept of our practical Reason,\nand can be inferred from no data of experience for the theoretical\njudging of nature, nor can it be applied to the cognition of nature.\nNo use of this concept is possible except its use for practical Reason\naccording to moral laws; and the final purpose of creation is that\nconstitution of the world which harmonises with that which alone we\ncan put forward definitely according to laws, viz. the final purpose of\nour pure practical Reason, in so far as it is to be practical.-- Now\nwe have in the moral law, which enjoins on us in a practical point of\nview the application of our powers to the accomplishment of this final\npurpose, a ground for assuming its possibility and practicability, and\nconsequently too (because without the concurrence of nature with a\ncondition not in our power, its accomplishment would be impossible) a\nnature of things harmonious with it. Hence we have a moral ground for\nthinking in a world also a final purpose of creation.\n\nWe have not yet advanced from moral Teleology to a Theology, _i.e._ to\nthe being of a moral Author of the world, but only to a final purpose\nof creation which is determined in this way. But in order to account\nfor this creation, _i.e._ the existence of things, in accordance with\na _final purpose_, we must assume not only first an intelligent Being\n(for the possibility of things of nature which we are compelled to\njudge of as _purposes_), but also a _moral_ Being, as author of the\nworld, _i.e._ a _God_. This second conclusion is of such a character\nthat we see it holds merely for the Judgement according to concepts\nof practical Reason, and as such for the reflective and not the\ndeterminant Judgement. It is true that in us morally practical Reason\nis essentially different in its principles from technically practical\nReason. But we cannot assume that it must be so likewise in the supreme\nWorld-Cause, regarded as Intelligence, and that a peculiar mode of\nits causality is requisite for the final purpose, different from that\nwhich is requisite merely for purposes of nature. We cannot therefore\nassume that in our final purpose we have not merely a _moral ground_\nfor admitting a final purpose of creation (as an effect), but also\nfor admitting a _moral Being_ as the original ground of creation. But\nwe may well say, that, _according to the constitution of our rational\nfaculty_, we cannot comprehend the possibility of such a purposiveness\n_in respect of the moral law_, and its Object, as there is in this\nfinal purpose, apart from an Author and Governor of the world, who is\nat the same time its moral Lawgiver.\n\nThe actuality of a highest morally-legislating Author is therefore\nsufficiently established merely _for the practical use_ of our Reason,\nwithout determining anything theoretically as regards its being. For\nReason requires, in respect of the possibility of its purpose, which\nis given to us independently by its own legislation, an Idea through\nwhich the inability to follow up this purpose, according to the mere\nnatural concepts of the world, is removed (sufficiently for the\nreflective Judgement). Thus this Idea gains practical reality, although\nall means of creating such for it in a theoretical point of view, for\nthe explanation of nature and determination of the supreme Cause,\nare entirely wanting for speculative cognition. For the theoretical\nreflective Judgement physical Teleology sufficiently proves from the\npurposes of nature an intelligent World-Cause; for the practical\nJudgement moral Teleology establishes it by the concept of a final\npurpose, which it is forced to ascribe to creation in a practical\npoint of view. The objective reality of the Idea of God, as moral\nAuthor of the world, cannot, it is true, be established by physical\npurposes _alone_. But nevertheless, if the cognition of these purposes\nis combined with that of the moral purpose, they are, by virtue of the\nmaxim of pure Reason which bids us seek unity of principles so far as\nis possible, of great importance for the practical reality of that\nIdea, by bringing in the reality which it has for the Judgement in a\ntheoretical point of view.\n\nTo prevent a misunderstanding which may easily arise, it is in the\nhighest degree needful to remark that, in the first place, we can\n_think_ these properties of the highest Being only according to\nanalogy. How indeed could we explore the nature of that, to which\nexperience can show us nothing similar? Secondly, in this way we only\nthink the supreme Being; we cannot thereby _cognise_ Him and ascribe\nanything theoretically to Him. It would be needful for the determinant\nJudgement in the speculative aspect of our Reason, to consider what\nthe supreme World-Cause is in Himself. But here we are only concerned\nwith the question what concept we can form of Him, according to the\nconstitution of our cognitive faculties; and whether we have to assume\nHis existence in order merely to furnish practical reality to a\npurpose, which pure Reason without any such presupposition enjoins upon\nus _a priori_ to bring about with all our powers, _i.e._ in order to\nbe able to think as possible a designed effect. Although that concept\nmay be transcendent for the speculative Reason, and the properties\nwhich we ascribe to the Being thereby thought may, objectively used,\nconceal an anthropomorphism in themselves; yet the design of its use\nis not to determine the nature of that Being which is unattainable by\nus, but to determine ourselves and our will accordingly. We may call\na cause after the concept which we have of its effect (though only\nin reference to this relation), without thereby meaning to determine\ninternally its inner constitution, by means of the properties which\ncan be made known to us solely by similar causes and must be given in\nexperience. For example, amongst other properties we ascribe to the\nsoul a _vis locomotiva_ because bodily movements actually arise whose\ncause lies in the representation of them; without therefore meaning\nto ascribe to it the only mode [of action] that we know in moving\nforces (viz. by attraction, pressure, impulse, and consequently motion,\nwhich always presuppose an extended being). Just so we must assume\n_something_, which contains the ground of the possibility and practical\nreality, _i.e._ the practicability, of a necessary moral final purpose;\nbut we can think of this, in accordance with the character of the\neffect expected of it, as a wise Being governing the world according\nto moral laws, and, conformably to the constitution of our cognitive\nfaculties, as a cause of things distinct from nature, only in order\nto express the _relation_ of this Being (which transcends all our\ncognitive faculties) to the Objects of _our_ practical Reason. We do\nnot pretend thus to ascribe to it theoretically the only causality of\nthis kind known to us, viz. an Understanding and a Will: we do not\neven pretend to distinguish objectively the causality thought in this\nBeing, as regards what is _for us_ final purpose, from the causality\nthought in it as regards nature (and its purposive determinations in\ngeneral). We can only assume this distinction as subjectively necessary\nby the constitution of our cognitive faculties, and as valid for the\nreflective, not for the objectively determinant Judgement. But if we\ncome to practice, then such a _regulative_ principle (of prudence or\nwisdom) [commanding us] to act conformably to that as purpose, which\nby the constitution of our cognitive faculties can only be thought\nas possible in a certain way, is at the same _constitutive_, _i.e._\npractically determinant. Nevertheless, as a principle for judging\nof the objective possibility of things, it is no way theoretically\ndeterminant (_i.e._ it does not say that the only kind of possibility\nwhich belongs to the Object is that which belongs to our thinking\nfaculty), but is a mere _regulative_ principle for the reflective\nJudgement.\n\n\n_Remark_\n\nThis moral proof is not one newly discovered, although perhaps its\nbasis is newly set forth; since it has lain in man\u2019s rational faculty\nfrom its earliest germ, and is only continually developed with its\nadvancing cultivation. So soon as men begin to reflect upon right and\nwrong--at a time when, quite indifferent as to the purposiveness of\nnature, they avail themselves of it without thinking anything more of\nit than that it is the accustomed course of nature--this judgement is\ninevitable, viz. that the issue cannot be the same, whether a man has\nbehaved candidly or falsely, fairly or violently, even though up to his\nlife\u2019s end, as far as can be seen, he has met with no happiness for\nhis virtues, no punishment for his vices. It is as if they perceived a\nvoice within [saying] that the issue must be different. And so there\nmust lie hidden in them a representation, however obscure, of something\nafter which they feel themselves bound to strive; with which such a\nresult would not agree,--with which, if they looked upon the course of\nthe world as the only order of things, they could not harmonise that\ninner purposive determination of their minds. Now they might represent\nin various rude fashions the way in which such an irregularity could\nbe adjusted (an irregularity which must be far more revolting to the\nhuman mind than the blind chance that we are sometimes willing to use\nas a principle for judging of nature). But they could never think\nany other principle of the possibility of the unification of nature\nwith its inner ethical laws, than a supreme Cause governing the world\naccording to moral laws; because a final purpose in them proposed as\nduty, and a nature without any final purpose beyond them in which that\npurpose might be actualised, would involve a contradiction. As to the\n[inner][136] constitution of that World-Cause they could contrive much\nnonsense. But that moral relation in the government of the world would\nremain always the same, which by the uncultivated Reason, considered\nas practical, is universally comprehensible, but with which the\nspeculative Reason can make far from the like advance.--And in all\nprobability attention would be directed first by this moral interest to\nthe beauty and the purposes in nature, which would serve excellently\nto strengthen this Idea though they could not be the foundation of it.\nStill less could that moral interest be dispensed with, because it is\nonly in reference to the final purpose that the investigation of the\npurposes of nature acquires that immediate interest which displays\nitself in such a great degree in the admiration of them without any\nreference to the advantage to be derived from them.\n\n\n\u00a7 89. _Of the use of the moral argument_\n\nThe limitation of Reason in respect of all our Ideas of the\nsupersensible to the conditions of its practical employment has, as\nfar as the Idea of God is concerned, undeniable uses. For it prevents\n_Theology_ from rising into THEOSOPHY (into transcendent concepts which\nconfound Reason), or from sinking into DEMONOLOGY (an anthropomorphic\nway of representing the highest Being). And it also prevents _Religion_\nfrom turning into _Theurgy_ (a fanatical belief that we can have a\nfeeling of other supersensible beings and can reciprocally influence\nthem), or into _Idolatry_ (a superstitious belief that we can please\nthe Supreme Being by other means than by a moral sentiment).[137]\n\nFor if we permit the vanity or the presumption of sophistry to\ndetermine the least thing theoretically (in a way that extends our\nknowledge) in respect of what lies beyond the world of sense, or\nif we allow any pretence to be made of insight into the being and\nconstitution of the nature of God, of His Understanding and Will, of\nthe laws of both and of His properties which thus affect the world,\nI should like to know where and at what point we will bound these\nassumptions of Reason. For wherever such insight can be derived, there\nmay yet more be expected (if we only strain our reflection, as we have\na mind to do). Bounds must then be put to such claims according to a\ncertain principle, and not merely because we find that all attempts\nof the sort have hitherto failed, for that proves nothing against the\npossibility of a better result. But here no principle is possible,\nexcept either to assume that in respect of the supersensible absolutely\nnothing can be theoretically determined (except mere negations);\nor else that our Reason contains in itself a yet unused mine of\ncognitions, reaching no one knows how far, stored up for ourselves and\nour posterity.--But as concerns Religion, _i.e._ morals in reference\nto God as legislator, if the theoretical cognition of Him is to come\nfirst, morals must be adjusted in accordance with Theology; and not\nonly is an external arbitrary legislation of a Supreme Being introduced\nin place of an internal necessary legislation of Reason, but also\nwhatever is defective in our insight into the nature of this Being\nmust extend to ethical precepts, and thus make Religion immoral and\nperverted.\n\nAs regards the hope of a future life, if instead of the final purpose\nwe have to accomplish in conformity with the precept of the moral law,\nwe ask of our theoretical faculty of cognition a clue for the judgement\nof Reason upon our destination (which clue is only considered as\nnecessary or worthy of acceptance in a practical reference), then in\nthis aspect Psychology, like Theology, gives no more than a negative\nconcept of our thinking being. That is, none of its actions or of the\nphenomena of the internal sense can be explained materialistically; and\nhence of its separate nature and of the continuance or non-continuance\nof its personality after death absolutely no ampliative determinant\njudgement is possible on speculative grounds by means of our whole\ntheoretical cognitive faculty. Here then everything is handed over to\nthe teleological judging of our existence in a practically necessary\naspect, and to the assumption of our continuance as a condition\nrequisite for the final purpose absolutely furnished by Reason. And so\nthis advantage (which indeed at first glance seems to be a loss) is\napparent; that, as Theology for us can never be Theosophy, or rational\n_Psychology_ become _Pneumatology_--an ampliative science--so on the\nother hand this latter is assured of never falling into _Materialism_.\nPsychology, rather, is a mere anthropology of the internal sense,\n_i.e._ is the knowledge of our thinking self _in life_; and, as\ntheoretical cognition, remains merely empirical. On the other hand,\nrational Psychology, as far as it is concerned with questions as to\nour eternal existence, is not a theoretical science at all, but rests\non a single conclusion of moral Teleology; as also its whole use is\nnecessary merely on account of the latter, _i.e._ on account of our\npractical destination.