{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_50966/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_50966","id":"gutenberg_50966","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50966","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Sufficient reason","Will"],"text":"TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE:\n\nItalics have been transcribed using _underscores_, bold with =equal\nsigns=, spaced text with +plus signs+, small capitals as ALL CAPITALS,\nand text in superscript is preceded by a ^carat. Inconsistencies in\nhyphenation, punctuation, spelling and abbreviations have not been\ncorrected. A list of other corrections can be found at the end of the\ndocument.\n\n\n\n\n  _BOHN'S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY._\n\n  TWO ESSAYS\n\n  BY\n\n  ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.\n\n\n  LONDON: GEORGE BELL AND SONS\n  PORTUGAL ST. LINCOLN'S INN, W.C.\n  CAMBRIDGE: DEIGHTON, BELL & CO.\n  NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN CO.\n  BOMBAY: A. H. WHEELER & CO.\n\n\n  ON\n\n  THE FOURFOLD ROOT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON\n\n  AND\n\n  ON THE WILL IN NATURE.\n\n\n  TWO ESSAYS BY\n\n  ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.\n\n\n  TRANSLATED BY MME. KARL HILLEBRAND.\n\n  _REVISED EDITION._\n\n\n  LONDON\n  GEORGE BELL AND SONS\n  1907\n\n\n  CHISWICK PRESS: CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO.\n  TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.\n\n\n\n\nTRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.\n\n\nIn venturing to lay the present translation[1] before the public, I\nam aware of the great difficulties of my task, and indeed can hardly\nhope to do justice to the Author. In fact, had it not been for the\nconsiderations I am about to state, I might probably never have\npublished what had originally been undertaken in order to acquire a\nclearer comprehension of these essays, rather than with a view to\npublicity.\n\n  [1] From the fourth edition by Julius Frauenst\u00e4dt. \"Fourfold Root,\"\n  Leipzig, 1875; \"Will in Nature,\" Leipzig, 1878.\n\nThe two treatises which form the contents of the present volume have so\nmuch importance for a profound and correct knowledge of Schopenhauer's\nphilosophy, that it may even be doubted whether the translation of\nhis chief work, \"Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,\" can contribute\nmuch towards the appreciation of his system without the help at\nleast of the \"Vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde.\"\nSchopenhauer himself repeatedly and urgently insists upon a previous\nthorough knowledge of Kant's philosophy, as the basis, and of his\nown \"Fourfold Root,\" as the key, to his own system, asserting that\nknowledge to be the indispensable condition for a right comprehension\nof his meaning. So far as I am aware, neither the \"Fourfold Root\"\nnor the \"Will in Nature\" have as yet found a translator; therefore,\nconsidering the dawning interest which has begun to make itself felt\nfor Schopenhauer's philosophy in England and in America, and the fact\nthat no more competent scholar has come forward to do the work, it may\nnot seem presumptuous to suppose that this version may be acceptable\nto those who wish to acquire a more than superficial knowledge of this\nremarkable thinker, yet whose acquaintance with German does not permit\nthem to read his works in the original.\n\nNow although some portions of both the Essays published in the present\nvolume have of course become antiquated, owing to the subsequent\ndevelopment of the empirical sciences, while others--such as, for\ninstance, Schopenhauer's denunciation of plagiarism in the cases of\nBrandis and Rosas in the beginning of Physiology and Pathology[2]--can\nhave no interest for the reader of the present day, I have nevertheless\ngiven them just as he left them and refrained from all suppression or\nalteration. And if, on the whole, the \"Will in Nature\" may be less\nindispensable for a right understanding of our philosopher's views\nthan the \"Fourfold Root,\" being merely a record of the confirmations\nwhich had been contributed during his lifetime by the various branches\nof Natural Science to his doctrine, that _the thing in itself is the\nwill_, the Second Essay has nevertheless in its own way quite as much\nimportance as the First, and is, in a sense, its complement. For they\nboth throw light on Schopenhauer's view of the Universe in its double\naspect as Will and as Representation, each being as it were _a r\u00e9sum\u00e9_\nof the exposition of one of those aspects. My plea for uniting them in\none volume, in spite of the difference of their contents and the wide\nlapse of time (seventeen years) which lies between them, must be, that\nthey complete each other, and that their great weight and intrinsic\nvalue seem to point them out as peculiarly fitted to be introduced to\nthe English thinker.\n\n  [2] See \"Will in Nature,\" pp. 9-18 of the original; pp. 224-234 of\n  the present translation.\n\nIn endeavouring to convey the Author's thoughts as he expresses\nthem, I have necessarily encountered many and great difficulties. His\nmeaning, though always clearly expressed, is not always easy to seize,\neven for his countrymen; as a foreigner, therefore, I may often have\nfailed to grasp, let alone adequately to render, that meaning. In this\ncase besides, the responsibility for any want of perspicuity cannot\nbe shifted by the translator on to the Author; since the consummate\nperfection of Schopenhauer's prose is universally recognised, even by\nthose who reject, or at least who do not share, his views. An eminent\nGerman writer of our time has not hesitated to rank him immediately\nafter Lessing and G\u00f6the as the third greatest German prose-writer, and\nonly quite recently a German professor, in a speech delivered with\nthe intent of demolishing Schopenhauer's philosophy, was reluctantly\nobliged to admit that his works would remain on account of their\nliterary value. G\u00f6the himself expressed admiration for the clearness of\nexposition in Schopenhauer's chief work and for the beauty of his style.\n\nThe chief obstacle I have encountered in translating these Essays, did\nnot therefore consist in the obscurity of the Author's style, nor even\nin the difficulty of finding appropriate terms wherewith to convey his\nmeaning; although at times certainly the want of complete precision in\nour philosophical terminology made itself keenly felt and the selection\nwas often far from easy: it lay rather in the great difference in the\nway of thinking and of expressing their thoughts which lies between\nthe two nations. The regions of German and English thought are indeed\nseparated by a gulf, which at first seems impassable, yet which must\nbe bridged over by some means or other, if a right comprehension is to\nbe achieved. The German writer loves to develop synthetically a single\nthought in a long period consisting of various members; he proceeds\nsteadily to unravel the seemingly tangled skein, while he keeps the\nreader ever on the alert, making him assist actively in the process\nand never letting him lose sight of the main thread. The English\nauthor, on the contrary, anxious before all things to avoid confusion\nand misunderstanding, and ready for this end not only to sacrifice\nharmony of proportion in construction, but to submit to the necessity\nof occasional artificial joining, usually adopts the analytical\nmethod. He prefers to divide the thread of his discourse into several\nsmaller skeins, easier certainly to handle and thus better suiting the\nconvenience of the English thinker, to whom long periods are trying and\nbewildering, and who is not always willing to wait half a page or more\nfor the point of a sentence or the gist of a thought. Wherever it could\nbe done without interfering seriously with the spirit of the original,\nI have broken up the longer periods in these essays into smaller\nsentences, in order to facilitate their comprehension. At times however\nSchopenhauer recapitulates a whole side of his view of the Universe\nin a single period of what seems intolerable length to the English\nreader: as, for instance, the _r\u00e9sum\u00e9_ contained in the Introduction\nto his \"Will in Nature,\"[3] which could not be divided without damage\nto his meaning. Here therefore it did not seem advisable to sacrifice\nthe unity and harmony of his design and to disturb both his form and\nhis meaning, in order to minister to the reader's dislike for mental\nexertion; in keeping the period intact I have however endeavoured to\nmake it as easy to comprehend as possible by the way in which the\nsingle parts are presented to the eye.\n\n  [3] Pp. 2 and 3 of the original, and pp. 216 to 218 of the present\n  translation.\n\nAs regards the terms chosen to convey the German meaning, I can hardly\nhope to have succeeded in every case in adequately rendering it, still\nless can I expect to have satisfied my English readers. Several words\nof frequent occurrence and of considerable importance for the right\nunderstanding of the original, have been used at different times by\ndifferent English philosophers in senses so various, that, until our\nphilosophical terminology has by universal consent attained far greater\nprecision than at present, it must always be difficult for the writer\nor translator to convey to the reader's mind precisely the same thought\nthat was in his own. To prevent unnecessary confusion however, by\nleaving too much to chance, I will here briefly state those terms which\ngive most latitude for misapprehension, explaining the sense in which\nI employ them and also the special meaning attached to some of them by\nSchopenhauer, who often differs in this from other writers. They are as\nfollows.\n\n(_a._) _Anschauung_ (_anschauen_, literally 'to behold') I have\nrendered differently, according to its double meaning in German. When\nused to designate the mental act by which an object is perceived, as\nthe cause of a sensation received, it is rendered by _perception_.\nWhen used to lay stress upon _immediate_, as opposed to _abstract_\nrepresentation, it is rendered by _intuition_. This last occurs however\nmore often in the adjective form.\n\n(_b._) _Vorstellung_ (_vorstellen_, literally 'to place before') I\nrender by _representation_ in spite of its foreign, unwelcome sound to\nthe English ear, as being the term which nearest approaches the German\nmeaning. The faculty of representation is defined by Schopenhauer\nhimself as \"an exceedingly complicated physiological process in the\nbrain of an animal, the result of which is the consciousness of a\n_picture_ there.\"\n\n(_c._) _Auffassung_ (_auffassen_, literally 'to catch up') has so\nmany shades of meaning in German that it has to be translated in many\ndifferent ways according to the relation in which it stands in the\ncontext. It signifies _apprehension_, _comprehension_, _perception_,\n_viewing_ and _grasping_.\n\n(_d._) _Wahrnehmung_ (_wahrnehmen_, from _wahr_, true, and _nehmen_, to\ntake), is translated by _apprehension_ or _perception_, according to\nthe degree of consciousness which accompanies it.\n\nBut the two words which have proved most difficult to translate, have\nbeen _Vernehmen_ and _Willk\u00fchr_.\n\n(_e._) _Vernehmen_ means, to distinguish by the sense of hearing. This\nword conveys a shade of thought which it is almost impossible to render\nin English, because we have no word by which to distinguish, from mere\nsensuous hearing, a sort of hearing which implies more than hearing and\nless than comprehension. The French _entendre_ comes nearer to it than\nour _hearing_, but implies more comprehension than _vernehmen_.\n\n(_f._) As to _Willk\u00fchr_ (_arbitrium_, literally '_will-choice_'), after\na great deal of consideration I have chosen (_relative_) _free-will_ as\nthe nearest approach to the German sense, or at any rate, to that in\nwhich Schopenhauer uses it. _Willk\u00fchr_ means in fact what is commonly\nunderstood as free-will; _i.e._ will with power of choice, will\ndetermined by motives and unimpeded by outward obstacles: _arbitrium_\nas opposed to _voluntas_: conscious will as opposed to blind impulse.\nThis relative free-will however is quite distinct from _absolute\nfree-will_ (_liberum arbitrium indifferenti\u00e6_) in a metaphysical sense,\n_i.e._ will in its self-dependency. When its arbitrary character is\nspecially emphasized, we call _Willk\u00fchr_, _caprice_, but this is not\nthe usual meaning given to it by Schopenhauer.\n\nBesides the meaning of these German words, I have still to define\nthe sense in which I have used the term _idea_ in this translation;\nfor this word has greatly changed its meaning at different times and\nwith different authors, and is even now apt to confuse and mislead.\nSchopenhauer has himself contributed in one way to render its\nsignification less clear; since, in spite of his declaration in the\n\"Fourfold Root\"[4] to the effect, that he never uses the word _idea_\nin any other than its original (Platonic) sense, he has himself\nemployed it to translate _Vorstellung_, in a specimen he gives of a\nrendering of a passage in Kant's \"Prolegomena\" in a letter addressed\nto Haywood, published in Gwinner's \"Biography of Schopenhauer.\" This\nhe probably did because some eminent English and French philosophers\nhad taken the word in this sense, thinking perhaps that Kant's meaning\nwould thus be more readily understood. As however he uses the word\n'_idea_' everywhere else exclusively in its original (Platonic) sense,\nI have preferred to avoid needless confusion by adhering to his own\ndeclaration and definition. Besides, many English writers of note have\nprotested against any other sense being given to it, and modern German\nphilosophers have more and more returned to the original meaning of the\nterm.\n\n  [4] See p. 113, \u00a7 34 of the original, and p. 133 of the present\n  translation.\n\nSome readers may take exception at such expressions as _\u00e0 priority_,\n_motivation_, _aseity_; for they are not, strictly speaking, English\nwords. These terms however belong to Schopenhauer's own characteristic\nterminology, and have a distinct and clearly defined meaning; therefore\nthey had to be retained in all cases in which they could not be evaded,\nin order not to interfere with the Author's intention: a necessity\nwhich the scholar will not fail to recognise, especially when I plead\nin my defence that fidelity and accuracy have been my sole aim in this\nwork.\n\nIf moreover Carlyle's words, \"He who imports into his own country\nany true delineation, any rationally spoken word on any subject, has\ndone well,\" are true, I may also be absolved from censure, if I lay\nbefore the public this version of some important utterances of a great\nthinker, in the hope that it may be an assistance in, and an incitement\nto, a deeper study of all Schopenhauer's works.\n\n                    THE TRANSLATOR.\n\n_May, 1888._\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n  ON THE FOURFOLD ROOT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.\n\n  CHAP.                                                             PAGE\n\n        Translator's Preface                                           v\n\n        Author's Preface to the Second Edition                      xvii\n\n        Editor's Preface to the Third Edition                         xx\n\n        Editor's Preface to the Fourth Edition                    xxviii\n\n     I. Introduction                                                   1\n\n    II. General Survey of the most important views hitherto held\n          concerning the Principle of Sufficient Reason                6\n\n   III. Insufficiency of the Old and outlines of a New\n          Demonstration                                               28\n\n    IV. On the First Class of Objects for the Subject, and that\n          form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which\n          predominates in it                                          31\n\n     V. On the Second Class of Objects for the Subject and that\n          form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which\n          predominates in it                                         114\n\n    VI. On the Third Class of Objects for the Subject and that\n          form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which\n          predominates in it                                         153\n\n   VII. On the Fourth Class of Objects for the Subject, and that\n          form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which\n          predominates in it                                         165\n\n  VIII. General observations and results                             177\n\n\n  ON THE WILL IN NATURE.\n\n  Preface to the Second Edition                                      193\n\n  Editor's Preface to the Third Edition                              213\n\n  Editor's Preface to the Fourth Edition                             214\n\n  Introduction                                                       215\n\n  Physiology and Pathology                                           224\n\n  Comparative Anatomy                                                252\n\n  Physiology of Plants                                               281\n\n  Physical Astronomy                                                 305\n\n  Linguistic                                                         322\n\n  Animal Magnetism and Magic                                         326\n\n  Sinology                                                           359\n\n  Reference to Ethics                                                372\n\n  Conclusion                                                         378\n\n\n\n\nON THE FOURFOLD ROOT\n\nOF THE\n\nPRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.\n\nA PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISE.\n\n\n  \u039d\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f01\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u1fb3 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fb7 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 +\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03cd\u03bd+,\n  \u03a0\u03b1\u03b3\u1f70\u03bd \u1f00\u03b5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 +\u1fe5\u03b9\u03b6\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4'+ \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd.\n\n\n\n\nTHE AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.\n\n\nThis treatise on Elementary Philosophy, which first appeared in the\nyear 1813, when it procured for me the degree of doctor, afterwards\nbecame the substructure for the whole of my system. It cannot,\ntherefore, be allowed to remain out of print, as has been the case,\nwithout my knowledge, for the last four years.\n\nOn the other hand, to send a juvenile work like this once more into the\nworld with all its faults and blemishes, seemed to me unjustifiable.\nFor I am aware that the time cannot be very far off when all correction\nwill be impossible; but with that time the period of my real influence\nwill commence, and this period, I trust, will be a long one, for I\nfirmly rely upon Seneca's promise: \"_Etiamsi omnibus tecum viventibus\nsilentium livor indixerit; venient qui sine offensa, sine gratia\njudicent._\"[5] I have done what I could, therefore, to improve this\nwork of my youth, and, considering the brevity and uncertainty of life,\nI must even regard it as an especially fortunate circumstance, to have\nbeen thus permitted to correct in my sixtieth year what I had written\nin my twenty-sixth.\n\n  [5] Seneca, Ep. 79.\n\nNevertheless, while doing this, I meant to deal leniently with my\nyounger self, and to let him discourse, nay, even speak his mind\nfreely, wherever it was possible. But wherever he had advanced what\nwas incorrect or superfluous, or had even left out the best part,\nI have been obliged to interrupt the thread of his discourse. And\nthis has happened often enough; so often, indeed, that some of my\nreaders may perhaps think they hear an old man reading a young man's\nbook aloud, while he frequently lets it drop, in order to indulge in\ndigressions of his own on the same subject.\n\nIt is easy to see that a work thus corrected after so long an interval,\ncould never acquire the unity and rounded completeness which only\nbelong to such as are written in one breath. So great a difference\nwill be found even in style and expression, that no reader of any\ntact can ever be in doubt whether it be the older or younger man who\nis speaking. For the contrast is indeed striking between the mild,\nunassuming tone in which the youth--who is still simple enough to\nbelieve quite seriously that for all whose pursuit is philosophy,\ntruth, and truth alone, can have importance, and therefore that whoever\npromotes truth is sure of a welcome from them--propounds his arguments\nwith confidence, and the firm, but also at times somewhat harsh voice\nof the old man, who in course of time has necessarily discovered\nthe true character and real aims of the noble company of mercenary\ntime-servers into which he has fallen. Nay, the just reader will\nhardly find fault with him should he occasionally give free vent to\nhis indignation; since we see what comes of it when people who profess\nto have truth for their sole aim, are always occupied in studying the\npurposes of their powerful superiors, and when the _e quovis ligno fit\nMercurius_ is extended even to the greatest philosophers, and a clumsy\n_charlatan_, like Hegel, is calmly classed among them? Verily German\nPhilosophy stands before us loaded with contempt, the laughing-stock of\nother nations, expelled from all honest science--like the prostitute\nwho sells herself for sordid hire to-day to one, to-morrow to another;\nand the brains of the present generation of _savants_ are disorganised\nby Hegelian nonsense: incapable of reflection, coarse and bewildered,\nthey fall a prey to the low Materialism which has crept out of the\nbasilisk's egg. Good speed to them. I return to my subject.\n\nMy readers will thus have to get over the difference of tone in this\ntreatise; for I could not do here what I had done in my chief work,\nthat is, give the later additions I had made in a separate appendix.\nBesides, it is of no consequence that people should know what I wrote\nin my twenty-sixth and what in my sixtieth year; the only matter of\nreal importance is, that those who wish to find their way through the\nfundamental principles of all philosophizing, to gain a firm footing\nand a clear insight, should in these few sheets receive a little volume\nby which they may learn something substantial, solid, and true: and\nthis, I hope, will be the case. From the expansion now given to some\nportions, it has even grown into a compendious theory of the entire\nfaculty of knowing, and this theory, by limiting itself strictly to\nthe research of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, shows the matter\nfrom a new and peculiar side; but then it finds its completion in the\nFirst Book of \"The World as Will and Representation,\" together with\nthose chapters of the Second Volume which refer to it, and also in my\nCritique of Kantian Philosophy.\n\n                    ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.\n\n  FRANKFURT AM MAIN,\n          _September, 1847._\n\n\n\n\nEDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.\n\n\nIn the present volume I lay before the public the Third Edition of\nthe \"Fourfold Root,\" including the emendations and additions left\nby Schopenhauer in his own interleaved copy. I have already had\noccasion elsewhere to relate that he left copies of all his works thus\ninterleaved, and that he was wont to jot down on these fly-leaves any\ncorrections and additions he might intend inserting in future editions.\n\nSchopenhauer himself prepared for the press all that has been added in\nthe present edition, for he has indicated, by signs in the original\ncontext corresponding to other similar signs in the MS. passages, the\nplaces where he wished his additions to be inserted. All that was left\nfor me to do, was to give in extended form a few citations he had\npurposed adding.\n\nNo essential corrections and additions, such as might modify the\nfundamental thoughts of the work, will be found in this new edition,\nwhich simply contains corrections, amplifications, and corroborations,\nmany of them interesting and important. Let me take only a single\ninstance: \u00a7 21, on the \"Intellectual Nature of Empirical Perception.\"\nAs Schopenhauer attached great importance to his proof of the\n_intellectual nature_ of perception, nay, believed he had made a new\ndiscovery by it, he also worked out with special predilection all that\ntended to support, confirm, and strengthen it. Thus we find him in\nthis \u00a7 21 quoting an interesting fact he had himself observed in 1815;\nthen the instances of Caspar Hauser and others (taken from Franz's\nbook, \"The Eye,\" &c. &c.); and again the case of Joseph Kleinhaus,\nthe blind sculptor; and finally, the physiological confirmations he\nhas found in Flourens' \"De la vie et de l'intelligence des Animaux.\"\nAn observation, too, concerning the value of Arithmetic for the\ncomprehension of physical processes, which is inserted into this same\nparagraph, will be found very remarkable, and may be particularly\nrecommended to those who are inclined to set too high a value on\ncalculation.\n\nMany interesting and important additions will be found in the other\nparagraphs also.\n\nOne thing I could have wished to see left out of this Third Edition:\nhis effusions against the \"professors of philosophy.\" In a conversation\nwith Schopenhauer in the year 1847, when he told me how he intended\nto \"chastise the professors of philosophy,\"[6] I expressed my dissent\non this point; for even in the Second Edition these passages had\ninterrupted the measured progress of objective inquiry. At that time,\nhowever, he was not to be persuaded to strike them out; so they were\nleft to be again included in this Third Edition, where the reader will\naccordingly once more find them, although times have changed since then.\n\n  [6] See \"Arthur Schopenhauer. Von ihm; \u00fcber ihn. Ein Wort der\n  Vertheidigung,\" von Ernst Otto Lindner, and \"Memorabilien, Briefe\n  und Nachlassst\u00fccke,\" von Julius Frauenst\u00e4dt (Berlin, 1863), pp.\n  163-165.\n\nUpon another point, more nearly touching the real issue, I had a\ncontroversy with Schopenhauer in the year 1852. In arguing against\nFichte's derivation of the _Non-Ego_ from the _Ego_ in his chief\nwork,[7] he had said:--\n\n  [7] Schopenhauer, \"Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,\" second\n  edition, i., 37 (third edition, i., 39).\n\n\"Just as if Kant had never existed, the Principle of Sufficient Reason\nstill remains with Fichte what it was with all the Schoolmen, an\n_\u0153terna veritas_: that is to say, just as the Gods of the ancients\nwere still ruled over by eternal Destiny, so was the God of the\nSchoolmen still ruled over by these _\u0153terna veritates_, _i.e._, by\nthe metaphysical, mathematical, and metalogical truths, and even,\naccording to some, by the validity of the moral law. These _veritates_\nalone were unconditioned by anything, and God, as well as the world,\nexisted through their necessity. Thus with Fichte the _Ego_, according\nto the Principle of Sufficient Reason, is the reason of the world or\nof the _Non-Ego_, of the Object, which is the product or result of\nthe _Ego_ itself. He took good care, therefore, neither to examine\nnor to check the Principle of Sufficient Reason any farther. But if I\nhad to indicate the particular form of this principle by which Fichte\nwas guided in making the _Ego_ spin the _Non-Ego_ out of itself, as\nthe spider its web, I should point to the Principle of the Sufficient\nReason of Being in Space; for nothing but a reference to this principle\ngives any sort of sense or meaning to his laboured deductions of the\nway in which the _Ego_ produces and manufactures the _Non-Ego_ out\nof itself, which form the contents of the most senseless and--simply\non this account--most tiresome book ever written. The only interest\nthis Fichteian philosophy has for us at all--otherwise it would not\nbe worth mentioning--lies in its being the tardy appearance of the\nreal antithesis to ancient Materialism, which was the most consistent\nstarting from the Object, just as Fichte's philosophy was the most\nconsistent starting from the Subject. As Materialism overlooked the\nfact, that with the simplest Object it forthwith posited the Subject\nalso; so Fichte not only overlooked the fact, that with the Subject\n(whatever name he might choose to give it) he had already posited\nthe Object also, because no Subject can be thought without it; he\nlikewise overlooked the fact, that all derivation _\u00e0 priori_, nay,\nall demonstration whatsoever, rests upon a necessity, and that all\nnecessity itself rests entirely and exclusively on the Principle of\nSufficient Reason, because to be necessary, and to result from a given\nreason, are convertible terms; that the Principle of Sufficient Reason\nis still nothing but the common form of the Object as such: therefore\nthat it always presupposes the Object and does not, as valid before and\nindependently of it, first introduce it, and cannot make the Object\narise in conformity with its own legislation. Thus this starting from\nthe Object and the above-mentioned starting from the Subject have in\ncommon, that both presuppose what they pretend to derive: _i.e._, the\nnecessary correlate of their starting-point.\"\n\nThis last assertion \"that the Principle of Sufficient Reason\n_already presupposes the Object_, but does not, as valid before\nand independently of it, first introduce it, and cannot make the\nObject arise in conformity with its own legislation,\" seemed to me\nso far to clash with the proof given by Schopenhauer in \u00a7 21 of the\n\"Fourfold Root,\" as, according to the latter, it is _the function of\nthe Subject's understanding_ which primarily creates the _objective_\nworld out of the subjective feelings of the sensuous organs by the\napplication of the Principle of Sufficient Reason; so that all that is\nObject, as such, after all comes into being only in conformity with\nthe Principle of Sufficient Reason, consequently that this principle\ncannot, as Schopenhauer asserted in his polemic against Fichte, already\npresuppose the Object. In 1852, therefore, I wrote as follows to\nSchopenhauer:--\n\n\"In your arguments against Fichte, where you say that the Principle\nof Sufficient Reason already presupposes the Object, and cannot, as\nvalid before and independently of it, first introduce it, the objection\noccurred to me anew, that in your \"Fourfold Root\" you had made the\nObject of perception first come into being through the application of\nthe Principle of Sufficient Reason, and that you yourself, therefore,\nderive the Object from the Subject, as, for instance, p. 73 of the\n\"Fourfold Root\" (2nd edition). How then can you maintain against Fichte\nthat the Object is always pre-supposed by the Subject? I know of no\nway of solving this difficulty but the following: The Subject only\npresupposes in the Object what belongs to the thing in itself, what is\ninscrutable; but it creates itself the _representation_ of the Object,\n_i.e._ that by which the thing in itself becomes _phenomenon_. For\ninstance, when I see a tree, my Subject assumes the thing in itself of\nthat tree; whereas the _representation_ of it conversely presupposes\nthe operation of my Subject, the transition from the effect (in my eye)\nto its cause.\"\n\nTo this Schopenhauer replied as follows on the 12th of July, 1852:--\n\n\"Your answers (to the objection in question) are not the right ones.\nHere there cannot yet be a question of the thing in itself, and the\ndistinction between representation and object is inadmissible: the\nworld is representation. The matter stands rather as follows--Fichte's\nderivation of the _Non-Ego_ from the _Ego_, is quite abstract:--A = A,\n_ergo_, I = I, and so forth. Taken in an abstract sense, the Object is\nat once posited with the Subject. For to be Subject means, to know;\nand to know means, to have representations. Object and representation\nare one and the same thing. In the \"Fourfold Root,\" therefore, I have\ndivided all objects or representations into four classes, within which\nthe Principle of Sufficient Reason always reigns, though in each class\nunder a different form; nevertheless, the Principle of Sufficient\nReason always presupposes the class itself, and indeed, properly\nspeaking, they coincide.[8] Now, in reality, the existence of the\nSubject of knowing is not an abstract existence. The Subject does not\nexist for itself and independently, as if it had dropped from the sky;\nit appears as the instrument of some individual phenomenon of the Will\n(animal, human being), whose purposes it is destined to serve, and\nwhich thereby now receives a consciousness, on the one hand, of itself,\non the other hand, of everything else. The question next arises, as\nto how or out of what _elements_ the representation of the outer\nworld is brought about within this consciousness. This I have already\nanswered in my \"Theory of Colours\" and also in my chief work,[9] but\nmost thoroughly and exhaustively of all in the Second Edition of the\n\"Fourfold Root,\" \u00a7 21, where it is shown, that all those elements are\nof _subjective_ origin; wherefore attention is especially drawn to the\ngreat difference between all this and Fichte's humbug. For the whole\nof my exposition is but the full carrying out of Kant's Transcendental\nIdealism.\"[10]\n\n  [8] See \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.,\" vol. ii. pp. 17-21, and vol. i. p.\n  39 of the second edition. (The passages referred to by Schopenhauer\n  in the second edition are in the third edition vol. ii. pp. 18-21,\n  and vol. i. p. 40).\n\n  [9] Die Welt a. W. u. V., vol. i. p. 22 _et seqq._, and vol. ii.\n  chap. ii. of the second edition; vol. i. p. 22, \u00a7 6, and vol. ii.\n  chap. ii. of the third edition.\n\n  [10] The passage I have quoted above from Schopenhauer's letter is\n  also to be found among the letters published in my book, \"Arthur\n  Schopenhauer. Von ihm, \u00fcber ihn, u. s. w.,\" p. 541 _et seqq._, and\n  it results from this, as well as from several other letters which\n  likewise deal with important and knotty points in his philosophy,\n  that this correspondence may perhaps not be quite so worthless\n  and unimportant as many--among them Gwinner, in his pamphlet,\n  \"Schopenhauer und seine Freunde\" (Leipzig, 1863)--represent it\n  to be. This pamphlet of Gwinner's, by the way, has met with the\n  treatment it deserves in the Preface to the collection, \"Aus\n  Arthur Schopenhauer's handschriftlichen Aphorismen und Nachlass.\n  Abhandlungen, Anmerkungen, Fragmente.\" (Leipzig, 1864).\n\nI have thought it advisable to give this passage of his letter, as\nbeing relevant to the matter in question. As to the division in\nchapters and paragraphs, it is the same in this new edition as in the\nlast. By comparing each single paragraph of the second with the same\nparagraph of the present edition, it will be easy to find out what has\nbeen newly added. In conclusion, however, I will still add a short list\nof the principal passages which are new.\n\n\nList of Additions to the Third Edition.\n\n\u00a7 8, p. 13, the passages from \"_Notandum_,\" &c., to \"_Ex necessitate_,\"\nand p. 14, from \"_Zun\u00e4chst adoptirt_\" down to the end of the page\n(English version, p. 14, \"_Not._,\" &c., to \"_Ex nec._\"; p. 15, from\n\"First he adopts\" down to the end of the paragraph, p. 16, \"_est_ causa\nsui\"), in confirmation of his assertion that Spinoza had interchanged\nand confounded the relation between reason of knowledge and consequent,\nwith that between cause and effect.\n\n\u00a7 9, p. 17, from \"_er proklamirt_\" down to \"_gewusst haben wird_.\" (E.\nv., \u00a7 9, p. 19, from \"He proclaims it\" down to \"by others before.\")\n\n\u00a7 20, p. 42, in speaking of _reciprocity_ (_Wechselwirkung_), from\nthe words \"_Ja, wo einem Schreiber_\" down to \"_ins Bodenlose gerathen\nsei_.\" (E. v., \u00a7 20, p. 45, from \"Nay, it is precisely\" down to \"his\ndepth.\")\n\n\u00a7 21, p. 61, the words at the bottom, \"_und r\u00e4umlich konstruirt_,\"\ndown to p. 62, \"_Data erh\u00e4lt_,\" together with the quotation concerning\nthe blind sculptor, J. Kleinhaus. (E. v., \u00a7 21, p. 67, the words \"and\nconstructs in Space\" down to \"of the Understanding,\") and the note.\n\n\u00a7 21, pp. 67-68, from \"_Ein specieller und interessanter Beleg_\" down\nto \"_albernes Zeug dazu_.\" (E. v., \u00a7 21, p. 73, \"I will here add\" down\nto p. 74, \"followed by twaddle.\")\n\n\u00a7 21, p. 73, _sq._, the instances of Caspar Hauser, &c., from Franz,\n\"The Eye,\" &c., and the physiological corroborations from Flourens,\n\"_De la vie et de l'intelligence_,\" &c. (E. v., p. 80, and following.)\n\n\u00a7 21, p. 77, the parenthesis on the value of calculation. (E. v., p.\n83, \"All comprehension,\" &c.)\n\n\u00a7 21, p. 83, the words \"_da ferner Substanz_\" down to \"_das Wirken_ in\nconcreto.\" (E. v., \u00a7 21, p. 90, \"Substance and Matter\" down to \"_in\nconcreto_.\")\n\n\u00a7 29, p. 105, the words \"_im Lateinischen_\" down to \"_erkannte_.\" (E.\nv., \u00a7 29, p. 116, from \"In Latin\" down to \"\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4' \u1f10\u03be\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd.\")\n\n\u00a7 34, p. 116, the words \"_Ueberall ist_\" down to \"_Praxis und\nTheorie_.\" (E. v., \u00a7 34, p. 128, the words \"Reasonable or Rational\"\ndown to \"theory and practice.\")\n\n\u00a7 34, p. 121, the verses from G\u00f6the's \"West-\u00d6stlicher Divan.\"\n\n\u00a7 34, p. 125, _Anmerkung_, the words \"_Auch ist Brahma_\" down to\n\"_die erstere_,\" and p. 126, the quotation from I. J. Schmidt's\n\"Forschungen.\" (E. v., \u00a7 34, p. 138, note, \"Brahma is also\" down to\n\"first of these.\")\n\n\u00a7 34, p. 127, the words from \"_Aber der naive_\" down to \"_judaisirten\ngouverneurs_\" (E. v., \u00a7 34, p. 150, sentence beginning \"But the\nartless\" down to \"infancy,\" and the Greek quotation from Plutarch in\nthe note.)\n\n\u00a7 34, p. 128, the words from \"_Ganz \u00fcbereinstimmend_\" down to\n\"_\u00fcberfl\u00fcssige sein soll_.\" (E. v., p. 151, from \"J. F. Davis\" down to\n\"superfluous.\")\n\n\u00a7 45, p. 147, the words \"_Eben daher kommt es_\" down to \"_sich\nerh\u00e4lt_.\" (E. v., \u00a7 45, p. 163, \"It is just for this reason too\" down\nto \"their possession.\")\n\n\u00a7 45, p. 149, the words \"_Man suche Das_,\" &c., down to \"_gelesen\nhaben_.\" (E. v., \u00a7 45, p. 164, from \"We should\" down to \"read in\nbooks.\")\n\n\u00a7 49, p. 154, the words \"_Der bei den Philosophastern_,\" down to\n\"_zu kontroliren sind_.\" (E. v., \u00a7 49, p. 169, from the words \"The\nconception of our,\" &c., down to \"by perception.\")\n\n\u00a7 50, p. 156, the words \"_Denn der Satz vom Grunde_\" down to \"_nur\nsich selbst nicht_.\" (E. v., \u00a7 50, p. 172, from \"For the Principle of\nSufficient Reason,\" &c., down to \"everything else.\")\n\n\u00a7 52, p. 158, the words \"_Der allgemeine Sinn des Satzes vom Grunde_,\"\ndown to \"_der Kosmologische Beweis ist_.\" (E. v., \u00a7 52, p. 173, from \"The\ngeneral meaning\" down to \"the Cosmological Proof.\")\n\n                    JULIUS FRAUENST\u00c4DT.\n\nBERLIN, _August, 1864_.\n\n\n\n\nEDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.\n\n\nThe present Fourth Edition is of the same content as the Third;\ntherefore it contains the same corrections and additions which I\nhad already inserted in the Third Edition from Schopenhauer's own\ninterleaved copy of this work.\n\n                    JULIUS FRAUENST\u00c4DT.\n\nBERLIN, _September, 1877_.\n\n\n\n\nON THE FOURFOLD ROOT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. _The Method._\n\nThe divine Plato and the marvellous Kant unite their mighty voices\nin recommending a rule, to serve as the method of all philosophising\nas well as of all other science.[11] Two laws, they tell us: the law\nof _homogeneity_ and the law of _specification_, should be equally\nobserved, neither to the disadvantage of the other. The law of\n_homogeneity_ directs us to collect things together into kinds by\nobserving their resemblances and correspondences, to collect kinds\nagain into species, species into genera, and so on, till at last we\ncome to the highest all-comprehensive conception. Now this law, being\ntranscendental, _i.e._ essential to our Reason, takes for granted\nthat Nature conforms with it: an assumption which is expressed by the\nancient formula, _entia pr\u00e6ter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda_.\nAs for the law of _specification_, Kant expresses it thus: _entium\nvarietates non temere esse minuendas_. It requires namely, that we\nshould clearly distinguish one from another the different genera\ncollected under one comprehensive conception; likewise that we should\nnot confound the higher and lower species comprised in each genus;\nthat we should be careful not to overleap any, and never to classify\ninferior species, let alone individuals, immediately under the generic\nconception: each conception being susceptible of subdivision, and none\neven coming down to mere intuition. Kant teaches that both laws are\ntranscendental, fundamental principles of our Reason, which postulate\nconformity of things with them _\u00e0 priori_; and Plato, when he tells us\nthat these rules were flung down from the seat of the gods with the\nPromethean fire, seems to express the same thought in his own way.\n\n  [11] Platon, \"Phileb.\" pp. 219-223. \"Politic.\" 62, 63. \"Ph\u00e6dr.\"\n  361-363, ed. Bip. Kant, \"Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Anhang zur\n  transcend. Dialektik.\" English Translation by F. Max M\u00fcller.\n  \"Appendix to the Transc. Dialectic.\" pp. 551, and _seqq._\n\n\n\u00a7 2. _Application of the Method in the present case._\n\nIn spite of the weight of such recommendations, I find that the second\nof these two laws has been far too rarely applied to a fundamental\nprinciple of all knowledge: _the Principle of Sufficient Reason_.\nFor although this principle has been often and long ago stated in a\ngeneral way, still sufficient distinction has not been made between\nits extremely different applications, in each of which it acquires\na new meaning; its origin in various mental faculties thus becoming\nevident. If we compare Kant's philosophy with all preceding systems, we\nperceive that, precisely in the observation of our mental faculties,\nmany persistent errors have been caused by applying the principle\nof homogeneity, while the opposite principle of specification was\nneglected; whereas the law of specification has led to the greatest\nand most important results. I therefore crave permission to quote a\npassage from Kant, in which the application of the law of specification\nto the sources of our knowledge is especially recommended; for it gives\ncountenance to my present endeavour:--\n\n\"It is of the highest importance to _isolate_ various sorts of\nknowledge, which in kind and origin are different from others, and to\ntake great care lest they be mixed up with those others with which,\nfor practical purposes, they are generally united. What is done by the\nchemist in the analysis of substances, and by the mathematician in\npure mathematics, is far more incumbent on the philosopher, in order\nto enable him to define clearly the part which, in the promiscuous\nemployment of the understanding, belongs to a special kind of\nknowledge, as well as its peculiar value and influence.\"[12]\n\n  [12] Kant, \"Krit. d. r. V. Methodenlehre. Drittes Hauptst\u00fcck,\" p.\n  842 of the 1st edition. Engl. Tr. by F. M. M\u00fcller. \"Architectonic\n  of Pure Reason,\" p. 723.\n\n\n\u00a7 3. _Utility of this Inquiry._\n\nShould I succeed in showing that the principle which forms the subject\nof the present inquiry does not issue directly from _one_ primitive\nnotion of our intellect, but rather in the first instance from\n_various_ ones, it will then follow, that neither can the necessity\nit brings with it, as a firmly established _\u00e0 priori_ principle, be\n_one_ and the _same_ in all cases, but must, on the contrary, be as\nmanifold as the sources of the principle itself. Whoever therefore\nbases a conclusion upon this principle, incurs the obligation of\nclearly specifying on which of its grounds of necessity he founds his\nconclusion and of designating that ground by a special name, such\nas I am about to suggest. I hope that this may be a step towards\npromoting greater lucidity and precision in philosophising; for I hold\nthe extreme clearness to be attained by an accurate definition of\neach single expression to be indispensable to us, as a defence both\nagainst error and against intentional deception, and also as a means\nof securing to ourselves the permanent, unalienable possession of\neach newly acquired notion within the sphere of philosophy beyond the\nfear of losing it again on account of any misunderstanding or double\nmeaning which might hereafter be detected. The true philosopher will\nindeed always seek after light and perspicuity, and will endeavour\nto resemble a Swiss lake--which through its peacefulness is enabled\nto unite great depth with great clearness, the depth revealing\nitself precisely by the clearness--rather than a turbid, impetuous\nmountain torrent. \"_La clart\u00e9 est la bonne foi des philosophes_,\"\nsays Vauvenargues. Pseudo-philosophers, on the contrary, use speech,\nnot indeed to conceal their thoughts, as M. de Talleyrand has it,\nbut rather to conceal the absence of them, and are apt to make their\nreaders responsible for the incomprehensibility of their systems, which\nreally proceeds from their own confused thinking. This explains why in\ncertain writers--Schelling, for instance--the tone of instruction so\noften passes into that of reproach, and frequently the reader is even\ntaken to task beforehand for his assumed inability to understand.\n\n\n\u00a7 4. _Importance of the Principle of Sufficient Reason._\n\nIts importance is indeed very great, since it may truly be called the\nbasis of all science. For by _science_ we understand a _system_ of\nnotions, _i.e._ a totality of connected, as opposed to a mere aggregate\nof disconnected, notions. But what is it that binds together the\nmembers of a system, if not the Principle of Sufficient Reason? That\nwhich distinguishes every science from a mere aggregate is precisely,\nthat its notions are derived one from another as from their reason.\nSo it was long ago observed by Plato: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f31 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f04\u03be\u03b9\u03b1\u03af \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f15\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ae\u03c3\u1fc3 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u1ff7 (_etiam\nopiniones ver\u00e6 non multi pretii sunt, donec quis illas ratiocinatione\na causis ducta liget_).[13] Nearly every science, moreover, contains\nnotions of causes from which the effects may be deduced, and likewise\nother notions of the necessity of conclusions from reasons, as will be\nseen during the course of this inquiry. Aristotle has expressed this as\nfollows: \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae, \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03ac \u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03ac\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 (_omnis intellectualis scientia, sive aliquo modo\nintellectu participans, circa causas et principia est_).[14] Now, as\nit is this very assumption _\u00e0 priori_ that all things must have their\nreason, which authorizes us everywhere to search for the _why_, we may\nsafely call this _why_ the mother of all science.\n\n  [13] \"Meno.\" p. 385, ed Bip. \"Even true opinions are not of\n  much value until somebody binds them down by proof of a cause.\"\n  [Translator's addition.]\n\n  [14] Aristot. \"Metaph.\" v. 1. \"All knowledge which is intellectual\n  or partakes somewhat of intellect, deals with causes and\n  principles.\" [Tr.'s add.]\n\n\n\u00a7 5. _The Principle itself._\n\nWe purpose showing further on that the Principle of Sufficient Reason\nis an expression common to several _\u00e0 priori_ notions. Meanwhile, it\nmust be stated under some formula or other. I choose Wolf's as being\nthe most comprehensive: _Nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit, quam\nnon sit._ Nothing is without a reason for its being.[15]\n\n  [15] Here the translator gives Schopenhauer's free version of\n  Wolf's formula.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nGENERAL SURVEY OF THE MOST IMPORTANT VIEWS HITHERTO HELD CONCERNING\nTHE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.\n\n\n\u00a7 6. _First Statement of the Principle and Distinction between Two of\nits Meanings._\n\nA more or less accurately defined, abstract expression for so\nfundamental a principle of all knowledge must have been found at a\nvery early age; it would, therefore, be difficult, and besides of no\ngreat interest, to determine where it first appeared. Neither Plato nor\nAristotle have formally stated it as a leading fundamental principle,\nalthough both often speak of it as a self-evident truth. Thus, with a\n_na\u00efvet\u00e9_ which savours of the state of innocence as opposed to that\nof the knowledge of good and of evil, when compared with the critical\nresearches of our own times, Plato says: \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f02\u03bd \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u1f76\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf;[16]\n(_necesse est, qu\u00e6cunque fiunt, per aliquam causam fieri: quomodo\nenim absque ea fierent?_) and then again: \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0'\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f00\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u1f76\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd[17] (_quidquid gignitur, ex aliqua causa necessario\ngignitur: sine causa enim oriri quidquam, impossibile est_). At the end\nof his book \"De fato,\" Plutarch cites the following among the chief\npropositions of the Stoics: \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03b5, \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03c2[18] (_maxime\nid primum esse videbitur, nihil fieri sine causa, sed omnia causis\nantegressis_).\n\n  [16] Platon, \"Phileb.\" p. 240, ed Bip. \"It is necessary that all\n  which arises, should arise by some cause; for how could it arise\n  otherwise?\" [Tr.'s add.]\n\n  [17] _Ibid._ \"Tim\u00e6us,\" p. 302. \"All that arises, arises necessarily\n  from some cause; for it is impossible for anything to come into\n  being without cause.\" [Tr.'s add.]\n\n  [18] \"This especially would seem to be the first principle: that\n  nothing arises without cause, but [everything] according to\n  preceding causes.\" [Tr.'s add.]\n\nIn the \"Analyt. post.\" i. 2, Aristotle states the principle of\nsufficient reason to a certain degree when he says: \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03bf\u1f30\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1 \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4' \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03b4\u03b9' \u1f23\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1fb6\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9. (_Scire autem putamus unamquamque rem simpliciter, quum putamus\ncausam cognoscere, propter quum res est, ejusque rei causam esse, nec\nposse eam aliter se habere._)[19] In his \"Metaphysics,\" moreover, he\nalready divides causes, or rather principles, \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b1\u03af, into different\nkinds,[20] of which he admits eight; but this division is neither\nprofound nor precise enough. He is, nevertheless, quite right in\nsaying, \u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f45\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u1f22 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd,\n\u1f22 \u03b3\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f22 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.[21] (_Omnibus igitur principiis commune est,\nesse primum, unde aut est, aut fit, aut cognoscitur._) In the following\nchapter he distinguishes several kinds of causes, although somewhat\nsuperficially and confusedly. In the \"Analyt. post.\" ii. 11, he\nstates four kinds of causes in a more satisfactory manner: \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c4\u03ad\u03c3\u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c2\u00b7 \u03bc\u03af\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f26\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u03bc\u03af\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72, \u1f25 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u00b7 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7 \u03b4\u1f72, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1.[22]\n(_Caus\u00e6 autem quatuor sunt: una qu\u00e6 explicat quid res sit; altera,\nquam, si qu\u00e6dam sint, necesse est esse; tertia, qu\u00e6 quid primum movit;\nquarta id, cujus gratia._) Now this is the origin of the division\nof the _caus\u00e6_ universally adopted by the Scholastic Philosophers,\ninto _caus\u00e6 materiales, formales, efficientes et finales_, as may be\nseen in \"Suarii disputationes metaphysic\u00e6\"[23]--a real compendium of\nScholasticism. Even Hobbes still quotes and explains this division.[24]\nIt is also to be found in another passage of Aristotle, this time\nsomewhat more clearly and fully developed (\"Metaph.\" i. 3.) and it\nis again briefly noticed in the book \"De somno et vigilia,\" c. 2. As\nfor the vitally important distinction between _reason_ and _cause_,\nhowever, Aristotle no doubt betrays something like a conception of it\nin the \"Analyt. post.\" i. 13, where he shows at considerable length\nthat knowing and proving _that_ a thing exists is a very different\nthing from knowing and proving _why_ it exists: what he represents as\nthe latter, being knowledge of the _cause_; as the former, knowledge\nof the _reason_. If, however, he had quite clearly recognized the\ndifference between them, he would never have lost sight of it, but\nwould have adhered to it throughout his writings. Now this is not the\ncase; for even when he endeavours to distinguish the various kinds of\ncauses from one another, as in the passages I have mentioned above, the\nessential difference mooted in the chapter just alluded to, never seems\nto occur to him again. Besides he uses the term \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd indiscriminately\nfor every kind of cause, often indeed calling reasons of knowledge,\nand sometimes even the premisses of a conclusion, \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, as, for\ninstance, in his \"Metaph.\" iv. 18; \"Rhet.\" ii. 2; \"De plantis.\" p. 816\n(_ed. Berol._), but more especially \"Analyt. post.\" i. 2, where he\ncalls the premisses to a conclusion simply \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2\n(causes of the conclusion). Now, using the same word to express two\nclosely connected conceptions, is a sure sign that their difference\nhas not been recognised, or at any rate not been firmly grasped; for a\nmere accidental homonymous designation of two widely differing things\nis quite another matter. Nowhere, however, does this error appear\nmore conspicuously than in his definition of the sophism _non caus\u00e6\nut causa_, \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, (reasoning from what is not\ncause as if it were cause), in the book \"De sophisticis elenchis,\" c.\n5. By \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd he here understands absolutely nothing but the argument,\nthe premisses, consequently a reason of knowledge; for this sophism\nconsists in correctly proving the impossibility of something, while the\nproof has no bearing whatever upon the proposition in dispute, which\nit is nevertheless supposed to refute. Here, therefore, there is no\nquestion at all of physical causes. Still the use of the word \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\nhas had so much weight with modern logicians, that they hold to it\nexclusively in their accounts of the _fallacia extra dictionem_, and\nexplain the _fallacia non caus\u00e6 ut causa_ as designating a physical\ncause, which is not the case. Reimarus, for instance, does so, and\nG. E. Schultze and Fries--all indeed of whom I have any knowledge.\nThe first work in which I find a correct definition of this sophism,\nis Twesten's Logic. Moreover, in all other scientific works and\ncontroversies the charge of a _fallacia non caus\u00e6 ut causa_ usually\ndenotes the interpolation of a wrong cause.\n\n  [19] \"We think we understand a thing perfectly, whenever we\n  think we know the cause by which the thing is, that it is really\n  the cause of that thing, and that the thing cannot possibly be\n  otherwise.\" [Tr.'s add.]\n\n  [20] Lib. iv. c. 1.\n\n  [21] \"Now it is common to all principles, that they are the first\n  thing through which [anything] is, or arises, or is understood.\"\n  [Tr.'s add.]\n\n  [22] \"There are four causes: first, the essence of a thing itself;\n  second, the _sine qua non_ of a thing; third, what first put\n  a thing in motion; fourth, to what purpose or end a thing is\n  tending.\" [Tr.'s add.]\n\n  [23] \"Suarii disputationes metaph.\" Disp. 12, sect. 2 et 3.\n\n  [24] Hobbes, \"De corpore,\" P. ii. c. 10, \u00a7 7.\n\nSextus Empiricus presents another forcible instance of the way in which\nthe Ancients were wont universally to confound the logical law of the\nreason of knowledge with the transcendental law of cause and effect\nin Nature, persistently mistaking one for the other. In the 9th Book\n\"Adversus Mathematicos,\" that is, the Book \"Adversus Physicos,\" \u00a7 204,\nhe undertakes to prove the law of causality, and says: \"He who asserts\nthat there is no cause (\u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1), either has no cause (\u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1) for his\nassertion, or has one. In the former case there is not more truth in\nhis assertion than in its contradiction; in the latter, his assertion\nitself proves the existence of a cause.\"\n\nBy this we see that the Ancients had not yet arrived at a clear\ndistinction between requiring a reason as the ground of a conclusion,\nand asking for a cause for the occurrence of a real event. As for the\nScholastic Philosophers of later times, the law of causality was in\ntheir eyes an axiom above investigation: \"_non inquirimus an causa sit,\nquia nihil est per se notius_,\" says Suarez.[25] At the same time they\nheld fast to the above quoted Aristotelian classification; but, as far\nas I know at least, they equally failed to arrive at a clear idea of\nthe necessary distinction of which we are here speaking.\n\n  [25] Suarez, \"Disp.\" 12, sect. 1.\n\n\n\u00a7 7. _Descartes._\n\nFor we find even the excellent Descartes, who gave the first impulse\nto subjective reflection and thereby became the father of modern\nphilosophy, still entangled in confusions for which it is difficult\nto account; and we shall soon see to what serious and deplorable\nconsequences these confusions have led with regard to Metaphysics.\nIn the \"_Responsio ad secundas objectiones in meditationes de prima\nphilosophia_,\" _axioma i._ he says: _Nulla res existit, de qua non\npossit qu\u00e6ri, qu\u00e6nam sit causa, cur existat. Hoc enim de ipso Deo qu\u00e6ri\npotest, non quod indigeat ulla causa ut existat, sed quia ipsa ejus\nnatur\u00e6 immensitas est_ CAUSA, SIVE RATIO, _propter quam nulla causa\nindiget ad existendum_. He ought to have said: The immensity of God\nis a logical reason from which it follows, that God needs no cause;\nwhereas he confounds the two together and obviously has no clear\nconsciousness of the difference between reason and cause. Properly\nspeaking however, it is his intention which mars his insight. For\nhere, where the law of causality demands a _cause_, he substitutes a\n_reason_ instead of it, because the latter, unlike the former, does\nnot immediately lead to something beyond it; and thus, by means of\nthis very axiom, he clears the way to the _Ontological Proof_ of\nthe existence of God, which was really his invention, for Anselm\nhad only indicated it in a general manner. Immediately after these\naxioms, of which I have just quoted the first, there comes a formal,\nquite serious statement of the Ontological Proof, which, in fact,\nalready lies within that axiom, as the chicken does within the egg\nthat has been long brooded over. Thus, while everything else stands\nin need of a cause for its existence, the _immensitas_ implied in the\nconception of the Deity--who is introduced to us upon the ladder of the\nCosmological Proof--suffices in lieu of a cause or, as the proof itself\nexpresses it: _in conceptu entis summe perfecti existentia necessaria\ncontinetur_. This, then, is the sleight-of-hand trick, for the sake of\nwhich the confusion, familiar even to Aristotle, of the two principal\nmeanings of the principle of sufficient reason, has been used directly\n_in majorem Dei gloriam_.\n\nConsidered by daylight, however, and without prejudice, this famous\nOntological Proof is really a charming joke. On some occasion or\nother, some one excogitates a conception, composed out of all sorts\nof predicates, among which however he takes care to include the\npredicate actuality or existence, either openly stated or wrapped\nup for decency's sake in some other predicate, such as _perfectio_,\n_immensitas_, or something of the kind. Now, it is well known,--that,\nfrom a given conception, those predicates which are essential to\nit--_i.e._, without which it cannot be thought--and likewise the\npredicates which are essential to those predicates themselves, may be\nextracted by means of purely logical analyses, and consequently have\n_logical_ truth: that is, they have their reason of knowledge in the\ngiven conception. Accordingly the predicate reality or existence is\nnow extracted from this arbitrarily thought conception, and an object\ncorresponding to it is forthwith presumed to have real existence\nindependently of the conception.\n\n  \"W\u00e4r' der Gedank' nicht so verw\u00fcnscht gescheut,\n  Man w\u00e4r' versucht ihn herzlich dumm zu nennen.\"[26]\n\n  [26]\n    \"Were not the thought so cursedly acute,\n    One might be tempted to declare it silly.\"\n  SCHILLER, \"Wallenstein-Trilogie. Piccolomini,\" Act ii. Sc. 7.\n\nAfter all, the simplest answer to such ontological demonstrations\nis: \"All depends upon the source whence you have derived your\nconception: if it be taken from experience, all well and good, for\nin this case its object exists and needs no further proof; if, on\nthe contrary, it has been hatched in your own _sinciput_, all its\npredicates are of no avail, for it is a mere phantasm.\" But we form\nan unfavourable prejudice against the pretensions of a theology which\nneeded to have recourse to such proofs as this in order to gain a\nfooting on the territory of philosophy, to which it is quite foreign,\nbut on which it longs to trespass. But oh! for the prophetic wisdom of\nAristotle! He had never even heard of the Ontological Proof; yet as\nthough he could detect this piece of scholastic jugglery through the\nshades of coming darkness and were anxious to bar the road to it, he\ncarefully shows[27] that defining a thing and proving its existence are\ntwo different matters, separate to all eternity; since by the one we\nlearn _what_ it is that is meant, and by the other _that_ such a thing\nexists. Like an oracle of the future, he pronounces the sentence: \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03b4' \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af\u00b7 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f44\u03bd: (ESSE _autem nullius\nrei essentia, est, quandoquidem ens non est genus_) which means:\n\"Existence never can belong to the essence of a thing.\" On the other\nhand, we may see how great was Herr von Schelling's veneration for\nthe Ontological Proof in a long note, p. 152, of the 1st vol. of his\n\"Philosophische Schriften\" of 1809. We may even see in it something\nstill more instructive, _i.e._, how easily Germans allow sand to be\nthrown in their eyes by impudence and blustering swagger. But for so\nthoroughly pitiable a creature as Hegel, whose whole pseudo-philosophy\nis but a monstrous amplification of the Ontological Proof, to have\nundertaken its defence against Kant, is indeed an alliance of which\nthe Ontological Proof itself might be ashamed, however little it may\nin general be given to blushing. How can I be expected to speak with\ndeference of men, who have brought philosophy into contempt?\n\n  [27] Aristot., \"Analyt. post.\" c. 7.\n\n\n\u00a7 8. _Spinoza._\n\nAlthough Spinoza's philosophy mainly consists in the negation of the\ndouble dualism between God and the world and between soul and body,\nwhich his teacher, Descartes, had set up, he nevertheless remained true\nto his master in confounding and interchanging the relation between\nreason and consequence with that between cause and effect; he even\nendeavoured to draw from it a still greater advantage for his own\nmetaphysics than Descartes for his, for he made this confusion the\nfoundation of his whole Pantheism.\n\nA conception contains _implicite_ all its essential predicates, so that\nthey may be developed out of it _explicite_ by means of mere analytical\njudgments: the sum total of them being its definition. This definition\ntherefore differs from the conception itself merely in form and not in\ncontent; for it consists of judgments which are all contained within\nthat conception, and therefore have their reason in it, in as far as\nthey show its essence. We may accordingly look upon these judgments as\nthe consequences of that conception, considered as their reason. Now\nthis relation between a conception and the judgments founded upon it\nand susceptible of being developed out of it by analysis, is precisely\nthe relation between Spinoza's so-called God and the world, or rather\nbetween the one and only substance and its numberless accidents\n(_Deus, sive substantia constans infinitis attributis_[28]--_Deus,\nsive omnia Dei attributa_). It is therefore the relation in knowledge\nof the _reason_ to its consequent; whereas true Theism (Spinoza's\nTheism is merely nominal) assumes the relation of the _cause_ to its\neffect, in which the cause remains different and separate from the\nconsequence, not only in the way in which we consider them, but really\nand essentially, therefore in themselves to all eternity. For the word\nGod, honestly used, means a cause such as this of the world, with\nthe addition of personality. An impersonal God is, on the contrary,\na _contradictio in adjecto_. Now as nevertheless, even in the case\nas stated by him, Spinoza desired to retain the word God to express\nsubstance, and explicitly called this the _cause_ of the world, he\ncould find no other way to do it than by completely intermingling the\ntwo relations, and confounding the principle of the reason of knowledge\nwith the principle of causality. I call attention to the following\npassages in corroboration of this statement. _Notandum, dari necessario\nunius cujusque rei existentis certam aliquam_ CAUSAM, _propter quam\nexistit. Et notandum, hanc causam, propter quart aliqua res existit,\nvel debere contineri in ipsa natura et_ DEFINITIONE _rei existentis_\n(_nimirum quod ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere_), _vel debere_\nEXTRA _ipsam dari._[29] In the last case he means an efficient cause,\nas appears from what follows, whereas in the first he means a mere\nreason of knowledge; yet he identifies both, and by this means prepares\nthe way for identifying God with the world, which is his intention.\nThis is the artifice of which he always makes use, and which he has\nlearnt from Descartes. He substitutes a cause acting from without, for\na reason of knowledge lying within, a given conception. _Ex necessitate\ndivin\u00e6 natur\u00e6 omnia, qu\u00e6 sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt,\nsequi debent._[30] At the same time he calls God everywhere the cause\nof the world. _Quidquid existit Dei potentiam, qu\u00e6 omnium rerum_\nCAUSA _est, exprimit._[31]--_Deus est omnium rerum_ CAUSA _immanens,\nnon vero transiens._[32]--_Deus non tantam est_ CAUSA EFFICIENS\n_rerum existenti\u00e6, sed etiam essenti\u00e6._[33]--_Ex data quacunque_\nIDEA _aliquis_ EFFECTUS _necessario sequi debat._[34]--And: _Nulla\nres nisi a causa externa potest destrui._[35]--Demonstr. DEFINITIO\n_cujuscunque rei, ipsius essentiam_ (essence, nature, as differing from\nexistentia, existence), _affirmat, sed non negat; sive rei essentiam\nponit, sed non tollit. Dum itaque ad rem ipsam tantum, non autem ad\ncausas externas attendimus, nihil in eadem poterimus invenire, quod\nipsam possit destruere._ This means, that as no conception can contain\nanything which contradicts its definition, _i.e._, the sum total of\nits predicates, neither can an existence contain anything which might\nbecome a cause of its destruction. This view, however, is brought to\na climax in the somewhat lengthy second demonstration of the 11th\nProposition, in which he confounds a cause capable of destroying or\nannihilating a being, with a contradiction contained in its definition\nand therefore destroying that definition. His need of confounding cause\nwith reason here becomes so urgent, that he can never say _causa_ or\n_ratio_ alone, but always finds it necessary to put _ratio seu causa_.\nAccordingly, this occurs as many as eight times in the same page, in\norder to conceal the subterfuge. Descartes had done the same in the\nabove-mentioned axiom.\n\n  [28] Spinoza, \"Eth.\" i. prop. 11.\n\n  [29] Spinoza, \"Eth.\" P. 1. prop. 8, schol. 2.\n\n  [30] _Ibid._ Prop. 16.\n\n  [31] _Ibid._ Prop. 36, demonstr.\n\n  [32] _Ibid._ Prop. 18.\n\n  [33] _Ibid._ Prop. 25.\n\n  [34] \"Eth.\" P. iii. prop. 1, demonstr.\n\n  [35] _Ibid._ Prop. 4.\n\nThus, properly speaking, Spinoza's Pantheism is merely the\n_realisation_ of Descartes' Ontological Proof. First, he adopts\nDescartes' ontotheological proposition, to which we have alluded above,\n_ipsa natur\u00e6 Dei immensitas est_ CAUSA SIVE RATIO, _propter quam nulla\ncausa indiget ad existendum_, always saying _substantia_ instead of\n_Deus_ (in the beginning); and then he finishes by _substanti\u00e6 essentia\nnecessario involvit existentiam, ergo erit substantia_ CAUSA SUI.[36]\nTherefore the very same argument which Descartes had used to prove\nthe existence of God, is used by Spinoza to prove the existence of\nthe world,--which consequently needs no God. He does this still more\ndistinctly in the 2nd Scholium to the 8th Proposition: _Quoniam ad\nnaturam substantia pertinet existere, debet ejus definitio necessariam\nexistentiam involvere, et consequenter ex sola ejus definitione debet\nipsius existentia concludi_. But this substance is, as we know, the\nworld. The demonstration to Proposition 24 says in the same sense: _Id,\ncujus natura in se considerata_ (_i.e._, in its definition) _involvit\nexistentiam, est_ CAUSA SUI.\n\n  [36] \"Eth.\" P. i. prop. 7.\n\nFor what Descartes had stated in an exclusively _ideal_ and\n_subjective_ sense, _i.e._, only for us, for _cognitive purposes_--in\nthis instance for the sake of proving the existence of God--Spinoza\ntook in a _real_ and _objective_ sense, as the actual relation of\nGod to the world. According to Descartes, the existence of God is\ncontained in the _conception_ of God, therefore it becomes an\nargument for his actual being: according to Spinoza, God is himself\ncontained in the world. Thus what, with Descartes, was only reason\nof knowledge, becomes, with Spinoza, reason of fact. If the former,\nin his Ontological Proof, taught that the _existentia_ of God is a\nconsequence of the _essentia_ of God, the latter turns this into _causa\nsui_, and boldly opens his Ethics with: _per causam sui intelligo id,\ncujus essentia_ (conception) _involvit existentiam_, remaining deaf to\nAristotle's warning cry, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4' \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03af! Now, this is the\nmost palpable confusion of _reason_ and _cause_. And if Neo-Spinozans\n(Schellingites, Hegelians, &c.), with whom words are wont to pass for\nthoughts, often indulge in pompous, solemn admiration for this _causa\nsui_, for my own part I see nothing but a _contradictio in adjecto_ in\nthis same _causa sui_, a _before_ that is _after_, an audacious command\nto us, to sever arbitrarily the eternal causal chain--something, in\nshort, very like the proceeding of that Austrian, who finding himself\nunable to reach high enough to fasten the clasp on his tightly-strapped\nshako, got upon a chair. The right emblem for _causa sui_ is Baron\nM\u00fcnchhausen, sinking on horseback into the water, clinging by the legs\nto his horse and pulling both himself and the animal out by his own\npigtail, with the motto underneath: _Causa sui_.\n\nLet us finally cast a look at the 16th proposition of the 1st book\nof the Ethics. Here we find Spinoza concluding from the proposition,\n_ex data cujuscunque rei definitione plures proprietates intellectus\nconcludit, qu\u00e6 revera ex eadem necessario sequuntur, that ex\nnecessitate divin\u00e6, natur\u00e6_ (_i.e._, taken as a reality), _infinita\ninfinitis modis sequi debent_: this God therefore unquestionably stands\nin the same relation to the world as a conception to its definition.\nThe corollary, _Deum omnium rerum esse_ CAUSAM EFFICIENTEM, is\nnevertheless immediately connected with it. It is impossible to carry\nthe confusion between reason and cause farther, nor could it lead to\ngraver consequences than here. But this shows the importance of the\nsubject of the present treatise.\n\nIn endeavouring to add a third step to the climax in question, Herr\nvon Schelling has contributed a small afterpiece to these errors,\ninto which two mighty intellects of the past had fallen owing to\ninsufficient clearness in thinking. If Descartes met the demands of the\ninexorable law of causality, which reduced his God to the last straits,\nby substituting a reason instead of the cause required, in order thus\nto set the matter at rest; and if Spinoza made a real cause out of this\nreason, _i.e._, _causa sui_, his God thereby becoming the world itself:\nSchelling now made reason and consequent separate in God himself.[37]\nHe thus gave the thing still greater consistency by elevating it to a\nreal, substantial hypostasis of reason and consequent, and introducing\nus to something \"in God, which is not himself, but his reason, as a\nprimary reason, or rather reason beyond reason (abyss).\" _Hoc quidem\nvere palmarium est._--It is now known that Schelling had taken the\nwhole fable from Jacob B\u00f6hme's \"Full account of the terrestrial and\ncelestial mystery;\" but what appears to me to be less well known, is\nthe source from which Jacob B\u00f6hme himself had taken it, and the real\nbirth-place of this so-called _abyss_, wherefore I now take the liberty\nto mention it. It is the \u03b2\u03c5\u03b8\u03cc\u03c2, i.e. _abyssus, vorago_, bottomless\npit, reason beyond reason of the Valentinians (a heretical sect of the\nsecond century) which, in silence--co-essential with itself--engendered\nintelligence and the world, as Iren\u00e6us[38] relates in the following\nterms: \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f00\u03bf\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\n\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u0391\u1f30\u1ff6\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u00b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n+\u03b2\u03c5\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd+ \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.--\u1f59\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03cc\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f10\u03bd \u1f21\u03c3\u03c5\u03c7\u03af\u1fb3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f20\u03c1\u03b5\u03bc\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1fc7 \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03af\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd. \u03a3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c5\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f1c\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd, \u1f23\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03a7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03a3\u03b9\u03b3\u1f74\u03bd \u1f40\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03b6\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03b8\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03c6' \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd +\u03b2\u03c5\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd+ \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd (\u1f23\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7) \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03c1\u1fb3, \u03c4\u1fc7\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c5\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u1fc3, \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03a3\u03b9\u03b3\u1fc7. \u03a4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72, \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b7\u03be\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03cd\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd, \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03c5\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u039d\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd, \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f34\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9,\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bc\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03a0\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2. \u03a4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u1fc6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd.[39] (_Dicunt enim esse quendam\nin sublimitatibus illis, qu\u00e6 nec oculis cerni, nec nominari possunt,\nperfectum \u00c6onem pr\u00e6existentem, quem et proarchen, et propatorem, et_\nBythum _vocant. Eum autem, quum incomprehensibilis et invisibilis,\nsempiternus idem, et ingenitus esset, infinitis temporum seculis in\nsumma quiete ac tranquillitate fuisse. Un\u00e2 etiam cum eo Cogitationem\nexstitisse, quam et Gratiam et Silentium (Sigen) nuncupant. Hunc\nporro_ Bythum _in animum, aliquando induxisse, rerum omnium initium\nproferre, atque hanc, quam in animum induxerat, productionem, in Sigen\n(silentium) qu\u00e6 un\u00e2 cum eo erat, non secus atque in vulvam demisisse.\nHanc vero, suscepto hoc semine, pr\u00e6gnantem effectam peperisse\nIntellectum, parenti suo parem et \u00e6qualem, atque ita comparatum, ut\nsolus patern\u00e6 magnitudinis capax esset. Atque hunc Intellectum et\nMonogenem et Patrem et principum omnium rerum appellant._)\n\n  [37] Schelling, \"Abhandlung von der menschlichen Freiheit.\"\n\n  [38] Iren\u00e6us, \"Contr. h\u00e6res.\" lib. i. c. 1.\n\n  [39] \"For they say that in those unseen heights which have no\n  name there is a pre-existing, perfect \u00c6on; this they also call\n  fore-rule, forefather and the depth.--They say, that being\n  incomprehensible and invisible, eternal and unborn, he has existed\n  during endless \u00c6ons in the deepest calmness and tranquillity; and\n  that coexisting with him was Thought, which they also call Grace\n  and Silence. This Depth once bethought him to put forth from\n  himself the beginning of all things and to lay that offshoot--which\n  he had resolved to put forth--like a sperm into the coexisting\n  Silence, as it were into a womb. Now this Silence, being thus\n  impregnated and having conceived, gave birth to Intellect, a\n  being which was like and equal to its Creator, and alone able to\n  comprehend the greatness of its father. This Intellect also they\n  call the Only-begotten and the Beginning of all things.\" [Tr.'s\n  add.]\n\nSomehow or other this must have come to Jacob B\u00f6hme's hearing from the\nHistory of Heresy, and Herr von Schelling must have received it from\nhim in all faith.\n\n\n\u00a7 9. _Leibnitz._\n\nIt was Leibnitz who first formally stated the Principle of Sufficient\nReason as a main principle of all knowledge and of all science. He\nproclaims it very pompously in various passages of his works, giving\nhimself great airs, as though he had been the first to invent it; yet\nall he finds to say about it is, that everything must have a sufficient\nreason for being as it is, and not otherwise: and this the world had\nprobably found out before him. True, he makes casual allusions to the\ndistinction between its two chief significations, without, however,\nlaying any particular stress upon it, or explaining it clearly anywhere\nelse. The principal reference to it is in his \"Principia Philosophi\u00e6,\"\n\u00a7 32, and a little more satisfactorily in the French version, entitled\n\"Monadologie\": _En vertu du principe de la raison suffisante, nous\nconsid\u00e9rons qu'aucun fait ne sauroit se trouver vrai ou existant,\naucune \u00e9nonciation v\u00e9ritable, sans qu'il y ait une raison suffisante,\npourquoi il en soit ainsi et non pas autrement_.[40]\n\n  [40] Compare with this \u00a7 44 of his \"Theodic\u00e9e,\" and his 5th letter\n  to Clarke, \u00a7 125.\n\n\n\u00a7 10. _Wolf._\n\nThe first writer who explicitly separated the two chief significations\nof our principle, and stated the difference between them in detail,\nwas therefore Wolf. Wolf, however, does not place the principle of\nsufficient reason in Logic, as is now the custom, but in Ontology.\nTrue, in \u00a7 71 he urges the necessity of not confounding the principle\nof sufficient reason of knowing with that of cause and effect; still\nhe does not clearly determine here wherein the difference consists.\nIndeed, he himself mistakes the one for the other; for he quotes\ninstances of cause and effect in confirmation of the _principium\nrationis sufficientis_ in this very chapter, _de ratione sufficiente_,\n\u00a7\u00a7 70, 74, 75, 77, which, had he really wished to preserve that\ndistinction, ought rather to have been quoted in the chapter _de\ncausis_ of the same work. In said chapter he again brings forward\nprecisely similar instances, and once more enunciates the _principium\ncognoscendi_ (\u00a7 876), which does not certainly belong to it, having\nbeen already discussed, yet which serves to introduce the immediately\nfollowing clear and definite distinction between this principle and\nthe law of causality, \u00a7\u00a7 881-884. _Principium_, he continues, _dicitur\nid, quod in se continet rationem alterius_; and he distinguishes\n_three_ kinds: 1. PRINCIPIUM FIENDI (_causa_), which he defines as\n_ratio actualitatis alterius_, e.g., _si lapis calescit, ignis aut\nradii solares sunt rationes, cur calor lapidi insit_.--2. PRINCIPIUM\nESSENDI, which he defines as _ratio possibilitatis alterius; in eodem,\nexemplo, ratio possibilitatis, cur lapis calorem recipere possit, est\nin essentia seu modo compositionis lapidis_. This last conception seems\nto me inadmissible. If it has any meaning at all, possibility means\ncorrespondence with the general conditions of experience known to us _\u00e0\npriori_, as Kant has sufficiently shown. From these conditions we know,\nwith respect to Wolf's instance of the stone, that changes are possible\nas effects proceeding from causes: we know, that is, that one state can\nsucceed another, if the former contains the conditions for the latter.\nIn this case we find, as effect, the state of being warm in the stone;\nas cause, the preceding state of a limited capacity for warmth in the\nstone and its contact with free heat. Now, Wolf's naming the first\nmentioned property of this state _principium essendi_, and the second,\n_principium fiendi_, rests upon a delusion caused by the fact that, so\nfar as the stone is concerned, the conditions are more lasting and can\ntherefore wait longer for the others. That the stone should be as it\nis: that is, that it should be chemically so constituted as to bring\nwith it a particular degree of specific heat, consequently a capacity\nfor heat which stands in inverse proportion to its specific heat; that\nbesides it should, on the other hand, come into contact with free\nheat, is the consequence of a whole chain of antecedent causes, all of\nthem _principia fiendi_; but it is the coincidence of circumstances\non both sides which primarily constitutes that condition, upon which,\nas cause, the becoming warm depends, as effect. All this leaves no\nroom for Wolf's _principium essendi_, which I therefore do not admit,\nand concerning which I have here entered somewhat into detail, partly\nbecause I mean to use the word myself later on in a totally different\nsense; partly also, because this explanation contributes to facilitate\nthe comprehension of the law of causality.--3. Wolf, as we have said,\ndistinguishes a PRINCIPIUM COGNOSCENDI, and refers also under _causa_\nto a _causa impulsiva, sive ratio voluntatem determinans_.\n\n\n\u00a7 11. _Philosophers between Wolf and Kant._\n\nBaumgarten repeats the Wolfian distinctions in his \"Metaphysica,\" \u00a7\u00a7\n20-24, and \u00a7\u00a7 306-313.\n\nReimarus, in his \"Vernunftlehre,\"[41] \u00a7 81, distinguishes 1. _Inward\nreason_, of which his explanation agrees with Wolf's _ratio essendi_,\nand might even be applicable to the _ratio cognoscendi_, if he did\nnot transfer to things what only applies to conceptions; 2. _Outward\nreason_, i.e. _causa_.--\u00a7 120 _et seqq._, he rightly defines the\n_ratio cognoscendi_ as a condition of the proposition; but in an\nexample, \u00a7 125, he nevertheless confounds it with cause.\n\n  [41] Doctrine of Reason.\n\nLambert, in the new Organon, does not mention Wolf's distinctions;\nhe shows, however, that he recognizes a difference between reason\nof knowledge and cause;[42] for he says that God is the _principium\nessendi_ of truths, and that truths are the _principia cognoscendi_ of\nGod.\n\n  [42] Lambert, \"New Organon,\" vol. i. \u00a7 572.\n\nPlattner, in his Aphorisms, \u00a7 868, says: \"What is called reason\nand conclusion within our knowledge (_principium cognoscendi,\nratio--rationatum_), is in reality cause and effect (_causa\nefficiens--effectus_). Every cause is a reason, every effect a\nconclusion.\" He is therefore of opinion that cause and effect, in\nreality, correspond to the conceptions reason and consequence in our\nthought; that the former stand in a similar relation with respect\nto the latter as substance and accident, for instance, to subject\nand predicate, or the quality of the object to our sensation of that\nquality, &c. &c. I think it useless to refute this opinion, for it is\neasy to see that premisses and conclusion in judgments stand in an\nentirely different relation to one another from a knowledge of cause\nand effect; although in individual cases even knowledge of a cause, as\nsuch, may be the reason of a judgment which enunciates the effect.[43]\n\n  [43] Compare \u00a7 36. of this treatise.\n\n\n\u00a7 12. _Hume._\n\nNo one before this serious thinker had ever doubted what follows.\nFirst, and before all things in heaven and on earth, is the Principle\nof Sufficient Reason in the form of the Law of Causality. For it is a\n_veritas \u00e6terna_: _i.e._ it is in and by itself above Gods and Fate;\nwhereas everything else, the understanding, for instance, which thinks\nthat principle, and no less the whole world and whatever may be its\ncause--atoms, motion, a Creator, _et c\u00e6tera_--is what it is only in\naccordance with, and by virtue of, that principle. Hume was the first\nto whom it occurred to inquire whence this law of causality derives its\nauthority, and to demand its credentials. Everyone knows the result\nat which he arrives: that causality is nothing beyond the empirically\nperceived succession of things and states in Time, with which habit has\nmade us familiar. The fallacy of this result is felt at once, nor is\nit difficult to refute. The merit lies in the question itself; for it\nbecame the impulse and starting-point for Kant's profound researches,\nand by their means led to an incomparably deeper and more thorough\nview of Idealism than the one which had hitherto existed, and which\nwas chiefly Berkeley's. It led to transcendental Idealism, from which\narises the conviction, that the world is as dependent upon us, as a\nwhole, as we are dependent upon it in detail. For, by pointing out the\nexistence of those transcendental principles, as such, which enable us\nto determine _\u00e0 priori_, _i.e._ before all experience, certain points\nconcerning objects and their possibility, he proved that these things\ncould not exist, as they present themselves to us, independently of our\nknowledge. The resemblance between a world such as this and a dream, is\nobvious.\n\n\n\u00a7 13. _Kant and his School._\n\nKant's chief passage on the Principle of Sufficient Reason is in\na little work entitled \"On a discovery, which is to permit us to\ndispense with all Criticism of Pure Reason.\"[44] Section I., _lit._ A.\nHere he strongly urges the distinction between \"the logical (formal)\nprinciple of cognition 'every proposition must have its reason,' and\nthe transcendental (material) principle 'every thing must have its\ncause,'\" in his controversy with Eberhard, who had identified them as\none and the same.--I intend myself to criticize Kant's proof of the\n_\u00e0 priori_ and consequently transcendental character of the law of\ncausality further on in a separate paragraph, after having given the\nonly true proof.\n\n  [44] \"Ueber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle Kritik der reinen\n  Vernunft entbehrlich gemacht werden soll.\"\n\nWith these precedents to guide them, the several writers on Logic\nbelonging to Kant's school; Hofbauer, Maass, Jakob, Kiesewetter\nand others, have defined pretty accurately the distinction between\nreason and cause. Kiesewetter, more especially, gives it thus quite\nsatisfactorily:[45] \"Reason of knowledge is not to be confounded with\nreason of fact (cause). The Principle of Sufficient Reason belongs\nto Logic, that of Causality to Metaphysics.[46] The former is the\nfundamental principle of thought; the latter that of experience.\nCause refers to real things, logical reason has only to do with\nrepresentations.\"\n\n  [45] Kiesewetter, \"Logik,\" vol. i. p. 16.\n\n  [46] _Ibid._ p. 60.\n\nKant's adversaries urge this distinction still more strongly. G. E.\nSchultze[47] complains that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is\nconfounded with that of Causality. Salomon Maimon[48] regrets that so\nmuch should be said about the sufficient reason without an explanation\nof what is meant by it, while he blames Kant[49] for deriving the\nprinciple of causality from the logical form of hypothetical judgments.\n\n  [47] G. E. Schultze, \"Logik,\" \u00a7 19, Anmerkung 1, und \u00a7 63.\n\n  [48] Sal. Maimon, \"Logik,\" p. 20, 21.\n\n  [49] _Ibid._ \"Vorrede,\" p. xxiv.\n\nF. H. Jacobi[50] says, that by the confounding of the two conceptions,\nreason and cause, an illusion is produced, which has given rise to\nvarious false speculations; and he points out the distinction between\nthem after his own fashion. Here, however, as is usual with him,\nwe find a good deal more of self-complacent phrase-jugglery than of\nserious philosophy.\n\n  [50] Jacobi, \"Briefe \u00fcber die Lehre des Spinoza,\" Beilage 7, p. 414.\n\nHow Herr von Schelling finally distinguishes reason from cause, may be\nseen in his \"Aphorisms introductory to the Philosophy of Nature,\"[51]\n\u00a7 184, which open the first book of the first volume of Marcus and\nSchelling's \"Annals of Medecine.\" Here we are taught that gravity is\nthe _reason_ and light the _cause_ of all things. This I merely quote\nas a curiosity; for such random talk would not otherwise deserve a\nplace among the opinions of serious and honest inquirers.\n\n  [51] \"Aphorismen zur Einleitung in die Naturphilosophie.\"\n\n\n\u00a7 14. _On the Proofs of the Principle._\n\nWe have still to record various fruitless attempts which have been\nmade to prove the Principle of Sufficient Reason, mostly without\nclearly defining in which sense it was taken: Wolf's, for instance,\nin his Ontology, \u00a7 70, repeated by Baumgarten in his \"Metaphysics,\"\n\u00a7 20. It is useless to repeat and refute it here, as it obviously\nrests on a verbal quibble. Plattner[52] and Jakob[53] have tried other\nproofs, in which, however, the circle is easily detected. I purpose\ndealing with those of Kant further on, as I have already said. Since\nI hope, in the course of this treatise, to point out the different\nlaws of our cognitive faculties, of which the principle of sufficient\nreason is the common expression, it will result as a matter of course,\nthat this principle cannot be proved, and that, on the contrary,\nAristotle's remark:[54] \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9 \u1f67\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2. \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\n\u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03be\u03af\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 (_rationem eorum qu\u00e6rant, quorum non est\nratio: demonstrationis enim principium non est demonstratio_) may be\napplied with equal propriety to all these proofs. For every proof is a\nreference to something already recognised; and if we continue requiring\na proof again for this something, whatever it be, we at last arrive at\ncertain propositions which express the forms and laws, therefore the\nconditions, of all thought and of all knowledge, in the application\nof which consequently all thought and all knowledge consists: so that\ncertainty is nothing but correspondence with those conditions, forms,\nand laws, therefore their own certainty cannot again be ascertained by\nmeans of other propositions. In the fifth chapter I mean to discuss the\nkind of truth which belongs to propositions such as these.\n\n  [52] Plattner, \"Aphorismen,\" \u00a7 828.\n\n  [53] Jakob, \"Logik und Metaphysik,\" p. 38 (1794).\n\n  [54] Aristotle, \"Metaph.\" iii. 6. \"They seek a reason for that\n  which has no reason; for the principle of demonstration is not\n  demonstration.\" [Tr.'s add.] Compare with this citation \"Analyt.\n  post.\" i. 2.\n\nTo seek a proof for the Principle of Sufficient Reason, is, moreover,\nan especially flagrant absurdity, which shows a want of reflection.\nEvery proof is a demonstration of the reason for a judgment which has\nbeen pronounced, and which receives the predicate _true_ in virtue\nprecisely of that demonstration. This necessity for a reason is exactly\nwhat the Principle of Sufficient Reason expresses. Now if we require\na proof of it, or, in other words, a demonstration of its reason,\nwe thereby already assume it to be true, nay, we found our demand\nprecisely upon that assumption, and thus we find ourselves involved in\nthe circle of exacting a proof of our right to exact a proof.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nINSUFFICIENCY OF THE OLD AND OUTLINES OF A NEW DEMONSTRATION.\n\n\n\u00a7 15. _Cases which are not comprised among the old established meanings\nof the Principle._\n\nFrom the summary given in the preceding chapter we gather, that two\ndistinct applications of the principle of sufficient reason have\nbeen recognized, although very gradually, very tardily, and not\nwithout frequent relapses into error and confusion: the one being its\napplication to judgments, which, to be true, must have a reason; the\nother, its application to changes in material objects, which must\nalways have a cause. In both cases we find the principle of sufficient\nreason authorizing us to ask _why?_ a quality which is essential to it.\nBut are all the cases in which it authorizes us to ask _why_ comprised\nin these two relations? If I ask: Why are the three sides of this\ntriangle equal? the answer is: Because the three angles are so. Now,\nis the equality of the angles the cause of the equality of the sides?\nNo; for here we have to do with no change, consequently with no effect\nwhich must have a cause.--Is it merely a logical reason? No; for the\nequality of the angle is not only a proof of the equality of the sides,\nit is not only the foundation of a judgment: mere conceptions alone\nwould never suffice to explain why the sides must be equal, because\nthe angles are so; for the conception of the equality of the sides is\nnot contained in that of the equality of the angles. Here therefore\nwe have no connection between conceptions and judgments, but between\nsides and angles. The equality of the angles is not the _direct_, but\nthe _indirect_ reason, by which we know the equality of the sides; for\nit is the reason why a thing is such as it is (in this case, that the\nsides are equal): the angles being equal, the sides must therefore\nbe equal. Here we have a necessary connection between angles and\nsides, not a direct, necessary connection between two judgments.--Or\nagain, if I ask why _infecta facta_, but never _facta infecta fieri\npossunt_, consequently why the past is absolutely irrevocable, the\nfuture inevitable, even this does not admit of purely logical proof\nby means of mere abstract conceptions, nor does it belong either\nto causality, which only rules _occurrences_ within Time, not Time\nitself. The present hour hurled the preceding one into the bottomless\npit of the past, not through causality, but immediately, through its\nmere existence, which existence was nevertheless inevitable. It is\nimpossible to make this comprehensible or even clearer by means of\nmere conceptions; we recognise it, on the contrary, quite directly and\ninstinctively, just as we recognize the difference between right and\nleft and all that depends upon it: for instance, that our left glove\nwill not fit our right hand, &c. &c.\n\nNow, as all those cases in which the principle of sufficient reason\nfinds its application cannot therefore be reduced to logical reason and\nconsequence and to cause and effect, the law of specification cannot\nhave been sufficiently attended to in this classification. The law of\nhomogeneity, however, obliges us to assume, that these cases cannot\ndiffer to infinity, but that they may be reduced to certain species.\nNow, before attempting this classification, it will be necessary to\ndetermine what is peculiar to the principle of sufficient reason in all\ncases, as its special characteristic; because the conception of the\ngenus must always be determined before the conception of the species.\n\n\n\u00a7 16. _The Roots of the Principle of Sufficient Reason._\n\n_Our knowing consciousness, which manifests itself as outer and inner\nSensibility_ (or receptivity) _and as Understanding and Reason,\nsubdivides itself into Subject and Object and contains nothing else. To\nbe Object for the Subject and to be our representation, are the same\nthing. All our representations stand towards one another in a regulated\nconnection, which may be determined_ \u00c0 PRIORI, _and on account of\nwhich, nothing existing separately and independently, nothing single or\ndetached, can become an Object for us_. It is this connection which is\nexpressed by the Principle of Sufficient Reason in its generality. Now,\nalthough, as may be gathered from what has gone before, this connection\nassumes different forms according to the different kinds of objects,\nwhich forms are differently expressed by the Principle of Sufficient\nReason; still the connection retains what is common to all these forms,\nand this is expressed in a general and abstract way by our principle.\nThe relations upon which it is founded, and which will be more closely\nindicated in this treatise, are what I call the Root of the Principle\nof Sufficient Reason. Now, on closer inspection, according to the laws\nof homogeneity and of specification, these relations separate into\ndistinct species, which differ widely from each other. Their number,\nhowever, may be reduced to _four_, according to the _four_ classes into\nwhich everything that can become an object for us--that is to say, all\nour representations--may be divided. These classes will be stated and\nconsidered in the following four chapters.\n\nWe shall see the Principle of Sufficient Reason appear under a\ndifferent form in each of them; but it will also show itself under all\nas the same principle and as derived from the said root, precisely\nbecause it admits of being expressed as above.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nON THE FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT, AND THAT FORM OF THE\nPRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON WHICH PREDOMINATES IN IT.\n\n\n\u00a7 17. _General Account of this Class of Objects._\n\nThe first class of objects possible to our representative faculty, is\nthat of _intuitive, complete, empirical_ representations. They are\n_intuitive_ as opposed to mere thoughts, _i.e._ abstract conceptions;\nthey are _complete_, inasmuch as, according to Kant's distinction,\nthey not only contain the formal, but also the material part of\nphenomena; and they are _empirical_, partly as proceeding, not from a\nmere connection of thoughts, but from an excitation of feeling in our\nsensitive organism, as their origin, to which they constantly refer\nfor evidence as to their reality: partly also because they are linked\ntogether, according to the united laws of Space, Time and Causality,\nin that complex without beginning or end which forms our _Empirical\nReality_. As, nevertheless, according to the result of Kant's teaching,\nthis _Empirical Reality_ does not annul their _Transcendental\nIdeality_, we shall consider them here, where we have only to do with\nthe formal elements of knowledge, merely as representations.\n\n\n\u00a7 18. _Outline of a Transcendental Analysis of Empirical Reality._\n\nThe forms of these representations are those of the inner and outer\nsense; namely, _Time_ and _Space_. But these are only _perceptible_\nwhen _filled_. Their _perceptibility_ is _Matter_, to which I shall\nreturn further on, and again in \u00a7 21. _If Time were the only form_\nof these representations, there could be no _coexistence_, therefore\nnothing _permanent_ and no _duration_. For _Time_ is only perceived\nwhen filled, and its course is only perceived by the _changes_ which\ntake place in that which fills it. The _permanence_ of an object\nis therefore only recognized by contrast with the _changes_ going\non in other objects _coexistent_ with it. But the representation\nof _coexistence_ is impossible in Time alone; it depends, for its\ncompletion, upon the representation of _Space_; because, in mere Time,\nall things _follow one another_, and in mere Space all things are _side\nby side_; it is accordingly only by the combination of Time and Space\nthat the representation of coexistence arises.\n\n_On the other hand, were Space the sole form_ of this class of\nrepresentations, there would be no _change_; for change or alteration\nis _succession_ of states, and _succession_ is only possible in _Time_.\nWe may therefore define Time as the possibility of opposite states in\none and the same thing.\n\nThus we see, that although infinite divisibility and infinite\nextension are common to both Time and Space, these two forms of\nempirical representations differ fundamentally, inasmuch as what is\nessential to the _one_ is without any meaning at all for the _other_:\njuxtaposition having no meaning in Time, succession no meaning in\nSpace. The empirical representations which belong to the orderly\ncomplex of reality, appear notwithstanding in both forms together;\nnay, the _intimate union_ of both is the condition of reality which,\nin a sense, grows out of them, as a product grows out of its factors.\nNow it is the Understanding which, by means of its own peculiar\nfunction, brings about this _union_ and connects these heterogeneous\nforms in such a manner, that _empirical reality_--albeit only for\nthat Understanding--arises out of their mutual interpenetration, and\narises as a collective representation, forming a complex, held together\nby the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, but whose limits\nare problematical. Each single representation belonging to this class\nis a part of this complex, each one taking its place in it according\nto laws known to us _\u00e0 priori_; in it therefore countless objects\n_coexist_, because Substance, _i.e._ Matter, remains permanent in\nspite of the ceaseless flow of Time, and because its states change in\nspite of the rigid immobility of Space. In this complex, in short,\nthe whole objective, real world exists for us. The reader who may be\ninterested in this, will find the present rough sketch of the analysis\nof empirical reality further worked out in \u00a7 4 of the first volume of\n\"Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,\"[55] where a closer explanation\nis given of the way in which the Understanding effects this union\nand thus creates for itself the empirical world. He will also find a\nvery important help in the table, \"_Pr\u00e6dicabilia \u00e0 priori_ of Time,\nSpace, and Matter,\" which is added to the fourth chapter of the second\nvolume of the same work, and which I recommend to his attention, as\nit especially shows how the contrasts of Time and Space are equally\nbalanced in Matter, as their product, under the form of Causality.\n\n  [55] Vol. i. p. 12, and _seqq._ of the 1st edition; p. 9 of the 3rd\n  edition.\n\nWe shall now proceed to give a detailed exposition of that function\nof the Understanding which is the basis of empirical reality; only we\nmust first, by a few incidental explanations, remove the more immediate\nobjections which the fundamental idealism of the view I have adopted\nmight encounter.