{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_49228/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_49228","id":"gutenberg_49228","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/49228","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ethics"],"text":"THE ORIGIN\n                          OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF\n                            RIGHT AND WRONG\n\n\n\n\n                              THE ORIGIN\n                          OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF\n                            RIGHT AND WRONG\n\n                           BY FRANZ BRENTANO\n\n                          ENGLISH TRANSLATION\n                            BY CECIL HAGUE\n\n                          FORMERLY LECTOR AT\n                           PRAGUE UNIVERSITY\n\n                       WITH A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE\n\n                              WESTMINSTER\n                     ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE & CO LTD\n                          2 WHITEHALL GARDENS\n                                 1902\n\n                           BUTLER & TANNER,\n                      THE SELWOOD PRINTING WORKS,\n                          FROME, AND LONDON.\n\n\nThe present translation owes its origin to a desire on the part of the\ntranslator of bringing to the wider notice of his fellow-countrymen a\nwork which has proved beneficial and stimulating to himself. Written\nduring short intervals of leisure while studying with Professor Anton\nMarty of Prague University, it has had the advantage of his careful and\nconstant supervision. Without his aid it would scarcely have seen the\nlight. The translator has especially to thank Professor S. A. Alexander,\nof Owens College, Manchester, for his valuable help in the general\nrevision and the translation of several difficult passages. It is now,\nalas, too late to do more than record the translator\u2019s debt to the late\nProfessor Adamson, of Glasgow University, whose revision and correction\nof this essay was one of the last services rendered to the cause of\ntruth by a life-long disciple.\n\n_West Dulwich, 1902._\n\n\n\n\nAUTHOR\u2019S PREFACE\n\n\nThis lecture, which I now bring before the notice of a larger public,\nwas delivered by me before the Vienna Law Society on January 23, 1889.\nIt then bore the title: \u201cOf the Natural Sanction for Law and Morality.\u201d\nThis title I have changed in order to bring its general purport more\nclearly into prominence; otherwise I have made scarcely any further\nalteration. Numerous notes have been added, and an already published\nessay: \u201cMiklosich on Subjectless Propositions\u201d appended. In what way it\nbears upon inquiries apparently so remote will be evident in the sequel.\n\nThe occasion of the lecture was an invitation extended to me by Baron\nVon Hye, President of the Society. It was his wish that what had been\nsaid here a few years ago by Ihering, as jurist, in his address, _\u00dcber\ndie Entstehung des Rechtsgef\u00fchls_, might in the same Society be\nillustrated by me from the philosophic point of view. It would be a\nmistake to assume from the incidental nature of the circumstances to\nwhich it owed its first appearance that the Essay was only a fugitive,\noccasional study. It embraces the fruits of many years\u2019 reflection. The\ndiscussions it contains form the ripest product of all that I have\nhitherto published.\n\nThese thoughts form a fragment of a Descriptive Psychology, which, as I\nnow venture to hope, I may be enabled in the near future to publish in\nits complete form. In its wide divergence from all that has hitherto\nbeen put forward, and especially by reason of its being an essential\nstage in the further development of some of the views advocated in my\n_Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint_ it will be sufficiently\nevident that during the period of my long literary retirement I have not\nbeen idle.\n\nSpecialists in philosophy will find also in this lecture what will be at\nonce recognized as new. As regards the general reader, the rapidity with\nwhich I pass from one question to another might at first completely\nconceal many a sunken reef which required to be circumnavigated, many a\nprecipice which had to be avoided. Surely I, if any one, have reason,\nowing to the conciseness of statement employed, to remember the saying\nof Leibnitz and pay little attention to refutation and much to\ndemonstration. A glance at the notes--which, were they to do full\njustice to the subject, would need to be multiplied an hundredfold--will\ngive him a further idea of those bye-paths which have misled so many,\nand prevented their finding an issue to the labyrinth. Meantime I would\nbe well content--nay, I would regard it as the crown to all my\nefforts--should all that has been said appear so self-evident to him\nthat he does not deem himself bound to thank me once in return.\n\nNo one has determined the principles of ethics as, on the basis of new\nanalyses, I have found it necessary to determine them, no one,\nespecially among those who hold that in the foundation of those\nprinciples the feelings must find a place, have so radically and\ncompletely broken with the subjective view of ethics. I except only\nHerbart. But he lost himself in the sphere of aesthetic feeling, until\nat last we find him so far from the track that he, who in the\ntheoretical philosophy is the irreconcilable enemy of contradiction,\nnevertheless in practical philosophy (i.e. ethics) tolerates it when his\nprinciples--the highest universally valid ideas--rush into conflict with\none another. Still his teaching remains in a certain aspect truly\nrelated with mine, while, on other sides, other celebrated attempts to\ndiscover a basis for ethics find in it points of contact.\n\nIn the notes, individual points are more sharply defined, a very\ndetailed examination of which would have been too prolix in the lecture.\nMany an objection already urged has been met, many an expected rejoinder\nanticipated. I also hope that some will be interested in the several\nhistorical contributions, especially in the inquiries concerning\nDescartes, where I trace back the doctrine of evidence to its causes and\npoint out two further thoughts, one of which has been misunderstood, the\nother scarcely noticed, neither treated with the consideration they\ndeserve. I refer to his fundamental classification of mental states and\nto his doctrine of the relation of love to joy, and of hate to sadness.\n\nWith several highly honoured investigators of the present--assuredly not\nleast honoured by myself--I have entered into a polemical debate, and\nindeed most vigorously with those whose previous attack has compelled\nme to a defence. I hope that they do not regard it as a violation of\n_their_ claims, when I seek, to the utmost of my power, to help the\ntruth, which we in common serve, to her rights, and I assure them in\nturn, that as I myself speak frankly, so also none the less do I welcome\nwith all my heart every sincere word of my opponent.\n\nFRANZ BRENTANO.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF RIGHT AND WRONG\n\nA LECTURE\n\n                                                                    PAGE\n\n1. Value of History and Philosophy for Jurisprudence; the new proposals\nfor the reform of legal studies in Austria                             1\n\n2. Our theme; Relation to Ihering\u2019s lecture before the Vienna Law\nSociety                                                                2\n\n3. Twofold meaning of the expression \u201cnatural right\u201d                   2\n\n4. Points of agreement with Ihering; rejection of the \u201cjus naturae\u201d\nand \u201cjus gentium\u201d; pre-ethical political statutes                      3\n\n5. Opposition to Ihering; There exists a universally valid naturally\nrecognizable moral law. Relative independence of the question          4\n\n6. The notion \u201cnatural sanction\u201d                                       4\n\n7. Manifold misconception of the same by philosophers                  6\n\n8. Habitually developed feeling of compulsion as such is no sanction   6\n\n9. Motives of hope and fear as such not yet sanction                   6\n\n10. The thought of the arbitrary command of a higher power is not the\nnatural sanction                                                       7\n\n11. The ethical sanction is a command similar to the logical rule      8\n\n12. The aesthetic point of view; as little in ethics as in logic\nthe right one                                                          9\n\n13. Kant\u2019s Categorical Imperative an impracticable fiction            10\n\n14. Necessity for preliminary psychological inquiries                 10\n\n15. No willing without a final end                                    10\n\n16. The problem: which end is right? the chief problem of ethics      11\n\n17. The right end is the best among attainable ends; obscureness\n of this definition                                                   11\n\n18. Of the origin of the conception of the good; it has not its origin in\nthe sphere of the so-called external impression                       12\n\n19. The common characteristic of everything psychical                 12\n\n20. The three fundamental classes of psychical phenomena; idea\n(Vorstellung), judgment, feeling (Gem\u00fctsbewegung)                     13\n\n21. The contrasts, belief and denial, love and hate                   15\n\n22. Of these opposed modes of relation one is always right, one wrong  15\n\n23. The conception of the good                                        15\n\n24. Distinction of the good in the narrow sense from what is good for\nthe sake of some other good                                           16\n\n25. Love is not always a proof that an object is worthy to be loved   16\n\n26. \u201cBlind\u201d and \u201cself-evident\u201d judgment                               17\n\n27. Analogous distinction in the sphere of pleasure and displeasure;\ncriterion of the good                                                 18\n\n28. Plurality of the good; problems associated therewith              21\n\n29. Whether by \u201cthe better\u201d is to be understood that which deserves\nto be loved with more intensity                                       21\n\n30. Right determination of the conception                             22\n\n31. When and how do we recognize that anything is in itself preferable?\nThe case of the opposite, of absence, of the addition of\nlike to like                                                          23\n\n32. Cases where the problem is insoluble                              25\n\n33. Whether the Hedonists in this respect would have the advantage    26\n\n34. Why these failures prove less disadvantageous than might\nbe feared                                                             27\n\n35. The sphere of the highest practical good                          28\n\n36. The harmonious development                                        28\n\n37. The natural sanction respecting the limits of right               29\n\n38. The natural sanction for positive ethical laws                    29\n\n39. The power of the natural sanction                                 30\n\n40. True and false relativity respecting ethical rules                30\n\n41. Derivation of well known special enactments                       32\n\n42. Why other philosophers, by other ways, arrive at the same goal    32\n\n43. Whence arise the universally extended ethical truths? Unclearness\nconcerning processes in one\u2019s own consciousness                       33\n\n44. Trace of the influence of the moments severally mentioned         35\n\n45. Lower currents exercising an influence                            37\n\n46. Necessity of guarding against overlooking the distinction between\nethical and pseudo-ethical development                                39\n\n47. Value of such developments in the pre-ethical time; establishment\nof the social order; formation of dispositions; outlines of laws\nat the disposal of legislative ethical authority; security against\ndoctrinaire tendencies                                                39\n\n48. Beneficent influences which still operate continually\nfrom this side                                                        41\n\n49. A further word on the reform of politico-legal studies            42\n\n\n\n\nNOTES.\n\n                                                                    PAGE\n\n13. In defence of my characterization of Herbart\u2019s ethical criterion  44\n\n14. Of Kant\u2019s Categorical Imperative                                  44\n\n16. The Nicomachean Ethics and Ihering\u2019s \u201cfundamental idea\u201d in\nhis work; _Der Zweck im Recht_                                        46\n\n17. Of the cases of smaller chances in the effort after higher ends   46\n\n18. Of the dependence of the conceptions upon concrete perceptions    46\n\n19. The term \u201cintentional\u201d                                            47\n\n21. The fundamental classification of mental states in Descartes      47\n\n22. Windelband\u2019s error in respect of the fundamental classification of\nmental states; short defence of various attacks upon my _Psychology\nfrom the Empirical Standpoint_; Land, on a supposed improvement on\nformal logic; Steinthal\u2019s criticism of my doctrine of judgment        50\n\n23. In criticism of Sigwart\u2019s theories of the existential and\nnegative judgments                                                    55\n\n24. Descartes on the relation of \u201clove\u201d to \u201cjoy\u201d and of \u201chate\u201d to\n\u201csadness\u201d                                                             69\n\n25. Of the notions of truth and existence                             69\n\n26. Of the unity of the notion of the good                            71\n\n27. Of \u201cevidence.\u201d Descartes \u201cClara et distincta perceptio.\u201d Sigwart\u2019s\ndoctrine of \u201cevidence\u201d and his \u201cpostulates\u201d                           71\n\n28. Of ethical subjectivism. Aristotle\u2019s oversight in respect of the\nsource of our knowledge of the good. Parallels between his\nerror in respect of the feelings (Gem\u00fctsth\u00e4tigkeit), and Descartes\u2019\ndoctrine of the \u201cClara et distincta perceptio\u201d as a pre-condition\nof the logically justified judgment; modern views which approach\nto this doctrine                                                      78\n\n29. Of the expressions \u201cgut gefallen\u201d and \u201cschlecht gefallen\u201d         84\n\n31. Typical case of a constant geometrical relation of mental values  85\n\n32. Cases in which something at the same time both pleases and\ndispleases                                                            85\n\n33. Establishment of universal laws of valuation on the basis of a\nsingle experience                                                     86\n\n34. Certain moments in the theory of ethical knowledge are of more\nimportance for the theodicy than for ethics itself                    87\n\n35. Explanation of the manner in which anything in certain cases is\nrecognized as preferable                                              87\n\n36. The two cases, unique in their kind, in which preferability becomes\nclear for us from a certain character in the act of preference        87\n\n39. Gauss on the measurement of intensities                           89\n\n40. Against exaggerated expectations from the so-called psycho-physical\nlaw                                                                   89\n\n40. Defence against the objection of a too great ethical rigour       90\n\n41. Love of neighbour in harmony with greater care of one\u2019s own good  91\n\n43. Why the narrowness of human foresight should not do injury to\nmoral courage                                                         92\n\n44. In criticism of Ihering\u2019s view of the notion of right and of his\ncriticism of older views                                              93\n\n45. Of the provisional ethical sanction of objectionable laws         96\n\n60. Self-contradiction of Epicurus                                    97\n\n64-65. Proof for the law of addition of like to like; testimony for it in\nthe teaching of the Stoa, of the theistic Hedonists, and in the\ndemand for immortality; Helmholtz                                     98\n\n67. The great theologians are opponents of the arbitrary character of\nthe divine law of morals                                              99\n\n68. John Stuart Mill on the doctrine of the distinction between\n\u201cblind\u201d and \u201cself-evident judgments\u201d                                  99\n\n(The numbers missing in the index contain only literary references.)\n\n\nMIKLOSICH ON SUBJECTLESS PROPOSITIONS\n\n(Appendix to pages 14 and 55).\n\nI. Short sketch of the essential features treated in Miklosich\u2019s\narticle                                                              105\n\nII. Critical remarks                                                 110\n\nBiographical Note                                                    119\n\n\n\n\nA LECTURE\n\n\n1. The invitation to lecture extended to me by the Law Society was the\nmore binding as it gave expression in strong terms to a conviction\nwhich, unfortunately, seems on the point of falling into abeyance.\nProposals for a reform of legal studies have been heard (and they are\neven said to have proceeded from university circles) which can only mean\nthat the roots of jurisprudence deeply implanted as they are in the\nspheres of ethics and national history may be severed, without the\norganism itself suffering any vital injury.\n\nAs regards history, this counsel is to me, I confess, utterly\ninexplicable; in respect of philosophy, I can excuse it only on the\nground that the men who at present occupy the chairs in the legal\nfaculty have taken a deep and gloomy impression of the mistakes of a\nperiod which has lately passed away. A personal reproach may therefore\nwell be spared them. Yet indeed such suggestions were every bit as wise\nas would be the case if a medical faculty were to propose to erase from\ntheir plan of obligatory studies zoology, physics and chemistry.\n\nIf Leibnitz in his _Vita a se ipso lineata_, speaking of himself, says:\n\u201cI found that my earlier studies in history and philosophy lightened\nmaterially my study of law,\u201d and if, as in his _Specimen difficultatis\nin jure_, deploring the prejudices of contemporary jurists, he exclaims:\n\u201cOh! that those who busy themselves with the study of law would throw\naside their contempt of philosophy and see that without philosophy most\nof the questions of their jus form a labyrinth without issue!\u201d what\nindeed would he say were he to rise again to-day, to these retrograde\nreform movements?\n\n\n2. The worthy President of the Society, who has retained such a lively\nand wide sense of the real scientific needs of his profession, expressed\nto me his own special wishes respecting the theme to be chosen. The\nquestion as to the existence of a natural right was, he said, a subject\nwhich enjoyed an exceptional interest with the members of the Law\nSociety; and he himself was anxious to learn what attitude I would adopt\nwith regard to the views there expressed by Ihering some years ago.[1]\n\nI consented gladly, and have therefore designated as the subject of my\nlecture the natural sanction for law and morality, wishing thereby, at\nthe same time, to indicate in what sense alone I believe in a natural\nright.\n\n\n3. For a two-fold meaning may be associated with the term \u201cnatural\u201d:--\n\n     (1) It may mean as much as \u201cgiven by nature,\u201d \u201cinnate,\u201d in\n     contradistinction to what has been acquired during historical\n     development either by deduction or by experience.\n\n     (2) It may mean, in contradistinction to what is determined by the\n     arbitrary will of a dictator, the rules which, in and for\n     themselves and in virtue of their nature are recognized as right\n     and binding.\n\nIhering rejects natural right in either of these meanings.[2] I, for my\npart, agree as thoroughly with him regarding the one meaning as I differ\nfrom him regarding the other.\n\n\n4. I agree completely with Ihering when, following the example of John\nLocke, he denies all innate moral principles.\n\nFurther, like him, I believe neither in the grotesque _jus naturae_,\ni.e. _quod natura ipsa omnia animalia docuit_, nor in a _jus gentium_,\nin a right which, as the Roman jurists defined it, is recognized as a\nnatural law of reason by the universal agreement of all nations.\n\nIt is not necessary to have gone deeply into zoology and physiology in\norder to see that we can no longer use the animal world as a criterion\nfor the setting up of ethical standards, even if one is not disposed to\ngo so far as Rokitansky in pronouncing protoplasma, with its aggressive\ncharacter, an unrighteous and evil principle.\n\nAs to a common code of right for all nations, such a belief was a\ndelusion which might hold good in the antique world; in modern times\nwhen the ethnographical horizon has been extended, and the customs of\nbarbarous races drawn upon for comparison, these laws can no longer be\nrecognized as a product of nature, but only as a product of culture\ncommon to the more advanced nations.\n\nAs regards all this, therefore, I am in agreement with Ihering; I am\nalso substantially in agreement with him when he asserts that there have\nbeen times without any trace of ethical knowledge and ethical feeling;\nat any rate without anything of the kind that was commonly accepted.\n\nIndeed I acknowledge unhesitatingly that this state of things continued\neven when larger communities under state government had been\nconstituted. When Ihering, in support of this view, points to Greek\nmythology with its gods and goddesses destitute of moral thought and\nfeeling, and maintains that, by the lives of the gods, the life of\nmankind in the period in which these myths took shape may be\ninterpreted,[3] he does but use a method of proof which Aristotle has\nalready employed in a similar manner in his _Politics_.[4] This also\nmust therefore be conceded him, and we shall, on this ground, no longer\ndeny that the earliest political laws supported by penal sanction were\nestablished without the help of any feeling of right founded upon moral\ninsight. There are, therefore, no natural moral laws and legal precepts\nin the sense that they are given by nature herself, that they are\ninnate; in this respect, Ihering\u2019s views have our entire approval.\n\n\n5. We have now to meet the second and far more important question: Do\nthere exist truths concerning morality, taught by nature herself, and is\nthere moral truth, independent of all ecclesiastical, political, in fact\nevery kind of social authority? Is there a natural moral law which, in\nits nature, is universally and incontestably valid for men of every\nplace and time, valid indeed for every kind of thinking and sentient\nbeing; and does the knowledge of it lie within the realm of our mental\nfaculties? Here we are at the point where I join issue with Ihering. To\nthis question, which Ihering answers in the negative, I return a decided\naffirmative. Which of us is here in the right our present inquiry into\nthe natural sanction for law and morality will, I hope, make clear.\n\nAt any rate, the decision as to the former question, whatever Ihering[5]\nhimself may think to the contrary, does not in any way prejudge the\nlatter. Innate prejudices do exist; these are natural in the former\nsense, but they lack natural sanction; whether true or false, they\npossess no immediate validity. On the other hand, there are many\npropositions recognized after a natural manner, which are incontestably\ncertain and have universal validity for all thinking beings, which,\nhowever, as, for example, the Pythagorean theorem are anything but\ninnate, else the blissful first discoverer had never offered his\nhecatomb to the god.\n\n\n6. In what has been said I have made it sufficiently evident how, when I\nspeak of natural sanction, I understand the notion of sanction. Yet it\nwill be well to linger a moment in order to exclude another inadequate\nview.\n\n\u201cSanction\u201d signifies \u201cmaking fast.\u201d Now a law may be fixed in a double\nsense:\n\n     (1) It may be fixed in the sense of becoming law, as when a\n     proposed law receives validity by ratification on the part of the\n     highest legislative authority.\n\n     (2) In the sense of being rendered more effectual by attaching to\n     it positive punishments, perhaps also rewards.\n\nIt is in this latter sense that sanction was spoken of by writers of\nantiquity, as when Cicero[6] says of the leges Porciae: \u201cNeque quicquam\npraeter sanctionem attulerunt novi\u201d; and Ulpian:[7] \u201cInterdum in\nsanctionibus adijicitur, ut qui ibi aliquid commisit, capite puniatur.\u201d\nIt is in the former sense that the expression is more usual in modern\ntimes; a law is said to be \u201csanctioned\u201d when it secures validity by\nreceiving confirmation at the hands of the highest authority.\n\nManifestly sanction in the second sense presupposes sanction in the\nfirst, which sanction is the more essential, since, without it, the law\nwould not truly be law at all. Such a natural sanction therefore is of\nthe last necessity if anything whatever is to bear by nature the stamp\nof law or morality.\n\n\n7. If we now compare with such a view what has been said by philosophers\nconcerning the natural sanction for morality, it will be easily seen how\noften they have overlooked its essential character.\n\n\n8. Many think that they have discovered a natural sanction in respect of\na certain line of conduct when they have shown that a certain feeling of\ncompulsion so to act is developed within the individual. Since every\none, for example, renders services to others in order to receive similar\nservices in return, there at last arises a habit of performing such\nservices even in cases where there has been no thought of recompense.[8]\nThis it is which is thought to constitute the sanction for love of our\nneighbour.\n\nBut this view is entirely erroneous. Such a feeling of compulsion is\ncertainly a force driving to action, but it is assuredly not a sanction\nconferring validity. Besides, the inclination to vice develops according\nto the same law of habit, and exercises, as an impulse, the most\nunbounded sway. The miser\u2019s passion which leads him, in his desire of\namassing riches, to submit to the heaviest sacrifices and to commit the\nmost extreme cruelties, certainly constitutes no sanction for his\nconduct.\n\n\n9. Again, motives of hope or fear that a certain manner of behaviour,\nas, for example, regard for the general good, will render us agreeable\nor disagreeable to other and more powerful beings, these it has often\nbeen sought to regard as a sanction for such conduct.[9] But it is\nmanifest that the most cringing cowardice, the most servile flattery\nmight then boast a natural sanction. As a matter of fact virtue shines\nout most brightly where neither threats nor entreaties are able to\ndivert her from the right path.\n\n\n10. Some speak of an education in which man, as belonging to an order of\nliving beings accustomed to live in society, receives from those by whom\nhe is surrounded. An injunction is repeatedly laid upon him, the\ncommand: \u201cYou ought.\u201d It lies in the nature of things that certain\nactions are very frequently and generally required of him. There is thus\nformed an association between his mode of action and the thought: \u201cYou\nought.\u201d And so it may happen that he may come to regard, as the source\nof this command, the society in which he lives, or even something\nvaguely conceived to be higher than an individual, that is to say,\nsomething regarded in a way as superhuman. The \u201cought\u201d associated by him\nwith such a being would then constitute the sanction of conscience.[10]\n\nIn this case the natural sanction would then consist in the naturally\ndeveloped belief in the command of a more powerful will.\n\nBut it is manifest that such a belief in the command of a more powerful\nbeing contains, as yet, nothing which deserves the name of a sanction.\nSuch a conviction is shared by one who knows himself to be at the mercy\nof a tyrant or of a robber horde. Whether he obey, or bid defiance, the\ncommand itself contains nothing able to give to the required act a\nsanction similar to that of the conscience. Even if he obey he does so\nthrough fear, not because he regards the command as one based on right.\n\nThe thought, therefore, that an act is commanded by some one does not\nconstitute a natural sanction. In the case of every command issued by an\nexternal will the question arises: Is such a command authorized or is\nit not? Neither is there any reference here to a command enforced by a\nstill higher power enjoining obedience to the former. For then the\nquestion would again reappear, and we should proceed from one command to\nanother enjoining obedience to the former, and from that to a third\nenjoining in like manner obedience to the second, and so on _ad infin_.\n\nJust as in the case of the feeling of compulsion, and in that of the\nfear or hope of recompense, so also the thought of the command of an\nexternal will cannot possibly be the sanction for law and morality.\n\n\n11. But there are also commands in an essentially different sense;\ncommands in the sense in which we speak of the commands of logic\nrespecting our judgments and conclusions. We are not here concerned with\nthe will of logic, since a will logic manifestly has not, nor with the\nwill of the logician, to which we have in no way sworn allegiance. The\nlaws of logic are naturally valid rules of judging, that is to say, we\nare obliged to conform to them, since conformity to these rules ensures\ncertainty in our judgments, whereas judgments diverging from these rules\nare liable to error. What we therefore mean is a natural superiority\nwhich thought-processes in conformity with law have over such as are\ncontrary to law. So also in ethics, we are not concerned with the\ncommand of an external will but rather with a natural preference similar\nto that in logic, and the law founded on that preference. This has been\nemphasized not only by Kant but also by the majority of great thinkers\nbefore him. Nevertheless there are still many--unfortunately even among\nthe adherents of the empirical school to which I myself belong--by whom\nthis fact has neither been rightly understood nor appreciated.\n\n\n12. In what then lies this special superiority which gives to morality\nits natural sanction? Some regarded it as, in a sense, external, they\nbelieved its superiority to consist in beauty of appearance. The Greeks\ncalled noble and virtuous conduct \u03a4\u1f40 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f41\u03bd, the beautiful, and the\nperfect man of honour \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03ba\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03c2; though none of the philosophers of\nantiquity set up this aesthetic view as a criterion. On the other hand,\nDavid Hume[11], among modern thinkers, has spoken of a moral sense of\nthe beautiful which acts as arbiter between the moral and the immoral,\nwhile still more recently the German philosopher, Herbart,[12] has\nsubordinated ethics to aesthetics.\n\nNow I do not deny that the aspect of virtue is more agreeable than that\nof moral perversity. But I cannot concede that in this consists the only\nand essential superiority of ethical conduct. It is rather an inner\nsuperiority which distinguishes the moral from the immoral will, in the\nsame way that it is an inner superiority which distinguishes true and\nself evident judgments and conclusions from prejudices and fallacies.\nHere also it cannot be denied that a prejudice, a fallacy has in it\nsomething unbeautiful, often indeed something ridiculously\nnarrow-minded, which makes the person so scantily favoured by Minerva\nappear in a most disadvantageous attitude; yet who, on this account,\nwould class the rules of logic among those of aesthetics, or make logic\na branch of aesthetics?[13] No, the real logical superiority is no mere\naesthetic appearance but a certain inward rightness which then carries\nwith it a certain superiority of appearance. It will, therefore, be\nalso a certain inward rightness which constitutes the essential\nsuperiority of one particular act of will over another of an opposite\ncharacter; in which consists the superiority of the moral over the\nimmoral.\n\nThe belief in this superiority is an ethical motive; the knowledge of it\nis the right ethical motive, the sanction which gives to ethical law\npermanence and validity.\n\n\n13. But are we capable of attaining to such knowledge? Here lies the\ndifficulty which philosophers have for a long time sought in vain to\nsolve. Even to Kant it seemed as though none had found the right end of\nthe thread by means of which to unravel the skein. This the Categorical\nImperative was to do. It resembled however, rather the sword drawn by\nAlexander to cut the Gordian knot. With such a palpable fiction the\nmatter is not to be set right.[14]\n\n\n14. In order to gain an insight into the true origin of ethical\nknowledge it will be necessary to take some account of the results of\nlater researches in the sphere of descriptive psychology. The limited\ntime at my disposal makes it necessary for me to set forth my views very\nbriefly, and I have reason to fear that by its conciseness the\ncompleteness of the statement may suffer. Yet it is just here that I ask\nyour special attention, in order that what is most essential to a right\nunderstanding of the problem be not overlooked.\n\n\n15. The subject of the moral and immoral is termed the will. What we\nwill is, in many cases, a means to an end. In that case we will this end\nalso, and even in a higher degree than the means. The end itself may\noften be the means to a further end; in a far reaching plan there may\noften appear a whole series of ends, the one being always connected in\nsubordination to the other as a means. There must be present, however,\none end, which is desired above all others and for its own sake; without\nthis essential and final end all incentive would be lacking, and this\nwould involve the absurdity of aiming without a goal at which to aim.\n\n\n16. The means we employ in order to gain an end may be manifold, may be\nright or wrong. They are right when they are really adapted to the\nattainment of the end.\n\nThe ends, also, even the most essential and final ends, may be manifold.\nIt is a mistake which appeared especially in the eighteenth century,\nnowadays the tendency is more and more to abandon it, that every one\nseeks the same end, namely, his own highest possible pleasure.[15]\nWhoever can believe that the martyr facing with full consciousness the\nmost terrible tortures for the sake of his conviction--and there were\nsome who had no hope of recompense hereafter--was thus inspired by a\ndesire after the greatest possible pleasure, such a man must have either\na very defective sense of the facts of the case, or, indeed, have lost\nall measure of the intensities of pleasure and pain.\n\nThis, therefore, is certain: even final ends are manifold, between them\nhovers the choice, which, since the final end is for everything the\ndetermining principle, is of the most importance. What ought I to strive\nafter? Which end is the right one, which wrong? This, as Aristotle long\nago declared, is the essential, the cardinal question in ethics.[16]\n\n\n17. Which end is right, for which should our choice declare itself?\n\nWhere the end is fixed and it is merely a question as to the choice of\nmeans, we reply: Choose means which will certainly attain the end. Where\nit is a question as to the choice of ends we would say: Choose an end\nwhich reason regards as really attainable. This answer is, however,\ninsufficient, many a thing attainable is rather to be shunned than\nsought after; choose the best among attainable ends, this alone is the\nadequate answer.[17]\n\nBut the answer is obscure; what do we mean by \u201cthe best\u201d? what can be\ncalled \u201cgood\u201d at all? and how can we attain to the knowledge that one\nthing is good and better than another?\n\n\n18. In order to answer this question satisfactorily, we must, above all,\ninquire into the origin of the conception of the good, which lies, like\nthe origin of all our conceptions, in certain concrete impressions.[18]\n\nWe possess impressions with _physical_ content. These exhibit to us\nsensuous qualities localized in space. Out of this sphere arise the\nconceptions of colour, sound, space and many others. The conception of\nthe good, however, has not here its origin. It is easily recognizable\nthat the conception of the good like that of the true, which, as having\naffinity, is rightly placed side by side with it, derives its origin\nfrom concrete impressions with _psychical_ content.\n\n\n19. The common feature of everything psychical consists in what has been\ncalled by a very unfortunate and ambiguous term, consciousness; i.e. in\na subject-attitude; in what has been termed an _intentional_ relation to\nsomething which, though perhaps not real, is none the less an inner\nobject of perception[19] No hearing without the heard, no believing\nwithout the believed, no hoping without the hoped for, no striving\nwithout the striven for, no joy without the enjoyed, and so with other\nmental phenomena.\n\n\n20. The sensuous qualities which are given in our impressions with\nphysical content exhibit manifold differences. So also do the\nintentional relations given in our impressions with psychical content.