{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_50086/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_50086","id":"gutenberg_50086","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50086","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Creation","Evolution"],"text":"Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this\n      file which includes the original illustration.\n      See 50086-h.htm or 50086-h.zip:\n      (https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/50086/pg50086-images.html)\n      or\n      (https://www.gutenberg.org/files/50086/50086-h.zip)\n\n\n      Images of the original pages are available through\n      Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries. See\n      https://archive.org/details/creationorevolut00curtuoft\n\n\nTranscriber's note:\n\n      Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).\n\n      Text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face (=bold=).\n\n\n\n\n\nCREATION OR EVOLUTION?\n\nA Philosophical Inquiry.\n\nby\n\nGEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNew York:\nD. Appleton and Company,\n1, 3, And 5 Bond Street.\n1887.\n\nCopyright, 1887.\nby George Ticknor Curtis.\n\n\n\n    TO\n    LEWIS A. SAYRE, M. D.,\n    WHOSE PROFESSIONAL EMINENCE IS RECOGNIZED\n    IN BOTH HEMISPHERES,\n    WHOSE SKILL AS A SURGEON\n    SUFFERING HUMANITY GRATEFULLY ACKNOWLEDGES,\n    TO WHOSE ANATOMICAL LEARNING\n    THE AUTHOR IS LARGELY INDEBTED,\n    AND OF WHOSE FRIENDSHIP HE IS PROUD,\n    This Book\n    IS AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED.\n\n\n    \"_Dost thou not know, my new astronomer!\n    Earth, turning from the sun, brings night to man?\n    Man, turning from his God, brings endless night;\n    Where thou canst read no morals, find no friend,\n    Amend no manners, and expect no peace._\"\n\n    _YOUNG'S NIGHT THOUGHTS._\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nPerhaps it is expected of a writer who steps out of the sphere of his\nordinary pursuits, and deals with such a subject as that which is\ntreated in this work, that he will account for his so doing. It is not\nnecessary for me to say that no class of men can have a monopoly in any\nsubject. But I am quite willing to take my readers into my confidence\nso far as to state how I came to write this book.\n\nMost men, who have a special pursuit, find the necessity for recreation\nof some kind. Some take it in one way, and some in another. It has been\nmy habit through life to seek occasional relief from the monotony of\nprofessional vocations in intellectual pursuits of another character.\nHaving this habit--which I have found by experience has no tendency\nto lessen one's capacity for the duties of a profession, or one's\nrelish of its occupations--I some years ago took up the study of the\nmodern doctrine of animal evolution. Until after the death of the late\nMr. Charles Darwin, I had not given a very close attention to this\nsubject. The honors paid to his memory, and due to his indefatigable\nresearch and extensive knowledge, led me to examine his \"Descent of\nMan\" and his \"Origin of Species,\" both of which I studied with care,\nand I trust with candor. I was next induced to examine the writings\nof Mr. Herbert Spencer on the subject of evolution, with which I had\nalso been previously unacquainted except in a general way. I was a\ngood deal surprised at the extent of Mr. Spencer's reputation as a\nthinker, and by the currency which his peculiar philosophy has had in\nthis country, where it has led, among the young and inexperienced, as\nwell as among older persons, to very incorrect habits of reasoning on\nsubjects of the highest importance. The result of my studies of these\nwriters is the present book. I have written it because I have seen,\nor believe that I have seen, where the conflict arises between some\nof the deductions of modern science and the principles which ought to\nregulate not only religious belief, but belief in anything that is\nnot open to the direct observation of our senses. But I trust that I\nshall not be understood as having written for the purpose of specially\ndefending the foundations of religious belief. This is no official\nduty of mine. How theologians manage, or ought to manage, the argument\nwhich is to convince men of the existence and methods of God, it is\nnot for me to say. But a careful examination of the new philosophy\nhas convinced me that those who are the special teachers of religious\ntruth have need of great caution in the admissions or concessions which\nthey make, when they undertake to reconcile some of the conclusions\nof modern scientists with belief in a Creator. I do not here speak of\nthe Biblical account of the creation, but I speak of that belief in\na Creator which is to be deduced from the phenomena of nature. While\nthere are naturalists, scientists, and philosophers at the present\nday, whose speculations do not exclude the idea of a Supreme Being,\nthere are others whose theories are entirely inconsistent with a belief\nin a personal God, the Creator and Governor of the universe. Moreover,\nalthough there are great differences in this respect between the\ndifferent persons who accept evolution in some form, the whole doctrine\nof the development of distinct species out of other species makes\ndemands upon our credulity which are irreconcilable with the principles\nof belief by which we regulate, or ought to regulate, our acceptance\nof any new matter of belief. The principles of belief which we apply\nin the ordinary affairs of life are those which should be applied to\nscientific or philosophical theories; and inasmuch as the judicial\nmethod of reasoning upon facts is at once the most satisfactory and the\nmost in accordance with common sense, I have here undertaken to apply\nit to the evidence which is supposed to establish the hypothesis of\nanimal evolution, in contrast with the hypothesis of special creations.\n\nI am no ecclesiastic. I advance no arguments in favor of one or another\ninterpretation of the Scriptures about which there is controversy among\nChristians. While I firmly believe that God exists, and that he has\nmade a revelation to mankind, whereby he has given us direct assurance\nof immortality, I do not know that this belief disqualifies me from\njudging, upon proper principles of evidence, of the soundness of a\ntheory which denies that he specially created either the body or the\nmind of man. How far the hypothesis of evolution, by destroying our\nbelief that God specially created us, tends to negative any purpose\nfor which we can suppose him to have made to us a revelation of our\nimmortality, it is for the theologian to consider. For myself, I am\nnot conscious that in examining the theory of evolution I have been\ninfluenced by my belief in what is called revealed religion. I have,\nat all events, studiously excluded from the argument all that has been\ninculcated by the Hebrew or the Christian records as authorized or\ninspired teachings, and have treated the Mosaic account of the creation\nlike any other hypothesis of the origin of man and the other animals.\nThe result of my study of the hypothesis of evolution is, that it is an\ningenious but delusive mode of accounting for the existence of either\nthe body or the mind of man; and that it employs a kind of reasoning\nwhich no person of sound judgment would apply to anything that might\naffect his welfare, his happiness, his estate, or his conduct in the\npractical affairs of life.\n\nHe who would truly know what the doctrine of evolution is, and to\nwhat it leads, must literally begin at the beginning. He must free\nhis mind from the cant of agnosticism and from the cant of belief. He\nmust refuse to accept dogmas on the authority of any one, be they the\ndogmas of the scientist, or of the theologian. He must learn that his\nmental nature is placed under certain laws, as surely as his corporeal\nstructure; and he must cheerfully obey the necessities which compel him\nto accept some conclusions and to reject others. Keeping his reasoning\npowers in a well-balanced condition, he must prove all things, holding\nfast to that which is in conformity with sound deduction, and to that\nalone. But all persons may not be able to afford the time to pursue\ntruth in this way, or may not have the facilities for the requisite\nresearch. It seemed to me, therefore, that an effort to do for them\nwhat they can not do for themselves would be acceptable to a great many\npeople.\n\nIt may be objected that the imaginary philosopher whom I have\nintroduced in some of my chapters under the name of Sophereus, or the\nsearcher after wisdom, debating the doctrines of evolution with a\nsupposed disciple of that school, whom I have named Kosmicos, is an\nimpossible person. It may perhaps be said that the conception of a man\nabsolutely free from all dogmatic religious teaching, from all bias to\nany kind of belief, and yet having as much knowledge of various systems\nof belief as I have imputed to this imaginary person, would in modern\nsociety be the conception of an unattainable character. My answer to\nthis criticism would be that I felt myself at liberty to imagine any\nkind of character that would suit my purpose. How successfully I have\ncarried out the idea of a man in mature life entirely free from all\npreconceived opinions, and forming his beliefs upon principles of\npure reason, it is for my readers to judge. With regard to the other\ninterlocutor in the dialogues, I hope it is not necessary for me to\nsay that I do not impute all of his opinions or arguments to the\nprofessors of the evolution school, or to any section of it. He is a\nrepresentative of the effects of some of their teachings, but not an\nindividual portrait. But as, for the purposes of the antagonism, it\nwas expedient to put into the mouth of this person whatever can be\nsaid in favor of the hypothesis of evolution, it became necessary to\nmake him represent the dogmatic side of the theory; and thus to make\nthe collision and contrast between the minds of the two debaters as\nstrong as I could. Controversial discussion in the form of debate has\nbeen used from the time of Plato. While I have adopted a method, I have\nnot presumed to imitate its great exemplars. But for the value of that\nmethod I shall presently cite weighty testimony. It was a relief to\nme to resort to it after having pursued the subject in the more usual\nform of discussion; and indeed it forced itself upon me as a kind of\nnecessity, because it seemed the fairest way of presenting what could\nbe said on both sides of the question. I hope it may have the good\nfortune to keep alive the interest of the reader, after he has perused\nthe previous chapters.\n\nOne disadvantage of all positive writing or discourse is that there is\nno one to confute, to contradict, or to maintain the negative. At the\nbar, and in some public assemblies, there is an antagonist; and truth\nis elicited by the collision. But in didactic writing, especially on a\nphilosophical topic, it is best to introduce an antagonist, and to make\nhim speak in his own person. Two of the best thinkers of our time have\nforcibly stated the advantage--the necessity, in short--of personal\ndebate. Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his essay on Liberty, observes that--\n\n\"The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living\napprehension of a truth as is afforded by the necessity of explaining\nit to or defending it against opponents, though not sufficient to\noutweigh, is no trifling drawback from the benefits of its universal\nrecognition. Where this advantage can not be had, I confess I should\nlike to see the teachers of mankind endeavoring to provide a substitute\nfor it; some contrivance for making the difficulties of the question as\npresent to the learner's consciousness as if they were pressed upon him\nby a dissentient champion eager for his conversion.\n\n\"But instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose, they have lost\nthose they formerly had. The Socratic dialectics, so magnificently\nexemplified in the dialogues of Plato, were a contrivance of this\ndescription. They were essentially a discussion of the great questions\nof life and philosophy, directed with consummate skill to the purpose\nof convincing any one, who had merely adopted the commonplaces of\nreceived opinion, that he did not understand the subject--that he as\nyet attached no definite meaning to the doctrines he professed, in\norder that, becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the way\nto attain a stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension both of the\nmeaning of doctrines and of their evidence. The school disputations\nof the middle ages had a similar object. They were intended to make\nsure that the pupil understood his own opinion, and (by necessary\ncorrelation) the opinion opposed to it, and could enforce the grounds\nof one and confute those of the other. The last-mentioned contests\nhad, indeed, the incurable defect that the premises appealed to were\ntaken from authority, not from reason; and as a discipline to the mind\nthey were in every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which\nformed the intellects of the 'Socratici viri.' But the modern mind\nowes far more to both than it is generally willing to admit; and the\npresent modes of instruction contain nothing which in the smallest\ndegree supplies the place either of the one or of the other.... It\nis the fashion of the present time to disparage negative logic--that\nwhich points out weakness in theory or errors in practice, without\nestablishing positive truths. Such negative criticism would indeed\nbe poor enough as an ultimate result, but as a means to attaining\nany positive knowledge or conviction worthy the name, it can not be\nvalued too highly; and until people are again systematically trained\nto it there will be few great thinkers, and a low general average of\nintellect in any but the mathematical and physical departments of\nspeculation. On any other subject no one's opinions deserve the name\nof knowledge, except so far as he has either had forced upon him by\nothers, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which would\nhave been required of him in carrying on an active controversy with\nopponents.\"\n\nMr. Grote, in his admirable work on \"Plato and the other Companions of\nSocrates,\" has the following passage:\n\n\"Plato is usually extolled by his admirers as the champion of the\nAbsolute--of unchangeable forms, immutable truth, objective necessity,\ncogent and binding on every one. He is praised for having refuted\nProtagoras, who can find no standard beyond the individual recognition\nand belief of his own mind or that of some one else. There is no doubt\nthat Plato often talks in that strain, but the method followed in his\ndialogues, and the general principles of methods which he lays down\nhere as well as elsewhere, point to a directly opposite conclusion.\nOf this the Ph\u00e6drus is a signal instance. Instead of the extreme of\ngenerality, it proclaims the extreme of speciality. The objection\nwhich the Socrates of the Ph\u00e6drus advances against the didactic\nefficacy of written discourse is founded on the fact that it is the\nsame to all readers--that it takes no cognizance of the differences\nof individual minds nor of the same mind at different times. Socrates\nclaims for dialectic debate the valuable privilege that it is constant\naction and reaction between two individual minds--an appeal by the\ninherent force and actual condition of each to the like elements in the\nother--an ever-shifting presentation of the same topics, accommodated\nto the measure of intelligence and cast of emotion in the talkers\nand at the moment. The individuality of each mind--both questioner\nand respondent--is here kept in view as the governing condition of\nthe process. No two minds can be approached by the same road or by\nthe same interrogation. The questioner can not advance a step except\nby the admission of the respondent. Every respondent is the measure\nto himself. He answers suitably to his own belief; he defends by\nhis own suggestions; he yields to the pressure of contradiction and\ninconsistency _when he feels them_, and not before. Each dialogist is\n(to use the Protagorean phrase) the measure to himself of truth and\nfalsehood, according as he himself believes it. Assent or dissent,\nwhichever it may be, springs only from the free working of the\nindividual mind in its actual condition then and there. It is to the\nindividual mind alone that appeal is made, and this is what Protagoras\nasks for.\n\n\"We thus find, in Plato's philosophical character, two extreme opposite\ntendencies and opposite poles co-existent. We must recognize them both,\nbut they can never be reconciled; sometimes he obeys and follows the\none, sometimes the other.\n\n\"If it had been Plato's purpose to proclaim and impose upon every one\nsomething which he called 'Absolute Truth,' one and the same alike\nimperative upon all, he would best proclaim it by preaching or writing.\nTo modify this 'Absolute,' according to the varieties of the persons\naddressed, would divest it of its intrinsic attribute and excellence.\nIf you pretend to deal with an Absolute, you must turn away your eyes\nfrom all diversity of apprehending intellects and believing subjects.\"\n\nWith such testimony to the value of dialectic debate, I hope that my\nadoption of it as a method will be regarded as something better than an\naffectation.\n\nMr. Spencer, in one of his works,[1] referring to and quoting from\nBerkeley's \"Dialogues of Hylas and Philolaus,\" observes that \"imaginary\nconversation affords great facilities for gaining a victory. When\nyou can put into an adversary's mouth just such replies as suit\nyour purpose, there is little difficulty in reaching the desired\nconclusion.\" I have not written to gain a victory; and, indeed, I\nam quite aware that it would be impossible to gain one over those\nwith whom I can have no common ground of reasoning. In the imaginary\nconversations in this work, I have taken great care not to put into\nthe mouth of the supposed representative of the doctrine of evolution\nanything that would suit my own purpose; and, in every instance in\nwhich I have represented him as relying on the authority of Mr. Darwin\nor of Mr. Spencer, I have either made him quote the words or have made\nhim state the positions as I suppose they must be understood, and have\nreferred the reader to the proper page in the works of those writers.\n\nAnd here I will render all honor to the admirable candor with which Mr.\nDarwin discussed objections to his theory which have been propounded by\nothers, and suggested further difficulties himself. If I do not pay the\nsame tribute to Mr. Spencer, the reason will be found in those portions\nof my work in which I have had occasion to call in question his methods\nof reasoning.\n\nSome repetition of facts and arguments will be found in the following\npages in the different aspects in which the subject is treated. This\nhas been intentional. When the tribunal that is addressed is a limited\nand special one, and is composed of a high order of minds accustomed\nto deal with such a science, for example, as jurisprudence, he who\nundertakes to produce conviction can afford to use condensation.\nHe seldom has to repeat what he has once said; and often, the more\ncompact his argument, the more likely it will be to command assent if\nit is clear as well as close. But this work is not addressed to such a\ntribunal. It is written for various classes of readers, some of whom\nhave already a special acquaintance with the subject, some of whom have\nless, and some of whom have now none at all. It is designed to explain\nwhat the theory of evolution is, and to encounter it in the mode\nbest adapted to reach the various minds of which the mass of readers\nis composed. If I had written only for scientists and philosophers, I\nshould not have repeated anything.\n\nFor similar reasons I have added to this volume both a general index\nand a glossary of the scientific and technical terms which I have had\noccasion to use.\n\nThe whole of the text of this work had been written and electrotyped\nbefore I had an opportunity to see the very interesting \"Life and\nCorrespondence\" of the illustrious naturalist, the late Louis Agassiz,\nedited by his accomplished widow, Mrs. Elizabeth Cary Agassiz, and\npublished in October, 1885, by Houghton, Mifflin and Company, Boston.\nFor a long period of years, after his residence in this country began,\nand until my removal from Boston to New York in 1862, I enjoyed as much\nof his intimacy as would be likely to subsist between persons of such\ndifferent pursuits. I believe that I understood his general views of\ncreation, from his lectures and conversation. It is now made entirely\ncertain that he never accepted the doctrine of evolution of distinct\ntypes out of preceding and different types by ordinary generation;\nand it has been to me an inexpressible satisfaction to find that the\nopinions and reasoning contained in my work, and adopted independently\nof any influence of his, are confirmed by what has now been given to\nthe world. I need only refer to his letter to Prof. Sedgwick, written\nin June, 1845, and to his latest utterance, the paper on \"Evolution\nand Permanence of Type,\" in the thirty-third volume of the \"Atlantic\nMonthly,\" published after his lamented death in 1873, for proof\nthat his opinions on the Darwinian theory never changed. Of all the\nscientists whom I have ever known, or whose writings I have read,\nAgassiz always seemed to me the broadest as well as the most exact and\nlogical reasoner.\n\n NEW YORK, _September, 1886_.\n\n FOOTNOTES:\n\n [1] \"Principles of Psychology,\" vol. i, p. 336.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n  CHAPTER I.\n                                                                  PAGE\n\n  Nature and importance of the subject--Is there a relation of Creator\n  and creature between God and man?--Rules of rational belief--Is\n  natural theology a progressive science?                           1\n\n\n  CHAPTER II.\n\n  The Platonic Kosmos compared with the Darwinian theory of\n  evolution                                                        44\n\n\n  CHAPTER III.\n\n  The Darwinian pedigree of man--The evolution of organisms out of\n  other organisms, according to the theory of Darwin               87\n\n\n  CHAPTER IV.\n\n  The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer          131\n\n\n  CHAPTER V.\n\n  The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer further\n  considered                                                      167\n\n\n  CHAPTER VI.\n\n  The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer further\n  considered                                                      200\n\n\n  CHAPTER VII.\n\n  Mr. Spencer's agnosticism--His theory of the origin of religious\n  beliefs--The mode in which mankind are to lose the consciousness\n  of a personal God                                               257\n\n\n  CHAPTER VIII.\n\n  The existence, attributes, and methods of God deducible from the\n  phenomena of Nature--Origin of the solar system                 300\n\n\n  CHAPTER IX.\n\n  Does evolution account for the phenomena of society and of nature?\n  --Necessity for a conception of a personal actor--Mr. Spencer's\n  protoplasmic origin of all organic life--The Mosaic account of\n  creation treated as a hypothesis which may be scientifically\n  contrasted with evolution                                       334\n\n\n  CHAPTER X.\n\n  \"Species,\" \"races,\" and \"varieties\"--Sexual division--Causation 372\n\n\n  CHAPTER XI.\n\n  Origin of the human mind--Mr. Spencer's theory of the composition\n  of mind--His system of morality                                 394\n\n\n  CHAPTER XII.\n\n  Mr. Spencer's philosophy as a whole--His psychology, and his\n  system of ethics--The sacred origin of moral injunctions, and\n  the secularization of morals                                    434\n\n\n  CHAPTER XIII.\n\n  Sophereus discourses on the nature and origin of the human mind 467\n\n\n  GLOSSARY                                                        547\n\n\n  INDEX                                                           557\n\n\n\n\nCREATION OR EVOLUTION?\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\n Nature and importance of the subject--Is there a relation of Creator\n and creature between God and man?--Rules of rational belief--Is\n natural theology a progressive science?\n\n\nMan finds himself in the universe a conscious and thinking being. He\nhas to account to himself for his own existence. He is impelled to this\nby an irresistible propensity, which is constantly leading him to look\nboth inward and outward for an answer to the questions: What am I? How\ncame I to be? What is the limit of my existence? Is there any other\nbeing in the universe between whom and myself there exists the relation\nof Creator and creature?\n\nThe whole history of the human mind, so far as we have any reliable\nhistory, is marked by this perpetual effort to find a First Cause.\n\nHowever wild and fantastic may be the idea which the savage conceives\nof a being stronger and wiser than himself; however groveling and\nsensual may be his conception of the form, or attributes, or action\nof that being, he is, when he strives after the comprehension of his\ndeity, engaged in the same intellectual effort that is made by the\nmost civilized and cultivated of mankind, when, speculating upon the\norigin of the human soul, or its relation to the universe, or the\ngenesis of the material world, they reach the sublime conception of\nan infinite God, the creator of all other spiritual existences and\nof all the forms of animal life, or when they end in the theory that\nthere is no God, or in that other theory which supposes that what we\ncall the creation, man included, is an evolution out of primordial\nmatter, which has been operated upon by certain fixed laws, without any\nspecial interposition of a creating power, exerted in the production\nof the forms of animal life that now inhabit this earth, or ever have\ninhabited it. In the investigation of these contrasted theories, it\nis necessary to remember that the faculties of the human mind are\nessentially the same in all conditions of civilization or barbarism;\nthat they differ only in the degree of their growth, activity, and\npower of reasoning, and therefore that there must be a common standard\nto which to refer all beliefs. The sole standard to which we can refer\na belief in anything is its rationality, or a comparison between that\nwhich is believed and that which is most probable, according to the\npower of human reason to weigh probabilities. In the untutored and\nuncultivated savage, this power, although it exists, is still very\nfeeble; partly because it is exercised upon only a few objects, and\npartly because the individual has comparatively but little opportunity\nto know all the elements which should be taken into account in\ndetermining a question of moral probabilities.\n\nIn the educated and cultivated man this power of judging probabilities,\nof testing beliefs by their rationality, is carried, or is capable of\nbeing carried, to the highest point of development, so as to comprehend\nin the calculation the full elements of the question, or at least to\nreduce the danger of some fatal omission to the minimum. It is, of\ncourse, true that the limited range of our faculties may prevent a full\nview of all the elements of any question of probability, even when our\nfaculties have attained the highest point of development experienced\nby the age in which we happen to live. This renders the rationality of\nany hypothesis less than an absolutely certain test of truth. But this\nrationality is all that we have to apply to any question of belief; and\nif we attend carefully to the fact that moral probabilities constitute\nthe groundwork of all our beliefs, and note the mental processes by\nwhich we reach conclusions upon any question depending upon evidence,\nwe shall find reason to regard this power of testing beliefs by a\nconformity between the hypotheses and that which is most probable to\nbe the most glorious attribute of the human understanding, as it is\nunquestionably the safest guide to which we can trust ourselves.\n\nIt may be that, while philosophers will not object to my definition\nof rationality, churchmen will ask what place I propose to assign to\nauthority in the formation of beliefs. I answer, in the first place,\nthat I am seeking to make myself understood by plain but reflecting\nand reasoning people. Such persons will perceive that what I mean by\nthe rationality of a belief in any hypothesis is its fitness to be\naccepted and acted upon because it has in its favor the strongest\nprobabilities of the case, so far as we can grasp those probabilities.\nI know of no other foundation for a belief in anything; for belief\nis the acceptance by the mind of some proposition, statement, or\nsupposed fact, the truth of which depends upon evidence addressed to\nour senses, or to our intellectual perceptions, or to both. In the\nnext place, in regard to the influence of authority over our beliefs,\nit is to be observed that the existence of the authority is a question\nto be determined by evidence, and this question, therefore, of itself\ninvolves an application of the test of rationality, or conformity with\nwhat is probable. But, assuming that the authority is satisfactorily\nestablished, it is not safe to leave all minds to the teaching of that\nauthority, without the aid of the reasoning, which, independent of\nall authority, would conduct to the same conclusion. There are many\nminds to whom it is useless to say, You are commanded to believe.\nThe question instantly arises, Commanded by whom, or what? And if the\nanswer is, By the Church, or by the Bible, and the matter is left to\nrest upon that statement, there is great danger of unbelief. It is\napparent that a large amount of what is called infidelity, or unbelief,\nnow prevailing in the world, is due to the fact that men are told that\nthey are commanded to believe, as if they were to be passive recipients\nof what is asserted, and because so little is addressed to their\nunderstandings.\n\nI do not wish to be understood as maintaining that there is no place\nfor authority in matters of what is called religious belief. I am quite\nsensible that there may be such a thing as authority even in regard to\nour beliefs; that it is quite within the range of possibilities that\nthere should be such a relation between the human soul and an infinite\nCreator as to require the creature to accept by faith whatever a proved\nrevelation requires that intelligent creature to believe. But, in\nview of the fact that what is specially called revealed religion is\naddressed to an intelligent creature, to whom the revelation itself\nmust be proved by some evidence that will satisfy the mind, there is an\nevident necessity for treating the rationality of a belief in God as\nan independent question. In some way, by some process, we must reach a\nbelief in the existence of a being before we can consider the claims of\na message which that being is supposed to have sent to us. What we have\nto work with, before we can approach the teaching of what is called\nrevealed religion, is the mind of man and the material universe. Do\nthese furnish us with the rational basis for a belief in God?\n\nAnd here I shall be expected to say what I mean by a belief in God.\nI have neither so little reverence for what I myself believe in, nor\nso little respect for my readers, as to offer them anything but the\ncommon conception of God. All that is necessary for me to do, in\norder to put my own mind in contact with that of the reader, is to\nexpress my conception of God just as it would be expressed by any one\nwho is accustomed to think of the being called God by the Christian,\nthe Jew, the Mohammedan, or by some other branches of the human race.\nThese different divisions of mankind may differ in regard to some of\nthe attributes of the Deity, or his dealings with men, or the history\nor course of his government of the world. But what is common to them\nall is a belief in God as the Supreme Being, who is self-existing and\neternal, by whose will all things and all other beings were created,\nwho is infinite in power and wisdom and in goodness and benevolence. As\nan intellectual conception, this idea of a Supreme Being, one only God,\nwho never had a beginning and can have no end, and who is the creator\nof all other beings, excludes, of course, the polytheism of the ancient\ncivilized nations, or that of the present barbarous tribes; and it\nespecially excludes the idea of what the Greeks called Destiny, which\nwas a power that governed the gods as well as the human race, and was\nanterior and superior to Jove himself. The simple conception of the one\nGod held by the Christian, the Jew, or the Mohammedan, as the First\nCause of the universe and all that it embraces, creating all things\nand all other beings by his will, in contrast with the modern idea\nthat they came into existence without the volition of a conscious and\nintelligent being making special creations, is what I present to the\nmind of the reader.\n\nThis idea of God as a matter of belief presents, I repeat, a question\nof moral probabilities. The existence of the universe has to be\naccounted for somehow. We can not shut out this inquiry from our\nthoughts. The human being who never speculates, never thinks, upon the\norigin of his own soul, or upon the genesis of this wondrous frame of\nthings external to himself, or upon his relations to some superior\nbeing, is a very rare animal. If he is much more than an animal, he\nwill have some idea of these things; and the theories by which some of\nthe most cultivated and acute intellects of our race, from the widest\nrange of accumulated physical facts and phenomena yet gathered, have\nundertaken to account for the existence of species without referring\nthem to the volition of an infinite creator, are at once a proof of the\nuniversal pressure of the question of creation upon the human mind, and\nof the logical necessity for treating it as a question dependent upon\nevidence and probability.\n\nI lay out of consideration, now, the longing of the human mind to\nfind a personal God and Creator. This sentiment, this yearning for an\ninfinite father, this feeling of loneliness in the universe without the\nidea of God, is certainly an important moral factor in the question\nof probability; but I omit it now from the number of proofs, because\nit is a sentiment, and because I wish to subject the belief in God as\nthe Creator to the cold intellectual process by which we may discover\na conformity between that hypothesis and the phenomena of Nature as a\ntest of the probable truth. If such a conformity can be satisfactorily\nshown, and if the result of the process as conducted can fairly claim\nto be that the existence of God the Creator has by far the highest\ndegree of probability above and beyond all other hypotheses that have\nbeen resorted to to account for our existence, the satisfaction of a\nmoral feeling of the human heart may well become a source of happiness,\na consolation in all the evils of this life, and a support in the hour\nof death.\n\nBut in this preliminary chapter I ought to state what I understand to\nbe the scientific hypothesis or hypotheses with which I propose to\ncontrast the idea of God as the creator of species by applying the test\nof probability. To discuss the superior claims of one hypothesis over\nanother, without showing that there is a real conflict between them,\nwould be to set up a man of straw for the sake of knocking it down as\nif it were a living and real antagonist. What I desire to do is not to\naim at a cheap victory by attacking something that does not call for\nopposition; but it is to ascertain first whether there is now current\nany explanation or hypothesis concerning the origin of the creation, or\nanything that it contains, which rejects the idea of God as the creator\nof that which we know to exist and as it exists, and then to ascertain\nwhich of the two hypotheses ought to be accepted as the truth, because\nit has in its favor the highest attainable amount of probability. There\nis an amount of probability which becomes to us a moral demonstration,\nbecause our minds are so constituted that conviction depends upon\nthe completeness with which the evidence in favor of one hypothesis\nexcludes the other from the category of rational beliefs.\n\nI pass by the common sort of infidelity which rejects the idea of an\nintelligent creator acting in any manner whatever, whether by special\ncreations or by laws of development operating on some primordial form\nof animal life. But among the modern scientists who have propounded\nexplanations of the origin of species, I distinguish those who do not,\nas I understand, deny that there was an intelligent Creator by whose\nwill some form of animal life was originally called into being, but who\nmaintain that the diversified forms of animal life which we now see\nwere not brought into being by the special will of the Creator as we\nnow know them, but that they were evolved, by a process called natural\nselection, out of some lower type of animated organism. Of this class,\nthe late Mr. Darwin is a representative. There is, however, at least\none philosopher who carries the doctrine of evolution much farther,\nand who, if I rightly understand him, rejects any act of creation,\neven of the lowest and simplest type of animal existence. This is\nMr. Herbert Spencer--a writer who, while he concurs in Mr. Darwin's\ngeneral theory of natural selection as the process by which distinct\norganisms have been evolved out of other organisms, does not admit of\nany primal organism as the origin of the whole series of animals and as\nthe creation of an intelligent will.\n\nIt will be appropriate hereafter to refer to the doctrine of evolution\nas a means of accounting for the existence of the human mind. At\npresent it is only necessary to say that I understand it to be\nmaintained as the hypothesis which has the highest attainable amount\nof evidence in its favor, that distinct species of animals are not a\ncreation but a growth; and also that the mind of man is not a special\ncreation of a spiritual existence, but a result of a long process\nby which organized matter has slowly worked itself from matter into\nintellect. Wherever, for instance, these scientists may place the\nnon-human primate, out of which man has been evolved by what is called\nnatural selection, and whether they do or do not assume that he was a\ncreation of an intelligent will, they do not, as I understand, claim\nthat the primate was endowed with what we call intellect; so that at\nsome time there was a low form of animal life without intellect, but\nintellect became evolved in the long course of countless ages, by the\nprocess of natural selection, through the improving conditions and\nbetter organization of that low animal which had no intellect. In\nother words, we have what the scientist calls the non-human primate,\na low form of animal without intellect, but capable of so improving\nits own physical organization as to create for itself and within\nitself that essence which we recognize as the human mind. Here, then,\nthere is certainly a theory, an hypothesis, which may be and must be\ncontrasted with the idea that the mind of man is a spiritual essence\ncreated by the volition of some other being having the power to create\nsuch existences, and put into a temporary union with a physical\norganization, by the establishment of a mysterious connection which\nmakes the body the instrument of the soul so long as the connection\nexists. If I have stated correctly the theory which assigns the origin\nof the human mind to the process of evolution, I have assuredly not set\nup a man of straw. I stand confronted with an hypothesis which directly\nencounters the idea that the human intellect is a creation, in the\nsense of a direct, intelligent, conscious, and purposed production of\na special character, as the human mind and hand, in the production of\nwhatever is permitted to finite capacities, purposely creates some new\nand independent object of its wishes, its desires, or its wants. The\nhuman mind, says the scientist, was not created by a spiritual being as\na spiritual existence independent of matter, but it grew out of matter,\nthat was at first so organized that it did not manifest what we call\nintellect, but that could so improve its own organization as to evolve\nout of matter what we know as mind.\n\nAnd here I lay out of view entirely the comparative dignity of man as a\nbeing whose existence is to be accounted for by the one hypothesis or\nthe other, because this comparative dignity is not properly an element\nin the question of probability. The doctrine of evolution, as expounded\nby Darwin and other modern scientists, may be true, and we shall still\nhave reason to exclaim with Hamlet, \"What a piece of work is man!\"\n\nOn the other hand, the hypothesis that man is a special creation of\nan infinite workman, if true, does not enhance the mere _a priori_\ndignity of the human race. It may, and it will hereafter appear that\nit does, establish the moral accountability of man to a supreme being,\na relation which, if I correctly understand the doctrine of evolution,\nis left out of the system that supposes intellect to be evolved out of\nthe improving process by which matter becomes nervous organization,\nwhose action exhibits those manifestations which we call mind. The\nmoral accountability of man to a supreme being may, if it becomes\nestablished by proper evidence, be a circumstance that distinguishes\nhim from other animals, and may, therefore, raise him in the scale of\nbeing. But then this dignity is a fact that comes after the process\nof reasoning has shown the relation of creator and creature, and it\nshould not be placed at the beginning of the process among the proofs\nthat are to show that relation. Mr. Darwin, in concluding his great\nwork, \"The Descent of Man,\" which he maintains to have been from some\nvery low type of animated creature, through the apes, who became\nour ancestors, and who were developed into the lowest savages, and\nfinally into the civilized man, has anticipated that his theory will,\nhe regrets to say, be \"highly distasteful to many\"; and he adds, by\nway of parrying this disgust, that \"he who has seen a savage in his\nnative land will not feel much shame if forced to acknowledge that the\nblood of some more humble creature flows in his veins.\" For his own\npart, he adds, he would as soon be descended from a certain heroic\nlittle monkey who exposed himself to great danger in order to save\nthe life of his keeper, as from a savage who delights to torture his\nenemies, offers bloody sacrifices, practices infanticide, etc. Waiving\nfor the present the question whether the man who is called civilized\nis necessarily descended from or through the kind of savage whom Mr.\nDarwin saw in the Tierra del Fuego, or whether that kind of savage is a\ndeteriorated offshoot from some higher human creatures that possessed\nmoral and intellectual characteristics of a more elevated nature, I\nfreely concede that this question of the dignity of our descent is not\nof much logical consequence. However distasteful to us may be the idea\nthat we are descended from the same stock as the apes, and that their\ndirect ancestors are to be traced to some more humble creature until\nwe reach the lowest form of organized and animated matter, the dignity\nof our human nature is not to be reckoned among the probabilities by\nwhich our existence is to be accounted for. It is, in this respect,\nlike the feeling or sentiment which prompts us to wish to find an\ninfinite creator, the father of our spirits and the creator of our\nbodies. As a matter of reasoning, we must prove to ourselves, by\nevidence that satisfies the mind, that God exists. Having reached this\nconviction, the belief in his existence becomes a vast and inestimable\ntreasure. But our wish to believe in God does not help us to attain\nthat belief. In the same way our feeling about the dignity of man, the\nnobleness or ignobleness of our descent from or through one kind of\ncreature or another, may be a satisfaction or a dissatisfaction after\nwe have reached a conclusion, but it affords us no aid in arriving at a\nsatisfactory conclusion from properly chosen premises.\n\nAnd here, in advance of the tests which I shall endeavor to apply to\nthe existence of God and the existence of man as a special creation, I\ndesire to say something respecting the question of a logical antagonism\nbetween science and religion. I have often been a good deal puzzled to\nmake out what those well-meaning persons suppose, who unwarily admit\nthat there is no necessary antagonism between what modern science\nteaches and what religion teaches. Whether there is or is not, depends\nupon what we mean by science and religion. If by science we understand\nthe investigation of Nature, or a study of the structure and conditions\nof everything that we can subject to the observation of our senses,\nand the deduction of certain hypotheses from what we observe, then\nwe must compare the hypotheses with the teachings or conclusions\nwhich we derive from religion. The next question, therefore, is, What\nis religion? If we make it to consist in the Mosaic account of the\ncreation, or in the teachings of the Bible respecting God, we shall\nfind that we have to deal with more or less of conflict between the\ninterpretations that are put upon a record supposed to have been\ninspired, and the conclusions of science. But if we lay aside what is\ncommonly understood by revealed religion, which supposes a special\ncommunication from a superior to an inferior being of something which\nthe former desires the latter to know, after the latter has been for\nsome time in existence, then we mean by religion that belief in the\nexistence of a superior being which we derive from the exercise of\nour reasoning powers upon whatever comes within the observation of\nour senses, and upon our own intellectual faculties. In other words,\nfor what we call natural religion, we look both outward and inward,\nin search of a belief in a Supreme Being. We look outward, because\nthe whole universe is a vast array of facts, from which conclusions\nare to be drawn; and among this array of facts is the construction\nof our bodies. We look inward, because our own minds present another\narray of facts from which conclusions are to be drawn. Now, if the\nconclusions which the scientist draws from the widest observation\nof Nature, including the human mind itself, fail to account for the\nexistence of the mind of man, and natural religion does account for\nit, there is an irreconcilable conflict between science and religion.\nI can not avoid the conviction that Mr. Darwin has missed the point of\nthis conflict. \"I am aware,\" he says, \"that the conclusions arrived\nat in this work will be denounced by some as highly irreligious; but\nhe who denounces them is bound to show why it is more irreligious to\nexplain the origin of man, as a distinct species by descent from a\nlower form, through the laws of variation and natural selection, than\nto explain the birth of the individual through the laws of ordinary\nreproduction.\" I do not understand him, by the terms \"religious\" or\n\"irreligious,\" to refer to anything that involves praise or blame for\nadopting one hypothesis rather than another. I suppose he meant to say\nthat a belief in his theory of the descent of man as a species is no\nmore inconsistent with a belief in God than it is to believe that the\nindividual is brought into being through the operation of the laws of\nordinary reproduction which God has established. This would be strictly\ntrue, if the hypothesis of man's descent as a distinct species from\nsome lower form accounted for his existence by proofs that satisfy\nthe rules of evidence by which our beliefs ought to be and must be\ndetermined. In that case, there would be no inconsistency between his\nhypothesis and that to which natural religion conducts us. On the other\nhand, if the Darwinian hypothesis fails to establish a relation between\nthe soul of man, as a special creation, and a competent creator, then\nthe antagonism between this hypothesis and natural religion is direct,\nimmediate, and irreconcilable; for the essence of religion consists in\nthat relation, and a belief in that relation is what we mean, or ought\nto mean, by religion.\n\nThere is another form in which Mr. Darwin has depreciated the idea of\nany antagonism between his theory and our religious ideas, but it has\nthe same logical defect as the suggestion which I have just considered,\nbecause it involves the same assumption. It is put hypothetically,\nbut it is still an assumption, lacking the very elements of supreme\nprobability that can alone give it force. \"Man,\" he observes, \"may\nbe excused for feeling some pride at having risen, not through his\nown exertions, to the very summit of the organic scale; and the fact\nof his having so risen, instead of being aboriginally placed there,\nmay give him some hope for a still higher destiny in the distant\nfuture.\" I certainly would not misrepresent, and I earnestly desire\nto understand, this distinguished writer. It is a little uncertain\nwhether he here refers to the hope of immortality, or of an existence\nafter the connection between our minds and our bodies is dissolved, or\nwhether he refers to the further elevation of man on this earth in the\ndistant future of terrestrial time. If he referred to the hope of an\nexistence after what we call death, then he ought to have shown that\nhis theory is compatible with such a continued existence of the soul\nof man. It will be one of the points on which I propose to bestow some\nattention, that the doctrine of evolution is entirely incompatible with\nthe existence of the human soul for one instant after the brain has\nceased to act as an organism, and death has wholly supervened; because\nthat doctrine, if I understand it rightly, regards the intellect of\nman as a high development of what in other animals is called instinct,\nand instinct as a confirmed and inherited habit of animal organism to\nact in a certain way. If this is a true philosophical account of the\norigin and nature of intellect, it can have no possible individual\nexistence after the organ called the brain, which has been in the habit\nof acting in a certain way, has perished, any more than there can be\na digestion of food after the stomach or other assimilating organ has\nbeen destroyed. If, on the contrary, the mind of man is a special\ncreation, of a spiritual essence, placed in an intimate union with\nthe body for a temporary period, and made to depend for a time on the\norgans of that body as its means of manifestation and the exercise of\nits spiritual faculties, then it is conceivable that this union may be\nsevered and the mind may survive. Not only is this conceivable, but,\nas I shall endeavor hereafter to show, the proof of it rises very high\nin the scale of probability--so high that we may accept it as a fact,\njust as confidently as we accept many things of which we can not have\nabsolute certainty.\n\nAnd here I think it needful, although not for all readers, but for\nthe great majority, to lay down as distinctly as I can the rules\nof evidence which necessarily govern our beliefs. I do so because,\nin reading the works of many of the modern scientists who have\nespoused the Darwinian doctrine of evolution, I find that the rules\nof evidence are but little observed. There is a very great, often\nan astonishingly great, accumulation of facts, or of assumed facts.\nIt is impossible not to be impressed by the learning, the industry,\nand the range of these writers. Nor would I in the least impugn their\ncandor, or question their accuracy as witnesses of facts, which I am\nnot competent to dispute if I were disposed to do so. But there is one\nthing for which I may suppose myself competent. I have through a long\nlife been accustomed to form conclusions upon facts; and this is what\nevery person does and must do who is asked to accept a new theory or\nhypothesis of any kind upon any subject.\n\nMost of our beliefs depend upon what is called circumstantial\nevidence. There are very few propositions which address themselves to\nour belief upon one direct and isolated proof. We may class most of\nthe perceptions of our senses among the simple and unrelated proofs\nwhich we accept without hesitation, although there is more or less\nof an unconscious and instantaneous process of reasoning, through\nwhich we pass before the evidence of our senses is accepted and acted\nupon. Then there are truths to which we yield an instant assent,\nbecause they prove themselves, as is the case with the mathematical\nor geometrical problems, as soon as we perceive the connection in the\nsteps of the demonstration. Besides these, there are many propositions\nwhich, although they involve moral reasoning, have become axioms about\nwhich we do not care to inquire, but which we assume to have been so\nrepeatedly and firmly established that it would be a waste of time to\ngo over the ground again whenever they come up. But there is a very\nlarge class of propositions which address themselves to our belief,\nwhich do not depend on a single perception through our senses, and are\nnot isolated facts, and are not demonstrable by mathematical truth, and\nare not axioms accepted because they were proved long ago, and have\nby general consent been adopted into the common stock of ideas. The\nclass of beliefs with which the rules of circumstantial evidence are\nconcerned are those where the truth of the proposition, or hypothesis,\nis a deduction from many distinct facts, but the coexistence of which\nfacts leads to the inevitable conclusion that the proposition or\nhypothesis is true. We can not tell why it is that moral conviction is\nforced upon us by the coexistence of certain facts and their tendency\nto establish a certain conclusion. All we know is, that our minds are\nso constituted that we can not resist the force of circumstantial\nevidence if we suffer our faculties to act as reason has taught them.\nBut, then, in any given case, whether we ought to yield our belief\nin anything where we have only circumstantial evidence to guide us,\nthere are certain rules to be observed. The first of these rules is,\nthat every fact in a collection of proofs from which we are to draw\na certain inference must be proved independently by direct evidence,\nand must not be itself a deduction from some other fact. This is the\nfirst step in the process of arranging a chain of moral evidence.\nThere is a maxim in this branch of the law of evidence that you can\nnot draw an inference from an inference. In other words, you can not\ninfer a fact from some other fact, and then unite the former with two\nor more independent facts to make a chain of proofs. Every link in\nthe chain must have its separate existence, and its existence must be\nestablished by the same kind and degree of evidence as if it were the\nonly thing to be proved. The next rule is to place the several facts,\nwhen so proved, in their proper relation to each other in the group\nfrom which the inference is to be drawn. In circumstantial evidence a\nfact may be established by the most direct and satisfactory proofs,\nand yet it may have no relation to other facts with which you attempt\nto associate it. For example, suppose it to be proved that A on a\ncertain occasion bought a certain poison, and that soon after B died\nof that kind of poison; but it does not appear that A and B were ever\nseen together, or stood in any relation to each other. The fact that\nA bought poison would have no proper relation to the other fact that\nB died of that kind of poison. But introduce by independent evidence\nthe third fact, that A knew B intimately, and then add the fourth\nfact, that A had a special motive for wishing B's death, you have some\nground for believing that A poisoned B, although no human eye ever saw\nthe poison administered. From this correlation of all the facts in a\nbody of circumstantial evidence, there follows a third rule, namely,\nthat the whole collection of facts, in order to justify the inference\nsought to be drawn from them, must be consistent with that inference.\nThus, the four facts above supposed are entirely consistent with the\nhypothesis that A poisoned B. But leave out the two intermediate facts,\nor leave out the last one, and B might as well have been poisoned by\nC as by A. Hence there is a fourth rule: that the collection of facts\nfrom which an inference is to be drawn must not only be consistent\nwith the probable truth of that inference, but they must exclude the\nprobable truth of any other inference. Thus, not only must it be shown\nthat A bought poison, that B died of poison, that A was intimate with\nB and had a motive for wishing B's death, but, to justify a belief in\nA's guilt, the motive ought to be shown to have been so strong as to\nexclude the moral probability that B was poisoned by some one else,\nor poisoned himself. It is in the application of these rules that in\ncourts of justice the minds of jurymen often become perplexed with\ndoubts which they can not account for, or else they yield a too easy\ncredence to the guilt of the accused when the question of guilt depends\nupon circumstantial evidence.\n\nI shall not spend much time in contending that these rules of evidence\nmust be applied to scientific investigations which are to affect\nour belief in such a proposition as the descent of man from a common\nancestor with the monkey. This is not only an hypothesis depending upon\ncircumstantial evidence, but it is professedly a deduction from a great\nrange of facts and from a very complex state of facts. In reasoning\nupon such subjects, when the facts which constitute the chain of\ncircumstantial evidence are very numerous, we are apt to regard their\ngreater comparative number as if it dispensed with a rigid application\nof the rules of determination. Every one can see, in the illustration\nabove employed, borrowed from criminal jurisprudence, that the facts\nwhich constitute the chain of circumstantial evidence ought to be\nrigidly tested by the rules of determination before the guilt of the\naccused can be safely drawn as a deduction from the facts. But, in\nreasoning from physical facts to any given physical hypothesis where\nthe facts are very numerous, there is a strong tendency to relax the\nrules of evidence, because, the greater the accumulation of supposed\nfacts becomes, the greater is the danger of placing in the chain of\nevidence something that is not proved, and thus of vitiating the whole\nprocess. To this tendency, which I have observed to be very frequent\namong scientists, I should apply, without meaning any disrespect,\nthe term invention. A great accumulation of facts is made, following\none another in a certain order; all those which precede a certain\nintermediate link are perhaps duly and independently proved, and the\nsame may be the case with those which follow that link. But there is\nno proof of the fact that constitutes the link and makes a complete\nchain of evidence. This vacuity of proof, if one may use such an\nexpression, is constantly occurring in the writings of naturalists, and\nis often candidly admitted. It is gotten over by reasoning from the\nantecedent and the subsequent facts that the intermediate facts must\nhave existed; and then the reasoning goes on to draw the inference of\nthe principal hypothesis from a chain of proof in which a necessary\nintermediate link is itself a mere inference from facts which may be\njust as consistent with the non-existence as with the existence of\nthe supposed intermediate link. In such cases we are often told very\nfrankly that no one has yet discovered that the intermediate link ever\nactually existed; that the researches of science have not yet reached\ndemonstrative proof of the existence of a certain intermediate animal\nor vegetable organization; that geological exploration has not yet\nrevealed to us all the specimens of the animal or vegetable kingdoms\nthat may have inhabited this globe at former periods of time; but that\nthe analogies which lead down or lead up to that as yet undiscovered\nlink in the chain are such that it must have existed, and that we may\nconfidently expect that the actual proof of it will be found hereafter.\nThe difficulty with this kind of reasoning is that it borrows from the\nmain hypothesis which one seeks to establish the means of showing the\nfacts from which the hypothesis is to be drawn as an inference. Thus,\nfor example, the hypothesis is that the species called man is a highly\ndeveloped animal formed by a process of natural selection that went on\nfor unknown ages among the individuals descended from the progenitor\nof the anthropomorphous apes. The facts in the physical organization\nand mental manifestations of the animal called man, when viewed\nhistorically through all the conditions in which we know anything of\nthis species, lead up to that common supposed ancestor of the apes.\nThe facts in the physical organization and instinctive habits of the\nape, when viewed historically through all the conditions in which we\nknow anything of his species, show that he, too, was evolved by the\nprocess of natural selection out of that same ancestor. Intermediate,\nrespectively, between the man and the monkey and their primordial\nnatural-selection ancestor or predecessor, there are links in the chain\nof proof of which we have no evidence, and which must be supplied by\ninferring their existence from the analogies which we can trace in\ncomparing things of which we have some satisfactory proof. Thus, the\nmain hypothesis, the theory of natural selection as the explanation\nof the existence of distinct species of animals, is not drawn from a\ncomplete chain of established facts, but it is helped out by inferring\nfrom facts that are proved other facts that are not proved, but which\nwe have reason to expect will be discovered hereafter. I need not say\nthat this kind of argument will not do in the common affairs of life,\nand that no good reason can be shown why our beliefs in matters of\nscience should be made to depend upon it.\n\nWe do not rest our belief in what is called the law of gravitation\nupon any chain of proof in which it is necessary to supply a link\nby assuming that it exists. The theory that bodies have a tendency\nto approach each other, that the larger mass attracts to itself the\nsmaller by a mysterious force that operates through all space, is a\ndeduction from a great multitude of perpetually recurring facts that\nare open to our observation, no one of which is inferred from any other\nfact, while the whole excludes the moral probability that any other\nhypothesis will account for the phenomena which are continually and\ninvariably taking place around us.\n\nThis illustration of the rules of evidence, when applied to scientific\ninquiries, leads me to refer to one of the favorite postulates of\nthe evolution school. We are often told that it ought to be no\nobjection to the doctrine of evolution that it is new, or startling,\nor contrary to other previous theories of the existence of species.\nWe are reminded again and again that Galileo's grand conception was\nscouted as an irreligious as well as an irrational hypothesis, and\nthat the same reception attended the first promulgation of many\nscientific truths which no intelligent and well-informed person now\ndoubts.[2] Then we have it asserted that the doctrine of evolution\nis now accepted by nearly all the most advanced and accomplished\nnatural philosophers, especially those of the rising scientists who\nhave bestowed most attention upon it. Upon this there are two things\nto be said: First, it is a matter of very little consequence that the\nlearned of a former age did not attend to the proofs of the law of\ngravitation, or of any other new theory of physics, as they should\nhave done, and that they consequently rejected it. Their logical\nhabits of mind, their preconceived religious notions, and many other\ndisturbing causes, rendered them incapable of correct reasoning on some\nparticular subject, while they could reason with entire correctness\non other subjects. Secondly, the extent to which a new theory is\naccepted by those whose special studies lead them to make the necessary\ninvestigations, does not dispense with the application of the laws\nof evidence to the facts which are supposed to establish the theory.\nThe doctrine of evolution addresses itself not only to the scientific\nnaturalist, but to the whole intelligent part of mankind. How is one\nwho does not belong to this class of investigators to regulate his\nbelief in the theory which they propound? Is he to take it on their\nauthority? or is he, while he accords to their statements of facts all\nthe assent which as witnesses they are entitled to expect from him, to\napply to their deduction the same principles of belief that he applies\nto everything else which challenges belief, and to assent or dissent\naccordingly? No one, I presume, will question that the latter is the\nonly way in which any new matter of belief should be approached. I have\nnot supposed that any scientist questions this; but I have referred to\nthe constant iteration that the doctrine of evolution is now generally\nadmitted by men of science, that the assertion, supposing it to be\ntrue, may pass for just what it is worth. It is worth this and no\nmore: that candid, truthful, and competent witnesses, when they speak\nof facts that they have observed, are entitled to be believed as to\nthe existence of those facts. When they assume facts which they do not\nprove, but which are essential links in the chain of evidence, or when\nthe facts which they do prove do not rationally exclude every other\nhypothesis excepting their own, the authority of even the whole body\nof such persons is of no more account than that of any other class\nof intelligent and cultivated men. In the ages when ecclesiastical\nauthority exercised great power over the beliefs of men upon questions\nof physical science, the superiority was accorded to the authority\nwhich claimed it, and the scientist who propounded a new physical\ntheory that did not suit the theologian was overborne. It seems to me\nthat it is a tendency of the present age to substitute the authority\nof scientific experts in the place of the ecclesiastical authority\nof former periods, by demanding that something more than the office\nof witnesses of facts shall be accorded to them. We are told that it\nis a very important proof of the soundness of deductions, that the\ndeductions are drawn by the greater number of the specialists who\nhave examined the facts. Sometimes this is carried so far as to imply\npresumption in those who do not yield assent to the theory, as if it\nought to be accepted upon the authority of the experts whose proper\noffice it is to furnish us with the facts, and whose deductions we have\nto examine upon the strength of their reasoning. Those of us who are\nnot professors of the particular science may be charged with ignorance\nor incapacity if we do not join in the current of scientific opinion.\nBut, after all, the new theory challenges our belief. If we examine it\nat all, we must judge of it, not by the numbers of those who propound\nor accept it, or by any amount of mere authority, but by the soundness\nof the reasoning by which its professors support it.\n\nThe reader is now informed of what he may expect to find discussed\nin this volume. It remains for me to indicate the mode in which the\ndiscussion will be carried on. I propose to divest my own mind, and\nso far as I may to divest the mind of the reader, of all influence\nfrom revealed religion. I shall not refer to the Mosaic account of the\ncreation excepting as I refer to other hypotheses. With its authority\nas an account given by the Deity himself through his chosen servant,\nI have here nothing to do. Nor shall I rely upon the revelation\nrecorded in the New Testament. All the inquiries which I propose to\nmake are those which lie in the domain of natural religion; and while\nI can not expect, in exploring this domain, to make discoveries or to\nfind arguments which can claim the merit of originality, I may avoid\ntraveling in a well beaten path, by pursuing the line of my own\nreflections, without considering whether they coincide with or differ\nfrom the reasonings of others. Although, at a former period of my life,\nI have studied the great writers whose speculations in the science\nof natural theology are the most famous and important pieces in its\nliterature, it is more than forty years since I have looked into one of\nthem; and I do not propose to turn to them now, in order to see whether\nthey have or have not left any traces in my mind. It is quite possible\nthat critics may array against me the authority of some great name or\nnames; but even if I am to be charged with presumption in entering upon\nthis field, it will not be found, so far as I am conscious, that I have\nborrowed an argument, imitated a method, or followed an example.\n\nThere is a passage in one of the writings of Lord Macaulay in which\nthat brilliant essayist maintained that natural theology is not\na progressive science. Macaulay's tendency to paradox was often\naggravated by the superficial way in which he used his multifarious\nknowledge. As in the course of this work I am about to do that which\nhe regarded as idle, namely, to inquire whether natural religion,\naside from revelation, is of any value as a means of reaching a belief\nin the existence and attributes of God and the immortality of man, I\ncite the passage in which Macaulay makes the assertion that natural\ntheology has made no progress from the time of the Greek philosophers\nto the present day: \"As respects natural religion, revelation being\nfor the present altogether left out of the question, it is not easy to\nsee that a philosopher of the present day is more favorably situated\nthan Thales or Simonides. He has before him just the same evidences\nof design in the structure of the universe that the early Greeks had.\nWe say just the same, for the discoveries of modern astronomers and\nanatomists have really added nothing to the force of that argument\nwhich a reflecting mind finds in every beast, bird, insect, fish,\nleaf, flower, and shell. The reasoning by which Socrates in Xenophon's\nhearing confuted the little atheist Aristophanes, is exactly the\nreasoning of Paley's 'Natural Theology.' Socrates makes precisely the\nsame use of the statues of Polycletus and the pictures of Zeuxis which\nPaley makes of the watch. As to the other great question, the question\nwhat becomes of man after death, we do not see that a highly educated\nEuropean, left to his unassisted reason, is more likely to be in the\nright than a Blackfoot Indian. Not a single one of the many sciences\nin which we surpass the Blackfoot Indians throws the smallest light on\nthe state of the soul after the animal life is extinct. In truth, all\nthe philosophers, ancient and modern, who have attempted without the\naid of revelation to prove the immortality of man, from Plato down to\nFranklin, appear to us to have failed deplorably.\n\n\"Then, again, all the great enigmas which perplex the natural\ntheologian are the same in all ages. The ingenuity of a people just\nemerging from barbarism is quite sufficient to propound those enigmas.\nThe genius of Locke or Clarke is quite unable to solve them. It is\na mistake to imagine that subtile speculations touching the Divine\nattributes, the origin of evil, the necessity of human actions, the\nfoundation of moral obligation, imply any high degree of intellectual\nculture. Such speculations, on the contrary, are in a peculiar manner\nthe delight of intelligent children and of half-civilized men. The\nnumber of boys is not small who, at fourteen, have thought enough on\nthese questions to be fully entitled to the praise which Voltaire gives\nto Zadig: 'Il en savait ce qu'on a su dans tous les ages; c'est \u00e0 dire,\nfort peu de chose.'\n\n\"The book of Job shows that, long before letters and arts were known\nto Ionia, these vexing questions were debated with no common skill and\neloquence under the tents of the Idumean emirs; nor has human reason,\nin the course of three thousand years, discovered any satisfactory\nsolution of the riddles which perplexed Eliphaz and Zophar. Natural\ntheology, then, is not a progressive science.\"[3]\n\nHere, in the space of two not very long paragraphs, is a multitude\nof allusions which evince the range of Lord Macaulay's reading, but\nwhich are employed, without very close thinking, in a quite inaccurate\nway, to sustain assertions that are not true. If he had said that a\nmodern philosopher has before him in the structure of the universe\nnot only all the same evidence of design which the early Greeks had,\nbut a great deal more, he would have hit the exact truth. It is\nsimple extravagance to say that modern astronomy has added nothing to\nthe strength of the argument which shows the existence of a supreme\nlawgiver and artificer of infinite power and skill. What did the\nearly Greeks know about the structure of the solar system, the law\nof universal gravitation, and the laws of motion? Compare the ideas\nentertained by the Greek philosophers of the phenomena of the universe\nwith those which modern astronomy has enabled a modern philosopher\nto assume as scientific facts established by rigorous demonstration;\ncompare what was known before the invention of the telescope with\nwhat the telescope has revealed; compare the progress that was made\nin Greek speculative philosophy from the time of Thales to the time\nof Plato, and then say whether natural religion had not made advances\nof the greatest importance even before modern science had multiplied\nthe means for still greater progress. A brief summary of the Greek\nphilosophy concerning the producing causes of phenomena will determine\nwhether Lord Macaulay was right or wrong in the assertion that the\n\"early Greeks\" had as good means of making true deductions in natural\ntheology as the means which exist to-day.\n\nAll scholars who have attended to the history of Greek speculation know\nthat the Greeks held to the belief in polytheistic personal agents as\nthe active producers of the phenomena of Nature. This was the system of\nHomer and Hesiod and the other old poets. This was the popular belief\nheld throughout all the Hellenic world, and it continued to be the\nfaith of the general public, not only after the different schools of\nphilosophy had arisen, but down to and after the time when St. Paul\nstood on Mars Hill and told the men of Athens how he had found that\nthey were in all things too superstitious. Thales, who flourished in\nthe first half of the sixth century before Christ, was the first Greek\nwho suggested a physical agency in place of a personal. He assumed the\nmaterial substance, water, to be the primordial matter and universal\nsubstratum of everything in Nature. All other substances were, by\ntransmutations, generated from water, and when destroyed they all\nreturned into water. His idea of the earth was that it was a flat,\nround surface floating on the immense watery expanse or ocean. In\nthis he agreed with the old poets; but he did not, like them, suppose\nthat the earth extended down to the depths of Tartarus. The Thalesian\nhypothesis, therefore, rejected the Homeric Okeanus, the father of\nall things, and substituted for that personal agency the agency of\none primordial physical substance, by its own energy producing all\nother substances. This is about all that is known of the philosophy of\nThales, and even this is not known from any extant writing of his, but\nit is derived from what subsequent writers, including Aristotle, have\nimputed to him.[4] Why Lord Macaulay should have selected Thales as the\nGreek philosopher who was as favorably situated as a philosopher of\nthe present day for dealing with questions of natural religion, is not\nvery apparent. All that Thales did, assuming that we know what he did,\nwas to strike out a new vein of thought, the direct opposite of the\npoetical and popular idea of the origin of phenomena.\n\nFrom Thales to Plato, a century and a half intervened.[5] During this\nperiod there arose, according to Mr. Grote, twelve distinct schemes\nof philosophy, the authors of which that learned Englishman has\nenumerated, together with an admirable summary of their respective\nsystems. From this summary certain things are apparent. All these\nphilosophers, from Thales to Democritus, while each speculated\nupon Nature in an original vein of his own, endeavored to find an\nexplanation or hypothesis on which to account for the production and\ngeneration of the universe by some physical agency apart from the\nmythical personifications which were believed in by the populace and\nassumed in the poetical theologies. Some of them, without blending\nethics and theology in their speculations, adopted, as the universal\nand sufficient agents, the common, familiar, and pervading material\nsubstances, such as water, fire, air, etc.; others, as Pythagoras and\nhis sect, united with ethical and theological speculations the idea\nof geometrical and arithmetical combinations as the primal scientific\nbasis of the phenomena of Nature. But what was common to all these\nspeculations was the attempt to find a scientific basis on which to\nexplain, by physical generation, by transmutation and motion from place\nto place, the generation of the Kosmos, to take the place of generation\nby a divine personal agency or agencies. But while these speculations\nwere of course unsuccessful, their abundance and variety, the inventive\ngenius which they exhibit, the effort to find a scientific basis apart\nfrom the popular and poetic belief in a multitude of personal and\ndivine agencies, constitute, as Mr. Grote has well said, \"one of the\nmost memorable facts in the history of the Hellenic mind\"; and \"the\nmental effort required to select some known agency and to connect it\nby a chain of reasoning with the result, all this is a new phenomenon\nin the history of the human mind.\" Such an amount of philosophical\nspeculations could not go on for a century and a half without enlarging\nthe means for dealing with questions of natural theology; for they very\nnearly exhausted the \"causings and beginnings\" which could be assigned\nto regular knowable and predictable agencies; and these they carried\nthrough almost every conceivable form of action by which such agencies\ncould be supposed to operate. While the authors of these systems\nof philosophy were constantly hampered by the popular and poetic\nconceptions of a diversified and omnipresent polytheistic agency, a\nbelief which, as Mr. Grote has said, was \"eminently captivating and\nimpressive,\" and which pervaded all the literature of their time,\ntheir speculations accumulated a vast fund of ideas in the sphere of\nscientific explanations, which, although unsatisfactory to modern\nscience, became, when we reach Plato, the principal influence which led\nhim to revert to the former idea of a divine agency, intentionally and\ndeliberately constructing out of a chaotic substratum the system of the\nKosmos; and which also led him to unite with it the idea of a mode in\nwhich it acted on and through the primordial elements of matter.\n\nSo that, from the class of philosophers to whom Lord Macaulay\npresumably referred as \"the early Greeks,\" down to and including Plato,\nthere was a great advance. The earlier Greek philosophers did not\ndivide substance from its powers or properties, nor did they conceive\nof substance as a thing acted upon by power, or of power as a thing\ndistinct from substance. They regarded substance, some primordial\nsubstance, with its powers and properties, as an efficient and\nmaterial cause, and as the sole cause, as a positive and final agent.\nThey did not seek for a final cause apart from the substances which\nthey supposed to be the sole agents operating to produce important\neffects. But, inasmuch as they carried their various theories through\nnearly the whole range of possible speculation, they enabled Plato\nand Aristotle to see that there was a fundamental defect in their\nreasoning; that there must be an abstract conception of power as\nsomething distinct from substance or its properties. It was by Plato\nand Aristotle that this abstract conception was reached, of course\nwithout any influence of what we regard as revelation; and, although\nthey did not always describe correctly the mode in which this power\nhad acted, their perception of the logical necessity for such a final\ncause marks a great progress in philosophical speculation. It entirely\nrefutes Lord Macaulay's assertion that natural theology is not a\nprogressive science. It had made great progress from Thales to Plato;\nand while in a certain sense it is true that \"a modern philosopher\nhas before him just the same evidence of design in the structure of\nthe universe which the early Greeks had\"--that is, he has the same\nphysical phenomena to observe--it is not true that the early Greeks\ndid not develop conceptions of the origin of the universe valuable\nto their successors. Lord Macaulay should not have compared Thales\nwith the modern philosopher, in respect of advantage of situation,\nbut he should have compared the modern philosopher with Plato, and\nPlato with his predecessors; and if he had done this, he could not\nhave asserted with any show of truth that natural theology has\nmade no advance as a science from the time of Thales, the Milesian\nphilosopher, and Simonides, the poet, to the present day. I shall have\noccasion hereafter to speak of the masterly intellectual power by\nwhich Plato wrought out his conception of a formative divine agency in\nthe production of the Kosmos, and the bold and original speculation\nby which he avoided the charge of infidelity toward the established\nreligion of his countrymen.\n\nWhen I come to speak of what modern astronomy has done in furnishing\nus with new means of sound philosophical speculation on the being,\nattributes, and methods of God, it will be seen whether Lord Macaulay\nis correct in the assertion that it has added nothing to the argument.\nAt present I will briefly advert to what the \"early Greeks,\" or any of\nthe Greeks, knew of the structure of the solar system. We learn, from\na work which dates from nearly the middle of the second century of the\nChristian era, what was the general conception of the solar system\namong the ancients, including the Greeks. This work is known as the\n\"Almagest\" of Ptolemy, and the name of the \"Ptolemaic System\" has been\ngiven to the theory which he describes. This theory was common to all\nthe ancient astronomers, Ptolemy's statement of it being a compendium\nof what they believed. Its principal features are these: 1. The heavens\nare a vast sphere, in which the heavenly bodies are set, and around the\npole of this sphere they revolve in a circle every day. 2. The earth\nis likewise a sphere, and is situated in the center of the celestial\nplane as a fixed point. The earth having no motion, and being in the\ncenter of all the motions of the other bodies, the diurnal revolutions\nof those bodies are in a uniform motion around it. 3. The sun, being\none of the heavenly bodies making a revolution around the earth, was\nsupposed to be placed outside of the position of Venus in the heavenly\nsphere. The order of the Ptolemaic system was thus: The moon was first,\nbeing nearest to the earth; then came Mercury and Venus, the sun being\nbetween Venus and Mars. Beyond Mars came Jupiter and Saturn. Plato's\narrangement was in one respect different, his order being the moon, the\nsun, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. But this ideal heavenly\nsphere, with the earth in the center of all the revolutions of the\nother bodies, and remaining quiescent--a theory which was common to all\nthe ancient astronomers--was the result of observing the motions of\nthe heavenly bodies as they appear to a spectator on the earth. Such a\nspectator would have this appearance of a celestial sphere presented\nto him wherever he might be; and, judging from the apparent motions\nof the heavenly bodies relative to his own position at the center, he\nwould conclude that the earth is at that center, and that it remains\nat rest, supported on nothing. It required certain discoveries to\nexplode this system of a celestial sphere. First came Copernicus, who,\nabout the middle of the sixteenth century of our era, published his\ndemonstrations, which convinced the world of two great propositions: 1.\nThat the diurnal revolution of the heavens is nothing but an apparent\nmotion, caused by the revolution of the earth on its own axis. 2. That\nthe earth is but one of a group of planets, all of which revolve around\nthe sun as a center. Next came Kepler, who, in the early part of the\nseventeenth century, recognizing the truth of the Copernican system,\ndetermined the three laws of planetary motion: 1. That the orbit of\neach planet is an ellipse, the sun being in one focus. 2. That as each\nplanet moves around the sun, the line which joins it to the sun passes\nover equal areas in equal times. 3. That the square of the time of a\nplanet's revolution around the sun is in proportion to the cube of its\nmean distance from the sun. These laws were discovered by Kepler as\ndeductions made upon mathematical principles from observations which\nhad to be carried on without the aid of the telescope, and without that\nknowledge of the general laws of motion which came later. Kepler's\nlaws, although in the main correct, were subsequently found to be\nsubject to certain deviations in the planetary motions. It was when\nGalileo, the contemporary of Kepler, who, if he was not the first\ninventor of the telescope, was the first to use it in astronomical\nobservations, was able by means of it to discover the general laws of\nmotion, that the substantial accuracy of Kepler's three laws could be\nproved, while at the same time the deviations from them were accounted\nfor. Still, there was wanting the grand discovery, which would disclose\nthe cause of these motions of the planets in elliptical orbits, and the\nrelations between their distances and their times of revolution, and\nthus reduce the whole of the phenomena to a general law. Descartes,\nwho flourished 1596-1650, first attempted to do this by his theory of\nVortices. He supposed the sun to be immersed in a vast fluid, which, by\nthe sun's rotation, was made to rotate in a whirlpool, that carried the\nplanets around with it, the outer ones revolving more slowly because\nthe parts of the ethereal fluid in which they were immersed moved more\nslowly. This was a reversion back to some of the ancient speculations.\nIt was reserved for Newton to discover the law of universal\ngravitation, by which, in the place of any physical connection between\nthe bodies of the solar system by any intervening medium, the force\nof attraction exerted by a larger body upon a smaller would draw the\nsmaller body out of the straight line that it would pursue when under\na projectile force, and would thus convert its motion into a circular\nrevolution around the attracting body, and make the orbit of this\nrevolution elliptical by the degree in which the attracting force\nvaried in intensity according to the varying distance between the two\nbodies. When Newton's laws of motion were discovered and found to be\ntrue, the phenomena of the solar system were explained.\n\nIt may be interesting, before leaving for the present this branch of\nthe subject, to advert more particularly to one of the philosophical\nsystems of the Greeks, which, when compared with the discoveries of\nmodern astronomy, illustrates the great addition that has been made\nto our means of sound speculation upon the origin of the material\nuniverse. I refer to the system of the Pythagoreans--one of the most\nremarkable instances of the invention of facts to fit and carry out\na theory that can be found in the history of philosophy, although\nwe are not without striking examples of this practice in modern\nspeculations. It has already been seen that, during the whole period\nof Greek philosophy before the time of Plato, the problem was to find\na primordial and universal agent by which the sensible universe was\nbuilt up and produced; supplying, that is to say, the matter and force\nrequired for the generation of successive products.[6] It has been seen\nthat the Thalesian philosophers undertook to solve this problem by the\nemployment of some primordial physical substance, such as water, fire,\nair, etc. Pythagoras and his school held that the essence of things\nconsisted in number; by which they did not mean simply that all things\ncould be numbered, but they meant that numbers were substance, endowed\nwith an active force, by which things were constituted as we know them.\nIn the Pythagorean doctrine number was the self-existing reality; not,\nas in Plato's system of ideas, separate from things, but as the essence\nor determining principles of things, and having, moreover, magnitude\nand active force.[7] This remarkably subtle conception of an agent in\nthe production of material things evinces the effort that was making,\nin a direction opposite to that of Thales and his immediate successors,\nto find a First Cause. It was carried out by the Pythagoreans in the\nmovements of the heavenly bodies, in the works of human art, and in\nmusical harmony; in all of which departments, according to Mr. Grote,\nthey considered measure and number as the producing and directing\nagencies. We are here concerned only with their application of this\ntheory to the celestial bodies. One of their writers is quoted by Mr.\nGrote as a representative of the school which was founded by Pythagoras\n(about 530 B. C.), and which extended into the Gr\u00e6co-Italian\ncities, where, as a brotherhood, they had political ascendency\nuntil they were put down and dispersed about 509 B. C.; but\nthey continued for several generations as a social, religious, and\nphilosophical sect. According to this writer (Philolaus), \"the Dekad,\nthe full and perfect number, was of supreme and universal efficacy as\nthe guide and principle of life, both to the Kosmos and to man. The\nnature of number was imperative and law-giving, affording the only\nsolution of all that was perplexing or unknown; without number all\nwould be indeterminate and unknowable.\"\n\nAccordingly, the Pythagoreans constructed their system of the universe\nby the all-pervading and producing energy of this primordial agent,\nNumber, in the manner thus described by Mr. Grote (i, 12-15): \"The\nPythagoreans conceived the Kosmos, or the universe, as one single\nsystem, generated out of numbers. Of this system the central point--the\ndetermining or limiting One--was first in order of time and in order of\nphilosophical conception. By the determining influence of this central\nconstituted One, portions of the surrounding Infinite were successively\nattracted and brought into system: numbers, geometrical figures, solid\nsubstances were generated. But, as the Kosmos thus constituted was\ncomposed of numbers, there could be no continuum; each numeral unit\nwas distinct and separate from the rest by a portion of vacant space,\nwhich was imbibed, by a sort of inhalation, from the infinite space or\nspirit without. The central point was fire, called by the Pythagoreans\nthe Hearth of the Universe (like the public hearth or perpetual fire\nmaintained in the prytaneum of a Grecian city), or the watch-tower of\nZeus. Around it revolved, from west to east, ten divine bodies, with\nunequal velocities, but in symmetrical movement or regular dance.\nOutermost was the circle of the fixed stars, called by the Pythagoreans\nOlympus, and composed of fire like the center. Within this came\nsuccessively, with orbits more and more approximating to the center,\nthe five planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury; next, the sun,\nthe moon, and the earth. Lastly, between the earth and the central\nfire, an hypothetical body, called the Antichthon, or counter-earth,\nwas imagined for the purpose of making up a total represented by\nthe sacred number ten, the symbol of perfection and totality. The\nAntichthon was analogous to a separated half of the earth, simultaneous\nwith the earth in its revolutions, and corresponding with it on the\nopposite side of the central fire. The inhabited portion of the earth\nwas supposed to be that which was turned away from the central fire\nand toward the sun, from which it received light. But the sun itself\nwas not self-luminous: it was conceived as a glassy disk, receiving\nand concentrating light from the central fire, and reflecting it upon\nthe earth, so long as the two were on the same side of the central\nfire. The earth revolved in an orbit obliquely intersecting that of the\nsun, and in twenty-four hours, round the central fire, always turning\nthe same side toward that fire. The alternation of day and night was\noccasioned by the earth being, during a part of such revolution, on the\nsame side of the central fire with the sun, and thus receiving light\nreflected from him; and during the remaining part of her revolution on\nthe side opposite to him, so that she received no light at all from\nhim. The earth, with the Antichthon, made this revolution in one day;\nthe moon, in one month; the sun, with the planets Mercury and Venus,\nin one year; the planets Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn in longer periods\nrespectively, according to their distances from the center; lastly, the\noutermost circle of the fixed stars (the Olympus, or the Asslanes), in\nsome unknown period of very long duration.\n\n\"The revolutions of such grand bodies could not take place, in the\nopinion of the Pythagoreans, without producing a loud and powerful\nsound; and as their distances from the central fire were supposed to\nbe arranged in musical ratios, so the result of all these separate\nsounds was full and perfect harmony. To the objection, Why were not the\nsounds heard by us? they replied that we had heard them constantly and\nwithout intermission from the hour of our birth; hence they had become\nimperceptible by habit.\"\n\nBeautiful as was this theory--the origin of the phrase, \"the music of\nthe spheres\"--it owed its perfection as a theory to a pure invention,\nresorted to in order to carry out the hypothesis of the sacred\nnumber Ten, of which all the greater numbers were only compounds and\nderivatives. This perfect and normal Ten, as a basis on which to\nrest a bold astronomical hypothesis, required the imagination of the\nAntichthon, or counter-earth, in order, with the other bodies, to make\nup the primordial number to whose generative force the whole of these\nbodies owed their origin. The resort to this conception of number, as\na formative and active agent, was doubtless due to the fact that the\nPythagoreans were the earliest cultivators of mathematical science. We\nare told, in fact, that they paved the way for Euclid and Archimedes,\nnotwithstanding their symbolical and mystical fancies, and from their\nmathematical studies they were led to give exclusive supremacy to\narithmetical and geometrical views of Nature. But what is curious about\nthis whole speculation is, that in the invention or substitution of\ncertain facts in order to make a perfect theory, it resembles some\nmodern hypotheses, in which facts have been assumed, or argued as\nexisting from analogies, when there is no evidence which establishes\nthem. Modern instances of this will appear hereafter.\n\nEnough has now been said about the speculations of the \"early Greeks\"\nto show the extravagance of Lord Macaulay's assertion that the\ndiscoveries of modern astronomy have placed the modern philosopher in\nno better situation to make safe deductions in natural theology than\nthat occupied by the Hellenic philosophers from Thales to Plato. The\nevidences of design in the formation of the solar system--of that kind\nof design which acts in direct and specific exertions of a formative\nwill--have been enormously multiplied by the discoveries of modern\nastronomy. Those discoveries, instead of leaving us to grope among\ntheories which require the invention or imagination of facts, relate to\nfacts that are demonstrated; and they tend in the strongest manner to\nestablish the hypothesis of an infinite Creator, making laws to govern\nmaterial objects, and then creating a system of objects to be governed\nby those laws. In a future chapter I shall endeavor to show why this\nhypothesis in regard to the solar system is most conformable to the\nrules of rational belief.\n\nNot to anticipate what will be said hereafter concerning the modern\ndiscoveries in anatomy and in comparative zo\u00f6logy, it is enough to\nsay here that in the writings of the Greek philosophers, especially\nof Plato and Aristotle, we may discover what the Greeks knew or did\nnot know, and may therefore compare their knowledge with what is\nnow known. What was known about the human anatomy to the Greeks of\nPlato's time is probably pretty well reflected in his \"Tim\u00e6us,\" the\ncelebrated dissertation in which he developed his theory of the Kosmos;\nfor, although Plato in that superb philosophical epic made use of the\norgans of the human body for ethical and theological purposes, and\ndid not make a special study of matters of fact, it is not probable\nthat in his mode of using them he so far departed from the received\nideas of his time respecting the human anatomy that his treatise would\nhave been regarded by his contemporaries as an absurdity. Indeed,\nMr. Grote considered that Plato had that anatomical knowledge which\nan accomplished man of his time could hardly fail to acquire without\nspecial study.[8] Moreover, even Galen, who came five centuries after\nPlato, and whose anatomical knowledge was far greater than could have\nbeen commanded in Plato's day, was wholly wrong in respect to the\nfunctions of some of the human organs. He agreed with Plato's ethical\nview of the human organism, but not in his physiological postulates.\nHe considered, according to Mr. Grote, that Plato had demonstrated the\nhypothesis of one soul to be absurd; he accepted Plato's triplicity of\nsouls, but he located them differently. He held that there are three\n\"originating and governing organs in the body: the brain, which is the\norigin of all the nerves, both of sensation and motion; the heart, the\norigin of the arteries; the liver, the sanguifacient organ, and the\norigin of the veins which distribute nourishment to all parts of the\nbody. These three are respectively the organs of the rational, the\nenergetic, and the appetitive soul.\"[9] Plato, on the other hand, had\nplaced the rational soul in the cranium, the energetic soul in the\nthoracic cavity, and the appetitive soul in the abdominal cavity; he\nconnected them by the line of the spinal marrow continuous with the\nbrain, making the rational soul immortal, and the two inferior souls,\nor two divisions of one inferior soul, mortal. Galen did not decide\nwhat is the essence of the three souls, or whether they are immortal.\nPlato assigned to the liver a very curious function, or compound of\nfunctions, making it the assistant of the rational soul in maintaining\nits ascendency over the appetitive soul, and at the same time making\nit the seat of those prophetic warnings which the gods would sometimes\nvouchsafe to the appetitive soul, especially when the functions of the\nrational soul are suspended, as in sleep, disease, or ecstasy.\n\nBut while there was much scientific progress from Plato to Galen, and\nwhile Galen's physiological ideas of the functions of the brain, the\nheart, and the liver held their place until Harvey's discovery of the\ncirculation of the blood in the seventeenth century, that discovery\nand the subsequent investigations proved that Galen, although not far\nwrong as to the brain, was wholly wrong as to the liver, and partially\nwrong as to the heart. Yet Galen's physiological theories concerning\nthese organs were founded on many anatomical facts and results of\nexperiments, such as could then be made.\n\nThere is another fact which marks the state of anatomical knowledge\namong the Greeks in the time of Plato, and of Aristotle, who belonged\nto the same century. The \"Tim\u00e6us\" of Plato shows that there were\nphysicians at that period, and that he was acquainted with the writings\nof Hippocrates. The important fact is, as stated by Mr. Grote, that\n\"the study and practice of medicine was at that time greatly affected\nby the current speculations respecting Nature as a whole; accomplished\nphysicians combined both lines of study, implicating cosmical and\nbiological theories.\"[10]\n\nIt is now only needful to say that modern anatomy and physiology\nafford aids to sound deductions in natural theology in reference to\nthe structure of the human body as an animal organism, and all the\nfunctions of its different organs, which immeasurably transcend all\nthat was known or assumed among the early Greeks, or in the time of\nPlato and Aristotle, or in the time of Galen. Notwithstanding the\ndispute whether the origin of man as an animal is to be referred to\na special act of creation, or to the process of what has been called\nevolution, there can be no controversy on one point, namely, that\nmodern anatomy and physiology have vastly increased our knowledge\nof the structure of the human frame, and the means of rational\nspeculation upon the nature of intellect, as compared with any means\nthat were possessed by the most accomplished and learned of the Greeks\nof antiquity. It matters little on which side of the controversy,\nbetween creation and evolution, the great anatomists of the present\nday range themselves. It is upon the facts which their investigations\nhave revealed that we have to judge of the probable truth of the one\nhypothesis or the other. The probable destiny of man as an immortal\nbeing is an inquiry that has certainly lost nothing by our increased\nknowledge of the facts in his animal structure which tend to support\nthe hypothesis of design in his creation.\n\nLord Macaulay attributes an utter failure to the efforts of the\nphilosophers, from Plato to Franklin, to \"prove\" the immortality of\nthe soul without the help of revelation. What did he mean by proof?\nRevelation is, of course, the only direct proof. It is so, because it\nis direct testimony of a fact, proceeding from the only source that\ncan have direct and certain knowledge of that fact. When the evidences\nwhich are supposed to establish the existence and authority of the\nwitness have become satisfactory to us, we are possessed of proof of\nour immortality, and this proof is the only direct evidence of which\nthe fact admits, and it constitutes all that should be spoken of as\nproof. But there is collateral although inferior evidence--inferior,\nbecause it consists in facts which show a high degree of probability\nthat the soul of man is immortal, although this kind of evidence\nis not like the direct testimony of a competent witness. Is all\nthis presumptive evidence, with its weighty tendency to establish\nthe probable truth of immortality, to be pronounced of no value,\nbecause it belongs to a different order of proof from that derived\nfrom the assertion of a competent witness to the fact? It is one of\nthe advantages of our situation in this life, that the collateral\nevidence which tends to show the high probability of a future state of\nexistence is not withheld from us. As a supplemental aid to the direct\nteaching of revelation, it is of inestimable importance if we do not\nobscure it by theories which pervert its force, and if we reason upon\nit on sound philosophical principles. What we have to do in estimating\nthe probable truth of our immortality, as shown by the science of\nnatural religion, is to give the same force to moral evidence in this\nparticular department of belief, that we give to the moral evidence\nwhich convinces us of many things of which we have no direct proof, or\nof which the direct proof lies in evidence of another kind.\n\n\"He knew as much about it,\" said Voltaire, \"as has been known in all\nages--that is to say, very little indeed.\" This, like many of the\nwitticisms of Voltaire, pressed into the service of an argument against\nthe value of natural religion at the present day when studied by mature\nand disciplined minds, is quite out of place. What human reason has\ndone in the course of three thousand years is not to be put on a par\nwith the speculations of intelligent children or half-civilized men;\nand although some of the riddles which perplexed Eliphaz and Zophar\nhave not had a perfectly satisfactory solution, it is quite wide\nfrom the truth to assert that there has been no approximation to a\nsatisfactory solution, or that some of the riddles have not ceased to\nbe the riddles which they were three thousand years ago. In that period\nthere has been an accumulation of evidence concerning the phenomena of\nNature, and the phenomena of mind, vast beyond comparison when placed\nin contrast with what was known in the tents of the Idumean emirs, and\nthe importance of this accumulation of evidence is proved by the fact\nthat theories have been built upon it which undertake to explain it\nby hypotheses that were never heard of before, and which may possibly\nleave the \"riddles\" in a far less satisfactory state than they were\nin the time of Job. On the other hand, while the companions of Job may\nhave been unable to suggest to him any solution of the problems of\nlife, it does not at all follow that we are as helpless as they were,\neven if we avail ourselves of nothing but what the science of natural\ntheology can now teach us.[11]\n\nIt will be seen that I attach great importance to natural theology. But\nI do not propose to write for the confirmed believers in revelation, on\nthe one hand, who have become convinced by the evidence which supports\nrevelation; or for those, on the other hand, who believe nothing, and\nwho have become confirmed in habits of thinking which unfit them for\njudging of the weight of evidence on such subjects as the existence\nof God and the creation of man. I write for that great mass of people\nof average intelligence, who do not understand accurately what the\ndoctrine of evolution is as expounded by its leading representatives,\nand who do not know to what it leads. It will be found that in some\nrespects there is a distinction between the school of which Darwin is\nthe representative and the school which follows Spencer. To point out\nthis distinction, and yet to show that both systems result in negatives\nwhich put an end to the idea of immortality, and that the weight of\nevidence is against both of them, is what I propose to do.\n\n FOOTNOTES:\n\n [2] Galileo's \"heresy,\" that the earth moves round the sun, was\n condemned by a papal decree in the sixteenth century as \"absurd,\n philosophically false, and formally heretical, because it is expressly\n contrary to Holy Scripture.\" No Roman Catholic now dreams of disputing\n what the Florentine astronomer maintained; and the evolutionists are\n perpetually foretelling that the time will come when to question\n their doctrine will be admitted to be as ridiculous as was the papal\n interdict fulminated against Galileo. If their doctrine had nothing\n to confront it but a similar condemnation, proceeding from some\n ecclesiastical authority claiming to be \"infallible,\" or, if it could\n be met only by the assertion that it is \"contrary to Holy Scripture,\"\n there would be some analogy between the two cases. But there is a\n vast unlikeness between the two cases. While the hypothesis of animal\n evolution is plainly enough \"contrary to Holy Scripture,\" no one who\n has any perception of the weakness of its proofs is obliged to rest\n his rejection of it on that ground. If, in the sixteenth century,\n there had been as good scientific and physical grounds on which to\n refute Galileo as there now are for questioning the doctrine of\n the evolution of distinct species out of other species, the papal\n condemnation would have been superfluous even for churchmen. We must\n not forget the age in which we live, or allow any kind of truth to\n fail of vindication, from fear of being classed with those who in some\n former age have blunderingly mistaken the means of vindicating truth.\n Belief in special creations, whatever the Bible may say, does not now,\n and in all probability never will, stand on a par with the belief that\n the sun moves round the earth.\n\n [3] Macaulay's \"Essays,\" etc., Riverside edition, vol. ii, 502-504.\n\n [4] Grote's \"Plato,\" i, 4.\n\n [5] Thales flourished 620-560 B. C. Plato's life extended from 427-347\n B. C.\n\n [6] Grote's \"Plato,\" i, 10. I follow Mr. Grote in describing the\n hypothesis of the Pythagoreans.\n\n [7] Ibid.\n\n [8] Grote, iii, 290.\n\n [9] Ibid., 287, 288.\n\n [10] Grote, iii, 289.\n\n [11] It should be stated that the passage from Macaulay's writings\n here commented on was written and first published in 1840, before the\n speculations of the scientists who maintain the doctrines of evolution\n had attracted much attention, or been promulgated in their present\n shape.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nThe Platonic Kosmos compared with the Darwinian theory of evolution.\n\n\nIt is my purpose in this chapter to draw a parallel between the theory\nof the origin of different animals propounded in the \"Tim\u00e6us\" of Plato\nand that of Mr. Darwin. The analogy between them has been briefly\nhinted by Mr. Grote, but he has not followed it out in detail, as it\nwas no part of his object to make minute comparisons between any of\nthe speculations of Plato and those of modern philosophers. The great\nEnglish scholar and critic seems to regard it as somewhat uncertain how\nfar Plato meant in the \"Tim\u00e6us\" to have his description of the Kosmos\nstand as an expression of his own belief, or as a mere work of his\nimagination and fancy. Plato, we are told, and this is quite obvious,\ndealt but little with facts, while he dealt largely with theories.\nBut, even as a pure work of the imagination, or as a philosophical\nepic, the daring conception of the Kosmos is wonderfully complete; and\nit will repay any one, who follows Mr. Grote in his analysis of it,\nto observe how Plato employs a process of degeneration to account for\nthe formation of different species of animals, from the higher to the\nlower, by agencies that bear a strong resemblance to those which are\nassumed by Darwin to have worked in the opposite process of variation\nand natural selection, resulting in the evolution of a higher from a\nlower animal. But, in order to render this comparison intelligible, it\nis necessary to make an abstract of Plato's system of the Kosmos before\nadverting to the analogies between that system and the Darwinian\ntheory. I follow, although I have greatly condensed, Mr. Grote's\ndescription of the Platonic Kosmos.\n\nAccording to the Platonic idea of the Kosmos, as given in the \"Tim\u00e6us,\"\nthere existed, anterior to all time, primordial matter in a state of\nchaos. This matter was not created for; according to Mr. Grote, whose\nauthority upon such a point is the highest, the notion of absolute\ncreation was unknown to the Greeks of antiquity, and it does not appear\nthat Plato suggests it. But, without accounting for its existence,\nPlato assumes that there was matter in a condition of utter chaos\nbefore time could have had an existence; and, in order to make the\nchaotic condition the more impressive in its primitive destitution\nof all form or active principles tending to union or arrangement, he\nsupposes that the four elements of fire, air, earth, and water had\nno existence save in the abstract, or as ideas and forms. But, as\nabstract ideas, these four elements of fire, air, earth, and water were\ndistinct, self-existing, and indestructible, coeval with the chaotic\nmatter which was waiting to receive their impress and to take on their\ndistinctive elemental characters. They had already begun to act on the\n_fundamentum_, or primordial chaotic matter, as upon a recipient, but\nit was in a confused way and without regularity of plan, so that they\nhad not become concrete existences or determinate agents.\n\nIn this state of things there appears upon the scene the Demiurgus,\na being coeval with the chaos of matter, that is, self-existing and\neternal. But, consistently with the philosophy which did not admit of\nthe idea of absolute creation, the Demiurgus was not a creator, but\nan architect or designer, working on materials that lay within his\nreach. His moral attribute was goodness, which was, in his situation,\nsynonymous with order, regularity, symmetry, and proportion, and, along\nwith this tendency, he had supreme artistic skill. In other words, he\nwas the personification of \u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, or reason, working against necessity:\nthe latter being, not what we mean by that term, something preordained\nand fixed, but confusion, uncertainty, irregularity, and unreason,\nwhich are to be overcome by their opposites.\n\nBesides the chaotic matter and the ideas or forms of the four elements,\nas yet unrealized in the actual substances of fire, air, earth, and\nwater, there were coeval ideas or forms of animals, or, as we should\nsay, abstract animals, or conceptions of animals. The first and\ngrandest of these was the eternal self-animal, or the ideal of animal\nexistence. Next came the ideas or forms of four other animals: 1. The\ncelestial gods; 2. Man; 3. Birds, or animals living in air; 4. Land\nor water animals. Bearing in mind that we are still in the region of\nabstract conceptions in regard to these types of animals, which as\nyet have no concrete existence, and that they are, so to speak, the\nintellectual models from which the Demiurgus is to work, in order to\nmake the real animals conformably to the pre-existing and eternal\nplan, we come to the process of forming the Kosmos, which is to be the\ncontaining animal of all the other four. Out of the confused chaos of\nexisting matter the Demiurgus proceeds to construct the Kosmos, which\nwas to become the one self-animal, by impressing the idea or abstract\nform of animal upon a physical structure built out of the primordial\nchaotic matter and comprehending the whole of it. The first step was\nto bring the four elements of fire, air, earth, and water out of their\nchaotic and confused condition by separating them according to the\nforms of their eternal ideas. The total of each element, when made to\ntake its normal form, was used in the construction of the Kosmos, which\nthus came to possess the whole existing body of material; \"so that,\"\nto borrow the words of Mr. Grote, \"there remained nothing of the four\nelements apart, to hurt the Kosmos from without, nor anything as raw\nmaterial for a second Kosmos.\"\n\nThe Kosmos was made a perfect sphere, and with a perfectly smooth outer\nsurface, without organs of sight or hearing, because there was nothing\noutside to be seen or heard; without organs of respiration, because\nthere was no outside atmosphere to be breathed; and without nutritive\nor excrementory organs, because it was self-sufficing, being supplied\nwith nourishment by its own decay. It was not furnished with limbs or\nmeans of locomotion or standing, because, being a sphere turning on an\naxis, and having only one of the seven possible varieties of movement,\nnamely, rotation in a circle in one and the same plane, there was\nnothing for it to grasp or repel.[12] This body, the only-begotten,\nbecause in its formation all existing bodily material was employed,\nperfectly spherical and smooth, equidistant from its center to all\npoints of its circumference, and suspended upon its own axis traversing\nits diameter, was now to be animated by a soul.\n\nThe Demiurgus, in the formation of the soul of the Kosmos, took three\nconstituent ingredients and mixed them together. They were: 1. The\nSame, or the Identical, the indivisible and unchangeable essence of\nIdeas; 2. The Different, or the Plural, the divisible essence of\nbodies or of the elements; 3. A compound of both of these ingredients\nmelted into one. Blended together in one grand compound, these three\ningredients formed the soul of the Kosmos by first dividing the mixture\ninto different portions, and then uniting the portions according to\na complicated scale of harmonious numerical proportions. The outer\nor sidereal sphere of the Kosmos was made to receive the Same, or\nIdentity, by being placed in an even and undivided rotation toward the\nright, turning on the great axis of the whole sphere. The interior, or\nplanetary spheres, the five planets, and the sun and the moon, were\nmade to be under the influence of the Different, or Diversity--that\nis to say, their rotations on their separate axes, all oblique, were\ntoward the left, while the overpowering force of rotation of the\nouter sphere carried them along with it, although the time of their\nseparate rotations was more or less modified by their own inherent and\ncountermoving forces.\n\nThus the sentient capacity of the cosmical soul became the cognition\nof the Same and the Different, and the blended Same and Different,\nbecause it embodied these three ingredients in its own nature. It was\ninvisible; rooted at its center and pervading and inclosing the whole\nvisible body, circulating and communicating, without voice or sound,\nall impressions and information concerning the existing relations\nbetween the separate parts and specialties of the cosmical body.\n\nAnterior to the Kosmos there was no time. With the rotation of the\nKosmos time began. It was marked first by the eternal and unchanging\nrotation of the outer circle, in which were placed the fixed stars,\nwhich revolved with it in unaltered position with regard to each other;\nand one revolution of this outer or most rational circle made a day.\nThe sun, moon, and planets were distributed in different portions of\nthe Circle of the Different; one revolution of the moon marking a\nmonth, and one revolution of the sun marking a year. The earth, the\nfirst and oldest of the sidereal and planetary gods, was packed around\nthe great axis which ran through the center of the Kosmos, and turned\nthat axis; so that the earth regulated the movement of the great\ncosmical axis, and was the determining agent of night and day.\n\nThus far we have the formation of the Kosmos, animated with a pervading\nsoul, the body being formed out of the whole of existing matter, molded\ninto the specific elements of fire, air, earth, and water, and the\nsoul being formed out of the constituent ingredients furnished by the\neternal and invisible essence of ideas. The whole, body and soul of\nthe Kosmos, was thus an animal, formed on the abstract but eternal\nidea or form of an animal which had existed before time began. We\nnow approach the formation of the other animals. Of the Kosmos there\ncould be but one. All existing material of matter had been used in\nhis construction. He could not become a species, as there could be no\nsecond Kosmos. Something could be borrowed from him, for the formation\nof other animals, but nothing could be destroyed. He was not yet,\nhowever, a full copy of the model of the Generic Animal or Idea of\nAnimal, because the eternal plan of that model required that he should\nbe peopled or inhabited by four other animals, which might constitute\nspecies. Accordingly, the Demiurgus proceeds to form the first of\nthese sub-animals, the gods, who are to inhabit different portions of\nthe Kosmos. The first of these in formation was the earth, planted\nin the center, and made sentinel over night and day; next the fixed\nstars, formed chiefly out of fire, and placed in the outer circle of a\nfixed revolution, or the Circle of the Same, to give to it light and\nbrilliancy. The sidereal orbs thus became animated beings, eternal and\ndivine. They remained constantly turning round in the same relative\nposition, but the sun, moon, and planets, belonging to the Circle of\nthe Different, and trying to revolve by their own effort in a direction\nopposite to that of the outer sphere, became irregular in their\nrevolutions and varied in their relative positions. Thus the primitive\ngods were the earth and the fixed stars, which revolved without\nvariation with the Circle of the Same, and became immortal as well as\nvisible; while the sun, moon, and planets were not among the primitive\ngods, but were simply spherical bodies placed in the inner Circle\nof the Different. The primitive gods preside over and regulate the\nKosmos. From them are generated and descended the remaining gods.[13]\n\nHaving completed the Kosmos and the primitive gods, the Demiurgus\npaused in his work. There were still other animals to be constructed,\nthe first and noblest of which was to be Man. But the Demiurgus,\nwho, in the construction of these gods, had made them immortal, not\nin their own nature but through his determination, seems to have\napprehended that, if he proceeded to construct the other animals\nhimself, they would likewise be thereby rendered of immortal duration.\nHe therefore assembled the newly generated gods and made to them a\npersonal address. He informed them of their immortal existence, and of\nhis purpose to confide to them the construction of the other animals,\nstating at the same time, in the case of man, that he would himself\nsupply an immortal element which they were to incorporate with a\nmortal body, in imitation of the power which he had exercised in the\ngeneration of themselves. He then proceeded to compound together, but\nin inferior perfection and purity, the remnant of the same elements\nout of which he had formed the cosmical soul.[14] He then distributed\nthe whole of this mass into souls equal in number to the fixed stars,\nplaced each of them in a star of its own, where it would be carried\nround in the cosmical rotation, explained to it its immortal destiny,\nand that at an appointed hour of birth it would be transferred into a\nmortal body in conjunction with two inferior kinds of soul or mind.\nThese irrational enemies, the two inferior souls, the rational and\nimmortal soul would have to control and subdue, so as to live a good\nlife. If it triumphed in the conflict, it would return after death to\nits own star, where in an everlasting abode it would dwell forever\nin unison with the celestial harmonies and perfections of the outer\nsphere. But, if it failed, it would be born again into an inferior\nbody, and on the death of that body, if it continued evil, it would be\nagain born into a still more degraded animal, through an indefinite\ntransmigration from animal to animal, until the rational soul should\nhave obtained the mastery over the irrational and turbulent, when it\nwould be released and permitted to return to its own peculiar star.[15]\nHere, then, the Demiurgus retired, leaving to the gods the work of\nfabricating mortal bodies for man, and two mortal and inferior souls,\nwith which the immortal soul was to be joined. But before he withdrew\nhe inculcated upon the gods to construct the new mortal animal in the\nbest manner, so that the immortal soul should have the fairest chance\nof guiding and governing rightly, in order that the animal might\nnot be the cause of mischief and misery to himself; a possible and\neven probable result which the Demiurgus proclaimed beforehand, thus\nrelieving himself of responsibility, and casting it, it would seem,\nupon the gods.[16] The latter stood, then, in the position of workmen,\nwho have received certain directions from a superior architect, have\nbeen supplied with certain materials, and are obliged to conform to a\nprescribed model, the cosmical animal, as far as circumstances will\nallow. The Demiurgus retires, and leaves the gods to their work.\n\nThey borrow from the Kosmos, from which they are permitted to obtain\nmaterials, portions of the four elements, for the construction of the\nhuman body, with an engagement that these materials shall one day be\nreturned. These they unite in one body by numerous minute and invisible\nfastenings; over this body they place a head or cranium, into which\nthey introduce the immortal soul, making the head, with its spherical\nform like that of the Kosmos, and admitting of no motion but the\nrotary, the most divine portion of the human system and master of the\nbody, which is to be subject and ministerial. To the body they give all\nthe six varieties of motive power, forward, backward, upward, downward,\nto the right and to the left. The phenomena of nutrition and sensation\nbegin as soon as the connection is formed between the immortal soul and\nthe mortal body, but as the irregular movements and agitations arising\nfrom the diverse rotations of the Same and the Different convey false\nand foolish affirmations to the soul in the cranium. That soul is\ndestitute of intelligence when first joined to the body, and remains\nso for some time. But gradually these disturbing currents abate,\nthe rotations of the Same and the Different in the head become more\nregular, and the man becomes more intelligent.\n\nIt is now necessary to account for the introduction of the two mortal\nsouls, and to show how the conflict appointed for the immortal soul\nbecame the test of a life which was to determine whether the latter\nshould be permitted, on the death of the body, to return to its\npeculiar star, or whether it should be degraded into some lower form\nof animal. The immortal soul has its special abode in the head, which\nis both united to and separated from the trunk by the neck. The gods\nkept the two mortal souls separate, so that the rational or immortal\nsoul might be defiled by the contact as little as possible. The better\nportion of the mortal soul they placed in the thoracic cavity. It\nwas the energetic, courageous, contentious soul, placed above the\ndiaphragm, so as to receive orders easily from the head, and to aid\nthe rational soul in keeping the mutinous soul of appetite, which was\nplaced below the diaphragm, in subjection.\n\nIt is unnecessary to follow here the minute anatomical descriptions\nwhich Plato gives of the different organs of the human body, or of\nthe way in which they are supposed to act on the two divisions of\nthe mortal soul, or to be acted on by them, or the mode in which the\nlatter act upon the encephalic or immortal soul which is seated in the\ncranium. These descriptions evince much knowledge of the human anatomy,\nand probably all the knowledge that was possessed in Plato's time. It\nis immaterial how far this anatomical knowledge was correct, and of\ncourse there was in Plato's use of the various organs a great deal that\nwas fanciful. It is sufficient, without following Mr. Grote's analysis\nthrough these details, to note that, in Plato's arrangement, the\nimmortal soul was supposed to be fastened in the brain, the two mortal\nsouls in the line of the spinal marrow continuous with the brain, and\nthat this line formed the thread of connection between them all.\n\nPassing on toward the point where the process of degradation might\nbegin, which would result in the reduction of this new and divinely\nconstructed animal to a lower form, we have to note, first, that it was\nmade a non-sexual animal, being intended for an angelic type. In the\noriginal plan of the gods, it was not contemplated that this primitive\ntype should reproduce itself by any process of generation. According\nto the original scheme, it would seem that every time a new immortal\nsoul was to be brought down from its peculiar star, the process of\nconstructing for it a mortal body would have to be repeated. Plato,\nMr. Grote observes, does indeed tell us that the primitive non-sexual\ntype had the option of maintaining itself. But this must mean that\neach individual of that type had the option of maintaining itself in\nits struggle with the debasing influences of appetite and disease.\nBut not one representative of it has held his ground; and as it was\nforeseen that such an angelic type could not maintain itself, we\nare to look for a reconstruction of the whole organism. This came\nabout from the degeneracy of the primitive non-sexual animal below\nthe standard of good life which it had the option of continuing.\nMen whose lives had fallen below this standard became effeminate,\ncowardly, unjust. In their second birth, their immortal souls had to be\ntranslated into a body resembling that to which they had debased the\nfirst body into which they were born. The first transition, therefore,\nwas from man into woman. In other words, the gods, seeing that the\nnon-sexual primitive type did not maintain itself at the high point\nintended for it, reconstructed the whole organism upon the bi-sexual\nprinciple, introducing the comparatively lower type of woman. A partial\ntransformation of the male structure makes the female. A suitable\nadjustment of the male organs, and the implanting of the sexual\nimpulse in both sexes, by the agency of the gods, make provision for\ngenerative reproduction, and a species is formed, which takes the place\nof the primitive non-sexual type which did not reproduce itself in the\noriginal scheme. The primitive type disappears, and it disappears by\na process of degradation, which it undergoes by reason of its failure\nto avail itself of the option which it originally had of living a good\nlife that would entitle the immortal soul to return to its peculiar\nstar without further conflict with the debasing tendencies to which it\nwas exposed in the first body that it inhabited.\n\nIn this curious theory we see how a process of declension or\ndegradation is induced by what may almost be called a choice, since\nthe primitive human being, by not resisting the debasing tendencies of\nhis lower nature, is made by those tendencies to assume a less divine\nform than that in which he originally existed. To the primitive man the\ngods assigned the encephalic or head-soul, which was connected with\nand suspended from the divine soul of the Kosmos. They assigned it to\neach man as his presiding genius. If he neglected it, and directed\nall his development toward the energetic or appetitive mortal soul,\nhe would become debased. He did so. Hence it became necessary for the\ngods to reconstruct the whole organism, and in this reconstruction\nthe primitive non-sexual type becomes the bi-sexual, and a species is\nformed.\n\nIt is not necessary to enter into the metaphysical argument which\nrelates to the question of responsibility for this change from the\noriginal plan. Plato tells us that the gods foresaw it as a necessary\nconsequence of the original scheme; and, moreover, that they foresaw\nthat they must make preparation for the still more degenerate varieties\nof birds and quadrupeds, into which the corrupt and stupid part of\nmankind would sink, all of which were according to the great eternal\nscheme of the four kinds of ideal animals embraced in the idea of the\nKosmos itself. But with the moral justice of the whole theory we have\nno concern here. We are here concerned, first, with the nature of the\nprocess by which, in the Platonic theory, the bi-sexual human race\nbecame formed out of the primitive non-sexual type; and, next, with\nthe process by which individuals of this race became degraded into the\nlower animals.[17]\n\nAfter the process of degradation had begun, after the primitive type\nhad given place to the bi-sexual human race, and a species was thus\nformed, further degradation would be inevitable under the same causes\nwhich produced the first one. The female part of mankind would go on\nbringing forth new males and new females, and to each one at birth\nthere would come from its peculiar star an immortal soul, for I do not\nunderstand that Plato's women were supposed not to be constructed, in\nthis respect, upon the same plan as the men. But each of these newly\narrived immortal souls would be placed in a mortal body in contact and\nconflict with the two mortal souls of appetite, disturbance, and mutiny\nagainst the divine laws of reason. Each new human being would then be\nexposed to further debasement, by which his or her human organs and\nhuman form would undergo transformation into a lower type of animal\nlife. Accordingly, we find that Plato, in perfect consistency with his\ntheory, supposes that birds are a degraded birth or formation derived\nfrom one peculiar mode of degeneracy in man, hair being transmuted into\nfeathers and wings. If we inquire from what kind of men the birds were\nformed, and how they came to be assigned to the air, we shall best\nlearn from the words employed by Mr. Grote to express Plato's idea:\n\"Birds were formed from the harmless but light, airy, and superficial\nmen, who, though carrying their minds aloft to the study of cosmical\nphenomena, studied them by visual observation and not by reason,\nfoolishly imagining that they had discovered the way of reaching\ntruth.\"[18]\n\nNext to the birds came the land-animals, a more brutal formation.\nThese, to borrow the words of Mr. Grote's analysis, \"proceeded from men\ntotally destitute of philosophy, who neither looked up to the heavens\nnor cared for celestial objects; from men making no use whatever of\nthe rotations of their encephalic soul, but following exclusively\nthe guidance of the lower soul in the trunk. Through such tastes and\noccupations, both their heads and their anterior limbs became dragged\ndown to the earth by the force of affinity. Moreover, when the rotation\nof the encephalic soul from want of exercise became slackened and fell\ninto desuetude, the round form of the cranium was lost and became\nconverted into an oblong or some other form. These now degenerated into\nquadrupeds and multipeds, the gods furnishing a greater number of feet\nin proportion to the stupidity of each, in order that its approximation\nto earth might be multiplied. To some of the more stupid, however, the\ngods gave no feet or limbs at all, constraining them to drag the whole\nlength of their bodies along the ground, and to become reptiles. Out of\nthe most stupid and senseless of mankind, by still greater degeneracy,\nthe gods formed fishes, or aquatic animals--the fourth and lowest genus\nafter men, birds, land-animals. This race of beings, from their extreme\nwant of mind, were not considered worthy to live on earth, or to\nrespire thin and pure air. They were condemned to respire nothing but\ndeep and turbid water, many of them, as oysters and other descriptions\nof shell-fish, being fixed down at the lowest depth or bottom. It is by\nsuch transitions (concludes the Platonic 'Tim\u00e6us') that the different\nraces of animals passed originally, and still continue to pass, into\neach other. The interchange is determined by the acquisition or loss of\nreason or rationality.\"[19]\n\nHere, then, we have a process of degradation by which the different\nraces of animals were formed, by a kind of selection which, commencing\nin the human species from the neglect of the encephalic soul to\nmaintain its high duties and aims, goes on in successive debasements\nwhich result in the formation of lower and still lower animals until\nwe reach the shell-fish fixed upon the earth at the bottom of the\nwater. The bi-sexual principle of construction having been introduced\nin the human species, was continued through all the other species\nformed by the still descending process of deterioration, so that to\neach successive species there remained the power of reproducing its\nown type, along with the tendency to evolve a lower type by further\nloss of reason or rationality. It is not material to the purpose of\nthe parallel, which I am about to draw between the Platonic and the\nDarwinian system, to consider the precise nature of the Platonic idea\nof an intelligent power, by which these successive degradations were\nin one sense purposely ordained. Enough is apparent on the Platonic\nsystem to show that, while these degradations were according to an\neternal plan, because they resulted from the conflict between reason\nand unreason, order and disorder, between purity and impurity, yet the\ndifferent species of animals, after man, were not special creations by\nan infinite power interfering in each case by a separate exercise of\ncreative will. They were a growth of an inferior organization out of a\nsuperior through the inevitable operation of tendencies which changed\nthe forms of the animals. As fast as these tendencies operated--and\nthey were continually operating--the ministers of the Demiurgus, the\ngods, stood ready to adapt the structure to the new conditions in\nwhich the tendencies resulted, so that the new animal might be fitted\nto and fixed in those conditions. Still, the gods are not represented\nas making separate creations of new species as an act of their will,\nwithout the pre-existing operation in the preceding type of tastes and\noccupations which modify the structure into one of a more degraded\ncharacter. It may thus be said with entire truth that the Platonic idea\nof the origin of the different races of animals presents a parallel\nto the Darwinian theory, in which it will be found that the one is\nthe reverse of the other, both of them proceeding upon and involving\nanalogous principles of evolution, operating in the one system from\nbelow upward, and in the other from a higher point downward. If, in\nthe Platonic system, the idea of an original immortal soul placed\nin a heavenly abode, but afterward brought down and fixed in a\nmortal body, is the starting-point--if a conflict of a spiritual and\nangelic existence with corporeal and earthly tendencies is at first\nthe predominant fact--the parallel between the Platonic process of\ndegradation and the Darwinian process of elevation remains the same;\nfor, in the one system, reason degenerates into instinct, and instinct\nat last reaches its lowest possible action, or ceases entirely; and,\nin the other, instinct rises from its lowest action through successive\nimprovements until it becomes mind or intellect: so that somewhere in\nthe two processes there must be a point where they pass each other in\nopposite directions, the one losing or merging intellect in instinct,\nthe other losing and merging instinct in mind, each of the two\nprocesses being a process of development or evolution, but in opposite\ndirections.[20]\n\nIt is not easy to ascertain at once what was Mr. Darwin's idea of the\nmode in which a supreme intelligence has presided over the creation.\nIn his work on \"The Descent of Man\", he adduces some evidence that man\nwas not \"originally endowed with the ennobling belief in the existence\nof an Omnipotent God,\" this evidence being that numerous savage races\nhave existed, and still exist, who have had and have no words in their\nlanguage to express this idea. But this, if true, does not help us\nto understand what part in Mr. Darwin's theory an Omnipotent God is\nsupposed to play. Scattered through the same work we find references\nto the hypothesis of such a being, and to the influences which this\nbelief has exerted upon the advance of morality. But I assume that we\nare to understand that Mr. Darwin adopts as a fact, to be taken into\naccount in judging of his theory of evolution, that there is such a\nbeing as an Omnipotent God, having equally the power to make separate\ncreations, or to establish certain laws of matter, and to leave them\nto operate through secondary causes in the production and extinction\nof the past and present inhabitants of the world. In his work on the\n\"Origin of Species\" he refers to \"what we know of the laws impressed\nupon matter by the Creator.\"[21] In his \"Descent of Man\" the following\npassage occurs toward the close of the work: \"He who believes in the\nadvancement of man from some low organized form will naturally ask,\nHow does this bear on the belief in the immortality of the soul? The\nbarbarous races of man, as Sir J. Lubbock has shown, possess no clear\nbelief of this kind; but arguments, derived from the primeval beliefs\nof savages, are, as we have just seen, of little or no avail. Few\npersons feel any anxiety from the impossibility of determining at what\nprecise period in the development of the individual, from the first\ntrace of a minute germinal vesicle, man becomes an immortal being;\nand there is no greater cause for anxiety, because the period can not\npossibly be determined in the gradually ascending organic scale.\"\n\nSurely it is a most pertinent inquiry, How does his theory of the\nadvancement of man from some lower organized form bear on the\nimmortality of the soul? and it is no answer to this inquiry to say\nthat upon no hypothesis of man's origin can we determine at what\nprecise period he becomes an immortal being. That the idea of an\nOmnipotent God, capable of creating a spiritual essence, or an immortal\nsoul, is not denied by Mr. Darwin, is doubtless to be inferred from\nhis strong affirmation that our minds refuse to accept as the result\nof blind chance the grand sequence of events which the birth both of\nthe species and the individual presents to our view. That variations of\nstructure, the union of pairs in marriage, the dissemination of seeds,\nand similar events, have all been ordained for some special purpose,\nis the hypothesis according to which he regards them as events brought\nabout by the laws of natural selection, which laws were ordained by\nthe Creator and left to operate. Now, while this hypothesis excludes,\nor tends to exclude, the idea of blind chance, it still remains to\nbe considered whether the soul of man, or the essence which we call\nintellect, is in each case a direct creation of a special character, or\nwhether it is a result from the operation of the laws which have been\nordained for the action of organized matter. If it is the former, the\nsoul may survive the destruction of the body. If it is the latter, the\nsoul as well as all the other manifestations or exhibitions which the\nmaterial body gives forth in its action, may and in all probability\nmust cease with the organs whose action leads us falsely to believe\nthat we are animated by an immortal spirit while we are in the flesh.\nIf it is a necessary result of any theory that what is supposed to be\nthe immortal soul of man is a product of the operation of certain laws\nimposed upon organized matter, without being a special creation of\nsomething distinct from matter, it is immaterial whether the organized\nform of matter with which the soul is connected, or appears to act for\na time, was a special creation, or was an evolution out of some lower\nform, or came by blind chance. Nor is it material that we can not\ndetermine at what precise period in the genesis of the individual, by\nthe ordinary process of reproduction, he becomes an immortal being. The\nquestion is, Does he ever become an immortal being, if in body and in\nmind he is a mere product of organized matter, formed from some lower\ntype through the laws of variation and natural selection, resulting in\nan animal whose manifestations or exhibitions of what we call intellect\nor mind are manifestations of the same nature as the instincts of the\nlower animals, differing only in degree?