{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_50922/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_50922","id":"gutenberg_50922","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50922","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: History - Early Modern (c. 1450-1750)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Peace"],"text":"TRANSCRIBER\u2019S NOTE\n\n  * Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_.\n  * Bold text is denoted by equals as in =bold=.\n  * Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.\n  * Original spelling was kept, but variant spellings were made\n    consistent when a predominant usage was found.\n  * Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected.\n\n\n\n\nPERPETUAL PEACE\n\n\n[Illustration]\n\n\n  \u201cFor I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see,\n  Saw the Vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be;\n  Saw the heavens fill with commerce, argosies of magic sails,\n  Pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down with costly bales;\n  Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rain\u2019d a ghastly dew\n  From the nations\u2019 airy navies grappling in the central blue;\n  Far along the world-wide whisper of the south-wind rushing warm,\n  With the standards of the peoples plunging thro\u2019 the thunder-storm;\n  Till the war-drum throbb\u2019d no longer, and the battle-flags were furl\u2019d\n  In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.\n  There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe,\n  And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.\u201d\n\n  TENNYSON: _Locksley Hall_.\n\n\n\n\n  PERPETUAL PEACE\n  A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY\n\n  BY\n  IMMANUEL KANT\n\n  1795\n\n\n  TRANSLATED WITH INTRODUCTION\n  AND NOTES BY\n  M. CAMPBELL SMITH, M.A.\n\n  _WITH A PREFACE BY PROFESSOR LATTA_\n\n\n  LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.\n  RUSKIN HOUSE 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C.\n  NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n\n\n\n\n  _First Edition, 1903_\n  _Second Impression, February 1915_\n  _Third       \u201d      February 1917_\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThis translation of Kant\u2019s essay on _Perpetual Peace_ was undertaken\nby Miss Mary Campbell Smith at the suggestion of the late Professor\nRitchie of St. Andrews, who had promised to write for it a preface,\nindicating the value of Kant\u2019s work in relation to recent discussions\nregarding the possibility of \u201cmaking wars to cease.\u201d In view of the\ngeneral interest which these discussions have aroused and of the\nvague thinking and aspiration which have too often characterised\nthem, it seemed to Professor Ritchie that a translation of this wise\nand sagacious essay would be both opportune and valuable.[1] His\nuntimely death has prevented the fulfilment of his promise, and I\nhave been asked, in his stead, to introduce the translator\u2019s work.\n\n  [1] Cf. his _Studies in Political and Social Ethics_, pp. 169,\n  170.\n\nThis is, I think, the only complete translation into English of\nKant\u2019s essay, including all the notes as well as the text, and the\ntranslator has added a full historical Introduction, along with\nnumerous notes of her own, so as (in Professor Ritchie\u2019s words)\n\u201cto meet the needs (1) of the student of Political Science who\nwishes to understand the relation of Kant\u2019s theories to those of\nGrotius, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau etc., and (2) of the general reader\nwho wishes to understand the significance of Kant\u2019s proposals\nin connection with the ideals of Peace Congresses, and with the\ndevelopment of International Law from the end of the Middle Ages to\nthe Hague Conference.\u201d\n\nAlthough it is more than 100 years since Kant\u2019s essay was written,\nits substantial value is practically unimpaired. Anyone who is\nacquainted with the general character of the mind of Kant will\nexpect to find in him sound common-sense, clear recognition of the\nessential facts of the case and a remarkable power of analytically\nexhibiting the conditions on which the facts necessarily depend.\nThese characteristics are manifest in the essay on _Perpetual Peace_.\nKant is not pessimist enough to believe that a perpetual peace is an\nunrealisable dream or a consummation devoutly to be feared, nor is\nhe optimist enough to fancy that it is an ideal which could easily\nbe realised if men would but turn their hearts to one another. For\nKant perpetual peace is an ideal, not merely as a speculative Utopian\nidea, with which in fancy we may play, but as a moral principle,\nwhich ought to be, and therefore can be, realised. Yet he makes it\nperfectly clear that we cannot hope to approach the realisation of\nit unless we honestly face political facts and get a firm grasp of\nthe indispensable conditions of a lasting peace. To strive after the\nideal in contempt or in ignorance of these conditions is a labour\nthat must inevitably be either fruitless or destructive of its own\nends. Thus Kant demonstrates the hopelessness of any attempt to\nsecure perpetual peace between independent nations. Such nations may\nmake treaties; but these are binding only for so long as it is not\nto the interest of either party to denounce them. To enforce them\nis impossible while the nations remain independent. \u201cThere is,\u201d as\nProfessor Ritchie put it (_Studies in Political and Social Ethics_,\np. 169), \u201conly one way in which war between independent nations can\nbe prevented; and that is by the nations ceasing to be independent.\u201d\nBut this does not necessarily mean the establishment of a despotism,\nwhether autocratic or democratic. On the other hand, Kant maintains\nthat just as peace between individuals within a state can only be\npermanently secured by the institution of a \u201crepublican\u201d (that is\nto say, a representative) government, so the only real guarantee\nof a permanent peace between nations is the establishment of a\nfederation of free \u201crepublican\u201d states. Such a federation he regards\nas practically possible. \u201cFor if Fortune ordains that a powerful\nand enlightened people should form a republic\u2014which by its very\nnature is inclined to perpetual peace\u2014this would serve as a centre\nof federal union for other states wishing to join, and thus secure\nconditions of freedom among the states in accordance with the idea of\nthe law of nations. Gradually, through different unions of this kind,\nthe federation would extend further and further.\u201d\n\nReaders who are acquainted with the general philosophy of Kant\nwill find many traces of its influence in the essay on _Perpetual\nPeace_. Those who have no knowledge of his philosophy may find some\nof his forms of statement rather difficult to understand, and it\nmay therefore not be out of place for me to indicate very briefly\nthe meaning of some terms which he frequently uses, especially in\nthe Supplements and Appendices. Thus at the beginning of the First\nSupplement, Kant draws a distinction between the mechanical and the\nteleological view of things, between \u201cnature\u201d and \u201cProvidence\u201d,\nwhich depends upon his main philosophical position. According to\nKant, pure reason has two aspects, theoretical and practical. As\nconcerning knowledge, strictly so called, the _a priori_ principles\nof reason (_e.g._ substance and attribute, cause and effect etc.)\nare valid only within the realm of possible sense-experience. Such\nideas, for instance, cannot be extended to God, since He is not a\npossible object of sense-experience. They are limited to the world\nof phenomena. This world of phenomena (\u201cnature\u201d or the world of\nsense-experience) is a purely mechanical system. But in order to\nunderstand fully the phenomenal world, the pure theoretical reason\nmust postulate certain ideas (the ideas of the soul, the world and\nGod), the objects of which transcend sense-experience. These ideas\nare not theoretically valid, but their validity is practically\nestablished by the pure practical reason, which does not yield\nspeculative truth, but prescribes its principles \u201cdogmatically\u201d in\nthe form of imperatives to the will. The will is itself practical\nreason, and thus it imposes its imperatives upon itself. The\nfundamental imperative of the practical reason is stated by Kant in\nAppendix I. (p. 175):\u2014\u201cAct so that thou canst will that thy maxim\nshould be a universal law, be the end of thy action what it will.\u201d\nIf the end of perpetual peace is a duty, it must be necessarily\ndeduced from this general law. And Kant does regard it as a duty. \u201cWe\nmust desire perpetual peace not only as a material good, but also\nas a state of things resulting from our recognition of the precepts\nof duty\u201d (_loc. cit._). This is further expressed in the maxim (p.\n177):\u2014\u201cSeek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its\nrighteousness, and the object of your endeavour, the blessing of\nperpetual peace, will be added unto you.\u201d The distinction between\nthe moral politician and the political moralist, which is developed\nin Appendix I., is an application of the general distinction\nbetween duty and expediency, which is a prominent feature of the\nKantian ethics. Methods of expediency, omitting all reference to\nthe pure practical reason, can only bring about re-arrangements of\ncircumstances in the mechanical course of nature. They can never\nguarantee the attainment of their end: they can never make it more\nthan a speculative ideal, which may or may not be practicable. But\nif the end can be shown to be a duty, we have, from Kant\u2019s point\nof view, the only reasonable ground for a conviction that it is\nrealisable. We cannot, indeed, theoretically _know_ that it is\nrealisable. \u201cReason is not sufficiently enlightened to survey the\nseries of predetermining causes which would make it possible for us\nto predict with certainty the good or bad results of human action,\nas they follow from the mechanical laws of nature; although we may\nhope that things will turn out as we should desire\u201d (p. 163). On the\nother hand, since the idea of perpetual peace is a moral ideal, an\n\u201cidea of duty\u201d, we are entitled to believe that it is practicable.\n\u201cNature guarantees the coming of perpetual peace, through the natural\ncourse of human propensities; not indeed with sufficient certainty to\nenable us to prophesy the future of this ideal theoretically, but yet\nclearly enough for practical purposes\u201d (p. 157). One might extend\nthis discussion indefinitely; but what has been said may suffice for\ngeneral guidance.\n\nThe \u201cwise and sagacious\u201d thought of Kant is not expressed in a\nsimple style, and the translation has consequently been a very\ndifficult piece of work. But the translator has shown great skill in\nmanipulating the involutions, parentheses and prodigious sentences\nof the original. In this she has had the valuable help of Mr. David\nMorrison, M.A., who revised the whole translation with the greatest\ncare and to whom she owes the solution of a number of difficulties.\nHer work will have its fitting reward if it succeeds in familiarising\nthe English-speaking student of politics with a political essay of\nenduring value, written by one of the master thinkers of modern times.\n\n  R. LATTA.\n\n  _University of Glasgow_, May 1903.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n                                                                PAGE\n\n  PREFACE BY PROFESSOR LATTA                                       v\n\n  TRANSLATOR\u2019S INTRODUCTION                                        1\n\n  PERPETUAL PEACE                                                106\n\n  FIRST SECTION CONTAINING THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES OF\n  PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES                                 107\n\n  SECOND SECTION CONTAINING THE DEFINITIVE ARTICLES OF\n  PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES                                 117\n\n  FIRST SUPPLEMENT CONCERNING THE GUARANTEE OF PERPETUAL\n  PEACE                                                          143\n\n  SECOND SUPPLEMENT\u2014A SECRET ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACE         158\n\n  APPENDIX I.\u2014ON THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MORALS AND POLITICS\n  WITH REFERENCE TO PERPETUAL PEACE                              161\n\n  APPENDIX II.\u2014CONCERNING THE HARMONY OF POLITICS WITH MORALS\n  ACCORDING TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEA OF PUBLIC RIGHT           184\n\n  INDEX                                                          197\n\n\n\n\nTRANSLATOR\u2019S INTRODUCTION\n\n\nThis is an age of unions. Not merely in the economic sphere, in\nthe working world of unworthy ends and few ideals do we find\ngreat practical organizations; but law, medicine, science, art,\ntrade, commerce, politics and political economy\u2014we might add\nphilanthropy\u2014standing institutions, mighty forces in our social\nand intellectual life, all have helped to swell the number of our\nnineteenth century Conferences and Congresses. It is an age of\nPeace Movements and Peace Societies, of peace-loving monarchs and\npeace-seeking diplomats. This is not to say that we are preparing\nfor the millennium. Men are working together, there is a newborn\nsolidarity of interest, but rivalries between nation and nation, the\nbitternesses and hatreds inseparable from competition are not less\nkeen; prejudice and misunderstanding not less frequent; subordinate\nconflicting interests are not fewer, are perhaps, in view of changing\npolitical conditions and an ever-growing international commerce,\nmultiplying with every year. The talisman is, perhaps, self-interest,\nbut, none the less, the spirit of union is there; it is impossible to\nignore a clearly marked tendency towards international federation,\ntowards political peace. This slow movement was not born with Peace\nSocieties; its consummation lies perhaps far off in the ages to come.\nHistory at best moves slowly. But something of its past progress\nwe shall do well to know. No political idea seems to have so great\na future before it as this idea of a federation of the world. It\nis bound to realise itself some day; let us consider what are the\nchances that this day come quickly, what that it be long delayed.\nWhat obstacles lie in the way, and how may they be removed? What\nhistorical grounds have we for hoping that they may ever be removed?\nWhat, in a word, is the origin and history of the idea of a perpetual\npeace between nations, and what would be the advantage, what is the\nprospect of realising it?\n\nThe international relations of states find their expression, we are\ntold, in war and peace. What has been the part played by these great\ncounteracting forces in the history of nations? What has it been in\nprehistoric times, in the life of man in what is called the \u201cstate\nof nature\u201d? \u201cIt is no easy enterprise,\u201d says Rousseau, in more than\nusually careful language, \u201cto disentangle that which is original from\nthat which is artificial in the actual state of man, and to make\nourselves well acquainted with a state which no longer exists, which\nperhaps never has existed and which probably never will exist in the\nfuture.\u201d (Preface to the _Discourse on the Causes of Inequality_,\n1753, publ. 1754.) This is a difficulty which Rousseau surmounts only\ntoo easily. A knowledge of history, a scientific spirit may fail him:\nan imagination ever ready to pour forth detail never does. Man lived,\nsays he, \u201cwithout industry, without speech, without habitation,\nwithout war, without connection of any kind, without any need of\nhis fellows or without any desire to harm them ... sufficing to\nhimself.\u201d[2] (_Discourse on the Sciences and Arts_, 1750.) Nothing,\nwe are now certain, is less probable. We cannot paint the life of\nman at this stage of his development with any definiteness, but the\nconclusion is forced upon us that our race had no golden age,[3] no\npeaceful beginning, that this early state was indeed, as Hobbes\nheld, a state of war, of incessant war between individuals, families\nand, finally, tribes.\n\n  [2] For the inconsistency between the views expressed by Rousseau\n  on this subject in the _Discourses_ and in the _Contrat Social_\n  (Cf. I. Chs. VI., VIII.) see Ritchie\u2019s _Natural Right_, Ch.\n  III., pp. 48, 49; Caird\u2019s essay on Rousseau in his _Essays on\n  Literature and Philosophy_, Vol. I.; and Morley\u2019s _Rousseau_,\n  Vol. I., Ch. V.; Vol. II., Ch. XII.\n\n  [3] The theory that the golden age was identical with the\n  state of nature, Professor D. G. Ritchie ascribes to Locke\n  (see _Natural Right_, Ch. II., p. 42). Locke, he says, \u201chas an\n  idea of a golden age\u201d existing even after government has come\n  into existence\u2014a time when people did not need \u201cto examine the\n  original and rights of government.\u201d [_Civil Government_, II., \u00a7\n  111.] A little confusion on the part of his readers (perhaps in\n  his own mind) makes it possible to regard the state of nature as\n  itself the golden age, and the way is prepared for the favourite\n  theory of the eighteenth century:\u2014\n\n    \u201cNor think in nature\u2019s state they blindly trod;\n    The state of nature was the reign of God:\n    Self-love and social at her birth began,\n    Union the bond of all things and of man.\n    Pride then was not, nor arts that pride to aid;\n    Man walk\u2019d with beast, joint tenant of the shade;\n    The same his table, and the same his bed;\n    No murder cloath\u2019d him, and no murder fed.\u201d\n\n    [_Essay on Man_, III., 147 _seq._]\n\n  In these lines of Pope\u2019s the state of nature is identified with\n  the golden age of the Greek and Latin poets; and \u201cthe reign of\n  God\u201d is an equivalent for Locke\u2019s words, \u201chas a law of nature to\n  govern it.\u201d\n\n\n_The Early Conditions of Society._\n\nFor the barbarian, war is the rule; peace the exception. His gods,\nlike those of Greece, are warlike gods; his spirit, at death, flees\nto some Valhalla. For him life is one long battle; his arms go with\nhim even to the grave. Food and the means of existence he seeks\nthrough plunder and violence. Here right is with might; the battle is\nto the strong. Nature has given all an equal claim to all things, but\nnot everyone can have them. This state of fearful insecurity is bound\nto come to an end. \u201cGovernment,\u201d says Locke, (_On Civil Government_,\nChap. VIII., \u00a7 105) \u201cis hardly to be avoided amongst men that live\ntogether.\u201d[4] A constant dread of attack and a growing consciousness\nof the necessity of presenting a united front against it result in\nthe choice of some leader\u2014the head of a family perhaps\u2014who acts,\nit may be, only as captain of the hosts, as did Joshua in Israel,\nor who may discharge the simple duties of a primitive governor or\nking.[5] Peace within is found to be strength without. The civil\nstate is established, so that \u201cif there needs must be war, it may\nnot yet be against all men, nor yet without some helps.\u201d (Hobbes:\n_On Liberty_, Chap. I., \u00a7 13.) This foundation of the state is the\nfirst establishment in history of a peace institution. It changes the\ncharacter of warfare, it gives it method and system; but it does not\nbring peace in its train. We have now, indeed, no longer a wholesale\nwar of all against all, a constant irregular raid and plunder of one\nindividual by another; but we have the systematic, deliberate war of\ncommunity against community, of nation against nation.[6]\n\n  [4] Cf. _Republic_, II. 369. \u201cA state,\u201d says Socrates, \u201carises\n  out of the needs of mankind: no one is self-sufficing, but all of\n  us have many wants.\u201d\n\n  [5] See Hume\u2019s account of the origin of government (_Treatise_,\n  III., Part II., Sect. VIII.). There are, he says, American\n  tribes \u201cwhere men live in concord and amity among themselves\n  without any established government; and never pay submission\n  to any of their fellows, except in time of war, when their\n  captain enjoys a shadow of authority, which he loses after their\n  return from the field, and the establishment of peace with the\n  neighbouring tribes. This authority, however, instructs them in\n  the advantages of government, and teaches them to have recourse\n  to it, when either by the pillage of war, by commerce, or by any\n  fortuitous inventions, their riches and possessions have become\n  so considerable as to make them forget, on every emergence, the\n  interest they have in the preservation of peace and justice....\n  Camps are the true mothers of cities; and as war cannot be\n  administered, by reason of the suddenness of every exigency,\n  without some authority in a single person, the same kind of\n  authority naturally takes place in that civil government, which\n  succeeds the military.\u201d\n\n  Cf. Cowper: _The Winter Morning Walk_:\u2014\n\n    \u201c. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  and ere long,\n    When man was multiplied and spread abroad\n    In tribes and clans, and had begun to call\n    These meadows and that range of hills his own,\n    The tasted sweets of property begat\n    Desire of more; . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n    Thus wars began on earth. These fought for spoil,\n    And those in self-defence. Savage at first\n    The onset, and irregular. At length\n    One eminent above the rest, for strength,\n    For stratagem, or courage, or for all,\n    Was chosen leader. Him they served in war,\n    And him in peace for sake of warlike deeds\n    Rev\u2019renced no less. . . . . . . . . . . . .\n    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n    Thus kings were first invented.\u201d\n\n\n  [6] \u201cAmong uncivilised nations, there is but one profession\n  honourable, that of arms. All the ingenuity and vigour of the\n  human mind are exerted in acquiring military skill or address.\u201d\n  Cf. Robertson\u2019s _History of Charles V._, (_Works_, 1813, vol. V.)\n  Sect. I. vii.\n\n\n_War in Classical Times._\n\nIn early times, there were no friendly neighbouring nations: beyond\nthe boundaries of every nation\u2019s territory, lay the land of a\ndeadly foe. This was the way of thinking, even of so highly cultured\na people as the Greeks, who believed that a law of nature had made\nevery outsider, every barbarian their inferior and their enemy.[7]\nTheir treaties of peace, at the time of the Persian War, were frankly\nof the kind denounced by Kant, mere armistices concluded for the\npurpose of renewing their fighting strength. The ancient world is a\nworld of perpetual war in which defeat meant annihilation. In the\nEast no right was recognised in the enemy; and even in Greece and\nRome the fate of the unarmed was death or slavery.[8] The barbaric\nor non-Grecian states had, according to Plato and Aristotle, no claim\nupon humanity, no rights in fact of any kind. Among the Romans\nthings were little better. According to Mr. T. J. Lawrence\u2014see his\n_Principles of International Law_, III., \u00a7\u00a7 21, 22\u2014they were worse.\nFor Rome stood alone in the world: she was bound by ties of kinship\nto no other state. She was, in other words, free from a sense of\nobligation to other races. War, according to Roman ideas, was made\nby the gods, apart altogether from the quarrels of rulers or races.\nTo disobey the sacred command, expressed in signs and auguries would\nhave been to hold in disrespect the law and religion of the land.\nWhen, in the hour of victory, the Romans refrained from pressing\ntheir rights against the conquered\u2014rights recognised by all Roman\njurists\u2014it was from no spirit of leniency, but in the pursuit of\na prudent and far-sighted policy, aiming at the growth of Roman\nsupremacy and the establishment of a world-embracing empire, shutting\nout all war as it blotted out natural boundaries, reducing all rights\nto the one right of imperial citizenship. There was no real _jus\nbelli_, even here in the cradle of international law; the only limits\nto the fury of war were of a religious character.\n\n  [7] Similarly we find that the original meaning of the Latin word\n  \u201c_hostis_\u201d was \u201ca stranger.\u201d\n\n  [8] In Aristotle we find the high-water mark of Greek thinking\n  on this subject. \u201cThe object of military training,\u201d says he,\n  (_Politics_, Bk. IV. Ch. XIV., Welldon\u2019s translation\u2014in older\n  editions Bk. VII.) \u201cshould be not to enslave persons who do\n  not deserve slavery, but firstly to secure ourselves against\n  becoming the slaves of others; secondly, to seek imperial power\n  not with a view to a universal despotic authority, but for the\n  benefit of the subjects whom we rule, and thirdly, to exercise\n  despotic power over those who are deserving to be slaves. That\n  the legislator should rather make it his object so to order his\n  legislation upon military and other matters as to promote leisure\n  and peace is a theory borne out by the facts of history.\u201d ...\n  (_loc. cit._ Ch. XV.). \u201cWar, as we have remarked several times,\n  has its end in peace.\u201d\n\n  Aristotle strongly condemns the Laced\u00e6monians and Cretans for\n  regarding war and conquest as the sole ends to which all law and\n  education should be directed. Also in non-Greek tribes like the\n  Scythians, Persians, Thracians and Celts he says, only military\n  power is admired by the people and encouraged by the state.\n  \u201cThere was formerly too a law in Macedonia that any one who had\n  never slain an enemy should wear the halter about his neck.\u201d\n  Among the Iberians too, a military people, \u201cit is the custom to\n  set around the tomb of a deceased warrior a number of obelisks\n  corresponding to the number of enemies he has killed.... Yet\n  ... it may well appear to be a startling paradox that it should\n  be the function of a Statesman to succeed in devising the means\n  of rule and mastery over neighbouring peoples whether with or\n  against their own will. How can such action be worthy of a\n  statesman or legislator, when it has not even the sanction of\n  law?\u201d (_op. cit._, IV. Ch. 2.)\n\n  We see that Aristotle disapproves of a glorification of war for\n  its own sake, and regards it as justifiable only in certain\n  circumstances. Methods of warfare adopted and proved in the East\n  would not have been possible in Greece. An act of treachery,\n  for example, such as that of Jael, (_Judges_ IV. 17) which was\n  extolled in songs of praise by the Jews, (_loc. cit._ V. 24) the\n  Greek people would have been inclined to repudiate. The stories\n  of Roman history, the behaviour of Fabricius, for instance,\n  or Regulus and the honourable conduct of prisoners on various\n  occasions released on parole, show that this consciousness of\n  certain principles of honour in warfare was still more highly\n  developed in Rome.\n\n  Socrates in the _Republic_ (V. 469, 470) gives expression to a\n  feeling which was gradually gaining ground in Greece, that war\n  between Hellenic tribes was much more serious than war between\n  Greeks and barbarians. In such civil warfare, he considered,\n  the defeated ought not to be reduced to slavery, nor the slain\n  despoiled, nor Hellenic territory devastated. For any difference\n  between Greek and Greek is to \u201cbe regarded by them as discord\n  only\u2014a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called war\u201d....\n  \u201cOur citizens [_i.e._ in the ideal republic] should thus deal\n  with their Hellenic enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes\n  now deal with one another.\u201d (V. 471.)\n\n  The views of Plato and Aristotle on this and other questions were\n  in advance of the custom and practice of their time.\n\nThe treatment of a defeated enemy among the Jews rested upon a\nsimilar religious foundation. In the East, we find a special cruelty\nin the conduct of war. The wars of the Jews and Assyrians were wars\nof extermination. The whole of the _Old Testament_, it has been said,\nresounds with the clash of arms.[9] \u201cAn eye for an eye, a tooth for\na tooth!\u201d was the command of Jehovah to his chosen people. Vengeance\nwas bound up in their very idea of the Creator. The Jews, unlike the\nfollowers of Mahomet, attempted, and were commanded to attempt no\nviolent conversion[10]; they were then too weak a nation; but they\nfought, and fought with success against the heathen of neighbouring\nlands, the Lord of Hosts leading them forth to battle. The God of\nIsrael stood to his chosen people in a unique and peculiarly logical\nrelation. He had made a covenant with them; and, in return for their\nobedience and allegiance, cared for their interests and advanced\ntheir national prosperity. The blood of this elect people could\nnot be suffered to intermix with that of idolaters. Canaan must be\ncleared of the heathen, on the coming of the children of Israel to\ntheir promised land; and mercy to the conquered enemy, even to women,\nchildren or animals was held by the Hebrew prophets to be treachery\nto Jehovah. (_Sam._ XV.; _Josh._ VI. 21.)\n\n  [9] \u201cThe Lord is a man of war,\u201d said Moses (_Exodus_ XV. 3). Cf.\n  _Psalms_ XXIV. 8. He is \u201cmighty in battle.\u201d\n\n  [10] This was bound up with the very essence of Islam; the devout\n  Mussulman could suffer the existence of no unbeliever. Tolerance\n  or indifference was an attitude which his faith made impossible.\n  \u201cWhen ye encounter the unbelievers,\u201d quoth the prophet (_Koran_,\n  ch. 47), \u201cstrike off their heads, until ye have made a great\n  slaughter among them.... Verily if God pleased he could take\n  vengeance on them without your assistance; but he commandeth you\n  to fight his battles.\u201d\n\n  The propagation of the faith by the sword was not only commanded\n  by the Mohammedan religion: it was that religion itself.\n\nHence the attitude of the Jews to neighbouring nations[11] was still\nmore hostile than that of the Greeks. The cause of this difference\nis bound up with the transition from polytheism to monotheism. The\nmost devout worshipper of the national gods of ancient times could\nendure to see other gods than his worshipped in the next town or by\na neighbouring nation. There was no reason why all should not exist\nside by side. Religious conflicts in polytheistic countries, when\nthey arose, were due not to the rivalry of conflicting faiths, but to\nan occasional attempt to put one god above the others in importance.\nThere could be no interest here in the propagation of belief through\nthe sword. But, under the Jews, these relations were entirely\naltered. Jehovah, their Creator, became the one invisible God. Such\nan one can suffer no others near him; their existence is a continual\ninsult to him. Monotheism is, in its very nature, a religion of\nintolerance. Its spirit among the Jews was warlike: it commanded\nthe subjugation of other nations, but its instrument was rather\nextermination than conversion.\n\n  [11] See _Acts_ X. 28:\u2014\u201cYe know that it is an unlawful thing for\n  a man that is a Jew to keep company, or come unto one of another\n  nation.\u201d\n\n\n_The Attitude of Christianity and the Early Church to War._\n\nFrom the standpoint of the peace of nations, we may say that the\nChristian faith, compared with other prominent monotheistic religious\nsystems, occupies an intermediate position between two extremes\u2014the\nfanaticism of Islam, and to a less extent of Judaism, and the\nrelatively passive attitude of the Buddhist who thought himself\nbound to propagate his religion, but held himself justified only\nin the employment of peaceful means. Christianity, on the other\nhand, contains no warlike principles: it can in no sense be called\na religion of the sword, but circumstances gave the history of the\nChurch, after the first few centuries of its existence, a character\nwhich cannot be called peace-loving.\n\nThis apparent contradiction between the spirit of the new religion\nand its practical attitude to war has led to some difference of\nopinion as to the actual teaching of Christ. The _New Testament_\nseems, at a superficial glance, to furnish support as readily to the\nchampions of war as to its denouncers. The Messiah is the Prince\nof Peace (_Is._ IX. 6, 7; _Heb._ VI.), and here lies the way of\nrighteousness (_Rom._ III. 19): but Christ came not to bring peace,\nbut a sword (_Matth._ X. 34). Such statements may be given the\nmeaning which we wish them to bear\u2014the quoting of Scripture is ever\nan unsatisfactory form of evidence; but there is no direct statement\nin the _New Testament_ in favour of war, no saying of Christ which,\nfairly interpreted, could be understood too regard this proof of\nhuman imperfection as less condemnable than any other.[12] When men\nshall be without sin, nation shall rise up against nation no more.\nBut man the individual can attain peace only when he has overcome the\nworld, when, in the struggle with his lower self, he has come forth\nvictorious. This is the spiritual sword which Christ brought into\nthe world\u2014strife, not with the unbeliever, but with the lower self:\nmeekness and the spirit of the Word of God are the weapons with which\nman must fight for the Faith.\n\n  [12] Neither, however, is there any which regards the soldier as\n  a murderer.\n\nAn elect people there was no longer: Israel had rejected its Messiah.\nInstead there was a complete brotherhood of all men, the bond and\nthe free, as children of one God. The aim of the Church was a\nworld-empire, bound together by a universal religion. In this sense,\nas sowing the first seeds of a universal peace, we may speak of\nChristianity as a re-establishment of peace among mankind.\n\nThe later attitude of Christians to war, however, by no means\ncorresponds to the earliest tenets of the Church. Without doubt,\ncertain sects, from the beginning of our era and through the ages\nup to the present time, held, like the Mennonites and Quakers\nin our day, that the divine command, \u201cLove your enemies,\u201d could\nnot be reconciled with the profession of a soldier. The early\nChristians were reproached under the Roman Emperors, before the\ntime of Constantine, with avoiding the citizen\u2019s duty of military\nservice.[13] \u201cTo those enemies of our faith,\u201d wrote Origen (_Contra\nCelsum_, VIII., Ch. LXXIII., Anti-Nicene Christian Library), \u201cwho\nrequire us to bear arms for the commonwealth, and to slay men, we\ncan reply: \u2018Do not those who are priests at certain shrines, and\nthose who attend on certain gods, as you account them, keep their\nhands free from blood, that they may with hands unstained and free\nfrom human blood offer the appointed sacrifices to your gods; and\neven when war is upon you, you never enlist the priests in the army.\nIf that, then, is a laudable custom, how much more so, that while\nothers are engaged in battle, these too should engage as the priests\nand ministers of God, keeping their hands pure, and wrestling in\nprayers to God on behalf of those who are fighting in a righteous\ncause, and for the king who reigns righteously, that whatever is\nopposed to those who act righteously may be destroyed!\u2019 ... And we do\ntake our part in public affairs, when along with righteous prayers\nwe join self-denying exercises and meditations, which teach us to\ndespise pleasures, and not to be led away by them. And none fight\nbetter for the king than we do. We do not indeed fight under him,\nalthough he require it; but we fight on his behalf, forming a special\narmy\u2014an army of piety\u2014by offering our prayers to God.\u201d The Fathers\nof the Church, Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian,\nAmbrose and the rest gave the same testimony against war. The pagan\nrites connected with the taking of the military oath had no doubt\nsome influence in determining the feeling of the pious with regard\nto this life of bloodshed; but the reasons lay deeper. \u201cShall it be\nheld lawful,\u201d asked Tertullian, (_De Corona_, p. 347) \u201cto make an\noccupation of the sword, when the Lord proclaims that he who uses the\nsword shall perish by the sword? And shall the son of peace take\npart in the battle when it does not become him even to sue at law?\nAnd shall he apply the chain, and the prison, and the torture, and\nthe punishment, who is not the avenger even of his own wrongs?\u201d\n\n  [13] In the early centuries of our era Christians seem to\n  have occasionally refused to serve in the army from religious\n  scruples. But soldiers were not always required to change their\n  profession after baptism. And in _Acts_ X., for example, nothing\n  is said to indicate that the centurion, Cornelius, would have to\n  leave the Roman army. See Tertullian: _De Corona_ (Anti-Nicene\n  Christian Library), p. 348.\n\nThe doctrine of the Church developed early in the opposite direction.\nIt was its fighting spirit and not a love of peace that made\nChristianity a state religion under Constantine. Nor was Augustine\nthe first of the Church Fathers to regard military service as\npermissible. To come to a later time, this change of attitude has\nbeen ascribed partly to the rise of Mahometan power and the wave of\nfanaticism which broke over Europe. To destroy these unbelievers with\nfire and sword was regarded as a deed of piety pleasing to God. Hence\nthe wars of the Crusades against the infidel were holy wars, and\nappear as a new element in the history of civilisation. The nations\nof ancient times had known only civil and foreign war.[14] They had\nrebelled at home, and they had fought mainly for material interests\nabroad. In the Middle Ages there were, besides, religious wars and,\nwith the rise of Feudalism, private war:[15] among all the powers\nof the Dark Ages and for centuries later, none was more aggressive\nthan the Catholic Church, nor a more active and untiring defender of\nits rights and claims, spiritual or temporal. It was in some respects\na more warlike institution than the states of Greece and Rome. It\nstruggled through centuries with the Emperor:[16] it pronounced its\nban against disobedient states and disloyal cities: it pursued with\nits vengeance each heretical or rebellious prince: unmindful of its\nearly traditions about peace, it showed in every crisis a fiercely\nmilitary spirit.[17]\n\n  [14] There were so-called \u201cSacred Wars\u201d in Greece, but these were\n  due mainly to disputes caused by the Amphictyonic League. They\n  were not religious, in the sense in which we apply the epithet to\n  the Thirty Years\u2019 war.\n\n  [15] \u201cThe administration of justice among rude illiterate people,\n  was not so accurate, or decisive, or uniform, as to induce men\n  to submit implicitly to its determinations. Every offended baron\n  buckled on his armour, and sought redress at the head of his\n  vassals. His adversary met him in like hostile array. Neither\n  of them appealed to impotent laws which could afford them no\n  protection. Neither of them would submit points, in which their\n  honour and their passions were warmly interested, to the slow\n  determination of a judicial inquiry. Both trusted to their swords\n  for the decision of the contest.\u201d Robertson\u2019s _History of Charles\n  V._, (_Works_, vol. V.) Sect. I., p. 38.\n\n  [16] Erasmus in the \u201c\u1f38\u03c7\u03b8\u03c5\u03bf\u03c6\u03b1\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u201d (_Colloquies_, Bailey\u2019s ed.,\n  Vol. II., pp. 55, 56) puts forward the suggestion that a general\n  peace might be obtained in the Christian world, if the Emperor\n  would remit something of his right and the Pope some part of his.\n\n  [17] Cf. Robertson, _op. cit._, Sect. III., p. 106, _seq._\n\nFor more than a thousand years the Church counted fighting\nclergy[18] among its most active supporters. This strange anomaly\nwas, it must be said, at first rather suffered in deference to public\nopinion than encouraged by ecclesiastical canons and councils, but it\ngave rise to great discontent at the time of the Reformation.[19] The\nwhole question of the lawfulness of military service for Christians\nwas then raised again. \u201cIf there be anything in the affairs of\nmortals,\u201d wrote Erasmus at this time (_Opera_, II., _Prov._, 951\nC) \u201cwhich it becomes us deliberately to attack, which we ought\nindeed to shun by every possible means, to avert and to abolish,\nit is certainly war, than which there is nothing more wicked, more\nmischievous or more widely destructive in its effects, nothing harder\nto be rid of, or more horrible and, in a word, more unworthy of a\nman, not to say of a Christian.\u201d[20] The medi\u00e6val Church indeed\nsucceeded, by the establishment of such institutions as the Truce\nof God, in setting some limits to the fury of the soldier: but its\nendeavours (and it made several to promote peace)[21] were only to\na trifling extent successful. Perhaps custom and public opinion in\nfeudal Europe were too strong, perhaps the Church showed a certain\napathy in denouncing the evils of a military society: no doubt the\ntheoretical tenets of its doctrine did less to hinder war than its\nown strongly military tendency, its lust for power and the force of\nits example did to encourage it.