\nAnd, as in the former case, the number of the senses is determined by\nreference to those distinctions between sensuous qualities which are\nmost fundamental (called by Helmholtz distinctions of modality), so in\nthe latter case the number of fundamental classes of mental phenomena is\nfixed by reference to the most fundamental distinctions of intentional\nrelation.[20]\n\nIn this way we distinguish three fundamental classes. Descartes in his\n_Meditations_[21] was the first to exhibit these rightly and completely;\nbut sufficient attention has not been paid to his observations, and they\nwere soon quite forgotten, until in recent times, and independently of\nhim, these were again discovered. Nowadays they may lay claim to\nsufficient verification.[22]\n\nThe first fundamental class is that of ideas (Vorstellungen) in the\nwidest sense of the term (Descartes\u2019 ideae). This class embraces\nconcrete impressions, those for example which are given to us through\nthe senses, as well as every abstract conception.\n\nThe second fundamental class is judgment (Descartes\u2019 judicia). Previous\nto Descartes these were thought of as forming, along with ideas, _one_\nfundamental class, and since Descartes\u2019 time philosophy has fallen once\nmore into this error. This view regarded judgment as consisting\nessentially in a combination or relation of ideas to one another. This\nwas a gross misconception of its true nature. We may combine or relate\nideas as we please, as in speaking of a golden mountain, the father of a\nhundred children, a friend of science; but as long as nothing further\ntakes place there can be no judgment. Equally true is it that an idea\nalways forms the basis of a judgment, as also of a desire; but it is not\ntrue that, in a judgment, there are always several ideas related to one\nanother as subject and predicate. This is certainly the case when I say:\n\u201cGod is just,\u201d though not when I say: \u201cThere is a God.\u201d\n\nWhat, therefore, distinguishes those cases where I have not only an idea\nbut also a judgment? There is here added to the act of presentation a\nsecond intentional relation to the object given in presentation, a\nrelation either of recognition or rejection. Whoever says: \u201cGod,\u201d gives\nexpression to the idea of God; whoever says: \u201cThere is a God,\u201d gives\nexpression to a belief in him.\n\nI must not linger here, and can only assure you that this, if anything,\nadmits to-day of no denial. From the philological standpoint Miklosich\nconfirms the results of psychological analysis.[23]\n\nThe third fundamental class consists of the emotions in the widest sense\nof the term, from the simple forms of inclination or disinclination in\nrespect of the mere idea, to joy and sadness arising from conviction and\nto the most complicated phenomena as to the choice of ends and means.\nAristotle long since included these under the term \u1f4c\u03c1\u03b5\u03b6\u03b9\u03c2. Descartes\nsays this class embraces the _voluntates sive affectus_. As in the\nsecond fundamental class the intentional relation was one of recognition\nor rejection, so in the third class it is one of love or hate, (or, as\nit might be equally well expressed,) a form of pleasing or displeasing.\nLoving, pleasing, hating, displeasing, these are given in the simplest\nforms of inclination or disinclination, in victorious joy as well as in\ndespairing sorrow, in hope and fear, and in every form of voluntary\nactivity. \u201cPlait-il?\u201d asks the Frenchman; \u201ces hat Gott gefallen,\u201d one\nreads in (German) announcements of a death; while the \u201cPlacet,\u201d written\nwhen confirming an act, is the expression of the determining fiat of\nwill.[24]\n\n\n21. In comparing these three classes of phenomena it is found that the\ntwo last mentioned show an analogy which, in the first, is absent. There\nexists, that is, an opposition of intentional relation; in the case of\njudgment, recognition or rejection, in the case of the emotions, love or\nhate, pleasure or displeasure. The idea shows nothing of a similar\nnature. I can, it is true, conceive of opposites, as for example white\nand black, but whether I believe in this black or deny it, I can only\nrepresent it to myself in one way; the representation does not alter\nwith the opposite act of judgment; nor again, in the case of the\nfeelings, when I change my attitude towards it according as it pleases\nor displeases me.\n\n\n22. From this fact follows an important conclusion. Concerning acts of\nthe first class none can be called either right or wrong. In the case of\nthe second class on the other hand, one of the two opposed modes of\nrelation, affirmation and rejection, is right the other wrong, as logic\nhas long affirmed. The same naturally holds good of the third class. Of\nthe two opposed modes of relation, love and hate, pleasure and\ndispleasure, in each case one is right the other wrong.\n\n\n23. We have now reached the place where the notions of good and bad,\nalong with the notions of the true and the false which we have been\nseeking, have their source. We call anything true when the recognition\nrelated to it is right.[25] We call something good when the love\nrelating to it is right. That which can be loved with a right love, that\nwhich is worthy of love, is good in the widest sense of the term.\n\n\n24. Since everything which pleases does so, either for its own sake, or\nfor the sake of something else which is thereby produced, conserved or\nrendered probable, we must distinguish between a primary and a secondary\ngood, i.e. what is good in itself, and what is good on account of\nsomething else, as is specially the case in the sphere of the useful.\n\nWhat is good in itself is the good in the narrower sense. It alone can\nstand side by side with the true. For everything which is true is true\nin itself, even when only mediately known. When we speak of good later\nwe shall therefore mean, whenever the contrary is not expressly\nasserted, that which is good in itself.\n\nIn this way we have, I hope, made clear the notion of good.[26]\n\n\n25. There follows now the still more important question: How are we to\nknow that anything is good? Ought we to say that whatever is loved and\nis capable of being loved is worthy of love and is good? This is\nmanifestly untrue, and it is almost inconceivable that some have fallen\ninto this error. One loves what another hates, and, in accordance with a\nwell known psychological law already previously referred to it often\nhappens that what at first was desired merely as a means to something\nelse, comes at last from habit to be desired for its own sake. In such a\nway the miser is irrationally led to heap up riches and even to\nsacrifice himself for their sake. The actual presence of love,\ntherefore, by no means testifies unconditionally to the worthiness of\nthe object to be loved, just as affirmation is no unconditional proof of\nwhat is true.\n\nIt might even be said that the first statement is even more _evident_\nthan the second, since it can hardly happen that he who affirms anything\nat the same time holds it to be false, whereas it frequently happens\nthat a person, even while loving something, confesses himself that it is\nunworthy of his love:\n\n     \u201cVideo meliora proboque,\n    Deteriora sequor.\u201d\n\nHow then are we to know that anything is good?\n\n\n26. The matter appears enigmatical, but the enigma finds a very easy\nsolution.\n\nAs a preliminary step to answering the question, let us turn our glance\nfrom the good to the true.\n\nNot everything which we affirm is on this account true. Our judgments\nare frequently quite blind. Many a prejudice which we drank in, as it\nwere, with our mother\u2019s milk presents to us the appearance of an\nirrefutable principle. To other equally blind judgments all men have, by\nnature, a kind of instinctive impulsion, as, for example, in trusting\nblindly to the so-called external impression, or to a recent\nremembrance. What is so recognized may often be true, but it may equally\nwell be false since the affirming judgment contains nothing which gives\nto it the character of rightness.\n\nSuch, however, is the case in certain other judgments, which in\ncontradistinction to these blind judgments may be termed \u201cobvious,\u201d\n\u201cself-evident\u201d judgments; as, for example, the Principle of\nContradiction, and every so-called inner perception which informs me\nthat I am now experiencing sensations of sound or colour, or think and\nwill this or that.\n\nIn what, then, does the distinction between these lower and higher forms\nof judgment essentially consist? Is it a distinction in the degree of\nbelief, or is it something else? It is not a distinction in the degree\nof belief; the instinctive blind assumptions arising from habit are\noften not in the slightest degree weakened by doubts, and we are unable\nto get rid of some even when we have already seen their logical falsity.\nBut such assumptions are the results of blind impulse, they have nothing\nof the clearness peculiar to the higher forms of judgment. Were the\nquestion to be raised: \u201cWhat is then your reason for believing that?\u201d no\nrational answer would be forthcoming. It is quite true that if the same\ninquiry were to be made respecting the immediately evident judgment here\nalso no reason could be given, but in face of the clearness of the\njudgment the inquiry would appear utterly beside the point, in fact\nridiculous. Every one experiences for himself the difference between\nthese two classes of judgment, and in the reference to this experience,\nconsists, as in the case of every conception, the final explanation.\n\n\n27. All this is, in its essentials, universally known,[27] and is\ncontested only by a few, and then not without great inconsistency. Far\nfewer have noticed an analogous distinction between the higher and lower\nforms of the feelings of pleasure and displeasure.\n\nOur pleasure or displeasure is often quite like blind judgment, only an\ninstinctive or habitual impulse. This is so in the case of the miser\u2019s\npleasure in piling up, in those powerful feelings of pleasure and pain\nconnected in men and animals alike with the appearance of certain\nsensuous qualities, moreover, as is especially noticeable in tastes,\ndifferent species and even different individuals, are affected in a\nquite contrary manner.\n\nMany philosophers, and among them very considerable thinkers, have\nregarded only that mode of pleasure which is peculiar to the lower\nphenomena of the class, and have entirely overlooked the fact that there\nexists a pleasure and a displeasure of a higher kind. David Hume, for\nexample, betrays almost in every word that he has absolutely no idea of\nthe existence of this higher class.[28] How general this oversight has\nbeen may be judged from the fact that language has no common name for\nit.[29] Yet the fact is undeniable and we propose now to elucidate it by\na few examples.\n\nWe have already said that we are endowed by nature with a pleasure for\nsome tastes and an antipathy for others, both of which are purely\ninstinctive. We also naturally take pleasure in clear insight,\ndispleasure in error or ignorance. \u201cAll men,\u201d says Aristotle in the\nbeautiful introductory words of his _Metaphysics_,[30] \u201cnaturally desire\nknowledge.\u201d This desire is an example which will serve our purpose. It\nis a pleasure of that higher form which is analogous to _self-evidence_\nin the sphere of judgment. In our species it is universal. Were there\nanother species which, while having different preferences from us in\nrespect of sensible qualities, were opposed to us in loving error for\nits own sake and hating insight, then assuredly we should not in the\nlatter as in the former case say: that it was a matter of taste, \u201cde\ngustibus non est disputandum\u201d; rather we should here answer decisively\nthat such love and hatred were fundamentally absurd, that such a species\nhated what was undeniably good, and loved what was undeniably bad in\nitself. Now why, where the feeling of compulsion is equally strong, do\nwe answer differently in the one case than in the other? The answer is\nsimple. In the former case the feeling of compulsion was an instinctive\nimpulse; in the latter the natural feeling of pleasure is a higher love,\nhaving the character of rightness.[31] We therefore notice when we\nourselves have such a feeling, that its object is not merely loved and\nlovable, its opposite hated and unlovable, but also that the one is\nworthy of love, the other worthy of hatred, and therefore that one is\ngood, the other bad.\n\nAnother example. As we prefer insight to error, so also, generally\nspeaking, we prefer joy (unless indeed it be joy in what is bad) to\nsadness. Were there beings among whom the reverse held good, we should\nregard such conduct as perverse, and rightly so. Here too it is because\nour love and our hatred are qualified as right.\n\nA third example is found in feeling itself so far as it is right and has\nthe character of rightness. As was the case with the rightness and\nevidence of the judgment, so also the rightness and higher character of\nthe feelings are also reckoned as good, while love of the bad is itself\nbad.[32]\n\nIn order that, in the sphere of ideas, we may not leave the\ncorresponding experiences unmentioned: here in the same way every idea\nis found to be something good in itself, and that with every enlargement\nin the realm of our ideas, quite apart from what of good or bad may\nresult therefrom, the good within us is increased.[33]\n\nHere then, and from such experiences of love qualified as right, arises\nwithin us the knowledge that anything is truly and unmistakably good in\nthe full extent to which we are capable of such knowledge.[34]\n\nThis last clause is added advisedly; for we must not, of course, conceal\nfrom ourselves the fact that we have no guarantee that everything which\nis good will arouse within us a love with the character of rightness.\nWherever this is not the case our criterion fails, and the good then, so\nfar as our knowledge and practical account of it are concerned, is as\nmuch as non-existent.[35]\n\n\n28. It is, however, not _one_ but many things which we thus recognize as\ngood. And so the questions remain: In that which is good, and especially\nin what, as good, is attainable, which is the better? and further, which\nis the highest practical good? so that it may become the standard for\nour actions.\n\n\n29. We must first inquire: When is anything better than anything else\nand recognized by us as better? and what is meant by \u201cthe better\u201d at\nall?\n\nThe answer now lies ready to hand though not in such a way as to render\nit unnecessary to exclude a very possible error. If by \u201cgood\u201d is meant\nthat which is worthy of being loved for its own sake, then by \u201cbetter\u201d\nappears to be meant that which is worthy of being loved with a greater\nlove. But is this really so? What is meant by \u201cwith greater love\u201d? Is it\nspatial magnitude? Hardly; no one would propose to measure pleasure or\ndispleasure in feet and inches. \u201cThe intensity of the pleasure,\u201d some\nwill perhaps say, \u201cis what is meant in speaking of love as great.\u201d\nAccording to this \u201cbetter\u201d would mean that which pleases with a more\nintense pleasure. But such a definition closely examined would involve\nthe greatest absurdities. According to this view, each single case in\nwhich joy is felt in anything would seem only to admit of a certain\nmeasure of joy, whereas one would naturally think that it could not\npossibly be reprehensible to rejoice in what is really good to the\nfullest extent possible. Or, as we say, \u201cwith all one\u2019s heart.\u201d\nDescartes has already observed that the act of loving (when directed\ntowards what is good at all) can never be too intense.[36] And he is\nmanifestly right. Were it otherwise what cautiousness should we not be\ncalled upon to exercise considering the limits of our mental strength!\nEvery time one wished to rejoice over something good, an anxious survey\nwould be necessary respecting other existing goods in order that the\nmeasure of proportion to our total strength might in no way be exceeded.\nAnd if one believes in a God, understanding thereby the Infinite Good,\nthe Ideal of all ideals, then, since a man, even with his whole soul and\nstrength can only love God with an act of love of finite intensity he\nwill therefore be compelled to love every other good with an infinitely\nsmall degree of intensity, and, since this is impossible, must cease as\na matter of fact to love it at all.\n\nAll this is manifestly absurd.\n\n\n30. And yet it must be said that the better is that which is rightly\nloved with a greater love, which is rightly more pleasing, though in\nquite another sense. The \u201cmore\u201d refers not to the relation of intensity\nbetween the two acts, but rather to a peculiar species of phenomena\nbelonging to the general class of pleasure and displeasure, i.e., to the\nphenomena of choice. Thereby are meant relating acts which in their\npeculiar nature are known to every one in experience. In the province of\nideas there is nothing analogous. In the province of judgment there are,\nit is true, alongside the simple, subjectless propositions, predicative\njudgments which are acts of a relative character, but this resemblance\nis very imperfect. The case here which has most similarity is that of a\ndecision respecting a dialectically propounded question: \u201cIs this true\nor false?\u201d in which a sort of preference is given to one above the\nother. But even here it is always something true which is, so to speak,\npreferred to something false, never something more true over something\nless true. Whatever is true is true in a like degree, but whatever is\ngood is not good in equal degree, and by \u201cbetter\u201d nothing else is meant\nthan what, when compared with another good, is preferable, i.e.\nsomething which for its own sake, is preferred with a right preference.\nFor the rest a somewhat wider usage of language allows us also to speak\nof a good as \u201cbetter\u201d over against a bad or purely indifferent, or even\nto call something bad over against something still worse \u201cthe better.\u201d\nWe then say not of course that it is good, but still better than the\nother.\n\nThis shortly in explanation of the notion of the better.\n\n\n31. Next the question: How do we know that anything is really the\nbetter? Assuming the existence of simple knowledge of things as good and\nbad, we appear, so analogy suggests, to derive this insight from certain\nacts of preferring which have the character of rightness. For, like the\nsimple exercise of pleasure, so also the act of preferring is sometimes\nof a lower or impulsive, and sometimes of a higher kind, and like the\nevident judgment, is qualified as right. The cases in point are,\nhowever, of such a nature that many might say, and perhaps with a better\nright, that it is analytical judgments which furnish us here with the\nmeans of progress, and that instead of our learning the preferability\nfrom the actual preferences, the preferences have the qualification of\nrightness because they already presume the recognition of the standard\nof preferability.[37]\n\nChiefly belonging to this class are obviously (1) the case where we\nprefer something good, and recognized as good, to something bad, and\nrecognized as bad. Also (2) the case where we prefer the existence of\nsomething recognized as good to its non-existence, or the non-existence\nof something recognized as bad to its existence.\n\nThis case embraces in itself a series of important cases, as the case\nwhere we prefer a good to the same good with an admixture of the bad;\nand, on the other hand, where we prefer something bad, with an admixture\nof good, to the same bad purely for its own sake. Further, the cases in\nwhich we prefer the whole of a good to its part, and again, the part of\nsomething bad to its whole. Aristotle has already called attention to\nthe fact that in the case of the good the sum is always better than the\nseparate parts which together make up its sum. Such a case of summation\npresents itself wherever a state has a certain permanence. The same\namount of joy which endures an hour is better than if it only lasted for\na moment. Whoever denies this, like Epicurus when he would console us on\naccount of the mortality of the soul, may easily be led into still more\nstriking absurdities. For then an hour\u2019s torture would be no worse than\nthat of a moment. And, by combining both these propositions, we should\nhave to assume that an entire life full of joy with a single moment of\npain is in no way preferable to an entire life full of pain with a\nsingle moment of joy. This is a result at which not only every sound\nmind in general would demur, but also one respecting which Epicurus in\nparticular, expressly asserts the contrary.\n\nClosely related to this is the case (3) where one good is preferred to\nanother, which, while forming no part of the first, is yet similar in\nevery respect to one of its parts. It is not merely by adding a good to\nthe same good but also by adding it to a good which is in every respect\nsimilar that we get a better for total. The case is analogous when to a\nsimilar bad another bad is thought of as added. When therefore, for\nexample, a fine picture is seen, the first time as a whole, the second\ntime only partially though exactly in the same way, we must then say\nthat the first view, considered in itself, is better: Or, when one\nimagines something that is good and a second time not only imagines it\neven as perfectly as before, but also loves it, this latter sum of\npsychical acts is then something better.\n\nCases of difference in degree belong also to this third class, and are\nespecially worthy of mention. If one good, e.g. one joy is in every\nrespect quite equal to another, only more intense, then the preference\nwhich is given to the more intense is qualified as right, the more\nintense is the better. Conversely, the bad which is more intense, e.g. a\nmore intense pain, is worse. That is to say: the degree of intensity\ncorresponds with the distance from the zero point, and the distance of\nthe greater degree of intensity from zero is compounded of its distance\nfrom the weaker degree of intensity plus the distance of this from zero.\nWe have, therefore, really to do with a kind of addition, a view which\nhas been disputed.\n\n\n32. Many a one will, perhaps, think to himself that the three cases\nwhich I have set forth are so self-evident and insignificant that it is\na matter for surprise that I have lingered over them at all.\nSelf-evident they are of course, and this must be so, since we have\nhere to do with what has to serve as a fundamentum. The case would be\nworse if they were insignificant; for, I confess it frankly, I have\nscarcely another further case to add: in all, or, at any rate, most of\nthe cases not here included a criterion fails us completely.[38]\n\nAn example. All insight is, we have said, something good in itself, and\nall noble love is likewise something good in itself. We recognize both\nthese things clearly. But who shall say whether this act of insight or\nthat act of love is in itself, the better? There have, of course, not\nbeen wanting those who have given a verdict on this point; some have\neven asserted that it is certain every act of noble love for its own\nsake is a good so high that, taken by itself, it is better than all\nscientific insight taken together. In my judgment this view is not only\ndoubtful but altogether absurd. For a single act of noble love worthy as\nit is, is yet a certain finite good. But every act of insight is also a\nfinite good and if I keep adding this finite quantity to itself _ad\nlibitum_, its sum is bound some time to exceed every given finite\nmeasure of good. On the other hand, Plato and Aristotle were inclined to\nregard the act of knowing considered in itself as higher than ethically\nvirtuous acts, this also quite unjustly, and I only mention it since the\nopposition of opinions here is a confirmatory proof of the absence of\nany criterion. As often happens in the sphere of the psychical,[39] so\nalso here, real measurements are impossible. Now where the inner\npreference is not to be detected there holds good here what was said in\na similar case of simple goodness--as far as our knowledge and practical\nconcern go it is as good as non-existent.\n\n\n33. There are some who, in opposition to the clear teaching of\nexperience, assert that only pleasure is good for its own sake, and\npleasure is _the_ good. Assuming this view to be right, would it have\nthe advantage, as many have believed, and as Bentham in particular\nmaintained in its favour,[40] that we should at once attain to a\ndetermination of the relative value of goods, seeing that now we should\nhave only homogeneous goods and these admit of being measured side by\nside? Every more intense pleasure would then be a greater good than one\nless intense, and a good having double the intensity would be equal to\ntwo of half the intensity. In this way everything would become clear.\n\nA moment\u2019s reflection only is needed to shatter an illusion born of such\nhope. Are we really able to find out that one pleasure is twice as great\nas another? Gauss[41] himself, who knew something about measurements,\nhas denied this. A more intense pleasure is never really made up of\ntwelve less intense pleasures distinguishable as equal parts within it,\nas a foot is made up of twelve inches. So the matter presents itself\neven in simpler cases. But how foolish would any one appear were he to\nassert that the pleasure he had in smoking a good cigar increased 127,\nor, let us say, 1077 times in intensity yielded a measure of the\npleasure experienced by him in listening to a symphony of Beethoven or\ncontemplating one of Raphael\u2019s madonnas![42] I think I have said enough,\nand do not need to allude to the further difficulty involved in\ncomparing the intensity of pleasure with that of pain.\n\n\n34. Only therefore to this very limited extent are we able to derive\nfrom experience a knowledge of what is better in itself.\n\nI can well understand how any one, reflecting upon this for the first\ntime, will be led to fear that the great gaps which remain must, in\npractice, prove in the highest degree embarrassing. Yet as we proceed\nand make a vigorous use of what we do possess, we shall find that the\nmost sensible deficiencies may fortunately turn out harmless in\npractice.\n\n\n35. For, from the cases we adduced of preference qualified as right, the\nimportant proposition follows that the province of the highest practical\ngood embraces everything which is subject to our rational operation in\nso far as a good can be realized in such matter. Not merely the self but\nalso the family, the town, the state, the whole present world of life,\neven distant future times, may here be taken into account. All this\nfollows from the principle of the summation of the good. To promote as\nfar as possible the good throughout this great whole, that is manifestly\nthe right end in life, towards which every act is to be ordered; that is\nthe one, the highest command upon which all the rest depend.[43]\nSelf-devotion and, on occasion, self-sacrifice are, therefore, duties;\nan equal good wherever it be, and therefore in the person of another\nalso, is, in proportion to its value, and, therefore, everywhere equally\nto be loved, and jealousy and malignant envy are excluded.\n\n\n36. And now, since all lesser goods are to be made subservient to the\ngood of this widest sphere, light may also be shed from utilitarian\nconsiderations upon those dark regions where before we found a standard\nof choice wanting. If, for example, it was true that acts of insight and\nacts of noble love are not to be measured as to their inner worth in\nterms of one another, it is now clear that at any rate neither of these\ntwo sides may be entirely neglected at the expense of the other. If one\nperson had perfect knowledge without noble love, and another perfect\nnoble love without knowledge, neither would be able to use his gifts in\nthe service of the still greater collective good. A certain harmonious\ndevelopment and exercise of all our noblest powers seems, therefore,\nfrom this point of view to be, at any rate, what we must strive\nafter.[44]\n\n\n37. And now after seeing how many duties of love towards the highest\npractical good come to light, we proceed to the origin of duties of law.\nThat association which renders possible a division of labour is the\nindispensable condition of the advancement of the highest good as we\nhave learnt to understand it. Man therefore is morally destined to live\nin society, and it is easily demonstrable that limits must exist in\norder that one member of society may not be more of a hindrance than a\nhelp to another,[45] and that these limits (though much in this respect\nis settled by considerations of natural common-sense) require to be more\nexactly marked by positive laws, and need the further security and\nsupport of public authority.\n\nAnd while in this way our natural insight demands and sanctions positive\nlaw in general, it may, in particular, raise demands on the fulfillment\nof which depends the measure of the blessing which the state of law is\nto bring with it.\n\nIn this way does truth, bearing the supreme crown, give, or refuse, to\nthe products of positive legislation its sanction, and it is from this\ncrown that they derive their true binding force.[46] For as the old sage\nof Ephesus says in one of his pregnant Sibyl-like utterances: \u201cAll human\nlaws are fed from the _one_ divine law.\u201d[47]\n\n\n38. Besides the laws referring to the limits of right, in every society\nthere are other positive enactments as to the way in which an individual\nis to act inside his own sphere of right, how he is to make use of his\nliberty and his property. Public opinion approves industry, generosity,\nand economy each in its place, while disapproving idleness, greed,\nprodigality and much else. In the statutes no such laws are to be found,\nbut they stand written within the hearts of the people. Nor are reward\nand punishment lacking as regards this kind of positive law. These\nconsist in the advantages and disadvantages of good and bad reputation.\nThere exists here, as it were, a positive code of morality, the\ncomplement of the positive code of law. This positive code of morality\nalso may contain both right and wrong enactments. To be truly binding\nthey need to be in accord with the rules which, as we have already seen,\nare capable of recognition by the reason, as a duty of love towards the\nhighest practical good.\n\nAnd so we have really found the natural sanction of morality which we\nsought.\n\n\n39. I do not linger here to show how this sanction operates. Every one\nwould rather say to himself: \u201cI am acting rightly,\u201d than \u201cI am acting\nfoolishly.\u201d And to no one capable of recognizing what is better is this\nfact entirely indifferent in choosing. In the case of some it is nearly\nso, whereas for others it is of the very first importance. Innate\ndispositions are themselves diverse and much advance may be made by\neducation and one\u2019s own ethical conduct. Enough, truth speaks, and\nwhoever is of the truth hears her voice.\n\n\n40. Throughout the multiplicity of derived laws graven by nature herself\nupon the tables of the law, utilitarian considerations, as we have seen,\nform the standard. As now, in different situations, we resort to\ndifferent means, so also with regard to these different situations\ndifferent special precepts must hold good. They may be quite conflicting\nin their tenour without of course being really contradictory, since they\nare intended for different circumstances. In this sense, then, a\nrelativity in ethics is rightly asserted.\n\nIhering has drawn attention to this,[48] but he is not as he seems to\nthink, one of the first. On the contrary the doctrine was known of old\nand is insisted upon by Plato in his _Republic_.[49] Aristotle in his\n_Ethics_, and with special emphasis in his _Politics_ has affirmed\nit.[50] The scholastic philosophers also held fast to the doctrine, and\nin modern times men even of such energetic ethical and political\nconvictions as Bentham[51] have not denied it. If the fanatics of the\nFrench Revolution failed to recognize it, still the clear-headed among\ntheir fellow-citizens, even in that time, did not fall into such a\ndelusion. Laplace, for example, in his _Essai philosophique sur les\nprobabilit\u00e9s_ occasionally bears witness to the true teaching and raises\nhis voice in warning.[52]\n\nThus it happens that the distinguished investigator who has disclosed to\nus the spirit of Roman law and to whom, as the author of _Der Zweck im\nRecht_, we also are bound in many respects to tender our thanks, has yet\nhere, as we see, done nothing else than render the doctrine unclear by\nconfounding it with an essentially different and false doctrine of\nrelativity. According to this doctrine, no proposition in ethics, not\neven the proposition that the best in the widest sphere ought to be the\ndetermining standard of action, would have unexceptional validity. In\nprimitive times and even later, throughout long centuries, such a\nprocedure would, he expressly says, have been as immoral as, in later\ntimes, the opposite conduct. We must, he thinks, on looking back into\nthe times of cannibalism sympathize rather with the cannibals, and not\nwith those who perhaps, in advance of their time, preached even then the\nuniversal love of neighbour.[53] These are errors which have been\ncrushingly refuted not merely by philosophical reflection upon the\nfundamental principles of ethics, but also by the successes of Christian\nmissionaries.\n\n\n41. Thus the road leading to the goal which we set before us has been\ntraversed. For a time it led us through strange and rarely trodden\ndistricts, finally, however, the results at which we have arrived smile\nupon us like old acquaintances. In declaring love of neighbour and\nself-sacrifice, both for our country and for mankind to be duties, we\nare only echoing what is proclaimed all around us. We should also find\nby going further into particulars that lying, treachery, murder,\ndebauchery and much besides that is held to be morally base are,\nmeasured by the standard of the principles we have set up, condemned,\none as unjust, another as immoral.\n\nAll this would seem, in a measure, familiar to us as the shores of his\nnative land to the sea-farer when, after a voyage happily consummated,\nhe sees them rise suddenly into view, and the smoke curling from the old\nfamiliar chimney.\n\n\n42. And certainly we are at liberty to rejoice over this. The absolute\nclearness with which all this follows is good omen for the success of\nour undertaking, since it is the method by which we arrived at our\nresult, which is obviously the most essential feature in it. Without it\nwhat advantage can our inquiry be said to have over that of others?\nEven Kant, for example, whose doctrines concerning the principles of\nethics were quite different, arrived, in the further course of his\nstatement, pretty much to the popular view. But what we miss in him is\nstrict logical coherence. Beneke has shown that the Categorical\nImperative as Kant used it, may be so employed as to prove, in the same\ncase, contradictory statements and so everything and nothing.[54] If,\nnone the less, Kant is able to arrive so often at right conclusions,\nthis must be attributed to the fact that from the outset he had\nharboured such opinions. Even Hegel, had he not known in other ways that\nthe sky was blue, would certainly never have succeeded by means of his\ndialectic in deducing this _\u00e0 priori_. Did he not equally succeed in\ndemonstrating that there were seven planets, a number accepted in his\nday, but which in our time science has long left behind?\n\nThe causes of this phenomenon, therefore, are easily understood.\n\n\n43. But there is another point which appears enigmatical. How does it\nhappen that the prevailing public opinion respecting law and morality is\nitself, in so many respects, obviously right? If a thinker like Kant was\nunable to discover the sources from which ethical knowledge flows, how\ncan we believe that the common folk succeeded in drawing therefrom? And\nif this were not the case, how were they able, while ignorant of the\npremises, still to reach the conclusions? Here the phenomenon cannot\npossibly be explained from the fact that the right view was long before\nestablished.\n\nThis difficulty also resolves itself in a very simple manner when we\nreflect that much in our store of knowledge exists, and contributes\ntowards the attainment of new knowledge, without the knowledge of the\nprocess itself being clearly present to consciousness.\n\nIt must not be supposed that in saying this I am an adherent of the\nwonderful philosophy of the unconscious. I am speaking here only of\nundeniable and well known truths. Thus it has often been observed that\nfor thousands of years men have drawn right conclusions without bringing\nthe procedure and the principles which form the condition of the formal\nvalidity of the inference into clear consciousness by means of\nreflection. Indeed when Plato first took the step of reflecting upon it,\nhe was led to set up an entirely false theory which assumed that every\ninference was a process of reminiscence.