\n\nThat I may not be misunderstood, and especially that I may not be\ncharged with misrepresentation, I will state the case for the Darwinian\ntheory as strongly as I can. The question here is obviously not a\nquestion of power. An Omnipotent Creator has just the same capacity to\nmake special creations, by a direct and special exertion of his will,\nas he has to make one primordial type and place it under fixed laws\nthat will in their operation cause a physical organization to act in\nsuch a way as to evolve out of it other and more or less perfect types.\nIn either method of action, he would be the same Omnipotent God, by\nwhose will all things would exist; and I assume that upon this point\nthere is no difference between some of the evolution school and its\nopponents. But in considering the question of the origin of the human\nsoul, or the intellect of man, we are dealing not with a question of\npower, but with the probable method in which the conceded Omnipotent\ncapacity has acted. On the one hand, we have the hypothesis that the\nEternal and Omnipotent capacity has created a spiritual and immortal\nbeing, capable of existing without any union with the body that is\nformed out of earthly material, but placed for a time in unison with\nsuch a body; and that for the effectual purpose of this temporary\nunion this body has been specially constructed, and constructed in two\nrelated forms, male and female, so that this created species of animal\nmay perpetuate itself by certain organic laws of reproduction. Now it\nis obviously immaterial that we can not detect the point of time, or\nthe process, at or by which the union between the spiritual essence\nand the earthly body takes place in the generation of the individual.\nIt is conceded to be alike impossible to detect the time or mode in\nwhich descendants of the lower animals, which had nothing resembling\nintellect, become endowed with and inhabited by intellect, through the\nsupposed laws of variation and natural selection, operating to produce\nan animal of a more elaborate organization. The point of divergence\nbetween the two hypotheses is precisely this: that the one supposes the\nmind of man to be a special creation, of a spiritual nature, designed\nto be immortal, but placed in union with a mortal body for a temporary\npurpose. The other hypothesis supposes no special creation of either\nthe mind or the body of man, but maintains that the latter is evolved\nout of some lower animal, and that the former is evolved out of the\naction of physical organization.[22] Either mode of projecting and\nexecuting the creation of both the body and the mind of man is of\ncourse competent to an Omnipotent God. The question is, Which mode has\nthe highest amount of probability on which to challenge our belief?\nIf the one, as it is described, leads to the conclusion that the mind\ncan not survive the body, and the other leads to the conclusion that\nit can, we are left to choose between them: and our choice must be\ndetermined by what we can discover of satisfactory proof that the mind\nof man was destined to become immortal. What, then, is the Darwinian\ntheory of the origin of man as an animal, and to what does it lead\nrespecting the origin and nature of the human soul?\n\nWhoever will carefully examine Mr. Darwin's hypothesis of the\ndescent of man as an animal, will find that commencing at a point\nopposite to that at which Plato began his speculations, the modern\nnaturalist assumes the existence of a very low form of animated and\norganized matter, destitute of anything in the nature of reason,\neven if acting under what may be called instinctive and unconscious\nimpulses, imposed upon it by the preordained laws by which animated\nmatter is to act. By some process of generation, either bi-sexual or\nuni-sexual or non-sexual, this very low type of animal is endowed with\na power of reproducing other individuals of the same structure and\nhabits. In process of time, for which we must allow periods very much\nlonger than those of which we are accustomed to think in relation to\nrecorded history, the individuals of this species become enormously\nmultiplied. A struggle for existence takes place between these very\nnumerous individuals; and in this struggle there comes into operation\nthe law to which Mr. Darwin has given the name of \"natural selection,\"\nwhich is but another name for a series of events. He does not mean\nby this term to imply a conscious choice on the part of the animals,\nnor an active power or interfering deity. He employs it to express\na constantly occurring series of events or actions, by which, in\ncertain circumstances, animals secure themselves against the tendency\nto destruction which is caused by the great disparity between their\nnumbers and the amount of food that is accessible to them, or by the\nunfavorable influences of a change of climate upon so great a body\nof individuals. He calls this series of events or actions _natural_\nselection, in order, as I understand, to compare what takes place\nin nature with what takes place when a breeder of animals purposely\nselects the most favorable individuals for the purpose of improving\nor varying the breed. In nature, the selection is supposed to operate\nas follows: The strongest and most active individuals of a species\nof animals have the best chance of securing the requisite amount of\nfood from the supply that is insufficient for all. They do this by\ntheir greater fleetness in overtaking the common prey, or by making\nwar upon the more feeble or inactive of their fellows; and numerous\nindividuals are either directly destroyed by this warfare, or are\ndriven off from the feeding-ground and perish for want of nourishment.\nThus the best specimens of the race survive; and to this occurrence is\ngiven the name of the \"survival of the fittest,\" meaning the survival\nof those individuals best fitted to continue their own existence and\nto continue their species. A physical change in the country inhabited\nby a great multitude of individuals of a certain species, or by\ndifferent species--for example, a change of climate--operates to make\nthis struggle for existence still more severe, and the result would\nbe that those individuals of the same species which could best adapt\nthemselves to their new condition would tend to be preserved, as\nwould the different species inhabiting the same country which could\nbest maintain the struggle against other species. The improvement\nin the structure of the animals takes place, under this process of\nnatural selection, in the following manner: The best individuals being\npreserved, the organs of which they make most use in the struggle for\nexistence undergo development and slight modifications, favorable\nto the preservation of the individual, and these modifications are\ntransmitted to their offspring. Here there comes in play a kind of\ncollateral aid to which is given the name of \"sexual selection,\"\nwhich is defined as a form of selection depending \"not on a struggle\nfor existence in relation to other organic beings or to external\nconditions, but on a struggle between individuals of one sex, generally\nthe males, for the possession of the other sex.\"[23] \"The result,\"\ncontinues Mr. Darwin, \"is not death to the unsuccessful competitor,\nbut few or no offspring. Sexual selection is, therefore, less rigorous\nthan natural selection. Generally, the most vigorous males, those which\nare best fitted for their place in nature, will leave most progeny.\nBut, in many cases, victory depends not so much on general vigor, as\non having special weapons, confined to the male sex.\" As, by means of\nthis warfare of sexual selection, the victor would always be allowed\nto breed, his courage and his special weapons of offense or defense,\nin their increased development, would descend to his offspring. Thus\nthe improvement and modification induced by natural selection would be\nenhanced and transmitted by the sexual selection.[24]\n\nIn regard to the operation of the two kinds of selection in the\nevolution of man from a lower form of animal, we find the theory\nto be this: That organic beings with peculiar habits and structure\nhave passed through transitions which have converted the primordial\nanimal into one of totally different habits and structure; that,\nin these transitions, organs adapted to one condition and mode\nof life have become adapted to another; that such organs are\nhomologous, and that in their widely varied uses they have been\nformed by transitional gradations, so that, for example, a floating\napparatus, or swim-bladder, existing in a water-animal for one\npurpose--flotation--has become converted in the vertebrate animals into\ntrue lungs for the very different purpose of respiration. Thus, by\nordinary generation, from an ancient and unknown prototype, not only\nhave organs, by minute and successive transitions, become adapted to\nchanged conditions of life, but the whole organism has become changed,\nand this has resulted in the production of an animal vastly superior\nto his ancient and unknown prototype; and yet to that prototype, of\nwhich we have no specimen and no record, are to be traced the germs\nof all the peculiarities of structure which we find in the perfect\nanimals of different kinds that we thoroughly know, until we come to\nman, these successive results being brought about by the two kinds of\nselection--natural and sexual.\n\nThere can be no better illustration of the character of Mr. Darwin's\ntheory than that to which he resorts when he means to carry it to its\nmost startling length, while he candidly admits that he has felt the\ndifficulty of this application of it far too keenly to be surprised\nat the hesitation of others. This illustration is the eye. Here he\nvery justly says it is indispensable that reason should conquer\nimagination; but on which side of the question reason or imagination\nis most employed might, perhaps, be doubtful. Mr. Darwin's hypothesis\nconcerning the eye begins with the fact that in the highest division\nof the animal kingdom, the vertebrata, we can start from an eye so\nsimple that it consists, as in the lancelet,[25] of a little sack of\ntransparent skin, furnished with a nerve, and lined with pigment, but\ndestitute of any other apparatus. From this prototype of a visual\norgan, up to the marvelous construction of the eye of man or of the\neagle, he supposes that extremely slight and gradual modifications\nhave led, by the operation of natural and sexual selection; and by\nway of illustrating this development, he compares the formation of\nthe eye to the formation of the telescope. \"It is scarcely possible\nto avoid comparing the eye with a telescope. We know that this\ninstrument has been perfected by the long-continued efforts of the\nhighest human intellects, and we naturally infer that the eye has been\nformed by a somewhat analogous process. But may not this inference\nbe presumptuous? Have we any right to assume that the Creator works\nby intellectual powers like those of man? If we must compare the eye\nto an optical instrument, we ought, in imagination, to take a thick\nlayer of transparent tissue, with spaces filled with fluid, and with a\nnerve sensitive to light beneath, and then suppose every part of this\nlayer to be continually changing slowly in density, so as to separate\ninto layers of different densities and thickness, placed at different\ndistances from each other, and with the surface of each layer slowly\nchanging in form. Further, we must suppose that there is a power,\nrepresented by natural selection or the survival of the fittest,\nalways watching each slight alteration in the transparent layers, and\ncarefully preserving each which, under varied circumstances, in any way\nor in any degree, tends to produce a distincter image. We must suppose\neach new state of the instrument to be multiplied by the million, each\nto be preserved until a better one is produced, and then the old ones\nto be all destroyed. In living bodies variations will cause the slight\nalterations, generation will multiply them almost infinitely, and\nnatural selection will pick out with unerring skill each improvement.\nLet this process go on for millions of years, and during each year on\nmillions of individuals of many kinds, and may we not believe that a\nliving optical instrument might thus be formed as superior to one of\nglass as the works of the Creator are to those of man?\"[26]\n\nIt might have occurred to the very learned naturalist that the\nformation of a mechanical instrument by the hand of man, guided by\nhis intellect, admits of varieties of that instrument for different\npurposes, as products of an intelligent will. Different kinds of\ntelescopes for different uses have been produced, not by destroying\nthe poorer ones and preserving the better ones, but by a special\nand intentional adaptation of the structure to special uses, until\nan instrument is made which will dissolve the nebul\u00e6 of the milky\nway, and bring within the reach of our vision heavenly bodies of the\nexistence of which we had no previous knowledge. Why may not the same\nintelligent and intentional formation of the human eye, as a special\nstructure adapted to the special conditions of such an animal as man,\nhave been the direct work of the Creator, just as the lowest visual\norgan--that of such a creature as the lancelet--was specially made\nfor the conditions of its existence? Why resort to the theory that\nall the intermediate varieties of the eye have grown successively out\nof the lowest form of such an organ by transitional grades of which\nwe can not trace the series, when the probabilities concerning the\nvarieties of this organ of which we have any knowledge are so strongly\non the side of a special and intentional adaptation of each one to the\ncircumstances of the animal to which it has been given? As a question\nof power in the Creator, either method of action was of course just as\ncompetent as the other. As a question of which was his probable method,\nthe case is very different; for we know comparatively very little of\nthe modifications produced by such causes as natural or even sexual\nselection, while we may, without presumption, assume that we know much\nmore about the purposes of special adaptation to special conditions,\nwhich an omnipotent Creator may have designed and effected. But this is\na digression, and also an anticipation of the argument.\n\nTo state the pedigree of man according to the Darwinian theory, we\nmust begin with an aquatic animal as the early progenitor of all the\nvertebrata. This animal existing, it is assumed, \"in the dim obscurity\nof the past,\" was provided with branchi\u00e6 or gills, or organs for\nrespiration in water, with the two sexes united in the same individual,\nbut with the most important organs of the body, such as the brain and\nheart, imperfectly or not at all developed. From this fish-like animal,\nor from some of its fish descendants, there was developed an amphibious\ncreature, with the sexes distinct. Rising from the amphibians, through\na long line of diversified forms, we come to an ancient marsupial\nanimal, an order in which the young are born in a very incomplete state\nof development, and carried by the mother, while sucking, in a ventral\npouch.[27] From the marsupials came the quadrumana[28] and all the\nhigher mammals.[29] Among these mammals there was, it is supposed, a\nhairy, tailed quadruped, probably arboreal in its habits, from which\nman is descended. It was an inhabitant of the Old World. It branched\ninto the lemurid\u00e6, a group of four-handed animals, distinct from the\nmonkeys, and resembling the insectivorous quadrupeds in some of their\ncharacters and habits;[30] and from these came the simiad\u00e6, of which\nthere were two great stems--the New World and Old World monkeys. \"From\nthe latter, at a remote period, man, the wonder and glory of the\nuniverse, proceeded.\"[31]\n\nThe reader must now, in order to do justice to this theory, imagine\na lapse of time, from the period of the existence of the aquatic\nprogenitor of all the vertebrata, to be counted by millions of years,\nor by any figures that will represent to the mind the most conceivable\ndistance between a past and a present epoch. Through this enormous\nstretch of centuries, in order to give scope to the operation of the\nlaws of natural and sexual selection, we must suppose the struggle for\nexistence to be going on among the individuals of the same species, and\namong different species inhabiting the same country, and the sexual\nselection among the individuals of the same species to be perpetually\ntransmitting to offspring the improved and more developed organs and\npowers induced by natural selection; so that in the countless sequence\nof generations there are evolved animals that are so widely different\nfrom their remote progenitors that in classifying them we find them to\nbe new species, endowed with a power of reproducing their own type, and\nsimilarly capable, it would seem, of still further development into\neven higher types in the long-distant future.\n\nI know not how it may appear to others, but to me the parallelism\nbetween the Platonic and the Darwinian theory is very striking. Both\nspeculators assume the existence of a Supreme Intelligence and Power,\npresiding over the creation of animals which are to inhabit this earth.\nBehind the celestial or primitive gods the Greek philosopher places\nthe Demiurgus, to whom the gods stand in the relation of ministers\nor servants to execute his will. The modern naturalist assumes the\nexistence of the Omnipotent God; and although he does not directly\npersonify the laws of natural and sexual selection which the Omnipotent\npower has made to operate in nature, they perform an office in the\ntransitional gradations through which the animals are successively\ndeveloped, that very closely resembles the office performed by the\ngods of Plato's system in providing the modifications of structure\nwhich the animals undergo. In the two processes the one is the reversed\ncomplement of the other. Plato begins with the formation of an animal\nof a very exalted type, and by successive degradations, induced by the\nfailure of the animal to live up to the high standard of its rational\nexistence, he supposes a descent into lower and still lower forms, the\ngods all the while providing a new structure for each successive lower\nform, until we reach the shell-fish fixed on the earth beneath the\nwater. Darwin begins with the lowest form of animated organization,\nand by successive gradations induced by the struggle of the animal to\nmaintain its existence, he supposes an ascent into higher and still\nhigher forms, the laws of natural and sexual selection operating to\ndevelop a new structure for each successive higher form, until we reach\nman, \"the wonder and glory of the universe,\" an animal whose immediate\nancestor was the same as the monkey's, and whose remote progenitor was\nan aquatic creature breathing by gills and floating by a swim-bladder.\n\nNor had Plato less of probability to support his theory than Darwin\nhad to support his. The Greek philosopher might have adduced the\nconstant spectacle of men debasing their habits and even their physical\nappearance into a resemblance to the brutes. He might have suggested,\nand he does suggest, how the degrading tendencies of the lower\nappetites and the ravages of disease drag down the human frame from its\nerect carriage and its commanding power over matter to an approximation\nwith the condition of the inferior animals. He might have adduced\ninnumerable proofs of the loss of reason, or rationality, through\nsuccessive generations of men, brought about by the transmission of\nboth appetites and physical malformation from parents to children.\nHe might have compared one of his Athenian fellow-citizens of the\nhigher class with the lowest savage known throughout all the regions\naccessible to an observer of his day and country. He might have\nportrayed the one as a being preserving his physical organization\nin the highest state of perfection by gymnastic exercises, by a\nwell-chosen diet, by observance of all the conditions of health, by the\naid of the highest medical skill known to the age; cultivating his mind\nby philosophy, practicing every public and private virtue as they were\nunderstood among a people of rare refinement, and adorning his race by\nan exhibition of the highest qualities that were then attainable. All\nthese qualities, physical, mental, and moral, Plato might have shown\nwere transmissible in some degree, and in a good degree were actually\ntransmitted from sire to son. Turning to the other picture, and\ncomparing \"Hyperion to the satyr,\" he might have shown that the lowest\nsavage, in those physical points of structure which were best adapted\nto his animal preservation as an inhabitant of the wildest portion of\nthe earth, had retained those which made him more nearly resemble the\nbrute inhabitants of the same region, and that in his intellectual\nand moral qualities the resemblance between him and his Athenian\ncontemporary was almost wholly lost. Intermediate between these extreme\nspecimens of the human race, why could not Plato have found with great\nprobability, and often with actual proof, successive degradations of\nstructure and uses of organs, just as well supported by facts, or\nanalogies, or hypotheses, as are Mr. Darwin's successive elevations\nfrom a lower to a higher animal? If Plato had known as much about the\nanimal kingdom as is now known, he could have arrayed the same facts\nin support of his theory, by an argument as powerful as that which now\nsupports the doctrine of evolution.\n\nNay, it is certain that Plato's attention was drawn to some of these\nfacts, and that he makes use of them in a way that is as legitimately\na probable occurrence as any use that is made of them at the present\nday. For example, he was struck with the existence of what in\nscientific parlance are called \"rudiments,\" a term that is employed\nto describe an organ or part which appears to have no special use\nwhere it is found in one animal, but which, in a more developed or\nin a diversified condition, has an obvious use in another animal.\nThus, he tells us that the gods, with a long-sighted providence,\nintroduced a sketch or rudiment of nails into the earliest organization\nof man, foreseeing that the lower animals would be produced from\nthe degeneration of man, and that to them claws and nails would be\nabsolutely indispensable.[32] In the same way, he seems to regard hair\nas a rudiment, relatively speaking; for while its use on different\nparts of the body of man, or even on the head, is not very apparent,\nits use to the lower animals is very obvious. Why, then, is it not just\nas rational, and just as much in accordance with proper scientific\nreasoning, to suppose those parts of animal structure which are\ncalled \"rudiments\" to have been introduced as mere sketches in the\norganization of a very high animal, and then to have been developed\ninto special uses in lower animals produced by the degeneration of the\nhigher, as it is to suppose that they were developed in full activity\nand use in the lower animals, but sank into the condition of useless\nor comparatively useless appendages as the higher animal was evolved\nout of the lower by a process of elevation? The modern naturalist of\nthe evolution school will doubtless say that \"rudiments\" in the human\nstructure, for which there is no assignable use that can be observed,\nare not to be accounted for as sketches from which Nature was to work,\nin finding for them a use in some other animal in a developed and\npractically important condition; that, to the extent to which such\nthings are found in man, they are proofs of his cognate relations to\nthe lower animals, in which they have a palpable use; and that the\ngradations by which they have proceeded from practical and important\nuses in the lower animals, until they have become mere useless or\ncomparatively useless sketches in the human structure, are among the\nproofs of the descent of man from the lower animals which had a use for\nsuch things. I shall endeavor hereafter to examine the argument that\nis derived from \"rudiments\" more closely. At present, the point which\nI suggest to the mind of the reader arises in the parallel between\nthe Platonic and the Darwinian theory of the origin of the different\nspecies of animals. I ask, why is it not just as probably a true\nhypothesis to suppose that man was first created with these rudimentary\nsketches in his organization, and that they became useful appendages\nin the lower animals, into which man became degenerated, as it is to\nsuppose that these parts existed in full development, activity, and\npractical use in the lower animals, out of whom man was generated,\nand that in man they lost their utility and became relatively mere\nrudiments? To my mind, neither theory has the requisite amount of\nprobability in its favor compared with the probability of special\ncreations; but I can see as much probability in the Platonic as in the\nDarwinian explanation, and a strong parallelism between them.\n\nI will pursue this parallel somewhat further by again adverting to\nPlato's idea of the origin of the human soul. He supposes it to have\nbeen an immortal being, formed out of the eternal essence of Ideas\nby the Demiurgus. He manifestly makes it an existence distinct from\nmatter, because he places its first abode in a heavenly mansion, where\nit is in unison with the celestial harmonies and perfections of the\nouter circle. This heavenly sphere is again to be its abode, after it\nshall have been released from its temporary abode on earth, which has\nbeen appointed to it for purposes of discipline and trial. At a fixed\ntime of birth it is brought down from its celestial abode and united\nwith a mortal body, that it may assert and prove its power to preside\nover and govern that body according to the eternal laws of reason and\nrectitude. If it fulfills this high duty, when the fastenings, which\nhave bound it to the mortal frame, are dissolved with the dissolution\nof those which hold together the material structure, the soul flies\naway with delight to its own peculiar star. If it fails in this high\nduty, it is on the death of the first body transferred by a second\nbirth into a more degraded body, resembling that to which it has\nallowed the first one to be debased. At length, somewhere in the\nseries of transmigrations, the lower and bestial tendencies cease to\nhave power over the immortal soul; the animal with which it was last\nunited remains an animal bereft of reason, and the soul, released from\nfurther captivity, escapes to its original abode in the heavens, more\nor less contaminated by what it has undergone, but still immortal,\nindestructible, spiritual, and capable of purification.\n\nHere, then, we have a conception of the origin and nature of the human\nsoul as a spiritual existence, quite as distinctly presented as it can\nbe by human reason. Stripped of the machinery by which Plato supposes\nthe soul to have come into existence, his conception of its origin and\nnature is the most remarkable contribution which philosophy, apart\nfrom the aid of what is called inspiration, has made to our means of\nspeculating upon this great theme. Of course, it affords, with all the\nmachinery of which Plato makes use, no explanation of the point or the\ntime of junction between the soul and the body. But, as a conception\nof what in the poverty of language must be called the substance of\nthe soul, of its spiritual and immortal nature, of its distinctive\nexistence separate from what we know as matter, whether Plato borrowed\nmore or less from other philosophers who preceded him, it is a very\ndistinct presentation of the nature of the human mind.\n\nTurn now to what can be extracted from the Darwinian theory of the\norigin and nature of the human mind, and observe where it holds with\nand where it breaks from the parallelism between it and the Platonic\ntheory. The doctrine of evolution, so called, presents to us no\ndistinct suggestion that the mind of man is a separate and special\ncreation. Rejecting, and very properly rejecting, the Platonic idea of\nan existence of the human soul anterior to the birth of the individual,\nthe Darwinian theory supposes that in the long course of time, during\nwhich natural and sexual selection were operating to produce higher and\nstill higher animals, there came about, in the earlier and primitive\norganizations, a habit of the animal to act in a certain way; that this\nhabit descended to offspring; that it became developed into what is now\ncalled instinct; and that instinct became developed into what we now\ncall mind. I know not how otherwise to interpret Mr. Darwin's repeated\naffirmations that, in comparing the mental powers of man and those of\nthe lower animals, there can be detected no difference in kind, but\nthat the difference is one of degree only; that there is no fundamental\ndifference, or difference in nature, between the mental powers of\nan ape and a man, or between the mental power of one of the lowest\nfishes, as a lamprey or lancelet, and that of one of the higher apes;\nthat both of these intervals, that between the ape and man, and that\nbetween the lancelet and the ape, which are much wider in the latter\ncase than in the former, are filled up by numberless gradations.[33] If\nthis be true, it must be because the lancelet, supposing that animal to\nbe the progenitor, formed a habit of acting by an implanted impulse,\nwhich became, under the operation of natural and sexual selection,\nconfirmed, developed, and increased in its descendants, until it not\nonly amounted to what is called instinct, but took on more complex\nhabits until something akin to reason was developed. As the higher\nanimals continued to be evolved out of the lower, this approach to\na reasoning power became in the ape a true mental faculty; and, at\nlength, in the numberless gradations of structure intermediate between\nthe ape and the man, we reach those intellectual faculties which\ndistinguish the latter by an enormous interval from all the other\nanimals. \"If,\" says Mr. Darwin, \"no organic being, excepting man, had\npossessed any mental power, or if his powers had been of a wholly\ndifferent nature from those of the lower animals, then we never should\nhave been able to convince ourselves that our high faculties had been\ngradually developed. But it can be shown that there is no fundamental\ndifference of this kind.\"[34]\n\nI will not here ask how far this is theoretical assumption. I shall\nendeavor to examine in another place the evidence which is supposed\nto show that the mental powers of man are in no respect fundamentally\ndifferent, or different in kind, from the powers in the other animals\nto which the distinguished naturalist gives the name of \"mental\"\npowers. At present I am still concerned with the parallelism between\nthe Platonic and the Darwinian theory; and I again ask whether the\nlatter is not the former reversed, in respect to the process by which\nreason in the one case becomes lost, and that by which in the other\ncase it becomes developed out of something to which it bears no\nresemblance? Plato supposes the creation of pure reason, or mental\npower, in the shape--to use the counterpart of a physical term--of\na non-physical, spiritual intelligence, or mind. It remains always\nof this nature, but the successive animals which it is required to\ninhabit on earth undergo such degradations that the immortal reason\nloses in them the power to control their actions; nothing is left to\ngovern in them but mere instinct, and this at last sinks into its\nlowest manifestations. Darwin, on the other hand, supposes the first\ncreation to have been a very low animal of a fish-like structure, with\nthe lowest capacity for voluntary action of any kind, but impelled to\nact in a certain way by superimposed laws of self-preservation; that\nin the infinitude of successive generations these laws have operated\nto produce numberless gradations of structure, in the growth of which\nfixed habits have become complex instincts; that further gradations\nhave developed these instincts into something of mental power, as the\nsuccessive higher animals have become evolved out of the lower ones,\nuntil at length the intellect of man has been \"gradually developed\" by\na purely physical process of the action of organized matter.\n\nThis materialistic way of accounting for the origin of the human\nmind necessarily excludes the idea of its separate creation or its\ndistinctive character. The theory is perfectly consistent with itself,\nin supposing that the mind of man does not differ in kind, or differ\nfundamentally, from those exhibitions which in the lower animals lead\nus to attribute to them some mental power. But whether the theory is\nconsistent with what we know of our own minds, as compared with what\nwe can observe in the other animals, is the real question. In the\nfirst place, it is to be remembered that we can read our own minds, by\nthe power of consciousness and reflection. In the next place, it is\nconceded that we can know nothing of the minds of the other animals,\nexcepting by their outward actions. They can not speak, to tell us\nof their emotions, their memories, their fears, their hopes, their\ndesires, what they think, or whether they think at all. They do acts\nwhich wonderfully resemble the acts of man, in outward appearance,\nas if they were acts which proceeded from the same power of reason\nbut in a less perfect degree; yet they can tell us nothing of their\nmental processes, if they have such processes, and the utmost that we\ncan do is to argue from their acts that they have mental faculties\nakin to those of men. It is in the ordained nature of things that we\nknow and can know, by introspection, what our own minds are. We can\nknow the mind of no other animal excepting from his outward acts. How\nfar these will justify us in assuming that his mind is of the same\nnature as ours, or that ours is an advanced development of his, is the\nfundamental question.\n\nPlato was evidently led, by that study of the human mind which is open\nto all cultivated intellects through the process of consciousness\nand reflection, to conceive of the soul as a created intelligence of\na spiritual nature. The fanciful materials out of which he supposes\nit to have been composed were the mere machinery employed to express\nhis conception of its spiritual nature and its indestructible\nexistence. He was led to employ such machinery by his highly\nspeculative and constructive tendencies, and because it was the habit\nof Greek philosophy to account for everything. Some machinery he was\nirresistibly impelled to employ, in order to give due consistency to\nhis theory. But his machinery in no way obscures his conception of\nthe nature of the soul, and we may disregard it altogether and still\nhave left the conception of a spiritual and immortal being, formed for\nseparate existence from matter, but united to matter for a temporary\npurpose of discipline and trial.\n\nThe modern naturalist, on the other hand, although assuming the\nexistence of the Omnipotent God, supposes the human mind to have become\nwhat it is by the action of organized matter beginning at the lowest\npoint of animal life, and going on through successive gradations of\nanimal structure, until habits are formed which become instincts, and\ninstincts are gradually developed into mind. Take away the machinery\nthat is employed, and you have left no conception of the immortal and\nindestructible nature of the human soul. The material out of which it\nis constructed is all of the earth earthy, and the twofold question\narises: first, whether this was the probable method employed by the\nOmnipotent Creator; and, secondly, whether it will account for such an\nexistence as we have reason to believe the mind of man to be.\n\nThere is another point in the parallel between the Platonic and the\nDarwinian systems which is worthy of note. We have seen that, according\nto Plato, when the Demiurgus had completed the construction of the\nKosmos and that of the human soul, he retired and left to the gods the\nconstruction of a mortal body for man and of bodies of the inferior\nanimals into which man would become degraded. According to Darwin,\nthe Omnipotent God constructs some very low form of animal, and then,\nretiring from the work of direct creation, he leaves the laws of\nnatural and sexual selection to operate in the production of higher\nanimals through the process that is called evolution. Perhaps it may be\nunscientific to ask why the Omnipotent God should cease to exercise,\nor refrain from exercising, his power of special creation, after he\nhas once exerted it. Perhaps there is some view of the nature and\npurposes of that infinite being which would render such an abstention\nfrom his powers a probable occurrence. But it is difficult to conceive\nwhat this view can be. If we take a comprehensive survey of all the\nfacts concerning the animal kingdom that are within the reach of our\nobservation; and if, then, in cases where we know of no intermediate\nor transitional states, we assume that they must have existed; if we\narray the whole in support of a certain theory which undertakes to\naccount both for what we see and for what we do not see, we very easily\nreach the conclusion that the Omnipotent God performed but one act of\nspecial creation, or at most performed but a very few of such acts,\nand those of the rudest and simplest types, and then left all the\nsubsequent and splendid exhibitions of animal structure to be worked\nout by natural selection. This is the scientific method adopted by the\nevolution school to account for the existence of all the higher animals\nof which we have knowledge, man included. It may be very startling, but\nwe must acknowledge it as the method of action of the Omnipotent God,\nbecause it is said there is no logical impossibility in it.\n\nThere is a passage in Mr. Darwin's \"Origin of Species\" which I must now\nquote, because it shows how strongly the supposed action and abstention\nof the infinite Creator, according to the Darwinian theory, resembles\nthe action and abstention of Plato's Demiurgus: \"Although the belief\nthat an organ so perfect as the eye could have been formed by natural\nselection, is enough to stagger any one; yet in the case of any organ,\nif we know of a long series of gradations in complexity, each good for\nits possessor; then, under changing conditions of life, there is no\nlogical impossibility in the acquirement of any conceivable degree of\nperfection through natural selection. In the cases in which we know of\nno intermediate or transitional states, we should be extremely cautious\nin concluding that none can have existed, for the metamorphoses of many\norgans show what wonderful changes in function are at least possible.\nFor instance, a swim-bladder has apparently been converted into an\nair-breathing lung. The same organ having performed simultaneously\nvery different functions, and then having been in part or in whole\nspecialized for one function; and two distinct organs having performed\nat the same time the same function, the one having been perfected while\naided by the other, must often have largely facilitated transitions.\"\n\nHere, then, we have it propounded that after the creation of the\nrudest and simplest form of a visual organ, the infinite God abstains\nfrom direct and special creation of such a perfect and elaborate\norgan as the human eye, and leaves it to be worked out by natural\nselection; there being no logical impossibility, it is said, in this\nhypothesis. We are cautioned not to conclude, because we can not find\nthe intermediate and transitional states of the visual organs, that\nthey never existed; we are told that they are at least possible, and\nthat analogies show they must have existed; and from the possibility of\ntheir existence and from the assumption that they happened, we are to\nbelieve that the Omnipotent God, refraining from the exercise of his\npower to create the human eye, with its wondrously perfect structure,\nleft it to be evolved by natural selection out of the rudest and\nsimplest visual organ which he directly fashioned.\n\nAll things are possible to an infinite Creator. He who made the visual\norgan of the lowest aquatic creature that ever floated could make the\nhuman eye as we know it, or could make one that would do more than\nthe eye of man ever was capable of. He could by a direct exercise of\nhis power of creation form the eye of man, or he could leave it to be\nevolved out of the only type of a visual organ on which he saw fit\nto exercise his creative power. He could create in the land-animals\na true air-breathing lung as a special production of his will, or\ncould permit it to be formed by transitional gradations out of the\nswim-bladder of an aquatic creature. But why should he abstain from the\none method and employ the other? This question brings us at once to\nthe probabilities of the case; and, in estimating those probabilities,\nwe must take into the account all that reason permits us to believe\nof the attributes of the Almighty. We can not, it is true, penetrate\ninto his counsels without the aid of revelation. But if we confine\nourselves to the domain of science, or to the mere observation of\nnature, we shall find reason for believing that the Omnipotent God\nhad purposes in his infinite wisdom that render the acts of special\ncreation vastly more probable than the theory of evolution. A study of\nthe animal kingdom and of all the phenomena of the universe leads us\nrationally and inevitably to one of two conclusions: either that there\nis no God, and that all things came by chance; or to the belief that\nthere is a God, and that he is a being of infinite benevolence as well\nas infinite wisdom and power. Now, why should such a being, proposing\nto himself the existence on earth of such an animal as man, to be\ninhabited for a time by a soul destined to be immortal, abstain from\nthe direct creation of both soul and body, and leave the latter to be\nevolved out of the lowest form of animal life, and the former to become\na mere manifestation or exhibition of phenomena, resulting from the\nimproved and more elaborate structures of successive types of animals?\nIs there no conceivable reason why an infinitely wise, benevolent, and\nomnipotent being should have chosen to exercise the direct power of\ncreation in forming the soul of man for an immortal existence, and also\nto exercise his direct power of creation in so fashioning the body as\nto fit it with the utmost exactness to be serviceable and subservient\nto the mind which is to inhabit it for a season? Why depict the\ninfinite God as a quiescent and retired spectator of the operation of\ncertain laws which he has imposed upon organized matter, when there are\ndiscoverable so many manifest reasons for the special creation of such\na being as man? It is hardly in accordance with any rational theory of\nGod's providence, after we have attained a conception of such a being,\nto liken him intentionally or unintentionally to the Demiurgus of the\nacute and ingenious Greek philosopher. We must conclude that human\nsociety, with all that it has done or is capable of doing for man on\nearth, was in the contemplation of the Almighty; and if we adopt this\nconclusion, we must account for the moral sense, for moral obligation,\nand for the idea of law and duty. We can not account for these things\nupon any probable theory of their origin, if we reject the idea that\nthey were specially implanted in the structure of the human soul, and\nsuppose that both the intellectual faculties and the moral sense were\nevolved out of the struggle of lower animals for their existence,\nresulting in the formation of higher animals and in the development\nof their social instincts into more complex, refined, and consciously\ncalculating instincts of the same nature.\n\nI have not drawn this parallel between the Platonic and the Darwinian\ntheories of the origin of different animals for any purpose of\nsuggesting that the one was in any sense borrowed from the other.\nPlagiarism, in any form, is not, so far as I know, to be detected in\nthe writings of the evolution school. But the speculations of Plato in\nregard to the origin and nature of the human soul, fanciful as they\nare, afford great assistance in grasping the conception of a spiritual\nexistence; and the parallel between his process of degradation and\nDarwin's process of elevation shows to my mind as great probability in\nthe one theory as there is in the other.\n\n FOOTNOTES:\n\n [12] Rotation was considered the movement most conformable to reason\n and intelligence, and it is impracticable to any figure but the\n spherical. Grote, iii, 253.\n\n [13] The primitive gods of Plato's conception (in the \"Tim\u00e6us\") are\n not to be confounded with the gods of the poetic and popular faith.\n As Mr. Grote has pointed out, there is nothing more remarkable in\n Plato's writings than the subtilty and skill with which he contrived\n to elude the charge of impiety and infidelity toward the gods of\n tradition and of the popular faith. In a passage of the \"Tim\u00e6us,\"\n on which Mr. Grote seems to be in doubt whether it was ironical or\n sincere, Plato boldly confronts the difficulty by saying that we\n must believe competent witnesses whose testimony we have, respecting\n the genesis of the remaining gods who have personal names and were\n believed in by his contemporaries. For his own part, he says, he does\n not pretend to account for their generation. The sons of the gods,\n the heroic and sacred families, who must have known their own fathers\n and all about their own family affairs, have given us their family\n traditions, and we must obey the law and believe. But concerning\n the primitive gods, the first progenitors of the remaining gods,\n we are at liberty to speculate. The ingenuity of this admission of\n authority where authority has spoken, reconcilable with speculation\n upon matters on which authority has not spoken, is admirable. Plato,\n as Mr. Grote has observed, was willing to incur the risk of one count\n of the indictment which was brought against his master Socrates,\n that of introducing new divine persons. In legal parlance he might\n have demurred to this count, as not charging any offense against the\n established religion. But the other count, for not acknowledging the\n gods whom the city acknowledged, he did not choose to encounter. As to\n them, he prudently, and perhaps sarcastically, accepts the testimony\n of witnesses who speak by inspiration and authority. But as to the\n primitive gods, the progenitors of the gods from whom were descended\n the heroic and sacred families of men, he expresses in the \"Tim\u00e6us\"\n his own convictions, without appealing to authority and without\n intimating that he is speaking of mysteries beyond the comprehension\n of his reason. The boldness of this flight beyond all authority into\n the realms of pure reason is very striking, even if it does end in\n nothing but probability, which is all that Plato claims for his theory.\n\n [14] It must be remembered that, in the formation of the cosmical\n soul, the ingredients were the eternal Ideas; of these there could be\n a remnant after the cosmical soul was formed. But the cosmical body,\n which was formed out of the material elements, comprehended the whole\n of them, and there could be no remnant or surplus of them remaining\n outside. But portions of them could be borrowed for a limited period\n of mortal existence, and would return to their place in the Kosmos\n when that existence terminated. If this distinction be carried along,\n Plato will not be found to be inconsistent with himself.\n\n [15] It does not distinctly appear what was to become of the rational\n soul if it finally failed in the conflict with evil, at the lowest end\n of the transmigration. Being immortal, it could not perish. But in\n providing for it an opportunity of final success through all the forms\n of animal life to which it might be condemned, it would seem that\n Plato was pressed by a reluctance to encounter the idea of endless\n misery. This point, however, does not obscure his explanation of the\n process by which species of animals, and a succession of inferior\n animals, came to exist.\n\n [16] Mr. Grote has pointed out that in his other writings, notably\n in the \"Republic\" and in the \"Leges\", Plato is not consistent with\n this idea that the gods are responsible for the evil that man causes\n to himself; and that in the \"Tim\u00e6us\" he plainly makes the Demiurgus\n responsible, because he brings, or allows to be brought, an immortal\n soul down from its star, where it was living pure, intelligent, and in\n harmony with reason, and makes it incur corruption, disturbance, and\n stupidity, by junction with a mortal body and two mortal and inferior\n souls.\n\n [17] I have omitted the description of the influence of disease\n induced by an over-indulgence of appetite, etc., in aiding the process\n of debasement from the primitive type. The reader can find this\n influence developed in Grote, or can consult the original Greek of\n the \"Tim\u00e6us.\" It would appear that Plato considered the effect of all\n the appetites, when too much indulged, as tending in the primitive\n non-sexual type toward the development of that lower kind of animal\n which the gods saw fit to treat as fit only to become woman.\n\n [18] Grote.\n\n [19] Grote's \"Plato,\" iii, 282.\n\n [20] See, as to the reception of the Platonic Demiurgus by the\n Alexandrian Jews, first chapter.\n\n [21] \"Origin of Species,\" p. 428, American edition, from the sixth\n English. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1882.\n\n [22] Mr. Darwin refers to Mr. Herbert Spencer's theory of \"the\n necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation\";\n and indeed it is apparent that this class of philosophers have\n constructed a theory which denies the creation of the human mind as a\n spiritual essence, independent of matter, although some of them may\n adhere to the idea that it was God who caused matter to evolve out of\n its own action the substance or existence that we call mind.\n\n [23] \"Origin of Species,\" p. 69.\n\n [24] For the illustrations of both kinds of selection I must refer the\n reader to Mr. Darwin's works. In regard to birds, he makes the sexual\n selection operate less by the \"law of battle\" among the males, or by\n fighting, and more by the attractions of plumage and voice, by which\n the males carry on their rivalry for the choice of the females in\n pairing. But he attributes the same effect to the sexual selection in\n birds as in the other animals, namely, the transmission to offspring,\n and chiefly to the male offspring, of those peculiarities of structure\n which have given to the male parent the victory over his competitors.\n\n [25] A very low form of fish, without brain, vertebral column, or\n heart, classed by the older naturalists among the worms. (\"Descent of\n Man,\" p. 159.) The technical name of the lancelet is _Amphioxus_.\n\n [26] \"Origin of Species,\" p. 146.\n\n [27] The kangaroos and opossums are of this group.\n\n [28] Animals with four hands.\n\n [29] Animals which produce living young, and nourish them after birth\n by milk from the teats of the mother.\n\n [30] The lemur is one of a genus of four-handed mammals, allied to\n the apes, baboons, and monkeys, but with a form approaching that of\n quadrupeds.\n\n [31] \"Descent of Man,\" p. 165.--The reader will need to observe that\n monkey is the popular name of the ape and the baboon. In zo\u00f6logy,\n monkey designates the animals of the genus _Simia_, which have long\n tails. The three classes are apes, without tails; monkeys, with long\n tails; baboons, with short tails.\n\n [32] Grote, iii, p. 276.\n\n [33] \"Descent of Man,\" p. 65.\n\n [34] \"Descent of Man,\" p. 65.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\n The Darwinian pedigree of man--The evolution of organisms out of other\n organisms, according to the theory of Darwin.\n\n\nIt is doubtless an interesting speculation to go back in imagination to\na period to be counted by any number of millions of years, or covered\nby an immeasurable lapse of time, and to conceive of slowly-moving\ncauses by which the present or the past inhabitants of this globe\nbecame developed out of some primordial type, through successive\ngenerations, resulting in different species, which became final\nproducts and distinct organisms. But what the imagination can do in the\nformation of a theory when acting upon a certain range of facts is,\nas a matter of belief, to be tested by the inquiry whether the weight\nof evidence shows that theory to be, in a supreme degree, a probable\ntruth, when compared with any other hypothesis. It is in this way that\nI propose to examine and test the Darwinian pedigree of man. The whole\nof Mr. Darwin's theory of the descent of man as an animal consists in\nassigning to him a certain pedigree, which traces his organism through\na long series of other animals back to the lowest and crudest form of\nanimal life; and it must be remembered that this mode of accounting for\nthe origin of man of necessity supposes an unbroken connection of lives\nwith lives, back through the whole series of organisms which constitute\nthe pedigree, and that, according to the Darwinian theory, there was\nno aboriginal creation of any of these organisms, save the very first\nand lowest form with which the series commences. Not only must this\nconnection of lives with lives be shown, but the theory must be able\nto show how it has come about that there are now distinct species of\nanimals which never reproduce any type but their own.\n\nTwo great agencies, according to the Darwinian theory, have operated\nto develop the different species of animals from some low primordial\ntype, through a long series which has culminated in man, who can not\nlay claim to be a special creation, but must trace his pedigree to\nsome ape-like creature, and so on to the remote progenitor of all the\n_Vertebrata_. It is now needful to grasp, with as much precision as\nsuch a theory admits of, the nature and operation of these agencies,\nand to note the strength or weakness of the proof which they afford of\nthe main hypothesis. First, we have what is called \"the struggle for\nexistence,\" which may be conceded as a fact, and to which more or less\nmay be attributed. The term is used by Mr. Darwin in a metaphorical\nsense, to include all that any being has to encounter in maintaining\nits individual existence, and in leaving progeny, or perpetuating its\nkind. In the animal kingdom, the struggle for individual existence\nis chiefly a struggle for food among the different individuals which\ndepend on the same food, or against a dearth of one kind of food which\ncompels a resort to some other kind. The struggle for a continuation\nof its species is dependent on the success with which the individual\nanimal maintains the contest for its own existence. Now, it is\nargued that in this great and complex battle for life it would occur\nthat infinitely varied diversities of structure would be useful to\nthe animals in helping them to carry on the battle under changing\nconditions. These useful diversities, consisting of the development\nof new organs and powers, would be preserved and perpetuated in the\noffspring, through many successive generations, while the variations\nthat were injurious would be rigidly destroyed. The animals in whom\nthese favorable individual differences and variations of structure\nwere preserved would have the best chance of surviving and of\nprocreating their kind. So that, by this \"survival of the fittest,\"\nNature is continually selecting those variations of structure which\nare useful, and continually rejecting or eliminating those which are\ninjurious; the result being the gradual evolution of successive higher\ntypes of animals out of the lower ones, until we reach man, the highest\nanimal organism that exists on this earth. In the next place, we have,\nas an auxiliary agency, in aid of natural selection, what is called\n\"the sexual selection,\" by which the best endowed and most powerful\nmales of a given species appropriate the females, and thus the progeny\nbecome possessed of those variations of structure and the superior\nqualities which have given to the male parent the victory over his\ncompetitors.\n\nThe proofs that are relied upon to establish the operation and effect\nof these agencies in producing the results that are claimed for them,\nought to show that, in one or more instances, an animal of a superior\norganization which, when left to the natural course of its reproduction\nby the union of its two sexes, always produces its own distinct type\nand no other, has, in fact, been itself evolved out of some lower and\ndifferent organism by the agencies of natural and sexual selection\noperating among the individuals of that lower type. One of the proofs,\non which great stress is laid by Mr. Darwin, may be disposed of without\ndifficulty. It is that which is said to take place in the breeding of\ndomestic animals, or of animals the breeding of which man undertakes to\nimprove for his own practical benefit, or to please his fancy, or to\ntry experiments. In all that has been done in this kind of selection,\nin breeding from the best specimens of any class of animals, there\nis not one instance of the production of an animal varying from its\nnear or its remote known progenitors in anything but adventitious\npeculiarities which will not warrant us in regarding it as a new or\ndifferent animal. No breeder of horses has ever produced an animal\nthat was not a horse. He may have brought about great and important\nimprovements in the qualities of fleetness, or strength, or weight,\nor endurance, by careful selection of the sire and the dam; but the\nrace-horse or the hunter, or the draught-horse or the war-horse, is\nbut a horse of different qualities and powers, with the same skeleton,\nviscera, organs, muscles, which mark this species of animal, and with\nno other variations of structure than such as follow from the limited\ndevelopment of different parts for different uses. No breeder of cows\never produced a female animal that was not a cow, although he may have\ngreatly improved the quality and quantity of the milk peculiar to this\nanimal by careful selection of the individuals which he permits or\nencourages to breed. No breeder of sheep ever produced an animal that\nwas not a sheep, although the quality of the fleece or of the mutton\nmay have been greatly improved or varied. Among the domestic fowls, no\nanimal that was not a bird was ever bred by any crossing of breeds,\nalthough great varieties of plumage, structure of beak, formation of\nfoot, development of wing, habits of life, adaptation to changes of\nsituation, and many minor peculiarities, have been the consequences\nof careful and intelligent breeding from different varieties of the\nsame fowl. In the case of the pigeon, of which Mr. Darwin has given\na great many curious facts from his own experience as a breeder, the\nmost remarkable variations are perhaps to be observed as the results\nof intentional breeding from different races of that bird; but with\nall these variations nothing that was not a bird was ever produced.\nIn the case of the dog, whatever was his origin, or supposing him to\nhave been derived from the wolf, or to belong to the same family as\nthe wolf, it is, of course, impossible to produce, by any crossing of\ndifferent breeds of dogs, an animal that would not belong to the class\nof the _Canid\u00e6_. Indeed, it is conceded by Darwin, with all the array\nof facts which he adduces in regard to the domesticated animals, that\nby crossing we can only get forms in some degree intermediate between\nthe parents; and that although a race may be modified by occasional\ncrosses, if aided by careful selection of the individuals which present\nthe desired character, yet to obtain a race intermediate between two\ndistinct races would be very difficult, if not impossible. If this is\nso, how much more remote must be the possibility, by any selection, or\nby any crossing to which Nature will allow the different animals to\nsubmit, to produce an animal of so distinct a type that it would amount\nto a different species from its known progenitors!\n\nFrom all that has been brought about in the efforts of man to improve\nor to vary the breeds of domestic animals--a kind of selection that is\nsupposed to be analogous to what takes place in Nature, although under\ndifferent conditions--it is apparent that there are limitations to the\npower of selection in regard to the effects that are to be attributed\nto it. A line must be drawn somewhere. It will not do in scientific\nreasoning, or in any other reasoning, to ignore the limitations to\nwhich all experience and observation point with unerring certainty, so\nfar as experience and observation furnish us with facts. It is true\nthat the lapse of time during which there has been, with more or less\nsuccess, an intentional improvement in the breeds of domestic animals\ncarried on with recorded results has been very short when compared\nwith the enormous period that has elapsed since the first creation\nof an animal organization, whenever or whatever that creation was.\nBut history furnishes us with a pretty long stretch of time through\nwhich civilized, half-civilized, and savage nations have had to do\nwith various animals in first taming them from a wild state and then\nin domesticating so as to make them subservient to human wants, and\nfinally in improving their breeds. But there is no recorded or known\ninstance in which there has been produced under domestication an animal\nwhich can be said to be of a different species from its immediate known\nprogenitors, or one that differed from its remote known progenitors\nin any but minor and adventitious peculiarities of structure. If in\npassing from what has been done by human selection in the breeding of\nanimals to what has taken place in Nature in a much longer space of\ntime and on a far greater scale, we find that in Nature, too, there\nare limitations to the power of that agency which is called natural\nselection--that there is an impassable barrier which Nature never\ncrosses, an invincible division between the different species of\nanimals--we must conclude that there is a line between what selection\ncan and what it can not do. We must conclude, with all the scope and\npower that can be given to natural selection, that Nature has not\ndeveloped a higher and differently organized animal out of a lower\nand inferior type--has not made new species by the process called\nevolution, because the infinite God has not commissioned Nature to do\nthat thing, but has reserved it unto himself to make special creations.\nDo not all that we know of the animal kingdom--all that naturalists\nhave accumulated of facts and all that they concede to be the absence\nof facts--show that there is a clear and well-defined limitation to\nthe power of natural selection, as well as to the power of that other\nagency which is called sexual selection? Grant that this agency of\nnatural selection began to operate at a period, the commencement of\nwhich is as remote as figures can describe; that the struggle for life\nbegan as soon as there was an organized being existing in numbers\nsufficiently large to be out of proportion to the supply of food; that\nthe sexual selection began at the same time, and that both together\nhave been operating ever since among the different species of animals\nthat have successively arisen and successively displaced each other\nthroughout the earth. The longer we imagine this period to have\nbeen, the stronger is the argument against the theory of evolution,\nbecause the more numerous will be the absences of the gradations and\ntransitions necessary to prove an unbroken descent from the remote\nprototype which is assumed to have been the first progenitor of the\nwhole animal kingdom. Upon the hypothesis that evolution is a true\naccount of the origin of the different animals, we ought practically\nto find no missing links in the chain. The fact is that the missing\nlinks are both extremely numerous and important; and the longer the\nperiod assumed--the further we get from the probability that these two\nagencies of natural and sexual selection were capable of producing the\nresults that are claimed for them--the stronger is the proof that a\nbarrier has been set to their operation, and the more necessary is it\nto recognize the line which separates what they can from what they can\nnot do.\n\nLet us now see what is the state of the proof. It may assist the\nreader to understand the Darwinian pedigree of man if I present it in\na tabulated form, such as we are accustomed to use in exhibiting to\nthe eye the pedigree of a single animal. Stated in this manner, the\nDarwinian pedigree of man may be traced as follows:\n\n    I. A marine animal of the maggot form.\n                     |\n     II. Group of lowly-organized fishes.\n                     |\n        III. Ganoids and other fishes.\n                     |\n             IV. The Amphibians.\n                     |\n          V. The ancient Marsupials.\n                     |\n  VI. The Quadrumana and all the higher mammals.\n                     |\n            VII. The Lemurid\u00e6.\n                     |\n            VIII. The Simiad\u00e6.\n                     |\n          +-------------------+\n          |                   |\n  IX. Old World Monkeys.  New World Monkeys.\n                     |\n                  X. Man.\n\nThese ten classes or groups of animals are supposed to be connected\ntogether by intermediate diversified forms, which constitute the\ntransitions from one of the classes or groups to the other; and in\nreading the table downward it must be remembered that we are reading\nin fact through an ascending scale of beings, from the very lowest\norganized creature to the highest. The whole, taken together, forms a\nchain of evidence; and, according to the rational rules of evidence,\neach distinct fact ought to be proved to have existed at some time\nbefore our belief in the main hypothesis can be challenged. I know of\nno reason why the probable truth of a scientific hypothesis should\nbe judged by any other rules of determination than those which are\napplied to any other subject of inquiry; and, while I am ready to\nconcede that in matters of physical science it is allowable to employ\nanalogy in constructing a theory, it nevertheless remains, and must\nremain, true that where there are numerous links in a supposed chain\nof proofs that are established by nothing but an inference drawn from\nan analogous fact, the collection of supposed proofs does not exclude\nthe probable truth of every other hypothesis but that which is sought\nto be established, as it also does not establish the theory in favor of\nwhich the supposed facts are adduced. Upon these principles of evidence\nI propose now to examine the Darwinian pedigree of man.\n\nI. The group of marine animals described as resembling the larv\u00e6 of\nexisting Ascidians; that is to say, an aquatic animal in the form\nof a grub, caterpillar, or worm, which is the first condition of an\ninsect at its issuing from the egg. These assumed progenitors of the\nVertebrata are reached, according to Mr. Darwin, by \"an obscure glance\ninto a remote antiquity,\" and they are described as \"apparently\"\nexisting, and as \"resembling\" the larv\u00e6 of existing Ascidians. We are\ntold that these animals were provided with branchi\u00e6, or gills, for\nrespiration in water, but with the most important organs of the body,\nsuch as the brain and heart, imperfectly or not at all developed. This\nsimple and crude animal \"we can see,\" it is said, \"in the dim obscurity\nof the past,\" and that it \"must have been the early progenitor of\nall the Vertebrata.\"[35] It is manifest that this creature is a mere\nhypothesis, constructed, no doubt, by the aid of analogy, but existing\nonly in the eye of scientific imagination. Why is it placed in the\nwater? For no reason, apparently, but that its supposed construction\nis made to resemble that of some creatures which have been found in\nthe water, and because it was necessary to make it the progenitor of\nthe next group, the lowly-organized fishes, in order to carry out the\ntheory of the subsequent derivations. It might have existed on the\nland, unless at the period of its assumed existence the whole globe was\ncovered with water. If it had existed on the land, the four subsequent\nforms, up to and including the Marsupials, might have been varied to\nsuit the exigencies of the pedigree without tracing the descent of the\nMarsupials through fishes and the Amphibians.\n\nII. The group of lowly-organized fishes. These are said to have been\n\"probably\" derived from the aquatic worm (I), and they are described\nto have been as lowly organized as the lancelet, which is a known fish\nof negative characters, without brain, vertebral column, or heart,\npresenting some affinities with the Ascidians, which are invertebrate,\nhermaphrodite marine creatures, permanently attached to a support,\nand consisting of a simple, tough, leathery sack, with two small\nprojecting orifices. The larv\u00e6 of these creatures somewhat resemble\ntadpoles, and have the power of swimming freely about. These larv\u00e6 of\nthe Ascidians are said to be, in their manner of development, related\nto the Vertebrata in the relative position of the nervous system,\nand in possessing a structure closely like the _chorda dorsalis_ of\nvertebrate animals.[36] Here, again, it is apparent that a group of\nlowly-organized fish-like animals, of which there are no remains,\nhave been constructed by a process of scientific reasoning from a\ncertain class of marine creatures that are known. As a matter of pure\ntheory, there can be no serious objection to this kind of construction,\nespecially if it is supported by strong probabilities furnished by\nknown facts. But when a theory requires this kind of reasoning in order\nto establish an important link in a chain of proofs, it is perfectly\nlegitimate and necessary criticism that we are called upon to assume\nthe former existence of such a link; and, indeed, the theorists\nthemselves, with true candor and accuracy, tell us that they are\narguing upon probabilities from the known to the unknown, or that a\nthing \"must have existed\" because analogies warrant the assumption that\nit did exist. In a matter so interesting, and in many senses important,\nas the evolution theory of man's descent, it is certainly none too\nrigid to insist on the application of the ordinary rules of belief.\n\nIII. The Ganoids and other fishes like the Lepidosiren. These, we\nare told, \"must have been developed\" from the preceding (II). The\nGanoids, it is said, were fishes covered with peculiar enameled bony\nscales. Most of them are said to be extinct, but enough is known about\nthem to lay the foundation for their \"probable\" development from the\nfirst fishes that are supposed to have been derived from the aquatic\nworm (I). There is a reason for arguing the existence of these first\nfishes as a true fish with the power of locomotion, because the next\nascending group of animals is to be the Amphibians. In a fish, the\nswim-bladder is an important organ; and it is an organ that plays an\nimportant part in the Darwinian theory, furnishing, it is claimed,\na very remarkable illustration that an organ constructed originally\nfor one purpose, flotation, may be converted into one for a widely\ndifferent purpose, namely, respiration. As the Amphibians, which as\na distinct group were to come next after the fishes in the order of\ndevelopment, must be furnished with a true air-breathing lung, their\nprogenitors, which inhabited the water only, must be provided with an\norgan that would undergo, by transitional gradations, conversion into\na lung. But what is to be chiefly noted here is that it is admitted\nthat the prototype, which was furnished with a swim-bladder, was \"an\nancient and unknown prototype\"; and it is a mere inference that the\ntrue lungs of vertebrate animals are the swim-bladder of a fish so\nconverted, by ordinary generation, from the unknown prototype because\nthe swim-bladder is \"homologous or 'ideally similar' in position and\nstructure with the lungs of the higher vertebrate animals.\"[37] One\nmight ask here without presumption, why the Omnipotent God should not\nhave created in the vertebrate animals a lung for respiration, as well\nas have created or permitted the formation of a swim-bladder in a fish;\nand looking to the probabilities of the case, it is altogether too\nstrong for the learned naturalist to assert that \"there is no reason\nto doubt that the swim-bladder has actually been converted into lungs\nor an organ used exclusively for respiration\"; especially as we are\nfurnished with nothing but speculation to show the intermediate and\ntransitionary modifications between the swim-bladder and the lung.\nWhile we may not assume \"that the Creator works by intellectual powers\nlike those of man,\" in all respects, it is surely not presumptuous to\nsuppose that an Omnipotent and All-wise Being works by powers that are\ncompetent to produce anything that in his infinite purposes he may see\nfit specially to create.\n\nIV. The Amphibians. Here we come to what is now a very numerous group,\nof which it is said that the first specimens received, among other\nmodifications, the transformation of the swim-bladder of their fish\nprogenitors into an air-breathing lung. We are told that from the\nfishes of the last preceding group (III) \"a very small advance would\ncarry us on to the Amphibians.\"[38] But whether the advance from an\nanimal living in the water and incapable of existing out of that\nelement, to an animal capable of living on the land as well as in the\nwater, was small or large, we look in vain, at present, for the facts\nthat constitute that advance.\n\nV. The Ancient Marsupials. These were an order of mammals such as\nthe existing kangaroos, opossums, etc., of which the young, born in\na very incomplete state of development, are carried by the mother,\nwhile sucking, in a ventral pouch. They are supposed to have been\nthe predecessors, at an earlier geological period, of the placental\nmammals, namely, the highest class of mammals, in which the embryo,\nafter it has attained a certain stage, is united to the mother by a\nvascular connection called the _placenta_, which secures nourishment\nthat enables the young to be born in a more complete state. There is a\nthird and still lower division of the great mammalian series, called\nthe Montremata, and said to be allied to the Marsupials. But the\nearly progenitors of the existing Marsupials, classed as the Ancient\nMarsupials, are supposed to constitute the connection between the\nAmphibians and the placental mammals; that is to say, an animal which\nproduced its young by bringing forth an egg, from which the young is\nhatched, became converted into an animal which produced its young from\na womb and nourished it after birth from the milk supplied by its\nteats, the young being born in a very incomplete state of development\nand carried by the mother in a ventral pouch while it is sucking. The\nsteps of variation and development by which this extraordinary change\nof structure, of modes of reproduction and formation of organs, as well\nas habits of life, took place, are certainly not yet discovered; and\nit is admitted, in respect to forms \"now so utterly unlike,\" that the\nproduction of the higher forms by the process of evolution \"implies\nthe former existence of links binding closely together all these\nforms.\"[39] In other words, we are called upon to supply by general\nreasoning links of which we have as yet no proof.\n\nVI. The Quadrumana and all the higher (or Placental) Mammals. These are\nsupposed to stand between the implacental mammals (V) and the Lemurid\u00e6\n(VII). The latter were a group of four-handed animals, distinct from\nthe monkeys, and \"resembling the insectivorous quadrupeds.\" But the\ngradations which would show the transformation from the implacental\nMarsupials to the placental Quadrumana are wanting.\n\nVII. The Lemurid\u00e6. This branch of the placental mammals is now actually\nrepresented by only a few varieties. The early progenitors of those\nwhich still exist are placed by Darwin in the series intermediate\nbetween the Quadrumana and the Simiad\u00e6; and according to Huxley they\nwere derived from the lowest, smallest, and least intelligent of the\nplacental mammalia.\n\nVIII. The Simiad\u00e6. This is the general term given by naturalists to the\nwhole group of monkeys. From the Lemurid\u00e6 to the Simiad\u00e6 we are told by\nDarwin that \"the interval is not very wide.\" Be it wider or narrower,\nit would be satisfactory to know whether the gradations by which the\nformer became the latter are established by anything more than general\nspeculation.\n\nIX. The Catarrhine, or Old-World Monkeys. These are the great stem\nor branch of the Simiad\u00e6 which became the progenitors of man. His\nimmediate progenitors were \"probably\" a group of monkeys called by\nnaturalists the Anthropomorphous Apes, being a group without tails or\ncallosities, and in other respects resembling man. While this origin of\nman is gravely put forward and maintained with much ingenuity, we are\ntold that \"we must not fall into the error of supposing that the early\nprogenitor of the whole Simian stock, including man, was identical\nwith, or even closely resembled, any existing ape or monkey.\"[40] So\nthat somewhere between the early progenitor of the whole Simian stock\nand all that we know of the monkey tribe, there were transitions and\ngradations and modifications produced by natural and sexual selection\nwhich we must supply as well as we can.\n\nX. Man. We have now arrived at \"the wonder and glory of the universe,\"\nand have traced his pedigree from a low form of animal, in the shape\nof an aquatic worm, through successive higher forms, each developed\nout of its predecessor by the operation of fixed laws, and without the\nintervention of any special act of creation anywhere in the series,\nwhatever may have been the power and purpose by and for which existence\nwas given to the first organized and living creature, the aquatic worm.\nSpeaking of man as belonging, from a genealogical point of view, to the\nCatarrhine, or Old-World stock of monkeys, Mr. Darwin observes that \"we\nmust conclude, however much the conclusion may revolt our pride, that\nour early progenitors would have been properly thus designated.\"[41]\n\nI have already said that our pride may be wholly laid out of\nconsideration. The question of the probable truth of this hypothesis\nof man's descent should not be affected by anything but correct\nreasoning and the application of proper principles of belief. Treating\nit with absolute indifference in regard to the dignity of our race,\nI shall request my readers to examine the argument by which it is\nsupported, without the smallest influence of prejudice. I am aware\nthat it is asking a good deal to desire the reader to divest himself\nof all that nature and education and history and poetry and religion\nhave contributed to produce in our feelings respecting our rank in the\nscale of being. When I come to treat of that which, for want of a more\nsuitable term, must be called the substance of the human mind, and to\nsuggest how it bears upon this question of the origin of man, I shall,\nas I trust, give the true, and no more than the true, scope to those\nconsiderations which lead to the comparative dignity of the race. But\nthis dignity, as I have before observed, should follow and should not\nprecede or accompany the discussion of the scientific problem.\n\nWhat has chiefly struck me in studying the theory of evolution as an\naccount of the origin of man is the extent to which the theory itself\nhas influenced the array of proofs, the inconsequential character of\nthe reasoning, and the amount of assumption which marks the whole\nargument. This is not said with any purpose of giving offense. What is\nmeant by it will be fully explained and justified, and one of the chief\nmeans for its justification will be found in what I have here more than\nonce adverted to--Mr. Darwin's own candor and accuracy in pointing out\nthe particulars in which important proofs are wanting. Another thing\nby which I have been much impressed has been the repetition of what is\n\"probable,\" without a sufficient weighing of the opposite probability;\nand sometimes this reliance on the \"probable\" has been carried to the\nverge, and even beyond the verge, of all probability. Doubtless the\nwhole question of special creations on the one hand and of gradual\nevolution on the other is a question of probability. But I now refer\nto a habit among naturalists of asserting the probability of a fact or\nan occurrence, and then, without proof, placing that fact or occurrence\nin a chain of evidence from which the truth of their main hypothesis is\nto be inferred. It is creditable to them as witnesses, that they tell\nus that the particular fact or occurrence is only probably true, and\nthat we are to look for proof of it hereafter. But the whole theory\nthus becomes an expectant one. We are to give up our belief that God\nmade man in his own image--that he fashioned our minds and bodies after\nan image which he had conceived in his infinite wisdom--because we\nare to expect at some future time to discover the proof that he did\nsomething very different; that he formed some very lowly-organized\ncreature, and then sat as a retired spectator of the struggle for\nexistence, through which another and then another higher form of being\nwould be evolved, until the mind and the body of man would both have\ngrown out of the successive developments of organic structure. We can\nnot see this now; we can not prove it; but we may expect to be able to\nsee it and to prove it hereafter.\n\nThe present state of the argument does not furnish very strong\ngrounds for the expectation of what the future is to show. As far as\nI can discover, the main ground on which the principle of evolution\nis accepted by those who believe in it, is general reasoning. It is\nadmitted that there are breaks in the organic chain between man and his\nnearest supposed allies which can not be bridged over by any extinct or\nliving species. The answer that is made to this objection seems to me\na very singular specimen of reasoning. It is said that the objection\nwill not appear of much weight to those who believe in the principle\nof evolution from general reasons. But how is it with those who are\ninquiring, and who, failing to feel the force of the \"general reasons,\"\nseek to know what the facts are? When we are told that the breaks in\nthe organic chain \"depend merely on the number of related forms which\nhave become extinct,\" is it asking too much to inquire how it is known\nthat there were such forms and that they have become extinct? Geology,\nit is fully conceded on its highest authorities, affords us very little\naid in arriving at these extinct forms which would connect man with\nhis ape-like progenitors; for, according to Lyell, the discovery of\nfossil remains of all the vertebrate classes has been a very slow and\nfortuitous process, and this process has as yet reached no remains\nconnecting man with some extinct ape-like creature.[42] The regions\nwhere such remains would be most likely to be found have not yet been\nsearched by geologists. This shows the expectant character of the\ntheory, and how much remains for the future in supplying the facts\nwhich are to take the place of \"general reasons.\"\n\nBut perhaps the most remarkable part of the argument remains to be\nstated. The breaks in the organic chain of man's supposed descent are\nadmitted to be of frequent occurrence in all parts of the series, \"some\nbeing wide, sharp, and defined, others less so in various degrees.\"[43]\nBut these breaks depend merely, it is said, upon the number of related\nforms that have become extinct, there being as yet no proof, even by\nfossil remains, that they once existed. Now, the prediction is that\nat some future time such breaks will be found still more numerous and\nwider, by a process of extinction that will be observed and recorded;\nand hence we are not to be disturbed, in looking back into the past,\nby finding breaks that can not be filled by anything but general\nreasoning. The passage in which this singular kind of reasoning is\nexpressed by Mr. Darwin deserves to be quoted:\n\n\"At some future period, not very distant as measured by centuries,\nthe civilized races of man will almost certainly exterminate and\nreplace the savage races throughout the world. At the same time the\nanthropomorphous apes, as Prof. Schaafhausen has remarked, will no\ndoubt be exterminated. The break between man and his nearest allies\nwill then be wider, for it will intervene between man in a more\ncivilized state, as we may hope, even than the Caucasian, and some ape\nas low as the baboon, instead of as now between the negro or Australian\nand the gorilla.\"[44]\n\nI do not quite comprehend how the \"more civilized state of man\" in the\nmore or less remote future is to lead to this wider break. One can\nunderstand how the whole of mankind may become more civilized, and\nhow the savage races will disappear by extermination or otherwise. It\nmay be, and probably will be, that the anthropomorphous apes will be\nexterminated at the same time. But the question here is not in regard\nto a more perfect and widely diffused civilization--a higher and\nuniversal elevation of the intellectual and moral condition of mankind,\na more improved physical and moral well-being--but it is in regard to\na change in the physical and organic structure of the human animal, so\nmarked and pronounced as to produce a wider break between man and his\nnearest supposed allies than that which now exists between the negro\nor the Australian and the gorilla. The anthropomorphous ape existing\nnow will have disappeared; but it will be a well-known and recorded\nanimal of the past. But what reason is there to expect that natural and\nsexual selection, or the advance of civilization, or the extermination\nof the savage races of mankind, or all such causes combined, are going\nto change essentially the structure of the human body to something\nsuperior to or fundamentally different from the Caucasian individual?\nWe have had a tolerably long recorded history of the human body as it\nhas existed in all states of civilization or barbarism. And although\nin the progress from barbarism to civilization--if utter barbarism\npreceded civilization--the development of its parts has been varied,\nand the brain especially has undergone a large increase in volume and\nin the activity of its functions, we do not find that the plan on which\nthe human animal was constructed, however we may suppose him to have\noriginated, has undergone any material change.\n\nThe most splendid specimen of the Caucasian race that the civilized\nworld can show to-day has no more organs, bones, muscles, arteries,\nveins, or nerves than those which are found in the lowest savage.\nHe makes a different use of them, and that use has changed their\ndevelopment, and to some extent has modified stature, physical,\nintellectual, and moral, and many other attributes; as climate and\nhabits of life have modified complexion, the diseases to which the\nhuman frame is liable, and many other peculiarities. But if we take\nhistoric man, we find that in all the physical features of his animal\nconstruction that constitute him a species, he has been essentially\nthe same animal in all states of civilization or barbarism; and unless\nwe boldly assume that the prehistoric man was an animal born with a\ncoat of hair all over his body, and that clothing was resorted to as\nthe hair in successive generations disappeared, we can have no very\nstrong reason for believing that the human body has been at any time an\nessentially different structure from what it is now. Even in regard to\nlongevity or power of continued life, if we set aside the exceptional\ncases of what is related of the patriarchs in the biblical records,\nwe do not find that the average duration of human life has been much\ngreater or much less than the threescore and ten or the fourscore years\nthat are said to have been the divinely appointed term. As to what may\nhave been the average duration of life among prehistoric men, we are\naltogether in the dark.\n\nI must now revert to one of the most prominent of the admitted breaks\nin the Darwinian pedigree, namely, that which occurs at the supposed\ntransition from the amphibians to the mammalia. There is a term which\nis used in mechanics to mark the characteristic and fundamental\ndistinction between one complex machine and another. We speak of the\n\"principle\" on which a mechanical structure operates, meaning the\nessential construction and mode of operation which distinguish it from\nother machines of the same general class. Although we are not to forget\nthat an animal organization, to which is given that mysterious essence\nthat is called life, may come into being by very different processes\nfrom those which are employed by man in dealing with dead matter and\nthe forces which reside in it, yet there is no danger of being misled\ninto false analogies, if we borrow from mechanics a convenient term,\nand speak of the \"principle\" on which an animal is constructed and on\nwhich its animal organization operates. We find, then, that in the\nanimal kingdom there is a perfectly clear and pronounced division\nbetween the modes in which the reproductive system is constructed and\nby which it operates in the continuation of the species. The principle\nof construction and operation of the reproductive system, by which an\nindividual animal is produced from an egg brought forth by the female\nparent, and is thereafter nourished without anything derived from the\nparental body, is as widely different from that by which the young\nanimal is born from a womb and nourished for a time from the milk of\nthe mother, as any two constructions, animate or inanimate, that can be\nconceived of. Whatever may be the analogy or resemblance between the\nembryo that is in the egg of one animal and the embryo that remains in\nthe womb of another animal, at the point at which the egg is expelled\nfrom the parental system the analogy or resemblance ceases. In certain\nanimals a body that is called an egg is formed in the female parent,\ncontaining an embryo, or f\u0153tus, of the same species, or the substance\nfrom which a like animal is produced. This substance is inclosed in an\nair-tight vessel or shell; when this has been expelled from the parent\nthe growth of the embryo goes on to the stage of development at which\nthe young animal is to emerge from the inclosure, and, whatever may\nhave been the process or means of nourishment surrounding the embryo\nwithin the shell and brought in that inclosure from the body of the\nparent, the young animal never derives, at any subsequent stage of its\nexistence, either before or after it has left the shell, anything more\nfrom the parental system. It may be \"hatched\" by parental incubation\nor by heat from another source, but for nourishment, after it leaves\nthe shell, the young animal is dependent on substances that are not\nsupplied from the parental body, although they may be gathered or put\nwithin its reach by the parental care.\n\nThe transition from this system of reproduction to that by which the\nf\u0153tus is formed into a greater or less degree of development within the\nbody of the parent, and then brought forth to be nourished into further\ndevelopment by the parental milk, is enormous. The principle of the\norganic construction and mode of perpetuating the species, in the two\ncases, is absolutely unlike after we pass the point at which the ovule\nis formed by the union of the male and the female vesicles that are\nsupposed to constitute its substance. When we pass from the implacental\nto the placental mammals we arrive at the crowning distinction between\nthe two great systems of reproduction which separates them by a line\nthat seems to forbid the idea that the one has grown out of the\nother by such causes as natural selection, and without a special and\nintentional creation of a new and different mode of operation. On\nthe one hand, we have a system of reproduction by which the ovule is\nbrought forth from the body of the parent in an inclosed vessel, and\nthereafter derives nothing from the parental body. In the other, we\nhave the ovule developed into the f\u0153tus within the body of the parent,\nand the young animal is then brought forth in a more or less complete\nstate of development, to be nourished by the parental secretion called\nmilk. The intervention of the placental connection between the f\u0153tus\nand the mother, whereby nourishment is kept up so that the young animal\nmay be born in a more complete state of development, is a contrivance\nof marvelous skill, which natural selection, or anything that can be\nsupposed to take place in the struggle for existence, or the result\nof the sexual battle, seems to be entirely inadequate to account for.\nIf two such very diverse systems could be supposed to have been the\nproduct of human contrivance, we should not hesitate to say that the\nprinciple of the one was entirely different from that of the other, and\nthat the change evinced the highest constructive skill and a special\ndesign.\n\nThe Darwinian hypothesis is that this great transition from the one\nsystem of reproduction to the other took place between the amphibians\nand the ancient marsupials, by the operation of the influences\nof natural and sexual selection. That is to say, the system of\nreproduction through an egg, which is the characteristic of the\namphibians, became changed by gradations and modifications into the\nsystem of the lowest mammals, the distinction between the former and\nthe latter being an obvious and palpable one. Then we are to suppose a\nfurther change from the marsupials, or the implacental mammals, to that\nwonderful contrivance, the _placenta_, by which the mother nourishes\nthe f\u0153tus into a more complete state of development before the young\nanimal is born. This enormous change of system is supposed to have\nbeen brought about by a struggle among the individuals of one species\nfor food, aided by a struggle between the males of that species for\nthe possession of the females, by the growth and development of organs\nuseful to the animal in the two battles, and by the transmission of\nthese enhanced powers and improved weapons to offspring, and possibly\nby the crossing of different varieties of the new animals thus\nproduced. But what potency there could be in such causes to bring about\nthis great change it is extremely difficult to imagine, and we must\ndraw largely on our imaginations to reach it. It would seem that if\nthere is any one part of animal economy that is beyond the influence of\nsuch causes as the \"survival of the fittest,\" it is the reproductive\nsystem, by which the great divisions of the animal kingdom continue\ntheir respective forms. Give all the play that you can to the operation\nof the successful battle for individual life, and to the victory of\nthe best-appointed males over their competitors for the possession\nof the females, and to the transmission of acquired peculiarities to\noffspring--when you come to such a change as that between the two\nsystems of reproduction and perpetuation, you have to account for\nsomething which needs far more proof of the transitional gradations of\nstructure and habits of life than can now be found between the highest\nof the amphibians and the lowest of the mammalia. I know not how there\ncould be higher or stronger evidence of design, of a specially planned\nand intentionally elaborated construction, than is afforded by this\ngreat interval between the one reproductive system and the other. But\nit is time now to pass to those points of resemblance between man and\nthe other mammals which are asserted as the decisive proofs of his and\ntheir descent from some pre-existing form, their common progenitor.\nThese points of resemblance may be considered in the following order:\n\n1. _The Bodily Structure of Man._--He is notoriously constructed on\nthe same general type or model as other mammals. \"All the bones in his\nskeleton can be compared with corresponding bones in a monkey, bat, or\nseal. So it is with his muscles, nerves, blood-vessels, and internal\nviscera. The brain, the most important of all the organs, follows the\nsame law.\"[45]\n\n2. _The Liability of Man to certain Diseases to which the Lower\nAnimals are liable._--These diseases, such as hydrophobia, variola,\nthe glanders, syphilis, cholera, etc., man both communicates to and\nreceives from some of the lower animals. \"This fact proves the close\nsimilarity of their tissues and blood, both in minute structure\nand composition, far more plainly than does their comparison under\nthe best microscope or by the aid of the best chemical analysis.\"\nMonkeys are liable to many of the same non-contagious diseases as\nwe are, such as catarrh and consumption. They suffer from apoplexy,\ninflammation of the bowels, and cataract in the eye. Their young die\nfrom fever when shedding their milk-teeth. Medicines produce the\nsame effect on them as on us, and they have a strong taste for tea,\ncoffee, spirituous liquors, and even tobacco. Man is infested with\nboth internal and external parasites of the same genera or families as\nthose infesting other mammals; in the case of scabies, he is infested\nwith the same species of parasites. He is subject to the same law of\nlunar periods, in the process of gestation, and in the maturation and\nduration of certain diseases. His wounds are repaired by the same\nprocess of healing, and, after the amputation of his limbs, the stumps\noccasionally possess some power of regeneration, as in the lowest\nanimals.[46]\n\n3. _The Reproductive Process._--This is strikingly the same, it is\nsaid, in all mammals, from the first act of courtship by the male to\nthe birth and nurturing of the young.[47] The closeness of the parallel\nhere, however, is obviously between man and the other placental\nmammalia, if we regard the whole process of reproduction of the\ndifferent species.\n\n4. _Embryonic Development._--From the human ovule, which is said to\ndiffer in no respect from the ovule of other animals, into and through\nthe early embryonic period, we are told that the embryo of man can\nhardly be distinguished from that of other members of the vertebrate\nkingdom. It is not necessary to repeat the details of the resemblance,\nwhich are undoubtedly striking, because they show a remarkable\nsimilarity between the embryo of man and that of the dog and the ape,\nin the earlier stage of the development, and that it is not until quite\nin the later stages of development that the three depart from each\nother, the difference between the young human being and the ape being\nnot so great as that between the ape and the dog. We may, of course,\naccept Prof. Huxley's testimony that \"the mode of origin [conception?]\nand the early stages of the development of man are identical with those\nof the animals immediately below him in the scale; without a doubt, in\nthese respects, he is far nearer to the apes than the apes are to the\ndog.\"[48]\n\n5. _Rudiments._--This is a somewhat obscure branch of the proofs, which\nrequires a more detailed examination in order to appreciate its bearing\non the general theory of evolution. A distinction is made between\nrudimentary and nascent organs. The former are absolutely useless to\ntheir possessor--such as the mamm\u00e6 of male quadrupeds, or the incisor\nteeth of ruminants, which never cut through the gums--or else they are\nof such slight service to their present possessors that they can not be\nsupposed to have been developed under the conditions which now exist.\nThese useless, or very slightly useful, organs in the human frame,\nare supposed to have been organs which had an important utility in\nthe lower animals from which man is descended, but, by disuse at that\nperiod of life when the organ is chiefly used, and by inheritance at a\ncorresponding period of life, they became of less and less utility in\nthe successive animals that were evolved out of the preceding forms,\nuntil they sank into the condition of useless appendages, although\nperpetuated by force of the derivation of one species of animal from\nanother, caused by the operation of the laws of natural and sexual\nselection. Nascent organs, on the other hand, are those which, though\nnot fully developed to their entire capability, are of high service to\ntheir possessor, and may be carried to a higher degree of utility. One\nof the characteristics, as it is said, of rudimentary organs, is that\nthey often become wholly suppressed in individuals, and then reappear\noccasionally in other individuals, through what is called reversion,\nor a return to ancestral peculiarities.[49] We are told that \"not one\nof the higher animals can be named which does not bear some part in a\nrudimentary condition; and man forms no exception to the rule.\"[50]\n\nAmong the rudiments that are peculiar to man, and which are supposed\nto be proofs of his cognate relations to the lower animals, we are\nreferred to certain muscles in a reduced condition, which in the other\nanimals are used to move, twitch, or contract the skin, and remnants\nof which, in an efficient state, are found in various parts of our\nbodies; for instance, the muscles which raise the eyebrows, those which\ncontract the scalp, those which, in some individuals, move the external\near, and similar muscular powers in different parts of the body. These\nare adduced as illustrations of the persistent transmission of an\nabsolutely useless, or almost useless, faculty, \"probably\" derived from\nour remote semi-human progenitors. There is also another rudiment in\nman, found in the covering of the eye, and called by anatomists the\n\"semi-lunar fold,\" which in birds is of great functional importance,\nas it can be rapidly drawn across the whole eyeball. In those animals\nin which, with its accessory muscles and other structures, it is well\ndeveloped, as in some reptiles and amphibians, and in sharks, it is a\nthird eyelid. In the two lower divisions of the mammalian series, the\nmonotremata and the marsupials, and in some few of the higher mammals,\nas in the walrus, it is said to be fairly well developed. But in\nman, in the quadrumana, and most other mammals, it has become a mere\nrudiment.\n\nThe sense of smell in man is also classed by Darwin and other\nnaturalists among the rudiments. It is argued that it was not\noriginally acquired by man as he now exists, but that he has inherited\nthis power, in an enfeebled and so far rudimentary condition, from some\nearly progenitor, to whom it was highly serviceable, and by whom it was\ncontinually used.\n\nThen we have the rudiment of hair, which, so far as it now exists on\ndifferent parts of our body, is regarded as a mere remnant of the\nuniform hairy coat of the lower animals. Man, as he is now born,\n\"differs conspicuously from all the other primates in being almost\nnaked.\" But this nearly nude condition was not, it is said, the\ncondition of his progenitors, and it is not the condition of his\nco-descendants from the same progenitors. At some time the progenitors\nof man and his co-descendants became covered all over with a coat of\nhair. What remains upon our bodies of this peculiar growth, that is\ncalled hair, is what was left after the agency of natural selection\nhad worked off what was useless to the successive animals, and sexual\nselection had operated to transmit to offspring the absence of hair\nthat had accrued in the nearer progenitors and the immediate parents.\nThe illustrations which render this view \"probable\" do not need to\nbe repeated, nor is it necessary to follow out the speculations\nconcerning the mode in which our progenitors, near or remote, became\nvaried in respect to the quantity, position, or direction of the hairs\non various parts of their bodies.\n\nThere are several other alleged homologues or rudiments which are\nsupposed to connect man with the lower animals, but which, whatever may\nbe the resemblances, it is not necessary to discuss in detail, because\nthere is one consideration at least which applies to the whole of\nthis class of proofs, and to that I now pass. The three great classes\nof facts on which the whole argument rests, viewing man as an animal\nand omitting all reference to his intellect, are the resemblances of\nhis bodily structure to that of the other mammals, the similarity\nbetween his embryonic development and theirs, and the rudiments. I\nreserve for separate discussion the counter-proof which may be derived\nfrom the nature of the human mind, and the special adaptation of the\nhuman structure to become the temporary residence and instrument of a\nspiritual and immortal being.\n\n\"It is,\" says Mr. Darwin, \"no scientific explanation to assert that\nthey have all [man and the other animals of the mammalian class] been\nformed on the same ideal plan.\"[51] The similarity of pattern is\npronounced \"utterly inexplicable\" upon any other hypothesis than that\nall these animals are descended from a common progenitor, and that\nthey have become what they are by subsequent adaptation to diversified\nconditions. I may incur some risk in undertaking to suggest what is\na \"scientific\" explanation. Certainly I do not propose to \"assert\"\nanything. But I will endeavor to keep within the bounds of what I\nsuppose to be science. I take that to be a scientific explanation\nwhich, embracing the important facts of natural history as the\ngroundwork of the reasoning, undertakes to show the rationality of one\nhypothesis that differs from another, when the question is, Which has\nthe greater amount of probability in its favor?\n\nAll correct reasoning on this subject of man's descent as an animal\nbegins, I presume, with the postulate of an Infinite Creator, having\nunder his power all the elements and forms of matter, organized and\nunorganized, animate and inanimate. There is no fundamental difference\nof opinion on this point, as I understand, between some of the\nevolutionists and their opponents.[52] Omnipotence, boundless choice of\nmeans and ends, illimitable wisdom, a benevolence that can not fail and\ncan not err, are the conceded attributes of the being who is supposed\nto preside over the universe; and, however difficult it may be for us\nto express a conception of infinite power and infinite wisdom, as it\nis to describe infinite space and duration, we know what we mean to\nassume when we speak or think of faculties that are without limit, and\nof moral qualities that are subject to no imperfection. It is true that\nwe have no means of forming an idea of superhuman and infinite power\nbut by a comparison of our own limited faculties with those which we\nassume to belong to an eternal and infinite God. But the nature of our\nown limited powers teaches us that there may be powers that are as far\nabove ours as the heavens are above the earth, as the endless realms\nof space stretch beyond and forever beyond any measurable distance,\nas eternity stretches beyond and forever beyond all measurable time.\nAt all events, the postulate of an infinite God is the one common\nstarting-point for the scientists of the evolution school and those\nwho accept their doctrine, and for those who dissent from it. If I\ndid not assume this, I could not go one step further, for without it\nthere could not be a basis for any reasoning on the subject that would\nlead anywhere but to the conclusion that all that exists came by blind\nchance. This conclusion is rejected alike by the scientists, whose\nviews I am now examining, and by those who differ from them.\n\nIn the economy of Nature, which is but another term for the economy\nof the Omnipotent Creator, there is no waste of power, as there is no\nabstention from the exercise of power, where its exertions are needed\nto accomplish an end. By this I mean that when a general plan of\nconstruction is found carried out through a variety of organizations,\nthe rational inference is that so much power has been exerted as was\nneedful to accomplish in each organization the objects that are common\nto all of them, and that no more power has been used in that direction.\nBut where a special adaptation in some one variety of the same class\nof constructions is needful to accomplish an object peculiar to a new\nvariety, the necessary amount of power never fails to be exerted. A\nstudy of the animal kingdom reveals this great truth, as palpably as a\nstudy of the products of human skill reveals the fact that man, from\nthe imperfection of his faculties, is constantly exerting more or less\npower than was needful in his efforts to produce a new variety in his\nmechanical constructions. Experience and accumulated knowledge enable\nus to carry a general plan of construction through a considerable group\nof mechanical forms; but it is when we endeavor to vary the principle\nof construction so as to produce a new and special mode of operation,\nthat we either waste power in repeating the general plan or fail to\nexercise the amount of power necessary to adapt the general plan to the\nintroduction of the special object at which we are aiming. Our success\nin making such adaptations is often wonderful, but our failures evince\nthat our imperfect faculties do not always enable us to accomplish\nthe necessary adaptations of the general plan of construction to the\nspecial objects which we wish to attain. To the Infinite Creator, all\nsuch difficulties are unknown. He neither wastes power by new plans\nthat are unnecessary, nor makes \"vain repetitions,\" nor fails to exert\nthe requisite amount of power and wisdom in the introduction of new\nand special contrivances which he ingrafts upon or superadds to the\ngeneral plan, and which he has devised for the accomplishment of a\nnew object. With a boundless choice of means and ends, with a skill\nthat can not err, with a prescience that sees the end from the first\nconception of the design, he can repeat the general plan throughout\nany variety of constructions without any waste of power, and can\nintroduce the new adaptations or contrivances which are to constitute\na new construction, by the exercise of all the power that is required\nto accomplish a special object. Whether we are to suppose that he does\nthis by the establishment of certain laws which he leaves to operate\nwithin prescribed limits, or does it by special creations proceeding\nfrom direct and specific exertions of his will, the question of his\npower to employ the one method or the other remains always the same.\nThe question of which was his probable method depends upon the force of\nevidence; and upon this question we must allow great weight to the fact\nwhich all Nature discloses, namely, that the Creator does not waste\npower by making new plans of construction where an existing plan may be\nusefully repeated, and that he does not fail to exercise the necessary\npower when he wishes to add to the general plan of construction a new\nand special organism for a particular purpose.\n\nIs there anything presumptuous in thus speaking of the determination\nand purposes of the Omnipotent Creator? We have his existence and\ninfinite attributes conceded as the basis of all sound reasoning on his\nworks. Why then should we not infer his purposes and his acts from his\nworks? Why should we not attribute to him a special design, when we\ncan not examine his works without inferring such special design, unless\nwe conclude that the most amazing and peculiar constructions grew up\nunder the operation of causes of which we have no sufficient proof, and\nin the supposed result of which there are admitted chasms that can not\nbe bridged over?\n\nTo return now to the resemblance between the bodily structure of\nman and that of his supposed progenitors. The assertion is that a\nrepetition of the same general plan of construction throughout a class\nof animals can only be explained upon the hypothesis of their descent\nfrom a common progenitor. They are, it is claimed, co-descendants\nfrom some one ancient animal; and however they may differ from each\nother, in all these co-descendants from that animal we find the same\ngeneral plan of construction, the same ideal model repeated. Among the\nwhole class of the higher mammals, we have skeletons, muscles, nerves,\nblood-vessels, internal viscera, organs, that closely correspond. What\ndoes this prove but that there was no waste of power, because there\nwas no necessity in making man, for the formation of a general plan\nof construction different in these particulars from that which was\nemployed in making the monkey, the bat, or the seal? The similarity\nof pattern between the hand of a man or a monkey, the foot of a\nhorse, the flipper of a seal, or the wing of a bat, is pronounced\n\"utterly inexplicable\" upon any hypothesis but that of descent from a\ncommon progenitor. But why is not this sameness of ideal plan just as\nconsistent with the hypothesis that the same ideal plan would answer\nfor the human hand or the hand of an ape, the foot of the horse, the\nflipper of the seal, or the wing of the bat?[53] It is when you pass\nfrom such resemblances and come to the special contrivances which\nseparate one animal from another by a broad line of demarkation,\nthat you are to look for the adaptation of special contrivances to\nrepetitions of the same ideal model through the varying species. Take,\nfor example, the introduction among the mammals of the placental system\nof reproduction, parturition, and subsequent nourishment of the young,\ncombined with the nourishment of the f\u0153tus while it continues in the\nbody of the mother. This system would require no material variation\nfrom the general plan of construction that is common to the different\nmammals of this class in respect to the parts where the resemblances\nare kept up throughout the series, such as those of the skeleton,\nmuscles, nerves, viscera, and other organs that are found in all of\nthem. But for the introduction of this peculiar system of reproduction\nand continuation of the species, there was needful a special and\nmost extraordinary contrivance. If such a contrivance or anything\nlike it had been produced by human skill, and been introduced into a\nmechanical structure, we should not hesitate to say that there had\nbeen an invention of a most special character. When you follow this\nsystem through the different animals in which it is found operating,\nand find that the period of gestation and of suckling is varied for\neach of them, that for each there is the necessary modification of\ntrunk, situation of the organs, assimilation of food and formation\nof milk, and many other peculiarities, what are you to conclude but\nthat there has been an adaptation of a new system to a general plan\nof construction, and that while the latter remains substantially the\nsame, it has had ingrafted upon or incorporated with it a most singular\ncontrivance, so original, comprehensive, and flexible, that its\ncharacteristic principle admits of the most exact working in animals\nthat are as far asunder as man and the horse, or as the horse and the\nseal, or as the seal and the bat?\n\nThe resemblances between the embryonic development of man and the\nother mammals present another instance of the constantly occurring\nfact that there has been no waste of power on the one hand, and on the\nother no failure to exert the amount of power requisite to produce a\nnew variation of the general principle. There is no more logical force\nin the hypothesis of a common progenitor, in order to account for\nthese resemblances, than there is in the hypothesis that the general\nsystem of embryonic development was first devised, and that it was\nthen varied in each distinct animal according to the requirements of\nits special construction. Upon the latter supposition, there would\nbe resemblances to a certain stage, and then there would follow the\ndepartures which we have no difficulty in tracing. Upon the former\nsupposition we should expect to find, what we actually do find, that\nit is very difficult, if not impossible, to assign any reason for\nthe departures, or to suggest how it has happened that one animal is\nso absolutely distinct from another. Thus, to begin with the embryo\nitself, and to trace it through its stages of development, we find\nthat in man it can hardly be distinguished from that of other members\nof the vertebrate kingdom. This we should expect to be the case after\nwe have learned the great fact that Nature operates upon a uniform\nprinciple up to the point where variations and departures are to\nsupervene. The system of embryonic development being devised to operate\nin parallel lines through all the placental mammals until the lines\nshould begin to depart from each other so as to result in animals\nof different species, would necessarily show strong resemblances of\nstructure until the departures supervened. There would be, in other\nwords, a strong illustration of the truth that in the Divine economy\nthere is no waste of power. But when the stage is reached at which the\ndepartures may be noted, and the lines diverge into the production of\norganized beings differing widely from each other, we reach an equally\nstriking illustration of the corresponding truth that the amount of\npower necessary to produce very different results never fails to be\nput forth. There is no good reason why this latter exertion of power\nshould not be attributed to special design just as logically and\nrationally as we must attribute to intentional purpose and infinite\nskill the general system of embryonic development which has been made\nfor the whole class of the placental mammals. While, therefore, we may\naccept as a fact Prof. Huxley's statement on this branch of comparative\nanatomy, we are under no necessity to accept his conclusion. To the\nquestion whether man originates in a different way from a dog, bird,\nfrog, or fish, this anatomist answers, as already quoted: \"The reply\nis not doubtful for a moment; without question, the mode of origin and\nthe early stages of the development of man are identical with those\nof the animals immediately below him in the scale; without a doubt,\nin these respects he is far nearer to apes than apes are to the dog.\"\nThis refers, of course, to the parallelism that obtains in the early\nstages of the embryonic development. It necessarily implies, at later\nstages, diverging lines, which depart more or less from each other, and\nthus we have between the ape and the man a nearer approach than we have\nbetween the ape and the dog. But how does this displace, or tend to\ndisplace, the hypothesis of a general system of embryonic development\nfor all animals of a certain class, and an intentional and special\nvariation of that system so as to produce different species of animals?\nThe identity between the mode of origin and the early stages of the\ndevelopment of man and those of the animals immediately below him in\nthe scale, is strong proof of the applicability of the same general\nprinciple of development throughout all the animals of a certain class.\nThe cessation of the parallelism at the diverging lines is equally\nstrong proof of a design to create an animal differing as man does from\nthe ape, or as the ape does from the dog. The argument that these three\nspecies are co-descendants from a common progenitor, viewing man simply\nas an animal, is at least no stronger than the argument which leads to\nthe conclusion of special creations.\n\nThe same thing may be said of the liability of man to certain\ncontagious or non-contagious diseases in common with some of the lower\nanimals. That there is a similarity in the chemical composition of\nthe blood of an entire class of animals, in the structure of their\ntissues and blood-vessels, so that they are subject to the same causes\nof inflammation or to the same parasites, is proof of a uniform plan\nof the fluids and the vascular system, or, in other words, it evinces\nthat here, too, there has been in these respects no waste of power in\nforming the different animals of the same class. But trace back the\nsupposed pedigree of the animals sharing this chemical composition\nof the blood, character of tissues, and vascular system, until you\nhave passed through the amphibians and reached their supposed fish\nprogenitors. Somewhere between the fishes and the higher mammals,\nyou have not only a great change in the chemical composition of the\nblood-vessels and tissues, but an equally great change in the apparatus\nby which the blood is oxygenated.[54] How can these changes have\nbeen brought about without a new and intentional structure of the\nvessels and the apparatus for supplying the oxygen demanded for the\ncontinuation of life? How can we explain these changes by such agencies\nas the natural selection which is supposed to lead to the \"survival\nof the fittest,\" and the sexual selection which is supposed to give\nto the best-appointed males of a given species the power to transmit\nto their offspring the new peculiarities which they have acquired\nthrough successive generations? Do not these changes show that there\nis a line of division which such agencies alone can not cross? Do they\nnot clearly point to the exercise of the creative power in a special\nmanner, and for special purposes? That power being once exercised, the\nnew chemical composition and mechanical appliances being devised, the\nsame \"ideal plan\" could be carried through a new class of animals by\na repetition which is in accordance with the economy of Nature, and\nwhich an infinite power could adapt to the formation of animals, each\nof which was designed to perpetuate its own species and no other. Hence\nwe should expect to find in the animals sharing in the same formation\nof the blood and the vascular system a corresponding process of healing\nthe parts severed by a wound, and a continuous secretion from such\nvessels as have not been cut away; but we should not expect to find the\nstumps growing into a new and perfect part, to take the place of what\nhas been removed by amputation.[55] We should expect to find the same\ndrugs affecting different animals of the same class alike; and when the\nnervous system of a class of animals is upon the same general plan,\nwe should expect to find them similarly affected by stimulants. But\nthese resemblances do not militate very strongly against the hypothesis\nof special creations, when we consider that it is according to the\nuniversal economy of the Omnipotent Creator to employ the necessary,\nand no more than the necessary, power in originating a plan that may\nbe applied to the formation of a distinct class of beings, and that\nhis adaptations of this plan to further and specific constructions of\nbeings belonging to a general class, but differing widely from each\nother, are among the strongest and plainest proofs of his infinite\npower and the nature of his methods.\n\nIn regard to the \"rudiments\" that are found in man, the theory of Mr.\nDarwin can be best stated in his own words: \"In order to understand the\nexistence of rudimentary organs, we have only to suppose that a former\nprogenitor possessed the parts in question in a perfect state, and that\nunder changed habits of life they became greatly reduced, either from\nsimple disuse or through the natural selection of those individuals\nwhich were least encumbered with a superfluous part, aided by the\nother means previously indicated.\"[56] But, in order to do justice to\nthis theory, it is necessary to repeat the description and operation\nof the supposed agencies of natural and sexual selection. Natural\nselection is an occurrence which takes place among the individuals\nof a certain species in the struggle for existence, whereby those\nwho are best appointed secure the necessary supply of food, and the\nweaker or less active are either directly destroyed in the contest or\nperish for want of nourishment. The \"fittest\" having survived, they\nhave the best chance of procreating their kind, and are likely to have\nthe most progeny. To these individuals there comes in aid the sexual\nselection, which means chiefly the victory of the fittest males over\ntheir less fit competitors for the possession of the females. Whatever\npeculiarities of structure or development, or diminution of structure\nor development, these fittest males possess, they would transmit\nto their offspring. This tendency would be enhanced by the varying\nconditions of life through which the successive generations might have\nto pass; so that if the former progenitor possessed naturally an organ\nin a perfect state, but ceased to make use of it, and for thousands\nof generations its use went on diminishing, it would sink into the\ncondition of a mere rudiment. Supposing this to be a partially true\nexplanation of the modes in which organs become rudimentary, how does\nit militate against the idea of separate creations? We have \"only\nto suppose\" that the first men possessed, for example, the power of\nmoving the skin all over their bodies by the contraction of certain\nmuscles, and that their remote descendants lost it everywhere excepting\nin a few parts, where it remains in an efficient state, and that it\nhas become varied in different individuals. The process by which\norgans become rudimentary is an hypothesis just as consistent with\nthe separate creation of man as it is with his being a co-descendant\nfrom some lower animal whose descendants branched into men, apes,\nhorses, seals, bats, etc.; for, on the supposition of the separate\ncreation of all these different animals, each species might have been\noriginally endowed with this power of muscular contraction of the\nskin, and in their descendants it might have been retained or varied\nor have become more or less rudimentary, according to its utility\nto the particular species. The truth is, that our own faculties of\ncreation or construction, when we undertake to deal with matter and\nits properties, are so imperfect, and that which constitutes living\norganisms is so utterly beyond our reach, that we do not sufficiently\nremember how entirely it is within the compass of the infinite Power,\nwhich has given to matter all the properties that it possesses and\nhas living organisms under its absolute control, to form a system of\nconstruction and operation for beings of entirely distinct characters,\ncarrying it through each of them in parallel lines, or causing it to\ndiverge into varying results with an economy that neither wastes the\nconstructive power nor fails to exert it where it is needed. To argue\nthat the presence of rudiments in different animals, in different\ncomparative states of development or efficiency, or in a purely useless\ncondition, can only be explained by a descent from some remote common\nprogenitor, is what the logicians call a _non sequitur_. It overlooks\nthe illimitable faculty of the creating Power, and disregards the\ngreat fact that such a power acts by an economy that is saving where\nuniformity will accomplish what is intended, that is profuse where\nvariation is needful, and that can guide its own exertions of power,\nor its abstention from such exertions, by unerring wisdom, to the most\nvaried and exact results.\n\nI trust that by the use of the term \"economy\" in speaking of what\nis observable in the works of the Creator, I shall be understood as\ncomprehending both the avoidance of unnecessary and the exertion of\nall necessary power. Of the degree of necessity in any exercise of a\npower which we suppose to be infinite, we can only judge by what we\ncan see. If omnipotence and omniscience are to be predicated of the\nbeing who is supposed to preside over the universe, it is rational to\nconclude, from all that we can discover, that, in applying a uniform\nsystem of construction to different animals of a certain general class,\nhe acted upon a principle that his unerring faculties enabled him to\nsee was a comprehensive one; and that in producing variations of that\nsystem of construction that would result in adapting its uniformity\nto the varying conditions of the different species, he acted by the\nsame boundless wisdom and power. If these postulates of the Divine\nattributes are conceded, rudiments do not by any means necessarily\nlead to the conclusion that all the animals of a certain class are\nco-descendants from some remote common progenitor, for they do not\nexclude the hypothesis that each distinct animal was formed upon a\ngeneral plan of construction that could be applied throughout the\nclass, but that it was varied according to the special conditions of\nits intended being. Organs or parts may thus have become more or less\nrudimentary without resorting to the supposition of a common progenitor\nfor the whole class. That supposition, indeed, makes it necessary\nto assume that the infinite Creator fashioned some one animal, and\nthen, abstaining from all work of further direct creation, left all\nthe other animals to be evolved out of that one by the operation of\nsecondary causes that fail even as a theory to account for what we\nsee, and that can not be traced through any results that have yet been\ndiscovered. Wherever we pause in the ascending scale of the Darwinian\ndescent of man, wherever we place the first special act of creative\npower, whether we put it at the fish-like animal of the most remote\nantiquity, and call that creature the original progenitor of all the\nvertebrata, or whether we suppose a special creation to have occurred\nat the introduction of the mammalian series, or anywhere else, we\nhave to account for changes of system, new constructions, elaborately\ndiversified forms, by the operation of agencies that were incapable of\nproducing the results, if we are to judge of their capacity by anything\nthat we have seen or known of their effects.\n\nI will conclude this chapter by expressing as accurately as I can\nwhat has struck me as the excessive tendency of modern science to\nresolve everything into the operation of general laws, or into what\nwe call secondary causes. I may be able to suggest nothing new upon\nthis part of the subject, but I shall at least be able, I hope, to\nput my own mind in contact with that of the reader by explaining what\nhas impressed me in the speculations of those who lay so much stress\nupon the potency of general laws to produce the results which we\nsee in Nature. Of course, I do not question the great fact that the\ninfinite Power acts by and through the uniform methods from which we\nare accustomed to infer what we call laws; which in physics is nothing\nbut a deduction of regularity and system from that which we see to\nbe perpetually and invariably happening. Now, I do not enter here\ninto the question of the tendency of modern science to displace our\nreligious ideas of a special Providence, by attributing everything\nin Nature to the operation of fixed laws of matter; or its tendency,\nin other words, to remove the infinite Being at a greater distance\nfrom us than that in which our religious feelings like to contemplate\nhim. I am perfectly sensible that in truth the infinite God is just\nas near to us, when we regard him as acting by general laws and\nsecondary causes, as when we believe him to be exercising a direct and\nspecial power. I am equally sensible that it is in the very nature\nof infinite power, wisdom, and benevolence to be able and willing to\nordain uniform and fixed principles of action. That Power which gives\nto matter all its properties may well be supposed to have established\nuniformity and regularity of movements, forces, combinations, and\nqualities. How supremely consistent this uniformity and regularity\nare, with what stupendous accuracy they are kept forever in operation,\nwe are more or less able to discern; and that benevolence which is\nbelieved to accompany the power may well be supposed to have intended\nthat its intelligent and rational creatures should be able in some\ndegree to discover and to avail themselves of these unvarying laws of\nthe physical world. But are these laws to be supposed to be the only\nmethods by which the infinite Will has ever acted? Is it to be assumed\nthat, having settled and established these perpetual principles, on\nwhich matter, organized or unorganized, is to act, he leaves everything\nto their operation and abstains from all further exertion of his\ncreative power for any special purpose? Has he given to these general\nlaws a potency to produce, in and of themselves, all the results? In\nother words, has he affixed to their operation no limitations, or has\nhe set bounds to them, and reserved to himself, by direct, specific,\nand occasional exercise of his will and power, for new purposes, to\nproduce results for which the general laws were not ordained?\n\nIt is not necessary here to enter into the consideration of what\nare called \"miracles.\" These, in their true meaning, are special\ninterpositions, which the Divine Power is supposed to make, by a\nsuspension or interruption of the established laws of Nature; and,\nwhatever may be the grounds of our belief or our unbelief in such\noccurrences, they are not exercises of power such as those which are\nsupposed to take place in special creations of new beings. That the\nhypothesis of special creations of new beings involves no interruption\nor displacement of the fixed laws of Nature, is quite manifest.\n\n\nNOTE A.\n\n NOTE ON AMPUTATION, OR SEVERANCE OF PARTS.--As Mr. Darwin\n attached some importance to a fact which he asserted respecting the\n efforts of Nature to restore a part of an organism which has been\n severed by amputation, I think it well to quote his statement, and to\n point out what I believe to be an inaccuracy. His statement is this:\n \"His [man's] wounds are repaired by the same process of healing,\n and the stumps left after the amputation of his limbs, especially\n during an early embryonic period, occasionally possess some power of\n regeneration, as in the lowest animals.\" It is not quite apparent\n what he means by amputation during an early embryonic period. If he\n is to be understood as referring to a case of complete severance of\n any part of an embryo before birth, it has not been demonstrated\n that such a severance has been followed by a successful effort of\n Nature to replace the severed part; and it is difficult to understand\n how there could be such an amputation during embryonic life without\n destroying the life of the embryo; or, if the severed part were one\n of the extremities, how there could be a new extremity formed. In\n such a case, if life continued and birth were to take place, the\n animal must be born in an imperfect state. In regard to amputations\n taking place at any time after birth, if the expression \"some power\n of regeneration\" means to imply a new formation to take the place\n of the severed part, the assertion is not correct. What occurs in\n such cases may be illustrated by the very common accident of the\n severance of the end of a human finger at the root of the nail. If\n the incision is far enough back to remove the whole of the vessels\n which secrete the horny substance that forms the nail, there will\n be no after growth of anything resembling a nail. If some of those\n vessels are left in the stump, there will be continuous secretion\n and deposit of the horny substance, which may go so far as to form a\n crude resemblance to a nail. But if all the vessels which constitute\n the means of perpetuating a perfect nail are not left in their normal\n number and action, there can be no such thing as the formation of a\n new nail. Whether it is correct to speak of the imperfect continuation\n of a few of the vessels to secrete the substance which it is their\n normal function to secrete, as a \"power of regeneration,\" is more\n than doubtful, if by such a power is meant a power to make a new\n and complete structure to take the place of the structure that has\n been cut away. It is nothing more than the continued action of a\n few vessels, less in number than the normal system required for the\n continued growth and renewal of the part in question. The abortive\n product in such cases looks like an unsuccessful effort of Nature\n to make a new structure in place of the old one; but it is not in\n reality such an effort. The fact that the same thing occurs, in just\n the same way and to a corresponding extent, in different animals, has\n no tendency to prove anything excepting that these different animals\n share the same general system of secreting vessels for the formation\n and perpetuation of the several parts of their structures. It has no\n tendency to prove that they are co-descendants from a common ancestral\n stock, for on the hypothesis of their special and independent creation\n a common system of secreting vessels would be entirely consistent with\n their peculiar and special constructions.\n\n FOOTNOTES:\n\n [35] \"Descent of Man,\" pp. 164, 609.\n\n [36] \"Descent of Man,\" p. 159.\n\n [37] \"Origin of Species,\" p. 148.\n\n [38] \"Descent of Man,\" p. 165.\n\n [39] \"Descent of Man,\" p. 158.\n\n [40] \"Descent of Man,\" p. 155.\n\n [41] Ibid.\n\n [42] \"Descent of Man,\" pp. 156, 157.\n\n [43] Ibid., p. 156.\n\n [44] \"Descent of Man,\" p. 156.\n\n [45] \"Descent of Man,\" p. 6.\n\n [46] Ibid., p. 8.\n\n [47] Ibid.\n\n [48] \"Descent of Man,\" pp. 9, 10, quoting Huxley, \"Man's Place in\n Nature,\" p. 65.\n\n [49] \"Descent of Man,\" p. 11 _et seq._\n\n [50] Ibid.\n\n [51] \"Descent of Man,\" p. 24. Consult Mr. Darwin's note on Prof.\n Bianconi's explanation of homologous structures upon mechanical\n principles, in accordance with their uses.\n\n [52] Mr. Herbert Spencer's peculiar views are not here included in the\n discussion, but they will be considered hereafter.\n\n [53] It is immaterial, of course, in this discussion, whether the\n formation of man preceded that of the other animals, according to\n the Platonic idea, or whether, as in the account given in the book\n of Genesis, the other animals were first formed. So far as an ideal\n plan entered into all of them, that plan may have been devised for and\n first applied to any part of the series, and then varied accordingly.\n\n [54] The popular terms--\"fish\" and \"flesh\"--present to the mind the\n most vivid idea of this change from the characteristic substance of\n one of these animals to that of another.\n\n [55] See the note on amputation, or severance of parts, at the end of\n this chapter.\n\n [56] \"Descent of Man,\" p. 25.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\n The doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer.\n\n\nPassing from Mr. Darwin as the representative of that class of\nnaturalists who have undertaken to assign the pedigree of man by\ntracing the stages of his development back to the lowest and crudest\nform of animal life, I now come to a philosopher whose speculations\ncarry the doctrine of evolution through every field of inquiry, and\nwho, finding, as he supposes, evidence of its operation throughout all\nthe other realms of the physical and the moral word, contends that it\nalso obtains in the animal kingdom. It were to be wished that this\nwriter, whose intellect is of the order of minds to which we naturally\nlook for a judicial treatment of such themes, had been a little less\ndogmatic in his treatment of the doctrine of special creations. Mr.\nSpencer has, indeed, consistently recognized the necessity of trying\nthe question between the hypothesis of special creations and the\nhypothesis of evolution, as one to be decided, if it is to be decided\nat all, only by an examination of evidence. But to one who approaches\nthis question in a spirit of inquiry, and with a desire to learn\nwhatever can be said on both sides, it is somewhat disappointing to\nfind that the most eminent writer of the evolution school is unjust\nin his treatment of the belief which he opposes. There can be no\nobjection to advocacy, or to strong and decided advocacy, when settled\nconvictions are to be vindicated. But with advocacy we may expect that\nkind of fairness which consists in a full recognition of the opposite\nargument. A great master of dialectics once laid it down as a maxim of\nadvocacy, \"State the case of your opponent as strongly as you know how,\nstronger if possible than he states it himself, and then answer it, if\nyou can.\" Some instances in which Mr. Spencer has not followed this\nwise rule may now be mentioned:\n\n1. He attacks with great vigor the hypothesis that living beings\nresulted from special creations, as a primitive hypothesis; and because\nit is a very ancient belief he pronounces it to be probably untrue. He\neven goes so far as to assert that its antiquity raises a presumption\nagainst it. He classes it among a family of beliefs which began in\nprimitive ages, and which have one after another been destroyed by\nadvancing knowledge, until this one is almost the only member of the\nfamily that survives among educated people.[57] He says that if you\ncatechise any one who holds this belief as to the source from which he\nderived it, he is forced to confess that it was put into his mind in\nchildhood, as one portion of a story which, as a whole, he has long\nsince rejected. It will give way at last, along with all the rest of\nthe family of beliefs which have already been given up. It may be that\nthe arguments of those whose controversial writings on this subject\nMr. Spencer had before him, relied on the antiquity of this belief\nas one of the strongest proofs of its probable truth. I have not\nlooked to see how any writer on that side of the question has used the\nantiquity of the doctrine of special creations. But it is certainly\nnot in accordance with the sound rule, even of advocacy, to state the\nargument in support of the belief which you oppose with less than the\nforce that may be given to it, whether your opponents have or have not\ngiven to it the true force that belongs to it. The mere antiquity of\nthe belief in special creations has this force and no more: that a\nbelief which began in the primitive ages of mankind, and has survived\nthrough all periods of advancing knowledge, must have something to\nrecommend it. It is not one of those things that can be swept away with\ncontempt as a nursery-tale, originating in times of profound ignorance\nand handed down from generation to generation without inquiry. That it\nhas survived, after the rejection of other beliefs that originated at\nthe same period--survived in minds capable of dealing with the evidence\nin the light of increasing knowledge--is proof that it has something\nmore to rest upon than the time of its origin. If some of its defenders\nnow assert its antiquity as the sole or the strongest argument in its\nfavor, its opponents should not assume that this is the only or the\nbest argument by which it can be supported. Nor can it be summarily\ndisposed of by classifying it as one of a family of beliefs that\noriginated in times of ignorance, and that have mostly disappeared from\nthe beliefs held by educated people. Its association with a special\nclass of mistaken beliefs affords no intrinsic improbability of its\ntruth. Every belief has come to be regarded as a mistaken or a true\none, not according to its associated relations with other beliefs that\nhave come to be regarded as unfounded, but according to the tests that\nthe knowledge of the age has been able to apply to it. Take the whole\ncatalogue of beliefs that began to be held in the darkest ages, and\nit will be found that their association has had no influence beyond\ninducing incorrect habits of reasoning on certain subjects, or a\nhabit of accepting the official authority of those who claimed to be\nthe special custodians of truth. These intellectual habits have been\ntemporary in their influence, and have gradually changed. Every one of\nthe beliefs that have been given up by the lettered or the unlettered\npart of mankind, has been given up because better knowledge of a\nspecial character has come to show that it is unfounded, and because\nmere official authority has ceased to have the power that it once\nhad. If a belief has survived from a remote antiquity among those who\nare competent to judge of the evidence in its favor, by comparing the\nphenomena that increasing knowledge has accumulated, the force of the\nfact that it has so survived is not weakened by its association for a\nperiod with other beliefs that are now rejected.