{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_4967/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_4967","id":"gutenberg_4967","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4967","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Science - Biology","Evolution","Natural selection"],"text":"Transcribed from the 1922 Jonathan Cape edition by David Price, email\nccx074@pglaf.org\n\n\n\n\n\n Luck, or Cunning\n As the Main Means of\n Organic Modification?\n\n\n[Picture: Decorative graphic]\n\n * * * * *\n\n Jonathan Cape\n Eleven Gower Street, London\n\n * * * * *\n\n_First Published_ 1887\n_Second Edition_ 1920\n_Re-issued_ 1922\n\n * * * * *\n\n TO THE MEMORY OF\n THE LATE\n\n _ALFRED TAYLOR_, ESQ., _&c._\n\n WHOSE EXPERIMENTS AT CARSHALTON\n IN THE YEARS 1883 AND 1884\n ESTABLISHED THAT PLANTS ALSO ARE ENDOWED WITH\n INTELLIGENTIAL AND VOLITIONAL FACULTIES\n THIS BOOK\n BEGUN AT HIS INSTIGATION\n IS GRATEFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED\n\n\n\n\nNote\n\n\nTHIS second edition of _Luck_, _or Cunning_? is a reprint of the first\nedition, dated 1887, but actually published in November, 1886. The only\nalterations of any consequence are in the Index, which has been enlarged\nby the incorporation of several entries made by the author in a copy of\nthe book which came into my possession on the death of his literary\nexecutor, Mr. R. A. Streatfeild. I thank Mr. G. W. Webb, of the\nUniversity Library, Cambridge, for the care and skill with which he has\nmade the necessary alterations; it was a troublesome job because owing to\nthe re-setting, the pagination was no longer the same.\n\n_Luck_, _or Cunning_? is the fourth of Butler\u2019s evolution books; it was\nfollowed in 1890 by three articles in _The Universal Review_ entitled\n\u201cThe Deadlock in Darwinism\u201d (republished in _The Humour of Homer_), after\nwhich he published no more upon that subject.\n\nIn this book, as he says in his Introduction, he insists upon two main\npoints: (1) the substantial identity between heredity and memory, and (2)\nthe reintroduction of design into organic development; and these two\npoints he treats as though they have something of that physical life with\nwhich they are so closely associated. He was aware that what he had to\nsay was likely to prove more interesting to future generations than to\nhis immediate public, \u201cbut any book that desires to see out a literary\nthree-score years and ten must offer something to future generations as\nwell as to its own.\u201d By next year one half of the three-score years and\nten will have passed, and the new generation by their constant enquiries\nfor the work have already begun to show their appreciation of Butler\u2019s\nmethod of treating the subject, and their readiness to listen to what was\naddressed to them as well as to their fathers.\n\n HENRY FESTING JONES.\n\n_March_, 1920.\n\n\n\n\nAuthor\u2019s Preface to First Edition\n\n\nTHIS book, as I have said in my concluding chapter, has turned out very\ndifferent from the one I had it in my mind to write when I began it. It\narose out of a conversation with the late Mr. Alfred Tylor soon after his\npaper on the growth of trees and protoplasmic continuity was read before\nthe Linnean Society\u2014that is to say, in December, 1884\u2014and I proposed to\nmake the theory concerning the subdivision of organic life into animal\nand vegetable, which I have broached in my concluding chapter, the main\nfeature of the book. One afternoon, on leaving Mr. Tylor\u2019s bedside, much\ntouched at the deep disappointment he evidently felt at being unable to\ncomplete the work he had begun so ably, it occurred to me that it might\nbe some pleasure to him if I promised to dedicate my own book to him, and\nthus, however unworthy it might be, connect it with his name. It\noccurred to me, of course, also that the honour to my own book would be\ngreater than any it could confer, but the time was not one for balancing\nconsiderations nicely, and when I made my suggestion to Mr. Tylor on the\nlast occasion that I ever saw him, the manner in which he received it\nsettled the question. If he had lived I should no doubt have kept more\nclosely to my plan, and should probably have been furnished by him with\nmuch that would have enriched the book and made it more worthy of his\nacceptance; but this was not to be.\n\nIn the course of writing I became more and more convinced that no\nprogress could be made towards a sounder view of the theory of descent\nuntil people came to understand what the late Mr. Charles Darwin\u2019s theory\nof natural selection amounted to, and how it was that it ever came to be\npropounded. Until the mindless theory of Charles Darwinian natural\nselection was finally discredited, and a mindful theory of evolution was\nsubstituted in its place, neither Mr. Tylor\u2019s experiments nor my own\ntheories could stand much chance of being attended to. I therefore\ndevoted myself mainly, as I had done in \u201cEvolution Old and New,\u201d and in\n\u201cUnconscious Memory,\u201d to considering whether the view taken by the late\nMr. Darwin, or the one put forward by his three most illustrious\npredecessors, should most command our assent.\n\nThe deflection from my original purpose was increased by the appearance,\nabout a year ago, of Mr. Grant Allen\u2019s \u201cCharles Darwin,\u201d which I imagine\nto have had a very large circulation. So important, indeed, did I think\nit not to leave Mr. Allen\u2019s statements unchallenged, that in November\nlast I recast my book completely, cutting out much that I had written,\nand practically starting anew. How far Mr. Tylor would have liked it, or\neven sanctioned its being dedicated to him, if he were now living, I\ncannot, of course, say. I never heard him speak of the late Mr. Darwin\nin any but terms of warm respect, and am by no means sure that he would\nhave been well pleased at an attempt to connect him with a book so\npolemical as the present. On the other hand, a promise made and received\nas mine was, cannot be set aside lightly. The understanding was that my\nnext book was to be dedicated to Mr. Tylor; I have written the best I\ncould, and indeed never took so much pains with any other; to Mr. Tylor\u2019s\nmemory, therefore, I have most respectfully, and regretfully, inscribed\nit.\n\nDesiring that the responsibility for what has been done should rest with\nme, I have avoided saying anything about the book while it was in\nprogress to any of Mr Tylor\u2019s family or representatives. They know\nnothing, therefore, of its contents, and if they did, would probably feel\nwith myself very uncertain how far it is right to use Mr. Tylor\u2019s name in\nconnection with it. I can only trust that, on the whole, they may think\nI have done most rightly in adhering to the letter of my promise.\n\n_October_ 15, 1886.\n\n\n\n\nContents\n\n Page\n NOTE, BY HENRY FESTING JONES 6\n AUTHOR\u2019S PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION 7\n I. INTRODUCTION 13\n II. MR. HERBERT SPENCER 28\n III. MR. HERBERT SPENCER (_continued_) 42\n IV. MR. ROMANES\u2019 \u201cMENTAL EVOLUTION IN ANIMALS\u201d 52\n V. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION AT ISSUE 70\n VI. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION AT ISSUE 80\n (_continued_)\n VII. MR. SPENCER\u2019S \u201cTHE FACTORS OF ORGANIC 100\n EVOLUTION\u201d\n VIII. PROPERTY, COMMON SENSE, AND PROTOPLASM 112\n IX. PROPERTY, COMMON SENSE, AND PROTOPLASM 125\n (_continued_)\n X. THE ATTEMPT TO ELIMINATE MIND 135\n XI. THE WAY OF ESCAPE 147\n XII. WHY DARWIN\u2019S VARIATIONS WERE ACCIDENTAL 156\n XIII. DARWIN\u2019S CLAIM TO DESCENT WITH MODIFICATION 168\n XIV. DARWIN AND DESCENT WITH MODIFICATION 177\n (_continued_)\n XV. THE EXCISED \u201cMY\u2019S\u201d 202\n XVI. MR. GRANT ALLEN\u2019S \u201cCHARLES DARWIN\u201d 211\n XVII. PROFESSOR RAY LANKESTER AND LAMARCK 225\n XVIII. PER CONTRA 239\n XIX. CONCLUSION 251\n\n\n\n\nChapter I\nIntroduction\n\n\nI SHALL perhaps best promote the acceptance of the two main points on\nwhich I have been insisting for some years past, I mean, the substantial\nidentity between heredity and memory, and the reintroduction of design\ninto organic development, by treating them as if they had something of\nthat physical life with which they are so closely connected. Ideas are\nlike plants and animals in this respect also, as in so many others, that\nthey are more fully understood when their relations to other ideas of\ntheir time, and the history of their development are known and borne in\nmind. By development I do not merely mean their growth in the minds of\nthose who first advanced them, but that larger development which consists\nin their subsequent good or evil fortunes\u2014in their reception, favourable\nor otherwise, by those to whom they were presented. This is to an idea\nwhat its surroundings are to an organism, and throws much the same light\nupon it that knowledge of the conditions under which an organism lives\nthrows upon the organism itself. I shall, therefore, begin this new work\nwith a few remarks about its predecessors.\n\nI am aware that what I may say on this head is likely to prove more\ninteresting to future students of the literature of descent than to my\nimmediate public, but any book that desires to see out a literary\nthree-score years and ten must offer something to future generations as\nwell as to its own. It is a condition of its survival that it shall do\nthis, and herein lies one of the author\u2019s chief difficulties. If books\nonly lived as long as men and women, we should know better how to grow\nthem; as matters stand, however, the author lives for one or two\ngenerations, whom he comes in the end to understand fairly well, while\nthe book, if reasonable pains have been taken with it, should live more\nor less usefully for a dozen. About the greater number of these\ngenerations the author is in the dark; but come what may, some of them\nare sure to have arrived at conclusions diametrically opposed to our own\nupon every subject connected with art, science, philosophy, and religion;\nit is plain, therefore, that if posterity is to be pleased, it can only\nbe at the cost of repelling some present readers. Unwilling as I am to\ndo this, I still hold it the lesser of two evils; I will be as brief,\nhowever, as the interests of the opinions I am supporting will allow.\n\nIn \u201cLife and Habit\u201d I contended that heredity was a mode of memory. I\nendeavoured to show that all hereditary traits, whether of mind or body,\nare inherited in virtue of, and as a manifestation of, the same power\nwhereby we are able to remember intelligently what we did half an hour,\nyesterday, or a twelvemonth since, and this in no figurative but in a\nperfectly real sense. If life be compared to an equation of a hundred\nunknown quantities, I followed Professor Hering of Prague in reducing it\nto one of ninety-nine only, by showing two of the supposed unknown\nquantities to be so closely allied that they should count as one. I\nmaintained that instinct was inherited memory, and this without admitting\nmore exceptions and qualifying clauses than arise, as it were, by way of\nharmonics from every proposition, and must be neglected if thought and\nlanguage are to be possible.\n\nI showed that if the view for which I was contending was taken, many\nfacts which, though familiar, were still without explanation or\nconnection with our other ideas, would remain no longer isolated, but be\nseen at once as joined with the mainland of our most assured convictions.\nAmong the things thus brought more comfortably home to us was the\nprinciple underlying longevity. It became apparent why some living\nbeings should live longer than others, and how any race must be treated\nwhose longevity it is desired to increase. Hitherto we had known that an\nelephant was a long-lived animal and a fly short-lived, but we could give\nno reason why the one should live longer than the other; that is to say,\nit did not follow in immediate coherence with, or as intimately\nassociated with, any familiar principle that an animal which is late in\nthe full development of its reproductive system will tend to live longer\nthan one which reproduces early. If the theory of \u201cLife and Habit\u201d be\nadmitted, the fact of a slow-growing animal being in general longer lived\nthan a quick developer is seen to be connected with, and to follow as a\nmatter of course from, the fact of our being able to remember anything at\nall, and all the well-known traits of memory, as observed where we can\nbest take note of them, are perceived to be reproduced with singular\nfidelity in the development of an animal from its embryonic stages to\nmaturity.\n\nTake this view, and the very general sterility of hybrids from being a\n_crux_ of the theory of descent becomes a stronghold of defence. It\nappears as part of the same story as the benefit derived from judicious,\nand the mischief from injudicious, crossing; and this, in its turn, is\nseen as part of the same story, as the good we get from change of air and\nscene when we are overworked. I will not amplify; but reversion to\nlong-lost, or feral, characteristics, the phenomena of old age, the fact\nof the reproductive system being generally the last to arrive at\nmaturity\u2014few further developments occurring in any organism after this\nhas been attained\u2014the sterility of many animals in confinement, the\ndevelopment in both males and females under certain circumstances of the\ncharacteristics of the opposite sex, the latency of memory, the\nunconsciousness with which we grow, and indeed perform all familiar\nactions, these points, though hitherto, most of them, so apparently\ninexplicable that no one even attempted to explain them, became at once\nintelligible, if the contentions of \u201cLife and Habit\u201d were admitted.\n\nBefore I had finished writing this book I fell in with Professor Mivart\u2019s\n\u201cGenesis of Species,\u201d and for the first time understood the distinction\nbetween the Lamarckian and Charles-Darwinian systems of evolution. This\nhad not, so far as I then knew, been as yet made clear to us by any of\nour more prominent writers upon the subject of descent with modification;\nthe distinction was unknown to the general public, and indeed is only now\nbeginning to be widely understood. While reading Mr. Mivart\u2019s book,\nhowever, I became aware that I was being faced by two facts, each\nincontrovertible, but each, if its leading exponents were to be trusted,\nincompatible with the other.\n\nOn the one hand there was descent; we could not read Mr. Darwin\u2019s books\nand doubt that all, both animals and plants, were descended from a common\nsource. On the other, there was design; we could not read Paley and\nrefuse to admit that design, intelligence, adaptation of means to ends,\nmust have had a large share in the development of the life we saw around\nus; it seemed indisputable that the minds and bodies of all living beings\nmust have come to be what they are through a wise ordering and\nadministering of their estates. We could not, therefore, dispense either\nwith descent or with design, and yet it seemed impossible to keep both,\nfor those who offered us descent stuck to it that we could have no\ndesign, and those, again, who spoke so wisely and so well about design\nwould not for a moment hear of descent with modification.\n\nEach, moreover, had a strong case. Who could reflect upon rudimentary\norgans, and grant Paley the kind of design that alone would content him?\nAnd yet who could examine the foot or the eye, and grant Mr. Darwin his\ndenial of forethought and plan?\n\nFor that Mr. Darwin did deny skill and contrivance in connection with the\ngreatly preponderating part of organic developments cannot be and is not\nnow disputed. In the first chapter of \u201cEvolution Old and New\u201d I brought\nforward passages to show how completely he and his followers deny design,\nbut will here quote one of the latest of the many that have appeared to\nthe same effect since \u201cEvolution Old and New\u201d was published; it is by Mr.\nRomanes, and runs as follows:\u2014\n\n\u201cIt is the _very essence_ of the Darwinian hypothesis that it only seeks\nto explain the _apparently_ purposive variations, or variations of an\nadaptive kind.\u201d {17a}\n\nThe words \u201capparently purposive\u201d show that those organs in animals and\nplants which at first sight seem to have been designed with a view to the\nwork they have to do\u2014that is to say, with a view to future function\u2014had\nnot, according to Mr. Darwin, in reality any connection with, or\ninception in, effort; effort involves purpose and design; they had\ntherefore no inception in design, however much they might present the\nappearance of being designed; the appearance was delusive; Mr. Romanes\ncorrectly declares it to be \u201cthe very essence\u201d of Mr. Darwin\u2019s system to\nattempt an explanation of these seemingly purposive variations which\nshall be compatible with their having arisen without being in any way\nconnected with intelligence or design.\n\nAs it is indisputable that Mr. Darwin denied design, so neither can it be\ndoubted that Paley denied descent with modification. What, then, were\nthe wrong entries in these two sets of accounts, on the detection and\nremoval of which they would be found to balance as they ought?\n\nPaley\u2019s weakest place, as already implied, is in the matter of\nrudimentary organs; the almost universal presence in the higher organisms\nof useless, and sometimes even troublesome, organs is fatal to the kind\nof design he is trying to uphold; granted that there is design, still it\ncannot be so final and far-foreseeing as he wishes to make it out. Mr.\nDarwin\u2019s weak place, on the other hand, lies, firstly, in the supposition\nthat because rudimentary organs imply no purpose now, they could never in\ntime past have done so\u2014that because they had clearly not been designed\nwith an eye to all circumstances and all time, they never, therefore,\ncould have been designed with an eye to any time or any circumstances;\nand, secondly, in maintaining that \u201caccidental,\u201d \u201cfortuitous,\u201d\n\u201cspontaneous\u201d variations could be accumulated at all except under\nconditions that have never been fulfilled yet, and never will be; in\nother words, his weak place lay in the contention (for it comes to this)\nthat there can be sustained accumulation of bodily wealth, more than of\nwealth of any other kind, unless sustained experience, watchfulness, and\ngood sense preside over the accumulation. In \u201cLife and Habit,\u201d following\nMr. Mivart, and, as I now find, Mr. Herbert Spencer, I showed (pp.\n279\u2013281) how impossible it was for variations to accumulate unless they\nwere for the most part underlain by a sustained general principle; but\nthis subject will be touched upon more fully later on.\n\nThe accumulation of accidental variations which owed nothing to mind\neither in their inception, or their accumulation, the pitchforking, in\nfact, of mind out of the universe, or at any rate its exclusion from all\nshare worth talking about in the process of organic development, this was\nthe pill Mr. Darwin had given us to swallow; but so thickly had he gilded\nit with descent with modification, that we did as we were told, swallowed\nit without a murmur, were lavish in our expressions of gratitude, and,\nfor some twenty years or so, through the mouths of our leading\nbiologists, ordered design peremptorily out of court, if she so much as\ndared to show herself. Indeed, we have even given life pensions to some\nof the most notable of these biologists, I suppose in order to reward\nthem for having hoodwinked us so much to our satisfaction.\n\nHappily the old saying, _Naturam expellas furc\u00e2_, _tamen usque recurret_,\nstill holds true, and the reaction that has been gaining force for some\ntime will doubtless ere long brush aside the cobwebs with which those who\nhave a vested interest in Mr. Darwin\u2019s reputation as a philosopher still\ntry to fog our outlook. Professor Mivart was, as I have said, among the\nfirst to awaken us to Mr. Darwin\u2019s denial of design, and to the absurdity\ninvolved therein. He well showed how incredible Mr Darwin\u2019s system was\nfound to be, as soon as it was fully realised, but there he rather left\nus. He seemed to say that we must have our descent and our design too,\nbut he did not show how we were to manage this with rudimentary organs\nstill staring us in the face. His work rather led up to the clearer\nstatement of the difficulty than either put it before us in so many\nwords, or tried to remove it. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that\nthe \u201cGenesis of Species\u201d gave Natural Selection what will prove sooner or\nlater to be its death-blow, in spite of the persistence with which many\nstill declare that it has received no hurt, and the sixth edition of the\n\u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d published in the following year, bore abundant\ntraces of the fray. Moreover, though Mr. Mivart gave us no overt aid, he\npointed to the source from which help might come, by expressly saying\nthat his most important objection to Neo-Darwinism had no force against\nLamarck.\n\nTo Lamarck, therefore, I naturally turned, and soon saw that the theory\non which I had been insisting in \u201cLife and Habit\u201d was in reality an easy\ncorollary on his system, though one which he does not appear to have\ncaught sight of. I saw also that his denial of design was only, so to\nspeak, skin deep, and that his system was in reality teleological,\ninasmuch as, to use Isidore Geoffroy\u2019s words, it makes the organism\ndesign itself. In making variations depend on changed actions, and\nthese, again, on changed views of life, efforts, and designs, in\nconsequence of changed conditions of life, he in effect makes effort,\nintention, will, all of which involve design (or at any rate which taken\ntogether involve it), underlie progress in organic development. True, he\ndid not know he was a teleologist, but he was none the less a teleologist\nfor this. He was an unconscious teleologist, and as such perhaps more\nabsolutely an upholder of teleology than Paley himself; but this is\nneither here nor there; our concern is not with what people think about\nthemselves, but with what their reasoning makes it evident that they\nreally hold.\n\nHow strange the irony that hides us from ourselves! When Isidore\nGeoffroy said that according to Lamarck organisms designed themselves,\n{20a} and endorsed this, as to a great extent he did, he still does not\nappear to have seen that either he or Lamarck were in reality\nreintroducing design into organism; he does not appear to have seen this\nmore than Lamarck himself had seen it, but, on the contrary, like\nLamarck, remained under the impression that he was opposing teleology or\npurposiveness.\n\nOf course in one sense he did oppose it; so do we all, if the word design\nbe taken to intend a very far-foreseeing of minute details, a riding out\nto meet trouble long before it comes, a provision on academic principles\nfor contingencies that are little likely to arise. We can see no\nevidence of any such design as this in nature, and much everywhere that\nmakes against it. There is no such improvidence as over providence, and\nwhatever theories we may form about the origin and development of the\nuniverse, we may be sure that it is not the work of one who is unable to\nunderstand how anything can possibly go right unless he sees to it\nhimself. Nature works departmentally and by way of leaving details to\nsubordinates. But though those who see nature thus do indeed deny design\nof the prescient-from-all-eternity order, they in no way impugn a method\nwhich is far more in accord with all that we commonly think of as design.\nA design which is as incredible as that a ewe should give birth to a lion\nbecomes of a piece with all that we observe most frequently if it be\nregarded rather as an aggregation of many small steps than as a single\nlarge one. This principle is very simple, but it seems rather difficult\nto understand. It has taken several generations before people would\nadmit it as regards organism even after it was pointed out to them, and\nthose who saw it as regards organism still failed to understand it as\nregards design; an inexorable \u201cThus far shalt thou go and no farther\u201d\nbarred them from fruition of the harvest they should have been the first\nto reap. The very men who most insisted that specific difference was the\naccumulation of differences so minute as to be often hardly, if at all,\nperceptible, could not see that the striking and baffling phenomena of\ndesign in connection with organism admitted of exactly the same solution\nas the riddle of organic development, and should be seen not as a result\nreached _per saltum_, but as an accumulation of small steps or leaps in a\ngiven direction. It was as though those who had insisted on the\nderivation of all forms of the steam-engine from the common kettle, and\nwho saw that this stands in much the same relations to the engines, we\nwill say, of the Great Eastern steamship as the am\u0153ba to man, were to\ndeclare that the Great Eastern engines were not designed at all, on the\nground that no one in the early kettle days had foreseen so great a\nfuture development, and were unable to understand that a piecemeal\n_solvitur ambulando_ design is more omnipresent, all-seeing, and\nall-searching, and hence more truly in the strictest sense design, than\nany speculative leap of fancy, however bold and even at times successful.\n\nFrom Lamarck I went on to Buffon and Erasmus Darwin\u2014better men both of\nthem than Lamarck, and treated by him much as he has himself been treated\nby those who have come after him\u2014and found that the system of these three\nwriters, if considered rightly, and if the corollary that heredity is\nonly a mode of memory were added, would get us out of our dilemma as\nregards descent and design, and enable us to keep both. We could do this\nby making the design manifested in organism more like the only design of\nwhich we know anything, and therefore the only design of which we ought\nto speak\u2014I mean our own.\n\nOur own design is tentative, and neither very far-foreseeing nor very\nretrospective; it is a little of both, but much of neither; it is like a\ncomet with a little light in front of the nucleus and a good deal more\nbehind it, which ere long, however, fades away into the darkness; it is\nof a kind that, though a little wise before the event, is apt to be much\nwiser after it, and to profit even by mischance so long as the disaster\nis not an overwhelming one; nevertheless, though it is so interwoven with\nluck, there is no doubt about its being design; why, then, should the\ndesign which must have attended organic development be other than this?\nIf the thing that has been is the thing that also shall be, must not the\nthing which is be that which also has been? Was there anything in the\nphenomena of organic life to militate against such a view of design as\nthis? Not only was there nothing, but this view made things plain, as\nthe connecting of heredity and memory had already done, which till now\nhad been without explanation. Rudimentary organs were no longer a\nhindrance to our acceptance of design, they became weighty arguments in\nits favour.\n\nI therefore wrote \u201cEvolution Old and New,\u201d with the object partly of\nbacking up \u201cLife and Habit,\u201d and showing the easy rider it admitted,\npartly to show how superior the old view of descent had been to Mr.\nDarwin\u2019s, and partly to reintroduce design into organism. I wrote \u201cLife\nand Habit\u201d to show that our mental and bodily acquisitions were mainly\nstores of memory: I wrote \u201cEvolution Old and New\u201d to add that the memory\nmust be a mindful and designing memory.\n\nI followed up these two books with \u201cUnconscious Memory,\u201d the main object\nof which was to show how Professor Hering of Prague had treated the\nconnection between memory and heredity; to show, again, how substantial\nwas the difference between Von Hartmann and myself in spite of some\nlittle superficial resemblance; to put forward a suggestion as regards\nthe physics of memory, and to meet the most plausible objection which I\nhave yet seen brought against \u201cLife and Habit.\u201d\n\nSince writing these three books I have published nothing on the\nconnection between heredity and memory, except a few pages of remarks on\nMr. Romanes\u2019 \u201cMental Evolution in Animals\u201d in my book, {23a} from which I\nwill draw whatever seems to be more properly placed here. I have\ncollected many facts that make my case stronger, but am precluded from\npublishing them by the reflection that it is strong enough already. I\nhave said enough in \u201cLife and Habit\u201d to satisfy any who wish to be\nsatisfied, and those who wish to be dissatisfied would probably fail to\nsee the force of what I said, no matter how long and seriously I held\nforth to them; I believe, therefore, that I shall do well to keep my\nfacts for my own private reading and for that of my executors.\n\nI once saw a copy of \u201cLife and Habit\u201d on Mr. Bogue\u2019s counter, and was\ntold by the very obliging shopman that a customer had just written\nsomething in it which I might like to see. I said of course I should\nlike to see, and immediately taking the book read the following\u2014which it\noccurs to me that I am not justified in publishing. What was written ran\nthus:\u2014\n\n\u201cAs a reminder of our pleasant hours on the broad Atlantic, will Mr. \u2014\nplease accept this book (which I think contains more truth, and less\nevidence of it, than any other I have met with) from his friend \u2014?\u201d\n\nI presume the gentleman had met with the Bible\u2014a work which lays itself\nopen to a somewhat similar comment. I was gratified, however, at what I\nhad read, and take this opportunity of thanking the writer, an American,\nfor having liked my book. It was so plain he had been relieved at not\nfinding the case smothered to death in the weight of its own evidences,\nthat I resolved not to forget the lesson his words had taught me.\n\nThe only writer in connection with \u201cLife and Habit\u201d to whom I am anxious\nto reply is Mr. Herbert Spencer, but before doing this I will conclude\nthe present chapter with a consideration of some general complaints that\nhave been so often brought against me that it may be worth while to\nnotice them.\n\nThese general criticisms have resolved themselves mainly into two.\n\nFirstly, it is said that I ought not to write about biology on the ground\nof my past career, which my critics declare to have been purely literary.\nI wish I might indulge a reasonable hope of one day becoming a literary\nman; the expression is not a good one, but there is no other in such\ncommon use, and this must excuse it; if a man can be properly called\nliterary, he must have acquired the habit of reading accurately, thinking\nattentively, and expressing himself clearly. He must have endeavoured in\nall sorts of ways to enlarge the range of his sympathies so as to be able\nto put himself easily _en rapport_ with those whom he is studying, and\nthose whom he is addressing. If he cannot speak with tongues himself, he\nis the interpreter of those who can\u2014without whom they might as well be\nsilent. I wish I could see more signs of literary culture among my\nscientific opponents; I should find their books much more easy and\nagreeable reading if I could; and then they tell me to satirise the\nfollies and abuses of the age, just as if it was not this that I was\ndoing in writing about themselves.\n\nWhat, I wonder, would they say if I were to declare that they ought not\nto write books at all, on the ground that their past career has been too\npurely scientific to entitle them to a hearing? They would reply with\njustice that I should not bring vague general condemnations, but should\nquote examples of their bad writing. I imagine that I have done this\nmore than once as regards a good many of them, and I dare say I may do it\nagain in the course of this book; but though I must own to thinking that\nthe greater number of our scientific men write abominably, I should not\nbring this against them if I believed them to be doing their best to help\nus; many such men we happily have, and doubtless always shall have, but\nthey are not those who push to the fore, and it is these last who are\nmost angry with me for writing on the subjects I have chosen. They\nconstantly tell me that I am not a man of science; no one knows this\nbetter than I do, and I am quite used to being told it, but I am not used\nto being confronted with the mistakes that I have made in matters of\nfact, and trust that this experience is one which I may continue to spare\nno pains in trying to avoid.\n\nNevertheless I again freely grant that I am not a man of science. I have\nnever said I was. I was educated for the Church. I was once inside the\nLinnean Society\u2019s rooms, but have no present wish to go there again;\nthough not a man of science, however, I have never affected indifference\nto the facts and arguments which men of science have made it their\nbusiness to lay before us; on the contrary, I have given the greater part\nof my time to their consideration for several years past. I should not,\nhowever, say this unless led to do so by regard to the interests of\ntheories which I believe to be as nearly important as any theories can be\nwhich do not directly involve money or bodily convenience.\n\nThe second complaint against me is to the effect that I have made no\noriginal experiments, but have taken all my facts at second hand. This\nis true, but I do not see what it has to do with the question. If the\nfacts are sound, how can it matter whether A or B collected them? If\nProfessor Huxley, for example, has made a series of valuable original\nobservations (not that I know of his having done so), why am I to make\nthem over again? What are fact-collectors worth if the fact\nco-ordinators may not rely upon them? It seems to me that no one need do\nmore than go to the best sources for his facts, and tell his readers\nwhere he got them. If I had had occasion for more facts I daresay I\nshould have taken the necessary steps to get hold of them, but there was\nno difficulty on this score; every text-book supplied me with all, and\nmore than all, I wanted; my complaint was that the facts which Mr. Darwin\nsupplied would not bear the construction he tried to put upon them; I\ntried, therefore, to make them bear another which seemed at once more\nsound and more commodious; rightly or wrongly I set up as a builder, not\nas a burner of bricks, and the complaint so often brought against me of\nnot having made experiments is about as reasonable as complaint against\nan architect on the score of his not having quarried with his own hands a\nsingle one of the stones which he has used in building. Let my opponents\nshow that the facts which they and I use in common are unsound, or that I\nhave misapplied them, and I will gladly learn my mistake, but this has\nhardly, to my knowledge, been attempted. To me it seems that the chief\ndifference between myself and some of my opponents lies in this, that I\ntake my facts from them with acknowledgment, and they take their theories\nfrom me\u2014without.\n\nOne word more and I have done. I should like to say that I do not return\nto the connection between memory and heredity under the impression that I\nshall do myself much good by doing so. My own share in the matter was\nvery small. The theory that heredity is only a mode of memory is not\nmine, but Professor Hering\u2019s. He wrote in 1870, and I not till 1877. I\nshould be only too glad if he would take his theory and follow it up\nhimself; assuredly he could do so much better than I can; but with the\nexception of his one not lengthy address published some fifteen or\nsixteen years ago he has said nothing upon the subject, so far at least\nas I have been able to ascertain; I tried hard to draw him in 1880, but\ncould get nothing out of him. If, again, any of our more influential\nwriters, not a few of whom evidently think on this matter much as I do,\nwould eschew ambiguities and tell us what they mean in plain language, I\nwould let the matter rest in their abler hands, but of this there does\nnot seem much chance at present.\n\nI wish there was, for in spite of the interest I have felt in working the\ntheory out and the information I have been able to collect while doing\nso, I must confess that I have found it somewhat of a white elephant. It\nhas got me into the hottest of hot water, made a literary Ishmael of me,\nlost me friends whom I have been sorry to lose, cost me a good deal of\nmoney, done everything to me, in fact, which a good theory ought not to\ndo. Still, as it seems to have taken up with me, and no one else is\ninclined to treat it fairly, I shall continue to report its developments\nfrom time to time as long as life and health are spared me. Moreover,\nIshmaels are not without their uses, and they are not a drug in the\nmarket just now.\n\nI may now go on to Mr. Spencer.\n\n\n\n\nChapter II\nMr. Herbert Spencer\n\n\nMR. HERBERT SPENCER wrote to the _Athen\u00e6um_ (April 5, 1884), and quoted\ncertain passages from the 1855 edition of his \u201cPrinciples of Psychology,\u201d\n\u201cthe meanings and implications\u201d from which he contended were sufficiently\nclear. The passages he quoted were as follows:\u2014\n\n Though it is manifest that reflex and instinctive sequences are not\n determined by the experiences of the _individual_ organism\n manifesting them, yet there still remains the hypothesis that they\n are determined by the experiences of the _race_ of organisms forming\n its ancestry, which by infinite repetition in countless successive\n generations have established these sequences as organic relations (p.\n 526).\n\n The modified nervous tendencies produced by such new habits of life\n are also bequeathed (p. 526).\n\n That is to say, the tendencies to certain combinations of psychical\n changes have become organic (p. 527).\n\n The doctrine that the connections among our ideas are determined by\n experience must, in consistency, be extended not only to all the\n connections established by the accumulated experiences of every\n individual, but to all those established by the accumulated\n experiences of every race (p. 529).\n\n Here, then, we have one of the simpler forms of instinct which, under\n the requisite conditions, must necessarily be established by\n accumulated experiences (p. 547).\n\n And manifestly, if the organisation of inner relations, in\n correspondence with outer relations, results from a continual\n registration of experiences, &c. (p. 551).\n\n On the one hand, Instinct may be regarded as a kind of organised\n memory; on the other hand, Memory may be regarded as a kind of\n incipient instinct (pp. 555\u20136).\n\n Memory, then, pertains to all that class of psychical states which\n are in process of being organised. It continues so long as the\n organising of them continues; and disappears when the organisation of\n them is complete. In the advance of the correspondence, each more\n complex class of phenomena which the organism acquires the power of\n recognising is responded to at first irregularly and uncertainly; and\n there is then a weak remembrance of the relations. By multiplication\n of experiences this remembrance becomes stronger, and the response\n more certain. By further multiplication of experiences the internal\n relations are at last automatically organised in correspondence with\n the external ones; and so conscious memory passes into unconscious or\n organic memory. At the same time, a new and still more complex order\n of experiences is thus rendered appreciable; the relations they\n present occupy the memory in place of the simpler one; they become\n gradually organised; and, like the previous ones, are succeeded by\n others more complex still (p. 563).\n\n Just as we saw that the establishment of those compound reflex\n actions which we call instincts is comprehensible on the principle\n that inner relations are, by perpetual repetition, organised into\n correspondence with outer relations; so the establishment of those\n consolidated, those indissoluble, those instinctive mental relations\n constituting our ideas of Space and Time, is comprehensible on the\n same principle (p. 579).\n\nIn a book published a few weeks before Mr. Spencer\u2019s letter appeared\n{29a} I had said that though Mr. Spencer at times closely approached\nProfessor Hering and \u201cLife and Habit,\u201d he had nevertheless nowhere shown\nthat he considered memory and heredity to be parts of the same story and\nparcel of one another. In his letter to the _Athen\u00e6um_, indeed, he does\nnot profess to have upheld this view, except \u201cby implications;\u201d nor yet,\nthough in the course of the six or seven years that had elapsed since\n\u201cLife and Habit\u201d was published I had brought out more than one book to\nsupport my earlier one, had he said anything during those years to lead\nme to suppose that I was trespassing upon ground already taken by\nhimself. Nor, again, had he said anything which enabled me to appeal to\nhis authority\u2014which I should have been only too glad to do; at last,\nhowever, he wrote, as I have said, to the _Athen\u00e6um_ a letter which,\nindeed, made no express claim, and nowhere mentioned myself, but \u201cthe\nmeanings and implications\u201d from which were this time as clear as could be\ndesired, and amount to an order to Professor Hering and myself to stand\naside.\n\nThe question is, whether the passages quoted by Mr. Spencer, or any\nothers that can be found in his works, show that he regarded heredity in\nall its manifestations as a mode of memory. I submit that this\nconception is not derivable from Mr. Spencer\u2019s writings, and that even\nthe passages in which he approaches it most closely are unintelligible\ntill read by the light of Professor Hering\u2019s address and of \u201cLife and\nHabit.\u201d\n\nTrue, Mr. Spencer made abundant use of such expressions as \u201cthe\nexperience of the race,\u201d \u201caccumulated experiences,\u201d and others like them,\nbut he did not explain\u2014and it was here the difficulty lay\u2014how a race\ncould have any experience at all. We know what we mean when we say that\nan individual has had experience; we mean that he is the same person now\n(in the common use of the words), on the occasion of some present action,\nas the one who performed a like action at some past time or times, and\nthat he remembers how he acted before, so as to be able to turn his past\naction to account, gaining in proficiency through practice. Continued\npersonality and memory are the elements that constitute experience; where\nthese are present there may, and commonly will, be experience; where they\nare absent the word \u201cexperience\u201d cannot properly be used.\n\nFormerly we used to see an individual as one, and a race as many. We now\nsee that though this is true as far as it goes, it is by no means the\nwhole truth, and that in certain important respects it is the race that\nis one, and the individual many. We all admit and understand this\nreadily enough now, but it was not understood when Mr. Spencer wrote the\npassages he adduced in the letter to the _Athen\u00e6um_ above referred to.\nIn the then state of our ideas a race was only a succession of\nindividuals, each one of them new persons, and as such incapable of\nprofiting by the experience of its predecessors except in the very\nlimited number of cases where oral teaching, or, as in recent times,\nwriting, was possible. The thread of life was, as I have elsewhere said,\nremorselessly shorn between each successive generation, and the\nimportance of the physical and psychical connection between parents and\noffspring had been quite, or nearly quite, lost sight of. It seems\nstrange how this could ever have been allowed to come about, but it\nshould be remembered that the Church in the Middle Ages would strongly\ndiscourage attempts to emphasize a connection that would raise\ntroublesome questions as to who in a future state was to be responsible\nfor what; and, after all, for nine purposes of life out of ten the\ngenerally received opinion that each person is himself and nobody else is\non many grounds the most convenient. Every now and then, however, there\ncomes a tenth purpose, for which the continued personality side of the\nconnection between successive generations is as convenient as the new\npersonality side is for the remaining nine, and these tenth purposes\u2014some\nof which are not unimportant\u2014are obscured and fulfilled amiss owing to\nthe completeness with which the more commonly needed conception has\novergrown the other.\n\nNeither view is more true than the other, but the one was wanted every\nhour and minute of the day, and was therefore kept, so to speak, in\nstock, and in one of the most accessible places of our mental storehouse,\nwhile the other was so seldom asked for that it became not worth while to\nkeep it. By-and-by it was found so troublesome to send out for it, and\nso hard to come by even then, that people left off selling it at all, and\nif any one wanted it he must think it out at home as best he could; this\nwas troublesome, so by common consent the world decided no longer to busy\nitself with the continued personality of successive generations\u2014which was\nall very well until it also decided to busy itself with the theory of\ndescent with modification. On the introduction of a foe so inimical to\nmany of our pre-existing ideas the balance of power among them was upset,\nand a readjustment became necessary, which is still far from having\nattained the next settlement that seems likely to be reasonably\npermanent.\n\nTo change the illustration, the ordinary view is true for seven places of\ndecimals, and this commonly is enough; occasions, however, have now\narisen when the error caused by neglect of the omitted places is\nappreciably disturbing, and we must have three or four more. Mr. Spencer\nshowed no more signs of seeing that he must supply these, and make\npersonal identity continue between successive generations before talking\nabout inherited (as opposed to post-natal and educational) experience,\nthan others had done before him; the race with him, as with every one\nelse till recently, was not one long individual living indeed in\npulsations, so to speak, but no more losing continued personality by\nliving in successive generations, than an individual loses it by living\nin consecutive days; a race was simply a succession of individuals, each\none of which was held to be an entirely new person, and was regarded\nexclusively, or very nearly so, from this point of view.\n\nWhen I wrote \u201cLife and Habit\u201d I knew that the words \u201cexperience of the\nrace\u201d sounded familiar, and were going about in magazines and newspapers,\nbut I did not know where they came from; if I had, I should have given\ntheir source. To me they conveyed no meaning, and vexed me as an attempt\nto make me take stones instead of bread, and to palm off an illustration\nupon me as though it were an explanation. When I had worked the matter\nout in my own way, I saw that the illustration, with certain additions,\nwould become an explanation, but I saw also that neither he who had\nadduced it nor any one else could have seen how right he was, till much\nhad been said which had not, so far as I knew, been said yet, and which\nundoubtedly would have been said if people had seen their way to saying\nit.\n\n\u201cWhat is this talk,\u201d I wrote, \u201cwhich is made about the experience of the\nrace, as though the experience of one man could profit another who knows\nnothing about him? If a man eats his dinner it nourishes him and not his\nneighbour; if he learns a difficult art it is he that can do it and not\nhis neighbour\u201d (\u201cLife and Habit,\u201d p. 49).\n\nWhen I wrote thus in 1877, it was not generally seen that though the\nfather is not nourished by the dinners that the son eats, yet the son was\nfed when the father ate before he begot him.\n\n\u201cIs there any way,\u201d I continued, \u201cof showing that this experience of the\nrace about which so much is said without the least attempt to show in\nwhat way it may, or does, become the experience of the individual, is in\nsober seriousness the experience of one single being only, who repeats on\na great many different occasions, and in slightly different ways, certain\nperformances with which he has already become exceedingly familiar?\u201d\n\nI felt, as every one else must have felt who reflected upon the\nexpression in question, that it was fallacious till this was done. When\nI first began to write \u201cLife and Habit\u201d I did not believe it could be\ndone, but when I had gone right up to the end, as it were, of my _cu de\nsac_, I saw the path which led straight to the point I had despaired of\nreaching\u2014I mean I saw that personality could not be broken as between\ngenerations, without also breaking it between the years, days, and\nmoments of a man\u2019s life. What differentiates \u201cLife and Habit\u201d from the\n\u201cPrinciples of Psychology\u201d is the prominence given to continued personal\nidentity, and hence to _bon\u00e2 fide_ memory, as between successive\ngenerations; but surely this makes the two books differ widely.\n\nIdeas can be changed to almost any extent in almost any direction, if the\nchange is brought about gradually and in accordance with the rules of all\ndevelopment. As in music we may take almost any possible discord with\npleasing effect if we have prepared and resolved it rightly, so our ideas\nwill outlive and outgrow almost any modification which is approached and\nquitted in such a way as to fuse the old and new harmoniously. Words are\nto ideas what the fairy invisible cloak was to the prince who wore\nit\u2014only that the prince was seen till he put on the cloak, whereas ideas\nare unseen until they don the robe of words which reveals them to us; the\nwords, however, and the ideas, should be such as fit each other and stick\nto one another in our minds as soon as they are brought together, or the\nideas will fly off, and leave the words void of that spirit by the aid of\nwhich alone they can become transmuted into physical action and shape\nmaterial things with their own impress. Whether a discord is too violent\nor no, depends on what we have been accustomed to, and on how widely the\nnew differs from the old, but in no case can we fuse and assimilate more\nthan a very little new at a time without exhausting our tempering\npower\u2014and hence presently our temper.\n\nMr. Spencer appears to have forgotten that though _de minimis non curat\nlex_,\u2014though all the laws fail when applied to trifles,\u2014yet too sudden a\nchange in the manner in which our ideas are associated is as cataclysmic\nand subversive of healthy evolution as are material convulsions, or too\nviolent revolutions in politics. This must always be the case, for\nchange is essentially miraculous, and the only lawful home of the miracle\nis in the microscopically small. Here, indeed, miracles were in the\nbeginning, are now, and ever shall be, but we are deadened if they are\nrequired of us on a scale which is visible to the naked eye. If we are\ntold to work them our hands fall nerveless down; if, come what may, we\nmust do or die, we are more likely to die than to succeed in doing. If\nwe are required to believe them\u2014which only means to fuse them with our\nother ideas\u2014we either take the law into our own hands, and our minds\nbeing in the dark fuse something easier of assimilation, and say we have\nfused the miracle; or if we play more fairly and insist on our minds\nswallowing and assimilating it, we weaken our judgments, and _pro tanto_\nkill our souls. If we stick out beyond a certain point we go mad, as\nfanatics, or at the best make Coleridges of ourselves; and yet upon a\nsmall scale these same miracles are the breath and essence of life; to\ncease to work them is to die. And by miracle I do not merely mean\nsomething new, strange, and not very easy of comprehension\u2014I mean\nsomething which violates every canon of thought which in the palpable\nworld we are accustomed to respect; something as alien to, and\ninconceivable by, us as contradiction in terms, the destructibility of\nforce or matter, or the creation of something out of nothing. This,\nwhich when writ large maddens and kills, writ small is our meat and\ndrink; it attends each minutest and most impalpable detail of the\nceaseless fusion and diffusion in which change appears to us as\nconsisting, and which we recognise as growth and decay, or as life and\ndeath.\n\nClaude Bernard says, _Rien ne nait_, _rien ne se cr\u00e9e_, _tout se\ncontinue_. _La nature ne nous offre le spectacle d\u2019aucune cr\u00e9ation_,\n_elle est d\u2019une \u00e9ternelle continuation_; {35a} but surely he is insisting\nupon one side of the truth only, to the neglect of another which is just\nas real, and just as important; he might have said, _Rien ne se\ncontinue_, _tout nait_, _tout se cr\u00e9e_. _La nature ne nous offre le\nspectacle d\u2019aucune continuation_. _Elle est d\u2019une \u00e9ternelle cr\u00e9ation_;\nfor change is no less patent a fact than continuity, and, indeed, the two\nstand or fall together. True, discontinuity, where development is\nnormal, is on a very small scale, but this is only the difference between\nlooking at distances on a small instead of a large map; we cannot have\neven the smallest change without a small partial corresponding\ndiscontinuity; on a small scale\u2014too small, indeed, for us to\ncognise\u2014these breaks in continuity, each one of which must, so far as our\nunderstanding goes, rank as a creation, are as essential a factor of the\nphenomena we see around us, as is the other factor that they shall\nnormally be on too small a scale for us to find it out. Creations, then,\nthere must be, but they must be so small that practically they are no\ncreations. We must have a continuity in discontinuity, and a\ndiscontinuity in continuity; that is to say, we can only conceive the\nhelp of change at all by the help of flat contradiction in terms. It\ncomes, therefore, to this, that if we are to think fluently and\nharmoniously upon any subject into which change enters (and there is no\nconceivable subject into which it does not), we must begin by flying in\nthe face of every rule that professors of the art of thinking have drawn\nup for our instruction. These rules may be good enough as servants, but\nwe have let them become the worst of masters, forgetting that philosophy\nis made for man, not man for philosophy. Logic has been the true Tower\nof Babel, which we have thought to build so that we might climb up into\nthe heavens, and have no more miracle, but see God and live\u2014nor has\nconfusion of tongues failed to follow on our presumption. Truly St. Paul\nsaid well that the just shall live by faith; and the question \u201cBy what\nfaith?\u201d is a detail of minor moment, for there are as many faiths as\nspecies, whether of plants or animals, and each of them is in its own way\nboth living and saving.\n\nAll, then, whether fusion or diffusion, whether of ideas or things, is\nmiraculous. It is the two in one, and at the same time one in two, which\nis only two and two making five put before us in another shape; yet this\nfusion\u2014so easy to think so long as it is not thought about, and so\nunthinkable if we try to think it\u2014is, as it were, the matrix from which\nour more thinkable thought is taken; it is the cloud gathering in the\nunseen world from which the waters of life descend in an impalpable dew.\nGranted that all, whether fusion or diffusion, whether of ideas or\nthings, is, if we dwell upon it and take it seriously, an outrage upon\nour understandings which common sense alone enables us to brook; granted\nthat it carries with it a distinctly miraculous element which should\nvitiate the whole process _ab initio_, still, if we have faith we can so\nwork these miracles as Orpheus-like to charm denizens of the unseen world\ninto the seen again\u2014provided we do not look back, and provided also we do\nnot try to charm half a dozen Eurydices at a time. To think is to fuse\nand diffuse ideas, and to fuse and diffuse ideas is to feed. We can all\nfeed, and by consequence within reasonable limits we can fuse ideas; or\nwe can fuse ideas, and by consequence within reasonable limits we can\nfeed; we know not which comes first, the food or the ideas, but we must\nnot overtax our strength; the moment we do this we taste of death.\n\nIt is in the closest connection with this that we must chew our food fine\nbefore we can digest it, and that the same food given in large lumps will\nchoke and kill which in small pieces feeds us; or, again, that that which\nis impotent as a pellet may be potent as a gas. Food is very thoughtful:\nthrough thought it comes, and back through thought it shall return; the\nprocess of its conversion and comprehension within our own system is\nmental as well as physical, and here, as everywhere else with mind and\nevolution, there must be a cross, but not too wide a cross\u2014that is to\nsay, there must be a miracle, but not upon a large scale. Granted that\nno one can draw a clear line and define the limits within which a miracle\nis healthy working and beyond which it is unwholesome, any more than he\ncan prescribe the exact degree of fineness to which we must comminute our\nfood; granted, again, that some can do more than others, and that at all\ntimes all men sport, so to speak, and surpass themselves, still we know\nas a general rule near enough, and find that the strongest can do but\nvery little at a time, and, to return to Mr. Spencer, the fusion of two\nsuch hitherto unassociated ideas as race and experience was a miracle\nbeyond our strength.\n\nAssuredly when Mr. Spencer wrote the passages he quoted in the letter to\nthe _Athen\u00e6um_ above referred to, we were not in the habit of thinking of\nany one as able to remember things that had happened before he had been\nborn or thought of. This notion will still strike many of my non-readers\nas harsh and strained; no such discord, therefore, should have been taken\nunprepared, and when taken it should have been resolved with pomp and\ncircumstance. Mr Spencer, however, though he took it continually, never\neither prepared it or resolved it at all, but by using the words\n\u201cexperience of the race\u201d sprang this seeming paradox upon us, with the\nresult that his words were barren. They were barren because they were\nincoherent; they were incoherent because they were approached and quitted\ntoo suddenly. While we were realising \u201cexperience\u201d our minds excluded\n\u201crace,\u201d inasmuch as experience was an idea we had been accustomed\nhitherto to connect only with the individual; while realising the idea\n\u201crace,\u201d for the same reason, we as a matter of course excluded\nexperience. We were required to fuse two ideas that were alien to one\nanother, without having had those other ideas presented to us which would\nalone flux them. The absence of these\u2014which indeed were not immediately\nready to hand, or Mr. Spencer would have doubtless grasped them\u2014made\nnonsense of the whole thing; we saw the ideas propped up as two cards one\nagainst the other, on one of Mr. Spencer\u2019s pages, only to find that they\nhad fallen asunder before we had turned over to the next, so we put down\nhis book resentfully, as written by one who did not know what to do with\nhis meaning even if he had one, or bore it meekly while he chastised us\nwith scorpions, as Mr. Darwin had done with whips, according to our\ntemperaments.\n\nI may say, in passing, that the barrenness of incoherent ideas, and the\nsterility of widely distant species and genera of animals and plants, are\none in principle\u2014the sterility of hybrids being just as much due to\ninability to fuse widely unlike and unfamiliar ideas into a coherent\nwhole, as barrenness of ideas is, and, indeed, resolving itself\nultimately into neither more nor less than barrenness of ideas\u2014that is to\nsay, into inability to think at all, or at any rate to think as their\nneighbours do.\n\nIf Mr. Spencer had made it clear that the generations of any race are\n_bon\u00e2 fide_ united by a common personality, and that in virtue of being\nso united each generation remembers (within, of course, the limits to\nwhich all memory is subject) what happened to it while still in the\npersons of its progenitors\u2014then his order to Professor Hering and myself\nshould be immediately obeyed; but this was just what was at once most\nwanted, and least done by Mr. Spencer. Even in the passages given\nabove\u2014passages collected by Mr. Spencer himself\u2014this point is altogether\nignored; make it clear as Professor Hering made it\u2014put continued\npersonality and memory in the foreground as Professor Hering did, instead\nof leaving them to be discovered \u201cby implications,\u201d and then such\nexpressions as \u201caccumulated experiences\u201d and \u201cexperience of the race\u201d\nbecome luminous; till this had been done they were _Vox et pr\u00e6terea\nnihil_.\n\nTo sum up briefly. The passages quoted by Mr. Spencer from his\n\u201cPrinciples of Psychology\u201d can hardly be called clear, even now that\nProfessor Hering and others have thrown light upon them. If, indeed,\nthey had been clear Mr. Spencer would probably have seen what they\nnecesitated, and found the way of meeting the difficulties of the case\nwhich occurred to Professor Hering and myself. Till we wrote, very few\nwriters had even suggested this. The idea that offspring was only \u201can\nelongation or branch proceeding from its parents\u201d had scintillated in the\ningenious brain of Dr. Erasmus Darwin, and in that of the designer of\nJesse tree windows, but it had kindled no fire; it now turns out that\nCanon Kingsley had once called instinct inherited memory, {40a} but the\nidea, if born alive at all, died on the page on which it saw light:\nProfessor Ray Lankester, again called attention to Professor Hering\u2019s\naddress (_Nature_, July 13, 1876), but no discussion followed, and the\nmatter dropped without having produced visible effect. As for offspring\nremembering in any legitimate sense of the words what it had done, and\nwhat had happened to it, before it was born, no such notion was\nunderstood to have been gravely mooted till very recently. I doubt\nwhether Mr. Spencer and Mr. Romanes would accept this even now, when it\nis put thus undisguisedly; but this is what Professor Hering and I mean,\nand it is the only thing that should be meant, by those who speak of\ninstinct as inherited memory. Mr Spencer cannot maintain that these two\nstartling novelties went without saying \u201cby implication\u201d from the use of\nsuch expressions as \u201caccumulated experiences\u201d or \u201cexperience of the\nrace.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nChapter III\nMr. Herbert Spencer (_continued_)\n\n\nWHETHER they ought to have gone or not, they did not go.\n\nWhen \u201cLife and Habit\u201d was first published no one considered Mr. Spencer\nto be maintaining the phenomena of heredity to be in reality phenomena of\nmemory. When, for example, Professor Ray Lankester first called\nattention to Professor Hering\u2019s address, he did not understand Mr.