[55] What was perceived and\nexperienced on earth recalled to the memory knowledge acquired in a\npre-mundane existence. Nowadays this error has disappeared. Still, false\ntheories concerning the fundamental principles of syllogism are\ncontinually emerging, as, for example, when Albert Lange,[56] finds them\nin space-perceptions and in synthetic propositions _\u00e0 priori_, or\nAlexander Bain[57] in the experience that the moods Barbara, Celarent,\netc., have up to the present time been found to be valid in every case:\nmere crude errors which overlook the immediate intuitions forming the\nconditions of right conclusions, but which do not prevent Plato, Lange,\nand Bain from arguing in general exactly like other people. In spite of\ntheir false conception of the true fundamental principles, these still\ncontinue to operate in their reasoning.\n\nBut why do I go so far for examples? Let the experiment be made with the\nfirst \u201cplain man\u201d who has just drawn a right conclusion, and demand of\nhim that he give you the premises of his conclusion. This he will\nusually be unable to do and may perhaps make entirely false statements\nabout it. On requiring the same man to define a notion with which he is\nfamiliar, he will make the most glaring mistakes and so show once again\nthat he is not able rightly to describe his own thinking.\n\n\n44. Meantime, however dark the road to ethical knowledge might appear,\nboth to the \u201cplain man\u201d and to the philosopher, we must still expect,\nsince the process is a complicated one and many combined principles\noperate therein, that the traces of the operation of each separate\nprinciple will be evident in history, and this fact, even more than\nagreement in respect of the final results, is a confirmation of the\nright theory.\n\nThis also, if only the time permitted, in what fulness would I not be\nable to lay before you! Who is there, for example, who would not, as we\nhave done, regard joy as something evidently good in itself, if only it\nwere not joy in what is bad. Nor has there been any lack of writers on\nethics who have asserted that pleasure and the good were strictly\nidentical conceptions.[58] Opposed to these were others who bore witness\nto the inner worth of insight and such will be supported by all\nunprejudiced minds. Many philosophers have wished to exalt knowledge\nabove all else as the highest good.[59] They recognized, however, at the\nsame time, a certain inner worth in each act of virtue, while others\nhave carried this view so far as to recognize only in virtuous action\nthe highest good.[60]\n\nOn the one hand, therefore, we have had sufficient confirmatory tests in\nsupport of our view.\n\nNext with regard to the principles of choice, how often do we not see\nthe principle of summation applied as, for example, when it is said that\nthe measure of the happiness of life as a whole and not that of the\npassing moment is to be considered.[61] And, again, passing beyond the\nlimits of the self, when, for example, Aristotle says, that the\nhappiness of a nation seems to be a higher end than that of an\nindividual happiness,[62] and that in the same way in a work of art, or\nin an organism and similarly in the case of the family, the part always\nexists for the sake of the whole; everything is here subordinate to the\n\u201ccommon\u201d (\u201c\u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f40 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd\u201d).[63] Even in the case of the whole creation\nhe makes the same principle hold good. \u201cIn what,\u201d he asks,[64]\n\u201cregarding all created things consists the good, and the best, which is\nits final aim\u201d? Is it immanent or transcendent? And he answers: \u201cBoth,\u201d\nsetting forth as the transcendent aim the divine first cause, likeness\nto which everything strives after, while the immanent aim is the\nworld-order as a whole. The like testimony to the principle of summation\nmight be taken from the lips of the Stoics.[65] It reappears in every\nattempt to construct a theodicy from Plato down to Leibnitz and even\nlater.[66]\n\nIn the precepts of our popular religion, again, the operation of this\nprinciple is also distinctly visible. When it ordains us to love our\nneighbour as ourselves, what else is taught but that, in the right\nchoice, equality (be it our own or that of others) shall fall with equal\nweight into the balance, from which follows the subordination of the\nsingle individual to the good of the collective whole; just as the\nethical ideal of Christianity--the Saviour--offers himself as a\nsacrifice for the salvation of the world.\n\nAnd when it is said: \u201cLove God above all else\u201d (and Aristotle also says\nthat God is much rather to be called the best than the world as a\nwhole),[67] here also there is a special application of the law of\nsummation. For how else do we think of God than as the sum of all that\nis good raised to an infinite degree?\n\nAnd so the two propositions: that we should love our neighbour as\nourselves, and love God above all else, are manifestly so closely\nrelated that we are no longer surprised to find added the words that the\none law is like unto the other. The law that we are to love our\nneighbour, it should be carefully noted, is not subordinated to that of\nlove of God, and derived from it, it is, according to the Christian\nview, not right because God has required it, rather he requires it\nbecause it is by nature right;[68] and this rightness is made manifest\nin the same way, and with the same clearness by means, so to speak, of\nthe same ray of natural knowledge.\n\nSufficient testimony has perhaps been offered to the shaping operation\nof those factors which have been separately set forth by us, and so we\nhave, on the one hand, a strengthening of our theory while, on the other\nhand, we have in essentials the explanation of that paradoxical\nanticipation of philosophical results.\n\n\n45. We are not to suppose, however, that all has now been said. Not\nevery opinion regarding law and morality holding good in society to-day,\nand which has also the sanction of ethics, flows from these pure and\nnoble sources which, even when hid, have none the less discharged their\nwaters in rich abundance. Many such views have arisen in a way quite\nunjustifiable from a logical point of view, and an inquiry into the\nhistory of their origin shows that they take their rise in lower\nimpulses, in egoistic desires through a transformation due, not to\nhigher influences, but simply to the instinctive force of habit. It is\nreally true, as so many utilitarians have pointed out, that egoism\nprompts men to make themselves agreeable to others and that such\nconduct continually practised, develops finally into a habit which is\nblind to the original ends. The chief reason for this is the limits of\nour mind, the so-called \u201cnarrowness of consciousness,\u201d which does not\nallow of our always keeping clearly before us the more remote and final\nends side by side with what is immediately in question. In such a way\nmany a one may be frequently led, by the blind force of habit, to have\nregard also for the well-being of others with a certain\nself-forgetfulness. Further, it is true, as some have particularly\ninsisted, that in history it must often have happened that a powerful\nperson has selfishly reduced to subjection a weaker individual, and\ntransformed him by force of habit more and more into a willing slave.\nAnd then in this slave-soul an \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f40\u03c2 \u1f12\u03c6\u03b1 comes in the end to operate\nwith a blind, but none the less powerful force, an impelling \u201cyou\nought,\u201d as though it were a revelation of nature regarding good and bad.\nOn every violation of a command he feels himself, like a well-trained\ndog, uneasy and inwardly tormented. When such a tyrant had, in this way,\nreduced many to subjection his prudent egoism would cause him to give\ncommands helpful to the maintenance of his horde. These orders would in\nthe same slavish manner become habitual, and as it were, natural to his\nsubjects. And so regard for the whole of this community would gradually\nbecome for each subject something into which he felt himself driven in\nthe manner above described. At the same time, we may easily recognize\nhow, owing to the constant care exercised towards his subjects, habits\nmust be formed in the tyrant himself favourable to a regard for the\nwelfare of the community. It may even happen at last that, just as in\nthe case of the miser, who sacrifices himself for the sake of his gold,\nthe tyrant may be ready to die for the maintenance of his people.\nThroughout the whole process thus described ethical principles do not\nexercise the slightest influence. The compulsion which in this way\narises, and the opinions which as a result approve or disapprove of a\ncertain procedure have nothing whatever to do with the natural sanction\nand are devoid of all ethical worth. It may, however, be easily\nunderstood--especially if one considers how one tribe enters into\nrelations with another and considerations of friendliness begin here too\nto prove advantageous,--how this kind of training may lead, indeed one\nmay venture to say _must_, sooner or later, lead to opinions in\nagreement with the principles springing from a true appreciation of the\ngood.\n\n\n46. Thus also the blind, purely habitual expectation of similar events\nunder similar circumstances which animals, and also we ourselves,\npractise in countless instances, often coincide with the results which a\ncomplete induction according to the principles of the calculation of\nprobability would, in the same case, have brought about. The very\nsimilarity of result has led people even with a psychological\neducation,[69] to regard the two processes as exactly identical,\nalthough they stand wide as the poles asunder, the one completing itself\nby means of a purely blind instinct, while the other is illumined by\nmathematical evidence. We ourselves should, therefore, be well on our\nguard against supposing in such pseudo-ethical developments the\nconcealed influence of the true ethical sanction.\n\n\n47. Great, however, as is the contrast, still even these lower processes\nhave their worth. Nature--and this has been often insisted\non[70]--frequently does well in leaving much which concerns our welfare\nto instinctive impulses like hunger and thirst rather than leave\neverything to our reason. This, also, is confirmed in our case.\n\nIn those very early times in which, as I conceded to Ihering, (why you\nwill, perhaps, now be better able to see,) nearly every trace of ethical\nthought and feeling was absent, much nevertheless was done which was a\npreparation for true virtue. Public laws, however much in the first\ninstance established under the influence of lower motives, were yet\npreliminary conditions for the free unfolding of our noblest capacities.\n\nNor is it a matter of no consequence that, under the influence of this\ntraining, certain passions became moderated and certain dispositions\nimplanted which made it easier to follow the true moral law in the same\ndirection. Catiline\u2019s courage was assuredly not the true virtue of\ncourage if Aristotle is right when he says that they only have such who\ngo to danger and to death \u201c\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f14\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1,\u201d \u201cfor the sake of the\nmorally beautiful.\u201d[71] Augustine might have made use of this instance\nwhen he said: \u201cvirtutes ethnicorum splendida vitia.\u201d But who will deny\nthat if such a man as Catiline had been converted, the dispositions he\nhad acquired earlier would have made it easier for him to venture to\nextremes in the service of the good too? In this way, the ground was\nmade receptive for the admission of truly ethical impulses and therein\nlay a powerful encouragement to the propagation of truth on the part of\nthose who were foremost in the discovery of ethical knowledge, and first\nto hear the voice of a natural sanction. It is in this sense that\nAristotle observed that it is not every one who can study ethics. He who\nis to hear about law and morality, must be already well conducted by\ndint of habit. In the case of others, he thinks, it is but a waste of\npains.[72]\n\nIndeed, still more may be said in praise of the services rendered to the\nrecognition of natural law and morality by these pre-ethical, though not\npre-historical, times. The legal ordinances and customs formed in this\ntime, owing to the reasons previously assigned, approached so closely to\nwhat ethics demands, that this peculiar kind of mimicry blinded many to\nthe absence of a more thorough going affinity. What, in the one case, a\nblind impulse and in the other, knowledge of the good exalts into a law,\nis often completely the same in substance. The legislative moral\nauthority found therefore in these already codified laws and customs the\nrough drafts, as it were, of laws, which with a few changes, it could\nsanction without more ado. These were the more valuable because, as\nseems required from a utilitarian point of view, they were adapted to\nthe special circumstances of the people. A comparison of the one\nconstitution with the other made this noticeable, and early helped to\nlead to the important knowledge of the real relativity of natural right\nand of natural morality. Who knows whether otherwise, it would have been\npossible, even for an Aristotle, to succeed to the degree in which he\ndid in steering clear of all cut and dried doctrinaire theories?\n\nSo much, therefore, concerning the pre-ethical times, in order that\nthese may not be denied the acknowledgment which they deserve.\n\n\n48. Nevertheless it was then night; though a night which heralded the\ncoming day, and the dawn of that day witnessed assuredly the most\nglorious sunrise which, in the history of the world is yet to rise into\nfull splendour. I say, is to rise, not has risen, for we still see the\nlight struggling with the powers of darkness. True ethical motives, in\nprivate as in public life, are still far from being everywhere the\ndetermining standard. These forces--to use the language of the\npoet[A]--prove themselves still too little developed to hold together\nthe structure of the world; and so nature,--and we have need to be\nthankful that it is so--keeps the machine going by hunger and love, and,\nwe must also add, by all those other dark strivings which, as we have\nseen, may be developed from self-seeking desires.\n\n [A] Schiller.\n\n\n49. Of these, and their psychological laws the jurist must, therefore,\nif he would truly understand his time, and influence it beneficially,\ntake cognizance, as well as of the doctrines of natural right and\nnatural morality which our inquiry has shown to be not the first but--in\nso far as hope in the realization of a complete ideal may be cherished\nat all--will be the last in the history of the development of law and\nmorality.\n\nThus the near relationships of jurisprudence and politics of which\nLeibnitz spoke, become evident in their full range.\n\nPlato has said: \u201cIt will never be well with the state until the true\nphilosopher is king, or kings philosophize rightly.\u201d In our\nconstitutional times we should express ourselves better by saying that\nthere will never be a change for the better regarding the many evils in\nour national life until the authorities, instead of abolishing the\nlimited philosophical culture required for law students by the existing\nregulations, shall rather strive hard to secure that for their noble\nprofession they shall really receive an adequate philosophical culture.\n\n\n\n\nNOTES\n\n\n [1] (_p. 2_). Cf. \u201c\u00dcber die Entstehung des Rechtsgef\u00fchls.\u201d Lecture by\n Dr. Rudolf von Ihering, delivered before the Vienna Law Society, March\n 12, 1884 (_Allgem. Juristenzeitung_, 7 Jahrg., No. 11 seq., Vienna,\n March 16-April 13, 1884). Cf. further, v. Ihering, _Der Zweck im\n Recht_, vol. ii. Leipzig, 1877-83.\n\n [2] (_p. 2_). For the first point, cf. _Allgem. Juristenzeitung_, 7\n Jahrg. p. 122 seq., _Zweck im Recht_, vol. ii. p. 109 seq. For the\n second point _Allgem. Juristenzeitung_, 7 Jahrg. p. 171, _Zweck im\n Recht_, pp. 118-123. It is here denied that there is any absolutely\n valid ethical rule (pp. 118, 122 seq.); further every \u201cpsychological\u201d\n treatment of ethics, according to which ethics is represented \u201cas twin\n sister of logic\u201d is contested.\n\n [3] (_p. 4_). _Allgem. Juristenzeitung_, 7 Jahrg., p. 147; cf. _Zweck\n im Recht_, vol. ii. p. 124 seq.\n\n [4] (_p. 4_). Aristotle, _Politics_, i. 2, p. 1252 b. 24.\n\n [5] (_p. 4_). Cf. e.g. _Allgem. Juristenzeitung_, 7 Jahrg. p. 146.\n\n [6] (_p. 5_). _Rep._ 2. 31.\n\n [7] (_p. 5_). _Dig._ 1. 8, 9.\n\n [8] (_p. 6_). Amongst the numerous adherents of this view and one of\n its best advocates is J. S. Mill in his _Utilitarianism_, chap. iii.\n\n [9] (_p. 6_). Here also, along with many others, J. S. Mill may\n be cited. The motives of hope and fear are, according to him, the\n _external_; the motives first described, the feelings developed by\n habit, the internal sanction. _Utilitarianism_, chap. iii.\n\n [10] (_p. 7_). Cf. espec. here a discussion in James Mill\u2019s _Fragment\n on Mackintosh_, printed by J. S. Mill in the second edition of his\n _Analysis of the phenomena of the human mind_, vol. ii. p. 309 seq.;\n and Grote\u2019s powerful essay published by A. Bain under the title,\n \u201c_Fragments on Ethical Subjects_, by the late George Grote, F.R.S.,\u201d\n being a selection from his posthumous papers, London, 1876; Espec.\n Essay 1, _On the Origin and Nature of Ethical Sentiment_.\n\n [11] (_p. 9_). D. Hume, _An Enquiry concerning the Principles of\n Morals_, London, 1751.\n\n [12] (_p. 9_). Herbart, _Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie_,\n 81 seq. _Collected Works_, vol. i. p. 124 seq.\n\n [13] (_p. 9_). This comparison with logic should be my best defence\n against the charge of placing Herbart\u2019s doctrine in a false light.\n Were the logical criterion to consist in judgments of taste\n experienced on the appearance of thought-processes in accordance with\n or opposition to rule, it would then, in comparison with what it\n actually is (the internal self-evidence of a process in accordance\n with rule) have to be called external. Similarly Herbart\u2019s criterion\n of ethics is rightly characterized as external, however loudly\n Herbartians may insist that in the judgment of taste which arises\n spontaneously on the contemplation of certain relations of will, an\n inner superiority regarding these relations is recognizable.\n\n [14] (_p. 10_). In his _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_, Kant\n enunciates his Categorical Imperative in the following forms: \u201cAct\n only in accordance with that maxim which you can at the same time\n will should become a universal law,\u201d and \u201cAct as if the maxim of your\n action were by your will to be raised to a universal law.\u201d\n\n In the _Critique of Practical Reason_ it runs \u201cAct so that the\n maxim of your will could on each occasion be valid as a universal\n legislative principle,\u201d i.e. as Kant himself explains, in such a way\n that the maxim, when raised to a universal law, does not lead to\n contradictions and consequent self-abrogation. The consciousness of\n this fundamental law was, for Kant, a fact of pure reason, thereby\n proclaiming itself to be legislative (sic volo sic jubeo). Beneke has\n already observed (_Grundlinien der Sittenlehre_, vol. ii. p. xviii.,\n 1841; cf. his _Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten_, a counterpart to\n Kant\u2019s _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_, 1822) that it is\n nothing more than a \u201cpsychologische Dichtung,\u201d and to-day no one able\n to judge is any longer in doubt concerning it. It deserves to be noted\n that even philosophers like Mansel, who have the highest reverence\n for Kant, admit that the Categorical Imperative is a fiction and\n absolutely untenable.\n\n The Categorical Imperative has at the same time another and not less\n serious defect, i.e. that even when admitted, it leads to no ethical\n conclusions. Kant fails, as Mill (_Utilitarianism_, chap. i.) rightly\n says \u201cin an almost grotesque fashion\u201d to deduce what he seeks. His\n favourite example of a deduction, by which he illustrates his manner\n of procedure not only in his _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_\n but also in the _Critique of Practical Reason_ is as follows: May\n a person, he asks, retain for himself a possession which has been\n entrusted to him without a receipt or other acknowledgment? He\n answers, No. For he thinks, were the opposite maxim to be raised to\n a law, nobody, under such circumstances, would entrust anything to\n anybody. The law would then be without possibility of application,\n therefore impracticable and so self-abrogated.\n\n It may easily be seen that Kant\u2019s argumentation is false, indeed\n absurd. If, in consequence of the law, certain actions ceased to be\n practised, the law exercises an influence; it therefore still exists\n and has in no way annulled itself. How ridiculous would it appear if\n the following question were treated after an analogous fashion: \u201cMay\n I yield to a person who desires to bribe me?\u201d Yes, since, were I to\n think of the opposite maxim as raised to a universal law, then nobody\n would seek any longer to bribe another; therefore the law would be\n without application, therefore, impracticable, and so self-abrogated.\n\n [15] (_p. 11_). Cf. J. S. Mill, _System of Deductive and Inductive\n Logic_, vol. iv. chap. iv. section vi. (towards the end); vol. vi.\n chap. ii. section iv. and elsewhere, e.g. in his _Utilitarianism_,\n _Essays on Religion_, and in his article on _Comte and Positivism_,\n part ii.\n\n [16] (_p. 11_). Cf. with what has been said in the lecture the first\n chapter of the Nicomachian Ethics, and it will be seen that Ihering\u2019s\n \u201cfundamental thought\u201d in his work _Der Zweck im Recht_, vol. i. p.\n vi., viz.: \u201cthat no legal formula exists which does not owe its origin\n to an end,\u201d is as old as ethics itself.\n\n [17] (_p. 12_). Cases may arise where the consequence of certain\n efforts remains in doubt, and two courses are open: one presenting\n the prospect of a greater good but with less probability, the other a\n lesser good but with a greater probability. In choosing here, account\n must be taken of the degree of probability. If A is three times better\n than B, but B has ten times as many chances of being attained as A,\n then practical wisdom will prefer course B. Supposing that, under\n like circumstances, such a procedure always takes place, then (in\n accordance with the law of great numbers) the better would, generally\n speaking, be realized, a sufficient number of cases being assumed,\n and so such a manner of choosing would still obviously correspond to\n the principle laid down in the text, i.e. \u201cChoose the best that is\n attainable.\u201d The full significance of this remark will be made still\n more evident in the course of the inquiry.\n\n [18] (_p. 12_). This truth was familiar to Aristotle (cf. e.g. _De\n Anima_, iii. 8). The Middle Ages maintained it, but expressed it\n unfortunately in the proposition: _nihil est in intelluctu, quod\n non prius fuerit in sensu_. The notions \u201cwilling,\u201d \u201cconcluding\u201d are\n not gained from sensuous perception; the term \u201csensuous\u201d would in\n that case have to be taken so generally that all distinction between\n \u201csensuous\u201d and \u201csuper-sensuous\u201d disappears. These notions have\n their origin in certain concrete impressions with psychical content\n (Anschauungen psychischen Inhalts). From the same source arise the\n notions \u201cend,\u201d \u201ccause\u201d (we observe, for example, a causal relation\n existing between our belief in the premises and in the conclusion),\n \u201cimpossibility\u201d and \u201cnecessity\u201d (we gain these from judgments which\n accept or reject not merely assertorically, but, as it is usually\n expressed, apodictically,) and many other notions which some modern\n philosophers, failing in detecting the true origin of them, have\n sought to regard as categories given _\u00e0 priori_. I may mention, by\n the way, that I am well aware Sigwart and others influenced by him\n have recently questioned the peculiar nature of apodictic as opposed\n to assertorical judgments. But this is a psychological error which it\n is not the place to discuss here. Cf. note 27, p. 83 sub.\n\n [19] (_p. 12_). This doctrine in germ is also found in Aristotle; cf.\n espec. _Metaph._: \u0394 15, p. 1021 a. 29. This term \u201cintentional,\u201d like\n many other terms for important notions, comes from the scholastics.\n\n [20] (_p. 13_). The question of the grounds of this division\n is discussed in more detail in my _Psychologie vom empirischen\n Standpunkte_ (1874, Bk. ii. chap. vi.; cf. also chap. i. section 5).\n The statements there made regarding this division I still consider to\n be substantially correct in spite of many modifications respecting\n points of detail.\n\n [21] (_p. 13_). Meditat. iii. \u201cNunc autem ordo videtur exigere, ut\n prius omnes meas cogitationes (all psychical acts) in certa genera\n distribuam.... Quaedam ex his tanquam rerum imagines sunt, quibus\n solis proprie convenit _ideae_ nomen, ut cum hominem, vel chimaeram,\n vel coelum, vel angelum, vel Deum cogito; aliae vero alias quasdam\n praeterea formas habent, ut cum volo cum timeo, cum affirmo, cum nego,\n semper quidem aliquam rem ut subjectum meae cogitationis apprehendo,\n sed aliquid etiam amplius quam istius rei similitudinem cogitatione\n complector; et ex his aliae _voluntates_ sive _affectus_ aliae autem\n _judicia_ appellantur.\u201d\n\n Strangely enough this clear passage has not prevented Windelband\n (_Strassb. philos. Abhandl._ p. 171) from ascribing to Descartes the\n view that the judgment is an act of volition. What led him astray\n is a discussion in the fourth Meditation on the influence of the\n will in the formation of judgment. Even scholastics like Suarez had\n ascribed too much to this influence, and Descartes goes so far in\n exaggeration of this dependence that he considers every judgment (even\n the self-evident judgments) as the work of the will. But to \u201cproduce\n the judgment\u201d and \u201cto be the judgment\u201d are yet manifestly not one\n and the same. And, therefore, although Descartes, in the passage\n cited, allows his view as to the influence of the will to appear, and\n probably it is only on this account that he assigns to the judgment\n the third place in the fundamental classification of psychical\n phenomena, yet none the less he says without contradiction: _aliae_\n voluntates--_aliae_ judicia appellantur.\n\n More illusive are a couple of passages in his later writings, i.e.\n in his _Principia Philosophiae_ (i. 32), published three years after\n the Meditations, and in a work also written three years later: Notae\n in Programma quoddam, sub finem Anni 1647 in Belgio editum, cum\n hoc Titulo: Explicatio mentis humanae sive animae rationalis, ubi\n explicatur quid sit, et quid esse possit.\u201d Particularly might the\n passage in the _Principles_ lead to the opinion that Descartes must\n have changed his view, and it is astonishing that Windelband has not\n appealed to this passage rather than to that in the Meditations. We\n read here:--Ordines _modi cognitandi_ quos in nobis experimur, _ad\n duos generales_ referri possunt; quorum unus est, _perceptio sive\n operatio intellectus_; alius vero _volitio sive operatio voluntatis_.\n Nam sentire, imaginari, et pure intellegere, sunt tantum diversi modi\n percipiendi; _ut et cupere, aversari, affirmare, negare, dubitare,\n sunt diversi modi volendi_.\n\n At first sight this passage appears to be so clearly in contradiction\n to the one in the third Meditation that, as we have said, it is\n scarcely possible to avoid the supposition that Descartes had meantime\n rejected his thesis as to the three fundamental classes of psychical\n phenomena, so shunning Scylla only to plunge into Charybdis; avoiding\n the old mistake of confusing the judgment with the idea (Vorstellung),\n he would now seem to confound it with the will. But a more attentive\n examination of all the circumstances will suffice to exonerate\n Descartes from such a charge, and this on the following grounds: (1)\n There is not the slightest sign that Descartes was ever conscious of\n having become untrue to the view expressed in the Meditations. (2)\n Further, in the year 1647 (three years after the publication of the\n Meditations and shortly before writing the Notae to his Programma) the\n Meditations appeared in a translation revised by Descartes himself,\n where, remarkably enough, not the slightest alteration is to be\n found in the decisive passage in the third Meditation. \u201cEntre mes\n pens\u00e9es,\u201d it reads, \u201cquelques unes sont commes les images des choses,\n et c\u2019est \u00e0 celles-l\u00e0 scules que convient proprement le nom d\u2019id\u00e9e....\n D\u2019autres, outre cela ont quelques autres formes; ... et de ce genre de\n pens\u00e9es _les unes sont appel\u00e9es volont\u00e9s ou affections, et les autres\n jugements_.\u201d (3) In the _Principles_ itself he says directly after\n (i. No. 42) that all our errors depend upon our will (a voluntate\n pendere); but so far is he from regarding the \u201cerror\u201d as an act of\n volition, that he says there is no one who errs voluntarily (nemo est\n qui velit falli). Still clearer is it that he does not regard the\n judgment like the desires and dislikes as inner activities of the will\n itself, but only as a product of the will, since he at once adds:\n sed longe aliud est velle falli quam velle assentiri iis, in quibus\n contingit errorem reperiri,\u201d etc. He does not say of the will that it\n desires, affirms, assents, but that it wills the assent; so also, not\n that it _is_ true but that it desires the truth (veritatis assequendae\n cupiditas ... _efficit_, ut ... judicium ferant).\n\n As to Descartes\u2019 real view, therefore, there can be no doubt; his\n doctrine has not in this respect suffered the slightest change.\n It only remains, therefore, to come to an understanding of his\n obviously variable modes of expression, and this is, I believe,\n solved incontrovertibly in the following manner. Descartes, while\n regarding will and judgment as two classes differing fundamentally,\n none the less finds that in contradistinction to the first fundamental\n class--that of ideas--these have something in common. In the third\n Meditation he designates (cf. the above passage) as the common element\n the fact that although essentially based upon an idea, in both alike\n there is contained a further special form. In the fourth Meditation\n a further common character appears, i.e. that the will decides\n concerning them; not only can it determine and suspend its own acts,\n but also those of the judgment. It is this common character which he\n was bound to regard as especially, indeed all important, in the first\n part of the _Principles_, xxix.-xlii. Accordingly, he classes them, in\n opposition to the ideas (which he calls operationes intellectus) under\n the term operationes voluntatis. In the Notae to the Programma he\n calls them distinctly in the same sense, \u201cdeterminationes voluntatis.\u201d\n \u201cEgo enim, cum viderem, praeter perceptionem, quae praerequiritur\n ut judicemus, opus esse affirmatione vel negatione ad formam\n judicii constituendam, _nobisque saepe esse liberum ut cohibeamus\n assensionem_, etiamsi rem percipiamus, ipsum actum judicandi, qui non\n nisi in assensu, hoc est in affirmatione vel negatione consistit, non\n retuli ad perceptionem intellectus sed ad determinationem voluntatis.\u201d\n He does not even hesitate in the _Principles_ to term both these two\n classes of _modi cogitandi_, \u201c_modi volendi_\u201d the context seeming\n sufficiently to indicate that he means only to express thereby the\n fact that they fall within the domain of the will.\n\n In further support of this explanation we may compare the scholastic\n terminology into which Descartes as a young man was initiated. It was\n customary to denote under the term _actus voluntatis_ not merely the\n movement of the will itself but also the act performed in obedience\n to the will. In accordance with this custom, the _actus voluntatis_\n fell into two classes; the _actus elicitus voluntatis_ and the _actus\n imperatus voluntatis_. In a similar manner Descartes groups the class\n which, according to him, was only possible as an _actus imperatus_ of\n the will along with his _actus elicitus_. There is here, therefore, no\n question of a common fundamental character of the intentional relation.\n\n Clear as all this is to those who carefully attach due weight to\n the various moments, it would yet appear that Spinoza (probably\n misled rather by the passage in the _Principles_ than by that cited\n by Windelband), anticipates Windelband in this misunderstanding of\n the Cartesian doctrine. In his _Ethics_, ii. prop. 49, he actually,\n and in the most real sense, regards the _affirmatio_ and _negatio_\n as \u201c_volitiones mentis_,\u201d and by a further confusion, comes finally\n to obliterate the distinction between the two classes _ideae_ and\n _voluntates_. \u201c_Voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt_\u201d his thesis\n now reads, so overthrowing not only the three-fold classification of\n Descartes, but also the old Aristotelian dual classification. Spinoza\n has here, as usual, done nothing else than corrupt the teaching of his\n great master.\n\n [22] (_p. 13_). I do not mean to say that the classification is,\n universally recognized to-day. It would not even be possible to regard\n as certain the Principle of Contradiction if in order to do so we\n were to await universal assent. In the present instance it is not\n difficult to understand that old, deeply-rooted prejudices cannot all\n at once be banished. But that even under such circumstances it has not\n been possible to urge a single important objection affords the best\n confirmation of our doctrine.\n\n Some, as for instance, Windelband--while giving up the attempt at\n including judgment and idea (Vorstellung) in _one_ fundamental class,\n on the other hand believe it possible to subsume judgment under\n feeling, thus falling back into the error which Hume committed earlier\n in his inquiry into the nature of belief. According to these writers,\n to affirm implies an act of approval, an appreciation on the part of\n the feelings, while denial is an act of disapproval, a feeling of\n repugnance.\n\n Despite a certain analogy the confusion is hard to understand. There\n are people who recognize both the goodness of God and the wickedness\n of the devil, the being of Ormuzd and the being of Ahriman, with an\n equal degree of conviction, and yet, while prizing the nature of the\n one above all else, they feel themselves absolutely repelled by that\n of the other. Since we love knowledge and hate error it is, of course,\n proper that those _judgments_ we hold to be right (and this is true\n of all those judgments which we ourselves make) are for this very\n reason dear to us, i.e. we estimate them in some way or other through\n feeling. But who on this account would be misled into regarding the\n judgments themselves which are loved as acts of loving?. The confusion\n would be almost as gross as if we should fail to distinguish wife and\n child, money and possessions, from the activity which is directed\n towards these, inasmuch they are the objects of affection. Cf. also\n what has been said (note 21) with regard to Windelband, where,\n misunderstanding Descartes, he ascribes to him the same teaching;\n further, note 26 (on the unity of the idea of the good) as well as\n what is urged by Sigwart in the note (in part much to the point) on\n Windelband (_Logic_, vol. i. chap. ii. p. 156 seq.). To those who,\n despite all that has been said, still wish further arguments for the\n distinction between the second and third fundamental classes, I may,\n perhaps, be allowed to refer them, by anticipation, to my _Descriptive\n Psychology_, which I have alluded to in the preface as an almost\n completed work, and which will appear if not as a continuation, yet\n still as a further development of my _Psychology from the Empirical\n Standpoint_.\n\n As against Windelband, I here add the following observations:\n\n 1. It is false and a serious oversight, as he himself will be\n convinced on reading again in my _Psychology_, vol. i. p. 262, when\n he (p. 172) makes me assert, and that too as a quotation from my own\n work, that \u201clove and hate\u201d is not an appropriate term for the third\n fundamental class.\n\n 2. It is false, and a quite unjustifiable supposition when (p. 178)\n he ascribes to me the opinion that the classification of judgments\n according to quality is the only essential classification belonging\n to the act of judgment itself. I believe exactly the contrary. I\n regard, for example (of course in opposition to Windelband), the\n distinction between assertorical and apodictic judgments (cf. here\n note 27, p. 83), as also the distinction between self-evident and\n blind judgments as belonging and highly essential, to the act of\n judgment itself. Other differences, again, especially the distinction\n between simple and compound acts of judgment, I might mention. For\n it is not every compound judgment that can be resolved into quite\n simple elements, and something similar takes place also in the case\n of certain notions, a fact known to Aristotle. What is red?--Red\n colour. What is colour?--The quality of colour. The difference, it is\n seen, contains in both cases the notion of the genus. The separating\n of the one logical element from the other is only possible from the\n one side. A similar one-sided capacity to separate appears also in\n certain compound judgments. J. S. Mill is, therefore, quite wrong when\n he (_Deductive and Inductive Logic_, vol. i. chap. iv. section 3),\n regards as ridiculous the old classification of judgments into simple\n and compound, and thinks that the procedure in such a case is exactly\n as if one should wish to divide horses into single horses and teams\n of horses; otherwise the same argument would hold good against the\n classification of conceptions into simple and compound.