\n\n  [18] Robertson (_op. cit._, Note XXI., p. 483) quotes the\n  following statement: \u201cflamma, ferro, caede, possessiones\n  ecclesiarum praelati defendebant.\u201d (Guido Abbas ap. Du Cange, p.\n  179.)\n\n  [19] J. A. Farrar, in a pamphlet, (reprinted from the\n  _Gentleman\u2019s Magazine_, vol. 257, 1884) on _War and\n  Christianity_, quotes the following passage from Wycliffe in\n  which he protests against this blot upon the Church and Christian\n  professions.\u2014\u201cFriars now say that bishops can fight best of all\n  men, and that it falleth most properly to them, since they are\n  lords of all this world. They say Christ bade His disciples sell\n  their coats, and buy them swords; but whereto, if not to fight?\n  Thus friars make a great array, and stir up many men to fight.\n  But Christ taught not His apostles to fight with a sword of iron,\n  but with the sword of God\u2019s Word, and which standeth in meekness\n  of heart and in the prudence of man\u2019s tongue.... If man-slaying\n  in others be odious to God, much more in priests, who should be\n  vicars of Christ.\u201d See also the passage where Erasmus points\n  out that King David was not permitted to build a temple to God,\n  because he was a man of blood. \u201cNolo clericos ullo sanguine\n  contaminari. Gravis impietas!\u201d (_Opera_, IX., 370 B.)\n\n  This question had already been considered by Thomas Aquinas, who\n  decided that the clergy ought not to be allowed to fight, because\n  the practices of warfare, although right and meritorious in\n  themselves, were not in accordance with a holy calling. (_Summa_,\n  II. 2: Qu. 40.)\n\n  Aquinas held that war\u2014excluding private war\u2014is justifiable in a\n  just cause. So too did Luther, (cf. his pamphlet: _Ob Kriegsleute\n  auch in seligem Stande sein k\u00f6nnen?_) Calvin and Zwingli, the\n  last of whom died sword in hand.\n\n  With regard to the question of a fighting clergy, the passage\n  quoted from Origen (pp. 14, 15, above) has considerable interest,\n  Origen looks upon the active participation of priests in warfare\n  as something which everyone would admit to be impossible.\n\n  [20] See also the _Querela Pacis_, 630 B., (_Opera_,\n  IV.):\u2014\u201cWhosoever preaches Christ, preaches peace.\u201d Erasmus even\n  goes the length of saying that the most iniquitous peace is\n  better than the most just war (_op. cit._, 636 C).\n\n  [21] Cf. Robertson, _op. cit._, Note XXI. p. 483 and Sect. I., p.\n  39.\n\nHence, in spite of Christianity and its early vision of a brotherhood\nof men, the history of the Middle Ages came nearer to a realization\nof the idea of perpetual war than was possible in ancient times.\nThe tendency of the growth of Roman supremacy was to diminish the\nnumber of wars, along with the number of possible causes of racial\nfriction. It united many nations in one great whole, and gave them,\nto a certain extent, a common culture and common interests; even,\nwhen this seemed prudent, a common right of citizenship. The fewer\nthe number of boundaries, the less the likelihood of war. The\nestablishment of great empires is of necessity a force, and a great\nand permanent force working on the side of peace. With the fall of\nRome this guarantee was removed.\n\n\n_The Development of the New Science of International Law._\n\nOut of the ruins of the old feudal system arose the modern state\nas a free independent unity. Private war between individuals or\nclasses of society was now branded as a breach of the peace: it\nbecame the exclusive right of kings to appeal to force. War, wrote\nGentilis[22] towards the end of sixteenth century, is the just or\nunjust conflict between states. Peace was now regarded as the normal\ncondition of society. As a result of these great developments in\nwhich the name \u201cstate\u201d acquired new meaning, jurisprudence freed\nitself from the trammelling conditions of medi\u00e6val Scholasticism. Men\nbegan to consider the problem of the rightfulness or wrongfulness of\nwar, to question even the possibility of a war on rightful grounds.\nOut of theses new ideas\u2014partly too as one of the fruits of the\nReformation,[23]\u2014arose the first consciously formulated principles of\nthe science of international law, whose fuller, but not yet complete,\ndevelopment belongs to modern times.\n\n  [22] It is uncertain in what year the _De Jure Belli_ of Gentilis\n  was published\u2014a work to which Grotius acknowledges considerable\n  indebtedness. Whewell, in the preface to his translation of\n  Grotius, gives the date 1598, but some writers suppose it to have\n  been ten years earlier.\n\n  [23] This came about in two ways. The Church of Rome discouraged\n  the growth of national sentiment. At the Reformation the\n  independence and unity of the different nations were for the\n  first time recognised. That is to say, the Reformation laid the\n  foundation for a science of international law. But, from another\n  point of view, it not only made such a code of rules possible,\n  it made it necessary. The effect of the Reformation was not to\n  diminish the number of wars in which religious belief could play\n  a part. Moreover, it displaced the Pope from his former position\n  as arbiter in Europe without setting up any judicial tribunal in\n  his stead.\n\nFrom the beginning of history every age, every people has something\nto show here, be it only a rudimentary sense of justice in their\ndealings with one another. We may instance the Amphictyonic League\nin Greece which, while it had a merely Hellenic basis and was\nmainly a religious survival, shows the germ of some attempt at\narbitration between Greek states. Among the Romans we have the _jus\nfeciale_[24] and the _jus gentium_, as distinguished from the civil\nlaw of Rome, and certain military regulations about the taking of\nbooty in war. Ambassadors were held inviolate in both countries;\nthe formal declaration of war was never omitted. Many Roman writers\nheld the necessity of a just cause for war. But nowhere do these\nconsiderations form the subject matter of a special science.\n\n  [24] Cf. Cicero: _De Officiis_, I. xi. \u201cBelli quidem aequitas\n  sanctissime feciali populi Romani jure perscripta est.\u201d (See the\n  reference to Lawrence\u2019s comments on this subject, p. 9 above.)\n\n  \u201cWars,\u201d says Cicero, \u201care to be undertaken for this end,\n  that we may live in peace without being injured; but when we\n  obtain the victory, we must preserve those enemies who behaved\n  without cruelty or inhumanity during the war: for example,\n  our forefathers received, even as members of their state, the\n  Tuscans, the \u00c6qui, the Volscians, the Sabines and the Hernici,\n  but utterly destroyed Carthage and Numantia.... And, while\n  we are bound to exercise consideration toward those whom we\n  have conquered by force, so those should be received into\n  our protection who throw themselves upon the honour of our\n  general, and lay down their arms,\u201d (_op. cit._, I. xi., Bohn\u2019s\n  Translation).... \u201cIn engaging in war we ought to make it appear\n  that we have no other view but peace.\u201d (_op. cit._, I. xxiii.)\n\n  In fulfilling a treaty we must not sacrifice the spirit to the\n  letter (_De Officiis_, I. x). \u201cThere are also rights of war, and\n  the faith of an oath is often to be kept with an enemy.\u201d (_op.\n  cit._, III. xxix.)\n\n  This is the first statement by a classical writer in which the\n  idea of justice being due to an enemy appears. Cicero goes\n  further. Particular states, he says, (_De Legibus_, I. i.) are\n  only members of a whole governed by reason.\n\nIn the Middle Ages the development of these ideas received little\nencouragement. All laws are silent in the time of war,[25] and this\nwas a period of war, both bloody and constant. There was no time\nto think of the right or wrong of anything. Moreover, the Church\nemphasised the lack of rights in unbelievers, and gave her blessing\non their annihilation.[26] The whole Christian world was filled with\nthe idea of a spiritual universal monarchy. Not such as that in\nthe minds of Greek and Jew and Roman who had been able to picture\ninternational peace only under the form of a great national and\nexclusive empire. In this great Christian state there were to be no\ndistinctions between nations; its sphere was bounded by the universe.\nBut, here, there was no room or recognition for independent national\nstates with equal and personal rights. This recognition, opposed\nby the Roman Church, is the real basis of international law. The\nReformation was the means by which the personality of the peoples,\nthe unity and independence of the state were first openly admitted.\nOn this foundation, mainly at first in Protestant countries, the new\nscience developed rapidly. Like the civil state and the Christian\nreligion, international law may be called a peace institution.\n\n  [25] The saying is attributed to Pompey:\u2014\u201cShall I, when I am\n  preparing for war, think of the laws?\u201d\n\n  [26] This implied, however, the idea of a united Christendom as\n  against the infidel, with which we may compare the idea of a\n  united Hellas against Persia. In such things we have the germ not\n  only of international law, but of the ideal of federation.\n\n\n_Grotius, Puffendorf and Vattel._\n\nIn the beginning of the seventeenth century, Grotius laid the\nfoundations of a code of universal law (_De Jure Belli et Pacis_,\n1625) independent of differences of religion, in the hope that its\nrecognition might simplify the intercourse between the newly formed\nnations. The primary object of this great work, written during the\nmisery and horrors of the Thirty Years\u2019 war, was expressly to draw\nattention to these evils and suggest some methods by which the\nseverity of warfare might be mitigated. Grotius originally meant to\nexplain only one chapter of the law of nations:[27] his book was\nto be called _De Jure Belli_, but there is scarcely any subject of\ninternational law which he leaves untouched. He obtained, moreover,\na general recognition for the doctrine of the Law of Nature which\nexerted so strong an influence upon succeeding centuries; indeed,\nbetween these two sciences, as between international law and\nethics, he draws no very sharp line of demarcation, although, on\nthe whole, in spite of an unscientific, scholastic use of quotation\nfrom authorities, his treatment of the new field is clear and\ncomprehensive. Grotius made the attempt to set up an ethical\nprinciple of right, in the stead of such doctrines of self-interest\nas had been held by many of the ancient writers. There was a law, he\nheld, established in each state purely with a view to the interests\nof that state, but, besides this, there was another higher law in\nthe interest of the whole society of nations. Its origin was divine;\nthe reason of man commanded his obedience. This was what we call\ninternational law.[28]\n\n  [27] See Maine\u2019s _Ancient Law_, pp. 50-53: pp. 96-101. Grotius\n  wrongly understood \u201cJus Gentium,\u201d (\u201ca collection of rules\n  and principles, determined by observation to be common to\n  the institutions which prevailed among the various Italian\n  tribes\u201d) to mean \u201cJus _inter_ gentes.\u201d The Roman expression for\n  International Law was not \u201cJus Gentium,\u201d but \u201cJus Feciale.\u201d\n\n  \u201cHaving adopted from the Antonine jurisconsults,\u201d says Maine,\n  \u201cthe position that the Jus Gentium and the Jus Natur\u00e6 were\n  identical, Grotius, with his immediate predecessors and his\n  immediate successors, attributed to the Law of Nature an\n  authority which would never perhaps have been claimed for it,\n  if \u201cLaw of Nations\u201d had not in that age been an ambiguous\n  expression. They laid down unreservedly that Natural Law is the\n  code of states, and thus put in operation a process which has\n  continued almost down to our own day, the process of engrafting\n  on the international system rules which are supposed to have\n  been evolved from the unassisted contemplation of the conception\n  of Nature. There is, too, one consequence of immense practical\n  importance to mankind which, though not unknown during the early\n  modern history of Europe, was never clearly or universally\n  acknowledged till the doctrines of the Grotian school had\n  prevailed. If the society of nations is governed by Natural\n  Law, the atoms which compose it must be absolutely equal. Men\n  under the sceptre of Nature are all equal, and accordingly\n  commonwealths are equal if the international state be one of\n  nature. The proposition that independent communities, however\n  different in size and power, are all equal in the view of the Law\n  of Nations, has largely contributed to the happiness of mankind,\n  though it is constantly threatened by the political tendencies\n  of each successive age. It is a doctrine which probably would\n  never have obtained a secure footing at all if International Law\n  had not been entirely derived from the majestic claims of Nature\n  by the Publicists who wrote after the revival of letters.\u201d (_Op.\n  cit._, p. 100.)\n\n  [28] The name \u201cInternational Law\u201d was first given to the law of\n  nations by Bentham. (_Principles of Morals and Legislation, XIX._\n  \u00a7 xxv.)\n\nGrotius distinctly holds, like Kant and Rousseau, and unlike Hobbes,\nthat the state can never be regarded as a unity or institution\nseparable from the people; the terms _civitas_, _communitas_,\n_coetus_, _populus_, he uses indiscriminately. But these nations,\nthese independent units of society cannot live together side by side\njust as they like; they must recognise one another as members of a\nEuropean society of states.[29] Law, he said, stands above force\neven in war, \u201cwhich may only be begun to pursue the right;\u201d and the\nbeginning and manner of conduct of war rests on fixed laws and can be\njustified only in certain cases. War is not to be done away with:\nGrotius accepts it as fact,[30] (as Hobbes did later) as the natural\nmethod for settling the disputes which were bound constantly to\narise between so many independent and sovereign nations. A terrible\nscourge it must ever remain, but as the only available form of legal\nprocedure, it is sanctioned by the practice of states and not less by\nthe law of nature and of nations. Grotius did not advance beyond this\nposition. Every violation of the law of nations can be settled but in\none way\u2014by war, the force of the stronger.\n\n  [29] In the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, the balance of power in\n  Europe was recognised on the basis of terms such as these.\n\n  [30] Grotius, however, is a painstaking student of Scripture, and\n  is willing to say something in favour of peace\u2014not a permanent\n  peace, that is to say, the idea of which would scarcely be\n  likely to occur to anyone in the early years of the seventeenth\n  century\u2014but a plea for fewer, shorter wars. \u201cIf therefore,\u201d\n  he says, \u201ca peace sufficiently safe can be had, it is not\n  ill secured by the condonation of offenses, and damages, and\n  expenses: especially among Christians, to whom the Lord has given\n  his peace as his legacy. And so St. Paul, his best interpreter,\n  exhorts us to live at peace with all men.... May God write these\n  lessons\u2014He who alone can\u2014on the hearts of all those who have\n  the affairs of Christendom in their hands.\u201d (_De Jure Belli et\n  Pacis_, III. Ch. XXV., Whewell\u2019s translation.)\n\n  See also _op. cit._, II., Ch. XXIII., Sect. VIII., where\n  Grotius recommends that Congresses of Christian Powers should\n  be held with a view to the peaceful settlement of international\n  differences.\n\nThe necessary distinction between law and ethics was drawn by\nPuffendorf,[31] a successor of Grotius who gave an outwardly\nsystematic form to the doctrine of the great jurist, without adding\nto it either strength or completeness. His views, when they were\nnot based upon the system of Grotius, were strongly influenced by\nthe speculation of Hobbes, his chronological predecessor, to whom we\nshall have later occasion to refer. In the works of Vattel,[32] who\nwas, next to Rousseau, the most celebrated of Swiss publicists, we\nfind the theory of the customs and practice in war widely developed,\nand the necessity for humanising its methods and limiting its\ndestructive effects upon neutral countries strongly emphasised.\nGrotius and Puffendorf, while they recommend acts of mercy, hold that\nthere is legally no right which requires that a conquered enemy shall\nbe spared. This is a matter of humanity alone. It is to the praise\nof Vattel that he did much to popularise among the highest and most\npowerful classes of society, ideas of humanity in warfare, and of\nthe rights and obligations of nations. He is, moreover, the first to\nmake a clear separation between this science and the Law of Nature.\nWhat, he asks, is international law as distinguished from the Law\nof Nature? What are the powers of a state and the duties of nations\nto one another? What are the causes of quarrel among nations, and\nwhat the means by which they can be settled without any sacrifice of\ndignity?\n\n  [31] Puffendorf\u2019s best known work, _De Jure Natur\u00e6 et Gentium_,\n  was published in 1672.\n\n  [32] _Le Droit des Gens_ was published in 1758 and translated\n  into English by Joseph Chitty in 1797, (2nd ed., 1834).\n\nThey are, in the first place, a friendly conciliatory attitude; and\nsecondly, such means of settlement as mediation, arbitration and\nPeace Congresses. These are the refuges of a peace-loving nation, in\ncases where vital interests are not at stake. \u201cNature gives us no\nright to use force, except where mild and conciliatory measures are\nuseless.\u201d (_Law of Nations_, II. Ch. xviii. \u00a7 331.) \u201cEvery power owes\nit in this matter to the happiness of human society to show itself\nready for every means of reconciliation, in cases where the interests\nat stake are neither vital nor important.\u201d (_ibid._ \u00a7 332.) At the\nsame time, it is never advisable that a nation should forgive an\ninsult which it has not the power to resent.\n\n\n_The Dream of a Perpetual Peace._\n\nBut side by side with this development and gradual popularisation\nof the new science of International Law, ideas of a less practical,\nbut not less fruitful kind had been steadily making their way and\nobtaining a strong hold upon the popular mind. The Decree of Eternal\nPacification of 1495 had abolished private war, one of the heavy\ncurses of the Middle Ages. Why should it not be extended to banish\nwarfare between states as well? Gradually one proposal after another\nwas made to attain this end, or, at least, to smooth the way for\nits future realisation. The first of these in point of time is to\nbe found in a somewhat bare, vague form in Sully\u2019s _Memoirs_,[33]\nsaid to have been published in 1634. Half a century later the Quaker\nWilliam Penn suggested an international tribunal of arbitration in\nthe interests of peace.[34] But it was by the French Abb\u00e9 St. Pierre\nthat the problem of perpetual peace was fairly introduced into\npolitical literature: and this, in an age of cabinet and dynastic\nwars, while the dreary cost of the war of the Spanish succession was\nyet unpaid. St. Pierre was the first who really clearly realised and\nendeavoured to prove that the establishment of a permanent state of\npeace is not only in the interest of the weaker, but is required\nby the European society of nations and by the reason of man. From\nthe beginning of the history of humanity, poets and prophets had\ncherished the \u201csweet dream\u201d of a peaceful civilisation: it is in the\nform of a practical project that this idea is new.\n\n  [33] _M\u00e9moires ou \u0152conomies Royales D\u2019Estat, Domestiques,\n  Politiques et Militaires de Henri le Grand, par Maximilian de\n  Bethune, Duc de Sully._\n\n  [34] See _International Tribunals_ (1899), p. 20 _seq._ Penn\u2019s\n  _Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe_ was\n  written about 1693, but is not included in all editions of his\n  works.\n\nThe ancient world actually represented a state of what was almost\nperpetual war. This was the reality which confronted man, his\ninevitable doom, it seemed, as it had been pronounced to the fallen\nsinners of Eden. Peace was something which man had enjoyed once, but\nforfeited. The myth- and poetry-loving Greeks, and, later, the poets\nof Rome delighted to paint a state of eternal peace, not as something\nto whose coming they could look forward in the future, but as a\ngolden age of purity whose records lay buried in the past, a paradise\nwhich had been, but which was no more. Voices, more scientific, were\nraised even in Greece in attempts, such as Aristotle\u2019s, to show\nthat the evolution of man had been not a course of degeneration\nfrom perfection, but of continual progress upwards from barbarism\nto civilisation and culture. But the change in popular thinking on\nthis matter was due less to the arguments of philosophy than to a\npractical experience of the causes which operate in the interests\nof peace. The foundation of a universal empire under Alexander the\nGreat gave temporary rest to nations heretofore incessantly at war.\nHere was a proof that the Divine Will had not decreed that man was\nto work out his punishment under unchanging conditions of perpetual\nwarfare. This idea of a universal empire became the Greek ideal of a\nperpetual peace. Such an empire was, in the language of the Stoics, a\nworld-state in which all men had rights of citizenship, in which all\nother nations were absorbed.\n\nParallel to this ideal among the Greeks, we find the hope in Israel\nof a Messiah whose coming was to bring peace, not only to the Jewish\nrace, but to all the nations of the earth. This idea stands out\nin the sharpest contrast to the early nationalism of the Hebrew\npeople, who regarded every stranger as an idolater and an enemy.\nThe prophecies of Judaism, combined with the cosmopolitan ideas\nof Greece, were the source of the idea, which is expressed in the\nteaching of Christ, of a spiritual world-empire, an empire held\ntogether solely by the tie of a common religion.\n\nThis hope of peace did not actually die during the first thousand\nyears of our era, nor even under the morally stagnating influences\nof the Middle Ages. When feudalism and private war were abolished\nin Europe, it wakened to a new life. Not merely in the mouths of\npoets and religious enthusiasts was the cry raised against war, but\nby scholars like Thomas More and Erasmus, jurists like Gentilis\nand Grotius, men high in the state and in the eyes of Europe like\nHenry IV. of France and the Duc de Sully or the Abb\u00e9 de St. Pierre\nwhose _Projet de Paix Perp\u00e9tuelle_ (1713)[35] obtained immediate\npopularity and wide-spread fame. The first half of the eighteenth\ncentury was already prepared to receive and mature a plan of this\nkind.\n\n  [35] _Projet de trait\u00e9 pour rendre la paix perp\u00e9tuelle entre les\n  souverains chr\u00e9tiens._ The first two volumes of this work were\n  published in 1713 (trans. London, 1714); a third volume followed\n  in 1717.\n\n\n_Henry IV. and St. Pierre._\n\nThe _Grand Dessein_ of Henry IV. is supposed to have been formed by\nthat monarch and reproduced in Sully\u2019s _Memoirs_, written in 1634 and\ndiscovered nearly a century later by St. Pierre. The story goes that\nthe Abb\u00e9 found the book buried in an old garden. It has been shewn,\nhowever, that there is little likelihood that this project actually\noriginated with the king, who probably corresponded fairly well to\nVoltaire\u2019s picture of him as war hero of the _Henriade_. The plan was\nmore likely conceived by Sully, and ascribed to the popular king for\nthe sake of the better hearing and greater influence it might in this\nway be likely to have, and also because, thereby, it might be less\nlikely to create offence in political circles. St. Pierre himself may\nor may not have been acquainted with the facts.\n\nThe so-called _Grand Dessein_ of Henry IV. was, shortly, as\nfollows.[36] It proposed to divide Europe between fifteen\nPowers,[37] in such a manner that the balance of power should be\nestablished and preserved. These were to form a Christian republic\non the basis of the freedom and equality of its members, the armed\nforces of the federation being supported by fixed contribution. A\ngeneral council, consisting of representatives from the fifteen\nstates, was to make all laws necessary for cementing the union thus\nformed and for maintaining the order once established. It would also\nbe the business of this senate to \u201cdeliberate on questions that might\narise, to occupy themselves with discussing different interests, to\nsettle quarrels amicably, to throw light upon and arrange all the\ncivil, political and religious affairs of Europe, whether internal or\nforeign.\u201d (_M\u00e9moires_, vol. VI., p. 129 _seq._)\n\n  [36] The main articles of this and other peace projects are to\n  be found in _International Tribunals_, published by the Peace\n  Society.\n\n  [37] Professor Lorimer points out that Prussia, then the Duchy\n  of Brandenburg, is not mentioned. (_Institutes of the Law of\n  Nations_, II. Ch. VII., p. 219.)\n\nThis scheme of the king or his minister was expanded with great\nthoroughness and clear-sightedness by the Abb\u00e9 St. Pierre: none of\nthe many later plans for a perpetual peace has been so perfect in\ndetails. He proposes that there should be a permanent and perpetual\nunion between, if possible, all Christian sovereigns\u2014of whom he\nsuggests nineteen, excluding the Czar\u2014\u201cto preserve unbroken peace in\nEurope,\u201d and that a permanent Congress or senate should be formed\nby deputies of the federated states. The union should protect weak\nsovereigns, minors during a regency, and so on, and should banish\ncivil as well as international war\u2014it should \u201crender prompt and\nadequate assistance to rulers and chief magistrates against seditious\npersons and rebels.\u201d All warfare henceforth is to be waged between\nthe troops of the federation\u2014each nation contributing an equal\nnumber\u2014and the enemies of European security, whether outsiders or\nrebellious members of the union. Otherwise, where it is possible,\nall disputes occurring within the union are to be settled by the\narbitration of the senate, and the combined military force of the\nfederation is to be applied to drive the Turks out of Europe. There\nis to be a rational rearrangement of boundaries, but after this no\nchange is to be permitted in the map of Europe. The union should bind\nitself to tolerate the different forms of faith.\n\nThe objections to St. Pierre\u2019s scheme are, many of them, obvious. He\nhimself produces sixty-two arguments likely to be raised against his\nplan, and he examines these in turn with acuteness and eloquence.\nBut there are other criticisms which he was less likely to be able\nto forestall. Of the nineteen states he names as a basis of the\nfederation, some have disappeared and the governments of others\nhave completely changed. Indeed St. Pierre\u2019s scheme did not look\nfar beyond the present. But it has besides a too strongly political\ncharacter.[38] From this point of view, the Abb\u00e9\u2019s plan amounts\npractically to a European coalition against the Ottoman Empire.\nMoreover, we notice with a smile that the French statesman and\npatriot is not lost in the cosmopolitan political reformer. \u201cThe\nkingdom of Spain shall not go out of the House of Bourbon!\u201d[39]\nFrance is to enjoy more than the privileges of honour; she is to reap\ndistinct material and political advantages from the union. Humanity\nis to be a brotherhood, but, in the federation of nations, France is\nto stand first.[40] We see that these \u201cr\u00eaves d\u2019un homme de bien,\u201d\nas Cardinal Dubois called them, are not without their practical\nelement. But the great mistake of St. Pierre is this: he actually\nthought that his plan could be put into execution in the near future,\nthat an ideal of this kind was realisable at once.[41] \u201cI, myself,\nform\u2019d it,\u201d he says in the preface, \u201cin full expectation to see it\none Day executed.\u201d As Hobbes, says, \u201cthere can be nothing so absurd,\nbut may be found in the books of philosophers.\u201d[42] St. Pierre was\nnot content to make his influence felt on the statesmen of his time\nand prepare the way for the abolition of all arbitrary forms of\ngovernment. This was the flaw which drew down upon the good Abb\u00e9\nVoltaire\u2019s sneering epigram[43] and the irony of Leibniz.[44] Here,\nabove all, in this unpractical enthusiasm his scheme differs from\nthat of Kant.\n\n  [38] The same objection was raised by Leibniz (see his\n  _Observations_ on St. Pierre\u2019s _Projet_) to the scheme of Henry\n  IV., who, says Leibniz, thought more of overthrowing the house of\n  Austria than of establishing a society of sovereigns.\n\n  [39] _Project_, Art. VI., Eng. trans. (1714), p. 119.\n\n  [40] St. Pierre was not blind to this aspect of the question.\n  Among the critical objections which he anticipates to his plan is\n  this,\u2014that it promises too great an increase of strength to the\n  house of France, and that therefore the author would have been\n  wiser to conceal his nationality.\n\n  [41] St. Pierre, in what may be called an apology for the wording\n  of the title of his book (above, p. 32, _note_), justifies his\n  confidence in these words:\u2014\u201cThe Pilot who himself seems uncertain\n  of the Success of his Voyage is not likely to persuade the\n  Passenger to embark.... I am persuaded, that it is not impossible\n  to find out Means sufficient and practicable to settle an\n  Everlasting Peace among Christians; and even believe, that the\n  Means which I have thought of are of that Nature.\u201d (Preface to\n  _Project_, Eng. trans., 1714.)\n\n  [42] _Leviathan_, I. Ch. V.\n\n  [43] See too Voltaire\u2019s allusion to St. Pierre in his\n  _Dictionary_, under \u201cReligion.\u201d\n\n  [44] Leibniz regarded the project of St. Pierre with an\n  indifference, somewhat tinged with contempt. In a letter to\n  Grimarest, (_Leibnit. Opera_, Dutens\u2019 ed., 1768, Vol. V., pp.\n  65, 66: in _Epist._, ed. Kortholt., Vol. III., p. 327) he\n  writes:\u2014\u201cI have seen something of M. de St. Pierre\u2019s plan for\n  maintaining perpetual peace in Europe. It reminds me of an\n  inscription outside of a churchyard which ran, \u2018_Pax Perpetua_.\n  For the dead, it is true, fight no more. But the living, are of\n  another mind, and the mightiest among them have little respect\n  for tribunals.\u2019\u201d This is followed by the ironical suggestion\n  that a court of arbitration should be established at Rome of\n  which the Pope should be made president; while at the same time\n  the old spiritual authority should be restored to the Church,\n  and excommunication be the punishment of non-compliance with the\n  arbitral decree. \u201cSuch plans,\u201d he adds, \u201care as likely to succeed\n  as that of M. de St. Pierre. But as we are allowed to write\n  novels, why should we find fault with fiction which would bring\n  back the golden age?\u201d But see also _Observations sur le Projet\n  d\u2019une Paix Perp\u00e9tuelle de M. l\u2019Abb\u00e9 de St. Pierre_ (Dutens, V.,\n  esp. p. 56) and the letter to Remond de Montmort (_ibid._ pp. 20,\n  21) where Leibniz considers this project rather more seriously.\n\n\n_Rousseau\u2019s Criticism of St. Pierre._\n\nRousseau took St. Pierre\u2019s project[45] much more seriously than\neither Leibniz or Voltaire. But sovereigns, he thought, are deaf to\nthe voice of justice; the absolutism of princely power would never\nallow a king to submit to a tribunal of nations. Moreover war was,\naccording to Rousseau\u2019s experience, a matter not between nations, but\nbetween princes and cabinets. It was one of the ordinary pleasures of\nroyal existence and one not likely to be voluntarily given up.[46] We\nknow that history has not supported Rousseau\u2019s contention. Dynastic\nwars are now no more. The Great Powers have shown themselves able\nto impose their own conditions, where the welfare and security of\nEurope have seemed to demand it. Such a development seemed impossible\nenough in the eighteenth century. In the military organisation\nof the nations of Europe and in the necessity of making their\ninternal development subordinate to the care for their external\nsecurity, Rousseau saw the cause of all the defects in their\nadministration.[47] The formation of unions on the model of the Swiss\nConfederation or the German _Bund_ would, he thought, be in the\ninterest of all rulers. But great obstacles seemed to him to lie in\nthe way of the realisation of such a project as that of St. Pierre.\n\u201cWithout doubt,\u201d says Rousseau in conclusion, \u201cthe proposal of a\nperpetual peace is at present an absurd one.... It can only be put\ninto effect by methods which are violent in themselves and dangerous\nto humanity. One cannot conceive of the possibility of a federative\nunion being established, except by a revolution. And, that granted,\nwho among us would venture to say whether this European federation is\nto be desired or to be feared? It would work, perhaps, more harm in a\nmoment than it would prevent in the course of centuries.\u201d (_Jugement\nsur la Paix Perp\u00e9tuelle._)\n\n  [45] \u201cC\u2019est un livre solide et sens\u00e9,\u201d says Rousseau (_Jugement\n  sur la Paix Perp\u00e9tuelle_), \u201cet il est tr\u00e8s important qu\u2019il\n  existe.\u201d [This _Jugement_ is appended to Rousseau\u2019s _Extrait du\n  Projet de Paix Perp\u00e9tuelle de Monsieur l\u2019Abb\u00e9 de Saint-Pierre_,\n  1761.]\n\n  [46] Cf. Cowper: _The Winter Morning Walk_:\u2014\n\n    \u201cGreat princes have great playthings. Some have play\u2019d\n    At hewing mountains into men, and some\n    At building human wonders mountain high.\n    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n    Some seek diversion in the tented field,\n    And make the sorrows of mankind their sport.\n    But war\u2019s a game, which, were their subjects wise,\n    Kings should not play at. Nations would do well\n    T\u2019extort their truncheons from the puny hands\n    Of heroes, whose infirm and baby minds\n    Are gratified with mischief, and who spoil,\n    Because men suffer it, their toy the world.\u201d\n\n\n  [47] \u201cLes troupes r\u00e9gl\u00e9es, peste et d\u00e9population de l\u2019Europe,\n  ne sont bonnes qu\u2019a deux fins: ou pour attaquer et conqu\u00e9rir\n  les voisins, ou pour ench\u00e2iner et asservir les citoyens.\u201d\n  (_Gouvernement de Pologne_, Ch. XII.)\n\n\n_The Position of Hobbes._\n\nThe most profound and searching analysis of this problem comes\nfrom Immanuel Kant, whose indebtedness in the sphere of politics\nto Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau it is difficult to\noverestimate. Kant\u2019s doctrine of the sovereignty of the people comes\nto him from Locke through Rousseau. His explanation of the origin\nof society is practically that of Hobbes. The direct influence on\npolitics of this philosopher, apart from his share in moulding the\nKantian theory of the state, is one we cannot afford to neglect. His\nwas a great influence on the new science just thrown on the world\nby Grotius, and his the first clear and systematic statement we\nhave of the nature of society and the establishment of the state.\nThe natural state of man, says Hobbes, is a state of war,[48] a\n_bellum omnium contra omnes_, where all struggle for honour and for\npreferment and the prizes to which every individual is by natural\nright equally entitled, but which can of necessity fall only to the\nfew, the foremost in the race. Men hate and fear the society of their\nkind, but through this desire to excel are forced to seek it: only\nwhere there are many can there be a first. This state of things, this\napparent sociability which is brought about by and coupled with the\nleast sociable of instincts, becomes unendurable. \u201cIt is necessary to\npeace,\u201d writes Hobbes (_On Dominion_, Ch. VI. 3) \u201cthat a man be so\nfar forth protected against the violence of others, that he may live\nsecurely; that is, that he may have no just cause to fear others, so\nlong as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make men altogether safe\nfrom mutual harms, so as they cannot be hurt or injuriously killed,\nis impossible; and, therefore, comes not within deliberation.\u201d But to\nprotect them so far as is possible the state is formed. Hobbes has no\ngreat faith in human contracts or promises. Man\u2019s nature is malicious\nand untrustworthy. A coercive power is necessary to guarantee this\nlong-desired security within the community. \u201cWe must therefore,\u201d he\nadds, \u201cprovide for our security, not by compacts, but by punishments;\nand there is then sufficient provision made, when there are so great\npunishments appointed for every injury, as apparently it prove a\ngreater evil to have done it, than not to have done it. For all men,\nby a necessity of nature, choose that which to them appears to be the\nless evil.\u201d (_Op. cit._, Ch. VI. 4.)\n\n  [48] Hobbes realises clearly that there probably never was such a\n  state of war all over the world nor a state of nature conforming\n  to a common type. The case is parallel to the use of the term\n  \u201coriginal contract\u201d as an explanation of the manner in which the\n  civil state came to be formed. (Cf. p. 52, _note_.)\n\n  See also Hume (_Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,_\n  Sect. III. Part I.). \u201cThis _poetical_ fiction of the _golden age_\n  is, in some respects, of a piece with the _philosophical_ fiction\n  of the _state of nature_; only that the former is represented\n  as the most charming and most peaceable condition, which can\n  possibly be imagined; whereas the latter is painted out as a\n  state of mutual war and violence, attended with the most extreme\n  necessity.\u201d This fiction of a state of nature as a state of war,\n  says Hume, (in a note to this passage) is not the invention of\n  Hobbes. Plato (_Republic_, II. III. IV.) refutes a hypothesis\n  very like it, and Cicero (_Pro Sext._ l. 42) regards it as a fact\n  universally acknowledged.\n\n  Cf. also Spinoza (_Tract. Pol._ c. ii. \u00a7 14): \u201cHomines ex natura\n  hostes.\u201d And (c. v. \u00a7 2): \u201cHomines civiles non nascuntur sed\n  fiunt.\u201d These expressions are to be understood, says Bluntschli\n  (_Theory of the State_, IV. Ch. vi., p. 284, _note_ a), \u201crather\n  as a logical statement of what _would be_ the condition of\n  man apart from civil society, than as distinctly implying a\n  historical theory.\u201d\n\n  While starting from the same premises, Spinoza carries Hobbes\u2019\n  political theories to their logical conclusion. If we admit that\n  right lies with might, then right is with the people in any\n  revolution successfully carried out. (But see Hobbes\u2019 Preface to\n  the _Philosophical Rudiments_ and Kant\u2019s _Perpetual Peace_, p.\n  188, _note_.) Spinoza, in a letter, thus alludes to this point of\n  difference:\u2014\u201cAs regards political theories, the difference which\n  you inquire about between Hobbes and myself, consists in this,\n  that I always preserve natural right intact, and only allot to\n  the chief magistrates in every state a right over their subjects\n  commensurate with the excess of their power over the power of\n  the subjects. This is what always takes place in the state of\n  nature.\u201d (Epistle 50, _Works_, Bohn\u2019s ed., Vol. II.)\n\nThese precautions secure that relative peace within the state which\nis one of the conditions of the safety of the people. But it is,\nbesides, the duty of a sovereign to guarantee an adequate protection\nto his subjects against foreign enemies. A state of defence as\ncomplete and perfect as possible is not only a national duty, but an\nabsolute necessity. The following statement of the relation of the\nstate to other states shows how closely Hobbes has been followed by\nKant. \u201cThere are two things necessary,\u201d says Hobbes, (_On Dominion_,\nCh. XIII. 7) \u201cfor the people\u2019s defence; to be warned and to be\nforearmed. _For the state of commonwealths considered in themselves,\nis natural, that is to say, hostile._[49] Neither, if they cease from\nfighting, is it therefore to be called peace; but rather a breathing\ntime, in which one enemy observing the motion and countenance of the\nother, values his security not according to pacts, but the forces and\ncounsels of his adversary.\u201d\n\n  [49] The italics are mine.\u2014[Tr.]\n\nHobbes is a practical philosopher: no man was less a dreamer, a\nfollower after ideals than he. He is, moreover, a pessimist, and\nhis doctrine of the state is a political absolutism,[50] the form\nof government which above all has been, and is, favourable to war.