{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_51635/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_51635","id":"gutenberg_51635","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/51635","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Other","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Philosophy -- History"],"text":"HEGEL\u2019S LECTURES ON THE\n HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n VOLUME ONE\n\n Hegel\u2019s Lectures on\n\n THE HISTORY OF\n\n PHILOSOPHY\n\n _Translated from the German by_\n\n E. S. HALDANE\n\n _In three volumes_\n\n VOLUME ONE\n\n[Illustration]\n\n ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL LTD\n\n Broadway House, 68-74 Carter Lane\n\n London, E.C.4\n\n\n\n\n _First published in England 1892\n by Kegan Paul, Trench, Tr\u00fcbner & Co. Ltd\n Reprinted 1955\n by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd\n Broadway House, 68-74 Carter Lane\n London, E.C.4_\n\n\n _Reprinted by lithography in Great Britain by\n Jarrold and Sons Limited, Norwich_\n\n\n\n\n TRANSLATOR\u2019S NOTE\n\n\nIT is perhaps unnecessary to say anything respecting the difficulty\nof making any adequate translation of Hegel\u2019s writings. In the case\nof the History of Philosophy, that difficulty is possibly enhanced\nby the fact that the greater part of the book is put together from\nthe notes of different courses of lectures delivered on the subject\nat various times. Hegel, as we learn from Michelet, in his preface\nto the first edition of this work, lectured in all nine times on the\nHistory of Philosophy: first in Jena in 1805-1806, then in Heidelberg\nin 1816-1817 and 1817-1818, and the other six times in Berlin between\nthe years 1819 and 1830. He had begun the tenth course on the subject\nin 1831 when death cut his labours short. It was only for the first\ncourse of lectures\u2014that delivered in Jena\u2014that Hegel fully wrote out\nhis lectures; this was evidently done with the intention of future\npublication in book form. At Heidelberg he composed a short abstract\nof his subject, giving in a few terse words the main points dealt with\nin each system of Philosophy. In the later courses of lectures Hegel\ntrusted to extempore speaking, but at the same time made considerable\nuse of the above writings, the margins of which he annotated with\nsubsequent additions. Besides these annotations he left behind him a\nlarge number of miscellaneous notes, which have proved of the greatest\nvalue. The present translation is taken from the second and amended\nedition of the \u201cGeschichte der Philosophie,\u201d published in 1840. This\nedition is derived from no one set of lectures in particular, but\ncarefully prepared by Michelet\u2014himself one of Hegel\u2019s pupils\u2014from all\navailable sources, including the notes of students. The Jena volume\nis, however, made the basis, as representing the main elements of the\nsubject afterwards to be more fully amplified; or, in Michelet\u2019s words,\nas the skeleton which was afterwards to be clothed with flesh.\n\nI have endeavoured to make this translation as literal as possible\nconsistently with intelligibility, and have attempted, so far as\nmight be, to give the recognized symbols for the words for which we\nhave in English no satisfactory equivalents. \u201cBegriff,\u201d when used in\nits technical sense, is translated by \u201cNotion,\u201d \u201cIdee\u201d by \u201cIdea,\u201d as\ndistinguished from the colloquial \u201cidea\u201d; \u201cVorstellung\u201d is usually\nrendered by \u201cpopular\u201d or \u201cordinary conception.\u201d\n\nMiss Frances H. Simson has rendered very valuable assistance in going\ncarefully over most of the proofs of the first volume, and she is now\nengaged with me in the translation of the volumes following.\n\n E. S. H.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n PAGE\n\n INTRODUCTION 1\n\n A. Notion of the History of Philosophy 7\n\n 1. Common Ideas regarding the History of Philosophy 10\n\n 2. Explanatory remarks upon the Definition of the\n History of Philosophy 19\n 3. Results obtained with respect to the Notion of the\n History of Philosophy 29\n\n B. The Relation of Philosophy to other Departments of\n Knowledge 49\n\n 1. The Historical side of this Connection 50\n\n 2. Separation of Philosophy from other allied departments\n of Knowledge 55\n\n 3. Commencement of Philosophy and its History 94\n\n C. Division, Sources, and Method adopted in treating of the\n History of Philosophy 101\n\n 1. Division of the History of Philosophy 101\n\n 2. Sources of the History of Philosophy 110\n\n 3. Method of Treatment adopted 114\n\n\n ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY 117\n\n A. Chinese Philosophy 119\n\n 1. Confucius 120\n\n 2. The Philosophy of the Y-king 121\n\n 3. The Sect of the Tao-See 124\n\n B. Indian Philosophy 125\n\n 1. The Sanc\u2019hya Philosophy of Capila 128\n\n 2. The Philosophy of Gotama and Canade 141\n\n\n PART ONE\n\n GREEK PHILOSOPHY\n\n Introduction 149\n\n The Seven Sages 156\n\n Division of the Subject 163\n\n\n SECTION ONE\n\n CHAPTER I.\u2014FIRST PERIOD, FIRST DIVISION 166\n\n A. The Ionic Philosophy 171\n\n 1. Thales 171\n\n 2. Anaximander 185\n\n 3. Anaximenes 189\n\n B. Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 194\n\n 1. The System of Numbers 208\n\n 2. Application of the System to the Universe 224\n\n 3. Practical Philosophy 235\n\n C. The Eleatic School 239\n\n 1. Xenophanes 241\n\n 2. Parmenides 249\n\n 3. Melissus 257\n\n 4. Zeno 261\n\n D. Heraclitus 278\n\n 1. The Logical Principle 282\n\n 2. Natural Philosophy 285\n\n 3. Relation of the Principle to Consciousness 293\n\n E. Empedocles, Leucippus and Democritus 298\n\n 1. Leucippus and Democritus 299\n _a._ The Logical Principle 302\n _b._ The Constitution of the World 304\n _c._ The Soul 310\n\n 2. Empedocles 310\n\n F. Philosophy of Anaxagoras 319\n\n 1. The Universal Principle 329\n\n 2. The Hom\u0153omeri\u00e6 333\n\n 3. The Relation of the Two 339\n\n\n CHAPTER II.\u2014FIRST PERIOD, SECOND DIVISION 350\n\n A. The Sophists 352\n\n 1. Protagoras 372\n\n 2. Gorgias 378\n\n B. Socrates 384\n\n 1. The Socratic Method 397\n\n 2. The Principle of the Good 406\n\n 3. The Fate of Socrates 425\n\n C. The Philosophy of the Socratics 448\n\n 1. The Megarics 454\n _a._ Euclides 455\n _b._ Eubulides 456\n _c._ Stilpo 464\n\n 2. The Cyrenaic School 469\n _a._ Aristippus 470\n _b._ Theodoras 475\n _c._ Hegesias 477\n _d._ Anniceris 478\n\n 3. The Cynic School 479\n _a._ Antisthenes 481\n _b._ Diogenes 484\n _c._ Later Cynics 486\n\n\n\n\nINAUGURAL ADDRESS\n\nDELIVERED AT HEIDELBERG ON THE 28TH OCTOBER, 1816\n\n\nGENTLEMEN,\u2014Since the History of Philosophy is to be the subject of\nthese lectures, and to-day I am making my first appearance in this\nUniversity, I hope you will allow me to say what satisfaction it\ngives me to take my place once more in an Academy of Learning at this\nparticular time. For the period seems to have been arrived at when\nPhilosophy may again hope to receive some attention and love\u2014this\nalmost dead science may again raise its voice, and hope that the world\nwhich had become deaf to its teaching, may once more lend it an ear.\nThe necessities of the time have accorded to the petty interests of\nevery-day life such overwhelming attention: the deep interests of\nactuality and the strife respecting these have engrossed all the powers\nand the forces of the mind\u2014as also the necessary means\u2014to so great\nan extent, that no place has been left to the higher inward life, the\nintellectual operations of a purer sort; and the better natures have\nthus been stunted in their growth, and in great measure sacrificed.\nBecause the spirit of the world was thus occupied, it could not look\nwithin and withdraw into itself. But since this stream of actuality\nis checked, since the German nation has cut its way out of its most\nmaterial conditions, since its nationality, the basis of all higher\nlife, has been saved, we may hope that, in addition to the State, which\nhas swallowed up all other interests in its own, the Church may now\nresume her high position\u2014that in addition to the kingdom of the world\nto which all thoughts and efforts have hitherto been directed; the\nKingdom of God may also be considered. In other words, along with the\nbusiness of politics and the other interests of every-day life, we may\ntrust that Science, the free rational world of mind, may again flourish.\n\nWe shall see in the History of Philosophy that in other European\ncountries in which the sciences and the cultivation of the\nunderstanding have been prosecuted with zeal and with respect,\nPhilosophy, excepting in name, has sunk even from memory, and that\nit is in the German nation that it has been retained as a peculiar\npossession. We have received the higher call of Nature to be the\nconservers of this holy flame, just as the Eumolpid\u00e6 in Athens had\nthe conservation of the Eleusinian mysteries, the inhabitants of the\nisland of Samothrace the preservation and maintenance of a higher\ndivine service; and as, earlier still, the World-spirit reserved to the\nJewish nation the highest consciousness that it should once more rise\nfrom thence as a new spiritual force. We have already got so far, and\nhave attained to a seriousness so much greater and a consciousness so\nmuch deeper, that for us ideas and that which our reason justifies, can\nalone have weight; to speak more plainly, the Prussian State is a State\nconstituted on principles of intelligence. But the needs of the time\nand the interests of the events in the world already mentioned, have\nrepressed a real and earnest effort after Philosophy and driven hence\nany general attention to it. It has thus happened that because vigorous\nnatures turned to the practical, insipidity and dulness appropriated\nto themselves the preeminence in Philosophy and flourished there. It\nmay indeed be said that since Philosophy began to take a place in\nGermany, it has never looked so badly as at the present time\u2014never\nhave emptiness and shallowness overlaid it so completely, and never\nhave they spoken and acted with such arrogance, as though all power\nwere in their hands! To combat the shallowness, to strive with German\nearnestness and honesty, to draw Philosophy out of the solitude into\nwhich it has wandered\u2014to do such work as this we may hope that we are\ncalled by the higher spirit of our time. Let us together greet the dawn\nof a better time in which the spirit, hitherto a prey to externalities,\nmay return within itself, come to itself again, and win space and\nroom for a kingdom of its own, where true minds will rise above the\ninterests of the moment, and obtain the power to receive the true,\neternal and divine, the power to consider and to grasp the highest.\n\nWe elders, who in the storms of the age have ripened into men, may\nthink you happy whose youth falls in the day in which you may devote\nthe same undisturbed to Science and to Truth. I have dedicated my life\nto Science, and it is a true joy to me to find myself again in this\nplace where I may, in a higher measure and more extensive circle,\nwork with others in the interests of the higher sciences, and help to\ndirect your way therein. I hope that I may succeed in deserving and\nobtaining your confidence. But in the first place, I can ask nothing of\nyou but to bring with you, above all, a trust in science and a trust\nin yourselves. The love of truth, faith in the power of mind, is the\nfirst condition in Philosophy. Man, because he is Mind, should and must\ndeem himself worthy of the highest; he cannot think too highly of the\ngreatness and the power of his mind, and, with this belief, nothing\nwill be so difficult and hard that it will not reveal itself to him.\nThe Being of the universe, at first hidden and concealed, has no power\nwhich can offer resistance to the search for knowledge; it has to lay\nitself open before the seeker\u2014to set before his eyes and give for his\nenjoyment, its riches and its depths.\n\n\n\n\nPREFATORY NOTE\n\n\nIN the History of Philosophy the observation is immediately forced\nupon us that it certainly presents great interest if its subject is\nregarded from a favourable point of view, but that it would still\npossess interest even if its end were regarded as opposite to what it\nis. Indeed, this interest may seem to increase in the degree in which\nthe ordinary conception of Philosophy, and of the end which its history\nserves, is reversed; for from the History of Philosophy a proof of the\nfutility of the science is mainly derived.\n\nThe demand that a history, whatever the subject may be, should state\nthe facts without prejudice and without any particular object or end\nto be gained by its means, must be regarded as a fair one. But with a\ncommonplace demand like this, we do not get far; for the history of a\nsubject is necessarily intimately connected with the conception which\nis formed of it. In accordance with this what is important in it is\ndetermined, and the relation of the events to the end regulates the\nselection of facts to be recorded, the mode of comprehending them, and\nthe point of view under which they are regarded. It may happen from the\nideas formed of what a State really is, that a reader of the political\nhistory of a country may find therein nothing of what he looks for.\nStill more may this be the case in the history of Philosophy, and\nrepresentations of this history may be instanced in which everything,\nexcepting what was supposed to be Philosophy, appears to be found.\n\nIn other histories we have a clear conception of their subjects, at\nleast so far as their principal points are concerned; we know whether\nthey concern a particular land, people or race, or whether their\nsubject is the science of mathematics, physics, &c., or an art, such as\npainting. The science of Philosophy has, however, this distinguishing\nfeature, and, if you will, this disadvantage as compared with other\nsciences, that we find the most varied points of view as regards its\nNotion, and regarding that which it ought to and can accomplish. If\nthis first assumption, the conception of the subject of the history, is\nnot established, the history itself is necessarily made vacillating,\nand it only obtains consistency when it sets forth a definite\nconception: but then in view of the various ways of regarding its\nsubject, it easily draws upon itself the reproach of one-sidedness.\n\nThat drawback relates, however, only to an external consideration of\nthis narrative; there is another and greater disadvantage allied to\nit. If there are different Notions of the science of Philosophy, it\nis the true Notion alone that puts us in a position to understand the\nwritings of philosophers who have worked in the knowledge of it. For in\nthought, and particularly in speculative thought, comprehension means\nsomething quite different from understanding the grammatical sense\nof the words alone, and also from understanding them in the region\nof ordinary conception only. Hence we may possess a knowledge of the\nassertions, propositions, or of the opinions of philosophers; we may\nhave occupied ourselves largely with the grounds of and deductions from\nthese opinions, and the main point in all that we have done may be\nwanting\u2014the comprehension of the propositions. There is hence no lack\nof voluminous and even learned histories of Philosophy in which the\nknowledge of the matter itself about which so much ado has been made,\nis absent. The authors of such histories may be compared to animals\nwhich have listened to all the tones in some music, but to whose senses\nthe unison, the harmony of their tones, has not penetrated.\n\nThe circumstance mentioned makes it in no science so necessary as in\nthe history of Philosophy to commence with an Introduction, and in it\ncorrectly to define, in the first place, the subject of the history\nabout to be related. For it may be said, How should we begin to treat\na subject, the name of which is certainly mentioned often enough, but\nof whose nature we as yet know nothing? In treating the history of\nPhilosophy thus, we could have no other guidance than that of seeking\nout and taking up whatever has received the name of Philosophy,\nanywhere or any time. But in fact, when the Notion of Philosophy is\nestablished, not arbitrarily but in a scientific way, such treatment\nbecomes the science of Philosophy itself. For in this science the\npeculiar characteristic is that its Notion forms the beginning in\nappearance merely, and it is only the whole treatment of the science\nthat is the proof, and indeed we may say the finding of its Notion; and\nthis is really a result of that treatment.\n\nIn this Introduction the Notion of the science of Philosophy, of the\nsubject of its history, has thus likewise to be set forth. At the same\ntime, though this Introduction professes to relate to the history of\nPhilosophy only, what has just been said of Philosophy on the whole,\nalso holds good. What can be said in this Introduction is not so much\nsomething which may be stated beforehand, as what can be justified or\nproved in the treatment of the history. These preparatory explanations\nare for this reason only, not to be placed in the category of arbitrary\nassumptions. But to begin with stating what in their justification are\nreally results, can only have the interest which may be possessed by a\nsummary, given in advance, of the most general contents of a science.\nIt must serve to set aside many questions and demands which might, from\nour ordinary prejudices, arise in such a history.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nTHERE are various aspects under which the History of Philosophy may\npossess interest. We shall find the central point of this interest in\nthe essential connection existing between what is apparently past and\nthe present stage reached by Philosophy. That this connection is not\none of the external considerations which may be taken into account in\nthe history of Philosophy, but really expresses its inner character:\nthat the events of this history, while they perpetuate themselves in\ntheir effects like all other events, yet produce their results in a\nspecial way\u2014this it is which is here to be more clearly expounded.\n\nWhat the history of Philosophy shows us is a succession of noble minds,\na gallery of heroes of thought, who, by the power of Reason, have\npenetrated into the being of things, of nature and of spirit, into\nthe Being of God, and have won for us by their labours the highest\ntreasure, the treasure of reasoned knowledge.\n\nThe events and actions of this history are therefore such that\npersonality and individual character do not enter to any large degree\ninto its content and matter. In this respect the history of Philosophy\ncontrasts with political history, in which the individual, according to\nthe peculiarity of his disposition, talents, affections, the strength\nor weakness of his character, and in general, according to that through\nwhich he is this individual, is the subject of actions and events. In\nPhilosophy, the less deserts and merits are accorded to the particular\nindividual, the better is the history; and the more it deals with\nthought as free, with the universal character of man as man, the more\nthis thought, which is devoid of special characteristic, is itself\nshown to be the producing subject.\n\nThe acts of thought appear at first to be a matter of history, and,\ntherefore, things of the past, and outside our real existence. But in\nreality we are what we are through history: or, more accurately, as\nin the history of Thought, what has passed away is only one side, so\nin the present, what we have as a permanent possession is essentially\nbound up with our place in history. The possession of self-conscious\nreason, which belongs to us of the present world, did not arise\nsuddenly, nor did it grow only from the soil of the present. This\npossession must be regarded as previously present, as an inheritance,\nand as the result of labour\u2014the labour of all past generations of men.\nJust as the arts of outward life, the accumulated skill and invention,\nthe customs and arrangements of social and political life, are the\nresult of the thought, care, and needs, of the want and the misery, of\nthe ingenuity, the plans and achievements of those who preceded us in\nhistory, so, likewise, in science, and specially in Philosophy, do we\nowe what we are to the tradition which, as Herder has put it,[1] like\na holy chain, runs through all that was transient, and has therefore\npassed away. Thus has been preserved and transmitted to us what\nantiquity produced.\n\nBut this tradition is not only a stewardess who simply guards\nfaithfully that which she has received, and thus delivers it unchanged\nto posterity, just as the course of nature in the infinite change and\nactivity of its forms ever remains constant to its original laws and\nmakes no step in advance. Such tradition is no motionless statue, but\nis alive, and swells like a mighty river, which increases in size the\nfurther it advances from its source. The content of this tradition is\nthat which the intellectual world has brought forth, and the universal\nMind does not remain stationary. But it is just the universal Mind\nwith which we have to do. It may certainly be the case with a single\nnation that its culture, art, science\u2014its intellectual activities as a\nwhole\u2014are at a standstill. This appears, perhaps, to be the case with\nthe Chinese, for example, who may have been as far advanced in every\nrespect two thousand years ago as now. But the world-spirit does not\nsink into this rest of indifference; this follows from its very nature,\nfor its activity is its life. This activity presupposes a material\nalready present, on which it acts, and which it does not merely augment\nby the addition, of new matter, but completely fashions and transforms.\nThus that which each generation has produced in science and in\nintellectual activity, is an heirloom to which all the past generations\nhave added their savings, a temple in which all races of men thankfully\nand cheerfully deposit that which rendered aid to them through life,\nand which they had won from the depths of Nature and of Mind. To\nreceive this inheritance is also to enter upon its use. It constitutes\nthe soul of each successive generation, the intellectual substance of\nthe time; its principles, prejudices, and possessions; and this legacy\nis degraded to a material which becomes metamorphosed by Mind. In this\nmanner that which is received is changed, and the material worked upon\nis both enriched and preserved at the same time.\n\nThis is the function of our own and of every age: to grasp the\nknowledge which is already existing, to make it our own, and in so\ndoing to develop it still further and to raise it to a higher level. In\nthus appropriating it to ourselves we make it into something different\nfrom what it was before. On the presupposition of an already existing\nintellectual world which is transformed in our appropriation of it,\ndepends the fact that Philosophy can only arise in connection with\nprevious Philosophy, from which of necessity it has arisen. The course\nof history does not show us the Becoming of things foreign to us, but\nthe Becoming of ourselves and of our own knowledge.\n\nThe ideas and questions which may be present to our mind regarding the\ncharacter and ends of the history of Philosophy, depend on the nature\nof the relationship here given. In this lies the explanation of the\nfact that the study of the history of Philosophy is an introduction to\nPhilosophy itself. The guiding principles for the formation of this\nhistory are given in this fact, the further discussion of which must\nthus be the main object of this introduction. We must also, however,\nkeep in mind, as being of fundamental importance, the conception of\nthe aim of Philosophy. And since, as already mentioned, the systematic\nexposition of this conception cannot here find a place, such discussion\nas we can now undertake, can only propose to deal with the subject\nprovisionally and not to give a thorough and conclusive account of the\nnature of the Becoming of Philosophy.\n\nThis Becoming is not merely a passive movement, as we suppose movements\nsuch as those of the sun and moon to be. It is no mere movement in\nthe unresisting medium of space and time. What we must represent to\nourselves is the activity of free thought; we have to present the\nhistory of the world of thought as it has arisen and produced itself.\n\nThere is an old tradition that it is the faculty of thought which\nseparates men from beasts; and to this tradition we shall adhere. In\naccordance with this, what man has, as being nobler than a beast,\nhe has through thinking. Everything which is human, however it may\nappear, is so only because the thought contained in it works and has\nworked. But thought, although it is thus the essential, substantial,\nand effectual, has many other elements. We must, however, consider it\nbest when Thought does not pursue anything else, but is occupied only\nwith itself\u2014with what is noblest\u2014when it has sought and found itself.\nThe history which we have before us is the history of Thought finding\nitself, and it is the case with Thought that it only finds itself in\nproducing itself; indeed, that it only exists and is actual in finding\nitself. These productions are the philosophic systems; and the series\nof discoveries on which Thought sets out in order to discover itself,\nforms a work which has lasted twenty-five hundred years.\n\nIf the Thought which is essentially Thought, is in and for itself\nand eternal, and that which is true is contained in Thought alone,\nhow, then, does this intellectual world come to have a history? In\nhistory what appears is transient, has disappeared in the night of\nthe past and is no more. But true, necessary thought\u2014and it is only\nwith such that we have to do\u2014is capable of no change. The question\nhere raised constitutes one of those matters first to be brought\nunder our consideration. But in the second place, there are also\nmany most important things outside of Philosophy, which are yet the\nwork of Thought, and which are left unconsidered. Such are Religion,\nPolitical History, forms of Government, and the Arts and Sciences. The\nquestion arises as to how these operations differ from the subject of\nconsideration, and how they are related in history? As regards these\ntwo points of view, it is desirable to show in what sense the history\nof Philosophy is here taken, in order to see clearly what we are about.\nMoreover, in the third place, we must first take a general survey\nbefore we descend to particulars, else the whole is not seen for the\nmere details\u2014the wood is not seen for the trees, nor Philosophy for\nmere philosophies. We require to have a general idea of the nature and\naim of the whole in order to know what to look for. Just as we first\ndesire to obtain a general idea of a country, which we should no longer\nsee in going into detail, so we desire to see the relation which single\nphilosophies bear to the whole; for in reality, the high value of the\ndetail lies in its relation to the whole. This is nowhere more the\ncase than with Philosophy, and also with its history. In the case of a\nhistory, indeed, the establishment of the Universal seems to be less\nneedful than in that of one of the sciences proper. For history seems\nat first to be a succession of chance events, in which each fact stands\nisolated by itself, which has Time alone as a connecting-link. But even\nin political history we are not satisfied with this. We see, or at\nleast divine in it, that essential connection in which the individual\nevents have their place and relation to an end or aim, and in this\nway obtain significance. For the significant in history is such only\nthrough its relation to and connection with a Universal. To perceive\nthis Universal is thus to apprehend the significance.\n\nThere are, therefore, the following points with which I wish to deal in\nthis introduction.\n\nThe first of these will be to investigate the character of the history\nof Philosophy, its significance, its nature, and its aim, from which\nwill follow inferences as to its treatment. In particular, we shall\nget an insight into the relation of the history of Philosophy to the\nscience of Philosophy, and this will be the most interesting point of\nall. That is to say, this history represents, not merely the external,\naccidental, events contained within it, but it shows how the content,\nor that which appears to belong to mere history, really belongs to the\nscience of Philosophy. The history of Philosophy is itself scientific,\nand thus essentially becomes the science of Philosophy.\n\nIn the second place, the Notion of Philosophy must be more adequately\ndetermined, and from it must be deduced what should be excluded\nfrom the history of Philosophy out of the infinite material and the\nmanifold aspects of the intellectual culture of the nations. Religion,\ncertainly, and the thoughts contained in and regarding it, particularly\nwhen these are in the form of mythology, are, on account of their\nmatter, and the sciences with their ideas on the state, duties and\nlaws, on account of their form, so near Philosophy that the history\nof the science of Philosophy threatens to become quite indefinite in\nextent. It might be supposed that the history of Philosophy should take\naccount of all these ideas. Has not everything been called Philosophy\nand philosophizing? On the one hand, the close connection has to be\nfurther considered in which Philosophy stands with its allied subjects,\nreligion, art, the other sciences, and likewise with political history.\nOn the other hand, when the province of Philosophy has been correctly\ndefined, we reach, with the determination of what Philosophy is and\nwhat pertains to it, the starting-point of its history, which must\nbe distinguished from the commencements of religious ideas and mere\nthoughtful conjectures.\n\nFrom the idea of the subject which is contained in these first two\npoints of view, it is necessary to pass on to the consideration of the\nthird point, to the general review of this history and to the division\nof its progress into natural periods\u2014such an arrangement to exhibit\nit as an organic, progressive whole, as a rational connection through\nwhich this history attains the dignity of a science. And I will not\noccupy further space with reflections on the use of the history of\nPhilosophy, and other methods of treating it. The use is evident.\nBut, in conclusion, I wish to consider the sources of the history of\nPhilosophy, for this is customary.\n\n\n\n\nA\n\nTHE NOTION OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\nTHE thought which may first occur to us in the history of Philosophy,\nis that the subject itself contains an inner contradiction. For\nPhilosophy aims at understanding what is unchangeable, eternal, in and\nfor itself: its end is Truth. But history tells us of that which has at\none time existed, at another time has vanished, having been expelled by\nsomething else. Truth is eternal; it does not fall within the sphere of\nthe transient, and has no history. But if it has a history, and as this\nhistory is only the representation of a succession of past forms of\nknowledge, the truth is not to be found in it, for the truth cannot be\nwhat has passed away.\n\nIt might be said that all this argument would affect not only the other\nsciences, but in like degree the Christian religion, and it might be\nfound inconsistent that a history of this religion and of the other\nsciences should exist; but it would be superfluous further to examine\nthis argument, for it is immediately contradicted by the very fact that\nthere are such histories. But in order to get a better understanding\nof this apparent contradiction, we must distinguish between the\noutward history of a religion or a science and the history of the\nsubject itself. And then we must take into account that the history\nof Philosophy because of the special nature of its subject-matter,\nis different from other histories. It is at once evident that the\ncontradiction in question could not refer to the outward history, but\nmerely to the inward, or that of the content itself. There is a history\nof the spread of Christianity and of the lives of those who have avowed\nit, and its existence has formed itself into that of a Church. This in\nitself constitutes an external existence such that being brought into\ncontact with temporal affairs of the most diverse kind, its lot is a\nvaried one and it essentially possesses a history. And of the Christian\ndoctrine it is true that it, too, has its history, but it necessarily\nsoon reached its full development and attained to its appointed powers.\nAnd this old creed has been an acknowledged influence to every age, and\nwill still be acknowledged unchanged as the Truth, even though this\nacknowledgment were become no more than a pretence, and the words\nan empty form. But the history of this doctrine in its wider sense\nincludes two elements: first the various additions to and deviations\nfrom the truth formerly established, and secondly the combating of\nthese errors, the purification of the principles that remain from such\nadditions, and a consequent return to their first simplicity.\n\nThe other sciences, including Philosophy, have also an external history\nlike Religion. Philosophy has a history of its origin, diffusion,\nmaturity, decay, revival; a history of its teachers, promoters, and\nof its opponents\u2014often, too, of an outward relation to religion\nand occasionally to the State. This side of its history likewise\ngives occasion to interesting questions. Amongst other such, it is\nasked why Philosophy, the doctrine of absolute Truth, seems to have\nrevealed itself on the whole to a small number of individuals, to\nspecial nations, and how it has limited itself to particular periods\nof time. Similarly with respect to Christianity, to the Truth in\na much more universal form than the philosophical, a difficulty\nhas been encountered in respect to the question whether there is a\ncontradiction in the fact that this religion should have appeared so\nlate in time, and that it should have remained so long and should still\nremain limited to special races of men. But these and other similar\nquestions are too much a matter of detail to depend merely on the\ngeneral conflict referred to, and when we have further touched upon the\npeculiar character of philosophic knowledge, we may go more specially\ninto the aspects which relate to the external existence and external\nhistory of Philosophy.\n\nBut as regards the comparison between the history of Religion and that\nof Philosophy as to inner content, there is not in the latter as there\nis in Religion a fixed and fundamental truth which, as unchangeable, is\napart from history. The content of Christianity, which is Truth, has,\nhowever, remained unaltered as such, and has therefore little history\nor as good as none.[2] Hence in Religion, on account of its very nature\nas Christianity, the conflict referred to disappears. The errors and\nadditions constitute no difficulty. They are transitory and altogether\nhistorical in character.\n\nThe other sciences, indeed, have also according to their content a\nHistory, a part of which relates to alterations, and the renunciation\nof tenets which were formerly current. But a great, perhaps the\ngreater, part of the history relates to what has proved permanent,\nso that what was new, was not an alteration on earlier acquisitions,\nbut an addition to them. These sciences progress through a process of\njuxtaposition. It is true that in Botany, Mineralogy, and so on, much\nis dependent on what was previously known, but by far the greatest\npart remains stationary and by means of fresh matter is merely added\nto without itself being affected by the addition. With a science\nlike Mathematics, history has, in the main, only the pleasing task\nof recording further additions. Thus to take an example, elementary\ngeometry in so far as it was created by Euclid, may from his time on be\nregarded as having no further history.\n\nThe history of Philosophy, on the other hand, shows neither the\nmotionlessness of a complete, simple content, nor altogether the onward\nmovement of a peaceful addition of new treasures to those already\nacquired. It seems merely to afford the spectacle of ever-recurring\nchanges in the whole, such as finally are no longer even connected by a\ncommon aim.\n\n\n1. COMMON IDEAS REGARDING THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.\n\nAt this point appear these ordinary superficial ideas regarding the\nhistory of Philosophy which have to be referred to and corrected. As\nregards these very current views, which are doubtless known to you,\ngentlemen, for indeed they are the reflections most likely to occur\nin one\u2019s first crude thoughts on a history of Philosophy, I will\nshortly explain what requires explanation, and the explanation of the\ndifferences in philosophies will lead us further into the matter itself.\n\n\na. _The History of Philosophy as an accumulation of Opinions._\n\nHistory, at the first glance, includes in its aim the narration of\nthe accidental circumstances of times, of races, and of individuals,\ntreated impartially partly as regards their relation in time,\nand partly as to their content. The appearance of contingency in\ntime-succession is to be dealt with later on. It is contingency of\ncontent which is the idea with which we have first to deal\u2014the idea of\ncontingent actions. But thoughts and not external actions, or griefs,\nor joys, form the content of Philosophy. Contingent thoughts, however,\nare nothing but opinions, and philosophical opinions are opinions\nrelating to the more special content of Philosophy, regarding God,\nNature and Spirit.\n\nThus we now meet the view very usually taken of the history of\nPhilosophy which ascribes to it the narration of a number of\nphilosophical opinions as they have arisen and manifested themselves\nin time. This kind of matter is in courtesy called opinions; those who\nthink themselves more capable of judging rightly, call such a history\na display of senseless follies, or at least of errors made by men\nengrossed in thought and in mere ideas. This view is not only held by\nthose who recognize their ignorance of Philosophy. Those who do this,\nacknowledge it, because that ignorance is, in common estimation, held\nto be no obstacle to giving judgment upon what has to do with the\nsubject; for it is thought that anybody can form a judgment on its\ncharacter and value without any comprehension, of it whatever. But\nthe same view is even held by those who write or have written on the\nhistory of Philosophy. This history, considered only as the enumeration\nof various opinions, thus becomes an idle tale, or, if you will, an\nerudite investigation. For erudition is, in the main, acquaintance with\na number of useless things, that is to say, with that which has no\nintrinsic interest or value further than being known. Yet it is thought\nthat profit is to be derived from learning the various opinions and\nreflections of other men. It stimulates the powers of thought and also\nleads to many excellent reflections; this signifies that now and then\nit occasions an idea, and its art thus consists in the spinning one\nopinion out of the other.\n\nIf the history of Philosophy merely represented various opinions in\narray, whether they be of God or of natural and spiritual things\nexistent, it would be a most superfluous and tiresome science, no\nmatter what advantage might be brought forward as derived from such\nthought-activity and learning. What can be more useless than to learn\na string of bald opinions, and what more unimportant? Literary works,\nbeing histories of Philosophy in the sense that they produce and\ntreat the ideas of Philosophy as if they were opinions, need be only\nsuperficially glanced at to find how dry and destitute of interest\neverything about them is.\n\nAn opinion is a subjective conception, an uncontrolled thought, an\nidea which may occur to me in one direction or in another: an opinion\nis mine,[3] it is in itself a universal thought which is existent in\nand for itself. But Philosophy possesses no opinions, for there is no\nsuch thing as philosophical opinions. When we hear a man speaking of\nphilosophical opinions, even though he be an historian of philosophy\nitself, we detect at once this want of fundamental education.\nPhilosophy is the objective science of truth, it is science of\nnecessity, conceiving knowledge, and neither opinion nor the spinning\nout of opinions.\n\nThe more precise significance of this idea is that we get to know\nopinions only, thus laying emphasis upon the word Opinion. Now the\ndirect opposite of opinion is the Truth; it is Truth before which\nmere opinion pales. Those who in the history of Philosophy seek mere\ntheories, or who suppose that on the whole only such are to be found\nwithin it, also turn aside when that word Truth confronts them.\nPhilosophy here encounters opposition from two different sides. On the\none hand piety openly declares Reason or Thought to be incapable of\napprehending what is true, and to lead only to the abyss of doubt; it\ndeclares that independent thought must be renounced, and reason held in\nbounds by faith in blind authority, if Truth is to be reached. Of the\nrelation existing between Religion and Philosophy and of its history,\nwe shall deal later on. On the other hand, it is known just as well,\nthat so-called reason has maintained its rights, abandoning faith in\nmere authority, and has endeavoured to make Christianity rational, so\nthat throughout it is only my personal insight and conviction which\nobliges me to make any admissions. But this affirmation of the right\nof reason is turned round in an astonishing manner, so that it results\nin making knowledge of the truth through reason an impossibility.\nThis so-called reason on the one hand has combated religious faith in\nthe name and power of thinking reason, and at the same time it has\nitself turned against reason and is true reason\u2019s adversary. Instinct\nand feeling are maintained by it against the true reason, thus making\nthe measure of true value the merely subjective\u2014that is a particular\nconviction such as each can form in and for himself in his subjective\ncapacity. A personal conviction such as this is no more than the\nparticular opinion that has become final for men.\n\nIf we begin with what meets us in our very first conceptions, we cannot\nneglect to make mention of this aspect in the history of Philosophy.\nIn its results it permeates culture generally, being at once the\nmisconception and true sign of our times. It is the principle through\nwhich men mutually understand and know each other; an hypothesis\nwhose value is established and which is the ground of all the other\nsciences. In theology it is not so much the creed of the church that\npasses for Christianity, as that every one to a greater or less degree\nmakes a Christianity of his own to tally with his conviction. And in\nhistory we often see theology driven into acquiring the knowledge of\nvarious opinions in order that an interest may thus be furnished to\nthe science, and one of the first results of the attention paid them\nis the honour awarded to all convictions, and the esteem vouchsafed to\nwhat has been constituted merely by the individual. The endeavour to\nknow the Truth is then of course relinquished. It is true that personal\nconviction is the ultimate and absolute essential which reason and its\nphilosophy, from a subjective point of view, demand in knowledge. But\nthere is a distinction between conviction when it rests on subjective\ngrounds such as feelings, speculations and perceptions, or, speaking\ngenerally, on the particular nature of the subject, and when it rests\non thought proceeding from acquaintance with the Notion and the nature\nof the thing. In the former case conviction is opinion.\n\nThis opposition between mere opinion and truth now sharply defined, we\nalready recognize in the culture of the period of Socrates and Plato\u2014a\nperiod of corruption in Greek life\u2014as the Platonic opposition between\nopinion _\u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1_ and Science _\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7_. It is the same opposition as\nthat which existed in the decadence of Roman public and political life\nunder Augustus, and subsequently when Epicureanism and indifference set\nthemselves up against Philosophy. Under this influence, when Christ\nsaid, \u201cI came into the world that I should bear witness unto the\nTruth,\u201d Pilate answered, \u201cWhat is Truth?\u201d That was said in a superior\nway, and signifies that this idea of truth is an expedient which is\nobsolete: we have got further, we know that there is no longer any\nquestion about knowing the Truth, seeing that we have gone beyond it.\nWho makes this statement has gone beyond it indeed. If this is made our\nstarting point in the history of Philosophy, its whole significance\nwill consist in finding out the particular ideas of others, each one of\nwhich is different from the other: these individual points of view are\nthus foreign to me: my thinking reason is not free, nor is it present\nin them: for me they are but extraneous, dead historic matter, or so\nmuch empty content, and to satisfy oneself with empty vanity is mere\nsubjective vanity itself.\n\nTo the impartial man, the Truth has always been a heart-stirring word\nand one of great import. As to the assertion that the Truth cannot be\nknown, we shall consider it more closely in the history of Philosophy\nitself where it appears. The only thing to be here remarked is that\nif this assumption be allowed, as was the case with Tennemann, it is\nbeyond conception why anyone should still trouble about Philosophy,\nsince each opinion asserts falsely in its turn that it has found\nthe truth. This immediately recalls to me the old belief that Truth\nconsists in knowledge, but that an individual only knows the Truth in\nso far as he reflects and not as he walks and stands: and that the\nTruth cannot be known in immediate apprehension and perception, whether\nit be external and sensuous, or whether it be intellectual perception\n(for every perception as a perception is sensuous) but only through the\nlabour of thought.\n\n\nb. _Proof of the futility of Philosophical Knowledge obtained through\nthe History of Philosophy itself._\n\nFrom another point of view another consequence ensues from the above\nconception of the history of Philosophy which may at will be looked\nat as an evil or a benefit. In view of such manifold opinions and\nphilosophical systems so numerous, one is perplexed to know which\none ought to be accepted. In regard to the great matters to which\nman is attracted and a knowledge of which Philosophy would bestow,\nit is evident that the greatest minds have erred, because they have\nbeen contradicted by others. \u201cSince this has been so with minds so\ngreat, how then can _ego homuncio_ attempt to form a judgment?\u201d This\nconsequence, which ensues from the diversity in philosophical systems,\nis, as may be supposed, the evil in the matter, while at the same time\nit is a subjective good. For this diversity is the usual plea urged by\nthose who, with an air of knowledge, wish to make a show of interest\nin Philosophy, to explain the fact that they, with this pretence of\ngood-will, and, indeed, with added motive for working at the science,\ndo in fact utterly neglect it. But this diversity in philosophical\nsystems is far from being merely an evasive plea. It has far more\nweight as a genuine serious ground of argument against the zeal\nwhich Philosophy requires. It justifies its neglect and demonstrates\nconclusively the powerlessness of the endeavour to attain to\nphilosophic knowledge of the truth. When it is admitted that Philosophy\nought to be a real science, and one Philosophy must certainly be the\ntrue, the question arises as to which Philosophy it is, and when it can\nbe known. Each one asserts its genuineness, each even gives different\nsigns and tokens by which the Truth can be discovered; sober reflective\nthought must therefore hesitate to give its judgment.\n\nThis, then, is the wider interest which the history of Philosophy is\nsaid to afford. Cicero (De natura Deorum I. 8 sq.) gives us from this\npoint of view, a most slovenly history of philosophic thought on God.\nHe puts it in the mouth of an Epicurean, but he himself knew of nothing\nmore favourable to say, and it is thus his own view. The Epicurean\nsays that no certain knowledge has been arrived at. The proof that\nthe efforts of philosophy are futile is derived directly from the\nusual superficial view taken of its history; the results attendant\non that history make it appear to be a process in which the most\nvarious thoughts arise in numerous philosophies, each of which opposes,\ncontradicts and refutes the other. This fact, which cannot be denied,\nseems to contain the justification, indeed the necessity for applying\nto Philosophy the words of Christ, \u201cLet the dead bury their dead;\narise, and follow Me.\u201d The whole of the history of Philosophy becomes\na battlefield covered with the bones of the dead; it is a kingdom\nnot merely formed of dead and lifeless individuals, but of refuted\nand spiritually dead systems, since each has killed and buried the\nother. Instead of \u201cFollow thou Me,\u201d here then it must indeed be said,\n\u201cFollow thine own self\u201d\u2014that is, hold by thine own convictions, remain\nsteadfast to thine own opinion, why adopt another?\n\nIt certainly happens that a new philosophy makes its appearance, which\nmaintains the others to be valueless; and indeed each one in turn\ncomes forth at first with the pretext that by its means all previous\nphilosophies not only are refuted, but what in them is wanting is\nsupplied, and now at length the right one is discovered. But following\nupon what has gone before, it would rather seem that other words of\nScripture are just as applicable to such a philosophy\u2014the words which\nthe Apostle Peter spoke to Ananias, \u201cBehold the feet of them that shall\ncarry thee out are at the door.\u201d Behold the philosophy by which thine\nown will be refuted and displaced shall not tarry long as it has not\ntarried before.\n\n\nc. _Explanatory remarks on the diversity in Philosophies._\n\nCertainly the fact is sufficiently well established that there are and\nhave been different philosophies. The Truth is, however, one; and the\ninstinct of reason maintains this irradicable intuition or belief. It\nis said that only one philosophy can be true, and, because philosophies\nare different, it is concluded that all others must be erroneous.\nBut, in fact, each one in turn gives every assurance, evidence and\nproof of being the one and true Philosophy. This is a common mode of\nreasoning and is what seems in truth to be the view of sober thought.\nAs regards the sober nature of the word at issue\u2014thought\u2014we can tell\nfrom every-day experience that if we fast we feel hunger either at once\nor very soon. But sober thought always has the fortunate power of not\nresulting in hunger and desire, but of being and remaining as it is,\ncontent. Hence the thought expressed in such an utterance reveals the\nfact that it is dead understanding; for it is only death which fasts\nand yet rests satisfied. But neither physical life nor intellectual\nremains content with mere abstention; as desire it presses on through\nhunger and through thirst towards Truth, towards knowledge itself. It\npresses on to satisfy this desire and does not allow itself to feast\nand find sufficiency in a reflection such as this.\n\nAs to this reflection, the next thing to be said of it is that however\ndifferent the philosophies have been, they had a common bond in\nthat they were Philosophy. Thus whoever may have studied or become\nacquainted with a philosophy, of whatever kind, provided only that it\nis such, has thereby become acquainted with Philosophy. That delusive\nmode of reasoning which regards diversity alone, and from doubt of\nor aversion to the particular form in which a Universal finds its\nactuality, will not grasp or even allow this universal nature, I\nhave elsewhere[4] likened to an invalid recommended by the doctor to\neat fruit, and who has cherries, plums or grapes, before him, but\nwho pedantically refuses to take anything because no part of what is\noffered him is fruit, some of it being cherries, and the rest plums or\ngrapes.\n\nBut it is really important to have a deeper insight into the bearings\nof this diversity in the systems of Philosophy. Truth and Philosophy\nknown philosophically, make such diversity appear in another light from\nthat of abstract opposition between Truth and Error. The explanation\nof how this comes about will reveal to us the significance of the\nwhole history of Philosophy. We must make the fact conceivable, that\nthe diversity and number of philosophies not only does not prejudice\nPhilosophy itself, that is to say the possibility of a philosophy,\nbut that such diversity is, and has been, absolutely necessary to the\nexistence of a science of Philosophy and that it is essential to it.\n\nThis makes it easy to us to comprehend the aim of Philosophy, which\nis in thought and in conception to grasp the Truth, and not merely\nto discover that nothing can be known, or that at least temporal,\nfinite truth, which also is an untruth, can alone be known and not\nthe Truth indeed. Further we find that in the history of Philosophy\nwe have to deal with Philosophy itself. The facts within that history\nare not adventures and contain no more romance than does the history\nof the world. They are not a mere collection of chance events, of\nexpeditions of wandering knights, each going about fighting, struggling\npurposelessly, leaving no results to show for all his efforts. Nor is\nit so that one thing has been thought out here, another there, at will;\nin the activity of thinking mind there is real connection, and what\nthere takes place is rational. It is with this belief in the spirit of\nthe world that we must proceed to history, and in particular to the\nhistory of Philosophy.\n\n\n2. EXPLANATORY REMARKS UPON THE DEFINITION OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.\n\nThe above statement, that the Truth is only one, is still abstract\nand formal. In the deeper sense it is our starting point. But the\naim of Philosophy is to know this one Truth as the immediate source\nfrom which all else proceeds, both all the laws of nature and all\nthe manifestations of life and consciousness of which they are\nmere reflections, or to lead these laws and manifestations in ways\napparently contrary, back to that single source, and from that source\nto comprehend them, which is to understand their derivation. Thus what\nis most essential is to know that the single truth is not merely a\nsolitary, empty thought, but one determined within itself. To obtain\nthis knowledge we must enter into some abstract Notions which, as\nsuch, are quite general and dry, and which are the two principles of\n_Development_ and of the _Concrete_. We could, indeed, embrace the\nwhole in the single principle of development; if this were clear, all\nelse would result and follow of its own accord. The product of thinking\nis the thought; thought is, however, still formal; somewhat more\ndefined it becomes Notion, and finally Idea is Thought in its totality,\nimplicitly and explicitly determined. Thus the Idea, and it alone is\nTruth. Now it is essentially in the nature of the Idea to develop, and\nonly through development to arrive at comprehension of itself, or to\nbecome what it is. That the Idea should have to make itself what it is,\nseems like a contradiction; it may be said that it is what it is.\n\n\na. _The Notion of Development._\n\nThe idea of development is well known, but it is the special\ncharacteristic of Philosophy to investigate such matters as were\nformerly held as known. What is dealt with or made use of without\nconsideration as an aid to daily life, is certainly the unknown to man\nunless he be informed in Philosophy. The further discussion of this\nidea belongs to the science of Logic.\n\nIn order to comprehend what development is, what may be called two\ndifferent states must be distinguished. The first is what is known as\ncapacity, power, what I call being-in-itself (_potentia_, _\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2_);\nthe second principle is that of being-for-itself, actuality (_actus_,\n_\u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1_). If we say, for example, that man is by nature rational,\nwe would mean that he has reason only inherently or in embryo: in this\nsense, reason, understanding, imagination, will, are possessed from\nbirth or even from the mother\u2019s womb. But while the child only has\ncapacities or the actual possibility of reason, it is just the same as\nif he had no reason; reason does not yet exist in him since he cannot\nyet do anything rational, and has no rational consciousness. Thus what\nman is at first implicitly becomes explicit, and it is the same with\nreason. If, then, man has actuality on whatever side, he is actually\nrational; and now we come to reason.\n\nWhat is the real meaning of this word? That which is in itself must\nbecome an object to mankind, must arrive at consciousness, thus\nbecoming for man. What has become an object to him is the same as what\nhe is in himself; through the becoming objective of this implicit\nbeing, man first becomes for himself; he is made double, is retained\nand not changed into another. For example, man is thinking, and thus he\nthinks out thoughts. In this way it is in thought alone that thought is\nobject; reason produces what is rational: reason is its own object. The\nfact that thought may also descend to what is destitute of reason is\na consideration involving wider issues, which do not concern us here.\nBut even though man, who in himself is rational, does not at first\nseem to have got further on since he became rational for himself\u2014what\nis implicit having merely retained itself\u2014the difference is quite\nenormous: no new content has been produced, and yet this form of\nbeing for self makes all the difference. The whole variation in the\ndevelopment of the world in history is founded on this difference.\nThis alone explains how since all mankind is naturally rational, and\nfreedom is the hypothesis on which this reason rests, slavery yet has\nbeen, and in part still is, maintained by many peoples, and men have\nremained contented under it. The only distinction between the Africans\nand the Asiatics on the one hand, and the Greeks, Romans, and moderns\non the other, is that the latter know and it is explicit for them, that\nthey are free, but the others are so without knowing that they are,\nand thus without existing as being free. This constitutes the enormous\ndifference in their condition. All knowledge, and learning, science,\nand even commerce have no other object than to draw out what is inward\nor implicit and thus to become objective.\n\nBecause that which is implicit comes into existence, it certainly\npasses into change, yet it remains one and the same, for the whole\nprocess is dominated by it. The plant, for example, does not lose\nitself in mere indefinite change. From the germ much is produced when\nat first nothing was to be seen; but the whole of what is brought\nforth, if not developed, is yet hidden and ideally contained within\nitself. The principle of this projection into existence is that\nthe germ cannot remain merely implicit, but is impelled towards\ndevelopment, since it presents the contradiction of being only implicit\nand yet not desiring so to be. But this coming without itself has\nan end in view; its completion fully reached, and its previously\ndetermined end is the fruit or produce of the germ, which causes a\nreturn to the first condition. The germ will produce itself alone and\nmanifest what is contained in it, so that it then may return to itself\nonce more thus to renew the unity from which it started. With nature it\ncertainly is true that the subject which commenced and the matter which\nforms the end are two separate units, as in the case of seed and fruit.\nThe doubling process has apparently the effect of separating into two\nthings that which in content is the same. Thus in animal life the\nparent and the young are different individuals although their nature is\nthe same.\n\nIn Mind it is otherwise: it is consciousness and therefore it is free,\nuniting in itself the beginning and the end. As with the germ in\nnature, Mind indeed resolves itself back into unity after constituting\nitself another. But what is in itself becomes for Mind and thus\narrives at being for itself. The fruit and seed newly contained within\nit on the other hand, do not become for the original germ, but for us\nalone; in the case of Mind both factors not only are implicitly the\nsame in character, but there is a being for the other and at the same\ntime a being for self. That for which the \u201cother\u201d is, is the same\nas that \u201cother;\u201d and thus alone Mind is at home with itself in its\n\u201cother.\u201d The development of Mind lies in the fact that its going forth\nand separation constitutes its coming to itself.\n\nThis being-at-home-with-self, or coming-to-self of Mind may be\ndescribed as its complete and highest end: it is this alone that it\ndesires and nothing else. Everything that from eternity has happened\nin heaven and earth, the life of God and all the deeds of time simply\nare the struggles for Mind to know itself, to make itself objective\nto itself, to find itself, be for itself, and finally unite itself to\nitself; it is alienated and divided, but only so as to be able thus to\nfind itself and return to itself. Only in this manner does Mind attain\nits freedom, for that is free which is not connected with or dependent\non another. True self-possession and satisfaction are only to be found\nin this, and in nothing else but Thought does Mind attain this freedom.\nIn sense-perception, for instance, and in feeling, I find myself\nconfined and am not free; but I am free when I have a consciousness of\nthis my feeling. Man has particular ends and interests even in will; I\nam free indeed when this is mine. Such ends, however, always contain\n\u201canother,\u201d or something which constitutes for me \u201canother,\u201d such as\ndesire and impulse. It is in Thought alone that all foreign matter\ndisappears from view, and that Mind is absolutely free. All interest\nwhich is contained in the Idea and in Philosophy is expressed in it.\n\n\nb. _The Notion of the Concrete._\n\nAs to development, it may be asked, what does develop and what forms\nthe absolute content? Development is considered in the light of a\nformal process in action and as destitute of content. But the act\nhas no other end but activity, and through this activity the general\ncharacter of the content is already fixed. For being-in-self and\nbeing-for-self are the moments present in action; but the act is the\nretention of these diverse elements within itself. The act thus is\nreally one, and it is just this unity of differences which is the\nconcrete. Not only is the act concrete, but also the implicit, which\nstands to action in the relation of subject which begins, and finally\nthe product is just as concrete as the action or as the subject which\nbegins. Development in process likewise forms the content, the Idea\nitself; for this we must have the one element and then the other: both\ncombined will form a unity as third, because the one in the other is\nat home with, and not without, itself. Thus the Idea is in its content\nconcrete within itself, and this in two ways: first it is concrete\npotentially, and then it is its interest that what is in itself should\nbe there for it.\n\nIt is a common prejudice that the science of Philosophy deals only with\nabstractions and empty generalities, and that sense-perception, our\nempirical self-consciousness, natural instinct, and the feelings of\nevery-day life, lie, on the contrary, in the region of the concrete and\nthe self-determined. As a matter of fact, Philosophy is in the region\nof thought, and has therefore to deal with universals; its content\nis abstract, but only as to form and element. In itself the Idea is\nreally concrete, for it is the union of the different determinations.\nIt is here that reasoned knowledge differs from mere knowledge of the\nunderstanding, and it is the business of Philosophy, as opposed to\nunderstanding, to show that the Truth or the Idea does not consist\nin empty generalities, but in a universal; and that is within itself\nthe particular and the determined. If the Truth is abstract it must\nbe untrue. Healthy human reason goes out towards what is concrete;\nthe reflection of the understanding comes first as abstract and\nuntrue, correct in theory only, and amongst other things unpractical.\nPhilosophy is what is most antagonistic to abstraction, and it leads\nback to the concrete.\n\nIf we unite the Notion of the concrete with that of development we have\nthe motion of the concrete. Since the implicit is already concrete\nwithin itself, and we only set forth what is implicitly there, the new\nform which now looks different and which was formerly shut up in the\noriginal unity, is merely distinguished. The concrete must become for\nitself or explicit; as implicit or potential it is only differentiated\nwithin itself, not as yet explicitly set forth, but still in a state\nof unity. The concrete is thus simple, and yet at the same time\ndifferentiated. This, its inward contradiction, which is indeed the\nimpelling force in development, brings distinction into being. But\nthus, too, its right to be taken back and reinstated extends beyond\nthe difference; for its truth is only to be found in unity. Life, both\nthat which is in Nature and that which is of the Idea, of Mind within\nitself, is thus manifested. Were the Idea abstract, it would simply be\nthe highest conceivable existence, and that would be all that could\nbe said of it; but such a God is the product of the understanding of\nmodern times. What is true is rather found in motion, in a process,\nhowever, in which there is rest; difference, while it lasts, is but a\ntemporary condition, through which comes unity, full and concrete.\n\nWe may now proceed to give examples of sensuous things, which will help\nus further to explain this Notion of the concrete. Although the flower\nhas many qualities, such as smell, taste, form, colour, &c., yet it is\none. None of these qualities could be absent in the particular leaf or\nflower: each individual part of the leaf shares alike all the qualities\nof the leaf entire. Gold, similarly contains in every particle all\nits qualities unseparated and entire. It is frequently allowed with\nsensuous things that such varied elements may be joined together, but,\nin the spiritual, differentiation is supposed to involve opposition. We\ndo not controvert the fact, or think it contradictory, that the smell\nand taste of the flower, although otherwise opposed, are yet clearly\nin one subject; nor do we place the one against the other. But the\nunderstanding and understanding thought find everything of a different\nkind, placed in conjunction, to be incompatible. Matter, for example,\nis complex and coherent, or space is continuous and uninterrupted.\nLikewise we may take separate points in space and break up matter\ndividing it ever further into infinity. It then is said that matter\nconsists of atoms and points, and hence is not continuous. Therefore\nwe have here the two determinations of continuity and of definite\npoints, which understanding regards as mutually exclusive, combined\nin one. It is said that matter must be clearly either continuous or\ndivisible into points, but in reality it has both these qualities. Or\nwhen we say of the mind of man that it has freedom, the understanding\nat once brings up the other quality, which in this case is necessity,\nsaying, that if Mind is free it is not in subjection to necessity, and,\ninversely, if its will and thought are determined through necessity, it\nis not free\u2014the one, they say, excludes the other. The distinctions\nhere are regarded as exclusive, and not as forming something concrete.\nBut that which is true, the Mind, is concrete, and its attributes are\nfreedom and necessity. Similarly the higher point of view is that Mind\nis free in its necessity, and finds its freedom in it alone, since\nits necessity rests on its freedom. But it is more difficult for us\nto show the unity here than in the case of natural objects. Freedom\ncan, however, be also abstract freedom without necessity, which\nfalse freedom is self-will, and for that reason it is self-opposed,\nunconsciously limited, an imaginary freedom which is free in form\nalone.\n\nThe fruit of development, which comes third, is a result of motion,\nbut inasmuch as it is merely the result of one stage in development,\nas being last in this stage, it is both the starting point and the\nfirst in order in another such stage. Goethe somewhere truly says,\n\u201cThat which is formed ever resolves itself back into its elements.\u201d\nMatter\u2014which as developed has form\u2014constitutes once more the material\nfor a new form. Mind again takes as its object and applies its activity\nto the Notion in which in going within itself, it has comprehended\nitself, which it is in form and being, and which has just been\nseparated from it anew. The application of thought to this, supplies it\nwith the form and determination of thought. This action thus further\nforms the previously formed, gives it additional determinations, makes\nit more determinate in itself, further developed and more profound. As\nconcrete, this activity is a succession of processes in development\nwhich must be represented not as a straight line drawn out into vague\ninfinity, but as a circle returning within itself, which, as periphery,\nhas very many circles, and whose whole is a large number of processes\nin development turning back within themselves.\n\n\nc. _Philosophy as the apprehension of the development of the Concrete._\n\nHaving thus generally explained the nature of the Concrete, I now add\nas regards its import, that the Truth thus determined within itself\nis impelled towards development. It is only the living and spiritual\nwhich internally bestirs and develops itself. Thus the Idea as concrete\nin itself, and self-developing, is an organic system and a totality\nwhich contains a multitude of stages and of moments in development.\nPhilosophy has now become for itself the apprehension of this\ndevelopment, and as conceiving Thought, is itself this development in\nThought. The more progress made in this development, the more perfect\nis the Philosophy.\n\nThis development goes no further out than into externality, but the\ngoing without itself of development also is a going inwards. That\nis to say, the universal Idea continues to remain at the foundation\nand still is the all-embracing and unchangeable. While in Philosophy\nthe going out of the Idea in course of its development is not a\nchange, a becoming \u201canother,\u201d but really is a going within itself,\na self-immersion, the progress forward makes the Idea which was\npreviously general and undetermined, determined within itself. Further\ndevelopment of the Idea or its further determination is the same\nthing exactly. Depth seems to signify intensiveness, but in this case\nthe most extensive is also the most intensive. The more intensive is\nthe Mind, the more extensive is it, hence the larger is its embrace.\nExtension as development, is not dispersion or falling asunder, but\na uniting bond which is the more powerful and intense as the expanse\nof that embraced is greater in extent and richer. In such a case what\nis greater is the strength of opposition and of separation; and the\ngreater power overcomes the greater separation.\n\nThese are the abstract propositions regarding the nature of the Idea\nand of its development, and thus within it Philosophy in its developed\nstate is constituted: it is one Idea in its totality and in all its\nindividual parts, like one life in a living being, one pulse throbs\nthroughout all its members. All the parts represented in it, and their\nsystematization, emanate from the one Idea; all these particulars are\nbut the mirrors and copies of this one life, and have their actuality\nonly in this unity. Their differences and their various qualities are\nonly the expression of the Idea and the form contained within it. Thus\nthe Idea is the central point, which is also the periphery, the source\nof light, which in all its expansion does not come without itself, but\nremains present and immanent within itself. Thus it is both the system\nof necessity and its own necessity, which also constitutes its freedom.\n\n\n3. RESULTS OBTAINED WITH RESPECT TO THE NOTION OF THE HISTORY OF\nPHILOSOPHY.\n\nThus we see that Philosophy is system in development; the history of\nPhilosophy is the same; and this is the main point to be noted and the\nfirst principle to be dealt with in this treatise on that history. In\norder to make this evident, the difference in respect to the possible\nmodes of manifestation must first be pointed out. That is to say, the\nprogression of the various stages in the advance of Thought may occur\nwith the consciousness of necessity, in which case each in succession\ndeduces itself, and this form and this determination can alone emerge.\nOr else it may come about without this consciousness as does a natural\nand apparently accidental process, so that while inwardly, indeed,\nthe Notion brings about its result consistently, this consistency is\nnot made manifest. This is so in nature; in the various stages of the\ndevelopment of twigs, leaves, blossom and fruit, each proceeds for\nitself, but the inward Idea is the directing and determining force\nwhich governs the progression. This is also so with the child whose\nbodily powers, and above all whose intellectual activities, make their\nappearance one after the other, simply and naturally, so that those\nparents who form such an experience for the first time, marvel whence\nall that is now showing itself from within, comes from; for the whole\nof these manifestations merely have the form of a succession in time.\n\nThe one kind of progression which represents the deduction of the\nforms, the necessity thought out and recognized, of the determinations,\nis the business of Philosophy; and because it is the pure Idea which\nis in question and not yet its mere particularized form as Nature and\nas Mind, that representation is, in the main, the business of logical\nPhilosophy. But the other method, which represents the part played by\nthe history of Philosophy, shows the different stages and moments in\ndevelopment in time, in manner of occurrence, in particular places,\nin particular people or political circumstances, the complications\narising thus, and, in short, it shows us the empirical form. This point\nof view is the only one worthy of this science. From the very nature\nof the subject it is inherently the true one, and through the study of\nthis history it will be made manifest that it actually shows and proves\nitself so.\n\nNow in reference to this Idea, I maintain that the sequence in the\nsystems of Philosophy in History is similar to the sequence in the\nlogical deduction of the Notion-determinations in the Idea. I maintain\nthat if the fundamental conceptions of the systems appearing in the\nhistory of Philosophy be entirely divested of what regards their\noutward form, their relation to the particular and the like, the\nvarious stages in the determination of the Idea are found in their\nlogical Notion. Conversely in the logical progression taken for\nitself, there is, so far as its principal elements are concerned,\nthe progression of historical manifestations; but it is necessary to\nhave these pure Notions in order to know what the historical form\ncontains. It may be thought that Philosophy must have another order as\nto the stages in the Idea than that in which these Notions have gone\nforth in time; but in the main the order is the same. This succession\nundoubtedly separates itself, on the one hand, into the sequence in\ntime of History, and on the other into succession in the order of\nideas. But to treat more fully of this last would divert us too far\nfrom our aim.\n\nI would only remark this, that what has been said reveals that the\nstudy of the history of Philosophy is the study of Philosophy itself,\nfor, indeed, it can be nothing else. Whoever studies the history of\nsciences such as Physics and Mathematics, makes himself acquainted with\nPhysics and Mathematics themselves. But in order to obtain a knowledge\nof its progress as the development of the Idea in the empirical,\nexternal form in which Philosophy appears in History, a corresponding\nknowledge of the Idea is absolutely essential, just as in judging of\nhuman affairs one must have a conception of that which is right and\nfitting. Else, indeed, as in so many histories of Philosophy, there is\npresented to the vision devoid of idea, only a disarranged collection\nof opinions. To make you acquainted with this Idea, and consequently\nto explain the manifestations, is the business of the history of\nPhilosophy, and to do this is my object in undertaking to lecture on\nthe subject. Since the observer must bring with him the Notion of\nthe subject in order to see it in its phenomenal aspect and in order\nto expose the object faithfully to view, we need not wonder at there\nbeing so many dull histories of Philosophy in which the succession of\nits systems are represented simply as a number of opinions, errors and\nfreaks of thought. They are freaks of thought which, indeed, have been\ndevised with a great pretension of acuteness and of mental exertion,\nand with everything else which can be said in admiration of what is\nmerely formal. But, considering the absence of philosophic mind in\nsuch historians as these, how should they be able to comprehend and\nrepresent the content, which is reasoned thought?\n\nIt is shown from what has been said regarding the formal nature of the\nIdea, that only a history of Philosophy thus regarded as a system of\ndevelopment in Idea, is entitled to the name of Science: a collection\nof facts constitutes no science. Only thus as a succession of phenomena\nestablished through reason, and having as content just what is reason\nand revealing it, does this history show that it is rational: it shows\nthat the events recorded are in reason. How should the whole of what\nhas taken place in reason not itself be rational? That faith must\nsurely be the more reasonable in which chance is not made ruler over\nhuman affairs, and it is the business of Philosophy to recognize that\nhowever much its own manifestations may be history likewise, it is yet\ndetermined through the Idea alone.\n\nThrough these general preliminary conceptions the categories are now\ndetermined, the more immediate application of which to the history of\nPhilosophy we have now to consider. This application will bring before\nus the most significant aspects in this history.\n\n\na. _The development in Time of the various Philosophies._\n\nThe first question which may be asked in reference to this history,\nconcerns that distinction in regard to the manifestation of the Idea,\nwhich has just been noticed. It is the question as to how it happens\nthat Philosophy appears to be a development in time and has a history.\nThe answer to this question encroaches on the metaphysics of Time, and\nit would be a digression from our object to give here more than the\nelements on which the answer rests.\n\nIt has been shown above in reference to the existence of Mind, that\nits Being is its activity. Nature, on the contrary, is, as it is; its\nchanges are thus only repetitions, and its movements take the form of a\ncircle merely. To express this better, the activity of Mind is to know\nitself. I am, immediately, but this I am only as a living organism;\nas Mind I am only in so far as I know myself. _\u0393\u03bd\u1ff6\u03b8\u03b9 \u03c3\u03b5\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd_, Know\nthyself, the inscription over the temple of the oracle at Delphi,\nis the absolute command which is expressed by Mind in its essential\ncharacter. But consciousness really implies that for myself, I am\nobject to myself. In forming this absolute division between what is\nmine and myself, Mind constitutes its existence and establishes itself\nas external to itself. It postulates itself in the externality which is\njust the universal and the distinctive form of existence in Nature. But\none of the forms of externality is Time, and this form requires to be\nfurther examined both in the Philosophy of Nature and the finite Mind.\n\nThis Being in existence and therefore Being in time is a moment not\nonly of the individual consciousness, which as such is essentially\nfinite, but also of the development of the philosophical Idea in the\nelement of Thought. For the Idea, thought of as being at rest, is,\nindeed, not in Time. To think of it as at rest, and to preserve it in\nthe form of immediacy is equivalent to its inward perception. But the\nIdea as concrete, is, as has been shown, the unity of differences; it\nis not really rest, and its existence is not really sense-perception,\nbut as differentiation within itself and therefore as development,\nit comes into existent Being and into externality in the element of\nThought, and thus pure Philosophy appears in thought as a progressive\nexistence in time. But this element of Thought is itself abstract and\nis the activity of a single consciousness. Mind is, however, not only\nto be considered as individual, finite consciousness, but as that\nMind which is universal and concrete within itself; this concrete\nuniversality, however, comprehends all the various sides and modes\nevolved in which it is and becomes object to the Idea. Thus Mind\u2019s\nthinking comprehension of self is at the same time the progression of\nthe total actuality evolved. This progression is not one which takes\nits course through the thought of an individual and exhibits itself\nin a single consciousness, for it shows itself to be universal Mind\npresenting itself in the history of the world in all the richness of\nits form. The result of this development is that one form, one stage in\nthe Idea comes to consciousness in one particular race, so that this\nrace and this time expresses only this particular form, within which it\nconstructs its universe and works out its conditions. The higher stage,\non the other hand, centuries later reveals itself in another race of\npeople.\n\nNow if we thus grasp the principles of the Concrete and of Development,\nthe nature of the manifold obtains quite another signification, and\nwhat is said of the diversity in philosophies as if the manifold were\nfixed and stationary and composed of what is mutually exclusive, is at\nonce refuted and relegated to its proper place. Such talk is that in\nwhich those who despise Philosophy think they possess an invincible\nweapon against it, and in their truly beggarly pride in their pitiful\nrepresentations of it, they are in perfect ignorance even of what they\nhave and what they have to know in any meagre ideas attained, such as\nin that of the manifold and diverse. Yet this category is one which\nanybody can understand; no difficulty is made in regard to it, for\nit is thoroughly known, and those who use it think they can do so as\nbeing entirely comprehensible\u2014as a matter of course they understand\nwhat it is. But those who believe the principle of diversity to be\none absolutely fixed, do not know its nature, or its dialectic; the\nmanifold or diverse is in a state of flux; it must really be conceived\nof as in the process of development, and as but a passing moment.\nPhilosophy in its concrete Idea is the activity of development in\nrevealing the differences which it contains within itself; these\ndifferences are thoughts, for we are now speaking of development in\nThought. In the first place, the differences which rest in the Idea\nare manifested as thoughts. Secondly, these distinctions must come\ninto existence, one here and the other there; and in order that they\nmay do this, they must be complete, that is, they must contain within\nthemselves the Idea in its totality. The concrete alone as including\nand supporting the distinctions, is the actual; it is thus, and thus\nalone, that the differences are in their form entire.\n\nA complete form of thought such as is here presented, is a Philosophy.\nBut the Idea contains the distinctions in a peculiar form. It may be\nsaid that the form is indifferent, and that the content, the Idea, is\nthe main consideration; and people think themselves quite moderate and\nreasonable when they state that the different philosophies all contain\nthe Idea, though in different forms, understanding by this that these\nforms are contingent. But everything hangs on this: these forms are\nnothing else than the original distinctions in the Idea itself, which\nis what it is only in them. They are in this way essential to, and\nconstitute the content of the Idea, which in thus sundering itself,\nattains to form. The manifold character of the principles which\nappear, is, however, not accidental, but necessary: the different\nforms constitute an integral part of the whole form. They are the\ndeterminations of the original Idea, which together constitute the\nwhole; but as being outside of one another, their union does not take\nplace in them, but in us, the observers. Each system is determined as\none, but it is not a permanent condition that the differences are thus\nmutually exclusive. The inevitable fate of these determinations must\nfollow, and that is that they shall be drawn together and reduced to\nelements or moments. The independent attitude taken up by each moment\nis again laid aside. After expansion, contraction follows\u2014the unity\nout of which they first emerged. This third may itself be but the\nbeginning of a further development. It may seem as if this progression\nwere to go on into infinitude, but it has an absolute end in view,\nwhich we shall know better later on; many turnings are necessary,\nhowever, before Mind frees itself in coming to consciousness.