\n\n 3. It is false, though an error which finds almost universal\n acceptance, and one from which I myself at the time of writing the\n first volume of my _Psychology_ was not yet free, that the so-called\n degree of conviction consists in a degree of intensity of the\n judgment which can be brought into analogy with the intensity of\n pleasure and pain. Had Windelband charged me with _this_ error I\n would have acknowledged the complete justice of the charge. Instead\n of this he finds fault with me because I recognize intensity with\n regard to the judgment, only in a sense analogous, and not identical\n to that in the case of feeling, and because I assert the impossibility\n of comparing in respect of magnitude, the supposed intensity of the\n belief and the real intensity of feeling. Here we have one of the\n results of his improved theory of judgment!\n\n If the degree of conviction of my belief that 2 + 1 = 3 were one of\n intensity how powerful would this be! And if the said belief were to\n be identified, as by Windelband (p. 186), with feeling, not merely\n regarded as analogous to feeling, how destructive to our nervous\n system would the violence of such a shock to the feelings prove! Every\n physician would be compelled to warn the public against the study\n of mathematics as calculated to destroy health. (Cf. with regard to\n this so-called degree of conviction the view of Henry Newman in his\n interesting work: _An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent_--a work\n scarcely noticed in Germany.)\n\n 4. When Windelband (p. 183) wonders how I can regard the word \u201cis\u201d in\n such propositions as \u201cGod is,\u201d \u201cA man is\u201d (ein Mensch ist), \u201cA lack\n is\u201d (ein Mangel ist), \u201cA possibility is,\u201d \u201cA truth is,\u201d (i.e. There is\n a truth), etc., as having the same meaning and finds it extraordinary\n (184, note 1) in the author of _Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des\n Seienden nach Aristoteles_ that he should fail to recognize the\n manifold significance of \u201cto be,\u201d I can only reply that he who in\n this view does not perceive the simple consequence of my theory of\n the judgment can hardly have understood this doctrine. With regard to\n Aristotle it never occurs to him, while dividing the \u201c\u1f44\u03bd\u201d in the sense\n of reality into various categories, and into an \u201c \u1f42\u03bd \u1f72\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 and \u1f42\u03bd\n \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u201d, to do the same with the \u201c\u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u201d transforming what is the\n expression of an idea into that of a judgment and the \u201c\u1f42\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03c2\u201d\n as he calls it. This could only be done by those who, like Herbart\n and many others after him, did not know how to hold apart the notion\n of being in the sense of absolute position and being in the sense of\n reality (cf. the following note).\n\n 5. I have just said that there exist simple and compound judgments,\n and that many a compound judgment is not, without a residue,\n resolvable into simple judgments. Special attention must be paid to\n this in seeking to convert judgments otherwise expressed into the\n existential form. It is self-evident that only simple judgments, i.e.\n such as are, strictly speaking, without parts, are so convertible. I\n may therefore be excused for not thinking it necessary to emphasize\n this expressly in my _Psychology_. If this restriction hold good\n universally it is, of course, valid also of the categorical form.\n In the propositions categorical in form, which the formal logicians\n have denoted by the signs A.E.I. and O. they wish to express strictly\n simple judgments. These are therefore one and all convertible into\n the existential form (cf. my _Psychology_, vol. i. p. 283). The same,\n however, will not hold good when propositions categorical in form\n contain in consequence of an ambiguity of expression (cf. p. 120, note\n to Appendix) a plurality of judgments. In such a case the existential\n form may certainly be the expression of a simple judgment equivalent\n to the compound one, but cannot be the expression of the judgment\n itself.\n\n This is a point which Windelband ought to have considered in examining\n (p. 184) the proposition: \u201cThe rose is a flower\u201d with respect to its\n convertibility into an existential proposition. He is quite right\n in protesting against its conversion into the proposition: \u201cThere\n is no rose which is not a flower,\u201d but he is not equally right in\n ascribing this conversion to me. Neither in the passage cited by him\n nor elsewhere have I made such a conversion, and I consider it just as\n false as that attempted by Windelband and all such as may be attempted\n by anybody else. The judgment here expressed in the proposition is\n made up of two judgments of which one is the recognition of the\n subject (whether it be that thereby is meant \u201crose\u201d in the ordinary\n sense, or \u201cwhat is called rose,\u201d \u201cwhat is understood by rose\u201d), and\n this, as we have just said, is not always the case where a proposition\n is given of the form: All A is B.\n\n Unfortunately Land also has overlooked this, the only one among\n my critics who has succeeded in comprehending, in their necessary\n connection with the principle, what Windelband has termed the\n \u201cmysterious\u201d hints which I have thrown out towards the reform of\n elementary logic, and in deducing them correctly from it. (Cf. Land,\n \u201cOn a supposed improvement in Formal Logic\u201d in the papers of the _Kgl.\n Niederl\u00e4ndischen Akademie der Wissenschaften_, 1876.)\n\n I conclude with a curiosity recently furnished by Steinthal in his\n _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr V\u00f6lkerpsychologie_ (chap. xviii. p. 175). I there\n read with astonishment: \u201cBrentano\u2019s confusion in completely severing\n judgments from idea and thoughts (!) and grouping the judgments as\n acts of recognition or rejection, with love and hate (!!) is instantly\n removed if such (?) a judgment, as an aesthetic judgment is termed\n \u201cBeurteilen\u201d (!). Probably Steinthal has never once glanced into my\n _Psychology_, and has only read Windelband\u2019s statement concerning it;\n this, however, so hastily that I hope he will not be ungrateful at my\n sending his lines to Windelband for correction.\n\n [23] (_p. 14_). Miklosich, _Subjectlose S\u00e4tze_, second edition,\n Vienna, 1883.\n\n In order to make the reader familiar with the contents of this\n valuable little book a notice written at the time for the _Vienna\n Evening Post_ may prove useful. Through an oversight it was printed\n as a feuilleton in the Vienna newspaper. As no one certainly would\n look for it there, I will include it here by way of an appendix.\n Meantime, Sigwart\u2019s monograph, _The Impersonalia_ has appeared, in\n which he opposes Miklosich. Marty has submitted this, as well as\n (shortly before) the corresponding section in Sigwart\u2019s _Logic_ to a\n telling criticism in the _Vierteljahrsschrift f\u00fcr wissenschaftliche\n Philosopie_, with regard to which criticism Sigwart, though without\n any reasonable ground, has shown himself highly indignant. \u201cIl se\n fache,\u201d the French say, \u201cdonc il a tort.\u201d That Sigwart\u2019s theory in\n its essential points has not succeeded, even Steinthal really allows,\n though in his _Zeitschrift_ (chap. xviii. p. 172 seq.) he burns thick\n clouds of incense to the writer of the monograph, and even in his\n preface to the fourth edition of his _Origin of Language_ applauds\n a form of conduct which every true friend of that deserving man\n (Sigwart) must regret. After the high praise awarded to him at the\n outset, one feels somewhat disappointed finally by the criticism.\n Steinthal rejects (pp. 177-180) Sigwart\u2019s theory on its grammatical\n side. There would only remain therefore as really successful Sigwart\u2019s\n psychological theory. But the psychological portion is not that\n concerning which Steinthal\u2019s estimate is authoritative; for in that\n case, one would be bound to take seriously the following remark: \u201cIn\n the proposition: \u201cDa b\u00fcckt sich\u2019s hinunter mit liebendem Blick\u201d (a\n line from Schiller\u2019s _Diver_), it is obvious that everybody must think\n of the king\u2019s daughter, but it is not she which stands before me but\n a subjectless \u201csich hinunter-b\u00fccken,\u201d and now I have all the more\n fellow-feeling for her. According to my (Steinthal\u2019s) psychology, I\n should say the idea of the king\u2019s daughter \u201cfluctuates\u201d (schwingt) but\n does not enter into consciousness.\u201d This calls for something more than\n the old saying: _Sapienti sat_.\n\n\n I\n\n The psychological theory of Sigwart shows itself in all its weakness\n when he seeks to give an account of the notion of \u201c_existence_.\u201d It\n has been already recognized by Aristotle, that this notion is gained\n by reflection upon the affirmative judgment. But Sigwart, like most\n modern logicians, neglects to make use of this hint. Instead of saying\n that to the existent belongs everything of which the affirmative\n judgment is true, he becomes repeatedly, and once more in the second\n edition of his logic (pp. 88-95) involved in diffuse discussions upon\n the notion of being and upon existential propositions, which cannot\n in any way conduce to clearness, seeing that they move in false\n directions.\n\n \u201cTo be,\u201d according to Sigwart, expresses a relation (pp. 88, 95);\n if it be asked: What kind of a relation? the answer would, at first\n sight (92), appear to be, a relation to me as thinking. But no; the\n existential proposition asserts just this: \u201cthat the existing also\n exists, apart from its relation to me and to another thinking being.\u201d\n It cannot, therefore, be \u201ca relation to me as thinking.\u201d But what\n other relation can be meant? Not until p. 94 is this brought out more\n clearly. The relation ought to mean (of course he adds \u201czun\u00e4chst\u201d,\n provisionally) the agreement (\u201cidentity\u201d ib.) of the thing represented\n with a possible impression (\u201ceinem Wahrnehmbaren\u201d ib. \u201csomething which\n may be perceived by me,\u201d ib. p. 90).\n\n Now it will be immediately recognized that this notion of existence is\n too narrow; for it might very well be asserted that much exists which\n it is not possible to perceive, e.g. a past and a future, an empty\n space, and any sort of deficiency, a possibility or impossibility,\n etc., etc. It is therefore not surprising that Sigwart himself seeks\n to widen the notion. But he does this in a manner which I find it\n difficult to understand. At first sight he appears to say in order\n that something may exist it is not necessary that it can be perceived\n by me; it is enough if it can be perceived by anybody. Or what else\n can be meant when Sigwart, after what has just been said, that\n existence was the agreement of the thing represented with a possible\n impression, thus continues: \u201cThat which exists stands not merely _in\n this relation_ to me but to all other existing beings?\u201d It cannot\n surely mean that Sigwart is inclined to ascribe to every existing\n being the capacity to receive every impression. It may be he only\n wishes to say that everything which exists stands to every other\n existing being in the relation of existence, and then it might be\n concluded from what immediately follows that this rather meaningless\n definition is intended to express that existence is the capacity to\n act or to be acted upon. (\u201cWhat exists ... stands in causal relations\n to the rest of the world\u201d; similar also is p. 91, note: the existent\n is something which \u201ccan exercise effects upon me and others.\u201d)\n Finally, however, there is some ground for thinking Sigwart would\n say: what exists is that which can be perceived or can be inferred\n as perceivable, for he adds: \u201chence (on account of this causal\n relation) from what is _perceivable_ also an existence which is merely\n _inferred_ may be asserted.\u201d\n\n That all this is equally to be rejected it is not difficult to\n recognize.\n\n For (1) To \u201cinfer\u201d the existence of something does not mean so much as\n \u201cto infer that it is capable of being perceived.\u201d If, for example, the\n existence of atoms and of empty spaces could be assured by inference,\n we should still be very far from proving their perceptibility either\n to ourselves or to some other being. If any one were to conclude the\n existence of God while giving up the attempt \u201cto give vividness\u201d to\n the thought by anthropomorphic means, he would not on this account\n believe that God must be perceptible to one of his creatures or even\n that he is the object of his own perception.\n\n 2. From this point of view it would be absurd for any one to say: \u201cI\n am convinced that there is much the existence of which can neither be\n perceived at any time or even inferred by anybody.\u201d For that would\n mean: \u201cI am convinced that much can be perceived or can be inferred\n to be capable of perception which yet can never be perceived or\n inferred.\u201d Who does not recognize here how far Sigwart has strayed\n from the true notion of existence!\n\n 3. Should Sigwart wish in this passage to widen the notion of\n existence to such a degree as to think that existence is that which\n can either be perceived or inferred from some perceivable object, or\n again, stands in some sort of causal relation to what is perceivable,\n it might be replied--if indeed such a monstrous notion of existence\n still require refutation--that even this notion is still too narrow.\n If, for example, I say: It may be that an empty space exists but\n this can never with certainty be known by any one, I thereby confess\n that existence may perhaps belong to empty space; but I deny most\n definitely that it is perceptible, or that it is to be inferred from\n that which is perceptible. In regard to relations of cause and effect\n on the other hand, it is of course impossible that empty space (which\n is certainly no thing) can stand in such a relation to anything\n perceivable. We should thus once again arrive at an absurd meaning in\n interpretation of an assertion in no way absurd.\n\n How wrongly Sigwart has analysed the notion of existence is also\n proved very simply by means of the following proposition: A real\n centaur does not exist; a centaur _in idea_, however, certainly\n exists, and that as often as I imagine it. Whoever does not clearly\n recognize here the distinction of the \u201c\u1f42\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03c2 i.e. in the sense\n of existing, from \u1f42\u03bd in the sense of real (wesenhaft) will I fear\n hardly be brought to recognize it by the fullest illustrations which\n might be furnished by further examples. We may, however, also consider\n briefly the following point: According to Sigwart, the knowledge of\n the existence of anything consists in the knowledge of the agreement\n of something represented in idea with, let us say, \u03c7, since I do\n not clearly understand with what. What now is necessary in order to\n recognize the agreement of something with something else? Manifestly,\n the knowledge of everything which is required in order that this\n agreement should really exist. But this requires (1) that the one\n element exist, (2) that the other element exist, and (3) that between\n them there exist the relation of identity since what does not exist\n can be neither like something nor different from it. But the knowledge\n of the first element constitutes already in itself a knowledge of\n existence. Hence the knowledge of the two remaining elements is no\n longer necessary to the recognition of any existence, and Sigwart\u2019s\n theory leads to a contradiction. (Cf. with what has been said here,\n Sigwart\u2019s polemic against my _Psychology_, book ii. chap. vii. in his\n work; _The Impersonalia_, p. 50 seq., and _Logic_, vol. i. second\n edition, p. 89 seq. note, as well as Marty\u2019s polemic against Sigwart\n in the articles: \u201c\u00dcber Subjectlose S\u00e4tze\u201d in the _Vierteljahrsschrift\n f\u00fcr wissenschaftliche Philosophie_, viii. i. seq.)[A]\n\n  [A] I had already written my Critique of Sigwart\u2019s notion of existence\n when I became aware of a note in his _Logic_, second ed, p. 390, a\n passage which, while it has not made it necessary to alter anything\n which I had written, has led me to insert it for the purpose of\n comparison. \u201cDas Seiende \u00fcberhaupt,\u201d Sigwart writes, \u201ckann nicht als\n wahrer Gattungsbegriff zu dem einzelnen Seienden betrachtet werden;\n es ist, begrifflich betrachtet, nur ein gemeinschaftlicher Name.\n Denn, da \u2018Sein\u2019 f\u00fcr uns ein Relationspr\u00e4dikat ist, kann es kein\n gemeinschaftliches Merkmal sein, es m\u00fcsste denn gezeigt werden, dass\n dieses Pr\u00e4dikat in einer dem Begriffe alles Seienden gemeinsamen\n Bestimmung wurzle.\u201d I fear that the reader will, just as little as\n myself, attain by this explanation to clearness concerning Sigwart\u2019s\n notion of existence. He will perhaps the better understand why all my\n efforts regarding it have proved futile.\n s\n Sigwart has failed to grasp the nature of judgment in general he\n is not, of course, able to understand that of the _negative_ judgment\n in particular. He has gone so far in error as to deny to it an equal\n right as species along with the positive judgment; no negative\n judgment is, he thinks, a direct judgment, its object is rather always\n another actual judgment or the attempt to form such a judgment.\n\n In this assertion Sigwart is opposed to some important psychological\n views which I have made good in my lecture. It would therefore seem\n fitting to resist his attack. For this purpose I shall show: (1)\n that Sigwart\u2019s doctrine is badly founded; (2) that it leads to an\n irremediable confusion, as in that case Sigwart\u2019s affirmative judgment\n is a negative judgment, while his negative judgment if indeed a\n judgment at all, and not rather the absence of one, is a positive\n judgment, and that moreover his positive judgment really involves a\n negative one, along with other similar confusions. (3) Finally I think\n it will be possible--thanks to Sigwart\u2019s detailed explanations--to\n show the genesis of his error.\n\n 1. The first inquiry in the case of an assertion so novel and so\n widely diverging from the general view, will be as to its foundation.\n With regard to this, he insists above all (p. 150) that the negative\n judgment would have no meaning if the thought of the positive\n attribution of a predicate had not preceded. But what can this mean?\n Either there is here a clear _petitio principii_, or it cannot mean\n anything more than that a connection of ideas must have preceded. Now\n granting this for a moment (although I have in my _Psychology_ shown\n its falsity) this would by no means prove his proposition, since\n Sigwart himself recognizes (p. 89 note, and elsewhere) that such a\n \u201csubjective connexion of ideas\u201d would still not be a judgment; that\n there needs rather to be added to it a certain feeling of constraint.\n\n An argument follows later (p. 151) the logical connexion of which I\n understand just as little. It is rightly observed that in and for\n itself we have the right to deny of anything an infinite number of\n predicates, and it is with equal right added that in spite of this,\n we do not really pass all these negative judgments. And now what\n conclusion is drawn from these premisses? Perhaps this, that the\n fact that a certain negative judgment is warranted is not sufficient\n in itself to explain the entrance of the judgment. This we may\n without hesitation admit. But Sigwart concludes quite otherwise; he\n permits himself to assert, it follows from this that the further\n condition which is here lacking is that the corresponding positive\n affirmation has not yet been attempted. This is indeed a bold leap,\n and one which my logic at least is not able to follow. And why, if\n one were to inquire further, are not all the positive judgments here\n concerned really attempted? The most probable answer, judging by the\n examples given by Sigwart (this stone reads, writes, sings, composes;\n justice is blue, green, heptagonal, rotating), is, that this has\n not been done because the negative judgment has already been made\n with evident certainty; for this would best explain why there is no\n \u201cdanger of any one attributing these predicates to the stone or to\n justice.\u201d If, however, any one prefer to answer that \u201cthe narrowness\n of consciousness\u201d makes it impossible to attempt at the same time\n an infinite number of positive judgments, I am content with this\n expedient also, only it must then be asked if this appeal ought not to\n have been made directly and earlier, since Sigwart himself calls the\n possible negative judgments an \u201c_immeasurable_ quantity.\u201d\n\n It is also a curious error (Marty has already called attention to it),\n when Sigwart asserts that in contradistinction to what holds good of\n the negative judgment \u201cevery subject admits only of a limited number\n of predicates being affirmed.\u201d But why? Can we not, for example, say a\n whole hour is greater than half an hour, greater than a third, greater\n than a fourth and so on _ad infin._?... If then, notwithstanding, I do\n not really make all these judgments, there are evidently good reasons\n for this; above all that the \u201cnarrowness of consciousness\u201d forbids it.\n But then this might also be applied most successfully in regard to\n negative judgments.\n\n Somewhat later we meet a third argument which, as I have already by\n anticipation refuted it in my _Psychology_ (book ii. chap. 7, section\n v.), will be treated quite shortly here. If the negative judgment\n were a direct one, co-ordinated with the affirmative judgment as\n species then, thinks Sigwart (p. 155 seq.), whoever in an affirmative\n categorical proposition regards the affirmation of the subject as\n involved must, to be consistent, regard the denial of the subject\n as involved in the negative proposition, which is not the case. The\n latter observation is correct, the former assertion, however, quite\n untenable, as it involves in itself a contradiction. For exactly\n because the existence of each part in a whole is involved in the\n existence of the whole, the whole no longer exists if but one of its\n parts is missing.\n\n It only remains now to consider a point of language by which Sigwart\n believes himself able to support his view. A testimony for it is,\n he thinks, to be found in the fact that the symbol for the negative\n judgment is formed in every case by means of a combination with the\n symbol of affirmation, the word \u201cnot\u201d being added to the copula. In\n order to judge what is here actually the fact, we will glance for a\n moment at the sphere of feeling. Sigwart agrees, I think, with me and\n everybody else that pleasing and displeasing, rejoicing and sorrowing,\n loving and hating, etc., are co-ordinate with each other. Yet a\n complete series of expressions denoting a disinclination of feeling\n are found in dependence upon the expression for the corresponding\n inclination. For example, inclination, disinclination; pleasure,\n displeasure; ease, disease; Wille, Widerwille; froh, unfroh; happy,\n unhappy; beautiful, unbeautiful; pleasant, unpleasant;--even \u201cungut\u201d\n is used. The explanation of this is, I believe, not difficult for the\n psychologist, notwithstanding the equally primordial character of\n these opposite modes of feeling. Ought then the explanation of the\n phenomenon lying before us in the expression of the negative judgment,\n closely related as it is to the before mentioned phenomenon, to be\n really so very difficult, even assuming the primordial character?\n\n As a matter of fact the case must be very bad when thinkers like\n Sigwart in making statements so important in principle, and at the\n same time so unusual, have to resort to arguments so weak.\n\n 2. The grounds on which Sigwart\u2019s doctrine concerning the negative\n judgment rest have, therefore, each and all proved untenable. This\n must be so; for how could the truth of any doctrine be shown which\n would plunge everything into the greatest confusion?\n\n Sigwart finds himself compelled to distinguish between the positive\n and the affirmative judgment, and the affirmative judgment--one hears\n and wonders at the new terminology--is according to him, closely\n examined, a negative judgment. On page 150 he says literally: \u201cThe\n primordial judgment can certainly not be termed the affirmative\n judgment, but is better described as the positive judgment, for\n only in opposition to the negative judgment, and _in so far as it\n rejects_ the possibility of a negation, is the simple statement A is\n B an affirmation,\u201d and so on. Inasmuch as it \u201crejects.\u201d What else\n can that mean than \u201cso far as it denies\u201d? As a matter of fact only\n those negations can, according to this new and extraordinary use of\n language, be called affirmations! Yet this would really mean, and\n particularly when it is said that the proposition A is B _is_ often\n such a negation (cf. the expressions just quoted), that the use\n of language would be reduced to a confusion quite unnecessary and\n altogether unendurable.\n\n Not only is the affirmation--as set forth--according to Sigwart really\n a negation but also, paradoxical as it may seem, the negation, on\n close consideration, proves to be a positive judgment. It is true,\n Sigwart protests against those who, like Hobbes, would regard all\n negatives as affirmative judgments with negative predicates. But,\n following Sigwart, if this is not so, then these must be affirmative\n judgments with affirmative predicates, since he teaches that the\n subject is in every case a judgment, the predicate being the notion of\n invalidity. On p. 160 he says in the note the negation does away with\n a supposition, denies the validity, and this expression, considered\n in itself, might be taken to mean that Sigwart assumes here a special\n function of denial (absprechen) the contrary of that of affirmation\n (zusprechen). But no; a negative copula (cf. p. 153) according to him\n there is not.\n\n Now what in the world is one to understand by \u201cdenial\u201d (absprechen)?\n Does it mean the simple suppression (Aufh\u00f6renlassen) of the positive\n judgment upon the given subject matter, that is, according to Sigwart,\n the falling away of the feeling of compulsion previously given in\n a connexion between ideas? This is impossible, since the removal\n of this would bring about a condition in which the connexion of\n ideas remains, without being either affirmed or denied. How often\n does something of which we were previously certain become uncertain\n without our on this account denying it. What then is this denying?\n May we perhaps say that according to Sigwart it is a feeling oneself\n compelled (sich-gen\u00f6tigt-f\u00fchlen) to annul, whereas affirming is a\n feeling oneself compelled to posit? We should then have to say that\n all the while we are passing a negative judgment, we are in reality\n always seeking to pass a positive judgment, but that we experience a\n hindrance in so doing. The same consciousness, however, is felt by\n one who is clearly aware of the entire absence of a positive ground.\n For how can any one succeed in believing anything which he at the\n same time holds to be entirely ungrounded? Of no one, especially if\n Sigwart\u2019s definition of the judgment be applied as the standard,\n is this conceivable; that is to say, every one in such a case will\n experience failure in such an attempt. Accordingly there is, as\n yet, no negative judgment. If then the rejection does not signify a\n negative copula it must manifestly be regarded as an instance of the\n affirmation of the predicate \u201cfalse,\u201d or (to use Sigwart\u2019s term) as\n its \u201cidentification\u201d with the judgment which in this case should be\n the subject. This \u201cfalse\u201d also cannot simply mean \u201cuntrue,\u201d for I\n can assert \u201cuntrue\u201d of thousands of things with regard to which the\n predicate \u201cfalse,\u201d which appears in certain judgments, would not be\n in place. If only judgments are true, then of everything which is not\n a judgment the predicate \u201cuntrue\u201d must be affirmed, though certainly\n not on that account the predicate \u201cfalse.\u201d \u201cFalse\u201d must therefore be\n regarded as a positive predicate; and so from Sigwart\u2019s point of view\n absolutely false in principle, certain as it is that the merely not\n being convinced (nicht-\u00fcberzeugt-sein) is no denial, it is equally\n certain that we have actually no choice; we should be compelled to\n regard every negative judgment as a positive judgment with a positive\n predicate. So we arrive at a second and greater paradox.\n\n But here a third factor enters which completes the confusion. If\n we examine Sigwart\u2019s view as to the nature of judgment in general,\n it may be shown in the clearest manner possible that the simple\n positive judgment itself involves in turn, a negative judgment. That\n is to say, following Sigwart, every judgment involves besides a\n certain combination of ideas, a consciousness of the necessity of\n our \u201cidentification\u201d (unseres Einssetzens) and the impossibility of\n its contradictory (cf. espec. p. 102), the consciousness, moreover,\n of such a necessity and impossibility valid for all thinking beings\n (cf. pp. 102 and 107), which, by the way, is of course quite as false\n as Sigwart\u2019s whole view of the nature of judgment in general. All\n judgments without exception are, on account of this peculiarity,\n called by Sigwart apodictic: nor will he admit the validity of any\n distinction between the assertorical and apodictic forms of judgment\n (cf. p. 229 seq.). I now ask: Have we not here a negative judgment\n distinctly involved? Otherwise what meaning can be given to the\n statement when we hear Sigwart speak of a \u201cconsciousness of the\n impossibility of the contradictory.\u201d Further I have already shown in\n my _Psychology_ how all universal judgments are negative, since to\n be conscious of universality means nothing else than to be convinced\n that there exists no exception; if this negative be not added, the\n most extensive list of positive assertions will never constitute a\n belief in universality. When therefore, a consciousness that every\n one must so think is here spoken of, there is in this fact a further\n proof of what I have asserted, namely that according to Sigwart\u2019s\n doctrine of judgment the simplest positive acts of judgment must\n involve a negative act of judgment. And yet we are called upon at the\n same time to believe that the negative judgment, as set forth (p. 159\n seq.), arose relatively late, and that therefore on this, as well as\n on other grounds, it is unworthy of being placed side by side, with\n the positive judgment as a species equally primordial! Sigwart would\n surely not have expected this of us had he been conscious of all that\n I have here set forth in detail, and which is the more clearly seen to\n be involved in his exposition, often so difficult to comprehend the\n more carefully it is submitted to reflection. Of course expressions\n may be found where Sigwart, respecting this or that point of detail,\n asserts the contrary of what is here deduced; for what else can be\n expected where everything is left in such ambiguity, and where the\n attempt to make things clear exhibits the most manifold contradictions?\n\n 3. Finally, we have still to show the genesis of the error in which\n this able logician has involved himself in a relatively simple\n question after having once mistaken the nature of the judgment. The\n _proton pseudos_ is to be sought in a delusion which has come down\n to us from the older logic that to the essence of the judgment there\n belongs the relation of two ideas with one another. Aristotle has\n described this relation as combination and separation (\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f30\n \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) although he was well aware of the imperfect propriety of\n the expressions, adding at the same time that in a certain sense\n both relations might be described as a combination (\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, cf.\n _de Anima_, iii. 6). Scholastic and modern logic held fast to the\n expressions \u201ccombination\u201d and \u201cseparation\u201d; in grammar, however,\n both these relations were termed \u201ccombination,\u201d and the symbol for\n this combination the \u201ccopula.\u201d Sigwart now takes seriously the\n expressions \u201ccombination\u201d and \u201cseparation,\u201d and so a negative copula\n seems to him a contradiction (cf. p. 153), the positive judgment,\n on the other hand, appears to be a presupposition of the negative\n judgment, since, before a combination has been set up, it cannot be\n separated. And so it appears to him that a negative judgment without\n a preceding positive judgment is quite meaningless (cf. p. 150 and\n above). Consequently we find this celebrated inquirer in a position\n which compels him to put forth the most strenuous efforts all to no\n purpose--the negative judgment remains inexplicable.\n\n In a note (p. 159) he gives us, as a result of such attempts, a\n remarkable description of the process by which we arrive at the\n negative judgment--a result in which he believes himself finally\n able to rest satisfied. In this account the false steps which he\n successively makes become, each in turn, evident to the attentive\n observer. Long before the point is reached where he believes himself\n to have come upon the negative judgment, he has as a matter of fact\n already anticipated it.\n\n He sets out with the correct observation that the first judgments\n which we make are all positive in character. These judgments are\n evident and made with full confidence. \u201cNow, however,\u201d he continues,\n \u201cour thought goes out beyond the given; by the aid of recollections\n and associations, judgments arise which are at first also formed in\n the belief that they express reality\u201d (which means, according to\n other expressions of Sigwart, that the ideas are combined with the\n consciousness of objective validity; for this (xiv. p. 98) belongs\n to the essence of the judgment) \u201cas, for example, when we expect to\n find something with which we are acquainted in its usual place or\n pre-suppose respecting a flower that it smells. Now, however, a part\n of what is thus supposed _contradicts_ our immediate knowledge.\u201d (We\n leave Sigwart to show here how we are able to recognize anything as\n \u201ccontradictory\u201d when we are not as yet in possession of negative\n judgments and negative notions. The difficulty becomes still more\n sharply apparent as he proceeds:) \u201cwhen we do _not find_ what we\n expected, we become conscious of the _difference_ between what exists\n _merely_ in idea and what is real.\u201d (What does \u201cnot find\u201d mean here?\n I had not found it previously; obviously I now find that what was\n erroneously supposed to be associated with another object is _without_\n it, and this I can only do by recognizing the one and denying the\n other, i.e. recognize it as _not_ being with it. Further what is meant\n here by \u201cdifference\u201d? To recognize difference means to recognize that\n of two things the one is _not_ the other. What is meant by existing\n \u201cmerely in idea\u201d? Manifestly, \u201cwhat exists in idea which is _not_ at\n the same time also real.\u201d It would seem, however, that Sigwart is\n still unaware that in what he is describing the negative function\n of the judgment is already more than once involved. He continues:)\n \u201cThat of which we are immediately certain is _another_ than that\u201d\n (i.e. it is not the same, it is indeed absolutely incompatible with\n that) \u201cwhich we have judged in anticipation, and now\u201d (i.e. after and\n since we have already passed all these negative judgments) \u201cappears\n the negation which annuls the supposition and denies of it validity.\n _And here a new attitude is involved in so far as the subjective\n combination is separated from the consciousness of certainty._ The\n subjective combination is compared with one bearing the stamp of\n certainty, its distinction therefrom recognized, and out of this\n arises the notion of invalidity.\u201d This last would almost seem to be\n a carelessness of expression, for if invalid were to mean as much\n as \u201cfalse\u201d and not \u201cuncertain\u201d it could not be derived from the\n distinction between a combination with and a combination without\n certainty, but only from the opposition existing between combination\n which is denied and one which is affirmed. As a matter of fact, the\n opposite affirmative judgment is not at all necessary to it. The\n opposition, the incompatibility of the qualities in a real, is already\n evident on the ground of the combination of ideas representing the\n opposite qualities which, as I repeat once more, cannot, according to\n Sigwart himself (p. 89 note; and p. 98 seq.), be called an attempt\n at positive judgment. Although this may now and again happen in the\n case of contradictory ideas, it certainly does not happen always. If,\n for example, the question is put to me: Does there exist a regular\n chiliagon with 1001 sides? then--assuming that I am not perfectly\n clear in my own mind, as will be the case with most men, that there\n does exist a regular chiliagon, I certainly do not attempt to form a\n judgment (i.e. according to Sigwart, confidently assume) that there\n exists a regular chiliagon having 1001 sides before forming the\n negative judgment that no such figure exists on the ground of the\n opposition between the qualities.