\n\n\n\u00a7 90. _Of the kind of belief in a teleological proof of the Being of\nGod_\n\nThe first requisite for every proof, whether it be derived from the\nimmediate empirical presentation (as in the proof from observation of\nthe object or from experiment) of that which is to be proved, or by\nReason _a priori_ from principles, is this. It should not _persuade_,\nbut _convince_,[138] or at least should tend to conviction. _I.e._ the\nground of proof or the conclusion should not be merely a subjective\n(aesthetical) determining ground of assent (mere illusion), but\nobjectively valid and a logical ground of cognition; for otherwise\nthe Understanding is ensnared, but not convinced. Such an illusory\nproof is that which, perhaps with good intent but yet with wilful\nconcealment of its weaknesses, is adduced in Natural Theology. In this\nwe bring in the great number of indications of the origin of natural\nthings according to the principle of purposes, and take advantage\nof the merely subjective basis of human Reason, viz. its special\npropensity to think only one principle instead of several, whenever\nthis can be done without contradiction; and, when in this principle\nonly one or more requisites for determining a concept are furnished, to\nadd in our thought these additional [features] so as to complete the\nconcept of the thing by arbitrarily supplementing it. For, in truth,\nwhen we meet with so many products in nature which are to us marks of\nan intelligent cause, why should we not think One cause rather than\nmany; and in this One, not merely great intelligence, power, etc.,\nbut rather Omniscience, and Omnipotence--in a word, think it as a\nCause that contains the sufficient ground of such properties in all\npossible things? Further, why should we not ascribe to this unique,\nall-powerful, original Being not only intelligence for natural laws\nand products, but also, as to a moral Cause of the world, supreme,\nethical, practical Reason? For by this completion of the concept a\nsufficient principle is furnished both for insight into nature and\nfor moral wisdom; and no objection grounded in any way can be made\nagainst the possibility of such an Idea. If now at the same time\nthe moral motives of the mind are aroused, and a lively interest in\nthe latter is added by the force of eloquence (of which they are\nindeed very worthy), then there arises therefrom a persuasion of the\nobjective adequacy of the proof; and also (in most cases of its use)\na wholesome illusion which quite dispenses with all examination of\nits logical strictness, and even on the contrary regards this with\nabhorrence and dislike as if an impious doubt lay at its basis.--Now\nagainst this there is indeed nothing to say, so long as we only have\nregard to its popular usefulness. But then the division of the proof\ninto the two dissimilar parts involved in the argument--belonging to\nphysical and moral Teleology respectively--cannot and must not be\nprevented. For the blending of these makes it impossible to discern\nwhere the proper force of the proof lies, and in what part and how it\nmust be elaborated in order that its validity may be able to stand the\nstrictest examination (even if we should be compelled to admit in one\npart the weakness of our rational insight). Thus it is the duty of\nthe philosopher (supposing even that he counts as nothing the claims\nof sincerity) to expose the above illusion, however wholesome it is,\nwhich such a confusion can produce; and to distinguish what merely\nbelongs to persuasion from that which leads to conviction (for these\nare determinations of assent which differ not merely in degree but in\nkind), in order to present plainly the state of the mind in this proof\nin its whole clearness, and to be able to subject it frankly to the\nclosest examination.\n\nBut a proof which is intended to convince, can again be of two kinds;\neither deciding what the object is _in itself_, or what it is _for us_\n(for men in general) according to our necessary rational principles of\njudgement (proof \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f00\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd or \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd, the last word being\ntaken in its universal signification of man in general). In the first\ncase it is based on adequate principles for the determinant Judgement,\nin the second for the reflective Judgement. In the latter case it\ncan never, when resting on merely theoretical principles, tend to\nconviction; but if a practical principle of Reason (which is therefore\nuniversally and necessarily valid) lies at its basis, it may certainly\nlay claim to conviction adequate in a pure practical point of view,\n_i.e._ to moral conviction. But a proof _tends to conviction_, though\nwithout convincing, if it is [merely][139] brought on the way thereto;\n_i.e._ if it contains in itself only objective grounds, which although\nnot attaining to certainty are yet of such a kind that they do not\nserve merely for persuasion as subjective grounds of the judgement.[140]\n\nAll theoretical grounds of proof resolve themselves either into: (1)\nProofs by logically strict _Syllogisms of Reason_; or where this is not\nthe case, (2) _Conclusions_ according to _analogy_; or where this also\nhas no place, (3) _Probable opinion_; or finally, which has the least\nweight, (4) Assumption of a merely possible ground of explanation,\n_i.e._ _Hypothesis_.--Now I say that all grounds of proof in general,\nwhich aim at theoretical conviction, can bring about no belief of this\nkind from the highest to the lowest degree, if there is to be proved\nthe proposition of the _existence_ of an original Being, as a God, in\nthe signification adequate to the whole content of this concept; viz. a\n_moral_ Author of the world, by whom the final purpose of creation is\nat the same time supplied.\n\n(1.) As to the _logically accurate_ proof proceeding from universal\nto particular, we have sufficiently established in the Critique\nthe following: Since no intuition possible for us corresponds to\nthe concept of a Being that is to be sought beyond nature--whose\nconcept therefore, so far as it is to be theoretically determined by\nsynthetical predicates, remains always problematical for us--there\nis absolutely no cognition of it to be had (by which the extent of\nour theoretical knowledge is in the least enlarged). The particular\nconcept of a supersensible Being cannot be subsumed under the universal\nprinciples of the nature of things, in order to conclude from them to\nit, because those principles are valid simply for nature, as an object\nof sense.\n\n(2.) We can indeed _think_ one of two dissimilar things, even in\nthe very point of their dissimilarity, in accordance with the\n_analogy_[141] of the other; but we cannot, from that wherein they are\ndissimilar, _conclude_ from the one to the other by analogy, _i.e._\ntransfer from the one to the other this sign of specific distinction.\nThus I can, according to the analogy of the law of the equality of\naction and reaction in the mutual attraction and repulsion of bodies,\nalso conceive of the association of the members of a commonwealth\naccording to rules of right; but I cannot transfer to it those specific\ndeterminations (material attraction or repulsion), and ascribe them\nto the citizens in order to constitute a system called a state.--Just\nso we can indeed conceive of the causality of the original Being in\nrespect of the things of the world, as natural purposes, according to\nthe analogy of an Understanding, as ground of the forms of certain\nproducts which we call works of art (for this only takes place on\nbehalf of the theoretical or practical use that we have to make by our\ncognitive faculty of this concept in respect of the natural things\nin the world according to a certain principle). But we can in no way\nconclude according to analogy, because in the case of beings of the\nworld Understanding must be ascribed to the cause of an effect which\nis judged artificial, that in respect of nature the same causality\nwhich we perceive in men attaches also to the Being which is quite\ndistinct from nature. For this concerns the very point of dissimilarity\nwhich is thought between a cause sensibly conditioned in respect of its\neffects and the supersensible original Being itself in our concept of\nit, and which therefore cannot be transferred from one to the other.--\nIn the very fact that I must conceive the divine causality only\naccording to the analogy of an Understanding (which faculty we know in\nno other being than in sensibly-conditioned man) lies the prohibition\nto ascribe to it this Understanding in its peculiar signification.[142]\n\n(3.) _Opinion_ finds in _a priori_ judgements no place whatever, for\nby them we either cognise something as quite certain or else cognise\nnothing at all. But if the given grounds of proof from which we start\n(as here from the purposes in the world) are empirical, then we cannot\neven with their aid form any opinion as to anything beyond the world of\nsense, nor can we concede to such venturesome judgements the smallest\nclaim to probability. For probability is part of a certainty possible\nin a certain series of grounds (its grounds compare with the sufficient\nground as parts with a whole), the insufficient ground of which must\nbe susceptible of completion. But since, as determining grounds of one\nand the same judgement, they must be of the same kind, for otherwise\nthey would not together constitute a whole (such as certainty is), one\npart of them cannot lie within the bounds of possible experience and\nanother outside all possible experience. Consequently, since merely\nempirical grounds of proof lead to nothing supersensible, and since\nwhat is lacking in the series of them cannot in any way be completed,\nwe do not approach in the least nearer in our attempt to attain by\ntheir means to the supersensible and to a cognition thereof. Thus in\nany judgement about the latter by means of arguments derived from\nexperience, probability has no place.\n\n(4.) If an _hypothesis_ is to serve for the explanation of the\npossibility of a given phenomenon, at least its possibility must\nbe completely certain.[143] It is sufficient that in an hypothesis\nI disclaim any cognition of actuality (which is claimed in an\nopinion given out as probable); more than this I cannot give up. The\npossibility of that which I place at the basis of my explanation,\nmust at least be exposed to no doubt; otherwise there would be no end\nof empty chimeras. But to assume the possibility of a supersensible\nBeing determined according to certain concepts would be a completely\ngroundless supposition. For here none of the conditions requisite\nfor cognition, as regards that in it which rests upon intuition, is\ngiven, and so the sole criterion of possibility remaining is the mere\nprinciple of Contradiction (which can only prove the possibility of the\nthought, not of the object thought).\n\nThe result then is this. For the existence [Dasein] of the original\nBeing, as a Godhead, or of the soul as an immortal spirit, absolutely\nno proof in a theoretical point of view is possible for the human\nReason, which can bring about even the least degree of belief. The\nground of this is quite easy to comprehend. For determining our\nIdeas of the supersensible we have no material whatever, and we\nmust derive this latter from things in the world of sense, which is\nabsolutely inadequate for such an Object. Thus, in the absence of all\ndetermination of it, nothing remains but the concept of a non-sensible\nsomething which contains the ultimate ground of the world of sense, but\nwhich does not furnish any knowledge (any amplification of the concept)\nof its inner constitution.\n\n\n\u00a7 91. _Of the kind of belief produced by a practical faith_\n\nIf we look merely to the way in which anything can be _for us_\n(according to the subjective constitution of our representative powers)\nan Object of knowledge (_res cognoscibilis_), then our concepts will\nnot cohere with Objects, but merely with our cognitive faculties and\nthe use which they can make of a given representation (in a theoretical\nor practical point of view). Thus the question whether anything is or\nis not a cognisable being is not a question concerning the possibility\nof things but of our knowledge of them.\n\n_Cognisable_ things are of three kinds: _things of opinion_\n(_opinabile_); _things of fact_ (_scibile_); and _things of faith_\n(_mere credibile_).\n\n(1.) Objects of mere rational Ideas, which for theoretical knowledge\ncannot be presented in any possible experience, are so far not\n_cognisable_ things, and consequently in respect of them we can form\nno _opinion_; for to form an opinion _a priori_ is absurd in itself\nand the straight road to mere chimeras. Either then our proposition\nis certain _a priori_ or it contains nothing for belief. Therefore\n_things of opinion_ are always Objects of an empirical cognition at\nleast possible in itself (objects of the world of sense); but, which,\non account merely of the [low] degree of this faculty that we possess,\nis _for us_ impossible. Thus the ether of the new physicists,[144]\nan elastic fluid pervading all other matter (mingled intimately with\nit) is a mere thing of opinion, yet is such that, if our external\nsenses were sharpened to the highest degree, it could be perceived;\nthough it can never be presented in any observation or experiment.\nTo assume [the existence of] rational inhabitants of other planets\nis a thing of opinion; for if we could come closer to them, which is\nin itself possible, we should decide by experience whether they did\nor did not exist; but as we shall never come so near, it remains in\nthe region of opinion. But to hold the opinion that there are in the\nmaterial universe pure thinking spirits without bodies (viz. if we\ndismiss as unworthy of our notice certain phenomena which have been\npublished as actual[145]) is to be called poetic fiction. This is no\nthing of opinion, but a mere Idea which remains over, when we remove\nfrom a thinking being everything material, and only leave thought\nto it. Whether then the latter (which we know only in man, that is,\nin combination with a body) does survive, we cannot decide. Such a\nthing is a _sophistical being_ (_ens rationis ratiocinantis_), not a\n_rational being_ (_ens rationis ratiocinatae_)[146]; of which latter it\nis possible to show conclusively, the objective reality of its concept;\nat least for the practical use of Reason, because this which has its\npeculiar and apodictically certain principles _a priori_, demands\n(postulates) it.\n\n(2.) Objects for concepts, whose objective reality can be proved\n(whether through pure Reason or through experience, and, in the first\ncase, from its theoretical or practical data, in all cases by means of\na corresponding intuition) are _things of fact_ (_res facti_).[147] Of\nthis kind are the mathematical properties of magnitudes (in geometry),\nbecause they are susceptible of a _presentation a priori_ for the\ntheoretical use of Reason. Further, things or their characteristics,\nwhich can be exhibited in experience (either our own or that of others\nthrough the medium of testimony) are likewise things of fact.--And,\nwhat is very remarkable, there is one rational Idea (susceptible in\nitself of no presentation in intuition, and consequently, of no\ntheoretical proof of its possibility) which also comes under things of\nfact. This is the Idea of _freedom_, whose reality, regarded as that\nof a particular kind of causality (of which the concept, theoretically\nconsidered, would be transcendent), may be exhibited by means of\npractical laws of pure Reason, and conformably to this, in actual\nactions, and, consequently, in experience.--This is the only one of all\nthe Ideas of pure Reason, whose object is a thing of fact, and to be\nreckoned under the _scibilia_.\n\n(3.) Objects, which in reference to the use of pure practical Reason\nthat is in conformity with duty must be thought _a priori_ (whether\nas consequences or as grounds), but which are transcendent for its\ntheoretical use, are mere _things of faith_. Of this kind is the\n_highest good_ in the world, to be brought about by freedom.[148]\nThe concept of this cannot be established as regards its objective\nreality in any experience possible for us and thus adequately for\nthe theoretical use of Reason; but its use is commanded by practical\npure Reason [in reference to the best possible working out of that\npurpose],[149] and it consequently must be assumed possible. This\ncommanded effect, _together with the only conditions of its possibility\nthinkable by us_, viz. the Being of God and the immortality of the\nsoul, are _things of faith_ (_res fidei_), and of all objects are the\nonly ones which can be so called.