\n\nThe temple of self-conscious reason is to be considered from this the\npoint of view alone worthy of the history of Philosophy. It is hence\nrationally built by an inward master worker, and not in Solomon\u2019s\nmethod, as freemasons build. The great assumption that what has taken\nplace on this side, in the world, has also done so in conformity\nwith reason\u2014which is what first gives the history of Philosophy\nits true interest\u2014is nothing else than trust in Providence, only\nin another form. As the best of what is in the world is that which\nThought produces, it is unreasonable to believe that reason only is\nin Nature, and not in Mind. That man who believes that what, like the\nphilosophies, belongs to the region of mind must be merely contingent,\nis insincere in his belief in divine rule, and what he says of it is\nbut empty talk.\n\nA long time is undoubtedly required by Mind in working out Philosophy,\nand when one first reflects on it, the length of the time may seem\nastonishing, like the immensity of the space spoken of in astronomy.\nBut it must be considered in regard to the slow progress of the\nworld-spirit, that there is no need for it to hasten:\u2014\u201cA thousand\nyears are in Thy sight as one day.\u201d It has time enough just because it\nis itself outside of time, because it is eternal. The fleeting events\nof the day pass so quickly that there is not time enough for all that\nhas to be done. Who is there who does not die before he has achieved\nhis aims? The world-spirit has time enough, but that is not all. It\nis not time alone which has to be made use of in the acquisition of\na conception; much else is required. The fact that so many races and\ngenerations are devoted to these operations of its consciousness by\nMind, and that the appearance is so perpetually presented of rising\nup and passing away, concern it not at all; it is rich enough for\nsuch displays, it pursues its work on the largest possible scale,\nand has nations and individuals enough and to spare. The saying that\nNature arrives at its end in the shortest possible way, and that this\nis right, is a trivial one. The way shown by mind is indirect, and\naccommodates itself to circumstances. Considerations of finite life,\nsuch as time, trouble, and cost, have no place here. We ought, too, to\nfeel no disappointment that particular kinds of knowledge cannot yet be\nattained, or that this or that is still absent. In the history of the\nworld progression is slow.\n\n\nb. _The application of the foregoing to the treatment of Philosophy._\n\nThe first result which follows from what has been said, is that the\nwhole of the history of Philosophy is a progression impelled by an\ninherent necessity, and one which is implicitly rational and _\u00e0 priori_\ndetermined through its Idea; and this the history of Philosophy has to\nexemplify. Contingency must vanish on the appearance of Philosophy.\nIts history is just as absolutely determined as the development of\nNotions, and the impelling force is the inner dialectic of the forms.\nThe finite is not true, nor is it what it is to be\u2014its determinate\nnature is bound up with its existence. But the inward Idea abolishes\nthese finite forms: a philosophy which has not the absolute form\nidentical with the content, must pass away because its form is not that\nof truth.\n\nWhat follows, secondly from what we have said, is that every philosophy\nhas been and still is necessary. Thus none have passed away, but\nall are affirmatively contained as elements in a whole. But we must\ndistinguish between the particular principle of these philosophies as\nparticular, and the realization of this principle throughout the whole\ncompass of the world. The principles are retained, the most recent\nphilosophy being the result of all preceding, and hence no philosophy\nhas ever been refuted. What has been refuted is not the principle of\nthis philosophy, but merely the fact that this principle should be\nconsidered final and absolute in character. The atomic philosophy,\nfor example, has arrived at the affirmation that the atom is the\nabsolute existence, that it is the indivisible unit which is also the\nindividual or subject; seeing, then, that the bare unit also is the\nabstract being-for-self, the Absolute would be grasped as infinitely\nmany units. The atomic theory has been refuted, and we are atomists\nno longer. Mind is certainly explicitly existent as a unit or atom,\nbut that is to attribute to it a barren character and qualities\nincapable of expressing anything of its depth. The principle is indeed\nretained, although it is not the absolute in its entirety. This same\ncontradiction appears in all development. The development of the tree\nis the negation of the germ, and the blossom that of the leaves, in so\nfar as that they show that these do not form the highest and truest\nexistence of the tree. Last of all, the blossom finds its negation in\nthe fruit. Yet none of them can come into actual existence excepting\nas preceded by all the earlier stages. Our attitude to a philosophy\nmust thus contain an affirmative side and a negative; when we take both\nof these into consideration, we do justice to a philosophy for the\nfirst time. We get to know the affirmative side later on both in life\nand in science; thus we find it easier to refute than to justify.\n\nIn the third place, we shall limit ourselves to the particular\nconsideration of the principle itself. Each principle has reigned for a\ncertain time, and when the whole system of the world has been explained\nfrom this special form, it is called a philosophical system. Its whole\ntheory has certainly to be learned, but as long as the principle is\nabstract it is not sufficient to embrace the forms belonging to our\nconception of the world. The Cartesian principles, for instance, are\nvery suitable for application to mechanism, but for nothing further;\ntheir representation of other manifestations in the world, such as\nthose of vegetable and animal nature, are insufficient, and hence\nuninteresting. Therefore we take into consideration the principles of\nthese philosophies only, but in dealing with concrete philosophies\nwe must also regard the chief forms of their development and their\napplications. The subordinate philosophies are inconsistent; they have\nhad bright glimpses of the truth, which are, however, independent\nof their principles. This is exemplified in the Tim\u00e6us of Plato, a\nphilosophy of nature, the working out of which is empirically very\nbarren because its principle does not as yet extend far enough, and it\nis not to its principle that we owe the deep gleams of thought there\ncontained.\n\nIn the fourth place it follows that we must not regard the history\nof Philosophy as dealing with the past, even though it is history.\nThe scientific products of reason form the content of this history,\nand these are not past. What is obtained in this field of labour is\nthe True, and, as such, the Eternal; it is not what exists now, and\nnot then; it is true not only to-day or to-morrow, but beyond all\ntime, and in as far as it is in time, it is true always and for every\ntime. The bodily forms of those great minds who are the heroes of this\nhistory, the temporal existence and outward lives of the philosophers,\nare, indeed, no more, but their works and thoughts have not followed\nsuit, for they neither conceived nor dreamt of the rational import\nof their works. Philosophy is not somnambulism, but is developed\nconsciousness; and what these heroes have done is to bring that which\nis implicitly rational out of the depths of Mind, where it is found at\nfirst as substance only, or as inwardly existent, into the light of\nday, and to advance it into consciousness and knowledge. This forms a\ncontinuous awakening. Such work is not only deposited in the temple of\nMemory as forms of times gone by, but is just as present and as living\nnow as at the time of its production. The effects produced and work\nperformed are not again destroyed or interrupted by what succeeds, for\nthey are such that we must ourselves be present in them. They have as\nmedium neither canvas, paper, marble, nor representation or memorial\nto preserve them. These mediums are themselves transient, or else form\na basis for what is such. But they do have Thought, Notion, and the\neternal Being of Mind, which moths cannot corrupt, nor thieves break\nthrough and steal. The conquests made by Thought when constituted\ninto Thought form the very Being of Mind. Such knowledge is thus not\nlearning merely, or a knowledge of what is dead, buried and corrupt:\nthe history of Philosophy has not to do with what is gone, but with the\nliving present.\n\n\nc. _Further comparison between the History of Philosophy and Philosophy\nitself._\n\nWe may appropriate to ourselves the whole of the riches apportioned\nout in time: it must be shown from the succession in philosophies how\nthat succession is the systematization of the science of Philosophy\nitself. But a distinction is to be noted here: that which first\ncommences is implicit, immediate, abstract, general\u2014it is what has\nnot yet advanced; the more concrete and richer comes later, and the\nfirst is poorer in determinations. This may appear contrary to one\u2019s\nfirst impressions, but philosophic ideas are often enough directly\nopposed to ordinary ideas, and what is generally supposed, is not found\nto be the case. It may be thought that what comes first must be the\nconcrete. The child, for instance, as still in the original totality\nof his nature, is thought to be more concrete than the man, hence we\nimagine the latter to be more limited, no longer forming a totality,\nbut living an abstract life. Certainly the man acts in accordance with\ndefinite ends, not bringing his whole soul and mind into a subject,\nbut splitting his life into a number of abstract unities. The child\nand the youth, on the contrary, act straight from the fulness of the\nheart. Feeling and sense-perception come first, thought last, and thus\nfeeling appears to us to be more concrete than thought, or the activity\nof abstraction and of the universal. In reality, it is just the other\nway. The sensuous consciousness is certainly the more concrete, and if\npoorer in thought, at least richer in content. We must thus distinguish\nthe naturally concrete from the concrete of thought, which on its\nside, again, is wanting in sensuous matter. The child is also the most\nabstract and the poorest in thought: as to what pertains to nature, the\nman is abstract, but in thought he is more concrete than the child.\nMan\u2019s ends and objects are undoubtedly abstract in general affairs,\nsuch as in maintaining his family or performing his business duties,\nbut he contributes to a great objective organic whole, whose progress\nhe advances and directs. In the acts of a child, on the other hand,\nonly a childish and, indeed, momentary \u201cI,\u201d and in those of the youth\nthe subjective constitution or the random aim, form the principle\nof action. It is in this way that science is more concrete than\nsense-perception.\n\nIn applying this to the different forms of Philosophy, it follows in\nthe first place, that the earliest philosophies are the poorest and the\nmost abstract. In them the Idea is least determined; they keep merely\nto generalities not yet realized. This must be known in order that we\nmay not seek behind the old philosophies for more than we are entitled\nto find; thus we need not require from them determinations proceeding\nfrom a deeper consciousness. For instance, it has been asked whether\nthe philosophy of Thales is, properly speaking, Theism or Atheism,[5]\nwhether he asserted a personal God or merely an impersonal, universal\nexistence. The question here regards the attribution of subjectivity\nto the highest Idea, the conception of the Personality of God. Such\nsubjectivity as we comprehend it, is a much richer, more concentrated,\nand therefore much later conception, which need not be sought for in\ndistant ages. The Greek gods had, indeed, personality in imagination\nand idea like the one God of the Jewish religion, but to know what\nis the mere picture of fancy, and what the insight of pure Thought\nand Notion, is quite another thing. If we take as basis our own\nideas judged by these deeper conceptions, an ancient Philosophy may\nundoubtedly be spoken of as Atheism. But this expression would at the\nsame time be false, for the thoughts as thoughts in beginning, could\nnot have arrived at the development which we have reached.\n\nFrom this it follows\u2014since the progress of development is equivalent\nto further determination, and this means further immersion in and a\nfuller grasp of the Idea itself\u2014that the latest, most modern and\nnewest philosophy is the most developed, richest and deepest. In that\nphilosophy everything which at first seems to be past and gone must be\npreserved and retained, and it must itself be a mirror of the whole\nhistory. The original philosophy is the most abstract, because it is\nthe original and has not as yet made any movement forward; the last,\nwhich proceeds from this forward and impelling influence, is the\nmost concrete. This, as may at once be remarked, is no mere pride in\nthe philosophy of our time, because it is in the nature of the whole\nprocess that the more developed philosophy of a later time is really\nthe result of the previous operations of the thinking mind; and that\nit, pressed forwards and onwards from the earlier standpoints, has not\ngrown up on its own account or in a state of isolation.\n\nIt must also be recollected that we must not hesitate to say, what is\nnaturally implied, that the Idea, as comprehended and shown forth in\nthe latest and newest philosophy, is the most developed, the richest\nand deepest. I call this to remembrance because the designation, new\nor newest of all in reference to Philosophy, has become a very common\nby-word. Those who think they express anything by using such terms\nmight quite easily render thanks respecting any number of philosophies\njust as fast as their inclination directs, regarding either every\nshooting-star and even every candle-gleam in the light of a sun, or\nelse calling every popular cry a philosophy, and adducing as proof that\nat any rate there are so many philosophies that every day one displaces\nanother. Thus they have the category in which they can place any\napparently significant philosophy, and through which they may at the\nsame time set it aside; this they call a fashion-philosophy.\n\n \u201cScoffer, thou call\u2019st this but a fleeting phase\n When the Spirit of Man once again and anew,\n Strives earnestly on, towards forms that are higher.\u201d\n\nA second consequence has regard to the treatment of the older\nphilosophies. Such insight also prevents us from ascribing any blame\nto the philosophies when we miss determinations in them which were not\nyet present to their culture, and similarly it prevents our burdening\nthem with deductions and assertions which were neither made nor thought\nof by them, though they might correctly enough allow themselves to\nbe derived from the thought of such a philosophy. It is necessary\nto set to work on an historical basis, and to ascribe to Philosophy\nwhat is immediately given to us, and that alone. Errors crop up here\nin most histories of Philosophy, since we may see in them a number\nof metaphysical propositions ascribed to a philosopher and given out\nas an historical statement of the views which he has propounded, of\nwhich he neither thought nor knew a word, and of which there is not\nthe slightest trace found in history. Thus in Brucker\u2019s great History\nof Philosophy (Pt. I. pp. 465-478 seq.) a list of thirty, forty, or a\nhundred theorems are quoted from Thales and others, no idea of which\ncan be traced in history as having been present to these philosophers.\nThere are also propositions in support of them and citations taken\nfrom discussions of a similar kind with which we may occupy ourselves\nlong enough. Brucker\u2019s method is to endow the single theorem of an\nancient philosopher with all the consequences and premises which must,\naccording to the idea of the Wolffian Metaphysics, be the premises and\nconclusions of that theorem, and thus easily to produce a simple, naked\nfiction as if it were an actual historical fact. Thus, according to\nBrucker, Thales said, _Ex nihilo fit nihil_, since he said that water\nwas eternal. Thus, too, he was to be counted amongst the philosophers\nwho deny creation out of nothing; and of this, historically at least,\nThales was ignorant. Professor Ritter, too, whose history of Ionic\nPhilosophy is carefully written, and who on the whole is cautious not\nto introduce foreign matter, has very possibly ascribed to Thales more\nthan is found in history. He says (pp. 12, 13), \u201cHence we must regard\nthe view of nature which we find in Thales as dynamic in principle.\nHe regarded the world as the all-embracing, living animal which\nhas developed from a germ like every other animal, and this germ,\nlike that of all other animals, is either damp or water. Thus the\nfundamental idea of Thales is that the world is a living whole which\nhas developed from a germ and carries on its life as does an animal,\nby means of nourishment suitable to its nature\u201d (cf. p. 16). This is\nquite a different account from that of Aristotle, and none of it is\ncommunicated by the ancients regarding Thales. The sequence of thought\nis evident, but historically it is not justified. We ought not by such\ndeductions to make an ancient philosophy into something quite different\nfrom what it originally was.\n\nWe are too apt to mould the ancient philosophers into our own forms of\nthought, but this is just to constitute the progress of development;\nthe difference in times, in culture and in philosophies, depends on\nwhether certain reflections, certain thought determinations, and\ncertain stages in the Notion have come to consciousness, whether a\nconsciousness has been developed to a particular point or not. The\nhistory of Philosophy has simply to deal with this development and\nbringing forth of thought. The determinations involved certainly follow\nfrom a proposition, but whether they are put forth as yet or not is\nquite another thing, and the bringing forth of the inner content is the\nonly matter of importance. We must therefore only make use of the words\nwhich are actually literal, for to use further thought determinations\nwhich do not yet belong to the consciousness of the philosopher in\nquestion, is to carry on development. Thus Aristotle states that\nThales has defined the principle (_\u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03ae_) of every thing to be water.\nBut Anaximander first made use of _\u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03ae_, and Thales thus did not\npossess this determination of thought at all; he recognized _\u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03ae_ as\ncommencement in time, but not as the fundamental principle. Thales did\nnot once introduce the determination of cause into his philosophy, and\nfirst cause is a further determination still. There are whole nations\nwhich have not this conception at all; indeed it involves a great step\nforward in development. And seeing that difference in culture on the\nwhole depends on difference in the thought determinations which are\nmanifested, this must be so still more with respect to philosophies.\n\nNow, as in the logical system of thought each of its forms has its\nown place in which alone it suffices, and this form becomes, by means\nof ever-progressing development, reduced to a subordinate element,\neach philosophy is, in the third place, a particular stage in the\ndevelopment of the whole process and has its definite place where it\nfinds its true value and significance. Its special character is really\nto be conceived of in accordance with this determination, and it is to\nbe considered with respect to this position in order that full justice\nmay be done to it. On this account nothing more must be demanded or\nexpected from it than what it actually gives, and the satisfaction\nis not to be sought for in it, which can only be found in a fuller\ndevelopment of knowledge. We must not expect to find the questions of\nour consciousness and the interest of the present world responded to\nby the ancients; such questions presuppose a certain development in\nthought. Therefore every philosophy belongs to its own time and is\nrestricted by its own limitations, just because it is the manifestation\nof a particular stage in development. The individual is the offspring\nof his people, of his world, whose constitution and attributes are\nalone manifested in his form; he may spread himself out as he will, he\ncannot escape out of his time any more than out of his skin, for he\nbelongs to the one universal Mind which is his substance and his own\nexistence. How should he escape from this? It is the same universal\nMind that is embraced by thinking Philosophy; that Philosophy is\nMind\u2019s thought of itself and therefore its determinate and substantial\ncontent. Every philosophy is the philosophy of its own day, a link in\nthe whole chain of spiritual development, and thus it can only find\nsatisfaction for the interests belonging to its own particular time.\n\nOn this account an earlier philosophy does not give satisfaction\nto the mind in which a deeper conception reigns. What Mind seeks\nfor in Philosophy is this conception which already constitutes its\ninward determination and the root of its existence conceived of as\nobject to thought; Mind demands a knowledge of itself. But in the\nearlier philosophy the Idea is not yet present in this determinate\ncharacter. Hence the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, and indeed\nall philosophies, ever live and are present in their principles, but\nPhilosophy no longer has the particular form and aspect possessed\nby that of Plato and of Aristotle. We cannot rest content with\nthem, and they cannot be revived; hence there can be no Platonists,\nAristotelians, Stoics, or Epicureans to-day. To re-awaken them would\nbe to try to bring back to an earlier stage the Mind of a deeper\nculture and self-penetration. But this cannot be the case; it would be\nan impossibility and as great a folly as were a man to wish to expend\nhis energies in attaining the standpoint of the youth, the youth in\nendeavouring to be the boy or child again; whereas the man, the youth,\nand the child, are all one and the same individual. The period of\nrevival in the sciences, the new epoch in learning which took place in\nthe fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, began not only with the revived\nstudy of, but also with the re-animation of the old philosophies.\nMarsilius Ficinus was a Platonist; an Academy of Platonic philosophy\nwas established and installed with professors by Cosmos de Medici, and\nFicinus was placed at the head of it. There were pure Aristotelians\nlike Pomponius: Gassendi later on maintained the Epicurean philosophy,\nfor his philosophy dealt with Physics after the manner of the\nEpicureans; Lipsius wished to be a Stoic, and so on. The sense of\nopposition was so great, ancient philosophy and Christianity\u2014from or\nin which no special philosophy had developed\u2014were so diverse, that\nno philosophy peculiar to itself could develop in Christianity. What\nwas or could be had as philosophy, either in conformity with or in\nopposition to Christianity, was a certain ancient philosophy which was\nthus taken up anew. But mummies when brought amongst living beings\ncannot there remain. Mind had for long possessed a more substantial\nlife, a more profound Notion of itself, and hence its thought had\nhigher needs than such as could be satisfied by these philosophies.\nA revival such as this is then to be regarded only as the transitory\nperiod in which we learn to know the forms which are implied and which\nhave gone before, and as the renewal of former struggles through the\nsteps necessary in development. Such reconstructions and repetitions in\na distant time of principles which have become foreign to Mind, are in\nhistory transitory only, and formed in a language which is dead. Such\nthings are translations only and not originals, and Mind does not find\nsatisfaction excepting in knowledge of its own origination.\n\nWhen modern times are in the same way called upon to revert to the\nstandpoint of an ancient philosophy (as is recommended specially in\nregard to the philosophy of Plato) in order to make this a means of\nescaping from the complications and difficulties of succeeding times,\nthis reversion does not come naturally as in the first case. This\ndiscreet counsel has the same origin as the request to cultivated\nmembers of society to turn back to the customs and ideas of the savages\nof the North American forests, or as the recommendation to adopt the\nreligion of Melchisedec which Fichte[6] has maintained to be the\npurest and simplest possible, and therefore the one at which we must\neventually arrive. On the one hand, in this retrogression the desire\nfor an origin and for a fixed point of departure is unmistakable,\nbut such must be sought for in thought and Idea alone and not in an\nauthoritatively given form. On the other hand, the return of the\ndeveloped, enriched Mind to a simplicity such as this\u2014which means to\nan abstraction, an abstract condition or thought\u2014is to be regarded\nonly as the escape of an incapacity which cannot enjoy the rich\nmaterial of development which it sees before it, and which demands to\nbe controlled and comprehended in its very depths by thought, but seeks\na refuge in fleeing from the difficulty and in mere sterility.\n\nFrom what has been said it is quite comprehensible how so many of\nthose who, whether induced by some special attraction such as this,\nor simply by the fame of a Plato or ancient philosophy in general,\ndirect their way thereto in order to draw their own philosophy from\nthese sources, do not find themselves satisfied by the study, and\nunjustifiably quit such altogether. Satisfaction is found in them to\na certain extent only. We must know in ancient philosophy or in the\nphilosophy of any given period, what we are going to look for. Or at\nleast we must know that in such a philosophy there is before us a\ndefinite stage in the development of thought, and in it those forms\nand necessities of Mind which lie within the limits of that stage\nalone are brought into existence. There slumber in the Mind of modern\ntimes ideas more profound which require for their awakening other\nsurroundings and another present than the abstract, dim, grey thought\nof olden times. In Plato, for instance, questions regarding the nature\nof freedom, the origin of evil and of sin, providence, &c., do not\nfind their philosophic answer. On such subjects we certainly may in\npart take the ordinary serious views of the present time, and in part\nphilosophically set their consideration altogether aside, or else\nconsider sin and freedom as something negative only. But neither the\none plan nor the other gives freedom to Mind if such subjects have once\nbeen explicitly for it, and if the opposition in self-consciousness\nhas given it the power of sinking its interests therein. The case is\nsimilar with regard to questions regarding the limits of knowledge, the\nopposition between subjectivity and objectivity which had not yet come\nup in Plato\u2019s age. The independence of the \u201cI\u201d within itself and its\nexplicit existence was foreign to him; man had not yet gone back within\nhimself, had not yet set himself forth as explicit. The subject was\nindeed the individual as free, but as yet he knew himself only as in\nunity with his Being. The Athenian knew himself to be free, as such,\njust as the Roman citizen would, as _ingenuus_. But the fact that man\nis in and for himself free, in his essence and as man, free born, was\nknown neither by Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, nor the Roman legislators,\neven though it is this conception alone which forms the source of\nlaw. In Christianity the individual, personal mind for the first time\nbecomes of real, infinite and absolute value; God wills that all men\nshall be saved. It was in the Christian religion that the doctrine\nwas advanced that all men are equal before God, because Christ has\nset them free with the freedom of Christianity. These principles make\nfreedom independent of any such things as birth, standing or culture.\nThe progress made through them is enormous, but they still come short\nof this, that to be free constitutes the very idea of man. The sense\nof this existent principle has been an active force for centuries and\ncenturies, and an impelling power which has brought about the most\ntremendous revolutions; but the conception and the knowledge of the\nnatural freedom of man is a knowledge of himself which is not old.\n\n\n\n\nB\n\nTHE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO OTHER DEPARTMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE.\n\n\nThe History of Philosophy has to represent this science in that form\nof time and individualities from which its outward form has resulted.\nSuch a representation has, however, to shut out from itself the\nexternal history of the time, and to take into account only the general\ncharacter of the people and time, and likewise their circumstances as a\nwhole. But as a matter of fact, the history of Philosophy does present\nthis character, and that indeed in the highest possible degree;\nits connection with it is of the closest kind, and the particular\nappearance presented by a philosophy belonging to one special period,\nis only a particular aspect or element in the character. Because of\nthis inward correspondence we have partly to consider more closely\nthe particular relation borne by a philosophy to its historical\nsurroundings, and partly, but pre-eminently, what is proper to itself,\nfrom which alone, after separating everything related however closely,\nwe can fix our standpoint. This connection, which is not merely\nexternal but essential, has thus two sides, which we must consider. The\nfirst is the distinctly historical side, the second is the connection\nwith other matters\u2014the connection of Philosophy with Religion, for\ninstance, by which we at once obtain a deeper conception of Philosophy\nitself.\n\n\n1. THE HISTORICAL SIDE OF THIS CONNECTION.\n\nIt is usually said that political affairs and such matters as Religion\nare to be taken into consideration because they have exercised a great\ninfluence on the Philosophy of the time, and similarly it exerts an\ninfluence upon them. But when people are content with such a category\nas \u201cgreat influence\u201d they place the two in an external relationship,\nand start from the point of view that both sides are for themselves\nindependent. Here, however, we must think of this relationship in\nanother category, and not according to the influence or effect of one\nupon the other. The true category is the unity of all these different\nforms, so that it is one Mind which manifests itself in, and impresses\nitself upon these different elements.\n\n\na. _Outward and historical conditions imposed upon Philosophy._\n\nIt must be remarked in the first place, that a certain stage is\nrequisite in the intellectual culture of a people in order that it\nmay have a Philosophy at all. Aristotle says, \u201cMan first begins to\nphilosophize when the necessities of life are supplied\u201d (Metaphysics,\nI. 2); because since Philosophy is a free and not self-seeking\nactivity, cravings of want must have disappeared, a strength, elevation\nand inward fortitude of mind must have appeared, passions must be\nsubdued and consciousness so far advanced, before what is universal\ncan be thought of. Philosophy may thus be called a kind of luxury,\nin so far as luxury signifies those enjoyments and pursuits which do\nnot belong to external necessity as such. Philosophy in this respect\nseems more capable of being dispensed with than anything else; but that\ndepends on what is called indispensable. From the point of view of\nmind, Philosophy may even be said to be that which is most essential.\n\n\nb. _The commencement in History of an intellectual necessity for\nPhilosophy._\n\nHowever much Philosophy, as the thought and conception of the Mind\nof a particular time, is _\u00e0 priori_, it is at the same time just as\nreally a result, since the thought produced and, indeed, the life and\naction are produced to produce themselves. This activity contains the\nessential element of a negation, because to produce is also to destroy;\nPhilosophy in producing itself, has the natural as its starting point\nin order to abrogate it again. Philosophy thus makes its appearance\nat a time when the Mind of a people has worked its way out of the\nindifference and stolidity of the first life of nature, as it has also\ndone from the standpoint of the emotional, so that the individual aim\nhas blotted itself out. But as Mind passes on from its natural form,\nit also proceeds from its exact code of morals and the robustness of\nlife to reflection and conception. The result of this is that it lays\nhold of and troubles this real, substantial kind of existence, this\nmorality and faith, and thus the period of destruction commences.\nFurther progress is then made through the gathering up of thought\nwithin itself. It may be said that Philosophy first commences when a\nrace for the most part has left its concrete life, when separation and\nchange of class have begun, and the people approach toward their fall;\nwhen a gulf has arisen between inward strivings and external reality,\nand the old forms of Religion, &c., are no longer satisfying; when Mind\nmanifests indifference to its living existence or rests unsatisfied\ntherein, and moral life becomes dissolved. Then it is that Mind takes\nrefuge in the clear space of thought to create for itself a kingdom of\nthought in opposition to the world of actuality, and Philosophy is the\nreconciliation following upon the destruction of that real world which\nthought has begun. When Philosophy with its abstractions paints grey in\ngrey, the freshness and life of youth has gone, the reconciliation is\nnot a reconciliation in the actual, but in the ideal world. Thus the\nGreek philosophers held themselves far removed from the business of\nthe State and were called by the people idlers, because they withdrew\nthemselves within the world of thought.\n\nThis holds good throughout all the history of Philosophy. It was so\nwith Ionic Philosophy in the decline of the Ionic States in Asia Minor.\nSocrates and Plato had no more pleasure in the life of the State in\nAthens, which was in the course of its decline; Plato tried to bring\nabout something better with Dionysius. Thus in Athens, with the ruin of\nthe Athenian people, the period was reached when Philosophy appeared.\nIn Rome, Philosophy first expanded in the decline of the Republic and\nof Roman life proper, under the despotism of the Roman Emperors: a\ntime of misfortune for the world and of decay in political life, when\nearlier religious systems tottered and everything was in the process\nof struggle and disintegration. With the decline of the Roman Empire,\nwhich was so great, rich and glorious, and yet inwardly dead, the\nheight and indeed the zenith of ancient Philosophy is associated\nthrough the Neo-Platonists at Alexandria. It was also in the fifteenth\nand sixteenth centuries, when the Teutonic life of the Middle Ages\nacquired another form, that Philosophy first became taught, though it\nwas later on that it attained to independence. Before that, political\nlife still existed in unity with Religion, or if the State fought\nagainst the Church, the Church still kept the foremost place, but now\nthe gulf between Church and State came into existence. Philosophy thus\ncomes in at a certain epoch only in the development of the whole.\n\n\nc. _Philosophy as the thought of its time._\n\nBut men do not at certain epochs, merely philosophize in general,\nfor there is a definite Philosophy which arises among a people, and\nthe definite character of the standpoint of thought is the same\ncharacter which permeates all the other historical sides of the spirit\nof the people, which is most intimately related to them, and which\nconstitutes their foundation. The particular form of a Philosophy is\nthus contemporaneous with a particular constitution of the people\namongst whom it makes its appearance, with their institutions and forms\nof government, their morality, their social life and the capabilities,\ncustoms and enjoyments of the same; it is so with their attempts and\nachievements in art and science, with their religious, warfares and\nexternal relationships, likewise with the decadence of the States in\nwhich this particular principle and form had maintained its supremacy,\nand with the origination and progress of new States in which a higher\nprinciple finds its manifestation and development. Mind in each case\nhas elaborated and expanded in the whole domain of its manifold nature\nthe principle of the particular stage of self-consciousness to which\nit has attained. Thus the Mind of a people in its richness is an\norganization, and, like a Cathedral, is divided into numerous vaults,\npassages, pillars and vestibules, all of which have proceeded out of\none whole and are directed to one end. Philosophy is one form of these\nmany aspects. And which is it? It is the fullest blossom, the Notion\nof Mind in its entire form, the consciousness and spiritual essence of\nall things, the spirit of the time as spirit present in itself. The\nmultifarious whole is reflected in it as in the single focus, in the\nNotion which knows itself.\n\nThe Philosophy which is essential within Christianity could not be\nfound in Rome, for all the various forms of the whole are only the\nexpression of one and the same determinate character. Hence political\nhistory, forms of government, art and religion are not related to\nPhilosophy as its causes, nor, on the other hand, is Philosophy the\nground of their existence\u2014one and all have the same common root, the\nspirit of the time. It is one determinate existence, one determinate\ncharacter which permeates all sides and manifests itself in politics\nand in all else as in different elements; it is a condition which hangs\ntogether in all its parts, and the various parts of which contain\nnothing which is really inconsistent, however diverse and accidental\nthey may appear to be, and however much they may seem to contradict one\nanother. This particular stage is the product of the one preceding. But\nto show how the spirit of a particular time moulds its whole actuality\nand destiny in accordance with its principle, to show this whole\nedifice in its conception, is far from us\u2014for that would be the object\nof the whole philosophic world-history. Those forms alone concern us\nwhich express the principle of the Mind in a spiritual element related\nto Philosophy.\n\nThis is the position of Philosophy amongst its varying forms, from\nwhich it follows that it is entirely identical with its time. But\nif Philosophy does not stand above its time in content, it does so\nin form, because, as the thought and knowledge of that which is the\nsubstantial spirit of its time, it makes that spirit its object. In\nas far as Philosophy is in the spirit of its time, the latter is its\ndetermined content in the world, although as knowledge, Philosophy is\nabove it, since it places it in the relation of object. But this is in\nform alone, for Philosophy really has no other content. This knowledge\nitself undoubtedly is the actuality of Mind, the self-knowledge of Mind\nwhich previously was not present: thus the formal difference is also a\nreal and actual difference. Through knowledge, Mind makes manifest a\ndistinction between knowledge and that which is; this knowledge is thus\nwhat produces a new form of development. The new forms at first are\nonly special modes of knowledge, and it is thus that a new Philosophy\nis produced: yet since it already is a wider kind of spirit, it is the\ninward birthplace of the spirit which will later arrive at actual form.\nWe shall deal further with this in the concrete below, and we shall\nthen see that what the Greek Philosophy was, entered, in the Christian\nworld, into actuality.\n\n\n2. SEPARATION OF PHILOSOPHY FROM OTHER ALLIED DEPARTMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE.\n\nThe history of the other Sciences, of culture and above all the history\nof art and of religion are, partly in regard to the elements contained\nin them, and partly to their particular objects, related to the history\nof Philosophy. It is through this relationship that the treatment\nof the history of Philosophy has been so confused. If it is to\nconcern itself with the possession of culture generally and then with\nscientific culture, and then again with popular myths and the dogmas\ncontained only in them, and yet farther with the religious reflections\nwhich are already thoughts of a speculative kind, and which make their\nappearance in them, no bounds are left to Philosophy at all. This is\nso, partly on account of the amount of material itself and the labour\nrequired in working it up and preparing it, and partly because it is in\nimmediate connection with so much else. But the separation must not be\nmade arbitrarily or as by chance, but must be derived from fundamental\ndeterminations. If we merely look at the name of Philosophy, all this\nmatter will pertain to its history.\n\nI shall speak of this material from three points of view, for three\nrelated aspects are to be eliminated and separated from Philosophy. The\nfirst of these is that which is generally considered to be the domain\nof science, and in which are found the beginnings of understanding\nthought. The second region is that of mythology and religion; the\nrelation of Philosophy to them seems often to be inimical both in\nthe time of the Greeks and of the Christians. The third is that of\nphilosophizing and the metaphysics of the understanding. While we\ndistinguish what is related to Philosophy, we must also take note of\nthe elements in this related matter which belong to the Notion of\nPhilosophy, but which appear to us to be partially separated from it:\nand thus we may become acquainted with the Notion of Philosophy.\n\n\na. _Relation of Philosophy to Scientific Knowledge._\n\nKnowledge and thought certainly form the element of whatever has to do\nwith particular sciences as they form the element of Philosophy; but\ntheir subjects are mainly finite subjects and appearance. A collection\nof facts known about this content is by its nature excluded from\nPhilosophy: neither this content nor such a form has anything to do\nwith it. But even if the sciences are systematic and contain universal\nprinciples and laws from which they proceed, they are still related to\na limited circle of objects. The ultimate principles are assumed as are\nthe objects themselves; that is, the outward experience or the feelings\nof the heart, natural or educated sense of right and duty, constitute\nthe source from which they are created. Logic and the determinations\nand principles of thought in general are in their methods assumed.\n\nThe forms of thought or the points of view and principles which hold\ngood in the sciences and constitute the ultimate support of all their\nmatter, are not peculiar to them, but are common to the condition\nand culture of the time and of the people. This culture consists\nmainly in the general ideas and aims, in the whole extent of the\nparticular intellectual powers dominating consciousness and life. Our\nconsciousness has these ideas and allows them to be considered ultimate\ndeterminations; it makes use of them as guiding and connecting links,\nbut does not know them and does not even make them the objects of its\nconsideration. To give an abstract example, each act of consciousness\nhas and requires the whole abstract thought-determination of Being.\n\u201cThe sun is in the heavens, the bunch of grapes is ripe,\u201d and so on\ninto infinitude. Again, in a higher culture, such relations as those\nof cause and effect are involved, as also those of force and its\nmanifestation. All its knowledge and ideas are permeated and governed\nby a metaphysic such as this; it is the net in which all the concrete\nmatter which occupies mankind in action and in impulses, is grasped.\nBut this web and its knots in our ordinary consciousness are sunk into\na manifold material, for it contains the objects and interests which we\nknow and which we have before us. These common threads are not drawn up\nand made explicitly the objects of our reflection.\n\nWe Germans seldom now count general scientific knowledge as Philosophy.\nAnd yet traces of this are found, as for instance, in the fact that\nthe philosophic Faculty contains all the Sciences which have not as\ntheir immediate aim the Church and State. In connection with this,\nthe significance of the name of Philosophy, which is even now an\nimportant matter of discussion in England, comes in question. Natural\nSciences are in England called Philosophy. A \u201cPhilosophic Journal\u201d\nin England, edited by Thompson, treats of Chemistry, Agriculture,\nManuring, Husbandry, Technology, like Hermbst\u00e4dt\u2019s Journal, and gives\ninventions connected therewith. The English call physical instruments,\nsuch as the barometer and thermometer, philosophical instruments.\nTheories too, and especially morality and the moral sciences, which\nare derived from the feelings of the human heart or from experience,\nare called Philosophy, and finally this is also so with the theories\nand principles of Political Economy. And thus at least in England, is\nthe name of Philosophy respected. Some time ago a banquet took place\nunder the presidency of Lord Liverpool, at which the minister Canning\nwas also present. The latter in returning thanks congratulated England\nin having philosophic principles of government there brought into\noperation. There, at least, Philosophy is no by-word.\n\nIn the first beginnings of culture, however, we are more often met by\nthis admixture of Philosophy and general knowledge. There comes a time\nto a nation when mind applies itself to universal objects, when, for\nexample, in seeking to bring natural things under general modes of\nunderstanding, it tries to learn their causes. Then it is said that a\npeople begins to philosophize, for this content has thought in common\nwith Philosophy. At such a time we find deliverances about all the\ncommon events of Nature, as we also find intellectual maxims, moral\nsentences, general principles respecting morality, the will, duty,\nand the like, and those who expressed them have been called wise men\nor philosophers. Thus in the beginnings of Greek Philosophy we find\nthe seven sages and the Ionic Philosophers. From them a number of\nideas and discoveries are conveyed to us which seem like philosophic\npropositions. Thus Thales, amongst others, has explained that the\neclipse of sun and moon is due to the intervention of the moon or\nearth. This is called a theorem. Pythagoras found out the principle\nof the harmony of sounds. Others have had ideas about the stars: the\nheavens were supposed to be composed of perforated metal, by which we\nsee throughout the empyrean region, the eternal fire which surrounds\nthe world. Such propositions as products of the understanding, do not\nbelong to the history of Philosophy, although they imply that the\nmerely sensuous gaze has been left behind, as also the representation\nof those objects by the imagination only. Earth and heaven thus become\nunpeopled with gods, because the understanding distinguishes things in\ntheir outward and natural qualities from Mind.\n\nIn a later time the epoch of the revival in the sciences is as\nnoteworthy in this respect. General principles regarding the state,\n&c., were given expression to, and in them a philosophic side cannot be\nmistaken. To this place the philosophic systems of Hobbes and Descartes\nbelong: the writings of the latter contain philosophic principles, but\nhis Philosophy of Nature is quite empirical. Hugo Grotius composed\nan international law in which what was historically held by the\npeople as law, the _consensus gentium_, was a main element. Though,\nearlier, medicine was a collection of isolated facts and a theosophic\ncombination mixed up with astrology, &c. (it is not so long ago since\ncures were effected by sacred relics), a mode of regarding nature\ncame into vogue according to which men went forth to discover the\nlaws and forces of Nature. The _\u00e0 priori_ reasoning regarding natural\nthings, according to the metaphysics of the Scholastic Philosophy or\nto Religion, has now been given up. The Philosophy of Newton contains\nnothing but Natural Science, that is, the knowledge of the laws,\nforces, and general constitution of Nature, derived from observation\nand from experience. However much this may seem to be contrary to the\nprinciple of Philosophy, it has in common with it the fact that the\nbases of both are universal, and still further that _I_ have made\nthis experience, that it rests on my consciousness and obtains its\nsignificance through me.\n\nThis form is in its general aspect antagonistic to the positive, and\nhas come forward as particularly opposed to Religion and to that which\nis positive in it. If, in the Middle Ages, the Church had its dogmas\nas universal truths, man, on the contrary, has now obtained from the\ntestimony of his \u201cown thought,\u201d feeling and ideas, a mistrust of these.\nIt is merely to be remarked of this that \u201cmy own thought\u201d is in itself\na pleonasm, because each individual must think for himself, and no one\ncan do so for another. Similarly this principle has turned against the\nrecognized constitutions and has sought different principles instead,\nby them to correct the former. Universal principles of the State have\nnow been laid down, while earlier, because religion was positive, the\nground of obedience of subjects to princes and of all authority were\nalso so. Kings, as the anointed of the Lord, in the sense that Jewish\nkings were so, derived their power from God, and had to give account to\nHim alone, because all authority is given by God. So far theology and\njurisprudence were on the whole fixed and positive sciences, wherever\nthis positive character might have been derived. Against this external\nauthority reflection has been brought to bear, and thus, especially\nin England, the source of public and civil law became no longer mere\nauthority derived from God like the Mosaic Law. For the authority of\nkings other justification was sought, such as the end implied in the\nState, the good of the people. This forms quite another source of\ntruth, and it is opposed to that which is revealed, given and positive.\nThis substitution of another ground than that of authority has been\ncalled philosophizing.\n\nThe knowledge was then a knowledge of what is finite\u2014the world of\nthe content of knowledge. Because this content proceeded through\nthe personal insight of human reason, man has become independent in\nhis actions. This independence of the Mind is the true moment of\nPhilosophy, although the Notion of Philosophy through this formal\ndetermination, which limits it to finite objects, has not yet been\nexhausted. This independent thought is respected, has been called\nhuman wisdom or worldly wisdom, for it has had what is earthly as its\nobject, and it took its origin in the world. This was the meaning of\nPhilosophy, and men did rightly to call it worldly wisdom. Frederick\nvon Schlegel revived this by-name for Philosophy, and desired to\nindicate by it that what concerns higher spheres, such as religion,\nmust be kept apart; and he had many followers. Philosophy, indeed,\noccupies itself with finite things, but, according to Spinoza, as\nresting in the divine Idea: it has thus the same end as religion. To\nthe finite sciences which are now separated also from Philosophy, the\nChurches objected that they led men away from God, since they have as\nobjects only what is finite. This defect in them, conceived of from the\npoint of view of content, leads us to the second department allied to\nPhilosophy,\u2014that is, to Religion.\n\n\nb. _Relation of Philosophy to Religion.\n\n_As the first department of knowledge was related to Philosophy\nprincipally by means of formal and independent knowledge, Religion,\nthough in its content quite different from this first kind or sphere\nof knowledge, is through it related to Philosophy. Its object is not\nthe earthly and worldly, but the infinite. In the case of art and\nstill more in that of Religion, Philosophy has in common a content\ncomposed entirely of universal objects; they constitute the mode in\nwhich the highest Idea is existent for the unphilosophical feeling, the\nperceiving and imagining consciousness. Inasmuch as in the progress of\nculture in time the manifestation of Religion precedes the appearance\nof Philosophy, this circumstance must really be taken account of, and\nthe conditions requisite for beginning the History of Philosophy have\nto depend on this, because it has to be shown in how far what pertains\nto Religion is to be excluded from it, and that a commencement must not\nbe made with Religion.\n\nIn Religion, races of men have undoubtedly expressed their idea of the\nnature of the world, the substance of nature and of intellect and the\nrelation of man thereto. Absolute Being is here the object of their\nconsciousness; and as such, is for them pre-eminently the \u201cother,\u201d a\n\u201cbeyond,\u201d nearer or further off, more or less friendly or frightful\nand alarming. In the act and forms of worship this opposition is\nremoved by man, and he raises himself to the consciousness of unity\nwith his Being, to the feeling of, or dependence on, the Grace of\nGod, in that God has reconciled mankind to Himself. In conception,\nwith the Greeks, for instance, this existence is to man one which is\nalready in and for itself and friendly, and thus worship is but the\nenjoyment of this unity. This existence is now reason which is existent\nin and for itself, the universal and concrete substance, the Mind\nwhose first cause is objective to itself in consciousness; it thus is\na representation of this last in which not only reason in general,\nbut the universal infinite reason is. We must, therefore, comprehend\nReligion, as Philosophy, before everything else, which means to know\nand apprehend it in reason; for it is the work of self-revealing reason\nand is the highest form of reason. Such ideas as that priests have\nframed a people\u2019s Religion in fraud and self-interest are consequently\nabsurd; to regard Religion as an arbitrary matter or a deception is as\nfoolish as it is perverted. Priests have often profaned Religion\u2014the\npossibility of which is a consequence of the external relations\nand temporal existence of Religion. It can thus, in this external\nconnection, be laid hold of here and there, but because it is Religion,\nit is really that which stands firm against finite ends and their\ncomplications and constitutes a region exalted high above them. This\nregion of Mind is really the Holy place of Truth itself, the Holy place\nin which are dissolved the remaining illusions of the sensuous world,\nof finite ideas and ends, and of the sphere of opinion and caprice.\n\nInasmuch as it really is the content of religions, this rational matter\nmight now seem to be capable of being abstracted and expressed as a\nnumber of historical theorems. Philosophy stands on the same basis\nas Religion and has the same object\u2014the universal reason existing\nin and for itself; Mind desires to make this object its own, as is\ndone with Religion in the act and form of worship. But the form, as\nit is present in Religion, is different from what is found to be\ncontained in Philosophy, and on this account a history of Philosophy\nis different from a history of Religion. Worship is only the operation\nof reflection; Philosophy attempts to bring about the reconciliation\nby means of thinking knowledge, because Mind desires to take up its\nBeing into itself. Philosophy is related in the form of thinking\nconsciousness to its object; with Religion it is different. But the\ndistinction between the two should not be conceived of so abstractly as\nto make it seem that thought is only in Philosophy and not in Religion.\nThe latter has likewise ideas and universal thoughts. Because both are\nso nearly related, it is an old tradition in the history of Philosophy\nto deduce Philosophy from Persian, Indian, or similar philosophy, a\ncustom which is still partly retained in all histories of Philosophy.\nFor this reason, too, it is a legend universally believed, that\nPythagoras, for instance, received his Philosophy from India and Egypt;\nthe fame of the wisdom of these people, which wisdom is understood also\nto contain Philosophy, is an old one. The Oriental ideas and religious\nworship which prevailed throughout the West up to the time of the Roman\nEmpire, likewise bear the name of Oriental Philosophy. The Christian\nReligion and Philosophy are thought of in the Christian world, as more\ndefinitely divided; in these Eastern days, on the other hand, Religion\nand Philosophy are still conceived of as one in so far as that the\ncontent has remained in the form in which it is Philosophy. Considering\nthe prevalence of these ideas and in order to have a definite limit to\nthe relations between a history of Philosophy and religious ideas, it\nis desirable to note some further considerations as to the form which\nseparates religious ideas from philosophical theorems.\n\nReligion has not only universal thought as inward content _implicite_\ncontained in its myths, ideas, imaginations and in its exact and\npositive histories, so that we require first of all to dig this\ncontent out of such myths in the form of theorems, but it often has\nits content _explicite_ in the form of thought. In the Persian and\nIndian Religions very deep, sublime and speculative thoughts are even\nexpressed. Indeed, in Religion we even meet philosophies directly\nexpressed, as in the Philosophy of the Fathers. The scholastic\nPhilosophy really was Theology; there is found in it a union or, if you\nwill, a mixture of Theology and Philosophy which may very well puzzle\nus. The question which confronts us on the one side is, how Philosophy\ndiffers from Theology, as the science of Religion, or from Religion\nas consciousness? And then, in how far have we in the history of\nPhilosophy to take account of what pertains to Religion? For the reply\nto this last question three aspects have again to be dealt with; first\nof all the mythical and historical aspect of Religion and its relation\nto Philosophy; in the second place the theorems and speculative\nthoughts directly expressed in Religion; and in the third place we must\nspeak of Philosophy within Theology.\n\n\n_\u03b1. Difference between Philosophy and Religion._\n\nThe consideration of the mythical aspect of Religion or the historical\nand positive side generally, is interesting, because from it the\ndifference in respect of form will show in what this content is\nantagonistic to Philosophy. Indeed, taken in its connections, its\ndifference passes into apparent inconsistency. This diversity is not\nonly found in our contemplation but forms a very definite element\nin history. It is required by Philosophy that it should justify its\nbeginning and its manner of knowledge, and Philosophy has thus placed\nitself in opposition to Religion. On the other hand Philosophy is\ncombated and condemned by Religion and by the Churches. The Greek\npopular religion indeed, proscribed several philosophers; but the\nopposition is even more apparent in the Christian Church. The question\nis thus not only whether regard is to be paid to Religion in the\nhistory of Philosophy, for it has been the case that Philosophy has\npaid attention to Religion, and the latter to the former. Since neither\nof the two has allowed the other to rest undisturbed, we are not\npermitted to do so either. Of their relations, therefore, we must speak\ndefinitely, openly and honestly\u2014_aborder la question_, as the French\nsay. We must not hesitate, as if such a discussion were too delicate,\nnor try to help ourselves out by beating about the bush; nor must we\nseek to find evasions or shifts, so that in the end no one can tell\nwhat we mean. We must not seem to wish to leave Religion alone. This is\nnothing else than to appear to wish to conceal the fact that Philosophy\nhas directed its efforts against Religion. Religion, that is, the\ntheologians, are indeed the cause of this; they ignore Philosophy, but\nonly in order that they may not be contradicted in their arbitrary\nreasoning.\n\nIt may appear as if Religion demanded that man should abstain from\nthinking of universal matters and Philosophy because they are merely\nworldly wisdom and represent human operations. Human reason is\nhere opposed to the divine. Men are, indeed, well accustomed to a\ndistinction between divine teaching and laws and human power and\ninventions, such that under the latter everything is comprehended which\nin its manifestation proceeds from the consciousness, the intelligence\nor the will of mankind; which makes all this opposed to the knowledge\nof God and to things rendered divine by divine revelation. But the\ndepreciation of what is human expressed by this opposition is then\ndriven further still, inasmuch as while it implies the further view\nthat man is certainly called upon to admire the wisdom of God in\nNature, and that the grain, the mountains, the cedars of Lebanon in all\ntheir glory, the song of the birds in the bough, the superior skill\nand the domestic instincts of animals are all magnified as being the\nwork of God, it also implies that the wisdom, goodness and justice of\nGod is, indeed, pointed out in human affairs, but not so much in the\ndisposition or laws of man or in actions performed voluntarily and in\nthe ordinary progress of the world, as in human destiny, that is, in\nthat which is external and even arbitrary in relation to knowledge\nand free-will. Thus what is external and accidental is regarded as\nemphatically the work of God, and what has its root in will and\nconscience, as the work of man. The harmony between outward relations,\ncircumstances and events and the general aims of man is certainly\nsomething of a higher kind, but this is the case only for the reason\nthat this harmony is considered with respect to ends which are human\nand not natural\u2014such as those present in the life of a sparrow which\nfinds its food. But if the summit of everything is found in this, that\nGod rules over Nature, what then is free-will? Does He not rule over\nwhat is spiritual, or rather since He himself is spiritual, in what\nis spiritual? and is not the ruler over or in the spiritual region\nhigher than a ruler over or in Nature? But is that admiration of God as\nrevealed in natural things as such, in trees and animals as opposed to\nwhat is human, far removed from the religion of the ancient Egyptians,\nwhich derived its knowledge of what is divine from the ibis, or from\ncats and dogs? or does it differ from the deplorable condition of the\nancient and the modern Indians, who held and still hold cows and apes\nin reverence, and are scrupulously concerned for the maintenance and\nnourishment of these animals, while they allow men to suffer hunger;\nwho would commit a crime by removing the pangs of starvation through\ntheir slaughter or even by partaking of their food?\n\nIt seems to be expressed by such a view that human action as regards\nNature is ungodly; that the operations of Nature are divine operations,\nbut what man produces is ungodly. But the productions of human reason\nmight, at least, be esteemed as much as Nature. In so doing, however,\nwe cede less to reason than is permitted to us. If the life and the\naction of animals be divine, human action must stand much higher, and\nmust be worthy to be called divine in an infinitely higher sense. The\npreeminence of human thought must forthwith be avowed. Christ says on\nthis subject (Matt. vi. 26-80), \u201cBehold the fowls of the air,\u201d (in\nwhich we may also include the Ibis and the _Kokilas_,) \u201care ye not much\nbetter than they? Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field,\nwhich to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, shall He not\nmuch more clothe you?\u201d The superiority of man, of the image of God, to\nanimals and plants is indeed implicitly and explicitly established,\nbut in asking wherein the divine element is to be sought and seen\u2014in\nmaking use of such expressions\u2014none of the superior, but only the\ninferior nature, is indicated. Similarly, in regard to the knowledge of\nGod, it is remarkable that Christ places the knowledge of and faith in\nHim not in any admiration of the creatures of nature nor in marvelling\nat any so-called dominion, over them, nor in signs and wonders, but in\nthe witness of the Spirit. Spirit is infinitely high above Nature, in\nit the Divine Nature manifests itself more than in Nature.\n\nBut the form in which the universal content which is in and for itself,\nfirst belongs to Philosophy is the form of Thought, the form of the\nuniversal itself. In Religion, however, this content is for immediate\nand outward perception, and further for idea and sensation through art.\nThe import is for the sensuous nature; it is the evidence of the Mind\nwhich comprehends that content. To make this clearer, the difference\nmust be recollected between that which we are and have, and how we know\nthe same\u2014that is, in what manner we know it and have it as our object.\nThis distinction is an infinitely important matter, and it alone is\nconcerned in the culture of races and of individuals. We are men and\nhave reason; what is human, or above all, what is rational vibrates\nwithin us, both in our feelings, mind and heart and in our subjective\nnature generally. It is in this corresponding vibration and in the\ncorresponding motion effected that a particular content becomes our own\nand is like our own. The manifold nature of the determinations which\nit contains is concentrated and wrapt up within this inward nature\u2014an\nobscure motion of Mind in itself and in universal substantiality. The\ncontent is thus directly identical with the simple abstract certainty\nof ourselves and with self-consciousness. But Mind, because it is\nMind, is as truly consciousness. What is confined within itself in its\nsimplicity must be objective to itself and must come to be known. The\nwhole difference lies in the manner and method of this objectivity, and\nhence in the manner and method of consciousness.\n\nThis method and manner extends from the simple expression of the\ndulness of mere feeling to the most objective form, to that which is\nin and for itself objective, to Thought. The most simple, most formal\nobjectivity is the expression of a name for that feeling and for the\nstate of mind according with it, as seen in these words, worship,\nprayer, etc. Such expressions as \u201cLet us pray\u201d and \u201cLet us worship\u201d\nare simply the recalling of that feeling. But \u201cLet us think about God\u201d\nbrings with it something more; it expresses the absolutely embracing\ncontent of that substantial feeling, and the object, which differs\nfrom mere sensation as subjective self-conscious activity; or which is\ncontent distinguished from this activity as form. This object, however,\ncomprehending in itself the whole substantial content, is itself still\nundeveloped and entirely undetermined. To develop that content, to\ncomprehend, express and bring to consciousness its relations, is the\ncommencement, creation and manifestation of Religion. The form in which\nthis developed content first possesses objectivity is that of immediate\nperception, of sensuous idea or of a more defined idea deduced from\nnatural, physical or mental manifestations and conditions.\n\nArt brings about this consciousness, in that it gives permanence and\ncohesion to the fleeting visible appearance through which objectivity\npasses in sensation. The shapeless, sacred stone, the mere place, or\nwhatever it is to which the desire for objectivity first attaches\nitself, receives from art, form, feature, determinate character and\ncontent which can be known and which is now present for consciousness.\nArt has thus become the instructress of the people. This was the case\nwith Homer and Hesiod for instance, who, according to Herodotus (II.\n53), \u201cMade the Greeks their Theogony,\u201d because they elevated and\nconsolidated ideas and traditions in unison with the spirit of the\npeople, wherever and in whatever confusion they might be found, into\ndefinite images and ideas. This is not the art which merely gives\nexpression in its own way to the content, already perfectly expressed,\nof a Religion which in thought, idea and words has already attained\ncomplete development; that is to say, which puts its matter into stone,\ncanvas, or words as is done by modern art, which, in dealing either\nwith religious or with historical objects, takes as its groundwork\nideas and thoughts which are already there. The consciousness of this\nReligion is rather the product of thinking imagination, or of thought\nwhich comprehends through the organ of imagination alone and finds\nexpression in its forms.\n\nIf the infinite Thought, the absolute Mind, has revealed and does\nreveal itself in true Religion, that in which it reveals itself is the\nheart, the representing consciousness and the understanding of what\nis finite. Religion is not merely directed to every sort of culture.\n\u201cTo the poor is the Gospel preached,\u201d but it must as being Religion\nexpressly directed towards heart and mind, enter into the sphere of\nsubjectivity and consequently into the region of finite methods of\nrepresentation. In the perceiving and, with reference to perceptions,\nreflecting consciousness, man possesses for the speculative relations\nbelonging to the absolute, only finite relations, whether taken in an\nexact or in a symbolical sense, to serve him to comprehend and express\nthose qualities and relationships of the infinite.\n\nIn Religion as the earliest and the immediate revelations of God, the\nform of representation and of reflecting finite thought cannot be the\nonly form in which He gives existence to Himself in consciousness, but\nit must also appear in this form, for such alone is comprehensible\nto religious consciousness. To make this clearer, something must be\nsaid as to what is the meaning of comprehension. On the one hand,\nas has been remarked above, there is in it the substantial basis of\ncontent, which, coming to Mind as its absolute Being, affects it in\nits innermost, finds an answering chord, and thereby obtains from\nit confirmation. This is the first absolute condition necessary to\ncomprehension; what is not implicitly there cannot come within it or\nbe for it\u2014that is, a content which is infinite and eternal. For the\nsubstantial as infinite, is just that which has no limitations in that\nto which it is related, for else it would be limited and not the true\nsubstantial. And Mind is that alone which is not implicit, which is\nfinite and external; for what is finite and external is no longer what\nis implicit but what is for another, what has entered into a relation.\nBut, on the other hand, because the true and eternal must be for Mind\nbecome known, that is, enter into finite consciousness, the Mind for\nwhich it is, is finite and the manner of its consciousness consists\nin the ideas and forms of finite things and relations. These forms\nare familiar and well known to consciousness, the ordinary mode of\nfinality, which mode it has appropriated to itself, having constituted\nit the universal medium of its representation, into which everything\nthat comes to consciousness must be resolved in order that it may have\nand know itself therein.\n\nThe assertion of Religion is that the manifestation of Truth which\nis revealed to us through it, is one which is given to man from\noutside, and on this account it is also asserted that man has humbly\nto assent to it, because human reason cannot attain to it by itself.\nThe assertion of positive Religion is that its truths exist without\nhaving their source known, so that the content as given, is one which\nis above and beyond reason. By means of some prophet or other divine\ninstrument, the truth is made known: just as Ceres and Triptolemus who\nintroduced agriculture and matrimony, for so doing were honoured by\nthe Greeks, men have rendered thanks to Moses and to Mahomed. Through\nwhatever individual the Truth may have been given, the external matter\nis historical, and this is indifferent to the absolute content and to\nitself, since the person is not the import of the doctrine. But the\nChristian Religion has this characteristic that the Person of Christ\nin His character of the Son of God, Himself partakes of the nature\nof God. If Christ be for Christians only a teacher like Pythagoras,\nSocrates or Columbus, there would be here no universal divine content,\nno revelation or knowledge imparted about the Nature of God, and it is\nregarding this alone that we desire to obtain knowledge.\n\nWhatever stage it may itself have reached, the Truth must undoubtedly\nin the first place come to men from without as a present object,\nsensuously represented, just as Moses saw God in the fiery bush, and as\nthe Greek brought the god into conscious being by means of sculpture\nor other representations. But there is the further fact, that neither\nin Religion nor in Philosophy does this external form remain, nor can\nit so remain. A form of the imagination or an historical form, such\nas Christ, must for the spirit be spiritual; and thus it ceases to be\nan external matter, seeing that the form of externality is dead. We\nmust know God \u201cin Spirit and in Truth.\u201d He is the absolute and actual\nSpirit. The relation borne by the human spirit to this Spirit involves\nthe following considerations.\n\nWhen man determines to adopt a Religion he asks himself, \u201cWhat is the\nground of my faith?\u201d The Christian Religion replies\u2014\u201cThe Spirit\u2019s\nwitness to its content.\u201d Christ reproved the Pharisees for wishing to\nsee miracles; the Spirit alone comprehends Spirit, the miracle is only\na presentiment of that Spirit; and if the miracle be the suspension\nof natural laws, Spirit itself is the real miracle in the operations\nof nature. Spirit in itself is merely this comprehension of itself.\nThere is only one Spirit, the universal divine Spirit. Not that it\nis merely everywhere; it is not to be comprehended as what is common\nto everything, as an external totality, to be found in many or in\nall individuals, which are essentially individuals; but it must be\nunderstood as that which permeates through everything, as the unity\nof itself and of a semblance of its \u201cother,\u201d as of the subjective and\nparticular. As universal, it is object to itself, and thus determined\nas a particular, it is this individual: but as universal it reaches\nover this its \u201cother,\u201d so that its \u201cother\u201d and itself are comprised in\none. The true universality seems, popularly expressed, to be two\u2014what\nis common to the universal itself and to the particular. A division\nis formed in the understanding of itself, and the Spirit is the unity\nof what is understood and the understanding person. The divine Spirit\nwhich is comprehended, is objective; the subjective Spirit comprehends.\nBut Spirit is not passive, or else the passivity can be momentary only;\nthere is one spiritual substantial unity. The subjective Spirit is the\nactive, but the objective Spirit is itself this activity; the active\nsubjective Spirit is that which comprehends the divine, and in its\ncomprehension of it it is itself the divine Spirit. The relation of\nSpirit to self alone is the absolute determination; the divine Spirit\nlives in its own communion and presence. This comprehension has been\ncalled Faith, but it is not an historical faith; we Lutherans\u2014I am\na Lutheran and will remain the same\u2014have only this original faith.\nThis unity is not the Substance of Spinoza, but the apprehending\nSubstance in self-consciousness which makes itself eternal and relates\nto universality. The talk about the limitations of human thought is\nfutile; to know God is the only end of Religion. The testimony of the\nSpirit to the content of Religion is itself Religion; it is a testimony\nthat both bears witness and at the same time is that witness. The\nSpirit proves itself, and does so first in the proof; it is only proved\nbecause it proves itself and shows or manifests itself.\n\nIt has further to be said, that this testimony, this inward stirring\nand self-consciousness, reveals itself, while in the enshrouded\nconsciousness of devotion it does not arrive at the proper\nconsciousness of an object, but only at the consciousness of immersion\nin absolute Being. This permeating and permeated Spirit now enters\ninto conception; God goes forth into the \u201cother\u201d and makes Himself\nobjective. All that pertains to revelation and its reception, and\nwhich comes before us in mythology, here appears; everything which is\nhistorical and which belongs to what is positive has here its proper\nplace. To speak more definitely, we now have the Christ who came into\nthe world nearly two thousand years ago. But He says, \u201cI am with you\neven unto the ends of the earth; where two or three are gathered\ntogether in My Name, there will I be in the midst.\u201d I shall not be seen\nof you in the flesh, but \u201cThe Spirit of Truth will guide you into all\nTruth.\u201d The external is not the true relation; it will disappear.\n\nThe two stages have here been given, the first of which is the stage\nof devotion, of worship, such as that reached in partaking of the\nCommunion. That is the perception of the divine Spirit in the community\nin which the present, indwelling, living Christ as self-consciousness\nhas attained to actuality. The second stage is that of developed\nconsciousness, when the content becomes the object; here this present,\nindwelling Christ retreats two thousand years to a small corner of\nPalestine, and is an individual historically manifested far away at\nNazareth or Jerusalem. It is the same thing in the Greek Religion where\nthe god present in devotion changes into prosaic statues and marble;\nor in painting, where this externality is likewise arrived at, when\nthe god becomes mere canvas or wood. The Supper is, according to the\nLutheran conception, of Faith alone; it is a divine satisfaction,\nand is not adored as if it were the Host. Thus a sacred image is no\nmore to us than is a stone or thing. The second point of view must\nindeed be that with which consciousness begins; it must start from the\nexternal comprehension of this form: it must passively accept report\nand take it up into memory. But if it remain where it is, that is the\nunspiritual point of view; to remain fixed in this second standpoint\nin this dead far-away historic distance, is to reject the Spirit. The\nsins of him who lies against the Holy Ghost cannot be forgiven. That\nlie is the refusal to be a universal, to be holy, that is to make\nChrist become divided, separated, to make Him only another person as\nthis particular person in Judea; or else to say that He now exists, but\nonly far away in Heaven, or in some other place, and not in present\nactual form amongst His people. The man who speaks of the _merely_\nfinite, of _merely_ human reason, and of the limits to mere reason,\nlies against the Spirit, for the Spirit as infinite and universal, as\nself-comprehension, comprehends itself not in a \u201cmerely\u201d nor in limits,\nnor in the finite as such. It has nothing to do with this, for it\ncomprehends itself within itself alone, in its infinitude.\n\nIf it be said of Philosophy that it makes reality the subject of its\nknowledge, the principal point is that the reality should not be one\noutside of that of which it is the reality. For example, if from the\nreal content of a book, I abstract the binding, paper, ink, language,\nthe many thousand letters that are contained in it, the simple\nuniversal content as reality, is not outside of the book. Similarly\nlaw is not outside of the individual, but it constitutes the true\nBeing of the individual. The reality of my Mind is thus in my Mind\nitself and not outside of it; it is my real Being, my own substance,\nwithout which I am without existence. This reality is, so to speak, the\ncombustible material which may be kindled and lit up by the universal\nreality as such as objective; and only so far as this phosphorus is\nin men, is comprehension, the kindling and lighting up, possible.\nFeeling, anticipation, knowledge of God, are only thus in men; without\nsuch, the divine Mind would not be the in and for itself Universal.\nReality is itself a real content and not the destitute of content\nand undetermined; yet, as the book has other content besides, there\nis in the individual mind also a great amount of other matter which\nbelongs only to the manifestation of this reality, and the individual\nsurrounded with what is external, must be separated from this\nexistence. Since reality is itself Spirit and not an abstraction, \u201cGod\nis not a God for the dead but for the living,\u201d and indeed for living\nspirits.\n\n The great Creator was alone\n And experienced desire,\n Therefore He created Spirits,\n Holy mirrors of His holiness.\n The noblest Being He found no equal;\n From out the bowl of all the spiritual world,\n There sparkled up to Him infinitude.\n\nReligion is also the point of view from which this existence is known.\nBut as regards the different forms of knowledge existing in Religion\nand Philosophy, Philosophy appears to be opposed to the conception in\nReligion that the universal mind first shows itself as external, in the\nobjective mode of consciousness. Worship, commencing with the external,\nthen turns against and abrogates it as has just been said, and thus\nPhilosophy is justified through the acts and forms of worship, and only\ndoes what they do. Philosophy has to deal with two different objects;\nfirst as in the Religion present in worship, with the substantial\ncontent, the spiritual soul, and secondly with bringing this before\nconsciousness as object, but in the form of thought. Philosophy\nthinks and conceives of that which Religion represents as the object\nof consciousness, whether it is as the work of the imagination or as\nexistent facts in history. The form of the knowledge of the object\nis, in religious consciousness, such as pertains to the ordinary\nidea, and is thus more or less sensuous in nature. In Philosophy\nwe do not say that God begot a Son, which is a relation derived\nfrom natural life. Thought, or the substance of such a relation, is\ntherefore still recognized in Philosophy. Since Philosophy thinks its\nobject, it has the advantage of uniting the two stages of religious\nconsciousness\u2014which in Religion are different moments\u2014into one unity\nin philosophic thought.\n\nIt is these two forms which are different from one another and which,\nas opposed, may therefore seem to be mutually conflicting; and it\nis natural and it necessarily seems to be the case, that on first\ndefinitely coming to view they are so to speak conscious of their\ndiversity, and hence at first appear as inimical to one another. The\nfirst stage in the order of manifestation is definite existence, or\na determinate Being-for-self as opposed to the other. The later form\nis that Thought embraces itself in the concrete, immerses itself in\nitself, and Mind, as such, comes in it to consciousness. In the earlier\nstage, Mind is abstract, and in this constraint it knows itself to be\ndifferent, and in opposition to the other. When it embraces itself in\nthe concrete, it is no more simply confined in determinate existence,\nonly knowing or possessing itself in that diversity, but it is the\nUniversal which, inasmuch as it determines itself, contains its \u201cother\u201d\nwithin itself. As concrete intelligence, Mind thus comprehends the\nsubstantial in the form which seemed to differ from it, of which it had\nonly grasped the outward manifestation and had turned away from it; it\nrecognizes itself in its inward content, and so it for the first time\ngrasps its object, and deals justice to its opposite.\n\nGenerally speaking, the course of this antithesis in history is that\nThought first of all comes forth within Religion, as not free and in\nseparate manifestations. Secondly, it strengthens itself, feels itself\nto be resting upon itself, holds and conducts itself inimically towards\nthe other form, and does not recognize itself therein. In the third\nplace, it concludes by acknowledging itself as in this other. Or else\nPhilosophy has to begin with carrying on its work entirely on its\nown account, isolating Thought from all popular beliefs, and taking\nfor itself quite a different field of operation, a field for which\nthe world of ordinary ideas lies quite apart, so that the two exist\npeacefully side by side, or, to put it better, so that no reflection\non their opposition is arrived at. Just as little did the thought of\nreconciling them occur, since in the popular beliefs the same content\nappeared as in any external form other than the notion\u2014the thought\nthat is, of explaining and justifying popular belief, in order thus to\nbe able again to express the conceptions of free thought in the form of\npopular religion.