\n\nMr. Spencer asserts that, as the supposition of special creations is\ndiscredited by its origin in a time when men were profoundly ignorant,\nso conversely the supposition that races of organisms have been\ngradually evolved is credited by its origin, because it is a belief\nthat has come into existence in the most instructed class, living in\nthese better instructed times. This is a kind of argumentation that is\noften the result of a love of antithesis. The soundness of the last\nbranch of the proposition appears to depend upon the soundness of the\nfirst branch. Make it to appear that the origin of the elder hypothesis\nis unfavorable by reason of the time of its origin, and it seems to\nfollow that the origin of the modern hypothesis is favorable by reason\nof its time of origin. But this antithesis does not express the exact\ntruth in either branch of it. It is not because of its antiquity, or\nof the character of the times in which it was first believed, that\nthe doctrine of special creations can be shown to be irrational or\nimprobable. There is no presumption against the truth of any belief,\nto be derived from the fact that it was held by persons who also held\nsome erroneous beliefs on other subjects. If there were, nothing could\nbe worthy of belief unless it could show a recent origin, or at least\nuntil demonstration of its truth had overcome the presumption against\nit. On the other hand, there is no presumption in favor of the truth\nof a new theory to be derived from the fact that it is new, or that it\noriginated among those who think that they do not hold any erroneous\nbeliefs, or because it originated in a comparatively very enlightened\nage. Every physical and every moral theory, unless we mean to be\ngoverned by mere authority, whether it is ancient or recent, must be\njudged by its merits, according to the evidence.\n\n2. Another of Mr. Spencer's naked assertions is that the belief in\nspecial creations is \"not countenanced by a single fact.\" Not only did\nno man \"ever see a special creation,\" but \"no one ever found indirect\nproof of any kind that a special creation had taken place.\" In support\nof this sweeping dogma, he adduces a habit of the naturalists who\nmaintain special creations to locate them in some region remote from\nhuman observation.[58] This is another instance of not stating the case\nof your adversary as strongly as you might state it, or as he states\nit himself. \"While no naturalist and no other person who believes in\nspecial creations ever saw one take place, indirect and circumstantial\nevidence tending to show that the earth is full of them has been\naccumulated to an enormous amount.\" It is a monstrous extravagance to\nassert that the hypothesis is \"absolutely without support of any kind.\"\nWhat if Mr. Spencer's opponents were to retort that no man ever saw\nan instance in which an animal of a distinct species had been evolved\nout of one of an entirely different organization; that there is no\nexternal evidence to support the hypothesis of such derivations, and\nthat the naturalists of the evolution school habitually place the scene\nof operations in the region of scientific imagination? The discovery\nof truth is not likely to be much advanced by this mode of attacking\nopposite opinions, yet it could be used with as much propriety on the\none side of this question as on the other.\n\n3. Next, and completing the misrepresentation, we have the assertion\nthat, \"besides being absolutely without evidence to give it external\nsupport, this hypothesis of special creations can not support itself\ninternally--can not be framed into a coherent thought.... Immediately\nan attempt is made to elaborate the idea into anything like definite\nshape, it proves to be a pseud-idea, admitting of no definite shape.\nIs it supposed that a new organism when specially created is created\nout of nothing? If so, there is a supposed creation of matter, and the\ncreation of matter is inconceivable, implies the establishment of a\nrelation in thought between nothing and something--a relation of which\none term is absent--an impossible relation.... Those who entertain\nthe proposition that each kind of organism results from divine\ninterposition do so because they refrain from translating words into\nthoughts. The case is one of those where men do not really believe,\nbut _believe they believe_. For belief, properly so called, implies\na mental representation of the thing believed; and no such mental\nrepresentation is here possible.\"[59]\n\nWhen I first read this passage I could hardly trust the evidence\nof my eye-sight. It seemed as if the types must have in some way\nmisrepresented the distinguished writer; for I could scarcely conceive\nhow a man of Mr. Spencer's reputation as a thinker could have\ndeliberately penned and published such a specimen of logic run riot. It\nreads like some of the propositions propounded by the scholastics of\nthe middle ages. But, having assured myself that the American edition\nof his work is a correct reprint, and having carefully pondered and\nendeavored to ascertain his meaning, I was forced to the conclusion\nthat he supposes this to be a conclusive answer to the idea of absolute\ncreation in respect to anything whatever, because, when put into a\nlogical formula, one term of the relation is nothing, and the other\nterm is something. Logical formulas are not always the best tests of\nthe possibility of an intellectual conception, or of what the mind\ncan represent to itself by thought, although to a certain class of\nreaders or hearers they often appear to be a crushing refutation of the\nopposite opinion or belief against which they are employed.\n\nIs there in truth anything impossible because it is unthinkable\nin the idea of absolute creation? Is the creation of matter, for\nexample, inconceivable? It certainly is not if we adopt the postulate\nof an infinite Creator. That postulate is just as necessary to the\nevolutionist who maintains the ordination of fixed laws or systems\nof matter, by the operation of which the organized forms of matter\nhave been evolved, as it is to those who maintain that these forms\nare special creations. Who made the laws that have been impressed\nupon matter? Were they made at all, or were they without any origin,\nself-existing and eternal? If they were made, they were made out of\nnothing, for nothing preceded them. Then apply to them the logical\nformula, and say that one term of the relation is absent--is mere\nnothingness--and so there is an impossible relation, a relation in\nthought between nothing and something, which is inconceivable. This\ndilemma is not escaped by asserting, as Mr. Spencer does, that \"the\ncreation of force is just as inconceivable as the creation of matter.\"\nIt is necessary to inquire what he means by a \"conceivable\" idea. If he\nmeans that we can not trace or understand the process by which either\nforce or matter was created, our inability may be at once conceded.\nBut if he means that, granting the postulate of an infinite creating\npower, we can not conceive of the possibility that matter and all\nthe forces that reside in it or govern it were called into being by\nthe will of that power, the assertion is not true. Human faculties\nare entirely equal to the conception of an infinite creating power,\nwhatever may be the strength or the weakness of the proof by which\nthe existence of such a power is supported; and if there is such a\npower it is a contradiction in terms to assert that absolute creation,\nor the formation of \"something\" out of \"nothing,\" is an impossible\nconception. Such an assertion is simply a specious play upon words, or\nelse it involves the negation of an infinite creating power. The term\n\"creation,\" as used in all modern philosophy, implies, _ex vi termini_,\nthe act of causing to exist; and, unless we assume that nothing which\nexists was ever caused to exist, we must suppose that the causing power\nwas alike capable of giving existence to matter and to the forces that\nreside in it.\n\nThe reason why the Greek philosophers did not embrace the idea of\nabsolute creation was not because it was an unthinkable idea, or one\nincapable of representation in thought. They were, as we have seen,\nsurrounded by a mythology which attributed the origin of the world\nto polytheistic agencies. They struggled against the cosmogony of\npoetical and popular traditions in an effort to find a cause of a\ndifferent character. Monotheism, the conception of the one only and\nomnipotent God, freed philosophy from the great want which had hampered\nits speculations. This want was the conception of divine power, as\nabstracted from substance or the qualities of substance. When this\nconception had been obtained, absolute creation was seen to be a\nlegitimate deduction from the illimitable scope and nature of the power\nwhich monotheism imputed to the Being supposed to preside over the\nuniverse, and to have existed before all the objects which the universe\ncontains: and this conception of the act of creation thus became\nequally capable of representation in words and in thought. You may say\nthat it has no evidence to support it; that it leads to contradictory\nideas of the attributes claimed for the Creator; that upon the\nhypothesis of those attributes, his works are inexplicable. Whether\nyou can say this truly or not, you can not say that absolute creation\nis inconceivable; and unless you mean to claim that neither matter nor\nforce was ever created, that there never was a being competent to make\neither the one or the other to exist, you can not deny the probability\nthat both were called into being by a definite and specific exercise\nof power. Mr. Spencer's philosophy manifestly leads to the conclusion\nthat there is no God, or no such God as the hypothesis of special\ncreations supposes, or such as the hypothesis of evolution necessarily\ncalls for. If I understand him rightly, he rejects the idea of any\ncreation, whether of matter, or force, or the properties of matter, or\neven of law of any kind, physical or moral. Hence it is that I admit\nthe necessity of treating the existence of the Omnipotent Creator as an\nindependent question to be judged upon moral evidence; and hence, too,\nin reasoning upon the probable methods of the Almighty, I maintain that\nthe postulate of his existence is alike necessary to the evolutionist\nand to those who believe in special creations, and that both must adopt\nthe same cardinal attributes as attributes of his power and character.\n\nIt is well to pursue this particular topic somewhat further, because\nthis special difficulty arising from the creation of something out of\nnothing, triumphantly propounded by a certain class of philosophers,\nis echoed by others as if it concluded the question. The received\nmeaning of language is often a great help to the mind in representing\nto itself in thought the idea that is expressed by the word. The word\ncontains and suggests the thought. Lexicographers are the learned\npersons, one part of whose business it is to exhibit the thought that\nis represented by a word, not according to the popular and, perhaps,\nuncertain or erroneous use of the term, or according to its secondary\nmeanings, but according to the exact correspondence between the word\nand the idea which it conveys in its primary and philosophic usage.\nThe definition given to our English verb \"create,\" in its primary\nand philosophical sense, is: \"To produce,\" \"to bring into being from\nnothing\"; \"to cause to exist.\" \"Creation,\" as a noun expressing the\nact described by the verb, is defined as \"the act of creating: the act\nof causing to exist, and _especially_, the act of bringing this world\ninto existence.\" \"Created,\" as the past participle which describes what\nhas been done, is defined as \"formed from nothing: caused to exist;\nproduced; generated.\"[60] This is the sense in which the word is used\nin the English version of the first verse of the book of Genesis: \"In\nthe beginning God _created_ the heavens and the earth\"; and whatever\nmay be said about the source from which Moses derived his knowledge\nof the fact which he relates, there can be no doubt about the nature\nof the fact which he intended to assert. Now, does the lexicographer,\nwhen he describes creation as the act of causing something to exist,\nor the act of producing something out of nothing, present an idea\nthat is incapable of mental representation--a relation impossible in\nthought? What he means to express is clear enough. Is the idea which he\nexpresses impossible to be conceived by the mind?\n\nIt will be a good test of this supposed insuperable difficulty to\napply the term \"creation\" to some human act. When Shakespeare composed\nthe tragedy of \"Hamlet,\" he created something in the sense which we\nare here considering.[61] He created that something out of nothing:\nfor he caused something to exist which did not exist before. He did\nnot merely inscribe certain words upon paper, by the material process\nof writing, and afterward cause the same words to be repeated by the\nmaterial process of printing upon another paper. He gave intellectual\nexistence to certain male and female persons of his imagination,\ncarried them through certain periods of their imaginary lives, and\nmade them and their history an imperishable intellectual idea. It is\nentirely immaterial to the present discussion that such a product of\nthe imagination presents to us nothing but intellectual ideas; that\nHamlet and Ophelia, and the King and Queen, and all the rest of the\n_dramatis person\u00e6_, were mere creatures of the poet's fancy. Although\nthey were nothing but intellectual conceptions, they were \"creations\"\nin the sense of being intellectual products that never existed in idea\nbefore the poet made them, and therefore they were made out of nothing.\nNow, although we can not look into the mind of Shakespeare and describe\nthe process by which he formed these creatures of his imagination,\nwe experience no difficulty when we contemplate these imaginary\npersonages, in representing in thought what we mean when we say that\nhe \"created\" them. It would be simple absurdity to say that he did not\ncreate these ideal persons, because the notion of creation implies\nthe formation of something out of nothing. That is the very meaning\nof creation in its primary and philosophical sense; and, when applied\nto works of the human imagination, it presents to us an idea that is\nperfectly capable of representation in thought.\n\nPass from this illustration of the idea of human creation to the\nhypothesis of a supreme being, possessing infinite power, and existing\nbefore the material universe began. The hypothesis of his existence\nincludes the power to call into being things that had no previous\nbeing, whether these things be matter and material properties or\nmoral and intellectual ideas. The whole realms of possible existence,\nspiritual and material, the whole void which consists in mere\nnothingness, are, according to the hypothesis, under his absolute sway.\nHe holds the power of absolute creation; and the power this hypothesis\nimputes to him is no more incapable of representation in thought\nthan is the inferior and limited power of creation, which we know\nto be performed by the finite human intellect, and which we have no\ndifficulty in conceiving as a true creating faculty. When Watt formed\nthe steam-engine, he did something more than to place certain portions\nof matter in certain relations, and make them to operate in a certain\nmanner so as to produce a certain effect. He made the intellectual plan\nof a certain arrangement of matter; and to this act of giving being to\nsomething, both intellectual and physical, which did not exist before,\nwe ascribe in its true sense the act of creation, and the idea we\nexpress by the term is perfectly capable of mental representation.\n\n\"Those,\" says Mr. Spencer, \"who entertain the proposition that each\nkind of organism results from a divine interposition, do so because\nthey refrain from translating words into thoughts\"; and he adds, quite\ntruly, that there is no assignable mode or conceivable way in which the\nmaking of a new organism can be described. Let this be applied to some\nnew mechanical structure produced by the intellect and hand of man. It\nis a result or product of human interposition. When we describe this\nhuman product as an invention, do we refrain from translating words\ninto thoughts because we can not describe the process of invention? or,\nin other words, because we can not assign the mode in which the mind\nof the inventor reached his conception, are we to conclude that he did\nnot attain to the conception which is plainly embodied in the machine\nthat stands before our eyes? If we say that he created something, do we\nmake a statement that can not be consistently imagined because we can\nnot assign the mode in which his mind operated when it thought out the\nidea and constructed the plan? We can see how he put together certain\nmaterial substances, and how they operate; but we can not see or\ndescribe the mental process by which he obtained his conception. Yet\nwe ascribe to his act, and rightly ascribe to it, the idea of creation;\nand the term represents a thought of the mind that is as capable of\nbeing imagined as the word is of being spoken and understood.\n\nWhen Raphael painted the Sistine Madonna, he formed in his mind an\nimage of the heaven-chosen mother of Christ, and the marvelous skill of\nhis artist hand transferred that face of surpassing loveliness to the\ncanvas. The story that it tells may be a fiction or a fact. The image\nis a reality. It was a new existence; and, if we call it a creation,\ndo we use a word which we can not translate into thought because we do\nnot know how the painter attained to that sweet conception of the human\nmother's tenderness, and the dignity of her appointed office as the\nhandmaiden of the Lord?\n\nThere is nothing unphilosophical in thus ascribing what is done by\nfinite human faculties and what is done by the infinite Creator to\na power that is of the same nature, but which in the one being is\nlimited and imperfect, and in the other is superhuman and boundless.\nIf we know, as we certainly do, that weak and finite man can perform\nsome acts of creation, can cause some things to exist that did not\npreviously exist, how much more may we safely conclude that a being\nof infinite powers can call into existence, out of the primeval\nnothingness, objects of the most stupendous proportions, of the\nnicest adaptations, of the most palpable uses--can cause matter and\nforce and law to be where before all was vacuity, where force was\nunknown, where law had never operated! When the mind contemplates that\nOmnipotent Power, it reaches forth to an awful presence; but it does\nnot contemplate something of which it can not conceive, for its own\ninferior faculties teach it that creation is a possible occurrence.\n\nWe do not need to be and are not indebted to superstition, to\ntradition, or to deceptive words, for the idea of creation. At an\nimmeasurable distance from the Almighty Power, we ourselves are\nconstantly creating; and it is when we do so that our acts resemble\nhis in their nature, however below his productions may be the\nproductions of our poor human faculties. It is one of the proofs of\nour relationship to the infinite Creator, a proof for which we are not\nindebted solely to revelation, that we are endowed in this imperfect\ndegree with a power that resembles his. It is also one of the chief\nof the characteristics that distinguish man from the other animals:\nfor, wonderful as are the constructions made by some of them, they are\nuniformly made under the involuntary and uncontrollable impulse of an\nimplanted instinct; whereas, the constructions of man are made by the\nexercise of a constructive faculty that is guided by his will, which\nenables him to effect variations of structure entirely unattainable\nby any other being that exists on this earth. All the other animals\nare confined in the exercise of their constructive faculties to\nan invariable model, appointed for each of them according to the\ncircumstances of its being. The range of choice is bounded by the\nlimitations of the instinct under which the animal is compelled to do\nits work. It may appear to select a favorable site for its habitation,\nto cull its materials with judgment, to guard against disturbance from\nthe elements or from enemies. But we have not much reason to suppose\nthat any of these things are done from anything but an irresistible\nimpulse, and we certainly have no reason to suppose that the animal has\nthe moral power to do them or to refrain from them. To man alone does\nthere appear to have been given the power of varying his constructions\nby the exercise of an intelligent will; and that will is bounded only\nby the limitations of his power over matter: so that, in respect to\nmaterial structures, the power of man to make creations approaches\nnearest to the power of the Almighty Creator, and is, within its\nlimitations, a true creating power. In the realm of intellectual or\nideal creations, the resemblance of human and divine power is the same,\nand the limitations upon the former are those fixed by the finite\nnature of human faculties.[62]\n\n4. Mr. Spencer has a great deal to urge against \"the current\ntheology,\" and he treats of some of the theological difficulties in\nwhich those who espouse the hypothesis of special creations entangle\nthemselves.[63] I have nothing to do with the current theology. I do\nnot borrow from it or rely upon it, and do not undertake to disentangle\nits professors from any of the difficulties in which they may have\ninvolved themselves. The only question that interests me is, whether\nthe objections propounded by this philosopher as an answer to the\nhypothesis of special creations present insuperable difficulties to\none who does not depend upon the current theology for arguments,\nexplanations, or means of judgment. I shall therefore endeavor to\nstate fairly and fully the chief of the supposed difficulties, without\nconsidering the answer that is made to them by those who are taken as\nthe representatives of the current theology.\n\nPut into a condensed form, one of Mr. Spencer's grand objections\nto the belief in special creations of organized beings is that it\ninvolves a deliberate intention on the part of the Creator to produce\nmisery, suffering, pain, and an incalculable amount of evil, or else\nthat there was an inability to prevent these results. Omitting for\nthe present the human race, and confining our first view to the other\nanimals, the earth is largely peopled by creatures which inflict on\neach other and on themselves a vast amount of suffering. The animals\nare endowed with countless different pain-inflicting appliances and\ninstincts; the earth has been a scene of warfare among all sentient\ncreatures; and geology informs us that, from the earliest eras which\nit records, there has been going on this universal carnage. Throughout\nall past time there has been a perpetual preying of the superior upon\nthe inferior--a ceaseless devouring of the weak by the strong. In\nalmost every species, the number of individuals annually born is such\nthat the majority die of starvation or by violence before arriving at\nmaturity. But this is not all. Not only do the superior animals prey\nupon the inferior, for which there may be suggested some compensating\nbenefit by the sustentation of a higher order of life through the death\nof the lower, or by leaving the most perfect members of a species to\ncontinue that species, but the inferior prey upon the superior, and\norganisms that are incapable of feeling have appliances for securing\ntheir prosperity at the expense of misery to organisms capable of\nhappiness. Of the animal kingdom, as a whole, more than half, it is\nsaid, are parasites, and almost every known animal has its peculiar\nspecies. Passing over the evils thus inflicted on animals of inferior\ndignity and coming to man, we find that he is infested by animal and\nvegetable parasites of which two or three dozens may be distinctly\nenumerated; which are endowed with constitutions fitting them to live\nby absorbing the juices of the human body, furnished with appliances by\nwhich they root themselves in the human system, and made prolific in\nan almost incredible degree. They produce great suffering, sometimes\ncause insanity, and not infrequently death.[64]\n\nThe dilemma that is supposed to be created by these facts for those\nwho believe in the doctrine of special creations is this: If any\nanimals are special creations, all are so; and each animal must be\nsupposed to have been created for the special purposes that are\napparent upon an examination of its structure and mode of life. As the\nsuperior are constantly preying upon the inferior, and as there are\nnumerous inferior animals that are constantly inflicting evil upon\nthe superior, it results that malevolence rather than benevolence was\na characteristic attribute of the creating power, or else that the\npower which is supposed to have created was unable to make the perfect\ncreation which the hypothesis of infinite benevolence calls for.\nInfinite goodness fails to be demonstrated by a world that is full of\nmisery, caused by special appliances to bring it about; and infinite\npower can not have existed, unless it comprehended the power to produce\nperfect and universal happiness.\n\nI pass entirely aside from the argument which is drawn from the\nsupposed manifestations of Almighty power in the creation of\ndiversified forms of animal and vegetable life, because that argument\nleads doubtless to the inquiry whether the Almighty made these\nmanifestations to demonstrate his power to himself, or made them to\ndemonstrate it to his human creatures. Admitting the fact, as Mr.\nSpencer puts it, that millions of these demonstrations took place on\nearth when there were no intelligent beings to contemplate them--a\nstatement that is said to be verified by the deductions of geology\nand paleontology--an inquiry into the period or the purpose of these\nmanifestations of divine power as manifestations only, merely leads\nus into some of the arguments of the current theology. There is\nanother realm of thought and reasoning into which it will be far more\nprofitable to enter. It is that realm which lies outside of tradition\nand the teachings of theologians, and which takes the hypothesis of\ninfinite power and infinite goodness, not as something which we have\nbeen taught to believe, but as a postulate of philosophical reasoning;\nand, applying this hypothesis to the known facts of the animal and\nvegetable world, endeavors to ascertain whether these facts necessarily\ncreate an insuperable difficulty in the hypothesis which lies at the\nbasis of all sound reasoning on the subject. For I must again insist,\nand shall endeavor specifically to show, that this hypothesis of\ninfinite power and goodness is equally necessary to the evolutionist\nand to the believer in special creations, unless all speculation on the\ngenesis of the world is to end in blind chance, and the negation of a\npersonal creating power of any kind.\n\nWhat, then, is the true philosophical mode of dealing with the\nexistence in the world of physical and moral evil, in reference to\nthe hypothesis of infinite power and infinite goodness? I do not\nask what is a perfect demonstration of the problem of physical and\nmoral evil--although I think that the natural solution is very near\nto demonstration; but the inquiry which I now make is. What is the\nreasonable mode of comparing the existence of suffering, pain, misery,\nand their immediate agencies, with the supposition of an all-wise,\nall-powerful, and perfectly beneficent Creator?[65]\n\nWhat we have to do, in the first place, is to contemplate the scope\nof infinite goodness; or, in other words, to consider that infinite\nbenevolence is, in its very nature, guided by unerring wisdom, and\nconsequently that its methods, its plans, and its results are as far\nbeyond the methods, plans, and results which our imperfect benevolence\nwould adopt or achieve, as infinite power is beyond our finite and\nimperfect capacity. This does not call upon us to conceive of something\nthat is inconceivable, or that can not be represented in thought;\nfor power and goodness are qualities that we know to exist: we know\nthat they exist in degrees; and that what exists in a measurable and\nlimited degree may exist without measurable limitation, or in absolute\nperfection. The philosophic mode of regarding perfect goodness requires\nus to consider its methods and results with reference to its perfect\ncharacter, and not to measure them by the inferior standards of human\nwisdom. Following out this obvious truth, we have next to inquire\nwhether the physical and moral evil which we see ought to destroy the\nvery idea of an infinitely benevolent Creator, and to compel us to\nregard him as a malevolent being, or else to destroy our belief in\nhis infinite power, because his power has been unable to make a world\nof perfect happiness and enjoyment for his creatures. If this dilemma\nseriously exists, it is just as great a difficulty for the hypothesis\nof evolution as it is for that of special creations, and it drives\nboth schools into the utter negation of any intelligent causing power\nadequate to produce what we see.\n\nIn the next place, let us see what is the sum total of the physical\nand moral evil in the animal kingdom, which, in reference to the sum\ntotal of happiness, is supposed to create this formidable impeachment\nof the Almighty benevolence on the one hand, or of the Almighty power\non the other. As to the order of things which permits the superior\nanimals to prey upon the inferior, there is an explanation which lies\non the surface of the facts, and which would seem to satisfy all the\nrequirements of philosophic reasoning, whatever may be the mode in\nwhich this part of the moral problem is dealt with by theologians.\nWe find the fact to be that, as we rise higher and higher in the\nscale of organized beings, the superior are capable of happiness\nin a greater degree than the inferior, in some proportion to the\nsuperiority of their organization. The comparative duration of life\namong the different animals also enters into the estimate of the sum\ntotal of happiness. As a general rule, the inferior organizations\nare individually more short-lived than the superior. Now, it might\nhave pleased the Creator to cause all animals to be fed by manna from\nheaven, or to find their sustenance only in vegetable products; and\nhe could thus have dispensed with the carnivorous appetite, and have\nrendered it unnecessary for the superior to prey upon and destroy the\ninferior. But, although he could thus have made a world from which the\nmisery of this perpetual carnage would have been absent, and which\nwould have been so far a world of perfect happiness, the fact is\nthat this law of universal destruction is so shaped as to follow the\nincreasing capacity for happiness and enjoyment which moves through\nthe ascending scale of the organized beings. It also follows another\nobvious purpose of the carnivorous appetite and of the permission to\nindulge it. A large part of the whole animal kingdom is so constructed\nthat sustentation requires animal food. The blood, the tissues, the\nwhole substance of some animal structures require to be renewed by\nsimilar substances; and although life may sometimes be continued by the\nassimilation of vegetable substances alone, it is not the life for\nwhich the animal was formed, because it is not always the life which\nmakes the full end of its being, and realizes its best capacity for\nenjoyment and for the continuation of its species. In some cases, the\ncarnivorous appetite is withheld. The animal lives and thrives best\nupon a vegetable diet, and so far as the flesh of these animals enters\ninto the wholesome and beneficial food of man, the animal fulfills one\npurpose of its existence. Some animals, before they become fit food\nfor man, have been nourished by the substance of still other animals.\nIn all this variety of modes in which animal food is prepared for\nman, and in the whole of the stupendous economy by which the superior\norganizations prey upon the inferior in order that each species may\ncontinue itself and may fulfill the purposes of its existence, we may\nwithout any difficulty trace an obvious reason for the permission that\nhas been given to such destruction of individual life. When to the sum\ntotal of happiness and benefit which this permission bestows on each\nof the orders of the inferior animals according to its capacity for\nenjoyment, whether it does or does not enter into the food of man,\nwhether it comes or never comes within the reach of his arm, we add\nthe sum total of happiness and benefit which this law of universal\ndestruction bestows on man, so far as he avails himself of it, we shall\nfind no reason to impeach the Divine Goodness or to adopt a conclusion\nderogatory to the Infinite Power. We may dismiss the difficulty that is\nsupposed to arise from the warfare of the superior upon the inferior\nbeings, because that warfare, when we trace it through all its stages,\ninvolves no sort of deduction from the perfect character of the Divine\nGoodness or the Divine Power.\n\nNext, we come to the liability of animals, man included, to be preyed\nupon by parasites, creatures of a very inferior order when compared\nto the animals which they infest. I have looked in vain through Mr.\nSpencer's speculations for any explanation which makes the existence\nof the parasitic animals a support to the theory of evolution without\ninvolving the same impeachment of the Divine Power or the Divine\nGoodness which is supposed to be involved in the hypothesis of special\ncreations. We are indeed told that evolution brings about an increasing\namount of happiness, all evils being but incidental; that, applying\nalike to the lowest and to the highest forms of organization, there is\nin all cases a progressive adaptation, and a survival of the fittest.\n\"If,\" it is argued, \"in the uniform working of the process, there are\nevolved organisms of low types, which prey on those of higher types,\nthe evils inflicted form but a deduction from the average benefits. The\nuniversal and necessary tendency toward supremacy and multiplication\nof the best, applying to the organic creation as a whole as well as\nto each species, is ever diminishing the damage done, tends ever\nto maintain those most superior organizations which, in one way or\nanother, escape the invasions of the inferior, and so tends to produce\na type less liable to the invasions of the inferior. Thus the evils\naccompanying evolution are ever being self-eliminated.\"[66]\n\nAdmitting, for the argument's sake, that this is true, how does the\nhypothesis of evolution meet the difficulty? The parasitic inferior\norganizations exist, and they have existed, more or less, as long as we\nhave known anything of the superior organizations on which they prey.\nThey have inflicted and still inflict an incalculable amount of evil,\nan untold diminution of the happiness that might have been enjoyed if\nthey had never existed. The mode in which they came into existence,\nwhether by the process of evolution or by special creations of their\nrespective forms, does not affect the amount of evil which their\nravages have produced and are still producing. If they exist under an\norder of things which has made them the products of an evolving process\nthat has formed them out of still lower types, while they exist they\nhave the same power of inflicting evil as if they had been specially\nmade in their respective types without the former existence of any\nother type. If they owe their existence to the process of evolution,\nthey exist under a system that was designed to lead to their production\nby the operation of uniform laws working out a uniform process; and\nunder this process, so long as they are produced by it, they imply\ngratuitous malevolence, just as truly as they do if they are supposed\nto have been specially created. The evils which they have inflicted\nand still inflict were deliberately inflicted, unless we suppose that\nthe hypothetical process of evolution was not a system ordained by any\nsupreme and superhuman power, but was a result of blind chance; that\nthe system was not created, but, without the volition of any power\nwhatever, grew out of nothing.\n\nThe compensating tendency of the evolution system to evolve superior\norganisms, which in one way or other \"will escape the parasitic\ninvasions,\" by becoming less liable to them, and so to diminish the\ndamage done, as a sum total, finds a corresponding result in the system\nof special creations by a different process and at a more rapid rate.\nFor the hypothesis of special creations, rightly regarded, does not\nassume the special creation of each individual animal as a miraculous\nor semi-miraculous interposition of divine power; and even when we\napply it to the lowest types of animals it implies only the formation\nof that type with the power in most cases of continuing its species.\nAssuming the parasitic animals to be in this sense special creations,\nthe superior organisms on which they prey during their existence may\nbecome less liable to their invasions by an infinity of causes which\nwill diminish and finally put an end to the parasitic ravages. In\nthe progress of medical science man may be wholly relieved from the\nworst and most obscure parasites that have ever infested him, without\nwaiting for their evolution into some other type of animal that does\nnot desire or need to prey upon the human system, or without waiting\nto have the human organism developed into one that will not be exposed\nto such causes of suffering or death. We know already that very simple\nprecautions will ward off from man some of the most subtle of these\nenemies; and even in the case of animals lower than man we know that\ninstinct teaches them how to avoid the ravages of some of the parasites\nto which they are exposed, even if there are others which they can not\nnow escape.\n\nSo that, viewing as a whole the amount of misery inflicted by the\ninferior organisms upon the superior, and looking from the first\nforward to the last \"syllable of recorded time,\" we are able upon\neither of the two hypotheses respecting the origin of animals to\nreach certain definite conclusions, which may be stated as follows:\nThis world was not intended to be a state of unmixed and unbroken\nindividual happiness for any of the animal organisms. Death for every\nindividual in some form was necessary to the carrying on and the\ncarrying out of the scheme of average enjoyment and the accomplishment\nof a sum total of benefit that becomes larger and larger as time goes\non; and, although death without suffering might have been ordained,\nthe moral purpose for which suffering was allowed to precede death\nrequired that it should be permitted in numberless cases and forms,\nand by almost numberless agencies, although not always made necessary.\nThis great purpose can be discerned without taking into view at all\nthe idea of a future state of existence for man or any of the other\nterrestrial beings, and looking only at the moral development of man\nindividually and collectively as an agent in the promotion of happiness\non this earth. Man, however he originated, stands at the head of the\nwhole animal kingdom. If for himself and for all the inferior animal\norganisms death without suffering had been ordained as the universal\nrule, he would have been without the full strength of the moral\nstimulus which now leads him to relieve, to palliate, to diminish, and,\nas far as possible, to terminate every kind of suffering for himself\nand the superior organisms that are below him in the scale, which are\nthe most capable of enjoyment and happiness, next after himself, in\ntheir various proportionate capacities. He would have had no strong\nmotive for exterminating the inferior and noxious organisms excepting\nfor his own individual and immediate benefit; no reason for extending\nthe protection of his scientific acquirements to the lower animals\nexcepting to promote his own immediate advantage. Human society would\nhave been without that approach to moral perfection which is indicated\nby a tenderness for life in all its forms, where its destruction is\nnot needed by some controlling necessity or expediency, and by the\nalleviation of suffering in all its forms for the sake of increasing\nthe sum total of possible happiness. Human life itself would have been\nless sacred in human estimation if there had been no suffering to draw\nforth our sympathies and to stimulate us to the utmost contention\nagainst its evils. Civilization would have been destitute of that which\nis now its highest and noblest attribute. Wars would have been more\nfrequent among the most advanced portions of the human race; pestilence\nwould not have been encountered with half the vigor or the skill which\nnow wage battle against it; poverty would have been left to take care\nof itself, or would have been alleviated from only the lowest and most\nselfish motives, which would have left half its evils to be aggravated\nby neglect. As the world has been constituted, and as we have the\nstrongest reason to believe it will continue to the end, there is to\nbe added to the immeasurable sum of mere animal enjoyment of life that\nother immeasurable sum of moral happiness which man derives from doing\ngood and from the cultivation of his power to do it--an acquisition\nand accumulation of benefit which would have been wanting if there had\nbeen no physical suffering to awaken pity and to prompt our exertions\nfor its relief.\n\nSo that the objection that the hypothesis of infinite goodness required\na world where physical pain would have been unknown to any of its\norganisms, where human sorrow would never have been felt, where human\ntears would have never flowed, and where death would have been always\nand only euthanasia, is by no manner of means a necessary conclusion,\nas the existence of suffering is no impeachment of the Infinite Power.\nIf we consider man only in the light of his rank at the head of all the\nterrestrial beings, and as therefore capable of the greatest amount\nof benefit, to himself and to the other creatures, and if we regard\nhim individually as nothing more than a being dwelling on this earth\nfor a short-lived existence and endowed with the power of perpetuating\nhis species, he would have been morally an inferior being to what he\nis now capable of becoming, and human society would have been far\nbelow what it can be made and what we know that to a large degree it\nalready is, if physical suffering had been excluded from the world. All\nthis can be discerned without the aid of revelation; it can be seen\nby the eye of philosophic reason alone; and it is all equally true\nupon any hypothesis of the physical origin of man or any other living\ncreature on this earth, unless we suppose that the whole animal kingdom\ncame into being without any intentional design, without any plan of\nintentional benefit, without any purpose, and without the conscious\nexertion of any power of any kind.\n\nAnd, if the question is asked, What is to be the end of this world? or\nif we go forward in imagination toward the probable end of all this\nanimal life, I can not see that the hypothesis of evolution has more\nto recommend it than the hypothesis of special creations in reference\nto the perfectibility of the world, or to the sum of approximate\nperfection that seems to be attainable. As, upon either of the two\nhypotheses, a perfect world does not even now seem to have demanded\nan absence of suffering, since suffering tends obviously to produce\ngreater benefit than could have followed from its absence, so, in\nthe remotest conceivable future, a nearer and nearer approximation\nto a state of universal happiness will continue to be worked out by\nphysical and moral causes, which will be as potent under the system of\nspecial creations as they can be supposed to be under the system of\nevolution. It is true that the moral causes will supplement and aid\nthe physical under either of the two systems. But one difficulty with\nthe evolution theory as the sole method by which the past or present\ninhabitants of the world have come into existence is that, so far as\nwe can judge, it has done and completed its work just as effectually\nand finally as special creation appears to have terminated in certain\nforms, some of which are extinct and some of which are living. Take\nthe Darwinian pedigree of man, as stated in a former chapter, or any\nother mode of tracing the supposed stages of animal evolution. The\nprocess has hypothetically culminated in man. At whatever species in\nthe ascending scale you pause, you find that the particular type of\nanimal has either become extinct or that it has continued and still\ncontinues to be produced in that same type, with only such variations\nand incidental differences as have resulted from changed conditions\nof life, and from the intermingling of different breeds of the same\nanimal. I do not now speak of the theory, which admits, of course, of\nthe hypothetical development of every known animal, past or present,\nout of its supposed predecessors. But I speak of the facts as yet\nrevealed by the researches of naturalists among all the extinct and\nliving forms of animal life. If there had ever been discovered any one\ninstance in which it could be claimed by satisfactory proof that an\nanimal of a distinct species had been evolved out of races of animals\nof a fundamentally different organization, and without the special\ninterposition of any creating power operating to make a new organism,\nwe should certainly have it cited and relied upon as a fact of the\nutmost importance. I do not say that it would be reasonable to expect\ndirect and ocular demonstration of such a product, any more than it\nwould be reasonable to expect direct and ocular demonstration of an\nact of special creation. But I say that it could be shown by proofs\nthat ought to be satisfactory if there were any evidence from which the\ninference that such a fact ever occurred could be reasonably drawn;\njust as it is possible to draw the inference of special creation by\nreasonable deduction from the evidence that tends to establish it as\na safe conclusion. But if there has ever been such an instance of the\nevolution of any known species of animal out of other species shown by\nsatisfactory proof, or if we assume such an occurrence in the past as\nthe theory calls for, what reason have we to suppose that the process\nof evolution is still going on, and to expect it to go on to the end\nof time? We must judge of the future by the past, for we have no other\nmeans of judging it. The past and the present both show, so far as we\ncan yet perceive by the facts, that each distinct and peculiar type\nof animal life remains a perfect and completed production, however it\nwas fashioned or grew into that type; and that, so far as we have any\nmeans of actual knowledge, no crosses of different races of that animal\nproduce anything but incidental variations of structure and mode of\nlife. It is a mere hypothesis that they produce distinct species.\n\nApply this to the most important of the supposed connections between\ndifferent animals according to the theory of evolution--that between\nman and the monkey. The theory calls for the intermediate link or\nlinks. Nothing can be yet found that shows the pedigree without\neking it out by general reasoning, and by assumptions that are more\nor less imaginary. But suppose that the chain of proof were complete,\nwhat would it show? It would show that the process of evolution has\nculminated in man, as its crown and summit, and has there stopped. For,\nwhatever may have been the length of time required for the production\nof this result, we know what the product is. We have the history of man\nas an animal for a period of time that has been quite long enough to\nshow that, after he had become in his essential structure as an animal\nwhat we know him to be, no subsequent intermingling of the races or\nfamilies into which the species became divided has produced any change\nin his essential structure, or any new organs or any differences but\ndifferences in the development of powers which are to be found in him\nat all the stages of his known existence as parts of his characteristic\nanimal structure. The period of his known existence is certainly\ninfinitely small when compared with the whole indefinite future. It\nis long enough, however, to afford some basis of reasoning about the\nfuture; and, short as it is, it tends very strongly to show that the\nfurther development of man on earth is to be chiefly a moral and\nintellectual development; that in physical structure he is a completed\ntype; and that whatever superiorities of mere animal life he may\nattain to hereafter are to be such improvements as can be worked out,\nwithin the limits of his animal constitution, by the science which his\naccumulating experience and knowledge will enable him to apply to the\nphysical and moral well-being of his race.\n\nTo return now to the line of thought from which these suggestions have\ndiverged. If, as we have every reason to believe upon either hypothesis\nof man's origin, he is a completed animal, standing by original\ncreation or by the effect of the evolution process at the head of the\nwhole animal kingdom in the apparent purpose of his existence, his\nagency and his power in promoting the sum of happiness on earth, for\nhimself and all the other animals, are the same upon either hypothesis\nof his origin. The hypothesis of his origin by evolution gives him no\ngreater power over his own happiness or that of the other creatures\nthan he has if we suppose him to have been specially created; and it is\nonly by adopting the belief that in his own constitution he is to be\nhereafter developed into a being incapable of suffering, or one vastly\nless capable of suffering than the animal called man now is, that the\ntheory of evolution, even in regard to the sum total of happiness on\nearth, has any advantage over the theory of special creations. If we\nsuppose the future gradual development of a terrestrial being standing\nstill higher in the animal scale than man now stands, exempt from the\nsuffering which man now suffers, we have a great amount of suffering\nhereafter eliminated from the world by a certain process. But how does\nthis better satisfy the idea of infinite goodness in the power that\ndevised the process, than the hypothesis of special creation which has\nformed man as an ultimate product of the divine benevolence and power\nacting together, endowed him with the faculty of eliminating pain and\nevil from the circumstances of his existence, by his own exertions,\nand furnished him with the strongest motives as well as with almost\nimmeasurable means for diminishing the amount of evil for himself and\nall the other beings within his reach?\n\n5. Another of the specific objections urged by Mr. Spencer against\nthe doctrine of special creations is so put that it is manifestly\ndirected against one of the positions assumed by the representatives\nof the current theology. The learned philosopher begins this part of\nhis argument by imputing to those who assert this doctrine as their\nreason for maintaining it, that it \"honors the Unknown Cause of\nthings,\" and that they think any other doctrine amounts to an exclusion\nof divine power from the world. To encounter this supposed reason for\nmaintaining the doctrine of special creations, he proceeds to ask\nwhether the divine power \"would not have been still better demonstrated\nby the separate creation of each individual than it is by the separate\ncreation of each species? Why should there exist this process of\nnatural generation? Why should not omnipotence have been proved by the\nsupernatural production of plants and animals everywhere throughout\nthe world from hour to hour? Is it replied that the Creator was able\nto make individuals arise from one another in natural selection, but\nnot to make species thus arise? This is to assign a limit to power\ninstead of magnifying it. Is it replied that the occasional miraculous\norigination of a species was practicable, but that the perpetual\nmiraculous origination of countless individuals was impracticable? This\nalso is a derogation. Either it was possible or not possible to create\nspecies and individuals after the same general methods. To say that it\nwas not possible is suicidal in those who use this argument; and, if it\nwas possible, it is required to say what end is served by the special\ncreation of species that would not be better served by the special\ncreation of individuals?\"[67] I must again disclaim any participation\nin the views of those who contemplate this question with reference\nto the manifestations of divine power by one method of its supposed\naction or another, or who are influenced by the idea of honoring or\ndishonoring the Creator. This is not a question of the mode in which\nthe Creator has chosen to manifest his power for the purpose of making\nit more impressive in the eyes of his intelligent human creatures or\nmore palpable to their perceptions. Nor is it a question, excepting for\nthe theologian who begins to reason upon it from a peculiar point of\nview, by what belief we best honor the Creator, or the power which Mr.\nSpencer describes as the \"Unknown Cause.\" In the eye of philosophic\nreason, apart from all the religious dogmas that have been taught by\nhuman interpretations of revelation, this is a question of the probable\nmode in which the assumed omnipotent power has acted; and it is not a\nquestion of how we can best honor or magnify that power by believing\nthat it has acted in one mode and not in another. We have to take,\nfirst, the postulate of an infinitely powerful Creator, whose existence\nis an independent inquiry, which we are to make out upon evidence that\nsatisfies the mind. The hypothesis of his existence and attributes\nincludes the power to create species and to establish the process of\nnatural generation for the continuation of each species, or the power\nto make separate creations of each individual, as Mr. Spencer phrases\nit, \"from hour to hour.\" In either mode of action, the power was the\nsame. It is no derogation from it to suppose that the one or the other\nmode was adopted. It is no augmentation of it to suppose that the one\nwas adopted instead of the other. It is simply a question of what\ndoes the evidence show, to the reasonable satisfaction of the human\nmind, to have been most probably the method that was chosen by a power\nthat could adopt any method whatever. If we find that the creation of\nspecies and the establishment of the process of natural generation for\nthe multiplication of individuals is upon the whole sustained by a\npredominating weight of evidence, it is safe to adopt the belief that\nthis hypothesis of the Almighty method is in accordance with the facts.\nIf the evidence fails to show that species have arisen from each other\nin the same way that individuals have arisen from each other in natural\nsuccession, we have no reason to conclude that such has been the fact.\nOn the other hand, if the evidence shows, by reasonably satisfactory\nproofs, that a process has been established for the evolution of\ndistinct species out of other and different species, similar to\nthe process by which individuals arise from each other by natural\ngeneration, it will be safe to conclude that such has been the fact.\nUpon either hypothesis, the power of the Creator remains the same.\n\nNor is it in any degree necessary to consider in what sense the one\nmethod of action or the other was \"miraculous,\" or that the one was an\noccasional and the other a perpetual exercise of power. The special\ncreations of individuals from hour to hour would be just as miraculous\nas the special creation of species, and it would be occasional,\nalthough the occasions would be indefinite in number. The special\ncreation of species would be just as miraculous as the special creation\nof individuals, but the occasional exercise of such a power would be\nlimited by the number of species, each of which would be a finality\nin itself. The dilemma that is suggested by Mr. Spencer is a dilemma\nonly for those who think it necessary to mingle the idea of honoring\nor dishonoring the Creator by one or another mode of interpreting his\nworks, with a question of his probable method of action. His method of\naction is to be judged upon the evidence which a study of his works\ndiscloses.\n\n6. Mr. Spencer, in summing up his objections to the doctrine of\nspecial creations, has said that it not only \"fails to satisfy men's\nintellectual need of an interpretation,\" but that it also \"fails to\nsatisfy their moral sentiment\"; that \"their moral sentiment is much\nbetter satisfied by the doctrine of evolution, since that doctrine\nraises no contradictory implications respecting the Unknown Cause, such\nas are raised by the antagonist doctrine.\"[68] I have already suggested\nwhat seems to me a sufficient answer to the supposed contradictory\nimplications respecting the goodness and power of the Almighty Creator.\nBut it is here worthy of the further inquiry, What has been the\ninfluence upon the sacredness of human life, in human estimation, of\na belief in any other theory of man's origin, or of no belief on the\nsubject, compared with the effect of a belief in the doctrine that he\nis a creature of an Almighty Creator, formed by an exercise of infinite\npower for the enjoyment of greater happiness on earth than any other\ncreature, and therefore having a peculiarly sacred individual right to\nthe life that has been given to him? This, to be sure, does not afford\na direct test of the probable truth of the hypothesis respecting his\norigin. But the answer to this inquiry will afford some test of the\nclaim upon our consideration that may be put forward for any other\nhypothesis than the one that embraces the full idea of man's special\ncreation, even if we do not look beyond this world. Compare, then, the\ncivilization of the Romans at the period when it was at its highest\ndevelopment (the age of Julius and Augustus C\u00e6sar), when in many\nrespects it was a splendid civilization. Neither among the vulgar,\nnor among the most cultivated; not among the most accomplished of the\nstatesmen or philosophers, was there any such belief as the simple\nbelief in the relation between Creator and creature, such as had been\nheld by a people who were regarded by the Romans as barbarians, in\nrespect to man and all the other animals; or such a belief as is now\nheld by the least educated peasant of modern Europe. One consequence\nof the absence of this belief, or of the want of a vivid perception of\nit, was that the highest persons in the Roman state, men possessed of\nall the culture and refinement of their age, not only furnished for the\npopular amusement combats of wild beasts of the most ferocious natures,\nbut they provided gladiatorial shows in which human beings, trained for\nthe purpose, were by each other \"butchered to make a Roman holiday.\"\nThe statesmen who thus catered to the popular tastes, and never\nthought of correcting them, subjected themselves to enormous expenses\nfor the purpose; and all that was noble and dignified and cultured of\nboth sexes, as well as the rabble, looked on with delight at the horrid\nspectacle. But this was not all. The Roman law, in many ways a code\nof admirable ethics, in utter disregard of the natural rights of men,\nleft the life of the slave within the absolute power of the master,\nwithout any mitigation of the existing law of nations which made slaves\nof the captive in war and his posterity. Compare all this with the\ncivilization of any modern country in which the life or liberty of\nman can be taken away only by judicial process and public authority,\nfor actual crime; in which institutions exist for the relief of human\nsuffering and for the prevention of cruelty to the inferior creatures;\nand then say whether the belief in special creations is not a doctrine\nthat has worked vast good in the world, and one that should not be\nscouted because it is a \"primitive belief.\"\n\nAgain, compare the ages in modern Europe when statesmen and politicians\nof the highest standing with entire impunity employed assassination for\npolitical ends, with periods in the same countries when assassination\nhad come to be regarded not only with abhorrence, but as incapable of\njustification for any end whatever, public or private, and then say\nwhether the world can lose its belief that man is a special creation of\nGod, without losing one of the strongest safeguards of human life that\ncan be derived from any belief on the subject. All these, and a great\nmany similar considerations, while they do not prove the hypothesis\nof special creation, show strongly that, unlike some of the family of\nbeliefs with which it was associated in the darkest ages, this one\nhas worked no mischiefs; that, on the contrary, it has been producing\nmoral, social, and political benefits in all the ages in which it has\nbeen most vividly present to the popular faith. The command, \"Thou\nshalt do no murder,\" from whatever source it came, whether it was\ndelivered to Moses on the mount of fire, or came from the teachings of\nNature and the dictates of social expediency, whether it is a divine or\na human law, or both, has unhappily been broken in all times, in all\nlands, and in all conditions of civilization. It is broken still. But\nit has never yet ceased, for its moral foundation and for the moral\nsanction of all the methods which have aimed to enforce it, to rest\non the belief that man is peculiarly the child of God, whose life is\nsacred beyond the life of all other creatures. Whether any other belief\nof man's origin will afford an equally good foundation for that law,\nis a question which modern scientific speculation may or may not be\nable to answer. If its speculations conduct to the conclusion that the\n\"unknown cause\" has not specially caused anything, has not established\nany relation of Creator and creature, that is sufficiently special to\nimply divine care for the creature, we know what the answer must be.\nThe theologian is not the only person who has occasion to examine the\ndoctrine of evolution; it must be examined by the statesman as well.\n\n FOOTNOTES:\n\n [57] \"The Principles of Biology,\" by Herbert Spencer, vol. i, p. 334\n _et seq._ I use the American edition, D. Appleton & Co., 1881.\n\n [58] \"Biology,\" i, p. 336.\n\n [59] \"Biology,\" i, pp. 336, 337.\n\n [60] Webster's \"Dictionary of the English Language.\"\n\n [61] Let it be remembered that the sense which is here considered\n comprehends not only material objects, but also ideas, images, and\n in short whatever, in its kind, had no previous existence. This is\n just as true of an original poem, or picture, or statue, or musical\n composition, as it is of a machine that is both original and new as a\n piece of mechanism.\n\n [62] Perhaps I owe an apology to a large class of readers for having\n bestowed so much attention upon the logical formula with which Mr.\n Spencer aims to dispose of the idea of creation. But I have observed,\n especially among young persons and others whose habits of thinking\n are unformed or not corrected by sound and comprehensive reasoning, a\n popular reception of this particular dogma, which makes it necessary\n to subject it to some careful analysis. In fact, one of my chief\n objects in writing this book has been to contribute what I might\n to the formation of habits of testing philosophical and scientific\n theories by something better than specious assumptions which can be\n thrown into the plausible form of logical propositions. There is\n nothing more valuable than logic, when its forms represent a true and\n correct ratiocination; and, when they do not, there is nothing that is\n more delusive. It needs some discipline of mind to enable people to\n see when logic is valuable and when it is not.\n\n [63] \"Biology,\" i, p. 340 _et seq._\n\n [64] This is given almost _verbatim_ from Mr. Spencer's \"Biology,\" i,\n p. 340 _et seq._\n\n [65] In treating of the existence of physical and moral evil, I do\n not mean to include sin in the discussion. I mean now by moral evil\n that loss or diminution of happiness, for the individual or a race,\n which results from physical evil produced by causes for which the\n sufferer is not responsible. The sin that is in the world is a matter\n that is to be considered entirely with reference to the accountability\n of man as a moral being; and the reasons which may be assigned for\n its permission may be quite distinct from those which relate to the\n existence of physical suffering for which man is not responsible upon\n any rational theory of moral accountability.\n\n [66] \"Biology,\" i, p. 354.\n\n [67] \"Biology,\" i, p. 339.\n\n [68] \"Biology,\" i, pp. 344, 355.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nThe doctrine of evolution according to Herbert Spencer further\nconsidered.\n\n\nIn the last preceding chapter, I have examined Mr. Spencer's chief\nobjection to the doctrine of special creations when considered in\nits general aspects. I now advance to the general aspects of the\nevolution hypothesis as applied by this philosopher to the animal\nkingdom. I have already suggested the appropriate answer to the\nclaim that the derivation of the evolution hypothesis is favorable\nbecause it has originated \"among the most instructed class and in\nthese better-instructed times,\" and that the derivation of the other\nhypothesis is unfavorable because \"it originated in times of profound\nignorance.\" On this point it is unnecessary to say more. But there is\na supposed \"kindred antithesis\" between \"the two families of beliefs\"\nto which these two hypotheses are said respectively to belong; one of\nwhich families \"has been dying out,\" while the other family \"has been\nmultiplying.\" This brings into view the peculiar philosophical system\nof Mr. Spencer, by which he maintains \"the unity of Nature,\" or the\nprevalence of a universal law of evolution, as the law which is to be\ndiscerned in remote fields of inquiry, and which \"will presently be\nrecognized as the law of the phenomena which we are here considering,\"\nnamely, the phenomena of animal life. \"The discovery that evolution has\ngone on, and is going on, in so many departments of Nature, becomes a\nreason for believing that there is no department of Nature in which it\ndoes not go on.\"[69]\n\nIn considering this mode of generalization it is important to\ndistinguish between the phenomena that are observable in those\ndepartments of Nature which include only dead or inanimate matter, and\nthe phenomena that are peculiar to matter organized into living beings.\nAgain: it is important to distinguish between phenomena which have been\ninfluenced by human agencies and those which can not have been affected\nby the power of man. Another distinction of the greatest consequence\nis that which divides the phenomena in question according to their\nrelation to a moral purpose. In one class of phenomena, a moral purpose\nmay be plainly discovered as the purpose of an intelligent causing\npower, which has chosen a particular means for the accomplishment\nof an end. In another class of phenomena, a moral purpose may not\nbe discoverable as the end for which the existing arrangement of\nthings was specially designed, and to which that arrangement was an\nindispensable means. By classifying the departments of Nature and\nobserving their phenomena with these discriminations, we shall be\nable to judge of the value of Mr. Spencer's philosophical system when\napplied to the animal kingdom.\n\nIn grouping the departments and their respective phenomena as\ndepartments in which the law of evolution has obtained, and in drawing\nfrom them the sweeping deduction that there is no department in which\nthis law has not obtained as the _causa causans_, Mr. Spencer does not\nappear to have made these necessary discriminations. He specifies the\nfollowing remote fields of inquiry, in which he maintains that this law\nof evolution is now admitted to be the solution of the phenomena that\nlie in those respective fields: First, the solar system, which, as he\nasserts, astronomers now consider has been gradually evolved out of\ndiffused matter.[70] Second, geological discoveries, which show that\nthe earth has reached its present varied structure through a process of\nevolution. Third, society, which has progressed through a corresponding\nprocess of gradual development. \"Constitutions are not made, but grow,\"\nis said to be now a recognized truth among \"philosophical politicians,\"\nand a part of the more general truth that \"societies are not made, but\ngrow.\" Fourth, languages, which, we are told, are now believed not\nto have been artificially or supernaturally formed, but to have been\ndeveloped. Finally, the histories of religions, philosophy, science,\nthe fine arts, and the industrial arts, show, it is said, development\n\"through as unobtrusive changes as those which the mind of a child\npasses on its way to maturity.\"[71]\n\nIt is obvious that in some of these departments neither human agency\nnor the human will and choice can have had any influence in producing\nthe phenomena, while in some of them human agency, will, and choice\nhave had a vast influence in making the phenomena what they are. That\npolitical constitutions or social institutions are not made, but grow,\nis a dogma that is by no means universally true, however wise it may\nsound, or with whatever confidence in a paradox it may be asserted by\n\"some political philosophers.\" While past events and present exigencies\nmay have largely shaped some political constitutions, we know that\nothers have been deliberately modified by a choice that has had more\nor less of a free scope, and that sometimes this has amounted to an\narbitrary decision. Languages may or may not have been a direct and\nsupernatural gift from Heaven, but we know that their structure has\nbeen powerfully influenced by human agencies, when they have come\nto be written expressions of thought; for they have then received\nexpansion by the actual coinage of new words, as well as by new\nmeanings of old words; and even when they were in the first stages\nof a spoken tongue, inflections that were purely arbitrary have been\nintroduced. So it has been with systems of religion, philosophy, the\nfine arts, the mechanic arts, legislation, and jurisprudence. While\nin all these departments changes have been going on, which upon a\nsuperficial view appear to indicate a kind of spontaneous development,\nwhen they are analyzed they are seen to have been wholly caused, or\nmore or less influenced, by the genius, the thought, the discoveries,\nthe exertions, and the acts of particular individuals who have had the\nforce to impress themselves upon the age, and thus to make new systems,\nnew beliefs, new products, new rules of social or political life, new\ntastes, and new habits of thinking and acting.\n\nAgain: in some of the various orders of phenomena which are found in\nthese different departments, there is discernible a distinct moral\npurpose in the shape which they have been made to assume, and in\nothers of them there is no moral purpose discoverable, which we can\nsay required the employment of the particular means to effect the\nend. Thus, astronomers can not assign a moral purpose for which the\ndistribution of the fixed stars was made to be what it is, and which\npurpose could not have been answered by some other arrangement. At\nthe same time, it is easy to see that the solar system was arranged\nwith reference to the law of universal gravitation, which made this\narrangement of the different bodies essential to the harmonious working\nof a great and complex piece of mechanism. The present formation of\nthe earth may have resulted just as geologists think it has, and yet\nthey can not say that there was no moral purpose in the division of the\nexterior surface of our globe into land and water, seas, continents,\nmountains, etc. These are departments of Nature in which man has had no\ninfluence in producing the phenomena. When we turn to those departments\nin which man is placed as an actor, we often find an adjustment of\nmeans to an end that is so comprehensive, as well as so plain, that\nwe may justly conclude it to have been chosen by the creating power,\nwith the express intent that human agency should be the means by which\ncertain effects are to be produced. For example: man is eminently\na social animal. Human society is a result of his strong social\npropensities. He is placed in it as an actor; and in this arrangement\nthere is discoverable a moral purpose so plain that we may rightfully\nregard the social phenomena of mutual protection and improvement\nas proofs that society was ordained as the sphere of man's highest\ndevelopment on earth.\n\nSo that, in reasoning about the phenomena of any of the departments\nof Nature as affording indications of the so-called universal law\nof evolution, we must not forget the distinction between organized\ninanimate and organized animated matter; or the distinction between\nthose departments in which human will or choice, or the human\nintellect, has had no influence in shaping the phenomena, and those\nin which they have had great influence; or the distinction between\nphenomena in which a special moral purpose can be and those in which\nit can not be discovered, as the reason for the existing order of\nthings. It is especially hazardous to argue that because a spontaneous\ndevelopment, or a gradual evolution, can be traced in some of the\nphenomena of inanimate matter, it therefore must obtain in the animal\nkingdom. It is alike hazardous to argue, because there has been what\nis called evolution in some departments of Nature over which man has\nhad no control, that the same law obtains in other departments over\nwhich he has also had no control, or those in which he has had a large\ncontrol.\n\nThe bearing of these discriminations upon the supposed universality\nof the law of evolution may now be seen if we attend to the further\ninquiry whether that law obtains throughout all the phenomena of\nany one department of Nature as the sole cause of the phenomena in\nthat department. Take again, for example, the solar system. Suppose\nit to be true that the bodies which compose it, the sun and the\nplanetary spheres, were gradually evolved out of diffused matter. Does\nit necessarily follow that their existing arrangements and mutual\nrelations were not specially designed? That their orbits, their\nrevolutions, their distances from each other, were not specially\nplanned? That they were not hung in their respective positions with\nan intentional adjustment to the great force of gravitation that was\nprevailing throughout the universe? Must we suppose that all this part\nof the whole phenomena of the solar system resulted from the operation\nof an ungoverned evolution, because the bodies themselves may have been\ngradually formed out of diffused matter into their present condition\nwithout being spoken at once into that condition by the fiat of the\nAlmighty? We can certainly see that the existing arrangements must have\nbeen intentional; and, if intentional, the intention must have taken\neffect in the production of the phenomena exhibited by the arrangement,\nas any design takes effect in the production of the phenomena which\nare open to our observation. The moral purpose evinced by one part of\nthis arrangement, the alternation of day and night upon the earth,\nfor example, might have been effected by some other means than the\nmeans which now produce it. But there is the strongest evidence that\na certain means was chosen and intentionally put into operation; and\nalthough we can not tell why that means was preferred, the fact that it\nwas both designed and preferred makes it a special creation. To suppose\nthat it was left to be worked out by a process such as the hypothesis\nof evolution assumes, by the gradual, fortuitous, and ungoverned\noperation of infinitely slow-moving causes, which might have made the\nadjustments very different from what they are, is to deprive it of the\nelement of intentional preference that is proved by its existence.\nThe hypothesis of evolution, when applied to all the phenomena of the\nsolar system, relegates one great branch of those phenomena to a realm\nfrom which all special purposes and all direct design are absent, and\nconfines the explanation of the phenomena to the operation of causes\nthat might have brought about very different arrangements. That this\nsupposed process of evolution has, in fact, been followed by the\nexisting arrangements of the solar system, does not prove, or tend to\nprove, that the existing arrangements are solely due to the supposed\nmethod of their production; for we can not leave out the element of\nsome design, and if there was a design, the very nature of the system\nrequired that the design should be executed by a special creation of a\nplan for the mutual relations of the bodies composing it. The bodies\nthemselves might have been gradually formed out of diffused matter,\nfloating loosely in the realms of space. The relations of the bodies\nto each other required the act of an intelligent will, in the direct\nformation of an intentional plan; and that act was an act of special\ncreation in the same sense in which the structural plan of a species of\nanimal was a special creation.\n\nHere, then, is one department of Nature in which it is not necessary\nand not philosophical to assume that the law of so-called evolution has\nbeen the universal law to which all the phenomena of that department\nare to be attributed. If we follow out the same inquiry in other\ndepartments of Nature remote from the animal kingdom, we shall find\nreason to adopt the same conclusion in respect to their phenomena.\nThus, let us for a moment contemplate another of the departments\nin which inanimate matter is the subject of observation, and in\nwhich human will or intelligence has had no agency in producing the\nphenomena, namely, the formation of the present structure of the\nearth as it is described by geologists. This is a department in which\nthe hypothesis of evolution finds perhaps its stronghold. Yet it is\nnecessary even here to recognize an intentional plan and direct design\nin some part of the phenomena. Let us suppose that during the period\nrequired by any of the speculations of geologists, however long, a\nmass of matter was gathered in an unformed condition, and gradually\nshaped into the present condition of the earth by the action of its\nconstituent elements upon each other, influenced by the laws of\nmechanical forces, of chemical combinations, of light and heat, and\nof whatever physical agencies were made to operate in the process of\nevolving the mass into the condition in which it has been known to us\nfor a certain time. Is it a rational conclusion that the intelligent\npower which put these forces in operation--an hypothesis with which we\nmust begin to reason, or leave the origin of both matter and forces to\nblind chance--did not guide their operation at all to the intentional\nproduction of the results which we see? The results disclose some\nmanifest purposes; and although these purposes, or others equally\nbeneficent, might have been accomplished by different arrangements,\nwe can see that they have been effected by a certain arrangement of a\nspecific character. The results have been continents, seas, mountains,\nrivers, lakes, formation and distribution of minerals, growth of\nforests, and an almost innumerable, and certainly a very varied,\ncatalogue of phenomena, physical formations, and adaptations. All these\nvaried results disclose a plan by which this earth became a marvelously\nconvenient abode for the living creatures that have inhabited or still\ninhabit it, especially for man. The formation of this plan was an\nintelligent act, if we suppose that any intelligent being projected\nthe original gathering of the crude primordial matter and subjected it\nto the operation of the forces employed to shape it into its present\ncondition. This plan was an act of special creation, in the same\nsense in which the plan of a particular animal organism may have been\na special creation. While, therefore, a process which may be called\nevolution may have operated as the agency through which the earth has\nreached its present physical condition, the plan of that condition was\ncertainly not formed by any such process; for it was, if it was the\nproduct of anything, the product of an intelligent will operating in\nthe production of preconceived results by the exercise of superhuman\nand infinite wisdom and foresight.\n\nWhen we turn to a department in which human influence has largely\nor wholly shaped the phenomena, we find numerous special creations\nthat are not attributable to the operation of any law of development\nor evolution such as is supposed to have led to the production of\none species of animal out of another, or out of several previous\nspecies. In short, a survey of all the departments of Nature leads to\nthe conclusion that while there may be phenomena which are properly\ntraceable to the operation of the forces of Nature, or to fixed\ngeneral systems of production, there is another very large class\nof the phenomena which owe their existence to special acts of an\nintelligent will, finite or infinite, human or divine, according as\ntheir production required superhuman power or admitted of the efficacy\nof man's intervention.\n\nThe way is now somewhat cleared for an examination of Mr. Spencer's\napplication of the law of evolution to the gradual formation of\ndifferent species of animals out of one or more previous species,\nwithout any act of special creation intervening anywhere in the series.\nWe have seen that this alleged law is not of universal force as the\ncause of all the phenomena in all the departments of Nature. When\nwe come to apply it as the hypothesis which is to account for the\nexistence of different species of animals of very different types, we\nmust remember that we are dealing with organisms endowed with life,\nand, although we can not sufficiently explain what life is, we know\nthat animated organisms are brought into being by systems of production\nthat are widely different from the modes in which inanimate matter\nmay have been or has been made to assume its existing forms. Bearing\nthis in mind, we come to the arguments and proofs by which Mr. Spencer\nmaintains the immense superiority of the evolution hypothesis over\nthat of special creations, in reference to the animal kingdom. It must\nbe remembered that this is a department in which man can have had no\nagency in producing the phenomena, for whatever may have been the\nslight variations produced by human interference with the breeding of\nanimals domesticated from their wild condition, we must investigate the\norigin of species as if there had never been any human intervention\nin the crossing of breeds, because that origin is to be looked for in\na sphere entirely removed from all human interference. Man himself is\nincluded in the investigation, and we must make that investigation in\nreference to a time when he did not exist, or when he did not exist as\nwe now know him.\n\nOne of the favorite methods of Mr. Spencer consists in arraying\ndifficulties for the believers in special creations, which, he argues,\ncan not be encountered by their hypothesis, and then arguing that there\nare no difficulties in the way of the hypothesis of evolution. His\nposition shall be stated with all the strength that he gives to it,\nand with all the care that I can bestow upon its treatment. He puts\nthe argument thus: In the animal kingdom individuals come into being\nby a process of generation--that is to say, they arise out of other\nindividuals of the same species. If we contemplate the individuals\nof any species, we find an evolution repeated in every one of them by\na uniform process of development, which, in a short space of time,\nproduces a series of astonishing changes. The seed becomes a tree,\nand the tree differs from the seed immeasurably in bulk, structure,\ncolor, form, specific gravity, and chemical composition; so that\nno visible resemblance can be pointed out between them. The small,\nsemi-transparent gelatinous spherule constituting the human ovum\nbecomes the newly-born child; and this human infant \"is so complex in\nits structure that a cyclop\u00e6dia is needed to describe its constituent\nparts. The germinal vesicle is so simple that it may be defined in a\nline. Nevertheless, a few months suffice to develop the one out of\nthe other, and that, too, by a series of modifications so small that\nwere the embryo examined, at successive minutes, even a microscope\nwould with difficulty disclose any sensible changes. Aided by such\nfacts, the conception of general evolution may be rendered as definite\na conception as any of our complex conceptions can be rendered. If,\ninstead of the successive minutes of a child's f\u0153tal life, we take\nsuccessive generations of creatures, if we regard the successive\ngenerations as differing from each other no more than the f\u0153tus did in\nsuccessive minutes, our imaginations must indeed be feeble if we fail\nto realize in thought the evolution of the most complex organism out of\nthe simplest. If a single cell, under appropriate conditions, becomes\na man in the space of a few years, there can surely be no difficulty\nin understanding how, under appropriate conditions, a cell may, in the\ncourse of untold millions of years, give origin to the human race.\"[72]\n\nHere, then, we have a comparison between what takes place in the\ndevelopment of the individual animal in the space of a few years,\nand what may be supposed to take place in the successive generations\nof different creatures through untold millions of years. We turn\nthen to the proof, direct or indirect, that races of entirely\ndistinct organisms have resulted from antecedent races by gradual\ntransformation. Direct proof sufficient to establish the progressive\nmodifications of antecedent races into other races is not claimed to\nexist; yet it is claimed that there are numerous facts of the order\nrequired by the hypothesis which warrant our acceptance of it. These\nfacts are the alterations of structure which take place in successive\ngenerations of the same species, amounting, in the course of several\ngenerations of the same race, to additions and suppressions of parts.\nThese changes among the individuals of the same race, comprehended in\nwhat is scientifically called \"heredity\" and \"variation,\" are exhibited\nby the transmission of ancestral peculiarities of structure, by their\noccasional suppression in some individuals of the race and their\nreappearance in others, and by a difference in the relative sizes of\nparts. These variations, arising in successive short intervals of time,\nare said to be quite as marked as those which arise in a developing\nembryo, and, in fact, they are said to be often much more marked. \"The\nstructural modifications proved to have taken place since organisms\nhave been observed is not less than the hypothesis demands--bears as\ngreat a ratio to this brief period as the total amount of structural\nchange seen in the evolution of a complex organism out of a simple germ\nbears to the vast period during which living forms have existed on\nearth.\"[73]\n\nThe difficulty that is thus prepared for the hypothesis of the special\ncreation of species may now be stated. There is a professed conception\nof the ultimate power which is manifested to us through phenomena.\nThat conception implies omnipotence and omniscience, and it therefore\nimplies regularity of method, because uniformity of method is a mark\nof strength, whereas irregularity of method is a mark of weakness. \"A\npersistent process, adapted to all contingencies, implies greater skill\nin the achievement of an end than its achievement by the process of\nmeeting the contingencies as they severally arise.\" And, therefore,\nthose who adopt the notion of the special creation of species do, it\nis said, in truth impair the professed character of the power to which\nthey assume that the phenomena of the existence of species are to be\nreferred, whereas the hypothesis of the evolution of species out of\nother species is much more consistent with the professed conception of\nthe ultimate power.\n\nIn this claim of superiority for the evolution hypothesis, the learned\nphilosopher seems to have been almost oblivious of the fact that he was\ndealing with animal organisms in two aspects: first, in regard to the\nmethod by which individuals of the same species come into existence;\nand, secondly, in regard to the method by which different species have\ncome into existence. In the first case, regularity of method is evinced\nby the establishment of a uniform process of procreation and gestation.\nThis process, while retaining throughout the different classes of\nanimals one fundamental and characteristic method, namely, the union\nof the sexes, is widely varied in respect to the time of gestation,\nthe f\u0153tal development, and the nourishment of the young before and\nafter birth. There is no difficulty whatever in discovering the great\nreason for which this system of the reproduction of individuals was\nestablished. The tie that it makes between parents and offspring, and\nmore especially the tie between the female parent and the offspring,\nwas obviously one grand end for which this system of giving existence\nto individuals was adopted; and although the instinct which arises\nout of it is in some species feeble and almost inactive, it rises\nhigher and higher in its power and its manifestations in proportion\nas the animals rise in the scale of being, until in man it exhibits\nits greatest force and its most various effects, producing at last\npride of ancestry, and affecting in various ways the social and even\nthe political condition of mankind. But how can any corresponding\nconnection between one race of animals and another, or between\nantecedent and subsequent species, be imagined? The sexual impulse\nimplanted in animals leads to the production of offspring of the same\nrace. The desire for offspring keeps up the perpetual succession of\nindividuals, and love of the offspring insures the protection of the\nnewly born by the most powerful of impulses. But what can be imagined\nas an analogous impulse, appetite, or propensity which should lead one\nspecies to strive after the production of another species? Is it said\nthat the different species are evolved out of one another by a process\nin which the conscious desires, the efforts, the aspirations of the\npreceding races play no part? This is certainly true, if there was\never any such process as the evolution of species out of species; and\nit follows that, in respect to one great moral purpose of a process,\nthere is no analogy to be derived from the regularity and uniformity of\nthe process by which individuals of the same species are multiplied.\nMoreover, in regard to the latter process, we know that a barrier has\nbeen set to its operation; for Nature does not now admit of the sexual\nunion between animals of entirely distinct species, and we have no\nreason to believe that it ever did admit of it at any period in the\ngeological history of the earth.\n\nStill further: In what sense are special creations \"irregularities\nof method\"? In what sense are they \"contingencies\"? And if they are\n\"contingencies,\" how does it imply less skill to suppose that they\nhave been met as they have severally arisen, than would be implied by\nsupposing that they have been achieved by a uniform process adapted\nto all contingencies? This notion that something is derogated from\nthe idea of omnipotence and omniscience by the hypothesis that such\na power has acted by special exercises of its creating faculty in\nthe production of different orders of beings as completed and final\ntypes, instead of allowing or causing them to be successively evolved\nout of each other by gradual derivations, is neither logical nor\nphilosophical. In no proper sense is a method of action an irregular\nmethod unless it was imposed upon the actor by some antecedent\nnecessity, which compelled him to apply a method which was made uniform\nin one case to another case in which the same kind of uniformity\nwould not be indispensable. The uniformity of the process by which\nindividuals of the same species are multiplied is a uniformity for that\nparticular end. The regularity in that case is a regularity that has\nits special objects to accomplish. The uniformity and regularity of\na different method of causing different types of organisms to exist,\nso long as the object is always effected in the same way, is just as\ntruly a regularity and uniformity for that case, and just as completely\nfulfills the idea of infinite skill. That such creations are specially\nmade, that they are independently made, and that each is made for a\ndistinct purpose and also for the complex purposes of a varied class\nof organisms, does not render them contingencies arising at random, or\nmake the method of meeting them an occasional, irregular, spasmodic\ndevice for encountering something unforeseen and unexpected. The very\npurposes for which the distinct organisms exist--purposes that are\napparent on a comprehensive survey of their various structures and\nmodes of life--and the fact that they have come into existence by some\nprocess that was for the production of the ends a uniform and regular\none, whether that process was special creation or evolution, render the\ntwo methods of action equally consistent with the professed conception\nof the ultimate power. On the hypothesis of special creations so many\ndifferent types of organism as the Creator has seen fit to create have\nbeen made by the exercise of a power remaining uniformly of the same\ninfinite nature, but varying the products at will for the purposes of\ninfinite wisdom.\n\nWhat, again, does the learned author mean by meeting \"contingencies\"\n\"as they have severally arisen\"? This suggestion of a difficulty for\nthe believers in special creations seems to imply that the distinct\ntypes of animal organisms arose somehow as necessities outside of the\ndivine will, and that the Almighty artificer had to devise occasional\nmethods of meeting successive demands which he did not create. The\nhypothesis of special creations does not drive its believers into any\nsuch implications. The several distinct types of animal organisms are\nsupposed to have arisen in the divine mind as types which the Almighty\nsaw fit to create for certain purposes, and to have been severally\nfashioned as types by his infinite power. They are in no sense\n\"contingencies\" which he had to meet as occasions arising outside of\nhis infinite will. A human artificer has conceived and executed upon a\nnovel plan a machine that is distinguishable from all other machines.\nHe did not create the demand for that machine; the demand has grown\nout of the wants of society; and the artificer has met the demand by\nhis genius and his mechanical skill, which have effected a marked\nimprovement in the condition of society. In one sense, therefore, he\nhas met a \"contingency,\" because he has met a demand. But the infinite\nCreator, upon the hypothesis of his existence and attributes, does not\nmeet an external demand; there is no demand upon him; he creates the\noccasion; he makes the different organisms to effectuate the infinite\npurposes which he also creates; the want and the means of satisfying\nthe want alike arise in the infinite wisdom and will. Such is the\nhypothesis. We may now, therefore, pursue in some further detail the\nargument which maintains that this hypothesis is of far inferior\nstrength to that of evolution, as the method in which the Almighty\npower has acted in the production of different animal organisms.\n\nFirst we have the analogy that is supposed to be afforded by what takes\nplace in the development of a single cell into a man in the space of\na few years, and an alleged correspondence of development by which\na single cell, in the course of untold millions of years, has given\norigin to the human race. Granting any difference of time which this\ncomparison calls for, and substituting in place of the successive\nmoments or years of an individual life, from the formation of the\novum to the fully developed animal, the successive generations of any\nimaginable series of animals, the question is not merely what we can\ndefinitely conceive, or how successfully we can construct a theory.\nIt is whether the supposed analogy will hold; whether we can find\nthat in the two cases development takes place in the same way or in\na way that is so nearly alike in the two cases as to warrant us in\nreasoning from the one to the other. In the case of the development of\nthe single cell into the mature animal, although we can not, either\nbefore or after birth, detect the changes that are taking place from\nminute to minute, the infinitesimal accretions or losses, we know that\nthere is a perpetual and unbroken connection of life maintained from\nthe moment when the f\u0153tus is formed to the moment when the mature\nanimal stands before us. Break this connection anywhere in the process\nof development, and life is destroyed; the development is at once\narrested. It is this connection that constitutes, as I presume, what\nthe learned author calls the \"appropriate conditions,\" in the case of\nthe production of the individual animal; it is, at all events, the one\ngrand and indispensable condition to the development of the cell into\nthe f\u0153tus, of the f\u0153tus into the newly born child, and of the child\ninto the man. Now, if we are to reason from this case of individual\ndevelopment to the other case of successive generations of creatures\ndiffering from each other in the same or any other ratio in which\nthe perfect man differs from the ovum, the f\u0153tus, or the newly born\nchild, which are all successive stages of one and the same individual\nlife, we ought to find in the successive generations of the different\ncreatures some bond of connection, some continuity of lives with lives,\nsome perpetuation from one organism to another, that will constitute\nthe \"appropriate conditions\" for a corresponding development from a\nsingle cell through the successive types of animal life into the human\nrace. Without such connection, continuity, perpetuation from organism\nto organism, shown by some satisfactory proof, we have nothing but a\ntheory, and a theory that is destitute of the grand conditions that\nwill alone support the analogy between the two cases. If anywhere in\nthe supposed chain of successive generations of different animals the\ncontinuity of animal and animal is broken, the hypothesis of special\ncreations of new organisms must come in: for we must remember that\nwe are reasoning about animal life, and if the continuity of lives\nwith one another is interrupted, the series terminates, just as the\nseries between the ovum, the f\u0153tus, the child, and the man terminates,\nat whatever stage it is interrupted by a cause that destroys the\nmysterious principle of life. It is therefore absolutely necessary to\nlook for some proof which will show that in the supposed series of\nsuccessive generations of animals out of antecedent types, by whatever\ngradations and in whatever space of time we may suppose the process\nof evolution to have been worked, there has been a continuity of life\nbetween the different types, a perpetuation of organism from organism,\na connection of lives with lives.\n\nWe now come to another supposed analogy, on which great stress is laid\nby the evolution school, and especially by Mr. Spencer. Individuals\nof the same family are found to be marked by striking peculiarities\nof structure, ancestral traits, which appear and disappear and then\nappear again, in successive generations. This is obviously a case where\nthe \"appropriate conditions\" are all comprehended in the connection\nof life with life. When we trace the pedigree of a single man or any\nother individual animal back to a remote pair of ancestors, we connect\ntogether in an unbroken chain the successive generations of parents\nand offspring. If the chain is anywhere broken, so that direct descent\ncan not be traced throughout the series, we can not by direct evidence\ncarry the peculiarities of family traits any further back than the\nancestor or pair of ancestors with which we can find an unbroken\nconnection of life with life. We do indeed often say in common parlance\nthat an individual must have a trace of a certain blood in his veins,\nbecause of certain peculiarities of structure, complexion, or other\ntokens of descent, even when we can not find a perfect pedigree\nwhich would show where the infusion of the supposed blood came in.\nBut although it might be allowable, in making out the descent of an\nindividual man or any other animal, from a certain ancestor or pair of\nancestors, to aid the pedigree by strong family or race resemblance,\neven when a link is wanting, it could only be for the purpose of\nestablishing a pedigree, a connection of lives with lives, that such\ncollateral evidence could be resorted to. If by direct proof of an\nunbroken descent a full pedigree is made out, or if, when some link is\nwanting, the collateral proof from strong family or race resemblances\nis sufficient to warrant the belief that the link once existed, we\nmight accept it as a fact that the individual descended from the\nsupposed ancestors in a direct line, or that some peculiarity of blood\ncame into his constitution at some point in the descent of individuals\nfrom individuals.[74]\n\nCan we apply this mode of reasoning to the evolution of distinct types\nof animals out of antecedent and different types? The very nature of\nthe descent or derivation that is to be satisfactorily established\nrequires a connection of lives with lives, just as such a connection is\nrequired in making out the pedigree of an individual animal. We must\nconstruct a pedigree for the different classes or types of animals\nthrough which, by direct or collateral evidence, we can connect the\ndifferent organisms together, so as to warrant the belief that by\nthe ordinary process of generation these animals of widely different\norganizations have been successfully developed out of each other, life\nfrom life, organisms from organisms. The hypothesis is, that from a\nsingle cell all the various races and types of animals have in process\nof time been gradually formed out of each other, through an ascending\nscale, until we reach the human race, whose race pedigree consists of a\nseries of imperceptible formations, back to the single cell from which\nthe whole series proceeded. This, we must remember, is not a case of\nthe evolving production of different forms of inanimate matter, but it\nis the case of the evolving production of different forms of animal\nlife out of other preceding and different forms, by the process of\nanimal generation.\n\nOf direct evidence of this evolution of species, it can not be said\nthat we have any which will make it a parallel case with the direct\nevidence of the descent of an individual from parents and other\nancestors. We have different animal organisms that are marked by\ndistinctions which compel us to regard them as separate species, and\nthere is no known instance in which we can directly trace a production\nof one of these distinct species out of another or others by finding\na connection of lives with lives. Even in the vegetable kingdom, with\nall the crosses for which Nature has made such wonderful and various\nprovision, we do not find such occurrences as the production of an oak\nout of the seed of an apple, or the production of an orange-tree out of\nan acorn. We do not gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles. There\nare barriers set to miscegenation even in the vegetable world, and we\nhave no direct evidence that at any period in the geological history of\nthe earth these barriers have been crossed, and very little indirect\nevidence to warrant us in believing that they ever have been or ever\nwill be. In the animal kingdom such barriers are extremely prominent\nand certain. We not only have no direct evidence that any one species\nof animal was at any period of the earth's history or in any length of\ntime gradually evolved out of another distinct species, but we know\nthat the union of the sexes and the production of new individuals can\nnot take place out of certain limits; that, while Nature will permit\nof the crossing of different breeds of the same animal, and so will\nadmit of very limited variations of structure, she will not admit of\nthe sexual union of different species, so as to produce individuals\nhaving a union of the different organisms, or a resultant of a third\norganism of a different type from any that had preceded it. Is it, for\nexample, from mere taste or moral feeling that such occurrences as the\nsexual union between man and beast have not been known to have produced\na third and different animal? We know that it is because the Almighty\nhas \"fixed his canon\" against such a union in the case of man and in\nthe cases of all the other distinct animal organisms; and to find this\ncanon we do not need to go to Scripture or revelation, although we may\nfind it there also.\n\nWe are remitted, therefore, to indirect evidence, and in considering\nthis evidence we have to note that we have nothing but an imaginary\npedigree, or one hypothetically constructed, to which to apply it. In\ntracing the pedigree of an individual animal, we have a certain number\nof known connections of life with life; and where it becomes necessary\nto bridge over a break in the connection so as to carry the line back\nto an earlier ancestor, we may perhaps apply the collateral evidence\nof family or race resemblance to assist in making the connection with\nthat particular ancestor a reasonably safe deduction. But in the case\nof the hypothetical pedigree which supposes the human race to have been\nevolved from a single cell through successive organisms rising higher\nand higher in the scale of being, we have no known connections of lives\nwith lives to which to apply the collateral proofs. The collateral\nproofs are not auxiliary evidence; they are the sole evidence; and\nunless they are such as to exclude every other reasonable explanation\nof the phenomena which they exhibit excepting that of the supposed\nevolution, they can not be said to satisfy the rules of rational belief\nin the hypothesis to which we apply them.\n\nWhat, then, is the indirect and collateral evidence? It consists, as\nwe have already seen, of two principal classes of phenomena: first,\nresemblances of f\u0153tal development which are found on comparing the\nf\u0153tal growth of different species of animals; second, resemblances in\nthe structure of different species of animals after birth and maturity.\nThese various resemblances are supposed to constitute proof of descent\nfrom a common stock, which may be carried back in the series as far as\nthe resemblance can be carried, at whatever point that may be. Thus,\nin comparing all the vertebrata, we find certain marked peculiarities\nof structure common to the whole class: the deduction is, that all the\nvertebrate animals came from a common stock. In comparing all the\nmammalia, we find certain marked peculiarities of structure common\nto the whole class: the deduction is that all the mammalia came from\na common stock. Going still further back in the supposed series, we\ncome to the amphibians, as the supposed common stock from which the\nvertebrate and mammalian land animals were derived; and, comparing the\ndifferent classes of the amphibians, we find certain resemblances which\npoint to the fish inhabitants of the water as their common stock; and\nthen we trace the more highly organized fishes through the more lowly\norganized back to the aquatic worm, which may itself be supposed to\nhave been developed out of a single cell.[75]\n\nThe resemblances of structure, wherever we make the comparison\nbetween different species, are referable to an ideal plan of animal\nconstruction, followed throughout a class of animals, and adjusted to\ntheir peculiar differences which distinguish one species from another,\njust as in the vegetable world there is an ideal plan of construction\nof trees followed throughout a class of plants, and adjusted to the\npeculiar differences which distinguish one kind of tree from another.\nAs between man and the monkey, or between man and the horse, or the\nseal, or the bat, or the bird, there are certain resemblances in the\nstructure of the skeleton, which indicate an identity of plan, although\nvaried in its adjustments to the distinguishing structure of each\nseparate species of animal. In a former chapter, I have shown why the\nadoption of an ideal plan of a general character is consistent with\nwhat I have called the \"economy of Nature\" in the special creation of\ndifferent species. On a careful revision of the subject, I can see\nno reason to change the expression, or to modify the idea which it\nwas intended to convey, and which I will here repeat. It is entirely\nconsistent with the conception of an infinite and all-wise creating\npower, to suppose that in the formation of a large class of organisms,\nall the constructive power that was needed for the formation of a\ngeneral plan was exercised throughout the class, and that there was\nsuper added the exercise of all the power of variation that was needful\nto produce distinct species. Repetition of the same general plan of\nconstruction is certainly no mark of inferiority of original power,\nif accompanied by adaptations to new and further conditions. It is\na proof that in one direction all the necessary power was used, and\nno more, and that in producing the distinct organisms the necessary\namount of further power was also used. If we follow the resemblances of\nstructure that may be traced through all the animals of a varied class,\nwe shall find that they may be referred, as a rational and consistent\nhypothesis, to this method of giving to each animal its characteristic\nformation. If this is a rational hypothesis, it is so because it is\nconsistent with all the observable phenomena; and consequently, the\nopposite hypothesis that all these phenomena of resemblances and\ndifferences are due to the law of evolution does not exclude every\nother explanation of their existence.\n\nTo apply this now to one of the comparisons on which great stress\nis laid--the comparison between the brain of man and that of the\nape. Two questions arise in this comparison: 1. Do the resemblances\nnecessarily show that these two animals came from a common stock? 2.\nDo the resemblances necessarily show that man was descended from some\nape through intermediate animals by gradual transformations? And, when\nI ask whether the comparison necessarily leads to these conclusions,\nI mean to ask whether the resemblances point so strongly to the\nconclusions that they must rationally be held to exclude every other\nhypothesis.\n\nProf. Huxley furnished to Mr. Darwin a very learned note, in which he\nstated the results of all that is now known concerning the resemblances\nand differences in the structure and the development of the brain in\nman and the apes. The differences may be laid aside in the present\ndiscussion, because it is not necessary, for my present purpose, to\nfound anything upon them. But the resemblances, just as they are stated\nby the eminent anatomist, without regard to controverted details,\nare the important facts to be considered. The substance of the whole\ncomparison is that the cerebral hemispheres in man and the higher apes\nare disposed after the very same pattern in him as in them; that every\nprincipal \"gyrus\" and \"sulcus\" of a chimpanzee's brain is clearly\nrepresented in that of a man, so that the terminology which applies\nto one answers for the other; that there is no dispute as to the\nresemblance in fundamental character between the ape's brain and man's;\nand that even the details of the arrangement of the \"gyri\" and \"sulci\"\nof the cerebral hemispheres present a wonderfully close similarity\nbetween the chimpanzee, orang, and man.[76] These are said to be\nthe result of a comparison of the adult brain of man and the higher\napes; and, although it is claimed by some anatomists that there are\nfundamental differences in the mode of their development which point\nto a difference of origin, this is denied by Huxley, who maintains\nthat there is a fundamental agreement in the development of the brain\nin man and apes. His views of the facts for the purpose of the present\ninquiry may be accepted without controversy, not only because he is an\nauthority whose statements of facts I am not disposed to dispute, but\nbecause it is not necessary to dispute them. What, then, do they show?\n\nThey show that there are animals known as apes and animals known as\nmen, whose brains are found to be fundamentally constructed upon the\nsame general plan, with strong resemblances throughout the different\nparts of the organ; and the first question is, Do these resemblances\nshow that the two animals came from a common stock? Upon the theory\nthat man has resulted from the gradual modifications of the same form\nas that from which the apes have sprung, the resemblances in the\nstructure of their respective brains are claimed as having a tendency\nto show that there was an animal which preceded both of them, and which\nwas their common ancestor, in the same sense in which an individual\nprogenitor was the common ancestor of two other individuals, whether\none of these two individuals was or was not descended from the other in\na direct line. On the other hand, upon the hypothesis of the special\ncreation of the ape as one animal, and the special creation of man as\nanother animal, there was no common stock from which the two animals\nhave been derived, and the resemblances of their brains point to the\nadoption of a general plan of construction for that organ, or its\nconstruction upon the same model, and the adaptation of that model to\nthe other parts of the structure, and the purposes of the existence of\neach of the two animals. Without again repeating the argument which\nshows that the latter hypothesis is perfectly consistent with the\nprofessed conception of the infinite power, I will now inquire whether,\non the former hypothesis, we have anything to which we can apply the\nevidence of resemblance as a collateral aid in reaching the conclusion\nthat these two animals were derived from a common progenitor, or from\nsome antecedent animal whose brain and other parts of the structure\nbecame modified into theirs by numerous intermediate gradations.\n\nBetween the higher apes, or between any of the apes and any known\nantecedent and different animal, no naturalist has discovered the\nintermediate link or links. Darwin supposes that there was some\none extremely ancient progenitor from which proceeded the two main\ndivisions of the _Simiad\u00e6_--namely, the Catarrhine and Platyrhine\nmonkeys, with their sub-groups. This extremely ancient progenitor is\nnothing but a scientific hypothesis; or, to use a legal phrase, it\nhad nothing but a constructive existence. It is necessary to believe\nin the principle of evolution, in order to work out the hypothesis\nof this creature from which the two great stems of the _Simiad\u00e6_ are\nsupposed to have proceeded. Here, then, we have the case of a pedigree\nor succession of animal races, the _propositum_ of which has no known\nexistence. Next we have two known divisions of the _Simiad\u00e6_, or\nmonkeys; but, between them and their imaginary common progenitor, we\nhave no known intermediate animals constituting the gradations of\nstructure from the progenitor to the descendants. The whole chain has\nto be made out by tracing resemblances among the animals of a certain\nclass that are known, then applying these resemblances to the supposed\ndivergencies from the structure of a supposed progenitor, and then\ndrawing the conclusion that there was such a progenitor. It may be\nsubmitted to the common sense of mankind, whether this is a state of\nfacts which will warrant scientists or philosophers in using toward\nthose who do not accept their theory quite so much of the _de haut en\nbas_ style of remark as we find in the writings of Mr. Spencer.[77]\nIf the researches of geologists had ever discovered any remains of\nan animal that would fulfill the requirements, and thus stand as the\nprogenitor of the _Simiad\u00e6_. By the case would correspond to that of a\nknown individual from whom we undertake to trace the descent of another\nindividual through many intermediates; and in such a case strong family\nresemblances of various kinds might possibly afford some aid in making\nout the pedigree as a reliable conclusion. But there is no means of\nconnecting the Old World and the New World apes with any but an unknown\nand imaginary, progenitor. Darwin himself frankly tells us that \"the\nearly progenitor of the whole Simian stock, including man,\" is an\nundiscovered animal, which may not have been identical with, or may not\neven have closely resembled, any existing ape or monkey.[78]\n\nPassing from the supposed common progenitor to the resemblances\nbetween the brain of the higher apes and the brain of man, we come to\nthe question whether these resemblances show that man was descended\nfrom any of the Simian stock through intermediate animals by gradual\ntransformation. Here the case is in one respect different; for the\nanimals that are to be compared are known, and their respective brains\nhave been subjected to close anatomical scrutiny. This part of the\nprocess of evolution begins from one true species, the ape, and ends\nin another true species, the man. We are unable to trace the man and\nthe ape to a common progenitor race; but we find the ape possessed of\na brain which strongly resembles man's. I have searched diligently in\nthe writings of naturalists for a sound reason which ought rationally\nto exclude the hypothesis that the brain of the ape was formed upon\nthe same ideal plan as the brain of man, each animal being a distinct\nspecies and separately created. Anatomical comparison of the two\nbrains shows that, whether they were separately planned upon the same\ngeneral model, or the one was derived from the other by a process of\ngradual transformation through successive intermediate animals, the\nresemblances are consistent with either hypothesis. We are remitted,\ntherefore, to an inquiry for the evidence which will establish the\nexistence of a race or races of animals through whom there descended\nto man the peculiar structure of brain found in one of the classes of\napes--namely, the Catarrhine or Old World monkeys. If such intermediate\nraces could be found, their existence at any period anterior to the\nperiod of man's appearance on earth would have some tendency to\nshow that man was descended from one of the families of apes, and\nthis tendency would become stronger in proportion to the number of\nsuccessive links in the family chain that could be made out. But not\none of these links is known to have existed. There is an assumption\nthat man, \"from a genealogical point of view, belongs to the Catarrhine\nor Old World stock\" of monkeys; and this assumption is claimed to be\nsupported by the fact that the character of his brain is fundamentally\nthe same as theirs.\n\nA brain is an organ which, upon the hypothesis of an independent\ncreation of distinct species of animals, would be expected to be found\nin very numerous species, although they might differ widely from\neach other. In all the vertebrate animals this organ is the one from\nwhich, by its connection with the spinal chord, the central portion\nof the nervous system, that system descends through the arches of\nthe vertebr\u00e6, and thence radiates to the various other organs of\nthe body. The brain is the central seat of sensation, to which are\ntransmitted, along certain nerves, the impressions produced upon or\narising in the other organs; and it is the source from which voluntary\nactivity is transmitted along other nerves to organs and muscles that\nare subjected to a power of movement from within. The office which\nsuch an organ performs in a complex piece of animal mechanism is\ntherefore the same in all the vertebrate animals in which it is found;\nand it would necessarily be found to be constructed upon the same\nuniform plan, and with just the degree of uniformity and adaptation\nwhich would fit it to perform its office in the particular species\nof animal to which it might be given. In point of fact, we find this\noffice of the brain performed in all the vertebrate animals upon the\nsame uniform plan, with the necessary adaptations to the various\nstructures of the different animals. Resemblances, therefore, in the\nconvolutions of different parts of this organ, as found in different\nvertebrate animals, however close they may be, prove nothing more than\nthe adoption of a general plan for the production of objects common\nto the whole class of the vertebrate animals; and unless we can find\nother and independent proof that one species was descended from another\nby connection of lives with lives through successive generations,\nthe hypothesis of special creations of the different species is not\nexcluded by the facts.\n\nLet us now further examine the supposed kinship of man with the\nmonkey, as evidenced by the similarity of the structure of the\nbrains of the two animals, in reference to the supposed process of\nevolution as the means of accounting for the origin of two species\nso essentially distinct. How has it happened that different species\nhave become completed and final types, transmitting, after they have\nbecome completed, one and the same type, by the ordinary process of\ngeneration, and not admitting of the sexual union with any other\ndistinct species? On the theory of the evolution of animal out of\nanimal, we must suppose that at some time the secondary causes of\nnatural and sexual selection have done their work. It ends in the\nproduction of a species which thereafter remains one and the same\nanimal, and Nature has established a barrier to any sexual union with\nany other species. If we give the rein to our imaginations, and, taking\nthe process of evolution as it is described to us, suppose that in the\nlong course of countless ages the struggle for existence among very\nnumerous individuals has led to gradual transformations of structure\nwhich the sexual selection has transmitted to offspring, and so a new\nanimal has at length been formed through the successive \"survivals of\nthe fittest,\" we reach an animal of a new species, and that species,\nunder no circumstances, produces any type but its own, so far as we\nhave any means of knowledge. All the knowledge respecting the ape that\nhas been accumulated shows only that this species of animal, since it\nbecame a completed type, has procreated its own type and no other.\nWhatever struggle for existence the individuals of this type have had\nto undergo, whatever modifications of structure or habits of life the\nsurvival of the fittest individuals of this type may have produced\nfrom the earliest imaginable period until the present time, the fact\nremains that this species of animal is a completed and final product.\nAt the same time we have another completed and final type of animal\nknown as man, which, so long as he has been known at all, is a distinct\nand peculiar species. Between the brain of this animal and the brain\nof the other we find certain strong resemblances. In each of them\nthis organ is a structure performing the same office in the animal\nmechanism, with adaptations peculiar to the varying structure of each\nof them. In order to justify the conclusion that the one animal is a\nmodified descendant from the other, so as to exclude the hypothesis\nthat the resemblances of any one or of all of their respective organs\nwas a result of the adoption of a general plan in special creations of\ndistinct species, we ought to find some instance or instances in which\nthe completed animal called the ape has been developed into an animal\napproaching more nearly to man than the man, as he is first known to\nus, approached to the first ape that is known to us. Without such\nintermediate connections, the analogy of the descent of individuals\nfrom other individuals of the same species will not hold. There is\nnothing left but resemblances of structure in one or more organs, which\nare just as consistent with the hypothesis of special creations as with\nthat of evolution. Strong resemblances of structure and in the offices\nof different organs may be found between man and the horse, but upon\nno theory of evolution has it been suggested that man is descended\nfrom the horse, or from any other animal to which he bears more or\nless resemblance, excepting the monkey; and it is quite possible that\nnaturalists have been led unconsciously to make this exception by\nexternal resemblances of the monkey and the man, by the imitative power\nof the inferior animal when it comes in contact with man, and by some\nof its habits when found in its wild and native haunts.\n\n FOOTNOTES:\n\n [69] \"Biology,\" i, pp. 346-348 _et seq._\n\n [70] Concerning the nebular hypothesis, and what astronomers now\n consider, see _post._\n\n [71] \"Biology,\" i.\n\n [72] \"Biology,\" i, pp. 349, 350.\n\n [73] \"Biology,\" i, p. 351. I am not quite sure that I understand\n what Mr. Spencer means by \"direct\" proof. In the passage immediately\n following the sentence last quoted, he speaks of \"the kind and\n quantity of _direct evidence_ that all organic beings have gradually\n arisen,\" etc., whereas, in a previous passage, he had admitted that\n the facts at present assignable in _direct_ proof of this hypothesis\n are insufficient. I presume he meant insufficient in number. (Compare\n \"Biology,\" i, pp. 351 and 352). Now, I should say that _direct_ proof\n of the hypothesis that all animal organisms have arisen successively\n out of one another would require more or less positive evidence of\n such occurrences; and that the proof which is afforded by what has\n taken place within the limits of a single species in the course of\n successive generations would be _indirect_ evidence of what may have\n taken place in the evolution of different species, because it requires\n the aid of analogy to connect the two. I am not aware that there is\n supposed to be any proof of the evolution of species out of species,\n excepting that which is derived from what has taken place in single\n races in the development of the ovum into the infant, the development\n of the infant into the mature animal, and the limited varieties of\n structure appearing among individuals of the same race. As I go on\n through the examination of Mr. Spencer's argument, it will appear\n whether there are grounds for regarding this kind of reasoning as\n satisfactory or the reverse.\n\n [74] I have stated here, in reference to the pedigree of an\n individual, a far more liberal rule of evidence than would probably be\n allowed in courts of justice, where anything of value was depending\n upon the establishment of a descent from a certain ancestor. But I\n have purposely suggested the broadest rule that can be applied to\n family or race resemblances as a means of aiding a pedigree in popular\n determination or in a _judicium rusticum_. For example, suppose that\n there were persons now living in this country who trace their descent\n from the English husband of Pocahontas, the daughter of an Indian\n chief, and from her. They bear, we will suppose, the family name of\n the Englishman whom she is known to have married, and perhaps one of\n them bears very strong resemblance to the Indian race in features,\n complexion, and hair. In a judicial trial of this person's supposed\n pedigree I do not suppose that these resemblances, if they constituted\n his sole evidence, together with the name of Rolfe which he bears, and\n which a certain number of his ancestors may have borne before him,\n would be received as evidence of his descent from the Indian girl\n whose name was Pocahontas, and who married an Englishman of the name\n of Rolfe more than two centuries ago. It would be necessary to make\n some proof of the whole pedigree by the kind of evidence which the law\n admits in such cases, and then the resemblances of the individual to\n the Indian race might possibly be received as confirmatory proof, in\n aid of the proof derived from the family name of Pocahontas's English\n husband, from reputation, written or oral declarations of deceased\n witnesses, family documents, ancient gravestones, and the like. In\n popular judgment most persons would be apt to accept the family name\n of Rolfe and the apparent trace of Indian blood as sufficient proof of\n the descent of the individual from the Indian girl who married John\n Rolfe. But in a court of justice these facts would go for nothing\n without some independent proof of the pedigree.\n\n [75] See the table of the Darwinian pedigree of man, _ante_. Any\n other mode of arranging the order of evolution that will admit of the\n application of the steps of supposed development to what is known of\n the animal kingdom, will equally serve to illustrate the theory.\n\n [76] Darwin's \"Descent of Man,\" Prof. Huxley's note, p. 199 _et seq._\n\n [77] Mr. Spencer observes that the hypothesis of special creations is\n one \"which formulates absolute ignorance into a semblance of positive\n knowledge....\" Thus, however regarded, the hypothesis of special\n creations turns out to be worthless--worthless by its derivation;\n worthless in its intrinsic incoherence; worthless as absolutely\n without evidence; worthless as not satisfying a moral want. \"We must\n therefore consider it as counting for nothing, in opposition to any\n other hypothesis respecting the origin of organic beings.\" There is a\n great deal more in the same tone. (See \"Biology,\" i, pp. 344, 345, and\n _passim_ throughout Chapters II and III of Part III of that work.) Mr.\n Darwin, who is sufficiently positive, is much more moderate, and in my\n opinion a much better reasoner, although I can not subscribe to his\n reasoning or his conclusions. A rather irreverent naval officer of my\n acquaintance once extolled a doctrinal sermon, which he had just heard\n preached by a Unitarian clergyman, in this fashion: \"I tell you what,\n sir, the preacher did not leave the Trinity a leg to stand upon.\"\n Probably some of Mr. Spencer's readers think that he has equally\n demolished the doctrine of special creations.\n\n [78] \"Descent of Man,\" p. 155.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\n The doctrine of evolution, according to Herbert Spencer, further\n considered.\n\n\nIn the last two preceding chapters I have examined what Mr. Spencer\nregards as the direct supports of the doctrine of evolution. I have now\nto consider the different orders of facts which, as he claims, yield to\nit indirect support. These are the facts derived from classification,\nfrom embryology, from morphology, and from distribution. An explanation\nis here needful of the sense in which he uses these respective terms,\nbefore the reader, who is not accustomed to them, is called upon to\nunderstand and appreciate the argument:\n\n1. By classification is meant an arrangement of organic beings in some\nsystematic manner, according to attributes which they have in common,\nand which may form the principle of a division into different classes\nor families. Pointing out that in the early history of botanical and\nzo\u00f6logical science the tendency was to make classifications according\nto a single characteristic, Mr. Spencer reminds us that later\nnaturalists, by attending to a greater number of characteristics,\nand finally to the greatest number that can be found to be common to\nvarious classes of vegetable and animal organisms, have constructed\nsystems of classification which, in place of a linear or a serial\norder, have exhibited the alliances of different groups, then the\nsub-groups, and the sub-sub-groups, so that the divergences and\nredivergences become developed, while the resemblances which obtain\nare preserved throughout the whole class. But it is at once apparent\nthat, although classification, on whatever principle it is conducted,\nmay be valuable as a means of fixing in the mind the resemblances\nor differences of structure that obtain in the different orders\nof organized beings, as, for example, among the vertebrate or the\ninvertebrate animals, the flowering or the flowerless plants, the seeds\nnaked or the seeds inclosed in seed-vessels, yet that any other system\nof classification, based upon other resemblances or differences which\nactually present means of grouping or separating the different families\nof organized beings, is just as valuable an aid in the investigation of\nfacts. How far any classification affords an argument, or the means of\nconstructing an argument, which will yield a support to the doctrine of\nevolution superior to that which it yields to the doctrine of special\ncreations, is of course a question.\n\n2. Embryology: This is the term employed to express that branch of\ninquiry which is concerned in a comparison of the increase of different\norganisms through the stages of their embryonic life, and in noting\nat different stages of this growth the characters which they have\nin common with each other; the resemblances of structure which at\ncorresponding phases of a later embryonic stage are displayed by a less\nextensive multitude of organisms; and so on step by step, until we find\nthe class of resembling embryos becoming narrower and narrower, and\nthen we finally end in the species of which a particular embryo is a\nmember. This process of tracing and eliminating embryonic resemblances\nis said to have \"a profound significance\"; because, beginning with\na great multitude of resemblances between the embryonic development\nof different organisms, it reveals the divergences which they take\non, and through every successive step we find new divergences, by\nmeans of which \"we may construct an embryological tree, expressing\nthe developmental relations of the organisms, resembling the tree\nwhich symbolizes their classificatory relations.\" We thus arrive at\n\"that subordination of classes, orders, genera and species, to which\nnaturalists have been gradually led,\" and which is said to be \"that\nsubordination which results from the divergence and redivergence\nof embryos, as they all unfold.\"[79] On this mode of comparing the\nembryonic development of different organized beings Mr. Spencer builds\na scientific parallelism, which indicates, as he claims, a \"primordial\nkinship of all organisms,\" and a \"progressive differentiation of them,\"\nwhich justifies a belief in an original stock from which they have all\nbeen derived. In what way this method of investigation destroys or\ntends to destroy the hypothesis of special creations, or how it affords\nan important support to the doctrine of evolution, will be considered\nhereafter.[80]\n\n3. Morphology, or the science of form, involves a comparison of\nthe structure of different organisms in their mature state; an\nascertainment of the resemblances between their structures, and of\nthe community of plan that exists between them. Here, as in the aids\nderived from classification and embryology, it is claimed that the\nfundamental likenesses of forms of structure have a meaning which is\naltogether inconsistent with the hypothesis of predetermined typical\nplans pursued throughout immensely varied forms of organisms.\n\n4. Distribution: This is the term applied to the phenomena exhibited\nby the presence of different organisms in different localities of the\nglobe; or, as Mr. Spencer phrases it, \"the phenomena of distribution\nin space.\" These phenomena are very various. Sometimes, it is said, we\nfind adjacent territories, with similar conditions, occupied by quite\ndifferent faunas. In other regions, we find closely allied faunas in\nareas remote from each other in latitude, and contrasted in both soil\nand climate. The reasoning, as given by Mr. Darwin and adopted by Mr.\nSpencer, is this: that \"as like organisms are not universally or even\ngenerally found in like habitats, nor very unlike organisms in very\nunlike habitats, there is no predetermined adaptation of the organisms\nto the habitats.\" \"In other words,\" Mr. Spencer adds, \"the facts of\ndistribution in space do not conform to the hypothesis of design.\"\nThe reason why they do not is claimed to be that there are impassable\nbarriers between the similar areas which are peopled by dissimilar\nforms; whereas there are no such barriers between the dissimilar areas\nwhich are peopled by dissimilar forms. The conclusion is, \"that each\nspecies of organism tends ever to expand its sphere of existence--to\nintrude on other areas, other modes of life, other media.\" That is\nto say, there is a constant competition among races of organisms\nfor possession of the fields in which they can find the means of\nsubsistence and expansion; and this leads to new modes of existence,\nnew media of life, new structures and new habitats.\n\nThe reader can now retrace his steps, and advert to the facts that are\nrelied upon, under the four heads of the argument:\n\n1. With regard to the argument derived from classification: it is to\nbe observed that any system of classification is in a certain sense\nartificial, and at all events is manifestly conventional. But, in\norder that no injustice may be done to this branch of the argument for\nevolution, I shall state it in its full force. The classifications\nwhich naturalists make of the different organized beings according\nto their resemblances and differences reveal the fact of unity amid\nmultiformity. This fact it is said points to propinquity of descent,\n\"which is the only known cause of the similarity of organic beings.\"\nIt is the bond, hidden indeed by various degrees of modification, but\nnevertheless revealed to us by the classifications which display the\nresemblances. Again, we have, it is said, in the influence of various\nconditions of animated organisms, \"the only known cause of divergence\nof structure.\" Classification reveals to us these divergences. We have,\nthen, the bond of resemblances which indicate propinquity of descent,\nand the divergences of structure produced by varying conditions of\nlife. Put the two together, and we have remarkable harmonies of\nlikenesses obscured by unlikenesses; and to this state of facts it is\nclaimed that no consistent interpretation can be given, without the\nhypothesis that the likenesses and the unlikenesses were produced by\nthe evolution of organisms out of organisms by successive generation,\nthrough a great lapse of time.\n\nThis argument contains no inconsiderable amount of assumption. While\nit may be true that some naturalists do not assign any cause for the\nsimilarity which obtains among organic beings excepting their descent\nfrom a common ancestral stock, it is not true that the similarity\nof structure is inconsistent with the hypothesis of another cause,\nnamely, the adoption of a general plan of structure for a large class\nof organisms, and an intentional variation in those parts of structure\nwhich mark the divisions of that class into species that are very\nunlike. It is true that evolutionists treat with scorn the idea of\na pattern of structure followed throughout a class of animals, but\nmade by designed adaptations to coalesce with differences that mark\nthe peculiarities which distinguish one organism of that class from\nall the others. Mr. Spencer, for example, observes that \"to say that\nthe Creator followed a pattern throughout, merely for the purpose of\nmaintaining the pattern, is to assign a motive which, if avowed by a\nhuman being, we should call whimsical.\"\n\nLet us now follow this mode of disposing of the hypothesis of special\ncreations, by adverting to some of the facts that are adduced in its\nsummary condemnation; and, although the passage which I am about to\nquote is found in Mr. Spencer's work under the head of morphology, the\nillustration applies equally well to his argument from classification.\nSpeaking of fundamental likenesses of structure, he says: \"Under\nthe immensely varied forms of insects, greatly elongated like the\ndragon-fly, or contracted in shape like the lady-bird, winged like\nthe butterfly, or wingless like the flea, we find this character in\ncommon--there are primarily twenty segments. These segments may be\ndistinctly marked, or they may be so fused as to make it difficult to\nfind the divisions between them. This is not all. It has been shown\nthat the same number of segments is possessed by all the _Crustacea_.\nThe highly consolidated crab, and the squilla with its long,\nloosely-jointed divisions, are composed of the same number of somites.\nThough, in the higher crustaceans, some of these successive indurated\nrings, forming the exo-skeleton, are never more than partially marked\noff from each other, yet they are identifiable as homologous with\nsegments, which, in other crustaceans, are definitely divided. What,\nnow, can be the meaning of this community of structure among these\nhundreds of thousands of species filling the air, burrowing in the\nearth, swimming in the water, creeping about among the sea-weed, and\nhaving such enormous differences of size, outline, and substance, as\nthat no community would be suspected between them? Why, under the\ndown-covered body of the moth and under the hard wing-cases of the\nbeetle, should there be discovered the same number of divisions as in\nthe calcareous framework of the lobster? It can not be by _chance_ that\nthere exist just twenty segments in all these hundreds of thousands of\nspecies. There is no reason to think it was _necessary_, in the sense\nthat no other number would have made a possible organism. And to say\nthat it is the result of _design_--to say that the Creator followed\nthis pattern throughout, merely for the purpose of maintaining the\npattern--is to assign a motive which, if avowed by a human being, we\nshould call whimsical. No rational interpretation of this, and hosts\nof like morphological truths, can be given except by the hypothesis of\nevolution; and from the hypothesis of evolution they are corollaries.