\n\n\n\u00a7 19. _Immediate Presence of Representations._\n\nNow as, notwithstanding this union through the Understanding of the\nforms of the inner and outer sense in representing Matter and with it\na permanent outer world, all _immediate_ knowledge is nevertheless\nacquired by the Subject through the _inner_ sense alone--the outer\nsense being again Object for the inner, which in its turn perceives\nthe perceptions of the outer--and as therefore, with respect to the\n_immediate presence_ of representations in its consciousness, the\nSubject remains under the rule of _Time_ alone, as the form of the\n_inner sense_:[56] it follows, that only one representation can be\npresent to it (the Subject) at the same time, although that one may\nbe very complicated. When we speak of representations as _immediately\npresent_, we mean, that they are not only known in the union of Time\nand Space effected by the Understanding--an intuitive faculty, as\nwe shall soon see--through which the collective representation of\nempirical reality arises, but that they are known in mere Time alone,\nas representations of the inner sense, and just at the neutral point at\nwhich its two currents separate, called the _present_. The necessary\ncondition mentioned in the preceding paragraph for the immediate\npresence of a representation of this class, is its causal action upon\nour senses and consequently upon our organism, which itself belongs\nto this class of objects, and is therefore subject to the causal law\nwhich predominates in it and which we are now about to examine. Now\nas therefore, on the one hand, according to the laws of the inner and\nouter world, the Subject cannot stop short at that one representation;\nbut as, on the other hand, there is no coexistence in Time alone:\nthat single representation must always vanish and be superseded by\nothers, in virtue of a law which we cannot determine _\u00e0 priori_, but\nwhich depends upon circumstances soon to be mentioned. It is moreover\na well-known fact, that the imagination and dreams reproduce the\nimmediate presence of representations; the investigation of that fact,\nhowever, belongs to empirical Psychology. Now as, notwithstanding the\ntransitory, isolated nature of our representations with respect to\ntheir immediate presence in our consciousness, the Subject nevertheless\nretains the representation of an all-comprehensive complex of reality,\nas described above, by means of the function of the Understanding;\nrepresentations have, on the strength of this antithesis, been viewed,\nas something quite different when considered as belonging to that\ncomplex than when considered with reference to their immediate presence\nin our consciousness. From the former point of view they were called\n_real things_; from the latter only, representations \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4' \u1f10\u03be\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd. This\nview of the matter, which is the ordinary one, is known under the\nname of _Realism_. On the appearance of modern philosophy, _Idealism_\nopposed itself to this _Realism_ and has since been steadily gaining\nground. Malebranche and Berkeley were its earliest representatives,\nand Kant enhanced it to the power of Transcendental Idealism, by\nwhich the co-existence of the Empirical Reality of things with their\nTranscendental Ideality becomes conceivable, and according to which\nKant expresses himself as follows:[57] \"_Transcendental Idealism_\nteaches that all phenomena are representations only, not things\nby themselves.\" And again:[58] \"Space itself is nothing but mere\nrepresentation, and whatever is in it must therefore be contained in\nthat representation. There is nothing whatever in Space, except so\nfar as it is really represented in it.\" Finally he says:[59] \"If we\ntake away the thinking Subject, the whole material world must vanish;\nbecause it is nothing but a phenomenon in the sensibility of our own\nsubject and a certain class of its representations.\" In India, Idealism\nis even a doctrine of popular religion, not only of Brahminism, but\nof Buddhism; in Europe alone is it a paradox, in consequence of the\nessentially and unavoidably realistic principle of Judaism. But\nRealism quite overlooks the fact, that the so-called existence of\nthese real things is _absolutely nothing but their being represented_\n(_ein Vorgestellt-werden_), or--if it be insisted, that only the\nimmediate presence in the consciousness of the Subject can be called\nbeing represented \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4' \u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd--it is even only a possibility of\nbeing represented \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd. The realist forgets that the Object\nceases to be Object apart from its reference to the Subject, and that\nif we take away that reference, or think it away, we at once do away\nwith all objective existence. Leibnitz, while he clearly felt the\nSubject to be the necessary condition for the Object, was nevertheless\nunable to get rid of the thought that objects exist by themselves\nand independently of all reference whatsoever to the Subject, _i.e._\nindependently of being represented. He therefore assumed in the first\nplace a world of objects exactly like the world of representations\nand running parallel with it, having no direct, but only an outward\nconnection with it by means of a _harmonia pr\u00e6stabilita_;--obviously\nthe most superfluous thing possible, for it never comes within\nperception, and the precisely similar world of representations which\ndoes come within perception, goes its own way regardless of it. When,\nhowever, he wanted to determine more closely the essence of these\nthings existing objectively in themselves, he found himself obliged\nto declare the Objects in themselves to be Subjects (_monades_), and\nby doing so he furnished the most striking proof of the inability of\nour consciousness, in as far as it is merely cognitive, to find within\nthe limits of the intellect--_i.e._ of the apparatus by means of\nwhich we represent the world--anything beyond Subject and Object; the\nrepresenter and the represented. Therefore, if we abstract from the\nobjectivity of an Object, or in other words, from its being represented\n(_Vorgestellt-werden_), if we annul it in its quality as an Object,\nyet still wish to retain something, we can meet with nothing but _the\nSubject_. Conversely, if we desire to abstract from the subjectivity of\nthe Subject, yet to have something over, the contrary takes place, and\nthis leads to Materialism.\n\n  [56] Compare Kant, \"Krit. d. r. Vern.\" Elementarlehre. Abschnitt\n  ii. Schl\u00fcsse a. d. Begr. _b_ and _c_. 1st edition, pp. 33 and 34;\n  5th edition, p. 49. (Transl. M. M\u00fcller, p. 29, _b_ and _c_.)\n\n  [57] Kant, \"Krit. d. r. V.\" Kritik des Vierten Paralogismus der\n  transcendentalen Psychologie, p. 369, 1st edition. (Engl. Transl.\n  by M. M\u00fcller, p. 320.)\n\n  [58] _Ibid._ 1st edition, pp. 374-375. Note. (Engl. Transl. p. 325.\n  Note.)\n\n  [59] Kant, \"Krit. d. r. V.\" \"Betrachtung \u00fcber die Summe,\" &c., p.\n  383 of 1st edition. (Engl. Transl. p. 331.)\n\nSpinoza, who never thoroughly sifted the matter, and never therefore\nacquired a clear notion of it, nevertheless quite understood the\nnecessary correlation between Subject and Object as so essential, that\nthey are inconceivable without it; consequently he defined it as an\nidentity in the Substance (which alone exists) of that which knows,\nwith that which has extension.\n\n    OBSERVATION.--With reference to the chief argument of this\n    paragraph, I take the opportunity to remark that if, in the\n    course of this treatise, for the sake of brevity and in order\n    to be more easily understood, I at any time use the term _real\n    objects_, I mean by it nothing but the intuitive representations\n    that are united to form the complex of empirical reality, which\n    reality in itself always remains ideal.\n\n\n\u00a7 20. _Principle of Sufficient Reason of Becoming._\n\nIn the Class of Objects for the Subject just described, the principle\nof sufficient reason figures as the _Law of Causality_, and, as such,\nI call it the _Principle of Sufficient Reason of Becoming, principium\nrationis sufficientis fiendi_. By it, all objects presenting\nthemselves within the entire range of our representation are linked\ntogether, as far as the appearance and disappearance of their states\nis concerned, _i.e._ in the movement of the current of Time, to form\nthe complex of empirical reality. The law of causality is as follows.\nWhen one or several real objects pass into any new state, some other\nstate must have preceded this one, upon which the new state regularly\nfollows, _i.e._ as often as that preceding one occurs. This sort of\nfollowing we call _resulting_; the first of the states being named\na _cause_, the second an _effect_. When a substance takes fire, for\ninstance, this state of ignition must have been preceded by a state,\n1^o, of affinity to oxygen; 2^o, of contact with oxygen; 3^o, of a\ngiven temperature. Now, as ignition must necessarily follow immediately\nupon this state, and as it has only just taken place, that state\ncannot always have been there, but must, on the contrary, have only\njust supervened. This supervening is called a _change_. It is on this\naccount that the law of causality stands in exclusive relation to\n_changes_ and has to do with them alone. Every effect, at the time\nit takes place, is a _change_ and, precisely by not having occurred\nsooner, infallibly indicates some other _change_ by which it has been\npreceded. That other _change_ takes the name of _cause_, when referred\nto the following one--of _effect_, when referred to a third necessarily\npreceding _change_. This is the chain of causality. It is necessarily\nwithout a beginning. By it, each supervening state must have resulted\nfrom a preceding change: in the case just mentioned, for instance,\nfrom the substance being brought into contact with free heat, from\nwhich necessarily resulted the heightened temperature; this contact\nagain depended upon a preceding change, for instance the sun's rays\nfalling upon a burning-glass; this again upon the removal of a cloud\nfrom before the sun; this upon the wind; the wind upon the unequal\ndensity of the atmosphere; this upon other conditions, and so forth\n_in infinitum_. When a state contains all the requisite conditions for\nbringing about a new state excepting _one, this one_, when at last it\narrives, is, in a sense, rightly called the cause \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4' \u1f10\u03be\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd, inasmuch\nas we here have the final--in this case the decisive--change especially\nin view; but if we leave out this consideration, no single condition\nof the causal state has any advantage over the rest with reference to\nthe determination of the causal connection in general, merely because\nit happens to be the last. Thus the removal of the cloud in the above\nexample, is in so far the cause of the igniting, as it took place later\nthan the direction of the burning-glass towards the object; but this\nmight have taken place after the removal of the cloud and the addition\nof oxygen might have occurred later still: in this respect therefore it\nis the accidental order of things that determines which is the cause.\nOn closer inspection, however, we find that it is _the entire state_\nwhich is the cause of the ensuing one, so that the chronological order\nin which its single conditions were brought about, is in all essential\nrespects indifferent. With reference to a given case therefore, the\nlast occurring condition of a state may be called the cause \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4'\n\u1f10\u03be\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd, because it completes the measure of the necessary conditions,\nand its appearance thus becomes the decisive change. For purposes of\ngeneral consideration, however, it is only the _entire_ state which, by\nbringing about its successor, can be regarded as the cause. The single\nrequisites which, added together, complete and constitute the cause may\nbe called causal elements (_urs\u00e4chliche Momente_) or even _conditions_,\nand into these accordingly the cause may be subdivided. On the other\nhand, it is quite wrong to call the objects themselves causes, instead\nof the states: some would, for instance, call the burning-glass in the\nabove example the cause of the ignition; while others, again, would\ncall the cloud the cause; others the sun or the oxygen, and so on\narbitrarily and without order. But it is absurd to call an object the\ncause of another object; first of all, because objects not only contain\nform and quality, but _Matter_ also, which has neither beginning\nor end; secondly, because the law of causality refers exclusively\nto _changes_, _i.e._ to the entrance and exit of states in Time,\nwherein it regulates that special relation, in reference to which the\nearlier state is called _cause_, the later _effect_, and the necessary\nconnection between both, the _resulting_ of the one from the other.\n\nI here refer the thoughtful reader to the explanations I have given\nin my chief work.[60] For it is of the highest importance that our\nconception of the true and proper meaning of the law of causality and\nthe sphere of its validity should be perfectly clear and definite:\nbefore all things, that we should recognize, that this law refers\nsolely and exclusively to _changes_ of material states and to nothing\nelse whatever; consequently, that it ought not to be brought in when\n_these_ are not in question. The law of causality is the regulator of\nthe _changes_ undergone in Time by objects of our outer _experience_;\nbut these objects are all material. Each change can only be brought\nabout by another having preceded it, which is determined by a rule, and\nthen the new change takes place as being necessarily induced by the\npreceding one. This necessity is the causal nexus.\n\n  [60] \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" vol. ii. chap. 4, especially p. 42 and\n  _seq._ of the 2nd edition; p. 46 _seq._ of the 3rd edition.\n\nHowever simple therefore the law of causality is, we nevertheless\nfind it expressed quite differently in all philosophical manuals,\nfrom the earliest down to the latest ages: namely, in a broader, more\nabstract, therefore less definite way. We are, for instance, informed,\nnow, that it is that by which something else comes into being; now,\nthat it is what produces another thing or gives it reality, &c. &c.\nWolf says: _Causa est principium, a quo existentia, sive actualitas,\nentis alterius dependet_; whereas it is obvious that in causality we\nhave only to do with changes in the form of uncreated, indestructible\nMatter, and that a springing into existence of what did not previously\nexist is an impossibility. Want of clearness of thought may, no\ndoubt, in most cases have led to these views of the causal relation;\nbut surely sometimes an _arri\u00e8re-pens\u00e9e_ lurks in the background--a\ntheological intention coqueting with the Cosmological Proof, for whose\nsake it is ready to falsify even transcendental, _\u00e0 priori_ truths, the\nmother's milk of human understanding. We find the clearest instance of\nthis in Thomas Brown's book, \"On the Relation of Cause and Effect,\"\na work of 460 pages, which, in 1835, had already reached its fourth\nedition, and has probably since gone through several more, and which,\nin spite of its wearisome, pedantic, rambling prolixity, does not\nhandle the subject badly. Now this Englishman rightly recognises, that\nit is invariably with _changes_ that the causal law has to do, and that\nevery effect is accordingly a _change_. Yet, although it can hardly\nhave escaped him, he is unwilling to admit that every cause is likewise\na _change_, and that the whole process is therefore nothing but the\nuninterrupted nexus of _changes_ succeeding one another in Time. On\nthe contrary, he persists in clumsily calling the cause an _object_\nor _substance_, which precedes the change, and in tormenting himself\nthroughout his tedious book with this entirely false expression, which\nspoils all his explanations, notwithstanding his own better knowledge\nand against his conscience, simply in order that his definition may on\nno account stand in the way of the Cosmological Proof, which others\nmight hereafter state elsewhere.--But what can a truth be worth which\nneeds devices such as these to prepare its way?\n\nAnd what have our own worthy, honest German professors of philosophy\nbeen doing in behalf of their dearly beloved Cosmological Proof, since\nKant dealt it the death-blow in his Critique of Pure Reason?--they, who\nprize truth above everything. They were, indeed, at their wits' ends,\nfor--as these worthies well know, though they do not say so--_causa\nprima_ is, just as well as _causa sui_, a _contradictio in adjecto_,\nalbeit the former expression is more generally used than the latter. It\nis besides usually pronounced with a very serious, not to say solemn,\nair; nay, many people, especially English Reverends, turn up their\neyes in a truly edifying way when they impressively and emphatically\nmention that _contradictio in adjecto_: 'the first cause.' They know\nthat a first cause is just as inconceivable as the point at which\nSpace ends or the moment when Time first began. For every cause is\na _change_, which necessarily obliges us to ask for the preceding\nchange that brought it about, and so on _in infinitum, in infinitum_!\nEven a first state of Matter, from which, as it has ceased to be, all\nfollowing states could have proceeded, is inconceivable. For if this\nstate had in itself been the cause of the following ones, they must\nlikewise have existed from all eternity, and the actual state existing\nat the present moment could not have only just now come into being.\nIf, on the other hand, that first state only began to be causal at\nsome given period, something or other must have _changed_ it, for its\ninactivity to have ceased; but then something must have occurred,\nsome change must have taken place; and this again obliges us to ask\nfor its cause--_i.e._ a change which preceded it; and here we are\nonce more on the causal ladder, up which we are whipped step by step,\nhigher and higher, _in infinitum, in infinitum_! (These gentlemen\nwill surely not have the face to talk to me of Matter itself arising\nout of nothing! If so, they will find corollaries at their service\nfurther on.) The causal law therefore is not so accommodating as to\nlet itself be used like a hired cab, which we dismiss when we have\nreached our destination; rather does it resemble the broom brought to\nlife by the apprentice-wizard in G\u00f6the's poem,[61] which, when once\nset in motion, does not leave off running and fetching water until the\nold master-wizard himself stops it, which he alone has the power to\ndo. These gentlemen, however, have no master-wizards among them. So\nwhat did they do, these noble, genuine lovers of truth, ever on the\nalert, of course, to proclaim the advent of real merit to the world as\nsoon as it shows itself in their profession, who far from wishing to\ndivert attention from the works of those who are really what _they_\nonly seem to be, by craftily ignoring and meanly keeping them dark, are\nnaturally foremost to acknowledge their worth--aye, surely, as surely\nas folly loves wisdom above everything? What did they do, I say, to\nhelp their old friend, the sorely distressed Cosmological Proof, now at\nits last gasp? Oh, they hit upon a shrewd device. \"Friend,\" they said,\n\"you are in sorry plight since your fatal encounter with that stubborn\nold man in K\u00f6nigsberg, and indeed your brethren, the Ontological and\nPhysico-theological Proofs are in no better condition. Never mind,\nyou shall not be abandoned by us (that is what we are paid for, you\nknow); only you must alter your dress and your name--there is no help\nfor it--for if we call you by your right name, everyone will take to\nhis heels. Now _incognito_, on the contrary, we can take you by the\narm, and once more lead you into society; only, as we have just said,\nit must be _incognito_! That is sure to answer! First of all, your\nargument must henceforth be called _The Absolute_. This has a foreign,\ndignified, aristocratic ring; and no one knows better than we do all\nthat can be done with Germans by assuming airs of importance. Of course\nall know what the real meaning is, and pique themselves upon that\nknowledge. But you yourself must come forward disguised, in the form\nof an enthymeme. Be sure and leave behind you all those prosyllogisms\nand premisses, by which you used to drag us wearily up the long climax,\nfor everyone knows how utterly useless they are. Come forward with\na bold face and a self-sufficient, supercilious air, like a man of\nfew words, and at one bound you will reach the goal. Exclaim (and we\nwill chime in), '_The Absolute_, confound it! _that_ must _exist_,\nor there would be nothing at all!' Here, strike the table with your\nfist. Whence does the Absolute come? 'What a silly question! Did not\nI tell you it was the Absolute?'--That will do, forsooth! That will\ndo! Germans are accustomed to content themselves with words instead of\nthoughts. Do we not train them to it from their cradle? Only look at\nHegelianism! What is it but empty, hollow, nauseous twaddle! Yet how\nbrilliant a career was that of this philosophical time-server! A few\nmercenary individuals had only to strike up a laudation of this stuff,\nand they at once found an echo to their voices in the empty hollow of\na thousand numskulls--an echo which still continues to resound, and\nto extend--and behold! an ordinary intellect, a common impostor soon\nbecame a sublime thinker. Take heart, therefore! Besides, our friend\nand patron, we will also second you in other ways, for how, indeed,\nare we to get a living without you? So that carping old faultfinder,\nKant, has been criticizing Reason, and clipping her wings, has he?\nWell, then, we will invent a _new_ sort of Reason, such as has never\nbeen heard of--a Reason that does not think, but which has direct\nintuition--a Reason which sees Ideas (a high-flown word, made to\nmystify), sees them bodily; or which apprehends directly that which you\nand others seek to prove; or, again, a Reason which has forebodings of\nall this--this last for the benefit of those who do not care to make\nlarge concessions, but also are satisfied with very little. Let us thus\npass off early inculcated, popular conceptions for direct revelations\nof this new kind of Reason, _i.e._ for inspirations from above. As for\nthat old-fashioned Reason, which criticism has criticized away, let\nus degrade it, call it Understanding, and send it about its business.\nWell, and what is to become of real, true Understanding?--What in\nthe world have we to do with real, true Understanding?--You smile\nincredulously; but we know our listeners, and the _harum_, _horum_ we\nsee on the students' benches before us. Bacon of Verulam already in\nhis time said: 'Young men learn to believe at Universities.' Of this\nthey can learn as much as they wish from us; we have a good stock of\narticles of faith on hand. Should any misgivings assail you, remember\nthat we are in Germany, where what would have been impossible in any\nother country, has been found possible: where a dull-witted, ignorant,\npseudo-philosopher, whose ineffably hollow verbiage disorganizes\npeoples' brains completely and permanently, a scribbler of nonsense--I\nam speaking of our dearly beloved Hegel--has not only been actually\nproclaimed a profound thinker with impunity, and even without incurring\nridicule, but is readily accepted as such: yes, indeed, for this\nfiction has found credence for the last thirty years, and is believed\nto this day!--Once therefore we have this Absolute with your help,\nwe are quite safe, in spite of Kant and his Critique.--We may then\nphilosophise in a lofty tone, making the Universe proceed from _the\nAbsolute_ by means of the most heterogeneous deductions, one more\ntiresome than the other--this, by the way, being their only point of\nresemblance. We can call the world the Finite, and the Absolute the\nInfinite--thus giving an agreeable variety to our nonsense--and talk\nof nothing but God, explaining how, why, wherefore, by what voluntary\nor involuntary process he created or brought forth the world, showing\nwhether he be within or without it, and so forth, as if Philosophy were\nTheology, and as if it sought for enlightenment concerning God, not\nconcerning the Universe!\"\n\n  [61] G\u00f6the, \"Der Zauberlehrling.\"\n\nThe Cosmological Proof, with which we here have to do, and to which\nthe above apostrophe is addressed, consists thus, properly speaking,\nin the assertion, that the principle of the sufficient reason of\n_becoming_, or the law of causality, necessarily leads to a thought\nwhich destroys it and declares it to be null and void. For the _causa\nprima_ (_absolutum_) can only be reached by proceeding upwards from\nconsequence to reason, through a series prolonged _ad libitum_; but\nit is impossible to stop short at the _causa prima_ without at once\nannulling the principle of sufficient reason.\n\nHaving thus briefly and clearly shown the nullity of the Cosmological\nProof, as I had in my second chapter already shown the nullity of the\nOntological Proof, the sympathizing reader may perhaps expect me to\ndo the same with respect to the Physico-theological Proof, which is a\ngreat deal more plausible. As, however, this belongs by its nature to\na different department of philosophy, it would be quite out of place\nhere. I therefore refer him to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, as well\nas to his Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, where he treats this\nsubject _ex professo_; I likewise refer him, as a complement to Kant's\npurely negative procedure, to my own positive one in \"The Will in\nNature,\"[62] a work which, though small in bulk, is rich and weighty\nin content. As for the indifferent reader, he is free to let this and\nindeed all my writings pass down unread to his descendants. It matters\nnot to me; for I am here, not for one generation only, but for many.\n\n  [62] The translation of which follows the Fourfold Root in the\n  present volume.\n\nNow, as the law of causality is known to us _\u00e0 priori_, and is\ntherefore a transcendental law, applicable to every possible\nexperience and consequently without exception, as will be shown in \u00a7\n21; as moreover it decides, that upon a given, definite, relatively\nfirst state, a second equally definite one inevitably ensues by rule,\n_i.e._, always; the relation between cause and effect is a necessary\none, so that the causal law authorizes us to form hypothetical\njudgments, and thereby shows itself to be a form of the principle of\nsufficient reason, upon which principle all judgments must be founded\nand, as will be shown further on, all _necessity_ is based.\n\nThis form of our principle I call the _principle of the sufficient\nreason of becoming_, because its application invariably pre-supposes a\nchange, the entering upon a new state: consequently a becoming. One of\nits essential characteristics is this: that the cause always precedes\nthe effect in Time (compare \u00a7 47), and this alone gives us the original\ncriterion by which to distinguish which is cause and which effect, of\ntwo states linked together by the causal nexus. Conversely, in some\ncases, the causal nexus is known to us through former experience; but\nthe rapidity with which the different states follow upon each other is\nso great, that the order in which this happens escapes our perception.\nWe then conclude with complete certitude from causality to succession:\nthus, for instance, we infer that the igniting of gunpowder precedes\nits explosion.[63]\n\n  [63] Here I refer my readers to \"Die Welt als Wills und\n  Vorstellung,\" vol. ii. chap. 4, p. 41 of the 2nd edition, and p. 45\n  of the 3rd edition.\n\nFrom this essential connection between causality and succession it\nfollows, that the conception of reciprocity, strictly speaking, has\nno meaning; for it presumes the effect to be again the cause of its\ncause: that is, that what follows is at the same time what precedes.\nIn a \"Critique of Kantian Philosophy,\" which I have added to my chief\nwork, and to which I refer my readers,[64] I have shown at length that\nthis favourite conception is inadmissible. It may be remarked, that\nauthors usually have recourse to it just when their insight is becoming\nless clear, and this accounts for the frequency of its use. Nay, it\nis precisely when a writer comes to the end of his conceptions, that\nthe word '_reciprocity_' presents itself more readily than any other;\nit may, in fact, be looked upon as a kind of alarm-gun, denoting that\nthe author has got out of his depth. It is also worthy of remark, that\nthe word _Wechselwirkung_, literally reciprocal action--or, as we have\npreferred translating it, _reciprocity_--is only found in the German\nlanguage, and that there is no precise equivalent for it in daily use\nin any other tongue.\n\n  [64] \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" vol. i. pp. 517-521 of the 2nd edition,\n  and pp. 544-549 of the 3rd edition.\n\nFrom the law of causality spring two corollaries which, in virtue of\nthis origin, are accredited as cognitions _\u00e0 priori_, therefore as\nunquestionable and without exception. They are, _the law of inertia_\nand that _of permanence of substance_. The first of these laws avers,\nthat every state in which a body can possibly be--consequently that\nof repose as well as that of any kind of movement--must last for\never without change, diminution, or augmentation, unless some cause\nsupervenes to alter or annul it. But the other law, by which the\neternity of Matter is affirmed, results from the fact, that the law\nof causality is exclusively applicable to _states_ of bodies, such\nas repose, movement, form, and quality, since it presides over their\ntemporal passing in or out of being; but that it is by no means\napplicable to the existence of _that which endures_ these states, and\nis called _Substance_, in order precisely to express its exemption\nfrom all arising and perishing. '_Substance is permanent_' means,\nthat it can neither pass into, nor out of being: so that its quantity\nexisting in the universe can neither be increased nor diminished. That\nwe know this _\u00e0 priori_, is proved by the consciousness of unassailable\ncertainty with which, when we see a body disappear--whether it be by\nconjuring, by minute subdivision, by combustion, volatilisation,\nor indeed any process whatever--we all nevertheless firmly assume\nthat its substance, _i.e._ its _matter_, must still exist somewhere\nor other in undiminished quantity, whatever may have become of its\n_form_; likewise, when we perceive a body suddenly in a place,\nwhere it was not before, that it must have been brought there or\nformed by some combination of invisible particles--for instance, by\nprecipitation--but that it, _i.e._ its substance, cannot have then\nstarted into existence; for this implies a total impossibility and\nis utterly inconceivable. The certainty with which we assume this\nbeforehand (_\u00e0 priori_), proceeds from the fact, that our Understanding\npossesses absolutely no form under which to conceive the beginning\nand end of Matter. For, as before said, the law of causality--the\nonly form in which we are able to conceive changes at all--is solely\napplicable to _states_ of bodies, and never under any circumstances\nto the existence of _that which undergoes_ all changes: _Matter_.\nThis is why I place the principle of the permanence of Matter among\nthe corollaries of the causal law. Moreover, we cannot have acquired\n_\u00e0 posteriori_ the conviction that substance is permanent, partly\nbecause it cannot, in most instances, be empirically established;\npartly also, because every empirical knowledge obtained exclusively\nby means of induction, has only approximate, consequently precarious,\nnever unconditioned, certainty. The firmness of our persuasion as to\nthis principle is therefore of a different kind and nature from our\nsecurity of conviction with regard to the accuracy of any _empirically_\ndiscovered law of Nature, since it has an entirely different, perfectly\nunshakable, never vacillating firmness. The reason of this is, that\nthe principle expresses a _transcendental_ knowledge, _i.e._ one which\ndetermines and fixes, _prior_ to all experience, what is in any way\npossible within the whole range of experience; but, precisely by this,\nit reduces the world of experience to a mere cerebral phenomenon. Even\nthe most universal among the non-transcendental laws of Nature and the\none least liable to exception--the law of gravitation--is of empirical\norigin, consequently without guarantee as to its absolute universality;\nwherefore it is still from time to time called in question, and doubts\noccasionally arise as to its validity beyond our solar system; and\nastronomers carefully call attention to any indications corroborative\nof its doubtfulness with which they may happen to meet, thereby showing\nthat they regard it as merely empirical. The question may of course\nbe raised, whether gravitation takes effect between bodies which are\nseparated by an _absolute_ vacuum, or whether its action within a\nsolar system may not be mediated by some sort of ether, and may not\ncease altogether between fixed stars; but these questions only admit\nof an empirical solution, and this proves that here we have not to do\nwith a knowledge _\u00e0 priori_. If, on the other hand, we admit with Kant\nand Laplace the hypothesis, as the most probable one, that each solar\nsystem has developed out of an original _nebula_ by a gradual process\nof condensation, we still cannot for a moment conceive the possibility\nof that original substance having sprung into being out of _nothing_:\nwe are forced to assume the anterior existence of its particles\nsomewhere or other, as well as their having been brought together\nsomehow or other, precisely because of the transcendental nature of the\nprinciple of the permanence of Substance. In my Critique of Kantian\nPhilosophy,[65] I have shown at length, that _Substance_ is but another\nword for _Matter_, the conception of substance not being realisable\nexcepting in _Matter_, and therefore deriving its origin from _Matter_,\nand I have also specially pointed out how that conception was formed\nsolely to serve a surreptitious purpose. Like many other equally\ncertain truths, this eternity of Matter (called the permanence of\nsubstance) is forbidden fruit for professors of philosophy; so they\nslip past it with a bashful, sidelong glance.\n\n  [65] \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" vol. i. p. 550 of 2nd, and 580 of 3rd\n  edition.\n\nBy the endless chain of causes and effects which directs all _changes_\nbut never extends beyond them, two existing things remain untouched,\nprecisely because of the limited range of its action: on the one hand,\n_Matter_, as we have just shown; on the other hand, the primary _forces\nof Nature_. The first (matter) remains uninfluenced by the causal\nnexus, because it is _that which undergoes_ all changes, or _on which_\nthey take place; the second (the primary forces), because it is they\nalone _by which_ changes or effects become possible; for they alone\ngive causality to causes. _i.e._ the faculty of operating, which the\ncauses therefore hold as mere vassals a fief. Cause and effect are\n_changes_ connected together to necessary succession in Time; whereas\nthe forces of Nature by means of which all causes operate, are exempt\nfrom all change; in this sense therefore they are outside Time, but\nprecisely on that account they are always and everywhere in reserve,\nomnipresent and inexhaustible, ever ready to manifest themselves, as\nsoon as an opportunity presents itself in the thread of causality.\nA _cause_, like its _effect_, is invariably something individual,\na single change; whereas a force of Nature is something universal,\nunchangeable, present at all times and in all places. The attraction of\na thread by amber, for instance, at the present moment, is an effect;\nits cause is the preceding friction and actual contact of the amber\nwith the thread; and the _force of Nature_ which acts in, and presides\nover, the process, is Electricity. The explanation of this matter is\nto be found in my chief work,[66] and there I have shown in a long\nchain of causes and effects how the most heterogeneous natural forces\nsuccessively come into play in them. By this explanation the difference\nbetween transitory phenomena and permanent forms of operation, becomes\nexceedingly clear; and as, moreover, a whole section (\u00a7 26) is devoted\nto the question, it will be sufficient here to give a brief sketch of\nit. The _rule_, by which a force of Nature manifests itself in the\nchain of causes and effects--consequently the link which connects it\nwith them--is the law of Nature. But the confusion between forces of\nNature and causes is as frequent as it is detrimental to clearness of\nthought. It seems indeed as though no one had accurately defined the\ndifference between these conceptions before me, however great may have\nbeen the urgency for such a distinction. Not only are forces of Nature\nturned into causes by such expressions as, 'Electricity, Gravity, &c.,\nare the _cause_ of so-and-so,' but they are even often turned into\neffects by those who search for a cause for Electricity, Gravity, &c.\n&c., which is absurd. Diminishing the number of the forces of Nature,\nhowever, by reducing one to another, as for instance Magnetism is\nin our days reduced to Electricity, is a totally different thing.\nEvery _true_, consequently really primary force of Nature--and every\nfundamental chemical property belongs to these forces--is essentially\na _qualitas occulta_, _i.e._ it does not admit of physical, but only\nof metaphysical explanation: in other words, of an explanation which\ntranscends the world of phenomena. No one has carried this confusion,\nor rather identification, of causes with forces of Nature further\nthan Maine de Biran in his \"Nouvelles consid\u00e9rations des rapports\ndu physique au moral,\" for it is essential to his philosophy. It is\nbesides remarkable, that when he speaks of causes, he rarely uses the\nword _cause_ alone, but almost always speaks of _cause ou force_,\njust as we have seen Spinoza above (\u00a7 8) write _ratio sive causa_ no\nless than eight times in the same page. Both writers are evidently\nconscious that they are identifying two disparates, in order to be able\nto make use of the one or the other, according to circumstances; for\nthis end they are obliged to keep the identification constantly before\ntheir readers' mind.--\n\n  [66] See \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" vol. i. \u00a7 26, p. 153 of the 2nd,\n  and p. 160 of the 3rd edition.\n\nNow Causality, as the director of each and every change, presents\nitself in Nature under _three_ distinct forms: as _causes_ in the\nstrictest acceptation of the word, as _stimuli_, and as _motives_.\nIt is just upon this difference that the real, essential distinction\nbetween inorganic bodies, plants, and animals is based, and not upon\nexternal, anatomical, let alone chemical, distinctions.\n\nA _cause_, in its narrowest sense, is that upon which changes in the\n_inorganic_ kingdom alone ensue: those changes, that is to say, which\nform the theme of Mechanics, Physics, and Chemistry. Newton's third\nfundamental law, \"Action and reaction are equal to one another,\"\napplies exclusively to this cause, and enunciates, that the state which\nprecedes (the cause) undergoes a change equivalent to that produced by\nit (the effect). In this form of causality alone, moreover, does the\ndegree of the effect always exactly correspond to the degree of the\ncause, so as to enable us accurately to calculate the one by means of\nthe other.\n\nThe second form of causality is the _stimulus_; it reigns over\n_organic_ life, as such, _i.e._ over plant life and the vegetative,\nthat is, the unconscious, part of animal life. This second form is\ncharacterized by the absence of the distinctive signs of the first.\nIn it accordingly action and reaction are not equal, nor does the\nintensity of the effect by any means correspond throughout all its\ndegrees to the intensity of the cause; in fact, the opposite effect may\neven be produced by intensifying the cause.\n\nThe third form of causality is the _motive_. Under this form causality\nrules animal life proper: that is, the exterior, consciously performed\nactions of all animals. The medium for motives is _knowledge_: an\nintellect is accordingly needed for susceptibility to motives. The true\ncharacteristic of the animal is therefore the faculty of knowing, of\nrepresenting (_Das Vorstellen_). Animals, as such, always move towards\nsome aim and end, which therefore must have been _recognised_ by them:\nthat is to say, it must have presented itself to them as something\ndifferent from themselves, yet of which they are conscious. Therefore\nthe proper definition of the animal would be: 'That which knows;' for\nno other definition quite hits the mark or can even perhaps stand the\ntest of investigation. Movement induced by motives is necessarily\nwanting where there is no cognitive faculty, and movement by stimuli\nalone remains, _i.e._ plant life. Irritability and sensibility are\ntherefore inseparable. Still motives evidently act in a different way\nfrom stimuli; for the action of the former may be very brief, nay,\nneed only be momentary; since their efficacy, unlike that of stimuli,\nstands in no relation whatever to the duration of that action, to the\nproximity of the object, &c. &c. A motive needs but to be perceived\ntherefore, to take effect; whereas stimuli always require outward,\noften even inward, contact and invariably a certain length of time.\n\nThis short sketch of the three forms of causality will suffice here.\nThey are more fully described in my Prize-essay on Free Will.[67] One\nthing, however, still remains to be urged. The difference between\ncause, stimulus, and motive, is obviously only a consequence of\nthe various degrees of _receptivity_ of beings; the greater their\nreceptivity, the feebler may be the nature of the influence: a stone\nneeds an impact, while man obeys a look. Nevertheless, both are\nmoved by a sufficient cause, therefore with the same necessity. For\n'_motivation_'[68] is only causality passing through knowledge; the\nintellect is the medium of the motives, because it is the highest\ndegree of receptivity. By this, however, the law of causality loses\nnothing whatever of its rigour and certainty; for motives are causes\nand operate with the same necessity which all causes bring with them.\nThis necessity is easy to perceive in animals because of the greater\nsimplicity of their intellect, which is limited to the perception\nof what is present. Man's intellect is double: for not only has he\nintuitive, but abstract, knowledge, which last is not limited to\nwhat is present. Man possesses Reason; he therefore has a power of\nelective decision with clear consciousness: that is, he is able to\nweigh against one another motives which exclude each other, as such;\nin other terms, he can let them try their strength on his will. The\nmost powerful motive then decides him, and his actions ensue with\njust the same necessity as the rolling of a ball after it has been\nstruck. Freedom of Will[69] means (not professorial twaddle but)\n\"_that a given human being, in a given situation, can act in two\ndifferent ways_.\" But the utter absurdity of this assertion is a truth\nas certain and as clearly proved, as any truth can be which passes\nthe limits of pure mathematics. In my Essay on Free Will, to which\nthe Norwegian Society awarded the prize, this truth is demonstrated\nmore clearly, methodically, and thoroughly than has been done before\nby anyone else, and this moreover with special reference to those\nfacts of our consciousness by which ignorant people imagine that\nabsurdity to be confirmed. In all that is essential however, Hobbes,\nSpinoza, Priestley, Voltaire, and even Kant[70] already taught the\nsame doctrine. Our professional philosophers, of course, do not let\nthis interfere with their holding forth on Free Will, as if it were an\nunderstood thing which had never been questioned. But what do these\ngentlemen imagine the above-named great men to have come into the\nworld for, by the grace of Nature? To enable them (the professors) to\nearn their livelihood by philosophy?--Since I had proved this truth\nin my prize-essay more clearly than had ever been done before, and\nsince moreover a Royal Society had sanctioned that proof by placing\nmy essay among its memoranda, it surely behoved these worthies,\nconsidering the views they held, to make a vigorous attack upon so\npernicious a doctrine, so detestable a heresy, and thoroughly to\nrefute it. Nay, this duty was all the more imperative as, in my\nother essay \"On the Foundation of Morality,\"[71] I had proved the\nutter groundlessness of Kant's practical Reason with its Categorical\nImperative which, under the name of the Moral Law, is still used by\nthese gentlemen as the corner-stone of their own shallow systems of\nmorality. I have shown it to be a futile assumption so clearly and\nirrefutably, that no one with a spark of judgment can possibly believe\nany longer in this fiction.--\"Well, and so they probably did.\"--Oh\nno! They take good care not to venture on such slippery ground! Their\nability consists in holding their tongues; silence is all they have\nto oppose to intelligence, earnestness, and truth. In not one of the\nproducts of their useless scribblings that have appeared since 1841,\nhas the slightest notice been taken of my Ethics--undoubtedly the most\nimportant work on Moral Philosophy that has been published for the\nlast sixty years--nay, their terror of me and of my truth is so great,\nthat none of the literary journals issued by Academies or Universities\nhas so much as mentioned the book. _Zitto, zitto_, lest the public\nshould perceive anything: in this consists the whole of their policy.\nThe instinct of self-preservation may, no doubt, be at the bottom of\nthese artful tactics. For would not a philosophy, whose sole aim was\ntruth, and which had no other consideration in view, be likely to\nplay the part of the iron pot among the earthen ones, were it to come\nin contact with the petty systems composed under the influence of a\nthousand personal considerations by people whose chief qualification is\nthe propriety of their sentiments? Their wretched fear of my writings\nis the fear of truth. Nor can it be denied, that precisely this very\ndoctrine of the complete necessity of all acts of the will stands in\nflagrant contradiction with all the hypotheses of their favourite\nold-woman's philosophy cut after the pattern of Judaism. Still, that\nseverely tested truth, far from being disturbed by all this, as a sure\ndatum and criterion, as a true \u03b4\u03cc\u03c2 \u03bc\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03c4\u1ff6, proves the futility of\nall that old-woman's philosophy and the urgent need of a fundamentally\ndifferent, incomparably deeper view of the Universe and of Man;--no\nmatter whether that view be compatible with the official duties of a\nprofessional philosopher or not.\n\n  [67] See \"Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik,\" p. 30-34.\n\n  [68] The word \"motivation,\" though it may appear objectionable\n  to the English reader, seemed unavoidable here, as being\n  Schopenhauer's own term, for which there is no adequate equivalent\n  in general use in our language. [Translator's note.]\n\n  [69] Here used in the absolute sense of _liberum arbitrium\n  indifferenti\u00e6_. [Tr.]\n\n  [70] \"Whatever conception one may form of freedom of the will,\n  for metaphysical purposes, its phenomena, human actions, are\n  nevertheless determined by universal laws of Nature, just as well\n  as every other occurrence in Nature.\" \"Ideen zu einer allgemeinen\n  Geschichte.\" Anfang. I. Kant. \"All the acts of a man, so far as\n  they are phenomena, are determined from his empirical character\n  and from the other concomitant causes, according to the order of\n  Nature; and if we could investigate all the manifestations of\n  his will to the very bottom, there would be not a single human\n  action which we could not predict with certainty and recognize\n  from its preceding conditions as necessary. There is no freedom\n  therefore with reference to this empirical character, and yet\n  it is only with reference to it that we can consider man, when\n  we are merely observing, and, as is the case in anthropology,\n  trying to investigate the motive causes of his actions\n  physiologically.\"--\"Kritik. d. r. Vern.\" p. 549 of the 1st edition,\n  and p. 577 of the 5th edition. (Engl. Transl. by M. M\u00fcller, p. 474.)\n\n  \"It may therefore be taken for granted, that if we could see far\n  enough into a man's mode of thinking, as it manifests itself in his\n  inner, as well as outer actions, for us to know every, even the\n  faintest motive, and in like manner all the other causes which act\n  upon these, it would be possible to calculate his conduct in future\n  with the same certainty as an eclipse of the sun or moon.\"--\"Kritik\n  der praktischen Vernunft\" ed. Rosenkranz, p. 230 and p. 177 of the\n  4th edition.\n\n  [71] Published in the same volume with the Prize-Essay on \"Free\n  Will.\" See \"Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik.\"\n\n\n\u00a7 21. \u00c0 priori _character of the conception of Causality_.\n\n_Intellectual Character of Empirical Perception._\n\nTHE UNDERSTANDING.\n\nIn the professorial philosophy of our philosophy-professors we are\nstill taught to this day, that perception of the outer world is a\nthing of the senses, and then there follows a long dissertation upon\neach of the five senses: whereas no mention whatever is made of the\nintellectual character of perception: that is to say, of the fact,\nthat it is mainly the work of the Understanding, which, by means\nof its own peculiar form of Causality, together with the forms of\npure sensibility, Time and Space, which are postulated by Causality,\nprimarily creates and produces the objective, outer world out of the\nraw material of a few sensations. And yet in its principal features, I\nhad stated this matter in the first edition of the present treatise[72]\nand soon after developed it more fully in my treatise \"On Vision and\nColours\" (1816), of which Professor Rosas has shown his appreciation\nby allowing it to lead him into plagiarism.[73] But our professors of\nphilosophy have not thought fit to take the slightest notice either of\nthis, or indeed of any of the other great and important truths which it\nhas been the aim and labour of my whole life to set forth, in order to\nsecure them as a lasting possession to mankind. It does not suit their\ntastes, or fit into their notions; it leads to no Theology, nor is it\neven adapted to drill students for higher State purposes. In short,\nprofessional philosophers do not care to learn from me, nor do they\neven see how much they might learn from me: that is, all that their\nchildren and their children's children will learn from me. They prefer\nto sit down and spin a long metaphysical yarn, each out of his own\nthoughts, for the benefit of the public; and no doubt, if fingers are a\nsufficient qualification, they have it. How right was Macchiavelli when\nhe said, as Hesiod[74] before him: \"There are three sorts of heads:\nfirstly, those which acquire knowledge of things and comprehend them by\nthemselves; secondly, those which recognise the truth when it is shown\nthem by others; and thirdly, those which can do neither the one nor the\nother.\"[75]--\n\n  [72] Anno 1813, pp. 53-55.\n\n  [73] For further details see my \"Will in Nature,\" p. 19 of the\n  1st edition, and p. 14 of the 3rd. (P. 230 _et seqq._ of the\n  translation of the \"Will in Nature,\" which follows the \"Fourfold\n  Root\" in the present volume.)\n\n  [74] Hesiod, \u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1, 293.\n\n  [75] Macchiavelli, \"Il principe,\" cap. 22.\n\nOne must indeed be forsaken by all the gods, to imagine that the outer,\nperceptible world, filling Space in its three dimensions and moving on\nin the inexorable flow of Time, governed at every step by the laws of\nCausality, which is without exception, and in all this merely obeying\nlaws we can indicate before all experience of them--that such a world\nas this, we say, can have a real, objective existence outside us,\nwithout any agency of our own, and that it can then have found its way\ninto our heads through bare sensation and thus have a second existence\nwithin us like the one outside. For what a miserably poor thing is mere\nsensation, after all! Even in the noblest of our organs it is nothing\nbut a local, specific feeling, susceptible of some slight variation,\nstill in itself always subjective and, as such therefore, incapable of\ncontaining anything objective, anything like perception. For sensation\nis and remains a process within the organism and is limited, as such,\nto the region within the skin; it cannot therefore contain anything\nwhich lies beyond that region, or, in other words, anything that is\noutside us. A sensation may be pleasant or unpleasant--which betokens\na relation to the Will--but nothing objective can ever lie in any\nsensation. In the organs of the senses, sensation is heightened by the\nconfluence of the nerve-extremities, and can easily be excited from\nwithout on account of their extensive distribution and the delicacy of\nthe envelope which encloses them; it is besides specially susceptible\nto particular influences, such as light, sound, smell; notwithstanding\nwhich it is and remains mere sensation, like all others within our\nbody, consequently something essentially subjective, of whose changes\nwe only become immediately conscious in the form of the _inner_ sense,\nTime: that is, successively. It is only when the _Understanding_\nbegins to act--a function, not of single, delicate nerve-extremities,\nbut of that mysterious, complicated structure weighing from five to\nten pounds, called the brain--only when it begins to apply its sole\nform, _the causal law_, that a powerful transformation takes place,\nby which subjective sensation becomes objective perception. For, in\nvirtue of its own peculiar form, therefore _\u00e0 priori_, _i.e._ _before_\nall experience (since there could have been none till then), the\nUnderstanding conceives the given corporeal sensation as an _effect_\n(a word which the Understanding alone comprehends), which _effect_, as\nsuch, necessarily implies a _cause_. Simultaneously it summons to its\nassistance _Space_, the form of the _outer_ sense, lying likewise ready\nin the intellect (_i.e._ the brain), in order to remove that cause\n_beyond_ the organism; for it is by this that the external world first\narises, Space alone rendering it possible, so that pure intuition _\u00e0\npriori_ has to supply the foundation for empirical perception. In this\nprocess, as I shall soon show more clearly, the Understanding avails\nitself of all the several data, even the minutest, which are presented\nto it by the given sensation, in order to construct the cause of it in\nSpace in conformity with them. This intellectual operation (which is\nmoreover explicitly denied both by Schelling[76] and by Fries[77]),\ndoes not however take place discursively or reflectively, _in\nabstracto_, by means of conceptions and words; it is, on the contrary,\nan intuitive and quite direct process. For by it alone, therefore\nexclusively _in_ the Understanding and _for_ the Understanding, does\nthe real, objective, corporeal world, filling Space in its three\ndimensions, present itself and further proceed, according to the same\nlaw of causality, to change in Time, and to move in Space.--It is\ntherefore the Understanding itself which has to create the objective\nworld; for this world cannot walk into our brain from outside all ready\ncut and dried through the senses and the openings of their organs.\nIn fact, the senses supply nothing but the raw materials which the\nUnderstanding at once proceeds to work up into the objective view of\na corporeal world, subject to regular laws, by means of the simple\nforms we have indicated: Space, Time, and Causality. Accordingly our\nevery-day _empirical perception_ is an _intellectual_ one and has a\nright to claim this predicate, which German pseudo-philosophers have\ngiven to a pretended intuition of dream-worlds, in which their beloved\n_Absolute_ is supposed to perform its evolutions. And now I will\nproceed to show how wide is the gulf which separates sensation from\nperception, by pointing out how raw is the material out of which the\nbeautiful edifice is constructed.\n\n  [76] Schelling, \"Philosophische Schriften\" (1809), vol. i. pp. 237\n  and 238.\n\n  [77] Fries, \"Kritik der Vernunft.\" vol. i. pp. 52-56 and p. 290 of\n  the 1st edition.\n\nObjective perception makes use, properly speaking, of only two senses;\ntouch and sight. These alone supply the data upon which, as its basis,\nthe Understanding constructs the objective world by the process just\ndescribed. The three other senses remain on the whole subjective; for\ntheir sensations, while pointing to an external cause, still contain no\ndata by which its relations _in Space_ can be determined. Now _Space_\nis the form of all perception, _i.e._ of _that_ apprehension, in which\nalone _objects_ can, properly speaking, present themselves. Therefore\nthose other three senses can no doubt serve to announce the presence\nof objects we already know in some other way; but no construction in\nSpace, consequently no objective perception, can possibly be founded on\ntheir data. A rose cannot be constructed from its perfume, and a blind\nman may hear music all his life without having the slightest objective\nrepresentation either of the musicians, or of the instruments, or of\nthe vibrations of the air. On the other hand, the sense of hearing\nis of great value as a medium for language, and through this it is\nthe sense of _Reason_. It is also valuable as a medium for music,\nwhich is the only way in which we comprehend numerical relations not\nonly _in abstracto_, but directly, _in concreto_. A musical sound or\ntone, however, gives no clue to spacial relations, therefore it never\nhelps to bring the nature of its cause nearer to us; we stop short at\nit, so that it is no datum for the Understanding in its construction\nof the objective world. The sensations of touch and sight alone are\nsuch data; therefore a blind man without either hands or feet, while\nable to construct Space for himself _\u00e0 priori_ in all its regularity,\nwould nevertheless acquire but a very vague representation of the\nobjective world. Yet what is supplied by touch and sight is not by any\nmeans perception, but merely the raw material for it. For perception\nis so far from being contained in the sensations of touch and sight,\nthat these sensations have not even the faintest resemblance to the\nqualities of the things which present themselves to us through them,\nas I shall presently show. Only what really belongs to sensation\nmust first be clearly distinguished from what is added to it by the\nintellect in perception. In the beginning this is not easy, because\nwe are so accustomed to pass from the sensation at once to its cause,\nthat the cause presents itself to us without our noticing the sensation\napart from it, by which, as it were, the premisses are supplied to this\nconclusion drawn by the Understanding.\n\nThus touch and sight have each their own special advantages, to begin\nwith; therefore they assist each other mutually. Sight needs no\ncontact, nor even proximity; its field is unbounded and extends to the\nstars. It is moreover sensitive to the most delicate degrees of light,\nshade, colour, and transparency; so that it supplies the Understanding\nwith a quantity of nicely defined data, out of which, by dint of\npractice, it becomes able to construct the shape, size, distance, and\nnature of bodies, and represents them at once perceptibly. On the\nother hand, touch certainly depends upon contact; still its data are\nso varied and so trustworthy, that it is the most searching of all the\nsenses. Even perception by sight may, in the last resort, be referred\nto touch; nay, sight may be looked upon as an imperfect touch extending\nto a great distance, which uses the rays of light as long feelers; and\nit is just because it is limited to those qualities which have light\nfor their medium and is therefore one-sided, that it is so liable to\ndeception; whereas touch supplies the data for cognising size, shape,\nhardness, softness, roughness, temperature, &c. &c., quite immediately.\nIn this it is assisted, partly by the shape and mobility of our\narms, hands, and fingers, from whose position in feeling objects the\nUnderstanding derives its data for constructing bodies in Space, partly\nby muscular power, which enables it to know the weight, solidity,\ntoughness, or brittleness of bodies: all this with the least possible\nliability to error.\n\nThese data nevertheless do not by any means yet give perception, which\nis always the work of the Understanding. The sensation I have in\npressing against a table with my hand, contains no representation of\na firm cohesion of parts in that object, nor indeed anything at all\nlike it. It is only when my Understanding passes from that sensation\nto its cause, that the intellect constructs for itself a body having\nthe properties of solidity, impenetrability, and hardness. If in the\ndark, I put my hand upon a flat surface, or lay hold of a ball of\nabout three inches in diameter, the same parts of my hand feel the\npressure in both cases; it is only by the different position which my\nhand takes that, in the one or in the other case, my Understanding\nconstructs the shape of the body whose contact is the cause of the\nsensation, for which it receives confirmation from the changes of\nposition which I make. The sensations in the hand of a man born blind,\non feeling an object of cubic shape, are quite uniform and the same on\nall sides and in every direction: the edges, it is true, press upon\na smaller portion of his hand, still nothing at all like a cube is\ncontained in these sensations. His Understanding, however, draws the\nimmediate and intuitive conclusion from the resistance felt, that this\nresistance must have a cause, which then presents itself through that\nconclusion as a hard body; and through the movements of his arms in\nfeeling the object, while the hand's sensation remains unaltered, he\nconstructs the cubic shape in Space, which is known to him _\u00e0 priori_.\nIf the representation of a cause and of Space, together with their\nlaws, had not already existed within him, the image of a cube could\nnever have proceeded from those successive sensations in his hand. If\na rope be drawn through his hand, he will construct, as the cause of\nthe friction he feels and of its duration, a long cylindrical body,\nmoving uniformly in the same direction in that particular position\nof his hand. But the representation of movement, _i.e._ of change of\nplace in Space by means of Time, never could arise for him out of the\nmere sensation in his hand; for that sensation can neither contain,\nnor can it ever by itself alone produce any such thing. It is his\nintellect which must, on the contrary, contain within itself, before\nall experience, the intuitions of Space, Time, and together with them\nthat of the possibility of movement; and it must also contain the\nrepresentation of Causality, in order to pass from sensation--which\nalone is given by experience--to a cause of that sensation, and to\nconstruct that cause as a body having this or that shape, moving in\nthis or that direction. For how great is the difference between a mere\nsensation in my hand and the representations of causality, materiality,\nand mobility in Space by means of Time! The sensation in my hand, even\nif its position and its points of contact are altered, is a thing far\ntoo uniform and far too poor in data, to enable me to construct out of\nit the representation of Space, with its three dimensions, and of the\ninfluences of bodies one upon another, together with the properties of\nexpansion, impenetrability, cohesion, shape, hardness, softness, rest,\nand motion: the basis, in short, of the objective world. This is, on\nthe contrary, only possible by the intellect containing within itself,\nanterior to all experience, Space, as the form of perception; Time, as\nthe form of change; and the law of Causality, as the regulator of the\npassing in and out of changes. Now it is precisely the pre-existence\nbefore all experience of all these forms, which constitutes the\nIntellect. Physiologically, it is a function of the brain, which the\nbrain no more learns by experience than the stomach to digest, or the\nliver to secrete bile. Besides, no other explanation can be given\nof the fact, that many who were born blind, acquire a sufficiently\ncomplete knowledge of the relations of Space, to enable them to replace\ntheir want of eyesight by it to a considerable degree, and to perform\nastonishing feats. A hundred years ago Saunderson, for instance,\nwho was blind from his birth, lectured on Optics, Mathematics, and\nAstronomy at Cambridge.[78] This, too, is the only way to explain the\nexactly opposite case of Eva Lauk, who was born without arms or legs,\nyet acquired an accurate perception of the outer world by means of\nsight alone as rapidly as other children.[79] All this therefore proves\nthat Time, Space, and Causality are not conveyed into us by touch or by\nsight, or indeed at all from outside, but that they have an internal,\nconsequently not empirical, but intellectual origin. From this again\nfollows, that the perception of the bodily world is an essentially\nintellectual process, a work of the Understanding, to which sensation\nmerely gives the opportunity and the data for application in individual\ncases.\n\n  [78] Diderot, in his \"Lettre sur les Aveugles,\" gives a detailed\n  account of Saunderson.\n\n  [79] See \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" vol. ii. chap. 4.\n\nI shall now prove the same with regard to the sense of sight. Here\nthe only immediate datum is the sensation experienced by the retina,\nwhich, though admitting of great variety, may still be reduced to the\nimpression of light and dark with their intermediate gradations and to\nthat of colours proper. This sensation is entirely subjective: that is\nto say, it only exists within the organism and under the skin. Without\nthe Understanding, indeed, we should never even become conscious of\nthese gradations, excepting as of peculiar, varied modifications\nof the feeling in our eye, which would bear no resemblance to the\nshape, situation, proximity, or distance of objects outside us. For\n_sensation_, in seeing, supplies nothing more than a varied affection\nof the retina, exactly like the spectacle of a painter's palette with\ndivers splashes of colour. Nor would anything more remain over in our\nconsciousness, were we suddenly deprived of all our Understanding--let\nus say by paralysis of the brain--at a moment when we were\ncontemplating a rich and extensive landscape, while the sensation\nwas left unchanged: for this was the raw material out of which our\nUnderstanding had just before been constructing that perception.\n\nNow, that the Understanding should thus be able, from such limited\nmaterial as light, shade and colour, to produce the visible world,\ninexhaustibly rich in all its different shapes, by means of the simple\nfunction of referring effects to causes assisted by the intuition of\nSpace, depends before all things upon the assistance given by the\nsensation itself, which consists in this: first, that the retina, as\na surface, admits of a juxtaposition of impressions; secondly, that\nlight always acts in straight lines, and that its refraction in the\neye itself is rectilinear; finally, that the retina possesses the\nfaculty of immediately feeling from which direction the light comes\nthat impinges upon it, and this can, perhaps, only be accounted for\nby the rays of light penetrating below the surface of the retina.\nBut by this we gain, that the mere impression at once indicates the\ndirection of its cause; that is, it points directly to the position\nof the object from which the light proceeds or is reflected. The\npassage to this object as a cause no doubt presupposes the knowledge of\ncausal relations, as well as of the laws of Space; but this knowledge\nconstitutes precisely the furniture of the _Intellect_, which, here\nalso, has again to create perception out of mere sensation. Let us now\nexamine its procedure in doing so more closely.\n\nThe first thing it does is to set right the impression of the object,\nwhich is produced on the retina upside down. That original inversion\nis, as we know, brought about in the following manner. As each point\nof the visible object sends forth its rays towards all sides in a\nrectilinear direction, the rays from its upper extremity cross those\nfrom its lower extremity in the narrow aperture of the pupil, by which\nthe former impinge upon the bottom, the latter upon the top, those\nprojected from the right side upon the left, and _vice versa_. The\nrefracting apparatus of the eye, which consists of the _humor aqueus_,\n_lens_, _et corpus vitreum_, only serves to concentrate the rays of\nlight proceeding from the object, so as to find room for them on the\nsmall space of the retina. Now, if seeing consisted in mere sensation,\nwe should perceive the impression of the object turned upside down,\nbecause we receive it thus; but in that case we should perceive it as\nsomething within our eye, for we should stop short at the sensation.\nIn reality, however, the Understanding steps in at once with its\ncausal law, and as it has received from sensation the datum of the\ndirection in which the ray impinged upon the retina, it pursues that\ndirection retrogressively up to the cause on both lines; so that this\ntime the crossing takes place in the opposite direction, and the cause\npresents itself upright as an external object in Space, _i.e._ in\nthe position in which it originally sent forth its rays, not that in\nwhich they reached the retina (see fig. 1).--The purely intellectual\nnature of this process, to the exclusion of all other, more especially\nof physiological, explanations, may also be confirmed by the fact,\nthat if we put our heads between our legs, or lie down on a hill head\ndownwards, we nevertheless see objects in their right position, and\nnot upside down; although the portion of the retina, which is usually\nmet by the lower part of the object is then met by the upper: in fact,\neverything is topsy turvy excepting the Understanding.\n\n[Illustration: _Fig. 1._]\n\nThe _second_ thing which the Understanding does in converting sensation\ninto perception, is to make a single perception out of a double\nsensation; for each eye in fact receives its own separate impression\nfrom the object we are looking at; each even in a slightly different\ndirection: nevertheless that object presents itself as a single one.\nThis can only take place in the Understanding, and the process by\nwhich it is brought about is the following: Our eyes are never quite\nparallel, excepting when we look at a distant object, _i.e._ one which\nis more than 200 feet from us. At other times they are both directed\ntowards the object we are viewing, whereby they converge, so as to make\nthe lines proceeding from each eye to the exact point of the object\non which it is fixed, form an _angle_, called the _optic angle_; the\nlines themselves are called _optic axes_. Now, when the object lies\nstraight before us, these lines exactly impinge upon the centre of each\nretina, therefore in two points which correspond exactly to each other\nin each eye. The Understanding, whose only business it is to look for\nthe _cause_ of all things, at once recognises the impression as coming\nfrom a _single_ outside point, although here the sensation is double,\nand attributes it to _one_ cause, which therefore presents itself as\na single object. For all that is perceived by us, is perceived as a\n_cause_--that is to say, as the cause of an effect we have experienced,\nconsequently _in the Understanding_. As, nevertheless, we take in not\nonly a single point, but a considerable surface of the object with both\neyes, and yet perceive it as a single object, it will be necessary to\npursue this explanation still further. All those parts of the object\nwhich lie to one side of the vertex of the optic angle no longer send\ntheir rays straight into the centre, but to the side, of the retina in\neach eye; in both sides, however, to the same, let us say the left,\nside. The points therefore upon which these rays impinge, _correspond\nsymmetrically to each other_, as well as the centres--in other words,\nthey are _homonymous points_. The Understanding soon learns to know\nthem, and accordingly extends the above-mentioned rule of its causal\nperception to them also; consequently it not only refers those rays\nwhich impinge upon the centre of each retina, but those also which\nimpinge upon all the other symmetrically corresponding places in both\nretinas, to a single radiant point in the object viewed: that is,\nit sees all these points likewise as single, and the entire object\nalso. Now, it should be well observed, that in this process it is\nnot the outer side of one retina which corresponds to the outer side\nof the other, and the inner to the inner of each, but the right side\nof one retina which corresponds to the right side of the other, and\nso forth; so that this symmetrical correspondence must not be taken\nin a physiological, but in a geometrical sense. Numerous and very\nclear illustrations of this process, and of all the phenomena which\nare connected with it, are to be found in Robert Smith's \"Optics,\"\nand partly also in K\u00e4stner's German translation (1755). I only give\n_one_ (fig. 2), which, properly speaking, represents a special case,\nmentioned further on, but which may also serve to illustrate the\nwhole, if we leave the point R out of question. According to this\nillustration, we invariably direct both eyes equally towards the\nobject, in order that the symmetrically corresponding places on both\nretinas may catch the rays projected from the same points. Now, when\nwe move our eyes upwards and downwards, to the sides, and in all\ndirections, the point in the object which first impinged upon the\ncentral point of each retina, strikes a different place every time, but\nin all cases one which, in each eye, corresponds to the place bearing\nthe same name in the other eye. In examining (_perlustrare_) an object,\nwe let our eyes glide backwards and forwards over it, in order to bring\neach point of it successively into contact with the centre of the\nretina, which sees most distinctly: we feel it all over with our eyes.\nIt is therefore obvious that seeing singly with two eyes is in fact the\nsame process as feeling a body with ten fingers, each of which receives\na different impression, each moreover in a different direction: the\ntotality of these impressions being nevertheless recognised by the\nUnderstanding as proceeding from _one_ object, whose shape and size\nit accordingly apprehends and constructs in Space. This is why it is\npossible for a blind man to become a sculptor, as was the case, for\ninstance, with the famous Joseph Kleinhaus, who died in Tyrol, 1853,\nhaving been a sculptor from his fifth year.[80] For, no matter from\nwhat cause it may have derived its data, perception is invariably an\noperation of the Understanding.\n\n  [80] The Frankfort \"Konversationsblatt,\" July 22, 1853, gives the\n  following account of this sculptor:--\"The blind sculptor, Joseph\n  Kleinhaus, died at Nauders, in Tyrol, on the 10th inst. Having lost\n  his eyesight through small-pox when he was five years old, he began\n  to amuse himself with carving and modelling, as a pastime. Prugg\n  gave him some instructions, and supplied him with models, and at\n  the age of twelve he carved a Christ in life-size. During a short\n  stay in Nissl's workshop at F\u00fcgen, his progress was so rapid, that,\n  thanks to his good capacities and talents, his fame as the blind\n  sculptor soon spread far and wide. His works are numerous and of\n  various kinds. His Christs alone, of which there are about four\n  hundred, bear special witness to his proficiency, particularly if\n  his blindness is taken into consideration. He sculptured many other\n  objects besides, and, but two months ago, he modelled a bust of the\n  Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria which has been sent to Vienna.\"\n\n[Illustration: _Fig. 2._]\n\nBut just as a single ball seems to me double, if I touch it with my\nfingers crossed--since my Understanding, at once reverting to the\ncause and constructing it according to the laws of Space, takes for\ngranted that the fingers are in their normal position and of course\ncannot do otherwise than attribute two spherical surfaces, which come\nin contact with the outer sides of the first and middle fingers, to\ntwo different balls--just so also does an object seem double, if my\neyes, instead of converging symmetrically and enclosing the optic\nangle at a single point of the object, each view it at a different\ninclination--in other words, if I squint. For the rays, which in this\ncase emanate from one point of the object, no longer impinge upon\nthose symmetrically corresponding points in both retinas with which\nmy mind has grown familiar by long experience, but upon other, quite\ndifferent ones which, in a symmetrical position of the eyes, could only\nbe affected in this way by different bodies; I therefore now see _two_\nobjects, precisely because perception takes place by means of, and\nwithin, the Understanding.--The same thing happens without squinting\nwhen, for instance, I look fixedly at the furthest of two objects\nplaced at unequal distances before me, and complete the optic angle at\nit; for then the rays emanating from the nearer object do not impinge\nupon symmetrically corresponding places in both retinas, wherefore my\nUnderstanding attributes them to two objects, _i.e._ I see the nearer\nobject double (see fig. 2, page 70). If, on the contrary, I complete\nthe optic angle at the nearer object, by looking steadily at it, the\nfurther object appears double. It is easy to test this by holding a\npencil two feet from the eyes, and looking alternately at it and at\nsome other more distant object behind it.\n\nBut the finest thing of all is, that this experiment may quite well be\nreversed: so that, with two real objects straight before and close to\nus, and with our eyes wide open, we nevertheless see but _one_. This is\nthe most striking proof that perception is a work of the Understanding\nand by no means contained in sensation. Let two cardboard tubes, about\n8 inches long and 1-1/2 inches in diameter, be fastened parallel to one\nanother, like those of a binocular telescope, and fix a shilling at the\nend of each tube. On applying our eyes to the opposite extremity and\nlooking through the tubes, we shall see only _one_ shilling surrounded\nby _one_ tube. For in this case the eyes being forced into a completely\nparallel position, the rays emanating from the coins impinge exactly\nupon the centres of the two retinas and those points which immediately\nsurround them, therefore upon places which correspond symmetrically\nto each other; consequently the Understanding, taking for granted\nthe usual convergent position of the optic axes when objects are\nnear, admits but one object as the cause of the reflected rays. In\nother words, we see but one object; so direct is the act of causal\napprehension in the Understanding.\n\nWe have not space enough here to refute one by one the physiological\nexplanations of single vision which have been attempted; but their\nfallacy is shown by the following considerations:--\n\n1^o. If seeing single were dependent upon an organic connection, the\ncorresponding points in both retinas, on which this phenomenon is shown\nto depend, would correspond _organically_, whereas they do so in a\nmerely _geometrical_ sense, as has already been said. For, organically\nspeaking, the two inner and two outer corners of the eyes are those\nwhich correspond, and so it is with the other parts also; whereas for\nthe purpose of single vision, it is the right side of the right retina\nwhich corresponds to the right side of the left retina, and so on, as\nthe phenomena just described irrefutably show. It is also precisely on\naccount of the intellectual character of the process, that only the\nmost intelligent animals, such as the higher mammalia and birds of\nprey--more especially owls--have their eyes placed so as to enable them\nto direct both optic axes to the same point.\n\n2^o. The hypothesis of a confluence or partial intersection of the\noptic nerves before entering the brain, originated by Newton,[81] is\nfalse, simply because it would then be impossible to see double by\nsquinting. Vesalius and C\u00e6salpinus besides have already brought forward\nanatomical instances in which subjects saw single, although neither\nfusion nor even contact of the optic nerves had taken place. A final\nargument against the hypothesis of a mixed impression is supplied by\nthe fact, that on closing our right eye firmly and looking at the sun\nwith our left, the bright image which persists for a time is always in\nthe left, never in the right, eye: and _vice versa_.\n\n  [81] Newton, \"Optics.\" Query 15.\n\nThe _third_ process by which the Understanding converts sensation into\nperception, consists in constructing bodies out of the simple surfaces\nhitherto obtained--that is, in adding the third dimension. This it\ndoes by estimating the expansion of bodies in this third dimension\nin Space--which is known to the Understanding _\u00e0 priori_--through\nCausality, according to the degree in which the eye is affected by the\nobjects, and to the gradations of light and shade. In fact, although\nobjects fill Space in all three dimensions, they can only produce\nan impression upon the eye with two; for the nature of that organ\nis such, that our sensation, in seeing, is merely planimetrical,\nnot stereometrical. All that is stereometrical in our perception is\nadded by the Understanding, which has for its sole data the direction\nwhence the eye receives its impression, the limits of that impression,\nand the various gradations of light and dark: these data directly\nindicate their causes, and enable us to distinguish whether what we\nhave before us is a disk or a ball. This mental process, like the\npreceding ones, takes place so immediately and with such rapidity,\nthat we are conscious of nothing but the result. It is this which\nmakes perspective drawing so difficult a problem, that it can only\nbe solved by mathematics and has to be learnt; although all it has\nto do, is to represent the sensation of seeing as it presents itself\nto our Understanding as a datum for the third process: that is,\nvisual sensation in its merely planimetrical extension, to the _two_\ndimensions of which extension, together with the said data in them, the\nUnderstanding forthwith adds the _third_, in contemplating a drawing as\nwell as in contemplating reality. Perspective drawing is, in fact, a\nsort of writing which can be read as easily as printed type, but which\nfew are able to write; precisely because our intellect, in perceiving,\nonly apprehends effects with a view to constructing their causes,\nimmediately losing sight of the former as soon as it has discovered\nthe latter. For instance, we instantly recognise a chair, whatever\nposition it may be in; while drawing a chair in any position belongs to\nthe art which abstracts from this third process of the Understanding,\nin order to present the data alone for the spectator himself to\ncomplete. In its narrowest acceptation, as we have already seen, this\nis the art of drawing in perspective; in a more comprehensive sense,\nit is the whole art of painting. A painting presents us with outlines\ndrawn according to the rules of perspective; lighter and darker places\nproportioned to the effect of light and shade; finally patches of\ncolouring, which are determined as to quality and intensity by the\nteaching of experience. This the spectator reads and interprets by\nreferring similar effects to their accustomed causes. The painter's art\nconsists in consciously retaining the data of visual sensation in the\nartist's memory, as they are _before_ this third intellectual process;\nwhile we, who are not artists, cast them aside without retaining them\nin our memory, as soon as we have made use of them for the purpose\ndescribed above. We shall become still better acquainted with this\nthird intellectual process by now passing on to a fourth, which, from\nits intimate connection with the third, serves to elucidate it.\n\nThis _fourth_ operation of the Understanding consists in acquiring\nknowledge of the distance of objects from us: it is this precisely\nwhich constitutes that third dimension of which we have been speaking.\nVisual sensation, as we have said, gives us the _direction_ in which\nobjects lie, but not their _distance_ from us: that is, not their\n_position_. It is for the _Understanding_ therefore to find out this\ndistance; or, in other words, the distance must be inferred from\npurely _causal_ determinations. Now the most important of these is the\n_visual angle_, which objects subtend; yet even this is quite ambiguous\nand unable to decide anything by itself. It is like a word of double\nmeaning: the sense, in which it is to be understood, can only be\ngathered from its connection with the rest. An object subtending the\nsame visual angle may in fact be small and near, or large and far off;\nand it is only when we have previously ascertained its size, that the\nvisual angle enables us to recognise its distance: and conversely,\nits size, when its distance is known to us. Linear perspective is\nbased upon the fact that the visual angle diminishes as the distance\nincreases, and its principles may here be easily deduced. As our sight\nranges equally in all directions, we see everything in reality as from\nthe interior of a hollow sphere, of which our eye occupies the centre.\nNow in the first place, an infinite number of intersecting circles pass\nthrough the centre of this sphere in all directions, and the angles\nmeasured by the divisions of these circles are the possible angles\nof vision. In the second place, the sphere itself modifies its size\naccording to the length of radius we give to it; therefore we may also\nimagine it as consisting of an infinity of concentric, transparent\nspheres. As all radii diverge, these concentric spheres augment in\nsize in proportion to their distance from us, and the degrees of their\nsectional circles increase correspondingly: therefore the true size\nof the objects which occupy them likewise increases. Thus objects are\nlarger or smaller according to the size of the spheres of which they\noccupy similar portions--say 10\u00b0--while their visual angle remains\nunchanged in both cases, leaving it therefore undecided, whether the\n10\u00b0 occupied by a given object belong to a sphere of 2 miles, or of\n10 feet diameter. Conversely, if the size of the object has been\nascertained, the number of degrees occupied by it will diminish in\nproportion to the distance and the size of the sphere to which we\nrefer it, and all its outlines will contract in similar proportion.\nFrom this ensues the fundamental law of all perspective; for, as\nobjects and the intervals between them must necessarily diminish in\nconstant proportion to their distance from us, all their outlines\nthereby contracting, the result will be, that with increasing distance,\nwhat is above us will descend, what is below us will ascend, and all\nthat lies at our sides will come nearer together. This progressive\nconvergence, this linear perspective, no doubt enables us to estimate\ndistances, so far as we have before us an uninterrupted succession of\nvisibly connected objects; but we are not able to do this by means of\nthe visual angle alone, for here the help of another datum is required\nby the Understanding, to act, in a sense, as commentary to the visual\nangle, by indicating more precisely the share we are to attribute to\ndistance in that angle. Now there are four principal data of this kind,\nwhich I am about to specify. Thanks to these data, even where there\nis no linear perspective to guide us, if a man standing at a distance\nof 200 feet appears to me subtending a visual angle twenty-four times\nsmaller than if he were only 2 feet off, I can nevertheless in most\ncases estimate his size correctly. All this proves once more that\nperception is not only a thing of the senses, but of the intellect\nalso.--I will here add the following special and interesting fact in\ncorroboration of what I have said about the basis of linear perspective\nas well as about the intellectual nature of all perception. When I have\nlooked steadily at a coloured object with sharply defined outlines--say\na red cross--long enough for the physiological image to form in my\neye as a green cross, the further the surface on to which I project\nit, the larger it will appear to me: and _vice versa_. For the image\nitself occupies an unvarying portion of my retina, _i.e._ the portion\noriginally affected by the red cross; therefore when referred outwards,\nor, in other words, recognised as the effect of an external object,\nit forms an unchanging visual angle, say of 2\u00b0. Now if, in this case,\nwhere all commentary to the visual angle is wanting, I remove it to\na distant surface, with which I necessarily identify it as belonging\nto its effect, the cross will occupy 2\u00b0 of a distant and therefore\nlarger sphere, and is consequently large. If, on the other hand, I\nproject the image on to a nearer object, it will occupy 2\u00b0 of a smaller\nsphere, and is therefore small. The resulting perception is in both\ncases completely objective, quite like that of an external object;\nand as it proceeds from an entirely subjective reason (from the image\nhaving been excited in quite a different way), it thus confirms the\nintellectual character of all objective perception.--This phenomenon\n(which I distinctly remember to have been the first to notice, in 1815)\nforms the theme of an essay by S\u00e9guin, published in the \"_Comptes\nrendus_\" of the 2nd August, 1858, where it is served up as a new\ndiscovery, all sorts of absurd and distorted explanations of it being\ngiven. _Messieurs les illustres confr\u00e8res_ let pass no opportunity for\nheaping experiment upon experiment, the more complicated the better.\n_Exp\u00e9rience!_ is their watchword; yet how rarely do we meet with any\nsound, genuine reflection upon the phenomena observed! _Exp\u00e9rience!\nexp\u00e9rience!_ followed by twaddle.\n\nTo return to the subsidiary data which act as commentaries to a given\nvisual angle, we find foremost among them the _mutationes oculi\nintern\u00e6_, by means of which the eye adapts its refractory apparatus\nto various distances by increasing and diminishing the refraction. In\nwhat these modifications consist, has not yet been clearly ascertained.\nThey have been sought in the increased convexity, now of the _cornea_,\nnow of the crystalline _lens_; but the latest theory seems to me the\nmost probable one, according to which the lens is moved backwards\nfor distant vision and forwards for near vision, lateral pressure,\nin the latter case, giving it increased protuberance; so that the\nprocess would exactly resemble the mechanism of an opera-glass.\nKepler, however, had, in the main, already expressed this theory,\nwhich may be found explained in A. Hueck's pamphlet, \"Die Bewegung der\nKrystallinse,\" 1841. If we are not clearly conscious of these inner\nmodifications of the eye, we have at any rate a certain feeling of\nthem, and of this we immediately avail ourselves to estimate distances.\nAs however these modifications are not available for the purposes of\nclear sight beyond the range of from about 7 inches to 16 feet, the\nUnderstanding is only able to apply this datum within those limits.\n\nBeyond them, however, the second datum becomes available: that is to\nsay, the _optic angle_, formed by the two optic axes, which we had\noccasion to explain when speaking of single vision. It is obvious\nthat this optic angle becomes smaller, the further the object is\nremoved: and _vice versa_. This different direction of the eyes, with\nrespect to each other, does not take place without producing a slight\nsensation, of which we are nevertheless only in so far conscious as\nthe Understanding makes use of it, as a datum, in estimating distances\nintuitively. By this datum we are not only enabled to cognize the\ndistance, but the precise position of the object viewed, by means of\nthe parallax of the eyes, which consists in each eye seeing the object\nin a slightly different direction; so that if we close one eye, the\nobject seems to move. Thus it is not easy to snuff a candle with one\neye shut, because this datum is then wanting. But as the direction of\nthe eyes becomes parallel as soon as the distance of the object reaches\nor exceeds 200 feet, and as the optic angle consequently then ceases to\nexist, this datum only holds good within the said distance.\n\nBeyond it, the Understanding has recourse to _atmospheric perspective_,\nwhich indicates a greater distance by means of the increasing dimness\nof all colours, of the appearance of physical blue in front of all dark\nobjects (according to G\u00f6the's perfectly correct and true theory of\ncolours), and also of the growing indistinctness of all outlines. In\nItaly, where the atmosphere is very transparent, this datum loses its\npower and is apt to mislead: Tivoli, for instance, seems to be very\nnear when seen from Frascati. On the other hand, all objects appear\nlarger in a mist, which is an abnormal exaggeration of the datum;\nbecause our Understanding assumes them to be further from us.\n\nFinally, there remains the estimation of distance by means of the size\n(known to us intuitively) of intervening objects, such as fields,\nwoods, rivers, &c. &c. This mode of estimation is only applicable where\nthere is uninterrupted succession: in other words, it can only be\napplied to terrestrial, not to celestial objects. Moreover, we have in\ngeneral more practice in using it horizontally than vertically: a ball\non the top of a tower 200 feet high appears much smaller to us than\nwhen lying on the ground 200 feet from us; because, in the latter case,\nwe estimate the distance more accurately. When we see human beings in\nsuch a way, that what lies between them and ourselves is in a great\nmeasure hidden from our sight, they always appear strikingly small.\n\nThe fact that our Understanding assumes everything it perceives in a\nhorizontal direction to be farther off, therefore larger, than what\nis seen in a vertical direction, must partly be attributed to this\nlast mode of estimating distances, inasmuch as it only holds good when\napplied horizontally and to terrestrial objects; but partly also to our\nestimation of distances by atmospheric perspective, which is subject\nto similar conditions. This is why the moon seems so much larger on\nthe horizon than at its zenith, although its visual angle accurately\nmeasured--that is, the image projected by it on to the eye--is not at\nall larger in one case than in the other; and this also accounts for\nthe flattened appearance of the vault of the sky: that is to say, for\nits appearing to have greater horizontal than vertical extension. Both\nphenomena therefore are purely intellectual or cerebral, not optical.\nIf it be objected, that even when at its zenith, the moon occasionally\nhas a hazy appearance without seeming to be larger, we answer, that\nneither does it in that case appear red; for its haziness proceeds from\na greater density of vapours, and is therefore of a different kind from\nthat which proceeds from atmospheric perspective. To this may be added\nwhat I have already said: that we only apply this mode of estimating\ndistances in a horizontal, not in a perpendicular, direction; besides,\nin this case, other correctives come into play. It is related of\nSaussure that, when on the Mont Blanc, he saw so enormous a moon rise,\nthat, not recognising what it was, he fainted with terror.\n\nThe properties of the telescope and magnifying glass, on the other\nhand, depend upon a separate estimate according to the visual angle\nalone: _i.e._, that of size by distance, and of distance by size;\nbecause here the four other supplementary means of estimating distances\nare excluded. The telescope in reality magnifies objects, while it\nonly seems to bring them nearer; because their size being known to us\nempirically, we here account for its apparent increase by a diminution\nof their distance from us. A house seen through a telescope, for\ninstance, seems to be ten times nearer, not ten times larger, than seen\nwith the naked eye. The magnifying glass, on the contrary, does not\nreally magnify, but merely enables us to bring the object nearer to\nour eyes than would otherwise be possible; so that it only appears as\nlarge as it would at that distance even without the magnifying glass.\nIn fact, we are prevented from seeing objects distinctly at less than\nfrom eight to ten inches' distance from our eyes, by the insufficient\nconvexity of the ocular lens and cornea; but if we increase the\nrefraction by substituting the convexity of the magnifying glass for\nthat of the lens and cornea, we then obtain a clear image of objects\neven when they are as near as half an inch from our eyes. Objects thus\nseen in close proximity to us and in the size corresponding to that\nproximity, are transferred by our Understanding to the distance at\nwhich we naturally see distinctly, _i.e._ to about eight or ten inches\nfrom our eyes, and we then estimate their magnitude according to this\ndistance and to the given visual angle.\n\nI have entered thus fully into detail concerning all the different\nprocesses by which seeing is accomplished, in order to show clearly\nand irrefragably that the predominant factor in them is _the\nUnderstanding_, which, by conceiving each change as an _effect_ and\nreferring that effect to its _cause_, produces the cerebral phenomenon\nof the objective world on the basis of the _\u00e0 priori_ fundamental\nintuitions of Space and Time, for which it receives merely a few\ndata from the senses. And moreover the Understanding effects this\nexclusively by means of its own peculiar form, the law of Causality;\ntherefore quite directly and intuitively, without any assistance\nwhatever from reflection--that is, from abstract knowledge by means of\nconceptions and of language, which are the materials of _secondary_\nknowledge, _i.e._ of _thought_, therefore of _Reason_.\n\nThat this knowledge through the Understanding is independent of\nReason's assistance, is shown even by the fact, that when, at any\ntime, the Understanding attributes a given effect to a wrong cause,\nactually perceiving that cause, whereby _illusion_ arises, our Reason,\nhowever clearly it may recognise _in abstracto_ the true state of\nthe matter, is nevertheless unable to assist the Understanding, and\nthe illusion persists undisturbed in spite of that better knowledge.\nThe above-mentioned phenomena of seeing and feeling double, which\nresult from an abnormal position of the organs of touch and sight,\nare instances of such illusions; likewise the apparently increased\nsize of the rising moon; the image which forms in the focus of a\nconcave mirror and exactly resembles a solid body floating in space;\nthe painted relievo which we take for real; the apparent motion of a\nshore or bridge on which we are standing, if a ship happens to pass\nalong or beneath it; the seeming proximity of very lofty mountains,\nowing to the absence of atmospheric perspective, which is the result\nof the purity of the air round their summits. In these and in a\nmultitude of similar cases, our Understanding takes for granted the\nexistence of the usual cause with which it is conversant and forthwith\nperceives it, though our Reason has arrived at the truth by a different\nroad; for, the knowledge of the Understanding being anterior to that\nof the Reason, the intellect remains inaccessible to the teaching\nof the Reason, and thus the _illusion_--that is, the deception of\nthe Understanding--remains immovable; albeit _error_--that is, the\ndeception of the Reason--is obviated.--That which is correctly known by\nthe Understanding is _reality_: that which is correctly known by the\nReason is _truth_, or in other terms, a judgment having a sufficient\nreason; _illusion_ (that which is wrongly perceived) we oppose to\n_reality_: _error_ (that which is wrongly thought) to _truth_.\n\nThe purely formal part of empirical perception--that is, Space, Time,\nand the law of Causality--is contained _\u00e0 priori_ in the intellect;\nbut this is not the case with the application of this formal part to\nempirical data, which has to be acquired by the Understanding through\npractice and experience. Therefore new-born infants, though they\nno doubt receive impressions of light and of colour, still do not\napprehend or indeed, strictly speaking, see objects. The first weeks of\ntheir existence are rather passed in a kind of stupor, from which they\nawaken by degrees when their Understanding begins to apply its function\nto the data supplied by the senses, especially those of touch and\nof sight, whereby they gradually gain consciousness of the objective\nworld. This newly-arising consciousness may be clearly recognised\nby the look of growing intelligence in their eyes and a degree of\nintention in their movements, especially in the smile with which they\nshow for the first time recognition of those who take care of them.\nThey may even be observed to make experiments for a time with their\nsight and touch, in order to complete their apprehension of objects by\ndifferent lights, in different directions and at different distances:\nthus pursuing a silent, but serious course of study, till they have\nsucceeded in mastering all the intellectual operations in seeing which\nhave been described. The fact of this schooling can be ascertained\nstill more clearly through those who, being born blind, have been\noperated upon late in life, since they are able to give an account\nof their impressions. Cheselden's blind man[82] was not an isolated\ninstance, and we find in all similar cases the fact corroborated,\nthat those who obtain their sight late in life, no doubt, see light,\noutlines, and colours, as soon as the operation is over, but that they\nhave no objective perception of objects until their Understanding has\nlearnt to apply its causal law to data and to changes which are new\nto it. On first beholding his room and the various objects in it,\nCheselden's blind man did not distinguish one thing from another; he\nsimply received the general impression of a totality all in one piece,\nwhich he took for a smooth, variegated surface. It never occurred to\nhim to recognise a number of detached objects, lying one behind the\nother at different distances. With blind people of this sort, it is by\nthe sense of touch, to which objects are already known, that they have\nto be introduced to the sense of sight. In the beginning, the patient\nhas no appreciation whatever of distances and tries to lay hold of\neverything. One, when he first saw his own house from outside, could\nnot conceive how so small a thing could contain so many rooms. Another\nwas highly delighted to find, some weeks after the operation, that the\nengravings hanging on the walls of his room represented a variety of\nobjects. The \"Morgenblatt\" of October 23rd, 1817, contains an account\nof a youth who was born blind, and obtained his sight at the age of\nseventeen. He had to learn intelligent perception, for at first sight\nhe did not even recognise objects previously known to him through the\nsense of touch. Every object had to be introduced to the sense of sight\nby means of the sense of touch. As for the distances of the objects he\nsaw, he had no appreciation whatever of them, and tried to lay hold\nindiscriminately of everything, far or near.--Franz expresses himself\nas follows:[83]--\n\n    \"A definite idea of distance, as well as of form and size, is\n    only obtained by sight and touch, and by reflecting on the\n    impressions made on both senses; but for this purpose we must\n    take into account the muscular motion and voluntary locomotion\n    of the individual.--Caspar Hauser, in a detailed account of his\n    own experience in this respect, states, that upon his first\n    liberation from confinement, whenever he looked through the\n    window upon external objects, such as the street, garden, &c.,\n    it appeared to him as if there were a shutter quite close to his\n    eye, and covered with confused colours of all kinds, in which he\n    could recognise or distinguish nothing singly. He says farther,\n    that he did not convince himself till after some time during his\n    walks out of doors, that what had at first appeared to him as a\n    shutter of various colours, as well as many other objects, were\n    in reality very different things; and that at length the shutter\n    disappeared, and he saw and recognised all things in their just\n    proportions. Persons born blind who obtain their sight by an\n    operation in later years only, sometimes imagine that all objects\n    touch their eyes, and lie so near to them that they are afraid\n    of stumbling against them; sometimes they leap towards the moon,\n    supposing that they can lay hold of it; at other times they run\n    after the clouds moving along the sky, in order to catch them,\n    or commit other such extravagancies. Since ideas are gained by\n    reflection upon sensation, it is further necessary in all cases,\n    in order that an accurate idea of objects may be formed from the\n    sense of sight, that the powers of the mind should be unimpaired,\n    and undisturbed in their exercise. A proof of this is afforded in\n    the instance related by Haslam,[84] of a boy who had no defect of\n    sight, but was weak in understanding, and who in his seventh year\n    was unable to estimate the distances of objects, especially as to\n    height; he would extend his hand frequently towards a nail on the\n    ceiling, or towards the moon, to catch it. It is therefore the\n    judgment which corrects and makes clear this idea, or perception\n    of visible objects.\"\n\n  [82] See the original report in vol. 35 of the \"Philosophical\n  Transactions\" as to this case.\n\n  [83] Franz, \"The Eye, a treatise on preserving this organ in a\n  healthy state and improving the sight.\" London, Churchill, 1839,\n  pp. 34-36.