\n\nThus we see Philosophy first restrained and confined within the range\nof the Greek heathen world; then resting upon itself, it goes forth\nagainst popular religion and takes up an unfriendly attitude to it,\nuntil it grasps that religion in its innermost and recognizes itself\ntherein. Thus the ancient Greek philosophers generally respected the\npopular religion, or at least they did not oppose it, or reflect upon\nit. Those coming later, including even Xenophanes, handled popular\nideas most severely, and thus many so-called atheists made their\nappearance. But as the spheres of popular conception, and abstract\nthought stood peacefully side by side, we also find Greek philosophers\nof even a later period in development, in whose case speculative\nthought and the act of worship, as also the pious invocation upon\nand sacrifice to the gods, coexist in good faith, and not in mere\nhypocrisy. Socrates was accused of teaching other gods than those\nbelonging to the popular religion; his _\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd_ was indeed opposed\nto the principles of Greek morals and religion, but at the same time\nhe followed quite honestly the usages of his religion, and we know\nbesides that his last request was to ask his friends to offer a cock to\n\u00c6sculapius\u2014a desire quite inconsistent with his conclusions regarding\nthe existence of God and above all regarding morality. Plato declaimed\nagainst the poets and their gods. It was in a much later time that\nthe Neo-platonists first recognized in the popular mythology rejected\nearlier by the philosophers, the universal content; they transposed\nand translated it into what is significant for thought, and thus used\nmythology itself as a symbolical imagery for giving expression to their\nformulas.\n\nSimilarly do we see in the Christian Religion, thought which is not\nindependent first placing itself in conjunction with the form belonging\nto this Religion and acting within it\u2014that is to say, taking the\nReligion as its groundwork, and proceeding from the absolute assumption\nof the Christian doctrine. We see later on the opposition between\nso-called faith and so-called reason; when the wings of thought have\nbecome strengthened, the young eaglet flies away for himself to the sun\nof Truth; but like a bird of prey he turns upon Religion and combats\nit. Latest of all Philosophy permits full justice to be done to the\ncontent of Religion through the speculative Notion, which is through\nThought itself. For this end the Notion must have grasped itself in the\nconcrete and penetrated to concrete spirituality. This must be the\nstandpoint of the Philosophy of the present time; it has begun within\nChristianity and can have no other content than the world-spirit. When\nthat spirit comprehends itself in Philosophy, it also comprehends\nitself in that form which formerly was inimical to Philosophy.\n\nThus Religion has a content in common with Philosophy the forms alone\nbeing different; and the only essential point is that the form of the\nNotion should be so far perfected as to be able to grasp the content of\nReligion. The Truth is just that which has been called the mysteries\nof Religion. These constitute the speculative element in Religion\nsuch as were called by the Neo-platonists _\u03bc\u03c5\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u03bc\u03c5\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9_ (being\ninitiated), or being occupied with speculative Notions. By mysteries is\nmeant, superficially speaking, the secret, what remains such and does\nnot arrive at being known. But in the Eleusinian mysteries there was\nnothing unknown; all Athenians were initiated into them, Socrates alone\nshut himself out. Openly to make them known to strangers was the one\nthing forbidden, as indeed it was made a crime in the case of certain\npeople. Such matters however, as being holy, were not to be spoken of.\nHerodotus often expressly says (e.g. ii. 45-47) that he would speak\nof the Egyptian Divinities and mysteries in as far as it was pious so\nto do: he knew more, but it would be impious to speak of them. In the\nChristian Religion dogmas are called mysteries. They are that which man\nknows about the Nature of God. Neither is there anything mysterious in\nthis; it is known by all those who are partakers in that Religion, and\nthese are thus distinguished from the followers of other Religions.\nHence mystery here signifies nothing unknown, since all Christians are\nin the secret. Mysteries are in their nature speculative, mysterious\ncertainly to the understanding, but not to reason; they are rational,\njust in the sense of being speculative. The understanding does not\ncomprehend the speculative which simply is the concrete because it\nholds to the differences in their separation; their contradiction\nis indeed contained in the mystery, which, however, is likewise the\nresolution of the same.\n\nPhilosophy, on the contrary, is opposed to the so-called Rationalism\nof the new Theology which for ever keeps reason on its lips, but which\nis dry understanding only; no reason is recognizable in it as the\nmoment of independent thought which really is abstract thought and that\nalone. When the understanding which does not comprehend the truths of\nReligion, calls itself the illuminating reason and plays the lord and\nmaster, it goes astray. Rationalism is opposed to Philosophy in content\nand form, for it has made the content empty as it has made the heavens,\nand has reduced all that is, to finite relations\u2014in its form it is a\nreasoning process which is not free and which has no conceiving power.\nThe supernatural in Religion is opposed to rationalism, and if indeed\nthe latter is related in respect of the real content to Philosophy,\nyet it differs from it in form, for it has become unspiritual and\nwooden, looking for its justification to mere external authority. The\nscholastics were not supernaturalists in this sense; they knew the\ndogmas of the Church in thought and in conception. If Religion in the\ninflexibility of its abstract authority as opposed to thought, declares\nof it that \u201cthe gates of Hell shall not triumph over it,\u201d the gates of\nreason are stronger than the gates of Hell, not to overcome the Church\nbut to reconcile itself to the Church. Philosophy, as the conceiving\nthought of this content, has as regards the idea of Religion, the\nadvantage of comprehending both sides\u2014it comprehends Religion and\nalso comprehends both rationalism and supernaturalism and itself\nlikewise. But this is not the case on the other side. Religion from the\nstandpoint of idea, comprehends only what stands on the same platform\nas itself, and not Philosophy, the Notion, the universal thought\ndeterminations. Often no injustice is done to a Philosophy when its\nopposition to Religion has been made matter of reproach; but often,\ntoo, a wrong has been inflicted where this is done from the religious\npoint of view.\n\nThe form of Religion is necessary to Mind as it is in and for\nitself; it is the form of truth as it is for all men, and for every\nmode of consciousness. This universal mode is first of all for men\nin the form of sensuous consciousness, and then, secondly, in the\nintermingling of the form of the universal with sensuous manifestation\nor reflection\u2014the representing consciousness, the mythical, positive\nand historical form, is that pertaining to the understanding. What\nis received in evidence of Mind only becomes object to consciousness\nwhen it appears in the form of the understanding, that is to say,\nconsciousness must first be already acquainted with these forms from\nlife and from experience. Now, because thinking consciousness is not\nthe outward universal form for all mankind, the consciousness of the\ntrue, the spiritual and the rational, must have the form of Religion,\nand this is the universal justification of this form.\n\nWe have here laid down the distinction between Philosophy and Religion,\nbut taking into account what it is we wish to deal with in the history\nof Philosophy, there is something still which must be remarked upon,\nand which partly follows from what has been already said. There is\nthe question still confronting us as to what attitude we must take in\nreference to this matter in the history of Philosophy.\n\n\n_\u03b2. The religious element to be excluded from the content of the\nHistory of Philosophy._\n\n_\u03b1\u03b1_. Mythology first meets us, and it seems as if it might be drawn\nwithin the history of Philosophy. It is indeed a product of the\nimagination, but not of caprice, although that also has its place\nhere. But the main part of mythology is the work of the imaginative\nreason, which makes reality its object, but yet has no other means\nof so doing, than that of sensuous representation, so that the gods\nmake their appearance in human guise. Mythology can now be studied for\nart, &c. But the thinking mind must seek out the substantial content,\nthe thought and the theory implicitly contained therein, as reason\nis sought in Nature. This mode of treating mythology was that of the\nNeo-platonists; in recent times it has for the most part become the\nwork of my friend Creuzer in symbolism. This method of treatment is\ncombated and condemned by others. Man, it is said, must set to work\nhistorically alone, and it is not historic when a theory unthought\nof by the ancients, is read into a myth, or brought out of it. In\none light, this is quite correct, for it points to a method adopted\nby Creuzer, and also by the Alexandrians who acted in a similar way.\nIn conscious thought the ancients had not such theories before them,\nnor did anyone maintain them, yet to say that such content was not\nimplicitly present, is an absurd contention. As the products of reason,\nthough not of thinking reason, the religions of the people, as also\nthe mythologies, however simple and even foolish they may appear,\nindubitably contain as genuine works of art, thoughts, universal\ndeterminations and truth, for the instinct of reason is at their basis.\nBound up with this is the fact that since mythology in its expression\ntakes sensuous forms, much that is contingent and external becomes\nintermingled, for the representation of the Notion in sensuous forms\nalways possesses a certain incongruity, seeing that what is founded on\nimagination cannot express the Idea in its real aspect. This sensuous\nform produced as it is by an historic or natural method, must be\ndetermined on many sides, and this external determination must, more or\nless, be of such a nature as not to express the Idea. It may also be\nthat many errors are contained in that explanation, particularly when\na single one is brought within our notice; all the customs, actions,\nfurnishings, vestments, and offerings taken together, may undoubtedly\ncontain something of the Idea in analogy, but the connection is far\nremoved, and many contingent circumstances must find their entrance.\nBut that there is a Reason there, must certainly be recognized, and it\nis essential so to comprehend and grasp mythology.\n\nBut Mythology must remain excluded from our history of Philosophy.\nThe reason of this is found in the fact that in Philosophy we have\nto do not with theorems generally, or with thoughts which only are\n_implicite_ contained in some particular form or other, but with\nthoughts which are explicit, and only in so far as they are explicit\nand in so far as a content such as that belonging to Religion, has\ncome to consciousness in the form of Thought. And this is just what\nforms the immense distinction which we saw above, between capacity and\nactuality. The theorems which are _implicite_ contained within Religion\ndo not concern us; they must be in the form of thoughts, since Thought\nalone is the absolute form of the Idea.\n\nIn many mythologies, images are certainly used along with their\nsignificance, or else the images are closely attended by their\ninterpretation. The ancient Persians worshipped the sun, or fire, as\nbeing the highest existence; the first cause in the Persian Religion\nis Zervane Akerene\u2014unlimited time, eternity. This simple eternal\nexistence possesses according to Diogenes L\u00e6rtius (I. 8), \u201cthe two\nprinciples Ormuzd (_\u1f68\u03c1\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03c3\u03b4\u03b7\u03c2_) and Ahriman (_\u1f08\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2_), the rulers\nover good and evil.\u201d Plutarch in writing on Isis and Osiris (T. II. p.\n369, ed. Xyl.) says, \u201cIt is not one existence which holds and rules\nthe whole, but good is mingled with evil; nature as a rule brings\nforth nothing pure and simple; it is not one dispenser, who, like a\nhost, gives out and mixes up the drink from two different barrels. But\nthrough two opposed and inimical principles of which the one impels\ntowards what is right, and the other in the opposite direction, if not\nthe whole world, at least this earth is influenced in different ways.\nZoroaster has thus emphatically set up the one principle (Ormuzd) as\nbeing the Light, and the other (Ahriman) as the Darkness. Between the\ntwo (_\u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03bc\u03c6\u03bf\u1fd6\u03bd_) is Mithra, hence called by the Persians the\nMediator (_\u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2_).\u201d Mithra is then likewise substance, the universal\nexistence, the sun raised to a totality. It is not the mediator between\nOrmuzd and Ahriman by establishing peace and leaving each to remain\nas it was; it does not partake of good and evil both, like an unblest\nmiddle thing, but it stands on the side of Ormuzd and strives with him\nagainst the evil. Ahriman is sometimes called the first-born son of the\nLight, but Ormuzd only remained within the Light. At the creation of\nthe visible world, Ormuzd places on the earth in his incomprehensible\nkingdom of Light, the firm arches of the heavens which are above yet\nsurrounded on every side with the first original Light. Midway to the\nearth is the high hill Albordi, which reaches into the source of Light.\nOrmuzd\u2019s empire of Light extended uninterruptedly over the firm vault\nof the heavens and the hill Albordi, and over the earth too, until\nthe third age was reached. Then Ahriman, whose kingdom of night was\nformerly bound beneath the earth, broke in upon Ormuzd\u2019s corporeal\nworld and ruled in common with him. Now the space between heaven and\nearth was divided into light and night. As Ormuzd had formerly only a\nspiritual kingdom of light, Ahriman had only one of night, but now that\nthey were intermingled he placed the terrestrial light thus created in\nopposition to the terrestrial night. From this time on, two corporeal\nworlds stand opposed, one pure and good, and one impure and evil, and\nthis opposition permeates all nature. On Albordi, Ormuzd created Mithra\nas mediator for the earth. The end of the creation of the bodily world\nis none other than to reinstate existence, fallen from its creator,\nto make it good again, and thus to make the evil disappear for ever.\nThe bodily world is the battle-ground between good and evil; but the\nbattle between light and darkness is not in itself an absolute and\nirreconcilable opposition, but one which can be conquered, and in it\nOrmuzd, the principle of Light, will be the conqueror.\n\nI would remark of this, that when we consider the elements in these\nideas which bear some further connection with Philosophy, the universal\nof that duality with which the Notion is necessarily set forth can\nalone be interesting and noteworthy to us; for in it the Notion is just\nthe immediate opposite of itself, the unity of itself with itself in\nthe \u201cother:\u201d a simple existence in which absolute opposition appears\nas the opposition of existence, and the sublation of that opposition.\nBecause properly the Light principle is the only existence of both, and\nthe principle of Darkness is the null and void,\u2014the principle of Light\nidentifies itself with Mithra, which was before called the highest\nexistence. The opposition has laid aside the appearance of contingency,\nbut the spiritual principle is not separate from the physical, because\nthe good and evil are both determined as Light and Darkness. We thus\nhere see thought breaking forth from actuality, and yet not such a\nseparation as only takes place in Religion, when the supersensuous\nis itself again represented in a manner sensuous, notionless and\ndispersed, for the whole of what is dispersed in sensuous form is\ngathered together in the one single opposition, and activity is thus\nsimply represented. These determinations lie much nearer to Thought;\nthey are not mere images or symbols, but yet these myths do not concern\nPhilosophy. In them Thought does not take the first place, for the\nmyth-form remains predominant. In all religions this oscillation\nbetween form and thought is found, and such a combination still lies\noutside Philosophy.\n\nThis is also so in the Sanchuniathonic Cosmogony of the Ph\u0153nicians.\nThese fragments, which are found in Eusebius (Pr\u00e6par. Evang. I. 10),\nare taken from the translation of the Sanchuniathon from Ph\u0153nician\ninto Greek made by a Grammarian named Philo from Biblus. Philo\nlived in the time of Vespasian and ascribes great antiquity to the\nSanchuniathon. It is there said, \u201cThe principles of things are found\nin Chaos, in which the elements exist undeveloped and confused, and\nin a Spirit of Air. The latter permeated the chaos, and with it\nengendered a slimy matter or mud (_\u1f30\u03bb\u03cd\u03bd_) which contained within it the\nliving forces and the germs of animals. By mingling this mud with the\ncomponent matter of chaos and the resulting fermentation, the elements\nseparated themselves. The fire elements ascended into the heights and\nformed the stars. Through their influence in the air, clouds were\nformed and the earth was made fruitful. From the mingling of water\nand earth, through the mud converted into putrefying matter, animals\ntook their origin as imperfect and senseless. These again begot other\nanimals perfect and endowed with senses. It was the crash of thunder in\na thunder-storm that caused the first animals still sleeping in their\nhusks to waken up to life.\u201d[7]\n\nThe fragments of Berosus of the Chaldeans were collected from Josephus,\nSyncellus and Eusebius under the title _Berosi Chaldaica_, by Scaliger,\nas an appendix to his work _De emendatione temporum_, and they are\nfound complete in the Greek Library of Fabricius (T. xiv. pp. 175-211).\nBerosus lived in the time of Alexander, is said to have been a Priest\nof Bel and to have drawn upon the archives of the temple at Babylon.\nHe says, \u201cThe original god is Bel and the goddess Omoroka (the sea),\nbut beside them there were yet other gods. Bel divided Omoroka in two,\nin order to create from her parts heaven and earth. Hereupon he cut\noff his own head and the human race originated from the drops of his\ndivine blood. After the creation of man, Bel banished the darkness,\ndivided heaven and earth, and formed the world into its natural shape.\nSince certain parts of the earth seemed to him to be insufficiently\npopulated, he compelled another god to lay hands upon himself, and from\nhis blood more men and more kinds of animals were created. At first\nthe men lived a wild and uncultivated life, until a monster\u201d (called\nby Berosus, Oannes) \u201cjoined them into a state, taught them arts and\nsciences, and in a word brought Humanity into existence. The monster\nset about this end with the rising of the sun out of the sea, and with\nits setting he again hid himself under the waves.\u201d\n\n_\u03b2\u03b2_. What belongs to Mythology may in the second place make a pretence\nof being a kind of Philosophy. It has produced philosophers who availed\nthemselves of the mythical form in order to bring their theories and\nsystems more prominently before the imagination, for they made the\nthoughts the content of the myth. But the myth is not a mere cloak\nin the ancient myths; it is not merely that the thoughts were there\nand were concealed. This may happen in our reflecting times; but the\nfirst poetry does not start from a separation of prose and poetry. If\nphilosophers used myths, it was usually the case that they had the\nthoughts and then sought for images appropriate to them; Plato has\nmany beautiful myths of this kind. Others likewise have spoken in\nmyths, as for example, Jacobi, whose Philosophy took the form of the\nChristian Religion, through which he gave utterance to matter of a\nhighly speculative nature. But this form is not suitable to Philosophy.\nThought which has itself as object, must have raised itself to its own\nform, to the form of thought. Plato is often esteemed on account of his\nmyths; he is supposed to have evinced by their means greater genius\nthan other philosophers were capable of. It is contended here that\nthe myths of Plato are superior to the abstract form of expression,\nand Plato\u2019s method of representation is certainly a wonderful one.\nOn closer examination we find that it is partly the impossibility of\nexpressing himself after the manner of pure thought that makes Plato\nput his meaning so, and also such methods of expression are only used\nby him in introducing a subject. When he comes to the matter in point,\nPlato expresses himself otherwise, as we see in the Parmenides, where\nsimple thought determinations are used without imagery. Externally\nthese myths may certainly serve when the heights of speculative thought\nare left behind, in order to present the matter in an easier form, but\nthe real value of Plato does not rest in his myths. If thought once\nattains power sufficient to give existence to itself within itself\nand in its element, the myth becomes a superfluous adornment, by\nwhich Philosophy is not advanced. Men often lay hold of nothing but\nthese myths. Hence Aristotle has been misunderstood just because he\nintersperses similes here and there; the simile can never be entirely\nin accord with thought, for it always carries with it something more.\nThe difficulty of representing thoughts as thoughts always attaches to\nthe expedient of expression in sensuous form. Thought, too, ought not\nto be concealed by means of the myth, for the object of the mythical\nis just to give expression to and to reveal thought. The symbol is\nundoubtedly insufficient for this expression; thought concealed in\nsymbols is not yet possessed, for thought is self-revealing, and hence\nthe myth does not form a medium adequate for its conveyance. Aristotle\n(Metaph. III. 4) says, \u201cIt is not worth while to treat seriously of\nthose whose philosophy takes a mythical form.\u201d Such is not the form in\nwhich thought allows itself to be stated, but only is a subordinate\nmode.\n\nConnected with this, there is a similar method of representing the\nuniversal content by means of numbers, lines and geometric figures.\nThese are figurative, but not concretely so, as in the case of myths.\nThus it may be said that eternity is a circle, the snake that bites\nits own tail. This is only an image, but Mind does not require such\na symbol. There are people who value such methods of representation,\nbut these forms do not go far. The most abstract determinations\ncan indeed be thus expressed, but any further progress brings about\nconfusion. Just as the freemasons have symbols which are esteemed\nfor their depth of wisdom\u2014depth as a brook is deep when one cannot\nsee the bottom\u2014that which is hidden very easily seems to men deep,\nor as if depth were concealed beneath. But when it is hidden, it may\npossibly prove to be the case that there is nothing behind. This is so\nin freemasonry, in which everything is concealed to those outside and\nalso to many people within, and where nothing remarkable is possessed\nin learning or in science, and least of all in Philosophy. Thought is,\non the contrary, simply its manifestation; clearness is its nature and\nitself. The act of manifestation is not a condition which may be or\nmay not be equally, so that thought may remain as thought when it is\nnot manifested, but its manifestation is itself, its Being. Numbers,\nas will be remarked in respect of the Pythagoreans, are unsuitable\nmediums for expressing thoughts; thus _\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03ac\u03c2_, _\u03b4\u03c5\u03ac\u03c2_, _\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03ac\u03c2_ are,\nwith Pythagoras, unity, difference, and unity of the unity and of\nthe difference. The two first of the three are certainly united by\naddition; this kind of union is, however, the worst form of unity.\nIn Religion the three make their appearance in a deeper sense as the\nTrinity, and in Philosophy as the Notion, but enumeration forms a\nbad method of expression. There is the same objection to it as would\nexist to making the mensuration of space the medium for expressing the\nabsolute. People also quote the Philosophy of the Chinese, of the Fo\u00ef,\nin which it is said that thoughts are represented by numbers. Yet the\nChinese have explained their symbols and hence have made their meaning\nevident. Universal simple abstractions have been present to all people\nwho have arrived at any decree of culture.\n\n_\u03b3\u03b3_. We have still to remark in the third place, that Religion, as\nsuch, does not merely form its representations after the manner of\nart; and also that Poetry likewise contains actual thoughts. In the\ncase of the poets whose art has speech as medium, we find all through\ndeep universal thought regarding reality; these are more explicitly\nexpressed in the Indian Religion, but with the Indians everything is\nmixed up. Hence it is said that such races have also had a Philosophy\nproper to themselves; but the universal thoughts of interest in Indian\nbooks limit themselves to what is most abstract, to the idea of rising\nup and passing away, and thus of making a perpetual round. The story of\nthe Ph\u0153nix is well known as an example of this; it is one which took\nits origin in the East. We are able similarly to find thoughts about\nlife and death and of the transition of Being into passing away; from\nlife comes death and from death comes life; even in Being, in what\nis positive, the negation is already present. The negative side must\nindeed contain within it the positive, for all change, all the process\nof life is founded on this. But such reflections only occasionally come\nforth; they are not to be taken as being proper philosophic utterances.\nFor Philosophy is only present when thought, as such, is made the\nabsolute ground and root of everything else, and in these modes of\nrepresentation this is not so.\n\nPhilosophy does not reflect on any particular thing or object already\nexisting as a first substratum; its content is just Thought, universal\nthought which must plainly come first of all; to put it otherwise, the\nAbsolute must in Philosophy be in the form of thought. In the Greek\nReligion we find the thought-determination \u201ceternal necessity;\u201d which\nmeans an absolute and clearly universal relation. But such thought has\nother subjects besides; it only expresses a relation, the necessity to\nbe the true and all-embracing Being. Thus neither must we take this\nform into our consideration. We might speak in that way of a philosophy\nof Euripides, Schiller or Goethe. But all such reflection respecting,\nor general modes of representing what is true, the ends of men,\nmorality and so on, are in part only incidentally set forth, and in\npart they have not reached the proper form of thought, which implies\nthat what is so expressed must be ultimate, thus constituting the\nAbsolute.\n\n\n_\u03b3. Particular theories found in Religion._\n\nIn conclusion, the philosophy which we find within Religion does not\nconcern us. We find deep, speculative thoughts regarding the nature\nof God not only in the Indian Religions, but also in the Fathers and\nthe Schoolmen. In the history of dogmatism there is a real interest\nin becoming acquainted with these thoughts, but they do not belong\nto the history of Philosophy. Nevertheless more notice must be taken\nof the Schoolmen than of the Fathers, for they were certainly great\nphilosophers to whom the culture of Christendom owes much. But their\nspeculations belong in part to other philosophies such as to that of\nPlato, which must in so far be considered for themselves; partly, too,\nthey emanate from the speculative content of Religion itself which\nalready exists as independent truth in the doctrine of the Church,\nand belongs primarily to faith. Thus such modes of thought rest on an\nhypothesis and not on Thought itself; they are not properly speaking\nthemselves Philosophy or thought which rests on itself, but as ideas\nalready firmly rooted, they act on its behalf either in refuting\nother ideas and conclusions or in philosophically vindicating against\nthem their own religious teaching. Thought in this manner does not\nrepresent and know itself as the ultimate and absolute culmination of\nthe content, or as the inwardly self-determining Thought. Hence, too,\nwhen the Fathers, seeing that the content of the Christian Religion can\nonly be grasped after the speculative form, did, within the teaching\nof the Church, produce thoughts of a highly speculative nature, the\nultimate justification of these was not found in Thought as such, but\nin the teaching of the Church. Philosophic teaching here finds itself\nwithin a strongly bound system and not as thought which emanates freely\nfrom itself. Thus with the scholastics, too, Thought does not construct\nitself out of itself, but depends upon hypotheses; and although it ever\nrests more and more upon itself, it never does so in opposition to the\ndoctrine of the Church. Both must and do agree, since Thought has to\nprove from itself what the Church has already verified.\n\n\nc. _Philosophy proper distinguished from Popular Philosophy._\n\nOf the two departments of knowledge allied to Philosophy we found\nthat the one, that of the special sciences, could not be called a\nphilosophy in that it, as independent seeing and thinking immersed in\nfinite matter, and as the active principle in becoming acquainted with\nthe finite, was not the content, but simply the formal and subjective\nmoment. The second sphere, Religion, is deficient in that it only had\nthe content or the objective moment in common with Philosophy. In it\nindependent thought was an essential moment, since the subject had\nan imaginary or historical form. Philosophy demands the unity and\nintermingling of these two points of view; it unites the Sunday of\nlife when man in humility renounces himself, and the working-day when\nhe stands up independently, is master of himself and considers his\nown interests. A third point of view seems to unite both elements,\nand that is popular Philosophy. It deals with universal objects and\nphilosophizes as to God and the world; and thought is likewise occupied\nin learning about these matters. Yet this Philosophy must also be\ncast aside. The writings of Cicero may be put under this category;\nthey contain a kind of philosophy that has its own place and in which\nexcellent things are said. Cicero formed many experiences both in the\naffairs of life and mind, and from them and after observing what takes\nplace in the world, he deduced the truth. He expresses himself with\nculture on the concerns most important to man, and hence his great\npopularity. Fanatics and mystics may from another point of view be\nreckoned as in this category. They give expression to a deep sense of\ndevotion, and have had experiences in the higher regions. They are able\nto express the highest content, and the result is attractive. We thus\nfind the brightest gleams of thought in the writings of a Pascal\u2014as we\ndo in his _Pens\u00e9es_.\n\nBut the drawback that attaches to this Philosophy is that the ultimate\nappeal\u2014even in modern times\u2014is made to the fact that men are\nconstituted such as they are by nature, and with this Cicero is very\nfree. Here the moral instinct comes into question, only under the\nname of feeling; Religion now rests not on what is objective but on\nreligious feeling, because the immediate consciousness of God by men\nis its ultimate ground. Cicero makes copious use of the _consensus\ngentium_; in more modern times this appeal has been more or less left\nalone, since the individual subject has to rest upon himself. Feeling\nis first of all laid hold of, then comes reasoning from what is given,\nbut in these we can appeal to what is immediate only. Independent\nthought is certainly here advanced; the content too, is taken from the\nself; but we must just as necessarily exclude this mode of thinking\nfrom Philosophy. For the source from which the content is derived is\nof the same description as in the other cases. Nature is the source in\nfinite sciences, and in Religion it is Spirit; but here the source is\nin authority; the content is given and the act of worship removes but\nmomentarily this externality. The source of popular Philosophy is in\nthe heart, impulses and capacities, our natural Being, my impression of\nwhat is right and of God; the content is in a form which is of nature\nonly. I certainly have everything in feeling, but the whole content is\nalso in Mythology, and yet in neither is it so in veritable form. The\nlaws and doctrines of Religion are that in which this content always\ncomes to consciousness in a more definite way, while in feeling there\nstill is intermingled the arbitrary will of that which is subjective.\n\n\n3. COMMENCEMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND OF ITS HISTORY.\n\nNow that we have thus defined the Notion of Philosophy to be the\nThought which, as the universal content, is complete Being, it will\nbe shown in the history of Philosophy how the determinations in this\ncontent make their appearance little by little. At first we only ask\nwhere Philosophy and its History begin.\n\n\n_a. Freedom of Thought as a first condition._\n\nThe general answer is in accordance with what has been said. Philosophy\nbegins where the universal is comprehended as the all-embracing\nexistence, or where the existent is laid hold of in a universal form,\nand where thinking about thought first commences. Where, then, has\nthis occurred? Where did it begin? That is a question of history.\nThought must be for itself, must come into existence in its freedom,\nliberate itself from nature and come out of its immersion in mere\nsense-perception; it must as free, enter within itself and thus arrive\nat the consciousness of freedom. Philosophy is properly to be commenced\nwhere the Absolute is no more in the form of ordinary conception, and\nfree thought not merely thinks the Absolute but grasps its Idea. That\nis to say where Thought grasps as Thought, the Being (which may be\nThought itself), which it recognizes as the essence of things, the\nabsolute totality and the immanent essence of everything, and does so\nas an external Being. The simple existence which is not sensuous and\nwhich the Jews thought of as God (for all Religion is thinking), is\nthus not a subject to be treated of by Philosophy, but just such a\nproposition as that \u201cThe existence or principle of things is water,\nfire or thought.\u201d\n\nThought, this universal determination which sets forth itself, is\nan abstract determinateness; it is the beginning of Philosophy, but\nthis beginning is at the same time in history, the concrete form taken\nby a people, the principle of which constitutes what we have stated\nabove. If we say that the consciousness of freedom is connected with\nthe appearance of Philosophy, this principle must be a fundamental\none with those with whom Philosophy begins; a people having this\nconsciousness of freedom founds its existence on that principle seeing\nthat the laws and the whole circumstances of the people are based\nonly on the Notion that Mind forms of itself, and in the categories\nwhich it has. Connected with this on the practical side, is the fact\nthat actual freedom develops political freedom, and this only begins\nwhere the individual knows himself as an independent individual to be\nuniversal and real, where his significance is infinite, or where the\nsubject has attained the consciousness of personality and thus desires\nto be esteemed for himself alone. Free, philosophic thought has this\ndirect connection with practical freedom, that as the former supplies\nthought about the absolute, universal and real object, the latter,\nbecause it thinks itself, gives itself the character of universality.\nThinking means the bringing of something into the form of universality;\nhence Thought first treats of the universal, or determines what is\nobjective and individual in the natural things which are present in\nsensuous consciousness, as the universal, as an objective Thought. Its\nsecond attribute is that in recognizing and knowing this objective and\ninfinite universal, I, at the same time, remain confronting it from the\nstandpoint of objectivity.\n\nOn account of this general connection between political freedom and the\nfreedom of Thought, Philosophy only appears in History where and in as\nfar as free institutions are formed. Since Mind requires to separate\nitself from its natural will and engrossment in matter if it wishes\nto enter upon Philosophy, it cannot do so in the form with which the\nworld-spirit commences and which takes precedence of that separation.\nThis stage of the unity of Mind with Nature which as immediate is not\nthe true and perfect state, is mainly found in the Oriental conception\nof existence, therefore Philosophy first begins in the Grecian world.\n\n\nb. _Separation of the East and its Philosophy._\n\nSome explanations have to be given regarding this first form.\nSince Mind in it, as consciousness and will, is but desire,\nself-consciousness still stands upon its first stage in which the\nsphere of its idea and will is finite. As intelligence is thus finite\ntoo, its ends are not yet a universal for themselves; but if a people\nmakes for what is moral, if laws and justice are possessed, the\ncharacter of universality underlies its will. This presupposes a new\npower in Mind with which it commences to be free, for the universal\nwill as the relation of thought to thought or as the universal,\ncontains a thought which is at home with itself. If a people desire to\nbe free, they will subordinate their desires to universal laws, while\nformerly that which was desired was only a particular. Now finitude\nof the will characterizes the orientals, because with them the will\nhas not yet grasped itself as universal, for thought is not yet free\nfor itself. Hence there can but be the relation of lord and slave,\nand in this despotic sphere fear constitutes the ruling category.\nBecause the will is not yet free from what is finite, it can therein\nbe comprehended and the finite can be shown forth as negative. This\nsensation of negation, that something cannot last, is just fear as\ndistinguished from freedom which does not consist in being finite\nbut in being for itself, and this cannot be laid hold of. Religion\nnecessarily has this character, since the fear of the Lord is the\nessential element beyond which we cannot get. \u201cThe fear of the Lord is\nthe beginning of wisdom\u201d is indeed a true saying; man must begin with\nthis in order to know the finite ends in their negative character. But\nman must also have overcome fear through the relinquishment of finite\nends, and the satisfaction which that Religion affords is confined\nto what is finite, seeing that the chief means of reconciliation are\nnatural forms which are impersonated and held in reverence.\n\nThe oriental consciousness raises itself, indeed, above the natural\ncontent to what is infinite; but it only knows itself as accidental\nin reference to the power which makes the individual fear. This\nsubordination may take two forms and must indeed from one extreme pass\nto the other. The finite, which is for consciousness, may have the form\nof finitude as finite, or it may become the infinite, which is however\nan abstraction. The man who lives in fear, and he who rules over\nmen through fear, both stand upon the same platform; the difference\nbetween them is only in the greater power of will which can go forth to\nsacrifice all that is finite for some particular end. The despot brings\nabout what his caprice directs, including certainly what is good, not\nas law, but as arbitrary will: the passive will, like that of slavery,\nis converted into the active energy of will, which will, however, is\narbitrary still. In Religion we even find self-immersion in the deepest\nsensuality represented as the service of God, and then there follows in\nthe East a flight to the emptiest abstraction as to what is infinite,\nas also the exaltation attained through the renunciation of everything,\nand this is specially so amongst the Indians, who torture themselves\nand enter into the most profound abstraction. The Indians look straight\nbefore them for ten years at a time, are fed by those around, and are\ndestitute of other spiritual content than that of knowing what is\nabstract, which content therefore is entirely finite. This, then, is\nnot the soil of freedom.\n\nIn the East, Mind indeed begins to dawn, but it is still true of it\nthat the subject is not presented as a person, but appears in the\nobjectively substantial, which is represented as partly supersensuous\nand partly, and even more, material, as negative and perishing. The\nhighest point attainable by the individual, the everlasting bliss, is\nmade an immersion into substance, a vanishing away of consciousness,\nand thus of all distinction between substance and individuality\u2014hence\nan annihilation. A spiritually dead relation thus comes into existence,\nsince the highest point there to be reached is insensibility. So\nfar, however, man has not attained that bliss, but finds himself to\nbe a single existent individual, distinguished from the universal\nsubstance. He is thus outside the unity, has no significance, and as\nbeing what is accidental and without rights, is finite only; he finds\nhimself limited through Nature\u2014in caste for instance. The will is\nnot here the substantial will; it is the arbitrary will given up to\nwhat is outwardly and inwardly contingent, for substance alone is the\naffirmative. With it greatness, nobility, or exaltitude of character,\nare certainly not excluded, but they are only present as the naturally\ndetermined or the arbitrary will, and not in the objective forms of\nmorality and law to which all owe respect, which hold good for all, and\nin which for that same reason all are recognized. The oriental subject\nthus has the advantage of independence, since there is nothing fixed;\nhowever undetermined is the substance of the Easterns, as undetermined,\nfree and independent may their character be. What for us is justice\nand morality is also in their state, but in a substantial, natural,\npatriarchal way, and not in subjective freedom. Conscience does not\nexist nor does morality. Everything is simply in a state of nature,\nwhich allows the noblest to exist as it does the worst.\n\nThe conclusion to be derived from this is that no philosophic knowledge\ncan be found here. To Philosophy belongs the knowledge of Substance,\nthe absolute Universal, that whether I think it and develop it or not,\nconfronts me still as for itself objective; and whether this is to me\nsubstantial or not, still just in that I think it, it is mine, that in\nwhich I possess my distinctive character or am affirmative: thus my\nthoughts are not mere subjective determinations or opinions, but, as\nbeing my thoughts, are also thoughts of what is objective, or they are\nsubstantial thoughts. The Eastern form must therefore be excluded from\nthe History of Philosophy, but still, upon the whole, I will take some\nnotice of it. I have touched on this elsewhere,[8] for some time ago we\nfor the first time reached a position to judge of it. Earlier a great\nparade was made about the Indian wisdom without any real knowledge of\nwhat it was; now this is for the first time known, and naturally it is\nfound to be in conformity with the rest.\n\n\nc. _Beginnings of Philosophy in Greece._\n\nPhilosophy proper commences in the West. It is in the West that\nthis freedom of self-consciousness first comes forth; the natural\nconsciousness, and likewise Mind disappear into themselves. In the\nbrightness of the East the individual disappears; the light first\nbecomes in the West the flash of thought which strikes within itself,\nand from thence creates its world out of itself. The blessedness of\nthe West is thus so determined that in it the subject as such endures\nand continues in the substantial; the individual mind grasps its Being\nas universal, but universality is just this relation to itself. This\nbeing at home with self, this personality and infinitude of the \u201cI\u201d\nconstitutes the Being of Mind; it is thus and can be none else. For a\npeople to know themselves as free, and to be only as universal, is for\nthem to be; it is the principle of their whole life as regards morality\nand all else. To take an example, we only know our real Being in so far\nas personal freedom is its first condition, and hence we never can be\nslaves. Were the mere arbitrary will of the prince a law, and should\nhe wish slavery to be introduced, we would have the knowledge that this\ncould not be. To sleep, to live, to have a certain office, is not our\nreal Being, and certainly to be no slave is such, for that has come to\nmean the being in nature. Thus in the West we are upon the soil of a\nveritable Philosophy.\n\nBecause in desire I am subject to another, and my Being is in a\nparticularity, I am, as I exist, unlike myself; for I am \u201cI,\u201d the\nuniversal complete, but hemmed in by passion. This last is self-will\nor formal freedom, which has desire as content. Amongst the Greeks we\nfirst find the freedom which is the end of true will, the equitable and\nright, in which I am free and universal, and others, too, are free, are\nalso \u201cI\u201d and like me; where a relationship between free and free is\nthus established with its actual laws, determinations of the universal\nwill, and justly constituted states. Hence it is here that Philosophy\nbegan.\n\nIn Greece we first see real freedom flourish, but still in a restricted\nform, and with a limitation, since slavery was still existent, and the\nstates were by its means conditioned. In the following abstractions we\nmay first of all superficially describe the freedom of the East, of\nGreece, and of the Teutonic world. In the East only one individual is\nfree, the despot; in Greece the few are free; in the Teutonic world\nthe saying is true that all are free, that is, man is free as man. But\nsince the one in Eastern countries cannot be free because that would\nnecessitate the others also being free to him, impulse, self-will, and\nformal freedom, can there alone be found. Since in Greece we have to\ndeal with the particular, the Athenians, and the Spartans, are free\nindeed, but not the Messenians or the Helots. The principle of the\n\u201cfew\u201d has yet to be discovered, and this implies some modifications of\nthe Greek point of view which we must consider in connection with the\nHistory of Philosophy. To take these into consideration means simply to\nproceed to the dividing up of Philosophy.\n\n\nC\n\nDIVISION, SOURCES, AND METHOD ADOPTED IN TREATING OF THE HISTORY OF\nPHILOSOPHY.\n\n\n1. DIVISION OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.\n\nSince we set to work systematically this division must present itself\nas necessary. Speaking generally, we have properly only two epochs to\ndistinguish in the history of Philosophy, as in ancient and modern\nart\u2014these are the Greek and the Teutonic. The Teutonic Philosophy\nis the Philosophy within Christendom in so far as it belongs to the\nTeutonic nations; the Christian-European people, inasmuch as they\nbelong to the world of science, possess collectively Teutonic culture;\nfor Italy, Spain, France, England, and the rest, have through the\nTeutonic nations, received a new form. The influence of Greece also\nreaches into the Roman world, and hence we have to speak of Philosophy\nin the territory of the Roman world; but the Romans produced no proper\nPhilosophy any more than any proper poets. They have only received\nfrom and imitated others, although they have often done this with\nintelligence; even their religion is derived from the Greek, and the\nspecial character that it has, makes no approach to Philosophy and Art,\nbut is unphilosophical and inartistic.\n\nA further description of these two outstanding opposites must be given.\nThe Greek world developed thought as far as to the Idea; the Christian\nTeutonic world, on the contrary, has comprehended Thought as Spirit;\nIdea and Spirit are thus the distinguishing features. More particularly\nthe facts are as follows. Because God, the still undetermined and\nimmediate Universal, Being, or objective Thought, jealously allowing\nnothing to exist beside Him, is the substantial groundwork of all\nPhilosophy, which never alters, but ever sinks more deeply within\nitself, and through the development of determinations manifests itself\nand brings to consciousness, we may designate the particular character\nof the development in the first period of Philosophy by saying that\nthis development is a simple process of determinations, figurations,\nabstract qualities, issuing from the one ground that potentially\nalready contains the whole.\n\nThe second stage in this universal principle is the gathering up of\nthe determinations manifested thus, into ideal, concrete unity, in the\nmode of subjectivity. The first determinations as immediate, were still\nabstractions, but now the Absolute, as the endlessly self-determining\nUniversal, must furthermore be comprehended as active Thought, and not\nas the Universal in this determinate character. Hence it is manifested\nas the totality of determinations and as concrete individuality. Thus,\nwith the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ of Anaxagoras, and still more with Socrates, there\ncommences a subjective totality in which Thought grasps itself, and\nthinking activity is the fundamental principle.\n\nThe third stage, then, is that this totality, which is at first\nabstract, in that it becomes realized through the active,\ndetermining, distinguishing thought, sets itself forth even in the\nseparated determinations, which, as ideal, belong to it. Since these\ndeterminations are contained unseparated in the unity, and thus\neach in it is also the other, these opposed moments are raised into\ntotalities. The quite general forms of opposition are the universal\nand the particular, or, in another form, Thought as such, external\nreality, feeling or perception. The Notion is the identity of universal\nand particular; because each of these is thus set forth as concrete in\nitself, the universal is in itself at once the unity of universality\nand particularity, and the same holds good of particularity. Unity\nis thus posited in both forms, and the abstract moments can be made\ncomplete through this unity alone; thus it has come to pass that the\ndifferences themselves are each raised up to a system of totality,\nwhich respectively confront one another as the Philosophy of Stoicism\nand of Epicureanism. The whole concrete universal is now Mind; and\nthe whole concrete individual, Nature. In Stoicism pure Thought\ndevelops into a totality; if we make the other side from Mind\u2014natural\nbeing or feeling\u2014into a totality, Epicureanism is the result. Each\ndetermination is formed into a totality of thought, and, in accordance\nwith the simple mode which characterizes this sphere, these principles\nseem to be for themselves and independent, like two antagonistic\nsystems of Philosophy. Implicitly both are identical, but they\nthemselves take up their position as conflicting, and the Idea is also,\nas it is apprehended, in a one-sided determinateness.\n\nThe higher stage is the union of these differences. This may occur\nin annihilation, in scepticism; but the higher point of view is the\naffirmative, the Idea in relation to the Notion. If the Notion is,\nthen, the universal\u2014that which determines itself further within\nitself, but yet remains there in its unity and in the ideality and\ntransparency of its determinations which do not become independent\u2014the\nfurther step is, on the other hand, the reality of the Notion in which\nthe differences are themselves brought to totalities. Thus the fourth\nstage is the union of the Idea, in which all these differences, as\ntotalities, are yet at the same time blended into one concrete unity of\nNotion. This comprehension first takes place without constraint, since\nthe ideal is itself only apprehended in the element of universality.\n\nThe Greek world got as far as this Idea, since they formed an ideal\nintellectual world; and this was done by the Alexandrian Philosophy,\nin which the Greek Philosophy perfected itself and reached its end.\nIf we wish to represent this process figuratively, _A._ Thought, is\n(_\u03b1_) speaking generally abstract, as in universal or absolute space,\nby which empty space is often understood; (_\u03b2_) then the most simple\nspace determinations appear, in which we commence with the point in\norder that we may arrive at the line and angle; (_\u03b3_) what comes third\nis their union into the triangle, that which is indeed concrete, but\nwhich is still retained in this abstract element of surface, and\nthus is only the first and still formal totality and limitation which\ncorresponds to the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_. _B._ The next point is, that since we allow\neach of the enclosing lines of the triangle to be again surface, each\nforms itself into the totality of the triangle and into the whole\nfigure to which it belongs; that is the realization of the whole in the\nsides as we see it in Scepticism or Stoicism. _C._ The last stage of\nall is, that these surfaces or sides of the triangle join themselves\ninto a body or a totality; the body is for the first time the perfect\nspacial determination, and that is a reduplication of the triangle.\nBut in as far as the triangle which forms the basis is outside of the\npyramid, this simile does not hold good.\n\nGrecian Philosophy in the Neo-platonists finds its end in a perfect\nkingdom of Thought and of bliss, and in a potentially existent world\nof the ideal, which is yet unreal because the whole only exists in the\nelement of universality. This world still lacks individuality as such,\nwhich is an essential moment in the Notion; actuality demands that in\nthe identity of both sides of the Idea, the independent totality shall\nbe also posited as negative. Through this self-existent negation, which\nis absolute subjectivity, the Idea is first raised into Mind. Mind is\nthe subjectivity of self-knowledge; but it is only Mind inasmuch as\nit knows what is object to itself, and that is itself, as a totality,\nand is for itself a totality. That is to say, the two triangles which\nare above and below in the prism must not be two in the sense of being\ndoubled, but they must be one intermingled unity. Or, in the case of\nbody, the difference arises between the centre and the peripheral\nparts. This opposition of real corporeality and centre as the simple\nexistence, now makes its appearance, and the totality is the union of\nthe centre and the substantial\u2014not, however, the simple union, but a\nunion such that the subjective knows itself as subjective in relation\nto the objective and substantial. Hence the Idea is this totality,\nand the Idea which knows itself is essentially different from the\nsubstantial; the former manifests itself independently, but in such a\nmanner that as such it is considered to be for itself substantial. The\nsubjective Idea is at first only formal, but it is the real possibility\nof the substantial and of the potentially universal; its end is to\nrealize itself and to identify itself with substance. Through this\nsubjectivity and negative unity, and through this absolute negativity,\nthe ideal becomes no longer our object merely, but object to itself,\nand this principle has taken effect in the world of Christianity. Thus\nin the modern point of view the subject is for itself free, man is\nfree as man, and from this comes the idea that because he is Mind he\nhas from his very nature the eternal quality of being substantial. God\nbecomes known as Mind which appears to itself as double, yet removes\nthe difference that it may in it be for and at home with itself. The\nbusiness of the world, taking it as a whole, is to become reconciled\nwith Mind, recognizing itself therein, and this business is assigned to\nthe Teutonic world.\n\nThe first beginning of this undertaking is found in the Religion which\nis the contemplation of and faith in this principle as in an actual\nexistence before a knowledge of the principle has been arrived at. In\nthe Christian Religion this principle is found more as feeling and\nidea; in it man as man is destined to everlasting bliss, and is an\nobject of divine grace, pity and interest, which is as much as saying\nthat man has an absolute and infinite value. We find it further in\nthat dogma revealed through Christ to men, of the unity of the divine\nand human nature, according to which the subjective and the objective\nIdea\u2014man and God\u2014are one. This, in another form, is found in the\nold story of the Fall, in which the serpent did not delude man, for\nGod said, \u201cBehold, Adam has become as one of us, to know good and\nevil.\u201d We have to deal with this unity of subjective principle and of\nsubstance; it constitutes the process of Mind that this individual\none or independent existence of subject should put aside its immediate\ncharacter and bring itself forth as identical with the substantial.\nSuch an aim is pronounced to be the highest end attainable by man.\nWe see from this that religious ideas and speculation are not so far\nasunder as was at first believed, and I maintain these ideas in order\nthat we may not be ashamed of them, seeing that we still belong to\nthem, and so that if we do get beyond them, we may not be ashamed of\nour progenitors of the early Christian times, who held these ideas in\nsuch high esteem.\n\nThe first principle of that Philosophy which has taken its place in\nChristendom is thus found in the existence of two totalities. This\nis a reduplication of substance which now, however, is characterized\nby the fact that the two totalities are no longer external to one\nanother, but are clearly both required through their relation to one\nanother. If formerly Stoicism and Epicureanism, whose negativity was\nScepticism, came forth as independent, and if finally the implicitly\nexistent universality of both was established, these moments are now\nknown as separate totalities, and yet in their opposition they have\nto be thought of as one. We have here the true speculative Idea, the\nNotion in its determinations, each of which is brought into a totality\nand clearly relates to the other. We thus have really two Ideas, the\nsubjective Idea as knowledge, and then the substantial and concrete\nIdea; and the development and perfection of this principle and its\ncoming to the consciousness of Thought, is the subject treated by\nmodern Philosophy. Thus the determinations are in it more concrete than\nwith the ancients. This opposition in which the two sides culminate,\ngrasped in its widest significance, is the opposition between Thought\nand Being, individuality and substance, so that in the subject himself\nhis freedom stands once more within the bounds of necessity; it is the\nopposition between subject and object, and between Nature and Mind, in\nso far as this last as finite stands in opposition to Nature.\n\nThe Greek Philosophy is free from restraint because it does not yet\nhave regard to the opposition between Being and Thought, but proceeds\nfrom the unconscious presupposition that Thought is also Being.\nCertainly certain stages in the Greek Philosophy are laid hold of which\nseem to stand on the same platform as the Christian philosophies.\nThus when we see, for instance, in the Philosophy of the Sophists,\nthe new Academics, and the Sceptics, that they maintain the doctrine\nthat the truth is not capable of being known, they might appear to\naccord with the later subjective philosophies in asserting that all\nthought-determinations were only subjective in character, and that\nhence from these no conclusions could be arrived at as regards what is\nobjective. But there is really a difference. In the case of ancient\nphilosophies, which said that we know only the phenomenal, everything\nis confined to that; it is as regards practical life that the new\nAcademy and the Sceptics also admitted the possibility of conducting\noneself rightly, morally and rationally, when one adopts the phenomenal\nas one\u2019s rule and guide in life. But though it is the phenomenal that\nlies at the foundation of things, it is not asserted that there is\nlikewise a knowledge of the true and existent, as in the case of the\nmerely subjective idealists of a more modern day. These last still\nkeep in the background a potentiality, a beyond which cannot be known\nthrough thought or through conception. This other knowledge is an\nimmediate knowledge\u2014a faith in, a view of, and a yearning after,\nthe beyond such as was evinced by Jacobi. The ancients have no such\nyearning; on the contrary, they have perfect satisfaction and rest in\nthe certitude that only that which appears is for Knowledge. Thus it\nis necessary in this respect to keep strictly to the point of view\nfrom which we start, else through the similarity of the results, we\ncome to see in that old Philosophy all the determinate character of\nmodern subjectivity. Since in the simplicity of ancient philosophy the\nphenomenal was itself the only sphere, doubts as to objective thought\nwere not present to it.\n\nThe opposition defined, the two sides of which are in modern times\nreally related to one another as totalities, also has the form of an\nopposition between reason and faith, between individual perception\nand the objective truth which must be taken without reason of one\u2019s\nown, and even with a complete disregard for such reason. This is faith\nas understood by the church, or faith in the modern sense, i.e. a\nrejection of reason in favour of an inward revelation, called a direct\ncertainty or perception, or an implicit and intuitive feeling. The\nopposition between this knowledge, which has first of all to develop\nitself, and that knowledge which has already developed itself inwardly,\narouses a peculiar interest. In both cases the unity of thought or\nsubjectivity and of Truth or objectivity is manifested, only in the\nfirst form it is said that the natural man knows the Truth since\nhe intuitively believes it, while in the second form the unity of\nknowledge and Truth is shown, but in such a way that the subject raises\nitself above the immediate form of sensuous consciousness and reaches\nthe Truth first of all through Thought.\n\nThe final end is to think the Absolute as Mind, as the Universal, that\nwhich, when the infinite bounty of the Notion in its reality freely\nemits its determinations from itself, wholly impresses itself upon and\nimparts itself to them, so that they may be indifferently outside of\nor in conflict with one another, but so that these totalities are one\nonly, not alone implicitly, (which would simply be our reflection) but\nexplicitly identical, the determinations of their difference being thus\nexplicitly merely ideal. Hence if the starting-point of the history of\nPhilosophy can be expressed by saying that God is comprehended as the\nimmediate and not yet developed universality, and that its end\u2014the\ngrasping of the Absolute as Mind through the two and a half thousand\nyears\u2019 work of the thus far inert world-spirit\u2014is the end of our time,\nit makes it easy for us from one determination to go on through the\nmanifestation of its needs, to others. Yet in the course of history\nthis is difficult.\n\nWe thus have altogether two philosophies\u2014the Greek and the Teutonic.\nAs regards the latter we must distinguish the time when Philosophy made\nits formal appearance as Philosophy and the period of formation and of\npreparation for modern times. We may first begin Teutonic philosophy\nwhere it appears in proper form as Philosophy. Between the first\nperiod and those more recent, comes, as an intermediate period, that\nfermentation of a new Philosophy which on the one side keeps within the\nsubstantial and real existence and does not arrive at form, while on\nthe other side, it perfects Thought, as the bare form of a presupposed\ntruth, until it again knows itself as the free ground and source of\nTruth. Hence the history of Philosophy falls into three periods\u2014that\nof the Greek Philosophy, the Philosophy of the Middle Ages and the\nmodern Philosophy. Of these the first is speaking generally, regulated\nby Thought, the second falls into the opposition between existence and\nformal reflection, but the third has the Notion as its ground. This\nmust not be taken to mean that the first contains Thought alone; it\nalso has conceptions and ideas, just as the latter begins from abstract\nthoughts which yet constitute a duality.\n\n_First Period._\u2014This commences at the time of Thales, about 600 B.C.,\nand goes on to the coming to maturity of the Neo-platonic philosophy\nwith Plotinus in the third century; from thence to its further progress\nand development with Proclus in the fifth century until the time when\nall philosophy was extinguished. The Neo-platonic philosophy then made\nits entrance into Christianity later on, and many philosophies within\nChristianity have this philosophy as their only groundwork. This is a\nspace of time extending to about 1000 years, the end of which coincides\nwith the migration of the nations and the decline of the Roman Empire.\n\n_Second Period._\u2014The second period is that of the Middle Ages.\nThe Scholastics are included in it, and Arabians and Jews are also\nhistorically to be noticed, but this philosophy mainly falls within the\nChristian Church. This period is of something over 1000 years\u2019 duration.\n\n_Third Period._\u2014The Philosophy of modern times made its first\nindependent appearance after the Thirty Years\u2019 War, with Bacon, Jacob\nB\u00f6hm and Descartes; it begins with the distinction contained in:\n_cogito ergo sum_. This period is one of a couple of centuries and the\nphilosophy is consequently still somewhat modern.\n\n\n2. SOURCES OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.\n\nWe have to seek for sources of another kind in this than in political\nhistory. There historians are the fountainheads, which again have\nas sources the deeds and sayings of individuals; and the historians\nwho are not original have over and above performed their work at\nsecondhand. But historians always have the deeds already present\nin history, that is to say, here brought into the form of ordinary\nconception; for the name of history has two meanings: it signifies\non the one hand the deeds and events themselves, and on the other,\nit denotes them in so far as they are formed through conception for\nconception. In the history of Philosophy there are, on the contrary,\nnot any sources which can be derived from historians, but the deeds\nthemselves lie before us, and these\u2014the philosophic operations\nthemselves\u2014are the true sources. If we wish to study the history of\nPhilosophy in earnest, we must go to such springs as these. Yet these\noperations form too wide a field to permit of our keeping to it alone\nin this history. In the case of many philosophers it is absolutely\nnecessary to confine oneself to the original authors, but in many\nperiods, in which we cannot obtain original sources, seeing that they\nhave not been preserved to us, (as, for instance, in that of the older\nGreek philosophy) we must certainly confine our attention simply to\nhistorians and other writers. There are other periods, too, where it is\ndesirable that others should have read the works of the philosophers\nand that we should receive abstracts therefrom. Several schoolmen\nhave left behind them works of sixteen, twenty-four and twenty-six\nfolios, and hence we must in their case confine ourselves to the\nresearches of others. Many philosophic works are also rare and hence\ndifficult to obtain. Many philosophers are for the most part important\nfrom an historic or literary point of view only, and hence we may\nlimit ourselves to the compilations in which they are dealt with. The\nmost noteworthy works on the history of Philosophy are, however, the\nfollowing, regarding which I refer for particulars to the summary of\nTennemann\u2019s History of Philosophy, by A. Wendt, since I do not wish to\ngive any complete list.\n\n1. One of the first Histories of Philosophy, which is only interesting\nas an attempt, is the \u201cHistory of Philosophy,\u201d by Thomas Stanley\n(London, 1655, folio ed. III., 1701, 4. translated into Latin by\nGodofr. Olearius, Lipsi\u00e6, 1711, 4). This history is no longer much\nused, and only contains the old philosophic schools in the form of\nsects and as if no new ones had existed. That is to say, it keeps to\nthe old belief commonly held at that time, that there only were ancient\nphilosophies and that the period of philosophy came to an end with\nChristianity, as if Philosophy were something belonging to heathendom\nand the truth only could be found in Christianity. In it a distinction\nwas drawn between Truth as it is created from the natural reason in the\nancient philosophies, and the revealed truth of the Christian religion,\nin which there was consequently no longer any Philosophy. In the time\nof the Revival of Learning there certainly were no proper philosophies,\nand above all in Stanley\u2019s time systems of Philosophy proper were too\nyoung for the older generations to have the amount of respect for them\nnecessary to allow of their being esteemed as realities.\n\n2. _Jo. Jac. Bruckeri Historia critica philosophi\u00e6, Lipsi\u00e6_, 1742-1744,\nfour parts, or five volumes in four, for the fourth part has two\nvolumes. The second edition, unaltered, but with the addition of\na supplement, 1766-1767, four parts in six quartos, the last of\nwhich forms the supplement. This is an immense compilation which is\nnot formed straight from the original sources, but is mixed with\nreflections after the manner of the times. As we have seen from an\nexample above (p. 43) the accounts given are in the highest degree\ninaccurate. Brucker\u2019s manner of procedure is entirely unhistoric, and\nyet nowhere ought we to proceed in a more historic manner than in\nthe history of Philosophy. This work is thus simply so much useless\nballast. An epitome of the same is _Jo. Jac. Bruckeri Institutiones\nhistori\u00e6 philosophic\u00e6, usui academic\u00e6 juventutis adornat\u00e6, Lipsi\u00e6_,\n1747, 8; second edition, Leipzig, 1756; third edition prepared by Born,\nLeipzig, 1790, 8.\n\n3. Dietrich Tiedmann\u2019s _Geist der Speculativen Philosophie_, Marburg,\n1791-1797, 6 vols., 8. He treats of political history diffusely, but\nwithout any life, and the language is stiff and affected. The whole\nwork is a melancholy example of how a learned professor can occupy his\nwhole life with the study of speculative philosophy, and yet have no\nidea at all of speculation. His _argumenta_ to the Plato of Brucker\nare of the same description. In every history he makes abstracts from\nthe philosophers so long as they keep to mere ratiocination, but when\nthe speculative is arrived at, he becomes irate, declaring it all to\nbe composed of empty subtleties, and stops short with the words \u201cwe\nknow better.\u201d His merit is that he has supplied valuable abstracts\nfrom rare books belonging to the Middle Ages and from cabalistic and\nmystical works of that time.\n\n4. Joh. Gottlieb Buhle: _Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie und\neiner kritischen Literatur derselben_, G\u00f6ttingen, 1796 to 1804, eight\nparts, 8. Ancient philosophy is treated with disproportionate brevity;\nthe further Buhle went on, the more particular he became. He has many\ngood summaries of rare works, as for instance those of Giordano Bruno,\nwhich were in the G\u00f6ttingen Library.\n\n5. Wilh. Gottl. Tennemann\u2019s _Geschichte der Philosophie_, Leipzig,\n1798\u20141819, eleven parts, 8. The eighth part, the Scholastic\nPhilosophy, occupies two volumes. The philosophies are fully described,\nand the more modern times are better done than the ancient. The\nphilosophies of recent times are easier to describe, since it is only\nnecessary to make an abstract or to interpret straight on, for the\nthoughts contained in them lie nearer to ours. It is otherwise with\nthe ancient philosophers, because they stand in another stage of\nthe Notion, and on this account they are likewise more difficult to\ngrasp. That is to say, what is old is easily overthrown by something\nelse more familiar to us, and where Tennemann comes across such he is\nalmost useless. In Aristotle, for instance, the misinterpretation is so\ngreat, that Tennemann foists upon him what is directly opposite to his\nbeliefs, and thus from the adoption of the opposite to what Tennemann\nasserts to be Aristotle\u2019s opinion, a correct idea of Aristotelian\nphilosophy is arrived at. Tennemann is then candid enough to place the\nreference to Aristotle underneath the text, so that the original and\nthe interpretation often contradict one another. Tennemann thinks that\nit is really the case that the historian should have no philosophy, and\nhe glories in that; yet he really has a system and he is a critical\nphilosopher. He praises philosophers, their work and their genius,\nand yet the end of the lay is that all of them will be pronounced to\nbe wanting in that they have one defect, which is not to be Kantian\nphilosophers and not yet to have sought the source of knowledge. From\nthis the result is that the Truth could not be known.\n\nOf compendiums, three have to be noticed. 1. Frederick Aft\u2019s _Grundriss\neiner Geschichte der Philosophie_. (Landshut, 1807, 8; second edition,\n1825) is written from a better point of view; the Philosophy is that\nof Schelling for the most part, but it is somewhat confused. Aft by\nsome formal method has distinguished ideal philosophy from real. 2.\nProfessor Wendt\u2019s G\u00f6ttingen edition of Tennemann (fifth edition,\nLeipzig, 1828, 8). It is astonishing to see what is represented as\nbeing Philosophy, without any consideration as to whether it has any\nmeaning or not. Such so-called new philosophies grow like mushrooms out\nof the ground. There is nothing easier than to comprehend in harmony\nwith a principle; but it must not be thought that hence something\nnew and profound has been accomplished. 3. Rirner\u2019s _Handbuch der\nGeschichte der Philosophie_, 3 vols., Sulzbach, 1822-1823, 8 (second\namended edition, 1829) is most to be commended, and yet I will not\nassert that it answers all the requirements of a History of Philosophy.\nThere are many points which leave much to desire, but the appendices\nto each volume in which the principal original authorities are quoted,\nare particularly excellent for their purpose. Selected extracts, more\nspecially from the ancient philosophers, are needed, and these would\nnot be lengthy, since there are not very many passages to be given from\nthe philosophers before Plato.\n\n\n3. METHOD OF TREATMENT ADOPTED IN THIS HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.\n\nAs regards external history I shall only touch upon that which is\nthe concern of universal history, the spirit or the principle of the\ntimes, and hence I will treat of conditions of life in reference to\nthe outstanding philosophers. Of philosophies, however, only those\nare to be made mention of the principles of which have caused some\nsensation, and through which science has made an advance; hence I shall\nput aside many names which would be taken up in a learned treatise, but\nwhich are of little value in respect to Philosophy. The history of the\ndissemination of a doctrine, its fate, those who have merely taught a\nparticular doctrine, I pass over, as the deduction of the whole world\nfrom one particular principle.\n\nThe demand that in Philosophy an historian should have no system,\nshould put into the philosophy nothing of his own, nor assail it with\nhis ideas, seems a plausible one. The history of Philosophy should\nshow just this impartiality, and it seems in so far that to give only\nsummaries of the philosophers proves a success. He who understands\nnothing of the matter, and has no system, but merely historic\nknowledge, will certainly be impartial. But political history has to\nbe carefully distinguished from the history of Philosophy. That is\nto say, though in the former, one is not indeed at liberty to limit\noneself to representing the events chronologically only, one can yet\nkeep to what is entirely objective, as is done in the Homeric epic.\nThus Herodotus and Thucydides, as free men, let the objective world\ndo freely and independently as it would; they have added nothing of\ntheir own, neither have they taken and judged before their tribunal the\nactions which they represented. Yet even in political history there is\nalso a particular end kept in view. In Livy the main points are the\nRoman rule, its enlargement, and the perfecting of the constitution;\nwe see Rome arise, defend itself, and exercise its mastery. It is thus\nthat the self-developing reason in the history of Philosophy makes of\nitself an end, and this end is not foreign or imported, but is the\nmatter itself, which lies at the basis as universal, and with which the\nindividual forms of themselves correspond. Thus when the history of\nPhilosophy has to tell of deeds in history, we first ask, what a deed\nin Philosophy is; and whether any particular thing is philosophic or\nnot. In external history everything is in action\u2014certainly there is in\nit what is important and that which is unimportant\u2014but action is the\nidea immediately placed before us. This is not the case in Philosophy,\nand on this account the history of Philosophy cannot be treated\nthroughout without the introduction of the historian\u2019s views.\n\n\n\n\nORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY\n\n\nTHE first Philosophy in order is the so-called Oriental, which,\nhowever, does not enter into the substance or range of our subject\nas represented here. Its position is preliminary, and we only deal\nwith it at all in order to account for not treating of it at greater\nlength, and to show in what relation it stands to Thought and to true\nPhilosophy. The expression Eastern philosophy is specially employed\nin reference to the period in which this great universal Oriental\nconception aroused the East\u2014the land of circumscription and of\nlimitation, where the spirit of subjectivity reigns. More particularly\nin the first centuries of Christendom\u2014that significant period\u2014did\nthese great Oriental ideas penetrate into Italy; and in the Gnostic\nphilosophy they began to force the idea of the illimitable into the\nWestern mind, until in the Church the latter again succeeded in\nobtaining the ascendency and hence in firmly establishing the Divine.\nThat which we call Eastern Philosophy is more properly the religious\nmode of thought and the conception of the world belonging generally\nto the Orientals and approximates very closely to Philosophy; and to\nconsider the Oriental idea of religion just as if it were religious\nphilosophy, is to give the main reason why it is so like.\n\nWe do not similarly maintain that the Roman, Greek and Christian\nReligions constitute Philosophy. These bear all the less similarity\nthereto in that the Greek and Roman gods as also Christ and the God\nof the Jews, on account of the principle of individual freedom which\npenetrates the Greek and still more the Christian element, make their\nappearance immediately as the explicit, personal forms, which, being\nmythological or Christian, must first be themselves interpreted and\nchanged into a philosophic form. In the case of Eastern Religion, on\nthe contrary, we are much more directly reminded of the philosophic\nconception, for since in the East the element of subjectivity has\nnot come forth, religious ideas are not individualized, and we have\npredominating a kind of universal ideas, which hence present the\nappearance of being philosophic ideas and thoughts. The Orientals\ncertainly have also individual forms, such as Brahma, Vishnu and Civa,\nbut because freedom is wanting the individuality is not real, but\nmerely superficial. And so much is this the case, that when we suppose\nthat we have to deal with a human form, the same loses itself again and\nexpands into the illimitable. Just as we hear amongst the Greeks of a\nUranus and Chronos\u2014of Time individualized\u2014we find with the Persians,\nZeroane Akerene, but it is Time unlimited. We find Ormuzd and Ahriman\nto be altogether general forms and ideas; they appear to be universal\nprinciples which thus seem to bear a relationship to Philosophy or even\nseem to be themselves philosophic.\n\nJust as the content of the Eastern religions, God, the essentially\nexistent, the eternal, is comprehended somewhat in the light of\nuniversal, we find the relative positions of individuals to Him to be\nthe same. In the Eastern religions the first condition is that only\nthe one substance shall, as such, be the true, and that the individual\nneither can have within himself, nor can he attain to any value in as\nfar as he maintains himself as against the being in and for itself.\nHe can have true value only through an identification with this\nsubstance in which he ceases to exist as subject and disappears into\nunconsciousness. In the Greek and Christian Religion, on the other\nhand, the subject knows himself to be free and must be maintained as\nsuch; and because the individual in this way makes himself independent,\nit is undoubtedly much more difficult for Thought to free itself from\nthis individuality and to constitute itself in independence. The\nhigher point of view implicitly contained in the Greek individual\nfreedom, this happier, larger life, makes more difficult the work of\nThought, which is to give due value to the universal. In the East,\non the contrary, the substantial in Religion is certainly on its own\nview the principal matter, the essential\u2014and with it lawlessness,\nthe absence of individual consciousness is immediately connected\u2014and\nthis substance is undoubtedly a philosophic idea. The negation of\nthe finite is also present, but in such a manner that the individual\nonly reaches to its freedom in this unity with the substantial. In as\nfar as in the Eastern mind, reflection, consciousness come through\nthought to distinction and to the determination of principles, there\nexist such categories and such definite ideas not in unity with the\nsubstantial. The destruction of all that is particular either is an\nillimitable, the exaltitude of the East, or, in so far as that which\nis posited and determined for itself is known, it is a dry, dead\nunderstanding, which cannot take up the speculative Notion into itself.\nTo that which is true, this finite can exist only as immersed in\nsubstance; if kept apart from this it remains dead and arid. We thus\nfind only dry understanding amongst the Easterns, a mere enumeration\nof determinations, a logic like the Wolffian of old. It is the same as\nin their worship, which is complete immersion in devotion and then an\nendless number of ceremonials and of religious actions; and this on the\nother side is the exaltitude of that illimitable in which everything\ndisappears.\n\nThere are two Eastern nations with which I wish just now to deal\u2014the\nChinese and the Indian.\n\n\nA. CHINESE PHILOSOPHY.\n\nIt is true of the Chinese as well as of the Indians that they have a\ngreat reputation for culture; but this, as well as the amount of Indian\nliterature which exists, has largely diminished through a further\nknowledge of it. The great knowledge of these people bears upon such\nsubjects as Religion, Science, the constitution and administration\nof the state, poetry, handicrafts and commerce. But when we compare\nthe laws and constitution of China with the European, we find that\nwe can only do so in respect of what is formal, for the content is\nvery different. It is also felt, however consistently they may be\nconstituted as to form, that they cannot find their place with us, that\nwe could not allow of their giving us satisfaction, and that they take\nthe place of law, or rather that they put an end to it. It is the same\nthing when we compare Indian poetry with European; considered as a mere\nplay of the imagination it is as brilliant, rich and cultured as that\nof any other people. But in poetry we have to do with content, and that\nis the important part of it. Even the Homeric poetry is not serious for\nus, and hence such poetry cannot last. It is not the lack of genius\nin the Oriental poetry; the amount of genius is the same and the form\nmay be very much developed, but the content remains confined within\ncertain bounds and cannot satisfy us, nor can it be our content. This\nis at outset a fact applying universally to such comparisons, inasmuch\nas men let themselves be dazzled by form, making it equal with, or even\npreferring it to ours.\n\n1. _Confucius_. The first subject of remark with regard to the Chinese\nrespects the teaching of Confucius (500 years before Christ) which\nmade a great sensation in Liebnitz\u2019 time; this teaching is a moral\nphilosophy. Confucius has, besides, commented upon the old traditional\nprinciples of the Chinese; his high moral teaching, however, gave him\nhis great fame, and that teaching is the authority most esteemed in\nChina. Confucius\u2019 Biography has been translated by French missionaries\nfrom the original Chinese; from this he appears to have been almost\ncontemporaneous with Thales, to have been for a considerable time\nMinister, to have then fallen into disfavour, lost his place and\nlived and philosophized amongst his own friends, while still being\noften asked to give advice. We have conversations between Confucius\nand his followers in which there is nothing definite further than a\ncommonplace moral put in the form of good, sound doctrine, which may be\nfound as well expressed and better, in every place and amongst every\npeople. Cicero gives us _De Officiis_, a book of moral teaching more\ncomprehensive and better than all the books of Confucius. He is hence\nonly a man who has a certain amount of practical and worldly wisdom\u2014one\nwith whom there is no speculative philosophy. We may conclude from his\noriginal works that for their reputation it would have been better had\nthey never been translated. The treatise which the Jesuits produced[9]\nis, however, more a paraphrase than a translation.