\nHe would no doubt have ridiculed the idea of a perpetual peace\nbetween nations, had such a project as that of St. Pierre\u2014a practical\nproject, counting upon a realisation in the near future\u2014been brought\nbefore him. He might not even have accepted it in the very much\nmodified form which Kant adopts, that of an ideal\u2014an unattainable\nideal\u2014towards which humanity could not do better than work. He\nexpected the worst possible from man the individual. _Homo homini\nlupus._ The strictest absolutism, amounting almost to despotism,\nwas required to keep the vicious propensities of the human animal\nin check. States he looked upon as units of the same kind, members\nalso of a society. They had, and openly exhibited, the same faults\nas individual men. They too might be driven with a strong enough\ncoercive force behind them, but not without it; and such a coercive\nforce as this did not exist in a society of nations. Federation and\nfederal troops are terms which represent ideas of comparatively\nrecent origin. Without something of this kind, any enduring peace\nwas not to be counted upon. International relations were and\nmust remain at least potentially warlike in character. Under no\ncircumstances could ideal conditions be possible either between the\nmembers of a state or between the states themselves. Human nature\ncould form no satisfactory basis for a counsel of perfection.\n\n  [50] Professor Paulsen (_Immanuel Kant_, 2nd ed., 1899, p.\n  359\u2014Eng. trans., p. 353) points out that pessimism and absolutism\n  usually go together in the doctrines of philosophers. He gives as\n  instances Hobbes, Kant and Schopenhauer.\n\n  Hobbes (_On Dominion_, Ch. X. 3, _seq._) regarded an absolute\n  monarchy as the only proper form of government, while in the\n  opinion of Locke, (_On Civil Government_, II. Ch. VII. \u00a7\u00a7 90,\n  91) it was no better than a state of nature. Kant would not have\n  gone quite so far. As a philosopher, he upheld the sovereignty\n  of the people and rejected a monarchy which was not governed in\n  accordance with republican principles; as a citizen, he denied\n  the right of resistance to authority. (Cf. _Perpetual Peace_, pp.\n  126, 188, _note_.)\n\nHence Hobbes never thought of questioning the necessity of war.\nIt was in his eyes the natural condition of European society; but\ncertain rules were necessary both for its conduct and, where this\nwas compatible with a nation\u2019s dignity and prosperity, for its\nprevention. He held that international law was only a part of the\nLaw of Nature, and that this Law of Nature laid certain obligations\nupon nations and their kings. Mediation must be employed between\ndisputants as much as possible, the person of the mediators of\npeace being held inviolate; an umpire ought to be chosen to decide\na controversy, to whose judgment the parties in dispute agree to\nsubmit themselves; such an arbiter must be impartial. These are all\nwhat Hobbes calls precepts of the Law of Nature. And he appeals to\nthe Scriptures in confirmation of his assertion that peace is the\nway of righteousness and that the laws of nature of which these are\na few are also laws of the heavenly kingdom. But peace is like the\nstraight path of Christian endeavour, difficult to find and difficult\nto keep. We must seek after it where it may be found; but, having\ndone this and sought in vain, we have no alternative but to fall back\nupon war. Reason requires \u201cthat every man ought to endeavour peace,\u201d\n(_Lev._ I. Ch. XIV.) \u201cas far as he has hope of obtaining it; and\nwhen he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and\nadvantages of war.\u201d[51] This, says Hobbes elsewhere, (_On Liberty_,\nCh. I. 15) is the dictate of right reason, the first and fundamental\nlaw of nature.\n\n  [51] We find the same rule laid down as early as the time of\n  Dante. Cf. _De Monarchia_, Bk. II. 9:\u2014\u201cWhen two nations quarrel\n  they are bound to try in every possible way to arrange the\n  quarrel by means of discussion: it is only when this is hopeless\n  that they may declare war.\u201d\n\n\n_Kant\u2019s Idea of a Perpetual Peace._\n\nWith regard to the problems of international law, Kant is of course\na hundred and fifty years ahead of Hobbes. But he starts from the\nsame point: his theory of the beginning of society is practically\nidentical with that of the older philosopher. Men are by nature\nimperfect creatures, unsociable and untrustworthy, cursed by a love\nof glory, of possession, and of power, passions which make happiness\nsomething for ever unattainable by them. Hobbes is content to leave\nthem here with their imperfections, and let a strong government\nhelp them out as it may. But not so Kant. He looks beyond man\nthe individual, developing slowly by stages scarcely measurable,\nprogressing at one moment, and the next, as it seems, falling behind:\nhe looks beyond the individual, struggling and never attaining, to\nthe race. Here Kant is no pessimist. The capacities implanted in\nman by nature are not all for evil: they are, he says, \u201cdestined to\nunfold themselves completely in the course of time, and in accordance\nwith the end to which they are adapted.\u201d (_Idea of a Universal\nHistory from a Cosmopolitan Point of View_, 1784. Prop. 1.) This\nend of humanity is the evolution of man from the stage of mere\nself-satisfied animalism to a high state of civilisation. Through\nhis own reason man is to attain a perfect culture, intellectual and\nmoral. In this long period of struggle, the potential faculties\nwhich nature or Providence has bestowed upon him reach their full\ndevelopment. The process in which this evolution takes place is what\nwe call history.\n\nTo man nature has given none of the perfect animal equipments for\nself-preservation and self-defence which she has bestowed on others\nof her creatures. But she has given to him reason and freedom of\nwill, and has determined that through these faculties and without the\naid of instinct he shall win for himself a complete development of\nhis capacities and natural endowments. It is, says Kant, no happy\nlife that nature has marked out for man. He is filled with desires\nwhich he can never satisfy. His life is one of endeavour and not of\nattainment: not even the consciousness of the well-fought battle is\nhis, for the struggle is more or less an unconscious one, the end\nunseen. Only in the race, and not in the individual, can the natural\ncapacities of the human species reach full development. Reason, says\nKant, (Prop. 2, _op. cit._) \u201cdoes not itself work by instinct, but\nrequires experiments, exercise and instruction in order to advance\ngradually from one stage of insight to another. Hence each individual\nman would necessarily have to live an enormous length of time, in\norder to learn by himself how to make a complete use of all his\nnatural endowments. Or, if nature should have given him but a short\nlease of life, as is actually the case, reason would then require an\nalmost interminable series of generations, the one handing down its\nenlightenment to the other, in order that the seeds she has sown in\nour species may be brought at last to a stage of development which\nis in perfect accordance with her design.\u201d Man the individual shall\ntravel towards the land of promise and fight for its possession, but\nnot he, nor his children, nor his children\u2019s children shall inherit\nthe land. \u201cOnly the latest comers can have the good fortune of\ninhabiting the dwelling which the long series of their predecessors\nhave toiled\u2014though,\u201d adds Kant, \u201cwithout any conscious intent\u2014to\nbuild up without even the possibility of participating in the\nhappiness which they were preparing.\u201d (Proposition 3.)\n\nThe means which nature employs to bring about this development of\nall the capacities implanted in men is their mutual antagonism in\nsociety\u2014what Kant calls the \u201cunsocial sociableness of men, that is to\nsay, their inclination to enter into society, an inclination which\nyet is bound up at every point with a resistance which threatens\ncontinually to break up the society so formed.\u201d (Proposition 4.) Man\nhates society, and yet there alone he can develop his capacities; he\ncannot live there peaceably, and yet cannot live without it. It is\nthe resistance which others offer to his inclinations and will\u2014which\nhe, on his part, shows likewise to the desires of others\u2014that awakens\nall the latent powers of his nature and the determination to conquer\nhis natural propensity to indolence and love of material comfort\nand to struggle for the first place among his fellow-creatures, to\nsatisfy, in outstripping them, his love of glory and possession and\npower. \u201cWithout those, in themselves by no means lovely, qualities\nwhich set man in social opposition to man, so that each finds his\nselfish claims resisted by the selfishness of all the others, men\nwould have lived on in an Arcadian shepherd life, in perfect\nharmony, contentment, and mutual love; but all their talents would\nforever have remained hidden and undeveloped. Thus, kindly as the\nsheep they tended, they would scarcely have given to their existence\na greater value than that of their cattle. And the place among the\nends of creation which was left for the development of rational\nbeings would not have been filled. Thanks be to nature for the\nunsociableness, for the spiteful competition of vanity, for the\ninsatiate desires of gain and power! Without these, all the excellent\nnatural capacities of humanity would have slumbered undeveloped.\nMan\u2019s will is for harmony; but nature knows better what is good for\nhis species: her will is for dissension. He would like a life of\ncomfort and satisfaction, but nature wills that he should be dragged\nout of idleness and inactive content and plunged into labour and\ntrouble, in order that he may be made to seek in his own prudence\nfor the means of again delivering himself from them. The natural\nimpulses which prompt this effort,\u2014the causes of unsociableness and\nmutual conflict, out of which so many evils spring,\u2014are also in turn\nthe spurs which drive him to the development of his powers. Thus,\nthey really betray the providence of a wise Creator, and not the\ninterference of some evil spirit which has meddled with the world\nwhich God has nobly planned, and enviously overturned its order.\u201d\n(Proposition 4: Caird\u2019s translation in _The Critical Philosophy of\nKant_, Vol. II., pp. 550, 551.)\n\nThe problem now arises, How shall men live together, each free to\nwork out his own development, without at the same time interfering\nwith a like liberty on the part of his neighbour? The solution\nof this problem is the state. Here the liberty of each member is\nguaranteed and its limits strictly defined. A perfectly just civil\nconstitution, administered according to the principles of right,\nwould be that under which the greatest possible amount of liberty\nwas left to each citizen within these limits. This is the ideal\nof Kant, and here lies the greatest practical problem which has\npresented itself to humanity. An ideal of this kind is difficult of\nrealisation. But nature imposes no such duty upon us. \u201cOut of such\ncrooked material as man is made,\u201d says Kant, \u201cnothing can be hammered\nquite straight.\u201d (Proposition 6.) We must make our constitution as\ngood as we can and, with that, rest content.\n\nThe direct cause of this transition from a state of nature and\nconditions of unlimited freedom to civil society with its coercive\nand restraining forces is found in the evils of that state of nature\nas they are painted by Hobbes. A wild lawless freedom becomes\nimpossible for man: he is compelled to seek the protection of a\ncivil society. He lives in uncertainty and insecurity: his liberty\nis so far worthless that he cannot peacefully enjoy it. For this\npeace he voluntarily yields up some part of his independence. The\nestablishment of the state is in the interest of his development to\na higher civilisation. It is more\u2014the guarantee of his existence\nand self-preservation. This is the sense, says Professor Paulsen,\nin which Kant like Hobbes regards the state as \u201cresting on a\ncontract,\u201d[52] that is to say, on the free will of all.[53] _Volenti\nnon fit injuria._ Only, adds Paulsen, we must remember that this\ncontract is not a historical fact, as it seemed to some writers of\nthe eighteenth century, but an \u201cidea of reason\u201d: we are speaking here\nnot of the history of the establishment of the state, but of the\nreason of its existence. (Paulsen\u2019s _Kant_, p. 354.)[54]\n\n  [52] Rousseau (_Contrat Social_: I. vi.) regards the social\n  contract as tacitly implied in every actual society: its articles\n  \u201care the same everywhere, and are everywhere tacitly admitted\n  and recognised, even though they may never have found formal\n  expression\u201d in any constitution. In the same way he speaks of\n  a state of nature \u201cwhich no longer exists, which perhaps never\n  has existed.\u201d (Preface to the _Discourse on the Causes of\n  Inequality_.) But Rousseau\u2019s interpretation of these terms is, on\n  the whole, literal in spite of these single passages. He speaks\n  throughout the _Contrat Social_, as if history could actually\n  record the signing and drawing up of such documents. Hobbes,\n  Hooker, (_Ecclesiastical Polity_, I. sect. 10\u2014see also Ritchie:\n  _Darwin and Hegel_, p. 210 _seq._) Hume and Kant use more careful\n  language. \u201cIt cannot be denied,\u201d writes Hume, (_Of the Original\n  Contract_) \u201cthat all government is, at first, founded on a\n  contract and that the most ancient rude combinations of mankind\n  were formed chiefly by that principle. In vain are we asked in\n  what records this charter of our liberties is registered. It was\n  not written on parchment, nor yet on leaves or barks of trees. It\n  preceded the use of writing and all the other civilised arts of\n  life. But we trace it plainly in the nature of man, and in the\n  equality, or something approaching equality, which we find in all\n  the individuals of that species.\u201d\n\n  This fine passage expresses admirably the views of Kant on this\n  point. Cf. _Werke_, (Rosenkranz) IX. 160. The original contract\n  is merely an idea of reason, one of those ideas which we think\n  into things in order to explain them.\n\n  Hobbes does not professedly make the contract historical, but in\n  Locke\u2019s _Civil Government_ (II. Ch. VIII. \u00a7 102) there is some\n  attempt made to give it a historical basis.\u2014By consent all were\n  equal, \u201ctill by the same consent they set rulers over themselves.\n  So that their politic societies all began from a voluntary union,\n  and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice of\n  their governors, and forms of government.\u201d\n\n  Bluntschli points out (_Theory of the State_, IV. ix., p. 294\n  and _note_) that the same theory of contract on which Hobbes\u2019\n  doctrine of an absolute government was based was made the\n  justification of violent resistance to the government at the time\n  of the French Revolution. The theory was differently applied by\n  Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. According to the first, men leave\n  the \u201cstate of nature\u201d when they surrender their rights to a\n  sovereign, and return to that state during revolution. But, for\n  Rousseau, this sovereign authority is the people: a revolution\n  would be only a change of ministry. (See _Cont. Soc._, III. Ch.\n  xviii.) Again Locke holds revolution to be justifiable in all\n  cases where the governments have not fulfilled the trust reposed\n  by the people in them. (Cf. Kant\u2019s _Perpetual Peace_, p. 188,\n  _note_).\n\n  [53] \u201cIf you unite many men,\u201d writes Rousseau, (_Cont. Soc._, IV.\n  I.) \u201cand consider them as one body, they will have but one will;\n  and that will must be to promote the common safety and general\n  well-being of all.\u201d This _volont\u00e9 g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_, the common element\n  of all particular wills, cannot be in conflict with any of them.\n  (_Op. cit._, II. iii.)\n\n  [54] In Eng. trans., see p. 348.\n\nIn this civil union, self-sought, yet sought reluctantly, man is able\nto turn his most unlovable qualities to a profitable use. They bind\nthis society together. They are the instrument by which he wins for\nhimself self-culture. It is here with men, says Kant, as it is with\nthe trees in a forest: \u201cjust because each one strives to deprive the\nother of air and sun, they compel each other to seek both above,\nand thus they grow beautiful and straight. Whereas those that, in\nfreedom and isolation from one another, shoot out their branches at\nwill, grow stunted and crooked and awry.\u201d (Proposition 5, _op. cit._)\nCulture, art, and all that is best in the social order are the fruits\nof that self-loving unsociableness in man.\n\nThe problem of the establishment of a perfect civil constitution\ncannot be solved, says this treatise (_Idea for a Universal\nHistory_), until the external relations of states are regulated\nin accordance with principles of right. For, even if the ideal\ninternal constitution were attained, what end would it serve in the\nevolution of humanity, if commonwealths themselves were to remain\nlike individuals in a state of nature, each existing in uncontrolled\nfreedom, a law unto himself? This condition of things again cannot\nbe permanent. Nature uses the same means as before to bring about a\nstate of law and order. War, present or near at hand, the strain\nof constant preparation for a possible future campaign or the heavy\nburden of debt and devastation left by the last,\u2014these are the evils\nwhich must drive states to leave a lawless, savage state of nature,\nhostile to man\u2019s inward development, and seek in union the end of\nnature, peace. All wars are the attempts nature makes to bring about\nnew political relations between nations, relations which, in their\nvery nature, cannot be, and are not desired to be, permanent. These\ncombinations will go on succeeding each other, until at last a\nfederation of all powers is formed for the establishment of perpetual\npeace. This is the end of humanity, demanded by reason. Justice\nwill reign, not only in the state, but in the whole human race when\nperpetual peace exists between the nations of the world.\n\nThis is the point of view of the _Idea for a Universal History_. But\nequally, we may say, law and justice will reign between nations,\nwhen a legally and morally perfect constitution adorns the state.\nExternal perpetual peace presupposes internal peace\u2014peace civil,\nsocial, economic, religious. Now, when men are perfect\u2014and what\nwould this be but perfection\u2014how can there be war? Cardinal Fleury\u2019s\nonly objection\u2014no light one\u2014to St. Pierre\u2019s project was that, as\neven the most peace-loving could not avoid war, all men must first\nbe men of noble character. This seems to be what is required in\nthe treatise on _Perpetual Peace_. Kant demands, to a certain\nextent, the moral regeneration of man. There must be perfect honesty\nin international dealings, good faith in the interpretation and\nfulfilment of treaties and so on (Art. 1)[55]: and again, every state\nmust have a republican constitution\u2014a term by which Kant understands\na constitution as nearly as possible in accordance with the spirit\nof right. (Art. 1.)[56] This is to say that we have to start with\nour reformation at home, look first to the culture and education\nand morals of our citizens, then to our foreign relations. This is\na question of self-interest as well as of ethics. On the civil and\nreligious liberty of a state depends its commercial success. Kant\nsaw the day coming, when industrial superiority was to be identified\nwith political pre-eminence. The state which does not look to the\nenlightenment and liberty of its subjects must fail in the race. But\nthe advantages of a high state of civilisation are not all negative.\nThe more highly developed the individuals who form a state, the more\nhighly developed is its consciousness of its obligations to other\nnations. In the ignorance and barbarism of races lies the great\nobstacle to a reign of law among states. Uncivilised states cannot\nbe conceived as members of a federation of Europe. First, the\nperfect civil constitution according to right: then the federation of\nthese law-abiding Powers. This is the path which reason marks out.\nThe treatise on _Perpetual Peace_ seems to be in this respect more\npractical than the _Idea for a Universal History_. But it matters\nlittle which way we take it. The point of view is the same in both\ncases: the end remains the development of man towards good, the order\nof his steps in this direction is indifferent.\n\n  [55] See p. 107.\n\n  [56] See p. 120.\n\n\n_The Political and Social Conditions of Kant\u2019s Time._\n\nThe history of the human race, viewed as a whole, Kant regards\nas the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about a\npolitical constitution internally and externally perfect\u2014the only\ncondition under which the faculties of man can be fully developed.\nDoes experience support this theory? Kant thought that, to a certain\ndegree, it did. This conviction was not, however, a fruit of his\nexperience of citizenship in Prussia, an absolute dynastic state,\na military monarchy waging perpetual dynastic wars of the kind he\nmost hotly condemned. Kant had no feeling of love to Prussia,[57]\nand little of a citizen\u2019s patriotic pride, or even interest, in its\npolitical achievements. This was partly because of his sympathy with\nrepublican doctrines: partly due to his love of justice and peculiar\nhatred of war,[58] a hatred based, no doubt, not less on principle\nthan on a close personal experience of the wretchedness it brings\nwith it. It was not the political and social conditions in which he\nlived which fostered Kant\u2019s love of liberty and gave him inspiration,\nunless in the sense in which the mind reacts upon surrounding\ninfluences. Looking beyond Prussia to America, in whose struggle\nfor independence he took a keen interest, and looking to France\nwhere the old dynastic monarchy had been succeeded by a republican\nstate, Kant seemed to see the signs of a coming democratisation of\nthe old monarchical society of Europe. In this growing influence on\nthe state of the mass of the people who had everything to lose in\nwar and little to gain by victory, he saw the guarantee of a future\nperpetual peace. Other forces too were at work to bring about this\nconsummation. There was a growing consciousness that war, this costly\nmeans of settling a dispute, is not even a satisfactory method of\nsettlement. Hazardous and destructive in its effect, it is also\nuncertain in its results. Victory is not always gain; it no longer\nsignifies a land to be plundered, a people to be sold to slavery. It\nbrings fresh responsibilities to a nation, at a time when it is not\nalways strong enough to bear them. But, above all, Kant saw, even at\nthe end of the eighteenth century, the nations of Europe so closely\nbound together by commercial interests that a war\u2014and especially a\nmaritime war where the scene of conflict cannot be to the same extent\nlocalised as on land\u2014between any two of them could not but seriously\naffect the prosperity of the others.[59] He clearly realised that\nthe spirit of commerce was the strongest force in the service of the\nmaintenance of peace, and that in it lay a guarantee of future union.\n\n  [57] Unlike Hegel whose ideal was the Prussian state, as it was\n  under Frederick the Great. An enthusiastic supporter of the power\n  of monarchy, he showed himself comparatively indifferent to the\n  progress of constitutional liberty.\n\n  [58] Isolated passages are sometimes quoted from Kant in support\n  of a theory that the present treatise is at least half ironical[A]\n  and that his views on the question of perpetual peace did not\n  essentially differ from those of Leibniz. \u201cEven war,\u201d he says,\n  (_Kritik d. Urteilskraft_, I. Book ii. \u00a7 28.) \u201cwhen conducted in\n  an orderly way and with reverence for the rights of citizens has\n  something of the sublime about it, and the more dangers a nation\n  which wages war in this manner is exposed to and can courageously\n  overcome, the nobler does its character grow. While, on the other\n  hand, a prolonged peace usually has the effect of giving free\n  play to a purely commercial spirit, and side by side with this,\n  to an ignoble self-seeking, to cowardice and effeminacy; and the\n  result of this is generally a degradation of national character.\u201d\n\n    [A] Cf. K. v. Stengel: _Der Ewige Friede_, Munich, 1899; also\n    Vaihinger: _Kantstudien_, Vol. IV., p. 58.\n\n  This is certainly an admission that war which does not violate\n  the Law of Nations has a good side as well as a bad. We could\n  look for no less in so clear-sighted and unprejudiced a thinker.\n  Kant would have been the first to admit that under certain\n  conditions a nation can have no higher duty than to wage war.\n  War is necessary, but it is in contradiction to reason and the\n  spirit of right. The \u201cscourge of mankind,\u201d \u201cmaking more bad men\n  than it takes away,\u201d the \u201cdestroyer of every good,\u201d Kant calls it\n  elsewhere. (_Theory of Ethics_, Abbott\u2019s trans., 4th ed., p. 341,\n  _note_.)\n\n  [59] Cf. _Idea for a Universal History_, Prop. 8; _Perpetual\n  Peace_, pp. 142, 157.\n\nThis scheme of a federation of the nations of the world, in\naccordance with principles which would put an end to war between\nthem, was one whose interest for Kant seemed to increase during the\nlast twenty years of his life.[60] It was according to him an idea\nof reason, and, in his first essay on the subject\u2014that of 1784\u2014we\nsee the place this ideal of a perpetual peace held in the Kantian\nsystem of philosophy. Its realisation is the realisation of the\nhighest good\u2014the ethical and political _summum bonum_, for here the\naims of morals and politics coincide: only in a perfect development\nof his faculties in culture and in morals can man at last find true\nhappiness. History is working towards the consummation of this end. A\nmoral obligation lies on man to strive to establish conditions which\nbring its realisation nearer. It is the duty of statesmen to form a\nfederative union as it was formerly the duty of individuals to enter\nthe state. The moral law points the way here as clearly as in the\nsphere of pure ethics:\u2014\u201cThou can\u2019st, therefore thou ought\u2019st.\u201d\n\n  [60] The immediate stimulus to Kant\u2019s active interest in this\n  subject as a practical question was the Peace of Basle (1795)\n  which ended the first stage in the series of wars which followed\n  the French Revolution.\n\nLet us be under no misapprehension as to Kant\u2019s attitude to the\nproblem of perpetual peace. It is an ideal. He states plainly that he\nso regards it[61] and that as such it is unattainable. But this is\nthe essence of all ideals: they have not the less value in shaping\nthe life and character of men and nations on that account. They are\nnot ends to be realised but ideas according to which we must live,\nregulative principles. We cannot, says Kant, shape our life better\nthan in acting as if such ideas of reason have objective validity and\nthere be an immortal life in which man shall live according to the\nlaws of reason, in peace with his neighbour and in freedom from the\ntrammels of sense.\n\n  [61] It is _eine unausf\u00fchrbare Idee_. See the passage quoted from\n  the _Rechtslehre_, p. 129, _note_.\n\nHence we are concerned here, not with an end, but with the means by\nwhich we might best set about attaining it, if it were attainable.\nThis is the subject matter of the _Treatise on Perpetual Peace_\n(1795), a less eloquent and less purely philosophical essay than that\nof 1784, but throughout more systematic and practical. We have to do,\nnot with the favourite dream of philanthropists like St. Pierre and\nRousseau, but with a statement of the conditions on the fulfilment of\nwhich the transition to a reign of peace and law depends.\n\n\n_The Conditions of the Realisation of the Kantian Ideal._\n\nThese means are of two kinds. In the first place, what evils must\nwe set about removing? What are the negative conditions? And,\nsecondly, what are the general positive conditions which will make\nthe realisation of this idea possible and guarantee the permanence\nof an international peace once attained? These negative and\npositive conditions Kant calls Preliminary and Definitive Articles\nrespectively, the whole essay being carefully thrown into the form of\na treaty. The Preliminary Articles of a treaty for perpetual peace\nare based on the principle that anything that hinders or threatens\nthe peaceful co-existence of nations must be abolished. These\nconditions have been classified by Kuno Fischer. Kant, he points\nout,[62] examines the principles of right governing the different\nsets of circumstances in which nations find themselves\u2014namely, (_a_)\nwhile they are actually at war; (_b_) when the time comes to conclude\na treaty of peace; (_c_) when they are living in a state of peace.\nThe six Preliminary Articles fall naturally into these groups. War\nmust not be conducted in such a manner as to increase national\nhatred and embitter a future peace. (Art. 6.)[63] The treaty which\nbrings hostilities to an end must be concluded in an honest desire\nfor peace. (Art. 1.)[64] Again a nation, when in a state of peace,\nmust do nothing to threaten the political independence of another\nnation or endanger its existence, thereby giving the strongest of\nall motives for a fresh war. A nation may commit this injury in\ntwo ways: (1) indirectly, by causing danger to others through the\ngrowth of its standing army (Art. 3)[65]\u2014always a menace to the\nstate of peace\u2014or by any unusual war preparations: and (2) through\ntoo great a supremacy of another kind, by amassing money, the\nmost powerful of all weapons in warfare. The National Debt (Art.\n4)[66] is another standing danger to the peaceful co-existence of\nnations. But, besides, we have the danger of actual attack. There\nis no right of intervention between nations. (Art. 5.)[67] Nor can\nstates be inherited or conquered (Art. 2),[68] or in any way treated\nin a manner subversive of their independence and sovereignty as\nindividuals. For a similar reason, armed troops cannot be hired and\nsold as things.\n\n  [62] _Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_, (4th ed., 1899), Vol.\n  V., I. Ch. 12, p. 168 _seq._\n\n  [63] See p. 114.\n\n  [64] See p. 107.\n\n  [65] See p. 110.\n\n  [66] See p. 111.\n\n  [67] See p. 112.\n\n  [68] See p. 108.\n\nThese then are the negative conditions of peace.[69] There are,\nbesides, three positive conditions:\n\n  [69] A large part of Kant\u2019s requirements as they are expressed in\n  these Preliminary Articles has already been fulfilled. The first\n  (Art. 1) is recognised in theory at least by modern international\n  law. More cannot be said. A treaty of this kind is of necessity\n  more or less forced by the stronger on the weaker. The formal\n  ratification of peace in 1871 did not prevent France from longing\n  for the day when she might win back Alsace-Lorraine and be\n  revenged on Prussia. Not the treaty nor a consciousness of defeat\n  has kept the peace west of the Rhine, but a reluctant respect for\n  the fortress of Metz and the mighty army of united Germany.\n\n  Articles 2 and 6 are already commonplaces of international\n  law. Article 2 refers to practices which have not survived the\n  gradual disappearance of dynastic war. Art. 6 is the basis of\n  our modern law of war. Art. 3 has been fulfilled in the literal\n  sense that the standing armies composed of mercenary troops to\n  which Kant alludes exist no longer. But it is to be feared that\n  Kant would not think that we have made things much better, nor\n  regard our present system of progressive armaments as a step in\n  the direction of perpetual peace. Art. 4 is not likely to be\n  fulfilled in the near future. It is long since Cobden denounced\n  the institution of National Debts\u2014an institution which, as Kant\n  points out, owes its origin to the English, the \u201ccommercial\n  people\u201d referred to in the text. Art. 5 no doubt came to Kant\n  through Vattel. \u201cNo nation,\u201d says the Swiss publicist, (_Law of\n  Nations_, II. Ch. iv. \u00a7 54) \u201chas the least right to interfere\n  with the government of another,\u201d unless, he adds, (Ch. v. \u00a7\n  70) in a case of anarchy or where the well-being of the human\n  race demands it. This is a recognised principle of modern\n  international law. Intervention is held to be justifiable only\n  where the obligation to respect another\u2019s freedom of action comes\n  into conflict with the duty of self-preservation.\n\n  Puffendorf leaves much more room for the exercise of benevolence.\n  The natural affinity and kinship between men is, says he, (_Les\n  Devoirs de l\u2019homme et du citoien_, II. Ch. xvi. \u00a7 xi.) \u201ca\n  sufficient reason to authorise us to take up defence of every\n  person whom one sees unjustly oppressed, when he implores our\n  aid _and when we can do it conveniently_.\u201d (The italics are\n  mine.\u2014[Tr.])\n\n(_a_) The intercourse of nations is to be confined to a right of\nhospitality. (Art. 3.)[70] There is nothing new to us in this\nassertion of a right of way. The right to free means of international\ncommunication has in the last hundred years become a commonplace of\nlaw. And the change has been brought about, as Kant anticipated,\nnot through an abstract respect for the idea of right, but through\nthe pressure of purely commercial interests. Since Kant\u2019s time\nthe nations of Europe have all been more or less transformed from\nagricultural to commercial states whose interests run mainly in the\nsame direction, whose existence and development depend necessarily\nupon \u201cconditions of universal hospitality.\u201d Commerce depends upon\nthis freedom of international intercourse, and on commerce mainly\ndepends our hope of peace.\n\n  [70] See p. 137. The main principle involved in this passage\n  comes from Vattel (_op. cit._, II. Ch. viii. \u00a7\u00a7 104, 105: Ch. ix.\n  \u00a7\u00a7 123, 125). A sovereign, he says, cannot object to a stranger\n  entering his state who at the same time respects its laws. No one\n  can be quite deprived of the right of way which has been handed\n  down from the time when the whole earth was common to all men.\n\n(_b_) The first Definitive Article[71] requires that the constitution\nof every state should be republican. What Kant understands by this\nterm is that, in the state, law should rule above force and that\nits constitution should be a representative one, guaranteeing\npublic justice and based on the freedom and equality of its members\nand their mutual dependence on a common legislature. Kant\u2019s demand\nis independent of the _form_ of the government. A constitutional\nmonarchy like that of Prussia in the time of Frederick the Great,\nwho regarded himself as the first servant of the state and ruled\nwith the wisdom and forethought which the nation would have had\nthe right to demand from such an one\u2014such a monarchy is not in\ncontradiction to the idea of a true republic. That the state should\nhave a constitution in accordance with the principles of right is\nthe essential point.[72] To make this possible, the law-giving\npower must lie with the representatives of the people: there must be\na complete separation, such as Locke and Rousseau demand, between\nthe legislature and executive. Otherwise we have despotism. Hence,\nwhile Kant admitted absolutism under certain conditions, he rejected\ndemocracy where, in his opinion, the mass of the people was despot.\n\n  [71] See p. 120.\n\n  [72] Kant believed that, in the newly formed constitution of the\n  United States, his ideal with regard to the external forms of\n  the state as conforming to the spirit of justice was most nearly\n  realised. Professor Paulsen draws attention, in the following\n  passage, to the fact that Kant held the English government of\n  the eighteenth century in very low esteem. (_Kant_, p. 357,\n  _note_. See Eng. trans., p. 352, _note_.) It was not the English\n  state, he says, which furnished Kant with an illustration of\n  his theory:\u2014\u201cRather in it he sees a form of despotism only\n  slightly veiled, not Parliamentary despotism, as some people\n  have thought, but monarchical despotism. Through bribery of the\n  Commons and the Press, the King had actually absolute power, as\n  was evident, above all, from the fact that he had often waged war\n  without, and in defiance of, the will of the people. Kant has\n  a very unfavourable opinion of the English state in every way.\n  Among the collected notes written by him in the last ten years\n  of the century and published by Reicke (_Lose Bl\u00e4tter_, I. 129)\n  the following appears:\u2014\u2018The English nation (_gens_) regarded as\n  a people (_populus_) and looked upon side by side with other\n  races is, as a collection of individuals, of all mankind the\n  most highly to be esteemed. But as a state, compared with other\n  states, it is the most destructive, high-handed and tyrannical,\n  and the most provocative of war among them all.\u2019\u201d\n\n  Kuno Fischer (_op. cit._, Vol. V., I. Ch. 11, pp. 150, 151) to\n  whom Professor Paulsen\u2019s reference may here perhaps allude,\n  states that Kant\u2019s objection to the English constitution is that\n  it was an oligarchy, Parliament being not only a legislative\n  body, but through its ministers also executive in the interests\n  of the ruling party or even of private individuals in that party.\n  It seems more likely that what most offended a keen observer of\n  the course of the American War of Independence was the arbitrary\n  and ill-directed power of the king. But see the passage quoted\n  by Fischer (pp. 152, 153) from the _Rechtslehre_ (Part II. Sect.\n  I.) which is, he says, unmistakeably directed against the English\n  constitution and certain temporary conditions in the political\n  history of the country.\n\nAn internal constitution, firmly established on the principles of\nright, would not only serve to kill the seeds of national hatred and\ndiminish the likelihood of foreign war. It would do more: it would\ndestroy sources of revolution and discontent within the state. Kant,\nlike many writers on this subject, does not directly allude to civil\nwar[73] and the means by which it may be prevented or abolished.\nActually to achieve this would be impossible: it is beyond the\npower of either arbitration or disarmament. But in a representative\ngovernment and the liberty of a people lie the greatest safeguards\nagainst internal discontent. Civil peace and international peace must\nto a certain extent go hand in hand.\n\n  [73] St. Pierre actually thought that his federation would\n  prevent civil war. See _Project_ (1714), p. 16.\n\nWe come now to the central idea of the treatise: (_c_) the law of\nnations must be based upon a federation of free states. (Art. 2.)[74]\nThis must be regarded as the end to which mankind is advancing. The\nproblem here is not out of many nations to make one. This would\nbe perhaps the surest way to attain peace, but it is scarcely\npracticable, and, in certain forms, it is undesirable. Kant is\ninclined to approve of the separation of nations by language and\nreligion, by historical and social tradition and physical boundaries:\nnature seems to condemn the idea of a universal monarchy.[75] The\nonly footing on which a thorough-going, indubitable system of\ninternational law is in practice possible is that of the society\nof nations: not the world-republic[76] the Greeks dreamt of, but a\nfederation of states. Such a union in the interests of perpetual\npeace between nations would be the \u201chighest political good.\u201d The\nrelation of the federated states to one another and to the whole\nwould be fixed by cosmopolitan law: the link of self-interest which\nwould bind them would again be the spirit of commerce.\n\n  [74] See p. 128.\n\n  [75] This was the ideal of Dante. Cf. _De Monarchia_, Bk. I.\n  54:\u2014\u201cWe shall not find at any time except under the divine\n  monarch Augustus, when a perfect monarchy existed, that the world\n  was everywhere quiet.\u201d\n\n  Bluntschli (_Theory of the State_, I. Ch. ii., p. 26 _seq._)\n  gives an admirable account of the different attempts made to\n  realise a universal empire in the past\u2014the Empire of Alexander\n  the Great, based upon a plan of uniting the races of east and\n  west; the Roman Empire which sought vainly to stamp its national\n  character upon mankind; the Frankish Monarchy; the Holy Roman\n  Empire which fell to pieces through the want of a central\n  power strong enough to overcome the tendency to separation and\n  nationalisation; and finally the attempt of Napoleon I., whose\n  mistake was the same as that which wrecked the Roman Empire\u2014a\n  neglect of the strength of foreign national sentiment.