\n\n  [84] Haslam's \"Observations on Madness and Melancholy,\" 2nd ed. p.\n  192.\n\nThe intellectual nature of perception as I have shown it, is\ncorroborated physiologically by Flourens[85] as follows:\n\n    \"Il faut faire une grand distinction entre les sens et\n    l'intelligence. L'ablation d'un tubercule d\u00e9termine la perte\n    de la _sensation_, du _sens_ de la vue; la r\u00e9tine devient\n    insensible, l'iris devient immobile. L'ablation d'un lobe\n    c\u00e9r\u00e9bral laisse la _sensation_, le _sens_, la _sensibilit\u00e9_\n    de la r\u00e9tine, la _mobilit\u00e9_ de l'iris; elle ne d\u00e9truit que la\n    _perception_ seule. Dans un cas, c'est un fait _sensorial_; et,\n    dans l'autre, un fait _c\u00e9r\u00e9bral_; dans un cas, c'est la perte\n    du _sens_; dans l'autre, c'est la perte de la _perception_. La\n    distinction des perceptions et des sensations est encore un grand\n    r\u00e9sultat; et it est d\u00e9montr\u00e9 aux yeux. Il y a deux moyens de\n    faire perdre la vision par l'enc\u00e9phale: 1\u00b0 par les tubercules,\n    c'est la perte du sens, de la sensation; 2\u00b0 par les lobes, c'est\n    la perte de la perception, de l'intelligence. La sensibilit\u00e9\n    n'est donc pas l'intelligence; penser n'est donc pas sentir; et\n    voil\u00e0 toute une philosophie renvers\u00e9e. L'id\u00e9e n'est donc pas\n    la sensation; et voil\u00e0 encore une autre preuve du vice radical\n    de cette philosophie.\" And again, p. 77, under the heading:\n    S\u00e9paration de la Sensibilit\u00e9 et de la Perception:--\"Il y a une\n    de mes exp\u00e9riences qui s\u00e9pare nettement la _sensibilit\u00e9_ de\n    la _perception_. Quand on enl\u00e8ve le _cerveau proprement dit_\n    (_lobes_ ou _h\u00e9misph\u00e8res c\u00e9r\u00e9braux_) \u00e0 un animal, l'animal\n    perd la vue. Mais, par rapport a l'\u0153il, rien n'est chang\u00e9: les\n    objets continuent \u00e0 se peindre sur la r\u00e9tine; l'_iris_ reste\n    contractile, le _nerf optique_ sensible, parfaitement sensible.\n    Et cependant l'animal ne voit plus; il n'y a plus _vision_,\n    quoique tout ce qui est _sensation_ subsiste; il n'y a plus\n    _vision_, parce qu'il n'y a plus _perception_. Le _percevoir_, et\n    non le _sentir_, est donc le premier \u00e9l\u00e9ment de l'_intelligence_.\n    La _perception_ est partie de l'_intelligence_, car elle se\n    perd avec l'_intelligence_, et par l'ablation du m\u00eame organe,\n    les _lobes_ ou _h\u00e9misph\u00e8res c\u00e9r\u00e9braux_; et la _sensibilit\u00e9_\n    n'en est point partie, puisqu'elle subsiste apr\u00e8s la perte de\n    l'_intelligence_ et l'ablation des _lobes_ ou _h\u00e9misph\u00e8res_.\"\n\n  [85] Flourens, \"De la vie et de l'Intelligence,\" 2nd edition,\n  Paris, Garnier Fr\u00e8res, 1852, p. 49.\n\nThe following famous verse of the ancient philosopher Epicharmus,\nproves that the ancients in general recognized the intellectual\nnature of perception: \u039d\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u1fc7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f06\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03ba\u03c9\u03c6\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03c5\u03c6\u03bb\u03ac.\n(_Mens videt, mens audit; c\u00e6tera surda et c\u0153ca._)[86] Plutarch in\nquoting this verse, adds:[87] \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f44\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f66\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2,\n\u1f02\u03bd \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1fc7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd, \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 (_quia affectio oculorum\net aurium nullum affert sensum, intelligentia absente_). Shortly\nbefore too he says: \u03a3\u03c4\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03bd, \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03bd\u03cd\u03c9\u03bd\n\u1f61\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4' \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9. (_Stratonis\nphysici exstat ratiocinatio, qua \"sine intelligentia sentiri omnino\nnihil posse\" demonstrat._)[88] Again shortly after he says: \u1f45\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7, \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f37\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03b5\u1f30 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03cd\u03ba\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd (_quare necesse est, omnia, qu\u00e6 sentiunt, etiam\nintelligere, siquidem intelligendo demum sentiamus_).[89] A second\nverse of Epicharmus might be connected with this, which is quoted by\nDiogenes Laertes (iii. 16):\n\n  \u0395\u1f54\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03b5, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8' \u1f13\u03bd \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd,\n  \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb' \u1f45\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03b6\u1fc7, \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9.\n\n  [86] \"It is the mind that sees and hears; all besides is deaf and\n  blind.\" (Tr. Ad.)\n\n  [87] Plutarch, \"De solert. animal.\" c. 3. \"For the affection of\n  our eyes and ears does not produce any perception, unless it be\n  accompanied by thought.\" (Tr. Ad.)\n\n  [88] \"Straton, the physicist, has proved that 'without thinking it\n  is quite impossible to perceive.'\" (Tr. Ad.)\n\n  [89] \"Therefore it is necessary that all who perceive should also\n  think, since we are so constituted as to perceive by means of\n  thinking.\" (Tr. Ad.)\n\n(_Eumaee, sapientia non uni tantum competit, sed qu\u00e6cunque vivunt etiam\nintellectum habent._) Porphyry likewise endeavours to show at length\nthat all animals have understanding.[90]\n\n  [90] Porph. \"De abstinentia,\" iii. 21.\n\nNow, that it should be so, follows necessarily from the intellectual\ncharacter of perception. All animals, even down to the very lowest,\nmust have Understanding--that is, knowledge of the causal law,\nalthough they have it in very different degrees of delicacy and of\nclearness; at any rate they must have as much of it as is required\nfor perception by their senses; for sensation without Understanding\nwould be not only a useless, but a cruel gift of Nature. No one, who\nhas himself any intelligence, can doubt the existence of it in the\nhigher animals. But at times it even becomes undeniably evident that\ntheir knowledge of causality is actually _\u00e0 priori_, and that it does\nnot arise from the habit of seeing one thing follow upon another. A\nvery young puppy will not, for instance, jump off a table, because\nhe foresees what would be the consequence. Not long ago I had some\nlarge curtains put up at my bed-room window, which reached down to the\nfloor, and were drawn aside from the centre by means of a string. The\nfirst morning they were opened I was surprised to see my dog, a very\nintelligent poodle, standing quite perplexed, and looking upwards and\nsidewards for the cause of the phenomenon: that is, he was seeking\nfor the change which he knew _\u00e0 priori_ must have taken place. Next\nday the same thing happened again.--But even the lowest animals have\nperception--consequently Understanding--down to the aquatic polypus,\nwhich has no distinct organs of sensation, yet wanders from leaf to\nleaf on its waterplant, while clinging to it with its feelers, in\nsearch of more light.\n\nNor is there, indeed, any difference, beyond that of degree, between\nthis lowest Understanding and that of man, which we however distinctly\nseparate from his Reason. The intermediate gradations are occupied by\nthe various series of animals, among which the highest, such as the\nmonkey, the elephant, the dog, astonish us often by their intelligence.\nBut in every case the business of the Understanding is invariably to\napprehend directly causal relations: first, as we have seen, those\nbetween our own body and other bodies, whence proceeds objective\nperception; then those between these objectively perceived bodies among\nthemselves, and here, as has been shown in \u00a7 20, the causal relation\nmanifests itself in three forms--as cause, as stimulus, and as motive.\nAll movement in the world takes place according to these three forms\nof the causal relation, and through them alone does the intellect\ncomprehend it. Now, if, of these three, _causes_, in the narrowest\nsense of the word, happen to be the object of investigation for\nthe Understanding, it will produce Astronomy, Mechanics, Physics,\nChemistry, and will invent machines for good and for evil; but in all\ncases a direct, intuitive apprehension of the causal connection will\nin the last resort lie at the bottom of all its discoveries. For the\nsole form and function of the Understanding is this apprehension, and\nnot by any means the complicated machinery of Kant's twelve Categories,\nthe nullity of which I have proved.--(All comprehension is a direct,\nconsequently intuitive, apprehension of the causal connection; although\nthis has to be reduced at once to abstract conceptions in order to\nbe fixed. To calculate therefore, is not to understand, and, in\nitself, calculation conveys no comprehension of things. Calculation\ndeals exclusively with abstract conceptions of magnitudes, whose\nmutual relations it determines. By it we never attain the slightest\ncomprehension of a physical process, for this requires _intuitive_\ncomprehension of space-relations, by means of which causes take\neffect. Calculations have merely practical, not theoretical, value. It\nmay even be said that _where calculation begins, comprehension ceases_;\nfor a brain occupied with numbers is, as long as it calculates,\nentirely estranged from the causal connection in physical processes,\nbeing engrossed in purely abstract, numerical conceptions. The result,\nhowever, only shows us _how much_, never _what_. \"_L'exp\u00e9rience et le\ncalcul_,\" those watchwords of French physicists, are not therefore by\nany means adequate [for thorough insight].)--If, again, _stimuli_ are\nthe guides of the Understanding, it will produce Physiology of Plants\nand Animals, Therapeutics, and Toxicology. Finally, if it devotes\nitself to the study of _motives_, the Understanding will use them,\non the one hand, theoretically, to guide it in producing works on\nMorality, Jurisprudence, History, Politics, and even Dramatic and Epic\nPoetry; on the other hand, practically, either merely to train animals,\nor for the higher purpose of making human beings dance to its music,\nwhen once it has succeeded in discovering which particular wire has\nto be pulled in order to move each puppet at its pleasure. Now, with\nreference to the function which effects this, it is quite immaterial\nwhether the intellect turns gravitation ingeniously to account, and\nmakes it serve its purpose by stepping in just at the right time, or\nwhether it brings the collective or the individual propensities of men\ninto play for its own ends. In its practical application we call the\nUnderstanding _shrewdness_ or, when used to outwit others, _cunning_;\nwhen its aims are very insignificant, it is called _slyness_ and, if\ncombined with injury to others, _craftiness_. In its purely theoretical\napplication, we call it simply _Understanding_, the higher degrees of\nwhich are named _acumen_, _sagacity_, _discernment_, _penetration_,\nwhile its lower degrees are termed _dulness_, _stupidity_, _silliness_,\n&c. &c. These widely differing degrees of sharpness are innate, and\ncannot be acquired; although, as I have already shown, even in the\nearliest stages of the application of the Understanding, _i.e._ in\nempirical perception, practice and knowledge of the material to which\nit is applied, are needed. Every simpleton has Reason--give him\nthe premisses, and he will draw the conclusion; whereas _primary_,\nconsequently intuitive, knowledge is supplied by the Understanding:\nherein lies the difference. The pith of every great discovery, of every\nplan having universal historical importance, is accordingly the product\nof a happy moment in which, by a favourable coincidence of outer and\ninner circumstances, some complicated causal series, some hidden causes\nof phenomena which had been seen thousands of times before, or some\nobscure, untrodden paths, suddenly reveal themselves to the intellect.--\n\nBy the preceding explanations of the processes in seeing and feeling,\nI have incontestably shown that empirical perception is essentially\nthe work of _the Understanding_, for which the material only is\nsupplied by the senses in sensation--and a poor material it is, on the\nwhole; so that _the Understanding_ is, in fact, the artist, while the\nsenses are but the under-workmen who hand it the materials. But the\nprocess consists throughout in referring from given effects to their\ncauses, which by this process are enabled to present themselves as\nobjects in Space. The very fact that we presuppose Causality in this\nprocess, proves precisely that this law must have been supplied by\nthe Understanding itself; for it could never have found its way into\nthe intellect from outside. It is indeed the first condition of all\nempirical perception; but this again is the form in which all external\nexperience presents itself to us; how then can this law of Causality be\nderived from experience, when it is itself essentially presupposed by\nexperience?--It was just because of the utter impossibility of this,\nand because Locke's philosophy had put an end to all _\u00e0 priority_,\nthat Hume denied the whole reality of the conception of Causality.\nHe had besides already mentioned two false hypotheses in the seventh\nsection of his \"Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding,\" which\nrecently have again been advanced: the one, that the effect of the will\nupon the members of our body; the other, that the resistance opposed\nto our pressure by outward objects, is the origin and prototype of\nthe conception of Causality. Hume refutes both in his own way and\naccording to his own order of ideas. I argue as follows. There is\nno causal connection whatever between acts of the will and actions\nof the body; on the contrary, both are immediately one and the same\nthing, only perceived in a double aspect--that is, on the one hand,\nin our self-consciousness, or inner sense, as acts of the will; on\nthe other, simultaneously in exterior, spacial brain-perception,\nas actions of the body.[91] The second hypothesis is false, first\nbecause, as I have already shown at length, a mere sensation of touch\ndoes not yet give any objective perception whatever, let alone the\nconception of Causality, which never can arise from the feeling of an\nimpeded muscular effort: besides impediments of this kind often occur\nwithout any external cause; secondly, because our pressing against an\nexternal object necessarily has a motive, and this already presupposes\napprehension of that object, which again presupposes knowledge of\nCausality.--But the only means of radically proving the conception of\nCausality to be independent of all experience was by showing, as I have\ndone, that the whole possibility of experience is conditioned by the\nconception of Causality. In \u00a7 23 I intend to show that Kant's proof,\npropounded with a similar intent, is false.\n\n  [91] Compare \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" 3rd edition, vol. ii. p. 41.\n  [The 3rd edition of \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" contains at this place\n  a supplement which is wanting in the 2nd edition, vol. ii. p.\n  38.--Note by the Editor of the 3rd edition.]\n\nThis is also the proper place for drawing attention to the fact,\nthat Kant either did not clearly recognise in empirical perception\nthe mediation of the causal law--which law is known to us before all\nexperience--or that he intentionally evaded mentioning it, because\nit did not suit his purpose. In the \"Critique of Pure Reason,\" for\ninstance, the relation between causality and perception is not treated\nin the \"Doctrine of Elements,\" but in the chapter on the \"Paralogisms\nof Pure Reason,\" where one would hardly expect to find it; moreover it\nappears in his \"Critique of the Fourth Paralogism of Transcendental\nPsychology,\" and only in the first edition.[92] The very fact that\nthis place should have been assigned to it, shows that in considering\nthis relation, he always had the transition from the phenomenon to\nthe thing in itself exclusively in view, but not the genesis of\nperception itself. Here accordingly he says that the existence of a\nreal external object is not given directly in perception, but can be\nadded to it in thought and thus inferred. In Kant's eyes, however,\nhe who does this is a Transcendental Realist, and consequently on a\nwrong road. For by his \"outward object\" Kant here means the thing in\nitself. The Transcendental Idealist, on the contrary, stops short at\nthe perception of something empirically real--that is, of something\nexisting outside us in Space--without needing the inference of a cause\nto give it reality. For _perception_, according to Kant, is quite\ndirectly accomplished without any assistance from the causal nexus, and\nconsequently from the Understanding: he simply identifies perception\nwith sensation. This we find confirmed in the passage which begins,\n\"With reference to the reality of external objects, I need as little\ntrust to inference,\" &c. &c.[93] and again in the sentence commencing\nwith \"Now we may well admit,\" &c. &c.[94] It is quite clear from these\npassages that perception of external things in Space, according to\nKant, precedes all application of the causal law, therefore that the\ncausal law does not belong to perception as an element and condition\nof it: for him, mere sensation is identical with perception. Only in\nas far as we ask what may, in a _transcendental_ sense, exist _outside\nof us_: that is, when we ask for the thing in itself, is Causality\nmentioned as connected with perception. Moreover Kant admits the\nexistence, nay, the mere possibility, of causality only in reflection:\nthat is, in abstract, distinct knowledge by means of conceptions;\ntherefore he has no suspicion that its application is _anterior to all\nreflection_, which is nevertheless evidently the case, especially in\nempirical, sensuous perception which, as I have proved irrefragably\nin the preceding analysis, could never take place otherwise. Kant\nis therefore obliged to leave the genesis of empirical perception\nunexplained. With him it is a mere matter of the senses, given as it\nwere in a miraculous way: that is, it coincides with sensation. I\nshould very much like my reflective readers to refer to the passages I\nhave indicated in Kant's work, in order to convince themselves of the\nfar greater accuracy of my view of the whole process and connection.\nKant's extremely erroneous view has held its ground till now in\nphilosophical literature, simply because no one ventured to attack it;\ntherefore I have found it necessary to clear the way in order to throw\nlight upon the mechanism of our knowledge.\n\n  [92] Kant, \"Krit. d. r. V.\" 1st edition, p. 367 _sqq._ (English\n  translation by M. M\u00fcller, p. 318 _sqq._)\n\n  [93] Kant, \"Krit. d. r. Vern.\" 1st edition, p. 371. (English\n  translation, by M. M\u00fcller, p. 322.)\n\n  [94] Kant, \"Krit. d. r. Vern.\" 1st edition, p. 372. (English\n  translation, p. 323.)\n\nKant's fundamental idealistic position loses nothing whatever, nay, it\neven gains by this rectification of mine, in as far as, with me, the\nnecessity of the causal law is absorbed and extinguished in empirical\nperception as its product and cannot therefore be invoked in behalf\nof an entirely transcendent question as to the thing in itself. On\nreferring to my theory above concerning empirical perception, we find\nthat its first datum, sensation, is absolutely subjective, being a\nprocess within the organism, because it takes place beneath the skin.\nLocke has completely and exhaustively proved, that the feelings of\nour senses, even admitting them to be roused by external causes,\ncannot have any resemblance whatever to the qualities of those causes.\nSugar, for instance, bears no resemblance at all to sweetness, nor\na rose to redness. But that they should need an external cause at\nall, is based upon a law whose origin lies demonstrably within us,\nin our brain; therefore this necessity is not less subjective than\nthe sensations themselves. Nay, even _Time_--that primary condition\nof every possible _change_, therefore also of the change which first\npermits the application of the causal law--and not less _Space_--which\nalone renders the externalisation of causes possible, after which they\npresent themselves to us as objects--even Time and Space, we say, are\nsubjective forms of the intellect, as Kant has conclusively proved.\nAccordingly we find all the elements of empirical perception lying\nwithin us, and nothing contained in them which can give us reliable\nindications as to anything differing absolutely from ourselves,\nanything in itself.--But this is not all. What we think under the\nconception _matter_, is the residue which remains over after bodies\nhave been divested of their shape and of all their specific qualities:\na residue, which precisely on that account must be identical in all\nbodies. Now these shapes and qualities which have been abstracted by\nus, are nothing but the peculiar, specially defined _way in which\nthese bodies act_, which constitutes precisely their difference. If\ntherefore we leave these shapes and qualities out of consideration,\nthere remains nothing but _mere activity in general_, pure action as\nsuch, Causality itself, objectively thought--that is, the reflection\nof our own Understanding, the externalised image of its sole function;\nand Matter is throughout pure Causality, its essence is Action in\ngeneral.[95] This is why pure Matter cannot be perceived, but can only\nbe thought: it is a something we add to every reality, as its basis, in\nthinking it. For pure Causality, mere action, without any defined mode\nof action, cannot become perceptible, therefore it cannot come within\nany experience.--Thus Matter is only the objective correlate to pure\nUnderstanding; for it is Causality in general, and nothing else: just\nas the Understanding itself is direct knowledge of cause and effect,\nand nothing else. Now this again is precisely why the law of causality\nis not applicable to Matter itself: that is to say, Matter has neither\nbeginning nor end, but is and remains permanent. For as, on the one\nhand, Causality is the indispensable condition of all alternation in\nthe accidents (forms and qualities) of Matter, _i.e._ of all passage\nin and out of being; but as, on the other hand, Matter is pure\nCausality itself, as such, objectively viewed: it is unable to exercise\nits own power upon itself, just as the eye can see everything but\nitself. \"Substance\" and Matter being moreover identical, we may call\n_Substance_, _action_ viewed _in abstracto_: _Accidents_, particular\nmodes of action, action _in concreto_.--Now these are the results to\nwhich true, _i.e._ transcendental, Idealism leads. In my chief work I\nhave shown that the thing in itself--_i.e._ whatever, on the whole,\nexists independently of our representation--cannot be got at by way of\nrepresentation, but that, to reach it, we must follow quite a different\npath, leading through the inside of things, which lets us into the\ncitadel, as it were, by treachery.--\n\n  [95] Compare \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" 2nd edition; vol. i. sect. 4,\n  p. 9; and vol. ii. pp. 48, 49 (3rd edition, vol. i. p. 10; vol. ii.\n  p. 52). English translation, vol. i. pp. 9-10; vol. ii. p. 218.\n\nBut it would be downright chicanery, nothing else, to try and\ncompare, let alone identify, such an honest, deep, thorough analysis\nof empirical perception as the one I have just given, which proves all\nthe elements of perception to be subjective, with Fichte's algebraic\nequations of the _Ego_ and the _Non-Ego_; with his sophistical\npseudo-demonstrations, which in order to be able to deceive his readers\nhad to be clothed in the obscure, not to say absurd, language adopted\nby him; with his explanations of the way in which the _Ego_ spins\nthe _Non-Ego_ out of itself; in short, with all the buffoonery of\nscientific emptiness.[96] Besides, I protest altogether against any\ncommunity with this Fichte, as Kant publicly and emphatically did in a\nnotice _ad hoc_ in the \"Jenaer Litteratur Zeitung.\"[97] Hegelians and\nsimilar ignoramuses may continue to hold forth to their heart's content\nupon Kant-Fichteian philosophy: there exists a Kantian philosophy and\na Fichteian hocus-pocus,--this is the true state of the case, and will\nremain so, in spite of those who delight in extolling what is bad and\nin decrying what is good, and of these Germany possesses a larger\nnumber than any other country.\n\n  [96] _Wissenschaftsleere_ (literally, _emptiness of science_), a\n  pun of Schopenhauer's on the title of Fichte's _Wissenschaftslehre_\n  (_doctrine of science_), which cannot be rendered in English.\n  (Tr.'s Note.)\n\n  [97] Kant, \"Erkl\u00e4rung \u00fcber Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre.\" See the\n  \"Intelligenzblatt\" of the Jena Literary Gazette (1799), No. 109.\n\n\n\u00a7 22. _Of the Immediate Object._\n\nThus it is from the sensations of our body that we receive the data for\nthe very first application of the causal law, and it is precisely by\nthat application that the perception of this class of objects arises.\nThey therefore have their essence and existence solely in virtue of the\nintellectual function thus coming into play, and of its exercise.\n\nNow, as far as it is the starting-point, _i.e._ the mediator, for our\nperception of all other objects, I have called the bodily organism,\nin the first edition of the present work, the _Immediate Object_;\nthis, however, must not be taken in a strictly literal sense. For\nalthough our bodily sensations are all apprehended directly, still this\nimmediate apprehension does not yet make our body itself perceptible\nto us as an object; on the contrary, up to this point all remains\nsubjective, that is to say, sensation. From this sensation certainly\nproceeds the perception of all other objects as the causes of such\nsensations, and these causes then present themselves to us as objects;\nbut it is not so with the body itself, which only supplies sensations\nto consciousness. It is only _indirectly_ that we know even this\nbody objectively, _i.e._ as an object, by its presenting itself,\nlike all other objects, as the recognised cause of a subjectively\ngiven effect--and precisely on this account _objectively_--in our\nUnderstanding, or brain (which is the same). Now this can only take\nplace when its own senses are acted upon by its parts: for instance,\nwhen the body is seen by the eye, or felt by the hand, &c., upon which\ndata the brain (or understanding) forthwith constructs it as to shape\nand quality in space.--The immediate presence in our consciousness of\nrepresentations belonging to this class, depends therefore upon the\nposition assigned to them in the causal chain--by which all things\nare _connected_--relatively to the body (for the time being) of the\nSubject--by which (the Subject) all things are _known_.\n\n\n\u00a7 23. _Arguments against Kant's Proof of the_ \u00e0 priority _of the\nconception of Causality_.\n\nOne of the chief objects of the \"Critique of Pure Reason\" is to show\nthe universal validity, for all experience, of the causal law, its _\u00e0\npriority_, and, as a necessary consequence of this, its restriction to\npossible experience. Nevertheless, I cannot assent to the proof there\ngiven of the _\u00e0 priority_ of the principle, which is substantially\nthis:--\"The _synthesis_ of the manifold by the imagination, which\nis necessary for all empirical knowledge, gives succession, but not\nyet determinate succession: that is, it leaves undetermined which of\ntwo states perceived was the first, not only in my imagination, but\nin the object itself. But definite order in this succession--through\nwhich alone what we perceive becomes experience, or, in other words,\nauthorizes us to form objectively valid judgments--is first brought\ninto it by the purely intellectual conception of cause and effect.\nThus the principle of causal relation is the condition which renders\nexperience possible, and, as such, it is given us _\u00e0 priori_.\"[98]\n\n  [98] Kant, \"Krit. d. r. Vern.\" 1st edition, p. 201; 5th edition, p.\n  246. (English translation by M. M\u00fcller, p. 176.) This is, however,\n  not a literal quotation. (Tr.'s note.)\n\nAccording to this, the order in which changes succeed each other in\nreal objects becomes known to us as objective only by their causality.\nThis assertion Kant repeats and explains in the \"Critique of Pure\nReason,\" especially in his \"Second Analogy of Experience,\"[99] and\nagain at the conclusion of his \"Third Analogy,\" and I request every\none who desires to understand what I am now about to say, to read\nthese passages. In them he affirms everywhere that _the objectivity\nof the succession of representations_--which he defines as their\ncorrespondence with the succession of real objects--is only known\nthrough the rule by which they follow upon one another: that is,\nthrough the law of causality; that my mere apprehension consequently\nleaves the objective relation between phenomena following one another\nquite undetermined: since I merely apprehend the succession of my\nown representations, but the succession in my apprehension does not\nauthorize me to form any judgment whatever as to the succession in\nthe object, unless that judgment be based upon causality; and since,\nbesides, I might invert the order in which these perceptions follow\neach other in my apprehension, there being nothing which determines\nthem as objective. To illustrate this assertion, Kant brings forward\nthe instance of a house, whose parts we may consider in any order we\nlike, from top to bottom, or from bottom to top; the determination of\nsuccession being in this case purely subjective and not founded upon\nan object, because it depends upon our pleasure. In opposition to this\ninstance, he brings forward the perception of a ship sailing down a\nriver, which we see successively lower and lower down the stream, which\nperception of the successively varying positions of the ship cannot be\nchanged by the looker-on. In this latter case, therefore, he derives\nthe subjective following in his own apprehension from the objective\nfollowing in the phenomenon, and on this account he calls it an\n_event_. Now I maintain, on the contrary, that _there is no difference\nat all between these two cases, that both are events_, and that our\nknowledge of both is objective: that is to say, it is knowledge of\nchanges in real objects recognized as such by the Subject. _Both are\nchanges of relative position in two bodies._ In the first case, one of\nthese bodies is a part of the observer's own organism, the eye, and the\nother is the house, with respect to the different parts of which the\neye successively alters its position. In the second, it is the ship\nwhich alters its position towards the stream; therefore the change\noccurs between two bodies. Both are events, the only difference being\nthat, in the first, the change has its starting-point in the observer's\nown body, from whose sensations undoubtedly all his perceptions\noriginally proceed, but which is nevertheless an object among objects,\nand in consequence obeys the laws of the objective, material world.\nFor the observer, as a purely cognising individual, any movement of\nhis body is simply an empirically perceived fact. It would be just as\npossible in the second as in the first instance, to invert the order of\nsuccession in the change, were it as easy for the observer to move the\nship up the stream as to alter the direction of his own eyes. For Kant\ninfers the successive perception of different parts of the house to be\nneither objective nor an event, because it depends upon his own will.\nBut the movement of his eyes in the direction from roof to basement\nis one event, and in the direction from basement to roof another\nevent, just as much as the sailing of the ship. There is no difference\nwhatever here, nor is there any difference either, as to their being\nor not being events, between my passing a troop of soldiers and their\npassing me. If we fix our eyes on a ship sailing close by the shore on\nwhich we are standing, it soon seems as if it were the ship that stood\nstill and the shore that moved. Now, in this instance we are mistaken,\nit is true, as to the cause of the relative change of position, since\nwe attribute it to a wrong cause; the real succession in the relative\npositions of our body towards the ship is nevertheless quite rightly\nand objectively recognised by us. Even Kant himself would not have\nbelieved that there was any difference, had he borne in mind that his\nown body was an object among objects, and that the succession in his\nempirical perceptions depended upon the succession of the impressions\nreceived from other objects by his body, and was therefore an objective\nsuccession: that is to say, one which takes place among objects\n_directly_ (if not indirectly) and independently of the will of the\nSubject, and which may therefore be quite well recognised without any\ncausal connection between the objects acting successively on his body.\n\n  [99] _Ibid._ p. 189 of the 1st edition; more fully, p. 232 of the\n  5th edition. (English translation by M. M\u00fcller, p. 166.)\n\nKant says, Time cannot be perceived; therefore no succession of\nrepresentations can be empirically perceived as objective: _i.e._ can\nbe distinguished as changes in phenomena from the changes of mere\nsubjective representations. The causal law, being a rule according\nto which states follow one another, is the only means by which the\nobjectivity of a change can be known. Now, the result of his assertion\nwould be, that no succession in Time could be perceived by us as\nobjective, excepting that of cause and effect, and that every other\nsuccession of phenomena we perceive, would only be determined so, and\nnot otherwise, by our own will. In contradiction to all this I must\nadduce the fact, that it is quite possible for phenomena to _follow\nupon_ one another without _following from_ one another. Nor is the law\nof causality by any means prejudiced by this; for it remains certain\nthat each change is the effect of another change, this being firmly\nestablished _\u00e0 priori_; only each change not only follows upon the\nsingle one which is its cause, but upon all the other changes which\noccur simultaneously with that cause, and with which that cause stands\nin no causal connection whatever. It is not perceived by me exactly\nin the regular order of causal succession, but in quite a different\norder, which is, however, no less objective on that account, and\nwhich differs widely from any subjective succession depending on my\ncaprice, such as, for instance, the pictures of my imagination. The\nsuccession, in Time, of events which stand in no causal connection with\neach other is precisely what we call _contingency_.[100] Just as I am\nleaving my house, a tile happens to fall from the roof which strikes\nme; now, there is no causal connection whatever between my going out\nand the falling of the tile; yet the order of their succession--that\nis, that my going out preceded the falling of the tile--is objectively\ndetermined in my apprehension, not subjectively by my will, by which\nthat order would otherwise have most likely been inverted. The order\nin which tones follow each other in a musical composition is likewise\nobjectively determined, not subjectively by me, the listener; yet\nwho would think of asserting that musical tones follow one another\naccording to the law of cause and effect? Even the succession of day\nand night is undoubtedly known to us as an objective one, but we as\ncertainly do not look upon them as causes and effects of one another;\nand as to their common cause, the whole world was in error till\nCopernicus came; yet the correct knowledge of their succession was not\nin the least disturbed by that error. Hume's hypothesis, by the way,\nalso finds its refutation through this; since the following of day and\nnight upon each other--the most ancient of all successions and the one\nleast liable to exception--has never yet misled anyone into taking them\nfor cause and effect of each other.\n\n  [100] In German _Zufall_, a word derived from the _Zusammenfallen_\n  (falling together), _Zusammentreffen_ (meeting together), or\n  coinciding of what is unconnected, just as \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2 from\n  \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. (Compare Aristotle, \"Anal. post.,\" i. 4.)\n\nElsewhere Kant asserts, that a representation only shows reality\n(which, I conclude, means that it is distinguished from a mere\nmental image) by our recognising its necessary connection with other\nrepresentations subject to rule (the causal law) and its place in a\ndetermined order of the time-relations of our representations. But\nof how few representations are we able to know the place assigned to\nthem by the law of causality in the chain of causes and effects! Yet\nwe are never embarrassed to distinguish objective from subjective\nrepresentations: real, from imaginary objects. When asleep, we are\nunable to make this distinction, for our brain is then isolated from\nthe peripherical nervous system, and thereby from external influences.\nIn our dreams therefore, we take imaginary for real things, and it is\nonly when we awaken: that is, when our nervous sensibility, and through\nthis the outer world, once more comes within our consciousness, that we\nbecome aware of our mistake; still, even in our dreams, so long as they\nlast, the causal law holds good, only an impossible material is often\nsubstituted for the usual one. We might almost think that Kant was\ninfluenced by Leibnitz in writing the passage we have quoted, however\nmuch he differs from him in all the rest of his philosophy; especially\nif we consider that Leibnitz expresses precisely similar views, when,\nfor instance, he says: \"La v\u00e9rit\u00e9 des choses sensibles ne consiste que\ndans la liaison des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes, qui doit avoir sa raison, et c'est\nce qui les distingue des songes. ---- Le vrai Crit\u00e9rion, en mati\u00e8re\ndes objets des sens, est la liaison des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes, qui garantit les\nv\u00e9rit\u00e9s de fait, \u00e0 l'egard des choses sensibles hors de nous.\"[101]\n\n  [101] Leibnitz, \"Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement,\" lib. iv. ch.\n  ii. sect. 14.\n\nIt is clear that in proving the _\u00e0 priority_ and the necessity of the\ncausal law by the fact that the objective succession of changes is\nknown to us only by means of that law, and that, in so far, causality\nis a condition for all experience, Kant fell into a very singular\nerror, and one which is indeed so palpable, that the only way we can\naccount for it is, by supposing him to have become so absorbed in the\n_\u00e0 priori_ part of our knowledge, that he lost sight of what would have\nbeen evident to anyone else. The only correct demonstration of the _\u00e0\npriority_ of the causal law is given by me in \u00a7 21 of the present work.\nThat _\u00e0 priority_ finds its confirmation every moment in the infallible\nsecurity with which we expect experience to tally with the causal\nlaw: that is to say, in the apodeictic certainty we ascribe to it, a\ncertainty which differs from every other founded on induction--the\ncertainty, for instance, of empirically known laws of Nature--in\nthat we can conceive no exception to the causal law anywhere within\nthe world of experience. We can, for instance, _conceive_ that in an\nexceptional case the law of gravitation might cease to act, but not\nthat this could happen without a cause.\n\nKant and Hume have fallen into opposite errors in their proofs. Hume\nasserts that all _consequence_ is mere _sequence_; whereas Kant\naffirms that all _sequence_ must necessarily be _consequence_. Pure\nUnderstanding, it is true, can only conceive _consequence_ (causal\nresult), and is no more able to conceive mere _sequence_ than to\nconceive the difference between right and left, which, like sequence,\nis only to be grasped by means of pure Sensibility. Empirical knowledge\nof the following of events in Time is, indeed, just as possible as\nempirical knowledge of juxtaposition of things in Space (this Kant\ndenies elsewhere), but _the way in which_ things follow _upon_ one\nanother in general in Time can no more be explained, than the way in\nwhich one thing follows _from_ another (as the effect of a cause):\nthe former knowledge is given and conditioned by pure Sensibility;\nthe latter, by pure Understanding. But in asserting that knowledge\nof the objective succession of phenomena can only be attained by\nmeans of the causal law, Kant commits the same error with which\nhe reproaches Leibnitz:[102] that of \"intellectualising the forms\nof Sensibility.\"--My view of succession is the following one. We\nderive our knowledge of the bare _possibility_ of succession from\nthe form of Time, which belongs to pure Sensibility. The succession\nof real objects, whose form is precisely Time, we know empirically,\nconsequently as _actual_. But it is through the Understanding alone,\nby means of Causality, that we gain knowledge of the _necessity_ of\na succession of two states: that is, of a change; and even the fact\nthat we are able to conceive the necessity of a succession at all,\nproves already that the causal law is not known to us empirically,\nbut given us _\u00e0 priori_. The Principle of Sufficient Reason is the\ngeneral expression for the fundamental form of the necessary connection\nbetween all our objects, _i.e._ representations, which lies in the\ninnermost depths of our cognitive faculty: it is the form common to all\nrepresentations, and the only source of the conception of _necessity_,\nwhich contains absolutely nothing else in it and no other import,\nthan that of the following of the consequence, when its reason has\nbeen established. Now, the reason why this principle determines the\norder of succession in Time in the class of representations we are now\ninvestigating, in which it figures as the law of causality, is, that\nTime is the form of these representations, therefore the necessary\nconnection appears here as the rule of succession. In other forms of\nthe principle of sufficient reason, the necessary connection it always\ndemands will appear under quite different forms from that of Time,\ntherefore not as succession; still it always retains the character of\na necessary connection, by which the identity of the principle under\nall its forms, or rather the unity of the root of all the laws of which\nthat principle is the common expression, reveals itself.\n\n  [102] Kant, \"Kritik d. r. Vern.\" 1st edition, p. 275; 5th edition,\n  p. 331. (English translation by M. M\u00fcller, p. 236.)\n\nIf Kant's assertion were correct, which I dispute, our only way of\nknowing the reality of succession would be through its necessity; but\nthis would presuppose an Understanding that embraced all the series of\ncauses and effects at once, consequently an omniscient Understanding.\nKant has burdened the Understanding with an impossibility, merely in\norder to have less need of Sensibility.\n\nHow can we reconcile Kant's assertion that our only means of knowing\nthe objective reality of succession is by the necessity with which\neffect follows cause, with his other assertion[103] that succession\nin Time is our only empirical criterion for determining which of two\nstates is cause, and which effect. Who does not see the most obvious\ncircle here?\n\n  [103] Kant, \"Krit. d. r. Vern.\" vol. i. p. 203 of the 1st edition;\n  p. 249 of the 5th edition. (English translation by M. M\u00fcller, p.\n  178.)\n\nIf we knew objectiveness of succession through Causality, we should\nnever be able to think it otherwise than as Causality, and then it\nwould be nothing else than Causality. For, if it were anything else, it\nwould have other distinctive signs by which to be recognised; now this\nis just what Kant denies. Accordingly, if Kant were right, we could\nnot say: \"This state is the effect of that one, wherefore it follows\nit;\" for following and being an effect, would be one and the same\nthing, and this proposition a tautology. Besides, if we do away with\nall distinction between following _upon_ and following _from_, we once\nmore yield the point to Hume, who declared all consequence to be mere\nsequence and therefore denied that distinction likewise.\n\nKant's proof would, consequently, be reduced to this: that,\nempirically, we only know _actuality_ of succession; but as besides we\nrecognise _necessity_ of succession in certain series of occurrences,\nand even know before all experience that every possible occurrence must\nhave a fixed place in some one of these series, the reality and the\n_\u00e0 priority_ of the causal law follow as a matter of course, the only\ncorrect proof of the latter being the one I have given in \u00a7 21 of this\nwork.\n\nParallel with the Kantian theory: that the causal nexus alone renders\nobjective succession and our knowledge of it possible, there runs\nanother: that coexistence and our knowledge of it are only possible\nthrough reciprocity. In the \"Critique of Pure Reason\" they are\npresented under the title: \"Third Analogy of Experience.\" Here Kant\ngoes so far as to say that \"the co-existence of phenomena, which\nexercise no reciprocal action on one another, but are separated by\na perfectly empty space, could never become an object of possible\nperception\"[104] (which, by the way, would be a proof _\u00e0 priori_ that\nthere is no empty space between the fixed stars), and that \"the light\nwhich _plays between_ our eyes and celestial bodies\"--an expression\nconveying surreptitiously the thought, that this starlight not only\nacts upon our eyes, but is acted upon by them also--\"produces an\nintercommunity between us and them, and proves the co-existence of the\nlatter.\" Now, even empirically, this last assertion is false; since the\nsight of a fixed star by no means proves its coexistence simultaneously\nwith its spectator, but, at most, its existence some years, nay even\nsome centuries before. Besides, this second Kantian theory stands and\nfalls with the first, only it is far more easily detected; and the\nnullity of the whole conception of reciprocity has been shown in \u00a7 20.\n\n  [104] Kant, \"Krit. d. r. Vern.\" pp. 212 and 213 of the 1st edition.\n  (English translation, pp. 185 and 186.)\n\nThe arguments I have brought forward against Kant's proof may be\ncompared with two previous attacks made on it by Feder,[105] and by G.\nE. Schulze.[106]\n\n  [105] Feder, \"Ueber Raum und Causalit\u00e4t.\" sect. 29.\n\n  [106] G. E. Schulze, \"Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie,\" vol.\n  ii. p. 422 _sqq._\n\nNot without considerable hesitation did I thus venture (in 1813) to\nattack a theory which had been universally received as a demonstrated\ntruth, is repeated even now in the latest publications,[107] and forms\na chief point in the doctrine of one for whose profound wisdom I have\nthe greatest reverence and admiration; one to whom, indeed, I owe so\nmuch, that his spirit might truly say to me, in the words of Homer:\n\n  \u1f08\u03c7\u03bb\u1f7a\u03bd \u03b4' \u03b1\u1f56 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f00\u03c0' \u1f40\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03bb\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f15\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f23 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f76\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1fc6\u03b5\u03bd.[108]\n\n  [107] For instance, in Fries' \"Kritik der Vernunft,\" vol. ii. p. 85.\n\n  [108] I lifted from thine eyes the darkness which covered them\n  before. (Tr.'s Ad.)\n\n\n\u00a7 24. _Of the Misapplication of the Law of Causality._\n\nFrom the foregoing exposition it follows, that the application of the\ncausal law to anything but _changes_ in the material, empirically given\nworld, is an abuse of it. For instance, it is a misapplication to make\nuse of it with reference to physical forces, without which no changes\ncould take place; or to Matter, _on_ which they take place; or to the\nworld, to which we must in that case attribute an absolutely objective\nexistence independently of our intellect; indeed in many other cases\nbesides. I refer the reader to what I have said on this subject in my\nchief work.[109] Such misapplications always arise, partly, through\nour taking the conception of cause, like many other metaphysical and\nethical conceptions, in far _too wide_ a sense; partly, through our\nforgetting that the causal law is certainly a presupposition which\nwe bring with us into the world, by which the perception of things\noutside us becomes possible; but that, just on that account, we are\nnot authorized in extending beyond the range and independently of our\ncognitive faculty a principle, which has its origin in the equipment of\nthat faculty, nor in assuming it to hold good as the everlasting order\nof the universe and of all that exists.\n\n  [109] \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" 2nd edition, vol. ii. ch. iv. p. 42\n  _et seqq._; 3rd edition, vol. ii. p. 46 _et seqq._\n\n\n\u00a7 25. _The Time in which a Change takes place._\n\nAs the Principle of Sufficient Reason of Becoming is exclusively\napplicable to _changes_, we must not omit to mention here, that the\nancient philosophers had already raised the question as to the time in\nwhich a change takes place, there being no possibility of it taking\nplace during the existence of the preceding state nor after the new one\nhas supervened. Yet, if we assign a special time to it between both\nstates, a body would, during this time, be neither in the first nor in\nthe second state: a dying man, for instance, would be neither alive nor\ndead; a body neither at rest nor in movement: which would be absurd.\nThe scruples and sophistic subtleties which this question has evoked,\nmay be found collected together in Sextus Empiricus \"Adv. Mathem.\"\nlib. ix. 267-271, and \"Hypat.\" iii. c. 14; the subject is likewise\ndealt with by Gellius, l. vi. c. 13--Plato[110] had disposed somewhat\ncavalierly of this knotty point, by maintaining that changes take place\n_suddenly_ and occupy _no time at all_; they occur, he says, in the\n\u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03af\u03c6\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 (_in repentino_), which he calls an \u1f04\u03c4\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f10\u03bd \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u1ff3\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1; a strange, timeless existence (which nevertheless comes\nwithin Time).\n\n  [110] Plato, \"Parmenides,\" p. 138, ed. Bip.\n\nIt was accordingly reserved for the perspicacity of Aristotle to clear\nup this difficult point, which he has done profoundly and exhaustively\nin the sixth Book of Physics, chap. i.-viii. His proof that no change\ntakes place suddenly (in Plato's \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03af\u03c6\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2), but that each occurs only\ngradually and therefore occupies a certain time, is based entirely upon\nthe pure, _\u00e0 priori_ intuition of Time and of Space; but it is also\nvery subtle. The pith of this very lengthy demonstration may, however,\nbe reduced to the following propositions. When we say of objects that\nthey limit each other, we mean, that both have their extreme ends in\ncommon; therefore only two extended things can be conterminous, never\ntwo indivisible ones, for then they would be _one_--_i.e._ only lines,\nbut not mere points, can be conterminous. He then transfers this from\nSpace to Time. As there always remains a line between two points, so\nthere always remains a time between two _nows_; this is the time in\nwhich a change takes place--_i.e._ when _one_ state is in the first,\nand _another_ in the second, _now_. This time, like every other, is\ndivisible to infinity; consequently, whatever is changing passes\nthrough an infinite number of degrees within that time, through which\nthe second state gradually grows out of that _first_ one.--The process\nmay perhaps be made more intelligible by the following explanation.\nBetween two consecutive states the difference of which is perceptible\nto our senses, there are always several intermediate states, the\ndifference between which is not perceptible to us; because, in order to\nbe sensuously perceptible, the newly arising state must have reached a\ncertain degree of intensity or of magnitude: it is therefore preceded\nby degrees of lesser intensity or extension, in passing through which\nit gradually arises. Taken collectively, these are comprised under\nthe name of _change_, and the time occupied by them is called _the\ntime of change_. Now, if we apply this to a body being propelled, the\nfirst effect is a certain vibration of its inner parts, which, after\ncommunicating the impulse to other parts, breaks out into external\nmotion.--Aristotle infers quite rightly from the infinite divisibility\nof Time, that everything which fills it, therefore every change, _i.e._\nevery passage from one state to another, must likewise be susceptible\nof endless subdivision, so that all that arises, does so in fact by the\nconcourse of an infinite multitude of parts; accordingly its genesis is\nalways gradual, never sudden. From these principles and the consequent\ngradual arising of each movement, he draws the weighty inference\nin the last chapter of this Book, that nothing indivisible, no mere\n_point_ can move. And with this conclusion Kant's definition of Matter,\nas \"that which moves in Space,\" completely harmonizes.\n\nThis law of the continuity and gradual taking place of all changes\nwhich Aristotle was thus the first to lay down and prove, we find\nstated three times by Kant: in his \"Dissertatio de mundi sensibilis et\nintelligibilis forma,\" \u00a7 14, in the \"Critique of Pure Reason,\"[111] and\nfinally in his \"Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science.\"[112]\nIn all three places his exposition is brief, but also less thorough\nthan that of Aristotle; still, in the main, both entirely agree. We can\ntherefore hardly doubt that, directly or indirectly, Kant must have\nderived these ideas from Aristotle, though he does not mention him.\nAristotle's proposition--\u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c7\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bd\u1fe6\u03bd (\"the moments\nof the present are not continuous\")--we here find expressed as follows:\n\"between two moments there is always a time,\" to which may be objected\nthat \"even between two centuries there is none; because in Time as\nin Space, there must always be a pure limit.\"--Thus Kant, instead of\nmentioning Aristotle, endeavours in the first and earliest of his\nthree statements to identify the theory he is advancing with Leibnitz'\n_lex continuitatis_. If they really were the same, Leibnitz must have\nderived his from Aristotle. Now Leibnitz[113] first stated this _Loi\nde la continuit\u00e9_ in a letter to Bayle.[114] There, however, he calls\nit _Principe de l'ordre g\u00e9n\u00e9ral_, and gives under this name a very\ngeneral, vague, chiefly geometrical argumentation, having no direct\nbearing on the time of change, which he does not even mention.\n\n  [111] Kant, \"Krit. d. r. Vern.\" 1st edition, p. 207; 5th edition,\n  p. 253. (English translation by M. M\u00fcller, p. 182.)\n\n  [112] Kant, \"Metaphysische Anfangsgr\u00fcnde der Naturwissenschaft.\"\n  End of the \"Allgemeine Anmerkung zur Mechanik.\"\n\n  [113] According to his own assertion, p. 189 of the \"Opera philos.\"\n  ed. Erdmann.\n\n  [114] _Ibid._ p. 104.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nON THE SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT AND THE FORM OF THE\nPRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON WHICH PREDOMINATES IN IT.\n\n\n\u00a7 26. _Explanation of this Class of Objects._\n\nThe only essential distinction between the human race and animals,\nwhich from time immemorial has been attributed to a special cognitive\nfaculty peculiar to mankind, called _Reason_, is based upon the fact\nthat man owns a class of representations which is not shared by any\nanimal. These are _conceptions_, therefore _abstract_, as opposed to\n_intuitive_, representations, from which they are nevertheless derived.\nThe immediate consequence of this is, that animals can neither speak\nnor laugh; but indirectly all those various, important characteristics\nwhich distinguish human from animal life are its consequence. For,\nthrough the supervention of abstract representation, motivation has now\nchanged its character. Although human actions result with a necessity\nno less rigorous than that which rules the actions of animals, yet\nthrough this new kind of motivation--so far as here it consists in\n_thoughts_ which render elective decision (_i.e._ a conscious conflict\nof motives) possible--action with a purpose, with reflection, according\nto plans and principles, in concert with others, &c. &c., now takes\nthe place of mere impulse given by present, perceptible objects; but\nby this it gives rise to all that renders human life so rich, so\nartificial, and so terrible, that man, in this Western Hemisphere,\nwhere his skin has become bleached, and where the primitive, true,\nprofound religions of his first home could not follow him, now no\nlonger recognises animals as his brethren, and falsely believes them\nto differ fundamentally from him, seeking to confirm this illusion by\ncalling them brutes, giving degrading names to the vital functions\nwhich they have in common with him, and proclaiming them outlaws; and\nthus he hardens his heart against that identity of being between them\nand himself, which is nevertheless constantly obtruding itself upon him.\n\nStill, as we have said, the whole difference lies in this--that,\nbesides the intuitive representations examined in the last chapter,\nwhich are shared by animals, other, abstract representations derived\nfrom these intuitive ones, are lodged in the human brain, which\nis chiefly on this account so much larger than that of animals.\nRepresentations of this sort have been called _conceptions_,[115]\nbecause each comprehends innumerable individual things in, or rather\nunder, itself, and thus forms a complex.[116] We may also define them\nas _representations drawn from representations_. For, in forming\nthem, the faculty of abstraction decomposes the complete, intuitive\nrepresentations described in our last chapter into their component\nparts, in order to think each of these parts separately as the\ndifferent qualities of, or relations between, things. By this process,\nhowever, the representations necessarily forfeit their perceptibility;\njust as water, when decomposed, ceases to be fluid and visible. For\nalthough each quality thus isolated (abstracted) can quite well\nbe _thought_ by itself, it does not at all follow that it can be\n_perceived_ by itself. We form conceptions by dropping a good deal of\nwhat is given us in perception, in order to be able to think the rest\nby itself. To conceive therefore, is to think less than we perceive.\nIf, after considering divers objects of perception, we drop something\ndifferent belonging to each, yet retain what is the same in all, the\nresult will be the _genus_ of that species. The generic conception is\naccordingly always the conception of every species comprised under it,\nafter deducting all that does not belong to _every_ species. Now, as\nevery possible conception may be thought as a _genus_, a conception\nis always something general, and as such, not perceptible. Every\nconception has on this account also its _sphere_, as the sum-total[117]\nof what may be thought under it. The higher we ascend in abstract\nthought, the more we deduct, the less therefore remains to be thought.\nThe highest, _i.e._ the most general conceptions, are the emptiest and\npoorest, and at last become mere husks, such as, for instance, being,\nessence, thing, becoming, &c. &c.--Of what avail, by the way, can\nphilosophical systems be, which are only spun out of conceptions of\nthis sort and have for their substance mere flimsy husks of thoughts\nlike these? They must of necessity be exceedingly empty, poor, and\ntherefore also dreadfully tiresome.\n\n  [115] _Begriff_, _comprehensive_ thought, derived from _begreifen_,\n  to comprehend. [Tr.]\n\n  [116] _Inbegriff_, comprehensive totality. [Tr.]\n\n  [117] _Inbegriff._\n\nNow as representations, thus sublimated and analysed to form abstract\nconceptions, have, as we have said, forfeited all perceptibility, they\nwould entirely escape our consciousness, and be of no avail to it for\nthe thinking processes to which they are destined, were they not fixed\nand retained in our senses by arbitrary signs. These signs are words.\nIn as far as they constitute the contents of dictionaries and therefore\nof language, words always designate _general_ representations,\nconceptions, never perceptible objects; whereas a lexicon which\nenumerates individual things, only contains proper names, not words,\nand is either a geographical or historical dictionary: that is to say,\nit enumerates what is separated either by Time or by Space; for, as\n_my_ readers know, Time and Space are the _principium individuationis_.\nIt is only because animals are limited to intuitive representations\nand incapable of any abstraction--incapable therefore of forming\nconceptions--that they are without language, even when they are able\nto articulate words; whereas they understand proper names. That it is\nthis same defect which excludes them from laughter, I have shown in my\ntheory of the ridiculous.[118]\n\n  [118] See \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" vol. i. sect. 13, and vol. ii. ch.\n  8.\n\nOn analyzing a long, continuous speech made by a man of no education,\nwe find in it an abundance of logical forms, clauses, turns of phrase,\ndistinctions, and subtleties of all sorts, correctly expressed by\nmeans of grammatical forms with their inflections and constructions,\nand even with a frequent use of the _sermo obliquus_, of the different\nmoods, &c. &c., all in conformity with rule, which astonishes us,\nand in which we are forced to recognise an extensive and perfectly\ncoherent knowledge. Still this knowledge has been acquired on the\nbasis of the perceptible world, the reduction of whose whole essence\nto abstract conceptions is the fundamental business of the Reason,\nand can only take place by means of language. In learning the use of\nlanguage therefore, the whole mechanism of Reason--that is, all that\nis essential in Logic--is brought to our consciousness. Now this can\nevidently not take place without considerable mental effort and fixed\nattention, for which the desire to learn gives children the requisite\nstrength. So long as that desire has before it what is really available\nand necessary, it is vigorous, and it only appears weak when we try to\nforce upon children that which is not suited to their comprehension.\nThus even a coarsely educated child, in learning all the turns and\nsubtleties of language, as well through its own conversation as that\nof others, accomplishes the development of its Reason, and acquires\nthat really concrete Logic, which consists less in logical rules\nthan in the proper application of them; just as the rules of harmony\nare learnt by persons of musical talent simply by playing the piano,\nwithout reading music or studying thorough-bass.--The deaf and dumb\nalone are excluded from the above-mentioned logical training through\nthe acquirement of speech; therefore they are almost as unreasonable as\nanimals, when they have not been taught to read by the very artificial\nmeans specially adapted for their requirements, which takes the place\nof the natural schooling of Reason.\n\n\n\u00a7 27. _The Utility of Conceptions._\n\nThe fundamental essence of our Reason or thinking faculty is, as\nwe have seen, the power of abstraction, or the faculty of forming\n_conceptions_: it is therefore the presence of these in our\nconsciousness which produces such amazing results. That it should be\nable to do this, rests mainly on the following grounds.\n\nIt is just because they contain less than the representations from\nwhich they are drawn, that conceptions are easier to deal with than\nrepresentations; they are, in fact, to these almost as the formula\nof higher arithmetic to the mental operations which give rise to\nthem and which they represent, or as a logarithm to its number. They\nonly contain just the part required of the many representations from\nwhich they are drawn; if instead we were to try to recall those\nrepresentations themselves by means of the imagination, we should, as\nit were, have to lug about a load of unessential lumber, which would\nonly embarrass us; whereas, by the help of conceptions, we are enabled\nto think only those parts and relations of all these representations\nwhich are wanted for each individual purpose: so that their employment\nmay be compared to doing away with superfluous luggage, or to working\nwith extracts instead of plants themselves--with quinine, instead of\nbark. What is properly called _thinking_, in its narrowest sense, is\nthe occupation of the intellect with conceptions: that is, the presence\nin our consciousness of the class of representations we now have before\nus. This is also what we call _reflection_: a word which, by a figure\nof speech borrowed from Optics, expresses at once the derivative and\nthe secondary character of this kind of knowledge. Now it is this\nthinking, this reflection, which gives man that _deliberation_, which\nis wanting in animals. For, by enabling him to think many things under\none conception, but always only the essential part in each of them,\nit allows him to drop at his pleasure every kind of distinction,\nconsequently even those of Time and of Space, and thus he acquires\nthe power of embracing in thought, not only the past and the future,\nbut also what is absent; while animals are in every respect strictly\nbound to the present. This deliberative faculty again is really the\nroot of all those theoretical and practical achievements which give man\nso great a superiority over animals; first and foremost, of his care\nfor the future while taking the past into consideration; then of his\npremeditated, systematic, methodical procedure in all undertakings, and\ntherefore of the co-operation of many persons towards a common end,\nand, by this, of law, order, the State, &c. &c.--But it is especially\nin Science that the use of conceptions is important; for they are,\nproperly speaking, its materials. The aims of all the sciences may,\nindeed, in the last resort, be reduced to knowledge of the particular\nthrough the general; now this is only possible by means of the _dictum\nde omni et nullo_, and this, again, is only possible through the\nexistence of conceptions. Aristotle therefore says: \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd[119] (_absque universalibus enim non\ndatur scientia_). Conceptions are precisely those _universalia_, whose\nmode of existence formed the argument of the long controversy between\nthe Realists and Nominalists in the Middle Ages.\n\n  [119] Aristot. \"Metaph.\" xii. c. 9, \"For without universals it is\n  impossible to have knowledge.\" (Tr.'s Add.)\n\n\n\u00a7 28. _Representatives of Conceptions. The Faculty of Judgment._\n\nConceptions must not be confounded with pictures of the imagination,\nthese being intuitive and complete, therefore individual\nrepresentations, although they are not called forth by sensuous\nimpressions and do not therefore belong to the complex of experience.\nEven when used to _represent a conception_, a picture of the\nimagination (phantasm) ought to be distinguished from a conception.\nWe use phantasms as _representatives of conceptions_ when we try to\ngrasp the intuitive representation itself that has given rise to the\nconception and to make it tally with that conception, which is in\nall cases impossible; for there is no representation, for instance,\nof dog in general, colour in general, triangle in general, number in\ngeneral, nor is there any picture of the imagination which corresponds\nto these conceptions. Then we evoke the phantasm of some dog or other,\nwhich, as a representation, must in all cases be determined: that is,\nit must have a certain size, shape, colour, &c. &c.; even though the\nconception represented by it has no such determinations. When we use\nsuch _representatives of conceptions_ however, we are always conscious\nthat they are not adequate to the conceptions they represent, and that\nthey are full of arbitrary determinations. Towards the end of the first\npart of his Twelfth Essay on Human Understanding, Hume expresses\nhimself in agreement with this view, as also Rousseau in his \"Discours\nsur l'Origine de l'In\u00e9galit\u00e9.\"[120] Kant's doctrine, on the contrary,\nis a totally different one. The matter is one which introspection and\nclear reflection can alone decide. Each of us must therefore examine\nhimself as to whether he is conscious in his own conceptions of a\n\"Monogram of Pure Imagination _\u00e0 priori_;\" whether, for instance, when\nhe thinks dog, he is conscious of something _entre chien et loup_; or\nwhether, as I have here explained it, he is either thinking an abstract\nconception through his Reason, or representing some representative of\nthat conception as a complete picture through his imagination.\n\n  [120] Part the First, in the middle.\n\nAll thinking, in a wider sense: that is, all inner activity of\nthe mind in general, necessitates either words or pictures of the\nimagination: without one or other of these it has nothing to hold by.\nThey are not, however, both necessary at the same time, although they\nmay co-operate to their mutual support. Now, thinking in a narrower\nsense--that is, abstract reflection by means of words--is either\npurely logical reasoning, in which case it keeps strictly to its own\nsphere; or it touches upon the limits of perceptible representations\nin order to come to an understanding with them, so as to bring that\nwhich is given by experience and grasped by perception into connection\nwith abstract conceptions resulting from clear reflection, and\nthus to gain complete possession of it. In thinking therefore, we\nseek either for the conception or rule to which a given perception\nbelongs, or for the particular case which proves a given conception\nor rule. In this quality, thinking is an activity of the _faculty of\njudgment_, and indeed in the first case a reflective, in the second,\na subsuming activity. The faculty of judgment is accordingly the\nmediator between intuitive and abstract knowledge, or between the\nUnderstanding and the Reason. In most men it has merely rudimentary,\noften even merely nominal existence;[121] they are destined to follow\nthe lead of others, and it is as well not to converse with them more\nthan is necessary.\n\n  [121] Let any one to whom this assertion may appear hyperbolical,\n  consider the fate of G\u00f6the's \"Theory of Colours\" (_Farbenlehre_),\n  and should he wonder at my finding a corroboration for it in that\n  fate, he will himself have corroborated it a second time.\n\nThe true kernel of all knowledge is that reflection which works\nwith the help of intuitive representations; for it goes back to the\nfountain-head, to the basis of all conceptions. Therefore it generates\nall really original thoughts, all primary and fundamental views and all\ninventions, so far as chance had not the largest share in them. _The\nUnderstanding_ prevails in this sort of thinking, whilst _the Reason_\nis the chief factor in purely abstract reflection. Certain thoughts\nwhich wander about for a long time in our heads, belong to this sort\nof reflection: thoughts which come and go, now clothed in one kind\nof intuition, now in another, until they at last become clear, fix\nthemselves in conceptions and find words to express them. Some, indeed,\nnever find words to express them, and these are, unfortunately, the\nbest of all: _qu\u00e6 voce meliora sunt_, as Apuleius says.\n\nAristotle, however, went too far in thinking that no reflection is\npossible without pictures of the imagination. Nevertheless, what\nhe says on this point,[122] \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f21 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ae\n(_anima sine phantasmate nunquam intelligit_),[123] and \u1f45\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u1fc7,\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7 \u1f05\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c6\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03ac \u03c4\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd (_qui contemplatur, necesse est,\nuna cum phantasmate contempletur_),[124] and again, \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\n\u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 (_fieri non potest, ut sine phantasmate quidquam\nintelligatur_),[125]--made a strong impression upon the thinkers\nof the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, who therefore frequently\nand emphatically repeat what he says. Pico della Mirandola,[126]\nfor instance, says: _Necesse est, eum, qui ratiocinatur et\nintelligit, phantasmata speculari_;--Melanchthon[127] says: _Oportet\nintelligentem phantasmata speculari_;--and Jord. Brunus[128] says,\n_dicit Aristoteles: oportet scire volentem, phantasmata speculari_.\nPomponatius[129] expresses himself in the same sense.--On the whole,\nall that can be affirmed is, that every true and primary notion, every\ngenuine philosophic theorem even, must have some sort of intuitive view\nfor its innermost kernel or root. This, though something momentary[130]\nand single, subsequently imparts life and spirit to the whole analysis,\nhowever exhaustive it may be,--just as one drop of the right reagent\nsuffices to tinge a whole solution with the colour of the precipitate\nwhich it causes. When an analysis has a kernel of this sort, it is like\na bank note issued by a firm which has ready money wherewith to back\nit; whereas every other analysis proceeding from mere combinations of\nabstract conceptions, resembles a bank note which is issued by a firm\nwhich has nothing but other paper obligations to back it with. All mere\nrational talk thus renders the result of given conceptions clearer,\nbut does not, strictly speaking, bring anything new to light. It might\ntherefore be left to each individual to do himself, instead of filling\nwhole volumes every day.\n\n  [122] Aristot. \"De anima,\" iii. c. c. 3, 7, 8.\n\n  [123] \"The mind never thinks without (the aid of) an image.\" [Tr.]\n\n  [124] \"He who observes anything must observe some image along with\n  it.\" [Tr.]\n\n  [125] \"De Memoria,\" c. 1: \"It is impossible to think without (the\n  aid of) an image.\"\n\n  [126] \"De imaginatione,\" c. 5.\n\n  [127] \"De anima,\" p. 130.\n\n  [128] \"De compositione imaginum,\" p. 10.\n\n  [129] \"De immortalitate,\" pp. 54 et 70.\n\n  [130] \"_Ein Momentanes end Einheitliches._\"\n\n\n\u00a7 29. _Principle of Sufficient Reason of Knowing._\n\nBut, even in a narrower sense, thinking does not consist in the bare\npresence of abstract conceptions in our consciousness, but rather\nin connecting or separating two or more of these conceptions under\nsundry restrictions and modifications which Logic indicates in the\nTheory of Judgments. A relation of this sort between conceptions\ndistinctly thought and expressed we call a _judgment_. Now, with\nreference to these judgments, the Principle of Sufficient Reason here\nonce more holds good, yet in a widely different form from that which\nhas been explained in the preceding chapter; for here it appears as\nthe Principle of Sufficient Reason of Knowing, _principium rationis\nsufficientis cognoscendi_. As such, it asserts that if a _judgment_ is\nto express _knowledge_ of any kind, it must have a sufficient reason:\nin virtue of which quality it then receives the predicate _true_.\nThus _truth_ is the reference of a judgment to something different\nfrom itself, called its reason or ground, which reason, as we shall\npresently see, itself admits of a considerable variety of kinds. As,\nhowever, this reason is invariably a something upon which the judgment\nrests, the German term for it, viz., _Grund_, is not ill chosen. In\nLatin, and in all languages of Latin origin, the word by which a reason\nof knowledge is designated, is the same as that used for the faculty\nof Reason (_ratiocinatio_): both are called _ratio_, _la ragione_,\n_la razon_, _la raison_, _the reason_. From this it is evident, that\nattaining knowledge of the reasons of judgments had been recognised as\nReason's highest function, its business \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4' \u1f10\u03be\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd. Now, these grounds\nupon which a judgment may rest, may be divided into _four_ different\nkinds, and the truth obtained by that judgment will correspondingly\ndiffer. They are stated in the following paragraph.\n\n\n\u00a7 30. _Logical Truth._\n\nA judgment may have for its reason another judgment; in this case it\nhas _logical_ or _formal_ truth. Whether it has material truth also,\nremains an open question and depends on whether the judgment on which\nit rests has material truth, or whether the series of judgments on\nwhich it is founded leads to a judgment which has material truth,\nor not. This founding of a judgment upon another judgment always\noriginates in a comparison between them which takes place either\ndirectly, by mere conversion or contraposition, or by adding a third\njudgment, and then the truth of the judgment we are founding becomes\nevident through their mutual relation. This operation is the complete\n_syllogism_. It is brought about either by the opposition or by the\nsubsumption of conceptions. As the syllogism, which is the founding\nof one judgment upon another by means of a third, never has to do\nwith anything but judgments; and as judgments are only combinations\nof conceptions, and conceptions again are the exclusive object of our\nReason: syllogizing has been rightly called Reason's special function.\nThe whole syllogistic science, in fact, is nothing but the sum-total of\nthe rules for applying the principle of sufficient reason to the mutual\nrelations of judgments; consequently it is the canon of _logical truth_.\n\nJudgments, whose truth becomes evident through the four well-known laws\nof thinking, must likewise be regarded as based upon other judgments;\nfor these four laws are themselves precisely judgments, from which\nfollows the truth of those other judgments. For instance, the judgment:\n\"A triangle is a space enclosed within three lines,\" has for its last\nreason the Principle of Identity, that is to say, the thought expressed\nby that principle. The judgment, \"No body is without extension,\"\nhas for its last reason the Principle of Contradiction. This again,\n\"Every judgment is either true or untrue,\" has for its last reason\nthe Principle of the Excluded Middle; and finally, \"No one can admit\nanything to be true without knowing why,\" has for its last reason the\nPrinciple of Sufficient Reason of Knowing. In the general employment\nof our Reason, we do not, it is true, before admitting them to be true,\nreduce judgments which follow from the four laws of thinking to their\nlast reasons, as premisses; for most men are even ignorant of the very\nexistence of these abstract laws. The dependence of such judgments upon\nthem, as their premisses, is however no more diminished by this, than\nthe dependence of the first judgment upon the second, as its premiss,\nis diminished by the fact, that it is not at all necessary for the\nprinciple, \"all bodies incline towards the centre of the earth,\" to\nbe present in the consciousness of any one who says, \"this body will\nfall if its support is removed.\" That in Logic, therefore, _intrinsic\ntruth_ should hitherto have been attributed to all judgments founded\nexclusively on the four laws of thinking: that is to say, that these\njudgments should have been pronounced _directly true_, and that\nthis _intrinsic logical truth_ should have been distinguished from\n_extrinsic logical truth_, as attributed to all judgments which have\nanother judgment for their reason, I cannot approve. Every truth is\nthe reference of a judgment to something _outside_ of it, and the term\n_intrinsic truth_ is a contradiction.\n\n\n\u00a7 31. _Empirical Truth._\n\nA judgment may be founded upon a representation of the first class,\n_i.e._ a perception by means of the senses, consequently on experience.\nIn this case it has _material truth_, and moreover, if the judgment is\nfounded _immediately_ on experience, this truth is _empirical truth_.\n\nWhen we say, \"A judgment has _material truth_,\" we mean on the whole,\nthat its conceptions are connected, separated, limited, according to\nthe requirements of the intuitive representations through which it is\ninferred. To attain knowledge of this, is the direct function of the\n_faculty of judgment_, as the mediator between the intuitive and the\nabstract or discursive faculty of knowing--in other words, between the\nUnderstanding and the Reason.\n\n\n\u00a7 32. _Transcendental Truth._\n\nThe _forms_ of intuitive, empirical knowledge which lie within the\nUnderstanding and pure Sensibility may, as conditions of all possible\nexperience, be the grounds of a judgment, which is in that case\nsynthetical _\u00e0 priori_. As nevertheless this kind of judgment has\nmaterial truth, its truth is _transcendental_; because the judgment is\nbased not only on experience, but on the conditions of all possible\nexperience lying within us. For it is determined precisely by that\nwhich determines experience itself: namely, either by the forms of\nSpace and of Time perceived by us _\u00e0 priori_, or by the causal law,\nknown to us _\u00e0 priori_. Propositions such as: two straight lines do not\ninclude a space; nothing happens without a cause; matter can neither\ncome into being nor perish; 3 \u00d7 7 = 21, are examples of this kind of\njudgment. The whole of pure Mathematics, and no less my tables of the\n_Pr\u00e6dicabilia \u00e0 priori_,[131] as well as most of Kant's theorems in\nhis \"Metaphysische Anfangsgr\u00fcnde der Naturwissenschaft,\" may, properly\nspeaking, be adduced in corroboration of this kind of truth.\n\n  [131] See \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" 3rd edition, vol. ii. ch. iv. p.\n  55.\n\n\n\u00a7 33. _Metalogical Truth._\n\nLastly, a judgment may be founded on the formal conditions of all\nthinking, which are contained in the Reason; and in this case its truth\nis of a kind which seems to me best defined as _metalogical truth_.\nThis expression has nothing at all to do with the \"Metalogicus\" written\nby Johannes Sarisberriensis in the twelfth century, for he declares in\nhis prologue, \"_quia Logic\u00e6 suscepi patrocinium, Metalogicus inscriptus\nest liber_,\" and never makes use of the word again. There are only four\nmetalogically true judgments of this sort, which were discovered long\nago by induction, and called the laws of all thinking; although entire\nuniformity of opinion as to their expression and even as to their\nnumber has not yet been arrived at, whereas all agree perfectly as to\nwhat they are on the whole meant to indicate. They are the following:--\n\n1. A subject is equal to the sum total of its predicates, or a = a.\n\n2. No predicate can be attributed and denied to a subject at the same\ntime, or a =-a = o.\n\n3. One of two opposite, contradictory predicates must belong to every\nsubject.\n\n4. Truth is the reference of a judgment to something outside of it, as\nits sufficient reason.\n\nIt is by means of a kind of reflection which I am inclined to call\nReason's self-examination, that we know that these judgments express\nthe conditions of all thinking, and therefore have these conditions\nfor their reason. For, by the fruitlessness of its endeavours to think\nin opposition to these laws, our Reason acknowledges them to be the\nconditions of all possible thinking: we then find out, that it is just\nas impossible to think in opposition to them, as it is to move the\nmembers of our body in a contrary direction to their joints. If it were\npossible for the subject to know itself, these laws would be known to\nus _immediately_, and we should not need to try experiments with them\non objects, _i.e._ representations. In this respect it is just the\nsame with the reasons of judgments which have transcendental truth;\nfor they do not either come into our consciousness immediately, but\nonly in _concreto_, by means of objects, _i.e._ of representations. In\nendeavouring, for instance, to conceive a change without a preceding\ncause, or a passing into or out of being of Matter, we become aware\nthat it is impossible; moreover we recognise this impossibility to be\nan objective one, although its root lies in our intellect: for we could\nnot otherwise bring it to consciousness in a subjective way. There is,\non the whole, a strong likeness and connection between transcendental\nand metalogical truths, which shows that they spring from a common\nroot. In this chapter we see the Principle of Sufficient Reason chiefly\nas metalogical truth, whereas in the last it appeared as transcendental\ntruth and in the next one it will again be seen as transcendental truth\nunder another form. In the present treatise I am taking special pains,\nprecisely on this account, to establish the Principle of Sufficient\nReason as a judgment having a fourfold reason; by which I do not mean\nfour different reasons leading contingently to the same judgment, but\none reason presenting itself under a fourfold aspect: and this is\nwhat I call its Fourfold Root. The other three metalogical truths so\nstrongly resemble one another, that in considering them one is almost\nnecessarily induced to search for their common expression, as I have\ndone in the Ninth Chapter of the Second Volume of my chief work. On the\nother hand, they differ considerably from the Principle of Sufficient\nReason. If we were to seek an analogue for the three other metalogical\ntruths among transcendental truths, the one I should choose would be\nthis: Substance, I mean Matter, is permanent.\n\n\n\u00a7 34. _Reason._\n\nAs the class of representations I have dealt with in this chapter\nbelongs exclusively to Man, and as all that distinguishes human life\nso forcibly from that of animals and confers so great a superiority\non man, is, as we have shown, based upon his faculty for these\nrepresentations, this faculty evidently and unquestionably constitutes\nthat Reason, which from time immemorial has been reputed the\nprerogative of mankind. Likewise all that has been considered by all\nnations and in all times explicitly as the work or manifestation of the\nReason, of the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd, \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd, _ratio_, _la ragione_, _la\nrazon_, _la raison_, _reason_, may evidently also be reduced to what is\nonly possible for abstract, discursive, reflective, mediate knowledge,\nconditioned by words, and not for mere intuitive, immediate, sensuous\nknowledge, which belongs to animals also. Cicero rightly places\n_ratio et oratio_ together,[132] and describes them as _qu\u00e6 docendo,\ndiscendo, communicando, disceptando, judicando, conciliat inter se\nhomines_, &c. &c., and[133] _rationem dico, et, si placet, pluribus\nverbis, mentem, consilium, cogitationem, prudentiam_. And[134] _ratio,\nqua una pr\u00e6stamus beluis, per quam conjectura valemus, argumentamur,\nrefellimus, disserimus, conficimus aliquid, concludimus_. But, in all\nages and countries, philosophers have invariably expressed themselves\nin this sense with respect to the Reason, even to Kant himself, who\nstill defines it as the faculty for principles and for inference;\nalthough it cannot be denied that he first gave rise to the distorted\nviews which followed. In my principal work,[135] and also in the\nFundamental Problems of Ethics, I have spoken at great length about the\nagreement of all philosophers on this point, as well as about the true\nnature of Reason, as opposed to the distorted conceptions for which we\nhave to thank the professors of philosophy of this century. I need\nnot therefore repeat what has already been said there, and shall limit\nmyself to the following considerations.\n\n  [132] Cicer. \"De Offic.\" i. 16.\n\n  [133] _Idem_, \"De nat. deor.\" ii. 7.\n\n  [134] _Idem_, \"De Leg.\" i. 10.\n\n  [135] See \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" 2nd edition, vol. i. \u00a7 8, and also\n  in the Appendix, pp. 577-585 (3rd edition, pp. 610-620), and again\n  vol. ii. ch. vi.; finally \"Die b. G-P. d. Ethik,\" pp. 148-154 (2nd\n  edition, pp. 146-151).\n\nOur professors of philosophy have thought fit to do away with the name\nwhich had hitherto been given to that faculty of thinking and pondering\nby means of reflection and conceptions, which distinguishes man from\nanimals, which necessitates language while it qualifies us for its\nuse, with which all human deliberation and all human achievements hang\ntogether, and which had therefore always been viewed in this light and\nunderstood in this sense by all nations and even by all philosophers.\nIn defiance of all sound taste and custom, our professors decided\nthat this faculty should henceforth be called _Understanding_ instead\nof _Reason_, and that all that is derived from it should be named\n_intelligent_ instead of _rational_, which, of course, had a strange,\nawkward ring about it, like a discordant tone in music. For in all\nages and countries the words _understanding_, _intellectus_, _acumen_,\n_perspicacia_, _sagacitas_, &c. &c., had been used to denote the more\nintuitive faculty described in our last chapter; and its results,\nwhich differ specifically from those of Reason here in question, have\nalways been called _intelligent_, _sagacious_, _clever_, &c. &c.\n_Intelligent_ and _rational_ were accordingly always distinguished\none from the other, as manifestations of two entirely and widely\ndifferent mental faculties. Our professional philosophers could not,\nhowever, take this into account; their policy required the sacrifice,\nand in such cases the cry is: \"Move on, truth; for we have higher,\nwell-defined aims in view! Make way for us, truth, _in majorem Dei\ngloriam_, as thou hast long ago learnt to do! Is it thou who givest\nfees and pensions? Move on, truth, move on; betake thyself to merit and\ncrouch in the corner!\" The fact was, they wanted Reason's place and\nname for a faculty of their own creation and fabrication, or to speak\nmore correctly and honestly, for a completely fictitious faculty,\ndestined to help them out of the straits to which Kant had reduced\nthem; a faculty for direct, metaphysical knowledge: that is to say,\none which transcends all possible experience, is able to grasp the\nworld of things in themselves and their relations, and is therefore,\nbefore all, consciousness of God (_Gottesbewusstsein_): that is, it\nknows God the Lord immediately, construes _\u00e0 priori_ the way in which\nhe has created the Universe, or, should this sound too trivial, the\nway in which he has produced it out of himself, or to a certain degree\ngenerated it by some more or less necessary vital process, or again--as\nthe most convenient proceeding, however comical it may appear--simply\n\"dismissed\" it, according to the custom of sovereigns at the end of\nan audience, and left it to get upon its legs by itself and walk away\nwherever it liked. Nothing less than the impudence of a scribbler of\nnonsense like Hegel, could, it is true, be found to venture upon this\nlast step. Yet it is tom-foolery like this which, largely amplified,\nhas filled hundreds of volumes for the last fifty years under the\nname of cognitions of Reason (_Vernunfterkenntnisse_), and forms the\nargument of so many works called philosophical by their authors, and\nscientific by others--one would think ironically--this expression\nbeing even repeated to satiety. _Reason_, to which all this wisdom is\nfalsely and audaciously imputed, is pronounced to be a \"supersensuous\nfaculty,\" or a faculty \"for ideas;\" in short, an oracular power\nlying within us, designed directly for Metaphysics. During the last\nhalf-century, however, there has been considerable discrepancy of\nopinion among the adepts as to the way in which all these supersensuous\nwonders are perceived. According to the most audacious, Reason has\na direct intuition of the Absolute, or even _ad libitum_ of the\nInfinite and of its evolutions towards the Finite. Others, somewhat\nless bold, opine that its mode of receiving this information partakes\nrather of audition than of vision; since it does not exactly see, but\nmerely _hears_ (_vernimmt_), what is going on in \"cloud-cuckoo-land\"\n(\u03bd\u03b5\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u03ba\u03ba\u03c5\u03b3\u03af\u03b1), and then honestly transmits what it has thus received\nto the Understanding, to be worked up into text-books. According to\na pun of Jacobi's, even the German name for Reason, \"_Vernunft_,\" is\nderived from this pretended \"_Vernehmen_;\" whereas it evidently comes\nfrom that \"_Vernehmen_\" which is conveyed by language and conditioned\nby Reason, and by which the distinct perception of words and their\nmeaning is designated, as opposed to mere sensuous hearing which\nanimals have also. This miserable _jeu de mots_ nevertheless continues,\nafter half a century, to find favour; it passes for a serious thought,\nnay even for a proof, and has been repeated over and over again. The\nmost modest among the adepts again assert, that Reason neither sees nor\nhears, therefore it receives neither a vision nor a report of all these\nwonders, and has a mere vague _Ahndung_, or misgiving of them; but then\nthey drop the _d_, by which the word (_Ahnung_) acquires a peculiar\ntouch of silliness, which, backed up as it is by the sheepish look of\nthe apostle for the time being of this wisdom, cannot fail to gain it\nentrance.\n\nMy readers know that I only admit the word _idea_ in its primitive,\nthat is Platonic, sense, and that I have treated this point at length\nand exhaustively in the Third Book of my chief work. The French and\nEnglish, on the other hand, certainly attach a very commonplace,\nbut quite clear and definite meaning to the word _id\u00e9e_, or _idea_;\nwhereas the Germans lose their heads as soon as they hear the word\n_Ideen_;[136] all presence of mind abandons them, and they feel as if\nthey were about to ascend in a balloon. Here therefore was a field of\naction for our adepts in intellectual intuition; so the most impudent\nof them, the notorious _charlatan_ Hegel, without more ado, called\nhis theory of the universe and of all things \"_Die Idee_,\" and in this\nof course all thought that they had something to lay hold of. Still,\nif we inquire into the nature of these _ideas_ for which Reason is\npronounced to be the faculty, without letting ourselves be put out of\ncountenance, the explanation usually given is an empty, high-flown,\nconfused verbiage, in set periods of such length, that if the reader\ndoes not fall asleep before he has half read it, he will find himself\nbewildered rather than enlightened at the end; nay, he may even have\na suspicion that these ideas are very like chim\u00e6ras. Meanwhile,\nshould anyone show a desire to know more about this sort of ideas, he\nwill have all kinds of things served up to him. Now it will be the\nchief subjects of the theses of Scholasticism--I allude here to the\nrepresentations of God, of an immortal Soul, of a real, objectively\nexistent World and its laws--which Kant himself has unfortunately\ncalled Ideas of Reason, erroneously and unjustifiably, as I have shown\nin my Critique of his philosophy, yet merely with a view to proving\nthe utter impossibility of demonstrating them and their want of all\ntheoretical authority. Then again it will be, as a variation, only\nGod, Freedom, and Immortality; at other times it will be the Absolute,\nwhose acquaintance we have already made in \u00a7 20, as the Cosmological\nProof, forced to travel incognito; or the Infinite as opposed to the\nFinite; for, on the whole, the German reader is disposed to content\nhimself with such empty talk as this, without perceiving that the\nonly clear thought he can get out of it is, 'that which has an end'\nand 'that which has none.' 'The Good, the True, and the Beautiful,'\nmoreover, stand high in favour with the sentimental and tender-hearted\nas pretended _ideas_, though they are really only three very wide and\nabstract conceptions, because they are extracted from a multitude of\nthings and relations; wherefore, like many other such _abstracta_, they\nare exceedingly empty. As regards their contents, I have shown above\n(\u00a7 29) that Truth is a quality belonging exclusively to judgments: that\nis, a logical quality; and as to the other two _abstracta_, I refer my\nreaders partly to \u00a7 65 of the first volume, partly to the entire Third\nBook of my chief work. If, nevertheless, a very solemn and mysterious\nair is assumed and the eyebrows are raised up to the wig whenever\nthese three meagre _abstracta_ are mentioned, young people may easily\nbe induced to believe that something peculiar and inexpressible lies\nbehind them, which entitles them to be called _ideas_, and harnessed to\nthe triumphal car of this would-be metaphysical Reason.\n\n  [136] Here Schopenhauer adds, \"especially when pronounced\n  _Ued\u00e4hen_.\" [Tr.]\n\nWhen therefore we are told, that we possess a faculty for direct,\nmaterial (_i.e._, not only formal, but substantial), supersensuous\nknowledge, (that is, a knowledge which transcends all possible\nexperience), a faculty specially designed for metaphysical insight,\nand inherent in us for this purpose--I must take the liberty to call\nthis a downright lie. For the slightest candid self-examination will\nsuffice to convince us that absolutely no such faculty resides within\nus. The result at which all honest, competent, authoritative thinkers\nhave arrived in the course of ages, moreover, tallies exactly with my\nassertion. It is as follows: All that is innate in the whole of our\ncognitive faculty, all that is therefore _\u00e0 priori_ and independent of\nexperience, is strictly limited to the _formal_ part of knowledge: that\nis, to the consciousness of the peculiar functions of the intellect\nand of the only way in which they can possibly act; but in order to\ngive material knowledge, these functions one and all require material\nfrom outside. Within us therefore lie the forms of external, objective\nperception: Time and Space, and then the law of Causality--as a mere\nform of the Understanding which enables it to construct the objective,\ncorporeal world--finally, the formal part of abstract knowledge: this\nlast is deposited and treated of in _Logic_, which our forefathers\ntherefore rightly called the _Theory of Reason_. But this very Logic\nteaches us also, that the _conceptions_ which constitute those\njudgments and conclusions to which all logical laws refer, must look to\n_intuitive_ knowledge for their _material_ and their _content_; just as\nthe Understanding, which creates _this intuitive knowledge_, looks to\nsensation for the material which gives content to its _\u00e0 priori_ forms.\n\nThus all that is _material_ in our knowledge: that is to say, all\nthat cannot be reduced to subjective _form_, to individual mode\nof activity, to functions of our intellect,--its whole _material_\ntherefore,--comes from outside; that is, in the last resort, from the\nobjective perception of the corporeal world, which has its origin in\nsensation. Now it is this intuitive and, so far as material content is\nconcerned, empirical knowledge, which _Reason_--_real_ Reason--works up\ninto conceptions, which it fixes sensuously by means of words; these\nconceptions then supply the materials for its endless combinations\nthrough judgments and conclusions, which constitute the weft of our\nthought-world. _Reason_ therefore has absolutely no _material_,\nbut merely a _formal_, content, and this is the object-matter of\nLogic, which consequently contains only forms and rules for thinking\noperations. In reflecting, Reason is absolutely forced to take\nits material contents from outside, _i.e._, from the intuitive\nrepresentations which the Understanding has created. Its functions are\nexercised on them, first of all, in forming _conceptions_, by dropping\nsome of the various qualities of things while retaining others, which\nare then connected together to a conception. Representations, however,\nforfeit their capacity for being intuitively perceived by this process,\nwhile they become easier to deal with, as has already been shown. It\nis therefore in this, and in this alone, that the efficiency of Reason\nconsists; whereas it can never supply _material content from its own\nresources_.--It has nothing but forms: its nature is feminine; it\nonly conceives, but does not generate. It is not by mere chance that\nthe Reason is feminine in all Latin, as well as Teutonic, languages;\nwhereas the Understanding is invariably masculine.\n\nIn using such expressions as 'sound Reason teaches this,' or 'Reason\nshould control passion,' we by no means imply that Reason furnishes\nmaterial knowledge out of its own resources; but rather do we point\nto the results of rational reflection, that is, to logical inference\nfrom principles which abstract knowledge has gradually gathered from\nexperience and by which we obtain a clear and comprehensive view, not\nonly of what is empirically necessary, and may therefore, the case\noccurring, be foreseen, but even of the reasons and consequences of our\nown deeds also. _Reasonable_ or _rational_ is everywhere synonymous\nwith _consistent_ or _logical_, and conversely; for Logic is only\nReason's natural procedure itself, expressed in a system of rules;\ntherefore these expressions (rational and logical) stand in the same\nrelation to one another as theory and practice. Exactly in this same\nsense too, when we speak of a reasonable conduct, we mean by it one\nwhich is quite consistent, one therefore which proceeds from general\nconceptions, and is not determined by the transitory impression of\nthe moment. By this, however, the morality of such conduct is in\nno wise determined: it may be good or bad indifferently. Detailed\nexplanations of all this are to be found in my \"Critique of Kant's\nPhilosophy,\"[137] and also in my \"Fundamental Problems of Ethics.\"[138]\nNotions derived from _pure Reason_ are, lastly, those which have their\nsource in the _formal_ part, whether intuitive or reflective, of our\ncognitive faculty; those, consequently, which we are able to bring to\nour consciousness _\u00e0 priori_, that is, without the help of experience.\nThey are invariably based upon principles which have transcendental or\nmetalogical truth.\n\n  [137] \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" 2nd edition, vol. i. p. 576 _et\n  seqq._; 3rd edition, p. 610 _et seq._\n\n  [138] Schopenhauer, \"Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik,\" p. 152;\n  2nd edition, p. 149 _et seq._\n\nA Reason, on the other hand, which supplies material knowledge\nprimarily out of its own resources and conveys positive information\ntranscending the sphere of possible experience; a Reason which, in\norder to do this, must necessarily contain _innate ideas_, is a pure\nfiction, invented by our professional philosophers and a product of\nthe terror with which Kant's Critique of Pure Reason has inspired\nthem. I wonder now, whether these gentlemen know a certain Locke\nand whether they have ever read his works? Perhaps they may have\ndone so in times long gone by, cursorily and superficially, while\nlooking down complacently on this great thinker from the heights\nof their own conscious superiority: may be, too, in some inferior\nGerman translation; for I do not yet see that the knowledge of modern\nlanguages has increased in proportion to the deplorable decrease in\nthat of ancient ones. How could time besides be found for such old\ncroakers as Locke, when even a real, thorough knowledge of Kant's\nPhilosophy at present hardly exists excepting in a very few, very\nold heads? The youth of the generation now at its maturity had of\ncourse to be spent in the study of \"Hegel's gigantic mind,\" of the\n\"sublime Schleiermacher,\" and of the \"acute Herbart.\" Alas! alas!\nthe great mischief in academical hero-worship of this sort, and in\nthe glorification of university celebrities by worthy colleagues\nin office or hopeful aspirants to it, is precisely, that ordinary\nintellects--Nature's mere manufactured ware--are presented to honest\ncredulous youths of immature judgment, as master minds, exceptions and\nornaments of mankind. The students forthwith throw all their energies\ninto the barren study of the endless, insipid scribblings of such\nmediocrities, thus wasting the short, invaluable period allotted to\nthem for higher education, instead of using it to attain the sound\ninformation they might have found in the works of those extremely rare,\ngenuine, truly exceptional thinkers, _nantes in gurgite vasto_, who\nonly rise to the surface every now and then in the course of ages,\nbecause Nature produced but one of each kind, and then \"destroyed the\nmould.\" For this generation also those great minds might have had life,\nhad our youth not been cheated out of its share in their wisdom by\nthese exceedingly pernicious extollers of mediocrity, members of the\nvast league and brotherhood of mediocrities, which is as flourishing\nto-day as it ever was and still hoists its flag as high as it can in\npersistent antagonism to all that is great and genuine, as humiliating\nto its members. Thanks to them, our age has declined to so low an ebb,\nthat Kant's Philosophy, which it took our fathers years of study, of\nserious application and of strenuous effort to understand, has again\nbecome foreign to the present generation, which stands before it like\n\u1f44\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cd\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd, at times attacking it coarsely and clumsily--as\nbarbarians throw stones at the statue of some Greek god which is\nforeign to them. Now, as this is the case, I feel it incumbent upon me\nto advise all champions of a Reason that perceives, comprehends, and\nknows directly--in short, that supplies material knowledge out of its\nown resources--to read, as something new to them, the _First Book_ of\nLocke's work, which has been celebrated throughout the world for the\nlast hundred and fifty years, and in it especially to peruse \u00a7\u00a7 21-26\nof the Third Chapter, expressly directed against all innate notions.