[150] For though what we learn by\n_testimony_ from the experience of others must be believed by us, yet\nit is not therefore a thing of faith; for it was the proper experience\nof some _one_ witness and so a thing of fact, or is presupposed as\nsuch. Again it must be possible by this path (that of historical faith)\nto arrive at knowledge; and the Objects of history and geography,\nlike everything in general which it is at least possible to know by\nthe constitution of our cognitive faculties, belong not to things of\nfaith but to things of fact. It is only objects of pure Reason which\ncan be things of faith at all, though not as objects of the mere pure\nspeculative Reason: for then they could not be reckoned with certainty\namong things, _i.e._ Objects of that cognition which is possible for\nus. They are Ideas, _i.e._ concepts of the objective reality of which\nwe cannot theoretically be certain. On the other hand, the highest\nfinal purpose to be worked out by us, by which alone we can become\nworthy of being ourselves the final purpose of creation, is an Idea\nwhich has in a practical reference objective reality for us, and is\nalso a thing. But because we cannot furnish such reality to this\nconcept in a theoretical point of view, it is a mere thing of faith\nof the pure Reason, along with God and Immortality, as the conditions\nunder which alone we, in accordance with the constitution of our\n(human) Reason, can conceive the possibility of that effect of the use\nof our freedom in conformity with law. But belief in things of faith is\na belief in a pure practical point of view, _i.e._ a moral faith, which\nproves nothing for theoretical pure rational cognition, but only for\nthat which is practical and directed to the fulfilment of its duties;\nit in no way extends speculation or the practical rules of prudence in\naccordance with the principle of self-love. If the supreme principle\nof all moral laws is a postulate, so is also the possibility of its\nhighest Object; and consequently, too, the condition under which we\ncan think this possibility is postulated along with it and by it.\nThus the cognition of the latter is neither knowledge nor opinion of\nthe being and character of these conditions, regarded as theoretical\ncognition; but is a mere assumption in a reference which is practical\nand commanded for the moral use of our Reason.\n\nIf we were able also plausibly to base upon the purposes of nature,\nwhich physical Teleology presents to us in such rich abundance, a\n_determinate_ concept of an intelligent World-Cause, then the existence\n[Dasein] of this Being would not be a thing of faith. For since this\nwould not be assumed on behalf of the performance of my duty, but\nonly in reference to the explanation of nature, it would be merely\nthe opinion and hypothesis most conformable to our Reason. Now such\nTeleology leads in no way to a determinate concept of God; on the\ncontrary, this can only be found in the concept of a moral Author of\nthe World, because this alone furnishes the final purpose to which\nwe can only reckon ourselves [as attached] if we behave conformably\nto what the moral law prescribes as final purpose and consequently\nobliges us [to do]. Hence it is only by its reference to the Object of\nour duty, as the condition of the possibility of attaining the final\npurpose of the same, that the concept of God attains the privilege\nof counting as a thing of faith, in our belief; but on the other\nhand, this same concept cannot make its Object valid as a thing of\nfact. For, although the necessity of duty is very plain for practical\nReason, yet the attainment of its final purpose, so far as it is not\naltogether in our own power, is only assumed on behalf of the practical\nuse of Reason, and therefore is not so practically necessary as duty\nitself.[151]\n\n_Faith_ (as _habitus_, not as _actus_) is the moral attitude of Reason\nas to belief in that which is unattainable by theoretical cognition.\nIt is therefore the constant principle of the mind, to assume as true,\non account of the obligation in reference to it, that which it is\nnecessary to presuppose as condition of the possibility of the highest\nmoral final purpose[152]; although its possibility or impossibility\nbe alike impossible for us to see into. Faith (absolutely so called)\nis trust in the attainment of a design, the promotion of which is a\nduty, but the possibility of the fulfilment of which (and consequently\nalso that of the only conditions of it thinkable by us) is not to be\n_comprehended_ by us. Faith, then, that refers to particular objects,\nwhich are not objects of possible knowledge or opinion (in which latter\ncase it ought to be called, especially in historical matters, credulity\nand not faith), is quite moral. It is a free belief, not in that for\nwhich dogmatical proofs for the theoretically determinant Judgement\nare to be found, or in that to which we hold ourselves bound, but in\nthat which we assume on behalf of a design in accordance with laws of\nfreedom. This, however, is not, like opinion, without any adequate\nground; but, is grounded as in Reason (although only in respect of its\npractical employment), and _adequately for its design_. For without\nthis, the moral attitude of thought in its repudiation of the claim of\nthe theoretical Reason for proofs (of the possibility of the Objects\nof morality) has no permanence; but wavers between practical commands\nand theoretical doubts. To be _incredulous_ means to cling to maxims,\nand not to believe testimony in general; but he is _unbelieving_,\nwho denies all validity to rational Ideas, because there is wanting\na _theoretical_ ground of their reality.[154] He judges therefore\ndogmatically. A dogmatical _unbelief_ cannot subsist together with a\nmoral maxim dominant in the mental attitude (for Reason cannot command\none to follow a purpose, which is cognised as nothing more than a\nchimera); but a _doubtful faith_ can. To this the absence of conviction\nby grounds of speculative Reason is only a hindrance, the influence of\nwhich upon conduct a critical insight into the limits of this faculty\ncan remove, while it substitutes by way of compensation a paramount\npractical belief.\n\n\n * * * * *\n\nIf, in place of certain mistaken attempts, we wish to introduce a\ndifferent principle into philosophy and to promote its influence, it\nmakes us highly contented to see how and why those attempts must have\ndisappointed us.\n\n_God_, _freedom_, and _immortality_, are the problems at the solution\nof which all the equipments of Metaphysic aim, as their ultimate and\nunique purpose. Now it was believed that the doctrine of freedom is\nneeded for practical philosophy only as its negative condition; but\nthat on the other hand the doctrine of God and of the constitution of\nthe soul, as belonging to theoretical philosophy, must be established\nfor themselves and separately, in order afterwards to unite both\nwith that which the moral law (possible only under the condition of\nfreedom) commands, and so to constitute a religion. But we can easily\nsee that these attempts must fail. For from mere ontological concepts\nof things in general, or of the existence of a necessary Being, it\nis possible to form absolutely no determinate concept of an original\nBeing by means of predicates which can be given in experience and can\ntherefore serve for cognition. Again a concept based on experience of\nthe physical purposiveness of nature could furnish no adequate proof\nfor morality, or consequently for cognition of a Deity. Just as little\ncould the cognition of the soul by means of experience (which we only\napply in this life) supply us with a concept of its spiritual immortal\nnature, a concept which would be adequate for morality. _Theology_ and\n_Pneumatology_, regarded as problems of the sciences of a speculative\nReason, can be established by no empirical data and predicates,\nbecause the concept of them is transcendent for our whole cognitive\nfaculty.--The determination of both concepts, God and the soul (in\nrespect of its immortality) alike, can only take place by means of\npredicates, which, although they are only possible from a supersensible\nground, must yet prove their reality in experience; for thus alone can\nthey make possible a cognition of a quite supersensible Being.--The\nonly concept of this kind to be met with in human Reason is that of the\nfreedom of men under moral laws, along with the final purpose which\nReason prescribes by these laws. Of these two [the moral laws and the\nfinal purpose] the first are useful for ascribing to the Author of\nNature, the second for ascribing to man, those properties which contain\nthe necessary condition of the possibility of both [God and the soul];\nso that from this Idea a conclusion can be drawn as to the existence\nand constitution of these beings which are otherwise quite hidden from\nus.\n\nThus the ground of the failure of the attempt to prove God and\nimmortality by the merely theoretical path lies in this, that no\ncognition whatever is possible of the supersensible in this way (of\nnatural concepts). The ground of its success by the moral way (of the\nconcept of freedom) is as follows. Here the supersensible (freedom),\nwhich in this case is fundamental, by a determinate law of causality\nthat springs from it, not only supplies material for cognition of other\nsupersensibles (the moral final purpose and the conditions of its\nattainability), but also establishes its reality in actions as a fact;\nthough at the same time it can furnish a valid ground of proof in no\nother than a practical point of view (the only one, however, of which\nReligion has need).\n\nIt is thus very remarkable that of the three pure rational Ideas,\n_God_, _freedom_, and _immortality_, that of freedom is the only\nconcept of the supersensible which (by means of the causality that is\nthought in it) proves its objective reality in nature by means of the\neffects it can produce there; and thus renders possible the connexion\nof both the others with nature, and of all three together with\nReligion. We have therefore in us a principle capable of determining\nthe Idea of the supersensible within us, and thus also that of the\nsupersensible without us, for knowledge, although only in a practical\npoint of view; a principle this of which mere speculative philosophy\n(which could give a merely negative concept of freedom) must despair.\nConsequently the concept of freedom (as fundamental concept of all\nunconditioned practical laws) can extend Reason beyond those bounds,\nwithin which every natural (theoretical) concept must remain hopelessly\nlimited.\n\n\n_General remark on Teleology_\n\nIf the question is, what rank the moral argument, which proves the\nBeing of God only as a thing of faith for the practical pure Reason,\nmaintains among the other arguments in philosophy, it is easy to set\naside the whole achievement of this last; by which it appears that\nthere is no choice, but that our theoretical faculty must give up all\nits pretensions before an impartial criticism.\n\nAll belief must in the first place be grounded upon facts, if it is\nnot to be completely groundless; and therefore the only distinction\nin proofs that there can be is that belief in the consequence derived\ntherefrom can either be grounded on this fact as _knowledge_ for\ntheoretical cognition, or merely as _faith_ for practical. All facts\nbelong either to the _natural concept_ which proves its reality in the\nobjects of sense, given (or which may possibly be given) before all\nnatural concepts; or to the _concept of freedom_, which sufficiently\nestablishes its reality through the causality of Reason in regard of\ncertain effects in the world of sense, possible through it, which it\nincontrovertibly postulates in the moral law. The natural concept\n(merely belonging to theoretical cognition) is now either metaphysical\nand thinkable completely _a priori_, or physical, _i.e._ thinkable\n_a posteriori_ and as necessary only through determinate experience.\nThe metaphysical natural concept (which presupposes no determinate\nexperience) is therefore ontological.\n\nThe _ontological_ proof of the being of God from the concept of an\noriginal Being is either that which from ontological predicates,\nby which alone it can be thought as completely determined, infers\nabsolutely necessary being; or that which, from the absolute necessity\nof the being somewhere of some thing, whatever it be, infers the\npredicates of the original Being. For there belongs to the concept of\nan original Being, inasmuch as it is not derived from anything, the\nunconditioned necessity of its presence, and (in order to represent\nthis) its complete determination by its [mere][155] concept. It was\nbelieved that both requirements were found in the concept of the\nontological Idea of a _Being the most real of all_; and thus two\nmetaphysical proofs originated.\n\nThe proof (properly called ontological) resting upon a merely\nmetaphysical natural concept concludes from the concept of the\nBeing the most real of all, its absolutely necessary existence;\nfor (it is said), if it did not exist, a reality would be wanting\nto it, viz. existence.--The other (which is also called the\nmetaphysico-_cosmological_ proof) concludes from the necessity of the\nexistence somewhere of a thing (which must be conceded, for a being\nis given to us in self-consciousness), its complete determination as\nthat of a Being the most real of all; for everything existing must be\ncompletely determined, but the absolutely necessary (_i.e._ that which\n_we_ ought to cognise as such and consequently _a priori_) must be\ncompletely determined _by means of its own concept_. But this is only\nthe case with the concept of a thing the most real of all. It is not\nneedful to expose here the sophistry in both arguments, which has been\nalready done elsewhere;[156] it is only needful to remark that neither\nproof, even if they could be defended by all manner of dialectical\nsubtlety, could ever pass from the schools into the world, or have the\nslightest influence on the mere sound Understanding.\n\nThe proof, which rests on a natural concept that can only be empirical\nand yet is to lead us beyond the bounds of nature regarded as the\ncomplex of the objects of sense, can be no other than that derived from\nthe _purposes_ of nature. The concept of these cannot, it is true,\nbe given _a priori_ but only through experience; but yet it promises\nsuch a concept of the original ground of nature as alone, among all\nthose which we can conceive, is suited to the supersensible, viz. that\nof a highest Understanding as Cause of the world. This, in fact, it\ncompletely performs in accordance with principles of the reflective\nJudgement, _i.e._ in accordance with the constitution of our (human)\nfaculty of cognition.--But whether or not it is in a position to supply\nfrom the same data this concept of a _supreme_, _i.e._ independent\nintelligent Being, in short of a God or Author of a world under moral\nlaws, and consequently as sufficiently determined for the Idea of a\nfinal purpose of the being of the world--this is the question upon\nwhich everything depends, whether we desire a theoretically adequate\nconcept of the Original Being on behalf of our whole knowledge of\nnature, or a practical concept for religion.\n\nThis argument derived from physical Teleology is worthy of respect. It\nproduces a similar effect in the way of conviction upon the common\nUnderstanding as upon the subtlest thinker; and a _Reimarus_[157] has\nacquired immortal honour in his work (not yet superseded), in which he\nabundantly develops this ground of proof with his peculiar thoroughness\nand lucidity.