\nSpencer to be intending this. \u201cProfessor Hering,\u201d he wrote (_Nature_,\nJuly 13, 1876), \u201chelps us to a comprehensive view of the nature of\nheredity and adaptation, by giving us the word \u2018memory,\u2019 conscious or\nunconscious, for the continuity of Mr. Spencer\u2019s polar forces or\npolarities of physiological units.\u201d He evidently found the prominence\ngiven to memory a help to him which he had not derived from reading Mr.\nSpencer\u2019s works.\n\nWhen, again, he attacked me in the _Athen\u00e6um_ (March 29, 1884), he spoke\nof my \u201ctardy recognition\u201d of the fact that Professor Hering had preceded\nme \u201cin treating all manifestations of heredity as a form of memory.\u201d\nProfessor Lankester\u2019s words could have no force if he held that any other\nwriter, and much less so well known a writer as Mr. Spencer, had preceded\nme in putting forward the theory in question.\n\nWhen Mr. Romanes reviewed \u201cUnconscious Memory\u201d in _Nature_ (January 27,\n1881) the notion of a \u201crace-memory,\u201d to use his own words, was still so\nnew to him that he declared it \u201csimply absurd\u201d to suppose that it could\n\u201cpossibly be fraught with any benefit to science,\u201d and with him too it\nwas Professor Hering who had anticipated me in the matter, not Mr.\nSpencer.\n\nIn his \u201cMental Evolution in Animals\u201d (p. 296) he said that Canon\nKingsley, writing in 1867, was the first to advance the theory that\ninstinct is inherited memory; he could not have said this if Mr. Spencer\nhad been understood to have been upholding this view for the last thirty\nyears.\n\nMr. A. R. Wallace reviewed \u201cLife and Habit\u201d in _Nature_ (March 27, 1879),\nbut he did not find the line I had taken a familiar one, as he surely\nmust have done if it had followed easily by implication from Mr.\nSpencer\u2019s works. He called it \u201can ingenious and paradoxical explanation\u201d\nwhich was evidently new to him. He concluded by saying that \u201cit might\nyet afford a clue to some of the deepest mysteries of the organic world.\u201d\n\nProfessor Mivart, when he reviewed my books on Evolution in the _American\nCatholic Quarterly Review_ (July 1881), said, \u201cMr Butler is not only\nperfectly logical and consistent in the startling consequences he deduces\nfrom his principles, but,\u201d &c. Professor Mivart could not have found my\nconsequences startling if they had already been insisted upon for many\nyears by one of the best-known writers of the day.\n\nThe reviewer of \u201cEvolution Old and New\u201d in the _Saturday Review_ (March\n31, 1879), of whom all I can venture to say is that he or she is a person\nwhose name carries weight in matters connected with biology, though he\n(for brevity) was in the humour for seeing everything objectionable in me\nthat could be seen, still saw no Mr. Spencer in me. He said\u2014\u201cMr Butler\u2019s\nown particular contribution to the terminology of Evolution is the phrase\ntwo or three times repeated with some emphasis\u201d (I repeated it not two or\nthree times only, but whenever and wherever I could venture to do so\nwithout wearying the reader beyond endurance) \u201coneness of personality\nbetween parents and offspring.\u201d The writer proceeded to reprobate this\nin language upon which a Huxley could hardly improve, but as he declares\nhimself unable to discover what it means, it may be presumed that the\nidea of continued personality between successive generations was new to\nhim.\n\nWhen Dr. Francis Darwin called on me a day or two before \u201cLife and Habit\u201d\nwent to the press, he said the theory which had pleased him more than any\nhe had seen for some time was one which referred all life to memory;\n{44a} he doubtless intended \u201cwhich referred all the phenomena of heredity\nto memory.\u201d He then mentioned Professor Ray Lankester\u2019s article in\n_Nature_, of which I had not heard, but he said nothing about Mr.\nSpencer, and spoke of the idea as one which had been quite new to him.\n\nThe above names comprise (excluding Mr. Spencer himself) perhaps those of\nthe best-known writers on evolution that can be mentioned as now before\nthe public; it is curious that Mr Spencer should be the only one of them\nto see any substantial resemblance between the \u201cPrinciples of Psychology\u201d\nand Professor Hering\u2019s address and \u201cLife and Habit.\u201d\n\nI ought, perhaps, to say that Mr. Romanes, writing to the _Athen\u00e6um_\n(March 8, 1884), took a different view of the value of the theory of\ninherited memory to the one he took in 1881.\n\nIn 1881 he said it was \u201csimply absurd\u201d to suppose it could \u201cpossibly be\nfraught with any benefit to science\u201d or \u201creveal any truth of profound\nsignificance;\u201d in 1884 he said of the same theory, that \u201cit formed the\nbackbone of all the previous literature upon instinct\u201d by Darwin,\nSpencer, Lewes, Fiske, and Spalding, \u201cnot to mention their numerous\nfollowers, and is by all of them elaborately stated as clearly as any\ntheory can be stated in words.\u201d\n\nFew except Mr. Romanes will say this. I grant it ought to \u201chave formed\nthe backbone,\u201d &c., and ought \u201cto have been elaborately stated,\u201d &c., but\nwhen I wrote \u201cLife and Habit\u201d neither Mr Romanes nor any one else\nunderstood it to have been even glanced at by more than a very few, and\nas for having been \u201celaborately stated,\u201d it had been stated by Professor\nHering as elaborately as it could be stated within the limits of an\naddress of only twenty-two pages, but with this exception it had never\nbeen stated at all. It is not too much to say that \u201cLife and Habit,\u201d\nwhen it first came out, was considered so startling a paradox that people\nwould not believe in my desire to be taken seriously, or at any rate were\nable to pretend that they thought I was not writing seriously.\n\nMr. Romanes knows this just as well as all must do who keep an eye on\nevolution; he himself, indeed, had said (_Nature_, January 27, 1881) that\nso long as I \u201caimed only at entertaining\u201d my \u201creaders by such works as\n\u2018Erewhon\u2019 and \u2018Life and Habit\u2019\u201d (as though these books were of kindred\ncharacter) I was in my proper sphere. It would be doing too little\ncredit to Mr. Romanes\u2019 intelligence to suppose him not to have known when\nhe said this that \u201cLife and Habit\u201d was written as seriously as my\nsubsequent books on evolution, but it suited him at the moment to join\nthose who professed to consider it another book of paradoxes such as, I\nsuppose, \u201cErewhon\u201d had been, so he classed the two together. He could\nnot have done this unless enough people thought, or said they thought,\nthe books akin, to give colour to his doing so.\n\nOne alone of all my reviewers has, to my knowledge, brought Mr. Spencer\nagainst me. This was a writer in the _St. James\u2019s Gazette_ (December 2,\n1880). I challenged him in a letter which appeared (December 8, 1880),\nand said, \u201cI would ask your reviewer to be kind enough to refer your\nreaders to those passages of Mr. Spencer\u2019s \u201cPrinciples of Psychology\u201d\nwhich in any direct intelligible way refer the phenomena of instinct and\nheredity generally, to memory on the part of offspring of the action it\n_bon\u00e2 fide_ took in the persons of its forefathers.\u201d The reviewer made\nno reply, and I concluded, as I have since found correctly, that he could\nnot find the passages.\n\nTrue, in his \u201cPrinciples of Psychology\u201d (vol. ii. p. 195) Mr. Spencer\nsays that we have only to expand the doctrine that all intelligence is\nacquired through experience \u201cso as to make it include with the experience\nof each individual the experiences of all ancestral individuals,\u201d &c.\nThis is all very good, but it is much the same as saying, \u201cWe have only\ngot to stand on our heads and we shall be able to do so and so.\u201d We did\nnot see our way to standing on our heads, and Mr. Spencer did not help\nus; we had been accustomed, as I am afraid I must have said _usque ad\nnauseam_ already, to lose sight of the physical connection existing\nbetween parents and offspring; we understood from the marriage service\nthat husband and wife were in a sense one flesh, but not that parents and\nchildren were so also; and without this conception of the matter, which\nin its way is just as true as the more commonly received one, we could\nnot extend the experience of parents to offspring. It was not in the\nbond or _nexus_ of our ideas to consider experience as appertaining to\nmore than a single individual in the common acceptance of the term; these\ntwo ideas were so closely bound together that wherever the one went the\nother went perforce. Here, indeed, in the very passage of Mr. Spencer\u2019s\njust referred to, the race is throughout regarded as \u201ca series of\nindividuals\u201d\u2014without an attempt to call attention to that other view, in\nvirtue of which we are able to extend to many an idea we had been\naccustomed to confine to one.\n\nIn his chapter on Memory, Mr. Spencer certainly approaches the Heringian\nview. He says, \u201cOn the one hand, Instinct may be regarded as a kind of\norganised memory; on the other, Memory may be regarded as a kind of\nincipient instinct\u201d (\u201cPrinciples of Psychology,\u201d ed. 2, vol. i. p. 445).\nHere the ball has fallen into his hands, but if he had got firm hold of\nit he could not have written, \u201cInstinct _may be_ regarded as _a kind of_,\n&c.;\u201d to us there is neither \u201cmay be regarded as\u201d nor \u201ckind of\u201d about it;\nwe require, \u201cInstinct is inherited memory,\u201d with an explanation making it\nintelligible how memory can come to be inherited at all. I do not like,\nagain, calling memory \u201ca kind of incipient instinct;\u201d as Mr. Spencer puts\nthem the words have a pleasant antithesis, but \u201cinstinct is inherited\nmemory\u201d covers all the ground, and to say that memory is inherited\ninstinct is surplusage.\n\nNor does he stick to it long when he says that \u201cinstinct is a kind of\norganised memory,\u201d for two pages later he says that memory, to be memory\nat all, must be tolerably conscious or deliberate; he, therefore (vol. i.\np. 447), denies that there can be such a thing as unconscious memory; but\nwithout this it is impossible for us to see instinct as the \u201ckind of\norganised memory\u201d which he has just been calling it, inasmuch as instinct\nis notably undeliberate and unreflecting.\n\nA few pages farther on (vol. i. p. 452) he finds himself driven to\nunconscious memory after all, and says that \u201cconscious memory passes into\nunconscious or organic memory.\u201d Having admitted unconscious memory, he\ndeclares (vol. i. p. 450) that \u201cas fast as those connections among\npsychical states, which we form in memory, grow by constant repetition\nautomatic\u2014they _cease to be part of memory_,\u201d or, in other words, he\nagain denies that there can be an unconscious memory.\n\nMr. Spencer doubtless saw that he was involved in contradiction in terms,\nand having always understood that contradictions in terms were very\ndreadful things\u2014which, of course, under some circumstances they\nare\u2014thought it well so to express himself that his readers should be more\nlikely to push on than dwell on what was before them at the moment. I\nshould be the last to complain of him merely on the ground that he could\nnot escape contradiction in terms: who can? When facts conflict,\ncontradict one another, melt into one another as the colours of the\nspectrum so insensibly that none can say where one begins and the other\nends, contradictions in terms become first fruits of thought and speech.\nThey are the basis of intellectual consciousness, in the same way that a\nphysical obstacle is the basis of physical sensation. No opposition, no\nsensation, applies as much to the psychical as to the physical kingdom,\nas soon as these two have got well above the horizon of our thoughts and\ncan be seen as two. No contradiction, no consciousness; no cross, no\ncrown; contradictions are the very small deadlocks without which there is\nno going; going is our sense of a succession of small impediments or\ndeadlocks; it is a succession of cutting Gordian knots, which on a small\nscale please or pain as the case may be; on a larger, give an ecstasy of\npleasure, or shock to the extreme of endurance; and on a still larger,\nkill whether they be on the right side or the wrong. Nature, as I said\nin \u201cLife and Habit,\u201d hates that any principle should breed\nhermaphroditically, but will give to each an helpmeet for it which shall\ncross it and be the undoing of it; and in the undoing, do; and in the\ndoing, undo, and so _ad infinitum_. Cross-fertilisation is just as\nnecessary for continued fertility of ideas as for that of organic life,\nand the attempt to frown this or that down merely on the ground that it\ninvolves contradiction in terms, without at the same time showing that\nthe contradiction is on a larger scale than healthy thought can stomach,\nargues either small sense or small sincerity on the part of those who\nmake it. The contradictions employed by Mr. Spencer are objectionable,\nnot on the ground of their being contradictions at all, but on the ground\nof their being blinked, and used unintelligently.\n\nBut though it is not possible for any one to get a clear conception of\nMr. Spencer\u2019s meaning, we may say with more confidence what it was that\nhe did not mean. He did not mean to make memory the keystone of his\nsystem; he has none of that sense of the unifying, binding force of\nmemory which Professor Hering has so well expressed, nor does he show any\nsigns of perceiving the far-reaching consequences that ensue if the\nphenomena of heredity are considered as phenomena of memory. Thus, when\nhe is dealing with the phenomena of old age (vol. i. p. 538, ed. 2) he\ndoes not ascribe them to lapse and failure of memory, nor surmise the\nprinciple underlying longevity. He never mentions memory in connection\nwith heredity without presently saying something which makes us\ninvoluntarily think of a man missing an easy catch at cricket; it is only\nrarely, however, that he connects the two at all. I have only been able\nto find the word \u201cinherited\u201d or any derivative of the verb \u201cto inherit\u201d\nin connection with memory once in all the 1300 long pages of the\n\u201cPrinciples of Psychology.\u201d It occurs in vol ii. p. 200, 2d ed., where\nthe words stand, \u201cMemory, inherited or acquired.\u201d I submit that this was\nunintelligible when Mr. Spencer wrote it, for want of an explanation\nwhich he never gave; I submit, also, that he could not have left it\nunexplained, nor yet as an unrepeated expression not introduced till late\nin his work, if he had had any idea of its pregnancy.\n\nAt any rate, whether he intended to imply what he now implies that he\nintended to imply (for Mr. Spencer, like the late Mr. Darwin, is fond of\nqualifying phrases), I have shown that those most able and willing to\nunderstand him did not take him to mean what he now appears anxious to\nhave it supposed that he meant. Surely, moreover, if he had meant it he\nwould have spoken sooner, when he saw his meaning had been missed. I\ncan, however, have no hesitation in saying that if I had known the\n\u201cPrinciples of Psychology\u201d earlier, as well as I know the work now, I\nshould have used it largely.\n\nIt may be interesting, before we leave Mr. Spencer, to see whether he\neven now assigns to continued personality and memory the place assigned\nto it by Professor Hering and myself. I will therefore give the\nconcluding words of the letter to the _Athen\u00e6um_ already referred to, in\nwhich he tells us to stand aside. He writes \u201cI still hold that\ninheritance of functionally produced modifications is the chief factor\nthroughout the higher stages of organic evolution, bodily as well as\nmental (see \u2018Principles of Biology,\u2019 i. 166), while I recognise the truth\nthat throughout the lower stages survival of the fittest is the chief\nfactor, and in the lowest the almost exclusive factor.\u201d\n\nThis is the same confused and confusing utterance which Mr. Spencer has\nbeen giving us any time this thirty years. According to him the fact\nthat variations can be inherited and accumulated has less to do with the\nfirst development of organic life, than the fact that if a square\norganism happens to get into a square hole, it will live longer and more\nhappily than a square organism which happens to get into a round one; he\ndeclares \u201cthe survival of the fittest\u201d\u2014and this is nothing but the fact\nthat those who \u201cfit\u201d best into their surroundings will live longest and\nmost comfortably\u2014to have more to do with the development of the am\u0153ba\ninto, we will say, a mollusc than heredity itself. True, \u201cinheritance of\nfunctionally produced modifications\u201d is allowed to be the chief factor\nthroughout the \u201chigher stages of organic evolution,\u201d but it has very\nlittle to do in the lower; in these \u201cthe almost exclusive factor\u201d is not\nheredity, or inheritance, but \u201csurvival of the fittest.\u201d\n\nOf course we know that Mr. Spencer does not believe this; of course,\nalso, all who are fairly well up in the history of the development theory\nwill see why Mr. Spencer has attempted to draw this distinction between\nthe \u201cfactors\u201d of the development of the higher and lower forms of life;\nbut no matter how or why Mr. Spencer has been led to say what he has, he\nhas no business to have said it. What can we think of a writer who,\nafter so many years of writing upon his subject, in a passage in which he\nshould make his meaning doubly clear, inasmuch as he is claiming ground\ntaken by other writers, declares that though hereditary use and disuse,\nor, to use his own words, \u201cthe inheritance of functionally produced\nmodifications,\u201d is indeed very important in connection with the\ndevelopment of the higher forms of life, yet heredity itself has little\nor nothing to do with that of the lower? Variations, whether produced\nfunctionally or not, can only be perpetuated and accumulated because they\ncan be inherited;\u2014and this applies just as much to the lower as to the\nhigher forms of life; the question which Professor Hering and I have\ntried to answer is, \u201cHow comes it that anything can be inherited at all?\nIn virtue of what power is it that offspring can repeat and improve upon\nthe performances of their parents?\u201d Our answer was, \u201cBecause in a very\nvalid sense, though not perhaps in the most usually understood, there is\ncontinued personality and an abiding memory between successive\ngenerations.\u201d How does Mr. Spencer\u2019s confession of faith touch this? If\nany meaning can be extracted from his words, he is no more supporting\nthis view now than he was when he wrote the passages he has adduced to\nshow that he was supporting it thirty years ago; but after all no\ncoherent meaning can be got out of Mr. Spencer\u2019s letter\u2014except, of\ncourse, that Professor Hering and myself are to stand aside. I have\nabundantly shown that I am very ready to do this in favour of Professor\nHering, but see no reason for admitting Mr. Spencer\u2019s claim to have been\namong the forestallers of \u201cLife and Habit.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nChapter IV {52a}\nMr. Romanes\u2019 \u201cMental Evolution in Animals\u201d\n\n\nWITHOUT raising the unprofitable question how Mr. Romanes, in spite of\nthe indifference with which he treated the theory of Inherited Memory in\n1881, came, in 1883, to be sufficiently imbued with a sense of its\nimportance, I still cannot afford to dispense with the weight of his\nauthority, and in this chapter will show how closely he not infrequently\napproaches the Heringian position.\n\nThus, he says that the analogies between the memory with which we are\nfamiliar in daily life and hereditary memory \u201care so numerous and\nprecise\u201d as to justify us in considering them to be of essentially the\nsame kind. {52b}\n\nAgain, he says that although the memory of milk shown by new-born infants\nis \u201cat all events in large part hereditary, it is none the less memory\u201d\nof a certain kind. {52c}\n\nTwo lines lower down he writes of \u201chereditary memory or instinct,\u201d\nthereby implying that instinct is \u201chereditary memory.\u201d \u201cIt makes no\nessential difference,\u201d he says, \u201cwhether the past sensation was actually\nexperienced by the individual itself, or bequeathed it, so to speak, by\nits ancestors. {52d} For it makes no essential difference whether the\nnervous changes . . . were occasioned during the life-time of the\nindividual or during that of the species, and afterwards impressed by\nheredity on the individual.\u201d\n\nLower down on the same page he writes:\u2014\n\n\u201cAs showing how close is the connection between hereditary memory and\ninstinct,\u201d &c.\n\nAnd on the following page:\u2014\n\n\u201cAnd this shows how closely the phenomena of hereditary memory are\nrelated to those of individual memory: at this stage . . . it is\npractically impossible to disentangle the effects of hereditary memory\nfrom those of the individual.\u201d\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cAnother point which we have here to consider is the part which heredity\nhas played in forming the perceptive faculty of the individual prior to\nits own experience. We have already seen that heredity plays an\nimportant part in forming memory of ancestral experiences, and thus it is\nthat many animals come into the world with their power of perception\nalready largely developed. The wealth of ready-formed information, and\ntherefore of ready-made powers of perception, with which many newly-born\nor newly-hatched animals are provided, is so great and so precise that it\nscarcely requires to be supplemented by the subsequent experience of the\nindividual.\u201d {53a}\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cInstincts probably owe their origin and development to one or other of\nthe two principles.\n\n\u201cI. The first mode of origin consists in natural selection or survival\nof the fittest, continuously preserving actions, &c. &c.\n\n\u201cII. The second mode of origin is as follows:\u2014By the effects of habit in\nsuccessive generations, actions which were originally intelligent become\nas it were stereotyped into permanent instincts. Just as in the lifetime\nof the individual adjustive actions which were originally intelligent may\nby frequent repetition become automatic, so in the lifetime of species\nactions originally intelligent may by frequent repetition and heredity so\nwrite their effects on the nervous system that the latter is prepared,\neven before individual experience, to perform adjustive actions\nmechanically which in previous generations were performed intelligently.\nThis mode of origin of instincts has been appropriately called (by\nLewes\u2014see \u201cProblems of Life and Mind\u201d {54a}) the \u2018lapsing of\nintelligence.\u2019\u201d {54b}\n\nI may say in passing that in spite of the great stress laid by Mr.\nRomanes both in his \u201cMental Evolution in Animals\u201d and in his letters to\nthe _Athen\u00e6um_ in March 1884, on Natural Selection as an originator and\ndeveloper of instinct, he very soon afterwards let the Natural Selection\npart of the story go as completely without saying as I do myself, or as\nMr. Darwin did during the later years of his life. Writing to _Nature_,\nApril 10, 1884, he said: \u201cTo deny _that experience in the course of\nsuccessive generations is the source of instinct_, is not to meet by way\nof argument the enormous mass of evidence which goes to prove _that this\nis the case_.\u201d Here, then, instinct is referred, without reservation, to\n\u201cexperience in successive generations,\u201d and this is nonsense unless\nexplained as Professor Hering and I explain it. Mr. Romanes\u2019 words, in\nfact, amount to an unqualified acceptance of the chapter \u201cInstinct as\nInherited Memory\u201d given in \u201cLife and Habit,\u201d of which Mr. Romanes in\nMarch 1884 wrote in terms which it is not necessary to repeat.\n\nLater on:\u2014\n\n\u201cThat \u2018practice makes perfect\u2019 is a matter, as I have previously said, of\ndaily observation. Whether we regard a juggler, a pianist, or a\nbilliard-player, a child learning his lesson or an actor his part by\nfrequently repeating it, or a thousand other illustrations of the same\nprocess, we see at once that there is truth in the cynical definition of\na man as a \u2018bundle of habits.\u2019 And the same, of course, is true of\nanimals.\u201d {55a}\n\nFrom this Mr. Romanes goes on to show \u201cthat automatic actions and\nconscious habits may be inherited,\u201d {55b} and in the course of doing this\ncontends that \u201cinstincts may be lost by disuse, and conversely that they\nmay be acquired as instincts by the hereditary transmission of ancestral\nexperience.\u201d\n\nOn another page Mr. Romanes says:\u2014\n\n\u201cLet us now turn to the second of these two assumptions, viz., that some\nat least among migratory birds must possess, by inheritance alone, a very\nprecise knowledge of the particular direction to be pursued. It is\nwithout question an astonishing fact that a young cuckoo should be\nprompted to leave its foster parents at a particular season of the year,\nand without any guide to show the course previously taken by its own\nparents, but this is a fact which must be met by any theory of instinct\nwhich aims at being complete. Now upon our own theory it can only be met\nby taking it to be due to inherited memory.\u201d\n\nA little lower Mr. Romanes says: \u201cOf what kind, then, is the inherited\nmemory on which the young cuckoo (if not also other migratory birds)\ndepends? We can only answer, of the same kind, whatever this may be, as\nthat upon which the old bird depends.\u201d {55c}\n\nI have given above most of the more marked passages which I have been\nable to find in Mr. Romanes\u2019 book which attribute instinct to memory, and\nwhich admit that there is no fundamental difference between the kind of\nmemory with which we are all familiar and hereditary memory as\ntransmitted from one generation to another.\n\nBut throughout his work there are passages which suggest, though less\nobviously, the same inference.\n\nThe passages I have quoted show that Mr. Romanes is upholding the same\nopinions as Professor Hering\u2019s and my own, but their effect and tendency\nis more plain here than in Mr Romanes\u2019 own book, where they are overlaid\nby nearly 400 long pages of matter which is not always easy of\ncomprehension.\n\nMoreover, at the same time that I claim the weight of Mr. Romanes\u2019\nauthority, I am bound to admit that I do not find his support\nsatisfactory. The late Mr. Darwin himself\u2014whose mantle seems to have\nfallen more especially and particularly on Mr. Romanes\u2014could not\ncontradict himself more hopelessly than Mr. Romanes often does. Indeed\nin one of the very passages I have quoted in order to show that Mr.\nRomanes accepts the phenomena of heredity as phenomena of memory, he\nspeaks of \u201cheredity as playing an important part _in forming memory_ of\nancestral experiences;\u201d so that, whereas I want him to say that the\nphenomena of heredity are due to memory, he will have it that the memory\nis due to the heredity, which seems to me absurd.\n\nOver and over again Mr. Romanes insists that it is heredity which does\nthis or that. Thus it is \u201c_heredity with natural selection which adapt_\nthe anatomical plan of the ganglia.\u201d {56a} It is heredity which\nimpresses nervous changes on the individual. {56b} \u201cIn the lifetime of\nspecies actions originally intelligent may by frequent repetition and\nheredity,\u201d &c.; {56c} but he nowhere tells us what heredity is any more\nthan Messrs. Herbert Spencer, Darwin, and Lewes have done. This,\nhowever, is exactly what Professor Hering, whom I have unwittingly\nfollowed, does. He resolves all phenomena of heredity, whether in\nrespect of body or mind, into phenomena of memory. He says in effect, \u201cA\nman grows his body as he does, and a bird makes her nest as she does,\nbecause both man and bird remember having grown body and made nest as\nthey now do, or very nearly so, on innumerable past occasions.\u201d He thus,\nas I have said on an earlier page, reduces life from an equation of say\n100 unknown quantities to one of 99 only by showing that heredity and\nmemory, two of the original 100 unknown quantities, are in reality part\nof one and the same thing.\n\nThat he is right Mr. Romanes seems to me to admit, though in a very\nunsatisfactory way.\n\nWhat, for example, can be more unsatisfactory than the following?\u2014Mr.\nRomanes says that the most fundamental principle of mental operation is\nthat of memory, and that this \u201cis the _conditio sine qu\u00e2 non_ of all\nmental life\u201d (page 35).\n\nI do not understand Mr. Romanes to hold that there is any living being\nwhich has no mind at all, and I do understand him to admit that\ndevelopment of body and mind are closely interdependent.\n\nIf, then, \u201cthe most fundamental principle\u201d of mind is memory, it follows\nthat memory enters also as a fundamental principle into development of\nbody. For mind and body are so closely connected that nothing can enter\nlargely into the one without correspondingly affecting the other.\n\nOn a later page Mr. Romanes speaks point-blank of the new-born child as\n\u201c_embodying_ the results of a great mass of _hereditary experience_\u201d (p.\n77), so that what he is driving at can be collected by those who take\ntrouble, but is not seen until we call up from our own knowledge matter\nwhose relevancy does not appear on the face of it, and until we connect\npassages many pages asunder, the first of which may easily be forgotten\nbefore we reach the second. There can be no doubt, however, that Mr.\nRomanes does in reality, like Professor Hering and myself, regard\ndevelopment, whether of mind or body, as due to memory, for it is now\npretty generally seen to be nonsense to talk about \u201chereditary\nexperience\u201d or \u201chereditary memory\u201d if anything else is intended.\n\nI have said above that on page 113 of his recent work Mr. Romanes\ndeclares the analogies between the memory with which we are familiar in\ndaily life, and hereditary memory, to be \u201cso numerous and precise\u201d as to\njustify us in considering them as of one and the same kind.\n\nThis is certainly his meaning, but, with the exception of the words\nwithin inverted commas, it is not his language. His own words are\nthese:\u2014\n\n\u201cProfound, however, as our ignorance unquestionably is concerning the\nphysical substratum of memory, I think we are at least justified in\nregarding this substratum as the same both in ganglionic or organic, and\nin the conscious or psychological memory, seeing that the analogies\nbetween them are so numerous and precise. Consciousness is but an\nadjunct which arises when the physical processes, owing to infrequency of\nrepetition, complexity of operation, or other causes, involve what I have\nbefore called ganglionic friction.\u201d\n\nI submit that I have correctly translated Mr. Romanes\u2019 meaning, and also\nthat we have a right to complain of his not saying what he has to say in\nwords which will involve less \u201cganglionic friction\u201d on the part of the\nreader.\n\nAnother example may be found on p. 43 of Mr. Romanes\u2019 book. \u201cLastly,\u201d he\nwrites, \u201cjust as innumerable special mechanisms of muscular\nco-ordinations are found to be inherited, innumerable special\nassociations of ideas are found to be the same, and in one case as in the\nother the strength of the organically imposed connection is found to bear\na direct proportion to the frequency with which in the history of the\nspecies it has occurred.\u201d\n\nMr. Romanes is here intending what the reader will find insisted on on p.\n51 of \u201cLife and Habit;\u201d but how difficult he has made what could have\nbeen said intelligibly enough, if there had been nothing but the reader\u2019s\ncomfort to be considered. Unfortunately that seems to have been by no\nmeans the only thing of which Mr. Romanes was thinking, or why, after\nimplying and even saying over and over again that instinct is inherited\nhabit due to inherited memory, should he turn sharply round on p. 297 and\npraise Mr. Darwin for trying to snuff out \u201cthe well-known doctrine of\ninherited habit as advanced by Lamarck\u201d? The answer is not far to seek.\nIt is because Mr. Romanes did not merely want to tell us all about\ninstinct, but wanted also, if I may use a homely metaphor, to hunt with\nthe hounds and run with the hare at one and the same time.\n\nI remember saying that if the late Mr. Darwin \u201chad told us what the\nearlier evolutionists said, why they said it, wherein he differed from\nthem, and in what way he proposed to set them straight, he would have\ntaken a course at once more agreeable with usual practice, and more\nlikely to remove misconception from his own mind and from those of his\nreaders.\u201d {59a} This I have no doubt was one of the passages which made\nMr. Romanes so angry with me. I can find no better words to apply to Mr.\nRomanes himself. He knows perfectly well what others have written about\nthe connection between heredity and memory, and he knows no less well\nthat so far as he is intelligible at all he is taking the same view that\nthey have taken. If he had begun by saying what they had said, and had\nthen improved on it, I for one should have been only too glad to be\nimproved upon.\n\nMr. Romanes has spoiled his book just because this plain old-fashioned\nmethod of procedure was not good enough for him. One-half the obscurity\nwhich makes his meaning so hard to apprehend is due to exactly the same\ncause as that which has ruined so much of the late Mr. Darwin\u2019s work\u2014I\nmean to a desire to appear to be differing altogether from others with\nwhom he knew himself after all to be in substantial agreement. He\nadopts, but (probably quite unconsciously) in his anxiety to avoid\nappearing to adopt, he obscures what he is adopting.\n\nHere, for example, is Mr. Romanes\u2019 definition of instinct:\u2014\n\n\u201cInstinct is reflex action into which there is imported the element of\nconsciousness. The term is therefore a generic one, comprising all those\nfaculties of mind which are concerned in conscious and adaptive action,\nantecedent to individual experience, without necessary knowledge of the\nrelation between means employed and ends attained, but similarly\nperformed under similar and frequently recurring circumstances by all the\nindividuals of the same species.\u201d {60a}\n\nIf Mr. Romanes would have been content to build frankly upon Professor\nHering\u2019s foundation, the soundness of which he has elsewhere abundantly\nadmitted, he might have said\u2014\n\n\u201cInstinct is knowledge or habit acquired in past generations\u2014the new\ngeneration remembering what happened to it before it parted company with\nthe old. More briefly, Instinct is inherited memory.\u201d Then he might\nhave added a rider\u2014\n\n\u201cIf a habit is acquired as a new one, during any given lifetime, it is\nnot an instinct. If having been acquired in one lifetime it is\ntransmitted to offspring, it is an instinct in the offspring, though it\nwas not an instinct in the parent. If the habit is transmitted\npartially, it must be considered as partly instinctive and partly\nacquired.\u201d\n\nThis is easy; it tells people how they may test any action so as to know\nwhat they ought to call it; it leaves well alone by avoiding all such\ndebatable matters as reflex action, consciousness, intelligence, purpose,\nknowledge of purpose, &c.; it both introduces the feature of inheritance\nwhich is the one mainly distinguishing instinctive from so-called\nintelligent actions, and shows the manner in which these last pass into\nthe first, that is to say, by way of memory and habitual repetition;\nfinally it points the fact that the new generation is not to be looked\nupon as a new thing, but (as Dr. Erasmus Darwin long since said {61a}) as\n\u201ca branch or elongation\u201d of the one immediately preceding it.\n\nIn Mr. Darwin\u2019s case it is hardly possible to exaggerate the waste of\ntime, money and trouble that has been caused, by his not having been\ncontent to appear as descending with modification like other people from\nthose who went before him. It will take years to get the evolution\ntheory out of the mess in which Mr. Darwin has left it. He was heir to a\ndiscredited truth; he left behind him an accredited fallacy. Mr.\nRomanes, if he is not stopped in time, will get the theory connecting\nheredity and memory into just such another muddle as Mr. Darwin has got\nevolution, for surely the writer who can talk about \u201c_heredity being able\nto work up_ the faculty of homing into the instinct of migration,\u201d {61b}\nor of \u201cthe principle of (natural) selection combining with that of\nlapsing intelligence to the formation of a joint result,\u201d {61c} is little\nlikely to depart from the usual methods of scientific procedure with\nadvantage either to himself or any one else. Fortunately Mr. Romanes is\nnot Mr. Darwin, and though he has certainly got Mr. Darwin\u2019s mantle, and\ngot it very much too, it will not on Mr. Romanes\u2019 shoulders hide a good\ndeal that people were not going to observe too closely while Mr. Darwin\nwore it.\n\nI ought to say that the late Mr. Darwin appears himself eventually to\nhave admitted the soundness of the theory connecting heredity and memory.\nMr. Romanes quotes a letter written by Mr. Darwin in the last year of his\nlife, in which he speaks of an intelligent action gradually becoming\n\u201c_instinctive_, _i.e._, _memory transmitted from one generation to\nanother_.\u201d {62a}\n\nBriefly, the stages of Mr. Darwin\u2019s opinion upon the subject of\nhereditary memory are as follows:\u2014\n\n1859. \u201cIt would be _the most serious error_ to suppose that the greater\nnumber of instincts have been acquired by habit in one generation and\ntransmitted by inheritance to succeeding generations.\u201d {62b} And this\nmore especially applies to the instincts of many ants.\n\n1876. \u201cIt would be a _serious error_ to suppose,\u201d &c., as before. {62c}\n\n1881. \u201cWe should remember _what a mass of inherited knowledge_ is\ncrowded into the minute brain of a worker ant.\u201d {62d}\n\n1881 or 1882. Speaking of a given habitual action Mr. Darwin writes: \u201cIt\ndoes not seem to me at all incredible that this action [and why this more\nthan any other habitual action?] should then become instinctive:\u201d i.e.,\n_memory transmitted from one generation to another_. {62e}\n\nAnd yet in 1839, or thereabouts, Mr. Darwin had pretty nearly grasped the\nconception from which until the last year or two of his life he so\nfatally strayed; for in his contribution to the volumes giving an account\nof the voyages of the _Adventure_ and _Beagle_, he wrote: \u201cNature by\nmaking habit omnipotent and its effects hereditary, has fitted the\nFuegian for the climate and productions of his country\u201d (p. 237).\n\nWhat is the secret of the long departure from the simple common-sense\nview of the matter which he took when he was a young man? I imagine\nsimply what I have referred to in the preceding chapter, over-anxiety to\nappear to be differing from his grandfather, Dr. Erasmus Darwin, and\nLamarck.\n\nI believe I may say that Mr. Darwin before he died not only admitted the\nconnection between memory and heredity, but came also to see that he must\nreadmit that design in organism which he had so many years opposed. For\nin the preface to Hermann M\u00fcller\u2019s \u201cFertilisation of Flowers,\u201d {63a}\nwhich bears a date only a very few weeks prior to Mr. Darwin\u2019s death, I\nfind him saying:\u2014\u201cDesign in nature has for a long time deeply interested\nmany men, and though the subject must now be looked at from a somewhat\ndifferent point of view from what was formerly the case, it is not on\nthat account rendered less interesting.\u201d This is mused forth as a\ngeneral gnome, and may mean anything or nothing: the writer of the\nletterpress under the hieroglyph in Old Moore\u2019s Almanac could not be more\nguarded; but I think I know what it does mean.\n\nI cannot, of course, be sure; Mr. Darwin did not probably intend that I\nshould; but I assume with confidence that whether there is design in\norganism or no, there is at any rate design in this passage of Mr.\nDarwin\u2019s. This, we may be sure, is not a fortuitous variation; and,\nmoreover, it is introduced for some reason which made Mr. Darwin think it\nworth while to go out of his way to introduce it. It has no fitness in\nits connection with Hermann M\u00fcller\u2019s book, for what little Hermann M\u00fcller\nsays about teleology at all is to condemn it; why, then, should Mr.\nDarwin muse here of all places in the world about the interest attaching\nto design in organism? Neither has the passage any connection with the\nrest of the preface. There is not another word about design, and even\nhere Mr. Darwin seems mainly anxious to face both ways, and pat design as\nit were on the head while not committing himself to any proposition which\ncould be disputed.\n\nThe explanation is sufficiently obvious. Mr Darwin wanted to hedge. He\nsaw that the design which his works had been mainly instrumental in\npitchforking out of organisms no less manifestly designed than a\nburglar\u2019s jemmy is designed, had nevertheless found its way back again,\nand that though, as I insisted in \u201cEvolution Old and New,\u201d and\n\u201cUnconscious Memory,\u201d it must now be placed within the organism instead\nof outside it, as \u201cwas formerly the case,\u201d it was not on that account any\nthe less\u2014design, as well as interesting.\n\nI should like to have seen Mr. Darwin say this more explicitly. Indeed I\nshould have liked to have seen Mr. Darwin say anything at all about the\nmeaning of which there could be no mistake, and without contradicting\nhimself elsewhere; but this was not Mr. Darwin\u2019s manner.\n\nIn passing I will give another example of Mr Darwin\u2019s manner when he did\nnot quite dare even to hedge. It is to be found in the preface which he\nwrote to Professor Weismann\u2019s \u201cStudies in the Theory of Descent,\u201d\npublished in 1881.\n\n\u201cSeveral distinguished naturalists,\u201d says Mr. Darwin, \u201cmaintain with much\nconfidence that organic beings tend to vary and to rise in the scale,\nindependently of the conditions to which they and their progenitors have\nbeen exposed; whilst others maintain that all variation is due to such\nexposure, though the manner in which the environment acts is as yet quite\nunknown. At the present time there is hardly any question in biology of\nmore importance than this of the nature and causes of variability; and\nthe reader will find in the present work an able discussion on the whole\nsubject, which will probably lead him to pause before he admits the\nexistence of an innate tendency to perfectibility\u201d\u2014or towards _being able\nto be perfected_.\n\nI could find no able discussion upon the whole subject in Professor\nWeismann\u2019s book. There was a little something here and there, but not\nmuch.\n\nIt may be expected that I should say something here about Mr. Romanes\u2019\nlatest contribution to biology\u2014I mean his theory of physiological\nselection, of which the two first instalments have appeared in _Nature_\njust as these pages are leaving my hands, and many months since the\nforegoing, and most of the following chapters were written. I admit to\nfeeling a certain sense of thankfulness that they did not appear earlier;\nas it is, my book is too far advanced to be capable of further embryonic\nchange, and this must be my excuse for saying less about Mr. Romanes\u2019\ntheory than I might perhaps otherwise do. I cordially, however, agree\nwith the _Times_, which says that \u201cMr. George Romanes appears to be the\nbiological investigator on whom the mantle of Mr. Darwin has most\nconspicuously descended\u201d (August 16, 1886). Mr. Romanes is just the\nperson whom the late Mr. Darwin would select to carry on his work, and\nMr. Darwin was just the kind of person towards whom Mr. Romanes would\nfind himself instinctively attracted.\n\nThe _Times_ continues\u2014\u201cThe position which Mr. Romanes takes up is the\nresult of his perception shared by many evolutionists, that the theory of\nnatural selection is not really a theory of the origin of species. . . .\u201d\nWhat, then, becomes of Mr. Darwin\u2019s most famous work, which was written\nexpressly to establish natural selection as the main means of organic\nmodification? \u201cThe new factor which Mr. Romanes suggests,\u201d continues the\n_Times_, \u201cis that at a certain stage of development of varieties in a\nstate of nature a change takes place in their reproductive systems,\nrendering those which differ in some particulars mutually infertile, and\nthus the formation of new permanent species takes place without the\nswamping effect of free intercrossing. . . . How his theory can be\nproperly termed one of selection he fails to make clear. If correct, it\nis a law or principle of operation rather than a process of selection.\nIt has been objected to Mr. Romanes\u2019 theory that it is the re-statement\nof a fact. This objection is less important than the lack of facts in\nsupport of the theory.\u201d The _Times_, however, implies it as its opinion\nthat the required facts will be forthcoming by and by, and that when they\nhave been found Mr. Romanes\u2019 suggestion will constitute \u201cthe most\nimportant addition to the theory of evolution since the publication of\nthe \u2018Origin of Species.\u2019\u201d Considering that the _Times_ has just implied\nthe main thesis of the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d to be one which does not stand\nexamination, this is rather a doubtful compliment.\n\nNeither Mr. Romanes nor the writer in the _Times_ appears to perceive\nthat the results which may or may not be supposed to ensue on choice\ndepend upon what it is that is supposed to be chosen from; they do not\nappear to see that though the expression natural selection must be always\nmore or less objectionable, as too highly charged with metaphor for\npurposes of science, there is nevertheless a natural selection which is\nopen to no other objection than this, and which, when its metaphorical\ncharacter is borne well in mind, may be used without serious risk of\nerror, whereas natural selection from variations that are mainly\nfortuitous is chimerical as well as metaphorical. Both writers speak of\nnatural selection as though there could not possibly be any selection in\nthe course of nature, or natural survival, of any but accidental\nvariations. Thus Mr. Romanes says: {66a} \u201cThe swamping effect of free\ninter-crossing upon an individual variation constitutes perhaps the most\nformidable difficulty with which _the theory of natural selection_ is\nbeset.\u201d And the writer of the article in the _Times_ above referred to\nsays: \u201cIn truth _the theory of natural selection_ presents many facts and\nresults which increase rather than diminish the difficulty of accounting\nfor the existence of species.\u201d The assertion made in each case is true\nif the Charles-Darwinian selection from fortuitous variations is\nintended, but it does not hold good if the selection is supposed to be\nmade from variations under which there lies a general principle of wide\nand abiding application. It is not likely that a man of Mr. Romanes\u2019\nantecedents should not be perfectly awake to considerations so obvious as\nthe foregoing, and I am afraid I am inclined to consider his whole\nsuggestion as only an attempt upon the part of the wearer of Mr. Darwin\u2019s\nmantle to carry on Mr. Darwin\u2019s work in Mr. Darwin\u2019s spirit.\n\nI have seen Professor Hering\u2019s theory adopted recently more unreservedly\nby Dr. Creighton in his \u201cIllustrations of Unconscious Memory in Disease.\u201d\n{67a} Dr. Creighton avowedly bases his system on Professor Hering\u2019s\naddress, and endorses it; it is with much pleasure that I have seen him\nlend the weight of his authority to the theory that each cell and organ\nhas an individual memory. In \u201cLife and Habit\u201d I expressed a hope that\nthe opinions it upheld would be found useful by medical men, and am\ntherefore the more glad to see that this has proved to be the case. I\nmay perhaps be pardoned if I quote the passage in \u201cLife and Habit\u201d to\nwhich I am referring. It runs:\u2014\n\n\u201c_Mutatis mutandis_, the above would seem to hold as truly about medicine\nas about politics. We cannot reason with our cells, for they know so\nmuch more\u201d (of course I mean \u201cabout their own business\u201d) \u201cthan we do,\nthat they cannot understand us;\u2014but though we cannot reason with them, we\ncan find out what they have been most accustomed to, and what, therefore,\nthey are most likely to expect; we can see that they get this as far as\nit is in our power to give it them, and may then generally leave the rest\nto them, only bearing in mind that they will rebel equally against too\nsudden a change of treatment and no change at all\u201d (p. 305).\n\nDr. Creighton insists chiefly on the importance of change, which\u2014though I\ndid not notice his saying so\u2014he would doubtless see as a mode of\ncross-fertilisation, fraught in all respects with the same advantages as\nthis, and requiring the same precautions against abuse; he would not,\nhowever, I am sure, deny that there could be no fertility of good results\nif too wide a cross were attempted, so that I may claim the weight of his\nauthority as supporting both the theory of an unconscious memory in\ngeneral, and the particular application of it to medicine which I had\nventured to suggest.\n\n\u201cHas the word \u2018memory,\u2019\u201d he asks, \u201ca real application to unconscious\norganic phenomena, or do we use it outside its ancient limits only in a\nfigure of speech?\u201d\n\n\u201cIf I had thought,\u201d he continues later, \u201cthat unconscious memory was no\nmore than a metaphor, and the detailed application of it to these various\nforms of disease merely allegorical, I should still have judged it not\nunprofitable to represent a somewhat hackneyed class of maladies in the\nlight of a parable. None of our faculties is more familiar to us in its\nworkings than the memory, and there is hardly any force or power in\nnature which every one knows so well as the force of habit. To say that\na neurotic subject is like a person with a retentive memory, or that a\ndiathesis gradually acquired is like an over-mastering habit, is at all\nevents to make comparisons with things that we all understand.\n\n\u201cFor reasons given chiefly in the first chapter, I conclude that\nretentiveness, with reproduction, is a single undivided faculty\nthroughout the whole of our life, whether mental or bodily, conscious or\nunconscious; and I claim the description of a certain class of maladies\naccording to the phraseology of memory and habit as a real description\nand not a figurative.\u201d (p. 2.)\n\nAs a natural consequence of the foregoing he regards \u201calterative action\u201d\nas \u201chabit-breaking action.\u201d\n\nAs regards the organism\u2019s being guided throughout its development to\nmaturity by an unconscious memory, Dr. Creighton says that \u201cProfessor\nBain calls reproduction the acme of organic complication.\u201d \u201cI should\nprefer to say,\u201d he adds, \u201cthe acme of organic implication; for the reason\nthat the sperm and germ elements are perfectly simple, having nothing in\ntheir form or structure to show for the marvellous potentialities within\nthem.\n\n\u201cI now come to the application of these considerations to the doctrine of\nunconscious memory. If generation is the acme of organic implicitness,\nwhat is its correlative in nature, what is the acme of organic\nexplicitness? Obviously the fine flower of consciousness. Generation is\nimplicit memory, consciousness is explicit memory; generation is\npotential memory, consciousness is actual memory.\u201d\n\nI am not sure that I understand the preceding paragraph as clearly as I\nshould wish, but having quoted enough to perhaps induce the reader to\nturn to Dr. Creighton\u2019s book, I will proceed to the subject indicated in\nmy title.\n\n\n\n\nChapter V\nStatement of the Question at Issue\n\n\nOF the two points referred to in the opening sentence of this book\u2014I mean\nthe connection between heredity and memory, and the reintroduction of\ndesign into organic modification\u2014the second is both the more important\nand the one which stands most in need of support. The substantial\nidentity between heredity and memory is becoming generally admitted; as\nregards my second point, however, I cannot flatter myself that I have\nmade much way against the formidable array of writers on the\nneo-Darwinian side; I shall therefore devote the rest of my book as far\nas possible to this subject only. Natural selection (meaning by these\nwords the preservation in the ordinary course of nature of favourable\nvariations that are supposed to be mainly matters of pure good luck and\nin no way arising out of function) has been, to use an Americanism than\nwhich I can find nothing apter, the biggest biological boom of the last\nquarter of a century; it is not, therefore, to be wondered at that\nProfessor Ray Lankester, Mr. Romanes, Mr. Grant Allen, and others, should\nshow some impatience at seeing its value as prime means of modification\ncalled in question. Within the last few months, indeed, Mr. Grant Allen\n{70a} and Professor Ray Lankester {70b} in England, and Dr. Ernst Krause\n{70c} in Germany, have spoken and written warmly in support of the theory\nof natural selection, and in opposition to the views taken by myself; if\nthey are not to be left in possession of the field the sooner they are\nmet the better.\n\nStripped of detail the point at issue is this;\u2014whether luck or cunning is\nthe fitter to be insisted on as the main means of organic development.\nErasmus Darwin and Lamarck answered this question in favour of cunning.\nThey settled it in favour of intelligent perception of the\nsituation\u2014within, of course, ever narrower and narrower limits as\norganism retreats farther backwards from ourselves\u2014and persistent effort\nto turn it to account. They made this the soul of all development\nwhether of mind or body.\n\nAnd they made it, like all other souls, liable to aberration both for\nbetter and worse. They held that some organisms show more ready wit and\n_savoir faire_ than others; that some give more proofs of genius and have\nmore frequent happy thoughts than others, and that some have even gone\nthrough waters of misery which they have used as wells.\n\nThe sheet anchor both of Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck is in good sense and\nthrift; still they are aware that money has been sometimes made by\n\u201cstriking oil,\u201d and ere now been transmitted to descendants in spite of\nthe haphazard way in which it was originally acquired. No speculation,\nno commerce; \u201cnothing venture, nothing have,\u201d is as true for the\ndevelopment of organic wealth as for that of any other kind, and neither\nErasmus Darwin nor Lamarck hesitated about admitting that highly\npicturesque and romantic incidents of developmental venture do from time\nto time occur in the race histories even of the dullest and most\ndead-level organisms under the name of \u201csports;\u201d but they would hold that\neven these occur most often and most happily to those that have\npersevered in well-doing for some generations. Unto the organism that\nhath is given, and from the organism that hath not is taken away; so that\neven \u201csports\u201d prove to be only a little off thrift, which still remains\nthe sheet anchor of the early evolutionists. They believe, in fact, that\nmore organic wealth has been made by saving than in any other way. The\nrace is not in the long run to the phenomenally swift nor the battle to\nthe phenomenally strong, but to the good average all-round organism that\nis alike shy of Radical crotchets and old world obstructiveness.\n_Festina_, but _festina lente_\u2014perhaps as involving so completely the\ncontradiction in terms which must underlie all modification\u2014is the motto\nthey would assign to organism, and _Chi va piano va lontano_, they hold\nto be a maxim as old, if not as the hills (and they have a hankering even\nafter these), at any rate as the am\u0153ba.\n\nTo repeat in other words. All enduring forms establish a _modus vivendi_\nwith their surroundings. They can do this because both they and the\nsurroundings are plastic within certain undefined but somewhat narrow\nlimits. They are plastic because they can to some extent change their\nhabits, and changed habit, if persisted in, involves corresponding\nchange, however slight, in the organs employed; but their plasticity\ndepends in great measure upon their failure to perceive that they are\nmoulding themselves. If a change is so great that they are seriously\nincommoded by its novelty, they are not likely to acquiesce in it kindly\nenough to grow to it, but they will make no difficulty about the miracle\ninvolved in accommodating themselves to a difference of only two or three\nper cent. {72a}\n\nAs long as no change exceeds this percentage, and as long, also, as fresh\nchange does not supervene till the preceding one is well established,\nthere seems no limit to the amount of modification which may be\naccumulated in the course of generations\u2014provided, of course, always,\nthat the modification continues to be in conformity with the instinctive\nhabits and physical development of the organism in their collective\ncapacity. Where the change is too great, or where an organ has been\nmodified cumulatively in some one direction, until it has reached a\ndevelopment too seriously out of harmony with the habits of the organism\ntaken collectively, then the organism holds itself excused from further\neffort, throws up the whole concern, and takes refuge in the liquidation\nand reconstruction of death. It is only on the relinquishing of further\neffort that this death ensues; as long as effort endures, organisms go on\nfrom change to change, altering and being altered\u2014that is to say, either\nkilling themselves piecemeal in deference to the surroundings or killing\nthe surroundings piecemeal to suit themselves. There is a ceaseless\nhiggling and haggling, or rather a life-and-death struggle between these\ntwo things as long as life lasts, and one or other or both have in no\nsmall part to re-enter into the womb from whence they came and be born\nagain in some form which shall give greater satisfaction.\n\nAll change is _pro tanto_ death or _pro tanto_ birth. Change is the\ncommon substratum which underlies both life and death; life and death are\nnot two distinct things absolutely antagonistic to one another; in the\nhighest life there is still much death, and in the most complete death\nthere is still not a little life. _La vie_, says Claud Bernard, {73a}\n_c\u2019est la mort_: he might have added, and perhaps did, _et la mort ce\nn\u2019est que la vie transform\u00e9e_. Life and death are the extreme modes of\nsomething which is partly both and wholly neither; this something is\ncommon, ordinary change; solve any change and the mystery of life and\ndeath will be revealed; show why and how anything becomes ever anything\nother in any respect than what it is at any given moment, and there will\nbe little secret left in any other change. One is not in its ultimate\nessence more miraculous that another; it may be more striking\u2014a greater\n_congeries_ of shocks, it may be more credible or more incredible, but\nnot more miraculous; all change is _qu\u00e2_ us absolutely incomprehensible\nand miraculous; the smallest change baffles the greatest intellect if its\nessence, as apart from its phenomena, be inquired into.\n\nBut however this may be, all organic change is either a growth or a\ndissolution, or a combination of the two. Growth is the coming together\nof elements with _quasi_ similar characteristics. I understand it is\nbelieved to be the coming together of matter in certain states of motion\nwith other matter in states so nearly similar that the rhythms of the one\ncoalesce with and hence reinforce the rhythms pre-existing in the\nother\u2014making, rather than marring and undoing them. Life and growth are\nan attuning, death and decay are an untuning; both involve a succession\nof greater or smaller attunings and untunings; organic life is \u201cthe\ndiapason closing full in man\u201d; it is the fulness of a tone that varies in\npitch, quality, and in the harmonics to which it gives rise; it ranges\nthrough every degree of complexity from the endless combinations of\nlife-and-death within life-and-death which we find in the mammalia, to\nthe comparative simplicity of the am\u0153ba. Death, again, like life, ranges\nthrough every degree of complexity. All pleasant changes are recreative;\nthey are _pro tanto_ births; all unpleasant changes are wearing, and, as\nsuch, _pro tanto_ deaths, but we can no more exhaust either wholly of the\nother, than we can exhaust all the air out of a receiver; pleasure and\npain lurk within one another, as life in death, and death in life, or as\nrest and unrest in one another.\n\nThere is no greater mystery in life than in death. We talk as though the\nriddle of life only need engage us; this is not so; death is just as\ngreat a miracle as life; the one is two and two making five, the other is\nfive splitting into two and two. Solve either, and we have solved the\nother; they should be studied not apart, for they are never parted, but\ntogether, and they will tell more tales of one another than either will\ntell about itself. If there is one thing which advancing knowledge makes\nclearer than another, it is that death is swallowed up in life, and life\nin death; so that if the last enemy that shall be subdued is death, then\nindeed is our salvation nearer than what we thought, for in strictness\nthere is neither life nor death, nor thought nor thing, except as figures\nof speech, and as the approximations which strike us for the time as most\nconvenient. There is neither perfect life nor perfect death, but a being\never with the Lord only, in the eternal \u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1, or going to and fro and\nheat and fray of the universe. When we were young we thought the one\ncertain thing was that we should one day come to die; now we know the one\ncertain thing to be that we shall never wholly do so. _Non omnis\nmoriar_, says Horace, and \u201cI die daily,\u201d says St. Paul, as though a life\nbeyond the grave, and a death on this side of it, were each some strange\nthing which happened to them alone of all men; but who dies absolutely\nonce for all, and for ever at the hour that is commonly called that of\ndeath, and who does not die daily and hourly? Does any man in continuing\nto live from day to day or moment to moment, do more than continue in a\nchanged body, with changed feelings, ideas, and aims, so that he lives\nfrom moment to moment only in virtue of a simultaneous dying from moment\nto moment also? Does any man in dying do more than, on a larger and more\ncomplete scale, what he has been doing on a small one, as the most\nessential factor of his life, from the day that he became \u201che\u201d at all?