{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_48892/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_48892","id":"gutenberg_48892","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/48892","summary":null,"tags":["Bible. Leviticus, XVIII, 18 -- Criticism, interpretation, etc.","Category: Law & Criminology","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Marriage law -- Great Britain","Marriage with deceased wife's sister -- Biblical teaching","Marriage with deceased wife's sister -- Great Britain"],"text":"Transcribed from the 1869 James Parker and Co. edition by David Price,\nemail ccx074@pglaf.org\n\n\n\n\n\n                 Marriage with a Deceased Wife\u2019s Sister.\n\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n                           LEVITICUS XVIII. 18,\n                  CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH THE LAW\n                             OF THE LEVIRATE.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n                                 A LETTER\n                                    TO\n                    THE RIGHT HON. THE LORD HATHERLEY,\n                     LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF ENGLAND,\n                               &c\u201e &c, &c.\n\n                                    BY\n\n                            M. W. MAYOW, M.A.,\n\n          RECTOR OF SOUTH HEIGHTON CUM TARRING NEVILLE, SUSSEX,\n                   AND LATE STUDENT OF CH. CH., OXFORD.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n                             Second Edition.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n                 London and Oxford: JAMES PARKER AND CO.\n                          Brighton: G. WAKELING.\n                                  1869.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n                                BRIGHTON:\n                          G. WAKELING, PRINTER,\n                              NORTH STREET.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n\n\n\nMarriage with a Deceased Wife\u2019s Sister.\n\n\n                                 A LETTER\n                  TO THE RIGHT HON. THE LORD HATHERLEY,\n                    _Lord High Chancellor of England_,\n                           _&c._, _&c._, _&c._\n\n                                * * * * *\n\nMY LORD,\n\nThe deep interest which for a long period you have taken in preserving\nintact our Table of Degrees as to prohibited marriages, will, I hope,\nsufficiently account for my wish to address the following remarks to your\nLordship, and your unvarying kindness will no less account for the ready\npermission which you have given me to do so.  I will not take up any time\nin preface further than just to observe that of course you are not in any\nway responsible for the views or the argument of the ensuing pages,\nthough I am, I hope, justified in believing that, whatever be their\nimperfections, the object at which they aim will meet with your sympathy\nand approval.  My earnest and anxious wish is to do what I may, God\nhelping me, to aid in averting what I feel would be a grievous sin if our\nmarriage law were altered in the sense desired by the promoters of the\nWife\u2019s Sister\u2019s Marriage Bill.  I do not purpose to go over the whole\nground which has been so often contested, (to do which would be almost an\nimpertinence in remarks addressed to your Lordship), but rather to\nconfine my observations to the Scriptural argument, or, perhaps I should\nsay, to a portion of the Scriptural argument against the change proposed,\nviz.\u2014to the due sense and application of the 18th verse of the xviii.\nchapter of Leviticus.\n\nThere is, I suppose, no room for reasonable doubt that the case of the\nadvocates of a change in our law which may sanction the marriage of a man\nwith his deceased wife\u2019s sister, rests mainly, so far as the Scriptural\nargument is concerned, upon the 18th verse of the xviii. chapter of\nLeviticus.  \u201cNeither shalt thou take a wife to her sister, to vex her, to\nuncover her nakedness, beside the other, in her life time,\u201d where, the\ntranslation being assumed to be correct, the interpretation put upon it\nis that if such a union is forbidden in the life time of the first wife,\nthere is a tacit sanction of the same after her decease.  If it were not\nfor this one verse thus translated and thus interpreted, there would, I\nthink, hardly be a question raised or a doubt felt by one in a thousand\nthat such unions are prohibited, denounced as incestuous, and forbidden\nunder God\u2019s general law, just as we find them set down in Archbishop\nParker\u2019s table of prohibited degrees.\n\nThe importance, then, of this verse being admitted as to the right\nunderstanding of God\u2019s will in this matter, I propose briefly to call\nattention to some points connected with it which I think have not\nreceived the consideration to which they are entitled.  My aim will be to\nshow, even conceding the whole demand as to the correctness of the\ntranslation found in the Text of our authorized version, and not\ndisputing the inference that there is a certain tacit sanction of such a\nUnion with the second sister after the death of the first, yet that upon\na careful consideration, it may most reasonably be maintained that the\nsanction does not extend to any general permission of the same, but that\nthe enactment or permission is made and given for one special object\nonly, and is limited to one particular condition of things, incident only\nto the Jewish economy, to meet which it is definitely designed and\nrestricted; that therefore it involves, rightly understood, no\ncontradiction at all to the law laid down generally that none shall\napproach to any near of kin to him (v. 6), nor to the cases which follow\nillustrating the meaning of that law (v. 7\u201317), nor, therefore to the\nprohibitions generally, nor to that one among them particularly, that a\nwoman shall not marry two brothers\u2014extended by direct analogy to the\nconverse case, that a man shall not marry two sisters; in other words,\nthat though the translation, and the inference to a certain extent, be\nboth conceded, yet there is an ample and true sense for the passage, and\nfull scope for its intention and enactment, without its for a moment\nclashing with the prohibitions of the general law.\n\nBut first I would say a word to clear the position that but for this 18th\nverse of the xviii. chapter of Leviticus, no one would doubt, as to the\nprohibition in question.\n\nHow does the case stand?  The xviii. chapter of Leviticus deals first (as\nthe heading states), with \u201cunlawful marriages.\u201d  After declaring\nemphatically, in the first five verses, the importance of keeping God\u2019s\nlaw, and warning the people against falling into the sins of the\nEgyptians and the Canaanites, the matter itself is opened in the 6th\nverse\u2014\u201cNone of you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him to\nuncover their nakedness: I am the Lord.\u201d  \u201cThis,\u201d as you, my lord,\nobserved at the meeting at Willis\u2019s Rooms, (February 1st, 1860,) \u201cis the\nkey-note to all that follows.  The law then shows who are near of kin to\nus, and proceeds to mention more cases of affinity than of relationship\nby blood.\u201d {5}  I am aware that it has been contended on philological\ngrounds that the terms \u201cnear of kin\u201d are necessarily confined in their\nsense to kindred by blood relationship, and cannot embrace relationship\nby marriage; but I do not feel that there is any material weight in the\ncritical examination of such a passage, as to the general use of a phrase\nor word, because it seems to me we have here the comment of the Holy\nGhost Himself in what follows as to the sense in which the words \u201cnear of\nkin\u201d are, in the connection in which they there stand, to be understood;\nthat is to say, that which follows gives, by the details of the\nenactments ensuing, God\u2019s own comment as to what is intended by \u201cnear of\nkin,\u201d and if these details be found to embrace affinity as well as, and\nas much as, blood relationship, it appears to me that the consideration\nof what in other cases is the usage of the term, must be beside the\nquestion we have before us.  Nay, is it not, indeed, very probable that\nterms, which in their ordinary usage would refer simply to blood\nrelationship, are here chosen by Divine inspiration to include also\nrelationship by affinity, for the very purpose of showing that a man and\nhis wife being one flesh, the nearness of kin here contemplated, and\nillustrated by the instances which follow, was to embrace both\nrelationships alike?  I do not know how better to shew that, in the whole\nconnection of this passage, the enactment is of the kind which I have\nmentioned, than by a quotation from the pamphlet of Mr. Keble, published\nin 1849.  Though, my lord, you and others have said the same things, you\nwill, I am sure, bear with me whilst I recall the passage as it stands in\nthe words of that revered writer.  After shewing the scope of the law to\nextend not merely to the Jews by the curse which it entails having been\nbrought upon the very heathen who gave way to such iniquities, he says:\u2014\n\n    \u201cNow, what are the customs which were so abominable in the old\n    inhabitants of God\u2019s Holy Land, and caused the land itself to vomit\n    them out? (the customs, I mean, in respect of marriage: for of the\n    other horrors mentioned in this chapter we are not now compelled to\n    speak.)  They are all forbidden in one general principle: \u2018None of\n    you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him, to uncover\n    their nakedness: I am the Lord.\u2019  This being laid down in the 6th\n    verse, the following verses allege so many instances, whereby God\u2019s\n    people might understand what \u2018near of kin\u2019 means.  And it is\n    remarkable, that in this enunciation the law makes no distinction\n    between those who are akin by marriage and those who are akin by\n    blood, but mentions them indiscriminately, as if the one sort were\n    precluded from marrying under the same penalties as the other.\n\n    \u201cFor these are the degrees expressly forbidden, in their order.\n    First, a natural mother, in v. 7.  