--But how does this proof acquire such mighty influence\nupon the mind? How does a judgement by cold reason (for we might\nrefer to persuasion the emotion and elevation of reason produced by\nthe wonders of nature) issue thus in a calm and unreserved assent? It\nis not the physical purposes, which all indicate in the World Cause\nan unfathomable intelligence; these are inadequate thereto, because\nthey do not satisfy the need of the inquiring Reason. For, wherefore\n(it asks) are all those natural things that exhibit art? Wherefore is\nman himself, whom we must regard as the ultimate purpose of nature\nthinkable by us? Wherefore is this collective Nature here, and what\nis the final purpose of such great and manifold art? Reason cannot\nbe contented with enjoyment or with contemplation, observation, and\nadmiration (which, if it stops there, is only enjoyment of a particular\nkind) as the ultimate final purpose for the creation of the world and\nof man himself; for this presupposes a personal worth, which man alone\ncan give himself, as the condition under which alone he and his being\ncan be the final purpose. Failing this (which alone is susceptible\nof a definite concept), the purposes of nature do not satisfactorily\nanswer our questions; especially because they cannot furnish any\n_determinate_ concept of the highest Being as an all-sufficient (and\ntherefore unique and so properly called _highest_) being, and of the\nlaws according to which an Understanding is Cause of the world.\n\nHence that the physico-teleological proof convinces, just as if it were\na theological proof, does not arise from our availing ourselves of the\nIdeas of purposes of nature as so many empirical grounds of proof of\na _highest_ Understanding. But it mingles itself unnoticed with that\nmoral ground of proof, which dwells in every man and influences him\nsecretly, in the conclusion by which we ascribe to the Being, which\nmanifests itself with such incomprehensible art in the purposes of\nnature, a final purpose and consequently wisdom (without however being\njustified in doing so by the perception of the former); and by which\ntherefore we arbitrarily fill up the lacunas of the [design] argument.\nIn fact it is only the moral ground of proof which produces conviction,\nand that only in a moral reference with which every man feels inwardly\nhis agreement. But the physico-teleological proof has only the merit\nof leading the mind, in its consideration of the world, by the way of\npurposes and through them to an _intelligent_ Author of the world. The\nmoral reference to purposes and the Idea of a moral legislator and\nAuthor of the world, as a theological concept, seem to be developed of\nthemselves out of that ground of proof, although they are in truth pure\nadditions.\n\nHenceforward we may allow the customary statement to stand. For it\nis generally difficult (if the distinction requires much reflection)\nfor ordinary sound Understanding to distinguish from one another as\nheterogeneous the different principles which it confuses, and from\none of which alone it actually draws conclusions with correctness. The\nmoral ground of proof of the Being of God, properly speaking, does\nnot merely _complete_ and render perfect the physico-teleological\nproof; but it is a special proof that _supplies_ the conviction which\nis wanting in the latter. This latter in fact can do nothing more\nthan guide Reason, in its judgements upon the ground of nature and\nthat contingent but admirable order of nature only known to us by\nexperience, to the causality of a Cause containing the ground of the\nsame in accordance with purposes (which we by the constitution of our\ncognitive faculties must think as an intelligent cause); and thus by\narresting the attention of Reason it makes it more susceptible of\nthe moral proof. For what is requisite to the latter concept is so\nessentially different from everything which natural concepts contain\nand can teach, that there is need of a particular ground of proof\nquite independent of the former, in order to supply the concept of the\noriginal Being adequately for Theology and to infer its existence.--The\nmoral proof (which it is true only proves the Being of God in a\npractical though indispensable aspect of Reason) would preserve all\nits force, if we found in the world no material, or only that which\nis doubtful, for physical Teleology. It is possible to conceive\nrational beings surrounded by a nature which displayed no clear trace\nof organisation but only the effects of a mere mechanism of crude\nmatter; on behalf of which and amid the changeability of some merely\ncontingent purposive forms and relations there would appear to be no\nground for inferring an intelligent Author. In such case there would\nbe no occasion for a physical Teleology; and yet Reason, which here\ngets no guidance from natural concepts, would find in the concept of\nfreedom and in the moral Ideas founded thereon a practically sufficient\nground for postulating the concept of the original Being in conformity\nwith these, _i.e._ as a Deity, and for postulating nature (even the\nnature of our own being) as a final purpose in accordance with freedom\nand its laws--and all this in reference to the indispensable command of\npractical Reason.--However the fact that there is in the actual world\nfor the rational beings in it abundant material for physical Teleology\n(even though this is not necessary) serves as a desirable confirmation\nof the moral argument, as far as nature can exhibit anything analogous\nto the (moral) rational Ideas. For the concept of a supreme Cause\npossessing intelligence (though not reaching far enough for a Theology)\nthus acquires sufficient reality for the reflective Judgement, but it\nis not required as the basis of the moral proof; nor does this latter\nserve to complete as a proof the former, which does not by itself point\nto morality at all, by means of an argument developed according to\na single principle. Two such heterogeneous principles as nature and\nfreedom can only furnish two different kinds of proof; and the attempt\nto derive one from the other is found unavailing as regards that which\nis to be proved.\n\nIf the physico-teleological ground of proof sufficed for the proof\nwhich is sought, it would be very satisfactory for the speculative\nReason; for it would furnish the hope of founding a Theosophy (for\nso we must call the theoretical cognition of the divine nature and\nits existence which would suffice at once for the explanation of the\nconstitution of the world and for the determination of moral laws).\nIn the same way if Psychology enabled us to arrive at a cognition\nof the immortality of the soul it would make Pneumatology possible,\nwhich would be just as welcome to the speculative Reason. But neither,\nagreeable as they would be to the arrogance of our curiosity, would\nsatisfy the wish of Reason in respect of a theory which must be based\non a cognition of the nature of things. Whether the first, as Theology,\nand the second, as Anthropology, when founded on the moral principle,\n_i.e._ the principle of freedom, and consequently in accordance with\nthe practical use [of Reason] do not better fulfil their objective\nfinal design, is another question which we need not here pursue.\n\nThe physico-teleological ground of proof does not reach to Theology,\nbecause it does not and cannot give any determinate concept, sufficient\nfor this design, of the original Being; but we must derive this from\nquite another quarter, or must supply its lacuna by an arbitrary\naddition. You infer, from the great purposiveness of natural forms and\ntheir relations, a world-cause endowed with Understanding; but what is\nthe degree of this Understanding? Without doubt you cannot assume that\nit is the highest possible Understanding; because for that it would be\nrequisite that you should see that a greater Understanding than that\nof which you perceive proofs in the world, is not thinkable; and this\nwould be to ascribe Omniscience to yourself.[158] In the same way,\nif you infer from the magnitude of the world the very great might of\nits Author, you must be content with this having only a comparative\nsignificance for your faculty of comprehension; for since you do not\nknow all that is possible, so as to compare it with the magnitude of\nthe world as far as you know it, you cannot infer the Almightiness\nof its Author from so small a standard, and so on. Now you arrive in\nthis way at no definite concept of an original Being available for a\nTheology; for this can only be found in the concept of the totality of\nperfections compatible with intelligence, and you cannot help yourself\nto this by merely _empirical_ data. But without such a definite concept\nyou cannot infer a _unique_ intelligent original Being; you can only\nassume it (with whatever motive).--Now it may certainly be conceded\nthat you should arbitrarily add (for Reason has nothing fundamental to\nsay to the contrary): Where so much perfection is found, we may well\nassume that all perfection is united in a unique Cause of the world,\nbecause Reason succeeds better both theoretically and practically with\na principle thus definite. But then you cannot regard this concept\nof the original Being as proved by you, for you have only assumed it\non behalf of a better employment of Reason. Hence all lamentation or\nimpotent anger on account of the alleged mischief of rendering doubtful\nthe coherency of your chain of reasoning, is vain pretentiousness,\nwhich would fain have us believe that the doubt here freely expressed\nas to your argument is a doubting of sacred truth, in order that under\nthis cover the shallowness of your argument may pass unnoticed.\n\nMoral Teleology, on the other hand, which is not less firmly based\nthan physical,--which, indeed, rather deserves the preference because\nit rests _a priori_ on principles inseparable from our Reason--leads\nto that which is requisite for the possibility of a Theology, viz. to\na determinate _concept_ of the supreme Cause, as Cause of the world\naccording to moral laws, and, consequently, to the concept of such a\ncause as satisfies our moral final purpose. For this are required, as\nnatural properties belonging to it, nothing less than Omniscience,\nOmnipotence, Omnipresence, and the like, which must be thought as\nbound up with the moral final purpose which is infinite and thus as\nadequate to it. Hence moral Teleology alone can furnish the concept of\na _unique_ Author of the world, which is available for a Theology.\n\nIn this way Theology leads immediately to _Religion_, _i.e._ _the\nrecognition of our duties as divine commands_[159]; because it is only\nthe recognition of our duty and of the final purpose enjoined upon us\nby Reason which brings out with definiteness the concept of God. This\nconcept, therefore, is inseparable in its origin from obligation to\nthat Being. On the other hand, even if the concept of the original\nBeing could be also found determinately by the merely theoretical path\n(viz. the concept of it as mere Cause of nature), it would afterwards\nbe very difficult--perhaps impossible without arbitrary interpolation\n[of elements]--to ascribe to this Being by well-grounded proofs a\ncausality in accordance with moral laws; and yet without this that\nquasi-theological concept could furnish no foundation for religion.\nEven if a religion could be established by this theoretical path, it\nwould actually, as regards sentiment (wherein its essence lies) be\ndifferent from that in which the concept of God and the (practical)\nconviction of His Being originate from the fundamental Ideas of\nmorality. For if we must suppose the Omnipotence, Omniscience, etc., of\nan Author of the world as concepts given to us from another quarter,\nin order afterwards only to apply our concepts of duties to our\nrelation to Him, then these latter concepts must bear very markedly\nthe appearance of compulsion and forced submission. If, instead of\nthis, the respect for the moral law, quite freely, in virtue of the\nprecept of our own Reason, represents to us the final purpose of our\ndestination, we admit among our moral views a Cause harmonising with\nthis and with its accomplishment, with the sincerest reverence, which\nis quite distinct from pathological fear; and we willingly submit\nourselves thereto.[160]\n\nIf it be asked why it is incumbent upon us to have any Theology at all,\nit appears clear that it is not needed for the extension or correction\nof our cognition of nature or in general for any theory, but simply\nin a subjective point of view for Religion, _i.e._ the practical or\nmoral use of our Reason. If it is found that the only argument which\nleads to a definite concept of the object of Theology is itself moral,\nit is not only not strange, but we miss nothing in respect of its\nfinal purpose as regards the sufficiency of belief from this ground\nof proof, provided that it be admitted that such an argument only\nestablishes the Being of God sufficiently for our moral destination,\n_i.e._ in a practical point of view, and that here speculation neither\nshows its strength in any way, nor extends by means of it the sphere\nof its domain. Our surprise and the alleged contradiction between the\npossibility of a Theology asserted here and that which the Critique\nof speculative Reason said of the Categories--viz. that they can only\nproduce knowledge when applied to objects of sense, but in no way when\napplied to the supersensible--vanish, if we see that they are here\nused for a cognition of God not in a theoretical point of view (in\naccordance with what His own nature, inscrutable to us, may be) but\nsimply in a practical.--In order then at this opportunity to make an\nend of the misinterpretation of that very necessary doctrine of the\nCritique, which, to the chagrin of the blind dogmatist, refers Reason\nto its bounds, I add here the following elucidation.\n\nIf I ascribe to a body _motive force_ and thus think it by means of\nthe category of _causality_, then I at the same time _cognise_ it\nby that [category]; _i.e._ I determine the concept of it, as of an\nObject in general, by means of what belongs to it by itself (as the\ncondition of the possibility of that relation) as an object of sense.\nIf the motive force ascribed to it is repulsive, then there belongs to\nit (although I do not place near it any other body upon which it may\nexert force) a place in space, and moreover extension, _i.e._ space\nin itself, besides the filling up of this by means of the repulsive\nforces of its parts. In addition there is the law of this filling up\n(that the ground of the repulsion of the parts must decrease in the\nsame proportion as the extension of the body increases, and as the\nspace, which it fills with the same parts by means of this force, is\naugmented).--On the contrary, if I think a supersensible Being as the\nfirst _mover_, and thus by the category of causality as regards its\ndetermination of the world (motion of matter), I must not think it as\nexisting in any place in space nor as extended; I must not even think\nit as existing in time or simultaneously with other beings. Hence I\nhave no determinations whatever, which could make intelligible to me\nthe condition of the possibility of motion by means of this Being as\nits ground. Consequently, I do not in the very least cognise it by\nmeans of the predicate of Cause (as first mover), for itself; but I\nhave only the representation of a something containing the ground\nof the motions in the world; and the relation of the latter to it\nas their cause, since it does not besides furnish me with anything\nbelonging to the constitution of the thing which is cause, leaves its\nconcept quite empty. The reason of this is, that by predicates which\nonly find their Object in the world of sense I can indeed proceed\nto the being of something which must contain their ground, but not\nto the determination of its concept as a supersensible being, which\nexcludes all these predicates. By the category of causality, then,\nif I determine it by the concept of a _first mover_, I do not in the\nvery least cognise what God is. Perhaps, however, I shall have better\nsuccess if I start from the order of the world, not merely to _think_\nits causality as that of a supreme _Understanding_, but to _cognise_\nit by means of this determination of the said concept; because here\nthe troublesome condition of space and of extension disappears.