\nWhen the note of life is struck the harmonics of death are sounded, and\nso, again, to strike death is to arouse the infinite harmonics of life\nthat rise forthwith as incense curling upwards from a censer. If in the\nmidst of life we are in death, so also in the midst of death we are in\nlife, and whether we live or whether we die, whether we like it and know\nanything about it or no, still we do it to the Lord\u2014living always, dying\nalways, and in the Lord always, the unjust and the just alike, for God is\nno respecter of persons.\n\nConsciousness and change, so far as we can watch them, are as\nfunctionally interdependent as mind and matter, or condition and\nsubstance, are\u2014for the condition of every substance may be considered as\nthe expression and outcome of its mind. Where there is consciousness\nthere is change; where there is no change there is no consciousness; may\nwe not suspect that there is no change without a _pro tanto_\nconsciousness however simple and unspecialised? Change and motion are\none, so that we have substance, feeling, change (or motion), as the\nultimate three-in-one of our thoughts, and may suspect all change, and\nall feeling, attendant or consequent, however limited, to be the\ninteraction of those states which for want of better terms we call mind\nand matter. Action may be regarded as a kind of middle term between mind\nand matter; it is the throe of thought and thing, the quivering clash and\nunion of body and soul; commonplace enough in practice; miraculous, as\nviolating every canon on which thought and reason are founded, if we\ntheorise about it, put it under the microscope, and vivisect it. It is\nhere, if anywhere, that body or substance is guilty of the contradiction\nin terms of combining with that which is without material substance and\ncannot, therefore, be conceived by us as passing in and out with matter,\ntill the two become a body ensouled and a soul embodied.\n\nAll body is more or less ensouled. As it gets farther and farther from\nourselves, indeed, we sympathise less with it; nothing, we say to\nourselves, can have intelligence unless we understand all about it\u2014as\nthough intelligence in all except ourselves meant the power of being\nunderstood rather than of understanding. We are intelligent, and no\nintelligence, so different from our own as to baffle our powers of\ncomprehension deserves to be called intelligence at all. The more a\nthing resembles ourselves, the more it thinks as we do\u2014and thus by\nimplication tells us that we are right, the more intelligent we think it;\nand the less it thinks as we do, the greater fool it must be; if a\nsubstance does not succeed in making it clear that it understands our\nbusiness, we conclude that it cannot have any business of its own, much\nless understand it, or indeed understand anything at all. But letting\nthis pass, so far as we are concerned, \u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03ac\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2;\nwe are body ensouled, and soul embodied, ourselves, nor is it possible\nfor us to think seriously of anything so unlike ourselves as to consist\neither of soul without body, or body without soul. Unmattered condition,\ntherefore, is as inconceivable by us as unconditioned matter; and we must\nhold that all body with which we can be conceivably concerned is more or\nless ensouled, and all soul, in like manner, more or less embodied.\nStrike either body or soul\u2014that is to say, effect either a physical or a\nmental change, and the harmonics of the other sound. So long as body is\nminded in a certain way\u2014so long, that is to say, as it feels, knows,\nremembers, concludes, and forecasts one set of things\u2014it will be in one\nform; if it assumes a new one, otherwise than by external violence, no\nmatter how slight the change may be, it is only through having changed\nits mind, through having forgotten and died to some trains of thought,\nand having been correspondingly born anew by the adoption of new ones.\nWhat it will adopt depends upon which of the various courses open to it\nit considers most to its advantage.\n\nWhat it will think to its advantage depends mainly on the past habits of\nits race. Its past and now invisible lives will influence its desires\nmore powerfully than anything it may itself be able to add to the sum of\nits likes and dislikes; nevertheless, over and above preconceived opinion\nand the habits to which all are slaves, there is a small salary, or, as\nit were, agency commission, which each may have for himself, and spend\naccording to his fancy; from this, indeed, income-tax must be deducted;\nstill there remains a little margin of individual taste, and here, high\nup on this narrow, inaccessible ledge of our souls, from year to year a\nbreed of not unprolific variations build where reason cannot reach them\nto despoil them; for _de gustibus non est disputandum_.\n\nHere we are as far as we can go. Fancy, which sometimes sways so much\nand is swayed by so little, and which sometimes, again, is so hard to\nsway, and moves so little when it is swayed; whose ways have a method of\ntheir own, but are not as our ways\u2014fancy, lies on the extreme borderland\nof the realm within which the writs of our thoughts run, and extends into\nthat unseen world wherein they have no jurisdiction. Fancy is as the\nmist upon the horizon which blends earth and sky; where, however, it\napproaches nearest to the earth and can be reckoned with, it is seen as\nmelting into desire, and this as giving birth to design and effort. As\nthe net result and outcome of these last, living forms grow gradually but\npersistently into physical conformity with their own intentions, and\nbecome outward and visible signs of the inward and spiritual faiths, or\nwants of faith, that have been most within them. They thus very\ngradually, but none the less effectually, design themselves.\n\nIn effect, therefore, Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck introduce uniformity\ninto the moral and spiritual worlds as it was already beginning to be\nintroduced into the physical. According to both these writers\ndevelopment has ever been a matter of the same energy, effort, good\nsense, and perseverance, as tend to advancement of life now among\nourselves. In essence it is neither more nor less than this, as the\nrain-drop which denuded an ancient formation is of the same kind as that\nwhich is denuding a modern one, though its effect may vary in geometrical\nratio with the effect it has produced already. As we are extending\nreason to the lower animals, so we must extend a system of moral\ngovernment by rewards and punishments no less surely; and if we admit\nthat to some considerable extent man is man, and master of his fate, we\nshould admit also that all organic forms which are saved at all have been\nin proportionate degree masters of their fate too, and have worked out,\nnot only their own salvation, but their salvation according, in no small\nmeasure, to their own goodwill and pleasure, at times with a light heart,\nand at times in fear and trembling. I do not say that Erasmus Darwin and\nLamarck saw all the foregoing as clearly as it is easy to see it now;\nwhat I have said, however, is only the natural development of their\nsystem.\n\n\n\n\nChapter VI\nStatement of the Question at Issue (_continued_)\n\n\nSO much for the older view; and now for the more modern opinion.\nAccording to Messrs. Darwin and Wallace, and ostensibly, I am afraid I\nshould add, a great majority of our most prominent biologists, the view\ntaken by Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck is not a sound one. Some organisms,\nindeed, are so admirably adapted to their surroundings, and some organs\ndischarge their functions with so much appearance of provision, that we\nare apt to think they must owe their development to sense of need and\nconsequent contrivance, but this opinion is fantastic; the appearance of\ndesign is delusive; what we are tempted to see as an accumulated outcome\nof desire and cunning, we should regard as mainly an accumulated outcome\nof good luck.\n\nLet us take the eye as a somewhat crucial example. It is a\nseeing-machine, or thing to see with. So is a telescope; the telescope\nin its highest development is a secular accumulation of cunning,\nsometimes small, sometimes great; sometimes applied to this detail of the\ninstrument, and sometimes to that. It is an admirable example of design;\nnevertheless, as I said in \u201cEvolution Old and New,\u201d he who made the first\nrude telescope had probably no idea of any more perfect form of the\ninstrument than the one he had himself invented. Indeed, if he had, he\nwould have carried his idea out in practice. He would have been unable\nto conceive such an instrument as Lord Rosse\u2019s; the design, therefore, at\npresent evidenced by the telescope was not design all on the part of one\nand the same person. Nor yet was it unmixed with chance; many a detail\nhas been doubtless due to an accident or coincidence which was forthwith\nseized and made the best of. Luck there always has been and always will\nbe, until all brains are opened, and all connections made known, but luck\nturned to account becomes design; there is, indeed, if things are driven\nhome, little other design than this. The telescope, therefore, is an\ninstrument designed in all its parts for the purpose of seeing, and, take\nit all round, designed with singular skill.\n\nLooking at the eye, we are at first tempted to think that it must be the\ntelescope over again, only more so; we are tempted to see it as something\nwhich has grown up little by little from small beginnings, as the result\nof effort well applied and handed down from generation to generation,\ntill, in the vastly greater time during which the eye has been developing\nas compared with the telescope, a vastly more astonishing result has been\narrived at. We may indeed be tempted to think this, but, according to\nMr. Darwin, we should be wrong. Design had a great deal to do with the\ntelescope, but it had nothing or hardly anything whatever to do with the\neye. The telescope owes its development to cunning, the eye to luck,\nwhich, it would seem, is so far more cunning than cunning that one does\nnot quite understand why there should be any cunning at all. The main\nmeans of developing the eye was, according to Mr. Darwin, not use as\nvarying circumstances might direct with consequent slow increase of power\nand an occasional happy flight of genius, but natural selection. Natural\nselection, according to him, though not the sole, is still the most\nimportant means of its development and modification. {81a} What, then,\nis natural selection?\n\nMr. Darwin has told us this on the title-page of the \u201cOrigin of Species.\u201d\nHe there defines it as \u201cThe Preservation of Favoured Races;\u201d \u201cFavoured\u201d\nis \u201cFortunate,\u201d and \u201cFortunate\u201d \u201cLucky;\u201d it is plain, therefore, that\nwith Mr. Darwin natural selection comes to \u201cThe Preservation of Lucky\nRaces,\u201d and that he regarded luck as the most important feature in\nconnection with the development even of so apparently purposive an organ\nas the eye, and as the one, therefore, on which it was most proper to\ninsist. And what is luck but absence of intention or design? What,\nthen, can Mr. Darwin\u2019s title-page amount to when written out plainly, but\nto an assertion that the main means of modification has been the\npreservation of races whose variations have been unintentional, that is\nto say, not connected with effort or intention, devoid of mind or\nmeaning, fortuitous, spontaneous, accidental, or whatever kindred word is\nleast disagreeable to the reader? It is impossible to conceive any more\ncomplete denial of mind as having had anything to do with organic\ndevelopment, than is involved in the title-page of the \u201cOrigin of\nSpecies\u201d when its doubtless carefully considered words are studied\u2014nor,\nlet me add, is it possible to conceive a title-page more likely to make\nthe reader\u2019s attention rest much on the main doctrine of evolution, and\nlittle, to use the words now most in vogue concerning it, on Mr. Darwin\u2019s\nown \u201cdistinctive feature.\u201d\n\nIt should be remembered that the full title of the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d\nis, \u201cOn the origin of species by means of natural selection, or the\npreservation of favoured races in the struggle for life.\u201d The\nsignificance of the expansion of the title escaped the greater number of\nMr. Darwin\u2019s readers. Perhaps it ought not to have done so, but we\ncertainly failed to catch it. The very words themselves escaped us\u2014and\nyet there they were all the time if we had only chosen to look. We\nthought the book was called \u201cOn the Origin of Species,\u201d and so it was on\nthe outside; so it was also on the inside fly-leaf; so it was on the\ntitle-page itself as long as the most prominent type was used; the\nexpanded title was only given once, and then in smaller type; so the\nthree big \u201cOrigins of Species\u201d carried us with them to the exclusion of\nthe rest.\n\nThe short and working title, \u201cOn the Origin of Species,\u201d in effect claims\ndescent with modification generally; the expanded and technically true\ntitle only claims the discovery that luck is the main means of organic\nmodification, and this is a very different matter. The book ought to\nhave been entitled, \u201cOn Natural Selection, or the preservation of\nfavoured races in the struggle for life, as the main means of the origin\nof species;\u201d this should have been the expanded title, and the short\ntitle should have been \u201cOn Natural Selection.\u201d The title would not then\nhave involved an important difference between its working and its\ntechnical forms, and it would have better fulfilled the object of a\ntitle, which is, of course, to give, as far as may be, the essence of a\nbook in a nutshell. We learn on the authority of Mr. Darwin himself\n{83a} that the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d was originally intended to bear the\ntitle \u201cNatural Selection;\u201d nor is it easy to see why the change should\nhave been made if an accurate expression of the contents of the book was\nthe only thing which Mr. Darwin was considering. It is curious that,\nwriting the later chapters of \u201cLife and Habit\u201d in great haste, I should\nhave accidentally referred to the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d as \u201cNatural\nSelection;\u201d it seems hard to believe that there was no intention in my\nthus unconsciously reverting to Mr. Darwin\u2019s own original title, but\nthere certainly was none, and I did not then know what the original title\nhad been.\n\nIf we had scrutinised Mr. Darwin\u2019s title-page as closely as we should\ncertainly scrutinise anything written by Mr. Darwin now, we should have\nseen that the title did not technically claim the theory of descent;\npractically, however, it so turned out that we unhesitatingly gave that\ntheory to the author, being, as I have said, carried away by the three\nlarge \u201cOrigins of Species\u201d (which we understood as much the same thing as\ndescent with modification), and finding, as I shall show in a later\nchapter, that descent was ubiquitously claimed throughout the work,\neither expressly or by implication, as Mr. Darwin\u2019s theory. It is not\neasy to see how any one with ordinary instincts could hesitate to believe\nthat Mr. Darwin was entitled to claim what he claimed with so much\ninsistance. If _ars est celare artem_ Mr. Darwin must be allowed to have\nbeen a consummate artist, for it took us years to understand the ins and\nouts of what had been done.\n\nI may say in passing that we never see the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d spoken of\nas \u201cOn the Origin of Species, &c.,\u201d or as \u201cThe Origin of Species, &c.\u201d\n(the word \u201con\u201d being dropped in the latest editions). The distinctive\nfeature of the book lies, according to its admirers, in the \u201c&c.,\u201d but\nthey never give it. To avoid pedantry I shall continue to speak of the\n\u201cOrigin of Species.\u201d\n\nAt any rate it will be admitted that Mr. Darwin did not make his\ntitle-page express his meaning so clearly that his readers could readily\ncatch the point of difference between himself and his grandfather and\nLamarck; nevertheless the point just touched upon involves the only\nessential difference between the systems of Mr. Charles Darwin and those\nof his three most important predecessors. All four writers agree that\nanimals and plants descend with modification; all agree that the fittest\nalone survive; all agree about the important consequences of the\ngeometrical ratio of increase; Mr. Charles Darwin has said more about\nthese last two points than his predecessors did, but all three were alike\ncognisant of the facts and attached the same importance to them, and\nwould have been astonished at its being supposed possible that they\ndisputed them. The fittest alone survive; yes\u2014but the fittest from among\nwhat? Here comes the point of divergence; the fittest from among\norganisms whose variations arise mainly through use and disuse? In other\nwords, from variations that are mainly functional? Or from among\norganisms whose variations are in the main matters of luck? From\nvariations into which a moral and intellectual system of payment\naccording to results has largely entered? Or from variations which have\nbeen thrown for with dice? From variations among which, though cards\ntell, yet play tells as much or more? Or from those in which cards are\neverything and play goes for so little as to be not worth taking into\naccount? Is \u201cthe survival of the fittest\u201d to be taken as meaning \u201cthe\nsurvival of the luckiest\u201d or \u201cthe survival of those who know best how to\nturn fortune to account\u201d? Is luck the only element of fitness, or is not\ncunning even more indispensable?\n\nMr. Darwin has a habit, borrowed, perhaps, _mutatis mutandis_, from the\nframers of our collects, of every now and then adding the words \u201cthrough\nnatural selection,\u201d as though this squared everything, and descent with\nmodification thus became his theory at once. This is not the case.\nBuffon, Erasmus Darwin, and Lamarck believed in natural selection to the\nfull as much as any follower of Mr. Charles Darwin can do. They did not\nuse the actual words, but the idea underlying them is the essence of\ntheir system. Mr. Patrick Matthew epitomised their doctrine more\ntersely, perhaps, than was done by any other of the pre-Charles-Darwinian\nevolutionists, in the following passage which appeared in 1831, and which\nI have already quoted in \u201cEvolution Old and New\u201d (pp. 320, 323). The\npassage runs:\u2014\n\n\u201cThe self-regulating adaptive disposition of organised life may, in part,\nbe traced to the extreme fecundity of nature, who, as before stated, has\nin all the varieties of her offspring a prolific power much beyond (in\nmany cases a thousandfold) what is necessary to fill up the vacancies\ncaused by senile decay. As the field of existence is limited and\npreoccupied, it is only the hardier, more robust, better suited to\ncircumstance individuals, who are able to struggle forward to maturity,\nthese inhabiting only the situations to which they have superior\nadaptation and greater power of occupancy than any other kind; the weaker\nand less circumstance-suited being prematurely destroyed. This principle\nis in constant action; it regulates the colour, the figure, the\ncapacities, and instincts; those individuals in each species whose colour\nand covering are best suited to concealment or protection from enemies,\nor defence from inclemencies or vicissitudes of climate, whose figure is\nbest accommodated to health, strength, defence, and support; whose\ncapacities and instincts can best regulate the physical energies to\nself-advantage according to circumstances\u2014in such immense waste of\nprimary and youthful life those only come forward to maturity from _the\nstrict ordeal by which nature tests their adaptation to her standard of\nperfection_ and fitness to continue their kind by reproduction.\u201d {86a} A\nlittle lower down Mr. Matthew speaks of animals under domestication \u201c_not\nhaving undergone selection by the law of nature_, _of which we have\nspoken_, and hence being unable to maintain their ground without culture\nand protection.\u201d\n\nThe distinction between Darwinism and Neo-Darwinism is generally believed\nto lie in the adoption of a theory of natural selection by the younger\nDarwin and its non-adoption by the elder. This is true in so far as that\nthe elder Darwin does not use the words \u201cnatural selection,\u201d while the\nyounger does, but it is not true otherwise. Both writers agree that\noffspring tends to inherit modifications that have been effected, from\nwhatever cause, in parents; both hold that the best adapted to their\nsurroundings live longest and leave most offspring; both, therefore, hold\nthat favourable modifications will tend to be preserved and intensified\nin the course of many generations, and that this leads to divergence of\ntype; but these opinions involve a theory of natural selection or\nquasi-selection, whether the words \u201cnatural selection\u201d are used or not;\nindeed it is impossible to include wild species in any theory of descent\nwith modification without implying a quasi-selective power on the part of\nnature; but even with Mr. Charles Darwin the power is only\nquasi-selective; there is no conscious choice, and hence there is nothing\nthat can in strictness be called selection.\n\nIt is indeed true that the younger Darwin gave the words \u201cnatural\nselection\u201d the importance which of late years they have assumed; he\nprobably adopted them unconsciously from the passage of Mr. Matthew\u2019s\nquoted above, but he ultimately said, {87a} \u201cIn the literal sense of the\nword (_sic_) no doubt natural selection is a false term,\u201d as personifying\na fact, making it exercise the conscious choice without which there can\nbe no selection, and generally crediting it with the discharge of\nfunctions which can only be ascribed legitimately to living and reasoning\nbeings. Granted, however, that while Mr. Charles Darwin adopted the\nexpression natural selection and admitted it to be a bad one, his\ngrandfather did not use it at all; still Mr. Darwin did not mean the\nnatural selection which Mr. Matthew and those whose opinions he was\nepitomising meant. Mr. Darwin meant the selection to be made from\nvariations into which purpose enters to only a small extent\ncomparatively. The difference, therefore, between the older\nevolutionists and their successor does not lie in the acceptance by the\nmore recent writer of a quasi-selective power in nature which his\npredecessors denied, but in the background\u2014hidden behind the words\nnatural selection, which have served to cloak it\u2014in the views which the\nold and the new writers severally took of the variations from among which\nthey are alike agreed that a selection or quasi-selection is made.\n\nIt now appears that there is not one natural selection, and one survival\nof the fittest only, but two natural selections, and two survivals of the\nfittest, the one of which may be objected to as an expression more fit\nfor religious and general literature than for science, but may still be\nadmitted as sound in intention, while the other, inasmuch as it supposes\naccident to be the main purveyor of variations, has no correspondence\nwith the actual course of things; for if the variations are matters of\nchance or hazard unconnected with any principle of constant application,\nthey will not occur steadily enough, throughout a sufficient number of\nsuccessive generations, nor to a sufficient number of individuals for\nmany generations together at the same time and place, to admit of the\nfixing and permanency of modification at all. The one theory of natural\nselection, therefore, may, and indeed will, explain the facts that\nsurround us, whereas the other will not. Mr. Charles Darwin\u2019s\ncontribution to the theory of evolution was not, as is commonly supposed,\n\u201cnatural selection,\u201d but the hypothesis that natural selection from\nvariations that are in the main fortuitous could accumulate and result in\nspecific and generic differences.\n\nIn the foregoing paragraph I have given the point of difference between\nMr. Charles Darwin and his predecessors. Why, I wonder, have neither he\nnor any of his exponents put this difference before us in such plain\nwords that we should readily apprehend it? Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck\nwere understood by all who wished to understand them; why is it that the\nmisunderstanding of Mr. Darwin\u2019s \u201cdistinctive feature\u201d should have been\nso long and obstinate? Why is it that, no matter how much writers like\nMr. Grant Allen and Professor Ray Lankester may say about \u201cMr. Darwin\u2019s\nmaster-key,\u201d nor how many more like hyperboles they brandish, they never\nput a succinct _r\u00e9sum\u00e9_ of Mr. Darwin\u2019s theory side by side with a\nsimilar _r\u00e9sum\u00e9_ of his grandfather\u2019s and Lamarck\u2019s? Neither Mr. Darwin\nhimself, not any of those to whose advocacy his reputation is mainly due,\nhave done this. Professor Huxley is the man of all others who foisted\nMr. Darwin most upon us, but in his famous lecture on the coming of age\nof the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d he did not explain to his hearers wherein the\nNeo-Darwinian theory of evolution differed from the old; and why not?\nSurely, because no sooner is this made clear than we perceive that the\nidea underlying the old evolutionists is more in accord with instinctive\nfeelings that we have cherished too long to be able now to disregard them\nthan the central idea which underlies the \u201cOrigin of Species.\u201d\n\nWhat should we think of one who maintained that the steam-engine and\ntelescope were not developed mainly through design and effort (letting\nthe indisputably existing element of luck go without saying), but to the\nfact that if any telescope or steam-engine \u201chappened to be made ever such\na little more conveniently for man\u2019s purposes than another,\u201d &c., &c.?\n\nLet us suppose a notorious burglar found in possession of a jemmy; it is\nadmitted on all hands that he will use it as soon as he gets a chance;\nthere is no doubt about this; how perverted should we not consider the\ningenuity of one who tried to persuade us we were wrong in thinking that\nthe burglar compassed the possession of the jemmy by means involving\nideas, however vague in the first instance, of applying it to its\nsubsequent function.\n\nIf any one could be found so blind to obvious inferences as to accept\nnatural selection, \u201cor the preservation of favoured machines,\u201d as the\nmain means of mechanical modification, we might suppose him to argue much\nas follows:\u2014\u201cI can quite understand,\u201d he would exclaim, \u201chow any one who\nreflects upon the originally simple form of the earliest jemmies, and\nobserves the developments they have since attained in the hands of our\nmost accomplished housebreakers, might at first be tempted to believe\nthat the present form of the instrument has been arrived at by\nlong-continued improvement in the hands of an almost infinite succession\nof thieves; but may not this inference be somewhat too hastily drawn?\nHave we any right to assume that burglars work by means analogous to\nthose employed by other people? If any thief happened to pick up any\ncrowbar which happened to be ever such a little better suited to his\npurpose than the one he had been in the habit of using hitherto, he would\nat once seize and carefully preserve it. If it got worn out or broken he\nwould begin searching for a crowbar as like as possible to the one that\nhe had lost; and when, with advancing skill, and in default of being able\nto find the exact thing he wanted, he took at length to making a jemmy\nfor himself, he would imitate the latest and most perfect adaptation,\nwhich would thus be most likely to be preserved in the struggle of\ncompetitive forms. Let this process go on for countless generations,\namong countless burglars of all nations, and may we not suppose that a\njemmy would be in time arrived at, as superior to any that could have\nbeen designed as the effect of the Niagara Falls is superior to the puny\nefforts of the landscape gardener?\u201d\n\nFor the moment I will pass over the obvious retort that there is no\nsufficient parallelism between bodily organs and mechanical inventions to\nmake a denial of design in the one involve in equity a denial of it in\nthe other also, and that therefore the preceding paragraph has no force.\nA man is not bound to deny design in machines wherein it can be clearly\nseen because he denies it in living organs where at best it is a matter\nof inference. This retort is plausible, but in the course of the two\nnext following chapters but one it will be shown to be without force; for\nthe moment, however, beyond thus calling attention to it, I must pass it\nby.\n\nI do not mean to say that Mr. Darwin ever wrote anything which made the\nutility of his contention as apparent as it is made by what I have above\nput into the mouth of his supposed follower. Mr. Darwin was the\nGladstone of biology, and so old a scientific hand was not going to make\nthings unnecessarily clear unless it suited his convenience. Then,\nindeed, he was like the man in \u201cThe Hunting of the Snark,\u201d who said, \u201cI\ntold you once, I told you twice, what I tell you three times is true.\u201d\nThat what I have supposed said, however, above about the jemmy is no\nexaggeration of Mr. Darwin\u2019s attitude as regards design in organism will\nappear from the passage about the eye already referred to, which it may\nperhaps be as well to quote in full. Mr. Darwin says:\u2014\n\n\u201cIt is scarcely possible to avoid comparing the eye to a telescope. We\nknow that this instrument has been perfected by the long-continued\nefforts of the highest human intellects, and we naturally infer that the\neye has been formed by a somewhat analogous process. But may not this\ninference be presumptuous? Have we any right to assume that the Creator\nworks by intellectual powers like those of men? If we must compare the\neye to an optical instrument, we ought in imagination to take a thick\nlayer of transparent tissue, with a nerve sensitive to light beneath, and\nthen suppose every part of this layer to be continually changing slowly\nin density, so as to separate into layers of different densities and\nthicknesses, placed at different distances from each other, and with the\nsurfaces of each layer slowly changing in form. Further, we must suppose\nthat there is a power always intently watching each slight accidental\nalteration in the transparent layers, and carefully selecting each\nalteration which, under varied circumstances, may in any way, or in any\ndegree, tend to produce a distincter image. We must suppose each new\nstate of the instrument to be multiplied by the million, and each to be\npreserved till a better be produced, and then the old ones to be\ndestroyed. In living bodies variation will cause the slight alterations,\ngeneration will multiply them almost infinitely, and natural selection\nwill pick out with unerring skill each improvement. Let this process go\non for millions on millions of years, and during each year on millions of\nindividuals of many kinds; and may we not believe that a living optical\ninstrument might thus be formed as superior to one of glass as the works\nof the Creator are to those of man?\u201d {92a}\n\nMr. Darwin does not in this passage deny design, or cunning, point blank;\nhe was not given to denying things point blank, nor is it immediately\napparent that he is denying design at all, for he does not emphasize and\ncall attention to the fact that the _variations_ on whose accumulation he\nrelies for his ultimate specific difference are accidental, and, to use\nhis own words, in the passage last quoted, caused by _variation_. He\ndoes, indeed, in his earlier editions, call the variations \u201caccidental,\u201d\nand accidental they remained for ten years, but in 1869 the word\n\u201caccidental\u201d was taken out. Mr. Darwin probably felt that the variations\nhad been accidental as long as was desirable; and though they would, of\ncourse, in reality remain as accidental as ever, still, there could be no\nuse in crying \u201caccidental variations\u201d further. If the reader wants to\nknow whether they were accidental or no, he had better find out for\nhimself. Mr. Darwin was a master of what may be called scientific\nchiaroscuro, and owes his reputation in no small measure to the judgment\nwith which he kept his meaning dark when a less practised hand would have\nthrown light upon it. There can, however, be no question that Mr.\nDarwin, though not denying purposiveness point blank, was trying to refer\nthe development of the eye to the accumulation of small accidental\nimprovements, which were not as a rule due to effort and design in any\nway analogous to those attendant on the development of the telescope.\n\nThough Mr. Darwin, if he was to have any point of difference from his\ngrandfather, was bound to make his variations accidental, yet, to do him\njustice, he did not like it. Even in the earlier editions of the \u201cOrigin\nof Species,\u201d where the \u201calterations\u201d in the passage last quoted are\ncalled \u201caccidental\u201d in express terms, the word does not fall, so to\nspeak, on a strong beat of the bar, and is apt to pass unnoticed.\nBesides, Mr. Darwin does not say point blank \u201cwe may believe,\u201d or \u201cwe\nought to believe;\u201d he only says \u201cmay we not believe?\u201d The reader should\nalways be on his guard when Mr. Darwin asks one of these bland and\nchild-like questions, and he is fond of asking them; but, however this\nmay be, it is plain, as I pointed out in \u201cEvolution Old and New\u201d {93a}\nthat the only \u201cskill,\u201d that is to say the only thing that can possibly\ninvolve design, is \u201cthe unerring skill\u201d of natural selection.\n\nIn the same paragraph Mr. Darwin has already said: \u201cFurther, we must\nsuppose that there is a power represented by natural selection or the\nsurvival of the fittest always intently watching each slight alteration,\n&c.\u201d Mr. Darwin probably said \u201ca power represented by natural selection\u201d\ninstead of \u201cnatural selection\u201d only, because he saw that to talk too\nfrequently about the fact that the most lucky live longest as \u201cintently\nwatching\u201d something was greater nonsense than it would be prudent even\nfor him to write, so he fogged it by making the intent watching done by\n\u201ca power represented by\u201d a fact, instead of by the fact itself. As the\nsentence stands it is just as great nonsense as it would have been if\n\u201cthe survival of the fittest\u201d had been allowed to do the watching instead\nof \u201cthe power represented by\u201d the survival of the fittest, but the\nnonsense is harder to dig up, and the reader is more likely to pass it\nover.\n\nThis passage gave Mr. Darwin no less trouble than it must have given to\nmany of his readers. In the original edition of the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d\nit stood, \u201cFurther, we must suppose that there is a power always intently\nwatching each slight accidental variation.\u201d I suppose it was felt that\nif this was allowed to stand, it might be fairly asked what natural\nselection was doing all this time? If the power was able to do\neverything that was necessary now, why not always? and why any natural\nselection at all? This clearly would not do, so in 1861 the power was\nallowed, by the help of brackets, actually to become natural selection,\nand remained so till 1869, when Mr. Darwin could stand it no longer, and,\ndoubtless for the reason given above, altered the passage to \u201ca power\nrepresented by natural selection,\u201d at the same time cutting out the word\n\u201caccidental.\u201d\n\nIt may perhaps make the workings of Mr. Darwin\u2019s mind clearer to the\nreader if I give the various readings of this passage as taken from the\nthree most important editions of the \u201cOrigin of Species.\u201d\n\nIn 1859 it stood, \u201cFurther, we must suppose that there is a power always\nintently watching each slight accidental alteration,\u201d &c.\n\nIn 1861 it stood, \u201cFurther, we must suppose that there is a power\n(natural selection) always intently watching each slight accidental\nalteration,\u201d &c.\n\nAnd in 1869, \u201cFurther, we must suppose that there is a power represented\nby natural selection or the survival of the fittest always intently\nwatching each slight alteration,\u201d &c. {94a}\n\nThe hesitating feeble gait of one who fears a pitfall at every step, so\neasily recognisable in the \u201cnumerous, successive, slight alterations\u201d in\nthe foregoing passage, may be traced in many another page of the \u201cOrigin\nof Species\u201d by those who will be at the trouble of comparing the several\neditions. It is only when this is done, and the working of Mr. Darwin\u2019s\nmind can be seen as though it were the twitchings of a dog\u2019s nose, that\nany idea can be formed of the difficulty in which he found himself\ninvolved by his initial blunder of thinking he had got a distinctive\nfeature which entitled him to claim the theory of evolution as an\noriginal idea of his own. He found his natural selection hang round his\nneck like a millstone. There is hardly a page in the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d\nin which traces of the struggle going on in Mr. Darwin\u2019s mind are not\ndiscernible, with a result alike exasperating and pitiable. I can only\nrepeat what I said in \u201cEvolution Old and New,\u201d namely, that I find the\ntask of extracting a well-defined meaning out of Mr. Darwin\u2019s words\ncomparable only to that of trying to act on the advice of a lawyer who\nhas obscured the main issue as much as he can, and whose chief aim has\nbeen to leave as many loopholes as possible for himself to escape by, if\nthings should go wrong hereafter. Or, again, to that of one who has to\nconstrue an Act of Parliament which was originally drawn with a view to\nthrowing as much dust as possible in the eyes of those who would oppose\nthe measure, and which, having been found utterly unworkable in practice,\nhas had clauses repealed up and down it till it is now in an inextricable\ntangle of confusion and contradiction.\n\nThe more Mr. Darwin\u2019s work is studied, and more especially the more his\ndifferent editions are compared, the more impossible is it to avoid a\nsuspicion of _arri\u00e8re pens\u00e9e_ as pervading it whenever the \u201cdistinctive\nfeature\u201d is on the _tapis_. It is right to say, however, that no such\nsuspicion attaches to Mr. A. R. Wallace, Mr. Darwin\u2019s fellow discoverer\nof natural selection. It is impossible to doubt that Mr. Wallace\nbelieved he had made a real and important improvement upon the Lamarckian\nsystem, and, as a natural consequence, unlike Mr. Darwin, he began by\ntelling us what Lamarck had said. He did not, I admit, say quite all\nthat I should have been glad to have seen him say, nor use exactly the\nwords I should myself have chosen, but he said enough to make it\nimpossible to doubt his good faith, and his desire that we should\nunderstand that with him, as with Mr. Darwin, variations are mainly\naccidental, not functional. Thus, in his memorable paper communicated to\nthe Linnean Society in 1858 he said, in a passage which I have quoted in\n\u201cUnconscious Memory\u201d:\n\n\u201cThe hypothesis of Lamarck\u2014that progressive changes in species have been\nproduced by the attempts of the animals to increase the development of\ntheir own organs, and thus modify their structures and habits\u2014has been\nrepeatedly and easily refuted by all writers on the subject of varieties\nand species; . . . but the view here developed renders such an hypothesis\nquite unnecessary. . . . The powerful retractile talons of the falcon\nand cat tribes have not been produced or increased by the volition of\nthose animals; . . . neither did the giraffe acquire its long neck by\ndesiring to reach the foliage of the more lofty shrubs, and constantly\nstretching its neck for this purpose, but because any varieties which\noccurred among its antitypes with a longer neck than usual _at once\nsecured a fresh range of pasture over the same ground as their\nshorter-necked companions_, _and on the first scarcity of food were thus\nenabled to outlive them_\u201d (italics in original). {96a}\n\n\u201cWhich occurred\u201d is obviously \u201cwhich happened to occur, by some chance or\naccident entirely unconnected with use and disuse;\u201d and though the word\n\u201caccidental\u201d is never used, there can be no doubt about Mr. Wallace\u2019s\ndesire to make the reader catch the fact that with him accident, and not,\nas with Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck, sustained effort, is the main\npurveyor of the variations whose accumulation amounts ultimately to\nspecific difference. It is a pity, however, that instead of contenting\nhimself like a theologian with saying that his opponent had been refuted\nover and over again, he did not refer to any particular and tolerably\nsuccessful attempt to refute the theory that modifications in organic\nstructure are mainly functional. I am fairly well acquainted with the\nliterature of evolution, and have never met with any such attempt. But\nlet this pass; as with Mr. Darwin, so with Mr. Wallace, and so indeed\nwith all who accept Mr. Charles Darwin\u2019s natural selection as the main\nmeans of modification, the central idea is luck, while the central idea\nof the Erasmus-Darwinian system is cunning.\n\nI have given the opinions of these contending parties in their extreme\ndevelopment; but they both admit abatements which bring them somewhat\nnearer to one another. Design, as even its most strenuous upholders will\nadmit, is a difficult word to deal with; it is, like all our ideas,\nsubstantial enough until we try to grasp it\u2014and then, like all our ideas,\nit mockingly eludes us; it is like life or death\u2014a rope of many strands;\nthere is design within design, and design within undesign; there is\nundesign within design (as when a man shuffles cards designing that there\nshall be no design in their arrangement), and undesign within undesign;\nwhen we speak of cunning or design in connection with organism we do not\nmean cunning, all cunning, and nothing but cunning, so that there shall\nbe no place for luck; we do not mean that conscious attention and\nforethought shall have been bestowed upon the minutest details of action,\nand nothing been left to work itself out departmentally according to\nprecedent, or as it otherwise best may according to the chapter of\naccidents.\n\nSo, again, when Mr. Darwin and his followers deny design and effort to\nhave been the main purveyors of the variations whose accumulation results\nin specific difference, they do not entirely exclude the action of use\nand disuse\u2014and this at once opens the door for cunning; nevertheless,\naccording to Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck, the human eye and the long neck\nof the giraffe are alike due to the accumulation of variations that are\nmainly functional, and hence practical; according to Charles Darwin they\nare alike due to the accumulation of variations that are accidental,\nfortuitous, spontaneous, that is to say, mainly cannot be reduced to any\nknown general principle. According to Charles Darwin \u201cthe preservation\nof favoured,\u201d or lucky, \u201craces\u201d is by far the most important means of\nmodification; according to Erasmus Darwin effort _non sibi res sed se\nrebus subjungere_ is unquestionably the most potent means; roughly,\ntherefore, there is no better or fairer way of putting the matter, than\nto say that Charles Darwin is the apostle of luck, and his grandfather,\nand Lamarck, of cunning.\n\nIt should be observed also that the distinction between the organism and\nits surroundings\u2014on which both systems are founded\u2014is one that cannot be\nso universally drawn as we find it convenient to allege. There is a\ndebatable ground of considerable extent on which _res_ and _me_, ego and\nnon ego, luck and cunning, necessity and freewill, meet and pass into one\nanother as night and day, or life and death. No one can draw a sharp\nline between ego and non ego, nor indeed any sharp line between any\nclasses of phenomena. Every part of the ego is non ego _qu\u00e2_ organ or\ntool in use, and much of the non ego runs up into the ego and is\ninseparably united with it; still there is enough that it is obviously\nmost convenient to call ego, and enough that it is no less obviously most\nconvenient to call non ego, as there is enough obvious day and obvious\nnight, or obvious luck and obvious cunning, to make us think it advisable\nto keep separate accounts for each.\n\nI will say more on this head in a following chapter; in this present one\nmy business should be confined to pointing out as clearly and succinctly\nas I can the issue between the two great main contending opinions\nconcerning organic development that obtain among those who accept the\ntheory of descent at all; nor do I believe that this can be done more\neffectually and accurately than by saying, as above, that Mr. Charles\nDarwin (whose name, by the way, was \u201cCharles Robert,\u201d and not, as would\nappear from the title-pages of his books, \u201cCharles\u201d only), Mr. A. R.\nWallace, and their supporters are the apostles of luck, while Erasmus\nDarwin and Lamarck, followed, more or less timidly, by the Geoffroys and\nby Mr. Herbert Spencer, and very timidly indeed by the Duke of Argyll,\npreach cunning as the most important means of organic modification.\n\n * * * * *\n\nNOTE.\u2014It appears from \u201cSamuel Butler: A Memoir\u201d (II, 29) that Butler\nwrote to his father (Dec. 1885) about a passage in Horace (near the\nbeginning of the First Epistle of the First Book)\u2014\n\n Nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor,\n Et mihi res, non me rebus subjungere conor.\n\nOn the preceding page he is adapting the second of these two verses to\nhis own purposes.\u2014H. F. J.\n\n\n\n\nChapter VII\n(_Intercalated_)\nMr. Spencer\u2019s \u201cThe Factors of Organic Evolution\u201d\n\n\nSINCE the foregoing and several of the succeeding chapters were written,\nMr. Herbert Spencer has made his position at once more clear and more\nwidely understood by his articles \u201cThe Factors of Organic Evolution\u201d\nwhich appeared in the _Nineteenth Century_ for April and May, 1886. The\npresent appears the fittest place in which to intercalate remarks\nconcerning them.\n\nMr. Spencer asks whether those are right who regard Mr. Charles Darwin\u2019s\ntheory of natural selection as by itself sufficient to account for\norganic evolution.\n\n\u201cOn critically examining the evidence\u201d (modern writers never examine\nevidence, they always \u201ccritically,\u201d or \u201ccarefully,\u201d or \u201cpatiently,\u201d\nexamine it), he writes, \u201cwe shall find reason to think that it by no\nmeans explains all that has to be explained. Omitting for the present\nany consideration of a factor which may be considered primordial, it may\nbe contended that one of the factors alleged by Erasmus Darwin and\nLamarck must be recognised as a co-operator. Unless that increase of a\npart resulting from extra activity, and that decrease of it resulting\nfrom inactivity, are transmissible to descendants, we are without a key\nto many phenomena of organic evolution. _Utterly inadequate to explain\nthe major part of the facts as is the hypothesis of the inheritance of\nfunctionally produced modifications_, yet there is a minor part of the\nfacts very extensive though less, which must be ascribed to this cause.\u201d\n(Italics mine.)\n\nMr. Spencer does not here say expressly that Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck\nconsidered inheritance of functionally produced modifications to be the\nsole explanation of the facts of organic life; modern writers on\nevolution for the most part avoid saying anything expressly; this\nnevertheless is the conclusion which the reader naturally draws\u2014and was\ndoubtless intended to draw\u2014from Mr. Spencer\u2019s words. He gathers that\nthese writers put forward an \u201cutterly inadequate\u201d theory, which cannot\nfor a moment be entertained in the form in which they left it, but which,\nnevertheless, contains contributions to the formation of a just opinion\nwhich of late years have been too much neglected.\n\nThis inference would be, as Mr. Spencer ought to know, a mistaken one.\nErasmus Darwin, who was the first to depend mainly on functionally\nproduced modifications, attributes, if not as much importance to\nvariations induced either by what we must call chance, or by causes\nhaving no connection with use and disuse, as Mr. Spencer does, still so\nnearly as much that there is little to choose between them. Mr.\nSpencer\u2019s words show that he attributes, if not half, still not far off\nhalf the modification that has actually been produced, to use and disuse.\nErasmus Darwin does not say whether he considers use and disuse to have\nbrought about more than half or less than half; he only says that animal\nand vegetable modification is \u201cin part produced\u201d by the exertions of the\nanimals and vegetables themselves; the impression I have derived is, that\njust as Mr. Spencer considers rather less than half to be due to use and\ndisuse, so Erasmus Darwin considers decidedly more than half\u2014so much\nmore, in fact, than half as to make function unquestionably the factor\nmost proper to be insisted on if only one can be given. Further than\nthis he did not go. I will quote enough of Dr. Erasmus Darwin\u2019s own\nwords to put his position beyond doubt. He writes:\u2014\n\n\u201cThirdly, when we enumerate the great changes produced in the species of\nanimals before their nativity, as, for example, when the offspring\nreproduces the effects produced upon the parent by accident or culture,\nor the changes produced by the mixture of species, as in mules; or the\nchanges produced probably by exuberance of nourishment supplied to the\nfoetus, as in monstrous births with additional limbs; many of these\nenormities are propagated and continued as a variety at least, if not as\na new species of animal. I have seen a breed of cats with an additional\nclaw on every foot; of poultry also with an additional claw and with\nwings to their feet; and of others without rumps. Mr. Buffon\u201d (who, by\nthe way, surely, was no more \u201cMr. Buffon\u201d than Lord Salisbury is \u201cMr.\nSalisbury\u201d) \u201cmentions a breed of dogs without tails which are common at\nRome and Naples\u2014which he supposes to have been produced by a custom long\nestablished of cutting their tails close off.\u201d {102a}\n\nHere not one of the causes of variation adduced is connected with use and\ndisuse, or effort, volition, and purpose; the manner, moreover, in which\nthey are brought forward is not that of one who shows signs of\nrecalcitrancy about admitting other causes of modification as well as use\nand disuse; indeed, a little lower down he almost appears to assign the\nsubordinate place to functionally produced modifications, for he\nsays\u2014\u201cFifthly, from their first rudiments or primordium to the\ntermination of their lives, all animals undergo perpetual\ntransformations; _which are in part produced_ by their own exertions in\nconsequence of their desires and aversions, of their pleasures and their\npains, or of irritations or of associations; and many of these acquired\nforms or propensities are transmitted to their posterity.\u201d\n\nI have quoted enough to show that Dr. Erasmus Darwin would have protested\nagainst the supposition that functionally produced modifications were an\nadequate explanation of all the phenomena of organic modification. He\ndeclares accident and the chances and changes of this mortal life to be\npotent and frequent causes of variations, which, being not infrequently\ninherited, result in the formation of varieties and even species, but\nconsiders these causes if taken alone as no less insufficient to account\nfor observable facts than the theory of functionally produced\nmodifications would be if not supplemented by inheritance of so-called\nfortuitous, or spontaneous variations. The difference between Dr.\nErasmus Darwin and Mr. Spencer does not consist in the denial by the\nfirst, that a variety which happens, no matter how accidentally, to have\nvaried in a way that enables it to comply more fully and readily with the\nconditions of its existence, is likely to live longer and leave more\noffspring than one less favoured; nor in the denial by the second of the\ninheritance and accumulation of functionally produced modifications; but\nin the amount of stress which they respectively lay on the relative\nimportance of the two great factors of organic evolution, the existence\nof which they are alike ready to admit.\n\nWith Erasmus Darwin there is indeed luck, and luck has had a great deal\nto do with organic modification, but no amount of luck would have done\nunless cunning had known how to take advantage of it; whereas if cunning\nbe given, a very little luck at a time will accumulate in the course of\nages and become a mighty heap. Cunning, therefore, is the factor on\nwhich, having regard to the usage of language and the necessity for\nsimplifying facts, he thinks it most proper to insist. Surely this is as\nnear as may be the opinion which common consent ascribes to Mr. Spencer\nhimself. It is certainly the one which, in supporting Erasmus Darwin\u2019s\nsystem as against his grandson\u2019s, I have always intended to support.\nWith Charles Darwin, on the other hand, there is indeed cunning, effort,\nand consequent use and disuse; nor does he deny that these have produced\nsome, and sometimes even an important, effect in modifying species, but\nhe assigns by far the most important _r\u00f4le_ in the whole scheme to\nnatural selection, which, as I have already shown, must, with him, be\nregarded as a synonym for luck pure and simple. This, for reasons well\nshown by Mr. Spencer in the articles under consideration, is so untenable\nthat it seems only possible to account for its having been advanced at\nall by supposing Mr. Darwin\u2019s judgment to have been perverted by some one\nor more of the many causes that might tend to warp them. What the chief\nof those causes may have been I shall presently point out.\n\nBuffon erred rather on the side of ignoring functionally produced\nmodifications than of insisting on them. The main agency with him is the\ndirect action of the environment upon the organism. This, no doubt, is a\nflaw in Buffon\u2019s immortal work, but it is one which Erasmus Darwin and\nLamarck easily corrected; nor can we doubt that Buffon would have readily\naccepted their amendment if it had been suggested to him. Buffon did\ninfinitely more in the way of discovering and establishing the theory of\ndescent with modification than any one has ever done either before or\nsince. He was too much occupied with proving the fact of evolution at\nall, to dwell as fully as might have been wished upon the details of the\nprocess whereby the am\u0153ba had become man, but we have already seen that\nhe regarded inherited mutilation as the cause of establishing a new breed\nof dogs, and this is at any rate not laying much stress on functionally\nproduced modifications. Again, when writing of the dog, he speaks of\nvariations arising \u201c_by some chance_ common enough with nature,\u201d {104a}\nand clearly does not contemplate function as the sole cause of\nmodification. Practically, though I grant I should be less able to quote\npassages in support of my opinion than I quite like, I do not doubt that\nhis position was much the same as that of his successors, Erasmus Darwin\nand Lamarck.\n\nLamarck is more vulnerable than either Erasmus Darwin or Buffon on the\nscore of unwillingness to assign its full share to mere chance, but I do\nnot for a moment believe his comparative reticence to have been caused by\nfailure to see that the chapter of accidents is a fateful one. He saw\nthat the cunning or functional side had been too much lost sight of, and\ntherefore insisted on it, but he did not mean to say that there is no\nsuch thing as luck. \u201cLet us suppose,\u201d he says, \u201cthat a grass growing in\na low-lying meadow, gets carried _by some accident_ to the brow of a\nneighbouring hill, where the soil is still damp enough for the plant to\nbe able to exist.\u201d {105a} Or again\u2014\u201cWith sufficient time, favourable\nconditions of life, successive changes in the condition of the globe, and\nthe power of new surroundings and habits to modify the organs of living\nbodies, all animal and vegetable forms have been imperceptibly rendered\nsuch as we now see them.\u201d {105b} Who can doubt that accident is here\nregarded as a potent factor of evolution, as well as the design that is\ninvolved in the supposition that modification is, in the main,\nfunctionally induced? Again he writes, \u201cAs regards the circumstances\nthat give rise to variation, the principal are climatic changes,\ndifferent temperatures of any of a creature\u2019s environments, differences\nof abode, of habit, of the most frequent actions, and lastly of the means\nof obtaining food, self-defence, reproduction,\u201d &c. {105c} I will not\ndwell on the small inconsistencies which may be found in the passages\nquoted above; the reader will doubtless see them, and will also doubtless\nsee that in spite of them there can be no doubt that Lamarck, while\nbelieving modification to be effected mainly by the survival in the\nstruggle for existence of modifications which had been induced\nfunctionally, would not have hesitated to admit the survival of\nfavourable variations due to mere accident as also a potent factor in\ninducing the results we see around us.\n\nFor the rest, Mr. Spencer\u2019s articles have relieved me from the necessity\nof going into the evidence which proves that such structures as a\ngiraffe\u2019s neck, for example, cannot possibly have been produced by the\naccumulation of variations which had their origin mainly in accident.\nThere is no occasion to add anything to what Mr. Spencer has said on this\nscore, and I am satisfied that those who do not find his argument\nconvince them would not be convinced by anything I might say; I shall,\ntherefore, omit what I had written on this subject, and confine myself to\ngiving the substance of Mr. Spencer\u2019s most telling argument against Mr.\nDarwin\u2019s theory that accidental variations, if favourable, would\naccumulate and result in seemingly adaptive structures. Mr. Spencer well\nshows that luck or chance is insufficient as a motive-power, or helm, of\nevolution; but luck is only absence of design; if, then, absence of\ndesign is found to fail, it follows that there must have been design\nsomewhere, nor can the design be more conveniently placed than in\nassociation with function.\n\nMr. Spencer contends that where life is so simple as to consist\npractically in the discharge of only one function, or where circumstances\nare such that some one function is supremely important (a state of\nthings, by the way, more easily found in hypothesis than in nature\u2014at\nleast as continuing without modification for many successive seasons),\nthen accidental variations, if favourable, would indeed accumulate and\nresult in modification, without the aid of the transmission of\nfunctionally produced modification. This is true; it is also true,\nhowever, that only a very small number of species in comparison with\nthose we see around us could thus arise, and that we should never have\ngot plants and animals as embodiments of the two great fundamental\nprinciples on which it is alone possible that life can be conducted,\n{107a} and species of plants and animals as embodiments of the details\ninvolved in carrying out these two main principles.\n\nIf the earliest organism could have only varied favourably in one\ndirection, the one possible favourable accidental variation would have\naccumulated so long as the organism continued to exist at all, inasmuch\nas this would be preserved whenever it happened to occur, while every\nother would be lost in the struggle of competitive forms; but even in the\nlowest forms of life there is more than one condition in respect of which\nthe organism must be supposed sensitive, and there are as many directions\nin which variations may be favourable as there are conditions of the\nenvironment that affect the organism. We cannot conceive of a living\nform as having a power of adaptation limited to one direction only; the\nelasticity which admits of a not being \u201cextreme to mark that which is\ndone amiss\u201d in one direction will commonly admit of it in as many\ndirections as there are possible favourable modes of variation; the\nnumber of these, as has been just said, depends upon the number of the\nconditions of the environment that affect the organism, and these last,\nthough in the long run and over considerable intervals of time tolerably\nconstant, are over shorter intervals liable to frequent and great\nchanges; so that there is nothing in Mr. Charles Darwin\u2019s system of\nmodification through the natural survival of the lucky, to prevent gain\nin one direction one year from being lost irretrievably in the next,\nthrough the greater success of some in no way correlated variation, the\nfortunate possessors of which alone survive. This, in its turn, is as\nlikely as not to disappear shortly through the arising of some difficulty\nin some entirely new direction, and so on; nor, if function be regarded\nas of small effect in determining organism, is there anything to ensure\neither that, even if ground be lost for a season or two in any one\ndirection, it shall be recovered presently on resumption by the organism\nof the habits that called it into existence, or that it shall appear\nsynchronously in a sufficient number of individuals to ensure its not\nbeing soon lost through gamogenesis.\n\nHow is progress ever to be made if races keep reversing, Penelope-like,\nin one generation all that they have been achieving in the preceding?