Next, a father\u2019s wife, or\n    step-mother, in v. 8: which is the case mentioned in 1 Cor. v. 1.\n    Next, a sister, v. 9.  Next, a grand-daughter, v. 10.  Next, a\n    half-sister, v. 11.  Next, an aunt by the father\u2019s side, v. 12.\n    Next, an aunt by the mother\u2019s side, v. 13.  Next, an aunt by marriage\n    with an uncle, v. 14.  Next, a son\u2019s wife, v. 15.  Next, a brother\u2019s\n    wife, v. 16.  Next, a wife\u2019s daughter, mother, or grand-daughter, v.\n    17.\n\n    \u201cHere are thirteen cases in all: six of kindred by blood, and seven\n    of kindred by marriage: and neither by the order in which they follow\n    one another, nor by any difference of expression regarding them, is\n    any hint given, that the one sort of profanation is less heinous in\n    God\u2019s sight than the other.  The world may have come to think there\n    is a difference, because the world will not believe that man and wife\n    are really one flesh.  But the written law of God apparently deals\n    with both alike.\u201d {7}\n\nHe then adds:\u2014\n\n    \u201cThe next remark I have to make on this, which is God\u2019s own table of\n    prohibited marriages, is one which it seems to me that no fair mind\n    can deny.  Indeed, one is half ashamed to enounce it, it is so\n    obvious: yet the reasoning on the other side appears to be mainly\n    based on the denial of it.  It is simply this: that nearness of kin\n    not being affected by sex, what is forbidden to a man is forbidden to\n    a woman in the same degree of kindred or affinity, though it be not\n    set down in words.  For instance, in v. 7, a man is forbidden to\n    marry his mother: then, by the same rule, a woman is forbidden to\n    marry her father, though the prohibition is not expressed.  Surely it\n    would be fearful paltering with God\u2019s law, not to accept and obey\n    such a plain rule as this.  And it is to be observed, that these\n    Canons are all addressed to men only: the woman\u2019s duty and the\n    woman\u2019s sin are left to be inferred in each case: but what should we\n    think of the woman who should therefore account herself left at\n    liberty, so far as the Levitical laws are concerned?\n\n    \u201cNow look at v. 16; which, being expressed in such English as we now\n    commonly talk, would run, I suppose, as follows: \u2018Thou shalt not\n    marry thy brother\u2019s widow: she is one flesh with thy brother, and is\n    therefore thine own sister.\u2019  Can any other interpretation be put\n    upon it? and if this be the right interpretation, are not marriages\n    with a brother\u2019s widow plainly forbidden among the Canaanitish\n    abominations?\u201d {8}\n\nAll this appears to me not only a fair and right explanation, with no\nunwarrantable deductions or inferences, but one absolutely irrefutable,\nunless God Himself have marked in some other place a dispensation or\nexception to be made to it.  I know such dispensation or exception is\njust what is claimed.  To deal with such allegation is the very object of\nmy addressing you, and I shall shortly come to that part of my subject.\nBut it may not be amiss here just to call attention to the fact that Dr.\nM\u2019Caul himself (whom I think I may designate as the most learned and able\nof the advocates for the change of the law in question) seems to admit\nthat, were there no other Scripture to override the law as thus\nproclaimed, he should acknowledge the force of this part of the xviii.\nchapter of Leviticus as conclusive on the unlawfulness of marriage with\nthe deceased wife\u2019s sister; for he says expressly, in his first letter on\nthe subject, addressed to the Rev. W. H. Lyall, \u201cOn some points, I think,\nwe agree; as, for instance, that the final appeal in questions relating\nto marriage must be to the Word of God. . . . I also am convinced that\nthe laws in Leviticus xviii., being a part of the moral law, stand on a\ntotally different footing from circumcision, or the Jewish Sabbaths, or\nabstinence from meats.  Indeed, I believe that this marriage law was\ngiven to the Gentile Churches in the famous decree of the Council of\nJerusalem.  On this ground, I believe that the prohibitions of Leviticus\nxviii. are binding on all Christians.\u201d  That is, he believes, that the\ngeneral law then given, as being of a moral nature, and intended for all\nmen, was distinctly re-enacted, and re-decreed for the sake of greater\nperspicuity, by the Christian Church in the Council at Jerusalem.  And he\ngoes on\u2014\u201cI agree, further, with those who interpret \u2018woman\u2019 or \u2018wife\u2019 in\nthese prohibitions as comprehending widowhood, so that these females are\nprohibited, not only during the lives of their husbands, but absolutely\nand forever.\u201d  And he adds\u2014\u201cAnd, lastly, I admit that from the prohibited\nmarriages enumerated, compared with other parts of the Divine\nlegislation, others not enumerated may be pronounced unlawful.\u201d {9}\nWhere we may see that, although with a certain reserve, yet the principle\nof arguing from analogy, and from a case to its converse, in regard to\nsex, appears to be admitted.  And I think I do not misrepresent the whole\ntone and sense of the two letters of Dr. M\u2019Caul, when I say that I am\nconvinced, but for the 18th verse of the xviii. chapter, he would himself\nreadily have allowed the full weight of Mr. Keble\u2019s statement, and\nconsidered these unions to be absolutely prohibited.\n\nBut next as to the exception claimed.  It is true that there is an\nexception to the working of the law laid down in verse 16, concerning the\nbrother\u2019s wife, by a positive enactment in Deuteronomy (chap. xxv. v.\n5\u201310), where provision is made for a man \u201craising up seed unto his\nbrother,\u201d by taking to him his widow to wife, if the brother have died\nchildless, that \u201cthe first-born which she beareth\u201d may \u201csucceed in the\nname of his brother, which is dead, that his name be not put out of\nIsrael\u201d (v. 6.)  But I feel justified in saying that this alone would\nhave been no difficulty to Dr. M\u2019Caul (nor to any man of his reasoning\npowers), as to the prevalence of the general law in all cases but the\nspecial one excepted, and that but for the 18th verse of the xviii.\nchapter of Leviticus, our 99th Canon and the table of prohibited degrees\nwould have been almost or quite universally accepted as the true\nenunciation of the will and law of God in this matter of unlawful\nmarriages.\n\nIt is, then, to that particular passage of Holy Scripture that it is\nnecessary to draw attention.  And here, my lord, I must take up a word,\nwhich I find in your speech before referred to, which seems to me to be\nemphatically a word \u201cof truth and soberness.\u201d  You say, \u201cTo over-ride a\ncommand, which is distinct and precise, you must have a very clear verse\nand a very clear interpretation.\u201d {10}  Dr. M\u2019Caul quotes these words,\nwith a distinct approval of their statement, though with exactly the\nconverse of their application.  \u201cYou believe,\u201d he says, \u201cthat a very\nclear verse and a very clear interpretation might over-ride a command,\neven though it be distinct and precise, and you are right.\u201d  He goes on,\n\u201cLev. xviii. 16, the verse on which you chiefly rest your Scriptural\narguments, is, so far as relates to marriage with a brother\u2019s wife,\ndistinct and precise, and enunciates a command absolutely and without any\nlimitation; and yet it is over-ridden by Deut. xxv. 5.\u201d  He means, of\ncourse, over-ridden as to the particular case of \u201ca man\u2019s raising up seed\nunto his brother;\u201d but not so as to sanction the brother taking the\nbrother\u2019s wife in any other contingency.  And this we, as well as he,\nallow and admit, for who shall limit the Almighty\u2019s right, and power to\ngrant or make any special exceptions to His general laws, which He may\nthink fit?  But we should have deemed it strange indeed if the whole law\nenacted in one place were definitely repealed in another, whilst that law\nwas in force among those for whom it was given and designed.  But so far\nwe can well go with Dr. M\u2019Caul.  He proceeds, where, as I hope presently\nto shew, we have no need to follow him, and where, indeed, if his view\nwere correct, there _would be_ the total repeal of what is stated as the\nlaw in one verse, in the second verse after it.  However, to go on,\u2014Dr.\nM\u2019Caul adds, \u201cAnd therefore, _a fortiori_, your inferential prohibition\nwith regard to a wife\u2019s sister may be over-ridden also by a clear verse\nand a clear interpretation.  If weight of authority is to decide, Lev.\nxviii. 18, is just such a verse, and its interpretation has the required\ncondition.  Here, then, the controversy narrows itself into that which is\nthe common and popular view of the matter: whether the inferential\nprohibition from verse 16 is to over-ride the expressed command of verse\n18, or the plain letter of this latter verse to over-ride the inference\nfrom the former.\u201d {11}  Now, I shall have something further to say\npresently as to \u201cthe expressed command,\u201d and the \u201cplain letter of this\nlatter verse;\u201d but at present let me merely remark, that we have, at any\nrate, Dr. M\u2019Caul\u2019s admission that between these two verses there _is a\nconflict and an over-riding_.  In his view even, there is discrepancy.\nWhat is, in the one, he tells us, at least inferentially prohibited, is,\nin the other, expressly commanded; and this, not in a case or manner\nparallel to the variation between the 16th verse, _prohibiting_ as the\ngeneral law, and the passage in Deut. xxv. 5, _enjoining_ in the\nexceptional contingency named, but, on the contrary, in a case of a\nuniversal negative met and confronted, two verses afterwards, by a case\nof a, not exceptional, contradictory affirmative.  And the only\npalliation of such a startling discrepancy in Holy Scripture is, we are\nto understand, that it is inadmissible to draw the inference from the\nwoman being forbidden to marry two brothers, that the man is forbidden to\nmarry two sisters.  