\nFor although Locke goes too far in denying all innate truths, inasmuch\nas he extends his denial even to our _formal_ knowledge--a point in\nwhich he has been brilliantly rectified by Kant--he is nevertheless\nperfectly and undeniably right with reference to all _material_\nknowledge: that is, all knowledge which gives substance.\n\nI have already said in my Ethics what I must nevertheless repeat here,\nbecause, as the Spanish proverb says, \"_No hay peor sordo que quien no\nquiere oir_\" (None so deaf as those who will not hear): namely, that\nif Reason were a faculty specially designed for Metaphysics, a faculty\nwhich supplied the material of knowledge and could reveal that which\ntranscends all possible experience, the same harmony would necessarily\nreign between men on metaphysical and religious subjects--for they are\nidentical--as on mathematical ones, and those who differed in opinion\nfrom the rest would simply be looked upon as not quite right in their\nmind. Now exactly the contrary takes place, for on no subject are men\nso completely at variance with one another as upon these. Ever since\nmen first began to think, philosophical systems have opposed and\ncombated each other everywhere; they are, in fact, often diametrically\ncontrary to one another. Ever since men first began to believe (which\nis still longer), religions have fought against one another with fire\nand sword, with excommunication and cannons. But in times when faith\nwas most ardent, it was not the lunatic asylum, but the Inquisition,\nwith all its paraphernalia, which awaited individual heretics. Here\nagain, therefore, experience flatly and categorically contradicts the\nfalse assertion, that Reason is a faculty for direct metaphysical\nknowledge, or, to speak more clearly, of inspiration from above. Surely\nit is high time that severe judgment should be passed upon this Reason,\nsince, _horribile dictu_, so lame, so palpable a falsehood continues\nafter half a century to be hawked about all over Germany, wandering\nyear by year from the professors' chair to the students' bench, and\nfrom bench to chair, and has actually found a few simpletons, even in\nFrance, willing to believe in it, and carry it about in that country\nalso. Here, however, French _bon-sens_ will very soon send _la raison\ntranscendentale_ about its business.\n\nBut where was this falsehood originally hatched? How did the fiction\nfirst come into the world? I am bound to confess that it was first\noriginated by Kant's Practical Reason with its Categorical Imperative.\nFor when this Practical Reason had once been admitted, nothing further\nwas needed than the addition of a second, no less sovereign Theoretical\nReason, as its counterpart, or twin-sister: a Reason which proclaims\nmetaphysical truths _ex tripode_. I have described the brilliant\nsuccess of this invention in my Fundamental Problems of Ethics[139] to\nwhich work I refer my reader. Now, although I grant that Kant first\ngave rise to this false assumption, I am, nevertheless, bound to add,\nthat those who want to dance are not long in finding a piper. For it\nis surely as though a curse lay on mankind, causing them, in virtue\nof a natural affinity for all that is corrupt and bad, to prefer and\nhold up to admiration the inferior, not to say downright defective,\nportions of the works of eminent minds, while the really admirable\nparts are tolerated as merely accessory. Very few in our time know\nwherein the peculiar depth and true grandeur of Kant's philosophy\nlies; for his works have necessarily ceased to be comprehended since\nthey have ceased to be studied. In fact, they are now only cursorily\nread, for historical purposes, by those who are under the delusion\nthat philosophy has advanced, not to say begun, since Kant. We soon\nperceive therefore, that in spite of all their talk about Kantian\nphilosophy, these people really know nothing of it but the husk, the\nmere outer envelope, and that if perchance they may here or there have\ncaught up a stray sentence or brought away a rough sketch of it, they\nhave never penetrated to the depths of its meaning and spirit. People\nof this sort have always been chiefly attracted, in Kant's Philosophy,\nfirst of all by the Antinomies, on account of their oddity, but still\nmore by his Practical Reason with its Categorical Imperative, nay\neven by the Moral Theory he placed on the top of it, though with this\nlast he was never in earnest; for a theoretical dogma which has only\npractical validity, is very like the wooden guns we allow our children\nto handle without fear of danger: properly speaking, it belongs to\nthe same category as: \"Wash my skin, but without wetting it.\" Now,\nas regards the Categorical Imperative, Kant never asserted it as a\nfact, but, on the contrary, protests repeatedly against this being\ndone; he merely served it up as the result of an exceedingly curious\ncombination of thoughts, because he stood in need of a sheet-anchor\nfor morality. Our professors of philosophy, however, never sifted the\nmatter to the bottom, so that it seems as if no one before me had ever\nthoroughly investigated it. Instead of this, they made all haste to\nbring the Categorical Imperative into credit as a firmly established\nfact, calling it in their purism \"the moral law\"--which, by the way,\nalways reminds me of B\u00fcrger's \"Mam'zelle Lar\u00e8gle;\" indeed, they have\nmade out of it something as massive as the stone tables of Moses,\nwhose place it entirely takes, for them. Now in my Essay upon the\nFundament of Morality, I have brought this same Practical Reason with\nits Categorical Imperative under the anatomical knife, and proved so\nclearly and conclusively that they never had any life or truth, that\nI should like to see the man who can refute me with reasons, and so\nhelp the Categorical Imperative honestly on its legs again. Meanwhile,\nour professors of philosophy do not allow themselves to be put out of\ncountenance by this. They can no more dispense with their \"moral law\nof practical Reason,\" as a convenient _deus ex machina_ on which to\nfound their morality, than with Free Will: both are essential points\nin their old woman's philosophy. No matter if I have made an end of\nboth, since, for them, both continue to exist, like deceased sovereigns\nwho for political reasons are occasionally allowed to continue reigning\nfor a few days after their death. These worthies simply pursue their\ntactics of old against my merciless demolition of those two antiquated\nfictions: silence, silence; and so they glide past noiselessly,\nfeigning ignorance, to make the public believe that I and the like of\nme are not worth listening to. Well, to be sure, their philosophical\ncalling comes to them from the ministry, while mine only comes from\nNature. True, we may at last perhaps discover that these heroes act\nupon the same principle as that idealistic bird, the ostrich, which\nimagines that by closing its eyes it does away with the huntsman. Ah\nwell! we must bide our time; if the public can only be brought to\ntake up meantime with the barren twaddle, the unbearably tiresome\nrepetitions, the arbitrary constructions of the Absolute, and the\ninfant-school morality of these gentlemen--say, till I am dead and they\ncan trim up my works as they like--we shall then see.\n\n  Morgen habe denn das Rechte\n  Seine Freunde wohlgesinnet,\n  Wenn nur heute noch das Schlechte\n  Vollen Platz und Gunst gewinnet.\n                    G\u00d6THE, _West-Oestlicher Divan_.\n\n  [139] Schopenhauer, \"Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik,\" p. 148\n  and _sqq._ (p. 146 _et seq._ of 2nd edition.)\n\nBut do these gentlemen know what time of day it is? A long predicted\nepoch has set in; the church is beginning to totter, nay it totters\nalready to such a degree, that it is doubtful whether it will ever\nbe able to recover its centre of gravity; for faith is lost. The\nlight of revelation, like other lights, requires a certain amount of\ndarkness as an indispensable condition. The number of those who have\nbeen unfitted for belief by a certain degree and extent of knowledge,\nis already very large. Of this we have evident signs in the general\ndiffusion of that shallow Rationalism which is showing its bulldog\nface daily more and more overtly. It quietly sets to work to measure\nthose profound mysteries of Christianity over which centuries have\nbrooded and disputed with its draper's ell, and thinks itself wondrous\nwise withal. It is, however, the very quintessence of Christianity, the\ndogma of Original Sin, which these shallow-brained Rationalists have\nespecially singled out for a laughing-stock; precisely because nothing\nseems clearer or more certain to them, than that existence should begin\nfor each of us with our birth: nothing therefore so impossible as\nthat we can have come into the world already burdened with guilt. How\nacute! And just as in times of prevailing poverty and neglect, wolves\nbegin to make their appearance in villages; so does Materialism, ever\nlying in wait, under these circumstances lift up its head and come to\nthe front hand in hand with Bestialism, its companion, which some call\nHumanism. Our thirst after knowledge augments with our incapacity for\nbelief. There comes a boiling-point in the scale of all intellectual\ndevelopment, at which all faith, all revelation, and all authority\nevaporate, and Man claims the right to judge for himself; the right,\nnot only to be taught, but to be convinced. The leading-strings of\nhis infancy have fallen off, and henceforth he demands leave to walk\nalone. Yet his craving for Metaphysics can no more be extinguished\nthan any physical want. Then it is, that the desire for philosophy\nbecomes serious and that mankind invokes the spirits of all the genuine\nthinkers who have issued from its ranks. Then, too, empty verbiage and\nthe impotent endeavours of emasculated intellects no longer suffice;\nthe want of a serious philosophy is felt, having other aims in view\nthan fees and salaries, and caring little therefore whether it meets\nthe approbation of cabinet-ministers, or councillors, whether it serves\nthe purposes of this or that religious faction, or not; a philosophy\nwhich, on the contrary, clearly shows that it has a very different\nmission in view from that of procuring a livelihood for the poor in\nspirit.\n\nBut I return to my argument. By means of an amplification which only\nneeded a little audacity, a _theoretical_ oracle had been added to the\n_practical_ oracle with which Kant had wrongly endowed Reason. The\ncredit of this invention is no doubt due to F. H. Jacobi, from whom\nthe professional philosophers joyfully and thankfully received the\nprecious gift, as a means to help them out of the straits to which Kant\nhad reduced them. That cool, calm, deliberate Reason, which Kant had\ncriticized so mercilessly, was henceforth degraded to _Understanding_\nand known by this name; while Reason was supposed to denote an entirely\nimaginary, fictitious faculty, admitting us, as it were, to a little\nwindow overlooking the superlunar, nay, the supernatural world,\nthrough which all those truths are handed to us ready cut and dried,\nconcerning which old-fashioned, honest, reflective Reason had for ages\nvainly argued and contended. And it is on such a mere product of the\nimagination, such a completely fictitious Reason as this, that German\nsham philosophy has been based for the last fifty years; first, as\nthe free construction and projection of the absolute _Ego_ and the\nemanation from it of the _non-Ego_; then, as the intellectual intuition\nof absolute identity or indifference, and its evolutions to Nature;\nor again, as the arising of God out of his dark depths or bottomless\npit[140] _\u00e0 la_ Jakob B\u00f6hme; lastly, as the pure, self-thinking,\nabsolute Idea, the scene of the ballet-dance of the self-moving\nconceptions--still, at the same time, always as immediate apprehension\n(_Vernehmen_) of the Divine, the supersensuous, the Deity, verity,\nbeauty and as many other \"-ties\" as may be desired, or even as a mere\nvague presentiment[141] of all these wonders.--So this is Reason, is\nit? Oh no, it is simply a farce, of which our professors of philosophy,\nwho are sorely perplexed by Kant's serious critiques, avail themselves\nin order to pass off the subjects of the established religion of their\ncountry somehow or other, _per fas aut nefas_, for the results of\nphilosophy.\n\n  [140] \"_Aus seinem Grund oder Ungrund._\"\n\n  [141] \"_Ahnung_ without the _d_.\" See above, p. 133. (Tr.'s note.)\n\nFor it behoves all professorial philosophy, before all things, to\nestablish beyond doubt, and to give a philosophical basis to, the\ndoctrine, that there is a God, Creator, and Ruler of the Universe, a\npersonal, consequently individual, Being, endowed with Understanding\nand Will, who has created the world out of nothing, and who rules it\nwith sublime wisdom, power and goodness. This obligation, however,\nplaces our professors of philosophy in an awkward position with respect\nto serious philosophy. For Kant had appeared and the Critique of Pure\nReason, was written more than sixty years ago, the result being, that\nof all the proofs of the existence of God which had been brought\nforward during the Christian ages, and which may be reduced to three\nwhich alone are possible, none are able to accomplish the desired end.\nNay, the impossibility of any such proof, and with it the impossibility\nof all speculative theology, is shown at length _\u00e0 priori_ and not in\nthe empty verbiage or Hegelian jargon now in fashion, which may be made\nto mean anything one likes, but quite seriously and honestly, in the\ngood old-fashioned way; wherefore, however little it may have been to\nthe taste of many people, nothing cogent could be brought forward in\nreply to it for the last sixty years, and the proofs of the existence\nof God have in consequence lost all credit, and are no longer in use.\nOur professors of philosophy have even begun to look down upon them\nand treat them with decided contempt, as ridiculous and superfluous\nattempts to demonstrate what was self-evident. Ho! ho! what a pity\nthis was not found out sooner! How much trouble might have been spared\nin searching whole centuries for these proofs, and how needless it\nwould have been for Kant to bring the whole weight of his Critique\nof Reason to bear upon and crush them! Some folks, will no doubt be\nreminded by this contempt of the fox with the sour grapes. But those\nwho wish to see a slight specimen of it will find a particularly\ncharacteristic one in Schelling's \"Philosophische Schriften,\" vol. i.,\n1809, p. 152. Now, whilst others were consoling themselves with Kant's\nassertion, that it is just as impossible to prove the non-existence, as\nthe existence, of God--as if, forsooth, the old wag did not know that\n_affirmanti incumbit probatio_--Jacobi's admirable invention came to\nthe rescue of our perplexed professors, and granted German _savants_\nof this century a peculiar sort of Reason that had never been known or\nheard of before.\n\nYet all these artifices were quite unnecessary. For the impossibility\nof proving the existence of God by no means interferes with that\nexistence, since it rests in unshakeable security on a much firmer\nbasis. It is indeed a matter of revelation, and this is besides all the\nmore certain, because that revelation was exclusively vouchsafed to a\nsingle people, called, on this account, the chosen people of God. This\nis made evident by the fact, that the notion of God, as personal Ruler\nand Creator of the world, ordaining everything for the best, is to be\nfound in no other religion but the Jewish, and the two faiths derived\nfrom it, which might consequently in a wider sense be called Jewish\nsects. We find no trace of such a notion in any other religion, ancient\nor modern. For surely no one would dream of confounding this Creator\nGod Almighty with the Hindoo Brahm, which is living in me, in you, in\nmy horse, in your dog--or even with Brahma, who is born and dies to\nmake way for other Brahmas, and to whom moreover the production of\nthe world is imputed as sin and guilt[142]--least of all with beguiled\nSaturn's voluptuous son, to whom Prometheus, defiant, prophesies his\ndownfall. But if we finally direct our attention towards the religion\nwhich numbers most followers, and in this respect may therefore be said\nto rank foremost: that is, Buddhism, we can no longer shut our eyes to\nthe fact that it is as decidedly and explicitly atheistic, as it is\nidealistic and ascetic; and this moreover to such a degree, that its\npriests express the greatest abhorrence of the doctrine of pure Theism\nwhenever it is brought to their notice. Therefore, in a treatise handed\nto a Catholic bishop by the High Priest of the Buddhists at Ava,[143]\nthe doctrine \"that there is a Being who has created the world and all\nthings, and who alone is worthy of worship,\" is counted among the six\ndamnable heresies.[144] This is entirely corroborated by I. J. Schmidt,\na most excellent and learned authority, whom I consider as having\nundoubtedly the deepest knowledge of Buddhism of any European _savant_,\nand who, in his work \"Upon the connection between Gnostic doctrines and\nBuddhism,\" p. 9, says:--\n\n  [142] \"If Brimha be unceasingly employed in the creation of worlds\n  ... how can tranquillity be obtained by inferior orders of being?\"\n  Prabodh Chandro Daya, translated by J. Taylor, p. 23.--Brahma is\n  also part of the Trimurti, which is the personification of nature,\n  as procreation, preservation, and death: that is, he represents the\n  first of these.\n\n  [143] See \"Asiatic Researches,\" vol. vi. p. 268, and Sangermano's\n  \"Description of the Burmese Empire,\" p. 81.\n\n  [144] See I. J. Schmidt, \"Forschungen im Gebiete der \u00e4lteren\n  Bildungsgeschichte Mittelasiens.\" St. Petersburg, 1824, pp. 276,\n  and 180.\n\n\"In the writings of the Buddhists not a trace is to be found of any\npositive indication of a Supreme Being as the principle of Creation.\nWhenever this subject presents itself consistently in the course of\nargument, it seems, indeed, to be intentionally evaded.\" And again:\n\"The system of Buddhism knows of no eternal, uncreated, one and only\nBeing, having existed before Time and created all that is visible and\ninvisible. This idea is quite foreign to Buddhism, and not a trace\nof it is to be found in Buddhist works. And just as little mention\ndo we find of Creation. True, the visible Universe is not without a\nbeginning, but it _arose_ out of empty Space, according to consistent,\nimmutable, natural laws. We should however err, were we to assume\nthat anything--call it Fate or Nature--is regarded or revered by the\nBuddhists as a divine principle; on the contrary, it is just this very\ndevelopment of empty Space, this precipitate from it or this division\ninto countless parts, this Matter thus arising, which constitutes\nthe Evil of _Jirtintschi_, or of the Universe in its inner and outer\nrelations, out of which sprang _Ortschilang_, or continuous change\naccording to immutable laws, which the same Evil had established.\" Then\nagain:[145] \"The expression _Creation_ is foreign to Buddhism, which\nonly knows _Cosmogony_;\" and, \"We must comprehend that no idea of a\ncreation of divine origin is compatible with their system.\" I could\nbring forward a hundred corroborative passages like these; but will\nlimit myself to one more, which I quote on account of its popular and\nofficial character. The third volume of a very instructive Buddhist\nwork, \"Mahavansi, Raja-ratnacari, and Raja-Vali,\"[146] contains a\ntranslation of the interrogatories to which the High Priests of the\nfive chief Pagodas were separately and successively subjected by the\nDutch Governor of Ceylon about the year 1766. It is exceedingly amusing\nto see the contrast between the interlocutors, who have the greatest\ndifficulty in understanding one another's meaning. In conformity\nwith the doctrines of their faith, these priests, who are penetrated\nwith love and compassion for all living beings, not excepting even\nDutch Governors, spare no pains to satisfy him by their answers. But\nthe artless, na\u00efve Atheism of these priests, whose piety extends\neven to practising continence, soon comes into conflict with the\ndeep convictions founded on Judaism, imbibed by the Governor in his\ninfancy. This faith has become a second nature for him; he cannot in\nthe least understand that these priests are not Theists, therefore\nhe constantly returns to his inquiries after a Supreme Being, asking\nthem who created the world, and so forth. Whereupon they answer that\nthere can be no higher being than Buddha Shakia-Muni, the Victorious\nand the Perfect, who, though a king's son by birth, voluntarily lived\nthe life of a beggar, and preached to the end his sublime doctrine,\nfor the Redemption of mankind, and for our salvation from the misery\nof constant renascence. They hold that the world has not been made\nby anyone,[147] that it is self-created, that Nature spreads it out,\nand draws it in again; but that it is that, which existing, does not\nexist: that it is the necessary accompaniment of renascence, and that\nrenascence is the result of our sinful conduct, &c. &c. &c. I mention\nsuch facts as these chiefly on account of the really scandalous way in\nwhich German _savants_ still universally persist, even to the present\nday, in looking upon Religion and Theism as identical and synonymous;\nwhereas Religion is, in fact, to Theism as the genus to the single\nspecies, and Judaism and Theism are alone identical. For this reason\nwe stigmatize as heathen all nations who are neither Jews, Christians,\nnor Mahometans. Christians are even taxed by Mahometans and Jews with\nthe impurity of their Theism, because of the dogma of the Trinity.\nFor, whatever may be said to the contrary, Christianity has Indian\nblood in its veins, therefore it constantly tends to free itself from\nJudaism. The Critique of Pure Reason is the most serious attack that\nhas ever been made upon Theism--and this is why our professors of\nphilosophy have been in such a hurry to set Kant aside; but had that\nwork appeared in any country where Buddhism prevailed, it would simply\nhave been regarded as an edifying treatise intended to refute heresy\nmore thoroughly by a salutary confirmation of the orthodox doctrine\nof Idealism--that is, the doctrine of the merely apparent existence\nof the world, as it presents itself to our senses. Even the two other\nreligions which coexist with Buddhism in China--those of Taotsee and\nof Confucius--are just as Atheistic as Buddhism itself; wherefore the\nmissionaries have never been able to translate the first verse of the\nPentateuch into Chinese, because there is no word in the language for\nGod and Creation. Even the missionary G\u00fctzlaff, in his \"History of the\nChinese Empire,\" p. 18, has the honesty to say: \"It is extraordinary\nthat none of the (Chinese) philosophers ever soared high enough to\nreach the knowledge of a Creator and Lord of the Universe, although\nthey possessed the Light of Nature in full measure.\" J. F. Davis\nlikewise quotes a passage, which is quite in accordance with this, from\nMilne's Preface to his translation of the Shing-yu, where in speaking\nof that work, he says that we may see from it \"that the bare Light of\nNature, as it is called, even when aided by all the light of Pagan\nphilosophy, is totally incapable of leading men to the knowledge and\nworship of the true God.\" All this confirms the fact that revelation\nis the sole foundation on which Theism rests; indeed, it must be so,\nunless revelation is to be superfluous. This is a good opportunity\nfor observing that the word Atheism itself implies a surreptitious\nassumption, since it takes Theism for granted as a matter of course.\nIt would be more honest to say Non-Judaism instead of Atheism, and\nNon-Jew instead of Atheist.\n\n  [145] I. J. Schmidt, Lecture delivered in the Academy at St.\n  Petersburg on the 15th Sept. 1830, p. 26.\n\n  [146] Mahavansi, Raja-ratnacari, and Raja-Vali, from the\n  Singhalese, by E. Upham. London, 1833.\n\n  [147] \u039a\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5, \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd \u1f29\u03c1\u03ac\u03ba\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd\n  \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd. (Neither a God nor a man created this world, says\n  Heraclitus.) Plut. \"De anim\u00e6 procreatione,\" c. 5.\n\nNow as, according to the above, the existence of God belongs to\nrevelation, by which it is firmly established, it has no need whatever\nof human authentication. Philosophy, however, is properly speaking only\nan idle, superfluous attempt to let Reason--that is, the human power of\nthinking, reflecting, deliberating--once in a while, try its own powers\nunassisted, as a child is now and then allowed to run alone on a lawn\nand try its strength without leading-strings, just to see what will\ncome of it. Tests and experiments of this kind we call _speculation_;\nand it lies in the nature of the matter that it should, for once, leave\nall authority, human or divine, out of consideration, ignore it, and go\nits own way in search of the most sublime, most important truths. Now,\nif on this basis it should arrive at the very same results as those\nmentioned above, to which Kant had come, speculation has no right on\nthat account to cast all honesty and conscience forthwith aside, and\ntake to by-ways, in order somehow or other to get back to the domain of\nJudaism, as its _conditio sine qua non_; it ought rather henceforth to\nseek truth quite honestly and simply by any road that may happen to lie\nopen before it, but never to allow any other light than that of Reason\nto guide it: thus advancing calmly and confidently, like one at work in\nhis vocation, without concern as to where that road may lead.\n\nIf our professors of philosophy put a different construction on the\nmatter, and hold that they cannot eat their bread in honour, so long as\nthey have not reinstalled God Almighty on his throne--as if, forsooth,\nhe stood in need of _them_--this already accounts for their not\nrelishing my writings, and explains why I am not the man for them; for\nI certainly do not deal in this sort of article, nor have I the newest\nreports to communicate about the Almighty every Leipzig fair-time, as\nthey have.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nON THE THIRD CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT AND THAT FORM OF THE\nPRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON WHICH PREDOMINATES IN IT.\n\n\n\u00a7 35. _Explanation of this Class of Objects._\n\nIt is the formal part of complete representations--that is to say, the\nintuitions given us _\u00e0 priori_ of the forms of the outer and inner\nsense, _i.e._ of Space and of Time--which constitutes the Third Class\nof Objects for our representative faculty.\n\nAs pure intuitions, these forms are objects for the faculty of\nrepresentation by themselves and apart from complete representations\nand from the determinations of being empty or filled which these\nrepresentations first add to them; since even pure points and pure\nlines cannot be brought to sensuous perception, but are only _\u00e0\npriori_ intuitions, just as the infinite expansion and the infinite\ndivisibility of Space and of Time are exclusively objects of pure\nintuition and foreign to empirical perception. That which distinguishes\nthe third class of representations, in which Space and Time are _pure\nintuitions_, from the first class, in which they are _sensuously_ (and\nmoreover conjointly) _perceived_, is Matter, which I have therefore\ndefined, on the one hand, as the perceptibility of Space and Time, on\nthe other, as objectified Causality.\n\nThe form of Causality, on the contrary, which belongs to the\nUnderstanding, is not separately and by itself an object for our\nfaculty of representation, nor have we consciousness of it, until it is\nconnected with what is material in our knowledge.\n\n\n\u00a7 36. _Principle of the Sufficient Reason of Being._\n\nSpace and Time are so constituted, that all their parts stand in\nmutual relation, so that each of them conditions and is conditioned\nby another. We call this relation in Space, _position_; in Time,\n_succession_. These relations are peculiar ones, differing entirely\nfrom all other possible relations of our representations; neither the\nUnderstanding nor the Reason are therefore able to grasp them by means\nof mere conceptions, and pure intuition _\u00e0 priori_ alone makes them\nintelligible to us; for it is impossible by mere conceptions to explain\nclearly what is meant by above and below, right and left, behind and\nbefore, before and after. Kant rightly confirms this by the assertion,\nthat the distinction between our right and left glove cannot be made\nintelligible in any other way than by intuition. Now, the law by which\nthe divisions of Space and of Time determine one another reciprocally\nwith reference to these relations (position and succession) is what\nI call the _Principle of the Sufficient Reason of Being, principium\nrationis sufficientis essendi_. I have already given an example of\nthis relation in \u00a7 15, by which I have shown, through the connection\nbetween the sides and angles of a triangle, that this relation is\nnot only quite different from that between cause and effect, but\nalso from that between reason of knowledge and consequent; wherefore\nhere the condition may be called _Reason of Being_, _ratio essendi_.\nThe insight into such a _reason of being_ can, of course, become a\nreason of knowing: just as the insight into the law of causality\nand its application to a particular case is the reason of knowledge\nof the effect; but this in no way annuls the complete distinction\nbetween Reason of Being, Reason of Becoming, and Reason of Knowing. It\noften happens, that what according to _one_ form of our principle is\n_consequence_, is, according to another, _reason_. The rising of the\nquicksilver in a thermometer, for instance, is the _consequence_ of\nincreased heat according to the law of causality, while according to\nthe principle of the sufficient reason of knowing it is the _reason_,\nthe ground of knowledge, of the increased heat and also of the judgment\nby which this is asserted.\n\n\n\u00a7 37. _Reason of Being in Space._\n\nThe position of each division of Space towards any other, say of any\ngiven line--and this is equally applicable to planes, bodies, and\npoints--determines also absolutely its totally different position with\nreference to any other possible line; so that the latter position\nstands to the former in the relation of the consequent to its reason.\nAs the position of this given line towards any other possible line\nlikewise determines its position towards all the others, and as\ntherefore the position of the first two lines is itself determined\nby all the others, it is immaterial which we consider as being first\ndetermined and determining the others, _i.e._ which particular one\nwe regard as _ratio_ and which others as _rationata_. This is so,\nbecause in Space there is no succession; for it is precisely by uniting\nSpace and Time to form the collective representation of the complex\nof experience, that the representation of coexistence arises. Thus an\nanalogue to so-called reciprocity prevails everywhere in the Reason\nof Being in Space, as we shall see in \u00a7 48, where I enter more fully\ninto the reciprocity of reasons. Now, as every line is determined by\nall the others just as much as it determines them, it is arbitrary to\nconsider any line merely as determining and not as being determined,\nand the position of each towards any other admits the question as to\nits position with reference to some other line, which second position\nnecessarily determines the first and makes it that which it is. It\nis therefore just as impossible to find an end _a parte ante_ in the\nseries of links in the chain of Reasons of Being as in that of Reasons\nof Becoming, nor can we find any _a parte post_ either, because of the\ninfinity of Space and of the lines possible within Space. All possible\nrelative spaces are figures, because they are limited; and all these\nfigures have their Reason of Being in one another, because they are\nconterminous. The _series rationum essendi_ in Space therefore, like\nthe _series rationum fiendi_, proceeds _in infinitum_; and moreover not\nonly in a single direction, like the latter, but in all directions.\n\nNothing of all this can be proved; for the truth of these principles is\ntranscendental, they being directly founded upon the intuition of Space\ngiven us _\u00e0 priori_.\n\n\n\u00a7 38. _Reason of being in Time. Arithmetic._\n\nEvery instant in Time is conditioned by the preceding one. The\nSufficient Reason of Being, as the law of consequence, is so simple\nhere, because Time has only one dimension, therefore it admits of\nno multiplicity of relations. Each instant is conditioned by its\npredecessor; we can only reach it through that predecessor: only so far\nas this _was_ and has elapsed, does the present one exist. All counting\nrests upon this nexus of the divisions of Time, numbers only serving to\nmark the single steps in the succession; upon it therefore rests all\narithmetic likewise, which teaches absolutely nothing but methodical\nabbreviations of numeration. Each number pre-supposes its predecessors\nas the reasons of its being: we can only reach the number _ten_ by\npassing through all the preceding numbers, and it is only in virtue\nof this insight that I know, that where ten are, there also are eight,\nsix, four.\n\n\n\u00a7 39. _Geometry._\n\nThe whole science of Geometry likewise rests upon the nexus of the\nposition of the divisions of Space. It would, accordingly, be an\ninsight into that nexus; only such an insight being, as we have already\nsaid, impossible by means of mere conceptions, or indeed in any other\nway than by intuition, every geometrical proposition would have to be\nbrought back to sensuous intuition, and the proof would simply consist\nin making the particular nexus in question clear; nothing more could\nbe done. Nevertheless we find Geometry treated quite differently.\nEuclid's Twelve Axioms are alone held to be based upon mere intuition,\nand even of these only the Ninth, Eleventh, and Twelfth are properly\nspeaking admitted to be founded upon different, separate intuitions;\nwhile the rest are supposed to be founded upon the knowledge that in\nscience we do not, as in experience, deal with real things existing\nfor themselves side by side, and susceptible of endless variety, but\non the contrary with conceptions, and in Mathematics with _normal\nintuitions_, i.e. figures and numbers, whose laws are binding for all\nexperience, and which therefore combine the comprehensiveness of the\nconception with the complete definiteness of the single representation.\nFor although, as intuitive representations, they are throughout\ndetermined with complete precision--no room being left in _this_ way\nby anything remaining undetermined--still they are general, because\nthey are the bare forms of all phenomena, and, as such, applicable to\nall real objects to which such forms belong. What Plato says of his\nIdeas would therefore, even in Geometry, hold good of these normal\nintuitions, just as well as of conceptions, _i.e._ that two cannot be\nexactly similar, for then they would be but one.[148] This would, I\nsay, be applicable also to normal intuitions in Geometry, if it were\nnot that, as exclusively spacial objects, these differ from one another\nin mere juxtaposition, that is, in place. Plato had long ago remarked\nthis, as we are told by Aristotle:[149] \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72, \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b7, \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03cd, \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03bb'\n\u1f04\u03c4\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f13\u03bd \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd (_item, pr\u00e6ter\nsensibilia et species, mathematica rerum ait media esse, a sensibilibus\nquidem differentia eo, quod perpetua et immobilia sunt, a speciebus\nvero eo, quod illorum quidem multa qu\u00e6dam similia sunt, species vero\nipsa unaqu\u00e6que sola_). Now the mere knowledge that such a difference\nof place does not annul the rest of the identity, might surely, it\nseems to me, supersede the other nine axioms, and would, I think, be\nbetter suited to the nature of science, whose aim is knowledge of the\nparticular through the general, than the statement of nine separate\naxioms all based upon the same insight. Moreover, what Aristotle says:\n\u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f21 \u1f30\u03c3\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f11\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 (_in illis \u00e6qualitas unitas est_)[150] then\nbecomes applicable to geometrical figures.\n\n  [148] Platonic ideas may, after all, be described as normal\n  intuitions, which would hold good not only for what is formal, but\n  also for what is material in complete representations--therefore\n  as complete representations which, as such, would be determined\n  throughout, while comprehending many things at once, like\n  conceptions: that is to say, as representatives of conceptions, but\n  which are quite adequate to those conceptions, as I have explained\n  in \u00a7 28.\n\n  [149] Aristot. \"Metaph.\" i. 6, with which compare x. 1. \"Further,\n  says he, besides things sensible and the ideas, there are things\n  mathematical coming in between the two, which differ from the\n  things sensible, inasmuch as they are eternal and immovable, and\n  from the ideas, inasmuch as many of them are like each other; but\n  the idea is absolutely and only one.\" (Tr.'s Add.)\n\n  [150] \"In these it is equality that constitutes unity.\" (Tr.'s Add.)\n\nBut with reference to the normal intuitions in Time, _i.e._ to\nnumbers, even this distinction of juxtaposition no longer exists.\nHere, as with conceptions, absolutely nothing but the _identitas\nindiscernibilium_ remains: for there is but one five and one seven.\nAnd in this we may perhaps also find a reason why 7 + 5 = 12 is a\nsynthetical proposition _\u00e0 priori_, founded upon intuition, as Kant\nprofoundly discovered, and not an identical one, as it is called by\nHerder in his \"Metakritik\". 12 = 12 is an identical proposition.\n\nIn Geometry, it is therefore only in dealing with axioms that we appeal\nto intuition. All the other theorems are demonstrated: that is to say,\na reason of knowing is given, the truth of which everyone is bound to\nacknowledge. The logical truth of the theorem is thus shown, but not\nits transcendental truth (v. \u00a7\u00a7 30 and 32), which, as it lies in the\nreason of _being_ and not in the reason of _knowing_, never can become\nevident excepting by means of intuition. This explains _why_ this sort\nof geometrical demonstration, while it no doubt conveys the conviction\nthat the theorem which has been demonstrated is true, nevertheless\ngives no insight as to why that which it asserts is what it is. In\nother words, we have not found its Reason of Being; but the desire to\nfind it is usually then thoroughly roused. For proof by indicating\nthe reason of knowledge only effects conviction (_convictio_), not\nknowledge (_cognitio_): therefore it might perhaps be more correctly\ncalled _elenchus_ than _demonstratio_. This is why, in most cases,\ntherefore, it leaves behind it that disagreeable feeling which is given\nby all want of insight, when perceived; and here, the want of knowledge\n_why_ a thing is as it is, makes itself all the more keenly felt,\nbecause of the certainty just attained, _that_ it is as it is. This\nimpression is very much like the feeling we have, when something has\nbeen conjured into or out of our pocket, and we cannot conceive how.\nThe reason of knowing which, in such demonstrations as these, is given\nwithout the reason of being, resembles certain physical theories,\nwhich present the phenomenon without being able to indicate its cause:\nfor instance, Leidenfrost's experiment, inasmuch as it succeeds also\nin a platina crucible; whereas the reason of being of a geometrical\nproposition which is discovered by intuition, like every knowledge\nwe acquire, produces satisfaction. When once the reason of being is\nfound, we base our conviction of the truth of the theorem upon that\nreason alone, and no longer upon the reason of knowing given us by the\ndemonstration. Let us, for instance, take the sixth proposition of the\nfirst Book of Euclid:--\n\n\"If two angles of a triangle are equal, the sides also which subtend,\nor are opposite to, the equal angles shall be equal to one another.\"\n(See fig. 3.)\n\n[Illustration: _Fig. 3._]\n\nWhich Euclid demonstrates as follows:--\n\n\"Let _a b c_ be a triangle having the angle _a b c_ equal to the angle\n_a c b_, then the side _a c_ must be equal to the side _a b_ also.\n\n\"For, if side _a b_ be not equal to side _a c_, one of them is greater\nthan the other. Let _a b_ be greater than _a c_; and from _b a_ cut off\n_b d_ equal to _c a_, and draw _d c_. Then, in the triangles _d b c_,\n_a b c_, because _d b_ is equal to _a c_, and _b c_ is common to both\ntriangles, the two sides _d b_ and _b c_ are equal to the two sides _a\nc_, _a b_, each to each; and the angle _d b c_ is equal to the angle\n_a c b_, therefore the base _d c_ is equal to the base _a b_, and the\ntriangle _d b c_ is equal to the triangle _a b c_, the less triangle\nequal to the greater,--which is absurd. Therefore _a b_ is not unequal\nto _a c_, that is, _a b_ is equal to _a c_.\"\n\nNow, in this demonstration we have a reason of knowing for the truth\nof the proposition. But who bases his conviction of that geometrical\ntruth upon this proof? Do we not rather base our conviction upon the\nreason of being, which we know intuitively, and according to which\n(by a necessity which admits of no further demonstration, but only of\nevidence through intuition) two lines drawn from both extreme ends of\nanother line, and inclining equally towards each other, can only meet\nat a point which is equally distant from both extremities; since the\ntwo arising angles are properly but one, to which the oppositeness\nof position gives the appearance of being two; wherefore there is no\nreason why the lines should meet at any point nearer to the one end\nthan to the other.\n\nIt is the knowledge of the reason of being which shows us the necessary\nconsequence of the conditioned from its condition--in this instance,\nthe lateral equality from the angular equality--that is, it shows their\nconnection; whereas the reason of knowing only shows their coexistence.\nNay, we might even maintain that the usual method of proving merely\nconvinces us of their coexistence in the actual figure given us as\nan example, but by no means that they are always coexistent; for, as\nthe necessary connection is not shown, the conviction we acquire of\nthis truth rests simply upon induction, and is based upon the fact,\nthat we find it is so in every figure we make. The reason of being\nis certainly not as evident in all cases as it is in simple theorems\nlike this 6th one of Euclid; still I am persuaded that it might be\nbrought to evidence in every theorem, however complicated, and that\nthe proposition can always be reduced to some such simple intuition.\nBesides, we are all just as conscious _\u00e0 priori_ of the necessity of\nsuch a reason of being for each relation of Space, as we are of the\nnecessity of a cause for each change. In complicated theorems it will,\nof course, be very difficult to show that reason of being; and this is\nnot the place for difficult geometrical researches. Therefore, to make\nmy meaning somewhat clearer, I will now try to bring back to its reason\nof being a moderately complicated proposition, in which nevertheless\nthat reason is not immediately evident. Passing over the intermediate\ntheorems, I take the 16th:\n\n\"In every triangle in which one side has been produced, the exterior\nangle is greater than either of the interior opposite angles.\"\n\nThis Euclid demonstrates in the following manner (see fig. 4):--\n\n[Illustration: _Fig. 4._]\n\n\"Let _a b c_ be a triangle; and let the side _b c_ be produced to _d_;\nthen the exterior angle _a c d_ shall be greater than either of the\ninterior opposite angles _b a c_ or _c b a_. Bisect the side _a c_ at\n_e_, and join _b e_; produce _b e_ to _f_, making _e f_ equal to _e b_,\nand join _f c_. Produce _a c_ to _g_. Because _a e_ is equal to _e c_,\nand _b e_ to _e f_; the two sides _a e_, _e b_, are equal to the two\nsides _c e_, _e f_, each to each; and the angle _a e b_ is equal to the\nangle _c e f_, because they are opposite vertical angles; therefore\nthe base _a b_ is equal to the base _c f_, and the triangle _a e b_ is\nequal to the triangle _c e f_, and the remaining angles of one triangle\nto the remaining angles of the other, each to each, to which the equal\nsides are opposite; therefore the angle _b a e_ is equal to the angle\n_e c f_. But the angle _e c d_ is greater than the angle _e c f_.\nTherefore the angle _a c d_ is greater than the angle _a b c_.\"\n\n\"In the same manner, if the side _b c_ be bisected, and the side _a c_\nbe produced to _g_, it may be demonstrated that the angle _b c g_, that\nis, the opposite vertical angle _a c d_ is greater than the angle _a b\nc_.\"\n\nMy demonstration of the same proposition would be as follows (see fig.\n5):--\n\n[Illustration: _Fig. 5._]\n\nFor the angle _b a c_ to be even equal to, let alone greater than,\nthe angle _a c d_, the line _b a_ toward _c a_ would have to lie in\nthe same direction as _b d_ (for this is precisely what is meant by\nequality of the angles), _i.e._, it must be parallel with _b d_; that\nis to say, _b a_ and _b d_ must never meet; but in order to form\na triangle they must meet (reason of being), and must thus do the\ncontrary of that which would be required for the angle _b a c_ to be of\nthe same size as the angle _a c d_.\n\nFor the angle _a b c_ to be even equal to, let alone greater than, the\nangle _a c d_, line _b a_ must lie in the same direction towards _b d_\nas _a c_ (for this is what is meant by equality of the angles), _i.e._,\nit must be parallel with _a c_, that is to say, _b a_ and _a c_ must\nnever meet; but in order to form a triangle _b a_ and _a c_ must meet\nand must thus do the contrary of that which would be required for the\nangle _a b c_ to be of the same size as _a c d_.\n\nBy all this I do not mean to suggest the introduction of a new method\nof mathematical demonstration, nor the substitution of my own proof\nfor that of Euclid, for which its whole nature unfits it, as well as\nthe fact that it presupposes the conception of parallel lines, which\nin Euclid comes much later. I merely wished to show what the reason of\nbeing is, and wherein lies the difference between it and the reason of\nknowing, which latter only effects _convictio_, a thing that differs\nentirely from insight into the reason of being. The fact that Geometry\nonly aims at effecting _convictio_, and that this, as I have said,\nleaves behind it a disagreeable impression, but gives no insight into\nthe reason of being--which insight, like all knowledge, is satisfactory\nand pleasing--may perhaps be one of the reasons for the great dislike\nwhich many otherwise eminent heads have for mathematics.\n\nI cannot resist again giving fig. 6, although it has already been\npresented elsewhere; because the mere sight of it without words conveys\nten times more persuasion of the truth of the Pythagorean theorem than\nEuclid's mouse-trap demonstration.\n\n[Illustration: _Fig. 6._]\n\nThose readers for whom this chapter may have a special interest will\nfind the subject of it more fully treated in my chief work, \"Die Welt\nals Wille und Vorstellung,\" vol. i. \u00a7 15; vol. ii. chap. 13.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\n    ON THE FOURTH CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT, AND THE FORM OF\n    THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON WHICH PREDOMINATES IN IT.\n\n\n\u00a7 40. _General Explanation._\n\nThe last Class of Objects for our representative faculty which remains\nto be examined is a peculiar but highly important one. It comprises but\n_one_ object for each individual: that is, the immediate object of the\ninner sense, the _Subject in volition_, which is Object for the Knowing\nSubject; wherefore it manifests itself in Time alone, never in Space,\nand as we shall see, even in Time under an important restriction.\n\n\n\u00a7 41. _Subject of Knowledge and Object._\n\nAll knowledge presupposes Subject and Object. Even self-consciousness\n(_Selbstbewusstsein_) therefore is not absolutely simple, but, like our\nconsciousness of all other things (_i.e._, the faculty of perception),\nit is subdivided into that which is known and that which knows. Now,\nthat which is known manifests itself absolutely and exclusively as\n_Will_.\n\nThe Subject accordingly knows itself exclusively as _willing_, but not\nas _knowing_. For the _ego_ which represents, never can itself become\nrepresentation or Object, since it conditions all representations as\ntheir necessary correlate; rather may the following beautiful passage\nfrom the Sacred Upanishad be applied to it: _Id videndum non est: omnia\nvidet; et id audiendum non est: omnia audit; sciendum non est: omnia\nscit: et intelligendum, non est: omnia intelligit. Pr\u00e6ter id, videns,\net sciens, et audiens, et intelligens ens aliud non est._[151]\n\n  [151] \"Oupnekhat,\" vol. i. p. 202.\n\nThere can therefore be no _knowledge of knowing_, because this would\nimply separation of the Subject from knowing, while it nevertheless\nknew that knowing--which is impossible.\n\nMy answer to the objection, \"I not only know, but know also that I\nknow,\" would be, \"Your knowing that you know only differs in words\nfrom your knowing. 'I know that I know' means nothing more than 'I\nknow,' and this again, unless it is further determined, means nothing\nmore than '_ego_.' If your knowing and your knowing that you know are\ntwo different things, just try to separate them, and first to know\nwithout knowing that you know, then to know that you know without this\nknowledge being at the same time knowing.\" No doubt, by leaving all\n_special_ knowing out of the question, we may at last arrive at the\nproposition \"_I know_\"--the last abstraction we are able to make; but\nthis proposition is identical with \"_Objects exist for me_,\" and this\nagain is identical with \"_I am Subject_,\" in which nothing more is\ncontained than in the bare word \"_I_.\"\n\nNow, it may still be asked how the various cognitive faculties\nbelonging to the Subject, such as Sensibility, Understanding, Reason,\nare known to us, if we do not know the Subject. It is not through\nour knowing having become an Object for us that these faculties\nare known to us, for then there would not be so many conflicting\njudgments concerning them; they are inferred rather, or more\ncorrectly, they are general expressions for the established classes of\nrepresentations which, at all times, have been more or less clearly\ndistinguished in those cognitive faculties. But, with reference to\nthe necessary correlate of these representations as their condition,\n_i.e._, the Subject, these faculties are abstracted from them (the\nrepresentations), and stand consequently towards the classes of\nrepresentations in precisely the same relation as the Subject in\ngeneral towards the Object in general. Now, just as the Object is at\nonce posited with the Subject (for the word itself would otherwise have\nno meaning), and conversely, as the Subject is at once posited with\nthe Object--so that being the Subject means exactly as much as having\nan Object, and being an Object means the same thing as being known by\nthe Subject--so likewise, when an Object is assumed as being determined\n_in any particular way_, do we also assume that the Subject _knows\nprecisely in that particular way_. So far therefore it is immaterial\nwhether we say that Objects have such and such peculiar inherent\ndeterminations, or that the Subject knows in such and such ways. It\nis indifferent whether we say that Objects are divided into such and\nsuch classes, or that such and such different cognitive faculties\nare peculiar to the Subject. In that singular compound of depth and\nsuperficiality, Aristotle, are to be found traces even of insight into\nthis truth, and indeed the critical philosophy lies in embryo in his\nworks. He says:[152] \u1f21 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ce\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 (anima quammodo est\nuniversa, qu\u00e6 sunt). And again: \u1f41 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u1ff6\u03bd, _i.e._, the\nunderstanding is the form of forms, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd, and\nsensibility the form of sensuous objects. Accordingly, it is all one\nwhether we say, \"sensibility and understanding are no more;\" or, \"the\nworld is at an end.\" It comes to the same thing whether we say, \"There\nare no conceptions,\" or \"Reason is gone and animals alone remain.\"\n\n  [152] Aristot., \"De anima,\" iii. 8. \"In a certain sense the\n  intellect is all that exists.\" (Tr.'s Add.)\n\nThe dispute between Realism and Idealism, which appeared for the last\ntime in the dispute between the Dogmatists and Kantians, or between\nOntology and Metaphysics on the one hand and Transcendental \u00c6sthetic\nand Transcendental Logic on the other, arose out of the misapprehension\nof this relation and was based upon its misapprehension with reference\nto the First and Third Classes of representations as established by me,\njust as the medi\u00e6val dispute between Realists and Nominalists rested\nupon the misapprehension of this relation with reference to the Second\nClass.\n\n\n\u00a7 42. _The Subject of Volition._\n\nAccording to what has preceded, the Subject of knowledge can never be\nknown; it can never become Object or representation. Nevertheless, as\nwe have not only an outer self-knowledge (in sensuous perception), but\nan inner one also; and as, on the other hand, every knowledge, by its\nvery nature, presupposes a knower and a known, what is known within us\nas such, is not the knower, but the willer, the Subject of Volition:\nthe Will. Starting from knowledge, we may assert that \"I know\" is an\nanalytical, \"I will,\" on the contrary, a synthetical, and moreover an\n_\u00e0 posteriori_ proposition, that is, it is given by experience--in this\ncase by inner experience (_i.e._, in Time alone). In so far therefore\nthe Subject of volition would be an Object for us. Introspection\nalways shows us to ourselves as _willing_. In this _willing_, however,\nthere are numerous degrees, from the faintest wish to passion, and I\nhave often shown[153] that not only all our emotions, but even all\nthose movements of our inner man, which are subsumed under the wide\nconception of feeling, are states of the will.\n\n  [153] See \"Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik,\" p. 11, and in\n  several other places.\n\nNow, the identity of the willing with the knowing Subject, in virtue of\nwhich the word \"I\" includes and designates both, is the _nodus_[154] of\nthe Universe, and therefore inexplicable. For we can only comprehend\nrelations between Objects; but two Objects never can be one, excepting\nas parts of a whole. Here, where the Subject is in question, the rules\nby which we know Objects are no longer applicable, and actual identity\nof the knower with what is known as willing--that is, of Subject and\nObject--is _immediately given_. Now, whoever has clearly realized\nthe utter impossibility of explaining this identity, will surely\nconcur with me in calling it the miracle \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4' \u1f10\u03be\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd.\n\n  [154] _Weltknoten._\n\nJust as the Understanding is the subjective correlate to our First\nClass of representations, the Reason to the Second, and pure\nSensibility to the Third, so do we find that the correlate to this\nFourth Class is the inner sense, or Self-consciousness in general.\n\n\n\u00a7 43. _Willing. The Law of Motives (Motivation)._\n\nIt is just because the willing Subject is immediately given in\nself-consciousness, that we are unable further to define or to describe\nwhat willing is; properly speaking, it is the most direct knowledge we\nhave, nay, one whose immediateness must finally throw light upon every\nother knowledge, as being very mediate.\n\nAt every resolution that we take ourselves, or that we see others take,\nwe deem ourselves justified in asking, why? That is, we assume that\nsomething must have previously occurred, from which this resolution has\nresulted, and we call this something its reason, or, more correctly,\nthe motive of the action which now follows. Without such a reason or\nmotive, the action is just as inconceivable for us, as the movement\nof a lifeless body without being pushed or pulled. Motives therefore\nbelong to causes, and have also been already numbered and characterized\namong them in \u00a7 20, as the third form of Causality. But all Causality\nis only the form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the First\nClass of Objects: that is, in the corporeal world given us in external\nperception. There it forms the link which connects changes one with\nanother, the cause being that which, coming from outside, conditions\neach occurrence. The inner nature of such occurrences on the contrary\ncontinues to be a mystery for us: for we always remain on the outside.\nWe certainly see this cause necessarily produce that effect; but we\ndo not learn how it is actually enabled to do so, or what is going on\ninside. Thus we see mechanical, physical, chemical effects, as well as\nthose brought about by _stimuli_, in each instance follow from their\nrespective causes without on that account ever completely understanding\nthe process, the essential part of which remains a mystery for us;\nso we attribute it to qualities of bodies, to forces of Nature, or\nto vital energy, which, however, are all _qualitates occult\u00e6_. Nor\nshould we be at all better off as to comprehension of the movements and\nactions of animals and of human beings, which would also appear to us\nas induced in some unaccountable way by their causes (motives), were\nit not that here we are granted an insight into the inward part of the\nprocess; we know, that is, by our own inward experience, that this is\nan act of the will called forth by the motive, which consists in a mere\nrepresentation. Thus the effect produced by the motive, unlike that\nproduced by all other causes, is not only known by us from outside,\nin a merely indirect way, but at the same time from inside, quite\ndirectly, and therefore according to its whole mode of action. Here we\nstand as it were behind the scenes, and learn the secret of the process\nby which cause produces effect in its most inward nature; for here\nour knowledge comes to us through a totally different channel and in\na totally different way. From this results the important proposition:\n_The action of motives (motivation) is causality seen from within_.\nHere accordingly causality presents itself in quite a different way,\nin quite a different medium, and for quite another kind of knowledge;\ntherefore it must now be exhibited as a special and peculiar form of\nour principle, which consequently here presents itself as the Principle\nof the Sufficient Reason of Acting, _principium rationis sufficientis\nagendi_, or, more briefly, as the _Law of Motives (Law of Motivation)_.\n\nAs a clue to my philosophy in general, I here add, that this Fourth\nClass of Objects for the Subject, that is, the one object contained\nin it, the _will_ which we apprehend within us, stands in the same\nrelation towards the First Class as the law of motives towards the\nlaw of causality, as I have established it in \u00a7 20. This truth is the\ncorner-stone of my whole Metaphysic.\n\nAs to the way in which, and the necessity with which, motives act,\nand as to the dependence of their action upon empirical, individual\ncharacter, and even upon individual capacity for knowledge, &c. &c., I\nrefer my readers to my Prize-essay on the Freedom of the Will, in which\nI have treated all this more fully.\n\n\n\u00a7 44. _Influence of the Will over the Intellect._\n\nIt is not upon causality proper, but upon the identity of the knowing\nwith the willing Subject, as shown in \u00a7 42, that the influence is\nbased, which the will exercises over the intellect, when it obliges\nit to repeat representations that have once been present to it,\nand in general to turn its attention in this or that direction and\nevoke at pleasure any particular series of thoughts. And even in\nthis, the will is determined by the law of motives, in accordance\nwith which it also secretly rules what is called the association of\nideas, to which I have devoted a separate chapter (the 14th) in the\nsecond volume of my chief work. This association of ideas is itself\nnothing but the application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason\nin its four forms to the subjective train of thought; that is, to\nthe presence of representations in our consciousness. But it is the\nwill of the individual that sets the whole mechanism in motion, by\nurging the intellect, in accordance with the interest, _i.e._, the\nindividual aims, of the person, to recall, together with its present\nrepresentations, those which either logically or analogically, or by\nproximity in Time or Space, are nearly related to them. The will's\nactivity in this, however, is so immediate, that in most cases we\nhave no clear consciousness of it; and so rapid, that we are at\ntimes even unconscious of the occasion which has thus called forth a\nrepresentation. In such cases, it appears as if something had come into\nour consciousness quite independently of all connection with anything\nelse; that this, however, is impossible, is precisely the Root of the\nPrinciple of Sufficient Reason, which has been fully explained in the\nabove-mentioned chapter of my chief work.[155] Every picture which\nsuddenly presents itself to our imagination, every judgment even that\ndoes not follow its previously present reason, must be called forth\nby an act of volition having a motive; although that motive may often\nescape our perception owing to its insignificance, and although such\nacts of volition are often in like manner unperceived, because they\ntake place so easily, that wish and fulfilment are simultaneous.\n\n  [155] See \"Die Welt, a. W. u. V.\" vol. ii. ch. xiv.\n\n\n\u00a7 45. _Memory._\n\nThat peculiar faculty of the knowing Subject which enables it to obey\nthe will the more readily in repeating representations, the oftener\nthey have already been present to it--in other words, its capacity for\nbeing exercised--is what we call _Memory_. I cannot agree with the\ncustomary view, by which it is looked upon as a sort of store-house\nin which we keep a stock of ready-made representations always at our\ndisposal, only without being always conscious of their possession.\nThe voluntary repetition of representations which have once been\npresent becomes so easy through practice, that one link in a series of\nrepresentations no sooner becomes present to us, than we at once evoke\nall the rest, often even, as it were, involuntarily. If we were to look\nfor a metaphor for this characteristic quality of our representative\nfaculty (such as that of Plato, who compared it with a soft mass that\nreceives and retains impressions), I think the best would be that\nof a piece of drapery, which, after having been repeatedly folded\nin the same folds, at last falls into them, as it were, of its own\naccord. The body learns by practice to obey the will, and the faculty\nof representing does precisely the same. A remembrance is not by any\nmeans, as the usual view supposes, always the same representation which\nis, as it were, fetched over and over again from its store-house;\na new one, on the contrary, arises each time, only practice makes\nthis especially easy. Thus it comes to pass that pictures of our\nimagination, which we fancy we have stowed away in our memory, become\nimperceptibly modified: a thing which we realize when we see some\nfamiliar object again after a long time, and find that it no longer\ncompletely corresponds to the image we bring with us. This could not\nbe if we retained ready-made representations. It is just for this\nreason too, that acquired knowledge, if left unexercised, gradually\nfades from our memory, precisely because it was the result of practice\ncoming from habit and knack; thus most scholars, for instance, forget\ntheir Greek, and most artists their Italian on their return from Italy.\nThis is also why we find so much difficulty in recalling to mind a\nname or a line of poetry formerly familiar to us, when we have ceased\nto think of it for several years; whereas when once we succeed in\nremembering it, we have it again at our disposal for some time, because\nthe practice has been renewed. Everyone therefore who knows several\nlanguages, will do well to make a point of reading occasionally in\neach, that he may ensure to himself their possession.\n\nThis likewise explains why the surroundings and events of our childhood\nimpress themselves so deeply on our memory; it is because, in childhood\nwe have but few, and those chiefly intuitive, representations: so that\nwe are induced to repeat them constantly for the sake of occupation.\nPeople who have little capability for original thought do this all\ntheir lives (and moreover not only with intuitive representations,\nbut with conceptions and words also); sometimes therefore they\nhave remarkably good memories, when obtuseness and sluggishness of\nintellect do not act as impediments. Men of genius, on the contrary,\nare not always endowed with the best of memories, as, for instance,\nRousseau has told us of himself. Perhaps this may be accounted for by\ntheir great abundance of new thoughts and combinations, which leaves\nthem no time for frequent repetition. Still, on the whole, genius is\nseldom found with a very bad memory; because here a greater energy\nand mobility of the whole thinking faculty makes up for the want of\nconstant practice. Nor must we forget that Mnemosyne was the mother of\nthe Muses. We may accordingly say, that our memory stands under two\ncontending influences, that of the energy of the representative faculty\non the one hand, and that of the quantity of representations occupying\nthat faculty on the other. The less energy there is in the faculty, the\nfewer must be the representations, and conversely. This explains the\nimpaired memory of habitual novel-readers, for it is with them as with\nmen of genius: the multitude of representations following rapidly upon\neach other, leaves no time or patience for repetition and practice;\nonly, in novels, these representations are not the readers' own, but\nother people's thoughts and combinations quickly succeeding each other,\nand the readers themselves are wanting in that which, in genius,\ncounterbalances repetition. The whole thing besides is subject to the\ncorrective, that we all have most memory for that which interests\nus, and least for that which does not. Great minds therefore are apt\nto forget in an incredibly short time the petty affairs and trifling\noccurrences of daily life and the commonplace people with whom they\ncome in contact, whereas they have a wonderful recollection of those\nthings which have importance in themselves and for them.\n\nIt is, however, on the whole, easy to understand that we should more\nreadily remember such series of representations as are connected\ntogether by the thread of one or more of the above-mentioned species\nof reasons and consequences, than such as have no connection with one\nanother, but only with our will according to the law of motives; that\nis to say, those which are arbitrarily grouped. For, in the former,\nthe fact that we know the formal part _\u00e0 priori_, saves us half the\ntrouble; and this probably gave rise to Plato's doctrine, that all\nlearning is mere remembering.\n\nAs far as possible we ought to try and reduce all that we wish to\nincorporate in our memory to a perceptible image, either directly, or\nas an example, a mere simile, or an analogue, or indeed in any other\nway; because intuitive perceptions take a far firmer hold than any\nabstract thoughts, let alone mere words. This is why we remember things\nwe have ourselves experienced so much better than those of which we\nread.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nGENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS.\n\n\n\u00a7 46. _The Systematic Order._\n\nThe order of succession in which I have stated the various forms of the\nPrinciple of Sufficient Reason in this treatise, is not systematic; it\nhas been chosen for the sake of greater clearness, in order first to\npresent what is better known and least presupposes the rest. In this I\nhave followed Aristotle's rule: \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03af\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03c1\u03ba\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb' \u1f45\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u1fe5\u1fb7\u03c3\u03c4' \u1f02\u03bd \u03bc\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03b9 (_et\ndoctrina non a primo, ac rei principio aliquando inchoanda est, sed\nunde quis facilius discat_).[156] But the systematic order in which\nthe different classes of reasons ought to follow one another is the\nfollowing. First of all should come The Principle of Sufficient Reason\nof Being; and in this again first its application to Time, as being the\nsimple schema containing only what is essential in all the other forms\nof the Principle of Sufficient Reason, nay, as being the prototype of\nall finitude. The Reason of Being in Space having next been stated, the\nLaw of Causality would then follow; after which would come the Law of\nMotives, and last of all the Principle of Sufficient Reason of Knowing;\nfor the other classes of reasons refer to immediate representations,\nwhereas this last class refers to representations derived from other\nrepresentations.\n\n  [156] Aristot. \"Metaph.\" iv. 1. \"Sometimes too, learning must\n  start, not from what is really first and with the actual beginning\n  of the thing concerned, but from where it is easiest to learn.\"\n  [Tr.'s add.]\n\nThe truth expressed above, that Time is the simple schema which\nmerely contains the essential part of all the forms of the Principle\nof Sufficient Reason, explains the absolutely perfect clearness\nand precision of Arithmetic, a point in which no other science can\ncompete with it. For all sciences, being throughout combinations of\nreasons and consequences, are based upon the Principle of Sufficient\nReason. Now, the series of numbers is the simple and only series of\nreasons and consequences of Being in Time; on account of this perfect\nsimplicity--nothing being omitted, no indefinite relations left--this\nseries leaves nothing to be desired as regards accuracy, apodeictic\ncertainty and clearness. All the other sciences yield precedence in\nthis respect to Arithmetic; even Geometry: because so many relations\narise out of the three dimensions of Space, that a comprehensive\nsynopsis of them becomes too difficult, not only for pure, but even for\nempirical intuition; complicated geometrical problems are therefore\nonly solved by calculation; that is, Geometry is quick to resolve\nitself into Arithmetic. It is not necessary to point out the existence\nof sundry elements of obscurity in the other sciences.\n\n\n\u00a7 47. _Relation in Time between Reason and Consequence._\n\nAccording to the laws of causality and of motivation, a reason must\nprecede its consequence in Time. That this is absolutely essential,\nI have shown in my chief work, to which I here refer my readers[157]\nin order to avoid repeating myself. Therefore, if we only bear\nin mind that it is not one thing which is the cause of another\nthing, but one state which is the cause of another state, we shall\nnot allow ourselves to be misled by examples like that given by\nKant,[158] that the stove, which is the cause of the warmth of the\nroom, is simultaneous with its effect. The state of the stove: that\nis, its being warmer than its surrounding medium, must precede the\ncommunication of its surplus caloric to that medium; now, as each layer\nof air on becoming warm makes way for a cooler layer rushing in, the\nfirst state, the cause, and consequently also the second, the effect,\nare renewed until at last the temperature of stove and room become\nequalized. Here therefore we have no permanent cause (the stove) and\npermanent effect (the warmth of the room) as simultaneous things, but\na chain of changes; that is, a constant renewing of two states, one of\nwhich is the effect of the other. From this example, however, it is\nobvious that even Kant's conception of Causality was far from clear.\n\n  [157] See \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.,\" vol. ii. ch. iv. p. 41, 42 of the\n  2nd edition, and p. 44 of the 3rd.\n\n  [158] Kant, \"Krit. d. r. Vern.,\" 1st edition, p. 202; 5th edition,\n  p. 248 (English translation by M. M\u00fcller, p. 177.)\n\nOn the other hand, the Principle of Sufficient Reason of Knowing\nconveys with it no relation in Time, but merely a relation for our\nReason: here therefore, _before_ and _after_ have no meaning.\n\nIn the Principle of Sufficient Reason of Being, so far as it is valid\nin Geometry, there is likewise no relation in Time, but only a relation\nin Space, of which we might say that all things were co-existent,\nif here the words co-existence and succession had any meaning. In\nArithmetic, on the contrary, the Reason of Being is nothing else but\nprecisely the relation of Time itself.\n\n\n\u00a7 48. _Reciprocity of Reasons._\n\nHypothetical judgments may be founded upon the Principle of Sufficient\nReason in each of its significations, as indeed every hypothetical\njudgment is ultimately based upon that principle, and here the laws\nof hypothetical conclusions always hold good: that is to say, it is\nright to infer the existence of the consequence from the existence of\nthe reason, and the non-existence of the reason from the non-existence\nof the consequence; but it is wrong to infer the non-existence of the\nconsequence from the non-existence of the reason, and the existence of\nthe reason from the existence of the consequence. Now it is singular\nthat in Geometry we are nevertheless nearly always able to infer the\nexistence of the reason from the existence of the consequence, and\nthe non-existence of the consequence from the non-existence of the\nreason. This proceeds, as I have shown in \u00a7 37, from the fact that, as\neach line determines the position of the rest, it is quite indifferent\nwhich we begin at: that is, which we consider as the reason, and which\nas the consequence. We may easily convince ourselves of this by going\nthrough the whole of the geometrical theorems. It is only where we have\nto do not only with figures, _i.e._, with the positions of lines, but\nwith planes independently of figures, that we find it in most cases\nimpossible to infer the existence of the reason from the existence of\nthe consequence, or, in other words, to convert the propositions by\nmaking the condition the conditioned. The following theorem gives an\ninstance of this: Triangles whose lengths and bases are equal, include\nequal areas. This cannot be converted as follows: Triangles whose areas\nare equal, have likewise equal bases and lengths; for the lengths may\nstand in inverse proportion to the bases.\n\nIn \u00a7 20 it has already been shown, that the law of causality does not\nadmit of reciprocity, since the effect never can be the cause of its\ncause; therefore the conception of reciprocity is, in its right sense,\ninadmissible. Reciprocity, according to the Principle of Sufficient\nReason of knowing, would only be possible between equivalent\nconceptions, since the spheres of these alone cover each other\nmutually. Apart from these, it only gives rise to a vicious circle.\n\n\n\u00a7 49. _Necessity._\n\nThe Principle of Sufficient Reason in all its forms is the sole\nprinciple and the sole support of all necessity. For _necessity_ has\nno other true and distinct meaning than that of the infallibility of\nthe consequence when the reason is posited. Accordingly every necessity\nis _conditioned_: absolute, _i.e._, unconditioned, necessity therefore\nis a _contradicto in adjecto_. For _to be necessary_ can never mean\nanything but to result from a given reason. By defining it as \"what\ncannot not be,\" on the other hand, we give a mere verbal definition,\nand screen ourselves behind an extremely abstract conception to avoid\ngiving a definition of the thing. But it is not difficult to drive us\nfrom this refuge by inquiring how the non-existence of anything can\nbe possible or even conceivable, since all existence is only given\nempirically. It then comes out, that it is only possible so far as some\n_reason_ or other is posited or present, from which it follows. To\nbe necessary and to follow from a given reason, are thus convertible\nconceptions, and may always, as such, be substituted one for the other.\nThe conception of an \"ABSOLUTELY _necessary Being_\" which finds so much\nfavour with pseudo-philosophers, contains therefore a contradiction:\nit annuls by the predicate \"_absolute_\" (_i.e._, \"unconditioned by\nanything else\") the only determination which makes the \"_necessary_\"\nconceivable. Here again we have an instance of the _improper use of\nabstract conceptions_ to play off a metaphysical artifice such as\nthose I have already pointed out in the conceptions \"_immaterial\nsubstance_,\" \"_cause in general_,\" \"_absolute reason_,\" &c. &c.[159] I\ncan never insist too much upon all abstract conceptions being checked\nby _perception_.\n\n  [159] Compare \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.,\" vol. i. p. 551 _et seq._\n  of the 2nd edition (i. p. 582 _et seq._ of 3rd edition) as to\n  \"immaterial substance,\" and \u00a7 52 of the present work as to \"reason\n  in general.\" (Editor's note.)\n\nThere exists accordingly a _fourfold_ necessity, in conformity with the\n_four_ forms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason:--\n\n1^o. _Logical necessity_, according to the principle of sufficient\nreason of knowing, in virtue of which, when once we have admitted the\npremisses, we must absolutely admit the conclusion.\n\n2^o. _Physical necessity_, according to the law of causality, in\nvirtue of which, as soon as the cause presents itself, the effect must\ninfallibly follow.\n\n3^o. _Mathematical necessity_, according to the principle of sufficient\nreason of being, in virtue of which, every relation which is stated in\na true geometrical theorem, is as that theorem affirms it to be, and\nevery correct calculation remains irrefutable.\n\n4^o. _Moral necessity_, in virtue of which, every human being, every\nanimal even, is _compelled_, as soon as a motive presents itself, to\ndo that which alone is in accordance with the inborn and immutable\ncharacter of the individual. This action now follows its cause\ntherefore as infallibly as every other effect, though it is less easy\nhere to predict what that effect will be than in other cases, because\nof the difficulty we have in fathoming and completely knowing the\nindividual empirical character and its allotted sphere of knowledge,\nwhich is indeed a very different thing from ascertaining the chemical\nproperties of a neutral salt and predicting its reaction. I must repeat\nthis again and again on account of the dunces and blockheads who, in\ndefiance of the unanimous authority of so many great thinkers, still\npersist in audaciously maintaining the contrary, for the benefit of\ntheir old woman's philosophy. I am not a professor of philosophy,\nforsooth, that I need bow to the folly of others.\n\n\n\u00a7 50. _Series of Reasons and Consequences._\n\nAccording to the law of causality, the condition is itself always\nconditioned, and, moreover, conditioned in the same way; therefore,\nthere arises a series _in infinitum a parte ante_. It is just the same\nwith the Reason of Being in Space: each relative space is a figure; it\nhas its limits, by which it is connected with another relative space,\nand which themselves condition the figure of this other, and so on\nthroughout all dimensions _in infinitum_. But when we examine a single\nfigure in itself, the series of reasons of being has an end, because\nwe start from a given relation, just as the series of causes comes to\nan end if we stop at pleasure at any particular cause. In Time, the\nseries of reasons of being has infinite extension both _a parte ante_,\nand _a parte post_, since each moment is conditioned by a preceding\none, and necessarily gives rise to the following. Time has therefore\nneither beginning nor end. On the other hand, the series of reasons\nof knowledge--that is, a series of judgments, each of which gives\nlogical truth to the other--always ends somewhere, _i.e._, either in\nan empirical, a transcendental, or a metalogical truth. If the reason\nof the major to which we have been led is an empirical truth, and we\nstill continue asking _why_, it is no longer a reason of knowledge that\nis asked for, but a cause--in other words, the series of reasons of\nknowing passes over into the series of reasons of becoming. But if we\ndo the contrary, that is, if we allow the series of reasons of becoming\nto pass over into the series of reasons of knowing, in order to bring\nit to an end, this is never brought about by the nature of the thing,\nbut always by a special purpose: it is therefore a trick, and this\nis the sophism known by the name of the Ontological Proof. For when\na cause, at which it seems desirable to stop short in order to make\nit the _first_ cause, has been reached by means of the Cosmological\nProof, we find out that the law of causality is not so easily brought\nto a standstill, and still persists in asking _why_: so it is simply\nset aside and the principle of sufficient reason of knowing, which\nfrom a distance resembles it, is substituted in its stead; and thus a\nreason of knowledge is given in the place of the cause which had been\nasked for--a reason of knowledge derived from the conception itself\nwhich has to be demonstrated, the reality of which is therefore still\nproblematical: and this reason, as after all it is one, now has to\nfigure as a cause. Of course the conception itself has been previously\narranged for this purpose, and reality slightly covered with a few\nhusks just for decency's sake has been placed within it, so as to give\nthe delightful surprise of finding it there--as has been shown in\nSection 7. On the other hand, if a chain of judgments ultimately rests\nupon a principle of transcendental or of metalogical truth, and we\nstill continue to ask _why_, we receive no answer at all, because the\nquestion has no meaning, _i.e._, it does not know what kind of reason\nit is asking for.\n\nFor the Principle of Sufficient Reason is the _principle of all\nexplanation: to explain a thing_ means, to reduce its given existence\nor connection to some form or other of the Principle of Sufficient\nReason, in accordance with which form that existence or connection\nnecessarily is that which it is. The Principle of Sufficient Reason\nitself, _i.e._, the connection expressed by it in any of its forms,\ncannot therefore be further explained; because there exists no\nprinciple by which to explain the source of all explanation: just as\nthe eye is unable to see itself, though it sees everything else.\nThere are of course series of motives, since the resolve to attain\nan end becomes the motive for the resolve to use a whole series\nof means; still this series invariably ends _\u00e0 parte priori_ in a\nrepresentation belonging to one of our two first classes, in which lies\nthe motive which originally had the power to set this individual will\nin motion. The fact that it was able to do this, is a datum for knowing\nthe empirical character here given, but it is impossible to answer\nthe question why that particular motive acts upon that particular\ncharacter; because the intelligible character lies outside Time and\nnever becomes an Object. Therefore the series of motives, as such,\nfinds its termination in some such final motive and, according to the\nnature of its last link, passes into the series of causes, or that of\nreasons of knowledge: that is to say, into the former, when that last\nlink is a real object; into the latter, when it is a mere conception.\n\n\n\u00a7 51. _Each Science has for its Guiding Thread one of the Forms of the\nPrinciple of Sufficient Reason in preference to the others._\n\nAs the question _why_ always demands a sufficient reason, and as\nit is the connection of its notions according to the principle of\nsufficient reason which distinguishes science from a mere aggregate of\nnotions, we have called that _why_ the parent of all science (\u00a7 4).\nIn each science, moreover, we find one of the forms of that principle\npredominating over the others as its guiding-thread. Thus in pure\nMathematics the reason of being is the chief guiding-thread (although\nthe exposition of the proofs proceeds according to the reason of\nknowing only); in applied Mathematics the law of causality appears\ntogether with it, but in Physics, Chemistry, Geology, &c., that law\nentirely predominates. The principle of sufficient reason in knowing\nfinds vigorous application throughout all the sciences, for in all\nof them the particular is known through the general; but in Botany,\nZoology, Mineralogy, and other classifying sciences, it is the chief\nguide and predominates absolutely. The law of motives (_motivation_) is\nthe chief guide in History, Politics, Pragmatic Psychology, &c. &c.,\nwhen we consider all motives and maxims, whatever they may be, as data\nfor explaining actions--but when we make those motives and maxims the\nobject-matter of investigation from the point of view of their value\nand origin, the law of motives becomes the guide to Ethics. In my chief\nwork will be found the highest classification of the sciences according\nto this principle.[160]\n\n  [160] \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.,\" vol. ii. ch. 12, p. 126 of the 2nd\n  edition (p. 139 of the 3rd edition).\n\n\n\u00a7 52. _Two principal Results._\n\nI have endeavoured in this treatise to show that the Principle of\nSufficient Reason is a common expression for four completely different\nrelations, each of which is founded upon a particular law given _\u00e0\npriori_ (the principle of sufficient reason being a synthetical _\u00e0\npriori_ principle). Now, according to the principle of _homogeneity_,\nwe are compelled to assume that these four laws, discovered according\nto the principle of specification, as they agree in being expressed\nby one and the same term, must necessarily spring from one and the\nsame original quality of our whole cognitive faculty as their common\nroot, which we should accordingly have to look upon as the innermost\ngerm of all dependence, relativeness, instability and limitation of\nthe objects of our consciousness--itself limited to Sensibility,\nUnderstanding, Reason, Subject and Object--or of that world, which\nthe divine Plato repeatedly degrades to the \u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f44\u03bd (ever arising and perishing, but in\nfact never existing), the knowledge of which is merely a \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4'\n\u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5, and which Christendom, with a correct instinct,\ncalls _temporal_, after that form of our principle (Time) which I have\ndefined as its simplest schema and the prototype of all limitation.\nThe general meaning of the Principle of Sufficient Reason may, in the\nmain, be brought back to this: that every thing existing no matter when\nor where, exists _by reason of something else_. Now, the Principle of\nSufficient Reason is nevertheless _\u00e0 priori_ in all its forms: that\nis, it has its root in our intellect, therefore it must not be applied\nto the totality of existent things, the Universe, including that\nintellect in which it presents itself. For a world like this, which\npresents itself in virtue of _\u00e0 priori_ forms, is just on that account\nmere phenomenon; consequently that which holds good with reference\nto it as the result of these forms, cannot be applied to the world\nitself, _i.e._ to the thing in itself, representing itself in that\nworld. Therefore we cannot say, \"the world and all things in it exist\nby reason of something else;\" and this proposition is precisely the\nCosmological Proof.\n\nIf, by the present treatise, I have succeeded in deducing the result\njust expressed, it seems to me that every speculative philosopher\nwho founds a conclusion upon the Principle of Sufficient Reason or\nindeed talks of a reason at all, is bound to specify which kind\nof reason he means. One might suppose that wherever there was any\nquestion of a reason, this would be done as a matter of course, and\nthat all confusion would thus be impossible. Only too often, however,\ndo we still find either the terms reason and cause confounded in\nindiscriminate use; or do we hear basis and what is based, condition\nand what is conditioned, _principia_ and _principiata_ talked about in\nquite a _general_ way without any nearer determination, perhaps because\nthere is a secret consciousness that these conceptions are being used\nin an unauthorized way. Thus even Kant speaks of the thing in itself\nas the _reason_[161] of the phenomenon, and also of a _ground_ of the\n_possibility_ of all phenomena,[162] of an _intelligible cause_ of\nphenomena, of an _unknown ground_ of the possibility of the sensuous\nseries in general, of a _transcendental object_[163] as the _ground_ of\nall phenomena and of the _reason_ why our sensibility should have this\nrather than all other supreme conditions, and so on in several places.\nNow all this does not seem to me to tally with those weighty, profound,\nnay immortal words of his,[164] \"the contingency[165] of things is\nitself mere phenomenon, and can lead to no other than the empirical\nregressus which determines phenomena.\"\n\n  [161] Or _ground_.\n\n  [162] Kant, \"Krit. d. r. Vern.,\" 1st edition, pp. 561, 562, 564; p.\n  590 of the 5th edition. (Pp. 483 to 486 of the English translation\n  by M. M\u00fcller.)\n\n  [163] _Ibid._ p. 540 of 1st edition, and 641 of 5th edition. (P.\n  466 of English translation.)\n\n  [164] _Ibid._ p. 563 of the 1st and 591 of the 5th edition. (P. 485\n  of English translation.)\n\n  [165] Empirical contingency is meant, which, with Kant, signifies\n  as much as dependence upon other things. As to this, I refer my\n  readers to my censure in my \"Critique of Kantian Philosophy,\" p.\n  524 of the 2nd, and p. 552 of the 3rd edition.\n\nThat since Kant the conceptions reason and consequence, _principium_\nand _principiatum_, &c. &c., have been and still are used in a yet more\nindefinite and even quite transcendent sense, everyone must know who is\nacquainted with the more recent works on philosophy.\n\nThe following is my objection against this promiscuous employment of\nthe word _ground_ (reason) and, with it, of the Principle of Sufficient\nReason in general; it is likewise the second result, intimately\nconnected with the first, which the present treatise gives concerning\nits subject-matter proper. The four laws of our cognitive faculty, of\nwhich the Principle of Sufficient Reason is the common expression, by\ntheir common character as well as by the fact that all Objects for the\nSubject are divided amongst them, proclaim themselves to be posited by\none and the same primary quality and inner peculiarity of our knowing\nfaculty, which faculty manifests itself as Sensibility, Understanding,\nand Reason. Therefore, even if we imagined it to be possible for a new\nFifth Class of Objects to come about, we should in that case likewise\nhave to assume that the Principle of Sufficient Reason would appear\nin this class also under a different form. Notwithstanding all this,\nwe still have no right to talk of an _absolute reason_ (ground), nor\ndoes a _reason in general_, any more than a _triangle in general_,\nexist otherwise than as a conception derived by means of discursive\nreflection, nor is this conception, as a representation drawn from\nother representations, anything more than a means of thinking several\nthings in one. Now, just as every triangle must be either acute-angled,\nright-angled, or obtuse-angled, and either equilateral, isosceles\nor scalene, so also must every reason belong to one or other of the\nfour possible kinds of reasons I have pointed out. Moreover, since we\nhave only four well-distinguished Classes of Objects, every reason\nmust also belong to one or other of these four, and no further Class\nbeing possible, Reason itself is forced to rank it within them; for as\nsoon as we employ a reason, we presuppose the Four Classes as well as\nthe faculty of representing (_i.e._ the whole world), and must hold\nourselves within these bounds, never transcending them. Should others,\nhowever, see this in a different light and opine that a _reason in\ngeneral_ is anything but a conception, derived from the four kinds of\nreasons, which expresses what they all have in common, we might revive\nthe controversy of the Realists and Nominalists, and then I should side\nwith the latter.\n\n\n\n\nON THE WILL IN NATURE.\n\nAN ACCOUNT OF THE CORROBORATIONS RECEIVED BY THE AUTHOR'S PHILOSOPHY\n\nSINCE ITS FIRST APPEARANCE\n\nFROM THE EMPIRICAL SCIENCES.\n\nBY\n\nARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.\n\n_Translated from the Fourth Edition published by_ JULIUS FRAUENST\u00c4DT.\n\n  \u03a4\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4' \u1f10\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03be\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5,\n  \u039f\u1f50\u03ba \u1f20\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b2\u03bb\u03ad\u03c8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd\u00b7\n  \u1f08\u03bb\u03bb' \u1f10\u03ba\u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03ac\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03b8' \u1f41 \u03b3\u03b7\u03c1\u03ac\u03c3\u03ba\u03c9\u03bd \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2.\n                    \u00c6SCH.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.\n\n\nTo my great joy I have lived to revise even this little work, after\na lapse of nineteen years, and that joy is enhanced by the special\nimportance of this treatise for my philosophy. For, starting from\nthe purely empirical, from the observations of unbiassed physical\ninvestigators--themselves following the clue of their own special\nsciences--I here immediately arrive at the very kernel of my\nMetaphysic; I establish its points of contact with the physical\nsciences and thus corroborate my fundamental dogma, in a sense, as the\narithmetician proves a sum: for by this I not only confirm it more\nclosely and specially, but even make it more clearly, easily, and\nrightly understood than anywhere else.\n\nThe improvements in this new edition are confined almost entirely to\nthe Additions; for scarcely anything that is worth mentioning in the\nFirst Edition has been left out, while I have inserted many and, in\nsome cases, important new passages.\n\nBut, even in a general sense, it may be looked upon as a good sign,\nthat a new edition of the present treatise should have been found\nnecessary; since it shows that there is an interest in serious\nphilosophy and confirms the fact that the necessity for real progress\nin this direction is now more strongly felt than ever. This is based\nupon two circumstances. The first is the unparalleled zeal and\nactivity displayed in every branch of Natural Science which, as this\npursuit is mostly in the hands of people who have learned nothing\nelse, threatens to lead to a gross, stupid Materialism, the _more\nimmediately_ offensive side of which is less the moral bestiality\nof its ultimate results, than the incredible absurdity of its first\nprinciples; for by it even vital force is denied, and organic Nature is\ndegraded to a mere chance play of chemical forces.[166] These knights\nof the crucible and retort should be made to understand, that the\nmere study of Chemistry qualifies a man to become an apothecary, but\nnot a philosopher. Certain other like-minded investigators of Nature,\ntoo, must be taught, that a man may be an accomplished zoologist and\nhave the sixty species of monkeys at his fingers' ends, yet on the\nwhole be an ignoramus to be classed with the vulgar, if he has learnt\nnothing else, save perhaps his school-catechism. But in our time this\nfrequently happens. Men set themselves up for enlighteners of mankind,\nwho have studied Chemistry, or Physics, or Mineralogy and nothing else\nunder the sun; to this they add their only knowledge of any other kind,\nthat is to say, the little they may remember of the doctrines of the\nschool-catechism, and when they find that these two elements will not\nharmonize, they straightway turn scoffers at religion and soon become\nshallow and absurd materialists.[167] They may perhaps have heard at\ncollege of the existence of a Plato and an Aristotle, of a Locke, and\nespecially of a Kant; but as these folk never handled crucibles and\nretorts or even stuffed a monkey, they do not esteem them worthy of\nfurther acquaintance. They prefer calmly to toss out of the window the\nintellectual labour of two thousand years and treat the public to a\nphilosophy concocted out of their own rich mental resources, on the\nbasis of the catechism on the one hand, and on that of crucibles and\nretorts or the catalogue of monkeys on the other. They ought to be told\nin plain language that they are ignoramuses, who have much to learn\nbefore they can be allowed to have any voice in the matter. Everyone,\nin fact, who dogmatizes at random, with the _na\u00efve_ realism of a child\non such arguments as God, the soul, the world's origin, atoms, &c. &c.\n&c., as if the Critique of Pure Reason had been written in the moon and\nno copy had found its way to our planet--is simply one of the vulgar.\nSend him into the servants' hall, where his wisdom will best find a\nmarket.[168]\n\n  [166] And this infatuation has reached such a point, that people\n  seriously imagine themselves to have found the key to the mystery\n  of the essence and existence of this wonderful and mysterious world\n  in wretched _chemical affinities_! Compared with this illusion of\n  our physiological chemists, that of the alchymists who sought after\n  the philosopher's stone, and only hoped to find out the secret of\n  making gold, was indeed a mere trifle. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\n  [167] \"_Aut catechismus, aut materialismus_,\" is their watchword.\n  [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\n  [168] There too he will meet with people who fling about words of\n  foreign origin, which they have caught up without understanding\n  them, just as readily as he does himself, when he talks about\n  \"_Idealism_\" without knowing what it means, mostly therefore using\n  the word instead of Spiritualism (which being Realism, is the\n  opposite to Idealism). Hundreds of examples of this kind besides\n  other _quid pro quos_ are to be found in books, and critical\n  periodicals. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\nThe other circumstance which calls for a real progress in philosophy,\nis the steady growth of unbelief in the face of all the hypocritical\ndissembling and the outward conformity to the Church. This unbelief\nnecessarily and unavoidably goes hand in hand with the growing\nexpansion of empirical and historical knowledge. It threatens to\ndestroy not only the form, but even the spirit of Christianity (a\nspirit which has a much wider reach than Christianity itself), and to\ndeliver up mankind to _moral_ materialism--a thing even more dangerous\nthan the chemical materialism already mentioned. And nothing plays\nmore into the hands of this unbelief, than the Tartuffianism _de\nrigueur_ impudently flaunting itself everywhere just now, whose clumsy\ndisciples, fee in hand, hold forth with such unction and emphasis,\nthat their voices penetrate even into learned, critical reviews issued\nby Academies and Universities, and into physiological as well as\nphilosophical books, where however, being quite in their wrong place,\nthey only damage their own cause by rousing indignation.[169] Under\nsuch circumstances as these, it is gratifying to see the public betray\nan interest in philosophy.\n\n  [169] They ought everywhere to be shown that their belief is not\n  believed in. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\nI have nevertheless one sad piece of news to communicate to our\nprofessors of philosophy. Their Caspar Hauser (according to Dorguth)\nwhom they had so carefully secreted, so securely walled up for\nnearly forty years, that no sound could betray his existence to the\nworld--their Caspar Hauser--I say, has escaped! He has escaped and is\nrunning about in the world;--some even say he is a prince. In plain\nlanguage, the misfortune they feared more than anything has come to\npass after all. In spite of their having done their best to prevent\nit for more than a generation by acting with united force, with rare\nconstancy, secreting and ignoring to a degree that is without example,\nmy books are beginning and henceforth will continue to be read. _Legor\net legar_: there is no help for it. This is really dreadful and most\ninopportune; nay, it is a positive fatality, not to say calamity. Is\nthis the recompense for all their faithful, snug secrecy; for having\nheld so firmly and unitedly together? Poor time-servers! What becomes\nof Horace's assurance:--\n\n  \"Est et fideli tuta silentio\n  Merces,----?\"\n\nFor verily they have not been deficient in faithful reticence; rather\ndo they excel in this quality wherever they scent merit. And, after\nall, it is no doubt the cleverest artifice; for what no one knows, is\nas though it did not exist. Whether the _merces_ will remain quite so\n_tuta_, seems rather doubtful--unless we are to take _merces_ in a\n_bad_ sense; and for this the support of many a classical authority\nmight certainly be found. These gentlemen had seen quite rightly that\nthe only means to be used against my writings, was to secrete them\nfrom the public by maintaining profound silence concerning them, while\nthey kept up a loud noise at the birth of every misshapen offspring of\nprofessorial philosophy; as the voice of the new-born Zeus was drowned\nin days of yore by the clashing of the cymbals of the Corybantes.\nBut this expedient is now used up; the secret is out--the public\nhas discovered me. The rage of our professors of philosophy at this\nis great, but powerless; for their only effective resource, so long\nsuccessfully employed, being exhausted, no snarling can avail any\nlonger against my influence, and in vain do they now take this, or\nthat, or the other attitude. They have certainly succeeded, so far as\nthe generation which was properly speaking contemporaneous with my\nphilosophy, went to the grave in ignorance of it. But this was a mere\npostponement, and Time has kept its word, as it always does.\n\nNow there are two reasons why these gentlemen \"in the philosophical\ntrade\"--as they call themselves with incredible _na\u00efvet\u00e9_--hate my\nphilosophy. The first of them is, that my writings spoil the taste of\nthe public for tissues of empty phrases, for accumulations of unmeaning\nwords piled one upon another, for hollow, superficial, brain-racking\ntwaddle, for Christian dogmatics under the disguise of the most\nwearisome Metaphysics, for systematized Philistinism of the flattest\nkind made to represent Ethics and even accompanied by instructions for\ncard-playing and dancing--in short, they unfit my readers for the whole\nmethod of philosophising _\u00e0 la vieille femme_, which has scared so\nmany for ever from the pursuit of philosophy.\n\nThe second reason is, that our gentlemen \"in the trade\" are absolutely\nbound in conscience not to let my philosophy pass and are therefore\ndebarred from using it for the benefit of \"the trade;\"--and this they\neven heartily regret; for my abundance might have been admirably\nturned to account for the benefit of their own needy poverty. But even\nif it contained the greatest hoards of human wisdom ever unearthed,\nmy doctrine could never find favour with them either now or in the\nfuture; for it is absolutely wanting in all Speculative Theology and\nRational Psychology, and these, just these, are the very breath of\nlife to these gentlemen, the _sine qua non_ of their existence. For\nthey are anxious before all things in heaven and on earth, to hold\ntheir official appointments, and these appointments demand before all\nthings in heaven and on earth a Speculative Theology and a Rational\nPsychology: _extra h\u00e6c non datur salus_. Theology there must and shall\nbe, no matter whence it come; Moses and the Prophets must be made out\nto be in the right: this is the highest principle in philosophy; and\nthere must be Rational Psychology to boot, as is proper. Now there is\nnothing of the sort to be found either in Kant's philosophy or in mine.\nFor, as we all know, the most cogent theological argumentation shivers\nto atoms like a glass thrown at a wall, when it is brought into contact\nwith Kant's Critique of all Speculative Theology, and under his hands\nnot a shred remains entire of the whole tissue of Rational Psychology!\nAs to myself, being the bold continuer of Kant's philosophy, I have\nentirely done away with all Speculative Theology and all Rational\nPsychology, as is only consistent and honest.