\nAnd how, on Mr. Darwin\u2019s system, of which the accumulation of strokes of\nluck is the greatly preponderating feature, is a hoard ever to be got\ntogether and conserved, no matter how often luck may have thrown good\nthings in an organism\u2019s way? Luck, or absence of design, may be\nsometimes almost said to throw good things in our way, or at any rate we\nmay occasionally get more through having made no design than any design\nwe should have been likely to have formed would have given us; but luck\ndoes not hoard these good things for our use and make our wills for us,\nnor does it keep providing us with the same good gifts again and again,\nand no matter how often we reject them.\n\nI had better, perhaps, give Mr. Spencer\u2019s own words as quoted by himself\nin his article in the _Nineteenth Century_ for April, 1886. He there\nwrote as follows, quoting from \u00a7 166 of his \u201cPrinciples of Biology,\u201d\nwhich appeared in 1864:\u2014\n\n\u201cWhere the life is comparatively simple, or where surrounding\ncircumstances render some one function supremely important, the survival\nof the fittest\u201d (which means here the survival of the luckiest) \u201cmay\nreadily bring about the appropriate structural change, without any aid\nfrom the transmission of functionally-acquired modifications\u201d (into which\neffort and design have entered). \u201cBut in proportion as the life grows\ncomplex\u2014in proportion as a healthy existence cannot be secured by a large\nendowment of some one power, but demands many powers; in the same\nproportion do there arise obstacles to the increase of any particular\npower, by \u2018the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life\u2019\u201d\n(that is to say, through mere survival of the luckiest). \u201cAs fast as the\nfaculties are multiplied, so fast does it become possible for the several\nmembers of a species to have various kinds of superiority over one\nanother. While one saves its life by higher speed, another does the like\nby clearer vision, another by keener scent, another by quicker hearing,\nanother by greater strength, another by unusual power of enduring cold or\nhunger, another by special sagacity, another by special timidity, another\nby special courage; and others by other bodily and mental attributes.\nNow it is unquestionably true that, other things equal, each of these\nattributes, giving its possessor an equal extra chance of life, is likely\nto be transmitted to posterity. But there seems no reason to believe it\nwill be increased in subsequent generations by natural selection. That\nit may be thus increased, the animals not possessing more than average\nendowments of it must be more frequently killed off than individuals\nhighly endowed with it; and this can only happen when the attribute is\none of greater importance, for the time being, than most of the other\nattributes. If those members of the species which have but ordinary\nshares of it, nevertheless survive by virtue of other superiorities which\nthey severally possess, then it is not easy to see how this particular\nattribute can be developed by natural selection in subsequent\ngenerations.\u201d (For if some other superiority is a greater source of\nluck, then natural selection, or survival of the luckiest, will ensure\nthat this other superiority be preserved at the expense of the one\nacquired in the earlier generation.) \u201cThe probability seems rather to\nbe, that by gamogenesis, this extra endowment will, on the average, be\ndiminished in posterity\u2014just serving in the long run to compensate the\ndeficient endowments of other individuals, whose special powers lie in\nother directions; and so to keep up the normal structure of the species.\nThe working out of the process is here somewhat difficult to follow\u201d\n(there is no difficulty as soon as it is perceived that Mr. Darwin\u2019s\nnatural selection invariably means, or ought to mean, the survival of the\nluckiest, and that seasons and what they bring with them, though fairly\nconstant on an average, yet individually vary so greatly that what is\nluck in one season is disaster in another); \u201cbut it appears to me that as\nfast as the number of bodily and mental faculties increases, and as fast\nas the maintenance of life comes to depend less on the amount of any one,\nand more on the combined action of all, so fast does the production of\nspecialities of character by natural selection alone become difficult.\nParticularly does this seem to be so with a species so multitudinous in\npowers as mankind; and above all does it seem to be so with such of the\nhuman powers as have but minor shares in aiding the struggle for life\u2014the\n\u00e6sthetic faculties, for example.\n\n\u201cDwelling for a moment on this last illustration of the class of\ndifficulties described, let us ask how we are to interpret the\ndevelopment of the musical faculty; how came there that endowment of\nmusical faculty which characterises modern Europeans at large, as\ncompared with their remote ancestors? The monotonous chants of low\nsavages cannot be said to show any melodic inspiration; and it is not\nevident that an individual savage who had a little more musical\nperception than the rest would derive any such advantage in the\nmaintenance of life as would secure the spread of his superiority by\ninheritance of the variation,\u201d &c.\n\nIt should be observed that the passage given in the last paragraph but\none appeared in 1864, only five years after the first edition of the\n\u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d but, crushing as it is, Mr. Darwin never answered\nit. He treated it as nonexistent\u2014and this, doubtless from a business\nstandpoint, was the best thing he could do. How far such a course was\nconsistent with that single-hearted devotion to the interests of science\nfor which Mr. Darwin developed such an abnormal reputation, is a point\nwhich I must leave to his many admirers to determine.\n\n\n\n\nChapter VIII\nProperty, Common Sense, and Protoplasm\n\n\nONE would think the issue stated in the three preceding chapters was\ndecided in the stating. This, as I have already implied, is probably the\nreason why those who have a vested interest in Mr. Darwin\u2019s philosophical\nreputation have avoided stating it.\n\nIt may be said that, seeing the result is a joint one, inasmuch as both\n\u201cres\u201d and \u201cme,\u201d or both luck and cunning, enter so largely into\ndevelopment, neither factor can claim pre-eminence to the exclusion of\nthe other. But life is short and business long, and if we are to get the\none into the other we must suppress details, and leave our words\npregnant, as painters leave their touches when painting from nature. If\none factor concerns us greatly more than the other, we should emphasize\nit, and let the other go without saying, by force of association. There\nis no fear of its being lost sight of; association is one of the few\nreally liberal things in nature; by liberal, I mean precipitate and\ninaccurate; the power of words, as of pictures, and indeed the power to\ncarry on life at all, vests in the fact that association does not stick\nto the letter of its bond, but will take the half for the whole without\neven looking closely at the coin given to make sure that it is not\ncounterfeit. Through the haste and high pressure of business, errors\narise continually, and these errors give us the shocks of which our\nconsciousness is compounded. Our whole conscious life, therefore, grows\nout of memory and out of the power of association, in virtue of which not\nonly does the right half pass for the whole, but the wrong half not\ninfrequently passes current for it also, without being challenged and\nfound out till, as it were, the accounts come to be balanced, and it is\nfound that they will not do so.\n\nVariations are an organism\u2019s way of getting over an unexpected\ndiscrepancy between its resources as shown by the fly-leaves of its own\ncheques and the universe\u2019s passbook; the universe is generally right, or\nwould be upheld as right if the matter were to come before the not too\nincorruptible courts of nature, and in nine cases out of ten the organism\nhas made the error in its own favour, so that it must now pay or die. It\ncan only pay by altering its mode of life, and how long is it likely to\nbe before a new departure in its mode of life comes out in its own person\nand in those of its family? Granted it will at first come out in their\nappearance only, but there can be no change in appearance without some\nslight corresponding organic modification. In practice there is usually\ncompromise in these matters. The universe, if it does not give an\norganism short shrift and eat it at once, will commonly abate something\nof its claim; it gets tricked out of an additional moiety by the\norganism; the organism really does pay something by way of changed\nhabits; this results in variation, in virtue of which the accounts are\ncooked, cobbled, and passed by a series of those miracles of\ninconsistency which was call compromises, and after this they cannot be\nreopened\u2014not till next time.\n\nSurely of the two factors which go to the making up of development,\ncunning is the one more proper to be insisted on as determining the\nphysical and psychical well or ill being, and hence, ere long, the future\nform of the organism. We can hardly open a newspaper without seeing some\nsign of this; take, for example, the following extract from a letter in\nthe _Times_ of the day on which I am writing (February 8, 1886)\u2014\u201cYou may\npass along a road which divides a settlement of Irish Celts from one of\nGermans. They all came to the country equally without money, and have\nhad to fight their way in the forest, but the difference in their\ncondition is very remarkable; on the German side there is comfort,\nthrift, peace, but on the other side the spectacle is very different.\u201d\nFew will deny that slight organic differences, corresponding to these\ndifferences of habit, are already perceptible; no Darwinian will deny\nthat these differences are likely to be inherited, and, in the absence of\nintermarriage between the two colonies, to result in still more typical\ndifference than that which exists at present. According to Mr. Darwin,\nthe improved type of the more successful race would not be due mainly to\ntransmitted perseverance in well-doing, but to the fact that if any\nmember of the German colony \u201chappened\u201d to be born \u201cever so slightly,\u201d &c.\nOf course this last is true to a certain extent also; if any member of\nthe German colony does \u201chappen to be born,\u201d &c., then he will stand a\nbetter chance of surviving, and, if he marries a wife like himself, of\ntransmitting his good qualities; but how about the happening? How is it\nthat this is of such frequent occurrence in the one colony, and is so\nrare in the other? _Fortes creantur fortibus et bonis_. True, but how\nand why? Through the race being favoured? In one sense, doubtless, it\nis true that no man can have anything except it be given him from above,\nbut it must be from an above into the composition of which he himself\nlargely enters. God gives us all things; but we are a part of God, and\nthat part of Him, moreover, whose department it more especially is to\nlook after ourselves. It cannot be through luck, for luck is blind, and\ndoes not pick out the same people year after year and generation after\ngeneration; shall we not rather say, then, that it is because mind, or\ncunning, is a great factor in the achievement of physical results, and\nbecause there is an abiding memory between successive generations, in\nvirtue of which the cunning of an earlier one enures to the benefit of\nits successors?\n\nIt is one of the commonplaces of biology that the nature of the organism\n(which is mainly determined by ancestral antecedents) is greatly more\nimportant in determining its future than the conditions of its\nenvironment, provided, of course, that these are not too cruelly\nabnormal, so that good seed will do better on rather poor soil, than bad\nseed on rather good soil; this alone should be enough to show that\ncunning, or individual effort, is more important in determining organic\nresults than luck is, and therefore that if either is to be insisted on\nto the exclusion of the other, it should be cunning, not luck. Which is\nmore correctly said to be the main means of the development of\ncapital\u2014Luck? or Cunning? Of course there must be something to be\ndeveloped\u2014and luck, that is to say, the unknowable and unforeseeable,\nenters everywhere; but is it more convenient with our oldest and\nbest-established ideas to say that luck is the main means of the\ndevelopment of capital, or that cunning is so? Can there be a moment\u2019s\nhesitation in admitting that if capital is found to have been developed\nlargely, continuously, by many people, in many ways, over a long period\nof time, it can only have been by means of continued application, energy,\neffort, industry, and good sense? Granted there has been luck too; of\ncourse there has, but we let it go without saying, whereas we cannot let\nthe skill or cunning go without saying, inasmuch as we feel the cunning\nto have been the essence of the whole matter.\n\nGranted, again, that there is no test more fallacious on a small scale\nthan that of immediate success. As applied to any particular individual,\nit breaks down completely. It is unfortunately no rare thing to see the\ngood man striving against fate, and the fool born with a silver spoon in\nhis mouth. Still on a large scale no test can be conceivably more\nreliable; a blockhead may succeed for a time, but a succession of many\ngenerations of blockheads does not go on steadily gaining ground, adding\nfield to field and farm to farm, and becoming year by year more capable\nand prosperous. Given time\u2014of which there is no scant in the matter of\norganic development\u2014and cunning will do more with ill luck than folly\nwith good. People do not hold six trumps every hand for a dozen games of\nwhist running, if they do not keep a card or two up their sleeves.\nCunning, if it can keep its head above water at all, will beat mere luck\nunaided by cunning, no matter what start luck may have had, if the race\nbe a fairly long one. Growth is a kind of success which does indeed come\nto some organisms with less effort than to others, but it cannot be\nmaintained and improved upon without pains and effort. A foolish\norganism and its fortuitous variation will be soon parted, for, as a\ngeneral rule, unless the variation has so much connection with the\norganism\u2019s past habits and ways of thought as to be in no proper sense of\nthe word \u201cfortuitous,\u201d the organism will not know what to do with it when\nit has got it, no matter how favourable it may be, and it is little\nlikely to be handed down to descendants. Indeed the kind of people who\nget on best in the world\u2014and what test to a Darwinian can be comparable\nto this?\u2014commonly do insist on cunning rather than on luck, sometimes\nperhaps even unduly; speaking, at least, from experience, I have\ngenerally found myself more or less of a failure with those Darwinians to\nwhom I have endeavoured to excuse my shortcomings on the score of luck.\n\nIt may be said that the contention that the nature of the organism does\nmore towards determining its future than the conditions of its immediate\nenvironment do, is only another way of saying that the accidents which\nhave happened to an organism in the persons of its ancestors throughout\nall time are more irresistible by it for good or ill than any of the more\nordinary chances and changes of its own immediate life. I do not deny\nthis; but these ancestral accidents were either turned to account, or\nneglected where they might have been taken advantage of; they thus passed\neither into skill, or want of skill; so that whichever way the fact is\nstated the result is the same; and if simplicity of statement be\nregarded, there is no more convenient way of putting the matter than to\nsay that though luck is mighty, cunning is mightier still. Organism\ncommonly shows its cunning by practising what Horace preached, and\ntreating itself as more plastic than its surroundings; those indeed who\nhave had the greatest the first to admit that they had gained their ends\nmore by reputation as moulders of circumstances have ever been shaping\ntheir actions and themselves to suit events, than by trying to shape\nevents to suit themselves and their actions. Modification, like charity,\nbegins at home.\n\nBut however this may be, there can be no doubt that cunning is in the\nlong run mightier than luck as regards the acquisition of property, and\nwhat applies to property applies to organism also. Property, as I have\nlately seen was said by Rosmini, is a kind of extension of the\npersonality into the outside world. He might have said as truly that it\nis a kind of penetration of the outside world within the limits of the\npersonality, or that it is at any rate a prophesying of, and essay after,\nthe more living phase of matter in the direction of which it is tending.\nIf approached from the dynamical or living side of the underlying\nsubstratum, it is the beginning of the comparatively stable equilibrium\nwhich we call brute matter; if from the statical side, that is to say,\nfrom that of brute matter, it is the beginning of that dynamical state\nwhich we associate with life; it is the last of ego and first of non ego,\nor _vice vers\u00e2_, as the case may be; it is the ground whereon the two\nmeet and are neither wholly one nor wholly the other, but a whirling mass\nof contradictions such as attends all fusion.\n\nWhat property is to a man\u2019s mind or soul that his body is also, only more\nso. The body is property carried to the bitter end, or property is the\nbody carried to the bitter end, whichever the reader chooses; the\nexpression \u201corganic wealth\u201d is not figurative; none other is so apt and\naccurate; so universally, indeed, is this recognised that the fact has\nfound expression in our liturgy, which bids us pray for all those who are\nany wise afflicted \u201cin mind, body, or estate;\u201d no inference, therefore,\ncan be more simple and legitimate than the one in accordance with which\nthe laws that govern the development of wealth generally are supposed\nalso to govern the particular form of health and wealth which comes most\nclosely home to us\u2014I mean that of our bodily implements or organs. What\nis the stomach but a living sack, or purse of untanned leather, wherein\nwe keep our means of subsistence? Food is money made easy; it is petty\ncash in its handiest and most reduced form; it is our way of assimilating\nour possessions and making them indeed our own. What is the purse but a\nkind of abridged extra corporeal stomach wherein we keep the money which\nwe convert by purchase into food, as we presently convert the food by\ndigestion into flesh and blood? And what living form is there which is\nwithout a purse or stomach, even though it have to job it by the meal as\nthe am\u0153ba does, and exchange it for some other article as soon as it has\ndone eating? How marvellously does the analogy hold between the purse\nand the stomach alike as regards form and function; and I may say in\npassing that, as usual, the organ which is the more remote from\nprotoplasm is at once more special, more an object of our consciousness,\nand less an object of its own.\n\nTalk of ego and non ego meeting, and of the hopelessness of avoiding\ncontradiction in terms\u2014talk of this, and look, in passing, at the am\u0153ba.\nIt is itself _qu\u00e2_ maker of the stomach and being fed; it is not itself\n_qu\u00e2_ stomach and _qu\u00e2_ its using itself as a mere tool or implement to\nfeed itself with. It is active and passive, object and subject, _ego_\nand _non ego_\u2014every kind of Irish bull, in fact, which a sound logician\nabhors\u2014and it is only because it has persevered, as I said in \u201cLife and\nHabit,\u201d in thus defying logic and arguing most virtuously in a most\nvicious circle, that it has come in the persons of some of its\ndescendants to reason with sufficient soundness. And what the am\u0153ba is\nman is also; man is only a great many am\u0153bas, most of them dreadfully\nnarrow-minded, going up and down the country with their goods and\nchattels like gipsies in a caravan; he is only a great many am\u0153bas that\nhave had much time and money spent on their education, and received large\nbequests of organised intelligence from those that have gone before them.\n\nThe most incorporate tool\u2014we will say an eye, or a tooth, or the closed\nfist when used to strike\u2014has still something of the _non ego_ about it in\nso far as it is used; those organs, again, that are the most completely\nseparate from the body, as the locomotive engine, must still from time to\ntime kiss the soil of the human body, and be handled and thus crossed\nwith man again if they would remain in working order. They cannot be cut\nadrift from the most living form of matter (I mean most living from our\npoint of view), and remain absolutely without connection with it for any\nlength of time, any more than a seal can live without coming up sometimes\nto breathe; and in so far as they become linked on to living beings they\nlive. Everything is living which is in close communion with, and\ninterpermeated by, that something which we call mind or thought.\nGiordano Bruno saw this long ago when he made an interlocutor in one of\nhis dialogues say that a man\u2019s hat and cloak are alive when he is wearing\nthem. \u201cThy boots and spurs live,\u201d he exclaims, \u201cwhen thy feet carry\nthem; thy hat lives when thy head is within it; and so the stable lives\nwhen it contains the horse or mule, or even yourself;\u201d nor is it easy to\nsee how this is to be refuted except at a cost which no one in his senses\nwill offer.\n\nIt may be said that the life of clothes in wear and implements in use is\nno true life, inasmuch as it differs from flesh and blood life in too\nmany and important respects; that we have made up our minds about not\nletting life outside the body too decisively to allow the question to be\nreopened; that if this be tolerated we shall have societies for the\nprevention of cruelty to chairs and tables, or cutting clothes amiss, or\nwearing them to tatters, or whatever other absurdity may occur to idle\nand unkind people; the whole discussion, therefore, should be ordered out\nof court at once.\n\nI admit that this is much the most sensible position to take, but it can\nonly be taken by those who turn the deafest of deaf ears to the teachings\nof science, and tolerate no going even for a moment below the surface of\nthings. People who take this line must know how to put their foot down\nfirmly in the matter of closing a discussion. Some one may perhaps\ninnocently say that some parts of the body are more living and vital than\nothers, and those who stick to common sense may allow this, but if they\ndo they must close the discussion on the spot; if they listen to another\nsyllable they are lost; if they let the innocent interlocutor say so much\nas that a piece of well-nourished healthy brain is more living than the\nend of a finger-nail that wants cutting, or than the calcareous parts of\na bone, the solvent will have been applied which will soon make an end of\ncommon sense ways of looking at the matter. Once even admit the use of\nthe participle \u201cdying,\u201d which involves degrees of death, and hence an\nentry of death in part into a living body, and common sense must either\nclose the discussion at once, or ere long surrender at discretion.\n\nCommon sense can only carry weight in respect of matters with which every\none is familiar, as forming part of the daily and hourly conduct of\naffairs; if we would keep our comfortable hard and fast lines, our rough\nand ready unspecialised ways of dealing with difficult questions, our\nimpatience of what St. Paul calls \u201cdoubtful disputations,\u201d we must refuse\nto quit the ground on which the judgments of mankind have been so long\nand often given that they are not likely to be questioned. Common sense\nis not yet formulated in manners of science or philosophy, for only few\nconsider them; few decisions, therefore, have been arrived at which all\nhold final. Science is, like love, \u201ctoo young to know what conscience,\u201d\nor common sense, is. As soon as the world began to busy itself with\nevolution it said good-bye to common sense, and must get on with uncommon\nsense as best it can. The first lesson that uncommon sense will teach it\nis that contradiction in terms is the foundation of all sound\nreasoning\u2014and, as an obvious consequence, compromise, the foundation of\nall sound practice. This, it follows easily, involves the corollary that\nas faith, to be of any value, must be based on reason, so reason, to be\nof any value, must be based on faith, and that neither can stand alone or\ndispense with the other, any more than culture or vulgarity can stand\nunalloyed with one another without much danger of mischance.\n\nIt may not perhaps be immediately apparent why the admission that a piece\nof healthy living brain is more living than the end of a finger-nail, is\nso dangerous to common sense ways of looking at life and death; I had\nbetter, therefore, be more explicit. By this admission degrees of\nlivingness are admitted within the body; this involves approaches to\nnon-livingness. On this the question arises, \u201cWhich are the most living\nparts?\u201d The answer to this was given a few years ago with a flourish of\ntrumpets, and our biologists shouted with one voice, \u201cGreat is\nprotoplasm. There is no life but protoplasm, and Huxley is its prophet.\u201d\nRead Huxley\u2019s \u201cPhysical Basis of Mind.\u201d Read Professor Mivart\u2019s article,\n\u201cWhat are Living Beings?\u201d in the _Contemporary Review_, July, 1879. Read\nDr. Andrew Wilson\u2019s article in the _Gentleman\u2019s Magazine_, October, 1879.\nRemember Professor Allman\u2019s address to the British Association, 1879;\nask, again, any medical man what is the most approved scientific attitude\nas regards the protoplasmic and non-protoplasmic parts of the body, and\nhe will say that the thinly veiled conclusion arrived at by all of them\nis, that the protoplasmic parts are alone truly living, and that the\nnon-protoplasmic are non-living.\n\nIt may suffice if I confine myself to Professor Allman\u2019s address to the\nBritish Association in 1879, as a representative utterance. Professor\nAllman said:\u2014\n\n\u201cProtoplasm lies at the base of every vital phenomenon. It is, as Huxley\nhas well expressed it, \u2018the physical basis of life;\u2019 wherever there is\nlife from its lowest to its highest manifestation there is protoplasm;\nwherever there is protoplasm there is life.\u201d {122a}\n\nTo say wherever there is life there is protoplasm, is to say that there\ncan be no life without protoplasm, and this is saying that where there is\nno protoplasm there is no life. But large parts of the body are\nnon-protoplasmic; a bone is, indeed, permeated by protoplasm, but it is\nnot protoplasm; it follows, therefore, that according to Professor Allman\nbone is not in any proper sense of words a living substance. From this\nit should follow, and doubtless does follow in Professor Allman\u2019s mind,\nthat large tracts of the human body, if not the greater part by weight\n(as bones, skin, muscular tissues, &c.), are no more alive than a coat or\npair of boots in wear is alive, except in so far as the bones, &c., are\nmore closely and nakedly permeated by protoplasm than the coat or boots,\nand are thus brought into closer, directer, and more permanent\ncommunication with that which, if not life itself, still has more of the\near of life, and comes nearer to its royal person than anything else\ndoes. Indeed that this is Professor Allman\u2019s opinion appears from the\npassage on page 26 of the report, in which he says that in \u201cprotoplasm we\nfind the only form of matter in which life can manifest itself.\u201d\n\nAccording to this view the skin and other tissues are supposed to be made\nfrom dead protoplasm which living protoplasm turns to account as the\nBritish Museum authorities are believed to stuff their new specimens with\nthe skins of old ones; the matter used by the living protoplasm for this\npurpose is held to be entirely foreign to protoplasm itself, and no more\ncapable of acting in concert with it than bricks can understand and act\nin concert with the bricklayer. As the bricklayer is held to be living\nand the bricks non-living, so the bones and skin which protoplasm is\nsupposed to construct are held non-living and the protoplasm alone\nliving. Protoplasm, it is said, goes about masked behind the clothes or\nhabits which it has fashioned. It has habited itself as animals and\nplants, and we have mistaken the garment for the wearer\u2014as our dogs and\ncats doubtless think with Giordano Bruno that our boots live when we are\nwearing them, and that we keep spare paws in our bedrooms which lie by\nthe wall and go to sleep when we have not got them on.\n\nIf, in answer to the assertion that the osseous parts of bone are\nnon-living, it is said that they must be living, for they heal if broken,\nwhich no dead matter can do, it is answered that the broken pieces of\nbone do not grow together; they are mended by the protoplasm which\npermeates the Haversian canals; the bones themselves are no more living\nmerely because they are tenanted by something which really does live,\nthan a house lives because men and women inhabit it; and if a bone is\nrepaired, it no more repairs itself than a house can be said to have\nrepaired itself because its owner has sent for the bricklayer and seen\nthat what was wanted was done.\n\nWe do not know, it is said, by what means the structureless viscid\nsubstance which we call protoplasm can build for itself a solid bone; we\ndo not understand how an am\u0153ba makes its test; no one understands how\nanything is done unless he can do it himself; and even then he probably\ndoes not know how he has done it. Set a man who has never painted, to\nwatch Rembrandt paint the Burgomaster Six, and he will no more understand\nhow Rembrandt can have done it, than we can understand how the am\u0153ba\nmakes its test, or the protoplasm cements two broken ends of a piece of\nbone. _Ces choses se font mais ne s\u2019expliquent pas_. So some denizen of\nanother planet looking at our earth through a telescope which showed him\nmuch, but still not quite enough, and seeing the St. Gothard tunnel plumb\non end so that he could not see the holes of entry and exit, would think\nthe trains there a kind of caterpillar which went through the mountain by\na pure effort of the will\u2014that enabled them in some mysterious way to\ndisregard material obstacles and dispense with material means. We know,\nof course, that it is not so, and that exemption from the toil attendant\non material obstacles has been compounded for, in the ordinary way, by\nthe single payment of a tunnel; and so with the cementing of a bone, our\nbiologists say that the protoplasm, which is alone living, cements it\nmuch as a man might mend a piece of broken china, but that it works by\nmethods and processes which elude us, even as the holes of the St.\nGothard tunnel may be supposed to elude a denizen of another world.\n\nThe reader will already have seen that the toils are beginning to close\nround those who, while professing to be guided by common sense, still\nparley with even the most superficial probers beneath the surface; this,\nhowever, will appear more clearly in the following chapter. It will also\nappear how far-reaching were the consequences of the denial of design\nthat was involved in Mr. Darwin\u2019s theory that luck is the main element in\nsurvival, and how largely this theory is responsible for the fatuous\ndevelopments in connection alike with protoplasm and automatism which a\nfew years ago seemed about to carry everything before them.\n\n\n\n\nChapter IX\nProperty, Common Sense, and Protoplasm (_continued_)\n\n\nTHE position, then, stands thus. Common sense gave the inch of admitting\nsome parts of the body to be less living than others, and philosophy took\nthe ell of declaring the body to be almost all of it stone dead. This is\nserious; still if it were all, for a quiet life, we might put up with it.\nUnfortunately we know only too well that it will not be all. Our bodies,\nwhich seemed so living and now prove so dead, have served us such a trick\nthat we can have no confidence in anything connected with them. As with\nskin and bones to-day, so with protoplasm to-morrow. Protoplasm is\nmainly oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and carbon; if we do not keep a sharp\nlook out, we shall have it going the way of the rest of the body, and\nbeing declared dead in respect, at any rate, of these inorganic\ncomponents. Science has not, I believe, settled all the components of\nprotoplasm, but this is neither here nor there; she has settled what it\nis in great part, and there is no trusting her not to settle the rest at\nany moment, even if she has not already done so. As soon as this has\nbeen done we shall be told that nine-tenths of the protoplasm of which we\nare composed must go the way of our non-protoplasmic parts, and that the\nonly really living part of us is the something with a new name that runs\nthe protoplasm that runs the flesh and bones that run the organs\u2014\n\nWhy stop here? Why not add \u201cwhich run the tools and properties which are\nas essential to our life and health as much that is actually incorporate\nwith us?\u201d The same breach which has let the non-living effect a lodgment\nwithin the body must, in all equity, let the organic\ncharacter\u2014bodiliness, so to speak\u2014pass out beyond its limits and effect a\nlodgment in our temporary and extra-corporeal limbs. What, on the\nprotoplasmic theory, the skin and bones are, that the hammer and spade\nare also; they differ in the degree of closeness and permanence with\nwhich they are associated with protoplasm, but both bones and hammers are\nalike non-living things which protoplasm uses for its own purposes and\nkeeps closer or less close at hand as custom and convenience may\ndetermine.\n\nAccording to this view, the non-protoplasmic parts of the body are tools\nof the first degree; they are not living, but they are in such close and\nconstant contact with that which really lives, that an aroma of life\nattaches to them. Some of these, however, such as horns, hooves, and\ntusks, are so little permeated by protoplasm that they cannot rank much\nhigher than the tools of the second degree, which come next to them in\norder.\n\nThese tools of the second degree are either picked up ready-made, or are\nmanufactured directly by the body, as being torn or bitten into shape, or\nas stones picked up to throw at prey or at an enemy.\n\nTools of the third degree are made by the instrumentality of tools of the\nsecond and first degrees; as, for example, chipped flint, arrow-heads,\n&c.\n\nTools of the fourth degree are made by those of the third, second, and\nfirst. They consist of the simpler compound instruments that yet require\nto be worked by hand, as hammers, spades, and even hand flour-mills.\n\nTools of the fifth degree are made by the help of those of the fourth,\nthird, second, and first. They are compounded of many tools, worked, it\nmay be, by steam or water and requiring no constant contact with the\nbody.\n\nBut each one of these tools of the fifth degree was made in the first\ninstance by the sole instrumentality of the four preceding kinds of tool.\nThey must all be linked on to protoplasm, which is the one original\ntool-maker, but which can only make the tools that are more remote from\nitself by the help of those that are nearer, that is to say, it can only\nwork when it has suitable tools to work with, and when it is allowed to\nuse them in its own way. There can be no direct communication between\nprotoplasm and a steam-engine; there may be and often is direct\ncommunication between machines of even the fifth order and those of the\nfirst, as when an engine-man turns a cock, or repairs something with his\nown hands if he has nothing better to work with. But put a hammer, for\nexample, to a piece of protoplasm, and the protoplasm will no more know\nwhat to do with it than we should be able to saw a piece of wood in two\nwithout a saw. Even protoplasm from the hand of a carpenter who has been\nhandling hammers all his life would be hopelessly put off its stroke if\nnot allowed to work in its usual way but put bare up against a hammer; it\nwould make a slimy mess and then dry up; still there can be no doubt (so\nat least those who uphold protoplasm as the one living substance would\nsay) that the closer a machine can be got to protoplasm and the more\npermanent the connection, the more living it appears to be, or at any\nrate the more does it appear to be endowed with spontaneous and reasoning\nenergy, so long, of course, as the closeness is of a kind which\nprotoplasm understands and is familiar with. This, they say, is why we\ndo not like using any implement or tool with gloves on, for these impose\na barrier between the tool and its true connection with protoplasm by\nmeans of the nervous system. For the same reason we put gloves on when\nwe box so as to bar the connection.\n\nThat which we handle most unglovedly is our food, which we handle with\nour stomachs rather than with our hands. Our hands are so thickly\nencased with skin that protoplasm can hold but small conversation with\nwhat they contain, unless it be held for a long time in the closed fist,\nand even so the converse is impeded as in a strange language; the inside\nof our mouths is more naked, and our stomachs are more naked still; it is\nhere that protoplasm brings its fullest powers of suasion to bear on\nthose whom it would proselytise and receive as it were into its own\ncommunion\u2014whom it would convert and bring into a condition of mind in\nwhich they shall see things as it sees them itself, and, as we commonly\nsay, \u201cagree with\u201d it, instead of standing out stiffly for their own\nopinion. We call this digesting our food; more properly we should call\nit being digested by our food, which reads, marks, learns, and inwardly\ndigests us, till it comes to understand us and encourage us by assuring\nus that we were perfectly right all the time, no matter what any one\nmight have said, or say, to the contrary. Having thus recanted all its\nown past heresies, it sets to work to convert everything that comes near\nit and seems in the least likely to be converted. Eating is a mode of\nlove; it is an effort after a closer union; so we say we love roast beef.\nA French lady told me once that she adored veal; and a nurse tells her\nchild that she would like to eat it. Even he who caresses a dog or horse\n_pro tanto_ both weds and eats it. Strange how close the analogy between\nlove and hunger; in each case the effort is after closer union and\npossession; in each case the outcome is reproduction (for nutrition is\nthe most complete of reproductions), and in each case there are\n_residua_. But to return.\n\nI have shown above that one consequence of the attempt so vigorously made\na few years ago to establish protoplasm as the one living substance, is\nthe making it clear that the non-protoplasmic parts of the body and the\nsimpler extra-corporeal tools or organs must run on all fours in the\nmatter of livingness and non-livingness. If the protoplasmic parts of\nthe body are held living in virtue of their being used by something that\nreally lives, then so, though in a less degree, must tools and machines.\nIf, on the other hand, tools and machines are held non-living inasmuch as\nthey only owe what little appearance of life they may present when in\nactual use to something else that lives, and have no life of their\nown\u2014so, though in a less degree, must the non-protoplasmic parts of the\nbody. Allow an overflowing aroma of life to vivify the horny skin under\nthe heel, and from this there will be a spilling which will vivify the\nboot in wear. Deny an aroma of life to the boot in wear, and it must ere\nlong be denied to ninety-nine per cent. of the body; and if the body is\nnot alive while it can walk and talk, what in the name of all that is\nunreasonable can be held to be so?\n\nThat the essential identity of bodily organs and tools is no ingenious\nparadoxical way of putting things is evident from the fact that we speak\nof bodily organs at all. Organ means tool. There is nothing which\nreveals our most genuine opinions to us so unerringly as our habitual and\nunguarded expressions, and in the case under consideration so completely\ndo we instinctively recognise the underlying identity of tools and limbs,\nthat scientific men use the word \u201corgan\u201d for any part of the body that\ndischarges a function, practically to the exclusion of any other term.\nOf course, however, the above contention as to the essential identity of\ntools and organs does not involve a denial of their obvious superficial\ndifferences\u2014differences so many and so great as to justify our classing\nthem in distinct categories so long as we have regard to the daily\npurposes of life without looking at remoter ones.\n\nIf the above be admitted, we can reply to those who in an earlier chapter\nobjected to our saying that if Mr. Darwin denied design in the eye he\nshould deny it in the burglar\u2019s jemmy also. For if bodily and non-bodily\norgans are essentially one in kind, being each of them both living and\nnon-living, and each of them only a higher development of principles\nalready admitted and largely acted on in the other, then the method of\nprocedure observable in the evolution of the organs whose history is\nwithin our ken should throw light upon the evolution of that whose\nhistory goes back into so dim a past that we can only know it by way of\ninference. In the absence of any show of reason to the contrary we\nshould argue from the known to the unknown, and presume that even as our\nnon-bodily organs originated and were developed through gradual\naccumulation of design, effort, and contrivance guided by experience, so\nalso must our bodily organs have been, in spite of the fact that the\ncontrivance has been, as it were, denuded of external evidences in the\ncourse of long time. This at least is the most obvious inference to\ndraw; the burden of proof should rest not with those who uphold function\nas the most important means of organic modification, but with those who\nimpugn it; it is hardly necessary, however, to say that Mr. Darwin never\nattempted to impugn by way of argument the conclusions either of his\ngrandfather or of Lamarck. He waved them both aside in one or two short\nsemi-contemptuous sentences, and said no more about them\u2014not, at least,\nuntil late in life he wrote his \u201cErasmus Darwin,\u201d and even then his\nremarks were purely biographical; he did not say one syllable by way of\nrefutation, or even of explanation.\n\nI am free to confess that, overwhelming as is the evidence brought\nforward by Mr. Spencer in the articles already referred to, as showing\nthat accidental variations, unguided by the helm of any main general\nprinciple which should as it were keep their heads straight, could never\naccumulate with the results supposed by Mr. Darwin; and overwhelming,\nagain, as is the consideration that Mr. Spencer\u2019s most crushing argument\nwas allowed by Mr. Darwin to go without reply, still the considerations\narising from the discoveries of the last forty years or so in connection\nwith protoplasm, seem to me almost more overwhelming still. This\nevidence proceeds on different lines from that adduced by Mr. Spencer,\nbut it points to the same conclusion, namely, that though luck will avail\nmuch if backed by cunning and experience, it is unavailing for any\npermanent result without them. There is an irony which seems almost\nalways to attend on those who maintain that protoplasm is the only living\nsubstance which ere long points their conclusions the opposite way to\nthat which they desire\u2014in the very last direction, indeed, in which they\nof all people in the world would willingly see them pointed.\n\nIt may be asked why I should have so strong an objection to seeing\nprotoplasm as the only living substance, when I find this view so useful\nto me as tending to substantiate design\u2014which I admit that I have as much\nand as seriously at heart as I can allow myself to have any matter which,\nafter all, can so little affect daily conduct; I reply that it is no part\nof my business to inquire whether this or that makes for my pet theories\nor against them; my concern is to inquire whether or no it is borne out\nby facts, and I find the opinion that protoplasm is the one living\nsubstance unstable, inasmuch as it is an attempt to make a halt where no\nhalt can be made. This is enough; but, furthermore, the fact that the\nprotoplasmic parts of the body are _more_ living than the\nnon-protoplasmic\u2014which I cannot deny, without denying that it is any\nlonger convenient to think of life and death at all\u2014will answer my\npurpose to the full as well or better.\n\nI pointed out another consequence, which, again, was cruelly the reverse\nof what the promoters of the protoplasm movement might be supposed\nanxious to arrive at\u2014in a series of articles which appeared in the\n_Examiner_ during the summer of 1879, and showed that if protoplasm were\nheld to be the sole seat of life, then this unity in the substance\nvivifying all, both animals and plants, must be held as uniting them into\na single corporation or body\u2014especially when their community of descent\nis borne in mind\u2014more effectually than any merely superficial separation\ninto individuals can be held to disunite them, and that thus protoplasm\nmust be seen as the life of the world\u2014as a vast body corporate, never\ndying till the earth itself shall pass away. This came practically to\nsaying that protoplasm was God Almighty, who, of all the forms open to\nHim, had chosen this singularly unattractive one as the channel through\nwhich to make Himself manifest in the flesh by taking our nature upon\nHim, and animating us with His own Spirit. Our biologists, in fact, were\nfast nearing the conception of a God who was both personal and material,\nbut who could not be made to square with pantheistic notions inasmuch as\nno provision was made for the inorganic world; and, indeed, they seem to\nhave become alarmed at the grotesqueness of the position in which they\nmust ere long have found themselves, for in the autumn of 1879 the boom\ncollapsed, and thenceforth the leading reviews and magazines have known\nprotoplasm no more. About the same time bathybius, which at one time\nbade fair to supplant it upon the throne of popularity, died suddenly, as\nI am told, at Norwich, under circumstances which did not transpire, nor\nhas its name, so far as I am aware, been ever again mentioned.\n\nSo much for the conclusions in regard to the larger aspect of life taken\nas a whole which must follow from confining life to protoplasm; but there\nis another aspect\u2014that, namely, which regards the individual. The\ninevitable consequences of confining life to the protoplasmic parts of\nthe body were just as unexpected and unwelcome here as they had been with\nregard to life at large; for, as I have already pointed out, there is no\ndrawing the line at protoplasm and resting at this point; nor yet at the\nnext halting-point beyond; nor at the one beyond that. How often is this\nprocess to be repeated? and in what can it end but in the rehabilitation\nof the soul as an ethereal, spiritual, vital principle, apart from\nmatter, which, nevertheless, it animates, vivifying the clay of our\nbodies? No one who has followed the course either of biology or\npsychology during this century, and more especially during the last\nfive-and-twenty years, will tolerate the reintroduction of the soul as\nsomething apart from the substratum in which both feeling and action must\nbe held to inhere. The notion of matter being ever changed except by\nother matter in another state is so shocking to the intellectual\nconscience that it may be dismissed without discussion; yet if bathybius\nhad not been promptly dealt with, it must have become apparent even to\nthe British public that there were indeed but few steps from protoplasm,\nas the only living substance, to vital principle. Our biologists\ntherefore stifled bathybius, perhaps with justice, certainly with\nprudence, and left protoplasm to its fate.\n\nAny one who reads Professor Allman\u2019s address above referred to with due\ncare will see that he was uneasy about protoplasm, even at the time of\nits greatest popularity. Professor Allman never says outright that the\nnon-protoplasmic parts of the body are no more alive than chairs and\ntables are. He said what involved this as an inevitable consequence, and\nthere can be no doubt that this is what he wanted to convey, but he never\ninsisted on it with the outspokenness and emphasis with which so\nstartling a paradox should alone be offered us for acceptance; nor is it\neasy to believe that his reluctance to express his conclusion _totidem\nverbis_ was not due to a sense that it might ere long prove more\nconvenient not to have done so. When I advocated the theory of the\nlivingness, or quasi-livingness of machines, in the chapters of \u201cErewhon\u201d\nof which all else that I have written on biological subjects is a\ndevelopment, I took care that people should see the position in its\nextreme form; the non-livingness of bodily organs is to the full as\nstartling a paradox as the livingness of non-bodily ones, and we have a\nright to expect the fullest explicitness from those who advance it. Of\ncourse it must be borne in mind that a machine can only claim any\nappreciable even aroma of livingness so long as it is in actual use. In\n\u201cErewhon\u201d I did not think it necessary to insist on this, and did not,\nindeed, yet fully know what I was driving at.\n\nThe same disposition to avoid committing themselves to the assertion that\nany part of the body is non-living may be observed in the writings of the\nother authorities upon protoplasm above referred to; I have searched all\nthey said, and cannot find a single passage in which they declare even\nthe osseous parts of a bone to be non-living, though this conclusion was\nthe _raison d\u2019\u00eatre_ of all they were saying and followed as an obvious\ninference. The reader will probably agree with me in thinking that such\nreticence can only have been due to a feeling that the ground was one on\nwhich it behoved them to walk circumspectly; they probably felt, after a\nvague, ill-defined fashion, that the more they reduced the body to\nmechanism the more they laid it open to an opponent to raise mechanism to\nthe body, but, however this may be, they dropped protoplasm, as I have\nsaid, in some haste with the autumn of 1879.\n\n\n\n\nChapter X\nThe Attempt to Eliminate Mind\n\n\nWHAT, it may be asked, were our biologists really aiming at?\u2014for men like\nProfessor Huxley do not serve protoplasm for nought. They wanted a good\nmany things, some of them more righteous than others, but all\nintelligible. Among the more lawful of their desires was a craving after\na monistic conception of the universe. We all desire this; who can turn\nhis thoughts to these matters at all and not instinctively lean towards\nthe old conception of one supreme and ultimate essence as the source from\nwhich all things proceed and have proceeded, both now and ever? The most\nstriking and apparently most stable theory of the last quarter of a\ncentury had been Sir William Grove\u2019s theory of the conservation of\nenergy; and yet wherein is there any substantial difference between this\nrecent outcome of modern amateur, and hence most sincere,\nscience\u2014pointing as it does to an imperishable, and as such unchangeable,\nand as such, again, for ever unknowable underlying substance the modes of\nwhich alone change\u2014wherein, except in mere verbal costume, does this\ndiffer from the conclusions arrived at by the psalmist?\n\n\u201cOf old,\u201d he exclaims, \u201chast Thou laid the foundation of the earth; and\nthe heavens are the work of Thy hands. They shall perish, but Thou shalt\nendure; yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; as a vesture shalt\nThou change them and they shall be changed; but Thou art the same, and\nThy years shall have no end.\u201d {135a}\n\nI know not what theologians may think of this passage, but from a\nscientific point of view it is unassailable. So again, \u201cO Lord,\u201d he\nexclaims, \u201cThou hast searched me out, and known me: Thou knowest my\ndown-sitting and mine up-rising; Thou understandest my thoughts long\nbefore. Thou art about my path, and about my bed: and spiest out all my\nways. For lo, there is not a word in my tongue but Thou, O Lord, knowest\nit altogether . . . Whither shall I go, then, from Thy Spirit? Or\nwhither shall I go, then, from Thy presence? If I climb up into heaven\nThou art there: if I go down to hell, Thou art there also. If I take the\nwings of the morning, and remain in the uttermost parts of the sea, even\nthere also shall Thy hand lead me and Thy right hand shall hold me. If I\nsay, Peradventure the darkness shall cover me, then shall my night be\nturned to day. Yea, the darkness is no darkness with Thee, but . . . the\ndarkness and light to Thee are both alike.\u201d {136a}\n\nWhat convention or short cut can symbolise for us the results of laboured\nand complicated chains of reasoning or bring them more aptly and\nconcisely home to us than the one supplied long since by the word God?\nWhat can approach more nearly to a rendering of that which cannot be\nrendered\u2014the idea of an essence omnipresent in all things at all times\neverywhere in sky and earth and sea; ever changing, yet the same\nyesterday, to-day, and for ever; the ineffable contradiction in terms\nwhose presence none can either ever enter, or ever escape? Or rather,\nwhat convention would have been more apt if it had not been lost sight of\nas a convention and come to be regarded as an idea in actual\ncorrespondence with a more or less knowable reality? A convention was\nconverted into a fetish, and now that its worthlessness as a fetish is\nbeing generally felt, its great value as a hieroglyph or convention is in\ndanger of being lost sight of. No doubt the psalmist was seeking for Sir\nWilliam Grove\u2019s conception, if haply he might feel after it and find it,\nand assuredly it is not far from every one of us. But the course of true\nphilosophy never did run smooth; no sooner have we fairly grasped the\nconception of a single eternal and for ever unknowable underlying\nsubstance, then we are faced by mind and matter. Long-standing ideas and\ncurrent language alike lead us to see these as distinct things\u2014mind being\nstill commonly regarded as something that acts on body from without as\nthe wind blows upon a leaf, and as no less an actual entity than the\nbody. Neither body nor mind seems less essential to our existence than\nthe other; not only do we feel this as regards our own existence, but we\nfeel it also as pervading the whole world of life; everywhere we see body\nand mind working together towards results that must be ascribed equally\nto both; but they are two, not one; if, then, we are to have our monistic\nconception, it would seem as though one of these must yield to the other;\nwhich, therefore, is it to be?\n\nThis is a very old question. Some, from time immemorial, have tried to\nget rid of matter by reducing it to a mere concept of the mind, and their\nfollowers have arrived at conclusions that may be logically irrefragable,\nbut are as far removed from common sense as they are in accord with\nlogic; at any rate they have failed to satisfy, and matter is no nearer\nbeing got rid of now than it was when the discussion first began.\nOthers, again, have tried materialism, have declared the causative action\nof both thought and feeling to be deceptive, and posit matter obeying\nfixed laws of which thought and feeling must be admitted as concomitants,\nbut with which they have no causal connection. The same thing has\nhappened to these men as to their opponents; they made out an excellent\ncase on paper, but thought and feeling still remain the mainsprings of\naction that they have been always held to be. We still say, \u201cI gave him\n\u00a35 because I felt pleased with him, and thought he would like it;\u201d or, \u201cI\nknocked him down because I felt angry, and thought I would teach him\nbetter manners.\u201d Omnipresent life and mind with appearances of brute\nnon-livingness\u2014which appearances are deceptive; this is one view.\nOmnipresent non-livingness or mechanism with appearances as though the\nmechanism were guided and controlled by thought\u2014which appearances are\ndeceptive; this is the other. Between these two views the slaves of\nlogic have oscillated for centuries, and to all appearance will continue\nto oscillate for centuries more.\n\nPeople who think\u2014as against those who feel and act\u2014want hard and fast\nlines\u2014without which, indeed, they cannot think at all; these lines are as\nit were steps cut on a slope of ice without which there would be no\ndescending it. When we have begun to travel the downward path of\nthought, we ask ourselves questions about life and death, ego and non\nego, object and subject, necessity and free will, and other kindred\nsubjects. We want to know where we are, and in the hope of simplifying\nmatters, strip, as it were, each subject to the skin, and finding that\neven this has not freed it from all extraneous matter, flay it alive in\nthe hope that if we grub down deep enough we shall come upon it in its\npure unalloyed state free from all inconvenient complication through\nintermixture with anything alien to itself. Then, indeed, we can docket\nit, and pigeon-hole it for what it is; but what can we do with it till we\nhave got it pure? We want to account for things, which means that we\nwant to know to which of the various accounts opened in our mental ledger\nwe ought to carry them\u2014and how can we do this if we admit a phenomenon to\nbe neither one thing nor the other, but to belong to half-a-dozen\ndifferent accounts in proportions which often cannot even approximately\nbe determined? If we are to keep accounts we must keep them in\nreasonable compass; and if keeping them within reasonable compass\ninvolves something of a Procrustean arrangement, we may regret it, but\ncannot help it; having set up as thinkers we have got to think, and must\nadhere to the only conditions under which thought is possible; life,\ntherefore, must be life, all life, and nothing but life, and so with\ndeath, free will, necessity, design, and everything else. This, at\nleast, is how philosophers must think concerning them in theory; in\npractice, however, not even John Stuart Mill himself could eliminate all\ntaint of its opposite from any one of these things, any more than Lady\nMacbeth could clear her hand of blood; indeed, the more nearly we think\nwe have succeeded the more certain are we to find ourselves ere long\nmocked and baffled; and this, I take it, is what our biologists began in\nthe autumn of 1879 to discover had happened to themselves.\n\nFor some years they had been trying to get rid of feeling, consciousness,\nand mind generally, from active participation in the evolution of the\nuniverse. They admitted, indeed, that feeling and consciousness attend\nthe working of the world\u2019s gear, as noise attends the working of a\nsteam-engine, but they would not allow that consciousness produced more\neffect in the working of the world than noise on that of the\nsteam-engine. Feeling and noise were alike accidental unessential\nadjuncts and nothing more. Incredible as it may seem to those who are\nhappy enough not to know that this attempt is an old one, they were\ntrying to reduce the world to the level of a piece of unerring though\nsentient mechanism. Men and animals must be allowed to feel and even to\nreflect; this much must be conceded, but granted that they do, still (so,\nat least, it was contended) it has no effect upon the result; it does not\nmatter as far as this is concerned whether they feel and think or not;\neverything would go on exactly as it does and always has done, though\nneither man nor beast knew nor felt anything at all. It is only by\nmaintaining things like this that people will get pensions out of the\nBritish public.\n\nSome such position as this is a _sine qu\u00e2 non_ for the Neo-Darwinistic\ndoctrine of natural selection, which, as Von Hartmann justly observes,\ninvolves an essentially mechanical mindless conception of the universe;\nto natural selection\u2019s door, therefore, the blame of the whole movement\nin favour of mechanism must be justly laid. It was natural that those\nwho had been foremost in preaching mindless designless luck as the main\nmeans of organic modification, should lend themselves with alacrity to\nthe task of getting rid of thought and feeling from all share in the\ndirection and governance of the world. Professor Huxley, as usual, was\namong the foremost in this good work, and whether influenced by Hobbes,\nor Descartes, or Mr. Spalding, or even by the machine chapters in\n\u201cErewhon\u201d which were still recent, I do not know, led off with his\narticle \u201cOn the hypothesis that animals are automata\u201d (which it may be\nobserved is the exact converse of the hypothesis that automata are\nanimated) in the _Fortnightly Review_ for November 1874. Professor\nHuxley did not say outright that men and women were just as living and\njust as dead as their own watches, but this was what his article came to\nin substance. The conclusion arrived at was that animals were automata;\ntrue, they were probably sentient, still they were automata pure and\nsimple, mere sentient pieces of exceedingly elaborate clockwork, and\nnothing more.\n\n\u201cProfessor Huxley,\u201d says Mr. Romanes, in his Rede Lecture for 1885,\n{140a} \u201cargues by way of perfectly logical deduction from this statement,\nthat thought and feeling have nothing to do with determining action; they\nare merely the bye-products of cerebration, or, as he expresses it, the\nindices of changes which are going on in the brain. Under this view we\nare all what he terms conscious automata, or machines which happen, as it\nwere by chance, to be conscious of some of their own movements. But the\nconsciousness is altogether adventitious, and bears the same ineffectual\nrelation to the activity of the brain as a steam whistle bears to the\nactivity of a locomotive, or the striking of a clock to the time-keeping\nadjustments of the clockwork. Here, again, we meet with an echo of\nHobbes, who opens his work on the commonwealth with these words:\u2014\n\n\u201c\u2018Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by the\n_art_ of man, as in many other things, in this also imitated, that it can\nmake an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the\nbeginning whereof is in the principal part within; why may we not say\nthat all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as\ndoth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the _heart_ but a\nspring, and the _nerves_ but so many _strings_; and the _joints_ but so\nmany _wheels_ giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by\nthe artificer?