--At\nall events the great purposiveness in the world compels us to _think_\na supreme cause of it, and to _think_ its causality as that of an\nUnderstanding; but we are not therefore entitled to _ascribe_ this to\nit. (_E.g._ we think of the eternity of God as presence in all time,\nbecause we can form no other concept of mere being as a quantum, _i.e._\nas duration; or we think of the divine Omnipresence as presence in\nall places in order to make comprehensible to ourselves His immediate\npresence in things which are external to one another; without daring\nto ascribe to God any of these determinations, as something cognised\nin Him.) If I determine the causality of a man, in respect of certain\nproducts which are only explicable by designed purposiveness, by\nthinking it as that of Understanding, I need not stop here, but I can\nascribe to him this predicate as a well-known property and cognise him\naccordingly. For I know that intuitions are given to the senses of men\nand are brought by the Understanding under a concept and thus under a\nrule; that this concept only contains the common characteristic (with\nomission of the particular ones) and is thus discursive; and that the\nrules for bringing given representations under a consciousness in\ngeneral are given by Understanding before those intuitions, etc. I\ntherefore ascribe this property to man as a property by means of which\nI _cognise_ him. However, if I wish to _think_ a supersensible Being\n(God) as an intelligence, this is not only permissible in a certain\naspect of my employment of Reason--it is unavoidable; but to ascribe\nto Him Understanding and to flatter ourselves that we can _cognise_\nHim by means of it as a property of His, is in no way permissible.\nFor I must omit all those conditions under which alone I know an\nUnderstanding, and thus the predicate which only serves for determining\nman cannot be applied at all to a supersensible Object; and therefore\nby a causality thus determined, I cannot cognise what God is. And so it\nis with all Categories, which can have no significance for cognition in\na theoretical aspect, if they are not applied to objects of possible\nexperience.--However, according to the analogy of an Understanding I\ncan in a certain other aspect think a supersensible being, without at\nthe same time meaning thereby to cognise it theoretically; viz. if this\ndetermination of its causality concerns an effect in the world, which\ncontains a design morally necessary but unattainable by a sensible\nbeing. For then a cognition of God and of His Being (Theology) is\npossible by means of properties and determinations of His causality\nmerely thought in Him according to analogy, which has all requisite\nreality in a practical reference though _only in respect of this_\n(as moral).--An Ethical Theology is therefore possible; for though\nmorality can subsist without theology as regards its rule, it cannot\ndo so as regards the final design which this proposes, unless Reason\nin respect of it is to be renounced. But a Theological Ethic (of pure\nReason) is impossible; for laws which Reason itself does not give and\nwhose observance it does not bring about as a pure practical faculty,\ncan not be moral. In the same way a Theological Physic would be a\nnonentity, for it would propose no laws of nature but ordinances of a\nHighest Will; while on the other hand a physical (properly speaking a\nphysico-teleological) Theology can serve at least as a propaedeutic\nto Theology proper, by giving occasion for the Idea of a final purpose\nwhich nature cannot present by the observation of natural purposes of\nwhich it offers abundant material. It thus makes felt the need of a\nTheology which shall determine the concept of God adequately for the\nhighest practical use of Reason, but it cannot develop this and base it\nsatisfactorily on its proofs.\n\n\nTHE END\n\n\n_Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_.\n\n\n\n\nWORKS ON PHILOSOPHY\n\n\nBy IMMANUEL KANT\n\n KANT\u2019S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY FOR ENGLISH READERS. By J.\u00a0P. MAHAFFY,\n D.D., and The Right Rev. J. H. BERNARD, D.D. Two vols. Crown 8vo.\n\n Vol. I. THE KRITIK OF THE PURE REASON EXPLAINED AND DEFENDED. 7s.\n 6d.\n\n Vol. II. PROLEGOMENA. Translated, with Notes and Appendices. 6s.\n\n CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. Translated by F. MAX M\u00dcLLER. Second Edition,\n Revised. Extra Crown 8vo. 15s. net.\n\n CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. Translated by F. MAX M\u00dcLLER. Vol. 1.\n Containing Translator\u2019s Preface; Historical Introduction by LUDWIG\n NOIR\u00c9; and Additions made by KANT in the Second Edition of the\n Critique. 8vo. 16s.\n\n\nBy Professor HENRI BERGSON\n\n CREATIVE EVOLUTION. Translated by ARTHUR MITCHELL, Ph.D. 8vo. 10s.\n net.\n\n LAUGHTER: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic. Authorised\n Translation from the Sixth Edition by CLOUDESLEY BRERETON, L. \u00e8s L.\n (Paris), M.A. (Cantab.); and FRED ROTHWELL, B.A. (London). Extra\n Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. net.\n\n AN INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS. Translated by T.\u00a0E. HULME. Crown 8vo.\n 2s. net.\n\n A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF BERGSON\u2019S PHILOSOPHY. By J. McKELLAR\n STEWART, B.A., D.Phil. 8vo. 5s. net.\n\n\nBy BENEDETTO CROCE\n\n PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRACTICAL. Economic and Ethic. Translated by\n DOUGLAS AINSLIE, B.A. 8vo. 12s. net.\n\n \u00c6STHETIC AS SCIENCE OF EXPRESSION AND GENERAL LINGUISTIC. Translated\n by DOUGLAS AINSLIE, B.A. 8vo. 10s. net.\n\n ENCYCLOP\u00c6DIA OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES. Edited by WILHELM\n WINDELBAND and ARNOLD RUGE. English Edition under the Editorship of\n Sir HENRY JONES. 8vo.\n\n Vol. I. LOGIC. By ARNOLD RUGE, WILHELM WINDELBAND, JOSIAH ROYCE,\n LOUIS COUTURAT, BENEDETTO CROCE, FEDERIGO ENRIQUES, and NICOLAJ\n LOSSKIJ. 7s. 6d. net.\n\nLONDON: MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.\n\n\n\n\nWORKS ON PHILOSOPHY\n\n\nTHE SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY\n\nA HISTORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT\n\nBY VARIOUS WRITERS\n\nEDITED BY\n\nSIR HENRY JONES\n\nPROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW\n\n THE EVOLUTION OF EDUCATIONAL THEORY. By Professor JOHN ADAMS, M.A.,\n B.Sc., LL.D. 8vo. 10s. net.\n\n THE HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. By Professor JOHN BURNET, LL.D. Vol.\n I. From Thales to Plato. [_In the Press._\n\n THE HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY FROM HOBBES TO REID. By Professor\n G.\u00a0F. STOUT. [_In preparation._\n\n _Other volumes to follow._\n\n * * * * *\n\n THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUALITY AND VALUE. The Gifford Lectures for\n 1911. By BERNARD BOSANQUET, LL.D., D.C.L. 8vo. 10s. net.\n\n THE VALUE AND DESTINY OF THE INDIVIDUAL. The Gifford Lectures for\n 1912 By BERNARD BOSANQUET, LL.D., D.C.L. 8vo. 10s. net.\n\n THE CROWNING PHASE OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. A Study in Kant\u2019s\n Critique of Judgment. By R.\u00a0A.\u00a0C. MACMILLAN, M.A., D.Phil. 8vo.\n 10s. net.\n\n THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF VITALISM. By Prof. HANS DRIESCH, Ph.D.\n Translated by C.\u00a0K. OGDEN, B.A. Revised throughout and in part\n rewritten by the Author for the English Edition. Crown 8vo.\n [_In the Press._\n\n THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUALITY. Lectures. By Prof. HANS DRIESCH, Ph.D.\n 8vo. [_In the Press._\n\n THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHARACTER. Being a Study of the Emotions and\n Sentiments. By ALEXANDER F. SHAND, M.A. 8vo. [_In the Press._\n\n THE THEORY OF RELATIVITY. By L. SILBERSTEIN, Ph.D. 8vo.\n [_In the Press._\n\n MODERN PHILOSOPHERS. Lectures. By HARALD H\u00d6FFDING. Translated by\n ALFRED C. MASON, M.A. Crown 8vo. [_In the Press._\n\n\nLONDON: MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n\n[1] Dr. Caird (_Critical Philosophy of Kant_, vol. ii. p. 406) has\ngiven an instructive account of the gradual development in Kant\u2019s mind\nof the main idea of the Critique of Judgement.\n\n[2] _Natural Theology and Modern Thought_, p. 158.\n\n[3] I reproduce here in part a paper read before the Victoria Institute\nin April 1892.\n\n[4] _Critique of Pure Reason._ Dialectic, Bk. ii. chap. i. near the end.\n\n[5] Cf. Kuno Fischer, _A Critique of Kant_, p. 142.\n\n[6] Quoted by Caird, _Critical Philosophy of Kant_, vol. ii. p. 507,\nwho reiterates this criticism all through his account of Kant\u2019s\nteaching.\n\n[7] _Natural Theology and Modern Thought_, p. 241.\n\n[8] [Reading, with Windelband, _in sicheren alleinigen Besitz_.]\n\n[9] If we have cause for supposing that concepts which we use as\nempirical principles stand in relationship with the pure cognitive\nfaculty _a priori_, it is profitable, because of this reference,\nto seek for them a transcendental definition; _i.e._ a definition\nthrough pure categories, so far as these by themselves adequately\nfurnish the distinction of the concept in question from others. We\nhere follow the example of the mathematician who leaves undetermined\nthe empirical data of his problem, and only brings their relation in\ntheir pure synthesis under the concepts of pure Arithmetic, and thus\ngeneralises the solution. Objection has been brought against a similar\nprocedure of mine (cf. the Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason,\n_Abbott\u2019s Translation_, p. 94), and my definition of the faculty\nof desire has been found fault with, viz. that it is [the being\u2019s]\n_faculty of becoming by means of its representations the cause of the\nactuality of the objects of these representations_; for the desires\nmight be mere _cravings_, and by means of these alone every one is\nconvinced the Object cannot be produced.--But this proves nothing more\nthan that there are desires in man, by which he is in contradiction\nwith himself. For here he strives for the production of the Object\nby means of the representation _alone_, from which he can expect no\nresult, because he is conscious that his mechanical powers (if I may\nso call those which are not psychological) which must be determined\nby that representation to bring about the Object (mediately) are\neither not competent, or even tend towards what is impossible; e.g.\nto reverse the past (_O mihi praeteritos_ ... etc.), or to annihilate\nin the impatience of expectation the interval before the wished for\nmoment.--Although in such fantastic desires we are conscious of the\ninadequacy (or even the unsuitability) of our representations for\nbeing _causes_ of their objects, yet their reference as causes, and\nconsequently the representation of their _causality_, is contained in\nevery _wish_; and this is specially evident if the wish is an affection\nor _longing_. For these [longings] by their dilatation and contraction\nof the heart and consequent exhaustion of its powers, prove that these\npowers are continually kept on the stretch by representations, but that\nthey perpetually let the mind, having regard to the impossibility [of\nthe desire], fall back in exhaustion. Even prayers for the aversion\nof great and (as far as one can see) unavoidable evils, and many\nsuperstitious means for attaining in a natural way impossible purposes,\npoint to the causal reference of representations to their Objects; a\nreference which cannot at all be checked by the consciousness of the\ninadequacy of the effort to produce the effect.--As to why there should\nbe in our nature this propensity to desires which are consciously vain,\nthat is an anthropologico-teleological problem. It seems that if we\nwere not determined to the application of our powers before we were\nassured of the adequacy of our faculties to produce an Object, these\npowers would remain in great part unused. For we commonly learn to\nknow our powers only by first making trial of them. This deception in\nthe case of vain wishes is then only the consequence of a benevolent\nordinance in our nature. [This note was added by Kant in the Second\nEdition.]\n\n[10] One of the various pretended contradictions in this whole\ndistinction of the causality of nature from that of freedom is\nthis. It is objected that if I speak of _obstacles_ which nature\nopposes to causality according to (moral) laws of freedom or of the\n_assistance_ it affords, I am admitting an _influence_ of the former\nupon the latter. But if we try to understand what has been said, this\nmisinterpretation is very easy to avoid. The opposition or assistance\nis not between nature and freedom, but between the former as phenomenon\nand the _effects_ of the latter as phenomena in the world of sense.\nThe causality of freedom itself (of pure and practical Reason) is\nthe causality of a natural cause subordinated to freedom (_i.e._\nof the subject considered as man and therefore as phenomenon). The\nintelligible, which is thought under freedom, contains the ground of\nthe _determination_ of this [natural cause] in a way not explicable\nany further (just as that intelligible does which constitutes the\nsupersensible substrate of nature).\n\n[11] It has been thought a doubtful point that my divisions in pure\nPhilosophy should always be threefold. But that lies in the nature of\nthe thing. If there is to be an _a priori_ division it must be either\n_analytical_, according to the law of contradiction, which is always\ntwofold (_quodlibet ens est aut A aut non A_); or it is _synthetical_.\nAnd if in this latter case it is to be derived from _a priori concepts_\n(not as in Mathematic from the intuition corresponding to the concept),\nthe division must necessarily be trichotomy. For according to what\nis requisite for synthetical unity in general there must be (1) a\ncondition, (2) a conditioned, and (3) the concept which arises from the\nunion of the conditioned with its condition.\n\n[12] The definition of taste which is laid down here is that it is the\nfaculty of judging of the beautiful. But the analysis of judgements of\ntaste must show what is required in order to call an object beautiful.\nThe moments, to which this Judgement has regard in its reflection, I\nhave sought in accordance with the guidance of the logical functions of\njudgement (for in a judgement of taste a reference to the Understanding\nis always involved). I have considered the moment of quality first,\nbecause the aesthetical judgement upon the beautiful first pays\nattention to it.\n\n[13] A judgement upon an object of satisfaction may be quite\n_disinterested_, but yet very _interesting_, _i.e._ not based upon an\ninterest, but bringing an interest with it; of this kind are all pure\nmoral judgements. Judgements of taste, however, do not in themselves\nestablish any interest. Only in society is it _interesting_ to have\ntaste: the reason of this will be shown in the sequel.\n\n[14] [Second Edition.]