\nIf organic forms have arisen from common stocks by perpetual\ndivergences and redivergences--if they have continued to inherit, more\nor less clearly, the characters of ancestral races, then there will\nnaturally result these communities of fundamental structure among\nextensive assemblages of creatures, that have severally become modified\nin countless ways and degrees, in adaptation to their respective\nmodes of life. To this let it be added that, while the belief in an\nintentional adhesion to a predetermined pattern throughout a whole\ngroup is totally negatived by the occurrence of occasional deviations\nfrom the pattern, such deviations are reconcilable with the belief in\nevolution. As pointed out in the last chapter, there is reason to think\nthat remote ancestral traits will be obscured more or less according\nas the superposed modifications of structure have or have not been\ngreat or long maintained. Hence, though the occurrence of articulate\nanimals, such as spiders and mites, having fewer than twenty segments,\nis fatal to the supposition that twenty segments was decided on for the\nthree groups of superior _Articulata_, it is not incongruous with the\nsupposition that some primitive races of articulate animals bequeathed\nto these three groups this common typical character--a character which\nhas nevertheless, in many cases, become greatly obscured, and in some\nof the most aberrant orders of these classes quite lost.\"[81]\n\nWhatever may be the explanation suggested by one or another hypothesis\nas to the mode in which this uniformity of structure came to exist, it\nis certain that it does exist. Twenty segments are found in hundreds\nof thousands of species which are immensely different from each other\nin size, outline, substance and modes of existence. Here, then, is a\nplan. There is a pattern, on which all these different organisms are\nconstructed with a common peculiarity. It is averred that this could\nnot have been the result of design, because this would be to impute to\nthe Creator a whimsical motive, namely, that he followed the pattern\nthroughout a vast group of different organisms merely for the purpose\nof following it. On the contrary, it may be contended that this\nuniformity of plan, this repeated pattern, affords the highest probable\nevidence of design; and that the supposed whimsicality of motive will\nentirely disappear as soon as we reach a purpose which may have had\nvery solid reasons for this uniformity of structure. When we reason\nabout the works of the Creator, we are reasoning about the methods of\na being who, we must suppose, is governed by a purpose in all that he\ndoes. In reasoning about the methods of such a being, it is entirely\nunphilosophical to suppose that he has done anything merely for the\nsake of doing it, or for the sake of exercising or displaying his\npowers in repetitions that had no practical value. In order to reason\nconsistently with the supposed attributes of the Creator, we should\nendeavor to find the value of any given pattern which we discover in a\ncertain very large class of organisms differing widely from each other\nin other respects; and in order to find that value it is by no means\nessential to make out that the particular plan of construction was\nnecessary to the making of any organism whatever. The true question\nis, not whether twenty segments were necessary to the construction\nof any organism, but whether, in each of the different species, this\npeculiar number of divisions was useful to each particular organism. If\nnaturalists of the evolution school, instead of looking at everything\nthrough the medium of a certain theory, would in their dissection,\nfor example, of the framework of the lobster, the body of the moth,\nand the body of the beetle, furnish us with facts which would show\nthat these twenty divisions are of no use either for strength, or\nresistance, or suppleness, or adaptation to what is contained within\nthem, we should have a body of evidence that could be claimed as\ntending to overthrow the hypothesis of intentional design. They might\nthen speak of the repetition of this pattern as whimsical, upon the\nhypothesis that it was a repetition by design. But so little is done\nby this class of naturalists to give due consideration to the value\nof such repetitions, and so little heed is paid to the truth that\nthe Creator does nothing that is useless--a truth which all sound\nphilosophy must assume, because it is a necessary corollary from the\nattributes of the Creator--that we are left without the aid which we\nmight expect from these specialists in natural science. Is it, then,\nimpossible to discover, or even to suggest, that for each of these\norganisms this number of twenty divisions had a value? If they were of\nno value, we may safely conclude that they would never have existed,\nunless we ignore the hypothesis of infinite wisdom and skill. That\nhypothesis is a postulate without which we can not reason on the\ncase at all. With it, we have as a starting-point the conception of\na being of infinite perfections, who does nothing idly, nothing from\nwhim, nothing from caprice, and nothing that is without value to the\ncreature in which it is found. So that, while we can not in all cases\nas yet assign that value, we have the strongest reasons for believing\nthat there is a value; and, instead of asserting that an extensive\ncommunity of structure throughout a great branch of the animal kingdom\nhas no meaning excepting upon the doctrine of evolution, it is the\npart of true science to assume that it may have another meaning, and\nto discover if possible what that other meaning is. This is the part\nof true science, because it is the part of sound philosophy. There\nis another remark to be made upon Mr. Spencer's reasoning on this\nparticular case of a community of pattern. He says that it can not\nbe imputed to _chance_. It was, then, either an intentional design,\nor it came about through the process of descent \"from common stocks,\nwhich process was at the same time producing perpetual divergences and\nredivergences.\" Without turning aside for the present to ask from how\nmany common stocks, it may be shown as in the highest degree probable\nthat the occasional deviations from the pattern did not arise by the\nevolution process, because that process has in itself an element\nof chance which is fatal to the theory. The assertion is that \"an\nintentional adhesion to a predetermined plan throughout a whole group\nis totally negatived by the occurrence of occasional deviations from\nthe pattern.\" Let this assertion be examined first in the light of\nfacts, and secondly by the absence of facts.\n\nThe hypothesis is that some primitive race of articulated animals,\npossessed by some means of the twenty segments, transmitted this\nancestral trait to hundreds of thousands of species having no community\nof structure in other respects. Unfortunately for the theory, no\nfigures can measure the chances against the preservation of a single\npattern through such a multitude of differing organisms descending\nfrom a common stock. Infinity alone can express the chances against\nsuch a result. While, according to the theory, the deviations from the\noriginal type were constantly working out new organisms of the most\ndiversified forms, until there came to be hundreds of thousands of new\nspecies differing from each other in all but this one peculiarity--a\ndiversity which is supposed to have been caused by the fundamental law\nof evolution--how did it happen that the same law did not break this\nuniformity of articulation? If it was potent enough to differentiate\nthe enormous multitude of these animals in all other traits, why did\nit not vary the number of segments with which the primitive race\nwas endowed? Is the law of evolution limited or unlimited? If it is\nlimited in its effects, then there are patterns of animal structure\nwhich it has not modified, and the presence of which in hundreds of\nthousands of different species must be explained as a form of structure\ndesigned for some end that was to be common to a great multitude\nof different beings. If the law of evolution was unlimited in its\npower, then the community of pattern has had to undergo chances of\ndestruction or discontinuance that are immeasurable; as there can be\nno measure which will represent to the mind the infinitely diversified\nand innumerable causes that have produced the dissimilarities\nwhich compel a classification into the different species, upon the\nhypothesis of their descent from a common stock. Grant, too, for the\npurpose of the argument, that the occasional deviations from the\npattern of twenty segments, producing a few groups with a smaller\nnumber of articulations, are reconcilable with the belief that some\nlater ancestral form became endowed with the smaller number which it\ntransmitted to its descendants. How came that later ancestral form\nto be endowed with the smaller number of segments? Was there a still\nmore remote ancestral race, which in some way became possessed of the\nsmaller number, or did the spiders and the mites, in the countless\ngenerations of evolution, branch off from ancestral races having the\nfull number of twenty segments? Upon either supposition, what an\ninfinity of chances there were, against the natural selection of the\nsmaller number, and against its preservation as the unvarying type of\narticulation found in the spiders and the mites! The supposition that\nthe number of twenty segments was decided on for the three groups of\nsuperior _Articulata_ for the mere sake of adhering to a pattern is\ndoubtless unphilosophical. But it is not unphilosophical to suppose\nthat whatever amount of articulation is found in each species was\ngiven to it because in that species it would be useful. If in some of\nthe most aberrant orders of these animals the articulation is greatly\nobscured, or not found at all, the conclusion that it was not needed,\nor not needed in a like degree, is far more rational than the theory\nwhich commits the particular result to an infinity of chances against\nit; or which supposes it to have been worked by a process that might\nhave produced a very different result, since it can not be claimed that\nnatural selection works by methods of which any definite result can be\npredicated more than another.\n\nThus far I have considered Mr. Spencer's argument from the _Articulata_\nin the light of the facts that he adduces. Let us now test it by the\nabsence of facts. In a former discussion, I have asked for facts\nwhich show, aside from the theory, that any one species of animal,\ndistinctly marked as a continuing type, is connected by intermediate\ntypes or forms with any pre-existing race of another character. Take\nthis class of the articulated animals, said to be of hundreds of\nthousands of different species having no community of form but this\nof articulation, and now known as perfect organisms, each after its\nkind. What naturalist has discovered the continuity of lives with\nlives, which would furnish the steps of descent of any one of this\nspecies from an antecedent and a different species? It is very easy\nto construct a theory, and from it to argue that there must have been\nintermediate links, which, if discovered, would show the continuity\nof lives from lives which the descent of one organism from another\nnecessarily implies. To a certain extent, within certain limits, the\nsub-groups and the sub-sub-groups of the articulated class of animals,\nwhich classification or morphology reveals, may lay the foundation for\na theoretical belief in an ancestral stock from which the different\nand now perfect forms of these distinct animals may have become\ndeveloped by successive changes of structure. But the extent to which\nconnected changes can be actually traced in the animal kingdom is\nextremely limited; and the important practical question is whether any\none fact, or class of facts, has been discovered which will warrant\nthe belief that beings of totally dissimilar forms and habits of\nlife have, without any design, been evolved by the ordinary process\nof successive generation, through the operation of causes that have\ngradually modified the structure in all respects save one, and have at\nthe same time enabled or allowed that one peculiarity of structure to\nescape from the influences which have modified both structure and modes\nof life in every other respect. Why, for example, upon the hypothesis\nof descent from a common stock, has that stock deviated under the\ninfluences of natural selection into the lobster, the moth, and the\nbeetle, and yet the community of twenty segments of articulation\nhas entirely escaped the effect of those influences? No reason can\nbe assigned for the fact that it has escaped those influences,\nexcepting that it was originally designed, and was impressed upon the\nproto-typical stock with such force as to place it beyond the reach\nof all such causes of modification as those which are ascribed to\nnatural or sexual selection. Without the latter supposition, those\ncauses were just as potent to bring about a modification in the number\nof articulations as they were to bring about all the astonishing\ndiversities of structure and modes of life that we see, and therefore\nthe most probable conclusion from the fact of this uniformity of the\ntwenty segments is, that there was a barrier placed in this whole\nclass of organisms, which has limited the modifying force of the\nsupposed process of evolution, for the reason of some peculiar utility\nin this plan of articulation.\n\nPerhaps it will be said that the process of evolution itself tends to\nthe preservation of whatever is most useful, while the modifications\nare going on which develop new organs and new structures; and that\nthus, in the case before us, the twenty segments have been preserved\nthroughout an enormous group by one of the fundamental laws of\nevolution, so that, if there is any peculiar utility in the twenty\nsegments, that utility has been answered by the very process of gradual\ndescent of one organism from another. But the difficulty with this\nreasoning is, that while it assumes for the modifying influences of\nnatural and sexual selection a range of fortuitous causes sufficient to\nchange the ancestral type into the acquisition of vastly diversified\norgans, powers, and modes of existence, so as to constitute new\nanimals, it yet assumes that, by some recognition of a superior and\nparamount utility in the particular number of segments, the law of\nevolution has preserved that number from the influence of causes\nwhich have changed everything else. Now, the range of causes which\nwas sufficiently varied, accidental, long-continued and complex to\nproduce the diversities of structure in all other respects, by the\ninfinitely modifying influences which have developed new organs and\nnew modes of existence, must also have been of a sufficiently varied,\naccidental, long-continued, and complex character to have broken this\nplan of the twenty segments, unless we suppose that in some mysterious\nand inexplicable manner the different generations of these beings were\nendowed with some kind of sagacity which would enable them to strive\nfor the preservation of this one peculiarity, or unless we suppose that\nNature was ever on the watch to guard them from its destruction or\nvariation, on account of its peculiar utility. The first supposition is\nnot in accordance with the evolution theory; for that theory rejects\nall idea of conscious exertion on the part of any of the organisms.\nThe second supposition leads us at once to the inquiry, how came it\nto be imposed upon a whole group of beings as a law of nature, that\nwhatever utility of structure was of paramount importance to the\nwhole group should be preserved against the modifying influences that\nwere to produce species differing absolutely from each other, through\nhundreds of thousands of varieties, in every other feature of their\nexistence? Can we get along here without the hypothesis of design? And,\nif there was such design, how does the fact of this uniformity amid\nsuch diversity become an argument against the hypothesis of a Creator?\nOr, how does it tend to displace the hypothesis of special creations,\nwhen we find that the very process of so-called evolution has failed\nto break the uniformity of a pattern that is conceded not to have been\nthe result of chance, although that pattern was exposed to just as\nmany and as powerful causes of modification as those which are assumed\nto have brought about the modifications in every other feature of the\nanimal existence? The truth would seem to be, that the uniformity amid\nso great a diversity was either the result of a design which placed it\nout of the reach of all the modifying influences, or else it has, by a\nmost incalculable result, escaped from the effect of those influences\nby a chance in which the ratio of one to infinity can alone measure the\nprobability of such an escape.\n\nLet us now advert to another of Mr. Spencer's illustrations of the\nfutility of the \"supernatural\" and of the rationality of the \"natural\"\ninterpretation.[82] This illustration is derived from what are\ncalled \"homologous\" organs; and the particular instance selected is\nthe vertebral column.[83] There are creatures, such as snakes, a low\norder of the vertebrate kingdom, in which the bony axis is divided\ninto segments of about the same dimensions from end to end, for the\nobvious advantage of flexibility throughout the whole length of the\nanimal. But in most of the higher vertebrata, some parts of this axis\nare flexible and others are inflexible; and this is especially the case\nin that part of the vertebral column called the sacrum, which is the\nfulcrum that has to bear the greatest strain to which the skeleton is\nexposed, and which is yet made not of one long segment or vertebra,\nbut of several segments \"fused together.\" Mr. Spencer says: \"In man\nthere are five of these confluent sacral vertebr\u00e6; and in the ostrich\ntribe they number from seventeen to twenty. Why is this? Why, if the\nskeleton of each species was separately contrived, was this bony mass\nmade by soldering together a number of vertebr\u00e6 like those forming the\nrest of the column, instead of being made out of one single piece? And\nwhy, if typical uniformity was to be maintained, does the number of\nsacral vertebr\u00e6 vary within the same order of birds? Why, too, should\nthe development of the sacrum be the roundabout process of first\nforming its separate constituent vertebr\u00e6, and then destroying their\nseparativeness? In the embryo of a mammal or bird, the substance of the\nvertebral column is, at the outset, continuous. The segments that are\nto become vertebr\u00e6, arise gradually in the midst of this originally\nhomogeneous axis. Equally in those parts of the spine which are to\nremain flexible, and in those which are to grow rigid, these segments\nare formed, and that part of the spine which is to compose the sacrum,\nhaving passed out of its original unity into disunity by separating\nitself into segments, passes again into unity by the coalescence of\nthese segments. To what end is this construction and reconstruction?\nIf, originally, the spine in vertebrate animals consisted from head to\ntail of separate movable segments, as it does still in fishes and some\nreptiles--if, in the evolution of the higher vertebrata, certain of\nthese movable segments were rendered less movable with respect to each\nother, by the mechanical conditions to which they were exposed, and at\nlength became relatively immovable--it is comprehensible why the sacrum\nformed out of them should continue ever after to show more or less\nclearly its originally segmented structure. But on any other hypothesis\nthis segmented structure is inexplicable.\"\n\nWe here see the predominating force of a theory which refuses all\npossible rationality to any hypothesis but its own. The confident tone\nwith which facts are arrayed and are then pronounced inexplicable\nupon any other hypothesis than that which the writer asserts, without\none scintilla of proof of their tendency to exclude every other\nsupposition, renders the refutation of such reasoning a wearisome\ntask. But there is here one plain and sufficient answer to the whole\nof the supposed difficulty. The evolution theory, in this particular\napplication of it, is that originally there were vertebrate animals\nin which the spine consisted of separate movable segments from head\nto tail, as it does now in fishes and reptiles; but, as the higher\nvertebrata were evolved out of these lower forms, the movable segments\nwere rendered less movable with respect to each other, and at length\nin the sacrum the segments became relatively immovable, and yet the\noriginally segmented structure was retained in this part of the\ncolumn, by force of the propinquity of descent from an antecedent type\nwhich had the whole column divided into movable segments. Upon no other\nhypothesis, it is asserted, is this result explicable.\n\nMr. Spencer's analysis of the sacrum is somewhat defective. It is, as\nhe says, that part of the vertebrate column which in the higher class\nof vertebrate animals is, during f\u0153tal life, composed, like all the\nrest of the column, of distinct vertebr\u00e6. These vertebr\u00e6, like the\nothers, are flexible in the f\u0153tal stage, but after birth they become\ncoalesced or united into one piece, instead of remaining in separate\npieces. Thus far, Mr. Spencer's description is, I am informed by\nanatomists, correct. But the questions which he propounds as if they\nwere unanswerable upon the assumption that this change is inexplicable\nupon any other hypothesis than that of the evolution of the higher\nvertebrata out of the lower vertebrate animals, and that the sacrum,\nwith its continuous piece, has retained the segmented outward form by\nforce of the descent, demand closer consideration. Let us trace the\nprocess of formation in the human species, and then see what is the\njust conclusion to be derived from it. In the embryonic condition,\nthe substance which is to form the vertebral column is continuous.\nAs the f\u0153tus is developed, this substance separates itself into\nthe segments which are called vertebr\u00e6, and these segments remain\nflexible and movable throughout the column. After birth, the five\nlower segments become united in what is substantially one piece,\nbut of course the marks of the original segments remain. This is\nwhat occurs in the origin and growth of the individual. Now, looking\nback to the period when this species of animal did not exist, and\nsupposing it to have been specially created in the two related forms\nof male and female, endowed with the same process of procreation and\ngestation that has been going on ever since there is any recorded or\ntraditionary knowledge of the race, why should not this very growth\nof the sacrum have been designed, in order to produce, after the\nbirth of the individual, that relative rigidity which would in this\npart of the vertebral column be useful to an animal destined to an\nupright posture of the whole skeleton and to the habits and life of\na biped? And, if we extend the inquiry to other species, why should\nwe not expect to find, as in the case of an oviparous vertebrate like\nthe ostrich, a repetition of the same general plan of forming the\nspinal column, for the same ultimate purpose, with such a variation in\nthe number of original segments that are to constitute the sacrum as\nwould be most useful to that bird, thus establishing for the ostrich\na sacrum that in a reptile or a fish would not only not be required,\nbut would be a positive incumbrance? Upon the hypothesis of special\ncreations of the different species of vertebrate animals, every one\nof Mr. Spencer's questions, asked as if they were unanswerable, can\nreceive a satisfactory solution. Thus, he asks, \"Why, if the skeleton\nof each species was separately contrived, was this bony mass [the\nsacrum] made by soldering together a number of vertebr\u00e6 like those\nforming the rest of the column, instead of being made [aboriginally]\nin one single piece?\" The answer is, that in the establishment of\nthe process of gestation and f\u0153tal growth, if a human artificer and\ndesigner could have devised the process, he would have selected the\nvery one that now exists, for certain obvious reasons. First, he would\nhave designedly made the process to consist, in the embryo, of a\ndivision of the substance which was to form the vertebral column in a\ncontinuous and uniform division into segments, because the whole column\nis to have at first the flexibility that may be derived from such a\ndivision. Secondly, when the time was to arrive at which the formation\nof the sacrum, with its practical continuity of a single piece, was\nto commence, he would select the number of the lower vertebr\u00e6 that\nwould make a sacrum most useful to the particular species of animal,\nand would weld them together so as to give them the relative rigidity\nand action of a single piece. But as the whole formation is the result\nof a growth of the sacrum out of a part of the slowly forming column\noriginally divided into vertebr\u00e6, the marks of these separate vertebr\u00e6\nwould remain distinguishable, while they would cease to have the\nmechanical action of separate vertebr\u00e6.\n\nAnother of Mr. Spencer's questions is, \"Why, if typical uniformity was\nto be maintained, does the number of sacral vertebr\u00e6 vary within the\nsame order of birds?\" The answer is the same as that which assigns\na reason for all other variations in the skeleton of animals of the\nsame order but of different varieties, namely, the special utility\nof the variations in the number of sacral vertebr\u00e6 that would be\nmost useful in that variety. The typical uniformity maintained is a\nuniformity in the process of growth and formation, down to a point\nwhere the variations are to come in which mark one animal from another;\nand I have more than once had occasion to suggest that the typical\nuniformity, and its adaptation to the varying requirements of different\nbeings, is the highest kind of moral evidence of the existence, wisdom,\nand power of a supreme artificer, and that it militates so strongly\nagainst the doctrine of evolution that, without more proof than can\npossibly be claimed for that doctrine, we ought not to yield to it our\nbelief.\n\nThe theory that the original condition of all vertebrate animals was\nthat of separate movable segments throughout the spinal column, as it\nis now in fishes and some reptiles, and that in the evolution of the\nhigher vertebrates out of these lower forms, certain of these movable\nsegments were rendered less movable with respect to each other by\nthe mechanical conditions to which the successive generations were\nexposed, until at length the sacrum was formed, is undoubtedly a theory\nthat excludes all design of an infinite artificer, and all intention\nwhatever. It is a theory which relegates the most special contrivances\nand the most exact adaptations to the fortuitous operation of causes\nthat could not have produced the variations of structure and at the\nsame time have preserved the typical uniformity. It is certainly a\ntheory which we should not apply to the works of man, if we were\ninvestigating products which seemed to be the result of human ingenuity\nand skill, but of the origin of which we had no direct evidence. In\nsuch a case, we should not shut our eyes to the proofs of intentional\nvariations and adaptation, or, if we did, our speculations would not\nbe likely to command the assent of cultivated and sound reasoners. We\nmay treat the works of Nature by a system of logic that we should not\napply to the works of man, but if we do, we shall end in no tenable\nresults. The principal and in fact the only essential distinction to\nbe observed between the works of Nature and the works of man relates\nto the degree of power, intelligence, and skill in the actor. If we\nassume, as we must, that in the one case there was an actor, applying\nwill, intelligence, and power to the properties of matter, and molding\nit into certain products and uses, and that in the other case there\nwas no actor, but that all products and results are but the ungoverned\neffects of what are called natural laws in contradistinction to all\nintentional purposes, we must argue upon principles that are logically\nand diametrically inconsistent in themselves, and at variance with\nfundamental laws of reasoning.\n\nI will now advert to an omission in Mr. Spencer's analysis of the\nsacrum, which overlooks one of the strongest proofs of intentional\ndesign afforded by that part of the spinal column. We have seen what\nwas its general purpose and growth, and the process of its formation.\nWe have now to note its variations in the male and the female skeleton.\nIn the male, the sacrum, thus formed before birth, after birth answers\nto and performs its ultimate function of a comparatively rigid and\ninflexible piece of bone, and it is provided with no other special\ncharacteristic. In the female, on the contrary, there is a most\nremarkable adaptation of this piece to the function of maternity. While\nall the upper vertebr\u00e6 of which this piece was originally composed\nare welded together after birth in the female as in the male, in the\nfemale the lowest segment of all remains for a certain time flexible\nrelatively to the upper part of the sacrum, in order to admit of the\nnecessary expansion of the pelvis during the passage of the infant\nfrom the womb of the mother. In the normal condition of females of\nall the vertebrate orders, this flexibility of the lower part of the\nsacrum continues while the period of possible maternity continues. If\nin any individual female it happens to be wanting during the period\nof possible conception, delivery can not take place without danger\nto the mother or the offspring, or both. Hence, in very bad cases,\nnature has to be assisted by extraordinary means. But in the normal\ncondition of the female sacrum, this flexibility, so essential in the\nprocess of safe delivery, is always found, and its special purpose is\nknown to every anatomist, while it has no existence in the structure\nof the male. Is this distinction to be accounted for by the same\nkind of reasoning that undertakes to account for all the other great\ndistinctions between the related forms of male and female, which\nreproduce their kind by a common process of the sexual union, namely,\nthat this division of male and female came about by a habit that\nresulted now in the production of a male and now in the production\nof a female, from tendencies that were ungoverned by any special\npurpose? Must we not conclude, however inscrutable are the causes that\ndetermine the sex of a particular infant, that the sexes themselves\nwere specially ordained? And if they were specially ordained, how are\nwe to account for the special construction and function of each of\nthem, without the interposition of a special design? And when we find\na structure in the female obviously designed for a special purpose, and\nnot existing in the male, are we to conclude that some particular race\nof females, in some remote period of antiquity, among the countless\ngenerations of the vertebrata, found that this flexibility of the\nsacrum would be highly convenient to them, and, having adopted it\nas a habit, transmitted it, as a specially acquired peculiarity of\nstructure, to their female descendants? This is all very well as a\ntheoretical speculation, but as a speculation it is entirely defective,\nbecause it assigns the peculiarity of structure to a cause that could\nnot have produced it. On the other hand, the hypothesis of its special\ncreation assigns it to a cause that could have produced it, and its\nexistence is among the highest of the multitudinous evidences of\nintentional design and special formation.\n\nWherein consists the irrationality of the hypothesis that a plan of\nconstruction was intentionally, and with supreme skill, framed for\nvery different beings, to answer in each of them a common purpose? The\nasserted irrational character of this hypothesis consists in nothing\nbut a denial that there was a Creator. It comes down to this, if it\ncomes to anything: because, if we assume that there was a Supreme Being\nwho took any care whatever of the complex and manifold product that we\ncall nature--if we suppose that he ordained anything--we must suppose\nthat his power to construct was boundless, and that a repetition of\nhis plans wherever they would be useful, to answer the beneficent\nand diversified ends of infinite skill and benevolence, is just as\nmuch in accordance with the whole hypothesis of his attributes as it\nis to suppose that he caused anything whatever to exist. If we deny\nhis existence, if we can not satisfy ourselves of it at all, if we\nsuppose that nothing was ordained, nothing was created, but that all\nthese diversified forms of animal organisms grew out of a protoplasmic\nsubstance, and that there was never any absolute commencement of\norganic life on the globe, or any absolute commencement of anything\nwhatever, it is of course idle to speculate upon the adoption or\npreservation of patterns, as it is equally idle to pursue the theory of\nevolution through stages which at last end nowhere whatever.[84]\n\nIt may be well to cite Mr. Spencer's final summary of the general\ntruths which he claims to be revealed by morphology, because it will\nenable the reader to see just where the logical inconsequence of his\nposition occurs: \"The general truths of morphology thus coincide\nin their implications. Unity of type, maintained under extreme\ndissimilarities of form and mode of life, is explicable as resulting\nfrom descent with modification; but is otherwise inexplicable. The\nlikenesses disguised by unlikenesses, which the comparative anatomist\ndiscovers between various organs in the same organisms, are worse than\nmeaningless if it be supposed that organisms were severally formed as\nwe now see them; but they fit in quite harmoniously with the belief\nthat each kind of organism is a product of accumulated modifications\nupon modifications. And the presence, in all kinds of animals and\nplants, of functionally useless parts corresponding to parts that are\nfunctionally useful in allied animals and plants, while it is totally\nincongruous with the belief in a construction of each organism by\nmiraculous interposition, is just what we are led to expect by the\nbelief that organisms have arisen by progression.\"[85]\n\nWithout expending much criticism upon the phrase \"miraculous\ninterposition,\" as a description of what takes place in special\ncreation, it is sufficient to say that the act of special creation of a\ndistinct organism is to be first viewed by itself, as if it stood alone\nin nature, and that it is like any other act of causing a new thing\nto exist which did not exist before. To this idea should be added\nthe fact that in the creation of an animal organism there is involved\nthe direct formation of a peculiar type of animal, with a capacity\nof producing other individuals of the same type through a process of\ngeneration. When, after having attained this conception of the act of\nspecial creation, and contemplated a single instance of the supposed\nexercise of such a power, we extend our inquiries, we find many other\ninstances of the exercise of the same power; and then we observe a\ncertain unity of type in some peculiarity of structure, maintained\nunder extreme dissimilarities of form and mode of life. How, then,\nis this one similarity of pattern, amid such multiformity in other\nrespects, \"worse than meaningless,\" if we suppose that \"organisms were\nseverally framed as we now see them\"? The very hypothesis that they\nwere so severally framed carries in itself a meaning which can not be\nthus summarily ignored; because that hypothesis implies a power in the\nCreator to do just what we see. You may deny the power; but if you\nadmit the existence of the infinite creating power, you are remitted\nto the inquiry into its probable methods; and you can no more say that\nthe special creation of distinct organisms, with a certain unity amid\na great multiformity, leaves the whole phenomena without a meaning,\nthan you can say that any method which you can suggest is necessarily\nthe only method which will afford a rational meaning in what we see.\nYou must go the length of denying the entire postulate of a Creator,\nbefore you can be in a situation to deny the meaning that is involved\nin the idea of creation; for that idea implies an absolute power to\napply a uniform pattern of structure to a whole class of organisms\nvaried in all other respects. The theory that each kind of organism\nis a product of accumulated modifications upon modifications, without\nany special interposition to produce the modified and distinct forms,\nmust be maintained on one of two suppositions: either that at some\nperiod there was an absolute commencement of organic life in some form,\nupon this globe, and that then all the other forms which we see were\nleft to be evolved out of that one by the ungoverned accumulation of\nmodifications upon modifications, or else that there was never any\nabsolute commencement of organic life at any time, but that matter,\nby some peculiar property derived from some source that is not\nsuggested, took on combinations which resulted in some crude form of\nanimated organism, and that then the accumulations of modifications\nupon modifications followed from some process of generation by which\nthe successive organisms became multiplied and varied. Of the former\nsupposition, I understand Mr. Darwin to have been a representative\nnaturalist. Of the latter, I understand Mr. Spencer to be an advocate.\nUpon what may be called the Darwinian doctrine, the idea of a Creator,\ncausing to exist at some time some crude form of animal life, is\nadmitted. Upon the Spencerian doctrine, which will be in this respect\nmore closely examined hereafter, I do not see that the idea of a\ncreating power comes in anywhere, either at the commencement of a\nseries of organisms or at any point in that series. But, upon the\nlogical proposition asserted in the passage last above quoted, it is\nobvious that, unless the idea of a Creator is absolutely denied, the\npresence of a unity of type amid any amount of dissimilarities of form\nand mode of life can not be pronounced to be without meaning, because\nthe idea of a Creator implies a power to make that very unity amid the\nuniformity, which is asserted to be inexplicable without resorting\nto the theory that it was not made at all, but that it grew out of\nevents over which no superintending or governing power was exercised.\nUpon this kind of dogmatic assertion there can be no common ground of\nreasoning.\n\nThe assumed incongruity between the facts and the hypothesis of a\nspecial creation of each organism is an incongruity that arises out of\nthe assumption that such special creation was an impossibility. If once\nthe idea of an infinite creating faculty is assumed as the basis of the\nreasoning, all seeming incongruity vanishes, and the probable method\nof that creating power must be determined by the preponderance of\nevidence. If the power is denied, we must grope our way through systems\nwhich impute everything to the properties of substance, without any\nsuggestion of a source from which those properties were derived, and\nwithout anything to guide them but the tendencies implanted in them,\nwe know not how or when, and of the origin of which we have not even a\nsuggestion. Some of the speculations of Greek philosophers adverted to\nin a previous chapter may serve to show us what comes of the omission\nto conceive of power as abstracted from substance or its properties.\nThe philosophy which first attained to this conception led the way\nto that conception of an Infinite Being, without whose existence and\nattributes all speculation upon the phenomena of nature leads to\nnothing. A belief in his existence and attributes must undoubtedly be\nattained by an examination of his works, if we set aside the teachings\nof revealed religion. But if we can not attain it, we have no better\nmeans for believing in the doctrine of evolution than we have for\nbelieving in any other method by which the phenomena of nature have\nbecome what they are.\n\nThe question here is, not whether descent of organisms from organisms,\nwith modifications upon modifications, is a supposable theory, but\nwhether it is so satisfactorily shown that it can be said to exclude\nthe hypothesis of a special creation of each organism. There may be\nparts of structure in one animal which seem to have no functional use,\nalthough we should be cautious in making the assumption that they are\nof no use because we have not yet discovered that use. But let it be\nassumed that these apparently useless parts in one animal correspond to\nparts which in another animal are functionally useful. If there was\nestablished for these two separately created animals a like system of\nprocreation and gestation, that system, affected at the same time by a\nlaw of growth imposed by the special type of the species, might in one\nspecies lead to the presence of parts of which we can not recognize\nthe use, and might in other species lead to the presence of parts of\nwhich we can see the use. It does not help to a better explanation\nto say that there has been an accumulation of modifications upon\nmodifications in the course of an unknown descent of one organism from\nanother. Why did these modifications stop short of the production of\na species or of several species in which no resemblance of parts more\nor less functionally useful could be found? The supposition is that\nthe modifications have been going on through millions of years. Time\nenough, therefore, has elapsed for the destruction of all uniformity\nof structure; and the causes of modification are as immeasurable as\nthe period through which they are supposed to have been operating.\nThe imaginary ancestral stock, wherever it is placed in the line of\nremote descent, had, in its first distinctive existence, a peculiar\nstructure, which it bequeaths to its offspring. In the countless\ngenerations of its descendants, modifications of that structure take\nplace, until a new animal is evolved. What preserved any unity of\ntype from the modifying influences? It was not choice on the part of\nthe several descending species; not a conscious exertion to preserve\nsomething; it was nothing but the propinquity of descent, which by the\nlaw of heredity transmitted certain resemblances. But why was that\nlaw so potent that it could preserve a certain unity of type, and at\nthe same time so powerless as not to prevent the modifications which\nthe successive organisms have undergone in all other respects? Or, to\nreverse the terms of the question, why were the causes of modification\nsufficiently powerful to produce distinct species, and yet not\npowerful enough to eliminate the resemblances which we find obtaining\nthroughout the whole group of animals to which these several species\nbelong? It would seem that here we are not to lose sight of the fact\nthat, in the animal kingdom, procreation never takes place between\na male and a female of distinct species, and that we have no reason\nto believe that it ever did take place. Now, although the evolution\nhypothesis supposes that, starting from an ancestral stock, the\nmodifications of structure have been produced in offspring descended\nfrom parents of that same stock, which have transmitted acquired\npeculiarities to their immediate progeny, and so on indefinitely, yet\nthere must have been a time when the diverging species became distinct\nand peculiar organisms, and when it became impossible for any crossing\nof these organisms to take place. All the supposed modifications,\ntherefore, have taken place within the limits of an actual descent of\none kind of animal from another, each successive pair belonging to the\nspecies from which they were individually generated. In this descent\nof lives from lives, there came about changes which in progress of\ntime led to two animals as wide asunder as the man and the ostrich,\nor as the man and the horse, and yet the causes which were powerful\nenough to produce these widely diverging species were not powerful\nenough to break up all unity of plan in some one or more respects. If\nnaturalists of the evolution school would explain how there has come to\nbe, for example, in the skeleton of the _vertebrata_, a bony structure\ncalled the spine, in which a certain resemblance and a certain function\nobtain throughout the whole class, and yet one species creeps upon its\nbelly, another walks on four legs, and another on two, and one flies\nin the air and another never can do so, and how this could be without\nany design or special interposition of a creating power, but that the\nwhole of this uniformity amid such diversity has arisen from acquired\nhabits among the different descendants from an aboriginal stock that\nhad no such habits in either mode of locomotion, and no organs for such\nmodes of life, they would at least be able to commend their theory to\na better appreciation of its claims than is now possible to those who\nwant \"grounds more relative\" than a naked hypothesis.\n\n3. The argument from embryology requires for its appreciation a\ncareful statement of its abstract proposition, and a statement of\nit in a concrete form. As an abstract proposition, embryology, or\nthe comparison of the development of different organisms under their\nembryonic stages, shows that in the earliest stage of any organism\nit has the greatest number of characters in common with all other\norganisms in their earliest stage; that at a later stage its structure\nis like the structures displayed at corresponding phases by a less\nextensive number of organisms; that at each subsequent stage the\ndeveloping embryo becomes more and more distinguished from the groups\nof embryos that it previously resembled; and that this divergence goes\non, until we reach the species of which the embryo is a member, in\nwhich the class of similar forms is finally narrowed to that species.\n\nIt seems that Von Baer formulated this generalization of embryologic\ndevelopment into an \"embryologic law,\" which, according to Mr.\nSpencer, becomes a support to the hypothesis of evolution in this way:\nSpecies that had a common ancestry will exhibit a parallelism in the\nembryonic development of their individual members. As the embryos of\nthe ancestral stock were developed in their growth, so the embryos of\nthe descended species would be developed at corresponding phases in a\nsimilar way. As one species diverged from its ancestral stock, there\nwould come about modifications in the development of its embryos, and\nthus a later ancestral stock would be formed, which would in turn\ntransmit to its descendants in the development of the embryo less and\nless resemblances, and so on, until finally the individual animal, at\nbirth, would structurally resemble only the individual infants of its\nown race.\n\nHere, then, is another remarkable instance of the force of an adopted\ntheory. First, we have a comparison of the embryonic development of\ndifferent animals from their seminal germs which displays certain\nphenomena of resemblances and departures. Next, we have the assumption\nof an ancestral stock, the common origin of all the organisms in the\ndevelopment of whose embryos among its descendants an embryologic law\nwas to work, starting from the visible resemblance of all the germs,\nthen exhibiting structural changes into later ancestral stocks, and so\non, until the resemblances are reduced to those which obtain only among\nindividuals of the same species. So that, without the hypothesis, the\nassumption of an ancestral stock of all the organisms, formed somehow\nin the course of descent from a germ that gave rise to an animal of\nsome kind, we have nothing to which to apply the embryologic law. We\nare to infer the embryologic law from the parallelism of embryonic\ndevelopment which prevails in the whole series of animal generation, or\nfrom its divergences, or from both, and then we draw from _this law_\nthe inference that the whole series of animals came from some common\nstock. The difficulty with this whole theory is, as I have more than\nonce suggested, that we have no means, aside from the theory itself, of\nconnecting lives with lives, in the generation of one distinct species\nout of another. Without some proof of the fact that the human f\u0153tus was\na diverging growth out of some ancestral stock that was the same as\nthat from which the f\u0153tus of another animal was a different diverging\ngrowth, the embryologic law is no help to us whatever. If this kinship\nof the human f\u0153tus with the f\u0153tus of some other animal can not be\nfound, by tracing the intermediate links which carry them respectively\nback to their common ancestor, between what animals in respect to\ntheir embryonic development can such kinship be found, excepting upon\nthe theoretical assumption of a common origin of the whole vertebral\nclass? If there was such a common ancestral stock, where is it to\nbe placed, what was its character, when did the law of embryologic\ndevelopment begin to operate upon its descendants? Until some facts\ncan be adduced which will have a satisfactory tendency to show the\nkinship of one animal with another by reason of ancestral descent from\na common ancestral stock that was unlike either of them, the phenomena\nof embryologic development have no tendency to displace the hypothesis\nof special creations; for, on the latter hypothesis, the phenomena of\nresemblances and differences in the growth from the germ into the f\u0153tus\nand from the f\u0153tus into the newly born infant, evinced by any range of\ncomparison of the different species, would be the same. If man was a\nspecial creation, and one of the higher quadrumana was also a distinct\nand separate creation, the establishment for each of a like process of\nprocreation and gestation would produce all the resemblances of f\u0153tal\ngrowth that obtain between them, and the ordained differences of their\nanimal destinies would explain all the divergences. Let us see if this\nis not a rational conclusion.\n\nIt is exceedingly difficult for the common reader of such a work\nas that of Mr. Spencer, on which I am now commenting, to avoid the\ninfluence of the perpetual assertion that facts are explicable upon\none hypothesis alone. At each step in the argument, the array of facts\nterminates with the assertion that, upon the hypothesis of design, the\nfacts are inexplicable; and yet we are furnished with no reasoning\nthat has a tendency to show that the facts necessarily exclude\nthe hypothesis of design, or, in other words, that the facts are\ninconsistent with that hypothesis. It is essential to understand what\nis the true scope of the hypothesis of special creation; for, without\na definite idea of what that term implies, we have no proper means of\ncomparing the facts of animal resemblances or differences with the\nrationality of the hypothesis that they resulted from an intentional\ndesign. Recollecting, then, that we are now pursuing the resemblances\nand divergences that are found in a comparison of the embryologic\ndevelopment of different species of animals, let us endeavor to\nunderstand the meaning of what I have suggested at the close of the\nlast preceding paragraph; namely, the establishment for a large class\nof animals of a like general system of procreation and gestation, and\nthe ordination of different destinies for the different species of\nanimals belonging to that class. I have said that the two branches of\nthis hypothesis would account for the resemblances in the embryological\ngrowth of different animals, and would explain the divergences which\nobtain among their embryological developments. The first inquiry is,\nwhether this hypothesis presents a true philosophic idea of special\ncreation. The next inquiry is, whether it affords a satisfactory\nexplanation of the phenomena of comparative embryologic development.\n\nWe must never lose sight of the one grand postulate of an infinite\nCreator. This postulate must be conceded to the believers in special\ncreations, because any idea of creation implies a creating power. If\nwe conceive of creation without a Creator, we must stop all argument.\nNow, the hypothesis of creation, as I have more than once said,\nimplies a being of boundless faculties. There can be absolutely no\nlimitation to the power of such a being, either in respect to the\nmethods by which he will accomplish his objects, or to the number and\nvariety of these objects, or to the purposes for which they are to\nexist. If we narrow our conception of creating power to anything less\nthan an infinite faculty; if we suppose it to be restricted in any\ndirection; if we argue about it as if there were things that it can not\ndo, we shall be without the means of reasoning soundly upon anything\nthat it is supposed to have done. It is quite otherwise when we are\nreasoning about the operation and effect of secondary causes. There\nis no secondary cause--no imaginable operation of a fixed quality of\nsubstance--no action of any of the properties of substance--that is not\nlimited. The scope of its action may be very wide; within its sphere it\nmay be enormously potent; but in its very nature it is bounded.[86] It\nis not so with the First Cause of all things; not so with the Infinite\nPower which, upon the hypothesis of a First Cause, has established all\nthe physical laws of the universe and all the properties of matter.\nSo that, when we reason about the methods of that infinite creating\npower, if we find a general system established, or a pattern repeated\nthrough a very large class of organisms, the proper inference is, not\nthat the power was limited, but that it has been exercised to the whole\nextent of what was useful, and in that direction has been exercised\nno further; and if we find variations or additional structures\nincorporated with the repetition of a general pattern, the proper\ninference is that the unlimited creating power has put forth all the\nadditional exertion and skill needful for the formation of new beings.\n\nWhat, then, does the establishment of a like system of procreation\nand gestation imply, upon the supposition of the distinct creation of\nspecies? It implies a certain parallel embryonic development, from\nthe germ to the f\u0153tus and from the f\u0153tus to the new-born infant,\nthroughout a large group of different animals; and this parallelism\nwould in certain stages of the embryonic growth display identity\nor close similarity of form and structure. But as in each species\nof animal the distinct creation would necessarily imply a distinct\ndestiny, the parallelism of embryonic form and structure would cease\nat the point of development at which the characteristic structure\nof the species would begin to unfold itself. The general system of\nprocreation and gestation common to a whole class of different animals,\nand the ordained diversity of species, would present the same phenomena\nof resemblances and differences in the embryonic development that\nare supposed to be explicable only by the hypothesis of a descent of\nall the species from a common ancestral stock through the process of\nevolution.\n\nNotwithstanding the mystery and obscurity in which the process of\nanimal procreation is involved--a mystery and obscurity which will\nperhaps never be fully solved--we can see enough to warrant some\ndefinite conclusions. One of these conclusions is that, in the\nformation of the germ which becomes developed into the f\u0153tus, the male\nand female parent each contributes some cellular substance to the\ncompound which constitutes that germ. We may safely infer this, because\nthe individual animal becomes a union of characteristics belonging\nto both the parents, although the traits that are peculiar to one of\nthe parents may be more or less marked in their different offspring,\nso that in one of the descendants the paternal and in another the\nmaternal traits will predominate. But in every descendant from the\nsame pair there is more or less of the peculiarities of each parent\nplainly discernible. The inference, therefore, may be safely drawn\nthat the male and the female parent each contributes to the formation\nof the ante-f\u0153tal germ some cellular substance, in which resides the\ntypical characteristic of animal organism which each parent possesses.\nThe compound germ that is thus formed is endowed with the mysterious\nprinciple of animal life which admits of growth and development; and\nwhether after its formation the female parent bestows most or bestows\nleast upon the product, that product consists of a union of cellular\nsubstances contributed by both the male and the female parent in\nthe sexual act of procreation. This compound resultant germ, in the\nearliest stage of its formation, like the separate cells of which it is\na union, exhibits no visible difference when we compare the ante-f\u0153tal\ngerm of one animal with that of a different animal. Perhaps we shall\nnever be able to detect either chemical or mechanical differences\nin the cellular substances or in the earliest stage of the compound\nproduct which has resulted from their union. But in that compound\nproduct there resides a contributory cellular substance derived from\neach of the parents; and it is a just inference from this fact, and\nfrom what we learn when we trace the further development, that there\nis a peculiar and typical structure impressed upon and inwrapped in\nthis compound germ, which is to grow into a f\u0153tal development by a\nlaw of its own. There will at the same time be a particular law of\ndevelopment for each distinct species of animal, and a general law of\ndevelopment for a great variety of species among whom there obtains a\ncommon process of the sexual union and of the contribution of male and\nfemale cellular substance. When the f\u0153tus becomes formed, there will\nstill be marked resemblances in the different species, before the stage\nis reached at which the characteristic structure of each species is to\nbegin to unfold itself. But at some time the fundamental difference of\nstructure originally lodged in the cellular substances of which the\ncompound ante-f\u0153tal germ was composed, and impressed upon that germ as\nthe type which was gradually to unfold itself into a distinct being,\nwill begin to exert its force. The resemblances of structure will\nbecome less and less, as the f\u0153tus of the different animals approaches\nto the time of birth. Organs, or appearances of organs, which at one\nstage of the comparison have seemed to indicate descent from a common\nancestral stock, but which may have been only the result of a common\nprocess of f\u0153tal development, will be found to be varied by force of\nthe original diversity of structure and destiny that was made to reside\nin the seminal substance of each distinct species of animal; and, at\nlength, this original and intentional peculiarity of structure and\nbeing would become perfected at or before the period when birth is to\ntake place, leaving only those resemblances which must obtain in all\norganisms constructed in certain respects upon a uniform plan, and\nbrought into being by a common process of procreation and gestation.\n\nLet us now see whether this reasoning involves any such unphilosophical\nor unscientific belief as is supposed. Passing by the often-repeated\nassertion that the facts of comparative embryologic development are\nreconcilable only with the belief in evolution, let us advert to some\nof those facts. \"The substitutions,\" says Mr. Spencer, \"of organs and\nthe suppression of organs, are among those secondary embryological\nphenomena which harmonize with the belief in evolution, but can not\nbe reconciled with any other belief. There are cases where, during\nits earlier stages of development, an embryo possesses organs that\nafterward dwindle away, as there arise other organs to discharge the\nsame functions. And there are cases where organs make their appearance,\ngrow to certain points, have no functions to discharge, and disappear\nby absorption.\" The concrete illustration of this substitution and\nsuppression of organs is thus given by Mr. Spencer:\n\n\"We have a remarkable instance of this substitution in the successive\ntemporary appliances for a\u00ebrating the blood which the mammalian embryo\nexhibits. During the first phase of its development, the mammalian\nembryo circulates its blood through a system of vessels distributed\nover what is called the _area vasculosa_, a system of vessels\nhomologous with one which, among fishes, serves for a\u00ebrating the blood\nuntil the permanent respiratory organs come into play. After a time,\nthere buds out from the mammalian embryo a vascular membrane called the\nallantois, homologous with one which, in birds and reptiles, replaces\nthe first as a breathing apparatus. But while, in the higher oviparous\nvertebrates, the allantois serves the purpose of a lung during the\nrest of embryonic life, it does not do so in the mammalian embryo. In\nimplacental mammals it aborts, having no function to discharge; and in\nthe higher mammals it becomes \"placentiferous, and serves as the means\nof intercommunication between the parent and the offspring\"--becomes\nan organ of nutrition more than of respiration. Now, since the first\nsystem of external blood-vessels, not being in contact with a directly\noxygenated medium, can not be very serviceable to the mammalian embryo\nas a lung; and since the second system of external blood-vessels is, to\nthe implacental embryo, of no greater avail than the first; and since\nthe communication between the embryo and the placenta among placental\nmammals might as well or better have been made directly, instead\nof by metamorphosis of the allantois--these substitutions appear\nunaccountable as results of design. But they are quite congruous with\nthe supposition that the mammalian type arose out of lower vertebrate\ntypes. For, in such case, the mammalian embryo, passing through states\nrepresenting, more or less distinctly, those which its remote ancestors\nhad, in common with the lower _vertebrata_, develops these subsidiary\norgans in like ways with the lower vertebrata.\"[87]\n\nIn what way, then, are these substitutions unaccountable as results\nof design, and why are they any more congruous with the supposition\nthat the mammalian type arose out of the lower vertebrate type? In the\nfirst place, it is necessary to have a distinct conception of what\nis meant by design. In the present case, it means that for a certain\nlarge group of animals there was established a system of reproduction\nby the sexual union of male and female, each contributing a cellular\nsubstance peculiar to itself, in the formation of a compound cellular\nsubstance in which the separate substances are united, and which is\nto be developed into the f\u0153tus by a law of growth; and as a further\ndesign there is wrapped up in the compound germ of each distinct\nspecies of animal a typical plan of ultimate form and structure.\nThis typical plan can not be detected in the germ itself, as it is\ntoo subtile and obscure even for the microscope; but we have every\nreason to believe that it is there in all its distinctness of original\npurpose, because at a later stage of the embryonic development we\nfind a distinct species of animal is the result. This is a conclusion\nthat must be adopted by the evolutionist, as well as by the believer\nin special creations, because it has nothing to do with the question\nof how distinct species came to exist. Whether they were designedly\nand separately created, or were evolved out of one another, the\nreproductive process by which the individuals of the same species\nare brought into being alike involves the conclusion that, in the\nante-f\u0153tal germ of that species, there is somehow involved, in a form\nso minute that it can not be seen, the type of animal which is to\nbelong to that species, and to no other. Here, then, we have the grand\nand compound design which is to obtain throughout a whole group of\ndifferent animals; namely, that they shall multiply in the production\nof individuals of their own types, by a sexual union, in which the\nmale and the female each contributes a cellular substance of its own\nto the formation of a compound germ, and in that germ there is made\nto reside the typical form and structure of a distinct organism, so\nminute that we can not see it, but which we must conclude from the\nresult has been put there to be developed by a law of growth ordained\nfor the accomplishment of a certain distinct order of beings. But\nthe very obscurity of this type, in the earliest stage of embryonic\ndevelopment, leads to the conclusion that while it will never be lost,\nso long as its life is preserved, it will unfold itself in ways that\nwill be equally beyond our ken, until the point is reached where it is\nno longer obscured, but where it is revealed in all its distinctness\nof outline and its peculiarity of structure. What is certain and\ninvariable is, that the type peculiar to the species is at some time\nin the growth of the individual animal perfectly developed. But in the\nmodes of its development through different embryonic stages, there will\nbe variations and substitutions of organs in the different species,\nbut in each distinct species these variations and substitutions will\nbe uniformly the same, because the law of development imposed by\nthe distinct type, while it may operate differently among different\nspecies, will always operate in the same way in the same species.\nThus in one animal the development from the original type which was\nimplanted in its seminal ante-f\u0153tal germ may at one stage exhibit an\norgan for which at a later stage another organ will be substituted; and\nin another animal a seemingly corresponding organ may serve a different\npurpose, or may altogether abort. These embryologic phenomena, varying\nin different species, but occurring uniformly in the same species,\nare necessarily among the most obscure of all the phenomena of animal\nlife, on account of the fact that they take place where we can not\nwatch the changes or modifications as they are taking place during\nactual f\u0153tal life. But they are no more explicable upon the hypothesis\nof the descent of distinct animals from a common stock, than they are\nupon the hypothesis of distinct creations of species. Upon the former\nhypothesis, the assumed propinquity of descent implies the preservation\nof the same mode of embryonic development until it becomes varied by\nthe operation of causes that bring about a new habit of development,\nand then a fixation in this new habit after a new species or a new\nancestral stock is formed; so that in each distinct species there comes\nat length to be a uniform process of substituting and suppressing\norgans, or changing the functions of organs. But how are we to account\nfor the operation of causes that have preserved a parallelism of\ndevelopment, along with the operation of causes that have produced the\ndifferent modes of development, when all the species are supposed to be\nderived from a common ancestral stock, which first began to procreate\nand to develop its descendants in one and the same way? What are the\nfacts which will enable us to say that the mammalian type arose out\nof the lower vertebrate types, when we compare the different modes\nof their embryologic development? How are we to estimate the chances\nfor a preservation of so much resemblance as exists between the two\nin their embryologic lives, and the chances for the variations that\nare observable? What we can safely conclude is that there is a law\nwhich holds each species in a constant repetition of its own f\u0153tal\ngrowth, according to its unvarying development in the same series of\nchanges, substitutions, or suppressions. But we can not safely conclude\nthat this species became formed in the supposed process of descent\nfrom a remote ancestral stock, which may or may not have originally\nexhibited the same series of changes, substitutions, or suppressions.\nIf the ancestors of the mammalian vertebrates were the kind of animal\nsupposed, we have to find, in order to justify the supposed descent,\nthose states which represent the correspondence between the mode in\nwhich the ancestral stock developed its own embryos, when compared\nwith the mode in which the type of the lower vertebrata developed its\nembryos, so as to make it reasonably certain that these subsidiary\norgans derived their several substitutions or suppressions from the\nprocess of descent, and not from any special mode of development\nordained for each distinct species. We may imagine these states through\nwhich the mammalian embryo has passed, but as yet we have only a theory\nwhich suggests their existence without facts to support it. The truth\nwould seem to be that this whole subject of comparative embryology,\nupon the hypothesis of the kinship of all organized beings, or the\ndescent of many distinct species from a common stock, is involved in\nvery great difficulties; not the least of which is the difficulty of\nexplaining how the diverging descendants from that stock came to be\nendowed with habits of embryologic life and growth that resulted in the\nproduction of very different modes of development, and at the same time\npreserved for each new species its own peculiar mode of development.\nTo say, for example, that the mammalian embryo passed through states\nrepresenting, more or less distinctly, those which its remote ancestors\nhad in common with the lower vertebrata, and that it developed certain\nsubsidiary organs in like ways with the lower vertebrata, is merely to\nstate a theory, which, without some evidence that the mammalian embryo\nwas a formation resulting from a connection of lives with lives back\nto a common ancestor whose embryo was developed as those of the lower\nvertebrata are, amounts to nothing. Often as this want of evidence has\nbeen adverted to, it must be here again pointed out: for the whole\nargument from embryology, like that derived from a comparison of the\nforms of mature animals, lacks the support of facts that are essential\nto show the connection of life with life which descent from a common\nancestral stock necessarily implies.\n\nOn the other hand, the hypothesis of the distinct creation of\ndifferent species deals with the phenomena of embryologic life in\na very different way. It supposes the creation of a pair, male and\nfemale, and a law of procreation, designed for the multiplication of\nindividuals of a fixed type. It supposes many such creations, each\nhaving in its own peculiar germ the characteristic type of organism\nthat will distinguish the mature animal from all the others. It\nsupposes finally a law of development common to all the species the\nindividuals of which are multiplied by the sexual union of male\nand female; a law of growth under like conditions, which leads to\na parallelism of development until the typical plan of form and\nstructure designed for each distinct animal, and implanted in its germ,\nbegins to take on a mode of development peculiar to that species,\nand at length the perfect individual of that species is the result.\nIn this hypothesis, therefore, there is no necessity for resorting\nto any connection with an imaginary ancestral stock of a different\ntype, or for resorting to a theoretical process by which successive\ngenerations may be supposed to have gradually arisen out of the\nancestral stock by successive changes which have at length resulted\nin a totally new species. The new species is what is supposed to have\nbeen aboriginally created, and to have been placed under its own law\nfor the multiplication of individuals of the same type. In point of\nsimplicity, of comparative certainty, of freedom from accidental\ncauses of variation of which we can predicate no specific result, this\nhypothesis seems to have a far greater degree of probable evidence in\nits favor than the theory which entirely lacks the requisite evidence\nof intermediate connections between the lives of one species with the\nlives of a remote and different species. For, while it may be truly\nsaid that no man ever saw a special creation take place, and while such\nan act of the infinite power is of a nature that places it beyond the\nobservation of our senses, it is neither inconceivable nor improbable,\nnor inconsistent with the idea of the divine attributes which we\nderive from the study of nature. On the other hand, it is not only\nequally true that no man ever saw, or in the nature of things ever can\nsee, an evolution of distinct species out of other distinct species,\nbut the whole nature of the supposed process of transformation involves\nan element of chance which forbids all calculation of the results.\nHow, for example, in this very matter of comparative embryological\ndevelopment on the hypothesis of descent of all the species of the\nvertebrate animals from a common ancestral stock of a different type,\nare we to account for the fact that the embryo of any one of the\ndescended species has come to be developed in a mode peculiar to itself\nand differing from the mode in which the embryo of the ancestral stock\nwas developed? The law of sexual union, under which the individuals\nof the supposed ancestral stock were multiplied, must have imposed on\nthat species an invincible necessity of reproducing in its offspring\nthe same type that constituted the peculiar organism of the parents,\nwhether these parents were or were not the fittest survivors of their\nrace after the severest struggle for existence which they may have had\nto undergo. If the pair, or the male of that pair, has in the course\nof that struggle acquired a new organ, or more completely developed\nan old one, before the act of procreation takes place, how is it that\nthe ovum is developed into the f\u0153tus, and the f\u0153tus into the newly\nborn infant, in an invariable mode peculiar to the species to which\nthe parents belonged? Why did not the same causes of variation which\nare supposed to have changed the ancestral type into one of a new and\nentirely distinct character, also vary the mode of f\u0153tal development?\nWhen and how did the new organs become fixed in the type which the\nparents have transmitted to the offspring? And if they became so\nfixed in the germ which was formed out of the cellular substance\ncontributed by each of the parents, why do we find in every known\nspecies participating in this process of reproduction a uniform mode\nof embryologic development peculiar to the species, and exhibiting its\nown suppressions and substitutions of organs, irrespective of any newly\nacquired peculiarities in the individual structures of the parents?\n\nThe believer in special creations has to answer no such questions as\nthese. His hypothesis assumes the creation of a pair of animals of a\ncertain distinct species; a law of procreation and gestation common\nto a vast multitude of organisms; and a law of embryologic growth\npeculiar to each species. Whatever peculiarities of structure may have\nbeen possessed by the immediate parents of any individual of any one\nof these different species--peculiarities which did not separate the\nparents from their race, but only made them the fittest survivors of\ntheir race--those peculiarities would or would not descend to their\nimmediate offspring, according to varying and very inappreciable\ncircumstances. But that which constituted the special type of the\nrace, and especially that which constituted its peculiar mode of\ndevelopment during the embryonic stage, would remain unaffected by\nthese incidental and accidental peculiarities of the parents, because,\nfrom all that we can discover, that special type was impressed upon\nthe embryo at the earliest stage of its existence, and constituted\nthe living model that was to be developed into the perfect animal of\nthat species, by a law which placed it beyond the influence of any\nadventitious and non-essential advantages which the male or female\nparent may have acquired over other individuals of the same race. So\nthat, if the postulate of a special creation of species be assumed\nas the groundwork of the reasoning, we have to go through with no\nspeculations about a common ancestral stock of all the species, and\nwe have to account for no phenomena that are exposed to chances which\nmight have produced very different results from those which are open to\nour observation, and results of which we can predicate nothing with\nany degree of certainty. On the hypothesis of the special creation of\na species, and an aboriginal pair of each species, with all that this\nimplies, we can with a high degree of certainty predicate most of the\nphenomena that we have to observe, and more especially so much of the\nphenomena of embryologic growth of the different species as are open to\nour investigation after the life of both mother and embryo has become\nextinct.\n\nIt only remains for me to give to this reasoning a concrete\napplication. Take the case made use of by Mr. Spencer in the passage\nabove cited--that of the \"allantois,\" a vascular membrane, which is\nsaid to be in the mammalian embryo homologous with one which in the\nhigher oviparous vertebrates, such as the birds and reptiles, replaces\nwhat was at first a breathing apparatus, and becomes for them, during\nthe rest of embryonic life, a sort of lung, or an organ that a\u00ebrates\nthe blood until the permanent respiratory organs come into play. In\nthe mammalian embryo, the first appliance for a\u00ebrating the blood is\ndescribed as a system of vessels distributed over the _area vasculosa_,\nand like that which is first observable for the same purpose in\nfishes. But, as the mammalian embryo continues to grow, a change\ntakes place. There buds out from it the vascular membrane called the\n\"allantois,\" which is substituted in the place of the first a\u00ebrating\napparatus. Then a further change takes place, as between the higher\noviparous vertebrates and the mammalian vertebrates. In the former, the\n\"allantois\" continues to perform the breathing function through the\nrest of the embryonic life. In the mammalian vertebrates it undergoes\ntwo changes: In the implacental mammals, it aborts, having no function\nto discharge; in the placental mammals it becomes modified into another\norgan, namely, that which serves to convey nutrition from the mother to\nthe offspring. After birth, it is of course ended.\n\nNow, the reasoning, or rather the assertion, that these substitutions\nare unaccountable as the results of design, appears to me to be\nsingularly inconclusive. It is quite illogical, according to all\nphilosophic meaning of design as applied to the works of the Creator,\nor to the works of nature, if that term is preferred, to argue that\na particular object could have been better accomplished directly,\nthan by a metamorphosis of an organ from one function to another, or\nby substitution. The metamorphosis, or substitution, which in such\ncases we find in nature, is of itself the very highest evidence that\nthe indirect method was the best, if we admit the idea of a Creator,\nbecause it was the method chosen by a being of infinite perfections\nfor reasons which we may not be able to discover, but which we must\npresume to have existed, if we concede that hypothesis of attributes\nwhich \"design\" in this case necessarily implies. But how are these\nmetamorphoses and substitutions any more accountable upon the\nsupposition that the mammalian type arose by generation out of the\nlower vertebrate types which in their embryonic life exhibited the same\nchanges? The doctrine or theory of evolution does not account for them\nat all; for, while the doctrine supposes, as matters of pure theory,\nthat there were certain states through which the mammalian embryo\npassed, which represented more or less distinctly those which it had in\ncommon with its assumed remote ancestors, the lower vertebrata, it does\nnothing more than to suggest the theoretical idea that the mammalian\nembryo came to develop these subsidiary organs in the mode in which\nthey were developed in the embryo of the lower vertebrata, because it\nwas descended from the lower vertebrata. The varying states through\nwhich the embryo passed from the lower vertebrata to the mammalian\ntype, are all hypothetical, and there is, therefore, no basis of\nfact on which to rest the belief in a common mode of development, as\nresulting from a connection of lives with lives between the mammalian\ntype and the types of birds, reptiles, or fishes.\n\nOn the other hand, the hypothesis of the special creation of a species\nimplies the simple fact of a designed process of embryonic development\nfor each species, with substitutions of organs and changes of function\nin certain organs peculiar to that species; a fact which may well\nconsist in a certain parallelism in the different metamorphoses, and\na preservation of the same unvarying changes in the development of\neach separate embryo. Why these changes should exist, we can not tell;\nbut their existence is very strong proof that they were designed, or\nmade to take place, for some reason, if we admit the hypothesis of a\nCreator. For that hypothesis, we must look to a wider class of facts,\nand to the whole phenomena of nature.\n\n4. We now come to the argument from distribution. This is one of the\nweakest of the indirect supports of the doctrine of evolution; but,\nas it is much relied upon, it must be stated with all the force that\nit is supposed to have. The facts that are relied upon are these:\nWhen we survey the whole surface of the globe, so far as it is known\nto us, we find, in the first place, that the areas which have similar\nconditions (of soil and climate), and sometimes, where the areas are\nnearly adjacent, are occupied by quite different faunas. On the other\nhand, it is said that areas remote from each other in latitude, and\ncontrasted in soil and climate, are occupied by closely allied faunas.\nThe inference drawn is, that there is no manifest predetermined\nadaptation of the organisms to the areas, or habitats, in which they\nare found, because we do not find that like organisms are universally\nor generally found in like habitats, nor very unlike organisms in very\nunlike habitats. The conclusion is, that the facts of distribution\nin space do not conform to the hypothesis of design. In other words,\nthe different animals found in different regions were not specially\ndesigned for those regions, but some of them have extended into regions\nof a different character; and when the regions are very unlike there\nare not found very unlike organisms, but there is a general similarity,\nor a less extensive variety. There is said, also, to be another\nimportant fact, namely, that \"the similar areas peopled by dissimilar\nforms are those between which there are impassable barriers; while the\ndissimilar areas peopled by similar forms, are those between which\nthere are no such barriers.\" Hence is drawn the conclusion that \"each\nspecies of organism tends ever to expand its sphere of existence--to\nintrude on other areas, other modes of life, other media.\"[88] A good\ndeal of aid is supposed to be derived for this argument respecting\nanimal life by analogies drawn from the vegetable kingdom; but I\ncan not help thinking that there is much caution to be observed in\nformulating such analogies into a law of universal application, or into\none that relates to the existence of animal organisms. The origin,\nthe multiplication, and the spread of animals involve a principle of\nlife, organization and development which is very different in some\nimportant respects from that which obtains in the vegetable world.\nBut, without laying any stress upon this distinction, and without\nintending to deprive the argument for animal evolution of any aid which\nit can derive from such supposed analogies, I pass to the specific\nargument respecting animal distribution. The argument is this: Races\nof organisms become distributed over different areas, and also through\ndifferent media. They are thrust by the pressure of overpopulation from\ntheir old into new habitats, and as they diverge more widely in space\nthey undergo more and more modifications of structure, by reason of the\nnew conditions on which they enter. Thus, these powerfully incident\nforces, the new conditions on which the migrating races enter in new\nregions, vary the structure which they originally brought with them,\nand which descended to them from the common stock of which they were\nmodified descendants. The widest divergences in space, under such\ncircumstances, will indicate the longest periods of time during which\nthese various descendants from a common stock have been subject to\nmodifying conditions. There will, therefore, come to be, it is said,\namong organisms of the same group, smaller contrasts of structure in\nthe smaller areas; and, where the varying incident forces vary greatly\nwithin given areas, the alterations will become more numerous than in\nequal areas which are less variously conditioned: that is to say, in\nthe most uniform regions there will be the fewest species, and in the\nmost multiform regions there will be the most numerous species. These\nhypotheses are said to be in accordance with the facts of distribution\nin space.[89]\n\nBut there are also facts of distribution through different media. The\nmeaning of this is, that, whereas all forms of organisms have descended\nfrom some primordial simplest form, which inhabited some one medium,\nsuch as the water, its descendants, by migration into some other\nmedium or other media, underwent adaptations to media quite unlike\nthe original medium. In other words, the earth and the air have been\ncolonized from the water. Numerous facts are adduced in support of this\nconclusion, which are thus summarized:\n\n There are particular habitats in which animals are subject to changes\n of media. In such habitats exist animals having, in various degrees,\n the power to live in both media, consequent on various phases of\n transitional organization. Near akin to these animals, there are some\n that, after passing their early lives in the water, acquire more\n completely the structures fitting them to live on land, to which\n they then migrate. Lastly, we have closely-allied creatures like\n the Surinam toad and the terrestrial salamander, which, though they\n belong by their structures to the class Amphibia, are not amphibious\n in their habits--creatures the larv\u00e6 of which do not pass their early\n lives in the water, and yet go through these same metamorphoses!\n Must we, then, think that the distribution of kindred organisms\n through different media presents an insurmountable difficulty? On the\n contrary, with facts like these before us, the evolution-hypothesis\n supplies possible interpretations of many phenomena that are else\n unaccountable. Realizing the way in which such changes of media are\n in some cases gradually imposed by physical conditions, and in other\n cases voluntarily commenced and slowly increased in the search after\n food, we shall begin to understand how, in the course of evolution,\n there have arisen those strange obscurations of one type by the\n externals of another type. When we see land-birds occasionally feeding\n by the water-side, and then learn that one of them, the water-ouzel,\n an \"anomalous member of the strictly terrestrial thrush family, wholly\n subsists by diving--grasping the stones with its feet and using its\n wings under water\"--we are enabled to comprehend how, under pressure\n of population, aquatic habits may be acquired by creatures organized\n for a\u00ebrial life; and how there may eventually arise an ornithic type,\n in which the traits of the bird are very much disguised.\n\n Finding among mammals some that, in search of prey or shelter, have\n taken to the water in various degrees, we shall cease to be perplexed\n on discovering the mammalian structure hidden under a fish-like form,\n as it is in the Cetacea. Grant that there has even been going on that\n redistribution of organisms which we see still resulting from their\n intrusions on one another's areas, media, and modes of life, and we\n have an explanation of those multitudinous cases in which homologies\n of structure are complicated with analogies. And while it accounts for\n the occurrence, in one medium of organic types fundamentally organized\n for another medium, the doctrine of evolution accounts also for the\n accompanying unfitness. Either the seal has descended from some mammal\n which, little by little, became aquatic in its habits, in which\n case the structure of its hind-limbs has a meaning; or else it was\n specially framed for its present habitat, in which case the structure\n of its hind-limbs is incomprehensible.[90]\n\nAlong with these phenomena of distribution in space and in medium of\nlife, we have the further element of distribution in time; the facts\nof which are admitted, however, to be too fragmentary to be conclusive\neither for or against the doctrine of evolution. Still it is claimed\nthat there is one general truth respecting distribution in time,\nwhich is \"profoundly significant, namely, that the relations between\nthe extinct forms of life, found by geological exploration, and the\npresent forms of life, especially in each great geographical region,\nshow in the aggregate a close kinship, and a connection which is in\nperfect harmony with the belief in evolution, but quite irreconcilable\nwith any other belief. As Mr. Darwin has expressed it, there is 'a\nwonderful relationship in the same continent between the living and the\ndead.'\"[91]\n\nThe argument from distribution is thus summed up by Mr. Spencer:\n\n Given, then, that pressure which species exercise on one another,\n in consequence of the universal overfilling of their respective\n habitats--given the resulting tendency to thrust themselves into one\n another's areas, and media, and modes of life, along such lines of\n least resistance as from time to time are found--given, besides the\n changes in modes of life hence arising, those other changes which\n physical alterations of habitats necessitate--given the structural\n modifications directly or indirectly produced in organisms by modified\n conditions--and the facts of distribution in space and time are\n accounted for. That divergence and redivergence of organic forms,\n which we saw to be shadowed forth by the truths of classification\n and the truths of embryology, we see to be also shadowed forth by\n the truths of distribution. If that aptitude to multiply, to spread,\n to separate, and to differentiate, which the human races have in\n all times shown, be a tendency common to races in general, as we\n have ample reason to assume, then there will result that kind of\n relation among the species, and genera, and orders, peopling the\n earth's surface, which we find exists. Those remarkable identities\n of type discovered between organisms inhabiting one medium, and\n strangely-modified organisms inhabiting another medium, are at\n the same time rendered comprehensible. And the appearances and\n disappearances of species which the geological record shows us, as\n well as the connections between successive groups of species from\n early eras down to our own, cease to be inexplicable.[92]\n\nPassing by what is here said of the aptitude of the human race to\nmultiply, to spread, to separate, and to differentiate--an aptitude\nwhich has never resulted in the production of an essentially different\nanimal, or in anything but incidental variations within the limits\nof the same species--I propose now to apply to this argument from\ndistribution a test which seems to me to be a perfectly fair one,\nand one which it ought to be able to encounter. If the theory that\nthe different species of animals now known to us have been evolved\nsuccessively by descent from some primordial simplest form through\nmodifications induced by change of habitation, of medium of life, and\naccumulation of new structures occurring through an immense period of\ntime, be a sound hypothesis, the process which has evolved superior out\nof inferior organizations ought, in consistency with itself and with\nall its supposed conditions, to be capable of being reversed, so as\nto lead to the evolution of inferior out of superior organisms. For,\nalthough the doctrine of evolution has thus far been applied only to\nfacts which are supposed to show an ascent in the scale of being, the\nargument ought to be equally good for a descent in the scale of being,\nprovided we take care to include all the elements and causes of a\nchange of structure, mode and medium of life, and the necessary element\nof time, in the operation of the process. The imaginary case that is\nabout to be put shall include all the elements of the evolutionary\nhypothesis, and will serve to test at least the rationality of that\ntheory.\n\nLet it be supposed, then, that there was a period in the history of\nthis earth when the whole human race, however it originated, was\nconfined to an island, thousands of miles from any other land. This\nrace of men adapted to a life in one medium, the air, may be supposed\nto have so far advanced in the ruder arts of hunting and fishing,\nand in the higher art of tillage, as to be able for many generations\nto support life by what the sea and the land would put within their\nreach, and by the product which their rude agriculture could extract\nfrom the soil, or which the soil would spontaneously yield. But as the\ncenturies flow on, the population begins to press upon the resources\nof the territory, and the struggle for life becomes very great. At\nlength a point is reached where the supply of food from the land\nbecomes inadequate to sustain the population, and what can be made\nup from the sea will not supply the deficiency. The population will\nthen slowly decrease, but, while this decrease goes on, there comes\nin a disturbing cause which will prevent any adjustment of the supply\nof food to the diminished number of the consumers. The sea begins by\nalmost imperceptible but steadily progressing encroachments to diminish\nthe area of dry land; a change of climate reduces the number of other\nanimals available for human food, and reduces the productive capacity\nof the earth. Then ensues that struggle for existence which is supposed\nto entail changes of medium of life, and to induce transformations of\nstructure. The conditions of existence have become wholly changed.\nThe wretched descendants of a once comparatively thriving race are\ndwelling on a territory which has become a marsh. They have no means\nof migrating to another territory; they can only migrate to another\nmedium. They begin by feeding exclusively on what the water will\nafford. They pass their lives in the pursuit of a prey which lives\nonly in the water, and in this change of life they acquire or develop\norgans adapted to the new condition, organs which, in such miserable\nreproduction of their own species as can go on, they transmit to their\noffspring. Modifications upon modifications accumulate in this way\nthrough untold periods of time, until at last a new aquatic or a new\namphibious creature is formed, and the difference between that creature\nand his remote ancestral human stock is as great as that between man\nand the seal, or between man and any fish that swims. Still, there will\nbe peculiarities of structure retained, which might lead any inhabitant\nof another world, alighting on this globe and undertaking to trace the\norigin of this new creature, to the supposition that he was akin to a\nrace of men whose fossil remains he might find buried in some stratum\nbeneath the marsh which was the last habitat of this unfortunate race,\nwhen it had all the characteristics of its original type.\n\nIs it conceivable that this transformation could take place? Could such\na condition and situation result in anything but the utter extinction\nof the human race, or, in other words, in an absolute break? Could\nthere be any modifications exhibited by the last survivors of that race\nother than those which are familiar to us among the varieties of the\nhuman species which have never separated themselves from their race,\nand between whom and their ancestral stock, wherever it was originally\nplaced on this globe, we recognize no fundamental difference of\nstructure, whatever may have been the changes of habitat or conditions\nof life? Yet the conditions and elements of this imaginary case,\nwhich is simply the process of evolution reversed, are just what the\nevolution theory assumes as the causes of that modification which\nproceeds from a lower to a higher organism; and whatever may be said of\nthe tendency, through \"the survival of the fittest,\" to evolve higher\nout of lower forms of animal life, if we allow time enough for the\nprocess, there is no reason, in the nature of things, why corresponding\nconditions should not lead to a degradation as well as to an elevation\nin the scale of beings. There is, however, one reason why no such\npotency should be ascribed to the conditions, either in respect to\nthe one result or the other. That reason is that all such causes of\nmodification, either in the ascending or the descending scale, are so\nlimited in their effects that distinct beings can not be rationally\npredicated as their product, whereas the power of the Infinite\nArtificer to give existence to distinct beings is absolutely without\nlimit. If naturalists would turn their attention to the limitations\nupon the power of all such causes as those which are supposed to work\nin the process of evolution, and would give us the explanations to\nwhich those limitations point, in those cases of local variation which\nare exhibited by animals that can clearly be traced to a parent form,\nthey would not be compelled to resort to a sweeping theory that refuses\nall force to any hypothesis but its own.\n\nBut now let us go a step further in this imaginary case. Let us suppose\nthat after this new creature, fish or amphibian, descended from the\nhuman race, has inhabited the water surrounding the ill-fated island\nfor a million of years, another great change takes place. The water\nbegins to recede from the land by gradations as slow as those by which\nin the former period it encroached. The land rises from the low level\nto which it had sunk, by volcanic action. Forests spring up upon the\nsides of mountains. The soil becomes firm; verdure overspreads the\nfields; the climate grows genial; the wilderness blossoms as the rose.\nAllow another million years for this restoration of the territory\nto an inhabitable condition. Slowly and in an unbroken series of\ngenerations the aquatic creatures, descended from the ancient human\ninhabitants of the island, emerge from the sea and betake themselves\nto the land. Modifications upon modifications accumulate, new organs\nare acquired; the survival of the fittest perpetuates them; the animals\nascend in the scale of being, until the human type is again evolved\nout of the degraded descendants of the population which two millions\nof years previously dwelt as men upon the island, and carried on in\nsome primitive fashion the simpler arts of human life. Is not this just\nas supposable as the evolution of the human race out of some lower\nform of organism? Are not all the elements--time, migration from one\nmedium to another, change of conditions, and what is supposed to lead\nto the production of different organisms--just as powerful to produce\nthe inferior out of the superior as to produce the superior out of the\ninferior, and so on interchangeably? The answer in each case is, that\nall such causes of modification in the animal kingdom are limited; that\nwhen once a distinct species is in existence, we have no evidence that\nit loses its distinct type or merges itself in another, although the\nearth may be full of evidence that types which formerly existed are no\nlonger among the living organisms.\n\n FOOTNOTES:\n\n [79] \"Biology,\" i, p. 366.\n\n [80] \"In the presence of the various genealogical trees of animal\n descent which have been put forward so frequently of late, a judicious\n skepticism seems the attitude best warranted by the evidence yet\n obtained. If so many similar forms have arisen in mutual independence,\n then the affinities of the animal kingdom can never be represented by\n the symbol of a tree. Rather, we should conceive of the existence of\n a grove of trees, closely approximated, greatly differing in age and\n size, with their branches interlaced in a most complex entanglement.\n The great group of apes is composed of two such branches; but their\n relations one to another, to the other branches which represent\n mammalian groups, and to the trunks from which such branches diverge,\n are problems still awaiting solution.\"--_\"Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica,\"\n article \"Apes.\"_\n\n [81] \"Biology,\" i, pp. 380-382.\n\n [82] I use these terms with quotation-marks, because I do not admit\n any philosophical antagonism such as they are intended to imply.\n\n [83] \"Homology\" is defined by lexicographers as \"the doctrine of\n similar parts.\" \"Homologous organs\" is a term used by scientific\n writers to describe organs having a relation of some proportion to\n each other. In this particular case of the vertebral column, the\n different parts of the column are treated as if they were different\n organs, and they are said to be homologous organs in the same animal,\n because they bear a certain relation or ratio of proportion to each\n other.\n\n [84] See the discussion of how evolution works, _post_.\n\n [85] \"Biology,\" i, p. 387.\n\n [86] The Greek philosophers, as we have seen, before Plato and\n Aristotle, found that their systems of causes, which did not involve\n the idea of power as abstracted from substance, would not account for\n the phenomena of nature. With all their subtilty and ingenuity, they\n did not reach the truth that secondary causes are necessarily limited\n in their action, and that there must be an unlimited cause.\n\n [87] \"Biology,\" i, pp. 369, 370.\n\n [88] \"Biology,\" i, p. 388.\n\n [89] \"Biology,\" i, pp. 390, 391.\n\n [90] \"Biology,\" i, p. 396.\n\n [91] \"Biology,\" i, p. 399. It is to be noted that the relationship\n here referred to is supposed or apparent kinship between the\n _aggregate_ of the surviving and the _aggregate_ of the extinct forms\n which have died out in recent geologic times. But this does not supply\n the steps of descent by which any one surviving form can be traced\n back to any one extinct form.\n\n [92] \"Biology,\" i, p. 401.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\n Mr. Spencer's agnosticism--His theory of the origin of religious\n beliefs--The mode in which mankind are to lose the consciousness of a\n personal God.\n\n\nIn a former chapter I had occasion to advert to one of Mr. Spencer's\nfavorite dogmas, namely, the impossibility of an intellectual\nconception of creation, which he thinks is made apparent by the\nstatement that one term of the relation, the thing created, is\nsomething, and the other term of the relation, that out of which the\nthing was created, is nothing. When I wrote the chapter in which I\ncommented on this extraordinary kind of logic, I felt a little disposed\nto apologize to my readers for answering it. I had not then met with\nthe fuller statement of Mr. Spencer's peculiar agnosticism which I\nam now about to quote. The controversy recently carried on between\nMr. Spencer and Mr. Harrison was closed by the former in an article\nentitled \"Last Words about Agnosticism and the Religion of Humanity,\"\nwhich appeared in the \"Nineteenth Century\" for November, 1884. This\ndrew my attention to a passage in Mr. Spencer's \"Essays,\" which he\nhas reproduced in his late article for the purpose of repeating his\nposition against some of the misrepresentations which he complains\nhad been made of it by Mr. Harrison. I have nothing to do with the\ncontroversy between these two gentlemen, or with any of the arguments\nwhich Mr. Spencer's opponents, be they churchmen or laymen, have\nemployed against him. I take the passage as he has quoted it from his\n\"Essays,\" for the purpose of making his agnostic views the subject of\na more extended commentary than I had bestowed on them in my previous\nchapter, in writing which I had before me only a passage contained in\nhis \"Biology.\" There is no occasion, however, for altering a word of\nwhat I had previously written; for, on a comparison of his position as\ngiven in the \"Biology,\" and that given in the \"Essays,\" it appears very\nplainly that I had not misunderstood him. But as the passage in the\n\"Essays\" displays much more fully the peculiar reasoning by which he\nsupports his agnostic philosophy, I should not do justice to him or to\nmy readers if I did not notice it. The passage is the following:\n\n Always implying terms in relation, thought implies that both terms\n shall be more or less defined; and as fast as one of them becomes\n indefinite, the relation also becomes indefinite, and thought becomes\n indistinct. Take the case of magnitudes. I think of an inch; I think\n of a foot; and having tolerably definite ideas of the two, I have a\n tolerably definite idea of the relation between them. I substitute\n for the foot a mile; and being able to represent a mile much less\n definitely, I can not so definitely think of the relation between an\n inch and a mile--can not distinguish it in thought from the relation\n between an inch and two miles, as clearly as I can distinguish in\n thought the relation between an inch and one foot from the relation\n between an inch and two feet. And now, if I endeavor to think of the\n relation between an inch and the 240,000 miles from here to the moon,\n or the relation between an inch and the 92,000,000 miles from here to\n the sun, I find that while these distances, practically inconceivable,\n have become little more than numbers to which I frame no answering\n ideas, so too has the relation between an inch and either of them\n become practically inconceivable. Now this partial failure in the\n process of forming thought relations, which happens even with finite\n magnitudes when one of them is immense, passes into complete failure\n when one of them can not be brought within any limits. The relation\n itself becomes unrepresentable at the same time that one of its terms\n becomes unrepresentable. Nevertheless, in this case it is to be\n observed that the almost blank form of relation preserves a certain\n qualitative character. It is still distinguishable as belonging to\n the consciousness of extensions, not to the consciousnesses of forces\n or durations; and in so far remains a vaguely identifiable relation.\n But now suppose we ask what happens when one term of the relation has\n not simply magnitude having no known limits, and duration of which\n neither beginning nor end is cognizable, but is also an existence\n not to be defined? In other words, what must happen if one term\n of the relation is not only quantitatively but also qualitatively\n unrepresentable? Clearly in this case the relation does not simply\n cease to be thinkable except as a relation of a certain class, but it\n lapses completely. When one of the terms becomes wholly unknowable,\n the law of thought can no longer be conformed to; both because one\n term can not be present, and because relation itself can not be framed\n ... In brief, then, to Mr. Martineau's objection I reply that the\n insoluble difficulties he indicates arise here, as elsewhere, when\n thought is applied to that which transcends the sphere of thought;\n and that just as when we try to pass beyond phenomenal manifestations\n to the Ultimate Reality manifested, we have to symbolize it out of\n such materials as the phenomenal manifestations give us; so we have\n simultaneously to symbolize the connection between this Ultimate\n Reality and its manifestations, as somehow allied to the connections\n among the phenomenal manifestations themselves. The truth Mr.\n Martineau's criticism adumbrates is that the law of thought fails\n where the elements of thought fail; and this is a conclusion quite\n conformable to the general view I defend. Still holding the validity\n of my argument against Hamilton and Mansel, that in pursuance of\n their own principle the Relative is not at all thinkable _as such_,\n unless in contradiction to some existence posited, however vaguely,\n as the other term of a relation, conceived however indefinitely; it\n is consistent on my part to hold that in this effort which thought\n inevitably makes to pass beyond its sphere, not only does the product\n of thought become a dim symbol of a product, but the process of\n thought becomes a dim symbol of a process; and hence any predicament\n inferable from the law of thought can not be asserted.[93]\n\nIn judging of the soundness of this reasoning, the first thing to be\ndone is to determine what we are thinking about when we compare the\nfinite with the infinite, or when, to put it as Mr. Spencer does, we\nhave two terms of a relation, one of which is a thing open to the\nobservation of our senses, and the other of which lies beyond them.\nIn this case, does all thinkable relation lapse, or fade into an\nimpossible conception, when we undertake to conceive of that which\nlies beyond what we see? Does the relation between the two supposed\nterms cease to be a continuously existing relation? Or, to quote Mr.\nSpencer's words, is it true that \"insoluble difficulties arise, because\nthought is applied to that which is beyond the sphere of thought\"?\n\nWe must be careful to distinguish between the \"insoluble difficulties\"\nwhich arise out of the imperfection of language adequate to give\na formal description of a thing, and which may lead us to suppose\nourselves involved in contradictions, and the \"insoluble difficulties\"\nwhich may arise out of the impossibility of having a mental\nrepresentation of that thing. The latter is the only difficulty about\nwhich we need concern ourselves; and the best way to test the supposed\ndifficulty as an insuperable one is to take one of the illustrations\nused by Mr. Spencer--the idea of space. We measure a foot or a mile\nof space, and then compare it with the idea of endless or (to us)\nimmeasurable space. Figures afford us the means of expressing in\nlanguage a certain definite number of miles of space, but, beyond the\nhighest figures of which we have definite forms of expression, we can\nnot go in definite descriptions of space. But when we have exhausted\nall the expressions of number that our arithmetical forms of expression\nadmit, does it follow that we can not conceive of extension beyond\nthat number? On the contrary, the very measure which we are able to\nexpress in figures, to a certain extent, in regard both to space and\ntime, gives us the idea of space and time, and shows us that there\nmust be an extension of both beyond and forever beyond the portion of\neither which language will allow us definitely to describe. This to\nus immeasurable and indescribable extent of space or time becomes a\nthinkable idea, because we are all the while thinking of space or time,\nwhether it is a measurable portion of either, or an immeasurable and\nendless existence.\n\nTake as another illustration a purely moral idea. We know that there is\na moral quality which we call goodness; an attribute of human character\nof which we have a clear conception, and which we can describe because\nit is manifested to us in human lives. When we speak of the moral\nphenomena to which we give the name of goodness, or virtue, all mankind\nknow what is meant. But human virtue is imperfect, limited, measurable.\nIt may be idealized into something approaching to perfection, but the\nideal character thus drawn must fall short of perfection if it is made\nconsistent with human nature. But from human character we derive the\nidea of goodness or virtue as a thinkable idea. Is the idea of absolute\nperfection of this quality any less thinkable? Absolute perfection\nof moral character can not be described by a definition; but, as we\nknow that a measurable goodness which we can describe exists, wherein\nconsists the failure or lapse of a thinkable relation, when we reason\nfrom that which exists in a measurable degree to that which transcends\nall degree? We are all the while thinking of goodness or virtue,\nwhether we think of it as limited and imperfect, or as unlimited and\nperfect. Take another quality--power. We know that there is such a\nquality as power, wielded by human beings, and guided by their will.\nBut human power is limited, measurable, and therefore finite. When we\nreason from the finite power of man to the idea of an infinite and\nimmeasurable power held and wielded by another being, do we strive to\nconceive of something that is unthinkable because we can only say that\nthe power of that other being is without limit? We are all the while\nthinking of power, of the quality of power, whether we think of it\nas measurable or immeasurable. All qualities and all faculties which\nare manifested to us in a limited degree, when we conceive of them\nas unlimited and without degree, become proofs that what exists in a\nmeasurable and limited degree may exist without limitation and without\ndegree. Although we can only define the finite, the infinite is not\nthe less a subject of true thinking, because, whether we think of the\nfinite or the infinite, what we are all the time thinking about is the\nquality of power, and nothing else. In the one case it is limited, in\nthe other it is unlimited, but it is all the time the quality itself of\nwhich we are thinking.[94]\n\nBut now let us attend a little more closely to Mr. Spencer's grand\nobjection to this mode of thinking. The reader will be careful to note\nthat what he needs to ascertain is, whether Mr. Spencer's agnostic\ntheory is really sound. To test it, he must inquire just where the\nsupposed difficulty lies. Translated into other language, Mr. Spencer's\nposition is this: In order to keep within the sphere of possible\nthought, there must be a definite relation between any two ideas, which\nmust not lapse, but the two ideas must be equally capable of mental\nrepresentation. When one term of the relation is an idea capable of\nmental representation, as when we think of a thing cognizable by our\nsenses, and the other term of the relation is something that lies\nbeyond them, the law of thought, according to Mr. Spencer, can no\nlonger be conformed to; the relation lapses; the latter term can not\nbe present to the mind; we pass out of the sphere of thought into that\nwhich can not be a subject of thought, the unknown and the unknowable.\nWhat takes place in this process is assumed to be this: We take\ncertain phenomenal manifestations which we are able to observe and to\ndescribe. Out of the materials which these phenomenal manifestations\ngive us, we \"symbolize the Ultimate Reality.\" We do this, by arguing\nfrom the phenomenal manifestations which convince us of the existence\nof a being whom we know and can observe, to the existence of a being\nin whom we \"symbolize\" qualities and faculties which the phenomenal\nmanifestations show us to belong to human beings. At the same time we\nrepresent to ourselves by the same symbolizing process a connection\nbetween the Ultimate Reality and its manifestation, which is allied to\nthe connections among the phenomenal manifestations which we observe in\nman, or in nature. In other words, we reason from what we see and can\nmeasure and describe, to that which we can not see or describe, and we\nend in a term of the relation which can not be present to the mind, and\nthus no thinkable relation can be framed.\n\nWhatever may be said of the rational force of the evidence derived from\nphenomenal manifestations which we can observe when we reason about\nother phenomenal manifestations which we can not measure, it can not\nbe said that we have reached a term in the relation that is beyond\nthe sphere of thought. What I understand Mr. Spencer to mean when he\nspeaks of \"symbolizing\" out of the materials which the phenomenal\nmanifestations give us, may be a process liable to error, but it does\nnot involve or lead to the \"insoluble difficulties\" that are supposed\nto arise. For example, when, from the existence and power of man, a\nbeing whom we know, and whose phenomenal manifestations lead us to a\nknowledge of his limited faculties, we reason to the existence of a\nbeing whose faculties are boundless, we may be in danger of conclusions\ninto which imperfection will find its way; but it certainly is not\ntrue that in thinking of unlimited power or goodness, or any other\nunlimited quality, we transcend the sphere of thought. When we have\nexpressed in figures the greatest measurable idea of space that can\nbe so expressed, what do we \"symbolize,\" when we say that beyond that\nmeasured space there stretches a space that we can not measure, and to\nwhich there is of necessity no limit? Does a thinkable relation cease\nto exist, because one of the terms is immeasurable to us? As soon as we\nhave formed an idea of a measurable portion of space, we necessarily\nhave an idea of endless and immeasurable space; and in this deduction\nwe have employed no \"symbol\" formed out of the materials which the\nmeasurable manifestations have given us. We have simply reached a\nconclusion that is inevitable. We are all the while thinking of space,\nwhether it is definite space that we can measure, or indefinite space\nthat we can not measure.\n\nWhen the moral and intellectual qualities of men constitute one part\nof the phenomenal manifestations which we adopt as the basis of\nreasoning to the existence of God, we are in danger of assigning to\nthat being attributes of character which would be far from perfection.\nNearly all the religions that have existed, and of which we have much\nknowledge--perhaps all of them but one--have displayed more or less of\nthis tendency. It is only necessary to instance the Hebrew Scriptures,\nfor there are parts of that narrative in which the Deity is represented\nas actuated by something very much like human passions and motives, and\nthese representations are among the hardest things to be reconciled\nwith the idea that those books were inspired writings. Every one knows\nwith what effect these passages of the Hebrew Scriptures are used by\nthose who reject both the Old and the New Testaments as inspired books.\nBut is philosophy therefore to shrink from the use of materials with\nwhich the world is filled, and which lead to the conception of a being\nof infinite faculties and perfect goodness? Grant all that may be said\nof the stupid and fatal errors into which men have been led by likening\nthe Deity to man: there remains a vast store-house of materials on\nwhich to reason to the existence of God, which philosophy can not\nafford to reject, which can be freed from the peril that has often\nattended their use, and which involve no \"symbolizing\" process of the\nkind which Mr. Spencer imagines.\n\nLet us again translate Mr. Spencer's language, and endeavor to analyze\nhis position. There is, he says, a law of thought, which requires and\ndepends upon certain elements of thought. By \"thought\" he means a\nconceivable idea, or one which the mind can represent to itself. By\nthe elements of thought he means, I suppose, the data which enable us\nto have an idea of a product. The process of reaching this product\nis supposed to be conducted according to a law which requires us to\nhave the data or elements by which the process is to be conducted. For\nexample, in the process of reaching an idea of definite space as a\nproduct of thought, we take certain data or elements, by conceiving of\nspace as divided into successive portions to which we give the name of\nfeet or miles. The product of thought is the number of feet or miles\ninto which we divide the definite space of which we form an idea. In\nthis process we have conformed to Mr. Spencer's law of thought, because\nwe have data or elements by which to conduct the process and reach the\nproduct.\n\nBut now, says Mr. Spencer, when thought undertakes to have as its\nproduct the idea of endless space, it makes an effort to pass beyond\nits sphere; the elements of thought fail, and therefore the law of\nthought fails; the product is nothing but a dim symbol of a product;\nthe process becomes nothing but a dim symbol of a process; and no\npredicament, that is, no fact, is here inferable from the law of\nthought as a fact or predicament that can be asserted. But what, in the\ncase supposed, is the fact or predicament that is asserted, when we\nspeak or think of endless space, or of space that transcends all our\npowers of measurement? Is it correct to say that the law of thought\nfails, because we can not express endless space in feet or miles? Is it\ntrue that we have only \"symbolized\" the product of endless space out\nof the data or elements of measurable space? Here it is necessary to\ninquire what the learned philosopher means by \"symbolizing\" a product\nor a process. I understand him to mean, in the case supposed, that\nwhereas in reference to the idea or product of a measurable space we\nhave certain data or elements out of which to form that idea, when\nwe undertake to think of endless space we transfer the notion of a\nmeasurable space to that of which no measure can be predicated, and\ntherefore we can have no conception of endless space, but only a\n\"formless consciousness of the inscrutable.\" Let us see if this is\nsound.\n\nTake as a convenient idea of a measurable space the 92,000,000 miles\nfrom the earth to the sun, and lay it down on paper. If, after having\nmeasured this space, we could transport ourselves to the sun, we could\nextend the line in the same direction beyond the sun, by laying down\na further measurement of 92,000,000 miles from the sun to any object\nthat we could observe beyond the sun. This process we could repeat\nindefinitely and forever, if we could be successively removed to the\ndifferent stages at each point of departure. But when an aggregate of\nsuch multiplied measurements had been reached greater than could be\nexpressed in figures, we should still have the intellectual power of\nthinking of an extension of space indefinitely beyond that which we\nhave measured. Nothing would have failed us but the power of expressing\nin figures the endless extent of space which lies beyond the utmost\nlimit that we can so express.\n\nIt is precisely here, as I suppose, that Mr. Spencer's \"symbolizing\nprocess\" and his \"symbolized product\" come in. We have taken as the\nelements of thought the idea of successive measurements of space; and\nthe law of thought permits us to have as a definite product whatever\nextent of space can be marked off by such successive measurements.\nBut when we undertake to have, as the product of thought, a\nconsciousness, or conception, of endless space, we have merely used\nthe idea of a definite space as a \"symbol,\" or _simulacrum_, of that\nwhich is without form, and is only a \"formless consciousness of the\ninscrutable\"--whatever that means.\n\nLet us see what has happened. The power of measuring, or describing\nin form, a definite extent of space, has given us an idea of space.\nThe product of our thought is extension between two given points. Such\nextensions must be capable of indefinite multiplication, although we\ncan not express in figures an indefinite multiplicand. The product is\nthen something beyond what we can express in a definite form; but is\nit beyond the sphere of thought? What is it? It is an idea which we\ndeduce by a strict process of reasoning, and to which we do not need to\ngive and can not give expression in figures. The process of reasoning\nis this: Measurement has given us an idea of space; our faculty of\napplying measurement is limited; but our faculty of conceiving of space\nthrough which we could go on forever multiplying such measurements,\nif we had the means, is certainly a faculty of which all men are\nconscious who are accustomed to analyze the processes of thought. In\nthis process we may reach that which in one sense is \"inscrutable.\" It\nis inscrutable, inasmuch as we can not understand how eternity of space\nor time came to exist. Our experience of phenomena enables us to have\nan idea of space and time, and from the fact that we have measured off\nportions of space or time, we deduce the fact that there must be an\neternity of both. It is immaterial whether we call this a \"symbolizing\"\nprocess, or call it something else. The product is an idea at which we\narrive by a strict process of reasoning. Eternity of space or time is\nan inscrutable idea, when we attempt to inquire how it came to be. That\nit exists, is an idea from which the human mind can not escape, and\nwhich it reaches by a perfectly sound deduction. We are all the while\nthinking of space or time, whether we are thinking of that which is\nmeasurable, or of that which is immeasurable.\n\nI now come to a passage in Mr. Spencer's recent article which it is\nnecessary to attempt to explain to the unlearned reader, and to bring\nit, if possible, within the reach of ordinary minds. This passage,\nwhich follows in his recent article immediately after his quotation\nfrom his \"Essays,\" is the following:\n\n Thus, then, criticisms like this of Mr. Martineau, often recurring in\n one shape or other, and now again made by Mr. Harrison, do not show\n the invalidity of my argument, but once more show the imbecility of\n human intelligence when brought to bear on the ultimate question.\n Phenomenon without noumenon is unthinkable; and yet noumenon can not\n be thought of in the true sense of thinking. We are at once obliged\n to be conscious of a reality behind appearance, and yet can neither\n bring this consciousness of reality into any shape, nor can bring into\n any shape its connection with appearance. The forms of our thought,\n molded on experience of phenomena, as well as the connotations of our\n words formed to express the relations of phenomena, involve us in\n contradictions when we try to think of that which is beyond phenomena;\n and yet the existence of that which is beyond phenomena is a necessary\n datum alike of our thoughts and our words. We have no choice but to\n accept a formless consciousness of the inscrutable.\n\nSome definitions must now be given. The word \"phenomenon\" has become\nnaturalized in our English tongue. Derived as a noun from the Greek\nverb \u03a6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9, _to appear_, it means anything visible; whatever\nis presented to the eye by observation or experiment, or what is\ndiscovered to exist; as the phenomena of the natural world, the\nphenomena of the heavenly bodies, of terrestrial substances, the\nphenomena of heat and color.[95] In this application the word denotes\nwhat appears to us, or what we discover by our senses. It is also used,\nin the plural, more loosely, to denote occurrences or things which we\nobserve to happen; as when, speaking of physical occurrences, we mean\nphysical facts the happening of which we observe. Moral phenomena, on\nthe other hand, are the appearances exhibited by the action of mind.\n\nThe word _noumenon_ has not become naturalized in our language, and\ndid not exist in Greek.[96] It can convey no intelligible meaning to\ncommon readers without tracing its derivation, and when it is analyzed\nwe can attribute to it no meaning but a purely arbitrary one, even if\nwe can arrive at that arbitrary signification. In fact, it is a word\nmade by and for the school of Kant. Its first syllable is the Greek\nnoun \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 or \u03bd\u03cc\u03bf\u03c2, which corresponds to our English word _thought_ or\n_intelligence_. The Greek verb \u03bd\u03bf\u03ad\u03c9, _to think_, was primarily used as\n_I perceive_; the act of the mind in seeing. This idea was distinct\nfrom \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03c9, which conveyed the plain meaning of I _see_. But so subtile\nwere the Greeks in their use of words, that \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03c9 was sometimes used\nspecifically to mean _to see with the mind's eye_, or, as we sometimes\nsay, to _realize_, or to have a mental perception of. In the Greek\nuse of the two words \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c9 and \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03c9, no distinction was made between\n_phenomenon_ and _noumenon_. To a cultivated Greek, _phenomenon_\nwould mean something perceived, and _noumenon_, if he had possessed\nthe word, would have had the same meaning. He would have used the two\nwords interchangeably, to express either sight by the visual organs or\nmental perception. Mr. Spencer uses them as if they meant different\nthings, as if _phenomenon_ were something different from _noumenon_.\nBut _noumenon_, according to its derivation (for it is coined as the\nparticiple of n\u03bf\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd), means a thing, subject, or object, _perceived by\nthe mind_. The root idea is mind-action, the verb \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c9 meaning to do\nwhat the mind does in apprehending a subject or object. So that the\nderivation of _noumenon_ does not help us to understand the Kantian or\nSpencerian use of the word.\n\nAs this use of the word is, then, purely arbitrary, we must try to\nunderstand, as well as we can, what this arbitrary meaning is. As well\nas I can fathom it, in contrast with _phenomenon_, the meaning is that\n_phenomenon_ is something that we see, and _noumenon_ is the ghost or\ndouble of what we see. We see a thing with our eyes; but our mind does\nnot see it--it perceives its ghostly double. This is _noumenon_.\n\nPenetrating, or trying to penetrate, a little further into Mr.\nSpencer's meaning, it would seem that when he says that _phenomenon_\nwithout _noumenon_ is unthinkable, he means that, although we can see a\nthing with our corporeal eye, we can not think of it without the mental\nact of seeing its image with the mind's eye; and then he adds that\n_noumenon_ can not be thought of in the true sense of thinking, because\n_noumenon_ is an abstraction or a mere ghost of a subject or an object.\n\nWhat is all this but a kind of play upon words? We are so constituted\nthat the impressions which a thing external to us produces upon our\nnerves of perception are instantly transmitted to the brain, and the\nmind has an instantaneous perception of that object. The phenomenon\nwhich we see with our eyes, or become sensible of by touch, thus\nbecomes a thing perceived by the mind, and when we think of it we do\nnot think of its ghost, but we think of the thing itself. Did Laura\nBridgman, who had neither eye-sight nor hearing nor speech, but who\nacquired all her ideas of external objects by the sense of touch,\nconceive of a round or a square, a rough or a smooth surface, by\ncontemplating the ghost or double of what she touched? And had she no\nthinking in the true sense of thinking, because the double, or _imago_\nof the thing which she touched--the so-called _noumenon_--was at once\nnecessary to her mental perception, and yet could not be thought of\nwithout seeing the object by the corporeal eye? She had no corporeal\neye in which there was any vision. All her mental perceptions of\nexternal objects were acquired by the sense of touch alone; and we\nmay well believe that she did not need the supposed _noumenon_ to\ngive her an idea of _phenomenon_. She perceived many phenomena by the\nsimple transmission to her brain, along her nerves of touch, of the\nimpressions produced upon them by external objects; and there is every\nreason to believe that many of her perceptions were as accurate and\ntrue as those which we derive from all our senses. We may now dismiss\nMr. Spencer's distinction between _phenomenon_ and _noumenon_ as a\ndistinction quite needless for the elucidation of what takes place in\nthinking of that which is behind appearance, and may proceed with the\ndiscussion of what remains of the passage above quoted.\n\nAt the risk of wearying by repetition, I will again resort to the\nillustration before employed, and will again describe how we reach the\nconception, for example, of endless space. According to Mr. Spencer,\nspace, or extension, as a thinkable idea, or a subject of thought,\nis confined to a measurable extent of space. This is the phenomenon,\nor appearance. All our forms of thought are, it is said, molded on\nour experience of phenomena that are measurable, or capable of being\ndefinitely described; and the connotations of our words which express\nthe relations of phenomena relate to phenomena that we measure, or see,\nand can definitely describe. Therefore, we can not think of a reality\nthat is behind appearance; can not bring the consciousness of such a\nreality into any shape, nor bring into any shape its connection with\nappearance.\n\nIf mankind are never to think of that which is behind appearance--can\nnever think of a reality that is behind what they see--because their\nforms of thought are molded on experiences of phenomena that they see,\nand because the connotations of their words express the relations of\nthose phenomena and no others, a vast domain of thinking is necessarily\nclosed to them. This is not the experience of our minds. Every day of\nour lives we go on in search of that which is beyond appearance, and we\nfind it. Take again, for example, the phenomena of a measurable portion\nof space or time. What appears to us gives an idea of space and time.\nWe measure as great a portion of either as our forms of expression\nadmit of our describing by definite terms, but we are immediately\nconscious of another reality, an endless extension or duration, because\nwe are conscious that we have not exhausted and can not exhaust, by our\nmeasurements and descriptions, the whole possible existence of space or\ntime. This new reality behind appearance is just as truly thinkable,\njust as true a consciousness, as is the measurable portion of time or\nspace; for it is time or space of which we are constantly thinking,\nwhether it is an extent or duration which we can describe in words, or\nwhether we can only say that it is extent or duration without beginning\nand without end. Our minds are so constituted that the existence which\nis manifested to us by observable phenomena leads us to go behind\nthe appearance in search of another reality beyond that which is\nmanifested by the phenomena that we see. All that is inscrutable about\nthis other reality that lies behind appearance is that we can not\nunderstand how it came to be, any more than we can understand how the\nphenomenon which we see and can measure and describe in a definite\nform came to exist. We do not bring, and do not need to bring, this\nother reality into connection with appearance. We first have an idea of\nspace and time from observable and measurable phenomena. The reality\nof extension without limit, and duration without end, follows of\nnecessity, by a process of thought which we can not escape.\n\nBut now it becomes needful to answer a further objection. I have said\nthat we are all the while thinking of space, whether it is a measurable\nand limited or an immeasurable and illimitable space. Mr. Spencer,\nanticipating this obvious statement, admits that the form of relation\nbetween the two ideas, although \"almost blank,\" preserves a certain\nqualitative character; that is, it is of the quality of space of which\nwe think, whether it is measurable or immeasurable, and therefore it\nremains \"a vaguely identifiable relation.\" But when, in place of one\nof the terms of the relation qualitatively the same as the other, we\nsubstitute an existence that can not be defined, and is therefore both\nquantitatively and qualitatively unrepresentable, the relation, he\nasserts, lapses entirely; one of the terms becomes wholly \"unknowable.\"\n\nI will not again repeat that extension or magnitude having no known\nlimits is a thinkable term, because the subject of thought is the\nquality of extension or magnitude; quantity not being essential to\nthe idea of extension or magnitude. But I will pass to the idea of an\nexistence which can not be defined. I suppose that by an existence is\nmeant a being. If we undertake to think of a being whose quality we\ndo not know to be the same as the quality of another being whom we\ndo know, and the quantity of whose powers and faculties we can not\nmeasure, we propose, says Mr. Spencer, a term of impossible thought,\nbecause the law of thought can not be conformed to; the term can not be\npresent to the mind, and no thinkable relation can be framed. Let this\nsupposed difficulty be tested by a plain inquiry into that which we\nundertake to make the subject of thought when we think of a being who\nis said to be \"unknowable.\"\n\n\"Agnosticism\" is a doctrine which eludes a definite grasp. I have\nseen it defined by one of its most distinguished professors in this\nway: \"Agnosticism is of the essence of science, whether ancient or\nmodern. It simply means that a man shall not say he knows or believes\nthat which he has no scientific grounds for professing to know or\nbelieve.... Agnosticism simply says that we know nothing of what may\nbe beyond phenomena.\"[97] Mankind are apt to be rather practical in\ntheir habits of thinking: experience teaches them that there is a\nwell-founded distinction between knowledge and belief, when it comes to\nbe a question of asserting the one or the other.[98] They find, too,\nby experience that, in regard to what they speak of when they say that\nthey know a thing, there is a distinction to be observed in respect to\nthe means of knowledge. No one hesitates to say that he knows there\nwas such a man as Napoleon Bonaparte, although he never saw him, and\nalthough our knowledge of him is now derived from hearsay. But when we\nspeak of knowing that a certain living person was at a certain spot on\na certain day, we become immediately aware that in order to justify the\nassertion we or some one ought to have seen the person at the time and\nplace, especially if anything important depends upon the assertion.\nThere are a great many things that we say we know without scientific or\nother rigorous proof, and there are a great many other things which we\ndo not say that we know without the kind of proof which is required.\nAll our actions in life proceed upon this distinction, and we could\nnot live in this world with any comfort if we did not act upon the\nassumption that we know things of which we have no scientific proof.\n\nA very clever _jeu d'esprit_ went the rounds of the periodical press\nsome time ago, in which a well-born and highly educated young agnostic\nwas represented as losing his birthright, his _fianc\u00e9e_, and all his\nprospects in life, because he demanded rigorous proof of everything\nthat affected him. As he would not admit that he was the son of his own\nparents, without having better proof of it than their assertion, he was\nturned out-of-doors and disinherited. He would not accept the bloom on\nthe cheek of his mistress as natural unless she gave him her word that\nshe did not paint; and he would not admit that they loved each other\nwithout some better proof than their mutual feelings, about which they\nmight be mistaken. The young lady indignantly dismissed him, but he\nconsoled himself as a martyr to the truth of agnosticism. He became\ntutor to the son of a nobleman, whose belief in the boy's extraordinary\ntalents, although justified by his progress in his studies, the tutor\nwould not admit had the requisite proof. He propounded his denial of\nwhat the father had no proper grounds for maintaining, in an offensive\nway, and of course he lost his place. He retired to a sort of agnostic\nbrotherhood, glorying in his adhesion to truth. Some of his companions\nremained long enough in the brotherhood to find out that they were\nmaking fools of themselves, and at the first opportunity for acting on\nthe ordinary grounds of knowing a fact without rigorous demonstration\nof it they left him in solitude, went into the world, and achieved\nsuccess.\n\n\"A man shall not say he knows or believes that which he has no\nscientific grounds for professing to know or believe.\" By \"scientific\ngrounds,\" I presume is meant, in the case of a fact or occurrence,\nproper proof of the fact or occurrence. This varies with the nature of\nthe thing which one professes to know. We constantly act upon proofs\nwhich do not amount to demonstration, and there could be no practical\nenjoyment of our lives and no safety if we did not. If a government\nwere to receive information that a foreign army was on the border of\nthe country and about to invade it, and the information fell short of\nbeing the testimony of eye-witnesses, what would be thought of the\nrulers if they were to fold their hands and say that they did not know\nthe fact because they had no \"scientific grounds for professing to know\nit\"? On the other hand, if in a court of justice the question to be\ndetermined were the presence of an individual at a certain place and at\na certain time, the established rules of evidence require certain kinds\nof proof of the fact.\n\nBelief, however, is a conviction of something which may or may not\nrequire what are called \"scientific grounds\" before we can be permitted\nto profess that we believe. It depends upon the thing which we profess\nto believe, and upon the grounds on which we rest the belief, whether\nwe have or have not safe and sufficient means of belief. Belief in\nthe law of gravitation as a force operating throughout the universe\nis arrived at as a deduction from scientific data. Belief in an\nexistence beyond phenomena, in a being who is the producing agent\nof the phenomena, depends upon a great variety of grounds, some of\nwhich are scientific data and some of which are the elements of moral\nreasoning. We may not say that we \"_know_\" that God or any other\nsupernatural being exists, but we may say that we \"_believe_\" in his\nexistence. Here knowledge is one thing; belief is another. Knowledge\nof the existence of God, like knowledge of the existence of any other\nbeing, might come to us through the testimony of a competent witness\ncommissioned and authorized to inform us. Belief in the existence of\nGod may be founded on many and various grounds without the direct\ntestimony of the competent witness; and these grounds may be perfectly\nsatisfactory without being mathematical or scientific demonstration. It\nis a very remarkable fact that some of the most eminent of the school\nof agnosticism profess to have, and probably have, the most undoubting\nfaith in the theory and actual occurrence of animal evolution, without\nany data, scientific or other, which can enable other men to arrive\nat the same conviction, whatever may be the character of the supposed\nproofs. They certainly have no grounds for professing to know that\nan evolution of species out of species has ever taken place; and the\ngrounds of their belief in the fact, whether denominated \"scientific\"\nor called something else, do not satisfy the rules of belief on\nwhich mankind must act, in accordance with their mental and moral\nconstitutions; and this belief does not rise any higher in the scale of\nmoral probabilities than the belief in special creations, nor does it\nrise so high. But to return to Mr. Spencer.