\u2019\n\n\u201cNow this theory of conscious automatism is not merely a legitimate\noutcome of the theory that nervous changes are the causes of mental\nchanges, but it is logically the only possible outcome. Nor do I see any\nway in which this theory can be fought on grounds of physiology.\u201d\n\nIn passing, I may say the theory that living beings are conscious\nmachines, can be fought just as much and just as little as the theory\nthat machines are unconscious living beings; everything that goes to\nprove either of these propositions goes just as well to prove the other\nalso. But I have perhaps already said as much as is necessary on this\nhead; the main point with which I am concerned is the fact that Professor\nHuxley was trying to expel consciousness and sentience from any causative\naction in the working of the universe. In the following month appeared\nthe late Professor Clifford\u2019s hardly less outspoken article, \u201cBody and\nMind,\u201d to the same effect, also in the _Fortnightly Review_, then edited\nby Mr. John Morley. Perhaps this view attained its frankest expression\nin an article by the late Mr. Spalding, which appeared in _Nature_,\nAugust 2, 1877; the following extracts will show that Mr. Spalding must\nbe credited with not playing fast and loose with his own conclusions, and\nknew both how to think a thing out to its extreme consequences, and how\nto put those consequences clearly before his readers. Mr. Spalding\nsaid:\u2014\n\n\u201cAgainst Mr. Lewes\u2019s proposition that the movements of living beings are\nprompted and guided by feeling, I urged that the amount and direction of\nevery nervous discharge must depend solely on physical conditions. And I\ncontended that to see this clearly is to see that when we speak of\nmovement being guided by feeling, we use the language of a less advanced\nstage of enlightenment. This view has since occupied a good deal of\nattention. Under the name of automatism it has been advocated by\nProfessor Huxley, and with firmer logic by Professor Clifford. In the\nminds of our savage ancestors feeling was the source of all movement . . .\nUsing the word feeling in its ordinary sense . . . _we assert not only\nthat no evidence can be given that feeling ever does guide or prompt\naction_, _but that the process of its doing so is inconceivable_.\n(Italics mine.) How can we picture to ourselves a state of consciousness\nputting in motion any particle of matter, large or small? Puss, while\ndozing before the fire, hears a light rustle in the corner, and darts\ntowards the spot. What has happened? Certain sound-waves have reached\nthe ear, a series of physical changes have taken place within the\norganism, special groups of muscles have been called into play, and the\nbody of the cat has changed its position on the floor. Is it asserted\nthat this chain of physical changes is not at all points complete and\nsufficient in itself?\u201d\n\nI have been led to turn to this article of Mr. Spalding\u2019s by Mr. Stewart\nDuncan, who, in his \u201cConscious Matter,\u201d {142a} quotes the latter part of\nthe foregoing extract. Mr. Duncan goes on to quote passages from\nProfessor Tyndall\u2019s utterances of about the same date which show that he\ntoo took much the same line\u2014namely, that there is no causative connection\nbetween mental and physical processes; from this it is obvious he must\nhave supposed that physical processes would go on just as well if there\nwere no accompaniment of feeling and consciousness at all.\n\nI have said enough to show that in the decade, roughly, between 1870 and\n1880 the set of opinion among our leading biologists was strongly against\nmind, as having in any way influenced the development of animal and\nvegetable life, and it is not likely to be denied that the prominence\nwhich the mindless theory of natural selection had assumed in men\u2019s\nthoughts since 1860 was one of the chief reasons, if not the chief, for\nthe turn opinion was taking. Our leading biologists had staked so\nheavily upon natural selection from among fortuitous variations that they\nwould have been more than human if they had not caught at everything that\nseemed to give it colour and support. It was while this mechanical fit\nwas upon them, and in the closest connection with it, that the protoplasm\nboom developed. It was doubtless felt that if the public could be got to\ndislodge life, consciousness, and mind from any considerable part of the\nbody, it would be no hard matter to dislodge it, presently, from the\nremainder; on this the deceptiveness of mind as a causative agent, and\nthe sufficiency of a purely automatic conception of the universe, as of\nsomething that will work if a penny be dropped into the box, would be\nproved to demonstration. It would be proved from the side of mind by\nconsiderations derivable from automatic and unconscious action where mind\n_ex hypothesi_ was not, but where action went on as well or better\nwithout it than with it; it would be proved from the side of body by what\nthey would doubtless call the \u201cmost careful and exhaustive\u201d examination\nof the body itself by the aid of appliances more ample than had ever\nbefore been within the reach of man.\n\nThis was all very well, but for its success one thing was a _sine qu\u00e2\nnon_\u2014I mean the dislodgment must be thorough; the key must be got clean\nof even the smallest trace of blood, for unless this could be done all\nthe argument went to the profit not of the mechanism, with which, for\nsome reason or other, they were so much enamoured, but of the soul and\ndesign, the ideas which of all others were most distasteful to them.\nThey shut their eyes to this for a long time, but in the end appear to\nhave seen that if they were in search of an absolute living and absolute\nnon-living, the path along which they were travelling would never lead\nthem to it. They were driving life up into a corner, but they were not\neliminating it, and, moreover, at the very moment of their thinking they\nhad hedged it in and could throw their salt upon it, it flew mockingly\nover their heads and perched upon the place of all others where they were\nmost scandalised to see it\u2014I mean upon machines in use. So they retired\nsulkily to their tents baffled but not ashamed.\n\n * * * * *\n\nSome months subsequent to the completion of the foregoing chapter, and\nindeed just as this book is on the point of leaving my hands, there\nappears in _Nature_ {144a} a letter from the Duke of Argyll, which shows\nthat he too is impressed with the conviction expressed above\u2014I mean that\nthe real object our men of science have lately had in view has been the\ngetting rid of mind from among the causes of evolution. The Duke says:\u2014\n\n\u201cThe violence with which false interpretations were put upon this theory\n(natural selection) and a function was assigned to it which it could\nnever fulfil, will some day be recognised as one of the least creditable\nepisodes in the history of science. With a curious perversity it was the\nweakest elements in the theory which were seized upon as the most\nvaluable, particularly the part assigned to blind chance in the\noccurrence of variations. This was valued not for its scientific\ntruth,\u2014for it could pretend to none,\u2014but because of its assumed bearing\nupon another field of thought and the weapon it afforded for expelling\nmind from the causes of evolution.\u201d\n\nThe Duke, speaking of Mr. Herbert Spencer\u2019s two articles in the\n_Nineteenth Century_ for April and May, 1886, to which I have already\ncalled attention, continues:\u2014\n\n\u201cIn these two articles we have for the first time an avowed and definite\ndeclaration against some of the leading ideas on which the mechanical\nphilosophy depends; and yet the caution, and almost timidity, with which\na man so eminent approaches the announcement of conclusions of the most\nself-evident truth is a most curious proof of the reign of terror which\nhas come to be established.\u201d\n\nAgainst this I must protest; the Duke cannot seriously maintain that the\nmain scope and purpose of Mr. Herbert Spencer\u2019s articles is new. Their\nsubstance has been before us in Mr. Spencer\u2019s own writings for some\ntwo-and-twenty years, in the course of which Mr. Spencer has been\nfollowed by Professor Mivart, the Rev. J. J. Murphy, the Duke of Argyll\nhimself, and many other writers of less note. When the Duke talks about\nthe establishment of a scientific reign of terror, I confess I regard\nsuch an exaggeration with something like impatience. Any one who has\nknown his own mind and has had the courage of his opinions has been able\nto say whatever he wanted to say with as little let or hindrance during\nthe last twenty years, as during any other period in the history of\nliterature. Of course, if a man will keep blurting out unpopular truths\nwithout considering whose toes he may or may not be treading on, he will\nmake enemies some of whom will doubtless be able to give effect to their\ndispleasure; but that is part of the game. It is hardly possible for any\none to oppose the fallacy involved in the Charles-Darwinian theory of\nnatural selection more persistently and unsparingly than I have done\nmyself from the year 1877 onwards; naturally I have at times been very\nangrily attacked in consequence, and as a matter of business have made\nmyself as unpleasant as I could in my rejoinders, but I cannot remember\nanything having been ever attempted against me which could cause fear in\nany ordinarily constituted person. If, then, the Duke of Argyll is right\nin saying that Mr. Spencer has shown a caution almost amounting to\ntimidity in attacking Mr. Darwin\u2019s theory, either Mr. Spencer must be a\nsingularly timid person, or there must be some cause for his timidity\nwhich is not immediately obvious. If terror reigns anywhere among\nscientific men, I should say it reigned among those who have staked\nimprudently on Mr. Darwin\u2019s reputation as a philosopher. I may add that\nthe discovery of the Duke\u2019s impression that there exists a scientific\nreign of terror, explains a good deal in his writings which it has not\nbeen easy to understand hitherto.\n\nAs regards the theory of natural selection, the Duke says:\u2014\n\n\u201cFrom the first discussions which arose on this subject, I have ventured\nto maintain that . . . the phrase \u2018natural-selection\u2019 represented no true\nphysical cause, still less the complete set of causes requisite to\naccount for the orderly procession of organic forms in Nature; that in so\nfar as it assumed variations to arise by accident it was not only\nessentially faulty and incomplete, but fundamentally erroneous; in short,\nthat its only value lay in the convenience with which it groups under one\nform of words, highly charged with metaphor, an immense variety of\ncauses, some purely mental, some purely vital, and others purely physical\nor mechanical.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nChapter XI\nThe Way of Escape\n\n\nTO sum up the conclusions hitherto arrived at. Our philosophers have\nmade the mistake of forgetting that they cannot carry the rough-and-ready\nlanguage of common sense into precincts within which politeness and\nphilosophy are supreme. Common sense sees life and death as distinct\nstates having nothing in common, and hence in all respects the antitheses\nof one another; so that with common sense there should be no degrees of\nlivingness, but if a thing is alive at all it is as much alive as the\nmost living of us, and if dead at all it is stone dead in every part of\nit. Our philosophers have exercised too little consideration in\nretaining this view of the matter. They say that an am\u0153ba is as much a\nliving being as a man is, and do not allow that a well-grown, highly\neducated man in robust health is more living than an idiot cripple. They\nsay he differs from the cripple in many important respects, but not in\ndegree of livingness. Yet, as we have seen already, even common sense by\nusing the word \u201cdying\u201d admits degrees of life; that is to say, it admits\na more and a less; those, then, for whom the superficial aspects of\nthings are insufficient should surely find no difficulty in admitting\nthat the degrees are more numerous than is dreamed of in the somewhat\nlimited philosophy which common sense alone knows. Livingness depends on\nrange of power, versatility, wealth of body and mind\u2014how often, indeed,\ndo we not see people taking a new lease of life when they have come into\nmoney even at an advanced age; it varies as these vary, beginning with\nthings that, though they have mind enough for an outsider to swear by,\ncan hardly be said to have yet found it out themselves, and advancing to\nthose that know their own minds as fully as anything in this world does\nso. The more a thing knows its own mind the more living it becomes, for\nlife viewed both in the individual and in the general as the outcome of\naccumulated developments, is one long process of specialising\nconsciousness and sensation; that is to say, of getting to know one\u2019s own\nmind more and more fully upon a greater and greater variety of subjects.\nOn this I hope to touch more fully in another book; in the meantime I\nwould repeat that the error of our philosophers consists in not having\nborne in mind that when they quitted the ground on which common sense can\nclaim authority, they should have reconsidered everything that common\nsense had taught them.\n\nThe votaries of common sense make the same mistake as philosophers do,\nbut they make it in another way. Philosophers try to make the language\nof common sense serve for purposes of philosophy, forgetting that they\nare in another world, in which another tongue is current; common sense\npeople, on the other hand, every now and then attempt to deal with\nmatters alien to the routine of daily life. The boundaries between the\ntwo kingdoms being very badly defined, it is only by giving them a wide\nberth and being so philosophical as almost to deny that there is any\neither life or death at all, or else so full of common sense as to refuse\nto see one part of the body as less living than another, that we can hope\nto steer clear of doubt, inconsistency, and contradiction in terms in\nalmost every other word we utter. We cannot serve the God of philosophy\nand the Mammon of common sense at one and the same time, and yet it would\nalmost seem as though the making the best that can be made of both these\nworlds were the whole duty of organism.\n\nIt is easy to understand how the error of philosophers arose, for, slaves\nof habit as we all are, we are more especially slaves when the habit is\none that has not been found troublesome. There is no denying that it\nsaves trouble to have things either one thing or the other, and indeed\nfor all the common purposes of life if a thing is either alive or dead\nthe small supplementary residue of the opposite state should be neglected\nas too small to be observable. If it is good to eat we have no\ndifficulty in knowing when it is dead enough to be eaten; if not good to\neat, but valuable for its skin, we know when it is dead enough to be\nskinned with impunity; if it is a man, we know when he has presented\nenough of the phenomena of death to allow of our burying him and\nadministering his estate; in fact, I cannot call to mind any case in\nwhich the decision of the question whether man or beast is alive or dead\nis frequently found to be perplexing; hence we have become so accustomed\nto think there can be no admixture of the two states, that we have found\nit almost impossible to avoid carrying this crude view of life and death\ninto domains of thought in which it has no application. There can be no\ndoubt that when accuracy is required we should see life and death not as\nfundamentally opposed, but as supplementary to one another, without\neither\u2019s being ever able to exclude the other altogether; thus we should\nindeed see some things as more living than others, but we should see\nnothing as either unalloyedly living or unalloyedly non-living. If a\nthing is living, it is so living that it has one foot in the grave\nalready; if dead, it is dead as a thing that has already re-entered into\nthe womb of Nature. And within the residue of life that is in the dead\nthere is an element of death; and within this there is an element of\nlife, and so _ad infinitum_\u2014again, as reflections in two mirrors that\nface one another.\n\nIn brief, there is nothing in life of which there are not germs, and, so\nto speak, harmonics in death, and nothing in death of which germs and\nharmonics may not be found in life. Each emphasizes what the other\npasses over most lightly\u2014each carries to its extreme conceivable\ndevelopment that which in the other is only sketched in by a faint\nsuggestion\u2014but neither has any feature rigorously special to itself.\nGranted that death is a greater new departure in an organism\u2019s life, than\nany since that _congeries_ of births and deaths to which the name\nembryonic stages is commonly given, still it is a new departure of the\nsame essential character as any other\u2014that is to say, though there be\nmuch new there is much, not to say more, old along with it. We shrink\nfrom it as from any other change to the unknown, and also perhaps from an\ninstinctive sense that the fear of death is a _sine qu\u00e2 non_ for physical\nand moral progress, but the fear is like all else in life, a substantial\nthing which, if its foundations be dug about, is found to rest on a\nsuperstitious basis.\n\nWhere, and on what principle, are the dividing lines between living and\nnon-living to be drawn? All attempts to draw them hitherto have ended in\ndeadlock and disaster; of this M. Vianna De Lima, in his \u201cExpos\u00e9 Sommaire\ndes Th\u00e9ories transformistes de Lamarck, Darwin, et Haeckel,\u201d {150a} says\nthat all attempts to trace _une ligne de d\u00e9marcation nette et profonde\nentre la mati\u00e8re vivante et la mati\u00e8re inerte_ have broken down. {150b}\n_Il y a un reste de vie dans le cadavre_, says Diderot, {150c} speaking\nof the more gradual decay of the body after an easy natural death, than\nafter a sudden and violent one; and so Buffon begins his first volume by\nsaying that \u201cwe can descend, by almost imperceptible degrees, from the\nmost perfect creature to the most formless matter\u2014from the most highly\norganised matter to the most entirely inorganic substance.\u201d {150d}\n\nIs the line to be so drawn as to admit any of the non-living within the\nbody? If we answer \u201cyes,\u201d then, as we have seen, moiety after moiety is\nfilched from us, till we find ourselves left face to face with a tenuous\nquasi immaterial vital principle or soul as animating an alien body, with\nwhich it not only has no essential underlying community of substance, but\nwith which it has no conceivable point in common to render a union\nbetween the two possible, or give the one a grip of any kind over the\nother; in fact, the doctrine of disembodied spirits, so instinctively\nrejected by all who need be listened to, comes back as it would seem,\nwith a scientific _imprimatur_; if, on the other hand, we exclude the\nnon-living from the body, then what are we to do with nails that want\ncutting, dying skin, or hair that is ready to fall off? Are they less\nliving than brain? Answer \u201cyes,\u201d and degrees are admitted, which we have\nalready seen prove fatal; answer \u201cno,\u201d and we must deny that one part of\nthe body is more vital than another\u2014and this is refusing to go as far\neven as common sense does; answer that these things are not very\nimportant, and we quit the ground of equity and high philosophy on which\nwe have given ourselves such airs, and go back to common sense as unjust\njudges that will hear those widows only who importune us.\n\nAs with the non-living so also with the living. Are we to let it pass\nbeyond the limits of the body, and allow a certain temporary overflow of\nlivingness to ordain as it were machines in use? Then death will fare,\nif we once let life without the body, as life fares if we once let death\nwithin it. It becomes swallowed up in life, just as in the other case\nlife was swallowed up in death. Are we to confine it to the body? If\nso, to the whole body, or to parts? And if to parts, to what parts, and\nwhy? The only way out of the difficulty is to rehabilitate contradiction\nin terms, and say that everything is both alive and dead at one and the\nsame time\u2014some things being much living and little dead, and others,\nagain, much dead and little living. Having done this we have only got to\nsettle what a thing is\u2014when a thing is a thing pure and simple, and when\nit is only a _congeries_ of things\u2014and we shall doubtless then live very\nhappily and very philosophically ever afterwards.\n\nBut here another difficulty faces us. Common sense does indeed know what\nis meant by a \u201cthing\u201d or \u201can individual,\u201d but philosophy cannot settle\neither of these two points. Professor Mivart made the question \u201cWhat are\nLiving Beings?\u201d the subject of an article in one of our leading magazines\nonly a very few years ago. He asked, but he did not answer. And so\nProfessor Moseley was reported (_Times_, January 16, 1885) as having said\nthat it was \u201calmost impossible\u201d to say what an individual was. Surely if\nit is only \u201calmost\u201d impossible for philosophy to determine this,\nProfessor Moseley should have at any rate tried to do it; if, however, he\nhad tried and failed, which from my own experience I should think most\nlikely, he might have spared his \u201calmost.\u201d \u201cAlmost\u201d is a very dangerous\nword. I once heard a man say that an escape he had had from drowning was\n\u201calmost\u201d providential. The difficulty about defining an individual\narises from the fact that we may look at \u201calmost\u201d everything from two\ndifferent points of view. If we are in a common-sense humour for\nsimplifying things, treating them broadly, and emphasizing resemblances\nrather than differences, we can find excellent reasons for ignoring\nrecognised lines of demarcation, calling everything by a new name, and\nunifying up till we have united the two most distant stars in heaven as\nmeeting and being linked together in the eyes and souls of men; if we are\nin this humour individuality after individuality disappears, and ere\nlong, if we are consistent, nothing will remain but one universal whole,\none true and only atom from which alone nothing can be cut off and thrown\naway on to something else; if, on the other hand, we are in a subtle\nphilosophically accurate humour for straining at gnats and emphasizing\ndifferences rather than resemblances, we can draw distinctions, and give\nreasons for subdividing and subdividing, till, unless we violate what we\nchoose to call our consistency somewhere, we shall find ourselves with as\nmany names as atoms and possible combinations and permutations of atoms.\nThe lines we draw, the moments we choose for cutting this or that off at\nthis or that place, and thenceforth the dubbing it by another name, are\nas arbitrary as the moments chosen by a South-Eastern Railway porter for\nleaving off beating doormats; in each case doubtless there is an\napproximate equity, but it is of a very rough and ready kind.\n\nWhat else, however, can we do? We can only escape the Scylla of calling\neverything by one name, and recognising no individual existences of any\nkind, by falling into the Charybdis of having a name for everything, or\nby some piece of intellectual sharp practice like that of the shrewd but\nunprincipled Ulysses. If we were consistent honourable gentlemen, into\nCharybdis or on to Scylla we should go like lambs; every subterfuge by\nthe help of which we escape our difficulty is but an arbitrary\nhigh-handed act of classification that turns a deaf ear to everything not\nrobust enough to hold its own; nevertheless even the most scrupulous of\nphilosophers pockets his consistency at a pinch, and refuses to let the\nnative hue of resolution be sicklied o\u2019er with the pale cast of thought,\nnor yet fobbed by the rusty curb of logic. He is right, for assuredly\nthe poor intellectual abuses of the time want countenancing now as much\nas ever, but so far as he countenances them, he should bear in mind that\nhe is returning to the ground of common sense, and should not therefore\nhold himself too stiffly in the matter of logic.\n\nAs with life and death so with design and absence of design or luck. So\nalso with union and disunion. There is never either absolute design\nrigorously pervading every detail, nor yet absolute absence of design\npervading any detail rigorously, so, as between substances, there is\nneither absolute union and homogeneity, not absolute disunion and\nheterogeneity; there is always a little place left for repentance; that\nis to say, in theory we should admit that both design and chance, however\nwell defined, each have an aroma, as it were, of the other. Who can\nthink of a case in which his own design\u2014about which he should know more\nthan any other, and from which, indeed, all his ideas of design are\nderived\u2014was so complete that there was no chance in any part of it? Who,\nagain, can bring forward a case even of the purest chance or good luck\ninto which no element of design had entered directly or indirectly at any\njuncture? This, nevertheless, does not involve our being unable ever to\nascribe a result baldly either to luck or cunning. In some cases a\ndecided preponderance of the action, whether seen as a whole or looked at\nin detail, is recognised at once as due to design, purpose, forethought,\nskill, and effort, and then we properly disregard the undesigned element;\nin others the details cannot without violence be connected with design,\nhowever much the position which rendered the main action possible may\ninvolve design\u2014as, for example, there is no design in the way in which\nindividual pieces of coal may hit one another when shot out of a sack,\nbut there may be design in the sack\u2019s being brought to the particular\nplace where it is emptied; in others design may be so hard to find that\nwe rightly deny its existence, nevertheless in each case there will be an\nelement of the opposite, and the residuary element would, if seen through\na mental microscope, be found to contain a residuary element of _its_\nopposite, and this again of _its_ opposite, and so on _ad infinitum_, as\nwith mirrors standing face to face. This having been explained, and it\nbeing understood that when we speak of design in organism we do so with a\nmental reserve of _exceptis excipiendis_, there should be no hesitation\nin holding the various modifications of plants and animals to be in such\npreponderating measure due to function, that design, which underlies\nfunction, is the fittest idea with which to connect them in our minds.\n\nWe will now proceed to inquire how Mr. Darwin came to substitute, or try\nto substitute, the survival of the luckiest fittest, for the survival of\nthe most cunning fittest, as held by Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck; or more\nbriefly how he came to substitute luck for cunning.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XII\nWhy Darwin\u2019s Variations were Accidental\n\n\nSOME may perhaps deny that Mr. Darwin did this, and say he laid so much\nstress on use and disuse as virtually to make function his main factor of\nevolution.\n\nIf, indeed, we confine ourselves to isolated passages, we shall find\nlittle difficulty in making out a strong case to this effect. Certainly\nmost people believe this to be Mr. Darwin\u2019s doctrine, and considering how\nlong and fully he had the ear of the public, it is not likely they would\nthink thus if Mr. Darwin had willed otherwise, nor could he have induced\nthem to think as they do if he had not said a good deal that was capable\nof the construction so commonly put upon it; but it is hardly necessary,\nwhen addressing biologists, to insist on the fact that Mr. Darwin\u2019s\ndistinctive doctrine is the denial of the comparative importance of\nfunction, or use and disuse, as a purveyor of variations,\u2014with some, but\nnot very considerable, exceptions, chiefly in the cases of domesticated\nanimals.\n\nHe did not, however, make his distinctive feature as distinct as he\nshould have done. Sometimes he said one thing, and sometimes the\ndirectly opposite. Sometimes, for example, the conditions of existence\n\u201cincluded natural selection\u201d or the fact that the best adapted to their\nsurroundings live longest and leave most offspring; {156a} sometimes \u201cthe\nprinciple of natural selection\u201d \u201cfully embraced\u201d \u201cthe expression of\nconditions of existence.\u201d {156b} It would not be easy to find more\nunsatisfactory writing than this is, nor any more clearly indicating a\nmind ill at ease with itself. Sometimes \u201cants work _by inherited\ninstincts_ and inherited tools;\u201d {157a} sometimes, again, it is\nsurprising that the case of ants working by inherited instincts has not\nbeen brought as a demonstrative argument \u201cagainst the well-known doctrine\nof _inherited habit_, as advanced by Lamarck.\u201d {157b} Sometimes the\nwinglessness of beetles inhabiting ocean islands is \u201cmainly due to\nnatural selection,\u201d {157c} and though we might be tempted to ascribe the\nrudimentary condition of the wing to disuse, we are on no account to do\nso\u2014though disuse was probably to some extent \u201ccombined with\u201d natural\nselection; at other times \u201cit is probable that disuse has been the main\nmeans of rendering the wings of beetles living on small exposed islands\u201d\nrudimentary. {157d} We may remark in passing that if disuse, as Mr.\nDarwin admits on this occasion, is the main agent in rendering an organ\nrudimentary, use should have been the main agent in rendering it the\nopposite of rudimentary\u2014that is to say, in bringing about its\ndevelopment. The ostensible _raison d\u2019\u00eatre_, however, of the \u201cOrigin of\nSpecies\u201d is to maintain that this is not the case.\n\nThere is hardly an opinion on the subject of descent with modification\nwhich does not find support in some one passage or another of the \u201cOrigin\nof Species.\u201d If it were desired to show that there is no substantial\ndifference between the doctrine of Erasmus Darwin and that of his\ngrandson, it would be easy to make out a good case for this, in spite of\nMr. Darwin\u2019s calling his grandfather\u2019s views \u201cerroneous,\u201d in the\nhistorical sketch prefixed to the later editions of the \u201cOrigin of\nSpecies.\u201d Passing over the passage already quoted on p. 62 of this book,\nin which Mr. Darwin declares \u201chabit omnipotent and its effects\nhereditary\u201d\u2014a sentence, by the way, than which none can be either more\nunfalteringly Lamarckian or less tainted with the vices of Mr. Darwin\u2019s\nlater style\u2014passing this over as having been written some twenty years\nbefore the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d\u2014the last paragraph of the \u201cOrigin of\nSpecies\u201d itself is purely Lamarckian and Erasmus-Darwinian. It declares\nthe laws in accordance with which organic forms assumed their present\nshape to be\u2014\u201cGrowth with reproduction; Variability from the indirect and\ndirect action of the external conditions of life and from use and disuse,\n&c.\u201d {158a} Wherein does this differ from the confession of faith made\nby Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck? Where are the accidental fortuitous,\nspontaneous variations now? And if they are not found important enough\nto demand mention in this peroration and _stretto_, as it were, of the\nwhole matter, in which special prominence should be given to the special\nfeature of the work, where ought they to be made important?\n\nMr. Darwin immediately goes on: \u201cA ratio of existence so high as to lead\nto a struggle for life, and as a consequence to natural selection,\nentailing divergence of character and the extinction of less improved\nforms;\u201d so that natural selection turns up after all. Yes\u2014in the letters\nthat compose it, but not in the spirit; not in the special sense up to\nthis time attached to it in the \u201cOrigin of Species.\u201d The expression as\nused here is one with which Erasmus Darwin would have found little fault,\nfor it means not as elsewhere in Mr. Darwin\u2019s book and on his title-page\nthe preservation of \u201cfavoured\u201d or lucky varieties, but the preservation\nof varieties that have come to be varieties through the causes assigned\nin the preceding two or three lines of Mr. Darwin\u2019s sentence; and these\nare mainly functional or Erasmus-Darwinian; for the indirect action of\nthe conditions of life is mainly functional, and the direct action is\nadmitted on all hands to be but small.\n\nIt now appears more plainly, as insisted upon on an earlier page, that\nthere is not one natural selection and one survival of the fittest, but\ntwo, inasmuch as there are two classes of variations from which nature\n(supposing no exception taken to her personification) can select. The\nbottles have the same labels, and they are of the same colour, but the\none holds brandy, and the other toast and water. Nature can, by a figure\nof speech, be said to select from variations that are mainly functional\nor from variations that are mainly accidental; in the first case she will\neventually get an accumulation of variation, and widely different types\nwill come into existence; in the second, the variations will not occur\nwith sufficient steadiness for accumulation to be possible. In the body\nof Mr. Darwin\u2019s book the variations are supposed to be mainly due to\naccident, and function, though not denied all efficacy, is declared to be\nthe greatly subordinate factor; natural selection, therefore, has been\nhitherto throughout tantamount to luck; in the peroration the position is\nreversed _in toto_; the selection is now made from variations into which\nluck has entered so little that it may be neglected, the greatly\npreponderating factor being function; here, then, natural selection is\ntantamount to cunning. We are such slaves of words that, seeing the\nwords \u201cnatural selection\u201d employed\u2014and forgetting that the results\nensuing on natural selection will depend entirely on what it is that is\nselected from, so that the gist of the matter lies in this and not in the\nwords \u201cnatural selection\u201d\u2014it escaped us that a change of front had been\nmade, and a conclusion entirely alien to the tenor of the whole book\nsmuggled into the last paragraph as the one which it had been written to\nsupport; the book preached luck, the peroration cunning.\n\nAnd there can be no doubt Mr. Darwin intended that the change of front\nshould escape us; for it cannot be believed that he did not perfectly\nwell know what he had done. Mr. Darwin edited and re-edited with such\nminuteness of revision that it may be said no detail escaped him provided\nit was small enough; it is incredible that he should have allowed this\nparagraph to remain from first to last unchanged (except for the\nintroduction of the words \u201cby the Creator,\u201d which are wanting in the\nfirst edition) if they did not convey the conception he most wished his\nreaders to retain. Even if in his first edition he had failed to see\nthat he was abandoning in his last paragraph all that it had been his\nostensible object most especially to support in the body of his book, he\nmust have become aware of it long before he revised the \u201cOrigin of\nSpecies\u201d for the last time; still he never altered it, and never put us\non our guard.\n\nIt was not Mr. Darwin\u2019s manner to put his reader on his guard; we might\nas well expect Mr. Gladstone to put us on our guard about the Irish land\nbills. Caveat _lector_ seems to have been his motto. Mr. Spencer, in\nthe articles already referred to, is at pains to show that Mr. Darwin\u2019s\nopinions in later life underwent a change in the direction of laying\ngreater stress on functionally produced modifications, and points out\nthat in the sixth edition of the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d Mr. Darwin says, \u201cI\nthink there can be no doubt that use in our domestic animals has\nstrengthened and enlarged certain parts, and disuse diminished them;\u201d\nwhereas in his first edition he said, \u201cI think there can be _little_\ndoubt\u201d of this. Mr. Spencer also quotes a passage from \u201cThe Descent of\nMan,\u201d in which Mr. Darwin said that _even in the first edition_ of the\n\u201cOrigin of Species\u201d he had attributed great effect to function, as though\nin the later ones he had attributed still more; but if there was any\nconsiderable change of position, it should not have been left to be\ntoilsomely collected by collation of editions, and comparison of passages\nfar removed from one another in other books. If his mind had undergone\nthe modification supposed by Mr. Spencer, Mr. Darwin should have said so\nin a prominent passage of some later edition of the \u201cOrigin of Species.\u201d\nHe should have said\u2014\u201cIn my earlier editions I underrated, as now seems\nprobable, the effects of use and disuse as purveyors of the slight\nsuccessive modifications whose accumulation in the ordinary course of\nthings results in specific difference, and I laid too much stress on the\naccumulation of merely accidental variations;\u201d having said this, he\nshould have summarised the reasons that had made him change his mind, and\ngiven a list of the most important cases in which he has seen fit to\nalter what he had originally written. If Mr. Darwin had dealt thus with\nus we should have readily condoned all the mistakes he would have been at\nall likely to have made, for we should have known him as one who was\ntrying to help us, tidy us up, keep us straight, and enable us to use our\njudgments to the best advantage. The public will forgive many errors\nalike of taste and judgment, where it feels that a writer persistently\ndesires this.\n\nI can only remember a couple of sentences in the later editions of the\n\u201cOrigin of Species\u201d in which Mr. Darwin directly admits a change of\nopinion as regards the main causes of organic modification. How\nshuffling the first of these is I have already shown in \u201cLife and Habit,\u201d\np. 260, and in \u201cEvolution, Old and New,\u201d p. 359; I need not, therefore,\nsay more here, especially as there has been no rejoinder to what I then\nsaid. Curiously enough the sentence does not bear out Mr. Spencer\u2019s\ncontention that Mr. Darwin in his later years leaned more decidedly\ntowards functionally produced modifications, for it runs: {161a}\u2014\u201cIn the\nearlier editions of this work I underrated, as now seems probable, the\nfrequency and importance of modifications due,\u201d not, as Mr. Spencer would\nhave us believe, to use and disuse, but \u201cto spontaneous variability,\u201d by\nwhich can only be intended, \u201cto variations in no way connected with use\nand disuse,\u201d as not being assignable to any known cause of general\napplication, and referable as far as we are concerned to accident only;\nso that he gives the natural survival of the luckiest, which is indeed\nhis distinctive feature, if it deserve to be called a feature at all,\ngreater prominence than ever. Nevertheless there is no change in his\nconcluding paragraph, which still remains an embodiment of the views of\nErasmus Darwin and Lamarck.\n\nThe other passage is on p. 421 of the edition of 1876. It stands:\u2014\u201cI\nhave now recapitulated the facts and considerations which have\nthoroughly\u201d (why \u201cthoroughly\u201d?) \u201cconvinced me that species have been\nmodified during a long course of descent. This has been effected chiefly\nthrough the natural selection of numerous, successive, slight, favourable\nvariations; aided in an important manner by the inherited effects of the\nuse and disuse of parts; and in an unimportant manner, that is, in\nrelation to adaptive structures, whether past or present, by the direct\naction of external conditions, and by variations which seem to us in our\nignorance to arise spontaneously. It appears that I formerly underrated\nthe frequency and value of these latter forms of variation as leading to\npermanent modifications of structure independently of natural selection.\u201d\n\nHere, again, it is not use and disuse which Mr. Darwin declares himself\nto have undervalued, but spontaneous variations. The sentence just given\nis one of the most confusing I ever read even in the works of Mr Darwin.\nIt is the essence of his theory that the \u201cnumerous successive, slight,\nfavourable variations,\u201d above referred to, should be fortuitous,\naccidental, spontaneous; it is evident, moreover, that they are intended\nin this passage to be accidental or spontaneous, although neither of\nthese words is employed, inasmuch as use and disuse and the action of the\nconditions of existence, whether direct or indirect, are mentioned\nspecially as separate causes which purvey only the minor part of the\nvariations from among which nature selects. The words \u201cthat is, in\nrelation to adaptive forms\u201d should be omitted, as surplusage that draws\nthe reader\u2019s attention from the point at issue; the sentence really\namounts to this\u2014that modification has been effected _chiefly through\nselection_ in the ordinary course of nature _from among spontaneous\nvariations_, _aided in an unimportant manner by variations which qu\u00e2 us\nare spontaneous_. Nevertheless, though these spontaneous variations are\nstill so trifling in effect that they only aid spontaneous variations in\nan unimportant manner, in his earlier editions Mr. Darwin thought them\nstill less important than he does now.\n\nThis comes of tinkering. We do not know whether we are on our heads or\nour heels. We catch ourselves repeating \u201cimportant,\u201d \u201cunimportant,\u201d\n\u201cunimportant,\u201d \u201cimportant,\u201d like the King when addressing the jury in\n\u201cAlice in Wonderland;\u201d and yet this is the book of which Mr. Grant Allen\n{163a} says that it is \u201cone of the greatest, and most learned, the most\nlucid, the most logical, the most crushing, the most conclusive, that the\nworld has ever seen. Step by step, and principle by principle, it proved\nevery point in its progress triumphantly before it went on to the next.\nSo vast an array of facts so thoroughly in hand had never before been\nmustered and marshalled in favour of any biological theory.\u201d The book\nand the eulogy are well mated.\n\nI see that in the paragraph following on the one just quoted, Mr. Allen\nsays, that \u201cto the world at large Darwinism and evolution became at once\nsynonymous terms.\u201d Certainly it was no fault of Mr. Darwin\u2019s if they did\nnot, but I will add more on this head presently; for the moment,\nreturning to Mr. Darwin, it is hardly credible, but it is nevertheless\ntrue, that Mr Darwin begins the paragraph next following on the one on\nwhich I have just reflected so severely, with the words, \u201cIt can hardly\nbe supposed that a false theory would explain in so satisfactory a manner\nas does the theory of natural selection, the several large classes of\nfacts above specified.\u201d If Mr. Darwin found the large classes of facts\n\u201csatisfactorily\u201d explained by the survival of the luckiest irrespectively\nof the cunning which enabled them to turn their luck to account, he must\nhave been easily satisfied. Perhaps he was in the same frame of mind as\nwhen he said {164a} that \u201ceven an imperfect answer would be\nsatisfactory,\u201d but surely this is being thankful for small mercies.\n\nOn the following page Mr. Darwin says:\u2014\u201cAlthough I am fully\u201d (why\n\u201cfully\u201d?) \u201cconvinced of the truth of the views given in this volume under\nthe form of an abstract, I by no means expect to convince experienced\nnaturalists,\u201d &c. I have not quoted the whole of Mr. Darwin\u2019s sentence,\nbut it implies that any experienced naturalist who remained unconvinced\nwas an old-fashioned, prejudiced person. I confess that this is what I\nrather feel about the experienced naturalists who differ in only too\ngreat numbers from myself, but I did not expect to find so much of the\nold Adam remaining in Mr. Darwin; I did not expect to find him support me\nin the belief that naturalists are made of much the same stuff as other\npeople, and, if they are wise, will look upon new theories with distrust\nuntil they find them becoming generally accepted. I am not sure that Mr.\nDarwin is not just a little bit flippant here.\n\nSometimes I ask myself whether it is possible that, not being convinced,\nI may be an experienced naturalist after all; at other times, when I read\nMr. Darwin\u2019s works and those of his eulogists, I wonder whether there is\nnot some other Mr. Darwin, some other \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d some other\nProfessors Huxley, Tyndal, and Ray Lankester, and whether in each case\nsome malicious fiend has not palmed off a counterfeit upon me that\ndiffers _toto c\u00e6lo_ from the original. I felt exactly the same when I\nread Goethe\u2019s \u201cWilhelm Meister\u201d; I could not believe my eyes, which\nnevertheless told me that the dull diseased trash I was so toilsomely\nreading was a work which was commonly held to be one of the great\nliterary masterpieces of the world. It seemed to me that there must be\nsome other Goethe and some other Wilhelm Meister. Indeed I find myself\nso depressingly out of harmony with the prevailing not opinion only, but\nspirit\u2014if, indeed, the Huxleys, Tyndals, Miss Buckleys, Ray Lankesters,\nand Romaneses express the prevailing spirit as accurately as they appear\nto do\u2014that at times I find it difficult to believe I am not the victim of\nhallucination; nevertheless I know that either every canon, whether of\ncriticism or honourable conduct, which I have learned to respect is an\nimpudent swindle, suitable for the cloister only, and having no force or\napplication in the outside world; or else that Mr. Darwin and his\nsupporters are misleading the public to the full as much as the\ntheologians of whom they speak at times so disapprovingly. They sin,\nmoreover, with incomparably less excuse. Right as they doubtless are in\nmuch, and much as we doubtless owe them (so we owe much also to the\ntheologians, and they also are right in much), they are giving way to a\ntemper which cannot be indulged with impunity. I know the great power of\nacademicism; I know how instinctively academicism everywhere must range\nitself on Mr. Darwin\u2019s side, and how askance it must look on those who\nwrite as I do; but I know also that there is a power before which even\nacademicism must bow, and to this power I look not unhopefully for\nsupport.\n\nAs regards Mr. Spencer\u2019s contention that Mr. Darwin leaned more towards\nfunction as he grew older, I do not doubt that at the end of his life Mr.\nDarwin believed modification to be mainly due to function, but the\npassage quoted on page 62 written in 1839, coupled with the concluding\nparagraph of the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d written in 1859, and allowed to\nstand during seventeen years of revision, though so much else was\naltered\u2014these passages, when their dates and surroundings are considered,\nsuggest strongly that Mr. Darwin thought during all the forty years or so\nthus covered exactly as his grandfather and Lamarck had done, and indeed\nas all sensible people since Buffon wrote have done if they have accepted\nevolution at all.\n\nThen why should he not have said so? What object could he have in\nwriting an elaborate work to support a theory which he knew all the time\nto be untenable? The impropriety of such a course, unless the work was,\nlike Buffon\u2019s, transparently ironical, could only be matched by its\nfatuousness, or indeed by the folly of one who should assign action so\nmotiveless to any one out of a lunatic asylum.\n\nThis sounds well, but unfortunately we cannot forget that when Mr. Darwin\nwrote the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d he claimed to be the originator of the\ntheory of descent with modification generally; that he did this without\none word of reference either to Buffon or Erasmus Darwin until the first\nsix thousand copies of his book had been sold, and then with as meagre,\ninadequate notice as can be well conceived. Lamarck was just named in\nthe first editions of the \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d but only to be told that\nMr. Darwin had not got anything to give him, and he must go away; the\nauthor of the \u201cVestiges of Creation\u201d was also just mentioned, but only in\na sentence full of such gross misrepresentation that Mr. Darwin did not\nventure to stand by it, and expunged it in later editions, as usual,\nwithout calling attention to what he had done. It would have been in the\nhighest degree imprudent, not to say impossible, for one so conscientious\nas Mr. Darwin to have taken the line he took in respect of descent with\nmodification generally, if he were not provided with some ostensibly\ndistinctive feature, in virtue of which, if people said anything, he\nmight claim to have advanced something different, and widely different,\nfrom the theory of evolution propounded by his illustrious predecessors;\na distinctive theory of some sort, therefore, had got to be looked\nfor\u2014and if people look in this spirit they can generally find.\n\nI imagine that Mr. Darwin, casting about for a substantial difference,\nand being unable to find one, committed the Gladstonian blunder of\nmistaking an unsubstantial for a substantial one. It was doubtless\nbecause he suspected it that he never took us fully into his confidence,\nnor in all probability allowed even to himself how deeply he distrusted\nit. Much, however, as he disliked the accumulation of accidental\nvariations, he disliked not claiming the theory of descent with\nmodification still more; and if he was to claim this, accidental his\nvariations had got to be. Accidental they accordingly were, but in as\nobscure and perfunctory a fashion as Mr. Darwin could make them\nconsistently with their being to hand as accidental variations should\nlater developments make this convenient. Under these circumstances it\nwas hardly to be expected that Mr. Darwin should help the reader to\nfollow the workings of his mind\u2014nor, again, that a book the writer of\nwhich was hampered as I have supposed should prove clear and easy\nreading.\n\nThe attitude of Mr. Darwin\u2019s mind, whatever it may have been in regard to\nthe theory of descent with modification generally, goes so far to explain\nhis attitude in respect to the theory of natural selection (which, it\ncannot be too often repeated, is only one of the conditions of existence\nadvanced as the main means of modification by the earlier evolutionists),\nthat it is worth while to settle the question once for all whether Mr.\nDarwin did or did not believe himself justified in claiming the theory of\ndescent as an original discovery of his own. This will be a task of some\nlittle length, and may perhaps try the reader\u2019s patience, as it assuredly\ntried mine; if, however, he will read the two following chapters, he will\nprobably be able to make up his mind upon much that will otherwise, if he\nthinks about it at all, continue to puzzle him.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XIII\nDarwin\u2019s Claim to Descent with Modification\n\n\nMR. ALLEN, in his \u201cCharles Darwin,\u201d {168a} says that \u201cin the public mind\nMr. Darwin is commonly regarded as the discoverer and founder of the\nevolution hypothesis,\u201d and on p. 177 he says that to most men Darwinism\nand evolution mean one and the same thing. Mr. Allen declares\nmisconception on this matter to be \u201cso extremely general\u201d as to be\n\u201calmost universal;\u201d this is more true than creditable to Mr. Darwin.\n\nMr. Allen says {168b} that though Mr. Darwin gained \u201cfar wider general\nacceptance\u201d for both the doctrine of descent in general, and for that of\nthe descent of man from a simious or semi-simious ancestor in particular,\n\u201che laid no sort of claim to originality or proprietorship in either\ntheory.\u201d This is not the case. No one can claim a theory more\nfrequently and more effectually than Mr. Darwin claimed descent with\nmodification, nor, as I have already said, is it likely that the\nmisconception of which Mr. Allen complains would be general, if he had\nnot so claimed it. The \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d begins:\u2014\n\n\u201cWhen on board H.M.S. _Beagle_, as naturalist, I was much struck with\ncertain facts in the distribution of the inhabitants of South America,\nand in the geological relation of the present to the past inhabitants of\nthat continent. These facts seemed to me to throw some light on the\norigin of species\u2014that mystery of mysteries, as it has been called by one\nof our greatest philosophers. On my return home it occurred to me, in\n1837, that something might perhaps be made out on this question by\npatiently accumulating and reflecting upon all sorts of facts which could\npossibly have any bearing on it. After five years\u2019 work I allowed myself\nto speculate upon the subject, and drew up some short notes; these I\nenlarged in 1844 {169a} into a sketch of the conclusions which then\nseemed to me probable. From that period to the present day I have\nsteadily pursued the same object. I hope I may be excused these personal\ndetails, as I give them to show that I have not been hasty in coming to a\ndecision.\u201d\n\nThis is bland, but peremptory. Mr. Darwin implies that the mere asking\nof the question how species has come about opened up a field into which\nspeculation itself had hardly yet ventured to intrude. It was the\nmystery of mysteries; one of our greatest philosophers had said so; not\none little feeble ray of light had ever yet been thrown upon it. Mr.\nDarwin knew all this, and was appalled at the greatness of the task that\nlay before him; still, after he had pondered on what he had seen in South\nAmerica, it really did occur to him, that if he was very very patient,\nand went on reflecting for years and years longer, upon all sorts of\nfacts, good, bad, and indifferent, which could possibly have any bearing\non the subject\u2014and what fact might not possibly have some bearing?\u2014well,\nsomething, as against the nothing that had been made out hitherto, might\nby some faint far-away possibility be one day dimly seem. It was only\nwhat he had seen in South America that made all this occur to him. He\nhad never seen anything about descent with modification in any book, nor\nheard any one talk about it as having been put forward by other people;\nif he had, he would, of course, have been the first to say so; he was not\nas other philosophers are; so the mountain went on for years and years\ngestating, but still there was no labour.\n\n\u201cMy work,\u201d continues Mr. Darwin, \u201cis now nearly finished; but as it will\ntake me two or three years to complete it, and as my health is far from\nstrong, I have been urged to publish this abstract. I have been more\nespecially induced to do this, as Mr. Wallace, who is now studying the\nnatural history of the Malay Archipelago, has arrived at almost exactly\nthe same general conclusions that I have on the origin of species.\u201d Mr.\nDarwin was naturally anxious to forestall Mr. Wallace, and hurried up\nwith his book. What reader, on finding descent with modification to be\nits most prominent feature, could doubt\u2014especially if new to the subject,\nas the greater number of Mr. Darwin\u2019s readers in 1859 were\u2014that this same\ndescent with modification was the theory which Mr. Darwin and Mr. Wallace\nhad jointly hit upon, and which Mr. Darwin was so anxious to show that he\nhad not been hasty in adopting? When Mr. Darwin went on to say that his\nabstract would be very imperfect, and that he could not give references\nand authorities for his several statements, we did not suppose that such\nan apology could be meant to cover silence concerning writers who during\ntheir whole lives, or nearly so, had borne the burden and heat of the day\nin respect of descent with modification in its most extended application.\n\u201cI much regret,\u201d says Mr. Darwin, \u201cthat want of space prevents my having\nthe satisfaction of acknowledging the generous assistance I have received\nfrom very many naturalists, some of them personally unknown to me.\u201d This\nis like what the Royal Academicians say when they do not intend to hang\nour pictures; they can, however, generally find space for a picture if\nthey want to hang it, and we assume with safety that there are no\nmaster-works by painters of the very highest rank for which no space has\nbeen available. Want of space will, indeed, prevent my quoting from more\nthan one other paragraph of Mr. Darwin\u2019s introduction; this paragraph,\nhowever, should alone suffice to show how inaccurate Mr. Allen is in\nsaying that Mr. Darwin \u201claid no sort of claim to originality or\nproprietorship\u201d in the theory of descent with modification, and this is\nthe point with which we are immediately concerned. Mr. Darwin says:\u2014\n\n\u201cIn considering the origin of species, it is quite conceivable that a\nnaturalist, reflecting on the mutual affinities of organic beings, on\ntheir embryological relations, their geographical distribution,\ngeological succession, and other such facts, might come to the conclusion\nthat each species had not been independently created, but had descended\nlike varieties from other species.\u201d\n\nIt will be observed that not only is no hint given here that descent with\nmodification was a theory which, though unknown to the general public,\nhad been occupying the attention of biologists for a hundred years and\nmore, but it is distinctly implied that this was not the case. When Mr.\nDarwin said it was \u201cconceivable that a naturalist might\u201d arrive at the\ntheory of descent, straightforward readers took him to mean that though\nthis was conceivable, it had never, to Mr. Darwin\u2019s knowledge, been done.\nIf we had a notion that we had already vaguely heard of the theory that\nmen and the lower animals were descended from common ancestors, we must\nhave been wrong; it was not this that we had heard of, but something\nelse, which, though doubtless a little like it, was all wrong, whereas\nthis was obviously going to be all right.\n\nTo follow the rest of the paragraph with the closeness that it merits\nwould be a task at once so long and so unpleasant that I will omit\nfurther reference to any part of it except the last sentence. That\nsentence runs:\u2014\n\n\u201cIn the case of the mistletoe, which draws its nourishment from certain\ntrees, which has seeds that must be transported by certain birds, and\nwhich has flowers with separate sexes absolutely requiring the agency of\ncertain insects to bring pollen from one flower to the other, it is\nequally preposterous to account for the structure of this parasite, with\nits relations to several distinct organic beings, by the effects of the\nexternal conditions, or of habit, or of the volition of the plant\nitself.\u201d\n\nDoubtless it would be preposterous to refer the structure of either\nwoodpecker or mistletoe to the single agency of any one of these three\ncauses; but neither Lamarck nor any other writer on evolution has, so far\nas I know, even contemplated this; the early evolutionists supposed\norganic modification to depend on the action and interaction of all\nthree, and I venture to think that this will ere long be considered as,\nto say the least of it, not more preposterous than the assigning of the\nlargely preponderating share in the production of such highly and\nvariously correlated organisms as the mistletoe and woodpecker mainly to\nluck pure and simple, as is done by Mr. Charles Darwin\u2019s theory.\n\nIt will be observed that in the paragraph last quoted from, Mr. Darwin,\n_more suo_, is careful not to commit himself. All he has said is, that\nit would be preposterous to do something the preposterousness of which\ncannot be reasonably disputed; the impression, however, is none the less\neffectually conveyed, that some one of the three assigned agencies, taken\nsingly, was the only cause of modification ever yet proposed, if, indeed,\nany writer had even gone so far as this. We knew we did not know much\nabout the matter ourselves, and that Mr. Darwin was a naturalist of long\nand high standing; we naturally, therefore, credited him with the same\ngood faith as a writer that we knew in ourselves as readers; it never so\nmuch as crossed our minds to suppose that the head which he was holding\nup all dripping before our eyes as that of a fool, was not that of a fool\nwho had actually lived and written, but only of a figure of straw which\nhad been dipped in a bucket of red paint. Naturally enough we concluded,\nsince Mr. Darwin seemed to say so, that if his predecessors had nothing\nbetter to say for themselves than this, it would not be worth while to\ntrouble about them further; especially as we did not know who they were,\nnor what they had written, and Mr. Darwin did not tell us. It would be\nbetter and less trouble to take the goods with which it was plain Mr.\nDarwin was going to provide us, and ask no questions. We have seen that\neven tolerably obvious conclusions were rather slow in occurring to poor\nsimple-minded Mr. Darwin, and may be sure that it never once occurred to\nhim that the British public would be likely to argue thus; he had no\nintention of playing the scientific confidence trick upon us. I dare say\nnot, but unfortunately the result has closely resembled the one that\nwould have ensued if Mr. Darwin had had such an intention.\n\nThe claim to originality made so distinctly in the opening sentences of\nthe \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d is repeated in a letter to Professor Haeckel,\nwritten October 8, 1864, and giving an account of the development of his\nbelief in descent with modification. This letter, part of which is\nquoted by Mr. Allen, {173a} is given on p. 134 of the English translation\nof Professor Haeckel\u2019s \u201cHistory of Creation,\u201d {173b} and runs as\nfollows:\u2014\n\n\u201cIn South America three classes of facts were brought strongly before my\nmind. Firstly, the manner in which closely allied species replace\nspecies in going southward. Secondly, the close affinity of the species\ninhabiting the islands near South America to those proper to the\ncontinent. This struck me profoundly, especially the difference of the\nspecies in the adjoining islets in the Galapagos Archipelago. Thirdly,\nthe relation of the living Edentata and Rodentia to the extinct species.\nI shall never forget my astonishment when I dug out a gigantic piece of\narmour like that of the living armadillo.\n\n\u201cReflecting on these facts, and collecting analogous ones, it seemed to\nme probable that allied species were descended from a common ancestor.\nBut during several years I could not conceive how each form could have\nbeen modified so as to become admirably adapted to its place in nature.