\n\n Sigwart himself, as his language frequently betrays (cf. e.g. pp. 152\n and 150) recognizes at bottom, as he is bound to recognize, in spite\n of his attack upon the negative copula, that negation and denial are\n just as much a special function of the judgment as affirmation and\n recognition. If this be granted, then the range of their application\n is by no means so limited as he erroneously asserts. It is false that\n in every case where a denial takes place the predicate denied is the\n notion \u201cvalid.\u201d Even of a judgment we may deny now its validity, now\n its certainty, now its _\u00e0 priori_ character. And just in the same way\n the subject of the judgment can change most frequently. Of a judgment\n we may deny certainty, and validity; of a request, modesty; and so\n in every case, universally expressed, we may deny B of A. Sigwart\n himself, of course, does this just like any one else. Indeed he\n sometimes speaks unintentionally far more correctly than his theory\n would admit, and witnesses, as it were, instinctively to the truth;\n as, e.g. p. 151, where he declares not--as he elsewhere teaches--that\n the subject of a negative proposition is always a judgment, and its\n predicate the term \u201cvalid,\u201d but \u201cthat of _every subject_ ... _a\n countless_ _number of predicates may be denied_.\u201d This is certainly\n true and just on this account the old doctrine holds that affirmation\n and denial are equally primordial species.\n\n [24] (_p. 15_). The discovery that every act of love is a \u201cpleasing,\u201d\n every act of hate a \u201cdispleasing,\u201d was very near to Descartes when\n he wrote his valuable little work on _The Affections_. In the second\n book, _Des Passions_, ii. art. 139, he says: \u201cLorsque les choses\n qu\u2019elles (l\u2019amour et la haine) nous portent \u00e0 aimer sont v\u00e9ritablement\n bonnes, et celles qu\u2019elles nous portent \u00e0 ha\u00efr, sont v\u00e9ritablement\n mauvaises, l\u2019amour est incomparablement meilleure que la haine; elle\n ne saurait \u00eatre trop grande et elle ne manque jamais de produire la\n joie\u201d; and this agrees with what he says a little later: \u201cLa haine, au\n contraire ne saurait \u00eatre si petite qu\u2019elle ne nuise, et elle n\u2019est\n jamais sans tristesse.\u201d\n\n In ordinary life, however, the expressions \u201cjoy\u201d and \u201csadness,\u201d\n \u201cpleasure\u201d and \u201cpain\u201d are only used when the pleasure and displeasure\n have attained a certain degree of liveliness. A sharp boundary in\n this unscientific division there is not; we may, however, be allowed\n to make use of it as it stands. It is enough that the expressions,\n \u201cpleasure\u201d and \u201cdispleasure\u201d are not narrowed down by any such limit.\n\n [25] (_p. 16_). The expressions \u201ctrue\u201d and \u201cfalse\u201d are employed in a\n manifold sense; in one sense we employ them in speaking of true and\n false judgments; again (somewhat modifying the meaning), of objects,\n as when we say, \u201ca true friend,\u201d \u201cfalse money.\u201d I need scarcely\n observe that where I use the expressions \u201ctrue\u201d and \u201cfalse\u201d in this\n lecture, I associate therewith not the first and proper meaning, but\n rather a metaphorical one having reference to objects. True, is,\n therefore, what is; false, what is not. Just as Aristotle spoke of \u201c\u1f42\u03bd\n \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03c2\u201d so we might also say, \u201c\u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03c2 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f42\u03bd.\u201d\n\n Of truth in its proper sense it has often been said that it is\n the agreement of the judgment with the object (adequatio rei et\n intellectus, as the scholastics said). This expression, true in a\n certain sense, is yet in the highest degree open to misunderstanding,\n and has led to serious errors. The agreement is regarded as a kind of\n identity between something contained in the judgment, or in the idea\n lying at the root of the judgment and something situated without\n the mind. But this cannot be the meaning here; \u201cto agree\u201d means here\n rather as much as \u201cto be appropriate,\u201d \u201cto be in harmony with,\u201d\n \u201csuit,\u201d \u201ccorrespond.\u201d It is as though in the sphere of feeling one\n should say, the rightness of love and hate consists in the agreement\n of the feelings with the object. Properly understood this also would\n be unquestionably right; whoever loves and hates rightly, has his\n feelings adequately related to the object, i.e. the relation is\n appropriate, suitable, corresponds suitably, whereas it would be\n manifestly absurd were one to believe that in a rightly directed love\n or hate there was found to be an identity between these feelings or\n the ideas lying at their root on the one hand, and something lying\n outside the feelings on the other, an identity which is absent where\n the attitude of the feelings is unrightly directed. Among other\n circumstances this misunderstanding has also conduced towards bringing\n the doctrine of judgment into that sad confusion from which to-day\n psychology and logic seek with such painful efforts to set themselves\n free.\n\n The conceptions of existence and non-existence are the correlates\n of the conceptions of the truth of the (simple) affirmative and\n negative judgments. Just as to judgment belongs what is judged, to\n the affirmative judgment what is judged of affirmatively, to the\n negative judgment, what is judged of negatively, so to the rightness\n of the affirmative judgment belongs the existence of what is judged\n of affirmatively, to the rightness of the negative judgment the\n non-existence of what is judged of negatively; and whether I say an\n affirmative judgment is true, or, its object is existent; whether I\n say a negative judgment is true, or its object is non-existent; in\n both cases I am saying one and the same thing. In the same way, it is\n essentially one and the same logical principle whether I say, in each\n case either the (simple) affirmative or negative judgment is true, or,\n each is either existent or non-existent.\n\n Thus, for example, the assertion of the truth of the judgment, \u201ca man\n is learned,\u201d is the correlate of the assertion of the existence of\n the object, \u201ca learned man\u201d; and the assertion of the truth of the\n judgment, \u201cno stone is alive,\u201d is the correlate of the assertion of\n the non-existence of its object, \u201ca living stone.\u201d The correlative\n assertions are here, as everywhere, inseparable. The case is exactly\n the same as in the assertions A > B and that B < A; that A is the\n cause of B, and that B is produced by A.\n\n [26] (_p. 16_). The notion of the good, in and for itself, is\n accordingly a unity in the strict sense, and not, as Aristotle teaches\n (in consequence of a confusion which we shall have to speak of later)\n a unity in a merely analogous sense. German philosophers also have\n failed to grasp the unity of the conception. This is the case with\n Kant, and, quite recently, with Windelband. There is a defect in our\n ordinary way of speaking which may prove very misleading to Germans\n inasmuch as for the opposite of the term \u201cgood\u201d there is no common\n expression current, but this is designated now as \u201cschlimm,\u201d now\n as \u201c\u00fcbel,\u201d now as \u201cb\u00f6se,\u201d now as \u201carg,\u201d now as \u201cabscheulich,\u201d now\n as \u201cschlecht,\u201d etc. It might very well, as in similar cases, come\n to be thought that not only the common name is wanting, but also\n the common notion. And if the notion is wanting on the one side of\n the antithesis, it would also be wanting on the other, and so the\n expression \u201cgood\u201d would seem an equivocal term.\n\n Of all the expressions quoted, it seems to me (and philologists\n also, whose advice I have asked, are of the same opinion), that the\n expression \u201cschlecht,\u201d like the Latin \u201cmalum,\u201d is most applicable as\n the opposite of the good in its full universality, and in this way I\n shall allow myself to use this expression in what follows.\n\n The fact that I adhere to the view of a certain common character\n regarding the intentional relation of love and hate does not debar my\n recognizing along with this view, special forms for particular cases.\n If, therefore, \u201cbad\u201d is a truly universal simple class conception,\n there may yet be distinguished special classes within its domain of\n which one may be suitably termed \u201cb\u00f6se,\u201d another \u201c\u00fcbel,\u201d etc.\n\n [27] (_p. 18_). The distinction between \u201cself-evident\u201d and \u201cblind\u201d\n judgments is something too striking to have altogether escaped notice.\n Even the sceptical Hume is very far from denying the distinction.\n _Self-evidence_, according to him (_Enq. concerning Hum. Underst._\n iv.) may be ascribed, on the one hand, to analytic judgments (to which\n class belong also the axioms of mathematics and the mathematical\n demonstrations), and, on the other hand, to certain impressions, but\n not to the so-called truths of experience. Reason does not lead us\n here, but rather habit, after a manner entirely irrational; belief, in\n this case is _instinctive_ and _mechanical_ (_ib._ v.).\n\n But to observe a fact does not mean to set forth its nature clearly\n and distinctly. As the nature of the judgment has, until recent times,\n been almost universally misunderstood, how could it be possible\n rightly to understand its self-evidence? It is just here that even\n Descartes\u2019 discernment fails him. How very closely the phenomenon\n occupied him a passage in the Meditations bears witness: \u201cCum hic dico\n me ita doctum esse a natura (he is speaking of the so-called external\n impressions) intelligo tantum _spontaneo quodam impetu_ me ferri ad\n hoc credendum _non lumine aliquo naturali_ mihi ostendi esse verum,\n quae duo multum discrepant. Nam quaecunque _lumine naturali_ mihi\n ostenduntur (ut quod ex eo quo dubitem sequatur me esse et similia)\n nullo modo dubia esse possunt quia nulla alia facultas esse potest,\n cui aeque fidam ac lumini isti, quaeque illa non vera esse possit\n docere; sed quantum ad impetus naturales jam saepe olim judicavi me\n ab illis in deteriorem partem fuisse impulsum cum de bono eligendo\n ageretur, nec video cur iisdem in ulla alia re magis fidam.\u201d--(Medit.\n iii.).\n\n That Descartes did not mark the fact of self-evidence, that he did not\n observe the distinction between intuition and blind judgment certainly\n cannot be affirmed from the above. But, while separating the judgment\n as a class from the idea, he still leaves behind in the class of ideas\n the character of self-evidence which distinguishes the judgments of\n intuition. It consists, according to him, in a special mark of the\n perception, that is, of the idea lying at the root of the judgment.\n Descartes even goes so far as actually to call this act of perception\n a \u201ccognoscere,\u201d a \u201cknowing.\u201d A \u201cknowing,\u201d that is, and still not an\n act of judgment! These are rudimentary organs which after the progress\n made, owing to Descartes, in the doctrine of judgment, remind us of\n a stage of life in Psychology which has been surmounted; but with\n this distinction, in opposition to similar phenomena in the history of\n the development of the species, that these organs, in no way adapted,\n become in the highest degree troublesome, and render all Descartes\u2019\n further efforts for the theory of knowledge ineffective. He remains,\n to use Leibnitz\u2019 phrase, \u201cin the antechamber of truth\u201d (cf. here\n note 28, towards the end). Only in this way does Descartes\u2019 clara et\n distincta perceptio--concerning which term itself it is so difficult\n to gain a clear and distinct idea--in its curious dual nature become\n perfectly intelligible. The only means of overcoming this confusion\n is to seek that which distinguishes insight in opposition to other\n judgments as an inner quality belonging to the act of insight itself.\n\n It is true that some who have sought here have yet failed to find. We\n saw (cf. note 23) how Sigwart conceives the nature of the judgment. To\n this, he teaches, there belongs a relation of ideas to one another,\n and along with this a feeling of obligation respecting this connexion.\n (Cf. sections 14 and 31, espec. 4 and 5.) Such a feeling therefore,\n always exists even in the case of the blindest prejudice. It is then\n abnormal, but is held (as Sigwart expressly explains) to be normal and\n of universal validity. And what now in contrast to this case, is given\n in the case of insight? Sigwart replies that its evidence consists\n in the same feeling (cf. e.g. section 3) which now, however, is not\n merely held to be normal and universally valid, but is really normal\n and universally valid.\n\n It seems to me that the weakness of this theory is at once apparent;\n and it is on many grounds to be rejected.\n\n 1. The peculiar nature of insight, the clearness and evidence of\n certain judgments from which their truth is inseparable has little\n or nothing to do with any feeling of compulsion. It may well happen\n that at a given moment I cannot refrain from so judging, yet none the\n less the essence of its clearness does not consist in the feeling of\n compulsion, and no consciousness of an obligation so to judge could,\n as such, afford security as to its truth. He who disbelieves in every\n form of indeterminism in respect of judging, regards all judgments\n under the circumstances in which they were passed as necessary, but he\n does not--and with indisputable right--regard all of them as on that\n account true.\n\n 2. Sigwart, in seeking the consciousness of insight in a feeling\n of necessity so to think, asserts that the consciousness of one\u2019s\n being compelled is, at the same time, a consciousness of a necessity\n for all thinking beings whenever the same grounds are present. If\n he means, however, that the one conviction is doubtless connected\n with the other, this is an error. Why, when a person feels bound to\n pass a judgment upon certain data, should the same compulsion hold\n good in respect of every other thinking being to whom the same data\n are also given? It is obvious that only an appeal to the law of\n causality which, under like conditions demands like results, could\n be the ground of the logical connexion. Its application, however,\n to the present case would be entirely erroneous, since this would\n involve the ignoring of the special psychical dispositions, which,\n although they do not directly enter into consciousness at all, must\n yet be regarded, along with the conscious data, as pre-determining\n conditions, and these are very different in the case of different\n persons. Hegel and his school, misled by paralogisms, have denied the\n principle of contradiction; Trendelenburg, who opposed Hegel, has at\n least restricted its validity (cf. his _Abhandlungen \u00fcber Herbarts\n Metaphysik_). The universal impossibility of inwardly denying the\n principle which Aristotle asserted cannot therefore, to-day, be any\n longer defended; Aristotle himself, however, for whom the principle\n was self-evident, assuredly found its denial impossible.\n\n Whatever is evident to any one is of course certain not only for him,\n but also for every one else who, in the same way, sees its evidence.\n The judgment, moreover, which is seen to be evident by any one has\n also universal validity, i.e. the contradictory of what is seen to be\n evident by one person, cannot be seen to be evident by another person,\n and every one who believes in its contradictory is in error. Further,\n since what is here said belongs to the essence of truth, whoever has\n evidence of the truth of anything may perceive that he is justified\n in regarding it as true for all. But he would be guilty of a flagrant\n confusion of ideas who should regard such a consciousness that a\n truth is true for all, as equivalent to a consciousness of a universal\n necessity of thinking.\n\n 3. Sigwart involves himself in a multitude of contradictions. He\n asserts and must assert--if he is not to yield to the sceptics and\n relinquish his entire logical system--that evident judgments are\n not merely different from non-evident judgments, but that they are\n also distinguishable in consciousness. The one class must therefore\n appear as normal and of universal validity, the other class as\n not so. But if evident and non-evident judgments alike carry with\n them the consciousness of universal validity, then the two classes\n would at first sight exactly agree in the manner in which they\n present themselves, and only as it were, afterwards (or at the same\n time, though as a mere concomitant), and by reflection upon some\n sort of criterion which is applied to them as a standard could the\n distinction be discovered. And passages are actually to be found in\n Sigwart where he speaks of a consciousness of agreement with the\n universal rules which accompany the fully evident judgment. (Cf.\n e.g. _Logic_, 2nd ed., 39, p. 311.) But apart from the fact that\n this contradicts experience--for long before the discovery of the\n syllogism, conclusions were reached syllogistically and with complete\n evidence--it is also to be rejected inasmuch as, seeing that the rule\n itself must be assured, it would lead either to an infinite regress,\n or to a _circulus vitiosus_.\n\n 4. Another contradiction with which I have to charge Sigwart (though\n in my opinion it might have been avoided even after his erroneous\n view as to the nature of the judgment and as to the nature of\n self-evidence), we meet with in his doctrine of self-consciousness.\n The knowledge that I am contains _only_ self-evidence, and this exists\n independent of any consciousness of an obligation so to think and of\n a necessity which is common to all alike. (At least I am not able\n otherwise to understand the passage, _Logic_, 2nd ed., p. 310: \u201cThe\n certainty that I am and think is the absolutely last and fundamental\n one--the condition of all thinking and certainty at all; here, only\n immediate evidence can be given; one cannot even say that this thought\n is necessary, since it is previous to all necessity, and just as\n immediate and evident is the conscious certainty that I think this\n or that; it is inextricably interwoven with my self-consciousness;\n the one is given with the other.\u201d) After Sigwart\u2019s doctrine already\n examined, this would appear to be a _contradictio in adjecto_ and, as\n such, quite indefensible.\n\n 5. Further contradictions appear in Sigwart\u2019s very peculiar and\n doubtful doctrine concerning the postulates, which he opposes to the\n axioms. The latter are to be regarded as certain on the ground of\n their real intellectual necessity; the former, not on the ground of\n purely intellectual motives, but on psychological motives of another\n kind, on the ground of practical needs. (_Logic_, 2nd ed. p. 412 seq.)\n The law of causality: e.g. is, according to him, not an axiom, but a\n mere postulate; we regard it as certain, since we find that without\n affirming it we should not be able to investigate nature. Sigwart,\n by this mode of accepting the law of causality, that is, affirming,\n out of mere good-will, that in nature under like conditions, the same\n results would constantly be forthcoming, manifestly takes it for\n granted without being conscious of its intellectual necessity. But, if\n all \u201ctaking-as-true\u201d (F\u00fcrwahrhalten) is an act of judgment, this is\n quite incompatible with his views as to the nature of the judgment.\n Sigwart has here, as far as I can see, but one way of escape, i.e. to\n confess that he does not believe in what, as a postulate, he accepts\n as certain (as e.g. the law of causality); then, however, he will be\n hardly serious in hoping for it.\n\n 6. This point becomes still more doubtful on reflection upon what\n (2) has been previously discussed. The consciousness of a universal\n necessity of thought does not, according to Sigwart, belong to the\n postulates, but rather to the axioms. (Cf. 5.) But Sigwart could only\n with any plausibility exhibit the consciousness of this universal\n necessity of thinking as operating in the consciousness of one\u2019s\n personal necessity of thinking by making use of the universal law\n of causation. But this causal law is itself merely a postulate; it\n is destitute of self-evidence. It is therefore obvious that the\n universal thought-necessity in the case of the axioms is also a\n postulate, and consequently they lose what, according to Sigwart, is\n their most essential distinction from the postulates. It may perhaps\n be in accordance with this that Sigwart calls the belief in the\n trustworthiness of \u201cself-evidence\u201d a postulate. But how the statement\n so interpreted, can be brought into harmony with the remaining parts\n of his doctrine I am at a loss to conceive.\n\n 7. Sigwart denies (31) the distinction between assertorical and\n apodictic judgments, since in every judgment the sense of necessity\n in respect of its function is essential. Consequently this assertion\n likewise hangs together with his erroneous fundamental view of\n the judgment; he would appear to identify the feeling which he\n sometimes calls the feeling of evidence with the apodictic character\n of a judgment. But it would be quite unjustifiable to overlook the\n modal peculiarity of certain judgments, as for example, the law of\n contradiction in distinction from other forms of judgment like that of\n the consciousness that I am. In the first instance, we have to do with\n what is \u201cnecessarily true or false,\u201d in the second instance only with\n what is \u201ctrue or false as a matter of fact,\u201d though both are in the\n same sense evident and do not differ in respect of their certainty.\n Only in the case of judgments like the former, not, however, from such\n as the latter do we draw the notions of impossibility and necessity.\n\n That Sigwart, in opposing the view which regards the apodictic\n judgment as a special class, also occasionally bears witness against\n himself is clear from what has been already said (4). The knowledge\n that I am, he calls, in opposition to the knowledge of an axiom, the\n knowledge of a simple actual truth (p. 312). Here he speaks more\n soundly than his general statements would really allow.\n\n Sigwart\u2019s theory of self-evidence is, therefore, essentially false.\n As in the case of Descartes, so here it cannot be said that Sigwart\n was not conscious of the phenomenon; indeed, we must rather say in\n his praise, that with the greatest zeal he has sought to analyze it,\n but as is the case with many in psychological analysis, it would seem\n that in the eagerness of analyzing he did not stop at the right point,\n and has sought to resolve into one another phenomena very distinct in\n nature.\n\n It is obvious that an error respecting the nature of evidence is\n fraught with the gravest consequence for the logician. It might well\n be said that we have here touched upon the deep-seated organic disease\n in Sigwart\u2019s logic, if this may not rather be said to consist in a\n misunderstanding of the nature of the judgment in general. Again and\n again its evil results become manifest, as for example, in Sigwart\u2019s\n inability to understand the most essential causes of our errors, Cf.\n _Logic_, vol. i. 2nd ed. p. 103, note, where, with strange partiality\n he assigns the chief blame to the defective development of our\n language.\n\n For the rest, many another celebrated logician in recent times can\n claim no superiority over Sigwart here. As a further example we need\n only observe how the doctrine of evidence fares at the hands of the\n admirable J. S. Mill. Cf. note 69, p. 99.\n\n Owing to the great unclearness as to the nature of evidence, almost\n universal, it becomes conceivable why, as often happens, we meet\n with the expression \u201cmore or less self-evident.\u201d Even Descartes and\n Pascal use such expressions, although it is clearly quite unsuitable.\n Whatever is self-evident is certain, and certainty in the real sense\n knows no distinctions of degree. Even quite recently we find the\n opinion expressed in the _Vierteljahrsschrift f\u00fcr wissenschaftliche\n Philosophie_ (and the writer is manifestly quite serious), that\n there exist _self-evident suppositions_ which, in spite of their\n self-evidence, may quite well be false. It is unnecessary to add that\n I hold this to be opposed to reason. I may here, however, express\n regret that lectures delivered by me at a time when I still regarded\n degrees of conviction as intensities of judgment, seem to have given\n an occasion for such confusions.\n\n [28] (_p. 19_). Cf. Hume\u2019s Essay, already cited: _An Enquiry\n concerning the Principles of Morals._ Other philosophers, who have\n placed the foundation of ethics in the feelings, as e.g. Beneke and\n Uberweg (who follows him) have seen further than Hume here. (Cf. the\n presentation of Beneke\u2019s ethics in his _Grundriss der Geschichte der\n Philosophie_, iii.) Herbart comes still nearer to the truth when he\n speaks of self-evident judgments of taste (these, however, are really\n not judgments at all, but feelings, and as such are not self-evident,\n but can only be said to have something analogous to self-evident\n judgments) and when he further opposes to the merely pleasurable\n the beautiful, ascribing to the latter as distinct from the former,\n universal validity and undeniable worth. Unfortunately, there is\n always something false mixed up with his view, and Herbart loses at\n once and for ever the right path, so that his ethics in its course\n diverges much further from the truth than the doctrine of Hume.\n\n Those thinkers who have completely overlooked the distinction between\n pleasure with the character of rightness and pleasure which is not\n so qualified, are in danger of falling into opposite errors. The one\n class view the matter as though _all_ pleasure had the character of\n rightness, the other class as though _no_ pleasure were so qualified.\n By the one class the notion of the good as that which rightly\n pleases, is entirely given up; \u201cworthy of desire\u201d (begehrenswert) in\n distinction from \u201cdesirable\u201d (begehrbar), is an unmeaning expression.\n For the other class, \u201cworthy of desire\u201d (begehrenswert) remains as a\n separate notion, so that there is no tautology in their saying nothing\n is in itself desirable except in so far as it is in itself worthy of\n desire, is good in itself. Manifestly they must, to be consistent,\n assert this, and this they have really taught. The extreme hedonists\n all belong to this class; but, along with them, many others; in the\n Middle Ages, for example, the teaching is found in Thomas Aquinas,\n whose greatness receives fresh appreciation from Ihering (cf. Summ.\n theol. I.a. qu. 80, qu. 82, art. 2 ad. 1, etc.).\n\n But even then such a view cannot be maintained in the light of the\n facts without exposing the nature of good and bad to a falsification\n which involves a form of subjectivism similar to that formerly\n committed by Protagoras respecting the notions of truth and falsehood.\n Just as, according to this subjectivist in the sphere of the judgment,\n man is the measure of all things, and often what is true for one,\n may at the same time be false for another--so the advocates of the\n view that only the good can be loved, only the bad hated, are really\n compelled to assume that, in this sphere, each is himself the measure\n of all things; for the good, in that it is good; for the bad, that it\n is bad; so that often something is, in itself and at the same time,\n both good and bad: good in itself, in the case of all who love it for\n its own sake; bad in itself, in the case of all who hate it for its\n own sake. This is absurd, and the subjectivistic falsification of the\n notion of the good is to be rejected equally with the subjectivistic\n falsification of the notions of truth and existence by Protagoras,\n but with this difference: that the subjectivistic error in the sphere\n of what is rightly pleasing and displeasing takes root more easily\n and infects most ethical systems even to-day. Some, as recently,\n Sigwart (_Vorfragen der Ethik_, p. 6), confess it openly; others fall\n into this error without themselves becoming clearly conscious of the\n subjectivistic character of their view.[A]\n\n  [A] Those especially who teach that generally speaking the knowledge,\n pleasure, and perfection of each individual is, for him, good, their\n opposites bad, and that all else is in itself indifferent, will\n perhaps protest against my classing them among the subjectivists.\n It might even seem on a superficial survey, that they have set up a\n doctrine of the good equally valid for all. But on a more careful\n examination we find that this teaching does not even in a single\n instance, hold one and the same object to be good universally.\n For example, my own knowledge is, according to this view, for me\n worthy of love; for every one else indifferent in itself, while the\n knowledge of another individual is in itself for me indifferent. It\n is curious to observe theistic thinkers, as often happens, setting\n up a subjectivistic view respecting the good, valid of all mortal\n loving and willing, while, at the same time assuming that God, without\n respect of person, estimates every perfection by a kind of objective\n standard. This exception with regard to the loving and willing of\n God and the notion of Him as eternal Judge is then meant to render\n harmless in respect of its practical consequences, the egoism which\n such a principle implies.\n\n elebrated controversy between Bossuet and Fenelon it may be said that\n the great bishop of Meaux advocated a kind of subjectivism. Fenelon\u2019s\n theses, though he advocated a system of morality neither ignoble nor\n unchristian, were finally condemned by the Church of Rome, though it\n did not go so far as to reject his teaching as heretical. Otherwise\n one would really be compelled to condemn also those fine glowing lines\n attributed by many to St. Theresa, that in a very imperfect Latin\n translation have found their way into many Catholic prayer-books which\n is much more than their escaping the ecclesiastical censor. I give\n them translated directly from the Spanish\n\n    Nicht Hoffnung auf des Himmels sel\u2019ge Freuden\n    Hat Dir, mein Gott, zum Dienste mich verbunden.\n    Nicht Furcht, die ich vor ew\u2019gem Graus empfunden,\n    Hat mich bewegt der S\u00fcnder Pfad zu meiden.\n\n    Du Herr bewegst mich, mich bewegt Dein Leiden.\n    Dein Anblick in den letzten, bangen Stunden.\n    Der Geisseln Wuth. Dein Haupt von Dorn umwunden.\n    Dein schweres Kreuz und--ach!--Dein bittres Scheiden.\n\n    _Herr, Du bewegest mich mit solchem Triebe,_\n    _Das ich Dich liebte, w\u00e4r\u2019 kein Himmel offen._\n    _Dich f\u00fcrchtete, wenn auch kein Abgrund schreckte;_\n    _Nichts kannst Du geben, was mir Liebe weckte;_\n    _Denn w\u00fcrd\u2019 ich auch nicht, wie ich hoffe, hoffen,_\n    _Ich w\u00fcrde dennoch lieben, wie ich liebe.\u201d_\n\n The teaching of Thomas Aquinas has often been so represented as though\n it were pure subjectivism. It is true that much of his teaching\n sounds quite subjectivistic (cf. e.g. Summ. theol. 1a. q. 80, art.\n 1, especially the objections and replies as well as the passages in\n which he declares that the happiness of each is the highest and final\n end, asserting even of the saints in heaven that each rightly desires\n more his own blessedness than the blessedness of all others). Along\n with these, however, are to be found statements in which he soars\n above this subjectivistic view as, for example, when he declares (as\n Plato and Aristotle before him and Descartes and Leibnitz after) that\n everything which exists is good as such, not good merely as a means\n but also--a point which pure subjectivists (as recently Sigwart,\n _Vorfr. d. Ethik_, p. 6) expressly deny--good in itself, and again,\n when he affirms that in case any one--an impossible case--had at any\n time to choose between his own eternal ruin and an injury to the\n Divine love, the right course would be to prefer his own eternal\n unhappiness.\n\n There the moral feeling of western Christendom touches the feeling of\n the heathen Hindu, as is shown in a somewhat strange story of a maiden\n who renounces her own everlasting blessedness for the salvation of the\n rest of the world; as also that of a positivist thinker like Mill when\n he declares sooner than bow in prayer before a being not truly good,\n \u201cto hell he will go.\u201d I knew a Catholic priest who, on account of this\n utterance of Mill\u2019s, voted for him at the parliamentary election.]\nWhoever, as I have said, has once accepted the view that nothing can\n please except in so far as it is really good, nothing displease,\n except in so far as it is really bad, is on a way which, if\n consistently followed, must lead him to subjectivism. This is\n evident as soon as it is admitted (and at first sight, it is true,\n it may be denied) that opposite tastes, here desire, there dislike,\n may be associated with the same sense phenomenon. One might, in\n defence, argue that here, in spite of the similarity of the external\n stimulus the corresponding subjective idea may have an essentially\n different content. But such a view refutes itself in those cases\n where we ourselves repeatedly experience the same phenomenon, and, in\n consequence of a further development in age or by reason of a changed\n habit (cf. text 25, p. 16) thereby experience a different feeling,\n dislike for desire, or desire for dislike. There remains, then, no\n doubt, that as a fact the feelings may take an opposed attitude\n towards the same phenomenon: and again, in the case where ideas\n instinctively repel us, while at the same time arousing within us a\n pleasure of a higher kind (cf. note 32, p. 92), what has been said is\n also clearly evident.\n\n Finally, we should expect from one who thinks that every act of simple\n pleasure is right, and that one act never contradicts another, a\n similar doctrine in respect of the act of choosing. But the reverse\n is here so obvious that the advocates of this view have in striking\n contrast always asserted in the most definite manner that different\n individuals have preferences opposite in character, and that one is\n right, the other wrong.\n\n Glancing back from the disciples of Aristotle in the Middle Ages to\n the master himself, we find his teaching appears to be a different\n one. Aristotle recognizes a right and a wrong kind of desire (\u1f4c\u03c1\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03c2\n \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f90 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f30 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u03ae) and that what is desired (\u1f40\u03c1\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd) is not\n always the good. (_De Anima_, iii. 10.) In the same way he affirms in\n respect of pleasure (\u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae) in the _Nicomachian Ethics_ that not every\n pleasure is good; there is a pleasure in the bad, which is itself bad\n (_Nic. Eth._ x. 2). In his _Metaphysics_ he distinguishes between a\n lower and a higher kind of desire (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u03af\u03b1 and \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2); whatever is\n desired by the higher kind for its own sake is truly good (_Metaph._ \u0394\n 7, p. 1072 a. 28). A certain approach to the right view seems already\n to have been reached here. It is of special interest (a point I have\n only discovered later) that Aristotle has suggested an analogy between\n ethical subjectivism and the logical subjectivism of Protagoras, and\n equally repudiates both (_Metaph._ \u039a 6, p. 1062 b. 16, and 1063 a. 5).\n On the other hand it would appear from the lines immediately following\n as though Aristotle had fallen into the very obvious temptation of\n believing that we can know the good as good, independent of the\n excitation of the emotions. (_Metaph._ 29; cf. _De Anima_, iii. 9 and\n 10.)\n\n In close connection with this appears to be the passage (_Nic. Eth._\n i. 4) where he denies that there is any uniform notion of the good\n (understanding, of course, the good in itself, cf. respecting this,\n note 26, p. 77), thinking rather that only by way of analogy does\n there exist a unity in the case of the good of rational thinking\n and seeing, joy, etc., and when, in another passage (_Metaph._ \u0395 4,\n p. 1027 b. 25), he says that the true and the false are not in the\n things, where the good and the bad are, i.e. the former predicates\n (e.g. true God, false friend) are ascribed to the things only in\n respect of certain mental acts, the true and false judgments, while\n the latter, on the other hand, are not in a similar way ascribed to\n them merely in respect of a certain class of mental activities:--all\n of which, incorrect as it is, is still connected as a necessary result\n with the aforesaid error. He is more in agreement with the true\n doctrine of the origin of our notion and knowledge of the good, when\n (_Nic. Ethics_, x. 2) he adduces as an argument against the assumption\n that joy does not belong to the good, the fact that all desire it,\n and adds: \u201cFor if only irrational beings desired it, the opposition\n to this argument would still contain a certain justification; but if\n every rational being also does so, how can anything be said against\n it?