\n\nIf we did not act upon the process of thinking of another reality than\nthat which appearance gives, act upon it fearlessly and by a mode of\nthinking to which we can safely trust ourselves, science would stand\nstill, there would be no progress in physics, discoveries would cease,\nthere would be no improvement in morals, the world would remain\nstationary. What did Columbus do, when, going behind the phenomena\nthat made the earth appear to be a flat surface, he thought of it as a\nsphere? Did he break the law of thought? He formed an idea of a reality\nbehind appearance, not by employing the phenomenal manifestations to\nhelp him to the new conception, but by going away from them in search\nof a reality that lay behind them, and which they seemed to contradict.\nThis conception of a sphere as the reality of the earth's condition\nproved to be the truth. He did not bring it, and did not need to bring\nit, into connection with appearance. He did not use, and did not need\nto use, the relations of the visible phenomena to help him to attain\nhis conception of a spherical form of the earth. He contradicted them\nall.\n\nDid all the moral lawgivers who have reformed the world break the law\nof thought, when, going behind the phenomena of human conduct, with\ntheir relations pointing to one idea of right and wrong, they conceived\nthe idea of a new and a better rule of life? When it was said, in place\nof the old law of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, \"Love your\nenemies and pray for those who persecute you\"--when for the old rule\nof revenge there was substituted forgiveness of injuries--something\nwas inculcated that contradicted all the appearances of the social\nphenomena, and that lay beyond them. Did the consciousness of this new\nreality become \"a formless consciousness of the inscrutable\"? What\nis there about it that is inscrutable? There is nothing inscrutable\nabout it, or in the consciousness of it, excepting the mode in which\nthe being who promulgated it came to exist. The idea of forgiveness is\nclearly within the compass of human thought and of human endeavor.\n\nWhen we are in the process of making a new physical discovery, or of\nforming a new rule of moral action, we work away from the materials\nwhich the phenomenal manifestations give us, to a new conception.\nWe become conscious of a new reality behind appearance, and of an\nexistence beyond the relations of the phenomena with which we have\nheretofore been familiar. It is to this striving after realities behind\nappearances--striving by an entirely true process of thinking--that the\nworld owes its progress.\n\nWhen the phenomenal manifestations of an intellectual and moral nature\nin man have given us the idea of an existence of an intellectual and\nmoral being as a reality of which we become conscious, what is to\nprevent us from thinking of another intellectual and moral being as a\nreality, with faculties and powers immeasurably superior to ours? It\nis true that the phenomenal manifestations of man's intellectual and\nmoral nature give us an idea of a being of very limited faculties and\nvery imperfect moral qualities. But what is the \"insoluble difficulty\"\nin which we become involved, when we think of a being whose faculties\nare boundless, and whose moral nature is perfect? Does the \"insoluble\ndifficulty\" consist in the impossibility of thinking of that which\ntranscends all our powers of measurement? All that we have done, in the\ncase of man, is to have a consciousness of a being whose phenomenal\nmanifestations evince the existence of an intellectual and moral\nnature. He happens to be a being of very limited faculties and very\nimperfect moral characteristics. What prevents us from thinking, in\nthe true sense of thinking, of another being, whose powers are without\nlimit, and whose moral nature is perfect? Is it said that we can\nnot bring into any shape the idea of unlimited power or of perfect\ngoodness, or bring into any shape its connection with appearance,\nbecause all our ideas of power and goodness, all our forms of thought\nand expression, are molded on experiences of limited power and\nimperfect goodness? The truth is that we do not and need not strive\nto bring into connection with appearance the idea of any quality\nwhich we conceive of as unlimited. What we derive from the phenomenal\nmanifestations of human power and goodness is a consciousness of the\nqualities of power and goodness. It is perfectly correct thinking to\nreason that these qualities, whose phenomenal manifestations, in the\ncase of man, show that in him they exist only in a limited degree, may\nexist in another being in unlimited perfection and without degree.\nOur minds are so constituted that we reason from the finite to the\ninfinite, by observing that one class of phenomena evince the existence\nof the finite and another class of phenomena evince the existence of\nthe infinite.\n\nWhen, therefore, we pass from the phenomenal manifestations of human\npower and goodness, we come into the presence of other phenomena which\nwe know could not be and were not produced by such a limited and\nimperfect being as man, but which must yet have had an author, a maker,\nan originator, a creator. We thus contemplate and investigate facts\nwhich show that the phenomena were the products of a skill, wisdom, and\npower that transcend all measurement. Is it said that the phenomena of\nnature, stupendous and varied and minute and wonderful as they are,\nevince only that a certain degree of power and wisdom was exerted in\ntheir production, even if their production is attributed to a being\ncompetent to bring them about? And therefore that the idea of a being\nof unlimited faculties and perfect goodness is as far as ever from our\nreach by any true process of thought? This assumption begs something\nthat should not be taken for granted. It assumes that the production\nof the phenomena of nature does not evince unlimited power and perfect\ngoodness; did not call for the existence of boundless faculties and\ninexhaustible benevolence; involved only a degree of such qualities,\nalthough a vastly superior degree to that possessed by us. The\ncorrectness of this assumption depends upon the force of the evidence\nwhich nature affords of the character of the Deity. It is an assumption\nwhich has led to enormous errors--errors of conception and belief\nwhich impute to the Supreme Being only a superior degree of power and\nwisdom, greater than our own, but still limited and imperfect, liable\nto error, and acting in modes which distress us with contradictions and\ninconsistencies.\n\nIt may without rashness be asserted that the phenomena of the universe\ncould not have been produced by a power and wisdom that were subject to\nany limitations. While all the researches of science, from the first\nbeginnings of human observation to the present moment, show that in\nthe production of the phenomena of nature there has been exerted a\ncertain amount of power and wisdom, they also show that it is an amount\nwhich we can not measure; that there is, moreover, a power and wisdom\nthat have not been exhausted; that the reserved force and skill and\nbenevolence are without limit. For, in every successive new discovery\nthat we make, in every new revelation of the power and goodness\nwhich our investigations bring forth, we continuously reach proofs\nof an endless capacity, an inexhaustible variety of methods and of\nproducts. So that, if we conceive of the whole human race, with all its\naccumulated knowledge, as ending at last in one individual possessed\nof all that has been learned on earth, and imagine him to be then\ntranslated to another state of existence, with all his faculties of\nobservation and study preserved, and new fields of inquiry to be opened\nto him, his experience on earth would lead him to expect to find, and\nwe must believe that in his new experience he will find, that the\nphysical and the moral phenomena of the universe are an inexhaustible\nstudy; that search and discovery must go on forever; and that forever\nnew revelations of power and goodness will be made to the perceptions\nwhose training began in a very limited sphere. His experience in\nthat limited sphere has taught him that there was no end to the\ndiscoveries which were here partially within his reach. His experience\nin the new sphere will be a continuation of his experience in the old\none; for there is a law by which we judge of the future by the past.\nThis law is one of the conditions of our intellectual existence; an\ninevitable habit of our minds; imposed upon us by an inexorable but\nfamiliar authority. Our experience in this life has taught us that,\nin the investigation of the phenomena of nature that are open to our\nobservation here, we have never reached the end of possible discovery;\nthat every fresh discovery has evinced that there are still new things\nto be learned, new manifestations of power to be revealed, new products\nand new methods to be seen. However long we may suppose the human race\nto exist on earth and its researches to be prosecuted here, we must\nsuppose an endless accumulation of knowledge hereafter, because the\nlaw which compels us to judge of the future by the past obliges us to\naccept as the fruition of the future that which has been the fruition\nof the past.[99]\n\nIs there in this any violation of the true law of thought? Does the\nrelation between our past experience and the experience which we\nforecast for the future fade into a dim symbol of a relation? On the\ncontrary, both are equally capable of mental representation; for\nwe are mentally so constituted that the consciousness of what has\nhappened to us in the past--the unending succession of new discoveries,\nthe constant accumulation of knowledge, which we have experienced\nhere--gives us the conception of the same endless progress hereafter,\ncompels us to believe in it, and enables us to grasp it as a product of\ntrue thought.\n\nMr. Spencer has much to say of \"the imbecility of human intelligence\nwhen brought to bear on the ultimate question.\" What is the ultimate\nquestion? The ultimate question with which science and philosophy are\nconcerned is the existence of the Supreme Being. It is of the utmost\nconsequence for us to understand wherein consists the imbecility of\nhuman intelligence when brought to bear upon this question of the\nexistence of God. How does our imbecility manifest itself? What is\nthe point beyond which thought can not go? We become conscious of the\nexistence of the being called man, because, from the phenomena which we\nknow that he produces by the exercise of his will and power, and which\nwe know must have had an author and producer, we deduce an existence\nbeyond the phenomena, an actor in their production. What more, or\nwhat that is different, do we do or undertake to do, when, from the\nphenomena of nature which we know that man did not produce, we think\nof another existence beyond the phenomena? In both cases, we study\nthe phenomena by our senses and powers of observation; in both cases\nwe reason that there is an actor who produces the phenomena; yet the\nexistence of the actor who produces the phenomena is inscrutable in the\ncase of the Deity in the same sense and for the same reason that it\nis inscrutable in the case of man. How the human mind came to exist,\nby what process it was made to exist, by what means it was created,\nwhat was the genesis of the human intellect, is just as inscrutable,\nno more and no less so, as the mode in which the Deity came to exist.\nIn both cases the existence of a being is what we think of; and when\nwe think of either being we think of that which is beyond phenomena\nbut which we deduce from phenomena. In neither case do we \"accept a\nformless consciousness of the inscrutable\"; for what we accept is the\nconsciousness of a being, and it is not a consciousness of the mode in\nwhich he came to exist. The latter consciousness is the inscrutable\nproblem. The existence is what we think of, and we think of it by a\nperfectly true process of thought, deducing it from the simple truth\nthat the phenomena must have had an actor in their production. We do\nnot undertake to think of the process by which man was created, or of\nthe mode in which that other existence came to be without beginning and\nwithout end.\n\nI have thus discriminated between what we do and what we do not think\nof, when we think of an existence beyond phenomena, but which we deduce\nfrom phenomena. This is a most necessary discrimination; for, in\nthinking of the existence, we do not try to think how it came to be an\nexistence. We think only of the existence; and we deduce it from our\nobservation and study of phenomena, which teach us that they must have\nhad an actor, an author, a producer, and that they did not produce or\ncreate themselves.\n\nIt remains for me to advert to Mr. Spencer's theory of the origin of\nthe religious consciousness, or the origin of the idea of supernatural\nbeings, and hence of one highest supernatural being. This is his\nghost-theory. He has recently told us that in his \"Descriptive\nSociology\"--a work commenced in 1867, and which preceded his\n\"Principles of Sociology\" (written in 1874)--he caused to be gathered\nadequate materials for generalization, consisting of a great number\nof excerpts from the writings of travelers and historians who have\ngiven accounts of the religious beliefs of the uncivilized races. He\nnumbers 697 of these extracts which refer to the ghost-theory, and\nonly 87 which refer to fetichism. This great ratio of eight to one\nhe considers overwhelming proof that the ghost-theory, as opposed\nto fetichism, is sustained by the beliefs of a vast majority of the\nuncivilized races. What if it is? What is the ghost-theory, and\nwhat is fetichism, as the chief source and origin of religion? Mr.\nSpencer, in his recent article, explains fetichism as most persons\nunderstand it, namely, the worship of inanimate objects, or belief in\ntheir supernatural powers. The ghost-theory, which his 697 extracts\nillustrate, is \"the belief in a wandering double, which goes away\nduring sleep, or fainting, and deserts the body for a longer period\nat death; a double which can enter and possess other persons, causing\ndisease, epilepsy, insanity, etc., which gives rise to ideas of\nspirits, demons, etc., and which, originates propitiation and worship\nof ghosts.\"[100] Further on, he reiterates his ghost-theory as the\norigin of religious beliefs, and explains it thus:\n\n Setting out with the statement that \"unlike the ordinary\n consciousness, the religious consciousness is concerned with that\n which lies beyond the sphere of sense,\" I went on to show that the\n rise of this consciousness begins among primitive men with the\n belief in a double belonging to each individual, which, capable of\n wandering away from him during life, becomes his ghost or spirit after\n death; and that from this idea of a being eventually distinguished\n as supernatural, there develop, in course of time, the ideas of\n supernatural beings of all orders up to the highest. Mr. Harrison has\n alleged that the primitive religion is not belief in and propitiation\n of the ghost, but is worship of \"physical objects treated frankly as\n physical objects\" (p. 498). That he has disproved the one view and\n proved the other, no one will, I think, assert. Contrariwise, he has\n given occasion for me to cite weighty authorities against him.\n\n Next it was contended that in the assemblage of supernatural beings\n thus originating in each tribe, some, derived from chiefs, were\n superior to others; and that, as the compounding and recompounding\n of tribes gave origin to societies having social grades and rulers\n of different orders, there resulted that conception of a hierarchy\n of ghosts or gods which polytheism shows us. Further it was argued\n that while, with the growth of civilization and knowledge, the\n minor supernatural agents became merged in the major supernatural\n agent, this single great supernatural agent, gradually losing the\n anthropomorphic attributes at first ascribed, has come in our days to\n retain but few of them; and, eventually losing these, will then merge\n into a consciousness of an Omnipresent Power to which no attributes\n can be ascribed. This proposition has not been contested.\n\nWithout entering into any consideration of what Mr. Harrison has\ndisproved or proved, as between fetichism and the ghost-theory, I will\nnow ask why the beliefs of the uncivilized races, or of the primitive\nmen, should be regarded as important evidence of the origin of beliefs\namong civilized and cultivated men? Is modern philosophy, in accounting\nfor or justifying the belief in a Supreme Being which is held to-day\nby most of the cultivated and educated part of mankind, to assign its\norigin to the primitive and uncivilized men? Is the whole idea of a\nsupernatural being to be regarded as traditionally handed down from our\nbarbarian ancestors? Is there no other source from which we can derive\nthat idea? Are we none of us capable of finding for ourselves rational\ngrounds of belief in a supernatural agent, deducing his existence from\na study of nature? Or must we trace this belief back through the ages\nuntil we arrive at an origin which we shall of course despise? What has\nphilosophy to do now with \"the primitive religion\"? Is there nothing\nthat science and reason and disciplined methods of thought and sound\ndeduction can teach us? Are we to throw away all the proofs which\nnature spreads before us, and for the investigation of which we have\naccumulated so many facilities, and turn to the beliefs of uncivilized\nmen? Are the conceptions of supernatural beings, to which a barbarian\nattained, to be taken as the origin of the conception of a personal\nGod to which an educated philosopher can now attain? And because of the\ninadequate and childish superstitions of the past, and of their growth\ninto a belief of one supreme supernatural agent--whatever that idea of\nhim may have been--is the consciousness which we have of a personal God\nto be hereafter merged into a consciousness of an Omnipresent Power to\nwhich no attributes can be ascribed?\n\nIt should seem that the mode in which philosophy, after it came to be\ncultivated by civilized thinkers and observers, freed itself first\nfrom fetichism and the ghost-theory and all the beliefs of polytheism,\nnext from physical agents as the causes of all phenomena, and finally\nattained an independent conception of a First Cause as a supreme\npersonal intelligence and power, is worthy of some consideration.\n\nIn the first chapter of this work, borrowing from the English scholar\nand critic, Mr. Grote, I have given a condensed account of some of\nthe systems of Greek philosophy which began in the first half of the\nsixth century before Christ, and extended down to Plato, whose life\nwas embraced in 427-347 of the ante-Christian era. About 150 B.\nC., the Greek philosophy, and especially the speculations of\nPlato, encountered at Alexandria the monotheism of the Hellenizing\nJews.[101] This history of Greek philosophy, as developed by Mr. Grote,\nshows that the struggle against polytheistic agencies, as the causes of\nnatural phenomena, began with efforts to find purely physical agencies;\nthat this struggle, in spite of the surrounding beliefs in a multitude\nof supernatural beings of different orders, was long continued, and\ngave rise to a most remarkable variety of scientific explanations:\nthat it passed through an extraordinary number of physical theories,\nuntil at length in Plato there was developed the idea of a distinct\npersonal constructive actor, the Demiurgus, a being to whom, whether\nintended by Plato as a philosophical myth, or as an entity in which\nhe had something of faith or conviction, he assigned the formation of\nhis Kosmos. With characteristic acumen, the English commentator points\nout Plato's skill in eluding the possible charge of infidelity to the\nestablished religion of Athens, while he at the same time propounded\nthe existence of a personal First Cause that was in a striking degree\ninconsistent with the popular faith. The whole course of this history\nof Greek speculation evinces that from an early period the Greek\nphilosophers were utter skeptics in regard to the popular religion and\nthe poetic traditions; that they not only did not derive anything from\nthe primitive religion, from fetichism, from the ghost-beliefs of their\nbarbarian ancestors--if their ancestors had such beliefs--or from their\nheroic ages, or from the multitudinous gods of the popular theology and\nthe popular worship, or from the old poetical imagery, but that they\nstrove to get away from all these sources, and to construct theories\nof the universe that would explain the ultimate cause or causes in a\nvery different manner. The earliest Greek speculators got no further in\ntheir theories than the construction of systems of physical agencies,\nor agencies that stood to them in the quality of physical actors.\nPlato, on the other hand, resorted to the conception of a supreme\npersonal actor.\n\nMr. Grote has further mentioned a very striking fact, which is, that\nbefore the Christian era, the Demiurgus of Plato was received by the\nHellenizing Jews at Alexandria as a conception kindred to the God of\nMoses. His statement, in substance the same as that previously made by\na Continental critic, Gfr\u00f6rer, is so interesting and important that\nI quote his words: \"But though the idea of a pre-kosmic Demiurgus\nfound little favor among the Grecian schools of philosophy before\nthe Christian era, it was greatly welcomed among the Hellenizing Jews\nat Alexandria, from Aristobulus (about B. C. 150) down to\nPhilo. It formed the suitable point of conjunction between Hellenic\nand Judaic speculation. The marked distinction drawn by Plato between\nthe Demiurgus, and the constructed or generated Kosmos, with its\nin-dwelling gods, provided a suitable place for the Supreme God of the\nJews, degrading the pagan gods by comparison. The 'Tim\u00e6us' was compared\nwith the book of Genesis, from which it was even affirmed that Plato\nhad copied. He received the denomination of the Atticising Moses--Moses\nwriting in Attic Greek. It was thus that the Platonic 'Tim\u00e6us' became\nthe medium of transition from the polytheistic theology, which served\nas philosophy among the early ages of Greece, to the omnipotent\nmonotheism to which philosophy became subordinated after the Christian\nera.\"[102]\n\nPerhaps there is no more remarkable fact than this in the whole history\nof philosophical speculation. Possibly Mr. Spencer would say that it\nadds another proof to his ghost-theory. But the important fact is that\nPlato's Demiurgus partakes in no degree of the ghost idea, and, instead\nof being a modification of that idea, is an original and perfectly\nindependent conception. The Demiurgus of Plato is not a chief spirit\nevolved in imagination out of a hierarchy of spirits. He is himself the\noriginator and fashioner of the gods, of whom he makes use as ministers\nin the formation of the bodies of the primitive men, after he has\nhimself formed the souls which are to inhabit them for a season.\n\nIt appears, by Mr. Grote's citations from Gfr\u00f6rer, that the latter had\npreviously noted what Aristobulus maintained one hundred and fifty\nyears earlier than Philo, namely, that \"not only the oldest Grecian\npoets, Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus, etc., but also the most celebrated\nthinkers, especially Plato, had acquired all their wisdom from a\nvery old translation of the Pentateuch.\" Neither of these modern\ncritics appears to have accepted the assertion of Aristobulus, and\nits intrinsic improbability is very great. Certainly the internal\nevidence of the \"Tim\u00e6us\" negatives the assumption that Plato had seen\nthe Pentateuch, for his Demiurgus is not the God of Moses, although\nit was very natural for the Alexandrian Jews to think they recognized\na resemblance. Mr. Grote, moreover, seems to put this matter beyond\ndoubt, for he says that the Platonic \"Tim\u00e6us\" _became the medium of\ntransition_ from the polytheism of early Greece to the monotheism\nof the Christian era. This implies very clearly that Mr. Grote did\nnot consider the Demiurgus of Plato to be either derived from the\npolytheism of the early Grecian ages, on the one hand, or from the\nMosaic Jehovah, on the other hand, but that he considered it a\nconception which stood between them. The point of resemblance is in\nthe idea of a divine and supreme personal actor in the production of\nphenomena.\n\nIt does not seem, therefore, that a philosopher at the present day is\nconfined to the source of the primitive religion, be that source what\nit may. The primitive religion, whether its origin was fetichism or a\nbelief in ghosts, has imposed no shackles upon our minds. The beliefs\nof the primitive men may have originated as Mr. Spencer supposes, but\nthe question for us--revelation being laid aside--is just what it was\nfor Plato, the difference being that our means of investigation are\nsuperior to his. The grounds of our belief in a personal God are not\nthe same as those on which the uncivilized races formed first the idea\nof a wandering double emanating from the human body, then conceived\nof spirits or ghosts, next of different orders of spirits or ghosts,\nand finally of a chief and supreme spirit. Our materials for sound\ndeduction are not the same as those of the primitive races of mankind,\nor of the uncivilized tribes of the present day. I have before remarked\nthat the intellectual effort of a savage in striving for the idea of a\ndeity is the same kind of effort as that of the civilized and educated\nman; but that the difference between them is in the growth and activity\nof the reasoning power, and in the materials on which it is exercised.\nWhile our barbarian predecessors lived in an age of ignorance, we live\nin an age of knowledge. We are surrounded by extraordinary discoveries,\nand are possessed of the means of still further research. They had\nalmost no means for investigating physical phenomena. We are, or ought\nto be, disciplined reasoners. They, on the contrary, while able to\nreason correctly on a very few subjects, could not reason correctly\non all subjects. We are, or ought to be, capable of subjecting the\nmaterials which the phenomena of nature spread before us, to sound\nprocesses of thought and to logical deductions. We are, or ought to\nbe, capable of discriminating between that which is really inscrutable\nand that which is not so. We are, or ought to be, able to know when we\nare within the bounds of possible thought, and when we transcend them.\nWe are, or ought to be, able to see that the existence of phenomena\nnecessarily implies a causing power; that when the phenomena are such\nas we know that man produces, the idea of an intelligent personal actor\nis both a legitimate deduction and a perfectly appreciable subject\nof thought. Are we not entitled to apply the same reasoning to the\nphenomena of nature which we know that man did not produce? And when\nwe so reason, do we borrow anything whatever from the primitive idea\nof ghosts or spirits, whether they are supposed to have first emanated\nfrom human bodies, or to reside in inanimate objects?\n\nThere are two distinct values to be assigned to the researches of\nscience. One of them consists in the practical improvement of the\nmaterial condition of society; the lessening of physical evil, the\nincrease of physical good; the advancement of our power over matter.\nIn an age intensely devoted to this materialistic improvement, there\nwill be a great accumulation of physical knowledge. At the same\ntime there are accumulating in the same ratio new materials for\nphilosophical speculation concerning the causes of the phenomena that\nare investigated. The specialists who carry on the investigations\nmay not always be the best reasoners in the application of the new\nmaterials to the purpose of philosophical inquiry into the producing\ncauses of the phenomena. But the other distinct value of their\ninvestigations consists in the accumulation of materials from which the\nphilosopher can deduce the existence of an actor in the production of\nthe phenomena. When, from these materials, constantly accumulating and\nconstantly to be used in a uniform process of reasoning to which the\nhuman mind is both able and obliged to resort, the philosopher deduces\nthe conception of a supreme, personal, intelligent being, he assigns\nto that being just those attributes which the phenomena of nature\ncompel him to believe in, because if the attributes did not exist the\nphenomena of nature could not have become what they are. There can be\nno reason to suppose that as the materials increase, as the researches\nof science, for whatever purpose carried on, lead to greater and still\ngreater accumulations of knowledge, the law of thought by which we\ndeduce the idea of an actor in the production of phenomena will change,\nor that the logical necessity for conceiving, or the intellectual\ncapacity to conceive of, the attributes of that actor will either\ndiminish or fade away. An Omnipotent Power without attributes, or one\nto which no attributes can be assigned, is not likely to be the end of\nall philosophical speculation about the ultimate cause. Power without\nattributes, power without a determining will, power without guidance,\nor purposes, or objects, is not a conception to which a well-trained\nintellect is now likely to attain; and the greater the accumulation of\nphysical knowledge becomes, the greater will be the necessity to such\nan intellect for recognizing attributes, and for assigning them to the\npower which is manifested by the phenomena.\n\nAccording to Mr. Spencer, the process by which mankind are ultimately\nto lose the consciousness of a personal Deity is the following:\nAnthropomorphic attributes were at first ascribed to the single great\nsupernatural agent of whom the primitive men conceived. But in our\ndays, the idea of such a supreme supernatural agent has come to retain\nbut a few of these attributes. These few will eventually be lost,\nand there will be nothing left but a consciousness of an Omnipotent\nPower to which no attributes can be ascribed. The probability of\nthis result depends upon the necessity for ascribing what are called\nanthropomorphic attributes to the Supreme Being; or, in other words, it\ndepends upon the inquiry whether, in order to ascribe to the Supreme\nBeing any attributes at all, we are necessarily confined to those which\nare anthropomorphic.\n\n\"Anthropomorphism,\" a term compounded from the Greek \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2, man,\nand \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u03ae, form, has come to signify the representation of the Deity\nunder a human form, or with human attributes and affections. It is\ntherefore important to know what we in fact do, when reasoning on the\nphenomena of nature, we reach the conclusion that they must have had\nan author or producer, and then ascribe to him certain attributes. The\nfact that the ancient religious beliefs ascribed to the Supreme Being\ngrossly anthropomorphic attributes, is unimportant. So is the fact that\nthe anthropomorphic attributes have been slowly diminishing in the\nconceptions of the reasoning and cultivated part of mankind. The really\nimportant question is whether there can be no conception of a Supreme\nBeing without ascribing to him attributes which liken him to man; or\nwhether, when the anthropomorphic attributes are lost, the idea of a\npersonal God will be lost.\n\nThe essential character of any anthropomorphic or human\nattribute--power for example, or wisdom, or goodness--is that it is\nlimited, imperfect, and liable to error. But when we conceive of these\nqualities as existing in absolute perfection and boundless capacity,\nwhile we retain the idea that they are personal qualities, we in fact\ndivest them of their anthropomorphic or human character. It is a\ncontradiction in terms to say that an imperfect human capacity is the\nsame attribute as a divine and unlimited capacity. The difficulty with\nthe ancient religious beliefs, the whole error of anthropomorphism,\nwas that the conceptions stopped short of the idea of unlimited power,\nwisdom, and benevolence. The attributes ascribed to the Deity likened\nhim to man in form, character, powers, dispositions, passions. He was\nan exaggerated human being, with vastly more power, more skill, more\nwisdom, but still with the same kind of power, skill, and wisdom,\nactuated by like motives and governed by like passions. Now the truth\nis, that the difference between a limited and imperfect attribute of\ncharacter and one that is boundless--power, for example--is more than\na difference of degree. It is a difference in kind; for while in both\ncases we conceive of a personal capacity to act and a will to guide\nthe act, in the one case we are thinking of that which is inferior,\nlimited, and feeble, and in the other case we are thinking of that\nwhich knows no limitations and is absolutely inexhaustible. It is\nnot true, therefore, that there can be no conception of a Supreme\nBeing without ascribing to him human attributes. When we reason from\nphenomena to the conclusion that they must have had an author--when\nwe reach the conviction that phenomena must have had a cause, that\nthere must have been an actor, a process, and a product--we have\nto deal with two classes of phenomena. One is the class in which we\nknow, from the observations of our senses and our experience, that the\nauthor and actor was man. It becomes verified to us with irresistible\ncertainty that the phenomena of human society were produced by an\nactor, and that that actor was man; a personal agent with a limited and\nimperfect power. When we turn to the phenomena of nature which we know\nthat man did not produce, we are led by the same irresistible logical\nsequence of thought to the conviction that these phenomena must have\nbeen caused to exist, for human reason revolts at the idea that the\nphenomena which exist were not caused to exist. We come immediately\nto perceive that the phenomena of nature are of such a character that\nthe power which has produced them must not only have been superhuman,\nbut it must have been absolutely boundless. At the moment we depart\nfrom the investigation of phenomena which belong in the department of\nhuman efforts, and come to the phenomena which belong in the department\nof nature alone, while the necessity for a personal actor continues,\nthe character and capacities of the actor become entirely changed.\nWe see that the phenomena of nature required for their production\npower without limitation, skill incapable of error, benevolence that\nwas inexhaustible. We thus pass entirely away from anthropomorphic\nattributes, to the conception of attributes that are not human. We\nmay go on to divest the idea of a Supreme Being of all the attributes\nthat can appropriately be classed as anthropomorphic, and there will\nstill remain the conception of a Supreme Being to whom we not only may\nbut must ascribe attributes that are forced upon our convictions, not\nbecause some of them belong in an inferior degree to man, but because\nall of them are of such a character that if they did not exist in\nboundless perfection the phenomena of nature could not have existed.\n\nAmong the origins which have been assigned to religious beliefs,\nthere is one remarkable hypothesis which may be contrasted with the\nghost-theory, and which, so far as the beliefs of cultivated men at\nthe present day are concerned, is about as important as the origin of\nthe belief in ghosts, or as fetichism. It seems that some of the Greek\nphilosophers and historians, entirely regardless of the ghost-theory as\nthe origin of beliefs in supernatural beings, considered that they were\nfictions invented by the first lawgivers, and promulgated by them for\nuseful purposes. Belief in the gods was thus imposed by the authority\nof those who organized society and dictated what men were to believe in\norder to exercise a useful restraint. Plato himself regarded this as\nthe origin of what the communities around him believed respecting the\nattributes and acts of the gods; the matters believed being fictions\nprescribed by the lawgivers. In his \"Republic,\" in which he sketches\nthe entire political, social, ethical, and religious constitution of\nan ideal city, assuming it to be planned and put in operation by an\nabsolute and unlimited authority, he laid it down as essential for\nthe lawgiver to determine what the fictions were to be in which his\nown community were to be required to believe. Some fictions there\nmust be; for in the community there would be originally nothing but a\nvague emotional tendency to belief in supernatural beings, and this\ntendency must be availed of by some positive mythical inventions which\nit was for the lawgiver to produce and the citizens to accept. Such\nfictions were the accredited stories about the gods and heroes, which\nformed the religious beliefs among Plato's contemporaries, and were\neverywhere embodied in the works of poets, painters, and sculptors,\nand in the religious ceremonies. But the ancient fictions were, in\nPlato's opinion, bad, inasmuch as they gave wrong ethical ideas of the\ncharacters of the gods. They did not rest upon traditionary evidence,\nor divine inspiration, being merely pious frauds, constructed by\nauthority and for an orthodox purpose. But they did not fulfill the\npurpose as well as they should have done. Accordingly, Plato directs\nin his \"Republic\" the coinage of a new body of legends, for which he\nclaims no character of veracity, but which will be more in harmony\nwith what he conceives to be the true characters of the gods, and\nwill produce a more salutary ethical effect upon those who are to\nbe the efficient rulers of the commonwealth after it is founded. As\nthe founder of his ideal city, he claims and exercises an exclusive\nmonopoly of coining and circulating such fictions, and they are to\nbe absolutely accepted by those who are to constitute its rulers,\nand who are to promulgate and teach them to the community, as the\nphysician administers wholesome remedies. To prevent the circulation of\ndissenting narratives, he establishes a peremptory censorship. There is\nthus no question of absolute truth or absolute falsehood. That is true\nwhich is stamped at the mint of the lawgiver, and that is false which\nhe interdicts.[103]\n\nNowhere has orthodoxy been rested more distinctly upon the basis of\nabsolute human authority--authority acting upon the highest motives of\nthe public good, for the most salutary purposes, but without claiming\nanything in the nature of divine inspiration, or even pretending to any\nother truth than conformity to preconceived ideas of the characters\nof the gods. As evidence of what Plato regarded as the origin of the\nreligious beliefs which were held by his contemporaries, his \"Republic\"\nis an important testimony; for he assigns almost nothing to mankind in\ngeneral, but an emotional tendency to believe in invisible quasi-human\nagents, of whom they had no definite conceptions, and at the same time\nthey were entirely ignorant of recorded history, past and present.\nThey needed distinct legendary fictions and invented narratives; these\nwere furnished to them by those who could coin them, and were accepted\nupon the authority of those who promulgated them. Those who first\nembodied the fictions as narratives were the oldest poets; in progress\nof time the authority which dictated belief in them came to be the\nstate. Plato rejected the fictions of the state, and in his \"Republic\"\nproposed to substitute fictions of his own. The testimony of Plato,\ntherefore, in respect to the origin of religious beliefs in the early\nages of Greece is decidedly against the ghost-theory, whatever support\nmay be found for that theory in the beliefs of the uncivilized races\nof our own day, or in the beliefs of other nations of antiquity. But\nneither the ghost-theory, as the origin of beliefs in supernatural\nbeings, nor the origin of such beliefs in the will of the lawgiver,\nwhich Plato clearly held in his \"Republic\" to be the foundation of\northodoxy, is any test or measure of what philosophy may attain to as a\nrational conception at the present day.[104]\n\nI propose, therefore, to imagine a man of mature years, without any\nreligious prepossessions whatever, a perfectly independent thinker,\nfurnished with the knowledge that is now within the easy reach of human\nacquisition, capable of correct reasoning, and with no bias to any kind\nof belief. It is only necessary to personify in one individual the\nintellectual capacity of the cultivated and educated part of mankind,\nbut without the religious ideas instilled into them by education, in\norder to have a valuable witness to the mental processes and results\nwhich can be followed and attained by a right employment of our\nfaculties. And, the better to exhibit the processes and results, I\npropose to let this imaginary person discuss in the form of dialogue,\nin which another imaginary interlocutor shall be a modern disciple of\nthe evolution school, whatever topics would be likely to come into\ndebate between such persons.\n\n FOOTNOTES:\n\n [93] \"Essays,\" vol. iii, pp. 293-296.\n\n [94] For the answer to the objection that we thus ascribe\n anthropomorphic attributes to the Supreme Being, see _infra._\n\n [95] Webster's Dictionary, \"Phenomenon.\"\n\n [96] Our other American lexicographer, Worcester, who was pretty\n strict in regard to the words which he admitted into the English\n language, gives the word \"noumenon,\" but he was careful to designate\n its arbitrary use. His definition is this:\n\n \"Noumenon, _n._ [Gr. \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, the mind.] In the philosophy of Kant, an\n object in itself, not relatively to us; opposed to _phenomenon_.\n _Fleming_.\"\n\n [97] Prof. Huxley, who claims a sort of patent right or priority of\n invention in the term and doctrine \"agnosticism.\"\n\n [98] \"There are some things I know and some things I believe,\" said\n the Syrian; \"I know that I have a soul, and I believe that it is\n immortal.\" ...\n\n \"I wish I could assure myself of the personality of the Creator,\" said\n Lothair; \"I cling to that, but they say it is unphilosophical!\" \"In\n what sense,\" asked the Syrian, \"is it more unphilosophical to believe\n in a personal God, omnipotent and omniscient, than in natural forces,\n unconscious and irresistible? Is it unphilosophical to combine power\n with intelligence?\"--_Disraeli's \"Lothair.\"_\n\n [99] The practice of judging of the future by the past is sometimes\n treated as if it were a mere habit of the uncultivated and\n undisciplined part of mankind--a kind of mental weakness. Undoubtedly,\n our past experience is not always an infallible guide to what is to\n be our experience in the future. We often have to correct our past\n experience, by carefully separating the accidental from the essential;\n by more comprehensive analysis of the facts which constitute our\n former experience. But when we have full, comprehensive, and accurate\n views of that which has happened to us heretofore, our beliefs in what\n is to happen to us hereafter are not only attained by a safe process\n of reasoning, but that process is imposed upon us by a law of our\n mental constitution.\n\n [100] \"Nineteenth Century\" for November, 1884, p. 827.\n\n [101] Grote's \"Plato,\" iii, pp. 284, 285.\n\n [102] Grote's \"Plato,\" iii, p. 285, and notes.\n\n [103] Grote's \"Plato,\" iii, p. 181 _et seq._\n\n [104] The contradictions between Plato's ideas of the origin of\n beliefs in the gods, as given in his various writings, are of course\n unimportant in reference to the present discussion. In the \"Tim\u00e6us,\"\n as Mr. Grote has pointed out, Plato \"accepts the received genealogy\n of the gods, upon the authority of the sons and early descendants of\n the gods. These eons must have known their own fathers; we ought,\n therefore, to 'follow the law and believe them,' though they spoke\n without either probable or demonstrative proof.... That which Plato\n here enjoins to be believed is the genealogy of Hesiod and other\n poets, though he does not expressly name the poets.\" (Grote, iii, p.\n 189, note.) In other words, the sons of the gods are authoritative\n witnesses to their genealogy, whose _ipsi diximus_ must be believed.\n On the other hand, in his \"Republic\" and \"Leges,\" Plato rejects the\n authority of those witnesses, and boldly proclaims that their legends\n are fictions, which must be displaced by better fictions, more\n consonant to a true ethical conception of the characters of the gods.\n It is the province of the lawgiver to supply these better legends, but\n they are all the while fictions, although the multitude do not know\n that they are so. Mr. Grote accounts for these and other discrepancies\n in the writings of Plato by explaining that his different dialogues\n are not interdependent productions, but separate disquisitions. (See\n his admirable and critical examination of the Platonic canon, in\n Chapters IV, V, VI, of his first volume.)\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\n The existence, attributes, and methods of God deducible from the\n phenomena of Nature--Origin of the solar system.\n\n\nIn all that has been said in the preceding chapters respecting the\ntwo hypotheses of special creation and evolution, the existence and\nattributes of the Supreme Being have been assumed. The question of the\nexistence and attributes of God has been reserved for discussion as\nan independent inquiry; and this inquiry it is now proposed to make,\nwithout any reference to the teachings of revealed religion, or to\nthe traditionary beliefs of mankind. The simple idea of God, which I\nsuppose to be capable of being reached as a philosophical deduction\nfrom the phenomena of the universe, embraces the conception of a\nSupreme Being existing from and through all eternity, and possessed of\nthe attributes of infinite power and goodness, boundless, that is to\nsay in faculties, incapable of error, and of supreme beneficence. While\nthis idea of God corresponds with that which has been held from an\nearly period under more or less of the influence exerted by teachings\nwhich have been accepted as inspired, or as authorized by the Deity\nhimself, the question here to be considered is whether the same idea of\nGod is a rationally philosophical deduction from the phenomena of the\nuniverse without the aid of revelation.\n\nIn order to conduct this inquiry so as to exclude all influence of\ntraditionary beliefs derived from sources believed to have been\ninspired, or from any authority whatever, let us suppose a man to\nhave been born into this world in the full maturity of average human\nfaculties, as they are found in well-disciplined intellects of the\npresent age, but without any inculcated ideas on religious subjects.\nIn the place of education commencing in infancy and carried on to the\nyears of maturity, in the course of which more or less of dogmatic\ntheology would have become incorporated almost with the texture of the\nmind, let us suppose that the mind of our inquirer is at first a total\nblank in respect to a belief in or conception of such a being as God,\nbut that his intellectual powers are so well developed that he can\nreason soundly upon whatever comes within the reach of his observation\nor study. Let us further imagine him to be so situated that he can\ncommand at will the knowledge that science, as it now exists, could\nfurnish to him, and that he is able to judge impartially any theories\nwith which he meets. Such a person would be likely to deal rationally\nand independently with any question that might arise in the course of\nhis investigations; and the fundamental question that would be likely\nto present itself to his mind would be, How came this universe and its\ncountless phenomena to exist?\n\nStimulated by an eager curiosity, but careful to make his\ninvestigations with entire coolness of reasoning, let us suppose\nthat our inquirer first turns his attention to the phenomena of the\nsolar system, and to what astronomy can teach him in regard to its\nconstruction. He finds it to consist of--\n\n1. The sun, a great central body giving forth light and heat.\n\n2. A group of four interior planets: Mercury, Venus, the Earth, and\nMars.\n\n3. A group of small planets, called asteroids, revolving beyond the\norbit of Mars, and numbering, according to the latest discoveries,\nabout two hundred and twenty.\n\n4. A group of four planets beyond the asteroids: Jupiter, Saturn,\nUranus, and Neptune.\n\n5. The satellites of the planets, of which there are twenty now known;\nall but three of them belonging to the outer planets.\n\n6. An intermediate number of bodies called comets and meteors, which\nrevolve in very eccentric orbits.\n\nThis system of bodies, constituting a mechanism by itself, apart from\nwhat are called the fixed stars, is the first object in nature to which\nour inquirer directs his studies. Inasmuch as the comets and meteors\nmove in very eccentric orbits, and are supposed to come into our system\nfrom the illimitable spaces beyond it, although in the case of the\ncomets, or some of them, mathematical calculations enable astronomers\nto predict their return when they have passed out of the solar system,\nand inasmuch as the sun and the superior planets may be contemplated\nas a grand piece of mechanism, and as the greatest mechanical object\nin nature of whose construction and movements we have some accurate\nknowledge, we will suppose that our inquirer confines his attention\nto this part of the solar system, without adverting to the action of\nthe bodies which are not always, as these are, within the range of the\ntelescope.\n\nOne of the first things that would strike him would be the enormous\nrange in the sizes, distances, and relative weights of these different\nbodies. He would learn, for example, that Neptune is eighty times as\nfar from the sun as Mercury, and that Jupiter is several thousand times\nas heavy; and he would observe that these differences in magnitude,\ndistance from the sun, and weight of each mass, are carried through a\nrange of proportions stupendously great. If he followed the best lights\nof modern astronomy, he would learn that what is known, or accepted as\nknown, in regard to the operation of any law among these bodies, is\nthat they are bound together by the law of universal gravitation as\na force to which all matter would be subjected when it should come to\nexist, in whatever forms it might be distributed; secondly, that when\nthe bodies now composing the solar system should come into existence,\nthe system would not owe its proportions to the operation of the law of\ngravitation, but would be the result of a plan so shaped as to admit\nof its being governed by the law of gravitation after the system had\nbeen made, in such a manner as to produce regularity and certainty of\nmovement and to prevent dislocation and disturbance. What the great\nmodern telescopes have enabled astronomers to discover tends very\nstrongly to show that the plan of the solar system, in respect to the\nrelative distances, magnitudes, and revolutions of the different bodies\naround the sun, and their relations to that central body and to each\nother, are not the result of any antecedent law which gradually evolved\nthis particular plan, but that the plan itself was primarily designed\nand executed as one on which the law of gravitation could operate\nuniformly, and so as to prevent any disturbance in the relations of the\ndifferent bodies to each other.[105]\n\nAn illustration will help to make the meaning of this apparent. Let\nus suppose a human artificer to project the formation of a complex\nmechanism, in which different solid bodies would be made to revolve\naround a central body; and let us imagine him to be situated outside\nof the earth's attraction, so that its attraction would not disturb\nhim. He would then have to consider the law of gravitation only in\nreference to its operation among the different bodies of his machine;\nand he would adjust their relative distances, weights, and orbits of\nrevolution around the central body, so that the law of gravitation,\ninstead of producing dislocation and disturbance, would bind the\nwhole together in a fixed system of movement, by counteracting the\ncentrifugal tendency of a revolving body to depart from its intended\norbit, and at the same time relying on the effect of the two forces in\npreventing the revolving bodies from falling into the center or from\nrushing off into the endless realms of space.\n\nThis is what may well be supposed to have taken place in the formation\nof the solar system, for it is consistent with the law which must have\npreceded the existence of that system. We can not suppose that the law\nof gravitation was itself a mere result of the relative distances,\nmagnitudes, and orbits of the different bodies. This supposition would\nmake gravitation not a law, but a phenomenon. We do indeed arrive at\nthe existence of the law of gravitation by observing the actions of\nthe bodies which compose the solar system; in other words, we discover\nthe law that holds them together, by observing their actions. But we\nshould entirely reverse the proper process of reasoning, if we were to\nconclude that the law of gravitation is a phenomenon resulting from\nan arrangement of certain bodies according to a certain plan. The\ndiscoveries of astronomy, on the contrary, should lead us to regard\ngravitation as a universal law, which existed before the existence of\nthe bodies which have been subjected to it. This is the only way in\nwhich our inquirer could reason in regard to the formation of the solar\nsystem, whether he supposed its plan to have been a special creation,\nor to have been evolved out of a nebulous vapor by the operation of\nthe laws of motion or any other laws. Reasoning upon the hypothesis\nthat the law of gravitation existed before there were any bodies for\nit to operate upon, or, in other words, that it had become in some\nway an ordained or established principle by which all bodies would be\ngoverned, he would have the means of understanding the adaptation of\nthe solar system to be operated upon by the law which he had discovered.\n\nHe would next ask himself, How came this law of gravitation to exist?\nThat it must have had an origin, must have proceeded from some lawgiver\ncompetent to make and enforce it, would be a conclusion to which he\nwould be irresistibly led, for the very idea of a law implies that\nit is a command proceeding from an authority and power capable of\nordaining and executing it. When it is said that a law is a rule of\naction ordained by a supreme power, which is perhaps the most familiar\nas it is the most exact definition, the idea of a command and of a\npower to enforce it is necessarily implied. This is just as true of a\nphysical as it is of a moral law; of a law that is to govern matter as\nof a law that is to govern moral and accountable beings. Both proceed\nfrom a supreme authority and power, and both are commands. There is,\nhowever, one distinction between a moral law and a law of Nature,\nwhich relates to the mode in which we arrive at a knowledge of the\nlaw; a distinction which our inquirer would learn in the course of his\ninvestigations. We infer the existence of a law of Nature, or a law\ndesigned to operate upon matter, from the regularity and uniformity\nof certain physical phenomena. As the phenomena occur always in the\nsame way we infer it to be an ordinance of Nature that they shall\noccur in that way. But the moral phenomena exhibited by the actions\nof men have not this regularity and uniformity. They are sometimes\nin accordance with and sometimes grossly variant from any supposed\nrule of moral action. We can not, therefore, deduce a moral law from\nour observation of the actions of the beings whom it was designed to\ngovern, but we must discover it from the rules of right reason and\nfrom such information as has been given to us by whatever revelation\nmay have come to us from another source than our own minds. But this\ndistinction between the modes of reaching a knowledge of physical\nand moral laws does not apply to the authority from which they have\nproceeded. Both of them being commands, or fixed rules of action, both\nmust have had an enacting authority. We learn the one by observing the\nphenomena of Nature. We learn the other from reason and revelation.\n\nTo return now to the examination of the solar system, which our\ninquirer is supposed to be prosecuting. The study, which astronomy\nand its implements will have enabled him to make, has taught him\nthe existence of the law of gravitation, and has led him to the\nconclusion that it must have had an enacting authority. Following out\nthe operation of this law, through the stupendous spaces of the solar\nsystem, he would begin to form conclusions respecting the attributes\nof its author. He would see that the power must have been superhuman;\nin other words, that it must have immeasurably transcended anything\nthat can be imagined of power wielded by a being of less than infinite\ncapacities; for, although the space occupied by the solar system, from\nthe central sun out to the orbit of the planet Neptune, is a measurable\ndistance, the conception of the law of gravitation, and its execution,\nthrough such an enormous space and among such a complex system of\nbodies, evince a faculty in the lawgiver that must have been boundless\nin power and skill. The force of gravitation is found to exactly\nbalance the centrifugal tendency of the bodies revolving around the\nsun, so that, when once set in motion around that center, they remain\nin their respective orbits and never fall into the sun or into each\nother. Our learner would thus see the nature of the adjustment required\nto produce such a result; and, even if he endeavored to follow out\nthis balancing of forces no farther than to the extreme boundary of\nthe solar system, he would see that the being, who could conceive and\nexecute such a design on such a scale, must have had supreme power and\nboundless intelligence. So that, by the study of the solar system, as\nits arrangements and movements are disclosed by astronomy, our inquirer\nwould be naturally led to the conception of a lawgiver and artificer of\ninfinite power and wisdom, ordaining the law of gravitation to operate\nagainst the centrifugal force, which would otherwise conduct out of its\norbit a body revolving around a center, and then adjusting the relative\ndistances, weights, and revolutions of the different bodies, so as to\nsubject them to the operation of the great law that is to preserve them\nin fixed relations to each other.\n\nIf, next, our inquirer should go farther in his investigations of the\nsolar system, and endeavor to satisfy himself concerning the mode in\nwhich the different bodies of this system came into existence in their\nrespective positions, the history of astronomy would teach him that\nthere has been a theory on this subject which fails to account for\nthe existence of this system of bodies without the hypothesis of some\nspecial creation. This theory is what is called the nebular hypothesis.\nIt supposes that the solar system was evolved out of a mass of fiery\nvapor, which filled the stellar spaces, and which became the bodies\nnow observable by the telescope, and that they were finally swung into\ntheir respective places by the operation of the fixed laws of motion.\nBut all that astronomers now undertake to say is that this hypothesis\nis a probably true account of the origin of the solar system, and not\nthat it is an established scientific fact, or a fact supported by\nsuch proofs as those which show the existence of the laws of motion.\nThe history of the nebular hypothesis, from the time of its first\nsuggestion to the present day, shows that there are no satisfactory\nmeans of accounting for the method in which the supposed mass of\nfiery vapor became separated, consolidated, and formed into different\nbodies, and those bodies became ranged and located in their respective\npositions. The hypothesis that these results were all produced by\nfixed laws working upon a mass of fiery vapor, is one that has been\nreasoned out in very different ways; and this diversity of views is\nsuch that astronomers of the higher order do not undertake to say that\nopinions may not reasonably differ in regard to the principal question,\nnamely, the question between the nebular hypothesis and the hypothesis\nof a special act or acts of creation.\n\nInasmuch, therefore, as scientific astronomy would present to our\ninquirer nothing but the nebular hypothesis to account for the\nproduction of the bodies of the solar system as they now exist, and as\nthere are admitted difficulties in this hypothesis which may not be\ninsurmountable but which have not been as yet by any means overcome,\nit can not be said that philosophers are warranted in assuming that\nall the phenomena of the solar system are to be explained by this\ntheory. The hypothesis that the phenomena, or some part of them, have\nbeen produced by a cause operating in a different way, that is, by\nan act or acts of intentional and direct or special creation, is not\nexcluded by the discoveries of the astronomer. Those discoveries lie\nin the domain of astronomy, and they do not exclude the hypothesis of\na special creation of the solar system upon the plan on which we find\nit arranged. The latter hypothesis lies in the domain of philosophy. It\nis to be judged by the inquiry whether it is a rational explanation of\nphenomena, which astronomy does not show as an established scientific\nfact, or by proofs that ought to be deemed satisfactory, to have been\nproduced by the method suggested by the nebular hypothesis.\n\nThe philosophic reasoning, which would conduct our inquirer to his\nconclusions, would begin for him with the existence of an omnipotent\nbeing, by whom the laws of matter and motion were established. This\nconception and belief he has attained from having discovered those\nlaws, which must have had an author. He would soon hear the scientist\nspeak of \"natural\" and \"supernatural\" methods, and he would understand\nthat by the former is meant the operation of certain fixed laws, and,\nby the latter, a mode of action in a different way. But he would also\nand easily understand that the power which could establish the laws\nof matter and motion, the operation of which the scientist calls the\nnatural method, could equally act in another way, which the scientist\ncalls the supernatural, but which, in the eye of philosophy, is just\nas competent to the Infinite Power as the method called natural. To\nstate it in different words, but with the same meaning, that which\nthe scientist calls the supernatural is to the philosopher just as\nconceivable and just as consistent with the idea of a supreme being as\nthe order of what we call Nature; for Nature is the phenomena that are\nopen to our observation, and from which we deduce the probable method\nby which they have been brought about. It will never do to say that\nthey could not have been produced by a cause operating differently from\na system of fixed laws so long as we reason from the hypothesis of the\nexistence and attributes of a Supreme Being. If we reason without that\nhypothesis, we may persuade ourselves of anything or of nothing.\n\nThis idea of a Supreme Being, possessed of the attributes of infinite\npower and wisdom, is one that our inquirer would have reached as a\nrational deduction from the operation of a law (gravitation) which must\nhave had an author; from the structure of a mechanism so designed as to\nbe governed successfully by that law, and from the execution of the law\nthrough such enormous spaces that nothing short of infinite power and\nwisdom could have produced the result.\n\nAt this stage of his investigations, our inquirer encounters a modern\nscientist. I shall take the liberty of coining convenient names for\nthese two interlocutors: calling the one Sophereus, as representing\nthe spirit of unprejudiced research in the formation of beliefs without\nthe influence of previous teaching; and the other Kosmicos, as a\nrepresentative of the dogmatic school of evolution and agnosticism.\n\nSophereus has imparted to his scientific friend the conclusions which\nhe has thus far reached, concerning the existence and attributes of a\nsupreme lawgiver and artificer, as deduced from the phenomena of the\nsolar system. The discussion between them then proceeds as follows:\n\nKOSMICOS. I do not wish to convince you at present of my\nown views on this subject, but I put before you a difficulty which\nyou ought to solve, if you can, to your own satisfaction, before you\nproceed farther. You have learned of the law of gravitation; and you\nhave imagined a being who has established this and other laws by which\nmatter is to be governed. To this being you have imputed certain\npersonal attributes, which you call infinite power and boundless\nwisdom. Observe now that the laws to which you assign this origin are\nof perpetual duration; they have operated without change from the\nremotest period of their existence just as they operate now, and we\nhave no reason to doubt that they will continue to operate in the same\nway through the indefinite future. They constitute the order of Nature.\nNow, you suppose a Supreme Being, who has established these invariable\nlaws, but has not left them anything to do; has not left to them the\nproduction of the solar system, but has specially interposed, and in a\nsupernatural mode of action has constructed the machine which has the\nsun for its center and the surrounding bodies which revolve about it.\nHow can you suppose that the same being has acted in different ways?\nHow can you suppose that the being who you imagine established the\ngeneral laws of Nature and gave to them a fixed operation throughout\nthe universe, so that they never would be suspended or interrupted,\nhas gone aside from them, and made occasional constructions by special\ninterpositions of his power? Is it not a contradiction to suppose that\nan Almighty Being, who must have acted by uniform methods without\nreference to occasions, has acted on certain occasions by special\nmethods that were not uniform with his fixed laws? Does not this\nhypothesis imply that his fixed laws were insufficient for the purposes\nfor which he designed them, and that he had to resort to other means?\nHow do you get over this difficulty?\n\nSOPHEREUS. What you propound as a difficulty does not disturb\nme. I understand the distinction which you make between the natural\nand the supernatural. I can see in the solar system how the law of\ngravitation and all the other laws of motion operate; but I do not\nsee, nor can you explain, how these laws, or the laws of chemical\ncombination or any other laws, can have evolved the plan of the solar\nsystem out of a mass of fiery vapor. I can understand the enactment and\nestablishment of laws of motion, of chemical combination, and of the\nmechanical action of different states of matter upon each other, to\noperate in fixed and invariable ways, in certain conditions. But I do\nnot see that there is any interruption or displacement of these laws,\nafter they are established, when an end that is to be accomplished\ncalls for a complex system of new objects among which they are to\noperate. It is manifest that the question is whether the different\nbodies of the solar system have been formed and placed in their\nrespective positions, according to a special design of their relative\ndistances, magnitudes, and orbits, or whether these are the results\nof the operation of fixed laws, without any special interposition\nof a creating power. Astronomers have not explained how the latter\nhypothesis is anything more than a probable conjecture. It remains\nfor me to consider whether the hypothesis of a special interposition,\nwhereby the plan of the solar system has been made, is attended with\nthe difficulty which you suggest. We are reasoning about a period of\nthe remote past when this system of bodies did not exist, but when the\ngeneral laws that were to govern all matter may be supposed to have\nbeen previously ordained. If we think of the solar system, conceived\nand projected by the Supreme Being, as a complex mechanism that was to\nexist in Nature, the occasion would be one calling for the exercise\nof infinite wisdom and power. The production of such a mechanism, to\nanswer any ends for which it was intended that it should exist, implies\nattributes that transcend all our human experience of the qualities of\npower and wisdom. That it was an occasional exercise of power, in no\nway implies any irregularity or inconsistency of method, if the power\nwas so exercised as to leave all the general laws of Nature in full\noperation, so that there would be no clashing between what you call\nthe natural and the supernatural. I have first to ascertain what was\nthe probably intended scope of the general laws which are supposed to\nhave been ordained before the solar system came into existence. If\nit appears to have been the purpose of the constructor to have these\nlaws work out this system of bodies without any special interposition\nand formative skill directly exercised, I need go no further. But I\nsee no evidence of that purpose. No one has suggested anything but a\ntheory on this subject, which is not supported by any satisfactory\nproofs. I am left, therefore, to the consideration of the question\nwhether an act of special interposition, in the formation of a plan\nobviously calling for the exercise of infinite wisdom and power, is\nin any way inconsistent with the establishment of a system of laws\nwhich were to operate on these bodies and among them after they had\ncome to exist. My conclusion, from what I have learned of the solar\nsystem, is, that in the exercise by the same being of the method which\nyou call the natural, and the exercise of the method which you call\nthe supernatural, there is no inconsistency; that each of the fixed\nlaws of matter and motion was designed to have its own scope; and that\neach of them may well consist, within its limitations, with occasional\nexercises of power, for the production of objects that were to be\noperated upon by the laws, but of which they were not designed to be\nthe producing cause. Thus it seems to me to be a rational conclusion\nthat the law of gravitation, the general laws of motion, and all the\nother laws of matter, which preceded the existence of the solar system,\nwere not designed to be the agents by which the plan of that system\nwould be worked out, but that the plan was so formed and executed that\nthe bodies composing it would be subject to the operation of laws\nenacted by the Infinite Will for the government of all the forms of\nmatter. The question is, whether the plan of the solar system is due to\nthe operation of the fixed laws, or to a special interposition; or, to\nstate it in another way, whether the whole of the phenomena, the plan\nand arrangement of the solar system included, are to be referred to the\noperation of certain fixed laws as the producing agents, or whether\nsome part of the phenomena, namely, the mechanism of the system,\nshould be referred to the special interposition. I am taught, by the\nphysics on which astronomers are now agreed, that gravitation is a\nforce by which the particles of matter act on each other; _that every\nparticle of matter in the universe attracts every other particle with\na force varying directly as their masses, and inversely as the square\nof the distance which separates them_. This I understand to be the\nformula in which the law of universal gravitation is expressed. But,\nfor the purpose of illustrating what I understand to be the operation\nof this force, I have constructed a diagram, in which two bodies are\nrepresented as A and B. From each of these bodies there radiates in\nall directions an attracting force, which acts directly upon every\nother body in the universe, and which is represented in the diagram\nby dotted lines. In the diagram, the bodies A and B are first supposed\nto be one thousand miles apart. A certain portion of the attracting\nrays proceeding from A would strike directly upon B. All the other rays\nproceeding in the same direction from A would pass on either side of B\nwithout striking it. If B is removed to the distance of two thousand\nmiles from A, the sum total of the attractive force which A would exert\nupon B would be diminished by the square of the distance, because B\nwould intercept just one fourth of the number of rays proceeding from\nA compared with the number which it intercepts when the two bodies\nare only one thousand miles apart; and the rays which B does not\nintercept would pass along through the realms of space, until they\nencountered some other body, on which they would exert a force that\nwould follow the same law of diminution. In the diagram, the two bodies\nA and B may be single particles of matter or collections of particles;\nthey are represented as cubes; but the law of direct action of the\nattracting force and the law of its diminution would be the same if the\nbodies were spheres or oblongs. The power of attraction which bodies\nexert upon each other resides in every individual particle of matter\ncomposing the body, and the attraction which that body exerts upon\nanother body is the sum total of the attractions which proceed from all\nthe particles composing the mass and which impinge upon that other body.\n\n[Illustration]\n\nIn the diagram the two bodies A and B are supposed to be of the same\nmass. If, as in the case of the sun and the earth, one of the bodies\nis of far greater mass than the other, then the attraction of the\nsun for the earth is the same as the attraction of the earth for the\nsun, because the action is mutual; but the sun, being the greater\nmass, tends, by reason of its correspondingly greater inertia, to\nremain comparatively stationary, or, in other words, it has a greater\nresistance to being pulled out of its normal position, while the\nearth, having less inertia, is more easily deflected from its straight\ncourse in which its momentum tends to carry it, and so travels in an\norbit around the sun, the resisting or centrifugal pull of the earth,\ndue to its inertia, exactly balancing the inward pull due to the\nmutual attraction. I understand that, besides the law of universal\ngravitation, there are two fundamental laws of motion. By one of these\nlaws, if a body be set in motion and be acted on by no other than the\nprojectile force, it will move forward in a straight line and with a\nuniform velocity forever. But by another law, if the moving body is\nacted on by another force than that which originally projected it in\na straight line, it will deviate from that line in the direction of\nthat other force and in proportion to it. If A, the earth, liable to\nbe drawn toward B, the sun, by their mutual attraction, was originally\nprojected into space, at a certain distance from the sun, by a force\nwhich would carry it on in a straight line, it would be acted on by two\nforces: the projectile force would cause it to move in a straight line;\nthe force of the mutual attraction would cause it to deviate from that\nline in the direction of the sun. The result would be that the earth\nwould be carried around the sun in a circular or an elliptical orbit.\nEvery other planet in the solar system would be under the operation of\nthe same compound forces governed by the same laws; and while the sun\nwould exert upon each of them its force of attraction, and they would\neach exert upon the others an attractive force that would be diminished\nby the squares of their distances from one another, each of them\nwould be deflected from the straight line that would have otherwise\nbeen the path of its motion, and the result would be a perpetual\nrevolution around the body that could exert upon each just the amount\nof attraction requisite to overcome the projectile force by which it\nwas first put in motion.\n\nKOSMICOS. You have made an ingenious explanation of the law of\ngravitation, which may or may not be correct. But now let me understand\nwhat you infer from this hypothesis, supposing it to be true. What\nshould have prevented the law of gravitation and the laws of motion\nfrom working out this very system of bodies, by operating upon a mass\nof crude matter lying in the universe, supposing it to have been fiery\nvapor or anything else?\n\nSOPHEREUS. I have thus far arrived, by the aid of what\nastronomy teaches, at a complex system of physical laws, the law of\nuniversal gravitation, and the laws of motion. I must suppose that\nthese laws had an intelligent author. I must suppose that they were\nenacted, in the same sense in which we speak of any rule of action\nordained by a power competent to conceive of it and to put it into\nexecution. To me, as I view the facts of the solar system, the idea\nthat the law of gravitation and the laws of motion are to be regarded\nas mere phenomena of matter, or as qualities of matter according to\nwhich, from some inherent condition, it must act, does not explain the\nsolar system. I can not explain to myself what I see, without asking\nmyself how these qualities of matter came to exist. How came it to\nbe a condition of all matter that its particles should attract each\nother by a certain force according to a certain rule? How came it to\nbe a law of motion that bodies projected into space should continue to\nmove on forever in a straight line, unless deviated from that line by\nsome other force? To say that things happen, but that no power ever\ncommanded them to happen; that things occur because they do occur, and\nnot because some power has ordained that they shall occur, is to me an\ninconceivable kind of reasoning, if it be reasoning at all. Because men\nact or profess to act upon certain principles of moral conduct, I can\nnot suppose that justice, and truth, and mercy are mere phenomena of\nhuman conduct, that they never had any origin as moral laws in the will\nof a lawgiver. For the same reason I can not suppose that the physical\nlaws of matter, stupendous in their scope, and of unerring certainty in\ntheir operation, did not proceed from an enacting authority. In short,\nit seems to me that the conception of power, as something independent\nof the qualities of substance, is a logical necessity.\n\nKOSMICOS. I am not now trying to persuade you that the law\nof gravitation and the laws of motion did not have an intelligent\nauthor. For the purposes of the argument, I will concede that they were\nenacted, as you term it. You have explained your understanding of the\noperation of these; laws as they are expressed in the formula given\nby astronomers, and for the present I will assume that they operate\nin some such way. I will also concede that the idea of power in the\nabstract, as something independent of the qualities of substance, is\nnecessary to the explanation of all physical phenomena. But I now\nrecall your attention to the point which I originally suggested.\nExplain to me how it has happened that the being who you suppose\nestablished certain laws for the government of all matter has not\nallowed those laws to evolve out of diffused matter certain bodies\nwhich we find grouped together in the universe, but has specially\ninterposed by another act, and constructed this system of bodies\nwithout the agency of his own laws. All that we know about the law of\ngravitation and the laws of motion we derive from observing the actions\nof these bodies which compose the solar system. We infer the existence\nof these laws from the actions of these bodies. Now tell me how you\nsuppose that the same being who ordained these laws as fixed conditions\nto which matter was to be subjected, and made them to operate upon all\nmatter, whether in a crude and unformed state or after it had become\norganized into bodies of definite shapes and dimensions, did not rely\nupon these inherent conditions of matter to produce those shapes and\ndimensions, but went to work by special interposition, and produced the\nmechanism of the solar system as a human artificer would make a machine\nof a corresponding character.\n\nSOPHEREUS. We must take things in a certain order. I\nunderstand you to concede, for the present, that the laws of\ngravitation and motion must, or may, have existed before the sun\nand the planets were formed. We are agreed, then, that power has an\nexistence anterior to and separate from the qualities of substance.\nWhat, then, is the difficulty attending the hypothesis that the\nInfinite Power, which devised and established the laws of gravitation\nand motion before the bodies of the solar system were formed, so\nfashioned and distributed those bodies that while each of them\nshall exert upon every other a certain amount of direct attraction,\nthat attraction shall diminish in a certain fixed ratio, as the\ndistance between them increases? We can not suppose that the relative\nmagnitudes, weights, and distances of these bodies were accidental, or\nthat they resulted from the property of attraction that was given to\nthe particles of matter of which they are composed. That property of\nmutual attraction became at some time a fixed condition of all matter,\nbut it will not account for the formation of a system of bodies so\nadjusted that the attracting force will act among them by a specific\nlaw, by the operation of which they will be prevented from exerting\non each other an excessive amount of such force, or any amount but\nthat which is exactly needful to preserve their relative distances\nfrom each other. Let it be supposed that the property of attraction\nwas impressed upon all the particles of matter in the universe, and\nthen that the Infinite Power, abstaining from all farther action, and\nwithout forming and arranging the bodies of the solar system upon any\nintentional plan, left all that plan to be worked out by that property\nof matter; what reason have we to conclude that the law of gravitation\nwould, as the sole efficient cause, have produced just exactly this\ncomplex piece of mechanism, so wonderfully adjusted? What reason have\nwe to conclude that the property of attraction, although ordained as an\ninherent quality of all matter, would not, if left without any special\ninterposition, have resulted in some very different arrangement and\ndisposition of the matter lying in the space now occupied by the solar\nsystem?\n\nKOSMICOS. Give me your idea of the condition which is called\n\"chaos,\" and I will then explain to you why it is that you do not do\njustice to the scientific distinction between the natural and the\nsupernatural method by which things have been produced as we see them.\n\nSOPHEREUS. I presume you do not mean to ask how I suppose\nchaotic matter came to exist. Its origin is one thing--its condition\nis another. In regard to its condition, it seems very plain that there\nwas a period when diffused matter had not received the impress of the\nqualities or been subjected to the laws which we now recognize. Take\nthe Mosaic hypothesis, where it speaks of the earth, for example, as\n\"without form and void.\" In this terse expression, there is embraced\nthe idea of a condition of matter without qualities, properties, or\nlaws; lying in an utterly crude state, waiting to receive the impress\nof the divine will. The laws of motion have not begun to operate upon\nit; the laws of chemical combination have not been applied to it. It\nis a rational conclusion that this was the condition of things in that\nremote period of eternity before the solar system was formed. Chaos,\nthen, was the condition of primeval matter before it had received the\nfixed properties that were afterward to belong to it, and before the\nlaws that were ever afterward to govern it had been ordained. Lying in\nthis utterly crude state, without tendencies, without combinations,\nwithout definite motion, floating in the universe without fixed form or\nqualities, it awaits the action of the Infinite Power. It pleases that\npower, out of its illimitable resources, to bestow upon this chaotic\nmatter certain properties, and to subject it to certain laws. One of\nthese properties is that its particles shall attract one another by a\ncertain force; one of these laws is that this force shall operate by an\ninvariable and fixed rule of direct action, and by an invariable and\nfixed rule of diminution, according to the distance of the particles\nfrom each other; and another law is that a body projected into space,\nby any force, shall continue to move in a straight line until and\nunless it is deflected from that line by some other force. There\nare, too, chemical properties belonging to matter as we know it, by\nwhich it takes on certain combinations and undergoes modifications\nand arrangements of its particles. All these properties, qualities,\nand laws--these unavoidable methods of action--must have been imposed\nupon the chaotic matter at some time by a power competent to establish\nthem, and to put them in operation. But the laws and the methods of\ntheir operation do not account for the PLAN on which the solar\nsystem has been formed, consisting of different bodies of such shapes,\ndimensions, and relative distances, that the laws, when applied to\nthem, will produce the wonderfully exact and perpetual movements which\nthe telescope reveals. That PLAN is a _creation_, for which we\nmust look to something more than the laws and properties of matter; and\nwe can only find it in the will and purposes of the infinite artificer\nwho devised the laws by which this mechanism was to be governed after\nit had been made, and who has so made it that it would be governed by\nthem.\n\nKOSMICOS. I do not see that you have yet reached a stronger\nground on which to rest the hypothesis of special interposition than\nthat on which is based the hypothesis which imputes the formation of\nthe solar system to certain fixed laws operating upon crude matter\nnot yet formed into definite shapes or placed in certain relative\npositions. You will have to adduce some proof that has a stronger\ntendency to exclude the supposition that the mechanism of the solar\nsystem was produced by the laws of matter and motion working upon some\nmaterial that lay in the condition which you have described as \"chaos.\"\n\nSOPHEREUS. Let us, then, look a little farther into some of\nthe details of this vast machine. Take one that is most obvious, and\nthat lies the nearest to us; I mean the moon, which accompanies our\nearth as its satellite. The most remarkable thing about the motion of\nthe moon is the fact that she makes one revolution on her axis in the\nsame time that she takes to revolve around the earth, and consequently\nshe always presents to us the same face, and her other side is never\nseen by human eyes. How came this to be the case? How came this to be\nthe adjustment of the two motions, the axial revolution of the moon and\nher revolution around the earth, causing her always to present to us\nthe same side? It is said by astronomers that the two motions are so\nexactly adjusted to each other that the longer axis of the moon always\npoints to the earth, without the slightest variation. It is conceded,\nas I understand, to be infinitely improbable that this adjustment was\nthe result of chance. A cause for it is therefore to be found. Where\nare we to look for that cause, unless we look for it in the will and\ndesign of the Creator, who established it for some special purpose?\n\nKOSMICOS. You are aware that there is a physical explanation\nof this phenomenon which accounts for it without the special design.\nThis explanation is that the moon was once in a partially fluid state,\nand that she rotated on her axis in a period different from the present\none. In such a condition, the attraction of the earth would produce\ngreat tides in the fluid substance of the moon; this attraction,\ncombined with the centrifugal force of the moon's rotation on her own\naxis, would cause a friction, and this friction would retard the rate\nof her axial rotation, until it became coincident with the rate of her\nrevolution around the earth. It is highly improbable that the moon was\noriginally set in rotation on her axis with just the same velocity with\nwhich she was made to revolve around the earth. This improbability is\nbased on the ellipticity of the moon's orbit, which is caused by the\nattraction of the sun. The mean distance of the moon from the earth\nis 240,300 miles; her smallest possible distance is 221,000 miles;\nand the greatest possible distance is 259,600. The usual oscillation\nbetween these extremes is about 13,000 miles on each side of the mean\ndistance of 240,300. The diameter of the moon is 2,160 miles, or less\nthan two sevenths of the earth's diameter. In volume she is about one\nfiftieth as large as the earth, but her density, or the specific\ngravity of her material, is supposed to be a little more than half\nof that of our globe; and her weight is about three and a half times\nthe weight of the same bulk of water. When she is nearest to the sun,\nthe superior attraction of that body tends to draw her out of her\ncircular orbit around the earth; when she is farthest from the sun,\nthis attraction is diminished, and thus her terrestrial orbit becomes\nslightly elliptical. But there is another attraction to be taken into\naccount. This other attraction, in her former fluid condition, has\ngiven her the shape, not of a perfect sphere, but of an ellipsoid, or\nan elongated body with three unequal axes. The shortest of her axes is\nthat around which she rotates; the next longest is that which points\nin the direction in which she is moving; and the longest of all points\ntoward the earth. This shape of the moon, resulting from the earth's\nattraction, has been produced by drawing the matter of the moon which\nis nearest to the earth toward the earth, and by the centrifugal force\nwhich tends to throw outward the matter farthest from the earth. The\nsubstance of the moon being a liquid, so as to yield freely, she would\nbe elongated in the direction of the earth. But if she was originally\nset in motion on her own axis at precisely the same rate with which\nshe was made to revolve around the earth, the correspondence between\nthe two motions could not have been kept up; her axial rotation would\nhave varied, by reason of the fact that her relative distance from the\nsun and the earth varies with the ellipticity of her orbit around the\nearth, and thus the two motions would not correspond. But if we allow\nfor the attraction of the earth upon a liquid or semi-liquid body,\nproducing for the moon an elongated shape, her axial rotation would,\nif the two motions were in the beginning very near together, vary\nwith her revolutions around the earth, and the correspondence between\nthe two motions would be kept up. Here, then, you have a physical\nexplanation of the phenomenon which strikes you as so remarkable--a\nresult brought about by natural causes, without the supposition of what\nyou call intentional design, or formative skill directly exercised by a\nsupernatural interposition.\n\nSOPHEREUS. This is a very plausible theory, but it all depends\nupon two assumptions: First, it assumes it to be extremely improbable\nthat the two motions were aboriginally made to correspond, by an\nintentional adjustment of the moon's weight, dimensions, and shape,\nupon such a plan that the laws of gravitation and movement would keep\nthe two motions in exact correspondence. Why should not the rates\nof movement have been originally designed and put in execution as\nwe find them? You anticipate the answer to this question by another\nassumption, namely, that the substance of the moon was at first in a\nfluid or semi-fluid state, so that she owed her present shape to the\neffect of the earth's attraction, and the centrifugal tendency of\nits most distant part to be thrown out of the line of its motion. I\nshould be glad to have you explain why it is extremely improbable that\nthe Creator planned this part of the solar system, the earth and its\nsatellite, and so adjusted the dimensions, shapes, and weights of each\nof them, and fixed the rates of revolution of the satellite, that the\nlaws of attraction and motion would find a mechanism which they would\nkeep perpetually in operation, and thus preserve a constant relation\nbetween the moon's axial rotation and her revolution around the\nearth. I have thus far learned to regard the probable methods of the\nCreator somewhat differently from those which you scientists ascribe\nto him. Most of you, I observe, have a strong tendency to regard\nthe Deity as having no specific plan in the production of anything,\nwhich plan he directly executed; and, so far as you regard a First\nCause as the producing cause of phenomena, you limit its activity to\nthe establishment of certain fixed laws, and explain all phenomena\nupon the hypothesis that the Supreme Being--if you admit one--made no\nspecial interpositions of his will and power in any direction, after\nhe had established his system of general laws. But to me it seems that\nthe weight of probability is entirely against your hypothesis. In this\nparticular case of which we have been speaking, that of the moon's\nrevolution, the supposed improbability of an original and intentional\nadjustment of the two motions turns altogether on the argument that if\nthey had been so adjusted at the beginning they would not have kept\non, and this argument is supported by the assumption that the moon\nwas at first a mass of fluid. I do not understand this mode of making\nfacts to support theories; and I wish you would explain to me why, in\nthis particular instance, the inference of a divine and intentional\nplan in the structure of this part of the solar system is so extremely\nimprobable. To me it seems so obvious a piece of invented mechanism,\nthat I can not avoid the conclusion that it was the intentional work\nof a constructor, any more than I could if I were to find a piece of\nmechanism under circumstances which indicated that it was produced by\nhuman hands.\n\nKOSMICOS. You do not even yet do justice to the scientific\nmethod of reasoning. The deductions of science--the conclusions\nwhich the scientist draws from the phenomena of Nature--rest upon\nthe postulate of fixed laws of Nature, which never change, and which\nhave not been varied by any supernatural interference. We mean by\na supernatural cause one which is not uniformly in operation, or\nwhich operates in some way different from the fixed laws which we\nhave deduced from the observed order of the phenomena that we have\nstudied and found to be invariable. We adopt this distinction between\nthe natural and the supernatural because the observable phenomena of\nNature do not furnish any means of discovering as a fact the operation\nof anything but the fixed laws, or any cause which has acted in a\ndifferent way. Let us now apply this to the phenomena which we have\nbeen considering--the composition and arrangement of the solar system.\nWhat do we find? We find a system of bodies in the movements of which\nwe detect certain fixed laws operating invariably in the same way.\nWhen the question is asked, How were these bodies produced? we have no\nmeans of reaching a conclusion except by reasoning upon the operation\nof the forces which these laws disclose, working on the primordial\nmatter out of which the bodies became formed. It is for this reason\nthat, in accounting for their existence, we speak of the method of\ntheir formation as the natural, in contradistinction to some other\nmethod which we call the supernatural; by which latter term we mean\nsome mode in which there has been a power exerted differently from the\nestablished and fixed agency of the laws of matter, which constitute\nall that we have ever discovered. The nebular hypothesis affords a\ngood illustration of the distinction which I am endeavoring to show\nyou, whether it is well established or not, or is ever likely to be.\nIt supposes that there was a mass of fiery vapor, floating in the\nspace now occupied by the solar system. Under the operation of the\nlaws of gravitation and motion, of mechanical forces and chemical\ncombination, this crude matter becomes consolidated and formed into\nthe different bodies known to us as the sun and the planets, and the\nlaws which thus formed them continue to operate to keep them in the\nfixed relations to each other which resulted from the process of their\nformation. Whether as a matter of fact the solar system was formed in\nthis way, this, or some other mode of operation through the action of\ncertain established laws operating upon primeval matter, is what we\ncall the natural method, in opposition to the supernatural; and we can\nnot discover the supernatural method, because the closest and most\nextensive investigations never enable us to find in nature any method\nof operation but that which acts in a fixed and invariable way.\n\nSOPHEREUS. What you have now said brings me to a question that\nI have all along desired to ask you: How do you know that the Infinite\nPower never acts, or never has acted, in any way different from the\nestablished order of Nature? Is science able to determine this? If it\nis not, it must be for philosophy to consider whether there can have\nbeen, or probably has been, in operation at any time any cause other\nthan those fixed laws of Nature which the scientist is able to deduce\nfrom observable phenomena. Because science can only discover certain\nfixed laws as the forces governing the bodies which compose the solar\nsystem, or governing the materials of which they are supposed to be\nmade, it does not seem to me that a philosopher is precluded from\ndeducing, by a proper method of reasoning upon a study of the solar\nsystem, the probable truth that its mechanism was specially planned\nand executed by a special act of the creating power. The degree to\nwhich this probability rises--whether it rises higher in the scale\nthan any other hypothesis--must depend upon the inquiry whether any\nother hypothesis will better account for the existence of this great\nobject, with its enormous mechanism, its adjustments, and its unerring\nmovements. I must say, from what I have learned of this planetary\nsystem, with the sun as its center, viewed as a mechanism, that I can\nconceive of no hypothesis concerning its origin and formation which\ncompares in probability with the hypothesis that it was directly and\nspecially created, as we know it, by the Infinite Artificer.\n\nKOSMICOS. Pray, tell me what you mean by an act of creation?\nDid you or any other man ever see one? Can you tell what creation is?\n\nSOPHEREUS. I think that your question can be answered.\nCreation is the act of giving existence to something that did not\npreviously exist. We see such acts performed by men, very frequently,\nso that we do not hesitate to speak of the product as a created thing.\nWe do not see acts of creation performed by the Infinite Power, but it\nis surely not unphilosophical to suppose that what can be and is done\nby finite human faculties, can be and has been done by the infinite\nfaculties of the Deity, and done upon a scale and in a perfection that\ntranscend everything that human power has produced. The sense in which\nI have been led to conceive of the solar system as a creation is the\nsame as that by which I represent to myself the production, by human\npower and skill, of some physical object which never existed before,\nsuch as a machine, a statue, a picture, a pyramid, or an obelisk; any\nconcrete object which, whether or not new of its kind, did not as an\nindividual object previously exist. In weighing the probabilities as\nto the mode in which the solar system came to exist, the reasons why\nthe idea of its special creation stands by far the highest in the scale\nare these: 1. There must have been a period when this great object in\nnature did not exist, and therefore it must have been caused to exist.\n2. The necessary hypothesis of a causing power leads inevitably to the\nconclusion that the power was adequate to the production of a system of\nbodies so proportioned and arranged that they would act on each other\nby certain fixed rules. 3. The causing or creating power must have\nconceived the proportions and arrangements of the different bodies as\na plan, and must have executed that plan according to the conception.\n4. While as a theory we can represent to ourselves that the causing\npower established certain laws of matter and motion, which would by\ntheir fixed operation on crude substances lying in the universe produce\nthis system of bodies without any preconceived and predetermined plan,\nwithout any occasional or special interposition, yet that the system,\nas we find it, is a product of such a nature as to have called for\nand required the special interposition of a formative will. For, if\nwe proceed upon the hypothesis that this enormous and exact mechanism\nwas nothing but the product of certain pre-established laws operating\non crude matter, without direct and special interposition exerted in\nthe execution of a formed design, we have to obtain some definite\nconception, and to find some proof of a method by which these laws\ncan have operated to produce this system of bodies exactly as we know\nthem to be proportioned and arranged. Astronomical science, and all\nother science, has not discovered, or even suggested, any method by\nwhich this result could have been brought about, without a special\nact of creation in the execution of an original design. On the other\nhand, the hypothesis of a special interposition in the execution of a\npreconceived plan of construction is the most rational, the most in\naccordance with probability, because it best meets the requirements of\nthe case. These requirements were that the proportions, arrangements,\nand relations of the different bodies composing one grand mechanism,\nshould be such that the laws of gravitation and motion would operate\nupon and among them so as to keep them in uniform and unvarying\nmovement.\n\nKOSMICOS. Very well. You have now come to the end of your\nreasoning. Tell me, then, why it is not just as rational a supposition\nthat the Deity conceived of the plan of the solar system as a product\nthat would result, and that he intended should result, from the\noperation of his fixed laws of matter and motion, and then left it to\nthe unerring certainty of their operation to produce the mechanism by\nthe process of gradual evolution?\n\nSOPHEREUS. The being who is supposed to hold and exercise\nsupreme power over the universe, holds a power to execute, by direct\nand special creation, any design which he conceives and proposes to\naccomplish. I am prepared to concede that the process of gradual\nevolution can produce and apparently has produced some results. But\nwhen we are looking for the probable methods of the Deity in the\nproduction of such a mechanism as the solar system, we must recognize\nthe superior probability of the direct method, because the indirect\nmethod which you describe as gradual evolution does not seem adequate\nto the production of such a system of bodies. If we could obtain\nfacts which could have any tendency to show that, without any special\ninterposition, the mechanism of the solar system, or any part of it, is\na mere result of the working of the laws of gravitation and motion upon\na mass of crude matter, we might yield assent to the probability of\nthat occurrence. But of course we have no such facts; we have nothing\nbut theories; and therefore there appears nothing to exclude the\nprobable truth of a special creation.\n\nKOSMICOS. We shall not convince each other. You have stated\nyour conclusions concerning the solar system fairly enough, and I have\nendeavored to answer them. But now let me understand how you propose\nto apply them to other departments of Nature, in which we have means\nof closer investigation. You will find it very difficult, I imagine,\nto maintain that every organism, every plant, animal, fish, insect, or\nbird, is a special creation, or even that man himself is.\n\nSOPHEREUS. Let me state for myself just what my conclusions\nare in regard to the solar system. You will then know what the\nconvictions are with which I shall come to the study of other\ndepartments. I have arrived at the conception of an Infinite Being\nhaving the power to create anything that seems to him good; and I\nhave experienced no difficulty in conceiving what an act of creation\nis. I have also reached the conviction that there is one great object\nin Nature, the existence of which I can not account for without the\nhypothesis of some special act of creation. Whether I shall find this\nto be the case in regard to every other object in Nature, I can not\nnow tell. Perhaps, as many of these objects are nearer to us, and more\nwithin our powers of investigation, the result may be different. I\nshall endeavor to keep my mind open to the necessary discriminations\nwhich facts may disclose. Possibly I may find reason to reverse the\nconclusions at which I have arrived in regard to the solar system, if\nI find that the hypothesis of evolution is fairly sustained by other\nphenomena.\n\n NOTE.--Newton, whose reasoning powers have certainly not\n been surpassed by those of any other philosopher, ancient or modern,\n not only deduced the existence of a personal God from the phenomena\n of Nature, but he felt no difficulty in ascribing to the Deity those\n personal attributes which the phenomena of Nature show that he must\n possess, because without them \"all that diversity of natural things\n which we find suited to different times and places\" could not have\n been produced. They could, he reasons, \"arise from nothing but the\n ideas and will of a Being necessarily existing.\" Newton does indeed\n say that all our notions of God are taken from the ways of mankind;\n but this is by way of allegory and similitude. There is a likeness,\n but not a perfect likeness. There is therefore no necessity for\n ascribing to God anthropomorphic attributes, because the enlargement\n of the faculties and powers to superhuman and boundless attributes\n takes them out of the category of anthropomorphic qualities and\n capacities. In his \"Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy,\"\n Newton had occasion to treat of the theory of vortices, as a\n hypothesis by which the formation of the solar system is to be\n explained. The \"General Scholium,\" by which he concludes the third\n book of his \"Principia,\" lays down the masterly reasoning by which he\n maintains that the bodies of the solar system, while they persevere\n in their orbits by the mere laws of gravity, could by no means have\n at first derived the regular position of the orbits themselves from\n those laws. I had written the whole of the preceding chapter on the\n origin of the solar system just as I have printed it, before I looked\n into the \"Principia\" to see what confirmation might be derived from\n Newton's speculations. I found that while I had not included the\n comets in my examination of the solar system, but had confined myself\n to the bodies that are at all times within the reach of the telescope,\n the same deductions are re-enforced by the comets, eccentric as are\n the orbits through which they range into and out of our system. I\n quote the entire Scholium, as given in Motte's English translation of\n the \"Principia\" from the Latin in which Newton wrote, published with a\n Life by Chittenden, at New York, in the year 1848.\n\n\n\"GENERAL SCHOLIUM.\n\n\"The hypothesis of vortices is pressed with many difficulties.\nThat every planet by a radius drawn to the sun may describe areas\nproportional to the times of description, the periodic times of the\nseveral parts of the vortices should observe the duplicate proportion\nof their distances from the sun; but that the periodic times of the\nplanets may obtain the sesquiplicate proportion of their distances\nfrom the sun, the periodic times of the parts of the vortex ought\nto be in the sesquiplicate proportion of their distances. That the\nsmaller vortices may maintain their lesser revolutions about _Saturn_,\n_Jupiter_, and other planets, and swim quietly and undisturbed in the\ngreater vortex of the sun, the periodic times of the parts of the\nsun's vortex should be equal; but the rotation of the sun and planets\nabout their axes, which ought to correspond with the motions of their\nvortices, recede far from all these proportions. The motions of the\ncomets are exceedingly regular, are governed by the same laws with the\nmotions of the planets, and can by no means be accounted for by the\nhypothesis of vortices; for comets are carried with very eccentric\nmotions through all parts of the heavens indifferently, with a freedom\nthat is incompatible with the notion of a vortex. Bodies projected in\nour air suffer no resistance but from the air. Withdraw the air, as is\ndone in Mr. _Boyle's_ vacuum, and the resistance ceases; for in this\nvoid a bit of fine down and a piece of solid gold descend with equal\nvelocity. And the parity of reason must take place in the celestial\nspaces above the earth's atmosphere; in which spaces, where there is no\nair to resist their motions, all bodies will move with the greatest\nfreedom; and the planets and comets will constantly pursue their\nrevolutions in orbits given in kind and position, according to the laws\nabove explained; but though these bodies may, indeed, persevere in\ntheir orbits by the mere laws of gravity, yet they could by no means\nhave at first derived the regular position of the orbits themselves\nfrom those laws.\n\n\"The six primary planets are revolved about the sun in circles\nconcentric with the sun, and with motions directed toward the same\nparts, and almost in the same plane. Ten moons are revolved about the\nearth, Jupiter, and Saturn, in circles concentric with them, with\nthe same direction of motion, and nearly in the planes of the orbits\nof those planets; but it is not to be conceived that mere mechanical\ncauses could give birth to so many regular motions, since the comets\nrange over all parts of the heavens in very eccentric orbits; for by\nthat kind of motion they pass easily through the orbits of the planets,\nand with great rapidity; and in their aphelions, where they move the\nslowest, and are detained the longest, they recede to the greatest\ndistances from each other, and thence suffer the least disturbance\nfrom their mutual attractions. This most beautiful system of the sun,\nplanets, and comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion\nof an intelligent and powerful Being. And if the fixed stars are the\ncenters of other like systems, these being formed by the like wise\ncounsel, must be all subject to the dominion of One; especially since\nthe light of the fixed stars is of the same nature with the light of\nthe sun, and from every system light passes into all the other systems;\nand lest the systems of the fixed stars should, by their gravity,\nfall on each other mutually, he hath placed those systems at immense\ndistances one from another.\"\n\n FOOTNOTES:\n\n [105] The reader will understand that I do not assert this to be what\n astronomers teach, but I maintain it to be a rational deduction from\n the facts which they furnish to us.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\n Does evolution account for the phenomena of society and of\n nature?--Necessity for a conception of a personal actor--Mr.\n Spencer's protoplasmic origin of all organic life--The Mosaic account\n of creation treated as a hypothesis which may be scientifically\n contrasted with evolution.\n\n\nA long interval has elapsed since the conference described in the last\nchapter, between the searcher after wisdom and his scientific friend.\nAt their next interview they take up the subject of a First Cause where\nthey left it at the conclusion of their debate on the solar system.\n\nKOSMICOS. Well, Sophereus, what have you been studying since\nwe last met?\n\nSOPHEREUS. Many things. I have been studying what is commonly\ncalled Nature, and I have been studying society. With regard to\nsociety, I have been endeavoring to discover to what the phenomena of\nsocial life are to be attributed as their producing cause or causes;\nwhether they can be said to owe their existence to the direct action\nor influence of intelligent wills, or are to be considered as effects\nproduced in the course of an ungoverned development, wrought by\nincidental forces in varying conditions of human existence. The latter,\nI find, is one of the theories now prevailing.\n\nKOSMICOS. And what is your conclusion?\n\nSOPHEREUS. My general conclusion in regard to the phenomena\nof human society is the same as that which I formed from a study of\nthe phenomena of the solar system. I find a great many things which\nI can not explain without the hypothesis of a direct creating power\nexerted by an intelligent being. I know that you object to the idea\nof creation, but I explained to you in our last discussion that I\nunderstood it to mean the causing something to exist which did not\nexist before, and the doing it by an intentional and direct act of\nproduction.\n\nKOSMICOS. No matter about your definition. What are the facts\nthat you propose to discuss?\n\nSOPHEREUS. In the social phenomena I find many acts of\ncreation. I do not find that buildings spring out of the ground without\nhuman intervention, or that machinery is formed by the spontaneous\narrangement of matter in certain forms and relations, or by the\ntendencies that are implanted in matter as its inherent properties.\nI find an enormous multitude of concrete objects, formed out of dead\nmatter, by human intervention, availing itself of those properties of\nmatter, which without such active intervention would have remained\nquiescent, and would not have resulted in the production of these\nobjects. It is a common form of expression to speak of the \"growth\"\nof cities, but no one understands by this form of speech that a city\nhas become what it is without the action of numerous individuals\nprojecting and building their separate structures, or without the\ncombined action of the whole body of the inhabitants in determining and\nexecuting a general plan to which individuals are to conform, more or\nless exactly, their particular erections. Again, I find that there are\nrules of social life, which take the form of what are called \"laws,\"\nand these are imposed by the will of some governing authority; they are\nalways the product of some one human will, or of the collective will\nof a greater number of persons. I have looked into history and have\nfound many instances of military conquest, invasions of the territory\ninhabited by one race of men by another race, domination of different\ndynasties, overthrow of one governing power, and substitution of\nanother. Although the changes thus produced are often very complex,\nsometimes rapid and sometimes slow in reaching the consequences, I do\nnot find that they have ever taken place without the direct action of\nsome one human will, or of the aggregate force of many human wills.\nThe conquests of Alexander and Napoleon are instances of what a single\nhuman will can do in changing the condition of nations; and I have\nnot been able to read history by the interpretation that makes such\nmen mere instruments in the hands of their age, which would, without\ntheir special existences and characters, have brought about the same or\nsomething like the same results. The invasions of the Roman Empire by\nthe Northern barbarians are instances of the pressure of one population\nupon another, not attributable, perhaps, to the will and leadership\nof any one individual, but produced by the united force of a great\nhorde of individuals determined to enjoy the plunder which a superior\ncivilization spread before them. Then, with regard to the phenomena of\nwhat are called constitutions of government, or the political systems\nof exercising public authority, I find numerous cases in which the\nforce of an individual will and intelligence has been not only a great\nfactor, but by far the largest factor in the production of particular\ninstitutions. The genius of C\u00e6sar, and his extraordinary constructive\nfaculties, molded the institutions of Rome in the most direct manner,\nand created an imperial system that lasted for a thousand years,\nand that even out of its ruins affected all subsequent European\ncivilization. In such cases, more than once repeated in modern times,\nthe particular circumstances of the age and the co-operation of many\nother individuals have helped on the result, but the conception, the\nplan, the purpose, and the execution, have had their origin in some\none mind. But for the individual character, the ambition, the force,\nand the mental resources of the first Napoleon, can one believe that\nthe first French Empire of modern times would have grown out of the\ncondition of France? Suppose that Oliver Cromwell had never lived. The\nprotectorate, the system of government which he gave to England, was\nthe most absolute product of the will and intellect of one man that the\nworld in that kind of product had ever seen; for, although the people\nof England were ready for and needed that system, and although the\nantecedent and the surrounding circumstances furnished to Cromwell many\nmaterials for a political structure that was not the old monarchy, and\nyet had while it lasted all the vigor, and more than the vigor, of the\nold monarchy, still, without his personal characteristics, his ambition\nto found a dynasty on the wants of his country, and his personal\ncapacity to devise and execute such a system, one can not believe that\nEngland would have had what he gave her. What he could not give her\nwas a son capable of wielding the scepter which he had fashioned. Here\nis this America of yours--a country in which, to a certain extent,\nthe political institutions have been influenced by the circumstances\nthat followed the separation of your colonies from the English crown.\nUndoubtedly, your ancestors of the Revolutionary epoch could not\nconstruct a monarchy for the group of thirteen newly existing States,\neach with its right and enjoyment of an actual autonomy. The habits\nand genius of the people forbade the experiment of monarchical or\naristocratic institutions; no materials for either existed. But within\nthe range of republican institutions there was a choice open, and the\npeople exercised that choice. They made one system of confederated\nStates, and found it would not answer. They then deliberately assembled\ntheir wisest and greatest men. They gave to them a commission that\nwas restricted by nothing but the practical necessity of framing\na government that would unite the requirements of power with the\nrequirements of liberty. The result was the Constitution of the United\nStates--a system of government that was, within the limitations of\ncertain practical necessities, both in its fundamental principles and\nin many of its details, the deliberate choice and product of certain\nleading minds, aided by the public consent, to a degree that is almost\nunparalleled in the formation of political institutions. After it had\ngone into operation, it was believed that the requirements of liberty\nhad not been sufficiently regarded, and it was directly and purposely\nmodified by the intervention of the collective will of the whole\npeople. And when I turn to the history of philosophies, of religions,\nof the fine arts, or of the mechanical arts, I find everywhere traces\nof the force of individual genius, of the direct intervention of\nindividual wills, and of the power of men to cause new systems of\nthought and action to come into existence, and to create new objects of\nadmiration or utility. In regard to languages, I have read a good deal\nabout the controversy concerning their origin, but I have observed one\nthing to be very apparent: whether the gift of articulate speech was\nbestowed on man, when he had become a distinct being, in a manner and\nfor a purpose which would distinguish him from all the other animals,\nor whether it became a developed faculty akin to that by which other\nanimals utter vocal sounds intelligible to those of their species, it\nis certain that in man there is a power of varying his vocal utterances\nat pleasure, which is possessed by no other creature on this earth.\nThe expansion of languages, therefore, the coinage of new words,\nthe addition of new inflections, the introduction of new shades of\nmeaning, the method of utterance which is called pronunciation, and\nthe different dialects of the same tongue, are all matters which have\nbeen under the control of individuals dwelling together, and have all\nresulted from the arbitrary determination of more or less numerous\npersons, followed by the great mass of their nation, their race, or\ntheir tribe. Even when a new and third language has been formed by\nthe contact of two peoples speaking separate tongues, we may trace the\nsame arbitrary adoption of parts of each separate tongue, in the first\nbeginning of the fusion, and the new language consequently exhibits a\ngreater or a less predominance of the characteristics of one of its\nparent tongues, according as the one population has compelled the other\nto adopt the greater part of its peculiar modes of speech.\n\nKOSMICOS. You have gone over a good deal of ground, but now\nwhat do you infer from all this, supposing that you have taken a right\nview of the facts?\n\nSOPHEREUS. I infer that, as in the social phenomena there are\nproducts and effects which have owed their existence to human will\nand direct human action, so, in other departments, for example, in\nthe domain which is called Nature, and which is out of the sphere of\nhuman agency and human force, it is reasonable to conclude that there\nare products and effects which must have owed their existence to a\nwill and a power capable of conceiving and producing them. And this is\nwhat leads me, as I was led in the examination of the solar system,\nto the idea of a Supreme Being, capable of producing those objects in\nnature which are so varied, so complex, so marvelously constructed, so\nnicely adapted to the conditions of each separate organism, that if we\nattribute their existence to any intelligent power, it must be to a\npower of infinite capacities, since nothing short of such capacities\ncould have conceived and executed them.\n\nKOSMICOS. You have now come to the very point at which I have\nbeen expecting to see you arrive, and at which I will put to you this\nquestion: Why do you personify the power to which you trace these\nproducts in the natural world? Substitute for the term God, or the\nCreator, the power of Nature. You then have a force that is not only\nimmense, but is in truth without any limit--a force that embraces\neverything, gives life to everything, is at once cause and effect,\nis incessantly active and inexhaustible. It commands all methods,\naccomplishes all objects, and uses time, space, and matter as its\nmeans. Why do you personify this all-pervading and sufficient power of\nNature? Why make it a being, a deity, when all you know is that it is a\npower? \"Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the world?\" is a\nquestion that God is supposed to have asked of Job; and it simply shows\nthat Job had been traditionally taught to believe that there is such a\nbeing as God, and that that being laid the foundations of the world.\nSubstitute Nature in the question, let Nature ask the question, and it\nis just as pertinent, and involves the same problem of human existence.\nWhere was man when Nature began to exhibit that power which has evolved\nall things that we see out of the primeval nothingness?\n\nSOPHEREUS. Well, here I must say that you have left out\ncertain ideas that are essential to all true reasoning on this\nsubject. Power without a guide, power without control, power without a\ndetermining will, power that acts without a volition which determines\nthe how and the when, is a thing that I can not conceive. I thought\nthat in our former conversation, when we were considering the solar\nsystem, you conceded that power, as something abstracted from substance\nor its properties, was a logically necessary conception.\n\nKOSMICOS. I did. But I did not concede that power must be\nconverted into a person. You must not misunderstand me. It certainly is\nmy idea that power is a thing to be contemplated by itself; and we are\nsurrounded everywhere by its manifestations. But it is not my idea that\nit is held and exercised by the being called God, or by any being. We\nonly know of it by its effects; and these show that Nature is, after\nall, both cause and effect, manner and execution, design and product.\nYou can go no farther. You can not go behind Nature and find a being\nwho sat in the heavens and laid the foundations of the world, unless\nyou mean to accept a story which wise men have at last abandoned along\nwith many kindred beliefs which came from the ages of the greatest\nignorance.\n\nSOPHEREUS. Pardon me: the question that was put to Job has\nmore than one aspect. But I have considered the narrative that is found\nin the first chapter of Genesis only as a hypothesis to be weighed\nwith other hypotheses of the origin of the world and its inhabitants.\nI have studied the phenomena to which you give the name of Nature, and\nI will tell you what seems to me to be a postulate necessary to be\ncarried into that study. I have observed that in the works of man two\nthings are apparent: One is, that power is exercised; the other is,\nthat the exercise of the power is always accompanied by a determining\nwill, which decides that the power shall be exerted, or that it shall\nbe deferred, or that it shall be applied variously as respects the mode\nand the time. In human hands, power is not illimitable, but within\ncertain limitations it may be exercised, and it is always under the\nguidance of a will. A man determines to build a house; he decides\non its dimensions, and when he will begin to erect it. A general\ndetermines to attack the enemy on a certain day, and he marshals his\nforces accordingly. A people determine to change their government, and\nthey decide what their new government shall be. An artist determines to\npaint a certain picture, and he paints it. Whenever we see human power\nexercised, so that we can connect product and power, the power itself\nis put in motion by an intelligent will. I say, therefore, that the\nidea of power without a controlling will, without a determining design,\nis inconceivable: for I am obliged to draw my conclusions from what\nI observe, and certainly the phenomena of society do not present any\ninstances of a product resulting from an exercise of power without a\ndetermination to exercise it. Power diffused, power without guidance,\npower moving by its own volition and without the volition of any\nintelligent being, is not exhibited in the works of man.\n\nKOSMICOS. But we are now dealing with the works of Nature;\nand the question is, whether the power that is manifest in Nature is,\nto adopt your language, under the control or guidance of a being who\nis something other than the power itself. You must remember that this\nis a domain in which you can see nothing but products and effects. You\nmust also remember that if the immensity and variety of those products\nand effects lead to the conclusion that the power transcends all\nhuman faculty, is superhuman, and, so far as we can tell, boundless,\nall that we can know is that the power itself is illimitable. The\nquality of an infinite and illimitable capacity may be imputed to the\npower of Nature, because a power without limit seems necessary to\nthe production of such effects as we see. But here we must stop. We\nhave no warrant for believing that the power which we trace in the\nphenomena of Nature is held and controlled by a person, as man holds\nand controls the power which he exercises with his hands. What we\nsee in Nature is the exercise of an immense and apparently boundless\npower. But the imputation of that power to a being distinct from the\npower itself, is a mere exercise of the human imagination, without\nany proof whatever. See how this imagination has worked at different\nperiods. Monotheism and polytheism are alike in their origin. The one\nhas imputed to different beings all the phenomena in the different\ndepartments of Nature, one being having the charge and superintendence\nof one department and another being having another department. Good\nand evil have thus been parceled out to different deities or demons.\nOn the other hand, monotheism attributes all to some one being, and\nhis existence is no more rational than the existence of the whole\ncatalogue of the mythologies of all antiquity, or the stupid beliefs of\nthe present barbarous tribes. But Nature is a great fact, or rather a\nvast store-house of facts, which we can study; and what we learn from\nit is that there is a power which Nature is constantly exerting, which\nis without any assignable limit, which is itself both cause and effect,\nand beyond this we can not go.\n\nSOPHEREUS. Let us see if you are correct. In the first\nplace, do you not observe that the tendency of mankind to personify\nthe powers of Nature is one of the strongest proofs of the logical\nnecessity for an interpretation which seeks for an intelligent being\nof some kind as the actor in the production of the phenomena? It is\nthe fashion, I find, among a certain class of philosophers, to impute\nthis propensity to the proneness of the human mind toward superstitious\nbeliefs; to the mere effect of poetical or imaginary temperament\nin certain races of men, or to fear in other races; or to a vague\nlonging for some superior being who can sympathize with human sorrows\nor assist human efforts. Something of all these influences has, no\ndoubt, in different degrees and in various ways, worked itself into\nthe religious beliefs of mankind. But neither any one of them, nor the\nwhole of them, will satisfactorily account for either polytheism or\nmonotheism. We must go deeper. There has been an unconscious reasoning\nat work, more or less unconscious, which has led to the conclusion\nthat power, the manifestation of power, necessarily implies that the\npower is held and wielded by some intelligent being. The beliefs of\nmankind, whether embracing one such being or many, have not been the\nmere results of superstition, or fear, or longing for divine sympathy,\nor for superhuman companionship or protection. Those beliefs owe as\nmuch to the reasoning powers of mankind as they do to the influence\nof imagination. In many ages there have been powerful intellects,\nwhich have been free from the influence of superstition or fancy, and\nwhich have recognized the logical necessity for a conception of power\nas a force that must be under the guidance and control of intellect.\nWhile the popular belief has not attained this conviction by the same\nconscious and logically conducted process of reasoning, it has been\nunconsciously led through the same process, by what is open to the\nobservation of human faculties, even in the less civilized portions of\nthe human race. The savage who is sufficiently raised above the brute\ncreation to exercise his own will and intelligence in the pursuit of\nhis game, or in building his wigwam, or in fighting his enemy, knows\nthat he exercises a power that is under his own control; and, as\nsoon as he begins to observe the phenomena of Nature, he conceives\nof some being who holds a like power over the material universe, and\nwhom he begins to personify, to propitiate, and to worship. This is\nthe result of reasoning: feeble in some cases, but in all cases the\nintellectual process is the same. Now let us see whether this process\nis a sound one. Are you sure that you are correct in saying that the\npower of Nature is without limit? Is there a single force in Nature,\na single property of matter, or any sequence of natural events, that\nis not circumscribed? Do not the very regularity and uniformity of\nthe phenomena of Nature imply that some authority has said, from the\nbeginning, Thus far shalt thou go and no farther? You surely do not\nimagine that the law of universal gravitation made itself, or that it\nsettled itself into an exact and invariable method of action by the\nmere force of habit, beginning without prescribed and superimposed\nlimits, and finally resulting in a fixed rule which never changes.\nYou do not imagine that the mysterious, impalpable motion to which is\nnow given the name of electricity, created for itself, as a matter\nof habit, the perpetual tendency to seek an equilibration of the\nquantity accumulated in one body with the quantity that is contained\nin another, by transmission through intermediate bodies; or that it\nestablished for itself the conditions which make one substance a\nbetter conducting medium than another. You do not suppose, I take it,\nthat certain particles of matter adopted for themselves a capacity\nto arrange themselves in crystals of certain fixed combinations and\nshapes, and that other particles of matter did not choose to take on\nthis habit. All these forces, powers, and tendencies are of very great\nextent, much beyond any that man can exercise; but they all have their\nlimitations, their prescribed and invariable methods of action; they\nall act as if they have been commanded to act in a certain way and to\na certain extent, and not as if they have chosen for themselves both\nmethod and scope. Now, is it not a rational deduction that what is\nreally illimitable is not the power of Nature, but the power which made\nNature what it is? Is it not a necessary conclusion that, inasmuch as\nall Nature acts within certain limits, stupendous and minute and varied\nas the products or effects may be, there must have been behind Nature\na power that could and did prescribe the methods, the limitations, the\nlines within which Nature was to move and act? You can not put into\nthe mouth of Nature the question, Where wast thou (Man) when I laid\nthe foundations of the world? without suggesting the retort, \"Where\nwast _thou_ (Nature) when the foundations of the world _were_ laid?\"\nAnd this question Nature can no more answer, for itself, than man can\nanswer for himself when the question is put to him. Each must answer,\nI was nowhere--I did not exist. Each must answer, There was a power\nwhich called me into being, which prescribed the conditions of my\nexistence, which gave me the capacities that I possess, which ordained\nthe limitations within which I was to act.\n\nKOSMICOS. And all this you derive from the fact that a being\nwhom we call Man has some power over matter; that he has an intelligent\nfaculty by which he can do certain things with matter, and that he\nactually does produce certain concrete forms of new things that he did\nnot find made to his hand. Is this the basis of your reasoning about\nthe origin of Nature?\n\nSOPHEREUS. It is, and I will tell you why. Man is the\none being on this earth in whom we find an intelligent will and\nconstructive faculty united, to a degree which shows a power of\nvariation and execution superior to that of all other beings of whose\nactions we have the direct evidence of our senses. We might select one\nor more of the inferior animals, and find in them a strong constructive\nfaculty; but we do not find it accompanied by a power of variation and\nadaptation that is equal to that of man in degree, or that is probably\nthe same in kind. I will not insist on the distinction between reason\nand instinct, but I presume you will admit that, when we compare\nthe constructive faculty of man and that of the most ingenious and\nwonderfully endowed animal or insect, the latter acts always under an\nimplanted impulse, which we have no good ground for regarding as of\nthe same nature as man's reasoning power, however striking may be the\nproducts. When, therefore, we select the human power of construction\nor creation as the basis of reasoning upon the works of Nature, we\nresort to a being in whom that power is the highest of which we have\ndirect evidence. In the works of man we have direct and palpable proof\nthat the phenomena--the products of human skill and human force--are\nbrought about by the faculties of an intelligent and reasoning being.\nIf we dig into the earth and find there a statue, an implement, or a\nweapon, we do not hesitate to conclude that the spot was once inhabited\nby men, just as surely as we should conclude the same thing if we\nfound there human bones. The world, above-ground and below-ground,\nis full of concrete objects that we know must have been fashioned by\nhuman skill, guided by human intelligence. This intelligence, this\nintellect, is not matter; it is a being; it is a person. It is not a\nforce, acting without consciousness; it is a being wielding a force\nwhich is under the control of volition. The force and the volition are\nboth limited, but within the limitations they constitute the power\nof man. Pass, then, to the works of Nature, or to what you call the\npower of Nature. As, in the case of man, you can not conclude that he\ncreated for himself his own faculties, that he prescribed for himself\nthe limitations of his power over matter, or that he formed those\nlimitations as mere matters of habit, or that it was from habit alone\nthat he derived his great constructive powers, so, in studying the\nworks of Nature, you must conclude that some intelligent being made the\nlaws of matter and motion, prescribed the unvarying order and method\nof action, laid down the limitations, originated the properties, and,\nin so doing, acted by volition, choice, and design. The distinction,\nas I conceive, between man and Nature is, that there has been bestowed\non man, in a very inferior degree, a part of the original power of\ncreation. On Nature there has been bestowed none of this power. As we\nfind that the existence of man as an intelligent being, endowed with\ncertain high faculties, among which is a certain degree of the power of\ncreating new objects, can not be accounted for without the hypothesis\nof a creator, still less can we account for the existence and phenomena\nof Nature, which has in itself no degree of the creating power, without\nthe same hypothesis.\n\nKOSMICOS. Stop where you are. Why do you separate man from\nNature? Have you yet to learn that man is a part of Nature? I suspect\nyou have, after all, been reading the book of Genesis for something\nmore than a hypothesis, and that you have adopted the notion that God\nmade Adam a living soul. Put away all the nursery-stories, and come\ndown to the \"hard-pan\" of actual facts, which show by an overwhelming\narray of evidence that man had a very different origin.\n\nSOPHEREUS. You know, my friend, that I never learned any\nnursery-stories, and therefore I have none to unlearn. It may be my\nmisfortune, but I find myself here in the world in mature years,\nstudying the phenomena of life, without having had any early teaching,\nbut with such reasoning as I can apply to what I observe, and to what\nscience, history, and philosophy can furnish to me. I belong to no\nchurch, to no sect, to no party, and I have not even a country. I am\na citizen of the world, on my travels through it, learning what I\ncan. Now, what are your facts? Let us get down, as you say, upon the\n\"hard-pan,\" and make it as hard as you please.\n\nKOSMICOS. First answer my question: Why do you separate man\nfrom Nature?\n\nSOPHEREUS. I know very well that in a certain sense man is a\npart of Nature. But it is necessary to contemplate man apart from all\nthe rest of Nature, because we find that he is endowed with intellect,\nand we have very good and direct evidence that his intellect is an\nactor; and we know that he is endowed with consciousness, and we have\nvery good and direct evidence that, by introspection, he becomes aware\nof his own consciousness, and what it is.\n\nKOSMICOS. Very well, assume all that if you choose. Now let me\nshow you an origin of man, with his intellect and consciousness, which\nwill entirely overthrow the idea that he was a special creation in the\nsense to which you seem to be drifting, namely, that of miraculous\ninterposition by a being called God. You must be aware, as you have\nread so much, that modern science has made great discoveries, and that\nthere are certain conclusions on this subject which are drawn from\nvery numerous and important data. Those data involve the origin of\nall the different animals, man included. They are all to be accounted\nfor in the same way and by the same reasoning. Now, if we go back to\na period when none of them existed, we find a method of accounting\nfor them that is infinitely superior as a hypothesis to any idea of\ntheir special creation as an act or as a series of acts of divine and\ndirect interposition. I will take this method as it is given by Herbert\nSpencer, because, as he has reasoned it, it accounts for both intellect\nand consciousness; and Mr. Spencer is allowed to be one of the leading\nminds of this age. Mark the starting-point of his whole philosophy\non this subject of organic life. Darwin, as you know, supposes some\none very low form of organic life, an aquatic grub, and out of it he\nevolves all the other animal organisms, by the process of natural and\nsexual selection, through successive generations, ending in man. This\nhypothesis leaves the original organism to be accounted for, and,\nalthough Darwin does not expressly assert that it was the Creator who\nfashioned the first organism, he leaves it to be implied. Spencer, on\nthe other hand, explicitly denies the absolute commencement of organic\nlife on the globe. Observe that the terms of his theory of evolution\nare much more complete than Darwin's, for he says that \"the affirmation\nof universal evolution is in itself a negation of an absolute\ncommencement of anything. Construed in terms of evolution, every\nkind of being is conceived as a product of modifications wrought by\ninsensible gradations on a pre-existing being; and this holds as fully\nof the supposed commencement of organic life, or a first organism, as\nof all subsequent developments of organic life.