Although throughout the restrictions this principle\nis necessary to prevent the most revolting permissions under the law, and\nalthough, but for the 18th verse, no one, we believe, would have dreamed\nof questioning it in the particular of the man and two sisters, yet here\nit must be at once ignored, or you have an absolute contradiction of\ncommands, in the same enunciation of law, within two verses. {12}  I\nnotice this point expressly, because I think we cannot too strongly\nentertain the conviction of the _unlikelihood_ of such a thing occurring\nthus in the word and law of God; and therefore, as a reason for the most\ncareful examination, whether we may not have overlooked the real scope\nand object of this 18th verse, even if we admit the correctness of the\ntranslation and of the sense.  Observe, there is a great distinction\nbetween the sense and the application.  Admitting the sense, I must deny\nthe application, as I shall presently shew.  But here let me repeat, if\nthere be but a fairly reasonable account to be given of the existence and\napplication of the 18th verse, without its running us into the difficulty\nof this over-riding, and collision with itself of God\u2019s law, and if we\nhereby avoid the gross unlikelihood which I have mentioned, then surely\nsuch account and such application ought to commend itself to every candid\nmind, as at least worthy of the most serious consideration.\n\nMy Lord, I venture to think such account and application of the 18th\nverse there is; and though it has been touched upon by others, and Dr.\nM\u2019Caul himself came very near it, yet it appears to have been too little\ndwelt upon by any, and strangely overlooked by him. {13a}\n\nLet me here bring the matter once more to the point of divergence.  We\nhave first the general law, \u201cNone of you shall approach to any that is\nnear of kin to him\u201d (v. 6).  We have then the general catalogue of\nprohibitions which come under this head, and form the divine comment on\nthe terms \u201cnear of kin:\u201d and these dealing, with cases of affinity, in a\nmajority of the prohibitions expressed, as compared with those of blood\nrelationship (v. 7\u201317.)  All these, moreover, be it observed, put in the\nstatement as commands upon the _man_, leaving the obligation upon the\n_woman_ to be inferred.  Upon this statement we have Archbishop Parker\u2019s\ntable of degrees, and of the forbidden unions, extending exactly to the\nparallel cases of all those named;\u2014with the like witness also of the 99th\nCanon, declaring all such alliances to be incestuous;\u2014and this table\nrequired by our law, both of Church and State, to be set up in all Parish\nChurches. {13b}  But we have then the 18th verse making, as is alleged,\nnot merely an exception, but a contradiction to the parallel case of what\nis forbidden in verse 16 as to the brother\u2019s wife, and permitting the\nunion with a wife\u2019s sister, so that it be not in the lifetime of the\nformer.  We thus come to what Dr. M\u2019Caul himself considers to be a case\nof _over-riding_, where we must determine whether (to use again his own\nwords) \u201cthe inferential prohibition from verse 16 is to over-ride the\nexpressed command of verse 18, or the plain letter of this latter verse\nto over-ride the inference from the former.\u201d {14}\n\nNow, what I am anxious to see is, whether there is any need to force upon\nus this _over-riding_ at all.  I think not.\n\nTo show what I mean, I ask this\u2014Take the prohibition of the brother\u2019s\nwife first in its plain literal terms, verse 16, and then is there,\nindependently of the 18th verse, any direct exception to it?  Certainly\nthere is.  When we come to the further explication of the Jewish polity,\nand God\u2019s designs in reference to it, we find a special provision in the\nlaw of the Levirate, (that is, the law of raising up seed to the deceased\nbrother), which will clash with that prohibition; for the brother is\nrequired to take his brother\u2019s wife and raise up seed to a house in\ndanger of becoming extinct in Israel.  \u201cIf brethren dwell together, and\none of them die, and have no child, the wife of the dead shall not marry\nwithout unto a stranger: her husband\u2019s brother shall go in unto her, and\ntake her to him to wife, and perform the duty of an husband\u2019s brother\nunto her.  And it shall be, that the firstborn which she beareth shall\nsucceed in the name of his brother which is dead, that his name be not\nput out of Israel.  And if the man like not to take his brother\u2019s wife,\nthen let his brother\u2019s wife go up to the gate unto the elders, and say,\nMy husband\u2019s brother refuseth to raise up unto his brother a name in\nIsrael, he will not perform the duty of my husband\u2019s brother.  Then the\nelders of his city shall call him, and speak unto him: and if he stand to\nit, and say, I like not to take her; then shall his brother\u2019s wife come\nunto him in the presence of the elders, and loose his shoe from off his\nfoot, and spit in his face, and say, So shall it be done unto that man\nthat will not build up his brother\u2019s house.  And his name shall be called\nin Israel, The house of him that hath his shoe loosed.\u201d  Deut. xxv.,\n5\u201310.\n\nIn this passage there is, not what I should call a contradiction to the\ngeneral law, but an exception in a particular case, and for a particular\ncase only.  It is no general permission over-riding and making of none\neffect the general prohibition, but a particular injunction for a special\npurpose in one defined contingency.  If a man\u2019s brother die childless,\nhis brother shall take his wife and raise up seed unto his brother.  As\nit was exactly quoted in the gospel: \u201cMaster, Moses said, If a man die,\nhaving no children, his brother shall marry his wife, and raise up seed\nunto his brother.\u201d {15}\n\nWe have already observed that the authority of Him who gave the\nprohibitory law is sufficient to give also the permissive, or more than\npermissive, exception, so that we come into no difficulty as to the one,\nin such measure, _over-riding_ (to use again the term) the other.\n\nBut of course the opponent\u2019s rejoinder is: Are you not in the very same\ncase as to the other over-riding?  Is not the authority which gave the\nprohibition of the 16th verse equal to give the permission of the 18th?\n\nGranting that it is so, yet I must again call attention to this; how\nwholly unlikely it is that, without making any special exception, for any\nsuggested or defined cause, there should be within two verses of each\nother two general laws exactly contradictory, for so they are, if the\nargument from parallelism is allowed.  And therefore I must again urge\nhow probable this makes it, if there be any other reasonable sense or\napplication of the second passage not involving this contradiction, that\nsuch sense and application should be the true one, and there should be\nthus no over-riding at all between those two verses.\n\nIs there then any such reasonable sense and application of the\nprohibition of the 18th verse?  I think there is.  To see what it is, go\nback to the exception under the law of the Levirate, {16} and ask whether\nthe application of that law might not involve a man\u2019s marrying two\nsisters.  Undoubtedly it might.  Suppose two brothers to have married two\nsisters, and the one brother to die, leaving no child, if, by the\nLeviratical law the brother, as he would do under that law simply, took\nhis brother\u2019s widow to raise up seed unto his brother, he would also be\ntaking to wife his own wife\u2019s sister, and this, it would seem under the\ninjunction in Deuteronomy, he would not only be permitted but enjoined to\ndo.  But was this to be without exception?  I answer, No!  If his own\nwife, the sister of the other were still alive, the Almighty did not\nintend this rule to be carried out in such case.  He, the surviving\nbrother, in that contingency, should _not_ \u201ctake a wife to her sister to\nvex her, . . . beside the other in her life-time.\u201d  The prohibition of\nthe 18th verse of the xviii. chapter of Leviticus comes in.  It comes, in\nthe translation of the authorized version.  It comes, in the sense\ncontended for, as prohibitory if both sisters are alive together.  It\ncomes, as tacitly sanctioning the union if they are not; but it comes as\nlimited in its application to this one case and one contemplated\ncontingency, as God\u2019s own exception touching the two sisters \u201cin their\nlife-time:\u201d\u2014His exception, as to both sisters alive together; the\nexception to the exception contained in the law of the Levirate, but as\nhaving nothing at all to do with the general law: as therefore in no way\ninterfering with or over-riding the general law of the 16th verse; in no\nway making its general provision of none effect, as it would do if taken\nin the sense and application of these reformers of our marriage law.  And\nthe above-mentioned sense and application which everyone must allow the\n18th verse will bear, nay, which Dr. M\u2019Caul tells us all Jewish\nauthorities claim and sanction, as at least included in its legislation,\nis, I must contend, ample and sufficient to explain the standing of the\n18th verse, and its full meaning, without supposing any other application\nwhatsoever.\n\nAnd let it be observed that this statement of such application to the\ncase of two brothers having married two sisters, and the consequent duty,\nin the case of one brother dying childless, of the other brother to take\nhis widow under the law of Deuteronomy, modified by the exception of the\n18th verse of Lev. xviii, that such union is not to take place, if his\nown wife be still alive, is not mine, but Dr. M\u2019Caul\u2019s, in a full\nexamination of certain passages in the Mishna upon this subject.  Indeed\nit was Dr. M\u2019Caul\u2019s own statement, in his Letter addressed, my Lord, to\nyourself in 1860, which brought to my mind the main line of argument\nwhich I am endeavouring to unfold.  I asked myself;\u2014If all this in the\nMishna and in Dr. M\u2019Caul\u2019s explication of the matter, be true, why is it\nnot the sufficient truth and the whole explanation needed?  Why go on to\nmake a conflict between the two verses in Leviticus when the 18th verse\nis acknowledged to be the enunciation of an exception to the law of the\nLevirate, and when this is a full and sufficient account of it?