\n\n2. _The Philosophy of the Y-king_. A second matter of remark is\nthat the Chinese have also taken up their attention with abstract\nthoughts and with pure categories. The old book Y-king, or the Book of\nPrinciples, serves as the foundation for such; it contains the wisdom\nof the Chinese, and its origin is attributed to Fohi. That which is\nthere by him related passes into what is quite mythological, fabulous\nand even senseless. The main point in it is the ascription to him of\nthe discovery of a table with certain signs or figures (Ho-tu) which\nhe saw on the back of a horse-dragon as it rose out of the river.[10]\nThis table contains parallel lines above one another, which have a\nsymbolical signification; and the Chinese say that these lines are\nthe foundation of their characters as also of their philosophy. These\nsymbols are quite abstract categories, and consequently the most\nsuperficial determinations of the understanding. It must certainly be\nconsidered that pure thoughts are brought to consciousness, but in this\ncase we make no advance, merely remaining stationary so far as they\nare concerned. The concrete is not conceived of speculatively, but\nis simply taken from ordinary ideas, inasmuch as it is expressed in\naccordance with their forms of representation and of perception. Hence\nin this collection of concrete principles there is not to be found\nin one single instance a sensuous conception of universal natural or\nspiritual powers.\n\nTo satisfy the curious, I will give these principles in greater detail.\nThe two fundamental, figures are a horizontal line (\u268a, Yang) and the\none which is broken into two equal parts (\u268b, Yin). The first which is\nthe perfect, the father, the manlike, the unity, such as is represented\nby the Pythagoreans, represents the affirmative; the second is the\nimperfect, the mother, the womanly, the duality and the negation.\nThese signs are held in high esteem, for they are considered to be\nthe Principles of things. First of all they are placed in combination\nof two from which four figures result: \u268c, \u268d, \u268e, \u268f, or the great Yang,\nthe little Yang, the little Yin, and the great Yin. The signification\nof these four representations is matter as perfect and imperfect. The\ntwo Yangs are perfect matter: the first is in the category of youth\nand power; the second is the same matter, but as old and powerless.\nThe third and fourth images, where Yin constitutes the basis, are\nimperfect matter, which has again the two determinations of youth and\nage, strength and weakness. These lines are further united in sets of\nthree, and thus eight figures result, which are called Kua, \u2630, \u2631, \u2632, \u2633,\n\u2634, \u2635, \u2636, \u2637. I will give the interpretation of these Kua just to show\nhow superficial it is. The first sign, containing the great Yang and\nthe Yang is the Heavens (Tien) or the all-pervading ether. The Heavens\nto the Chinese means what is highest, and it has been a great source\nof division amongst the missionaries whether they ought to call the\nChristian God, Tien, or not. The second sign is pure water (Tui),\nthe third pure fire (Li), the fourth thunder (Tschin), the fifth wind\n(Siun), the sixth common water (Kan), the seventh mountains (Ken), the\neighth the earth (Kuen). We should not place heaven, thunder, wind\nand mountains on the same footing. We may thus obtain a philosophic\norigin for everything out of these abstract thoughts of absolute unity\nand duality. All symbols have the advantage of indicating thoughts\nand of calling up significations, and in this way such are likewise\npresent there. Thought thus forms the first beginning, but afterwards\nit goes into the clouds, and Philosophy does likewise. Therefore\nif Windischmann[11] in his commentary recognizes in this system of\nConfucius, a \u201cthorough interconnection between all Kua in the whole\nseries,\u201d it should be remembered that not a particle of the Notion is\nto be found in it.\n\nUnited further in sets of four, the lines produce sixty-four figures,\nwhich the Chinese consider to be the origin of their characters,\nsince there have been added to these straight lines those which are\nperpendicular and inclined in different directions.\n\nIn Schuking there is also a chapter on Chinese wisdom, where the five\nelements from which everything is made make their appearance. These are\nfire, water, wood, metal and earth, which exist all in confusion, and\nwhich we should no more than we did before, allow to be principles. The\nfirst canon in the law is found in the Schuking, as the naming of the\nfive elements; the second, considerations upon the last, and so it goes\non.[12] Universal abstraction with the Chinese thus goes on to what is\nconcrete, although in accordance with an external kind of order only,\nand without containing anything that is sensuous. This is the principle\nof all Chinese wisdom and of all the objects of study in China.\n\n3. _The Sect of the Tao-See_. There is yet another separate sect,\nthat of the Tao-See, the followers of which are not mandarins and\nattached to the state religion, nor are they Buddhists or Lamaics. The\noriginator of this philosophy and the one who was closely connected\nwith it in his life, is Lao-Ts\u00f6, who was born in the end of the seventh\ncentury before Christ and who was older than Confucius, for this\nrepresentative of the more political school went to him in order to\nask his advice. The book of the Lao-Ts\u00f6, Tao-king, is certainly not\nincluded in the proper Kings and has not their authority, but it is\nan important work amongst the Taosts or the followers of reason, who\ncall their rule in life Tao-Tao, which means the observation of the\ndictates or the laws of reason. They dedicate their lives to the study\nof reason, and maintain that he who knows reason in its source will\npossess universal science, remedies for every ill and all virtue; he\nwill also have obtained a supernatural power of being able to fly to\nheaven and of not dying.[13]\n\nHis followers say of Lao-Ts\u00f6 himself that he is Buddha who as man\nbecame the ever-existent God. We still have his principal writings;\nthey have been taken to Vienna, and I have seen them there myself.\nOne special passage is frequently taken from them: \u201cWithout a name\nTao[14] is the beginning of Heaven and Earth, and with a name she is\nthe Mother of the Universe. It is only in her imperfect state that she\nis considered with affection; who desires to know her must be devoid\nof passions.\u201d Abel R\u00e9musat says that taken at its best this might be\nexpressed by the Greek in _\u03cc\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2_. The celebrated passage which is\noften quoted by the ancients is this,[15] \u201cReason has brought forth\nthe one; the one has brought forth the two; the two have brought forth\nthe three; and the three have produced the whole world.\u201d In this men\nhave tried to find a reference to the Trinity. \u201cThe Universe rests\nupon the principle of Darkness, the universe embraces the principle of\nLight,\u201d or \u201cit is embraced by ether;\u201d it can be thus reversed, because\nthe Chinese language has no case inflection, the words merely standing\nin proximity. Another passage in the same place has this sense, \u201cHe\nwhom ye look at and do not see, is named I; thou hearkenest to him and\nhearest him not, and he is called Hi; thou seekest for him with thy\nhand and touchest him not, and his name is We\u00ef. Thou meetest him and\nseest not his head; thou goest behind him and seest not his back.\u201d\nThese contradictory expressions are called the \u201cchain of reason.\u201d One\nnaturally thinks in quoting these passages of \u05d9\u05d4\u05e8\u05d4 and of the African\nkingly name of Juba and also of _Jovis_. This I-hi-we\u00ef or I-H-W[16] is\nfurther made to signify an absolute vacuity and that which is Nothing;\nto the Chinese what is highest and the origin of things is nothing,\nemptiness, the altogether undetermined, the abstract universal, and\nthis is also called Tao or reason. When the Greeks say that the\nabsolute is one, or when men in modern times say that it is the highest\nexistence, all determinations are abolished, and by the merely abstract\nBeing nothing has been expressed excepting this same negation, only in\nan affirmative form. But if Philosophy has got no further than to such\nexpression, it still stands on its most elementary stage. What is there\nto be found in all this learning?\n\n\nB. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.\n\nIf we had formerly the satisfaction of believing in the antiquity\nof the Indian wisdom and of holding it in respect, we now have\nascertained through being acquainted with the great astronomical\nworks of the Indians, the inaccuracy of all figures quoted. Nothing\ncan be more confused, nothing more imperfect than the chronology of\nthe Indians; no people which has attained to culture in astronomy,\nmathematics, &c., is as incapable for history; in it they have neither\nstability nor coherence. It was believed that such was to be had in\nthe time of Wikramaditya, who was supposed to have lived about 50\nB.C., and under whose reign the poet Kalidasa, author of Sakontala,\nlived. But further research discovered half a dozen Wikramadityas and\ncareful investigation has placed this epoch in our eleventh century.\nThe Indians have lines of kings and an enormous quantity of names, but\neverything is vague.\n\nWe know how the ancient glory of this land was held in the highest\nestimation even by the Greeks, just as they knew about the\nGymnosophists, who were excellent men, though people ventured to call\nthem otherwise\u2014men who having dedicated themselves to a contemplative\nlife, lived in abstraction from external life, and hence, wandering\nabout in hordes, like the Cynics renounced all ordinary desires. These\nlatter in their capacity as philosophers, were also more especially\nknown to the Greeks, inasmuch as Philosophy is also supposed to exist\nin this abstraction, in which all the relationships of ordinary life\nare set aside; and this abstraction is a feature which we wish to bring\ninto prominence and consider.\n\nIndian culture is developed to a high degree, and it is imposing, but\nits Philosophy is identical with its Religion, and the objects to\nwhich attention is devoted in Philosophy are the same as those which\nwe find brought forward in Religion. Hence the holy books or Vedas\nalso form the general groundwork for Philosophy. We know the Vedas\ntolerably well; they contain principally prayers addressed to the\nmany representations of God, direction as to ceremonials, offerings,\n&c. They are also of the most various periods; many parts are very\nancient, and others have taken their origin later, as, for instance,\nthat which treats of the service of Vishnu. The Vedas even constitute\nthe basis for the atheistical Indian philosophies; these, too, are not\nwanting in gods, and they pay genuine attention to the Vedas. Indian\nPhilosophy thus stands within Religion just as scholastic Philosophy\nstands within Christian dogmatism, having at its basis and presupposing\nthe doctrines of the church. Mythology takes the form of incarnation\nor individualization, from which it might be thought that it would be\nopposed to Philosophy in its universality and ideality; incarnation is\nnot, however, here taken in so definite a sense, for almost everything\nis supposed to partake of it, and the very thing that seems to define\nitself as individuality falls back directly within the mist of the\nuniversal. The idea of the Indians more appropriately expressed, is\nthat there is one universal substance which may be laid hold of in the\nabstract or in the concrete, and out of which everything takes its\norigin. The summit of man\u2019s attainment is that he as consciousness\nshould make himself identical with the substance, in Religion by means\nof worship, offerings, and rigid acts of expiation, and in Philosophy\nthrough the instrumentality of pure thought.\n\nIt is quite recently that we first obtained a definite knowledge of\nIndian Philosophy; in the main we understand by it religious ideas,\nbut in modern times men have learned to recognize real philosophic\nwritings. Colebrooke,[17] in particular, communicated abstracts\nto us from two Indian philosophic works, and this forms the first\ncontribution we have had in reference to Indian Philosophy. What\nFrederick von Schlegel says about the wisdom of the Indians is taken\nfrom their religious ideas only. He is one of the first Germans who\ntook up his attention with Indian philosophy, yet his work bore little\nfruit because he himself read no more than the index to the Ramayana.\nAccording to the abstract before mentioned, the Indians possess ancient\nphilosophic systems; one part of these they consider to be orthodox,\nand those which tally with the Vedas are particularly included; the\nothers are held to be heterodox and as not corresponding with the\nteaching of the holy books. The one part, which really is orthodox, has\nno other purpose than to make the deliverances of the Vedas clearer,\nor to derive from the text of these original treatises an ingeniously\nthought-out Psychology. This system is called Mimansa, and two schools\nproceed from it. Distinguished from these there are other systems,\namongst which the two chief are those of the Sanc\u2019hya and Nyaya. The\nformer again divides into two parts which are, however, different in\nform only. The Nyaya is the most developed; it more particularly gives\nthe rules for reasoning, and may be compared to the Logic of Aristotle.\nColebrooke has made abstracts from both of these systems, and he says\nthat there are many ancient treatises upon them, and that the _versus\nmemoriales_ from them are very extensive.\n\n1. _The Sanc\u2019hya Philosophy of Capila_. The originator of the Sanc\u2019hya\nis called Capila, and he was an ancient sage of whom it was said that\nhe was a son of Brahma, and one of the seven great Holy men; others\nsay that he was an incarnation of Vishnu, like his disciple Asuri,\nand that he was identified with fire. As to the age of the Aphorisms\n(Sutras) of Capila, Colebrooke can say nothing; he merely mentions that\nthey were already mentioned in other very ancient books, but he does\nnot feel able to say anything definite in the matter. The Sanc\u2019hya is\ndivided into different schools, of which there are two or three, which,\nhowever, differ from one another only in a few particulars. It is held\nto be partly heterodox and partly orthodox.\n\nThe real aim of all Indian schools and systems of Philosophy, whether\natheistic or theistic, is to teach the means whereby eternal happiness\ncan be attained before, as well as after, death. The Vedas say, \u201cWhat\nhas to be known is the Soul; it must be distinguished from nature, and\nhence it will never come again.\u201d That means that it is exempt from\nmetempsychosis and likewise from bodily form, so that it does not after\ndeath make its appearance in another body. This blessed condition\ntherefore is, according to the Sanc\u2019hya, a perfect and eternal\nrelease from every kind of ill. It reads:\u2014\u201cThrough Thought, the true\nScience, this freedom can be accomplished; the temporal and worldly\nmeans of procuring enjoyment and keeping off spiritual or bodily evil\nare insufficient; even the methods advocated by the Vedas are not\neffectual for the purpose, and these are found in the revealed form\nof worship, or in the performance of religious ceremonies as directed\nin the Vedas.\u201d The offering up of animals is specially valuable as\nsuch a means; and in this regard the Sanc\u2019hya rejects the Vedas; such\nan offering is not pure, because it is connected with the death of\nanimals, and the main tenet in the former is not to injure any animal.\nOther methods of deliverance from evil are in the excessive acts of\npenance performed by the Indians, to which a retreat within themselves\nis added. Now when the Indian thus internally collects himself, and\nretreats within his own thoughts, the moment of such pure concentration\nis called Brahma, the one and the clearly supersensuous state, which\nthe understanding calls the highest possible existence. When this is\nso with me, then am I Brahma. Such a retreat into Thought takes place\nin the Religion as well as in the Philosophy of the Indians, and they\nassert with reference to this state of bliss that it is what is highest\nof all, and that even the gods do not attain to it. Indra, for example,\nthe god of the visible heavens, is much lower than the soul in this\nlife of internal contemplation; many thousand Indras have passed away,\nbut the soul is exempt from every change. The Sanc\u2019hya only differs\nfrom Religion in that it has a complete system of thought or logic, and\nthat the abstraction is not made a reduction to what is empty, but is\nraised up into the significance of a determinate thought. This science\nis stated to subsist in the correct knowledge of the principles\u2014which\nmay be outwardly perceptible or not\u2014of the material and of the\nimmaterial world.\n\nThe Sanc\u2019hya system separates itself into three parts: the method of\nknowledge, the object of knowledge, and the determinate form of the\nknowledge of principles.\n\n_a._ As regards the methods of obtaining knowledge, the Sanc\u2019hya says\nthat there are three kinds of evidence possible: first of all, that of\nperception; secondly, that of inference; thirdly, that of affirmation,\nwhich is the origin of all others, such as reverence for authority, a\nteachable disposition, and tradition. Perception is said to require no\nexplanation. Inference is a conclusion arrived at from the operation of\ncause and effect, by which one determination merely passes over into\na second. There are three forms, because inferences are made either\nfrom cause to effect, from effect to cause, or in accordance with\ndifferent relations of cause and effect. Rain, we may say, is foretold\nwhen a cloud is seen to be gathering; fire, when a hill is seen to be\nsmoking; or the movement of the moon is inferred when, at different\ntimes, it is observed to be in different places. These are simple,\ndry relations, originating from the understanding. Under affirmation,\ntradition or revelation is understood, such as that of the orthodox\nVedas; in a wider sense, immediate certainty or the affirmation in my\nconsciousness, and in a less wide sense, an assurance through verbal\ncommunication or through tradition is so denominated.\n\n_b._ Of objects of knowledge or of principles, the Sanc\u2019hya gives\nfive-and-twenty; and these I will mention to show the want of order\nthat is in them.\n\n1. Nature, as the origin of everything, is said to be the\nuniversal, the material cause, eternal matter, undistinguished and\nundistinguishable, without parts, productive but without production,\nabsolute substance. 2. Intelligence, the first production of Nature\nand itself producing other principles, distinguishable as three gods\nthrough the efficacy of three qualities, which are Goodness, Foulness\nand Darkness. These form one person and three gods, namely, Brahma,\nVishnu, and Maheswara. 3. Consciousness, personality, the belief that\nin all perceptions and meditations I am present, that the objects of\nsense, as well as of intelligence, concern me, in short that I am I.\nIt issues from the power of intelligence, and itself brings forth the\nfollowing principles. 4-8. Five very subtle particles, rudiments or\natoms, which are only perceptible to an existence of a higher order,\nand not through the senses of men; these proceed from the principle\nof consciousness, and bring forth on their own account the five\nelements\u2014space and the first origination of earth, water, fire and\nair. 9-19. The eleven succeeding principles are the organs of feeling,\nwhich are produced by the personality. There are ten external organs,\ncomprising the five senses and five active organs\u2014the organs of the\nvoice, hands and feet, the excretory and genital organs. The eleventh\norgan is that of the inward sense. 20 to 24. These principles are the\nfive elements brought forth from the earlier-named rudiments\u2014the ether\nwhich takes possession of space, air, fire, water and earth. 25. The\nsoul. In this very unsystematic form we see only the first beginnings\nof reflection, which seem to be put together as a universal. But\nthis arrangement is, to say nothing of being unsystematic, not even\nintelligent.\n\nFormerly the principles were outside of and successive to one another;\ntheir unity is found in the Soul. It is said of the latter that\nit is not produced, and is not productive; it is individual, and\nhence there are many souls; it is sentient, eternal, immaterial and\nunchangeable. Colebrooke here distinguishes between the theistic and\natheistic systems of the Sanc\u2019hya, since the former not only admits\nof individual souls, but also upholds God (Iswara) as the ruler of the\nworld. The knowledge of the soul still remains the principal point. It\nis through the consideration of nature and through abstraction from\nnature that the unity of the soul with nature is brought about, just\nas the lame man and the blind are brought together for the purposes of\ntransport and of guidance\u2014the one being the bearer and being directed\n(nature?), the other being borne and guiding (soul?). Through the union\nof Soul and Nature, the creation is effected, and this consists in\nthe development of intelligence and of other principles. This unity\nis the actual support for that which is, and the means by which it is\nso maintained. It is at the same time an important consideration that\nthe negation of the object which is contained in thought, is necessary\nin order to comprehend; this reflection has far more depth than the\nordinary talk about immediate consciousness. The view is superficial\nand perverted which maintains the Easterns to have lived in unity\nwith nature; the soul in its activity, mind, is indeed undoubtedly in\nrelation with nature and in unity with the truth of nature. But this\ntrue unity essentially contains the moment of the negation of nature\nas it is in its immediacy; such an immediate unity is merely the life\nof animals, the life and perception of the senses. The idea which is\npresent to the Indians is thus indeed the unity of nature and of soul,\nbut the spiritual is only one with nature in so far as it is within\nitself, and at the same time manifests the natural as negative. As\nregards the creation, this is further signified. The soul\u2019s desire\nand end is for satisfaction and freedom, and with this view it is\nendowed with a subtle environment, in which all the above-mentioned\nprinciples are contained, but only in their elementary development.\nSomething of our ideal, or of the implicit is present in this idea; it\nis like the blossom which is ideally in the bud, and yet is not actual\nand real. The expression for this is Lingam, the generative power of\nnature, which holds a high place in the estimation of all Indians. This\nsubtle form, says the Sanc\u2019hya, also assumes a coarse bodily shape,\nand clothes itself in several garbs; and as a means of preventing\nthe descent into a coarse materiality, philosophic contemplation is\nrecommended.\n\nHitherto we have observed the abstract principles; the following is\nto be noticed regarding the creation of the concrete actuality of\nthe universe. The bodily creation consists of the soul habited in\na material body; it comprehends eight orders of higher beings and\nfive orders of lower beings, which constitute\u2014with men, who form\na single class\u2014fourteen orders, and these are divided into three\nworlds or classes. The first eight orders have appellations which\nappear in Indian mythology, viz. Brahma, Prajapatis, Indra, &c.;\nthere are both gods and demi-gods, and Brahma himself is represented\nhere as if he were created. The five lower orders are composed of\nanimals: the four-footed animals are in two classes, birds come third,\nreptiles, fishes, and insects fourth, and, finally, vegetable and\ninorganic nature comes fifth. The abode of the eight higher classes\nis in heaven; they are, it is said, in the enjoyment of that which is\ngood and virtuous, and consequently are happy, though still they are\nbut imperfect and transient; underneath is the seat of darkness or\ndelusion, where beings of the lower orders live; and between is the\nworld of men, where untruth or passion reigns.\n\nAgainst these three worlds, which have their place in the material\ncreation, the system places yet another creation, and that is the\nIntellectual, consisting of the powers of understanding and the\nsenses. These last are again divided into four classes, viz. those\ndeterminations which impede, those which incapacitate, those which\nsatisfy, and those which perfect the intelligence. 1. Sixty-two of\nthe impeding determinations are adduced; eight kinds of error, as\nmany of opinion or of illusion, ten of passion as being illusion\ncarried to extremity, eighteen of hate or sullenness, and the same of\ngrief. Here there is shown somewhat of an empirical, psychological,\nand observing mode of treatment. 2. The incapacity of intelligence\nhas again eight-and-twenty variations: injury, want of organs, &c.\n3. Satisfaction is either inward or outward. The inward satisfaction\nis fourfold; the first concerns nature, the whole universal or\nsubstantial, and is set forth in the opinion that philosophic knowledge\nis a modification of the principle of nature itself, with which there\nis immediately united the anticipation of a liberty given through\nthe act of nature; yet the true liberty is not to be expected as\nan act of nature, for it is the soul which has to bring forth that\nliberty through itself and through its thinking activity. The second\nsatisfaction is in the belief of securing liberty through ascetic\nexercises, pains, torments, and penances. The third has to do with\ntime\u2014the idea that liberty will come in the course of time and without\nstudy. The fourth satisfaction is obtained in a belief in luck\u2014in\nbelieving that liberty depends on fate. The external mode of obtaining\nsatisfaction relates to continence from enjoyment, but continence\nfrom sensuous motives, such as dislike to the unrest of acquisition,\nand fear of the evil consequences of enjoyment. 4. There are, again,\nseveral means of perfecting the intelligence adduced, and, amongst\nothers, there is the direct psychological mode of perfecting mind, as\nis seen in the act of reasoning, in friendly converse, and so on. This\nwe may find, indeed, in our applied logic.\n\nThere is still somewhat to be remarked as to the main points of\nthe system. The Sanc\u2019hya, and likewise the other Indian systems of\nPhilosophy, occupy themselves particularly with the three _qualities_\n(Guna) of the absolute Idea, which are represented as substances and\nas modifications of nature. It is noteworthy that in the observing\nconsciousness of the Indians it struck them that what is true and\nin and for itself contains three determinations, and the Notion of\nthe Idea is perfected in three moments. This sublime consciousness\nof the trinity, which we find again in Plato and others, then went\nastray in the region of thinking contemplation, and retains its place\nonly in Religion, and there but as a Beyond. Then the understanding\npenetrated through it, declaring it to be senseless; and it was Kant\nwho broke open the road once more to its comprehension. The reality and\ntotality of the Notion of everything, considered in its substance, is\nabsorbed by the triad of determinations; and it has become the business\nof our times to bring this to consciousness. With the Indians, this\nconsciousness proceeded from sensuous observation merely, and they now\nfurther define these qualities as follows: The first and highest is\nwith them the Good (Sattva); it is exalted and illuminating\u2014allied\nto joy and felicity\u2014and piety predominates within it. It prevails\nin fire, and therefore flames rise up and sparks fly upwards; if it\nhas ascendency in men, as it does have in the eight higher orders,\nit is the origin of virtue. This also is the universal\u2014throughout\nand in every aspect the affirmative\u2014in abstract form. The second\nand mediate quality is deceit or passion (Najas, Tejas) which for\nitself is blind; it is that which is impure, harmful, hateful; it is\nactive, vehement, and restless, allied to evil and misfortune, being\nprevalent in the air, on which account the wind moves transversely;\namongst living beings it is the cause of vice. The third and last\nquality is darkness (Tamas); it is inert and obstructive, allied to\ncare, dullness, and disappointment, predominating in earth and water,\nand hence these fall down and tend ever downwards. With living beings\nstupidity takes its origin in this. The first quality is thus the\nunity with itself; the second the manifestation or the principle of\ndifference, desire, disunion, as wickedness; the third, however, is\nmere negation, as in mythology it is concretely represented in the form\nof Siva, Mahadeva, or Maheswara, the god of change or destruction. As\nfar as we are concerned, the important distinction is that the third\nprinciple is not the return to the first which Mind and Idea demand,\nand which is effected by the removal of the negation in order to effect\na reconciliation with itself and to go back within itself. With the\nIndians the third is still change and negation.\n\nThese three qualities are represented as the essential being of nature.\nThe Sanc\u2019hya says, \u201cWe speak of them as we do of the trees in a wood.\u201d\nYet this is a bad simile, for the wood is but an abstract universal, in\nwhich the individuals are independent. In the religious ideas of the\nVedas, where these qualities also appear as Trimurti, they are spoken\nof as if they were successive modifications, so that \u201cEverything was\ndarkness first, then received the command to transform itself, and in\nthis manner the form\u201d\u2014which, however, is a worse one\u2014\u201cof movement and\nactivity (foulness) was assumed, until finally, by yet another command\nfrom Brahma, the form of goodness was adopted.\u201d\n\nFurther determinations of the intelligence in respect of these\nqualities follow. It is said that eight kinds of intelligence are\ncounted, of which four pertain to what is good:\u2014virtue first,\nscience and knowledge second, thirdly, freedom from passion, which,\nmay have either an external and sensuous motive\u2014the repugnance to\ndisturbance\u2014or be of an intellectual nature, and emanate from the\nconviction that nature is a dream, a mere jugglery and sham; the fourth\nis power. This last is eight-fold, and hence eight special qualities\nare given as being present; viz. the power to contract oneself into a\nquite small form, for which everything shall be penetrable; the power\nto expand into a gigantic body; the power to become light enough to\nbe able to mount to the sun on a sunbeam; the possession of unlimited\npower of action in the organs, so that with the finger-tips the moon\nmay be touched; irresistible will, so that, for instance, one may dive\ninto the earth as easily as in the water; mastery over all living and\nlifeless existence; the power to change the course of nature; and the\npower to perform everything that is wished. \u201cThe feeling that such\ntranscendent power,\u201d Colebrooke goes on, \u201cis within the reach of man\nin his life is not peculiar to the Sanc\u2019hya sect, but is common to all\nsystems and religious ideas, and such a power is in good faith ascribed\nto many holy men and Brahmins in dramas and popular narratives.\u201d\nSensuous evidence is of no account as opposed to this, for with the\nIndian, perception of the senses is, generally speaking, absent:\neverything adopts the form of imaginary images, every dream is esteemed\njust as much as truth and actuality. The Sanc\u2019hya ascribes this power\nto man, in so far as he elevates himself through the working of his\nthought into inward subjectivity. Colebrooke says, \u201cThe Yoga-sastra\nnames in one of its four chapters a number of acts by which such power\nmay be attained; these are exemplified by a profound meditation,\naccompanied by holding back the breath and inactivity of the senses,\nwhile a fixed position is constantly preserved. By means of such acts\nthe adept reaches the knowledge of all that is past as well as future;\nhe has learned to divine the thoughts of others, to have the strength\nof elephants, the courage of lions, the swiftness of the wind, the\npower to fly in the air, to swim in the water, to dive into the earth,\nto behold every possible world in one moment, and to accomplish other\nwonderful deeds. But the quickest mode of reaching happiness through\ndeep contemplation is that worship of God which consists in ever\nmurmuring the mystic name of God, \u2018Om.\u2019\u201d This idea is a very general\none.\n\nColebrooke deals more particularly with the theistic and atheistic\ndivisions of the Sanc\u2019hya as distinguished. While in the theistic\nsystem, Iswara, the chief ruler of the world, is a soul or spirit\ndistinguished from the other souls, Capila, in the atheistic Sanc\u2019hya,\ndisowns Iswara, the originator of the world by volition, alleging that\nthere is no proof of the existence of God, since it is not shown by\nperception, nor is it possible that it should be deduced from argument.\nHe recognizes, indeed, an existence proceeding from nature which is\nAbsolute Intelligence, the source of all individual intelligences and\nthe origin of all other existences, which gradually develop out of it:\nabout the Creator of the world, understanding this to be creation, he\nemphatically remarks that \u201cthe truth of such an Iswara is proved.\u201d\nBut, he says, \u201cthe existence of effects depends on the soul, on\nconsciousness, and not on Iswara. Everything proceeds from the great\nPrinciple, which is Intelligence;\u201d to this the individual soul belongs,\nand through this it is brought about.\n\n_c._ As to the third division of the Sanc\u2019hya, the more particular\nconsideration of the forms of knowledge as regards the principle, I\nshall make a few more remarks, which may perhaps have some interest.\nOf the various kinds of knowledge already given, that of reasoning, of\nthe connection existing with the conclusion through the relation of\ncause and effect, remains the chief, and I will show how the Indians\ncomprehend this relation. The understanding and all other principles\nderived from it are to them effects, and from these they reason to\ntheir causes; in one respect this is analogous to our inference, but\nin another different. They perceive that \u201ceffects exist even before\nthe operation of the causes; for what does not exist cannot be made\nexplicit in existence through causality.\u201d Colebrooke says, \u201cThis means\nthat effects are educts rather than products.\u201d But the question is just\nwhat products are. As an example of how the effect is already contained\nin the cause, the following is given:\u2014Oil is already existent in the\nseeds of sesamum before it is pressed out; rice is in the husk before\nit is thrashed; milk is in the udder of the cow before it is milked.\nCause and effect are in reality the same; a piece of a dress is not\nreally different from the yarn from which it is woven, for the material\nis the same. This is how this relation is understood. A consequence\nderived from it was the eternity of the world, for the saying \u201cOut\nof nothing there comes nothing,\u201d which Colebrooke also mentions, is\nopposed to the belief in a creation of the world from nothing in our\nreligious sense. As a matter of fact, it must also be said, \u201cGod\ncreates the world not out of nothing, but out of Himself; it is His\nown determination, by Him brought into existence.\u201d The distinction\nbetween cause and effect is only a formal distinction; it is the\nunderstanding that keeps them separate, and not reason. Moisture is the\nsame as rain; or again we speak in mechanics of different movements,\nwhereas motion has the same velocity before as after impact. The\nordinary consciousness cannot comprehend the fact that there is no real\ndistinction between cause and effect.\n\nThe Indians infer the existence of \u201ca universal cause which is\nundistinguishable, while determinate things are finite,\u201d and on\nthis account there must be a cause permeating through them. Even\nintelligence is an effect of this cause, which is the soul in so far\nas it is creative in this identity with nature after its abstraction\nfrom it. Effect proceeds from cause, yet, on the other hand, this\nlast is not independent, but goes back into universal cause. General\ndestruction is postulated along with what is called the creation of\nthe three worlds. Just as the tortoise stretches out its limbs and\nthen draws them back again within its shell, the five elements, earth,\n&c., which constitute the three worlds, are in the general ruin and\ndissolution of things which takes place within a certain time, again\ndrawn back in the reverse order to that in which they emerged from\nthe original principle, because they return, step by step, to their\nfirst cause\u2014that is, to what is highest and inseparable, which is\nNature. To this the three qualities, goodness, passion, and darkness,\nare attributed; the further attributes of these determinations may be\nvery interesting, but they are understood in a very superficial way.\nFor it is said that nature operates through the admixture of these\nthree qualities; each thing has all three within itself, like three\nstreams which flow together; it also works by means of modifications,\njust as water which is soaked in through the roots of plants and led\nup into the fruit, obtains a special flavour. There are hence only\nthe categories of admixture and of modification present. The Indians\nsay:\u2014\u201cNature has these three qualities in her own right as her forms\nand characteristics; other things have them only because they are\npresent in them as effects of the former.\u201d\n\nWe still have to consider the relation of nature to spirit. \u201cNature,\nalthough it is quite inanimate, performs the office of preparing\nthe soul for its freedom, just as it is the function of milk\u2014of a\nsubstance having no sensation\u2014to nourish the calf.\u201d The Sanc\u2019hya makes\nthe following simile. Nature is like a _bajadere_ showing herself to\nthe soul as to an audience; she is abused for her impudence in exposing\nherself too often to the rude gaze of the spectators. \u201cBut she retires\nwhen she has shown herself sufficiently; she does so because she\nhas been seen, and the audience retires because it has seen. Nature\nhas no further use as regards the soul, and yet the union remains a\nlasting one.\u201d With the attainment of intellectual knowledge through\nthe study of principles, the final, incontrovertible, single truth is\nlearnt, that \u201cI neither am, nor is anything mine, nor do I exist.\u201d\nThat is, the personality is still distinguished from the soul, and\nfinally personality and self-consciousness disappear for the Indian.\n\u201cEverything that comes forth in consciousness is reflected by the\nsoul, but like an image which does not dull the crystal of the soul,\nand does not belong to it. In possession of this self-knowledge\u201d\n(without personality) \u201cthe soul contemplates nature at its ease,\nthus exempt from all terrible variation, and freed from every other\nform and operation of the understanding, with the exception of this\nspiritual knowledge.\u201d This is a mediate spiritual knowledge of the\nlikewise spiritualized content\u2014a knowledge without personality and\nconsciousness. \u201cThe soul still indeed remains for some time in bodily\ngarb, but this is only so after the same manner as the potter\u2019s wheel,\nwhen the jar is perfected, still turns round from the effect of the\npreviously given impulse.\u201d The soul thus has, according to the Indians,\nnothing further to do with the body, and its connection therewith is\ntherefore a superfluous one. \u201cBut when the separation of the already\nprepared soul from its body at length comes to pass, and nature is done\nwith soul, the absolute and final liberation is accomplished.\u201d Here we\nfind the crowning moments in the Sanc\u2019hya philosophy.\n\n2. _The Philosophy of Gotama and Canade_. The philosophy of Gotama and\nthat of Canade belong to one another.[18] The philosophy of Gotama is\ncalled Nyaya (reasoning), and that of Canade, Vaiseshica (particular).\nThe first is a specially perfect dialectic, and the second, on the\nother hand, occupies itself with physics, that is, with particular or\nsensuous objects. Colebrooke says:\u2014\u201cNo department of science or of\nliterature has taken up the attention of the Indians more than the\nNyaya; and the fruit of this study is an infinite number of writings,\nincluded in which there may be found the works of very celebrated\nmen of learning. The system which Gotama and Canade observe is that\nindicated in one part of the Vedas as being the path which must be\ntrodden in the pursuit of learning and study; viz., enunciation,\ndefinition, and investigation. Enunciation is the specification of\na thing by its name, that is, by the expression denoting it, as\nrevelation directs; for language is considered as revealed to man.\nDefinition sets forth the particular quality which constitutes the\nreal character of a thing. Investigation consists in an inquiry into\nthe adequacy and sufficiency of the definition. In conformity with\nthis, the teachers of philosophy presuppose scientific terms, proceed\nto definitions and then come to the investigation of the thus premised\nsubjects.\u201d By the name, the ordinary conception is indicated, and with\nit what is given in definition is compared in investigation. What comes\nnext is the object to be contemplated. \u201cGotama here adduces sixteen\npoints, amongst which proof, evidence\u201d (which is formal), \u201cand what has\nto be proved, are the principal; the others are merely subsidiary and\naccessory, as contributing to the knowledge and confirmation of the\ntruth. The Nyaya concurs with the other psychological schools in this,\nthat it promises happiness, final excellence, and freedom from evil as\nthe reward of a perfect knowledge of the principles which it teaches,\nthat is to say, of the Truth, meaning the conviction of the eternal\nexistence of the soul as separable from body,\u201d which makes spirit\nindependent. Soul then is itself the object which is to be known and\nproved. This has still to be shown more particularly.\n\n_a._ The first point of importance, the evidence brought forth\nas proof, is said to be divided into four kinds:\u2014first of all,\nperception; secondly, inference, of which there are three kinds,\nviz. inference from result to cause, that from cause to effect, and\nthat derived from analogy. The third kind of evidence is comparison,\nthe fourth, trustworthy authority, including both tradition and the\nrevelation implied in it. These kinds of proof are much brought\nforward, both in the ancient Treatise ascribed to Gotama and in\ninnumerable commentaries.\n\n_b._ The second point of importance is found in the subjects which\nhave to be proved, and which have to be made evident; and of these\ntwelve are here given. The first and most important is, however, the\nsoul, as the seat, distinguished from the body and from the senses,\nof feeling and of knowledge, the existence of which is proved through\ninclination, disinclination, will, &c. It has fourteen qualities:\nnumber, size, individuality, connection, separation, intelligence,\npleasure, pain, desire, dislike, will, merit, fault, and imagination.\nWe see in this first commencement of reflection, which is quite without\norder, neither connection nor any totality of determinations. The\nsecond object of knowledge is body; the third, the organs of sensation,\nas the five outward senses are called. These are not modifications of\nconsciousness, as the Sanc\u2019hya asserts, but matter constructed out of\nthe elements, which respectively consist of earth, water, light, air,\nand ether. The pupil of the eye is not, they say, the organ of sight,\nnor the ear of hearing, but the organ of seeing is a ray of light that\nproceeds from the eye to the object; the organ of hearing is the ether\nthat in the cavity of the ear communicates with the object heard,\nthrough the ether that is found between. The ray of light is usually\ninvisible, just as a light is not seen at mid-day, but in certain\ncircumstances it is visible. In taste, a watery substance like saliva\nis the organ, and so on. We find something similar to what is here said\nabout sight in Plato\u2019s Tim\u00e6us (pp. 45, 46, Steph.; pp. 50-53, Bekk.);\nthere are interesting remarks upon the phosphorus of the eyes in a\npaper by Schultz, contained in Goethe\u2019s Morphology. Examples of men\nseeing at night, so that their eyes lighted up the object, are brought\nforward in numbers, but the demonstration certainly demands particular\nconditions. The objects of sense form the fourth subject. Here Cesava,\na commentator, inserts the categories of Canade, of which there are\nsix. The first of these is substance, and of this there are nine kinds:\nearth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul, understanding. The\nfundamental elements of material substances are by Canade regarded as\nif they were original atoms, and afterwards aggregates of the same; he\nmaintains the everlasting nature of atoms, and thus much is adduced\nabout the union of atoms, by which means motes are also produced. The\nsecond category is that of Quality, and of it there are twenty-four\nkinds, viz. 1, colour; 2, taste; 3, smell; 4, tangibility; 5, numbers;\n6, size; 7, individuality; 8, conjunction; 9, separation; 10,\npriority; 11, posteriority; 12, weight; 13, fluidity; 14, viscidity;\n15, sound; 16, intelligence; 17, pleasure; 18, pain; 19, desire; 20,\ndislike; 21, will; 22, virtue; 23, vice; 24, a capacity which includes\nthree different qualities, viz. celerity, elasticity, and power of\nimagination. The third category is action; the fourth, association of\nqualities; the fifth, distinction; the sixth, is aggregation, and,\naccording to Canade, this is the last; other writers add negation as\nthe seventh. This is the manner in which philosophy is regarded by the\nIndians.\n\n_c._ The philosophy of Gotama makes doubt the third topic, succeeding\nthose of the evidence of knowledge, and the subjects of interest to\nknowledge. Another topic is regular proof, formal reasoning, or the\nperfect syllogism (Nyaya), which consists of five propositions:\u20141, the\nproposition; 2, the reason; 3, the instance; 4, the application; 5, the\nconclusion. To take examples:\u20141. This hill is burning; 2, because it\nsmokes; 3, what smokes is burning, like a kitchen fire; 4, accordingly\nthe hill smokes; 5, therefore it is on fire. This is propounded as\nsyllogisms are with us, but in the manner adopted, the matter which is\nin point is propounded first. We should, on the contrary, begin with\nthe general. This is the ordinary form, and these examples may satisfy\nus, yet we shall recapitulate the matter once more.\n\nWe have seen that in India the point of main importance is the\nsoul\u2019s drawing itself within itself, raising itself up into liberty,\nor thought, which constitutes itself for itself. This becoming\nexplicit of soul in the most abstract mode may be called intellectual\nsubstantiality, but here it is not the unity of mind and nature that\nis present, but directly the opposite. To mind, the consideration of\nnature is only the vehicle of thought or its exercise, which has as\nits aim the liberation of mind. Intellectual substantiality is in India\nthe end, while in Philosophy it is in general the true commencement;\nto philosophize is the idealism of making thought, in its own right,\nthe principle of truth. Intellectual substantiality is the opposite\nof the reflection, understanding, and the subjective individuality of\nthe European. With us it is of importance that I will, know, believe,\nthink this particular thing according to the grounds that I have for\nso doing, and in accordance with my own free will; and upon this\nan infinite value is set. Intellectual substantiality is the other\nextreme from this; it is that in which all the subjectivity of the \u201cI\u201d\nis lost; for it everything objective has become vanity, there is for\nit no objective truth, duty or right, and thus subjective vanity is\nthe only thing left. The point of interest is to reach intellectual\nsubstantiality in order to drown in it that subjective vanity with all\nits cleverness and reflection. This is the advantage of arriving at\nthis point of view.\n\nThe defect in such a view is that because intellectual substantiality,\nwhile represented as end and aim for the subject, as a condition that\nhas to be produced in the interest of the subject, even though it be\nmost objective, is yet only quite abstractly objective; and hence the\nessential form of objectivity is wanting to it. That intellectual\nsubstantiality that thus remaining in abstraction, has as its\nexistence the subjective soul alone. Just as in empty vanity, where\nthe subjective power of negation alone remains, everything disappears,\nthis abstraction of intellectual substantiality only signifies\nan escape into what is empty and without determination, wherein\neverything vanishes. Therefore what remains to be done is to force\nforward the real ground of the inwardly self-forming and determining\nobjectivity\u2014the eternal form within itself, which is what men call\nThought. Just as this Thought in the first place, as subjective, is\nmine, because I think, but in the second place is universality which\ncomprehends intellectual substantiality, it is likewise in the third\nplace forming activity, the principle of determination. This higher\nkind of objectivity that unfolds itself, alone gives a place to the\nparticular content, allows it to have free scope and receives it\ninto itself. If in the Oriental view, the particular shakes and is\ndestined to fall, it still has its place grounded on thought. It is\nable to root itself in itself, it is able to stand firm, and this is\nthe hard European understanding. Such Eastern ideas tend to destroy\nit, but it is preserved active in the soil of thought; it cannot exist\nwhen regarded as independent, but must exist only as a moment in the\nwhole system. In the Eastern Philosophy we have also discovered a\ndefinite content, which is brought under our consideration; but the\nconsideration is destitute of thought or system because it comes\nfrom above and is outside of the unity. On that side there stands\nintellectual substantiality, on this side it appears dry and barren;\nthe particular thus only has the dead form of simple reason and\nconclusion, such as we find in the Scholastics. Based on the ground of\nthought, on the other hand, the particular may receive its dues; it may\nbe regarded and grasped as a moment in the whole organization. The Idea\nhas not become objective in the Indian Philosophy; hence the external\nand objective has not been comprehended in accordance with the Idea.\nThis is the deficiency in Orientalism.\n\nThe true, objective ground of thought finds its basis in the real\nfreedom of the subject; the universal or substantial must itself have\nobjectivity. Because thought is this universal, the ground of the\nsubstantial and likewise \u201cI\u201d\u2014thought is the implicit and exists as\nthe free subject\u2014the universal has immediate existence and actual\npresence; it is not only an end or condition to be arrived at, but the\nabsolute character is objective. It is this principle that we find in\nthe Greek world, and the object of our further consideration is its\ndevelopment. The universal first appears as quite abstract, and as such\nit confronts the concrete world; but its value is both for the ground\nof the concrete world and for that which is implicit. It is not a\nbeyond, for the value of the present lies in the fact that it exists in\nthe implicit; or that which is implicit, the universal, is the truth of\npresent objects.\n\n\n\n\nPART ONE\n\nGREEK PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nTHE name of Greece strikes home to the hearts of men of education in\nEurope, and more particularly is this so with us Germans. Europeans\nhave taken their religion, the life to come, the far-off land, from a\npoint somewhat further off than Greece\u2014they took it from the East, and\nmore especially from Syria. But the here, the present, art and science,\nthat which in giving liberty to our spiritual life, gives it dignity as\nit likewise bestows upon it ornament, we know to have proceeded from\nGreece either directly or indirectly\u2014through the circuitous road of\nRome. The latter of these two ways was the earlier form in which this\nculture came to us; it also came from the formerly universal church\nwhich derived its origin as such from Rome, and has retained its speech\neven until now. The sources of authority in addition to the Latin\nGospels have been the Fathers. Our law, too, boasts of deriving its\nmost perfect forms from Rome. Teutonic strength of mind has required\nto pass through the hard discipline of the church and law which came\nto us from Rome, and to be kept in check; it is in this way that the\nEuropean character first obtained its pliability and capacity for\nfreedom. Thus it was after European manhood came to be at home with\nitself and to look upon the present, that the historical and that which\nis of foreign derivation was given. When man began to be at home with\nhimself, he turned to the Greeks to find enjoyment in it. Let us leave\nthe Latin and the Roman to the church and to jurisprudence. Higher,\nfreer philosophic science, as also the beauty of our untrammelled art,\nthe taste for, and love of the same, we know to have taken their root\nin Greek life and to have created therefrom their spirit. If we were to\nhave an aspiration, it would be for such a land and such conditions.\n\nBut what makes us specially at home with the Greeks is that they\nmade their world their home; the common spirit of homeliness unites\nus both. In ordinary life we like best the men and families that are\nhomely and contented in themselves, not desiring what is outside and\nabove them, and so it is with the Greeks. They certainly received the\nsubstantial beginnings of their religion, culture, their common bonds\nof fellowship, more or less from Asia, Syria and Egypt; but they have\nso greatly obliterated the foreign nature of this origin, and it is\nso much changed, worked upon, turned round, and altogether made so\ndifferent, that what they, as we, prize, know, and love in it, is\nessentially their own. For this reason, in the history of Greek life,\nwhen we go further back and seem constrained so to go back, we find\nwe may do without this retrogression and follow within the world and\nmanners of the Greeks, the beginnings, the germination and the progress\nof art and science up to their maturity, even seeing the origin of\ntheir decay\u2014and this completely comprehended within their own range.\nFor their spiritual development requires that which is received or\nforeign, as matter or stimulus only; in such they have known and borne\nthemselves as men that were free. The form which they have given to the\nforeign principle is this characteristic breath of spirituality, the\nspirit of freedom and of beauty which can in the one aspect be regarded\nas form, but which in another and higher sense is simply substance.\n\nThey have thus not only themselves created the substantial in their\nculture and made their existence their own, but they have also held\nin reverence this their spiritual rebirth, which is their real birth.\nThe foreign origin they have so to speak thanklessly forgotten,\nputting it in the background\u2014perhaps burying it in the darkness of\nthe mysteries which they have kept secret from themselves. They have\nnot only done this, that is they have not only used and enjoyed all\nthat they have brought forth and formed, but they have become aware of\nand thankfully and joyfully placed before themselves this at-homeness\n[Heimathlichkeit] in their whole existence, the ground and origin of\nthemselves, not merely existing in it, possessing and making use of\nit. For their mind, when transformed in this spiritual new birth, is\njust the living in their life, and also the becoming conscious of that\nlife as it has become actual. They represent their existence as an\nobject apart from themselves, which manifests itself independently and\nwhich in its independence is of value to them; hence they have made for\nthemselves a history of everything which they have possessed and have\nbeen. Not only have they represented the beginning of the world\u2014that\nis, of gods and men, the earth, the heavens, the wind, mountains\nand rivers\u2014but also of all aspects of their existence, such as the\nintroduction of fire and the offerings connected with it, the crops,\nagriculture, the olive, the horse, marriage, property, laws, arts,\nworship, the sciences, towns, princely races, &c. Of all these it is\npleasingly represented through tales how they have arisen in history as\ntheir own work.\n\nIt is in this veritable homeliness, or, more accurately, in the spirit\nof homeliness, in this spirit of ideally being-at-home-with-themselves\nin their physical, corporate, legal, moral and political existence; it\nis in the beauty and the freedom of their character in history, making\nwhat they are to be also a sort of Mnemosyne with them, that the kernel\nof thinking liberty rests; and hence it was requisite that Philosophy\nshould arise amongst them. Philosophy is being at home with self, just\nlike the homeliness of the Greek; it is man\u2019s being at home in his\nmind, at home with himself. If we are at home with the Greeks, we must\nbe at home more particularly in their Philosophy; not, however, simply\nas it is with them, for Philosophy is at home with itself, and we have\nto do with Thought, with what is most specially ours, and with what is\nfree from all particularity. The development and unfolding of thought\nhas taken place with them from its earliest beginning, and in order to\ncomprehend their Philosophy we may remain with them without requiring\nto seek for further and external influences.\n\nBut we must specify more particularly their character and point of\nview. The Greeks have a starting-point in history as truly as they have\narisen from out of themselves: this starting-point, comprehended in\nthought, is the oriental substantiality of the natural unity between\nthe spiritual and the natural. To start from the self, to live in the\nself, is the other extreme of abstract subjectivity, when it is still\nempty, or rather has made itself to be empty; such is pure formalism,\nthe abstract principle of the modern world. The Greeks stand between\nboth these extremes in the happy medium; this therefore is the medium\nof beauty, seeing that it is both natural and spiritual, but yet\nthat the spiritual still remains the governing, determining subject.\nMind immersed in nature is in substantial unity with it, and in so\nfar as it is consciousness, it is essentially sensuous perception:\nas subjective consciousness it is certainly form-giving though it is\ndevoid of measure. For the Greeks, the substantial unity of nature and\nspirit was a fundamental principle, and thus being in the possession\nand knowledge of this, yet not being overwhelmed in it, but having\nretired into themselves, they have avoided the extreme of formal\nsubjectivity, and are still in unity with themselves. Thus it is a\nfree subject which still possesses that original unity in content,\nessence and substratum, and fashions its object into beauty. The stage\nreached by Greek consciousness is the stage of beauty. For beauty is\nthe ideal; it is the thought which is derived from Mind, but in such a\nway that the spiritual individuality is not yet explicit as abstract\nsubjectivity that has then in itself to perfect its existence into a\nworld of thought. What is natural and sensuous still pertains to this\nsubjectivity, but yet the natural form has not equal dignity and rank\nwith the other, nor is it predominant as is the case in the East.\nThe principle of the spiritual now stands first in rank, and natural\nexistence has no further value for itself, in its existent forms,\nbeing the mere expression of the Mind shining through, and having been\nreduced to be the vehicle and form of its existence. Mind, however,\nhas not yet got itself as a medium whereby it can represent itself in\nitself, and from which it can form its world.\n\nThus free morality could and necessarily did find a place in Greece,\nfor the spiritual substance of freedom was here the principle of\nmorals, laws and constitutions. Because the natural element is,\nhowever, still contained in it, the form taken by the morality of\nthe state is still affected by what is natural; the states are\nsmall individuals in their natural condition, which could not unite\nthemselves into one whole. Since the universal does not exist in\nindependent freedom, that which is spiritual still is limited. In\nthe Greek world what is potentially and actually eternal is realized\nand brought to consciousness through Thought; but in such a way that\nsubjectivity confronts it in a determination which is still accidental,\nbecause it is still essentially related to what is natural; and in this\nwe find the reason as promised above, for the fact that in Greece the\nfew alone are free.\n\nThe measureless quality of substance in the East is brought, by\nmeans of the Greek mind, into what is measurable and limited; it\nis clearness, aim, limitation of forms, the reduction of what is\nmeasureless, and of infinite splendour and riches, to determinateness\nand individuality. The riches of the Greek world consist only of an\ninfinite quantity of beautiful, lovely and pleasing individualities\nin the serenity which pervades all existence; those who are greatest\namongst the Greeks are the individualities, the connoisseurs in art,\npoetry, song, science, integrity and virtue. If the serenity of the\nGreeks, their beautiful gods, statues, and temples, as well as their\nserious work, their institutions and acts, may seem\u2014compared to the\nsplendour and sublimity, the colossal forms of oriental imagination,\nthe Egyptian buildings of Eastern kingdoms\u2014to be like child\u2019s play,\nthis is the case yet more with the thought that comes into existence\nhere. Such thought puts a limit on this wealth of individualities as on\nthe oriental greatness, and reduces it into its one simple soul, which,\nhowever, is in itself the first source of the opulence of a higher\nideal world, of the world of Thought.\n\n\u201cFrom out of thy passions, oh, man,\u201d exclaimed an ancient, \u201cthou\nhast derived the materials for thy gods,\u201d just as the Easterns, and\nespecially the Indians, did from the elements, powers and forms of\nNature. One may add, \u201cout of Thought thou takest the element and\nmaterial for God.\u201d Thus Thought is the ground from which God comes\nforth, but it is not Thought in its commencement that constitutes the\nfirst principle from which all culture must be grasped. It is quite the\nother way. In the beginning, thought comes forth as altogether poor,\nabstract, and of a content which is meagre in comparison to that given\nto his subject by the oriental; for as immediate, the beginning is\njust in the form of nature, and this it shares with what is oriental.\nBecause it thus reduces the content of the East to determinations which\nare altogether poor, these thoughts are scarcely worth observation on\nour part, since they are not yet proper thoughts, neither being in the\nform of, or determined as thought, but belonging really to Nature.\nThus Thought is the Absolute, though not as Thought. That is, we have\nalways two things to distinguish, the universal or the Notion, and\nthe reality of this universal, for the question here arises as to\nwhether the reality is itself Thought or Nature. We find in the fact\nthat reality at first has still the immediate form and is only Thought\npotentially, the reason for commencing with the Greeks and from the\nnatural philosophy of the Ionic school.\n\nAs regards the external and historical condition of Greece at this\ntime, Greek philosophy commences in the sixth century before Christ in\nthe time of Cyrus, and in the period of decline in the Ionic republics\nin Asia Minor. Just because this world of beauty which raised itself\ninto a higher kind of culture went to pieces, Philosophy arose. Cr\u0153sus\nand the Lydians first brought Ionic freedom into jeopardy; later on the\nPersians were those who destroyed it altogether, so that the greater\npart of the inhabitants sought other spots and created colonies, more\nparticularly in the West. At the time of the decline in Ionic towns,\nthe other Greece ceased to be under its ancient lines of kings; the\nPelopideans and the other, and for the most part foreign, princely\nraces had passed away. Greece had in many ways come into touch with\nthe outside world and the Greek inhabitants likewise sought within\nthemselves for a bond of fellowship. The patriarchal life was past, and\nin many states it came to be a necessity that they should constitute\nthemselves as free, organized and regulated by law. Many individuals\ncome into prominence who were no more rulers of their fellow-citizens\nby descent, but who were by means of talent, power of imagination and\nscientific knowledge, marked out and reverenced, and such individuals\ncame into many different relations with their fellows. Part of them\nbecame advisers, but their advice was frequently not followed; part\nof them were hated and despised by their fellow-citizens, and they\ndrew back from public affairs; others became violent, if not fierce\ngovernors of the other citizens, and others again finally became the\nadministrators of liberty.\n\n_The Seven Sages_. Amongst these men just characterized, the seven\nsages\u2014in modern times excluded from the history of Philosophy\u2014take\ntheir place. In as far as they may be reckoned as milestones in the\nhistory of Philosophy, something about their character should, in the\ncommencement of Philosophy, be shortly said. They came into prominence,\npartly as taking part in the battles of the Ionic towns, partly as\nexpatriated, and partly as individuals of distinction in Greece. The\nnames of the seven are given differently: usually, however, as Thales,\nSolon, Periander, Cleobulus, Chilon, Bias, Pittacus. Hermippus in\nDiogenes Laertius (1, 42) specifies seventeen, and, amongst these,\nvarious people pick out seven in various ways. According to Diogenes\nLaertius (1, 41) Dic\u00e6archus, who came still earlier in history, only\nnames four, and these are placed amongst the seven by all; they are\nThales, Bias, Pittacus and Solon. Besides these, Myson, Anacharsis,\nAcusilaus, Epimenides, Pherecydes, &c., are mentioned. Dic\u00e6archus\nin Diogenes (1, 40), says of them that they are neither wise men\n(_\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2_) nor philosophers, but men of understanding (_\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03be\u03cd\u03c2_) and\nlaw-givers; this judgment has become the universal one and is held\nto be just. They come in a period of transition amongst the Greeks\u2014a\ntransition from a patriarchal system of kings into one of law or force.\nThe fame of the wisdom of these men depends, on the one hand, on the\nfact that they grasped the practical essence of consciousness, or the\nconsciousness of universal morality as it is in and for itself, giving\nexpression to it in the form of moral maxims and in part in civil laws,\nmaking these actual in the state; on the other hand it depends on\ntheir having, in theoretic form, expressed the same in witty sayings.\nSome of these sayings could not merely be regarded as thoughtful or\ngood reflections, but in so far, as philosophic and speculative; they\nhave a comprehensive, universal significance ascribed to them, which,\nhowever, does not explain them. These men have not really made science\nand Philosophy their aim; it is expressly said of Thales that it was\nin the latter part of his life that he first took to Philosophy. What\nhad relation to politics appeared most frequently; they were practical\nmen, men of affairs, but not in our sense of the word; with us\npractical activity devotes itself to a special line of administration\nor to a particular business, or to economics, &c. They lived in\ndemocratic states and thus shared the responsibilities of the general\nadministration and rule. They were not statesmen like the great Greek\npersonalities, like Miltiades, Themistocles, Pericles and Demosthenes,\nbut they were statesmen in a time when safety, preservation and,\nindeed, the whole well-being, disposition and well nigh the very\nfoundation of civic life were in question; and certainly when this was\nso with the foundations of legally established institutions.\n\nThales and Bias thus appear as the representatives of the Ionic\ntowns. Herodotus (I. 169-171) speaks of both, and says of Thales\nthat he advised even before the overthrow of the Ionians (apparently\nthrough Cr\u0153sus), that they should constitute a supreme council (_\u1f13\u03bd\n\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd_) in Teos, in the centre of the Ionian people, and thus\nmake a federal state with a capital and principal federal town, so that\nthey might still remain separate nations (_\u03b4\u1fc6\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9_) as before. However,\nthey did not follow this advice, and this isolated and weakened them,\nand the result was their conquest; it has always been a difficult thing\nfor the Greeks to give up their individuality. Later on, when Harpagus,\nthe general of Cyrus who accomplished their overthrow, pressed in upon\nthem, the Ionians took no better the most excellent advice of Bias of\nPriene, given them at the decisive moment when they were assembled at\nPanionium, \u201cto go in a common fleet to Sardinia, there to found an\nIonic state. By so doing they would escape servitude, be happy, and,\ninhabiting the largest island, subdue the others. But if they remained\nin Ionia there was no hope of liberty to be seen for them.\u201d Herodotus\ngives his corroboration to this advice\u2014\u201cIf they had followed him they\nwould have been the happiest of Greeks.\u201d Such things take place, but\nthrough force and not voluntarily.\n\nWe find the other sages under similar conditions. Solon was an\nadministrator in Athens, and thereby became famous; few men have\nattained the honourable position of being a law-giver. Solon shares it\nwith Moses, Lycurgus, Zaleucus, Numa, &c., alone. No individuals can be\nfound amongst Teutonic peoples who possess the distinction of being the\nlaw-givers of their people. Nowadays there can be law-givers no longer;\nlegal institutions and regulations are in modern times always ready to\nhand, and the little that can still be done by means of the law-giver\nand by law-making assemblies is simply the further modification of\ndetails or making very insignificant additions. What is dealt with is\nthe compilation, wording and perfecting of the particular only; and\nyet neither Solon and Lycurgus did more than respectively bring the\nIonic mind and the Doric character\u2014being that which had been given\nthem and which was implicitly present\u2014into the form of consciousness,\nand obviate the temporary inconvenience of disorder through effective\nlaws. Solon was thus not a perfect statesman; this is manifest from\nthe sequel of his history. A constitution which allowed Pisistratus\nin Solon\u2019s own time to raise himself into the Tyranny, showing itself\nto be so destitute of strength and organization that it could not\nprevent its own overthrow, (and by what a power!) manifests some inward\nwant. This may seem strange, for a constitution must be able to afford\nresistance to such an attack. But let us see what Pisistratus did.\n\nWhat the so-called tyrants really were, is most clearly shown by the\nrelation borne by Solon to Pisistratus. When orderly institutions and\nlaws were necessary to the Greeks, we find law-givers and regents of\nstates appearing, who laid down laws, and ruled accordingly. The law,\nas universal, seemed and still seems now to the individual to be\nforce, inasmuch as he does not have regard to or comprehend the law:\nit applies first to all the people, and then only, to the individual;\nit is essential first of all to use constraint until the individual\nattains discernment, and law to him becomes his law, and ceases to be\nsomething foreign. Most of the law-givers and administrators of states\nundertook themselves to constrain the people and to be their tyrants.\nIn states where they did not undertake it, it had to be done by other\nindividuals, for it was essential. According to Diogenes Laertius\u2019\naccount (I. 48-50), we find Solon\u2014whom his friends advised to secure\nthe mastery for himself since the people held to him (_\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd_), and\nwould have liked to see him become tyrant\u2014repulse them, and try to\nprevent any such occurrence, when he became suspicious of Pisistratus\u2019\nintentions. What he did when he remarked upon the attitude of\nPisistratus, was to come into the assembly of the people, and tell them\nthe design of Pisistratus, accoutred in armour and shield; this was\nthen unusual, for Thucydides (1, 6) makes it a distinguishing feature\nbetween Greeks and Barbarians, that the former, and pre-eminently the\nAthenians, put aside their arms in time of peace. He said, \u201cMen of\nAthens, I am wiser than some and braver than others: I am wiser than\nthose who do not see the deceit of Pisistratus, braver than those\nwho certainly see it, but say nothing from fear.\u201d As he could not do\nanything, he left Athens. Pisistratus is said to have then written a\nmost honourable letter to Solon in his absence, which Diogenes (I.\n53, 54) has preserved for us, inviting him to return to Athens, and\nlive with him as a free citizen. \u201cNot only am I not the only one of\nthe Greeks to have seized the tyranny, but I have not taken anything\nwhich was not my due, for I am of the race of Codrus. I have only taken\nback to myself what the Athenians swore they would preserve to Codrus\nand his race, and yet took from them. Moreover I am doing no evil\ntoward gods and men, but as thou hast given laws to the Athenians, I\ntake care (_\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u1ff6_) that in civil life they shall carry them out\n(_\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd_.) His son Hippias did the same. And these relations are\ncarried out better than they would be in a democracy, for I allow\nnobody to do evil (_\u1f51\u03b2\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd_), and as Tyrant, I lay claim to no more\n(_\u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03cc\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9_) than such consideration and respect and specified\ngifts (_\u03c4\u1f70 \u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b3\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1_) as would have been offered to the kings in\nearlier times. Every Athenian gives the tenth part of his revenue,\nnot to me, but towards the cost of the public offering, and besides\nfor the commonwealth, and for use in case of war. I am not angry that\nthou hast disclosed my project. For thou didst it more out of love to\nthe people than hate against me, and because thou didst not know how I\nwould conduct my rule. For if thou hadst known this, thou wouldst have\nsubmitted to it willingly, and wouldst not have taken flight;\u201d and so\nhe goes on. Solon, in the answer given by Diogenes, (I. 66, 67) says,\nthat he \u201chas not a personal grudge against Pisistratus, and he must\ncall him the best of tyrants; but to turn back does not befit him. For\nhe made equality of rights essential in the Athenian constitution, and\nhimself refused the tyranny. By his return he would condone what was\ndone by Pisistratus.\u201d The rule of Pisistratus accustomed the Athenians\nto the laws of Solon, and brought them into usage, so that after this\nusage came to be general, supremacy was superfluous; his sons were\nhence driven out of Athens, and for the first time the constitution of\nSolon upheld itself. Solon undoubtedly gave the laws, but it is another\nthing to make such regulations effectual in the manners, habits and\nlife of a people. What was separate in Solon and Pisistratus, we find\nunited in Periander in Corinth, and Pittacus in Mitilene.\n\nThis may be enough about the outward life of the seven sages. They are\nalso famed for the wisdom of the sayings which have been preserved to\nus; these sayings seem in great measure, however, to be superficial\nand hackneyed. The reason for this is found in the fact that, to\nour reflection, general propositions are quite usual; much in the\nProverbs of Solomon seems to us to be superficial and commonplace\nfor the same reason. But it is quite another thing to bring to the\nordinary conception for the first time this same universal in the\nform of universality. Many distichs are ascribed to Solon which we\nstill retain; their object is to express in maxims general obligations\ntowards the gods, the family and the country. Diogenes (I. 58) tells us\nthat Solon said: \u201cLaws are like a spider\u2019s web; the small are caught,\nthe great tear it up: speech is the image of action,\u201d &c. Such sayings\nare not philosophy, but general reflections, the expression of moral\nduties, maxims, necessary determinations. The wisdom of the sages is\nof this kind; many sayings are insignificant, but many seem to be more\ninsignificant than they are. For instance, Chilon says: \u201cStand surety,\nand evil awaits thee\u201d (_\u1f10\u03b3\u03b3\u03cd\u03b1, \u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b4\u0313 \u1f04\u03c4\u03b1_). On the one hand this is\nquite a common rule of life and prudence, but the sceptics gave to\nthis proposition a much higher universal significance, which is also\naccredited to Chilon. This sense is, \u201cAlly thyself closely to any\nparticular thing, and unhappiness will fall upon thee.\u201d The sceptics\nadduced this proposition independently, as demonstrating the principle\nof scepticism, which is that nothing is finite and definite in and for\nitself, being only a fleeting, vacillating phase which does not last.\nCleobulus says, _\u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f04\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd_, another _\u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f04\u03b3\u03b1\u03bd_, and this has\nlikewise a universal significance which is that limitation, the _\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2_\nof Plato as opposed to the _\u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd_\u2014-the self-determined as opposed\nto undetermined\u2014is what is best; and thus it is that in Being limit or\nmeasure is the highest determination.\n\nOne of the most celebrated sayings is that of Solon in his conversation\nwith Cr\u0153sus, which Herodotus (I. 30-33) has in his own way given us\nvery fully. The result arrived at is this:\u2014\u201cNobody is to be esteemed\nhappy before his death.\u201d But the noteworthy point in this narrative\nis that from it we can get a better idea of the standpoint of Greek\nreflection in the time of Solon. We see that happiness is put forward\nas the highest aim, that which is most to be desired and which is the\nend of man; before Kant, morality, as eud\u00e6monism, was based on the\ndetermination of happiness. In Solon\u2019s sayings there is an advance over\nthe sensuous enjoyment which is merely pleasant to the feelings. Let us\nask what happiness is and what there is within it for reflection, and\nwe find that it certainly carries with it a certain satisfaction to the\nindividual, of whatever sort it be\u2014whether obtained through physical\nenjoyment or spiritual\u2014the means of obtaining which lie in men\u2019s own\nhands. But the fact is further to be observed that not every sensuous,\nimmediate pleasure can be laid hold of, for happiness contains a\nreflection on the circumstances as a whole, in which we have the\nprinciple to which the principle of isolated enjoyment must give way.\nEud\u00e6monism signifies happiness as a condition for the whole of life;\nit sets up a totality of enjoyment which is a universal and a rule\nfor individual enjoyment, in that it does not allow it to give way to\nwhat is momentary, but restrains desires and sets a universal standard\nbefore one\u2019s eyes. If we contrast it with Indian philosophy, we find\neud\u00e6monism to be antagonistic to it. There the liberation of the soul\nfrom what is corporeal, the perfect abstraction, the necessity that the\nsoul shall, in its simplicity, be at home with itself, is the final\nend of man. With the Greeks the opposite is the case; the satisfaction\nthere is also satisfaction of the soul, but it is not attained through\nflight, abstraction, withdrawal within self, but through satisfaction\nin the present, concrete satisfaction in relation to the surroundings.\nThe stage of reflection that we reach in happiness, stands midway\nbetween mere desire and the other extreme, which is right as right and\nduty as duty. In happiness, the individual enjoyment has disappeared;\nthe form of universality is there, but the universal does not yet come\nforth on its own account, and this is the issue of the conversation\nbetween Cr\u0153sus and Solon. Man as thinking, is not solely engrossed\nwith present enjoyment, but also with the means for obtaining that to\ncome. Cr\u0153sus points out to him these means, but Solon still objects\nto the statement of the question of Cr\u0153sus. For in order that any one\nshould be conceived of as happy, we must await his death, for happiness\ndepends upon his condition to the end, and upon the fact that his\ndeath should be a pious one and be consistent with his higher destiny.\nBecause the life of Cr\u0153sus had not yet expired, Solon could not deem\nhim happy. And the history of Cr\u0153sus bears evidence that no momentary\nstate deserves the name of happiness. This edifying history holds in\nits embrace the whole standpoint of the reflection of that time.\n\n_Division of the Subject_. In the consideration of Greek philosophy we\nhave now to distinguish further three important periods:\u2014in the first\nplace the period from Thales to Aristotle; secondly, Greek philosophy\nin the Roman world; thirdly, the Neo-platonic philosophy.\n\n1. We begin with thought, as it is in a quite abstract, natural or\nsensuous form, and we proceed from this to the Idea as determined. This\nfirst period shows the beginning of philosophic thought, and goes on to\nits development and perfection as a totality of knowledge in itself;\nthis takes place in Aristotle as representing the unity of what has\ncome before. In Plato there is just such a union of what came earlier,\nbut it is not worked out, for he only represents the Idea generally.\nThe Neo-platonists have been called eclectics, and Plato was said to\nhave brought about the unity; they were not, however, eclectics, but\nthey had a conscious insight into the necessity for uniting these\nphilosophies.\n\n2. After the concrete Idea was reached, it came forth as if in\nopposites, perfecting and developing itself. The second period is that\nin which science breaks itself up into different systems. A one-sided\nprinciple is carried through the whole conception of the world; each\nside is in itself formed into a totality, and stands in the relation\nof one extreme to another. The philosophical systems of Stoicism\nand Epicureanism are such; scepticism forms the negative to their\ndogmatism, while the other philosophies disappear.\n\n3. The third period is the affirmative, the withdrawal of the\nopposition into an ideal world or a world of thought, a divine world.\nThis is the Idea developed into totality, which yet lacks subjectivity\nas the infinite being-for-self.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION ONE\n\nFIRST PERIOD, FROM THALES TO ARISTOTLE\n\n\nIN this first period we shall again make three divisions:\u2014\n\n1. The first extends from Thales to Anaxagoras, from abstract\nthought which is in immediate determinateness to the thought of the\nself-determining Thought. Here a beginning is made with the absolutely\nsimple, in which the earliest methods of determination manifest\nthemselves as attempts, until the time of Anaxagoras; he determines\nthe true as the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_, and as active thought which no longer is in a\ndeterminate character, but which is self-determining.\n\n2. The second division comprises the Sophists, Socrates, and the\nfollowers of Socrates. Here the self-determining thought is conceived\nof as present and concrete in me; that constitutes the principle of\nsubjectivity if not also of infinite subjectivity, for thought first\nshows itself here only partly as abstract principle and partly as\ncontingent subjectivity.\n\n3. The third division, which deals with Plato and Aristotle, is found\nin Greek science where objective thought, the Idea, forms itself into\na whole. The concrete, in itself determining Thought, is, with Plato,\nthe still abstract Idea, but in the form of universality; while with\nAristotle that Idea was conceived of as the self-determining, or in the\ndetermination of its efficacy or activity.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nPERIOD I.\u2014DIVISION I.\u2014THALES TO ANAXAGORAS\n\n\nSINCE we possess only traditions and fragments of this epoch, we may\nspeak here of the sources of these.