\n\n[15] An obligation to enjoyment is a manifest absurdity. Thus the\nobligation to all actions which have merely enjoyment for their aim can\nonly be a pretended one; however spiritually it may be conceived (or\ndecked out), even if it is a mystical, or so-called heavenly, enjoyment.\n\n[16] [Second Edition.]\n\n[17] [Second Edition.]\n\n[18] [Ueberweg points out (_Hist. of Phil._, ii. 528, Eng. Trans.)\nthat Mendelssohn had already called attention to the disinterestedness\nof our satisfaction in the Beautiful. \u201cIt appears,\u201d says Mendelssohn,\n\u201cto be a particular mark of the beautiful, that it is contemplated\nwith quiet satisfaction, that it pleases, even though it be not in our\npossession, and even though we be never so far removed from the desire\nto put it to our use.\u201d But, of course, as Ueberweg remarks, Kant\u2019s\nconception of disinterestedness extends far beyond the absence of a\ndesire to possess the object.]\n\n[19] [Reading _besondere_ with Windelband; Hartenstein reads\n_bestimmte_.]\n\n[20] [_I.e._ _The Critique of Pure Reason_, Analytic, bk. ii. c. i.]\n\n[21] [Second Edition. Spencer expresses much more concisely what Kant\nhas in his mind here. \u201cPleasure ... is a feeling which we seek to\nbring into consciousness and retain there; pain is ... a feeling which\nwe seek to get out of consciousness and to keep out.\u201d _Principles of\nPsychology_, \u00a7 125.]\n\n[22] [The editions of Hartenstein and Kirchmann omit _ohne_ before\n_zweck_, which makes havoc of the sentence. It is correctly printed by\nRosenkranz and Windelband.]\n\n[23] [First Edition.]\n\n[24] [Cf. _Metaphysic of Morals_, Introd. I. \u201cThe pleasure which\nis necessarily bound up with the desire (of the object whose\nrepresentation affects feeling) may be called _practical_ pleasure,\nwhether it be cause or effect of the desire. On the contrary, the\npleasure which is not necessarily bound up with the desire of the\nobject, and which, therefore, is at bottom not a pleasure in the\nexistence of the Object of the representation, but clings to the\nrepresentation only, may be called mere contemplative pleasure or\n_passive satisfaction_. The feeling of the latter kind of pleasure we\ncall _taste_.\u201d]\n\n[25] [Second Edition.]\n\n[26] [First Edition has _gleiche_; Second Edition has _solche_.]\n\n[27] [First and Second Editions have _sehr zweifle_; but this was\ncorrected to _nicht zweifle_ in the Third Edition of 1799.]\n\n[28] [_Belebt machen_; First Edition had _beliebt_.]\n\n[29] [Second Edition.]\n\n[30] [Kant probably alludes here to Baumgarten (1714-1762), who was the\nfirst writer to give the name of Aesthetics to the Philosophy of Taste.\nHe defined beauty as \u201cperfection apprehended through the senses.\u201d Kant\nis said to have used as a text-book at lectures a work by Meier, a\npupil of Baumgarten\u2019s, on this subject.]\n\n[31] [Cf. Preface to the _Metaphysical Elements of Ethics_, v.: \u201cThe\nword _perfection_ is liable to many misconceptions. It is sometimes\nunderstood as a concept belonging to Transcendental Philosophy; viz.\nthe concept of the _totality_ of the manifold, which, taken together,\nconstitutes a Thing; sometimes, again, it is understood as belonging to\n_Teleology_, so that it signifies the agreement of the characteristics\nof a thing with a _purpose_. Perfection in the former sense might be\ncalled _quantitative_ (material), in the latter _qualitative_ (formal)\nperfection.\u201d]\n\n[32] [The words _even if ... general_ were added in the Second Edition.]\n\n[33] [Second Edition.]\n\n[34] Models of taste as regards the arts of speech must be composed\nin a dead and learned language. The first, in order that they may not\nsuffer that change which inevitably comes over living languages, in\nwhich noble expressions become flat, common ones antiquated, and newly\ncreated ones have only a short currency. The second, because learned\nlanguages have a grammar which is subject to no wanton change of\nfashion, but the rules of which are preserved unchanged.\n\n[35] [This distinction between an _Idea_ and an _Ideal_, as also\nthe further contrast between Ideals of the Reason and Ideals of the\nImagination, had already been given by Kant in the _Critique of Pure\nReason_, Dialectic, bk. ii. c. iii. \u00a7 1.]\n\n[36] [Polycletus of Argos flourished about 430 B.C. His statue of the\n_Spearbearer_ (_Doryphorus_), afterwards became known as the _Canon_;\nbecause in it the artist was supposed to have embodied a perfect\nrepresentation of the ideal of the human figure.]\n\n[37] [This was a celebrated statue executed by Myron, a Greek sculptor,\ncontemporary with Polycletus. It is frequently mentioned in the Greek\nAnthology.]\n\n[38] It will be found that a perfectly regular countenance, such\nas a painter might wish to have for a model, ordinarily tells us\nnothing; because it contains nothing characteristic, and therefore\nrather expresses the Idea of the race than the specific [traits] of\na person. The exaggeration of a characteristic of this kind, _i.e._\nsuch as does violence to the normal Idea (the purposiveness of the\nrace) is called _caricature_. Experience also shows that these quite\nregular countenances commonly indicate internally only a mediocre man;\npresumably (if it may be assumed that external nature expresses the\nproportions of internal) because, if no mental disposition exceeds that\nproportion which is requisite in order to constitute a man free from\nfaults, nothing can be expected of what is called _genius_, in which\nnature seems to depart from the ordinary relations of the mental powers\non behalf of some special one.\n\n[39] It might be objected to this explanation that there are things, in\nwhich we see a purposive form without cognising any [definite] purpose\nin them, like the stone implements often got from old sepulchral\ntumuli with a hole in them as if for a handle. These, although they\nplainly indicate by their shape a purposiveness of which we do not\nknow the purpose, are nevertheless not described as beautiful. But if\nwe regard a thing as a work of art, that is enough to make us admit\nthat its shape has reference to some design and definite purpose. And\nhence there is no immediate satisfaction in the contemplation of it.\nOn the other hand a flower, _e.g._ a tulip, is regarded as beautiful;\nbecause in perceiving it we find a certain purposiveness which, in our\njudgement, is referred to no purpose at all.\n\n[40] [Cp. p. 170, _infra_.]\n\n[41] [See _The History of Sumatra_, by W. Marsden (London, 1783), p.\n113.]\n\n[42] [Cf. \u00a7 42, _infra_.]\n\n[43] [Second Edition.]\n\n[44] [Second Edition.]\n\n[45] [_Lettres sur l\u2019\u00c9gypte_, par M. Savary, Amsterdam, 1787.]\n\n[46] [Second Edition.]\n\n[47] [With this should be compared the similar discussion in the\n_Critique of Pure Reason_, Dialectic, bk. ii. c. ii. \u00a7 1, _On the\nSystem of Cosmological Ideas_.]\n\n[48] [Second Edition.]\n\n[49] [Cf. \u00a7 83, _infra_.]\n\n[50] [In the _Philosophical Theory of Religion_, pt. i. _sub fin._\n(Abbott\u2019s Translation, p. 360), Kant, as here, divides \u201call religions\ninto two classes--_favour-seeking_ religion (mere worship) and _moral_\nreligion, that is, the religion _of a good life_;\u201d and he concludes\nthat \u201camongst all the public religions that have ever existed the\nChristian alone is moral.\u201d]\n\n[51] [_Voyages dans les Alpes_, par H. B. de Saussure; vol. i. was\npublished at Neuchatel in 1779; vol. ii. at Geneva in 1786.]\n\n[52] [Second Edition.]\n\n[53] [_Als Verm\u00f6gen der Independenz der absoluten Totalit\u00e4t_, a curious\nphrase.]\n\n[54] [Second Edition.]\n\n[55] _Affections_ are specifically different from _passions_. The\nformer are related merely to feeling; the latter belong to the faculty\nof desire, and are inclinations which render difficult or impossible\nall determination of the [elective] will by principles. The former are\nstormy and unpremeditated; the latter are steady and deliberate; thus\nindignation in the form of wrath is an affection, but in the form of\nhatred (revenge) is a passion. The latter can never and in no reference\nbe called sublime; because while in an affection the freedom of the\nmind is _hindered_, in a passion it is abolished. [Cf. Preface to the\n_Metaphysical Elements of Ethics_, \u00a7 xvi., where this distinction is\nmore fully drawn out. Affection is described as _hasty_; and passion is\ndefined as the sensible _appetite_ grown into a permanent inclination.]\n\n[56] [In the Preface to the _Metaphysical Elements of Ethics_, \u00a7 xvii.,\nKant gives the term _moral apathy_ to that freedom from the sway of the\naffections, which is distinguished from indifference to them.]\n\n[57] [Reading _weiche_ with Rosenkranz and Windelband; Hartenstein and\nKirchmann have _weise_, which yields no sense.]\n\n[58] [Cf. p. 129, _supra_.]\n\n[59] [Kirchmann has _positiv_; but this is probably a mere misprint.]\n\n[60] [L.c. vol. ii. p. 181.]\n\n[61] [See Burke, _On the Sublime and Beautiful_, Part IV., Sect.\nvii. \u201cIf the pain and terror are so modified as not to be actually\nnoxious; if the pain is not carried to violence, and the terror is\nnot conversant about the present destruction of the person, as these\nemotions clear the parts, whether fine or gross, of a dangerous and\ntroublesome incumbrance, they are capable of producing delight; not\npleasure, but a sort of delightful horror, a sort of tranquillity\ntinged with terror; which, as it belongs to self-preservation, is one\nof the strongest of all the passions.\u201d Kant quotes from the German\nversion published at Riga in 1773. This was a free translation made\nfrom Burke\u2019s fifth edition.]\n\n[62] [See Burke, l.c., Part IV., Sect. xix. \u201cBeauty acts by relaxing\nthe solids of the whole system. There are all the appearances of such\na relaxation; and a relaxation somewhat below the natural tone seems\nto me to be the cause of all positive pleasure. Who is a stranger to\nthat manner of expression so common in all times and in all countries,\nof being softened, relaxed, enervated, dissolved, melted away by\npleasure?\u201d]\n\n[63] [Reading _Gebot_; Kirchmann has _Gesetz_.]\n\n[64] [Second Edition.]\n\n[65] [Second Edition.]\n\n[66] [Cf. _Critique of Pure Reason_, Methodology, c. 1, \u00a7 1. \u201cThe\nconstruction of a concept is the _a priori_ presentation of the\ncorresponding intuition.\u201d]\n\n[67] [Charles Batteux (1713-1780), author of _Les Beaux Arts reduits \u00e0\nun m\u00eame principe_.]\n\n[68] [Essay XVIII, _The Sceptic_. \u201cCritics can reason and dispute\nmore plausibly than cooks or perfumers. We may observe, however, that\nthis uniformity among human kind, hinders not, but that there is a\nconsiderable diversity in the sentiments of beauty and worth, and that\neducation, custom, prejudice, caprice, and humour, frequently vary\nour taste of this kind.... Beauty and worth are merely of a relative\nnature, and consist in an agreeable sentiment, produced by an object in\na particular mind, according to the peculiar structure and constitution\nof that mind.\u201d]\n\n[69] [For the distinction, an important one in Kant, between judgements\nof experience and judgements of perception, see his _Prolegomena_, \u00a7\n18. Cf. _Kant\u2019s Critical Philosophy for English Readers_, vol. i. p.\n116.]\n\n[70] [First Edition has \u201climited.\u201d]\n\n[71] In order to be justified in claiming universal assent for an\naesthetical judgement that rests merely on subjective grounds, it\nis sufficient to assume, (1) that the subjective conditions of the\nJudgement, as regards the relation of the cognitive powers thus put\ninto activity to a cognition in general, are the same in all men. This\nmust be true, because otherwise men would not be able to communicate\ntheir representations or even their knowledge. (2) The judgement must\nmerely have reference to this relation (consequently to the _formal\ncondition_ of the Judgement) and be pure, _i.e._ not mingled either\nwith concepts of the Object or with sensations, as determining grounds.\nIf there has been any mistake as regards this latter condition, then\nthere is only an inaccurate application of the privilege, which a law\ngives us, to a particular case; but that does not destroy the privilege\nitself in general.\n\n[72] [Kant lays down these three maxims in his _Introduction to Logic_,\n\u00a7 vii., as \u201cgeneral rules and conditions of the avoidance of error.\u201d]\n\n[73] We soon see that although enlightenment is easy _in thesi_, yet\n_in hypothesi_ it is difficult and slow of accomplishment. For not to\nbe passive as regards Reason, but to be always self-legislative, is\nindeed quite easy for the man who wishes only to be in accordance with\nhis essential purpose, and does not desire to know what is beyond his\nUnderstanding. But since we can hardly avoid seeking this, and there\nare never wanting others who promise with much confidence that they\nare able to satisfy our curiosity, it must be very hard to maintain in\nor restore to the mind (especially the mind of the public) that bare\nnegative which properly constitutes enlightenment.\n\n[74] We may designate Taste as _sensus communis aestheticus_, common\nUnderstanding as _sensus communis logicus_.\n\n[75] [Peter Camper (1722-1789), a celebrated naturalist and comparative\nanatomist; for some years professor at Groningen.]\n\n[76] In my country a common man, if you propose to him such a problem\nas that of Columbus with his egg, says, _that is not art, it is only\nscience_. _I.e._ if we _know_ how, we can _do_ it; and he says the same\nof all the pretended arts of jugglers. On the other hand, he will not\nrefuse to apply the term art to the performance of a rope-dancer.\n\n[77] [Kant was accustomed to say that the talk at a dinner table\nshould always pass through these three stages--narrative, discussion,\nand jest; and punctilious in this, as in all else, he is said to have\ndirected the conversation at his own table accordingly (Wallace\u2019s\n_Kant_, p. 39).]\n\n[78] [Second Edition.]\n\n[79] [Cf. Aristotle\u2019s _Poetics_, c. iv. p. 1448 b: \u1f03 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03c5\u03c0\u03b7\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c2\n\u1f41\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f20\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03b2\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c7\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2\n\u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u03b8\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03c1\u1ff6\u03bd. Cf. also _Rhetoric_,\nI. 11, p. 1371 b; and Burke on the _Sublime and Beautiful_, Part I. \u00a7\n16. Boileau (_L\u2019art po\u00e9tique_, chant 3), makes a similar observation:\n\n \u201cIl n\u2019est point de serpent ni de monstre odieux\n Qui, par l\u2019art imit\u00e9, ne puisse plaire aux yeux.\n D\u2019un pinceau d\u00e9licat l\u2019artifice agr\u00e9able\n Du plus affreux objet fait un objet aimable.\u201d\n]\n\n[80] [Second Edition.]\n\n[81] [Cf. p. 199, _infra_.]\n\n[82] [In English we would rather say \u201cwithout _soul_\u201d; but I prefer to\ntranslate _Geist_ consistently by _spirit_, to avoid the confusion of\nit with _Seele_.]\n\n[83] [These lines occur in one of Frederick the Great\u2019s French poems:\n\u00c9p\u00eetre au mar\u00e9chal Keith XVIII., \u201csur les vaines terreurs de la mort et\nles frayeurs d\u2019une autre vie.\u201d Kant here translates them into German.]\n\n[84] [Withof, whose \u201cMoral Poems\u201d appeared in 1755. This reference was\nsupplied by H. Krebs in _Notes and Queries_ 5th January 1895.]\n\n[85] Perhaps nothing more sublime was ever said and no sublimer thought\never expressed than the famous inscription on the Temple of _Isis_\n(Mother _Nature_): \u201cI am all that is and that was and that shall be,\nand no mortal hath lifted my veil.