\n\nIt will, I think, be no waste of time to extract the passage to which I\nrefer from Dr. M\u2019Caul\u2019s letter, as this will serve both to make what I\nhave here said the more distinct, and shew also, how entirely both the\nMishna and Dr. M\u2019Caul maintain all which I have advanced as to the\napplication of the verse in Leviticus to the case of the two brothers\nhaving married two sisters, though they refuse (at least the latter) to\nstop at this point.\n\nI ought to say thus much as introduction to the Extract.  In his first\nletter Dr. M\u2019Caul had mentioned the Mishna as confirming his view.  \u201cThe\nMishna compiled in the second century testifies that it (this permission\nof the marriage) was the common and received sense of the Hebraizing\nJews.\u201d {18}  This drew some remarks from the writer of one of the Tracts\npublished by the Marriage Law Defence Association, (Tract 8, p. 4, and\nAppendix, quoted also by yourself in the Appendix to your speech,) upon\nthe statements of the Mishna, which again caused Dr. M\u2019Caul in rejoinder\nto examine those statements and to comment upon them afresh in his letter\nto yourself.  I need not go back to the first two pamphlets.  Dr.\nM\u2019Caul\u2019s explanations in his second letter will shew all which I want to\nexhibit.  Complaining of inaccurate quotation on the part of the writer\nof Tract 8, he says,\n\n    \u201cI will give the passages as they stand in the Mishna, and you, Sir,\n    may judge of the faithfulness of this writer in making quotations.\n    The words of the Mishna are:\u2014\n\n    \u201c\u2018Suppose three brothers, two of them married to two sisters, and one\n    of them married to a stranger\u2014one of the sister\u2019s husbands dies, and\n    he who is married to the stranger takes his widow\u2014then the wife of\n    the second dies, and after that he that is married to the stranger\n    dies, behold this _widow_, (_i.e._, the surviving sister) is\n    prohibited to him for ever, because she was prohibited to him for\n    _one hour_.\u2019\n\n    \u201cNow, Sir, you will perceive several differences between this\n    statement of the Mishna and that of the Appendix.  1st, The Appendix\n    says,\u2014\u2018It is declared, that if that _brother\u2019s wife is his own wife\u2019s\n    sister_, _he may not marry her_.\u2019  The Mishna makes no such general\n    statement, but confines itself to a particular case.  2dly, The\n    reason the Mishna gives for the prohibition of the surviving sister\n    is that \u2018she had been prohibited to him _for one hour_,\u2019 which the\n    Appendix omits altogether.  3rdly, The Appendix says, \u2018And the reason\n    assigned is, that _the man and his wife\u2019s sister_ are related _within\n    the degrees forbidden by the holy law_ to intermarry,\u2019 not one word\n    of which is in the text of the Mishna, as you see.  The Mishna gives\n    the reason correctly, _she had been prohibited to the second brother\n    for one hour_, _i.e._, her widowhood commenced whilst her sister was\n    still alive and the wife of the other brother, in which case the\n    _Rabbis_ rule that she is prohibited for ever.\n\n    \u201cTo make this plain, I will put letters as in the Appendix:\u2014\n\n    \u201cTwo brothers | A/B | marry | M/N | Two sisters.\n\n    \u201cA third brother, C, marries S, a stranger, _i.e._, no relation.\n\n    \u201cA dies; M is left a widow.\n\n    \u201cC marries M, A\u2019s Widow, to fulfil a brother-in-law\u2019s duty, which B\n    could not do, because to marry two sisters simultaneously is\n    forbidden by Lev. xviii. 18.  This is the \u2018one hour\u2019 during which M\n    is prohibited to B.\n\n    \u201cN then dies, and B is left a widower; but he is not allowed to marry\n    M, left a second time a widow, because on the death of A, whilst N,\n    his wife, was alive, M was prohibited.  Out of this particular case,\n    by putting in words not in the Mishna, and by leaving out the words\n    \u2018one hour,\u2019 which are in the Mishna, the writer has made a new\n    Rabbinic law, unknown to the Mishna and its commentators, and from a\n    particular case has drawn a general conclusion, opposed to Jewish law\n    and practice.  For, take the deaths in a different order, so as to\n    avoid the \u2018one hour,\u2019 and then B might marry M.  Thus:\u2014\n\n    \u201cTwo brothers | A/B | marry | M/N | Two sisters.\n\n    \u201cA third brother, C, marries S, a stranger.\n\n    \u201cSuppose that N dies first, and after she is dead A dies without\n    children, then B may marry M, because she had not been \u2018prohibited to\n    him for _one hour_,\u2019 _i.e._, she had not been a widow whilst his own\n    wife was alive.  The second case alluded to is exactly similar:\u2014\n\n    \u201cMishna III. 9.\u2014\u2018Suppose two brothers [A and B] married two sisters\n    [M and N].  If one of the brothers [A] die, and afterwards the wife\n    of the second [N] die, then the widow [M] is prohibited to the\n    surviving brother [B] because she had been prohibited to him _one\n    hour_.\u2019\n\n    \u201cBut suppose that N had died first, and then A died without children,\n    then it would have been lawful for B to marry M, as may be seen in\n    Maimonides, Yad Hachazakah, Hilchoth Yibbum, ch. vii., \u00a7 3, 4, where\n    there is an analogous case.  The prohibition in the one case, and the\n    permission in the other, depends, not upon the words of the law, but\n    upon a general rule _laid down by the Rabbis_; that the lawfulness or\n    unlawfulness, as well as the obligation to perform the duty of a\n    brother-in-law, is regulated by the state of things existing at the\n    moment when the brother died.\u201d {20}\n\nI have extracted the above at full length, because at the same time that\nit shews all I want and even more than I want for my purpose, it yet also\nshews no contradiction to what I want, whilst it shews also that I\nsuppress no part of Dr. M\u2019Caul\u2019s statement or argument.  I say that it\nshews something more than I want, though nothing contradictory to it;\nbecause I have no need to consider either the third case of a brother\nmarrying a stranger, or the case of the _one hour_ commented upon by the\nMishna, or at least this case no further than as it brings out into the\nplainest prominence Dr. M\u2019Caul\u2019s own witness to the sense of Lev. xviii.\n18, that it forbids \u201cB to marry A\u2019s widow, because _to marry two sisters\nsimultaneously is forbidden by Lev. xviii._ 18.\u201d  That is, by the law of\nthe Levirate simply, this would have been required, but by the exception\nof the above verse it is forbidden. {21}\n\nAnd this is what I mean by saying the passage shews all I want.  It\nproves incontestably that according to the Mishna, according to the\nJewish Rabbis, according to Dr. M\u2019Caul, the enactment of the 18th verse\nof the xviii. of Leviticus was inserted, for the very purpose which I\nhave all along supposed:\u2014that it was the declaration of God\u2019s will, that\nwhen the operation of the law of the Levirate _per se_ would bring about\nthe brother taking his own wife\u2019s sister to wife to raise up seed unto\nhis brother, _then_ the exception to the exception came in and forbade\nhim to do so, if her sister, his own wife, were alive.  And this is what\nmade me say (p. 13) that Dr. M\u2019Caul came very near to the application of\nthat text which I have been unfolding, though I was obliged to add, he\noverlooked its importance in interpreting the law as contained in\nLeviticus, for he allows that the 18th verse of Leviticus xviii. reaches\nto, is intended to reach to, and to forbid, this especial union, which\notherwise would have been enjoined by the law in Deut. xxv., but it\nappears never to have occurred to him that this is the ample and\nsufficient explanation of the existence of that 18th verse.  He never\nseems to have conceived it possible that it should be restricted to being\nthe exception to the Leviratical Law, and not be a general Law itself.\n\nI would, my Lord, for many reasons, had it so pleased God, that Dr.\nM\u2019Caul were alive.  His ability and learning, his strong sense and true\npiety, and not least his willing readiness to join with those who might\ndiffer from him in many points in the defence of our common Church and\ncommon faith against the assaults of infidelity and rationalism, make his\ndeath a no ordinary loss to us in days like these.  But beyond this, I\nown, had it so been possible, I should have liked to point out to him how\nhis own statements, his own authorities, and his own reasoning had been\nthe very means to lead me to the conclusion, that we find a very complete\nand sufficient explanation of the existence and meaning of the 18th verse\nof Lev. xviii., without any occasion to resort to so violent an\nover-riding one statement of Scripture by another, as he has advocated.\nAnd this too without having to question the ordinary translation of the\nverse, or to find any difficulty in the sense of the words, \u201cin her\nlifetime.\u201d  All this, at any rate for the sake of argument, I seem able\nto concede to Dr. M\u2019Caul, to take his own account of _an_ application of\nthe passage, and only add, that it seems to me to be _the_ application,\nand the only application needed.  I cannot forbear adding, that if there\nbe but a chance of this being so, it makes it a most serious thing for\nanyone to speak lightly of the restrictions in question\u2014not merely of\nthis one of the brother\u2019s wife, but of all those laid down in this\nchapter of Leviticus, or to _think_ even of relaxing that code; for who\nshall say that we shall not thus \u201chaply be found to fight against God,\u201d\nand be bringing ourselves and our country under the curse of His Word,\ndenounced against all who defile themselves in these things: \u201cYe shall\ntherefore keep My statutes and My judgments; and shall not commit any of\nthese abominations, neither any of your own nation, nor any stranger that\nsojourneth among you: (for all these abominations have the men of the\nland done which were before you, and the land is defiled:) that the land\nspue not you out also, as it spued out the nations that were before you.\nFor whosoever shall commit any of these abominations, even the souls that\ncommit them shall be cut off from among their people.  