[170] On the other hand,\nthe task incumbent upon University Philosophy is at bottom this: to\nset forth the chief fundamental truths belonging to the Catechism under\nthe veil of some very abstract, abstruse and difficult, therefore\npainfully wearisome formulas and sentences; wherefore, however\nconfused, intricate, strange and eccentric the matter may seem at first\nsight, these truths invariably reveal themselves as its kernel. This\nproceeding may be useful, though to me it is unknown. All I know is,\nthat philosophy, _i.e._ the search after truth--I mean the truth \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4'\n\u1f10\u03be\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd, by which the most sublime and important disclosures, more\nprecious than anything else to the human race, are understood--will\nnever advance a step, nay, an inch, by means of such man\u0153uvring, by\nwhich its course is on the contrary impeded; therefore I found out long\nago that University philosophy is the enemy of all genuine philosophy.\nNow, this being the state of the case, when a really honest philosophy\narises, which seriously has truth for its sole aim, must not these\ngentlemen \"of the philosophical trade\" feel as might stage-knights in\npaste-board armour, were a knight suddenly to appear in the midst of\nthem clad in real armour, who made the stage-floor creak under his\nponderous tread? Such philosophy as this _must_ therefore be bad and\nfalse and consequently places these gentlemen \"of the trade\" under the\npainful obligation of playing the part of him who, in order to appear\nwhat he is not, cannot allow others to pass for what they really are.\nOut of all this however there unrolls itself the amusing spectacle we\nenjoy, when these gentlemen, now that ignoring has unfortunately come\nto an end, after forty years, at last begin to measure me by their\nown puny standard and pass judgment upon me from the heights of their\nwisdom, as though they were amply qualified to do so by their office;\nbut they are most amusing of all when they assume airs of superiority\ntowards me.\n\n  [170] For revelation goes for nothing in philosophy; therefore a\n  philosopher must before all things be an unbeliever. [Add. to 3rd\n  ed.].\n\nTheir abhorrence of Kant, though less openly expressed, is scarcely\nless great than their hatred of me; precisely because all speculative\nTheology and all Rational Psychology--the bread-winners of these\ngentlemen--have been undermined, not to say irrevocably ruined, by him\nin the eyes of all serious thinkers. What! Not hate him? him, who has\nmade their \"trade in philosophy\" so difficult to them, that they hardly\nsee how to pull through honourably! So Kant and I are accordingly both\nbad, and these gentlemen quite overlook us. For nearly forty years\nthey have not deigned to cast a glance upon me, and now they look down\ncondescendingly upon Kant from the heights of their wisdom, smiling in\npity at his errors. This policy is both very wise and very profitable;\nsince they are thus able to hold forth at their ease volume after\nvolume upon God and the soul, as if these were personalities with whom\nthey were intimately acquainted, and to discourse upon the relation in\nwhich the former stands to the world and the latter to the body, just\nas if there had never been such a thing as a Critique of Pure Reason.\nWhen once the Critique of Pure Reason is done away with, all will go\non splendidly! Now it is for this end that they have been endeavouring\nfor many years quietly and gradually to set Kant aside, to make him\nobsolete, nay, to turn up their noses at him, and one being encouraged\nby the other in this, they are becoming bolder every day.[171] They\nhave no opposition to fear from their own colleagues, since they\nall have the same aims and the same mission and all together form a\nnumerous _coterie_, the brilliant members of which, _coram populo_, bow\nand scrape to each other on all sides. Thus by degrees things have come\nto such a point, that the wretchedest compilers of manuals have the\npresumption to treat Kant's grand, immortal discoveries as antiquated\nerrors, nay, calmly to set them aside with the most ludicrous\narrogance and most impudent dicta of their own, which they nevertheless\nlay down under the disguise of argumentation, because they know they\nmay count upon a credulous public, to whom Kant's writings are not\nknown.[172] And this is what happens to Kant on the part of writers,\nwhose total incapacity strikes us in every page, not to say every line,\nwe read of their unmeaning, stupefying verbiage! Were this to go on\nmuch longer, Kant would present the spectacle of the dead lion being\nkicked by the donkey. Even in France there is no lack of fellow-workers\ninspired by a similar orthodoxy, who are labouring towards the same\nend. A certain M. Barth\u00e9lemy de St. Hilaire, for instance, in a lecture\ndelivered in the _Acad\u00e9mie des Sciences Morales_ in April, 1850, has\npresumed to criticize Kant with an air of condescension and to use most\nimproper language in speaking of him; luckily however in such a way,\nthat no one could fail to see the underlying purpose.[173]\n\n  [171] One always says the other is right, so that the public in its\n  simplicity at last imagines them really to be right. [Add. to 3rd\n  ed.]\n\n  [172] Here it is especially Ernst Reinhold's \"System of\n  Metaphysics\" (3rd edition, 1854) that I have in my eye. In my\n  \"Parerga\" I have explained how it comes, that brain-perverting\n  books like this go through several editions. See \"Parerga,\" vol. i.\n  p. 171 (2nd edition, vol. i. p. 194).\n\n  [173] Nevertheless, by Zeus, all such gentlemen, in France as\n  well as Germany, should be taught that Philosophy has a different\n  mission from that of playing into the hands of the clergy. We must\n  let them clearly see before all things that we have no faith in\n  their faith--from this follows what we think of them. [Add. to 3rd\n  ed.]\n\nNow others among our German \"traders in philosophy\" again try to get\nrid of the obnoxious Kant in a different way: instead of attacking his\nphilosophy point-blank, they rather seek to undermine the foundations\non which it is built. These people however are so utterly forsaken by\nall the gods and by all power of judgment, that they attack _\u00e0 priori_\ntruths: that is to say, truths as old as the human understanding,\nnay, which constitute that understanding itself, and which it is\ntherefore impossible to contradict without declaring war against that\nunderstanding also. So great however is the courage of these gentlemen.\nI am sorry to say I know of three,[174] and I am afraid there are\na good many more at work at this undermining process, who have the\nincredible presumption to maintain the _\u00e0 posteriori_ origin of Space\nas a consequence, a mere relation, of the objects _within it_; for they\nassert that Space and Time are of empirical origin and attached to\nthose bodies, so that [according to them] Space first arises through\nour perception of the juxtaposition of bodies and Time likewise through\nour perception of the succession of changes (_sancta simplicitas!_ as\nif the words \"collateral\" and \"successive\" would have any sense for us\nwithout the antecedent intuitions of Space and of Time to give them a\nmeaning); consequently, that if there were no bodies, there would be no\nSpace, therefore if they disappeared Space also must lapse, and that if\nall changes were to stop, Time also would stop.[175]\n\n  [174] (_a_) Rosenkranz, \"Meine Reform der Hegelschen Philosophie,\"\n  1852, especially p. 41, in a pompous, dictatorial tone: \"I have\n  explicitly said, that Space and Time would not exist if Matter did\n  not exist. \u00c6ther spread out within itself first constitutes real\n  Space, and the movement of this \u00e6ther and consequent real genesis\n  of everything individual and separate, constitutes real Time.\"\n  (_b_) L. Noack, \"Die Theologie als Religionsphilosophie,\" 1853, pp.\n  8, 9. (_c_) V. Reuchlin-Meldegg, Two reviews of Oersted's \"Geist in\n  der Natur\" in the Heidelberg Annals, Nov.-Dec., 1850, and May-June,\n  1854.\n\n  [175] Time is the condition of the _possibility_ of succession,\n  which could neither take place, nor be understood by us and\n  expressed in words, without Time. And Space is likewise the\n  condition of the _possibility_ of juxtaposition, and Transcendental\n  \u00c6sthetic is the proof that these conditions have their seat in the\n  constitution of our head. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\nAnd such stuff as this is gravely taught fifty years after Kant's\ndeath! The aim of it is, as we know, to undermine Kantian philosophy,\nand certainly if these propositions were true, _one_ stroke would\nsuffice to overthrow it. Fortunately however these assertions are of a\nkind which is met by derision rather than by serious refutation. For,\nin them, the question is one of heresy, not so much against Kantian\nphilosophy, as against common sense; and they are not so much an attack\nupon any particular philosophical dogma, as upon an _\u00e0 priori_ truth\nwhich, as such, constitutes human understanding itself, and therefore\nmust be instantaneously evident to every one who is in his senses,\njust as much as that 2 \u00d7 2 = 4. Fetch me a peasant from the plough;\nmake the question intelligible to him; and he will tell you, that\neven if all things in Heaven and on Earth were to vanish, Space would\nnevertheless remain, and that if all changes in Heaven and on Earth\nwere to cease, Time would nevertheless flow on. Compared with German\npseudo-philosophers like these, how estimable does a man like the\nFrench physicist Pouillet appear, who, though he never troubles his\nhead about Metaphysics, is careful to incorporate two long paragraphs,\none on _l'Espace_, the other on _le Temps_, in the first chapter of\nhis well-known Manual, on which public instruction in France is based,\nwhere he shows that if all Matter were annihilated, Space would still\nremain, and that Space is infinite; and that if all changes ceased,\nTime would still pursue its course without end. Now here he does not\nappeal, as in all other cases, to experience, because in this case\nexperience is not possible; yet he speaks with apodeictic certainty.\nFor, as a physicist, professing a science which is absolutely\nimmanent--_i.e._ limited to the reality that is empirically given--it\nnever comes into his head to inquire whence he knows all this. It _did_\ncome into Kant's head, and it was this very problem, clothed by him in\nthe severe form of an inquiry as to the possibility of synthetical _\u00e0\npriori_ judgments, that became the starting-point and the corner-stone\nof his immortal discoveries, or in other words, of Transcendental\nPhilosophy which, precisely by answering this question and others\nrelated to it, shows what is the nature of that empirical reality\nitself.[176]\n\n  [176] In the Scholium to the eighth of the definitions he has\n  placed at the top of his \"Principia,\" Newton quite rightly\n  distinguishes _absolute_, that is, _empty_, from relative, or\n  filled Time, and likewise absolute from relative Space. He says,\n  p. 11: _Tempus, spatium, locum, motum, ut omnibus notissima, non\n  definio. Notandum tamen quod_ VULGUS (that is, professors like\n  those I have been mentioning) _quantitates hasce non aliter quam\n  ex relatione ad sensibilia concipiat. Et inde oriuntur pr\u00e6judicia\n  qu\u00e6dam, quibus tollendis convenit easdem in absolutas et relativas,\n  veras et apparentes, mathematicas et vulgares distingui._ And again\n  (p. 12):\n\n  I. _Tempus absolutum, verum et mathematicum, in se et natura sua\n  sine relatione ad externum quodvis, \u00e6quabiliter fluit, alioque\n  nomine dicitur Duratio: relativum, apparens et vulgare est\n  sensibilis et externa qu\u00e6vis Durationis per motum mensura (seu\n  accurata seu in\u00e6quabilis) qu\u00e2 vulgus vice veri temporis utitur; ut\n  Hora, Dies, Mensis, Annus._\n\n  II. _Spatiam absolutum, natura sua sine relatione ad externum\n  quodvis, semper manet similare et immobile: relativum est spatii\n  hujus mensura seu dimensio qu\u00e6libet mobilis, qu\u00e6 a sensibus nostris\n  per situm suum ad corpora definitur, et a vulgo pro spatio immobili\n  usurpatur: uti dimensio spatii subterranei, \u00e6rei vel coelestis\n  definita per situm suum ad terram._\n\n  But even Newton never dreamt of asking how we know these two\n  infinite entities, Space and Time; since, as he here impresses on\n  us, they do not fall within the range of the senses; and how we\n  know them moreover so intimately, that we are able to indicate\n  their whole nature and rule down to the minutest detail. [Add. to\n  3rd ed.]\n\nAnd seventy years after the Critique of Pure Reason had appeared and\nfilled the world with its fame, these gentlemen dare to serve up such\ngross absurdities, which were done away with long ago, and to return to\nformer barbarism. If Kant were to come back and see all this mischief,\nhe would feel like Moses on returning from Mount Sinai, when he found\nhis people worshipping the golden calf, and dashed the Tables to pieces\nin his anger. But if Kant were to take things as tragically as Moses,\nI should console him with the words of Jesus Sirach:[177] \"He that\ntelleth a tale to a fool speaketh to one in a slumber; when he hath\ntold his tale, he will say, 'What is the matter?'\" For that diamond\nin Kant's crown, Transcendental \u00c6sthetic, never has existed for these\ngentlemen--it is tacitly set aside, as _non-avenue_. I wonder what\nthey think Nature means by producing the rarest of all her works, a\ngreat mind, one among so many hundreds of millions, if the worshipful\ncompany of numskulls are to be able at their pleasure and by their mere\ncounter-assertion to annul the weightiest doctrines emanating from that\nmind, let alone to treat them with disregard and do as if they did not\nexist.\n\n  [177] Ecclesiasticus xxii. 8.\n\nBut this degenerate, barbarous state of philosophy which, in the\npresent day, emboldens every tyro to hold forth at random upon subjects\nthat have puzzled the greatest minds, is precisely a consequence still\nremaining of the impunity with which--thanks to the connivance of our\nprofessors of philosophy--that audacious scribbler, Hegel, has been\nallowed to flood the market with his monstrous vagaries and so to pass\nfor the greatest of all philosophers for the last thirty years in\nGermany. Every one of course now thinks himself entitled to serve up\nconfidently anything that may happen to come into his sparrow's brain.\n\nTherefore, as I have said, the gentlemen of the 'philosophical trade'\nare anxious before all things to obliterate Kant's philosophy, in\norder to be able to return to the muddy canal of the old dogmatism\nand to talk at random to their heart's content upon the favourite\nsubjects which are specially recommended to them: just as if nothing\nhad happened and neither a Kant nor a Critical Philosophy had ever\ncome into the world.[178] The affected veneration for, and laudation\nof, Leibnitz too, which has been showing itself everywhere for some\nyears, proceed from the same source. They like to place him in a\nline with, nay above, Kant, having at times the assurance to call him\nthe greatest of all German philosophers. Now, compared with Kant,\nLeibnitz is a poor rushlight. Kant is a master-mind, to whom mankind\nis indebted for the discovery of never-to-be-forgotten truths. One of\nhis chief merits is precisely, to have delivered us from Leibnitz and\nhis subtleties: from pre-established harmonies, monads and _identitas\nindiscernibilium_. Kant has made philosophy serious and I am keeping it\nso. That these gentlemen should think differently is easily explained;\nfor has not Leibnitz a central Monad and a _Theodic\u00e9e_ also, with\nwhich to deck it out? Now this is quite to the taste of my gentlemen\n'of the philosophical trade.' It does not stand in the way of earning\na honest livelihood; it allows one to subsist; whereas such a thing\nas Kant's \"Critique of all Speculative Theology,\" makes one's hair\nstand on end. Kant is consequently a wrong-headed man and one to be\nset aside. Vivat Leibnitz! Vivat the 'philosophical trade!' Vivat old\nwoman's philosophy! These gentlemen really imagine that, according to\nthe standard of their own petty aims, they can obscure what is good,\ndisparage what is great, and accredit what is false. They may perhaps\nsucceed in doing so for a time, but certainly not in the long run, nor\nwith impunity. Notwithstanding all their machinations and spiteful\nignoring of me for forty years, have not even I at last made my way?\nDuring those forty years however I have learnt to appreciate Chamfort's\nwords: \"_En examinant la ligue des sots contre les gens d'esprit, on\ncroirait voir une conspiration de valets pour \u00e9carter les ma\u00eetres._\"\n\n  [178] For Kant has disclosed the dreadful truth, that philosophy\n  must be quite a different thing from Jewish mythology. [Add. to 3rd\n  ed.]\n\nWe do not care to have much to do with those whom we dislike. One\nof the consequences of this antipathy for Kant, therefore, has been\nan incredible ignorance of his doctrines. I can scarcely believe my\neyes at times, when I see certain proofs of this ignorance, and must\nhere support my assertion by a few examples. First let me present a\nvery singular specimen, though it is now some years old. In Professor\nMichelet's \"Anthropology and Psychology\" (p. 444), he states Kant's\nCategorical Imperative in the following words: \"thou must, for thou\ncanst\" (_du sollst, denn du kannst_). This cannot be a _lapsus\ncalami_, for he again states it in the same words in his \"History of\nthe Development of Modern German Philosophy\" (p. 38),[179] published\nthree years later. Letting alone the fact that he appears to have\nstudied Kantian philosophy in Schiller's epigrams, he has thus turned\nthe thing upside down, and expressed exactly the opposite of Kant's\nargument; evidently without having the slightest inkling of what Kant\nmeant by that postulate of Freedom on the basis of his Categorical\nImperative. None of Professor Michelet's colleagues, to my knowledge,\nhave pointed out this mistake, but \"_hanc veniam damus, petimusque\nvicissim_.\"--Another more recent instance. The above mentioned\nreviewer of Oersted's book (see note 1 (_c_), p. 202), to whose title\nthe present treatise unfortunately had to stand godfather, comes in\nthat work on the sentence that \"bodies are spaces filled with force\"\n(_krafterf\u00fcllte R\u00e4ume_). This is new to him; so without the faintest\nsuspicion that he has to do with a far-famed Kantian dogma, and taking\nthis for a paradoxical opinion of Oersted's, he attacks it and argues\nagainst it bravely, persistently and repeatedly in both his reviews,\nwhich appeared at an interval of three years from one another, using\narguments like these: \"Force cannot fill Space without something\nsubstantial, Matter;\" then again three years later: \"Force in Space\ndoes not yet constitute any thing. For Force to fill Space, there must\nbe Substance, Matter. A mere force can never fill. Matter must be there\nfor it to fill.\"--Bravo! my cobbler would use just such arguments as\nthese.[180]--When I see _specimina eruditionis_ of this sort, I begin\nto have my misgivings whether I did not do the man injustice by naming\nhim among those who endeavour to undermine Kant; but in this, to be\nsure, I had in view his assertions that \"Space is but the relation, the\njuxtaposition of things,\"[181] and that \"Space is a relation in which\nthings stand, a juxtaposition of things. This juxtaposition ceases\nto be a conception as soon as the conception of Matter ceases.\"[182]\nFor he might possibly have penned these sentences in sheer innocence,\nsince he may have known no more of the \"Transcendental \u00c6sthetic\" than\nof the \"Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science;\" though\nto be sure, this would be rather extraordinary for a professor of\nphilosophy. Now-a-days however we must not be surprised at anything.\nFor all knowledge of Critical Philosophy has died out, in spite of its\nbeing the latest true philosophy that has appeared, and a doctrine\nwithal, that has made a revolution and epoch in human knowledge and\nthought. Now therefore, since it has overthrown all previous systems,\nand since the knowledge of it has died out, philosophising no longer\nproceeds on the basis of any of the doctrines propounded by the great\nminds of the past, but becomes a mere random untutored process, having\nan ordinary education and the catechism for its foundation. Now that\nI have startled them however, our professors may perhaps take to\nstudying Kant's works again. Still Lichtenberg says: \"Past a certain\nage, I think it as impossible to learn Kantian Philosophy as to learn\nrope-dancing.\"\n\n  [179] Another instance of Michelet's ignorance is to be found in\n  Schopenhauer's posthumous writings, see \"Aus Arthur Schopenhauer's\n  handschriftlichem Nachlass,\" Leipzig, A. Brockhaus, 1864, p. 327.\n  [Editor's note.]\n\n  [180] The same reviewer (Von Reuchlin-Meldegg) when be expounds\n  the doctrines of the philosophers concerning God in the August\n  number of the Heidelberg Annals (1855), p. 579, says: \"In Kant,\n  God is a thing in itself which cannot be known.\" In his review of\n  Frauenst\u00e4dt's \"Letters\" in the Heidelberg Annals of May and June\n  (1855) he says that there is no knowledge _\u00e0 priori_. [Add. to 3rd\n  ed.]\n\n  [181] C. 1. p. 899.\n\n  [182] p. 908.\n\nI should certainly not have condescended to record the sins of these\nsinners had not the interests of truth required that I should do so,\nin order to show the state of degradation at which German Philosophy\nhas arrived fifty years after Kant's death in consequence of the\nmachinations of the gentlemen 'of the trade,' and also to show what\nwould result, if these puny minds, who know nothing but their own ends,\nwere to be suffered without hindrance to check the influence of the\ngreat geniuses who have illumined the world. I cannot look on at this\nin silence; it is rather a case to which G\u00f6the's exhortation applies:\n\n  \"Du Kr\u00e4ftiger, sei nicht so still,\n    Wenn auch sich Andre scheuen:\n  Wer den Teufel erschrecken will,\n    Der muss laut schreien.\"\n\nDr. Martin Luther thought so also.\n\nHatred against Kant, hatred against me, hatred against truth, all\nhowever _in majorem Dei gloriam_, is what inspires these worthies\nwho live on philosophy. Who can be so blind as not to see that\nUniversity philosophy is the enemy of all true, serious philosophy,\nwhose progress it feels bound to withstand? For a philosophy which\ndeserves the name, is pure service of truth, therefore the most\nsublime of all human endeavours; but, as such, it is not adapted for\na trade. Least of all can it have its seat in Universities, where a\ntheological Faculty predominates and things are irrevocably decided\nbeforehand ere philosophy comes to them. With Scholasticism, from\nwhich University philosophy descends, it was quite a different thing.\nScholasticism was avowedly the _ancilla theologi\u00e6_, so that here the\nname corresponded to the thing. Our University philosophy of to-day,\non the contrary, disclaims the connection, and professes independent\nresearch; yet in reality it is only the _ancilla_ disguised, and\nit is intended no less than its predecessor to be the servant of\nTheology. Thus genuine, sincerely meant philosophy has an adversary\nunder the guise of an ally in University philosophy. Therefore I said\nlong ago, that nothing would be of greater benefit to philosophy than\nfor it to cease altogether to be taught at Universities; and if at\nthat time I still admitted the propriety of a brief, quite succinct\ncourse of History of Philosophy accompanying Logic--which undoubtedly\nought to be taught at Universities--I have since withdrawn that hasty\nconcession in consequence of the following disclosure made to us in\nthe _G\u00f6ttingischen Gelehrten Anzeigen_ of the 1st January, 1853, p.\n8, by the _Ordinarius loci_ (one who writes History of Philosophy\nin thick volumes): \"It could not be mistaken that Kant's doctrine\nis ordinary Theism, and that it has contributed little or nothing\ntowards transforming the current views on God and his relation to\nthe world.\"--If this is the state of the case, Universities are in\nmy opinion no longer the right place even for teaching History of\nPhilosophy. There designs and intentions reign paramount. I had indeed\nlong ago begun to suspect, that History of Philosophy was taught at our\nUniversities in the same spirit and with the same _granum salis_ as\nPhilosophy itself, and it needed but very little to make my suspicions\ncertainty. Accordingly it is my wish to see both Philosophy and its\nHistory disappear from the lecture-list, because I desire to rescue\nthem from the tender mercies of our court-councillors.[183] But far be\nit from me, to wish to see our professors of philosophy removed from\ntheir thriving business at our Universities. On the contrary, what I\nshould like would be, to see them promoted three degrees higher in\ndignity and raised to the highest faculty, as professors of Theology.\nFor at the bottom they have really been this for some time already, and\nhave served quite long enough as volunteers.\n\n  [183] _Hofr\u00e4the._ A title of honour often given for literary\n  and scientific merit in Germany, and common among University\n  professors. [Tr.'s note.]\n\nMeanwhile my honest and kindly advice to the young generation is, not\nto waste any time with University philosophy, but to study Kant's works\nand my own instead. I promise them that there they will learn something\nsubstantial, that will bring light and order into their brains: so far\nat least as they may be capable of receiving them. It is not good to\ncrowd round a wretched farthing rushlight when brilliant torches are\nclose by; still less to run after will o' the wisps. Above all, my\ntruth-seeking young friends, beware of letting our professors tell you\nwhat is contained in the Critique of Pure Reason. Read it yourselves,\nand you will find in it something very different from what they deem it\nadvisable for you to know.--In our time a great deal too much study is\ngenerally devoted to the History of Philosophy; for this study, being\nadapted by its very nature to substitute knowledge for reflection, is\njust now cultivated downright with a view to making philosophy consist\nin its own history. It is not only of doubtful necessity, but even of\nquestionable profit, to acquire a superficial half-knowledge of the\nopinions and systems of all the philosophers who have taught for 2,500\nyears; yet what more does the most honest history of philosophy give?\nA real knowledge of philosophers can only be acquired from their own\nworks, and not from the distorted image of their doctrines as it is\nfound in the commonplace head.[184] But it is really urgent that order\nshould be brought into our heads by some sort of philosophy, and that\nwe should at the same time learn to look at the world with a really\nunbiassed eye. Now no philosophy is so near to us, both as regards time\nand language, as that of Kant, and it is at the same time a philosophy,\ncompared with which all those which went before are superficial. On\nthis account it is unhesitatingly to be preferred to all others.\n\n  [184] \"_Potius de rebus ipsis judicare debemus, quam pro magno\n  habere, de hominibus quid quisque senserit scire_,\" says St.\n  Augustine (\"_De civ. Dei_,\" l. 19, c. 3). Under the present mode of\n  proceeding, however, the philosophical lecture-room becomes a sort\n  of rag-fair for old worn out, cast-off opinions, which are brought\n  there every six months to be aired and beaten. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\nBut I perceive that the news of Caspar Hauser's escape has already\nspread among our professors of philosophy; for I see that some of\nthem have already given vent to their feelings in bitter and venomous\nabuse of me in various periodicals, making up by falsehoods for their\ndeficiency of wit.[185] Nevertheless I do not complain of all this,\nbecause I am rejoiced at the cause and amused by the effect of it, as\nillustrative of G\u00f6the's verse:\n\n  \"Es will der Spitz aus unserm Stall\n    Uns immerfort begleiten:\n  Doch seines Bellens lauter Schall\n    Beweist nur, dass wir reiten.\"\n\n                    ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.\n\n  FRANKFURT AM MEIN,\n      _August, 1854_.\n\n  [185] I take this opportunity urgently to request that the public\n  will not believe unconditionally any accounts of what I am supposed\n  to have said, even when they are given as quotations; but will\n  first verify the existence of these quotations in my works. In this\n  way many a falsehood will be detected, which can however only be\n  stamped as a direct forgery when accompanied by quotation marks\n  (\"\"). [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\n\n\n\nEDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.\n\n\nSchopenhauer has left an interleaved copy of his work \"On the Will\nin Nature,\" as well as of his other writings, and has inserted in it\nthose Corrections and Additions which he intended to use for the Third\nEdition. I have therefore included them in this Third Edition.\n\nThe Corrections chiefly concern the style, here and there an expression\nbeing changed, and a word inserted or omitted. The Additions, on the\ncontrary, concern the _matter_ of the book; they amplify it more or\nless considerably, and are tolerably numerous.\n\nThe Corrections are incorporated by Schopenhauer with the text; whereas\nthe Additions are designated by him as \"Notes\" (_Anmerkungen_) to be\nplaced at the foot of the pages with the words, \"added to the third\nedition.\" They will therefore be found at the places indicated by him\nfor them, as foot-notes; and thus the reader will be enabled easily to\ndiscern how much has been added in this edition.\n\nAs to the value of the present work, Schopenhauer has expressed himself\nas follows in the \"World as Will and Representation:\"\n\n\"It would be a great mistake to consider the foreign deliverances with\nwhich I have connected my own exposition there (in the work \"On the\nWill in Nature\") as the real substance and argument of that work which,\nthough small in size, is weighty in import. They are rather a mere\noccasion which I take as my starting-point in order to expound the\nfundamental truth of my doctrine more clearly there than has been done\nanywhere else, and to apply it all the way down even to the empirical\nknowledge of Nature. This I have done most exhaustively and stringently\nunder the heading \"Physical Astronomy,\" nor can I ever hope to find a\nmore correct or accurate expression for the kernel of my doctrine than\nthe one given there.\"[186]\n\n  [186] \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.,\" vol. ii., c. 18, p. 213.\n\nI have nothing to add to testimony thus given by Schopenhauer himself.\n\n                    JULIUS FRAUENST\u00c4DT.\n\nBerlin, _March, 1867_.\n\n\n\n\nEDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.\n\n\nThe present Fourth Edition is an identical reprint of the Third:\nit therefore contains the same Corrections and Additions which I\nhad already inserted in the Third Edition from Schopenhauer's own\nmanuscript.\n\n                    JULIUS FRAUENST\u00c4DT.\n\nBerlin, _September, 1877_.\n\n\n\n\nTHE WILL IN NATURE.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\nI break silence after seventeen years,[187] in order to point out to\nthe few who, in advance of the age, may have given their attention\nto my philosophy, sundry corroborations which have been contributed\nto it by unbiassed empiricists, unacquainted with my writings, who,\nin pursuing their own road in search of merely empirical knowledge,\ndiscovered at its extreme end what my doctrine has propounded as\nthe Metaphysical (_das Metaphysische_), from which the explanation\nof experience as a whole must come. This circumstance is the more\nencouraging, as it confers upon my system a distinction over\nall hitherto existing ones; for all the other systems, even the\nlatest--that of Kant--still leave a wide gap between their results and\nexperience, and are far from coming down directly to, and into contact\nwith, experience. By this my Metaphysic proves itself to be the only\none having an extreme point in common with the physical sciences: a\npoint up to which these sciences come to meet it by their own paths,\nso as really to connect themselves and to harmonize with it. Moreover\nthis is not brought about by twisting and straining the empirical\nsciences in order to adapt them to Metaphysic, nor by Metaphysic\nhaving been secretly abstracted from them beforehand and then, _\u00e0 la_\nSchelling, finding _\u00e0 priori_ what it had learnt _\u00e0 posteriori_. On the\ncontrary, both meet at the same point of their own accord, yet without\ncollusion. My system therefore, far from soaring above all reality and\nall experience, descends to the firm ground of actuality, where its\nlessons are continued by the Physical Sciences.\n\n  [187] So had I written in 1835, when the present treatise was first\n  composed, having published nothing since 1818, before the close\n  of which year \"Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung\" had appeared.\n  For a Latin version, which I had added to the third volume of\n  \"_Scriptores ophthalmologici minores_,\" _edente_ J. Radio, in 1830,\n  for the benefit of my foreign readers, of my treatise \"On Vision\n  and Colours\" (published in 1816), can hardly be said to break the\n  silence of that pause.\n\nNow the extraneous and empirical corroborations I am about to bring\nforward, all concern the kernel and chief point of my doctrine, its\nMetaphysic proper. They concern, that is, the paradoxical fundamental\ntruth,\n\n  _that_ what Kant opposed as _thing in itself_ to mere\n     _phenomenon_--called more decidedly by me _representation_--and\n     what he held to be absolutely unknowable, that this _thing in\n     itself_, this substratum of all phenomena, and therefore of\n     the whole of Nature, is nothing but what we know directly and\n     intimately and find within ourselves as _the will_;[188]\n\n  [188] As will be seen by the following detailed exposition,\n  Schopenhauer attaches a far wider meaning to the word than is\n  usually given, and regards the _will_, not merely as _conscious\n  volition_ enlightened by Reason and determined by motives, but as\n  the fundamental essence of all that occurs, even where there is no\n  choice. [Tr.]\n\n  _that_ accordingly, this _will_, far from being inseparable from,\n     and even a mere result of, _knowledge_, differs radically and\n     entirely from, and is quite independent of, knowledge, which\n     is secondary and of later origin; and can consequently subsist\n     and manifest itself without knowledge: a thing which actually\n     takes place throughout the whole of Nature, from the animal\n     kingdom downwards;\n\n  _that_ this _will_, being the one and only thing in itself,\n     the sole truly real, primary, metaphysical thing in a world\n     in which everything else is only phenomenon--_i.e._ mere\n     representation--gives all things, whatever they may be, the\n     power to exist and to act;\n\n  _that_ accordingly, not only the voluntary actions of animals,\n     but the organic mechanism, nay even the shape and quality of\n     their living body, the vegetation of plants and finally, even in\n     inorganic Nature, crystallization, and in general every primary\n     force which manifests itself in physical and chemical phenomena,\n     not excepting Gravity,--that all this, I say, in itself, _i.e._\n     independently of phenomenon (which only means, independently of\n     our brain and its representations), is absolutely identical with\n     the _will_ we find within us and know as intimately as we can\n     know anything;\n\n  _that_ further, the individual manifestations of the will are\n     set in motion by _motives_ in beings gifted with an intellect,\n     but no less by _stimuli_ in the organic life of animals and of\n     plants, and finally in all inorganic Nature, by _causes_ in\n     the narrowest sense of the word--these distinctions applying\n     exclusively to phenomena;\n\n  _that_, on the other hand, knowledge with its substratum,\n     the intellect, is a merely secondary phenomenon, differing\n     completely from the will, only accompanying its higher degrees\n     of objectification and not essential to it; which, as it depends\n     upon the manifestations of the will in the animal organism, is\n     therefore physical, and not, like the will, metaphysical;\n\n  _that_ we are never able therefore to infer absence of will from\n     absence of knowledge; for the will may be pointed out even in\n     all phenomena of unconscious Nature, whether in plants or in\n     inorganic bodies; in short,\n\n  _that_ the will is not conditioned by knowledge, as has hitherto\n     been universally assumed, although knowledge _is_ conditioned by\n     the will.\n\nNow this fundamental truth, which even to-day sounds so like a\nparadox, is the part of my doctrine to which, in all its chief points,\nthe empirical sciences--themselves ever eager to steer clear of all\nMetaphysic--have contributed just as many confirmations forcibly\nelicited by the irresistible cogency of truth, but which are most\nsurprising on account of the quarter whence they proceed; and although\nthey have certainly come to light since the publication of my chief\nwork, it has been quite independently of it and as the years went on.\nNow, that it should be precisely this fundamental doctrine of mine\nwhich has thus met with confirmation, is advantageous in two respects.\nFirst, because it is the main thought upon which my system is founded;\nsecondly, because it is the only part of my philosophy that admits\nof confirmation through sciences which are alien to, and independent\nof, it. For although the last seventeen years, during which I have\nbeen constantly occupied with this subject, have, it is true, brought\nme many corroborations as to other parts, such as Ethics, \u00c6sthetics,\nDianoiology; still these, by their very nature, pass at once from the\nsphere of actuality, whence they arise, to that of philosophy itself:\nso they cannot claim to be extraneous evidence, nor can they, as\ncollected by me, have the same irrefragable, unequivocal cogency as\nthose concerning _Metaphysics_ proper which are given by its correlate\n_Physics_ (in the wide sense of the word which the Ancients gave it).\nFor, in pursuing its own road, Physics, _i.e._, Natural Science as a\nwhole, must in all its branches finally come to a point where physical\nexplanation ceases. Now this is precisely the _Metaphysical_, which\nNatural Science only apprehends as the impassable barrier at which it\nstops short and henceforth abandons its subject to Metaphysics. Kant\ntherefore was quite right in saying: \"It is evident, that the primary\nsources of Nature's agency must absolutely belong to the sphere of\nMetaphysics.\"[189] Physical science is wont to designate this unknown,\ninaccessible something, at which its investigations stop short and\nwhich is taken for granted in all its explanations, by such terms as\nphysical force, vital force, formative principle, &c. &c., which in\nfact mean no more than _x, y, z_. Now if nevertheless, in single,\npropitious instances, specially acute and observant investigators\nsucceed in casting as it were a furtive glance behind the curtain\nwhich bounds off the domain of Natural Science, and are able not\nonly to feel it is a barrier but, in a sense, to obtain a view of\nits nature and thus to peep into the metaphysical region beyond; if\nmoreover, having acquired this privilege, they explicitly designate\nthe limit thus explored downright as that which is stated to be the\ntrue inner essence and final principle of all things by a system of\nMetaphysics unknown to them, which takes its reasons from a totally\ndifferent sphere and, in every other respect, recognises all things\nmerely as phenomena, _i.e._, as representation--then indeed the two\nbodies of investigators must feel like two mining engineers driving a\ngallery, who, having started from two points far apart and worked for\nsome time in subterranean darkness, trusting exclusively to compass\nand spirit-level, suddenly to their great joy catch the sound of each\nother's hammers. For now indeed these investigators know, that the\npoint so long vainly sought for has at last been reached at which\nMetaphysics and Physics meet--they, who were as hard to bring together\nas Heaven and Earth--that a reconciliation has been initiated and a\nconnection found between these two sciences. But the philosophical\nsystem which has witnessed this triumph receives by it the strongest\nand most satisfactory proof possible of its own truth and accuracy.\nCompared with such a confirmation as this, which may, in fact, be\nlooked upon as equivalent to proving a sum in arithmetic, the regard or\ndisregard of a given period of time loses all importance, especially\nwhen we consider what has been the subject of interest meanwhile and\nfind it to be--the sort of philosophy we have been treated to since\nKant. The eyes of the public are gradually opening to the mystification\nby which it has been duped for the last forty years under the name\nof philosophy, and this will be more and more the case. The day of\nreckoning is at hand, when it will see whether all this endless\nscribbling and quibbling since Kant has brought to light a single truth\nof any kind. I may thus be dispensed from the obligation of entering\nhere into subjects so unworthy; the more so, as I can accomplish my\npurpose more briefly and agreeably by narrating the following anecdote.\nDuring the carnival, Dante having lost himself in a crowd of masks,\nthe Duke of Medici ordered him to be sought for. Those commissioned\nto look for him, being doubtful whether they would be able to find\nhim, as he was himself masked, the Duke gave them a question to put to\nevery mask they might meet who resembled Dante. It was this: \"Who knows\nwhat is good?\" After receiving several foolish answers, they finally\nmet with a mask who replied: \"He that knows what is bad,\" by which\nDante was immediately recognised.[190] What is meant by this here\nis, that I have seen no reason to be disheartened on account of the\nwant of sympathy of my contemporaries, since I had at the same time\nbefore my eyes the objects of their sympathy. What those authors were,\nposterity will see by their works; what the contemporaries were, will\nbe seen by the reception they gave to those works. My doctrine lays\nno claim whatever to the name \"Philosophy of the present time\" which\nwas disputed to the amusing adepts of Hegel's mystification; but it\ncertainly does claim the title of \"Philosophy of time to come:\" that\nis, of a time when people will no longer content themselves with a\nmere jingle of words without meaning, with empty phrases and trivial\nparallelisms, but will exact real contents and serious disclosures\nfrom philosophy, while, on the other hand, they will exempt it from\nthe unjust and preposterous obligation of paraphrasing the national\nreligion for the time being. \"For it is an extremely absurd thing,\"\nsays Kant,[191] \"to expect to be enlightened by Reason and yet to\nprescribe to her beforehand on which side she must incline.\"--It is\nindeed sad to live in an age so degenerate, that it should be necessary\nto appeal to the authority of a great man to attest so obvious a truth.\nBut it is absurd to expect marvels from a philosophy that is chained\nup, and particularly amusing to watch the solemn gravity with which it\nsets to work to accomplish great things, when we all know beforehand\n\"the short meaning of the long speech.\"[192] However the keen-sighted\nassert that under the cloak of philosophy they can mostly detect\ntheology holding forth for the edification of students thirsting after\ntruth, and instructing them after its own fashion;--and this again\nreminds us forcibly of a certain favourite scene in Faust. Others, who\nthink that they see still further into the matter, maintain that what\nis thus disguised is neither theology nor philosophy, but simply a poor\ndevil who, while solemnly protesting that he has lofty, sublime truth\nfor his aim, is in fact only striving to get bread for himself and for\nhis future young family. This he might no doubt obtain by other means\nwith less labour and more dignity; meanwhile however for this price he\nis ready to do anything he is asked to do, even to deduce _\u00e0 priori_,\nnay, should it come to the worst, to perceive, the 'Devil and his dam,'\nby intellectual intuition--and here indeed the exceedingly comical\neffect is brought to a climax by the contrast between the sublimity\nof the ostensible, and the lowliness of the real, aim. It remains\nnevertheless desirable, that the pure, sacred precincts of philosophy\nshould be cleansed of all such traders, as was the temple of Jerusalem\nin former times of the buyers and sellers.--Biding such better times\ntherefore, may our philosophical public bestow its attention and\ninterest as it has done hitherto. May it continue as before invariably\nnaming Fichte as an obligato accompaniment to, and in the same breath\nwith, Kant--that great mind, produced but once by Nature, which has\nillumined its own depth--as if forsooth they were of the same kind; and\nthis without a single voice being heard to exclaim in protest \u1f29\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03af\u03b8\u03b7\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2! May Hegel's philosophy of absolute nonsense--three-fourths\ncash and one-fourth crazy fancies--continue to pass for unfathomable\nwisdom without anyone suggesting as an appropriate motto for his\nwritings Shakespeare's words: \"Such stuff as madmen tongue and brain\nnot,\" or, as an emblematical vignette, the cuttle-fish with its\nink-bag, creating a cloud of darkness around it to prevent people\nfrom seeing what it is, with the device: _mea caligine tutus_.--May\neach day bring us, as hitherto, new systems adapted for University\npurposes, entirely made up of words and phrases and in a learned\njargon besides, which allows people to talk whole days without saying\nanything; and may these delights never be disturbed by the Arabian\nproverb: \"I hear the clappering of the mill, but I see no flour.\"--For\nall this is in accordance with the age and must have its course. In\nall times some such thing occupies the contemporary public more or\nless noisily; then it dies off so completely, vanishes so entirely,\nwithout leaving a trace behind, that the next generation no longer\nknows what it was. Truth can bide its time, for it has a long life\nbefore it. Whatever is genuine and seriously meant, is always slow to\nmake its way and certainly attains its end almost miraculously; for on\nits first appearance it as a rule meets with a cool, if not ungracious,\nreception: and this for exactly the same reason that, when once it is\nfully recognised and has passed on to posterity, the immense\nmajority of men take it on credit, in order to avoid compromising\nthemselves, whereas the number of genuine appreciators remains nearly\nas small as it was at first. These few nevertheless suffice to make\nthe truth respected, for they are themselves respected. And thus it is\npassed from hand to hand through centuries over the heads of the inept\nmultitude: so hard is the existence of mankind's best inheritance!--On\nthe other hand, if truth had to crave permission to be true from such\nas have quite different aims at heart, its cause might indeed be given\nup for lost; for then it might often be dismissed with the witches'\nwatch-word: \"fair is foul, and foul is fair.\" Luckily however this is\nnot the case. Truth depends upon no one's favour or disfavour, nor does\nit ask anyone's leave: it stands upon its own feet, and has Time for\nits ally; its power is irresistible, its life indestructible.\n\n  [189] Kant, \"Von der wahren Sch\u00e4tzung der lebendigen Kr\u00e4fte,\" \u00a7 51.\n\n  [190] Baltazar Gracian, \"_El Criticon_,\" iii. 90, to whom I leave\n  the responsibility for the anachronism.\n\n  [191] Kant, \"Krit. d. r. V.\" 5th edition, p. 755. (English\n  translation by M. M\u00fcller, p. 640.)\n\n  [192] Schiller, \"der langen Rede kurzer Sinn.\" [Tr.]\n\n\n\n\nPHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY.\n\n\nIn classifying the above-mentioned empirical corroborations of my\ndoctrine according to the sciences from which they come, while I\ntake the graduated order of Nature from the highest to the lowest\ndegree as a guiding-thread to my expositions, I must first mention a\nvery striking confirmation lately received by my chief dogma in the\nphysiological and pathological views of Dr. J. D. Brandis, private\nphysician to the King of Denmark, a veteran in science, whose \"Essay on\nVital Force\" (1795) had received Reil's hearty commendation. In his two\nlatest writings: \"Experiences in the Application of Cold in Disease\"\n(Berlin, 1833), and \"Nosology and Therapeutics of Cachexi\u00e6\" (1834), we\nfind him in the most emphatic and striking manner stating the primary\nsource of all vital functions to be an _unconscious will_, from which\nhe derives all processes in the machinery of the organism, in health\nas well as in disease, and which he represents as the _primum mobile_\nof life. I must support this by literal quotations from these essays,\nsince few save medical readers are likely to have them at hand.\n\nIn the first of them, p. viii., we find: \"The essence of every living\norganism consists in the will to maintain its own existence as much\nas possible over against the macrocosm;\"--p. x.: \"Only _one_ living\nentity, _one_ will can be in an organ at the same time; therefore\nif there is a diseased _will_ in disagreement with the rest of the\nbody in the organ of the skin, we may hold it in check by applying\ncold as long as the generation of warmth, a normal _will_, can be\ninduced by it.\" P. 1: \"If we are forced to the conviction that there\nmust be a _determining principle_--a _will_, in every vital action,\nby which the development suited to the whole organism is occasioned,\nand each metamorphosis of the parts conditioned, in harmony with the\nwhole individuality, and likewise that there is a something capable\nof being determined and developed,\" &c. &c.--P. 11: \"With respect to\nindividual life, the element which determines, the organic _will_,\nif it is to rest satisfied, must be able to attain what it wants\nfrom that which has to be determined. This occurs even when the\nvital movements are over-excited, as in inflammation: something new\nis formed, the noxious element is expelled; new plastic materials\nare meanwhile conveyed through the arteries, more venous blood is\ncarried off, until the process of inflammation is finished and the\norganic _will_ satisfied. It is however possible to excite this\n_will_ to such a degree, as to make satisfaction impossible. This\nexciting cause (or stimulus) either acts directly upon the particular\norgan (poison, contagion) or it affects the whole life; and this\nlife then begins to make the most strenuous efforts to rid itself\nof the noxious element or to modify the disposition of the organic\n_will_, and provokes critical vital activity in particular parts\n(inflammations) or yields to the unappeased _will_.\"--P. 12: \"The\ninsatiable _will_ acts destructively upon the organism unless either\n(_a_) the whole life, in its efforts to attain unity (tendency to\nadapt means to end), produces other activities requiring satisfaction\n(_crises et lyses_) which hold that _will_ in check--called decisive\n(_crises complet\u00e6_) when quite successful; _crises incomplet\u00e6_, when\nonly partially so--or (_b_) some other stimulus (medicine) produces\nanother _will_ which represses the diseased one. If we place this in\none and the same category with the _will_ of which we have become\nconscious through our own representations, and bear in mind that\nhere there can be no question of more or less distant resemblance, we\ngain the conviction that we have grasped the fundamental conception\nof the _one_ unlimited, therefore indivisible, life which, according\nto its different manifestations in various more or less endowed and\nexercised organs, is just as able to make hair grow on the human body\nas to combine the most sublime representations. We see that the most\nviolent passion--unsatisfied _will_--may be checked by more or less\nstrong excitement,\" &c. &c.--P. 18: \"The determining element--_this\norganic will without representation_, this tendency to preserve the\norganism as a unity--is induced by outward temperature to modify its\nactivity now in the same, now in a remoter organ. Every manifestation\nof life, however, whether in health or in disease, is a manifestation\nof the _organic will: this will determines vegetation:_ in a healthy\ncondition, in harmony with the unity of the whole; in an unhealthy one\n... it is induced _not to will_ in harmony with that unity\" ...--P. 23:\n\"Cold suddenly applied to the skin suppresses its function (chill);\ncold drinks check the _organic will_ in the digestive organs and\nthereby intensify that of the skin and produce perspiration; just so\nwith the diseased _organic will_: cold checks cutaneous eruptions,\" &c.\n&c.--P. 33: \"Fever is the complete participation of the whole vital\nprocess in a diseased _will_, _i.e._ it is to the entire vital process\nwhat inflammation is to particular organs--the effort of our vitality\nto form something definite, in order to content the diseased _will_\nand remove the noxious element.--We call this process of formation\n_crisis_ or _lysis_ (turning-point or release). The first perception of\nthe pernicious element which causes the diseased _will_, affects the\nindividuality just in the same way as a noxious element apprehended by\nour senses, before we have brought to clear representation the entire\nrelation in which it stands to our individuality and the means of\nremoving it. It creates terror and its consequences, a standstill of\nthe vital process in the _parenchyma_, especially in the parts directed\ntowards the outer world; in the skin, and in all the motor muscles\nbelonging to the entire individuality (outer body): shuddering, chills,\ntrembling, pains in the limbs, &c. &c. The difference between them\nis, that in the latter case the noxious element, either at once or\ngradually, becomes clear representation, because it is compared with\nthe individuality by means of all the senses, so that its relation\nto that individuality can be determined, and the means of protection\nagainst it (disregard, flight, warding off, defence, &c.) be brought to\na _conscious will_; whereas, in the former case, we remain unconscious\nof that noxious element, and it is life alone (or Nature's curative\npower) which is striving to remove the noxious element and thereby\nto content the diseased _will_. Nor must this be taken for a simile;\nit is, on the contrary, a true description of the manifestation of\nlife.\"--P. 58: \"We must however always bear in mind, that cold acts\nhere as a powerful stimulus to check or moderate the diseased _will_\nand to rouse in its place a natural _will_, accompanied by general\nwarmth.\"--\n\nIn almost every page of this book similar expressions are to be found.\nIn the second of the Essays I have named, Brandis no longer combines\nthe explanation by the will so universally with each separate analysis,\nprobably in consideration that this explanation is properly speaking, a\nmetaphysical one. Nevertheless he maintains it entirely and completely,\ngiving it even all the more distinct and decided expression, wherever\nhe states it. Thus, for instance, in \u00a7 68 _et seq._ he speaks of an\n\"_unconscious will_, which cannot be separated from the conscious\none,\" and is the _primum mobile_ of all life, as well in plants as\nin animals; for, in these, it is a desire and aversion manifesting\nitself in all the organs which determines all their vital processes,\nsecretions, &c. &c.--\u00a7. 71: \"All convulsions prove that the\nmanifestation of the will can take place without distinct power of\nrepresentation.\"--\u00a7. 72: \"Everywhere do we meet with a spontaneous,\nuncommunicated activity, now determined by the sublimest human free\nwill, now by animal desire and aversion, now again by simple, more\nvegetative requirements; which activity, in order to maintain itself,\ncalls forth several other kinds of activity in the unity of the\nindividual.\"--P. 96: \"A creative, spontaneous, uncommunicated activity\nshows itself in every vital manifestation.\" ...--\"The third factor in\nthis individual creation is the _will, the individual's life itself_.\"\n...--\"The nerves are the conductors of this individual creation:\nby their means form and mixture are varied according to desire and\naversion.\"--P. 97: \"Assimilation of foreign substance ... makes the\nblood.... It is not an absorption or an exudation of organic matter;\n... on the contrary, here the sole factor of the phenomenon is in all\ncases _the creative will_, a life which cannot be brought back to any\nsort of imparted movement.\"--\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWhen I wrote this (1835) I was still _na\u00eff_ enough seriously to believe\nthat Brandis was unacquainted with my work, or I should not allude\nhere to his writings; for they would then be merely a repetition,\napplication and carrying out of my own doctrine on this point, not a\ncorroboration of it. But I thought I might safely assume that he did\nnot know me, because he has not mentioned me anywhere and because if\nhe had known me, literary honesty would have made it his imperative\nduty not to remain silent concerning the man from whom he had borrowed\nhis chief fundamental thought, the more so as he saw that man then\nenduring unmerited neglect, by his writings being generally ignored--a\ncircumstance which might be construed as favourable to fraud. Add\nto this, that it lay in Brandis' own interest as a writer, and would\ntherefore have shown sagacity on his part, to have appealed to me as\nan authority. For the fundamental doctrine propounded by him is so\nstriking and paradoxical, that even his G\u00f6ttingen reviewer is amazed\nand hardly knows what to think of it; yet such a doctrine as this was\nleft without foundation either through proof or induction, nor did\nDr. Brandis establish its relation to the whole of our knowledge of\nNature: he simply asserted it. I imagined therefore that it was by the\npeculiar gift of divination, which enables eminent physicians to see\nand do the right thing in cases of illness, that he had been led to\nthis view, without being able to give a strict and methodical account\nof the grounds of this really metaphysical truth, although he must have\nseen how greatly it is opposed to the generally received views. Had he,\nthought I, been acquainted with my philosophy, which gives far greater\nextension to this truth, makes it valid for the whole of Nature and\nfounds it both by proof and induction in close connection with Kant's\nteaching, from which it proceeds as a final result of excogitation--how\ngladly must he have availed himself of such confirmation and support,\nrather than to stand alone by an unheard-of assertion which was never\nfurther carried out and, with him, never went beyond bare assertion.\nSuch were the reasons that led me to believe myself entitled to take\nfor granted Dr. Brandis' ignorance of my book.\n\nSince then however I have become better acquainted with German\nscientists and Copenhagen Academicians, to which body Dr. Brandis\nbelonged, and have gained the conviction that he knew me very well\nindeed. I stated my reasons for arriving at this conviction already\nin 1844 in the 2nd vol. of \"Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,\"[193]\nso that, as the subject is by no means edifying, it is needless to\nrepeat them here; I will merely add that I have since been assured on\ntrustworthy authority that Dr. Brandis not only knew my work but even\npossessed it, as it was found among his property after his death.--The\nunmerited obscurity to which writers like myself are long condemned,\nencourages such people to appropriate their thoughts without so much as\nnaming them.\n\n  [193] Chapter 20, p. 263; p. 295 of the 3rd edition.\n\nAnother medical authority has carried this even farther; for, not\ncontent with the thought alone, he has appropriated to himself the\nexpression of it also. I allude to Professor Anton Rosas of the\nUniversity of Vienna, whose entire \u00a7 507 in the 1st vol. of his\nTextbook of Ophthalmology[194] (1830) is copied word for word from\npp. 14-16 of my treatise \"On Vision and Colours\" (1816) without any\nmention whatever of me, or even the slightest hint that he is using the\nwords of another. This sufficiently accounts for the care he has taken\nnot to mention my treatise among the lists of twenty-one writings on\nColours and forty on the Physiology of the Eye, which he gives in \u00a7\u00a7\n542 and 567; a caution which was however all the more advisable, as\nhe had appropriated to himself a good deal more out of that pamphlet\nwithout mentioning me. All that is referred, for instance, in \u00a7 526\nto 'them' (_man_), is only applicable to me. His entire \u00a7 527 is\ncopied almost literally from my pp. 59 and 60. The theory which he\nintroduces without further ceremony in \u00a7 535 by the word \"evidently\":\nthat is, that yellow is 3/4 and violet 1/4 of the eye's activity,\nnever was 'evident' to anyone until I made it so; even to this day it\nis a truth known to few and acknowledged by fewer still, and much is\nyet wanting--for example, that I should be dead and buried--ere it be\npossible to call it 'evident' without further ceremony. The matter\nwill even have to wait till after my death to be seriously sifted,\nsince a close investigation might easily bring to 'evidence' the real\ndifference between Newton's theory of colours and my own, which is\nsimply that his is false, and mine true: a discovery which could not\nfail to mortify my contemporaries. Wherefore, according to ancient\ncustom, all serious examination into the question is wisely postponed\nfor these few years. Professor Rosas knew no such policy as this and,\nas the matter was not alluded to anywhere, thought himself entitled,\nlike the Danish Academician, to claim it as lawful prey (_de bonne\nprise_). Evidently North and South German honesty had not yet come to\na satisfactory understanding.--Moreover the whole contents of \u00a7\u00a7 538,\n539 and 540 in Professor Rosas' book are taken from my pamphlet, nay\neven in great part copied word for word from my \u00a7 13. Still once, where\nhe stands in need of a voucher for a fact, he finds himself obliged to\nrefer to my treatise: that is, in his \u00a7 531; and it is most amusing to\nsee the way in which he even brings in the numerical fractions used by\nme, as a result of my theory, to express all colours. It had probably\noccurred to him, that appropriating them quite _sans fa\u00e7on_ might be\na delicate matter, so he says, p. 308: \"_If we wished_ to express in\nnumbers the first-mentioned relation in which colours stand to white,\nassuming white to be = 1, the following scale of proportion might _by\nthe way_ be adopted (as has already been done by Schopenhauer):\n\n  yellow = 3/4\n  orange = 2/3\n  red    = 1/2\n  green  = 1/2\n  blue   = 1/3\n  violet = 1/4\n  black  = 0\"\n\n  [194] Rosas, \"Handbuch der Augenheilkunde\" (1830).\n\nNow I should like to know how anyone could do this _by the way_,\nwithout having first thought out my whole colour-theory, to which\nalone these numbers refer, and apart from which they are mere abstract\nnumbers without meaning; above all, how anyone could do it who, like\nProfessor Rosas, professes to be a follower of Newton's colour-theory,\nwith which these numbers are in direct contradiction? Finally, I should\nlike to know how it came, that during the thousands of years in which\nmen have thought and written, no one but myself and Professor Rosas\nshould ever have thought of using just these particular fractions\nto denote colours? For the words I have quoted above tell us, that\nhe would have stated those fractions precisely as he has done, even\nhad I not chanced to do it 'already' fourteen years before and thus\nneedlessly anticipated his statement; they also tell us, that all that\nis required is '_to wish_,' in order to do so. Now it is precisely in\nthese numerical fractions that the secret of colours lies: by them\nalone can we rightly solve the mystery of their nature and of their\ndifference from one another.--I should however be heartily glad, were\nplagiarism the worst kind of dishonesty that defiled German literature;\nthere are others far more mischievous, which penetrate more deeply,\nand to which plagiarism bears the same proportion as picking pockets\nin a mild way to capital crime. I allude to that mean, despicable\nspirit, whose loadstar is personal interest, when it ought to be truth,\nand in which the voice of intention makes itself heard beneath the\nmask of insight. Double-dealing and time-serving are the order of the\nday. Tartuffe comedies are performed without _rouge_; nay, Capuchin\nsermons are preached in halls consecrated to Science; enlightenment,\nthat once revered word, has become a term of opprobrium; the greatest\nthinkers of the past century, Voltaire, Rousseau, Locke, Hume, are\nslandered--those heroes, ornaments and benefactors of mankind, whose\nfame, diffused throughout both hemispheres, can only be increased, if\nby anything, by the fact that wherever and whenever obscurantists show\nthemselves, it is as their bitterest enemies--and with good reason.\nLiterary _coteries_ and associations are formed to deal out praise\nand blame, and spurious merit is then trumpeted forth and extolled,\nwhile sterling merit is slandered or, as G\u00f6the says, \"_secreted, by\nmeans of an inviolable silence, in which sort of inquisitorial censure\nthe Germans have attained great proficiency_.\"[195] The motives and\nconsiderations however from which all this proceeds, are of too low\na nature for me to care to enumerate them in detail. But what a\ndifference there is between periodicals such as the \"Edinburgh Review,\"\nin which gentlemen of independent means are induced to write by a\ngenuine interest in the subjects treated, and which honourably upholds\nits noble motto taken from Publius Syrus: _Judex damnnatur cum nocens\nabsolvitur_, and our mean-spirited, disingenuous, German literary\njournals, full of considerations and intentions, that are mostly\ncompiled for the sake of pay by hired editors, and ought properly to\nhave for their motto: _Accedas socius laudes, lauderis, ut absens_.[196]\nNow, after twenty years, do I understand what G\u00f6the said to me at Berka\nin 1814. As I found him reading Madame de Sta\u00ebl's \"_De l'Allemagne_,\" I\nremarked in course of conversation that she had given too exaggerated a\ndescription of German honesty and one that might mislead foreigners. He\nlaughed and said: \"Yes, to be sure, they will not secure their baggage\nbehind and will have it cut off.\" He then added in a graver tone: \"But\none has to know German literature in order to realise the full extent\nof German dishonesty.\"--All well and good! But the most revolting\nkind of dishonesty in German literature is that of the time-servers,\nwho pass themselves off for philosophers, while in reality they are\nobscurantists. The word 'time-serving' no more needs explanation than\nthe thing needs a proof; for anyone who had the face to deny it would\nfurnish strong evidence in support of my present argument. Kant\ntaught, that man ought to use his fellow-man only as an end, never as\na means: he did not think it necessary to say, that philosophy ought\nonly to be dealt with as an end, never as a means. Time-serving may\nafter all be excused under every garb, the cowl as well as the ermine,\nsave only the philosopher's cloak (_Tribonion_); for he who has once\nassumed this, has sworn allegiance to truth, and from that moment every\nother consideration, no matter of what kind, becomes base treachery.\nTherefore it was that Socrates did not shun the hemlock, nor Bruno\nthe stake, while 'for a piece of bread these men will transgress.'\nAre they too short-sighted to see posterity close at hand, with the\nhistory of philosophy at its side, recording two lines of bitter\ncondemnation with unflinching hand and iron pen in its immortal pages?\nOr has this no sting for them?--Well to be sure, if it comes to the\nworst, '_apr\u00e8s moi le d\u00e9luge_' may be pronounced; but as to '_apr\u00e8s\nmoi le m\u00e9pris_,' that is a more difficult matter. Therefore I fancy\nthey will answer that austere judge as follows: \"Ah, dear posterity and\nhistory of philosophy! you are quite wrong to take us in earnest; we\nare not philosophers at all, Heaven forbid! No, we are only professors\nof philosophy, mere servants of the state, mere philosophers in jest.\nYou might as well drag puppet-knights in pasteboard armour into a real\ntournament.\" Then the judge will most likely see how matters stand,\nerase all their names, and confer upon them the _beneficium perpetui\nsilentii_.\n\n  [195] G\u00f6the, \"Tag und Jahreshefte,\" 1812.\n\n  [196] This I wrote in 1836. The \"Edinburgh Review\" has since\n  however greatly deteriorated, and is no longer its old self. I have\n  even seen clerical time-serving in its pages, written down to the\n  level of the mob.\n\nFrom this digression--to which I had been led away eighteen years ago,\nby the cant and time-serving I then witnessed, though they were not\nnearly as flourishing then as they are now--I return to that part of my\ndoctrine which Dr. Brandis has confirmed, though he did not originate\nit, in order to add a few explanations with which I shall then connect\nsome further corroborations it has since received from Physiology.\n\nThe three assumptions which are criticised by Kant in his\nTranscendental Dialectic under the names of Ideas of Reason, and have\nin consequence since been set aside in theoretical philosophy, had\nalways stood in the way of a deeper insight into Nature, until that\ngreat thinker brought about a complete transformation in philosophy.\nThat supposed Idea of Reason, the soul: that metaphysical being,\nin it whose absolute singleness knowing and willing were knit and\nblended together to eternal, inseparable unity, was an impediment\nof this sort for the subject-matter of this chapter. As long as it\nlasted, no philosophical Physiology was possible: the less so, as\nits correlate, real, purely passive Matter, had necessarily also\nto be assumed together with it, as the substance of the body.[197]\nIt was this Idea of Reason, the soul, therefore, that caused the\ncelebrated chemist and physiologist, George Ernest Stahl, at the\nbeginning of the last century to miss the discovery of the truth he\nso nearly approached and would have quite reached, had he been able\nto put that which is alone metaphysical, the bare _will_--as yet\nwithout intellect--in the place of the _anima rationalis_. Under the\ninfluence of this Idea of Reason however, he could not teach anything\nbut that it is this simple, rational soul which builds itself a body,\nall whose inner organic functions it directs and performs, yet has\nno knowledge or consciousness of all this, although knowledge is the\nfundamental destination and, as it were, the substance, of its being.\nThere was something absurd in this doctrine which made it utterly\nuntenable. It was superseded by Haller's Irritability and Sensibility,\nwhich, to be sure, are taken in a purely empirical sense, but, to\nmake up for this, are also two _qualitates occult\u00e6_, at which all\nexplanation ceases. The movement of the heart and of the intestines\nwas now attributed to Irritability. But the _anima rationalis_ still\nremained in undiminished honour and dignity as a visitor at the\nhouse of the body.[198]--\"Truth lies at the bottom of a well,\" said\nDemocritus; and the centuries with a sigh, have repeated his words. But\nsmall wonder, if it gets a rap on the knuckles as soon as it tries to\ncome out!\n\n  [197] As a being existing by itself, a thing in itself. [Add. to\n  3rd ed.]\n\n  [198] In which it is lodged in the garret. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\nThe fundamental truth of my doctrine, which places that doctrine in\nopposition with all others that have ever existed, is the complete\nseparation between the will and the intellect, which all philosophers\nbefore me had looked upon as inseparable; or rather, I ought to say\nthat they had regarded the will as conditioned by, nay, mostly even\nas a mere function of, the intellect, assumed by them to be the\nfundamental substance of our spiritual being. But this separation, this\nanalysis into two heterogeneous elements, of the _ego_ or _soul_, which\nhad so long been deemed an indivisible unity, is, for philosophy, what\nthe analysis of water has been for chemistry, though it may take time\nto be acknowledged. With me, that which is eternal and indestructible\nin man, therefore, that which constitutes his vital principle, is not\n_the soul_, but--if I may use a chemical term--its radical: and this is\n_the will_. The so-called soul is already a compound: it is the union\nof the will and the intellect (\u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2). This intellect is the secondary\nelement, the _posterius_ of the organism and, as a mere cerebral\nfunction, is conditioned by the organism; whereas the will is what is\nprimary, the _prius_ of the organism, which is conditioned by it. For\nthe will is that thing in itself, which only becomes apparent as an\norganic body in our representation (that mere function of the brain):\nit is only through the forms of knowledge (or cerebral function), that\nis, only in our representation--not apart from that representation,\nnot immediately in our self-consciousness--that our body is given to\neach of us as a thing which has extension, limbs and organs. As the\nactions of our body are only acts of volition portraying themselves\nin representation, so likewise is their substratum, the shape of that\nbody, in the main the portrait of the will: so that, in all the organic\nfunctions of our body, the will is just as much the _agent_ as in its\nexternal actions. True Physiology, at its highest, shows the spiritual\n(the intellectual) in man to be the product of the physical in him,\nand no one has done this so thoroughly as Cabanis; but true Metaphysic\nteaches us, that the physical in man is itself mere product, or rather\nphenomenon, of a spiritual (the will); nay, that Matter itself is\nconditioned by representation, in which alone it exists. Perception\nand reflection will more and more find their explanation through\nthe organism; but not the will, by which conversely the organism is\nexplained, as I shall show in the following chapter. First of all\ntherefore I place _the will, as thing in itself_ and quite primary;\nsecondly, its mere visibility, its objectification: _i.e._ the _body_;\nthirdly, the _intellect_, as a mere function of one part of that body.\nThis part is itself the objectified will to know (the will to know\nhaving entered into representation), since the will needs knowledge to\nattain its own ends. Now the entire world as representation, together\nwith the body itself therefore, inasmuch as it is a perceptible object,\nnay, Matter in general as existing only in representation,--all this,\nI say, is again conditioned by that function; for, duly considered,\nwe cannot possibly conceive an objective world without a Subject, in\nwhose consciousness it is present. Thus knowledge and matter (Subject\nand Object) exist only relatively one for the other and constitute\n_phenomenon_. The whole thing therefore, owing to the radical change\nmade by me, stands in a different light from that in which it has\nhitherto been regarded.\n\nAs soon as it is directed outwardly and acts upon a recognised object,\nas soon therefore as it has passed through the medium of knowledge,\nwe all recognise the _will_ at once to be the active principle, and\ncall it by its right name. Yet it is no less active in those inner\nprocesses which have preceded such outward actions as their conditions:\nin those, for instance, which create and maintain organic life and its\nsubstratum; and the circulation of the blood, secretion, digestion,\n&c. &c., are its work likewise. But just because the will was only\nrecognised as the active principle in those cases in which it abandons\nthe individual whence it proceeds, in order to direct itself towards\nthe outer world--now presenting itself precisely for this end, as\nperception--knowledge has been taken for its essential condition, its\nsole element, nay, as the substance of which it consists: and hereby\nwas perpetrated the greatest \u1f55\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd that has ever been.\n\nBut before all things we must learn to distinguish will [_Wille_]\n(_voluntas_) from free-will [_Willk\u00fchr_] (_arbitrium_)[199] and to\nunderstand that the former can subsist without the latter; this however\npresupposes my whole philosophy. The will is called free-will when it\nis illumined by knowledge, therefore when the causes which move it are\nmotives: that is, representations. Objectively speaking this means:\nwhen the influence from outside which causes the act, has a _brain_ for\nits mediator. A motive may be defined as an external stimulus, whose\naction first of all causes an _image_ to arise in the _brain_, through\nthe medium of which the will carries out the effect proper--an outward\naction of the body. Now, in the human species however, the place of\nsuch an image as this may be taken by a conception drawn from former\nimages of this kind by dropping their differences, which conception\nconsequently is no longer perceptible, but merely denoted and fixed\nby words. As the action of motives accordingly does not depend upon\ncontact, they can try their power on the will against each other: in\nother words, they permit a certain choice which, in animals, is limited\nto the narrow sphere of that which has _perceptible_ existence for\nthem; whereas, in man, its range comprises the vast extent of all that\nis _thinkable_: that is, of his conceptions. Accordingly we designate\nas _voluntary_ those movements which are occasioned, not by _causes_\nin the narrowest sense of the word, as in inorganic bodies, nor even\nby _mere stimuli_, as in plants, but by _motives_.[200] These motives\nhowever presuppose an _intellect_ as _their mediator_, through which\ncausality here acts, without prejudice to its entire necessity in all\nother respects. Physiologically, the difference between stimulus and\nmotive admits also of the following definition. The stimulus provokes\n_immediate_ reaction, which proceeds from the very part on which the\nstimulus has acted; whereas the motive is a stimulus that has to go\na roundabout way through the brain, where its action first causes an\nimage to arise, which then, but not till then, provokes the consequent\nreaction, which is now called an act of volition, and _voluntary_.\nThe distinction between voluntary and involuntary movement does not\ntherefore concern what is essential and primary--for this is in\nboth cases the will--but only what is secondary, the rousing of the\nwill's manifestation: it has to do with the determination whether\n_causes_ proper, _stimuli_ or _motives_ (_i.e._ causes having passed\nthrough the medium of knowledge) are the guidance under which that\nmanifestation takes place. It is in human consciousness,--differing\nfrom that of animals by not only containing perceptible representations\nbut also abstract conceptions independent of time-distinctions, which\nact simultaneously and collaterally, whereby deliberation, _i.e._ a\nconflict of motives, becomes possible--it is in human consciousness,\nI say, that free-will (_arbitrium_) in its narrowest sense first\nmakes its appearance; and this I have called elective decision. It\nnevertheless merely consists in the _strongest_ motive for a given\nindividual character overcoming the others and thus determining the\nact, just as an impact is overcome by a stronger counter-impact, the\nresult thus ensuing with precisely the same necessity as the movement\nof a stone that has been struck. That all great thinkers in all ages\nwere decided and at one on this point, is just as certain, as that the\nmultitude will never understand, never grasp, the important truth,\nthat the work of our freedom must not be sought in our individual\nactions but in our very existence and nature itself. In my prize-essay\non Freedom of the Will, I have shown this as clearly as possible.\nThe _liberum arbitrium indifferenti\u00e6_ which is assumed to be the\ndistinctive characteristic of movements proceeding from _the will_,\nis accordingly quite inadmissible: for it asserts that effects are\npossible without causes.\n\n  [199] By this Schopenhauer means the distinction between _the will_\n  in its widest sense, regarded as the fundamental essence of all\n  that happens,--even where there is no choice, even where it is\n  _unconscious_,--and _conscious will_, implying deliberation and\n  choice, commonly called _free-will_. We must however carefully\n  guard against confounding this _relative_ free-will, with\n  _absolute_ free-will (_liberum arbitrium indifferenti\u00e6_), which\n  Schopenhauer declares to be inadmissible. The sense in which I have\n  used the expression '_free-will_' throughout this treatise, is that\n  of _relative_ freedom, _i.e._ power to choose between different\n  motives, free of all outward restraint (_Willk\u00fchr_). (Tr.)\n\n  [200] I have shown the difference between _cause_ in its narrowest\n  sense, _stimulus_, and _motive_, at length in my \"Grund-probleme\n  der Ethik\" p. 29 _et seq._\n\nAs soon therefore as we have got so far as to distinguish _will_\n[_Wille_] from _free-will_ [_Willk\u00fchr_], and to consider the latter as\na particular kind or particular phenomenon of the former, we shall find\nno difficulty in recognising the will, even in unconscious processes.\nThus the assertion, that all bodily movements, even those which are\npurely vegetative and organic, proceed from _the will_, by no means\nimplies that they are voluntary. For that would mean that they were\noccasioned by motives; but motives are representations, and their seat\nis the brain: only those parts of our body which communicate with the\nbrain by means of the nerves, can be put in movement by the brain,\nconsequently by motives, and this movement alone is what is called\nvoluntary. The movement of the inner economy of the organism, on the\ncontrary, is directed, as in plant-life, by _stimuli_; only as, on the\none hand, the complex nature of the animal organism necessitated an\nouter sensorium for the apprehension of the outer world and the will's\nreaction on that outer world, so, on the other hand, did it necessitate\na _cerebrum abdominale_, the sympathetic nervous system, in order to\ndirect the will's reaction upon inner stimuli likewise. We may compare\nthe former to a Home Ministry, the latter to a Foreign Office; but the\nwill remains the omnipresent Autocrat.\n\nThe progress made in Physiology since Haller has placed beyond\ndoubt, that not only those actions which are consciously performed\n(_functiones animales_), but even vital processes that take place\nquite unconsciously (_functiones vitales et naturales_), are\ndirected throughout by the _nervous system_. Likewise that their\nonly difference, as far as our consciousness of them is concerned,\nconsists in the former being directed by nerves proceeding from the\nbrain, the latter by nerves that do not directly communicate with\nthat chief centre of the nervous system--mainly directed towards the\noutside--but with subordinate, minor centres, with the nerve-knots, the\nganglia and their net-work, which preside as it were like vice-gerents\nover the various departments of the nervous system, directing those\ninternal processes that follow upon internal stimuli, just as the\nbrain directs the external actions that follow upon external motives,\nand thus receiving impressions from inside upon which they react\ncorrespondingly, just as the brain receives representations on the\nstrength of which it forms resolutions; only each of these minor\ncentres is confined to a narrower sphere of action. Upon this rests\nthe _vita propria_ of each system, in referring to which Van Helmont\nsaid that each organ has, as it were, its own _ego_. It accounts also\nfor life continuing in parts which have been cut off the bodies of\ninsects, reptiles, and other inferior animals, whose brain has no\nmarked preponderance over the ganglia of single parts; and it likewise\nexplains how many reptiles are able to live for weeks, nay even months,\nafter their brain has been removed. Now, if our surest experience\nteaches us that _the will_, which is known to us in most immediate\nconsciousness and in a totally different way from the outer world,\nis the real agent in actions attended by consciousness and directed\nby the chief centre of the nervous system; how can we help admitting\nthat those other actions which, proceeding from that nervous system\nbut obeying the direction of its subordinate centres, keep the vital\nprocesses constantly going, must also be manifestations of _the will_?\nEspecially as we know perfectly well the cause because of which they\nare not, like the others, attended by consciousness: we know, that is\nto say, that all consciousness resides in the brain and therefore is\nlimited to such parts as have nerves which communicate directly with\nthe brain; and we know also that, even in these, consciousness ceases\nwhen those nerves are severed. By this the difference between all\nthat is conscious and unconscious and together with it the difference\nbetween all that is voluntary and involuntary in the movements of\nthe body is perfectly explained, and no reason remains for assuming\ntwo entirely different primary sources of movement: especially as\n_principia pr\u00e6ter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda_. All this is\nso obvious, that, on impartial reflection from this standpoint, it\nseems almost absurd to persist in making the body serve two masters\nby deriving its actions from two radically different origins and then\nascribing on the one hand the movements of our arms and legs, of our\neyes, lips, throat, tongue and lungs, of the facial and abdominal\nmuscles, to the will; while on the other hand the action of the\nheart, the movements of the veins, the peristaltic movements of the\nintestines, the absorption by the intestinal villi and glands and all\nthose movements which accompany secretion, are supposed to proceed from\na totally different, ever mysterious principle of which we have no\nknowledge, and which is designated by names such as vitality, archeus,\n_spiritus animales_, vital energy, instinct, all of which mean no more\nthan _x_.[201]\n\n  [201] It is especially in secretive processes that we cannot avoid\n  recognising a certain selection of the materials fitted for each\n  purpose, consequently a _free will_ in the secretive organs, which\n  must even be assisted by a certain dull sensation, and in virtue of\n  which each secreting organ only extracts from the same blood that\n  particular secretion which suits it and no others: for instance,\n  the liver only absorbs bile from the blood flowing through it,\n  sending the rest of the blood on, and likewise the salivary glands\n  and the pancreas only secrete saliva, the kidneys only urine, &c.\n  &c. We may therefore compare the organs of secretion to different\n  kinds of cattle grazing on one and the same pasture-land, each of\n  which only browses upon the one sort of herb which suits its own\n  particular appetite. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\nIt is curious and instructive to see the trouble that excellent writer,\nTreviranus[202] takes, to find out in the lower animals, such as\n_infusoria_ and _zoophyta_, which movements are voluntary, and which\nare what he calls automatic or physical, _i.e._ merely vital. He founds\nhis inquiry upon the assumption that he has to do with two primarily\ndifferent sources of movement; whereas in truth they all proceed from\nthe will, and the whole difference consists in their being occasioned\nby stimuli or by motives, _i.e._ in their having a brain for their\nmedium or not; and the stimulus may again be merely interior or\nexterior. In several animals of a higher order--crustaceans and even\nfishes--he finds that the voluntary and vital movements, for instance\nlocomotion and respiration, entirely coincide: a clear proof that their\norigin and essence are identical. He says p. 188: \"In the family of the\n_actinia_, star-fishes, sea-urchins, and _holothuri\u00e6_ (_echinodermata\npedata Cuv._), it is evident that the movement of the fluids depends\nupon the will of the animals and that it is a means of locomotion.\"\nThen again p. 288: \"The gullet of mammals has at its upper end the\npharynx, which expands and contracts by means of muscles resembling\nvoluntary muscles in their formation, yet which do not obey the will.\"\nHere we see how the limits of the movements proceeding from the will\nand of those assumed to be foreign to it, merge into one another.\n_Ibid._, p. 293: \"Thus movements having all the appearance of being\nvoluntary, take place in the stomachs of ruminants. They do not however\nalways stand in connection with the ruminating process only. Even the\nsimpler human stomach and that of many animals only allows free passage\nto what is digestible through its lower orifice, and rejects what is\nindigestible by vomiting.\"\n\n  [202] Treviranus, \"Die Erscheinungen und Gesetze des Organischen\n  Lebens,\" vol. i. pp. 178-185.\n\nThere is moreover special evidence that the movements induced by\nstimuli (involuntary movements) proceed from the will just as well as\nthose occasioned by motives (voluntary movements): for instance, when\nthe same movement follows now upon a stimulus, now again upon a motive,\nas is the case when the pupil of the eye is contracted. This movement,\nwhen caused by increased light, follows upon a stimulus; whereas, when\noccasioned by the wish to examine a very small object minutely in\nclose proximity, it follows upon a motive; because contracting the\npupil enables us to see things distinctly even when quite near to us,\nand this distinctness may be increased by our looking through a hole\npierced in a card with a pin; conversely, the pupil is dilated when we\nlook at distant objects. Surely the same movement of the same organ\nis not likely to proceed alternately from two fundamentally different\nsources.--E. H. Weber[203] relates that he discovered in himself the\npower of dilating and contracting at will the pupil of one of his eyes,\nwhile looking at the same object, so as to make that object appear now\ndistinct, now indistinct, while the other eye remained closed.--Joh.\nM\u00fcller[204] also tries to prove that the will acts upon the pupil.\n\n  [203] E. H. Weber, \"Additamenta ad E. H. Weberi tractatum de motu\n  iridis.\" Lipsia, 1823.\n\n  [204] Joh. M\u00fcller, \"Handbuch der Physiologie,\" p. 764.\n\nThe truth that the innermost mainspring of unconsciously performed\nvital and vegetative functions is the will, we find moreover confirmed\nby the consideration, that even the movement of a limb recognised as\nvoluntary, is only the ultimate result of a multitude of preceding\nchanges which have taken place inside that limb and which no more\nenter into our consciousness than those organic functions. Yet these\nchanges are evidently that which was first set in motion by the will,\nthe movement of the limb being merely their remote consequence;\nnevertheless this remains so foreign to our consciousness that\nphysiologists try to reach it by means of such hypotheses as these:\nthat the sinews and muscular fibre are contracted by a change in the\ncellular tissue wrought by a precipitation of the blood-vapour in\nthat tissue to serum; but that this change is brought about by the\nnerve's action, and this--by _the will_. Thus, even here, it is not\nthe change which proceeded originally from the will which comes into\nconsciousness, but only its remote result; and even this, properly\nspeaking, only through the special perception of the brain in which it\npresents itself together with the whole organism. Now by following the\npath of experimental research and hypotheses physiologists would never\nhave arrived at the truth, that the last link in this ascending causal\nseries is _the will_; it is known to them, on the contrary, in quite a\ndifferent way. The solution of the enigma comes to them in a whisper\nfrom outside the investigation, owing to the fortunate circumstance\nthat the investigator is in this case at the same time himself the\nobject of the investigation and by this learns the secret of the inward\nprocess, his explanation of which would otherwise, like that of every\nother phenomenon, be brought to a standstill by an inscrutable force.\nAnd conversely, if we stood in the same inward relation towards every\nnatural phenomenon as towards our own organism, the explanation of\nevery natural phenomenon, as well as of all the properties of every\nbody, would likewise ultimately be reduced to a will manifesting itself\nin them. For the difference does not reside in the thing itself, but\nin our relation to the thing. Wherever explanation of the physical\ncomes to an end, it is met by the metaphysical; and wherever this\nlast is accessible to immediate knowledge, the result will be, as\nhere, the will. That even those parts of the body whose movements do\nnot proceed from the brain, do not follow upon motives, and are not\nvoluntary, are nevertheless ruled and animated by the will, is also\nshown by their participation in all unusually violent movements of\nthe will, _i.e._ emotions and passions. We see, for instance, the\nquickened pulse in joy or alarm, the blush in embarrassment, the\ncheek's pallor in terror or in suppressed anger, the tears of sorrow,\nthe difficult breathing and increased activity of the intestines\nin terror, watering of the mouth at the sight of dainties, nausea\noccasioned by that of loathsome objects, strongly accelerated\ncirculation of the blood and even altered quality of bile through\nwrath, and of saliva through violent rage: this last even to the\ndegree, that an excessively irritated dog may communicate hydrophobia\nby its bite without being itself affected with rabies, or even then\ncontracting the disease--and the same is also asserted of cats and of\ncocks. The organism is further deeply undermined by lasting grief,\nand may be mortally affected by fright as well as by sudden joy. On\nthe other hand, all those inner processes and changes which only have\nto do with the intellect and do not concern the will, however great\nmay be their importance, remain without influence upon the machinery\nof the organism, with the one exception, that mental activity,\nprolonged to excess, fatigues and gradually exhausts the brain and\nfinally undermines the organism. This again confirms the fact that the\nintellect is of a secondary character, and merely the organic function\nof a single part, a product of life; not the innermost kernel of our\nbeing, not the thing in itself, not metaphysical, incorporeal, eternal,\nlike the will: the will never tires, never grows old, never learns,\nnever improves by practice, is in infancy what it is in old age,\neternally one and the same, and its character in each individual is\nunchangeable. Being essential moreover, it is likewise immutable, and\ntherefore exists in animals as it does in us; for it does not, like\nthe intellect, depend upon the perfection of the organization, but\nis in every essential respect in all animals the same thing which we\nknow so intimately. Accordingly animals have all the feelings which\nbelong to man: joy, grief, fear, anger, love, hate, desire, envy, &c.\n&c. The great difference between man and the brute creation consists\nexclusively in the degrees of perfection of the intellect. This however\nis leading us too far from our subject, so I refer my readers to my\nchief work, vol. ii. chap. 19, _sub._ 2.\n\nAfter the cogent reasons just given in favour of the primary _agens_\nin the inward machinery of the organism being the very same will\nwhich rules the outward actions of the body and only reveals itself\nas the will in this passage through consciousness because here it\nneeds the mediation of outwardly directed knowledge, we shall not be\nastonished to find that other physiologists besides Brandis had, by\nmeans of strictly empirical research, also recognised this truth more\nor less clearly. Meckel,[205] in his \"Archiv f\u00fcr die Physiologie,\"\narrives quite empirically and impartially at the conclusion, that\nvegetative existence [in animals], the first growth of the embryo,\nthe assimilation of nourishment and plant-life, ought properly to\nbe considered as manifestations of the will, nay, that even the\ninclination of the magnetic needle seems to be something of the same\nkind. \"The assumption,\" he says, \"of a certain free will in every\nvital movement may perhaps be justified.\" \"Plants appear to seek\nlight voluntarily,\" &c. &c. This book is dated 1819 just after the\nappearance of my work; and as, to say the least, it is doubtful whether\nit had any influence upon him or whether he was even aware of its\nexistence, I class these utterances among the independent empirical\nconfirmations of my doctrine. Burdach also,[206] in his great work on\nPhysiology, arrives by a completely empirical road at the conclusion,\nthat \"self-love is a force belonging to all things indiscriminately.\"\nHe points it out, first in animals, then in plants, and lastly in\ninanimate bodies. But what is self-love after all, if not the will\nto preserve our existence, the will to live? Under the heading\n\"Comparative Anatomy,\" I shall quote a passage from the same book,\nwhich confirms my view still more decidedly. That the doctrine, which\nteaches that the will is the vital principle, has begun to spread even\nto the wider circles of medical science and to meet with a favourable\nreception from its younger representatives, I notice with particular\npleasure in the theses sustained by Dr. Von Sigriz on taking his degree\nat Munich (August, 1835), which commence as follows: 1. _Sanguis est\ndeterminans formam organismi se evolventis._ 2. _Evolutio organica\ndeterminatur vit\u00e6 intern\u00e6 actione et_ voluntate.\n\n  [205] Meckel, \"A. f. d. P.\" vol. 5, pp. 195-198.\n\n  [206] Burdach, \"Physiologie,\" vol. i. \u00a7 259, p. 388.\n\nLastly, a very remarkable and unexpected corroboration of this part of\nmy doctrine has to be mentioned, which has recently been communicated\nfrom ancient Hindoo philosophy by Colebrook. In his exposition of the\nphilosophical schools of the Hindoos,[207] he quotes the following\nas the doctrine of the Nyaga school: \"Volition, Yatna, effort or\nmanifestation of the Will, is a self-determination to act which gives\nsatisfaction. Desire is its occasion, perception its motive. Two kinds\nof perceptible effort of the will are distinguished: that which springs\nfrom desire which seeks the agreeable, and that which springs from\naversion which shuns the repulsive. Another species, which escapes\nsensation and perception, but is inferred from analogy of spontaneous\nacts, comprises animal functions, having for a cause the vital, unseen\npower.\" Here the words \"animal functions\" are evidently used, not in\na physiological, but in a popular sense: so that here organic life\nis unquestionably derived from the will. We find a similar statement\nin Colebrook's Report on the Vedas[208] where he says: \"_Asu is\nunconscious volition_, which occasions an act necessary to the support\nof life, as breathing, &c.\"\n\n  [207] \"Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Great Britain,\" 1824,\n  p. 110.\n\n  [208] \"Asiatic Researches,\" vol. 8, p. 426.\n\nMoreover my reduction of vital energy to the will by no means\ninterferes with the old division of its functions into reproductive\nforce, irritability and sensibility. This division remains a deep view\nof their difference, and gives occasion for interesting observations.\n\n_The faculty of reproduction_, objectified in the cellular tissue\nof plants, constitutes the chief characteristic of plants and the\nvegetative element in Man. Where we find it predominant to excess\nin human beings, we assume them to be phlegmatic, dull, indolent,\nobtuse (B\u0153otians); though this assumption does not always meet with\nconfirmation. _Irritability_, objectified in the muscular tissue,\nconstitutes the chief characteristic of Animals and the animal element\nin Man. Where it predominates to excess, dexterity, strength, bravery,\nthat is, fitness for bodily exertion and for war, is usually to be\nfound (Spartans). Nearly all warm-blooded animals and even insects\nfar surpass Man in irritability. It is by irritability that animals\nare most vividly conscious of their existence; wherefore they exult\nin manifesting it. There is even still a trace of that exultation\nperceptible in Man, in dancing. _Sensibility_, objectified in the\nnerves, is Man's chief characteristic, and constitutes what is properly\nhuman in him. In this no animal can in the remotest degree compare\nwith Man. Where it predominates to excess, it produces _genius_\n(Athenians). Accordingly a man of genius is in a higher degree a _man_.\nThis explains why some men of genius have been unwilling to recognise\nother men, with their monotonous physiognomies and universal stamp of\ncommonplace mediocrity, as human beings: for in them they did not find\ntheir equals and naturally came to the erroneous conclusion that their\nown was the normal standard. Diogenes sought for men with a lantern in\nthis sense;--in that work of genius, the Koheleth (Ecclesiastes) it\nis said:[209] \"_One_ man among a thousand have I found, but one woman\namong all those have I not found;\" and Gracian in his Criticon--perhaps\nthe grandest and most beautiful allegory ever written--says: \"But what\nwas strangest of all, in the whole country, even in the most populous\ncities, they did not meet with a single _man_; on the contrary these\ncities were inhabited by lions, tigers, leopards, wolves, foxes, apes,\noxen, asses, pigs,--nowhere was there a man! They only made out after\na time that the few existing human beings, in order to hide themselves\nand not to witness what was going on, had retired to those desert\nplaces which ought to have been the dwellings of wild beasts.\" The\nsame reason indeed accounts for the peculiar inclination of all men of\ngenius for solitude, to which they are driven by their difference from\nthe rest, and for which their own inner wealth qualifies them. For,\nwith humanity it is as with diamonds, the extraordinarily great ones\nalone are fitted to be _solitaires_, while those of ordinary size have\nto be set in clusters to produce any effect.\n\n  [209] Ecclesiastes, ch. 7, v. 28.\n\nEven the three _Gunas_, or fundamental qualities of the Hindoos,\ntally with the three physiological fundamental forces. _Tamas-Guna_,\nobtuseness, stupidity, corresponds to reproductive power; _Rajas-Guna_,\npassionateness, to irritability; and _Sattwa-Guna_, wisdom and virtue,\nto sensibility. When however they add to this, that Tamas-Guna is\nthe fate of animals, Rajas-Guna the fate of man, and Sattwa-Guna\nthat of the Gods, this is to be taken in a mythological, rather than\nphysiological sense.\n\nIn Chapter 20th of the 2nd Vol. of my chief work entitled\n\"Objectification of the Will in the Animal Organism,\" I have likewise\ntreated the argument of the present chapter; therefore I advise\nmy readers to read it after this, as a complement to what is here\ngiven.[210]\n\n  [210] In my \"Parerga,\" \u00a7 94 of the 2nd vol. (\u00a7 96 in the 2nd\n  edition) belongs also to the above.\n\nI may observe, that the passages I have quoted from pp. 14 and 15 of my\nEssay on Colours, refer to the first edition.\n\n\n\n\nCOMPARATIVE ANATOMY.\n\n\nNow, from my proposition: that the Will is what Kant calls the \"thing\nin itself\"[211] or the ultimate substratum of every phenomenon, I had\nhowever not only deduced that the will is the agent in all inner,\nunconscious functions of the body, but also that the organism itself is\nnothing but the will which has entered the region of representation,\nthe will itself, perceived in the cognitive form of Space. I had\naccordingly said that, just as each single momentary act of willing\npresents itself at once directly and infallibly in the outer perception\nof the body as one of its actions, so also must the collective volition\nof each animal, the totality[212] of its efforts, be faithfully\nportrayed in its whole body, in the constitution of its organism; and\nthat the means supplied by its organisation for attaining the aims of\nits will must as a whole exactly correspond to those aims--in short,\nthat the same relation must exist between the whole character of its\nvolition and the shape and nature of its body, as between each single\nact of its will and the single bodily action which carries it out. Even\nthis too has recently been recognised as a fact, and accordingly been\nconfirmed _\u00e0 posteriori_, by thoughtful zootomists and physiologists\nfrom their own point of view and independently of my doctrine: their\njudgments on this point make Nature testify even here to the truth of\nmy theory.\n\n  [211] _Ding an sich._\n\n  [212] _Inbegriff._\n\nIn Pander and d'Alton's admirable illustrated work[213] we find: \"Just\nas all that is characteristic in the formation of bones springs from\nthe _character_ of the animals, so does that character, on the other\nhand, develop out of their _tendencies and desires_. These _tendencies\nand desires_ of animals, which are _so vividly expressed_ in their\nwhole organisation and of which that organisation only appears to be\nthe medium, cannot be explained by special primary forces, since we\ncan only deduce their inner reason from the general life of Nature.\"\nBy this last turn the author shows indeed that he has arrived at the\npoint where, like all other investigators of Nature, he is brought\nto a standstill by the metaphysical; but he also shows, that up to\nthis point beyond which Nature eludes investigation, _tendencies and\ndesires_ (_i.e._ will) were the utmost thing knowable. The shortest\nexpression for his last conclusion about animals would be \"As they\nwill, so they are.