\n\n1. The first source is found in Plato, who makes copious reference to\nthe older philosophers. For the reason that he makes the earlier and\napparently independent philosophies, which are not so far apart when\nonce their Notion is definitely grasped, into concrete moments of one\nIdea, Plato\u2019s philosophy often seems to be merely a clearer statement\nof the doctrines of the older philosophers, and hence it draws upon\nitself the reproach of plagiarism. Plato was willing to spend much\nmoney in procuring the writings of the older philosophers, and, from\nhis profound study of these, his conclusions have much weight. But\nbecause in his writings he never himself appeared as teacher, but\nalways represented other people in his dialogues as the philosophers, a\ndistinction never has been made between what really belonged to them in\nhistory and what was added by him through the further development which\nhe effected in their thoughts. In the Parmenides, for instance, we\nhave the Eleatic philosophy, and yet the working out of this doctrine\nbelongs peculiarly to Plato.\n\n2. Aristotle is our most abundant authority; he studied the older\nphilosophers expressly and most thoroughly, and he has, in the\nbeginning of his Metaphysics especially, and also to a large extent\nelsewhere, dealt with them, in historical order: he is as philosophic\nas erudite, and we may rely upon him. We can do no better in Greek\nphilosophy than study the first book of his Metaphysics. When the\nwould-be-wise man depreciates Aristotle, and asserts that he has not\ncorrectly apprehended Plato, it may be retorted that as he associated\nwith Plato himself, with his deep and comprehensive mind, perhaps no\none knew him better.\n\n3. Cicero\u2019s name may also occur to us here\u2014although he certainly is\nbut a troubled spring\u2014since he undoubtedly gives us much information;\nyet because he was lacking in philosophic spirit, he understood\nPhilosophy rather as if it were a matter of history merely. He does\nnot seem to have himself studied its first sources, and even avows\nthat, for instance, he never understood Heraclitus; and because\nthis old and deep philosophy did not interest him, he did not give\nhimself the trouble to study it. His information bears principally\non later philosophers\u2014the Stoics, Epicureans, the new Academy, and\nthe Peripatetics. He saw what was ancient through their medium,\nand, generally speaking, through a medium of reasoning and not of\nspeculation.\n\n4. Sextus Empiricus, a later sceptic, has importance through his\nwritings, _Hypotyposes Pyrrhonic\u00e6_ and _adversus Mathematicos_.\nBecause, as a sceptic, he both combated the dogmatic philosophy and\nalso adduced other philosophers as testifying to scepticism (so that\nthe greater part of his writings is filled with the tenets of other\nphilosophers), he is the most abundant source we have for the history\nof ancient philosophy, and he has retained for our use many valuable\nfragments.\n\n5. The book of Diogenes Laertius (_De vitis_, &c., Philoss. lib.\nx., ed. Meibom. c. notis Menagii, Amstel. 1692) is an important\ncompilation, and yet it brings forward copious evidence without much\ndiscrimination. A philosophic spirit cannot be ascribed to it; it\nrambles about amongst bad anecdotes extraneous to the matter in hand.\nFor the lives of philosophers, and here and there for their tenets, it\nis useful.\n\n6. Finally, we must speak of Simplicius, a later Greek, from Cilicia,\nliving under Justinian, in the middle of the sixth century. He is the\nmost learned and acute of the Greek commentators of Aristotle, and of\nhis writings there is much still unpublished: to him we certainly owe\nour thanks.\n\nI need give no more references, for they may be found without trouble\nin any compendium. In the progress of Greek philosophy men were\nformerly accustomed to follow the order that showed, according to\nordinary ideas, an external connection, and which is found in one\nphilosopher having had another as his teacher\u2014this connection is one\nwhich might show him to be partly derived from Thales and partly from\nPythagoras. But such a connection is in part defective in itself, and\nin part it is merely external. The one set of philosophic sects, or\nof philosophers classed together, which is considered as belonging to\na system\u2014that which proceeds from Thales\u2014pursues its course in time\nand mind far separate from the other. But, in truth, no such series\never does exist in this isolation, nor would it do so even though the\nindividuals were consecutive and had been externally connected as\nteacher and taught, which never is the case; mind follows quite another\norder. These successive series are interwoven in spirit just as much as\nin their particular content.\n\nWe come across Thales first amongst the Ionic people, to whom the\nAthenians belonged, or from whom the Ionians of Asia Minor, as a whole,\nderived their origin. The Ionic race appears earlier in Peloponnesus,\nbut seems to have been removed from thence. It is, however, not known\nwhat nations belonged to it, for, according to Herodotus (I. 143), the\nother Ionians, and even the Athenians, laid aside the name. According\nto Thucydides (I. 2 and 12), the Ionic colonies in Asia Minor and the\nislands proceeded principally from Athens, because the Athenians,\non account of the over-population of Attica, migrated there. We find\nthe greatest activity in Greek life on the coasts of Asia Minor, in\nthe Greek islands, and then towards the west of Magna Gr\u00e6cia; we see\namongst these people, through their internal political activity and\ntheir intercourse with foreigners, the existence of a diversity and\nvariety in their relations, whereby narrowness of vision is done away\nwith, and the universal rises in its place. These two places, Ionia and\nGreater Greece, are thus the two localities where this first period\nin the history of Philosophy plays its part until the time when, that\nperiod being ended, Philosophy plants itself in Greece proper, and\nthere makes its home. Those spots were also the seat of early commerce\nand of an early culture, while Greece itself, so far as these are\nconcerned, followed later.\n\nWe must thus remark that the character of the two sides into which\nthese philosophies divide, the philosophy of Asia Minor in the east\nand that of Grecian Italy in the west, partakes of the character of\nthe geographical distinction. On the Asia Minor side, and also in\nthe islands, we find Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus,\nLeucippus, Democritus, Anaxagoras, and Diogenes from Crete. On the\nother side are the inhabitants of Italy: Pythagoras from Samos, who\nlived in Italy, however; Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Empedocles;\nand several of the Sophists also lived in Italy. Anaxagoras was the\nfirst to come to Athens, and thus his science takes a middle place\nbetween both extremes, and Athens was made its centre. The geographical\ndistinction makes its appearance in the manifestation of Thought,\nin the fact that, with the Orientals a sensuous, material side is\ndominant, and in the west, Thought, on the contrary, prevails, because\nit is constituted into the principle in the form of thought. Those\nphilosophers who turned to the east knew the absolute in a real\ndetermination of nature, while towards Italy there is the ideal\ndetermination of the absolute. These explanations will be sufficient\nfor us here; but Empedocles, whom we find in Sicily, is somewhat of\na natural philosopher, while Gorgias, the Sicilian sophist, remains\nfaithful to the ideal side.\n\nWe now have to consider further:\u20141, The Ionians, viz. Thales,\nAnaximander, Anaximenes; 2, Pythagoras and his followers; 3, the\nEleatics, viz. Xenophanes, Parmenides, &c.; 4, Heraclitus; 5,\nEmpedocles, Leucippus and Democritus; 6, Anaxagoras. We have to trace\nand point out the progression of this philosophy also. The first and\naltogether abstract determinations are found with Thales and the\nother Ionians; they grasped the universal in the form of a natural\ndetermination, as water and air. Progression must thus take place by\nleaving behind the merely natural determination; and we find that this\nis so with the Pythagoreans. They say that number is the substance or\nthe essence of things; number is not sensuous, nor is it pure thought,\nbut it is a non-sensuous object of sense. It was with the Eleatics\nthat pure thought appeared, and that its forcible liberation from the\nsensuous form and the form of number came to pass; and thus from them\nproceeds the dialectic movement of thought, which negates the definite\nparticular in order to show that it is not the many but only the one\nthat is true. Heraclitus declares the Absolute to be this very process,\nwhich, according to the Eleatics, was still subjective; he arrived at\nobjective consciousness, since in it the Absolute is that which moves\nor changes. Empedocles, Leucippus, and Democritus, on the contrary,\nrather go to the opposite extreme, to the simple, material, stationary\nprinciple, to the substratum which underlies the process; and thus this\nlast, as being movement, is distinguished from it. With Anaxagoras it\nis the moving, self-determining thought itself that is then known as\nexistence, and this is a great step forward.\n\n\nA. THE IONIC PHILOSOPHY.\n\nHere we have the earlier Ionic philosophy, which we desire to treat as\nshortly as possible; and this is so much the easier, that the thought\ncontained in it is very abstract and barren. Other philosophers than\nThales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, only come under our consideration\nas names. We have no more than half a dozen passages in the whole\nof the early Ionic philosophy, and that makes it an easy study. Yet\nlearning prides itself most upon the ancients, for we may be most\nlearned about that of which we know the least.\n\n\n1. _Thales._\n\nWith Thales we, properly speaking, first begin the history of\nPhilosophy. The life of Thales occurred at the time when the Ionic\ntowns were under the dominion of Cr\u0153sus. Through his overthrow (Ol.\n58, 1; 548 B.C.), an appearance of freedom was produced, yet the most\nof these towns were conquered by the Persians, and Thales survived the\ncatastrophe only a few years. He was born at Miletus; his family is,\nby Diogenes (I. 22, 37), stated to be the Ph\u0153nician one of Thelides,\nand the date of his birth, according to the best calculation, is placed\nin the first year of the 35th Olympiad (640 B.C.), but according to\nMeiners it was a couple of Olympiads later (38th Olympiad, 629 B.C.).\nThales lived as a statesman partly with Cr\u0153sus and partly in Miletus.\nHerodotus quotes him several times, and tells (I. 75) that, according\nto the narratives of the Greeks, when Cr\u0153sus went to battle against\nCyrus and had difficulty in passing over the river Halys, Thales, who\naccompanied the army, diverted the river by a trench, which he made\nin the form of a crescent behind the camp, so that it could then be\nforded. Diogenes (I. 25) says further of him as regards his relations\nto his country, that he restrained the men of Miletus from allying\nthemselves with Cr\u0153sus when he went against Cyrus, and that hence,\nafter the conquest of Cr\u0153sus, when the other Ionic States were subdued\nby the Persians, the inhabitants of Miletus alone remained undisturbed.\nDiogenes records, moreover (I. 23), that he soon withdrew his attention\nfrom the affairs of the State and devoted himself entirely to science.\n\nVoyages to Ph\u0153nicia are recorded of him, which, however, rest on vague\ntradition; but that he was in Egypt in his old age seems undoubted.[19]\nThere he was said to have learned geometry, but this would appear\nnot to have been much, judging from the anecdote, which Diogenes (I.\n24, 27) retails from a certain Hieronymus. It was to the effect that\nThales taught the Egyptians to measure the height of their pyramids\nby shadow\u2014by taking the relation borne by the height of a man to his\nshadow. The terms of the proportion are: as the shadow of a man is to\nthe height of a man, so is the shadow of a pyramid to its height. If\nthis were something new to the Egyptians, they must have been very far\nback in the theory of geometry. Herodotus tells (I. 74), moreover,\nthat Thales foretold an eclipse of the sun that happened exactly on\nthe day of the battle between the Medians and Lydians, and that he\nascribed the rising of the Nile to the contrary Etesian winds, which\ndrove back the waters.[20] We have some further isolated instances\nof, and anecdotes about his astronomical knowledge and works.[21] \u201cIn\ngazing at and making observations on the stars, he fell into a ditch,\nand the people mocked him as one who had knowledge of heavenly objects\nand yet could not see what lay at his own feet.\u201d The people laugh at\nsuch things, and boast that philosophers cannot tell them about such\nmatters; but they do not understand that philosophers laugh at them,\nfor they do not fall into a ditch just because they lie in one for\nall time, and because they cannot see what exists above them. He also\nshowed, according to Diogenes (I. 26), that a wise man, if he wishes,\ncan easily acquire riches. It is more important that he fixed that the\nyear, as solar year, should have 365 days. The anecdote of the golden\ntripod to be given to the wisest man, is recorded by Diogenes (I.\n27-33); and it carries with it considerable weight, because he combines\nall the different versions of the story. The tripod was given to Thales\nor to Bias; Thales gave it to some one else, and thus it went through\na circle until it again came to Thales; the latter, or else Solon,\ndecided that Apollo was wisest, and sent it to Didyma or to Delphi.\nThales died, according to Diogenes (I. 38), aged seventy-eight or\nninety, in the 58th Olympiad; according to Tennemann (vol. i. p. 414),\nit was in Olympiad 59, 2 (543 B.C.), when Pythagoras came to Crotona.\nDiogenes relates that he died at one of the games, overcome by heat and\nthirst.\n\nWe have no writings by Thales, and we do not know whether he was in\nthe habit of writing. Diogenes Laertius (I. 23, 34, 35) speaks of two\nhundred verses on astronomy, and some maxims, such as \u201cIt is not the\nmany words that have most meaning.\u201d\n\nAs to his philosophy, he is universally recognized as the first natural\nphilosopher, but all one knows of him is little, and yet we seem to\nknow the most of what there is. For since we find that the further\nphilosophic progress of which his speculative idea was capable, and the\nunderstanding of his propositions, which they alone could have, make\ntheir first appearance and form particular epochs with the philosophers\nsucceeding him, who may be recognized thereby, this development\nascribed to Thales never took place with him at all. Thus if it is the\ncase that a number of his other reflections have been lost, they cannot\nhave had any particular speculative value; and his philosophy does not\nshow itself to be an imperfect system from want of information about\nit, but because the first philosophy cannot be a system.\n\nWe must listen to Aristotle as regards these ancient philosophers,\nfor he speaks most sympathetically of them. In the passage of most\nimportance (Metaph. I. 3), he says: \u201cSince it is clear that we must\nacquire the science of first causes (_\u1f10\u03be \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03bd_), seeing that\nwe say that a person knows a thing when he becomes acquainted with\nits cause, there are, we must recollect, four causes\u2014Being and Form\nfirst (for the \u2018why\u2019 is finally led back to the Notion, but yet the\nfirst \u2018why\u2019 is a cause and principle); matter and substratum, second;\nthe cause whence comes the beginning of movement, third; and fourth\nthe cause which is opposed to this, the aim in view and the good (for\nthat is the end of every origination). Hence we would make mention of\nthose who have undertaken the investigation of Being before us, and\nhave speculated regarding the Truth, for they openly advance certain\nprinciples and first causes. If we take them under our consideration,\nit will be of this advantage, so far as our present investigation\ngoes, that we shall either find other kinds of causes or be enabled\nto have so much the more confidence in those just named. Most of the\nearliest philosophers have placed the principles of everything in\nsomething in the form of matter (_\u1f10\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9_), for, that from which\neverything existent comes, and out of which it takes its origin as its\nfirst source, and into which it finally sinks, as substance (_\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1_),\never remains the same and only changes in its particular qualities\n(_\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9_); and this is called the element (_\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd_) and this the\nprinciple of all that exists\u201d (the absolute prius). \u201cOn this account\nthey maintain that nothing arises or passes away, because the same\nnature always remains. For instance, we say that, absolutely speaking,\nSocrates neither originates if he becomes beautiful or musical, nor\ndoes he pass away if he loses these qualities, because the subject (_\u03c4\u1f78\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd_), Socrates, remains the same. And so it is with all else.\nFor there must be one nature, or more than one, from which all else\narises, because it maintains its existence\u201d (_\u03c3\u03c9\u03b6\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2_),\nthat means that in its change there is no reality or truth. \u201cAll do not\ncoincide as to the number of this principle or as to its description\n(_\u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2_); Thales, the founder of this philosophy,\u201d (which recognizes\nsomething material as the principle and substance of all that is),\n\u201csays that it is water. Hence he likewise asserts the earth to be\nfounded on water.\u201d Water is thus the _\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd_, the first ground,\nand, according to Seneca\u2019s statement (Qu\u00e6st. Nat. vi. 6), it seems to\nhim to be not so much the inside of the earth, as what encloses it\nwhich is the universal existence; for \u201cThales considered that the whole\nearth has water as its support (_subjecto humore_), and that it swims\nthereon.\u201d\n\nWe might first of all expect some explanation of the application of\nthese principles, as, for example, how it is to be proved that water is\nthe universal substance, and in what way particular forms are deduced\nfrom it. But as to this we must say that of Thales in particular,\nwe know nothing more than his principle, which is that water is the\ngod over all. No more do we know anything further of Anaximander,\nAnaximenes and Diogenes than their principles. Aristotle brings forward\na conjecture as to how Thales derived everything directly out of water,\n\u201cPerhaps (_\u1f34\u03c3\u03c9\u03c2_) the conclusions of Thales have been brought about\nfrom the reflection that it was evident that all nourishment is moist,\nand warmth itself comes out of moisture and thereby life continues.\nBut that from which anything generates is the principle of all things.\nThis was one reason for holding this theory, and another reason is\ncontained in the fact that all germs are moist in character, and water\nis the principle of what is moist.\u201d It is necessary to remark that\nthe circumstances introduced by Aristotle with a \u201cperhaps\u201d which are\nsupposed to have brought about the conclusions of Thales, making water\nthe absolute essence of everything, are not adduced as the grounds\nacknowledged by Thales. And furthermore, they can hardly be called\ngrounds, for what Aristotle does is rather to establish, as we would\nsay from actuality, that the latter corresponds to the universal\nidea of water. His successors, as for instance Pseudo-Plutarch (De\nplac. phil. I. 3), have taken Thales\u2019 assertion as positive and not\nhypothetical; Tiedmann (_Geist der spec. Phil._ vol. I. p. 36) remarks\nwith great reason that Plutarch omits the \u201cperhaps.\u201d For Plutarch\nsays, \u201cThales suggests (_\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c7\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9_) that everything takes its origin\nfrom water and resolves itself into the same, because as the germs of\nall that live have moisture as the principle of life, all else might\nlikewise (_\u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2_) take its principle from moisture; for all plants\ndraw their nourishment, and thus bear fruit, from water, and if they\nare without it, fade away; and even the fires of sun, and stars and\nworld are fed through the evaporation of water.\u201d Aristotle is contented\nwith simply showing in regard to moisture that, at least, it is\neverywhere to be found. Since Plutarch gives more definite grounds for\nholding that water is the simple essence of things, we must see whether\nthings, in so far as they are simple essence, are water, (_\u03b1_) The germ\nof the animal, of moist nature, is undoubtedly the animal as the simple\nactual, or as the essence of its actuality, or undeveloped actuality.\n(_\u03b2_) If, with plants, water may be regarded as for their nourishment,\nnourishment is still only the being of a thing as formless substance\nthat first becomes individualized by individuality, and thus succeeds\nin obtaining form. (_\u03b3_) To make sun, moon and the whole world arise\nthrough evaporation, like the food of plants, certainly approximates to\nthe idea of the ancients, who did not allow the sun and moon to have\nobtained independence as we do.\n\n\u201cThere are also some,\u201d continues Aristotle, \u201cwho hold that all the\nancients who, at the first and long before the present generation,\nmade theology their study, understood Nature thus. They made Oceanus\nand Tethys the producers of all origination (_\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2_), and\nwater, which by the poets is called Styx, the oath of the gods. For\nwhat is most ancient is most revered, and the oath is that most held in\nreverence.\u201d This old tradition has within it speculative significance.\nIf anything cannot be proved or is devoid of objective form, such as\nwe have in respect of payment in a discharge, or in witnesses who have\nseen the transaction, the oath, the confirmation of myself as object,\nexpresses the fact that my assurance is absolute truth. Now since, by\nway of confirmation, men swear by what is best, by what is absolutely\ncertain, and the gods swore by the subterranean water, it follows that\nthe essence of pure thought, the inmost being, the reality in which\nconsciousness finds its truth, is water; I, so to speak, express this\nclear certainty of myself as object, as God.\n\n1. The closer consideration of this principle in its bearings would\nhave no interest. For since the whole philosophy of Thales lies in\nthe fact that water is this principle, the only point of interest can\nbe to ask how far that principle is important and speculative. Thales\ncomprehends essence as devoid of form. While the sensuous certitude\nof each thing in its individuality is not questioned, this objective\nactuality is now to be raised into the Notion that reflects itself\ninto itself and is itself to be set forth as Notion; in commencement\nthis is seen in the world\u2019s being manifested as water, or as a simple\nuniversal. Fluid is, in its Notion, life, and hence it is water itself,\nspiritually expressed; in the so-called grounds or reasons, on the\ncontrary, water has the form of existent universal. We certainly\ngrant this universal activity of water, and for that reason call it\nan element, a physical universal power; but while we find it thus to\nbe the universal of activity, we also find it to be this actual, not\neverywhere, but in proximity to other elements\u2014earth, air and fire.\nWater thus has not got a sensuous universality, but a speculative one\nmerely; to be speculative universality, however, would necessitate its\nbeing Notion and having what is sensuous removed. Here we have the\nstrife between sensuous universality and universality of the Notion.\nThe real essence of nature has to be defined, that is, nature has to\nbe expressed as the simple essence of thought. Now simple essence, the\nNotion of the universal, is that which is devoid of form, but this\nwater as it is, comes into the determination of form, and is thus, in\nrelation to others, a particular existence just like everything that\nis natural. Yet as regards the other elements, water is determined as\nformless and simple, while the earth is that which has points, air is\nthe element of all change, and fire evidently changes into itself.\nNow if the need of unity impels us to recognize for separate things a\nuniversal, water, although it has the drawback of being a particular\nthing, can easily be utilized as the One, both on account of its\nneutrality, and because it is more material than air.\n\nThe proposition of Thales, that water is the Absolute, or as the\nancients say, the principle, is the beginning of Philosophy, because\nwith it the consciousness is arrived at that essence, truth, that which\nis alone in and for itself, are one. A departure from what is in our\nsensuous perception here takes place; man recedes from this immediate\nexistence. We must be able to forget that we are accustomed to a rich\nconcrete world of thought; with us the very child learns, \u201cThere is\none God in Heaven, invisible.\u201d Such determinations are not yet present\nhere; the world of Thought must first be formed and there is as yet no\npure unity. Man has nature before him as water, air, stars, the arch\nof the heavens; and the horizon of his ideas is limited to this. The\nimagination has, indeed, its gods, but its content still is natural;\nthe Greeks had considered sun, mountains, earth, sea, rivers, &c.,\nas independent powers, revered them as gods, and elevated them by\nthe imagination to activity, movement, consciousness and will. What\nthere is besides, like the conceptions of Homer, for instance, is\nsomething in which thought could not find satisfaction; it produces\nmere images of the imagination, endlessly endowed with animation and\nform, but destitute of simple unity. It must undoubtedly be said that\nin this unconsciousness of an intellectual world, one must acknowledge\nthat there is a great robustness of mind evinced in not granting this\nplenitude of existence to the natural world, but in reducing it to\na simple substance, which, as the ever enduring principle, neither\noriginates nor disappears, while the gods have a Theogony and are\nmanifold and changing. This wild, endlessly varied imagination of\nHomer is set at rest by the proposition that existence is water; this\nconflict of an endless quantity of principles, all these ideas that\na particular object is an independent truth, a self-sufficient power\nover others existing in its own right, are taken away, and it is shown\nlikewise that there is only one universal, the universal self-existent,\nthe simple unimaginative perception, the thought that is one and one\nalone.\n\nThis universal stands in direct relationship to the particular\nand to the existence of the world as manifested. The first thing\nimplied in what has been said, is that the particular existence\nhas no independence, is not true in and for itself, but is only an\naccidental modification. But the affirmative point of view is that all\nother things proceed from the one, that the one remains thereby the\nsubstance from which all other things proceed, and it is only through\na determination which is accidental and external that the particular\nexistence has its being. It is similarly the case that all particular\nexistence is transient, that is, it loses the form of particular and\nagain becomes the universal, water. The simple proposition of Thales\ntherefore, is Philosophy, because in it water, though sensuous, is not\nlooked at in its particularity as opposed to other natural things, but\nas Thought in which everything is resolved and comprehended. Thus we\napproach the divorce of the absolute from the finite; but it is not\nto be thought that the unity stands above, and that down here we have\nthe finite world. This idea is often found in the common conception\nof God\u2014where permanence is attributed to the world and where men\noften represent two kinds of actuality to themselves, a sensuous and a\nsupersensuous world of equal standing. The philosophic point of view is\nthat the one is alone the truly actual, and here we must take actual in\nits higher significance, because we call everything actual in common\nlife. The second circumstance to be remembered is that with the ancient\nphilosophers, the principle has a definite and, at first, a physical\nform. To us this does not appear to be philosophic but only physical;\nin this case, however, matter has philosophic significance. Thales\u2019\ntheory is thus a natural philosophy, because this universal essence\nis determined as real; consequently the Absolute is determined as the\nunity of thought and Being.\n\n2. Now if we have this undifferentiated principle predominating, the\nquestion arises as to the determination of this first principle. The\ntransition from universal to particular at once becomes essential, and\nit begins with the determination of activity; the necessity for such\narises here. That which is to be a veritable principle must not have\na one-sided, particular form, but in it the difference must itself\nbe absolute, while other principles are only special kinds of forms.\nThe fact that the Absolute is what determines itself is already more\nconcrete; we have the activity and the higher self-consciousness of the\nspiritual principle, by which the form has worked itself into being\nabsolute form, the totality of form. Since it is most profound, this\ncomes latest; what has first to be done is merely to look at things as\ndetermined.\n\nForm is lacking to water as conceived by Thales. How is this accorded\nto it? The method is stated (and stated by Aristotle, but not directly\nof Thales), in which particular forms have arisen out of water; it\nis said to be through a process of condensation and rarefaction\n(_\u03c0\u03c5\u03ba\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9_), or, as it may be better put, through\ngreater or less intensity. Tennemann (vol. I. p. 59) in reference to\nthis, cites from Aristotle, _De gen. et corrupt._ I. 1, where there\nis no mention of condensation and rarefaction as regards Thales, and\nfurther, _De c\u00e6lo_, III. 5, where it is only said that those who uphold\nwater or air, or something finer than water or coarser than air, define\ndifference as density and rarity, but nothing is said of its being\nThales who gave expression to this distinction. Tiedmann (vol. I. p.\n38) quotes yet other authorities; it was, however, later on, that this\ndistinction was first ascribed to Thales.[22] Thus much is made out,\nthat for the first time in this natural philosophy as in the modern,\nthat which is essential in form is really the quantitative difference\nin its existence. This merely quantitative difference, however, which,\nas the increasing and decreasing density of water, constitutes its\nonly form-determination, is an external expression of the absolute\ndifference; it is an unessential distinction set up through another and\nis not the inner difference of the Notion in itself; it is therefore\nnot worth while to spend more time over it.\n\nDifference as regards the Notion has no physical significance,\nbut differences or the simple duality of form in the sides of its\nopposition, must be comprehended as universally in the Notion. On this\naccount a sensuous interpretation must not be given to the material,\nthat is to particular determinations, as when it is definitely said\nthat rare water is air, rare air, fiery ether, thick water, mud, which\nthen becomes earth; according to this, air would be the rarefaction of\nthe first water, ether the rarefaction of air, and earth and mud the\nsediment of water. As sensuous difference or change, the division here\nappears as something manifested for consciousness; the moderns have\nexperimented in making thicker and thinner what to the senses is the\nsame.\n\nChange has consequently a double sense; one with reference to existence\nand another with reference to the Notion. When change is considered\nby the ancients, it is usually supposed to have to do with a change\nin what exists, and thus, for instance, inquiry would be made as to\nwhether water can be changed through chemical action, such as heat,\ndistillation, &c., into earth; finite chemistry is confined to this.\nBut what is meant in all ancient philosophies is change as regards\nthe Notion. That is to say, water does not become converted into air\nor space and time in retorts, &c. But in every philosophic idea, this\ntransition of one quality into another takes place, _i.e._ this inward\nconnection is shown in the Notion, according to which no one thing can\nsubsist independently and without the other, for the life of nature\nhas its subsistence in the fact that one thing is necessarily related\nto the other. We certainly are accustomed to believe that if water\nwere taken away, it would indeed fare badly with plants and animals,\nbut that stones would still remain; or that of colours, blue could\nbe abstracted without harming in the least yellow or red. As regards\nmerely empirical existence, it may easily be shown that each quality\nexists on its own account, but in the Notion they only are, through one\nanother, and by virtue of an inward necessity. We certainly see this\nalso in living matter, where things happen in another way, for here\nthe Notion comes into existence; thus if, for example, we abstract the\nheart, the lungs and all else collapse. And in the same way all nature\nexists only in the unity of all its parts, just as the brain can exist\nonly in unity with the other organs.\n\n3. If the form is, however, only expressed in both its sides as\ncondensation and rarefaction, it is not in and for itself, for to be\nthis it must be grasped as the _absolute Notion_, and as an endlessly\nforming unity. What is said on this point by Aristotle (De Anima, I.\n2, also 5) is this: \u201cThales seems, according to what is said of him,\nto consider the soul as something having movement, for he says of\nthe loadstone that it has a soul, since it moves the iron.\u201d Diogenes\nLaertius (I. 24) adds amber to this, from which we see that even Thales\nknew about electricity, although another explanation of it is that\n_\u1f24\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd_ was besides a metal. Aldobrandini says of this passage in\nDiogenes, that it is a stone which is so hostile to poison that when\ntouched by such it immediately hisses. The above remark by Aristotle\nis perverted by Diogenes to such an extent that he says: \u201cThales has\nlikewise ascribed a soul to what is lifeless.\u201d However, this is not the\nquestion, for the point is how he thought of absolute form, and whether\nhe expressed the Idea generally as soul so that absolute essence should\nbe the unity of simple essence and form.\n\nDiogenes certainly says further of Thales (I. 27), \u201cThe world is\nanimated and full of demons,\u201d and Plutarch (De plac. phil. I. 7)\nsays, \u201cHe called God the Intelligence (_\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_) of the world.\u201d But all\nthe ancients, and particularly Aristotle, ascribe this expression\nunanimously to Anaxagoras as the one who first said that the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_\nis the principle of things. Thus it does not conduce to the further\ndetermination of form according to Thales, to find in Cicero (De Nat.\nDeor. I. 10) this passage: \u201cThales says that water is the beginning\nof everything, but God is the Mind which forms all that is, out of\nwater.\u201d Thales may certainly have spoken of God, but Cicero has\nadded the statement that he comprehended him as the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ which\nformed everything out of water. Tiedmann (vol. I. p. 42) declares the\npassage to be possibly corrupt, since Cicero later on (c. 11) says\nof Anaxagoras that \u201che first maintained the order of things to have\nbeen brought about through the infinite power of Mind.\u201d However, the\nEpicurean, in whose mouth these words are put, speaks \u201cwith confidence\nonly fearing that he should appear to have any doubts\u201d (c. 8) both\npreviously and subsequently of other philosophers rather foolishly, so\nthat this description is given merely as a jest. Aristotle understands\nhistoric accuracy better, and therefore we must follow him. But to\nthose who make it their business to find everywhere the conception of\nthe creation of the world by God, that passage in Cicero is a great\nsource of delight, and it is a much disputed point whether Thales is\nto be counted amongst those who accepted the existence of a God. The\nTheism of Thales is maintained by Plouquet, whilst others would have\nhim to be an atheist or polytheist, because he says that everything is\nfull of demons. However, this question as to whether Thales believed\nin God does not concern us here, for acceptation, faith, popular\nreligion are not in question; we only have to do with the philosophic\ndetermination of absolute existence. And if Thales did speak of God as\nconstituting everything out of this same water, that would not give us\nany further information about this existence; we should have spoken\nunphilosophically of Thales because we should have used an empty word\nwithout inquiring about its speculative significance. Similarly the\nword world-soul is useless, because its being is not thereby expressed.\n\nThus all these further, as also later, assertions do not justify us in\nmaintaining that Thales comprehended form in the absolute in a definite\nmanner; on the contrary, the rest of the history of philosophical\ndevelopment refutes this view. We see that form certainly seems to\nbe shown forth in existence, but as yet this unity is no further\ndeveloped. The idea that the magnet has a soul is indeed always better\nthan saying that it has the power of attraction; for power is a quality\nwhich is considered as a predicate separable from matter, while soul\nis movement in unison with matter in its essence. An idea such as\nthis of Thales stands isolated, however, and has no further relation\nto his absolute thought. Thus, in fact, the philosophy of Thales is\ncomprised in the following simple elements: (_a_) It has constituted\nan abstraction in order to comprehend nature in a simple sensuous\nessence. (_b_) It has brought forth the Notion of ground or principle;\nthat is, it has defined water to be the infinite Notion, the simple\nessence of thought, without determining it further as the difference of\nquantity. That is the limited significance of this principle of Thales.\n\n\n2. _Anaximander._\n\nAnaximander was also of Miletus, and he was a friend of Thales. \u201cThe\nlatter,\u201d says Cicero (Acad. Quaest. IV. 37), \u201ccould not convince him\nthat everything consisted of water.\u201d Anaximander\u2019s father was called\nPraxiades; the date of his birth is not quite certain; according to\nTennemann (vol. I. p. 413), it is put in Olympiad 42, 3 (610 B.C.),\nwhile Diogenes Laertius (II. I, 2) says, taking his information\nfrom Apollodorus, an Athenian, that in Ol. 58, 2 (547 B.C.), he was\nsixty-four years old, and that he died soon after, that is to say about\nthe date of Thales\u2019 death. And taking for granted that he died in his\nninetieth year, Thales must have been nearly twenty-eight years older\nthan Anaximander. It is related of Anaximander that he lived in Samos\nwith the tyrant Polycrates, where were Pythagoras and Anacreon also.\nThemistius, according to Brucker (Pt. I. p. 478), says of him that\nhe first put his philosophic thoughts into writing, but this is also\nrecorded of others, as for example, of Pherecydes, who was older than\nhe. Anaximander is said to have written about nature, the fixed stars,\nthe sphere, besides other matters; he further produced something like a\nmap, showing the boundary (_\u03c0\u03c1\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd_) of land and sea; he also made\nother mathematical inventions, such as a sun-dial that he put up in\nLaced\u00e6mon, and instruments by which the course of the sun was shown,\nand the equinox determined; a chart of the heavens was likewise made by\nhim.\n\nHis philosophical reflections are not comprehensive, and do not extend\nas far as to determination. Diogenes says in the passage quoted\nbefore: \u201cHe adduced the Infinite\u201d (_\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd_, the undetermined),\n\u201cas principle and element; he neither determined it as air or water or\nany such thing.\u201d There are, however, few attributes of this Infinite\ngiven. (_\u03b1_.) \u201cIt is the principle of all becoming and passing away;\nat long intervals infinite worlds or gods rise out of it, and again\nthey pass away into the same.\u201d This has quite an oriental tone. \u201cHe\ngives as a reason that the principle is to be determined as the\nInfinite, the fact that it does not need material for continuous\norigination. It contains everything in itself and rules over all: it\nis divine, immortal, and never passes away.\u201d[23] (_\u03b2_.) Out of the\none, Anaximander separates the opposites which are contained in it,\nas do Empedocles and Anaxagoras; thus everything in this medley is\ncertainly there, but undetermined.[24] That is, everything is really\ncontained therein in possibility (_\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9_), \u201cso that,\u201d says Aristotle\n(Metaphys. XI. 2), \u201cit is not only that everything arises accidentally\nout of what is not, but everything also arises from what is, although\nit is from incipient being which is not yet in actuality.\u201d Diogenes\nLaertius adds (II. 1): \u201cThe parts of the Infinite change, but it itself\nis unchangeable.\u201d (_\u03b3_.) Lastly, it is said that the infinitude is in\nsize and not in number, and Anaximander differs thus from Anaxagoras,\nEmpedocles and the other atomists, who maintain the absolute discretion\nof the infinite, while Anaximander upholds its absolute continuity.[25]\nAristotle (Metaphys. I. 8) speaks also of a principle which is neither\nwater nor air, but is \u201cthicker than air and thinner than water.\u201d Many\nhave connected this idea with Anaximander, and it is possible that it\nbelongs to him.\n\nThe advance made by the determination of the principle as infinite in\ncomprehensiveness rests in the fact that absolute essence no longer is\na simple universal, but one which negates the finite. At the same time,\nviewed from the material side, Anaximander removes the individuality\nof the element of water; his objective principle does not appear to\nbe material, and it may be understood as Thought. But it is clear\nthat he did not mean anything else than matter generally, universal\nmatter.[26] Plutarch reproaches Anaximander \u201cfor not saying what (_\u03c4\u03b9_)\nhis infinite is, whether air, water or earth.\u201d But a definite quality\nsuch as one of these is transient; matter determined as infinitude\nmeans the motion of positing definite forms, and again abolishing the\nseparation. True and infinite Being is to be shown in this and not in\nnegative absence of limit. This universality and negation of the finite\nis, however, our operation only: in describing matter as infinite,\nAnaximander does not seem to have said that this is its infinitude.\n\nHe has said further (and in this, according to Theophrastus, he agrees\nwith Anaxagoras), \u201cIn the infinite the like separates itself from the\nunlike and allies itself to the like; thus what in the whole was gold\nbecomes gold, what was earth, earth, &c., so that properly nothing\noriginates, seeing that it was already there.\u201d[27] These, however, are\npoor determinations, which only show the necessity of the transition\nfrom the undetermined to the determined; for this still takes place\nhere in an unsatisfying way. As to the further question of how the\ninfinite determines the opposite in its separation, it seems that the\ntheory of the quantitative distinction of condensation and rarefaction\nwas held by Anaximander as well as by Thales. Those who come later\ndesignate the process of separation from the Infinite as development.\nAnaximander supposes man to develop from a fish, which abandoned water\nfor the land.[28] Development comes also into prominence in recent\ntimes, but as a mere succession in time\u2014a formula in the use of which\nmen often imagine that they are saying something brilliant; but there\nis no real necessity, no thought, and above all, no Notion contained in\nit.\n\nBut in later records the idea of warmth, as being the disintegration of\nform, and that of cold, is ascribed to Anaximander by Stob\u00e6us (Eclog.\nPhys. c. 24, p. 500); this Aristotle (Metaphys. I. 5) first ascribed\nto Parmenides. Eusebius (De pr\u00e6p. Evang. I. 8), out of a lost work of\nPlutarch, gives us something from Anaximander\u2019s Cosmogony which is\ndark, and which, indeed, Eusebius himself did not rightly understand.\nIts sense is approximately this: \u201cOut of the Infinite, infinite\nheavenly spheres and infinite worlds have been set apart; but they\ncarry within them their own destruction, because they only are through\nconstant dividing off.\u201d That is, since the Infinite is the principle,\nseparation is the positing of a difference, i.e. of a determination or\nsomething finite. \u201cThe earth has the form of a cylinder, the height\nof which is the third part of the breadth. Both of the eternally\nproductive principles of warmth and cold separate themselves in the\ncreation of this earth, and a fiery sphere is formed round the air\nencircling the earth, like the bark around a tree. As this broke up,\nand the pieces were compressed into circles, sun, moon, and stars\nwere formed.\u201d Hence Anaximander, according to Stob\u00e6us (Ecl. Phys. 25,\np. 510), likewise called the stars \u201cwheel-shaped with fire-filled\nwrappings of air.\u201d This Cosmogony is as good as the geological\nhypothesis of the earth-crust which burst open, or as Buffon\u2019s\nexplosion of the sun, which beginning, on the other hand, with the sun,\nmakes the planets to be stones projected from it. While the ancients\nconfined the stars to our atmosphere, and made the sun first proceed\nfrom the earth, we make the sun to be the substance and birthplace of\nthe earth, and separate the stars entirely from any further connection\nwith us, because for us, like the gods worshipped by the Epicureans,\nthey are at rest. In the process of origination, the sun, indeed,\ndescends as the universal, but in nature it is that which comes later;\nthus in truth the earth is the totality, and the sun but an abstract\nmoment.\n\n\n3. _Anaximenes._\n\nAnaximenes still remains as having made his appearance between the\n55th and 58th Olympiads (560-548 B.C.). He was likewise of Miletus, a\ncontemporary and friend of Anaximander; he has little to distinguish\nhim, and very little is known about him. Diogenes Laertius says neither\nwith consideration nor consistency (II. 3): \u201cHe was born, according\nto Apollodorus in the 63rd Olympiad, and died in the year Sardis was\nconquered\u201d (by Cyrus, Olympiad 58th).\n\nIn place of the undetermined matter of Anaximander, he brings forward\na definite natural element; hence the absolute is in a real form,\nbut instead of the water of Thales, that form is air. He found that\nfor matter a sensuous being was indeed essential, and air has the\nadditional advantage of being more devoid of form; it is less corporeal\nthan water, for we do not see it, but feel it first in movement.\nPlutarch (De plac. phil. I. 3) says: \u201cOut of it everything comes forth,\nand into it everything is again resolved.\u201d According to Cicero (De Nat.\nDeor. I. 10), \u201che defined it as immeasurable, infinite, and in constant\nmotion.\u201d Diogenes Laertius expresses this in the passage already\nquoted: \u201cThe principle is air and the infinite\u201d (_\u03bf\u1f56\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f36\u03c0\u03b5\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd_) as if there were two principles; however, _\u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd_ may be taken together as subject, and _\u1f00\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1_ regarded as the\npredicate in the statement. For Simplicius, in dealing with the Physics\nof Aristotle, expressly says (p. 6, a) \u201cthat the first principle was to\nhim one and infinite in nature as it was to Anaximander, but it was not\nindefinite as with the latter, but determined, that is, it was air,\u201d\nwhich, however, he seems to have understood as endowed with soul.\n\nPlutarch characterizes Anaximenes\u2019 mode of representation which makes\neverything proceed from air\u2014later on it was called ether\u2014and resolve\nitself therein, better thus: \u201cAs our soul, which is air, holds us\ntogether (_\u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6_), one spirit (_\u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u1fe6\u03bc\u03b1_) and air together likewise\nhold (_\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9_) the whole world together; spirit and air are\nsynonymous.\u201d Anaximenes shows very clearly the nature of his essence\nin the soul, and he thus points out what may be called the transition\nof natural philosophy into the philosophy of consciousness, or the\nsurrender of the objective form of principle. The nature of this\nprinciple has hitherto been determined in a manner which is foreign\nand negative to consciousness; both its reality, water or air, and the\ninfinite are a \u201cbeyond\u201d to consciousness. But soul is the universal\nmedium; it is a collection of conceptions which pass away and come\nforth, while the unity and continuity never cease. It is active as\nwell as passive, from its unity severing asunder the conceptions and\nsublating them, and it is present to itself in its infinitude, so that\nnegative signification and positive come into unison. Speaking more\nprecisely, this idea of the nature of the origin of things is that of\nAnaxagoras, the pupil of Anaximenes.\n\nPherecydes has also to be mentioned as the teacher of Pythagoras; he\nis of Syros, one of the Cyclades islands. He is said to have drawn\nwater from a spring, and to have learned therefrom that an earthquake\nwould take place in three days; he is also said to have predicted of\na ship in full sail that it would go down, and it sank in a moment.\nTheopompus in Diogenes Laertius (I. 116), relates of this Pherecydes\nthat \u201che first wrote to the Greeks about Nature and the gods\u201d (which\nwas before said of Anaximander). His writings are said to have been in\nprose, and from what is related of them it is clear that it must have\nbeen a theogony of which he wrote. The first words, still preserved\nto us, are: \u201cJupiter and Time and what is terrestrial (_\u03c7\u03b8\u03ce\u03bd_) were\nfrom eternity (_\u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f00\u03b5\u03af_); the name of earthly (_\u03c7\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u1fc3_) was given\nto the terrestrial sphere when Zeus granted to it gifts.\u201d[29] How it\ngoes on is not known, but this cannot be deemed a great loss. Hermias\ntells us only this besides:[30] \u201cHe maintained Zeus or Fire (_\u03b1\u1f30\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1_),\nEarth and Chronos or Time as principles\u2014fire as active, earth as\npassive, and time as that in which everything originates.\u201d Diogenes of\nApollonia, Hippasus, and Archelaus are also called Ionic philosophers,\nbut we know nothing more of them than their names, and that they gave\ntheir adherence to one principle or the other.\n\nWe shall leave these now and go on to Pythagoras, who was a\ncontemporary of Anaximander; but the continuity of the development of\nthe principle of physical philosophy necessitated our taking Anaximenes\nwith him. We see that, as Aristotle said, they placed the first\nprinciple in a form of matter\u2014in air and water first, and then, if\nwe may so define Anaximander\u2019s matter, in an essence finer than water\nand coarser than air. Heraclitus, of whom we have soon to speak, first\ncalled it fire. \u201cBut no one,\u201d as Aristotle (Metaph. I. 8) remarks,\n\u201ccalled earth the principle, because it appears to be the most complex\nelement\u201d (_\u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd_); for it seems to be an aggregate of\nmany units. Water, on the contrary, is the one, and it is transparent;\nit manifests in sensuous guise the form of unity with itself, and this\nis also so with air, fire, matter, &c. The principle has to be one,\nand hence must have inherent unity with itself; if it shows a manifold\nnature as does the earth, it is not one with itself, but manifold. This\nis what we have to say about the early Ionic Philosophy. The importance\nof these poor abstract thoughts lies (_a_) in the comprehension of a\nuniversal substance in everything, and (_b_) in the fact that it is\nformless, and not encumbered by sensuous ideas.\n\nNo one recognized better the deficiencies in this philosophy than\ndid Aristotle in the work already quoted. Two points appear in his\ncriticism of these three modes of determining the absolute: \u201cThose who\nmaintain the original principle to be matter fall short in many ways.\nIn the first place, they merely give the corporeal element and not the\nincorporeal, for there also is such.\u201d In treating of nature in order\nto show its essence, it is necessary to deal with it in its entirety,\nand everything found in it must be considered. That is certainly but an\nempirical instance. Aristotle maintains the incorporeal to be a form of\nthings opposed to the material, and indicates that the absolute must\nnot be determined in a one-sided manner; because the principle of these\nphilosophers is material only, they do not manifest the incorporeal\nside, nor is the object shown to be Notion. Matter is indeed itself\nimmaterial as this reflection into consciousness; but such philosophers\ndo not know that what they express is an existence of consciousness.\nThus the first great defect here rests in the fact that the universal\nis expressed in a particular form.\n\nSecondly, Aristotle says (Metaph. I. 3): \u201cFrom this it may be seen\nthat first cause has only been by all these expressed in the form of\nmatter. But because they proceeded thus, the thing itself opened out\ntheir way for them, and forced them into further investigation. For\nwhether origin and decay are derived from one or more, the question\nalike arises, \u2018How does it happen and what is the cause of it?\u2019 For\nthe fundamental substance (_\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd_) does not make itself to\nchange, just as neither wood nor metal are themselves the cause of\nchange; wood neither forms a bed nor does brass a statue, but something\nelse is the cause of the change. To investigate this, however, is\nto investigate the other principle, which, as we would say, is the\nPrinciple of Motion.\u201d This criticism holds good even now, where the\nAbsolute is represented as the one fixed substance. Aristotle says\nthat change is not conceivable out of matter as such, or out of water\nnot itself having motion; he reproaches the older philosophers for\nthe fact that they have not investigated the principle of motion for\nwhich men care most. Further, object is altogether absent; there is no\ndetermination of activity. Hence Aristotle says in the former passage:\n\u201cIn that they undertake to give the cause of origin and decay, they in\nfact remove the cause of movement. Because they make the principle to\nbe a simple body (earth being excepted), they do not comprehend the\nmutual origination and decay whereby the one arises out of the other:\nI am here referring to water, air, fire, and earth. This origination\nis to be shown as separation or as union, and hence the contradiction\ncomes about that one in time comes earlier than the other. That is,\nbecause this kind of origination is the method which they have adopted,\nthe way taken is from the simple universal, through the particular, to\nthe individual as what comes latest. Water, air, and fire are, however,\nuniversal. Fire seems to be most suitable for this element, seeing that\nit is the most subtle. Thus those who made it to be the principle, most\nadequately gave expression to this method (_\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3_) of origination; and\nothers thought very similarly. For else why should no one have made the\nearth an element, in conformity with the popular idea? Hesiod says that\nit was the original body\u2014so ancient and so common was this idea. But\nwhat in Becoming comes later, is the first in nature.\u201d However, these\nphilosophers did not understand this so, because they were ruled by the\nprocess of Becoming only, without again sublating it, or knowing that\nfirst formal universal as such, and manifesting the third, the totality\nor unity of matter and form, as essence. Here, we see, the Absolute is\nnot yet the self-determining, the Notion turned back into itself, but\nonly a dead abstraction; the moderns were the first, says Aristotle,\n(Metaph. I. 6; III. 3) to understand the fundamental principle more in\nthe form of genus.\n\nWe are able to follow the three moments in the Ionic philosophy:\n(_\u03b1_) The original essence is water; (_\u03b2_) Anaximander\u2019s infinite is\ndescriptive of movement, simple going out of and coming back into the\nsimple, universal aspects of form\u2014condensation and rarefaction; (_\u03b3_)\nthe air is compared to the soul. It is now requisite that what is\nviewed as reality should be brought into the Notion; in so doing we see\nthat the moments of division, condensation, and rarefaction are not in\nany way antagonistic to the Notion. This transition to Pythagoras, or\nthe manifestation of the real side as the ideal, is Thought breaking\nfree from what is sensuous, and, therefore, it is a separation between\nthe intelligible and the real.\n\n\nB. PYTHAGORAS AND THE PYTHAGOREANS.\n\nThe later Neo-Pythagoreans have written many extensive biographies\nof Pythagoras, and are especially diffuse as regards the Pythagorean\nbrotherhood. But it must be taken into consideration that these often\ndistorted statements must not be regarded as historical. The life of\nPythagoras thus first comes to us in history through the medium of the\nideas belonging to the first centuries after Christ, and more or less\nin the style in which the life of Christ is written, on the ground of\nordinary actuality, and not in a poetic atmosphere; it appears to be\nthe intermingling of many marvellous and extravagant tales, and to\ntake its origin in part from eastern ideas and in part from western.\nIn acknowledging the remarkable nature of his life and genius and of\nthe life which he inculcated on his followers, it was added that his\ndealings were not with right things, and that he was a magician and\none who had intercourse with higher beings. All the ideas of magic,\nthat medley of unnatural and natural, the mysteries which pervade\na clouded, miserable imagination, and the wild ideas of distorted\nbrains, have attached themselves to him.\n\nHowever corrupt the history of his life, his philosophy is as much so.\nEverything engendered by Christian melancholy and love of allegory\nhas been identified with it. The treatment of Plato in Christian\ntimes has quite a different character. Numbers have been much used\nas the expression of ideas, and this on the one hand has a semblance\nof profundity. For the fact that another significance than that\nimmediately presented is implied in them, is evident at once; but how\nmuch there is within them is neither known by him who speaks nor by\nhim, who seeks to understand; it is like the witches\u2019 rhyme (one time\none) in Goethe\u2019s \u201cFaust.\u201d The less clear the thoughts, the deeper they\nappear; what is most essential, but most difficult, the expression\nof oneself in definite conceptions, is omitted. Thus Pythagoras\u2019\nphilosophy, since much has been added to it by those who wrote of it,\nmay similarly appear as the mysterious product of minds as shallow\nand empty as they are dark. Fortunately, however, we have a special\nknowledge of the theoretic, speculative side of it, and that, indeed,\nfrom Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus, who have taken considerable\ntrouble with it. Although later Pythagoreans disparage Aristotle on\naccount of his exposition, he has a place above any such disparagement,\nand therefore to them no attention must be given.\n\nIn later times a quantity of writings were disseminated and foisted\nupon Pythagoras. Diogenes Laertius (VIII. 6, 7) mentions many which\nwere by him, and others which were set down to him in order to obtain\nauthority for them. But in the first place we have no writings by\nPythagoras, and secondly it is doubtful whether any ever did exist.\nWe have quotations from these in unsatisfactory fragments, not from\nPythagoras, but from Pythagoreans. It cannot be decisively determined\nwhich developments and interpretations belonged to the ancients and\nwhich to the moderns; yet with Pythagoras and the ancient Pythagoreans\nthe determinations were not worked out in so concrete a way as later.\n\nAs to the life of Pythagoras, we hear from Diogenes Laertius (VIII.\n1-3, 45) that he flourished about the 60th Olympiad (540 B.C.). His\nbirth is usually placed in the 49th or 50th Olympiad (584 B.C.); by\nLarcher in Tennemann (Vol. I., pp. 413, 414), much earlier\u2014in the\n43rd Olympiad (43, 1, i.e. 608 B.C.). He was thus contemporaneous with\nThales and Anaximander. If Thales\u2019 birth were in the 38th Olympiad\nand that of Pythagoras in the 43rd, Pythagoras was only twenty-one\nyears younger than he; he either only differed by a couple of years\nfrom Anaximander (Ol. 42, 3) in age, or the latter was twenty-six\nyears older. Anaximenes was from twenty to twenty-five years younger\nthan Pythagoras. His birthplace was the Island of Samos, and hence he\nbelonged to the Greeks of Asia Minor, which place we have hitherto\nfound to be the seat of philosophy. Pythagoras is said by Herodotus\n(IV., 93 to 96) to have been the son of Mnesarchus, with whom Zalmoxis\nserved as slave in Samos; Zalmoxis obtained freedom and riches, became\nruler of the Get\u00e6, and asserted that he and his people would not die.\nHe built a subterranean habitation and there withdrew himself from\nhis subjects; after four years he re-appeared;[31] hence the Getans\nbelieved in immortality. Herodotus thinks, however, that Zalmoxis was\nundoubtedly much older than Pythagoras.\n\nHis youth was spent at the court of Polycrates, under whose rule Samos\nwas brought, not only to wealth, but also to the possession of culture\nand art. In this prosperous period, according to Herodotus (III., 39),\nit possessed a fleet of a hundred ships. His father was an artist or\nengraver, but reports vary as to this, as also as to his country, some\nsaying that his family was of Tyrrhenian origin and did not go to Samos\ntill after Pythagoras\u2019 birth. That may be as it will, for his youth\nwas spent in Samos and he must hence have been naturalized there, and\nto it he belongs. He soon journeyed to the main land of Asia Minor\nand is said there to have become acquainted with Thales. From thence\nhe travelled to Ph\u0153nicia and Egypt, as Iamblichus (III., 13, 14) says\nin his biography of Pythagoras. With both countries Asia Minor had\nmany links, commercial and political, and it is related that he was\nrecommended by Polycrates to King Amasis, who, according to Herodotus\n(II. 154), attracted many Greeks to the country, and had Greek troops\nand colonies. The narratives of further journeys into the interior\nof Asia, to the Persian magicians and Indians, seem to be altogether\nfabulous, although travelling, then as now, was considered to be a\nmeans of culture. As Pythagoras travelled with a scientific purpose, it\nis said that he had himself initiated into nearly all the mysteries of\nGreeks and of Barbarians, and thus he obtained admission into the order\nor caste of the Egyptian priesthood.\n\nThese mysteries that we meet with amongst the Greeks, and which are\nheld to be the sources of much wisdom, appear in their religion to have\nstood in the relationship of doctrine to worship. This last existed in\nofferings and solemn festivals only, but to ordinary conceptions, to\na consciousness of these conceptions, there is no transition visible\nunless they were preserved in poems as traditions. The doctrines\nthemselves, or the act of bringing the actual home to the conception,\nseems to have been confined to the mysteries; we find it to be the\ncase, however, that it is not only the ideas as in our teaching, but\nalso the body that is laid claim to\u2014that there was brought home to man\nby sending him to wander amongst his fellow-men, both the abandonment\nof his sensuous consciousness and the purification and sanctification\nof the body. Of philosophic matter, however, there is as little openly\ndeclared as possible, and just as we know the system of freemasonry,\nthere is no secret in those mysteries.\n\nHis alliance with the Egyptian priesthood had a most important\ninfluence upon Pythagoras, not through the derivation of profound\nspeculative wisdom therefrom, but by the idea obtained through it of\nthe realization of the moral consciousness of man; the individual, he\nlearned, must attend to himself, if inwardly and to the outer world\nhe is to be meritorious and to bring himself, morally formed and\nfashioned, into actuality. This is a conception which he subsequently\ncarried out, and it is as interesting a matter as his speculative\nphilosophy. Just as the priests constituted a particular rank and\nwere educated for it, they also had a special rule, which was binding\nthroughout the whole moral life. From Egypt Pythagoras thus without\ndoubt brought the idea of his Order, which was a regular community\nbrought together for purposes of scientific and moral culture, which\nendured during the whole of life. Egypt at that time was regarded as\na highly cultured country, and it was so when compared with Greece;\nthis is shown even in the differences of caste which assumes a division\namongst the great branches of life and work, such as the industrial,\nscientific and religious. But beyond this, we need not seek great\nscientific knowledge amongst the Egyptians, nor think that Pythagoras\ngot his science there. Aristotle (Metaph. I.) only says that \u201cin Egypt\nmathematical sciences first commenced, for there the nation of priests\nhad leisure.\u201d[32]\n\nPythagoras stayed a long time in Egypt, and returned from thence\nto Samos; but he found the internal affairs of his own country in\nconfusion, and left it soon after. According to Herodotus\u2019 account\n(III. 45-47), Polycrates had\u2014not as tyrant\u2014banished many citizens\nfrom Samos, who sought and found support amongst the Laced\u00e6monians, and\na civil war had broken out. The Spartans had, at an earlier period,\ngiven assistance to the others, for, as Thucydides says (I. 18), to\nthem thanks were generally ascribed for having abolished the rule of\nthe few, and caused a reversion to the system of giving public power to\nthe people; later on they did the opposite, abolishing democracy and\nintroducing aristocracy. Pythagoras\u2019 family was necessarily involved in\nthese unpleasant relations, and a condition of internal strife was not\ncongenial to Pythagoras, seeing that he no longer took an interest in\npolitical life, and that he saw in it an unsuitable soil for carrying\nout his plans. He traversed Greece, and betook himself from thence to\nItaly, in the lower parts of which Greek colonies from various states\nand for various motives had settled, and there flourished as important\ntrading towns, rich in people and possessions.\n\nIn Crotona he settled down, and lived in independence, neither as\na statesman, warrior, nor political law-giver to the people, so\nfar as external life was concerned, but as a public teacher, with\nthe provision that his teaching should not be taken up with mere\nconviction, but should also regulate the whole moral life of the\nindividual. Diogenes Laertius says that he first gave himself the name\n_\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c2_, instead of _\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03c2_; and men called this modesty, as if he\nthereby expressed, not the possession of wisdom, but only the struggle\ntowards it, as towards an end which cannot be attained.[33] But _\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03cc\u03c2_\nat the same time means a wise man, who is also practical, and that\nnot in his own interest only, for that requires no wisdom, seeing\nthat every sincere and moral man does what is best from his own point\nof view. Thus _\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c2_ signifies more particularly the opposite\nto participation in practical matters, that is in public affairs.\nPhilosophy is thus not the love of wisdom, as of something which one\nsets oneself to acquire; it is no unfulfilled desire. _\u03a6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c2_\nmeans a man whose relation to wisdom is that of making it his object;\nthis relationship is contemplation, and not mere Being; but it must\nbe consciously that men apply themselves to this. The man who likes\nwine (_\u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2_) is certainly to be distinguished from the man who is\nfull of wine, or a drunkard. Then does _\u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2_ signify only a futile\naspiration for wine?\n\nWhat Pythagoras contrived and effected in Italy is told us by later\neulogists, rather than by historians. In the history of Pythagoras by\nMalchus (this was the Syrian name of Porphyry) many strange things\nare related, and with the Neo-Platonists the contrast between their\ndeep insight and their belief in the miraculous is surprising. For\ninstance, seeing that the later biographers of Pythagoras had already\nrelated a quantity of marvels, they now proceeded to add yet more to\nthese with reference to his appearance in Italy. It appears that they\nwere exerting themselves to place him, as they afterwards did with\nApollonius of Tyana, in opposition to Christ. For the wonders which\nthey tell of him seem partly to be an amplification of those in the\nNew Testament, and in part they are altogether absurd. For instance,\nthey make Pythagoras begin his career in Italy with a miracle. When he\nlanded in the Bay of Tarentum, at Crotona, he encountered fishermen on\nthe way to the town who had caught nothing. He called upon them to draw\ntheir nets once more, and foretold the number of fishes that would be\nfound in them. The fishermen, marvelling at this prophecy, promised\nhim that if it came true they would do whatever he desired. It came to\npass as he said, and Pythagoras then desired them to throw the fishes\nalive back into the sea, for the Pythagoreans ate no flesh. And it is\nfurther related as a miracle which then took place, that none of the\nfishes whilst they were out of the water died during the counting. This\nis the kind of miracle that is recorded, and the stories with which\nhis biographers fill his life are of the same silly nature. They then\nmake him effect such a general impression upon the mind of Italy, that\nall the towns reformed upon their luxurious and depraved customs, and\nthe tyrants partly gave up their powers voluntarily, and partly they\nwere driven out. They thereby, however, commit such historical errors\nas to make Charondas and Zaleucus, who lived long before Pythagoras,\nhis disciples; and similarly to ascribe the expulsion and death of the\ntyrant Phalaris to him, and to his action.[34]\n\nApart from these fables, there remains as an historic fact, the great\nwork which he accomplished, and this he did chiefly by establishing\na school, and by the great influence of his order upon the principal\npart of the Greco-Italian states, or rather by means of the rule\nwhich was exercised in these states through this order, which lasted\nfor a very long period of time. It is related of him that he was a\nvery handsome man, and of a majestic appearance, which captivated as\nmuch as it commanded respect. With this natural dignity, nobility of\nmanners, and the calm propriety of his demeanour, he united external\npeculiarities, through which he seemed a remarkable and mysterious\nbeing. He wore a white linen garment, and refrained from partaking of\ncertain foods.[35] Particular personality, as also the externalities of\ndress and the like, are no longer of importance; men let themselves be\nguided by general custom and fashion, since it is a matter outside of\nand indifferent to them not to have their own will here; for we hand\nover the contingent to the contingent, and only follow the external\nrationality that consists in identity and universality. To this outward\npersonality there was added great eloquence and profound perception;\nnot only did he undertake to impart this to his individual friends, but\nhe proceeded to bring a general influence to bear on public culture,\nboth in regard to understanding and to the whole manner of life and\nmorals. He not merely instructed his friends, but associated them in a\nparticular life in order to constitute them into persons and make them\nskilful in business and eminent in morals. The Institute of Pythagoras\ngrew into a league, which included all men and all life in its embrace;\nfor it was an elaborately fashioned piece of work, and excellently\nplastic in design.\n\nOf the regulations of Pythagoras\u2019 league, we have descriptions from\nhis successors, more especially from the Neo-Platonists, who are\nparticularly diffuse as regards its laws. The league had, on the\nwhole, the character of a voluntary priesthood, or a monastic order\nof modern times. Whoever wished to be received was proved in respect\nof his education and obedience, and information was collected about\nhis conduct, inclinations, and occupations. The members were subject\nto a special training, in which a difference was made amongst those\nreceived, in that some were exoteric and some esoteric. These last were\ninitiated into the highest branches of science, and since political\noperations were not excluded from the order, they were also engaged\nin active politics; the former had to go through a novitiate of five\nyears. Each member must have surrendered his means to the order, but he\nreceived them again on retiring, and in the probationary period silence\nwas enjoined (_\u1f10\u03c7\u03b5\u03bc\u03c5\u03b8\u03af\u03b1_).[36]\n\nThis obligation to cease from idle talk may be called an essential\ncondition for all culture and learning; with it men must begin if\nthey wish to comprehend the thoughts of others and relinquish their\nown ideas. We are in the habit of saying that the understanding is\ncultivated through questioning, objecting and replying, &c., but, in\nfact, it is not thus formed, but made from without. What is inward\nin man is by culture got at and developed; hence though he remains\nsilent, he is none the poorer in thought or denser of mind. He rather\nacquires thereby the power of apprehension, and comes to know that his\nideas and objections are valueless; and as he learns that such ideas\nare valueless, he ceases to have them. Now the fact that in Pythagoras\nthere is a separation between those in the course of preparation and\nthose initiated, as also that silence is particularly enjoined, seems\nmost certainly to indicate that in his brotherhood both were formal\nelements and not merely as present in the nature of things, as might\noccur spontaneously in the individual without any special law or the\napplication of any particular consideration. But here it is important\nto remark that Pythagoras may be regarded as the first instructor\nin Greece who introduced the teachings of science; neither Thales,\nwho was earlier than he, nor his contemporary Anaximander taught\nscientifically, but only imparted their ideas to their friends. There\nwere, generally speaking, no sciences at that time; there was neither a\nscience of philosophy, mathematics, jurisprudence or anything else, but\nmerely isolated propositions and facts respecting these subjects. What\nwas taught was the use of arms, theorems, music, the singing of Homer\u2019s\nor Hesiod\u2019s songs, tripod chants, &c., or other arts. This teaching\nis accomplished in quite another way. Now if we said that Pythagoras\nhad introduced the teaching of science amongst a people who, though\nlike the Greeks, untaught therein, were not stupid but most lively,\ncultured and loquacious, the external conditions of such teaching might\nin so far be given as follows:\u2014(_\u03b1_) He would distinguish amongst\nthose who as yet had no idea of the process of learning a science, so\nthat those who first began should be excluded from that which was to\nbe imparted to those further on; and (_\u03b2_) he would make them leave\nthe unscientific mode of speaking of such matters, or their idle\nprattle, alone, and for the first time study science. But the fact\nthat this action both appeared to be formal and likewise required to\nbe made such, was, on account of its unwonted character, a necessary\none, just because the followers of Pythagoras were not only numerous,\nnecessitating a definite form and order, but also, generally speaking,\nthey lived continually together. Thus a particular form was natural to\nPythagoras, because it was the very first time that a teacher in Greece\narrived at a totality, or a new principle, through the cultivation of\nthe intelligence, mind and will. This common life had not only the\neducational side and that founded on the exercise of physical ingenuity\nor skill, but included also that of the moral culture of practical men.\nBut even now everything relating to morality appears and is or becomes\naltogether formal, or rather this is so in as far as it is consciously\nthought of as in this relation, for to be formal is to be universal,\nthat which is opposed to the individual. It appears so particularly\nto him who compares the universal and the individual and consciously\nreflects over both, but this difference disappears for those living\ntherein, to whom it is ordinary habit.\n\nFinally, we have sufficient and full accounts of the outward forms\nobserved by the Pythagoreans in their common life and also of their\ndiscipline. For much of this, however, we are indebted to the\nimpressions of later writers. In the league, a life regulated in\nall respects was advocated. First of all, it is told us, that the\nmembers made themselves known by a similar dress\u2014the white linen of\nPythagoras. They had a very strict order for each day, of which each\nhour had its work. The morning, directly after rising, was set aside\nfor recalling to memory the history of the previous day, because what\nis to be done in the day depends chiefly on the previous day; similarly\nthe most constant self-examination was made the duty of the evening\nin order to find whether the deeds done in the day were right or\nwrong. True culture is not the vanity of directing so much attention to\noneself and occupying oneself with oneself as an individual, but the\nself-oblivion that absorbs oneself in the matter in hand and in the\nuniversal; it is this consideration of the thing in hand that is alone\nessential, while that dangerous, useless, anxious state does away with\nfreedom. They had also to learn by heart from Homer and from Hesiod;\nand all through the day they occupied themselves much with music\u2014one\nof the principal parts of Greek education and culture.[37] Gymnastic\nexercises in wrestling, racing, throwing, and so on, were with them\nalso enforced by rule. They dined together, and here, too, they had\npeculiar customs, but of these the accounts are different. Honey and\nbread were made their principal food, and water the principal, and\nindeed only, drink; they must thus have entirely refrained from eating\nmeat as being associated with metempsychosis. A distinction was also\nmade regarding vegetables\u2014beans, for example, being forbidden. On\naccount of this respect for beans, they were much derided, yet in the\nsubsequent destruction of the political league, several Pythagoreans,\nbeing pursued, preferred to die than to damage a field of beans.[38]\n\nThe order, the moral discipline which characterized them, the common\nintercourse of men, did not, however, endure long; for even in\nPythagoras\u2019 life-time the affairs of his league must have become\ninvolved, since he found enemies who forcibly overthrew him. He drew\ndown upon him, it is said, the envy of others, and was accused of\nthinking differently from what he seemed to indicate, and thus of\nhaving an _arri\u00e8re pens\u00e9e_. The real fact of the case was that the\nindividual belonged, not entirely to his town, but also to another.\nIn this catastrophe, Pythagoras himself, according to Tennemann (Vol.\nI. p. 414), met his death in the 69th Olympiad (504, B.C.) in a\nrising of the people against these aristocrats; but it is uncertain\nwhether it happened in Crotona or in Metapontum, or in a war between\nthe Syracusans and the Agrigentines. There is also much difference of\nopinion about the age of Pythagoras, for it is given sometimes as 80,\nand sometimes as 104.[39] For the rest, the unity of the Pythagorean\nschool, the friendship of the members, and the connecting bond of\nculture have even in later times remained, but not in the formal\ncharacter of a league, because what is external must pass away. The\nhistory of Magna Gr\u00e6cia is in general little known, but even in\nPlato\u2019s[40] time we find Pythagoreans appearing at the head of states\nor as a political power.\n\nThe Pythagorean brotherhood had no relation with Greek public and\nreligious life, and therefore could not endure for long: in Egypt and\nin Asia exclusiveness and priestly influence have their home, but\nGreece, in its freedom, could not let the Eastern separation of caste\nexist. Freedom here is the principle of civic life, but still it is\nnot yet determined as principle in the relations of public and private\nlaw. With us the individual is free since all are alike before the law;\ndiversity in customs, in political relations and opinions may thus\nexist, and must indeed so do in organic states. In democratic Greece,\non the contrary, manners, the external mode of life, necessarily\npreserved a certain similarity, and the stamp of similarity remained\nimpressed on these wider spheres; for the exceptional condition of the\nPythagoreans, who could not take their part as free citizens, but were\ndependent on the plans and ends of a combination and led an exclusive\nreligious life, there was no place in Greece. The preservation of the\nmysteries certainly belonged to the Eumolpid\u00e6, and other special forms\nof worship to other particular families, but they were not regarded\nin a political sense as of fixed and definite castes, but as priests\nusually are, politicians, citizens, men like their fellows; nor, as\nwith the Christians, was the separation of religious persons driven to\nthe extreme of monastic rule. In ordinary civic life in Greece, no one\ncould prosper or maintain his position who held peculiar principles,\nor even secrets, and differed in outward modes of life and clothing;\nfor what evidently united and distinguished them was their community\nof principles and life\u2014whether anything was good for the commonwealth\nor not, was by them publicly and openly discussed. The Greeks are\nabove having particular clothing, maintaining special customs of\nwashing, rising, practising music, and distinguishing between pure and\nimpure foods. This, they say, is partly the affair of the particular\nindividual and of his personal freedom, and has no common end in view,\nand partly it is a general custom and usage for everybody alike.\n\nWhat is most important to us is the Pythagorean philosophy\u2014not\nthe philosophy of Pythagoras so much as that of the Pythagoreans,\nas Aristotle and Sextus express it. The two must certainly be\ndistinguished, and from comparing what is given out as Pythagorean\ndoctrine, many anomalies and discrepancies become evident, as we shall\nsee. Plato bears the blame of having destroyed Pythagorean philosophy\nthrough absorbing what is Pythagorean in it into his own. But the\nPythagorean philosophy itself developed to a point which left it\nquite other than what at first it was. We hear of many followers of\nPythagoras in history who have arrived at this or that conclusion,\nsuch as Alcm\u00e6on and Philolaus; and we see in many cases the simple\nundeveloped form contrasted with the further stages of development in\nwhich thought comes forth in definiteness and power. We need, however,\ngo no further into the historical side of the distinction, for we\ncan only consider the Pythagorean philosophy generally; similarly\nwe must separate what is known to belong to the Neo-Platonists and\nNeo-Pythagoreans, and for this end we have sources to draw from which\nare earlier than this period, namely the express statements found in\nAristotle and Sextus.\n\nThe Pythagorean philosophy forms the transition from realistic to\nintellectual philosophy. The Ionic school said that essence or\nprinciple is a definite material. The next conclusion is (_\u03b1_)\nthat the absolute is not grasped in natural form, but as a thought\ndetermination. (_\u03b2_) Then it follows that determinations must\nbe posited while the beginning was altogether undetermined. The\nPythagorean philosophy has done both.\n\n1. _The System of Numbers_. Thus the original and simple proposition\nof the Pythagorean philosophy is, according to Aristotle (Metaph. I.\n5), \u201cthat number is the reality of things, and the constitution of the\nwhole universe in its determinations is an harmonious system of numbers\nand of their relations.\u201d In what sense is this statement to be taken?