Therefore shall ye\nkeep Mine ordinance, that ye commit not any of these abominable customs\nwhich were committed before you, and that ye defile not yourselves\ntherein: I am the Lord.\u201d {23}  In these days, my lord, we have many\nthings to make us anxious\u2014many things, I do not go too far in saying, to\nmake us tremble; but I hardly know anything which should fill us more\nwith anxiety, fear and trembling, than the thought that our legislature\nshould bring us under this terrible curse of God, by sanctioning, as the\nact of a people among whom \u201cChristianity is\u201d still \u201cthe law of the land,\u201d\nany one of those abominations, for which even the nations of Canaan were\ncut off and spued out.  And as to individuals, I must say, there are to\nme few things more calculated to raise mixed feelings of pity, contempt\nand horror, than the levity and recklessness of some of those who are\nadvocating the change\u2014pity for the ignorance of many who have been misled\nby mere bold assertion, contempt for the reasoning powers of others who\nseem never to dream of looking at any side of the question except that on\nwhich their own passions, prejudices, or wishes are enlisted, and horror\nat the fearful temerity of those who dare approach and argue upon such a\nsubject, without at least a sense of its importance, of the reverence\nwith which all discussion relative to it should be conducted, and an awe,\nat any rate, as to the possibility, after all, of God\u2019s law and will\nbeing in accordance with the Church\u2019s interpretation of it for so long a\ntime, and wholly against the \u201cnew thing\u201d which the spirit of modern\nlawlessness seems anxious to introduce!\n\nMy Lord, I have not designed or attempted to go through the whole\nargument on the question of the alteration of the Marriage law as now\nproposed, but have sought to confine myself to these points:\n\nI.  That the whole strength of the case of the promoters of the change,\nso far as Holy Scripture is concerned, rests upon the text, Lev. xviii.\n18, this text being taken to override the prohibition of Lev. xviii. 16.\n\nII.  That the contradiction of two general laws in God\u2019s Word, the one to\nthe other, in the course of three verses is highly unlikely and\nimprobable; so improbable that we are justified in expecting to find some\nother solution of the difficulty.\n\nIII.  That in the case in hand, there is another solution falling very\nnaturally into its place by careful comparison of Scripture with\nScripture.\n\nTo sum up the general argument, even at the risk of some repetition, we\nmay state it thus:\u2014\n\n(i.)  We have the general rule laid down: \u201cNone of you shall approach to\nany that is near of kin to him\u201d (verse 6).\n\n(ii.)  We have the instances and exemplifications of what this \u201cnearness\nof kin\u201d means, all of these given directly with reference to the _man_,\nleaving the corresponding _woman\u2019s_ duty to be inferred (verses 7\u201317).\n\n(iii.)  We have the particular case of the brother\u2019s wife (verse 16);\nwhereupon, by parity of reasoning, is inferred the prohibition of the\nwife\u2019s sister, it being here to be observed, that unless the cases of the\ndifferent sex, by parity of reason, be taken as contemplated by the Holy\nGhost in giving this Scripture, we have no written law against several\nmost frightful kinds of incest. {24}\n\n(iv.)  We have an exception to the very letter of the law as to the\nbrother\u2019s wife, by the injunction of the law of the Levirate, in the\nprovision for preventing the extinction of a house in Israel, by the\nbrother\u2019s taking his deceased brother\u2019s wife (if he have died childless),\nand raising up seed unto his brother: this, not in the nature of a\nprohibition, but of an exceptional injunction or command. (Deut. xxv.\n5\u201310.)\n\n(v.)  We have an exception to the above exception, forbidding its being\nextended to the taking the wife\u2019s sister in the case of the above\ninjunction working (as in one special case it might work), to the result\nof a brother, in taking his deceased brother\u2019s widow, taking also, by the\nsame act, his own wife\u2019s sister, and thus, if his own wife were still\nalive, having the two sisters together as wives.  For this would be the\ncase, were there no exceptional prohibition, when two brothers had\nmarried two sisters, and when, though one of the brothers had died\nchildless, yet both sisters were alive.  Then there comes in the\nexception: \u201cNeither shalt thou take a wife to her sister, to vex her . . .\nbeside the other in her lifetime\u201d (verse 18); as if it were said, In no\ncase\u2014no, not when the law of the Levirate would otherwise require it\u2014no,\nnot when the saving of a house in Israel from extinction would otherwise\ndemand it\u2014shall a man take his wife\u2019s sister, his own wife, her sister,\nbeing yet alive: where, too, we may observe, that the parallelism in the\ncases of the two brothers and the two sisters is strictly and exactly\nmaintained; for the woman in no case _could_ take a second brother, the\nother being alive; for her husband, the first brother, _must be dead_\nbefore the law of the Levirate could operate at all; therefore the wife\u2019s\nsister _could not_ (even when two brothers had married two sisters) take\nher husband\u2019s brother beside the other in his lifetime, and thus the\nwife\u2019s sister is exactly equally restrained from taking the sister\u2019s\nhusband, when the circumstances would lead to it by a man taking \u201ca wife\nto her sister . . . beside the other in her lifetime.\u201d\n\nThus, too, it is clear that the law of this 18th verse is a law of\nprohibition, not of relaxation, and therefore naturally and properly\ncomes in its place with the other prohibitions of this 18th chapter of\nLeviticus.\n\nAnd I venture to submit, that this is the whole meaning and application\nof this much controverted verse: viz., that it is not in the nature of a\ngeneral law at all, but is merely the declaration of an exception to an\nexception\u2014an exception to preclude two living sisters being\nsimultaneously the wives of one man, even when the law of the Levirate,\nbut for this prohibition, would lead to such result.  I must add, that to\nme it seems to be a full, natural and sufficient explanation of the\npassage without any further application at all, that is, without\nsupposing it to have anything to do with the general law, or to be any\nrelaxation of the prohibition of the 16th verse as to the brother\u2019s wife,\nor the converse case to it, by analogy, as to the wife\u2019s sister.\n\nPossibly the exact bearing of the foregoing argument may be made plainer\nby a paraphrase of the Scriptural statements, putting them something into\nthe form of statute law, by which means the different provisions of the\nseveral passages may be combined and their connection be seen, as various\nprovisions in the clauses or sections of an Act of Parliament are read\ntogether.  I dare say I shall expose myself to not unjust criticism for\ntechnical blunders, in attempting to adopt Act-of-Parliament phraseology;\nbut I shall be content to bear this, if I may attain my main object,\nviz., to shew how the different parts of the law combine and should be\nread in connection with each other, and especially what is the force and\ndue application of what will be, so to speak, the last clause or section\nin the Act.\n\nSuppose, then, God\u2019s law as to these marriages to stand in the\nstatute-book of a Jewish Parliament, imagining for the moment such to\nhave existed.  Might not the principal enactments stand something in this\nway?  It will be understood that a permission or tacit sanction of\npolygamy must be assumed, as part of the common law of the community.\nSay, then, that the enactments in question stood thus:\u2014\n\n                              [None to intermarry with those near of kin.]\n\n\u00a7 1.  Be it enacted, that none shall inter-marry with any related to\nthem, whether by blood relationship or by affinity, within the following\ndegrees, as set forth in the annexed schedule:\u2014\n\n                                         [Schedule of Prohibited Degrees.]\n\n(Then suppose Archbishop Parker\u2019s Table of Prohibited Degrees here\nannexed as the schedule.)\n\nThe Act would then continue:\u2014\n\n        [Brother to marry deceased Brother\u2019s Wife, to raise up seed to his\n                                                                 Brother.]\n\n\u00a7 2.  Provided always, that, in reference to the above prohibition of the\nbrother taking his brother\u2019s widow, it shall yet be lawful, authorized\nand required (under penalty of a stigma of disgrace, to be attached to\nhim who fails in compliance), that in the case of a man\u2019s brother dying\nchildless, in order to prevent the extinction of a house in Israel, his\nbrother shall take the deceased brother\u2019s wife, and raise up seed unto\nhis brother; and, therefore, that the first-born child of such union\nshall succeed in the name of the brother who is dead, and be accounted\nand taken by the law of this land as not of the family of the second\nbrother, but of the first, and shall be the heir, both in name and\npossessions, of that deceased brother, whose widow\u2019s child he is.\n\n           [But none to take a wife to her sister, beside the other in her\n                                                               life-time.]\n\n\u00a7 3.  But, inasmuch as in the case of two brothers having married two\nsisters, the enactment of the preceding section might, and, in the event\nof one brother dying childless, would, authorize and require a man to\ntake to wife two sisters, his brother\u2019s widow being in such case his own\nwife\u2019s sister, and whereas, if his own wife should at such time be alive,\nthis might lead to rivalry and vexation, be it further enacted, that\nnothing herein enacted, in the previous section or in any part of this\nAct, shall authorize, permit or require any brother, even for the purpose\nof saving a house and family from extinction, to take to wife the sister\nof his own wife, his said wife her sister being yet alive; and be it\ntherefore enacted, that in such case, where such would be the result of\nthe enactment of the previous section of this Act the provision of the\nsaid previous section shall become inoperative and of none effect, rather\nthan a man take a wife to her sister to vex her, beside the other, in her\nlifetime.