\u201d Yet even this utterance is reconcilable with his erroneous view.\n\n Considered in this aspect, the moralist of sentiment\n (Gef\u00fchls-moralist), Hume, has here the advantage of him, for Hume\n rightly urges, how is any one to recognize that anything is to be\n loved without experiencing the love?\n\n I have said that the temptation into which Aristotle has fallen\n appears quite conceivable. It arises from the fact that, along with\n the experience of an emotion qualified as right there is given at the\n same time the knowledge that the object itself is good. Thus it may\n easily happen that the relation is then perverted and the love is\n thought to follow as a consequence of the knowledge, and recognized as\n right by reason of its agreement with this its rule.\n\n It is not without interest to compare the error here made by Aristotle\n in respect of emotion qualified as right with that which we have seen\n was committed by Descartes in respect of the similarly qualified\n judgment (cf. note 27, p. 78). The cases are essentially analogous; in\n both cases the distinguishing mark is sought in the special character\n of the idea which forms the basis of the act rather than in the act\n itself qualified as right. In fact it seems to me evident from various\n passages in his treatise _Des Passions_, that Descartes himself has\n treated the matter in a way quite similar to that of Aristotle, and in\n a manner essentially analogous to his doctrine of the self-evident\n judgment.\n\n At the present time many approach very near to Descartes\u2019 error in\n respect of the marks of self-evidence (if we are not rather to say\n that the error is really implicitly contained in their statements)\n when they regard the matter as though in the case of every\n self-evident judgment a criterion were referred to. In this case it\n must have been previously given somewhere, either as recognized--and\n this would lead to infinity--or (and this is the only alternative),\n it is given in the idea. It may be said that here also the temptation\n to such a misconception lies ready to hand and this may well have\n exercised a misleading influence upon Descartes. Aristotle\u2019s error\n is less general, though only because the phenomenon of the emotion\n qualified as right has, generally speaking, come less frequently under\n consideration than that of the similarly qualified judgment.\n\n If the nature of the former has been misunderstood, the latter has\n often been so overlooked as not even to admit of its essential nature\n being misinterpreted.\n\n [29] (_p. 19_). When I affirmed that the language of common life\n offers no suitable terms for activities of feeling qualified as right,\n I did not mean thereby to deny that certain expressions are, in\n themselves, well suited, indeed they would seem to have been created\n for this purpose, particularly, for example, the expressions \u201c_to be\n well pleasing_,\u201d and \u201c_to be ill pleasing_\u201d (gut gefallen and schlecht\n gefallen), as distinct from the simple \u201cto be pleasing\u201d and \u201cto be\n mis-pleasing.\u201d Though, however, it might seem advisable to limit these\n terms in this way and so to make them serve as scientific terms,\n scarcely any trace of such a limitation is to be found in ordinary\n language. One does not, of course, care to say: \u201cthe good pleases him\n ill,\u201d \u201cthe bad pleases him well,\u201d though one still says that to one\n this tastes good, to another that, and so on, i.e. the expression\n \u201c_to be well pleasing_\u201d is applied unhesitatingly even in the case\n where pleasure is given in the lowest instinctive form. Indeed the\n term-\u201cimpression\u201d (Wahrnehmung) has degenerated in an almost similar\n way. Only really appropriate in respect of knowledge, it came to be\n applied in the case of the so-called external impression (\u00e4ussere\n Wahrnehmung), i.e. in cases of a belief, blind, and in its essential\n relations, erroneous, and consequently would require, in order, as a\n terminus technicus to have scientific application, an important reform\n of the usual terminology and one which would essentially narrow the\n range of the term.\n\n [30] (_p. 19_). _Metaph._, \u0391 1, p. 980 a. 22.\n\n [31] (_p. 20_) i.e., \u201cAls richtig characterisiert.\u201d This phrase, which\n occurs frequently, I have translated sometimes as above, sometimes by\n \u201cqualified as right.\u201d By this phrase and its equivalents is meant that\n the act (sc. of loving, hating, or preferring,) is at once perceived\n by us to be a right one, bears the mark or character of rightness.\n\n [32] (_p. 20_). In order to exclude a misunderstanding and the\n doubts necessarily connected therewith, I add the following remark\n to what has been suggested shortly in the text. In order that an\n act of feeling may be called purely good in itself it is requisite:\n (1) that it be right; (2) that it be an act of pleasing and not an\n act of displeasing. If either condition be absent, it is already,\n in a certain respect, bad in itself; pleasure at the misfortunes of\n others (Schadenfreude) is bad on the first ground; pain at the sight\n of injustice, on the second ground. If both conditions are lacking,\n the act is still worse, in accordance with the principle of summation\n of which we shall speak later in the lecture. According to this same\n principle, where a feeling is good, its increase increases also the\n goodness of the act, while, similarly, where an act is purely bad, or\n at least participates in any respect in the bad, with the intensity\n of the feeling increases the badness of the act. When the act is a\n mixed one, good and bad manifestly increase, or diminish, in simple\n proportion to one another. The \u201cplus\u201d belonging to the one or the\n other side, must therefore, with the increase in intensity of the\n act become ever greater, with its decrease ever smaller. And so the\n surplus of good in the act may, under certain circumstances in spite\n of its impurity, be described as a very great good, while conversely,\n the surplus of the bad may, despite the admixture of the good, be\n described as something very bad (cf. note 36).\n\n [33] (_p. 20_). It may happen that, at the same time, one and the\n same thing is both pleasing and displeasing. First, something in\n itself displeasing may yet be pleasing as a means to something else,\n and vice versa; then a case may arise where something instinctively\n repels us, while at the same time it is loved by us with a higher\n love. We may thus have an instinctive repugnance to a sensation, which\n is yet at the same time (and every idea, qua idea, is good), a welcome\n enrichment of our world of ideas. Aristotle has said: \u201cIt happens\n that desires enter into conflict with each other. This happens when\n the reason (\u03bb\u1f41\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2) and the lower desires (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1) are in opposition\n (_De Anima_ iii. 10). And again: \u201cNow the lower desires (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1)\n gain a victory over the higher, now the higher over the lower, and as\u201d\n (according to the ancient astronomy) \u201cone celestial sphere the other,\n so one desire draws off the other with it when the individual has lost\n the firm rule over himself\u201d (_De Anima_ ii.).\n\n [34] (_p. 21_). Just as love and hate may be directed towards single\n individuals, so also they may be directed to whole classes. This\n Aristotle has already observed. We are, he thinks, \u201cnot only angry\n with the individual thief who has robbed us, and with the individual\n sycophant who deceives our confiding nature, but we hate thieves and\n sycophants in general\u201d (_Rhet._ ii. 4). Acts of loving and hating,\n where in this way there is an underlying general conception, also\n possess frequently the character of rightness. And so quite naturally\n along with the experience of this given act of love or hate, the\n goodness or badness of the entire class becomes manifest at one\n stroke, and apart from every induction from special cases. In this\n way, for example, we attain to the general knowledge that insight as\n such is good. It is easy to understand how near the temptation lies,\n in the case of such knowledge of a general truth without any induction\n from single cases otherwise demanded in truths of experience,\n entirely to overlook the preparatory experience of a feeling having\n the character of rightness, and to regard the universal judgment\n as an immediate synthetic _\u00e0 priori_ form of knowledge. Herbart\u2019s\n very remarkable doctrine of a sudden elevation to general ethical\n principles seems to me to point to the fact that he had observed\n something of this peculiar process without at the same time becoming\n quite clear about it.\n\n [35] (_p. 21_). It is easy to see how important this proposition may\n become for a theodicy. As regards ethics it might be feared that\n its security becomes thereby seriously endangered, perhaps, indeed,\n completely destroyed. To see how unfounded such a fear is, cf. note\n 43, p. 99.\n\n [36] (_p. 22_). It seems to me evident even from analysis of the\n notion of choice (1) that everything which is good is to be preferred,\n i.e. that in an act of choice it shall fall as a reasonable moment\n into the balance; (2) that everything bad forms a reasonable\n anti-moment, and therefore also that (3) in such cases--partly by\n direct means, partly by an addition in which the good and the bad\n are to be taken into account as quantities with opposite signs--the\n preponderance in which right choice is to be grounded may become\n evident, i.e. the preferability or superiority of the one as opposed\n to the other. According to this view, it does not, closely examined,\n require the special experience of an act of preference having the\n character of rightness, but only the experience of simple similarly\n qualified acts of pleasing and displeasing, in order to attain in the\n above-mentioned cases to the knowledge of the better. And therefore\n I have said that we derived our knowledge of preferability, not from\n the fact that our experience has the character of rightness, but\n that the said preferences possess the character of rightness because\n the knowledge of preferability has here been made the determining\n standard. I do not, however, mean to say that the same distinguishing\n character which was previously insisted upon in the case of certain\n simple acts of pleasing is not also here really present.\n\n [37] (_p. 24_). In order that the procedure here might have been\n rendered quite exact and really exhaustive, two other very important\n cases would still need to have been mentioned in the lecture. The one\n case is that of pleasure in the bad, the other that of displeasure\n in the bad. If we enquire: Is pleasure in the bad good? the answer\n has already been given in a measure quite rightly by Aristotle: No.\n \u201cNo one,\u201d he says in the _Nicomachian Ethics_ (x. 2, p. 1174 a. 1),\n \u201cwould wish to feel joy in what is shameful even if it were made\n certain to him that no harm would result therefrom.\u201d The hedonists,\n to which class belonged such noble men as Fechner (cf. his work on\n _The Highest Good_) contradicted this view. Their teaching is to be\n rejected; in practice as Hume has observed, they fortunately proved\n much better than in theory. There is still, however, a grain of truth\n in their view. The pleasure in the bad is, qua pleasure, good, and\n only at the same time bad as a wrong activity of feeling, and though,\n by reason of this perversion, it may be described as a preponderance\n of the bad, it cannot be regarded as something purely bad. While,\n therefore, abhorring it as bad, we are really making an act of choice\n in which freedom from what in the object is bad is preferred to the\n possession of what is good. And when we recognize the aversion as\n right, this is possible only because the preference has the character\n of rightness.\n\n The case is similar when we inquire if a similarly qualified\n displeasure in the bad is good, as e.g. where a noble heart feels pain\n on seeing the innocent oppressed, or where some one, looking back upon\n his past life, feels remorse at the consciousness of a bad action.\n Here the case is in every respect the reverse of the one preceding.\n Such a feeling arouses a state in which pleasure preponderates, but\n this pleasure is not pure; it cannot be called a pure good like the\n joy which would have arisen were the opposite of that over which we\n now mourn a fact, hence Descartes\u2019 advice (cf. 24, p. 75)--to turn the\n attention and feeling in an equal degree rather to the good--would\n really not lose its significance. We recognize all this clearly, and\n have therefore, once more a preference with the character of rightness\n as the source of our knowledge of what is worthy of preference.\n\n In order not to introduce too many complications, I omitted in my\n lecture when discussing preferences to mention these cases. And this\n seemed to me the more admissible, because it would practically lead\n to the same result, if (like Aristotle in the case of disgraceful\n pleasure) one were to treat hate qualified as right on the one hand\n and love qualified as right on the other, as phenomena of simple\n disinclination and inclination.\n\n It may be easily seen that from these special cases of a possible\n determination of a quantitative relation between good and bad pleasure\n and displeasure, on the one hand, and of rightness and unrightness on\n the other hand (cf. for these also Note 31, p. 91) there is no hope of\n filling in the great gaps referred to in the lecture in a way valid\n for all cases.\n\n [38] (_p. 26_). Cf. my _Psych. from the Empirical Standpoint_, book\n ii. chap. iv.\n\n [39] (_p. 26_). E. Dumont. _Trait\u00e9s de l\u00e9gislation civile et p\u00e9nale,\n extraits des manuscrits de J. Bentham_; espec. in the section bearing\n the title: \u201cPrincipes des l\u00e9gislation,\u201d chap. iii. section 1 towards\n the end; chap. vi. section 2 towards the end; and chaps. viii. and ix.\n\n [40] (_p. 27_). S. Rudolph Wagner. _Der Kampf um die Seele, vom\n Standpunkt der Wissenschaft._ (Sendschreiben an Herrn Leibarzt Dr.\n Beneke in Oldenburg.) G\u00f6ttingen, 1857, p. 94 note. \u201cGauss said, the\n author (of a certain psychological work) spoke of a want of exact\n measurements in the case of psychical phenomena, but it would be good\n if we only had clumsy ones, one could then make a beginning; but we\n have none. There is here wanting the _conditio sine qu\u00e2 non_ of all\n mathematical treatment, i.e. whether and how far the changing of an\n intensive into an extensive quantity is possible. Yet this is the\n first and indispensable condition; then there were also others. On\n this occasion Gauss spoke also about the usual incorrect definition\n of quantity as an \u2018ens\u2019 which is capable of being increased or\n diminished; one ought rather to say, an \u2018ens\u2019 that admits of being\n divided into equal parts....\u201d\n\n [41] (_p. 27_). Fechner\u2019s psycho-physical law, even were it assured,\n whereas it awakens continually increasing doubt and opposition, could\n only be used as a means of measuring the intensity of the content\n of certain concrete perceptions, not, however, for measuring the\n strength of the emotions like joy and sorrow. Attempts have been made\n at determining the measure of feelings by means of the involuntary\n movements and other externally visible changes accompanying them. To\n me, this seems very much as if one were to seek to reckon the exact\n date of the day of the month by means of the weather. The direct inner\n consciousness, however imperfect its testimony may be, nevertheless\n offers here far more. At least one draws from the spring itself,\n whereas in the other case one has to do with water rendered impure by\n a variety of influences.\n\n 42\n: (_p. 27_). Sigwart, in his _Vorfragen der Ethik_ (p. 42),\nemphasizes the fact that no more must be required from the human will\nthan what it is able to perform. This utterance, which coming from the\nlips of so decided an indeterminist (cf. _Logic_, ii. p. 592) may\nespecially excite surprise, hangs together with his subjective view of\nthe good, from which view, in my opinion, there is offered no logical,\nnormal path to the peace of all who possess a good will. (Cf. e.g. the\nway in which Sigwart, p. 15, passes over from egoism to regard for the\ngeneral good.)\n\nBut similar expressions are also heard from others. And it might really\nappear doubtful whether the sublime command which bids us to subordinate\nall our actions to the highest practical good is really the right\nethical principle. For, putting aside cases of want of reflection, which\ndo not, of course, enter here into consideration, the demand for such\ncomplete self-devotion still seems too stringent, since there is no one,\nhowever carefully he may conduct himself, who, looking sincerely into\nhis heart, will not frequently be compelled to say with Horace:--\n\n    \u201cNunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor,\n     Et mihi res, non me rebus subjungere conor.\u201d\n\nAnd yet the doubt is unfounded, and a comparison may serve to make this\nclear. It is certain that no one can entirely avoid error; still,\navoidable or unavoidable, every error remains a judgment, which is what\nit should not be, and is opposed to the indispensable demands of logic.\nWhat applies to logic in respect of weakness of thought applies to\nethics on the ground of weakness of will. Ethics cannot cease to demand\nfrom a man that he should love the acknowledged good and prefer that\nwhich is recognized to be better, not putting anything else before the\nhighest practical good. Even were it proved (which is not the case),\nthat in a definite class of cases all men without exception in respect\nof these were never able to remain true to the highest practical good,\nthis would still not afford the slightest justification for setting\naside the fundamental ethical demand. Even then it would still remain an\nevident and unchangeable truth, the sole and only right rule, here as\neverywhere, to give the preference to the better over what is less good.\n\nJ. S. Mill fears that this would lead to endless self-reproaches and\nthat these constant reproaches would embitter the life of each\nindividual. This, however, is so little implied by the rule that it is\neasily demonstrable that such a result is excluded. Goethe well\nunderstood this,--\n\n    \u201cNichts taugt Ungeduld\u201d\n\ni.e. impatience in respect of one\u2019s own imperfections, he says in one of\nhis by no means lax sayings,--\n\n    \u201cNoch weniger Reue,\u201d\n\n--giving way to the stings of conscience, when fresh joyous resolve is\nalone available,--\n\n    \u201cJene vermehrt die Schuld,\n     Diese schafft neue.\u201d[A]\n\n [A]\n\n    \u201cImpatience naught avails\n     Nor more availeth rue,\n     One addeth to the fault,\n     The other maketh new.\u201d--Tr.\n\n\nIn an album I once found in the hand of the pious Abbot Haneberg,\nafterwards Bishop of Spires, the following lines, written to the same\neffect:--\n\n    \u201cSonne dich mit Lust an Gottes Huld,\n     Hab\u2019 mit allen--auch mit dir, Geduld.\u201d[B]\n\n [B]\n\n    \u201cBathe thyself with delight in the sunshine of heavenly grace,\n     Let patience toward all men abound--e\u2019en with thyself find a place.\u201d--Tr.\n\n\n [43] (_p. 28_). It is necessary to be on one\u2019s guard against drawing\n from the principle of love of our neighbour the conclusion that each\n has to _care for_ every other individual in the same degree as for\n himself, which, far from conducing towards the universal good, would\n rather essentially prejudice it. This is seen by reflecting on the\n circumstance that to ourselves we stand in a position different from\n that in which we stand to everybody else, while again in respect of\n these others we are in a position to help, or to injure, one more,\n the other less. If there are human beings in Mars the inhabitants of\n the earth can and ought to wish them good also, not however to strive\n after their good in the same manner as for himself and his fellow-men.\n\n It is in this connexion that the injunction to take thought in the\n first instance for oneself, a precept to be found in every system\n of morality, is justifiable: \u201c\u03b3\u03bd\u1ff7\u03b8\u03b9 \u03c3\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd,\u201d \u201cSweep before your own\n doorstep,\u201d etc. The demand to seek first of all the welfare of wife\n and child, home and fatherland, is also universal. The command: \u201cTake\n no thought for the morrow,\u201d in the sense in which it really offers\n wise counsel, also flows as a result from the same source. That\n my future happiness ought not to be so _dear_ to me as my present\n happiness is not here implied.\n\n So regarded, the communistic doctrines which illogical impetuosity\n would seek to derive from the lofty principle of universal brotherhood\n are shown to be unjustifiable.\n\n [44] (_p. 29_). The fact that we are often unable to measure the more\n remote results of our actions offers a more serious difficulty.\n\n But even this thought will not discourage us if we love the universal\n good. It may be said of all results which are unrecognizable in an\n exactly equal degree, that one has just as many chances in its favour\n as the others. According to the law of great numbers a compensation\n will on the whole result, and so whatever calculable good we create\n will stand as a plus on the one side and, just as though it stood\n alone, will justify our choice.\n\n From the same point of view, as I have already suggested in the\n lecture (p. 22), the doubt is removed which in a similar manner might\n arise through uncertainty as to whether everything that is good draws\n from us a love having the qualification of rightness, and whether,\n therefore, we are able to recognize it as good and to take due account\n of it.\n\n [45] (_p. 29_). That in the case of the limits of right\n (Rechtsgrenzen) we have essentially to do with spheres which lie at\n the disposal of the individual will has been frequently emphasized\n both by philosophers (cf. in this respect e.g. Herbart\u2019s Idea of\n Right) and by able jurists. Ihering in his _Geist des r\u00f6mischen\n Rechts_, iii. 1 (p. 320 note), demonstrates this with numerous\n citations. Arndt e.g. in his _Handbuch der Pandekten_ defines law as\n \u201csupremacy of the will regarding an object\u201d; for Sintenis it is, \u201cthe\n will of one person raised to the universal will.\u201d Windscheid defines\n it as \u201ca certain volition (Willensinhalt) of which the legal code in\n a concrete case affirms that it may be made valid as against every\n other will.\u201d Puchta, who has perhaps expressed the thought in the\n most manifold ways, says in his digest of Roman law, section 22, \u201cas\n the subjects of such a _will_ thought of potentially men are called\n persons, ... personality is therefore the subjective possibility of\n the legalized will, of a legal power.\u201d In the same work (section 118,\n note b) he observes in regard to a want of personality: \u201cThe principle\n of modern law is inability to dispose of property\u201d; many other of his\n expressions convey the same meaning.\n\n As however these legal authorities have concentrated their attention\n exclusively upon legal duties, and do not touch upon the problem as to\n the way in which the individual will has to rule in its legal sphere,\n Ihering has interpreted them as meaning that they considered the\n true and highest good, and the most intrinsic and final end, towards\n which the legal code strives, to be the exercise of the will as will,\n the joy of the individual in his volitional activity; \u201cthe final end\n of all law is, for them, willing\u201d (pp. 320, 325); \u201cthe end of law\n (according to them) consists once for all in the power of the will,\n in its supremacy\u201d (p. 326). One can well understand how he comes to\n condemn a theory so interpreted (p. 327), and even that he succeeds\n in making it appear ridiculous. \u201cAccording to this view,\u201d he says,\n (p. 320) \u201call private right is nothing less than an arena in which\n the will moves and exercises itself; the will is the organ by which\n the individual enjoys his right, the profit obtained from legal right\n consists in feeling the joy and glory of power, in the satisfaction of\n having realized an act of will, e.g. of having effected a mortgage,\n transferred a title, and so proved oneself to be a legal personality.\n What a poor thing would the will be if the bare and low regions of law\n were the proper \u201csphere of its activity!\u201d\n\n Certainly the heaviest charges of absurdity and ridiculousness would\n be well deserved if those scholars who regard the _immediate_ aim of\n law as consisting in a limitation of the spheres at the disposal of\n the will had intended in so doing to disavow all regard for the _final\n ethical end_, i.e. the advancement of the highest practical good.\n There is, however, absolutely nothing to justify this insinuation,\n and therefore one could perhaps with more right smile at the zeal\n of an attack which is really levelled merely against windmills.\n Moreover, what Ihering proposes to set in its place is certainly a\n bad substitute. For, in regarding the sphere ascribed by the legal\n authority to the individual simply as a sphere consigned to their\n egoism (a view which, as the author of _Der Zweck im Recht_, he\n perhaps no longer holds), he is thus led to his definition: \u201cLaw\n (Recht) is legal security for enjoyment,\u201d whereas he would have been\n more correct in saying: \u201cLaw is legal security for the undisturbed\n disposal of individual power in the advancement of the highest good.\u201d\n Is then injustice something which exhausts bad conduct? By no means;\n legal duties have limits; duty in general governs all our actions,\n and this our popular religion expressly emphasizes, as, for instance,\n when it asserts that for every idle word the individual must render an\n account.\n\n Besides this first objection, which rests upon a simple\n misunderstanding of the intention, Ihering has also raised several\n others which are essentially due to imperfections in the use of\n language. If the legal code essentially consists in setting certain\n limits to the activity of the individual will in order that one person\n may not disturb the other in striving after the good, it follows that\n he who has, or had, or will have no will has also no legal sphere. I\n say, \u201chas, or had, or will have,\u201d for obviously regard must be paid to\n the past and to the future. A dead man often exercises an influence\n extending into the far distant future, so that Comte well says: the\n living are more and more dominated by the dead. In like manner, the\n situation will entail that, in respect of many problems, we leave\n the decision to the future, i.e. renounce the sovereignty in favour\n of a future will. This consideration resolves many a paradox urged\n by Ihering (pp. 320-325); not however, all. In the case of one who\n from birth has been an incurable imbecile, it is obvious that no\n power of will whatever can be found, to which regard for the highest\n practical good might allow a sphere; there remains therefore to him,\n according to our view, really no legal sphere, and yet on every hand\n we hear of a right which he possesses in his own life; even under\n some circumstances, we refer to him as the owner of a great estate,\n or ascribe to him the right of a crown or kingly rule. On examining\n the relations closely, we find that we are never concerned here with\n a true legal sphere respecting a subject incapable of being held\n responsible, but rather with the legal spheres of other individuals,\n as, for example, that of a father who, in providing for his imbecile\n child, gives instructions in his will concerning his property, the\n dominion of whose will is safeguarded after his death by the law of\n the land; or (as, for example, the case where the imbecile\u2019s life is\n held to be sacred), quite apart from the injury done to the simple\n duty of affection which this would involve, there is also in question\n the State\u2019s legal sphere, which permits no one else to commit a fatal\n attack, and accordingly often imposes a punishment, even in the case\n of an attempt at suicide.\n\n A third objection of Ihering\u2019s, i.e. that by a limitation of rights\n as affecting spheres of will, even the most senseless dispositions of\n will must be allowed legal validity (p. 325), this offers, after what\n has been said, hardly any further difficulty. Certainly many a foolish\n disposition of will must be allowed. Were the State not to admit\n this, then it alone would possess a definitive right of disposal; all\n private right would be at an end. So long as not merely subjects, but\n also governments, are liable to commit acts of foolishness, such an\n extension of the power of the State cannot be recommended. For the\n rest, just as secondary ethical rules in general suffer exceptions,\n and in particular expropriations in the case of private owners are\n frequently necessary, so also it is clear and to be admitted without\n contradiction, that senseless dispositions or dispositions which have\n evidently lost all meaning and reference to the highest practical good\n can be annulled by the State. Regard for the highest practical good\n is here, as is the case of every other so-called collision of duties,\n decisive.\n\n [46] (_p. 29_). That a law, which in and for itself is bad and\n contrary to nature, however condemnable from an ethical point of view,\n and its modification urgently necessary, may yet in many cases receive\n a provisional sanction from the reason, this has long been recognized\n and made clear, as e.g. by Bentham in his _Trait\u00e9s de L\u00e9gislation\n civ. et p\u00e9n._ In antiquity Socrates, who deemed himself worthy to be\n feasted in the Prytaneum, died for the sake of this conviction. The\n positive legal code, despite all its defects, creates a condition\n of things which is better than anarchy, and since each act of\n insubordination to the law threatens to injure its force in general,\n so in those circumstances brought about by the law itself, it may be\n that provisionally and for the individual a mode of action even from\n the rational standpoint is right, which, apart from this, would be in\n no way justifiable. All this results without doubt from the relativity\n of the secondary ethical rules, which will be treated later.\n\n It may be added that errors respecting the laws of positive morality\n (a point shortly to be discussed in the lecture) in a similar way\n demand, under certain circumstances, to be taken into account.\n\n It dare not, on the other hand, be overlooked that there are here\n limits, and that the saying: \u201cWe ought to obey God rather than man,\u201d\n may not, in its free and sublime range, be allowed to suffer injury.\n\n [47] (_p. 29_). Heraclitus of Ephesus (B.C. 500), the\n oldest of the Greek philosophers, of whose philosophy we possess\n rather extensive fragments.\n\n [48] (_p. 31_). Ihering, _Der Zweck im Recht_, vol. ii. p. 119, and\n other passages.\n\n [49] (_p. 31_). _Politics_, vol. i. chap. 5.\n\n [50] (_p. 31_). _Nic. Ethics_, v. 14, p. 1137 b. 13. _Politics_, iii.\n and iv.\n\n [51] (_p. 31_). Cf. Discours pr\u00e9liminaire to the _Trait\u00e9s de\n L\u00e9gislation_, also the section \u201cDe l\u2019influence des temps et des lieux\n en mati\u00e8re de l\u00e9gislation\u201d of that work.\n\n [52] (_p. 31_). _Philos. Versuch \u00fcber die Wahrscheinlichkeiten von\n Laplace_, translated from the sixth edition of the original text by N.\n Schwaiger, Leipzig, 1886, p. 93 seq. (Application of the calculation\n of probabilities to moral science.)\n\n [53] (_p. 32_). Cf. _Allg. Juristenzeitung_, vii. p. 171; _Zweck im\n Recht_, vol. ii. p. 118; 122 seq.\n\n [54] (_p. 33_). _Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten._ Cf. above note\n 14, p. 49.\n\n [55] (_p. 34_). Cf. e.g. the Meno dialogue.\n\n [56] (_p. 34_). Friedr. Alb. Lange, _Logische Studien, ein Beitrag zur\n Neubegr\u00fcndung der formalen Logik und der Erkenntnislehre_. Iserlohn,\n 1877.\n\n [57] (_p. 34_). Alex. Bain, _Logic_, pt. 1. Deduction. London, 1870,\n p. 159 seq.\n\n [58] (_p. 35_). e.g. Bentham, also, in antiquity, Epicurus.\n\n [59] (_p. 35_). e.g. Plato and Aristotle, and following them Thomas\n Aquinas.\n\n [60] (_p. 35_). The Stoics, and in the Middle Ages, the followers of\n Scotus.\n\n [61] (_p. 36_). This even Epicurus did not deny (little in harmony as\n it is with his utterance quoted p. 54).\n\n [62] (_p. 36_). _Nic. Ethics_, I. i.\n\n [63] (_p. 36_). _Metaph._ \u0394 10.\n\n [64] (_p. 36_). _Metaph._ \u0394 10.\n\n [65] (_p. 36_). They made the relation to the greater whole serve as\n an argument in favour of the view that the practical life (of the\n politician) stands higher than that of the theorist.\n\n [66] (_p. 36_). This testimony to the principle of summation likewise\n reappears as often as in a theory based upon egoistic and utilitarian\n grounds, the notion of God is employed in the construction of ethics\n (e.g. Locke; Fechner in his work on the highest good; cf. also for\n Leibnitz, Trendelenburg, _Histor. Beitr\u00e4ge_, vol. ii. p. 245). God,\n so runs their argument, loves each of His creatures, and therefore\n their totality more than the single individual; He therefore approves\n and rewards the sacrifice of the individual to the whole, while\n disapproving and punishing self-seeking injury.\n\n In the desire after immortality also, the influence of the principle\n of summation is manifest. Thus Helmholtz, (_\u00fcber die Entstehung des\n Planetensystems_, lecture delivered at Heidelberg and Cologne, 1871),\n in seeking to offer a hopeful prospect to those who cherish this\n desire, says: \u201cThe individual (if that which we achieve can ennoble\n the lives of those who succeed us) may face fearlessly the thought\n that the thread of his own consciousness will one day be broken. But\n to the thought of a final annihilation of the race of living mortals,\n and with them, the fruits of the striving of all past generations,\n even men of minds so unfettered and great as Lessing and David Strauss\n could scarcely reconcile themselves.\u201d When it is scientifically shown\n that the earth will one day be incapable of supporting living beings,\n then, he thinks, the need of immortality will irresistibly return, and\n we shall feel bound to cast about for something which will afford us\n the possibility of assuming it.\n\n [67] (_p. 34_). _Metaph._ \u0394 10.\n\n [68] (_p. 37_). This is the standing doctrine of the great\n theologians, as e.g. Thomas Aquinas in his _Summa Theologica_.\n Only certain nominalists, like Robert Holcot, teach the complete\n arbitrariness of the divine commands. Cf. my essay on the _Geschichte\n der kirchlichen Wissenschaften im Mittelalter_, in M\u00f6hler\u2019s _Church\n History_ (published by Gams, 1867) vol. ii. 526 seq., respecting\n which, however, the reader is asked not to overlook the revision of\n the printer\u2019s errors in the \u201cerrata,\u201d p. 103 seq., at the end of that\n work.\n\n [69] (_p. 39_). At a time when psychology was far less advanced\n and inquiries into the province of the calculation of probability\n had not brought sufficient clearness into the process of rational\n induction, it was possible even for a Hume to fall a victim to this\n gross confusion. Cf. his _Enq. concern. Hum. Underst._, chaps. v.\n and vi. More striking is it that James Mill and Herbert Spencer have\n still not advanced in the slightest degree beyond Hume; (Cf. _Anal.\n of the Phen. of the Hum. Mind_, vol. ii. chap. ix. and note 108), and\n that even the acute thinker, J. S. Mill, although Laplace\u2019s _Essai\n Philosophique sur les Probabilit\u00e9s_ lay at his disposal, never arrived\n at a clear distinction of the essential difference between these two\n forms of procedure. This hangs together with his failure to appreciate\n the purely analytic character of mathematics and the import of the\n deductive procedure in general. Indeed he has absolutely denied that\n the syllogism leads to new knowledge. Whoever bases the whole of\n mathematics upon induction cannot possibly justify mathematically the\n inductive procedure. It would be for him a _circulus vitiosus_. It is\n here beyond question that Jevon\u2019s _Logic_ takes a truer view.\n\n Even in the case of Mill, it sometimes appears as if an inkling of\n the immense difference had begun to dawn upon him, as when, in a note\n to his _Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind_ (vol. i., chap.