\u201d _Segner_ availed himself of this\nIdea in a _suggestive_ vignette prefixed to his Natural Philosophy, in\norder to inspire beforehand the pupil whom he was about to lead into\nthat temple with a holy awe, which should dispose his mind to serious\nattention. [J.\u00a0A. de Segner (1704-1777) was Professor of Natural\nPhilosophy at G\u00f6ttingen, and the author of several scientific works of\nrepute.]\n\n[86] [Second Edition.]\n\n[87] The three former faculties are _united_ in the first instance by\nmeans of the fourth. Hume gives us to understand in his _History of\nEngland_ that although the English are inferior in their productions\nto no people in the world as regards the evidences they display of the\nthree former properties, _separately_ considered, yet they must be put\nafter their neighbours the French as regards that which unites these\nproperties. [In his _Observations on the Beautiful and Sublime_, \u00a7 iv.\n_sub init._, Kant remarks that the English have the keener sense of the\n_sublime_, the French of the _beautiful_.]\n\n[88] The reader is not to judge this scheme for a possible division of\nthe beautiful arts as a deliberate theory. It is only one of various\nattempts which we may and ought to devise.\n\n[89] [Second Edition.]\n\n[90] [_I.e._ the case of Plastic art, with its subdivisions of\nArchitecture and Sculpture, as is explained in the next paragraph.]\n\n[91] That landscape gardening may be regarded as a species of the\nart of painting, although it presents its forms corporeally, seems\nstrange. But since it actually takes its forms from nature (trees,\nshrubs, grasses, and flowers from forest and field--at least in the\nfirst instance), and so far is not an art like Plastic; and since it\nalso has no concept of the object and its purpose (as in Architecture)\nconditioning its arrangements, but involves merely the free play of the\nImagination in contemplation, it so far agrees with mere aesthetical\npainting which has no definite theme (which arranges sky, land, and\nwater, so as to entertain us by means of light and shade only).--In\ngeneral the reader is only to judge of this as an attempt to combine\nthe beautiful arts under one principle, viz. that of the expression\nof aesthetical Ideas (according to the analogy of speech), and not to\nregard it as a definitive analysis of them.\n\n[92] I must admit that a beautiful poem has always given me a pure\ngratification; whilst the reading of the best discourse, whether of a\nRoman orator or of a modern parliamentary speaker or of a preacher, has\nalways been mingled with an unpleasant feeling of disapprobation of\na treacherous art, which means to move men in important matters like\nmachines to a judgement that must lose all weight for them on quiet\nreflection. Readiness and accuracy in speaking (which taken together\nconstitute Rhetoric) belong to beautiful art; but the art of the orator\n(_ars oratoria_), the art of availing oneself of the weaknesses of men\nfor one\u2019s own designs (whether these be well meant or even actually\ngood does not matter) is worthy of no _respect_. Again, this art only\nreached its highest point, both at Athens and at Rome, at a time when\nthe state was hastening to its ruin and true patriotic sentiment had\ndisappeared. The man who along with a clear insight into things has in\nhis power a wealth of pure speech, and who with a fruitful Imagination\ncapable of presenting his Ideas unites a lively sympathy with what is\ntruly good, is the _vir bonus discendi peritus_, the orator without\nart but of great impressiveness, as _Cicero_ has it; though he may not\nalways remain true to this ideal.\n\n[93] [From this to the end of the paragraph, and the next note, were\nadded in the Second Edition.]\n\n[94] Those who recommend the singing of spiritual songs at family\nprayers do not consider that they inflict a great hardship upon\nthe public by such _noisy_ (and therefore in general pharisaical)\ndevotions; for they force the neighbours either to sing with them\nor to abandon their meditations. [Kant suffered himself from such\nannoyances, which may account for the asperity of this note. At one\nperiod he was disturbed by the devotional exercises of the prisoners in\nthe adjoining jail. In a letter to the burgomaster \u201che suggested the\nadvantage of closing the windows during these hymn-singings, and added\nthat the warders of the prison might probably be directed to accept\nless sonorous and neighbour-annoying chants as evidence of the penitent\nspirit of their captives\u201d (Wallace\u2019s _Kant_, p. 42).]\n\n[95] [Cf. \u201cParturiunt montes, nascitur _ridiculus_ mus.\u201d]\n\n[96] [The First Edition adds \u201cas in the case of a man who gets the news\nof a great commercial success.\u201d]\n\n[97] [The jest may have been taken from Steele\u2019s play, \u201cThe Funeral or\nGrief _\u00e0 la mode_,\u201d where it occurs verbatim. This play was published\nin 1702.]\n\n[98] [_Henriade_, _Chant 7_, sub init.\n\n \u201cDu Dieu qui nous cr\u00e9a la cl\u00e9mence infinie,\n Pour adoucir les maux de cette courte vie,\n A plac\u00e9 parmi nous deux \u00eatres bienfaisants,\n De la terre \u00e0 jamais aimables habitants,\n Soutiens dans les travaux, tr\u00e9sors dans l\u2019indigence:\n L\u2019un est le doux sommeil, et l\u2019autre est l\u2019esp\u00e9rance.\u201d\n]\n\n[99] We may describe as a rationalising judgement (_judicium\nratiocinans_) one which proclaims itself as universal, for as such it\ncan serve as the major premise of a syllogism. On the other hand, we\ncan only speak of a judgement as rational (_judicium ratiocinatum_)\nwhich is thought as the conclusion of a syllogism, and consequently as\ngrounded _a priori_.\n\n[100] [Cf. p. 241, _infra_.]\n\n[101] [Second Edition.]\n\n[102] [Antiparos is a small island in the Cyclades, remarkable for a\nsplendid stalactite cavern near the southern coast.]\n\n[103] The intuitive in cognition must be opposed to the discursive\n(not to the symbolical). The former is either _schematical_, by\n_demonstration_; or _symbolical_ as a representation in accordance with\na mere _analogy_.\n\n[104] [I read _Geselligkeit_ with Rosenkranz and Windelband;\nHartenstein and Kirchmann have _Gl\u00fcckseligkeit_.]\n\n[105] As in pure mathematics we can never talk of the existence, but\nonly of the possibility of things, viz. of an intuition corresponding\nto a concept, and so never of cause and effect, it follows that all\npurposiveness observed there must be considered merely as formal and\nnever as a natural purpose.\n\n[106] [The allusion is to _Vitruvius de Architectura_, Bk. vi.\nPraef. \u201cAristippus philosophus Socraticus, naufragio cum eiectus ad\nRhodiensium litus animadvertisset geometrica schemata descripta,\nexclamavisse ad comites ita dicitur, Bene speremus, hominum enim\nvestigia video.\u201d]\n\n[107] [Second Edition.]\n\n[108] We can conversely throw light upon a certain combination, much\nmore often met with in Idea than in actuality, by means of an analogy\nto the so-called immediate natural purposes. In a recent complete\ntransformation of a great people into a state the word _organisation_\nfor the regulation of magistracies, etc., and even of the whole\nbody politic, has often been fitly used. For in such a whole every\nmember should surely be purpose as well as means, and, whilst all\nwork together towards the possibility of the whole, each should be\ndetermined as regards place and function by means of the Idea of the\nwhole. [Kant probably alludes here to the organisation of the United\nStates of America.]\n\n[109] [These words are inserted by Rosenkranz and Windelband, but\nomitted by Hartenstein and Kirchmann.]\n\n[110] In the aesthetical part [\u00a7 58, p. 247] it was said: _We\nview beautiful nature with favour_, whilst we have a quite free\n(disinterested) satisfaction in its form. For in this mere judgement of\ntaste no consideration is given to the purpose for which these natural\nbeauties exist; whether to excite pleasure in us, or as purposes\nwithout any reference to us at all. But in a teleological judgement we\npay attention to this reference, and here we can _regard it as a favour\nof nature_ that it has been willing to minister to our culture by the\nexhibition of so many beautiful figures.\n\n[111] The German word _vermessen_ is a good word and full of meaning.\nA judgement in which we forget to consider the extent of our powers\n(our Understanding) may sometimes sound very humble, and yet make great\npretensions, and so be very presumptuous. Of this kind are most of\nthose by which we pretend to extol the divine wisdom by ascribing to\nit designs in the works of creation and preservation which are really\nmeant to do honour to the private wisdom of the reasoner.\n\n[112] We thus see that in most speculative things of pure Reason, as\nregards dogmatic assertions, the philosophical schools have commonly\ntried all possible solutions of a given question. To explain the\npurposiveness of nature men have tried either _lifeless matter_ or\na _lifeless God_, or again, _living matter_ or a _living God_. It\nonly remains for us, if the need should arise, to abandon all these\nobjective _assertions_ and to examine critically our judgement merely\nin reference to our cognitive faculties, in order to supply to their\nprinciple a validity which, if not dogmatic, shall at least be that of\na maxim sufficient for the sure employment of Reason.\n\n[113] [That is, the wider concept serves as a universal, under which\nthe particular may be brought; cognition from principles, in Kant\u2019s\nphrase, is the process of knowing the particular in the universal by\nmeans of concepts.]\n\n[114] [This distinction will be familiar to the student of the\n_Critique of Pure Reason_. See Dialectic, bk. i., _Of the Concepts of\nPure Reason_.]\n\n[115] [Second Edition.]\n\n[116] [This principle, that for our intellect, the conception of an\norganised body is impossible except by the aid of the Idea of design,\nis frequently insisted on by Kant. Professor Wallace points out\n(_Kant_, p. 110) that as far back as 1755, in his _General Physiogony\nand Theory of the Heavens_, Kant classed the origin of animals and\nplants with the secrets of Providence and the mystical number 666 \u201cas\none of the topics on which ingenuity and thought are occasionally\nwasted.\u201d]\n\n[117] [Second Edition.]\n\n[118] [Second Edition.]\n\n[119] [This is marked as an _Appendix_ in the Second Edition.]\n\n[120] We may call a hypothesis of this kind a daring venture of reason,\nand there may be few even of the most acute naturalists through whose\nhead it has not sometimes passed. For it is not absurd, like that\n_generatio aequivoca_ by which is understood the production of an\norganised being through the mechanics of crude unorganised matter.\nIt would always remain _generatio univoca_ in the most universal\nsense of the word, for it only considers one organic being as derived\nfrom another organic being, although from one which is specifically\ndifferent; _e.g._ certain water-animals transform themselves gradually\ninto marsh-animals and from these, after some generations, into\nland-animals. _A priori_, in the judgement of Reason alone, there is no\ncontradiction here. Only experience gives no example of it; according\nto experience all generation that we know is _generatio homonyma_.\nThis is not merely _univoca_ in contrast to the generation out of\nunorganised material, but in the organisation the product is of like\nkind to that which produced it; and _generation heteronyma_, so far as\nour empirical knowledge of nature extends, is nowhere found.\n\n[121] [It is probable that Kant alludes here to Hume\u2019s Essay _On a\nProvidence and a Future State_, \u00a7 xi of the _Inquiry_. Hume argues that\nthough the inference from an effect to an intelligent cause may be\nvalid in the case of human contrivance, it is not legitimate to rise by\na like argument to Supreme Intelligence. \u201cIn human nature there is a\ncertain experienced coherence of designs and inclinations; so that when\nfrom any fact we have discovered one intention of any man, it may often\nbe reasonable from experience to infer another, and draw a long chain\nof conclusions concerning his past or future conduct. But this method\nof reasoning can never have place with regard to a being so remote and\nincomprehensible, who bears much less analogy to any other being in the\nuniverse than the sun to a waxen taper, and who discovers himself only\nby some faint traces or outlines, beyond which we have no authority to\nascribe to him any attribute or perfection.\u201d]\n\n[122] [J. F. Blumenbach (1752-1840), a German naturalist and professor\nat G\u00f6ttingen; the author of _Institutiones Physiologicae_ (1787) and\nother works. An interesting account of him is given in Lever\u2019s novel\n_Adventures of Arthur O\u2019Leary_, ch. xix.]\n\n[123] [Carl von Linn\u00e9 (1707-1778), Knight of the Polar Star, the\ncelebrated Swedish botanist.]\n\n[124] If the once adopted name _Natural history_ is to continue for the\ndescription of nature, we may in contrast with art, give the title of\n_Archaeology of nature_ to that which the former literally indicates,\nviz. a representation of the _old_ condition of the earth, about\nwhich, although we cannot hope for certainty, we have good ground for\nconjecture. As sculptured stones, etc., belong to the province of art,\nso petrefactions belong to the archaeology of nature. And since work\nis actually being done in this [science] (under the name of the Theory\nof the Earth), constantly, although of course slowly, this name is not\ngiven to a merely imaginary investigation of nature, but to one to\nwhich nature itself leads and invites us.\n\n[125] [See p. 184 above.]\n\n[126] [First Edition has _freedom_.]\n\n[127] [These views are set forth by Kant more fully in the essay _Zum\newigen Frieden_ (1795).]\n\n[128] [Second Edition.]\n\n[129] [Cf. _The Philosophical Theory of Religion_, Part i., _On the bad\nprinciple in Human Nature_, III., where Kant remarks that although war\n\u201cis not so incurably bad as the deadness of a universal monarchy ...\nyet, as an ancient observed, it makes more bad men than it takes away.\u201d]\n\n[130] The value of life for us, if it is estimated by that _which we\nenjoy_ (by the natural purpose of the sum of all inclinations, _i.e._\nhappiness), is easy to decide. It sinks below zero; for who would be\nwilling to enter upon life anew under the same conditions? who would do\nso even according to a new, self-chosen plan (yet in conformity with\nthe course of nature), if it were merely directed to enjoyment? We\nhave shown above what value life has in virtue of what it contains in\nitself, when lived in accordance with the purpose that nature has along\nwith us, and which consists in what we do (not merely what we enjoy),\nin which, however, we are always but means towards an undetermined\nfinal purpose. There remains then nothing but the value which we\nourselves give our life, through what we can not only do, but do\npurposively in such independence of nature that the existence of nature\nitself can only be a purpose under this condition.\n\n[131] It would be possible that the happiness of rational beings in\nthe world should be a purpose of nature, and then also this would be\nits _ultimate_ purpose. At least we cannot see _a priori_ why nature\nshould not be so ordered, because by means of its mechanism this\neffect would be certainly possible, at least so far as we see. But\nmorality, with a causality according to purposes subordinated thereto,\nis absolutely impossible by means of natural causes; for the principle\nby which it determines to action is supersensible, and is therefore\nthe only possible principle in the order of purposes that in respect\nof nature is absolutely unconditioned. Its subject consequently alone\nis qualified to be the _final purpose_ of creation to which the whole\nof nature is subordinated.