\nThe fundamental determination of number is its being a measure; if we\nsay that everything is quantitatively or qualitatively determined,\nthe size and measure is only one aspect or characteristic which is\npresent in everything, but the meaning here is that number itself is\nthe essence and the substance of things, and not alone their form.\nWhat first strikes us as surprising is the boldness of such language,\nwhich at once sets aside everything which to the ordinary idea is real\nand true, doing away with sensuous existence and making it to be the\ncreation of thought. Existence is expressed as something which is not\nsensuous, and thus what to the senses and to old ideas is altogether\nforeign, is raised into and expressed as substance and as true Being.\nBut at the same time the necessity is shown for making number to be\nlikewise Notion, to manifest it as the activity of its unity with\nBeing, for to us number does not seem to be in immediate unity with the\nNotion.\n\nNow although this principle appears to us to be fanciful and wild, we\nfind in it that number is not merely something sensuous, therefore it\nbrings determination with it, universal distinctions and antitheses.\nThe ancients had a very good knowledge of these. Aristotle (Metaph.\nI. 6) says of Plato: \u201cHe maintained that the mathematical elements in\nthings are found outside of what is merely sensuous, and of ideas,\nbeing between both; it differs from what is sensuous in that it\nis eternal and unchangeable, and from ideas, in that it possesses\nmultiplicity, and hence each can resemble and be similar to another,\nwhile each idea is for itself one alone.\u201d That is, number can be\nrepeated; thus it is not sensuous, and still not yet thought. In\nthe life of Pythagoras, this is further said by Malchus (46, 47):\n\u201cPythagoras propounded philosophy in this wise in order to loose\nthought from its fetters. Without thought nothing true can be discerned\nor known; thought hears and sees everything in itself, the rest is lame\nand blind. To obtain his end, Pythagoras makes use of mathematics,\nsince this stands midway between what is sensuous and thought, as a\nkind of preliminary to what is in and for itself.\u201d Malchus quotes\nfurther (48, 53) a passage from an early writer, Moderatus: \u201cBecause\nthe Pythagoreans could not clearly express the absolute and the first\nprinciples through thought, they made use of numbers, of mathematics,\nbecause in this form determinations could be easily expressed.\u201d For\ninstance, similarity could be expressed as one, dissimilarity as two.\n\u201cThis mode of teaching through the use of numbers, whilst it was the\nfirst philosophy, is superseded on account of its mysterious nature.\nPlato, Speusippus, Aristotle, &c., have stolen the fruits of their work\nfrom the Pythagoreans by making a simple use of their principle.\u201d In\nthis passage a perfect knowledge of numbers is evident.\n\nThe enigmatic character of the determination through number is what\nmost engages our attention. The numbers of arithmetic answers to\nthought-determinations, for number has the \u201cone\u201d as element and\nprinciple; the one, however, is a category of being-for-self, and\nthus of identity with self, in that it excludes all else and is\nindifferent to what is \u201cother.\u201d The further determinations of number\nare only further combinations and repetitions of the one, which all\nthrough remains fixed and external; number, thus, is the most utterly\ndead, notionless continuity possible; it is an entirely external and\nmechanical process, which is without necessity. Hence number is not\nimmediate Notion, but only a beginning of thought, and a beginning in\nthe worst possible way; it is the Notion in its extremest externality,\nin quantitative form, and in that of indifferent distinction. In so\nfar, the one has within itself both the principle of thought and\nthat of materiality, or the determination of the sensuous. In order\nthat anything should have the form of Notion, it must immediately in\nitself, as determined, relate itself to its opposite, just as positive\nis related to negative; and in this simple movement of the Notion we\nfind the ideality of differences and negation of independence to be\nthe chief determination. On the other hand, in the number three, for\ninstance, there are always three units, of which each is independent;\nand this is what constitutes both their defect and their enigmatic\ncharacter. For since the essence of the Notion is innate, numbers are\nthe most worthless instruments for expressing Notion-determinations.\n\nNow the Pythagoreans did not accept numbers in this indifferent way,\nbut as Notion. \u201cAt least they say that phenomena must be composed of\nsimple elements, and it would be contrary to the nature of things if\nthe principle of the universe pertained to sensuous phenomena. The\nelements and principles are thus not only intangible and invisible, but\naltogether incorporeal.\u201d[41] But how they have come to make numbers\nthe original principle or the absolute Notion, is better shown from\nwhat Aristotle says in his Metaphysics (I. 5), although he is shorter\nthan he would have been, because he alleges that elsewhere (infra., p.\n214) he has spoken of it. \u201cIn numbers they thought that they perceived\nmuch greater similitude to what is and what takes place than in fire,\nwater, or earth; since a certain property of numbers (_\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\u03b4\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2_)\nis justice, so is it with (_\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\u03b4\u1f76_) the soul and understanding;\nanother property is opportunity, and so on. Since they further saw the\nconditions and relations of what is harmonious present in numbers, and\nsince numbers are at the basis of all natural things, they considered\nnumbers to be the elements of everything, and the whole heavens to\nbe a harmony and number.\u201d In the Pythagoreans we see the necessity\nfor one enduring universal idea as a thought-determination. Aristotle\n(Met. XII. 4), speaking of ideas, says: \u201cAccording to Heraclitus,\neverything sensuous flows on, and thus there cannot be a science of the\nsensuous; from this conviction the doctrine of ideas sprang. Socrates\nis the first to define the universal through inductive methods; the\nPythagoreans formerly concerned themselves merely with a few matters\nof which they derived the notions from numbers\u2014as, for example, with\nwhat opportuneness, or right, or marriage are.\u201d It is impossible to\ndiscern what interest this in itself can have; the only thing which\nis necessary for us as regards the Pythagoreans, is to recognize any\nindications of the Idea, in which there may be a progressive principle.\n\nThis is the whole of the Pythagorean philosophy taken generally. We now\nhave to come to closer quarters, and to consider the determinations,\nor universal significance. In the Pythagorean system numbers seem\npartly to be themselves allied to categories\u2014that is, to be at\nonce the thought-determinations of unity, of opposition and of the\nunity of these two moments. In part, the Pythagoreans from the\nvery first gave forth universal ideal determinations of numbers as\nprinciples, and recognized, as Aristotle remarks (Metaph. I. 5), as\nthe absolute principles of things, not so much immediate numbers in\ntheir arithmetic differences, as the principles of number, _i.e._ their\nrational differences. The first determination is unity generally, the\nnext duality or opposition. It is most important to trace back the\ninfinitely manifold nature of the forms and determinations of finality\nto their universal thoughts as the most simple principles of all\ndetermination. These are not differences of one thing from another,\nbut universal and essential differences within themselves. Empirical\nobjects distinguish themselves by outward form; this piece of paper\ncan be distinguished from another, shades are different in colour,\nmen are separated by differences of temperament and individuality.\nBut these determinations are not essential differences; they are\ncertainly essential for the definite particularity of the things,\nbut the whole particularity defined is not an existence which is in\nand for itself essential, for it is the universal alone which is the\nself-contained and the substantial. Pythagoras began to seek these\nfirst determinations of unity, multiplicity, opposition, &c. With him\nthey are for the most part numbers; but the Pythagoreans did not remain\ncontent with this, for they gave them the more concrete determinations,\nwhich really belong to their successors. Necessary progression and\nproof are not to be sought for here; comprehension, the development\nof duality out of unity are wanting. Universal determinations are\nonly found and established in a quite dogmatic form, and hence the\ndeterminations are dry, destitute of process or dialectic, and\nstationary.\n\na. The Pythagoreans say that the first simple Notion is unity\n(_\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03ac\u03c2_); not the discrete, multifarious, arithmetic one, but identity\nas continuity and positivity, the entirely universal essence. They\nfurther say, according to Sextus (adv. Math. X. 260, 261): \u201cAll\nnumbers come under the Notion of the one; for duality is one duality\nand triplicity is equally a \u2018one,\u2019 but the number ten is the one chief\nnumber. This moved Pythagoras to assert unity to be the principle of\nthings, because, through partaking of it, each is called one.\u201d That\nis to say, the pure contemplation of the implicit being of a thing\nis the one, the being like self; to all else it is not implicit,\nbut a relationship to what is other. Things, however, are much more\ndetermined than being merely this dry \u201cone.\u201d The Pythagoreans have\nexpressed this remarkable relationship of the entirely abstract one\nto the concrete existence of things through \u201csimulation\u201d (_\u03bc\u03af\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2_).\nThe same difficulty which they here encounter is also found in Plato\u2019s\nIdeas; since they stand over against the concrete as species, the\nrelation of concrete to universal is naturally an important point.\nAristotle (Metaph. I. 6) ascribes the expression \u201cparticipation\u201d\n(_\u03bc\u03ad\u03b8\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03c2_) to Plato, who took it in place of the Pythagorean\nexpression \u201csimulation.\u201d Simulation is a figurative, childish way of\nputting the relationship; participation is undoubtedly more definite.\nBut Aristotle says, with justice, that both are insufficient; that\nPlato has not here arrived at any further development, but has only\nsubstituted another name. \u201cTo say that ideas are prototypes and that\nother things participate in them is empty talk and a poetic metaphor;\nfor what is the active principle that looks upon the ideas?\u201d (Metaph.\nI. 9). Simulation and participation are nothing more than other names\nfor relation; to give names is easy, but it is another thing to\ncomprehend.\n\nb. What comes next is the opposition, the duality (_\u03b4\u03c5\u03ac\u03c2_), the\ndistinction, the particular; such determinations have value even now in\nPhilosophy; Pythagoras merely brought them first to consciousness. Now,\nas this unity relates to multiplicity, or this being-like-self to being\nanother, different applications are possible, and the Pythagoreans\nhave expressed themselves variously as to the forms which this first\nopposition takes.\n\n(_\u03b1_) They said, according to Aristotle (Metaph. I. 5): \u201cThe elements\nof number are the even and the odd; the latter is the finite\u201d (or\nprinciple of limitation) \u201cand the former is the infinite; thus the\nunity proceeds from both and out of this again comes number.\u201d The\nelements of immediate number are not yet themselves numbers: the\nopposition of these elements first appears in arithmetical form rather\nthan as thought. But the one is as yet no number, because as yet it is\nnot quantity; unity and quantity belong to number. Theon of Smyrna[42]\nsays: \u201cAristotle gives, in his writings on the Pythagoreans, the reason\nwhy, in their view, the one partakes of the nature of even and odd;\nthat is, one, posited as even, makes odd; as odd, it makes even. This\nis what it could not do unless it partook of both natures, for which\nreason they also called the one, even-odd\u201d (_\u1f00\u03c1\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd_).\n\n(_\u03b2_) If we follow the absolute Idea in this first mode, the opposition\nwill also be called the undetermined duality (_\u1f00\u03cc\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03c5\u03ac\u03c2_). Sextus\nspeaks more definitely (adv. Math. X. 261, 262) as follows: \u201cUnity,\nthought of in its identity with itself (_\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u0313 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2_), is\nunity; if this adds itself to itself as something different (_\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u0313\n\u1f11\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1_), undetermined duality results, because no one of the\ndetermined or otherwise limited numbers is this duality, but all are\nknown through their participation in it, as has been said of unity.\nThere are, according to this, two principles in things; the first\nunity, through participation in which all number-units are units,\nand also undetermined duality through participation in which all\ndetermined dualities are dualities.\u201d Duality is just as essential a\nmoment in the Notion as is unity. Comparing them with one another, we\nmay either consider the unity to be form and duality matter, or the\nother way; and both appear in different modes. (_\u03b1\u03b1_) Unity, as the\nbeing-like-self, is the formless; but in duality, as the unlike, there\ncomes division or form. (_\u03b2\u03b2_) If, on the other hand, we take form\nas the simple activity of absolute form, the one is what determines;\nand duality as the potentiality of multiplicity, or as multiplicity\nnot posited, is matter. Aristotle (Met. I. 6) says that it is\ncharacteristic of Plato that \u201che makes out of matter many, but with him\nthe form originates only once; whereas out of one matter only one table\nproceeds, whoever brings form to matter, in spite of its unity, makes\nmany tables.\u201d He also ascribes this to Plato, that \u201cinstead of showing\nthe undetermined to be simple (_\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03af\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f11\u03bd\u03cc\u03c2_), he made of\nit a duality\u2014the great and small.\u201d\n\n(_\u03b3_) Further consideration of this opposition, in which Pythagoreans\ndiffer from one another, shows us the imperfect beginning of a table\nof categories which were then brought forward by them, as later on by\nAristotle. Hence the latter was reproached for having borrowed these\nthought-determinations from them; and it certainly was the case that\nthe Pythagoreans first made the opposite to be an essential moment in\nthe absolute. They further determined the abstract and simple Notions,\nalthough it was in an inadequate way, since their table presents a\nmixture of antitheses in the ordinary idea and the Notion, without\nfollowing these up more fully. Aristotle (Met. I. 5) ascribes these\ndeterminations either to Pythagoras himself, or else to Alcm\u00e6on \u201cwho\nflourished in the time of Pythagoras\u2019 old age,\u201d so that \u201ceither Alcm\u00e6on\ntook them from the Pythagoreans or the latter took them from him.\u201d Of\nthese antitheses or co-ordinates to which all things are traced, ten\nare given, for, according to the Pythagoreans, ten is a number of great\nsignificance:\u2014\n\n 1. The finite and the infinite.\n 2. The odd and the even.\n 3. The one and the many.\n 4. The right and the left.\n 5. The male and the female.\n 6. The quiescent and the moving.\n 7. The straight and the crooked.\n 8. Light and darkness.\n 9. Good and evil.\n 10. The square and the parallelogram.\n\nThis is certainly an attempt towards a development of the Idea of\nspeculative philosophy in itself, _i.e._ in Notions; but the attempt\ndoes not seem to have gone further than this simple enumeration.\nIt is very important that at first only a collection of general\nthought-determinations should be made, as was done by Aristotle; but\nwhat we here see with the Pythagoreans is only a rude beginning of the\nfurther determination of antitheses, without order and sense, and very\nsimilar to the Indian enumeration of principles and substances.\n\n(_\u03b4_) We find the further progress of these determinations in Sextus\n(adv. Math. X. 262-277), when he speaks about an exposition of the\nlater Pythagoreans. It is a very good and well considered account of\nthe Pythagorean theories, which has some thought in it. The exposition\nfollows these lines: \u201cThe fact that these two principles are the\nprinciples of the whole, is shown by the Pythagoreans in manifold ways.\u201d\n\n\u05d0. \u201cThere are three methods of thinking things; firstly, in accordance\nwith diversity, secondly, with opposition, and thirdly, according\nto relation. (_\u03b1\u03b1_) What is considered in its mere diversity, is\nconsidered for itself; this is the case with those subjects in which\neach relates only to itself, such as horse, plant, earth, air, water\nand fire. Such matters are thought of as detached and not in relation\nto others.\u201d This is the determination of identity with self or of\nindependence. (_\u03b2\u03b2_) \u201cIn reference to opposition, the one is determined\nas evidently contrasting with the other; we have examples of this in\ngood and evil, right and wrong, sacred and profane, rest and movement,\n&c. (_\u03b3\u03b3_) According to relation (_\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9_), we have the object\nwhich is determined in accordance with its relationship to others,\nsuch as right and left, over and under, double and half. One is only\ncomprehensible from the other; for I cannot tell which is my left\nexcepting by my right.\u201d Each of these relations in its opposition,\nis likewise set up for itself in a position of independence. \u201cThe\ndifference between relationship and opposition is that in opposition\nthe coming into existence of the \u2018one\u2019 is at the expense of the\n\u2018other,\u2019 and conversely. If motion is taken away, rest commences; if\nmotion begins, rest ceases; if health is taken away, sickness begins,\nand conversely. In a condition of relationship, on the contrary, both\ntake their rise, and both similarly cease together; if the right\nis removed, so also is the left; the double goes and the half is\ndestroyed.\u201d What is here taken away is taken not only as regards its\nopposition, but also in its existence. \u201cA second difference is that\nwhat is in opposition has no middle; for example, between sickness and\nhealth, life and death, rest and motion, there is no third. Relativity,\non the contrary, has a middle, for between larger and smaller there\nis the like; and between too large and too small the right size is\nthe medium.\u201d Pure opposition passes through nullity to opposition;\nimmediate extremes, on the other hand, subsist in a third or middle\nstate, but in such a case no longer as opposed. This exposition shows\na certain regard for universal, logical determinations, which now and\nalways have the greatest possible importance, and are moments in all\nconceptions and in everything that is. The nature of these opposites\nis, indeed, not considered here, but it is of importance that they\nshould be brought to consciousness.\n\n\u05d1. \u201cNow since these three represent three different genera, the\nsubjects and the two-fold opposite, there must be a higher genus over\neach of them which takes the first place, since the genus comes before\nits subordinate kinds. If the universal is taken away, so is the kind;\non the other hand, if the kind, not the genus, for the former depends\non the latter, but not the contrary way.\u201d (_\u03b1\u03b1_) \u201cThe Pythagoreans have\ndeclared the one to be the highest genus of what is considered as in\nand for itself\u201d (of subjects in their diversity); this is, properly\nspeaking, nothing more than translating the determinations of the\nNotion into numbers. (_\u03b2\u03b2_) \u201cWhat is in opposition has, they say, as\nits genus the like and the unlike; rest is the like, for it is capable\nof nothing more and nothing less; but movement is the unlike. Thus\nwhat is according to nature is like itself; it is a point which is not\ncapable of being intensified (_\u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03c0\u03af\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2_); what is opposed to it is\nunlike. Health is like, sickness is unlike. (_\u03b3\u03b3_) The genus of that\nwhich is in an indifferent relationship is excess and want, the more\nand the less;\u201d in this we have the quantitative relation just as we\nformerly had the qualitative.\n\n\u05d2. We now come for the first time to the two opposites: \u201cThese three\ngenera of what is for itself, in opposition and in relationship,\nmust now come under\u201d\u2014yet simpler, higher\u2014\u201cgenera,\u201d _i.e._\nthought-determinations. \u201cSimilarity reduces itself to the determination\nof unity.\u201d The genus of the subjects is the very being on its own\naccount. \u201cDissimilarity, however, consists of excess and want, but both\nof these come under undetermined duality;\u201d they are the undetermined\nopposition, opposition generally. \u201cThus from all these relationships\nthe first unity and the undetermined duality proceed;\u201d the Pythagoreans\nsaid that such are found to be the universal modes of things. \u201cFrom\nthese, there first comes the \u2018one\u2019 of numbers and the \u2018two\u2019 of numbers;\nfrom the first unity, the one; from the unity and the undetermined\nduality the two; for twice the one is two. The other numbers take their\norigin in a similar way, for the unity over moves forward, and the\nundetermined duality generates the two.\u201d This transition of qualitative\ninto quantitative opposition is not clear. \u201cHence underlying these\nprinciples, unity is the active principle\u201d or form, \u201cbut the two is\nthe passive matter; and just as they make numbers arise from them, so\ndo they make the system of the world and that which is contained in\nit.\u201d The nature of these determinations is to be found in transition\nand in movement. The deeper significance of this reflection rests in\nthe connection of universal thought-determinations with arithmetic\nnumbers\u2014in subordinating these and making the universal genus first.\n\nBefore I say anything of the further sequence of these numbers, it\nmust be remarked that they, as we see them represented here, are pure\nNotions. (_\u03b1_) The absolute, simple essence divides itself into unity\nand multiplicity, of which the one sublates the other, and at the same\ntime it has its existence in the opposition. (_\u03b2_) The opposition has\nat the same time subsistence, and in this is found the manifold nature\nof equivalent things. (_\u03b3_) The return of absolute essence into itself\nis the negative unity of the individual subject and of the universal\nor positive. This is, in fact, the pure speculative Idea of absolute\nexistence; it is this movement: with Plato the Idea is nothing else.\nThe speculative makes its appearance here as speculative; whoever does\nnot know the speculative, does not believe that in indicating simple\nNotions such as these, absolute essence is expressed. One, many, like,\nunlike, more or less, are trivial, empty, dry moments; that there\nshould be contained in them absolute essence, the riches and the\norganization of the natural, as of the spiritual world, does not seem\npossible to him who, accustomed to ordinary ideas, has not gone back\nfrom sensuous existence into thought. It does not seem to such a one\nthat God is, in a speculative sense, expressed thereby\u2014that what is\nmost sublime can be put in those common words, what is deepest, in\nwhat is so well known, self-evident and open, and what is richest, in\nthe poverty of these abstractions.\n\nIt is at first in opposition to common reality that this idea of\nreality as the manifold of simple essence, has in itself its opposition\nand the subsistence of the same; this essential, simple Notion of\nreality is elevation into thought, but it is not flight from what is\nreal, but the expression of the real itself in its essence. We here\nfind the Reason which expresses its essence; and absolute reality is\nunity immediately in itself. Thus it is pre-eminently in relation\nto this reality that the difficulties of those who do not think\nspeculatively have become so intense. What is its relation to common\nreality? What has taken place is just what happens with the Platonic\nIdeas, which approximate very closely to these numbers, or rather\nto pure Notions. That is to say, the first question is, \u201cNumbers,\nwhere are they? Dispersed through space, dwelling in independence in\nthe heaven of ideas? They are not things immediately in themselves,\nfor a thing, a substance, is something quite other than a number:\na body bears no similarity to it.\u201d To this we may answer that the\nPythagoreans did not signify anything like that which we understand\nby prototypes\u2014as if ideas, as the laws and relations of things,\nwere present in a creative consciousness as thoughts in the divine\nunderstanding, separated from things as are the thoughts of an artist\nfrom his work. Still less did they mean only subjective thoughts in our\nconsciousness, for we use the absolute antithesis as the explanation of\nthe existence of qualities in things, but what determines is the real\nsubstance of what exists, so that each thing is essentially just its\nhaving in it unity, duality, as also their antithesis and connection.\nAristotle (Met. I. 5, 6) puts it clearly thus: \u201cIt is characteristic of\nthe Pythagoreans that they did not maintain the finite and the infinite\nand the One, to be, like fire, earth, &c., different natures or to have\nanother reality than things; for the Infinite and the abstract One\nare to them, the substance of the things of which they are predicated.\nHence too, they said, Number is the essence of all things. Thus they\ndo not separate numbers from things, but consider them to be things\nthemselves. Number to them is the principle and matter of things, as\nalso their qualities and forces;\u201d hence it is thought as substance, or\nthe thing as it is in the reality of thought.\n\nThese abstract determinations then became more concretely determined,\nespecially by the later philosophers, in their speculations regarding\nGod. We may instance Iamblichus, for example, in the work _\u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\n\u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2_, ascribed to him by Porphyry and Nicomachus. Those\nphilosophers sought to raise the character of popular religion, for\nthey inserted such thought-determinations as these into religious\nconceptions. By Monas they understood nothing other than God; they also\ncall it Mind, the Hermaphrodite (which contains both determinations,\nodd as well as even), and likewise substance, reason, chaos (because it\nis undetermined), Tartarus, Jupiter, and Form. They called the duad by\nsimilar names, such as matter, and then the principle of the unlike,\nstrife, that which begets, Isis, &c.\n\nc. The triad (_\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03ac\u03c2_) has now become a most important number,\nseeing that in it the monad has reached reality and perfection. The\nmonad proceeds through the duad, and again brought into unity with\nthis undetermined manifold, it is the triad. Unity and multiplicity\nare present in the triad in the worst possible way\u2014as an external\ncombination; but however abstractly this is understood, the triad\nis still a profound form. The triad then is held to be the first\nperfect form in the universal. Aristotle (De C\u0153lo I. 1) puts this\nvery clearly: \u201cThe corporeal has no dimension outside of the Three;\nhence the Pythagoreans also say that the all and everything is\ndetermined through triplicity,\u201d that is, it has absolute form. \u201cFor\nthe number of the whole has end, middle, and beginning; and this\nis the triad.\u201d Nevertheless there is something superficial in the\nwish to bring everything under it, as is done in the systematization\nof the more modern natural philosophy. \u201cTherefore we, too, taking\nthis determination from nature, make use of it in the worship of the\ngods, so that we believe them to have been properly apostrophized\nonly when we have called upon them three times in prayer. Two we call\nboth, but not all; we speak first of three as all. What is determined\nthrough three is the first totality (_\u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd_); what is in triple form\nis perfectly divided. Some is merely in one, other is only in two,\nbut this is All.\u201d What is perfect, or has reality, is its identity,\nopposition and unity, like number generally; but in triplicity this\nis actual, because it has beginning, middle, and end. Each thing is\nsimple as beginning; it is other or manifold as middle, and its end\nis the return of its other nature into unity or mind; if we take this\ntriplicity from a thing, we negate it and make of it an abstract\nconstruction of thought.\n\nIt is now comprehensible that Christians sought and found the Trinity\nin this threefold nature. It has often been made a superficial reason\nfor objecting to them; sometimes the idea of the Trinity as it was\npresent to the ancients, was considered as above reason, as a secret,\nand hence, too high; sometimes it was deemed too absurd. But from the\none cause or from the other, they did not wish to bring it into closer\nrelation to reason. If there is a meaning in this Trinity, we must try\nto understand it. It would be an anomalous thing if there were nothing\nin what has for two thousand years been the holiest Christian idea; if\nit were too holy to be brought down to the level of reason, or were\nsomething now quite obsolete, so that it would be contrary to good\ntaste and sense to try to find a meaning in it. It is the Notion of the\nTrinity alone of which we can speak, and not of the idea of Father and\nSon, for we am not dealing with these natural relationships.\n\nd. The Four (_\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03ac\u03c2_) is the triad but more developed, and hence with\nthe Pythagoreans it held a high position. That the tetrad should be\nconsidered to be thus complete, reminds one of the four elements, the\nphysical and the chemical, the four continents, &c. In nature four\nis found to be present everywhere, and hence this number is even now\nequally esteemed in natural philosophy. As the square of two, the\nfourfold is the perfection of the two-fold in as far as it\u2014only having\nitself as determination, i.e. being multiplied with itself\u2014returns\ninto identity with itself. But in the triad the tetrad is in so far\ncontained, as that the former is the unity, the other-being, and\nthe union of both these moments, and thus, since the difference, as\nposited, is a double, if we count it, four moments result. To make this\nclearer, the tetrad is comprehended as the _\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03cd\u03c2_, the efficient,\nactive four (from _\u03c4\u03ad\u03c4\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1_ and _\u1f04\u03b3\u03c9_); and afterwards this is by the\nPythagoreans made the most notable number. In the fragments of a poem\nof Empedocles, who originally was a Pythagorean, it is shown in what\nhigh regard this tetraktus, as represented by Pythagoras, was held:\n\n \u201cIf thou dost this,\n It will lead thee in the path of holy piety. I swear it\n By the one who to our spirit has given the Tetraktus,\n Which has in it eternal nature\u2019s source and root.\u201d[43]\n\ne. From this the Pythagoreans proceed to the ten, another form of this\ntetrad. As the four is the perfect form of three, this fourfold, thus\nperfected and developed so that all its moments shall be accepted as\nreal differences, is the number ten (_\u03b4\u03b5\u03ba\u03ac\u03c2_), the real tetrad. Sextus\n(adv. Math. IV. 3; VII. 94, 95) says: \u201cTetraktus means the number\nwhich, comprising within itself the four first numbers, forms the most\nperfect number, that is the number ten; for one and two and three and\nfour make ten. When we come to ten, we again consider it as a unity\nand begin once more from the beginning. The tetraktus, it is said,\nhas the source and root of eternal nature within itself, because it\nis the Logos of the universe, of the spiritual and of the corporeal.\u201d\nIt is an important work of thought to show the moments not merely to\nbe four units, but complete numbers; but the reality in which the\ndeterminations are laid hold of, is here, however, only the external\nand superficial one of number; there is no Notion present although\nthe tetraktus does not mean number so much as idea. One of the later\nphilosophers, Proclus, (in Tim\u00e6um, p. 269) says, in a Pythagorean\nhymn:\u2014\n\n \u201cThe divine number goes on,\u201d...\n \u201cTill from the still unprofaned sanctuary of the Monad\n It reaches to the holy Tetrad, which creates the mother of all that\n is;\n Which received all within itself, or formed the ancient bounds of all,\n Incapable of turning or of wearying; men call it the holy Dekad.\u201d\n\nWhat we find about the progression of the other numbers is more\nindefinite and unsatisfying, and the Notion loses itself in them. Up to\nfive there may certainly be a kind of thought in numbers, but from six\nonwards they are merely arbitrary determinations.\n\n2. _Application of the System to the Universe_. This simple idea and\nthe simple reality contained therein, must now, however, be further\ndeveloped in order to come to reality as it is when put together and\nexpanded. The question now meets us as to how, in this relation, the\nPythagoreans passed from abstract logical determinations to forms which\nindicate the concrete use of numbers. In what pertains to space or\nmusic, determinations of objects formed by the Pythagoreans through\nnumbers, still bear a somewhat closer relation to the thing, but when\nthey enter the region of the concrete in nature and in mind, numbers\nbecome purely formal and empty.\n\na. To show how the Pythagoreans constructed out of numbers the\nsystem of the world, Sextus instances (adv. Math. X. 277-283), space\nrelations, and undoubtedly we have in them to do with such ideal\nprinciples, for numbers are, in fact, perfect determinations of\nabstract space. That is to say, if we begin with the point, the first\nnegation of vacuity, \u201cthe point corresponds to unity; it is indivisible\nand the principle of lines, as the unity is that of numbers. While\nthe point exists as the monad or One, the line expresses the duad or\nTwo, for both become comprehensible through transition; the line is\nthe pure relationship of two points and is without breadth. Surface\nresults from the threefold; but the solid figure or body belongs to\nthe fourfold, and in it there are three dimensions present. Others say\nthat body consists of one point\u201d (_i.e._ its essence is one point),\n\u201cfor the flowing point makes the line, the flowing line, however, makes\nsurface, and this surface makes body. They distinguish themselves from\nthe first mentioned, in that the former make numbers primarily proceed\nfrom the monad and the undetermined duad, and then points and lines,\nplane surfaces and solid figures, from numbers, while they construct\nall from one point.\u201d To the first, distinction is opposition or form\nset forth as duality; the others have form as activity. \u201cThus what is\ncorporeal is formed under the directing influence of numbers, but from\nthem also proceed the definite bodies, water, air, fire, and the whole\nuniverse generally, which they declare to be harmonious. This harmony\nis one which again consists of numeral relations only, which constitute\nthe various concords of the absolute harmony.\u201d\n\nWe must here remark that the progression from the point to actual space\nalso has the signification of occupation of space, for \u201caccording to\ntheir fundamental tenets and teaching,\u201d says Aristotle (Metaph. I. 8),\n\u201cthey speak of sensuously perceptible bodies in nowise differently\nfrom those which are mathematical.\u201d Since lines and surfaces are only\nabstract moments in space, external construction likewise proceeds from\nhere very well. On the other hand, the transition from the occupation\nof space generally to what is determined, to water, earth, &c., is\nquite another thing and is more difficult; or rather the Pythagoreans\nhave not taken this step, for the universe itself has, with them,\nthe speculative, simple form, which is found in the fact of being\nrepresented as a system of number-relations. But with all this, the\nphysical is not yet determined.\n\nb. Another application or exhibition of the essential nature of the\ndetermination of numbers is to be found in the relations of music,\nand it is more especially in their case that number constitutes\nthe determining factor. The differences here show themselves as\nvarious relations of numbers, and this mode of determining what is\nmusical is the only one. The relation borne by tones to one another\nis founded on quantitative differences whereby harmonies may be\nformed, in distinction to others by which discords are constituted.\nThe Pythagoreans, according to Porphyry (De vita Pyth. 30), treated\nmusic as something soul-instructing and scholastic [Psychagogisches\nund P\u00e4dagogisches]. Pythagoras was the first to discern that musical\nrelations, these audible differences, are mathematically determinable,\nthat what we hear as consonance and dissonance is a mathematical\narrangement. The subjective, and, in the case of hearing, simple\nfeeling which, however, exists inherently in relation, Pythagoras has\njustified to the understanding, and he attained his object by means\nof fixed determinations. For to him the discovery of the fundamental\ntones of harmony are ascribed, and these rest on the most simple\nnumber-relations. Iamblichus (De vita Pyth. XXVI. 115) says that\nPythagoras, in passing by the workshop of a smith, observed the strokes\nthat gave forth a particular chord; he then took into consideration\nthe weight of the hammer giving forth a certain harmony, and from that\ndetermined mathematically the tone as related thereto.[44] And finally\nhe applied the same, and experimented in strings, by which means there\nwere three different relations presented to him\u2014Diapason, Diapente,\nand Diatessaron. It is known that the tone of a string, or, in the wind\ninstrument, of its equivalent, the column of air in a reed, depends on\nthree conditions; on its length, on its thickness, and on the amount\nof tension. Now if we have two strings of equal thickness and length,\na difference in tension brings about a difference in sound. If we want\nto know what tone any string has, we have only to consider its tension,\nand this may be measured by the weight depending from the string,\nby means of which it is extended. Pythagoras here found that if one\nstring were weighted with twelve pounds, and another with six (_\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03c0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2_, 1 : 2) it would produce the musical chord of the octave\n(_\u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u1ff6\u03bd_); the proportion of 8 : 12, or of 2 : 3 (_\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u03b9\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2_)\nwould give the chord of the fifth (_\u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5_); the proportion of 9\n: 12, or 3 : 4 (_\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2_), the fourth (_\u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c3\u03c3\u03ac\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd_).[45]\nA different number of vibrations in like times determines the height\nand depth of the tone, and this number is likewise proportionate to\nthe weight, if thickness and length are equal. In the first case, the\nmore distended string makes as many vibrations again as the other;\nin the second case, it makes three vibrations for the other\u2019s two,\nand so it goes on. Here number is the real factor which determines\nthe difference, for tone, as the vibration of a body, is only a\nquantitatively determined quiver or movement, that is, a determination\nmade through space and time. For there can be no determination for the\ndifference excepting that of number or the amount of vibrations in one\ntime; and hence a determination made through numbers is nowhere more\nin place than here. There certainly are also qualitative differences,\nsuch as those existing between the tones of metals and catgut strings,\nand between the human voice and wind instruments; but the peculiar\nmusical relation borne by the tone of one instrument to another, in\nwhich harmony is to be found, is a relationship of numbers.\n\nFrom this point the Pythagoreans enter into further applications of\nthe theory of music, in which we cannot follow them. The _\u00e0 priori_\nlaw of progression, and the necessity of movement in number-relations,\nis a matter which is entirely dark; minds confused may wander about at\nwill, for everywhere ideas are hinted at, and superficial harmonies\npresent themselves and disappear again. But in all that treats of the\nfurther construction of the universe as a numerical system, we have\nthe whole extent of the confusion and turbidity of thought belonging\nto the later Pythagoreans. We cannot say how much pains they took\nto express philosophic thought in a system of numbers, and also to\nunderstand the expressions given utterance to by others, and to put in\nthem all the meaning possible. When they determined the physical and\nthe moral universe by means of numbers, everything came into indefinite\nand insipid relationships in which the Notion disappeared. In this\nmatter, however, so far as the older Pythagoreans are concerned, we\nare acquainted with the main principles only. Plato exemplifies to us\nthe conception of the universe as a system of numbers, but Cicero and\nthe ancients always call these numbers the Platonic, and it does not\nappear that they were ascribed to the Pythagoreans. It was thus later\non that this came to be said; even in Cicero\u2019s time they had become\nproverbially dark, and there is but little after all that is really old.\n\nc. The Pythagoreans further constructed the heavenly bodies of the\nvisible universe by means of numbers, and here we see at once the\nbarrenness and abstraction present in the determination of numbers.\nAristotle says (Met. I. 5), \u201cBecause they defined numbers to be\nthe principles of all nature, they brought under numbers and their\nrelationships all determinations and all sections, both of the heavens\nand of all nature; and where anything did not altogether conform, they\nsought to supply the deficiency in order to bring about a harmony.\nFor instance, as the Ten or dekad appeared to them to be the perfect\nnumber, or that which embraces the whole essence of numbers, they\nsaid that the spheres moving in the heavens must be ten; but as only\nnine of these are visible, they made out a tenth, the Antichthone\n(_\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03c7\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1_).\u201d These nine are, first the milky way, or the fixed\nstars, and after that the seven stars which were then all held to be\nplanets: Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury, the Sun, Moon, and in\nthe last and ninth place, the Earth. The tenth is thus the Antichthone,\nand in regard to this it must remain uncertain whether the Pythagoreans\nconsidered it to be the side of the Earth which is turned away, or as\nquite another body.\n\nAristotle says, in reference to the specially physical character of\nthese spheres (De c\u0153lo II. 13 and 9), \u201cFire was by the Pythagoreans\nplaced in the middle, but the Earth was made a star that moved around\nthis central body in a circle.\u201d This circle is, then, a sphere, which,\nas the most perfect of figures, corresponds to the dekad. We here\nfind a certain similarity to our ideas of the solar system, but the\nPythagoreans did not believe the fire to be the sun. \u201cThey thus,\u201d says\nAristotle, \u201crely, not on sensuous appearance, but on reasons,\u201d just as\nwe form conclusions in accordance with reasons as opposed to sensuous\nappearances; and indeed this comes to us still as the first example of\nthings being in themselves different from what they appear. \u201cThis fire,\nthat which is in the centre, they called Jupiter\u2019s place of watch.\nNow these ten spheres make, like all that is in motion, a tone; but\neach makes a different one, according to the difference in its size\nand velocity. This is determined by means of the different distances,\nwhich bear an harmonious relationship to one another, in accordance\nwith musical intervals; by this means an harmonious sound arises in the\nmoving spheres\u201d\u2014a universal chorus.\n\nWe must acknowledge the grandeur of this idea of determining everything\nin the system of the heavenly spheres through number-relations which\nhave a necessary connection amongst themselves, and have to be\nconceived of as thus necessarily related; it is a system of relations\nwhich must also form the basis and essence of what can be heard, or\nmusic. We have, comprehended here in thought, a system of the universe;\nthe solar system is alone rational to us, for the other stars are\ndevoid of interest. To say that there is music in the spheres, and\nthat these movements are tones, may seem just as comprehensible to us\nas to say that the sun is still and the earth moves, although both are\nopposed to the dictates of sense. For, seeing that we do not see the\nmovement, it may be that we do not hear the notes. And there is little\ndifficulty in imagining a universal silence in these vast spheres,\nsince we do not hear the chorus, but it is more difficult to give a\nreason for not hearing this music. The Pythagoreans say, according to\nthe last quoted passage of Aristotle, that we do not hear it because\nwe live in it, like the smith who gets accustomed to the blows of\nhis hammer. Since it belongs to our substance and is identical with\nourselves, nothing else, such as silence, by which we might know\nthe other, comes into relationship with us, for we are conceived of\nas entirely within the movement. But the movement does not become a\ntone, in the first place, because pure space and time, the elements in\nmovement, can only raise themselves into a proper voice, unstimulated\nfrom without, in an animate body, and movement first reaches this\ndefinite, characteristic individuality in the animal proper; and, in\nthe next place, because the heavenly bodies are not related to one\nanother as bodies whose sound requires for its production, contact,\nfriction, or shock, in response to which, and as the negation of its\nparticularity its own momentary individuality resounds in elasticity;\nfor heavenly bodies are independent of one another, and have only a\ngeneral, non-individual, free motion.\n\nWe may thus set aside sound; the music of the spheres is indeed a\nwonderful conception, but it is devoid of any real interest for us.\nIf we retain the conception that motion, as measure, is a necessarily\nconnected system of numbers, as the only rational part of the theory,\nwe must maintain that nothing further has transpired to the present\nday. In a certain way, indeed, we have made an advance upon Pythagoras.\nWe have learned from Kepler about laws, about eccentricity, and the\nrelation of distances to the times of revolution, but no amount of\nmathematics has as yet been able to give us the laws of progression\nin the harmony through which the distances are determined. We know\nempirical numbers well enough, but everything has the semblance of\naccident and not of necessity. We are acquainted with an approximate\nrule of distances, and thus have correctly foretold the existence\nof planets where Ceres, Vesta, Pallas, &c., were afterwards\ndiscovered\u2014that is, between Mars and Jupiter. But astronomy has not as\nyet found in it a consistent sequence in which there is rationality;\non the other hand, it even looks with disdain on the appearance of\nregularity presented by this sequence, which is, however, on its own\naccount, a most important matter, and one which should not be forgotten.\n\nd. The Pythagoreans also applied their principle to the Soul, and\nthus determined what is spiritual as number. Aristotle (De anim. I.\n2) goes on to tell that they thought that solar corpuscles are soul,\nothers, that it is what moves them; they adopted this idea because\nthe corpuscles are ever moving, even in perfect stillness, and hence\nthey must have motion of their own. This does not signify much, but\nit is evident from it that the determination of self-movement was\nsought for in the soul. The Pythagoreans made a further application\nof number-conceptions to the soul after another form, which Aristotle\ndescribes in the same place as follows:\u2014\u201cThought is the one, knowledge\nor science is the two, for it comes alone out of the one. The number\nof the plane is popular idea, opinion; the number of the corporeal\nis sensuous feeling. Everything is judged of either by thought, or\nscience, or opinion, or feeling.\u201d In these ideas, which we must,\nhowever, ascribe to later Pythagoreans, we may undoubtedly find some\nadequacy, for while thought is pure universality, knowledge deals with\nsomething \u201cother,\u201d since it gives itself a determination and a content;\nbut feeling is the most developed in its determinateness. \u201cNow because\nthe soul moves itself, it is the self-moving number,\u201d yet we never find\nit said that it is connected with the monad.\n\nThis is a simple relationship to number-determinations. Aristotle\ninstances (De anim. I. 3) one more intricate from Tim\u00e6us: \u201cThe soul\nmoves itself, and hence also the body because it is bound up with body;\nit consists of elements and is divided according to harmonic numbers,\nand hence it has feeling and an immediately indwelling (_\u03c3\u03cd\u03bc\u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd_)\nharmony. In order that the whole may have an harmonious movement,\nTim\u00e6us has bent the straight line of harmony (_\u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u03c5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd_) into a\ncircle, and again divided off from the whole circle two circles,\nwhich are doubly connected; and the one of these circles is again\ndivided into seven circles, so that the movements of the soul may\nresemble those of the heavens.\u201d The more definite significance of these\nideas Aristotle unfortunately has not given; they contain a profound\nknowledge of the harmony of the whole, but yet they are forms which\nthemselves remain dark, because they are clumsy and unsuitable. There\nis always a forcible turning and twisting, a struggle with the material\npart of the representation, as there is in mythical and distorted\nforms: nothing has the pliability of thought but thought itself. It\nis remarkable that the Pythagoreans have grasped the soul as a system\nwhich is a counterpart of the system of the heavens. In Plato\u2019s Tim\u00e6us\nthis same idea is more definitely brought forward. Plato also gives\nfurther number-relations, but not their significance as well; even to\nthe present day no one has been able to make any particular sense out\nof them. An arrangement of numbers such as this is easy, but to give to\nit a real significance is difficult, and, when done, it always must be\narbitrary.\n\nThere is still something worthy of attention in what is said by the\nPythagoreans in reference to the soul, and this is their doctrine\nof the transmigration of souls. Cicero (Tusc. Qu\u00e6st. I. 16) says:\n\u201cPherecydes, the teacher of Pythagoras, first said that the souls\nof men were immortal.\u201d The doctrine of the transmigration of souls\nextends even to India, and, without doubt, Pythagoras took it from\nthe Egyptians; indeed Herodotus (II. 123) expressly says so. After he\nspeaks of the mythical ideas of the Egyptians as to the lower world,\nhe continues: \u201cThe Egyptians were the first to say that the soul of\nman is immortal, and that, when the body disappears, it goes into\nanother living being; and when it has gone through all the animals of\nland and sea, and likewise birds, it again takes the body of a man,\nthe period being completed in 3000 years.\u201d Diogenes Laertius says in\nthis connection (VIII. 14) that the soul, according to Pythagoras, goes\nthrough a circle. \u201cThese ideas,\u201d proceeds Herodotus, \u201care also found\namongst the Greeks; there are some who, earlier or later, have made\nuse of this particular doctrine, and have spoken of it as if it were\ntheir own; I know their names very well, but I will not mention them.\u201d\nHe undoubtedly meant Pythagoras and his followers. In the sequel,\nmuch that is given utterance to is fictitious: \u201cPythagoras himself\nis said to have stated that his former personality was known to him.\nHermes granted him a knowledge of his circumstances before his birth.\nHe lived as the son of Hermes, \u00c6thalides, and then in the Trojan\nwar as Euphorbus, the son of Panthous, who killed Patroclus, and was\nkilled by Menelaus; in the third place he was Hermotimus; fourthly,\nPyrrhus, a fisherman of Delos; in all he lived 207 years. Euphorbus\u2019\nshield was offered up to Apollo by Menelaus, and Pythagoras went to the\ntemple and, from the mouldering shield, showed the existence of signs,\nhitherto not known of, by which it was recognized.\u201d[46] We shall not\ntreat further of these very various and foolish stories.\n\nAs in the case of the brotherhood copied from the Egyptian priesthood,\nso must we here set aside this oriental and un-Greek idea of the\ntransmigration of souls. Both were too far removed from the Greek\nspirit to have had a place and a development there. With the Greeks,\nthe consciousness of a higher, freer individuality has become too\nstrong to allow any permanence to the idea of metempsychosis, according\nto which, man, this independent and self-sufficing Being, takes the\nform of a beast. They have, indeed, the conception of men as becoming\nsprings of water, trees, animals, &c., but the idea of degradation\nwhich comes as a consequence of sin, lies at its root. Aristotle (De\nanim. I. 3) shortly and in his own manner deals with and annihilates\nthis idea of the Pythagoreans. \u201cThey do not say for what reason soul\ndwells in body, nor how the latter is related to it. For owing to\ntheir unity of nature when one acts the other suffers: one moves and\nthe other is moved, but none of this happens in what is mutually\ncontingent. According to the Pythagorean myths any soul takes to any\nbody, which is much like making architects take to flutes. For crafts\nmust necessarily have tools and soul body; but each tool must have\nits proper form and kind.\u201d It is implied in the transmigration of\nsouls that the organization of the body is something accidental to\nthe human soul; this refutation by Aristotle is complete. The eternal\nidea of metempsychosis had philosophic interest only as the inner\nNotion permeating all these forms, the oriental unity which appears in\neverything; we have not got this signification here, or at best we have\nbut a glimmering of it. If we say that the particular soul is, as a\ndefinite thing, to wander about throughout all, we find firstly, that\nthe soul is not a thing such as Leibnitz\u2019 Monad, which, like a bubble\nin the cup of coffee, is possibly a sentient, thinking soul; in the\nsecond place an empty identity of the soul-thing such as this has no\ninterest in relation to immortality.\n\n3. _Practical Philosophy_. As regards the practical philosophy of\nPythagoras, which is closely connected with what has gone before, there\nis but little that is philosophic known to us. Aristotle (Magn. Moral.\nI. 1) says of him that \u201che first sought to speak of virtue, but not in\nthe right way, for, because he deduced the virtues from numbers, he\ncould not form of them any proper theory.\u201d The Pythagoreans adopted ten\nvirtues as well as ten heavenly spheres. Justice, amongst others, is\ndescribed as the number which is like itself in like manner (_\u1f34\u03c3\u03b1\u03ba\u03b9\u03c2\n\u1f34\u03c3\u03bf\u03c2_); it is an even number, which remains even when multiplied with\nitself. Justice is pre-eminently what remains like itself; but this\nis an altogether abstract determination, which applies to much that\nis, and which does not exhaust the concrete, thus remaining quite\nindeterminate.\n\nUnder the name of the \u201cGolden words,\u201d we have a collection of\nhexameters which are a succession of moral reflections, but which are\nrightly ascribed to later Pythagoreans. They are old, well-known, moral\nmaxims, which are expressed in a simple and dignified way, but which\ndo not contain anything remarkable. They begin with the direction \u201cto\nhonour the immortal gods as they are by law established,\u201d and further,\n\u201cHonour the oath and then the illustrious heroes;\u201d elsewhere they go\non to direct \u201chonour to be paid to parents and to relatives,\u201d &c.[47]\nSuch matter does not deserve to be regarded as philosophy, although it\nis of importance in the process of development.\n\nThe transition from the form of outward morals to morality as existent,\nis more important. As in Thales\u2019 time, law-givers and administrators\nof states were preeminent in possessing a physical philosophy, so we\nsee that with Pythagoras practical philosophy is advocated as the means\nof constituting a moral life. There we have the speculative Idea,\nthe absolute essence, in its reality, and in a definite, sensuous\nexistence; and similarly the moral life is submerged in actuality\nas the universal spirit of a people, and as their laws and rule. In\nPythagoras, on the contrary, we have the reality of absolute essence\nraised, in speculation, out of sensuous reality, and expressed, though\nstill imperfectly, as the essence of thought. Morality is likewise\npartly raised out of actuality as ordinarily known; it is certainly a\nmoral disposition of all actuality, but as a brotherhood, and not as\nthe life of a people. The Pythagorean League is an arbitrary existence\nand not a part of the constitution recognized by public sanction; and\nin his person Pythagoras isolated himself as teacher, as he also did\nhis followers. The universal consciousness, the spirit of a people, is\nthe substance of which the accident is the individual consciousness;\nthe speculative is thus the fact that pure, universal law is absolute,\nindividual consciousness, so that this last, because it draws therefrom\nits growth and nourishment, becomes universal self-consciousness. These\ntwo sides do not, however, come to us in the form of the opposition;\nit is first of all in morality that there is properly this Notion of\nthe absolute individuality of consciousness which does everything on\nits own account. But we see that it was really present to the mind\nof Pythagoras that the substance of morality is the universal, from\nan example in Diogenes Laertius (VIII. 16). \u201cA Pythagorean answered\nto the question of a father who inquired as to the best education he\ncould give his son, that it should be that which would make him the\ncitizen of a well-regulated State.\u201d This answer is great and true; to\nthe great principle of living in the spirit of one\u2019s people, all other\ncircumstances are subordinate. Nowadays men try to keep education free\nfrom the spirit of the times, but they cannot withdraw themselves\nfrom this supreme power, the State, for even if they try to separate\nthemselves, they unconsciously remain beneath this universal. The\nspeculative meaning of the practical philosophy of Pythagoras thus is,\nthat in this signification, the individual consciousness shall obtain\na moral reality in the brotherhood. But as number is a middle thing\nbetween the sensuous and Notion, the Pythagorean brotherhood is a\nmiddle between universal, actual morality and maintaining that in true\nmorality the individual, as an individual, is responsible for his own\nbehaviour; this morality ceases to be universal spirit. If we wish to\nsee practical philosophy reappear, we shall find it; but, on the whole,\nwe shall not see it become really speculative until very recent times.\n\nWe may satisfy ourselves with this as giving us an idea of the\nPythagorean system. I will, however, shortly give the principal\npoints of the criticism which Aristotle (Met. I. 8) makes upon the\nPythagorean number-form. He says justly, in the first place: \u201cIf only\nthe limited and the unlimited, the even and odd are made fundamental\nideas, the Pythagoreans do not explain how movement arises, and how,\nwithout movement and change there can be coming into being and passing\naway, or the conditions and activities of heavenly objects.\u201d This\ndefect is significant; arithmetical numbers are dry forms and barren\nprinciples in which life and movement are deficient. Aristotle says\nsecondly, \u201cFrom number no other corporeal determinations, such as\nweight and lightness, are conceivable;\u201d or number thus cannot pass\ninto what is concrete. \u201cThey say that there is no number outside of\nthose in the heavenly spheres.\u201d For instance, a heavenly sphere and\na virtue, or a natural manifestation in the earth, are determined as\none and the same number. Each of the first numbers may be exhibited\nin each thing or quality; but in so far as number is made to express\na further determination, this quite abstract, quantitative difference\nbecomes altogether formal; it is as if the plant were five because it\nhas five stamens. This is just as superficial as are determination\nthrough elements or through particular portions of the globe; it is a\nmethod as formal as that by which men now try to apply the categories\nof electricity, magnetism, galvanism, compression and expansion, of\nmanly and of womanly, to everything. It is a purely empty system of\ndetermination where reality should be dealt with.\n\nTo Pythagoras and his disciples there are, moreover, many scientific\nconclusions and discoveries ascribed, which, however, do not concern us\nat all. Thus, according to Diogenes Laertius (VIII. 14, 27), he is said\nto have known that the morning and evening star is the same, and that\nthe moon derives her light from the sun. We have already mentioned what\nhe says of music. But what is best known is the Pythagorean Theorem;\nit really is the main proposition in geometry, and cannot be regarded\nlike any other theorem. According to Diogenes, (VIII. 12), Pythagoras,\non discovering the theorem, sacrificed a hecatomb, so important did he\nthink it; and it may indeed seem remarkable that his joy should have\ngone so far as to ordain a great feast to which rich men and all the\npeople were invited. It was worth the trouble; it was a rejoicing, a\nfeast of spiritual cognition\u2014at the cost of the oxen.\n\nOther ideas which are brought forward by the Pythagoreans casually and\nwithout any connection, have no philosophic interest, and need only\nbe mentioned. Aristotle, for instance, says (Phys. IV. 6) that \u201cthe\nPythagoreans believed in an empty space which the heavens inspire, and\nan empty space which separates natural things and brings about the\ndistinction between continuous and discrete; it first exists in numbers\nand makes them to be different.\u201d Diogenes Laertius (VIII. 26-28) says\nmuch more, all of which is dull; this is like the later writers,\nwho, generally speaking, take up what is external and devoid of any\nintellectual meaning. \u201cThe air which encircles the earth is immovable\u201d\n(_\u1f04\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd_, at least through itself) \u201cand diseased, and all that is\nin it is mortal; but what is highest is in continual movement, pure\nand healthy, and in it everything is immortal\u2014divine. Sun, moon and\nthe other stars are gods, for in them warmth has predominance and is\nthe cause of life. Man is related to the gods because he participates\nin warmth, and hence God cares for us. A ray penetrates from the sun\nthrough the thick and cold ether and gives life to everything; they\ncall air, cold ether, the sea and moisture, thick ether. The soul is a\ndetached portion of ether.\u201d\n\n\nC. THE ELEATIC SCHOOL.\n\nThe Pythagorean philosophy has not yet got the speculative form of\nexpression for the Notion. Numbers are not pure Notion, but Notion in\nthe form of ordinary idea or sensuous perception, and hence a mixture\nof both. This expression of absolute essence in what is a pure Notion\nor something thought, and the movement of the Notion or of Thought,\nis that which we find must come next, and this we discover in the\nEleatic school. In it we see thought becoming free for itself; and in\nthat which the Eleatics express as absolute essence, we see Thought\ngrasp itself in purity, and the movement of Thought in Notions. In\nthe physical philosophy we saw movement represented as an objective\nmovement, as an origination and passing away. The Pythagoreans\nsimilarly did not reflect upon these Notions, and also treated their\nessence, Number, as fleeting. But since alteration is now grasped in\nits highest abstraction as Nothing, this objective movement changes\ninto a subjective one, comes over to the side of consciousness, and\nexistence becomes the unmoved. We here find the beginning of dialectic,\n_i.e._ simply the pure movement of thought in Notions; likewise we\nsee the opposition of thought to outward appearance or sensuous\nBeing, or of that which is implicit to the being-for-another of this\nimplicitness, and in the objective existence we see the contradiction\nwhich it has in itself, or dialectic proper. When we reflect in\nanticipation on how the course of pure thought must be formed, we\nfind (_\u03b1_) that pure thought (pure Being, the One) manifests itself\nimmediately in its rigid isolation and self-identity, and everything\nelse as null; (_\u03b2_) that the hitherto timid thought\u2014which after it\nis strengthened, ascribes value to the \u201cother\u201d and constitutes itself\ntherefrom\u2014shows that it then grasps the other in its simplicity and\neven in so doing shows its nullity; (_\u03b3_) finally, Thought manifests\nthe other in the manifold nature of its determinations. We shall see\nthis in the development and culture of the Eleatics in history. These\nEleatic propositions still have interest for Philosophy, and are\nmoments which must necessarily there appear.\n\nXenophanes, Parmenides, Melissus and Zeno are to be reckoned as\nbelonging to this school. Xenophanes may be regarded as the founder\nof it; Parmenides is supposed to have been his pupil, and Melissus,\nand especially Zeno, are called the pupils of Parmenides. In fact,\nthey are to be taken together as forming the Eleatic school; later on\nit lost the name, being then called Sophistic, and its locality was\ntransferred to Greece proper. What Xenophanes began, Parmenides and\nMelissus developed further, and similarly Zeno perfected what these\ntwo taught. Aristotle (Metaph. I. 5) characterizes the first three\nthus: \u201cParmenides seems to comprehend the one as Notion (_\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd_), Melissus as matter (_\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd_); hence the former says\nthat it is limited (_\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd_) and the latter that it is unlimited\n(_\u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd_). But Xenophanes, who was the first of them to express the\ntheory of the One, made the matter no plainer (_\u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03c3\u03b1\u03c6\u03ae\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd_), nor did\nhe deal with either of these aspects (_\u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2_), but looking into the\nheavens\u201d\u2014as we say, into the blue\u2014\u201csaid, God is the One. Xenophanes\nand Melissus are on the whole less civilized (_\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03b3\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9_);\nParmenides, however, is more acute (_\u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03b2\u03bb\u03ad\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd_).\u201d There is less to\nsay of Xenophanes and Melissus, and what has come to us from the latter\nin particular\u2014in fragments and derived from the sayings of others\u2014is\nstill in a state of ferment, and in his case there is least knowledge\nobtainable. On the whole, philosophic utterances and Notions are still\npoor, and it was in Zeno that Philosophy first attained to a purer\nexpression of itself.\n\n\n1. XENOPHANES.\n\nThe period at which he lived is clear enough, and as this suffices,\nit is a matter of indifference that the year of his birth and of his\ndeath is unknown. According to Diogenes Laertius (IX. 18), he was\ncontemporary with Anaximander and Pythagoras. Of his circumstances\nfurther than this, it is only known that he, for reasons which are\nunknown, escaped from his native town, Colophon, in Asia Minor, to\nMagna Gr\u00e6cia, and resided for the most part at Zancle, (now Messina)\nand Catana (still called Catania) in Sicily. I find it nowhere said\nby the ancients that he lived at Elea, although all recent writers on\nthe history of Philosophy repeat it, one after the other. Tennemann,\nin particular, says (Vol. I. pp. 151 and 414), that about the 61st\nOlympiad (536 B.C.), he repaired from Colophon to Elea. Diogenes\nLaertius (IX. 20), however, only says that he flourished about the 60th\nOlympiad and that he made two thousand verses on the colonization of\nElea, from which it might be easily concluded that he was also born\nat Elea. Strabo says this in the beginning of his sixth book\u2014when\ndescribing Elea\u2014of Parmenides and Zeno only, and these he called\nPythagoreans; hence, according to Cicero (Acad. Qu\u00e6st. IV. 42) the\nEleatic school took its name from these two. Xenophanes was nearly a\nhundred years old, and lived to see the Median wars: it is said that he\nbecame so poor that he had not the means of having his children buried,\nand was obliged to do so with his own hands. Some say that he had no\nteacher; others name Archelaus, which is a chronological error.\n\nHe wrote a book \u201cOn Nature,\u201d the general subject and title of\nPhilosophy at that time; some verses have been preserved to us which so\nfar show no powers of reasoning. Professor Brandis of Bonn collected\nthem together, with the fragments of Parmenides and Melissus, under\nthe title \u201cCommentationum Eleaticarum, P. 1,\u201d Alton\u00e6, 1813. The older\nphilosophers wrote in verse, for prose comes much later on; on account\nof the awkward and confused mode of expression in Xenophanes\u2019 poems,\nCicero calls them (Acad. Qu\u00e6st. IV. 23): _minus boni versus_.\n\nAs to his philosophy, Xenophanes in the first place maintained absolute\nexistence to be the one, and likewise called this God. \u201cThe all is\nOne and God is implanted in all things; He is unchangeable, without\nbeginning, middle or end.\u201d[48] In some verses by Xenophanes found in\nClemens of Alexandria (Strom. V. 14, p. 714, ed. Potter), it is said:\n\n \u201cOne God is greatest amongst gods and men.\n Neither like unto mortals in spirit or in form;\u201d\n\nand in Sextus Empiricus (adv. Math. IX. 144):\n\n \u201cHe sees everywhere, thinks everywhere, and hears everywhere,\u201d\n\nto which words Diogenes Laertius (IX, 19) adds: \u201cThought and reason\nare everything and eternal.\u201d By this Xenophanes denied the truth of the\nconceptions of origination and of passing away, of change, movement,\n&c., seeing that they merely belong to sensuous perception. \u201cHe found,\u201d\nsays Tennemann (Vol. I. p. 156) \u201call origination to be inconceivable:\u201d\nthe One as the immediate product of pure thought, is, in its immediacy,\nBeing.\n\nFor us the determination of Being is already known and trivial, but\nif we know about Being, the One, we place this, as a particular\ndetermination, in a line with all the rest. Here, on the contrary, it\nsignifies that all else has no reality and is only a semblance. We\nmust forget our own ideas; we know of God as Spirit. But, because the\nGreeks only had before them the sensuous world, these gods of their\nimagination, and found in them no satisfaction, they rejected all\nas being untrue, and thus came to pure thought. This is a wonderful\nadvance, and thought thus becomes for the first time free for itself in\nthe Eleatic school. Being, the One of the Eleatic school, is just this\nimmersion in the abyss of the abstract identity of the understanding.\nJust as this comes first, so it also comes last, as that to which the\nunderstanding comes back, and this is proved in recent times when God\nis grasped only as the highest Being. If we say of God that this the\nhighest Being is outside of and over us, we can know nothing more of\nit but that it is, and thus it is the undetermined; for if we knew of\ndeterminations, this would be to possess knowledge. The truth then\nsimply is that God is the One, not in the sense that there is one God\n(this is another determination), but only that He is identical with\nHimself; in this there is no other determination, any more than in the\nutterance of the Eleatic school. Modern thought has, indeed, passed\nthrough a longer path, not only through what is sensuous, but also\nthrough philosophic ideas and predicates of God, to this all negating\nabstraction; but the content, the result arrived at is the same.\n\nWith this the dialectic reasoning of the Eleatics is closely connected\nin respect that they have also proved that nothing can originate or\npass away. This deduction is to be found in Aristotle\u2019s work, De\nXenophane, Zenone et Gorgia, c. 3. \u201cIt is impossible, he says,[49] that\nif anything is, it arises (and he even applies this to the Godhead);\nfor it must arise either from the like or from the unlike. But both are\nequally impossible: for it is no more probable that the like should be\nengendered from the like, than that it should engender it, for the like\nmust have determinations identical with one another.\u201d In acknowledging\nsimilarity, the distinction between begetting and begotten falls away.\n\u201cJust as little can unlike arise from unlike, for if from the weaker\nthe stronger takes its rise; or from the smaller, the greater; or from\nthe worse, the better: or if, conversely, the worse proceeds from the\nbetter, non-being would result from Being: this is impossible, and thus\nGod is eternal.\u201d The same thing has been expressed as Pantheism or\nSpinozaism, which rests on the proposition _ex nihilo fit nihil_. The\nunity of God is further proved by Xenophanes: \u201cIf God is the mightiest,\nHe must be One; for were He two or more, He would not have dominion\nover the others, but, not having dominion over the others, He could not\nbe God. Thus were there several, they would be relatively more powerful\nor weaker, and thus they would not be gods, for God\u2019s nature is to have\nnothing mightier than He. Were they equal, God would no longer possess\nthe quality of being the mightiest, for the like is neither worse nor\nbetter than the like\u201d\u2014or it does not differ therefrom. \u201cHence if\nGod is, and is such as this, He is only one; He could not, were there\nseveral, do what He willed. Since He is one, He is everywhere alike.\nHe hears, sees and has also the other senses everywhere, for were this\nnot the case, the parts of God would be one more powerful than the\nother, which is impossible. Since God is everywhere alike, He has a\nspherical form, for He is not here thus and elsewhere different, but is\neverywhere the same. Since He is eternal and one and spherical in form,\nHe is neither unlimited nor limited. To be unlimited is non-being;\nfor that has neither middle, beginning, end, nor part; and what is\nunlimited corresponds to this description. But whatever non-being is,\nBeing is not. Mutual limitation would take place if there were several,\nbut since there is only One, it is not limited. The one does not move\nitself, nor is it unmoved; to be unmoved is non-being, for to it none\nother comes, nor does it go into another; but to be moved must mean to\nbe several, for one must move into another. Thus the One neither rests\nnor is it moved, for it is neither non-being nor is it many. In all\nthis God is thus indicated; He is eternal and One, like Himself and\nspherical, neither unlimited nor limited, neither at rest nor moved.\u201d\nFrom this result, that nothing can arise from the like or from the\nunlike, Aristotle (De Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia c. 4) draws this\nconclusion: \u201cthat either there is nothing excepting God, or all else is\neternal.\u201d\n\nWe here see a dialectic which may be called metaphysical reasoning, in\nwhich the principle of identity is fundamental. \u201cThe nothing is like\nnothing and does not pass into Being or conversely; thus nothing can\noriginate from like.\u201d This, the oldest mode of argument, holds its\nplace even to the present day, as, for example, in the so-called proof\nof the unity of God. This proceeding consists of making presuppositions\nsuch as the power of God, and from them drawing conclusions and denying\nthe existence of predicates; that is the usual course in our mode of\nreasoning. In respect of determinations, it must be remarked that\nthey, as being negative, are all kept apart from the positive and\nmerely real being. We reach this abstraction by a more ordinary way,\nand do not require a dialectic such as that of the Eleatic school: we\nsay God is unchangeable, change concerns finite things alone (which\nwe represent as an empirical proposition); on the one hand we thus\nhave finite things and change, and on the other, unchangeableness in\nthis abstract absolute unity with itself. It is the same separation,\nonly that we also allow the finite to be Being, which the Eleatics\ndeny. Or else we too proceed from finite things to kinds and genera,\nleaving the negative out bit by bit; and the highest order of all is\nGod, who, as the highest Being, is affirmative only, but devoid of any\ndetermination. Or we pass from what is finite to the infinite, for we\nsay that the finite as limited must have its basis in the infinite.\nIn all these different forms which are quite familiar to us, there is\nthe same difficult question which exists in reference to the Eleatic\nthought. Whence comes determination and how is it to be grasped\u2014how\nis it in the one, leaving the finite aside, and also how does the\ninfinite pass out into the finite? The Eleatics in their reflections\nwere distinguished from this our ordinary reflecting thought, in that\nthey went speculatively to work (the speculative element being that\nchange does not exist at all) and that they thus showed that, as Being\nwas presupposed, change in itself is contradictory and inconceivable.\nFor from the one, from Being, the determination of the negative, of\nthe manifold, is withdrawn. Thus while we, in our conception, allow\nthe actuality of the finite world, the Eleatics are more consistent,\nin that they proceeded to say that only the One exists and that the\nnegative does not exist at all;\u2014a consequence which, if it necessarily\narouses in us surprise, still none the less remains a great abstraction.\n\nSceptics saw in this the point of view of the uncertainty of all\nthings, and Sextus several times[50] quotes verses such as these:\u2014\n\n \u201cNo man at any time knew clearly and truly; nor will he ever know\n What of the gods I say, as also of the universe.\n For what he thinks to speak most perfectly\n He knows that not at all; his own opinions cleave to all.\u201d\n\nSextus, generalizing, explains this in the first passage thus: \u201cLet us\nimagine that in a house in which are many valuables, there were those\nwho sought for gold by night; in such a case everyone would think that\nhe had found the gold, but would not know certainly whether he actually\nhad found it. Thus philosophers come into this world as into a great\nhouse to seek the truth, but were they to reach it, they could not tell\nwhether they really had attained to it.\u201d The indefinite expressions\nof Xenophanes might also merely mean that none knows that which he\n(Xenophanes) here makes known. In the second passage Sextus puts it\nthus: \u201cXenophanes does not make all knowledge void, but only the\nscientific and infallible; opinionative knowledge is, however, left. He\nexpresses this in saying that opinion cleaves to all. So that with him\nthe criterion is made to be opinion, i.e. the apparent, and not that\nwhich is firm and sure; Parmenides, on the contrary, condemns opinion.\u201d\nBut from his doctrine of the One, there follows the annihilation of\nordinary ideas, which is what he did in the foregoing dialectic; it\nis evident, however, that nobody could know the truth which he hereby\nutters. If a thought such as this passed through one\u2019s head, one could\nnot tell that it was true, and in such a case it would only be an\nopinion.\n\nWe here find in Xenophanes a double consciousness; a pure consciousness\nand consciousness of Being, and a consciousness of opinion. The former\nwas to him the consciousness of the divine, and it is the pure\ndialectic, which is negatively related to all that is determined and\nwhich annuls it. The manner in which he expresses himself towards the\nsensuous world and finite thought-determinations is seen most clearly\nin his allusions to the Greek mythological conceptions of the gods. He\nsays, amongst other things, according to Brandis (Comment. Eleat. P. I.\np. 68):\u2014\n\n \u201cDid beasts and lions only have hands,\n Works of art thereby to bring forth, as do men,\n They would, in creating divine forms, give to them\n What in image and size belongs to themselves.\u201d\n\nHe also animadverts on the ideas of the gods held by Homer and Hesiod\nin verses which Sextus (adv. Math. IX. 193) has preserved to us:\u2014\n\n \u201cHesiod and Homer have attached to the gods\n All that which brings shame and censure to men;\n Stealing, adultery, and mutual deceit.\u201d\n\nAs, on the one hand, he defined absolute Being to be simple, making\nthat which is, however, break through and be immediately present in\nit, on the other hand he philosophizes on appearances; in reference to\nthis certain fragments only are transmitted to us, and such physical\nopinions as these can have no great interest. They are meant to have no\nspeculative significance any more than are those of our own physicists.\nWhen he says in this connection\n\n \u201cOut of the earth comes all, and returns to it again,\n We all have come from earth and water alike,\n Thus all that grows and takes its rise is only earth and water,\u201d[51]\n\nthis does not signify existence, physical principles, as did the water\nof Thales. For Aristotle expressly says, that no one regarded the earth\nas the absolute principle.\n\n\n2. PARMINIDES.\n\nParmenides is a striking figure in the Eleatic school, and he arrives\nat more definite conceptions than does Xenophanes. He was, according\nto Diogenes (IX. 21), born at Elea of a rich and honourable race. Of\nhis life, however, little is known; Aristotle only says (Met. I. 5)\nfrom tradition that he was a scholar of Xenophanes. Sextus Empiricus\n(adv. Math. VII. 111) calls him a friend (_\u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03c1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2_) of Xenophanes.\nDiogenes Laertius further states: \u201cHe heard Anaximander and Xenophanes\nalso, but did not follow the latter\u201d (which seems only to refer to\nhis place of abode), \u201cbut he lived with Aminias and Diochartes the\nPythagorean, attached himself to the latter, and by the former, and\nnot by Xenophanes, was prevailed upon to lead a quiet life.\u201d That the\nperiod in which his life falls comes between Xenophanes and Zeno\u2014so\nthat he is contemporaneous with them, though younger than the former\nand older than the latter\u2014is ascertained. According to Diogenes (IX.\n23) he flourished about the 69th Olympiad (504-501 B.C.). What is\nmost important is his journey to Athens with Zeno, where Plato makes\nthem talk with Socrates. This may be accepted generally, but what is\nstrictly historical in it cannot be ascertained. In the Th\u00e6tetus Plato\nmakes Socrates reply to the invitation to examine the Eleatic system:\n\u201cFor Melissus and the others who assert the All to be One at rest,\nI have a certain respect; I have even more for Parmenides. For, to\nspeak in Homeric language, he seems to me both venerable and strong.\nI knew him when he was an old man and I was still quite young, and I\nheard wonderful things from him.\u201d[52] And in the Platonic Dialogue\nParmenides (p. 127. Steph. p. 4. Bekk.) where, as is well known, the\nconversation is carried on by Parmenides and Socrates, the historic\ncircumstances of this interview are related in detail. \u201cParmenides was\nvery old, had hair which was quite grey, was beautiful in countenance,\nabout sixty-five years old, and Zeno almost forty.\u201d Tennemann (Vol. I.\np. 415) places the journey in the 80th Olympiad (460-457 B.C.). Thus\nSocrates, since he was born in Olympiad 77, 4 (469 B.C.), would seem to\nhave been still too young to have carried on a dialogue such as Plato\ndescribes, and the principal matter of this dialogue, which is written\nin the spirit of the Eleatic school, belongs to Plato himself. Besides,\nwe know from Parmenides\u2019 life, that he stood in high respect with his\nfellow-citizens at Elea, whose prosperity must be chiefly ascribed to\nthe laws which Parmenides gave them.