\nI began, therefore, to study domesticated animals and cultivated plants,\nand after a time perceived that man\u2019s power of selecting and breeding\nfrom certain individuals was the most powerful of all means in the\nproduction of new races. Having attended to the habits of animals and\ntheir relations to the surrounding conditions, I was able to realise the\nsevere struggle for existence to which all organisms are subjected, and\nmy geological observations had allowed me to appreciate to a certain\nextent the duration of past geological periods. Therefore, when I\nhappened to read Malthus on population, the idea of natural selection\nflashed on me. Of all minor points, the last which I appreciated was the\nimportance and cause of the principle of divergence.\u201d\n\nThis is all very na\u00efve, and accords perfectly with the introductory\nparagraphs of the \u201cOrigin of Species;\u201d it gives us the same picture of a\nsolitary thinker, a poor, lonely, friendless student of nature, who had\nnever so much as heard of Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, or Lamarck.\nUnfortunately, however, we cannot forget the description of the\ninfluences which, according to Mr. Grant Allen, did in reality surround\nMr. Darwin\u2019s youth, and certainly they are more what we should have\nexpected than those suggested rather than expressly stated by Mr. Darwin.\n\u201cEverywhere around him,\u201d says Mr. Allen, {174a} \u201cin his childhood and\nyouth these great but formless\u201d (why \u201cformless\u201d?) \u201cevolutionary ideas\nwere brewing and fermenting. The scientific society of his elders and of\nthe contemporaries among whom he grew up was permeated with the leaven of\nLaplace and Lamarck, of Hutton and of Herschel. Inquiry was especially\neverywhere rife as to the origin and nature of specific distinctions\namong plants and animals. Those who believed in the doctrine of Buffon\nand of the \u2018Zoonomia,\u2019 and those who disbelieved in it, alike, were\nprofoundly interested and agitated in soul by the far-reaching\nimplications of that fundamental problem. On every side evolutionism, in\nits crude form.\u201d (I suppose Mr. Allen could not help saying \u201cin its\ncrude form,\u201d but descent with modification in 1809 meant, to all intents\nand purposes, and was understood to mean, what it means now, or ought to\nmean, to most people.) \u201cThe universal stir,\u201d says Mr. Allen on the\nfollowing page, \u201cand deep prying into evolutionary questions which\neverywhere existed among scientific men in his early days was naturally\ncommunicated to a lad born of a scientific family and inheriting directly\nin blood and bone the biological tastes and tendencies of Erasmus\nDarwin.\u201d\n\nI confess to thinking that Mr. Allen\u2019s account of the influences which\nsurrounded Mr. Darwin\u2019s youth, if tainted with picturesqueness, is still\nsubstantially correct. On an earlier page he had written:\u2014\u201cIt is\nimpossible to take up any scientific memoirs or treatises of the first\nhalf of our own century without seeing at a glance how every mind of high\noriginal scientific importance was permeated and disturbed by the\nfundamental questions aroused, but not fully answered, by Buffon,\nLamarck, and Erasmus Darwin. In Lyell\u2019s letters, and in Agassiz\u2019s\nlectures, in the \u2018Botanic Journal\u2019 and in the \u2018Philosophical\nTransactions,\u2019 in treatises on Madeira beetles and the Australian flora,\nwe find everywhere the thoughts of men profoundly influenced in a\nthousand directions by this universal evolutionary solvent and leaven.\n\n\u201cAnd while the world of thought was thus seething and moving restlessly\nbefore the wave of ideas set in motion by these various independent\nphilosophers, another group of causes in another field was rendering\nsmooth the path beforehand for the future champion of the amended\nevolutionism. Geology on the one hand and astronomy on the other were\nmaking men\u2019s minds gradually familiar with the conception of slow natural\ndevelopment, as opposed to immediate and miraculous creation.\n\n . . .\n\n\u201cThe influence of these novel conceptions upon the growth and spread of\nevolutionary ideas was far-reaching and twofold. In the first place, the\ndiscovery of a definite succession of nearly related organic forms\nfollowing one another with evident closeness through the various ages,\ninevitably suggested to every inquiring observer the possibility of their\ndirect descent one from the other. In the second place, the discovery\nthat geological formations were not really separated each from its\npredecessor by violent revolutions, but were the result of gradual and\nordinary changes, discredited the old idea of frequent fresh creations\nafter each catastrophe, and familiarised the minds of men of science with\nthe alternative notion of slow and natural evolutionary processes. The\npast was seen in effect to be the parent of the present; the present was\nrecognised as the child of the past.\u201d\n\nThis is certainly not Mr. Darwin\u2019s own account of the matter. Probably\nthe truth will lie somewhere between the two extreme views: and on the\none hand, the world of thought was not seething quite so badly as Mr.\nAllen represents it, while on the other, though \u201cthree classes of fact,\u201d\n&c., were undoubtedly \u201cbrought strongly before\u201d Mr. Darwin\u2019s \u201cmind in\nSouth America,\u201d yet some of them had perhaps already been brought before\nit at an earlier time, which he did not happen to remember at the moment\nof writing his letter to Professor Haeckel and the opening paragraph of\nthe \u201cOrigin of Species.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nChapter XIV\nDarwin and Descent with Modification (_continued_)\n\n\nI HAVE said enough to show that Mr. Darwin claimed I to have been the\noriginator of the theory of descent with modification as distinctly as\nany writer usually claims any theory; but it will probably save the\nreader trouble in the end if I bring together a good many, though not,\nprobably, all (for I much disliked the task, and discharged it\nperfunctorily), of the passages in the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d in which the\ntheory of descent with modification in its widest sense is claimed\nexpressly or by implication. I shall quote from the original edition,\nwhich, it should be remembered, consisted of the very unusually large\nnumber of four thousand copies, and from which no important deviation was\nmade either by addition or otherwise until a second edition of two\nthousand further copies had been sold; the \u201cHistorical Sketch,\u201d &c.,\nbeing first given with the third edition. The italics, which I have\nemployed so as to catch the reader\u2019s eye, are mine, not Mr. Darwin\u2019s.\nMr. Darwin writes:\u2014\n\n\u201cAlthough much remains obscure, and will long remain obscure, _I can\nentertain no doubt_, _after the most deliberate study and dispassionate\njudgment of which I am capable_, _that the view which most naturalists\nentertain_, _and which I formerly entertained\u2014namely that each species\nhas been independently created\u2014is erroneous_. I am fully convinced that\nspecies are not immutable, but that those belonging to what are called\nthe same genera are lineal descendants of some other and generally\nextinct species, in the same manner as the acknowledged varieties of any\none species are the descendants of that species. Furthermore, I am\nconvinced that natural selection\u201d (or the preservation of fortunate\nraces) \u201chas been the main but not exclusive means of modification\u201d (p.\n6).\n\nIt is not here expressly stated that the theory of the mutability of\nspecies is Mr. Darwin\u2019s own; this, nevertheless, is the inference which\nthe great majority of his readers were likely to draw, and did draw, from\nMr. Darwin\u2019s words.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cIt is not that all large genera are now varying much, and are thus\nincreasing in the number of their species, or that no small genera are\nnow multiplying and increasing; for if this had been so it would have\nbeen fatal to _my theory_; inasmuch as geology,\u201d &c. (p. 56).\n\nThe words \u201cmy theory\u201d stand in all the editions. Again:\u2014\n\n\u201cThis relation has a clear meaning _on my view_ of the subject; I look\nupon all the species of any genus as having as certainly descended from\nthe same progenitor, as have the two sexes of any one of the species\u201d (p.\n157).\n\n\u201cMy view\u201d here, especially in the absence of reference to any other\nwriter as having held the same opinion, implies as its most natural\ninterpretation that descent pure and simple is Mr. Darwin\u2019s view.\nSubstitute \u201cthe theory of descent\u201d for \u201cmy view,\u201d and we do not feel that\nwe are misinterpreting the author\u2019s meaning. The words \u201cmy view\u201d remain\nin all editions.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cLong before having arrived at this part of my work, a crowd of\ndifficulties will have occurred to the reader. Some of them are so grave\nthat to this day I can never reflect on them without being staggered; but\nto the best of my belief the greater number are only apparent, and those\nthat are real are not, I think, _fatal to my theory_.\n\n\u201cThese difficulties and objections may be classed under the following\nheads:\u2014Firstly, if species have descended from other species by\ninsensibly fine gradations, why do we not everywhere see?\u201d &c. (p. 171).\n\nWe infer from this that \u201cmy theory\u201d is the theory \u201cthat species have\ndescended from other species by insensibly fine gradations\u201d\u2014that is to\nsay, that it is the theory of descent with modification; for the theory\nthat is being objected to is obviously the theory of descent _in toto_,\nand not a mere detail in connection with that theory.\n\nThe words \u201cmy theory\u201d were altered in 1872, with the sixth edition of the\n\u201cOrigin of species,\u201d into \u201cthe theory;\u201d but I am chiefly concerned with\nthe first edition of the work, my object being to show that Mr. Darwin\nwas led into his false position as regards natural selection by a desire\nto claim the theory of descent with modification; if he claimed it in the\nfirst edition, this is enough to give colour to the view which I take;\nbut it must be remembered that descent with modification remained, by the\npassage just quoted \u201cmy theory,\u201d for thirteen years, and even when in\n1869 and 1872, for a reason that I can only guess at, \u201cmy theory\u201d became\ngenerally \u201cthe theory,\u201d this did not make it become any one else\u2019s\ntheory. It is hard to say whose or what it became, if the words are to\nbe construed technically; practically, however, with all ingenuous\nreaders, \u201cthe theory\u201d remained as much Mr. Darwin\u2019s theory as though the\nwords \u201cmy theory\u201d had been retained, and Mr. Darwin cannot be supposed so\nsimple-minded as not to have known this would be the case. Moreover, it\nappears, from the next page but one to the one last quoted, that Mr.\nDarwin claimed the theory of descent with modification generally, even to\nthe last, for we there read, \u201c_By my theory_ these allied species have\ndescended from a common parent,\u201d and the \u201cmy\u201d has been allowed, for some\nreason not quite obvious, to survive the general massacre of Mr. Darwin\u2019s\n\u201cmy\u2019s\u201d which occurred in 1869 and 1872.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cHe who believes that each being has been created as we now see it, must\noccasionally have felt surprise when he has met,\u201d &c. (p. 185).\n\nHere the argument evidently lies between descent and independent acts of\ncreation. This appears from the paragraph immediately following, which\nbegins, \u201cHe who believes in separate and innumerable acts of creation,\u201d\n&c. We therefore understand descent to be the theory so frequently\nspoken of by Mr. Darwin as \u201cmy.\u201d\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cHe who will go thus far, if he find on finishing this treatise that\nlarge bodies of facts, otherwise inexplicable, can be explained _by the\ntheory of descent_, ought not to hesitate to go farther, and to admit\nthat a structure even as perfect as an eagle\u2019s eye might be formed _by\nnatural selection_, although in this case he does not know any of the\ntransitional grades\u201d (p. 188).\n\nThe natural inference from this is that descent and natural selection are\none and the same thing.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cIf it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed which could\nnot possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight\nmodifications, _my theory_ would absolutely break down. But I can find\nout no such case. No doubt many organs exist of which we do not know the\ntransitional grades, more especially if we look to much-isolated species,\nround which, according to my _theory_, there has been much extinction\u201d\n(p. 189).\n\nThis makes \u201cmy theory\u201d to be \u201cthe theory that complex organs have arisen\nby numerous, successive, slight modifications;\u201d that is to say, to be the\ntheory of descent with modification. The first of the two \u201cmy theory\u2019s\u201d\nin the passage last quoted has been allowed to stand. The second became\n\u201cthe theory\u201d in 1872. It is obvious, therefore, that \u201cthe theory\u201d means\n\u201cmy theory;\u201d it is not so obvious why the change should have been made at\nall, nor why the one \u201cmy theory\u201d should have been taken and the other\nleft, but I will return to this question.\n\nAgain, Mr. Darwin writes:\u2014\n\n\u201cAlthough we must be extremely cautious in concluding that any organ\ncould not possibly have been produced by small successive transitional\ngradations, yet, undoubtedly grave cases of difficulty occur, some of\nwhich will be discussed in my future work\u201d (p. 192).\n\nThis, as usual, implies descent with modification to be the theory that\nMr. Darwin is trying to make good.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cI have been astonished how rarely an organ can be named towards which no\ntransitional variety is known to lead . . . Why, _on the theory of\ncreation_, should this be so? Why should not nature have taken a leap\nfrom structure to structure? _On the theory of natural selection_ we can\nclearly understand why she should not; for natural selection can act only\nby taking advantage of slight successive variations; she can never take a\nleap, but must advance by the slowest and shortest steps\u201d (p. 194).\n\nHere \u201cthe theory of natural selection\u201d is opposed to \u201cthe theory of\ncreation;\u201d we took it, therefore, to be another way of saying \u201cthe theory\nof descent with modification.\u201d\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cWe have in this chapter discussed some of the difficulties and\nobjections which may be urged against _my theory_. Many of them are very\ngrave, but I think that in the discussion light has been thrown on\nseveral facts which, _on the theory of independent acts of creation_, are\nutterly obscure\u201d (p. 203).\n\nHere we have, on the one hand, \u201cmy theory,\u201d on the other, \u201cindependent\nacts of creation.\u201d The natural antithesis to independent acts of\ncreation is descent, and we assumed with reason that Mr. Darwin was\nclaiming this when he spoke of \u201cmy theory.\u201d \u201cMy theory\u201d became \u201cthe\ntheory\u201d in 1869.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cOn the theory of natural selection we can clearly understand the full\nmeaning of that old canon in natural history, \u2018_Natura non facit\nsaltum_.\u2019 This canon, if we look only to the present inhabitants of the\nworld is not strictly correct, but if we include all those of past times,\nit must _by my theory_ be strictly true\u201d (p. 206).\n\nHere the natural interpretation of \u201cby my theory\u201d is \u201cby the theory of\ndescent with modification;\u201d the words \u201con the theory of natural\nselection,\u201d with which the sentence opens, lead us to suppose that Mr.\nDarwin regarded natural selection and descent as convertible terms. \u201cMy\ntheory\u201d was altered to \u201cthis theory\u201d in 1872. Six lines lower down we\nread, \u201c_On my theory_ unity of type is explained by unity of descent.\u201d\nThe \u201cmy\u201d here has been allowed to stand.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cAgain, as in the case of corporeal structure, and conformably with _my\ntheory_, the instinct of each species is good for itself, but has never,\u201d\n&c. (p. 210).\n\nWho was to see that \u201cmy theory\u201d did not include descent with\nmodification? The \u201cmy\u201d here has been allowed to stand.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cThe fact that instincts . . . are liable to make mistakes;\u2014that no\ninstinct has been produced for the exclusive good of other animals, but\nthat each animal takes advantage of the instincts of others;\u2014that the\ncanon of natural history, \u2018_Natura non facit saltum_,\u2019 is applicable to\ninstincts as well as to corporeal structure, and is plainly explicable on\nthe foregoing views, but is otherwise inexplicable,\u2014_all tend to\ncorroborate the theory of natural selection_\u201d (p. 243).\n\nWe feel that it is the theory of evolution, or descent with modification,\nthat is here corroborated, and that it is this which Mr. Darwin is mainly\ntrying to establish; the sentence should have ended \u201call tend to\ncorroborate the theory of descent with modification;\u201d the substitution of\n\u201cnatural selection\u201d for descent tends to make us think that these\nconceptions are identical. That they are so regarded, or at any rate\nthat it is the theory of descent in full which Mr. Darwin has in his\nmind, appears from the immediately succeeding paragraph, which begins\n\u201c_This theory_,\u201d and continues six lines lower, \u201cFor instance, we can\nunderstand, on the _principle of inheritance_, how it is that,\u201d &c.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cIn the first place, it should always be borne in mind what sort of\nintermediate forms must, _on my theory_, formerly have existed\u201d (p. 280).\n\n\u201cMy theory\u201d became \u201cthe theory\u201d in 1869. No reader who read in good\nfaith could doubt that the theory of descent with modification was being\nhere intended.\n\n\u201cIt is just possible _by my theory_, that one of two living forms might\nhave descended from the other; for instance, a horse from a tapir; but in\nthis case _direct_ intermediate links will have existed between them\u201d (p.\n281).\n\n\u201cMy theory\u201d became \u201cthe theory\u201d in 1869.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201c_By the theory of natural selection_ all living species have been\nconnected with the parent species of each genus,\u201d &c. We took this to\nmean, \u201cBy the theory of descent with modification all living species,\u201d\n&c. (p. 281).\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cSome experienced conchologists are now sinking many of the very fine\nspecies of D\u2019Orbigny and others into the rank of varieties; and on this\nview we do find the kind of evidence of change which _on my theory_ we\nought to find\u201d (p. 297).\n\n\u201cMy theory\u201d became \u201cthe theory\u201d in 1869.\n\nIn the fourth edition (1866), in a passage which is not in either of the\ntwo first editions, we read (p. 359), \u201cSo that here again we have\nundoubted evidence of change in the direction required by _my theory_.\u201d\n\u201cMy theory\u201d became \u201cthe theory\u201d in 1869; the theory of descent with\nmodification is unquestionably intended.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cGeological research has done scarcely anything in breaking down the\ndistinction between species, by connecting them together by numerous,\nfine, intermediate varieties; and this not having been effected, is\nprobably the gravest and most obvious of all the many objections which\nmay be urged against _my views_\u201d (p. 299).\n\nWe naturally took \u201cmy views\u201d to mean descent with modification. The \u201cmy\u201d\nhas been allowed to stand.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cIf, then, there be some degree of truth in these remarks, we have no\nright to expect to find in our geological formations an infinite number\nof those transitional forms which _on my theory_ assuredly have connected\nall the past and present species of the same group in one long and\nbranching chain of life . . . But I do not pretend that I should ever\nhave suspected how poor was the record in the best preserved geological\nsections, had not the absence of innumerable transitional links between\nthe species which lived at the commencement and at the close of each\nformation pressed so hardly _on my theory_\u201d (pp. 301, 302).\n\nSubstitute \u201cdescent with modification\u201d for \u201cmy theory\u201d and the meaning\ndoes not suffer. The first of the two \u201cmy theories\u201d in the passage last\nquoted was altered in 1869 into \u201cour theory;\u201d the second has been allowed\nto stand.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cThe abrupt manner in which whole groups of species suddenly appear in\nsome formations, has been urged by several pal\u00e6ontologists . . . as a\nfatal objection _to the belief in the transmutation of species_. If\nnumerous species, belonging to the same genera or families, have really\nstarted into life all at once, the fact would be fatal _to the theory of\ndescent with slow modification through natural selection_\u201d (p. 302).\n\nHere \u201cthe belief in the transmutation of species,\u201d or descent with\nmodification, is treated as synonymous with \u201cthe theory of descent with\nslow modification through natural selection;\u201d but it has nowhere been\nexplained that there are two widely different \u201ctheories of descent with\nslow modification through natural selection,\u201d the one of which may be\ntrue enough for all practical purposes, while the other is seen to be\nabsurd as soon as it is examined closely. The theory of descent with\nmodification is not properly convertible with either of these two views,\nfor descent with modification deals with the question whether species are\ntransmutable or no, and dispute as to the respective merits of the two\nnatural selections deals with the question how it comes to be transmuted;\nnevertheless, the words \u201cthe theory of descent with slow modification\nthrough the ordinary course of things\u201d (which is what \u201cdescent with\nmodification through natural selection\u201d comes to) may be considered as\nexpressing the facts with practical accuracy, if the ordinary course of\nnature is supposed to be that modification is mainly consequent on the\ndischarge of some correlated function, and that modification, if\nfavourable, will tend to accumulate so long as the given function\ncontinues important to the wellbeing of the organism; the words, however,\nhave no correspondence with reality if they are supposed to imply that\nvariations which are mainly matters of pure chance and unconnected in any\nway with function will accumulate and result in specific difference, no\nmatter how much each one of them may be preserved in the generation in\nwhich it appears. In the one case, therefore, the expression natural\nselection may be loosely used as a synonym for descent with modification,\nand in the other it may not. Unfortunately with Mr. Charles Darwin the\nvariations are mainly accidental. The words \u201cthrough natural selection,\u201d\ntherefore, in the passage last quoted carry no weight, for it is the\nwrong natural selection that is, or ought to be, intended; practically,\nhowever, they derived a weight from Mr. Darwin\u2019s name to which they had\nno title of their own, and we understood that \u201cthe theory of descent with\nslow modification\u201d through the kind of natural selection ostensibly\nintended by Mr. Darwin was a quasi-synonymous expression for the\ntransmutation of species. We understood\u2014so far as we understood anything\nbeyond that we were to believe in descent with modification\u2014that natural\nselection was Mr. Darwin\u2019s theory; we therefore concluded, since Mr.\nDarwin seemed to say so, that the theory of the transmutation of species\ngenerally was so also. At any rate we felt as regards the passage last\nquoted that the theory of descent with modification was the point of\nattack and defence, and we supposed it to be the theory so often referred\nto by Mr. Darwin as \u201cmy.\u201d\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cSome of the most ancient Silurian animals, as the Nautilus, Lingula,\n&c., do not differ much from the living species; and it cannot _on my\ntheory_ be supposed that these old species were the progenitors,\u201d &c. (p.\n306) . . . \u201cConsequently _if my theory be true_, it is indisputable,\u201d &c.\n(p. 307).\n\nHere the two \u201cmy theories\u201d have been altered, the first into \u201cour\ntheory,\u201d and the second into \u201cthe theory,\u201d both in 1869; but, as usual,\nthe thing that remains with the reader is the theory of descent, and it\nremains morally and practically as much claimed when called \u201cthe\ntheory\u201d\u2014as during the many years throughout which the more open \u201cmy\u201d\ndistinctly claimed it.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cAll the most eminent pal\u00e6ontologists, namely, Cuvier, Owen, Agassiz,\nBarrande, E. Forbes, &c., and all our greatest geologists, as Lyell,\nMurchison, Sedgwick, &c., have unanimously, often vehemently, maintained\n_the immutability of species_. . . . I feel how rash it is to differ from\nthese great authorities . . . Those who think the natural geological\nrecord in any degree perfect, and who do not attach much weight to the\nfacts and arguments of other kinds brought forward in this volume, will\nundoubtedly at once _reject my theory_\u201d (p. 310).\n\nWhat is \u201cmy theory\u201d here, if not that of the mutability of species, or\nthe theory of descent with modification? \u201cMy theory\u201d became \u201cthe theory\u201d\nin 1869.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cLet us now see whether the several facts and rules relating to the\ngeological succession of organic beings, better accord with the common\nview of the immutability of species, or with that of their _slow and\ngradual modification_, _through descent and natural selection_\u201d (p. 312).\n\nThe words \u201cnatural selection\u201d are indeed here, but they might as well be\nomitted for all the effect they produce. The argument is felt to be\nabout the two opposed theories of descent, and independent creative\nefforts.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cThese several facts accord well with _my theory_\u201d (p. 314). That \u201cmy\ntheory\u201d is the theory of descent is the conclusion most naturally drawn\nfrom the context. \u201cMy theory\u201d became \u201cour theory\u201d in 1869.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cThis gradual increase in the number of the species of a group is\nstrictly conformable _with my theory_; for the process of modification\nand the production of a number of allied forms must be slow and gradual,\n. . . like the branching of a great tree from a single stem, till the\ngroup becomes large\u201d (p. 314).\n\n\u201cMy theory\u201d became \u201cthe theory\u201d in 1869. We took \u201cmy theory\u201d to be the\ntheory of descent; that Mr. Darwin treats this as synonymous with the\ntheory of natural selection appears from the next paragraph, on the third\nline of which we read, \u201cOn _the theory of natural selection_ the\nextinction of old forms,\u201d &c.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201c_The theory of natural selection_ is grounded on the belief that each\nnew variety and ultimately each new species, is produced and maintained\nby having some advantage over those with which it comes into competition;\nand the consequent extinction of less favoured forms almost inevitably\nfollows\u201d (p. 320). Sense and consistency cannot be made of this passage.\nSubstitute \u201cThe theory of the preservation of favoured races in the\nstruggle for life\u201d for \u201cThe theory of natural selection\u201d (to do this is\nonly taking Mr. Darwin\u2019s own synonym for natural selection) and see what\nthe passage comes to. \u201cThe preservation of favoured races\u201d is not a\ntheory, it is a commonly observed fact; it is not \u201cgrounded on the belief\nthat each new variety,\u201d &c., it is one of the ultimate and most\nelementary principles in the world of life. When we try to take the\npassage seriously and think it out, we soon give it up, and pass on,\nsubstituting \u201cthe theory of descent\u201d for \u201cthe theory of natural\nselection,\u201d and concluding that in some way these two things must be\nidentical.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cThe manner in which single species and whole groups of species become\nextinct accords well with _the theory of natural selection_\u201d (p. 322).\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cThis great fact of the parallel succession of the forms of life\nthroughout the world, is explicable _on the theory of natural selection_\u201d\n(p. 325).\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cLet us now look to the mutual affinities of extinct and living species.\nThey all fall into one grand natural system; and this is at once\nexplained _on the principle of descent_\u201d (p. 329).\n\nPutting the three preceding passages together, we naturally inferred that\n\u201cthe theory of natural selection\u201d and \u201cthe principle of descent\u201d were the\nsame things. We knew Mr. Darwin claimed the first, and therefore\nunhesitatingly gave him the second at the same time.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cLet us see how far these several facts and inferences accord with _the\ntheory of descent with modification_\u201d (p. 331)\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cThus, _on the theory of descent with modification_, the main facts with\nregard to the mutual affinities of the extinct forms of life to each\nother and to living forms, seem to me explained in a satisfactory manner.\nAnd they are wholly inexplicable _on any other view_\u201d (p. 333).\n\nThe words \u201cseem to me\u201d involve a claim in the absence of so much as a\nhint in any part of the book concerning indebtedness to earlier writers.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201c_On the theory of descent_, the full meaning of the fossil remains,\u201d &c.\n(p. 336).\n\nIn the following paragraph we read:\u2014\n\n\u201cBut in one particular sense the more recent forms must, _on my theory_,\nbe higher than the more ancient.\u201d\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cAgassiz insists that ancient animals resemble to a certain extent the\nembryos of recent animals of the same classes; or that the geological\nsuccession of extinct forms is in some degree parallel to the\nembryological development of recent forms. . . . This doctrine of Agassiz\naccords well with _the theory of natural selection_\u201d (p. 338).\n\n\u201cThe theory of natural selection\u201d became \u201cour theory\u201d in 1869. The\nopinion of Agassiz accords excellently with the theory of descent with\nmodification, but it is not easy to see how it bears upon the fact that\nlucky races are preserved in the struggle for life\u2014which, according to\nMr. Darwin\u2019s title-page, is what is meant by natural selection.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201c_On the theory of descent with modification_, the great law of the\nlong-enduring but not immutable succession of the same types within the\nsame areas, is at once explained\u201d (p. 340).\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cIt must not be forgotten that, _on my theory_, all the species of the\nsame genus have descended from some one species\u201d (p. 341).\n\n\u201cMy theory\u201d became \u201cour theory\u201d in 1869.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cHe who rejects these views on the nature of the geological record, will\nrightly reject _my whole theory_\u201d (p. 342).\n\n\u201cMy\u201d became \u201cour\u201d in 1869.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cPassing from these difficulties, the other great leading facts in\npal\u00e6ontology agree admirably with _the theory of descent with\nmodification through variation and natural selection_\u201d (p. 343).\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\nThe succession of the same types of structure within the same areas\nduring the later geological periods _ceases to be mysterious_, and _is\nsimply explained by inheritance_ (p. 345).\n\nI suppose inheritance was not when Mr. Darwin wrote considered\nmysterious. The last few words have been altered to \u201cand is intelligible\non the principle of inheritance.\u201d It seems as though Mr. Darwin did not\nlike saying that inheritance was not mysterious, but had no objection to\nimplying that it was intelligible.\n\nThe next paragraph begins\u2014\u201cIf, then, the geological record be as\nimperfect as I believe it to be, . . . the main objections _to the theory\nof natural selection_ are greatly diminished or disappear. On the other\nhand, all the chief laws of pal\u00e6ontology plainly proclaim, _as it seems\nto me_, _that species have been produced by ordinary generation_.\u201d\n\nHere again the claim to the theory of descent with modification is\nunmistakable; it cannot, moreover, but occur to us that if species \u201chave\nbeen produced by ordinary generation,\u201d then ordinary generation has as\ngood a claim to be the main means of originating species as natural\nselection has. It is hardly necessary to point out that ordinary\ngeneration involves descent with modification, for all known offspring\ndiffer from their parents, so far, at any rate, as that practised judges\ncan generally tell them apart.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cWe see in these facts some deep organic bond, prevailing throughout\nspace and time, over the same areas of land and water, and independent of\ntheir physical condition. The naturalist must feel little curiosity who\nis not led to inquire what this bond is.\n\n\u201cThis bond, _on my theory_, _is simply inheritance_, that cause which\nalone,\u201d &c. (p. 350).\n\nThis passage was altered in 1869 to \u201cThe bond is simply inheritance.\u201d\nThe paragraph concludes, \u201c_On this principle of inheritance with\nmodification_, we can understand how it is that sections of genera . . .\nare confined to the same areas,\u201d &c.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cHe who rejects it rejects the _vera causa of ordinary_ generation,\u201d &c.\n(p. 352).\n\nWe naturally ask, Why call natural selection the \u201cmain means of\nmodification,\u201d if \u201cordinary generation\u201d is a _vera causa_?\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cIn discussing this subject, we shall be enabled at the same time to\nconsider a point equally important for us, namely, whether the several\ndistinct species of a genus, _which on my theory have all descended from\na common ancestor_, can have migrated (undergoing modification during\nsome part of their migration) from the area inhabited by their\nprogenitor\u201d (p. 354).\n\nThe words \u201con my theory\u201d became \u201con our theory\u201d in 1869.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cWith those organic beings which never intercross (if such exist) _the\nspecies_, _on my theory_, _must have descended from a succession of\nimproved varieties_,\u201d &c. (p. 355).\n\nThe words \u201con my theory\u201d were cut out in 1869.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cA slow southern migration of a marine fauna will account, _on the theory\nof modification_, for many closely allied forms,\u201d &c. (p. 372).\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cBut the existence of several quite distinct species, belonging to genera\nexclusively confined to the southern hemisphere, is, _on my theory of\ndescent with modification_, a far more remarkable case of difficulty\u201d (p.\n381).\n\n\u201cMy\u201d became \u201cthe\u201d in 1866 with the fourth edition. This was the most\ncategorical claim to the theory of descent with modification in the\n\u201cOrigin of Species.\u201d The \u201cmy\u201d here is the only one that was taken out\nbefore 1869. I suppose Mr. Darwin thought that with the removal of this\n\u201cmy\u201d he had ceased to claim the theory of descent with modification.\nNothing, however, could be gained by calling the reader\u2019s attention to\nwhat had been done, so nothing was said about it.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cSome species of fresh-water shells have a very wide range, _and allied\nspecies_, _which_, _on my theory_, _are descended from a single source_,\nprevail throughout the world\u201d (p. 385).\n\n\u201cMy theory\u201d became \u201cour theory\u201d in 1869.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cIn the following remarks I shall not confine myself to the mere question\nof dispersal, but shall consider some other facts which bear upon the\ntruth of _the two theories of independent creation and of descent with\nmodification_\u201d (p. 389). What can be plainer than that the theory which\nMr. Darwin espouses, and has so frequently called \u201cmy,\u201d is descent with\nmodification?\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cBut as these animals and their spawn are known to be immediately killed\nby sea-water, _on my view_, we can see that there would be great\ndifficulty in their transportal across the sea, and therefore why they do\nnot exist on any oceanic island. But why, _on the theory of creation_,\nthey should not have been created there, it would be very difficult to\nexplain\u201d (p. 393).\n\n\u201cOn my view\u201d was cut out in 1869.\n\nOn the following page we read\u2014\u201cOn my view this question can easily be\nanswered.\u201d \u201cOn my view\u201d is retained in the latest edition.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cYet there must be, _on my view_, some unknown but highly efficient means\nfor their transportation\u201d (p. 397).\n\n\u201cOn my view\u201d became \u201caccording to our view\u201d in 1869.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cI believe this grand fact can receive no sort of explanation _on the\nordinary view of independent creation_; whereas, _on the view here\nmaintained_, it is obvious that the Galapagos Islands would be likely to\nreceive colonists . . . from America, and the Cape de Verde Islands from\nAfrica; and that such colonists would be liable to modification; the\nprinciple of inheritance still betraying their original birth-place\u201d (p.\n399).\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cWith respect to the distinct species of the same genus which, _on my\ntheory_, must have spread from one parent source, if we make the same\nallowances as before,\u201d &c.\n\n\u201cOn my theory\u201d became \u201con our theory\u201d in 1869.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201c_On my theory_ these several relations throughout time and space are\nintelligible; . . . the forms within each class have been connected by\nthe same bond of ordinary generation; . . . in both cases the laws of\nvariation have been the same, and modifications have been accumulated by\nthe same power of natural selection\u201d (p. 410).\n\n\u201cOn my theory\u201d became \u201caccording to our theory\u201d in 1869, and natural\nselection is no longer a power, but has become a means.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201c_I believe that something more is included_, and that propinquity of\ndescent\u2014the only known cause of the similarity of organic beings\u2014is the\nbond, hidden as it is by various degrees of modification, which is\npartially revealed to us by our classification\u201d (p. 418).\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201c_Thus_, _on the view which I hold_, the natural system is genealogical\nin its arrangement, like a pedigree\u201d (p. 422).\n\n\u201cOn the view which I hold\u201d was cut out in 1872.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cWe may feel almost sure, _on the theory of descent_, that these\ncharacters have been inherited from a common ancestor\u201d (p. 426).\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201c_On my view of characters being of real importance for classification\nonly in so far as they reveal descent_, we can clearly understand,\u201d &c.\n(p. 427).\n\n\u201cOn my view\u201d became \u201con the view\u201d in 1872.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cThe more aberrant any form is, the greater must be the number of\nconnecting forms which, _on my theory_, have been exterminated and\nutterly lost\u201d (p. 429).\n\nThe words \u201con my theory\u201d were excised in 1869.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cFinally, we have seen that _natural selection_ _. . . explains_ that\ngreat and universal feature in the affinities of all organic beings,\nnamely, their subordination in group under group. _We use the element of\ndescent_ in classing the individuals of both sexes, &c.; . . . _we use\ndescent_ in classing acknowledged varieties; . . . and I believe this\nelement of descent is the hidden bond of connection which naturalists\nhave sought under the term of the natural system\u201d (p. 433).\n\nLamarck was of much the same opinion, as I showed in \u201cEvolution Old and\nNew.\u201d He wrote:\u2014\u201cAn arrangement should be considered systematic, or\narbitrary, when it does not conform to the genealogical order taken by\nnature in the development of the things arranged, and when, by\nconsequence, it is not founded on well-considered analogies. There is a\nnatural order in every department of nature; it is the order in which its\nseveral component items have been successively developed.\u201d {195a} The\npoint, however, which should more particularly engage our attention is\nthat Mr. Darwin in the passage last quoted uses \u201cnatural selection\u201d and\n\u201cdescent\u201d as though they were convertible terms.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cNothing can be more hopeless than to attempt to explain this similarity\nof pattern in members of the same class by utility or the doctrine of\nfinal causes . . . _On the ordinary view of the independent creation of\neach being_, we can only say that so it is . . . _The explanation is\nmanifest on the theory of the natural selection of successive slight_\nmodifications,\u201d &c. (p. 435).\n\nThis now stands\u2014\u201cThe explanation is to a large extent simple, on the\ntheory of the selection of successive, slight modifications.\u201d I do not\nlike \u201ca large extent\u201d of simplicity; but, waiving this, the point at\nissue is not whether the ordinary course of things ensures a\nquasi-selection of the types that are best adapted to their surroundings,\nwith accumulation of modification in various directions, and hence wide\neventual difference between species descended from common progenitors\u2014no\nevolutionist since 1750 has doubted this\u2014but whether a general principle\nunderlies the modifications from among which the quasi-selection is made,\nor whether they are destitute of such principle and referable, as far as\nwe are concerned, to chance only. Waiving this again, we note that the\ntheories of independent creation and of natural selection are contrasted,\nas though they were the only two alternatives; knowing the two\nalternatives to be independent creation and descent with modification, we\nnaturally took natural selection to mean descent with modification.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201c_On the theory of natural selection_ we can satisfactorily answer these\nquestions\u201d (p. 437).\n\n\u201cSatisfactorily\u201d now stands \u201cto a certain extent.\u201d\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201c_On my view_ these terms may be used literally\u201d (pp. 438, 439).\n\n\u201cOn my view\u201d became \u201caccording to the views here maintained such language\nmay be,\u201d &c., in 1869.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cI believe all these facts can be explained as follows, _on the view of\ndescent with modification_\u201d (p. 443).\n\nThis sentence now ends at \u201cfollows.\u201d\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cLet us take a genus of birds, _descended_, _on my theory_, _from some\none parent species_, and of which the several new species _have become\nmodified through natural selection_ in accordance with their divers\nhabits\u201d (p. 446).\n\nThe words \u201con my theory\u201d were cut out in 1869, and the passage now\nstands, \u201cLet us take a group of birds, descended from some ancient form\nand modified through natural selection for different habits.\u201d\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201c_On my view of descent with modification_, the origin of rudimentary\norgans is simple\u201d (p. 454).\n\n\u201cOn my view\u201d became \u201c_on the view_\u201d in 1869.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201c_On the view of descent with modification_,\u201d &c. (p. 455).\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201c_On this same view of descent with modification_ all the great facts of\nmorphology become intelligible\u201d (p. 456).\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cThat many and grave objections may be advanced against _the theory of\ndescent with modification through natural selection_, I do not deny\u201d (p.\n459).\n\nThis now stands, \u201cThat many and serious objections may be advanced\nagainst _the theory of descent with modification through variation and\nnatural selection_, I do not deny.\u201d\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cThere are, it must be admitted, cases of special difficulty _on the\ntheory of natural selection_\u201d (p. 460).\n\n\u201cOn\u201d has become \u201copposed to;\u201d it is not easy to see why this alteration\nwas made, unless because \u201copposed to\u201d is longer.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cTurning to geographical distribution, the difficulties encountered _on\nthe theory of descent with modification_ are grave enough.\u201d\n\n\u201cGrave\u201d has become \u201cserious,\u201d but there is no other change (p. 461).\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cAs _on the theory of natural selection_ an interminable number of\nintermediate forms must have existed,\u201d &c.\n\n\u201cOn\u201d has become \u201caccording to\u201d\u2014which is certainly longer, but does not\nappear to possess any other advantage over \u201con.\u201d It is not easy to\nunderstand why Mr. Darwin should have strained at such a gnat as \u201con,\u201d\nthough feeling no discomfort in such an expression as \u201can interminable\nnumber.\u201d\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cThis is the most forcible of the many objections which may be urged\n_against my theory_ . . . For certainly, _on my theory_,\u201d &c. (p. 463).\n\nThe \u201cmy\u201d in each case became \u201cthe\u201d in 1869.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cSuch is the sum of the several chief objections and difficulties which\nmay be justly urged _against my theory_\u201d (p. 465).\n\n\u201cMy\u201d became \u201cthe\u201d in 1869.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cGrave as these several difficulties are, _in my judgment_ they do not\noverthrow _the theory of descent with modifications_\u201d (p. 466).\n\nThis now stands, \u201cSerious as these several objections are, in my judgment\nthey are by no means sufficient to overthrow _the theory of descent with\nsubsequent modification_;\u201d which, again, is longer, and shows at what\nlittle, little gnats Mr. Darwin could strain, but is no material\namendment on the original passage.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201c_The theory of natural selection_, even if we looked no further than\nthis, _seems to me to be in itself probable_\u201d (p. 469).\n\nThis now stands, \u201cThe theory of natural selection, even if we look no\nfurther than this, _seems to be in the highest degree probable_.\u201d It is\nnot only probable, but was very sufficiently proved long before Mr.\nDarwin was born, only it must be the right natural selection and not Mr.\nCharles Darwin\u2019s.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cIt is inexplicable, _on the theory of creation_, why a part developed,\n&c., . . . _but_, _on my view_, this part has undergone,\u201d &c. (p. 474).\n\n\u201cOn my view\u201d became \u201con our view\u201d in 1869.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cGlancing at instincts, marvellous as some are, they offer no greater\ndifficulty than does corporeal structure _on the theory of the natural\nselection of successive_, _slight_, _but profitable modifications_\u201d (p.\n474).\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201c_On the view of all the species of the same genus having descended from\na common parent_, and having inherited much in common, we can understand\nhow it is,\u201d &c. (p. 474).\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cIf we admit that the geological record is imperfect in an extreme\ndegree, then such facts as the record gives, support _the theory of\ndescent with modification_.\n\n\u201c . . . The extinction of species . . . almost inevitably follows on _the\nprinciple of natural selection_\u201d (p. 475).\n\nThe word \u201calmost\u201d has got a great deal to answer for.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cWe can understand, _on the theory of descent with modification_, most of\nthe great leading facts in Distribution\u201d (p. 476).\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cThe existence of closely allied or representative species in any two\nareas, implies, _on the theory of descent with modification_, that the\nsame parents formerly inhabited both areas . . . It must be admitted that\nthese facts receive no explanation _on the theory of creation_ . . . The\nfact . . . is intelligible _on the theory of natural selection_, with its\ncontingencies of extinction and divergence of character\u201d (p. 478).\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cInnumerable other such facts at once explain themselves _on the theory\nof descent with slow and slight successive modifications_\u201d (p. 479).\n\n\u201cAny one whose disposition leads him to attach more weight to unexplained\ndifficulties than to the explanation of a certain number of facts, _will\ncertainly reject my theory_\u201d (p. 482).\n\n\u201cMy theory\u201d became \u201cthe theory\u201d in 1869.\n\n * * * * *\n\nFrom this point to the end of the book the claim is so ubiquitous, either\nexpressly or by implication, that it is difficult to know what not to\nquote. I must, however, content myself with only a few more extracts.\nMr. Darwin says:\u2014\n\n\u201cIt may be asked _how far I extend the doctrine of the modification of\nspecies_\u201d (p. 482).\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cAnalogy would lead me one step further, namely, to the belief that all\nanimals and plants have descended from some one prototype . . . Therefore\nI should infer from analogy that probably all the organic beings which\nhave ever lived on this earth have descended from some one primordial\nform, into which life was first breathed.\u201d\n\nFrom an am\u0153ba\u2014Adam, in fact, though not in name. This last sentence is\nnow completely altered, as well it might be.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cWhen _the views entertained in this volume on the origin of species_,\n_or when analogous views are generally admitted_, we can dimly foresee\nthat there will be a considerable revolution in natural history\u201d (p.\n434).\n\nPossibly. This now stands, \u201cWhen the views advanced by me in this\nvolume, and by Mr. Wallace, or when analogous views on the origin of\nspecies are generally admitted, we can dimly foresee,\u201d &c. When the\n\u201cOrigin of Species\u201d came out we knew nothing of any analogous views, and\nMr. Darwin\u2019s words passed unnoticed. I do not say that he knew they\nwould, but he certainly ought to have known.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201c_A grand and almost untrodden field of inquiry will be opened_, on the\ncauses and laws of variation, on correlation of growth, on the effects of\nuse and disuse, on the direct action of external conditions, and so\nforth\u201d (p. 486).\n\nBuffon and Lamarck had trodden this field to some purpose, but not a hint\nto this effect is vouchsafed to us. Again;\u2014\n\n\u201c_When I view all beings not as special creations_, _but as the lineal\ndescendants of some few beings which lived long before_ the first bed of\nthe Silurian system was deposited, they seem to me to become ennobled . . .\nWe can so far take a prophetic glance into futurity as to foretell that\nit will be the common and widely spread species, belonging to the larger\nand dominant groups, which will ultimately prevail and procreate new and\ndominant species.\u201d\n\nThere is no alteration in this except that \u201cSilurian\u201d has become\n\u201cCambrian.\u201d\n\nThe idyllic paragraph with which Mr. Darwin concludes his book contains\nno more special claim to the theory of descent _en bloc_ than many\nanother which I have allowed to pass unnoticed; it has been, moreover,\ndealt with in an earlier chapter (Chapter XII.)\n\n\n\n\nChapter XV\nThe Excised \u201cMy\u2019s\u201d\n\n\nI HAVE quoted in all ninety-seven passages, as near as I can make them,\nin which Mr. Darwin claimed the theory of descent, either expressly by\nspeaking of \u201cmy theory\u201d in such connection that the theory of descent\nought to be, and, as the event has shown, was, understood as being\nintended, or by implication, as in the opening passages of the \u201cOrigin of\nSpecies,\u201d in which he tells us how he had thought the matter out without\nacknowledging obligation of any kind to earlier writers. The original\nedition of the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d contained 490 pp., exclusive of index;\na claim, therefore, more or less explicit, to the theory of descent was\nmade on the average about once in every five pages throughout the book\nfrom end to end; the claims were most prominent in the most important\nparts, that is to say, at the beginning and end of the work, and this\nmade them more effective than they are made even by their frequency. A\nmore ubiquitous claim than this it would be hard to find in the case of\nany writer advancing a new theory; it is difficult, therefore, to\nunderstand how Mr. Grant Allen could have allowed himself to say that Mr.\nDarwin \u201claid no sort of claim to originality or proprietorship\u201d in the\ntheory of descent with modification.\n\nNevertheless I have only found one place where Mr. Darwin pinned himself\ndown beyond possibility of retreat, however ignominious, by using the\nwords \u201cmy theory of descent with modification.\u201d {202a} He often, as I\nhave said, speaks of \u201cmy theory,\u201d and then shortly afterwards of \u201cdescent\nwith modification,\u201d under such circumstances that no one who had not been\nbrought up in the school of Mr. Gladstone could doubt that the two\nexpressions referred to the same thing. He seems to have felt that he\nmust be a poor wriggler if he could not wriggle out of this; give him any\nloophole, however small, and Mr. Darwin could trust himself to get out\nthrough it; but he did not like saying what left no loophole at all, and\n\u201cmy theory of descent with modification\u201d closed all exits so firmly that\nit is surprising he should ever have allowed himself to use these words.\nAs I have said, Mr. Darwin only used this direct categorical form of\nclaim in one place; and even here, after it had stood through three\neditions, two of which had been largely altered, he could stand it no\nlonger, and altered the \u201cmy\u201d into \u201cthe\u201d in 1866, with the fourth edition\nof the \u201cOrigin of Species.\u201d\n\nThis was the only one of the original forty-five my\u2019s that was cut out\nbefore the appearance of the fifth edition in 1869, and its excision\nthrows curious light upon the working of Mr. Darwin\u2019s mind. The\nselection of the most categorical my out of the whole forty-five, shows\nthat Mr. Darwin knew all about his my\u2019s, and, while seeing reason to\nremove this, held that the others might very well stand. He even left\n\u201cOn my _view_ of descent with modification,\u201d {203a} which, though more\ncapable of explanation than \u201cmy theory,\u201d &c., still runs it close;\nnevertheless the excision of even a single my that had been allowed to\nstand through such close revision as those to which the \u201cOrigin of\nSpecies\u201d had been subjected betrays uneasiness of mind, for it is\nimpossible that even Mr. Darwin should not have known that though the my\nexcised in 1866 was the most technically categorical, the others were in\nreality just as guilty, though no tower of Siloam in the shape of\nexcision fell upon them. If, then, Mr. Darwin was so uncomfortable about\nthis one as to cut it out, it is probable he was far from comfortable\nabout the others.\n\nThis view derives confirmation from the fact that in 1869, with the fifth\nedition of the \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d there was a stampede of my\u2019s\nthroughout the whole work, no less than thirty out of the original\nforty-five being changed into \u201cthe,\u201d \u201cour,\u201d \u201cthis,\u201d or some other word,\nwhich, though having all the effect of my, still did not say \u201cmy\u201d\noutright. These my\u2019s were, if I may say so, sneaked out; nothing was\nsaid to explain their removal to the reader or call attention to it.\nWhy, it may be asked, having been considered during the revisions of 1861\nand 1866, and with only one exception allowed to stand, why should they\nbe smitten with a homing instinct in such large numbers with the fifth\nedition? It cannot be maintained that Mr. Darwin had had his attention\ncalled now for the first time to the fact that he had used my perhaps a\nlittle too freely, and had better be more sparing of it for the future.\nThe my excised in 1866 shows that Mr. Darwin had already considered this\nquestion, and saw no reason to remove any but the one that left him no\nloophole. Why, then, should that which was considered and approved in\n1859, 1861, and 1866 (not to mention the second edition of 1859 or 1860)\nbe retreated from with every appearance of panic in 1869? Mr. Darwin\ncould not well have cut out more than he did\u2014not at any rate without\nsaying something about it, and it would not be easy to know exactly what\nsay. Of the fourteen my\u2019s that were left in 1869, five more were cut out\nin 1872, and nine only were allowed eventually to remain. We naturally\nask, Why leave any if thirty-six ought to be cut out, or why cut out\nthirty-six if nine ought to be left\u2014especially when the claim remains\npractically just the same after the excision as before it?\n\nI imagine complaint had early reached Mr. Darwin that the difference\nbetween himself and his predecessors was unsubstantial and hard to grasp;\ntraces of some such feeling appear even in the late Sir Charles Lyell\u2019s\n\u201cPrinciples of Geology,\u201d in which he writes that he had reprinted his\nabstract of Lamarck\u2019s doctrine word for word, \u201cin justice to Lamarck, in\norder to show how nearly the opinions taught by him at the beginning of\nthis century resembled those now in vogue among a large body of\nnaturalists respecting the infinite variability of species, and the\nprogressive development in past time of the organic world.\u201d {205a} Sir\nCharles Lyell could not have written thus if he had thought that Mr.\nDarwin had already done \u201cjustice to Lamarck,\u201d nor is it likely that he\nstood alone in thinking as he did. It is probable that more reached Mr.\nDarwin than reached the public, and that the historical sketch prefixed\nto all editions after the first six thousand copies had been sold\u2014meagre\nand slovenly as it is\u2014was due to earlier manifestation on the part of\nsome of Mr. Darwin\u2019s friends of the feeling that was afterwards expressed\nby Sir Charles Lyell in the passage quoted above. I suppose the removal\nof the my that was cut out in 1866 to be due partly to the Gladstonian\ntendencies of Mr. Darwin\u2019s mind, which would naturally make that\nparticular my at all times more or less offensive to him, and partly to\nthe increase of objection to it that must have ensued on the addition of\nthe \u201cbrief but imperfect\u201d historical sketch in 1861; it is doubtless only\nby an oversight that this particular my was not cut out in 1861. The\nstampede of 1869 was probably occasioned by the appearance in Germany of\nProfessor Haeckel\u2019s \u201cHistory of Creation.\u201d This was published in 1868,\nand Mr. Darwin no doubt foresaw that it would be translated into English,\nas indeed it subsequently was. In this book some account is given\u2014very\nbadly, but still much more fully than by Mr. Darwin\u2014of Lamarck\u2019s work;\nand even Erasmus Darwin is mentioned\u2014inaccurately\u2014but still he is\nmentioned. Professor Haeckel says:\u2014\n\n\u201cAlthough the theory of development had been already maintained at the\nbeginning of this century by several great naturalists, especially by\nLamarck and Goethe, it only received complete demonstration and causal\nfoundation nine years ago through Darwin\u2019s work, and it is on this\naccount that it is now generally (though not altogether rightly) regarded\nas exclusively Mr. Darwin\u2019s theory.\u201d {206a}\n\nLater on, after giving nearly a hundred pages to the works of the early\nevolutionists\u2014pages that would certainly disquiet the sensitive writer\nwho had cut out the \u201cmy\u201d which disappeared in 1866\u2014he continued:\u2014\n\n\u201cWe must distinguish clearly (though this is not usually done) between,\nfirstly, the theory of descent as advanced by Lamarck, which deals only\nwith the fact of all animals and plants being descended from a common\nsource, and secondly, Darwin\u2019s theory of natural selection, which shows\nus _why_ this progressive modification of organic forms took place\u201d (p.\n93).\n\nThis passage is as inaccurate as most of those by Professor Haeckel that\nI have had occasion to examine have proved to be. Letting alone that\nBuffon, not Lamarck, is the foremost name in connection with descent, I\nhave already shown in \u201cEvolution Old and New\u201d that Lamarck goes\nexhaustively into the how and why of modification. He alleges the\nconservation, or preservation, in the ordinary course of nature, of the\nmost favourable among variations that have been induced mainly by\nfunction; this, I have sufficiently explained, is natural selection,\nthough the words \u201cnatural selection\u201d are not employed; but it is the true\nnatural selection which (if so metaphorical an expression is allowed to\npass) actually does take place with the results ascribed to it by\nLamarck, and not the false Charles-Darwinian natural selection that does\nnot correspond with facts, and cannot result in specific differences such\nas we now observe. But, waiving this, the \u201cmy\u2019s,\u201d within which a little\nrift had begun to show itself in 1866, might well become as mute in 1869\nas they could become without attracting attention, when Mr. Darwin saw\nthe passages just quoted, and the hundred pages or so that lie between\nthem.