--_Happiness_, on the contrary, as has been\nshown in the preceding paragraphs by the testimony of experience, is\nnot even a _purpose of nature_ in respect of man in preference to\nother creatures; much less a _final purpose of creation_. Men may of\ncourse make it their ultimate subjective purpose. But if I ask, in\nreference to the final purpose of creation, why must men exist? then\nwe are speaking of an objective supreme purpose, such as the highest\nReason would require for creation. If we answer: These beings exist\nto afford objects for the benevolence of that Supreme Cause; then we\ncontradict the condition to which the Reason of man subjects even his\ninmost wish for happiness (viz. the harmony with his own internal moral\nlegislation). This proves that happiness can only be a conditioned\npurpose, and that it is only as a moral being that man can be the final\npurpose of creation; but that as concerns his state happiness is only\nconnected with it as a consequence, according to the measure of his\nharmony with that purpose regarded as the purpose of his being.\n\n[132] [Second Edition.]\n\n[133] I say deliberately under moral laws. It is not man _in accordance\nwith_ moral laws, _i.e._ a being who behaves himself in conformity\nwith them, who is the final purpose of creation. For by using the\nlatter expression we should be asserting more than we know; viz. that\nit is in the power of an Author of the world to cause man always to\nbehave himself in accordance with moral laws. But this presupposes a\nconcept of freedom and of nature (of which latter we can only think an\nexternal author), which would imply an insight into the supersensible\nsubstrate of nature and its identity with that which causality through\nfreedom makes possible in the world. And this far surpasses the\ninsight of our Reason. Only of _man under moral laws_ can we say,\nwithout transgressing the limits of our insight: his being constitutes\nthe final purpose of the world. This harmonises completely with the\njudgement of human Reason reflecting morally upon the course of the\nworld. We believe that we perceive in the case of the wicked the traces\nof a wise purposive reference, if we only see that the wanton criminal\ndoes not die before he has undergone the deserved punishment of his\nmisdeeds. According to our concepts of free causality, our good or bad\nbehaviour depends on ourselves; we regard it the highest wisdom in the\ngovernment of the world to ordain for the first, opportunity, and for\nboth, their consequence, in accordance with moral laws. In the latter\nproperly consists the glory of God, which is hence not unsuitably\ndescribed by theologians as the ultimate purpose of creation.-- It\nis further to be remarked that when we use the word creation, we\nunderstand nothing more than we have said here, viz. the cause of the\n_being_ of the world or of the things in it (substances). This is\nwhat the concept properly belonging to this word involves (_actuatio\nsubstantiae est creatio_); and consequently there is not implied in it\nthe supposition of a freely working, and therefore intelligent, cause\n(whose being we first of all want to prove).\n\n[134] [Note added in Second Edition.] This moral argument does not\nsupply any _objectively-valid_ proof of the Being of God; it does\nnot prove to the sceptic that there is a God, but proves that if he\nwishes to think in a way consonant with morality, he must admit the\n_assumption_ of this proposition under the maxims of his practical\nReason.-- We should therefore not say: it is necessary _for morals_\n[Sittlichkeit], to assume the happiness of all rational beings of the\nworld in proportion to their morality [Moralit\u00e4t]; but rather, this\nis necessitated _by_ morality. Accordingly, this is a _subjective_\nargument sufficient for moral beings.\n\n[135] [Second Edition.]\n\n[136] [Second Edition.]\n\n[137] In a practical sense that religion is always idolatry which\nconceives the Supreme Being with properties, according to which\nsomething else besides morality can be a fit condition for that which\nman can do being in accordance with His Will. For however pure and\nfree from sensible images the concept that we have formed may be in a\ntheoretical point of view, yet it will be in a practical point of view\nstill represented as an _idol_, _i.e._ in regard to the character of\nHis Will, anthropomorphically.\n\n[138] [Cf. _Introd. to Logic_, ix. p. 63, \u201cConviction is opposed to\nPersuasion, which is a belief from inadequate reasons, of which we do\nnot know whether they are only subjective or are also objective.\u201d]\n\n[139] [Second Edition.]\n\n[140] [_I.e._ _Urtheils_. First Edition had _Urtheilens_, the judging\nsubject.]\n\n[141] _Analogy_ (in a qualitative signification) is the identity of\nthe relation between reasons and consequences (causes and effects), so\nfar as it is to be found, notwithstanding the specific difference of\nthe things or those properties in them which contain the reason for\nlike consequences (_i.e._ considered apart from this relation). Thus we\nconceive of the artificial constructions of beasts by comparing them\nwith those of men; by comparing the ground of those effects brought\nabout by the former, which we do not know, with the ground of similar\neffects brought about by men (reason), which we do know; _i.e._ we\nregard the ground of the former as an analogon of reason. We then try\nat the same time to show that the ground of the artisan faculty of\nbeasts, which we call instinct, specifically different as it is in fact\nfrom reason, has yet a similar relation to its effect (the buildings of\nthe beaver as compared with those of men).--But then I cannot therefore\nconclude that because man uses _reason_ for his building, the beaver\nmust have the like, and call this a _conclusion_ according to analogy.\nBut from the similarity of the mode of operation of beasts (of which\nwe cannot immediately perceive the ground) to that of men (of which we\nare immediately conscious), we can quite rightly conclude _according\nto analogy_, that beasts too act in accordance with _representations_\n(not as _Descartes_ has it, that they are machines), and that despite\ntheir specific distinction they are yet (as living beings) of the same\ngenus as man. The principle of our right so to conclude consists in\nthe sameness of the ground for reckoning beasts in respect of the said\ndetermination in the same genus with men, regarded as men, so far as we\ncan externally compare them with one another in accordance with their\nactions. There is _par ratio_. Just so I can conceive, according to the\nanalogy of an Understanding, the causality of the supreme World-Cause,\nby comparing its purposive products in the world with the artificial\nworks of men; but I cannot conclude according to analogy to those\nproperties in it [which are in man], because here the principle of the\npossibility of such a method of reasoning entirely fails, viz. the\n_paritas rationis_ for counting the Supreme Being in one and the same\ngenus with man (in respect of the causality of both). The causality\nof the beings of the world, which is always sensibly conditioned (as\nis causality through Understanding) cannot be transferred to a Being\nwhich has in common with them no generic concept save that of Thing in\ngeneral.\n\n[142] We thus miss nothing in the representation of the relations of\nthis Being to the world, as far as the consequences, theoretical or\npractical, of this concept are concerned. To wish to investigate what\nit is in itself, is a curiosity as purposeless as it is vain.\n\n[143] [Cf. _Introd. to Logic_, p. 76, where the conditions of a\nlegitimate hypothesis are laid down. See also _Critique of Pure\nReason_, Methodology, c. i. \u00a7 3.]\n\n[144] [This illustration is also given in the _Logic_ (p. 57);\nwhere the three _modi_ of belief, Opinion, Faith, and Knowledge,\nare distinguished from each other. Cf. _Critique of Pure Reason_,\nMethodology, c. ii. \u00a7 3.]\n\n[145] [The speculations of Swedenborg seem to have always had a strange\nfascination for Kant. He says of two reported cases of Swedenborg\u2019s\nclairvoyance that he knows not how to disprove them (Rosenkranz vii.\n5); but in his _Anthropology_ \u00a7\u00a7 35, 37, he attacks Swedenborgianism\nas folly. So in an early essay, _Dreams of a Visionary explained\nby Dreams of Metaphysics_, he avows his scepticism as to the value\nof the information which \u201cpsychical research\u201d can supply about the\nspirit-world, though he is careful not to commit himself to any\ndogmatic statement on the subject of ghosts. In the _Critique of Pure\nReason_ (when discussing the Postulates of Empirical Thought) he\ngives, as an instance of a concept inconsistent with the canons of\npossibility, \u201ca power of being in a community of thought with other\nmen, however distant from us.\u201d]\n\n[146] [Cf. _supra_, p. 229.]\n\n[147] I here extend, correctly as it seems to me, the concept of a\nthing of fact beyond the usual signification of this word. For it is\nnot needful, not even feasible, to limit this expression merely to\nactual experience, if we are talking of the relation of things to\nour cognitive faculties; for an experience merely possible is quite\nsufficient in order that we may speak of them merely as objects of a\ndefinite kind of cognition.\n\n[148] [Cf. _introduction to Logic_, p. 59 note.]\n\n[149] [Second Edition.]\n\n[150] Things of faith are not therefore _articles of faith_; if we\nunderstand by the latter things of faith to the _confession_ of which\n(internal or external) we can be bound. Natural theology contains\nnothing like this. For since they, as things of faith (like things of\nfact) cannot be based on theoretical proofs, [they are accepted by]\na belief which is free and which only as such is compatible with the\nmorality of the subject.\n\n[151] The final purpose which the moral law enjoins upon us to further,\nis not the ground of duty; since this lies in the moral law, which,\nas formal practical principle, leads categorically, independently\nof the Objects of the faculty of desire (the material of the will)\nand consequently of any purpose whatever. This formal characteristic\nof my actions (their subordination under the principle of universal\nvalidity), wherein alone consists their inner moral worth, is quite\nin our power; and I can quite well abstract from the possibility or\nthe unattainableness of purposes which I am obliged to promote in\nconformity with that law (because in them consists only the external\nworth of my actions) as something which is never completely in my\npower, in order only to look to that which is of my doing. But then\nthe design of promoting the final purpose of all rational beings\n(happiness so far as it is possible for it to be accordant with duty)\nis even yet prescribed by the law of duty. The speculative Reason,\nhowever, does not see at all the attainableness of this (neither on\nthe side of our own physical faculty nor on that of the co-operation\nof nature). It must rather, so far as we can judge in a rational way,\nhold the derivation, by the aid of such causes, of such a consequence\nof our good conduct from mere nature (internal and external) without\nGod and immortality, to be an ungrounded and vain, though well-meant,\nexpectation; and if it could have complete certainty of this judgement,\nit would regard the moral law itself as the mere deception of our\nReason in a practical aspect. But since the speculative Reason fully\nconvinces itself that the latter can never take place, but that on the\nother hand those Ideas whose object lies outside nature can be thought\nwithout contradiction, it must for its own practical law and the\nproblem prescribed thereby, and therefore in a moral aspect, recognise\nthose Ideas as real in order not to come into contradiction with itself.\n\n[152] It is a trust in the promise of the moral law; [not however such\nas is contained in it, but such as I put into it and that on morally\nadequate grounds.[153] For a final purpose cannot be commanded by any\nlaw of Reason without this latter at the same time promising, however\nuncertainly, its attainableness; and thus justifying our belief in\nthe special conditions under which alone our Reason can think it as\nattainable. The word _fides_ expresses this; and it can only appear\ndoubtful, how this expression and this particular Idea came into moral\nphilosophy, since it first was introduced with Christianity, and the\nadoption of it perhaps might seem to be only a flattering imitation\nof Christian terminology. But this is not the only case in which this\nwonderful religion with its great simplicity of statement has enriched\nphilosophy with far more definite and purer concepts of morality, than\nit had been able to furnish before; but which, once they are there, are\n_freely_ assented to by Reason and are assumed as concepts to which\nit could well have come of itself and which it could and should have\nintroduced.]\n\n[153] [Second Edition.]\n\n[154] [Cf. _Introd. to Logic_, ix. p. 60, \u201cThat man is morally\n_unbelieving_ who does not accept that which though _impossible_ to\nknow is _morally necessary_ to suppose.\u201d]\n\n[155] [First Edition.]\n\n[156] [In the _Critique of Pure Reason_, Dialectic, bk. II. c. iii. \u00a7\u00a7\n4, 5.]\n\n[157] [H. S. Reimarus (1694-1768), the author of the famous\n_Wolfenb\u00fcttel Fragments_, published after the death of Reimarus by\nLessing. The book alluded to by Kant is probably the _Abhandlungen von\nden vornehmsten Wahrheiten der nat\u00fcrlichen Religion_ (1754), which had\ngreat popularity in its day.]\n\n[158] [These arguments are advanced by Hume, _Inquiry_, \u00a7 vii. Cf. also\n_Pure Reason_, Dialectic, bk. II. c. iii. \u00a7 6, and _Practical Reason_,\nDialectic, c. ii. \u00a7 vii.]\n\n[159] [Cf. _Practical Reason_, Dialectic, c. ii. \u00a7 v.]\n\n[160] The admiration for beauty, and also the emotion aroused by the\nmanifold purposes of nature, which a reflective mind is able to feel\neven prior to a clear representation of a rational Author of the world,\nhave something in themselves like _religious_ feeling. They seem in the\nfirst place by a method of judging analogous to moral to produce an\neffect upon the moral feeling (gratitude to, and veneration for, the\nunknown cause); and thus by exciting moral Ideas to produce an effect\nupon the mind, when they inspire that admiration which is bound up with\nfar more interest than mere theoretical observation can bring about.\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber\u2019s Notes\n\n\nPunctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a\npredominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not\nchanged.\n\nSimple typographical errors were corrected.\n\nAmbiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.\n\nText has three occcurrences of \u201ccasuality\u201d, which have been retained,\nbut which may be misprints for \u201ccausality\u201d.\n\nThese are transliterations of the Greek text for use on devices that\ncannot display such text:\n\n Page xvii: kosmos.\n\n Page xxii: kalo.\n\n Page xxiv: s\u00f4phrosyn\u00ea.\n\n Page xxxiii: nous.\n\n Page 397: kat\u2019 al\u00eatheian (or) kat\u2019 anthr\u00f4pon.\n\n Footnote 79 (originally on page 195): ha gar auta lyp\u00ear\u00f4s hor\u00f4men,\n tout\u00f4n tas eikonas tas malista \u00eakrib\u00f4menas chairomen the\u00f4rountes\n hoion th\u00eari\u00f4n te morphas t\u00f4n atimotat\u00f4n kai nekr\u00f4n.","title":"Kant's Critique of Judgement","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":134980}