\"[106]\n\nYou will see, therefore, that the idea of a Creator, fashioning a\ntype of animal organism, or making a commencement of organic life, is\nexcluded by this great philosopher, although he does concur in the main\nin Darwin's general explanation of the mode in which one organism is\nevolved out of a pre-existing organism. He goes much farther, because\nhis system of universal evolution embraces the elements out of which\nany organic life whatever has been developed, and negatives the idea\nof any absolute commencement of anything whatever. He begins with the\noriginal molecules of organizable matter. By modifications induced\nupon modifications these become formed, by their inherent tendencies,\ninto higher types of organic molecules, as we see in the artificial\nevolution effected by chemists in their laboratories; who, although\nthey are unable to form the complex combinations directly from their\nelements, can form them indirectly through successive modifications\nof simpler combinations, by the use of equivalents. In Nature, the\nmore complex combinations are formed by modifications directly from\nthe elements, and each modification is a change of the molecule into\nequilibrium with its environment, subjecting it, that is to say, to\nnew conditions. Then, larger aggregates, compound molecules, are\nsuccessively generated; more complex or heterogeneous aggregates arise\nout of one another, and there results a geometrically increasing\nmultitude of these larger and more complex aggregates. So that by the\naction of the successive higher forms on one another, joined with the\naction of the environing conditions, the highest forms of organic\nmolecules are reached. Thus in the early world, as in the modern\nlaboratory, inferior types of organic substances, by their mutual\nactions under fit conditions, evolved the superior types of organic\nsubstances, and at length ended in organizable protoplasm. Now, let\nme read to you Mr. Spencer's description of the mode in which the\nsubstance called \"protein\" becomes developed into organic life. \"And\nit can hardly be doubted,\" he says, \"that the shaping of organizable\nprotoplasm, which is a substance modifiable in multitudinous ways\nwith extreme facility, went on after the same manner. As I learn\nfrom one of our first chemists, Prof. Frankland, protein is capable\nof existing under probably at least a thousand isomeric forms; and,\nas we shall presently see, it is capable of forming, with itself\nand other elements, substances yet more intricate in composition,\nthat are practically intricate in their varieties of kind. Exposed\nto those innumerable modifications of conditions which the earth's\nsurface afforded, here in amount of light, there in amount of heat,\nand elsewhere in the mineral quality of its aqueous medium, this\nextremely changeable substance must have undergone, now one, now\nanother, of its countless metamorphoses. And to the mutual influences\nof its metamorphic forms, under favoring conditions, we may ascribe\nthe production of the still more composite, still more sensitive,\nstill more variously-changeable portions of organic matter, which, in\nmasses more minute and simpler than existing _protozoa_, displayed\nactions varying little by little into those called vital actions, which\nprotein itself exhibits in a certain degree, and which the lowest known\nliving things exhibit only in a greater degree. Thus, setting out\nwith inductions from the experiences of organic chemists at the one\nextreme, and with inductions from the observations of biologists at the\nother extreme, we are enabled to deductively bridge the interval--are\nenabled to conceive how organic compounds were evolved, and how, by a\ncontinuance of the process, the nascent life displayed in these becomes\ngradually more pronounced.\"[107]\n\nIt is in this way that Spencer accounts for the formation of the cell\nwhich becomes developed into a living organism, out of which are\nsuccessively evolved all the higher forms of animal organisms, until we\nreach man.\n\nSOPHEREUS. And is this put forward as something which rational\npeople are to believe?\n\nKOSMICOS. Undoubtedly it is put forward as something that is\nto be believed, because it is supported by a vast array of evidence;\nand let me tell you that this conception of Nature as a whole is\nthe consummate flower of this nineteenth century in the domain of\nphilosophic speculation.\n\nSOPHEREUS. Perhaps it is. But although this nineteenth\ncentury has witnessed many great scientific discoveries, and has\nproduced extraordinary inventions, I do not find that among the\nspeculative philosophers of this age there are such very superior\npowers of reasoning displayed that we ought to regard them as\nauthorities entitled to challenge our acceptance of their theories\nwithout examination. I must say that among your scientific people of\nthe present day, and especially among the philosophers of the class\nof which Mr. Spencer is the leading representative, there are certain\ntendencies and defects which surprise me. One of their defects is that\nthey do not obviate remote difficulties, perhaps because they have not\nbeen trained, as other men have, to foresee where such difficulties\nmust arise. This is sometimes apparent even when the difficulties\nare not very remote, but are quite obvious. One of their tendencies\nis to arrive at a theory from some of the phenomena, and then to\nstrain the remaining phenomena to suit the theory; and sometimes\nthey proceed to the invention or imagination of phenomena which are\nnecessary to the completion of a chain of proof. This last process\nis called bridging the interval. I will now apply this criticism to\nMr. Spencer's philosophy of the origin of man. In the first place he\nhas not obviated a fundamental difficulty, whether it be a near or a\nremote one. Where did the molecules get their tendency or capacity to\narrange themselves into higher and more complex forms? Whence came the\nauxiliary or additional force of their surrounding environment? What\nendowed _protein_ with its capacity to assume a thousand isomeric\nforms? What made the favoring conditions which have helped on the\ninfluence of its metamorphic tendencies, so as to produce still more\nsensitive and variously-changeable portions of organic matter? These\nquestions must have an answer; and, when we ask them, we see the\nsignificance of the inquiry, \"Where wast thou (man) when I laid the\nfoundations of the world?\" For these things, on the evolution theory,\n_are_ the foundations of the world. It is no answer to say, as Mr.\nSpencer does, that these tendencies, or capacities of matter, and\nthese laws of the favoring conditions, came from the Unknown Cause.\nKnown or unknown, did they have a cause, or did they make themselves?\nDid these, the foundations of the world, have an origin, or were they\nwithout any origin? If they had an origin, was it from the will and\npower of a being capable of giving existence to them and prescribing\ntheir modes of action? If they had no origin, if they existed from all\neternity, how came it that they formed this extraordinary habit of\ninvariable action in a certain method, which amid all its multiformity\nshows an astonishing persistency? If we deny, with Mr. Spencer, the\nabsolute commencement of organic life on the globe, we must still go\nback of all the traces of organic life, and inquire whence matter,\nmolecules, organized or unorganized, derived the capacities or\ntendencies to become organized, and how the favoring conditions became\nestablished as auxiliary or subsidiary forces. And therefore it is that\nthis difficulty, whether remote or near at hand, is not met by Mr.\nSpencer: for whether we call the cause an unknown or a known cause, the\nquestion is, Was there a cause, or did the foundations of the world\nlay themselves? The reasoning powers of mankind, exercised by daily\nobservation of cause and effect, of creative power and created product,\nare equal to the conception of a First Cause as a being who could have\nlaid the foundations of the world, but they are utterly unequal to\nthe conception that they had no origin whatever. Again, consider how\nnumerous are the missing links in the chain of evolution, how many gaps\nare filled up by pure inventions or assumptions. The evolution of one\ndistinct and perfect animal, or being, out of a pre-existing animal\nor being of a different type, has never been proved as a fact. Yet\nwhole pedigrees of such generation of species have been constructed\nupon the same principles as we should construct the pedigree of an\nindividual. Furthermore, if we regard the facts about which there can\nbe no controversy, we find not only distinct species of animals, but\nwe find the same species divided into male and female, with a system\nof procreation and gestation established for the multiplication of\nindividuals of that species. Now go back to the imaginary period when\nprotein began to form itself into something verging toward organic\nlife, and then there became evolved the nascent life of an organized\nbeing. How did the division of the sexes originate? Did some of the\nmolecules or their progressive forms, or their aggregates, or masses,\nunder some conditions, tend to the production of the male, and others\nunder certain conditions tend to the development of the female, so\nthat the sexes were formed by a mere habit of arrangement without any\nspecial intervention? Here is one of the most serious difficulties\nwhich the doctrine of evolution, whether it be the Darwinian or the\nSpencerian theory, has to encounter. There is a division into male and\nfemale: there is a law of procreation by the union of the two sexes.\nThis is a fact about which there can be no dispute. It is one of the\nmost remarkable facts in Nature. It is the means by which species are\ncontinued, and the world is peopled with individuals of each species.\nIs it conceivable that this occurred without any design, that it had no\norigin in a formative will, that it had, properly speaking, no origin\nat all, but that it grew out of the tendencies of organized matter to\ntake on such a diversity in varying conditions? And if the latter was\nall the origin that it had, whence came the tendencies and whence the\nfavoring conditions that helped them on toward the result? It seems to\nme that the Spencerian theory, so far as it suggests a mode in which\nthe two sexes of animals came to exist, is hardly less fanciful than\nwhat Plato has given us in his \"Tim\u00e6us.\" I have studied them both.\n\nIf you will hand me Mr. Spencer's work from which you have just quoted,\nI will point out a passage which fully justifies my criticism. It is\nthis: \"Before it can be ascertained how organized beings have been\ngradually evolved, there must be reached the conviction that they have\nbeen gradually evolved.\" He says this in praise of De Maillet, one of\nthe earliest of the modern speculators who reached this conviction,\nand whose \"wild notions\" as to the way should not make us, says Mr.\nSpencer, \"forget the merit of his intuition that animals and plants\nwere produced by natural causes.\"[108] That is to say, first form\nto yourself a theory, and have a thorough conviction of it. Then\ninvestigate, and shape the facts so as to support the theory. Is it\nnot plain that an inquiry into the mode in which organized beings have\nbeen gradually evolved must precede any conclusion or conviction on the\nsubject? It is one of those cases in which the _how_ a thing has been\ndone lies at the basis of the inquiry whether it has probably been done\nat all. If a suggested mode turns out to be wild and visionary, what is\nthe value of any \"intuition\" of the main fact? But, what is still more\nextraordinary in this kind of deduction, which is no deduction, is the\nway in which, according to Mr. Spencer, the first conviction is to be\nreached before one looks for the facts. The process of the evolution\nof organisms, according to Mr. Spencer's philosophy, is contained as\na part in the great whole of evolution in general. We first convince\nourselves that evolution obtains in all the other departments of\nNature, and is the interpretation of all their phenomena. Then we\nconclude that it has obtained in the animal kingdom, and so we have the\nconviction necessary to be acquired before we examine the phenomena;\nand then we make that investigation so as to reconcile the facts with\nthe supposed universal laws of matter and motion. I do not exaggerate\nin the least. Here is what he says: \"Only when the process of evolution\nof organisms is affiliated on the process of evolution in general can\nit be truly said to be explained. The thing required is to show that\nits various results are corollaries from first principles. We have\nto reconcile the facts with the universal laws of the redistribution\nof matter and motion.\"[109] What would Bacon have thought of this\nmethod of establishing the probable truth of a theory? It leaves out\nof consideration a multitude of facts, and one of them at least is of\nthe utmost importance. It is that in the domain of animated matter,\nin organized beings, and most signally in the animal kingdom, there\nis a principle of life; and, whatever may be the universal laws of\nthe redistribution of matter and motion, in their operation upon or\namong the products which are not endowed with this principle, when\nwe come to reason about products that _are_ endowed with it we are\nnot entitled to conclude that this principle of animal life is itself\na product of the operation of those laws because they have resulted\nin products which do not possess life, or life of the same kind. In\norder to reach the conviction that animal organisms have resulted\nsolely from the operation of the laws of matter and motion, we must\nnot undertake to reconcile the facts with those laws, but we must have\nsome evidence that those laws have produced living beings with complex\nand diversified organisms, and this evidence must at least tend to\nexclude every other hypothesis. It is not enough to flout at all other\nhypotheses, or to pronounce them _ex cathedra_ to be idle tales.\n\nKOSMICOS. You must not catch at single expressions and\nmake yourself a captious critic. That would be unworthy of such an\ninquirer as you profess to be, and as I believe you are. Mr. Spencer\ndid not mean, by reconciling the facts with the laws of matter and\nmotion, that we are to distort the facts. He meant that we are to\ndiscover the correspondence between the facts and the operation of\nthose laws. Now, let me show you more explicitly that he is quite\nright. There are certain laws of matter and motion, discoverable and\ndiscovered by scientific investigation, which prevail throughout all\nNature. The phenomena which they produce, although not yet fully\nunderstood, justify the assumption of their universality and their\nmodes of operation. It is perfectly legitimate, therefore, to reason\nthat the same laws which have produced the observable phenomena in\nother departments of Nature have had a like potency as causes by which\nthe phenomena in the animal kingdom have been produced. Using this\nlegitimate mode of reasoning, Mr. Spencer traces the operation of\nthose laws upon the primal molecules, which are peculiarly sensitive\nto their effects. He follows them through the successive aggregations\nof higher combinations until he arrives at the protoplasmic substance,\nout of which, from its capability of assuming an infinity of forms,\naided by the environing conditions, the simplest organic forms become\nevolved, and thus what you call the principle of life gradually arose\nthrough a vast extent of time. He is therefore perfectly consistent\nwith himself in denying the absolute commencement of organic life on\nthe globe; for you must understand that he means by this to deny that\nthere was any point of time, or any particular organism, at or in which\nanimal life can be said to have had its first commencement, without\nhaving been preceded by some other kind of being, out of which the more\nhighly organized being has been produced by modifications wrought by\ninsensible gradations. If you will attend closely to his reasoning,\nyou will see that you have small cause for criticising it as you have;\nand, if you will look at one of his illustrations, you will see the\nstrength of his position. Hear what he says: \"It is no more needful to\nsuppose an absolute commencement of organic life or a 'first organism'\nthan it is needful to suppose an absolute commencement of social life\nand a first social organism. The assumption of such a necessity in this\nlast case, made by early speculators with their theories of 'social\ncontracts' and the like, is disproved by the facts; and the facts,\nso far as they are ascertained, disprove the assumption of such a\nnecessity in the first case.\"[110] That is to say, as the social facts,\nthe social phenomena, disprove the \"social contract\" as an occurrence\ntaking place by human design and intention, so the phenomena of animal\nlife disprove the assumption of such an occurrence as its commencement\nby divine intervention, or its commencement at all.\n\nSOPHEREUS. I think I understood all this before, just as you\nput it, but I am not the less obliged to you for the restatement.\nIn regard to society, I know not why the family, the institution of\nmarriage, is not to be regarded as the first social organism, and\nthe union of two or more families in some kind of mutual league is\ncertainly the first society in a more comprehensive sense. I care\nvery little about the theory of the social contract, as applied to\nmore complex societies, although, as a kind of legal fiction, it is\nwell enough for all the uses which sound reasoners nowadays make of\nit. But the institution of marriage, the family, is no fiction at\nall; it is a fact, however it was first established, and it was the\nabsolute commencement of social life. But I do not hold to this sort\nof analogies, or to this mode of reasoning from what happens in a\ndepartment, in which the actions of men have largely or exclusively\ninfluenced the complex phenomena, to a department in which human\ninfluence has had nothing to do with the phenomena. But now let us come\nback to the proposition that there never was any absolute commencement\nof organic life on the globe. I will take Mr. Spencer's meaning--his\ndenial, as you put it--and will test it by one or two observations\nupon his own explanation, as given in the elaborate paper in which\nhe replied to a critic in the \"North American Review\" a little more\nthan four years ago.[111] In the first place, then, as to time. It\nwill not do to say that there never was a time when such a product as\nlife, animated or organized life, had its first existence. To whatever\nit owed its existence, it must at some time have begun to exist. It\nmatters not how far back in the ages of the globe you place it: you\nmust contemplate a time when it did not exist, and a point of time at\nwhich it began to exist. It matters not that you can not fix this time.\nThere was such a time, whether you can fix it chronologically or not.\nIn the next place, however minute the supposed gradations which you\ntrace backward from a recognizable organism to the primal protoplasmic\nsubstance, out of which you suppose it to have been gradually evolved,\nand through whatever extent of time you imagine these gradations\nto have been worked out by the operation of the forces of Nature,\nmodifying successive beings, you must find an organism to which you can\nattribute life. Whatever that organism was, it was the commencement of\norganic life; for, when you go back of it in the series, you come to\nsomething that was not organic life, but was merely a collection of\nmolecules or a product of aggregated molecules, that had a capacity to\nbe developed into an animated organism under favorable conditions. \"It\nis,\" says Mr. Spencer, \"by the action of the successively higher forms\non one another, joined with the action of environing conditions, that\nthe highest forms are reached.\" Some one, then, of those highest forms,\nsomething that can be called an animal organism, some being endowed\nwith life, was the commencement of organic life on the globe; and it\nis just as correct and necessary to speak of it as the \"absolute\"\ncommencement as it is when we speak of Darwin's aquatic grub, or of the\nMosaic account of the creation of the different animals by the hand\nand will of God. Neither Mr. Spencer nor any other man can construct a\nchain of animated existence back into the region of its non-existence\nwithout showing that it began to have an existence. He can say that\nthe affirmation of universal evolution is in itself a negation of an\nabsolute commencement of anything. And so it is theoretically. But this\ndoes not get over the difficulty. On his own explanation of the mode\nin which organisms have been evolved, there must have been a first\norganism, and in that first organism life began. So that I am not yet\nprepared to yield my criticism, or to yield my convictions to a writer\nwho is so much carried away by his theory.\n\nKOSMICOS. But you will allow that the theory is perfect in\nitself; and why, then, do you say that he is carried away by it? You\nought either to give up your criticism, or to show that there is a\nsuperior hypothesis by which to account for the origin of organisms,\nand one that is supported by stronger proofs and better reasoning. You\nhave nothing to oppose to Mr. Spencer's explanation of the origin of\norganic life, excepting the fable which you find in the book of Genesis.\n\nSOPHEREUS. Undoubtedly the opposite hypothesis is that which\nattributes to a Creator the production of organic life; and whether\nthe Mosaic account, as it stands, be a fable or a true narrative of an\nactual occurrence, what we have to do is to ascertain, upon correct\nprinciples of reasoning, whether the creating power can be dispensed\nwith. Mr. Spencer dispenses with it altogether. He gives it a direct\nnegative in the most absolute manner. But the perfection of his theory\ndepends upon its ability to sustain itself as an explanation of the\nexistence of organisms without the intervention of a creating power\nanywhere at any time. I have already suggested the serious defect of\nhis whole philosophic scheme as applied to the existence of organisms,\nnamely, that the foundation of the theory, the existence of the\nmolecules with their properties and capacities tending to rearrangement\nunder the laws of matter and motion, those laws themselves, and the\nenvironing conditions which assist the process of adjustment and\ncombination, must all have had an origin, or a cause. If we can get\nalong without that origin, without any cause, without any actor\nlaying the foundations of the world, we can make a theory. But that\ntheory can not sustain itself by such a negation if all experience,\nobservation, and reflection amount to anything; for these all point in\none direction. They all tend to show that every existing thing must\nhave had a cause, that every product must have had an origin, and, if\nwe place that origin in the operation of certain laws of matter and\nmotion upon and among the primal molecules of matter, we still have to\nlook for the origin of those laws and of the molecules on which they\nhave operated. If we say that these things had no origin, that they\nexisted without having been caused to exist, we end in a negation at\nwhich reason at once rebels. If, on the other hand, we reject, as we\nmust reject, this negation, then the same power which could establish\nthe laws of matter and motion, and give origin to the molecules and\nthe favoring conditions by which their aggregated higher forms are\nsupposed to have been developed, was alike capable of the direct\nproduction of species, the creation of the sexes, and the establishment\nof the laws of procreation and gestation. So that it becomes a question\nof probability, of the weight of evidence, as to whether we can explain\nthe phenomena of species, of the sexual division and the sexual\nunion, with all that they involve, without the hypothesis of direct\nintervention, design, and formative skill of a boundless character. I\nhave seen no explanation of the origin of species and of the sexual\ndistinction, with its concomitant methods of reproduction, that does\nnot end in an utter blank, whenever it undertakes to dispense with\nthat kind of direct design to which is derisively given the name of\n\"miraculous interposition,\" but which in truth implies no miracle at\nall.\n\nKOSMICOS. I have to be perpetually recalling you to the first\nprinciples of Mr. Spencer's philosophy. You seem to think it enough\nto point to the existence of species and the sexual division, as if\nhis philosophy did not afford the means of accounting for them by the\noperation of natural causes. Let me put to you, then, this question: If\nnatural causes have produced a crystal, by successive new combinations\nof molecules of matter through gradations rising successively into\nhigher forms, why should not natural causes, acting upon other\nmolecules in a corresponding way, have produced organic life, or\nanimated organisms? If natural causes have evolved out of certain\nmolecules the substance known as organizable protein, why should not\nthe continued operation of the same or similar causes have modified\norganizable protein into some distinct and recognizable animated\norganism? If you admit this as a possible or highly probable result,\nwhy should not natural causes have produced, in the course of millions\nof years, the division of the sexes and the methods of procreation and\nmultiplication?\n\nSOPHEREUS. I will assign the reasons for not adopting the\nconclusions to which you expect me to arrive, in a certain order. In\nthe first place, the capacity of certain molecules to result in the\nformation of a crystal, under the operation of what you call natural\ncauses, requires that the molecules, their capacity, and the natural\ncauses should all have had an origin, call it known or unknown. The\ncause was of equal potency to produce the crystal directly, or anything\nelse that exists in Nature. The same thing is true of certain other\nmolecules which, under the operation of the so-called natural causes,\nhave resulted in organizable protein. There must have been an origin\nto the molecules, to their capacity, and to the laws which effect\ntheir combinations; and this cause could equally fashion an organism\nand fashion it in the related forms of male and female by direct\nintervention, for to such a power there is no assignable limit. In the\nnext place, the distinction between inanimate and animated matter,\nbetween beings endowed and beings not endowed with animal life, is a\ndistinction that can not be overlooked; for, although we find this\ndistinction to be a fact that has resulted after the operation of\nwhatever causes may have produced it, we must still note that there is\na distinction, and a very important one. It may be that the dividing\nline is very difficult of detection; that it is impossible to determine\nin all cases just where organizable matter passes from dead matter into\na living organism. But that at some point there has arisen a living\norganism, however produced, is certain. Now, suppose that what you\ncall natural causes have operated to bring organizable matter up to\nthis dividing line, the question is, whether we can conclude that they\nhave had the potency to pass that line, and to lead of themselves to\nall the varying and manifold results of species, the division of the\nsexes, and all that follows that division. Certain great facts seem to\nme to negative this conclusion. The first is, that we have species,\nwhich differ absolutely from each other as organisms, in their modes\nof life, and their destinies, however strong may be the resemblances\nwhich obtain among them in certain respects. The second fact is, that\neach of the true species is divided into the related forms of male and\nfemale, and is placed under a law of procreation, by the sexual union,\nfor the multiplication of individuals of that species. The third fact\nis, that no crosses take place in Nature between different species\nof animals--between the true species--resulting in a third species,\nor a third animal. It is true that multiplication of individuals of\nsome of the lowest organisms takes place without the bisexual process\nof procreation, as where, in the severance of a part of an organism\nthe severed part grows, under favorable conditions, into a perfect\norganism of the same kind, as in the analogous phenomenon of a plant\npropagated by a branch or a slip from the parent stem. But this\noccurrence does not take place among the animals which are placed\nfor their multiplication under the law of the sexual union and the\nsexual procreation. The sexual division, therefore, the law of sexual\nprocreation, and all that they involve, have to be accounted for.\nCan they be accounted for by the theory of evolution? Wherever you\nplace their first occurrence, you have to find a process adequate to\ntheir production. What, then, entitles you to say that the hypothesis\nof their production, by the capacity and tendency of organizable\nsubstances, when they have reached certain combinations, is superior\nto the hypothesis of a direct interposition and a formative will? At\nthe outset, you must begin with some interposition and some formative\nwill; you must account for the existence of the very capacities of\nmatter to become organized under the laws of the redistribution of\nmatter and motion, or you will end nowhere whatever. If you assume, as\nyou must, that, in laying \"the foundations of the world,\" there was\nexercised some interposition and some formative will, you have a power\nwhich was just as adequate to the production of species, and their\nsexual division, as it was to the endowment of matter with certain\nproperties and capacities, and the establishment of any laws for the\nredistribution of matter and motion. If you deny the existence and\npotency of the original power in the one production you must deny them\nin the other. If you concede them in the one case, you must concede\nthem in the other. Now, although the original power was equal to the\nendowment of organizable matter with its capacities for and tendencies\nto organization, and may be theoretically assumed to have made that\nendowment, the question is, whether these capacities and tendencies,\nwithout special formative interposition, and by the mere force of what\nyou call natural causes, were equal to the production of such phenomena\nas the division of the sexes and all that follows that division. Can\nit with any truth he said that the so-called natural causes have\nproduced any phenomena which can be compared, on the question of\nspecial design, to the phenomena of the sexual division, the law of\nsexual procreation, and the whole system of the multiplication of\nindividuals of distinct and true species? When I can see any facts\nwhich will warrant the belief that the origin of the sexes is to be\nattributed to the capacity of organizable protein to form itself into\nnew compounds, to the capacity of these new compounds to become living\norganisms, and to the capacity of these living organisms, without the\nintervention of any formative will specially designing the result, to\ndivide themselves into related forms of male and female, to establish\nfor themselves the law of procreation, and to limit that procreation\nto the same species, I shall, perhaps, begin to see some ground for\nthe superior claims of the evolution hypothesis. I should like,\nby-the-by, to see a system of classification of animal organisms, based\nexclusively on the distinction between the bisexual and the unisexual,\nor the non-sexual, methods of reproduction, and without running it out\ninto the analogies of the vegetable world. I fancy that it would be\nfound extremely difficult to account for the bisexual division without\nreaching the conclusion that it required and was effected by a special\ninterposition. At all events, I should like to see it explained how the\nasexual and the unisexual construction passed into the bisexual by the\nmere operation of what you call natural causes.\n\nKOSMICOS. You said, a while ago, that you had never learned\nany nursery-stories. Yet, all along, you seem to me to have been under\nthe influence of the Mosaic account of the creation. Of course you\nhave read it, and, although you did not learn anything about it in\nchildhood, and now try to treat it solely as a hypothesis, without any\nregard to its claims as a divinely inspired narrative, it is certainly\nworth your while to see how completely it becomes an idle tale of the\nnursery when scientific tests are applied to it. Hear what Spencer says\nabout the creation of man, as given by Moses: \"The old Hebrew idea\nthat God takes clay and molds a new creature, as a potter might mold a\nvessel, is probably too grossly anthropomorphic to be accepted by any\nmodern defender of special creations.\"\n\nSOPHEREUS. Let us see about this. Let us discard all idea\nof the source from which Moses received his information of the\noccurrences which he relates, and put his account upon the same level\nwith Plato's description of the origin of animals, and with the\nDarwinian or Spencerian theory of that origin; regarding all three\nof them, that is to say, as mere hypotheses. Whatever may be the\nsupposed conflict between the Mosaic account of the creation and the\nconclusions of geologists concerning the periods during which the\nearth may have become formed as we now find it, the question is, on\nthe one hand, whether the Hebrew historian's account of the process\nof creation is a conception substantially the same as that at which\nwe should have arrived from a study of Nature if we had never had\nthat account transmitted to us from a period when the traditions of\nmankind were taking the shapes in which they have reached us from\ndifferent sources; or whether, on the other hand, it is so \"grossly\nanthropomorphic\" and absurd that it is not worthy of any consideration\nas an occurrence that it will bear the slightest test of scientific\nscrutiny. Let any one take the Mosaic narrative, and, divesting himself\nof all influence of supposed inspiration or divine authority speaking\nthrough the chosen servant of God, and disregarding the meaning of\nthose obscure statements which divide the stages of the work into\nthe first and the second \"day,\" etc., let him follow out the order\nin which the Creator is said by Moses to have acted. He will find in\nthe narrative an immense condensation, highly figurative expressions,\nand many elliptical passages. But he will also find that the Creator\nis described as proceeding in the exertion of his omnipotent power\nin a manner which we should be very likely to deduce from a study of\nhis works without this narrative. We have, first, the reduction of\nthe earth from its chaotic condition--\"without form and void\"--to the\nseparation of its elemental substances; then the creation of light;\nthe separation of earth and water; the productive capacity of the\ndry land; the establishment of the vegetable kingdom, each product\n\"after its kind\"; the formation of the heavenly bodies as lights in\nthe firmament, to make the division of day and night, seasons and\nyears. It is obviously immaterial, so far as this order of the work is\nconcerned, down to the stage when the formation of the first animals\ntook place, in what length of time this first stage of the work was\naccomplished; whether it was done by an Omnipotence that could speak\nthings into existence by a word, or whether the process was carried on\nthrough periods of time of which we can have no measure, and by the\noperation of infinitely slow-moving agencies selected and employed for\nthe accomplishment of a certain result. Confining our attention to the\nfirst stage of the work as we find it described, we have the formation\nof the earth, light, air, the heavenly bodies, alternations of day\nand night, seasons and years, and the vegetable kingdom, before any\nanimal creation. We then come to the formation of animals which are to\ninhabit this convenient abode, and which are described as taking place\nin the following order: first the water animals, the fowls of the air,\nand the beasts of the field, \"each after its kind\"; then, and finally,\nthe creation of man. Respecting his creation, we are told that it was\nthe purpose of the Almighty to make a being after a very different\n\"image\" from that of any other creature on the earth; and whatever may\nbe the true interpretation of the language employed, whether man was\ncreated literally \"in our image, after our likeness,\" or according\nto an image and a likeness of which his Creator had conceived, there\ncan be no doubt that what Moses described as the purpose of God was\nto make a being differing absolutely from all the other animals by\na broad line of demarkation which is perfectly discoverable through\nall the resemblances that obtain between him and all the other living\ncreatures. To this new being there was given, we are told, dominion\nover all the other animals, and the fruits of the earth were assigned\nto him for food; he was formed out of the dust of the earth, the breath\nof life was breathed into his nostrils, and he became \"a living soul.\"\nLet us now see if this statement of the creation of man is so \"grossly\nanthropomorphic\" as is supposed. You are aware that Buffon, who was\ncertainly no mean naturalist or philosopher, and who was uninfluenced\nby the idea that the book of Genesis was an inspired production,\nreached the conclusion that a study of nature renders the order of\nman's creation as described by Moses a substantially true hypothesis.\n\"We are persuaded,\" said Buffon, \"independently of the authority of\nthe sacred books, that man was created last, and that he only came to\nwield the scepter of the earth when that earth was found worthy of\nhis sway.\"[112] You evolutionists will say that this may be very true\nupon your hypothesis of his gradual development out of other animals,\nthrough untold periods of time. But now let us see whether Moses was\nso grossly unscientific, upon the supposition that God created man\nas he describes. If man was created, or molded, by the Deity, he was\nformed, in his physical structure, out of matter; and all matter may\nbe figuratively and even scientifically described as \"the dust of the\nearth,\" or as \"clay,\" or by any other term that will give an idea of a\nsubstance that was not spirit. If Moses had said that man's body was\nformed out of the constituent elements of matter, or some of them, he\nwould have said nothing that a modern believer in special creations\nneed shrink from, for he would have stated an indisputable fact. He\nstated in one form of expression the very same fact that a modern\nscientist would have to state in another form, whatever might have been\nthe mode, or the power, or the time in or by which the constituent\nelements were brought together and molded into the human body. So that\nthe derisive figure of God taking clay and molding it into the human\nform, as a potter would mold a vessel, does not strike me as presenting\nany proof that the account given by Moses is so destitute of scientific\naccuracy, or as rendering his statements a ridiculous hypothesis.\n\nKOSMICOS. Well, then, it comes at last to this: that you\nconsider the substance of the Mosaic account of the creation,\nindependent of its authority as an inspired statement, to be entitled\nto stand as a hypothesis against the explanations given to us by the\nscientists of the great modern school of evolution, notwithstanding\nthose explanations are in one form or another now accepted by the most\nadvanced scientific thinkers and explorers?\n\nSOPHEREUS. I certainly do. But understand me explicitly.\nAs, after my study of the probable origin of the solar system, and\nour discussion of that subject, I expressed my conclusion that the\nphenomena called for and manifested the exercise of a formative will\nby some acts of special creation, so now, in reference to the animal\nkingdom, I have reached the same conclusion, for reasons which I have\nendeavored to assign. I can see that the operation of the process which\nyou call evolution may have caused certain limited modifications in\nthe structure and habits of life of different animals; or rather, that\nlimited modifications of structure and habits of life have occurred,\nand hence you deduce what you call the process of evolution. But\nto me this entirely fails to account for, or to suggest a rational\nexplanation of, the distinct existence of species, their division into\nmale and female, and the establishment of the laws of procreation by\nwhich individuals of a species are multiplied--a process which does not\nadmit of the production of individuals of an essentially different type\nfrom the parents, and which, so far as we have any means of knowledge,\nhas never commenced in one species and ended in another, in any length\nof time that can be imagined, or through any series of modifications.\n\nKOSMICOS. Let us postpone the farther discussion of the origin\nof species to some future time, when I will endeavor to convince you\nthat both Darwin and Spencer have satisfactorily accounted for them.\n\nSOPHEREUS. Very well; I shall be glad to be enlightened.\n\n\nTHE SINGLE-CELL HYPOTHESIS.\n\n NOTE.--It will readily occur to the reader that Sophereus\n might most pertinently have asked: Whence did the primal cell\n originate? It is conceived of as the ultimate unit of organizable\n matter; invisible to the naked eye, perhaps incapable of being\n reached by the microscope, but consisting of an infinitesimally small\n portion of matter, more or less organized in itself, and possessing a\n capacity to unite with itself other minute particles of matter, and\n so to form larger aggregates of molecules. The hypothesis is, that\n this single cell has given origin to all animated organisms, and,\n through an indefinite series of such organisms, to the human race.\n The single cell, then, having this capacity and this extraordinary\n destiny, was either the first and only one of its kind, or it was one\n of many of the same kind. If we select any supposed point of time\n in the far antecedent history of matter, the question may be asked\n whether there existed at first but one such cell, or many. If there\n were many of such cells, how came they to exist? If one only was\n selected out of many, for this extraordinary destiny of giving origin\n to all the animated organisms, who or what made the selection for\n this transcendent office of the one cell? If there never was but one\n such cell, how did it come to exist? As these questions are clearly\n pertinent, the effort to answer them inevitably conducts us to the\n idea of creation, or else to the conclusion that the numerous cells\n and the selected one had no origin; that the selection was not made,\n but was accidental; or that the one cell, if there never was but one,\n was not a created thing. Human reason can not accept this conclusion.\n\n FOOTNOTES:\n\n [106] \"Biology,\" i, p. 482.\n\n [107] \"Biology,\" i, Appendix, pp. 483, 484.\n\n [108] \"Biology,\" i, p. 408.\n\n [109] \"Biology,\" i, pp. 409, 410.\n\n [110] \"Biology,\" i, p. 482.\n\n [111] Now contained in \"Biology,\" i, Appendix.\n\n [112] Quoted by M. Guizot in his \"History of France,\" vol. vi, p.\n 328. Guizot observes that Buffon was \"absolutely unshackled by any\n religious prejudice,\" and that he \"involuntarily recurred to the\n account given in Genesis.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\n \"Species,\" \"races,\" and \"varieties\"--Sexual division--Causation.\n\n\nThe two friendly disputants have again met. Sophereus begins their\nfurther colloquy, in an effort to reach a common understanding of\ncertain terms, so that they may not be speaking of different things.\n\nSOPHEREUS. I have more than once referred to the fact that\nNature does not permit crosses between the true species of animals,\nin breeding, and that we have no reason to suppose it ever did. This\nis a very important fact to be considered in weighing the claims of\nyour theory of evolution. I have been looking into Darwin, and I find\nit somewhat uncertain in what sense he uses the terms \"species,\"\n\"races,\" and \"varieties.\" In his \"Descent of Man,\" he devotes a good\ndeal of space to the discussion of the various classifications made by\ndifferent naturalists under these respective terms; and there is no\nsmall danger of confusion arising from the use of these terms unless\nthey are defined. The possibility of the process of evolution, as a\nmeans of accounting for the existence of any known animal, depends\nin some degree upon the animals among which, by sexual generation,\nthe supposed transition from one kind of animal to another kind has\ntaken place. Darwin speaks of the difficulty of defining \"species\";\nand yet it is obvious (is it not?) that the theory of the graduation\nof different forms into one another depends for its possibility upon\nthe forms which have admitted of interbreeding. While, therefore,\nthe term \"species\" is in one sense arbitrary, as used by different\nnaturalists, and there is no definition of it common to them all, it is\nstill necessary to have a clear idea of the limits within which crosses\ncan take place in breeding, because there are such limits in nature.\nThus, in the case of man, as known to us in history and by observation,\nthere are different families, which are classed as \"races.\" Darwin\nspeaks of the weighty arguments which naturalists have, or may have,\nfor \"raising the _races_ of man to the dignity of _species_.\" Whether\nthis would be anything more than a matter of scientific nomenclature,\nis perhaps unnecessary to consider. Whether we call the \"races\" of men\n\"species,\" or speak of them as families of one race, we know as a fact\nthat interbreeding can take place among them all, and that between man\nand any other animal it can not take place. The same thing is true of\nthe equine and the bovine races and their several varieties. Whether,\nin speaking of the different families or races of men, we consider them\nall as one \"species,\" or as different species--and so of the varieties\nof the equine or the bovine races--the important fact is, that there\nare limits within which interbreeding can take place, and out of which\nit can not take place. Do you admit or deny that the barriers against\nsexual generation between animals of essentially different types,\nwhich are established in nature, are important facts in judging of the\nhypothesis of animal evolution?\n\nKOSMICOS. Take care that you have an accurate idea of what the\ntheory of evolution is. Apply it, for example, to the origin of man,\nas an animal, proceeding \"by a series of forms graduating insensibly\nfrom some ape-like creature to man as he now exists.\" This expresses\nthe whole theory as applied to one animal, man, without going behind\nhis ape-like progenitors. It does not suppose a crossing between\nthe ape-like creature and some other creature that was not an ape.\nIt supposes a gradual development of the ape-like creature into the\nman as he now exists; and, of course, the interbreeding took place\nbetween the males and the females of that ape-like race and their\ndescendants--the descendants, through a long series of forms, being\ngradually modified into men, by the operation of the laws of natural\nand sexual selection, which I need not again explain to you.\n\nSOPHEREUS. Very well, I have always so understood the theory.\nBut then I have also understood it to be a part of the same theory that\nthere is important auxiliary proof of the supposed process of evolution\nto be derived from what is known to take place in the interbreeding\nof different races or families of the same animal. Whatever value\nthere may be in this last fact, as auxiliary evidence of the supposed\nprocess of evolution, there must have been a time, in the development\nof the long series of forms proceeding from the ape-like progenitor,\nwhen an animal had been produced which could propagate nothing but\nits own type, and between which and the surrounding other animals no\npropagation could take place, if we are to judge by what all nature\nteaches us. You may say that the laws of natural and sexual selection\nwould still go on operating among the numerous individuals of this\nanimal which had become in itself a completed product, and that to\ntheir descendants would be transmitted newly acquired organs and\npowers, new habits of life, and all else that natural and sexual\nselection can be imagined to have brought about. But at some time,\nsomewhere in the series, you reach an animal of a distinct character,\nin which natural and sexual selection have done all that they can\ndo; in which there can be no propagation of offspring but those of\na distinct and peculiar type, and the invincible barrier against a\nsexual union with any other type becomes established. For this reason,\nwe must recognize the limits of possible interbreeding. It is best\nfor us, therefore, to come to some understanding of the sense in\nwhich we shall use the term \"species.\" For I shall press upon you\nthis consideration--that animals differ absolutely from each other;\nthat there can be no interbreeding between animals which so differ;\nand yet that, without interbreeding between animals having distinct\norganizations, natural and sexual selection had not the force necessary\nto produce, in any length of time, such a being as man out of such a\nbeing as the ape.\n\nKOSMICOS. I will let Darwin answer you, in a passage which\nI will read. \"Whether primeval man,\" he observes, \"when he possessed\nbut few arts, and those of the rudest kind, and when his power of\nlanguage was extremely imperfect, would have deserved to be called\nman, must depend on the definition which we employ. In a long series\nof forms graduating insensibly from some ape-like creature to man as\nhe now exists, it would be impossible to fix on any definite time when\nthe term 'man' ought to be used. But this is a matter of very little\nimportance.\" That is to say, in the long series of forms descending\nfrom the ape-like creature, we can not fix on any one of the modified\ndescendants which we can pronounce to be separated from the family\nof apes, and to have become the new family, man, because to do this\nrequires a definition of man. Man as he now exists we know, but the\nprimeval man we do not know. He may have been an animal capable of\nsexual union with some of his kindred who stood nearest to him, but\nyet remained apes, or he may not. It is not important what he was, or\nwhether we can find the time when he ceased to belong to the family\nof apes and became the primeval man. The hypothesis of his descent\nremains good, notwithstanding we can not find that time, because it is\nsupported by a great multitude of facts.\n\nSOPHEREUS. I have never seen any facts which I can regard\nas giving direct support to the theory. But, waiving this want\nof evidence, doubtless it is not important to find the time,\nchronologically, when the modified descendants, supposed to have\nproceeded from the ape-like creature, became the primeval man; but\nit is of the utmost importance to have some satisfactory grounds for\nbelieving that there ever was such an occurrence as the development of\nthe animal man, primeval or modern man, out of such an animal as the\nape. And therefore, without reference to the sense in which naturalists\nuse the term \"species,\" I shall give you the sense in which I use it.\nI use it to designate the animals which are distinct from each other,\nas the man, the horse, the ape, and the dog are all distinct from each\nother. Speaking of man as one true species, I include all the races\nof men. Speaking of the apes as another species, I include all the\nfamilies of apes. Speaking of the bovine, the equine, or the canine\nspecies, I include in each their respective varieties. Now, as crosses\nin interbreeding can take place between the different varieties or\nfamilies of these several species, and can not take place between the\nspecies themselves--between those which I thus class as species--the\nlimits of such crosses become important facts in considering the theory\nof evolution, because they narrow the inquiry to the possibility of\neffecting a propagation of one species out of another species. Take any\nanimal which has become a completed and final product--a peculiar and\ndistinct creature--whether made so by aboriginal creation or produced\nby what you call evolution. The reproductive faculty of the males and\nthe females of this distinct and peculiar animal is limited to the\ngenerative reproduction of individuals of the same type, by a sexual\nunion of two individuals of that type. Their progeny, in successive\ngenerations, may be marked by adventitious and slowly acquired\npeculiarities; but unless there can be found some instance or instances\nin which the process of modification has resulted in an animal which\nwe must regard as an 'essentially new creature--a new species--what\nbecomes of the auxiliary evidence which is supposed to be derived\nfrom the effects of interbreeding between those individuals which\ncan interbreed? I lose all hold upon the theory of evolution, unless\nI can have some proof that natural and sexual selection have overcome\nthe barriers against a sexual union among animals which are divided\ninto males and females of the several species, each of which is placed\nunder a law of procreation and gestation peculiar to itself, and never\nproduces any type but its own.\n\nKOSMICOS. You wander from the principle of evolution. I\nhave to be perpetually restating it. Observe, then, that there are\nmultitudes of facts which warrant the belief that, starting with\nany one kind of animal organism, however peculiar and distinct, the\nstruggle for existence among the enormous number of individuals of\nthat animal becomes most intense, and a furious battle is constantly\ngoing on. The best-appointed males, in the fierceness of the strife\nfor possession of the females, develop new organs and powers, or their\noriginal organs and powers are greatly enhanced. Their descendants\nshare in these modifications; and the modifications go on in a\ngeometrical ratio of increase through millions of years, until at\nsome time there is developed an animal which differs absolutely from\nits remote progenitors which were away back in the remote past, and\nwhich began the struggle for individual life and the continuation\nof their species or their race in a condition of things which left\nthe fittest survivors the sole or nearly the sole propagators of new\nindividuals. This struggle for existence may have begun--probably\nit did begin--before the separation of the sexes, when the organism\nwas unisexual or even asexual. That is to say, there may have been,\nand there probably was, an organism which multiplied with enormous\nrapidity, without the bisexual method of reproduction. The vast\nmultitude of such individuals would lead to the destruction of the\nweakest; the strong survivors would continue to give rise to other\nindividuals, modified from the original type, until at length, by\nforce of this perpetual exertion and struggle and the survival of the\nfittest, modifications of the method of reproduction would ensue, and\nthe bisexual division would be developed and perpetuated.\n\nSOPHEREUS. I confess I did not expect to hear you go quite so\nfar. I will yield all the potency to natural and sexual selection that\ncan be fairly claimed for them as modifying agencies operating after\nthe sexual division has come about; but I have, I repeat, seen no facts\nwhich justify the hypothesis that they have led to distinct organisms\nbetween which no propagation can take place. But now you expect me to\naccept the startling conclusion that at some time the asexual or the\nunisexual method of reproduction passed into the bisexual, without\nany formative will or design of a creating power, and without any\nact of direct creation. We know what Plato imagined as the origin\nof the sexual division, and that he could not get along without the\nintervention of the gods. What modern naturalist has done any better? I\nhave examined Darwin's works pretty diligently, and I can not get from\nthem any solution of the origin of the bisexual division. I am left to\nreason upon it as I best can. We know, then, that in the higher animal\norganisms the individuals of each species are divided into the related\nforms of male and female, and that for each species there exists the\none invariable method of the sexual union, and a law of gestation\npeculiar to itself. One hypothesis is that this system was produced by\nthe operation of natural causes, like those which are supposed to have\ndifferentiated the various kinds of organisms; the other hypothesis is\nthat it was introduced with special design, by an act of some creative\nwill. If we view the phenomena of the sexual division and the sexual\ngenesis in the highest animal in which they obtain, we find that\nthey lead to certain social results, which plainly indicate that in\nthis animal they exist for a great and comprehensive moral purpose,\nwhich far transcends all that can be imagined as the moral purpose\nfor which they exist in the other animals. To a comparatively very\nlimited extent, certain social consequences flow from the law of sexual\ndivision and genesis among the other animals. But there is no animal in\nwhich the moral and social effects of this law are to be compared to\nthose which it produces in the human race. Not only does the same law\nof multiplication obtain among the human race; not only does it lead to\nlove of the offspring far more durable and powerful than in the case\nof any other animal; not only is it the origin of a society far more\ncomplex, more lasting, and more varied in its conditions than any that\ncan be discovered in the associations of other animals which appear\nto have some social habits and to form themselves into communities,\nbut in the human race alone, so far as we have any means of knowledge,\nhas the passion of sexual love become refined into a sentiment. You\nmay remember the passage in the \"Paradise Lost\" in which Raphael, in\nhis conversation with Adam, touches so finely the distinction between\nsexual love in the human race and in all the other animals. The angel\nreminds Adam that he shares with the brutes the physical enjoyment\nwhich leads to propagation; and then tells him that there was implanted\nin his nature a higher and different capacity of enjoyment in love. The\nconclusion is:--\n\n                    \"... for this cause\n    Among the beasts no mate for thee was found.\"\n\nIn the human being alone, even when there is not much else to\ndistinguish the savage from the beasts around him, the passion of\nlove is often something more nearly akin to what might be looked for\nin an elevated nature, than it can be among the brutes. What do the\npoetry and romance of the ruder nations show, but that this passion of\nsexual love in the human being is one in which physical appetite and\nsentimental feeling are so \"well commingled\" that their union marks the\ncompound nature of an animal and a spiritual being? How human society\nhas resulted from this passion, how in the great aggregate of its\nforces it moves the world, how in its highest development it gives rise\nto the social virtues, and in its baser manifestations leads to vice,\nmisery, and degradation, I do not need to remind you. How, then, is it\npossible to avoid the conclusion that in man the sexual passion was\nimplanted by special design and for a special purpose, which extends\nfar beyond the immediate end of a continuation of the race?\n\nKOSMICOS. Why do you resort to a special purpose in the\nconstitution of one animal, and to the absence of a similar purpose\nfrom the constitution of another animal? In both, the consequences make\na case of the _post hoc_ just as plainly as they make a case of the\n_propter hoc_. It is just as rational to conclude that they only show\nthe former as it is to conclude that they establish the latter. In man,\nwe have the physical fact of the sexual division, and all you can say\nis that it is followed by certain great and varied moral phenomena. In\nthe other animals, we have the same physical fact, followed by moral\nphenomena less complex and varied, and not so lasting. In neither case\ncan you say that there was a special and separate design, according\nto which the same physical fact was intended to produce the special\nconsequences which we observe in each. Why, as the species called man\nbecame developed into beings of a higher order than the primates of\nthe race or than their remote progenitors, should not this passion of\nsexual love have become elevated into a sentiment and been followed by\nthe effects of that elevation, just as the gratification of another\nappetite, that for food, _par exemple_, has been refined by the\nintellectual pleasures of the social banquet and the interchange of\nsocial courtesies? Is there anything to be proved by the institution\nor the practice of marriage, beyond this--that it has been found by\nexperience to be of great social utility, and is therefore regulated\nby human laws and customs, which vary in the different races of\nmankind? Monogamy is the rule among some nations, polygamy is at least\nallowed in others. You can predicate nothing of either excepting that\neach society deems its own practice to be upon the whole the most\nadvantageous. You can not say that there is any fixed law of nature\nwhich renders it unnatural for one man to have more than one wife.\nIn many ages of the world there have been states of society in which\nthe family has had as good a foundation in polygamous as it has had\nin monogamous unions. Looking, then, at these undeniable facts, and\nalso at the fact that marriage, whether monogamous or polygamous, is\nan institution regulated by human law and custom, we have to inquire\nfor the reason why human law and custom take any cognizance of the\nrelation. We find that, among some of the other animals, the sexes\ndo not pair excepting for a single birth. The connection lasts no\nlonger than for a certain period during which the protection of both\nparents is needed by the offspring, and not always so long even as\nthat. It has become the experience of mankind that the connection\nof the parents ought to be formed for more than one birth; shall be\nof indefinite duration; and this because of the physical and social\nbenefits which flow from such a permanency of the union. This has given\nrise to certain moral feelings concerning the relation of husband and\nwife. But we have no more warrant, from anything that we can discover\nin nature, for regarding the permanency of marriage among the human\nrace as a divine institution than we have for regarding its temporary\ncontinuance among the other animals as a divinely appointed temporary\narrangement. In the one case, the permanency of the union has resulted\nfrom experience of its utility. In the other case, the animal perceives\nno such utility, and therefore does not follow the practice. Upon the\nhypothesis that all the animals, man included, had a common origin,\nit is very easy to account for the difference which prevails between\nman and the other animals in this matter of marriage, or the pairing\nof the sexes. As man became by insensible gradations evolved out of\nsome pre-existing organism, and as moral sentiments became evolved\nout of his superior and more complex relations with his fellows, from\nhis experience of the practical utility of certain kinds of conduct\nand practice, the sentiments became insensibly interwoven with his\nfeelings about the most important of his social relations, the union\nof the sexes in marriage. This is quite sufficient to account for the\ndifference between man and the other animals in regard to the duration\nof such unions, without resorting to any intentional or divine or\nsuperhuman origin of that difference.\n\nSOPHEREUS. For the purpose of the argument, I concede that\nthis is a case of either the _post hoc_ or the _propter hoc_. I have\nbeen pretty careful, however, in all my investigations, not to lose\nsight of this distinction in reasoning on the phenomena of nature or\nthose of society. I think I can perceive when there is a connection\nbetween cause and effect, when that connection evinces an intelligent\ndesign, and when the phenomena bear no relation to a certain fact\nbeyond that of sequence in time. What, then, have we to begin with?\nWe have the fact that the human race is divided into the two forms of\nmale and female, and that the passion or appetite of sexual love exists\nin both sexes, and that its gratification is the immediate cause of\na production of other individuals of the same species. We next have\nthe fact that this union of the sexes is followed by an extraordinary\namount of moral and social phenomena that are peculiar to the human\nrace. This sequence proves to me an intentional design that the moral\nand social phenomena shall flow from the occurrence of the sexual\nunion, for it establishes not only a possibility, but an immensely\nstrong probability, that the phenomena were designed to flow from\nthis one occurrence among this particular species of animal. If this\nconnection between the original physiological fact and the moral and\nsocial phenomena be established to our reasonable satisfaction, it is\nthe highest kind of moral evidence of a special design in the existence\nof the sexual division and the sexual passion among the human race.\nYou remember old Sir Thomas Browne's suggestion, that men might have\nbeen propagated as trees are. But they are not so propagated. If they\nwere, no such consequences would have followed as those which do follow\nfrom the mode in which they are in fact propagated. These consequences\nare most numerous and complex, and they are capable of being assigned\nto nothing but the sexual division and the sexual union as the means\nof continuing the race. Turn now to some of the other animals among\nwhom there prevail the same bisexual division and the same method of\nprocreation and multiplication. You find they result in sexual unions\nof very short duration, and that, if it is followed by phenomena that\nin some feeble degree resemble those which are found in human society,\nthey bear no comparison in point of complexity and character to those\nwhich in the human race mark the family, the tribe, and the nation.\nAnd here there occurs something which is closely analogous to what\nI pointed out to you in considering the supposed development of the\nfirst animal organism. I said that although you may theoretically\nsuppose that the first animal organism was formed by the spontaneous\nunion of molecular aggregates, and that the higher organisms were\nevolved out of the lower solely by the operation of causes which you\ncall \"natural,\" yet that when you come to account for the existence of\ntrue and distinct species, each with its sexual division and its law\nof procreation and gestation, you must infer a special design and a\nformative will, because there has never been suggested any method by\nwhich the so-called natural causes could have produced this division\nof the sexes and this invariable law of the sexual procreation among\nindividuals of the same species. Here, then, we arrive at a distinct\nmoral purpose; for, when we compare the different social phenomena\nwhich follow the operation of the sexual division and procreation in\nman with the social phenomena which follow in the case of the other\nanimals, we find a difference that is not simply one of degree, but\nis one of kind. We find the origin of the family, the tribe, and the\nnation: the source of the complex phenomena of human society. We may\ntherefore rationally conclude that in man the sexual division and\nthe sexual passion were designed to have effects that they were not\ndesigned to have in the other animals. To suppose that these vastly\nsuperior consequences in the case of man are the mere results of his\nperception of their utility will not account for the fact that when\nhe does not recognize the utility--when he departs from the law of\nhis human existence--human society can not be formed and continued.\nAlthough it is possible for human society to exist with polygamous\nmarriages, and even to have some strength and duration, yet human\nsociety without the family, with promiscuous sexual intercourse, with\nno marriages and no ties between parents and children, never has\nexisted or can exist. Compare Plato's curious constitution of the body\nof \"guardians,\" in his \"Republic,\" and the strange method of unions,\nthe offspring of which were not allowed to know their parents or the\nparents to know their own children. This was not imagined as a form\nof human society, but was entirely like a breeding-stud. Among the\nbrutes, permanent marriages, families, do not exist, not because the\nanimals do not perceive their social utility, but because the purposes\nof their lives, their manifest destinies, show that there was no reason\nfor endowing them with any higher capacity for the sexual enjoyment\nthan that which leads to the very limited consequences for which the\ndivision of the sexes was in their cases ordained. But in the case of\nman there is a further and higher capacity for the sexual enjoyment,\nwhich becomes the root of his social happiness, and which distinguishes\nhim from the brute creation quite as palpably as the superiority of his\nintellectual faculties. In all this we must recognize a moral purpose.\n\nKOSMICOS. Pray tell me why it is not just as rational to\nconclude that these moral phenomena, as results of the human passion\nof love, have become, in all their complex and diversified aspects,\nthe consequences of a progressive elevation of the human animal to a\nhigher plane of existence than that occupied by the inferior species,\nor than that occupied by the primeval man. When man had become\ndeveloped into an animal in whom the intellect could become what it\nis, he could begin to perceive the social utility of certain modes\nof life, and from this idea of their utility would result certain\nmaxims of conduct which would be acted on as moral obligations. Thus,\ncommencing with a consciousness that the race exists with the sexual\ndivision into male and female, there would begin to be formed some\nideas of the superior social utility of a regulated sexual union of\nindividuals and of permanent marriages. These ideas would become\nrefined as the progressive elevation of the race went on, and that\nwhich we recognize as the sentimental element in the passion of love\nwould become developed out of the perceptions of a superior utility\nin the permanent devotion and consecration of two individuals to\neach other. If, then, by a moral purpose in the establishment of the\nbisexual division you mean that all these social phenomena of the\nfamily, the tribe, and the nation were designed in the human race to\nfollow from that division, I see no necessity for resorting to any such\nmoral purpose on the part of a creator, because they might just as\nwell have followed from the progressive elevation and development of\nthe human animal, supposing him to be descended from some pre-existing\ntype of animal of another and inferior organization. The philosophy\nwhich you seem to be cultivating closely resembles that which ascribes\neverything to the action of mind as its cause. This, you must be aware,\nit is the tendency of modern science to antagonize by a different\nview of causation. What have you been reading, that you adhere so\npertinaciously to the idea of a moral purpose adopted by some being,\noverlooking those physical causes which may have produced all the\nresults without that hypothesis?\n\nSOPHEREUS. I have been reading a good deal, but I have\nreflected more. I may not be able to reconcile the metaphysical\nspeculations of the different schools of philosophy by explanations\nthat will satisfy others, but I can satisfy myself on one point. This\nis, that power, force, energy, causation, are all attributes of mind,\nand can exist in a mind only. Let us pass for a moment from abstract\nreasoning to an illustration drawn from familiar objects. A ton of coal\ncontains a certain amount of what is scientifically called energy.\nThis energy becomes developed by combustion, which liberates heat. The\nheat, when applied to water, converts the water into a vapor called\nsteam--a highly elastic substance. The expansion of the steam against a\nmechanical instrument called a piston produces motion, and an engine is\ndriven. The force thus obtained represents the energy that was latent\nin the coal. If we inquire whence the coal obtained this latent energy,\nthere is a hypothesis which assigns its origin to the sun, which laid\nup a certain quantity of it in the vegetable substances that became\nconverted into coal in one of the geological periods of the earth's\nformation. But in order to find the ultimate and original cause--the\n_causa causans_ of the whole process--we must go behind the steam and\nits expansive quality, behind the heat which converts the water into\nsteam, behind the coal and its combustible quality, and behind the sun\nand its indwelling heat, a portion of which was imparted to and left\nlatent in the vegetable substances that became coal. We must inquire\nwhence they all originated. If they did not create themselves--an\ninconceivable and inadmissible hypothesis--they must have originated\nin some creating power, which commanded them to exist and established\ntheir connections. Without a mental energy and its exertions, matter\nand all its properties, substance and all its qualities, the sun's\nindwelling heat and its capacity to be stored up in vegetable fiber\nin a latent condition, could not have existed, and the forces of\nnature of which we avail ourselves would never have emerged from the\nnon-existent state that we conceive of as \"chaos.\" I know very well\nthat we are accustomed to associate with inanimate matter the ideas of\npower, force, energy, and causation. But if we rest in the conception\nof these as acting of themselves, and without being under the control\nof an originating mind or a determining will, we may think that we\nhave arrived at ultimate causes, but we have not. We have arrived at\nsubsidiary causes--the instruments, so to speak, in the control of an\nintellect which has ordained and uses them. Whether we look at the\nphysical causes by which the early Greek philosophers endeavored to\nexplain the phenomena of the universe, or at one of Plato's conceptions\nof a designing and volitional agency in the formation of the Kosmos,\nor to another of his conceptions, the sovereignty of universal ideas\nor metaphysical abstractions, we are everywhere confronted with the\nnecessity for assigning an origin to the physical causes, or to\nthe universal ideas; and the result is that the idea of a supreme,\ndesigning, and volitional agency is forced upon us--it is upon me--by\nan irresistible process of reasoning, an invincible necessity of my\nmental constitution. I can not agree with Auguste Comte, who regards\nit as the natural progress of the human mind to explain phenomena at\nfirst by reference to some personal agency, and to pass from this\nmode of explanation to that by metaphysical abstractions. Nor can I\nagree with you scientists, who not only rest satisfied yourselves with\nthe explanation of the ultimate cause of phenomena by mere physical\nagencies, but who insist that others shall not deduce a personal and\nvolitional agency from the existence of those physical agencies. To me\nit seems indispensable, in the study of phenomena, to recognize moral\npurposes for which they have been made to be what they are: and of\ncourse a moral purpose is not assignable to the physical agencies of\nmatter, or to metaphysical abstractions. Hence it is that in reasoning\non the phenomena of human society, I am obliged to recognize a moral\npurpose in the sexual division, of far greater scope and far more\nvaried consequences than can be found in the case of the same division\namong the other animals.\n\nKOSMICOS. I put to you this question: What do you mean by a\nmoral purpose? In teleology, or the science of the final causes of\nthings, you must find out the producing agencies. Let me give you a\ntheory of causation, which will show you that your notion of a moral\npurpose is altogether out of place. The only true causes are phenomenal\nones, or what is certified by experience. There are uniform and\nunconditional antecedents, and uniform and unconditional sequences.\nSomething goes before, uniformly and invariably; something uniformly\nand invariably follows. The first are causes; the last are effects.\nWe can not go farther back than the antecedent cause; we can not go\nfarther forward than the effect. We can not connect the effect with\nanything but the antecedent cause. When, therefore, you speak of a\nmoral purpose, what do you mean? Where do you get the evidence of the\nmoral purpose? What is the purpose, and what is the evidence of it?\n\nSOPHEREUS. I answer you as I have before--that the agencies\nwhich you call phenomenal causes could not have established themselves;\ncould not have originated their own uniformity; could not have made\nthe invariable connection between themselves and the effects. If we\ndiscard the idea of a moral and sentient being, a mind originating\nand ordaining the physical agencies, we have nothing left but those\nagencies; and in this the human mind can not rest. It is not enough to\nsay that it ought to rest there. It does not, will not, and can not.\nScience--what you call science--may rest there, but philosophy can not.\nIt is unphilosophical to speak of the Unknown Cause, or the Unknown\nPower, underlying all manifestations, as something of which we can not\nconceive and must not personify. The ultimate power which underlies\nall phenomena necessarily implies a will, an intellectual origin, and\na mental energy. That it is something whose mental operations we can\nnot trace, is no argument against its personality, and no reason why we\nshould not conceive of it as a mental energy.\n\nKOSMICOS. You have more than once referred to the constitution\nof the human mind as if it had been constructed with an irresistible\nnecessity to attribute everything to the action of a being, an\nintelligence, and a will. You should rather say that _some minds_ have\ntrained themselves to this mode of reasoning, because they have first\nreceived the idea of such a being as the final cause, as a matter of\ndogmatic teaching, and they have tried to reason it out so as to attain\na conviction that what they have been taught is true. It is in this way\nthat they have found what they consider as evidence of a moral purpose.\nBut you have no warrant for the assumption that the human intellect\nhas been put together in such a way that it can not avoid reaching the\nconclusion that all phenomena are to be imputed to the volition of a\nmind as their producing cause.\n\nSOPHEREUS. In speaking of the human mind and its incapacity\nto rest satisfied with what science can discover of immediate physical\nagencies in the production of phenomena, I have not overlooked the\nfact that the idea of a Creator has been dogmatically inculcated as\na matter of belief. But I form my conception of the construction of\nthe human mind from the operations of my own mind. I have not trained\nmyself into any mode of reasoning. I have somehow been so placed in\nthis world that, as I have frequently told you and as I am perfectly\nconscious, I am uninfluenced by any early teaching, and can judge\nfor myself of the force of evidence. When I say, therefore, that\nthe human intellect is so constituted that it is obliged to regard\nmind as the source of power, I exclude all teaching but the teaching\nof experience. There can not be two courses of reasoning that are\nalike correct. If you uncover a portion of the earth's surface, and\nfind there structures, implements, and various objects which you\nare convinced that the forces of nature did not produce, you must\nconclude that they were the productions of mind availing itself of the\ncapabilities of matter to be molded and arranged by the force of an\nintelligent will. You do not see that mind, you do not see the work in\nprogress, but you are irresistibly led to the conclusion that there\nwas a mind which produced what you have found. You can not reason on\nthe phenomena at all, without having the conviction forced upon you\nthat the ultimate cause was an intelligent being. You can not explain\nthe phenomena without this conclusion. How, then, can you explain the\nmore various and extraordinary phenomena of nature without attributing\ntheir production to mind? You have no more direct evidence that the\nPyramids of Egypt, or an obelisk which has lain buried in the earth\nfor thousands of years, were made by human hands, than you have for\nbelieving that an animal organism, or the solar system, was planned\nand executed by an intelligent being. In both cases, you have only\nindirect evidence; but in both cases that evidence addresses itself to\nyour intellect upon the same principles of belief. In the case of the\npyramid or the obelisk, you refer the construction to mind, because you\nsee that mind alone could have been the real cause of its existence.\nIn the case of the animal organism, or the mechanism of the heavenly\nbodies, you are obliged to reason in the same way. Hence I say that\nour minds are so constituted that there is but one method of correct\nreasoning, whether the phenomena are those which can be attributed only\nto human intellect, or are those which must be attributed to superhuman\npower and intelligence. Hence, too, I speak of a moral purpose as\nindicated by the phenomena. The pyramid and the obelisk were built\nwith a moral purpose. The animal organism and all that follows from\nit, the structure of the solar system and all that follows from it,\nwere made to be what they are with a moral purpose. When you ask me for\nthe evidence of this purpose, I point to the fact that the phenomenal\ncauses, as you denominate the mere physical agencies employed in the\nproduction of certain objects, were incapable of any volitional action,\nand that without volition the connection between the physical agencies\nand their effects could not have been established. The stone and the\nchisel were the immediate physical agencies which produced the obelisk.\nBut who selected the stone and wielded the chisel? And who designed the\nmoral uses of the obelisk? Procreation, by the sexual union, is the\nimmediate physical cause of the existence of an individual animal. But\nwho designed its structure, appointed for it a law of its being, and\nestablished the physical agencies which brought the individual into\nexistence and the moral consequences that those agencies produce?\n\nKOSMICOS. We are no nearer to an agreement than we have been\nin our former discussions. And the reason is that you do not perceive\nthe mission and the method of science. Science undertakes to discover\nthose causes of phenomena which can be verified by experience; so that\nwe can truly say that our knowledge has been advanced, and that we\nreally do know something of the things which we talk about. This is the\ndomain of science. Its conclusions do not extend into the region of\nthat which is unknown and unknowable. Inasmuch as its conclusions are\nstrictly positive, because they are demonstrated by experience, they\nnegative, as matter of knowledge, anything beyond. You may speculate\nabout what lies beyond, but you have no reason for saying that you know\nanything about it; whereas men who reason as you do, and yet who do\nnot accept dogmas simply as matters of faith, are constantly trying to\npersuade themselves that they know something about that of which they\nhave no means of knowledge. If you accept that something as a matter of\nfaith, because you are satisfied with the evidence which establishes,\nor is supposed to establish, a divine revelation, you have a ground for\nbelief with which science does not undertake to interfere. But you have\nno ground for maintaining that, from the phenomena of nature alone, you\ncan derive any knowledge beyond that which you can demonstrate as a\nscientific fact.\n\nSOPHEREUS. I accept your definition of the aims and methods\nof science. But what I find fault with is the assumption that we are\nnot entitled to say that we know or believe a thing which can not be\ndemonstrated as a scientific fact, when we are all the time grounding\nsuch knowledge or belief upon reasoning that convinces us of the truth\nand reality of other things which in like manner are not demonstrable\nas scientific facts. You may say that this is not the knowledge\nwhich we derive from scientific facts, and therefore it is not to be\ndignified by the name of knowledge. But we are always acting and must\nact upon proofs which are not scientific demonstrations; and whether we\ncall this knowledge, or call it belief, we govern our lives according\nto it. We accept the proof that a buried city was the habitation and\nwork of intelligent human beings, because we know that the forces of\nnature, not guided and applied by intelligent wills, never constructed\na city. We accept the proof that men are just, merciful, courageous,\ntruthful, or the reverse of all this, because their actions prove it,\nalthough we can not look into their hearts. What does all the estimate\nof the characters of men rest upon, but upon their actions? And is not\nthis entitled to be ranked as knowledge of the characters of individual\nmen?\n\nKOSMICOS. We must each retain his conclusions. Let our next\ndiscussion relate to the origin of the human mind, and then we shall\nsee whether you will be able to resist the origin which evolution\nassigns to it.\n\nSOPHEREUS. I shall be glad to meet you again.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\n Origin of the human mind--Mr. Spencer's theory of the composition of\n mind--His system of morality.\n\n\nAccording to their appointment, our two disputants have met to discuss\nthe origin of mind.\n\nSOPHEREUS. Will you begin this conference by stating the\nevolution theory of the origin of the human mind?\n\nKOSMICOS. Most willingly. I have thus far spoken of the\nhypothesis of evolution as affording an explanation of the origin of\ndistinct animals, regarded simply as living organisms, differentiated\nfrom each other by the slow process of development from a common stock,\nby the operation of certain physical causes. I am now to account to you\nfor the origin of the human mind, upon the same hypothesis, namely,\nthat man is a development from some previous and lower organism. I\nacknowledge that what we call mind, or intellect, has to be accounted\nfor; and that we who hold the evolution theory of the origin of man as\nan animal must be able to suggest how his intellect became developed by\nthe operation of the same natural causes which produced his physical\norganization. It is not material, in this inquiry, whether we agree\nwith Darwin in assuming some one distinct living organism of a very\nlow type, as the original stock from which all the other animal\norganisms have been derived, or whether we go with Spencer back to\nthe primal molecules of organizable matter, and suppose that from a\nsingle cell have been developed all the organisms possessing life, in\na regular order of succession. Upon either supposition, the doctrine\nof evolution explains the origin of the human mind. For, upon either\nsupposition, there was a point in the long series of new forms, each\ndescending from a pre-existing form, at which the manifestations of\nwhat we call mind may be said to have begun. This link in the connected\nchain of organisms occurred where nervous organization began to act\nwith some spontaneous movement, with some power of voluntary exertion,\nas distinguished from the involuntary exertions of a substance that\nacted only in a certain and fixed way, although that substance was\nendowed with life. The substance of nervous organization is alike\nin all animals. In some it acts in a limited manner, and without\nvolitional control; in others, it acts in more varied modes, and it\nmanifests some power of volitional control and volitional rest, as\nwell as of involuntary movement. But in all animals the substance of\nwhich nervous organization is composed--the substance which acts in\nproducing movement, whether voluntary or involuntary--is the same kind\nof physical structure. In the higher animals, the great nerve-center\nis the organ called the brain. To this organ proceed the impressions\nproduced upon one set of nerves by external objects, or by light or\nheat. From the same organ proceed, by another set of nerves, those\nmovements which the animal is endowed with the power of making from\nwithin. Contemplating, then, the whole animal kingdom as one great\nconnected family, but divided into different species, all of which have\na nervous organization, we find that each species is endowed with the\npower of generating other individuals of the same species and of the\nsame nervous organization. In the long course of development of the\nseveral species, or forms of animal life, there comes about a nervous\norganization which acts freely within certain limits, but in a fixed\nand invariable mode, so that the movements are uniformly the same,\nand not in any proper sense volitional. To such an animal we should\nnot attribute any mind, for mind implies some power of comparison and\nvariation, some ability to act in more than a prescribed way. This\nanimal, which I have just supposed to possess a very limited power of\nnervous action, transmits that power to its descendants; and in some of\nthe successive generations the power remains always at the same fixed\npoint. But the laws of natural and sexual selection are perpetually\noperating among those descendants. In progress of time there comes\nto be developed another organism, which has a wider range of nervous\naction; and, as this ceaseless process of modification and improvement\ngoes on, there is developed still another nervous organization which\nacts with still more varied movements. As the different species\nof animals become evolved out of those that have gone before, the\nexpansion of nervous organization goes on; and as each new and higher\nand more complex stage is gained, individuals of the species have the\npower to transmit it to their descendants by ordinary generation.\nAt length, as in some of the mammalia, a nervous organization is\nattained, whose action exhibits manifestations of what we call mind.\nThere appears to be a power of something like reasoning and volition,\nbecause the nervous actions are so various and so much adapted to\noutward circumstances. Thus, before we reach the human animal, we\nfind nervous organizations widely separated from those of the remote\nprogenitor species, because they can do so much more, and can do it\nwith an apparent power of voluntary variation. At last, this process of\nmodifications accumulating upon modifications culminates in an animal\nin whose nervous organization we find the freest, the most complex,\nand the most various power of receiving into his brain the impressions\nderived from the external world, and of transmitting from his brain to\nthe different organs of his body those movements which the external\ncircumstances of his life, or his internal efforts, cause him to strive\nfor and to effect. This animal was the primeval man.[113]\n\nLooking back, then, to the primal source of all nervous organization,\nin the remote animal in which the nervous structure and action were\nat the crudest state of development, and remembering that there was\na power of transmitting it to offspring, and that natural and sexual\nselection were unceasingly operating to expand and perfect it, we may\ntrace the successive stages of its modification and growth, from the\nlowest to the highest, until we reach in the primeval man the highest\ndevelopment that it had yet attained. But throughout all its stages,\nfrom the lowest to the highest, the system of nervous organization and\naction is the same in kind. We do not call its manifestations or action\nmind, or speak of them as indicating mind, until we find it developed\ninto a condition of some voluntary activity and power of variation, as\nit is in many of the animals inferior to man. But in all the animals,\nman included, mind is the action of the nervous organization when it\nevinces a superior power of variation; and we speak of the brain of\nsuch animals as the seat of mind because that organ is the source to\nand from which nervous action proceeds.\n\nLet me now illustrate this view by the acquisition of articulate speech\nand the formation of language. In many of the lower animals with\nwhich we are acquainted there is a power of uttering vocal sounds,\nand of understanding them when uttered by their fellows. It must have\nbeen a power possessed by those animals which were the progenitors\nof man in the long line of descent of one species from another. But\nin them it was a very limited power. It increased as the nervous\norganization and the vocal organs became in the successive species\ncapable of a more varied action. The sounds of the external world\nimpressed themselves upon the brains of the primeval men more forcibly\nthan they did upon the brains of the other animals, and excited the\nnervous organization to reproduce or imitate them. Those emotions\nand desires which originated in the brain itself--the impressions\nof pain or the sensations of pleasure experienced in the nervous\nsystem--sought expression through the vocal organs. Certain sounds\nrepeated alike by the same individual, or by numerous individuals, for\na long time, became associated in their brains with certain feelings\nor sensations. What are called words were thus formed; which, at\nfirst, could have been nothing but the utterance of certain sounds\nby the vocal organs, expressing the sensations felt by the nervous\norganization, or the imitations of external noises. At length these\nvocal sounds are gathered in the memory, multiplied and systematized,\nand a rude language is formed. But, all the while, the first crude\nhuman language was nothing but the result of nervous action excited\nto greater activity than in the other animals, accompanied by nicer\nand more capable vocal organs and a greater power of using them.\nThis acquisition, obtained by the primeval men, was transmitted to\ntheir descendants as an improved physical organization, and in those\ndescendants it finally reached the marvelous development of the most\nperfect languages of antiquity.\n\nLet us now retrace our steps back to the time when nervous\norganization, in the successive generations of the whole animal series\nregarded as one great family of kindred animals successively developed\nout of a common stock, began to act in such a way as to evince the\npresence of what we call mind. Once attained, this improved nervous\norganization would be transmitted by the parents to new individuals;\nand so on through countless generations, just as the offspring would\ninherit the same physical structure as the parents in other respects.\n\nMental phenomena are the products of nervous organization. We have no\nmeans of knowing that mind is an organism or an entity. If it is an\nexistence capable of surviving the death of the body, which evolution\nneither affirms nor denies, you must go to revelation for the grounds\nof belief in its immortality. There is no conflict between the\nevolution theory of the nature of mind and the doctrine of immortality\nas taught by revealed religion.\n\nSOPHEREUS. I am not disposed to constitute myself a champion\nof revealed religion. I have lately read in the writings of some\nwell-meaning persons, whose positions and convictions made them anxious\nabout the truths of revelation, expressions of the opinion that there\nis no necessary conflict between the hypothesis of a revelation and\nthe teachings of evolution. I have been rather surprised by such\nconcessions. But through all our discussions, and throughout all my\nreflections and inquiries, I have excluded revealed religion from the\nnumber of proofs of our immortality. But it seems to me that, as to\nthe possibility of a survival of the mind after the death of the body,\nyou have stated yourself out of court, not because you have propounded\nsomething that is inconsistent with revelation, although it certainly\nis, but because you have made mind to consist in nothing but the\naction of nervous organization, and when that has perished what can\nremain? You may say that science does not undertake to determine that\nmind is or is not a special existence capable of surviving the body.\nBut, observe that you attribute to nervous action the production of\nphenomena to which you give the name of mind, when the nervous action\nevinces some power of volitional variation and control. Now, when and\nwhere did this begin, in the long series of animal organisms which\nyou assume have been successively evolved out of one another? Remember\nthat, according to the system of evolution, there are supposed to\nhave been countless forms of animal organisms, graduating by slow\nimprovements into higher and higher organisms. Where and when and what\nwas the first animal that possessed a nervous organization which would\nmanifest the power of variation in so marked a degree as to render\nit proper to speak of the animal as possessing or evincing mind? Are\nnot the works of naturalists of the evolution school filled with\ncomparisons of the minds of different animals, and do they not contend\nthat in many of them there are manifestations of mental power, of the\nexercise of reason and comparison, and a volitional action according\nto varying circumstances? Did, then, these manifestations of something\nlike mental power begin in the anthropomorphous ape from whom we are\nsupposed to be descended, or who is supposed to be of kin to us? Or did\nit begin in any one and which of the innumerable intermediate forms\nbetween that ape-like creature and the primeval man? And when once this\nimproved and improving nervous organization had been developed and\nput into a condition to be transmitted to descendants, until in the\nprimeval man it had attained its highest development, what was it but\na more sensitive, more various, and complex condition of the substance\nof which all nervous tissues are composed? And when these tissues are\ndecomposed and resolved into their original material elements, where\nand what is the mind, whether of man or beast? It is nowhere and\nnothing, unless you suppose that the improved and improving action\nof the nervous organization at last developed an existence which is\nnot in itself material or physical, and which may be imperishable and\nindestructible, while the material and physical organs by and through\nwhich it acts for a time perish daily in our sight. If this is a\npossible, it is a very improbable hypothesis, because the nature of the\nhuman mind points to a very different origin.\n\nI surely do not need to tell you that like produces like. If the mind\nof man is now a spiritual essence, it is a wild conjecture to suppose\nthat it was generated out of the action of a material substance, in\nwhatever animal, or supposed species of animal, its genesis is imagined\nto have begun. We must therefore determine, from all the evidence\nwithin our reach, whether the mind is a spiritual existence. If it is,\nit is not difficult to reach a rational conclusion that its Creator\ncontrived a means of connecting it for a season with the bodily organs,\nand made the generative production of each new individual body at the\nsame time give birth to a new individual mind, whenever a new child is\nborn into the world. We can not discover the nature of the connection,\nor the process by which generative production of a new body becomes\nalso generative production of a new mind. These are mysteries that\nare hidden from us. But the fact of the connection--the simultaneous\nproduction of the new body and the new mind--is a fact that the birth\nof every child demonstrates. Whether the union takes place at any\ntime before birth, or whether it is only at birth that the mind, the\nspiritual essence, comes into existence, and so may become capable of\nan endless life, we can not know. But that this occurs at some time in\nthe history of every human being, we are justified in saying that we\nknow.\n\nI shall now contrast your hypothesis of the origin of the human mind\nwith another and a very different one; and, in stating it, I shall\nborrow nothing from the Mosaic account of the creation of Adam and\nEve. I shall not assert, on the authority of Moses, that God breathed\ninto Adam a living soul, for that would be to resort to a kind of\nevidence which, for the present, I mean to avoid, and which would\nbring into consideration the nature of the means by which the Hebrew\nhistorian was informed of the fact which he relates, and which he could\nhave known in no other way. It would also give rise to a question\nof what was meant by \"a living soul.\" But I shall assume that there\nis a spiritual and a material world; that a spiritual existence is\none thing and a material existence is another. I shall assume that\nthere is a spiritual world, because all our commonest experience, our\nintrospection and consciousness, our observation of what the human mind\ncan do, its operations and its productions, its capacity to originate\nthought and to send it down the course of ages, its power to recognize\nand obey a moral law as a divine command, the monuments of every kind\nwhich attest that it is something which is not matter or material\nsubstance, prove to us that the human mind is essentially a spiritual\nexistence; and that while it acts and must act by and through bodily\norgans, so long as it acts in this world, it is a being quite distinct\nfrom all the physical substance and physical organism with which it is\nconnected for a time. Physiology alone can teach us this much at least,\nthat mind is not matter; and experience, consciousness, and observation\nteach us that while the action of the mind may be suspended for a\ntime when the nervous organization can not normally act, from disease\nor injury, the mind itself is not destroyed, but its action may be\nrestored with the restoration of the brain to its normal condition.\n\nI am going to assume another thing--the existence of the Creator, the\nSupreme Governor of the universe, having under his control the whole\nrealms of the spiritual and the material world; alike capable of giving\nexistence to spiritual entities and to material organisms, and capable\nof uniting them by any connection and for any purpose that might seem\nto him good. I shall assume this, because some of you evolutionists\nconcede, if I understand rightly, the existence and capacities of the\nSupreme Being, since you assume, and rightly, that the whole question\nrelates to his methods; and you believe that he chose the method of\nevolution instead of the method of special creation for all the types\nof animal life excepting the aboriginal and created lowest form, out\nof which all the others have been evolved. With these two assumptions,\nthen, the nature of a spiritual existence, and the existence and\ncapacities of the Creator, I now state to you the opposite hypothesis\nof the origin and nature of the human mind.\n\nA pair of human beings, male and female, is created by the hand and\nwill of the Almighty; and to each is given a physical organism,\nand a spiritual, intellectual self, or mind, which is endowed\nwith consciousness and capable of thought. Why is this a rational\nsupposition, aside from any evidence of the fact derived from its\nassertion by an inspired or a divinely instructed witness? It is so,\nbecause, when this aboriginal pair of human creatures fulfill the law\nof their being, by the procreation of other creatures of the same\nkind, the offspring must be supposed to possess whatever the parents\npossessed of peculiar and characteristic organization. This law of\ntransmission is stamped upon all the forms of organic life; and we\nmay well apply it to the first pair of human beings. Its operation\nmust have begun in them and their offspring. Every law that proceeded\nfrom the will of the Supreme Being began to operate at some time; and\nthis law, like all others, must have been put in operation by the\nCreator at some definite period. He created in the first pair a bodily\norganization, and he created in each of them the spiritual entity that\nwe now call mind, and established its connection with their bodily\norgans. He established in them also the power of procreating offspring;\nand this included the production of a new individual of the same\nspecies, in whom would be united, by the same mysterious bond, the\nsame kind of physical organization and the same kind of spiritual or\nintellectual existence, which is not matter, and could not have been\ngenerated out of matter alone. The beginning of this connection of body\nand mind in the first parents was an occasional and special exercise of\nthe divine power. It was not a miraculous exercise of power, because\na miracle, in the proper sense, implies some action aside from a\npreviously established course of things. It was simply a first exercise\nof the power in the case of the creation of the first human pair;\nthat is, it was the establishment in them, specially, of the union of\nthe body and soul. Its repetition in the offspring, for all time, and\nthrough successive generations, was left to the operation of the laws\nof procreation and heredity. The nature and operation of those laws are\nwrapped in mystery; but about the fact of their existence, and of the\ncompound procreation of a new body and a new mind at every new birth,\nthere can be no doubt whatever.\n\nIt seems to me that this hypothesis has in its favor a vast\npreponderance of probability, because--\n\n1. The generation of mind or spirit out of matter is inconceivable.\n\n2. The creation of mind by the Almighty is just as conceivable as his\ncreation of a material organism; and the latter is conceded by all\nnaturalists who admit that there was a first animal organism; and\neven some of the evolutionists hold that the first animal organism\nwas directly fashioned by the Creator, although all the succeeding\norganisms were formed, as they contend, by natural and sexual selection.\n\n3. The nature of mind--of the human mind--is the same in all\nindividuals of the race. They may differ in mental power, but they\nall possess an intellectual principle that is the same in kind. To\nthe production of mind, or its formation, the process of evolution\nwas not necessary. Not only was it unnecessary, but in the nature of\nthings it was not adapted to do what it is supposed to have done in\nthe production of physical organisms. To suppose that the Creator,\ninstead of the direct exercise of his power of creation, left it to the\nmaterial laws of natural and sexual selection to produce a mind, is\nto suppose him to have resorted to a method that was both unnecessary\nand indirect, and was furthermore incapable of effecting that kind of\nproduct. In reasoning about the methods of the Creator, it is certainly\nirrational to suppose him to have resorted to one that was so ill\nadapted to the accomplishment of his object. In the accomplishment\nof some physical objects, we may well suppose that they have been\nbrought about by physical agencies that have operated very slowly\nand indirectly; and we can see that this has often been the case in\nregard to many material products. But for the production of mind, for\nthe accomplishment of a spiritual existence, there can be imagined no\nsecondary agencies, no gradual growth out of antecedent existences or\nsubstances, no evolution out of some other and that other a material\norganism. The first mind, the first human soul, must have come direct\nfrom the hand and will of God. The succeeding minds may well have been\nleft to owe their existence to the laws of procreation, by a process\nwhich we can not understand, but of which we have proof in the birth of\nevery child that has been born of woman.\n\nKOSMICOS. We now have the two hypotheses of the origin and\nnature of the human mind fairly before us; and here I must point out\nto you wherein you do injustice to my side of the question. In the\nfirst place, your assumption of one pair of progenitors of the human\nrace from whom have diverged all the varieties of the race, does not\nencounter the evolution process of man's descent as an animal. It\nis either an arbitrary assumption, or it is derived from the Mosaic\naccount of the creation, which, in a scientific point of view, and\naside from the supposed authority of that story, is just as arbitrary\nan assumption as if the book of Genesis had never existed. Take,\ntherefore, Darwin's hypothesis of the zo\u00f6logical series: First, a\nfish-like animal, of course inhabiting the water; next, the amphibians,\ncapable of living in the water and on the land; next, the ancient\nmarsupials; next, the quadrumana and all the higher mammals, among\nwhom are to be classed the _Simiad\u00e6_ or monkeys; and out of these came\nthe hairy, tailed quadruped, arboreal in its habits, from which man is\ndescended. This long line of descent is filled with diversified forms,\nintermediate between the several principal forms which are known to us,\nand which were successively the progenitors of man. Now, hear Darwin on\nthe subject of one pair of progenitors:\n\n\"But since he [man] attained to the rank of manhood he has diverged\ninto distinct races, or, as they may be more fitly called, sub-species.\nSome of these, such as the negro and European, are so distinct that,\nif specimens had been brought to a naturalist without any further\ninformation, they would undoubtedly have been considered by him as\ngood and true species. Nevertheless, all the races agree in so many\nunimportant details of structure and in so many mental peculiarities,\nthat these can be accounted for only by inheritance from a common\nprogenitor; and a progenitor thus characterized would probably deserve\nto rank as man. It must not be supposed that the divergence of each\nrace from the other races, and of all from a common stock, can be\ntraced back to any one pair of progenitors. On the contrary, at every\nstage in the process of modification all the individuals which were in\nany way better fitted for their conditions of life, though in different\ndegrees, would have survived in greater numbers than the less well\nfitted. The process would have been like that followed by man, when he\ndoes not intentionally select particular individuals, but breeds from\nall the superior individuals and neglects the inferior. He thus slowly\nbut surely modifies his stock, and unconsciously forms a new strain.\nSo with respect to modifications acquired independently of selection,\nand due to variations arising from the nature of the organism and the\naction of the surrounding conditions, or from changed habits of life,\nno single pair will have been modified much more than the other pairs\ninhabiting the same country, for all will have been continually blended\nthrough free intercrossing.\"[114]\n\nThe meaning of this is that if you go back to the period when an\nanimal, by the slow process of modification which was continually\noperating among the preceding organisms, had been raised to the\npresent state of man, and then follow out the divergencies into the\ndistinct races of men, those divergencies would not have occurred in\nconsequence of any one pair having been modified much more than the\nother pairs inhabiting the same country, but all the individuals would\nhave undergone a continually blending process through unrestrained\nintercrossing; and those individuals of both sexes, who became in\na superior degree fitted for their conditions of life, would have\nsurvived in greater numbers than the less well fitted, and would have\ntransmitted to their posterity those peculiarities which tended at last\nto produce different races of the human family. So that the notion of a\nsingle pair of the negro variety, or of a single pair of the Caucasian\nvariety, formed and completed as an independent stock, is not necessary\nto account for these varieties.\n\nTo apply this, now, to the slow production of man's intellectual\nfaculties, we must, if we would do justice to Darwin's hypothesis of\nthe method in which he was developed as an animal, bear in mind that\nhis mental powers, like his animal structure, have been the necessary\nacquirement of new powers and capacities by gradation, through the\nperpetual process of modification, and retention and transmission of\nthe new acquisitions. Darwin, indeed, does not professedly undertake\nthe genealogy of the human mind; but he appears to hold the opinion\nthat in future psychology will be based on the gradual acquisition of\neach mental power and capacity, as distinguished from their complete\nproduction in any one pair, or in any one being; and he refers to\nHerbert Spencer as having already securely laid the foundation for this\nnew psychology.[115]\n\nI take, therefore, the great English naturalist as the person who has\nmost satisfactorily explained the origin of man as an animal, and\nthe great English philosopher as the person who has propounded the\nmost satisfactory theory of the origin of the human mind. The two\nhypotheses run parallel to and support each other. Man, as respects his\nmere animal structure, is an organism developed by a slow process of\nmodification out of preceding organisms. His mental faculties have one\nby one grown out of the operation of the same physical agencies that\nhave formed his animal structure, and they have not been bestowed at\nonce upon any one pair, or upon any one individual of the race. After\nthey have all been acquired, as we now know and recognize them, they\nhave descended to the successive generations of the race.\n\nSOPHEREUS. I have studied Mr. Spencer's \"System of\nPsychology,\" but I do not know whether we understand it alike. You\nsay that he has propounded the most satisfactory theory of the origin\nof mind. Assuming that mind was evolved as an aggregate of powers and\ncapacities, slowly acquired, _pari passu_ with the evolution of the\nanimal organism, be good enough to tell me whether Mr. Spencer does\nor does not conclude that mind is anything more than an aggregate of\npowers and capacities of the nervous organization. I am quite aware\nof the mode in which he meets the charge of materialism; but waiving\nfor the present the question of materialism, I should be glad to know,\naccording to your understanding of his philosophy, what he considers\nmind to be.\n\nKOSMICOS. To answer your question requires an analysis of\nSpencer's \"Principles of Psychology.\" You have here on your table the\nthird edition of that work, which received his latest corrections and\nadditions.[116] If you look at the preface of this edition, you will\nsee that, as between Realism and Idealism, he enunciates a view which\nrecognizes an element of truth in each, but rejects the rest. By this\n\"Transfigured Realism\" he aims to conciliate what is true in Realism\nwith what is true in Idealism; and it is by this conciliation that he\nanswers the partisans of both systems, who will not sacrifice any part\nof their respective doctrines. It is important for you to remember this\nin judging of his psychological system. He begins by a description\nof the structure and functions of the nervous system, and the nature\nof nervous actions. Without repeating in all its minute details the\nstructure which he describes, it is enough to say that in all animals,\nfrom the lowest to the highest, this peculiar part of the organism\nwhich we call the nervous system is composed of two tissues which\ndiffer considerably from those composing the rest of the organism.\nIn color they are distinguished from one another as gray and white,\nand in their minute structures as vesicular and fibrous. In the gray\ntissue, the vesicles or corpuscles contain a soft protein substance,\nwith granules imbedded in it, consisting of fatty matter. The more\ndeveloped of these nerve-corpuscles give off branching processes, and\nthe terminations of nerve-fibers are distributed among them. The white\ntissue is composed of minute tubes containing a medullary substance or\npulp, viscid like oil. Imbedded in this pulp, which fills the tubes,\nthere lies a delicate fiber or axis-cylinder, which is uniform and\ncontinuous instead of having its continuity broken by fat-granules.\nThis central thread is the essential nerve; and the sheath of\nmedullary matter, and its surrounding membranous sheath, are only its\naccessories. While, therefore, the matter of nerve-fiber has much in\ncommon with the matter of nerve-vesicle, in the latter the protein\nsubstance contains more water, is mingled with fat-granules, and forms\npart of an unstable mass; whereas in the former, the nerve-tube, the\nprotein substance, is denser, is distinct from the fatty compounds that\nsurround it, and so presents an arrangement that is relatively stable.\n\nConceive, then, of this interlaced physical structure extending\nthroughout the whole organism as a kind of circular mechanism, having\nits periphery at the surface of the body and limbs, ramifying among\nand into the internal organs, with various nerve-centers distributed\nthrough the interior mechanism, and the one great nerve-center in the\nbrain. Conceive of this structure, further, as fed continually by the\nblood-vessels, which repair its waste of tissue and keep it in proper\ntone and activity. Then imagine it as first put in operation in some\nanimal in whom it has become developed as we now know it in ourselves,\nand let that animal stand as the primeval man, who has become, by\ninherited transmission of gradual accumulations, possessed of this\nconsummate development of nervous organization. You can then observe\nthe method of its action, and can perceive how mind became developed,\nand what it is.\n\nWhat I have now given you is only a general description of the\nstructure of the nervous mechanism, and in order to understand its\nfunctions, we may take it up, in an individual, at a point of time\nwhen it had not experienced a single movement or change from a state\nof rest, but when it was completely fitted to act. Observe, then,\nthat its action will consist in the origination and accomplishment\nof motion; or, in other words, in molecular change of the substance\ncomposing the nerves, which, for illustration only, may be likened to\nthe conductor through which the molecular disturbance passes which is\npopularly, but not scientifically, called the electric fluid. At the\nsurface of the body and limbs, the external termini of the nerves are\nexposed to disturbance by contact with an external object. Along the\nhighly sensitive and minute conductor, the nerve which has by contact\nwith an external object at its outer extremity received a slight shock,\nthere passes through the fluid or semi-fluid substance of the nerve a\nwave of disturbance, or a succession of such waves. This disturbance\nreaches the brain, the great nerve-center, where it becomes a feeling.\nIn this way is generated the feeling of contact with an external\nobject, and this is what is commonly called the sense of touch, which\nis simply a feeling produced in the great nerve-center of the brain.\nNow, to reverse the process, let us suppose that this feeling, caused\nby touching an external object, provokes or excites a desire to remove\nthat object, or to get rid of the continuance of the feeling, and\nto be without the irritation or pain which it is causing. From the\ncentral seat of nervous action, the brain, along another nerve, there\nproceeds a wave, or a series of waves, in the fluid or semi-fluid\nsubstance of which the conductor of that nerve is composed, and motion\nis communicated to some muscle or set of muscles, which need to be put\nin motion in order to break the contact with the external object. In\nlike manner, all internal organs of the body, the viscera, are supplied\nwith a system of nerves connected with the great nerve-center. If a\ndisturbance arises in one of the viscera, some action that is abnormal,\na sensation that is called pain is produced. So, too, in regard to the\nnormal action of the viscera, kept up by involuntary movements--those\nmovements originate in and are transmitted from the nerve-center, by\nwaves in the fluid or semi-fluid substance of which the special nerves\nare composed, whose office it is to cause the necessary movements in\nthe muscular substance, or the tissue, of the particular organ.\n\nIn this way began, in the supposed individual, those simpler states of\nfeeling which pain or irritation produced in the nervous system, and\nthose other involuntary movements which were essential to the normal\nand unconscious action of the viscera. These varying conditions of\nthe highly sensitive nervous system, which constitute and are rightly\ndenominated feelings, were constantly repeated; and, so far as they\nare capable of becoming a part of consciousness, that consciousness\nis a repetition of the same nervous actions many times over. Pass,\nthen, from the feelings called sensations to the feelings called\nemotions, and it will be found that while both are states of nervous\naction, the former are peripherally initiated and the latter are\ncentrally initiated. The meaning of this is that a sensation is an\neffect produced at the nerve-center by the transmission, from the\nouter terminus of a particular nerve, of the waves in the fluid or\nsemi-fluid substance of the nerve. The strong forms of feeling called\nsensations are peripherally initiated, and the feelings called emotions\nare centrally initiated. Now, any feeling of any kind is directly known\nby each person in no other place than his own consciousness; and the\nquestion is, Of what is consciousness composed? In order to afford an\nanswer to this question, Mr. Spencer proceeds to examine the substance\nof mind, and then passes to a consideration of the composition of\nmind. These are not the same thing; for, if there be no such thing,\nproperly speaking, as the substance of mind, its composition, or its\nnature, must be looked for in another way. The expression \"substance\nof mind,\" if used in any way but that in which we use the _x_ of an\nalgebraic equation, has no meaning. If we undertake to interpret mind\nin the terms of matter, as crude materialism does, we are at once\nbrought to this result, that we know, and can know, nothing of the\nultimate substance of either. We know matter only as forms of certain\nunits; but the ultimate unit, of which the ultimate homogeneous units\nare probably composed, must remain absolutely unknown. In like manner,\nif mind consists of homogeneous units of feeling, the ultimate unit,\nas a substance, must remain unknown. When, therefore, we think of the\nsubstance of mind, the simplest form under which we can think of it\nis nothing but a symbol of something that can never be rendered into\nthought, just as the concept we form to ourselves of matter is but the\nsymbol of some form of power absolutely and forever unknown to us, as\nthe representation of all objective activities in terms of motion is\nonly a symbolic representation, and not a knowledge of them. Symbols of\nunknown forms of existence, whether in the case of matter, motion, or\nmind, are mere representations which do not determine anything about\nthe ultimate substance of either. \"Our only course is constantly to\nrecognize our symbols as symbols only, and to rest content with that\nduality of them which our constitution necessitates. The unknowable as\nmanifested to us within the limits of consciousness in the shape of\nfeeling, being no less inscrutable than the unknowable as manifested\nbeyond the limits of consciousness in other shapes, we approach no\nnearer to understanding the last by rendering it into the first.\"[117]\n\nDiscarding, then, the expression \"substance of mind,\" excepting as\na mere symbol, Mr. Spencer passes to the \"composition of mind\"; and\nhere we reach his explanation of mind as an evolution traceable\nthrough ascending stages of composition, conformably to the laws of\nevolution in general, so that the composition of mind, as something\nevolved out of simple elements, does not need or involve a symbolical\nrepresentation in the terms of matter.\n\nThe method of composition, by which the whole fabric of mind is\nconstituted, from the formation of its simplest feelings up to the\nformation of the complex aggregates of feelings which are its highest\ndevelopments, can now be sketched. A sensation is formed by the\nconsolidation of successive units of feeling; but the feelings called\nsensations can not of themselves constitute mind, even when many of\ndifferent kinds are present together. When, however, each sensation,\nas it occurs, is linked in association with the faint forms of\nprevious sensations of the same kind, mind is constituted; for, by the\nconsolidation of successive sensations, there is formed a knowledge\nof the particular sensation as a distinct subject of what we call\nthought, or the smallest separable portion of thought as distinguished\nfrom mere confused sentiency. Thus, as the primitive units of feeling\nare compounded into sensations, by the same method simple sensations,\nand the relations among them, are compounded into states of definite\nconsciousness. The next highest stage of mental composition is a\nrepetition of the same process. Take a special object, which produces\nin us a vivid cluster of related sensations. When these are united with\nthe faint forms of like clusters that have been before produced by\nsuch objects, we know the object. Knowledge of it is the assimilation\nof the combined group of real feelings which it excites, with one or\nmore preceding ideal groups which were once excited by objects of the\nsame kind; and, when the series of ideal groups is large, the knowledge\nis clear. In the same way, by the connections between each special\ncluster of related sensations produced by one object, and the special\nclusters generated by other objects, a wider knowledge is obtained.\nBy assimilating the more or less complex relations exhibited in the\nactions of things in space and time, with other such complex relations,\nknowledge of the powers and habits of things is constituted. If we\ncan not so assimilate them, or parts of them, we have no knowledge of\ntheir actions. So it is, without definite limit, through those tracts\nof higher consciousness which are formed of clusters of clusters of\nfeelings held together by extremely involved relations. This law\nof the composition of mind is, therefore, the assimilation of real\nfeelings and groups of real feelings with the ideal feelings or ideal\ngroups of feelings which objects of the same kind once produced. You\ncan follow out, without my assistance, the correspondence which Mr.\nSpencer exhibits between the views of mental composition and the\ngeneral truths respecting nervous structure and nervous functions with\nwhich he began the treatment of mind, which consists largely, and in\none sense entirely, of feelings. The inferior tracts of consciousness\nare constituted by feelings; and the feelings are the materials out of\nwhich are constituted the superior tracts of consciousness, and thus\nintellect is evolved by structural combination. \"Everywhere feeling is\nthe substance of which, when it is present, intellect is the form. And\nwhere intellect is not present, or but little present, mind consists\nof feelings that are unformed or but little formed.\"[118] Does not\nthis statement, which in substance is Mr. Spencer's explanation of the\nformation of mind, explain to you why he denominates it \"transfigured\nrealism\"?\n\nSOPHEREUS. I have attentively and carefully read Mr. Spencer's\nbook from which you have made this partial analysis of his view of the\nnature of mind, but whether it is realism \"transfigured,\" or whatever\nis, I think it must be admitted that its basis is a truly realistic\none; for it comes back at last to just what I suggested to you at the\nbeginning of this discussion, that mind, according to his view, is\nconstituted by the action of the nervous system, or, in other words,\nthat mind consists of the phenomena of movements which take place in a\nphysical structure. If this is all that can be predicated of mind, it\nis not something that can have an independent and continuous existence\nafter the dissolution of the physical structure called the nervous\nsystem. That structure is one that is analogous in its action to the\nother part of the organism by which digestion, or the assimilation\nof food, is carried on. We might as well suppose that by the action\nof the digestive system there has been constituted a something which\nwill remain as a digestive function after the organs of digestion\nhave perished, as to suppose that the action of the nervous system\nhas constituted a something which will remain mind, a conscious and\nindependent existence, after the nervous system has been resolved\ninto its original material elements. Indeed, I do not understand Mr.\nSpencer's philosophy as including, providing for, or leading to, any\npossible continued existence of the mind after the death of the body.\nHe seems to exclude it altogether. There is a passage at the end of one\nof his chapters which appears to be a summary of his whole philosophic\nscheme, and which is one of the dreariest conclusions I have ever met\nwith. \"Once more,\" he says, \"we are brought round to the conclusion\nrepeatedly reached by other routes, that behind all manifestations,\ninner and outer, there is a Power manifested. Here, as before, it has\nbecome clear that while the nature of this Power can not be known,\nwhile we lack the faculty of forming even the dimmest conception of it,\nyet its universal presence is the absolute fact without which there can\nbe no relative facts. Every feeling and thought being but transitory,\nan entire life made up of such feelings and thoughts being also but\ntransitory, nay, the objects amid which life is passed, though less\ntransitory, being severally in course of losing their individualities\nquickly or slowly; we learn that the one thing permanent is the\nUnknowable Reality hidden under all these changing shapes.\"[119]\n\nI will not say that the mournful character of this hopelessness\nof human destiny is proof of its unsoundness. I have accustomed\nmyself to accept results, whatever may be the gloom in which they\ninvolve us, provided they are deductions of sound reasoning; and\nour wishes or hopes can not change the constitution of the universe\nor become important evidence for or against any view of what that\nconstitution is. But let me ask, what does this philosopher mean by\nthe transitory character of an entire life made up of transitory\nfeelings and thoughts, occupied throughout their continuance with\ntransitory objects, or objects which are quickly or slowly losing\ntheir individualities? What possible room does he leave for the\ndevelopment and discipline of an immortal being, supposing that man\nis an immortal being, by an entire life passed in feelings, thoughts,\nand action about objects which, relatively to the individual, may,\nquickly or slowly, pass away from him? Or, what room does he allow\nfor the effect on such a being of an entire life spent in the pursuit\nof objects or the enjoyment of pleasures which develop only his baser\nnature and unfit him for anything else? In any scheme of philosophy\nwhich omits to regard this life as a preparatory school for some\nother life, it seems to me that something is left out which ought to\nbe included, and which ought to be included for the very reason that\nthe evidence which tends to show that mind is not constituted as Mr.\nSpencer supposes, but that it is an existence of a special character,\nnot generated by the action of a physical structure, but deriving its\nexistence from the direct action of the creating Power, is so strong\nthat, if we leave this conclusion out of the hypothesis, we shall have\nleft out the strongest probabilities of the case. It is no answer to\nthe necessity for including this conclusion to say that there is a\npower which we can not know, or an Unknowable Reality hidden under\nall changing manifestations, among which are those of mind. A study\nof those manifestations leads rightly to some conclusions respecting\nthe Power which underlies all manifestations. It is necessary,\ntherefore, to subject Mr. Spencer's philosophy of mind to the further\ninquiry, How does he account for the moral sense? How does he explain\nthat part of consciousness which recognizes moral obligations--the\nrecognition of moral law and duty? We may easily dispense with the\nphrase \"substance of the mind,\" if we wish to avoid a term of matter;\nbut if mind is constituted by the perception of feelings excited in\nthe nervous system, what is it that perceives? Is there a something\nthat is reached by the feelings which constitute sensations in the\ngreat nerve-center, which takes cognizance of them, which combines\nthem into portions of consciousness, or is consciousness nothing but\na succession of sensations, and if so, what is \"thought\"? And what\nis that portion of thought which takes cognizance of moral duty, and\nwhich shows man to be capable of recognizing and obeying or breaking\na moral law? I have somewhere read a suggestion that the polity which\nis said to have been given to the Hebrew people on the Mount of Sinai,\nand which is described as ten statutes written on two tablets of stone,\nconsisted of five laws on one tablet and five on the other; one set\nof them expressing the relations of the Hebrews to the Deity, and the\nother being the fundamental laws of the social life which the Hebrews\nwere commanded to lead. This division is not accurate, because the\ncommandments which express the relations of the Hebrews to the Deity\nare four in number, and the commandments which were to constitute\ntheir social law are six. But that there is a line of demarkation\nbetween the two kinds of laws is obvious, and how they were written\non the tablets, or whether they were written at all, is immaterial.\nLooking, then, first at the social law, whether there was more or less\nof the same ethical character in the codes of other ancient peoples,\nor whether the social law which is said to have been delivered to\nMoses and by him communicated to his nation stands as an embodiment\nof morality unequaled by anything that had preceded it, it is certain\nthat it found the Hebrew people capable of the idea of law as a divine\ncommand. It is true that the corner-stone of the whole superstructure\nis to be found in the fact that the several commands which constituted\nthis social code--\"Honor thy father and thy mother,\" \"Thou shalt do\nno murder,\" \"Thou shalt not commit adultery,\" \"Thou shalt not steal,\"\n\"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor,\" \"Thou shalt\nnot covet thy neighbor's house,\" etc.--were addressed to a people to\nwhose representatives the Almighty is supposed to have revealed himself\namid \"thunders and lightnings, and a thick cloud upon the mount, and\nthe voice of a trumpet exceeding loud, and all the people that were\nin the camp [below] trembled.\" It is also true that the first of\nthese awful annunciations was said to have been, \"I am the Lord thy\nGod, which brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of\nbondage. Thou shalt have no other gods before [or beside] me.\"[120] So\nthat the source whence all the following commands proceeded was the\none and only God, who is described as having thus revealed himself in\nfire and cloud and earthquake, and thus to have secured instant and\nimplicit faith in what he spoke. But what he is asserted to have said\nwas addressed to human minds. This is in one aspect the most important\nfact in the whole Hebrew history. It makes no difference whether Moses\nperformed a piece of jugglery, or whether he actually went within\nthe fire and the cloud, and actually spoke with God and received his\ncommands. The indisputable truth remains that the individual minds\nof the Hebrew people, whom Moses had led out of Egypt, received and\nobeyed, as divine commands, an original and unique moral code, because\nthey were so constituted that they could embrace and act upon the idea\nof law emanating from another than an earthly or a human source. What,\nthen, was this constitution of the human mind, that could thus receive\nand act upon a divine command; and what is it now? It matters not, in\nthe view in which I ask this question, whether there was any deceit\npracticed or not, or whether there is any practiced now in respect to\nthe authority giving the command. What is to be accounted for is the\ncapacity of the human mind to embrace and accept the idea of a moral\nlaw, be it that of Moses, or of Christ, or of Mohammed.\n\nKOSMICOS. I am glad that you put this matter of the ten\ncommandments hypothetically, because otherwise we might have been led\naside into an argument about the authenticity of the narrative. I\nrecognize, however, the bearing of the question which you have put, and\nshall endeavor to answer it. Your question implies that the essential\nconstitution of the human mind has been the same in all ages; that\nit was the same in this race of nomads, who had been, they and their\nfathers for ages, serfs of the Egyptian kings, that it is in us.\nPerhaps this assumption may be allowed; and, at all events, the real\nquestion is, How did the idea of a moral law originate, and what is\nthe sense of moral obligation? Like all things else, it is a product\nof the process of evolution. I shall not argue this by any elaborate\nreasoning, but will proceed to state the grounds on which it rests.\nI will first give you what I understand to be Darwin's view of the\norigin of the habit of thinking and feeling, which we call the moral\nsense. Primeval man must have existed in a state of barbarism. When he\nhad become developed out of some pre-existing animal, he was a mere\nsavage, distinguishable from his predecessors only by the possession\nof some superior degree of mental power. Savages, like some other\nanimals, form themselves into tribes or bands. Certain social instincts\narise, out of which spring what are regarded as virtues. Individuals\nof the tribe begin to desire the sympathy and approbation of their\nfellows. They perceive that certain actions, such as protection\nof other and weaker individuals against danger, gain for them the\nsympathy and approbation of the tribe. There are thus formed some\nideas of the common advantage to the tribe of certain actions, and\nof the common disadvantage of the opposite actions. Man is eminently\na social animal, and this desire for the sympathy and approbation of\nhis tribe, and this fear of their disapprobation, is so strong that\nthe individual savage is led to perceive that the common good of the\ntribe is the object at which he must aim to conform. The first social\ninstincts, therefore, are those which perceive the relations between\ncertain kinds of conduct and the common good of the tribe; and out of\nthese relations, with the aid of increasing intellectual powers, is\ndeveloped the golden rule, \"As ye would that men should do to you, do\nye to them likewise,\" which lies at the foundation of morality. These\nsocial instincts, thus leading at last to the great rule of social\nmorality, are developed very slowly. They are at first confined to the\nbenefit of the same tribe, and they have no force in the relations of\nthat tribe to the members of any other. To a savage it is a highly\nmeritorious action to save the life of another member of his own tribe,\nand if he loses his own life in the effort it is so much the more\nmeritorious. But he does not extend this idea of doing a good action\nto the members of a different tribe, and, whether his own tribe is\nor is not at war with the other tribe, he and his own community will\nthink it no harm if he murders a member of that other tribe. But as\nthe approach to civilization goes on--as man advances in intellectual\npower, and can trace the more remote consequences of his actions, and\nas he rejects baneful customs and superstitions, he begins to regard\nmore and more not only the welfare but the happiness of his fellow-men.\nHabit, resulting from beneficial experiences, instruction and example,\nrenders his sympathies more tender and widely diffused, until at last\nhe extends them to men of all races, to the imbecile, maimed, and other\nuseless members of society, and to the inferior animals. Thus the\nstandard of morality rises higher and higher; but its origin is in the\nsocial instincts, which spring out of the love of approbation and the\nfear of disapprobation.[121]\n\nBut morality comprehends also the self-regarding virtues, those which\ndirectly affect the individual, and which affect society but remotely\nand incidentally. How did the idea of these originate? There is a\nvery wide difference between the morality of savages, in respect to\nthe self-regarding virtues, and the morality of civilized nations.\nAmong the former, the greatest intemperance, utter licentiousness,\nand unnatural crimes are very common. But as soon as marriage was\nintroduced, whether monogamous or polygamous, jealousy led to the\ninculcation of female virtue; and this, being honored, spread to the\nunmarried females. Chastity, the hatred of indecency, temperance, and\nmany other self-regarding virtues, originating first in the social\ninstincts, have come to be highly prized by civilized nations as\naffecting, first, the welfare of the community, and, secondly, the\nwelfare of the individual. This was the origin of the so-called \"moral\nsense.\" It rejects the intuitive theory of morality, and bases its\norigin on the increasing perception of the advantage of certain conduct\nto the community and the individual.[122]\n\nSOPHEREUS. And in this origin of the social and the\nself-regarding virtues, which I understand you to say is the theory of\nDarwin, is the idea of a divine command to practice certain things, and\nto avoid doing certain other things, left out?\n\nKOSMICOS. The idea of a divine command, as the source of\nmorality, is not necessary to the explanation of the mode in which\nthe social or the self-regarding virtues were gradually developed.\nIn the progress from barbarism to civilization, what is called the\nmoral sense has been slowly developed as an increasing perception of\nwhat is beneficial, and this has become an inherited faculty. We thus\nhave a sure scientific basis for the moral intuitions which we do not\nindividually stay to analyze when we are called upon to determine the\nmorality or the immorality of certain actions. The supposed divine\ncommand is something that is aside from the process by which the idea\nof morality or immorality became developed.\n\nSOPHEREUS. And is this also Mr. Spencer's philosophy of the\nmoral sense?\n\nKOSMICOS. Let me read you what Spencer says: \"I believe that\nthe experience of utility, organized and consolidated through all\npast generations of the human race, has been producing corresponding\nmodifications which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have\nbecome in us certain _faculties_ of moral intuition--certain _emotions_\nresponding to right and wrong conduct, which have no _apparent_ basis\nin the _individual_ experiences of utility.\"[123] I have emphasized\ncertain words in this passage in order to make its meaning distinct.\nMr. Spencer's theory is that we have certain _faculties_ of moral\nintuition, which have become such by transmission and accumulation;\nthat the original ideas of right and wrong sprang from perceptions of\nutility; and that when to the individual the question of a good or a\nbad action in others or himself is now presented, he feels an _emotion_\nwhich responds to right or wrong conduct, and feels it in the _faculty_\nwhich he has inherited from ancestors, without referring it to his\n_individual_ experience of the utility or inutility of certain conduct.