\n\nI suppose Mr. Darwin cut out the five more my\u2019s that disappeared in 1872\nbecause he had not yet fully recovered from his scare, and allowed nine\nto remain in order to cover his retreat, and tacitly say that he had not\ndone anything and knew nothing whatever about it. Practically, indeed,\nhe had not retreated, and must have been well aware that he was only\nretreating technically; for he must have known that the absence of\nacknowledgment to any earlier writers in the body of his work, and the\npresence of the many passages in which every word conveyed the impression\nthat the writer claimed descent with modification, amounted to a claim as\nmuch when the actual word \u201cmy\u201d had been taken out as while it was allowed\nto stand. We took Mr. Darwin at his own estimate because we could not\nfor a moment suppose that a man of means, position, and education,\u2014one,\nmoreover, who was nothing if he was not unself-seeking\u2014could play such a\ntrick upon us while pretending to take us into his confidence; hence the\nalmost universal belief on the part of the public, of which Professors\nHaeckel and Ray Lankester and Mr. Grant Allen alike complain\u2014namely, that\nMr. Darwin is the originator of the theory of descent, and that his\nvariations are mainly functional. Men of science must not be surprised\nif the readiness with which we responded to Mr. Darwin\u2019s appeal to our\nconfidence is succeeded by a proportionate resentment when the peculiar\nshabbiness of his action becomes more generally understood. For myself,\nI know not which most to wonder at\u2014the meanness of the writer himself, or\nthe greatness of the service that, in spite of that meanness, he\nunquestionably rendered.\n\nIf Mr. Darwin had been dealing fairly by us, when he saw that we had\nfailed to catch the difference between the Erasmus-Darwinian theory of\ndescent through natural selection from among variations that are mainly\nfunctional, and his own alternative theory of descent through natural\nselection from among variations that are mainly accidental, and, above\nall, when he saw we were crediting him with other men\u2019s work, he would\nhave hastened to set us right. \u201cIt is with great regret,\u201d he might have\nwritten, \u201cand with no small surprise, that I find how generally I have\nbeen misunderstood as claiming to be the originator of the theory of\ndescent with modification; nothing can be further from my intention; the\ntheory of descent has been familiar to all biologists from the year 1749,\nwhen Buffon advanced it in its most comprehensive form, to the present\nday.\u201d If Mr. Darwin had said something to the above effect, no one would\nhave questioned his good faith, but it is hardly necessary to say that\nnothing of the kind is to be found in any one of Mr. Darwin\u2019s many books\nor many editions; nor is the reason why the requisite correction was\nnever made far to seek. For if Mr. Darwin had said as much as I have put\ninto his mouth above, he should have said more, and would ere long have\nbeen compelled to have explained to us wherein the difference between\nhimself and his predecessors precisely lay, and this would not have been\neasy. Indeed, if Mr. Darwin had been quite open with us he would have\nhad to say much as follows:\u2014\n\n\u201cI should point out that, according to the evolutionists of the last\ncentury, improvement in the eye, as in any other organ, is mainly due to\npersistent, rational, employment of the organ in question, in such\nslightly modified manner as experience and changed surroundings may\nsuggest. You will have observed that, according to my system, this goes\nfor very little, and that the accumulation of fortunate accidents,\nirrespectively of the use that may be made of them, is by far the most\nimportant means of modification. Put more briefly still, the distinction\nbetween me and my predecessors lies in this;\u2014my predecessors thought they\nknew the main normal cause or principle that underlies variation, whereas\nI think that there is no general principle underlying it at all, or that\neven if there is, we know hardly anything about it. This is my\ndistinctive feature; there is no deception; I shall not consider the\narguments of my predecessors, nor show in what respect they are\ninsufficient; in fact, I shall say nothing whatever about them. Please\nto understand that I alone am in possession of the master key that can\nunlock the bars of the future progress of evolutionary science; so great\nan improvement, in fact, is my discovery that it justifies me in claiming\nthe theory of descent generally, and I accordingly claim it. If you ask\nme in what my discovery consists, I reply in this;\u2014that the variations\nwhich we are all agreed accumulate are caused\u2014by variation. {209a} I\nadmit that this is not telling you much about them, but it is as much as\nI think proper to say at present; above all things, let me caution you\nagainst thinking that there is any principle of general application\nunderlying variation.\u201d\n\nThis would have been right. This is what Mr. Darwin would have had to\nhave said if he had been frank with us; it is not surprising, therefore,\nthat he should have been less frank than might have been wished. I have\nno doubt that many a time between 1859 and 1882, the year of his death,\nMr. Darwin bitterly regretted his initial error, and would have been only\ntoo thankful to repair it, but he could only put the difference between\nhimself and the early evolutionists clearly before his readers at the\ncost of seeing his own system come tumbling down like a pack of cards;\nthis was more than he could stand, so he buried his face, ostrich-like,\nin the sand. I know no more pitiable figure in either literature or\nscience.\n\nAs I write these lines (July 1886) I see a paragraph in _Nature_ which I\ntake it is intended to convey the impression that Mr. Francis Darwin\u2019s\nlife and letters of his father will appear shortly. I can form no idea\nwhether Mr. F. Darwin\u2019s forthcoming work is likely to appear before this\npresent volume; still less can I conjecture what it may or may not\ncontain; but I can give the reader a criterion by which to test the good\nfaith with which it is written. If Mr. F. Darwin puts the distinctive\nfeature that differentiates Mr. C. Darwin from his predecessors clearly\nbefore his readers, enabling them to seize and carry it away with them\nonce for all\u2014if he shows no desire to shirk this question, but, on the\ncontrary, faces it and throws light upon it, then we shall know that his\nwork is sincere, whatever its shortcomings may be in other respects; and\nwhen people are doing their best to help us and make us understand all\nthat they understand themselves, a great deal may be forgiven them. If,\non the other hand, we find much talk about the wonderful light which Mr.\nCharles Darwin threw on evolution by his theory of natural selection,\nwithout any adequate attempt to make us understand the difference between\nthe natural selection, say, of Mr. Patrick Matthew, and that of his more\nfamous successor, then we may know that we are being trifled with; and\nthat an attempt is being again made to throw dust in our eyes.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XVI\nMr. Grant Allen\u2019s \u201cCharles Darwin\u201d\n\n\nIT is here that Mr. Grant Allen\u2019s book fails. It is impossible to\nbelieve it written in good faith, with no end in view, save to make\nsomething easy which might otherwise be found difficult; on the contrary,\nit leaves the impression of having been written with a desire to hinder\nus, as far as possible, from understanding things that Mr. Allen himself\nunderstood perfectly well.\n\nAfter saying that \u201cin the public mind Mr. Darwin is perhaps most commonly\nregarded as the discoverer and founder of the evolution hypothesis,\u201d he\ncontinues that \u201cthe grand idea which he did really originate was not the\nidea of \u2018descent with modification,\u2019 but the idea of \u2018natural\nselection,\u2019\u201d and adds that it was Mr. Darwin\u2019s \u201cpeculiar glory\u201d to have\nshown the \u201cnature of the machinery\u201d by which all the variety of animal\nand vegetable life might have been produced by slow modifications in one\nor more original types. \u201cThe theory of evolution,\u201d says Mr. Allen,\n\u201calready existed in a more or less shadowy and undeveloped shape;\u201d it was\nMr. Darwin\u2019s \u201ctask in life to raise this theory from the rank of a mere\nplausible and happy guess to the rank of a highly elaborate and almost\nuniversally accepted biological system\u201d (pp. 3\u20135).\n\nWe all admit the value of Mr. Darwin\u2019s work as having led to the general\nacceptance of evolution. No one who remembers average middle-class\nopinion on this subject before 1860 will deny that it was Mr. Darwin who\nbrought us all round to descent with modification; but Mr. Allen cannot\nrightly say that evolution had only existed before Mr. Darwin\u2019s time in\n\u201ca shadowy, undeveloped state,\u201d or as \u201ca mere plausible and happy guess.\u201d\nIt existed in the same form as that in which most people accept it now,\nand had been carried to its extreme development, before Mr. Darwin\u2019s\nfather had been born. It is idle to talk of Buffon\u2019s work as \u201ca mere\nplausible and happy guess,\u201d or to imply that the first volume of the\n\u201cPhilosophie Zoologique\u201d of Lamarck was a less full and sufficient\ndemonstration of descent with modification than the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d\nis. It has its defects, shortcomings, and mistakes, but it is an\nincomparably sounder work than the \u201cOrigin of Species;\u201d and though it\ncontains the deplorable omission of any reference to Buffon, Lamarck does\nnot first grossly misrepresent Buffon, and then tell him to go away, as\nMr. Darwin did to the author of the \u201cVestiges\u201d and to Lamarck. If Mr.\nDarwin was believed and honoured for saying much the same as Lamarck had\nsaid, it was because Lamarck had borne the brunt of the laughing. The\n\u201cOrigin of Species\u201d was possible because the \u201cVestiges\u201d had prepared the\nway for it. The \u201cVestiges\u201d were made possible by Lamarck and Erasmus\nDarwin, and these two were made possible by Buffon. Here a somewhat\nsharper line can be drawn than is usually found possible when defining\nthe ground covered by philosophers. No one broke the ground for Buffon\nto anything like the extent that he broke it for those who followed him,\nand these broke it for one another.\n\nMr. Allen says (p. 11) that, \u201cin Charles Darwin\u2019s own words, Lamarck\n\u2018first did the eminent service of arousing attention to the probability\nof all change in the organic as well as in the inorganic world being the\nresult of law, and not of miraculous interposition.\u2019\u201d Mr. Darwin did\nindeed use these words, but Mr. Allen omits the pertinent fact that he\ndid not use them till six thousand copies of his work had been issued,\nand an impression been made as to its scope and claims which the event\nhas shown to be not easily effaced; nor does he say that Mr. Darwin only\npays these few words of tribute in a quasi-preface, which, though\nprefixed to his later editions of the \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d is amply\nneutralised by the spirit which I have shown to be omnipresent in the\nbody of the work itself. Moreover, Mr. Darwin\u2019s statement is inaccurate\nto an unpardonable extent; his words would be fairly accurate if applied\nto Buffon, but they do not apply to Lamarck.\n\nMr. Darwin continues that Lamarck \u201cseems to attribute all the beautiful\nadaptations in nature, such as the long neck of the giraffe for browsing\non the branches of trees,\u201d to the effects of habit. Mr. Darwin should\nnot say that Lamarck \u201cseems\u201d to do this. It was his business to tell us\nwhat led Lamarck to his conclusions, not what \u201cseemed\u201d to do so. Any one\nwho knows the first volume of the \u201cPhilosophie Zoologique\u201d will be aware\nthat there is no \u201cseems\u201d in the matter. Mr. Darwin\u2019s words \u201cseem\u201d to say\nthat it really could not be worth any practical naturalist\u2019s while to\ndevote attention to Lamarck\u2019s argument; the inquiry might be of interest\nto antiquaries, but Mr. Darwin had more important work in hand than\nfollowing the vagaries of one who had been so completely exploded as\nLamarck had been. \u201cSeem\u201d is to men what \u201cfeel\u201d is to women; women who\nfeel, and men who grease every other sentence with a \u201cseem,\u201d are alike to\nbe looked on with distrust.\n\n\u201cStill,\u201d continues Mr. Allen, \u201cDarwin gave no sign. A flaccid,\ncartilaginous, unphilosophic evolutionism had full possession of the\nfield for the moment, and claimed, as it were, to be the genuine\nrepresentative of the young and vigorous biological creed, while he\nhimself was in truth the real heir to all the honours of the situation.\nHe was in possession of the master-key which alone could unlock the bars\nthat opposed the progress of evolution, and still he waited. He could\nafford to wait. He was diligently collecting, amassing, investigating;\neagerly reading every new systematic work, every book of travels, every\nscientific journal, every record of sport, or exploration, or discovery,\nto extract from the dead mass of undigested fact whatever item of\nimplicit value might swell the definite co-ordinated series of notes in\nhis own commonplace books for the now distinctly contemplated \u2018Origin of\nSpecies.\u2019 His way was to make all sure behind him, to summon up all his\nfacts in irresistible array, and never to set out upon a public progress\nuntil he was secure against all possible attacks of the ever-watchful and\nalert enemy in the rear,\u201d &c. (p. 73).\n\nIt would not be easy to beat this. Mr. Darwin\u2019s worst enemy could wish\nhim no more damaging eulogist.\n\nOf the \u201cVestiges\u201d Mr. Allen says that Mr. Darwin \u201cfelt sadly\u201d the\ninaccuracy and want of profound technical knowledge everywhere displayed\nby the anonymous author. Nevertheless, long after, in the \u201cOrigin of\nSpecies,\u201d the great naturalist wrote with generous appreciation of the\n\u201cVestiges of Creation\u201d\u2014\u201cIn my opinion it has done excellent service in\nthis country in calling attention to the subject, in removing prejudice,\nand in thus preparing the ground for the reception of analogous views.\u201d\n\nI have already referred to the way in which Mr. Darwin treated the author\nof the \u201cVestiges,\u201d and have stated the facts at greater length in\n\u201cEvolution Old and New,\u201d but it may be as well to give Mr. Darwin\u2019s words\nin full; he wrote as follows on the third page of the original edition of\nthe \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d:\u2014\n\n\u201cThe author of the \u2018Vestiges of Creation\u2019 would, I presume, say that,\nafter a certain unknown number of generations, some bird had given birth\nto a woodpecker, and some plant to the mistletoe, and that these had been\nproduced perfect as we now see them; but this assumption seems to me to\nbe no explanation, for it leaves the case of the coadaptation of organic\nbeings to each other and to their physical conditions of life untouched\nand unexplained.\u201d\n\nThe author of the \u201cVestiges\u201d did, doubtless, suppose that \u201c_some_ bird\u201d\nhad given birth to a woodpecker, or more strictly, that a couple of birds\nhad done so\u2014and this is all that Mr. Darwin has committed himself to\u2014but\nno one better knew that these two birds would, according to the author of\nthe \u201cVestiges,\u201d be just as much woodpeckers, and just as little\nwoodpeckers, as they would be with Mr. Darwin himself. Mr. Chambers did\nnot suppose that a woodpecker became a woodpecker _per saltum_ though\nborn of some widely different bird, but Mr. Darwin\u2019s words have no\napplication unless they convey this impression. The reader will note\nthat though the impression is conveyed, Mr. Darwin avoids conveying it\ncategorically. I suppose this is what Mr. Allen means by saying that he\n\u201cmade all things sure behind him.\u201d Mr. Chambers did indeed believe in\noccasional sports; so did Mr. Darwin, and we have seen that in the later\neditions of the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d he found himself constrained to lay\ngreater stress on these than he had originally done. Substantially, Mr.\nChambers held much the same opinion as to the suddenness or slowness of\nmodification as Mr. Darwin did, nor can it be doubted that Mr. Darwin\nknew this perfectly well.\n\nWhat I have said about the woodpecker applies also to the mistletoe.\nBesides, it was Mr. Darwin\u2019s business not to presume anything about the\nmatter; his business was to tell us what the author of the \u201cVestiges\u201d had\nsaid, or to refer us to the page of the \u201cVestiges\u201d on which we should\nfind this. I suppose he was too busy \u201ccollecting, amassing,\ninvestigating,\u201d &c., to be at much pains not to misrepresent those who\nhad been in the field before him. There is no other reference to the\n\u201cVestiges\u201d in the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d than this suave but singularly\nfraudulent passage.\n\nIn his edition of 1860 the author of the \u201cVestiges\u201d showed that he was\nnettled, and said it was to be regretted Mr. Darwin had read the\n\u201cVestiges\u201d \u201calmost as much amiss as if, like its declared opponents, he\nhad an interest in misunderstanding it;\u201d and a little lower he adds that\nMr. Darwin\u2019s book \u201cin no essential respect contradicts the \u2018Vestiges,\u2019\u201d\nbut that, on the contrary, \u201cwhile adding to its explanations of nature,\nit expressed the same general ideas.\u201d {216a} This is substantially true;\nneither Mr. Darwin\u2019s nor Mr. Chambers\u2019s are good books, but the main\nobject of both is to substantiate the theory of descent with\nmodification, and, bad as the \u201cVestiges\u201d is, it is ingenuous as compared\nwith the \u201cOrigin of Species.\u201d Subsequently to Mr. Chambers\u2019 protest, and\nnot till, as I have said, six thousand copies of the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d\nhad been issued, the sentence complained of by Mr. Chambers was expunged,\nbut without a word of retractation, and the passage which Mr. Allen\nthinks so generous was inserted into the \u201cbrief but imperfect\u201d sketch\nwhich Mr. Darwin prefixed\u2014after Mr. Chambers had been effectually snuffed\nout\u2014to all subsequent editions of his \u201cOrigin of Species.\u201d There is no\nexcuse for Mr. Darwin\u2019s not having said at least this much about the\nauthor of the \u201cVestiges\u201d in his first edition; and on finding that he had\nmisrepresented him in a passage which he did not venture to retain, he\nshould not have expunged it quietly, but should have called attention to\nhis mistake in the body of his book, and given every prominence in his\npower to the correction.\n\nLet us now examine Mr. Allen\u2019s record in the matter of natural selection.\nFor years he was one of the foremost apostles of Neo-Darwinism, and any\nwho said a good word for Lamarck were told that this was the \u201ckind of\nmystical nonsense\u201d from which Mr. Allen \u201chad hoped Mr. Darwin had for\never saved us.\u201d {216b} Then in October 1883 came an article in \u201cMind,\u201d\nfrom which it appeared as though Mr. Allen had abjured Mr. Darwin and all\nhis works.\n\n\u201cThere are only two conceivable ways,\u201d he then wrote, \u201cin which any\nincrement of brain power can ever have arisen in any individual. The one\nis the Darwinian way, by spontaneous variation, that is to say, by\nvariation due to minute physical circumstances affecting the individual\nin the germ. The other is the Spencerian way, by functional increment,\nthat is to say, by the effect of increased use and constant exposure to\nvarying circumstances during conscious life.\u201d\n\nMr. Allen calls this the Spencerian view, and so it is in so far as that\nMr. Spencer has adopted it. Most people will call it Lamarckian. This,\nhowever, is a detail. Mr. Allen continues:\u2014\n\n\u201cI venture to think that the first way, if we look it clearly in the\nface, will be seen to be practically unthinkable; and that we have no\nalternative, therefore, but to accept the second.\u201d\n\nI like our looking a \u201cway\u201d which is \u201cpractically unthinkable\u201d \u201cclearly in\nthe face.\u201d I particularly like \u201cpractically unthinkable.\u201d I suppose we\ncan think it in theory, but not in practice. I like almost everything\nMr. Allen says or does; it is not necessary to go far in search of his\ngood things; dredge up any bit of mud from him at random and we are\npretty sure to find an oyster with a pearl in it, if we look it clearly\nin the face; I mean, there is sure to be something which will be at any\nrate \u201calmost\u201d practically unthinkable. But however this may be, when Mr.\nAllen wrote his article in \u201cMind\u201d two years ago, he was in substantial\nagreement with myself about the value of natural selection as a means of\nmodification\u2014by natural selection I mean, of course, the commonly known\nCharles-Darwinian natural selection from fortuitous variations; now,\nhowever, in 1885, he is all for this same natural selection again, and in\nthe preface to his \u201cCharles Darwin\u201d writes (after a handsome\nacknowledgment of \u201cEvolution Old and New\u201d) that he \u201cdiffers from\u201d me\n\u201cfundamentally in\u201d my \u201cestimate of the worth of Charles Darwin\u2019s\ndistinctive discovery of natural selection.\u201d\n\nThis he certainly does, for on page 81 of the work itself he speaks of\n\u201cthe distinctive notion of natural selection\u201d as having, \u201clike all true\nand fruitful ideas, more than once flashed,\u201d &c. I have explained _usque\nad nauseam_, and will henceforth explain no longer, that natural\nselection is no \u201cdistinctive notion\u201d of Mr. Darwin\u2019s. Mr. Darwin\u2019s\n\u201cdistinctive notion\u201d is natural selection from among fortuitous\nvariations.\n\nWriting again (p. 89) of Mr. Spencer\u2019s essay in the \u201cLeader,\u201d {218a} Mr.\nAllen says:\u2014\n\n\u201cIt contains, in a very philosophical and abstract form, the theory of\n\u2018descent with modification\u2019 without the distinctive Darwinian adjunct of\n\u2018natural selection\u2019 or survival of the fittest. Yet it was just that\nlever dexterously applied, and carefully weighted with the whole weight\nof his endlessly accumulated inductive instances, that finally enabled\nour modern Archimedes to move the world.\u201d\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cTo account for adaptation, for the almost perfect fitness of every plant\nand every animal to its position in life, for the existence (in other\nwords) of definitely correlated parts and organs, we must call in the aid\nof survival of the fittest. Without that potent selective agent, our\nconception of the becoming of life is a mere chaos; order and\norganisation are utterly inexplicable save by the brilliant illuminating\nray of the Darwinian principle\u201d (p. 93).\n\nAnd yet two years previously this same principle, after having been\nthinkable for many years, had become \u201cunthinkable.\u201d\n\nTwo years previously, writing of the Charles-Darwinian scheme of\nevolution, Mr. Allen had implied it as his opinion \u201cthat all brains are\nwhat they are in virtue of antecedent function.\u201d \u201cThe one creed,\u201d he\nwrote\u2014referring to Mr Darwin\u2019s\u2014\u201cmakes the man depend mainly upon the\naccidents of molecular physics in a colliding germ cell and sperm cell;\nthe other makes him depend mainly on the doings and gains of his\nancestors as modified and altered by himself.\u201d\n\nThis second creed is pure Erasmus-Darwinism and Lamarck.\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cIt seems to me easy to understand how survival of the fittest may result\nin progress _starting from such functionally produced gains_ (italics\nmine), but impossible to understand how it could result in progress, if\nit had to start in mere accidental structural increments due to\nspontaneous variation alone.\u201d {219a}\n\nWhich comes to saying that it is easy to understand the Lamarckian system\nof evolution, but not the Charles-Darwinian. Mr. Allen concluded his\narticle a few pages later on by saying:\u2014\n\n\u201cThe first hypothesis\u201d (Mr. Darwin\u2019s) \u201cis one that throws no light upon\nany of the facts. The second hypothesis\u201d (which is unalloyed Erasmus\nDarwin and Lamarck) \u201cis one that explains them all with transparent\nlucidity.\u201d Yet in his \u201cCharles Darwin\u201d Mr. Allen tells us that though\nMr. Darwin \u201cdid not invent the development theory, he made it believable\nand comprehensible\u201d (p. 4).\n\nIn his \u201cCharles Darwin\u201d Mr. Allen does not tell us how recently he had,\nin another place, expressed an opinion about the value of Mr. Darwin\u2019s\n\u201cdistinctive contribution\u201d to the theory of evolution, so widely\ndifferent from the one he is now expressing with characteristic\nappearance of ardour. He does not explain how he is able to execute such\nrapid changes of front without forfeiting his claim on our attention;\nexplanations on matters of this sort seem out of date with modern\nscientists. I can only suppose that Mr. Allen regards himself as having\ntaken a brief, as it were, for the production of a popular work, and\nfeels more bound to consider the interests of the gentleman who pays him\nthan to say what he really thinks; for surely Mr. Allen would not have\nwritten as he did in such a distinctly philosophical and scientific\njournal as \u201cMind\u201d without weighing his words, and nothing has transpired\nlately, _apropos_ of evolution, which will account for his present\nrecantation. I said in my book \u201cSelections,\u201d &c., that when Mr. Allen\nmade stepping-stones of his dead selves, he jumped upon them to some\ntune. I was a little scandalised then at the completeness and suddenness\nof the movement he executed, and spoke severely; I have sometimes feared\nI may have spoken too severely, but his recent performance goes far to\nwarrant my remarks.\n\nIf, however, there is no dead self about it, and Mr. Allen has only taken\na brief, I confess to being not greatly edified. I grant that a good\ncase can be made out for an author\u2019s doing as I suppose Mr. Allen to have\ndone; indeed I am not sure that both science and religion would not gain\nif every one rode his neighbour\u2019s theory, as at a donkey-race, and the\nleast plausible were held to win; but surely, as things stand, a writer\nby the mere fact of publishing a book professes to be giving a _bon\u00e2\nfide_ opinion. The analogy of the bar does not hold, for not only is it\nperfectly understood that a barrister does not necessarily state his own\nopinions, but there exists a strict though unwritten code to protect the\npublic against the abuses to which such a system must be liable. In\nreligion and science no such code exists\u2014the supposition being that these\ntwo holy callings are above the necessity for anything of the kind.\nScience and religion are not as business is; still, if the public do not\nwish to be taken in, they must be at some pains to find out whether they\nare in the hands of one who, while pretending to be a judge, is in\nreality a paid advocate, with no one\u2019s interests at heart except his\nclient\u2019s, or in those of one who, however warmly he may plead, will say\nnothing but what springs from mature and genuine conviction.\n\nThe present unsettled and unsatisfactory state of the moral code in this\nrespect is at the bottom of the supposed antagonism between religion and\nscience. These two are not, or never ought to be, antagonistic. They\nshould never want what is spoken of as reconciliation, for in reality\nthey are one. Religion is the quintessence of science, and science the\nraw material of religion; when people talk about reconciling religion and\nscience they do not mean what they say; they mean reconciling the\nstatements made by one set of professional men with those made by another\nset whose interests lie in the opposite direction\u2014and with no recognised\npresident of the court to keep them within due bounds this is not always\neasy.\n\nMr. Allen says:\u2014\n\n\u201cAt the same time it must be steadily remembered that there are many\nnaturalists at the present day, especially among those of the lower order\nof intelligence, who, while accepting evolutionism in a general way, and\ntherefore always describing themselves as Darwinians, do not believe, and\noften cannot even understand, the distinctive Darwinian addition to the\nevolutionary doctrine\u2014namely, the principle of natural selection. Such\nhazy and indistinct thinkers as these are still really at the prior stage\nof Lamarckian evolution\u201d (p. 199).\n\nConsidering that Mr. Allen was at that stage himself so recently, he\nmight deal more tenderly with others who still find \u201cthe distinctive\nDarwinian adjunct\u201d \u201cunthinkable.\u201d It is perhaps, however, because he\nremembers his difficulties that Mr. Allen goes on as follows:\u2014\n\n\u201cIt is probable that in the future, while a formal acceptance of\nDarwinism becomes general, the special theory of natural selection will\nbe thoroughly understood and assimilated only by the more abstract and\nphilosophical minds.\u201d\n\nBy the kind of people, in fact, who read the _Spectator_ and are called\nthoughtful; and in point of fact less than a twelvemonth after this\npassage was written, natural selection was publicly abjured as \u201ca theory\nof the origin of species\u201d by Mr. Romanes himself, with the implied\napproval of the _Times_.\n\n\u201cThus,\u201d continues Mr. Allen, \u201cthe name of Darwin will often no doubt be\ntacked on to what are in reality the principles of Lamarck.\u201d\n\nIt requires no great power of prophecy to foretell this, considering that\nit is done daily by nine out of ten who call themselves Darwinians. Ask\nten people of ordinary intelligence how Mr. Darwin explains the fact that\ngiraffes have long necks, and nine of them will answer \u201cthrough\ncontinually stretching them to reach higher and higher boughs.\u201d They do\nnot understand that this is the Lamarckian view of evolution, not the\nDarwinian; nor will Mr. Allen\u2019s book greatly help the ordinary reader to\ncatch the difference between the two theories, in spite of his frequent\nreference to Mr. Darwin\u2019s \u201cdistinctive feature,\u201d and to his \u201cmaster-key.\u201d\nNo doubt the British public will get to understand all about it some day,\nbut it can hardly be expected to do so all at once, considering the way\nin which Mr. Allen and so many more throw dust in its eyes, and will\ndoubtless continue to throw it as long as an honest penny is to be turned\nby doing so. Mr. Allen, then, is probably right in saying that \u201cthe name\nof Darwin will no doubt be often tacked on to what are in reality the\nprinciples of Lamarck,\u201d nor can it be denied that Mr. Darwin, by his\npractice of using \u201cthe theory of natural selection\u201d as though it were a\nsynonym for \u201cthe theory of descent with modification,\u201d contributed to\nthis result.\n\nI do not myself doubt that he intended to do this, but Mr. Allen would\nsay no less confidently he did not. He writes of Mr. Darwin as follows:\u2014\n\n\u201cOf Darwin\u2019s pure and exalted moral nature no Englishman of the present\ngeneration can trust himself to speak with becoming moderation.\u201d\n\nHe proceeds to trust himself thus:\u2014\n\n\u201cHis love of truth, his singleness of heart, his sincerity, his\nearnestness, his modesty, his candour, his absolute sinking of self and\nselfishness\u2014these, indeed are all conspicuous to every reader on the very\nface of every word he ever printed.\u201d\n\nThis \u201cconspicuous sinking of self\u201d is of a piece with the \u201cdelightful\nunostentatiousness _which every one must have noticed_\u201d about which Mr.\nAllen writes on page 65. Does he mean that Mr. Darwin was\n\u201costentatiously unostentatious,\u201d or that he was \u201cunostentatiously\nostentatious\u201d? I think we may guess from this passage who it was that in\nthe old days of the _Pall Mall Gazelle_ called Mr. Darwin \u201ca master of a\ncertain happy simplicity.\u201d\n\nMr. Allen continues:\u2014\n\n\u201cLike his works themselves, they must long outlive him. But his\nsympathetic kindliness, his ready generosity, the staunchness of his\nfriendship, the width and depth and breadth of his affections, the manner\nin which \u2018he bore with those who blamed him unjustly without blaming them\nagain\u2019\u2014these things can never be so well known to any other generation of\nmen as to the three generations that walked the world with him\u201d (pp. 174,\n175).\n\nAgain:\u2014\n\n\u201cHe began early in life to collect and arrange a vast encyclop\u00e6dia of\nfacts, all finally focussed with supreme skill upon the great principle\nhe so clearly perceived and so lucidly expounded. He brought to bear\nupon the question an amount of personal observation, of minute\nexperiment, of world-wide book knowledge, of universal scientific\nability, such as never, perhaps, was lavished by any other man upon any\nother department of study. His conspicuous and beautiful love of truth,\nhis unflinching candour, his transparent fearlessness and honesty of\npurpose, his childlike simplicity, his modesty of demeanour, his charming\nmanner, his affectionate disposition, his kindliness to friends, his\ncourtesy to opponents, his gentleness to harsh and often bitter\nassailants, kindled in the minds of men of science everywhere throughout\nthe world a contagious enthusiasm only equalled perhaps among the\ndisciples of Socrates and the great teachers of the revival of learning.\nHis name became a rallying-point for the children of light in every\ncountry\u201d (pp. 196, 197).\n\nI need not quote more; the sentence goes on to talk about \u201cfirmly\ngrounding\u201d something which philosophers and speculators might have taken\na century or two more \u201cto establish in embryo;\u201d but those who wish to see\nit must turn to Mr. Allen\u2019s book.\n\nIf I have formed too severe an estimate of Mr. Darwin\u2019s work and\ncharacter\u2014and this is more than likely\u2014the fulsomeness of the adulation\nlavished on him by his admirers for many years past must be in some\nmeasure my excuse. We grow tired even of hearing Aristides called just,\nbut what is so freely said about Mr. Darwin puts us in mind more of what\nthe people said about Herod\u2014that he spoke with the voice of a God, not of\na man. So we saw Professor Ray Lankester hail him not many years ago as\nthe \u201cgreatest of living men.\u201d {224a}\n\nIt is ill for any man\u2019s fame that he should be praised so extravagantly.\nNobody ever was as good as Mr. Darwin looked, and a counterblast to such\na hurricane of praise as has been lately blowing will do no harm to his\nultimate reputation, even though it too blow somewhat fiercely. Art,\ncharacter, literature, religion, science (I have named them in\nalphabetical order), thrive best in a breezy, bracing air; I heartily\nhope I may never be what is commonly called successful in my own\nlifetime\u2014and if I go on as I am doing now, I have a fair chance of\nsucceeding in not succeeding.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XVII\nProfessor Ray Lankester and Lamarck\n\n\nBEING anxious to give the reader a sample of the arguments against the\ntheory of natural selection from among variations that are mainly either\ndirectly or indirectly functional in their inception, or more briefly\nagainst the Erasmus-Darwinian and Lamarckian systems, I can find nothing\nmore to the point, or more recent, than Professor Ray Lankester\u2019s letter\nto the _Athen\u00e6um_ of March 29, 1884, to the latter part of which,\nhowever, I need alone call attention. Professor Ray Lankester says:\u2014\n\n\u201cAnd then we are introduced to the discredited speculations of Lamarck,\nwhich have found a worthy advocate in Mr. Butler, as really solid\ncontributions to the discovery of the _ver\u00e6 caus\u00e6_ of variation! A much\nmore important attempt to do something for Lamarck\u2019s hypothesis, of the\ntransmission to offspring of structural peculiarities acquired by the\nparents, was recently made by an able and experienced naturalist,\nProfessor Semper of Wurzburg. His book on \u2018Animal Life,\u2019 &c., is\npublished in the \u2018International Scientific Series.\u2019 Professor Semper\nadduces an immense number and variety of cases of structural change in\nanimals and plants brought about in the individual by adaptation (during\nits individual life-history) to new conditions. Some of these are very\nmarked changes, such as the loss of its horny coat in the gizzard of a\npigeon fed on meat; _but in no single instance could Professor Semper\nshow_\u2014although it was his object and desire to do so if possible\u2014that\nsuch change was transmitted from parent to offspring. Lamarckism looks\nall very well on paper, but, as Professor Semper\u2019s book shows, when put\nto the test of observation and experiment it collapses absolutely.\u201d\n\nI should have thought it would have been enough if it had collapsed\nwithout the \u201cabsolutely,\u201d but Professor Ray Lankester does not like doing\nthings by halves. Few will be taken in by the foregoing quotation,\nexcept those who do not greatly care whether they are taken in or not;\nbut to save trouble to readers who may have neither Lamarck nor Professor\nSemper at hand, I will put the case as follows:\u2014\n\nProfessor Semper writes a book to show, we will say, that the hour-hand\nof the clock moves gradually forward, in spite of its appearing\nstationary. He makes his case sufficiently clear, and then might have\nbeen content to leave it; nevertheless, in the innocence of his heart, he\nadds the admission that though he had often looked at the clock for a\nlong time together, he had never been able actually to see the hour-hand\nmoving. \u201cThere now,\u201d exclaims Professor Ray Lankester on this, \u201cI told\nyou so; the theory collapses absolutely; his whole object and desire is\nto show that the hour-hand moves, and yet when it comes to the point, he\nis obliged to confess that he cannot see it do so.\u201d It is not worth\nwhile to meet what Professor Ray Lankester has been above quoted as\nsaying about Lamarckism beyond quoting the following passage from a\nreview of \u201cThe Neanderthal Skull on Evolution\u201d in the \u201cMonthly Journal of\nScience\u201d for June, 1885 (p. 362):\u2014\n\n\u201cOn the very next page the author reproduces the threadbare objection\nthat the \u2018supporters of the theory have never yet succeeded in observing\na single instance in all the millions of years invented (!) in its\nsupport of one species of animal turning into another.\u2019 Now, _ex\nhypothesi_, one species turns into another not rapidly, as in a\ntransformation scene, but in successive generations, each being born a\nshade different from its progenitors. Hence to observe such a change is\nexcluded by the very terms of the question. Does Mr. Saville forget Mr.\nHerbert Spencer\u2019s apologue of the ephemeron which had never witnessed the\nchange of a child into a man?\u201d\n\nThe apologue, I may say in passing, is not Mr. Spencer\u2019s; it is by the\nauthor of the \u201cVestiges,\u201d and will be found on page 161 of the 1853\nedition of that book; but let this pass. How impatient Professor Ray\nLankester is of any attempt to call attention to the older view of\nevolution appears perhaps even more plainly in a review of this same book\nof Professor Semper\u2019s that appeared in \u201cNature,\u201d March 3, 1881. The\ntenor of the remarks last quoted shows that though what I am about to\nquote is now more than five years old, it may be taken as still giving us\nthe position which Professor Ray Lankester takes on these matters. He\nwrote:\u2014\n\n\u201cIt is necessary,\u201d he exclaims, \u201cto plainly and emphatically state\u201d (Why\nso much emphasis? Why not \u201cit should be stated\u201d?) \u201cthat Professor Semper\nand a few other writers of similar views\u201d {227a} (I have sent for the\nnumber of \u201cModern Thought\u201d referred to by Professor Ray Lankester but\nfind no article by Mr. Henslow, and do not, therefore, know what he had\nsaid) \u201care not adding to or building on Mr. Darwin\u2019s theory, but are\nactually opposing all that is essential and distinctive in that theory,\nby the revival of the exploded notion of \u2018directly transforming agents\u2019\nadvocated by Lamarck and others.\u201d\n\nIt may be presumed that these writers know they are not \u201cadding to or\nbuilding on\u201d Mr. Darwin\u2019s theory, and do not wish to build on it, as not\nthinking it a sound foundation. Professor Ray Lankester says they are\n\u201cactually opposing,\u201d as though there were something intolerably audacious\nin this; but it is not easy to see why he should be more angry with them\nfor \u201cactually opposing\u201d Mr. Darwin than they may be with him, if they\nthink it worth while, for \u201cactually defending\u201d the exploded notion of\nnatural selection\u2014for assuredly the Charles-Darwinian system is now more\nexploded than Lamarck\u2019s is.\n\nWhat Professor Ray Lankester says about Lamarck and \u201cdirectly\ntransforming agents\u201d will mislead those who take his statement without\nexamination. Lamarck does not say that modification is effected by means\nof \u201cdirectly transforming agents;\u201d nothing can be more alien to the\nspirit of his teaching. With him the action of the external conditions\nof existence (and these are the only transforming agents intended by\nProfessor Ray Lankester) is not direct, but indirect. Change in\nsurroundings changes the organism\u2019s outlook, and thus changes its\ndesires; desires changing, there is corresponding change in the actions\nperformed; actions changing, a corresponding change is by-and-by induced\nin the organs that perform them; this, if long continued, will be\ntransmitted; becoming augmented by accumulation in many successive\ngenerations, and further modifications perhaps arising through further\nchanges in surroundings, the change will amount ultimately to specific\nand generic difference. Lamarck knows no drug, nor operation, that will\nmedicine one organism into another, and expects the results of adaptive\neffort to be so gradual as to be only perceptible when accumulated in the\ncourse of many generations. When, therefore, Professor Ray Lankester\nspeaks of Lamarck as having \u201cadvocated directly transforming agents,\u201d he\neither does not know what he is talking about, or he is trifling with his\nreaders. Professor Ray Lankester continues:\u2014\n\n\u201cThey do not seem to be aware of this, for they make no attempt to\nexamine Mr. Darwin\u2019s accumulated facts and arguments.\u201d Professor Ray\nLankester need not shake Mr. Darwin\u2019s \u201caccumulated facts and arguments\u201d\nat us. We have taken more pains to understand them than Professor Ray\nLankester has taken to understand Lamarck, and by this time know them\nsufficiently. We thankfully accept by far the greater number, and rely\non them as our sheet-anchors to save us from drifting on to the\nquicksands of Neo-Darwinian natural selection; few of them, indeed, are\nMr. Darwin\u2019s, except in so far as he has endorsed them and given them\npublicity, but I do not know that this detracts from their value. We\nhave paid great attention to Mr. Darwin\u2019s facts, and if we do not\nunderstand all his arguments\u2014for it is not always given to mortal man to\nunderstand these\u2014yet we think we know what he was driving at. We believe\nwe understand this to the full as well as Mr. Darwin intended us to do,\nand perhaps better. Where the arguments tend to show that all animals\nand plants are descended from a common source we find them much the same\nas Buffon\u2019s, or as those of Erasmus Darwin or Lamarck, and have nothing\nto say against them; where, on the other hand, they aim at proving that\nthe main means of modification has been the fact that if an animal has\nbeen \u201cfavoured\u201d it will be \u201cpreserved\u201d\u2014then we think that the animal\u2019s\nown exertions will, in the long run, have had more to do with its\npreservation than any real or fancied \u201cfavour.\u201d Professor Ray Lankester\ncontinues:\u2014\n\n\u201cThe doctrine of evolution has become an accepted truth\u201d (Professor Ray\nLankester writes as though the making of truth and falsehood lay in the\nhollow of Mr. Darwin\u2019s hand. Surely \u201chas become accepted\u201d should be\nenough; Mr. Darwin did not make the doctrine true) \u201centirely in\nconsequence of Mr. Darwin\u2019s having demonstrated the mechanism.\u201d (There\nis no mechanism in the matter, and if there is, Mr. Darwin did not show\nit. He made some words which confused us and prevented us from seeing\nthat \u201cthe preservation of favoured races\u201d was a cloak for \u201cluck,\u201d and\nthat this was all the explanation he was giving) \u201cby which the evolution\nis possible; it was almost universally rejected, while such\nundemonstrable agencies as those arbitrarily asserted to exist by\nProfessor Semper and Mr. George Henslow were the only means suggested by\nits advocates.\u201d\n\nUndoubtedly the theory of descent with modification, which received its\nfirst sufficiently ample and undisguised exposition in 1809 with the\n\u201cPhilosophie Zoologique\u201d of Lamarck, shared the common fate of all\ntheories that revolutionise opinion on important matters, and was\nfiercely opposed by the Huxleys, Romaneses, Grant Allens, and Ray\nLankesters of its time. It had to face the reaction in favour of the\nChurch which began in the days of the First Empire, as a natural\nconsequence of the horrors of the Revolution; it had to face the social\ninfluence and then almost Darwinian reputation of Cuvier, whom Lamarck\ncould not, or would not, square; it was put forward by one who was old,\npoor, and ere long blind. What theory could do more than just keep\nitself alive under conditions so unfavourable? Even under the most\nfavourable conditions descent with modification would have been a hard\nplant to rear, but, as things were, the wonder is that it was not killed\noutright at once. We all know how large a share social influences have\nin deciding what kind of reception a book or theory is to meet with;\ntrue, these influences are not permanent, but at first they are almost\nirresistible; in reality it was not the theory of descent that was\nmatched against that of fixity, but Lamarck against Cuvier; who can be\nsurprised that Cuvier for a time should have had the best of it?\n\nAnd yet it is pleasant to reflect that his triumph was not, as triumphs\ngo, long lived. How is Cuvier best known now? As one who missed a great\nopportunity; as one who was great in small things, and stubbornly small\nin great ones. Lamarck died in 1831; in 1861 descent with modification\nwas almost universally accepted by those most competent to form an\nopinion. This result was by no means so exclusively due to Mr. Darwin\u2019s\n\u201cOrigin of Species\u201d as is commonly believed. During the thirty years\nthat followed 1831 Lamarck\u2019s opinions made more way than Darwinians are\nwilling to allow. Granted that in 1861 the theory was generally accepted\nunder the name of Darwin, not under that of Lamarck, still it was Lamarck\nand not Darwin that was being accepted; it was descent, not descent with\nmodification by means of natural selection from among fortuitous\nvariations, that we carried away with us from the \u201cOrigin of Species.\u201d\nThe thing triumphed whether the name was lost or not. I need not waste\nthe reader\u2019s time by showing further how little weight he need attach to\nthe fact that Lamarckism was not immediately received with open arms by\nan admiring public. The theory of descent has become accepted as\nrapidly, if I am not mistaken, as the Copernican theory, or as Newton\u2019s\ntheory of gravitation.\n\nWhen Professor Ray Lankester goes on to speak of the \u201cundemonstrable\nagencies\u201d \u201carbitrarily asserted\u201d to exist by Professor Semper, he is\nagain presuming on the ignorance of his readers. Professor Semper\u2019s\nagencies are in no way more undemonstrable than Mr. Darwin\u2019s are. Mr.\nDarwin was perfectly cogent as long as he stuck to Lamarck\u2019s\ndemonstration; his arguments were sound as long as they were Lamarck\u2019s,\nor developments of, and riders upon, Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, and Lamarck,\nand almost incredibly silly when they were his own. Fortunately the\ngreater part of the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d is devoted to proving the theory\nof descent with modification, by arguments against which no exception\nwould have been taken by Mr. Darwin\u2019s three great precursors, except in\nso far as the variations whose accumulation results in specific\ndifference are supposed to be fortuitous\u2014and, to do Mr. Darwin justice,\nthe fortuitousness, though always within hail, is kept as far as possible\nin the background.\n\n\u201cMr. Darwin\u2019s arguments,\u201d says Professor Ray Lankester, \u201crest on the\n_proved_ existence of minute, many-sided, irrelative variations _not_\nproduced by directly transforming agents.\u201d Mr. Darwin throughout the\nbody of the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d is not supposed to know what his\nvariations are or are not produced by; if they come, they come, and if\nthey do not come, they do not come. True, we have seen that in the last\nparagraph of the book all this was changed, and the variations were\nascribed to the conditions of existence, and to use and disuse, but a\nconcluding paragraph cannot be allowed to override a whole book\nthroughout which the variations have been kept to hand as accidental.\nMr. Romanes is perfectly correct when he says {232a} that \u201cnatural\nselection\u201d (meaning the Charles-Darwinian natural selection) \u201ctrusts to\nthe chapter of accidents in the matter of variation\u201d this is all that Mr.\nDarwin can tell us; whether they come from directly transforming agents\nor no he neither knows nor says. Those who accept Lamarck will know that\nthe agencies are not, as a rule, directly transforming, but the followers\nof Mr. Darwin cannot.\n\n\u201cBut showing themselves,\u201d continues Professor Ray Lankester, \u201cat each new\nact of reproduction, as part of the phenomena of heredity such minute\n\u2018sports\u2019 or \u2018variations\u2019 are due to constitutional disturbance\u201d (No\ndoubt. The difference, however, between Mr. Darwin and Lamarck consists\nin the fact that Lamarck believes he knows what it is that so disturbs\nthe constitution as generally to induce variation, whereas Mr. Darwin\nsays he does not know), \u201cand appear not in individuals subjected to new\nconditions\u201d (What organism can pass through life without being subjected\nto more or less new conditions? What life is ever the exact fac-simile\nof another? And in a matter of such extreme delicacy as the adjustment\nof psychical and physical relations, who can say how small a disturbance\nof established equilibrium may not involve how great a rearrangement?),\n\u201cbut in the offspring of all, though more freely in the offspring of\nthose subjected to special causes of constitutional disturbance. Mr.\nDarwin has further proved that these slight variations can be transmitted\nand intensified by selective breeding.\u201d\n\nMr. Darwin did, indeed, follow Buffon and Lamarck in at once turning to\nanimals and plants under domestication in order to bring the plasticity\nof organic forms more easily home to his readers, but the fact that\nvariations can be transmitted and intensified by selective breeding had\nbeen so well established and was so widely known long before Mr. Darwin\nwas born, that he can no more be said to have proved it than Newton can\nbe said to have proved the revolution of the earth on its own axis.\nEvery breeder throughout the world had known it for centuries. I believe\neven Virgil knew it.\n\n\u201cThey have,\u201d continues Professor Ray Lankester, \u201cin reference to\nbreeding, a remarkably tenacious, persistent character, as might be\nexpected from their origin in connection with the reproductive process.\u201d\n\nThe variations do not normally \u201coriginate in connection with the\nreproductive process,\u201d though it is during this process that they receive\norganic expression. They originate mainly, so far as anything originates\nanywhere, in the life of the parent or parents. Without going so far as\nto say that no variation can arise in connection with the reproductive\nsystem\u2014for, doubtless, striking and successful sports do occasionally so\narise\u2014it is more probable that the majority originate earlier. Professor\nRay Lankester proceeds:\u2014\n\n\u201cOn the other hand, mutilations and other effects of directly\ntransforming agents are rarely, if ever, transmitted.\u201d Professor Ray\nLankester ought to know the facts better than to say that the effects of\nmutilation are rarely, if ever, transmitted. The rule is, that they will\nnot be transmitted unless they have been followed by disease, but that\nwhere disease has supervened they not uncommonly descend to offspring.\n{234a} I know Brown-S\u00e9quard considered it to be the morbid state of the\nnervous system consequent upon the mutilation that is transmitted, rather\nthan the immediate effects of the mutilation, but this distinction is\nsomewhat finely drawn.\n\nWhen Professor Ray Lankester talks about the \u201cother effects of directly\ntransforming agents\u201d being rarely transmitted, he should first show us\nthe directly transforming agents. Lamarck, as I have said, knows them\nnot. \u201cIt is little short of an absurdity,\u201d he continues, \u201cfor people to\ncome forward at this epoch, when evolution is at length accepted solely\nbecause of Mr. Darwin\u2019s doctrine, and coolly to propose to replace that\ndoctrine by the old notion so often tried and rejected.\u201d\n\nWhether this is an absurdity or no, Professor Lankester will do well to\nlearn to bear it without showing so much warmth, for it is one that is\nbecoming common. Evolution has been accepted not \u201cbecause of\u201d Mr.\nDarwin\u2019s doctrine, but because Mr. Darwin so fogged us about his doctrine\nthat we did not understand it. We thought we were backing his bill for\ndescent with modification, whereas we were in reality backing it for\ndescent with modification by means of natural selection from among\nfortuitous variations. This last really is Mr. Darwin\u2019s theory, except\nin so far as it is also Mr. A. R. Wallace\u2019s; descent, alone, is just as\nmuch and just as little Mr. Darwin\u2019s doctrine as it is Professor Ray\nLankester\u2019s or mine. I grant it is in great measure through Mr. Darwin\u2019s\nbooks that descent has become so widely accepted; it has become so\nthrough his books, but in spite of, rather than by reason of, his\ndoctrine. Indeed his doctrine was no doctrine, but only a back-door for\nhimself to escape by in the event of flood or fire; the flood and fire\nhave come; it remains to be seen how far the door will work\nsatisfactorily.\n\nProfessor Ray Lankester, again, should not say that Lamarck\u2019s doctrine\nhas been \u201cso often tried and rejected.\u201d M. Martins, in his edition of\nthe \u201cPhilosophie Zoologique,\u201d {235a} said truly that Lamarck\u2019s theory had\nnever yet had the honour of being seriously discussed. It never has\u2014not\nat least in connection with the name of its propounder. To mention\nLamarck\u2019s name in the presence of the conventional English society\nnaturalist has always been like shaking a red rag at a cow; he is at once\ninfuriated; \u201cas if it were possible,\u201d to quote from Isidore Geoffroy St.\nHilaire, whose defence of Lamarck is one of the best things in his book,\n{235b} \u201cthat so great labour on the part of so great a naturalist should\nhave led him to \u2018a fantastic conclusion\u2019 only\u2014to \u2018a flighty error,\u2019 and,\nas has been often said, though not written, to \u2018one absurdity the more.\u2019\nSuch was the language which Lamarck heard during his protracted old age,\nsaddened alike by the weight of years and blindness; this was what people\ndid not hesitate to utter over his grave, yet barely closed, and what,\nindeed, they are still saying\u2014commonly too, without any knowledge of what\nLamarck maintained, but merely repeating at second hand bad caricatures\nof his teaching.\n\n\u201cWhen will the time come when we may see Lamarck\u2019s theory discussed, and\nI may as well at once say refuted, in some important points, with at any\nrate the respect due to one of the most illustrious masters of our\nscience? And when will this theory, the hardihood of which has been\ngreatly exaggerated, become freed from the interpretations and\ncommentaries by the false light of which so many naturalists have formed\ntheir opinion concerning it? If its author is to be condemned, let it,\nat any rate, not be before he has been heard.\u201d\n\nLamarck was the Lazarus of biology. I wish his more fortunate brethren,\ninstead of intoning the old Church argument that he has \u201cbeen refuted\nover and over again,\u201d would refer us to some of the best chapters in the\nwriters who have refuted him. My own reading has led me to become\nmoderately well acquainted with the literature of evolution, but I have\nnever come across a single attempt fairly to grapple with Lamarck, and it\nis plain that neither Isidore Geoffroy nor M. Martins knows of such an\nattempt any more than I do. When Professor Ray Lankester puts his finger\non Lamarck\u2019s weak places, then, but not till then, may he complain of\nthose who try to replace Mr. Darwin\u2019s doctrine by Lamarck\u2019s.\n\nProfessor Ray Lankester concludes his note thus:\u2014\n\n\u201cThat such an attempt should be made is an illustration of a curious\nweakness of humanity. Not infrequently, after a long contested cause has\ntriumphed, and all have yielded allegiance thereto, you will find, when\nfew generations have passed, that men have clean forgotten what and who\nit was that made that cause triumphant, and ignorantly will set up for\nhonour the name of a traitor or an impostor, or attribute to a great man\nas a merit deeds and thoughts which he spent a long life in opposing.\u201d\n\nExactly so; that is what one rather feels, but surely Professor Ray\nLankester should say \u201cin trying to filch while pretending to oppose and\nto amend.\u201d He is complaining here that people persistently ascribe\nLamarck\u2019s doctrine to Mr. Darwin. Of course they do; but, as I have\nalready perhaps too abundantly asked, whose fault is this? If a man\nknows his own mind, and wants others to understand it, it is not often\nthat he is misunderstood for any length of time. If he finds he is being\nmisapprehended in a way he does not like, he will write another book and\nmake his meaning plainer. He will go on doing this for as long time as\nhe thinks necessary. I do not suppose, for example, that people will say\nI originated the theory of descent by means of natural selection from\namong fortunate accidents, or even that I was one of its supporters as a\nmeans of modification; but if this impression were to prevail, I cannot\nthink I should have much difficulty in removing it. At any rate no such\nmisapprehension could endure for more than twenty years, during which I\ncontinued to address a public who welcomed all I wrote, unless I myself\naided and abetted the mistake. Mr. Darwin wrote many books, but the\nimpression that Darwinism and evolution, or descent with modification,\nare identical is still nearly as prevalent as it was soon after the\nappearance of the \u201cOrigin of Species;\u201d the reason of this is, that Mr.\nDarwin was at no pains to correct us. Where, in any one of his many\nlater books, is there a passage which sets the matter in its true light,\nand enters a protest against the misconception of which Professor Ray\nLankester complains so bitterly? The only inference from this is, that\nMr. Darwin was not displeased at our thinking him to be the originator of\nthe theory of descent with modification, and did not want us to know more\nabout Lamarck than he could help. If we wanted to know about him, we\nmust find out what he had said for ourselves, it was no part of Mr.\nDarwin\u2019s business to tell us; he had no interest in our catching the\ndistinctive difference between himself and that writer; perhaps not; but\nthis approaches closely to wishing us to misunderstand it. When Mr.\nDarwin wished us to understand this or that, no one knew better how to\nshow it to us.\n\nWe were aware, on reading the \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d that there was a\nsomething about it of which we had not full hold; nevertheless we gave\nMr. Darwin our confidence at once, partly because he led off by telling\nus that we must trust him to a great extent, and explained that the\npresent book was only an instalment of a larger work which, when it came\nout, would make everything perfectly clear; partly, again, because the\ncase for descent with modification, which was the leading idea throughout\nthe book, was so obviously strong, but perhaps mainly because every one\nsaid Mr. Darwin was so good, and so much less self-heeding than other\npeople; besides, he had so \u201cpatiently\u201d and \u201ccarefully\u201d accumulated \u201csuch\na vast store of facts\u201d as no other naturalist, living or dead, had ever\nyet even tried to get together; he was so kind to us with his, \u201cMay we\nnot believe?\u201d and his \u201cHave we any right to infer that the Creator?\u201d &c.\n\u201cOf course we have not,\u201d we exclaimed, almost with tears in our eyes\u2014\u201cnot\nif you ask us in that way.\u201d Now that we understand what it was that\npuzzled us in Mr. Darwin\u2019s work we do not think highly either of the\nchief offender, or of the accessories after the fact, many of whom are\ntrying to brazen the matter out, and on a smaller scale to follow his\nexample.