\n\n  [76] Reason requires a State of nations. This is the ideal,\n  and Kant\u2019s proposal of a federation of states is a practical\n  substitute from which we may work to higher things. Kant, like\n  Fichte, (_Werke_, VII. 467) strongly disapproves of a universal\n  monarchy such as that of which Dante dreamed\u2014a modern Roman\n  Empire. The force of necessity, he says, will bring nations at\n  last to become members of a cosmopolitan state, \u201cor if such a\n  state of universal peace proves (as has often been the case\n  with too great states) a greater danger to freedom from another\n  point of view, in that it introduces despotism of the most\n  terrible kind, then this same necessity must compel the nations\n  to enter a state which indeed has the form not of a cosmopolitan\n  commonwealth under one sovereign, but of a federation\n  regulated by legal principles determined by a common code of\n  international law.\u201d (_Das mag in d. Theorie richtig sein_,\n  _Werke_, (Rosenkranz) VII., p. 225). Cf. also _Theory of Ethics_,\n  (Abbott), p. 341, _note_; _Perpetual Peace_, pp. 155, 156.\n\nThis scheme of a perpetual peace had not escaped ridicule in the\neighteenth century: the name of Kant protected it henceforth.\nThe facts of history, even more conclusively than the voices of\nphilosophers, soldiers and princes, show how great has been the\nprogress of this idea in recent years. But it has not gained its\npresent hold upon the popular mind without great and lasting\nopposition. Indeed we have here what must still be regarded as a\ncontroversial question. There have been, and are still, men who\nregard perpetual peace as a state of things as undesirable as\nit is unattainable. For such persons, war is a necessity of our\ncivilisation: it is impossible that it should ever cease to exist.\nAll that we can do, and there is no harm, nor any contradiction in\nthe attempt, is to make wars shorter, fewer and more humane: the\nwhole question, beyond this, is without practical significance.\nOthers, on the other hand,\u2014and these perhaps more thoughtful\u2014regard\nwar as hostile to culture, an evil of the worst kind, although a\nnecessary evil. In peace, for them, lies the true ideal of humanity,\nalthough in any perfect form this cannot be realised in the near\nfuture. The extreme forms of these views are to be sought in what has\nbeen called in Germany \u201cthe philosophy of the barracks\u201d which comes\nforward with a glorification of war for its own sake, and in the\nattitude of modern Peace Societies which denounce all war wholesale,\nwithout respect of causes or conditions.\n\n\n_Hegel, Schiller and Moltke._\n\nHegel, the greatest of the champions of war, would have nothing\nto do with Kant\u2019s federation of nations formed in the interests\nof peace. The welfare of a state, he held, is its own highest\nlaw; and he refused to admit that this welfare was to be sought\nin an international peace. Hegel lived in an age when all power\nand order seemed to lie with the sword. Something of the charm of\nNapoleonism seems to hang over him. He does not go the length of\nwriters like Joseph de Maistre, who see in war the finger of God or\nan arrangement for the survival of the fittest\u2014a theory, as far as\nregards individuals, quite in contradiction with the real facts,\nwhich show that it is precisely the physically unfit whom war, as a\nmethod of extermination, cannot reach. But, like Schiller and Moltke,\nHegel sees in war an educative instrument, developing virtues in a\nnation which could not be fully developed otherwise, (much as pain\nand suffering bring patience and resignation and other such qualities\ninto play in the individual), and drawing the nation together, making\neach citizen conscious of his citizenship, as no other influence can.\nWar, he holds, leaves a nation always stronger than it was before;\nit buries causes of inner dissension, and consolidates the internal\npower of the state.[77] No other trial can, in the same way, show\nwhat is the real strength and weakness of a nation, what it _is_, not\nmerely materially, but physically, intellectually and morally.\n\n  [77] See the _Philosophie d. Rechts_, (_Werke_, Vol. VIII.) Part\n  iii. \u00a7 324 and appendix.\n\nWith this last statement most people will be inclined to agree. There\nis only a part of the truth in Napoleon\u2019s dictum that \u201cGod is on\nthe side of the biggest battalions\u201d; or in the old saying that war\nrequires three necessaries\u2014in the first place, money; in the second\nplace, money; and in the third, money. Money is a great deal: it is a\nnecessity; but what we call national back-bone and character is more.\nSo far we are with Hegel. But he goes further. In peace, says he,\nmankind would grow effeminate and degenerate in luxury. This opinion\nwas expressed in forcible language in his own time by Schiller,[78]\nand in more recent years by Count Moltke. \u201cPerpetual peace,\u201d says\na letter of the great general,[79] \u201cis a dream and not a beautiful\ndream either: war is part of the divine order of the world. During\nwar are developed the noblest virtues which belong to man\u2014courage\nand self-denial, fidelity to duty and the spirit of self-sacrifice:\nthe soldier is called upon to risk his life. Without war the world\nwould sink in materialism.\u201d[80] \u201cWant and misery, disease, suffering\nand war,\u201d he says elsewhere, \u201care all given elements in the Divine\norder of the universe.\u201d Moltke\u2019s eulogy of war, however, is somewhat\nmodified by his additional statement that \u201cthe greatest kindness in\nwar lies in its being quickly ended.\u201d (Letter to Bluntschli, 11th\nDec., 1880.)[81] The great forces which we recognise as factors\nin the moral regeneration of mankind are always slow of action as\nthey are sure. War, if too quickly over, could not have the great\nmoral influence which has been attributed to it. The explanation\nmay be that it is not all that it naturally appears to a great and\nsuccessful general. Hegel, Moltke, Trendelenburg, Treitschke[82]\nand the others\u2014not Schiller[83] who was able to sing the blessings\nof peace as eloquently as of war\u2014were apt to forget that war is as\nefficient a school for forming vices as virtues; and that, moreover,\nthose virtues which military life is said to cultivate\u2014courage,\nself-sacrifice and the rest\u2014can be at least as perfectly developed in\nother trials. There are in human life dangers every day bravely met\nand overcome which are not less terrible than those which face the\nsoldier, in whom patriotism may be less a sentiment than a duty, and\nwhose cowardice must be dearly paid.\n\n  [78] Cf. _Die Braut von Messina_:\u2014\n\n    \u201cDenn der Mensch verk\u00fcmmert im Frieden,\n    M\u00fcssige Ruh\u2019 ist das Grab des Muths.\n    Das Gesetz ist der Freund des Schwachen,\n    Alles will es nur eben machen,\n    M\u00f6chte gerne die Welt verflachen;\n    Aber der Krieg l\u00e4sst die Kraft erscheinen,\n    Alles erhebt er zum Ungemeinen,\n    Selber dem Feigen erzeugt er den Muth.\u201d\n\n  This passage perhaps scarcely gives a fair representation of\n  Schiller\u2019s views on the question, which, if we judge from\n  _Wilhelm Tell_, must have been very moderate. War, he says, in\n  this oft-quoted passage, is sometimes a necessity. There is\n  a limit to the power of tyranny and, when the burden becomes\n  unbearable, an appeal to Heaven and the sword.\n\n  _Wilhelm Tell_: Act. II. Sc. 2.\n\n    \u201cNein, eine Grenze hat Tyrannenmacht.\n    Wenn der Gedr\u00fcckte nirgends Recht kann finden,\n    Wenn unertr\u00e4glich wird die Last greift er\n    Hinauf getrosten Muthes in den Himmel\n    Und holt herunter seine ew\u2019gen Rechte,\n    Die droben hangen unver\u00e4usserlich\n    Und unzerbrechlich, wie die Sterne selbst\u2014\n    Der alte Urstand der Natur kehrt wieder,\n    Wo Mensch dem Menschen gegen\u00fcber steht\u2014\n    Zum letzten Mittel, wenn kein andres mehr\n    Verfangen will, ist ihm das Schwert gegeben.\u201d\n\n  [79] Letter to Bluntschli, dated Berlin, 11th Dec., 1880\n  (published in Bluntschli\u2019s _Gesammelte Kleine Schriften_, Vol.\n  II., p. 271).\n\n  [80] Cf. Tennyson\u2019s _Maud_: Part I., vi. and xiii.\n\n    \u201cWhy do they prate of the blessings of Peace? we have made them a curse,\n    Pickpockets, each hand lusting for all that is not its own;\n    And lust of gain, in the spirit of Cain, is it better or worse\n    Than the heart of the citizen hissing in war on his own hearthstone?\n    For I trust if an enemy\u2019s fleet came yonder round by the hill,\n    And the rushing battle-bolt sang from the three-decker out of the foam,\n    That the smooth-faced snub-nosed rogue would leap from his counter and till,\n    And strike, if he could, were it but with his cheating yardwand, home.\u201d\n\n  See too Part III., ii. and iv.\n\n    \u201cAnd it was but a dream, yet it lighten\u2019d my despair\n    When I thought that a war would arise in defence of the right,\n    That an iron tyranny now should bend or cease,\n    The glory of manhood stand on his ancient height,\n    Nor Britain\u2019s one sole God be the millionaire:\n    No more shall commerce be all in all, and Peace\n    Pipe on her pastoral hillock a languid note,\n    And watch her harvest ripen, her herd increase,\n    Nor the cannon-bullet rest on a slothful shore,\n    And the cobweb woven across the cannon\u2019s throat\n    Shall shake its threaded tears in the wind no more.\n\n    Let it go or stay, so I wake to the higher aims\n    Of a land that has lost for a little her lust of gold,\n    And love of a peace that was full of wrongs and shames,\n    Horrible, hateful, monstrous, not to be told;\n    And hail once more to the banner of battle unroll\u2019d!\n    Tho\u2019 many a light shall darken, and many shall weep\n    For those that are crush\u2019d in the clash of jarring claims,\n    For God\u2019s just wrath shall be wreak\u2019d on a giant liar;\n    And many a darkness into the light shall leap,\n    And shine in the sudden making of splendid names,\n    And noble thought be freer under the sun,\n    And the heart of a people beat with one desire.\u201d\n\n\n  [81] Moltke strangely enough was, at an earlier period, of the\n  opinion that war, even when it is successful, is a national\n  misfortune. Cf. Kehrbach\u2019s preface to Kant\u2019s essay, _Zum Ewigen\n  Frieden_, p. XVII.\n\n  [82] See his discussion on constitutional monarchy in Germany.\n  (_Hist. u. Pol. Aufs\u00e4tze_, Bd. III., p. 533 _seq._)\n\n  [83] See _Die Piccolomini_: Act. I. Sc. 4.\n\n\n_War under Altered Conditions._\n\nThe Peace Societies of our century, untiring supporters of a point of\nview diametrically opposite to that of Hegel, owe their existence\nin the first place to new ideas on the subject of the relative\nadvantages and disadvantages of war, which again were partly due to\nchanges in the character of war itself, partly to a new theory that\nthe warfare of the future should be a war of free competition for\nindustrial interests, or, in Herbert Spencer\u2019s language, that the\nwarlike type of mankind should make room for an industrial type.\nThis theory, amounting in the minds of some thinkers to a fervid\nconviction, and itself, in a sense, the source of what has been\ncontemptuously styled our British \u201cshopkeeper\u2019s policy\u201d in Europe,\nwas based on something more solid than mere enthusiasm. The years of\npeace which followed the downfall of Napoleon had brought immense\nincrease in material wealth to countries like France and Britain.\nSomething of the glamour had fallen away from the sword of the great\nEmperor. The illusive excitement of a desire for conquest had died:\nthe glory of war had faded with it, but the burden still remained:\nits cost was still there, something to be calmly reckoned up and not\nsoon to be forgotten. Europe was seen to be actually moving towards\nruin. \u201cWe shall have to get rid of war in all civilised countries,\u201d\nsaid Louis Philippe in 1843. \u201cSoon no nation will be able to afford\nit.\u201d War was not only becoming more costly. New conditions had\naltered it in other directions. With the development of technical\nscience and its application to the perfecting of methods and\ninstruments of destruction every new war was found to be bloodier\nthan the last; and the day seemed to be in sight, when this very\ndevelopment would make war (with instruments of extermination)\nimpossible altogether. The romance and picturesqueness with which\nit was invested in the days of hand-to-hand combat was gone. But,\nabove all, war was now waged for questions fewer and more important\nthan in the time of Kant. Napoleon\u2019s successful appeal to the masses\nhad suggested to Prussia the idea of consciously nationalising the\narmy. Our modern national wars exact a sacrifice, necessarily much\nmore heavy, much more reluctantly made than those of the past which\nwere fought with mercenary troops. Such wars have not only greater\ndignity: they are more earnest, and their issue, as in a sense the\nissue of conflict between higher and lower types of civilisation, is\nspeedier and more decisive.\n\nIn the hundred years since Kant\u2019s death, much that he prophesied\nhas come to pass, although sometimes by different paths than he\nanticipated. The strides made in recent years by commerce and the\ngrowing power of the people in every state have had much of the\ninfluence which he foretold. There is a greater reluctance to wage\nwar.[84] But, unfortunately, as Professor Paulsen points out, the\nprogress of democracy and the nationalisation of war have not worked\nmerely in the direction of progress towards peace. War has now become\npopular for the first time. \u201cThe progress of democracy in states,\u201d\nhe says, (_Kant_, p. 364[85]) \u201chas not only not done away with war,\nbut has very greatly changed the feeling of people towards it. With\nthe universal military service, introduced by the Revolution, war\nhas become the people\u2019s affair and popular, as it could not be in\nthe case of dynastic wars carried on with mercenary troops.\u201d In the\npeople the love of peace is strong, but so too is the love of a\nfight, the love of victory.\n\n  [84] An admirable short account of popular feeling on this matter\n  is to be found in Lawrence\u2019s _Principles of International Law_, \u00a7\n  240.\n\n  [85] The first Peace Society was founded in London in 1816, and\n  the first International Peace Congress held in 1843.\n\nIt is in the contemplation of facts and conflicting tendencies like\nthese that Peace Societies[86] have been formed. The peace party is,\nwe may say, an eclectic body: it embraces many different sections\nof political opinion. There are those who hold, for instance, that\npeace is to be established on a basis of communism of property.\nThere are others who insist on the establishment throughout Europe\nof a republican form of government, or again, on a redistribution\nof European territory in which Alsace-Lorraine is restored to\nFrance\u2014changes of which at least the last two would be difficult to\ncarry out, unless through international warfare. But these are not\nthe fundamental general principles of peace workers. The members\nof this party agree in rejecting the principle of intervention, in\ndemanding a complete or partial disarmament of the nations of Europe,\nand in requiring that all disputes between nations\u2014and they admit the\nprospects of dispute\u2014should be settled by means of arbitration. In\nhow far are these principles useful or practicable?\n\n  [86] In Eng. trans. see p. 358.\n\n\n_The Value of Arbitration._\n\nThere is a strong feeling in favour of arbitration on the part of all\nclasses of society. It is cheaper under all circumstances than war.\nIt is a judgment at once more certain and more complete, excluding\nas far as possible the element of chance, leaving irritation perhaps\nbehind it, but none of the lasting bitterness which is the legacy\nof every war. Arbitration has an important place in all peace\nprojects except that of Kant, whose federal union would naturally\nfulfil the function of a tribunal of arbitration. St. Pierre,\nJeremy Bentham,[87] Bluntschli[88] the German publicist, Professor\nLorimer[89] and others among political writers,[90] and among rulers,\nLouis Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander I. of Russia, have all made\nproposals more or less ineffectual for the peaceful settlement of\ninternational disputes. A number of cases have already been decided\nby this means. But let us examine the questions which have been\nat issue. Of a hundred and thirty matters of dispute settled by\narbitration since 1815 (cf. _International Tribunals_, published\nby the Peace Society, 1899) it will be seen that all, with the\nexception of one or two trifling cases of doubt as to the succession\nto certain titles or principalities, can be classified roughly\nunder two heads\u2014disputes as to the determination of boundaries or\nthe possession of certain territory, and questions of claims for\ncompensation and indemnities due either to individuals or states,\narising from the seizure of fleets or merchant vessels, the insult\nor injury to private persons and so on\u2014briefly, questions of money\nor of territory. These may fairly be said to be trifling causes,\nnot touching national honour or great political questions. That they\nshould have been settled in this way, however, shows a great advance.\nSmaller causes than these have made some of the bloodiest wars in\nhistory. That arbitration should have been the means of preventing\neven one war which would otherwise have been waged is a strong reason\nwhy we should fully examine its claims. \u201cQuand l\u2019institution d\u2019une\nhaute cour,\u201d writes Laveleye, (_Des causes actuelles de guerre en\nEurope et de l\u2019arbitrage_) \u201cn\u2019\u00e9viterait qu\u2019une guerre sur vingt,\nil vaudrait encore la peine de l\u2019\u00e9tablir.\u201d But history shows us\nthat there is no single instance of a supreme conflict having been\nsettled otherwise than by war. Arbitration is a method admirably\nadapted to certain cases: to those we have named, where it has been\nsuccessfully applied, to the interpretation of contracts, to offences\nagainst the Law of Nations\u2014some writers say to trivial questions of\nhonour\u2014in all cases where the use of armed force would be impossible,\nas, for instance, in any quarrel in which neutralised countries[91]\nlike Belgium or Luxembourg should take a principal part, or in a\ndifference between two nations, such as (to take an extreme case)\nthe United States and Switzerland, which could not easily engage in\nactual combat. These cases, which we cannot too carefully examine,\nshow that what is here essential is that it should be possible to\nformulate a juridical statement of the conflicting claims. In Germany\nthe _Bundestag_ had only power to decide questions of law. Other\ndisputes were left to be fought out. Questions on which the existence\nand vital honour of a state depend\u2014any question which nearly concerns\nthe disputants\u2014cannot be reduced to any cut and dry legal formula\nof right and wrong. We may pass over the consideration that in some\ncases (as in the Franco-Prussian War) the delay caused by seeking\nmediation of any kind would deprive a nation of the advantage its\nstate of military preparation deserved. And we may neglect the\nproblem of finding an impartial judge on some questions of dispute,\nalthough its solution might be a matter of extreme difficulty,\nso closely are the interests of modern nations bound up in one\nanother. How could the Eastern Question, for example, be settled by\narbitration? It is impossible that such a means should be sufficient\nfor every case. Arbitration in other words may prevent war, but can\nnever be a substitute for war. We cannot wonder that this is so. So\nnumerous and conflicting are the interests of states, so various\nare the grades of civilisation to which they have attained and the\ndirections along which they are developing, that differences of the\nmost vital kind are bound to occur and these can never be settled\nby any peaceful means at present known to Europe. This is above all\ntrue where the self-preservation[92] or independence of a people are\nconcerned. Here the \u201cgood-will\u201d of the nations who disagree would\nnecessarily be wanting: there could be no question of the arbitration\nof an outsider.\n\n  [87] See \u201cA Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace\u201d in the\n  _Principles of International Law_ (_Works_, Vol. II). One of\n  the main principles advocated by Bentham in this essay (written\n  between 1787 and 1789) is that every state should give up its\n  colonies.\n\n  [88] See his _Kleine Schriften_.\n\n  [89] _Institutes of the Law of Nations_ (1884), Vol. II., Ch. XIV.\n\n  [90] John Stuart Mill holds that the multiplication of federal\n  unions would be a benefit to the world. [See his _Considerations\n  on Representative Government_ (1865), Ch. XVII., where he\n  discusses the conditions necessary to render such unions\n  successful.] But the Peace Society is scarcely justified, on the\n  strength of what is here, in including Mill among writers who\n  have made definite proposals of peace or federation. (See _Inter.\n  Trib._)\n\n  [91] See what Lawrence says (_op. cit._, \u00a7 241) of neutralisation\n  and the limits of its usefulness as a remedy for war.\n\n  [92] Montesquieu: _Esprit des Lois_, X. Ch. 2. \u201cThe life of\n  governments is like that of man. The latter has a right to kill\n  in case of natural defence: the former have a right to wage war\n  for their own preservation.\u201d\n\n  See also Vattel (_Law of Nations_, II. Ch. XVIII. \u00a7 332):\u2014\u201cBut\n  if anyone would rob a nation of one of her essential rights, or\n  a right without which she could not hope to support her national\n  existence,\u2014if an ambitious neighbour threatens the liberty of a\n  republic, if he attempts to subjugate and enslave her,\u2014she will\n  take counsel only from her own courage. She will not even attempt\n  the method of conferences, in the case of a contention so odious\n  as this. She will, in such a quarrel, exert her utmost efforts,\n  exhaust every resource and lavish her blood to the last drop if\n  necessary. To listen to the slightest proposal in a matter of\n  this kind is to risk everything.\u201d\n\nBut, indeed, looking away from questions so vital and on which there\ncan be little difference of opinion, we are apt to forget, when we\nallow ourselves to talk extravagantly of the future of arbitration,\nthat every nation thinks, or at least pretends to think, that it\nis in the right in every dispute in which it appears (cf. Kant:\n_Perpetual Peace_, p. 120.): and, as a matter of history, there has\nnever been a conflict between civilised states in which an appeal to\nthis \u201cright\u201d on the part of each has not been made. We talk glibly\nof the right and wrong of this question or of that, of the justice\nof this war, the iniquity of that. But what do these terms really\nmean? _Do_ we know, in spite of the labour which has been spent on\nthis question by the older publicists, which are the causes that\njustify a war? Is it not true that the same war might be just in one\nset of circumstances and unjust in another? Practically all writers\non this subject, exclusive of those who apply the biblical doctrine\nof non-resistance, agree in admitting that a nation is justified in\ndefending its own existence or independence, that this is even a\nmoral duty as it is a fundamental right of a state. Many, especially\nthe older writers, make the confident assertion that all wars of\ndefence are just. But will this serve as a standard? Gibbon tells us\nsomewhere, that Livy asserts that the Romans conquered the world in\nself-defence. The distinction between wars of aggression and defence\nis one very difficult to draw. The cause of a nation which waits\nto be actually attacked is often lost: the critical moment in its\ndefence may be past. The essence of a state\u2019s defensive power may\nlie in a readiness to strike the first blow, or its whole interests\nmay be bound up in the necessity of fighting the matter out in its\nenemy\u2019s country, rather than at home. It is not in the strictly\nmilitary interpretation of the term \u201cdefensive\u201d, but in its wider\nethical and political sense that we can speak of wars of defence as\njust. But, indeed, we cannot judge these questions abstractly. Where\na war is necessary, it matters very little whether it is just or not.\nOnly the judgment of history can finally decide; and generally it\nseems at the time that both parties have something of right on their\nside, something perhaps too of wrong.[93]\n\n  [93] The difficulties in the way of hard and fast judgments on a\n  complicated problem of this kind are convincingly demonstrated in\n  a recent essay by Professor D. G. Ritchie (_Studies in Political\n  and Social Ethics_, Sonnenschein, 1902). Professor Ritchie\n  considers in detail a number of concrete cases which occurred\n  in the century between 1770 and 1870. \u201cLet any one take the\n  judgments he would pass on these or any similarly varied cases,\n  and I think he will find that we do not restrict our approval\n  to wars of self-defence, that we do not approve self-defence\n  under all circumstances, that there are some cases in which we\n  approve of absorption of smaller states by larger, that there\n  are cases in which we excuse intervention of third parties in\n  quarrels with which at first they had nothing to do, and that\n  we sometimes approve war even when begun without the authority\n  of any already existing sovereign. Can any principles be found\n  underlying such judgments? In the first place we ought not to\n  disguise from ourselves the fact that our judgments after the\n  result are based largely on success. ... I think it will be\n  found that our judgments on the wars of the century from 1770 to\n  1870 turn very largely on the question, Which of the conflicting\n  forces was making for constitutional government and for social\n  progress? or, to put it in wider terms, Which represented the\n  higher civilisation? And thus it is that we may sometimes approve\n  the rise of a new state and sometimes the absorption of an old.\u201d\n  (_Op. cit._, pp. 152, 155.)\n\nA consideration of difficulties like these brings us to a realisation\nof the fact that the chances are small that a nation, in the heat of\na dispute, will admit the likelihood of its being in the wrong. To\nrefuse to admit this is generally tantamount to a refusal to submit\nthe difficulty to arbitration. And neither international law, nor the\nmoral force of public opinion can induce a state to act contrary to\nwhat it believes to be its own interest. Moreover, as international\nlaw now stands, it is not a duty to have recourse to arbitration.\nThis was made quite clear in the proceedings of the Peace Conference\nat the Hague in 1899.[94] It was strongly recommended that\narbitration should be sought wherever it was possible, but, at the\nsame time definitely stated, that this course could in no case be\ncompulsory. In this respect things have not advanced beyond the\nposition of the Paris Congress of 1856.[95] The wars waged in Europe\nsubsequent to that date, have all been begun without previous attempt\nat mediation.\n\n  [94] See Fred. W. Holls: _The Peace Conference at the Hague_,\n  Macmillan, 1900.\n\n  [95] The feeling of the Congress expressed itself thus\n  cautiously:\u2014\u201cMessieurs les pl\u00e9nipotentiaires n\u2019h\u00e9sitent pas \u00e0\n  exprimer, au nom de leur gouvernements, le voeu, que les Etats\n  entre lesquels s\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9verait un dissentiment s\u00e9rieux, avant d\u2019en\n  appeler aux armes, eussent recours, en tant que les circonstances\n  l\u2019admettraient, aux bons offices d\u2019une puissance amie.\u201d\n\nBut the work of the peace party regarding the humaner methods of\nsettlement is not to be neglected. The popular feeling which they\nhave been partly the means of stimulating has no doubt done something\nto influence the action of statesmen towards extreme caution in\nthe treatment of questions likely to arouse national passions and\nprejudices. Arbitration has undoubtedly made headway in recent\nyears. Britain and America, the two nations whose names naturally\nsuggest themselves to us as future centres of federative union, both\ncountries whose industrial interests are numerous and complicated,\nhave most readily, as they have most frequently, settled disputes\nin this practical manner. It has shown itself to be a policy as\neconomical as it is business-like. Its value, in its proper place,\ncannot be overrated by any Peace Congress or by any peace pamphlet;\nbut we have endeavoured to make it clear that this sphere is but a\nlimited one. The \u201cgood-will\u201d may not be there when it ought perhaps\nto appear: it will certainly not be there when any vital interest\nis at stake. But, even if this were not so and arbitration were\nthe natural sequence of every dispute, no coercive force exists\nto enforce the decree of the court. The moral restraint of public\nopinion is here a poor substitute. Treaties, it is often said,\nare in the same position; but treaties have been broken, and will\nno doubt be broken again. We are moved to the conclusion that a\nthoroughly logical peace programme cannot stop short of the principle\nof federation. Federal troops are necessary to carry out the decrees\nof a tribunal of arbitration, if that court is not to run a risk\nof being held feeble and ineffectual. Except on some such basis,\narbitration, as a substitute for war, stands on but a weak footing.\n\n\n_Disarmament._\n\nThe efforts of the Peace Society are directed with even less hope\nof complete success against another evil of our time, the crushing\nburden of modern armaments. We have peace at this moment, but at\na daily increasing cost. The Peace Society is rightly concerned\nin pressing this point. It is not enough to keep off actual war:\nthere is a limit to the price we can afford to pay even for peace.\nProbably no principle has cost Europe so much in the last century as\nthat handed down from Rome:\u2014\u201cSi vis pacem, para bellum.\u201d It is now\na hundred and fifty years since Montesquieu[96] protested against\nthis \u201cnew distemper\u201d which was spreading itself over Europe; but\nnever, in time of peace, has complaint been so loud or so general\nas now: and this, not only against the universal burden of taxation\nwhich weighs upon all nations alike, but, in continental countries,\nagainst the waste of productive force due to compulsory military\nservice, a discontent which seems to strike at the very foundations\nof society. Vattel relates that in early times a treaty of peace\ngenerally stipulated that both parties should afterwards disarm. And\nthere is no doubt that Kant was right in regarding standing armies\nas a danger to peace, not only as openly expressing the rivalry and\ndistrust between nation and nation which Hobbes regards as the basis\nof international relations, but also as putting a power into the\nhand of a nation which it may some day have the temptation to abuse.\nA war-loving, overbearing spirit in a people thrives none the worse\nfor a consciousness that its army or navy can hold its own with any\nother in Europe. Were it not the case that the essence of armed peace\nis that a high state of efficiency should be general, the danger to\npeace would be very great indeed. No doubt it is due to this fact\nthat France has kept quietly to her side of the Rhine during the last\nthirty years. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was an immediate\nstimulus to the increase of armaments; but otherwise, just because of\nthis greater efficiency and the slightly stronger military position\nof Germany, it has been an influence on the side of peace.\n\n  [96] _Esprit des Lois_, XIII. Chap. 17. \u201cA new distemper has\n  spread itself over Europe: it has infected our princes, and\n  induces them to keep up an exorbitant number of troops. It has\n  its redoublings, and of necessity becomes contagious. For as\n  soon as one prince augments what he calls his troops, the rest\n  of course do the same: so that nothing is gained thereby but the\n  public ruin. Each monarch keeps as many armies on foot as if his\n  people were in danger of being exterminated: and they give the\n  name of Peace to this general effort of all against all.\u201d\n\n  Montesquieu is of course writing in the days of mercenary troops;\n  but the cost to the nation of our modern armies, both in time of\n  peace and of war, is incomparably greater.\n\nThe Czar\u2019s Rescript of 1898 gave a new stimulus to an interest in\nthis question which the subsequent conference at the Hague was\nunable fully to satisfy. We are compelled to consider carefully\nhow a process of simultaneous disarmament can actually be carried\nout, and what results might be anticipated from this step, with a\nview not only to the present but the future. Can this be done in\naccordance with the principles of justice? Organisations like a great\nnavy or a highly disciplined army have been built up, in the course\nof centuries, at great cost and at much sacrifice to the nation.\nThey are the fruit of years of wise government and a high record\nof national industry. Are such visible tokens of the culture and\ncharacter and worth of a people to be swept away and Britain, France,\nGermany, Italy, Spain, Turkey to stand on the same level? And, even\nif no such ethical considerations should arise, on what method are\nwe to proceed? The standard as well as the nature of armament depends\nin every state on its geographical conditions and its historical\nposition. An ocean-bound empire like Britain is comparatively immune\nfrom the danger of invasion: her army can be safely despatched to\nthe colonies, her fleet protects her at home, her position is one of\nnatural defence. But Germany and Austria find themselves in exactly\nopposite circumstances, with the hard necessity imposed upon them of\nguarding their frontiers on every side. The safety of a nation like\nGermany is in the hands of its army: its military strength lies in an\nalmost perfect mastery of the science of attack.\n\nThe Peace Society has hitherto made no attempt to face the\ndifficulties inseparable from any attempt to apply a uniform method\nof treatment to peculiarities and conditions so conflicting and\nvarious as these. Those who have been more conscientious have not\nbeen very successful in solving them. Indeed, so constantly is\nmilitary technique changing that it is difficult to prophesy wherein\nwill lie, a few years hence, the essence of a state\u2019s defensive power\nor what part the modern navy will play in this defence. No careful\nthinker would suggest, in the face of dangers threatening from the\nEast,[97] a complete disarmament. The simplest of many suggestions\nmade\u2014but this on the basis of universal conscription\u2014seems to be\nthat the number of years or months of compulsory military service\nshould be reduced to some fixed period. But this does not touch the\ndifficulty of colonial empires[98] like Britain which might to a\ncertain extent disarm, like their neighbours, in Europe, but would\nbe compelled to keep an army for the defence of their colonies\nelsewhere. It is, in the meantime, inevitable that Europe should keep\nup a high standard of armament\u2014this is, (and even if we had European\nfederation, would remain) an absolute necessity as a protection\nagainst the yellow races, and in Europe itself there are at present\nelements hostile to the cause of peace. Alsace-Lorraine, Polish\nPrussia, Russian Poland and Finland are still, to a considerable\ndegree, sources of discontent and dissatisfaction. But in Russia\nitself lies the great obstacle to a future European peace or\nEuropean federation: we can scarcely picture Russia as a reliable\nmember of such a union. That Russia should disarm is scarcely\nfeasible, in view of its own interest: it has always to face the\ndanger of rebellion in Poland and anarchy at home. But that Europe\nshould disarm, before Russia has attained a higher civilisation, a\nconsciousness of its great future as a north-eastern, inter-oceanic\nempire, and a government more favourable to the diffusion of liberty,\nis still less practicable.[99] We have here to fall back upon\nfederation again. It is not impossible that, in the course of time,\nthis problem may be solved and that the contribution to the federal\ntroops of a European union may be regulated upon some equitable basis\nthe form of which we cannot now well prophesy.\n\n  [97] Even St. Pierre was alive to this danger (_Projet_,\n  Art. VIII: in the English translation of 1714, p. 160):\u2014\u201cThe\n  _European_ Union shall endeavour to obtain in _Asia_, a\n  _permanent_ society like that of _Europe_, that Peace may be\n  maintain\u2019d There also; and especially that it may have no cause\n  to fear any _Asiatic_ Sovereign, either as to its tranquillity,\n  or its Commerce in _Asia_.\u201d\n\n  [98] Bentham\u2019s suggestion would be useful here! See above, p. 79,\n  _note_.\n\n  [99] The best thing for Europe might be that Russia (perhaps\n  including China) should be regarded as a serious danger by all\n  the civilised powers of the West. _That_ would bring us nearer to\n  the United States of Europe _and_ America (for the United States,\n  America, is Russia\u2019s neighbour on the East) than anything else.\n\nEuropean federation would likewise meet all difficulties where\na risk might be likely to occur of one nation intervening to\nprotect another. As we have said (above, p. 64, _note_) nations\nare now-a-days slow to intervene in the interests of humanity:\nthey are in general constrained to do so only by strong motives\nof self-interest, and when these are not at hand they are said to\nrefrain from respect for another\u2019s right of independent action.\nActually a state which is actuated by less selfish impulses is apt to\nlose considerably more than it gains, and the feeling of the people\nexpresses itself strongly against any quixotic or sentimental policy.\nIt is not impossible that the Powers may have yet to intervene to\nprotect Turkey against Russia. Such a step might well be dictated\npurely by a proper care for the security of Europe; but wars of this\nkind seem not likely to play an important part in the near future.\n\nWe have said that the causes of difference which may be expected\nto disturb the peace of Europe are now fewer. A modern sovereign\nno longer spends his leisure time in the excitement of slaying or\nseeing slain. He could not, if he would. His honour and his vanity\nare protected by other means: they play no longer an important part\nin the affairs of nations. The causes of war can no more be either\ntrifling or personal. Some crises there are, which are ever likely to\nbe fatal to peace. There present themselves, in the lives of nations,\nideal ends for which everything must be sacrificed: there are rights\nwhich must at all cost be defended. The question of civil war we\nmay neglect: liberty and wise government are the only medicine for\nsocial discontent, and much may be hoped from that in the future.\nBut now, looking beyond the state to the great family of civilised\nnations, we may say that the one certain cause of war between them\nor of rebellion within a future federated union will be a menace to\nthe sovereign rights, the independence and existence of any member\nof that federation. Other causes of quarrel offer a more hopeful\nprospect. Some questions have been seen to be specially fitted for\nthe legal procedure of a tribunal of arbitration, others to be such\nas a federal court would quickly settle. The preservation of the\nbalance of power which Frederick the Great regarded as the talisman\nof peace in Europe\u2014a judgment surely not borne out by experience\u2014is\nhappily one of the causes of war which are of the past. Wars of\ncolonisation, such as would be an attempt on the part of Russia to\nconquer India, seem scarcely likely to recur except between higher\nand lower races. The cost is now-a-days too great. Political wars,\nwars for national union and unity, of which there were so many\nduring the past century, seem at present not to be near at hand; and\nthe integration of European nations\u2014what may be called the great\nmission of war\u2014is, for the moment, practically complete; for it is\nhighly improbable that either Alsace-Lorraine or Poland\u2014still less\nFinland\u2014will be the cause of a war of this kind.\n\nOur hope lies in a federated Europe. Its troops would serve to\npreserve law and order in the country from which they were drawn and\nto protect its colonies abroad; but their higher function would\nbe to keep peace in Europe, to protect the weaker members of the\nFederation and to enforce the decision of the majority, either, if\nnecessary, by actual war, or by the mere threatening demonstrations\nof fleets, such as have before proved effectual.\n\nWe have carefully considered what has been attempted by peace\nworkers, and we have now to take note that all the results of the\nlast fifty years are not to be attributed to their conscientious\nbut often ill-directed labour. The diminution of the causes of war\nis to be traced less to the efforts of the Peace Society, (except\nindirectly, in so far as they have influenced the minds of the\nmasses) than to the increasing power of the people themselves.