\n\nNow, in regard to the divine command as the origin of our ideas\nof right and wrong, if you turn to Mr. Spencer's \"Principles of\nSociology,\" you will find an immense collection of evidence which shows\nthe genesis of deities of all kinds. Beginning with the ideas formed\nby the primitive men of souls, ghosts, spirits, and demons, the ideas\nof another life and of another world, there came about the ideas of\nsupernatural beings, aided in their development by ancestor-worship,\nidol-worship, fetich-worship, animal-worship, plant-worship, and\nnature-worship. Hence came the ideas of deities of various kinds, one\nclass of which is that of the human personality greatly disguised, and\nthe other is the class which has arisen by simple idealization and\nexpansion of the human personality. The last class, although always\ncoexisting with the other, at length becomes predominant, and finally\nthere is developed the idea of one chief or supreme deity. Having\ntraced the origin of this idea of a supreme deity, Mr. Spencer puts and\nanswers this question: \"While among all races and all regions, from\nthe earliest times down to the most recent, the conceptions of deities\nhave been naturally evolved in the way shown, must we conclude that\na small clan of the Semitic race had given to it, supernaturally, a\nconception which, though superficially like the rest, was in substance\nabsolutely unlike them?\"[124] He then proceeds to show that the Hebrew\nJehovah, or God, was a conception that had a kindred genesis with all\nthe other conceptions of a deity or deities. \"Here,\" he says, \"pursuing\nthe methods of science, and disregarding foregone conclusions, we must\ndeal with the Hebrew conception in the same manner as with all the\nothers.\" Dealing with it by the scientific method, he shows that behind\nthe supernatural being of the order of the Hebrew God, as behind the\nsupernatural beings of all other orders, there has in every case been\na human personality. Thus, taking the narrative as it has come down to\nus of God's dealing with Abraham, he shows that what Abraham thought,\nor is described as thinking by those who preserved the tradition, was\nof a terrestrial ruler who could, like any other earthly potentate,\nmake a covenant with him about land or anything else, or that he was\nthe maker of all things, and that Abraham believed the earth and the\nheavens were produced by one who eats and drinks, and feels weary\nafter walking. Upon either idea, Abraham's conception of a Deity\nremains identical with that of his modern Semitic representative,\nand with that of the uncivilized in general. But the ideas of Deity\nentertained by cultivated people, instead of being innate, arise only\nat a comparatively advanced stage, as results of accumulated knowledge,\ngreater intellectual grasp, and higher sentiment.[125]\n\nTo return now to the supposed divine command as the origin of morality,\nit is obvious that the conception of the being who has uttered the\ncommand makes the nature of the command partake of the attributes\nascribed to that being. Accordingly, the grossest superstitions, the\nmost revolting practices, the most immoral actions, have found their\nsanction in what the particular deity who is believed in is supposed\nto have inculcated or required. I do not need to enumerate to you the\nproofs of this, or to tell you that the Hebrew God is no exception to\nit. One illustration of it, however, is worth repeating. Speaking of\nthe ceremony by which the covenant between God and Abraham is said to\nhave been established, Mr. Spencer says: \"Abraham and each of his male\ndescendants, and each of his slaves, is circumcised. The mark of the\ncovenant, observe, is to be borne not only by Abraham and those of\nhis blood, but also by those of other blood whom he has bought. The\nmark is a strange one, and the extension of it is a strange one, if\nwe assume it to be imposed by the Creator of the universe, as a mark\non a favored man and his descendants; and on this assumption it is no\nless strange that the one transgression for which every 'soul shall\nbe cut off' is, not any crime, but the neglect of this rite. But such\na ceremony insisted on by a living potentate, under penalty of death,\nis not strange, for, as we shall hereafter see, circumcision is one of\nvarious mutilations imposed as marks on subject persons by terrestrial\nsuperiors.\"[126]\n\nSo that the Hebrew God who made the covenant with Abraham was not,\nin Abraham's own conception, the First Cause of all things, or a\nsupernatural being, but he was a powerful human ruler, making an\nagreement with a shepherd chief. In all religions, the things required\nor commanded by the supposed deified person have been marked by the\ncharacteristics of human rulers; and as a source of morality, or as\na standard of morality, the requirements or commands of the deified\nperson, however they are supposed to have been communicated, fail to\nanswer the indispensable condition of a fixed and innate system of\nmorality, which is that it must have proceeded from the Creator of\nthe universe, and not from a being who partakes of human passions,\ninfirmities, and desires, and is merely a deified human potentate.\n\nPass, now, to Mr. Spencer's \"Principles of Morality\"; and although but\none volume of this work has been as yet published, we may see that\nhe is entirely consistent with what he has said in his \"Sociology\"\nand his other writings.[127] He does not leave us in any doubt as to\nhis theory of morals. It appears, from the preface to his \"Data of\nEthics,\" that he has been compelled by ill-health to deviate from the\nplan which he had mapped out for himself, and to publish one volume\nof his \"Principles of Morality\" before completing his \"Principles of\nSociology.\" But while we have reason for his sake and for the sake\nof the world to regret this, we can easily understand his system of\nmorality. He means to rest the rules of right conduct on a scientific\nbasis, and he shows that this is a pressing need. In his preface, he\nsays:\n\n I am the more anxious to indicate in outline, if I can not complete,\n this final proof, because the establishment of rules of right conduct\n on a scientific basis is a pressing need. Now that moral injunctions\n are losing the authority given by their supposed sacred origin, the\n secularization of morals is becoming imperative. Few things can happen\n more disastrous than the decay and death of a regulative system no\n longer fit, before another and fitter regulative system has grown\n up to replace it. Most of those who reject the current creed appear\n to assume that the controlling agency furnished by it may be safely\n thrown aside, and the vacancy left unfilled by any other controlling\n agency. Meanwhile, those who defend the current creed allege that, in\n the absence of the guidance it yields, no guidance can exist; divine\n commandments they think the only possible guides. Thus, between these\n extreme opponents there is a certain community. The one holds that\n the gap left by disappearance of the code of supernatural ethics need\n not be filled by a code of natural ethics; and the other holds that it\n can not be so filled. Both contemplate a vacuum, which the one wishes\n and the other fears. As the change which promises or threatens to\n bring about this state, desired or dreaded, is rapidly progressing,\n those who believe that the vacuum can be filled are called upon to do\n something in pursuance of their belief.\n\nThe code of natural ethics which Mr. Spencer propounds, and which is\na product of the process of evolution, may be summarized as follows:\nConduct is an aggregate of actions which are not purposeless, but\nwhich include all acts that are adjusted to ends, from the simplest to\nthe most complex. The division or aspect of conduct with which ethics\ndeals, the behavior we call good or bad, is a part of an organic whole;\nbut, although inextricably bound up with acts which are neither good\nnor bad, it is distinguishable as comprehending those acts with which\nmorality is concerned. The evolution of conduct, from the simplest\nand most indifferent actions up to those on which ethical judgments\nare passed, is what Mr. Spencer means by the scientific method of\ninvestigating the origin of morality. We must begin with the conduct\nof all living creatures, because the complete comprehension of conduct\nis not to be obtained by contemplating the conduct of human beings\nonly. \"The conduct of the higher animals as compared with that of\nman, and the conduct of the lower animals as compared with that of\nthe higher, mainly differ in this, that the adjustments of acts to\nends are relatively simple and relatively incomplete. And as in other\ncases, so in this case, we must interpret the more developed by the\nless developed. Just as, fully to understand the part of conduct which\nethics deals with, we must study human conduct as a whole, so, fully\nto understand human conduct as a whole, we must study it as a part of\nthat larger whole constituted by the conduct of animate beings in\ngeneral.\"[128]\n\nBegin, for example, with an infusorium swimming about at random,\ndetermined in its course not by an object which it perceives and which\nis to be pursued or escaped, but apparently by varying stimuli in its\nmedium, the water. Its acts, unadjusted in any appreciable way to\nends, lead it now into contact with some nutritive substance which it\nabsorbs, and now into the neighborhood of some creature by which it is\nswallowed and digested. Pass on to another aquatic creature, which,\nalthough of a low type, is much higher than the infusorium, such as\na rotifer. With larger size, more developed structures, and greater\npower of combining functions, there comes an advance in conduct. It\npreserves itself for a longer period by better adjusting its own\nactions, so that, it is less dependent on the actions going on around.\nAgain, compare a low mollusk, such as a floating ascidian, with a high\nmollusk, such as a cephalopod, and it is apparent how greater organic\nevolution is accompanied by more evolved conduct. And if you pass then\nto the vertebrate animals, you see how, along with advance in structure\nand functions, there is evolved an advance in conduct, until at length,\nwhen you reach the doings of the highest of mammals, mankind, you not\nonly find that the adjustments of acts to ends are both more numerous\nand better than among the lower mammals, but you find the same thing on\ncomparing the doings of the higher races of men with those of the lower\nraces. There is a greater completeness of achievement by civilized\nmen than by savages, and there is also an achievement of relatively\nnumerous minor ends subserving major ends.\n\nRecollecting, then, what conduct is--namely, the adjustment of acts to\nends--and observing how this adjustment becomes more and more complete\nas the organism becomes more developed, we have to note the order of\nthe ends to which the acts are adjusted. The first end, the first\nstage of evolving conduct, is the further prolongation of life. The\nnext is that adjustment of acts to ends which furthers an increased\namount of life. Thus far the ends are complete individual life. Then\ncome those adjustments which have for their final purpose the life of\nthe species. Then there is a third kind of conduct, which results from\nthe fact that the multitudinous creatures which fill the earth can not\nlive wholly apart from one another, but are more or less in presence\nof one another, are interfered with by one another. No one species can\nso act as to secure the greatest amount of life to its individuals\nand the preservation of the species--can make a successful adjustment\nof its acts to these ends--without interfering with the corresponding\nadjustments by other creatures of their acts to their ends. That\nsome may live, others must die. Finally, when we contemplate those\nadjustments of acts to ends which miss completeness, because they can\nnot be made by one creature without other creatures being prevented\nfrom making them, we reach the thought of adjustments such that each\ncreature may make them without preventing them from being made by other\ncreatures. Let me now quote Mr. Spencer's concrete illustrations of\nthese abstract statements:\n\n\"Recognizing men as the beings whose conduct is most evolved, let\nus ask under what conditions their conduct, in all three aspects of\nits evolution, reaches its limit. Clearly while the lives led are\nentirely predatory, as those of savages, the adjustments of acts\nto ends fall short of this highest form of conduct in every way.\nIndividual life, ill carried on from hour to hour, is prematurely\ncut short; the fostering of offspring often fails, and is incomplete\nwhen it does not fail; and in so far as the ends of self-maintenance\nand race-maintenance are met, they are met by destruction of other\nbeings, of different kind, or of like kind. In social groups formed\nby compounding and recompounding primitive hordes, conduct remains\nimperfectly evolved in proportion as there continue antagonisms between\nthe groups and antagonisms between members of the same group--two\ntraits necessarily associated; since the nature which prompts\ninternational aggression prompts aggression of individuals on one\nanother. Hence, the limit of evolution can be reached by conduct only\nin permanently peaceful societies. That perfect adjustment of acts\nto ends in maintaining individual life and rearing new individuals,\nwhich is effected by each without hindering others from effecting like\nperfect adjustments, is, in its very definition, shown to constitute a\nkind of conduct that can be approached only as war decreases and dies\nout.\n\n\"A gap in this outline must now be filled up. There remains a further\nadvance not yet even hinted. For beyond so behaving that each achieves\nhis ends without preventing others from achieving their ends, the\nmembers of a society may give mutual help in the achievement of ends.\nAnd if, either indirectly by industrial co-operation, or directly\nby volunteered aid, fellow-citizens can make easier for one another\nthe adjustments of acts to ends, then their conduct assumes a still\nhigher phase of evolution; since whatever facilitates the making of\nadjustments by each, increases the totality of the adjustments made,\nand serves to render the lives of all more complete.\"\n\nIn the outline which I have now given you of the evolution of conduct,\nyou will perceive the foundation of Spencer's system of ethics. Actions\nbegin to assume an ethical character--conduct becomes good or bad--when\nthe acts tend to promote or to prevent the general well-being of the\ncommunity. But how is the perception or recognition of this quality\nin an action reached? What is the determining reason for considering\nan action good or bad? Obviously, conduct is considered by us as good\nor bad according as its aggregate results to self, or others, or\nboth, are pleasurable or painful. Mr. Spencer shows that every other\nproposed standard of conduct derives its authority from this standard:\n\"No school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable\nstate of feeling called by whatever name--gratification, enjoyment,\nhappiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings,\nis an inexpugnable element of the conception. It is as much a necessary\nform of moral intuition as space is a necessary form of intellectual\nintuition.\"[129]\n\nOn this fundamental basis, Mr. Spencer rests his system of absolute\nethics and relative ethics. Relative ethics are those by which,\nallowing for the friction of an incomplete life and the imperfections\nof existing natures, we may ascertain with approximate correctness what\nis the relatively right. This is often exceedingly difficult, because\ntwo cases are rarely the same in all their circumstances. But absolute\nethics are the ideal ethical truths, expressing the absolutely right.\nSuch a system of ideal ethical truths, which must have precedence over\nrelative ethics, is reached only when there has been, in conformity\nwith the laws of evolution in general, and in conformity with the laws\nof organization in particular, an adaptation of humanity to the social\nstate, changing it in the direction of an ideal congruity. But, as in\nrelative ethics, the production of happiness or pleasure is the aim,\nhowever imperfectly accomplished, so in the ideal state the aim is\nthe same, the difference being that in the latter the accomplishment\nof happiness or pleasure and the exclusion or prevention of pain are\ncomplete.\n\nSOPHEREUS. And do I understand you that in this system of\nethics the idea of a moral law proceeding from and consisting of the\ncommand of a Supreme Lawgiver is left out?\n\nKOSMICOS. Certainly it is. Did I not just now read to you from\nMr. Spencer's preface his complete rejection of the supposed sacred\norigin of moral injunctions, and what he says of the necessity for the\nsecularization of morals to take the place of that system which is\nlosing its authority?\n\nSOPHEREUS. And this philosopher is the same writer who\nnegatives the idea of any creation of organic life, and who also\nnegatives the idea that the human mind is an existence of a spiritual\nnature, owing its existence to a Creator?\n\nKOSMICOS. Undoubtedly; we have gone over all that ground.\n\nSOPHEREUS. And he is the same philosopher who denies the\nexistence of a Supreme Being, Creator, and Governor of the universe?\n\nKOSMICOS. Perhaps you may call it denial, although what he\nmaintains is that we know, and can know, nothing on the subject of a\npersonal God.\n\nSOPHEREUS. Very well. I will reflect upon all this until we\nmeet again.\n\n FOOTNOTES:\n\n [113] Probably Kosmicos did not mean that man excels all other animals\n in the delicacy and perfection of his nervous organization, for some\n of his senses are inferior to those of some of the other animals, as\n his movements are less swift. Apparently his meaning is that, taken as\n a whole, the nervous organization of man evinces the greatest power of\n variation and the widest range of action.\n\n [114] Darwin's \"Descent of Man,\" pp. 608, 609.\n\n [115] Darwin's \"Origin of Species,\" p. 428.\n\n [116] \"The Principles of Psychology,\" by Herbert Spencer, third\n edition. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1885.\n\n [117] \"Principles of Psychology,\" i, p. 162.\n\n [118] \"Principles of Psychology,\" ii, p. 503.\n\n [119] \"Principles of Psychology,\" ii, p. 503.\n\n [120] Revised version.\n\n [121] Darwin, \"Descent of Man,\" Part I, chap. iv.\n\n [122] \"Descent of Man,\" Part I, chap. iv.\n\n [123] Quoted in Darwin's \"Descent of Man,\" p. 123.\n\n [124] \"Principles of Sociology,\" i, p. 433, \u00a7 202.\n\n [125] Ibid., chap. XXV, p. 414 _et seq._\n\n [126] \"Principles of Sociology,\" i, p. 135.\n\n [127] \"Principles of Morality,\" vol. i. I. \"The Data of Ethics.\" By\n Herbert Spencer. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1884.\n\n [128] \"The Data of Ethics,\" pp. 6, 7, by Herbert Spencer. New York: D.\n Appleton & Co., 1884.\n\n [129] \"The Data of Ethics,\" pp. 45, 46, by Herbert Spencer. New York:\n D. Appleton & Co., 1884.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\n Mr. Spencer's philosophy as a whole--His psychology, and his system of\n ethics--The sacred origin of moral injunctions, and the secularization\n of morals.\n\n\nA certain honesty and directness of mind prevent Sophereus from being\nbewildered by the Spencerian philosophy. Before his next meeting with\nthe scientist, he has reviewed the main features of this philosophy as\ndeveloped in Mr. Spencer's published works; and he has taken notice of\nthe warning which Mr. Spencer has given to his readers in the preface\nto his \"Data of Ethics,\" that \"there will probably be singled out for\nreprobation from this volume, doctrines which, taken by themselves, may\nreadily be made to seem utterly wrong.\" There is not much likelihood\nthat Sophereus will be able, if he is willing, to avail himself of\nthis \"opportunity for misrepresentation\" in a discussion with such a\nchampion of Mr. Spencer's philosophy as the scientist who explains and\ndefends it, especially as they have the works before them to refer to.\nBeing thus respectively equipped for the discussion, the conference\nbetween them proceeds:\n\nSOPHEREUS. Before I give you my convictions respecting Mr.\nSpencer's philosophy as a whole, I wish to say something about the\npassage which you read from the preface to his \"Data of Ethics,\"\nbecause it is the key to his ethical system. In the first place, to\nwhat does he refer when he speaks of \"the current creed\"? When I\nundertake to investigate a system of morality, the only \"creed\" that\nI care about--the only one that is of any importance--is that which\naccepts, as a matter of belief, the existence of the Creator and\nSupreme Governor of the universe, from whose infinite will and purposes\nhave proceeded certain moral as well as physical laws. This, I take\nit, is the \"creed\" of which Mr. Spencer speaks; the one which assigns\nmoral injunctions to the will of a Supreme Lawgiver as \"their supposed\nsacred origin.\" It is to this creed that he opposes his \"secularization\nof morals,\" which must take the place of their supposed sacred origin,\nbecause the authority of the latter is rapidly dying out of the world.\nIt is this \"creed\" which is rejected by those who \"assume that the\ncontrolling agency furnished by it may be safely thrown aside, and the\nvacancy left unfilled by any other agency.\"\n\nUndoubtedly there are and always have been numerous persons who appear\npractically to think that the sacred origin of morality can be safely\nrejected, and that the vacancy may be left unfilled by any other\nrestraining agency. The deliberate and willful murderer, the burglar,\nthe adulterer, and many of the other criminal classes, not only appear\nto reject \"the current creed,\" but they would be very glad to have it\nassumed that there is no other restraining agency to take its place.\nSo, too, there are persons who break no moral law, whose lives are\npure, but who, having theoretically persuaded themselves that there is\nno sacred origin of moral injunctions, omit to provide, for themselves\nor others, any other controlling agency to fill the vacuum. But this\nlatter class is not very numerous; and if, without meaning any offense\nto them, their number is added to that of the criminal classes, to make\nup the aggregate of those who reject \"the current creed,\" we have not\na very large body compared with the whole body of persons in civilized\ncommunities who adhere to \"the current creed,\" who live by it, and who\nthink that others should live by it too, as the ultimate foundation of\nthose social laws which take cognizance of men's conduct toward one\nanother. So that I do not quite understand the assertion that \"moral\ninjunctions are losing the authority given by their supposed sacred\norigin\"; connected as it is with the other assertion that society is\n\"rapidly progressing\" to that vacuum which is to follow the complete\nrejection of the one guide without the substitution of another in its\nplace. I am quite aware that there has been of late years an increasing\namount of what is called infidelity, or unbelief, or atheism. But I am\nquite sure that there has not been a general theoretical or practical\nrejection of so much of the religious creed of mankind as assigns\nto the will of a supreme and supernatural lawgiver certain moral\ninjunctions. If we confine our view to Christendom alone, it is certain\nthat the growth, activity, and influence of the various religious\nbodies are not materially checked, and that religious beliefs are not\nby any means losing their hold upon great multitudes of people. If\nwe survey the regions where the Mohammedan faith prevails, the same\ngeneral result is found, whatever Christians may think of the beliefs\nor practices of that vast body of the human race. And, even when we\npenetrate among the races which are less civilized, we find very few\nraces or tribes in which there does not prevail some idea of some kind\nof command proceeding from some deity or other, whatever we may think\nof the character of that deity or of the nature of the command.\n\nBut I presume that Mr. Spencer meant to confine his assertion of the\nnecessity for a secularization of morals, and his assumption that\ntheir sacred origin is rapidly passing away from men's beliefs, to\nthe state of society as it exists now in Western civilization; and my\nobservation of this portion of the world is, that those who reject\nwhat I presume he means by \"the current creed\" are, first, a class of\ntheorizers: and, secondly, the criminal classes; and that the aggregate\nof the two is not, after all, so formidable that we ought to conclude\nthat the regulative system of the sacred origin of moral injunctions\nis \"no longer fit\" for any practical purpose. I do not, therefore,\nrecognize what he considers the supreme practical necessity for \"the\nsecularization of morals\" to take the place of a system which is worn\nout.\n\nKOSMICOS. You have left out of the case a very important\nelement. Mr. Spencer antagonizes those who reject the current creed\nagainst those who defend it. The former, while they reject the current\ncreed, do not recognize the necessity for any other controlling agency.\nThe latter, while they defend the current creed, maintain that nothing\ncan take its place as a regulating agency. Between them they create a\nvacuum, which one class wishes for and the other fears. This is the\nvacuum which he says can be and must be filled by the secularization of\nmorals. It is a vacuum in philosophical speculation about the origin of\nmorality, and, when the conclusion is reached, it becomes a practical\nand pressing question how it is to be carried out.\n\nSOPHEREUS. Precisely; and, when the conclusion is reached, it\nis to be carried out in legislation and government, or else the conduct\nof men toward one another in society is not to be regulated by public\nauthority at all, but is to be left to each man's perception of what\nwill produce the greatest amount of pleasure and happiness, or the\nleast amount of pain and misery. Now, it is pretty important to settle\nat the outset whether those who defend the current creed are right or\nwrong when they say that nothing which will answer the same purpose\ncan be found to take its place. They constitute one of the classes who\nwill be responsible for the supposed vacuum; and their share in that\nvacuum, their contribution to it, if I may use such an expression,\nconsists in their assertion that nothing of any value can take the\nplace of the sacred origin of moral injunctions. The practical test of\nwhether they are right or wrong is to be found in legislation. Let us\nsuppose, then, a legislative assembly in which there is a proposal to\nchange the law of murder, or to do away with it altogether. A member\nwho does not believe in any sacred origin of the command \"Thou shalt do\nno murder,\" moves not only to abolish the death-penalty, but to abolish\nall legal definition of the crime, and leave every man to be restrained\nby the consciousness that, if he takes the life of another, he will\ncause a great deal of pain and misery to the relations and friends of\nthat person. The mover argues that \"the current creed\" of morality is\nworn out; is \"no longer fit,\" as a regulator; and that the safest and\nbest regulator is the perception of the beneficial effects of actions\nof kindness and good-will, and of the disastrous effects of cruelty and\nmalice. He is answered by one who defends the current creed, and who\nmaintains that, as human nature is constituted, the utilitarian system\nof morals can not take the place of the sacred origin as the ultimate\nfoundation of social relations. But the majority of the assembly think\nthat the mover of the proposition has the best of the argument, and\nthey proceed to \"secularize\" morals by passing his bill doing away with\nthe law of murder altogether. I am not obliged to extend my travels\nanywhere, where I do not care to go, and I confess I should not like to\nvisit that country after it had thus \"secularized\" morality.\n\nKOSMICOS. Now just be careful to note that this whole science\nof conduct--the science of ethics--the foundation of right and wrong,\nis a product of evolution. As in the development of organisms the\nhigher and more elaborate are reached after a great length of time, as\nin mechanics knowledge of the empirical sort evolves into mechanical\nscience by first omitting all qualifying circumstances and generalizing\nin absolute ways the fundamental laws of forces, so empirical ethics\nevolve into rational ethics by first neglecting all complicating\nincidents and formulating the laws of right action apart from the\nobscuring effects of special conditions. There are thus reached, after\na great lapse of time, those ideal ethical truths which express the\nabsolutely right. Mr. Spencer treats of the ideal man among ideal men;\nthe ideal man existing in the ideal social state. \"On the evolution\nhypothesis,\" he says, \"the two presuppose one another; and only when\nthey coexist can there exist that ideal conduct which absolute ethics\nhas to formulate, and which relative ethics has to take as the standard\nby which to estimate divergences from right, or degrees of wrong.\"[130]\nBut, again, observe that society is now in a transition state; the\nultimate man has not yet been reached; the evolution of ethics is,\nhowever, going on, retarded as it may be by various frictions arising\nfrom imperfect natures. But there is in progress an adaptation of\nhumanity to the social state, and the ultimate man will be one in\nwhom this process has gone so far as to produce a correspondence\nbetween all the promptings of his nature and all the requirements of\nhis life, as carried on in society; so that there is an ideal code of\nconduct formulating the behavior of the completely adapted man in the\ncompletely evolved society.[131]\n\nSOPHEREUS. But I understand that we have already reached, or\nare very soon to reach, a condition of things in which the supposed\nsacred origin of moral injunctions is now, or very shortly will become,\nno guide. We are to fill the vacuum which is caused, or is about to\nbe caused, by its disappearance, by substituting as the standard of\nright and wrong the perceptions which we can have of the effects of\nactions upon the sum total of happiness, because this will be the sole\nstandard in the ideal state of society in which the ideal man will\nultimately find himself. I will not insist on the total depravity of\nman's nature, because I never borrow an argument from theologians.\nBut it has been one of the conclusions that I have drawn from some\nstudy of human nature, that it requires very strong restraints. Not\nonly must some of the restraints be of the strongest kind, but they\nmust be simple, positive, and adapted to the varying dispositions and\nintelligence of men. There can not well be imagined any restraining\nmoral force so efficacious as that which is derived from a belief\nthat the Creator of the universe has ordained some moral laws; has\nspecialized certain conduct as right and certain conduct as wrong,\nwithout regard to varying circumstances. As the foundation of all that\npart of legislation that takes cognizance of the simpler relations of\nmen to one another--those relations which are always the same--the\nsacred origin of moral injunctions is of far greater force than the\nperception of the greatest-happiness principle can possibly be. If\na man is tempted to commit murder, is he not far more likely to be\nrestrained by a law which he knows will punish him without regard to\nthe misery he would cause to the friends and relatives of the person\nwhom he is tempted to kill, than he would be if the law were based on\nthe latter consideration alone? Do away with all legislation which\npunishes the simpler crimes first and foremost because they break\nthe laws of God, and substitute as the restraining agency individual\nrecognition of the effect of actions upon the sum total of happiness,\nand you would soon see that one of two consequences would follow:\neither you would have no criminal code at all, or it would be one that\nwould be governed by the most fluctuating and uncertain standards.\nMoreover, how is the transition from the sacred source of the simpler\nmoral injunctions to the secularization of morals to be effected?\nI once heard a wise person say that if a thing is to be done, an\ningenious man ought to be able to show how it is to be done. I suppose\nthe secularization of morals means the complete renovation of our\nideas of right and wrong, by taking as the sole standard the pleasure\nor pain, the happiness or unhappiness, which actions will produce. How\nare you going to reach this ideal state? The vacuum is rapidly coming\nabout. How are you going to take the first step in filling it? Before\nthe vacuum is complete, you must do something. You have waited until\nthe evolution of conduct of the purely utilitarian type has made some\ngreat advances; but the ideal state is not yet reached by all men.\nYou wish to hasten its approach, and you must begin to act. There is\nnothing for you to do but to formulate the new moral code and put it in\noperation. You must make your laws--if you continue to have laws--so\nthat murder and lying and theft will not be punished because the\nAlmighty has prohibited them, but they will be punished simply because\nthey produce misery. Do you think you would ever see every individual\nof such a community brought to an ideal congruity between all the\npromptings of his nature and all the requirements of his life, as\ncarried on in society? That you would have nothing but \"the completely\nadapted man in the completely evolved society\"? I fancy that you would\noften have to fall back upon the sacred origin of moral injunctions,\nand to punish some conduct because it breaks a law of divine authority.\nI may have been too much in the habit of looking at things practically;\nbut I have not yet discovered that the feeling of obligation, the sense\nof duty, what is recognized as moral obligation, having its origin in\nsome command, and enforced by some kind of compulsion, can be dispensed\nwith.\n\nKOSMICOS. I must refer you to Mr. Spencer's explanation of the\nfact that the sense of duty or moral obligation fades away as the moral\nmotive emerges from all the political, religious, and social motives,\nand frees itself from the consciousness of subordination to some\nexternal agency. He does not shrink from the conclusion because it will\nbe startling. He tells us that it will be to most very startling to\nbe informed that \"the sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory,\nand will diminish as fast as moralization increases.\" He fortifies his\nposition thus:\n\n Startling though it is, this conclusion may be satisfactorily\n defended. Even now progress toward the implied ultimate state is\n traceable. The observation is not infrequent that persistence in\n performing a duty ends in making it a pleasure, and this amounts to\n the admission that, while at first the motive contains an element\n of coercion, at last this element of coercion dies out, and the act\n is performed without any consciousness of being obliged to perform\n it. The contrast between the youth on whom diligence is enjoined,\n and the man of business so absorbed in affairs that he can not be\n induced to relax, shows us how the doing of work, originally under the\n consciousness that it _ought_ to be done, may eventually cease to have\n any such accompanying consciousness. Sometimes, indeed, the relation\n comes to be reversed; and the man of business persists in work from\n pure love of it when told that he ought not. Nor is it thus with\n self-regarding feelings only. That the maintaining and protecting of\n wife by husband often result solely from feelings directly gratified\n by these actions, without any thought of _must_; and that the\n fostering of children by parents is in many cases made an absorbing\n occupation without any coercive feeling of _ought_; are obvious\n truths which show us that even now, with some of the fundamental\n other-regarding duties, the sense of obligation has retreated\n into the background of the mind. And it is in some degree so with\n other-regarding duties of a higher kind. Conscientiousness has in many\n outgrown that stage in which the sense of a compelling power is joined\n with rectitude of action. The truly honest man, here and there to be\n found, is not only without thought of legal, religious, or social\n compulsion, when he discharges an equitable claim on him; but he is\n without thought of self-compulsion. He does the right thing with a\n simple feeling of satisfaction in doing it; and is, indeed, impatient\n if anything prevents him from having the satisfaction of doing it.\n\n Evidently, then, with complete adaptation to the social state, that\n element in the moral consciousness which is expressed by the word\n obligation will disappear. The higher actions required for the\n harmonious carrying on of life will be as much matters of course\n as are those lower actions which the simple desires prompt. In\n their proper times and places and proportions, the moral sentiments\n will guide men just as spontaneously and adequately as now do the\n sensations. And though, joined with their regulating influence when\n this is called for, will exist latent ideas of the evils which\n non-conformity would bring, these will occupy the mind no more than do\n ideas of the evils of starvation at the time when a healthy appetite\n is being satisfied by a meal.\n\nSOPHEREUS. There is a religion in the world called\nChristianity, with which we are tolerably familiar. It comprehends\na system of morality which, when completely observed, develops the\ntruly good man, the man who does the right thing with a feeling of\nsatisfaction in doing it, and brings about those higher actions which\nare required for the harmonious carrying on of life, as matters of\ncourse, just as surely as the same result can be brought about by the\nmost ideal secularization of morals that any philosophical theories\ncan accomplish. Whatever may be the evidences by which the sacred\norigin of Christianity is supposed to be established, it is certain\nthat this religion does not omit, but on the contrary it presupposes\nand asserts, as the foundation of its moral code, that the sense of\nobligation to which it appeals is the consciousness of obligation to\nobey divine commands. It proceeds upon the idea that human nature\nstands in need of some coercion; that the sense of obligation is not to\nbe allowed to retreat into the background of the mind, but that a sense\nof the compelling power must be kept joined with rectitude of action,\notherwise there will be a failure of rectitude. It is considered, I\nbelieve, that the adaptation of the Christian morality to the whole\nnature of man, by means of the compelling power, the consciousness of\nwhich is not to be transitory, but is to be universal and perpetual, is\nvery strong proof that this religion came from a being who understood\nhuman nature better than we can understand it. However this may be,\nit is, at all events, certain that the scheme of Christian morality\nproceeds upon the necessity for a more efficacious regulator of human\nconduct than the simple feeling of satisfaction in doing right, or\nthe feeling of dissatisfaction in doing wrong; and, although the true\nChristian is, in completeness of moral character, like Mr. Spencer's\nideal man, and although a society completely Christian would be that\nideal social state in which there would be perfect congruity between\nthe lives of men and the welfare of that society, yet the Christian\nreligion, if I understand it rightly, does not assume that there will\nbe more than an approximation to that universal state of perfection\nwhile the human race remains on earth. The proof of this is to be found\nin the fact that this religion does not contemplate a time when divine\ncommand is to cease as the restraining agency on earth; but, on the\ncontrary, it appears to assume that obedience to the divine will is to\ncontinue in another life to be a perpetual motive, as it has been in\nthis life. All this may be without such proof as \"science\" demands,\nbut it is certain that the scheme of Christian morality is based upon\nthe idea that the Creator has made obedience to his laws, because they\nare his laws, the great regulator of human conduct. If the Creator\nhad so made men that the consciousness of the effect of conduct on\nthe happiness or misery of our fellow-men would be sufficient as a\nregulator, it is rational to conclude that he would not have imposed\ncommands which were to be obeyed because they are commands. However\ngreat may be the approximation to a complete adaptation of the social\nstate, I do not look forward to the disappearance of that element in\nthe moral consciousness which is expressed by the word obligation,\nbecause obligation, in its ultimate sense, is obedience to a higher\npower. Obedience for its own sake, obedience because there is a\ncommand, irrespective of all the reasons for the command, is a law\nwhich is illustrated in very many of the relations of life. A wise\nparent will sometimes explain to his child why he commands some things\nand prohibits others; but if he means to train that child in the way he\nshould go, he will sometimes require him to obey for the mere purpose\nof teaching him that obedience without question or inquiry is a law of\nhis nature. A master of a vessel, which is in peril at sea, gives an\norder to the sailors. They may or may not understand the reasons for\nit. But what sort of sailors would they be if they did not act upon the\nconsciousness that unquestioning obedience is the law of their relation\nto the ship?\n\nIn the earliest traditions that we have of the human race, as those\ntraditions are accepted by the Western nations, we find a pretty\nstriking and very simple instance of this law of obedience. The first\npair of human beings are placed in a garden where they are at liberty\nto eat of the fruit of every tree save one, but of that one their\nCreator absolutely forbids them to partake. He assigns to them no\nreason for the prohibition, but he lays upon them his absolute command,\non the penalty of death if they are disobedient. One of them begins to\nreason about the matter--an allegorical creature or being, called the\nserpent, tempting her with certain advantages that she will get from\neating this particular fruit. She yields, disobeys, and persuades her\nhusband to do the same. The consequences follow, as their Creator told\nthem they would. The law of obedience which this story illustrates\nhas been in operation through all the ages, and society can no more\ndispense with it than it can dispense with any of the physical laws\nthat govern the universe.\n\nKOSMICOS. Are you going back to the fables for the sacred\norigin of moral injunctions? I thought you had got beyond that.\n\nSOPHEREUS. I use an illustration wherever I find it. I am\nperfectly content that you should call the story of Adam and Eve a\nfable, but the law of obedience which it illustrates is a tremendous\nfact. The incident, fable or no fable, is eminently human, and it is\noccurring every day in human experience. It is not strange that the\nfirst Hebrew tradition should have been one that illustrates in so\nsimple a manner the existence of the law of obedience. In like manner,\nit is not strange that the Christian system of ethics should have been\nbased on the existence of this same law of obedience to commands. This\nChristian system of ethics has dispensed with a great many minute\nobservances which one branch of the Semitic race believed were imposed\nupon them as commands by their Creator; but it has not displaced the\nlaw of obedience, or dispensed with certain moral injunctions as divine\ncommands, for it proceeds upon the great truth that human nature\nrequires that kind of restraint, and that there are certain actions\nwhich can not be left without it.\n\nKOSMICOS. Mr. Spencer has anticipated you. Your reference to\nChristianity is not happy. Having gone through with the explanation of\nthe evolution process in the development of the highest conception of\nmorals, and having shown that what now characterizes the exceptionally\nhighest natures will eventually characterize all, he has something\nto say about the reception of his conclusions, to which, as you have\nreferred to the Christian system of morals, you would do well to attend:\n\n \u00a7 98. That these conclusions will meet with any considerable\n acceptance is improbable. Neither with current ideas nor with current\n sentiments are they sufficiently congruous.\n\n Such a view will not be agreeable to those who lament the spreading\n disbelief in eternal damnation, nor to those who follow the apostle of\n brute force in thinking that because the rule of the strong hand was\n once good it is good for all time; nor to those whose reverence for\n one who told them to put up the sword is shown by using the sword to\n spread his doctrine among heathens. From the ten thousand priests of\n the religion of love, who are silent when the nation is moved by the\n religion of hate, will come no sign of assent; nor from their bishops\n who, far from urging the extreme precept of the Master they pretend to\n follow, to turn the other cheek when one is smitten, vote for acting\n on the principle--strike lest ye be struck. Nor will any approval be\n felt by legislators who, after praying to be forgiven their trespasses\n as they forgive the trespasses of others, forthwith decide to attack\n those who have not trespassed against them; and who, after a Queen's\n speech has invoked \"the blessing of Almighty God\" on their councils,\n immediately provide means for committing political burglary.\n\n But though men who profess Christianity and practice paganism can feel\n no sympathy with such a view, there are some, classed as antagonists\n to the current creed, who may not think it absurd to believe that a\n rationalized version of its ethical principles will eventually be\n acted upon.\n\nSOPHEREUS. \"Our withers are unwrung.\" I am not a believer\nin eternal damnation; I am not an apostle of brute force; I am not\nin favor of using the sword to spread a religion of love; I am not a\npriest or a bishop, nor am I a member of Parliament or of any other\nlegislative body. I am a simple inquirer, endeavoring to ascertain\nthe soundness of certain systems of philosophy. If there are men who\nprofess Christianity and practice paganism, I do not see that this fact\nshould deter me from estimating the nature of the Christian religion,\nas I would endeavor to estimate the character of any other religion.\nIt is no concern of mine whether men who profess Christianity and\npractice paganism can feel any sympathy with Mr. Spencer's views. The\nquestion for me is whether _I_ can feel any sympathy with his views. I\nwill, therefore, go on to tell you why I do not believe that a merely\n\"rationalized version\" of the ethical principles of Christianity will\ntake the place of those divine injunctions on which the ethics of\nChristianity are primarily based. Observe, now, that I do not enter\nupon the proofs of the divine authority or the divine nature of Christ.\nI point to nothing but the fact that the Christian ethics presuppose\na divine and superhuman origin of moral injunctions. About the fact\nthat they presuppose and assume the sacred origin of moral injunctions,\nthere can be no controversy. We read that the question was put to\nJesus, \"What commandment is first of all?\" and the answer was, \"The\nfirst is, Hear, O Israel; the Lord our God, the Lord is one; and thou\nshalt love thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with\nall thy strength. The second is this, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as\nthyself. There is none other commandment greater than these.\"[132]\nThe person who made this answer may or may not have been a divinely\ncommissioned teacher, but, whatever he was, the question that was put\nto him was a very searching one, and both question and answer assume\ntwo things: first, that there is a being, man, to whom commands are\naddressed; secondly, that there is a being, God, by whom commands are\ngiven. Jesus undertakes to inform those who questioned him, what are\nthe two commandments than which there are none greater addressed to\nhuman beings; and in this answer he covers the existence of man as\none being and the existence of God as another being. In any scheme of\nphilosophy which ignores the existence of these two beings--ignores\nthe existence of man as a being capable of receiving and acting upon a\ncommand, and the existence of a being capable of addressing a command\nto man--there must necessarily be a great defect; not because Jesus, a\nsupposed divinely commissioned teacher, assumed that there are two such\nbeings, but because without the hypothesis of their existence there can\nbe no ethical system whatever. The crucial test of the soundness of Mr.\nSpencer's philosophy is, therefore, whether he negatives the existence\nof man and the existence of God.\n\nUndoubtedly, there is a certain kind of consistency and completeness\nin Mr. Spencer's whole philosophy. Beginning with biology, he traces\nall organized life back to the original molecules of organizable\nmatter, and he makes man, in his physical structure, a product of\nsuccessive modifications of organisms out of one another, by simple\ngeneration. This ignores the Creator as a being specially fashioning\nthe human animal, which Mr. Spencer thinks is a conception too grossly\nanthropomorphic to stand the slightest scientific scrutiny. He then\ntakes up what he calls \"psychology,\" and deals with what he considers\nthe origin and nature of the human mind. He makes consciousness to\nconsist in tracts of feeling in the nervous organization. He denies\nthat mind is an entity, a being, perceiving and recognizing ideas\nsuggested by the impressions produced upon the nervous organization\nby external objects. According to his psychological system, there is\nno _ego_, no person, no thinking being, behind the sensations and\nfeelings in the nerve-center, and to whom the nerve-center suggests\nideas. Rejecting the hypothesis of such a being, Mr. Spencer treats\nof the composition of mind; and he makes it consist, not in a being,\nbut in components of feelings produced by the molecular changes of\nwhich nerve-corpuscles are the seats, and the molecular changes\ntransmitted through fibers. He does not regard the ultimate fabric of\nmind as a thing admitting of any inquiry. He says that its proximate\ncomponents can be investigated, and that these are feelings and the\nrelations between feelings. This \"method of composition remains the\nsame throughout the entire composition of mind, from the formation of\nits simplest feelings up to the formation of those immense and complex\naggregates of feelings which characterize its highest development.\"\nHere, then, we must stop. We are not to conceive of mind as an\norganized entity, or as an organism; or as a something in which certain\npowers inhere, and which affords a field for their action. We may talk\nof a \"thread of consciousness,\" meaning aggregates of feelings produced\nby successive waves of molecular change in the nerve-corpuscles, but we\nmay not talk of \"consciousness\" as perception by a conscious subject.\nWe may talk of feelings, but not of a subject that feels. Mind, then,\nis not an existence apart from physical organization. Its phenomena are\nproducts of our corporeal organization. Man is not a person; and, if\nhe is not, how he is to have a sense of obligation, how there is to be\nany intuitional idea of right and wrong, in the sense of a command or\nan injunction addressed by one being to another, I do not understand.\nMr. Spencer does not help me to understand this, and obviously he does\nnot intend to, because he denies it absolutely. His system of ethics\nplainly ignores it; and to that I now pass.\n\nHe makes conduct consist in the adjustment of actions to ends. Good\nconduct is when the actions are adjusted to the ends of producing all\nthe pleasure and happiness that they can be made to bring about. Bad\nconduct is when the actions produce only pain or misery to some one,\nor there is not a proper adjustment of them to the end of happiness.\nBeginning, as you described it in our last conference, with the lowest\norders of animals, the conduct of man is the same adjustment of actions\nto ends that it is in them; the difference being, in the case of man,\nthat as an animal he has a greater and more varied power of complete\nadjustment of his actions to wider and more comprehensive ends than\nany other animal. These wider and more comprehensive ends consist in\nthe full accomplishment of happiness and pleasure to other beings.\nThis, according to Mr. Spencer, is impliedly admitted by those who\nassert the sacred origin of moral injunctions; for, when pressed for\nthe reason why moral injunctions have been given, all moralists,\nhe says, admit that the ultimate moral aim is a desirable state of\nfeeling, gratification, enjoyment, happiness to some being or beings.\nThat the welfare of society is _one_ of the moral aims which moral\ninjunctions of the sacred order were designed to accomplish, so far as\nspecial injunctions are believed to have been given, is plain enough.\nBut that this congruity between the divine commands and the happiness\nof others--the useful effect of such commands--comprehends the whole\npurpose of such commands, is the ultimate and sole reason for their\nbeing given, so far as they are believed to have been given, may be\ndisproved without difficulty. For example, an individual may be an\nutterly worthless person, a curse to his relatives and friends and to\nsociety, irreclaimably sunk in vice and misery, a mere cumberer of the\nground. To kill him will produce no unhappiness to any one, but will\nbe a positive relief and benefit. According to \"the current creed,\"\nthere stands a sacred injunction, \"Thou shalt do NO murder.\"\nThis is accepted as an absolute, fixed, eternal canon of the divine\nwill. You are not to take upon yourself individually to determine, by\nany standard of utility applied to a particular case, that you can\nrightfully kill a human being. A miser is alone in the world. I can\nsteal his hoarded gold, and apply it to good objects. There stands\nthe command, \"Thou shalt _not_ steal.\" For no purpose, for no object\nwhatever, for no end whatever, shall you commit a theft. \"Society,\" to\nborrow a phrase of one of the strongest men of our time, \"would go all\nto pieces in an hour\" if it were to adopt only the utilitarian standard\nof morality, and to reject the sacred origin of moral injunctions.[133]\nThe reception of that sacred origin--the belief in it--implies that\nman is a being capable of receiving and obeying a divine command. The\nexistence of such a being is negatived by Mr. Spencer's psychological\nsystem. That he equally negatives the existence of God as a being\ncapable of giving, and who has given, moral injunctions to man, is\napparent throughout his whole scheme of philosophy. According to that\nphilosophy, there is nothing in the universe but an Omnipotent Power,\nwhich underlies all manifestations. To ascribe a personality to that\nPower is a relic of the primitive beliefs of barbarians, and it is one\nthat is rapidly dying out of the conceptions of educated men.\n\nThere is, therefore, no room in Mr. Spencer's philosophy for any\nmoral intuitions, such as are implied in the hypothesis that man was\nplaced under an obligation to obey his Creator, and made capable\nof recognizing that obligation. I can perceive no other ultimate\nfoundation for a system of ethics. As to the idea that we can make\na system of ethics which is to relegate to individual judgment the\nadaptability of actions to produce complete happiness, and to have no\nother standard of right and wrong, we might as well at once act upon\nthe maxim that the end justifies the means, and leave every man to\ndetermine that the end is a good one; and, therefore, the action is\ngood.\n\nKOSMICOS. How do you justify the death-penalty which is\ninflicted by society? Have you any justification for it, excepting the\nclaim that it is a useful restraint?\n\nSOPHEREUS. When society acts judicially in the punishment of\ncrime, it inflicts such punishments as experience shows will prevent,\nor tend to prevent, others from committing that crime. Its authority\nto punish with death or some other penalty is founded, primarily, in\nregard to the simpler crimes, such as murder, theft, adultery, false\ntestimony, etc., on the divine prohibition, which a belief in the\nsacred origin of certain special moral injunctions leads it to accept;\nand, secondly, on the general welfare of mankind.[134] Eliminate from\nthe ethical code all belief in the sacred origin of moral injunctions,\nand confine the judicial action of society to the merely utilitarian\neffect of individual conduct, and you will surrender the whole criminal\ncode to the doctrine that the individual who does a certain act is to\nbe punished or not to be punished, according to the effect of his act\non the person or persons who are immediately or remotely affected by\nit. It is because of Mr. Spencer's negation of man's intuitive sense of\nobligation to obey divine commands, because of his peculiar system of\n\"psychology,\" that I can not accept the system to which he gives the\nname of \"ethics.\" He ought to have invented a new term for his science\nof mind. \"Psychology,\" according to its derivation, and as it is used\nin the English language, means discourse or treatise on the human soul,\nor the doctrine of man's spiritual nature. If he has no spiritual\nnature, no soul, what does this philosopher mean by entitling his work\n\"The Principles of Psychology\"? It seems to me that in this use of a\nterm which implies something that he labors to show does not exist, he\nis not quite consistent, for he certainly does not mean to admit that\nman has a soul, in the sense in which the learned world have generally\nused the term \"psychology.\" But, not to stickle for verbal criticisms,\nI will endeavor to give you my conception of his \"scientific\" analysis\nof the mind, and to contrast it with the other analysis, which seems to\nme to be better supported.\n\nKOSMICOS. Take care that you do not misrepresent him.\n\nSOPHEREUS. I shall take the utmost care to represent him\nin the only sense in which I can understand him; and, if I do not\nrepresent him accurately, you will correct me. Take, in the first\nplace, the following passage, in which he defines the only _ego_ that\nhas any existence:\n\n That the _ego_ is something more than the passing group of feelings\n and ideas is true or untrue according to the degree of comprehension\n we give to the word. It is true if we include the body and its\n functions; but it is untrue if we include only what is given in\n consciousness.\n\n Physically considered, the _ego_ is the entire organism, including its\n nervous system; and the nature of this _ego_ is predetermined: the\n infant had no more to do with the structure of its brain than with the\n color of its eyes. Further, the _ego_, considered physically, includes\n all the functions carried on by these structures when supplied with\n the requisite materials. These functions have for their net result\n to liberate from the food, etc., certain latent forces. And that\n distribution of these forces shown by the activities of the organism,\n is from moment to moment caused partly by the existing arrangement of\n its parts and partly by the environing conditions.\n\n The physical structures thus pervaded by the forces thus obtained,\n constitute that substantial _ego_ which lies behind and determines\n those ever-changing states of consciousness we call mind. And\n while this substantial _ego_, unknowable in ultimate nature, is\n phenomenally known to us under its statical form as the organism, it\n is phenomenally known under its dynamical form as the energy diffusing\n itself through the organism, and, among other parts, through the\n nervous system. Given the external stimuli, and the nervous changes\n with their correlative mental states depend partly on the nervous\n structures and partly on the amount of this diffused energy, each of\n which factors is determined by causes not in consciousness but beneath\n consciousness. The aggregate of feelings and ideas constituting the\n mental _I_, have not in themselves the principle of cohesion holding\n them together as a whole; but the _I_ which continually survives as\n the subject of these changing states is that portion of the Unknowable\n Power which is statically conditioned in special nervous structures\n pervaded by a dynamically-conditioned portion of the Unknowable Power\n called energy.[135]\n\nIt is now necessary to translate this; and in translating it, it is\nnecessary to attend to the meaning of words. Let us begin with the\nfirst proposition comprehended in this statement: \"That the _ego_ is\nsomething more than the passing group of feelings and ideas, is true\nor untrue according to the degree of comprehensiveness we give to the\nword. It is true if we include the body and its functions; but it is\nuntrue if we include only what is given in consciousness.\" The natural\nantithesis would have been to contrast what is included in the _body_\nwith what is included in the _mind_. But as he does not admit that\nthe mind is an existence, as there is nothing but a passing group of\nfeelings and ideas, not a person who perceives feelings and has ideas,\nhe speaks of _what is given in consciousness_, consciousness being\nnothing but that passing group, an ever-changing series, never the\nsame, and never laid hold of and appropriated by a conscious subject.\nWe do, indeed, call these ever-changing states of consciousness mind,\nbut this is a misnomer, if we mean it in the sense of a being. What is\nto be considered, therefore, when the analysis seeks to ascertain the\nreal and only _ego_, is the body and its functions, and the passing\ngroup of feelings and ideas which is given in consciousness.\n\nLet us pass on: The body is the physical structure and its functions.\nIt is pervaded by the forces which its functions liberate from the\nlatent condition in which they exist in food and other environment.\nThis physical structure, thus pervaded by certain forces, is the\nsubstantial _ego_ which lies behind and determines the ever-changing\nstates of consciousness which we call mind. There is no other _ego_\nthan the body. It is phenomenally known to us under its _statical_\nform as the organism; that is to say, when the body is contemplated\nas an organism which is not acting, or as a mere structure. But it\nis phenomenally known to us also under its _dynamical_ form, which\nis when the energy derived from the pervading forces is diffusing\nitself through the organism. Statical,[136] I understand, refers to\na body at rest, or in equilibrium, not acting; dynamical refers to\nbodies in motion, or acted on by force, in movement. The human body is\nphenomenally known to us in both of these conditions or states. When\nit is in the dynamical state, that is, when it is acted on by external\nstimuli, there will be nervous changes; these nervous changes have\ncorrelative mental states, which depend partly on the nervous structure\nand partly on the amount of the diffused energy which pervades the\norganism. But these two factors, the nervous changes and the diffused\nenergy, are each determined by causes that are not in consciousness,\nbut beneath consciousness. This I understand to mean that when there\nare nervous changes from a state of rest or non-action, produced by\nexternal stimuli, and a certain amount of diffused energy pervades the\norganism, there will be correlative mental states, which are determined\nby factors that are not in consciousness but beneath consciousness.\nConsciousness, therefore, is not a perception by a conscious subject,\nor a consciousness of a self experienced by a being, but it is a\npassing group of feelings and ideas, which have no cohesion, are never\nthe same, but are ever-changing successions of impressions produced in\nthe physical organism.\n\nI come now to the summary and conclusion of the whole matter as\nexpressed in the last sentence of the paragraph which I have read.\nThere is a mental I, but it is not a person, an existence, an\nindependent _ego_. It is constituted of an aggregate of feelings and\nideas, which have not in themselves a principle of cohesion that\nholds them together as a whole. They are merely passing groups of\nfeelings and ideas which are never the same, but which succeed one\nanother without connection or cohesion. There is an I which continually\nsurvives as the subject of these changing states, but it is that\nportion of the Unknowable Power which is statically conditioned in\nspecial nervous structures pervaded by a dynamically conditioned\nportion of the Unknowable Power called energy.\n\nSo that each individual of the human race is to be contemplated,\nnot as a dual existence, composed of a body and a mind, united for\na certain period, but as a subject which is continuously undergoing\ncertain physical changes by the action through it of a portion of the\nenergy exerted by the Unknowable Power. The Unknowable Power pulsates\nthrough my bodily organism a certain portion of its energy, and that\nof which continuous existence can alone be predicated is this portion\nof the Unknowable Power which is statically conditioned in my nervous\nstructure, pervaded by a dynamically conditioned portion of that\nUnknown Power.\n\nI trust, now, it will not be said that I misrepresent Mr. Spencer\nwhen I assert that he ignores, denies, and endeavors to disprove\nthe existence of the mind of man as a spiritual entity, capable of\nsurviving his body. Have you any fault to find with my paraphrase of\nthe passage on which I have commented?\n\nKOSMICOS. You have paraphrased that passage fairly enough, but\nyou ought to attend to the proof which he adduces in support of his\nposition in the subsequent passage to which he refers you in the one\nthat you have quoted. Let me read it:\n\n \u00a7 469. And now, before closing the chapter, let me parenthetically\n remark on a striking parallelism between the conception of the\n Object thus built up, and that which we shall find to be the proper\n conception of the Subject. For just in the same way that the\n Object is the unknown permanent _nexus_ which is never itself a\n phenomenon, but is that which holds phenomena together; so is the\n Subject the unknown permanent _nexus_ which is never itself a state\n of consciousness, but which holds states of consciousness together.\n Limiting himself to self-analysis, the Subject can never learn\n anything about this _nexus_, further than that it forms part of the\n _nexus_ to that peculiar vivid aggregate he distinguishes as his\n body. If, however, he makes a vicarious examination, the facts of\n nervous structure and function, as exhibited in other bodies like\n his own, enable him to see how, for each changing cluster of ideas,\n there exists a permanent _nexus_ which, in a sense, corresponds to the\n permanent _nexus_ holding together the changing cluster of appearances\n referable to the external body.\n\n For, as shown in earlier parts of this work, an idea is the psychical\n side of what on its physical side is an involved set of molecular\n changes propagated through an involved set of nervous plexuses. That\n which makes possible this idea is the pre-existence of these plexuses,\n so organized that a wave of molecular motion diffused through them\n will produce, as its psychical correlative, the components of the\n conception, in due order and degree. This idea lasts while the waves\n of molecular motion last, ceasing when they cease; but that which\n remains is the set of plexuses. These constitute the potentiality of\n the idea, and make possible future ideas like it. Each such set of\n plexuses, perpetually modified in detail by perpetual new actions;\n capable of entering into countless combinations with others, just\n as the objects thought of entered into countless combinations; and\n capable of having its several parts variously excited, just as the\n external object presents its combined attributes in various ways--is\n thus the permanent internal _nexus_ for ideas, answering to the\n permanent external _nexus_ for phenomena. And just as the external\n _nexus_ is that which continues to exist amid transitory appearances,\n so the internal _nexus_ is that which continues to exist amid\n transitory ideas. The ideas have no more a continued existence than\n we have found the impressions to have. They are like the successive\n chords and cadences brought out from a piano, which successively die\n away as other ones are sounded. And it would be as proper to say that\n these passing chords and cadences thereafter exist in the piano, as it\n is proper to say that passing ideas thereafter exist in the brain. In\n the one case, as in the other, the actual existence is the structure\n which, under like conditions, again evolves like combinations.\n\n It is true that we seem to have somewhere within us these sets of\n faint states answering to sets of vivid states which once occurred.\n It is true that in common life ideas are spoken of as being treasured\n up, forming a store of knowledge; the implied notion being that they\n are duly arranged and, as it were, pigeon-holed for future use. It\n is true that in psychological explanations, ideas are often referred\n to as thus having a continued existence. It is true that our forms\n of expression are such as to make this implication unavoidable; and\n that in many places throughout this work the phrases used apparently\n countenance it; though, I believe, they are always transformable\n into their scientific equivalents, as above expressed. But here, as\n in metaphysical discussions at large, where our express object is\n to make a final analysis, and to disentangle facts from hypotheses,\n it behooves us to recognize the truth that this popular conception,\n habitually adopted into psychological and metaphysical discussions,\n is not simply gratuitous, but absolutely at variance with experience.\n All which introspection shows us is that under certain conditions\n there occurs a state of consciousness more or less like that which\n previously occurred under more or less like conditions. Not only are\n we without proof that during the interval this state of consciousness\n existed under some form; but, so far as observation reaches, it gives\n positive evidence to the contrary. For the new state is never the\n same--is never more than an approximate likeness of that which went\n before. It has not that identity of structure which it would have were\n it a pre-existing thing presenting itself afresh. Nay, more; even\n during its presence its identity of structure is not preserved--it is\n not literally the same for two seconds together. No idea, even of the\n most familiar object, preserves its stability while in consciousness.\n To carry further the foregoing simile, its temporary existence is\n like that of a continuously-sounded chord, of which the components\n severally vary from instant to instant in pitch and loudness. Quite\n apart, however, from any interpretation of ideas as not substantive\n things but psychical changes, corresponding to physical changes\n wrought in a physical structure, it suffices to insist upon the\n obvious truth that the existence in the Subject of any other ideas\n than those which are passing, is pure hypothesis absolutely without\n any evidence whatever.\n\n And here we come upon yet another phase of that contradiction which\n the anti-realistic conception everywhere presents. For setting out\n from the data embodied in the popular speech, which asserts both the\n continued existence of ideas and the continued existence of objects,\n it accepts the fiction as a fact, and on the strength of it tries to\n show that the fact is a fiction. Continued existence being claimed for\n that which has it not, is thereupon denied to that which has it.[137]\n\nSOPHEREUS. The writings of Mr. Spencer, more than those of\nany other person of equal reputation that I have met with, require\nclose examination in order to test the soundness of his propositions\nand assertions. Such a passage as the one which you have now quoted\nappears, on a first reading, to be quite plausible. When it is read\ncarefully two or three times, and analyzed, it is found to be untenable\nin its reasoning, and largely made up of dogmatic assumptions. I shall\nnow give you my reasons for this criticism. In the first place, let us\ngo through the passage and fix the meanings of words. \"Nexus,\" although\nnot a term adopted into the English language, means, I presume, bond\nor ligament. \"Plexus\" is a word that we find in English dictionaries\nas a scientific term, and it means a union of vessels, nerves, or\nfibers, in the form of net-work.[138] Taking along these meanings, we\nfind that the subject, the only thing of which a subjective existence\ncan be predicated, is the ligament which holds states of consciousness\ntogether, and this permanent ligament is unknown. It is not itself\na state of consciousness, but it is the bond which holds states of\nconsciousness together. These states of consciousness are the ideas\nwhich are passing in the subject, which are never the same, which are\nnot a permanent possession, and therefore there is in the subject no\nother existence than the passing ideas of the moment. Ideas, then,\nare not substantive things, but psychical changes, corresponding to\nphysical changes wrought in a physical structure. The proof which is\nsupposed to make this a tenable hypothesis consists of, first, what\ncan be learned by self-analysis, or by my introspection of myself;\nnext by vicarious examination, or by observing the facts of nervous\nstructure and function exhibited in other bodies like my own. These\nexaminations enable us to discover, what? Not a conscious person,\nlearning, appropriating, and holding ideas, but that there exists only,\nfor each changing cluster of ideas, a permanent _nexus_, corresponding\nto the permanent _nexus_ which holds together the changing cluster of\nappearances referable to the external body. We next have the assertion\nthat ideas have no more a continued existence than the impressions\nmade in the external body. Both are transitory, and in both the only\ncontinued existence is the _nexus_, or ligament which binds together\nthe changing impressions and the changing clusters of ideas. This Mr.\nSpencer illustrates by the successive chords and cadences brought\nout from a piano. These have no existence in the piano, which is\nnothing but a mechanical structure, giving forth sounds, when they\nare struck, which sounds are merely passing chords and cadences; and\nhe concludes that it would be just as proper to say that the passing\nchords and cadences, after they have died away, exist in the piano, as\nit is to say that passing ideas, after the nervous impressions have\nceased, exist in the brain. Let us now go back and examine this kind\nof psychology in detail. Mr. Spencer speaks of self-analysis, and of\nthe analysis of other minds and bodies like our own. He uses the terms\nself, others, me, mine, him, his. Who or what is this thing which\nexamines himself or another? Who and what are \"you\" or \"I,\" who sit\nhere talking to each other? Are these mere forms of expression, always\ntransformable into their scientific equivalents? What is the scientific\nequivalent for he, his, me, mine, you, yours? Mr. Spencer says that,\nunder certain conditions, there occurs a state of consciousness more or\nless like other states of consciousness that have existed before, but\nthat the only permanent thing is the _nexus_ which holds these states\nof consciousness together. His illustration of the piano fails. If\nthe piano were a structure that could of its own volition give forth\nsuch sounds as it chose to utter, it might be correct to speak of it\nas an existence having a store of sounds which it could make reach our\nears when and as it saw fit. But it does not happen to be an automatic\nmachine. It is a mere collection of strings, of different sizes and\ntensions, which, when struck by an instrument called a hammer, cause\ncertain vibrations in the air. But a human being is an automatic\norganism; one that can at pleasure give utterance to ideas through\nthe vocal organs, so that they are communicated to you. When I give\nutterance to an idea, through my vocal organs, in speaking to you, do\nI draw on a stock of permanent ideas, some of which I express, or do\nI express nothing but a passing state of consciousness, more or less\nlike other states of consciousness that have before passed through\nmy nervous organization? Mr. Spencer asserts that the notion of the\ncontinued existence of ideas is absolutely at variance with experience.\nOn the contrary, experience proves it every moment of our lives.\n\nFor example: Years ago a person related to me a fact very interesting\nand important to me, but I have not until now had occasion to make use\nof it. I have a perfect recollection of what he told me. It bears no\nresemblance to any other fact of which I ever heard. It concerns me\nalone. I have a perfect recollection of it. I stored it up for future\nuse whenever I should need to use it. Is it a self-delusion that I have\nstored up and treasured this information? When I recollect and repeat\nit, just as it was told me, am I doing nothing but giving expression to\na passing idea, more or less like the original idea? This would be a\nrather dangerous doctrine to adopt as the interpretation of experience.\nHuman testimony respecting things that we have been told, or have seen,\nwould be a pretty uncertain reliance if the memory had no other power\nthan to assimilate a passing idea, more or less, to a former state of\nconsciousness which more or less resembled the present consciousness.\nMen deviate from the truth rather frequently, now; but, teach them that\nmemory is nothing but the assimilation, more or less, of a passing\nidea to some other idea that formerly passed through their heads, and\nI should be rather afraid of their testimony. I should fear that the\n\"psychological changes\" would be a little too frequent, and that the\nstory would not have \"that identity of structure which it would have\nwere it a pre-existing thing presenting itself afresh.\"\n\nWhat is all the learning of the scholar? Has he treasured up nothing?\nHas he nothing in the pigeon-holes of his mind? Has he no mind in which\nto store his acquisitions? Is the sole actual existence \"the structure\nwhich, under like conditions, again evolves like combinations\"? Must\nhe find himself under like conditions which will again evolve like\ncombinations of ideas in passing trains of consciousness, before he can\nbring forth from the store-house of his mind the pre-existing thing\nthat lies within it?\n\nKOSMICOS. I must here interject a question in my turn. What is\nthe proof that ideas have a continued existence? Speaking of the brain\nas the nerve-center, in which impressions are produced by molecular\nchanges transmitted along the nerve-fibers, what proof is there that an\nidea which is now passing through the brain continues to exist there,\nany more than the passing chord or cadence continues to exist in the\npiano?\n\nSOPHEREUS. Do you not see that the very power of\ndiscrimination which we possess, whereby we distinguish between\npresent and former conditions, and present and former combinations,\nproves that there is a permanent existing thing in an idea which\npresents itself afresh, and with which we compare the passing idea, so\nas to determine whether they are the same? If we did not possess this\npower, all thinking, all expression of ideas, all memory, all that\npart of consciousness which is not made up of mere bodily feelings and\nsensations, would be nothing but the repetition of the passing idea;\nand all learning, information, knowledge, and experience, would be\nutterly useless. If there did not exist something with which to compare\nthe passing idea of the present moment, we should be always floating\non the surface of the passing idea. There would be no continuity in\nour intellectual existence. We should be reduced to the condition of\nthe piano, and could only give forth such chords and cadences as are\nproduced by successive blows of the hammer upon the strings of the\ninstrument. And how could anything originate in ourselves? What is\nthe faculty which produces ideas that are not only new to ourselves,\nnot only not suggested by passing ideas, but new to all other human\nintellects, and never embraced in their experience until we put\nthem within their apprehension? What did Dante do when he produced\nthe \"Inferno\"? or Milton, when he composed the \"Paradise Lost\"? or\nShakespeare, when he composed his \"Hamlet\"? or Goethe, when he produced\nhis \"Faust\"? Does the poet, when he gives us ideas that we never\npossessed before, originate nothing? If he is a maker, a creator, in\nthe realm of ideas, are those original ideas, which neither he nor\nany one else ever had before, the mere result of like combinations\nevolved out of like conditions, when neither the old conditions nor\nthe combinations have anything to do with the new ideas which he has\nproduced? Surely, in reference to the great productions of human\ngenius, we must contemplate the mind as an existence, having the power\nto do something more than to produce the transitory ideas that are\npassing through the brain from the impressions on it, communicated\nthrough the nervous structure. Surely there is some other structure\nthan that which can be likened to the piano. Surely there is something\nmore than a set of plexuses \"which constitute the potentiality of an\nidea, and make possible future ideas like it\"; for there are possible\nfuture ideas which are not like any former ideas, which do not depend\non any set of plexuses, and do not cease to be possible when the\nwaves of molecular motion cease. These possible future ideas are the\nconceptions which the mind originates in itself; which are unlike\nanything that has gone before, or that is passing now. So that there\nare two kinds of ideas: the kind that has a continued existence, and\nthat consists in knowledge, and is drawn upon by memory; and the other,\nthe kind of which continued existence is not to be predicated until it\nhas been formulated by the faculty of original production, not produced\nby an exercise of memory, but produced by original creation.\n\nKOSMICOS. Has not Mr. Spencer allowed for and accounted for\nall that you claim as the power of originating new ideas? Does he not\nsay that \"each set of plexuses\"--each set of the net-work of ideas--is\n\"perpetually modified in detail by perpetual new actions\"; is \"capable\nof entering into countless combinations with others, just as the\nobjects thought of entered into countless combinations; and capable of\nhaving its several parts variously excited, just as the external object\npresents its combined attributes in various ways\"? Is not this the\nwhole matter, in regard to what you call the power of originating new\nideas?\n\nSOPHEREUS. No, it is not. In the first place, I do not believe\nthat he was here intentionally speaking of any ideas but those which\nare suggested by, or involve external objects. But, if he did mean to\ninclude the production of new and original ideas through the countless\ncombinations into which old ones may be made to enter, his theory does\nnot fit the case of poetical invention of new ideas, or the invention\nof imaginary characters, or lives; for these are creations which are\nnot mere combinations of old ideas, and the more they depart from\neverything suggested by, or resembling, former ideas, the more we are\nobliged to recognize as a faculty of the mind the power to originate\nand formulate new ideas that did not previously exist.\n\nKOSMICOS. Well, you have criticised Mr. Spencer's mental\nphilosophy from your point of view. Now let me hear your hypothesis of\nthe origin and nature of mind, with which you promised to contrast his\npsychology, and which you think is better supported.\n\nSOPHEREUS. I think I had better put my views in writing, and\nread them to you at our next meeting. You can then have them before\nyou to examine at your leisure. Let me say in advance, however, that\nI shall not rely on any of the metaphysicians, but shall endeavor to\ngive you my conception of the nature of mind from my own reflections,\nand from common experience. I shall make my examination of the nature\nof mind precede any suggestion of its probable origin, just as I think\nwe should examine the structure of any organism before we undertake to\ndeduce its probable origin.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nHere, then, closes the debate between these two persons, from whom,\nat the end of the next chapter, I shall part with a reluctance which\nI hope the reader will share. Not for victory do I allow Sophereus to\nexplain his analysis of mind, without describing how his scientific\nfriend receives it.\n\n FOOTNOTES:\n\n [130] \"Data of Ethics,\" chap. xv.\n\n [131] Ibid.\n\n [132] Revised version of St. Mark's gospel.\n\n [133] The late Jeremiah S. Black is the person whose language is here\n quoted, although it was used with reference to something else.\n\n [134] This does not imply that the punishment inflicted by society\n is to be always the same. It implies only that there is to be some\n punishment, so long as the prohibited act continues to be committed.\n\n [135] \"Principles of Psychology,\" vol. i, pp. 503, 504, \u00a7 220.\n\n [136] _Statical_: pertaining to bodies at rest or in equilibrium.\n\n _Dynamical_: pertaining to strength or power.\n\n _Dynamics_: that part of mechanical philosophy which treats of bodies\n in motion; opposed to _statics_. (\"Webster's Dictionary.\")\n\n [137] \"Principles of Psychology,\" vol. ii, p. 484, _et seq._\n\n [138] \"Webster's Dictionary.\" PLEXUS.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nSophereus discourses on the Nature and Origin of the Human Mind.\n\n\nSOPHEREUS, in fulfillment of his intention expressed at their\nlast meeting, reads to the scientist the following\n\n\nDISCOURSE ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN MIND.\n\nI regard the mind as an organism, capable of anatomical examination, as\nthe body is, but of course by very different means. In the anatomical\nexamination of an animal organism we use our eye-sight to acquire\na knowledge of its component parts, its organs, and its structure,\nby dissection of a dead or inspection of a living subject. But, in\nstudying the anatomy of mind, we have a subject that is beyond our\nvisual perception. It is not, however, beyond our examination. We carry\non that examination by means of the introspection which consciousness\nenables us to have of our own minds, and by observing and comparing the\nphenomena of mind as manifested in other persons. If these respective\nmeans of investigation enable us to reach the conviction that in each\nindividual of the human race there is an existence of a spiritual\nnature and another existence of a corporeal or physical nature, we\nshall have attained this conclusion by observing the difference between\nthe two organisms. The fact that we can not detect the bond that unites\nthem while they are united should not lead us to doubt their distinct\nexistence as organisms of different natures, but made for a temporary\nperiod to act on and with each other.\n\nBefore entering further into the subject, I will refer to some of the\nterms which we are obliged to use in speaking of the nature of mind as\nan organism, when contrasted with the nature of the physical organism.\nWe speak, for example, and from the want of another term we are obliged\nto speak, of the substance of mind. But, while we thus speak of mind\nin a term of matter, there is no implication that the subject of which\nwe speak is of the same nature as that which constitutes the physical\norganism; nor is there any danger of the incorporation of materialistic\nideas with our ideas of the fabric of mind. On the contrary, the\nvery nature of the inquiry is whether that which constitutes mind is\nsomething different from that which constitutes body; and, although in\nspeaking of both we use the term substance, we mean in the one case\norganized matter, and in the other case organized spirit. There is a\nvery notable instance of a corresponding use of terms in the passage\nof one of St. Paul's epistles, where he discourses on the doctrine\nof the resurrection. According to my universal custom when I refer\nto any of the writings regarded by the Christian world as sacred,\nor inspired, I lay aside altogether the idea of a person speaking\nby divine or any other authority. I cite the statement of St. Paul,\nin its philosophical aspect, as an instance of the use of the term\nbody applied to each of the distinct organisms. His statement, or\nassertion, or assumption--call it what you please--is, \"If there is\na natural body, there is also a spiritual body\";[139] he uses the\nterm _body_ in speaking of that which is natural, or of the earth,\nearthy, and of that which is spiritual, or heavenly. Without following\nhim into the nature of the occurrence which he affirms is to take\nplace in the resurrection, the question is whether he was or was not\nphilosophically correct, in speaking of two kinds of organisms, one\ncomposed of matter, and liable to corruption and dissolution, and the\nother composed of spirit, indestructible and imperishable.\n\nIn order to be understood, he was obliged to use the term _body_ in\nreference to both of these organisms, just as we are obliged to use the\nterm _substance_ when we speak of the subject of contemplation as a\nphysical or as a spiritual organism. Can this distinctness of nature be\npredicated of the body and the mind of man before what we call death?\n\nThe peculiar occurrence which St. Paul so vigorously and vividly\ndescribes as what is to happen at the resurrection, is a prophecy in\nwhich he mingles with great force philosophical illustrations and the\ninformation which he claims to have received from inspiration; or\nthings revealed to him by the Almighty through the Holy Spirit. He\nexpresses himself in terms level to the apprehension of those whom he\nis addressing; and in this use of terms he does just what we do when we\nspeak of a natural body and a spiritual body. He puts the existence of\nthe natural body hypothetically:\n\n\"_If_ there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body.\"[140]\nParaphrased as the whole passage may be, he says, \"You well know that\nthere is a natural body, and I tell you that there is also a spiritual\nbody.\" Laying aside the mode in which the spiritual body is to be\nmanifested at and after the resurrection, we have to consider whether,\nduring this life, there is a bodily organism and a mental organism,\ndistinct in their natures, but united for a time by a bond which is\nhidden from our detection.\n\nI have used the term anatomy of the mind, from the same necessity which\ncompels me to speak of the substance of mind. You will understand\nthat, when I speak of anatomical examination of the mind, I mean\nthat analysis of its structure which we can make by the use of the\nappropriate means, and which enables us to conceive that it is an\norganized structure of a peculiar character.\n\nThe grand difficulty with Mr. Spencer's \"Psychology\" is, that after he\nhas made what he calls \"the proximate components of mind\" to consist\nof \"two broadly contrasted kinds--feelings and the relations between\nfeelings,\" which are mere impressions produced on the nerve-center by\nmolecular changes in the fluid or semi-fluid substance of the nerves,\nhe has not approached to a solution of the question whether there is or\nis not a something to which these feelings and the relations between\nthem suggest ideas, and which holds ideas continuously for future use.\n\nThus he makes consciousness to consist in passing groups of feelings\nand their relations, and not in a conscious subject. He denies that\nthere is any _ego_, in the sense in which every person is conscious\nof a self, and maintains that the only substantive existence is the\nunknown ligament which holds together the ever-changing states of\nfeelings and impressions produced in the nerve-center. There is a far\nbetter method of investigation. It is to inquire into the fabric of the\nmind as an organism, by determining whether mental phenomena justify\nus in the conclusion that it is an organism. In this way we may reach\na satisfactory conclusion that the mind is a substantive existence,\npossessing a uniform structure, of a character, however, fundamentally\ndifferent from the bodily structure; and in this way we may be able to\nexplain, wholly or in part, how the mind and the body act on and with\neach other so long as the connection is maintained.\n\nI am entirely free to acknowledge that, when I speak of the\nsubstance of mind, or speak of it as an organism, I am and must\nremain ignorant of the nature of its substance beyond the point where\nits self-manifestations cease. But the question is, whether we are\nnot under an irresistible necessity of adopting as a postulate the\nexistence of a something which has certain inherent powers, and whether\nthe mental phenomena, the self-manifestations of those powers, do not\nnecessarily lead us to the conception and conviction that mind is a\nsubstantive existence. I can not talk or think of consciousness apart\nfrom a conscious subject, or of feelings without a subject that feels.\nA thread of consciousness, or a series of feelings, conveys no meaning\nto me, apart from a being who has the consciousness and perceives the\nfeelings.[141]\n\nOne very important question to be considered in all such investigations\nis, Whether our experience does not teach us that we are mentally so\nconstituted that certain conceptions are necessary to us? Our mental\nnature is placed under certain laws, as our physical or corporeal\nnature is placed under certain other laws. One of these necessary\nconceptions, which are imposed on us, as it seems to me, by a law of\nour mental constitution, is a conception of the fundamental difference\nbetween matter and spirit. In what way is it forced upon us that there\nis a natural world and a spiritual world? The phenomena of matter\nand the phenomena of mind are essentially different. In ourselves\nthey occur in conjunction, and they occur in disjunction. They are\nmanifested synchronously, and they are manifested separately in point\nof time. The normal action of all the functions of the body is not\nnecessary to the action of the mind. The body may be prostrated by\ndisease, and the moment of its death may be at hand; yet the mind,\nto the last moment of the physical life, may be unclouded, and its\nmanifestations may be as perfect as they ever were in the full health\nand activity of the vital functions of the body. No one who stands at\na death-bed where this phenomenon occurs, and observes how completely\nthe mind is master of itself; how it holds in consciousness the past\nand the present; how it essays to grasp the future for those whom it is\nto leave and for itself, can easily escape the conviction that death\nis nothing but the dissolution of the bond which has hitherto held\ntogether the two existences that constituted the human being, one of\nwhich is to be dissolved into its elemental and material substances,\nand the other of which is to go elsewhere, intact and indestructible.\n\nLet me now refer to what is taking place while I am writing this essay.\nI have said that the phenomena of our bodily organism and the phenomena\nof our mental organism may occur synchronously in the same individual.\nThe act of writing an original composition is an instance of this. The\naction of certain organs of the body and the action of the mind are\nsimultaneous. In time, they can not be separated. In themselves, they\nare separable and separate. The thought springing up in the mind may be\nretained there, or may flow into language and be written by the hand\nupon the page. No one can detect in himself any instant of time when\nthe mental formation of a sentence, or any clause of a sentence, as\nhe writes, is separable from the physical act of writing. In that not\nvery common, but still possible, feat of dictating to two amanuenses,\nat what appears to be the same time, on two distinct subjects, there\nis undoubtedly an appreciable interval, in which the mind passes from\none subject to the other, and then back again, with great rapidity.\nBut, when one is one's own amanuensis, when the act of thinking and\nformulating the thought, and the act of writing it down in words, is\nperformed by the same person, there is a simultaneous action of that\nwhich originates the thought and clothes it in words, and the act of\nthe bodily organ which inscribes the words upon paper. How is this\nphenomenon to be explained? And to what does it lead? Is there anything\nin the whole range of Mr. Spencer's \"Psychology\" that will interpret\nthis familiar experience? May it not be interpreted by an anatomical\nexamination of the mind as an organism?\n\nI do not now refer to cases where a thought is completely formulated\nbefore the pen begins to be moved over the paper, and is then recalled\nby an effort of the memory and written down. I am referring to what\nI suppose is the habit of many persons in writing, namely, the\norigination and formulation of the thought as the hand moves the pen,\na habit of which most practiced writers are perfectly conscious. The\nsame thing occurs in what is truly called extemporaneous speaking,[142]\nwhen oral discourse is not a mere repetition, _memoriter_, of thoughts\nand sentences which had been previously formulated, but, as the\nword extemporaneous implies, when the thought and the language flow\nfrom the vocal organs _eo instanti_ with their conception. In these\nand the similar cases of improvisation and animated conversation,\nin which there is a synchronous action of the mind and the bodily\norgans, it would be impossible for us to have that action if mind were\nconstituted as Mr. Spencer supposes it to be. If there were no mind in\nthe sense of an organized entity, conceiving a thought and clothing\nit in the language needful to give it written or oral expression,\n\"if the _ego_ were nothing more than the passing group of feelings\nand ideas\"--if an \"idea lasts (only) while the nerves of molecular\nmotion last, ceasing when they cease\"--if that which remains is (only)\nthe \"set of plexuses\"--how could we originate any new thought? The\nvery illustration to which Mr. Spencer resorts, when he likens the\nautomatic human being to the non-automatic piano, and makes them\nanalogous in their action, in order to show that passing ideas do not\nhave a continual existence in the mind, but that the actual existence\nis the physical structure which, under like conditions, again evolves\nlike combinations, reduces us at once to the level of the piano,\nand precludes the potentiality of a new and original idea which is\nnot a combination of former ideas, and is produced under different\nconditions. The assertion or argument that each set of plexuses is\ncapable of entering into countless combinations with others, and so\nrenders possible future ideas, does not advance us one step to the\nsolution of what takes place when we conceive a new thought, clothe it\nin language, and write it down on paper, or give it oral expression.\n\nIn justification of this criticism, let me now refer to that\nintellectual process which is called \"invention,\" in its application\nto the mechanic arts. I do not mean to suggest or to claim that this\nkind of invention is an act which is to be referred to a distinct and\npeculiar faculty of certain minds, in the possession of which one\nman may differ from another. But I shall endeavor to describe what\ntakes place when one conceives the intellectual plan of a certain new\ncombination of mechanical devices, and embodies that plan in a machine\nwhich differs from all other previous machines in its characteristic\nmethod of operation. For convenience, I shall speak of the person who\nproduces such a machine as the inventor, which is the same as speaking\nof him as the maker, as the poet is the maker of a poem. This act of\ninvention, or the making of some concrete new thing, is an act of\ncreation. The inventor, then, may be supposed to have learned all\nthat empirical and all that scientific mechanics could teach him; to\nhave had any quantity of passing groups of ideas pass through his\nconsciousness; to be possessed of any number of plexuses capable of\nentering into countless combinations with others. These plexuses, or\nnetworks of transitory ideas, consisting of former impressions in the\nnerve-center, must, it is said, be recalled under the like conditions\nwhich produced them. But the conditions for the inventor are not the\nsame. Something is to be produced into which the old ideas do not\nenter. There is to be a new arrangement of old mechanical devices;\na new combination is to be made, which will possess a method of\noperation and accomplish a result never before seen or obtained.\nA new concrete thing, a new machine, is to be created. That the\nconception must be formed, that the objective point, to which the whole\nintellectual effort is to aim, must be seen, is manifest. A tentative\nintellectual process may have to be gone through before the full\nconception is reached, just as a tentative experimental process may be\nnecessary in finding out how the practical embodiment of the conception\nis to be reached in building the structure. These processes may go on\nsimultaneously or separately; but, when they are both completed, when\nthe new machine stands before us, we see at once that the plan is an\nintellectual conception, perfectly original, and the physical structure\nis a new arrangement of matter effected by the hand of the inventor\nor by the hands of others, which he uses as his instruments in doing\nthe physical work. I do not know, therefore, how this phenomenon is\nto be explained upon the theory that the only _ego_ is the body and\nits functions, which lies behind and determines ever-changing states\nof consciousness. I know not how else to interpret the phenomenon of\ninvention, excepting to adopt the postulate that there is a mind, a\nsubstantive existence, which, while its consciousness holds ideas\nsuggested by former conditions, has the inherent power to originate\nideas that did not form a part of any previous state of consciousness.\n\nI have spoken of mind as an organism and as a substantive existence.\nThis is a deduction to be drawn from the manifestations of mental\nphenomena. In order to guard against an objection that may possibly\nbe interposed in the way of this method of investigation, I will\nanticipate and answer it. It will be said that we can not define or\ndescribe the substance of mind; can not tell whether it is a unit,\nin itself, or an aggregate of units; we know and can know nothing\nmore than its approximate components, and all that we know of these\ndoes not justify us in assuming to speak of the substance of mind. I\nhave more than once suggested, in our former conferences, that our\ninability to define and to describe the substance of any supposed\nexistence is no proper objection to the hypothesis that there is such\nan existence. When we undertake to define matter, or to describe the\nsubstance of that which we call matter, we find that we soon reach a\npoint where precise definition or description ceases. Yet we do not\nfor that reason refrain from deducing the existence of matter from the\nmanifestations of certain phenomena and from our experience with them.\nIt is perfectly true that we know matter only by the manifestations of\ncertain physical phenomena; that we can not define the nature of its\nsubstance. All we can do, by the most minute analysis, is to arrive at\nthe perception of the ultimate particles or units of matter; and the\nnature of the substance of which these units are composed is incapable\nof any further description. \"Matter\"[143] is one of the words in the\nEnglish language which are used in a great variety of senses, exact and\ninexact, literal and figurative. In its philosophical sense, meaning\nthe substance of which all physical bodies are composed, the efforts of\nlexicographers to give a definition, descriptive of the nature of what\nis defined, show that definition is, strictly speaking, impossible.\nAll that can be said is that matter is \"substance extended\"; or that\nwhich is visible or tangible, as \"earth, wood, stone, air, vapor,\nwater\"; or \"the substance of which all bodies are composed.\" But these\nefforts at definition express only what is needful to be expressed in\ncontrasting matter with that other existence which is called \"spirit.\"\nThis is another word which is used in very different senses, but of\nwhich no more exact definition can be given, when it is used in its\nphilosophical sense, than can be given of \"matter.\" Lexicographers\nhave defined \"spirit,\" in one of its meanings, as \"the _soul_ of man;\nthe intelligent, immaterial, and immortal part of human beings\"; and in\nanother of its meanings, more broadly, as \"an immaterial, intelligent\nsubstance.\" In these definitions they have followed the metaphysicians,\nand the uses of the word in the English translation of the Bible.\nWhen we turn to the definition of \"soul,\" we find it given as \"the\nspiritual and immortal substance in man, which distinguishes him from\nbrutes; that part of man which enables him to think and reason, and\nwhich renders him a subject of moral government.\" We also have it\ndefined as \"the understanding, the intellectual principle.\" Undoubtedly\nthese definitions involve certain assumptions, such as the existence\nof a substance called spirit, and the existence of an intellectual\nprinciple, of which \"soul,\" \"spirit,\" and \"intellect\" are mere names.\nBut there is no difficulty in the way of our knowing what is meant when\nthese terms are used. The difficulty of giving a definition without\na circuitous use of terms, explaining the one by the other, and then\nexplaining the last by the first, does not prevent us from having a\ndefinite conception of the thing spoken of. When we speak of mind,\nsoul, or intellect, what we think of is the something in ourselves\nof which we are conscious, and whose manifestations we observe in\nother beings like ourselves; and what we have to do is to examine the\nevidence which may bring home to our convictions the existence of this\nsomething that perceives, thinks, acts, originates new ideas; holds\nformer ideas in consciousness, is connected with and acts upon and\nis acted on by bodily organs, and is at the same time more than and\ndifferent from those organs.\n\nI have referred to some of the mental phenomena which have the\nstrongest tendency to prove the existence of the mind as an organized\nentity. These are the phenomena which occur in our waking hours,\nwhen the intellectual faculties and the bodily organs are in the full\nexercise of their normal functions respectively. There is another class\nof mental phenomena which may be said to be abnormal, in this, that\nthe intellectual faculties and the bodily organs do not preserve the\nsame relations to each other in all respects that they do when we are\nfully awake. These are the phenomena that occur during sleep--a class\nof mental phenomena of great consequence to be observed and analyzed in\nany study of psychology. They are of an extraordinary variety, complex\nin the highest degree, and dependent on numerous causes of mental and\nphysical disturbance; but it is quite possible to extract from some of\nthem certain definite conclusions.\n\nSleep, properly regarded, when it is perfect, is a state of absolute\nrest and inactivity of all the organs and functions of the body\nsave the digestion of food and the circulation of the blood, and of\nall the mental faculties. Perfect sleep, sleep in which there is\nabsolutely no consciousness, is more rare than those states in which\nthere is more or less consciousness. But it is often an actual state\nof both body and mind, and it was evidently designed to renew the\nvigor of both, and to prevent the wear and tear of unbroken activity.\nBetween absolute unconsciousness induced by perfect sleep and the\nfull consciousness of our waking moments, there are many intermediate\nstates; and the phenomena of these intermediate states present very\nstrong proofs of the existence of the mind as a special and spiritual\nentity, capable in greater or less degree of acting without the aid\nof the physical organs. I do not except even the organ of the brain\nfrom this suspension of action during certain states when the mind\nis in more or less of activity; for I am convinced that in some\nof the mental phenomena to which I shall advert and which I shall\nendeavor to describe, the brain is in a state of perfect sleep, and\nthat in the production of those phenomena it takes no part. In other\nmental phenomena, which occur during sleep, the brain or some part\nof it is evidently acted upon by the mind, as in the somnambulistic\ncondition, when the nerves of motion, responding to the action of the\nmind, communicate action to the muscles, and the body walks about and\nperforms other external acts.\n\nThere are other mental phenomena occurring during very profound sleep\nof the body and its organs, when the mind does not appear to derive\nits action from the brain, or to be dependent on the brain for its\nactivity; when it is exceedingly active, and when it communicates\naction to none of the bodily organs; when, for example, it carries on\nlong trains of thought, composes sentences, invents conversations,\nmakes poetry and prose, and performs other intellectual processes.\nDistributed into classes, the most important mental phenomena occurring\nduring sleep are the following:\n\nFirst, and presenting perhaps the strongest proof of the mind's\nindependence of all the bodily organs, is that whole class of mental\nphenomena in which, during profound sleep of the body, we carry on\nconversations, compose original matter in the form of oral or written\ndiscourse, which we seem to ourselves to be producing, and solve\nintellectual difficulties which have baffled us when awake, or imagine\nthat we receive from an unexpected source important information that we\nare not conscious of having previously received.\n\nThe phenomena of conversations, to which we appear to ourselves to be\nlistening during sleep, or in which we appear to ourselves to be taking\npart, are, when analyzed, most remarkable occurrences, for it is the\nmind of the sleeper which originates the whole of what appears to be\nsaid by different persons. These conversations are as vivid, as much\nmarked by different intellectual and personal characteristics, sudden\nand unexpected turns, apt repartee, interchange of ideas between two or\nmore persons, as are the real conversations which we overhear, or in\nwhich we take part, when we are awake. Yet the whole of what is said,\nor appears to us to be said, is the invention of the one mind, which\nappears to itself to be listening to or talking with other minds, and\nall the while the body is wrapped in profound sleep. This extraordinary\nintellectual feat, so familiar to us that it scarcely attracts our\nattention unless we undertake to analyze it, is closely akin to the\naction of the mind when the body and the mind are neither of them\nasleep, and when we invent a conversation between different persons.\nBut this occurrence is marked by another extraordinary peculiarity:\nfor it happens, during sleep, to persons who could not, when awake,\ninvent and write such conversations at will, and who in their waking\nhours have very little of the imaginative faculty needed for such\nproductions. I account for this phenomenon by the hypothesis that when\nthe mind is free from the necessity of depending on the bodily organs\nfor its action, as it is during profound sleep of the body, when its\nnormal relations with the body are completely suspended and it is left\nto its independent action, it has a power of separate action. This, I\nthink, accounts for a kind of mental action which, when compared with\nthat which occurs in conjunction with the action of the bodily organs,\nmay be called abnormal. Under the impulse of its own unrestrained and\nuncorrected activity, the mind goes through processes of invention,\nthe products of which are sometimes wild and incoherent, sometimes\nexceedingly coherent, sensible, and apt. Let the person to whom this\noccurs be thoroughly awakened out of one of these states, and the mind\nbecomes immediately again subjected to the necessity of acting along\nwith, and under the conditions of its normal relations to the body.\n\nAkin to this mental feat of inventing conversations, during a sleep of\nthe body, is the power of composing, during such sleep, oral discourse\nof one's own, or the power of composing something which we appear\nto ourselves to be writing. I suppose this is an occurrence which\nhappens to most persons who are much accustomed to writing or to public\nspeaking. It is often an involuntary action of the mind; that is to\nsay, it is sometimes accompanied with a distinct consciousness that\nit is a process that ought to be arrested because it is a dangerous\none, and yet it can not be arrested before full waking consciousness\nreturns. On goes the flow of thought and language, apparently with\ngreat success; we seem to be speaking or writing with even more than\nour usual power, and all the while in the style that belongs to us;\nbut, until we are fully restored to the normal relation of the mind\nand the body, we can not at will arrest this independent action of\nthe mind, but must wait until our bodily senses are again in full\nactivity. I do not suppose that this phenomenon ought to be explained\nby the hypothesis that there are certain parts or organs of the brain\nwhich are specially concerned in the work of original composition of\nintellectual matter, and that these organs are not affected by the\nsleep that is prevailing in other parts of the brain. While it is\ndoubtless true that there are special systems of nerves which proceed\nfrom or conduct to special parts of the brain, and by which action\nis imparted to or received from the other organs of the body, and\nwhile some of these special parts of the brain may be in the state\nof absolute inactivity called sleep, and others are not, I know of\nno warrant for the hypothesis that the intellectual operations or\nprocesses are dependent upon any particular organ or organs of the\nbrain, as distinguished from those from and to which proceed special\nsystems of nerves. If any person, who is much accustomed to that kind\nof intellectual activity which consists in original composition of\nintellectual matter, will attend to his own consciousness, and probe\nit as far as he may, he will not find reason, I apprehend, to conclude\nthat the power of thought and of clothing thought in language resides\nin any special part of the brain. His experience and introspection\nwill be more likely to lead him to the conclusion that this power,\nwhether it is exerted when he is asleep or awake bodily, is a power\nthat inheres in the mind itself regarded as a spiritual existence and\norganism, and that the action of the brain, or of any part of it, is\nnecessary to the exercise of this power only when it is necessary, as\nit is in our waking moments, to use some of the bodily organs in order\nto give the thought oral or written expression by giving it utterance\nthrough the vocal organs or by writing it down on paper. Certain it\nis that we conceive thoughts in more or less of connected sequence,\nand clothe them intellectually in language of which we have entire\nconsciousness while the process is going on, without the action of any\npart of the body.\n\nIt may be objected to this view that the intellectual products which\nwe seem to ourselves to be making when we are asleep would, if they\ncould be repeated by an effort of the memory, word for word, just as\nthey seem to have occurred, be found to be of the same incoherent,\nsenseless stuff of which all dreams are made; and that this test would\nshow that the brain is at such times not absolutely and completely in\nthe condition which is called sleep, but that it is only partially in\nthat condition; that it is performing its function feebly, imperfectly,\nand not as it performs that function when the whole body is awake. In\nreference to this hypothesis, I will repeat an anecdote which I have\nsomewhere read, which is equally valuable whether it was an imaginary\nor a real occurrence.\n\nA gentleman of literary pursuits, who was a very respectable poet, was\nsubject to this habit of composition during sleep. One night he awoke\nhis wife and informed her that he had composed in his dream some of\nthe best and most original verses that he had ever written. He begged\nher at once to get a candle, pen, ink, and paper, and let him dictate\nto her the new composition that appeared to him so striking. When they\nread together the new poem on the next morning, it turned out to be\nnonsensically puerile. But occurrences of this kind, if they could be\nmultiplied, would prove only that we are liable to illusions in sleep,\nin regard to the comparative merits of our intellectual products,\nwhich we imagine ourselves to be creating when we are in that state,\nas we are in regard to other things. We are under a delusion when we\nimagine in our dreams that we encounter and converse with another\nperson, living or dead. We are perhaps deluding ourselves when in sleep\nwe compose or seem to compose an original poem. But what is it that\ndeludes itself, either in respect to the interview with another person,\nor in respect to the new composition? Is it the brain, or is it the\nmind? Is it a person, or a bodily organ that has the false impression,\nin the one case or the other? There must be a something that is subject\nto an illusion, before there can be an illusion. If both brain and\nmind are in profound sleep, absolute suspension of all action, there\ncan be no illusion about anything. If the brain is absolutely asleep\nand the mind is not, the illusion is in the mind and not in the brain.\nThat the latter is what often occurs, the experience of the illiterate\nand uncultivated makes them aware, as well as the experience of the\nlettered scholar and the practiced writer.[144]\n\nUnder the same head, I will now refer to those strange but familiar\noccurrences which take place when there come to us, in sleep, solutions\nof difficulties which we had not overcome by all our efforts while\nawake, and which appeared to us utterly dark when we lay down to rest.\nThese mental phenomena are almost innumerably various. They take place\nin regard to all kinds of subjects, to lines of conduct and action, to\neverything about which our thoughts are employed; and they are a class\nof phenomena within everybody's experience. There is scarcely any one\nto whom it has not happened to lie down at night with a mind distressed\nand perplexed about some problem that requires a definite solution,\nand to rise in the morning, usually after a night of undisturbed\nrest, with his mind perfectly clear on the subject, and with just the\nsolution that did not come to him when he devoted to it all his waking\nthoughts. What is the explanation of this phenomenon? If the mind\nis an independent entity, a spiritual organism, capable of its own\naction without the aid of the body under certain circumstances, this\nphenomenon can be explained. If the mind is not a spiritual organism,\ncapable, under any circumstances, of acting without the aid of the\nbodily organs, this phenomenon can not be explained.\n\nThe most probable explanation is this: When we are awake, and devote\nour thoughts to a particular subject that is attended with great\ndifficulties, we go over the same ground repeatedly--the mind travels\nand toils in the same ruts. Nothing new occurs, because we look at the\nsubject in the same way every time we think of it. We are liable to be\nkept in the same beaten path by the associations between our thoughts\nand the bodily states in which we have those thoughts--associations\nwhich are exceedingly powerful. But let these associations be dissolved\nas they are during perfect sleep--let the mind be in a condition to act\nwithout being dependent on the brain or any other bodily organ for aid,\nor exposed to be hampered by the conditions of the body, and there will\nbe a mental activity in which ideas will be wrought out that did not\noccur to us while we were awake. The memory, too, may recall a fact\nwhich we had learned while awake, and yet we may be unable to recollect\nhow it came to our knowledge. At such times, the fact is recalled; but\nas the mind is acting in a condition which is abnormal when compared\nwith the waking condition, and is liable to delusions about some\nthings, we imagine that the fact is revealed to us in some wild and\nsupernatural way, as by a person who is dead and who has come to us to\ncommunicate it. There is a well-authenticated account of an occurrence\nof this kind, given by Sir Walter Scott in one of the notes to his\n\"Antiquary,\" and on which he founds an incident related by one of the\npersonages in his story. The real occurrence was this: A gentleman in\nScotland was involved in a litigation about a claim asserted upon his\nlanded estate. He had a strong conviction that his father had bargained\nand paid for a release of the claim, but he could find no such paper.\nWithout it he was sure to be defeated in the suit. Distressed by this\nprospect, but utterly unable to see any way out of his misfortune, he\nlay down to sleep, on the night before he was to go into Edinburgh to\nattend the trial of the cause. He dreamed that his father appeared to\nhim, and told him that the claim had been released, and that the paper\nwas in the hands of a lawyer in a neighboring town, whose name the\npaternal shade mentioned.\n\nBefore going into Edinburgh on the next day, the gentleman rode to\nthe place which his father had indicated, and found the lawyer, of\nwhose name he had been previously unconscious. This person turned out\nto be an old man, who had forgotten the fact that he had transacted\nthis piece of business for the gentleman's father; but on being\ntold of the fact that his client had paid his fee in a foreign coin\nof a peculiar character--which was one part of the story which the\nfather's apparition related to the son--he recalled the whole of the\ncircumstances, searched for the paper, and found it. The gentleman's\nestate was saved to him; but he became very superstitious about dreams,\nand suffered much from that cause, as was quite natural. Sir Walter's\nsolution of the whole affair is of course the correct one: \"The dream\nwas only the recapitulation of information which Mr. R---- had really\nreceived from his father while in life, but which at first he merely\nrecalled as a general impression that the claim was settled. It is not\nuncommon for persons to recover, during sleep, the thread of ideas\nwhich they have lost during their waking hours.\"[145] Sir Walter makes\nanother observation which is worthy of being repeated--that in dreams\nmen are not surprised by apparitions. Why are we not? Because the mind\nis in a state of abnormal activity, in which everything that occurs to\nit seems perfectly natural. The delusion in regard to the mode in which\nthe very important fact was communicated to Mr. R---- in his dream, was\nsubstituted in the place of the actual communication made to him by\nhis father during life. The latter he had wholly forgotten, and he had\nforgotten the circumstance of payment of the lawyer's fee in a peculiar\ncoin, which had also been mentioned to him by his father when living.\nThis remarkable incident, which might doubtless be paralleled by many\nsimilar occurrences, proves one of two things: either that the exercise\nof the memory is wholly dependent upon a waking condition of the brain,\nor that there may be an abnormal and imperfect act of memory while\nthe brain is in profound sleep, in the course of which a fact becomes\nmixed with a delusion about the mode in which we are told of the fact.\nWhat happened to Mr. R---- was that his mind recalled the fact, but\nimagined that he then learned it for the first time from an apparition.\nI do not know how such a phenomenon can be explained, excepting by the\nhypothesis that the mind is a special existence, which acts during\nsleep of the body upon facts that are lodged in the memory, but mixes\nthem with imaginary and delusive appearances, so that the mode in which\nthe fact was actually learned is obliterated from the memory, and some\nsupernatural mode of communication takes its place. On the return of\nwaking consciousness, the mode in which the fact was actually learned\nis still shut out from recollection, and, if the person to whom this\nkind of delusion has occurred is of a superstitious turn, he will act\non what he has imagined was told him by the apparition, because he has\nno other means of rescuing himself from an evil.\n\nIn regard to the mental phenomena which occur without delusions or\napparitions, where the thoughts on a difficult subject become clearer\nand more satisfactory to us when we awake from sleep than they ever\nwere during our waking hours, I suppose the explanation is this: During\nprofound sleep of the body, including the brain, there is an entire\nsuspension of every bodily function excepting the digestion of food and\nthe circulation of the blood. If there is excited in some of the other\norgans an action of a peculiar kind, by an excitation of the nerves\nconnected with those organs, it is proof that the condition of perfect\nsleep is not prevailing in all parts of the brain. The state to which I\nnow refer supposes a complete inactivity of the whole bodily organism\nsave in the digestive function and the circulation of the blood. In\nsuch a state, the mind, that which thinks and reasons, does not act\nupon the brain, and is not acted upon by it. It is capable of thinking\non any subject which has employed its thoughts during the waking hours;\nand while, in some cases, it is visited by apparitions and subject\nto delusions, it is in other cases engaged in ideas that involve no\ndelusive appearances. Freed from all the associations of these ideas\nwith the feelings prevailing in the body when we think of the subject\nduring our waking hours, we are able to perceive relations of the\nsubject which have not before occurred to us. When we pass from the\ncondition of sleep to the full consciousness of our bodily and mental\norganism, we are intellectually possessed of these new relations of the\nsubject, which we have brought with us out of the state in which we\nacquired them, and they furnish us with new materials for the solution\nof the problem that we had not solved when we lay down to rest. It\nis not, I am persuaded, because the mind was at rest during sleep,\nand when we become awake is by reason of that rest better able to\ngrapple with the difficulties of the subject, that we do grapple with\nthem successfully; for in the case supposed, which is a very common\nexperience, the thoughts are actually employed on the subject, while\nthe body and the brain are in the absolute rest and inactivity of all\nthe organic functions excepting those of digestion and circulation of\nthe blood. I do not know that it is possible to detect, in a person\nsleeping, an increased circulation of the blood to any part of the\nbrain which may be supposed to be concerned in the act of thinking,\nand at the same time to know that thinking is going on, unless such an\nobservation could be made of a person in the state called somnambulism,\nwhich is not the state of which I am now speaking. But reasoning upon\nthe phenomenon which I have now described, according to all that we can\nlearn from our own experience or from observation of others, I reach\nthe conclusion that the mind, the thinking and reasoning entity, can\nand does, in profound sleep of the body and the brain, employ itself\nupon a subject that has occupied us when awake, and can perceive new\nrelations of that subject, which had not before occurred to us, without\nthe activity of any portion of the nerve-center which is called the\nbrain. Does this hypothesis assume that our thoughts when asleep are\nmore valuable than our waking thoughts? It does, to a certain extent\nand under certain circumstances, for experience proves that in sleep\nwe acquire ideas which we did not have before we fell asleep, and which\nwe bring with us out of that condition.\n\nThat I have now given the true explanation of this familiar experience\nwill appear, I think, from this consideration: There are very few\nnights when we do not in sleep have many thoughts. The states of\nperfect unconsciousness are comparatively rare. If the brain were never\nentirely asleep, if it were always engaged in the physical work of\nthinking--whatever that work may be--it would be worn out prematurely.\nBut if the brain is perfectly at rest, while the mind is actively\nemployed, the brain undergoes no strain and suffers no exhaustion; and\nthe mind suffers no strain or exhaustion because it is in its nature\nincapable of wear and tear. It is only when the mind acts on the brain\nthat exhaustion takes place. I speak now of what happens in states of\nordinarily good health.[146]\n\nI shall now refer to some of the very peculiar phenomena of\nsomnambulism; and in illustration of their various phases I shall\nresort to Shakespeare's picture of the sleep-walking of Lady Macbeth,\nwhich, although purely imaginary, is a most accurate exhibition of\nnature. Treating it, as we are entitled to treat it, as if it were a\nreal occurrence at which we ourselves were witnesses, with a knowledge\nof her character and history, an analysis of the situation in which she\nwas placed when the habit of somnambulism came upon her, and of the\nmode in which her mind acted upon her body, will enable us to see the\nphenomena in their true philosophical aspect. We may suppose ourselves\npresent, with the doctor and the gentlewoman of her bedchamber, when\nshe comes forth in her night-dress and with a candle in her hand, and\nwe witness the impressive scene of a disturbed mind overmastering the\nbody while the body is asleep. It seems that, after the murder of\nDuncan, when she imbrued her own hands with his blood in smearing the\nfaces of his sleeping grooms, the habit of sleep-walking had come\nover her. As we stand by the side of the awe-stricken witnesses, and\nhear their whispered conversation, we get the first description of\nher actions since the new king, Macbeth, her husband, whom she had\ninstigated to murder the old king, went into the field. These first\nactions of hers, as described by the gentlewoman to the doctor, do not\nnecessarily exhibit the working of a guilty conscience. They exhibit\na mind oppressed and disturbed by cares of business and of state;\nand they are a distinct class of the phenomena of somnambulism. The\ngentlewoman tells the doctor that \"since his Majesty went into the\nfield, I have seen her rise from her bed, throw her night-gown upon\nher, unlock her closet, take forth paper, fold it, write upon it, read\nit, afterward seal it, and again return to bed; yet all this while in\na most fast sleep.\" This is merely a description of what the witness\nhas seen, and it might occur to any person of strong intellectual\nfaculties, disturbed by great cares, without the action of a guilty\nconscience. It makes the situation real when the doctor recognizes\nthe fact of this \"great perturbation in nature! to receive at once\nthe benefit of sleep, and do the effects of watching.\" As they are\nwhispering together, the doctor trying to make the gentlewoman tell\nhim what at such times she has heard her say, which the loyal servant\nrefuses to tell, Lady Macbeth moves forward, with the taper in her hand.\n\nHere we may pause upon the first exhibition of the phenomenon called\nsleep-walking, which we get by description only, and analyze the nature\nof the action. It is perfectly apparent that what the poet accepted\nas true, is the power of the mind to move the body while the body is\nasleep, so as to make it perform many acts. Experience makes this\nassumption perfectly correct. I presume it will not be questioned that\nthis phenomenon is described by Shakespeare with entire accuracy,\nand it is explicable only upon the hypothesis that the mind has some\ncontrol over the body while the body is asleep. Actions as minute and\nas much premeditated as those performed by Lady Macbeth \"in a most fast\nsleep,\" have been witnessed in persons who were undoubtedly asleep,\nand whose eyes were open for some purposes, but, as in her case, their\nsense was shut for other purposes.\n\nWe now pass to the more awful exhibition of a mind worked upon by a\nguilty conscience. Lady Macbeth comes out of her bedroom fast asleep,\nbut with a light in her hand. The gentlewoman who interprets her\nstate to the doctor informs him that she has a light by her bedside\ncontinuously; and we thus learn that her nights are so disturbed\nthat she can not bear darkness. They notice that her eyes are open,\nbut \"their sense is shut.\" Then begin the terrific manifestations of\nthe control of a guilty conscience over both mind and body, when the\nmemory, alive to certain terrible facts, plays fantastic tricks with\nitself, and mingles delusions with realities. As she approaches, with\nthe taper in her hand, she performs an action which the gentlewoman\nsays she has repeatedly seen her go through, for a quarter of an hour\nat a time, endeavoring to rub a spot of blood off from one of her\nhands. Her hands have been clean, physically, since the time when she\nfirst washed them on the fatal night; but the delusion that is upon her\nis that there is blood on them still. She goes on rubbing them, and her\nfirst exclamation is, \"Out, damned spot! out, I say!\" Yet it will not\nout. That little hand wears what she imagines to be an indelible stain.\nAfter her first exclamation, the memory rushes back to the moment\nbefore the murder. She thinks she hears, perhaps does hear, the clock\nstrike--\"one, two\"; and then, as if speaking to her husband, she says,\n\"Why, then 'tis time to do't.\" Then there is a pause, and out comes\nthe reflection, \"Hell is murky!\" This seems to indicate that darkness,\nin which she and her husband are whispering together just before\nthe murder, is a hell, and so very fit for what is about to be done.\nHell is murky, as this chamber is. Then she remembers her husband's\nreluctance, and fancying that she is still talking with him and\nbracing him up to the deed, she says: \"Fye, my lord, fye! a soldier,\nand afeard? What need we _fear_ who knows it, when none can call our\n_power_ to account?\" Presently she is looking back upon the deed, and\nexclaims, \"Yet who would have thought the old man to have had so much\nblood in him!\" Then she recurs to herself as if she were another: \"The\nthane of Fife had a wife; where is _she_ now?\" Again she thinks of her\nstained hands: \"What, will these hands _ne'er_ be clean?\" Are they to\nwear this horrible stain forever? Instantly she is again at the door\nof Duncan's chamber, speaking to her husband: \"No more o' that, my\nlord, no more o' that: you mar all with this starting!\" Then her hands\nagain, her poor hands; they _smell_ of the blood: \"Here's the smell\nof the blood still: all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this\nlittle hand! Oh, oh, oh!\" Then, after another pause, she is speaking\nto her husband, when the deed has been done: \"Wash your hands, put on\nyour night-gown; look not so pale!\" In another instant she is thinking\nof Banquo's murder, which occurred after Duncan's, and she says to her\nhusband: \"I tell you yet again, Banquo's _buried_; he can not come out\nof his _grave_!\" Once more she is back at the door of Duncan's chamber,\nin the darkness, and the murder has been committed. Speaking to her\nhusband, she says: \"To bed, to bed; there's knocking at the gate. Come,\ncome, come, come, give me your hand. What's done can not be undone. To\nbed, to bed, to bed!\" Then she goes quickly toward her chamber and to\nbed, believing that Macbeth is with her and that she is holding his\nhand.\n\nHow mixed, how wild, how fantastic, how coherent and incoherent are\nthese phantoms of the imagination! If she were awake, things would\nnot thus present themselves to her. Every event in the dreadful story\nwould stand in its true relations, and, however she might be suffering\nthe pangs of a guilty conscience, she would not mix up the scenes\nthrough which she had passed, but every fact would stand in its due\norder. She would be conscious that there was no blood upon her hands,\nand that they did not need the perfumes of Arabia to sweeten them.\nShe would know that Duncan had been murdered, and would not enact the\nmurder over again. She would remember that Banquo's murder had not been\ndistinctly made known to her, and that she had only surmised it, when\nat the banquet Macbeth fancied that the ghost of Banquo rose and sat\nat the table--an apparition which neither she nor any one else saw.\nBut, in that strange scene, it flashed across her mind that Banquo was\ndead, and to herself she interpreted truly what was passing in her\nhusband's mind, and instantly explained his conduct to the company as\nthe recurrence of an old malady to which he was subject.\n\nIf we go back to what had actually happened before the banquet, and\nthen go forward to the condition in which she is seen by the doctor and\nher attendant, we shall understand how her mind was working, not upon\na fact that she knew, but upon a fact which she had truly surmised.\nIn her somnambulistic state, she says to her husband: \"_I tell you\nyet again_, Banquo's buried; he can not come out of his grave.\" Had\nshe said this to him before? According to the course of the story, as\nthe text of the play gives it to us, she had not. In the second scene\nof the third act, where, after Duncan had been murdered and Macbeth\nhad become king, they are preparing for the banquet, to which Banquo\nwas expected as one of the guests, Macbeth and his wife are talking\ntogether, and she is trying to get him out of the contemplative and\nconscience-stricken mood in which he looks back upon what they have\ndone. He concludes one of his mixed and melancholy reflections with\nthese words:\n\n                Duncan is in his grave;\n    After life's fitful fever he sleeps well;\n    Treason has done his worst: nor steel, nor poison,\n    Malice domestic, foreign levy, nothing\n    Can touch him further!\n\nThen she says to him:\n\n   _Lady Macbeth._ Come on;\n  Gentle my lord, sleek o'er your rugged looks;\n  Be bright and jovial 'mong your guests to-night.\n\n   _Macbeth._ So shall I, love; and so, I pray, be you;\n  Let your remembrance apply to _Banquo_;\n  _Present him eminence_,[147] _both with eye and tongue_:\n  Unsafe the while, that we\n  Must lave our honors in these flattering streams;\n  And make our faces vizards to our hearts,\n  Disguising what they are.\n\nJust at this moment, therefore, he is not thinking of killing Banquo,\nbut wishes him to be received with all honor. But, in answer to his\nlast reflection on the hypocritical part that they must act, she says\nto him:\n\n  You must leave this.\n\nThen bursts forth the terrific oppression of his soul:\n\n   _Macb._ Oh, full of scorpions is my mind, dear wife!\n  Thou know'st that Banquo, and his Fleance, _lives_.\n   _Lady M._ _But in them nature's copy's not eterne._[148]\n   _Macb._ There's comfort yet; they _are_ assailable;\n  Then be thou jocund: ere the bat hath flown\n  His cloistered flight; ere, to black Hecate's summons,\n  The shard-borne beetle, with his drowsy hums,\n  Hath rung night's yawning peal, there shall be done\n  A deed of dreadful note!\n\nShe affects not to understand him--perhaps does not--and she asks:\n\n  _What's_ to be done?\n   _Macb._ Be innocent of the _knowledge_, dearest chuck,\n  Till thou applaud the _deed_. Come, seeling night,\n  Skarf up the tender eye of pitiful day;\n  And, with thy bloody and invisible hand,\n  Cancel, and tear to pieces, that great bond\n  Which keeps me pale!--Light thickens; and the crow\n  Makes wing to the rooky wood;\n  Good things of day begin to droop and drowse;\n  While night's black agents to their prey do rouse.\n  Thou marvel'st at my words: but hold thee still;\n  Things bad begun make strong themselves by ill:\n  So, prithee, go with me.                     [_Exeunt._\n\nIn the next scene, the murderers, previously engaged by Macbeth,\nwaylay Banquo in the park as he is approaching the castle, and kill\nhim, his son Fleance and a servant escaping. Then follows the banquet,\nMacbeth himself moving about at first, and then he takes a seat at\nthe table lower down. One of the murderers comes in and whispers to\nhim what has been done. The stage direction is, \"The ghost of Banquo\nrises and sits in Macbeth's place.\" As no one at the table but Macbeth\nsees this apparition, it might be inferred that it is the force of\nhis imagination which presents the spectacle to him, as Lady Macbeth\nsupposes, when she says to him:\n\n                        O proper stuff!\n    This is the very painting of your fear:\n    This is the air-drawn dagger, which, you said,\n    Led you to Duncan.\n\nBut the stage direction must be taken as a literal appearance of the\nghost, so as to make it visible to the audience, while it is invisible\nto all at the table excepting Macbeth himself.\n\nIf, now, we go forward to the night when Lady Macbeth is walking in her\nsleep, and remember what had occurred previous to and at the banquet,\nwe see how, without any actual previous knowledge that her husband\nintended to have Banquo killed, and with only the surmise that he had\nbeen killed, which comes to her at the banquet, she came to say to her\nhusband, in her dream:\n\n  I tell you yet again, Banquo's buried; he can not come out of his grave.\n\nHere we have a fact lodged in the mind during the waking hours, and\nin sleep wrought into a strange mixture with the killing of Duncan,\nwith which it had in reality no connection, having transpired\nafterward. This is very strong proof of the capacity of the mind to\nact during sleep without the action of the brain. The mind of the\nguilty sleep-walker is filled with horrible memories, which it can not\nshut out, but with which it can not deal in their actual order and\ntrue relations, because the sequences of thought, during sleep, are\nabnormal. Those whose experience has never involved any such workings\nof conscience are perfectly aware of the fact that in dreams ideas\nthat are separately lodged in the consciousness become entangled with\neach other in the most fantastic manner. Lady Macbeth at one moment\neven thinks of herself as if she were some one else, and asks, Where\nis the woman now who was the wife of the thane of Fife? Every one has\nexperienced in sleep the same projection of one's self out of one's own\nconsciousness; so that we seem to be contemplating ourselves as if we\nwere a different person.