\n\nUpon this illustration I will only ask\u2014Would not such an Act of\nParliament be perfectly distinct and clear?  Could any one possibly\nmisunderstand it?  Would not every clause and section have its own plain\nand intelligible sense?  Especially would not the last clause or section\nhave a full and sufficient both sense and application without any man\u2019s\ndreaming for a single moment of there being contained in it a repeal of\nany portion of the table or schedule of degrees?  I say contained _in\nit_, because no doubt the second section would contain something of this\nkind, and yet, be it observed, not a repeal, but a partial exception;\nthat is, in one particular case, and for one particular specified\npurpose, the second section would modify one entry in the table, that of\nthe brother\u2019s wife or sister\u2019s husband (as it is confessed on all hands,\nthe law of the Levirate, Deut. xxv., does modify the law of the 16th\nverse of Lev. xviii.), but even so, I must insist upon it, not\n_repealing_ it; for the exception would operate _only_ when the brother\nhad died childless, leaving the entry in the schedule in fulness of\nprohibition in all other cases.  And it is beyond all question that that\nmodification would be due to the second and not to the third section of\nthe Act.  The third or last section would have nothing to do with any\nrelaxation of the law, but would be merely a restrictive provision in\nrelation to the working of the previous section, being, as I have all\nalong been shewing, a narrowing, not an enlarging the liberty given under\nthe exception in the previous clause and having no further\nbearing:\u2014therefore having nothing to do with any entry in the schedule;\nnothing to do with the permission to take the brother\u2019s wife or the\nsister\u2019s husband, and, if so, nothing at all to do with the object for\nwhich that clause, so to speak, is used by the promoters of the change in\nour law, as proposed in the Wife\u2019s Sister\u2019s Marriage Bill.\n\nMoreover, does not this account make it perfectly intelligible why the\nfirst section should remain in the integrity of its enactment, and all\nthe entries find their place in the schedule, because no single entry is\nrepealed even by the modification caused by section 2?  But surely it\nwould have been absurd to enact, or to retain in the table, the entry as\nto a brother\u2019s wife or sister\u2019s husband, if an almost immediately\nsubsequent contradictory enactment were wholly to repeal it, as contended\nby the promoters of the Bill in question.\n\nI do not know that I have more to add unless it be to meet briefly a\npossible objection from the law of the Levirate not being found in the\nsame place with the other two passages, nor indeed in the same book of\nLeviticus, but in another book of Holy Scripture.  It may, perhaps, be\nasked\u2014Is it not strange and unnatural to find the exception to an\nexception entered where the first exception itself is not recorded, and\nperhaps even before that exception was made at all?\n\nI would reply, first\u2014\n\nIf this be an objection, it is one to which the Mishna, and the Jewish\nRabbis, and Dr. M\u2019Caul are open just as much as I am.  For they all\nacknowledge and maintain that upon that 18th verse of xviii. Leviticus is\nfounded the prohibition which they all claim as to the brother in the\ncase of two brothers having married two sisters; of the one not being\npermitted to obey the injunction of the law of the Levirate, as to taking\nthe other\u2019s wife in the particular case of the one brother leaving a\nwidow whilst the other brother\u2019s wife is yet living.\n\nI would reply, secondly\u2014\n\nThat the objection, from the exception in Deut. xxv. not possibly having\nbeen then made, is as nothing when the lawgiver is not man but God, who\nknows from the beginning all which He intends. {30}\n\nI would reply, thirdly\u2014\n\nThat a fair and reasonable account of the statements in Leviticus xviii.\nnot alluding directly to the law of Deut. xxv., and not in any way\nindicating the exception there made or to be made to the prohibition of\nverse 16, is to be found in this: that all the statements in that chapter\nof Leviticus are _prohibitions_, whilst the record in Deuteronomy is a\n_permission_ or indeed a _command_; that, therefore, it is perfectly\nreasonable and natural that we should not find prohibitions and\nrelaxations of the law mixed up together.  Thus Leviticus keeps to its\nprohibitions, verse after verse, with the warnings and denunciation of\npenalties proper to its subject; and Deuteronomy deals with its\nexceptional relaxation, and the duties and consequences therewith\nconnected.  And it may be just worth while to add that although the 18th\nverse of Leviticus xviii. is an exception, it is still in the sense and\napplication which I have been enforcing, a prohibitory not a permissive\nexception; a consideration which not only shows it is in its due place\namong the other prohibitions, but also strengthens the view taken in this\nletter of its being no more than a prohibition.  It _prohibits_ the\ntaking two sisters simultaneously, even under circumstances which, but\nfor its existence, would have required such union, and it does not permit\nanything as against the laws of the 6th and 16th verses.  Were Dr.\nM\u2019Caul\u2019s view, and the view of the promoters of the alteration of our law\nof marriage correct, we should at least have the anomaly of a permissive\nprecept foisted in, if I may so say, among the prohibitory sentences of\nthis chapter, dealing in all else with prohibitions only.  For, it is\nplain, to read the verse as meaning a man may marry two sisters, if it be\nnot simultaneously, is a permission upon the previous restriction; whilst\nto say a man may _not_ marry two sisters simultaneously, even when the\nlaw of the Levirate would seem to demand it, is a prohibition.  The law\nof Deuteronomy, therefore, (the law of the Levirate,) being a permission\nor command, not a prohibition, makes it no marvel that that injunction is\nnot found among the prohibitions, whilst that the prohibitional\nexceptional decree of the 18th verse of Lev. xviii., should be found\nwhere it is, among the prohibitions, is no marvel either.\n\nI would reply, fourthly\u2014\n\nThat to find the law of the Levirate in this place in the Book of\nLeviticus would have been to find a provision solely and simply of the\nJewish economy and polity, most unnaturally intermixed with the\nprovisions of God\u2019s general moral law:\u2014that is, what is applicable solely\nto Moses and the people under him, confused with the law intended for all\nnations and people, as witnessed by the denunciations of that chapter of\nthe book of Leviticus with which we have been concerned.  How is it\npossible to suppose the Leviratical injunction of Deuteronomy could have\nfound a place among the things prohibited and condemned as the\nabominations of the Canaanites and Egyptians?\n\nI would reply, fifthly\u2014\n\nThat if any further answer to the above objection be needed, there is, at\nleast, the general and most sufficient reply, that we are no judges of\nthe right collocation of different points in God\u2019s revelation to man.\nWhen we see the fitness of anything, even as we can judge, we may glorify\nHim and be thankful; when we cannot, we may and should \u201cput our mouth in\nthe dust\u201d and be humble.  If things are not made more plain to us than\nthey are, or even are less plain than they might have been, let us\nremember our state of trial, and acknowledge that all such may be, for\nought we know, exactly so revealed as they are, and so placed as they\nare, for our trial.  There is no reason why we should not be tried just\nas much as to difficulties put before our intellect, as by temptations\nappealing to our passions; and, as Bishop Butler has remarked, there are\nsome men who, but for the former, might be found to have hardly any trial\nat all.  (Analogy, Part ii., chapter 6.)  If the particular objection\nhere advanced be analyzed, it will be found to be but this:\u2014Why should\nthere have been _an omission_ of this law of the Levirate in Leviticus,\nwhen, in the same place, there is the record of a prohibitory exception\nto it?  But who shall pretend to account for the omissions of Holy\nScripture?  Take but that one record in St. Luke\u2019s Gospel of the two\ndisciples who, on the morning of the Resurrection, walked to Emmaus, and\nwere met by Jesus on the way, as they talked of those things which had\ncome to pass, and were sad.  What can be more wonderful to our conception\nthan what we find, and what we do not find!  After their converse\nconcerning Jesus of Nazareth, which was a Prophet mighty in word and deed\nbefore God and all the people, we find that He himself, \u201cbeginning at\nMoses and all the Prophets, expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the\nthings concerning Himself.\u201d {32}  But we _do not find_ a single syllable\nof all this discourse recorded in the Gospel.  If we judged by what\nseemed to us likely, how sure should we feel that it would have been set\ndown!  Oh! how many difficulties might have been met! how many objections\nhave been answered! how many heresies have been avoided! how great a\nflood of light have been thrown upon various points of history, prophecy,\nand doctrine! and how great a guide have been given for all in life and\nconduct! had it seemed good to the Holy Ghost to let the Evangelist\nrecord that discourse.  If we judged by our sense of likelihood, should\nwe not say, \u201cWhat could be so full of interest and of edification!  How\nimportant! how needful for us to know what our Lord said, when beginning\nat Moses and all the Prophets, He expounded unto them in all the\nScriptures the things concerning Himself!\u201d  But not one word of it is set\ndown, and, perchance, for the very cause that it would have too much\nabridged our trial had we possessed such an exposition, and that we may\nlearn in all things not to judge amiss as to the hard things or the\nsecret things in God\u2019s Word nor to think \u201cHis ways are as our ways.\u201d  Had\nthat discourse been placed before us, perchance there had never been an\nArian or a Socinian in the world.  (How good we might think it!)  Had the\nwhole marriage law of God, if we may so say, been systematically set down\nin His holy Word, it may be there would have been none now to tamper with\nit.  (How happy, too, we should think it!)  But we might as well say,\n\u201cHow happy if Adam had had no trial put upon him, and so had never\nfallen!\u201d\n\nBut our duty is, as it is, and as God has thought fit to set it before\nus.  He has revealed to us His law and will in such manner and degree as\nseemed to Him good.  It is our\u2019s to receive it and to seek to understand\nit as most humbly and reverently we may, and, asking His grace and help,\nto do our best to keep it: to keep it individually in our own lives, and\nso far as He permits us, to keep it from all defilement or breach in the\nlaws of our country.  We call ourselves, and rightly, a Christian\ncountry, for we are, as baptized into the body of Christ, His members.\nLet us remember, if even carelessly, much more if wilfully, we go against\nHis commands, and set human law in its permission against the divine law\nin its prohibition, we are rebellious against Him who is our God and our\nKing; we are going back from our Christian state and profession; we are\nplacing ourselves on the level of the nations\u2014the Egyptians and the\nCanaanites\u2014who committed all those abominations, against which His curse\nis denounced who is \u201cthe same yesterday and today, and for ever.\u201d\n\n                         I have the honour to be,\n                                 My Lord,\n            Your Lordship\u2019s very faithful and humble servant,\n\n                                                              M. W. MAYOW.\n\n_Buckingham Road_, _Brighton_, _July_ 14_th_, 1869.\n\nP.S.\u2014Whilst these sheets are passing through the press, I am reminded of\nan objection taken to the whole line of the argument of my letter upon\nthe very strength of the law of the Levirate.  I am told (and I think the\nview was touched upon in the report of the Commission) that there are\nsome who deem the law of the Levirate to be the total repeal of the\nprohibition as to the brother\u2019s wife (which most certainly it is not),\nand who would then go on to say, And, upon your own shewing, after the\nwife\u2019s death this very law of the Levirate will bring you to the\nconclusion of marrying the wife\u2019s sister.\n\nI should, perhaps, hardly deem it necessary to notice seriously such an\nobjection, but that I hear of it as actually made or revived at the\npresent time.  I will then say a few words upon it.  I reply; Consider\nwhat must be assumed, and what must be denied, to bring this argument in\nany way to bear upon the question before the Legislature.\n\nFirst\u2014It must be assumed that the law of the Levirate is a law binding\nupon Christians; that it is a law, not simply intended for the Jewish\neconomy, but that a Christian man is intended to take his brother\u2019s\nwidow, if he have died childless, and raise up seed unto his brother.\n\nSecondly\u2014It must be assumed that this object is to be attained, not by\nthe taking the brother\u2019s widow, but by taking the wife\u2019s sister, which is\nthe object of the Bill, but was not the object at all of the Jewish\nlegislation, and which, moreover, is absolutely absurd as to the end of\nraising up seed unto a brother.\n\nThirdly\u2014It must be denied that polygamy is forbidden to Christians; for\nif the brother in the case supposed have a wife previously to his\nbrother\u2019s death, (this wife being still alive, but not the sister of his\ndeceased brother\u2019s wife,) then, according to the law of the Levirate\nhereby assumed to be in force, he must still take his brother\u2019s widow to\nwife to raise up seed unto his brother.\n\nOr, Fourthly, if the argument be not carried quite so far, and it be\nmaintained that the brother should say, \u201cI cannot take her, lest I mar my\nown inheritance;\u201d or, \u201cI cannot take her, as I have already a wife;\u201d or,\n\u201cI like not to take her for I am engaged to another;\u201d or, if he should\nfor any cause refuse, then, at least, if the law of the Levirate be\nbinding upon us (which is the argument; for if not, it does not help the\npromoters of the Bill at all), the refuser should undergo the penalty\nprovided in the case, and we should have to witness the scene of the\nwidow, or the wife\u2019s sister, calling together the elders of her city, and\nloosing the shoe of her husband\u2019s brother, or sister\u2019s husband, and\nspitting in his face and saying, \u201cSo shall it be clone unto that man that\nwill not to build up his brother\u2019s house;\u201d and we should have to revive\nthe name of \u201cthe house of him that hath his shoe loosed.\u201d\n\nNo!  Who does not see that the whole scope and intention of the law of\nthe Levirate was Judaical, and limited to and exhausted by that economy.\nAnd, therefore, if the connection between the law of the Levirate and the\n18th verse of Lev. xviii. be established, as I have endeavoured to shew\nit is, it will follow that the exception to that law _must_ belong\nexclusively to it and expire with it; and, therefore, that the supposed\npermission to take the sister, \u201cbeside the other,\u201d if it be not \u201cin her\nlife-time,\u201d has, as I have all along been arguing, nothing to do with us\nas Christians at all, but is tied to and restrained by the law of the\nLevirate, and of the Jewish dispensation.  Under it, it was lawful, it\nwas enjoined, when a brother died childless, for the brother to take his\nwife and raise up seed unto his brother; and this would be lawful and\nenjoined in that particular case even when his brother\u2019s widow was his\nown wife\u2019s sister, if his own wife, the sister of the other were dead.\nBut among Christians I cannot believe that any one seriously believes for\na moment that the law of the Levirate remains, and so no one can suppose,\nif the 18th verse of Lev. xviii. be merely the exception to that law,\nthat it has any bearing upon, or gives any permission to, Christians in\ntheir marriages at all. {36}\n\n                                                                  M. W. M.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX A.\n\n\nThe only two passages which I have met with taking the same line of\nargument with that of the foregoing letter are the following.  In an\nappendix to the Speech of Vice-Chancellor Sir W. Page Wood, Feb. 1st,\n1860, I find this comment upon the statements in the Mishna:\u2014\n\n    \u201cThe passages from the _Mishna_ afford singular support to the view\n    which the Bishop of Oxford, at the late meeting, stated to be held by\n    some divines in America, viz., that the difficult 18th verse of the\n    18th chapter of Leviticus was, in fact, a special prohibition against\n    a wife\u2019s sister being married to her brother-in-law, even when the\n    exceptional _Levirical_ law (or law by which the brother-in-law was\n    to raise up seed to his deceased brother) might otherwise have\n    appeared to supersede the general code of the 18th chapter.\u201d\n\nIn an article recently reprinted from the Church Review, of February,\n1861, understood to be from the pen of the Rev. T. W. Perry, I find also\nthis:\u2014\n\n    \u201cMay it not be, then, that the prohibition simply related to the\n    (apparently) Patriarchal requirement (see Gen. xxxviii. 8), enforced\n    in Deut. xxv. 5\u201310 (that is, _after_ the Levitical prohibitions were\n    given), which commanded the _next kinsman_ to marry the widow of one\n    who died without issue, in order to preserve the inheritance?  For if\n    the next kinsman was a brother of the deceased, the duty of raising\n    up seed to his brother first devolved upon him.  But he might refuse\n    to perform it.  In that instance he underwent a kind of punishment.\n    The widow loosed his shoe and spat in his face before the elders of\n    his city (Deut. xxv. 8 and 9), and he became stigmatized as \u2018the\n    house of him that hath his shoe loosed\u2019 (v. 10).  This liberty to\n    refuse (see also Ruth iii. 12 and iv. 6) may have been a Divine\n    relaxation of the Patriarchal rule, designed, perhaps, to render more\n    effectual the prohibition in Lev. xviii. 18.  But it may not\n    improbably be, that the penalty attached was meant to secure the\n    custom from contempt, by deterring the kinsman from excusing himself\n    on grounds which the law of the Levirate (_i.e._, the law of raising\n    up seed to the deceased brother) did not mean to recognize.\u201d\n\nThen, after some remarks upon the jealousy or vexation likely to arise,\nthe writer continues:\u2014\n\n    \u201cMay it not, therefore, have been that God designed, in Lev. xviii.\n    18, to provide against this evil, which was very likely to attend\n    upon the performance of the existing rule, and of his own command\n    (then to be given) touching the marriage of the deceased brother\u2019s\n    wife?\n\n    \u201cYet, how does this explanation meet the difficulty arising from the\n    alleged permission contained in the words (v. 18) \u2018in her life-time?\u2019\n    Thus\u2014If the next kinsman\u2019s wife were already dead, or if she died\n    before the kinsman\u2019s part had been done to the widow, or after that\n    part had been done by another kinsman, who had died leaving the widow\n    still childless then, as she _could not be vexed_, the widow\u2019s\n    brother-in-law was free to marry her, for the purpose specified in\n    the Levirate law.\u201d\n\nAnd again:\u2014\n\n    \u201cSince this first suggested itself to us, we have learnt (see Tract\n    x. p. 21, of the Marriage Law Association) that the _Mishna_,\n    treating of the civil law of the Jews as to marrying the deceased\n    brother\u2019s wife, says that he may not marry her _if she is his own\n    wife\u2019s sister_, and, moreover, that the prohibition holds good\n    _after_ the wife\u2019s death.  It is possible that this latter part of\n    the tradition may be akin to what our Lord called (S. Mark vii. 9)\n    \u2018your own tradition,\u2019 and so may have tended to \u2018frustrate the\n    commandment of God,\u2019 in Lev. xviii. 18, by perplexing the\n    interpretation of the words, \u2018in her life-time.