\"\n\n  [213] Pander and d'Alton, \"Ueber die Skelette der Raubthiere,\"\n  1822, p. 7.\n\nThe learned and thoughtful Burdach,[214] when treating of the ultimate\nreason of the genesis of the embryo in his great work on Physiology,\nbears witness no less explicitly to the truth of my view. I must not,\nunfortunately, conceal the fact that in a weak moment, misled Heaven\nknows by what or how, this otherwise excellent man brings in just here\na few sentences taken from that utterly worthless, tyrannically imposed\npseudo-philosophy, about 'thought' being what is primary (it is just\nwhat is last and most conditioned of all) yet 'no representation'\n(that is to say, a wooden iron). Immediately after however, under the\nreturning influence of his own better self, he proclaims the real truth\n(p. 710): \"The brain curves itself outwards to the retina, because the\ncentral part of the embryo _desires_ to take in the impressions of\nthe activity of the world; the mucous membrane of the intestinal canal\ndevelops into the lung, because the organic body _desires_ to enter\ninto relation with the elementary substances of the universe; organs of\ngeneration spring from the vascular system, because the individual only\nlives in the species, and because the life which has commenced in the\nindividual _desires_ to multiply.\" This assertion of Burdach's, which\nso entirely agrees with my doctrine, reminds me of a passage in the\nancient Mahabharata, which it is really difficult not to regard as a\nmythical version of the same truth. It is in the third Canto of \"Sundas\nand Upasunda\" in Bopp's \"Ardschuna's Reise zu Indra's Himmel\"[215]\n(1824); Brahma has just created Tilottama, the fairest of women, who\nis walking round the circle of the assembled gods. Shiva conceives\nso violent a longing to gaze at her as she turns successively round\nthe circle, that four faces arise in him according to her different\npositions, that is, according to the four cardinal points. This may\naccount for Shiva being represented with five heads, as Pansh Mukhti\nShiva. Countless eyes arise on every part of Indra's body likewise on\nthe same occasion.[216] In fact, every organ must be looked upon as the\nexpression of a universal manifestation of the will, _i.e._ of one made\nonce for all, of a fixed longing, of an act of volition proceeding,\nnot from the individual, but from the species. Every animal form\nis a longing of the will to live which is roused by circumstances;\nfor instance, the will is seized with a longing to live on trees, to\nhang on their branches, to devour their leaves, without contention\nwith other animals and without ever touching the ground: this longing\npresents itself throughout endless time in the form (or Platonic\nIdea) of the sloth. It can hardly walk at all, being only adapted for\nclimbing; helpless on the ground, it is agile on trees and looks itself\nlike a moss-clad bough in order to escape the notice of its pursuers.\nBut now let us consider the matter from a somewhat more methodical and\nless poetical point of view.\n\n  [214] Burdach, \"Physiologie,\" vol. 2, \u00a7 474.\n\n  [215] Bopp, \"Ardschuna's Reise zu Indra's Himmel, nebst anderen\n  Episoden des Mahabharata\" (Ardshuna's Journey to Indra's Heaven\n  together with other episodes from the Mahabharata), 1824.\n\n  [216] The Matsya Parana attributes a similar origin to Brahma's\n  four countenances. It relates that, having fallen in love with his\n  daughter Satarupa, and gazed fixedly at her, she stepped aside to\n  avoid his eye; he being ashamed, would not follow her movement;\n  whereupon a new face arose on him directed towards the side where\n  she was and, on her once more moving, the same thing occurred,\n  and was repeated, until at last he had four faces. (\"Asiatic\n  Researches,\" vol. 6, p. 473.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\nThe manifest adaptation of each animal for its mode of life and outward\nmeans of subsistence, even down to the smallest detail, together with\nthe exceeding perfection of its organisation, form abundant material\nfor teleological contemplation, which has always been a favourite\noccupation of the human mind, and which, extended even to inanimate\nNature, has become the argument of the Physico-theological Proof.\nThe universal fitness for their ends, the obviously intentional\ndesign in all the parts of the organism of the lower animals without\nexception, proclaim too distinctly for it ever to have been seriously\nquestioned, that here no forces of Nature acting by chance and without\nplan have been at work, but a will. Now, that a will should act\notherwise than under the guidance of knowledge was inconceivable,\naccording to empirical science and views. For, up to my time, as\nhas been shown in the last chapter, _will_ and _intellect_ had been\nregarded as absolutely inseparable, nay, the will was looked upon as\na mere operation of the intellect, that presumptive basis of all that\nis spiritual. Accordingly wherever the will acted, knowledge must\nhave been its guide; consequently it must have been its guide here\nalso. But the mediation of knowledge, which, as such, is exclusively\ndirected towards the outside, brings with it, that a will acting by\nmeans of it, can only act outwardly, that is, only from _one_ being\nupon _another_. Therefore the will, of which unmistakable traces\nhad been found, was not sought for where these were discovered, but\nwas removed to the outside, and the animal became the product of a\nwill foreign to it, guided by knowledge, which must have been very\nclear knowledge indeed, nay, the deeply excogitated conception of a\npurpose; and this purpose must have preceded the animal's existence,\nand, together with the will, whose product the animal is, have\nlain outside that animal. According to this, the animal would have\nexisted in representation before existing in reality. This is the\nbasis of the train of thought on which the Physico-theological Proof\nis founded. But this proof is no mere scholastic sophism, like the\nOntological Proof: nor does it contain an untiring natural opponent\nwithin itself, like the Cosmological Proof, in that very same law of\ncausality to which it owes its existence. On the contrary, it is, in\nreality, for the educated, what the Keraunological Proof[217] is for\nthe vulgar,[218] and its plausibility is so great, so potent, that the\nmost eminent and at the same time least prejudiced minds have been\ndeeply entangled in it. Voltaire, for instance, who, after all sorts of\nother doubts, always comes back to it, sees no possibility of getting\nover it and even places its evidence almost on a level with that of\na mathematical demonstration. Even Priestley too declares it to be\nirrefutable.[219] Hume's reflection and acumen alone stood the test,\neven in this case; in his \"Dialogues on Natural Religion,\"[220] which\nare so well worth reading, this true precursor of Kant calls attention\nto the fact, that there is no resemblance at all between the works of\nNature and those of an Art which proceeds according to a design. Now\nit is precisely where he cuts asunder the _nervus probandi_ of this\nextremely insidious proof, as well as that of the two others--in his\nCritique of Judgment and in his Critique of Pure Reason--that Kant's\nmerit shines most brilliantly. A very brief summary of this Kantian\nrefutation of the Physico-theological Proof may be found in my chief\nwork.[221] Kant has earned for himself great merit by it; for nothing\nstands so much in the way of a correct insight into Nature and into\nthe essence of things as this view, by which they are looked upon as\nhaving been made according to a preconceived plan. Therefore, if a\nDuke of Bridgewater offers a prize of high value for the confirmation\nand perpetuation of such fundamental errors, let it be our task,\nfollowing in the footsteps of Hume and Kant, to work undauntedly at\ntheir destruction, without any other reward than truth. Truth deserves\nrespect: not what is opposed to it. Nevertheless here, as elsewhere,\nKant has confined himself to negation; but a negation only takes full\neffect when it has been completed by a correct affirmation, this alone\ngiving entire satisfaction and in itself dislodging and superseding\nerror, according to the words of Spinoza: _Sicut lux se ipsa et\ntenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est_. First of all\ntherefore we say: the world is not made with the help of knowledge,\nconsequently also not from the outside, but from the inside; and next\nwe endeavour to point out the _punctum saliens_[222] of the world-egg.\nThe physico-theological thought, that Nature must have been regulated\nand fashioned by an intellect, however well it may suit the untutored\nmind, is nevertheless fundamentally wrong. For the intellect is only\nknown to us in animal nature, consequently as an absolutely secondary\nand subordinate principle in the world, a product of the latest origin;\nit can never therefore have been the condition of the existence of that\nworld.[223] Now the will on the contrary, being that which fills every\nthing and manifests itself immediately in each--thus showing each thing\nto be its phenomenon--appears everywhere as that which is primary.\nIt is just for this reason, that the explanation of all teleological\nfacts is to be found in the will of the being itself in which they are\nobserved.\n\n  [217] I should like under this name to add a fourth to the three\n  proofs brought forward by Kant, _i.e._ the proof _a terrore_, which\n  the ancient saying of Petronius: _primus in orbe Deos fecit timor_,\n  designates and of which Hume's incomparable \"Natural History of\n  Religion\" may be considered as the critique. Understood in this\n  sense, even the theologist Schleiermacher's attempted proof might\n  have its truth from the feeling of dependence, though perhaps not\n  exactly that truth which its originator imagined it to have.\n\n  [218] Socrates propounded it already in detail in Xenophon. (\"Mem.\"\n  i. 4.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\n  [219] Priestley, \"Disqu. on Matter and Spirit,\" sect. 16, p. 188.\n\n  [220] Part 7, and in other places.\n\n  [221] See \"Die Welt als W. u. V.\" vol. i. p. 597. (Vol. i. p. 631\n  of the 3rd ed.)\n\n  [222] The point at which the life-spark is kindled. [Tr.]\n\n  [223] Nor can a _mundus intelligibilis_ precede a _mundus\n  sensibilis_; since it receives its material from the latter alone.\n  It is not an intellect which has brought forth Nature; it is, on\n  the contrary, Nature which has brought forth the intellect. [Add.\n  to 3rd ed.]\n\nBesides, the Physico-theological Proof may be simply invalidated by the\nempirical observation, that works produced by animal instinct, such as\nthe spider's web, the bee's honeycomb and its cells, the white ant's\nconstructions, &c. &c., are throughout constituted as if they were the\nresult of an intentional conception, of a wide-reaching providence\nand of rational deliberation; whereas they are evidently the work of\na blind impulse, _i.e._ of a will not guided by knowledge. From this\nit follows, that the conclusion from such and such a nature to such\nand such a mode of coming into being, has not the same certainty as\nthe conclusion from a consequent to its reason, which is in all cases\na sure one. I have devoted the twenty-seventh chapter of the second\nvolume of my chief work to a detailed consideration of the mechanical\ninstincts of animals, which may be used, together with the preceding\none on Teleology, to complete the whole examination of this subject in\nthe present chapter.\n\nNow, if we enter more closely into the above-mentioned fitness of every\nanimal's organisation for its mode of life and means of subsistence,\nthe question that first presents itself is, whether that mode of life\nhas been adapted to the organisation, or _vice versa_. At first sight,\nthe former assumption would seem to be the more correct one; since, in\nTime, the organisation precedes the mode of life, and the animal is\nthought to have adopted the mode of existence for which its structure\nwas best suited, making the best use of the organs it found within\nitself: thus, for instance, we think that the bird flies because it has\nwings, and that the ox butts because it has horns; not conversely. This\nview is shared by Lucretius, (always an ominous sign for an opinion):\n\n  \"Nil ideo quoniam natum est in corpore, ut uti\n  Possemus; sed, quod natum est, id procreat usum.\"[224]\n\n  [224] This is expanded, vol. iv. pp. 825-843.\n\nOnly this assumption does not explain how, collectively, the quite\ndifferent parts of an animal's organism so exactly correspond to\nits way of life; how no organ interferes with another, each rather\nassisting the others and none remaining unemployed; also that no\nsubordinate organ would be better suited to another mode of existence,\nwhile the life which the animal really leads is determined by the\nprincipal organs alone, but, on the contrary, each part of the animal\nnot only corresponds to every other part, but also to its mode of life:\nits claws, for instance, are invariably adapted for seizing the prey\nwhich its teeth are suited to tear and break, and its intestinal canal\nto digest: its limbs are constructed to convey it where that prey is\nto be found, and no organ ever remains unemployed. The ant-bear, for\ninstance, is not only armed with long claws on its fore-feet, in order\nto break into the nests of the white ant, but also with a prolonged\ncylindrical muzzle, in order to penetrate into them, with a small mouth\nand a long, threadlike tongue, covered with a glutinous slime, which it\ninserts into the white ants' nests and then withdraws covered with the\ninsects that adhere to it: on the other hand it has no teeth, because\nit does not want them. Who can fail to see that the ant-bear's form\nstands in the same relation to the white ants, as an act of the will to\nits motive? The contradiction between the powerful fore-feet and long,\nstrong, curved claws of the ant-bear and its complete lack of teeth,\nis at the same time so extraordinary, that if the earth ever undergoes\na fresh transformation, the newly arising race of rational beings will\nfind it an insoluble enigma, if white ants are unknown to them. The\nnecks of birds, as of quadrupeds, are generally as long as their legs,\nto enable them to reach down to the ground where they pick up their\nfood; but those of aquatic birds are often a good deal longer, because\nthey have to fetch up their nourishment from under the water while\nswimming.[225] Moor-fowl have exceedingly long legs, to enable them to\nwade without drowning or wetting their bodies, and a correspondingly\nlong neck and beak, this last being more or less strong, according to\nthe things (reptiles, fishes or worms) which have to be crushed; and\nthe intestines of these animals are invariably adapted likewise to this\nend. On the other hand, moor-fowl are provided neither with talons,\nlike birds of prey, nor with web-feet, like ducks: for the _lex\nparsimoni\u00e6 natur\u00e6_ admits of no superfluous organ. Now, it is precisely\nthis very law, added to the circumstance, that no organ required for\nits mode of life is ever wanting in any animal, and that all, even the\nmost heterogeneous, harmonize together and are, as it were, calculated\nfor a quite specially determined way of life, for the element in which\nthe prey dwells, for the pursuit, the overcoming, the crushing and\ndigesting of that prey,--all this, we say, proves, that the animal's\nstructure has been determined by the mode of life by which the animal\ndesired to find its sustenance, and not _vice versa_. It also proves,\nthat the result is exactly the same as if a knowledge of that mode of\nlife and of its outward conditions had preceded the structure, and as\nif therefore each animal had chosen its equipment before it assumed a\nbody; just as a sportsman before starting chooses his whole equipment,\ngun, powder, shot, pouch, hunting-knife and dress, according to the\ngame he intends chasing. The latter does not take aim at the wild boar\nbecause he happens to have a rifle: he took the rifle with him and not\na fowling-piece, because he intended to hunt the wild boar; and the ox\ndoes not butt because it happens to have horns: it has horns because\nit intends to butt. Now, to render this proof complete, we have the\nadditional circumstance, that in many animals, during the time they\nare growing, the effort of the will to which a limb is destined to\nminister, manifests itself before the existence of the limb itself,\nits employment thus anticipating its existence. Young he-goats, rams,\ncalves, for instance, butt with their bare polls before they have any\nhorns; the young boar tries to gore on either side, before its tusks\nare fully developed which would respond to the intended effect, while\non the other hand, it neglects to use the smaller teeth it already\nhas in its mouth and with which it might really bite. Thus its mode\nof defending itself does not adapt itself to the existing weapons,\nbut _vice versa_. This had already been noticed by Galenus[226] and by\nLucretius[227] before him. All these circumstances give us complete\ncertainty, that the will does not, as a supplementary thing proceeding\nfrom the intellect, employ those instruments which it may happen to\nfind, or use the parts because just they and no others chance to be\nthere; but that what is primary and original, is the endeavour to\nlive in this particular way, to contend in this manner, an endeavour\nwhich manifests itself not only in the employment, but even in the\nexistence of the weapon: so much so indeed, that the use of the weapon\nfrequently precedes its existence, thus denoting that it is the weapon\nwhich arises out of the existence of the endeavour, not, conversely,\nthe desire to use it out of the existence of the weapon. Aristotle\nexpressed this long ago, when he said, with reference to insects armed\nwith stings:[228] \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u1f78\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f45\u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 (_quia iram habent,\narma habent_), and further on, generally speaking:[229] \u03a4\u1f70 \u03b4' \u1f44\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f21 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb' \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f44\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1 (_Natura\nenim instrumenta ad officium, non officium ad instrumenta accommodat_).\nFrom which it follows, that the structure of each animal is adapted to\nits will.\n\n  [225] I have seen (Zooplast. Cab. 1860) a humming-bird (_colibri_)\n  with a beak as long as the whole bird, head and tail included.\n  This bird must certainly have had to fetch out its food from\n  a considerable depth, were it only from the calyx of a flower\n  (Cuvier, \"Anat. Comp.\" vol. iv. p. 374); otherwise it would not\n  have given itself the luxury, or submitted to the encumbrance, of\n  such a beak.\n\n  [226] Galenus, \"De Usu Partium Anim.,\" i. 1.\n\n  [227] Lucretius, v. pp. 1032-1039.\n\n  [228] Aristot., \"De Part. Animal.,\" iv. 6: \"They have a weapon\n  because they have passion.\" [Tr.]\n\n  [229] _Ibid._ c. 12: \"Nature makes the tools for the work, not the\n  work for the tools.\" [Tr.]\n\nThis truth forces itself upon thoughtful zoologists and zootomists\nwith such cogency, that unless their mind is at the same time purified\nby a deeper philosophy, it may lead them into strange errors. Now\nthis actually happened to a very eminent zoologist, the immortal De\nLamarck, who has acquired everlasting fame by his discovery of the\nclassification of animals in _vertebrata_ and _non-vertebrata_, so\nadmirable in depth of view. For he quite seriously maintains and tries\nto prove[230] at length, that the shape of each animal species, the\nweapons peculiar to it, and its organs of every sort destined for\noutward use, were by no means present at the origin of that species,\nbut have on the contrary _come into being_ gradually _in the course\nof time_ and through continued generation, in consequence of the\nexertions of the animal's will, evoked by the nature of its position\nand surroundings, through its own repeated efforts and the habits to\nwhich these gave rise. Aquatic birds and mammalia that swim, he says,\nhave only become web-footed through stretching their toes asunder in\nswimming; moor-fowl acquired their long legs and necks by wading;\nhorned cattle only gradually acquired horns because as they had no\nproper teeth for combating, they fought with their heads, and this\ncombative propensity in course of time produced horns or antlers; the\nsnail was originally, like other _mollusca_, without feelers; but out\nof the desire to feel the objects lying before it, these gradually\narose; the whole feline species acquired claws only in course of time,\nfrom their desire to tear the flesh of their prey, and the moveable\ncoverings of those claws, from the necessity of protecting them in\nwalking without being prevented from using them when they wished; the\ngiraffe, in the barren, grassless African deserts, being reduced for\nits food to the leaves of lofty trees, stretched out its neck and\nforelegs until at last it acquired its singular shape, with a height\nin front of twenty feet, and thus De Lamarck goes on describing a\nmultitude of animal species as arising according to the same principle,\nin doing which he overlooks the obvious objection which may be made,\nthat long before the organs necessary for its preservation could have\nbeen produced by means of such endeavours as these through countless\ngenerations, the whole species must have died out from the want of\nthem. To such a degree may we be blinded by a hypothesis which has once\nlaid hold of us! Nevertheless in this instance the hypothesis arose\nout of a very correct and profound view of Nature: it is an error of\ngenius, which in spite of all the absurdity it contains, still does\nhonour to its originator. The true part of it belongs to De Lamarck,\nas an investigator of Nature; he saw rightly that the primary element\nwhich has determined the animal's organisation, is the will of that\nanimal itself. The false part must be laid to the account of the\nbackward state of Metaphysics in France, where the views of Locke and\nof his feeble follower, Condillac, in fact still hold their ground and\ntherefore bodies are held to be things in themselves, Time and Space\nqualities of things in themselves; and where the great doctrine of the\nIdeal nature of Space and of Time and of all that is represented in\nthem, which has been so extremely fertile in its results, has not yet\npenetrated. De Lamarck therefore could not conceive his construction\nof living beings otherwise than in Time, through succession. Errors of\nthis sort, as well as the gross, absurd, atomic theory of the French\nand the edifying physico-theological considerations of the English,\nhave been banished for ever from Germany by Kant's profound influence.\nSo salutary was the effect produced by this great mind, even upon a\nnation capable of subsequently forsaking him to run after charlatanism\nand empty bombast. But the thought could never enter into De Lamarck's\nhead, that the animal's will, as a thing in itself, might lie outside\nTime, and in this sense be prior to the animal itself. Therefore he\nassumes the animal to have first been without any clearly defined\norgans, but also without any clearly defined tendencies, and to have\nbeen equipped only with perception. Through this it learns to know the\ncircumstances in which it has to live and from that knowledge arise\nits desires, _i.e._ its will, from which again spring its organs or\ndefinite embodiment; this last indeed with the help of generation and\ntherefore in boundless Time. If De Lamarck had had the courage to carry\nout his theory fully, he ought to have assumed a primary animal[231]\nwhich, to be consistent, must have originally had neither shape nor\norgans, and then proceeded to transform itself according to climate\nand local conditions into myriads of animal shapes of all sorts, from\nthe gnat to the elephant.--But this primary animal is in truth the\n_will to live_; as such however, it is metaphysical, not physical. Most\ncertainly the shape and organisation of each animal species has been\ndetermined by its own will according to the circumstances in which\nit wished to live; not however as a thing physical in Time, but on\nthe contrary as a thing metaphysical outside Time. The will did not\nproceed from the intellect, nor did the intellect exist, together with\nthe animal, before the will made its appearance as a mere accident,\na secondary, or rather tertiary, thing. It is on the contrary the\nwill which is the _prius_, the thing in itself: its phenomenon (mere\nrepresentation in the cognitive intellect and its forms of Space and\nTime) is the animal, fully equipped with all its organs which represent\nthe will to live in those particular circumstances. Among these organs\nis the intellect also--knowledge itself--which, like the rest of those\norgans, is exactly adapted to the mode of life of each animal; whereas,\naccording to De Lamarck, it is the will which arises out of knowledge.\nBehold the countless varieties of animal shapes; how entirely is each\nof them the mere image of its volition, the evident expression of the\nstrivings of the will which constitute its character! Their difference\nin shape is only the portrait of their difference in character.\nFerocious animals, destined for combat and rapine, appear armed with\nformidable teeth and claws and strong muscles; their sight is adapted\nfor great distances, especially when they have to mark their prey from\na dizzy height, as is the case with eagles and condors. Timid animals,\nwhose will it is to seek their safety in flight instead of contest,\npresent themselves with light, nimble legs and sharp hearing in lieu\nof all weapons; a circumstance which has even necessitated a striking\nprolongation of the outer ear in the most timid of them all, the hare.\nThe interior corresponds to the exterior: carnivorous animals have\nshort intestines; herbivorous animals long ones, suited to a protracted\nassimilation. Vigorous respiration and rapid circulation of the blood,\nrepresented by appropriate organs, always accompany great muscular\nstrength and irritability as their necessary conditions, and nowhere is\ncontradiction possible. Each particular striving of the will presents\nitself in a particular modification of shape. The abode of the prey\ntherefore has determined the shape of its pursuer: if that prey takes\nrefuge in regions difficult of access, in remote hiding places, in\nnight or darkness, the pursuer assumes the form best suited to those\ncircumstances, and no shape is rejected as too grotesque by the will to\nlive, in order to attain its ends. The cross-bill (_loxia curvirostra_)\npresents itself with this abnormal form of its organ of nutrition,\nin order to be able to extract the seeds out of the scales of the\nfir-cone. Moor-fowls appear equipped with extra long legs, extra long\nnecks and extra long beaks, in short, the strangest shapes, in order to\nseek out reptiles in their marshes. Then we have the ant-bear with its\nbody four feet long, its short legs, its strong claws, and its long,\nnarrow, toothless muzzle provided with a threadlike, glutinous tongue\nfor the purpose of digging out the white ants from their nests. The\npelican goes fishing with a huge pouch under its beak in which to pack\nits fish, when caught. In order to surprise their prey while asleep in\nthe night, owls fly out provided with enormous pupils which enable them\nto see in the dark, and with very soft feathers to make their flight\nnoiseless and thus permit them to fall unawares upon their sleeping\nprey without awakening it by their movements. _Silurus_, _gymnotus_\nand _torpedo_ bring a complete electric apparatus into the world with\nthem, in order to stun their prey before they can reach it; and also\nas a defence against _their own_ pursuers. For wherever anything\nliving breathed, there immediately came another to devour it,[232]\nand every animal is in a way designed and calculated throughout, down\nto the minutest detail, for the purpose of destroying some other\nanimal. Ichneumons, for instance, among insects, lay their eggs in\nthe bodies of certain caterpillars and similar _larv\u00e6_, in which they\nbore holes with their stings, in order to ensure nourishment for their\nfuture brood. Now those kinds which feed on _larv\u00e6_ that crawl about\nfreely, have short stings not more than about one-third of an inch\nlong, whereas _pimpla manifestator_, which feeds upon _chelostoma\nmaxillosa_, whose _larv\u00e6_ lie hidden in old trees at great depth and\nare not accessible to it, has a sting two inches long; and the sting of\nthe _ichneumon strobill\u00e6_ which lays its eggs in _larv\u00e6_ dwelling in\nfir-cones, is nearly as long. With these stings they penetrate to the\n_larva_ in which they bore a hole and deposit one egg, whose product\nsubsequently devours this _larva_.[233] Just as clearly does the will\nto escape their enemies manifest itself in the defensive equipment\nof animals that are the objects of pursuit. Hedgehogs and porcupines\nraise up a forest of spears; armadillos, scaly ant-eaters and tortoises\nappear cased from head to foot in armour which is inaccessible to\ntooth, beak or claw; and so it is, on a smaller scale, with the whole\nclass of _crustacea_. Others again seek protection by deceiving their\npursuers rather than by resisting them physically: thus the sepia has\nprovided itself with materials for surrounding itself with a dark\ncloud on the approach of danger. The sloth is deceptively like its\nmoss-clad bough, and the frog its leaf; and many insects resemble their\ndwelling-places. The negro's louse is black;[234] so, to be sure, is\nour flea also; but the latter, in providing itself with an extremely\npowerful apparatus for making irregular jumps to a considerable\ndistance, trusted to these for protection.--We can however make the\nanticipation in all these arrangements more intelligible to ourselves\nby the same anticipation which shows itself in the mechanical instincts\nof animals. Neither the young spider nor the ant-lion know the prey for\nwhich they lay traps, when they do it for the first time. And it is\nthe same when they are on the defensive. According to Latreille, the\ninsect _bombex_ kills the _parnope_ with its sting, although it neither\neats it nor is attacked by it, simply because the _parnope_ will lay\nits eggs in the _bombex's_ nest, and by doing this will interfere with\nthe development of its eggs; yet it does not know this. Anticipations\nof this kind once more confirm the ideal nature of Time, which indeed\nalways becomes manifest as soon as the will as thing in itself is\nin question. Not only with respect to the points here mentioned, but\nto many others besides, the mechanical instincts and physiological\nfunctions of animals serve to explain each other mutually, because the\nwill without knowledge is the agent in both.\n\n  [230] De Lamarck, \"Philosophie Zoologique,\" vol. i. c. 7, and\n  \"Histoire Naturelle des Animaux sans Vert\u00e8bres,\" vol. i. Introd.\n  pp. 180-212.\n\n  [231] _Urthier._\n\n  [232] Animated by the feeling of this truth, Robert Owen, after\n  passing in review the numerous and often very large Australian\n  fossile _marsupialia_--sometimes as big as the rhinoceros--came as\n  early as 1842 to the conclusion, that a large beast of prey must\n  have contemporaneously existed. This conclusion was afterwards\n  confirmed, for in 1846 he received part of the fossile skull of a\n  beast of prey of the size of the lion, which he named _thylacoleo_,\n  _i.e._ lion with a pouch, since it is also a marsupial. (See the\n  \"Times\" of the 19th of May, 1866, where there is an article on\n  \"Pal\u00e6ontology,\" with an account of Owen's lecture at the Government\n  School of Mines.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\n  [233] Kirby and Spence, \"Introduction to Entomology,\" vol. i. p.\n  355. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\n  [234] Blumenbach, \"De hum. gen. variet. nat.\" p. 50. S\u00f6mmering, \"On\n  the Negro,\" p. 8.\n\nAs the will has equipped itself with every organ and every weapon,\noffensive as well as defensive, so has it likewise provided itself in\nevery animal shape with an _intellect_, as a means of preservation for\nthe individual and the species. It was precisely in this account that\nthe ancients called the intellect the \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd, _i.e._ the guide and\nleader. Accordingly the intellect, being exclusively destined to serve\nthe will, always exactly corresponds to it. Beasts of prey stood in\ngreater need of intellect, and in fact have more intelligence, than\nherbivorous animals. The elephant certainly forms an exception, and so\ndoes even the horse to a certain extent; but the admirable intelligence\nof the elephant was necessary on account of the length of its life\n(200 years) and of the scantiness of its progeny, which obliged it\nto provide for a longer and surer preservation of the individual:\nand this moreover in countries teeming with the most rapacious, the\nstrongest and the nimblest beasts of prey. The horse too has a longer\nlife and a scantier progeny than the ruminants, and as it has neither\nhorns, tusks, trunk, nor indeed any weapon save perhaps its hoofs, it\nneeded greater intelligence and swiftness in order to elude pursuit.\nMonkeys needed their extraordinary intelligence, partly because of the\nlength of their life, which even in the moderate-sized animal extends\nto fifty years; partly also because of their scanty progeny, which is\nlimited to one at a time, but especially because of their _hands_,\nwhich, to be properly used, required the direction of an understanding.\nFor monkeys depend upon their hands, not only for their defence by\nmeans of outer weapons such as sticks and stones, but also for their\nnourishment, this last necessitating a variety of artificial means\nand a social and artificial system of rapine in general, the passing\nfrom hand to hand of stolen fruit, the placing of sentinels, &c. &c.\nAdd to this, that it is especially in their youth, before they have\nattained their full muscular development, that this intelligence is\nmost prominent. In the _pongo_ or ourang-outang for instance, the brain\nplays a far more important part and the understanding is much greater\nduring its youth than at its maturity, when the muscular powers having\nattained full development, they take the place of the proportionately\ndeclining intellect. This holds good of all sorts of monkeys, so that\nhere therefore the intellect acts for a time vicariously for the yet\nundeveloped muscular strength. We find this process discussed at\nlength in the \"R\u00e9sum\u00e9 des Observations de Fr. Cuvier sur l'instinct\net l'intelligence des animaux,\" par Flourens (1841), from which I\nhave quoted the whole passage referring to this question in the\nsecond volume of my chief work, at the end of the thirty-first\nchapter, and this is my only reason for not repeating it here. On\nthe whole, intelligence gradually increases from the rodents[235] to\nthe ruminants, from the ruminants to the pachyderms, and from these\nagain to the beasts of prey and finally to the _quadrumana_, and\nanatomy shows a gradual development of the brain in similar order\nwhich corresponds to this result of external observation. (According\nto Flourens and Fr. Cuvier.)[236] Among the reptiles, serpents are\nthe most intelligent, for they may even be trained; this is so,\nbecause they are beasts of prey and propagate more slowly than the\nrest--especially the venomous ones. And here also, as with the physical\nweapons, we find the will everywhere as the _prius_; its equipment,\nthe intellect, as the _posterius_. Beasts of prey do not hunt, nor do\nfoxes thieve, because they have more intelligence; on the contrary,\nthey have more intelligence, just as they have stronger teeth and claws\ntoo, because they wished to live by hunting and thieving. The fox even\nmade up at once for his inferiority in muscular power and strength of\nteeth by the extraordinary subtility of his understanding. Our thesis\nis singularly illustrated by the case of the bird _dodo_ or _dronte_\n(_didus ineptus_) on the island of Mauritius, whose species, it is\nwell known, has died out, and which, as its Latin name denotes, was\nexceedingly stupid, and this explains its disappearance; so that here\nit seems indeed as if Nature had for once gone too far in her _lex\nparsimoni\u00e6_ and thereby in a sense brought forth an abortion in the\nspecies, as she so often does in the individual, which was unable to\nsubsist, precisely because it was an abortion. If, on this occasion,\nanyone were to raise the question as to whether Nature ought not to\nhave provided insects with at least sufficient intelligence to prevent\nthem from flying into the flame of a candle, our answer would be: most\ncertainly; only she did not know that men would make candles and light\nthem, and _natura nihil agit frustra_. Insect intelligence is therefore\nonly insufficient where the surroundings are artificial.[237]\n\n  [235] That the lowest place should be given to the rodents,\n  seems however to proceed from _\u00e0 priori_ rather than from _\u00e0\n  posteriori_ considerations: that is to say, from the circumstance,\n  that their brain has extremely faint or small convolutions; so\n  that too much weight may have been given to this point. In sheep\n  and calves the convolutions are numerous and deep, yet how is\n  it with their intelligence? The mechanical instincts of the\n  beaver are again greatly assisted by its understanding, and even\n  rabbits show remarkable intelligence (see Leroy's beautiful work:\n  \"Lettres Philosophiques sur l'Intelligence des Animaux,\" lettre 3,\n  p. 149). Even rats give proof of quite uncommon intelligence, of\n  which some remarkable instances may be found in the \"Quarterly\n  Review,\" No. 201, Jan.-March, 1857, in a special article entitled\n  \"Rats.\"\n\n  [236] The most intelligent birds are also birds of prey, wherefore\n  many of them, especially falcons, are highly susceptible of\n  training. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\n  [237] That the negroes should have become the special victims of\n  the slave-trade, is evidently a consequence of the inferiority of\n  their intelligence compared with that of other human races; though\n  this by no means justifies the fact. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\nEverywhere indeed intelligence depends in the first instance upon the\ncerebral system, and this stands in a necessary relation to the rest\nof the organism; therefore cold-blooded animals are greatly inferior\nto warm-blooded ones, and invertebrate animals to _vertebrata_. But\nthe organism is precisely nothing but the will become visible, to\nwhich, as that which is absolutely _prius_, everything constantly\nrefers. The needs and aims of that will give in each phenomenon the\nrule for the means to be employed, and these means must harmonize\nwith one another. Plants have no self-consciousness because they have\nno power of locomotion; for of what use would self-consciousness be\nto them unless it enabled them to seek what was salutary and flee\nwhat was noxious to them? And conversely, of what use could power of\nlocomotion be to them, as they have no self-consciousness with which\nto guide it. The inseparable duality of Sensibility and Irritability\ndoes not yet appear therefore in the plant; they continue slumbering\nin the reproductive force which is their fundament, and in which alone\nthe will here objectifies itself. The sun-flower, and every other\nplant, wills for light; but as yet their movement towards light is not\nseparate from their apprehension of it, and both coincide with their\ngrowth.--Human understanding, which is so superior to that of all other\nbeings, and is assisted by Reason (the faculty for non-perceptible\nrepresentations, _i.e._ for conceptions; reflection, thinking faculty),\nis nevertheless only just proportionate, partly to Man's requirements,\nwhich greatly surpass those of animals and multiply to infinity; partly\nto his entire lack of all natural weapons and covering, and to his\nrelatively weaker muscular strength, which is greatly inferior to that\nof monkeys of his own size;[238] lastly also, to the slowness with\nwhich his race multiplies and the length of his childhood and life,\nwhich demand secure preservation of the individual. All these great\nrequirements had to be satisfied by means of intellectual powers,\nwhich, for this reason, predominate in him. But we find the intellect\nsecondary and subordinate everywhere, and destined exclusively to serve\nthe purposes of the will. As a rule too, it always remains true to\nits destiny and subservient to the will. How nevertheless, it frees\nitself in particular instances from this bondage through an abnormal\npreponderance of cerebral life, whereby purely objective cognition\nbecomes possible which may be enhanced to genius, I have shown at\nlength in the \u00e6sthetic part of my chief work.[239]\n\n  [238] As is likewise his capacity for escaping from his pursuers;\n  for in this respect all the four-footed mammalia surpass him. [Add.\n  to 3rd ed.]\n\n  [239] [See Third Book of the W. a. W. u. V.; later also, in my\n  \"Parerga,\" vol. ii. \u00a7\u00a7 50-57 and \u00a7 206. (\u00a7\u00a7 51-58, and \u00a7 210 of the\n  2nd edition.)]\n\nNow, after all these reflections upon the precise agreement between\nthe will and the organisation of each animal, if we inspect a\nwell-arranged osteological collection from this point of view, it\nwill certainly seem to us as if we saw one and the same being (De\nLamarck's primary animal, or, more properly, _the will to live_)\nchanging its shape according to circumstances, and thus producing all\nthis multiplicity of forms out of the same number and arrangement of\nits bones, by prolonging and curtailing, strengthening and weakening\nthem. This number and arrangement of the bones, which Geoffroy de\nSt. Hilaire[240] called the anatomical element, continues, as he\nhas thoroughly shown, in all essential points unchanged: it is a\nconstant magnitude, something which is absolutely given beforehand,\nirrevocably fixed by an unfathomable necessity--an immutability which\nI should compare with the permanence of matter in all physical and\nchemical changes: but to this I shall soon return. Conjointly with\nthis immutability of the anatomical element, we have the greatest\nsusceptibility to modification, the greatest plasticity and flexibility\nof these same bones with reference to size, shape and adaptation to\ndifferent purposes, all which we see determined by the will with\nprimary strength and freedom according to the aims prescribed to it by\nexternal circumstances: it makes out of these materials whatever its\nnecessity for the time being requires. If it desires to climb about\nin trees, it catches at the boughs at once with four hands, while it\nstretches the _ulva_ and _radius_ to an excessive length and\nimmediately prolongs the _os coccygis_ to a curly tail, a yard long,\nin order to hang by it to the boughs and swing itself from one branch\nto another. If, on the other hand, it desires to crawl in the mud\nas a crocodile, to swim as a seal, or to burrow as a mole, these\nsame arm-bones are shortened till they are no longer recognisable;\nin the last case the _metacarpus_ and _phalanges_ are enlarged to\ndisproportionately large shovel-paws, to the prejudice of the other\nbones. But if it wishes to fly through the air as a bat, not only\nare the _os humeri_, _radius_ and _alnus_ prolonged in an incredible\nmanner, but the usually small and subordinate _carpus_, _metacarpus_\nand _phalanges digitorum_ expand to an immense length, as in St.\nAnthony's vision, outmeasuring the length of the animal's body, in\norder to spread out the wing-membrane. If, in order to browse upon the\ntops of very tall African trees, it has, as a giraffe, placed itself\nupon extraordinarily high fore-legs, the same seven _vertebr\u00e6_ of\nthe neck, which never vary as to number and which, in the mole, were\ncontracted so as to be no longer recognisable, are now prolonged to\nsuch a degree, that here, as everywhere else, the neck acquires the\nsame length as the fore-legs, in order to enable the head to reach\ndown to drinking-water. But where, as is the case when it appears\nas the elephant, a long neck could not have borne the weight of\nthe enormous, unwieldy head--a weight increased moreover by tusks a\nyard long--the neck remains short, as an exception, and a trunk is\nlet down as an expedient, to lift up food and draw water from below\nand also to reach up to the tops of trees. In accordance with these\ntransformations, we see in all of them the skull, the receptacle\ncontaining the understanding, at the same time proportionately expand,\ndevelop, curve itself, as the mode of procuring nourishment becomes\nmore or less difficult and requires more or less intelligence; and the\ndifferent degrees of the understanding manifest themselves clearly to\nthe practised eye in the curves of the skull.\n\n  [240] \"Principes de Philosophie Zoologique,\" 1830.\n\nNow, in all this, that _anatomical element_ we have mentioned above as\nfixed and invariable, certainly remains in so far an enigma, as it does\nnot come within the teleological explanation, which only begins after\nthe assumption of that element; since the intended organ might in many\ncases have been rendered equally suitable for its purpose even with a\ndifferent number and disposition of bones. It is easy to understand,\nfor instance, why the human skull should be formed out of eight bones:\nthat is, to enable them to be drawn together by the fontanels during\nbirth; but we do not see why a chicken which breaks through its\negg-shell should necessarily have the same number of skull-bones. We\nmust therefore assume this anatomical element to be based, partly on\nthe unity and identity of the will to live in general, partly on the\ncircumstance, that the archetypal forms of animals have proceeded one\nfrom the other,[241] wherefore the fundamental type of the whole race\nwas preserved. It is this anatomical element which Aristotle means\nby his \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03b1 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, and the mutability of its shapes according to\ndifferent purposes he calls \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd,[242] and explains by\nit how the material for upper incisors has been employed for horns in\nhorned cattle. Quite rightly: since the only ruminants which have no\nhorns, the camel and the musk-ox, have upper incisors, and these are\nwanting in all horned ruminants.\n\n  [241] \"Parerga,\" vol. ii. \u00a7 91; \u00a7 93 of the 2nd edition.\n\n  [242] See Aristotle, \"De Partibus Animalium,\" iii. c. 2 _sub\n  finem_: \u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba. \u03c4. \u03bb.\n\nNo other explanation or assumption enables us nearly as well to\nunderstand either the complete suitableness to purpose and to the\nexternal conditions of existence I have here shown in the skeleton,\nor the admirable harmony and fitness of internal mechanism in the\nstructure of each animal, as the truth I have elsewhere firmly\nestablished: that the body of an animal is precisely nothing but\nthe _will itself_ of that animal brought to cerebral perception as\nrepresentation--through the forms of Space, Time and Causality--in\nother words, the mere visibility, objectivity of Will. For, if this\nis once pre-supposed, everything in and belonging to that body must\nconspire towards the final end: the life of this animal. Nothing\nsuperfluous, nothing deficient, nothing inappropriate, nothing\ninsufficient or incomplete of its kind, can therefore be found in it;\non the contrary, all that is required must be there, and just in the\nproportion needed, never more. For here artist, work and materials are\none and the same. Each organism is therefore a consummate master-piece\nof exceeding perfection. Here the will did not first cherish the\nintention, first recognise the end and then adapt the means to it and\nconquer the material; its willing was rather immediately the aim and\nimmediately the attainment of that aim; no foreign appliances needing\nto be overcome were wanted--willing, doing and attaining were here one\nand the same. Thus the organism presents itself as a miracle which\nadmits of no comparison with any work of human artifice wrought by the\nlamplight of knowledge.[243]\n\n  [243] The appearance of every animal therefore presents a totality,\n  a unity, a perfection and a rigidly carried out harmony in all its\n  parts which is so entirely based upon a single fundamental thought,\n  that even the strangest animal shape seems to the attentive\n  observer as if it were the only right, nay, only possible form\n  of existence, and as if there could be no other than just this\n  very one. The expression \"natural\" used to denote that a thing is\n  a matter of course, and that it cannot be otherwise, is in its\n  deepest foundation based upon this. G\u00f6the himself was struck by\n  this unity when contemplating whelks and crabs at Venice, and it\n  caused him to exclaim: \"How delightful, how glorious is a living\n  thing! how well adapted for its condition; how true, how real!\"\n  (\"Life,\" vol. iv. p. 223). No artist therefore, who has not made it\n  his business to study such forms for years and to penetrate into\n  their meaning and comprehension, can rightly imitate them. Without\n  this study his work will seem as if it were pasted together: the\n  parts no doubt will be there, but the bond which unites them and\n  gives them cohesion, the spirit, the idea, which is the objectivity\n  of the primary act of the will presenting itself as this or that\n  particular species, will be wanting. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\nOur admiration for the consummate perfection and fitness for their ends\nin all the works of Nature, is at the bottom based upon our viewing\nthem in the same light as we do our own works. In these, in the first\nplace, the will to do the work and the work are two different things;\nthen again two other things lie between these two: firstly, the medium\nof representation, which, taken by itself, is foreign to the will,\nthrough which the will must pass before it realizes itself here; and\nsecondly the material foreign to the will here at work, on which a\nform foreign to it has to be forced, which it resists, because the\nmaterial already belongs to another will, that is to say, to its own\nnature, its _forma substantialis_, the (Platonic) idea, expressed by\nit: therefore this material has first to be overcome, and however\ndeeply the artificial form may have penetrated, will always continue\ninwardly resisting. It is quite a different thing with Nature's works,\nwhich are not, like our own, indirect, but on the contrary, direct\nmanifestations of the will. Here the will acts in its primordial\nnature, that is, unconsciously. No mediating representation here\nseparates the will and the work: they are one. And even the material\nis one with them: for matter is the mere visibility of the will.\nTherefore here we find Matter completely permeated by Form; or, better\nstill, they are of quite the same origin, only existing mutually one\nfor the other; and in so far they are one. That we separate them in\nworks of Nature as well as in works of Art, is a mere abstraction.\nPure Matter, absolutely without Form or quality, which we think as the\nmaterial of a product of Nature, is merely an _ens rationis_ and cannot\nenter into any experience: whereas the material of a work of Art is\nempirical Matter, consequently already has a Form. The [distinctive]\ncharacter of Nature's products is the identity of form and substance;\nthat of products of Art the diversity of these two.[244] It is because\nMatter is the mere visibility of Form in Nature's products, that,\neven empirically, we see Form appear as a mere production of Matter,\nbursting forth from its inside in crystallisation, in vegetable and\nanimal _generatio \u00e6quivoca_, which last cannot be doubted, at any rate\nin the _epizoa_.[245]--For this reason we may even assume that nowhere,\neither on any planet or satellite, will Matter come to a state of\nendless repose, but rather that its inherent forces (_i.e._ the will,\nwhose mere visibility it is) will always put an end again to the repose\nwhich has commenced, always awaking again from their sleep, to resume\ntheir activity as mechanical, physical, chemical, organic forces; since\nat all times they only wait for the opportunity to do so.\n\n  [244] It is a great truth which Bruno expresses (\"De Immenso et\n  Innumerabili,\" 8, 10): \"_Ars tractat materiam alienam: natura\n  materiam propriam. Ars circa materiam est; natura interior\n  materi\u00e6._\" He treats this subject much more fully, \"Della Causa,\"\n  Dial. 3, p. 252 _et seqq._ Page 255 he declares the _forma\n  substantialis_ to be the form of every product of Nature, which is\n  the same as the _soul_. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\n  [245] Thus the saying of the Schoolmen is verified: \"_Materia\n  appetit formam._\" See \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" 3rd edition, vol. ii.\n  p. 352. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\nBut if we want to understand Nature's proceeding, we must not try to\ndo it by comparing her works with our own. The real essence of every\nanimal form, is an act of the will outside representation, consequently\noutside its forms of Space and Time also; which act, just on that\naccount, knows neither sequence nor juxtaposition, but has, on the\ncontrary, the most indivisible unity. But when our cerebral perception\ncomprehends that form, and still more when its inside is dissected\nby the anatomical knife, then that which originally and in itself\nwas foreign to knowledge and its laws, is brought under the light of\nknowledge; but then also, it has to present itself in conformity with\nthe laws and forms of knowledge. The original unity and indivisibility\nof that act of the will, of that truly metaphysical being, then appears\ndivided into parts lying side by side and functions following one\nupon another, which all nevertheless present themselves as connected\ntogether in closest relationship one to another for mutual help and\nsupport, as means and ends one to the other. The understanding, in\nthus apprehending these things, now perceives the original unity\nre-establishing itself out of a multiplicity which its own form of\nknowledge had first brought about, and involuntarily taking for\ngranted that its own way of perceiving this is the way in which this\nanimal form comes into being, it is now struck with admiration for the\nprofound wisdom with which those parts are arranged, those functions\ncombined. This is the meaning of Kant's great doctrine, that Teleology\nis brought into Nature by our own understanding, which accordingly\nwonders at a miracle of its own creation.[246] If I may use a trivial\nsimile to elucidate so sublime a matter, this astonishment very\nmuch resembles that of our understanding when it discovers that all\nmultiples of 9, when their single figures are added together, give\nas their product either the number 9 or one whose single figures\nagain make 9; yet it is that very understanding itself which has\nprepared for itself this surprise in the decimal system. According to\nthe Physico-theological argument, the actual existence of the world\nhas been preceded by its existence in an intellect: if the world is\ndesigned for an end, it must have existed as representation before it\ncame into being. Now I say, on the contrary, in Kant's sense: if the\nworld is to be representation, it must present itself as designed for\nan end; and this only takes place in an intellect.\n\n  [246] Compare \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" 3rd edition, vol. II. p. 375.\n  [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\nIt undoubtedly follows from my doctrine, that every being is its own\nwork. Nature, which is incapable of falsehood and is as _na\u00efve_ as\ngenius, asserts the same thing downright; since each being merely\nkindles the spark of life at another exactly similar being, and then\nmakes itself before our eyes, taking the materials for this from\noutside, form and movement from its own self: this process we call\ngrowth and development. Thus, even empirically, each being stands\nbefore us as its own work. But Nature's language is not understood\nbecause it is too simple.\n\n\n\n\nPHYSIOLOGY OF PLANTS.\n\n\nThe corroborations I am now about to bring forward of the phenomenon of\nthe will in plants, proceed chiefly from French sources, from a nation\nwhose tendencies are decidedly empirical and which is reluctant to go\na step beyond what is immediately given. The informant moreover is\nCuvier, whose rigid adherence to the purely empirical gave rise to the\nfamous dispute between him and Geoffroy de St. Hilaire. So we must not\nbe astonished if the language we meet with here is less decided than in\nthe preceding German corroborations and if we find each concession made\nwith cautious reserve.\n\nIn his \"Histoire des Progr\u00e8s des Sciences Naturelles depuis 1789\njusqu'\u00e1 ce jour,\"[247] Cuvier says: \"Plants have certain apparently\nspontaneous movements, which they show under certain circumstances\nand which at times so closely resemble those of animals, that a sort\nof feeling and _will_ might almost be attributed to plants on this\naccount, especially by those who think they can perceive something of\nthe same kind in the movements of the _inward_ parts of animals. Thus\nthe tops of trees always have a vertical tendency, excepting when they\nincline towards the light. Their roots seek out good earth and moisture\nand, in order to attain these, deviate from the straight course. Yet\nthese different tendencies cannot be explained by the influence of\nexternal causes, unless we also assume the existence of an inner\nnatural disposition, susceptible of being roused, which differs from\nthe mere mechanical force in inorganic bodies.... Decandolle made some\nremarkable experiments that proved to him the existence of a sort of\nhabit in plants which may be overcome by artificial light, but only\nafter a certain time. Plants that had been shut up in a cellar which\nwas continually lit by lamps, did not on this account leave off closing\nin the evening and opening again in the morning for several days. And\nthere are other habits besides which plants are able to adopt and\nto abandon. Flowers that habitually close in wet weather, finish by\nremaining open if the wet weather lasts too long. When M. Desfontaines\ntook a sensitive plant with him in his carriage, the jolting movement\nat first caused it to contract, but at last it expanded again as when\nin complete repose. Therefore even in these cases, light, moisture,\n&c., &c., only act in virtue of an inner disposition, which may be\nneutralized or modified by the continuation of that very activity\nitself; and the vital energy of plants, like that of animals, is\nsubject to fatigue and exhaustion. The _hedysarum gyrans_ is singularly\ncharacterized by the movements of its leaves which continue day and\nnight without needing any sort of stimulus. Surely, if any phenomenon\ncan cause illusion and remind us of the voluntary movements of animals,\nit is this. Broussonet, Silvestre, Cels and Halle have fully described\nit, and have shown that the plant's action depends entirely upon its\nown healthy condition.\"\n\n  [247] Vol. i. p. 245. 1826.\n\nAgain, in the third volume of the same work, p. 166 (1828), Cuvier\nsays: \"M. Dutrochet adds some physiological considerations to which\nhis own experiments had led him, and which in his opinion prove that\nthe movements of plants are _spontaneous_, _i.e._ that they depend\nupon an inner principle which immediately receives the influence of\nouter agencies. As he is however reluctant to admit that plants have\nfeeling, he makes use of the word '_nervimotilit\u00e9_.'\"--Here I must\nobserve, that when we come to examine it closely, what we think to\nourselves in the conception of _spontaneity_, is in the end always\nthe same thing as manifestation of will, with which spontaneity would\ntherefore be simply synonymous. The only difference between them\nconsists in the conception of spontaneity being derived from outer\nperception, while that of manifestation of will is drawn from our own\nconsciousness.--I find a remarkable instance of the impetuous violence\nof this spontaneity, even in plants, in the following communication\ncontained in the \"Cheltenham Examiner:\"[248] \"Last Thursday four\nenormous mushrooms performed a heroic feat of a new kind, in one of\nour most crowded streets, by lifting up a huge block of stone in their\nstrenuous effort to make their way into the visible world.\"\n\n  [248] Repeated in the \"Times\" of June 2nd, 1841.\n\nIn the \"M\u00e9m. de l'Acad. d. Sciences de l'ann\u00e9e\" (1821), Cuvier\nsays[249]:--\"For centuries botanists have been searching for the reason\nwhy in a seed which is germinating the root invariably grows downwards,\nwhile the stalk as invariably grows upwards, no matter what be the\nposition in which the seed is placed. M. Dutrochet put some seeds into\nholes bored in the bottom of a vessel filled with damp mould, which he\nhung up to a beam in his room. Now, in this case, the stem might have\nbeen expected to grow downwards. Not at all: the roots found their\nway to the air below, and the stems were prolonged so as to traverse\nthe damp mould until they reached its upper surface. According to M.\nDutrochet, the direction in which plants grow, is determined by an\ninner principle and not at all by the attraction of the bodies towards\nwhich they direct themselves. A mistletoe seed that was fastened to\nthe point of a perfectly moveable needle fixed on a peg, with a small\nplank placed near it, was induced to germinate. It soon began to send\nout shoots towards the plank, which it reached in five days without\nhaving communicated the slightest movement to the needle. The stems\nof onions and leeks with their bulbs, deposited in dark places, grow\nupwards, although more slowly than in light ones; they grow upwards\neven if placed in water: a fact which suffices to prove that neither\nlight nor moisture determines the direction of their growth.\"--Still C.\nH. Schultz asserts[250] that he made seeds germinate in a dark box with\nholes bored in the bottom, and succeeded in inducing the plants to grow\nupside down, by means of a mirror fastened to the box, which reflected\nthe sunlight.\n\n  [249] Vol. v. p. 171. Paris, 1826.\n\n  [250] C. H. Schultz, \"Sur la Circulation dans les Plantes,\" a\n  prize-essay, 1839.\n\nIn the \"Dictionnaire des Sciences Naturelles\" (article _Animal_) we\nfind: \"If, on the one hand, animals show avidity in their search after\nnourishment as well as power of discrimination in the selection of\nit, roots of plants may, on the other hand, be observed to direct\nthemselves towards the side where the soil contains most nourishment,\nnay, even to seek out the smallest crevices in rocks which may contain\nany food. If we twist a bough so as to make the upper surface of its\nleaves the under one, these leaves even will twist their stems in order\nto regain the position best suited for the exercise of their functions\n(_i.e._ so as to have the smooth side uppermost). Is it quite certain\nthat this takes place unconsciously?\"\n\nF. J. Meyen has devoted a chapter, entitled \"Of the movements and\nsensations of plants,\" to a full investigation of the subject now\nbefore us. In this he says[251]: \"Not unfrequently potatoes, stored\nin deep, dark cellars, may be observed towards summer to shoot\nforth stems which invariably grow in the direction of the chinks\nthrough which the light comes into the cellar, and to continue thus\ngrowing until they at last reach the aperture which receives the\nlight directly. In such cases potato-stalks have been known to reach\na length of twenty feet; whereas under ordinary circumstances, even\nsuch as are most favourable to the growth of the potato, the stalk is\nseldom longer than from three to four feet. It is interesting to watch\nclosely the course taken by a potato-stalk thus growing in darkness, in\nits endeavours to reach the light. It tries to do so by the shortest\nroad, but not being firm enough to grow straight across through the\nair without support, it lets itself drop on to the floor, and thus\ncreeps along the ground till it reaches the nearest wall, up which\nit then climbs.\" Even this botanist too is led by his facts to the\nfollowing assertion (p. 576): \"On observing the freedom of movement\nof _oscillatoria_ and other inferior plants, we may perhaps have no\nalternative but to attribute a species of _will_ to these beings.\"\n\n  [251] F. J. Meyen, \"Neues System der Pflanzenphysiologe\" (1839),\n  vol. iii. p. 585.\n\nCreepers bear distinct evidence as to manifestation of will in plants;\nfor, when they find no support near enough for their tendrils to cling\nto, they invariably direct their growth towards the shadiest place,\nor even towards a piece of dark-coloured paper, wherever it may be\nplaced; whereas they avoid glass, on account of its glitter. In the\n\"Philosophical Transactions\" of 1812, Th. Andrew Knight relates some\nvery pleasing experiments on this subject (especially with _ampelopsis\nquinquefolia_,)[252] although he strives hard to explain the matter\nmechanically, and will not admit that it is a manifestation of will. I\nappeal to his experiments, not to the conclusions he draws from them.\nA good test might be, to plant several free creepers in a circle\nround a tree-trunk and to observe whether they all crept towards the\ntrunk centripetally. On the 6th Nov. 1843, Dutrochet read a treatise\non this subject in the \"Acad. de Sciences\" called \"Sur les Mouvements\nR\u00e9volutifs spontan\u00e9s chez les V\u00e9g\u00e9taux,\" which, notwithstanding its\ngreat length, is well worth reading, and is published among the\n\"Comptes rendus des S\u00e9ances de l'Acad\u00e9mie des Sciences\" for Nov. 1843.\nThe result is, that in _pisum sativum_ (green pea), in _bryonia alba_\n(wild bryony) and in _cucumis sativus_ (cucumber) the stems of those\nleaves which bear the tendrils, describe a very slow circular movement\nin the air, the time in which they complete an ellipsis varying from\none to three hours according to temperature. By this movement they seek\nat random for solid bodies round which, when found, they twine their\ntendrils; these then support the plant, it being unable to stand by\nitself without help. That is, they do the same thing as the eyeless\ncaterpillar, which when seeking a leaf describes circles in the air\nwith the upper part of its body. Dutrochet contributes a good deal of\ninformation too concerning other movements in plants in this treatise:\nfor instance, that _stylidium graminifolium_ in New Holland, has a\ncolumn in the middle of its _corolla_ which bears the anthers and\n_stigma_ and alternately folds up and unfolds again. What Treviranus\nadduces is to the same effect:[253] \"In _parnassia palustris_ and\nin _ruta graveolens_, the stamina incline one after the other, in\n_saxifraga tridactylites_ in pairs, towards the stigma, and erect\nthemselves again in the same order.\"--Shortly before however, we read\nin Treviranus with reference to this subject: \"Of all apparently\nvoluntary movements of plants, the direction of their boughs and of the\nupper surface of their leaves towards the light and towards moist heat,\nand the twining movements of creepers round their supports, are the\nmost universal. In this last phenomenon especially there is something\nwhich resembles animal movements. While growing, creepers, it is true,\nif left to themselves, describe circles with their tips and by this\nmeans reach an object near at hand. But it is no merely mechanical\ncause that induces them to adapt their growth to the form of the object\nthey have thus reached. The _cuscuta_ does not twine round every kind\nof support: for instance, limbs of animals, dead vegetable matter,\nmetals and inorganic substances are not used for this purpose, but only\nliving plants, and not even all kinds--not mosses, for instance--only\nthose from which it can extract nourishment by its _papill\u00e6_; and these\nattract it from a considerable distance.\"[254] The following special\nobservation, communicated to the \"Farmer's Magazine,\" and reproduced by\nthe \"Times\" (13th July 1848) under the title \"Vegetable Instinct,\" is\nhowever still more to the point: \"If a basin of water be placed within\nsix inches of a young pumpkin-stalk, or of a stem of the large garden\npea, no matter on what side, the stalk will approach the basin during\nthe night and it will be found next morning with one of its leaves\nfloating on the water. This experiment may be renewed every night till\nthe plant begins to fructify.--Even if its position be changed every\nday, a stick fixed upright within six inches of a young convolvulus\nis sure to be found by the plant. If, after having wound itself for a\ncertain distance round the stick, it is unwound and wound round again\nin the opposite direction, it will return to its original position or\nlose its life in the endeavour to do so. Nevertheless, if two such\nplants grow close to one another without having any stick near enough\nfor them to cling to it, one of them will change the direction of its\nwinding and they will twine round each other. Duhamel placed some\nItalian beans in a cylinder filled with moist earth; after a little\nwhile they began to germinate and naturally sent their _plumula_\nupwards in the direction of the light and their _radicula_ downwards\ninto the mould. After a few days the cylinder was turned round to the\nextent of a quarter of its circumference and the same process was\nrepeated until it had been turned completely round. The beans were\nthen removed from the earth, when it was found that both _plumula_ and\n_radicula_ had twisted at each turn that had been given, in order to\nadapt themselves to it, the one endeavouring to rise perpendicularly,\nthe other to descend, so that they had formed a complete spiral.\nYet, notwithstanding this natural tendency to descend, when the soil\nbelow is too dry, roots will grow upwards in order to reach any moist\nsubstance which may be lying higher than themselves.\"\n\n  [252] These have been translated for the \"Biblioth\u00e8que Britannique,\n  Section des Sciences et Arts,\" vol. lii.\n\n  [253] Treviranus, \"Die Erscheinungen und Gesetze des Organischen\n  Lebens\" (Phenomena and Laws of Organic Life), vol. i. p. 173.\n\n  [254] Brandis, \"On Life and Polarity,\" 1836, p. 88, says: \"The\n  roots of rock-plants seek nourishing mould in the most delicate\n  crevices of rocks. These roots cling to a nourishing bone in dense\n  clusters. I saw a root whose growth was intercepted by the sole of\n  an old shoe: it divided itself into as many fibres as the shoe-sole\n  had holes--those by which it had been stitched together--but as\n  soon as these fibres had overcome the obstruction and grown through\n  the holes, they united again to a common stem.\" And p. 87: \"If\n  Sprengel's observations are confirmed, even mediate relations are\n  perceived (by plants) in order to obtain this end (fructification):\n  that is to say, the anthers of the _nigella_ bend down in order to\n  put the pollen on the bees' backs, and the pistils bend in like\n  manner to receive it from the bees.\" [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\nIn Froriep's \"Memoranda\" for 1833 (No. 832) there is a short article\nupon the locomotivity of plants: in poor soil, where good mould lies\nnear at hand, many plants will send out a shoot into the good mould;\nafter a time the original plant then withers, but the offshoot prospers\nand itself becomes the plant. By means of this process, a plant has\nbeen known to climb down from a wall.\n\nIn the same periodical (1835, No. 981) is to be found a communication\nfrom Professor Daubeny, of Oxford (taken from the \"Edinburgh New\nPhilosophical Journal,\" April-July, 1835), in which he shows with\ncertainty, by means of new and very careful experiments, that roots of\nplants have, at any rate to a certain degree, the power to make choice\nfrom those substances in the soil which present themselves to their\nsurface.[255]\n\n  [255] In this connection I may mention an analysis of an entirely\n  different kind, given by the French Academician Babinet in an\n  article in which he treats of the seasons on the planets. It is\n  contained in the No. of the 15th January, 1856, of the \"Revue\n  des Deux Mondes,\" and I will give the chief substance of it\n  here in translation. The object of it is to refer to its direct\n  cause the well-known fact, that cereals only thrive in temperate\n  climates. \"If grain did not necessarily perish in winter, if it\n  were perennial, it would not bear ears, and there would be no\n  harvest. In the hotter portions of Africa, Asia and America,\n  where no winter kills the grain, these plants grow like grass\n  with us: they multiply by means of shoots, remain always green,\n  and neither form ears nor run to seed. In cold climates, on the\n  contrary, the organism of these plants seems by some inconceivable\n  miracle to feel, as it were by anticipation, the necessity of\n  passing through the seed-phase in order to escape dying off in the\n  winter season\" (_L'organisme de la plante_, par un inconcevable\n  miracle, _semble pr\u00e9ssentir la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de passer par l'\u00e9tat\n  de graine, pour ne pas p\u00e9rir compl\u00e8tement pendant la saison\n  rigoureuse_). In a similar way, districts which have a \"droughty\n  season,\"--that is to say a season in which all plants are parched\n  up with drought--\"tropical countries, for instance Jamaica,\n  produce grain; because there the plant, moved by the same organic\n  presentiment (_par le m\u00eame_ pressentiment organique), in order\n  to multiply, hastens to bear seed at the approach of the season\n  in which it would have to dry up.\" In the fact which this author\n  describes as an inconceivable miracle, we recognise a manifestation\n  of the plant's will in increased potency, since here it appears as\n  the will of the species, and makes preparations for the future in a\n  similar way to animal instinct, without being guided by knowledge\n  of that future in doing so. Here we see plants in warmer climates\n  dispensing with a complicated process to which a cold climate alone\n  had obliged them. In similar instances animals do precisely the\n  same thing, especially bees. Leroy in his admirable work \"Lettres\n  Philosophiques sur l'Intelligence des Animaux\" (3rd letter, p.\n  231) relates, that some bees which had been taken to South America\n  continued at first to gather honey as usual and to build their\n  cells just as when they were at home; but that when they gradually\n  became aware that plants blossom there all the year round, they\n  left off working. The animal world supplies a fact analogous to the\n  above mentioned change in the mode of multiplying in cereals. This\n  is the abnormal mode of propagation for which the _aphides_ have\n  long been noted. The female _aphide_, as is well known, propagates\n  for 10-12 generations without any pairing with the male, and by a\n  variety of the ovoviviparous process. This goes on all summer; but\n  in autumn the males appear, impregnation takes place, and eggs are\n  laid as winter quarters for the whole species, since it is only in\n  this shape that it is able to outlive the winter. (Add. to 3rd ed.)\n\nFinally I will not omit to observe, that even so early an authority as\nPlato[256] had attributed desires, \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, _i.e._ _will_, to plants.\nIn my chief work,[257] however, I have entered into the doctrines of\nthe Ancients on this point, and the chapter there which treats of this\nsubject may on the whole serve to complete the present one.\n\n  [256] Plat. \"Tim.\" p. 403. Bip.\n\n  [257] \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" vol. ii. chap. 23.\n\nThe reluctance and reserve with which we see the authors here quoted\nmake up their minds to acknowledge the will, which nevertheless\nundoubtedly manifests itself in plants, comes from their being still\nhampered by the old opinion, that consciousness is a requisite\nand condition of the will: now it is evident that plants have no\nconsciousness. The thought never entered into the heads of these\nnaturalists, that the will might be the _prius_ and therefore\nindependent of the intellect, with which, as the _posterius_,\nconsciousness first makes its appearance. As for knowledge or\nrepresentation, plants have something merely analogous to it, a mere\nsubstitute for it; whereas they really have the will itself quite\ndirectly: for, as the thing in itself, it is the substratum of their\nphenomenal being as well as of every other. Taking a realistic view,\nstarting accordingly from the objective, the matter might even be\nstated as follows: That which lives and moves in plant-nature and\nin the animal organism, when it has gradually enhanced itself in\nthe scale of beings sufficiently for the light of knowledge to fall\ndirectly upon it, presents itself in this newly arising consciousness\nas _will_, and is here more immediately, consequently better, known\nthan anywhere else. This knowledge therefore must supply the key for\nthe comprehension of all that is lower in the scale. For in this\nknowledge the thing in itself is no longer veiled by any other form\nthan that of the most immediate apprehension. It is this immediate\napprehension of one's own volition which has been called the inner\nsense. In itself the will is without apprehension, and remains so in\nthe inorganic and vegetable kingdoms. Just as the world would remain\nin darkness, in spite of the sun, if there were no bodies to reflect\nits light; or as the mere vibration of a string can never become a\nsound without air or even without some sort of sounding-board: so\nlikewise does the will first become conscious of itself when knowledge\nis added to it. Knowledge is, as it were, the sounding-board of the\nwill, and consciousness the tone it produces. This becoming conscious\nof itself on the part of the will, was attributed to a supposed\ninner sense, because it is the first and most direct knowledge we\nhave. The various emotions of our own will can alone be the object\nof this inner sense; for the process of representation itself cannot\nover again be perceived, but, at the very utmost, only be once more\nbrought to consciousness in rational reflection, that second power\nof representing: that is, _in abstracto_. Therefore also, simple\nrepresentation (intuition) is to thinking proper--that is, to knowing\nby means of abstract conceptions--what willing in itself is to becoming\naware of that willing, _i.e._ to consciousness. For this reason,\na perfectly clear and distinct consciousness, not only of our own\nexistence but also of the existence of others, only arises with the\nadvent of Reason (the faculty for conceptions), which raises Man as far\nabove the brute, as the merely intuitive faculty of representation\nraises the brute above the plant. Now beings which, like plants, have\nno faculty for representation, are called unconscious, and we conceive\nthis condition as only slightly differing from non-existence; since the\nonly existence such beings have, is in the consciousness of others,\nas the representation of those others. They are nevertheless not\nwanting in what is primary in existence, the will, but only in what is\nsecondary; still, what is primary--and this is after all the existence\nof the thing in itself--appears to us, without that secondary element,\nto pass over into nullity. We are unable directly and clearly to\ndistinguish unconscious existence from non-existence, although we have\nour own experience of it in deep sleep.\n\nBearing in mind, according to the contents of the last chapter, that\nthe faculty of knowing, like every other organ, has only arisen for the\npurpose of self-preservation, and that it therefore stands in a precise\nrelation, admitting of countless gradations, to the requirements of\neach animal species; we shall understand that plants, having so very\nmuch fewer requirements than animals, no longer need any knowledge at\nall. On this account precisely, as I have often said, knowledge is the\ntrue characteristic which denotes the limits of animality, because of\nthe movement induced by motives which it conditions. Where animal life\nceases, there knowledge proper, with whose essence our own experience\nhas made us familiar, disappears; and henceforth analogy is our only\nway of making that which mediates between the influence of the outer\nworld and the movements of beings intelligible to us. The will, on the\nother hand, which we have recognised as being the basis and kernel\nof every existing thing, remains one and the same at all times and\nin all places. Now, in the lower degree occupied by plant-life and\nby the vegetative life of animal organisms, it is the _stimulus_\nwhich takes the place of knowledge as a means of determining the\nindividual manifestations of this omnipresent will and as a mediator\nbetween the outer world and the changes of such a being; finally, in\ninorganic Nature, it is _physical agency in general_; and when, as\nhere, observation takes place from a higher to a lower degree, both\nstimulus and physical agency present themselves as substitutes for\nknowledge, therefore as mere analogues to it. Plants cannot properly\nbe said to perceive light and the sun; yet we see them sensitive in\nvarious ways to the presence or absence of both. We see them incline\nand turn towards the light; and though this movement no doubt generally\ncoincides with their growth, just as the moon's rotation on its axis\ncoincides with its movement round the earth, it nevertheless exists,\nas well as that of the moon, and the direction of that growth is\ndetermined and systematically modified by light, just as an action\nis determined by a motive, and as the direction of the growth of\ncreeping and clinging plants is determined by the shape and position\nof the supports they may chance to find. Thus because plants on the\nwhole, still have wants, though not such wants as demand the luxury\nof a sensorium and an intellect, something analogous has to take the\nplace of these, in order to enable the will to lay hold of, if not to\nseek out, the satisfactions which offer themselves to it. Now, this\nanalogous substitute is susceptibility for stimuli, and I would express\nthe difference between knowledge and this susceptibility as follows:\nin knowledge, the motive which presents itself as representation and\nthe act of volition which follows from it, _remain distinctly separate\none from the other_, this separation moreover being the more distinct,\nthe greater the perfection of the intellect;--whereas, in mere\nsusceptibility for stimuli, the feeling of the stimulus can no longer\nbe distinguished from the volition it occasions, and they coalesce. In\ninorganic nature finally, even susceptibility for stimuli, the analogy\nof which to knowledge is unmistakable, ceases, but the diversity of\nreaction of each body upon divers kinds of action remains; now, when\nthe matter is considered, as we are doing, in the descending scale,\nthis reaction still presents itself, even here, as a substitute for\nknowledge. If a body reacts differently, it must have been acted upon\ndifferently and that action must have roused a different sensation in\nit, which with all its dullness has nevertheless a distant analogy\nto knowledge. Thus when water that is shut up finds an outlet of\nwhich it eagerly avails itself, rushing vehemently in that direction,\nit certainly does not recognise that outlet any more than the acid\nperceives the alkali approaching it which will induce it to abandon\nits combination with a metal, or than the strip of paper perceives\nthe amber which attracts it after being rubbed; yet we cannot help\nadmitting that what brings about such sudden changes in all these\nbodies, bears a certain resemblance to that which takes place within\nus, when an unexpected motive presents itself. In former times I have\navailed myself of such considerations as these in order to point out\nthe will in all things; I now employ them to indicate the sphere to\nwhich knowledge presents itself as belonging, when considered, not as\nis usual from the inside, but realistically, from a standpoint outside\nitself, as if it were something foreign: that is, when we gain the\nobjective point of view for it, which is so extremely important in\norder to complete the subjective one.[258] We find that knowledge then\npresents itself as the _mediator of motives_, _i.e._ of the action of\ncausality upon beings endowed with intellect--in other words, as that\nwhich receives the changes from outside upon which those in the inside\nmust follow, as that which acts as mediator between both. Now upon this\nnarrow line hovers _the world as representation_--that is to say, the\nwhole corporeal world, stretched out in Space and Time, which _as such_\ncan never exist anywhere but in the brain any more than dreams, which,\nas long as they last, exist in the same way. What the intellect does\nfor animals and for man, as the mediator of motives, susceptibility for\nstimuli does for plants, and susceptibility for every sort of cause\nfor inorganic bodies: and strictly speaking, all this differs merely\nin degree. For, exclusively as a consequence of this susceptibility to\noutward impressions having enhanced itself in animals proportionately\nto their requirements till it has reached the point where a nervous\nsystem and a brain become necessary, does consciousness arise as a\nfunction of that brain, and in it the objective world, whose forms\n(Time, Space, Causality) are the way in which that function is\nperformed. Therefore we find the intellect originally laid out entirely\nwith a view to subjectivity, destined merely to serve the purposes of\nthe will, consequently as something quite secondary and subordinate;\nnay, in a sense, as something which appears only _per accidens_; as a\ncondition of the action of mere motives, instead of stimuli, which has\nbecome necessary in the higher degree of animal existence. The image of\nthe world in Space and Time, which thus arises, is only the map[259]\non which the motives present themselves as ends. It also conditions\nthe spacial and causal connection in which the objects perceived stand\nto one another; nevertheless it is only the mediating link between the\nmotive and the act of volition. Now, to take such an image as this of\nthe world, arising in this manner, accidentally, in the intellect,\n_i.e._ in the cerebral function of animal beings, through the means to\ntheir ends being represented and the path of these ephemera on their\nplanet being thus illumined--to take this image, we say, this mere\ncerebral phenomenon, for the true, ultimate essence of things (thing\nin itself), to take the concatenation of its parts for the absolute\norder of the Universe (relations between things in themselves), and to\nassume all this to exist even independently of the brain, would indeed\nbe a leap! Here in fact, an assumption such as this must appear to us\nas the height of rashness and presumption; yet it is the foundation\nupon which all the systems of pre-Kantian _dogmatism_ have been built\nup; for it is tacitly pre-supposed in all their Ontology, Cosmology and\nTheology, as well as in the _\u00e6tern\u00e6 veritates_ to which they appeal.\nBut that leap had always been made tacitly and unconsciously, and it\nis precisely Kant's immortal achievement, to have brought it to our\nconsciousness.\n\n  [258] Compare \"Die Welt a. W. u. V.\" vol. ii. chap. 22: \"Objective\n  View of the Intellect.\"\n\n  [259] _Plan._\n\nBy our present realistic way of considering the matter therefore,\nwe unexpectedly gain the _objective stand-point_ for Kant's great\ndiscoveries; and, by the road of empirico-physiological contemplation,\nwe arrive at the point whence his transcendental-critical view starts.\nFor Kant's view takes the subjective for its standpoint and considers\nconsciousness as given. But from consciousness itself and its law\nand order, given _\u00e0 priori_, that view arrives at the conclusion,\nthat all which appears in that consciousness can be nothing more than\nmere phenomenon. From our realistic, exterior standpoint, on the\ncontrary, which assumes the _objective_--all that exists in Nature--to\nbe absolutely given, we see what the intellect is, as to its aim and\norigin, and to which class of phenomena it belongs, and we recognise\n(so far _\u00e0 priori_) that it _must_ be limited to mere phenomena. We see\ntoo, that what presents itself in the intellect can at all times only\nbe conditioned--chiefly _subjectively_--that is, can, together with\nthe order of the nexus of its parts, only be a _mundus phenomenon_,\nwhich is likewise subjectively conditioned; but that it can never be\na knowledge of things as they may be in themselves, or as they may be\nconnected in themselves. For, in the nexus of Nature, we have found\nthe faculty of knowing as a conditioned faculty, whose assertions,\nprecisely on that account, cannot claim unconditioned validity. To\nanyone who has studied and understood the Critique of Pure Reason--to\nwhich our standpoint is essentially foreign--it must nevertheless still\nappear as if Nature had intended the intellect for a puzzle-glass\nto mislead us and were playing at hide-and-seek with us. But by our\nrealistic objective road, _i.e._ by starting from the objective world\nas given, we have now come to the very same result at which Kant had\narrived by the idealistic, subjective road, _i.e._ by examining the\nintellect itself and the way in which it constitutes consciousness.\nWe now see that the world as representation hovers on the narrow line\nbetween the external cause (motive) and the effect evoked (act of\nthe will), in beings having knowledge (animals), in which beings for\nthe first time there occurs a distinct separation between motive and\nvoluntary act. _Ita res accendent lumina rebus._ It is only when it is\nreached by two quite opposite roads, that the great result attained by\nKant is distinctly seen; and when light is thus thrown upon it from\nboth sides, his whole meaning becomes clear. Our objective standpoint\nis realistic and therefore conditioned, so far as, in taking for\ngranted the existence of beings in Nature, it abstracts from the fact\nthat their objective existence postulates an intellect, which contains\nthem as its representation; but Kant's subjective and idealistic\nstandpoint is likewise conditioned, inasmuch as he starts from the\nintelligence, which itself, however, presupposes Nature, in consequence\nof whose development as far as animal life that intelligence is for\nthe first time enabled to make its appearance.--Keeping steadily to\nthis realistic, objective standpoint of ours, we may also define Kant's\ntheory as follows: After Locke, in order to know things in themselves,\nhad abstracted the share of sensuous functions--called by him secondary\nqualities--from things as they appear, Kant with infinitely greater\ndepth deducted from them the incomparably larger share of the cerebral\nfunction, which includes precisely what Locke calls primary qualities.\nBut all I have done here has been to show why all this must necessarily\nbe as it is, by indicating the place occupied by the intellect in the\nnexus of Nature, when we start realistically from the objective as\ngiven, but, in doing so, take the only thing of which we are quite\ndirectly conscious, the _will_--that true \u03c0\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c3\u03c4\u1ff6 of Metaphysics--for\nour support, as being what is primarily real, everything else being\nmerely its phenomenon. What now follows serves to complete this.\n\nI have mentioned already, that where knowledge takes place, the motive\nwhich appears as representation and the act of volition resulting\nfrom it, remain _the more clearly separated one from the other_, the\nmore perfect the intellect; that is, the higher we ascend in the\nscale of beings. This calls for fuller explanation. As long as the\nwill's activity is roused by stimuli alone, and no representation as\nyet takes place--that is, in plants--there is no separation at all\nbetween the receiving of impressions and the being determined by them.\nIn the lowest order of animal intelligence, such as we find it in\n_radiaria_, _acalepha_, _acephala_, &c., the difference is still small;\na feeling of hunger, a watchfulness roused by this, an apprehending\nand snapping at their prey, still constitute the whole content of\ntheir consciousness; nevertheless this is the first twilight of the\ndawning world as representation, the background of which--that is\nto say, everything excepting the motive which acts each time--still\nremains shrouded in impenetrable darkness. Here moreover the organs\nof the senses are correspondingly imperfect and incomplete, having\nexceedingly few data for perception to bring to an understanding yet\nin embryo. Nevertheless wherever there is sensibility, it is always\naccompanied by understanding, _i.e._ with the faculty for referring\neffects experienced to external causes; without this, sensibility\nwould be superfluous and a mere source of aimless suffering. The\nhigher we ascend in the scale of animals, the greater number and\nperfection of the senses we find, till at last we have all five; these\nare found in a small number of invertebrate animals, but they only\nbecome universal in the _vertebrata_. The brain and its function, the\nunderstanding, develop proportionately, and the object now gradually\npresents itself more and more distinctly and completely and even\nalready in connection with other objects; because the service of the\nwill requires apprehension of the mutual relations of objects. By this\nthe world of representation acquires some extent and background. Still\nthat apprehension never goes beyond what is required for the will's\nservice: the apprehending and the being roused to reaction by what is\napprehended, are not clearly held asunder: the object is only perceived\nin as much as it is a motive. Even the more sagacious animals only\nsee in objects what concerns themselves, what has reference to their\nwill or, at the utmost, what may have reference to it in future: of\nthis last we have an instance in cats, who take pains to acquire an\naccurate knowledge of localities, and in foxes, who endeavour to find\nhiding-places for their future prey. But they are insensible towards\neverything else; no animal has perhaps ever yet seen the starry sky: my\ndog started in terror when for the first time he accidentally caught\nsight of the sun. A first faint sign of a disinterested perception of\ntheir surroundings may at times be observed in the most intelligent\nanimals, especially when they have been trained by taming. Dogs go\nso far as to stare at things; we may often see them sit down at the\nwindow and attentively watch all that passes. Monkeys look about them\nat times, as if trying to make up their mind about their surroundings.\nIt is in Man that the separation between motive and action, between\nrepresentation and will, first becomes quite distinct. But this\ndoes not immediately put an end to the subservience of the intellect\nto the will. Ordinary human beings after all only comprehend quite\nclearly that which, in some way or other, refers directly or indirectly\nto their own selves (has an interest for them); with respect to\neverything else, their understanding continues to be unconquerably\ninert; the rest therefore remains in the back-ground and does not come\ninto consciousness under the radiant light of complete distinctness.\nPhilosophical astonishment and artistic emotion occasioned by the\ncontemplation of phenomena, remain eternally foreign to them, whatever\nthey may do; for at the bottom, everything appears to them to be a\nmatter of course. Complete liberation and separation of the intellect\nfrom the will and its bondage is the prerogative of genius, as I\nhave fully shown in the \u00e6sthetic part of my chief work. Genius is\nobjectivity. The pure objectivity and distinctness with which things\npresent themselves in intuitive perception--that fundamental and most\nsubstantial source of knowledge--actually stands every moment in\ninverse proportion to the interest which the will has in those things;\nand knowing without willing is the condition, not to say the essence,\nof all gifts of \u00e6sthetic intelligence. Why does an ordinary artist\nproduce so bad a painting of yonder landscape, notwithstanding all\nthe pains he has taken? Because he sees it so. And why does he see\nso little beauty in it? Because his intellect has not freed itself\nsufficiently from his will. The degrees of this separation give rise\nto great intellectual distinctions between men; for the more knowledge\nhas freed itself from the will, the purer, consequently the more\nobjective and correct, it is; just as that fruit is best, which has no\nafter-taste of the soil on which it has grown.\n\nThis relation, as important as it is interesting, deserves surely to\nbe made still clearer by a retrospective view of the whole scale\nof beings, and by recalling the gradual transition from absolute\nsubjectivity to the highest degrees of objectivity in the intellect.\nInorganic Nature namely, is absolutely subjective, no trace whatever of\nconsciousness of an outer world being found in it. Stones, boulders,\nice-blocks, even when they fall upon one another, or knock or rub\nagainst one another, have no consciousness of each other and of an\nouter world. Still even these are susceptible to external influence,\nwhich causes their position and movement to change and may therefore\nbe considered as a first step towards consciousness. Now, although\nplants also have no consciousness of the outer world, and although the\nmere analogue of a consciousness which exists in them must, on the\ncontrary, be conceived as a dull self-enjoyment; yet we see that they\nall seek light, and that many of them turn their flowers or leaves\ndaily towards the sun, while creepers find their way to supports\nwith which they are not in contact; and finally we see individual\nkinds of plants show even a sort of irritability. Unquestionably\ntherefore, there is a connection and relation between their movements\nand surroundings, even those with which they are not in immediate\ncontact; and this connection we must accordingly recognise as a\nfaint analogue to perception. With animal life first appears decided\nperception--that is, consciousness of other things, as opposed to\nthat clear consciousness of ourselves to which that consciousness of\nother things first gives rise. This constitutes precisely the true\ncharacter of animal-nature, as opposed to plant-nature. In the lowest\nanimals, consciousness of the outer world is very limited and dim: each\nincreasing degree of understanding extends it and makes it clearer,\nand this gradual increase of the understanding again adapts itself\nto the gradually increasing requirements of the animal, and thus the\nprocess continues through the whole long ascending scale of the animal\nseries up to Man, in whom consciousness of the outer world reaches\nits acme, and in whom the world accordingly presents itself more\ndistinctly and completely than in any other being. Still, even here,\nthere are innumerable degrees in the clearness of consciousness,\nfrom the dullest blockhead to genius. Even in normal heads there\nstill remains a considerable tinge of subjectivity in their objective\nperception of external objects, knowledge still bearing throughout\nthe character of existing merely for the ends of the will. The more\neminent the head, the less prominent is this character, and the more\npurely objective does the representation of the outer world become;\ntill in genius finally it attains completely objectivity, by which the\nPlatonic ideas detach themselves from the individual things, because\nthe mind which comprehends them enhances itself to the pure subject\nof knowledge. Now, as perception is the basis of all knowledge, all\nthinking and all insight must be influenced by this fundamental\ndifference in the quality of it, from which arises that complete\ndifference between the ordinary and the superior mind in their whole\nway of viewing things, which may be noticed on all occasions. From this\nalso proceeds the dull gravity, nearly resembling that of animals,\nwhich characterizes common-place heads whose knowledge is acquired\nsolely for the benefit of the will, as opposed to the constant play\nof exuberant intellect which brightens the consciousness of the\nsuperior mind. The consideration of the two extremes in the great\nscale which we have here exhibited, seems to have given rise to the\nGerman hyperbolical expression \"_Block_\" (_Klotz_), as applied to human\nbeings, and to the English \"blockhead.\"\n\nBut another different consequence of the clear separation of the will\nfrom the intellect--therefore of the motive from the action,--which\nfirst appears in the human race, is the deceptive illusion of freedom\nin our individual actions. Where, as in inorganic nature, causes,\nor, as in the vegetable kingdom, stimuli, call forth the effect,\nthe causal connection is so simple, that there is not even the\nslightest semblance of freedom. But already in animal life, where\nthat which till then had manifested itself as cause or as stimulus,\nnow appears as a _motive_--and a new world, that of representation,\nconsequently presents itself, and cause and effect lie in different\nspheres--the causal connection between both, and with it the necessity,\nare less evident than they were in plants and in inorganic Nature.\nNevertheless they are still unmistakable in animals, whose merely\nintuitive representation stands midway between organic functions\ninduced by stimuli and the deliberate acts of Man. The animal's actions\ninfallibly follow as soon as the perceptible motive is present,\nunless counter-acted by some equally perceptible counter-motive or by\ntraining; yet here representation is already distinct from the act of\nvolition and comes separately into consciousness. But in Man--whose\nrepresentation has enhanced itself even to abstract conception and\nwho now derives motives and counter-motives for his actions from a\nwhole invisible thought-world which he carries about with him in his\nbrain and which makes him independent of presence and of perceptible\nsurroundings--this connection no longer exists at all for observation\nfrom outside, and even for inward observation it is only knowable\nthrough abstract and mature reflection. For these abstract motives,\nwhen observed from outside, give an impress of deliberation to all\nhis movements, by which they acquire a semblance of independence\nthat manifestly distinguishes them from those of animals, yet which\nafter all only bears evidence to the fact, that Man is actuated by a\nclass of representations in which animals do not share. Then again,\nin self-consciousness, the act of volition is known to us in the\nmost immediate way, but the motive in most cases very indirectly,\nbeing often even intentionally veiled, out of consideration for\nour self-knowledge. This process therefore, in coincidence with the\nconsciousness of that true freedom which belongs to the will, as thing\nin itself outside phenomenon, produces the deceptive illusion that\neven the single act of volition is unconditioned and free: that is,\nwithout a reason; whereas, when the character is given and the motive\nrecognised, every act of volition really follows with the same strict\nnecessity as the changes of which mechanics teach us the laws, and, to\nuse Kant's words, were character and motive exactly known, might be\ncalculated with precisely the same certainty as an eclipse of the moon;\nor again, to place a very heterogeneous authority by the side of Kant,\nas Dante says, who is older than Buridan:--\n\n  \"Intra duo cibi distanti e moventi\n  D'un modo, prima si morria di fame\n  Che liber' uomo l'un recasse a' denti.\"\n                    _Paradiso_, iv. 1.[260]\n\n[260]\n  Between two kinds of food, both equally\n  Remote and tempting, first a man might die\n  Of hunger, ere he one could freely chuse. (_Cary's Tr._)\n\n\n\n\nPHYSICAL ASTRONOMY.\n\n\nNo part of my doctrine could I have less hoped to see corroborated\nby empirical science than that, in which the fundamental truth, that\nKant's thing in itself (_Ding an sich_) is the Will, is applied by me\neven to inorganic Nature, and in which I show the active principle in\nall fundamental forces of Nature to be absolutely identical with what\nis known to us within ourselves as the Will.--It has therefore been\nparticularly gratifying to me to have found that an eminent empiricist,\nyielding to the force of truth, had gone so far as to express this\nparadox in the exposition of his scientific doctrine. I allude to Sir\nJohn Herschel and to his \"Treatise on Astronomy,\" the first edition of\nwhich appeared in 1833, and a second enlarged one in 1849, under the\ntitle \"Outlines of Astronomy.\" Herschel,--who, as an astronomer, was\nacquainted with gravity, not only in the one-sided and really coarse\npart which it acts on earth, but also in the nobler one performed by it\nin universal Space, where the celestial bodies play with each other,\nbetray mutual inclination, exchange as it were amorous glances, yet\nnever allow themselves to come into rude contact, and thus continue\ndancing their dignified minuet to the music of the spheres, while\nthey keep at a respectful distance from one another--when he comes to\nthe statement of the law of gravitation in the seventh chapter,[261]\nexpresses himself as follows:--\n\n     [261] Herschel, \"Treatise on Astronomy,\" chap. 7, \u00a7 371 of the\n     1st edition, 1833.\n\n\"All bodies with which we are acquainted, when raised into the air\nand quietly abandoned, descend to the earth's surface in lines\nperpendicular to it. They are therefore urged thereto by a force or\neffort, the direct or indirect result of a consciousness and a will\nexisting somewhere, though beyond our power to trace, which force we\nterm _gravity_.