\n\nThe phenomena that occur during the delirium of fever, where the\nnormal consciousness is lost for the time being, are in some respects\nanalogous to and in some respects different from those which occur\nduring the somnambulistic condition. Delirium occurs when the body\nand the brain are not in the condition of sleep; but the senses of\nperception convey false impressions to the mind, and the mind itself\nhas temporarily lost its power of correcting its own action by its\nformer experience. The nearest friends who are around the bedside\nare not recognized by the sufferer; they appear to be strangers,\nand the patient talks to them as if both they and he were not their\nreal selves. It would seem that we can safely infer from the state\nof delirium a suspension of the direct and normal connection between\nthe brain and the mind; that neither of them can act, in relation to\nthe other, as they both act when there is no such disturbance: but\nthat this condition, so far from proving or tending to prove that the\nmind is not an independent spiritual existence, has a strong tendency\nto prove that it is. Insanity, on the other hand, is probably a\nderangement of the mental organism akin to derangement of the physical\norganism, but not necessarily connected with or induced by the latter,\nfor the bodily health of the insane is often entirely sound while\nthe mind is in an entirely unsound and irrational condition. But the\nphenomena of insanity are too various and multiform, and too much\ndependent on both physical and moral causes, to afford any satisfactory\nproofs of the postulate which I propound in this essay. The safest\nline of investigation is that which I suggested in the first instance,\nnamely, to regard the mind as an organism, and to ascertain whether\nit is susceptible of anatomical examination in a sense analogous\nto anatomical examination of the bodily organism. All that I have\nhitherto said is useful by way of preliminary illustration of my main\nhypothesis. It has a strong tendency to show that the mind, instead\nof consisting, as some philosophers now suppose, of the products of\na material organism, is itself an organized being with a definite\nstructure and capable of living a life of its own, although at present\ndwelling in a corporeal organism which affects it in various ways\nwhile the connection lasts. The theory that all mental phenomena are\nproducts of our corporeal organism is one that appears to derive\ngreat support from examinations of the structure of the brain and of\nthe whole nervous system. The physical anatomy of man exhibits very\nstriking illustrations of the influence of corporeal changes upon the\nmental state, as the mental changes show corresponding influences upon\nthe corporeal state. But, then, there are undoubtedly phenomena that\nare purely and exclusively mental; and therefore when we undertake to\nsolve these mental phenomena by the materialistic hypothesis we find a\nsense of inadequate causation confronting us so directly that we are\ncompelled to look for a solution elsewhere. It is certain that things\ntake place in the inner recesses of our minds, in the production of\nwhich the bodily senses not only render no aid, but in which they\nhave no part whatever. It is necessary, therefore, to carry our\ninvestigations into a class of mental phenomena in which all physical\ncausation ceases to afford an adequate guide to a conclusion.\n\nIt will not be denied that the products of material organisms can be\nproved to consist of matter and of nothing else. Their presence can\nbe detected by some physical test. For example, if it be true that\nall animals have been evolved from protoplasm, the organisms are\nsimply changes in the form of a certain portion of matter. If, in an\nindividual organism having a highly developed nervous structure, there\nare actions produced by an excitation of the nerves of sensation,\nthose actions are simply molecular changes in the matter comprising\nthe sensitive and easily moved substance of the nerve-fibers. However\nfar and into whatever minuti\u00e6 we carry our investigations into\norganized matter, we find that its products remain material, and that\nthey consist only of changes in the material substance of a material\norganization. But, when we pass from such material products into\nthe domain of purely mental phenomena, are we warranted in saying\nthat, although the latter are not, properly speaking, _products_ of\nthe material organization, they are _effects_ corresponding to and\ndependent upon the excitation of the nerves of sensation? This last\nhypothesis must assume one of two things: either that there is a\ndistinction between those corporeal feelings which do not and those\nwhich do produce mental changes or mental effects, or, if there are\ncorporeal feelings which produce corresponding mental states and\nmental action, there must be a something on which the effects can\nbe wrought, and this something must be an independent organism. It\nis doubtless true that there are many corporeal feelings which are\nfollowed by no very important mental effects, especially during a\nsound state of bodily health. But it is equally true that, if there\nare corporeal feelings which influence our mental action, there must\nbe an organism which is capable of being so influenced; and our\nexperience and consciousness teach us that there is such a difference\nbetween corporeal feelings and mental phenomena that the probability\nof a difference in the originating causes becomes very great. We know\nthat the mind can and does act with great force when bodily suffering\nis extreme; that it has an energy of its own which enables it to rise\nabove all the power of physical pain to restrain or influence it. I\nmust therefore follow out, as I had originally projected, my anatomical\nanalysis of the mind as an independent spiritual organism.\n\nIn order to arrive at a correct conclusion concerning the structure\nof mind, we must first observe that there are four special corporeal\norgans by which the capability of the mind to receive impressions\nfrom matter is acted upon. It is through these means that the\nproperties of matter, or those properties which can make themselves\nknown to us, become known to us. The senses, as they are usually\ncalled, are sight, hearing, smell, and taste. The external organ of\neach of these senses is furnished with a set of nerves, the function\nof which is to transmit from that organ a wave of molecular motion\nalong the fluid or semi-fluid substance inclosed in the nerve-tubes\nto the great nerve-center the brain, the central recipient of all\nsuch motions. Such, at least, is the theory, which may be accepted\nas a fact. But, then, the question remains, What is the intellectual\nperception or mental cognition of the idea suggested by one of these\nsupposed transmissions of a wave of molecular motion? Is there a\nbeing, a person, a spiritual entity, conceiving the idea or having an\nintellectual perception of it? Or is there no such being, and while we\nattribute to the office of the nervous system the function of producing\ncertain feelings or sensations in the brain, do these sensations or\nfeelings constitute all that there is of consciousness?\n\nIt is impossible for me to conceive of consciousness as anything but an\nintuitive sense of his own existence, experienced by a being capable of\nsuch an experience, because endowed with such a faculty. It is certain\nthat when we so regard consciousness we are not deceiving ourselves;\nfor if any one will consider what would happen to him if he should\nlose this faculty of being sensible of his own existence, he will see\nthat in the event of that loss he could neither distinguish himself\nfrom other persons, nor have any control over his own actions, or any\ncognition whatever. For this reason, the theory on which I made some\ncriticisms in one of our late conversations is the one with which\nI contrast my conception of mind. If that theory fails to satisfy\na reflecting person in regard to the nature of consciousness, as\ncertified to him by his own experience, the hypothesis that the mind is\nan extended and organized being, of which a conception can be formed,\nand not an unextended and unorganized something of which no conception\ncan be formed, must be accepted as the alternative.\n\nI explained in our former discussion my understanding of Mr. Spencer's\ntheory of the only _ego_ that can be scientifically recognized; and,\nin order to encounter it by my own hypothesis, I will here restate its\nsubstantial position in a condensed form.\n\nBy the _ego_ of which he treats, I understand him to mean all that\nwe can arrive at by an analysis of what takes place in the body\nand its functions, and of \"what is given in consciousness.\" This\nphrase--\"what is given in consciousness\"--reveals to us his purpose to\nreduce consciousness from a self-conviction and cognition of one's own\nexistence to a mere passing group of feelings, which constitute \"the\never-changing states of consciousness\" that we \"_call_ mind.\" So that,\nwhen we speak of mind, we mean and can mean nothing more than certain\nstates of feeling produced in our brains by perpetually changing\nimpressions. We do not and can not mean that there is a person who\nperceives and holds ideas suggested by external objects through the\naction of his nervous system. All that we know about any _ego_, any\nmental I, is that there is a physical structure, pervaded by certain\nphysical forces, that produce \"consecutive states,\" which Mr. Spencer\ncalls \"mental _states_\"; and the aggregate of the feelings and ideas\nwhich thus constitute the _mental states_ is the only _ego_ of which\nany continued existence can be predicated. But even these aggregates of\nfeelings and ideas have, according to this philosopher, no principle\nof cohesion holding them together as a whole; and, therefore, all\nthat we can assume as having any continuously surviving and durable\nexistence is the changing _states_ produced by the action through us\nof a certain unknowable power, statically conditioned in our nervous\norganism, which is pervaded by a dynamically conditioned portion of\nthat unknowable power which is operating everywhere in nature, and is\ncalled \"energy.\"[149]\n\nSo far as this theory is based upon the existence of a physical\norganism, whose functions liberate from the food supplied to it certain\nforces, which are distributed by the activities of the organism, we may\naccept it as a statement of what actually takes place in the form of\nphysical phenomena. But when we follow the physical phenomena of the\ndiffused energy into its action upon the brain, by the transmission\nof an impulse, we must stop with the effect of that impulse upon a\ncorporeal organ, or we must go further and find a something which\nreceives into itself and appropriates to itself the idea the elements\nof which the impulse has transmitted. The presence of that something\nin ourselves may be illustrated by its absence from a mechanism in\nwhich we know that it does not exist, but which appears superficially\nto be animated by an intelligent principle possessing volition. We\nstand, for example, before one of those automatic machines which\nperform actions that seem to be guided by a living spirit. They are\nmere physical organisms, constructed without the principle of life\nthat inhabits animal organisms, but they are so admirably contrived\nfor the production of certain limited but complex movements that they\nsuggest the presence of a spiritual being acting as we ourselves act.\nBut the least reflection upon what we see makes us aware that there is\nnothing before us but a mechanical organism, in which the artisan who\nmade it has availed himself of certain forces of nature and properties\nof matter, whereby he uses a portion of the energy that pervades the\nuniverse. There is nothing within the machine to which this energy\ncommunicates ideas that are to be the subject of its future voluntary\noperation. All is comprehended in a fixed mechanical operation of\ncertain machinery, and, when we have analyzed and understood the\nphysical phenomena, we can follow them no further, because there is\nno translation of the physical energy into mental phenomena. But in\nourselves there is such a translation, and we must follow it into the\nmental phenomena. So following it, we find ourselves in the presence\nof a something which has a self-conscious individuality, and which, by\na mysterious bond of connection, is so united with a physical organism\nthat it is capable of receiving, appropriating, and preserving the\nideas which the physical organism was designed to produce in it.\n\nMy objection to Mr. Spencer's system of psychology may be summed up in\nwhat I shall now say upon his chief position, which is that \"an idea\nis the psychical side of what, on its physical side, is an involved\nset of molecular changes, propagated through an involved set of\nnervous plexuses.\" Translated into what I take to be his meaning, the\nassertion, or hypothesis, is this: An idea is the mental cognition of\nan external object, as, for example, a tree. When we are looking at\nor thinking of a tree, we have a mental cognition of a tree; and this\nidea of a tree is said to be the psychical side of that which on its\nphysical side has been transmitted to our brain by molecular changes\nthrough our visual nerves. The idea of the tree is the psychical\ncorrelative of a wave of molecular motion diffused through our organs\nof vision; and the conception of a tree thus becomes a possible\nconception. But why did not the learned philosopher follow the wave\nof molecular motion until he found the impression of the object which\nthe visual organs have transmitted to the brain, or the nerve-center,\ntranslated into a thought by an intelligent being, capable, by its own\norganization, of having that thought? Why does he speak of an idea\nas the psychical side of what, on its physical side, is one and the\nsame thing? Obviously, because he meant to ignore the psychical or\nmental existence as an independent existence, or as any existence at\nall. Now, there is no way in which the psychical side and the physical\nside can be bridged over, excepting by the hypothesis that the mind\nis an entity of a peculiar nature, different in structure from the\nbodily organism, but capable, by the connection between them, of\nreceiving and transmuting into thought the impressions which the waves\nof molecular motion transmit to the brain from the external object.\nTo say that the set of plexuses, or networks, which hold together\nthe waves of molecular motion, constitute the potentiality of the\nidea and make possible future ideas like it, explains nothing. The\npotentiality of the idea, or the possibility of ideas like it, depends\nupon the existence of a something which is capable of conceiving\nthe idea, holding it, and reproducing it to itself, after the waves\nof molecular motion cease. I call this a process of translation, or\ntransmutation, because there is no other convenient term for it. It is\na process analogous to the physical assimilation of food by the organs\nof physical digestion, with this difference, however, that the action\nof the mental organism in the assimilation of ideas is the action of\na spiritual and intellectual organism upon materials that are brought\nwithin its reach by the means of communication with the external world\nafforded by the physical senses and the nervous system. The image of\nthe tree produced upon the retina of the eye by the lines of light\nthat proceed from every point of that object is the food which the\nmind assimilates and transmutes into the idea of the tree; and this\nmay remain as a permanent mental perception or cognition, although\nthe object itself may have been seen but once. If seen many times,\nthe various aspects in which it has been seen are transmuted into so\nmany distinct ideas. If many kinds of trees, of different shapes\nand dimensions, have been seen, the varieties become a part of our\nconsciousness in the several degrees of their precise resemblances\nand differences which we happen to have observed, when the different\nimpressions were produced upon the retina. Can there be any doubt that\nthis is the process by which the infant begins to acquire ideas of\nexternal objects, and that, as adolescence goes on and the powers of\nsense expand with the growth and exercise of the physical organs, there\nis a corresponding growth and expansion of the mental powers?\n\nThis hypothesis of the progress of mental growth, _paris passibus_ with\nthe growth of the physical organism, brings me to the consideration of\none of those specimens of Mr. Spencer's peculiar logic, in a passage\nin which he undertakes to disprove the existence of mind as anything\nmore than what he calls the psychical side of physical impressions. He\nis treating of the impossibility of our \"knowing\" anything about the\nsubstance of mind; and he propounds this impossibility in the following\nlogical formula:\n\n ...To know anything is to distinguish it as such or such--to class\n it as of this or that order. An object is said to be but little\n known when it is alien to objects of which we have had experience;\n and it is said to be well known when there is great community of\n attributes between it and objects of which we have had experience.\n Hence, by implication, an object is completely known when this\n recognized community is complete; and completely unknown when there\n is no recognized community at all. Manifestly, then, the smallest\n conceivable degree of knowledge implies at least two things between\n which some community is recognized. But, if so, how can we know the\n substance of mind? To know the substance of mind is to be conscious\n of some community between it and some other substance. If, with\n the idealist, we say that there exists no other substance, then,\n necessarily, as there is nothing with which the substance of mind can\n be even compared, much less assimilated, it remains unknown; while, if\n we hold with the realist that being is fundamentally divisible into\n that which is present to us as mind, and that which, lying outside of\n it, is not mind, then, as this proposition itself asserts a difference\n and not a likeness, it is equally clear that mind remains unclassable\n and therefore unknowable.\n\nThe answer to this supposed insuperable dilemma may be made by\ndetermining what we mean when we speak of knowing a thing. Definition\nof knowing is here essential, and the first inquiry we have to make\nis whether, in order to know mind, it is necessary to find and\nrecognize some community between the substance of mind and some other\nsubstance? The statement is, on the one hand, that there exists no\nother substance with which the substance of mind can be compared, much\nless assimilated, and therefore there is no aid to be derived from\nresemblance; or, on the other hand, that, if being is fundamentally\ndivisible into something which is mind and something which is not\nmind, we depend for a knowledge of mind on a difference, and not on a\nlikeness, and we have no means of knowing that difference. Upon either\nproposition, mind remains unclassable and therefore unknowable.\n\nIt may be conceded that our knowledge of the properties and forms of\nmatter consists in recognizing a community or a difference between\nthings which belong to the same class, so that there is a comparison\nbetween things which are of the same substance. But what is to prevent\nus from classifying the substance of mind, when the fundamental idea\nof its substance is that it is something which resembles no other\nsubstance, but constitutes a class or description of being that stands\nentirely by itself, and in which, for a knowledge of its properties we\ndistinguish its properties from those of any other substance? The only\ndifficulty that arises here springs from the fact that we have but one\nword--substance--by which to speak of the two existences that we call\nmind and matter; just as we can only speak of an organism when we speak\nof the natural body and the spiritual body. But this use of the same\nterm to express things which in our consciousness stand fundamentally\nopposed to each other does not prevent us from discriminating between\nthe means by which we become conscious of the two things, or from\nclassifying the knowledge which we have of mind as something distinct\nfrom the knowledge which we have of matter.\n\nWe must discriminate between the means by which the properties of\nmatter become known to us and the means by which the properties of\nmind become known to us. In both cases there is knowledge, but it is\nknowledge of a different kind; it is obtained by different means;\nand we must therefore recognize a fundamental difference between\nthe substance of mind and the substance of matter. It is true that\nour knowledge of the properties of matter and our knowledge of the\nproperties of mind are alike in this, that in both cases it is\nknowledge by one and the same person; but the distinction is that, in\nthe one case, I have knowledge of objects external to myself, and, in\nthe other case, I have knowledge of myself as the person possessing\nknowledge of external objects. The knowledge that we have of ourselves\nis what most persons mean by consciousness, and it is what we should\nscientifically understand by that term, although consciousness is\noften used as synonymous with mental cognition of things external to\nourselves, and as cognition of ourselves also.\n\nI shall now quote from the chapter in which Mr. Spencer makes a special\nsynthesis of reason, and in which he denies the existence of the\ncommonly assumed _hiatus_ between reason and instinct, maintaining that\nthe former is the continuation of the latter, because, as he thinks,\nthe highest forms of psychical activity arise little by little out of\nthe lowest and can not be separated from them. The passage which I\nshall now analyze is this:\n\n\"Here seems to be the fittest place for pointing out how the general\ndoctrine that has been developed supplies a reconciliation between the\nexperience-hypothesis as commonly interpreted and the hypothesis which\nthe transcendentalists oppose to it.\n\n\"The universal law, that, other things equal, the cohesion of psychical\nstates is proportionate to the frequency with which they have followed\none another in experience, supplies an explanation of the so-called\n'forms of thought,' as soon as it is supplemented by the law that\nhabitual psychical successions entail some hereditary tendency to such\nsuccessions, which, under persistent conditions, will become cumulative\nin generation after generation. We saw that the establishment of those\ncompound reflex actions called instincts is comprehensible on the\nprinciple that inner relations are, by perpetual repetition, organized\ninto correspondence with outer relations. We have now to observe that\nthe establishment of those consolidated, those indissoluble, those\ninstinctive mental relations constituting our ideas of space and time,\nis comprehensible on the same principle.\n\n\"For, if, even to external relations that are often experienced\nduring the life of a single organism, answering internal relations\nare established that become next to automatic--if such a combination\nof psychical changes as that which guides a savage in hitting a bird\nwith an arrow becomes, by constant repetition, so organized as to\nbe performed almost without thought of the processes of adjustment\ngone through--and if skill of this kind is so far transmissible that\nparticular races of men become characterized by particular aptitudes,\nwhich are nothing else than partially organized psychical connections;\nthen, if there exist certain external relations which are experienced\nby all organisms at all instants of their waking lives--relations\nwhich are absolutely constant, absolutely universal--there will\nbe established answering internal relations that are absolutely\nconstant, absolutely universal. Such relations we have in those of\nspace and time. The organization of subjective relations adjusted to\nthese objective relations has been cumulative, not in each race of\ncreatures only, but throughout successive races of creatures; and such\nsubjective relations have, therefore, become more consolidated than\nall others. Being experienced in every perception and every action of\neach creature, these connections among outer existences must, for this\nreason, too, be responded to by connections among inner feelings that\nare, above all others, indissoluble. As the substrata of all other\nrelations in the _non-ego_, they must be responded to by conceptions\nthat are the substrata of all other relations in the _ego_. Being the\nconstant and infinitely repeated elements of thought, they must become\nthe automatic elements of thought--the elements of thought which it is\nimpossible to get rid of--the 'forms of intuition.'\n\n\"Such, it seems to me, is the only possible reconciliation between the\nexperience-hypothesis and the hypothesis of the transcendentalists,\nneither of which is tenable by itself. Insurmountable difficulties\nare presented by the Kantian doctrine (as we shall hereafter see);\nand the antagonist doctrine, taken alone, presents difficulties that\nare equally insurmountable. To rest with the unqualified assertion\nthat, antecedent to experience, the mind is a blank, is to ignore the\nquestions: Whence comes the power of organizing experiences? Whence\narise the different degrees of that power possessed by different races\nof organisms, and different individuals of the same race? If, at birth,\nthere exists nothing but a passive receptivity of impressions, why\nis not a horse as educable as a man? Should it be said that language\nmakes the difference, then why do not the cat and the dog, reared in\nthe same household, arrive at equal degrees and kinds of intelligence?\nUnderstood in its current form, the experience-hypothesis implies\nthat the presence of a definitely organized nervous system is a\ncircumstance of no moment--a fact not needing to be taken into account!\nYet it is the all-important fact--the fact to which, in one sense, the\ncriticisms of Leibnitz and others pointed--the fact without which an\nassimilation of experiences is inexplicable.\n\n\"Throughout the animal kingdom in general the actions are dependent\non the nervous structure. The physiologist shows us that each reflex\nmovement implies the agency of certain nerves and ganglia; that a\ndevelopment of complicated instincts is accompanied by complication\nof the nervous centers and their commissural connections; that the\nsame creature in different stages, as larva and imago, for example,\nchanges its instincts as its nervous structure changes; and that,\nas we advance to creatures of high intelligence, a vast increase in\nthe size and in the complexity of the nervous system takes place.\nWhat is the obvious inference? It is that the ability to co-ordinate\nimpressions and to perform the appropriate actions always implies\nthe pre-existence of certain nerves arranged in a certain way. What\nis the meaning of the human brain? It is that the many _established_\nrelations among its parts stand for so many _established_ relations\namong the psychical changes. Each of the constant connections among\nthe fibers of the cerebral masses answers to some constant connection\nof phenomena in the experiences of the race. Just as the organized\narrangement subsisting between the sensory nerves of the nostrils and\nthe motor nerves of the respiratory muscles not only makes possible a\nsneeze, but also, in the newly born infant, implies sneezings to be\nhereafter performed, so, all the organized arrangements subsisting\namong the nerves of the infant's brain not only make possible certain\ncombinations of impressions, but also imply that such combinations\nwill hereafter be made, imply that there are answering combinations in\nthe outer world, imply a preparedness to cognize these combinations,\nimply faculties of comprehending them. It is true that the resulting\ncompound psychical changes do not take place with the same readiness\nand automatic precision as the simple reflex action instanced; it is\ntrue that some individual experiences seem required to establish them.\nBut, while this is partly due to the fact that these combinations are\nhighly involved, extremely varied in their modes of occurrence, made\nup, therefore, of psychical relations less completely coherent, and\nhence need further repetitions to perfect them, it is in a much greater\ndegree due to the fact that at birth the organization of the brain is\nincomplete, and does not cease its spontaneous progress for twenty or\nthirty years afterward. Those who contend that knowledge results wholly\nfrom the experiences of the individual, ignoring as they do the mental\nevolution which accompanies the autogenous development of the nervous\nsystem, fall into an error as great as if they were to ascribe all\nbodily growth and structure to exercise, forgetting the innate tendency\nto assume the adult form. Were the infant born with a full-sized and\ncompletely constructed brain, their position would be less untenable.\nBut, as the case stands, the gradually increasing intelligence\ndisplayed throughout childhood and youth is more attributable to\nthe completion of the cerebral organization than to the individual\nexperiences--a truth proved by the fact that in adult life there is\nsometimes displayed a high endowment of some faculty which, during\neducation, was never brought into play. Doubtless, experiences received\nby the individual furnish the concrete materials for all thought.\nDoubtless, the organized and semi-organized arrangements existing\namong the cerebral nerves can give no knowledge until there has been\na presentation of the external relations to which they correspond.\nAnd, doubtless, the child's daily observations and reasonings aid the\nformation of those involved nervous connections that are in process of\nspontaneous evolution, just as its daily gambols aid the development\nof its limbs. But saying this is quite a different thing from saying\nthat its intelligence is wholly _produced_ by its experiences. That is\nan utterly inadmissible doctrine--a doctrine which makes the presence\nof a brain meaningless--a doctrine which makes idiocy unaccountable.\n\n\"In the sense, then, that there exist in the nervous system certain\npre-established relations answering to relations in the environment,\nthere is truth in the doctrine of 'forms of intuition'--not the truth\nwhich its defenders suppose, but a parallel truth. Corresponding to\nabsolute external relations, there are established in the structure\nof the nervous system absolute internal relations--relations that are\npotentially present before birth in the shape of definite nervous\nconnections, that are antecedent to, and independent of, individual\nexperiences, and that are automatically disclosed along with the first\ncognitions. And, as here understood, it is not only these fundamental\nrelations which are thus predetermined, but also hosts of other\nrelations of a more or less constant kind, which are congenitally\nrepresented by more or less complete nervous connections. But these\npredetermined internal relations, though independent of the experiences\nof the individual, are not independent of experiences in general: they\nhave been determined by the experiences of preceding organisms. The\ncorollary here drawn from the general argument is that the human brain\nis an organized register of infinitely numerous experiences received\nduring the evolution of life, or, rather, during the evolution of that\nseries of organisms through which the human organism has been reached.\nThe effects of the most uniform and frequent of these experiences have\nbeen successively bequeathed, principal and interest; and have slowly\namounted to that high intelligence which lies latent in the brain\nof the infant--which the infant in after-life exercises and perhaps\nstrengthens or further complicates, and which, with minute additions,\nit bequeaths to future generations; and thus it happens that the\nEuropean inherits from twenty to thirty cubic inches more brain than\nthe Papuan. Thus it happens that faculties, as of music, which scarcely\nexist in some inferior human races, become congenital in superior ones.\nThus it happens that out of savages unable to count up to the number of\ntheir fingers, and speaking a language containing only nouns and verbs,\narise at length our Newtons and Shakespeares.\"[150]\n\nThe learned philosopher has here dealt with two hypotheses, neither\nof which he considers tenable by itself. The first is that the\nindividual mind, anterior to experience, is a blank; that at birth\nthere exists nothing but a passive receptivity of impressions, which\nbecome organized into intelligence by experience. The other hypothesis\nis that of the transcendental school, which attributes the growth of\nintelligence wholly to implanted intuitions, which become expanded by\nthe increase of mental power. His argument is put thus: If at birth the\nmind of the individual is a blank, and it becomes capable of thought\nor possessed of intelligence by experience, beginning with a passive\nreceptivity of impressions, and going on to their organization into\nintelligence by the repetition of experiences and their increasing\ncomplexity--why, he asks, is not a horse as educable as a man? Why\ndo not the cat and the dog, reared in the same household and hearing\nhuman beings use language every moment of their lives, arrive at equal\ndegrees and kinds of intelligence? In the first place, as a matter\nof fact, many animals are educable beyond their natural capacity of\nintelligence, or beyond the point at which they would arrive without\nsuch education, to a very remarkable degree. I have heard a credible\ndescription of a dog which would ascend to a chamber and bring down\nan article that he had been told to bring. Many repetitions of the\ncommand and the performance had taught the animal to associate the\nname of the article which he was to bring down with the act which he\nwas to perform. While I am writing, a bear beneath my window is going\nthrough performances, at the word of command, of very considerable\nvarieties; actions which he would not do if he had not been trained\nto do them. The trained war-horse knows the meaning of the different\nairs played on the bugle upon the battle-field or the parade-ground,\nand instantly charges or wheels about, without waiting to be prompted\nby the bit or the spur. Insects can be trained, to some extent, in the\nsame way; birds to a much greater extent. Is the explanation of these\ncapacities to be found in a definitely organized nervous system as the\nall-important fact without which an assimilation of experiences is\ninexplicable? Grant that, as we advance from creatures of very low to\ncreatures of very high intelligence, we find a vast increase in the\nsize and complexity of the nervous system taking place through the\nseries, until we arrive at its highest and most complex development\nin man. What is the hypothesis which explains the difference in\nmental power between man and all the other creatures below him in the\ncapability of co-ordinating impressions and performing the appropriate\nactions? It is, according to Mr. Spencer, that the capability implies\nthe existence of certain nerves arranged in a certain way; that where\nthis arrangement does not exist the capability is not found; and where\nit exists in only a low degree the capability exists only in the same\ndegree. As two parallel and concurring facts these may be conceded. But\nwhy are not these facts entirely consistent with another hypothesis,\nnamely, that to each creature, along with its specially organized\nnervous system, there has been given by divine appointment a certain\ndegree of innate mental power, to explain which we must follow the\nimpressions produced in the nervous system into their transmutation\ninto intelligence, until we arrive at the limit of that intelligence?\nMr. Spencer's answer to this inquiry is twofold: first, that the\nexperience-hypothesis, in the case of the individual creature, or the\nconstant repetition of the impressions and the appropriate actions, is\ninsufficient to account for what takes place, without recognizing the\nfact that the actions are dependent on the nervous structure, without\nwhich the impressions would not be followed by the actions; second,\nthat the nervous structure in the different races of animals has come\nto be what it is in each race by gradual modifications and increments\nthrough the process of evolution of organisms out of one another, and\nthat these accumulations have resulted in the human brain, which has\nthe highest power of co-ordinating the impressions and performing the\nappropriate actions. Then he puts, with an air of final solution, the\nquestion, \"What is the human brain?\" which he answers in his own way.\n\nHis mode of answering this question is that the brain is an organ\nwith established relations among its parts, which stand for so many\nestablished relations among the psychical changes. I understand this\nto mean, that as the human brain, in the process of animal evolution,\nhas come to have certain constant connections among the fibers of the\ncerebral masses, each of these connections answers to some constant\nconnection of phenomena in the experiences of the race. His corollary\nis that the human brain is an organized register of infinitely numerous\nexperiences received by the race during the evolution of life, or\nduring the evolution of that series of organisms through which the\nhuman organism has been reached. Each infant of the human race, to\nwhom has descended this improved and perfect brain, has latent in that\norgan a high capacity for intelligence. This it begins to exercise and\nstrengthen and further complicate as life goes on, and at the end of\ntwenty or thirty years the individual brain is fully developed, and\nthis development, or capacity for development, the individual bequeaths\nwith minute additions, principal and interest, to future generations.\nIn different races of men the cubic bulk of the brain varies greatly,\naccording to the size transmitted from ancestors; and so certain\nfaculties which scarcely exist in some races become congenital in\nothers; and whereas the remote ancestors of all of us were savages,\nincapable even of conceiving of numbers, and possessing but the rudest\nelements of language, there have at length arisen our Newtons and\nShakespeares.\n\nThis hypothesis leads me to ask a question and to state a fact. The\nquestion is, What is it in the infant of the most developed and\ncultivated race that constitutes the high intelligence which is said\nto lie latent in his brain? In other words, is there nothing in that\ninfant, or in the adult which he becomes, but a brain and a nervous\nsystem of a highly organized and complex physical structure adapted\nto receive impressions on itself from without? Are the experiences\nwhich have been enjoyed by the progenitors of the human infant or by\npreceding organisms registered in his brain, and is his capacity of\nintelligence dependent on his having inherited the same or nearly the\nsame volume of brain as that which was possessed by his progenitors?\nAnd does the intelligence consist, in degree or in kind, in nothing\nbut a repetition of the same experiences as those through which his\nprogenitors were carried, or is there a something in him to which his\nindividual experiences contribute the mental food by which the mind is\nnourished and by the assimilation of which its individual intellectual\ngrowth becomes possible?\n\nIt is not necessary to question the fact that individuals of great\nintellect, the Newtons and the Shakespeares, have had or may have\nhad large brains; or the fact that, as between races of men, the\nmost intelligent have brains of greater cubic measure than the less\nintelligent. But it has not always been found that individuals of\nsuperior intellect have had comparatively larger brains than other\nindividuals, nor that those who have had very large brains have\ntransmitted them to their children. The important fact to which I meant\nto advert is that, since we have known much about the human brain and\nthe nervous system connected with it, it has not been found that, in\nits several parts and in the action of the nerves connected with it,\nit has been differently organized and acted upon in the lowest savages\nfrom what we know of it in the European and the most civilized races.\nThere is a difference in volume, but not in the organization or the\noffice of the brain in different races of men, as there is in different\nindividuals of the same race. The fact that all men, since they became\na completed type of animal, however they originated and became men,\nhave possessed a capacity to become in different degrees intelligent\nand thinking beings, points strongly to the conclusion that while in\neach individual there is a nervous system so organized as to transmit\nimpressions from external objects to the central physical organ called\nthe brain, there must be another existence in that individual, of a\nspiritual and intellectual nature, of a substance that is not physical,\nto which the brain supplies the materials of thought, thought being\nmental cognition of an idea. If I am asked for the proof of such an\nexistence, I answer that the proof is consciousness, as I define it,\nand this I conceive is the highest kind of proof.\n\nOne may appeal to the convictions of mankind for an answer to the\nquestion, What is the highest and most satisfactory kind of knowledge\nthat any of us possess? The most intelligent man may be mistaken in\nthat part of self-knowledge that relates to his own character or\nmotives. Others may see him very differently from the light in which\nhe sees himself, and they may be right and he may be wrong. He may\nthink, too, that he knows a great deal that he does not know; but no\nintelligent man is mistaken or in any way deluded when he believes in\nhis own existence. No man in his waking moments and in his right mind\never confounded his own identity, as we have seen that Lady Macbeth\ndid when she was walking in her sleep, with the identity of another\nperson. No man in his right mind loses the constant, ever-present\nsense of himself as a being and as one distinct from all other beings.\nThe reason is that his own existence is certified to him by the most\nunerring of witnesses, one who can not lie, because the fact of one's\nown existence is the fact of which that witness must speak. Of all\nother facts the witness may speak falsely. The mind can not speak\nfalsely when it speaks to us of our own existence, for the witness who\nspeaks and the person spoken to are one and the same. The falsehood, if\nthere could be a falsehood, would be instantly detected.\n\nAs the mind certifies to itself its own existence by the most direct\nand the highest kind of proof, so it certifies to itself the powers\nwith which it is endowed; and this brings me to the anatomical\nexamination of the structure of the mind. I shall not make this\nanalysis a very minute one, but shall confine it to those distinct\nelementary powers which are constituted by systems, as the powers of\nthe bodily organism are constituted by systems distinguishable by the\nfunctions which they perform. In the bodily organism we recognize the\ndigestive system, the system of circulation of the blood, the muscular\nsystem, the nervous system, the sensory system, which is distributed\ninto the different organs of sense, the male and female systems of\nsexual generation, and the female system of gestation. These several\nsystems, acting together as one complex mechanism endowed with the\nmysterious principle of life, form in each human being of either sex\nthe physical existence of the individual. Acting in each individual of\neither sex simultaneously and with mutual involved interdependencies,\nthey form a whole which, in its several parts and their functions, may\nbe likened to the several parts and functions in one of those machines\nwhich we ourselves construct--with this difference, however, that\nin one life is present and in the other it is not. The fundamental\nquestion is whether this complex animal mechanism, thus constituted\nof certain physical systems, also constitutes during this life the\nentire individual. If so, the individual existence is a unit, and, when\nthe physical organism perishes by what we call death, the individual\nexistence ceases. If, on the contrary, we have satisfactory proof\nthat there is, during this life, in each individual an organized and\nextended entity, composed, like the systems of the bodily organisms,\nof certain systems of its own but of a substance that is not material,\nthen the existence of each individual is a dual existence; and one of\nthe two existences now associated and acting together may be dissolved\ninto its original material elements, while the other, composed of a\ndifferent substance, may be indissoluble and have an endless life.\nThere is no middle ground that I can perceive between these two\nhypotheses. One or the other of them is absolutely true, independent of\nthe inquiry as to the mode in which mind came to exist; for after going\nthrough with all the reasoning and all the proofs that are supposed to\nshow its origin by the process called evolution, we must still come\nback to the question of what mind is after it has come into existence;\nmust determine on which side lies the preponderating probability of its\ncontinuance after the death of the body; and must accept the conclusion\nof its destruction or cessation when the body dies, or the other\nconclusion that it is unlike the body in its substance, and therefore\nindestructible by the means which destroy the body. For this reason we\nmust examine the mind for proof that it is an organism of a special\nnature because composed of a special substance, and this proof is to be\nreached by an analysis of the systems of which the mind is composed. I\nselect, of course, for the purposes of this analysis, any individual\nwhose physical and mental faculties have had the average development\ninto the condition that is called a sound mind in a sound body--_mens\nsana in corpore sano_. I shall treat incidentally of the condition of\nidiocy.\n\nWe may classify the distinct systems of the mind, with their several\nfunctions, as easily as we can classify the distinct systems of our\nphysical structure and their functions. I have seen the systems of\nthe mind distributed into five; and although I do not adopt the whole\nanalysis made by the writer to whom I refer, or make use of the same\nterminology, I shall follow his classification because it is one which\nany thinking person must recognize as a description of mental powers\nof which he is conscious.[151] We are all aware that we possess the\nfollowing mental systems in which inhere certain elementary powers that\nare mental powers:\n\n1. A sensory system, by which the mind takes impressions from matter.\n\n2. A system of intellectual faculties, such as reason, imagination,\nreflection, combination of ideas, discrimination between different\nideas.\n\n3. A system of emotions, or susceptibilities to pleasure or pain, of a\nmoral and intellectual nature as distinguished from the pleasurable or\npainful excitation of our nerves.\n\n4. A system of desires, which prompt us to wish for and acquire some\ngood, or to avoid some evil.\n\n5. A system of affections, which prompt us to like or dislike persons,\nthings, situations, and whatever is attractive or unattractive, as the\ncase may be.\n\nA little further analysis of each of these systems will explain why\nthey are respectively to be thus classified as distinguishable organic\npowers or functions of the human mind:\n\n_First._ The mind is placed as a recipient in correspondence with the\nmaterial universe through the nerves of sensation and the special\ncorporeal organs, whereby the properties of matter become to some\nextent known to us. As the power of the physical senses to obtain for\nus a knowledge of the properties of matter is limited, even when our\nsenses are in the utmost state of their normal capacity, there may be\nproperties of matter which will never become known to us in our present\nexistence. But certain of its properties do become known to us, and we\nare perfectly aware that this takes place through our physical organs\nof sense, which convey to our mental reception certain impressions.\nThis power of the mind, therefore, to receive such impressions, to\nretain and transmute them into thought, is to be recognized as a power\nexerted by means of an organic physical contrivance and an organic\nmental structure, the two acting together, the resultant being the\nmind's faculty for receiving ideas from the external world. Let us\nsuppose, then, that the bodily senses are impaired by the partial\ndestruction of their organs. It does not follow that the knowledge\nwhich has been derived from them, when they were in full activity,\nis destroyed; all that happens is that we acquire no more of such\nknowledge by the same means, or do not acquire it so readily and\ncompletely. If the destruction of the physical senses is so complete\nas it becomes when death of the whole body takes place, the materials\nderived from the impressions conveyed to the mind from external objects\nduring life have been transmuted into ideas and thoughts, and, as\nthat which holds the ideas and the thoughts is of a substance unlike\nin nature to the substance of the physical organs which conveyed the\nimpressions, the rational conclusion is that the ideas and thoughts\nwill continue to be held by it, after the dissolution of the body, as\nthey were held while the body was in full life.\n\n_Second._ I recognize in the mind a system of intellectual faculties.\nOf intellect, I should say that the ascertainment of truth is its\nprimary function; and hence I should say that the power of retaining\npermanent possession of truth already ascertained is the means by\nwhich we maintain continued ascertainment, or the utilization of\ntruth already ascertained.[152] For the exercise of this power of\nascertaining, holding, applying, and expressing truth--the processes\nof intellect--we have three recognized faculties. These are the\nintuitive faculty; the faculty of association or combination; and\nthe introspective faculty, or the capacity to look inward upon the\nprocesses of our own minds. The philosophers who maintain that all\nour knowledge is derived from experience admit neither the intuitive\nfaculty nor the fact of intuition. On the other hand, the philosophers\nwho maintain, as Mr. Spencer does, that the brain of every infant is\nan organized register of the experiences of his ancestors, do not\nallow of the existence of any intuitions as facts in the individual\nlife of the infant, because they regard the individual experiences\nof the infant as mere repetitions of former experiences that took\nplace in its progenitors. But rightly regarded the true meaning of\nthe intuitive faculty is this: that at the instant when a new sensory\nimpression is received by the infant, or the adult, there is an innate\nand implanted power which comes into play, by which is asserted the\nreality of that from which the sensory impression is received. This\npower, the intuitive faculty, is infallible. It was ordained as the\nmeans by which a sensory impression becomes to us a reality. We are so\nconstructed, mentally, that we must believe those primary facts which\nthe sensory impressions certify to us to be facts. On the veracity of\nthis certification we are absolutely dependent, because we can not\ncontradict the affirmations of reality which causation makes to our\nintuitive mental perceptions. On this veracity we risk our lives; we\ncould not be safe if we were not subjected to this belief. Intuition,\ntherefore, is something anterior to experience; it is that power by\nwhich the first experience and the last become to us the means of\nbelief in a reality. This is a power that can belong to and inhere\nin a spiritual organism alone. We must, therefore, recognize in the\ninfant this original implanted endowment, the capacity to be mentally\nconvinced of realities; and while, in order to meet the first exercise\nof this capacity there must be a physical organism which will conduct\nthe sensory impressions to the brain and a brain that will receive\nthem, the capacity of the infant to have its first conviction of the\nreality certified to it by the sensory impression is at once the\ncapacity of an intellectual being, and a necessity imposed upon him by\nthe law of his existence. Idiocy, when complete, is the absence of this\ncapacity, by reason of some failure of connection between the brain, as\nthe central recipient of sensory impressions, and the mind which should\nreceive and transmute those impressions into thought. We are scarcely\nwarranted in regarding the idiot as a human animal possessed of no mind\nwhatever. The absolute idiot should be defined as a human creature whom\nwe can not educate at all--in whom we can awaken no intelligence; but\nwe are not therefore authorized in believing that there is no provision\nwhatever for the development of intelligence after the mere physical\nlife of the body is ended. Absolute idiocy, or what, from our as yet\nimperfect means of developing intelligence in such unfortunate persons\nwe must regard as at present absolute, is probably very rare. Between\nhuman creatures so born and those vast multitudes in whom average\nintelligence is developed by surrounding influences, whatever they may\nbe, there are various degrees of the capacity for development; and what\nhappens in these intermediate cases proves that there are different\ndegrees in which the connection between the physical and the mental\norganism is established at birth, so that in some the connection may\nbe said to be abnormal and imperfect, while in the enormous majority\nit is at least so nearly normal and complete that intelligence may be\ndeveloped.\n\nHere, then, is the place to advert to Mr. Spencer's assertion that\nthe doctrine that intelligence in the human being is wholly produced\nby experience is utterly inadmissible; that it makes the presence\nof a brain meaningless, and idiocy unaccountable. A doctrine which\nimputes the development of intelligence _wholly_ to the experience of\nthe individual is of course untenable. There must be a brain and a\nnervous system; but we are not warranted, in the case of the idiot, in\nassuming that he has a differently organized brain and nervous system\nfrom those of his parents or others of the human race, as Mr. Spencer\nappears to me to assume. What we are warranted in believing is that\nwhile the brain and nervous system of the idiot child may be just\nas complete in his structure as in those of the parents, there has\nsomehow occurred, from some cause, antecedent in some cases to birth,\nbut operating after birth in other cases, a failure of the adequate\nconnection between the brain and the mind, so that intelligence can\nnot be developed at all, or can be developed but partially. The\nindividual may have inherited just as good an \"organized register\" of\nthe experience of his ancestors--just as good a natural brain as his\nbrothers and sisters who are perhaps highly intelligent from their\nbirth, or capable of becoming intelligent. Yet he lacks the ability\nto co-ordinate impressions and to perform the actions appropriate\nto those impressions, because there has failed to be established in\nhim the necessary connection between the impressions and the sensory\nintellectual system which constitutes one organic part of the mind. The\nexperiences, however often repeated, of the impressions produced by\nhis physical senses on his brain, remain there as corporeal feelings.\nThey reach no further. They do not become transmuted into ideas,\nand so intelligence can not be developed, or is developed but to a\nvery feeble extent. Instead of saying that \"the gradually increasing\nintelligence displayed throughout childhood is more attributable to\nthe completion of the cerebral organization than to the individual\nexperiences,\" I should say that it is most attributable to the presence\nof an established connection between the function of the cerebral\norganization and the mental receptivity of impressions, which is\nnot merely passive, but is incessantly active because incessantly\nreceiving, and that, where this connection is wanting, the receptivity,\nalthough it may exist, can not become active, and so intelligence\ncan not be developed in this life. But there may be another state of\nexistence, in which the mind of the idiot, no longer dependent on a\nphysical organization of brain and nervous system for the reception\nof ideas and for intellectual growth, but retaining its capacity for\nmental development, may begin and carry on such development by other\nmeans; whereas, if the brain and the nervous system constitute all\nthere is of any human being, whether born an idiot or born capable of\nintellectual growth through his individual experiences, he can have no\nfuture after that brain and nervous system are destroyed, unless we\nsuppose that mind is something that has been developed out of matter\ninto a spiritual existence--a supposition which is to me inconceivable.\n\nThe second of the intellectual faculties is the associative, or\nthat intuitive power by which ideas are combined and associated or\nheld in disjunction and separation. I regard this as an intuitive\nfaculty, because, as our observation teaches us, its presence and\npower, manifested at the first dawning of infantile intelligence, are\nattested by every exercise of the organs through which the external\nworld reaches our minds, to the last moment of our mortal existence.\nExperience is, of course, necessary to the first action of this\nintuitive faculty. This is only another way of saying that there must\noccur a sensory impression upon the brain which becomes transmuted\ninto the idea of the external object, and then a repetition of that\nimpression produces a repetition of the idea, and the associative\nfaculty combines or disjoins them. But unless there exists an intuitive\npower, inherent in the intellective system, whereby the first idea and\nthe second can be associated and compared, there can be no knowledge,\nno acquisition of truth, because the sensory impressions will stop\nin the brain as so many feelings excited through the nervous system,\ninstead of being transmuted into thought.\n\nThe introspective faculty, on the other hand, does not deal solely\nwith sensory impressions, or with the ideas which they have suggested.\nIt is that power of the mind by which it can look inward upon itself.\nThis is seemingly a paradox; but nevertheless, the existence of such a\nfaculty is a necessary hypothesis, not only because we are conscious\nof it, but because without it we could have no means of analyzing\nour own mental structure, although we could make some very partial\nanalysis of the mind of another individual by studying his actions. As\nregards ourselves, it is as if our visual organs possessed the power\nof looking at the process by which an image of an external object is\nimpressed upon the retina and is thence transmitted to the brain, where\nthe sensory impression is produced. This, of course, is a physical\nimpossibility. All we can do is to examine the physical structure of\nthe eye, with its wonderful provision of lenses and other means for\nthe reception and the effect of light, and to reason upon what we can\ndiscover that the process of what is called seeing must be thus or\nthus. But that process itself we can not see by the same organs by\nwhich it is carried on. In the case of the mind, however--and herein\nis one of the remarkable proofs of its unlikeness as an organism to\nthe bodily organism--there is a power to witness, to observe, to\nbe sensible of its own operations. This power, like all the other\nmental powers, may be very feeble in some individuals, for want of\nexercise, but in others, from long and frequent exercise, it may become\nexceedingly vigorous, and be the means of advancing mental philosophy\nif its observations are preserved and recorded. It is one of the\nsystems which, as a whole, constitute the spiritual organism to which\nwe give the name of mind. Such a capacity can not be predicated of a\nphysical organism. It is impossible for us to conceive of a machine\nstanding and looking upon its own operations, speculating upon their\nimprovement, or thinking of the relation of its mechanism to the human\nauthor of its being. It is equally impossible for us to think of the\nbody of man contemplating its own existence, or being sensible of it;\nbut it is perfectly easy to conceive of its being known to the mind\nthat inhabits it, which takes cognizance both of its own operations\nand of the operations of the physical organism, reflects upon them\nseparately or in their action upon one another, and spontaneously\nrefers both to an author.\n\n_Third._ I have placed third in the category of mental systems the\nsystem of emotions or susceptibilities to mental pleasure or pain, as\ndistinguished from the pleasurable or painful excitation of our nervous\nsystem. No one can doubt that, however powerful may be the influence\nupon our mental states of physical pain or physical sensations that\nare pleasurable, there is such a thing as mental pain and mental\npleasure, satisfaction or dissatisfaction, wholly unconnected with\nand in no way dependent upon our corporeal feelings, present or past.\nIt is from this susceptibility to mental pain or pleasure that we\ncome to have the idea of goodness or badness, which is originally a\nclassification of the qualities of external things as good or bad;\nthe good being those which affect us pleasurably, and the bad those\nwhich affect us painfully. By our mental organization we are placed\nin such correspondence with the material universe, that things apart\nfrom ourselves affect us agreeably or disagreeably; sights, sounds,\nodors, and tastes give us pleasure or pain. We are also placed in\ncorrespondence with the spiritual universe, and thereby certain acts,\nrelations, and traits of character give us pleasure, or the reverse.\nIn process of time, the youth whose mental systems are in the course\nof expansion comes to perceive that his own acts give him pleasure or\npain, and hence he derives the perception of good or bad qualities\nin himself. Moral goodness in ourselves--goodness of disposition,\nof intention, of volition, of habit--is found to be distinct from\nphysical and intellectual goodness; and thus the consciousness of moral\ngoodness becomes the intellectual faculty to which moral commands can\nbe addressed, with a prospect that the connection between obedience\nand happiness will be perceived. This susceptibility to mental pain\nor pleasure, from the qualities of external things, from the acts and\ndispositions of other persons, and from our own, is one that can inhere\nin a mental organization, but it can not possibly inhere in a physical\norganism. The physical organism is undoubtedly the means by which the\nmental susceptibility to pleasure or pain is reached from the external\nuniverse; but, unless there is a mental organism to feel the pleasure\nor the pain, the action of the physical organization is nothing but the\nexcitation of the nervous system. I, therefore, make a distinct class\namong the mental systems, and assign to it the faculty of experiencing\nmental pleasure or mental pain as a capacity distinct from the\npleasurable or painful excitation of our nerves.\n\n_Fourth._ In the category of mental systems may be placed those desires\nwhich lead us to wish for and strive to obtain some good or to avoid\nsome evil. This, surely, is not to be regarded as anything but an\nintellectual perception of what is to us a good or an evil. It is a\nstructural capacity of the soul which, after an experience of that\nwhich we learn to be good for us, or the reverse of good, is always\nprompting us to take the steps or to perform the acts which will insure\na repetition of that experience, in the acquisition of further good\nor the avoidance of further evil. Its operations may be perverted.\nWe may, from bad habits or erroneous ideas of good and evil, pursue\nobjects that are pernicious. But whether we strive for that which is\ntruly good, or is deceptively regarded as a good, we are perpetually\nacting under the impulse of a desire that is implanted in us, and\nthat operates as a desire whether its objects are worthy or unworthy,\nbeneficial or injurious, noxious or innoxious to our moral health.\n\n_Fifth_, and lastly, we may classify the affections as one of the\nstructural systems of our spiritual existence. It is that part of\nour natures that makes us like or dislike both persons and things;\nand, in regard to the former, it is the capacity for love in its high\ndistinction from the physical appetite of sexual passion. The range\nof its operation is most various and multiform, but throughout all of\nits operations it is a spiritual capacity, implanted in us for our\nhappiness as spiritual beings.\n\nIf it is objected that this is an arbitrary classification--that as\nan analysis of structural systems in our mental organization it bears\nno analogy to the anatomical exploration and classification of the\nstructural systems of our physical organism--the answer is, that in\nregard to the latter we make the examination by the exercise of our\ncorporeal senses, chiefly by the visual organs, as we do in the case of\nall other organized matter. In analyzing the structural organization\nof our minds, we are examining a subject that is not laid bare to the\ninspection of any of our corporeal organs; the scalpel in the hand\nof the dissector can afford us no aid in this investigation, but the\ninspection must be carried on by turning the eye of the mind inward\nupon itself. This we are mentally constituted to do. While, therefore,\nit may be true that the classification which I have made, or which may\nhave been made by others, of the structural mental systems, is in one\nsense arbitrary, and while in any method of describing them they may\nrun into or overlap one another in a complex organism, it will always\nremain true that the mind is capable of such examinations, and that the\nanalysis, however given, is useful to the comprehension of the mind\nas an organized and extended entity. No one can carry on this mental\nexamination without perceiving that he is examining a something which\nhas an independent existence and a life of its own, whether he supposes\nit to have been evolved out of organized matter, or embraces the idea\nof its distinct and special creation by an exercise of the Divine Will.\n\nThe two main hypotheses concerning the origin of mind may now be\ncontrasted. In the long process of development of animal organisms\nout of one another there come to be, it is said, higher and higher\ndegrees of intelligence, as the nervous system becomes more and more\ncapable of complex impressions, until we arrive at the consummate\nphysical organization and the supreme intelligence of the human race.\nThe physical organization is open to our examination, and we find the\nhuman brain divided into cerebral masses, with ganglia of sensory\nnerves extending to the external sensory organs. Intelligence is the\nfaculty of comprehending by previous preparation the combinations of\nimpressions made on the brain through the sensory nerves. The brain\nbeing an organized register in which the experiences of progenitors\nhave accumulated a high degree of this faculty, each human infant born\ninto the world comes into it with a prepared capacity to acquire the\ncombinations of impressions produced in his individual experience.\nTransmitted from generation to generation, this inherited capacity\nbecomes the means by which each individual manifests and enjoys what\nwe call intelligence; and the resulting aggregate of all the faculties\nthus called into exercise is what we denominate mind. It must be\nobserved, however, that this theory or explanation of the origin of\nmind, rejecting the hypothesis of its special creation as a being\nof a spiritual nature, assumes it to be a something which has been\ndeveloped out of the growth and improvement of a physical organism.\nWhen you inquire whether the nature of this something is supposed to\nbe a product of a different substance from matter, although developed\nout of matter, you are left without an answer; and when you press the\ninquiry whether a spiritual existence can be conceived as having grown\nout of the action of a physical organism, you are told that there are\nno means of determining what a spiritual existence is, because there\nis nothing with which you can compare it so as to ascertain what it\nresembles or what it does not resemble. Or if there are some who\naccept the evolution theory of the origin of mind, and who think it\npossible that a spiritual existence can owe its origin to the action of\nmatter without any intervention of a creating power purposely giving\nexistence to a spiritual essence, you have to ask a question to which\nyou can only get this answer: that it has pleased the Almighty Being\nto establish a system by which a spiritual in contradistinction to a\nphysical existence has been developed in countless ages out of the\naction of material substances organized into definite systems and\nendowed with the principle of life. Those who assume this hypothesis\nmust necessarily assume also that the spiritual existence is, after it\nhas come into being, an existence distinct from the physical organism,\nalthough generated out of it, and then they must encounter the further\ninquiry as to the probability of the supposed method of production\nresorted to by the Supreme Being.\n\nMore than once in the course of our colloquies I have had occasion to\nsay that, in all our inquiries of this nature, whether in regard to the\norigin of our physical organism or that of our mental existence, we\nmust constantly bear in mind the unbounded capacity of the Creator to\nadopt any method of production whatever; that it is just as much within\nhis power to call things of the most opposite natures into existence\nby a single word as it is to establish methods by which they shall be\ndeveloped through innumerable ages of what we call time. That the Being\nwho is supposed to preside over the universe and to hold this unlimited\npower is an hypothesis I readily admit; but I affirm that his existence\nand attributes are necessary postulates, without which there can be no\nreasoning concerning the origin of anything. Whether that Being exists\nand possesses the attributes which we impute to him I have all along\nsaid is a matter of which we must be satisfied by independent proofs\nbefore we undertake to investigate his probable methods.\n\nThe hypothesis of the origin of mind which I now mean to contrast\nwith that of the evolutionists may be stated as follows: It is a\nrational deduction, from all that we know of our physical organism,\nthat procreation of new individuals of that organism by the sexual\nunion of male and female was established as the means of continuing\nthe species of animal known as man. When or how established is not a\nmaterial part of the inquiry that I now make. It may have been that\nthe division of the sexes came about by a very slow process, or it\nmay have been by the aboriginal creation of a completed pair, male\nand female. However or whenever it came to exist, there came to be\none uniform method of bringing into existence new individuals of a\npeculiar and perfectly distinguishable animal type. If we confine our\nattention to the physical organism of man, it is perfectly apparent\nthat when procreation and gestation take place they happen because of\nthe established law that a new individual of this species of animal\nshall be produced by the sexual union of two other individuals, male\nand female, and that the new individual shall have the same physical\norganism as the parents. A new physical life thus springs out of two\nother physical lives by a process the secret of which we can not\ndetect, although we can trace it through some of its stages so far as\nto see that there is a secret process by which two physical organisms\ngive existence to another physical organism of the same type and having\nthe same principle of life.\n\nAs the new individual animal grows into further development, we find\nthat along with his animal organism and united with it by a tie which\nwe can not see, but about which we can reason, there is apparently\npresent a kind of life that is something more than the life of the\nbody. The further we carry our investigations of the phenomena which\nindicate the existence of this mental life, the more we become\nconvinced that it is the life of a spiritual organism. As the Creator\nhad the power to give existence to the corporeal organism, why had he\nnot an equal power to give existence to a spiritual organism? If he\nestablished the law of sexual union between a male and a female in\norder to perpetuate the type of animal to which they belong--the law\nwhich gives existence to a new individual of that animal type every\ntime that a new conception and a new birth take place--why should he\nnot have established the collateral law that every time there is a\nnew birth of an infant there shall come into existence a spiritual\nentity which shall be united to the corporeal organism for a time,\nthus constituting in that infant a dual existence which makes his\nwhole individuality during this life? If we suppose that the physical\norganism of our double natures was left to be worked out by a very\nslow process, by which physical organisms are developed out of one\nanother--or by which we theoretically suppose them to have been so\ndeveloped--why is it necessary to suppose that our spirits or souls\nhave been developed in the same way or by an analogous method? What\nreason have we to believe that the Creator works by the same methods in\nthe spiritual world, or by methods that are of the same nature as those\nwhich we think we can discover to be his methods in giving existence\nto corporeal organisms? The two realms of spirit and matter are so\ncompletely unlike that we are not compelled to believe that the methods\nby which creation of organisms of the two kinds are effected by the\nAlmighty are necessarily or probably the same.\n\nIn order to be clearly understood I will now repeat my hypothesis\nin a distinct form. I assume the existence of a pair of animals of\nthe human type, male and female, endowed with the power of producing\nnew individuals of the same type. In their physical organisms is\nestablished the law of procreation, and in the female counterpart of\nthat organism is established the concomitant law of conception and\nparturition. Thus far provision is made for the production of a new\nindividual physically organized like the parents. In those parents\nthere is also established another law, by the operation of which the\nsame process which results in the production of the new individual\nanimal organism brings into existence a spiritual organism, which is\nunited with and becomes the companion of the physical organism so\nlong as the latter shall continue to live. These laws established\nin the first pair and in every succeeding pair continue to operate\nthrough every succeeding generation. Perhaps it will be said that\nthis attributes the production of a spiritual organism to a physical\nprocess; but, in truth, it does no more than to assert the simultaneous\nproduction of the two existences. It is not necessary to assume that\nthe f\u0153tus which becomes at birth the human infant is before birth\nanimated by a soul; for it is not necessary to suppose, nor is it\napparently true, that the physical organism is complete until birth\ntakes place and the breath of life enters the lungs, thus constituting\na new life other than that of the f\u0153tus or the unborn child, although\nthe one is a continuation of the other. At whatever point of time the\ncomplete animal organism is in a condition to be observed so that we\ncan say here is a living child, at that point we begin to perceive a\ncapacity to receive impressions from the external world without the\nconnection that has theretofore existed between the unborn child and\nthe maternal system. This capacity must either be attributed to the\nindividual experience of the infant, so that without experience of\nhis own he can not begin to be possessed of a growing intelligence,\nor it must be imputed to an innate and implanted power resident in\na spiritual organism that comes into exercise whenever the physical\norganism has begun to draw the breath of life.\n\nThe evolution hypothesis of the origin of the human mind necessarily\nleaves its nature in an indeterminate state that will not satisfy the\nrequirements of sound reasoning. In one mode of stating and reasoning\nupon this hypothesis it is assumed that there is not now and never was\na mental existence that was created in each individual of the race\nat his birth; but that at some very remote period in the history of\nsuccessive animal organisms there was produced an animal of a highly\ndeveloped nervous structure, capable of intelligence by reason of a\nsuperior power of receiving physical impressions and co-ordinating\nthem into states of consciousness which correspond to the physical\nfeelings; and to the perpetually recurring series of these states of\nconsciousness we give the name of mind. This capacity of intelligence\nis transmitted from parents to offspring, the experiences of the former\nbeing registered in the brain of the latter; but however complete may\nbe the inherited nervous structure, and however great the capacity\nfor intelligence, mind in each individual of the race is evidenced by\nnothing but a constant succession and variation of certain states of\nfeelings produced in the nervous structure.\n\nAgainst this view we may place what we know from constant observation.\nWe know that it has been ordained, as a consequence of the sexual union\nof two individuals of opposite sex, there shall come into existence a\nnew individual of the same physical organism as the parents. Of the\ninterior process by which this product is effected we must remain\nignorant, but about the fact there can be no doubt. That fact is,\nthat by the union of certain vesicles contributed by each of the\nparents there results a new individual organism. We know further\nthat simultaneously with the complete production of the new physical\norganism, there comes into being, and is incorporated with it, an\nexistence that we are compelled by the phenomena which it manifests to\nregard as a non-physical and a spiritual organism. Of the process by\nwhich this distinct existence is effected, we must remain as ignorant\nas we are of the process by which the physical organism was made to\nresult from the sexual union of the parents. But of the fact there can\nbe no more doubt in the one case than in the other. In every instance\nof a new birth of a perfect infant, we know that there results a dual\nexistence in the same individual; the one manifested by physical, the\nother by mental phenomena. To argue that the mental and spiritual\nexistence grew out of an improved and improving physical organism\nin long-past ages, and became an adjunct to that organism after it\nhad attained a certain development, without any intervention of the\ncreating power at each new birth of an individual infant, is to limit\nthe power of the Creator in a realm wherein the subject of his creating\npower is essentially unlike the subject with which he deals when he\ndeals with physical organisms. In all reasoning upon the origin and\nnature of the human mind, the boundless power of the Creator must be\nassumed. In judging of the probabilities of his methods of action, it\nis the safest course to be guided by what we can see takes place at\nevery new birth of a human infant. The physical organism results from\nthe operation of a certain law. The mental organism results, it is\nalike rational to presume, from the operation of a certain other law.\nHow either of these laws operates we are not permitted to know, but\nwe can as safely infer the one as the other, from what is open to our\nobservation.\n\nI shall now touch briefly upon another argument, the foundation of\nwhich is to be tested by historical facts into the truth of which I\nshall not here inquire, because they must, for the purposes for which\nI use them, be assumed. The immortality of the human soul is said to\nhave been proved by a Divine revelation. This great fact is supposed\nto be established by evidence of a character quite different from that\nwhich convinces us of the existence and attributes of the Almighty.\nBut, assuming revelation to be a fact, it has an important bearing\nupon the subject of this essay, because the question arises, for what\nconceivable reason the Almighty should have made to us a revelation of\nour immortality, through the direct testimony of a competent witness,\nif we are not spiritual beings. Information of a fact supposes that\nthere was a person to be informed. Concurrently with the consciousness\nwhich assures us of our personality, we have the assurance of our\nimmortality certified to us by a messenger expressly authorized to give\nus the information. If the mind, or that part of our individuality\nwhich we call the soul, is in its origin and nature nothing but what\nthe evolution theory supposes, what was there to be informed of\nimmortality, or of anything else? The possibility and certainty of\nan existence after the death of the body is a conviction that must\nexercise great influence over the conduct of men in this life. It is\nconsistent with the whole apparent scheme of the revelation to suppose\nthat it was made for a twofold purpose: first, to cause men to lead\nbetter lives in this world than they might have led without this\ninformation and conviction; and, secondly, to form them for greater\nhappiness in another world. The first of these purposes might have\nbeen effectuated by causing men to believe in their own immortality,\nnotwithstanding the belief might be a delusion because there is no\nbeing capable, in fact, of any existence after the life of the body\nis ended. But such a method of action is hardly to be imputed to the\nCreator and Supreme Governor of the universe, according to the ideas\nof his character which natural religion alone will give us. It is not\nin accordance with rational conceptions of his attributes to suppose\nthat he deludes his rational creatures with assurances or apparent\nproofs of something that is not true for the sake of making them act\nas if it were true. When we find ourselves running into a hypothesis\nof this kind, we may be pretty sure that we are departing from correct\nprinciples of reasoning. In regard to the second of the supposed\npurposes for which the revelation of immortality was made--to form\nmen for greater happiness in another state of existence--it is quite\nobvious that the supposed scheme of the revelation is a mere delusion,\nif we are not beings capable of a continued spiritual existence after\nthe death of our bodies. It is therefore a matter of great consequence\nto determine what the evolution theory of the origin and nature of the\nhuman mind makes us out to be.\n\nI have never seen any statement of that theory that does not lead to\nthe conclusion that man is a highly developed animal organism, whose\nmental existence is not something created in each individual of the\nrace, and of a substance and organized structure different from the\nphysical organism, but whose mental phenomena are merely exhibitions\nand effects of occurrences taking place in the physical system, and\nassuming the shape of what for distinctness is called thought. In\nwhatever form this theory has been stated by its most distinguished\nprofessors, it leaves only an interval of degree, and not an interval\nof kind, between the mind of man and that which, in some of the other\nanimals, is supposed to be mind. The evolution doctrine, taken in one\nof its aspects, supposes one grand chain of animal organisms, rising\nhigher and higher in the scale of animal life, but connected together\nby ordinary generation, so that they are of one kindred throughout; but\nthat, as each distinct species grows out of predecessors, by gradual\nimprovements and increments, forming more and more elaborate organisms,\nman is the consummate product of the whole process. But when we ask\nat what point or stage in the series of developing animal organisms\nthe mind of man was produced, or what it was when produced, we get no\nsatisfactory answer. To the first question, it can only be answered,\nas Darwin himself answers, that there must be a definition of man\nbefore we can determine at what time he came to exist. To the second\nquestion, we have answers which differ materially from each other.\nFirst, we have whatever we can extract from such a system of psychology\nas Mr. Spencer's, which ignores the capability of the mind to exist\nindependent of the nervous structure and the brain, because it excludes\nthe idea of any ego, any me, any person, and makes consciousness to\nconsist of a connected series of physical feelings, to which there are\ncorresponding psychical equivalents that he calls mental states. It\nwould seem to follow, therefore, that when there is no longer remaining\nfor the individual any nervous structure and any brain, the mental\nstates, or psychical side of the physical impressions, must cease; or,\nin other words, that the only existing ego has come to an end.\n\nOn the other hand, I have seen an ingenious hypothesis which it is well\nto refer to, because it illustrates the efforts that are often made\nto reconcile the doctrines of evolution with a belief in immortality.\nThis hypothesis by no means ignores the possibility of a spiritual\nexistence, or the spiritual as distinguished from the material world.\nBut it assumes that man was produced under the operation of physical\nlaws; and that after he had become a completed product--the consummate\nand finished end of the whole process of evolution--he passed under the\ndominion and operation of other and different laws, and is saved from\nannihilation by the intervention of a change from the physical to the\nspiritual laws of his Creator. Put into a condensed form, this theory\nhas been thus stated: Having spent countless \u00e6ons in forming man, by\nthe slow process of animal evolution, God will not suffer him to fall\nback into elemental flames, and be consumed by the further operation of\nphysical laws, but will transfer him into the dominion of the spiritual\nlaws that are held in reserve for his salvation.\n\nOne of the first questions to be asked, in reference to this\nhypothesis, is, Who or what is it that God is supposed to have spent\ncountless \u00e6ons in creating by the slow process of animal evolution? If\nwe contemplate a single specimen of the human race, we find a bodily\norganism, endowed with life like that of other animals, and acted upon\nby physical laws throughout the whole period of its existence. We\nalso find present in the same individual a mental existence, which is\ncertified to us by evidence entirely different from that by which we\nobtain a knowledge of the physical organism. As the methods employed\nby the Creator in the production of the physical organism, whatever\nwe may suppose them to have been, were physical laws operating upon\nmatter, so the methods employed by him in the production of a spiritual\nexistence must have operated in a domain that was wholly aside from\nthe physical world. Each of these distinct realms is equally under the\ngovernment of an Omnipotent Being; and while we may suppose that in the\none he employed a very slow process, such as the evolution of animal\norganisms out of one another is imagined to have been, there is no\nconceivable reason why he should not, in the other and very different\nrealm, have resorted to the direct creation of a spiritual existence,\nwhich can not, in the nature of things, have required to be produced by\nthe action of physical laws. When, at the birth of each individual of\nthe human race, the two existences become united, when, in consequence\nof the operation of that sexual union of the parents which has been\nordained for the production of a new individual, the physical and the\nspiritual existence become incorporated in the one being, the fact that\nthey remain for a certain time mutually dependent and mutually useful,\nco-operating in the purposes of their temporary connection, does not\nchange their essential nature. The one may be destructible because the\noperation of physical laws may dissolve the ligaments that hold it\ntogether; the other may be indestructible, because the operation of\nspiritual laws will hold together the spiritual organism that is in its\nnature independent of the laws of matter.\n\nI can therefore see no necessary connection between the methods\nemployed by the Almighty in the production of an animal and the methods\nemployed by him in the production of a soul. That in the birth of\nthe individual the two come into existence simultaneously, and are\ntemporarily united in one and the same being, only proves that the two\nexistences are contemporaneous in their joint inception. It does not\nprove that they are of the same nature, or the same substance, or that\nthe physical organism is the only ego, or that the psychical existence\nis nothing but certain states of the material structure, to whose\naggregate manifestations certain philosophers give the name of mind,\nwhile denying to them personal individuality and the consciousness of a\ndistinct being.\n\nAnd now, in bringing this discussion to a close, I will only add that\nthe great want of this age is the prosecution of inquiry into the\nnature of the human mind as an organic structure, regarded as such.\nIt seems to me that the whole mission of Science is now perverted by\na wrong aim, which is to find out the external to the neglect of the\ninternal--to make all exploration terminate in the laws of the physical\nuniverse, and go aside from the examination of the spiritual world.\nIt is no reproach to those who essay the latter inquiry that they\nare scoffed at as \"the metaphysicians.\" It matters not what they are\ncalled, so long as they pursue the right path. It is now in regard to\nthe pursuit of science as it was formerly in regard to the writing of\nhistory. That philosophical French historian, M. Taine, has luminously\nmarked the change which has come over the methods and objects of\nhistorical studies in the following passage:\n\n\"When you consider with your eyes the visible man, what do you look\nfor? The man invisible. The words which salute your ears, the gestures,\nthe motions of his head, the clothes he wears, visible acts and deeds\nof every kind, are expressions merely; somewhat is revealed beneath\nthem, and that is a soul--an inner man is concealed beneath the outer\nman; the second does not reveal the first; ... all the externals are\nbut avenues converging toward a center; you enter them simply to reach\nthat center, and that center is the genuine man--I mean that mass of\nfaculties and feelings which are the inner man. We have reached a new\nworld, which is infinite, because every action which we see involves\nan infinite association of reasonings, emotions, sensations new and\nold, which have served to bring it to light, and which, like great\nrocks deep-seated in the ground, find in it their end and their level.\nThis under-world is a new subject-matter proper to the historian....\nThis precise and proved interpretation of past sensations has given\nto history, in our days, a second birth; hardly anything of the sort\nwas known to the preceding century. They thought men of every race and\ncountry were all but identical--the Greek, the barbarian, the Hindoo,\nthe man of the Renaissance, and the man of the eighteenth century--as\nif they had all been turned out of a common mold, and all in conformity\nto a certain abstract conception which served for the whole human\nrace. They knew man, but not men; they had not penetrated to the soul;\nthey had not seen the infinite diversity and complexity of souls; they\ndid not know that the moral constitution of a people or an age is as\nparticular and distinct as the physical structure of a family of plants\nor an order of animals.\"[153]\n\nIn the same way psychology needs a new birth, like the new birth of\nhistory. If we would know the mind, we must reach the conviction that\nthere is a mind: and this conviction can be reached only by penetrating\nthrough all the externals, through the physical organism, through the\ndiversities of race, through the environment of matter, until we have\nfound the soul. If history, like zo\u00f6logy, has found its anatomy, mental\nscience must, in like manner, be prosecuted as an anatomical study. So\nlong as we allow the anatomy of zo\u00f6logy to be the predominant and only\nexplanation, the beginning and the end of the mental manifestations,\nso long we shall fail to comprehend the nature of man, and to see the\nreason for his immortality.\n\n\n FOOTNOTES:\n\n [139] Corinthians, revised version.\n\n [140] In the \"authorized\" version the passage is rendered thus: \"There\n is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body.\" Sophereus quotes\n the late revised version. The meaning is the same. St. Paul assumes\n the existence of a natural body, and then asserts that there is\n likewise a spiritual body.\n\n [141] I have met, by the kindness of the author, with a little\n treatise which contains a great deal of sound mental philosophy, with\n which in the main I concur, and to which I am indebted for some very\n valuable suggestions. This modest little book is entitled \"The Heart\n of Man: An Attempt in Mental Anatomy.\" The author is Mr. P. P. Bishop,\n a resident of San Mateo, in Florida. It was printed at Chicago, by\n Shepard & Johnson, for the author, in 1883. I know not if it is on\n sale. I suppose that Mr. Bishop was led to send me his interesting\n treatise by the publication, in the \"Manhattan Magazine,\" at New York,\n in 1884, of the substance of the first three chapters of the present\n work. I take this opportunity of expressing my high appreciation\n of his treatise, and of explaining the meaning of its title. As I\n understand him, he uses the term \"Heart of Man\" as synonymous with\n structure of the mind, and not as referring to what is figuratively\n called \"the human heart.\" He has explained \"Mental Anatomy\" as\n follows: \"The method of investigation, which I have employed in making\n my way to the conclusions set forth in this discussion, I call 'The\n Anatomical Method,' because it is based on the conception of mind as\n an organized being, and aims to discover the structure of that being.\"\n ... \"At the risk,\" he adds, \"of appearing egotistical, I think it best\n to relate an experience.\" He did not need to deprecate the appearance\n of egotism, for his method of investigation, based on his own mental\n experience, was the very best that he could have followed. It were to\n be wished that we could have more of this kind of self-analysis by\n persons competent to make it, and less of theoretical reasoning from\n premises more or less arbitrarily assumed.\n\n I have endeavored to make my imaginary philosopher, Sophereus, avoid\n the method of reasoning which I thus condemn, and to keep him within\n the bounds of experience.\n\n [142] \"Extemporaneous,\" Latin, _ex_, from; and _tempus_, time, at the\n same time, or from the same time. Extemporaneous discourse is when the\n thought and the expression in which it is clothed occur at the time\n it is uttered, or without premeditation of both thought and language.\n \"Improvisation\" means the same thing, but it is specially applied\n to the act of making poetry or performing music extemporaneously,\n that is, without prevision of what one is to say or sing. Rapid\n conversation is of the same nature. So is an instantaneous and\n unpremeditated answer to a question.\n\n [143] Webster's Dictionary--\"Matter.\"\n\n [144] \"And it shall be as when a hungry man dreameth, and behold, he\n eateth: but he awaketh, and his soul is empty; or as when a thirsty\n man dreameth, and behold, he drinketh: but he awaketh, and behold, he\n is faint, and his soul hath appetite.\"--ISAIAH.\n\n [145] Scott's \"Antiquary,\" note v.\n\n [146] If it is objected that I have allowed Sophereus to overstate\n the power of the mind to deal better with difficulties after \"a good\n night's sleep,\" as we say, than it had dealt with them before, I will\n cite the testimony of one of the most prolific of writers and one\n of the most self-observing of men, Sir Walter Scott, whose greatest\n success was achieved in the field of poetical and prose fiction. This\n is a department in which inventive genius is the main reliance, and\n is put to its greatest tasks. In that part of Scott's \"Diary\" which\n covers the year 1826--the period when he was writing \"Woodstock\"--he\n says:\n\n \"The half-hour between waking and rising has all my life proved\n propitious to any task which was exercising my invention. When I got\n over any knotty difficulty in a story, or have had in former times\n to fill up a passage in a poem, it was always when I first opened my\n eyes that the desired ideas thronged upon me. This is so much the\n case that I am in the habit of relying upon it and saying to myself\n when I am at a loss, 'Never mind, we shall have it at seven o'clock\n to-morrow morning.' If I have forgot a circumstance, a name, or a copy\n of verses, it is the same thing.... This morning I had some new ideas\n respecting 'Woodstock' which will make the story better.\" (Lockhart's\n \"Life of Scott,\" vol. viii, chap. lxviii.)\n\n This, it is true, was the experience of a man of extraordinary genius,\n whose facility of invention was as marvelous as the ease and rapidity\n with which he wrote. But his experience was a very common one. It has\n been shared by persons of much more humble faculties. I am sure that\n persons in my own profession, who have been engaged in pursuits very\n different from those of the poet or the novelist, will, from their\n own experience, confirm what is assumed by Sophereus as a well-known\n mental phenomenon. I could describe in detail many instances in which\n I have gone through with the same fruition of new ideas, resulting\n from the acquisitions obtained during sleep, or following from the\n benefits of sleep. For example, when having to do with a complex state\n of facts, needing orderly arrangement and analysis, it has repeatedly\n happened to me to rise in the morning after a night of undisturbed\n sleep, with the whole of an entangled skein unraveled, whereas before\n retiring to rest the mass of facts lay in some confusion in the mind.\n In like manner the mind can often deal with a legal question of a\n new and difficult character. The rule that ought to be applied to a\n particular case has to be extracted from many precedents, and perhaps\n none of them exactly cover the case in hand. On such occasions, if\n one refrains from pushing the study of his subject while awake to the\n severest analysis, and postpones the effort until the next morning,\n the experience of Sir Walter is very likely to be repeated. \"It was\n always,\" he says, \"when I first opened my eyes that the desired ideas\n thronged upon me.\" I am persuaded, therefore, that although in the\n study of any subject omission to master all its elements and details,\n when alone one can accumulate them, is not to be recommended, there is\n undoubtedly much to be gained by relieving the mind from the continued\n effort, and allowing some hours of sleep to intervene, during which\n the mind can act independently of all the bodily organs.\n\n The question is, then, as above suggested, whether there come to us\n during sleep acquisitions of new ideas with or without a simultaneous\n consciousness that we are thinking of the subject, or whether the\n new ideas follow from the benefits of sleep as a state of absolute\n rest and inactivity of the brain, and of the intellectual faculties,\n so that when we awake both the brain and the mental powers are in\n greater vigor. The expression used by Scott in describing his own\n experience is that as soon as he awoke the desired ideas _thronged_\n upon him. This might happen upon the hypothesis that the desired ideas\n came because the brain and the mental powers, refreshed by sleep,\n were in greater vigor. But I incline to believe that his meaning was\n the reverse of this. At all events, it seems to me that the true\n explanation of the phenomenon is that during sound and undisturbed\n sleep of the body, including the brain, we do unconsciously think of\n the subject on which our waking thoughts had been previously employed;\n that in these states there are acquisitions of new ideas which we\n bring with us out of the state in which they were acquired, or, as Sir\n Walter expressed it, which _throng_ upon us as soon as we open our\n eyes. While, therefore, it may be said that this hypothesis assumes\n the existence of the mind as a spiritual or intellectual entity\n capable of action as a thinking being without any action of the bodily\n organs, the question is, on the other hand, whether the phenomena\n here considered have not a very strong tendency to prove that the\n mind is such a substantive and independent existence. When it is\n remembered how common is the experience here referred to, how various\n the phenomena are, how they are manifested on all kinds of subjects,\n in regard to lines of conduct, and to everything about which we are\n perplexed, and when we add these peculiar phenomena to the other\n evidence which tends to establish the same belief in the existence\n of the mind as something entirely apart from all its physical\n environment, it seems to me that the argument becomes very strong,\n and that I have not made my imaginary philosopher press it beyond its\n legitimate bounds.\n\n [147] Do him every honor.\n\n [148] By some commentators, this hint, given with female subtilty, is\n explained to mean that their copy-hold, or lease, by which Banquo and\n his son hold their lives, is not eternal. The more probable meaning is\n that, if they are cut off, nature will produce no more copies of their\n race. But in either meaning the hint that she gave was the same, and\n it included both Banquo and his son.\n\n [149] When the unknowable power ceases to pulsate through our physical\n organism, this \"mental state\" ceases--nothing survives--continuity is\n ended.\n\n [150] \"Principles of Psychology,\" i, \u00a7 208, pp. 465-471.\n\n [151] I have allowed Sophereus to follow in the main the writer to\n whom I have already referred in the note on page 471--Mr. Bishop, of\n Florida.\n\n [152] Bishop.\n\n [153] Introduction to Taine's \"History of English Literature,\"\n translated by H. Van Laun. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1885.\n\n\n\n\n    GLOSSARY\n    OF\n    SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TERMS USED IN THIS WORK.\n\n\n [The following definitions marked with an asterisk are borrowed from\n the glossary annexed to Darwin's \"Origin of Species.\" The remainder of\n the definitions are taken from Webster's Dictionary.]\n\n =*Aberrant.= Forms or groups of animals or plants which deviate in\n important characters from their nearest allies, so as not to be easily\n included in the same group with them, are said to be aberrant.\n\n =*Abnormal.= Contrary to the general rule.\n\n =*Aborted.= An organ is said to be aborted when its development has\n been arrested at a very early stage.\n\n =A\u00ebrate= (Zo\u00f6l.). To subject to the influence of the air by the\n natural organs of respiration; to arterialize; especially used of\n animals not having lungs.\n\n =Agnostic= (_a._). Professing ignorance; involving no dogmatic\n assertion; leaving a question or problem still in doubt; pertaining to\n or involving agnosticism.\n\n =Agnostic= (_n._). One who professes ignorance, or refrains from\n dogmatic assertion; one who supports agnosticism, neither affirming\n nor denying the existence of a personal Deity.\n\n =Agnosticism.= That doctrine which, professing ignorance, neither\n asserts nor denies; specifically, in theology, the doctrine that the\n existence of a personal Deity can be neither asserted nor denied,\n neither proved nor disproved, because of the necessary limits of the\n human mind (as sometimes charged upon _Hamilton_ and _Mansel_), or\n because of the insufficiency of the evidence furnished by psychical\n and physical data, to warrant a positive conclusion (as taught by the\n school of _Herbert Spencer_); opposed alike to dogmatic skepticism and\n to dogmatic theism.\n\n =Allantois=, =Allantoid=. A thin membrane, situated between the\n chorion and amnion, and forming one of the membranes which invest the\n f\u0153tus.\n\n =*Analogy.= That resemblance of structures which depends upon\n similarity of function, as in the wings of insects and birds. Such\n structures are said to be _analogous_, and to be _analogues_ of each\n other.\n\n =Anthropomorphism.= The representation of the Deity under a human\n form, or with human attributes.\n\n =*Articulata.= A great division of the animal kingdom, characterized\n generally by having the surface of the body divided into rings, called\n segments, a greater or less number of which are furnished with jointed\n legs (such as insects, crustaceans, and centipeds).\n\n =Articulation= (Anat.). The joining or juncture of the bones of a\n skeleton.\n\n =Ascidians.= A class of acephalous mollusks, having often a leathery\n exterior.\n\n =Biology.= The science of life; that part of physiology which treats\n of life in general, or of the different forces of life.\n\n =Brain.= The upper part of the head. 1. (Anat.) The whitish, soft mass\n which constitutes the anterior or cephalic extremity of the nervous\n system in man and other vertebrates, occupying the upper cavity of\n the skull; and (_b_) the anterior or cephalic ganglion in insects and\n other invertebrates.\n\n 2. The organ or seat of intellect; hence, the understanding.\n\n 3. The affections; fancy; imagination.\n\n=*Branchi\u00e6.= Gills, or organs for respiration in water.\n\n=*Branchial.= Pertaining to gills or branchi\u00e6.\n\n=*Canid\u00e6.= The dog family, including the dog, wolf, fox, jackal, etc.\n\n=Cell.= A minute, inclosed space or sac, filled with fluid, making\nup the cellular tissue of plants, and of many parts of animals, and\noriginating the parts by their growth and reproduction; the constituent\nelement of all plants and animals (though not universal for all parts\nof such structure), much as a crystalline molecule is the element of a\ncrystal. In the simplest plants and animals (as the _infusoria_), one\nsingle cell constitutes the complete individual, such species being\ncalled _unicellular_ plants or animals.\n\n=Cephalopod= (Fr. _c\u00e9phalopode_, from Gr., head and foot). (Zo\u00f6l.) An\nanimal of the sub-kingdom _Mollusca_, characterized by a distinct head,\nsurrounded by a circle of long arms or tentacles, which they use for\ncrawling and for seizing objects. See MOLLUSK.\n\n=*Cetacea.= An order of Mammalia, including the whales, dolphins, etc.,\nhaving the form of the body fish-like, the skin naked, and only the\nfore-limbs developed.\n\n\n=Chaos.= 1. An empty, infinite space; a yawning chasm.\n\n 2. The rude, confused state, or unorganized condition, of matter\n before the creation of the universe.\n\n=Consciousness.= 1. The knowledge of sensations and mental operations,\nor of what passes in one's own mind; the act of the mind which makes\nknown an internal object.\n\n 2. Immediate knowledge of any object whatever.\n\n=*Crustaceans.= A class of articulated animals having the skin of the\nbody generally more or less hardened by the deposition of calcareous\nmatter, breathing by means of gills. (_Examples_, crab, lobster,\nshrimp, etc.)\n\n=Dynamically.= In accordance with the principles of dynamics or moving\nforces.\n\n=*Embryo.= The young animal undergoing development within the egg or\nwomb.\n\n=*Embryology.= The study of the development of the embryo.\n\n=Ethics.= The science of human duty; the body of rules of duty drawn\nfrom this science; a particular system of principles and rules\nconcerning duty, whether true or false; rules of practice in respect to\na single class of human actions; as political or social ethics.\n\n=*Fauna.= The totality of the animals naturally inhabiting a certain\ncountry or region, or which have lived during a given geological period.\n\n=Fetichism=, =Feticism=. One of the lowest and grossest forms of\nsuperstition, consisting in the worship of some material object, as a\nstone, a tree, or an animal, often casually selected; practiced among\ntribes of lowest mental endowment, as certain races of negroes.\n\n=*Flora.= The totality of the plants growing naturally in a country or\nduring a given geological period.\n\n=*F\u0153tal.= Of or belonging to the f\u0153tus, or embryo in course of\ndevelopment.\n\n=F\u0153tus=, same as =Fetus=. The young of viviparous animals in the womb,\nand of oviparous animals in the egg, after it is perfectly formed,\nbefore which time it is called _embryo_.\n\n=*Ganoid Fishes.= Fishes covered with peculiar enameled bony scales.\nMost of them are extinct.\n\n=Genus= (Science). An assemblage of species possessing certain\ncharacters in common, by which they are distinguished from all others.\nIt is subordinate to _tribe_ and _sub-tribe_; hence, a single species\nhaving distinctive characters that seem of more than specific value may\nconstitute a genus.\n\n=*Germinal Vesicle.= A minute vesicle in the eggs of animals, from\nwhich the development of the embryo proceeds.\n\n=Gravitation= (Physics). That species of attraction or force by\nwhich all bodies or particles of matter in the universe tend toward\neach other; called also _attraction of gravitation_, _universal\ngravitation_, and _universal gravity_.\n\n=Gravity= (Physics). The tendency of a mass of matter toward a center\nof attraction; especially the tendency of a body toward the center of\nthe earth, terrestrial gravitation.\n\n=Gyrus=, pl. =Gyri= (Anat.). A convolution of the brain.\n\n=*Habitat.= The locality in which a plant or animal naturally lives.\n\n=Heredity.= The transmission of the physical and psychical qualities of\nparents to their offspring; the biological law by which living beings\ntend to repeat themselves in their descendants.\n\n=Homologous.= Having the same relative proportion, position, value, or\nstructure; especially--(_a_) (Geom.) Corresponding in relative position\nand proportion. (_b_) (Alg.) Having the same relative proportion or\nvalue, as the two antecedents or the two consequents of a proportion.\n(_c_) (Chem.) Being of the same chemical type or series; differing\nby a multiple or arithmetical ratio in certain constituents, while\nthe physical qualities are wholly analogous, with small relative\ndifferences, as if corresponding to a series of parallels; as, the\nspecies in the group of alcohols are said to be _homologous_. (_d_)\n(Zo\u00f6l.) Being of the same typical structure; having like relations to\na fundamental type of structure; as, those bones in the hand of man\nand the fore-foot of a horse are _homologous_ that correspond in their\nstructural relations--that is, in their relations to the type-structure\nof the fore-limb in vertebrates.\n\n=Homology.= That relation between parts which results from their\ndevelopment from corresponding embryonic parts, either in different\nanimals, as in the case of the arm of a man, the fore-leg of a\nquadruped, and the wing of a bird; or in the same individual, as in the\ncase of the fore and hind legs in quadrupeds, and the segments or rings\nand their appendages of which the body of a worm, a centiped, etc., is\ncomposed. The latter is called _serial homology_. The parts which stand\nin such a relation to each other are said to be _homologous_, and one\nsuch part or organ is called the _homologue_ of the other. In different\nplants the parts of the flower are homologous, and in general these\nparts are regarded as homologous with leaves.\n\n=Hypothesis.= 1. A supposition; a proposition or principle which\nis supposed or taken for granted, in order to draw a conclusion or\ninference for proof of the point in question; something not proved, but\nassumed for the purpose of argument.\n\n 2. A system or theory imagined or assumed to account for known facts\n or phenomena.\n\n=Imago.= The perfect (generally winged) reproductive state of an insect.\n\n=Implacenta= (_n._). A mammal having no placenta. (_a._) Without a\nplacenta, as certain marsupial animals.\n\n=Insectivorous.= Feeding on insects.\n\n=Instinct= (_n._). Inward impulse; unconscious, involuntary, or\nunreasoning prompting to action; a disposition to any mode of action,\nwhether bodily or spiritual, without a distinct apprehension of the end\nor object which Nature has designed should be accomplished thereby;\nspecifically, the natural, unreasoning impulse in an animal, by which\nit is guided to the performance of any action, without thought of\nimprovement in the method.\n\n=Invertebrata=, or =Invertebrate Animals=. Those animals which do not\npossess a backbone or spinal column.\n\n=Isomeric= (from Gr., equal and part). (Chem.) Having the quality of\nisomerism; as _isomeric_ compounds.\n\n=Isomerism= (Chem.). An identity of elements and of atomic proportions\nwith a difference in the amount combined in the compound molecule, and\nof its essential qualities; as in the case of the physically unlike\ncompounds of carbon and hydrogen, consisting one of one part of each,\nanother of two parts of each, and a third of four of each.\n\n=Kangaroo.= A ruminating marsupial animal of the genus _Macropus_,\nfound in Australia and the neighboring islands.\n\n=Larva= (plural =Larv\u00e6=). The first condition of an insect at its\nissuing from the egg, when it is usually in the form of a grub,\ncaterpillar, or maggot.\n\n=Lemurid\u00e6.= A group of four-handed animals, distinct from the monkeys,\nand approaching the insectivorous quadrupeds in some of their\ncharacters and habits. Its members have the nostrils curved or twisted,\nand a claw instead of a nail upon the first finger of the hind hands.\n\n=Lepidosiren.= An eel-shaped animal covered with rounded scales, having\nfour rod-like members, and breathing water like a fish. It is found in\nponds and rivers of intertropical Africa and South America. By some it\nis regarded as a fish, and by others as a batrachian.\n\n=Mammal.= Belonging to the breast; from _mamma_, the breast or pap. An\nanimal of the highest class of vertebrates, characterized by the female\nsuckling its young.\n\n=Mammalia.= The highest class of animals, including the ordinary hairy\nquadrupeds, the whales, and man, and characterized by the production of\nliving young, which are nourished after birth by milk from the teats\n(_mamm\u00e6_, _mammary glands_) of the mother. A striking difference in\nembryonic development has led to the division of this class into two\ngreat groups: in one of these, when the embryo has attained a certain\nstage, a vascular connection, called the _placenta_, is formed between\nthe embryo and the mother; in the other this is wanting, and the\nyoung are produced in a very incomplete state. The former, including\nthe greater part of the class, are called _placental mammals_; the\nlatter, or _aplacental mammals_, include the marsupials and monotremes\n(_ornithorhynchus_).\n\n=Marsupials.= An order of Mammalia in which the young are born in a\nvery incomplete state of development, and carried by the mother, while\nsucking, in a ventral pouch (_marsupium_), such as the kangaroos,\nopossums, etc. (see MAMMALIA).\n\n=Molecule.= A mass; one of the invisible particles supposed to\nconstitute matter of any kind.\n\n=Mollusk.= An invertebrate animal, having a soft, fleshy body (whence\nthe name), which is inarticulate, and not radiate internally.\n\n=Monkey.= See SIMIA.\n\n=Monogamy.= A marriage to one wife only, or the state of such as are\nrestricted to a single wife, or may not marry again after the death of\na first wife.\n\n=Monotheism.= The doctrine or belief that there is but one God.\n\n=Morphology.= The law of form or structure independent of function.\n\n=Nascent.= Commencing development.\n\n=Nexus.= Connection; tie.\n\n=Nictitating Membrane.= A semi-transparent membrane, which can be drawn\nacross the eye in birds and reptiles, either to moderate the effects of\na strong light or to sweep particles of dust, etc., from the surface of\nthe eye.\n\n=Noumenon= (Metaph.). The of itself unknown and unknowable rational\nobject, or _thing in itself_, which is distinguished from the\n_phenomenon_ in which it occurs to apprehension, and by which it is\ninterpreted and understood; so used in the philosophy of Kant and his\nfollowers.\n\n=Opossum.= An animal of several species of marsupial quadrupeds of the\ngenus _Didelphys_. The common species of the United States is the _D.\nVirginiana_. Another species, common in Texas and California, is _D.\nCalifornica_, and other species are found in South America.\n\n=Organism.= An organized being, whether plant or animal.\n\n=Ovule.= An egg. (Bot.) The rudimentary state of a seed. It consists\nessentially of a nucleus developed directly from the placenta.\n\n=Parasite.= An animal or plant living upon or in, and at the expense\nof, another organism.\n\n=Pelvis.= The bony arch to which the hind-limbs of vertebrate animals\nare articulated.\n\n=Placentalia=, =Placentata=, or =Placental Mammals=. See MAMMALIA.\n\n=Protozoa.= The lowest great division of the Animal Kingdom. These\nanimals are composed of a gelatinous material, and show scarcely any\ntrace of distinct organs. The infusoria, foraminifera, and sponges,\nwith some other forms, belong to this division.\n\n=Phenomenon.= 1. An appearance; anything visible; whatever is\npresented to the eye; whatever, in matter or spirit, is apparent\nto, or is apprehended by, observation, as distinguished from its\nground, substance, or unknown constitution; as _phenomena_ of heat or\nelectricity; phenomena of imagination or memory.\n\n 2. Sometimes a remarkable or unusual appearance whose cause is not\n immediately obvious.\n\n=Plexus.= Any net-work of vessels, nerves, or fibers.\n\n=Polygamy.= A plurality of wives or husbands at the same time, or the\nhaving of such plurality; usually the condition of a man having more\nthan one wife.\n\n=Polytheism.= The doctrine of a plurality of gods or invisible beings\nsuperior to man, and having an agency in the government of the world.\n\n=Proteine= (_n._ Lat., _proteinum_, from Gr., _first_--to be the\nfirst--the first place, chief rank, because it occupies the first\nplace in relation to the albuminous principles). (Chem.) A substance\nclaimed by Mulder to be obtained as a distinct substance from albumen,\nfibrine, or caseine, and considered by him to be the basis of animal\ntissue and of some substances of vegetable origin.\n\n The theory of proteine can not be maintained.--_Gregory._\n\n The theory of Mulder is doubted and denied by many chemists, and also\n the existence of _proteine_ as a distinct substance.\n\n=Psychology.= A discourse or treatise on the human soul; the science of\nthe human soul; specifically, the systematic or scientific knowledge of\nthe powers and functions of the human soul, so far as they are known by\nconsciousness.\n\n=Quadrumane.= An animal having four feet that correspond to the hands\nof a man, as a monkey.\n\n=Race.= 1. The descendants of a common ancestor; a family, tribe,\npeople, or nation, believed or presumed to belong to the same stock; a\nlineage; a breed.\n\n 2. A root.\n\n=Retina.= The delicate inner coat of the eye, formed by nervous\nfilaments spreading from the optic nerve, and serving for the\nperception of the impressions produced by light.\n\n=Rotifer= (_n._ Lat. _rotifer_, from Lat. _rota_, a wheel, and _ferro_,\nto bear. Fr. _rotif\u00e8re_). (Zo\u00f6l.) One of a group of microscopic\ncrustaceans, having no limbs, and moving by means of rows of cilia\nabout the head or the anterior extremity.\n\n=Rudiment= (Nat. Hist.). An imperfect organ, or one which is never\nfully formed.\n\n=Sacral.= Belonging to the sacrum, or the bone composed usually of two\nor more united vertebr\u00e6 to which the sides of the pelvis in vertebrate\nanimals are attached.\n\n=Sacrum.= The bone which forms the posterior part of the pelvis. It is\ntriangular in form.\n\n=Secularize.= To convert from spiritual to secular or common use; as to\nsecularize a church, or church property.\n\n=Segments.= The transverse rings of which the body of an articulate\nanimal or annelid is composed.\n\n=Simia= (plural =Simiad\u00e6=) (Lat., an ape, from _simus_, flat-nosed,\nsnub-nosed). (Zo\u00f6l.) A Linn\u00e6an genus of animals, including the ape,\nmonkey, and the like; a general name of the various tribes of monkeys.\n\n=Species= (Nat. Hist.). A permanent class of existing things or beings,\nassociated according to attributes or properties which are determined\nby scientific observation.\n\n=Spinal Cord.= The central portion of the nervous system in the\nvertebrata, which descends from the brain through the arches of the\nvertebr\u00e6, and gives off nearly all the nerves to the various organs of\nthe body.\n\n=Statical.= To stand. 1. Pertaining to bodies at rest, or in\nequilibrium.\n\n 2. Resting; acting by mere weight without motion; as _statical_\n pressure.\n\n=Sulcus.= A fissure of the brain, separating two convolutions, or\n_gyri_.\n\n=Teleology= (Fr., _t\u00e9l\u00e9ologie_, from Gr., the end or issue, and\ndiscourse). The science or doctrine of the final causes of things; the\nphilosophical consideration of final causes in general.\n\n=Variety= (Nat. Hist., Bot., and Zo\u00f6l.). Any form or condition of\nstructure under a species which differs in its characteristics from\nthose typical to the species, as in color, shape, size, and the like,\nand which is capable either of perpetuating itself for a period, or of\nbeing perpetuated by artificial means; also, any of the various forms\nunder a species meeting the conditions mentioned. A form characterized\nby an abnormity of structure, or any difference from the type that is\nnot capable of being perpetuated through two or more generations, is\nnot called a variety.\n\n=Vascular.= Containing blood-vessels.\n\n=Vertebrata=; or =Vertebrate Animals=. The highest division of the\nanimal kingdom, so called from the presence in most cases of a\nback-bone composed of numerous joints or _vertebr\u00e6_, which constitutes\nthe center of the skeleton, and at the same time supports and protects\nthe central parts of the nervous system.\n\n=Vesicle.= A bladder-like vessel; a membranous cavity; a cyst; a cell;\nespecially (_a_) (Bot.) a small bladder-like body in the substance of a\nvegetable, or upon the surface of a leaf.--_Gray._ (_b_) (Med.) A small\norbicular elevation of the cuticle containing lymph, and succeeded by\na scurf or laminated scab; also, any small cavity or sac in the human\nbody; as the umbilical vesicle.\n\n=Vortices= (_verto_, to turn). 1. A whirling or circular motion of any\nfluid, usually of water, forming a kind of cavity in the center of\nthe circle, and in some instances drawing in water or absorbing other\nthings; a whirlpool.\n\n 2. A whirling of the air; a whirlwind.\n\n 3. (_Cartesian system._) A supposed collection of particles of very\n subtile matter, endowed with a rapid rotary motion around an axis.\n By means of these _vortices_ Descartes attempted to account for the\n formation of the universe.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX.\n\n\n  Advocacy, maxim of, 132.\n\n  Affections, structural system of, 532.\n\n  Agnosticism, as defined by Huxley, 274.\n\n  Allantois, the, office of, 236 _et seq._, 245.\n\n  Almagest. See PTOLEMAIC SYSTEM.\n\n  Amphibians in the Darwinian pedigree of man, 71, 96, 98.\n\n  Amphioxus. See LANCELET.\n\n  Amputation before or after birth, 129, 130.\n\n  Anatomy, modern, great advance of, 40, 41.\n    Plato's knowledge of, 38.\n\n  Anatomy of the mind, 470.\n\n  Animals, origin of, according to Plato, 57 _et seq._\n    origin of, according to Darwin, 60 _et seq._\n\n  Anthropomorphic attributes not necessary to the conception of God, 293\n  _et seq._\n\n  Anthropomorphism, meaning, 293.\n\n  Antichthon, or counter-earth, invented by the Pythagoreans, 36.\n\n  Apes, varieties of, 71.\n    anthropomorphous, 100.\n\n  Apparitions, facts communicated by, 486-488.\n\n  Aquatic worm, 94.\n\n  Areas, effect of change of, 248.\n\n  Articulata, likeness of structure in, 205 _et seq._\n\n  Ascidians, larv\u00e6 of, 94.\n\n  Assassination, once employed with impunity, 165.\n\n  Associative faculty, what it is, 528.\n\n  Athenian, the, compared with a savage, 73, 74.\n\n  Authority, as affecting belief, 3.\n    ecclesiastic and scientific, 22, 23.\n    in science, 21.\n\n  Automatic machines, analysis of, 505.\n\n\n  Baboons, how different from monkeys, 71, _note_.\n\n  Belief, foundations of, 1-3.\n    antiquity of, how to be regarded, 132 _et seq._\n    grounds of, 274-277.\n\n  Birds, origin of, according to Plato, 57.\n    sexual selection among, 67, _note_.\n\n  Bishop, P. P., \"The Heart of Man,\" 471, _note_.\n\n  Blood, similarity in the composition of, 122.\n    great change in, 122.\n\n  Body, natural and spiritual, 468.\n\n  Brain of men and apes compared, 191.\n    human, 518.\n    office of, 196.\n\n  Breaks in the organic chain, 103-106.\n\n  Buffon, accepted Mosaic account of creation, 368, 369.\n\n\n  Causation, ultimate, 386.\n\n  Cell, hypothesis of the single, 371, _note_.\n\n  Chaos, Plato's conception of, 45.\n\n  Classification, how it supports evolution, 200, 203.\n\n  Common stock, hypothesis of descent from, 209.\n\n  Composition, what occurs in, 473, 474.\n\n  Comte, Auguste, one of his suggestions, 387, 388.\n\n  Conduct, Spencer's view of, 427 _et seq._\n\n  Consciousness, what it is, 470, 471, 503.\n\n  Constitutions, political, supposed growth of, 168.\n\n  Conversations invented during sleep, 480, 481.\n\n  Conversion of organs, 67.\n\n  Copernicus, system of, 32.\n\n  Creation, special, contrasted with evolution, 1 _et seq._\n    absolute, unknown to the Greeks, 45.\n    influence of the belief in, 164, 165.\n    man's power of, 144.\n    Mosaic account of, 23.\n    poetical, 140, 141.\n    what it is, 136 _et seq._, 139, 140, 223.\n\n  Creator, the, postulate of, 115.\n    honoring or dishonoring the, not the question, 160 _et seq._\n    method of, 207.\n\n  Creator, methods of, in the two realms of spirit and matter, 537.\n    power of, boundless, 224, 232, 535.\n\n  Crosses not permissible between distinct species, 372.\n\n\n  Darwin, Charles, his theory of evolution, 7.\n    bearing of his theory on man's immortality, 12, 13.\n    candor and accuracy of, 101.\n    difference of, from Spencer, 43, 225.\n    his pedigree of man, 70-72, 87.\n    his view of human dignity, 10.\n    on primeval man, 375.\n    on the belief in God, 60, 61.\n    rejects an aboriginal pair, 406.\n    tabulated form of his pedigree of man, 93.\n\n  Dekad, the perfect number of the Pythagoreans, 35.\n\n  Delirium, explanation of, 499, 500.\n\n  Demiurgus, the, constructor of Plato's Kosmos, 46.\n\n  Descartes, his theory of vortices, 33.\n\n  Descent, must be unbroken, 211.\n\n  Design, when hypothesis of, necessary, 214.\n\n  Desires, mental system of, 532.\n\n  Domestic animals, breeding of, 89.\n\n  Distribution in space, how it affects evolution, 203, 247.\n    in time, 251.\n\n  Dreams, phenomena of, 479-490.\n\n\n  Earth. See SOLAR SYSTEM.\n\n  Economy of Nature, meaning of, 116, 126.\n\n  Elements, the four, in the Platonic Kosmos, 45, 46.\n\n  Eliphaz and Zophar. See JOB.\n\n  Embryonic development, resemblances in, 111, 120.\n\n  Embryology, cautions respecting, 241.\n    how it supports evolution, 229.\n\n  Emotions, system of, 530-532.\n\n  Energy. See POWER, CAUSATION.\n\n  Evidence, rules of circumstantial, 14-17.\n    applicable to scientific investigation, 17, 18.\n    missing links in chain of, 18-20.\n    process of, 67, 68.\n\n  Evil, rational explanation of, 148 _et seq._\n\n  Evolution, assumptions in the theory of, 18-20.\n    general reasons for, 102.\n    law of, limited, 210.\n    of man, 373.\n    principle of, 377.\n    process reversed, 252-256.\n\n  Experts, true office of, 21, 22.\n\n  Extemporaneous speaking, what is, 474.\n\n  Eye, the, formation of, 68-70, 83, 84.\n\n\n  Faunas of different areas, 247.\n\n  Fetichism. See SPENCER.\n\n  Fishes, origin of, according to Plato, 58.\n    most lowly organized, 95.\n    shell, the lowest form of, 58.\n\n  F\u0153tus, growth of the, 234 _et seq._\n\n\n  Galen, mistakes of, in anatomy, 39, 40.\n    how he differed from Plato, 39.\n\n  Galileo, confirms and rectifies Kepler's laws, 32.\n    Papal condemnation of, 20, 21, _note_.\n\n  Ganoids, description of, 96.\n\n  Genealogical trees of no value in zo\u00f6logy, 202, _note_.\n\n  General laws and special creations, 127, 128.\n\n  Germ, ante-f\u0153tal, how formed, 234.\n\n  Gladiatorial shows, part of Roman civilization, 164.\n\n  God, existence of, how proved, 11, 12.\n    a necessary postulate, 402.\n    a personal, denied by Spencer, 433.\n    consciousness of, how to be lost, according to Spencer, 285 _et seq._\n    existence and attributes of, how deduced, 300 _et seq._\n    his dealing with Abraham, 425.\n    probable methods of, 63, 64, 82-85, 102.\n    unlike Plato's Demiurgus, 85.\n\n  Gods, the, origin of, among the Greeks, 50.\n    genesis of, according to Plato, 46, 48-50, _note_.\n    office of, in the formation of Plato's Kosmos, 49.\n\n  Gravitation, law of, how deduced, 20.\n\n  Greek philosophy, account of, 24 _et seq._\n    encounters monotheism at Alexandria, 287.\n    how hampered by the mythology, 138.\n    schools of, before Plato, 28.\n\n  Grote, his Plato cited and followed, 27-40, 287, 288, 290.\n\n\n  Harvey discovers the circulation of the blood, 40.\n\n  Heat, origin of, 386, 387.\n\n  Hebrews receive divine commands, 418.\n\n  Heredity, law of, limited, 225.\n\n  Homologous organs, meaning of, 97.\n    See SWIM-BLADDER AND LUNG.\n    meaning of, 215, _note_.\n\n  Human life, peculiar sacredness of, 164-166.\n\n  Huxley, Professor, on the brain of man and apes, 192.\n\n  Huxley, Professor, quoted, 121.\n\n\n  Ideal persons, are creations, 140, 141.\n\n  Ideal plan, objection to, 114, 118.\n\n  Ideas in Plato's system, coeval with primordial matter, 45, 46.\n    how acquired, 506-508.\n\n  Idiocy, absolute, probably does not exist, 526.\n    what it is, 526-528.\n\n  Idiot. See IDIOCY.\n\n  Immortality, what is proof of, 41, 540.\n    belief in, 61, 62.\n    fanciful explanation of, 543.\n\n  Improvisation, what is, 474.\n\n  Infinite goodness consistent with the existence of suffering, 156.\n\n  Instinct, genesis of, according to Plato, 60.\n    genesis of, according to Darwin, _ib._\n\n  Intellectual faculties, system of, 525.\n\n  Interbreeding. See SPECIES.\n\n  Introspective faculty, power of the, 529.\n\n  Intuitive faculty, office of, 525, 526.\n\n  Invention in mechanics, 475.\n\n  Invention is creation, 142.\n\n\n  Job and his friends, 25 _et seq._\n\n\n  Kangaroos, structure of, 98.\n\n  Kepler, his laws of the planetary motions, 32.\n\n  Knowledge not limited to scientific demonstration, 392.\n    of ourselves, 520, 521.\n\n  Kosmos, the. See PLATO.\n\n\n  Lancelet, visual organ of the, 68.\n\n  Languages, origin of, 168, 397, 398.\n\n  Lemurid\u00e6 in the Darwinian pedigree of man, 71.\n    characteristics of, 99.\n\n  Logic, abuse of, 136 _et seq._\n    right use of, 220.\n    use and misuse of its forms, 145.\n\n  Lung in vertebrates, supposed homologue with a swim-bladder, 67.\n    conversion of, from swim-bladder, 97.\n\n\n  Macaulay, Lord, his depreciation of natural theology, 24 _et seq._\n\n  Macbeth, Lady, her sleep-walking analyzed, 491-499.\n\n  Man, dignity of, how to be treated, 9, 10.\n    bodily structure of, 109.\n    common ancestor of, and the apes, 71, 100.\n    constructive faculty of, 346.\n    immortality of, 12, 13.\n    liability to certain diseases, 110.\n    moral accountability of, 9, 10.\n    origin of, 348.\n    pedigree of, according to Darwin, 70-72.\n    rank of, in scale of being, 101.\n\n  Marriage, scientific view of, 381.\n\n  Marsupials in the Darwinian pedigree of man, 71.\n    ancient, 98.\n\n  Matter, primordial, according to Plato, 45.\n\n  Matter and spirit contrasted, 477.\n\n  Medium, effect of change of, 248, 249.\n\n  Mind, origin of, 8, 9.\n    a created being, 407 _et seq._\n    a spiritual creation, 401-404.\n    contrasted theories of, 533 _et seq._\n    evolution origin of the, 538.\n    evolution theory of origin of, 394 _et seq._\n    is an organism, 476.\n    of animals below man, 80, 81.\n    origin and nature of, 467-546.\n    origin of, according to Darwin, 78.\n    origin of, according to Plato, 79, 80.\n    structure of, 502.\n    substance of, 509.\n    systems of, 523 _et seq._\n    the human, placed under certain laws, 389, 390.\n\n  Miracles, meaning of, 129.\n\n  Miraculous interposition not necessary, 163.\n\n  Modern civilization, what it owes to belief in special creation,\n  164-166.\n\n  Monkeys, two great stems of, 71.\n    Catarrhine, or Old-World, 100.\n\n  Monotheism, its influence on philosophy, 138.\n    origin of, 342.\n\n  Monotremata, division of the mammalian series, 98.\n\n  Moral injunctions, sacred origin of, 418.\n\n  Moral injunctions, Spencer's denial of, 427 _et seq._, 433.\n\n  Moral law, capacity of human beings to receive, 420.\n    scientific view of the, 420 _et seq._\n\n  Moral purposes in the phenomena of nature, 387, 388.\n\n  Moral sense, origin of, 86.\n\n  Morphology, how it supports evolution, 202.\n\n  Mosaic account of creation, rationality of, 366 _et seq._\n\n  Murder, punishment of, moral foundation for, 166.\n\n  \"Music of the spheres,\" origin of the phrase, 37.\n\n\n  Nascent organs, meaning of, 111, 112.\n\n  \"Natural,\" meaning of, 214.\n\n  Natural theology, progress of, from Thales to Plato and Aristotle, 28,\n  29.\n    importance of, 43.\n\n  Nervous organization, Spencer's view of, 409 _et seq._\n\n  Newton, Sir Isaac, discovers the law of universal gravitation, 33.\n    deduces a personal God from nature, 331, _note_.\n    his General Scholium, 332.\n\n  Noumenon, an invented word, 269.\n\n  Number. See DEKAD, and PYTHAGORAS.\n\n\n  Opossums, structure of, 98.\n\n  Orthodoxy, Plato's idea of, as suggested in his \"Republic,\" 296, 297.\n\n  Oviparous animals, 98.\n\n\n  Pairs, of animals, opposite views of, 405.\n\n  Pairs, assumed existence of, 537.\n\n  Parasites, how to be viewed, 151 _et seq._\n\n  Pattern of structure, argument concerning, 204.\n\n  Pedigree, rule for tracing, 185-187.\n\n  Pedigree of man, Darwinian, 70 _et seq._\n\n  Phenomenon and noumenon, 268.\n\n  Philolaus as quoted by Grote, 35.\n\n  Philosophy, modern and ancient compared, 24 _et seq._\n\n  Physicians in Plato's time, 40.\n\n  Placental mammals, 99.\n\n  Plato, period of, 28, _note_.\n    as given in \"Tim\u00e6us,\" 298.\n    his Demiurgus, 287, 288.\n    his genealogy of the gods, 298, _note_.\n    his Kosmos and Darwin's hypothesis compared, 44-86.\n    his origin of religious beliefs as given in \"Republic,\" 296.\n    his triplicity of souls, 39.\n    his view of rudiments, 74, 75.\n    originality of, 289, 290.\n\n  Polytheism, origin of, 342.\n\n  Power, distinct from substance, 226, 233, _note_; 339 _et seq._\n    an attribute of mind, 386.\n    of nature, limited, 343-345.\n\n  Primitive beliefs, not necessarily wrong, 132 _et seq._\n\n  \"Principle\" of construction, 106, 107.\n\n  Probability, force of, in reasoning, 7.\n\n  Psychology, needs a new birth, 546.\n\n  Ptolemaic system, description of, 31.\n\n  Pyramids, why referable to mind, 390, 391.\n\n  Pythagoras, school of, 34 _et seq._\n\n\n  Quadrumana, in the Darwinian pedigree of man, 71.\n    and other mammals, 99.\n\n\n  Races, what are, 372.\n\n  Raphael, created images, 143.\n\n  Religion, what is, 11, 12.\n    natural, 23.\n    when in conflict with science, 11-13, 399.\n\n  Religious consciousness, Spencer's origin of, 284.\n\n  Reproduction, two grand systems of, 107, 108.\n\n  Reproductive process, parallel in the, 110.\n\n  Reptiles, Plato's origin of, 58.\n\n  Resurrection, St. Paul's doctrine of the, 468.\n\n  Revelation, how treated in this work, 23.\n    purpose of, 540.\n\n  Roman civilization, lacked belief in creation, 164.\n    law, slavery under, 165.\n\n  Rudiments, Plato's view of, 74, 75.\n    instances of, 111-114, 124, 125.\n\n\n  Sacrum, analysis of the human, 215.\n    structure of the female, 220.\n\n  Savages, beliefs of, 60, 61.\n\n  Science, domain of, 391, 392.\n    present tendency of, 352.\n    tendencies of, 127.\n    values of, 291.\n    when in conflict with religion, meaning of, 11, 12.\n    wrong aims of, 545.\n\n  Scott, Sir Walter, his reliance on thoughts obtained during sleep,\n  490, _note_.\n\n  Secularization of morals discussed, 434 _et seq._\n\n  Segments. See ARTICULATA; VERTEBRATES.\n\n  Selection, natural, 65, 72, 89.\n    limitations to, 91.\n    office of, 72.\n    sexual, 66, 72, 89.\n\n  Senses, the corporeal, 503.\n\n  Sexes, origin of, in Plato's Kosmos, 55.\n    in Nature, 221, 354 _et seq._, 378.\n\n  Sexual love, in men and brutes, 379.\n    moral and social phenomena of, 382.\n\n  Sexual union, operation of, 234 _et seq._\n\n  Sexual unions, purpose of, 384, 385.\n\n  Shakespeare, created imaginary persons, 140, 141.\n\n  Simiad\u00e6, general term for monkeys, 99.\n\n  Simonides, poetical theologies of, 24 _et seq._\n\n  Sixteenth century, intellectual habits in the, 21.\n\n  Sin, how to be viewed, 148, _note_.\n\n  Slavery, under the Roman law, 165.\n\n  Sleep, phenomena of, 479 _et seq._\n    better thoughts during, 489.\n\n  Society, phenomena of, 334 _et seq._\n\n  Solar system, how viewed by the Greeks, 31 _et seq._\n    origin of, 168, 172, 301.\n\n  Somnambulism, phenomena of, 491.\n\n  Soul, meaning of, 478.\n\n  Souls, of men, genesis of, in Plato's Kosmos, 51, 76, 77.\n    transmigration of, 78.\n    triplicity of, 51, 76, 77.\n\n  Space, illimitable, concepts of, 260 _et seq._\n\n  Species, finality of, 157 _et seq._\n    meaning of, 372 _et seq._\n\n  Spencer, Herbert, his theory of animal evolution, 7, 8.\n    answers to his objections, 145 _et seq._\n    attacks \"the current creed,\" 434.\n    creation is something made out of nothing, 136.\n    creation incapable of being conceived, 136.\n    creation not supported by any proof, 135.\n    his agnosticism examined, 257 _et seq._\n    his argument from parasites, 151 _et seq._\n    his denial of the possibility of knowing mind, 508.\n    his doctrine of evolution, 131.\n    his ethical system, 427 _et seq._\n    his ghost-theory, 284 _et seq._\n    his origin of man, 348-351, 357.\n    his psychological system, 408 _et seq._\n    his psychology criticised, 470, 504.\n    his theory of mind, 510-516.\n    his theory of the moral sense, 418, 423.\n    his treatment of the divine attributes, 293.\n    his \"unknown cause,\" 163, 166.\n    how his theory differs from Darwin's, 225.\n    on the evolution of mind, 64.\n    on the evolution of animals, 179.\n    on universal law of evolution, 167.\n    special creations presumptively absurd, 132 _et seq._\n\n  St. Paul, his doctrine of the resurrection, 468.\n\n  Struggle for existence, meaning of, 88.\n\n  Substance, distinct from power, 233.\n    of mind, 469.\n\n  Substitution and suppression of organs, 236 _et seq._\n\n  \"Supernatural,\" meaning of, 214.\n\n  \"Survival of the fittest,\" meaning of, 65, 66.\n\n  Swim-bladder, supposed homologue of a lung, 67.\n    conversion of, 96.\n\n\n  Taine, M., his views of the objects of history, 545.\n\n  Telescope, formation of the, 68-70.\n\n  Thales, philosophy of, 24, 27, 28.\n    period of, 28, _note_.\n\n  Theology, the current, not to be considered, 145.\n\n  Time, beginning of, in Plato's Kosmos, 48.\n    conception of endless, 262 _et seq._\n\n  Transmigration, from animal to animal, 54-59.\n\n  Typical plan, concealed in the ante-f\u0153tal germ, 238.\n\n\n  Uniformity. See PATTERN.\n\n\n  Varieties, what are, 372.\n\n  Vertebral column, analysis of, 215.\n\n  Voltaire, saying of, 25.\n\n  Von Baer, his embryologic law, 229.\n\n  Vortices. See DESCARTES.\n\n\n  Women, origin of, in Plato's Kosmos, 55.\n\n\n    THE END.\n\n\n\n\nBY GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS.\n\n\n =LIFE OF DANIEL WEBSTER.= By GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS. Illustrated with\n Steel Portrait and Woodcuts. Two vols., 8vo. Cloth, $4.00; sheep,\n $6.00; half morocco, $10.00.\n\nA most valuable and important contribution to the history of American\nparties and politics, and to the best class of our literature. It is a\nmodel biography of a most gifted man, wherein the intermingling of the\nstatesman and lawyer with the husband, father, and friend, is painted\nso that we feel the reality of the picture.\n\n \"We believe the present work to be a most valuable and\n important contribution to the history of American parties and\n politics.\"--_London Saturday Review._\n\n \"Of Mr. Curtis's labor we wish to record our opinion, in addition\n to what we have already said, that, in the writing of this book,\n he has made a most valuable contribution to the best class of our\n literature.\"--_New York Tribune._\n\n \"This 'Life of Webster' is a monument to both subject and author, and\n one that will stand well the wear of time.\"--_Boston Post._\n\n \"Mr. Curtis, it will be remembered, was one of the literary executors\n named by Mr. Webster, in his will, to do this work; and owing to the\n death of two of the others, Mr. Everett and President Felton, and the\n advanced age of Mr. Ticknor, Mr. Curtis has prepared the biography\n himself, and it has passed under Mr. Ticknor's revision. We believe\n the work will satisfy the wishes of Mr. Webster's most devoted\n friends.\"--_Boston Journal._\n\n\n =THE LAST YEARS OF DANIEL WEBSTER.= A MONOGRAPH. By GEORGE TICKNOR\n CURTIS. 8vo. Paper, 50 cents.\n\n \"Laying aside, so far as I may be able, the partiality of a friend and\n biographer, I shall subject to the scrutiny of reason and good sense\n the accusation that, in Mr. Webster's later years, for the sake of\n attaining the Presidency, by bidding for the political support of the\n Southern States, he renounced the principles which he had professed\n all his life on the subject of slavery.\"--_The Author._\n\n\n =McCLELLAN'S LAST SERVICE TO THE REPUBLIC=, together with a Tribute to\n his Memory. By GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS. With a Map showing the Position\n of the Union and Confederate Forces on the Night of November 7, 1862.\n 12mo. Paper, 30 cents.\n\n \"Every statement of a fact, contained in these pages, which was not\n founded on General McClellan's official report of his campaigns, or\n derived from some other public source, was given to me by the General\n in the spring of 1880, and was written down by me at the time. At my\n request he superintended the preparation of the map which shows his\n position and that of the Confederate troops on the 7th and 8th of\n November, 1862, and compared it with the military maps issued by the\n Government after the close of the civil war.\"--_From the Author's\n Prefatory Note._\n\n\n    New York: D. APPLETON & CO., 1, 3, & 5 Bond Street.\n\n\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's note:\n\n Obvious typographical errors have been silently corrected. Variations\n in spelling, punctuation, accents and hyphenation remain as in the\n original.\n\n In Chapter 12, Page 526, the sentence: \"This is a power that\n can belong to and inhere in a spiritual organism alone. We must,\n therefore, recognize in the infant this original implanted endowment,\n the capacity to be mentally convinced of realities; and while, in\n order to the first exercise of this capacity there must be a physical\n organism which will conduct the sensory impressions to the brain ...\"\n\n Has been amended to read \"... in order to meet the first exercise of this\n capacity ...\"","title":"Creation or Evolution? A Philosophical Inquiry","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":194369}