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XVIII\nPer Contra\n\n\n\u201c\u2018THE evil that men do lives after them\u201d {239a} is happily not so true as\nthat the good lives after them, while the ill is buried with their bones,\nand to no one does this correction of Shakespeare\u2019s unwonted spleen apply\nmore fully than to Mr. Darwin. Indeed it was somewhat thus that we\ntreated his books even while he was alive; the good, descent, remained\nwith us, while the ill, the deification of luck, was forgotten as soon as\nwe put down his work. Let me now, therefore, as far as possible, quit\nthe ungrateful task of dwelling on the defects of Mr. Darwin\u2019s work and\ncharacter, for the more pleasant one of insisting upon their better side,\nand of explaining how he came to be betrayed into publishing the \u201cOrigin\nof Species\u201d without reference to the works of his predecessors.\n\nIn the outset I would urge that it is not by any single book that Mr.\nDarwin should be judged. I do not believe that any one of the three\nprincipal works on which his reputation is founded will maintain with the\nnext generation the place it has acquired with ourselves; nevertheless,\nif asked to say who was the man of our own times whose work had produced\nthe most important, and, on the whole, beneficial effect, I should\nperhaps wrongly, but still both instinctively and on reflection, name him\nto whom I have, unfortunately, found myself in more bitter opposition\nthan to any other in the whole course of my life. I refer, of course, to\nMr. Darwin.\n\nHis claim upon us lies not so much in what is actually found within the\nfour corners of any one of his books, as in the fact of his having\nwritten them at all\u2014in the fact of his having brought out one after\nanother, with descent always for its keynote, until the lesson was\nlearned too thoroughly to make it at all likely that it will be\nforgotten. Mr. Darwin wanted to move his generation, and had the\npenetration to see that this is not done by saying a thing once for all\nand leaving it. It almost seems as though it matters less what a man\nsays than the number of times he repeats it, in a more or less varied\nform. It was here the author of the \u201cVestiges of Creation\u201d made his most\nserious mistake. He relied on new editions, and no one pays much\nattention to new editions\u2014the mark a book makes is almost always made by\nits first edition. If, instead of bringing out a series of amended\neditions during the fifteen years\u2019 law which Mr. Darwin gave him, Mr.\nChambers had followed up the \u201cVestiges\u201d with new book upon new book, he\nwould have learned much more, and, by consequence, not have been snuffed\nout so easily once for all as he was in 1859 when the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d\nappeared.\n\nThe tenacity of purpose which appears to have been one of Mr. Darwin\u2019s\nmost remarkable characteristics was visible even in his outward\nappearance. He always reminded me of Raffaelle\u2019s portrait of Pope Julius\nthe Second, which, indeed, would almost do for a portrait of Mr. Darwin\nhimself. I imagine that these two men, widely as the sphere of their\naction differed, must have been like each other in more respects than\nlooks alone. Each, certainly, had a hand of iron; whether Pope Julius\nwore a velvet glove or no, I do not know; I rather think not, for, if I\nremember rightly, he boxed Michael Angelo\u2019s ears for giving him a saucy\nanswer. We cannot fancy Mr. Darwin boxing any one\u2019s ears; indeed there\ncan be no doubt he wore a very thick velvet glove, but the hand\nunderneath it was none the less of iron. It was to his tenacity of\npurpose, doubtless, that his success was mainly due; but for this he must\ninevitably have fallen before the many inducements to desist from the\npursuit of his main object, which beset him in the shape of ill health,\nadvancing years, ample private means, large demands upon his time, and a\nreputation already great enough to satisfy the ambition of any ordinary\nman.\n\nI do not gather from those who remember Mr. Darwin as a boy, and as a\nyoung man, that he gave early signs of being likely to achieve greatness;\nnor, as it seems to me, is there any sign of unusual intellectual power\nto be detected in his earliest book. Opening this \u201calmost\u201d at random I\nread\u2014\u201cEarthquakes alone are sufficient to destroy the prosperity of any\ncountry. If, for instance, beneath England the now inert subterraneous\nforces should exert those powers which most assuredly in former\ngeological ages they have exerted, how completely would the entire\ncondition of the country be changed! What would become of the lofty\nhouses, thickly-packed cities, great manufacturies (_sic_), the beautiful\npublic and private edifices? If the new period of disturbance were to\ncommence by some great earthquake in the dead of night, how terrific\nwould be the carnage! England would be at once bankrupt; all papers,\nrecords, and accounts would from that moment be lost. Government being\nunable to collect the taxes, and failing to maintain its authority, the\nhand of violence and rapine would go uncontrolled. In every large town\nfamine would be proclaimed, pestilence and death following in its train.\u201d\n{240a} Great allowance should be made for a first work, and I admit that\nmuch interesting matter is found in Mr. Darwin\u2019s journal; still, it was\nhardly to be expected that the writer who at the age of thirty-three\ncould publish the foregoing passage should twenty years later achieve the\nreputation of being the profoundest philosopher of his time.\n\nI have not sufficient technical knowledge to enable me to speak\ncertainly, but I question his having been the great observer and master\nof experiment which he is generally believed to have been. His accuracy\nwas, I imagine, generally to be relied upon as long as accuracy did not\ncome into conflict with his interests as a leader in the scientific\nworld; when these were at stake he was not to be trusted for a moment.\nUnfortunately they were directly or indirectly at stake more often than\none could wish. His book on the action of worms, however, was shown by\nProfessor Paley and other writers {242a} to contain many serious errors\nand omissions, though it involved no personal question; but I imagine him\nto have been more or less _h\u00e9b\u00e9t\u00e9_ when he wrote this book. On the whole\nI should doubt his having been a better observer of nature than nine\ncountry gentlemen out of ten who have a taste for natural history.\n\nPresumptuous as I am aware it must appear to say so, I am unable to see\nmore than average intellectual power even in Mr. Darwin\u2019s later books.\nHis great contribution to science is supposed to have been the theory of\nnatural selection, but enough has been said to show that this, if\nunderstood as he ought to have meant it to be understood, cannot be rated\nhighly as an intellectual achievement. His other most important\ncontribution was his provisional theory of pan-genesis, which is admitted\non all hands to have been a failure. Though, however, it is not likely\nthat posterity will consider him as a man of transcendent intellectual\npower, he must be admitted to have been richly endowed with a much more\nvaluable quality than either originality or literary power\u2014I mean with\n_savoir faire_. The cards he held\u2014and, on the whole, his hand was a good\none\u2014he played with judgment; and though not one of those who would have\nachieved greatness under any circumstances, he nevertheless did achieve\ngreatness of no mean order. Greatness, indeed, of the highest kind\u2014that\nof one who is without fear and without reproach\u2014will not ultimately be\nallowed him, but greatness of a rare kind can only be denied him by those\nwhose judgment is perverted by temper or personal ill-will. He found the\nworld believing in fixity of species, and left it believing\u2014in spite of\nhis own doctrine\u2014in descent with modification.\n\nI have said on an earlier page that Mr. Darwin was heir to a discredited\ntruth, and left behind him an accredited fallacy. This is true as\nregards men of science and cultured classes who understood his\ndistinctive feature, or thought they did, and so long as Mr. Darwin lived\naccepted it with very rare exceptions; but it is not true as regards the\nunreading, unreflecting public, who seized the salient point of descent\nwith modification only, and troubled themselves little about the\ndistinctive feature. It would almost seem as if Mr. Darwin had reversed\nthe usual practice of philosophers and given his esoteric doctrine to the\nworld, while reserving the exoteric for his most intimate and faithful\nadherents. This, however, is a detail; the main fact is, that Mr. Darwin\nbrought us all round to evolution. True, it was Mr. Darwin backed by the\n_Times_ and the other most influential organs of science and culture, but\nit was one of Mr. Darwin\u2019s great merits to have developed and organised\nthis backing, as part of the work which he knew was essential if so great\na revolution was to be effected.\n\nThis is an exceedingly difficult and delicate thing to do. If people\nthink they need only write striking and well-considered books, and that\nthen the _Times_ will immediately set to work to call attention to them,\nI should advise them not to be too hasty in basing action upon this\nhypothesis. I should advise them to be even less hasty in basing it upon\nthe assumption that to secure a powerful literary backing is a matter\nwithin the compass of any one who chooses to undertake it. No one who\nhas not a strong social position should ever advance a new theory, unless\na life of hard fighting is part of what he lays himself out for. It was\none of Mr. Darwin\u2019s great merits that he had a strong social position,\nand had the good sense to know how to profit by it. The magnificent feat\nwhich he eventually achieved was unhappily tarnished by much that\ndetracts from the splendour that ought to have attended it, but a\nmagnificent feat it must remain.\n\nWhose work in this imperfect world is not tarred and tarnished by\nsomething that detracts from its ideal character? It is enough that a\nman should be the right man in the right place, and this Mr. Darwin\npre-eminently was. If he had been more like the ideal character which\nMr. Allen endeavours to represent him, it is not likely that he would\nhave been able to do as much, or nearly as much, as he actually did; he\nwould have been too wide a cross with his generation to produce much\neffect upon it. Original thought is much more common than is generally\nbelieved. Most people, if they only knew it, could write a good book or\nplay, paint a good picture, compose a fine oratorio; but it takes an\nunusually able person to get the book well reviewed, persuade a manager\nto bring the play out, sell the picture, or compass the performance of\nthe oratorio; indeed, the more vigorous and original any one of these\nthings may be, the more difficult will it prove to even bring it before\nthe notice of the public. The error of most original people is in being\njust a trifle too original. It was in his business qualities\u2014and these,\nafter all, are the most essential to success, that Mr. Darwin showed\nhimself so superlative. These are not only the most essential to\nsuccess, but it is only by blaspheming the world in a way which no good\ncitizen of the world will do, that we can deny them to be the ones which\nshould most command our admiration. We are in the world; surely so long\nas we are in it we should be of it, and not give ourselves airs as though\nwe were too good for our generation, and would lay ourselves out to\nplease any other by preference. Mr. Darwin played for his own\ngeneration, and he got in the very amplest measure the recognition which\nhe endeavoured, as we all do, to obtain.\n\nHis success was, no doubt, in great measure due to the fact that he knew\nour little ways, and humoured them; but if he had not had little ways of\nhis own, he never could have been so much _au fait_ with ours. He knew,\nfor example, we should be pleased to hear that he had taken his boots off\nso as not to disturb his worms when watching them by night, so he told us\nof this, and we were delighted. He knew we should like his using the\nword \u201csag,\u201d so he used it, {245a} and we said it was beautiful. True, he\nused it wrongly, for he was writing about tesselated pavement, and\nbuilders assure me that \u201csag\u201d is a word which applies to timber only, but\nthis is not to the point; the point was, that Mr. Darwin should have used\na word that we did not understand; this showed that he had a vast fund of\nknowledge at his command about all sorts of practical details with which\nhe might have well been unacquainted. We do not deal the same measure to\nman and to the lower animals in the matter of intelligence; the less we\nunderstand these last, the less, we say, not we, but they can understand;\nwhereas the less we can understand a man, the more intelligent we are apt\nto think him. No one should neglect by-play of this description; if I\nlive to be strong enough to carry it through, I mean to play \u201ccambre,\u201d\nand I shall spell it \u201ccamber.\u201d I wonder Mr. Darwin never abused this\nword. Laugh at him, however, as we may for having said \u201csag,\u201d if he had\nnot been the kind of man to know the value of these little hits, neither\nwould he have been the kind of man to persuade us into first tolerating,\nand then cordially accepting, descent with modification. There is a\ncorrelation of mental as well as of physical growth, and we could not\nprobably have had one set of Mr. Darwin\u2019s qualities without the other.\nIf he had been more faultless, he might have written better books, but we\nshould have listened worse. A book\u2019s prosperity is like a jest\u2019s\u2014in the\near of him that hears it.\n\nMr. Spencer would not\u2014at least one cannot think he would\u2014have been able\nto effect the revolution which will henceforth doubtless be connected\nwith Mr. Darwin\u2019s name. He had been insisting on evolution for some\nyears before the \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d came out, but he might as well have\npreached to the winds, for all the visible effect that had been produced.\nOn the appearance of Mr. Darwin\u2019s book the effect was instantaneous; it\nwas like the change in the condition of a patient when the right medicine\nhas been hit on after all sorts of things have been tried and failed.\nGranted that it was comparatively easy for Mr. Darwin, as having been\nborn into the household of one of the prophets of evolution, to arrive at\nconclusions about the fixity of species which, if not so born, he might\nnever have reached at all; this does not make it any easier for him to\nhave got others to agree with him. Any one, again, may have money left\nhim, or run up against it, or have it run up against him, as it does\nagainst some people, but it is only a very sensible person who does not\nlose it. Moreover, once begin to go behind achievement and there is an\nend of everything. Did the world give much heed to or believe in\nevolution before Mr. Darwin\u2019s time? Certainly not. Did we begin to\nattend and be persuaded soon after Mr. Darwin began to write? Certainly\nyes. Did we ere long go over _en masse_? Assuredly. If, as I said in\n\u201cLife and Habit,\u201d any one asks who taught the world to believe in\nevolution, the answer to the end of time must be that it was Mr. Darwin.\nAnd yet the more his work is looked at, the more marvellous does its\nsuccess become. It seems as if some organisms can do anything with\nanything. Beethoven picked his teeth with the snuffers, and seems to\nhave picked them sufficiently to his satisfaction. So Mr. Darwin with\none of the worst styles imaginable did all that the clearest, tersest\nwriter could have done. Strange, that such a master of cunning (in the\nsense of my title) should have been the apostle of luck, and one so\nterribly unlucky as Lamarck, of cunning, but such is the irony of nature.\nBuffon planted, Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck watered, but it was Mr. Darwin\nwho said, \u201cThat fruit is ripe,\u201d and shook it into his lap.\n\nWith this Mr. Darwin\u2019s best friends ought to be content; his admirers are\nnot well advised in representing him as endowed with all sorts of\nqualities which he was very far from possessing. Thus it is pretended\nthat he was one of those men who were ever on the watch for new ideas,\never ready to give a helping hand to those who were trying to advance our\nknowledge, ever willing to own to a mistake and give up even his most\ncherished ideas if truth required them at his hands. No conception can\nbe more wantonly inexact. I grant that if a writer was sufficiently at\nonce incompetent and obsequious Mr. Darwin was \u201cever ready,\u201d &c. So the\nEmperors of Austria wash a few poor people\u2019s feet on some one of the\nfestivals of the Church, but it would not be safe to generalise from this\nyearly ceremony, and conclude that the Emperors of Austria are in the\nhabit of washing poor people\u2019s feet. I can understand Mr. Darwin\u2019s not\nhaving taken any public notice, for example, of \u201cLife and Habit,\u201d for\nthough I did not attack him in force in that book, it was abundantly\nclear that an attack could not be long delayed, and a man may be pardoned\nfor not doing anything to advertise the works of his opponents; but there\nis no excuse for his never having referred to Professor Hering\u2019s work\neither in \u201cNature,\u201d when Professor Ray Lankester first called attention\nto it (July 13, 1876), or in some one of his subsequent books. If his\nattitude towards those who worked in the same field as himself had been\nthe generous one which his admirers pretend, he would have certainly come\nforward, not necessarily as adopting Professor Hering\u2019s theory, but still\nas helping it to obtain a hearing.\n\nHis not having done so is of a piece with his silence about Buffon,\nErasmus Darwin, and Lamarck in the early editions of the \u201cOrigin of\nSpecies,\u201d and with the meagre reference to them which is alone found in\nthe later ones. It is of a piece also with the silence which Mr. Darwin\ninvariably maintained when he saw his position irretrievably damaged, as,\nfor example, by Mr. Spencer\u2019s objection already referred to, and by the\nlate Professor Fleeming Jenkin in the _North British Review_ (June 1867).\nScience, after all, should form a kingdom which is more or less not of\nthis world. The ideal scientist should know neither self nor friend nor\nfoe\u2014he should be able to hob-nob with those whom he most vehemently\nattacks, and to fly at the scientific throat of those to whom he is\npersonally most attached; he should be neither grateful for a favourable\nreview nor displeased at a hostile one; his literary and scientific life\nshould be something as far apart as possible from his social; it is thus,\nat least, alone that any one will be able to keep his eye single for\nfacts, and their legitimate inferences. We have seen Professor Mivart\nlately taken to task by Mr. Romanes for having said {248a} that Mr.\nDarwin was singularly sensitive to criticism, and made it impossible for\nProfessor Mivart to continue friendly personal relations with him after\nhe had ventured to maintain his own opinion. I see no reason to question\nProfessor Mivart\u2019s accuracy, and find what he has said to agree alike\nwith my own personal experience of Mr. Darwin, and with all the light\nthat his works throw upon his character.\n\nThe most substantial apology that can be made for his attempt to claim\nthe theory of descent with modification is to be found in the practice of\nLamarck, Mr. Patrick Matthew, the author of the \u201cVestiges of Creation,\u201d\nand Mr. Herbert Spencer, and, again, in the total absence of complaint\nwhich this practice met with. If Lamarck might write the \u201cPhilosophie\nZoologique\u201d without, so far as I remember, one word of reference to\nBuffon, and without being complained of, why might not Mr. Darwin write\nthe \u201cOrigin of Species\u201d without more than a passing allusion to Lamarck?\nMr. Patrick Matthew, again, though writing what is obviously a _r\u00e9sum\u00e9_\nof the evolutionary theories of his time, makes no mention of Lamarck,\nErasmus Darwin, or Buffon. I have not the original edition of the\n\u201cVestiges of Creation\u201d before me, but feel sure I am justified in saying\nthat it claimed to be a more or less Minerva-like work, that sprang full\narmed from the brain of Mr. Chambers himself. This at least is how it\nwas received by the public; and, however violent the opposition it met\nwith, I cannot find that its author was blamed for not having made\nadequate mention of Lamarck. When Mr. Spencer wrote his first essay on\nevolution in the _Leader_ (March 20, 1852) he did indeed begin his\nargument, \u201cThose who cavalierly reject the doctrine of Lamarck,\u201d &c., so\nthat his essay purports to be written in support of Lamarck; but when he\nrepublished his article in 1858, the reference to Lamarck was cut out.\n\nI make no doubt that it was the bad example set him by the writers named\nin the preceding paragraph which betrayed Mr. Darwin into doing as they\ndid, but being more conscientious than they, he could not bring himself\nto do it without having satisfied himself that he had got hold of a more\nor less distinctive feature, and this, of course, made matters worse.\nThe distinctive feature was not due to any deep-laid plan for\npitchforking mind out of the universe, or as part of a scheme of\nmaterialistic philosophy, though it has since been made to play an\nimportant part in the attempt to further this; Mr. Darwin was perfectly\ninnocent of any intention of getting rid of mind, and did not, probably,\ncare the toss of sixpence whether the universe was instinct with mind or\nno\u2014what he did care about was carrying off the palm in the matter of\ndescent with modification, and the distinctive feature was an adjunct\nwith which his nervous, sensitive, Gladstonian nature would not allow him\nto dispense.\n\nAnd why, it may be asked, should not the palm be given to Mr. Darwin if\nhe wanted it, and was at so much pains to get it? Why, if science is a\nkingdom not of this world, make so much fuss about settling who is\nentitled to what? At best such questions are of a sorry personal nature,\nthat can have little bearing upon facts, and it is these that alone\nshould concern us. The answer is, that if the question is so merely\npersonal and unimportant, Mr. Darwin may as well yield as Buffon, Erasmus\nDarwin, and Lamarck; Mr. Darwin\u2019s admirers find no difficulty in\nappreciating the importance of a personal element as far as he is\nconcerned; let them not wonder, then, if others, while anxious to give\nhim the laurels to which he is entitled, are somewhat indignant at the\nattempt to crown him with leaves that have been filched from the brows of\nthe great dead who went before him. _Palmam qui meruit ferat_. The\ninstinct which tells us that no man in the scientific or literary world\nshould claim more than his due is an old and, I imagine, a wholesome one,\nand if a scientific self-denying ordinance is demanded, we may reply with\njustice, _Que messieurs les Charles-Darwinies commencent_. Mr. Darwin\nwill have a crown sufficient for any ordinary brow remaining in the\nachievement of having done more than any other writer, living or dead, to\npopularise evolution. This much may be ungrudgingly conceded to him, but\nmore than this those who have his scientific position most at heart will\nbe well advised if they cease henceforth to demand.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XIX\nConclusion\n\n\nAND now I bring this book to a conclusion. So many things requiring\nattention have happened since it was begun that I leave it in a very\ndifferent shape to the one which it was originally intended to bear. I\nhave omitted much that I had meant to deal with, and have been tempted\nsometimes to introduce matter the connection of which with my subject is\nnot immediately apparent. Such however, as the book is, it must now go\nin the form into which it has grown almost more in spite of me than from\n_malice prepense_ on my part. I was afraid that it might thus set me at\ndefiance, and in an early chapter expressed a doubt whether I should find\nit redound greatly to my advantage with men of science; in this\nconcluding chapter I may say that doubt has deepened into something like\ncertainty. I regret this, but cannot help it.\n\nAmong the points with which it was most incumbent upon me to deal was\nthat of vegetable intelligence. A reader may well say that unless I give\nplants much the same sense of pleasure and pain, memory, power of will,\nand intelligent perception of the best way in which to employ their\nopportunities that I give to low animals, my argument falls to the\nground. If I declare organic modification to be mainly due to function,\nand hence in the closest correlation with mental change, I must give\nplants, as well as animals, a mind, and endow them with power to reflect\nand reason upon all that most concerns them. Many who will feel little\ndifficulty about admitting that animal modification is upon the whole\nmainly due to the secular cunning of the animals themselves will yet\nhesitate before they admit that plants also can have a reason and cunning\nof their own.\n\nUnwillingness to concede this is based principally upon the error\nconcerning intelligence to which I have already referred\u2014I mean to our\nregarding intelligence not so much as the power of understanding as that\nof being understood by ourselves. Once admit that the evidence in favour\nof a plant\u2019s knowing its own business depends more on the efficiency with\nwhich that business is conducted than either on our power of\nunderstanding how it can be conducted, or on any signs on the plant\u2019s\npart of a capacity for understanding things that do not concern it, and\nthere will be no further difficulty about supposing that in its own\nsphere a plant is just as intelligent as an animal, and keeps a sharp\nlook-out upon its own interests, however indifferent it may seem to be to\nours. So strong has been the set of recent opinion in this direction\nthat with botanists the foregoing now almost goes without saying, though\nfew five years ago would have accepted it.\n\nTo no one of the several workers in this field are we more indebted for\nthe change which has been brought about in this respect than to my late\nvalued and lamented friend Mr. Alfred Tylor. Mr. Tylor was not the\ndiscoverer of the protoplasmic continuity that exists in plants, but he\nwas among the very first to welcome this discovery, and his experiments\nat Carshalton in the years 1883 and 1884 demonstrated that, whether there\nwas protoplasmic continuity in plants or no, they were at any rate\nendowed with some measure of reason, forethought, and power of\nself-adaptation to varying surroundings. It is not for me to give the\ndetails of these experiments. I had the good fortune to see them more\nthan once while they were in progress, and was present when they were\nmade the subject of a paper read by Mr. Sydney B. J. Skertchly before the\nLinnean Society, Mr. Tylor being then too ill to read it himself. The\npaper has since been edited by Mr. Skertchly, and published. {253a}\nAnything that should be said further about it will come best from Mr.\nSkertchly; it will be enough here if I give the _r\u00e9sum\u00e9_ of it prepared\nby Mr. Tylor himself.\n\nIn this Mr. Tylor said:\u2014\u201cThe principles which underlie this paper are the\nindividuality of plants, the necessity for some co-ordinating system to\nenable the parts to act in concert, and the probability that this also\nnecessitates the admission that plants have a dim sort of intelligence.\n\n\u201cIt is shown that a tree, for example, is something more than an\naggregation of tissues, but is a complex being performing acts as a\nwhole, and not merely responsive to the direct influence of light, &c.\nThe tree knows more than its branches, as the species know more than the\nindividual, the community than the unit.\n\n\u201cMoreover, inasmuch as my experiments show that many plants and trees\npossess the power of adapting themselves to unfamiliar circumstances,\nsuch as, for instance, avoiding obstacles by bending aside before\ntouching, or by altering the leaf arrangement, it seems probable that at\nleast as much voluntary power must be accorded to such plants as to\ncertain lowly organised animals.\n\n\u201cFinally, a connecting system by means of which combined movements take\nplace is found in the threads of protoplasm which unite the various\ncells, and which I have now shown to exist even in the wood of trees.\n\n\u201cOne of the important facts seems to be the universality of the upward\ncurvature of the tips of growing branches of trees, and the power\npossessed by the tree to straighten its branches afterwards, so that new\ngrowth shall by similar means be able to obtain the necessary light and\nair.\n\n\u201cA house, to use a sanitary analogy, is functionally useless without it\nobtains a good supply of light and air. The architect strives so to\nproduce the house as to attain this end, and still leave the house\ncomfortable. But the house, though dependent upon, is not produced by,\nthe light and air. So a tree is functionally useless, and cannot even\nexist without a proper supply of light and air; but, whereas it has been\nthe custom to ascribe the heliotropic and other motions to the direct\ninfluence of those agents, I would rather suggest that the movements are\nto some extent due to the desire of the plant to acquire its necessaries\nof life.\u201d\n\nThe more I have reflected upon Mr. Tylor\u2019s Carshalton experiments, the\nmore convinced I am of their great value. No one, indeed, ought to have\ndoubted that plants were intelligent, but we all of us do much that we\nought not to do, and Mr. Tylor supplied a demonstration which may be\nhenceforth authoritatively appealed to.\n\nI will take the present opportunity of insisting upon a suggestion which\nI made in \u201cAlps and Sanctuaries\u201d (New edition, pp. 152, 153), with which\nMr. Tylor was much pleased, and which, at his request, I made the subject\nof a few words that I ventured to say at the Linnean Society\u2019s rooms\nafter his paper had been read. \u201cAdmitting,\u201d I said, \u201cthe common\nprotoplasmic origin of animals and plants, and setting aside the notion\nthat plants preceded animals, we are still faced by the problem why\nprotoplasm should have developed into the organic life of the world,\nalong two main lines, and only two\u2014the animal and the vegetable. Why, if\nthere was an early schism\u2014and this there clearly was\u2014should there not\nhave been many subsequent ones of equal importance? We see innumerable\nsub-divisions of animals and plants, but we see no other such great\nsubdivision of organic life as that whereby it ranges itself, for the\nmost part readily, as either animal or vegetable. Why any\nsubdivision?\u2014but if any, why not more than two great classes?\u201d\n\nThe two main stems of the tree of life ought, one would think, to have\nbeen formed on the same principle as the boughs which represent genera,\nand the twigs which stand for species and varieties. If specific\ndifferences arise mainly from differences of action taken in consequence\nof differences of opinion, then, so ultimately do generic; so, therefore,\nagain, do differences between families; so therefore, by analogy, should\nthat greatest of differences in virtue of which the world of life is\nmainly animal, or vegetable. In this last case as much as in that of\nspecific difference, we ought to find divergent form the embodiment and\norganic expression of divergent opinion. Form is mind made manifest in\nflesh through action: shades of mental difference being expressed in\nshades of physical difference, while broad fundamental differences of\nopinion are expressed in broad fundamental differences of bodily shape.\n\nOr to put it thus:\u2014\n\nIf form and habit be regarded as functionally interdependent, that is to\nsay, if neither form nor habit can vary without corresponding variation\nin the other, and if habit and opinion concerning advantage are also\nfunctionally interdependent, it follows self-evidently that form and\nopinion concerning advantage (and hence form and cunning) will be\nfunctionally interdependent also, and that there can be no great\nmodification of the one without corresponding modification of the other.\nLet there, then, be a point in respect of which opinion might be early\nand easily divided\u2014a point in respect of which two courses involving\ndifferent lines of action presented equally-balanced advantages\u2014and there\nwould be an early subdivision of primordial life, according as the one\nview or the other was taken.\n\nIt is obvious that the pros and cons for either course must be supposed\nvery nearly equal, otherwise the course which presented the fewest\nadvantages would be attended with the probable gradual extinction of the\norganised beings that adopted it, but there being supposed two possible\nmodes of action very evenly balanced as regards advantage and\ndisadvantages, then the ultimate appearance of two corresponding forms of\nlife is a _sequitur_ from the admission that form varies as function, and\nfunction as opinion concerning advantage. If there are three, four,\nfive, or six such opinions tenable, we ought to have three, four, five,\nor six main subdivisions of life. As things are, we have two only. Can\nwe, then, see a matter on which opinion was likely to be easily and early\ndivided into two, and only two, main divisions\u2014no third course being\nconceivable? If so, this should suggest itself as the probable source\nfrom which the two main forms of organic life have been derived.\n\nI submit that we can see such a matter in the question whether it pays\nbetter to sit still and make the best of what comes in one\u2019s way, or to\ngo about in search of what one can find. Of course we, as animals,\nnaturally hold that it is better to go about in search of what we can\nfind than to sit still and make the best of what comes; but there is\nstill so much to be said on the other side, that many classes of animals\nhave settled down into sessile habits, while a perhaps even larger number\nare, like spiders, habitual liers in wait rather than travellers in\nsearch of food. I would ask my reader, therefore, to see the opinion\nthat it is better to go in search of prey as formulated, and finding its\norganic expression, in animals; and the other\u2014that it is better to be\never on the look-out to make the best of what chance brings up to them\u2014in\nplants. Some few intermediate forms still record to us the long struggle\nduring which the schism was not yet complete, and the halting between two\nopinions which it might be expected that some organisms should exhibit.\n\n\u201cNeither class,\u201d I said in \u201cAlps and Sanctuaries,\u201d \u201chas been quite\nconsistent. Who ever is or can be? Every extreme\u2014every opinion carried\nto its logical end\u2014will prove to be an absurdity. Plants throw out roots\nand boughs and leaves; this is a kind of locomotion; and, as Dr. Erasmus\nDarwin long since pointed out, they do sometimes approach nearly to what\nmay be called travelling; a man of consistent character will never look\nat a bough, a root, or a tendril without regarding it as a melancholy and\nunprincipled compromise\u201d (New edition, p. 153).\n\nHaving called attention to this view, and commended it to the\nconsideration of my readers, I proceed to another which should not have\nbeen left to be touched upon only in a final chapter, and which, indeed,\nseems to require a book to itself\u2014I refer to the origin and nature of the\nfeelings, which those who accept volition as having had a large share in\norganic modification must admit to have had a no less large share in the\nformation of volition. Volition grows out of ideas, ideas from feelings.\nWhat, then, is feeling, and the subsequent mental images or ideas?\n\nThe image of a stone formed in our minds is no representation of the\nobject which has given rise to it. Not only, as has been often remarked,\nis there no resemblance between the particular thought and the particular\nthing, but thoughts and things generally are too unlike to be compared.\nAn idea of a stone may be like an idea of another stone, or two stones\nmay be like one another; but an idea of a stone is not like a stone; it\ncannot be thrown at anything, it occupies no room in space, has no\nspecific gravity, and when we come to know more about stones, we find our\nideas concerning them to be but rude, epitomised, and highly conventional\nrenderings of the actual facts, mere hieroglyphics, in fact, or, as it\nwere, counters or bank-notes, which serve to express and to convey\ncommodities with which they have no pretence of analogy.\n\nIndeed we daily find that, as the range of our perceptions becomes\nenlarged either by invention of new appliances or after use of old ones,\nwe change our ideas though we have no reason to think that the thing\nabout which we are thinking has changed. In the case of a stone, for\ninstance, the rude, unassisted, uneducated senses see it as above all\nthings motionless, whereas assisted and trained ideas concerning it\nrepresent motion as its most essential characteristic; but the stone has\nnot changed. So, again, the uneducated idea represents it as above all\nthings mindless, and is as little able to see mind in connection with it\nas it lately was to see motion; it will be no greater change of opinion\nthan we have most of us undergone already if we come presently to see it\nas no less full of elementary mind than of elementary motion, but the\nstone will not have changed.\n\nThe fact that we modify our opinions suggests that our ideas are formed\nnot so much in involuntary self-adjusting mimetic correspondence with the\nobjects that we believe to give rise to them, as by what was in the\noutset voluntary, conventional arrangement in whatever way we found\nconvenient, of sensation and perception-symbols, which had nothing\nwhatever to do with the objects, and were simply caught hold of as the\nonly things we could grasp. It would seem as if, in the first instance,\nwe must have arbitrarily attached some one of the few and vague\nsensations which we could alone at first command, to certain motions of\noutside things as echoed by our brain, and used them to think and feel\nthe things with, so as to docket them, and recognise them with greater\nforce, certainty, and clearness\u2014much as we use words to help us to docket\nand grasp our feelings and thoughts, or written characters to help us to\ndocket and grasp our words.\n\nIf this view be taken we stand in much the same attitude towards our\nfeelings as a dog may be supposed to do towards our own reading and\nwriting. The dog may be supposed to marvel at the wonderful instinctive\nfaculty by which we can tell the price of the different railway stocks\nmerely by looking at a sheet of paper; he supposes this power to be a\npart of our nature, to have come of itself by luck and not by cunning,\nbut a little reflection will show that feeling is not more likely to have\n\u201ccome by nature\u201d than reading and writing are. Feeling is in all\nprobability the result of the same kind of slow laborious development as\nthat which has attended our more recent arts and our bodily organs; its\ndevelopment must be supposed to have followed the same lines as that of\nour other arts, and indeed of the body itself, which is the _ars\nartium_\u2014for growth of mind is throughout coincident with growth of\norganic resources, and organic resources grow with growing mind.\n\nFeeling is the art the possession of which differentiates the civilised\norganic world from that of brute inorganic matter, but still it is an\nart; it is the outcome of a mind that is common both to organic and\ninorganic, and which the organic has alone cultivated. It is not a part\nof mind itself; it is no more this than language and writing are parts of\nthought. The organic world can alone feel, just as man can alone speak;\nbut as speech is only the development of powers the germs of which are\npossessed by the lower animals, so feeling is only a sign of the\nemployment and development of powers the germs of which exist in\ninorganic substances. It has all the characteristics of an art, and\nthough it must probably rank as the oldest of those arts that are\npeculiar to the organic world, it is one which is still in process of\ndevelopment. None of us, indeed, can feel well on more than a very few\nsubjects, and many can hardly feel at all.\n\nBut, however this may be, our sensations and perceptions of material\nphenomena are attendant on the excitation of certain motions in the\nanterior parts of the brain. Whenever certain motions are excited in\nthis substance, certain sensations and ideas of resistance, extension,\n&c., are either concomitant, or ensue within a period too brief for our\ncognisance. It is these sensations and ideas that we directly cognise,\nand it is to them that we have attached the idea of the particular kind\nof matter we happen to be thinking of. As this idea is not like the\nthing itself, so neither is it like the motions in our brain on which it\nis attendant. It is no more like these than, say, a stone is like the\nindividual characters, written or spoken, that form the word \u201cstone,\u201d or\nthan these last are, in sound, like the word \u201cstone\u201d itself, whereby the\nidea of a stone is so immediately and vividly presented to us. True,\nthis does not involve that our idea shall not resemble the object that\ngave rise to it, any more than the fact that a looking-glass bears no\nresemblance to the things reflected in it involves that the reflection\nshall not resemble the things reflected; the shifting nature, however, of\nour ideas and conceptions is enough to show that they must be symbolical,\nand conditioned by changes going on within ourselves as much as by those\noutside us; and if, going behind the ideas which suffice for daily use,\nwe extend our inquiries in the direction of the reality underlying our\nconception, we find reason to think that the brain-motions which attend\nour conception correspond with exciting motions in the object that\noccasions it, and that these, rather than anything resembling our\nconception itself, should be regarded as the reality.\n\nThis leads to a third matter, on which I can only touch with extreme\nbrevity.\n\nDifferent modes of motion have long been known as the causes of our\ndifferent colour perceptions, or at any rate as associated therewith, and\nof late years, more especially since the promulgation of Newlands\u2019 {260a}\nlaw, it has been perceived that what we call the kinds or properties of\nmatter are not less conditioned by motion than colour is. The substance\nor essence of unconditioned matter, as apart from the relations between\nits various states (which we believe to be its various conditions of\nmotion) must remain for ever unknown to us, for it is only the relations\nbetween the conditions of the underlying substance that we cognise at\nall, and where there are no conditions, there is nothing for us to seize,\ncompare, and, hence, cognise; unconditioned matter must, therefore, be as\ninconceivable by us as unmattered condition; {261a} but though we can\nknow nothing about matter as apart from its conditions or states, opinion\nhas been for some time tending towards the belief that what we call the\ndifferent states, or kinds, of matter are only our ways of mentally\ncharacterising and docketing our estimates of the different kinds of\nmotion going on in this otherwise uncognisable substratum.\n\nOur conception, then, concerning the nature of any matter depends solely\nupon its kind and degree of unrest, that is to say, on the\ncharacteristics of the vibrations that are going on within it. The\nexterior object vibrating in a certain way imparts some of its vibrations\nto our brain\u2014but if the state of the thing itself depends upon its\nvibrations, it must be considered as to all intents and purposes the\nvibrations themselves\u2014plus, of course, the underlying substance that is\nvibrating. If, for example, a pat of butter is a portion of the\nunknowable underlying substance in such-and-such a state of molecular\ndisturbance, and it is only by alteration of the disturbance that the\nsubstance can be altered\u2014the disturbance of the substance is practically\nequivalent to the substance: a pat of butter is such-and-such a\ndisturbance of the unknowable underlying substance, and such-and-such a\ndisturbance of the underlying substance is a pat of butter. In\ncommunicating its vibrations, therefore, to our brain a substance does\nactually communicate what is, as far as we are concerned, a portion of\nitself. Our perception of a thing and its attendant feeling are symbols\nattaching to an introduction within our brain of a feeble state of the\nthing itself. Our recollection of it is occasioned by a feeble\ncontinuance of this feeble state in our brains, becoming less feeble\nthrough the accession of fresh but similar vibrations from without. The\nmolecular vibrations which make the thing an idea of which is conveyed to\nour minds, put within our brain a little feeble emanation from the thing\nitself\u2014if we come within their reach. This being once put there, will\nremain as it were dust, till dusted out, or till it decay, or till it\nreceive accession of new vibrations.\n\nThe vibrations from a pat of butter do, then, actually put butter into a\nman\u2019s head. This is one of the commonest of expressions, and would\nhardly be so common if it were not felt to have some foundation in fact.\nAt first the man does not know what feeling or complex of feelings to\nemploy so as to docket the vibrations, any more than he knows what word\nto employ so as to docket the feelings, or with what written characters\nto docket his word; but he gets over this, and henceforward the\nvibrations of the exterior object (that is to say, the thing) never set\nup their characteristic disturbances, or, in other words, never come into\nhis head, without the associated feeling presenting itself as readily as\nword and characters present themselves, on the presence of the feeling.\nThe more butter a man sees and handles, the more he gets butter on the\nbrain\u2014till, though he can never get anything like enough to be strictly\ncalled butter, it only requires the slightest molecular disturbance with\ncharacteristics like those of butter to bring up a vivid and highly\nsympathetic idea of butter in the man\u2019s mind.\n\nIf this view is adopted, our memory of a thing is our retention within\nthe brain of a small leaven of the actual thing itself, or of what _qu\u00e2_\nus is the thing that is remembered, and the ease with which habitual\nactions come to be performed is due to the power of the vibrations having\nbeen increased and modified by continual accession from without till they\nmodify the molecular disturbances of the nervous system, and therefore\nits material substance, which we have already settled to be only our way\nof docketing molecular disturbances. The same vibrations, therefore,\nform the substance remembered, introduce an infinitesimal dose of it\nwithin the brain, modify the substance remembering, and, in the course of\ntime, create and further modify the mechanism of both the sensory and\nmotor nerves. Thought and thing are one.\n\nI commend these two last speculations to the reader\u2019s charitable\nconsideration, as feeling that I am here travelling beyond the ground on\nwhich I can safely venture; nevertheless, as it may be some time before I\nhave another opportunity of coming before the public, I have thought it,\non the whole, better not to omit them, but to give them thus\nprovisionally. I believe they are both substantially true, but am by no\nmeans sure that I have expressed them either clearly or accurately; I\ncannot, however, further delay the issue of my book.\n\nReturning to the point raised in my title, is luck, I would ask, or\ncunning, the more fitting matter to be insisted upon in connection with\norganic modification? Do animals and plants grow into conformity with\ntheir surroundings because they and their fathers and mothers take pains,\nor because their uncles and aunts go away? For the survival of the\nfittest is only the non-survival or going away of the unfittest\u2014in whose\ndirect line the race is not continued, and who are therefore only uncles\nand aunts of the survivors. I can quite understand its being a good\nthing for any race that its uncles and aunts should go away, but I do not\nbelieve the accumulation of lucky accidents could result in an eye, no\nmatter how many uncles and aunts may have gone away during how many\ngenerations.\n\nI would ask the reader to bear in mind the views concerning life and\ndeath expressed in an early chapter. They seem to me not, indeed, to\ntake away any very considerable part of the sting from death; this should\nnot be attempted or desired, for with the sting of death the sweets of\nlife are inseparably bound up so that neither can be weakened without\ndamaging the other. Weaken the fear of death, and the love of life would\nbe weakened. Strengthen it, and we should cling to life even more\ntenaciously than we do. But though death must always remain as a shock\nand change of habits from which we must naturally shrink\u2014still it is not\nthe utter end of our being, which, until lately, it must have seemed to\nthose who have been unable to accept the grosser view of the resurrection\nwith which we were familiarised in childhood. We too now know that\nthough worms destroy this body, yet in our flesh shall we so far see God\nas to be still in Him and of Him\u2014biding our time for a resurrection in a\nnew and more glorious body; and, moreover, that we shall be to the full\nas conscious of this as we are at present of much that concerns us as\nclosely as anything can concern us.\n\nThe thread of life cannot be shorn between successive generations, except\nupon grounds which will in equity involve its being shorn between\nconsecutive seconds, and fractions of seconds. On the other hand, it\ncannot be left unshorn between consecutive seconds without necessitating\nthat it should be left unshorn also beyond the grave, as well as in\nsuccessive generations. Death is as salient a feature in what we call\nour life as birth was, but it is no more than this. As a salient\nfeature, it is a convenient epoch for the drawing of a defining line, by\nthe help of which we may better grasp the conception of life, and think\nit more effectually, but it is a _fa\u00e7on de parler_ only; it is, as I said\nin \u201cLife and Habit,\u201d {264a} \u201cthe most inexorable of all conventions,\u201d but\nour idea of it has no correspondence with eternal underlying realities.\n\nFinally, we must have evolution; consent is too spontaneous, instinctive,\nand universal among those most able to form an opinion, to admit of\nfurther doubt about this. We must also have mind and design. The\nattempt to eliminate intelligence from among the main agencies of the\nuniverse has broken down too signally to be again ventured upon\u2014not until\nthe recent rout has been forgotten. Nevertheless the old, far-foreseeing\n_Deus ex machin\u00e2_ design as from a point outside the universe, which\nindeed it directs, but of which it is no part, is negatived by the facts\nof organism. What, then, remains, but the view that I have again in this\nbook endeavoured to uphold\u2014I mean, the supposition that the mind or\ncunning of which we see such abundant evidence all round us, is, like the\nkingdom of heaven, within us, and within all things at all times\neverywhere? There is design, or cunning, but it is a cunning not\ndespotically fashioning us from without as a potter fashions his clay,\nbut inhering democratically within the body which is its highest outcome,\nas life inheres within an animal or plant.\n\nAll animals and plants are corporations, or forms of democracy, and may\nbe studied by the light of these, as democracies, not infrequently, by\nthat of animals and plants. The solution of the difficult problem of\nreflex action, for example, is thus facilitated, by supposing it to be\ndepartmental in character; that is to say, by supposing it to be action\nof which the department that attends to it is alone cognisant, and which\nis not referred to the central government so long as things go normally.\nAs long, therefore, as this is the case, the central government is\nunconscious of what is going on, but its being thus unconscious is no\nargument that the department is unconscious also.\n\nI know that contradiction in terms lurks within much that I have said,\nbut the texture of the world is a warp and woof of contradiction in\nterms; of continuity in discontinuity, and discontinuity in continuity;\nof unity in diversity, and of diversity in unity. As in the development\nof a fugue, where, when the subject and counter subject have been\nenounced, there must henceforth be nothing new, and yet all must be new,\nso throughout organic life\u2014which is as a fugue developed to great length\nfrom a very simple subject\u2014everything is linked on to and grows out of\nthat which comes next to it in order\u2014errors and omissions excepted. It\ncrosses and thwarts what comes next to it with difference that involves\nresemblance, and resemblance that involves difference, and there is no\njuxtaposition of things that differ too widely by omission of necessary\nlinks, or too sudden departure from recognised methods of procedure.\n\nTo conclude; bodily form may be almost regarded as idea and memory in a\nsolidified state\u2014as an accumulation of things each one of them so tenuous\nas to be practically without material substance. It is as a million\npounds formed by accumulated millionths of farthings; more compendiously\nit arises normally from, and through, action. Action arises normally\nfrom, and through, opinion. Opinion, from, and through, hypothesis.\n\u201cHypothesis,\u201d as the derivation of the word itself shows, is singularly\nnear akin to \u201cunderlying, and only in part knowable, substratum;\u201d and\nwhat is this but \u201cGod\u201d translated from the language of Moses into that of\nMr. Herbert Spencer? The conception of God is like nature\u2014it returns to\nus in another shape, no matter how often we may expel it. Vulgarised as\nit has been by Michael Angelo, Raffaelle, and others who shall be\nnameless, it has been like every other _corruptio optimi\u2014pessimum_: used\nas a hieroglyph by the help of which we may better acknowledge the height\nand depth of our own ignorance, and at the same time express our sense\nthat there is an unseen world with which we in some mysterious way come\ninto contact, though the writs of our thoughts do not run within it\u2014used\nin this way, the idea and the word have been found enduringly convenient.\nThe theory that luck is the main means of organic modification is the\nmost absolute denial of God which it is possible for the human mind to\nconceive\u2014while the view that God is in all His creatures, He in them and\nthey in Him, is only expressed in other words by declaring that the main\nmeans of organic modification is, not luck, but cunning.\n\n\n\n\nFootnotes\n\n\n{17a} \u201c_Nature_,\u201d Nov. 12, 1885.\n\n{20a} \u201cHist. Nat. G\u00e9n.,\u201d tom. ii. p. 411, 1859.\n\n{23a} \u201cSelections, &c.\u201d Tr\u00fcbner & Co., 1884. [Out of print.]\n\n{29a} \u201cSelections, &c., and Remarks on Romanes\u2019 \u2018Mental Intelligence in\nAnimals,\u2019\u201d Tr\u00fcbner & Co., 1884. pp. 228, 229. [Out of print.]\n\n{35a} Quoted by M. Vianna De Lima in his \u201cExpos\u00e9 Sommaire,\u201d &c., p. 6.\nParis, Delagrave, 1886.\n\n{40a} I have given the passage in full on p. 254a of my \u201cSelections,\u201d\n&c. [Now out of print.] I observe that Canon Kingsley felt exactly the\nsame difficulty that I had felt myself, and saw also how alone it could\nbe met. He makes the wood-wren say, \u201cSomething told him his mother had\ndone it before him, and he was flesh of her flesh, life of her life, and\nhad inherited her instinct (as we call hereditary memory, to avoid the\ntrouble of finding out what it is and how it comes).\u201d\u2014_Fraser_, June,\n1867. Canon Kingsley felt he must insist on the continued personality of\nthe two generations before he could talk about inherited memory. On the\nother hand, though he does indeed speak of this as almost a synonym for\ninstinct, he seems not to have realised how right he was, and implies\nthat we should find some fuller and more satisfactory explanation behind\nthis, only that we are too lazy to look for it.\n\n{44a} 26 Sept., 1877. \u201cUnconscious Memory.\u201d ch. ii.\n\n{52a} This chapter is taken almost entirely from my book, \u201cSelections,\n&c.. and Remarks on Romanes\u2019 \u2018Mental Evolution in Animals.\u2019\u201d Tr\u00fcbner,\n1884. [Now out of print.]\n\n{52b} \u201cMental Evolution in Animals,\u201d p. 113. Kegan Paul, Nov., 1883.\n\n{52c} Ibid. p. 115.\n\n{52d} Ibid. p. 116.\n\n{53a} \u201cMental Evolution in Animals.\u201d p. 131. Kegan Paul, Nov., 1883.\n\n{54a} Vol. I, 3rd ed., 1874, p. 141, and Problem I. 21.\n\n{54b} \u201cMental Evolution in Animals,\u201d pp. 177, 178. Nov., 1883.\n\n{55a} \u201cMental Evolution in Animals,\u201d p. 192.\n\n{55b} _Ibid._ p. 195.\n\n{55c} _Ibid._ p. 296. Nov., 1883.\n\n{56a} \u201cMental Evolution in Animals,\u201d p. 33. Nov., 1883.\n\n{56b} _Ibid._, p. 116.\n\n{56c} _Ibid._, p. 178.\n\n{59a} \u201cEvolution Old and New,\u201d pp. 357, 358.\n\n{60a} \u201cMental Evolution in Animals,\u201d p. 159. Kegan Paul & Co., 1883.\n\n{61a} \u201cZoonomia,\u201d vol. i. p. 484.\n\n{61b} \u201cMental Evolution in Animals,\u201d p. 297. Kegan Paul & Co., 1883.\n\n{61c} _Ibid._, p. 201. Kegan Paul & Co., 1883.\n\n{62a} \u201cMental Evolution in Animals,\u201d p. 301. November, 1883.\n\n{62b} \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d ed. i. p. 209.\n\n{62c} _Ibid._, ed. vi., 1876. p. 206.\n\n{62d} \u201cFormation of Vegetable Mould,\u201d etc., p. 98.\n\n{62e} Quoted by Mr. Romanes as written in the last year of Mr. Darwin\u2019s\nlife.\n\n{63a} Macmillan, 1883.\n\n{66a} \u201cNature,\u201d August 5, 1886.\n\n{67a} London, H. K. Lewis, 1886.\n\n{70a} \u201cCharles Darwin.\u201d Longmans, 1885.\n\n{70b} Lectures at the London Institution, Feb., 1886.\n\n{70c} \u201cCharles Darwin.\u201d Leipzig. 1885.\n\n{72a} See Professor Hering\u2019s \u201cZur Lehre von der Beziehung zwischen Leib\nund Seele. Mittheilung \u00fcber Fechner\u2019s psychophysisches Gesetz.\u201d\n\n{73a} Quoted by M. Vianna De Lima in his \u201cExpos\u00e9 Sommaire des Th\u00e9ories\nTransformistes de Lamarck, Darwin, et H\u00e6ckel.\u201d Paris, 1886, p. 23.\n\n{81a} \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d ed. i., p. 6; see also p. 43.\n\n{83a} \u201cI think it can be shown that there is such a power at work in\n\u2018Natural Selection\u2019 (the title of my book).\u201d\u2014\u201cProceedings of the Linnean\nSociety for 1858,\u201d vol. iii., p. 51.\n\n{86a} \u201cOn Naval Timber and Arboriculture,\u201d 1831, pp. 384, 385. See also\n\u201cEvolution Old and New,\u201d pp. 320, 321.\n\n{87a} \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d p. 49, ed. vi.\n\n{92a} \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d ed. i., pp. 188, 189.\n\n{93a} Page 9.\n\n{94a} Page 226.\n\n{96a} \u201cJournal of the Proceedings of the Linnean Society.\u201d Williams and\nNorgate, 1858, p. 61.\n\n{102a} \u201cZoonomia,\u201d vol. i., p. 505.\n\n{104a} See \u201cEvolution Old and New.\u201d p. 122.\n\n{105a} \u201cPhil. Zool.,\u201d i., p. 80.\n\n{105b} _Ibid._, i. 82.\n\n{105c} _Ibid._ vol. i., p. 237.\n\n{107a} See concluding chapter.\n\n{122a} Report, 9, 26.\n\n{135a} Ps. cii. 25\u201327, Bible version.\n\n{136a} Ps. cxxxix., Prayer-book version.\n\n{140a} _Contemporary Review_, August, 1885, p. 84.\n\n{142a} London, David Bogue, 1881, p. 60.\n\n{144a} August 12, 1886.\n\n{150a} Paris, Delagrave, 1886.\n\n{150b} Page 60.\n\n{150c} \u201c\u0152uvre compl\u00e8tes,\u201d tom. ix. p. 422. Paris, Garnier fr\u00e8res, 1875.\n\n{150d} \u201cHist. Nat.,\u201d tom. i., p. 13, 1749, quoted \u201cEvol. Old and New,\u201d\np. 108.\n\n{156a} \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d ed. vi., p. 107.\n\n{156b} _Ibid._, ed. vi., p. 166.\n\n{157a} \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d ed. vi., p. 233.\n\n{157b} _Ibid._\n\n{157c} _Ibid._, ed. vi., p. 109.\n\n{157d} _Ibid._, ed. vi., p. 401.\n\n{158a} \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d ed. i., p. 490.\n\n{161a} \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d ed. vi., 1876, p. 171.\n\n{163a} \u201cCharles Darwin,\u201d p. 113.\n\n{164a} \u201cAnimals and Plants under Domestication,\u201d vol. ii., p. 367, ed.\n1875.\n\n{168a} Page 3.\n\n{168b} Page 4.\n\n{169a} It should be remembered this was the year in which the \u201cVestiges\nof Creation\u201d appeared.\n\n{173a} \u201cCharles Darwin,\u201d p. 67.\n\n{173b} H. S. King & Co., 1876.\n\n{174a} Page 17.\n\n{195a} \u201cPhil. Zool.,\u201d tom. i., pp. 34, 35.\n\n{202a} \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d p. 381, ed. i.\n\n{203a} Page 454, ed. i.\n\n{205a} \u201cPrinciples of Geology,\u201d vol. ii., chap. xxxiv., ed. 1872.\n\n{206a} \u201cNat\u00fcrliche Sch\u00f6pfungsgeschichte,\u201d p. 3. Berlin, 1868.\n\n{209a} See \u201cEvolution Old and New,\u201d pp. 8, 9.\n\n{216a} \u201cVestiges,\u201d &c., ed. 1860; Proofs, Illustrations, &c., p. xiv.\n\n{216b} _Examiner_, May 17, 1879, review of \u201cEvolution Old and New.\u201d\n\n{218a} Given in part in \u201cEvolution Old and New.\u201d\n\n{219a} \u201cMind,\u201d p. 498, Oct., 1883.\n\n{224a} \u201cDegeneration,\u201d 1880, p. 10.\n\n{227a} E.g. the Rev. George Henslow, in \u201cModern Thought,\u201d vol. ii., No.\n5, 1881.\n\n{232a} \u201cNature,\u201d Aug. 6, 1886.\n\n{234a} See Mr. Darwin\u2019s \u201cAnimals and Plants under Domestication,\u201d vol.\ni., p. 466, &c., ed. 1875.\n\n{235a} Paris, 1873, Introd., p. vi.\n\n{235b} \u201cHist. Nat. Gen.,\u201d ii. 404, 1859.\n\n{239a} As these pages are on the point of going to press, I see that the\nwriter of an article on Liszt in the \u201cAthen\u00e6um\u201d makes the same emendation\non Shakespeare\u2019s words that I have done.\n\n{240a} \u201cVoyages of the _Adventure_ and _Beagle_,\u201d vol. iii., p. 373.\nLondon, 1839.\n\n{242a} See Professor Paley, \u201cFraser,\u201d Jan., 1882, \u201cScience Gossip,\u201d Nos.\n162, 163, June and July, 1878, and \u201cNature,\u201d Jan. 3, Jan. 10, Feb. 28,\nand March 27, 1884.\n\n{245a} \u201cFormation of Vegetable Mould,\u201d etc., p. 217. Murray, 1882.\n\n{248a} \u201cFortnightly Review,\u201d Jan., 1886.\n\n{253a} \u201cOn the Growth of Trees and Protoplasmic Continuity.\u201d London,\nStanford, 1886.\n\n{260a} Sometimes called Mendelejeff\u2019s (see \u201cMonthly Journal of Science,\u201d\nApril, 1884).\n\n{261a} I am aware that attempts have been made to say that we can\nconceive a condition of matter, although there is no matter in connection\nwith it\u2014as, for example, that we can have motion without anything moving\n(see \u201cNature,\u201d March 5, March 12, and April 9, 1885)\u2014but I think it\nlittle likely that this opinion will meet general approbation.\n\n{264a} Page 53.","title":"Luck, or Cunning, as the Main Means of Organic Modification","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":84136}