[53] We also find in the _\u03c0\u03af\u03bd\u03b1\u03be_ of\nCebes (towards the beginning) \u201ca Parmenidian life\u201d used synonymously\nwith a moral life.\n\nIt must be remarked that here, where the Eleatic school is definitely\ntreated of, Plato does not speak of Xenophanes at all, but only of\nMelissus and Parmenides. The fact that Plato, in one of his dialogues,\nlikewise accords the chief part to Parmenides, and puts in his mouth\nthe most lofty dialectic that ever was given, does not concern us here.\nIf with Xenophanes, by the proposition that out of nothing nothing\ncomes, origination and what depends upon or can be traced back to it is\ndenied, the opposition between Being and non-being makes its appearance\nstill more clearly with Parmenides, though still unconsciously. Sextus\nEmpiricus and Simplicius have preserved to us the most important\nfragments from the poems of Parmenides; for Parmenides also propounded\nhis philosophy as a poem. The first long fragment in Sextus (adv. Math.\nVII. 111) is an allegorical preface to his poem on Nature. This preface\nis majestic; it is written after the manner of the times, and in it all\nthere is an energetic, impetuous soul which strives with Being to grasp\nand to express it. We can show Parmenides\u2019 philosophy best in his own\nwords. The introduction runs thus:\u2014\n\n \u201cHorses that bore me, impelled by their courage,\n Brought me to the much-famed streets of the goddess\n Who leads the wise man to every kind of knowledge.\n Maidens point out the way.\n The axle sings hot as the daughters of Helios quickly approach,\n Leaving the dwelling of night, pressing on to the light,\n With mighty hands raising the sheltering veil.\u201d\n\nThe maidens are, according to Sextus (adv. Math. VII. 112, 113), the\nsenses, and Helios\u2019 daughters are more especially the eyes:\u2014\n\n \u201cThese are the gates of the pathways of night and of day.\n Now the heavenly maidens approach the great doors,\n Whose lock double-turned the punishing Dice protects.\n To this one soft words were by the maidens addressed\n Subtly persuading her the barriers of oak from the gates,\n Now to withdraw. Yet these,\n Directly the yawning breadth of the doors was revealed,\n Drove the horses and waggon, on through the gate.\n The goddess received me in friendship, seized with her one hand my\n right,\n And turning towards me, she said:\n \u2018Oh, thou, who with guides all immortal and horses,\n Camest here in my palace,\u2014be welcome, young man.\n For no evil fate has led thee into this path,\n (Indeed it lies far from the ways of a man)\n But Themis and Dice. Now shalt thou all things explore,\n The heart never-flinching of the truth that persuades,\n The transient opinions which are not to be trusted.\n But from such paths keep the inquiring soul far away.\n On this way let not the much followed custom\n Cause thee to take the rash eye as thy guide,\n Or the confused sounding ear and the tongue. Ponder considerately\n With thy reason alone, the doctrine much and often examined,\n Which I will proclaim. For there lacks but desire on your way.\u2019\u201d\n\nThe goddess develops everything from the double knowledge (_\u03b1_)\nof thought, of the truth, and (_\u03b2_) of opinion; these make up the\ntwo parts of the poem. In another fragment taken from Simplicius\u2019\nCommentary on Aristotle\u2019s Physics (p. 25; 19 a) and from Proclus\non the Tim\u00e6us (p. 29 b), we have the principal part of what is here\nrelated preserved to us. \u201cUnderstand,\u201d says the goddess, \u201cwhich are the\ntwo roads of knowledge. The one which is only Being, and which is not\nnon-being, is the path of conviction, the truth is in it. The other\nthat is not Being, and which is necessarily non-being, is, I must tell\nyou, a path quite devoid of reason, for thou canst neither know, or\nattain to, or express, non-being.\u201d The nothing, in fact, turns into\nsomething, since it is thought or is said: we say something, think\nsomething, if we wish to think and say the nothing. \u201cIt is necessary\nthat saying and thinking should be Being; for Being is, but nothing is\nnot at all.\u201d There the matter is stated in brief; and in this nothing,\nfalls negation generally, or in more concrete form, limitation, the\nfinite, restriction: _determinatio est negatio_ is Spinoza\u2019s great\nsaying. Parmenides says, whatever form the negation may take, it\ndoes not exist at all. To consider the nothing as the true is \u201cthe\nway of error in which the ignorant and double-minded mortals wander.\nPerplexity of mind sways the erring sense. Those who believe Being\nand non-being to be the same, and then again not the same, are like\ndeaf and blind men surprised, like hordes confusedly driven.\u201d The\nerror is to confuse them and to ascribe the same value to each, or to\ndistinguish them as if non-being were the limited generally. \u201cWhichever\nway is taken, it leads back to the point from which it started.\u201d It is\na constantly self-contradictory and disintegrating movement. To human\nideas, now this is held to be reality and now its opposite, and then\nagain a mixture of both.\n\nSimplicius quotes further, in writing on Aristotle\u2019s Physics (p.\n17 a; 31, 19): \u201cBut the truth is only the \u2018is\u2019; this is neither\nbegotten of anything else, nor transient, entire, alone in its class\n(_\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c2_), unmoved and without end; it neither was, nor will be,\nbut is at once the all. For what birth wouldst thou seek for it? How\nand whence should it be augmented? That it should be from that which\nis not, I shall allow thee neither to say nor to think, for neither\ncan it be said or thought that the \u2018is\u2019 is not. What necessity had\neither later or earlier made it begin from the nothing? Thus must it\nthroughout only be or not be; nor will any force of conviction ever\nmake something else arise out of that which is not. Thus origination\nhas disappeared, and decease is incredible. Being is not separable,\nfor it is entirely like itself; it is nowhere more, else would it not\nhold together, nor is it less, for everything is full of Being. The all\nis one coherent whole, for Being flows into unison with Being: it is\nunchangeable and rests securely in itself; the force of necessity holds\nit within the bounds of limitation. It cannot hence be said that it is\nimperfect; for it is without defect, while non-existence is wanting in\nall.\u201d This Being is not the undetermined (_\u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd_) for it is kept\nwithin the limits of necessity; we similarly find in Aristotle that\nlimitation is ascribed to Parmenides. The sense in which the expression\n\u201climit\u201d is to be taken is uncertain. According to Parmenides, however,\nthis absolute limitation is as _\u0394\u03af\u03ba\u03b7_, absolute necessity clearly\ndetermined in itself; and it is an important fact that he went beyond\nthe uncultured conception of the infinite. \u201cThought, and that on\naccount of which thought is, are the same. For not without that which\nis, in which it expresses itself (_\u1f10\u03bd \u1fa6 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03bd_), wilt thou\nfind Thought, seeing that it is nothing and will be nothing outside of\nthat which is.\u201d That is the main point. Thought produces itself, and\nwhat is produced is a Thought. Thought is thus identical with Being,\nfor there is nothing beside Being, this great affirmation. Plotinus,\nin quoting (V. Ennead. I. 8) this last fragment says: \u201cParmenides\nadopted this point of view, inasmuch as he did not place Being in\nsensuous things; identifying Being with Thought, he maintained it to be\nunchangeable.\u201d The Sophists concluded from this: \u201cAll is truth; there\nis no error, for error is the non-existent, that which is not to be\nthought.\u201d\n\nSince in this an advance into the region of the ideal is observable,\nParmenides began Philosophy proper. A man now constitutes himself free\nfrom all ideas and opinions, denies their truth, and says necessity\nalone, Being, is the truth. This beginning is certainly still dim and\nindefinite, and we cannot say much of what it involves; but to take\nup this position certainly is to develop Philosophy proper, which has\nnot hitherto existed. The dialectic that the transient has no truth,\nis implied in it, for if these determinations are taken as they are\nusually understood, contradictions ensue. In Simplicius (in Arist.\nPhys. p. 27 b.; 31 b.) we have further metaphorical images from\nParmenides. \u201cSince the utmost limit of Being is perfect, it resembles\non every side the form of a well rounded sphere, which from its centre\nextends in all directions equally, for it can be neither larger or\nsmaller in one part or another. There is no non-being which prevents it\nfrom attaining to the like\u201d\u2014from coming into unity with itself\u2014\u201cand\nthere is no Being where it was devoid of Being, here more and there\nless. Because the all is without defect, it is in all places in the\nsame way like itself in its determinations.\u201d Plotinus in the passage\nquoted says: \u201cHe compares Being with the spherical form, because it\ncomprehends all in itself, and Thought is not outside of this, but is\ncontained in it.\u201d And Simplicius says: \u201cWe must not wonder at him,\nfor on account of the poetic form, he adopts a mythological fiction\n(_\u03c0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2_).\u201d It immediately strikes us that the sphere is limited,\nand furthermore in space, and hence another must be above it; but\nthen the Notion of the sphere is the similarity of withholding the\ndifferent, notwithstanding that even the undifferentiated must be\nexpressed; hence this image is inconsistent.\n\nParmenides adds to this doctrine of the truth, the doctrine of human\nopinions, the illusive system of the world. Simplicius, writing on\nAristotle\u2019s Physics (p. 7 b; 39 a), tells us that he says: \u201cMen have\ntwo forms of opinion, one of which should not be, and in it they\nare mistaken; they set them in opposition to one another in form\nand symbol. The one, the ethereal fire of the flame, is quite fine,\nidentical with itself throughout, but not identical with the other,\nfor that is also for itself; on the other hand there is what belongs\nto night, or thick and ponderous existence.\u201d By the former, warmth,\nsoftness, lightness is expressed, and by the latter, cold. \u201cBut since\neverything is called light and night, and their qualities are suited\nboth to the one kind of things and the other, everything alike is\nfilled with light and dark night; both are alike since nothing exists\nwithout both.\u201d Aristotle (Met. I. 3 and 5), and the other historians,\nlikewise unanimously attribute to Parmenides the fact that he sets\nforth two principles for the system of manifest things, warmth and\ncold, through the union of which everything is. Light, fire, is the\nactive and animate; night, cold, is called the passive.\n\nParmenides also speaks like a Pythagorean\u2014he was called _\u1f00\u03bd\u1f72\u03c1\n\u03a0\u03c5\u03b8\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03c2_ by Strabo\u2014in the following, and likewise mythological\nconception: \u201cThere are circlets wound round one another, one of which\nis of the rare element and the other of the dense, between which others\nare to be found, composed of light and darkness mingled. Those which\nare less are of impure fire, but those over them of night, through\nwhich proceed the forces of the flames. That which holds this all\ntogether, however, is something fixed, like a wall, under which there\nis a fiery wreath, and the most central of the rare spheres again is\nfiery. The most central of those mixed is the goddess that reigns over\nall, the Divider (_\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c7\u03bf\u03c2_), Dice and Necessity. For she is the\nprinciple of all earthly produce and intermingling, which impels the\nmale to mix with the female, and conversely; she took Love to help\nher, creating him first amongst the gods. The air is an exhalation\n(_\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03c0\u03bd\u03bf\u03ae_) of the earth; the sun and the milky way, the breath of\nfire; and the moon is air and fire mingled, &c.\u201d[54]\n\nIt still remains to us to explain the manner in which Parmenides\nregarded sensation and thought, which may undoubtedly at first sight\nseem to be materialistic. Theophrastus,[55] for example, remarks in\nthis regard: \u201cParmenides said nothing more than that there are two\nelements. Knowledge is determined according to the preponderance of\nthe one or of the other; for, according as warmth or cold predominate,\nthought varies; it becomes better and purer through warmth, and yet it\nrequires also a certain balance.\u201d\n\n \u201cFor as in each man there still is in his dispersive limbs an\n intermingling,\n So is the understanding of man; for that\n Which is thought by men, is the nature of the limbs,\n Both in one and all; for thought is indeed the most.\u201d[56]\n\nHe thus takes sensation and thought to be the same, and makes\nremembrance and oblivion to arise from these through mingling them,\nbut whether in the intermingling they take an equal place, whether\nthis is thought or not, and what condition this is, he leaves quite\nundetermined. But that he ascribes sensation to the opposites in and\nfor themselves is clear, because he says: \u201cThe dead do not feel\nlight or warmth or hear voices, because the fire is out of them;\nthey feel cold, stillness and the opposite, however, and, speaking\ngenerally, each existence has a certain knowledge.\u201d In fact, this view\nof Parmenides is really the opposite of materialism, for materialism\nconsists in putting together the soul from parts, or independent forces\n(the wooden horse of the senses).\n\n\n3. MELISSUS.\n\nThere is little to tell about the life of Melissus. Diogenes Laertius\n(IX. 24) calls him a disciple of Parmenides, but the discipleship is\nuncertain; it is also said of him that he associated with Heraclitus.\nHe was born in Samos, like Pythagoras, and was besides a distinguished\nstatesman amongst his people. It is said by Plutarch (in Pericle, 26)\nthat, as admiral of the Samians, he gained in battle a victory over the\nAthenians. He flourished about the 84th Olympiad (444 B.C.).\n\nIn regard to his philosophy, too, there is little to say. Aristotle,\nwhere he mentions him, places him always with Parmenides, as resembling\nhim in mode of thought. Simplicius, writing on Aristotle\u2019s Physics\n(p. 7 sqq.), has preserved several fragments of his prose writings on\nNature, which show the same kind of thoughts and arguments as we find\nin Parmenides, but, in part, somewhat more developed. It was a question\nwhether the reasoning in which it is shown that change does not exist,\nor contradicts itself, which, by Aristotle in his incomplete, and, in\nsome parts, most corrupt work on Xenophanes, Zeno, and Gorgias (c. 2.),\nwas ascribed to Xenophanes, did not really belong to Melissus.[57]\n\nSince the beginning, in which we are told whose reasoning it is, is\nwanting, conjecture only applies it to Xenophanes. The writing begins\nwith the words \u201cHe says,\u201d without any name being given. It thus depends\non the superscription alone whether Aristotle speaks of the philosophy\nof Xenophanes or not, and it must be noticed that different hands have\nput different superscriptions. Indeed, there is in this work (c. 2) an\nopinion of Xenophanes mentioned in such a way that it appears as though\nhad what was previously quoted by Aristotle been by him ascribed to\nXenophanes, the expression would have been different. It is possible\nthat Zeno is meant, as the internal evidence abundantly shows. There\nis in it a dialectic more developed in form, more real reflexion, than\nfrom the verses could be expected, not from Xenophanes alone, but even\nfrom Parmenides. For Aristotle expressly says that Xenophanes does not\nyet determine with precision; thus the cultured reasoning contained in\nAristotle must certainly be denied to Xenophanes; at least, it is so\nfar certain that Xenophanes himself did not know how to express his\nthoughts in a manner so orderly and precise as that found here. We find\nit said:\u2014\n\n\u201cIf anything is, it is eternal (_\u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd_).\u201d Eternity is an awkward\nword, for it immediately makes us think of time and mingle past and\nfuture as an infinite length of time; but what is meant is that\n_\u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd_ is the self-identical, supersensuous, unchangeable, pure\npresent, which is without any time-conception. It is, origination and\nchange are shut out; if it commences, it does so out of nothing or\nout of Being. \u201cIt is impossible that anything should arise from the\nnothing. If everything could have arisen, or could it merely not have\nbeen everything eternally, it would equally have arisen out of nothing.\nFor, if everything had arisen, nothing would once have existed. If some\nwere alone the existent out of which the rest sprang, the one would be\nmore and greater. But the more and greater would thus have arisen out\nof the nothing of itself, for in the less there is not its more, nor in\nthe smaller its greater.\u201d\n\nSimplicius makes this note to the Physics of Aristotle (p. 22 b): \u201cNo\nmore can anything arise out of the existent, for the existent already\nis, and thus does not first arise from the existent.\u201d\n\n\u201cAs eternal, the existent also is unlimited, since it has no beginning\nfrom which it came, nor end in which it ceases. The infinite all is\none, for, if there were two or more, they would limit one another,\u201d\nand thus have a beginning and end. The one would be the nothing of the\nother and come forth from this nothing. \u201cThis one is like itself; for\nif it were unlike it would no longer be the one that was posited, but\nmany. This one is likewise immovable, inasmuch as it does not move\nitself, since it does not pass out into anything. In passing out, it\nwould require to do so into what is full or what is empty; it could\nnot be into the full, for that is an impossibility, and just as little\ncould it be into what is empty, for that is the nothing. The one,\ntherefore, is in this way devoid of pain or suffering, not changing in\nposition or form, or mingling with what is different. For all these\ndeterminations involve the origination of non-being and passing away\nof Being, which is impossible.\u201d Thus here again the contradiction\nwhich takes place when origination and passing away are spoken of, is\nrevealed.\n\nNow Melissus places opinion in opposition to this truth. The change\nand multiplicity extinguished in Being appears on the other side, in\nconsciousness, as in what is opinionative; it is necessary to say this\nif only the negative side, the removal of these moments, the Absolute\nas destitute of predicate, is laid hold of. \u201cIn sensuous perception the\nopposite is present for us; that is to say, a number of things, their\nchange, their origination and passing away, and their intermingling.\nThus that first knowledge must take its place beside this second,\nwhich has as much certainty for ordinary consciousness as the first.\u201d\nMelissus does not seem to have decided for the one or the other, but,\noscillating between both, to have limited the knowledge of the truth to\nthe statement that, speaking generally, between two opposite modes of\npresentation, the more probable opinion is to be preferred, but that\nwhat is so preferred is only to be regarded as the stronger opinion,\nand not as truth. This is what Aristotle says of him.\n\nSince Aristotle, in distinguishing his philosophy from the philosophy\nof Parmenides, maintains that in the first place Parmenides seems\nto understand the One as the principle of thought, and Melissus as\nmatter, we must remark that this distinction falls away in pure\nexistence, Being, or the One. Pure matter, as also pure thought (if\nI am to speak of such a distinction), are not present to Parmenides\nand Melissus, since they are abrogated; and it must only be in the\nmanner of his expression that one of them\u2014according to Aristotle\n(Phys. I. 2), on account of his clumsier mode of treatment (_\u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2_)\u2014could seem to have conceived of the other sense. If the\ndifference consisted secondly in the fact that Parmenides regarded the\none as limited and Melissus as unlimited, this limitation of the one\nwould, in effect, immediately contradict the philosophy of Parmenides;\nfor since limit is the non-being of Being, non-being would thus be\nposited. But when Parmenides speaks of limit, we see that his poetic\nlanguage is not altogether exact; limit, however, as pure limit, is\njust simple Being and absolute negativity, in which all else said and\nset forth is sublated. Necessity, as this pure negativity and movement\nwithin itself, although impassive thought, is absolutely bound to\nits opposite. In the third place it may be said that Parmenides set\nforth a concomitant philosophy of opinion or reality, to which Being\nas existence for thought was thus more opposed than was the case with\nMelissus.\n\n\n4. ZENO.\n\nWhat specially characterizes Zeno is the dialectic which, properly\nspeaking, begins with him; he is the master of the Eleatic school in\nwhom its pure thought arrives at the movement of the Notion in itself\nand becomes the pure soul of science. That is to say, in the Eleatics\nhitherto considered, we only have the proposition: \u201cThe nothing has\nno reality and is not at all, and thus what is called origin and\ndecease disappears.\u201d With Zeno, on the contrary, we certainly see just\nsuch an assertion of the one and removal of what contradicts it, but\nwe also see that this assertion is not made the starting point; for\nreason begins by calmly demonstrating in that which is established as\nexistent, its negation. Parmenides asserts that \u201cThe all is immutable,\nfor, in change, the non-being of that which is would be asserted,\nbut Being only is; in saying that non-being is, the subject and the\npredicate contradict themselves.\u201d Zeno, on the other hand, says:\n\u201cAssert your change; in it as change there is the negation to it, or\nit is nothing.\u201d To the former change existed as motion, definite and\ncomplete. Zeno protested against motion as such, or pure motion. \u201cPure\nBeing is not motion; it is rather the negation of motion.\u201d We find it\nspecially interesting that there is in Zeno the higher consciousness,\nthe consciousness that when one determination is denied, this negation\nis itself again a determination, and then in the absolute negation\nnot one determination, but both the opposites must be negated. Zeno\nanticipated this, and because he foresaw that Being is the opposite\nof nothing, he denied of the One what must be said of the nothing.\nBut the same thing must occur with all the rest. We find this higher\ndialectic in Plato\u2019s Parmenides; here it only breaks forth in respect\nto some determinations, and not to the determination of the One and of\nBeing. The higher consciousness is the consciousness of the nullity of\nBeing as of what is determined as against the nothing, partly found in\nHeraclitus and then in the Sophists; with them it never has any truth,\nit has no existence in itself, but is only the for-another, or the\nassurance of the individual consciousness, and assurance as refutation,\ni.e. the negative side of dialectic.\n\nAccording to Diogenes Laertius, (IX. 25) Zeno was likewise an Eleat;\nhe is the youngest, and lived most in company with Parmenides. The\nlatter became very fond of him and adopted him as a son; his own\nfather was called Telentagoras. Not in his State alone was his conduct\nheld in high respect, for his fame was universal, and he was esteemed\nparticularly as a teacher. Plato mentions that men came to him from\nAthens and other places, in order to profit from his learning.[58]\nProud self-sufficiency is ascribed to him by Diogenes (IX. 28) because\nhe\u2014with the exception of a journey made to Athens\u2014continued to reside\nin Elea, and did not stay a longer time in the great, mighty Athens,\nand there attain to fame. In very various narratives his death was made\nfor ever celebrated for the strength of his mind evinced in it; it was\nsaid that he freed a State (whether his own home at Elea or in Sicily,\nis not known) from its Tyrant (the name is given differently, but an\nexact historical account has not been recorded) in the following way,\nand by the sacrifice of his life. He entered into a plot to overthrow\nthe Tyrant, but this was betrayed. When the Tyrant now, in face of the\npeople, caused him to be tortured in every possible way to get from him\nan avowal of his confederates, and when he questioned him about the\nenemies of the State, Zeno first named to the Tyrant all his friends as\nparticipators in the plot, and then spoke of the Tyrant himself as the\npest of the State. The powerful remonstrances or the horrible tortures\nand death of Zeno aroused the citizens, inspired them with courage to\nfall upon the Tyrant, kill him, and liberate themselves. The manner of\nthe end, and his violent and furious state of mind, is very variously\ndepicted. He is said to have pretended to wish to say something into\nthe Tyrant\u2019s ear, and then to have bitten his ear, and thus held him\nfast until he was slain by the others. Others say that he seized him by\nthe nose between his teeth; others that as on his reply great tortures\nwere applied, he bit off his tongue and spat it into the Tyrant\u2019s face,\nto show him that he could get nothing from him, and that he then was\npounded in a mortar.[59]\n\nIt has just been noticed that Zeno had the very important character\nof being the originator of the true objective dialectic. Xenophanes,\nParmenides, and Melissus, start with the proposition: \u201cNothing is\nnothing; the nothing does not exist at all, or the like is real\nexistence,\u201d that is, they make one of the opposed predicates to be\nexistence. Now when they encounter the opposite in a determination,\nthey demolish this determination, but it is only demolished through\nanother, through my assertion, through the distinction that I form, by\nwhich one side is made to be the true, and the other the null. We have\nproceeded from a definite proposition; the nullity of the opposite does\nnot appear in itself; it is not that it abrogates itself, i.e. that it\ncontains a contradiction in itself. For instance, I assert of something\nthat it is the null; then I show this by hypothesis in motion, and\nit follows that it is the null. But another consciousness does not\nassert this; I declare one thing to be directly true; another has the\nright of asserting something else as directly true, that is to say,\nmotion. Similarly what seems to be the case when one philosophic system\ncontradicts another, is that the first is pre-established, and that men\nstarting from this point of view, combat the other. The matter is thus\neasily settled by saying: \u201cThe other has no truth, because it does not\nagree with me,\u201d and the other has the right to say the same. It does\nnot help if I prove my system or my proposition and then conclude that\nthus the opposite is false; to this other proposition the first always\nseems to be foreign and external. Falsity must not be demonstrated\nthrough another, and as untrue because the opposite is true, but in\nitself; we find this rational perception in Zeno.\n\nIn Plato\u2019s Parmenides (pp. 127, 128, Steph., pp. 6, 7, Bekk.) this\ndialectic is very well described, for Plato makes Socrates say of\nit: \u201cZeno in his writings asserts fundamentally the same as does\nParmenides, that All is One, but he would feign delude us into\nbelieving that he was telling something new. Parmenides thus shows in\nhis poems that All is One; Zeno, on the contrary, shows that the Many\ncannot be.\u201d Zeno replies, that \u201cHe wrote thus really against those who\ntry to make Parmenides\u2019 position ridiculous, for they try to show what\nabsurdities and self-contradictions can be derived from his statements;\nhe thus combats those who deduce Being from the many, in order to show\nthat far more absurdities arise from this than from the statements of\nParmenides.\u201d That is the special aim of objective dialectic, in which\nwe no longer maintain simple thought for itself, but see the battle\nfought with new vigour within the enemy\u2019s camp. Dialectic has in Zeno\nthis negative side, but it has also to be considered from its positive\nside.\n\nAccording to the ordinary ideas of science, where propositions result\nfrom proof, proof is the movement of intelligence, a connection brought\nabout by mediation. Dialectic is either (_\u03b1_) external dialectic,\nin which this movement is different from the comprehension of the\nmovement, or (_\u03b2_) not a movement of our intelligence only, but what\nproceeds from the nature of the thing itself, i.e. from the pure Notion\nof the content. The former is a manner of regarding objects in such a\nway that reasons are revealed and new light thrown, by means of which\nall that was supposed to be firmly fixed, is made to totter; there\nmay be reasons which are altogether external too, and we shall speak\nfurther of this dialectic when dealing with the Sophists. The other\ndialectic, however, is the immanent contemplation of the object; it is\ntaken for itself, without previous hypothesis, idea or obligation, not\nunder any outward conditions, laws or causes; we have to put ourselves\nright into the thing, to consider the object in itself, and to take it\nin the determinations which it has. In regarding it thus, it shows from\nitself that it contains opposed determinations, and thus breaks up;\nthis dialectic we more especially find in the ancients. The subjective\ndialectic, which reasons from external grounds, is moderate, for it\ngrants that: \u201cIn the right there is what is not right, and in the false\nthe true.\u201d True dialectic leaves nothing whatever to its object, as if\nthe latter were deficient on one side only; for it disintegrates itself\nin the entirety of its nature. The result of this dialectic is null,\nthe negative; the affirmative in it does not yet appear. This true\ndialectic may be associated with the work of the Eleatics. But in their\ncase the real meaning and quality of philosophic understanding was not\ngreat, for they got no further than the fact that through contradiction\nthe object is a nothing.\n\nZeno\u2019s dialectic of matter has not been refuted to the present\nday; even now we have not got beyond it, and the matter is left in\nuncertainty. Simplicius, writing on the Physics of Aristotle (p. 30),\nsays: \u201cZeno proves that if the many is, it must be great and small; if\ngreat, the many must be infinite in number\u201d (it must have gone beyond\nthe manifold, as indifferent limit, into the infinite; but what is\ninfinite is no longer large and no longer many, for it is the negation\nof the many). \u201cIf small, it must be so small as to have no size,\u201d\nlike atoms. \u201cHere he shows that what has neither size, thickness nor\nmass, cannot be. For if it were added to another, it would not cause\nits increase; were it, that is to say, to have no size and be added\nthereto, it could not supplement the size of the other and consequently\nthat which is added is nothing. Similarly were it taken away, the other\nwould not be made less, and thus it is nothing. If what has being is,\neach existence necessarily has size and thickness, is outside of one\nanother, and one is separate from the other; the same applies to all\nelse (_\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u1f54\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2_), for it, too, has size, and in it there is\nwhat mutually differs (_\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ad\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03b9_). But it is the same thing\nto say something once and to say it over and over again; in it nothing\ncan be a last, nor will there not be another to the other. Thus if many\nare, they are small and great; small, so that they have no size; great,\nso that they are infinite.\u201d\n\nAristotle (Phys. VI. 9) explains this dialectic further; Zeno\u2019s\ntreatment of motion was above all objectively dialectical. But the\nparticulars which we find in the Parmenides of Plato are not his.\nFor Zeno\u2019s consciousness we see simple unmoved thought disappear,\nbut become thinking movement; in that he combats sensuous movement,\nhe concedes it. The reason that dialectic first fell on movement is\nthat the dialectic is itself this movement, or movement itself the\ndialectic of all that is. The thing, as self-moving, has its dialectic\nin itself, and movement is the becoming another, self-abrogation. If\nAristotle says that Zeno denied movement because it contains an inner\ncontradiction, it is not to be understood to mean that movement did not\nexist at all. The point is not that there is movement and that this\nphenomenon exists; the fact that there is movement is as sensuously\ncertain as that there are elephants; it is not in this sense that Zeno\nmeant to deny movement. The point in question concerns its truth.\nMovement, however, is held to be untrue, because the conception of it\ninvolves a contradiction; by that he meant to say that no true Being\ncan be predicated of it.\n\nZeno\u2019s utterances are to be looked at from this point of view, not as\nbeing directed against the reality of motion, as would at first appear,\nbut as pointing out how movement must necessarily be determined, and\nshowing the course which must be taken. Zeno now brings forward four\ndifferent arguments against motion; the proofs rest on the infinite\ndivisibility of space and time.\n\n(a) This is his first form of argument:\u2014\u201cMovement has no truth,\nbecause what is in motion must first reach the middle of the space\nbefore arriving at the end.\u201d Aristotle expresses this thus shortly,\nbecause he had earlier treated of and worked out the subject at length.\nThis is to be taken as indicating generally that the continuity of\nspace is presupposed. What moves itself must reach a certain end, this\nway is a whole. In order to traverse the whole, what is in motion must\nfirst pass over the half, and now the end of this half is considered as\nbeing the end; but this half of space is again a whole, that which also\nhas a half, and the half of this half must first have been reached, and\nso on into infinity. Zeno here arrives at the infinite divisibility of\nspace; because space and time are absolutely continuous, there is no\npoint at which the division can stop. Every dimension (and every time\nand space always have a dimension) is again divisible into two halves,\nwhich must be measured off; and however small a space we have, the\nsame conditions reappear. Movement would be the act of passing through\nthese infinite moments, and would therefore never end; thus what is in\nmotion cannot reach its end. It is known how Diogenes of Sinope, the\nCynic, quite simply refuted these arguments against movement; without\nspeaking he rose and walked about, contradicting them by action.[60]\nBut when reasons are disputed, the only valid refutation is one derived\nfrom reasons; men have not merely to satisfy themselves by sensuous\nassurance, but also to understand. To refute objections is to prove\ntheir non-existence, as when they are made to fall away and can hence\nbe adduced no longer; but it is necessary to think of motion as Zeno\nthought of it, and yet to carry this theory of motion further still.\n\nWe have here the spurious infinite or pure appearance, whose simple\nprinciple Philosophy demonstrates as universal Notion, for the first\ntime making its appearance as developed in its contradiction; in the\nhistory of Philosophy a consciousness of this contradiction is also\nattained. Movement, this pure phenomenon, appears as something thought\nand shown forth in its real being\u2014that is, in its distinction of pure\nself-identity and pure negativity, the point as distinguished from\ncontinuity. To us there is no contradiction in the idea that the here\nof space and the now of time are considered as a continuity and length;\nbut their Notion is self-contradictory. Self-identity or continuity is\nabsolute cohesion, the destruction of all difference, of all negation,\nof being for self; the point, on the contrary, is pure being-for-self,\nabsolute self-distinction and the destruction of all identity and\nall connection with what is different. Both of these, however,\nare, in space and time, placed in one; space and time are thus the\ncontradiction; it is necessary, first of all, to show the contradiction\nin movement, for in movement that which is opposed is, to ordinary\nconceptions, inevitably manifested. Movement is just the reality of\ntime and space, and because this appears and is made manifest, the\napparent contradiction is demonstrated, and it is this contradiction\nthat Zeno notices. The limitation of bisection which is involved in\nthe continuity of space, is not absolute limitation, for that which\nis limited is again continuity; however, this continuity is again not\nabsolute, for the opposite has to be exhibited in it, the limitation\nof bisection; but the limitation of continuity is still not thereby\nestablished, the half is still continuous, and so on into infinity.\nIn that we say \u201cinto infinity,\u201d we place before ourselves a beyond,\noutside of the ordinary conception, which cannot reach so far. It is\ncertainly an endless going forth, but in the Notion it is present,\nit is a progression from one opposed determination to others, from\ncontinuity to negativity, from negativity to continuity; but both of\nthese are before us. Of these moments one in the process may be called\nthe true one; Zeno first asserts continuous progression in such a way\nthat no limited space can be arrived at as ultimate, or Zeno upholds\nprogression in this limitation.\n\nThe general explanation which Aristotle gives to this contradiction, is\nthat space and time are not infinitely divided, but are only divisible.\nBut it now appears that, because they are divisible\u2014that is, in\npotentiality\u2014they must actually be infinitely divided, for else they\ncould not be divided into infinity. That is the general answer of the\nordinary man in endeavouring to refute the explanation of Aristotle.\nBayle (Tom. IV. art. Z\u00e9non, not. E.) hence says of Aristotle\u2019s answer\nthat it is \u201cpitoyable: C\u2019est se moquer du monde que de se servir de\ncette doctrine; car si la mati\u00e8re est divisible \u00e0 l\u2019infini, elle\ncontient un nombre infini de parties. Ce n\u2019est donc point un infini en\npuissance, c\u2019est un infini, qui existe r\u00e9ellement, actuellement. Mais\nquand-m\u00eame on accorderait cet infini en puissance, qui deviendrait\nun infini par la division actuelle de ses parties, on ne perdrait\npas ses avantages; car le mouvement est une chose, qui a la m\u00eame\nvertu, que la division. Il touche une partie de l\u2019espace sans toucher\nl\u2019autre, et il les touche toutes les unes apr\u00e8s les autres. N\u2019est-ce\npas les distinguer actuellement? N\u2019est-ce pas faire ce que ferait un\ng\u00e9om\u00e8tre sur une table en tirant des lignes, qui d\u00e9signassent tous les\ndemi-pouces? Il ne brise pas la table en demi-pouces, mais il y fait\nn\u00e9anmoins une division, qui marque la distinction actuelle des parties;\net je ne crois pas qu\u2019Aristote eut voulu nier, que _si_ l\u2019on tirait une\ninfinit\u00e9 de lignes sur un pouce de mati\u00e8re, on n\u2019y introduis\u00eet une\ndivision, qui r\u00e9duirait en infini actuel ce qui n\u2019\u00e9tait selon lui qu\u2019un\ninfini virtual.\u201d This _si_ is good! Divisibility is, as potentiality,\nthe universal; there is continuity as well as negativity or the point\nposited in it\u2014but posited as moment, and not as existent in and for\nitself. I can divide matter into infinitude, but I only can do so; I\ndo not really divide it into infinitude. This is the infinite, that no\none of its moments has reality. It never does happen that, in itself,\none or other\u2014that absolute limitation or absolute continuity\u2014actually\ncomes into existence in such a way that the other moment disappears.\nThere are two absolute opposites, but they are moments, i.e. in the\nsimple Notion or in the universal, in thought, if you will; for in\nthought, in ordinary conception, what is set forth both is and is not\nat the same time. What is represented either as such, or as an image\nof the conception, is not a thing; it has no Being, and yet it is not\nnothing.\n\nSpace and time furthermore, as _quantum_, form a limited extension,\nand thus can be measured off; just as I do not actually divide space,\nneither does the body which is in motion. The partition of space as\ndivided, is not absolute discontinuity [Punktualit\u00e4t], nor is pure\ncontinuity the undivided and indivisible; likewise time is not pure\nnegativity or discontinuity, but also continuity. Both are manifested\nin motion, in which the Notions have their reality for ordinary\nconception\u2014pure negativity as time, continuity as space. Motion itself\nis just this actual unity in the opposition, and the sequence of both\nmoments in this unity. To comprehend motion is to express its essence\nin the form of Notion, _i.e._, as unity of negativity and continuity;\nbut in them neither continuity nor discreteness can be exhibited as\nthe true existence. If we represent space or time to ourselves as\ninfinitely divided, we have an infinitude of points, but continuity is\npresent therein as a space which comprehends them: as Notion, however,\ncontinuity is the fact that all these are alike, and thus in reality\nthey do not appear one out of the other like points. But both these\nmoments make their appearance as existent; if they are manifested\nindifferently, their Notion is no longer posited, but their existence.\nIn them as existent, negativity is a limited size, and they exist as\nlimited space and time; actual motion is progression through a limited\nspace and a limited time and not through infinite space and infinite\ntime.\n\nThat what is in motion must reach the half is the assertion of\ncontinuity, i.e. the possibility of division as mere possibility; it is\nthus always possible in every space, however small. It is said that it\nis plain that the half must be reached, but in so saying, everything\nis allowed, including the fact that it never will be reached; for to\nsay so in one case, is the same as saying it an infinite number of\ntimes. We mean, on the contrary, that in a larger space the half can be\nallowed, but we conceive that we must somewhere attain to a space so\nsmall that no halving is possible, or an indivisible, non-continuous\nspace which is no space. This, however, is false, for continuity is a\nnecessary determination; there is undoubtedly a smallest in space, i.e.\na negation of continuity, but the negation is something quite abstract.\nAbstract adherence to the subdivision indicated, that is, to continuous\nbisection into infinitude, is likewise false, for in the conception of\na half, the interruption of continuity is involved. We must say that\nthere is no half of space, for space is continuous; a piece of wood\nmay be broken into two halves, but not space, and space only exists in\nmovement. It might equally be said that space consists of an endless\nnumber of points, i.e. of infinitely many limits and thus cannot be\ntraversed. Men think themselves able to go from one indivisible point\nto another, but they do not thereby get any further, for of these there\nis an unlimited number. Continuity is split up into its opposite,\na number which is indefinite; that is to say, if continuity is not\nadmitted, there is no motion. It is false to assert that it is possible\nwhen one is reached, or that which is not continuous; for motion is\nconnection. Thus when it was said that continuity is the presupposed\npossibility of infinite division, continuity is only the hypothesis;\nbut what is exhibited in this continuity is the being of infinitely\nmany, abstractly absolute limits.\n\n(b) The second proof, which is also the presupposition of continuity\nand the manifestation of division, is called \u201cAchilles, the Swift.\u201d\nThe ancients loved to clothe difficulties in sensuous representations.\nOf two bodies moving in one direction, one of which is in front and\nthe other following at a fixed distance and moving quicker than the\nfirst, we know that the second will overtake the first. But Zeno says,\n\u201cThe slower can never be overtaken by the quicker.\u201d And he proves it\nthus: \u201cThe second one requires a certain space of time to reach the\nplace from which the one pursued started at the beginning of the given\nperiod.\u201d Thus during the time in which the second reached the point\nwhere the first was, the latter went over a new space which the second\nhas again to pass through in a part of this period; and in this way it\ngoes into infinity.\n\n c d e f g\n\n B A\n\nB, for instance, traverses two miles (c d) in an hour, A in the same\ntime, one mile (d e); if they are two miles (c d) removed from one\nanother, B has in one hour come to where A was at the beginning of the\nhour. While B, in the next half hour, goes over the distance crossed\nby A of one mile (d e), A has got half a mile (e f) further, and so\non into infinity. Quicker motion does not help the second body at all\nin passing over the interval of space by which he is behind: the time\nwhich he requires, the slower body always has at its avail in order to\naccomplish some, although an ever shorter advance; and this, because of\nthe continual division, never quite disappears.\n\nAristotle, in speaking of this, puts it shortly thus. \u201cThis proof\nasserts the same endless divisibility, but it is untrue, for the quick\nwill overtake the slow body if the limits to be traversed be granted to\nit.\u201d This answer is correct and contains all that can be said; that is,\nthere are in this representation two periods of time and two distances,\nwhich are separated from one another, i.e. they are limited in relation\nto one another; when, on the contrary, we admit that time and space\nare continuous, so that two periods of time or points of space are\nrelated to one another as continuous, they are, while being two, not\ntwo, but identical. In ordinary language we solve the matter in the\neasiest way, for we say: \u201cBecause the second is quicker, it covers a\ngreater distance in the same time as the slow; it can therefore come to\nthe place from which the first started and get further still.\u201d After\nB, at the end of the first hour, arrives at d and A at e, A in one and\nthe same period, that is, in the second hour, goes over the distance\ne g, and B the distance d g. But this period of time which should be\none, is divisible into that in which B accomplishes d e and that in\nwhich B passes through e g. A has a start of the first, by which it\ngets over the distance e f, so that A is at f at the same period as\nB is at e. The limitation which, according to Aristotle, is to be\novercome, which must be penetrated, is thus that of time; since it is\ncontinuous, it must, for the solution of the difficulty, be said that\nwhat is divisible into two spaces of time is to be conceived of as one,\nin which B gets from d to e and from e to g, while A passes over the\ndistance e g. In motion two periods, as well as two points in space,\nare indeed one.\n\nIf we wish to make motion clear to ourselves, we say that the body is\nin one place and then it goes to another; because it moves, it is no\nlonger in the first, but yet not in the second; were it in either it\nwould be at rest. Where then is it? If we say that it is between both,\nthis is to convey nothing at all, for were it between both, it would\nbe in a place, and this presents the same difficulty. But movement\nmeans to be in this place and not to be in it, and thus to be in both\nalike; this is the continuity of space and time which first makes\nmotion possible. Zeno, in the deduction made by him, brought both these\npoints into forcible opposition. The discretion of space and time we\nalso uphold, but there must also be granted to them the overstepping of\nlimits, i.e. the exhibition of limits as not being, or as being divided\nperiods of time, which are also not divided. In our ordinary ideas we\nfind the same determinations as those on which the dialectic of Zeno\nrests; we arrive at saying, though unwillingly, that in one period two\ndistances of space are traversed, but we do not say that the quicker\ncomprehends two moments of time in one; for that we fix a definite\nspace. But in order that the slower may lose its precedence, it must be\nsaid that it loses its advantage of a moment of time, and indirectly\nthe moment of space.\n\nZeno makes limit, division, the moment of discretion in space and time,\nthe only element which is enforced in the whole of his conclusions, and\nhence results the contradiction. The difficulty is to overcome thought,\nfor what makes the difficulty is always thought alone, since it keeps\napart the moments of an object which in their separation are really\nunited. It brought about the Fall, for man ate of the tree of the\nknowledge of good and evil; but it also remedies these evils.\n\n(c) The third form, according to Aristotle, is as follows:\u2014Zeno\nsays: \u201cThe flying arrow rests, and for the reason that what is in\nmotion is always in the self-same Now and the self-same Here, in the\nindistinguishable;\u201d it is here and here and here. It can be said of the\narrow that it is always the same, for it is always in the same space\nand the same time; it does not get beyond its space, does not take in\nanother, that is, a greater or smaller space. That, however, is what\nwe call rest and not motion. In the Here and Now, the becoming \u201cother\u201d\nis abrogated, limitation indeed being established, but only as moment;\nsince in the Here and Now as such, there is no difference, continuity\nis here made to prevail against the mere belief in diversity. Each\nplace is a different place, and thus the same; true, objective\ndifference does not come forth in these sensuous relations, but in the\nspiritual.\n\nThis is also apparent in mechanics; of two bodies the question as\nto which moves presents itself before us. It requires more than two\nplaces\u2014three at least\u2014to determine which of them moves. But it is\ncorrect to say this, that motion is plainly relative; whether in\nabsolute space the eye, for instance, rests, or whether it moves,\nis all the same. Or, according to a proposition brought forward by\nNewton, if two bodies move round one another in a circle, it may be\nasked whether the one rests or both move. Newton tries to decide this\nby means of an external circumstance, the strain on the string. When I\nwalk on a ship in a direction opposed to the motion of the ship, this\nis in relation to the ship, motion, and in relation to all else, rest.\n\nIn both the first proofs, continuity in progression has the\npredominance; there is no absolute limit, but an overstepping of all\nlimits. Here the opposite is established; absolute limitation, the\ninterruption of continuity, without however passing into something\nelse; while discretion is presupposed, continuity is maintained.\nAristotle says of this proof: \u201cIt arises from the fact that it is taken\nfor granted that time consists of the Now; for if this is not conceded,\nthe conclusions will not follow.\u201d\n\n(d) \u201cThe fourth proof,\u201d Aristotle continues, \u201cis derived from similar\nbodies which move in opposite directions in the space beside a similar\nbody, and with equal velocity, one from one end of the space, the other\nfrom the middle. It necessarily results from this that half the time\nis equal to the double of it. The fallacy rests in this, that Zeno\nsupposes that what is beside the moving body, and what is beside the\nbody at rest, move through an equal distance in equal time with equal\nvelocity, which, however, is untrue.\u201d\n\n 1\n _E_|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|_F_\n _k_ _i_ _m_\n _C_|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|_D_\n _g_ _n_ _h_\n _A_|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|_B_\n\nIn a definite space such as a table (A B) let us suppose two bodies\nof equal length with it and with one another, one of which (C D) lies\nwith one end (C) on the middle (g) of the table, and the other (E F),\nbeing in the same direction, has the point (E) only touching the end\nof the table (h); and supposing they move in opposite directions, and\nthe former (C D) reaches in an hour the end (h) of the table; we have\nthe result ensuing that the one (E F) passes in the half of the time\nthrough the same space (i k) which the other does in the double (g h);\nhence the half is equal to the double. That is to say, this second\npasses (let us say, in the point l) by the whole of the first C D. In\nthe first half-hour l goes from m to i, while k only goes from g to n.\n\n 1\n _E_|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|_F_\n _k_ _o_ _i_ _m_\n _C_|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|_D_\n _g_ _n_ _h_\n _A_|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|_B_\n\nIn the second half-hour l goes past o to k, and altogether passes from\nm to k, or the double of the distance.\n\n 1\n _E_|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|_F_\n _k_ _o_ _i_ _m_\n _C_|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|_D_\n _g_ _n_ _h_\n _A_|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|\u2014\u2014|_B_\n\nThis fourth form deals with the contradiction presented in opposite\nmotion; that which is common is given entirely to one body, while it\nonly does part for itself. Here the distance travelled by one body\nis the sum of the distance travelled by both, just as when I go two\nfeet east, and from the same point another goes two feet west, we are\nfour feet removed from one another; in the distance moved both are\npositive, and hence have to be added together. Or if I have gone two\nfeet forwards and two feet backwards, although I have walked four feet,\nI have not moved from the spot; the motion is then nil, for by going\nforwards and backwards an opposition ensues which annuls itself.\n\nThis is the dialectic of Zeno; he had a knowledge of the determinations\nwhich our ideas of space and time contain, and showed in them their\ncontradiction; Kant\u2019s antinomies do no more than Zeno did here. The\ngeneral result of the Eleatic dialectic has thus become, \u201cthe truth is\nthe one, all else is untrue,\u201d just as the Kantian philosophy resulted\nin \u201cwe know appearances only.\u201d On the whole the principle is the same;\n\u201cthe content of knowledge is only an appearance and not truth,\u201d but\nthere is also a great difference present. That is to say, Zeno and\nthe Eleatics in their proposition signified \u201cthat the sensuous world,\nwith its multitudinous forms, is in itself appearance only, and has\nno truth.\u201d But Kant does not mean this, for he asserts: \u201cBecause we\napply the activity of our thought to the outer world, we constitute\nit appearance; what is without, first becomes an untruth by the fact\nthat we put therein a mass of determinations. Only our knowledge, the\nspiritual, is thus appearance; the world is in itself absolute truth;\nit is our action alone that ruins it, our work is good for nothing.\u201d\nIt shows excessive humility of mind to believe that knowledge has no\nvalue; but Christ says, \u201cAre ye not better than the sparrows?\u201d and we\nare so inasmuch as we are thinking; as sensuous we are as good or as\nbad as sparrows. Zeno\u2019s dialectic has greater objectivity than this\nmodern dialectic.\n\nZeno\u2019s dialectic is limited to Metaphysics; later, with the Sophists,\nit became general. We here leave the Eleatic school, which perpetuates\nitself in Leucippus and, on the other side, in the Sophists, in such\na way that these last extended the Eleatic conceptions to all reality,\nand gave to it the relation of consciousness; the former, however, as\none who later on worked out the Notion in its abstraction, makes a\nphysical application of it, and one which is opposed to consciousness.\nThere are several other Eleatics mentioned, to Tennemann\u2019s surprise,\nwho, however, cannot interest us. \u201cIt is so unexpected,\u201d he says (Vol.\nI., p. 190), \u201cthat the Eleatic system should find disciples; and yet\nSextus mentions a certain Xeniades.\u201d\n\n\nD. HERACLITUS.\n\nIf we put aside the Ionics, who did not understand the Absolute as\nThought, and the Pythagoreans likewise, we have the pure Being of the\nEleatics, and the dialectic which denies all finite relationships.\nThought to the latter is the process of such manifestations; the world\nin itself is the apparent, and pure Being alone the true. The dialectic\nof Zeno thus lays hold of the determinations which rest in the content\nitself, but it may, in so far, also be called subjective dialectic,\ninasmuch as it rests in the contemplative subject, and the one, without\nthis movement of the dialectic, is abstract identity. The next step\nfrom the existence of the dialectic as movement in the subject, is that\nit must necessarily itself become objective. If Aristotle blames Thales\nfor doing away with motion, because change cannot be understood from\nBeing, and likewise misses the actual in the Pythagorean numbers and\nPlatonic Ideas, taken as the substances of the things which participate\nin them, Heraclitus at least understands the absolute as just this\nprocess of the dialectic. The dialectic is thus thre-fold: (_\u03b1_)\nthe external dialectic, a reasoning which goes over and over again\nwithout ever reaching the soul of the thing; (_\u03b2_) immanent dialectic\nof the object, but falling within the contemplation of the subject;\n(_\u03b3_) the objectivity of Heraclitus which takes the dialectic itself\nas principle. The advance requisite and made by Heraclitus is the\nprogression from Being as the first immediate thought, to the category\nof Becoming as the second. This is the first concrete, the Absolute, as\nin it the unity of opposites. Thus with Heraclitus the philosophic Idea\nis to be met with in its speculative form; the reasoning of Parmenides\nand Zeno is abstract understanding. Heraclitus was thus universally\nesteemed a deep philosopher and even was decried as such. Here we see\nland; there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in\nmy Logic.\n\nDiogenes Laertius says (IX. 1) that Heraclitus flourished about the\n69th Olympiad (500 B.C.), and that he was of Ephesus and in part\ncontemporaneous with Parmenides: he began the separation and withdrawal\nof philosophers from public affairs and the interests of the country,\nand devoted himself in his isolation entirely to Philosophy. We\nhave thus three stages: (_\u03b1_) the seven sages as statesmen, regents\nand law-givers; (_\u03b2_) the Pythagorean aristocratic league; (_\u03b3_)\nan interest in science for its own sake. Little more is known of\nHeraclitus\u2019 life than his relations to his countrymen the Ephesians,\nand according to Diogenes Laertius (IX. 15, 3), these were for the\nmost part found in the fact that they despised him and were yet more\nprofoundly despised by him\u2014a relationship such as we have now-a-days,\nwhen each man exists for himself, and despises everyone else. In the\ncase of this noble character, the disdain and sense of separation\nfrom the crowd emanates from the deep sense of the perversity of\nthe ordinary ideas and life of his people: in reference to this,\nisolated expressions used on various occasions are still preserved.\nCicero (Tusc. Qu\u00e6st. V. 36) and Diogenes Laertius (IX. 2) relate that\nHeraclitus said: \u201cThe Ephesians all deserve to have their necks broken\nas they grow up, so that the town should be left to minors\u201d (people now\nsay that only youth knows how to govern), \u201cbecause they drove away his\nfriend Hermodorus, the best of them all, and gave as their reason for\nso doing that amongst them none should be more excellent than the rest;\nand if any one were so, it should be elsewhere and amongst others.\u201d It\nwas for the same reason that in the Athenian Democracy great men were\nbanished. Diogenes adds: \u201cHis fellow-citizens asked him to take part in\nthe administration of public affairs, but he declined, because he did\nnot like their constitution, laws and administration.\u201d Proclus (T. III.\npp. 115, 116, ed. Cousin) says: \u201cThe noble Heraclitus blamed the people\nfor being devoid of understanding or thought. \u2018What is,\u2019 he says,\n\u2018their understanding or their prudence? Most of them are bad, and few\nare good.\u2019\u201d Diogenes Laertius (IX. 6) furthermore says: \u201cAntisthenes\ncites, as a proof of Heraclitus\u2019 greatness, that he left his kingdom\nto his brother.\u201d He expresses in the strongest manner his contempt\nfor what is esteemed to be truth and right, in the letter preserved\nto us by Diogenes (IX. 13, 14), in which, to the invitation of Darius\nHystaspes, \u201cto make him acquainted with Greek wisdom\u2014for his work\non Nature contains a very forcible theory of the world, but it is in\nmany passages obscure\u2014to come to him and explain to him what required\nexplanation\u201d (this is certainly not very probable if Heraclitus\u2019 turn\nof mind was also Oriental), he is said to have replied: \u201cAll mortal men\ndepart from truth and justice and are given over to excess and vain\nopinions according to their evil understandings. But I, since I have\nattained to an oblivion of all evil, and shun the overpowering envy\nthat follows me, and the vanity of high position, shall not come to\nPersia. I am content with little and live in my own way.\u201d\n\nThe only work that he wrote, and the title of which, Diogenes tells\nus, was by some stated to be \u201cThe Muses\u201d and by others \u201cOn Nature,\u201d\nhe deposited in the temple of Diana at Ephesus. It seems to have been\npreserved until modern times; the fragments which have come down to\nus are collected together in Stephanus\u2019 _Po\u00ebsis philosophica_ (p.\n129, seq.). Schleiermacher also collected them and arranged them in a\ncharacteristic way. The title is \u201cHeraclitus, the Dark, of Ephesus,\nas represented in fragments of his work and by the testimony of the\nancients,\u201d and it is to be found in Wolf and Buttmann\u2019s \u201cMuseum of\nancient Learning,\u201d vol. I. (Berlin, 1807) pp. 315-533. Seventy-three\npassages are given. Kreuzer made one hope that he would work at\nHeraclitus more critically and with a knowledge of the language.\nHe made a more complete collection, particularly from grammarians;\nhowever, as, for lack of time, he left it to be worked up by a younger\nscholar, and as the latter died, it never came before the public.\nCompilations of the kind are as a rule too copious: they contain a\nmass of learning and are more easily written than read. Heraclitus\nhas been considered obscure, and is indeed celebrated for this; it\nalso drew upon him the name of _\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03c2_. Cicero (De Nat. Deor. I.\n26; III. 14; De Finib. II. 5) takes up a wrong idea, as often happens\nto him; he thinks that Heraclitus purposely wrote obscurely. Any\nsuch design would, however, be a very shallow one, and it is really\nnothing but the shallowness of Cicero himself ascribed by him to\nHeraclitus. Heraclitus\u2019 obscurity is rather a result of neglecting\nproper composition and of imperfect language; this is what was thought\nby Aristotle (Rhet. III. 5), who, from a grammatical point of view,\nascribed it to a want of punctuation: \u201cWe do not know whether a word\nbelongs to what precedes or what succeeds.\u201d Demetrius is of the same\nopinion (De Elocutione, \u00a7 192, p. 78, ed. Schneider). Socrates, as\nDiogenes Laertius relates (II. 22; IX. 11-12), said of this book: \u201cWhat\nhe understood of it was excellent, and what he did not understand he\nbelieved to be as good, but it requires a vigorous (_\u0394\u03b7\u03bb\u03af\u03bf\u03c5_) swimmer\nto make his way through it.\u201d The obscurity of this philosophy, however,\nchiefly consists in there being profound speculative thought contained\nin it; the Notion, the Idea, is foreign to the understanding and\ncannot be grasped by it, though it may find mathematics quite simple.\n\nPlato studied the philosophy of Heraclitus with special diligence; we\nfind much of it quoted in his works, and he got his earlier philosophic\neducation most indubitably from this source, so that Heraclitus may\nbe called Plato\u2019s teacher. Hippocrates, likewise, is a philosopher of\nHeraclitus\u2019 school. What is preserved to us of Heraclitus\u2019 philosophy\nat first seems very contradictory, but we find the Notion making its\nappearance, and a man of profound reflection revealed. Zeno began\nto abrogate the opposed predicates, and he shows the opposition in\nmovement, an assertion of limitation and an abrogation of the same;\nZeno expressed the infinite, but on its negative side only, in\nreference to its contradiction as being the untrue. In Heraclitus we\nsee the perfection of knowledge so far as it has gone, a perfecting of\nthe Idea into a totality, which is the beginning of Philosophy, since\nit expresses the essence of the Idea, the Notion of the infinite, the\npotentially and actively existent, as that which it is, i.e. as the\nunity of opposites. From Heraclitus dates the ever-remaining Idea which\nis the same in all philosophers to the present day, as it was the Idea\nof Plato and of Aristotle.\n\n1. _The Logical Principle._ Concerning the universal principle, this\nbold mind, Aristotle tells us (Metaph. IV. 3 and 7), first uttered the\ngreat saying: \u201cBeing and non-being are the same; everything is and yet\nis not.\u201d The truth only is as the unity of distinct opposites and,\nindeed, of the pure opposition of being and non-being; but with the\nEleatics we have the abstract understanding that Being is alone the\ntruth. We say, in place of using the expression of Heraclitus, that\nthe Absolute is the unity of being and non-being. When we understand\nthat proposition as that \u201cBeing is and yet is not,\u201d this does not seem\nto make much sense, but only to imply complete negation and want of\nthought. But we have another sentence that gives the meaning of the\nprinciple better. For Heraclitus says: \u201cEverything is in a state of\nflux; nothing subsists nor does it ever remain the same.\u201d And Plato\nfurther says of Heraclitus: \u201cHe compares things to the current of a\nriver: no one can go twice into the same stream,\u201d[61] for it flows on\nand other water is disturbed. Aristotle tells us (Met. IV. 5) that his\nsuccessors even said \u201cit could not once be entered,\u201d for it changed\ndirectly; what is, is not again. Aristotle (De C\u0153lo, III. 1) goes on\nto say that Heraclitus declares that \u201cthere is only one that remains,\nand from out of this all else is formed; all except this one is not\nenduring (_\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03af\u03c9\u03c2_).\u201d\n\nThis universal principle is better characterized as Becoming, the truth\nof Being; since everything is and is not, Heraclitus hereby expressed\nthat everything is Becoming. Not merely does origination belong to it,\nbut passing away as well; both are not independent, but identical.\nIt is a great advance in thought to pass from Being to Becoming,\neven if, as the first unity of opposite determinations, it is still\nabstract. Because in this relationship both must be unrestful and\ntherefore contain within themselves the principle of life, the lack of\nmotion which Aristotle has demonstrated in the earlier philosophies\nis supplied, and this last is even made to be the principle. This\nphilosophy is thus not one past and gone; its principle is essential,\nand is to be found in the beginning of my Logic, immediately after\nBeing and Nothing. The recognition of the fact that Being and non-being\nare abstractions devoid of truth, that the first truth is to be found\nin Becoming, forms a great advance. The understanding comprehends\nboth as having truth and value in isolation; reason, on the other\nhand, recognizes the one in the other, and sees that in the one its\n\u201cother\u201d is contained. If we do not take the conception of existence\nas complete, the pure Being of simple thought in which everything\ndefinite is denied, is the absolute negative; but nothing is the\nsame, or just this self-identity. We here have an absolute transition\ninto the opposite which Zeno did not reach, for he remained at the\nproposition, \u201cFrom nothing, comes nothing.\u201d With Heraclitus, however,\nthe moment of negativity is immanent, and the Notion of Philosophy as\ncomplete is therefore dealt with.\n\nIn the first place we have here the abstract idea of Being and\nnon-being in a form altogether immediate and general; but when we look\ncloser, we find that Heraclitus also conceived of the opposites and\ntheir unification in a more definite manner. He says: \u201cThe opposites\nare combined in the self-same one, just as honey is both sweet and\nbitter.\u201d Sextus remarks of this (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 29, \u00a7\u00a7 210, 211; II. 6,\n\u00a7 63): \u201cHeraclitus, like the Sceptics, proceeds from ordinary ideas; no\none will deny that healthy men call honey sweet, while those who are\nsick will say it is bitter.\u201d If it is only sweet, it cannot alter its\nnature in another individual; it would in all places and even to the\njaundiced patient be sweet. Aristotle (De mundo, 5) quotes this from\nHeraclitus: \u201cJoin together the complete whole and the incomplete\u201d (the\nwhole makes itself the part, and the meaning of the part is to become\nthe whole), \u201cwhat coincides and what conflicts, what is harmonious and\nwhat discordant, and from out of them all comes one, and from one,\nall.\u201d This one is not an abstraction, but the activity of dividing\nitself into opposites; the dead infinite is a poor abstraction as\ncompared with the depths of Heraclitus. All that is concrete, as that\nGod created the world, divided Himself, begot a Son, is contained in\nthis determination. Sextus Empiricus mentions (adv. Math. IX. 337) that\nHeraclitus said: \u201cThe part is something different from the whole and\nis yet the same as the whole; substance is the whole and the part, the\nwhole in the universe and the part in this living being.\u201d Plato says in\nhis Symposium (p. 187, Steph.; p. 397, Bekk.) of Heraclitus\u2019 principle:\n\u201cThe one, separated from itself, makes itself one with itself like the\nharmony of the bow and the lyre.\u201d He then makes Eryximachus, who speaks\nin the Symposium, criticize this thus: \u201cIn harmony there is discord, or\nit arises from opposites; for harmony does not arise from height and\ndepth in that they are different, but from their union through the art\nof music.\u201d But this does not contradict Heraclitus, who means the same\nthing. That which is simple, the repetition of a tone, is no harmony;\ndifference is clearly necessary to harmony, or a definite antithesis;\nfor it is the absolute becoming and not mere change. The real fact is\nthat each particular tone is different from another\u2014not abstractly so\nfrom any other, but from _its_ other\u2014and thus it also can be one. Each\nparticular only is, in so far as its opposite is implicitly contained\nin its Notion. Subjectivity is thus the \u201cother\u201d of objectivity and not\nof a piece of paper, which would be meaningless; since each is the\n\u201cother\u201d of the \u201cother\u201d as its \u201cother,\u201d we here have their identity.\nThis is Heraclitus\u2019 great principle; it may seem obscure, but it\nis speculative. And this to the understanding which maintains the\nindependence of Being and non-being, the subjective and objective, the\nreal and the ideal, is always difficult and dim.\n\n2. _Natural Philosophy._ In his system Heraclitus did not rest content\nwith thus expressing himself in Notions, or with what is purely\nlogical. But in addition to this universal form in which he advanced\nhis principle, he gave his idea a real and more natural form, and\nhence he is still reckoned as belonging to the Ionic school of natural\nphilosophers. However, as regards this form of reality, historians are\nat variance; most of them, and amongst others, Aristotle (Met. I. 3,\n8), say that he maintained fire to be the existent principle; others,\naccording to Sextus (adv. Math. IX. 360; X. 233), say it was air, and\nothers again assert that he made vapour to be the principle rather\nthan air;[62] even time is, in Sextus (adv. Math. X. 216), given as\nthe primary existence. The question arises as to how this diversity is\nto be comprehended. It must not be believed that all these accounts\nare to be ascribed to the inaccuracy of historians, for the witnesses\nare of the best, like Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus, who do not speak\ncasually of these forms, but definitely, without, however, remarking\nupon any such differences and contradictions. We seem to have a better\nreason in the obscurity of the writing of Heraclitus, which might, by\nthe confusion of its expression, give occasion to misunderstanding.\nBut when regarded closer, this difficulty, which is evident when\nmerely looked at superficially, disappears; it is in the profoundly\nsignificant conceptions of Heraclitus that the true way out of this\ndifficulty manifests itself. Heraclitus could no longer, like Thales,\nexpress water, air or anything similar as an absolute principle\u2014he\ncould no longer do so in the form of a primeval element from which the\nrest proceeds\u2014because he thought of Being as identical with non-being,\nor the infinite Notion; thus the existent, absolute principle cannot\nwith him come forth as a definite and actual thing such as water, but\nmust be water in alteration, or as process only.\n\n_a._ Understanding the abstract process as time, Heraclitus said:\n\u201cTime is the first corporeal existence,\u201d as Sextus (adv. Math. X. 231,\n232) puts it. Corporeal is an unfortunate expression; the Sceptics\nfrequently pick out the crudest expressions or make thoughts crude\nin the first place so that they may afterwards dispense with them.\nCorporeal here means abstract sensuousness; time, as the first sensuous\nexistence, is the abstract representation of process. It is because\nHeraclitus did not rest at the logical expression of Becoming, but gave\nto his principle the form of the existent, that it was necessary that\ntime should first present itself to him as such; for in the sensuously\nperceptible it is the first form of Becoming. Time is pure Becoming\nas perceived, the pure Notion, that which is simple, and the harmony\nissuing from absolute opposites; its essential nature is to be and not\nto be in one unity, and besides this, it has no other character. It is\nnot that time _is_ or _is not_, for time _is_ non-being immediately in\nBeing and Being immediately in non-being: it is the transition out of\nBeing into non-being, the abstract Notion, but in an objective form,\ni.e. in so far as it is for us. In time there is no past and future,\nbut only the now, and this is, but is not as regards the past; and this\nnon-being, as future, turns round into Being. If we were to say how\nthat which Heraclitus recognized as principle, might, in the pure form\nin which he recognized it, exist for consciousness, we could mention\nnothing else but time; and it quite accords with the principle of\nthought in Heraclitus to define time as the first form of Becoming.\n\n_b._ But this pure, objective Notion must realize itself more fully,\nand thus we find in fact, that Heraclitus determined the process in a\nmore markedly physical manner. In time we have the moments of Being and\nnon-being manifested as negative only, or as vanishing immediately;\nif we wish to express both these moments as one independent totality,\nthe question is asked, which physical existence corresponds to this\ndetermination. To Heraclitus the truth is to have grasped the essential\nbeing of nature, i.e. to have represented it as implicitly infinite,\nas process in itself; and consequently it is evident to us that\nHeraclitus could not say that the primary principle is air, water, or\nany such thing. They are not themselves process, but fire is process;\nand thus he maintains fire to be the elementary principle, and this is\nthe real form of the Heraclitean principle, the soul and substance of\nthe nature-process. Fire is physical time, absolute unrest, absolute\ndisintegration of existence, the passing away of the \u201cother,\u201d but also\nof itself; and hence we can understand how Heraclitus, proceeding from\nhis fundamental determination, could quite logically call fire the\nNotion of the process.\n\n_c._ He further made this fire to be a real process; because its\nreality is for itself the whole process, the moments have become\nconcretely determined. Fire, as the metamorphosis of bodily things, is\nthe transformation and exhalation of the determinate; for this process\nHeraclitus used a particular word\u2014evaporation (_\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2_)\u2014but it\nis rather transition. Aristotle (De anim. I. 2) says of Heraclitus in\nthis regard, that, according to his view, \u201cthe soul is the principle\nbecause it is evaporation, the origination of everything; it is what\nis most incorporeal and always in a state of flux.\u201d This is quite\napplicable to the primary principle of Heraclitus.\n\nFurthermore he determined the real process in its abstract moments\nby separating two sides in it\u2014\u201cthe way upwards (_\u1f41\u03b4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd\u03c9_) and the\nway downwards (_\u1f41\u03b4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9_)\u201d\u2014the one being division, in that it is\nthe existence of opposites, and the other the unification of these\nexistent opposites. Corresponding to these, he had, according to\nDiogenes (IX. 8), the further determinations \u201cof enmity and strife\n(_\u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2_, _\u1f14\u03c1\u03b9\u03c2_), and friendship and harmony (_\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1_, _\u03b5\u1f30\u03c1\u03ae\u03bd\u03b7_);\nof these two, enmity and strife is that which is the principle of\nthe origination of differences; but what leads to combustion is\nharmony and peace.\u201d In enmity amongst men, the one sets himself up\nindependently of the other, or is for himself and realizes himself; but\nunity and peace is sinking out of independence into indivisibility or\nnon-reality. Everything is thre-fold and thereby real unity; nature is\nthe never-resting, and the all is the transition out of the one into\nthe other, from division into unity, and from unity into division.\n\nThe more detailed accounts of this real process are, in great measure,\ndeficient and contradictory. In this connection, it is in some\naccounts[63] said of Heraclitus that he defined it thus: \u201cOf the forms\ntaken by fire there is first of all the sea, and then of it half is\nthe earth and the other half the lightning flash (_\u03c0\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1_),\u201d the fire\nwhich springs up. This is general and very obscure. Diogenes Laertius\n(IX. 9) says: \u201cFire is condensed into moisture, and when concrete it\nbecomes water; water hardens into earth and this is the way downwards.\nThe earth then again becomes fluid, and from it moisture supervenes,\nand from this the evaporation of the sea, from which all else arises;\nthis is the way upwards. Water divides into a dark evaporation,\nbecoming earth, and into what is pure, sparkling, becoming fire and\nburning in the solar sphere; what is fiery becomes meteors, planets and\nstars.\u201d These are thus not still, dead stars, but are regarded as in\nBecoming, as being eternally productive. We thus have, on the whole, a\nmetamorphosis of fire. These oriental, metaphorical expressions are,\nhowever, in Heraclitus not to be taken in their strictly sensuous\nsignification, and as if these changes were present to the outward\nobservation; but they depict the nature of these elements by which the\nearth eternally creates its suns and comets.\n\nNature is thus a circle. With this in view, we find Heraclitus,\naccording to Clement of Alexandria (Strom. V. 14, p. 711), saying:\n\u201cThe universe was made neither by God nor man, but it ever was and is,\nand will be, a living fire, that which, in accordance with its laws,\n(_\u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u1ff3_) kindles and goes out.\u201d We now understand what Aristotle says\nof the principle being the soul, since the latter is evaporation; that\nis to say, fire, as this self-moving process of the world, is the\nsoul. Another statement follows, which is also found in Clement of\nAlexandria (Strom. VI. 2, p. 746): \u201cTo souls (to the living) death is\nthe becoming water; to water death is the becoming earth; on the other\nhand from earth, water arises, and from water, the soul.\u201d Thus, on the\nwhole, this process is one of extinction, of going back from opposition\ninto unity, of the re-awakening of the former, and of issuing forth\nfrom one. The extinction of the soul, of the fire in water, the\nconflagration that finally results, some, and amongst others, Diogenes\nLaertius (IX. 8), Eusebius (Pr\u00e6p. Evang. XIV. 3) and Tennemann (Vol.\nI. p. 218), falsely assert to be a conflagration of the world. What\nHeraclitus is said to have spoken of as a conflagration of this world,\nwas thought to be an imaginary idea that after a certain time\u2014as,\naccording to our ideas, at the end of the world\u2014the world would\ndisappear in flames. But we see at once from passages which are most\nclear,[64] that this conflagration is not meant, but that it is the\nperpetual burning up as the Becoming of friendship, the universal life\nand the universal process of the universe. In respect of the fact that,\naccording to Heraclitus, fire is the animating, or the soul, we find\nin Plutarch (De esu. carn. I. p. 995, ed. Xyl.) an expression which\nmay seem odd, namely, that \u201cthe driest soul is the best.\u201d We certainly\ndo not esteem the most moist the best, but, on the other hand, the one\nwhich is most alive; however dry here signifies fiery and thus the\ndriest soul is pure fire, and this is not lifeless but life itself.\n\nThese are the principal moments of the real life-process; I will stop\nhere a moment because we here find expressed the whole Notion of\nspeculative reflection regarding Nature. In this Notion, one moment\nand one element goes over into the other; fire becomes water, water\nearth and fire. The contention about the transmutation and immutability\nof the elements is an old one; in this conception the ordinary,\nsensuous science of nature separates itself from natural philosophy.\nIn the speculative point of view, which is that of Heraclitus, the\nsimple substance in fire and the other elements in itself becomes\nmetamorphosed; in the other, all transition is abolished and only an\nexternal separation of what is already there is maintained. Water is\njust water, fire is fire, &c. If the former point of view upholds\ntransmutation, the latter believes in the possibility of demonstrating\nthe opposite; it no longer, indeed, maintains water, fire, &c., to\nbe simple realities, for it resolves them into hydrogen, oxygen,\n&c., but it asserts their immutability. It justly asserts that what\nis asserted and implied in the speculative point of view, must also\nhave the truth of actuality; for if to be the speculative means to be\nthe very nature and principle of its elements, this must likewise be\npresent. We are wrong in representing the speculative to be something\nexistent only in thought or inwardly, which is no one knows where. It\nis really present, but men of learning shut their eyes to it because\nof their limited point of view. If we listen to their account, they\nonly observe and say what they see; but their observation is not true,\nfor unconsciously they transform what is seen through their limited\nand stereotyped conception; the strife is not due to the opposition\nbetween observation and the absolute Notion, but between the one Notion\nand the other. They show that changes\u2014such as that of water into\nearth\u2014are non-existent. Even in modern times this transformation was\nindeed maintained, for when water was distilled, a residuum of earth\nwas found. On this subject, however, Lavoisier carried on a number\nof very conclusive researches; he weighed all the receptacles, and\nit was shown that the residuum proceeded from the vessels. There is\na superficial process that does not carry us beyond the determinate\nnature of substance. They say in reference to it, \u201cwater does not\nchange into air but only into moisture, and moisture always condenses\nback into water again.\u201d But in this they merely fix on a one-sided,\ninsufficient process, and give it out to be the absolute process. In\nthe real process of nature they, however, found by experience that the\ncrystal dissolved gives water, and in the crystal, water is lost and\nsolidifies, or becomes the so-called water of crystallization; they\nfound that the evaporation of the earth is not to be found as moisture,\nin outward form in the air, for air remains quite pure, or hydrogen\nentirely disappears in pure air; they have sought in vain to find\nhydrogen in the atmospheric air. Similarly they discovered that quite\ndry air in which they can show neither moisture nor hydrogen, passes\ninto mist, rain, &c. These are their observations, but they spoilt all\ntheir perceptions of changes by the fixed conception which they brought\nwith them of whole and part, and of consistence out of parts, and of\nthe previous presence as such, of what manifests itself in coming into\nexistence. When the crystal dissolved reveals water, they say, \u201cit is\nnot that water has arisen, for it was already present there.