\nThe various classes of society are opposed to violent methods of\nsettlement, not in the main from a conviction as to the wrongfulness\nof war or from any fanatical enthusiasm for a brotherhood of nations,\nbut from self-interest. War is death to the industrial interests of\na nation. It is vain to talk, in the language of past centuries,\nof trade between civilised countries being advanced and markets\nopened up or enlarged by this means.[100] Kings give up the dream\nof military glory and accept instead the certainty of peaceful\nlabour and industrial progress, and all this (for we may believe\nthat to some monarchs it is much) from no enthusiastic appreciation\nof the efforts of Peace Societies, from no careful examination of\nthe New Testament nor inspired interpretation of its teaching. It\nis self-interest, the prosperity of the country\u2014patriotism, if you\nwill\u2014that seems better than war.\n\n  [100] Trade in barbarous or savage countries is still increased\n  by war, especially on the French and German plan which leaves no\n  open door to other nations. Here the trade follows the flag. And\n  war, of course, among civilised races causes small nations to\n  disappear and their tariffs with them. _This_ is beneficial to\n  trade, but to a degree so trifling that it may here be neglected.\n\n\n_What may be expected from Federation._\n\nFederation and federation alone can help out the programme\nof the Peace Society. It cannot be pretended that it will do\neverything. To state the worst at once, it will not prevent war.\nEven the federations of the states of Germany and America, bound\ntogether by ties of blood and language and, in the latter case, of\nsentiment, were not strong enough within to keep out dissension and\ndisunion.[101] Wars would not cease, but they would become much less\nfrequent. \u201cWhy is there no longer war between England and Scotland?\nWhy did Prussian and Hanoverian fight side by side in 1870, though\nthey had fought against each other only four years before?... If\nwe wish to know how war is to cease, we should ask ourselves how it\n_has_ ceased\u201d (Professor D. G. Ritchie, _op. cit._, p. 169). Wars\nbetween different grades of civilisation are bound to exist as long\nas civilisation itself exists. The history of culture and of progress\nhas been more or less a history of war. A calm acceptance of this\nposition may mean to certain short-sighted, enthusiastic theorists\nan impossible sacrifice of the ideal; but, the sacrifice once made,\nwe stand on a better footing with regard to at least one class of\narguments against a federation of the world. Such a union will lead,\nit is said, to an equality in culture, a sameness of interests fatal\nto progress; all struggle and conflict will be cast out of the\nstate itself; national characteristics and individuality will be\nobliterated; the lamb and the wolf will lie down together: stagnation\nwill result, intellectual progress will be at an end, politics will\nbe no more, history will stand still. This is a sweeping assertion,\nan alarming prophecy. But a little thought will assure us that there\nis small cause for apprehension. There can be no such standstill,\nno millennium in human affairs. A gradual smoothing down of sharply\naccentuated national characteristics there might be: this is a result\nwhich a freer, more friendly intercourse between nations would be\nvery likely to produce. But conflicting interests, keen rivalry\nin their pursuit, difference of culture and natural aptitude, and\nall or much of the individuality which language and literature,\nhistorical and religious traditions, even climatic and physical\nconditions produce are bound to survive until the coming of some more\noverwhelming and far-spreading revolution than this. It would not\nbe well if it were otherwise, if those \u201cunconscious and invisible\npeculiarities\u201d in which Fichte sees the hand of God and the guarantee\nof a nation\u2019s future dignity, virtue and merit should be swept away.\n(_Reden an die deutsche Nation_,[102] 1807.) Nor is stagnation to be\nfeared. \u201cStrife,\u201d said the old philosopher, \u201cis the father of all\nthings.\u201d There can be no lasting peace in the processes of nature and\nexistence. It has been in the constant rivalry between classes within\nthemselves, and in the struggle for existence with other races that\ngreat nations have reached the highwater mark of their development.\nA perpetual peace in international relations we may\u2014nay, surely\nwill\u2014one day have, but eternity will not see the end to the feverish\nunrest within the state and the jealous competition and distrust\nbetween individuals, groups and classes of society. Here there must\never be perpetual war.\n\n  [101] Cf. also the civil war of 1847 in Switzerland.\n\n  [102] See _Werke_, VII., p. 467.\n\nIt was only of this political peace between civilised nations that\nKant thought.[103] In this form it is bound to come. The federation\nof Europe will follow the federation of Germany and of Italy, not\nonly because it offers a solution of many problems which have long\ntaxed Europe, but because great men and careful thinkers believe in\nit.[104] It may not come quickly, but such men can afford to wait.\n\u201cIf I were legislator,\u201d cried Jean Jacques Rousseau, \u201cI should not\nsay what ought to be done, but I would do it.\u201d This is the attitude\nof the unthinking, unpractical enthusiast. The wish is not enough:\nthe will is not enough. The mills of God must take their own time: no\nhope or faith of ours, no struggle or labour even can hurry them.\n\n  [103] The other he knew was impossible. Peace within the state\n  meant decay and death. In the antagonism of nations, he saw\n  nature\u2019s means of educating the race: it was a law of existence,\n  a law of progress, and, as such, eternal.\n\n  [104] For a vivid picture of the material advantages offered by\n  such a union and of the dismal future that may lie before an\n  unfederated Europe, we cannot do better than read Mr. Andrew\n  Carnegie\u2019s recent Rectorial Address to the students of St.\n  Andrews University (Oct 1902). Unfortunately, Mr. Carnegie\u2019s\n  enthusiasm stops here: he does not tell us by what means the\n  difficulties at present in the way of a federation, industrial or\n  political, are to be overcome.\n\nIt is a misfortune that the Peace Society has identified itself\nwith so narrow and uncritical an attitude towards war, and that the\ncopious eloquence of its members is not based upon a consideration\nof the practical difficulties of the case. This well-meaning, hard\nworking and enthusiastic body would like to do what is impossible\nby an impossible method. The end which it sets for itself is an\nunattainable one. But this need not be so. To make unjustifiable\naggression difficult, to banish unworthy pretexts for making war\nmight be a high enough ideal for any enthusiasm and offer scope wide\nenough for the labours of any society. But the Peace Society has not\ncontented itself with this great work. Through its over-estimation\nof the value of peace,[105] its cause has been injured and much of\nits influence has been weakened or lost. Our age is one which sets\na high value upon human life; and to this change of thinking may be\ntraced our modern reform in the methods of war and all that has been\ndone for the alleviation of suffering by the great Conventions of\nrecent years. For the eyes of most people war is merely a hideous\nspectacle of bloodshed and deliberate destruction of life: this is\nits obvious side. But it is possible to exaggerate this confessedly\ngreat evil. Peace has its sacrifices as well as war: the progress of\nhumanity requires that the individual should often be put aside for\nthe sake of lasting advantage to the whole. An opposite view can only\nbe reckoned individualistic, perhaps materialistic. \u201cThe reverence\nfor human life,\u201d says Martineau, (_Studies of Christianity_, pp. 352,\n354) \u201cis carried to an immoral idolatry, when it is held more sacred\nthan justice and right, and when the spectacle of blood becomes\nmore horrible than the sight of desolating tyrannies and triumphant\nhypocrisies.... We have, therefore, no more doubt that a war may be\nright, than that a policeman may be a security for justice, and we\nobject to a fortress as little as to a handcuff.\u201d\n\n  [105] Professor D. G. Ritchie remarks that it is less an\n  over-estimation of the value of peace than a too easy-going\n  acceptance of abstract and unanalysed phrases about the rights of\n  nations that injures the work of the Peace Society. Cf. his note\n  on the principles of the Peace Congresses (_op. cit._, p. 172).\n\nThe Peace Society are not of this opinion: they greatly doubt that a\nwar may be right, and they rarely fail to take their doubts to the\ntribunal of Scripture. Their efforts are well meant, this piety may\nbe genuine enough; but a text is rarely a proof of anything, and in\nany case serves one man in as good stead as another. We remember that\n\u201cthe devil can cite Scripture for his purpose.\u201d This unscientific\nmethod of proof or persuasion has ever been widely popular. It is\na serious examination of the question that we want, a more careful\nstudy of its actual history and of the possibilities of human nature;\nless vague, exaggerated language about what ought to be done, and a\nrealisation of what has been actually achieved; above all, a clear\nperception of what may fairly be asked from the future.\n\nIt used to be said\u2014is perhaps asserted still by the war-lovers\u2014that\nthere was no path to civilisation which had not been beaten by the\nforce of arms, no height to which the sword had not led the way. The\ninspiration of war was upon the great arts of civilisation: its hand\nwas upon the greatest of the sciences. These obligations extended\neven to commerce. War not only created new branches of industry, it\nopened new markets and enlarged the old. These are great claims,\naccording to which war might be called the moving principle of\nhistory. If we keep our eyes fixed upon the history of the past, they\nseem not only plausible: they are in a great sense true. Progress\ndid tread at the heels of the great Alexander\u2019s army: the advance of\nEuropean culture stands in the closest connection with the Crusades.\nBut was this happy compensation for a miserable state of affairs not\ndue to the peculiarly unsocial conditions of early times and the\nabsence of every facility for the interchange of ideas or material\nadvantages? It is inconceivable that now-a-days[106] any aid to the\ndevelopment of thought in Europe should come from war. The old\nadage, in more than a literal sense, has but too often been proved\ntrue:\u2014\u201cInter arma, Musae silent.\u201d Peace is for us the real promoter\nof culture.\n\n  [106] The day is past, when a nation could enjoy the exclusive\n  advantages of its own inventions. Vattel naively recommends that\n  we should keep the knowledge of certain kinds of trade, the\n  building of war-ships and the like, to ourselves. Prudence, he\n  says, prevents us from making an enemy stronger and the care of\n  our own safety forbids it. (_Law of Nations_, II. Ch. I. \u00a7 16.)\n\nWe have to endeavour to take an intermediate course between\nuncritical praise and wholesale condemnation, between extravagant\nexpectation and unjustifiable pessimism. War used to be the rule: it\nis now an overwhelming and terrible exception\u2014an interruption to the\npeaceful prosperous course of things, inflicting unlimited suffering\nand temporary or lasting loss. Its evils are on the surface, apparent\nto the most unthinking observer. The day may yet dawn, when Europeans\nwill have learned to regard the force of arms as an instrument for\nthe civilisation of savage or half-savage races, and war within\ntheir continent as civil war, necessary and justifiable sometimes\nperhaps, but still a blot upon their civilisation and brotherhood as\nmen. Such a suggestion rings strangely. But the great changes, which\nthe roll of centuries has marked, once came upon the world not less\nunexpectedly. How far off must the idea of a civil peace have seemed\nto small towns and states of Europe in the fifteenth century! How\nstrange, only a century ago, would the idea of applying steam power\nor electrical force have seemed to ourselves! Let us not despair. War\nhas played a great part in the history of the world: it has been ever\nthe great architect of nations, the true mother of cities. It has\njustified itself to-day in the union of kindred peoples, the making\nof great empires. It may be that one decisive war may yet be required\nto unite Europe. May Europe survive that struggle and go forward\nfearlessly to her great future! A peaceful future that may not be. It\nmust never be forgotten that war is sometimes a moral duty, that it\nis ever the natural sequence of human passion and human prejudice. An\nunbroken peace we cannot and do not expect; but it is this that we\nmust work for. As Kant says, we must keep it before us as an ideal.\n\n\n\n\nTRANSLATION[107]\n\n\u201cPERPETUAL PEACE\u201d[108]\n\n\n  [107] The text used in this translation is that edited by\n  Kehrbach. [Tr.]\n\n  [108] I have seen something of M. de St. Pierre\u2019s plan for\n  maintaining perpetual peace in Europe. It reminds me of an\n  inscription outside of a churchyard, which ran \u201c_Pax Perpetua._\n  For the dead, it is true, fight no more. But the living are of\n  another mind, and the mightiest among them have little respect\n  for tribunals.\u201d (Leibniz: _Letter to Grimarest_, quoted above, p.\n  37, note 44.) [Tr.]\n\nWe need not try to decide whether this satirical inscription, (once\nfound on a Dutch innkeeper\u2019s sign-board above the picture of a\nchurchyard) is aimed at mankind in general, or at the rulers of\nstates in particular, unwearying in their love of war, or perhaps\nonly at the philosophers who cherish the sweet dream of perpetual\npeace. The author of the present sketch would make one stipulation,\nhowever. The practical politician stands upon a definite footing with\nthe theorist: with great self-complacency he looks down upon him as\na mere pedant whose empty ideas can threaten no danger to the state\n(starting as it does from principles derived from experience), and\nwho may always be permitted to knock down his eleven skittles at\nonce without a worldly-wise statesman needing to disturb himself.\nHence, in the event of a quarrel arising between the two, the\npractical statesman must always act consistently, and not scent\ndanger to the state behind opinions ventured by the theoretical\npolitician at random and publicly expressed. With which saving clause\n(_clausula salvatoria_) the author will herewith consider himself\nduly and expressly protected against all malicious misinterpretation.\n\n\n\n\n_FIRST SECTION_\n\nCONTAINING THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES\n\n\n1.\u2014\u201cNo treaty of peace shall be regarded as valid, if made with the\nsecret reservation of material for a future war.\u201d\n\nFor then it would be a mere truce, a mere suspension of hostilities,\nnot peace. A peace signifies the end of all hostilities and to attach\nto it the epithet \u201ceternal\u201d is not only a verbal pleonasm, but\nmatter of suspicion. The causes of a future war existing, although\nperhaps not yet known to the high contracting parties themselves, are\nentirely annihilated by the conclusion of peace, however acutely\nthey may be ferreted out of documents in the public archives. There\nmay be a mental reservation of old claims to be thought out at a\nfuture time, which are, none of them, mentioned at this stage,\nbecause both parties are too much exhausted to continue the war,\nwhile the evil intention remains of using the first favourable\nopportunity for further hostilities. Diplomacy of this kind only\nJesuitical casuistry can justify: it is beneath the dignity of a\nruler, just as acquiescence in such processes of reasoning is beneath\nthe dignity of his minister, if one judges the facts as they really\nare.[109]\n\n  [109] On the honourable interpretation of treaties, see Vattel\n  (_op. cit._, II. Ch. XVII., esp. \u00a7\u00a7 263-296, 291). See also what\n  he says of the validity of treaties and the necessity for holding\n  them sacred (II. Ch. XII. \u00a7\u00a7 157, 158: II. Ch. XV). [Tr.]\n\nIf, however, according to present enlightened ideas of political\nwisdom, the true glory of a state lies in the uninterrupted\ndevelopment of its power by every possible means, this judgment must\ncertainly strike one as scholastic and pedantic.\n\n\n2.\u2014\u201cNo state having an independent existence\u2014whether it be great or\nsmall\u2014shall be acquired by another through inheritance, exchange,\npurchase or donation.\u201d[110]\n\n  [110] \u201cEven the smoothest way,\u201d says Hume, (_Of the Original\n  Contract_) \u201cby which a nation may receive a foreign master, by\n  marriage or a will, is not extremely honourable for the people;\n  but supposes them to be disposed of, like a dowry or a legacy,\n  according to the pleasure or interest of their rulers.\u201d [Tr.]\n\nFor a state is not a property (_patrimonium_), as may be the ground\non which its people are settled. It is a society of human beings\nover whom no one but itself has the right to rule and to dispose.\nLike the trunk of a tree, it has its own roots, and to graft it on\nto another state is to do away with its existence as a moral person,\nand to make of it a thing. Hence it is in contradiction to the idea\nof the original contract without which no right over a people is\nthinkable.[111] Everyone knows to what danger the bias in favour of\nthese modes of acquisition has brought Europe (in other parts of\nthe world it has never been known). The custom of marriage between\nstates, as if they were individuals, has survived even up to the most\nrecent times,[112] and is regarded partly as a new kind of industry\nby which ascendency may be acquired through family alliances, without\nany expenditure of strength; partly as a device for territorial\nexpansion. Moreover, the hiring out of the troops of one state to\nanother to fight against an enemy not at war with their native\ncountry is to be reckoned in this connection; for the subjects are in\nthis way used and abused at will as personal property.\n\n  [111] An hereditary kingdom is not a state which can be inherited\n  by another state, but one whose sovereign power can be inherited\n  by another physical person. The state then acquires a ruler, not\n  the ruler as such (that is, as one already possessing another\n  realm) the state.\n\n  [112] This has been one of the causes of the extraordinary\n  admixture of races in the modern Austrian empire. Cf. the lines\n  of Matthias Corvinus of Hungary (quoted in Sir W. Stirling\n  Maxwell\u2019s _Cloister Life of Charles the Fifth_, Ch. I., _note_):\u2014\n\n    \u201cBella gerant alii, tu, felix Austria, nube!\n    Nam quae Mars aliis, dat tibi regna Venus.\u201d [Tr.]\n\n\n3.\u2014\u201cStanding armies (_miles perpetuus_) shall be abolished in course\nof time.\u201d\n\nFor they are always threatening other states with war by appearing\nto be in constant readiness to fight. They incite the various states\nto outrival one another in the number of their soldiers, and to this\nnumber no limit can be set. Now, since owing to the sums devoted\nto this purpose, peace at last becomes even more oppressive than a\nshort war, these standing armies are themselves the cause of wars of\naggression, undertaken in order to get rid of this burden. To which\nwe must add that the practice of hiring men to kill or to be killed\nseems to imply a use of them as mere machines and instruments in the\nhand of another (namely, the state) which cannot easily be reconciled\nwith the right of humanity in our own person.[113] The matter stands\nquite differently in the case of voluntary periodical military\nexercise on the part of citizens of the state, who thereby seek to\nsecure themselves and their country against attack from without.\n\n  [113] A Bulgarian Prince thus answered the Greek Emperor who\n  magnanimously offered to settle a quarrel with him, not by\n  shedding the blood of his subjects, but by a duel:\u2014\u201cA smith who\n  has tongs will not take the red-hot iron from the fire with his\n  hands.\u201d\n\n  (This note is a-wanting in the second Edition of 1796. It is\n  repeated in Art. II., see p. 130.) [Tr.]\n\nThe accumulation of treasure in a state would in the same way be\nregarded by other states as a menace of war, and might compel them to\nanticipate this by striking the first blow. For of the three forces,\nthe power of arms, the power of alliance and the power of money, the\nlast might well become the most reliable instrument of war, did not\nthe difficulty of ascertaining the amount stand in the way.\n\n\n4.\u2014\u201cNo national debts shall be contracted in connection with the\nexternal affairs of the state.\u201d\n\nThis source of help is above suspicion, where assistance is sought\noutside or within the state, on behalf of the economic administration\nof the country (for instance, the improvement of the roads, the\nsettlement and support of new colonies, the establishment of\ngranaries to provide against seasons of scarcity, and so on). But,\nas a common weapon used by the Powers against one another, a credit\nsystem under which debts go on indefinitely increasing and are yet\nalways assured against immediate claims (because all the creditors\ndo not put in their claim at once) is a dangerous money power. This\ningenious invention of a commercial people in the present century\nis, in other words, a treasure for the carrying on of war which may\nexceed the treasures of all the other states taken together, and\ncan only be exhausted by a threatening deficiency in the taxes\u2014an\nevent, however, which will long be kept off by the very briskness\nof commerce resulting from the reaction of this system on industry\nand trade. The ease, then, with which war may be waged, coupled with\nthe inclination of rulers towards it\u2014an inclination which seems\nto be implanted in human nature\u2014is a great obstacle in the way of\nperpetual peace. The prohibition of this system must be laid down as\na preliminary article of perpetual peace, all the more necessarily\nbecause the final inevitable bankruptcy of the state in question\nmust involve in the loss many who are innocent; and this would be\na public injury to these states. Therefore other nations are at\nleast justified in uniting themselves against such an one and its\npretensions.\n\n\n5.\u2014\u201cNo state shall violently interfere with the constitution and\nadministration of another.\u201d\n\nFor what can justify it in so doing? The scandal which is here\npresented to the subjects of another state? The erring state can\nmuch more serve as a warning by exemplifying the great evils which a\nnation draws down on itself through its own lawlessness. Moreover,\nthe bad example which one free person gives another, (as _scandalum\nacceptum_) does no injury to the latter. In this connection, it is\ntrue, we cannot count the case of a state which has become split up\nthrough internal corruption into two parts, each of them representing\nby itself an individual state which lays claim to the whole. Here\nthe yielding of assistance to one faction could not be reckoned as\ninterference on the part of a foreign state with the constitution of\nanother, for here anarchy prevails. So long, however, as the inner\nstrife has not yet reached this stage the interference of other\npowers would be a violation of the rights of an independent nation\nwhich is only struggling with internal disease.[114] It would\ntherefore itself cause a scandal, and make the autonomy of all states\ninsecure.\n\n  [114] See Vattel: _Law of Nations_, II. Ch. IV. \u00a7 55. No\n  foreign power, he says, has a right to judge the conduct and\n  administration of any sovereign or oblige him to alter it. \u201cIf\n  he loads his subjects with taxes, or if he treats them with\n  severity, the nation alone is concerned; and no other is called\n  upon to offer redress for his behaviour, or oblige him to follow\n  more wise and equitable maxims.... But (_loc. cit._ \u00a7 56) when\n  the bands of the political society are broken, or at least\n  suspended, between the sovereign and his people, the contending\n  parties may then be considered at two distinct powers; and, since\n  they are both equally independent of all foreign authority,\n  nobody has a right to judge them. Either may be in the right; and\n  each of those who grant their assistance may imagine that he is\n  giving his support to the better cause.\u201d [Tr.]\n\n\n6.\u2014\u201cNo state at war with another shall countenance such modes of\nhostility as would make mutual confidence impossible in a subsequent\nstate of peace: such are the employment of assassins (_percussores_)\nor of poisoners (_venefici_), breaches of capitulation, the\ninstigating and making use of treachery (_perduellio_) in the hostile\nstate.\u201d\n\nThese are dishonourable stratagems. For some kind of confidence in\nthe disposition of the enemy must exist even in the midst of war,\nas otherwise peace could not be concluded, and the hostilities\nwould pass into a war of extermination (_bellum internecinum_).\nWar, however, is only our wretched expedient of asserting a right\nby force, an expedient adopted in the state of nature, where no\ncourt of justice exists which could settle the matter in dispute. In\ncircumstances like these, neither of the two parties can be called\nan unjust enemy, because this form of speech presupposes a legal\ndecision: the issue of the conflict\u2014just as in the case of the\nso-called judgments of God\u2014decides on which side right is. Between\nstates, however, no punitive war (_bellum punitivum_) is thinkable,\nbecause between them a relation of superior and inferior does not\nexist. Whence it follows that a war of extermination, where the\nprocess of annihilation would strike both parties at once and all\nright as well, would bring about perpetual peace only in the great\ngraveyard of the human race. Such a war then, and therefore also the\nuse of all means which lead to it, must be absolutely forbidden.\nThat the methods just mentioned do inevitably lead to this result\nis obvious from the fact that these infernal arts, already vile in\nthemselves, on coming into use, are not long confined to the sphere\nof war. Take, for example, the use of spies (_uti exploratoribus_).\nHere only the dishonesty of others is made use of; but vices such\nas these, when once encouraged, cannot in the nature of things be\nstamped out and would be carried over into the state of peace, where\ntheir presence would be utterly destructive to the purpose of that\nstate.\n\nAlthough the laws stated are, objectively regarded, (_i.e._ in so far\nas they affect the action of rulers) purely prohibitive laws (_leges\nprohibitiv\u00e6_), some of them (_leges strict\u00e6_) are strictly valid\nwithout regard to circumstances and urgently require to be enforced.\nSuch are Nos. 1, 5, 6. Others, again, (like Nos. 2, 3, 4) although\nnot indeed exceptions to the maxims of law, yet in respect of the\npractical application of these maxims allow subjectively of a certain\nlatitude to suit particular circumstances. The enforcement of these\n_leges lat\u00e6_ may be legitimately put off, so long as we do not lose\nsight of the ends at which they aim. This purpose of reform does not\npermit of the deferment of an act of restitution (as, for example,\nthe restoration to certain states of freedom of which they have been\ndeprived in the manner described in article 2) to an infinitely\ndistant date\u2014as Augustus used to say, to the \u201cGreek Kalends\u201d, a day\nthat will never come. This would be to sanction non-restitution.\nDelay is permitted only with the intention that restitution should\nnot be made too precipitately and so defeat the purpose we have\nin view. For the prohibition refers here only to the _mode of\nacquisition_ which is to be no longer valid, and not to the _fact of\npossession_ which, although indeed it has not the necessary title of\nright, yet at the time of so-called acquisition was held legal by all\nstates, in accordance with the public opinion of the time.[115]\n\n  [115] It has been hitherto doubted, not without reason, whether\n  there can be laws of permission (_leges permissiv\u00e6_) of pure\n  reason as well as commands (_leges pr\u00e6ceptiv\u00e6_) and prohibitions\n  (_leges prohibitiv\u00e6_). For law in general has a basis of\n  objective practical necessity: permission, on the other hand, is\n  based upon the contingency of certain actions in practice. It\n  follows that a law of permission would enforce what cannot be\n  enforced; and this would involve a contradiction, if the object\n  of the law should be the same in both cases. Here, however,\n  in the present case of a law of permission, the presupposed\n  prohibition is aimed merely at the future manner of acquisition\n  of a right\u2014for example, acquisition through inheritance: the\n  exemption from this prohibition (_i.e._ the permission) refers\n  to the present state of possession. In the transition from a\n  state of nature to the civil state, this holding of property can\n  continue as a _bona fide_, if usurpatory, ownership, under the\n  new social conditions, in accordance with a permission of the Law\n  of Nature. Ownership of this kind, as soon as its true nature\n  becomes known, is seen to be mere nominal possession (_possessio\n  putativa_) sanctioned by opinion and customs in a natural state\n  of society. After the transition stage is passed, such modes of\n  acquisition are likewise forbidden in the subsequently evolved\n  civil state: and this power to remain in possession would not\n  be admitted if the supposed acquisition had taken place in the\n  civilized community. It would be bound to come to an end as an\n  injury to the right of others, the moment its illegality became\n  patent.\n\n  I have wished here only by the way to draw the attention of\n  teachers of the Law of Nature to the idea of a _lex permissiva_\n  which presents itself spontaneously in any system of rational\n  classification. I do so chiefly because use is often made of\n  this concept in civil law with reference to statutes; with this\n  difference, that the law of prohibition stands alone by itself,\n  while permission is not, as it ought to be, introduced into that\n  law as a limiting clause, but is thrown among the exceptions.\n  Thus \u201cthis or that is forbidden\u201d,\u2014say, Nos. 1, 2, 3, and so on\n  in an infinite progression,\u2014while permissions are only added to\n  the law incidentally: they are not reached by the application of\n  some principle, but only by groping about among cases which have\n  actually occurred. Were this not so, qualifications would have\n  had to be brought into the formula of laws of prohibition which\n  would have immediately transformed them into laws of permission.\n  Count von Windischgr\u00e4tz, a man whose wisdom was equal to his\n  discrimination, urged this very point in the form of a question\n  propounded by him for a prize essay. One must therefore regret\n  that this ingenious problem has been so soon neglected and left\n  unsolved. For the possibility of a formula similar to those of\n  mathematics is the sole real test of a legislation that would be\n  consistent. Without this, the so-called _jus certum_ will remain\n  forever a mere pious wish: we can have only general laws valid\n  on the whole; no general laws possessing the universal validity\n  which the concept law seems to demand.\n\n\n\n\n_SECOND SECTION_\n\nCONTAINING THE DEFINITIVE ARTICLES OF A PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES\n\nA state of peace among men who live side by side is not the natural\nstate (_status naturalis_), which is rather to be described as a\nstate of war:[116] that is to say, although there is not perhaps\nalways actual open hostility, yet there is a constant threatening\nthat an outbreak may occur. Thus the state of peace must be\n_established_.[117] For the mere cessation of hostilities is no\nguarantee of continued peaceful relations, and unless this guarantee\nis given by every individual to his neighbour\u2014which can only be done\nin a state of society regulated by law\u2014one man is at liberty to\nchallenge another and treat him as an enemy.[118]\n\n  [116] \u201cFrom this diffidence of one another, there is no way for\n  any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that\n  is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can,\n  so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him:\n  and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is\n  generally allowed.\u201d (Hobbes: _Lev._ I. Ch. XIII.) [Tr.]\n\n  [117] Hobbes thus describes the establishment of the state. \u201cA\n  _commonwealth_ is said to be _instituted_, when a _multitude_\n  of men do agree, and _covenant, every one, with every one_,\n  that to whatsoever _man_, or _assembly of men_, shall be given\n  by the major part, the _right_ to _present_ the person of them\n  all, that is to say, to be their _representative_; everyone,\n  as well he that _voted for it_, as he that _voted against it_,\n  shall _authorize_ all the actions and judgments, of that man, or\n  assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to\n  the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected\n  against other men.\u201d (_Lev._ II. Ch. XVIII.)\n\n  There is a covenant between them, \u201cas if every man should say to\n  every man, _I authorise and give up my right of governing myself,\n  to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that\n  thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in\n  like manner_.\u201d (_Lev._ II. Ch. XVII.) [Tr.]\n\n  [118] It is usually accepted that a man may not take hostile\n  steps against any one, unless the latter has already injured\n  him by act. This is quite accurate, if both are citizens of a\n  law-governed state. For, in becoming a member of this community,\n  each gives the other the security he demands against injury, by\n  means of the supreme authority exercising control over them both.\n  The individual, however, (or nation) who remains in a mere state\n  of nature deprives me of this security and does me injury, by\n  mere proximity. There is perhaps no active (_facto_) molestation,\n  but there is a state of lawlessness, (_status injustus_) which,\n  by its very existence, offers a continual menace to me. I can\n  therefore compel him, either to enter into relations with me\n  under which we are both subject to law, or to withdraw from my\n  neighbourhood. So that the postulate upon which the following\n  articles are based is:\u2014\u201cAll men who have the power to exert\n  a mutual influence upon one another must be under a civil\n  government of some kind.\u201d\n\n  A legal constitution is, according to the nature of the\n  individuals who compose the state:\u2014\n\n  (1) A constitution formed in accordance with the right of\n  citizenship of the individuals who constitute a nation (_jus\n  civitatis_).\n\n  (2) A constitution whose principle is international law which\n  determines the relations of states (_jus gentium_).\n\n  (3) A constitution formed in accordance with cosmopolitan law,\n  in as far as individuals and states, standing in an external\n  relation of mutual reaction, may be regarded as citizens of one\n  world-state (_jus cosmopoliticum_).\n\n  This classification is not an arbitrary one, but is necessary\n  with reference to the idea of perpetual peace. For, if even\n  one of these units of society were in a position physically to\n  influence another, while yet remaining a member of a primitive\n  order of society, then a state of war would be joined with these\n  primitive conditions; and from this it is our present purpose to\n  free ourselves.\n\n\nFIRST DEFINITIVE ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL PEACE\n\nI.\u2014\u201cThe civil constitution of each state shall be republican.\u201d\n\nThe only constitution which has its origin in the idea of the\noriginal contract, upon which the lawful legislation of every nation\nmust be based, is the republican.[119] It is a constitution, in the\nfirst place, founded in accordance with the principle of the freedom\nof the members of society as human beings: secondly, in accordance\nwith the principle of the dependence of all, as subjects, on a common\nlegislation: and, thirdly, in accordance with the law of the equality\nof the members as citizens. It is then, looking at the question of\nright, the only constitution whose fundamental principles lie at the\nbasis of every form of civil constitution. And the only question for\nus now is, whether it is also the one constitution which can lead to\nperpetual peace.\n\n  [119] Lawful, that is to say, external freedom cannot be defined,\n  as it so often is, as the right [_Befugniss_] \u201cto do whatever one\n  likes, so long as this does not wrong anyone else.\u201d[B] For what\n  is this right? It is the possibility of actions which do not lead\n  to the injury of others. So the explanation of a \u201cright\u201d would be\n  something like this:\u2014\u201cFreedom is the possibility of actions which\n  do not injure anyone. A man does not wrong another\u2014whatever his\n  action\u2014if he does not wrong another\u201d: which is empty tautology.\n  My external (lawful) freedom is rather to be explained in\n  this way: it is the right through which I require not to obey\n  any external laws except those to which I could have given my\n  consent. In exactly the same way, external (legal) equality in a\n  state is that relation of the subjects in consequence of which\n  no individual can legally bind or oblige another to anything,\n  without at the same time submitting himself to the law which\n  ensures that he can, in his turn, be bound and obliged in like\n  manner by this other.\n\n    [B] Hobbes\u2019 definition of freedom is interesting. See _Lev._ II.\n    Ch. XXI.:\u2014\u201cA FREEMAN, _is he, that in those things, which by his\n    strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he\n    has a will to_.\u201d [Tr.]\n\n  The principle of lawful independence requires no explanation,\n  as it is involved in the general concept of a constitution.\n  The validity of this hereditary and inalienable right, which\n  belongs of necessity to mankind, is affirmed and ennobled by the\n  principle of a lawful relation between man himself and higher\n  beings, if indeed he believes in such beings. This is so, because\n  he thinks of himself, in accordance with these very principles,\n  as a citizen of a transcendental world as well as of the world\n  of sense. For, as far as my freedom goes, I am bound by no\n  obligation even with regard to Divine Laws\u2014which are apprehended\n  by me only through my reason\u2014except in so far as I could have\n  given my assent to them; for it is through the law of freedom\n  of my own reason that I first form for myself a concept of a\n  Divine Will. As for the principle of equality, in so far as it\n  applies to the most sublime being in the universe next to God\u2014a\n  being I might perhaps figure to myself as a mighty emanation of\n  the Divine spirit,\u2014there is no reason why, if I perform my duty\n  in the sphere in which I am placed, as that aeon does in his,\n  the duty of obedience alone should fall to my share, the right\n  to command to him. That this principle of equality, (unlike the\n  principle of freedom), does not apply to our relation to God is\n  due to the fact that, to this Being alone, the idea of duty does\n  not belong.\n\n  As for the right to equality which belongs to all citizens as\n  subjects, the solution of the problem of the admissibility of\n  an hereditary nobility hinges on the following question:\u2014\u201cDoes\n  social rank\u2014acknowledged by the state to be higher in the case\n  of one subject than another\u2014stand above desert, or does merit\n  take precedence of social standing?\u201d Now it is obvious that, if\n  high position is combined with good family, it is quite uncertain\n  whether merit, that is to say, skill and fidelity in office, will\n  follow as well. This amounts to granting the favoured individual\n  a commanding position without any question of desert; and to\n  that, the universal will of the people\u2014expressed in an original\n  contract which is the fundamental principle of all right\u2014would\n  never consent. For it does not follow that a nobleman is a man\n  of noble character. In the case of the official nobility, as one\n  might term the rank of higher magistracy\u2014which one must acquire\n  by merit\u2014the social position is not attached like property to the\n  person but to his office, and equality is not thereby disturbed;\n  for, if a man gives up office, he lays down with it his official\n  rank and falls back into the rank of his fellows.