\u201d\n\nI may add, however, as shewing my argument to be an independent witness\nto the same sense and application of Leviticus xviii. 18, that I had no\nknowledge of either of these statements when I sketched out the argument\nof the preceding letter.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX B.\n\n\nI have said that I have no need to enter into the question of the \u201cone\nhour\u201d mentioned in the Mishna.  And this is certainly true, because the\nquestion which I have been considering is not whether, if a wife\u2019s sister\nbe forbidden at all she is forbidden for ever by both being alive\ntogether at a certain time but simply whether the whole matter involved\nin the words \u201cin her life-time\u201d be not explained and accounted for by its\nbeing a prohibition, narrowing the requirements of the law of the\nLevirate, and nothing more.  But it may be added that the statement of\nthe Mishna as to the \u201cone hour\u201d is certainly rather confirmatory than not\nof the second sister being wholly forbidden, except under that law\u2019s\nprovision in the case of the death of the one previous to the widowhood\nof the other, because if the being forbidden for one hour forbids for\never, the second sister, whether herself a virgin or the widow of a\nstranger, being (like the brother\u2019s widow left a widow in her sister\u2019s\nlife-time) marriageable to any other man than her brother-in-law, during\nall the time of her sister\u2019s married life, (she, I say,) would be all\nthat time forbidden to him.  This would answer certainly to the one hour,\nand if so, under the Rule of the Mishna, she would be forbidden to him\nfor ever, which brings us to the general prohibition under the general\nlaw.\n\nWhether the above inference of the Mishna be a legitimate one from the\nwords \u201cin her life-time,\u201d that is, that the forbidding should depend for\never upon the state of things at the time of the brother\u2019s death (as Dr.\nM\u2019Caul expresses it), I need not determine.  Mr. Perry, in one of the\nextracts above, seems to think it might rather be one of the additions by\nwhich the Jews frustrated \u201cthe Word of God by their tradition,\u201d and\npossibly it was so.  But at least we may say that there appears to be a\nweighty moral consideration to support the view of the prohibition\nextending from one hour to the future life.  Because thus, in the case of\na man finding his brother\u2019s wife a widow, being his own wife\u2019s sister,\nand perchance preferring her to his own wife, he might otherwise be\ntempted to get rid of his own wife, by divorce (so easily obtainable as\ndivorce became among the Jews) or otherwise, if such after-release set\nhim at liberty to marry his brother\u2019s wife, being a widow: a temptation\nbe it observed not occurring as to any other woman left a widow by his\nbrother\u2019s death, because the tacit sanction given to polygamy under the\nJewish dispensation would in that case render it unnecessary to obtain\nrelease from his own wife at all in order to take her.  If the brother\nhad died childless, he would be enjoined to take her, irrespectively of\nhis own wife being alive.  If not childless, he could never take her at\nall.  And this moral reason is not perhaps wholly unworthy of\nconsideration as applying to the general question of marriage with a\nwife\u2019s sister in a state of things in which polygamy is forbidden.  If\nthe greater intimacy arising between a man and his wife\u2019s sister might,\nif unrestrained by the knowledge that she can never under any\ncircumstances become his wife, tend to produce attachment, who shall say\nit is not a merciful and a wholesome restraint, that she should be\nforbidden to him for ever?  And this restraint, be it remarked, would be\nwholly lost under the change in our law now sought.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX C.\n\n\nThe drift of the objection considered in the Postscript may receive an\nillustration from that great moral drama, in the plot and conduct of\nwhich horror at the incestuous connection of the king with his brother\u2019s\nwidow bears so prominent a part.  The case of the objector who would make\nthe law of the Levirate a dispensation for Christians, is just as if\nClaudius king of Denmark had pleaded that law, though his brother had not\ndied childless (for no modern legislation proposes to regard this\nlimitation), as a reason for taking to wife his brother\u2019s widow;\u2014or, as\nif, yet further, had Queen Gertrude died, leaving a sister, he should\nplead again that same law (for all modern legislation proposes to go to\nthis extent), to sanction his afterward taking her also to wife.  Surely\nall this, as the king says of another matter, is \u201cabsurd to reason.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nNOTE TO PAGE 12.\n\n\nIt is of much importance to mark clearly how absolute, upon Dr. M\u2019Caul\u2019s\nreading of Leviticus xviii. 18, is the contradiction involved.  I add,\ntherefore:\u2014Let it be well observed that a time beyond that expressed by\nthe words \u201c_in her life-time_\u201d must be understood to be of the essence of\nall the prohibitions.  That is to say (and the awful importance of the\nmatter requires it to be stated plainly), that it is incest and not\nadultery which is the subject of the prohibitions throughout.  A man is\nprohibited from marrying his Mother not merely during his Father\u2019s life\ntime, but always\u2014his Sister, not merely, if she be married, and, if so,\nduring her husband\u2019s life-time, but always.  So of the Brother\u2019s Wife,\nand the rest.  Therefore according to the interpretation insisted upon,\nthe collision is, as stated in the text, a complete contradiction; a\nuniversal negative on the one side met by a particular affirmative on the\nother, just as if one should say, negatively, \u201cNo horses are black,\u201d and\nthen immediately add, affirmatively, \u201cSome horses are black.\u201d  For, the\nstatements drawn out in full, including the case by parity of reasoning\nfrom verse 16, would stand thus:\u2014\n\nThou shalt not take thy Brother\u2019s Wife, whether in thy Brother\u2019s\nlife-time or not.\n\nThou shalt not take thy Wife\u2019s Sister, whether in her Sister\u2019s life-time\nor not.\n\nThou mayest take thy Wife\u2019s Sister, if it be not in her Sister\u2019s\nlife-time.\n\nSuch is the over-riding demanded by Dr. M\u2019Caul\u2019s position, and necessary\nto the argument if this 18th verse is to be made in any way available for\nthe purpose of the promoters of the change in our marriage law.  The\nimprobability of such a contradiction within two verses, including an\nassumed change in the subject matter, from incest to adultery, in a\ncontinuous catalogue of the enormities denounced, can, as it appears to\nme, hardly be exaggerated.\n\nThere is one consideration further to which it may be well to call\nattention, viz., that the _translation_ of Lev. xviii. 18, is not to be\nconfused with its _interpretation_.  Dr. M\u2019Caul naturally insists much\nupon the translation, and in addition to his own critical judgment,\nallowed to be of great weight from his known eminence as an Hebrew\nScholar, he gives many authorities in favour of the rendering as it\nstands in the text of our authorized version.  Still it is to be remarked\nthat the authorities whom he cites for the translation are by no means at\none with him as to the interpretation.  This point will be found very\nfully treated of in the second letter of the present Lord Chancellor to\nthe Dean of Westminster, printed in 1861, {40} and, if I remember\nrightly, it was also examined and the result put very forcibly by the\nBishop of Exeter in the postscript to his letter to the late Bishop of\nLichfield, published, I believe, in 1860, where it is observantly noted\nthat of all our Reformers cited by Dr. M\u2019Caul as having accepted the\nauthorized version as to the rendering of Lev. xviii. 18, there is not\none who has gone with him in the application of it which he advocates,\ninasmuch as they have all either explicitly or implicitly received our\ntable of prohibited degrees: a proof that even from Dr. M\u2019Caul\u2019s premise,\nas to the translation, they have not come to his conclusion as to the\ninterpretation.  And it is plainly in the interpretation, not in the mere\ntranslation, that the above-mentioned contradiction is involved.\n\n\n\n\nFootnotes.\n\n\n{5}  Speech of Vice-Chancellor Sir W. P. Wood. p. 5.\n\n{7}  Against profane dealing with Holy Matrimony, by the Rev. John Keble,\npp. 12, 13.  J. H. Parker. 1849.\n\n{8}  Ibid. pp. 13, 14.\n\n{9}  Letter to Rev. W. H. Lyall, by Rev. A. M\u2019Caul, D.D., pp. 1\u20134.\nWertheim, Mackintosh, and Hunt. 1859.\n\n{10}  Speech of Sir W. P. Wood, pp. 5, 6.\n\n{11}  Dr. M\u2019Caul\u2019s Letter to Sir W. P. Wood, 1860, p. 55.\n\n{12}  See Note at the end of Appendix.\n\n{13a}  Appendix A.\n\n{13b}  Canon 99.\u2014\u201cNone to marry within the degrees prohibited.\u201d  \u201cAnd all\nsuch marriages so made shall be judged incestuous and unlawful.\u201d\n\nA Table of kindred and affinity, wherein whosoever are related are\nforbidden in Scripture and our laws to marry together.\u2014_Book of Common\nPrayer_.\n\n{14}  Letter, p. 55.\n\n{15}  St. Matt. xxii. 24.\n\n{16}  It may be useful just to state that the law termed the law of the\nLevirate is that law laid down in Deut. xxv. 5\u201310, that in case a Jew\ndying childless, his brother should take his wife and raise up seed unto\nhis brother.\n\n{18}  Letter to Rev. W. H. Lyall, p. 14.\n\n{20}  Letter to Vice-Chancellor Sir W. Page Wood, p. 29\u201331.\n\n{21}  Appendix B.\n\n{23}  Lev. xviii., 20\u201330.\n\n{24}  See Dr. Pusey\u2019s Evidence before the Royal Commission, First Report,\np. 37, questions 431\u20133.\n\n{30}  It is, moreover, evident that something of the kind of the law of\nthe Levirate was a usage of the Patriarchal times, from the history\nrecorded as to the sons of Judah in the book of Genesis.\n\n{32}  St. Luke xxiv. 27.\n\n{36}  Appendix C.\n\n{40}  Second Letter of Vice-Chancellor Sir W. Page Wood, pp. 47\u201363.","title":"Marriage with a deceased wife's sister: Leviticus XVIII. 18, considered in connection with the Law of the Levirate","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":13802}