\"[262]\n\n     [262] Even Copernicus had said the same thing long before\n     \"_Equidem existimo Gravitatem non aliud esse quam appetentiam\n     quandam naturalem, partibus inditam a divina providentia\n     opificis universorum, ut in unitatem integritatemque suam se\n     conferant, in formam Globi coeuntes. Quam affectionem credibile\n     est etiam Soli, Lun\u00e6 c\u00e6terisque errantium fulgoribus, inesse,\n     ut ejus efficacia, in ea qua se repraesentant rotunditate\n     permaneant; qu\u00e6 nihilominus multis modis suos efficiunt\n     circuitus_\" (\"Nicol. Copernici revol.\" Lib. I, Cap. IX. Compare\n     \"Exposition des D\u00e9couvertes de M. le Chevalier Newton par M.\n     Maclaurin; traduit de l'Anglois par M. Lavirotte,\" Paris, 1749,\n     p. 45). Herschel evidently saw, that if we hesitate to explain\n     gravity, as Descartes did, by an impulse from outside, we are\n     absolutely driven to admit a will inherent in bodies, _Non datur\n     tertium_. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\nThe writer who reviewed Herschel's book in the October number of the\n\"Edinburgh Review\" of 1833, anxious, as a true Englishman, before\nall things to prevent the Mosaic record[263] from being imperilled,\ntakes great umbrage at this passage, rightly observing that it cannot\nrefer to the will of God Almighty, who has called Matter and all its\nproperties into being; he utterly refuses to recognise the validity of\nthe proposition itself, and denies that it follows consistently from\nthe preceding \u00a7 upon which Herschel wishes to found it. My opinion\nis, that it undoubtedly would logically follow from that \u00a7 (because\nthe contents of a conception are determined by its origin), but that\nthe antecedent itself is false. It asserts namely, that the origin\nof the conception of causality is experience, more especially such\nexperience as we ourselves make in acting by means of our own efforts\nupon bodies belonging to the outer world. It is only in countries like\nEngland, where the light of Kantian philosophy has not yet begun to\ndawn, that the conception of causality can be thought of as originating\nin experience (professors of philosophy who pooh-pooh Kant's doctrines\nand think me beneath their notice being left out of the question);\nleast of all can it be thought of by those who are acquainted with my\nproof of the _\u00e0 priority_ of that conception, which differs completely\nfrom Kant's proof and rests upon the fact, that knowledge of causality\nmust necessarily precede all perception of the outer world itself as\nits condition; since perception is only brought about through the\n_transition_--effected by the understanding--from the sensation in\nthe organ of sense to its _cause_, which cause now presents itself\nas an _object_ in Space, itself likewise an _\u00e0 priori_ intuition.\nNow, as the perception of objects must be anterior to our conscious\naction upon them, the experience of that conscious action cannot be\nthe origin of the conception of causality; for, before I can act upon\nthings, they must first have acted upon me as motives. I have entered\nfully into all that has to do with this in my chief work,[264] and\nin the second edition of my treatise on the Principle of Sufficient\nReason, \u00a7 21,[265] where the assumption adopted by Herschel finds\nspecial refutation; it is therefore useless to enter into it once more\nhere. But it would be even quite possible to refute this assumption\nempirically, since it would necessarily follow from it, that a man\nwho came into the world without arms or legs, could never attain any\nknowledge of causality or perception of the outer world. Now Nature has\neffectually disproved this by a case, of which I have reproduced the\naccount from its original source in the above-mentioned chapter of my\nchief work, p. 40.[266]--In this assertion of Herschel's therefore, we\nhave another instance of a right conclusion drawn from wrong premisses.\nNow this always happens when we have obtained immediate insight into\na truth by a right _aper\u00e7u_ but are at a loss to find out and clearly\ndefine our reasons for knowing it, owing to our inability to bring them\nto clear consciousness. For, in all original insight, conviction exists\nbefore proof: the proof being invariably excogitated afterwards.\n\n     [263] Which he has more at heart than all the wisdom and truth\n     in the world. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\n     [264] See \"Die Welt a. W, u. V.\" vol. ii. ch. 4, pp. 38-42 (3rd\n     edition, pp. 41-46).\n\n     [265] P. 74 (3rd edition, p. 79), p. 92 of the translation in\n     the present volume.\n\n     [266] 3rd edition, p. 44.\n\nThe immediate manifestation of gravity is more evident in each part of\nliquid, than of solid, matter, owing to the perfect freedom of motion\nof the parts among each other. In order therefore to penetrate into\nthis _aper\u00e7u_, which is the true source of Herschel's assertion, let\nus look attentively at a torrent dashing headlong over rocks and ask\nourselves whether so determined an impetus, so boisterous a vehemence,\ncan arise without an exertion of strength, and whether an exertion\nof strength is conceivable without will. And so it is precisely in\nevery case in which we become aware of anything moving spontaneously,\nof any primary, uncommunicated force: we are constrained to think\nits innermost essence as will.--This much at any rate is certain,\nthat Herschel, like all the empiricists in so many different branches\nof science whose evidence I have quoted above, had arrived here at\nthe limit where nothing more is left behind the Physical but the\nMetaphysical; that this had brought him to a standstill, and that he,\nas well as the rest of them, was unable to find anything beyond that\nlimit, but the _will_.\n\nHerschel moreover, like most of these empiricists, is here still\nhampered by the opinion that will is inseparable from consciousness.\nAs I have expatiated enough above upon this fallacy, and its correction\nthrough my doctrine, it is needless for me to enter into it here again.\n\nThe attempt has repeatedly been made, since the beginning of this\ncentury, to ascribe _vitality_ to the inorganic world. Quite wrongly:\nfor living and inorganic are convertible conceptions, and with death\nthe organic ceases to be organic. But no limit in the whole of Nature\nis so sharply drawn as the line which separates the organic from the\ninorganic: that is to say, the line between the region in which Form is\nthe essential and permanent, Matter the accidental and changing,--and\nthe region in which this relation is entirely reversed. This is no\nvacillating boundary like that perhaps between animals and plants,\nbetween solid and liquid, between gas and steam: to endeavour to\ndestroy it therefore, is intentionally to bring confusion into our\nideas. On the other hand, I am the first who has asserted that a\n_will_ must be attributed to all that is lifeless and inorganic. For,\nwith me, the will is not, as has hitherto been assumed, an accident\nof cognition and therefore of life: but life itself is manifestation\nof will. Knowledge, on the contrary, is really an accident of life,\nand life of Matter. But Matter itself is only the perceptibility of\nthe phenomena of the will. Therefore we are compelled to recognise\n_volition_ in every effort or tendency which proceeds from the nature\nof a material body, and properly speaking constitutes that nature, or\nmanifests itself as phenomenon by means of that nature; and there can\nconsequently be no Matter without manifestation of will. The lowest\nand on that account most universal manifestation of will is _gravity_,\nwherefore it has been called a primary and essential property of Matter.\n\nThe usual view of Nature assumes _two_ fundamentally different\nprinciples of motion, therefore it supposes that the movement of a\nbody may have _two different origins_: _i.e._, that it proceeds either\nfrom the inside, in which case it is attributed to the _will_; or from\nthe outside, and then it is occasioned by _causes_. This principle\nis generally taken for granted as a matter of course and only\noccasionally brought explicitly into prominence; nevertheless, in order\nto make the case quite certain, I will point out a few passages from\nthe earliest to the latest authors in which it is specially stated.\nIn Ph\u00e6drus,[267] Plato makes the distinction between that which moves\nspontaneously from inside (_soul_) and that which receives movement\nonly from outside (_body_)--\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c6' \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03cc, \u1fa7 \u1f14\u03be\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.[268]--Aristotle establishes the principle in precisely\nthe same way: \u1f05\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f22 \u1f51\u03c6' \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f22 \u1f50\u03c0' \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\n(_quidquid fertur a se movetur, aut ab alio_).[269] He returns to the\nsubject in the next Book, chap. 4 and 5, and connects it with some\nexplanatory details which lead him into considerable perplexity, on\naccount precisely of the fallacy of the antithesis.[270]--In more\nrecent times again J. J. Rousseau brings forward the same antithesis\nwith great _na\u00efvet\u00e9_ and candour in his famous \"Profession de foi\ndu vicaire Savoyard:\"[271] \"_J'aper\u00e7ois dans les corps deux sortes\nde mouvement, savoir: mouvement communiqu\u00e9 et mouvement spontan\u00e9 ou\nvolontaire: dans le premier la cause motrice est \u00e9trang\u00e8re au corps\nm\u00fb; et dans le second elle est en lui-m\u00eame._\"--But even in our time\nand in the stilted, puffed-up style which is peculiar to it, Burdach\nholds forth as follows:[272] \"The cause that determines a movement\nlies either inside or outside of that which moves. Matter is external\nexistence; it has powers of motion, but it only brings them into play\nunder certain spacial conditions and external oppositions: the soul\nalone is an ever active and internal thing, and only those bodies which\nhave souls find within themselves inducement to move, and move of their\nown free will, independently of outer mechanical circumstances.\"\n\n     [267] Plato, \"Ph\u00e6d.\" p. 319 Bip.\n\n     [268] \"That which is moved by itself and that which is moved\n     from outside.\" [Tr.] And we find the same distinction again in\n     the 10th Book \"De Legibus,\" p. 85. [After him Cicero repeats it\n     in the two last chapters of his \"Somnium Scipionis.\" Add. to 3rd\n     ed.]\n\n     [269] \"All that is moved, is moved either by itself or by\n     something else.\" [Tr.] Aristotle, \"Phys.\" vii. 2.\n\n     [270] Maclaurin, too, in his account of Newton's discoveries, p.\n     102, lays down this principle as his starting-point. [Add. to\n     3rd ed.]\n\n     [271] \u00c9mile, iv. p. 27. Bip.\n\n     [272] Burdach, \"Physiologie,\" vol. iv. p. 323.\n\nNow here however I must say, as Ab\u00e9lard once did: _si omnes patres\nsic, at ego non sic_: for, in opposition to this principle, however\ngreat may be its antiquity and universality, my doctrine maintains,\nthat there are _not_ two origins of movement differing fundamentally\nfrom one another; that movement does _not_ proceed either from inside,\nwhen it is ascribed to the will, or from outside, when it is brought\nabout by causes; but that both things are inseparable and take place\nsimultaneously with every movement made by a body. For movement which\nis admitted to arise from the _will_, always presupposes a _cause_\nalso: this cause, in beings that have knowledge, is a _motive_; but\nwithout it, even in these beings, movement is impossible. On the other\nhand, the movement of a body which is admitted to have been brought\nabout by an outward _cause_, is nevertheless in itself a manifestation\nof the _will_ of that body which has only been evoked by that cause.\nAccordingly there is only one, uniform, universal and exceptionless\nprinciple of all movement, whose inner condition is _will_ and whose\nouter occasion is _cause_, which latter may also take the form of a\n_stimulus_ or of a _motive_, according to the nature of the thing moved.\n\nAll that is known to us of things in a merely empirical or _\u00e0\nposteriori_, way, is in itself _will_; whereas, so far as they can be\ndetermined _\u00e0 priori_, things belong exclusively to _representation_,\nto mere phenomenon. Natural phenomena therefore become proportionately\nless easy to comprehend, the more distinctly the will manifests itself\nin them, _i.e._ the higher they stand on the scale of beings; whereas,\nthey become more and more comprehensible the smaller the amount of\ntheir empirical content, because they remain more and more within the\nsphere of mere representation, the forms of which, known to us _\u00e0\npriori_, are the principle of comprehensibility. Accordingly, it is\nonly so long as we limit ourselves to this sphere--that is to say,\nonly when we have before us mere representation, mere form without\nempirical content--that our comprehension is complete and thorough:\nthat is, in the _\u00e0 priori_ sciences, Arithmetic, Geometry, Phoronomy\nand Logic. Here everything is in the highest degree comprehensible;\nour insight is quite clear and satisfactory: it leaves nothing to be\ndesired, since we are even unable to conceive that anything could be\notherwise than it is. This comes from our having here exclusively to\ndo with the forms of our own intellect. Thus the more we are able to\ncomprehend in a relation, the more it consists of mere phenomenon and\nthe less it has to do with the thing in itself. Applied Mathematics,\nMechanics, Hydraulics, &c. &c., deal with the lowest degrees of\nobjectification of the will, in which the largest part still remains\nwithin the sphere of mere representation; nevertheless even here\nthere is already an empirical element which stands in the way of\nentire comprehension, which makes the transparency less complete, and\nin which the inexplicable shows itself. For the same reason, only\nfew departments of Physics and of Chemistry continue to admit of a\nmathematical treatment; whereas higher up in the scale of beings\nthis has to be entirely done away with, precisely because of the\npreponderance of content over form in these phenomena. This content is\nwill, the _\u00e0 posteriori_, the thing in itself, the free, the causeless.\nUnder the heading \"Physiology of Plants,\" I have shown how--in beings\nthat live and have knowledge--motive and act of will, representation\nand volition, separate and detach themselves more and more distinctly\none from the other, the higher we ascend in the scale of beings. Now,\nin inorganic Nature also, the cause separates itself from the effect in\njust the same proportion, and the purely empirical--which is precisely\nphenomenon of the will--detaches itself more and more prominently;\nbut, just with this, comprehensibility diminishes. This point merits\nfuller investigation, and I request my readers to give their whole and\nundivided attention to what I am about to say, as it is calculated to\nplace the leading thought of my doctrine in the strongest possible\nlight, both as to comprehensibility and cogency. But this is all I can\ndo; for it is beyond my power to induce my contemporaries to prefer\nthoughts to verbiage; I can only console myself for not being the man\nof the age.\n\nOn the lowest step of the scale of Nature, cause and effect are quite\nhomogeneous and quite equivalent. Here therefore we have perfect\ncomprehension of the causal connection: for instance, the cause of the\nmovement of one ball propelled by impact, is the movement of another,\nwhich loses just as much movement as the first one receives. Here\ncausality is in the highest degree intelligible. What notwithstanding\nstill remains mysterious, is restricted to the possibility of the\npassage of movement--of a thing incorporeal--from one body to another.\nThe receptivity of bodies in this mode is so slight, that the effect\nto be produced has to pass over completely from its cause. The same\nholds good of all purely mechanical influences; and if they are not\nall just as instantaneously understood, it is either because they\nare hidden from us by accessory circumstances, or because we are\nconfused by the complicated connection of many causes and effects.\nIn itself, mechanical causality is everywhere equally, that is, in\nthe highest degree, comprehensible; because cause and effect do not\ndiffer here as to _quality_, and because where they differ as to\n_quantity_, as in the lever, mere Space and Time relations suffice to\nmake the thing clear. But as soon as weights come also into play, a\nsecond mysterious element supervenes, _gravity_: and, where elastic\nbodies are concerned, _elasticity_ also.--Things change as soon as we\nbegin to ascend in the scale of phenomena. Heat, considered as cause,\nand expansion, liquefaction, volatilization or crystallization, as\neffects, are not homogeneous; therefore their causal connection is\nnot intelligible. The comprehensibility of causality has diminished:\nwhat a lower degree of heat caused to liquefy, a higher degree makes\nevaporate: that which crystallizes with less heat, melts when the\nheat is augmented. Warmth softens wax and hardens clay; light whitens\nwax and blackens chloride of silver. And, to go still further, when\ntwo salts are seen to decompose each other mutually and to form two\nnew ones, elective affinity presents itself to us as an impenetrable\nmystery, and the properties of the two new bodies are not a combination\nof the properties of their separate elements. Nevertheless we are still\nable to follow the process and to indicate the elements out of which\nthe new bodies are formed; we can even separate what has been united\nand restore the original quantities. Thus noticeable heterogeneousness\nand incommensurability between cause and effect have here made their\nappearance: causality has become more mysterious. And this becomes\nstill more apparent when we compare the effects of electricity or of\nthe Voltaic pile with their causes, _i.e._ with the friction of glass,\nor the piling and oxidation of the plates. Here all similarity between\ncause and effect at once vanishes; causality becomes shrouded in a\nthick veil, which men like Davy, Faraday and Amp\u00e8re have strenuously\nendeavoured to lift. The only thing now discernible through that\nveil, are the laws ruling its mode of action, which may be brought\ninto a schema such as + E - E, communication, distribution, shock,\nignition, analysis, charging, isolation, discharging, electric current,\n&c. &c., to this schema we are able to reduce and even to direct the\neffect; but of the process itself we know nothing: that remains an\n_x_. Here therefore cause and effect are completely heterogeneous,\ntheir connection is unintelligible, and we see bodies show great\nsusceptibility to causal influences, the nature of which remains a\nsecret for us. Moreover in proportion as we mount higher in the scale,\nthe effect seems to contain more, the cause less. When we reach organic\nNature therefore, in which the phenomenon of life presents itself,\nthis is the case in a far higher degree still. If, as is done in\nChina, we fill a pit with decaying wood, cover it with leaves from the\nsame tree as the wood, and pour a solution of sulphur repeatedly over\nit, an abundant crop of edible mushrooms will spring up. A world of\nrapidly moving _infusoria_ will arise from a little hay well watered.\nWhat a difference lies here between effect and cause! How much more\ndoes the former seem to contain than the latter! When we compare the\nseed, sometimes centuries, nay even thousands of years old, with the\ntree, or the soil with the specifically and strikingly different\njuices of innumerable plants--some healthy, some poisonous, some again\nnutritious--which spring from the same earth, upon which the same\nsun shines and the same rain falls, all resemblance ceases, and with\nit all comprehensibility for us. For here causality already appears\nin increased potency: that is, as stimulus and as susceptibility for\nstimulus. The schema of cause and effect alone has remained; we know\nthat this is cause, that effect; but we know nothing whatever of the\nnature and disposition of causality. Between cause and effect there\nis not only no qualitative resemblance, but no quantitative relation:\nthe relatively greater importance of the effect as compared with its\ncause increases more and more; the effect of the stimulus too does\nnot augment in proportion with the enhancement of that stimulus; in\nfact just the contrary often takes place. Finally, when we come to the\nsphere of beings which have knowledge, there is no longer any sort of\nresemblance or relation between the action performed and the object\nwhich, as representation, evokes it. Animals, however, as they are\nrestricted to _perceptible_ representations, still need the _presence_\nof the object acting as a motive, which action is then immediate and\ninfallible (if we leave training, _i.e._ habit enforced by fear, out\nof the question). For animals are unable to carry about with them\nconceptions that might render them independent of present impressions,\nenable them to reflect, and qualify them for deliberate action. Man\ncan do this. Therefore when at last we come to rational beings, the\nmotive is even no longer a present, perceptible, actually existing,\nreal thing, but a mere conception having its present existence only\nin the brain of the person who acts, but which is extracted from\nmany multifarious perceptions, from the experience of former years,\nor has been handed down in words. Here the separation between cause\nand effect is so wide, the effect has grown so much stronger as\ncompared with the cause, that the vulgar mind no longer perceives the\nexistence of a cause at all, and the acts of the will appear to it to\nbe unconditioned, causeless: that is to say, free. This is just why,\nwhen we reflect upon them from outside, the movements of our own body\npresent themselves as if they took place without cause, or to speak\nmore properly, by a miracle. Experience and reflection alone teach\nus that these movements, like all others, are only possible as the\neffects of causes, here called motives, and that, on this ascending\nscale, it is only as to material reality that the cause has failed\nto keep pace with the effect; whereas it has kept pace with it as to\ndynamical reality, energy.--At this degree of the scale therefore--the\nhighest in Nature--causality has become less intelligible to us than\never. Nothing but the bare schema, taken in a quite general sense,\nnow remains, and the ripest reflection is needed to recognise its\napplicability and the necessity that schema brings with it everywhere.\n\nIn the Grotto of Pausilippo, darkness continues to augment as we\nadvance towards the interior; but when once we have passed the middle,\nday-light again appears at the other end and shows us the way; so also\nin this case: just at the point where the outwardly directed light\nof the understanding with its form of causality, gradually yielding\nto increasing darkness, had been reduced to a feeble, flickering\nglimmer, behold! we are met by a totally different light proceeding\nfrom quite another quarter, from our own inner self, through the\nchance circumstance, that we, the judges, happen here to be the\nvery objects that are to be judged. The growing difficulty of the\ncomprehension of the causal nexus, at first so clear, had now become\nso great for perception and for the understanding--the agent in\nit--that, in animal actions, the very existence of that nexus seemed\nalmost doubtful and those actions appeared to be a sort of miracle.\nBut, just at this point, the observer receives from his own inner self\nthe direct information that the agent in them is the will--that very\nwill, which he knows better and more intimately than anything that\nexternal perception can ever supply. This knowledge alone must be the\nphilosopher's key to an insight into the heart of all those processes\nin unconscious Nature, concerning which causal explanation--although,\nhere, to be sure, more satisfactory than in the processes last\nconsidered, and the clearer, the farther those processes were removed\nfrom these--nevertheless had still left an unknown _x_, and could never\nquite illumine the inside of the process, even in a body propelled\nby impact or attracted by gravity. This _x_ had continued expanding\ntill finally, on the highest degrees of the scale, it had wholly\nrepelled causal explanation. But then, just when the power of causal\nexplanation had been reduced to a minimum, that _x_ revealed itself as\n_the will_--reminding us of Mephistopheles when, yielding to Faust's\nlearned exorcisms, he steps forth out of the huge grown poodle whose\nkernel he was. In consequence of the considerations I have here set\nforth at length, we can surely hardly avoid recognising _the identity\nof this x_, even on the lowest degrees of the scale, where it was but\nfaintly perceptible; then higher up, where it extended its obscurity\nmore and more; and finally on the highest degrees, where it cast a\nshadow upon all things--till, at the very top, it reveals itself to\nour consciousness in our own phenomenal being, as _the will_. The\ntwo primarily different sources of our knowledge, that is to say the\ninward and the outward source, have to be connected together at this\npoint by reflection. It is quite exclusively out of this connection\nthat our comprehension of Nature, and of our own selves arises; but\nthen the inner side of Nature is disclosed to our intellect, which\nby itself alone can never reach further than to the mere outside;\nand the mystery which philosophy has so long tried to solve, lies\nopen before us. For then indeed we clearly see what the Real and the\nIdeal (the thing in itself and the phenomenon) properly are; and this\nsettles the principal question which has engaged the attention of\nphilosophers since Descartes: that is to say, the question as to the\nrelation between these two, whose complete diversity Kant had shown\nmost thoroughly and with unexampled depth, yet whose absolute identity\nwas immediately afterwards proclaimed by humbugs on the credit of\nintellectual intuition. But if we decline to avail ourselves of this\ninsight, which is really the one strait gate to truth, we can never\nacquire comprehension of the intrinsic essence of Nature, to which\nabsolutely no other road leads; for then indeed we fall into an\nirremovable error. Then, as I have already said, we maintain the view,\nthat motion has two radically different primary principles with a solid\npartition-wall between them: _i.e._ movement by means of causes, and\nmovement by means of the will. The first of these must then remain for\never incomprehensible as to its innermost essence, because, after all\nits explanations, there is still left that unknown _x_ which contains\nthe more, the higher the object under consideration stands in the scale\nof beings; while the second, movement by the will, presents itself\nas entirely disconnected from the principle of causality; as without\nreason; as freedom in individual actions: in other words, as completely\nopposed to Nature and utterly unexplainable. On the other hand, if the\nabove-mentioned union of our external and internal knowledge has once\nbeen accomplished at the point where both meet, we then recognise two\nidentities in spite of all accidental differences. That is to say,\nwe recognise the identity of causality with itself on every degree\nof the scale of beings, and the identity of the _x_, which at first\nwas unknown (_i.e._ of physical forces and vital phenomena), with the\nwill which is within us. We recognise, I say, firstly the essential\nidentity of causality under the various forms it is forced to assume\non the different degrees of the scale, as it may manifest itself, now\nas a mechanical, chemical, or physical cause, now as a stimulus, and\nagain as a perceptible or an abstract motive: we know it to be one and\nthe same, not only when a propelling body loses as much movement as\nit imparts by impact, but also when in the combats of thought against\nthought, the victorious one, as the more powerful motive, sets Man\nin motion, a motion which follows with no less necessity than that\nof the ball which is struck. Where we ourselves are the things set\nin motion, where therefore the kernel of the process is well and\nintimately known to us, instead of allowing ourselves to be dazzled\nand confused by this light and thereby losing sight of the causal\nconnection as it lies before us everywhere else in the whole of Nature;\ninstead of shutting out this insight for ever, we now apply the new\nknowledge we have acquired from within as a key to the knowledge of\nthings outside us, and then we recognise the second identity, that\nof our will with the hitherto mysterious _x_ that remains over after\nall causal explanation as an insoluble residue. Consequently we then\nsay: even in cases in which the effect is brought about by the most\npalpable cause, the mysterious _x_ in the process, the real innermost\ncore of it, the true agent, the _in-itself_ of all phenomena--which,\nafter all, is only given us as representation and according to the\nforms and laws of representation--is essentially one and the same with\nwhat is known to us immediately and intimately as _the will_ in the\nactions of our own body, which body is likewise given us as intuition\nand representation.--This is (say what you will) the basis of true\nphilosophy, and if the present age does not see this, many following\nages will. _Tempo \u00e8 galant' uomo!_ (_se nessun altro_).--Thus, just\nas, on the one hand, the essence of causality, which appears most\nclearly only on the lowest degree of the objectification of the will,\nis recognised by us again at every ascending step, even at the highest;\nso also, on the other hand, is the essence of the will recognised by us\nat every descending step in that ladder, even at the lowest, although\nthis knowledge is only immediately acquired at the very highest. The\nold error asserts, that where there is will, there is no causality; and\nthat where there is causality, there is no will. But we say: everywhere\nwhere there is causality, there is will; and no will acts without\ncausality. The _punctum controversi\u00e6_ therefore, is, whether will and\ncausality can and must subsist together in one and the same process at\nthe same time. What makes the knowledge, that this is indeed the case,\nso difficult, is the circumstance, that we know causality and will in\ntwo fundamentally different ways: causality entirely from outside,\nquite indirectly, quite through the understanding; will entirely from\ninside, quite directly; and that accordingly the clearer the knowledge\nof the one in each given instance, the less clear is the knowledge\nof the other. Therefore we recognise the essence of the will least\nreadily, where causality is most intelligible; and, where the will is\nmost unmistakably evident, causality becomes so obscured, that the\nvulgar mind could venture to deny its existence altogether.--Now,\nas Kant has taught us, causality is nothing but the form of the\nunderstanding itself, knowable _\u00e0 priori_: that is, the essence of\n_representation_, as such, which is one side of the world; the other\nside is _will_: which is the thing in itself. That relative increase\nand decrease of clearness in inverse proportion of causality and of the\nwill, that mutual advancing and receding of both, depends consequently\nupon the fact, that the more a thing is given us as mere phenomenon,\n_i.e._ as representation, the more clearly does the _\u00e0 priori_ form of\nrepresentation, _i.e._ causality, manifest itself: this is the case\nin inanimate Nature; conversely, the more immediate our knowledge of\nthe will, the more does the form of representation recede into the\nbackground: this is the case with ourselves. That is: the nearer one\nside of the world approaches to us, the more do we lose sight of the\nother.\n\n\n\n\nLINGUISTIC.\n\n\nAll that I have to record under this head is an observation of my\nown, made within the last few years, which seems hitherto to have\nescaped notice. Yet, that it is worthy of consideration, is attested by\nSeneca's utterance:[273] _Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas\nest, et consuetudo sermonis antiqui qu\u00e6dam efficacissimis notis\nsignat._ Lichtenberg too says: \"If one thinks much oneself, one finds\na good deal of wisdom deposited in language. It is hardly likely that\nwe have laid it all there ourselves, but rather that a great deal of\nwisdom really lies there.\"\n\n  [273] Seneca, \"Epist.\" 81.\n\nIn many, perhaps in all, languages, the action even of those bodies\nwhich are without intellect, nay of inanimate bodies, is expressed by\nthe words _to will_, so that the existence of a will in these bodies is\nthus taken for granted; but they are never credited with a faculty for\nknowing, representing, perceiving or thinking: I know of no expression\nwhich conveys this.\n\nSeneca, when speaking of lightning shot down from heaven, says:[274]\n\"_In his, ignibus accidit, quod arboribus: quarum cacumina, si tenera\nsunt, ita deorsum trahi possunt, ut etiam terram attingant; sed\nquum permiseris, in locum suum exsilient. Itaque non est quod eum\nspectes cujusque rei habitum, qui illi non_ ex voluntate _est. Si\nignem permittis ire quo velit, c\u0153lum repetet._\" In a more general\nsense Pliny says: _nec qu\u00e6renda in ulla parte natur\u00e6 ratio, sed\nvoluntas_.[275] Nor do we find Greek less fertile in instances.\nAristotle, when explaining gravity, says: \u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03bc\u03cc\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b3\u1fc6\u03c2,\n\u1f10\u1f70\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u1f72\u03bd \u1f00\u03c6\u03b5\u03b8\u1fc7, \u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 (_parva qu\u00e6dam\nterr\u00e6 pars, si elevata dimittitur, neque vult manere_).[276] And:\n\u0394\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f43 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 +\u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9+ \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9,\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f43 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f43 \u03b2\u03af\u1fb3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd (_unumquodque autem tale\ndicere oportet, quale natur\u00e2 su\u00e2 esse vult, et quod est; sed non id\nquod violenti\u00e2 et pr\u00e6ter naturam est_).[277] Of great and more than\nmerely linguistic importance is what Aristotle says in his \"Ethica\nmagna,\"[278] where not only animals, but inanimate beings (fire\nstriving upwards and earth downwards) are explicitly in question,\nand he asserts that they may be obliged to do something contrary to\ntheir nature or their will: \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9, \u1f22 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1' \u1f03 +\u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9+\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd,--and therefore rightly places \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1' \u1f03 \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 as a\nparaphrase of \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.--Anacreon, in his 29th Ode, \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u0392\u03ac\u03b8\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd,\nin ordering the portrait of his lady-love, says of her hair: \u1f1d\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03b4' \u1f10\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03bc\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u03ba\u03ac\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f04\u03c4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c2, \u1f04\u03c6\u03b5\u03c2, \u1f61\u03c2 +\u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9+,\n\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 (_capillorum cirros incomposite jungens, sine utut volunt\njacere_).[279] In German, B\u00fcrger says: \"_hinab_ will _der Bach, nicht\nhinan_\" (the brook _will_ go downwards not upwards). In daily life\nwe constantly hear: \"the water boils, it _will_ run over,\"--\"the\nglass _will_ break,\"--\"the ladder _will_ not stand;\"--\"_le feu ne_\nveut _pas br\u00fbler_.\"--\"_la corde, une fois tordue_, veut _toujours se\nretordre_.\"--In English, the verb '_to will_' is even the auxiliary\nof the future of all the other verbs, thus expressing the notion,\nthat there lies a will at the bottom of every action. In English\nmoreover, the endeavours of all inanimate and unconscious things, are\nexpressly designated by the word _want_, which denotes every sort of\nhuman desire or endeavour: \"the water _wants_ to get out,\"--\"the steam\n_wants_ to find an issue.\"--In Italian too we have \"vuol _piovere_;\"\n\"_quest' orologio non_ vuol _andare_.\"--The conception of willing\nis besides so deeply rooted in this last language, that it seems to\nindicate everything that is requisite or necessary: \"_ci_ vuol _un\ncontrappeso_;\" \"_ci_ vuol _pazienza_.\"\n\n  [274] _Ibid._ \"Qu\u00e6st. nat.\" ii. 24.\n\n  [275] Plin. \"Hist. nat.\" 37, 15.\n\n  [276] Aristot. \"De C\u0153lo.\" ii. c. 13, \"If a small particle of earth\n  is lifted and let loose, it is carried away and will not rest.\"\n  [Tr.'s add.]\n\n  [277] _Ibid._ c. 14, \"But each thing ought to be named as it wills\n  to be and really is according to its nature, not as it is by force\n  and contrary to its nature.\" [Tr.'s add.]\n\n  [278] Arist. \"Eth. Mag.\" i. c. 14.\n\n  [279] \"Let the freely curling locks fall unarranged as they _will_\n  [_like_].\" [Tr.'s add.]\n\nA very striking instance of this is to be found even in Chinese--a\nlanguage which differs fundamentally from all those belonging to the\nSanskrit family--it is in the commentary to the Y-King,[280] accurately\nrendered by Peter Regis as follows: \"_Yang, seu materia c\u0153lestis_, vult\n_rursus ingredi, vel_ (_ut verbis doctoris Tsching-tse utar_) vult\n_rursus esse in superiore loco; scilicet illius natur\u00e6 ratio ita fert,\nseu innata lex_.\"\n\n  [280] \"Y-King,\" ed. J. Mohl, vol. i. p. 341.\n\nThe following passage from Liebig[281] has decidedly much more than\na linguistic signification, for it expresses an intimate feeling and\ncomprehension of the way in which a chemical process takes place.\n\"Aldehyd arises, which with the same _avidity_ as sulphurous acid,\ncombines directly with oxygen to form acetic acid.\"--And again:[282]\n\"Aldehyd, which absorbs oxygen from the air with _great avidity_.\" As\nLiebig uses this expression twice in speaking of the same phenomenon,\nit can hardly be by chance, but rather because it was the only adequate\nexpression for the thing.[283] That most immediate stamp of our\nthoughts, language, shows us therefore, that every inward impulse must\nnecessarily be conceived as volition; but it by no means ascribes\nknowledge to things as well. The agreement on this point between all\nlanguages, perhaps without a single exception, proves that here we have\nto do with no mere figure of speech, but that the verbal expression is\ndetermined by a deeply-rooted feeling of the inner nature of things.\n\n  [281] Liebig, \"Die Chemie in ihrer Anwendung auf Agrikultur,\" p.\n  394.\n\n  [282] _Ibid._ \"Die Chemie in Anwendung auf Physiologie.\"\n\n  [283] French chemists likewise say: \"_Il est \u00e9vident que les\n  m\u00e9taux ne sont pas tous \u00e9galement_ avides _d'oxyg\u00e8ne_.\" ... \"_La\n  difficult\u00e9 de la r\u00e9duction devait correspondre n\u00e9cessairement \u00e0\n  une_ avidit\u00e9 _fort grande du m\u00e9tal pour l'oxyg\u00e8ne_.\"--(See Paul de\n  R\u00e9musat, \"La Chimie \u00e0 l'Exposition.\" \"L'Aluminium,\" \"Revue des Deux\n  Mondes,\" 1855, p. 649).\n\n  Vaninus (\"De Amirandis Natur\u00e6 Arcanis,\" p. 170) had said:\n  \"_Argentum vivum etiam in aqua conglobatur, quemadmodum et in\n  plumbi scobe etiam: at a scobe non refugit_ (this is directed\n  against an opinion expressed by Cardanus) _imo ex ea quantum\n  potest colligit: quod nequit (scil. colligere), ut censeo_,\n  invitum _relinquit_: natura enim et sua appetit, et vorat.\" This\n  is evidently more than a form of words. He here quite decidedly\n  attributes a will to quicksilver. And thus it will invariably be\n  found that where, in physical and chemical processes, there is\n  a reference to elementary forces of Nature and to the primary\n  qualities of bodies which cannot be further deduced, these are\n  always expressed by words which belong to the will and its\n  manifestations. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\n\n\n\nANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC.\n\n\nIn 1818, when my chief work first appeared, Animal Magnetism had only\nbegun to struggle into existence. But, as to its explanation--although,\nto be sure, some light had been thrown upon the passive side of it,\nthat is, upon what goes on within the patient, by the contrast between\nthe cerebral and the ganglionic systems, to which Reil had drawn\nattention, having been taken for the principle of explanation--the\nactive side, the agent proper by means of which the magnetiser evokes\nall these phenomena, was still completely shrouded in darkness. People\ngroped about among all sorts of material principles of explanation,\nsuch as Mesmer's all-permeating ether, or the exhalations from the\nmagnetiser's skin, assumed by Stieglitz to be the cause, &c. &c. At\nthe utmost a nerve-spirit had been recognised and, after all, this was\nbut a word for an unknown thing. The truth had scarcely begun to dawn\nupon a few persons, whom practice had more deeply initiated. But I was\nstill far from hoping for any direct corroboration of my doctrine from\nMagnetism.\n\n_Dies diem docet_ however, and the great teacher, experience, has since\nbrought to light an important fact concerning this deep-reaching agent\nwhich, proceeding from the magnetiser, produces effects apparently so\ncontrary to the regular course of Nature that the long lasting doubt\nas to their existence, the stiff-necked incredulity, the condemnation\nof a Committee of which Lavoisier and Franklin were members, in short,\nthe whole opposition that Magnetism encountered both in its first and\nsecond period (with the sole exception of the coarse, unintelligent\ncondemnation without inquiry, which till very lately, prevailed in\nEngland) is quite excusable. The fact I allude to is, that this agent\nis nothing but the _will_ of the magnetiser. To-day not a doubt\nexists on this point, I believe, among those who combine practice\nwith insight; therefore I think it superfluous to quote the numerous\nassertions of magnetisers in corroboration of it.[284] Time has thus\nnot only verified Puys\u00e9gur's watchword and that of the older French\nmagnetisers: \"_Veuillez et croyez!_\" _i.e._ \"Will with belief!\" but\nthis very watchword has even developed into a correct insight of the\nprocess itself.[285] From Kieser's \"Tellurismus,\" still probably the\nmost thorough and detailed text book of Animal Magnetism we have, it\nclearly results, that no act of Magnetism can take effect without the\nwill; on the other hand the bare will, without any outward action,\nis able to produce every magnetic effect. Manipulation seems to be\nonly a means of fixing, and so to say incorporating, the will and\nits direction. In this sense Kieser says: \"Inasmuch as the human\nhand--being the organ by which Man's outward activity is most visibly\nexpressed--is the efficient organ in magnetising, manipulation arises.\"\nDe Lausanne, a French magnetiser, pronounces himself with still\ngreater precision on this point in the Fourth Book of his \"Annales du\nMagn\u00e9tisme Animal\" (1814-1816), where he says: \"_L'action du magn\u00e9tisme\nd\u00e9pend de la seule volont\u00e9, il est vrai; mais l'homme ayant une forme_\next\u00e9rieure et sensible, _tout ce qui est \u00e0 son usage, tout ce qui doit\nagir sur lui, doit n\u00e9c\u00e9ssairement en avoir une, et pour que la volont\u00e9\nagisse, il faut qu'elle employe un mode d'action._\" As, according to\nmy doctrine, the organism is but the mere phenomenon, the visibility,\nthe objectivity of the will; nay, as it is properly speaking only\nthe will itself, viewed as representation in the brain: so also does\nthe outward act of manipulation coincide with the inward act of the\nwill. But where magnetic effects are produced without manipulation,\nthey take place as it were artificially, in a roundabout way, the\nimagination taking the place of the outer act and even occasionally\nthat of personal presence: wherefore it is much more difficult and\nsucceeds less frequently. Kieser accordingly alleges that the word\n\"Sleep!\" or \"You must!\" said aloud, has a more powerful effect upon a\nsomnambulist than the mere inward willing of the magnetiser.--On the\nother hand manipulation, and in general outward action, is really\nan infallible means of fixing the magnetiser's will and promoting\nits activity; precisely because outward acts are quite impossible\napart from all will, the body and its organs being nothing but the\nvisibility of the will itself. This explains the fact, that magnetisers\nat times magnetise without any conscious effort of volition and\nalmost without thinking, and yet produce the desired effect. On the\nwhole, it is not the consciousness of volition, reflection upon\nit, that acts magnetically, but pure volition itself, as detached\nas possible from all representation. In Kieser's directions to\nmagnetisers therefore,[286] we find all thinking and reflecting upon\ntheir respective doing and suffering, all conversation between them,\nforbidden both to physician and patient; also all outward impressions\nwhich arouse representations, the presence of strangers, and even\ndaylight. He advises that everything should proceed as unconsciously as\npossible, as is likewise recommended in charm-cures. The true reason\nof all this is, that here the will operates in its primariness, as\nthing in itself; and this demands the exclusion, as far as possible,\nof representation, as a different sphere, as secondary to the will.\nFacts to prove that the real agent in magnetising is the will and each\noutward act only its vehicle, may be found in all the more recent and\nmore trustworthy writings upon Magnetism, and it would be needless\nprolixity to repeat them here. Nevertheless I will quote _one_ case,\nnot as being especially striking, but as furnished by a remarkable\nperson and having a peculiar interest as his testimony. Jean Paul says\nin a letter:[287] \"Twice in a large company I have made Frau von K.\nnearly go to sleep by merely looking at her with a _firm will_, no\none else knowing anything about it, and before that, I had brought on\npalpitation of the heart and pallor to such a degree that Dr. S. had to\nbe summoned to her assistance.\"[288] Nowadays too, merely laying and\nkeeping hold of the patient's hands while fixing the eye steadily upon\nhim, is frequently substituted with complete success for the customary\nmanipulation; precisely because even this outward act is suited to fix\nthe will in a determined direction. But this immediate power which the\nwill can exercise over other persons, is brought to light best of all\nby the admirable experiments made, even in public, by M. Dupotet and\nhis pupils in Paris, in which a stranger is guided and determined at\npleasure by the magnetiser's mere will, aided by a few gestures, and\nis even forced into the most extraordinary contortions. An apparently\nquite honestly written pamphlet, entitled \"First glance into the\nwonder-world of Magnetism,\" by Karl Scholl (1853), contains a brief\naccount of this.\n\n  [284] I only mention _one_ work which has recently appeared, the\n  explicit object of which is to show that the magnetiser's will is\n  the real agent: \"Qu'est ce que le Magn\u00e9tisme?\" par E. Gromier.\n  (Lyon, 1850.)\n\n  [285] Puys\u00e9gur himself says in the year 1784: \"_Lorsque vous avez\n  magn\u00e9tis\u00e9 le malade, votre but \u00e9tait de l'endormir, et vous y avez\n  r\u00e9ussi par le seul acte de votre volont\u00e9; c'est de m\u00eame par un\n  autre acte de volont\u00e9 que vous le r\u00e9veillez._\" (Puys\u00e9gur, \"Magn\u00e9t.\n  Anim.\" 2me \u00e9dit. 1820, \"Cat\u00e9chisme Magn\u00e9tique,\" p. 150-171.) [Add.\n  to 3rd ed.]\n\n  [286] Kieser, \"Tellur.\" vol. i. p. 400, _et seqq._\n\n  [287] See \"Wahrheit aus Jean Paul's Leben,\" vol. viii. p. 120.\n\n  [288] I had the good fortune in the year 1854 myself to witness\n  some extraordinary feats of this kind, performed here by Signor\n  Regazzoni from Bergamo, in which the immediate, _i.e._ magical,\n  power of his will over other persons was unmistakeable, and of\n  which no one, excepting perhaps those to whom Nature has denied all\n  capacity for apprehending pathological conditions, could doubt the\n  genuineness. There are nevertheless such persons: they ought to\n  become lawyers, clergymen, merchants or soldiers, but in heaven's\n  name not doctors; for the result would be homicidal, diagnosis\n  being the principal thing in medicine.--Regazzoni was able at\n  will to throw the somnambulist who was under his influence into\n  a state of complete catalepsy, nay, he could make her fall down\n  backwards, when he stood behind her and she was walking before\n  him, by his mere will, without any gestures. He could paralyze\n  her, give her _tetanos_, with the dilated pupils, the complete\n  insensibility, and in short, all the unmistakeable symptoms of\n  complete catalepsy. He made one of the lady spectators first play\n  the piano; then standing fifteen paces behind her, he so completely\n  paralyzed her by his will and gestures, that she was unable to\n  continue playing. He next placed her against a column and charmed\n  her to the spot, so that she was unable to move in spite of the\n  strongest efforts.--_According to my own observation_, nearly\n  all his feats are to be explained by his _isolating the brain\n  from the spinal marrow_, either completely, in which case the\n  sensible and motor nerves become paralyzed, and total catalepsy\n  ensues; or partially, by the paralysis only affecting the _motor_\n  nerves while sensibility remains--in other words, the head keeps\n  its consciousness, while the body is apparently lifeless. This\n  is precisely the effect of strychnine: it paralyzes the motor\n  nerves only, even to complete _tetanos_, which induces death by\n  _asphyxia_; but it leaves the sensible nerves, and with them\n  consciousness, intact. Regazzoni does this same thing by the\n  magic influence of his will. The moment at which this isolation\n  takes place is distinctly visible in a peculiar trembling of the\n  patient. I recommend a small French publication entitled \"Antoine\n  Regazzoni de Bergame \u00e0 Francfort sur Mein,\" by L. A. V. Dubourg\n  (Frankfurt, Nov. 1854, 31 pages in 8vo.) on Regazzoni's feats and\n  the unmistakeably genuine character they bear for everyone who is\n  not entirely devoid of all sense for organic Nature.\n\n  In the \"Journal du Magn\u00e9tisme,\" edit. Dupotet, of the 15th August,\n  1856, in criticizing a treatise: \"De la Catalepsie, m\u00e9moire\n  couronn\u00e9,\" 1856, in 4to, the reviewer, Morin, says: \"La plupart\n  des caract\u00e8res qui distinguent la catalepsie, peuvent \u00eatre obtenus\n  artificiellement et sans danger sur les sujets magn\u00e9tiques, et c'est\n  m\u00eame l\u00e0 une des exp\u00e9riences les plus ordinaires des s\u00e9ances\n  magn\u00e9tiques.\" [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\nIn the \"Communications concerning the somnambulist, Auguste K. in\nDresden\" (1843), we find the truth in question confirmed in another way\nby what the somnambulist herself says, p. 53: \"I was half asleep and\nmy brother wished to play a piece he knew. As I did not like it, I\nrequested him not to play it; nevertheless he tried to do so and then,\nby means of my firm will that he should not, I succeeded in making him\nunable to remember the piece, in spite of all his endeavours.\"--The\nthing is however brought to a climax when this immediate power of the\nwill is extended even to inanimate bodies. However incredible this may\nappear, we have nevertheless two accounts of it coming from entirely\ndifferent quarters. In the book just mentioned,[289] it is related\nand testified by witnesses, that Auguste K. caused the needle of the\ncompass to deviate at one time 7\u00b0 and at another 4\u00b0, this experiment\nmoreover being repeated four times. She did this moreover without\nany use of her hands, through her mere will, by looking steadily at\nit.--The Parisian somnambulist, Prudence Bernard, again in a public\n_s\u00e9ance_ in London, at which Mr. Brewster, the physicist's son and two\nother gentlemen from among the spectators acted as jurors, made the\ncompass needle deviate and follow her movements by simply turning her\nhead round.[290]\n\n  [289] \"Mittheilungen \u00fcber die Somnamb\u00fcle, Auguste K., in Dresden.\"\n  1845, pp. 115, 116, and 318.\n\n  [290] See extract from the English periodical \"Britannia,\" in\n  \"Galignani's Messenger,\" of the 23rd October, 1851.\n\nNow, if we thus see the will--stated by me to be the thing in itself,\nthe only real thing in all existence, the kernel of Nature--accomplish\nthrough the human individual, in Animal Magnetism and even beyond\nit, things which cannot be explained according to the causal nexus,\n_i.e._ in the regular course of Nature; if we find it in a sense even\nannulling Nature's laws and actually performing _actio in distans_,\nconsequently manifesting a supernatural, that is, metaphysical,\nmastery over Nature--what corroboration better founded on fact could I\ndesire for my doctrine? Was not even Count Szapary, a magnetiser who\ncertainly did not know my philosophy, led by the results of his own\nexperience, after writing the title of his book: \"A word about Animal\nMagnetism, soul-bodies and vital essence,\"[291] to add the following\nremarkable explanatory words: \"or physical proofs that the current\nof Animal Magnetism is the element, and _the will the principle of\nall spiritual and corporeal life_?\"[292]--According to this, Animal\nMagnetism presents itself directly as _practical Metaphysic_, which\nwas the term used by Bacon of Verulam[293] to define Magic in his\nclassification of the sciences: it is empirical or experimental\nMetaphysic.--Further, because the will manifests itself in Animal\nMagnetism downright as the thing in itself, we see the _principium\nindividuationis_ (Space and Time), which belongs to mere phenomenon, at\nonce annulled: its limits which separate individuals from one another,\nare destroyed; Space no longer separates magnetiser and somnambulist;\ncommunity of thoughts and of motions of the will appears; the state of\n_clairvoyance_ overleaps the relations belonging to mere phenomenon\nand conditioned by Time and Space, such as proximity and distance, the\npresent and the future.\n\n  [291] Szapary, \"Ein Wort \u00fcber Animalischen Magnetismus,\n  Seelenk\u00f6rper and Lebensessenz\" (1840).\n\n  [292] \"Oder physische Beweise, dass der Animalisch-magnetische\n  Strom das Element, and _der Wille das Princip alles geistigen und\n  K\u00f6rperlichen Lebens sei_.\"\n\n  [293] Bacon, \"Instaur. Magna,\" L. III.\n\nIn consequence of these facts, notwithstanding many reasons and\nprejudices to the contrary, the opinion has gradually gained ground,\nnay almost raised itself to certainty, that Animal Magnetism and its\nphenomena are identical with part of the Magic of former times, of\nthat ill-famed occult art, of whose reality not only the Christian\nages by which it was so cruelly persecuted, but all, not excepting\neven savage, nations on the whole of the earth, have been equally\nconvinced throughout all ages. The Twelve Tables of the Romans,[294]\nthe Books of Moses, and even Plato's Eleventh Book on Laws, already\nmade its practice punishable by death, and Apuleius' beautiful\nspeech[295] before the court of justice, when defending himself against\nthe charge of practising magic by which his life was menaced, proves\nhow seriously this matter was taken even in the most enlightened Roman\nperiod, under the Antonines; since he merely tries to clear himself\npersonally from the charge in question, but by no means contests the\npossibility of witchcraft and even enters into a host of absurd details\nsuch as are wont to figure in all the medi\u00e6val trials for witchcraft.\nThe eighteenth century makes an exception as regards this belief in\nMagic, and this is mainly because Balthasar Becker, Thomasius and some\nothers, with the good intention of putting an end once for all to the\ncruel trials for witchcraft, declared all magic to be impossible.\nFavoured by the philosophy of the age, this opinion soon gained the\nupper hand, although only among the learned and educated classes. The\ncommon people have never ceased to believe in witchcraft, even in\nEngland; though here the educated classes contrive to unite a degrading\nreligious bigotry with the firm incredulity of a Saint Thomas (or\nof a Thomasius) as to all facts transcending the laws of impact and\ncounter-impact, acids and alkalis, and refuse to lend an ear to their\ngreat countryman, when he tells them that 'there are more things in\nheaven and earth than are dreamt of in their philosophy.' One branch\nof Magic is still notoriously preserved and practised among the lower\norders, being tolerated on account of its beneficent purpose. This\nis _curing by charms_ (_sympathetische Kuren_, as they are called in\nGerman), the reality of which can hardly be doubted. Charming away\nwarts, is one of the commonest forms of this practice, and of this\nBacon of Verulam, cautious and empirical though he was, attests the\nefficacy from personal experience.[296] The charming away of erisypelas\nin the face by a spell, is another instance, and so often succeeds,\nthat it is easy to convince oneself of its existence. Fever too is\noften successfully combated by spells, &c. &c.[297]--That, in all\nthis, the real agents are not the meaningless words and ceremonies,\nbut that it is the will of the operator which acts, as in Animal\nMagnetism, needs no further explanation after what has been said\nabove. For such as are still unacquainted with charm-cures, instances\nmay be found in Kieser.[298]--These two facts therefore, Animal\nMagnetism and Charm-curing, bear empirical evidence to the possibility\nof magical, as opposed to physical, influence, which possibility had\nbeen so peremptorily rejected by the past century; since it refused to\nrecognise as possible any other than physical influences brought about\nin the way of the intelligible nexus of causality.\n\n  [294] Plin. hist. nat. L. 30, c. 3. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\n  [295] Apuleius, \"Oratio de Magia,\" p. 104. Bip.\n\n  [296] Bacon, \"Silva Silvarum,\" \u00a7 997.\n\n  [297] In the \"Times\" of June the 12th, 1855, we find, p. 10, the\n  following:--\n\n  \"A Horse-charmer.\n\n  \"On the voyage to England the ship 'Simla' experienced some\n  heavy weather in the Bay of Biscay, in which the horses suffered\n  severely, and some, including a charger of General Scarlett, became\n  unmanageable. A valuable mare was so very bad, that a pistol was\n  got ready to shoot her and to end her misery; when a Russian\n  officer recommended a Cossak prisoner to be sent for, as he was\n  a 'juggler' and could, by charms, cure any malady in a horse. He\n  was sent for, and immediately said he could cure it at once. He\n  was closely watched, but the only thing they could observe him do\n  was to take his sash off and tie a knot in it three several times.\n  However the mare, in a few minutes, got on her feet and began to\n  eat heartily, and rapidly recovered.\" [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\n  [298] Kieser, \"Archiv, f\u00fcr den thierischen Magnetismus,\" vol.\n  v. heft 3, p. 106; vol. viii. heft 3, p. 145; vol. ix. heft 2,\n  p. 172; and vol. ix. heft 1, p. 128; Dr. Most's book likewise:\n  \"\u00dcber Sympathetische Mittel und Kuren,\" 1842, may be used as an\n  introduction to this matter. (And even Pliny indicates a number of\n  charm-cures in the 28th Book, chaps. 6 to 17. [Add. to 3rd ed.])\n\nIt is a fortunate circumstance, that the rectification of this view\nin our time should have come from medical science; because it ensures\nus at the same time against the danger of the pendulum of opinion\nreceiving too strong an impulse in the contrary direction, and thus\ncarrying us back to the superstition of ruder ages. Besides, as I\nhave said, Animal Magnetism and Charm-curing only save the reality\nof a part of Magic, which included a good deal more, a considerable\nportion of which must, for the present at least, remain under the old\nsentence of condemnation or be left in uncertainty; whereas another\nportion will at any rate have to be conceived as possible, through\nits analogy to Animal Magnetism. For Animal Magnetism and Charm-cures\nare but salutary influences exercised for curative purposes, like\nthose recorded in the \"History of Magic\" as practised by the so-called\n(Spanish) _Saludadores_,[299] who nevertheless were also condemned\nby the Church; whereas Magic was far oftener practised with an evil\nintent. Nevertheless, to judge by analogy, it is more than probable,\nthat the same inherent force which, by acting directly upon another\nindividuality, can exercise a salutary influence, will be at least as\npowerful to exercise a prejudicial and pernicious one. If therefore\nthere was reality in any part of ancient Magic beyond what may be\nreferred to Animal Magnetism and curing by charms, it must assuredly\nhave been in that which is called _maleficium_ and _fascinatio_, the\nvery thing that gave rise to most of the trials for witchcraft. In\nMost's book, too, already mentioned,[300] a few facts are related which\nmust undoubtedly be ascribed to _maleficium_; in Kieser,[301] also\nwe find instances of diseases which had been transmitted, especially\nto dogs, who died of them. In Plutarch[302] we find that _fascinatio_\nwas already known to Democritus, who tried to explain it as a fact.\nNow admitting these stories to be true, they give us the key to the\ncrime of witchcraft, the zealous persecution of which would therefore\nnot have been quite without reason. For even if in most cases it may\nhave been founded upon error and abuse, we are still not authorized\nto look upon our forefathers as having been so utterly benighted,\nas to persecute with the utmost vigour and cruelty for so many ages\nan absolutely impossible crime. From this point of view moreover,\nwe can also understand that the common people should still even to\nthe present day persist in attributing certain cases of illness to\na _maleficium_, and are not to be dissuaded from this conviction.\nNow if we are thus induced by the progress of the age to modify the\nextreme view adopted by the last century concerning the absolute\nnullity of this ill-famed art--at any rate with respect to some part\nof it--still nowhere is caution more necessary than here, in order to\nfish out from the chaos of fraud, falsehood and absurdity contained\nin the writings of Agrippa von Nettesheim, Wierus, Bodinus, Delrio,\nBindsfeldt, &c. &c., the few isolated truths that may lie in them. For,\nfrequent though they may be throughout the world, nowhere have lies\nand deceit freer play than where Nature's laws are avowedly set aside,\nnay declared invalid. Here therefore we find the wildest fictions, the\nstrangest freaks of the imagination worked up into an edifice, lofty\nas the skies, on the narrow foundation of the slight particle of truth\nthere may have been in Magic, and in consequence of this, the most\nsanguinary atrocities perpetrated age after age. In contemplating such\nthings, the psychological reflection on the unlimited capability of\nthe human intellect for accepting the most incredible absurdities and\nthe readiness of the human heart to set its seal to them by cruelty,\nprevails over every other.\n\n  [299] Delrio. \"Disqu. Mag.\" L. III. P. 2, q. 4. 4, s. 7--and\n  Bodinus, \"Mag. D\u00e6mon,\" iii. 2.\n\n  [300] See note 2, p. 334, especially pp. 40, 41, and Nos. 89, 91,\n  and 97 of Most's book.\n\n  [301] Kieser, \"Archiv. f. t. M.\" See the account of Bende Bensen's\n  illness, vol. ix. to vol. xii.\n\n  [302] Plutarch, \"Symposiac\u00e6 qu\u00e6stionis,\" qu. v. 7. 6.\n\nYet the modification which has taken place of late in the views of\nGerman _savants_ respecting magic, is not due exclusively to Animal\nMagnetism. The deep foundations of it had already been laid by the\nchange in philosophy wrought by Kant, which makes German culture\ndiffer fundamentally from that of the rest of Europe, with respect\nto philosophy as well as to other branches of knowledge.--For a man\nto be able to smile beforehand at all occult sympathies, let alone\nmagical influences, he must find the world very, nay completely,\nintelligible. But this is only possible if he looks at it with the\nutterly superficial glance which puts away from it all suspicion that\nwe human beings are immersed in a sea of riddles and mysteries and\nhave no exhaustive knowledge or understanding either of things or of\nourselves in any direct way. Nearly all great men have been of the\nopposite frame of mind and therefore, whatever age or nation they\nbelonged to, have always betrayed a slight tinge of superstition. If\nour natural mode of knowing were one that handed over to us things\nin themselves immediately and consequently gave us the absolutely\ntrue relations and connections of things, we might then, no doubt,\nbe justified in rejecting _\u00e0 priori_, therefore unconditionally, all\nprescience of future events, all apparitions of absent, of dying,\nlet alone of deceased persons, and all magical influence. But if all\nthat we know is, as Kant teaches, mere phenomenon, the forms and laws\nof which do not extend to things in themselves, it must be obviously\npremature to reject all foreknowledge, all apparitions and all magic;\nsince that rejection is based upon laws, whose _\u00e0 priori_ character\nprecisely restricts them to phenomena; whereas things in themselves,\nto which even our own inner self must belong, remain untouched by\nthem. But it is quite possible for these very things in themselves\nto have relations with us from which the above-mentioned occurrences\nmay have arisen, concerning which accordingly we have to wait for the\ndecision _\u00e0 posteriori_, and must not forestall it. That the English\nand French should persist in denying _\u00e0 priori_ all such occurrences,\ncomes at the bottom from the influence of Locke's philosophy, under\nwhich these nations still stand as to all essential points, and by\nwhich we are taught that, after merely subtracting sensation, we know\nthings in themselves. According to this view therefore, the laws of the\nmaterial world are held to be ultimate, and no other influence than\n_influxus physicus_ is admitted. Consequently these nations believe,\nit is true, in a physical, but not in a metaphysical, science, and\ntherefore reject all other than so-called \"Natural Magic:\" a term\nwhich contains the same _contradictio in adjecto_ as \"Supernatural\nPhysics,\" but is nevertheless constantly used quite seriously, while\nthe latter was used but once, and then in joke, by Lichtenberg. On the\nother hand, the common people, with their universal readiness to give\ncredit to supernatural influences, express by it in their own way the\nconviction, that all things which we perceive and comprehend are mere\nphenomena, not things in themselves; although, with them, conviction is\nonly felt. I quote the following passage from Kant's \"Grundlegung zur\nMetaphysik der Sitten,\" as a proof that this is not saying too much:\n\"There is an observation requiring no great subtlety of reflection,\nwhich we may on the contrary suppose the most ordinary understanding\ncapable of making, albeit in its own way and by an obscure distinction\nof the faculty of judgment, which it calls feeling. It is this: that\nall our involuntary representations (such as those of the senses) give\nus no further knowledge of objects than as they affect us, whereby we\nare left in ignorance as to what those objects may be in themselves;\nthat, as far as this sort of representation is concerned therefore, we\nare still only able by this means to attain knowledge of phenomena, but\nnever of _things in themselves_, even by dint of the utmost clearness\nand the most strenuous attention the understanding is able to give to\nthis point. When once this distinction is made, however, it stands to\nreason, that the existence of something else behind these phenomena,\nsomething which is not phenomenon, _i.e._ the thing in itself, has\nstill to be admitted and assumed.\"[303]\n\n  [303] Kant, \"First Principles of Ethical Metaphysic,\" 3rd edition,\n  p. 105.\n\nWhen we read D. Tiedemann's \"History of Magic,\"[304] we are astonished\nat the persistency with which mankind have clung to the thought of\nMagic in all places and at all times, notwithstanding frequent failure;\nand we come to the conclusion, that this thought must, to say the\nleast, be deeply rooted in human nature, if not in things in general,\nand cannot be a mere arbitrary creation of the fancy. Although Magic\nis differently defined by the various authors who have treated of it,\nthe fundamental thought which predominates in all its definitions is\nnevertheless unmistakeable. For the opinion, that there must be another\nquite different way of producing changes in the world besides the\nregular one through the causal nexus between bodies, and one moreover\nwhich is not founded at all upon that nexus, has found favour in all\nages and countries. Therefore also the means belonging to this second\nway appeared absurd, when they were viewed in the same light as the\nfirst; since the cause applied was obviously not suited to the effect\nintended and a causal nexus between them was impossible. But here it\nwas assumed, that apart from the outer connection between the phenomena\nof this world on which the _nexus physicus_ is founded, there must\nexist another besides, passing through the very essence in itself of\nall things: a subterranean connection as it were, by means of which\nimmediate action was possible from _one_ point of the phenomenon on to\nevery other point, through a _nexus metaphysicus_;\n\n  [304] D. Tiedemann, \"Disputatio de qu\u00e6stione, qu\u00e6 fuerit artum\n  magicarum origo.\" Marb. 1787. A prize-essay written for the\n  G\u00f6ttingen Society.\n\n_that_ accordingly, it must be possible to act upon things from inside,\ninstead of from outside, as is usual;\n\n_that_ it must be possible for phenomenon to act upon phenomenon\nby means of that being in itself, which is one and the same in all\nphenomena;\n\n_that_, just as we act causally as _natura naturata_, we might probably\nbe able to act also as _natura naturans_, and momentarily to enable the\nmicrocosm to play the part of the macrocosm;\n\n_that_, however firm the partition walls of individuation and\nseparation might be, they might nevertheless occasionally permit a\ncommunication to take place as it were behind the scenes, or like a\nsecret game under the table; and\n\n_that_, just as a neutralisation of individual isolation takes place\nin somnambulistic _clairvoyance_, so likewise might a neutralisation\nof the will in the individual be possible. Such a thought as this\ncannot have arisen empirically, nor can it have been confirmation\nthrough experience that has preserved it throughout all ages and in\nall countries: for in the majority of cases experience must result\ndownright unfavourably to it. I opine therefore, that the origin of\nthis thought, which has universally held its ground with the whole of\nmankind and, in spite of so much conflicting experience, in defiance\nof common sense, has never been eradicated, must be sought at great\ndepth: namely in the inward feeling of the omnipotence of the will in\nitself--of that will, which constitutes at once the inner essence of\nMan and of the whole of Nature--and in the assumption connected with\nit that, somehow or other, this omnipotence might possibly for once\nmake itself felt, even when proceeding from the individual. People\nwere unable to investigate and distinguish the difference between the\ncapabilities of the will as thing in itself and the same will in its\nindividual manifestation; but they assumed without further ado, that\nunder certain circumstances, the will might be enabled to break through\nthe barriers of individuation. For the above-mentioned feeling rebelled\nobstinately against the knowledge forced upon it by experience, that\n\n  \"Der Gott der mir im Busen wohnt,\n    Kann tief mein Innerstes erregen,\n  Der \u00fcber allen meinen Kr\u00e4ften thront,\n    Er kann nach Aussen nichts bewegen.\"\n\nAccording to the fundamental thought just expounded, we find that the\nphysical medium used in all attempts at magic, never was regarded in\nany other light than in that of a vehicle for a thing metaphysical;\notherwise it could evidently stand in no relation whatever to the\neffect contemplated. These media consisted in cabalistic words,\nsymbolical actions, traced figures, wax images, &c. &c. We see too\nthat, according to the original feeling, what this vehicle conveyed,\nwas in the last resort always an act of _volition_ that had been\nconnected with it. The very natural inducement to do this, was the\nobservation, that every moment men became aware of a completely\nunaccountable, that is, evidently metaphysical, agency of the will,\nin the movements of their own bodies. Might not this agency, they\nthought, be extended to other bodies also? To find out a way to annul\nthe isolation in which the will finds itself in each individual, and to\nextend the immediate sphere of the will's action beyond the organism of\nthe person willing, was the aim of Magic.\n\nA great deal was nevertheless still wanting ere this fundamental\nthought, from which Magic seems properly to have sprung, could pass\nover at once into distinct consciousness and be recognised _in\nabstracto_, and ere Magic could at once understand itself. Only a few\nthoughtful and learned writers of former ages--as I mean soon to prove\nby quotations--express the distinct thought, that it is in _the will_\nitself that the magic power lies, and that the strange signs and acts\ntogether with the senseless words that accompanied them, which passed\nfor the means of exorcising and the connecting link with demons, are\nin fact merely vehicles and means for fixing _the will_, by which the\nact of volition, which is to act magically, ceases to be mere wish\nand becomes deed, or, to use the language of Paracelsus, \"receives a\n_corpus_,\" and the individual will in a sense distinctly proclaims that\nit is now acting as general will, as will in itself. For in every act\nof Magic--charm-cure or whatever else it may be--the outward action\n(the connecting link) is exactly what the passes are in magnetising:\n_i.e._ not what is really essential, but the mere vehicle, that by\nwhich the will, the only real agent, is directed and fixed in the\nmaterial world and enters into reality. As a rule therefore, it is\nindispensable.--From the rest of the writers of those times we gather\nthat, in conformity with that fundamental thought of Magic, their only\naim was to obtain absolute, arbitrary power over Nature. But they were\nunable to elevate themselves to the thought that this power must be\na _direct_ one; they conceived it, on the contrary, absolutely as an\n_indirect_ one. For all religions in all countries had placed Nature\nunder the dominion of gods and of demons. Now, it was the magician's\nendeavour to subject these gods and demons to his will, to induce, nay,\nto force them to serve him; and he attributed all that he succeeded\nin achieving to their agency, just as Mesmer attributed the success\nof his Magnetism to the magnetic rods he held in his hands, instead\nof to his will which was the real agent. It was in this sense that\nall polytheistic nations took the matter, and even Plotinus,[305] but\nmore especially Iamblichus, understood Magic: that is, as _Theurgy_,\nan expression which Porphyry was the first to use. That divine\naristocracy, Pantheism, was favourable to this interpretation, since\nit distributed the dominion over the different forces of Nature among\nas many gods and demons--mostly mere personifications of natural\nforces--and the magician, by persuasion or by force, subjected now\none, now the other of these divinities to his power and made them do\nhis bidding. But in a Divine Monarchy, where all Nature obeys a single\nruler, the thought of contracting a private alliance with the Almighty,\nlet alone of exercising sovereignty over him, would have been too\naudacious. Therefore where Judaism, Christianity or Islam prevailed,\nthe omnipotence of the one God stood in the way of this interpretation\nof Magic: an omnipotence which the magician could not venture to\nattack. He had no alternative therefore, but to take refuge with the\nDevil, and with this rebellious spirit--perhaps even direct descendant\nof Ahriman--to whom some power over Nature was still attributed, he now\nentered into a compact, by which he ensured to himself his assistance.\nThis was \"necromancy\" (the 'black art'). Its antithesis, 'white Magic,'\nwas opposed to it by the circumstance that, in it, the magician did\nnot make friends with the Devil, but rather solicited the permission,\nnot to say co-operation, of the Almighty himself, to intercede with\nthe angels; oftener still, he invoked devils by pronouncing the rarer\nHebrew names and titles of the One God, such as Adon-Ai, &c. &c., and\ncompelled them to obey him, without promising them anything in return\nfor their services, in a hell-compulsion[306] (_H\u00f6llenzwang_).--But\nall these mere interpretations and outward trappings of the thing were\nreceived so entirely as its essence and as objective processes, that\nwriters like Bodinus, Delrio, Bindsfeldt, &c., whose knowledge of\nmagic was second-hand and not derived from personal experience, all\nassert the essential characteristic of Magic to be, that it does not\nact either through forces of Nature or in a natural way, but through\nthe assistance of the Devil. This view was, and long remained, current\neverywhere, locally modified according to the religions which prevailed\nin different countries. The laws against sorcery and the trials for\nwitchcraft were based upon it; likewise, wherever the possibility of\nMagic was contested, the attacks were generally directed against this\nopinion. An objective view, such as this, was an inevitable consequence\nof the decided Realism which prevailed throughout ancient and medi\u00e6val\nEurope and which Descartes was the first to disturb. Till then, Man\nhad not learnt to direct the light of speculative thought towards the\nmysterious depths of his own inner self, but, on the contrary, had\nsought everything outside himself. Above all the thought of making the\nwill he found within him rule over Nature, was so bold, that people\nwould have been alarmed by it: therefore it was made to rule over\nfictitious beings, supposed by the prevailing superstition to have\ncommand over Nature, in order through them to obtain at least indirect\nmastery over Nature. Every sort of god or demon moreover, is always\na hypostasis, by which believers of all sects and colours bring to\ntheir own comprehension the _Metaphysical_, that which lies _behind_\nNature, that which gives her existence and consistence and consequently\nrules over her. Thus, when it is said, that Magic acts by the help of\ndemons, the meaning which lies at the bottom of this thought still\nis, that it is an agency which is not physically, but _metaphysically_\nexercised: that it is not a natural, but a supernatural, agency. Now\nif, in the small amount of fact which speaks in favour of the reality\nof Magic: that is, in Animal Magnetism and charm-cures, we still do\nnot recognise anything but an immediate action of the will which here\nmanifests its direct power outside, instead of inside, the individual;\nif moreover, as I am about to show and to substantiate by decisive,\nunequivocal citations, those who are more deeply initiated into\nancient Magic, derive all its effects from the magician's will alone:\nthis is surely strong empirical evidence in support of my doctrine,\nthat the Metaphysical in general, that which alone exists apart from\nrepresentation, the _thing in itself_ of the universe--is nothing but\nwhat is known to us within ourselves as _the will_.\n\n  [305] Here and there, Plotinus betrays a more correct knowledge,\n  for instance, \"Enn.\" ii. lib. iii. c. 7; \"Enn.\" iv. lib. iii. c.\n  12, et lib. ix. c. 3.\n\n  [306] Delrio, \"Disq. mag.\" L. ii. qu. 2. Agrippa a Nettesheym, \"De\n  Vanit. Scient.\" c. 45.\n\nNow, if the direct power which may occasionally be exercised over\nNature by the will, was conceived by those magicians as a merely\nindirect one, acquired by the help of demons, this still could not\nprevent its efficiency wherever and whenever it may have taken place.\nFor, precisely because, in things of this kind, the will acts in\nitself, in its primariness, therefore apart from representation,\nits efficiency cannot be frustrated by erroneous conceptions of the\nintellect; on the contrary, the distance here is a wide one between\ntheory and practice: the errors of the former do not stand in the way\nof the latter, nor does a correct theory qualify for practice. Mesmer,\nin the beginning, attributed his agency to the magnetic rods he held\nin his hands and later on explained the wonders of Animal Magnetism by\na materialistic theory of a subtle, all-permeating fluid; nevertheless\nhe produced wonderfully powerful effects. I once myself knew the\nproprietor of an estate, whose peasants were wont by tradition to have\ntheir feverish attacks dispelled by a spell of their master's. Now,\nalthough he believed he had convinced himself of the impossibility of\nall such things, yet he continued good-naturedly to comply with their\nwish as usual, and indeed often succeeded in relieving them. This\nsuccess he ascribed to his peasants' firm belief, forgetting that a\nsimilar faith ought also to bring success to the medical treatment\nwhich is so often applied with complete inefficacy to believing\npatients.\n\nNow, if Theurgy and Demonomagic, as described above, were but the mere\ninterpretation and outward trappings of the thing, the mere husk, at\nwhich the majority were content to stop short: there were nevertheless\nsome, who went below the surface and quite recognised that the agent\nin influences supposed to proceed from magic, was absolutely nothing\nbut _the will_. We must not however look for such deeper observers as\nthese among the discountenancers and antagonists of Magic, and the\nmajority of the writers on this subject belong precisely to these:\nthey derived their knowledge exclusively from Courts of Justice and\nfrom the examination of witnesses, so that they merely describe the\noutside of the matter; and, if at any time they chanced, through\nconfessions, to gain an insight into the inner processes they took\ngood care not to betray that knowledge, lest, by doing so, they\nshould contribute to diffuse the terrible vice of sorcery. To this\nclass belong Bodinus, Delrio, Bindsfeldt, and others. For information\nas to the real nature of the thing, we must on the contrary go to\nphilosophers and investigators of Nature, who wrote in those times of\nprevailing superstition. Now, from what they say, it clearly follows,\nthat the real agent in Magic, just as in Animal Magnetism, is nothing\nbut _the will_. Here I must quote some passages in support of this\nassertion.[307] Theophrastus Paracelsus especially disclosed perhaps\nmore concerning the inner nature of Magic than any other writer, and\ndoes not even hesitate to give a minute description of the processes\nused in it.[308]--He says:[309] \"To be observed concerning wax images:\nif I bear malice in my will against anyone, that malice must be carried\nout by some medium or _corpus_. Thus it is possible for my spirit to\nstab or wound another person without help from my body in using a\nsword, merely by my _fervent desire_. Therefore it is also possible\nfor me to convey my opponent's spirit into the image by my _will_ and\nthen to deform or paralyze it at pleasure.--You must know, that the\ninfluence of the _will_ is a great point in medicine. For if a man hate\nanother and begrudge him anything good, it is possible that if he curse\nhim, that curse may take effect.--This occurs also with animals and\nmore easily than with men; for the spirit of man has far greater power\nof resistance than that of animals.\"\n\n  [307] Roger Bacon already in the thirteenth century said: ...\n  \"_Quod si ulterius aliqua anima maligna cogitat fertiter de\n  infectione alterius atque ardenter desideret et certitudinaliter\n  intendat, atque vehementer consideret se posse nocere, non est\n  dubium quin natura obediet cogitationibus anim\u00e6_.\" (See Rogeri\n  Bacon, \"Opus Majus,\" Londini, 1733, p. 252.)\n\n  [308] Theophrastus Paracelsus, Strassburg edition in two folio\n  vols., vol. i, pp. 91, 353, et seqq. and p. 789; vol. ii. pp. 362,\n  496.\n\n  [309] Vol. i. p. 19.\n\nAnd p. 375: \"It follows from this, that one image has magic power over\nanother, not by virtue of the characters or anything of that kind\nimpressed on the virgin wax; but the imagination overcomes its own\nconstellation, so as to become a means for fulfilling the will of its\nheaven, _i.e._ of its man.\"\n\np. 334: \"All the imagining of man comes from his heart. The heart is\nthe sun of the microcosm. And all the imagining of man passes from the\nsmall sun of the microcosm into the sun of the great Universe, into the\nheart of the macrocosm. Thus the _imaginatio_ of the microcosm is a\nseed which becomes material,\" &c.\n\np. 364: \"It suffices for you to know what rigorous imagination does,\nwhich is the beginning of all magical works.\"\n\np. 789: \"Even my thought therefore is a looking at a mark. Now I\nmust not turn my eye with my hands in this or that direction; but my\nimagination turns it as I wish. And this is also to be understood of\nwalking: I desire, I propose to myself, therefore my body moves, and\nthe firmer my thoughts, the more sure it is that I shall run. Thus\n_imaginatio_ alone is an impulse for my running.\"\n\np. 837: \"_Imaginatio_ used against me may be employed with such rigour,\nthat I may be killed by the _imaginatio_ of another person.\"\n\nVol. ii. p. 274: \"Imagination comes from longing and desire: envy,\nhatred, proceed from longing, for they do not arise unless you long for\nthem. As soon as you wish, the act of the imagination follows. This\nlonging must be quick, ardent, lively, as that of a pregnant woman,\n&c. &c.--A general curse is commonly verified. Why? It comes from the\nheart, and the seed lies and is born in that coming from the heart.\nThus parents' curses also come from the heart. The curse of the poor is\nlikewise _imaginatio_. The prisoner's curse, also mere _imaginatio_,\ncomes from the heart.... Thus too, when one man wishes to stab or\nparalyze, &c., another by means of his _imaginatio_, he must first\nattract the thing and instrument to himself and then he can impress\nit (with his wish): for whatever enters into it, may also go out of\nit again by the medium of thought as well as by that of the hands....\nIn such imagining, women outdo men ... for they are more ardent in\nrevenge.\"\n\np. 298: \"_Magica_ is a great occult wisdom; just as Reason is a great,\nopen folly.... No armour avails against sorcery, for it wounds the\ninner man, the vital spirit.... Some magicians make an image in the\nshape of a man they intend [to harm], knock a nail into the sole of\nits foot, and the man is invisibly struck with lameness, until the nail\nis removed.\"\n\np. 307: \"We ought to know, that we may convey the spirit of any man\ninto an image, solely by faith and by our strong imagination.--No\nincantation is needed, and the ceremonies, drawing of circles,\nfumigations, seals, &c. &c. are mere humbug to mislead.--_Homunculi_\nand images are made, &c. &c. ... by which all the operations, powers and\nwill of man are carried out.... The human heart is indeed so great a\nthing, that no one can express it: as God is eternal and imperishable,\nso also is the heart of man. If we men thoroughly recognised our heart,\nnothing would be impossible for us on earth.... Perfect imagination,\ncoming from the stars (_astris_) arises from the heart.\"\n\np. 513: \"_Imaginatio_ is confirmed and rendered perfect by the belief\nthat it really takes place: for every doubt injures the effect. Faith\nmust confirm the imagination, for faith decides the will.... But\njust the fact that man does not always perfectly imagine, perfectly\n_believe_, causes acts to be called uncertain, which nevertheless may\ncertainly and quite well exist.\" A passage from Campanella's book,\n\"De sensu rerum et magia,\" may serve to elucidate this last sentence.\n_Efficiunt alii ne homo possi futuere, si tantum credat: non enim\npotest facere quod non credit posse facere_ (l. iv. c. 18).\n\nAgrippa von Nettesheim[310] speaks in the same sense. \"_Non minus\nsubjicitur corpus alieno animo, quam alieno corpori_;\" and:[311]\n\"_Quidquid dictat animus fortissime odientis habet efficaciam nocendi\net destruendi; similiter in ceteris, qu\u00e6 affectat animus fortissimo\ndesiderio. Omnia enim qu\u00e6 tunc agit et dictat ex characteribus,\nfiguris, verbis, gestibus et ejusmodi, omnia sunt adjuvantia appetitum\nanim\u00e6 et acquirunt mirabiles quasdam virtutes, tum ab anima laborantis\nin illa hora, quando ipsum appetitus ejusmodi maxime invadit, tum ab\ninfluxa c\u0153lesti animum tunc taliter movente.\"[312]--\"Inest hominum\nanimis virtus qu\u00e6dam immutandi et ligandi res et homines ad id quod\ndesiderat, et omnes res obediunt illi, quando fertur in magnum excessum\nalicujus passionis, vel virtutis, in tantum, ut superet eos, quos\nligat. Radix ejusmodi ligationis ipsa est affectio anim\u00e6 vehemens et\nexterminata.\"_\n\n  [310] \"De occulta philosophia,\" lib. 1, c. 66.\n\n  [311] _Ibid._ c. 67.\n\n  [312] \"De occulta philosophia,\" lib. 1, cc. 66, 67 et 68.\n\nAnd likewise Jul. C\u00e6s. Vanninus, \"De admir. natur\u00e6 arcan.\" L. iv.\ndial. 5, \u00a7 435: \"_Vehementem imaginationem, cui spiritus et sanguis\nobediunt, rem mente conceptam realiter efficere, non solum intra, sed\net extra_.\"[313]\n\n  [313] _Ibid_. p. 440: _Addunt Avicenn\u00e6 dictum_: \"_Ad validam\n  alicujus imaginationem cadit camelus_.\" _Ibid._ p. 478,\n  speaking of charms: _fascinatio ne quis cum muliere coeat_,\n  he says: _Equidem in Germania complures allocutus sum vulgari\n  cognomento Necromantistas, qui ingenue confessi sunt, se firme\n  satis credere, meras fabulas esse opiniones, qu\u00e6 de d\u00e6monibus\n  vulgo circumferuntur, aliquid tamen ipsos operari, vel vi\n  herbarum commovendo phantasiam, vel vi imaginationis et fidei\n  vehementissim\u00e6, quam ipsorum nugacissimis confictis excantationibus\n  adhibent ignar\u00e6 mulieres, quibus persuadent, recitatis magna\n  cum devotione aliquibus preculis, statim effici fascinum, quare\n  credul\u00e6 ex intimo cordis effundunt excantationes, atque ita,\n  non vi verborum, neque caracterum, ut ips\u00e6 existimant, sed\n  spiritibus[314], fascini inferendi percupidis exsufflatis proximos\n  effascinant. Hinc fit, ut ipsi Necromantici, in causa propria, vel\n  aliena, si soli sint operarii, nihil unquam mirabile pr\u00e6stiterint:\n  carent enim fide, qu\u00e6 cuncta operatur_. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\n    [314] Schopenhauer has added to _spiritibus_ in parenthesis\n    (_sc. vitalibus et animalibus_).\n\nJust so Joh. Bapt. Van Helmont, who takes great pains to explain away\nas much as possible of the Devil's influence, in order to attribute it\nto the will. I quote a few passages from the voluminous collection of\nhis works, _Ortus Medicin\u00e6_:\n\n_Recepta injecta_. \u00a7 12. _Quum hostis natur\u00e6_ (_diabolus_) _ipsam\napplicationem complere ex se nequeat, suscitat ideam fortis desiderii\net odii in saga, ut, mutuatis istis mentalibus et liberis mediis,\ntransferat suum velle per quod quodque afficere intendit.[315]\nQuorsum imprimis etiam execrationes, cum idea desiderii et terroris,\nodiosissimis suis scrofis pr\u00e6scribit._--\u00a7 13. _Quippe desiderium\nistud, ut est passio imaginantis, ita quoque creat ideam, non quidem\ninanem, sed executivam atque incantamenti motivam._--\u00a7 19. _prout jam\ndemonstravi, quod vis incantamenti potissima pendeat ab idea naturali\nsag\u00e6._\n\n[315]\n  \"Der Teufel hat sie's zwar gelehrt;\n  Allein der Teufel kann's nicht machen.\"--Faust.\n\n  [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\n_+De injectis materialibus.+_ \u00a7 15. _Saga, per ens naturale,\nimaginative format ideam liberam, naturalem et nocuam.... Sag\u00e6\noperantur virtute naturali.... Homo etiam dimittit medium aliud\nexecutivum, emanativum et mandativum ad incantandum hominem; quod\nmedium est Idea fortis desiderii. Est nempe desiderio inseparabile\nferri circa optata._\n\n_+De sympatheticis mediis.+_ \u00a7 2. _Ide\u00e6 scilicet desiderii,\nper modum influentiarum c\u0153lestium, jaciuntur in proprium objectum,\nutcunque localiter remotum. Diriguntur nempe a desiderio objectum sibi\nspecificante._\n\n_+De magnetica vulnerum curatione.+_ \u00a7 76. _Igitur in sanguine\nest qu\u00e6dam potestas exstatica, qu\u00e6, si quando ardenti desiderio excita\nfuerit, etiam ad absens aliquod objectum, exterioris hominis spiritu\ndeducenda sit: ea autem potestas in exteriori homine latet, velut in\npotentia; nec ducitur ad actum, nisi excitetur, accensa imaginatione\nferventi desiderio, vel arte aliqua pari._--\u00a7 98. _Anima, prorsum\nspiritus, nequaquam posset spiritum vitalem (corporeum equidem), multo\nminus carnem et ossa movere aut concitare, nisi vis illi qu\u00e6piam\nnaturalis, magica tamen et spiritualis, ex anima in spiritum et corpus\ndescenderet. Cedo, quo pacto obediret spiritus corporeus jussui anim\u00e6,\nnisi jussus spiritum, et deinceps corpus movendo foret? At extemplo\ncontra hanc magicam motricem objicies, istam esse intra concretum sibi,\nsuumque hospitium naturale, idcirco hanc etsi magam vocitemus, tantum\nerit nominis detorsio et abusus, siquidem vera et superstitiosa magica\nnon ex anima basin desumit; cum eadem h\u00e6c nil quidquam valeat, extra\ncorpus suum movere, alterare aut ciere. Respondeo, vim et magicam\nillam naturalem anim\u00e6, qu\u00e6 extra se agat, virtute imaginis Dei, latere\njam obscuram in homine, velut obdormire (post pr\u00e6varicationem),\nexcitationisque indigam: qu\u00e6 eadem, utut somnolenta, ac velut ebria,\nalioqui sit in nobis quotidie: sufficit tamen ad obeunda munia in\ncorpore suo: dormit itaque scientia et potestas magica, et solo nutu\nactrix in homine._--\u00a7 102. _Satan itaque vim magicam hanc excitat\n(secus dormientem et scientia exterioris hominis impeditam) in suis\nmancipiis, et inservit eadem illis, ensis vice in manu potentis, id est\nsag\u00e6. Nec aliud prorsus Satan ad homicidium affert, pr\u00e6ter excitationem\ndict\u00e6 potestatis somnolent\u00e6._--\u00a7 106. _Saga in stabulo absente occidit\nequum: virtus qu\u00e6dam naturalis a spiritu sag\u00e6, et non a Satana,\nderivatur, qu\u00e6 opprimat vel strangulet spiritum vitalem equi._--\u00a7\n139. _Spiritus voco magnetismi patronos, non qui ex c\u0153lo demittuntur,\nmultoque minus de infernalibus sermo est; sed de iis, qui fiunt in ipso\nhomine, sicut ex silice ignis; ex voluntate hominis nempe aliquantillum\nspiritus vitalis influentis desumitur, et id ipsum assumit idealem\nentitatem, tanquam formam ad complementum. Qua nacta perfectione,\nspiritus mediam sortem inter corpora et non corpora assumit. Mittitur\nautem eo, quo voluntas ipsum dirigit; idealis igitur entitas ...\nnullis stringitur locorum, temporum aut dimensionum imperiis, ea\nnec d\u00e6mon est, nec ejus ullus effectus; sed spiritualis qu\u00e6dam est\nactio illius, nobis plane naturalis et vernacula._--\u00a7 168. _Ingens\nmysterium propalare hactenus distuli, ostendere videlicet, ad manum in\nhomine sitam esse energiam, qua, solo nutu et phantasia sua, queat\nagere extra se et imprimere virtutem aliquam, influentiam deinceps\nperseverantem, et agentem in objectum longissime absens._\n\nP. Pomponatius also says: _Sic contigit, tales esse homines, qui\nhabeant ejusmodi vires in potentia, et per vim imaginativam et\ndesiderativam cum actu operantur, tales virtus exit ad actum, et\nafficit sanguinem et spiritum, qu\u00e6 per evaporationem petunt ad extra et\nproducunt tales effectus_.[316]\n\n  [316] De incantationibus. Opera Basil. 1567, p. 44.\n\nJane Leade, an English mystic visionary of Cromwell's time and pupil\nof Pordage, has given us some very curious disclosures of this kind.\nShe is led to Magic in a very singular way. For, as the doctrine of\ntheir becoming one with the God of their religion is a fundamental\ncharacteristic of all Mystics, so is it with Jane Leade also. Now,\nwith her however, the human will has its share in the omnipotence\nof the Divine will as a consequence of the two having become one,\nand accordingly acquires magic power. What other magicians therefore\nbelieve to be due to a compact with the Devil, she attributes to her\nbecoming one with her God. Her Magic is therefore in the highest sense\n'white Magic.' Besides, this alters nothing as to the practice and\nresults. She is reserved and mysterious, as people had to be in those\ntimes; still it is easy to see that the thing is not a mere theoretical\ncorollary, but that it has sprung from knowledge and experience\nobtained in another way.\n\nIt is in her \"Revelation of Revelations\"[317] that we find the chief\npassage; but the following one, which is rather an abridgment than a\nliteral quotation and is contained in Horst's \"Zauberbibliothek,\"[318]\ncomes from the same book: \"Magic power enables its possessor to\nrule over and to renew the creation--_i.e._ the animal, vegetable\nand mineral kingdoms--so that, were _many_ to co-operate in _one_\nmagical power, Nature might be created anew as a paradise.... How is\nthis magic power to be acquired? By renascence through faith: that\nis, by our _will_ harmonizing with the divine _will_. For faith\nsubjects the world to us, inasmuch as our own _will_, when it is in\nharmony with the divine _will_, results, as St. Paul tells us, in\nmaking everything submit to and obey us.\" Thus far Horst.--p. 131 of\nthe \"Revelation, &c.,\" Jane Leade shows that it was by the force of\nhis will that Christ worked miracles, as, for instance, when he said\nto the leper: \"I _will_; be thou clean.\" Sometimes however he left it\nto the will of those who, he saw, believed in him, saying to them:\n\"'What _will_ ye that I shall do unto you?' in which cases no less\nwas done for them than they had desired in their will that the Lord\nshould do. These words of our Saviour's are well deserving of notice,\nsince the _highest Magia lies in the will_, so far as it is in union\nwith the will of the Almighty: when these two wheels fit into each\nother, becoming in a sense _one_, they are, &c.\"--Again, p. 132, she\nsays: \"For what could resist that which is united with the will of\nGod? The power of such a will is so great, that it always achieves its\nend. It is no _naked will_ deprived of its clothing, or power; on the\ncontrary, it brings with it an irresistible omnipotence, which enables\nit to uproot, to plant, to put to death and to bring to life, to bind\nand to loose, to heal and to injure, which power will be collected\nand concentrated in its entirety in the royal, free-born will. Of\nthis power we shall attain knowledge, when we shall have been made\none with the Holy Ghost. or when we shall be united in one spirit and\nbeing.\"--Again, p. 133: \"We must quench or drown altogether the many\nmultifarious wills which arise out of the mixed essence of souls, and\nthey must lose themselves in the abysmal depth from which there will\nthen arise and present itself the _virgin will_, which was never the\nslave of anything belonging to degenerate man; on the contrary, it\nstands in connection with the Almighty Power, quite free and pure, and\nwill infallibly produce fruits and results quite similar to those of\nthe divine will ... wherefrom the burning oil of the Holy Ghost flows\nup in Magic, as it emits its fiery sparks.\"\n\n  [317] German translation, Amsterdam, 1695, pp. 126 to 151,\n  especially the pages headed \"the power of calm will.\"\n\n  [318] Horst, \"Zauberbibliothek\" (Library of Magic), vol. i. p. 325.\n\nJacob B\u00f6hme too[319] speaks of Magic precisely in the sense here\ndescribed. Among other things he says: \"Magic is the mother of the\nessence of all beings: for it creates itself and is understood in\n_desire_.... True Magic is not a being, but the _desiring spirit_ of\nthe being.--In fine: Magic is action in the _will's spirit_.\"\n\n  [319] J. B\u00f6hme, \"Erkl\u00e4rung von sechs Punkten,\" under Punkt v.\n\nIn corroboration, or at any rate in explanation, of the above view\nof the will as the real agent in magic, a curious and interesting\nanecdote, related by Campanella, from Avicenna, may here find its\nplace.[320] \"_Mulieres qu\u00e6dam condixerunt, ut irent animi gratia in\nviridarium. Una earum non ivit. Ceter\u00e6 colludentes arangium acceperunt\net perforabant eum stilis acutis, dicentes: ita perforamus mulierem\ntalem, qu\u00e6 nobiscum venire detrectavit, et, projecto arangio intra\nfontem, abierunt. Postmodum mulierem illam dolentem invenerunt, quod\nse transfigi quasi clavis acutis sentiret, ab ea hora, qua arangium\nceter\u00e6; perforarunt: et cruciata est valde donec arangii clavos\nextraxerunt imprecantes bona et salutem._\"\n\n  [320] Campanella, \"De sensu rerum et magia,\" l. iv. c. 18.\n\nKrusenstern[321] gives a very curious and minute description of\nmaleficent sorcery as practised, it is said successfully, by the\npriests of the savage tribes on the island of Nukahiva, the procedure\nin which is exactly similar to that of our cures by charms.--This fact\nis especially remarkable on account of the identity of the thing,\nnotwithstanding the distance from all European tradition. With it ought\nto be compared Bende Bendsen's account of a headache he caused in\nanother person by sorcery, through the medium of some of that person's\nhair which had been cut off. He concludes with the following words:\n\"As far as I can learn, what is called witchcraft consists simply\nin preparing and applying noxious magnetic charms combined with a\n_maleficent influence of the will_: this is the detestable league with\nSatan.\"[322]\n\n  [321] Krusenstern's words are: \"A universal belief in witchcraft,\n  which is held to be very important by all islanders, seems to me to\n  be connected with their religion; for they assert that the priests\n  alone possess magic power, although some of the common people\n  also, it is said, profess to have the secret, probably in order to\n  make themselves feared, and to exact presents. This sorcery, which\n  they call _Kaha_, consists in inflicting a lingering death upon\n  those to whom they bear a grudge, twenty days being however fixed\n  as the term for this. They go to work as follows. Whoever wishes\n  to practise revenge by means of sorcery, seeks to procure either\n  saliva or urine or excrements of his enemy in some way or other.\n  These he mixes with a powder, lays the compound in a bag which is\n  woven in a special manner, and buries it. The most important secret\n  is in the art of weaving the bag in the right way and of preparing\n  the powder. As soon as it is buried, the effects show themselves\n  in the person who is the object of this witchcraft. He sickens,\n  becomes daily weaker, loses at last all his strength, and in twenty\n  days is sure to die. If, on the other hand, he attempts to divert\n  his enemy's revenge from himself by offering up a pig, or making\n  some other valuable present in order to save his life, he may yet\n  be saved, even on the nineteenth day, and no sooner is the bag\n  unburied, than the attacks of illness cease. He recovers gradually,\n  and after a few days is quite restored to health.\"--\"Reise um die\n  Welt.\" Ed. in 12mo, 1812, Part i., p. 249 _et seq._ [Add. to 3rd\n  ed.]\n\n  [322] Kieser, \"Archiv f\u00fcr thierischen Magnetismus,\" vol. ix. s. i.\n  in the note, pp. 128-132.\n\nThe agreement of all these writers, not only among themselves, but with\nthe convictions to which Animal Magnetism has led in latter years, and\nfinally even with what might be concluded from my speculative doctrine\non this point, is surely a most remarkable phenomenon. This much\nis at any rate certain, that at the bottom of all the experiments,\nsuccessful or unsuccessful, which have ever been made in Magic, there\nlies an anticipation of my Metaphysic. For in them is expressed the\nconsciousness, that the causal law only connects phenomena, while the\ninner nature of things remains independent of it; and also, that if any\n_direct_ influence on Nature be possible from within, it can only take\nplace through the _will_ itself. But even if Magic were to be ranked\nas practical Metaphysic, according to Bacon's classification, it is\ncertain that no other theoretical Metaphysic would stand in the right\nrelation to it but mine, by which the world is resolved into Will and\nRepresentation.\n\nThe zealous cruelty with which Magic has always been persecuted by the\nChurch and to which the papal _malleus maleficarum_ bears terrible\nevidence, seems not to have for its sole basis the criminal purposes\noften associated with the practice of Magic or the part assumed to\nbe played by the Devil, but rather to proceed partly from a vague\nforeboding and fear lest Magic should trace back its original power to\nits true source; whereas the Church has assigned to it a place outside\nNature.[323] The detestation shown by the cautious clergy of England\ntowards Animal Magnetism [324] tends to confirm this supposition, and\nalso the active zeal with which they oppose table-turning, which at any\nrate is harmless, yet which, for the same reason, has been violently\nassailed by the anathemas of the French, and even of the German,\nclergy.[325]\n\n  [323] They scent something of the\n\n    \"Nos habitat, non tartara sed nec sidera c\u0153li:\n    Spiritus in nobis qui viget, illa facit.