\n\nNow the republican constitution apart from the soundness of its\norigin, since it arose from the pure source of the concept of right,\nhas also the prospect of attaining the desired result, namely,\nperpetual peace. And the reason is this. If, as must be so under this\nconstitution, the consent of the subjects is required to determine\nwhether there shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than that\nthey should weigh the matter well, before undertaking such a bad\nbusiness. For in decreeing war, they would of necessity be resolving\nto bring down the miseries of war upon their country. This implies:\nthey must fight themselves; they must hand over the costs of the war\nout of their own property; they must do their poor best to make good\nthe devastation which it leaves behind; and finally, as a crowning\nill, they have to accept a burden of debt which will embitter even\npeace itself, and which they can never pay off on account of the new\nwars which are always impending. On the other hand, in a government\nwhere the subject is not a citizen holding a vote, (_i.e._ in a\nconstitution which is not republican), the plunging into war is the\nleast serious thing in the world. For the ruler is not a citizen,\nbut the owner of the state, and does not lose a whit by the war,\nwhile he goes on enjoying the delights of his table or sport, or\nof his pleasure palaces and gala days. He can therefore decide on\nwar for the most trifling reasons, as if it were a kind of pleasure\nparty.[120] Any justification of it that is necessary for the sake of\ndecency he can leave without concern to the diplomatic corps who are\nalways only too ready with their services.\n\n  [120] Cf. Cowper: _The Winter Morning Walk_:\u2014\n\n    \u201cBut is it fit, or can it bear the shock\n    Of rational discussion, that a man,\n    Compounded and made up like other men\n    Of elements tumultuous, . . . . . . .\n    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n    Should when he pleases, and on whom he will,\n    Wage war, with any or with no pretence\n    Of provocation giv\u2019n or wrong sustain\u2019d,\n    And force the beggarly last doit, by means\n    That his own humour dictates, from the clutch\n    Of poverty, that thus he may procure\n    His thousands, weary of penurious life,\n    A splendid opportunity to die?\u201d\n    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n    \u201cHe deems a thousand or ten thousand lives\n    Spent in the purchase of renown for him,\n    An easy reckoning.\u201d [Tr.]\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nThe following remarks must be made in order that we may not fall into\nthe common error of confusing the republican with the democratic\nconstitution. The forms of the state (_civitas_)[121] may be\nclassified according to either of two principles of division:\u2014the\ndifference of the persons who hold the supreme authority in the\nstate, and the manner in which the people are governed by their\nruler whoever he may be. The first is properly called the form\nof sovereignty (_forma imperii_), and there can be only three\nconstitutions differing in this respect: where, namely, the supreme\nauthority belongs to only one, to several individuals working\ntogether, or to the whole people constituting the civil society. Thus\nwe have autocracy or the sovereignty of a monarch, aristocracy or\nthe sovereignty of the nobility, and democracy or the sovereignty\nof the people. The second principle of division is the form of\ngovernment (_forma regiminis_), and refers to the way in which the\nstate makes use of its supreme power: for the manner of government\nis based on the constitution, itself the act of that universal will\nwhich transforms a multitude into a nation. In this respect the form\nof government is either republican or despotic. Republicanism is the\npolitical principle of severing the executive power of the government\nfrom the legislature. Despotism is that principle in pursuance of\nwhich the state arbitrarily puts into effect laws which it has itself\nmade: consequently it is the administration of the public will, but\nthis is identical with the private will of the ruler. Of these three\nforms of a state, democracy, in the proper sense of the word, is\nof necessity despotism, because it establishes an executive power,\nsince all decree regarding\u2014and, if need be, against\u2014any individual\nwho dissents from them. Therefore the \u201cwhole people\u201d, so-called, who\ncarry their measure are really not all, but only a majority: so that\nhere the universal will is in contradiction with itself and with the\nprinciple of freedom.\n\n  [121] Cf. Hobbes: _On Dominion_, Ch. VII. \u00a7 1. \u201cAs for the\n  difference of cities, it is taken from the difference of the\n  persons to whom the supreme power is committed. This power is\n  committed either to _one man_, or _council_, or some _one court_\n  consisting of many men.\u201d [Tr.]\n\nEvery form of government in fact which is not representative is\nreally no true constitution at all, because a law-giver may no more\nbe, in one and the same person, the administrator of his own will,\nthan the universal major premise of a syllogism may be, at the same\ntime, the subsumption under itself of the particulars contained\nin the minor premise. And, although the other two constitutions,\nautocracy and aristocracy, are always defective in so far as\nthey leave the way open for such a form of government, yet there\nis at least always a possibility in these cases, that they may\ntake the form of a government in accordance with the spirit of a\nrepresentative system. Thus Frederick the Great used at least to\n_say_ that he was \u201cmerely the highest servant of the state.\u201d[122] The\ndemocratic constitution, on the other hand, makes this impossible,\nbecause under such a government every one wishes to be master. We\nmay therefore say that the smaller the staff of the executive\u2014that\nis to say, the number of rulers\u2014and the more real, on the other\nhand, their representation of the people, so much the more is the\ngovernment of the state in accordance with a possible republicanism;\nand it may hope by gradual reforms to raise itself to that standard.\nFor this reason, it is more difficult under an aristocracy than\nunder a monarchy\u2014while under a democracy it is impossible except by\na violent revolution\u2014to attain to this, the one perfectly lawful\nconstitution. The kind of government,[123] however, is of infinitely\nmore importance to the people than the kind of constitution,\nalthough the greater or less aptitude of a people for this ideal\ngreatly depends upon such external form. The form of government,\nhowever, if it is to be in accordance with the idea of right, must\nembody the representative system in which alone a republican form\nof administration is possible and without which it is despotic\nand violent, be the constitution what it may. None of the ancient\nso-called republics were aware of this, and they necessarily slipped\ninto absolute despotism which, of all despotisms, is most endurable\nunder the sovereignty of one individual.\n\n  [122] The lofty appellations which are often given to a\n  ruler\u2014such as the Lord\u2019s Anointed, the Administrator of the\n  Divine Will upon earth and Vicar of God\u2014have been many times\n  censured as flattery gross enough to make one giddy. But it\n  seems to me without cause. Far from making a prince arrogant,\n  names like these must rather make him humble at heart, if he has\n  any intelligence\u2014which we take for granted he has\u2014and reflects\n  that he has undertaken an office which is too great for any\n  human being. For, indeed, it is the holiest which God has on\n  earth\u2014namely, the right of ruling mankind: and he must ever live\n  in fear of injuring this treasure of God in some respect or other.\n\n  [123] Mallet du Pan boasts in his seemingly brilliant but shallow\n  and superficial language that, after many years experience, he\n  has come at last to be convinced of the truth of the well known\n  saying of Pope [_Essay on Man_, III. 303]:\u2014\n\n    \u201cFor Forms of Government let fools contest;\n    Whate\u2019er is best administered is best.\u201d\n\n  If this means that the best administered government is best\n  administered, then, in Swift\u2019s phrase, he has cracked a nut to\n  find a worm in it. If it means, however, that the best conducted\n  government is also the best kind of government,\u2014that is, the\n  best form of political constitution,\u2014then it is utterly false:\n  for examples of wise administration are no proof of the kind of\n  government. Who ever ruled better than Titus and Marcus Aurelius,\n  and yet the one left Domitian, the other Commodus, as his\n  successor? This could not have happened where the constitution\n  was a good one, for their absolute unfitness for the position was\n  early enough known, and the power of the emperor was sufficiently\n  great to exclude them.\n\n\nSECOND DEFINITIVE ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL PEACE\n\nII.\u2014\u201cThe law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free\nstates.\u201d\n\nNations, as states, may be judged like individuals who, living in the\nnatural state of society\u2014that is to say, uncontrolled by external\nlaw\u2014injure one another through their very proximity.[124] Every\nstate, for the sake of its own security, may\u2014and ought to\u2014demand\nthat its neighbour should submit itself to conditions, similar to\nthose of the civil society where the right of every individual is\nguaranteed. This would give rise to a federation of nations which,\nhowever, would not have to be a State of nations.[125] That would\ninvolve a contradiction. For the term \u201cstate\u201d implies the relation of\none who rules to those who obey\u2014that is to say, of law-giver to the\nsubject people: and many nations in one state would constitute only\none nation, which contradicts our hypothesis, since here we have to\nconsider the right of one nation against another, in so far as they\nare so many separate states and are not to be fused into one.\n\n  [124] \u201cFor as amongst masterless men, there is perpetual war, of\n  every man against his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to\n  the son, nor to expect from the father; no propriety of goods,\n  or lands; no security; but a full and absolute liberty in every\n  particular man: so in states, and commonwealths not dependent on\n  one another, every commonwealth, not every man, has an absolute\n  liberty, to do what it shall judge, that is to say, what that\n  man, or assembly that representeth it, shall judge most conducing\n  to their benefit. But withal, they live in the condition of\n  a perpetual war, and upon the confines of battle, with their\n  frontiers armed, and cannons planted against their neighbours\n  round about.\u201d (Hobbes: _Leviathan_, II. Ch. XXI.) [Tr.]\n\n  [125] But see p. 136, where Kant seems to speak of a State of\n  nations as the ideal. Kant expresses himself, on this point, more\n  clearly in the _Rechtslehre_, Part. II. \u00a7 61:\u2014\u201cThe natural state\n  of nations,\u201d he says here, \u201clike that of individual men, is a\n  condition which must be abandoned, in order that they may enter a\n  state regulated by law. Hence, before this can take place, every\n  right possessed by these nations and every external \u201cmine\u201d and\n  \u201cthine\u201d [_id est_, symbol of possession] which states acquire or\n  preserve through war are merely _provisional_, and can become\n  _peremptorily_ valid and constitute a true state of peace only\n  in a universal _union of states_, by a process analogous to that\n  through which a people becomes a state. Since, however, the too\n  great extension of such a State of nations over vast territories\n  must, in the long run, make the government of that union\u2014and\n  therefore the protection of each of its members\u2014impossible, a\n  multitude of such corporations will lead again to a state of war.\n  So that _perpetual peace_, the final goal of international law\n  as a whole, is really an impracticable idea [_eine unausf\u00fchrbare\n  Idee_]. The political principles, however, which are directed\n  towards this end, (that is to say, towards the establishment of\n  such unions of states as may serve as a continual approximation\n  to that ideal), are not impracticable; on the contrary, as this\n  approximation is required by duty and is therefore founded also\n  upon the rights of men and of states, these principles are,\n  without doubt, capable of practical realization.\u201d [Tr.]\n\nThe attachment of savages to their lawless liberty, the fact\nthat they would rather be at hopeless variance with one another\nthan submit themselves to a legal authority constituted by\nthemselves, that they therefore prefer their senseless freedom to a\nreason-governed liberty, is regarded by us with profound contempt as\nbarbarism and uncivilisation and the brutal degradation of humanity.\nSo one would think that civilised races, each formed into a state by\nitself, must come out of such an abandoned condition as soon as they\npossibly can. On the contrary, however, every state thinks rather\nthat its majesty (the \u201cmajesty\u201d of a people is an absurd expression)\nlies just in the very fact that it is subject to no external legal\nauthority; and the glory of the ruler consists in this, that, without\nhis requiring to expose himself to danger, thousands stand at his\ncommand ready to let themselves be sacrificed for a matter of no\nconcern to them.[126] The difference between the savages of Europe\nand those of America lies chiefly in this, that, while many tribes of\nthe latter have been entirely devoured by their enemies, Europeans\nknow a better way of using the vanquished than by eating them; and\nthey prefer to increase through them the number of their subjects,\nand so the number of instruments at their command for still more\nwidely spread war.\n\n  [126] A Greek Emperor who magnanimously volunteered to settle by\n  a duel his quarrel with a Bulgarian Prince, got the following\n  answer:\u2014\u201cA smith who has tongs will not pluck the glowing iron\n  from the fire with his hands.\u201d\n\nThe depravity of human nature[127] shows itself without disguise\nin the unrestrained relations of nations to each other, while in\nthe law-governed civil state much of this is hidden by the check\nof government. This being so, it is astonishing that the word\n\u201cright\u201d has not yet been entirely banished from the politics of\nwar as pedantic, and that no state has yet ventured to publicly\nadvocate this point of view. For Hugo Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattel\nand others\u2014Job\u2019s comforters, all of them\u2014are always quoted in good\nfaith to justify an attack, although their codes, whether couched\nin philosophical or diplomatic terms, have not\u2014nor can have\u2014the\nslightest legal force, because states, as such, are under no common\nexternal authority; and there is no instance of a state having ever\nbeen moved by argument to desist from its purpose, even when this\nwas backed up by the testimony of such great men. This homage which\nevery state renders\u2014in words at least\u2014to the idea of right, proves\nthat, although it may be slumbering, there is, notwithstanding, to\nbe found in man a still higher natural moral capacity by the aid of\nwhich he will in time gain the mastery over the evil principle in his\nnature, the existence of which he is unable to deny. And he hopes the\nsame of others; for otherwise the word \u201cright\u201d would never be uttered\nby states who wish to wage war, unless to deride it like the Gallic\nPrince who declared:\u2014\u201cThe privilege which nature gives the strong is\nthat the weak must obey them.\u201d[128]\n\n  [127] \u201cBoth sayings are very true: that _man to man is a kind of\n  God_; and that _man to man is an arrant wolf_. The first is true,\n  if we compare citizens amongst themselves; and the second, if we\n  compare cities. In the one, there is some analogy of similitude\n  with the Deity; to wit, justice and charity, the twin sisters\n  of peace. But in the other, good men must defend themselves by\n  taking to them for a sanctuary the two daughters of war, deceit\n  and violence: that is, in plain terms, a mere brutal rapacity.\u201d\n  (Hobbes: Epistle Dedicatory to the _Philosophical Rudiments\n  concerning Government and Society_.) [Tr.]\n\n  [128] \u201cThe strongest are still never sufficiently strong to\n  ensure them the continual mastership, unless they find means of\n  transforming force into right, and obedience into duty.\n\n  From the right of the strongest, right takes an ironical\n  appearance, and is rarely established as a principle.\u201d (_Contrat\n  Social_, I. Ch. III.) [Tr.]\n\nThe method by which states prosecute their rights can never be by\nprocess of law\u2014as it is where there is an external tribunal\u2014but\nonly by war. Through this means, however, and its favourable issue,\nvictory, the question of right is never decided. A treaty of peace\nmakes, it may be, an end to the war of the moment, but not to the\nconditions of war which at any time may afford a new pretext\nfor opening hostilities; and this we cannot exactly condemn as\nunjust, because under these conditions everyone is his own judge.\nNotwithstanding, not quite the same rule applies to states according\nto the law of nations as holds good of individuals in a lawless\ncondition according to the law of nature, namely, \u201cthat they ought\nto advance out of this condition.\u201d This is so, because, as states,\nthey have already within themselves a legal constitution, and have\ntherefore advanced beyond the stage at which others, in accordance\nwith their ideas of right, can force them to come under a wider\nlegal constitution. Meanwhile, however, reason, from her throne of\nthe supreme law-giving moral power, absolutely condemns war[129] as\na morally lawful proceeding, and makes a state of peace, on the\nother hand, an immediate duty. Without a compact between the nations,\nhowever, this state of peace cannot be established or assured. Hence\nthere must be an alliance of a particular kind which we may call a\ncovenant of peace (_foedus pacificum_), which would differ from a\ntreaty of peace (_pactum pacis_) in this respect, that the latter\nmerely puts an end to one war, while the former would seek to put\nan end to war for ever. This alliance does not aim at the gain of\nany power whatsoever of the state, but merely at the preservation\nand security of the freedom of the state for itself and of other\nallied states at the same time.[130] The latter do not, however,\nrequire, for this reason, to submit themselves like individuals in\nthe state of nature to public laws and coercion. The practicability\nor objective reality of this idea of federation which is to extend\ngradually over all states and so lead to perpetual peace can be\nshewn. For, if Fortune ordains that a powerful and enlightened people\nshould form a republic,\u2014which by its very nature is inclined to\nperpetual peace\u2014this would serve as a centre of federal union for\nother states wishing to join, and thus secure conditions of freedom\namong the states in accordance with the idea of the law of nations.\nGradually, through different unions of this kind, the federation\nwould extend further and further.\n\n  [129] \u201cThe natural state,\u201d says Hobbes, (_On Dominion_, Ch. VII.\n  \u00a7 18) \u201chath the same proportion to the civil, (I mean, liberty to\n  subjection), which passion hath to reason, or a beast to a man.\u201d\n\n  Locke speaks thus of man, when he puts himself into the state of\n  war with another:\u2014\u201chaving quitted reason, which God hath given\n  to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the common bond whereby\n  human kind is united into one fellowship and society; and having\n  renounced the way of peace which that teaches, and made use of\n  the force of war, to compass his unjust ends upon another, where\n  he has no right; and so revolting from his own kind to that of\n  beasts, by making force, which is theirs, to be his rule of\n  right, he renders himself liable to be destroyed by the injured\n  person, and the rest of mankind that will join with him in the\n  execution of justice, as any other wild beast, or noxious brute,\n  with whom mankind can have neither society nor security.\u201d (_Civil\n  Government_, Ch. XV. \u00a7 172.) [Tr.]\n\n  [130] Cf. Rousseau: _Gouvernement de Pologne_, Ch. V. Federate\n  government is \u201cthe only one which unites in itself all the\n  advantages of great and small states.\u201d [Tr.]\n\nIt is quite comprehensible that a people should say:\u2014\u201cThere shall be\nno war among us, for we shall form ourselves into a state, that is to\nsay, constitute for ourselves a supreme legislative, administrative\nand judicial power which will settle our disputes peaceably.\u201d But if\nthis state says:\u2014\u201cThere shall be no war between me and other states,\nalthough I recognise no supreme law-giving power which will secure\nme my rights and whose rights I will guarantee;\u201d then it is not at\nall clear upon what grounds I could base my confidence in my right,\nunless it were the substitute for that compact on which civil society\nis based\u2014namely, free federation which reason must necessarily\nconnect with the idea of the law of nations, if indeed any meaning is\nto be left in that concept at all.\n\nThere is no intelligible meaning in the idea of the law of nations\nas giving a right to make war; for that must be a right to decide\nwhat is just, not in accordance with universal, external laws\nlimiting the freedom of each individual, but by means of one-sided\nmaxims applied by force. We must then understand by this that men of\nsuch ways of thinking are quite justly served, when they destroy\none another, and thus find perpetual peace in the wide grave which\ncovers all the abominations of acts of violence as well as the\nauthors of such deeds. For states, in their relation to one another,\nthere can be, according to reason, no other way of advancing from\nthat lawless condition which unceasing war implies, than by giving\nup their savage lawless freedom, just as individual men have done,\nand yielding to the coercion of public laws. Thus they can form\na State of nations (_civitas gentium_), one, too, which will be\never increasing and would finally embrace all the peoples of the\nearth. States, however, in accordance with their understanding of\nthe law of nations, by no means desire this, and therefore reject\n_in hypothesi_ what is correct _in thesi_. Hence, instead of the\npositive idea of a world-republic, if all is not to be lost, only the\nnegative substitute for it, a federation averting war, maintaining\nits ground and ever extending over the world may stop the current\nof this tendency to war and shrinking from the control of law. But\neven then there will be a constant danger that this propensity may\nbreak out.[131] \u201cFuror impius intus\u2014fremit horridus ore cruento.\u201d\n(Virgil.)[132]\n\n  [131] On the conclusion of peace at the end of a war, it might\n  not be unseemly for a nation to appoint a day of humiliation,\n  after the festival of thanksgiving, on which to invoke the\n  mercy of Heaven for the terrible sin which the human race are\n  guilty of, in their continued unwillingness to submit (in their\n  relations with other states) to a law-governed constitution,\n  preferring rather in the pride of their independence to use the\n  barbarous method of war, which after all does not really settle\n  what is wanted, namely, the right of each state in a quarrel. The\n  feasts of thanksgiving during a war for a victorious battle, the\n  hymns which are sung\u2014to use the Jewish expression\u2014\u201cto the Lord\n  of Hosts\u201d are not in less strong contrast to the ethical idea\n  of a father of mankind; for, apart from the indifference these\n  customs show to the way in which nations seek to establish their\n  rights\u2014sad enough as it is\u2014these rejoicings bring in an element\n  of exultation that a great number of lives, or at least the\n  happiness of many, has been destroyed.\n\n  [132] Cf. _Aeneidos_, I. 294 _seq._\n\n                                \u201cFuror impius intus,\n    Saeva sedens super arma, et centum vinctus a\u00ebnis\n    Post tergum nodis, fremet horridus ore cruento.\u201d [Tr.]\n\n\nTHIRD DEFINITIVE ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL PEACE\n\nIII.\u2014\u201cThe rights of men, as citizens of the world, shall be limited\nto the conditions of universal hospitality.\u201d\n\nWe are speaking here, as in the previous articles, not of\nphilanthropy, but of right; and in this sphere hospitality signifies\nthe claim of a stranger entering foreign territory to be treated by\nits owner without hostility. The latter may send him away again,\nif this can be done without causing his death; but, so long as he\nconducts himself peaceably, he must not be treated as an enemy.\nIt is not a right to be treated as a guest to which the stranger\ncan lay claim\u2014a special friendly compact on his behalf would be\nrequired to make him for a given time an actual inmate\u2014but he has\na right of visitation. This right[133] to present themselves to\nsociety belongs to all mankind in virtue of our common right of\npossession on the surface of the earth on which, as it is a globe,\nwe cannot be infinitely scattered, and must in the end reconcile\nourselves to existence side by side: at the same time, originally\nno one individual had more right than another to live in any one\nparticular spot. Uninhabitable portions of the surface, ocean and\ndesert, split up the human community, but in such a way that ships\nand camels\u2014\u201cthe ship of the desert\u201d\u2014make it possible for men to come\ninto touch with one another across these unappropriated regions\nand to take advantage of our common claim to the face of the earth\nwith a view to a possible intercommunication. The inhospitality of\nthe inhabitants of certain sea coasts\u2014as, for example, the coast of\nBarbary\u2014in plundering ships in neighbouring seas or making slaves\nof shipwrecked mariners; or the behaviour of the Arab Bedouins in\nthe deserts, who think that proximity to nomadic tribes constitutes\na right to rob, is thus contrary to the law of nature. This right\nto hospitality, however\u2014that is to say, the privilege of strangers\narriving on foreign soil\u2014does not amount to more than what is implied\nin a permission to make an attempt at intercourse with the original\ninhabitants. In this way far distant territories may enter into\npeaceful relations with one another. These relations may at last\ncome under the public control of law, and thus the human race may be\nbrought nearer the realisation of a cosmopolitan constitution.\n\n  [133] Cf. Vattel (_op. cit._, II. ch. IX. \u00a7 123):\u2014\u201cThe right of\n  passage is also a remnant of the primitive state of communion,\n  in which the entire earth was common to all mankind, and the\n  passage was everywhere free to each individual according to his\n  necessities. Nobody can be entirely deprived of this right.\u201d See\n  also above, p. 65, _note_. [Tr.]\n\nLet us look now, for the sake of comparison, at the inhospitable\nbehaviour of the civilised nations, especially the commercial\nstates of our continent. The injustice which they exhibit on\nvisiting foreign lands and races\u2014this being equivalent in their\neyes to conquest\u2014is such as to fill us with horror. America, the\nnegro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape etc. were, on being\ndiscovered, looked upon as countries which belonged to nobody; for\nthe native inhabitants were reckoned as nothing. In Hindustan, under\nthe pretext of intending to establish merely commercial depots, the\nEuropeans introduced foreign troops; and, as a result, the different\nstates of Hindustan were stirred up to far-spreading wars. Oppression\nof the natives followed, famine, insurrection, perfidy and all the\nrest of the litany of evils which can afflict mankind.\n\nChina[134] and Japan (Nipon) which had made an attempt at receiving\nguests of this kind, have now taken a prudent step. Only to a single\nEuropean people, the Dutch, has China given the right of access to\nher shores (but not of entrance into the country), while Japan has\ngranted both these concessions; but at the same time they exclude the\nDutch who enter, as if they were prisoners, from social intercourse\nwith the inhabitants. The worst, or from the standpoint of ethical\njudgment the best, of all this is that no satisfaction is derived\nfrom all this violence, that all these trading companies stand on\nthe verge of ruin, that the Sugar Islands, that seat of the most\nhorrible and deliberate slavery, yield no real profit, but only have\ntheir use indirectly and for no very praiseworthy object\u2014namely, that\nof furnishing men to be trained as sailors for the men-of-war and\nthereby contributing to the carrying on of war in Europe. And this\nhas been done by nations who make a great ado about their piety, and\nwho, while they are quite ready to commit injustice, would like, in\ntheir orthodoxy, to be considered among the elect.\n\n  [134] In order to call this great empire by the name which\n  it gives itself\u2014namely, China, not Sina or a word of similar\n  sound\u2014we have only to look at Georgii: _Alphab. Tibet._, pp.\n  651-654, particularly _note_ b., below. According to the\n  observation of Professor Fischer of St. Petersburg, there is\n  really no particular name which it always goes by: the most\n  usual is the word _Kin_, _i.e._ gold, which the inhabitants of\n  Tibet call _Ser_. Hence the emperor is called the king of gold,\n  _i.e._ the king of the most splendid country in the world. This\n  word _Kin_ may probably be _Chin_ in the empire itself, but\n  be pronounced _Kin_ by the Italian missionaries on account of\n  the gutturals. Thus we see that the country of the Seres, so\n  often mentioned by the Romans, was China: the silk, however,\n  was despatched to Europe across Greater Tibet, probably through\n  Smaller Tibet and Bucharia, through Persia and then on. This\n  leads to many reflections as to the antiquity of this wonderful\n  state, as compared with Hindustan, at the time of its union with\n  Tibet and thence with Japan. On the other hand, the name Sina or\n  Tschina which is said to be given to this land by neighbouring\n  peoples leads to nothing.\n\n  Perhaps we can explain the ancient intercourse of Europe with\n  Tibet\u2014a fact at no time widely known\u2014by looking at what Hesychius\n  has preserved on the matter. I refer to the shout, \u039a\u03bf\u03c5\u03be \u039f\u03bc\u03c0\u03b1\u03be\n  (_Konx Ompax_), the cry of the Hierophants in the Eleusinian\n  mysteries (cf. _Travels of Anacharsis the Younger_, Part V., p.\n  447, _seq._). For, according to Georgii _Alph. Tibet._, the word\n  _Concioa_ which bears a striking resemblance to _Konx_ means\n  God. _Pak-cio_ (_ib._ p. 520) which might easily be pronounced\n  by the Greeks like _pax_ means _promulgator legis_, the divine\n  principle permeating nature (called also, on p. 177, _Cencresi_).\n  _Om_, however, which La Croze translates by _benedictus_,\n  _i.e._ blessed, can when applied to the Deity mean nothing but\n  beatified (p. 507). Now P. Franc. Horatius, when he asked the\n  Lhamas of Tibet, as he often did, what they understood by God\n  (_Concioa_) always got the answer:\u2014\u201cit is the assembly of all the\n  saints,\u201d _i.e._ the assembly of those blessed ones who have been\n  born again according to the faith of the Lama and, after many\n  wanderings in changing forms, have at last returned to God, to\n  Burchane: that is to say, they are beings to be worshipped, souls\n  which have undergone transmigration (p. 223). So the mysterious\n  expression _Konx Ompax_ ought probably to mean the holy (_Konx_),\n  blessed, (_Om_) and wise (_Pax_) supreme Being pervading the\n  universe, the personification of nature. Its use in the Greek\n  mysteries probably signified monotheism for the Epoptes, in\n  distinction from the polytheism of the people, although elsewhere\n  P. Horatius scented atheism here. How that mysterious word\n  came by way of Tibet to the Greeks may be explained as above;\n  and, on the other hand, in this way is made probable an early\n  intercourse of Europe with China across Tibet, earlier perhaps\n  than the communication with Hindustan. (There is some difference\n  of opinion as to the meaning of the words \u03ba\u03cc\u03b3\u03be \u1f44\u03bc\u03c0\u03b1\u03be\u2014according\n  to Liddell and Scott, a corruption of \u03ba\u03cc\u03b3\u03be, \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03be. Kant\u2019s\n  inferences here seem to be more than far-fetched. Lobeck, in his\n  _Aglaophamus_ (p. 775), gives a quite different interpretation\n  which has, he says, been approved by scholars. And Whately\n  (_Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Bonaparte_, 3rd. ed.,\n  Postscript) uses Konx Ompax as a pseudonym. [Tr.])\n\nThe intercourse, more or less close, which has been everywhere\nsteadily increasing between the nations of the earth, has now\nextended so enormously that a violation of right in one part of the\nworld is felt all over it. Hence the idea of a cosmopolitan right\nis no fantastical, high-flown notion of right, but a complement of\nthe unwritten code of law\u2014constitutional as well as international\nlaw\u2014necessary for the public rights of mankind in general and thus\nfor the realisation of perpetual peace. For only by endeavouring\nto fulfil the conditions laid down by this cosmopolitan law can we\nflatter ourselves that we are gradually approaching that ideal.\n\n\n\n\nFIRST SUPPLEMENT\n\nCONCERNING THE GUARANTEE OF PERPETUAL PEACE\n\n\nThis guarantee is given by no less a power than the great artist\nnature (_natura d\u00e6dala rerum_) in whose mechanical course is clearly\nexhibited a predetermined design to make harmony spring from human\ndiscord, even against the will of man. Now this design, although\ncalled Fate when looked upon as the compelling force of a cause, the\nlaws of whose operation are unknown to us, is, when considered as the\npurpose manifested in the course of nature, called Providence,[135]\nas the deep-lying wisdom of a Higher Cause, directing itself towards\nthe ultimate practical end of the human race and predetermining the\ncourse of things with a view to its realisation. This Providence\nwe do not, it is true, perceive in the cunning contrivances\n[_Kunstanstalten_] of nature; nor can we even conclude from the\nfact of their existence that it is there; but, as in every relation\nbetween the form of things and their final cause, we can, and must,\nsupply the thought of a Higher Wisdom, in order that we may be able\nto form an idea of the possible existence of these products after\nthe analogy of human works of art [_Kunsthandlungen_].[136] The\nrepresentation to ourselves of the relation and agreement of these\nformations of nature to the moral purpose for which they were made\nand which reason directly prescribes to us, is an Idea, it is true,\nwhich is in theory superfluous; but in practice it is dogmatic, and\nits objective reality is well established.[137] Thus we see, for\nexample, with regard to the ideal [_Pflichtbegriff_] of perpetual\npeace, that it is our duty to make use of the mechanism of nature\nfor the realisation of that end. Moreover, in a case like this where\nwe are interested merely in the theory and not in the religious\nquestion, the use of the word \u201cnature\u201d is more appropriate than that\nof \u201cprovidence\u201d, in view of the limitations of human reason, which,\nin considering the relation of effects to their causes, must keep\nwithin the limits of possible experience. And the term \u201cnature\u201d is\nalso less presumptuous than the other. To speak of a Providence\nknowable by us would be boldly to put on the wings of Icarus in order\nto draw near to the mystery of its unfathomable purpose.\n\n  [135] In the mechanical system of nature to which man belongs as\n  a sentient being, there appears, as the underlying ground of its\n  existence, a certain _form_ which we cannot make intelligible\n  to ourselves except by thinking into the physical world the\n  idea of an end preconceived by the Author of the universe: this\n  predetermination of nature on the part of God we generally call\n  Divine Providence. In so far as this providence appears in the\n  origin of the universe, we speak of Providence as founder of the\n  world (_providentia conditrix; semel jussit, semper parent._\n  Augustine). As it maintains the course of nature, however,\n  according to universal laws of adaptation to preconceived ends,\n  [_i.e._ teleological laws] we call it a ruling providence\n  (_providentia gubernatrix_). Further, we name it the guiding\n  providence (_providentia directrix_), as it appears in the\n  world for special ends, which we could not foresee, but suspect\n  only from the result. Finally, regarding particular events\n  as divine purposes, we speak no longer of providence, but of\n  dispensation (_directio extraordinaria_). As this term, however,\n  really suggests the idea of miracles, although the events are\n  not spoken of by this name, the desire to fathom dispensation,\n  as such, is a foolish presumption in men. For, from one single\n  occurrence, to jump at the conclusion that there is a particular\n  principle of efficient causes and that this event is an end and\n  not merely the natural [_naturmechanische_] sequence of a\n  design quite unknown to us is absurd and presumptuous, in however\n  pious and humble a spirit we may speak of it. In the same way to\n  distinguish between a universal and a particular providence when\n  regarding it _materialiter_, in its relation to actual objects\n  in the world (to say, for instance, that there may be, indeed,\n  a providence for the preservation of the different species of\n  creation, but that individuals are left to chance) is false and\n  contradictory. For providence is called universal for the very\n  reason that no single thing may be thought of as shut out from\n  its care. Probably the distinction of two kinds of providence,\n  _formaliter_ or subjectively considered, had reference to the\n  manner in which its purposes are fulfilled. So that we have\n  ordinary providence (_e.g._ the yearly decay and awakening to\n  new life in nature with change of season) and what we may call\n  unusual or special providence (_e.g._ the bringing of timber\n  by ocean currents to Arctic shores where it does not grow, and\n  where without this aid the inhabitants could not live). Here,\n  although we can quite well explain the physico-mechanical cause\n  of these phenomena\u2014in this case, for example, the banks of the\n  rivers in temperate countries are over-grown with trees, some of\n  which fall into the water and are carried along, probably by the\n  Gulf Stream\u2014we must not overlook the teleological cause which\n  points to the providential care of a ruling wisdom above nature.\n  But the concept, commonly used in the schools of philosophy,\n  of a co-operation on the part of the Deity or a concurrence\n  (_concursus_) in the operations going on in the world of sense,\n  must be dropped. For it is, firstly, self-contradictory to couple\n  the like and the unlike together (_gryphes jungere equis_) and\n  to let Him who is Himself the entire cause of the changes in the\n  universe make good any shortcomings in His own predetermining\n  providence (which to require this must be defective) during the\n  course of the world; for example, to say that the physician has\n  restored the sick with the help of God\u2014that is to say that He\n  has been present as a support. For _causa solitaria non juvat_.\n  God created the physician as well as his means of healing; and\n  we must ascribe the result wholly to Him, if we will go back\n  to the supreme First Cause which, theoretically, is beyond our\n  comprehension. Or we can ascribe the result entirely to the\n  physician, in so far as we follow up this event, as explicable in\n  the chain of physical causes, according to the order of nature.\n  Secondly, moreover, such a way of looking at this question\n  destroys all the fixed principles by which we judge an effect.\n  But, from the ethico-practical point of view which looks entirely\n  to the transcendental side of things, the idea of a divine\n  concurrence is quite proper and even necessary: for example,\n  in the faith that God will make good the imperfection of our\n  human justice, if only our feelings and intentions are sincere;\n  and that He will do this by means beyond our comprehension,\n  and therefore we should not slacken our efforts after what is\n  good. Whence it follows, as a matter of course, that no one must\n  attempt to explain a good action as a mere event in time by this\n  _concursus_; for that would be to pretend a theoretical knowledge\n  of the supersensible and hence be absurd.\n\n  [136] _Id est_, which we cannot dissever from the idea of a\n  creative skill capable of producing them. [Tr.]\n\n  [137] See preface, p. ix. above.\n\nBefore we determine the surety given by nature more exactly, we\nmust first look at what ultimately makes this guarantee of peace\nnecessary\u2014the circumstances in which nature has carefully placed the\nactors in her great theatre. In the next place, we shall proceed to\nconsider the manner in which she gives this surety.