\n xi. p. 407), in criticizing his father\u2019s theory, he says: \u201cIf belief\n is only an inseparable association, belief is a matter of _habit_\n and accident and not of reason. Assuredly an association, however\n close, between two ideas is not a sufficient _ground_ (the italics\n are his own) of belief; it is not evidence that the corresponding\n facts are united in external nature. The theory seems to annihilate\n all distinction between the belief of the wise, _which is regulated\n by evidence_ and conforms to the real successions and co-existences\n of the facts of the universe, and the belief of fools _which is\n mechanically produced_ by any accidental association that suggests\n the idea of a succession or co-existence to the mind; a belief aptly\n characterized by the popular expression, believing a thing because\n they have taken it into their heads.\u201d This is all excellent. But it\n is robbed of its most essential worth, when, in a later note (vol.\n i. p. 438. note 110) we hear J. S. Mill say: \u201cIt must be conceded to\n him (the author of the _Analysis_) that an association sufficiently\n strong to exclude all ideas that would exclude itself, _produces\n a kind of mechanical belief_, and that the processes by which the\n belief is corrected, or reduced to rational bounds, _all consist in\n the growth of a counter-association_ tending to raise the idea of a\n disappointment of the first expectation, and as the one or the other\n prevails in the particular case, the belief or expectation exists or\n does not exist exactly as if the belief were the same thing with the\n association,\u201d and so on.\n\n There is much here that calls for criticism. When ideas are mentioned\n which mutually exclude one another it may well be asked what kind\n of ideas these are? According to another utterance of Mill\u2019s (vol.\n i. p. 98 seq. note 30 and elsewhere), he knows \u201cno case of absolute\n incompatibility of thought except between the thought of the\n presence of something and that of its absence.\u201d But are even these\n incompatible? Mill himself teaches elsewhere the very opposite when he\n thinks that along with the idea of existence there is always given at\n the same time the idea of non-existence (p. 126, note 39; \u201cwe are only\n conscious,\u201d he says, \u201cof the presence of an object by comparison with\n its absence\u201d). Apart, however, from all this, how strange is it that\n Mill here overlooks the fact that he abandons entirely the distinctive\n character of self-evidence, and retains only that blind and mechanical\n formation of judgment, which he rightly treats with contempt. The\n sceptic Hume stands in this respect far higher, since he at least sees\n that such an empirical (empiristisch) view of the process of induction\n does not satisfy the requirements of our reason. Sigwart\u2019s criticism\n of Mill\u2019s theory of Induction (_Logic_, vol. ii. p. 371) contains\n here much that is true, though in appealing to his postulates he has\n certainly not substituted anything truly satisfactory in the place of\n what is defective in Mill.\n\n [70] (_p. 40_). Cf. Hume, _Enquiry concerning Human Understanding_,\n vol. ii. towards the end.\n\n [71] (_p. 40_). _Nic. Ethics_, iii. 10. Cf. the subtle discussions in\n the subsequent chapter on the five kinds of false courage.\n\n [72] (_p. 41_). _Nic. Ethics_, i. 2.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX I\n\n\n\n\nI\n\n\u201cSubjectless propositions\u201d so the celebrated philologer has entitled a\nlittle work which, on its first appearance, bore the title, _The Verba\nImpersonalia in the Slav Languages_.\n\nThe change of name may well be connected with considerable additions in\nthe second edition. The new designation would, however, even in the\nearlier form, have been the more suitable title. For, far from treating\nthe special nature of merely _one_ family of languages, the author sets\nup a theory of wide-reaching significance, which, while contradicting\nthe prevailing view, only deserves all the more on this account general\nattention. Not only philology, but also psychology and metaphysics have\nan interest in the problem. Moreover, the new doctrine promised to bring\nprofit not only to the inquirer in these lofty spheres but also to the\nschoolboy at present tortured by the school-master with impossible and\nincomprehensible theories (cf. p. 23 seq.).\n\nSuch an influence, however, the treatise has not exercised. The earlier\nviews still hold unbroken sway even to-day, and although the appearance\nof the monograph in a new edition bears testimony to a certain interest\nin wider circles, this is manifestly not due to the circumstance that\nthe work was believed to have thrown light upon old doubts and errors.\nDarwin\u2019s epoch-making work, quite apart from the truth of its\nhypothesis, had, even for its opponents, an indisputable worth; the\nwealth of important observations and ingenious combinations every one\nhad to acknowledge with admiration. So also in the case of Miklosich,\nwho has compressed into a few pages a rich store of learning and\ninterspersed the most subtle observations. Many who have withheld their\nassent to his principal thesis may still feel indebted to him for many\npoints of detail.\n\nHere, however, we wish chiefly to consider the main problem and, very\nbriefly, to make ourselves clear respecting that with which it really\ndeals.\n\nIt is an old assertion of logic that the judgment consists essentially\nin a binding or separating, in a relation of ideas to one another. This\nview, almost unanimously maintained for two thousand years, has\nexercised an influence upon other disciplines. And so we find\ngrammarians from very early times teaching that no more simple form of\nexpression in the case of the judgment exists, or can exist, than the\ncategorical, which combines a subject with a predicate.\n\nThat the carrying out of this doctrine brings with it difficulties could\nnot, of course, be permanently concealed. Propositions like: it rains,\nit lightens, appear as though they had no wish to conform to this view.\nYet none the less the majority of inquirers were so firmly convinced,\nthat in such cases they felt compelled, not so much to doubt the\nuniversal validity of their theory as rather to search for the subjects,\nwhich in their view were only apparently missing. Many really believed\nthemselves to be in possession of the same. Now, however, in marked\ncontrast to the unity which had hitherto prevailed, they branched off in\nthe most varied directions. And if we examine somewhat closely and in\ndetail the various attempts at an explanation, we shall easily be able\nto understand, why none of these were able to give permanent\nsatisfaction, or even for a time to bring about unanimity.\n\nScience explains by reason of its comprehending a multiplicity as a\nunity. Here also, of course, every effort has been made to accomplish\nthis, but every attempt has proved futile. When we say: it rains, many\nhave supposed that the unnamed subject denoted by the indefinite \u201cit\u201d is\n\u201cZeus\u201d: Zeus rains. But when we say: \u201ces rauscht,\u201d it is obvious that\nZeus cannot be the subject. Others again have thought that the subject\nis here \u201cdas Rauschen\u201d; consequently the meaning of the proposition\nwould be: \u201cdas Rauschen rauscht.\u201d The previous example they also\ncompleted in the same manner: \u201cRaining, (or the rain) rains.\u201d\n\nWhen, however, we now say: \u201ces fehlt an Geld,\u201d the meaning must\ntherefore be: \u201cdas Fehlen an Geld fehlt an Geld.\u201d But this is absurd. It\nwas therefore explained that the subject here is \u201cGeld,\u201d and the meaning\nof the proposition is: \u201cGeld fehlt an Geld.\u201d Closely examined, this\nwould seem to strike a blow at the wished-for unity of explanation. If,\nhowever, by closing one eye, the failure here may be partially ignored,\neven this is useless when we stumble upon propositions like: \u201ces giebt\neinen Gott,\u201d respecting which we arrive at no satisfactory meaning\neither in the proposition: \u201cdas einen Gott geben giebt einen Gott; das\nGeben giebt einen Gott,\u201d or in the proposition, \u201cGott giebt einen Gott.\u201d\n\nIt was therefore necessary to look for an explanation of an entirely\ndifferent character. But where was such an explanation to be found? And\neven if ingenuity were here able to hit upon some expedient, what\navailed such leaping from case to case, which could only be called the\ncaricature of a truly scientific explanation? Not a single designation\nof the subject which has been so far suggested, can be termed suitable,\nunless indeed it be a saying of Schleiermacher\u2019s. For if this\nphilosopher (cf. p. 16) has really asserted that the subject in such\ncases is _chaos_, this utterance must be regarded, not so much as an\nattempt at explanation as rather a satire upon the hypotheses hitherto\nset up by philologists.\n\nMany inquirers are therefore of opinion that the real subjects of such\npropositions as: it rains, it lightens, have, up to the present time,\nnot been discovered, and that even at the present time it is the\nbusiness of science to find them. But, would it not be strange if the\ntracing of a subject, which is thought of by everyone, and which, though\nunexpressed, forms the basis of the judgment, should yet offer such\nextraordinary difficulties?\n\nSteinthal seeks to explain this by saying that by the grammatical\nsubject something is suggested, which is yet unthinkable. But many will\nreply with Miklosich (p. 23): \u201cWe would not, I think, be going too far\nin asserting that grammar is not concerned with the unthinkable.\u201d\n\nThe totality of the phenomena and the absolutely grotesque failure of\nevery attempt to determine the nature of the subject, however often and\nhowever ingeniously this has been attempted, are the chief grounds on\nwhich Miklosich bases his assertion that, generally speaking, the\nsupposed subject in the case of such propositions is a delusion, that\nthe proposition is no combination of subject and predicate, that, as\nMiklosich expresses it, the proposition is subjectless.\n\nFurther reflections go to confirm this view, and among these one\nconsideration as to the nature of the judgment requires to be emphasized\non account of its special importance. Miklosich combats those who, like\nSteinthal, deny that there is any reciprocal relation between grammar\nand logic, at the same time repelling the attacks which, on the ground\nof such a reciprocal relation, might be made against his doctrine by\npsychologists and logicians. Indeed he arrives at the result that, in\nconsequence of the special peculiarity of certain judgments, subjectless\npropositions must from the very first be expected in language. According\nto his view it is wrong to suppose that every judgment is a relation\nexisting between ideas. It often happens that in a proposition only one\nfact is affirmed or denied. In such cases a mode of expression is also\nnecessary, and it is obvious that this cannot well consist in a\ncombination of subject and predicate. Miklosich shows how philosophers\nhave been repeatedly led to this knowledge, though, as a rule, they have\nnot appreciated sufficiently the significance of their discovery. Not\nsufficiently clear themselves as to the new truth to which they gave\nexpression, and, at the same time, clinging with strange indecision to\ncertain residues of the older view, it came about that what at first\nthey affirmed they at last essentially deny. Thus Trendelenburg chose to\nfind expressed in the proposition, \u201cit lightens,\u201d in the last resort, no\nreal judgment, but only the rudiments of a judgment which precedes the\nnotion of lightning and settles down into it, thereby forming the basis\nfor the complete judgment, \u201clightning is conducted by iron.\u201d Herbart\nfinally declared such judgments as \u201ces rauscht,\u201d to be no judgments in\nthe ordinary sense, not, he thought, what in logic is, strictly\nspeaking, termed a judgment. The passage in which our author censures\nthe inconsistency of these philosophers, and shows that the source of\ntheir confusion lies in their misunderstanding of the nature of judgment\nand in their erroneous definition of it (p. 21 seq.), is excellent.\n\nFrom all this Miklosich draws the conclusion that his subjectless\npropositions are completely assured. And not only does he consider their\nexistence beyond doubt, he further shows that their appearance is by no\nmeans so rare as might be supposed from the controversy into which it\nhas been necessary to enter concerning them. Their great variety had led\nhim, in the second part of his treatise (pp. 33-72) to set forth their\nchief classes, and there we find subjectless propositions with the\nActive Verb, the Reflexive Verb, the Passive Verb and the verb \u201cto be,\u201d\neach of these four classes being illustrated by means of numerous\nexamples from the most various languages. This is especially the case\nwith the first class, where he makes an eightfold division with the\nobject of grouping the propositions according to the difference in their\ncontent. He mentions as universally true (p. 6) that the finite verb of\nthe subjectless propositions always stands in the third person singular,\nand, where the form admits a difference of gender, in the neuter.\n\nIn other directions also he traces the matter further. He shows how\nthese propositions did not arise later than those which predicate\nsomething of a subject, but appear from the very outset among the\nvarious forms of propositions (p. 13 seq., p. 19), and how, in the\ncourse of time, they have disappeared from several languages (p. 26). He\nproves that the languages in which they are preserved enjoy an\nadvantage, inasmuch as their application lends to the language a special\nliveliness (26), and he shows how in other respects also it is not\nalways possible to substitute for the subjectless proposition the\ncategorical form, with which it is supposed to be identical. \u201cIch\nfriere\u201d is, for instance, not fully identical with \u201cmich friert.\u201d\nInstead of, was frierst du draussen? Komme doch herein! we cannot say:\nwas friert dich\u2019s draussen? etc. \u201cMich friert\u201d cannot be applied if I\nexpose myself voluntarily to the cold (p. 37).\n\n\nII\n\nThis, shortly, is the substance of his book, regarding which I venture\nto make a few critical observations.\n\nI have sufficiently expressed in this summary, my approval of the\ntreatise in general, especially in respect of the main argument. The\nproofs appear to me to be of so cogent a nature, that even the unwilling\nwill scarcely be able to escape from the truth. Quite independent of\nthese arguments, however, I had myself, long ago, arrived at the same\nview, by way of a purely psychological analysis, and gave, in the most\ndecisive manner, public expression to it, when in 1874 I published my\n_Psychology_.\n\nGreat, however, as were the pains I then took to set the teaching in a\nclear light and to show every former view untenable, my success so far\nhas been slight. Apart from isolated individuals, I have been just as\nlittle able to convince the philosopher, as Miklosich, in his first\nedition, was able to convince philologists. Where a prejudice has,\nduring centuries, become ever more and more firmly rooted, where a\ndoctrine has penetrated even to the primary school, when a theory has\ncome to be regarded as fundamental upon which much else rests, and so,\nas it were, by its weight rendered the foundation immovable, in such a\ncase, it is not to be expected that the error will immediately disappear\nas soon as its refutation is established; on the contrary, it is to be\nfeared that distrust of the new view will be so great, as not even to\nadmit of a closer examination being made regarding the grounds on which\nit rests. And yet when two investigators completely independent of each\nother agree in their testimony, when by quite different paths they\narrive at the same goal, it may be hoped that this concurrence will not\nbe regarded as a mere coincidence, but that a more careful attention\nwill be bestowed upon the arguments on either side. I hope that this\nwill be so in the case of the new edition of Miklosich, in which I am\nglad to see regard paid to my own work.\n\nThe agreement with regard to the main points makes subordinate points,\nin respect of which we differ, of less moment. I shall, notwithstanding,\nbriefly touch on these.\n\nMiklosich has termed those simple propositions, in which there is\ncontained no combination of subject and predicate, and in the\nrecognition of which I am in agreement with him, \u201csubjectless\npropositions.\u201d I am not able entirely to approve his _use_ of the term\nand the _grounds_ which he has given for its use.\n\nSubject and predicate are correlative conceptions and stand or fall\ntogether. A proposition which is truly without a subject must with equal\nright be regarded as without a predicate. It does not therefore seem to\nme quite fitting that Miklosich should always term such propositions\nsubjectless, and it is quite incorrect when he calls them mere\npredicative propositions. (Cf. pp. 3, 25, 26, and elsewhere.) This might\nsuggest the view that he likewise believes a second conception (the\nsubject) is understood though not expressed, had he not in the most\ndecided manner denied this (p. 3 seq. and elsewhere); or that he\nregarded such propositions as stunted forms of categorical propositions,\nand the latter form as the original, had he not expressly refuted this\nalso (p. 13 seq.). His view rather seems to be, that the natural\ndevelopment from the simple to the categorical form in thinking and\nspeaking is generally accomplished in such a way that the notion which\nstands alone in the former proposition is combined with a second as\nsubject. \u201cThe subjectless propositions,\u201d he says, p. 25, \u201care\npropositions which consist only of a predicate, of what, in the natural\nprocess of thought-formation must, in a great number of propositions, be\nregarded as the prius, for which a subject may, but not necessarily\n_must_ be sought.\u201d\n\nBut this also can hardly be right, and the expression \u201csubject\u201d scarcely\nseems to favour this view. That which forms the basis is, of course,\ncertainly that which in the construction of the judgment stands first.\nThe temporal succession of the words also agrees ill with such a view,\nsince, in the categorical proposition, we usually begin with the\nsubject. In opposition to such a view it may also be contended that the\nemphasis usually falls upon the predicate (and Trendelenburg has made\nuse of this to indicate that the predicate is the main conception, and\neven with exaggeration goes on to say: \u201cWe think in predicates,\u201d cf. p.\n19). If the predicative conception is what is newly added, it will,\naccordingly, be the object of greater interest. On the other hand, we\nwould be compelled to expect exactly the opposite if the notion of the\nsubject contained the newly added moment.\n\nIt may just as truly be said, \u201ca bird is black,\u201d as, \u201csomething black is\na bird\u201d; \u201cSocrates is a man,\u201d as, \u201ca man is Socrates\u201d; but Aristotle has\nalready observed that only the former predication is natural, the latter\nform is opposed to the natural order. And this is really so far true,\nthat we naturally make _that_ term the subject to which we first pay\nregard in forming a judgment, or to which the hearer must first attend\nin order to understand the proposition, or to gain knowledge as to its\ntruth or falsity. We can be assured of the existence of a black bird by\nseeking it among birds or among black objects, more easily, however,\namong the former. In the same way we may be more easily assured that an\nindividual belongs to a particular species or genus by analysing its\nnature than by running over the entire range of the corresponding\ngeneral notion. The cases of exceptions clearly confirm the rule and the\ngrounds on which it rests, as, for instance, when I say: \u201cThere is\nsomething black; this something black is a bird,\u201d in which case it is\njust because I have first recognized the colour that I accordingly make\nit the subject in the categorical proposition so formed.\n\nOf the two categorical Sorites, the Aristotelian and the Goclenian, the\nformer in every succeeding link makes that term the subject which is\ncommon to it and to the one preceding, the latter form makes it the\npredicate. It is just on this account that the former appears the more\nnatural, and as such is generally regarded as the regular, the latter as\nthe reversed form. In like manner where, to a proposition not consisting\nof a combination of ideas, we add a categorical proposition having one\nterm in common with the former, we usually apply this not as a predicate\nbut as a subject, and we should therefore prefer to say that a predicate\nhas been sought for a subject rather than that a subject has been\nsought for a predicate. For example: es rauscht; das Rauschen kommt von\neinem Bache (there is a sound of running water; the sound comes from the\nbrook). Es donnert; der Donner verk\u00fcndet ein nahendes Gewitter (it\nthunders; the thunder heralds an approaching storm). Es riecht nach\nRosen; dieser Rosengeruch kommt aus dem Nachbargarten (there is a smell\nof roses; the rose-scent comes from a neighbour\u2019s garden). Es wird\ngelacht; das Gel\u00e4chter gilt dem Hanswurste (there is laughter; the\nlaughter is due to the clown). Es fehlt an Geld; dieser Geldmangel ist\ndie Ursache der Stockung der Gesch\u00e4fte (there is a lack of money; this\ndearth of money is the cause of the depression in trade). Es giebt einen\nGott; dieser Gott ist der Sch\u00f6pfer des Himmels und der Erde (there is a\nGod; this God is the maker of heaven and earth), etc., etc.\n\nOnly in _one_ sense, therefore, does the term \u201csubjectless proposition\u201d\nappear to me justifiable, and even perhaps deserving of recommendation,\nin so far as regard is paid to the fact, that the notion which is\ncontained thereby is the only, and therefore, of course, the main\nconception; a preference which in the categorical proposition belongs,\nas we have seen, to the predicate. Similarly also in respect of\ncategorical in relation to hypothetical propositions we would much\nrather say that they are propositions without an antecedent, than\npropositions without a consequent proposition; not as though we meant\nthat where there is no antecedent there may still be a consequent\nproposition, but that in the hypothetical construction the consequent is\nthe main proposition. In this way then I might perhaps agree with the\nauthor respecting the term \u201csubjectless proposition.\u201d\n\nAnother point, however, in which I am unable fully to agree with him is\nthe question as to what extent subjectless propositions are applicable.\nMiklosich rightly emphasizes the fact that the limits are on no account\nto be drawn too tightly. But he thinks such limits at any rate exist,\nand this is just what is shown most clearly in his attempt to classify\nand divide the varied nature of the matter capable of being expressed by\nsubjectless sentences. But this appears to me incorrect. The\napplicability of the subjectless form may, strictly speaking, be rather\nregarded as unlimited, since--as I believe I have already shown in my\n_Psychology_--every judgment, whether expressed in categorical,\nhypothetical or disjunctive form admits, without the slightest\nalteration in the sense, of being expressed in the form of a subjectless\nproposition or, as I expressed it, of an existential proposition. Thus\nthe proposition, \u201cA man is ill,\u201d is synonymous with \u201cThere is a sick\nman\u201d; and the proposition, \u201cAll men are mortal,\u201d with the proposition,\n\u201cThere is no immortal man,\u201d and the like.[A]\n\n [A] Supplementary note. What is here said of the general applicability\n of the existential form holds good only with the one manifest\n limitation, in respect of judgments which are really completely\n simple. In expressing such judgment logic has always made use of\n the categorical form; in common life they are often applied as the\n expression of a plurality of judgments based upon each other. This\n is clearly the case in the proposition, \u201cthis is a man.\u201d In the\n demonstrative \u201cthis\u201d the belief in existence is already included; a\n second judgment then ascribes to him the predicate \u201cman.\u201d Similar\n cases are frequent elsewhere. In my opinion it was the original\n purpose of the categorical form to serve as a means of expressing\n such double judgments (Doppelurteile), which recognize something\n while affirming or denying something else of it. I also believe that\n the existential and impersonal forms have, by a change in function,\n proceeded from this form. This does not alter its essential nature:\n a lung is not a swim-bladder (Fisch-blase) even though it has\n developed therefrom, and the word \u201ckraft\u201d is none the less a merely\n syncategorematic word (Cf. Mill, _Logic_, i. 2, \u00a7 2), even though its\n origin may be traced to a substantive.\n\nIn yet another direction Miklosich appears to me to have limited too\nnarrowly the applicability of his subjectless propositions. We have\nheard that such propositions constitute \u201can excellence in a language,\u201d\n\u201crespecting which all languages are very far from being able to boast\u201d\n(p. 26). This, however, appears scarcely credible if it be true, as in\nanother passage he has so convincingly shown, that there are and always\nhave been judgments which do not consist in any combination of two ideas\nwith each other, and which therefore it is impossible to express by\nmeans of a connexion of a subject with a predicate (p. 16). From this\nmust follow, not merely, as Miklosich _affirms_, the necessary existence\nof subjectless propositions generally, but further (which he _denies_)\nthe existence of such propositions in all languages.\n\nThat the author has here fallen into error seems to me partly explicable\nfrom the fact that in order to proceed with the utmost caution and lay\nclaim to no unwarrantable example, he has not ventured to regard certain\npropositions as subjectless, which, in truth, really are so. We saw that\nMiklosich expressed the view that the finite verb of subjectless\npropositions always stands in the third person of the singular, and,\nwhen the form admits a difference of gender, in the neuter. This was\ncertainly too narrow a limit, a limit which he himself transgresses,\nthough this appears in a much later passage. In the second part of his\ntreatise he says: \u201cIn \u2018es ist ein Gott,\u2019 the notion \u2018Gott\u2019 is affirmed\nabsolutely without a subject, and this is also the case in the\nproposition \u2018_es sind G\u00f6tter_\u2019\u201d; and he adds: The \u201cist\u201d of the\nexistential proposition _takes the place of the so-called copula \u201cist,\u201d_\nwhich in many, though by no means in all, languages, is indispensable to\nthe expression of the judgment, and has the same significance as the\ntermination of person in the finite verb as is clearly shown in the\nproposition \u201ces ist Sommer, es ist Nacht\u201d alongside the propositions,\n\u201ces sommert, es nachtet.\u201d \u201cIst\u201d is accordingly not a predicate (p. 34;\ncf. also p. 21 above). As a matter of fact, if the proposition, \u201ces\ngiebt einen Gott,\u201d is to be considered subjectless, so also must the\nproposition, \u201ces ist ein Gott,\u201d and therefore also, \u201ces sind G\u00f6tter\u201d;\nand thus the rule previously laid down has proved to be too narrow. That\nthe existential propositions and other analogous forms, which may be\nfound, are all to be reckoned as subjectless propositions may serve to\nconfirm what we have sought to show above, i.e. that no language exists,\nor can exist, which entirely dispenses with these simplest forms of\npropositions. Only certain special kinds of subjectless propositions\ntherefore, am I able, with Miklosich, to recognize as the peculiar\nadvantage of certain languages.\n\nThese are the criticisms which I have thought it necessary to make. It\nwill be seen that, if found to be justified, they do not in the\nslightest degree prejudice either the correctness or the value of the\nauthor\u2019s main argument, but rather lend to it a still wider\nsignificance. And so I conclude by expressing once again the wish that\nthis suggestive little work, which, on its first appearance did not\nmeet with sufficient general recognition, may in its second\nedition--where individual points have been corrected, much extended, and\nparticularly the critical objections of scholars like Benfey, Steinthal\nand others, refuted with a laconic brevity, yet rare dialectical\npower--find that interest which the importance of the inquiry and its\nexcellent treatment deserve.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX II\n\n\nFranz Brentano, son of Christian Brentano, and nephew of Clemens\nBrentano and Bettina von Arnim, was born on January 16, 1838, at\nMarienberg, near Boppard on the Rhine. He early embraced the study of\nphilosophy and theology, both at Berlin, under Trendelenburg, and also\nat Munich. In 1864 he was ordained priest, and two years later became\n_privat docent_ in the University of W\u00fcrzburg. In 1873 he was appointed\nprofessor there, but in the same year resigned his office in consequence\nof his changed attitude towards the Church, and as an opponent of the\nVatican Council. Somewhat later, in response to this change in his\nconvictions, he separated himself definitely from the Church.\n\nIn 1874 Brentano received a call to the University of Vienna, and\ncontinued there teaching Philosophy until 1895, first as ordinary\nprofessor, and afterwards, having meantime renounced his professorship,\nas _privat docent_. The reasons which led him to retire from this post\nalso, are set forth in his work, _My Last Wishes for Austria_\n(Stuttgart, 1895). After withdrawing from his post as teacher he took up\nhis residence at Florence.\n\nBrentano regards Aristotle as his real teacher in philosophy, and his\ntwo earliest publications, _Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden\nnach Aristoteles_ (Freiburg, i. Br. 1862), and _Die Psychologie des\nAristoteles insbesondere seine Lehre vom_ \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2 (Mainz, 1867),\nare a testimony to his comprehensive study and thorough knowledge of\nAristotelian philosophy. Especially is he in agreement with the\nStagirite regarding the high position he would assign to the application\nof the empirical method as the only one which, in regard alike to\nscientific and philosophical problems, is able by cautious and gradual\nadvance, to attain to knowledge. These first principles of method,\nespecially in their relation to psychological research, he has set forth\nand practised in his first systematic work, _Psychologie vom Empirischen\nStandpunkte_ (vol. i., Leipzig, 1874). It was also his regard for this\nmethod of inquiry which early imbued him with a special interest for the\nworks of the most eminent English philosophers of modern times, not only\nJohn Locke and David Hume, but also Bentham, the two Mills, Jevons and\nothers. A study of these writers led Brentano to enter at length in his\nW\u00fcrzburg lectures into a critical and explanatory treatment of English\npsychology and logic, characterizing it as a source of instruction and\ninspiration at a time when other distinguished advocates of German\nphilosophy looked askance at this attitude towards English thought,\nbelieving that by its contact with English writers the peculiar\ncharacter of German thought might suffer. It will be observed that only\nthe first volume of the _Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint_ has\nhitherto appeared, and it seems hardly likely that the work in its\npresent form will be continued, for further reflection convinced\nBrentano that _descriptive_[A] psychology, or Psychognosy, as of most\nimportance in the examination and presentation of psychological\nproblems, must be separated from _genetic psychology_,[B] a study\nnecessarily half physiological in character; and that the former problem\nas the naturally earlier and least difficult study should first be as\nfar as possible completed.\n\n [A] i.e. the closest possible description and analysis of psychical\n _events_ and their contents, on the basis of inner observation.\n\n [B] i.e. the more difficult inquiry into the laws underlying the\n origin of phenomena.\n\nSuch _psychognostical inquiries_, although not yet in principle\nseparated from genetic inquiry, occupy by far the greater part of the\nfirst volume of the _Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint_. Among\nthe subjects there treated are: 1, the fundamental revision of the\nclassification of psychical phenomena, and their division into the three\nmain classes: ideas, judgments, and phenomena of love and hate; 2, and\nin particular, a new and more appropriate characterization of the\njudgment.\n\nThe insufficiency of the old doctrine according to which judgment\nconsists essentially in a connexion of ideas, had already been shown by\nHume, and more recently was strongly emphasized by Mill, though neither\nwas able to arrive at perfect clearness respecting its real nature.\nNotwithstanding this, the affinity of Brentano\u2019s doctrine of the\njudgment with that of Mill, led to a scientific correspondence, and\nlater to arrangements for a personal interview, when, at the last\nmoment, the plan was frustrated by the death of the great English\ninvestigator.\n\nThe new description of the judgment and its essential qualities form the\nbasis for a reform of logic even in its most elementary stages, a reform\nwhich, in its essential features, is suggested in the above-mentioned\nwork, and also touched upon in the Essay here translated; but this truer\ndescription of the phenomenon of judgment also throws light upon the\ndescription and classification of the _modes of speech from the point of\nview of their function or meaning_,--a classification based upon true\nand most essential distinctions. In comparison with phonetics this\nbranch is still little developed. What is here said, was seen by eminent\nphilologists like Fr. von Miklosich, the pioneer in the sphere of Slav\ncomparative philology. In the appendix will be found an article bearing\nupon this view.\n\nWhile engaged in a profound study of the descriptive peculiarities\nconnected with the third fundamental class of psychical states above\nreferred to--a study analogous to that previously undertaken by him with\nregard to the judgment--Brentano was led to the discovery of the\n_principles of ethical knowledge_ which form the subject of this\nlecture. The author, in his lectures delivered before students of all\nfaculties, but especially to students in the faculty of law, during each\nwinter session throughout many years, presented a complete and fully\ndeveloped system of ethical teaching based upon these principles.[A]\nUnfortunately, this lecture still remains unpublished. The same holds\ngood of many of his inquiries into \u201cdescriptive psychology,\u201d or\npsychognosie, e.g. inquiries into the nature of sense perceptions\naccording to their qualitative and spatial nature, the nature of the\ncontinuum, the time phenomenon, etc., the results of which are hitherto\nfamiliar only to those who have either attended his lectures, or have\nbeen present during private conversations.\n\n [A] Since this essay was written the statements as to the principles\n here developed have been modified only in respect of two points which,\n if not practically important, are still theoretically so, and these,\n with the author\u2019s permission, may be here shortly referred to:--\n\n 1. In the lecture (p. 15) it is said that anything may be either\n affirmed or denied, and that if the affirmation is right its denial\n must be considered wrong, and vice vers\u00e2. It is also stated that this\n is true analogously in respect of love and hate.\n\n This Brentano no longer asserts, but rather observes that whereas the\n whole must be denied, if but a part is untrue, a sum of good and bad,\n on the other hand, may be of such a nature as nevertheless as a whole\n to be worthy of love. It may be also so constituted that good and bad\n remain in equilibrium.\n\n 2. In the lecture (p. 24), and in the corresponding note 37 (p. 87),\n it is said that our preference qualified as right in the case where,\n for instance, to one good another is added, is drawn, not from our\n knowledge of the preferability of the sum as opposed to the parts,\n but that analytic judgments here yield the means of our advance in\n knowledge, and that the corresponding preferences are therefore\n qualified as right, since the knowledge (given analytically) is here\n the criterion. Here it is overlooked that without the experience of\n acts of preferring we neither have nor could have the conception,\n and therefore also our notion of preferability. And so it is also\n true that it is by no means evident from analysis that one good plus\n another is preferable to each of these goods taken singly. Here also a\n complete analogy to the sphere of the true is wanting.\n\n One truth added to another does not yield something more true. On\n the other hand, one good plus another good yields a better. But that\n this is so can only be understood by means of a special experience\n belonging peculiarly to this sphere, i.e. by means of the experience\n of acts of preferring which are qualified as right.\n\nAs to the other branches of philosophy, the work of Brentano already\npublished forms but a portion--often but the smaller portion--of\ninvestigations, which, in the manner above described, have become known\nto a larger or smaller circle of disciples. This explains the striking\nfact that, in proportion to the extent of what has been published, an\nunusually large number of investigators and scholars appear in a greater\nor lesser degree to have been influenced by Brentano. (\u00dcberweg-Heinze,\nin the eighth edition of the _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_,\nreckons, as belonging to his school, six names of men at present\noccupying important positions as teachers of philosophy.)