\"\n    (Not in the heavens it lives, nor yet in hell;\n    The spirit that does it all, doth in us dwell.)\n\n  Compare Johann Beaumont, \"Historisch-Physiologisch-und\n  Theologischer Tractat von Geistern, Erscheinungen, Hexereyen und\n  andern Zauber-H\u00e4ndeln, Halle im Magdeburgischen, 1721,\" p. 281.\n  [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\n  [324] Compare Parerga, vol. i. p. 257 (2nd ed. vol. i. p. 286).\n\n  [325] On the 4th of August, 1856, the Roman Inquisition issued\n  a circular to all the bishops, in which it called upon them in\n  the name of the Church to use their utmost influence against the\n  practice of Animal Magnetism. The reasons for this are given with\n  striking want of lucidity and great vagueness, and even here and\n  there are not unmixed with falsehood; and it is easy to see that\n  the Church is reluctant to own the real reason. This circular is\n  published in the \"Turin Journal\" of December, 1856, and again in\n  the French \"Univers,\" and reprinted from this in the \"Journal des\n  D\u00e9bats\" of January 3rd, 1857. [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\n\n\n\nSINOLOGY.\n\n\nNothing perhaps points more directly to a high degree of civilization\nin China than the almost incredible density of its population, now\nrated, according to G\u00fctzlaff, at 367 millions of inhabitants.[326]\nFor whether we compare countries or ages, we find on the whole that\ncivilization keeps pace with population.\n\n  [326] According to a Chinese official Report on the census, printed\n  in Pekin, and found by the English in the Chinese Governor's palace\n  on entering Canton, China had 396 millions of inhabitants in 1852,\n  and allowing for a constant increase, may now have 400 millions.\n  (\"Moniteur de la Flotte,\" end of May, 1857.)\n\n  The Reports of the Russian Clerical Mission in Pekin give the\n  returns of 1842 as 414,687,000.\n\n  According to the tables published by the Russian Embassy at Pekin,\n  the population, in 1849, amounted to 415 millions. (\"Post-Zeitung,\"\n  1858.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\nThe pertinacious zeal with which the Jesuit missionaries of the\nseventeenth and eighteenth centuries strove to inculcate their own\nrelatively new doctrines into the minds of this very ancient nation,\nand their futile endeavours to discover early traces of their own\nfaith in that country, left them no time for a profound study of\nthe belief which prevails there. Therefore Europe has only lately\nobtained some slight knowledge of the religious state of the Chinese.\nWe now know, that is to say, that in China there exists first of all\na worship of Nature, which is universally professed, and dates from\nthe earliest times, even, it is alleged, from before the discovery of\nfire, wherefore animals were sacrificed raw. The sacrifices offered\nup publicly at certain seasons or after great events by the Chinese\nEmperor and the chief dignitaries of the Empire, belong to this\nworship. These sacrifices are dedicated first and foremost to the\nblue sky and to the earth--to the blue sky in the winter solstice, to\nthe earth in the summer solstice--and, after these, to every possible\npower of Nature: the sea, mountains, rivers, winds, thunder, rain,\nfire, &c. &c. A genius presides over each of these, and each genius has\nseveral temples. On the other hand, each genius presiding over every\nsingle province, town, village, or street, nay over family funerals\nand even sometimes over a merchant's warehouse, has also temples;\nonly, in the two last cases they are destined exclusively for private\nworship. But public worship is besides offered up to former illustrious\nEmperors, founders of dynasties and to heroes, _i.e._ to all such as\nhave benefited (Chinese) mankind by word or deed. Even these have\ntheir temples: Confucius alone having no less than 1,650 dedicated to\nhim. This therefore accounts for the great number of small temples\nfound throughout the Empire. With this hero-worship too, is associated\nthe private worship offered up by every respectable family on the\ntombs of their ancestors.--Now besides this worship of Nature and of\nheroes, which is universal, there are three other prevailing religious\ndoctrines in China, more with a dogmatical intent. First among these is\nthe doctrine of Taossee, founded by Laotse, an older contemporary of\nConfucius. This is the doctrine of Reason, as the inner order of the\nUniverse or inherent principle of all things, of the great One, the\nsublime Gable-Beam (Taiki) which supports all the Rafters, yet is above\nthem (properly the all-pervading Soul of the World) and of Tao, _i.e._\nthe _Way_, namely to salvation: that is, to redemption from the world\nand its misery. We have an exposition of this doctrine taken from the\nfountain-head in Stanislas Julien's translation (1842) of Laotse's\nTaoteking, in which we find that the Tao-doctrine completely harmonizes\nwith Buddhism both in meaning and in spirit. This sect however seems\nto have fallen very much into the background, and its teachers to be\nnow looked down upon.--Secondly, we find the wisdom of Confucius,\nwhich has special attractions for Chinese _savants_ and statesmen.\nJudging from translations, it is a rambling, commonplace, predominantly\npolitical, moral philosophy, without any metaphysical support, which\nhas something peculiarly insipid and tiresome about it.--Finally, there\nexists for the bulk of the nation Buddha's sublime doctrine full of\nlove. The name, or rather title, of Buddha in China is _Fo_ or _Fhu_,\nwhilst in Tartary the \"Victoriously-Perfect\" is more frequently called\nby his family-name, _Shakia-Muni_, and also _Burkhan-Bakshi_; in\nBirma and Ceylon, he is generally called _G\u00f3tama_ or _Tag\u00e1tata_, but\nhis original name was Prince _Siddharta_.[327] This religion which,\non account of its intrinsic excellence and truth, as well as of the\ngreat number of its followers, may be considered as ranking highest\namong all religions on earth, prevails throughout the greater part of\nAsia, and according to the latest investigator, Spence Hardy, numbers\n369 millions of believers: that is, far more than any other.--These\nthree religions, the most widely diffused of which, Buddhism, subsists\nwithout any protection whatever from the State, by its own power\nalone--a circumstance which speaks greatly in its favour--are far from\nbeing hostile to one another, and exist quietly side by side, nay,\nharmonize even to a certain extent, perhaps by reciprocal influence,\nso that the sentence: \"The three doctrines are only one\", has become\nproverbial. The Emperor, as such, professes all three; still many of\nthe Emperors, even up to the most recent times, have been especially\ndevoted to Buddhism. This is shown by their profound respect for the\nDala\u00ef-Lama, nay, even for the Teshoo-Lama, to whom they unhesitatingly\nyield precedence.--These three religions are neither monotheistic nor\npolytheistic, nor are they even pantheistic--Buddhism, at any rate, is\nnot; since Buddha did not look upon a world sunk in sin and suffering,\nwhose tenants, all subject to death, only subsist for a short time by\ndevouring each other, as a manifestation of God. Moreover the word\nPantheism, properly speaking, contains a contradiction; for it denotes\na self-destroying conception, and has therefore never been understood\notherwise than as a polite term of expression by those who know what\nseriousness means. It accordingly never entered into the heads of the\nclever, acute philosophers of the eighteenth century, not to take\nSpinoza for an Atheist, on account of his having called the world Deus;\non the contrary, this discovery was reserved for the sham philosophers\nof our own times, who know nothing but words: they even pique\nthemselves on the achievement and accordingly talk about Acomism, the\nwags! But I would humbly suggest leaving their meanings to words--in\nshort, calling the world, the world; and gods gods.\n\n  [327] For the benefit of those who wish to acquire a fuller\n  knowledge of Buddhism, I here note down those works belonging\n  to its literature, and written in European languages, which I\n  can really recommend, for I possess them and know them well;\n  the omission of a few others, for instance of Hodgson's and A.\n  R\u00e9musat's books, is intentional.\n\n  1. \"Dsanglun, or the Sage and the Fool,\" in Tibetan and German,\n  by I. J. Schmidt, Petersburg, 1843, 2 vols. in 4to, contains in\n  the preface to vol. i. (_i.e._ the Tibetan volume), from pp. xxxi\n  to xxxviii, a very brief, but excellent, sketch of the whole\n  doctrine, admirably calculated for a first introduction to the\n  knowledge of it: the whole book even, as a part of the Kandshur\n  (canonical books), may be recommended.--2. In the Memoranda of\n  the Academy of St. Petersburg are to be found several lectures by\n  the same excellent author (I. J. Schmidt), which were delivered\n  in German in that Academy in 1829-1832. As they are of very great\n  value for the knowledge of this religion, it is to be hoped that\n  they will be collected and published all together in Germany.--3.\n  By the same writer: \"Forschungen \u00fcber die Tibeter und Mongolen.\"\n  Petersb. 1829, in 4to. (Investigations concerning the Tibetans\n  and Mongols).--4. By the same writer: \"\u00dcber die Verwandtschaft\n  der gnostisch-theosophischen Lehren mit dem Buddhaismus,\" 1828.\n  (On the relation between the Gnostic-Theosophic Doctrines and\n  Buddhism.)--5. By the same: \"Geschichte der Ost-Mongolen,\"\n  Petersb. 1829, in 4to. (History of the Eastern Mongols.) [This\n  is very instructive, especially the explanations and appendix,\n  which give long extracts from writings on Religion, in which many\n  passages clearly show the deep meaning and breathe the genuine\n  spirit of Buddhism.--Add. to 3rd ed.]--6. Two treatises by\n  Schiefner in German, in the \"M\u00e9langes Asiatiques tir\u00e9s du Bulletin\n  Historico-Philol. de l'Acad. d. St. P\u00e9tersburg,\" Tome 1, 1851.--7.\n  \"Samuel Turner's journey to the Court of the Teshoo-Lama\" (at the\n  end), 1801.--8. Bochinger, \"La Vie asc\u00e9tique chez les Indous et les\n  Bouddhistes,\" Strasbourg, 1831.--9. In the 7th vol. of the \"Journal\n  Asiatique,\" 1825, an extremely beautiful biography of Buddha by\n  Deshauterayes.--10. Bournouf, \"Introd, \u00e0 l'Hist, d. Bouddhisme,\"\n  vol. i. in 4to, 1844.--11. \"Rgya Tsher Rolpa,\" traduit du Tib\u00e9tain,\n  par Foucaux, 1848, in 4to. This is the \"Lalita Vistara,\" _i.e._\n  life of Buddha, the gospel of the Buddhists.--12. \"Foe Koue Ki,\n  relation des royaumes Bouddhiques,\" traduit du Chinois par Abel\n  R\u00e9musat, 1836, in 4to.--13. \"Description du Tubet,\" traduit du\n  Chinois en Russe par Bitchourin, et du Russe en Fran\u00e7ais par\n  Klaproth, 1831.--14. Klaproth, \"Fragments Bouddhiques,\" printed\n  separately from the \"Nouveau Journal Asiatique,\" Mars, 1831.--15.\n  Spiegel, \"De officiis sacerdotum Buddhicorum,\" Palice et Latine,\n  1841.--16. The same author's \"Anecdota Palica,\" 1845.--[17.\n  \"Dhammapadam,\" palice edidet et latine vertit Fausb\u00f6ll, Hovni\u00e6,\n  1855.--Add. to 3rd ed.]--18. Asiatic Researches, vol. vi. Buchanan,\n  \"On the Religion of the Burmas,\" and vol. xx. (Calcutta, 1839),\n  Part 2, contains three important articles by Csoma K\u00f6r\u00f6si,\n  including Analyses of the Books of the Kandshur.--19. Sangermano,\n  \"The Burmese Empire,\" Rome, 1833.--20. Turnour, \"The Mahawanzo,\"\n  Ceylon, 1836.--21. Upham, \"The Mahavansi, Raja Ratnacari et\n  Rajavali,\" 3 vols. 1833.--22. _ejusd._ \"Doctrine of Buddhism,\"\n  1839, fol.--23. Spence Hardy, \"Eastern Monachism,\" 1850.--24.\n  _ejusd._ \"Manual of Buddhism,\" 1853. The two last books, written\n  after a twenty years' stay in Ceylon and from oral information\n  supplied by the priests there, have given me a deeper insight\n  into the essence of the Buddhist dogma than any other work. They\n  deserve to be translated into German, but without abridgement, for\n  otherwise the best part might be left out.--[25. C. F. K\u00f6ppen, \"Die\n  Religion des Buddha,\" 1857, a complete compendium of Buddhism,\n  compiled not only with great erudition and serious industry but\n  also with intelligence and insight from all the other works I have\n  mentioned above and from many more besides, which contains all that\n  is essential on the subject.--26. \"The Life of Buddha,\" from the\n  Chinese of Palladji, in the \"Archiv f\u00fcr wissenschaftliche Kunde von\n  Russland,\" edited by Erman, vol. xv. Heft 1, 1856.--Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\nIn their endeavours to acquire knowledge of the state of Religion in\nChina, Europeans began as usual, and as the Greeks and Romans under\nsimilar circumstances had done, by first searching for points of\ncontact with their own belief. Now as, in their own way of thinking,\nthe conceptions of Religion and of Theism were almost identified, or\nat any rate had grown together so closely, that they could only be\nseparated with great difficulty; as moreover, till a more accurate\nknowledge of Asia had reached Europe, the very erroneous opinion\nhad been disseminated--for the purpose of argument _e consensu\ngentium_--that all nations on earth worship a single, or at any rate a\nhighest, God, Creator of the Universe:[328] when they found themselves\nin a country where temples, priests and monasteries abounded, they\nstarted from the firm assumption that Theism would also be found\nthere, though in some very unusual form. On seeing these expectations\ndisappointed however, and on finding that the very conceptions of such\nthings, let alone the words to express them, were unknown, it was but\nnatural, considering the spirit in which their inquiries were made,\nthat their first reports of these religions should refer rather to\nwhat they did not, than to what they did, contain. Besides, for many\nreasons, it can be no easy task for European heads to enter fully into\nthe sense of these faiths. In the first place, they are brought up\nin Optimism, whereas in Asia, existence itself is looked upon as an\nevil and the world as a scene of misery, where it were better not to\nfind oneself. Another reason is to be found in the decided Idealism\nwhich is essential to Buddhism and to Hindooism: a view only known\nin Europe as a paradox hardly worth a serious thought, advanced by\ncertain eccentric philosophers; whereas in Asia it is even embodied\nin popular belief. For in Hindoostan it prevails universally as the\ndoctrine of _Maja_, and in Thibet, the chief seat of the Buddhist\nChurch, it is taught in an extremely popular way, a religious comedy\nbeing performed on occasions of special solemnity, in which the\nDala\u00ef-Lama is represented arguing with the Arch-fiend. The former\ndefends Idealism, the latter Realism, and among other things the Devil\nsays: \"What is perceived through the five sources of all knowledge (the\nsenses), is no deception, and what you teach is not true.\" After a long\nargumentation the matter is decided by a throw of the dice: the Realist\n(the Devil) loses, and is dismissed amid general jeering.[329] Keeping\nthis fundamental difference in the whole way of thinking steadily in\nview, we shall find it not only excusable, but even natural, that\nin their investigation of the Asiatic religions Europeans should at\nfirst have stopped short at the negative stand-point; though, properly\nspeaking, it has nothing to do with the matter. We therefore find a\ngreat deal referring to this negative stand-point which in no way\nadvances our positive knowledge; it all however amounts to this: that\nMonotheism--an exclusively Jewish doctrine, to be sure--is alien to\nBuddhists and in general to the Chinese. For instance, in the \"Lettres\n\u00c9difiantes\"[330] we find: \"The Buddhists, whose views on the migration\nof souls are universally adopted, are accused of Atheism.\" In the\n\"Asiatic Researches\" (vol. vi. p. 255) we find: \"The religion of the\nBirmans (Buddhism) shows them to be a nation far advanced beyond\nthe barbarism of a wild state and greatly influenced by religious\nopinions, but which nevertheless has no knowledge of a Supreme Being,\nCreator and Preserver of the world. Yet the system of morality\nrecommended in their fables is perhaps as good as any other taught\nby the religious doctrines which prevail among mankind.\"--And again, p.\n258: \"The followers of G\u00f3tama (_i.e._ of Buddha) are strictly speaking\nAtheists.\"--_Ibid._, p. 258: \"G\u00f3tama's sect consider the belief in a\ndivine Being, Creator of the world, to be highly impious.\"--_Ibid._,\np. 268, Buchanan relates, that Atuli, the Zarado or High-Priest\nof the Buddhists at Ava, in an article upon his religion which he\npresented to a Catholic bishop, \"counted the doctrine, that there is\na Being who has created the world and all things in it and is alone\nworthy of adoration, among the six damnable heresies.\" Sangermano\nrelates precisely the same thing,[331] and closes the list of the six\ngrave heresies with the words: \"The last of these impostors taught,\nthat there is a Supreme Being, the Creator of the world and of all\nthings in it, and that he alone is worthy of adoration.\" Colebrooke\ntoo says:[332] \"The sects of Jaina, and Buddha are really atheistic,\nfor they acknowledge no Creator of the world, nor any Supreme ruling\nProvidence.\"--I. J. Schmidt[333] likewise says: \"The system of Buddhism\nknows no eternal, uncreated, single, divine Being, having existed\nbefore all Time, who has created all that is visible and invisible.\nThis idea is quite foreign to Buddhism and there is not the slightest\ntrace of it anywhere in Buddhistic books.\"--We find the learned\nsinologist Morrison too[334] not less desirous to discover traces\nof a God in the Chinese dogmas and ready to put the most favourable\nconstruction upon everything which seems to point in that direction;\nyet he is finally obliged to own that nothing of the kind can be\nclearly discovered. Where he explains the words _Thung_ and _Tsing_,\n_i.e._ repose and movement, as that on which Chinese cosmogony is\nbased, he renews this inquiry and concludes it with the words: \"It\nis perhaps impossible to acquit this system of the accusation of\nAtheism.\"--And even recently Upham[335] says: \"Buddhism presents to us\na world without a moral ruler, guide or creator.\" The German sinologist\nNeumann too, says in his treatise[336] mentioned further on: \"In\nChina, where neither Mahometans nor Christians found a Chinese word\nto express the theological conception of the Deity.... The words God,\nsoul, spirit, as independent of Matter and ruling it arbitrarily, are\nutterly unknown in the Chinese language.... This range of ideas has\nbecome so completely one with the language itself, that the first verse\nof the book of Genesis cannot without considerable circumlocution be\ntranslated into genuine Chinese.\"--It was this very thing that led Sir\nGeorge Staunton to publish a book in 1848 entitled: \"An Inquiry into\nthe proper mode of rendering the word God in translating the Sacred\nScriptures into the Chinese language.\"[337]\n\n  [328] This is equivalent to imputing to the Chinese the thought,\n  that all princes on earth are tributary to their Emperor. [Add. to\n  3rd ed.]\n\n  [329] \"Description du Tubet,\" traduite du Chinois en Russe par\n  Bitchourin, et du Russe en Fran\u00e7ais par Klaproth, Paris, 1831,\n  p. 65. Also in the \"Asiatic Journal\" new series, vol. i. p. 15.\n  [K\u00f6ppen, \"Die Lamaische Hierarchie,\" p. 315.--Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\n  [330] \"Lettres \u00e9difiantes,\" \u00e9dit. de 1819, vol. viii. p. 46.\n\n  [331] \"Description of the Burman Empire,\" Rome. 1833. p. 81.\n\n  [332] Colebrooke, \"Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society,\" vol.\n  i.; \"Essay on the Philosophy of the Hindoos,\" published also among\n  his \"Miscellaneous Essays,\" p. 236.\n\n  [333] \"Investigations concerning the Tibetans and Mongols,\" p. 180.\n\n  [334] Morrison, \"Chinese Dictionary,\" Macao, 1815, and following\n  years, vol. i. p. 217.\n\n  [335] Upham, \"History and Doctrine of Buddhism,\" London, 1829, p.\n  102.\n\n  [336] Neumann, \"Die Natur-und Religions-Philosophie der Chinesen,\n  nach den Werken des Tehu-hi,\" pp. 10, 11.\n\n  [337] The following account given by an American sea-captain, who\n  had come to Japan, is very amusing from the _na\u00efvet\u00e9_ with which\n  he assumes that mankind consists exclusively of Jews. For the\n  \"Times\" of the 18th October, 1854, relates that an American ship,\n  under command of Captain Burr, had arrived in Jeddo Bay, and gives\n  his account of the favourable reception he met with there, at the\n  end of which we find: \"He likewise asserts the Japanese to be a\n  nation of Atheists, denying the existence of a God and selecting\n  as an object of worship either the spiritual Emperor at Meaco, or\n  any other Japanese. He was told by the interpreters that formerly\n  their religion was similar to that of China, but that the belief\n  in a supreme Being has latterly been entirely discarded--(this is\n  a mistake)--and he professed to be much shocked at Deejunoskee (a\n  slightly Americanised Japanese), declaring his belief in the Deity.\"\n  [Add. to 3rd ed.]\n\nMy intention in giving the above quotations and explanations, is merely\nto prepare the way for the extremely remarkable passage, which it is\nthe object of the present chapter to communicate, and to render that\npassage more intelligible to the reader by first making him realize the\nstandpoint from which these investigations were made, and thus throwing\nlight upon the relation between them and their subject. For Europeans,\nwhen investigating this matter in China in the way and in the spirit\ndescribed, always inquiring for the supreme principle of all things,\nthe power that rules the world, &c. &c., had often been referred to\nthat which is designated by the word Tien (Engl. T'h\u00eben). Now, the\nmore usual meaning of this word is \"Heaven,\" as Morrison also says in\nhis dictionary; still it is a well-known thing that Tien is used in\na figurative sense also, and then has a metaphysical signification.\nIn the \"Lettres \u00c9difiantes\"[338] we find the following explanation:\n\"_Hing-tien_ is the material, visible heaven; _Chin-tien_ the spiritual\nand invisible heaven.\" Sonnerat too,[339] in his travels in East-India\nand China, says: \"When the Jesuits disputed with the rest of the\nmissionaries as to the meaning of the word Tien, whether it was Heaven\nor God, the Chinese looked upon these foreigners as restless folk and\ndrove them away to Macao.\" It was at any rate through this word that\nEuropeans could first hope to find the track of that Analogy of Chinese\nMetaphysic with their own faith, which had been so persistently sought\nfor; and it was doubtless owing to investigations of this kind that\nthe results we find communicated in an Essay entitled \"Chinese Theory\nof the Creation\" were attained.[340] As to _Choo-foo-tze_, called also\n_Choo-hi_, who is mentioned in it, I observe that he lived in the\ntwelfth century according to our chronology, and that he is the most\ncelebrated of all the Chinese men of learning; because he has collected\ntogether all the wisdom of his predecessors and reduced it to a system.\nHis work is in our days the basis of all Chinese instruction, and his\nauthority of the greatest weight. In the passage I allude to, we find:\n\"The word _Teen_, would seem to denote 'the highest among the great'\nor 'above all what is great on earth:' but in practice its vagueness\nof signification is beyond all comparison greater, than that of the\nterm _Heaven_ in European languages.... Choo-foo-tze tells us that\n'to affirm, that heaven has a _man_ (_i.e._ a sapient being) there to\njudge and determine crimes, should not by any means be said; nor, on\nthe other hand, must it be affirmed, that there is nothing at all to\nexercise a supreme control over these things.'\n\n  [338] \u00c9dition de, 1819, vol. xi. p. 461.\n\n  [339] Book iv. ch. i.\n\n  [340] To be found in the \"Asiatic Journal,\" vol. xxii. anno 1826,\n  pp. 41 and 42.\n\n\"The same author being asked about the _heart of heaven_, whether it\nwas intelligent or not, answered: it must not be said that the mind of\nnature is unintelligent, but it does not resemble the cogitations of\nman....\n\n\"According to one of their authorities, _Teen_ is call'd ruler or\nsovereign (Choo), from the idea of the supreme control, and another\nexpresses himself thus: Had heaven (Teen) no designing mind, then\nit must happen, that the cow might bring forth a horse, and on the\npeach-tree be produced the blossom of the pear.' On the other hand it\nis said, that _the mind of Heaven is deducible from what is the Will of\nmankind_!\"\n\nThe agreement between this last sentence and my doctrine is so striking\nand so astonishing, that if this passage had not been printed full\neight years after my own work had appeared, I should no doubt have\nbeen accused of having taken my fundamental thought from it. For there\nare three well-known modes of repelling the attack of new thoughts:\nfirstly, by ignoring them, secondly by denying them, and lastly by\nasserting that they are not new, but were known long before. But\nthe fact that my fundamental thought was formed quite independently\nof this Chinese authority, is firmly established by the reasons I\nhave given; for I may hope to be believed when I affirm, that I am\nunacquainted with the Chinese language and consequently unable to\nderive thoughts for my own use from original Chinese sources unknown\nto others. On further investigation I have elicited the fact, that the\npassage I have quoted, was most probably, nay almost certainly, taken\nfrom Morrison's \"Chinese Dictionary,\" where it may be found under the\nsign _T\u00eben:_ only I have no opportunity of verifying it.[341]--In an\narticle by Neumann[342] there are some passages which have evidently\na common source with those here quoted from the \"Asiatic Journal.\"\nBut they are written with the vagueness of expression which is so\nfrequent in Germany, and excludes clear comprehension. Besides, this\ntranslator of Choo-hi evidently did not himself quite understand the\noriginal; though by this no blame need be implied, when we consider\nthe enormous difficulty of the Chinese language for Europeans, and\nthe insufficiency of the means for studying it. Meanwhile it does not\ngive us the enlightenment desired. We must therefore console ourselves\nwith the hope, that as a freer intercourse with China has now been\nestablished, some Englishman may one day give us more minute and\nthorough information concerning the above-mentioned dogma, of which we\nhave hitherto received such deplorably imperfect accounts.\n\n  [341] A note of Schopenhauer's referring to this says:--\"According\n  to letters from Doss\" (a friend of S.'s), \"dated 26th February and\n  8th June, 1857, the passages I have here quoted are to be found\n  in Morrison's Chinese Dictionary, Macao, 1815, vol. i. p. 576,\n  under \u5929 T\u00eben, although in a slightly different order, in nearly\n  the same words. The important passage at the end alone differs\n  and is as follows: 'Heaven makes the mind of mankind its mind: in\n  most ancient discussions respecting Heaven, its mind, or will,\n  was _divined_ (it stands thus, and not _derived_) from what was\n  the will of mankind.'--Neumann translated this passage for Doss,\n  independently of Morrison's rendering, and the end was: 'Through\n  the heart of the people Heaven is usually revealed.'\" [_Editor's\n  Note._]\n\n  [342] Neumann, \"Die Natur-und Religions-Philosophie der Chinesen,\n  nach dem Werke des Tschu-hi,\" an article in Illgen's \"Periodical\n  for Historical Theology,\" vol. vii. 1837, from pp. 60 to 63.\n\n\n\n\nREFERENCE TO ETHICS.\n\n\nFor reasons I have stated in the beginning, confirmations of the rest\nof my doctrine are excluded from my present task. Still, in concluding,\nI may perhaps be allowed to make a general reference to Ethics.\n\nFrom time immemorial, all nations have acknowledged that the world\nhas a moral, as well as a physical, import. Everywhere nevertheless\nthe matter was only brought to an indistinct consciousness, which, in\nseeking for its adequate expression, has clothed itself in various\nimages and myths. These are the different Religions. Philosophers, on\ntheir side, have at all times endeavoured to attain clear comprehension\nof the thing and, notwithstanding their differences in other respects,\nall, excepting the strictly materialistic, philosophical systems,\nagree in this one point: that what is most important, nay, alone\nessential, in our whole existence, that on which everything depends,\nthe real meaning, pivot or point (_sit venia verbo_) of it, lies in the\nmorality of human actions. But as to the sense of this, as to the ways\nand means, as to the possibility of the thing, they all again quite\ndisagree, and find themselves before an abyss of obscurity. Thus it\nfollows, that it is easy to preach, but difficult to found, morality.\nIt is just because that point is determined by our conscience, that it\nbecomes the touchstone of all systems; since we demand, and rightly\ndemand, that Metaphysic should give support to Ethics: and now arises\nthe difficult problem to show that, contrary to all experience, the\nphysical order of things depends upon a moral one, and to find out\na connection between the force which, by acting according to eternal\nlaws of Nature, gives the world stability, and the morality which has\nits seat in the human breast. This is therefore the rock on which the\nbest thinkers have foundered. Spinoza occasionally tacks a moral theory\non to his Pantheistic Fatalism by means of sophisms, but more often\nleaves morality terribly in the lurch. Kant, when theoretical Reason\nis exhausted, sends his Categorical Imperative, laboriously worked out\nof mere conceptions,[343] on the stage, as _deus ex machina_, with an\nabsolute _ought_. But the mistake he made by it only became quite clear\nwhen Fichte, who always took outbidding for outdoing, had spun it out\nwith Christian Wolfian prolixity and wearisomeness to a complete system\nof _moral fatalism_ in his \"System of Moral Doctrine,\" and subsequently\npresented it more briefly in his last pamphlet.[344]\n\n  [343] See my prize-essay \"On the Fundament of Morality,\" \u00a7 6.\n\n  [344] \"Die Wissenschaftslehre in allgemeinen Umrisse\" (The Doctrine\n  of Science in a general outline), 18, 10.\n\nNow, from this point of view, a system which places the reality of all\nexistence and the root of the whole of Nature in _the Will_, and in\nthis will places the root of the world, must undeniably carry with it,\nto say the least, a strong prejudice in its favour. For, by a direct\nand simple way, it reaches, nay, already holds in its hand before\ncoming to Ethics, what other systems try to reach by roundabout, ever\ndubious by-paths. Nor indeed can any other road ever lead to this\nbut the insight, that the active and impulsive force in Nature which\npresents this perceptible world to our intellect, is identical with\nthe will within us. The only Metaphysic which really and immediately\nsupports Ethics, is that one which is itself primarily ethical and\nconstituted out of the material of Ethics. Therefore I had a far\ngreater right to call my Metaphysic \"Ethics,\" than Spinoza, with\nwhom the word sounds almost like irony, and whose \"Ethics\" might be\nsaid to bear the name like _lucus a non lucendo_; since it is only by\nmeans of sophistry that he has been able to tack his morality on to\na system, from which it would never logically proceed. In general,\nmoreover, he disavows it downright with revolting assurance.[345] On\nthe whole, I can confidently assert, that there has never yet been a\nphilosophical system so entirely cut out of one piece, so completely\nwithout any joins or patches, as mine. As I have said in my preface,\nit is the unfolding of a single thought, by which the ancient \u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2\n\u1f41 \u03bc\u1fe6\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c6\u03c5[346] is again confirmed. Then we must still\ntake into consideration here, that freedom and responsibility--those\npillars on which all morality rests--can certainly be asserted in\nwords without the assumption of the aseity[347] of the will; but that\nit is absolutely impossible to think them without it. Whoever wishes\nto dispute this, must first invalidate the axiom, stated long ago\nby the Schoolmen: _operari sequitur esse_ (_i.e._ the acts of each\nbeing follow from the nature of that being), or we must demonstrate\nthe fallacy of the inference to be drawn from it: _unde esse, inde\noperari_. Responsibility has for its condition freedom; but freedom\nhas for its condition primariness. For I _will_ according to what I\n_am_; therefore I must _be_ according to what I _will_. Aseity of the\nwill is therefore the first condition of any Ethics based on serious\nthought, and Spinoza is right when he says: _Ea res libera dicetur,\nqu\u00e6 ex sola su\u00e6 natur\u00e6 necessitate_ existit, _et a se sola ad agendum\ndeterminatur_.[348] Dependence, as to existence and nature, united\nwith freedom as to action, is a contradiction. Were Prometheus to\ncall the creatures of his making to account for their actions, they\nwould be quite justified in answering: \"We could only act according\nto our being: for actions arise from nature. If our actions were\nbad, the fault lay in our nature: this is thine own work; punish\nthyself.\"[349] And it is just the same with the imperishableness\nof our true being in death; for this cannot be seriously thought\nwithout the aseity of that being, and can even hardly be conceived\nwithout a fundamental separation of the will from the intellect. This\nlast point is peculiar to my philosophy; but Aristotle had already\nproved the first thoroughly, by showing at length how that alone can\nbe imperishable which has not arisen, and that the two conceptions\ncondition each other:[350] \u03a4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03cc \u03c4\u03b5\n\u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f04\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f04\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd.... \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2.--\u03b5\u1f30 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9, \u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7[351]\n(_h\u00e6c mutuo se sequuntur, atque ingenerabile est incorruptibile, et\nincorruptibile ingenerabile.... generabile enim et corruptibile mutuo\nse sequuntur.--si generabile est, et corruptibile esse necesse est_).\nAll those among the ancient philosophers who taught an immortality of\nthe soul, understood it in this way; nor did it enter into the head of\nany of them to assign infinite permanence to a being _having arisen_ in\nany way. We have evidence of the embarrassment to which the contrary\nassumption leads, in the ecclesiastical controversy between the\nadvocates of Pre-existence, Creation and Traduction.\n\n  [345] For instance, \"Eth.\" iv. prop. 37, Schol. 2.\n\n  [346] The language of truth is simple. [Tr.'s add.]\n\n  [347] Self-existence; self-dependence.\n\n  [348] \"Eth.\" i. def. 7. [Tr.]\n\n  [349] Compare \"Parerga,\" i. p. 115, _et seqq._ (p. 133 of 2nd ed.).\n\n  [350] Aristot. \"De C\u0153lo,\" i. 12.\n\n  [351] \"These two go together, the uncreated is imperishable,\n  and the imperishable is uncreated.... For the created and the\n  perishable go together.... If a thing is created it is necessarily\n  perishable.\" [Tr.]\n\nThe Optimism moreover of all philosophical systems is a point\nclosely allied to Ethics which must never fail in any of them, as in\nduty bound: for the world likes to hear that it is commendable and\nexcellent, and philosophers like to please the world. With me it is\ndifferent: I have seen what pleases the world, and therefore shall\nnot swerve a step from the path of truth in order to please it. Thus\nin this point also my system varies from all the others and stands by\nitself. But when all the others have completed their demonstrations to\nthe song of the best of worlds, quite at the last, at the background\nof the system, like a tardy avenger of the monster, like a spirit from\nthe tomb, like the statue in Don Juan, there comes the question as to\nthe origin of evil, of the monstrous, nameless evil, of the awful,\nheartrending misery in the world:--and here they are speechless, or can\nonly find words, empty, sonorous words, with which to settle this heavy\nreckoning. On the other hand, a system, in whose basis already the\nexistence of evil is interwoven with the existence of the world, need\nnot fear that apparition any more than a vaccinated child need fear the\nsmallpox. Now this is the case when freedom is placed in the _esse_\ninstead of in the _operari_ and sin, evil and the world then proceed\nfrom that _esse_.--Moreover it is fair to let me, as a serious man,\nonly speak of things which I really know and only make use of words\nto which I attach a quite definite meaning; since this alone can be\ncommunicated with security to others, and Vauvenargues is quite right\nin saying: \"_la clart\u00e9 est la bonne foi des philosophes_.\" Therefore if\nI use the words 'Will, Will to live,' this is no mere _ens rationis_,\nno hypostasis set up by me, nor is it a term of vague, uncertain\nmeaning; on the contrary, I refer him, who asks what it is, to his own\ninner self, where he will find it entire, nay, in colossal dimensions,\nas a true _ens realissimum_. I have accordingly not explained the\nworld out of the unknown, but rather out of that which is better known\nthan anything, and known to us moreover in quite a different way from\nall the rest. As to the paradoxical character finally, with which the\nascetic results of my Ethics have been reproached, these results had\ngiven umbrage even to Jean Paul, otherwise so favourably disposed\ntowards me, and had induced Herr R\u00e4tze also (not knowing that the only\ncourse to be adopted against me was silence) to write a book against me\nin 1820, with the best intentions. They have since become the standing\nrock of offence in my philosophy; but I beg my readers to take into\nconsideration, that it is only in this north-western portion of the\nancient continent, and even here only in Protestant countries, that the\nterm paradoxical can be applied to such things; whereas throughout the\nwhole of vast Asia--everywhere indeed, where the detestable doctrine\nof Islam has not prevailed over the ancient and profound Religions of\nmankind by dint of fire and sword--they would rather have to fear the\nreproach of being commonplace. I console myself therefore with the\nthought that, when referred to the Upanishads of the Sacred Vedas,\nmy Ethics are quite orthodox,[352] and that even with primitive,\ngenuine Christianity they stand in no contradiction. As to all other\naccusations of heresy, I am well armoured and my breast is fortified\nwith triple steel.\n\n  [352] I refer those who may wish to be briefly, yet thoroughly,\n  informed on this point, to the late Pasteur Bochinger's work:\n  \"La vie contemplative, asc\u00e9tique et monastique chez les peuples\n  Bouddhistes,\" Strasbourg, 1831.\n\n\n\n\nCONCLUSION.\n\n\nThe undoubtedly striking confirmations recorded in this treatise, which\nhave been contributed to my doctrine by the Empirical Sciences since\nits first appearance, but independently of it, will unquestionably\nhave been followed by many more: for how small is the portion which\nthe individual can find time, opportunity and patience to become\nacquainted with, of the branch of literature dedicated to Natural\nScience which is so actively cultivated in all languages! Even what\nI have here mentioned however, inspires me with confidence that the\ntime for my philosophy is ripening; and it is with heartfelt joy that\nI see the Empirical Sciences gradually come forward in the course\nof time, as witnesses above suspicion, to testify to the truth of a\ndoctrine, concerning which a politic, inviolable silence has been\nmaintained for seventeen years by our \"philosophers by profession\"\n(some of them give themselves this characteristic name, nay even that\nof \"philosophers by trade\"); so that it had been left to Jean Paul,\nwho was ignorant of their tactics, to draw attention to it. For it\nmay have appeared to them a delicate matter to praise it, and, on\ndue consideration, they may have thought it not altogether safe to\nblame it either, and may have judged it unnecessary besides to show\nthe public, as belonging neither to the profession nor to the trade,\nthat it is quite possible to philosophize very seriously without being\neither unintelligible or wearisome. Why compromise themselves therefore\nwith it, since no one betrays himself by silence and the favourite\nsecretive method was ready at hand, the approved specific against\nmerit; this much was besides soon agreed upon: that, considering the\ncircumstances of the times, my philosophy did not possess the right\nqualifications for being taught professionally. Now the true, ultimate\naim of all philosophy, with them, is to be taught professionally,--so\nmuch and so truly is it so, that were Truth to come down stark naked\nfrom lofty Olympus, but were what she brought with her not found to\ncorrespond to the requirements called for by the circumstances of the\ntimes, or to the purposes of their mighty superiors, these gentlemen\n\"of the profession and trade\" would verily waste no time with the\nindecent nymph, but would hasten to bow her out again to her Olympus,\nthen place three fingers on their lips and return quietly to their\ncompendia. For assuredly he who makes love to this nude beauty, to this\nfascinating syren, to this portionless bride, will have to forego the\ngood fortune of becoming a Government and University professor. He may\neven congratulate himself if he becomes a garret-philosopher. On the\nother hand, his audience will consist, not of hungry undergraduates\nanxious to turn their learning to account, but rather of those rare,\nselect thinkers, thinly sprinkled among the countless multitude, who\narise from time to time, almost as a freak of Nature. And a grateful\nposterity is beckoning from afar. But they can have no idea of the\nbeauty and loveliness of Truth, of the delight there is in pursuing\nher track, of the rapture in possessing her, who can imagine that\nanyone who has once looked her in the face can ever desert, deny, or\ndistort her for the sake of the venal approval, of the offices, of the\nmoney or the titles of such people. Better to grind spectacle-glasses\nlike Spinoza or draw water like Cleanthes. Henceforth they may take\nwhatever course they like: Truth will not change her nature to\naccommodate \"the trade.\" Serious philosophy has now really outgrown\nUniversities, where Science stands under State-guardianship. It may\nhowever some day perhaps come to be counted among the occult sciences;\nwhile the spurious kind, that _ancilla theologi\u00e6_ in Universities, that\ninferior counterfeit of Scholasticism, for which the highest criterion\nof philosophical truth lies in the country catechism, will make our\nLecture-halls doubly re-echo.--\"You, that way: we, this way.\"--[353]\n\n  [353] Shakespeare, \"Love's Labour's Lost.\"\n\n\n  CHISWICK PRESS:--C. WHITTINGHAM AND CO., TOOKS COURT,\n  CHANCERY LANE.\n\n\n\n\nAN\n\nALPHABETICAL LIST\n\nOF BOOKS CONTAINED IN\n\nBOHN'S LIBRARIES.\n\n\n_Detailed Catalogue, arranged according to the various Libraries, will\nbe sent on application._\n\n  =ADDISON'S Works=. With the Notes of Bishop Hurd, Portrait, and 8\n    Plates of Medals and Coins. Edited by H. G. 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Translated by the Rev. O. F. Owen, M.A. 2 vols. 3_s._\n    6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- Rhetoric and Poetics=. Trans. by T. Buckley, B.A. 5_s._\n\n  =ARRIAN'S Anabasis of Alexander=, together with the =Indica=.\n    Translated by E. J. Chinnock, M.A., LL.D. With Maps and Plans.\n    5_s._\n\n  =ATHEN\u00c6US. The Deipnosophists=; or, the Banquet of the Learned.\n    Trans. by Prof. C. D. Yonge, M.A. 3 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =BACON'S Moral and Historical Works=, including the Essays,\n    Apophthegms, Wisdom of the Ancients, New Atlantis, Henry VII.,\n    Henry VIII., Elizabeth, Henry Prince of Wales, History of Great\n    Britain, Julius C\u00e6sar, and Augustus C\u00e6sar. Edited by J. Devey,\n    M.A. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Novum Organum= and =Advancement of Learning=. Edited by J.\n    Devey, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =BASS'S Lexicon to the Greek Testament=. 2_s._\n\n  =BAX'S Manual of the History of Philosophy=, for the use of\n    Students. By E. 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Balfour, M.P. 3 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =BION.= _See_ THEOCRITUS.\n\n  =BJ\u00d6RNSON'S Arne and the Fisher Lassie.= Translated by W. H. Low,\n    M.A. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =BLAIR'S Chronological Tables= Revised and Enlarged.\n    Comprehending the Chronology and History of the World, from the\n    Earliest Times to the Russian Treaty of Peace, April 1856. By J.\n    Willoughby Rosse. Double vol. 10_s._\n\n  =---- Index of Dates=. Comprehending the principal Facts in the\n    Chronology and History of the World, alphabetically arranged;\n    being a complete Index to Blair's Chronological Tables. By J. W.\n    Rosse. 2 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =BLEEK, Introduction to the Old Testament.= By Friedrich Bleek.\n    Edited by Johann Bleek and Adolf Kamphausen. Translated by G. H.\n    Venables, under the supervision of the Rev. Canon Venables. 2\n    vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =BOETHIUS'S Consolation of Philosophy.= King Alfred's Anglo-Saxon\n    Version of. With a literal English Translation on opposite pages,\n    Notes, Introduction, and Glossary, by Rev. S. Fox, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =BOHN'S Dictionary of Poetical Quotations.= 4th edition. 6_s._\n\n  =BOHN'S Handbooks of Games.= New edition. In 2 vols., with\n    numerous Illustrations 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n      Vol. I.--TABLE GAMES:--Billiards, Chess, Draughts, Backgammon,\n    Dominoes, Solitaire, Reversi, Go-Bang, Rouge et Noir, Roulette,\n    E.O., Hazard, Faro.\n\n      Vol. II.--CARD GAMES:--Whist, Solo Whist, Poker, Piquet, Ecart\u00e9,\n    Euchre, B\u00e9zique, Cribbage, Loo, Vingt-et-un, Napoleon, Newmarket,\n    Pope Joan, Speculation, &c., &c.\n\n  =BOND'S A Handy Book of Rules and Tables= for verifying Dates\n    with the Christian Era, &c. Giving an account of the Chief Eras\n    and Systems used by various Nations; with the easy Methods for\n    determining the Corresponding Dates. By J. J. Bond. 5_s._\n\n  =BONOMI'S Nineveh and its Palaces.= 7 Plates and 294 Woodcut\n    Illustrations. 5_s._\n\n  =BOSWELL'S Life of Johnson=, with the TOUR IN THE HEBRIDES and\n    JOHNSONIANA. Edited by the Rev. A. Napier, M.A. With Frontispiece\n    to each vol. 6 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =BRAND'S Popular Antiquities of England, Scotland, and Ireland.=\n    Arranged, revised, and greatly enlarged, by Sir Henry Ellis,\n    K.H., F.R.S., &c., &c. 3 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =BREMER'S (Frederika) Works.= Translated by Mary Howitt. 4 vols.\n    3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =BRIDGWATER TREATISES.=\n\n    =Bell (Sir Charles) on the Hand.= With numerous Woodcuts. 5_s._\n\n    =Kirby on the History, Habits, and Instincts of Animals.= Edited\n      by T. Rymer Jones. With upwards of 100 Woodcuts. 2 vols. 5_s._\n      each.\n\n    =Kidd on the Adaptation of External Nature to the Physical\n      Condition of Man.= 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n    =Chalmers on the Adaptation of External Nature to the Moral and\n      Intellectual Constitution of Man.= 5_s._\n\n  =BRINK (B. ten) Early English Literature.= By Bernhard ten Brink.\n    Vol. I. To Wyclif. Translated by Horace M. Kennedy. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n      Vol. II. Wyclif, Chaucer, Earliest Drama Renaissance. Translated\n    by W. Clarke Robinson, Ph.D. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n      Vol. III. From the Fourteenth Century to the Death of Surrey.\n    Edited by Dr. Alois Brandl. Trans. by L. Dora Schmitz. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Five Lectures on Shakespeare.= Trans. by Julia Franklin. 3_s._\n    6_d._\n\n  =BROWNE'S (Sir Thomas) Works.= Edited by Simon Wilkin. 3 vols. 3_s._\n    6_d._ each.\n\n  =BURKE'S Works.= 8 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n      I.--Vindication of Natural Society--Essay on the Sublime and\n          Beautiful, and various Political Miscellanies.\n\n      II.--Reflections on the French Revolution--Letters relating to\n          the Bristol Election--Speech on Fox's East India Bill, &c.\n\n      III.--Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs--On the Nabob of\n          Arcot's Debts--The Catholic Claims, &c.\n\n      IV.--Report on the Affairs of India, and Articles of Charge\n          against Warren Hastings.\n\n      V.--Conclusion of the Articles of Charge against Warren\n          Hastings--Political Letters on the American War, on a\n          Regicide Peace, to the Empress of Russia.\n\n      VI.--Miscellaneous Speeches--Letters and Fragments--Abridgments\n          of English History, &c. With a General Index.\n\n      VII. & VIII.--Speeches on the Impeachment of Warren Hastings; and\n          Letters. With Index. 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- Life.= By Sir J. Prior. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =BURNEY'S Evelina.= By Frances Burney (Mme. D'Arblay). With an\n    Introduction and Notes by A. R. Ellis. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Cecilia.= With an Introduction and Notes by A. R. Ellis. 2 vols.\n    3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =BURN (R.) Ancient Rome and its Neighbourhood.= An Illustrated\n    Handbook to the Ruins in the City and the Campagna, for the use\n    of Travellers. By Robert Burn, M.A. With numerous Illustrations,\n    Maps, and Plans. 7_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =BURNS (Robert), Life of.= By J. G. Lockhart, D.C.L. A new and\n    enlarged Edition. Revised by William Scott Douglas. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =BURTON'S (Robert) Anatomy of Melancholy.= Edited by the Rev. A.\n    R. Shilleto, M.A. With Introduction by A. H. Bullen, and full\n    Index. 3 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =BURTON (Sir R. F.) Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to\n    Al-Madinah and Meccah.= By Captain Sir Richard F. Burton,\n    K.C.M.G. With an Introduction by Stanley Lane-Poole, and all the\n    original Illustrations. 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n      \u2042 This is the copyright edition, containing the author's latest\n    notes.\n\n  =BUTLER'S (Bishop) Analogy of Religion=, Natural and Revealed,\n    to the Constitution and Course of Nature; together with two\n    Dissertations on Personal Identity and on the Nature of Virtue,\n    and Fifteen Sermons. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =BUTLER'S (Samuel) Hudibras.= With Variorum Notes, a Biography,\n    Portrait, and 28 Illustrations. 5_s._\n\n  =----= or, further Illustrated with 60 Outline Portraits. 2 vols.\n    5_s._ each.\n\n  =C\u00c6SAR. Commentaries on the Gallic and Civil Wars.= Translated by\n    W. A. McDevitte, B.A. 5_s._\n\n  =CAMOENS' Lusiad=; or, the Discovery of India. An Epic Poem.\n    Translated by W. J. Mickle. 5th Edition, revised by E. R. Hodges,\n    M.C.P. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =CARAFAS (The) of Maddaloni.= Naples under Spanish Dominion.\n    Translated from the German of Alfred de Reumont. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =CARLYLE'S French Revolution.= Edited by J. Holland Rose, Litt.D.\n    Illus. 3 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =---- Sartor Resartus.= With 75 Illustrations by Edmund J.\n    Sullivan. 5_s._\n\n  =CARPENTER'S (Dr. W. B.) Zoology.= Revised Edition, by W. S.\n    Dallas, F.L.S. With very numerous Woodcuts. Vol. I. 6_s._\n                    [_Vol. II. out of print._\n\n  =CARPENTER'S Mechanical Philosophy, Astronomy and Horology.= 181\n    Woodcuts. 5_s._\n\n  =---- Vegetable Physiology and Systematic Botany.= Revised\n    Edition, by E. Lankester M.D., &c. With very numerous Woodcuts.\n    6_s._\n\n  =---- Animal Physiology.= Revised Edition. With upwards of 300\n    Woodcuts. 6_s._\n\n  =CASTLE (E.) Schools and Masters of Fence=, from the Middle\n    Ages to the End of the Eighteenth Century. By Egerton Castle,\n    M.A., F.S.A. With a Complete Bibliography. Illustrated with 140\n    Reproductions of Old Engravings and 6 Plates of Swords, showing\n    114 Examples. 6_s._\n\n  =CATTERMOLE'S Evenings at Haddon Hall.= With 24 Engravings on\n    Steel from designs by Cattermole, the Letterpress by the Baroness\n    de Carabella. 5_s._\n\n  =CATULLUS, Tibullus, and the Vigil of Venus.= A Literal Prose\n    Translation. 5_s._\n\n  =CELLINI (Benvenuto). Memoirs of=, written by Himself. Translated\n    by Thomas Roscoe. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =CERVANTES' Don Quixote de la Mancha.= Motteaux's Translation\n    revised. 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- Galatea.= A Pastoral Romance. Translated by G. W. J. Gyll.\n    3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Exemplary Novels.= Translated by Walter K. Kelly. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =CHAUCER'S Poetical Works.= Edited by Robert Bell. Revised\n    Edition, with a Preliminary Essay by Prof. W. W. Skeat, M.A. 4\n    vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =CHESS CONGRESS of 1862.= A Collection of the Games played.\n    Edited by J. L\u00f6wenthal. 5_s._\n\n  =CHEVREUL on Colour.= Translated from the French by Charles\n    Martel. Third Edition, with Plates, 5_s._; or with an additional\n    series of 16 Plates in Colours, 7_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =CHILLINGWORTH'S Religion of Protestants.= A Safe Way to\n    Salvation. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =CHINA=, Pictorial, Descriptive, and Historical. With Map and\n    nearly 100 Illustrations. 5_s._\n\n  =CHRONICLES OF THE CRUSADES.= Contemporary Narratives of the\n    Crusade of Richard C\u0153ur de Lion, by Richard of Devizes and\n    Geoffrey de Vinsauf; and of the Crusade at St. Louis, by Lord\n    John de Joinville. 5_s._\n\n  =CICERO'S Orations.= Translated by Prof. C. D. Yonge, M.A. 4\n    vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =---- Letters.= Translated by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh. 4 vols.\n    5_s._ each.\n\n  =---- On Oratory and Orators.= With Letters to Quintus and\n    Brutus. Translated by the Rev. J. S. Watson, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =---- On the Nature of the Gods=, Divination, Fate, Laws, a\n    Republic, Consulship. Translated by Prof. C. D. Yonge, M.A., and\n    Francis Barham. 5_s._\n\n  =---- Academics=, De Finibus, and Tusculan Questions. By Prof. C.\n    D. Yonge, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =---- Offices=; or, Moral Duties. Cato Major, an Essay on Old\n    Age; L\u00e6lius, an Essay on Friendship; Scipio's Dream; Paradoxes;\n    Letter to Quintus on Magistrates. Translated by C. R. Edmonds.\n    3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =CORNELIUS NEPOS.=--_See_ JUSTIN.\n\n  =CLARK'S (Hugh) Introduction to Heraldry.= 18th Edition, Revised\n    and Enlarged by J. R. Planch\u00e9, Rouge Croix. With nearly 1000\n    Illustrations. 5_s._ Or with the Illustrations Coloured, 15_s._\n\n  =CLASSIC TALES=, containing Rasselas, Vicar of Wakefield,\n    Gulliver's Travels, and The Sentimental Journey. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =COLERIDGE'S (S. T.) Friend.= A Series of Essays on Morals,\n    Politics, and Religion. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Aids to Reflection=, and the CONFESSIONS OF AN INQUIRING\n    SPIRIT, to which are added the ESSAYS ON FAITH and the BOOK OF\n    COMMON PRAYER. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Lectures and Notes on Shakespeare and other English Poets.=\n    Edited by T. Ashe. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Biographia Literaria=; together with Two Lay\n    Sermons. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Table-Talk and Omniana.= Edited by T. Ashe, B.A. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Miscellanies, \u00c6sthetic and Literary=; to which is added,\n    THE THEORY OF LIFE. Collected and arranged by T. Ashe, B.A. 3_s._\n    6_d._\n\n  =COMTE'S Positive Philosophy.= Translated and condensed by\n    Harriet Martineau. With Introduction by Frederic Harrison. 3\n    vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =COMTE'S Philosophy of the Sciences=, being an Exposition of\n    the Principles of the _Cours de Philosophie Positive._ By G. H.\n    Lewes. 5_s._\n\n  =COND\u00c9'S History of the Dominion of the Arabs in Spain.=\n    Translated by Mrs. Foster. 3 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =COOPER'S Biographical Dictionary.= Containing Concise Notices\n    (upwards of 15,000) of Eminent Persons of all Ages and Countries.\n    By Thompson Cooper, F.S.A. With a Supplement, bringing the work\n    down to 1883. 2 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =COXE'S Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough.= With his original\n    Correspondence. By W. Coxe, M.A., F.R.S. Revised edition by John\n    Wade. 3 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n      \u2042 An Atlas of the plans of Marlborough's campaigns, 4to. 10_s._\n    6_d._\n\n  =---- History of the House of Austria= (1218-1792). With a\n    Continuation from the Accession of Francis I. to the Revolution\n    of 1848. 4 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =CRAIK'S (G. L.) Pursuit of Knowledge under Difficulties.=\n    Illustrated by Anecdotes and Memoirs. Revised edition, with\n    numerous Woodcut Portraits and Plates. 5_s._\n\n  =CRUIKSHANK'S Punch and Judy.= The Dialogue of the Puppet Show;\n    an Account of its Origin, &c. With 24 Illustrations, and Coloured\n    Plates, designed and engraved by G. Cruikshank. 5_s._\n\n  =CUNNINGHAM'S Lives of the Most Eminent British Painters.= A New\n    Edition, with Notes and Sixteen fresh Lives. By Mrs. Heaton. 3\n    vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =DANTE. Divine Comedy.= Translated by the Rev. H. F. Cary, M.A.\n    3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Translated into English Verse= by I. C. Wright, M.A. 3rd\n    Edition, revised. With Portrait, and 34 Illustrations on Steel,\n    after Flaxman.\n\n  =---- The Inferno.= A Literal Prose Translation, with the Text\n    of the Original printed on the same page. By John A. Carlyle,\n    M.D. 5_s._\n\n  =---- The Purgatorio.= A Literal Prose Translation, with the Text\n    printed on the same page. By W. S. Dugdale. 5_s._\n\n  =DE COMMINES (Philip), Memoirs of.= Containing the Histories of\n    Louis XI. and Charles VIII., Kings of France, and Charles the\n    Bold, Duke of Burgundy. Together with the Scandalous Chronicle,\n    or Secret History of Louis XI., by Jean de Troyes. Translated by\n    Andrew R. Scoble. With Portraits, 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =DEFOE'S Novels and Miscellaneous Works.= With Prefaces and\n    Notes, including those attributed to Sir W. Scott. 7 vols. 3_s._\n    6_d._ each.\n\n      I.--Captain Singleton, and Colonel Jack.\n\n      II.--Memoirs of a Cavalier, Captain Carleton, Dickory Cronke, &c.\n\n      III.--Moll Flanders, and the History of the Devil.\n\n      IV.--Roxana, and Life of Mrs. Christian Davies.\n\n      V.--History of the Great Plague of London, 1665; The Storm\n          (1703); and the True-born Englishman.\n\n      VI.--Duncan Campbell, New Voyage round the World, and Political\n          Tracts.\n\n      VII.--Robinson Crusoe.\n\n  =DEMMIN'S History of Arms and Armour=, from the Earliest Period.\n    By Auguste Demmin. Translated by C. C. Black, M.A. With nearly\n    2000 Illustrations. 7_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =DEMOSTHENES' Orations.= Translated by C. Rann Kennedy. 5 vols.\n    Vol. I., 3_s._ 6_d._; Vols. II.-V., 5_s._ each.\n\n  =DE STA\u00cbL'S Corinne or Italy.= By Madame de Sta\u00ebl. Translated by\n    Emily Baldwin and Paulina Driver. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =DEVEY'S Logic=, or the Science of Inference. A Popular Manual.\n    By J. Devey. 5_s._\n\n  =DICTIONARY of Latin and Greek Quotations=; including Proverbs,\n    Maxims, Mottoes, Law Terms and Phrases. With all the Quantities\n    marked, and English Translations. With Index Verborum (622\n    pages). 5_s._\n\n  =DICTIONARY of Obsolete and Provincial English.= Compiled by\n    Thomas Wright, M.A., F.S.A., &c. 2 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =DIDRON'S Christian Iconography=: a History of Christian Art in\n    the Middle Ages. Translated by E. J. Millington and completed by\n    Margaret Stokes. With 240 Illustrations. 2 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =DIOGENES LAERTIUS. Lives and Opinions of the Ancient\n    Philosophers.= Translated by Prof. C. D. Yonge, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =DOBREE'S Adversaria.= Edited by the late Prof. Wagner. 2 vols.\n    5_s._ each.\n\n  =DODD'S Epigrammatists.= A Selection from the Epigrammatic\n    Literature of Ancient, Medi\u00e6val, and Modern Times. By the\n    Rev. Henry Philip Dodd, M.A. Oxford. 2nd Edition, revised and\n    enlarged. 6_s._\n\n  =DONALDSON'S The Theatre of the Greeks.= A Treatise on the\n    History and Exhibition of the Greek Drama. With numerous\n    Illustrations and 3 Plans. By John William Donaldson, D.D. 5_s._\n\n  =DRAPER'S History of the Intellectual Development of Europe.= By\n    John William Draper, M.D., LL.D. 2 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =DUNLOP'S History of Fiction.= A new Edition. Revised by Henry\n    Wilson. 2 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =DYER (Dr. T. H.). Pompeii=: its Buildings and Antiquities. By T.\n    H. Dyer, LL.D. With nearly 300 Wood Engravings, a large Map, and\n    a Plan of the Forum. 7_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- The City of Rome=: its History and Monuments. With\n    Illustrations. 5_s._\n\n  =DYER (T. F. T.) British Popular Customs. Present and Past.=\n    An Account of the various Games and Customs associated with\n    Different Days of the Year in the British Isles, arranged\n    according to the Calendar. By the Rev. T. F. Thiselton Dyer, M.A.\n    5_s._\n\n  =EBERS' Egyptian Princess.= An Historical Novel. By George Ebers.\n    Translated by E. S. Buchheim. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =EDGEWORTH'S Stories for Children.= With 8 Illustrations by L.\n    Speed. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =ELZE'S William Shakespeare.=--_See_ SHAKESPEARE.\n\n  =EMERSON'S Works.= 5 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n      I.--Essays and Representative Men.\n\n      II.--English Traits, Nature, and Conduct of Life.\n\n      III.--Society and Solitude--Letters and Social Aims--Addresses.\n\n      IV.--Miscellaneous Pieces.\n\n      V.--Poems.\n\n  =ENNEMOSER'S History of Magic.= Translated by William Howitt. 2\n    vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =EPICTETUS, The Discourses of.= With the ENCHEIRIDION and\n    Fragments. Translated by George Long, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =EURIPIDES.= A New Literal Translation in Prose. By E. P.\n    Coleridge, M.A. 2 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =EUTROPIUS.=--_See_ JUSTIN.\n\n  =EUSEBIUS PAMPHILUS, Ecclesiastical History of.= Translated by\n    Rev. C. F. Cruse, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =EVELYN'S Diary and Correspondence.= Edited from the Original\n    MSS. by W. Bray, F.A.S. With 45 engravings. 4 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =FAIRHOLT'S Costume in England.= A History of Dress to the end of\n    the Eighteenth Century. 3rd Edition, revised, by Viscount Dillon,\n    V.P.S.A. Illustrated with above 700 Engravings. 2 vols. 5_s._\n    each.\n\n  =FIELDING'S Adventures of Joseph Andrews and his Friend Mr.\n    Abraham Adams.= With Cruikshank's Illustrations. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- History of Tom Jones, a Foundling.= With Cruikshank's\n    Illustrations. 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- Amelia.= With Cruikshank's Illustrations. 5_s._\n\n  =FLAXMAN'S Lectures on Sculpture.= By John Flaxman, R.A. With\n    Portrait and 53 Plates. 6_s._\n\n  =FOSTER'S (John) Life and Correspondence.= Edited by J. E.\n    Ryland. 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- Critical Essays.= Edited by J. E. Ryland. 2 vols. 3_s._\n    6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- Essays=: on Decision of Character; on a Man's writing\n    Memoirs of Himself; on the epithet Romantic; on the aversion of\n    Men of Taste to Evangelical Religion. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Essays= on the Evils of Popular Ignorance; to which is\n    added, a Discourse on the Propagation of Christianity in India.\n    3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =FOSTER'S Essays= on the Improvement of Time. With NOTES OF\n    SERMONS and other Pieces. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =GASPARY'S History of Italian Literature.= Translated by Herman\n    Oelsner, M.A., Ph.D. Vol. I. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =GEOFFREY OF MONMOUTH, Chronicle of.=--_See Old English\n    Chronicles._\n\n  =GESTA ROMANORUM=, or Entertaining Moral Stories invented by the\n    Monks. Translated by the Rev. Charles Swan. Revised Edition, by\n    Wynnard Hooper, B.A. 5_s._\n\n  =GILDAS, Chronicles of.=--_See Old English Chronicles._\n\n  =GIBBON'S Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.= Complete and\n    Unabridged, with Variorum Notes. Edited by an English Churchman.\n    With 2 Maps and Portrait. 7 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =GILBART'S History, Principles, and Practice of Banking.= By the\n    late J. W. Gilbart, F.R.S. New Edition, revised by A. S. Michie.\n    2 vols. 10_s._\n\n  =GIL BLAS, The Adventures of.= Translated from the French of\n    Lesage by Smollett. With 24 Engravings on Steel, after Smirke,\n    and 10 Etchings by George Cruikshank. 6_s._\n\n  =GIRALDUS CAMBRENSIS' Historical Works.= Translated by Th.\n    Forester, M.A., and Sir R. Colt Hoare. Revised Edition, Edited by\n    Thomas Wright, M.A., F.S.A. 5_s._\n\n  =GOETHE'S Faust.= Part I. German Text with Hayward's Prose\n    Translation and Notes. Revised by C. A. Buchheim, Ph.D. 5_s._\n\n  =GOETHE'S Works.= Translated into English by various hands. 14\n    vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n      I. and II.--Autobiography and Annals.\n\n      III.--Faust. Two Parts, complete. (Swanwick.)\n\n      IV.--Novels and Tales.\n\n      V.--Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship.\n\n      VI.--Conversations with Eckermann and Soret.\n\n      VIII.--Dramatic Works.\n\n      IX.--Wilhelm Meister's Travels.\n\n      X.--Tour in Italy, and Second Residence in Rome.\n\n      XI.--Miscellaneous Travels.\n\n      XII.--Early and Miscellaneous Letters.\n\n      XIV.--Reineke Fox, West-Eastern Divan and Achilleid.\n\n  =GOLDSMITH'S Works.= A new Edition, by J. W. M. Gibbs. 5 vols.\n    3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =GRAMMONT'S Memoirs of the Court of Charles II.= Edited by Sir\n    Walter Scott. Together with the BOSCOBEL TRACTS, including two\n    not before published, &c. New Edition. 5_s._\n\n  =GRAY'S Letters.= Including the Correspondence of Gray and Mason.\n    Edited by the Rev. D. C. Tovey, M.A. Vols. I. and II. 3_s._ 6_d._\n    each.\n\n  =GREEK ANTHOLOGY.= Translated by George Burges, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =GREEK ROMANCES of Heliodorus, Longus, and Achilles\n    Tatius--viz.=, The Adventures of Theagenes & Chariclea; Amours of\n    Daphnis and Chloe; and Loves of Clitopho and Leucippe. Translated\n    by Rev. R. Smith, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =GREGORY'S Letters on the Evidences, Doctrines, & Duties of the\n    Christian Religion.= By Dr. Olinthus Gregory. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =GREENE, MARLOWE, and BEN JONSON.= Poems of. Edited by Robert\n    Bell. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =GRIMM'S TALES.= With the Notes of the Original. Translated by\n    Mrs. A. Hunt. With Introduction by Andrew Lang, M.A. 2 vols.\n    3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- Gammer Grethel=; or, German Fairy Tales and Popular\n    Stories. Containing 42 Fairy Tales. Trans. by Edgar Taylor. With\n    numerous Woodcuts after George Cruikshank and Ludwig Grimm. 3_s._\n    6_d._\n\n  =GROSSI'S Marco Visconti.= Translated by A. F. D. The Ballads\n    rendered into English Verse by C. M. P. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =GUIZOT'S History of the English Revolution of 1640.= From the\n    Accession of Charles I. to his Death. Translated by William\n    Hazlitt. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- History of Civilisation=, from the Fall of the Roman Empire\n    to the French Revolution. Translated by William Hazlitt. 3 vols.\n    3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =HALL'S (Rev. Robert) Miscellaneous Works and Remains.= 3_s._\n    6_d._\n\n  =HAMPTON COURT: A Short History of the Manor and Palace.= By\n    Ernest Law, B.A. With numerous Illustrations. 5_s._\n\n  =HARDWICK'S History of the Articles of Religion.= By the late C.\n    Hardwick. Revised by the Rev. Francis Procter, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =HAUFF'S Tales.= The Caravan--The Sheik of Alexandria--The Inn in\n    the Spessart. Trans. from the German by S. Mendel. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =HAWTHORNE'S Tales.= 4 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n      I.--Twice-told Tales, and the Snow Image.\n\n      II.--Scarlet Letter, and the House with the Seven Gables.\n\n      III.--Transformation [The Marble Faun], and Blithedale Romance.\n\n      IV.--Mosses from an Old Manse.\n\n  =HAZLITT'S Table-talk.= Essays on Men and Manners. By W. Hazlitt.\n    3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Lectures on the Literature of the Age of Elizabeth= and on\n    Characters of Shakespeare's Plays. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Lectures on the English Poets=, and on the English Comic\n    Writers. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- The Plain Speaker.= Opinions on Books, Men, and Things.\n    3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Round Table.= 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Sketches and Essays.= 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- The Spirit of the Age=; or, Contemporary Portraits. Edited\n    by W. Carew Hazlitt. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- View of the English Stage.= Edited by W. 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Hamilton Bryce,\n    LL.D. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =HUGO'S (Victor) Dramatic Works.= Hernani--Ruy Blas--The King's\n    Diversion. Translated by Mrs. Newton Crosland and F. L. Slous.\n    3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Poems, chiefly Lyrical.= Translated by various Writers, now\n    first collected by J. H. L. Williams. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =HUMBOLDT'S Cosmos.= Translated by E. C. Ott\u00e9, B. H. Paul, and\n    W. S. Dallas, F.L.S. 5 Vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each, excepting Vol. V.\n    5_s._\n\n  =HUMBOLDT'S Personal Narrative= of his Travels to the Equinoctial\n    Regions of America during the years 1799-1804. Translated by T.\n    Ross. 3 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =---- Views of Nature.= Translated by E. C. Ott\u00e9 and H. G. Bohn.\n    5_s._\n\n  =HUMPHREYS' Coin Collector's Manual.= By H. N. 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Life of Richard C\u0153ur de Lion.= 2 vols. 3_s._\n    6_d._ each.\n\n  =JAMESON'S (Mrs.) Shakespeare's Heroines.= Characteristics of\n    Women: Moral, Poetical, and Historical. By Mrs. Jameson. 3_s._\n    6_d._\n\n  =JESSE'S (E.) Anecdotes of Dogs.= With 40 Woodcuts and 34 Steel\n    Engravings. 5_s._\n\n  =JESSE'S (J. H.) Memoirs of the Court of England during the Reign\n    of the Stuarts=, including the Protectorate. 3 vols. With 42\n    Portraits. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =---- Memoirs of the Pretenders and their Adherents.= With 6\n    Portraits. 5_s._\n\n  =JOHNSON'S Lives of the Poets.= Edited by Mrs. Alexander Napier,\n    with Introduction by Professor Hales. 3 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =JOSEPHUS (Flavius), The Works of.= Whiston's Translation,\n    revised by Rev. A. R. Shilleto, M.A. With Topographical and\n    Geographical Notes by Colonel Sir C. W. Wilson, K.C.B. 5 vols.\n    3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =JOYCE'S Scientific Dialogues.= With numerous Woodcuts. 5_s._\n\n  =JUKES-BROWNE (A. J.), The Building of the British Isles=: a\n    Study in Geographical Evolution. Illustrated by numerous Maps and\n    Woodcuts. 2nd Edition, revised, 7_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =JULIAN, the Emperor.= Containing Gregory Nazianzen's Two\n    Invectives and Libanus' Monody, with Julian's extant Theosophical\n    Works. Translated by C. W. King, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =JUNIUS'S Letters.= With all the Notes of Woodfall's Edition, and\n    important Additions. 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =JUSTIN CORNELIUS NEPOS, and EUTROPIUS.= Translated by the Rev.\n    J. S. Watson, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =JUVENAL, PERSIUS. SULPICIA and LUCILIUS.= Translated by L.\n    Evans, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =KANT'S Critique of Pure Reason.= Translated by J. M. D.\n    Meiklejohn. 5_s._\n\n  =---- Prolegomena and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural\n    Science.= Translated by E. Belfort Bax. 5_s._\n\n  =KEIGHTLEY'S (Thomas) Mythology of Ancient Greece and Italy.= 4th\n    Edition, revised by Leonard Schmitz, Ph.D., LL.D. With 12 Plates\n    from the Antique. 5_s._\n\n  =KEIGHTLEY'S Fairy Mythology=, illustrative of the Romance\n    and Superstition of Various Countries. Revised Edition, with\n    Frontispiece by Cruikshank. 5_s._\n\n  =LA FONTAINE'S Fables.= Translated into English Verse by Elizur\n    Wright. New Edition, with Notes by J. W. M. Gibbs. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =LAMARTINE'S History of the Girondists.= Translated by H. 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Carew Hazlitt. 2 vols.\n    3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- Tales from Shakespeare.= With Illustrations by Byam Shaw.\n    3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =LANE'S Arabian Nights' Entertainments.= Edited by Stanley\n    Lane-Poole, M.A., Litt.D. 4 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =LANZI'S History of Painting in Italy=, from the Period of the\n    Revival of the Fine Arts to the End of the Eighteenth Century,\n    Translated by Thomas Roscoe. 3 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =LAPPENBERG'S History of England under the Anglo-Saxon Kings.=\n    Translated by B. Thorpe, F.S.A. New edition, revised by E. C.\n    Ott\u00e9. 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =LECTURES ON PAINTING=, by Barry, Opie, Fuseli. Edited by R.\n    Wornum. 5_s._\n\n  =LEONARDO DA VINCI'S Treatise on Painting.= Translated by J. F.\n    Rigaud, R.A., With a Life of Leonardo by John William Brown. With\n    numerous Plates. 5_s._\n\n  =LEPSIUS'S Letters from Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Peninsula of\n    Sinai.= Translated by L. and J. B. Horner. With Maps. 5_s._\n\n  =LESSING'S Dramatic Works=, Complete. Edited by Ernest Bell, M.A.\n    With Memoir of Lessing by Helen Zimmern. 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- Laokoon, Dramatic Notes, and the Representation of Death\n    by the Ancients.= Translated by E. C. Beasley and Helen Zimmern.\n    Edited by Edward Bell, M.A. With a Frontispiece of the Laokoon\n    group. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =LILLY'S Introduction to Astrology.= With a GRAMMAR OF ASTROLOGY\n    and TABLES for Calculating Nativities, by Zadkiel. 5_s._\n\n  =LIVY'S History of Rome.= Translated by Dr. Spillan, C. Edmonds,\n    and others. 4 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =LOCKE'S Philosophical Works.= Edited by J. A. St. John. 2 vols.\n    3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- Life and Letters=: By Lord King. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =LOCKHART (J. G.)=--_See_ BURNS.\n\n  =LODGE'S Portraits of Illustrious Personages of Great Britain=,\n    with Biographical and Historical Memoirs. 240 Portraits engraved\n    on Steel, with the respective Biographies unabridged. 8 vols.\n    5_s._ each.\n\n  =LONGFELLOW'S Prose Works.= With 16 full-page Wood Engravings. 5_s._\n\n  =LOUDON'S (Mrs.) Natural History.= Revised edition, by W. S.\n    Dallas, F.L.S. With numerous Woodcut Illus. 5_s._\n\n  =LOWNDES' Bibliographer's Manual of English Literature.= Enlarged\n    Edition. By H. G. Bohn. 6 vols. cloth, 5_s._ each. Or 4 vols.\n    half morocco, 2_l._ 2_s._\n\n  =LONGUS. Daphnis and Chloe.=--_See_ GREEK ROMANCES.\n\n  =LUCAN'S Pharsalia.= Translated by H. T. Riley, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =LUCIAN'S Dialogues of the Gods, of the Sea Gods, and of the\n    Dead.= Translated by Howard Williams, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =LUCRETIUS.= Translated by the Rev. J. S. Watson, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =LUTHER'S Table-Talk.= Translated and Edited by William Hazlitt.\n    3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Autobiography.=--_See_ MICHELET.\n\n  =MACHIAVELLI'S History of Florence=, together with the Prince,\n    Savonarola, various Historical Tracts, and a Memoir of\n    Machiavelli. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =MALLET'S Northern Antiquities=, or an Historical Account of\n    the Manners, Customs, Religions and Laws, Maritime Expeditions\n    and Discoveries, Language and Literature, of the Ancient\n    Scandinavians. Translated by Bishop Percy. Revised and Enlarged\n    Edition, with a Translation of the PROSE EDDA, by J. A.\n    Blackwell. 5_s._\n\n  =MANTELL'S (Dr.) Petrifactions and their Teachings.= With\n    numerous illustrative Woodcuts. 6_s._\n\n  =---- Wonders of Geology.= 8th Edition, revised by T. Rupert\n    Jones, F.G.S. With a coloured Geological Map of England, Plates,\n    and upwards of 200 Woodcuts. 2 vols. 7_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =MANZONI. The Betrothed=: being a Translation of 'I Promessi\n    Sposi.' By Alessandro Manzoni. With numerous Woodcuts. 5_s._\n\n  =MARCO POLO'S Travels=; the Translation of Marsden revised by T.\n    Wright, M.A., F.S.A. 5_s._\n\n  =MARRYAT'S (Capt. R.N.) Masterman Ready.= With 93 Woodcuts. 3_s._\n    6_d._\n\n  =---- Mission=; =or, Scenes in Africa.= Illustrated by Gilbert\n    and Dalziel. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Pirate and Three Cutters.= With 8 Steel Engravings, from\n    Drawings by Clarkson Stanfield, R.A. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Privateersman.= 8 Engravings on Steel. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Settlers in Canada.= 10 Engravings by Gilbert and Dalziel.\n    3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Poor Jack.= With 16 Illustrations after Clarkson\n    Stansfield, R.A. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Peter Simple.= With 8 full-page Illustrations. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Midshipman Easy.= With 8 full-page Illustrations. 3_s._\n    6_d._\n\n  =MARTIAL'S Epigrams=, complete. Translated into Prose, each\n    accompanied by one or more Verse Translations selected from the\n    Works of English Poets, and other sources. 7_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =MARTINEAU'S (Harriet) History of England=, from 1800-1815. 3_s._\n    6_d._\n\n  =---- History of the Thirty Years' Peace=, A.D. 1815-46. 4 vols.\n    3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =----= _See Comte's Positive Philosophy_.\n\n  =MATTHEW PARIS'S English History=, from the Year 1235 to 1273.\n    Translated by Rev. J. A. Giles, D.C.L. 3 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =MATTHEW OF WESTMINSTER'S Flowers of History=, from the beginning\n    of the World to A.D. 1307. Translated by C. D. Yonge, M.A. 2\n    vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =MAXWELL'S Victories of Wellington and the British Armies.=\n    Frontispiece and 5 Portraits. 5_s._\n\n  =MENZEL'S History of Germany=, from the Earliest Period to 1842.\n    3 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =MICHAEL ANGELO AND RAPHAEL, their Lives and Works=. By Duppa and\n    Quatremere de Quincy. With Portraits, and Engravings on Steel.\n    5_s._\n\n  =MICHELET'S Luther's Autobiography.= Trans. by William Hazlitt.\n    With an Appendix (110 pages) of Notes. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- History of the French Revolution from= its earliest\n    indications to the flight of the King in 1791. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =MIGNET'S History of the French Revolution=, from 1789 to 1814.\n    3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =MILL (J. S.). Early Essays by John Stuart Mill=. Collected\n    from various sources by J. W. M. Gibbs. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =MILLER (Professor). History Philosophically Illustrated=, from\n    the Fall of the Roman Empire to the French Revolution. 4 vols.\n    3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =MILTON'S Prose Works=. Edited by J. A. St. John. 5 vols. 3_s._\n    6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- Poetical Works=, with a Memoir and Critical Remarks by\n    James Montgomery, an Index to Paradise Lost, Todd's Verbal Index\n    to all the Poems, and a Selection of Explanatory Notes by Henry\n    G. Bohn. Illustrated with 120 Wood Engravings from Drawings by W.\n    Harvey. 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =MITFORD'S (Miss) Our Village=, Sketches of Rural Character and\n    Scenery. With 2 Engravings on Steel. 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =MOLI\u00c8RE'S Dramatic Works=. A new Translation in English Prose,\n    by C. H. Wall. 3 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =MONTAGU. The Letters and Works of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu.=\n    Edited by her great-grandson, Lord Wharncliffe's Edition, and\n    revised by W. Moy Thomas. New Edition, revised, with 5 Portraits.\n    2 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =MONTAIGNE'S Essays.= Cotton's Translation, revised by W. C.\n    Hazlitt. New Edition. 3 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =MONTESQUIEU'S Spirit of Laws.= New Edition, revised and\n    corrected. By J. V. Pritchard, A.M. 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =MORPHY'S Games of Chess.= Being the Matches and best Games\n    played by the American Champion, with Explanatory and Analytical\n    Notes by J. L\u00f6wenthal. 5_s._\n\n  =MOTLEY (J. L.). The Rise of the Dutch Republic=. A History. By\n    John Lothrop Motley. New Edition, with Biographical Introduction\n    by Moncure D. Conway. 3 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =MUDIE'S British Birds=; or, History of the Feathered Tribes of\n    the British Islands. Revised by W. C. L. Martin. With 52 Figures\n    of Birds and 7 Coloured Plates of Eggs. 2 vols.\n\n  =NEANDER (Dr. A.). History of the Christian Religion and\n    Church.= Trans. from the German by J. Torrey. 10 vols. 3_s._\n    6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- Life of Jesus Christ.= Translated by J. McClintock and C.\n    Blumenthal. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- History of the Planting and Training of the Christian\n    Church by the Apostles.= Translated by J. E. Ryland. 2 vols.\n    3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- Memorials of Christian Life in the Early and Middle Ages=;\n    including Light in Dark Places. Trans. by J. E. Ryland. 3_s._\n    6_d._\n\n  =NIBELUNGEN LIED. 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Edited by Augustus Jessopp, D.D. 3\n    vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =NUGENT'S (Lord) Memorials of Hampden, his Party and Times.= With\n    a Memoir of the Author, an Autograph Letter, and Portrait. 5_s._\n\n  =OLD ENGLISH CHRONICLES=, including Ethelwerd's Chronicle,\n    Asser's Life of Alfred, Geoffrey of Monmouth's British History,\n    Gildas, Nennius, and the spurious chronicle of Richard of\n    Cirencester. Edited by J. A. Giles, D.C.L. 5_s._\n\n  =OMAN (J. C.) The Great Indian Epics=: the Stories of the\n    RAMAYANA and the MAHABHARATA. By John Campbell Oman, Principal\n    of Khalsa College, Amritsar. With Notes, Appendices, and\n    Illustrations. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =ORDERICUS VITALIS' Ecclesiastical History of England and\n    Normandy.= Translated by T. Forester, M.A. To which is added the\n    CHRONICLE OF ST. EVROULT. 4 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =OVID'S Works=, complete. Literally translated into Prose. 3\n    vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =PASCAL'S Thoughts=. 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With upwards of 400 Illustrations. 5_s._\n\n  =PLATO'S Works.= Literally translated, with Introduction and\n    Notes. 6 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n      I.--The Apology of Socrates, Crito, Ph\u00e6do, Gorgias, Protagoras,\n          Ph\u00e6drus, The\u00e6tetus, Euthyphron, Lysis. Translated by the\n          Rev. H. Carey.\n\n      II.--The Republic, Tim\u00e6us, and Critias. Translated by Henry\n          Davis.\n\n      III.--Meno, Euthydemus, The Sophist, Statesman, Cratylus,\n          Parmenides, and the Banquet. Translated by G. Burges.\n\n      IV.--Philebus, Charmides, Laches, Menexenus, Hippias, Ion, The\n          Two Alcibiades, Theages, Rivals, Hipparchus, Minos, Clitopho,\n          Epistles. Translated by G. Burges.\n\n      V.--The Laws. Translated by G. Burges.\n\n      VI.--The Doubtful Works. Translated by G. Burges.\n\n  =---- Summary and Analysis of the Dialogues.= With Analytical\n    Index. By A. Day, LL.D. 5_s._\n\n  =PLAUTUS'S Comedies.= Translated by H. T. Riley, M.A. 2 vols.\n    5_s._ each.\n\n  =PLINY'S Natural History.= Translated by the late John Bostock,\n    M.D., F.R.S., and H. T. Riley, M.A. 6 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =PLINY. The Letters of Pliny the Younger.= Melmoth's\n    translation, revised by the Rev. F. C. T. Bosanquet, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =PLOTINUS, Select Works of.= Translated by Thomas Taylor. With\n    an Introduction containing the substance of Porphyry's Plotinus.\n    Edited by G. R. S. Mead, B.A., M.R.A.S. 5_s._\n\n  =PLUTARCH'S Lives.= Translated by A. Stewart, M.A., and George\n    Long, M.A. 4 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- Morals.= Theosophical Essays. Translated by C. W. King,\n    M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =---- Morals.= Ethical Essays. Translated by the Rev. A. R.\n    Shilleto, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =POETRY OF AMERICA. Selections= from One Hundred American Poets,\n    from 1776 to 1876. By W. J. Linton. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =POLITICAL CYCLOP\u00c6DIA. A Dictionary= of Political,\n    Constitutional, Statistical, and Forensic Knowledge; forming a\n    Work of Reference on subjects of Civil Administration, Political\n    Economy, Finance, Commerce, Laws, and Social Relations. 4 vols.\n    3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =POPE'S Poetical Works.= Edited, with copious Notes, by Robert\n    Carruthers. With numerous Illustrations. 2 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =---- Homer's Iliad.= Edited by the Rev. J. S. Watson, M.A.\n    Illustrated by the entire Series of Flaxman's Designs. 5_s._\n\n  =---- Homer's Odyssey=, with the Battle of Frogs and Mice, Hymns,\n    &c., by other translators. Edited by the Rev. J. S. Watson, M.A.\n    With the entire Series of Flaxman's Designs. 5_s._\n\n  =---- Life=, including many of his Letters. By Robert Carruthers.\n    With numerous Illustrations. 5_s._\n\n  =POUSHKIN'S Prose Tales=: The Captain's Daughter--Doubrovsky--The\n    Queen of Spades--An Amateur Peasant Girl--The Shot--The Snow\n    Storm--The Postmaster--The Coffin Maker--Kirdjali--The Egyptian\n    Nights--Peter the Great's Negro. Translated by T. Keane. 3_s._\n    6_d._\n\n  =PRESCOTT'S Conquest of Mexico.= Copyright edition, with the\n    notes by John Foster Kirk, and an introduction by G. P. Winship.\n    3 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- Conquest of Peru.= Copyright edition, with the notes of\n    John Foster Kirk. 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella.= Copyright edition, with\n    the notes of John Foster Kirk. 3 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =PROPERTIUS.= Translated by Rev. P. J. F. Gantillon, M.A., and\n    accompanied by Poetical Versions, from various sources. 3_s._\n    6_d._\n\n  =PROVERBS, Handbook of.= Containing an entire Republication of\n    Ray's Collection of English Proverbs, with his additions from\n    Foreign Languages and a complete Alphabetical Index; in which are\n    introduced large additions as well of Proverbs as of Sayings,\n    Sentences, Maxims, and Phrases, collected by H. G. Bohn. 5_s._\n\n  =PROVERBS, A Polyglot of Foreign.= Comprising French, Italian,\n    German, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, and Danish. With English\n    Translations & a General Index by H. G. Bohn. 5_s._\n\n  =POTTERY AND PORCELAIN=, and other Objects of Vertu. Comprising\n    an Illustrated Catalogue of the Bernal Collection of Works of\n    Art, with the prices at which they were sold by auction, and\n    names of the possessors. To which are added, an Introductory\n    Lecture on Pottery and Porcelain, and an Engraved List of all the\n    known Marks and Monograms. By Henry G. Bohn. With numerous Wood\n    Engravings, 5_s._; or with Coloured Illustrations, 10_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =PROUT'S (Father) Reliques.= Collected and arranged by Rev. F.\n    Mahony. New issue, with 21 Etchings by D. Maclise, R.A. Nearly\n    600 pages. 5_s._\n\n  =QUINTILIAN'S Institutes of Oratory=, or Education of an Orator.\n    Translated by the Rev. J. S. Watson, M.A. 2 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =RACINE'S (Jean) Dramatic Works.= A metrical English version. By\n    R. Bruce Boswell, M.A. Oxon. 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =RANKE'S History of the Popes=, their Church and State, and\n    especially of their Conflicts with Protestantism in the 16th and\n    17th centuries. Translated by E. Foster. 3 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- History of Servia and the Servian Revolution.= With an\n    Account of the Insurrection in Bosnia. Translated by Mrs. Kerr.\n    3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =RECREATIONS in SHOOTING.= By 'Craven.' With 62 Engravings on\n    Wood after Harvey, and 9 Engravings on Steel, chiefly after A.\n    Cooper, R.A. 5_s._\n\n  =RENNIE'S Insect Architecture.= Revised and enlarged by Rev. J.\n    G. Wood, M.A. With 186 Woodcut Illustrations. 5_s._\n\n  =REYNOLD'S (Sir J.) Literary Works.= Edited by H. W. Beechy. 2\n    vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =RICARDO on the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.=\n    Edited by E. C. K. Gonner, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =RICHTER (Jean Paul Friedrich). Levana, a Treatise on Education:=\n    together with the Autobiography (a Fragment), and a short\n    Prefatory Memoir. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Flower, Fruit, and Thorn Pieces=, or the Wedded Life,\n    Death, and Marriage of Firmian Stanislaus Siebenkaes, Parish\n    Advocate in the Parish of Kuhschnapptel. Newly translated by Lt.\n    Col. Alex. Ewing. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =ROGER DE HOVEDEN'S Annals of English History=, comprising the\n    History of England and of other Countries of Europe from A.D. 732\n    to A.D. 1201. Translated by H. T. Riley, M.A. 2 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =ROGER OF WENDOVER'S Flowers of History=, comprising the History\n    of England from the Descent of the Saxons to A.D. 1235, formerly\n    ascribed to Matthew Paris. Translated by J. A. Giles, D.C.L. 2\n    vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =ROME in the NINETEENTH CENTURY.= Containing a complete Account\n    of the Ruins of the Ancient City, the Remains of the Middle Ages,\n    and the Monuments of Modern Times. By C. A. Eaton. With 34 Steel\n    Engravings. 2 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =----= _See_ BURN and DYER.\n\n  =ROSCOE'S (W.) Life and Pontificate of Leo X.= Final edition,\n    revised by Thomas Roscoe. 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- Life of Lorenzo de' Medici=, called 'the Magnificent.' With\n    his poems, letters, &c. 10th Edition, revised, with Memoir of\n    Roscoe by his Son. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =RUSSIA. History of=, from the earliest Period, compiled from\n    the most authentic sources by Walter K. Kelly. With Portraits. 2\n    vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =SALLUST, FLORUS, and VELLEIUS PATERCULUS.= Translated by J. S.\n    Watson, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =SCHILLER'S Works.= Translated by various hands. 7 vols. 3_s._\n    6_d._ each:--\n\n      I.--History of the Thirty Years' War.\n\n      II.--History of the Revolt in the Netherlands, the Trials\n          of Counts Egmont and Horn, the Siege of Antwerp, and the\n          Disturbances in France preceding the Reign of Henry IV.\n\n      III.--Don Carlos, Mary Stuart, Maid of Orleans, Bride of\n          Messina, together with the Use of the Chorus in Tragedy\n          (a short Essay).\n\n            These Dramas are all translated in metre.\n\n      IV.--Robbers (with Schiller's original Preface), Fiesco, Love\n          and Intrigue, Demetrius, Ghost Seer, Sport of Divinity.\n\n            The Dramas in this volume are translated into Prose.\n\n      V.--Poems.\n\n      VI.--Essays, \u00c6sthetical and Philosophical.\n\n      VII.--Wallenstein's Camp, Piccolomini and Death of Wallenstein,\n          William Tell.\n\n  =SCHILLER and GOETHE. Correspondence between=, from A.D.\n    1794-1805. Translated by L. Dora Schmitz. 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._\n    each.\n\n  =SCHLEGEL'S (F.) Lectures on the Philosophy of Life and the\n    Philosophy of Language.= Translated by the Rev. A. J. W.\n    Morrison, M.A. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Lectures on the History of Literature, Ancient and Modern.=\n    Translated from the German. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Lectures on the Philosophy of History.= Translated by J. B.\n    Robertson. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =SCHLEGEL'S Lectures on Modern History=, together with the\n    Lectures entitled C\u00e6sar and Alexander, and The Beginning of our\n    History. Translated by L. Purcell and R. H. Whitetock. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- \u00c6sthetic and Miscellaneous Works.= Translated by E. J.\n    Millington. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =SCHLEGEL (A. W.) Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature.=\n    Translated by J. Black. Revised Edition, by the Rev. A. J. W.\n    Morrison, M.A. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =SCHOPENHAUER on the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient\n    Reason=, and =On the Will in Nature=. Translated by Madame\n    Hillebrand. 5_s._\n\n  =---- Essays.= Selected and Translated. With a Biographical\n    Introduction and Sketch of his Philosophy, by E. Belfort Bax.\n    5_s._\n\n  =SCHOUW'S Earth, Plants, and Man.= Translated by A. Henfrey. With\n    coloured Map of the Geography of Plants. 5_s._\n\n  =SCHUMANN (Robert).= His Life and Works, by August Reissmann.\n    Translated by A. L. Alger. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =---- Early Letters.= Originally published by his Wife.\n    Translated by May Herbert. With a Preface by Sir George Grove,\n    D.C.L. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =SENECA on Benefits.= Newly translated by A. Stewart, M.A. 3_s._\n    6_d._\n\n  =---- Minor Essays and On Clemency.= Translated by A. Stewart,\n    M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =SHAKESPEARE DOCUMENTS.= Arranged by D. H. Lambert, B.A. 3_s._\n    6_d._\n\n  =SHAKESPEARE'S Dramatic Art.= The History and Character of\n    Shakespeare's Plays. By Dr. Hermann Ulrici. Translated by L. Dora\n    Schmitz. 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =SHAKESPEARE (William).= A Literary Biography by Karl Elze,\n    Ph.D., LL.D. Translated by L. Dora Schmitz. 5_s._\n\n  =SHARPE (S.) The History of Egypt=, from the Earliest Times till\n    the Conquest by the Arabs, A.D. 640. By Samuel Sharpe. 2 Maps and\n    upwards of 400 Illustrative Woodcuts. 2 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =SHERIDAN'S Dramatic Works=, Complete. With Life by G. G. S. 3_s._\n    6_d._\n\n  =SISMONDI'S History of the Literature of the South of Europe.=\n    Translated by Thomas Roscoe. 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =SMITH'S Synonyms and Antonyms, or Kindred Words= and their\n    =Opposites=. Revised Edition. 5_s._\n\n  =---- Synonyms Discriminated.= A Dictionary of Synonymous Words\n    in the English Language, showing the Accurate signification of\n    words of similar meaning. Edited by the Rev. H. Percy Smith, M.A.\n    6_s._\n\n  =SMITH'S (Adam) The Wealth of Nations.= Edited by E. Belfort Bax.\n    2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- Theory of Moral Sentiments.= With a Memoir of the Author by\n    Dugald Stewart. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =SMYTH'S (Professor) Lectures on Modern History.= 2 vols. 3_s._\n    6_d._ each.\n\n  =SMYTH'S (Professor) Lectures on the French Revolution.= 2 vols.\n    3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =SMITH'S (Pye) Geology and Scripture.= 2nd Edition. 5_s._\n\n  =SMOLLETT'S Adventures of Roderick Random.= With short Memoir and\n    Bibliography, and Cruikshank's Illustrations. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =SMOLLETT'S Adventures of Peregrine Pickle.= With Bibliography\n    and Cruikshank's Illustrations. 2 vols. 3_s._ 6_d._ each.\n\n  =---- The Expedition of Humphry Clinker.= With Bibliography and\n    Cruikshank's Illustrations. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =SOCRATES (surnamed Scholasticus'). The Ecclesiastical History of\n    (A.D. 305-445).= Translated from the Greek. 5_s._\n\n  =SOPHOCLES, The Tragedies of.= A New Prose Translation, with\n    Memoir, Notes, &c., by E. P. Coleridge, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =SOUTHEY'S Life of Nelson.= With Portraits, Plans, and upwards of\n    50 Engravings on Steel and Wood. 5_s._\n\n  =---- Life of Wesley=, and the Rise and Progress of Methodism. 5_s._\n\n  =---- Robert Southey.= The Story of his Life written in his\n    Letters. Edited by John Dennis. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =SOZOMEN'S Ecclesiastical History.= Translated from the Greek.\n    Together with the ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY OF PHILOSTORGIUS, as\n    epitomised by Photius. Translated by Rev. E. Walford, M.A. 5_s._\n\n  =SPINOZA'S Chief Works.= Translated, with Introduction, by R. H.\n    M. Elwes. 2 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =STANLEY'S Classified Synopsis of the Principal Painters of the\n    Dutch and Flemish Schools.= By George Stanley. 5_s._\n\n  =STARLING'S (Miss) Noble Deeds of Women.= With 14 Steel\n    Engravings. 5_s._\n\n  =STAUNTON'S Chess-Player's Handbook.= 5_s._\n\n  =---- Chess Praxis.= A Supplement to the Chess-player's Handbook.\n    5_s._\n\n  =---- Chess-player's Companion.= Comprising a Treatise on Odds,\n    Collection of Match Games, and a Selection of Original Problems.\n    5_s._\n\n  =---- Chess Tournament of 1851.= With Introduction and Notes. 5_s._\n\n  =STOCKHARDT'S Experimental Chemistry.= Edited by C. W. Heaton,\n    F.C.S. 5_s._\n\n  =STOWE (Mrs. H. B.) Uncle Tom's Cabin.= Illustrated. 3_s._ 6_d._\n\n  =STRABO'S Geography.= Translated by W. Falconer, M.A., and H. C.\n    Hamilton. 3 vols. 5_s._ each.\n\n  =STRICKLAND'S (Agnes) Lives of the Queens of England=, from the\n    Norman Conquest. Revised Edition. 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PERKINS,\n    M.A.\n\n\n\n\nThe Best Practical Working Dictionary of the English Language.\n\nWEBSTER'S\n\nINTERNATIONAL\n\nDICTIONARY.\n\n2348 PAGES.      5000 ILLUSTRATIONS.\n\n\nNEW EDITION, REVISED THROUGHOUT WITH A NEW SUPPLEMENT OF 25,000\nADDITIONAL WORDS AND PHRASES.\n\n\n      The Appendices comprise a Pronouncing Gazetteer of the World,\n    Vocabularies of Scripture, Greek, Latin, and English Proper\n    Names, a Dictionary of the Noted Names of Fiction, a Brief\n    History of the English Language, a Dictionary of Foreign\n    Quotations, Words, Phrases, Proverbs, &c., a Biographical\n    Dictionary with 10,000 names, &c., &c.\n\n\n      =Dr. MURRAY=, _Editor of the 'Oxford English Dictionary,'_\n    says:--'In this its latest form, and with its large Supplement\n    and numerous appendices, it is a wonderful volume, which well\n    maintains its ground against all rivals on its own lines. The\n    'definitions,' or more properly, 'explanations of meaning'\n    in 'Webster' have always struck me as particularly terse and\n    well-put; and it is hard to see how anything better could be done\n    within the limits.'\n\n      =Professor JOSEPH WRIGHT, M.A., Ph.D., D.C.L., LL.D.=, _Editor\n    of the 'English Dialect Dictionary_,' says:--'The new edition\n    of \"Webster's International Dictionary\" is undoubtedly the most\n    useful and reliable work of its kind in any country. No one who\n    has not examined the work carefully would believe that such a\n    vast amount of lexicographical information could possibly be\n    found within so small a compass.'\n\n      =Professor A. H. SAYCE, LL.D., D.D.=, says:--'It is indeed a\n    marvellous work; it is difficult to conceive of a Dictionary\n    more exhaustive and complete. Everything is in it--not only what\n    we might expect to find in such a work, but also what few of us\n    would ever have thought of looking for.'\n\n      =Rev. JOSEPH WOOD, D.D.=, _Head Master of Harrow_, says:--'I have\n    always thought very highly of its merits. Indeed, I consider it\n    to be far the most accurate English Dictionary in existence,\n    and much more reliable than the \"Century.\" For daily and hourly\n    reference, \"Webster\" seems to me unrivalled.'\n\n_Prospectuses, with Prices and Specimen Pages, on Application._\n\n\nLONDON: GEORGE BELL & SONS, YORK HOUSE,\n\nPORTUGAL STREET, W.C.\n\n\n\n\nTRANSCRIBER'S CORRECTIONS\n\n\n  page    original text      correction\n  xxvii,\n  169,    \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4' \u1f10\u03b6\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd                     \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4' \u1f10\u03be\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd\n  199\n  040     for it is a mere phantasm.      for it is a mere phantasm.\"\n  087     Il y a une de mes exp\u00e9rences    Il y a une de mes exp\u00e9riences\n  088     \u039d\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u1fc6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2                \u039d\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u1fc7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2\n  090     the object of invesgation       the object of investigation\n  121     between the Underderstanding    between the Understanding\n  140     No huy peor sordo               No hay peor sordo\n  146     Nay, the impossibity of         Nay, the impossibility of\n  158     \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b6\u03cd,               \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03af \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03cd,\n  220     footnote anchor missing         [190]\n  256     of imparted movement.           of imparted movement.\"\n  259     black = 0                       black = 0\"\n  233     footnote anchor missing         [196]\n  235     in a purely empircial sense,    in a purely empirical sense,\n  246     the blush in embarassment,      the blush in embarrassment,\n  271     Letters Philosophiques sur      Lettres Philosophiques sur\n  286     In _parnassia palustris_        \"In _parnassia palustris_\n  289     in the winter season            in the winter season\"\n  289     pr\u00e9ssentir la necessit\u00e9         pr\u00e9ssentir la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9\n  302     innummerable degrees            innumerable degrees\n  308     inseparable from conciousness   inseparable from consciousness\n  315     susceptibity to causal          susceptibility to causal\n  324     seu innata lex.                 seu innata lex.\"\n  328     effect upon a somnabulist       effect upon a somnambulist\n  354     with the divine will.\"          with the divine will.\n  366     which prevail among mankind.    which prevail among mankind.\"\n  395     his belief in the Deity.        his belief in the Deity.\"\n  396     and invisible heaven.           and invisible heaven.\"\n  372     confirmamations of the rest     confirmations of the rest","title":"On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition)","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":138833}