\n\nThe provisions she has made are as follow: (1) she has taken\ncare that men _can_ live in all parts of the world; (2) she has\nscattered them by means of war in all directions, even into the most\ninhospitable regions, so that these too might be populated; (3) by\nthis very means she has forced them to enter into relations more or\nless controlled by law. It is surely wonderful that, on the cold\nwastes round the Arctic Ocean, there is always to be found moss\nfor the reindeer to scrape out from under the snow, the reindeer\nitself either serving as food or to draw the sledge of the Ostiak or\nSamoyedes. And salt deserts which would otherwise be left unutilised\nhave the camel, which seems as if created for travelling in such\nlands. This evidence of design in things, however, is still more\nclear when we come to know that, besides the fur-clad animals of the\nshores of the Arctic Ocean, there are seals, walruses and whales\nwhose flesh furnishes food and whose oil fire for the dwellers in\nthese regions. But the providential care of nature excites our wonder\nabove all, when we hear of the driftwood which is carried\u2014whence\nno one knows\u2014to these treeless shores: for without the aid of\nthis material the natives could neither construct their craft, nor\nweapons, nor huts for shelter. Here too they have so much to do,\nmaking war against wild animals, that they live at peace with one\nanother. But what drove them originally into these regions was\nprobably nothing but war.\n\nOf animals, used by us as instruments of war, the horse was the first\nwhich man learned to tame and domesticate during the period of the\npeopling of the earth; the elephant belongs to the later period of\nthe luxury of states already established. In the same way, the art\nof cultivating certain grasses called cereals\u2014no longer known to us\nin their original form\u2014and also the multiplication and improvement,\nby transplanting and grafting, of the original kinds of fruit\u2014in\nEurope, probably only two species, the crab-apple and wild pear\u2014could\nonly originate under the conditions accompanying established states\nwhere the rights of property are assured. That is to say it would be\nafter man, hitherto existing in lawless liberty, had advanced beyond\nthe occupations of a hunter,[138] a fisherman or a shepherd to the\nlife of a tiller of the soil, when salt and iron were discovered,\u2014to\nbecome, perhaps, the first articles of commerce between different\npeoples,\u2014and were sought far and near. In this way the peoples would\nbe at first brought into peaceful relation with one another, and so\ncome to an understanding and the enjoyment of friendly intercourse,\neven with their most distant neighbours.\n\n  [138] Of all modes of livelihood the life of the hunter is\n  undoubtedly most incompatible with a civilised condition of\n  society. Because, to live by hunting, families must isolate\n  themselves from their neighbours, soon becoming estranged and\n  spread over widely scattered forests, to be before long on terms\n  of hostility, since each requires a great deal of space to obtain\n  food and raiment.\n\n  God\u2019s command to Noah not to shed blood (I. _Genesis_, IX. 4-6)\n\n  [4. \u201cBut flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood\n  thereof, shall ye not eat.\n\n  5. And surely your blood of your lives will I require; at\n  the hand of every beast will I require it, and at the hand\n  of man; at the hand of every man\u2019s brother will I require\n  the life of man.\n\n  6. Whoso sheddeth man\u2019s blood, by man shall his blood be\n  shed: for in the image of God made he man.\u201d]\n\n  is frequently quoted, and was afterwards\u2014in another connection it\n  is true\u2014made by the baptised Jews a condition to which Christians,\n  newly converted from heathendom, had to conform. Cf. _Acts_ XV. 20;\n  XXI. 25. This command seems originally to have been nothing else\n  than a prohibition of the life of the hunter; for here the\n  possibility of eating raw flesh must often occur, and, in\n  forbidding the one custom, we condemn the other.\n\nNow while nature provided that men could live on all parts of\nthe earth, she also at the same time despotically willed that\nthey _should_ live everywhere on it, although against their own\ninclination and even although this imperative did not presuppose an\nidea of duty which would compel obedience to nature with the force\nof a moral law. But, to attain this end, she has chosen war. So we\nsee certain peoples, widely separated, whose common descent is made\nevident by affinity in their languages. Thus, for instance, we find\nthe Samoyedes on the Arctic Ocean, and again a people speaking a\nsimilar language on the Altai Mts., 200 miles [_Meilen_][139] off,\nbetween whom has pressed in a mounted tribe, warlike in character\nand of Mongolian origin, which has driven one branch of the race\nfar from the other, into the most inhospitable regions where their\nown inclination would certainly not have carried them.[140] In the\nsame way, through the intrusion of the Gothic and Sarmatian tribes,\nthe Finns in the most northerly regions of Europe, whom we call\nLaplanders, have been separated by as great a distance from the\nHungarians, with whose language their own is allied. And what but war\ncan have brought the Esquimos to the north of America, a race quite\ndistinct from those of that country and probably European adventurers\nof prehistoric times? And war too, nature\u2019s method of populating\nthe earth, must have driven the Pescherais[141] in South America\nas far as Patagonia. War itself, however, is in need of no special\nstimulating cause, but seems engrafted in human nature, and is even\nregarded as something noble in itself to which man is inspired by the\nlove of glory apart from motives of self-interest. Hence, among the\nsavages of America as well as those of Europe in the age of chivalry,\nmartial courage is looked upon as of great value itself, not merely\nwhen a war is going on, as is reasonable enough, but in order that\nthere should be war: and thus war is often entered upon merely to\nexhibit this quality. So that an intrinsic dignity is held to attach\nto war in itself, and even philosophers eulogise it as an ennobling,\nrefining influence on humanity, unmindful of the Greek proverb, \u201cWar\nis evil, in so far as it makes more bad people than it takes away.\u201d\n\n  [139] About 1000 English miles.\n\n  [140] The question might be put:\u2014\u201cIf it is nature\u2019s will that\n  these Arctic shores should not remain unpopulated, what will\n  become of their inhabitants, if, as is to be expected, at some\n  time or other no more driftwood should be brought to them? For\n  we may believe that, with the advance of civilisation, the\n  inhabitants of temperate zones will utilise better the wood which\n  grows on the banks of their rivers, and not let it fall into the\n  stream and so be swept away.\u201d I answer: the inhabitants of the\n  shores of the River Obi, the Yenisei, the Lena will supply them\n  with it through trade, and take in exchange the animal produce in\n  which the seas of Arctic shores are so rich\u2014that is, if nature\n  has first of all brought about peace among them.\n\n  [141] Cf. _Enc. Brit._ (9th ed.), art. \u201cIndians\u201d, in which there\n  is an allusion to \u201cFuegians, the _Pescherais_\u201d of some writers.\n  [Tr.]\n\nSo much, then, of what nature does for her own ends with regard\nto the human race as members of the animal world. Now comes the\nquestion which touches the essential points in this design of a\nperpetual peace:\u2014\u201cWhat does nature do in this respect with reference\nto the end which man\u2019s own reason sets before him as a duty? and\nconsequently what does she do to further the realisation of his\nmoral purpose? How does she guarantee that what man, by the laws of\nfreedom, ought to do and yet fails to do, he will do, without any\ninfringement of his freedom by the compulsion of nature and that,\nmoreover, this shall be done in accordance with the three forms of\npublic right\u2014constitutional or political law, international law and\ncosmopolitan law?\u201d When I say of nature that she _wills_ that this or\nthat should take place, I do not mean that she imposes upon us the\nduty to do it\u2014for only the free, unrestrained, practical reason can\ndo that\u2014but that she does it herself, whether we will or not. \u201c_Fata\nvolentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt._\u201d\n\n1. Even if a people were not compelled through internal discord\nto submit to the restraint of public laws, war would bring this\nabout, working from without. For, according to the contrivance of\nnature which we have mentioned, every people finds another tribe\nin its neighbourhood, pressing upon it in such a manner that it\nis compelled to form itself internally into a state to be able to\ndefend itself as a power should. Now the republican constitution\nis the only one which is perfectly adapted to the rights of man,\nbut it is also the most difficult to establish and still more to\nmaintain. So generally is this recognised that people often say\nthe members of a republican state would require to be angels,[142]\nbecause men, with their self-seeking propensities, are not fit for\na constitution of so sublime a form. But now nature comes to the\naid of the universal, reason-derived will which, much as we honour\nit, is in practice powerless. And this she does, by means of these\nvery self-seeking propensities, so that it only depends\u2014and so much\nlies within the power of man\u2014on a good organisation of the state\nfor their forces to be so pitted against one another, that the one\nmay check the destructive activity of the other or neutralise its\neffect. And hence, from the standpoint of reason, the result will\nbe the same as if both forces did not exist, and each individual\nis compelled to be, if not a morally good man, yet at least a good\ncitizen. The problem of the formation of the state, hard as it may\nsound, is not insoluble, even for a race of devils, granted that\nthey have intelligence. It may be put thus:\u2014\u201cGiven a multitude of\nrational beings who, in a body, require general laws for their\nown preservation, but each of whom, as an individual, is secretly\ninclined to exempt himself from this restraint: how are we to order\ntheir affairs and how establish for them a constitution such that,\nalthough their private dispositions may be really antagonistic,\nthey may yet so act as a check upon one another, that, in their\npublic relations, the effect is the same as if they had no such evil\nsentiments.\u201d Such a problem must be capable of solution. For it\ndeals, not with the moral reformation of mankind, but only with the\nmechanism of nature; and the problem is to learn how this mechanism\nof nature can be applied to men, in order so to regulate the\nantagonism of conflicting interests in a people that they may even\ncompel one another to submit to compulsory laws and thus necessarily\nbring about the state of peace in which laws have force. We can see,\nin states actually existing, although very imperfectly organised,\nthat, in externals, they already approximate very nearly to what\nthe Idea of right prescribes, although the principle of morality is\ncertainly not the cause. A good political constitution, however, is\nnot to be expected as a result of progress in morality; but rather,\nconversely, the good moral condition of a nation is to be looked\nfor, as one of the first fruits of such a constitution. Hence the\nmechanism of nature, working through the self-seeking propensities\nof man (which of course counteract one another in their external\neffects), may be used by reason as a means of making way for the\nrealisation of her own purpose, the empire of right, and, as far\nas is in the power of the state, to promote and secure in this way\ninternal as well as external peace. We may say, then, that it is\nthe irresistible will of nature that right shall at last get the\nsupremacy. What one here fails to do will be accomplished in the long\nrun, although perhaps with much inconvenience to us. As Bouterwek\nsays, \u201cIf you bend the reed too much it breaks: he who would do too\nmuch does nothing.\u201d\n\n  [142] Rousseau uses these terms in speaking of democracy. (_Cont.\n  Soc._, III. Ch. 4.) \u201cIf there were a nation of Gods, they might\n  be governed by a democracy: but so perfect a government will not\n  agree with men.\u201d\n\n  But he writes elsewhere of republican governments (_op. cit._,\n  II. Ch. 6):\u2014\u201cAll lawful governments are republican.\u201d And in a\n  footnote to this passage:\u2014\u201cI do not by the word \u2018republic\u2019 mean\n  an aristocracy or democracy only, but in general all governments\n  directed by the public will which is the law. If a government\n  is to be lawful, it must not be confused with the sovereign\n  power, but be considered as the administrator of that power: and\n  then monarchy itself is a republic.\u201d This language has a close\n  affinity with that used by Kant. (Cf. above, p. 126.) [Tr.]\n\n2. The idea of international law presupposes the separate existence\nof a number of neighbouring and independent states; and, although\nsuch a condition of things is in itself already a state of war, (if\na federative union of these nations does not prevent the outbreak of\nhostilities) yet, according to the Idea of reason, this is better\nthan that all the states should be merged into one under a power\nwhich has gained the ascendency over its neighbours and gradually\nbecome a universal monarchy.[143] For the wider the sphere of their\njurisdiction, the more laws lose in force; and soulless despotism,\nwhen it has choked the seeds of good, at last sinks into anarchy.\nNevertheless it is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to\nattain to a permanent condition of peace in this very way; that is to\nsay, by subjecting the whole world as far as possible to its sway.\nBut nature wills it otherwise. She employs two means to separate\nnations, and prevent them from intermixing: namely, the differences\nof language and of religion.[144] These differences bring with them a\ntendency to mutual hatred, and furnish pretexts for waging war. But,\nnone the less, with the growth of culture and the gradual advance\nof men to greater unanimity of principle, they lead to concord in a\nstate of peace which, unlike the despotism we have spoken of, (the\nchurchyard of freedom) does not arise from the weakening of all\nforces, but is brought into being and secured through the equilibrium\nof these forces in their most active rivalry.\n\n  [143] See above, p. 69, _note_, esp. reference to _Theory of\n  Ethics_. [Tr.]\n\n  [144] Difference of religion! A strange expression, as if one\n  were to speak of different kinds of morality. There may indeed be\n  different historical forms of belief,\u2014that is to say, the various\n  means which have been used in the course of time to promote\n  religion,\u2014but they are mere subjects of learned investigation,\n  and do not really lie within the sphere of religion. In the same\n  way there are many religious works\u2014the _Zendavesta_, _Veda_,\n  _Koran_ etc.\u2014but there is only one religion, binding for all\n  men and for all times. These books are each no more than the\n  accidental mouthpiece of religion, and may be different according\n  to differences in time and place.\n\n3. As nature wisely separates nations which the will of each state,\nsanctioned even by the principles of international law, would\ngladly unite under its own sway by stratagem or force; in the same\nway, on the other hand, she unites nations whom the principle of a\ncosmopolitan right would not have secured against violence and war.\nAnd this union she brings about through an appeal to their mutual\ninterests. The commercial spirit cannot co-exist with war, and sooner\nor later it takes possession of every nation. For, of all the forces\nwhich lie at the command of a state, the power of money is probably\nthe most reliable. Hence states find themselves compelled\u2014not, it is\ntrue, exactly from motives of morality\u2014to further the noble end of\npeace and to avert war, by means of mediation, wherever it threatens\nto break out, just as if they had made a permanent league for this\npurpose. For great alliances with a view to war can, from the nature\nof things, only very rarely occur, and still more seldom succeed.\n\nIn this way nature guarantees the coming of perpetual peace, through\nthe natural course of human propensities: not indeed with sufficient\ncertainty to enable us to prophesy the future of this ideal\ntheoretically, but yet clearly enough for practical purposes. And\nthus this guarantee of nature makes it a duty that we should labour\nfor this end, an end which is no mere chimera.\n\n\n\n\nSECOND SUPPLEMENT\n\nA SECRET ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACE\n\n\nA secret article in negotiations concerning public right is, when\nlooked at objectively or with regard to the meaning of the term,\na contradiction. When we view it, however, from the subjective\nstandpoint, with regard to the character and condition of the person\nwho dictates it, we see that it might quite well involve some private\nconsideration, so that he would regard it as hazardous to his dignity\nto acknowledge such an article as originating from him.\n\nThe only article of this kind is contained in the following\nproposition:\u2014\u201cThe opinions of philosophers, with regard to the\nconditions of the possibility of a public peace, shall be taken into\nconsideration by states armed for war.\u201d\n\nIt seems, however, to be derogatory to the dignity of the legislative\nauthority of a state\u2014to which we must of course attribute all\nwisdom\u2014to ask advice from subjects (among whom stand philosophers)\nabout the rules of its behaviour to other states. At the same time,\nit is very advisable that this should be done. Hence the state will\nsilently invite suggestion for this purpose, while at the same time\nkeeping the fact secret. This amounts to saying that the state will\nallow philosophers to discuss freely and publicly the universal\nprinciples governing the conduct of war and establishment of peace;\nfor they will do this of their own accord, if no prohibition is laid\nupon them.[145] The arrangement between states, on this point, does\nnot require that a special agreement should be made, merely for\nthis purpose; for it is already involved in the obligation imposed\nby the universal reason of man which gives the moral law. We would\nnot be understood to say that the state must give a preference to\nthe principles of the philosopher, rather than to the opinions of\nthe jurist, the representative of state authority; but only that he\nshould be heard. The latter, who has chosen for a symbol the scales\nof right and the sword of justice,[146] generally uses that sword not\nmerely to keep off all outside influences from the scales; for, when\none pan of the balance will not go down, he throws his sword into it;\nand then _V\u00e6 victis_! The jurist, not being a moral philosopher, is\nunder the greatest temptation to do this, because it is his business\nonly to apply existing laws and not to investigate whether these\nare not themselves in need of improvement; and this actually lower\nfunction of his profession he looks upon as the nobler, because it\nis linked to power (as is the case also in both the other faculties,\ntheology and medicine). Philosophy occupies a very low position\ncompared with this combined power. So that it is said, for example,\nthat she is the handmaid of theology; and the same has been said of\nher position with regard to law and medicine. It is not quite clear,\nhowever, \u201cwhether she bears the torch before these gracious ladies,\nor carries the train.\u201d\n\n  [145] Montesquieu speaks thus in praise of the English state:\u2014\u201cAs\n  the enjoyment of liberty, and even its support and preservation,\n  consists in every man\u2019s being allowed to speak his thoughts and\n  to lay open his sentiments, a citizen in this state will say or\n  write whatever the laws do not expressly forbid to be said or\n  written.\u201d (_Esprit des Lois_, XIX. Ch. 27.) Hobbes is opposed to\n  all free discussion of political questions and to freedom as a\n  source of danger to the state. [Tr.]\n\n  [146] Kant is thinking here not of the sword of justice, in the\n  moral sense, but of a sword which is symbolical of the executive\n  power of the actual law. [Tr.]\n\nThat kings should philosophise, or philosophers become kings, is not\nto be expected. But neither is it to be desired; for the possession\nof power is inevitably fatal to the free exercise of reason. But\nit is absolutely indispensable, for their enlightenment as to the\nfull significance of their vocations, that both kings and sovereign\nnations, which rule themselves in accordance with laws of equality,\nshould not allow the class of philosophers to disappear, nor forbid\nthe expression of their opinions, but should allow them to speak\nopenly. And since this class of men, by their very nature, are\nincapable of instigating rebellion or forming unions for purposes of\npolitical agitation, they should not be suspected of propagandism.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX I\n\nON THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MORALS AND POLITICS WITH REFERENCE TO\nPERPETUAL PEACE\n\n\nIn an objective sense, morals is a practical science, as the sum of\nlaws exacting unconditional obedience, in accordance with which we\n_ought_ to act. Now, once we have admitted the authority of this\nidea of duty, it is evidently inconsistent that we should think of\nsaying that we _cannot_ act thus. For, in this case, the idea of duty\nfalls to the ground of itself; \u201c_ultra posse nemo obligatur_.\u201d Hence\nthere can be no quarrel between politics, as the practical science of\nright, and morals, which is also a science of right, but theoretical.\nThat is, theory cannot come into conflict with practice. For, in that\ncase, we would need to understand under the term \u201cethics\u201d or \u201cmorals\u201d\na universal doctrine of expediency, or, in other words, a theory of\nprecepts which may guide us in choosing the best means for attaining\nends calculated for our advantage. This is to deny that a science of\nmorals exists.\n\nPolitics says, \u201cBe wise as serpents\u201d; morals adds the limiting\ncondition, \u201cand guileless as doves.\u201d If these precepts cannot stand\ntogether in one command, then there is a real quarrel between\npolitics and morals.[147] But if they can be completely brought into\naccord, then the idea of any antagonism between them is absurd,\nand the question of how best to make a compromise between the two\npoints of view ceases to be even raised. Although the saying,\n\u201cHonesty is the best policy,\u201d expresses a theory which, alas, is\noften contradicted in practice, yet the likewise theoretical maxim,\n\u201cHonesty is better than any policy,\u201d is exalted high above every\npossible objection, is indeed the necessary condition of all politics.\n\n  [147] Cf. Aristotle: _Politics_, (Welldon\u2019s trans.) IV. Ch. XIV.\n  \u201cThe same principles of morality are best both for individuals\n  and States.\u201d\n\n  Among the ancients the connection between politics and morals\n  was never questioned, although there were differences of opinion\n  as to which science stood first in importance. Thus, while Plato\n  put politics second to morals, Aristotle regarded politics as the\n  chief science and ethics as a part of politics. This connection\n  between the sciences was denied by Machiavelli, who lays down\n  the dictum that, in the relations of sovereigns and states, the\n  ordinary rules of morality do not apply. See _The Prince_, Ch.\n  XVIII. \u201cA Prince,\u201d he says, \u201cand most of all a new Prince, cannot\n  observe all those rules of conduct in respect of which men are\n  accounted good, being frequently obliged, in order to preserve\n  his Princedom, to act in opposition to good faith, charity,\n  humanity, and religion. He must therefore keep his mind ready\n  to shift as the winds and tides of Fortune turn, and, as I have\n  already said, he ought not to quit good courses if he can help\n  it, but should know how to follow evil courses if he must.\u201d\n\n  Hume thought that laxer principles might be allowed to govern\n  states than private persons, because intercourse between them\n  was not so \u201cnecessary and advantageous\u201d as between individuals.\n  \u201cThere is a system of morals,\u201d he says, \u201ccalculated for princes,\n  much more free than that which ought to govern private persons,\u201d\n  (_Treatise_, III., Part II., Sect. IX.) [Tr.]\n\nThe Terminus of morals does not yield to Jupiter, the Terminus of\nforce; for the latter remains beneath the sway of Fate. In other\nwords, reason is not sufficiently enlightened to survey the series\nof predetermining causes which would make it possible for us to\npredict with certainty the good or bad results of human action, as\nthey follow from the mechanical laws of nature; although we may hope\nthat things will turn out as we should desire. But what we have to\ndo, in order to remain in the path of duty guided by the rules of\nwisdom, reason makes everywhere perfectly clear, and does this for\nthe purpose of furthering her ultimate ends.\n\nThe practical man, however, for whom morals is mere theory, even\nwhile admitting that what ought to be can be, bases his dreary\nverdict against our well-meant hopes really on this: he pretends\nthat he can foresee from his observation of human nature, that men\nwill never be willing to do what is required in order to bring\nabout the wished-for results leading to perpetual peace. It is\ntrue that the will of all individual men to live under a legal\nconstitution according to the principles of liberty\u2014that is to\nsay, the distributive unity of the wills of all\u2014is not sufficient\nto attain this end. We must have the collective unity of their\nunited will: all as a body must determine these new conditions. The\nsolution of this difficult problem is required in order that civil\nsociety should be a whole. To all this diversity of individual wills\nthere must come a uniting cause, in order to produce a common will\nwhich no distributive will is able to give. Hence, in the practical\nrealisation of that idea, no other beginning of a law-governed\nsociety can be counted upon than one that is brought about by force:\nupon this force, too, public law afterwards rests. This state of\nthings certainly prepares us to meet considerable deviation in actual\nexperience from the theoretical idea of perpetual peace, since we\ncannot take into account the moral character and disposition of a\nlaw-giver in this connection, or expect that, after he has united a\nwild multitude into one people, he will leave it to them to bring\nabout a legal constitution by their common will.\n\nIt amounts to this. Any ruler who has once got the power in his\nhands will not let the people dictate laws for him. A state which\nenjoys an independence of the control of external law will not\nsubmit to the judgment of the tribunals of other states, when it\nhas to consider how to obtain its rights against them. And even a\ncontinent, when it feels its superiority to another, whether this be\nin its way or not, will not fail to take advantage of an opportunity\noffered of strengthening its power by the spoliation or even conquest\nof this territory. Hence all theoretical schemes, connected with\nconstitutional, international or cosmopolitan law, crumble away into\nempty impracticable ideals. While, on the other hand, a practical\nscience, based on the empirical principles of human nature, which\ndoes not disdain to model its maxims on an observation of actual\nlife, can alone hope to find a sure foundation on which to build up a\nsystem of national policy.\n\nNow certainly, if there is neither freedom nor a moral law founded\nupon it, and every actual or possible event happens in the mere\nmechanical course of nature, then politics, as the art of making\nuse of this physical necessity in things for the government of\nmen, is the whole of practical wisdom and the idea of right is an\nempty concept. If, on the other hand, we find that this idea of\nright is necessarily to be conjoined with politics and even to be\nraised to the position of a limiting condition of that science, then\nthe possibility of reconciling them must be admitted. I can thus\nimagine a moral politician, that is to say, one who understands the\nprinciples of statesmanship to be such as do not conflict with\nmorals; but I cannot conceive of a political moralist who fashions\nfor himself such a system of ethics as may serve the interest of\nstatesmen.\n\nThe moral politician will always act upon the following\nprinciple:\u2014\u201cIf certain defects which could not have been avoided\nare found in the political constitution or foreign relations of a\nstate, it is a duty for all, especially for the rulers of the state,\nto apply their whole energy to correcting them as soon as possible,\nand to bringing the constitution and political relations on these\npoints into conformity with the Law of Nature, as it is held up as a\nmodel before us in the idea of reason; and this they should do even\nat a sacrifice of their own interest.\u201d Now it is contrary to all\npolitics\u2014which is, in this particular, in agreement with morals\u2014to\ndissever any of the links binding citizens together in the state\nor nations in cosmopolitan union, before a better constitution is\nthere to take the place of what has been thus destroyed. And hence\nit would be absurd indeed to demand that every imperfection in\npolitical matters must be violently altered on the spot. But, at the\nsame time, it may be required of a ruler at least that he should\nearnestly keep the maxim in mind which points to the necessity of\nsuch a change; so that he may go on constantly approaching the end\nto be realised, namely, the best possible constitution according to\nthe laws of right. Even although it is still under despotic rule,\nin accordance with its constitution as then existing, a state may\ngovern itself on republican lines, until the people gradually become\ncapable of being influenced by the mere idea of the authority of law,\njust as if it had physical power. And they become accordingly capable\nof self-legislation, their faculty for which is founded on original\nright. But if, through the violence of revolution, the product of\na bad government, a constitution more in accord with the spirit of\nlaw were attained even by unlawful means, it should no longer be\nheld justifiable to bring the people back to the old constitution,\nalthough, while the revolution was going on, every one who took part\nin it by use of force or stratagem, may have been justly punished\nas a rebel. As regards the external relations of nations, a state\ncannot be asked to give up its constitution, even although that be\na despotism (which is, at the same time, the strongest constitution\nwhere foreign enemies are concerned), so long as it runs the risk of\nbeing immediately swallowed up by other states. Hence, when such a\nproposal is made, the state whose constitution is in question must\nat least be allowed to defer acting upon it until a more convenient\ntime.[148]\n\n  [148] These are _permissive_ laws of reason which allow us to\n  leave a system of public law, when it is tainted by injustice, to\n  remain just as it is, until everything is entirely revolutionised\n  through an internal development, either spontaneous, or fostered\n  and matured by peaceful influences. For any legal constitution\n  whatsoever, even although it conforms only slightly with the\n  spirit of law is better than none at all\u2014that is to say, anarchy,\n  which is the fate of a precipitate reform. Hence, as things now\n  are, the wise politician will look upon it as his duty to make\n  reforms on the lines marked out by the ideal of public law. He\n  will not use revolutions, when these have been brought about\n  by natural causes, to extenuate still greater oppression than\n  caused them, but will regard them as the voice of nature, calling\n  upon him to make such thorough reforms as will bring about the\n  only lasting constitution, a lawful constitution based on the\n  principles of freedom.\n\nIt is always possible that moralists who rule despotically, and are\nat a loss in practical matters, will come into collision with the\nrules of political wisdom in many ways, by adopting measures without\nsufficient deliberation which show themselves afterwards to have been\noverestimated. When they thus offend against nature, experience must\ngradually lead them into a better track. But, instead of this being\nthe case, politicians who are fond of moralising do all they can to\nmake moral improvement impossible and to perpetuate violations of\nlaw, by extenuating political principles which are antagonistic to\nthe idea of right, on the pretext that human nature is not capable of\ngood, in the sense of the ideal which reason prescribes.\n\nThese politicians, instead of adopting an open, straightforward way\nof doing things (as they boast), mix themselves up in intrigue. They\nget at the authorities in power and say what will please them;\ntheir sole bent is to sacrifice the nation, or even, if they can,\nthe whole world, with the one end in view that their own private\ninterest may be forwarded. This is the manner of regular jurists (I\nmean the journeyman lawyer not the legislator), when they aspire to\npolitics. For, as it is not their business to reason too nicely over\nlegislation, but only to enforce the laws of the country, every legal\nconstitution in its existing form and, when this is changed by the\nproper authorities, the one which takes its place, will always seem\nto them the best possible. And the consequence is that everything\nis purely mechanical. But this adroitness in suiting themselves\nto any circumstances may lead them to the delusion that they are\nalso capable of giving an opinion about the principles of political\nconstitutions in general, in so far as they conform to ideas of\nright, and are therefore not empirical, but _a priori_. And they may\ntherefore brag about their knowledge of men,\u2014which indeed one expects\nto find, since they have to deal with so many\u2014without really knowing\nthe nature of man and what can be made of it, to gain which knowledge\na higher standpoint of anthropological observation than theirs is\nrequired. Filled with ideas of this kind, if they trespass outside\ntheir own sphere on the boundaries of political and international\nlaw, looked upon as ideals which reason holds before us, they can\ndo so only in the spirit of chicanery. For they will follow their\nusual method of making everything conform mechanically to compulsory\nlaws despotically made and enforced, even here, where the ideas of\nreason recognise the validity of a legal compulsory force, only when\nit is in accordance with the principles of freedom through which a\npermanently valid constitution becomes first of all possible. The\nwould-be practical man, leaving out of account this idea of reason,\nthinks that he can solve this problem empirically by looking to the\nway in which those constitutions which have best survived the test\nof time were established, even although the spirit of these may have\nbeen generally contrary to the idea of right. The principles which\nhe makes use of here, although indeed he does not make them public,\namount pretty much to the following sophistical maxims.\n\n1. =Fac et excusa.= Seize the most favourable opportunity for\narbitrary usurpation\u2014either of the authority of the state over its\nown people or over a neighbouring people; the justification of the\nact and extenuation of the use of force will come much more easily\nand gracefully, when the deed is done, than if one has to think out\nconvincing reasons for taking this step and first hear through all\nthe objections which can be made against it. This is especially\ntrue in the first case mentioned, where the supreme power in the\nstate also controls the legislature which we must obey without any\nreasoning about it. Besides, this show of audacity in a statesman\neven lends him a certain semblance of inward conviction of the\njustice of his action; and once he has got so far the god of success\n(_bonus eventus_) is his best advocate.\n\n2. =Si fecisti, nega.= As for any crime you have committed, such\nas has, for instance, brought your people to despair and thence\nto insurrection, deny that it has happened owing to any fault of\nyours. Say rather that it is all caused by the insubordination of\nyour subjects, or, in the case of your having usurped a neighbouring\nstate, that human nature is to blame; for, if a man is not ready to\nuse force and steal a march upon his neighbour, he may certainly\ncount on the latter forestalling him and taking him prisoner.\n\n3. =Divide et impera.= That is to say, if there are certain\nprivileged persons, holding authority among the people, who have\nmerely chosen you for their sovereign as _primus inter pares_, bring\nabout a quarrel among them, and make mischief between them and the\npeople. Now back up the people with a dazzling promise of greater\nfreedom; everything will now depend unconditionally on your will. Or\nagain, if there is a difficulty with foreign states, then to stir\nup dissension among them is a pretty sure means of subjecting first\none and then the other to your sway, under the pretext of aiding the\nweaker.\n\nIt is true that now-a-days no body is taken in by these political\nmaxims, for they are all familiar to everyone. Moreover, there is\nno need of being ashamed of them, as if their injustice were too\npatent. For the great Powers never feel shame before the judgment of\nthe common herd, but only before one another; so that as far as this\nmatter goes, it is not the revelation of these guiding principles of\npolicy that can make rulers ashamed, but only the unsuccessful use\nof them. For as to the morality of these maxims, politicians are all\nagreed. Hence there is always left political prestige on which they\ncan safely count; and this means the glory of increasing their power\nby any means that offer.[149]\n\n  [149] It is still sometimes denied that we find, in members of\n  a civilised community, a certain depravity rooted in the nature\n  of man;[C] and it might, indeed, be alleged with some show of\n  truth that not an innate corruptness in human nature, but the\n  barbarism of men, the defect of a not yet sufficiently developed\n  culture, is the cause of the evident antipathy to law which\n  their attitude indicates. In the external relations of states,\n  however, human wickedness shows itself incontestably, without any\n  attempt at concealment. Within the state, it is covered over by\n  the compelling authority of civil laws. For, working against the\n  tendency every citizen has to commit acts of violence against his\n  neighbour, there is the much stronger force of the government\n  which not only gives an appearance of morality to the whole\n  state (_causae non causae_), but, by checking the outbreak of\n  lawless propensities, actually aids the moral qualities of men\n  considerably, in their development of a direct respect for the\n  law. For every individual thinks that he himself would hold the\n  idea of right sacred and follow faithfully what it prescribes,\n  if only he could expect that everyone else would do the same.\n  This guarantee is in part given to him by the government; and\n  a great advance is made by this step which is not deliberately\n  moral, towards the ideal of fidelity to the concept of duty\n  for its own sake without thought of return. As, however, every\n  man\u2019s good opinion of himself presupposes an evil disposition in\n  everyone else, we have an expression of their mutual judgment\n  of one another, namely, that when it comes to hard facts, none\n  of them are worth much; but whence this judgment comes remains\n  unexplained, as we cannot lay the blame on the nature of man,\n  since he is a being in the possession of freedom. The respect for\n  the idea of right, of which it is absolutely impossible for man\n  to divest himself, sanctions in the most solemn manner the theory\n  of our power to conform to its dictates. And hence every man sees\n  himself obliged to act in accordance with what the idea of right\n  prescribes, whether his neighbours fulfil their obligation or not.\n\n  [C] This depravity of human nature is denied by Rousseau, who held\n  that the mind of man was naturally inclined to virtue, and that\n  good civil and social institutions are all that is required.\n  (_Discourse on the Sciences and Arts_, 1750.) Kant here takes\n  sides with Hobbes against Rousseau. See Kant\u2019s _Theory of Ethics_,\n  Abbott\u2019s trans. (4th ed., 1889), p. 339 _seq._\u2014esp. p. 341 and\n  _note_. Cf. also Hooker\u2019s _Ecclesiastical Polity_, I. \u00a7 10:\u2014\u201cLaws\n  politic, ordained for external order and regiment amongst men, are\n  never framed as they should be, unless presuming the will of man\n  to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience\n  to the sacred laws of his nature; in a word, unless presuming man\n  to be, in regard of his depraved mind, little better than a wild\n  beast, they do accordingly provide, notwithstanding, so to frame\n  his outward actions, that they be no hindrance unto the common\n  good, for which societies are instituted.