\n\nOne section of Brentano\u2019s doctrine of sense-perception forms the\nsubstance of a lecture, _Zur Lehre von der Empfindung_, delivered at the\nThird International Psychological Congress held in Munich (1896), and\npublished in the report of its proceedings (1897). A fragment of the\nabove system of ethical inquiry, _\u00dcber das Schlechte als Gegenstand\ndichterischer Darstellung_ (Leipzig, 1892), treats of the worth and\npreferability of the ideas employed by the artist.\n\nWith regard to psycho-genetic problems, apart from the question as to\nthe meaning and validity of Fechner\u2019s psycho-physical law, a question\ndiscussed in the first volume of his _Psychology_ and elsewhere, and\nthat of the spirituality and immortality of the soul, which formed\nrepeatedly the substance of lectures at Vienna University, Brentano has\nespecially occupied himself with the laws of the association of ideas.\nOne result of this study is his lecture, _Das Genie_, published in 1892,\nwhich seeks to explain the artistic productions of men of genius--often\nregarded as something quite unique and inexplicable--as a development of\npsychical events which universally control our imaginative life.\n\nOf Brentano\u2019s researches in _metaphysics_ and in the _theory of\nknowledge_ it must also be said that hitherto they remain still\nunpublished, though they are familiar to a greater or smaller circle of\ndisciples. In this latter sphere are to be mentioned particularly his\ninquiries respecting the nature of our insight into the law of\ncausality, the logical justification of induction, the _a priori_ nature\nof mathematics, and the nature of analytic judgments. In ontological\nquestions also psychognosie has proved fruitful to the investigator in\nleading him to an understanding and to an analysis based upon\nexperience, of the most important metaphysical notions, as, for\ninstance, causality, substance, necessity, impossibility, etc., notions\nwhich some, despairing of the task rightly insisted upon by Hume, of\nshowing their origin to be based upon perception and experience, have\nsought to explain straight away as _a priori_ categories.\n\nFor the rest, Brentano, in regard to metaphysics, is a decided theist.\nHe is an adherent of the theory of evolution, while denying that\naccidental variations and natural selection in the struggle for\nexistence render explicable the phenomena of evolution and the\nteleological character of the organism, basing his objections, among\nother things, upon the fact that this attempt at a solution not only\nleaves unexplained the first beginnings of an organism, but also takes\ntoo little account of the fact that with the increasing perfection and\ncomplication of the organism it becomes more and more improbable that an\naccidental variation will lead to an improvement upon that which already\nexists. And yet if there is to be progress, the organisms which, in the\nstruggle for existence, survive must not only be more perfect than those\nwhich perish, but also more perfect than the organisms through which\nthey themselves are descended.\n\nBrentano\u2019s views on the historical development of philosophical inquiry\nand the causes determining that development, the present state of\nphilosophy and its views regarding the future, he has set forth in\nvarious publications: _Die Geschichte der Philosophie im Mittelalter_\n(M\u00f6hler\u2019s _Kirchengeschichte_, vol. ii. 1868); _\u00dcber die Gr\u00fcnde der\nEntmutigung auf philosophischem Gebiete_ (Vienna, 1874), delivered as an\ninaugural address on entering upon his work at Vienna University; _Was\nf\u00fcr ein Philosoph manchmal Epoche macht_ (Vienna, 1876); _\u00dcber die\nZukunft der Philosophie_ (Vienna, 1893); and _Die vier Phasen der\nPhilosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand_ (Stuttgart, 1895).\n\nIn the last work a concise survey is made of the entire course of the\nHistory of Philosophy, and it is there shown how in the three periods,\nrightly regarded as distinct (Greek Philosophy, the Philosophy of the\nMiddle Ages, and Modern Philosophy), there is each time an analogous\nchange, a rising or blossoming period, and three periods of decadence,\nof which those which succeed are always the psychologically necessary\nresult of the preceding. That in so doing Brentano has characterized the\nlatest phase of German philosophy, the so-called idealistic direction\nfrom Kant to Hegel as the third or mystic period of decadence (howbeit\nwith all due recognition of the talents of these writers) has naturally\naroused violent opposition, though it has not found any real refutation.\n\nIt has been already said that Brentano\u2019s earliest efforts were directed\nto historical inquiries and especially to a presentation of the\nAristotelian psychology and to important sections of his Metaphysics.\nThe results of these researches, diverging as they did in many respects\nfrom the traditional view, did not fail to awaken the attention of other\ninvestigators. Their attitude, however (with a few exceptions like\nTrendelenburg, and in part also Grote), was, on the whole, hostile and\npolemic. This was especially so in the case of E. Zeller, in the later\nedition of his _Greek Philosophy_, and in view of the reputation which\nthis work enjoys, Brentano thought it necessary to offer, as against\nZeller\u2019s attacks, at least with regard to one point, an apology for his\nown view, a point where the threads of metaphysics and psychology become\nmost intimately related, and where at the same time, the contrast\nbetween the opposing views of these two writers in the psychological and\nmetaphysical spheres alike culminate. And so there appeared in the\n_Report of the Proceedings of the Imperial Academy of Sciences in\nVienna_ (1882) Brentano\u2019s article: \u201c\u00dcber den Creatianismus des\nAristoteles, in regard to which E. Zeller in the same year, in the\n_Report of the Proceedings of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences in\nBerlin_, (vol. 49), published a detailed reply under the title: \u201c\u00dcber\ndie Lehre des Aristoteles von der Ewigkeit des Geistes.\u201d The charge\nwhich is there made by Zeller against Brentano of interpreting Aristotle\nwithout sufficient confirmation and with over-confidence, Brentano has\nsufficiently repelled in his _Offener Brief an Herrn Prof. Dr. E.\nZeller_ (Leipzig, 1883), and the proofs which are here offered of the\nway in which Zeller, on his part, bases his own attempts at explanation\nand his charges against Brentano show distinctly that, if here one of\nthe two opponents is really open to the charge of over-confidence, it is\nat any rate not Brentano.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nDante and Giovanni del Vergilio\n\nBy PHILIP H. WICKSTEED, M.A., and\nEDMUND G. GARDNER, M.A.\n\nDemy 8vo.      12_s._\n\n\n\n                         The Mind of Tennyson\n\n             HIS THOUGHTS ON GOD, FREEDOM, AND IMMORTALITY\n\n                      By E. HERSHEY SNEATH, PH.D.\n\n              Professor of Philosophy in Yale University.\n\n            Crown 8vo.      5_s._ net.      Third Edition.\n\n\u201cAdmirably sums up for us Tennyson\u2019s philosophic ideas and the creed he\nhad ultimately arrived at. Since Mr. Stopford Brooke\u2019s comprehensive\nsurvey of Tennyson, nothing so excellent has been written on the poet\u2019s\nideas.\u201d--_Spectator._\n\n\n                        The Teachings of Dante\n\n                       By CHARLES ALLEN DINSMORE\n\n          With Frontispiece.      Crown 8vo.      5_s._ net.\n\n\u201cThe author of this delightful volume takes his reader, as it were,\nbehind the scenes and shows him of the inner life and thought of the\nmaster.... Mr. Dinsmore has a grip of the religious teaching of Dante\nwhich few men have attained, and the whole volume is wondrously\nsuggestive of the deep truths that underlie the marvellous imagery of\nthe poet.\u201d--_The Rock._\n\n\n                       The Chronicle of Villani\n\n      Translated by ROSE E. SELFE. Edited by Rev. P. H. WICKSTEED\n\n                         Crown 8vo.      6_s._\n\n\u201cPerhaps no one book is so important to the student of Dante as the\nchronicle of his contemporary Villani.\u201d--_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n\n                          Tiberius the Tyrant\n\n          By J. C. TARVER, Author of \u201cGustave Flaubert,\u201d etc.\n\n           With a Portrait.      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The\nauthor is to be congratulated on a volume which will attract many\nreaders to a subject that is just now exceptionally worthy of\nattention.\u201d--Mr. SPENSER WILKINSON in the _Morning Post_.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n                   Maximilian I., Holy Roman Emperor\n\n             (Stanhope Prize Essay.) By R. W. SETON WATSON\n\n                     Illustrated.      5_s._ net.\n\n\u201cA sound and well-considered piece of historical criticism.\u201d--_Daily\nNews._\n\n\u201cA notable essay.\u201d--_Morning Post._\n\n\n\n       By G. S. STREET, Author of \u201cThe Trials of the Bantocks,\u201d\n        \u201cThe Autobiography of a Boy,\u201d \u201cA Book of Stories,\u201d etc.\n\n                Crown 8vo.      Cloth Gilt.      6_s._\n\nA volume of essays divided under three headings: (1) London; (2) Books\nand Men; (3) Various.\n\n\n                  Studies in the Lives of the Saints\n\n            By EDWARD HUTTON, Author of \u201cFrederic Uvedale.\u201d\n\n                   Fcap. 8vo.      3_s._ 6_d._ net.\n\n\n                           Ephemera Critica\n\n                 PLAIN TRUTHS ABOUT CURRENT LITERATURE\n\n                        By JOHN CHURTON COLLINS\n\n           Second Edition.      Crown 8vo.      7_s._ 6_d._\n\n\u201cA book of uncommon interest and importance. A collection of essays\nunited in a common aim, and inspired by a genuine enthusiasm for\nliterature; it has something to say and says it without fear or\nfavour.\u201d--_Literature._\n\n\n                          Chalmers on Charity\n\nA Selection of Passages and Scenes to illustrate the Social Teaching and\n                Practical Work of THOMAS CHALMERS, D.D.\n\n               Arranged and Edited by N. MASTERMAN, M.A.\n\n   Eighteen years Member of the London Charity Organization Society,\n          and some time Guardian in the Parish of Kensington.\n\n     414 pp.      Price 7_s._ 6_d._ net.      With a Frontispiece.\n\n\u201cWe should advise such of our readers as care to know the arguments\nagainst public poor relief to look at a book which has just been\npublished by Mr. N. Masterman.... He has succeeded in making the\nunpopular side of a dry subject keenly interesting.\u201d--_Spectator._\n\n\n                           Human Immortality\n\n   By WILLIAM JAMES, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University.\n\n              Fourth Edition.      16mo.      2_s._ 6_d._\n\n\u201cProfessor James is well known as one of the most suggestive and\noriginal writers, and as certainly the most brilliant psychologist\nliving. Whatever, therefore, he has to say on this subject is worth\nlistening to; for he thinks freely, and he knows all that the scientist\nknows, and more too.\u201d--_Spectator._\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n                         A CATALOGUE OF BOOKS\n\n                             PUBLISHED BY\n\n                     Archibald Constable & Co Ltd\n\n                          2 WHITEHALL GARDENS\n\n                              WESTMINSTER\n\n\n                                     PAGE\n  HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, AND CRITICISM     3\n  TRAVEL                               14\n  SPORT                                17\n  NAVAL AND MILITARY                   18\n  FINE ART                             20\n  EDUCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL            22\n  RELIGIOUS                            31\n  FICTION                              33\n  POETRY                               42\n  BOOKS FOR THE YOUNG                  47\n  INDEX                                49\n  BOOKS ARRANGED IN ORDER OF PRICES    53\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n                             THE ANCESTOR\n\n                   A Quarterly Review of County and\n                       Family History, Heraldry\n                            and Antiquities\n\n                    EDITED BY OSWALD BARRON, F.S.A.\n\n                  _Large Super Royal, in paper boards\n                     with numerous Illustrations_\n\n                          _5s. net Quarterly_\n\n\u201cThoroughly original in scope and style, the publishers are to be\ncongratulated on its effective appearance. _The Ancestor_ intends to\napply the spirit of a new and conscientious criticism to the revived\ninterest in genealogy and family history.\u201d--THE ATHEN\u00c6UM.\n\n\u201cSuch a new departure is certainly designed to fill a want which has\nlong been felt, and the names of its contributors guarantee the accuracy\nand importance of its contents.\u201d--THE TIMES.\n\n\u201cPrinted in old-faced type, and neatly bound in studious-looking boards,\nthe new periodical makes a very handsome appearance. The pages of _The\nAncestor_ are brightened by portraits, illustrations of old armorial\nglass, and so on. It is edited carefully and with knowledge, and should\ncommand popularity among the large number of readers to whom it\nappeals.\u201d--THE STANDARD.\n\n\u201cClearly printed on good paper, and freely and excellently illustrated.\nThe literary contents of the number are of solid and varied interest.\nAltogether _The Ancestor_ is quite admirable in its aims, which it seems\ndetermined to achieve in scholarly and attractive fashion.\u201d--THE GLOBE.\n\n\u201cThe promise of a really authoritative periodical of English genealogy\nand family history will be received with general satisfaction. This is\ngiven us in the announcement of _The Ancestor_, a quarterly to be edited\nby Mr. Oswald Barron and published by Archibald Constable & Co., London.\nMr. Barron\u2019s unusual knowledge in the field to be covered is well known\nto many who are interested in it. 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Cloth,\n     gilt.\n\n   1. =MILTON--Areopagitica.= 1644. 1s. net.\n   2. =LATIMER--The Ploughers.= 1549. 1s. net.\n   3. =GOSSON--The School of Abuse.= 1579. 1s. net.\n   4. =SIDNEY--An Apology for Poetry.= ?1580. 1s. net.\n   5. =WEBBE, E.--Travels.= 1590. 1s. net.\n   6. =SELDEN--Table Talk.= 1634-54. 1s. net.\n   7. =ASCHAM--Toxophilus.= 1544. 1s. net.\n   8. =ADDISON--Criticism on \u2018Paradise Lost.\u2019= 1711-12. 1s. net.\n   9. =LYLY--Euphues.= 1579-80. 4s. net.\n  10. =VILLIERS--The Rehearsal.= 1671. 1s. net.\n  11. =GASCOIGNE--The Steel Glass, etc.= 1576. 1s. net.\n  12. =EARLE--Micro-cosmographie.= 1628. 1s. net.\n  13. =LATIMER--7 Sermons before Edward VI.= 1549. 1s. 6d. net.\n  14. =MORE--Utopia.= 1516-57. 1s. net.\n  15. =PUTTENHAM--The Art of English Poesy.= 1589. 2s. 6d. net.\n  16. =HOWELL--Instructions for Foreign Travel.= 1642. 1s. net.\n  17. =UDALL--Roister Doister.= 1553-66. 1s. net.\n  18. =MONK OF EVESHAM--The Revelation, etc.= 1186-1410. 1s. net.\n  19. =JAMES I.--A Counterblast to Tobacco, etc.= 1604. 1s. net.\n  20. =NAUNTON--Fragmenta Regalia.= 1653. 1s. net.\n  21. =WATSON--Poems.= 1582-93. 1s. 6d. net.\n  22. =HABINGTON--Castara.= 1640. 1s. net.\n  23. =ASCHAM--The Schoolmaster.= 1570. 1s. net.\n  24. =TOTTEL\u2019S MISCELLANY--Songs and Sonnets.= 1557. 2s. 6d. net.\n  25. =LEVER--Sermons.= 1550. 1s. net.\n  26. =WEBBE, W.--A Discourse of English Poetry.= 1586. 1s. net.\n  27. =LORD BACON--A Harmony of the \u2018Essays.\u2019= 1597-1626. 5s. net.\n  28. =ROY, Etc.--Read me, and be not Wroth!= 1528. 1s. 6d. net.\n  29. =RALEIGH, Etc.--Last Fight of the \u2018Revenge.\u2019= 1591. 1s. net.\n  30. =GOOGE--Eclogues, Epitaphs, and Sonnets.= 1563. 1s. net.\n\n     English Scholar\u2019s Library, The.  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JOHN UDALL]--A Demonstration of Discipline.= 1s. 6d. net.\n  10. =RICHARD STANIHURST--\u00c6neid I.-IV., in English Hexameters.= 3s. net.\n  11. =MARTIN MARPRELATE--The Epistle.= 1s. 6d. net.\n  12. =ROBERT GREENE--Menaphon.= 1s. 6d. net.\n  13. =GEORGE JOY--An Apology to William Tyndale.= 1s. 6d. net.\n  14. =RICHARD BARNFIELD---Poems.= 3s. net.\n  15. =BISHOP THOMAS COOPER--An Admonition to the People of England.= 3s. net.\n  16. =CAPTAIN JOHN SMITH--Works.= 1120 pp. Six Facsimile Maps. 2 vols. 12s. 6d. net.      [_Out of print._\n\n     Garner, An English. New Edition in preparation.\n\n     This Miscellany embodies the results of more than fifteen years\u2019\n     persistent search after the rarest and most valuable Tracts and\n     Poems in our Literature that are not generally known. Only one copy\n     now survives of the original edition of many of these Texts; and\n     that copy is often not to be found in any Public Library.\n\n     These volumes constitute a charming Pleasure Series of English\n     Literature; full of most varied and graphic Narratives, and of most\n     delightful and diversified Poetry.\n\n     But a much higher use than that can be made of this _English\n     Garner_. All History is ultimately based upon eye-witness\n     testimony, or upon written documents. This Series will throw floods\n     of light upon many little-known facts, or periods, of England\u2019s\n     past story.\n\n     _An English Garner_ also contains many hundreds of Poems, many of\n     them written in the Golden Age of English Song. This Poetry\n     represents almost every conceivable form of English versification;\n     and its topics range\n\n    \u2018From grave to gay, from lively to severe;\u2019\n\n\n     or, to put it in another way, from Sir J. 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W.=, Author of \u2018Miranda of the Balcony,\u2019 etc. =Ensign\n     Knightley, and other Stories.= Crown 8vo. 6s.\n\n     =MEREDITH, GEORGE.= =The Novels of. Library Edition.= Complete in 15\n     vols., with Photogravure Frontispiece to each. Cr. 8vo. 6s. each.\n\n     =MEREDITH, GEORGE.= =The Novels of.= In 15 Volumes. Pocket Edition.\n     Printed on thin opaque paper, specially manufactured for this\n     edition, bound in red cloth, gilt lettered on back and side, gilt\n     top. 2s. 6d. net per volume, or 3s. 6d. net in full leather per\n     volume.\n\n      =THE ORDEAL OF RICHARD FEVEREL.=\n      =RHODA FLEMING.=\n      =SANDRA BELLONI.=\n      =VITTORIA.=\n      =DIANA OF THE CROSSWAYS.=\n      =THE ADVENTURES OF HARRY RICHMOND.=\n      =BEAUCHAMP\u2019S CAREER.=\n      =THE EGOIST.=\n      =THE TRAGIC COMEDIANS.=\n      =EVAN HARRINGTON.=\n      =SHORT STORIES=:--=The Tale of Chloe.= =The House on the Beach.= =Farina.= =The Case of General Ople and Lady Camper.=\n      =THE SHAVING OF SHAGPAT.=\n      =THE AMAZING MARRIAGE.=\n      =ONE OF OUR CONQUERORS.=\n      =LORD ORMONT AND HIS AMINTA.=\n\n\n     =AN ESSAY ON COMEDY.= Uniform with the Library Edition of the Novels\n     of GEORGE MEREDITH. 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Large Crown 8vo. 6s.\n\n     =PAINE, ALBERT BIGELOW.= =The Hollow Tree.= Illustrated by J. M. COND\u00c9.\n     Bound in coloured boards. 4to. 3s. 6d.\n\n     =SINGING TIME.= =A Child\u2019s Song Book.= Music by ARTHUR SOMERVELL.\n     Drawings by L. LESLIE BROOKE. Square 4to. 5s.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nINDEX TO AUTHORS\n\nAddison, Joseph, 22.\n\n\u2018Alien,\u2019 33.\n\nAllen, Rev. G. C., 42.\n\nAndom, R., 33.\n\nAnitchkow, Michael, 3.\n\nAnon., 3, 33.\n\nArber, Professor Edward, 22-25.\n\nArgyll, Duke of, 33.\n\nArmstrong, Arthur Coles, 42.\n\nArnold, T. W., 3.\n\nArnold, Sir Edwin, 45.\n\nAscham, Roger, 22, 23.\n\n\nBacon, Lord, 23.\n\nBain, R. Nisbet, 3.\n\nBallin, Mrs. A., 26.\n\nBankes, Roden, 26.\n\nBarmby, Beatrice Helen, 42.\n\nBarnfield, Richard, 25.\n\nBartholomew, J. G., F.R.G.S., 14.\n\nBates, Arlo, 33.\n\nBattersby, Caryl, 42.\n\nBattye, A. Trevor-, F.L.S., 14.\n\nBaughan, B. E., 42.\n\nBayley, Sir Steuart Colvin, 7.\n\nBeatty, William, M.D., 3.\n\nBeaumont, Worby, 26.\n\nBerthet, E., 33.\n\nBertram, James, 4.\n\nBidder, George, 42.\n\nBidder, M., 33.\n\nBirdwood, Sir George, M.D., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., LL.D., 15.\n\nBirrell, Augustine, Q.C., M.P., 4.\n\nBlack, C. E. D., 10.\n\nBlount, Bertram, 26.\n\nBonavia, Emmanuel, M.D., 26.\n\nBoswell, James, 4.\n\nBower, Marian, 33.\n\nBrabant, Arthur Baring, 10.\n\nBradley, A. G., 4.\n\nBrame, J. S. S., 28.\n\nBright, Charles, F.R.S.E., 4.\n\nBright, Edward Brailston, C.E., 4.\n\nBrownell, W. C., 20.\n\nBrowning, Robert, 42.\n\nBryden, H. A., 33.\n\nBurroughs, John, 5.\n\n\nCairnes, Capt. W. E., 33.\n\nCampbell, James Dykes, 42.\n\nCampbell, Lord Archibald, 5.\n\nCapes, Bernard, 33.\n\nCarmichael, M., 34.\n\nCaxton, William, 24.\n\n\u2018Centurion,\u2019 5.\n\nChailley-Bert, J., 5.\n\nChamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph, M.P., D.C.L., LL.D., 5.\n\nChambers, R. W., 34.\n\nCharles, Joseph F., 34.\n\nCharrington, Charles, 34.\n\nColdstream, J. P., 26.\n\nCole, Alan S., 20.\n\nCollins, J. Churton, 5.\n\nConway, Sir William Martin, 14.\n\nCooper, Bishop Thomas, 25.\n\nCooper, E. H., 34.\n\nCornish, F. Warre, 34.\n\nCourtney, W. L., 5.\n\nCoxon, Ethel, 34.\n\nCunynghame, Henry, 20.\n\nCurrie, Maj.-Gen. Fendall, 5.\n\nCurzon, The Right Hon. George N. (Lord Curzon of Kedleston), 5.\n\n\nDale, T. F. (Stoneclink), 17, 34.\n\nDaniell, A. E., 20, 31.\n\nDanvers, Fred. Charles, 7.\n\nDarnley, Countess of, 34.\n\nDavidson, Thomas, 6.\n\nDecker, Thomas, 24.\n\nDeighton, Kenneth, 6.\n\nDe Bury, Mlle. Blaze, 6.\n\nDenny, Charles E., 34.\n\nDinsmore, Charles A., 6.\n\nDoughty, Charles, 43.\n\nDoyle, C. W., 34.\n\nDryden, John, 43.\n\nDuff, C. M., 6.\n\nDurand, Lady, 15.\n\nDutt, R. C., C.I.E., 6.\n\n\nEarle, Alice Morse, 12.\n\nEarle, John, 22.\n\nElliott, Robert H., 15.\n\nEnglehardt, A. P., 15.\n\n\nFilippi, Filippo de, 15.\n\nFish, Simon, 24.\n\nFlowerdew, Herbert, 35.\n\nForbes-Robertson, Frances, 35.\n\nFord, Paul Leicester, 35.\n\nFox, Arthur W., 6.\n\n\nGairdner, James, 6.\n\nGale, Norman, 43.\n\nGall, John, M.A., LL.B., 27.\n\nGardner, Edmund, 43.\n\nGascoigne, George, 22.\n\nGemmer, C. M., 43.\n\nGlasgow, Ellen, 35.\n\nGodkin, E. L., 6, 7.\n\nGoffic, Charles le, 36.\n\nGomme, G. Laurence, 7, 36, 37, 47.\n\nGooge, Barnabe, 23.\n\nGosson, Stephen, 22.\n\nGraham, David, 43.\n\nGranby, Marchioness of, 20.\n\nGreene, Robert, M.A., 24.\n\nGribble, Francis, 7.\n\nGuillemard, Dr. F. H. H., 16.\n\nGwynn, Paul, 35.\n\n\nHabington, William, 23.\n\nHackel, Eduard, 27.\n\nHake, A. Egmont, 7.\n\nHanna, Col. H. B., 7, 18.\n\nHannan, Charles, F.R.G.S., 35.\n\nHarald, J. H., 31.\n\nHarewood, Fred., 33.\n\nHarris, Joel Chandler (Uncle Remus), 35.\n\nHayden, E. G., 7.\n\nHewitt, J. F., 7.\n\nHewlett, Maurice, 35.\n\nHodgson, R. Ll., 15, 34.\n\nHolden, Ed. S., LL.D., 8.\n\nHolland, Clive, 27.\n\nHope, W. H. St. John, 8, 20.\n\nHoufe, C. A., 8.\n\nHowell, James, 23.\n\nHunter, Sir W. W., 8.\n\nHutten, Baroness von, 35.\n\nHyde, William, 21.\n\n\nIrwin, Sidney T., 8.\n\n\nJames, Henry, 35, 36.\n\nJames, King, the First, 23.\n\nJames, William, 8.\n\nJardine, Hon. Mr. Justice, 16.\n\nJohnston, Mary, 35, 36.\n\nJoy, George, 25.\n\n\nKennedy, Admiral, 17.\n\nKingsley, Charles, 36.\n\nKnox, John, 24.\n\nKrehbiel, Henry E., 8.\n\n\nLachambre, Henri, 15.\n\nLafargue, Philip, 36.\n\nLane-Poole, Stanley, 8.\n\nLatimer, Hugh, 22.\n\nLeach, A. F., M.A., 8, 27.\n\nLeaf, Cecil H., M.A., 27.\n\nLeaf, H. M., M.I.E.E., 27.\n\nLegg, L. G. Wickham, 8, 21.\n\nLever, Rev. Thomas, 23.\n\nLewes, Vivian B., 28.\n\nLoti, Pierre, 36.\n\nLover, Samuel, 36.\n\nLyly, John, 22.\n\nLytton, Lord, 36.\n\n\nMacfarlane, Charles, 37.\n\nMacGeorge, G. W., 8.\n\nMachuron, Alexis, 15.\n\nMacIlwaine, Herbert C., 37.\n\nMacleod, Fiona, 37, 48.\n\nMacNair, Major J. F. A., 9.\n\nMachray, Robert, 37.\n\nMadge, H. D., Rev., 31.\n\nMarprelate, Martin, 24.\n\nMason, A. E. W., 37.\n\nMasterman, N., 9.\n\nMayo, John Horsley, 18.\n\nM\u2019Candlish, J. M., 10.\n\nMcIlwraith, Jean, 37.\n\nMcLaws, Lafayette, 37.\n\nMeakin, A. M. B., 16.\n\nMeredith, George, 9, 21, 37, 38, 43.\n\nMerejkowski, Dmitri, 38.\n\nMetcalfe, Charles Theophilus, C.S.I., 9.\n\nMeynell, Alice, 21.\n\nMills, E. J., 44.\n\nMilton, John, 22.\n\nMitchell, H. G., 32.\n\nMonier-Williams, Sir M., K.C.I.E., 7.\n\nMonk of Evesham, A, 23.\n\nMontague, Charles, 39.\n\nMore, Sir Thomas, 22.\n\nMorison, M., 9, 28.\n\nMorison, Theodore, 9.\n\nMowbray, J. P., 39.\n\nM\u00fcnsterberg, Hugo, 9.\n\n\nNansen, Fridtjof, 16.\n\nNaunton, Sir Robert, 23.\n\nNesbit, E., 44.\n\nNewberry, Percy E., 10, 21.\n\nNewman, Mrs., 39.\n\nNisbet, John, 10.\n\n\nO\u2019Donoghue, J. T., 56.\n\nOokhtomsky, Prince E., 16.\n\nOppert, Gustav, 10.\n\n\nPaine, Albert Bigelow, 48.\n\nPalmer, Walter, M.P., 10.\n\nParker, Nella, 39.\n\nPayne, Will, 39.\n\nPeel, Mrs., 28.\n\nPenrose, Mrs. H. H., 39.\n\nPerks, Mrs. Hartley, 39.\n\nPiatt, John James, 44.\n\nPiatt, Mrs., 44.\n\nPickering, Sidney, 39.\n\nPincott, F., 44.\n\nPopowski, Joseph, 10.\n\nPowell, F. York, 42.\n\nPrichard, Hesketh, 16.\n\nPrichard, K. & Hesketh, 39.\n\nPuttenham, George, 23.\n\n\nRait, R. S., 10, 44, 45.\n\nRaleigh, Sir Walter, 23.\n\nReed, Marcus, 39, 58.\n\nRice, Louis, 10.\n\nRinder, E. Wingate, 36.\n\n\u2018Rita,\u2019 39.\n\nRoberts, Morley, 16.\n\nRobertson, David, 27.\n\nRobinson, Clement, 24.\n\nRogers, Alexander, 45.\n\nRogers, C. J., 28.\n\nRoosevelt, Theodore, 11.\n\nRound, J. Horace, M.A., 11.\n\nRoy, W., 23.\n\nRussell, W. Clark, 40.\n\nRyley, Rev. J. Buchanan, 11, 32.\n\n\nSangermano, Father, 16.\n\nSapte, Brand, 7.\n\nSchweitzer, Georg, 11.\n\nScott, Eva, 11.\n\nScott, Sir Walter, 40.\n\nScrutton, Percy E., 28.\n\nSelden, John, 22.\n\nSelfe, Rose E., 12.\n\nSetoun, Gabriel, 40.\n\nShakespeare, William, 45.\n\nSharp, William, 40.\n\nSiborne, Captain William, 11, 18.\n\nSichel, Edith, 12.\n\nSidney, Sir Philip, 22.\n\nSinclair, May, 40.\n\nSinclair, Ven. Archdeacon, D.D., 52.\n\nSkrine, J. Huntley, 32, 45.\n\nSlaughter, Frances, 34.\n\nSmith, Edward, 12.\n\nSmith, F. Hopkinson, 40.\n\nSmith, Captain John, 25.\n\nSmythe, A. J., 12.\n\nSneath, E. Hershey, 12, 32.\n\nSoane, John, 40.\n\nSomervell, Arthur, 48.\n\nSomerville, William, 43.\n\nSpalding, Thomas Alfred, 12, 18.\n\nSpenser, Edmund, 45.\n\nStadling, J., 16.\n\nStanihurst, Richard, 24.\n\nStanton, Frank L., 45.\n\nSteel, Flora Annie, 40.\n\nStein, M. A., 12.\n\nStevenson, Wallace, 45.\n\nStoker, Bram, 40, 41.\n\nStoneclink (T. F. Dale), 6, 17, 34.\n\nStreet, G. S., 12, 41.\n\nStuart, John, 12.\n\nSturgis, Julian, 41.\n\n\nTarver, J. C., 29.\n\nThompson, Francis, 46.\n\nThomson, J. J., F.R.S., 29.\n\nThomson, James, 46.\n\nThorburn, S. S., 41.\n\nThornton, Surg.-General, C.B., 13.\n\nTorrey, Joseph, 29.\n\nTottel, R., 23.\n\nTownsend, Meredith, 12.\n\nTraill, H. D., 13.\n\nTrench, Herbert, 38.\n\nTurner, H. H., F.R.S., 29.\n\nTynan, Katharine, 41.\n\n\nUdall, Rev. John, 24.\n\nUdall, Nicholas, 23.\n\n\nVallery-Radot, R., 13.\n\nVibart, Colonel Henry M., 13, 19.\n\nVilliers, George, 22.\n\n\nWaddell, Surg.-Maj. J. A., 16.\n\nWalker, Charles, 17.\n\nWarren, Kate M., 28, 30.\n\nWatson, Thomas. 23.\n\nWebb, Surgeon-Captain, W. W., 30.\n\nWebbe, E., 22.\n\nWebbe, William, 23.\n\nWesslau, O. E., 7.\n\nWhite, W. Hale, 42.\n\nWhite, Percy, 41.\n\nWhite, Stewart E., 41.\n\nWhiteway, R. S., 13.\n\nWicksteed, Rev. P. H., 13, 43.\n\nWigram, Percy, 7.\n\nWilkinson, Spenser, 13, 18, 19.\n\nWilson, A. J., 17.\n\nWilson, J. M., M.A., 32.\n\nWilson, Robert, 46.\n\nWilson, Sarah, 32.\n\nWinslow, Anna Green, 13.\n\nWood, Walter, 13.\n\n\nYoung, Ernest, 16.\n\n\n\u2018Zack,\u2019 41.\n\nZimmermann, Dr. A., 50.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n                         A CATALOGUE OF BOOKS\n\n                             PUBLISHED BY\n\n                     Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd\n\n\nArranged in Order of Prices\n\n\n***=Waverley Novels.= See page 64.\n\n\n[Sidenote: =1s.=]\n\n     =Anon. Muggleton College.=\n\n     =Bankes (Roden) A Story Book for Lesson Time.=\n\n     =Bidder (George) Merlin\u2019s Youth.= Paper.\n\n     =Bright (Charles) Science and Engineering, 1837-97.=\n\n     =Gale (Norman) Cricket Songs.=\n\n     =Palmer (Walter, M.P.) Poultry Management on a Farm.=\n\n\n[Sidenote: =1s. Net.=]\n\n     =Philips (F. C.) A Full Confession.=\n\n     =The Books of the Bible--Psalms, St. Matthew, St. Mark, St. Luke,\n     St. John.= Cloth. Paper label.\n\n     =The St. George\u2019s Kalendar, 1902.=\n\n\n[Sidenote: =1s. 6d. Net.=]\n\n=Doughty (Charles) Under Arms, 1900.=\n\n=Scott (Sir Walter) The Waverley Novels.= 48 Volumes. Label. Per vol.\n\n=The Books of the Bible--Psalms, St. Matthew, St. Mark, St. Luke, St.\nJohn.= Cloth gilt.\n\n=Warren (Kate M.) Spenser\u2019s Faerie Queene.= 6 vols. Each.\n\n\n[Sidenote: =2s.=]\n\n     =Chamberlain (Rt. Hon. Joseph, M.P.) Patriotism.= Buckram.\n\n     =Coldstream (John P.) Institutions of Austria.=\n\n=----                       \u201c      \u201c  Italy.=\n\n\n\n\n\n[Sidenote: =2s. Net.=]\n\n     =Scott (Sir Walter) The Waverley Novels.= 48 vols. Cloth gilt. Per\n     Vol.\n\n\n[Sidenote: =2s.6d.=]\n\n     =Anon. The Love of an Obsolete Woman.=\n\n     =Hanna (Col. H. B.) Backwards or Forwards.=\n\n     =---- Can Russia Invade India?=\n\n      =---- India\u2019s Scientific Frontier.=\n\n     =Holland (Clive) The Use of the Hand Camera.=\n\n     =Houfe (C. A.) 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Leather. Per vol.\n\n     =Shakespeare. The Works of.= Illustrated. 20 vols. Each.\n\n     =The Books of the Bible--Psalms, St. Matthew, St. Mark, St. Luke,\n     St. John.= Leather gilt.\n\n     =Walker (C.) Amateur Fish Culture.=\n\n     =Warren (Kate M.) Spenser\u2019s Faerie Queene.= Cloth gilt. 6 vols. Each.\n\n\n[Sidenote: =3s. Net.=]\n\n     =Four Gospels.= Cloth gilt.\n\n\n[Sidenote: =3s. 6d.=]\n\n     =Andom (R.) and Harewood (F.) The Fortune of a Spendthrift.=\n\n     =Anon. Muggleton College.= Cloth.\n\n     =Ballin (Mrs. Ada) From Cradle to School.=\n\n     =Bryden (H. A.) Tales of South Africa.=\n\n     =Carmichael (Montgomery) Sketches and Stories, Grave and Gay.=\n\n     =Charrington (Charles) A Sturdy Beggar, and Lady Bramber\u2019s Ghost.=\n     Two Stories.\n\n     =Doyle (C. W.) The Shadow of Quong Lung.=\n\n     =---- The Taming of the Jungle.=\n\n     =Goffic (C. Le) The Dark Way of Love.=\n\n     =Hannan (Charles, F.R.G.S.) Chin-Chin-Wa.=\n\n     =Kingsley (Charles) Westward Ho!=\n\n     =Lytton (Lord) Harold.=\n\n     =Macfarlane (Charles) The Camp of Refuge.=\n\n     =---- Reading Abbey.=\n\n     =Macleod (Fiona) Green Fire.=\n\n     =Morison (Theodore) Imperial Rule in India.=\n\n     =Parker (Nella) Dramas of To-Day.=\n\n     =Peel (Mrs. C. S.) The New Home.=\n\n     =---- Ten Shillings a Head per Week for House-books.=\n\n     =Perks (Mrs. Hartley) Among the Bracken.=\n\n     =Sinclair (Ven. Archdeacon, D.D.) Simplicity in Christ.=\n\n     =Steele (F. A.) In the Tideway.=\n\n     =Stoker (Bram) The Shoulder of Shasta.=\n\n     =Sturgis (Julian) The Folly of Pen Harrington.=\n\n     =Thorburn (S. S.) His Majesty\u2019s Greatest Subject.=\n\n     =Ward (Prof. A. W.) Sir Henry Wotton.=\n\n\n[Sidenote: =3s. 6d. Net=]\n\n     =Allen (G. C.) Tales from Tennyson.=\n\n     =Barmby (B. H.) Gisli Sursson. A Drama.=\n\n     =Battersby (Caryl) The Song of the Golden Bough.=\n\n     =Courtney (W. L.) 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E.) Verses.=\n\n     =Bidder (George) By Southern Shore.=\n\n     =---- Merlin\u2019s Youth.= Cloth.\n\n     =Four Gospels.= Leather.\n\n     =Gale (Norman) A Country Muse.= 1st Series.\n\n     =---- = 2nd Series.\n\n     =Mills (E. J.) My Only Child.=\n\n     =Nesbit (E.) Songs of Love and Empire.=\n\n     =Piatt (J. J.) The Ghost\u2019s Entry.=\n\n     =Piatt (Mrs.) Child World Ballads.=\n\n     =Rogers (Alexander) The Widowed Queen.=\n\n     =Skrine (J. H.) Songs of the Maid.=\n\n     =Somervell (A.) and Brooke (Leslie) Singing Time.= A Child\u2019s Song\n     Book.\n\n     =Walker (Charles) Shooting on a Small Income.=\n\n     =Wilkinson (Spenser) The Nation\u2019s Awakening.=\n\n     =Wilson (Robert) Laurel Leaves.=\n\n\n[Sidenote: =5s. Net.=]\n\n     =Armstrong (Arthur Coles) A Tale from Boccaccio.=\n\n     =Davidson (Thomas) A History of Education.=\n\n     =Dinsmore (Charles A.) 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A Ribbon of Iron.=\n\n     =Meredith (George) The Ordeal of Richard Feverel.=\n\n     =---- Rhoda Fleming.=\n\n     =---- Sandra Belloni.=\n\n     =---- Vittoria.=\n\n     =---- Diana of the Crossways.=\n\n     =---- Beauchamp\u2019s Career.=\n\n      =---- The Adventures of Harry Richmond.=\n\n     =Meredith (George) The Egoist.=\n\n     =---- The Tragic Comedians.=\n\n     =---- Evan Harrington.=\n\n     =---- The Tale of Chloe and other Stories.=\n\n     =---- The Shaving of Shagpat.=\n\n     =---- The Amazing Marriage.=\n\n     =---- One of Our Conquerors.=\n\n     =---- Poems.= 2 vols. Each.\n\n     =---- Lord Ormont and his Aminta.=\n\n     =---- An Essay on Comedy.=\n\n     =Merejkowski (Dmitri) The Death of the Gods.=\n\n     =---- The Resurrection of the Gods.=\n\n     =Montague (Charles) The Vigil.=\n\n     =Nansen (Fridtjof) Farthest North.=\n\n     =Newman (Mrs.) His Vindication.=\n\n     =Payne (Will) The Story of Eva.=\n\n     =Penrose (Mrs. H. H.) 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Prisoners their Own Warders.=\n\n     =Ryley and M\u2019Candlish, Scotland\u2019s Free Church.=\n\n\n[Sidenote: =10s. 6d. Net.=]\n\n     =Bain (R. Nisbet) Peter III.=\n\n     =Gairdner (James) The Paston Letters.= Supplementary Volume.\n\n     =Hackel (Eduard) The True Grasses.=\n\n     =Leaf (Cecil H.) The Surgical Anatomy of the Lymphatic Glands.=\n\n     =List of 837 London Publishers.=\n\n     =Rogers (C. J.) Coin Collecting in Northern India.=\n\n     =Roosevelt (Theodore) Oliver Cromwell.=\n\n     =Townsend (Meredith) Asia and Europe.=\n\n\n[Sidenote: =12s.=]\n\n     =Arnold (T. W.) The Preaching of Islam.=\n\n     =Gardner (E. G.) Dante\u2019s Ten Heavens.=\n\n     =Gardner (E. G.) and Wicksteed (P. H.) Dante and Giovanni del\n     Virgilio.=\n\n     =Gomme (G. Laurence) The Principles of Local Government.=\n\n     =Hewitt (J. F.) Ruling Races of Prehistoric Times.= Second Series.\n\n     =Irwin (S. T.) Letters of T. E. Brown.= 2 vols.\n\n     =Lafargue (Philip) Stephen Brent.= 2 vols.\n\n     =Metcalfe (C. T.) Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi.=\n\n     =Prichard (Hesketh) Where Black Rules White.=\n\n     =Traill (H. D.) England, Egypt and the Sudan.=\n\n\n[Sidenote: =12s. Net.=]\n\n     =Boswell\u2019s Life of Johnson.= Edited by Augustine Birrell. 6 vols.,\n     fcap. 8vo.\n\n     =Lane Poole (Stanley) Mohammedan Dynasties.=\n\n     =Leach (A. F., M.A., F.S.A.) English Schools at the Reformation,\n     1546-48.=\n\n     =Zimmermann (Dr. A.) Botanical Microtechnique.=\n\n\n[Sidenote: =12s. 6d.=]\n\n     =Popowski (Joseph) The Rival Powers in Central Asia.=\n\n     =Smythe (A. J.) William Terriss, Actor.=\n\n\n[Sidenote: =12s. 6d. Net.=]\n\n     =Campbell (James Dykes) Coleridge\u2019s Poems.= Large paper.\n\n     =Morison (M.) Time Table of Modern History.=\n\n     =Rait (Robert S.) Five Stuart Princesses.=\n\n     =Round (J. Horace) The Commune of London.=\n\n\n[Sidenote: =14s.=]\n\n     =Anon. Regeneration.=\n\n     =Constable\u2019s Hand Atlas of India.=\n\n     =Hake (A. E.) and Wesslau (O. E.) The Coming Individualism.=\n\n     =Smith (Edward) England and America after Independence.=\n\n\n[Sidenote: =15s.=]\n\n     =Bain (R. Nisbet) The Daughter of Peter the Great.=\n\n     =Spalding (T. A.) The Life and Times of Richard Badiley,\n     Vice-Admiral of the Fleet.=\n\n     =Wilkinson (Spenser) War and Policy.=\n\n\n[Sidenote: =15s. Net.=]\n\n     =Blount (Bertram) Practical Electro-Chemistry.=\n\n     =Duff (C. M.) The Chronology of India.=\n\n     =Pincott (F.) The Prema Sagara.=\n\n     =Spenser (Edmund) The Faerie Queene.= 6 volumes. Canvas gilt.\n\n     =Whiteway (R. S.) The Rise of Portuguese Power in India.=\n\n\n[Sidenote: =16s.=]\n\n     =Fox (Arthur W.) A Book of Bachelors.=\n\n     =MacGeorge (G. W.) Ways and Works in India.=\n\n\n[Sidenote: =16s. 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Price 2s. 6d. per vol. net.\n\n\n  Vols. 1, 2.        =Waverley.=\n  Vols. 3, 4.        =Guy Mannering.=\n  Vols. 5, 6.        =The Antiquary.=\n  Vols. 7, 8.        =Rob Roy.=\n  Vol. 9.            =The Black Dwarf.=\n  Vols. 10, 11.      =Old Mortality.=\n  Vols. 12, 13.      =Heart of Midlothian.=\n  Vol. 14.           =Bride of Lammermoor.=\n  Vol. 15.           =Legend of Montrose.=\n  Vols. 16, 17.      =Ivanhoe.=\n  Vols. 18, 19.      =The Monastery.=\n  Vols. 20, 21.      =The Abbot.=\n  Vols. 22, 23.      =Kenilworth.=\n  Vols. 24, 25.      =The Pirate.=\n  Vols. 26, 27.      =Fortunes of Nigel.=\n  Vols. 28, 29, 30.  =Peveril of the Peak.=\n  Vols. 31, 32.      =Quentin Durward.=\n  Vols. 33, 34.      =St. Ronan\u2019s Well.=\n  Vols. 35, 36.      =Redgauntlet.=\n  Vol. 37.           =The Betrothed.=\n  Vol. 38.           =The Talisman.=\n  Vols. 39, 40.      =Woodstock.=\n  Vol. 41.           =Highland Widow, etc.=\n  Vols. 42, 43.      =Fair Maid of Perth.=\n  Vols. 44, 45.      =Anne of Geierstein.=\n  Vols. 46, 47.      =Count Robert of Paris.= =Castle Dangerous.=\n  Vol. 48.           =The Surgeon\u2019s Daughter.= =Glossary.=\n\nTypographical errors corrected by the etext transcriber: natually desire\nknowledge=> naturally desire knowledge {pg 19}\n\n\u201cber \u00dcdie Entstehung des Rechtsgef\u00fchls.\u201d=> \u201c\u00dcber die Entstehung des\nRechtsgef\u00fchls.\u201d {pg 43}\n\nis is obvious that Zeus=> it is obvious that Zeus {pg 106}","title":"The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":56748}