\u201d [Tr.]\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nIn all these twistings and turnings of an immoral doctrine of\nexpediency which aims at substituting a state of peace for the\nwarlike conditions in which men are placed by nature, so much at\nleast is clear;\u2014that men cannot get away from the idea of right in\ntheir private any more than in their public relations; and that they\ndo not dare (this is indeed most strikingly seen in the concept of\nan international law) to base politics merely on the manipulations\nof expediency and therefore to refuse all obedience to the idea of\na public right. On the contrary, they pay all fitting honour to the\nidea of right in itself, even although they should, at the same time,\ndevise a hundred subterfuges and excuses to avoid it in practice, and\nshould regard force, backed up by cunning, as having the authority\nwhich comes from being the source and unifying principle of all\nright. It will be well to put an end to this sophistry, if not to\nthe injustice it extenuates, and to bring the false advocates of the\nmighty of the earth to confess that it is not right but might in\nwhose interest they speak, and that it is the worship of might from\nwhich they take their cue, as if in this matter they had a right to\ncommand. In order to do this, we must first expose the delusion by\nwhich they deceive themselves and others; then discover the ultimate\nprinciple from which their plans for a perpetual peace proceed;\nand thence show that all the evil which stands in the way of the\nrealisation of that ideal springs from the fact that the political\nmoralist begins where the moral politician rightly ends and that, by\nsubordinating principles to an end or putting the cart before the\nhorse, he defeats his intention of bringing politics into harmony\nwith morals.\n\nIn order to make practical philosophy consistent with itself, we must\nfirst decide the following question:\u2014In dealing with the problems of\npractical reason must we begin from its material principle\u2014the end as\nthe object of free choice\u2014or from its formal principle which is based\nmerely on freedom in its external relation?\u2014from which comes the\nfollowing law:\u2014\u201cAct so that thou canst will that thy maxim should be\na universal law, be the end of thy action what it will.\u201d[150]\n\n  [150] With regard to the meaning of the moral law and its\n  significance in the Kantian system of ethics, see Abbott\u2019s\n  translation of the _Theory of Ethics_ (1889), pp. 38, 45, 54, 55,\n  119, 282. [Tr.]\n\nWithout doubt, the latter determining principle of action must\nstand first; for, as a principle of right, it carries unconditional\nnecessity with it, whereas the former is obligatory only if we assume\nthe empirical conditions of the end set before us,\u2014that is to say,\nthat it is an end capable of being practically realised. And if\nthis end\u2014as, for example, the end of perpetual peace\u2014should be also\na duty, this same duty must necessarily have been deduced from the\nformal principle governing the maxims which guide external action.\nNow the first principle is the principle of the political moralist;\nthe problems of constitutional, international and cosmopolitan law\nare mere technical problems (_problema technicum_). The second or\nformal principle, on the other hand, as the principle of the moral\npolitician who regards it as a moral problem (_problema morale_),\ndiffers widely from the other principle in its methods of bringing\nabout perpetual peace, which we desire not only as a material good,\nbut also as a state of things resulting from our recognition of the\nprecepts of duty.[151]\n\n  [151] See Abbott\u2019s trans., pp. 33, 34. [Tr.]\n\nTo solve the first problem\u2014that, namely, of political expediency\u2014much\nknowledge of nature is required, that her mechanical laws may be\nemployed for the end in view. And yet the result of all knowledge\nof this kind is uncertain, as far as perpetual peace is concerned.\nThis we find to be so, whichever of the three departments of public\nlaw we take. It is uncertain whether a people could be better kept\nin obedience and at the same time prosperity by severity or by baits\nheld out to their vanity; whether they would be better governed\nunder the sovereignty of a single individual or by the authority of\nseveral acting together; whether the combined authority might be\nbetter secured merely, say, by an official nobility or by the power\nof the people within the state; and, finally, whether such conditions\ncould be long maintained. There are examples to the contrary in\nhistory in the case of all forms of government, with the exception\nof the only true republican constitution, the idea of which can\noccur only to a moral politician. Still more uncertain is a law of\nnations, ostensibly established upon statutes devised by ministers;\nfor this amounts in fact to mere empty words, and rests on treaties\nwhich, in the very act of ratification, contain a secret reservation\nof the right to violate them. On the other hand, the solution of the\nsecond problem\u2014the problem of political wisdom\u2014forces itself, we may\nsay, upon us; it is quite obvious to every one, and puts all crooked\ndealings to shame; it leads, too, straight to the desired end, while\nat the same time, discretion warns us not to drag in the conditions\nof perpetual peace by force, but to take time and approach this ideal\ngradually as favourable circumstances permit.\n\nThis may be expressed in the following maxim:\u2014\u201cSeek ye first the\nkingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, and the\nobject of your endeavour, the blessing of perpetual peace, will\nbe added unto you.\u201d For the science of morals generally has this\npeculiarity,\u2014and it has it also with regard to the moral principles\nof public law, and therefore with regard to a science of politics\nknowable _a priori_,\u2014that the less it makes a man\u2019s conduct depend\non the end he has set before him, his purposed material or moral\ngain, so much the more, nevertheless, does it conform in general\nto this end. The reason for this is that it is just the universal\nwill, given _a priori_, which exists in a people or in the relation\nof different peoples to one another, that alone determines what is\nlawful among men. This union of individual wills, however, if we\nproceed consistently in practice, in observance of the mechanical\nlaws of nature, may be at the same time the cause of bringing about\nthe result intended and practically realizing the idea of right.\nHence it is, for example, a principle of moral politics that a people\nshould unite into a state according to the only valid concepts of\nright, the ideas of freedom and equality; and this principle is not\nbased on expediency, but upon duty. Political moralists, however,\ndo not deserve a hearing, much and sophistically as they may reason\nabout the existence, in a multitude of men forming a society, of\ncertain natural tendencies which would weaken those principles and\ndefeat their intention. They may endeavour to prove their assertion\nby giving instances of badly organised constitutions, chosen both\nfrom ancient and modern times, (as, for example, democracies without\na representative system); but such arguments are to be treated with\ncontempt, all the more, because a pernicious theory of this kind\nmay perhaps even bring about the evil which it prophesies. For, in\naccordance with such reasoning, man is thrown into a class with all\nother living machines which only require the consciousness that they\nare not free creatures to make them in their own judgment the most\nmiserable of all beings.\n\n_Fiat justitia, pereat mundus._ This saying has become proverbial,\nand although it savours a little of boastfulness, is also true. We\nmay translate it thus:\u2014\u201cLet justice rule on earth, although all the\nrogues in the world should go to the bottom.\u201d It is a good, honest\nprinciple of right cutting off all the crooked ways made by knavery\nor violence. It must not, however, be misunderstood as allowing\nanyone to exercise his own rights with the utmost severity, a course\nin contradiction to our moral duty; but we must take it to signify\nan obligation, binding upon rulers, to refrain from refusing to\nyield anyone his rights or from curtailing them, out of personal\nfeeling or sympathy for others. For this end, in particular, we\nrequire, firstly, that a state should have an internal political\nconstitution, established according to the pure principles of\nright; secondly, that a union should be formed between this state\nand neighbouring or distant nations for a legal settlement of\ntheir differences, after the analogy of the universal state. This\nproposition means nothing more than this:\u2014Political maxims must not\nstart from the idea of a prosperity and happiness which are to be\nexpected from observance of such precepts in every state; that is,\nnot from the end which each nation makes the object of its will\nas the highest empirical principle of political wisdom; but they\nmust set out from the pure concept of the duty of right, from the\n\u201c_ought_\u201d whose principle is given _a priori_ through pure reason.\nThis is the law, whatever the material consequences may be. The world\nwill certainly not perish by any means, because the number of wicked\npeople in it is becoming fewer. The morally bad has one peculiarity,\ninseparable from its nature;\u2014in its purposes, especially in relation\nto other evil influences, it is in contradiction with itself, and\ncounteracts its own natural effect, and thus makes room for the moral\nprinciple of good, although advance in this direction may be slow.\n\nHence objectively, in theory, there is no quarrel between morals\nand politics. But subjectively, in the self-seeking tendencies of\nmen (which we cannot actually call their morality, as we would a\ncourse of action based on maxims of reason,) this disagreement in\nprinciple exists and may always survive; for it serves as a whetstone\nto virtue. According to the principle, _Tu ne cede malis, sed contra\naudentior ito_, the true courage of virtue in the present case lies\nnot so much in facing the evils and self-sacrifices which must be met\nhere as in firmly confronting the evil principle in our own nature\nand conquering its wiles. For this is a principle far more dangerous,\nfalse, treacherous and sophistical which puts forward the weakness in\nhuman nature as a justification for every transgression.\n\nIn fact the political moralist may say that a ruler and people, or\nnation and nation do _one another_ no wrong, when they enter on a war\nwith violence or cunning, although they do wrong, generally speaking,\nin refusing to respect the idea of right which alone could establish\npeace for all time. For, as both are equally wrongly disposed to one\nanother, each transgressing the duty he owes to his neighbour, they\nare both quite rightly served, when they are thus destroyed in war.\nThis mutual destruction stops short at the point of extermination,\nso that there are always enough of the race left to keep this game\ngoing on through all the ages, and a far-off posterity may take\nwarning by them. The Providence that orders the course of the world\nis hereby justified. For the moral principle in mankind never becomes\nextinguished, and human reason, fitted for the practical realisation\nof ideas of right according to that principle, grows continually in\nfitness for that purpose with the ever advancing march of culture;\nwhile at the same time, it must be said, the guilt of transgression\nincreases as well. But it seems that, by no theodicy or vindication\nof the justice of God, can we justify Creation in putting such a\nrace of corrupt creatures into the world at all, if, that is, we\nassume that the human race neither will nor can ever be in a happier\ncondition than it is now. This standpoint, however, is too high a\none for us to judge from, or to theorise, with the limited concepts\nwe have at our command, about the wisdom of that supreme Power which\nis unknowable by us. We are inevitably driven to such despairing\nconclusions as these, if we do not admit that the pure principles of\nright have objective reality\u2014that is to say, are capable of being\npractically realised\u2014and consequently that action must be taken on\nthe part of the people of a state and, further, by states in relation\nto one another, whatever arguments empirical politics may bring\nforward against this course. Politics in the real sense cannot take\na step forward without first paying homage to the principles of\nmorals. And, although politics, _per se_, is a difficult art,[152]\nin its union with morals no art is required; for in the case of a\nconflict arising between the two sciences, the moralist can cut\nasunder the knot which politics is unable to untie. Right must be\nheld sacred by man, however great the cost and sacrifice to the\nruling power. Here is no half-and-half course. We cannot devise a\nhappy medium between right and expediency, a right pragmatically\nconditioned. But all politics must bend the knee to the principle of\nright, and may, in that way, hope to reach, although slowly perhaps,\na level whence it may shine upon men for all time.\n\n  [152] Matthew Arnold defines politics somewhere as the art of\n  \u201cmaking reason and the will of God prevail\u201d\u2014an art, one would\n  say, difficult enough. [Tr.]\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX II\n\nCONCERNING THE HARMONY OF POLITICS WITH MORALS ACCORDING TO THE\nTRANSCENDENTAL IDEA OF PUBLIC RIGHT\n\n\nIf I look at public right from the point of view of most professors\nof law, and abstract from its _matter_ or its empirical elements,\nvarying according to the circumstances given in our experience of\nindividuals in a state or of states among themselves, then there\nremains the _form_ of publicity. The possibility of this publicity,\nevery legal title implies. For without it there could be no justice,\nwhich can only be thought as before the eyes of men; and, without\njustice, there would be no right, for, from justice only, right can\ncome.\n\nThis characteristic of publicity must belong to every legal title.\nHence, as, in any particular case that occurs, there is no difficulty\nin deciding whether this essential attribute is present or not,\n(whether, that is, it is reconcilable with the principles of the\nagent or not), it furnishes an easily applied criterion which is to\nbe found _a priori_ in the reason, so that in the particular case we\ncan at once recognise the falsity or illegality of a proposed claim\n(_praetensio juris_), as it were by an experiment of pure reason.\n\nHaving thus, as it were, abstracted from all the empirical elements\ncontained in the concept of a political and international law, such\nas, for instance, the evil tendency in human nature which makes\ncompulsion necessary, we may give the following proposition as the\n_transcendental formula_ of public right:\u2014\u201cAll actions relating to\nthe rights of other men are wrong, if the maxims from which they\nfollow are inconsistent with publicity.\u201d\n\nThis principle must be regarded not merely as ethical, as belonging\nto the doctrine of virtue, but also as juridical, referring to the\nrights of men. For there is something wrong in a maxim of conduct\nwhich I cannot divulge without at once defeating my purpose, a maxim\nwhich must therefore be kept secret, if it is to succeed, and which\nI could not publicly acknowledge without infallibly stirring up the\nopposition of everyone. This necessary and universal resistance with\nwhich everyone meets me, a resistance therefore evident _a priori_,\ncan be due to no other cause than the injustice with which such a\nmaxim threatens everyone. Further, this testing principle is merely\nnegative; that is, it serves only as a means by which we may know\nwhen an action is unjust to others. Like axioms, it has a certainty\nincapable of demonstration; it is besides easy of application as\nappears from the following examples of public right.\n\n1.\u2014=Constitutional Law.= Let us take in the first place the public\nlaw of the state (_jus civitatis_), particularly in its application\nto matters within the state. Here a question arises which many think\ndifficult to answer, but which the transcendental principle of\npublicity solves quite readily:\u2014\u201cIs revolution a legitimate means for\na people to adopt, for the purpose of throwing off the oppressive\nyoke of a so-called tyrant (_non titulo, sed exercitio talis_)?\u201d\nThe rights of a nation are violated in a government of this kind,\nand no wrong is done to the tyrant in dethroning him. Of this there\nis no doubt. None the less, it is in the highest degree wrong of\nthe subjects to prosecute their rights in this way; and they would\nbe just as little justified in complaining, if they happened to be\ndefeated in their attempt and had to endure the severest punishment\nin consequence.\n\nA great many reasons for and against both sides of this question\nmay be given, if we seek to settle it by a dogmatic deduction\nof the principles of right. But the transcendental principle\nof the publicity of public right can spare itself this diffuse\nargumentation. For, according to that principle, the people would\nask themselves, before the civil contract was made, whether they\ncould venture to publish maxims, proposing insurrection when a\nfavourable opportunity should present itself. It is quite clear\nthat if, when a constitution is established, it were made a\ncondition that force may be exercised against the sovereign under\ncertain circumstances, the people would be obliged to claim a\nlawful authority higher than his. But in that case, the so-called\nsovereign would be no longer sovereign: or, if both powers, that of\nthe sovereign and that of the people, were made a condition of the\nconstitution of the state, then its establishment (which was the aim\nof the people) would be impossible. The wrongfulness of revolution is\nquite obvious from the fact that openly to acknowledge maxims which\njustify this step would make attainment of the end at which they aim\nimpossible. We are obliged to keep them secret. But this secrecy\nwould not be necessary on the part of the head of the state. He may\nsay quite plainly that the ringleaders of every rebellion will be\npunished by death, even although they may hold that it was he who\nfirst transgressed the fundamental law. For, if a ruler is conscious\nof possessing irresistible sovereign power (and this must be assumed\nin every civil constitution, because a sovereign who has not power to\nprotect any individual member of the nation against his neighbour\nhas also not the right to exercise authority over him), then he need\nhave no fear that making known the maxims which guide him will cause\nthe defeat of his plans. And it is quite consistent with this view\nto hold that, if the people are successful in their insurrection,\nthe sovereign must return to the rank of a subject, and refrain from\ninciting rebellion with a view to regaining his lost sovereignty. At\nthe same time he need have no fear of being called to account for his\nformer administration.[153]\n\n  [153] \u201cWhen a king has dethroned himself,\u201d says Locke, (_On Civil\n  Government_, Ch. XIX. \u00a7 239) \u201cand put himself in a state of war\n  with his people, what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who\n  is no king, as they would any other man, who has put himself into\n  a state of war with them?\u201d ... \u201cThe legislative being only a\n  fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains still _in\n  the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative_.\u201d\n  (_Op. cit._, Ch. XIII. \u00a7 149.) And again, (_op. cit._, Ch. XI. \u00a7\n  134.) we find the words, \u201c... over whom [_i.e._ society] no body\n  can have a power to make laws, but by their own consent, and by\n  authority received from them.\u201d Cf. also Ch. XIX. \u00a7 228 _seq._\n\n  Hobbes represents the opposite point of view. \u201cHow many kings,\u201d\n  he wrote, (Preface to the _Philosophical Rudiments concerning\n  Government and Society_) \u201cand those good men too, hath this one\n  error, that a tyrant king might lawfully be put to death, been\n  the slaughter of! How many throats hath this false position\n  cut, that a prince for some causes may by some certain men be\n  deposed! And what bloodshed hath not this erroneous doctrine\n  caused, that kings are not superiors to, but administrators for\n  the multitude!\u201d This \u201cerroneous doctrine\u201d Kant received from\n  Locke through Rousseau. He advocated, or at least practised\n  as a citizen, a doctrine of passive obedience to the state. A\n  free press, he held, offered the only lawful outlet for protest\n  against tyranny. But, in theory, he was an enemy to absolute\n  monarchy. [Tr.]\n\n2.\u2014=International Law.= There can be no question of an international\nlaw, except on the assumption of some kind of a law-governed\nstate of things, the external condition under which any right can\nbelong to man. For the very idea of international law, as public\nright, implies the publication of a universal will determining the\nrights and property of each individual nation; and this _status\njuridicus_ must spring out of a contract of some sort which may not,\nlike the contract to which the state owes its origin, be founded\nupon compulsory laws, but may be, at the most, the agreement of a\npermanent free association such as the federation of the different\nstates, to which we have alluded above. For, without the control\nof law to some extent, to serve as an active bond of union among\ndifferent merely natural or moral individuals,\u2014that is to say, in\na state of nature,\u2014there can only be private law. And here we find\na disagreement between morals, regarded as the science of right,\nand politics. The criterion, obtained by observing the effect of\npublicity on maxims, is just as easily applied, but only when we\nunderstand that this agreement binds the contracting states solely\nwith the object that peace may be preserved among them, and between\nthem and other states; in no sense with a view to the acquisition of\nnew territory or power. The following instances of antinomy occur\nbetween politics and morals, which are given here with the solution\nin each case.\n\n_a._ \u201cWhen either of these states has promised something to another,\n(as, for instance, assistance, or a relinquishment of certain\nterritory, or subsidies and such like), the question may arise\nwhether, in a case where the safety of the state thus bound depends\non its evading the fulfilment of this promise, it can do so by\nmaintaining a right to be regarded as a double person:\u2014firstly,\nas sovereign and accountable to no one in the state of which that\nsovereign power is head; and, secondly, merely as the highest\nofficial in the service of that state, who is obliged to answer to\nthe state for every action. And the result of this is that the state\nis acquitted in its second capacity of any obligation to which it has\ncommitted itself in the first.\u201d But, if a nation or its sovereign\nproclaimed these maxims, the natural consequence would be that every\nother would flee from it, or unite with other states to oppose such\npretensions. And this is a proof that politics, with all its cunning,\ndefeats its own ends, if the test of making principles of action\npublic, which we have indicated, be applied. Hence the maxim we have\nquoted must be wrong.\n\n_b._ \u201cIf a state which has increased its power to a formidable extent\n(_potentia tremenda_) excites anxiety in its neighbours, is it right\nto assume that, since it has the means, it will also have the will\nto oppress others; and does that give less powerful states a right\nto unite and attack the greater nation without any definite cause of\noffence?\u201d A state which would here answer openly in the affirmative\nwould only bring the evil about more surely and speedily. For the\ngreater power would forestall those smaller nations, and their union\nwould be but a weak reed of defence against a state which knew how\nto apply the maxim, _divide et impera_. This maxim of political\nexpediency then, when openly acknowledged, necessarily defeats the\nend at which it aims, and is therefore wrong.\n\n_c._ \u201cIf a smaller state by its geographical position breaks up\nthe territory of a greater, so as to prevent a unity necessary to\nthe preservation of that state, is the latter not justified in\nsubjugating its less powerful neighbour and uniting the territory in\nquestion with its own?\u201d We can easily see that the greater state dare\nnot publish such a maxim beforehand; for either all smaller states\nwould without loss of time unite against it, or other powers would\ncontend for this booty. Hence the impracticability of such a maxim\nbecomes evident under the light of publicity. And this is a sign\nthat it is wrong, and that in a very great degree; for, although the\nvictim of an act of injustice may be of small account, that does not\nprevent the injustice done from being very great.\n\n3.\u2014=Cosmopolitan Law.= We may pass over this department of right in\nsilence, for, owing to its analogy with international law, its maxims\nare easily specified and estimated.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nIn this principle of the incompatibility of the maxims of\ninternational law with their publicity, we have a good indication\nof the non-agreement between politics and morals, regarded as a\nscience of right. Now we require to know under what conditions these\nmaxims do agree with the law of nations. For we cannot conclude that\nthe converse holds, and that all maxims which can bear publicity\nare therefore just. For anyone who has a decided supremacy has no\nneed to make any secret about his maxims. The condition of a law of\nnations being possible at all is that, in the first place, there\nshould be a law-governed state of things. If this is not so, there\ncan be no public right, and all right which we can think of outside\nthe law-governed state,\u2014that is to say, in the state of nature,\u2014is\nmere private right. Now we have seen above that something of the\nnature of a federation between nations, for the sole purpose of doing\naway with war, is the only rightful condition of things reconcilable\nwith their individual freedom. Hence the agreement of politics and\nmorals is only possible in a federative union, a union which is\nnecessarily given _a priori_, according to the principles of right.\nAnd the lawful basis of all politics can only be the establishment\nof this union in its widest possible extent. Apart from this end,\nall political sophistry is folly and veiled injustice. Now this sham\npolitics has a casuistry, not to be excelled in the best Jesuit\nschool. It has its mental reservation (_reservatio mentalis_): as\nin the drawing up of a public treaty in such terms as we can, if we\nwill, interpret when occasion serves to our advantage; for example,\nthe distinction between the _status quo_ in fact (_de fait_) and\nin right (_de droit_). Secondly, it has its probabilism; when it\npretends to discover evil intentions in another, or makes, the\nprobability of their possible future ascendency a lawful reason for\nbringing about the destruction of other peaceful states. Finally, it\nhas its philosophical sin (_peccatum philosophicum_, _peccatillum_,\n_baggatelle_) which is that of holding it a trifle easily pardoned\nthat a smaller state should be swallowed up, if this be to the gain\nof a nation much more powerful; for such an increase in power is\nsupposed to tend to the greater prosperity of the whole world.[154]\n\n  [154] We can find the voucher for maxims such as these in Herr\n  Hofrichter Garve\u2019s essay, _On the Connection of Morals with\n  Politics_, 1788. This worthy scholar confesses at the very\n  beginning that he is unable to give a satisfactory answer to this\n  question. But his sanction of such maxims, even when coupled with\n  the admission that he cannot altogether clear away the arguments\n  raised against them, seems to be a greater concession in favour\n  of those who shew considerable inclination to abuse them, than it\n  might perhaps be wise to admit.\n\nDuplicity gives politics the advantage of using one branch or\nthe other of morals, just as suits its own ends. The love of our\nfellowmen is a duty: so too is respect for their rights. But the\nformer is only conditional: the latter, on the other hand, an\nunconditional, absolutely imperative duty; and anyone who would\ngive himself up to the sweet consciousness of well-doing must be\nfirst perfectly assured that he has not transgressed its commands.\nPolitics has no difficulty in agreeing with morals in the first sense\nof the term, as ethics, to secure that men should give to superiors\ntheir rights. But when it comes to morals, in its second aspect,\nas the science of right before which politics must bow the knee,\nthe politician finds it prudent to have nothing to do with compacts\nand rather to deny all reality to morals in this sense, and reduce\nall duty to mere benevolence. Philosophy could easily frustrate\nthe artifices of a politics like this, which shuns the light of\ncriticism, by publishing its maxims, if only statesmen would have the\ncourage to grant philosophers the right to ventilate their opinions.\n\nWith this end in view, I propose another principle of public right,\nwhich is at once transcendental and affirmative. Its formula would be\nas follows:\u2014\u201cAll maxims which require publicity, in order that they\nmay not fail to attain their end, are in agreement both with right\nand politics.\u201d\n\nFor, if these maxims can only attain the end at which they aim by\nbeing published, they must be in harmony with the universal end of\nmankind, which is happiness; and to be in sympathy with this (to\nmake the people contented with their lot) is the real business of\npolitics. Now, if this end should be attainable only by publicity, or\nin other words, through the removal of all distrust of the maxims of\npolitics, these must be in harmony with the right of the people; for\na union of the ends of all is only possible in a harmony with this\nright.\n\nI must postpone the further development and discussion of this\nprinciple till another opportunity. That it is a transcendental\nformula is quite evident from the fact that all the empirical\nconditions of a doctrine of happiness, or the _matter_ of law, are\nabsent, and that it has regard only to the _form_ of universal\nconformity to law.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nIf it is our duty to realise a state of public right, if at the same\ntime there are good grounds for hope that this ideal may be realised,\nalthough only by an approximation advancing _ad infinitum_, then\nperpetual peace, following hitherto falsely so-called conclusions of\npeace, which have been in reality mere cessations of hostilities, is\nno mere empty idea. But rather we have here a problem which gradually\nworks out its own solution and, as the periods in which a given\nadvance takes place towards the realisation of the ideal of perpetual\npeace will, we hope, become with the passing of time shorter and\nshorter, we must approach ever nearer to this goal.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n  A\n\n  Absolutism; of Hobbes, 43, 44;\n    of Schopenhauer, 43;\n    according to Kant, 43, 44, 125-128;\n    to Locke, 44.\n\n  Alexander I. of Russia; 80.\n\n  Alexander the Great; 31, 103.\n\n  Alsace-Lorraine; annexation of, 90, 92, 95.\n\n  Ambrose, Saint; 15.\n\n  Amphictyonic League; 16, 22.\n\n  Aquinas, Thomas; on fighting clergy, 18;\n    on war, 18, 19.\n\n  Arbitration; as a substitute for war, 79, 81, 87;\n    difficulties settled by, 80;\n    where it is useless, 82, 83, 86.\n\n  Aristotle; on war, 7, 8;\n    and rights of an enemy, _ib._; 31;\n    on the relation between politics and ethics, 162.\n\n  Assyrians; war among the, 9.\n\n  Augustine, Saint; 16.\n\n\n  B\n\n  Balance of power; 26, 95.\n\n  Bentham, Jeremy; 26, 79, 92.\n\n  Bluntschli, J. K.; 41, 73, 74, 80.\n\n\n  C\n\n  Caird, Edward; 3, 51.\n\n  Calvin, John; 19.\n\n  Carnegie, Andrew; 100.\n\n  China; a danger to Europe, 92, 93, 140, 141.\n\n  Cicero; on the conduct of war, 22, 41.\n\n  Clement of Alexandria; 15.\n\n  Clergy, fighting; Origen on, 14, 15;\n    Wycliffe, 18;\n    Erasmus, _ib._;\n    Aquinas, _ib._\n\n  Cobden, Richard; 64.\n\n  Corvinus, Matthias; 109.\n\n  Cowper, William; 5, 38, 123.\n\n  Crusades, wars of the; 16, 103.\n\n\n  D\n\n  Dante, Alighieri; on mediation, 46;\n    on universal monarchy, 68, 69.\n\n  Disarmament; 88-93;\n    Czar\u2019s proposal of, 90;\n    practicability of, 90-93.\n\n  Dubois, Cardinal; 36.\n\n\n  E\n\n  Empire; of Rome, 9, 20, 68;\n    world-, spiritual, 23, 32, 69;\n    of Alexander the Great, 31, 68;\n    Frankish, 69;\n    Holy Roman 69;\n    of Napoleon I., 69.\n\n  Erasmus, Desiderius; and European peace, 17;\n    on war, 18, 19;\n    on fighting clergy, 18, 32.\n\n\n  F\n\n  Farrar, J. A.; 18.\n\n  Federation; Kant\u2019s idea of, 60, 68, 69, 128-137; 88, 92, 93, 95, 97;\n    probable results of, 98, 99, 100, 134.\n\n  Fichte, J. G.; 69, 99.\n\n  Finland; 92, 95.\n\n  Fischer, Kuno; 62, 67.\n\n  Fleury, Cardinal; 55.\n\n  Frederick the Great; 66, 126.\n\n\n  G\n\n  Gentilis, Albericus; 21, 32.\n\n  Golden Age; 3, 41.\n\n  Government; origin of, according to Plato, 5;\n    according to Hume, 5, 52;\n    to Cowper, 5, 6;\n    to Hobbes, 40-42, 118, 119;\n    to Kant, 51-54, 152-154;\n    to Rousseau, 52;\n    to Locke, 53;\n    representative, 65-68, 120, 121, 124-128.\n\n  Greeks; their attitude to other nations, 7;\n    to an enemy, _ib._;\n    their Sacred Wars, 16;\n    the Amphictyonic League, 16.\n\n  Grotius, Hugo; his _De Jure Belli et Pacis_, 24-27;\n    and the _Jus Gentium_, 24, 25;\n    and the Law of Nature, 25;\n    on peace, 27, 32, 40, 131.\n\n\n  H\n\n  Hague Conference (1899); 86, 90.\n\n  Hegel, G. W. F.; 57;\n    on war, 71, 72, 75.\n\n  Henry IV. of France; 30, 32, 33, 36.\n\n  Hobbes, Thomas; his theory of the state of nature and origin of\n      government, 4, 40-42, 51, 118, 119, 133; 6, 26, 27, 28, 37;\n    his influence on Kant, 40, 46;\n    his views on revolution, 41, 188;\n    of the relations between states, 43-46, 128, 131;\n    on the conduct of war, 45, 89, 120, 124, 159.\n\n  Holls, Fred. W.; 86.\n\n  Hooker, Richard; 52;\n    on the depravity of man, 173.\n\n  Hume, David; on the origin of government, 5, 52;\n    on the state of nature, 40, 41;\n    on the original contract, 52, 108, 109, 162.\n\n\n  I\n\n  International Law; the development of, 20-24;\n    its connection with the Reformation, 21, 24;\n    in Greece and Rome, 22, 23.\n\n  Intervention; 64, 93, 94, 112, 113.\n\n\n  J\n\n  Jews; war among the, 9-11;\n    their dream of peace, 32.\n\n  Justin; 15.\n\n\n  K\n\n  Kant, Immanuel; 26, 37;\n    his indebtedness to earlier political writers, 40, 46;\n    his theory of human development, 47-49;\n      and how this is possible, 49-51, 54;\n    on the foundation of the state, 51-54, 152-154;\n    the relations between states and individuals, 54, 55, 117-120,\n      128, 173, 174;\n    the necessity for reform within the state, 55, 56, 168;\n    the political and social conditions of his time, 57-59;\n    his attitude to war, 58, 133, 135, 136, 137, 149-151;\n    on the growing power of commerce, 59, 65, 142, 157;\n    his idea of federation, 60, 68, 69, 128-137, 192;\n      and ideal of perpetual peace, 61, 129, 196;\n    the conditions of its realization, 62-69;\n    on representative and other constitutions, 65-68, 120-128, 152,\n      153, 167;\n    his opinion of the English constitution, 66;\n    his disapproval of universal monarchy, 68, 69, 155, 156; 79, 83,\n      89, 100, 105;\n    on the right of way, 137-142;\n    on nature\u2019s guarantee of a perpetual peace, 143-157;\n    on the relation between politics and morals, 161-196;\n    on revolution, 167, 168, 186-188.\n\n\n  L\n\n  Laveleye, \u00c9mile de; 81.\n\n  Lawrence, T. J.; 9, 78, 81.\n\n  Leibniz, Gottfried W.; 36;\n    his criticism of St. Pierre, 37, 38, 58, 106.\n\n  Locke, John; and the golden age, 3, 4;\n    on the original contract, 53;\n    on revolution, 53, 188; 67, 133.\n\n  Lorimer, James; 34, 80.\n\n  Louis Philippe; 76.\n\n  Luther, Martin; on war, 19.\n\n\n  M\n\n  Machiavelli, Nicolo; 162.\n\n  Maine, Henry; on Grotius and the _Jus Gentium_, 24, 25.\n\n  Maistre, Joseph de; 71.\n\n  Martineau, James; 102.\n\n  Mennonites; and war, 14.\n\n  Military service; of Christians, 14, 16, 18, 19;\n    compulsory, 89;\n    voluntary, 111.\n\n  Mill, John Stuart; 80.\n\n  Moltke, Graf von; 71, 73-75.\n\n  Monarchy, universal; the ideal of Dante, 68, 69;\n    disapproved by Kant, 68, 69, 155, 156;\n    and Fichte, 69.\n\n  Montesquieu, Baron de; on self-preservation, 83;\n    on armed peace, 88, 159.\n\n  More, Thomas; 32.\n\n  Morley, John; 3.\n\n\n  N\n\n  Napoleon Bonaparte; Empire of, 69, 71, 72, 76, 77.\n\n  Napoleon, Louis; 80.\n\n  National Debt; 63, 64, 111, 112.\n\n\n  O\n\n  Origen; on military service, 14, 15.\n\n  Original Contract; 40;\n    as understood by Rousseau, 52;\n    by Hobbes, 52, 53;\n    by Hooker, 52;\n    by Hume, _ib._;\n    by Kant, _ib._;\n    by Locke, 53.\n\n\n  P\n\n  Paris Congress (1856); 86.\n\n  Paulsen, Friedrich; 43, 52, 53, 66, 78.\n\n  Peace, perpetual; the dream of, 29-33;\n    projects of, by Penn, 30;\n    by Henry IV., 30, 33, 34;\n    by St. Pierre, 30, 32, 34-37;\n    Rousseau\u2019s attitude to, 38-40, 106;\n    for Kant an ideal, 61, 129;\n    the articles of, 62-69, 107-142, 158-160;\n    the guarantee of, 143-157.\n\n  Peace Societies; 70, 75, 78, 79, 80, 86, 87;\n    and disarmament, 88, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102.\n\n  Penn, William; 30.\n\n  Plato; on the origin of the state, 5;\n    on war, 8, 41;\n    on the relation between ethics and politics, 162.\n\n  Poland; 92, 93, 95.\n\n  Politics; and morals, according to Kant, 161-196;\n    to Plato, 162;\n    to Aristotle, _ib._;\n    to Hume, _ib._;\n    sophistical maxims of, 170-172.\n\n  Pope, Alexander; 4, 127.\n\n  Puffendorf, Samuel; 27;\n    on intervention, 64, 131.\n\n\n  Q\n\n  Quakers; and war, 14.\n\n\n  R\n\n  Reformation; and military service, 18;\n    and international law, 21, 24.\n\n  Religion; Roman, and war, 9;\n    Jewish, 9-11;\n    Mohammedan, 10;\n    Buddhist, and conversion, 12;\n    Christian, and war, 12-20.\n\n  Revolution, right of; according to Hobbes, 41, 53;\n    and Spinoza, 41;\n    according to Locke, 53;\n    to Rousseau, _ib._;\n    to Kant, 167, 186-188.\n\n  Right of way; Vattel on, 65, 138;\n    Kant on, 65, 137-142.\n\n  Ritchie, D. G.; on Rousseau, 3;\n    on Locke and the golden age, _ib._, 52, 85, 98.\n\n  Robertson, William; 6, 17, 18, 19.\n\n  Romans; and war, 7, 8, 9, 22, 23;\n    and international law, 22, 23.\n\n  Rousseau, J. J.; and the state of nature, 2, 3, 52; 26, 28;\n    his criticism of St. Pierre, 38-40;\n    his views on militarism, 39;\n    on the original contract, 52;\n    on revolution, 53, 188; 61, 67, 100, 132, 134;\n    on democratic and republican governments, 153;\n    on the depravity of man, 173.\n\n  Russia; Alexander I. of, 80;\n    the Czar of, 90;\n    the backward civilization of, 92, 93, 94, 95.\n\n\n  S\n\n  Schiller, Friedrich von; on war and peace, 71, 72, 73, 75.\n\n  Schopenhauer, Arthur; 43.\n\n  Spencer, Herbert; 76.\n\n  Spinoza, Benedict; on the state of nature, 41;\n    and revolution, _ib._\n\n  Standing armies; 63, 64, 89, 110.\n\n  State of nature; according to Rousseau, 2, 3;\n    and the golden age, 3;\n    Hobbes\u2019 theory of, 4, 40, 41, 118;\n    according to Hume a philosophical fiction, 41;\n    according to Kant, 117-120.\n\n  States; transference of, 63, 108, 109;\n    marriage between, 109.\n\n  St. Pierre, Castel de; 30, 32, 33;\n    his _Projet_, 34-37;\n    and Leibniz, 37, 38;\n    and Rousseau, 38-40; 61, 67, 79, 92, 106.\n\n  Sully, Duke of; 30, 32, 33.\n\n\n  T\n\n  Tennyson, Lord; 73, 74.\n\n  Tertullian; 14, 15.\n\n  Treaties of peace; in Greece, 7, 63, 64, 107, 108.\n\n  Treitschke, H. von; 75.\n\n  Trendelenburg, F. A.; 75.\n\n\n  V\n\n  Vattel, Emerich; his _Droit des Gens_, 28, 29;\n    on intervention, 64, 113, 114;\n    on the right of way, 65;\n    of self-preservation, 83, 89, 103;\n    on treaties, 108; 131.\n\n  Voltaire, Fran\u00e7ois de; 33, 37, 38.\n\n\n  W\n\n  War; religious, 16;\n    private, 17, 20, 29;\n    dynastic, 38, 57, 123;\n    Kant\u2019s attitude to, 58, 133, 135, 136, 137, 149-151;\n    its influence on progress, 70, 96, 103;\n    views of Hegel on, 71, 72, 75;\n    of Schiller, 71, 72, 73, 75;\n    of Moltke, 71, 73, 74, 75;\n    under altered conditions, 76, 77, 78;\n    when just, 84, 85;\n    future probable causes of, 94, 95;\n    honorable conduct of, 114, 115.\n\n  Wycliffe, John; and fighting clergy, 18.\n\n\n  Z\n\n  Zwingli, Huldreich, 19.\n\n\n\n\n  _Printed in Great Britain by_\n  UNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED\n  WOKING AND LONDON","title":"Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":54126}