\u201d When\nwater in its decomposition reveals hydrogen and oxygen, that means,\naccording to them, \u201cthese last have not arisen for they were already\nthere as such, as the parts of which the water subsists.\u201d But they can\nneither demonstrate water in crystal nor oxygen and hydrogen in water,\nand the same is true of \u201clatent heat.\u201d As we find in all expression\nof perception and experience, as soon as men speak, there is a Notion\npresent; it cannot be withheld, for in consciousness there always is a\ntouch of universality and truth. For the Notion is the real principle,\nbut it is only to cultured reason that it is absolute Notion, and not\nif it remains, as here, confined in a determinate form. Hence these\nmen necessarily attain to their limits, and they are troubled because\nthey do not find hydrogen in air; hygrometers, flasks full of air\nbrought down from heights by an air-balloon, do not show it to exist.\nAnd similarly the water of crystallization is no longer water, but is\nchanged into earth.\n\nTo come back to Heraclitus, there is only one thing wanting to the\nprocess, which is that its simple principle should be recognized as\nuniversal Notion. The permanence and rest which Aristotle gives, may be\nmissed. Heraclitus, indeed, says that everything flows on, that nothing\nis existent and only the one remains; but that is the Notion of the\nunity which only exists in opposition and not of that reflected within\nitself. This one, in its unity with the movement of the individuals,\nis the genus, or in its infinitude the simple Notion as thought; as\nsuch, the Idea has still to be determined, and we shall thus find it\nagain as the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ of Anaxagoras. The universal is the immediate\nsimple unity in opposition which goes back into itself as a process of\ndifferences; but this is also found in Heraclitus; he called this unity\nin opposition Fate (_\u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7_) or Necessity.[65] And the Notion of\nnecessity is none other than this, that determinateness constitutes the\nprinciple of the existent as individual, but in that very way, relates\nit to its opposite: this is the absolute \u201cconnection (_\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2_) that\npermeates the Being of the whole.\u201d He calls this \u201cthe ethereal body,\nthe seed of the Becoming of everything\u201d;[66] that to him is the Idea,\nthe universal as reality, as process at rest.\n\n3. _Relation of the Principle to Consciousness._ There is still\nsomething else to consider, and that is what position in this principle\nHeraclitus gives to consciousness; his philosophy has, on the whole,\na bent towards a philosophy of nature, for the principle, although\nlogical, is apprehended as the universal nature-process. How does this\n_\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2_ come to consciousness? How is it related to the individual\nsoul? I shall explain this here in greater detail: it is a beautiful,\nnatural, childlike manner of speaking truth of the truth. The universal\nand the unity of the principle of consciousness and of the object,\nand the necessity of objectivity, make their first appearance here.\nSeveral passages from Heraclitus are preserved respecting his views of\nknowledge. From his principle that everything that is, at the same time\nis not, it immediately follows that he holds that sensuous certainty\nhas no truth; for it is the certainty for which something exists as\nactual, which is not so in fact. Not this immediate Being, but absolute\nmediation, Being as thought of, Thought itself, is the true Being.\nHeraclitus in this relation says of sensuous perception\u2014according to\nClement of Alexandria\u2014(Strom. III. 3, p. 520): \u201cWhat we see waking\nis dead, but what we see sleeping, a dream,\u201d and in Sextus (adv.\nMath. VII. 126, 127), \u201cMen\u2019s eyes and ears are bad witnesses, for\nthey have barbarous souls. Reason (_\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2_) is the judge of truth,\nnot the arbitrary, but the only divine and universal judge\u201d\u2014this is\nthe measure, the rhythm, that runs through the Being of everything.\nAbsolute necessity is just the having the truth in consciousness; but\nevery thought, or what proceeds from the individual, every relation\nin which there is only form and which has the content of the ordinary\nidea, is not such; what is so is the universal understanding, the\ndeveloped consciousness of necessity, the identity of subjective and\nobjective. Heraclitus says in this connection, according to Diogenes\n(IX. 1): \u201cMuch learning (_\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03af\u03bd_) does not instruct the mind, else\nit had instructed Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hecat\u00e6us. The only\nwisdom is to know the reason that reigns over all.\u201d\n\nSextus (adv. Math. VII. 127-133), further describes the attitude of\nthe subjective consciousness, of particular reason, to the universal,\nto this nature-process. That attitude has still a very physical\nappearance, resembling the state of mind we suppose in men who are\nmad or asleep. The waking man is related to things in a universal\nway, which is in conformity with the relation of the things and is\nthe way in which others also regard them, and yet he still retains\nhis independence. If, and in so far as I stand in the objectively\nintelligent connection of this state of mind, I am, just because of\nthis externality, in finitude; but waking, I have the knowledge of the\nnecessity of a connection in the form of objectivity, the knowledge\nof the universal existence, and thus the Idea in finite form. Sextus\nputs this in definite form: \u201cEverything that surrounds us is logical\nand intelligent\u201d\u2014yet not therefore accompanied by consciousness.\n\u201cIf we draw this universal reality through our breath, we shall be\nintelligent, but we are so waking only, sleeping we are in oblivion.\u201d\nThe waking consciousness of the outer world, what belongs to the sphere\nof the understanding, is rather what may be called a condition; but\nhere it is taken as the whole of rational consciousness. \u201cFor in sleep\nthe channels of feeling are closed and the understanding that is in\nus is prevented from uniting (_\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03c5\u0390\u03b1\u03c2_) with the surroundings; the\nbreath is the only connection (_\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2_) maintained, and it may\nbe compared to a root.\u201d This breath is thus distinguished from the\nuniversal breath, i.e. from the being of another for us. Reason is this\nprocess with the objective: when we are not in connection with the\nwhole, we only dream. \u201cSeparated, the understanding loses the power of\nconsciousness (_\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd_) that it formerly had.\u201d The mind\nas individual unity only, loses objectivity, is not in individuality\nuniversal, is not the Thought which has itself as object. \u201cIn a waking\ncondition, however, the understanding\u2014gazing through the channels of\nsense as though it were through a window, and forming a relationship\nwith the surroundings\u2014maintains the logical power.\u201d We here have the\nideal in its native simplicity. \u201cIn the same way as coals which come\nnear fire, themselves take fire, but apart from it, go out, the part\nwhich is cut off from the surroundings in our bodies becomes, through\nthe separation, almost irrational.\u201d This confutes those who think that\nGod gives wisdom in sleep or in somnambulism. But in connection with\nthe many channels it becomes similar to the whole. This whole, the\nuniversal and divine understanding, in unity with which we are logical,\nis, according to Heraclitus, the essence of truth. Hence that which\nappears as the universal to all, carries with it conviction, for it has\npart in the universal and divine Logos, while what is subscribed to by\nan individual carries with it no conviction from the opposite cause. He\nsays in the beginning of his book on Nature: \u201cSince the surroundings\nare reason, men are irrational both before they hear and when they\nfirst hear. For since what happens, happens according to this reason,\nthey are still inexperienced when they search the sayings and the works\nwhich I expound, distinguishing the nature of everything and explaining\nits relations. But other men do not know what they do awake, just as\nthey forget what they do in sleep.\u201d Heraclitus says further: \u201cWe do and\nthink everything in that we participate in the divine understanding\n(_\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2_). Hence we must follow the universal understanding. But\nmany live as if they had an understanding (_\u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd_) of their own;\nthe understanding is, however, nothing but interpretation\u201d (being\nconscious) \u201cof the manner in which all is ordered. Hence in so far\nas we participate in the knowledge (_\u03bc\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7\u03c2_) of it, we are in the\ntruth; but in so far as we are singular (_\u1f30\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd_) we are in error.\u201d\nGreat and important words! We cannot speak of truth in a truer or less\nprejudiced way. Consciousness as consciousness of the universal, is\nalone consciousness of truth; but consciousness of individuality and\naction as individual, an originality which becomes a singularity of\ncontent or of form, is the untrue and bad. Wickedness and error thus\nare constituted by isolating thought and thereby bringing about a\nseparation from the universal. Men usually consider, when they speak of\nthinking something, that it must be something particular, but this is\nquite a delusion.\n\nHowever much Heraclitus may maintain that there is no truth in sensuous\nknowledge because all that exists is in a state of flux, and that\nthe existence of sensuous certainty is not while it is, he maintains\nthe objective method in knowledge to be none the less necessary. The\nrational, the true, that which I know, is indeed a withdrawal from the\nobjective as from what is sensuous, individual, definite and existent;\nbut what reason knows within itself is necessity or the universal\nof being; it is the principle of thought, as it is the principle of\nthe world. It is this contemplation of truth that Spinoza in his\nEthics (P. II. propos. XLIV., coroll. II. p. 118, ed. Paul), calls \u201ca\ncontemplation of things in the guise of eternity.\u201d The being-for-self\nof reason is not an objectless consciousness, or a dream, but a\nknowledge, that which is for itself; but this being-for-self is\nawake, or is objective and universal, _i.e._ is the same for all. The\ndream is a knowledge of something of which I alone know; fancy may\nbe instanced as just such a dream. Similarly it is by feeling that\nsomething is for me alone, and that I have something in me as in this\nsubject; the feeling may profess to be ever so elevated, yet it really\nis the case that for me as this subject, it is what I feel, and not an\nobject independent of me. But in truth, the object is for me something\nessentially free, and I am for myself devoid of subjectivity; similarly\nthis object is no imaginary one made an object by me alone, but is in\nitself a universal.\n\nThere are, besides, many other fragments of Heraclitus, solitary\nexpressions, such as his saying, \u201cmen are mortal gods, and gods\nimmortal men; living is death to the former and dying is their\nlife.\u201d[67] Life is the death of the gods, death is the life of the\ngods; the divine is the rising through thought above mere nature which\nbelongs to death. Hence Heraclitus also says, according to Sextus (adv.\nMath. VII., 349): \u201cthe power of thinking is outside the body,\u201d which,\nin a remarkable way, Tennemann makes into: \u201coutside of men.\u201d In Sextus\n(Pyrrh. Hyp. III. 24, \u00a7 230) we further read: \u201cHeraclitus says that\nboth life and death are united in our life as in our death; for if we\nlive, our souls are dead and buried in us, but if we die, our souls\narise and live.\u201d We may, in fact, say of Heraclitus what Socrates said:\n\u201cWhat remains to us of Heraclitus is excellent, and we must conjecture\nof what is lost, that it was as excellent.\u201d Or if we wish to consider\nfate so just as always to preserve to posterity what is best, we must\nat least say of what we have of Heraclitus, that it is worthy of this\npreservation.\n\nE. EMPEDOCLES, LEUCIPPUS AND DEMOCRITUS.\n\nWe shall take Leucippus and Democritus with Empedocles; in them\nthere is manifested the ideality of the sensuous and also universal\ndeterminateness or a transition to the universal. Empedocles was\na Pythagorean Italian, whose tendencies were Ionic; Leucippus and\nDemocritus, who incline to the Italians, in that they carried on the\nEleatic school, are more interesting. Both these philosophers belong\nto the same philosophic system; they must be taken together as regards\ntheir philosophic thought and considered thus.[68] Leucippus is the\nolder, and Democritus perfected what the former began, but it is\ndifficult to say what properly speaking belongs to him historically.\nIt is certainly recorded that he developed Leucippus\u2019 thought, and\nthere is, too, some of his work preserved, but it is not worthy of\nquotation. In Empedocles we see the commencement of the determination\nand separation of principles. The becoming conscious of difference is\nan essential moment, but the principles here have in part the character\nof physical Being, and though partaking also of ideal Being, this form\nis not yet thought-form. On the other hand we find in Leucippus and\nDemocritus the more ideal principles, the atom and the Nothing, and we\nalso find thought-determination more immersed in the objective\u2014that\nis, the beginning of a metaphysics of body; or pure Notions possess the\nsignificance of the material, and thus pass over thought into objective\nform. But the teaching is, on the whole, immature, and is incapable of\ngiving satisfaction.\n\n\n1. LEUCIPPUS AND DEMOCRITUS.\n\nNothing is accurately known of the circumstances of Leucippus\u2019 life,\nnot even where he was born. Some, like Diogenes Laertius (IX. 30), make\nhim out to be an Eleatic; others to have belonged to Abdera (because he\nwas with Democritus), or to Melos\u2014Melos is an island not far from the\nPeloponnesian coast\u2014or else, as is asserted by Simplicius in writing\non Aristotle\u2019s Physics (p. 7), to Miletus. It is definitely stated\nthat he was a disciple and a friend of Zeno; yet he seems to have been\nalmost contemporaneous with him as well as with Heraclitus.\n\nIt is less doubtful that Democritus belonged to Abdera in Thrace, on\nthe Aegean Sea, a town that in later times became so notorious on\naccount of foolish actions. He was born, it would appear, about the\n80th Olympiad (460 B.C.), or Olympiad 77, 3 (470 B.C.); the first date\nis given by Apollodorus (Diog. Laert. IX. 41), the other by Thrasyllus;\nTennemann (Vol. I. p. 415) makes his birth to fall about the 71st\nOlympiad (494 B.C.). According to Diogenes Laertius (IX. 34), he was\nforty years younger than Anaxagoras, lived to the time of Socrates, and\nwas even younger than he\u2014that is supposing him to have been born, not\nin Olympiad 71, but in Olympiad 80. His connection with the Abderites\nhas been much discussed, and many bad anecdotes are told regarding it\nby Diogenes Laertius. That he was very rich, Valerius Maximus (VIII.\n7, ext. 4) judges from the fact that his father entertained the whole\nof Xerxes\u2019 army on its passage to Greece. Diogenes tells (IX. 35, 36)\nthat he expended his means, which were considerable, on journeys to\nEgypt and in penetrating into the East, but this last is not authentic.\nHis possessions are stated to have amounted to a hundred talents, and\nif an Attic talent was worth about from 1000 to 1200 thalers, he must\nundoubtedly have been able to get far enough with that. It is always\nsaid that he was a friend and disciple of Leucippus, as Aristotle\nrelates (Met. I. 4), but where they met is not told. Diogenes (IX. 39)\ngoes on: \u201cAfter he returned from his journeys into his own country,\nhe lived very quietly, for he had consumed all his substance, but\nhe was supported by his brother and attained to high honour amongst\nhis countrymen\u201d\u2014not through his philosophy, but\u2014\u201cby some prophetic\nutterances. According to the law, however, he who ran through his\nfather\u2019s means could not have a place in the paternal burial-place. To\ngive no place to the calumniator or evil speaker\u201d\u2014as though he had\nspent his means through extravagance\u2014\u201che read his work _\u0394\u03b9\u03ac\u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2_ to\nthe Abderites, and the latter gave him a present of 500 talents, had\nhis statue publicly erected, and buried him with great pomp when, at\n100 years old, he died.\u201d That this was also an Abderite jest, those who\nleft us this narrative, at least, did not see.\n\nLeucippus is the originator of the famous atomic system which, as\nrecently revived, is held to be the principle of rational science.\nIf we take this system on its own account, it is certainly very\nbarren, and there is not much to be looked for in it; but it must be\nallowed that we are greatly indebted to Leucippus, because, as it is\nexpressed in our ordinary physics, he separated the universal and\nthe sensuous, or the primary and the secondary, or the essential and\nthe nonessential qualities of body. The universal quality means, in\nspeculative language, the fact that the corporeal is really universally\ndetermined through the Notion or the principle of body: Leucippus\nunderstood the determinate nature of Being, not in a superficial\nmanner, but in a speculative. When it is said that body has those\nuniversal qualities, such as form, impenetrability and weight, we think\nthat the indeterminate conception of body is the essence, and that its\nessence is something other than these qualities. But speculatively,\nessential existence is just universal determinations; they are existent\nin themselves, or the abstract content and the reality of existence.\nTo body as such, there is nothing left for the determination of reality\nbut pure singularity; but it is the unity of opposites, and the unity\nof these predicates constitutes its reality.\n\nLet us recollect that in the Eleatic philosophy Being and non-being\nwere looked at as in opposition; that only Being is, and non-being, in\nwhich category we find motion, change, &c., is not. Being is not as yet\nthe unity turning back, and turned back into itself, like Heraclitus\u2019\nmotion and the universal. It may be said of the point of view that\ndifference, change, motion, &c., fall within sensuous, immediate\nperception, that the assertion that only Being is, is as contradictory\nto appearances as to thought; for the nothing, that which the Eleatics\nabolished, is. Or within the Heraclitean Idea, Being and non-being\nare the same; Being is, but non-being, since it is one with Being, is\nas well, or Being is both the predicate of Being and of non-being.\nBut Being and non-being are both expressed as having the qualities of\nobjectivity, or as they are for sensuous perception, and hence they are\nthe opposition of full and empty. Leucippus says this; he expresses as\nexistent what was really present to the Eleatics. Aristotle says (Met.\nI. 4): \u201cLeucippus and his friend Democritus maintain that the full and\nthe empty are the elements, and they call the one the existent, and the\nother the non-existent; that is, the full and solid are the existent,\nthe empty and rare, the non-existent. Hence they also say that Being\nis no more than non-being because the empty is as well as the bodily;\nand these form the material sources of everything.\u201d The full has the\natom as its principle. The Absolute, what exists in and for itself,\nis thus the atom and the empty (_\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f04\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd_): this is an\nimportant, if at the same time, an insufficient explanation. It is not\natoms as we should speak of them, such, for example, as we represent\nto ourselves as floating in the air, that are alone the principle, for\nthe intervening nothing is just as essential. Thus here we have the\nfirst appearance of the atomic system. We must now give the further\nsignification and determination of this principle.\n\n_a. The Logical Principle_\n\nThe principal point of consideration is the One, existent for\nitself: this determination is a great principle and one which we\nhave not hitherto had. Parmenides establishes Being or the abstract\nuniversal; Heraclitus, process; the determination of being-for-self\nbelongs to Leucippus. Parmenides says that the nothing does not exist\nat all; with Heraclitus Becoming existed only as the transition of\nBeing into nothing where each is negated; but the view that each is\nsimply at home with itself, the positive as the self-existent one and\nthe negative as empty, is what came to consciousness in Leucippus, and\nbecame the absolute determination. The atomic principle in this manner\nhas not passed away, for it must from this point of view always exist;\nthe being-for-self must in every logical philosophy[69] be an essential\nmoment and yet it must not be put forward as ultimate. In the logical\nprogression from Being and Becoming to this thought-determination,\nBeing as existent here and now[70] certainly first appears, but\nthis last belongs to the sphere of finality and hence cannot be the\nprinciple of Philosophy. Thus, though the development of Philosophy\nin history must correspond to the development of logical philosophy,\nthere will still be passages in it which are absent in historical\ndevelopment. For instance, if we wished to make Being as existent here\nthe principle, it would be what we have in consciousness\u2014there are\nthings, these things are finite and bear a relation to one another\u2014but\nthis is the category of our unthinking knowledge, of appearance.\nBeing-for-self, on the other hand, is, as Being, simple relation to\nitself, but through negation of the other-Being. If I say I am for\nmyself, I not only am, but I negate in me all else, exclude it from\nme, in so far as it seems to me to be external. As negation of other\nbeing, which is just negation in relation to me, being-for-self is\nthe negation of negation and thus affirmation; and this is, as I call\nit, absolute negativity in which mediation indeed is present, but a\nmediation which is just as really taken away.\n\nThe principle of the One is altogether ideal and belongs entirely to\nthought, even though we wish to say that atoms exist. The atom may be\ntaken materially, but it is supersensuous, purely intellectual. In our\ntimes, too, more especially through the instrumentality of Gassendi,\nthis conception of atoms has been renewed. The atoms of Leucippus are,\nhowever, not molecules, the small particles of Physics. In Leucippus,\naccording to Aristotle, (De gen. et corr. I. 8) there is to be found\nthe idea that \u201catoms are invisible because of the smallness of their\nbody,\u201d which is much like the way in which molecules are now-a-days\nspoken of: but this is merely a way of speaking of them. The One can\nneither be seen nor shown with magnifying glasses or measures, because\nit is an abstraction of thought; what is shown is always matter that is\nput together. It is just as futile when, as in modern times, men try\nby the microscope to investigate the inmost part of the organism, the\nsoul, and think they can discover it by means of sight and feeling.\nThus the principle of the One is altogether ideal, but not in the\nsense of being in thought or in the head alone, but in such a way that\nthought is made the true essence of things. Leucippus understood it\nso, and his philosophy is consequently not at all empirical. Tennemann\n(Vol. 1, p. 261), on the other hand, says, quite wrongly, \u201cThe system\nof Leucippus is opposed to that of the Eleatics; he recognizes the\nempirical world as the only objective reality, and body as the only\nkind of existence.\u201d But the atom and the vacuum are not things of\nexperience; Leucippus says that it is not the senses through which\nwe become conscious of the truth, and thereby he has established an\nidealism in the higher sense and not one which is merely subjective.\n\n_b. The Constitution of the World_\n\nHowever abstract this principle might be to Leucippus, he was\nanxious to make it concrete. The meaning of atom is the individual,\nthe indivisible; in another form the One is thus individuality,\nthe determination of subjectivity. The universal and, on the other\nside, the individual, are great determinations which are involved\nin everything, and men first know what they have in these abstract\ndeterminations, when they recognize in the concrete that even there\nthey are predominant. To Leucippus and Democritus this principle, which\nafterwards came to light with Epicurus, remained physical; but it also\nappears in what is intellectual. Mind indeed, is also an atom and one;\nbut as one within itself, it is at the same time infinitely full. In\nfreedom, right and law, in exercising will, our only concern is with\nthis opposition of universality and individuality. In the sphere of\nthe state the point of view that the single will is, as an atom, the\nabsolute, may be maintained; the more modern theories of the state\nwhich also made themselves of practical effect, are of this kind. The\nstate must rest on the universal, that is, on the will that exists\nin and for itself; if it rests on that of the individual, it becomes\natomic and is comprehended in accordance with the thought-determination\nof the one, as is the case in Rousseau\u2019s _Contrat Social_. From what\nAristotle tells us in the passage last quoted, Leucippus\u2019 idea of all\nthat is concrete and actual is further this: \u201cThe full is nothing\nsimple, for it is an infinitely manifold. These infinitely many, move\nin the vacuum, for the vacuum exists; their conglomeration brings\nabout origination\u201d (that is, of an existing thing, or what is for the\nsenses), \u201cdisintegration and separation result in passing away.\u201d All\nother categories are included here. \u201cActivity and passivity subsist in\nthe fact, that they are contiguous; but their contiguity is not their\nbecoming one, for from that which is truly\u201d (abstractly) \u201cone there\ndoes not come a number, nor from that which is truly many, one.\u201d Or,\nit may be said, they are in fact neither passive nor active, \u201cfor they\nmerely abide through the vacuum\u201d without having as their principle,\nprocess. Atoms thus are, even in their apparent union in that which\nwe call things, separated from one another through the vacuum which\nis purely negative and foreign to them, _i.e._ their relation is not\ninherent in themselves, but is with something other than them, in which\nthey remain what they are. This vacuum, the negative in relation to the\naffirmative, is also the principle of the movement of atoms; they are\nso to speak solicited by the vacuum to fill up and to negate it.\n\nThese are the doctrines of the atomists. We see that we have reached\nthe extreme limits of these thoughts, for when relation comes into\nquestion, we step beyond them. Being and non-being, as something\nthought, which, when represented for consciousness as differing in\nregard to one another, are the plenum and the vacuum, have no diversity\nin themselves; for the plenum has likewise negativity in itself; as\nindependent, it excludes what is different; it is one and infinitely\nmany ones, while the vacuum is not exclusive, but pure continuity. Both\nthese opposites, the one and continuity, being now settled, nothing is\neasier to imagine than that atoms should float in existent continuity,\nnow being separated and now united; and thus that their union should\nbe only a superficial relation, or a synthesis that is not determined\nthrough the inherent nature of what is united, but in which these\nself-existent beings really remain separated still. But this is an\naltogether external relationship; the purely independent is united to\nthe independent, and thus a mechanical combination alone results. All\nthat is living, spiritual, &c., is then merely thrown together; and\nchange, origination, creation, are simple union.\n\nHowever highly these principles are to be esteemed as a forward step,\nthey at once reveal to us their total inadequacy, as is also the\ncase when we enter with them on further concrete determinations.\nNevertheless, we need not add what is in great measure added by the\nconception of a later date, that once upon a time, there was a chaos, a\nvoid filled with atoms, which afterwards became united and orderly, and\nthat the world thereby arose; it is now and ever that what implicitly\nexists is the plenum and the vacuum. The satisfying point of view which\nnatural science found in such thoughts, is just the simple fact that in\nthese the existent is in its antithesis as what is thought and what is\nopposed to thought, and is hereby what exists in and for itself. The\nAtomists are therefore, generally speaking, opposed to the idea of the\ncreation and maintenance of this world by means of a foreign principle.\nIt is in the theory of atoms that science first feels released from\nthe sense of having no foundation for the world. For if nature is\nrepresented as created and held together by another, it is conceived\nof as not existent in itself, and thus as having its Notion outside\nitself, _i.e._ its principle or origin is foreign to it and it has no\nprinciple as such, only being conceivable from the will of another; as\nit is, it is contingent, devoid of necessity and Notion in itself. In\nthe conception of the atomist, however, we have the conception of the\ninherency of nature, that is to say, thought finds itself in it, or\nits principle is in itself something thought, and the Notion finds its\nsatisfaction in conceiving and establishing it as Notion. In abstract\nexistence, nature has its ground in itself and is simply for itself;\nthe atom and the vacuum are just such simple Notions. But we cannot\nhere see or find more than the formal fact that quite general and\nsimple principles, the antithesis between the one and continuity, are\nrepresented.\n\nIf we proceed from a wider, richer point of view in nature, and demand\nthat from the atomic theory, it, too, must be made comprehensible, the\nsatisfaction at once disappears and we see the impossibility of getting\nany further. Hence we must get beyond these pure thoughts of continuity\nand discontinuity. For these negations, the units, are not in and for\nthemselves; the atoms are indivisible and like themselves, or their\nprinciple is made pure continuity, so that they may be said to come\ndirectly into one clump. The conception certainly keeps them separate\nand gives them a sensuously represented Being; but if they are alike,\nthey are, as pure continuity, the same as what is empty. But that which\nis, is concrete and determined. How then can diversity be conceived\nof from these principles? Whence comes the determinate character of\nplants, colour, form? The point is, that though these atoms as small\nparticles may be allowed to subsist as independent, their union becomes\nmerely a combination which is altogether external and accidental. The\ndeterminate difference is missed; the one, as that which is for itself,\nloses all its determinateness. If various matters, electrical, magnetic\nand luminous, are assumed, and, at the same time, a mechanical shifting\nabout of molecules, on the one hand unity is quite disregarded, and, on\nthe other, no rational word is uttered in regard to the transition of\nphenomena, but only what is tautological.\n\nSince Leucippus and Democritus wished to go further, the necessity of\na more definite distinction than this superficial one of union and\nseparation was introduced, and they sought to bring this about by\nascribing diversity to atoms, and, indeed, by making their diversity\ninfinite. Aristotle (Met. I. 4) says: \u201cThis diversity they sought to\ndetermine in three ways. They say that atoms differ in figure, as A\ndoes from N; in order\u201d (place) \u201cas AN from NA; in position\u201d\u2014as to\nwhether they stand upright or lie\u2014\u201cas Z from N. From these all other\ndifferences must come.\u201d We see that figure, order and posture are again\nexternal relationships, indifferent determinations, _i.e._ unessential\nrelations which do not affect the nature of the thing in itself nor its\nimmanent determinateness, for their unity is only in another. Taken on\nits own account, this difference is indeed inconsistent, for as the\nentirely simple one, the atoms are perfectly alike, and thus any such\ndiversity cannot come into question.\n\nWe here have an endeavour to lead the sensuous back into few\ndeterminations. Aristotle (De gen. et corr. I. 8) says in this\nconnection of Leucippus: \u201cHe wished to bring the conception of the\nphenomenal and sensuous perception nearer, and thereby represented\nmovement, origination and decease, as existent in themselves.\u201d In\nthis we see no more than that actuality from him receives its rights,\nwhile others speak only of deception. But when Leucippus in the end\nrepresents the atom as also fashioned in itself, he brings existence\ncertainly so much nearer to sensuous perception, but not to the Notion;\nwe must, indeed, go on to fashioning, but so far we are still a long\nway off from the determination of continuity and discretion. Aristotle\n(De sensu, 4) therefore says: \u201cDemocritus, and most of the other\nancient philosophers are, when they speak of what is sensuous, very\nawkward, because they wish to make all that is felt into something\ntangible; they reduce everything to what is evident to the sense of\ntouch, black being rough, and white smooth.\u201d All sensuous qualities are\nthus only led back to form, to the various ways of uniting molecules\nwhich make any particular thing capable of being tasted or smelt; and\nthis endeavour is one which is also made by the atomists of modern\ntimes. The French particularly, from Descartes onward, stand in this\ncategory. It is the instinct of reason to understand the phenomenal\nand the perceptible, only the way is false; it is a quite unmeaning,\nundetermined universality. Since figure, order, posture and form,\nconstitute the only determination of what is in itself, nothing is said\nas to how these moments are experienced as colour, and indeed variety\nof colour, &c.; the transition to other than mechanical determinations\nis not made, or it shows itself to be shallow and barren.\n\nHow it was that Leucippus, from these poor principles of atoms and\nof the vacuum, which he never got beyond, because he took them to be\nthe absolute, hazarded a construction of the whole world (which may\nappear to us as strange as it is empty), Diogenes Laertius tells us\n(IX. 31-33) in an account which seems meaningless enough. But the\nnature of the subject allows of little better, and we can do no more\nthan observe from it the barrenness of this conception. It runs thus:\n\u201cAtoms, divergent in form, propel themselves through their separation\nfrom the infinite, into the great vacuum.\u201d (Democritus adds to this,\n\u201cby means of their mutual resistance (_\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c4\u03c5\u03c0\u03af\u03b1_) and a tremulous,\nswinging motion (_\u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2_).\u201d)[71] \u201cHere gathered, they form one vortex\n(_\u03b4\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd_) where, by dashing together and revolving round in all sorts\nof ways, the like are separated off with the like. But since they are\nof equal weight, when they cannot, on account of their number, move\nin any way, the finer go into outer vacuum, being so to speak forced\nout; and the others remain together and, being entangled, run one\nagainst another, and form the first round system. But this stands apart\nlike a husk that holds within it all sorts of bodies; since these, in\npressing towards the middle, make a vortex movement, this encircling\nskin becomes thin, because from the action of the vortex, they are\ncontinually running together. The earth arises in this way, because\nthese bodies, collected in the middle, remain together. That which\nencircles and which is like a husk, again becomes increased by means of\nthe adherence of external bodies, and since it also moves within the\nvortex, it draws everything with which it comes in contact to itself.\nThe union of some of these bodies again forms a system, first the moist\nand slimy, and then the dry, and that which circles in the vortex of\nthe whole; after that, being ignited, they constitute the substance of\nthe stars. The outer circle is the sun, the inner the moon,\u201d &c. This\nis an empty representation; there is no interest in these dry, confused\nideas of circle-motion, and of what is later on called attraction\nand repulsion, beyond the fact that the different kinds of motion are\nlooked at as the principle of matter.\n\n_c. The Soul_\n\nFinally Aristotle relates (De anim. I. 2) that in regard to the\nsoul, Leucippus and Democritus said that \u201cit is spherical atoms.\u201d We\nfind further from Plutarch (De plac. phil. IV. 8) that Democritus\napplied himself to the relation borne by consciousness to the\nexplanation, amongst other things, of the origin of feelings, because\nwith him, the conceptions that from things fine surfaces, so to speak,\nfree themselves, and fly into the eyes, ears, &c., first began. We see\nthat, thus far, Democritus expressed the difference between the moments\nof implicit Being and Being-for-another more distinctly. For he said,\nas Sextus tells us (adv. Math. VII. 135): \u201cWarmth exists according\nto opinion (_\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u1ff3_), and so do cold and colour, sweet and bitter:\nonly the indivisible and void are truthful (_\u1f10\u03c4\u03b5\u1fc7_).\u201d That is to say,\nonly the void and indivisible and their determinations are implicit;\nunessential, different Being, such as warmth, &c., is for another. But\nby this the way is at once opened up to the false idealism that means\nto be done with what is objective by bringing it into relation with\nconsciousness, merely saying of it that it is _my_ feeling. Thereby\nsensuous individuality is, indeed, annulled in the form of Being, but\nit still remains the same sensuous manifold; a sensuously notionless\nmanifold of feeling is established, in which there is no reason, and\nwith which this idealism has no further concern.\n\n\n2. EMPEDOCLES.\n\nThe fragments of Empedocles left, have several times been collected.\nSturz of Leipzig collected above 400 verses.[72] Peyron arranged a\ncollection of fragments of Empedocles and Parmenides,[73] which was put\ninto print in Leipzig in 1810. In Wolff\u2019s Analects, a treatise is to be\nfound on Empedocles by Ritter.\n\nEmpedocles\u2019 birthplace was Agrigentum in Sicily, while Heraclitus\nbelonged to Asia Minor. We thus come back to Italy, for our history\nchanges about between these two sides; from Greece proper, as the\nmiddle point, we have as yet had no philosophies at all. Empedocles,\naccording to Tennemann (Vol. I. p. 415), flourished about the 80th\nOlympiad (460 B.C.). Sturz (pp. 9, 10) quotes Dodwell\u2019s words: (De\n\u00e6tate Pythag. p. 220), which indicate that Empedocles was born in\nOlympiad 77, 1 (472 B.C.). They are as follows: \u201cIn the second year of\nthe 85th Olympiad Parmenides had reached his 65th year, so that Zeno\nwas born in the second year of the 75th Olympiad;[74] thus he was six\nyears older than his fellow-student Empedocles, for the latter was\nonly one year old when Pythagoras died in the first or second year of\nthe 77th Olympiad.\u201d Aristotle says (Met. I. 3): \u201cIn age Empedocles is\nsubsequent to Anaxagoras, but his works are earlier.\u201d But not only did\nhe philosophize earlier as regards time, that is, at a younger age,\nbut in reference to the stage reached by the Notion, his philosophy is\nearlier and less mature than that of Anaxagoras.\n\nFrom Diogenes\u2019 accounts of his life (VIII. 59, 60-73), he also seems\nto have been a kind of magician and sorcerer, like Pythagoras. During\nhis life he was much respected by his fellow-citizens, and, after\nhis death, a statue was erected to him in his native town; his fame\nextended very far. He did not live apart, like Heraclitus, but in the\nexercise of great influence on the affairs of the town of Agrigentum,\nlike Parmenides in Elea. He acquired the credit, after the death of\nMeton, the ruler of Agrigentum, of bringing about a free constitution\nand equal rights to all citizens. He likewise frustrated several\nattempts which were made by people of Agrigentum to seize upon the\nrulership of their city; and when the esteem of his fellow-citizens\nrose so high that they offered him the crown, he rejected their offers,\nand lived ever after amongst them as a respected private individual.\nBoth of his life and death much which was fabulous was told. Seeing\nthat he was famous in life, we are told that he wished not to appear\nto die an ordinary death, as a proof that he was not a mortal man, but\nhad merely passed out of sight. After a feast he is said either to have\nsuddenly disappeared, or else to have been on Etna with his friends,\nand suddenly to have been seen of them no more. But what became of him\nwas revealed by the fact that one of his shoes was thrown up by Etna,\nand found by one of his friends; this made it clear that he threw\nhimself into Etna, thereby to withdraw himself from the notice of\nmankind, and to give rise to the idea that he did not really die, but\nthat he was taken up amongst the gods.\n\nThe origin and occasion for this fable seems to lie in a poem in which\nthere are several verses that, taken alone, make great professions.\nHe says, according to Sturz, (p. 530: Reliqui\u00e6 _\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd_, v.\n364-376):\u2014\n\n \u201cFriends who dwell within the fort on yellow Acragas\n And who in the best of works are busy, I greet you!\n To you I am an immortal god, no more a mortal man,\n Do ye not see how that where\u2019er I go, all honour me,\n My head being \u2018circled round with diadems and crowns of green?\n When so decked out, I show myself in towns of wealth,\n Men and women pray to me. And thousands follow\n My steps, to seek from me the way to bliss,\n Others ask for prophecies; others again,\n Healing words for ailments manifold beseech.\n But what is this to me\u2014as though \u2018twere anything\n By art to conquer much corrupted man.\u201d\n\nBut, taken in the context, this laudation means that I am highly\nhonoured, but what is the value of that to me; it expresses weariness\nof the honour given him by men.\n\nEmpedocles had Pythagoreans as pupils, and went about with them; he\nis sometimes considered to have been a Pythagorean like Parmenides\nand Zeno, but this is the only ground for such a statement. It is a\nquestion whether he belonged to the League; his philosophy has no\nresemblance to the Pythagorean. According to Diogenes Laertius (VIII.\n56), he was also called Zeno\u2019s fellow-pupil. There have, indeed, been\nmany isolated reflections of a physical kind preserved to us, as also\nsome words of exhortation, and in him thought as penetrating within\nreality, and the knowledge of nature seem to have attained to greater\nbreadth and compass; we find in him, however, less speculative depth\nthan in Heraclitus, but a Notion more imbued with the point of view\nof reality, and a culture derived from natural philosophy or the\ncontemplation of nature. Empedocles is more poetic than definitely\nphilosophical; he is not very interesting, and much cannot be made of\nhis philosophy.\n\nAs to the particular Notion which governs it, and which really begins\nin it to appear, we may call it Combination or Synthesis. It is as\ncombination that the unity of opposites first presents itself; this\nNotion, first opening up with Heraclitus, is, while in a condition\nof rest, conceived of as combination, before thought grasps the\nuniversal in Anaxagoras. Empedocles\u2019 synthesis, as a completion of\nthe relationship, thus belongs to Heraclitus, whose speculative Idea,\nthough in reality, is process, but this is so without the individual\nmoments in reality being mutually related as Notions. Empedocles\u2019\nconception of synthesis holds good to the present day. He also is\nthe originator of the common idea that has even come down to us, of\nregarding the four known physical elements of fire, air, water, and\nearth, as fundamental; by chemists they are certainly no longer held\nto be elements, because they understand by elements a simple chemical\nsubstance. I will now give Empedocles\u2019 ideas shortly, and draw the many\nunits mentioned into the connection of a whole.\n\nHis general ideas Aristotle[75] shortly sums up thus: \u201cTo the three\nelements, fire, air, and water, each of which was in turn considered\nas the principle from which everything proceeded, Empedocles added\nthe Earth as the fourth corporeal element, saying that it is these\nwhich always remain the same, never becoming, but being united and\nseparated as the more or the less, combining into one and coming\nout of one.\u201d Carbon, metal, &c., are not something existing in and\nfor itself which remains constant and never becomes; thus nothing\nmetaphysical is signified by them. But with Empedocles this undoubtedly\nis the case: every particular thing arises through some kind of union\nof the four. These four elements, to our ordinary idea, are not so\nmany sensuous things if we consider them as universal elements; for,\nlooked at sensuously, there are various other sensuous things. All\nthat is organic, for example, is of another kind; and, further, earth\nas one, as simple, pure earth, does not exist, for it is in manifold\ndeterminateness. In the idea of four elements we have the elevation of\nsensuous ideas into thought.\n\nAristotle further says in reference to the abstract Notion of their\nrelation to one another (Met. I. 4), that Empedocles did not only\nrequire the four elements as principles, but also Friendship and\nStrife, which we have already met with in Heraclitus; it is at once\nevident that these are of another kind, because they are, properly\nspeaking, universal. He has the four natural elements as the real, and\nfriendship and strife as the ideal principles, so that six elements,\nof which Sextus[76] often speaks, make their appearance in lines\nthat Aristotle (Met. II. 4) and Sextus (adv. Math. VII. 92) have\npreserved:\u2014\n\n \u201cWith the earth, we see the earth, with water, water,\n With air, heavenly air, with fire, eternal fire,\n With love, love is seen, and strife with sorrowful strife.\u201d\n\nThrough our participation in them they become for us. There we have the\nidea that spirit, the soul, is itself the unity, the very totality of\nelements, in which the principle of earth relates to earth, water to\nwater, love to love, &c.[77] In seeing fire, the fire is in us for whom\nobjective fire is, and so on.\n\nEmpedocles also speaks of the process of these elements, but he did not\ncomprehend it further; the point to be remarked is that he represented\ntheir unity as a combination. In this synthetic union, which is a\nsuperficial relation devoid of Notion, being partly related and partly\nunrelated, the contradiction necessarily results that at one time the\nunity of elements is established and at another, their separation:\nthe unity is not the universal unity in which they are moments,\nbeing even in their diversity one, and in their unity different, for\nthese two moments, unity and diversity, fall asunder, and union and\nseparation are quite indeterminate relationships. Empedocles says in\nthe first book of his poem on Nature, as given by Sturz (p. 517, v.\n106-109): \u201cThere is no such thing as a Nature, only a combination and\nseparation of what is combined; it is merely called Nature by men.\u201d\nThat is to say, that which constitutes anything, as being its elements\nor parts, is not as yet called its nature, but only its determinate\nunity. For example, the nature of an animal is its constant and real\ndeterminateness, its kind, its universality, which is simple. But\nEmpedocles does away with nature in this sense, for every thing,\naccording to him, is the combination of simple elements, and thus\nnot in itself the universal, simple and true: this is not what is\nsignified by us when we speak of nature. Now this nature in which a\nthing moves in accordance with its own end, Aristotle (De gen. et\ncorr. II. 6) misses in Empedocles; in later times this conception was\nstill further lost. Because the elements were thus existent simply in\nthemselves, there was, properly speaking, no process established in\nthem, for in process they are only vanishing moments, and not existent\nin themselves. Being thus implicit, they must have been unchangeable,\nor they could not constitute themselves into a unity; for in the one\ntheir subsistence, or their implicit existence would be destroyed. But\nbecause Empedocles says that things subsist from these elements, he\nimmediately establishes their unity.\n\nThese are the principal points in Empedocles\u2019 philosophy. I will quote\nthe remarks that Aristotle (Met. I. 4) makes in this regard.\n\n(_\u03b1_) \u201cIf we wish to follow this up, and do so in accordance with\nthe understanding, not merely stumbling over it like Empedocles, we\nshould say that friendship is the principle of good and strife the\nprinciple of evil, so that in a measure we may assert that Empedocles\nmaintained\u2014and was the first to do so\u2014that the evil and the good\nare the absolute principles, because the good is the principle of all\ngood, and the bad the principle of all evil.\u201d Aristotle shows the trace\nof universality present here; for to him it may be termed essential\nin dealing with the Notion of the principle, that which is in and for\nitself. But this is only the Notion, or the thought which is present\nin and for itself; we have not yet seen such a principle, for we find\nit first in Anaxagoras. If Aristotle found the principle of motion\nmissed in ancient philosophers, in the Becoming of Heraclitus, he again\nmissed in Heraclitus the still deeper principle of the Good, and hence\nwished to discover it in Empedocles. By the good the \u201cwhy\u201d is to be\nunderstood, that which is an end in and for itself, which is clearly\nestablished in itself, which is on its own account, and through which\nall else is; the end has the determination of activity, the bringing\nforth of itself, so that it, as end to itself, is the Idea, the Notion\nthat makes itself objective and, in its objectivity, is identical with\nitself. Aristotle thus entirely controverts Heraclitus, because his\nprinciple is change alone, without remaining like self, maintaining\nself, and going back within self.\n\n(_\u03b2_) Aristotle also says in criticizing further the relationship\nand determination of these two universal principles of Friendship\nand Strife, as of union and separation, that \u201cEmpedocles neither\nadequately made use of them nor discovered in them what they involved\n(_\u1f10\u03be\u03b5\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd_); for with him friendship frequently\ndivides and strife unites. That is, when the All falls asunder through\nstrife amongst the elements, fire is thereby united into one, and\nso is each of the other elements.\u201d The separation of the elements\nwhich are comprised within the All, is just as necessarily the union\namongst themselves of the parts of each element; that which, on the\none hand, is the coming into separation, as independent, is at the\nsame time something united within itself. \u201cBut when everything through\nfriendship goes back into one, it is necessary that the parts of\neach element undergo separation again.\u201d The being in one is itself a\nmanifold, a diverse relation of the four diversities, and thus the\ngoing together is likewise a separation. This is the case generally\nwith all determinateness, that it must in itself be the opposite, and\nmust manifest itself as such. The remark that, speaking generally,\nthere is no union without separation, no separation without union, is\na profound one; identity and non-identity are thought-determinations\nof this kind which cannot be separated. The reproach made by Aristotle\nis one that lies in the nature of the thing. And when Aristotle says\nthat Empedocles, although younger than Heraclitus, \u201cwas the first to\nmaintain such principles, because he did not assert that the principle\nof motion is one, but that it is different and opposed,\u201d this certainly\nrelates to the fact that he thought it was in Empedocles that he first\nfound design, although his utterances on the subject were dubious.\n\n(_\u03b3_) As to the real moments in which this ideal realizes\nitself, Aristotle further says, \u201cHe does not speak of them as\nfour\u201d\u2014equivalents in juxtaposition\u2014\u201cbut on the contrary as two;\nfire he puts by itself on the one side, and the three others, earth,\nair, and water, on the other.\u201d What would be most interesting is the\ndetermination of their relationship.\n\n(_\u03b4_) In what deals with the relationship of the two ideal moments,\nfriendship and strife, and of the four real elements, there is thus\nnothing rational, for Empedocles, according to Aristotle (Met. XII.\n10), did not properly separate, but co-ordinated them, so that we often\nsee them in proximity and counted as having equal value; but it is\nself-evident that Empedocles also separated these two sides, the real\nand the ideal, and expressed thought as their relation.\n\n(_\u03b5_) Aristotle says with justice (De gen. et corr. I. 1) that\n\u201cEmpedocles contradicts both himself and appearances. For at one time\nhe maintains that none of the elements springs out of the other, but\nall else comes from them; and, at another time, he makes them into a\nwhole through friendship, and again destroys this unity through strife.\nThus through particular differences and qualities, one becomes water,\nthe other fire, &c. Now if the particular differences are taken away\n(and they can be taken away since they have arisen), it is evident\nthat water arises from earth, and the reverse. The All was not yet\nfire, earth, water, and air, when these were still one, so that it\nis not clear whether he made the one or the many to be, properly\nspeaking, real existence.\u201d Because the elements become one, their\nspecial character, that through which water is water, is nothing in\nitself, that is, they are passing into something different; but this\ncontradicts the statement that they are the absolute elements, or that\nthey are implicit. He considers actual things as an intermingling\nof elements, but in regard to their first origin, he thinks that\neverything springs from one through friendship and strife. This\ncustomary absence of thought is in the nature of synthetic conceptions;\nit now upholds unity, then multiplicity, and does not bring both\nthoughts together; as sublated, one is also not one.[78]\n\n\nF. ANAXAGORAS.\n\nWith Anaxagoras[79] a light, if still a weak one, begins to dawn,\nbecause the understanding is now recognized as the principle. Aristotle\nsays of Anaxagoras (Met. I. 3): \u201cBut he who said that reason (_\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_),\nin what lives as also in nature, is the origin of the world and of all\norder, is like a sober man as compared with those who came before and\nspoke at random (_\u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u1fc6_).\u201d As Aristotle says, hitherto philosophers may\n\u201cbe compared to the fencers who fence in an unscientific way. Just as\nthe latter often make good thrusts in their struggle, though not by any\nskill, these philosophers seem to speak without any knowledge of what\nthey say.\u201d Now if Anaxagoras, as a sober man amongst drunkards, was\nthe first to reach this consciousness\u2014for he says that pure thought\nis the actually existent universal and true\u2014he yet, to a considerable\nextent, still thrusts into space.\n\nThe connection of his philosophy with what precedes is as follows:\nIn Heraclitus\u2019 Idea as motion, all moments are absolutely vanishing.\nEmpedocles represents the gathering together of this motion into a\nunity, but into a synthetic unity; and with Leucippus and Democritus\nit is the same. With Empedocles, however, the moments of this\nunity are the existent elements of fire, water, &c., and with the\nothers, pure abstractions, implicit being, thoughts. But in this way\nuniversality is directly asserted, for the opposing elements have no\nlonger any sensuous support. We have had Being, Becoming, the One, as\nprinciples; they are universal thoughts and not sensuous, nor are they\nfigures of the imagination; the content and its parts are, however,\ntaken from what is sensuous, and they are thoughts in some sort of\na determination. Anaxagoras now says that it is not gods, sensuous\nprinciples, elements, or thoughts\u2014which really are determinations of\nreflection\u2014but that it is the Universal, Thought itself, in and for\nitself, without opposition, all embracing, which is the substance or\nthe principle. The unity as universal, returns from the opposition into\nitself, while in the synthesis of Empedocles, what is opposed is still\napart from it and independent, and Thought is not Being. Here, however,\nThought as pure, free process in itself, is the self-determining\nuniversal, and is not distinguished from conscious thought. In\nAnaxagoras quite new ground is thus opened up.\n\nAnaxagoras concludes this period, and after him a fresh one begins.\nIn accordance with the favourite idea of there being a genealogical\ndescent of principles from the teacher to the taught, because he was\nan Ionian, he is often represented as perpetuating the Ionic school,\nand as an Ionic philosopher: Hermotimus of Clazomen\u00e6, too, was his\nteacher. To support this theory Diogenes Laertius (II. 6) makes him a\ndisciple of Anaximenes, whose birth is, however, placed in Ol. 55-58,\nor about sixty years earlier than that of Anaxagoras.\n\nAristotle says (Met. I. 3) that Anaxagoras first began by these\ndeterminations to express absolute reality as understanding. Aristotle\nand others after him, such as Sextus (adv. Math. IX. 7), mention\nthe bare fact that Hermotimus gave rise to this conception, but it\nwas clearly due to Anaxagoras. Little is gained if such a fact were\ntrue, since we learn no more about the philosophy of Hermotimus; it\ncannot have been much. Others have made numerous historical researches\nrespecting this Hermotimus. The name we have already mentioned amongst\nthose of whom it is said that Pythagoras existed in them before he\nlived as Pythagoras. We also have a story of Hermotimus to the effect\nthat he possessed the peculiar gift of being able to make his soul quit\nhis body. But this did him bad service in the end, since his wife,\nwith whom he had a dispute, and who besides knew very well how matters\nstood, showed to their acquaintances this soul-deserted body as dead,\nand it was burnt before the soul reinstated itself\u2014which soul must\nhave been astonished.[80] It is not worth while to investigate what\nlies at the ground of these ancient stories, i.e. into how we should\nregard the matter: we may think of it as implying a state of ecstasy.\n\nWe must consider the life of Anaxagoras before his philosophy.\nAnaxagoras, according to Diogenes (II. 7), born in Ol. 70 (500 B.C.),\ncomes earlier than Democritus, and in age also precedes Empedocles,\nyet, on the whole, he was contemporaneous with these, as also with\nParmenides; he was as old as Zeno, and lived somewhat earlier than\nSocrates, but still they were acquainted with one another. His native\ntown was Clazomen\u00e6, in Lydia, not very far from Colophon and Ephesus,\nand situated on an isthmus by which a great peninsula is connected\nwith the mainland. His life is shortly summed up in the statement that\nhe devoted himself to the study of the sciences, withdrew from public\naffairs; according to Valerius Maximus (VIII. 7, extr. 6) he made\nnumerous journeys, and finally, according to Tennemann (Vol. I. pp.\n300, 415), in the forty-fifth year of his age, in the 81st Olympiad\n(456 B.C.), and at a propitious time, he came to Athens.\n\nWith him we thus find Philosophy in Greece proper, where so far there\nhad been none, and coming, indeed, as far as Athens; hitherto either\nAsia Minor or Italy had been the seat of Philosophy, though, when the\ninhabitants of Asia Minor fell under Persian rule, with their loss of\nfreedom, it expired amongst them. Anaxagoras, himself a native of Asia\nMinor, lived in the important period between the war of the Medes and\nthe age of Pericles, principally in Athens, which had now reached the\nzenith of its greatness, for it was both the head of Grecian power, and\nthe seat and centre of the arts and sciences. Athens, after the Persian\nwars, brought the greater part of the Greek islands into subjection,\nas also a number of maritime towns in Thrace, and even further into\nthe Black Sea. As the greatest artists collected in Athens, so also\ndid the most noted philosophers and sophists live there\u2014a circle\nof luminaries in the arts and sciences such as we have in \u00c6schylus,\nSophocles, Aristophanes, Thucydides, Diogenes of Apollonia, Protagoras,\nAnaxagoras, and others from Asia Minor. Pericles then ruled the State,\nand raised it to that height of splendour which may be called the\ngolden age in Athenian life; Anaxagoras, although living in the most\nflourishing time of Athenian life, touches on its decay, or rather\nreaches the first threatening of that decay, which ended in a total\nextermination of this beautiful life.\n\nWhat is of special interest at this time is the opposition between\nAthens and Laced\u00e6mon, the two Greek nations which contended with one\nanother for the foremost place in Greece; here we must therefore allude\nto the principles of these celebrated States. While the Laced\u00e6monians\nhad no arts or sciences, Athens had to thank the character of its\nconstitution, and of its whole spirit, for the fact that it was the\nseat of the sciences and fine arts. But the constitution of Laced\u00e6mon\nis also worthy of high esteem, for it regulated and restrained the\nhigh Doric spirit, and its principal feature was that all personal\npeculiarity was subordinated, or rather sacrificed, to the general aim\nof the life of the State, and the individual had the consciousness of\nhis honour and sufficiency only in the consciousness of working for\nthe State. A people of such genuine unity, in whom the will of the\nindividual had, properly speaking, quite disappeared, were united by\nan indestructible bond, and Laced\u00e6mon was hence placed at the head of\nGreece, and obtained the leadership, which, we find, it held among the\nArgives in the days of Troy. This is a great principle which must exist\nin every true State, but which with the Laced\u00e6monians retained its\none-sided character; this one-sidedness was avoided by the Athenians,\nand by that means they became the greater. In Laced\u00e6mon personality\nproper was so much disregarded that the individual could not have\nfree development or expression; individuality was not recognized, and\nhence not brought into harmony with the common end of the State. This\nabrogation of the rights of subjectivity, which, expressed in his own\nway, is also found in Plato\u2019s Republic, was carried very far with the\nLaced\u00e6monians. But the universal is living spirit only in so far as the\nindividual consciousness finds itself as such within it; the universal\nis not constituted of the immediate life and being of the individual,\nthe mere substance, but formed of conscious life. As individuality\nwhich separates itself from the universal is powerless and falls to\nthe ground, the one-sided universal, the morality of individuality\ncannot stand firm. The Laced\u00e6monian spirit, which had not taken into\naccount the freedom of consciousness, and whose universal had isolated\nitself therefrom, had hence to see it break forth in opposition to the\nuniversal; and though the first to come forward as the liberators of\nGreece from its tyranny were the Spartans, whom even Athens thanks for\nthe expulsion of the descendants of Pisistratus, their relationship\nto their confederates soon passes into that of common, mean, tyranny.\nWithin the State it likewise ends in a harsh aristocracy, just as the\nfixed equilibrium of property (each family retaining its inheritance,\nand through forbidding the possession of money, or trade and commerce,\npreventing the possibility of inequality in riches) passes into an\navarice which, as opposed to this universal, is brutal and mean. This\nessential moment of particularity, not being taken into the State,\nand hence not made legal and moral (moral first of all), comes forth\nas vice. In a rational organization all the elements of the Idea are\npresent; if the liver were isolated as bile it would become not more,\nand not less active, but becoming antagonistic, it would isolate itself\nfrom the corporate economy of the body. Solon, on the contrary, gave to\nthe Athenians not only equality of laws and unity of spirit in their\nconstitution (which was a purer democracy than in Sparta), but although\neach citizen had his substantial consciousness in unity with the laws\nof the State, he also gave free play to the individual mind, so that\neach might do as he would, and might find expression for himself.\nSolon entrusted the executive to the people, not to the Ephors, and\nthis became self-government after the displacement of the tyrants,\nand thus in truth a free people arose; the individual had the whole\nwithin himself, as he had his consciousness and action in the whole.\nThus we see in this principle the formation of free consciousness\nand the freedom of individuality in its greatness. The principle of\nsubjective freedom appears at first, however, still in unison with the\nuniversal principle of Greek morality as established by law, and even\nwith mythology; and thus in its promulgation, because the genius of its\nconceptions could develop freely, it brought about these masterpieces\nin the beautiful plastic arts, and the immortal works of poetry and\nhistory. The principle of subjectivity had, thus far, not taken the\nform that particularity, as such, should be set free, and that its\ncontent should be a subjectively particular, at least distinguished\nfrom the universal principle, universal morality, universal religion,\nuniversal laws. Thus we do not see the carrying out of isolated ideas,\nbut the great, moral, solid, divine content made in these works object\nfor consciousness, and generally brought before consciousness. Later\nwe shall find the form of subjectivity becoming free for itself, and\nappearing in opposition to the substantial, to morality, religion, and\nlaw.\n\nThe basis of this principle of subjectivity, though it is still a\nmerely general one, we now see in Anaxagoras. But amongst this noble,\nfree, and cultured people of Athens, he who had the happiness to be\nfirst, was Pericles, and this circumstance raised him in the estimation\nof the individual to a place so high that few could reach it. Of all\nthat is great amongst men, the power of ruling over the will of men who\nhave but one will, is the greatest, for this controlling individuality\nmust be both the most universal and the most living\u2014a lot for a mortal\nbeing than which hardly any better can be found. His individuality was,\naccording to Plutarch, (in Pericle 5) as deep as it was perfect; as\nserious (he never laughed), as full of energy and restfulness: Athens\nhad him the whole day long. Thucydides has preserved some of Pericles\u2019\nspeeches to the people which allow of few works being compared to them.\nUnder Pericles the highest culture of the moral commonwealth is to be\nfound, the juncture where individuality is still under and also in the\nuniversal. Presently individuality prevails, because its activity falls\ninto extremes, since the state as state, is not yet independently\norganized within itself. Because the essence of the Athenian State\nwas the common spirit, and the religious faith of individuals in this\nconstituted their essence, there disappears with the disappearance of\nthis faith, the inner Being of the people, since the spirit is not in\nthe form of the Notion as it is in our states. The speedy transition\nto this last is the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_, subjectivity, as Being, self-reflection.\nWhen Anaxagoras at this time, the principle of which has just been\ngiven, came to Athens, he was sought out by Pericles, and, as his\nfriend, lived in very intimate relations with him, before the latter\noccupied himself with public affairs. But Plutarch (in Pericle 4, 16)\nalso relates that Anaxagoras came to want because Pericles neglected\nhim\u2014did not supply the illuminating lamp with oil.\n\nA more important matter is that Anaxagoras (as happened later with\nSocrates and many other philosophers) was accused of despising those\nwhom the people accepted as gods. The prose of the understanding\ncame into contact with the poetic, religious point of view. It\nis distinctly said by Diogenes Laertius (II. 12) that Anaxagoras\nbelieved the sun and stars to be burning stones; and he is, according\nto Plutarch, (in Pericle, 6) blamed for having explained something\nthat the prophets stated to be a marvellous omen, in a natural way;\nit quite tallies with this that he is said to have foretold that on\nthe day of \u00c6gos-Potamos, where the Athenians lost their last fleet\nagainst Lysander, a stone should fall from heaven.[81] The general\nremark might be made of Thales, Anaximander, &c., that the sun,\nmoon, earth and stars were counted as mere things, i.e. as objects\nexternal to mind, and that they no longer held them to be living\ngods, but represented them in different ways\u2014which ideas, for the\nrest, deserve no further consideration, since these matters belong\nproperly to ordinary learning. Things may be derived from thought;\nthought really brings about the result that certain objects which may\nbe called divine, and certain conceptions of these which may be called\npoetic, together with the whole range of superstitious beliefs, are\ndemolished\u2014they are brought down to being what are called natural\nthings. For in thought, as the identity of itself and of Being, mind\nknows itself as the truly actual, so that for mind in thought, the\nunspiritual and material is brought down to being mere things, to the\nnegative of mind. All the ideas of those philosophers have this in\ncommon, that nature is through them undeified; they brought the poetic\nview of nature down to the prosaic, and destroyed the poetic point of\nview which ascribes to all that is now considered to be lifeless, a\nlife proper to itself, perhaps also sensation, and, it may be, a being\nafter the usual order of consciousness. The loss of this point of view\nis not to be lamented as if unity with nature, pure faith, innocent\npurity and childlike spirit went with it. Innocent and childlike it\nmay certainly have been, but reason is just the going forth from\nsuch innocence and unity with nature. So soon as mind grasps itself,\nis for itself, it must for that very reason confront the \u2018other\u2019 of\nitself as a negation of consciousness, i.e. look on it as something\ndevoid of mind, an unconscious and lifeless thing, and it must first\ncome to itself through this opposition. There is in this a fixing of\nself-moving things such as are met with in the myths of the ancients,\nwho relate such tales as that the Argonauts secured the rocks on the\nStraits of the Hellespont which formerly moved like scissors. Similarly\nprogressive culture consolidated that which formerly was thought to\nhave its own motion and life in itself, and made it into unmoving\nmatter. This transition of the mythical point of view into the prosaic,\nhere comes to be recognized by the Athenians. A prosaic point of\nview such as this, assumes that man has requirements quite different\nfrom those he formerly had; in this we find traces of the powerful,\nnecessary conversion brought about in the ideas of man through the\nstrengthening of thought, through knowledge of himself, and through\nPhilosophy.\n\nThe institution of charges of atheism, which we shall touch upon\nmore fully in dealing with Socrates, is, in Anaxagoras\u2019 case, quite\ncomprehensible, from the specific reason that the Athenians, who were\nenvious of Pericles, who contended with him for the first place, and\nwho did not venture to proceed against him openly, took his favourites\nto law, and sought through charges against his friend, to injure him.\nThus his friend Aspasia was brought under accusation, and the noble\nPericles had, according to Plutarch (in Pericle, 32), in order to save\nher from condemnation, to beg the individual citizens of Athens with\ntears for her acquittal. The Athenian people in their freedom, demanded\nsuch acts of the potentates to whom they allowed supremacy, for thereby\nan acknowledgment was given of their subordination to the people; they\nthus made themselves the Nemesis in respect to the high place accorded\nto the great, for they placed themselves in a position of equality with\nthese, while these again made evident their dependence, subjection\nand powerlessness before the others. What is told about the result of\nthis charge against Anaxagoras is quite contradictory and uncertain:\nPericles certainly saved him from condemnation to death. He was either,\nas some say, condemned only to banishment after Pericles had led him\nbefore the people, speaking and entreating for him, after, by reason\nof his age, attenuation and weakness the sympathy of the people had\nbeen aroused; or else, as others say, with the help of Pericles, he\nescaped from Athens and was in absence condemned to death, the judgment\nnever being executed upon him. Others again say that he was liberated,\nbut from the vexation that he felt respecting these charges, and from\napprehension as to their repetition, he voluntarily left Athens. And at\nabout sixty or seventy years of age, he died in Lampsacus in the 88th\nOlympiad (428 B.C.).[82]\n\n1. _The Universal Principle._ The logical principle of Anaxagoras was\nthat he recognized the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ as the simple, absolute essence of the\nworld. The simplicity of the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ is not a Being but a universality\nwhich is distinguished from itself, though in such a way that the\ndistinction is immediately sublated and the identity is set forth for\nitself. This universal for itself, sundered, exists in purity only\nas thought; it exists also in nature as objective existence, but in\nthat case no longer purely for itself, but as having particularity as\nan immediate in it. Space and time are, for example, the most ideal,\nuniversal facts in nature as such, but there is no pure space, no pure\ntime and motion any more than any pure matter\u2014for this universal is\nimmediately defined space, air, earth, &c. In thought, when I say, I\nam I, or I = I, I certainly distinguish something from me, but the\npure unity remains; there is no movement but a distinction which is\nnot distinguished, or the being-for-me. And in all that I think, if\nthe thought has a definite content, it is my thought: I am thus known\nto myself in this object. This universal which thus exists for itself\nand the individual, or thought and being, thus, however, come into\ndefinite opposition. Here the speculative unity of this universal with\nthe individual should be considered as it is posited as absolute unity,\nbut the comprehension of the Notion itself is certainly not found\nwith the ancients. We need not expect a pure Notion such as one of an\nunderstanding realizing itself into a system, organized as a universe.\n\nHow Anaxagoras enunciated the Notion of the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_, Aristotle (De\nanim. I. 2) goes on to tell: \u201cAnaxagoras maintains that the soul is\nthe principle of movement. Yet he does not always express himself\nfully about the soul and _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_: he seems to separate _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ and soul\nfrom one another, and still he makes use of them as though they were\nthe same existence, only that by preference he makes the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ the\nprinciple of everything. He certainly speaks frequently of the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_\nas of the cause of the beautiful and right, but another time he calls\nit the soul. For it is in all animals, in large as well as small, the\nhigher kind and the lower; it alone of all existence is the simple,\nunadulterated and pure; it is devoid of pain and is not in community\nwith any other.\u201d[83] What we therefore have to do is to show from the\nprinciple of motion, that it is the self-moving; and this thought is,\nas existent for itself. As soul, the self-moving is only immediately\nindividual; the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_, however, as simple, is the universal. Thought\nmoves on account of something: the end is the first simple which\nmakes itself result; this principle with the ancients is grasped as\ngood and evil, i.e. end as positive and negative. This determination\nis a very important one, but with Anaxagoras it was not fully worked\nout. While in the first place the principles are material, from these\nAristotle then distinguishes determination and form, and thirdly he\nfinds in the process of Heraclitus, the principle of motion. Then in\nthe fourth place there comes the reason why, the determination of end,\nwith the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_; this is the concrete in itself. Aristotle adds in\nthe above-mentioned passage (p. 192), \u201caccording to these men\u201d (the\nIonians and others) \u201cand in reference to such causes\u201d (water, fire,\n&c.), \u201csince they are not sufficient to beget the nature of things,\nthe philosophers are, as already said, compelled by the truth to go on\nto the principle following (_\u1f10\u03c7\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd_). For neither the earth nor any\nother principle is capable of explaining the fact that while on the\none hand all is good and beautiful, on the other, something else is\nproduced, and those men do not seem to have thought that this was so;\nnor is it seemly to abandon such matters to hazard (_\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u1ff3_) and to\nchance.\u201d Goodness and beauty express the simple restful Notion, and\nchange the Notion in its movement.\n\nWith this principle comes the determination of an understanding as of\nself-determining activity; this has hitherto been wanting, for the\nBecoming of Heraclitus, which is only process, is not yet as fate,\nthe independently self-determining. By this we must not represent\nto ourselves subjective thought; in thinking we think immediately\nof our thought as it is in consciousness. Here, on the contrary,\nquite objective thought is meant, active understanding\u2014as we say,\nthere is reason in the world, or we speak of genera in nature which\nare the universal. The genus animal is the substantial of the dog;\nthe dog itself is this; the laws of nature are themselves nature\u2019s\nimmanent essence. The nature is not formed from without as men\nmake a table; this is also made with understanding, but through an\nunderstanding outside of this wood. This external form, which is\ncalled the understanding, immediately occurs to us in speaking of\nthe understanding; but here the universal is meant, that which is\nthe immanent nature of the object itself. The _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ is thus not a\nthinking existence from without which regulates the world; by such\nthe meaning present to Anaxagoras would be quite destroyed and all\nits philosophic interest taken away. For to speak of an individual,\na unit from without, is to fall into the ordinary conception and its\ndualism; a so-called thinking principle is no longer a thought, but is\na subject. But still the true universal is for all that not abstract,\nbut the universal is just the determining in and out of itself of the\nparticular in and for itself. In this activity, which is independently\nself-determining, the fact is at once implied that the activity,\nbecause it constitutes process, retains itself as the universal\nself-identical. Fire, which, according to Heraclitus, was process,\ndies away and merely passes over, without independent existence, into\nthe opposite; it is certainly also a circle and a return to fire, but\nthe principle does not retain itself in its determinateness as the\nuniversal, seeing that a simple passing into the opposite takes place.\nThis relation to itself in determination which we see appearing in\nAnaxagoras, now, however, contains the determination of the universal\nthough it is not formally expressed, and therein we have the end or the\nGood.\n\nI have just recently (p. 316) spoken of the Notion of the end, yet\nby that we must not merely think of the form of the end as it is in\nus, in conscious beings. At first, end, in as far as I have it, is my\nconception, which is for itself, and the realization of which depends\non my wish; if I carry it out, and if I am not unskilful, the object\nproduced must be conformable to the end, containing nothing but it.\nThere is a transition from subjectivity to objectivity through which\nthis opposition is always again sublated. Because I am discontented\nwith my end in that it is only subjective, my activity consists in\nremoving this defect and making it objective. In objectivity the\nend has retained itself; for instance, if I have the end in view of\nbuilding a house and am active for that end, the house results in\nwhich my end is realized. But we must not, as we usually do, abide at\nthe conception of this subjective end; in this case both I and the\nend exist independently and externally in relation to each other. In\nthe conception that God, as wisdom, rules the world in accordance\nwith an end, for instance, the end is posited for itself in a wise,\nfiguratively conceiving Being. But the universal of end is the fact\nthat since it is a determination independently fixed, that rules\npresent existence, the end is the truth, the soul of a thing. The Good\nin the end gives content to itself, so that while it is active with\nthis content, and after it has entered into externality, no other\ncontent comes forth than what was already present. The best example of\nthis is presented in life; it has desires, and these desires are its\nends; as merely living, however, it knows nothing of these ends, but\nyet they are first, immediate determinations which are established.\nThe animal works at satisfying these desires, i.e. at reaching the\nend; it relates itself to external things, partly mechanically,\npartly chemically. But the character of its activity does not remain\nmechanical or chemical; the product is rather the animal itself,\nwhich, as its own end, brings forth in its activity only itself, since\nit negates and overturns those mechanical or chemical relationships.\nIn mechanical and chemical process, on the other hand, the result is\nsomething different, in which the subject does not retain itself; but\nin the end, beginning and end are alike, for we posit the subjective\nobjectively in order to receive it again. Self-preservation is a\ncontinual production by which nothing new, but always the old, arises;\nit is a taking back of activity for the production of itself.\n\nThus this self-determining activity, which is then active on something\nelse, enters into opposition, but it again negates the opposition,\ngoverns it, in it reflects upon itself; it is the end, the thought,\nthat which conserves itself in its self-determination. The development\nof these moments is the business of Philosophy from henceforth. But\nif we look more closely as to how far Anaxagoras has got in the\ndevelopment of this thought, we find nothing further than the activity\ndetermining from out of itself, which sets up a limit or measure;\nfurther than the determination of measure, development does not go.\nAnaxagoras gives us no more concrete definition of the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_, and\nthis we are still left to consider; we thus have nothing more than the\nabstract determination of the concrete in itself. The above-mentioned\npredicates which Anaxagoras gives the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_, may thus indeed be\naffirmed, but they are, on their own account, one-sided only.\n\n2. _The Hom\u0153omeri\u00e6._ This is the one side in the principle of\nAnaxagoras; we now have to consider the going forth of the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_\ninto further determinations. This remaining part of the philosophy of\nAnaxagoras at first, however, makes us think that the hopes in which\nsuch a principle justified us must be very much diminished. On the\nother side, this universal is confronted by Being, matter, the manifold\ngenerally, potentiality as distinguished from the former as actuality.\nFor if the Good or the end is also determined as potentiality, the\nuniversal, as the self-moving, may rather be called the actual in\nitself, the being-for-self, as opposed to implicit being, potentiality,\npassivity. Aristotle says in an important passage (Met. I. 8): \u201cIf\nany one should say of Anaxagoras that he adopted two principles,\nhe would rest his statement on a point respecting which the latter\nnever really clearly defined himself, but which he had necessarily\nto acknowledge to those who adduced it.... That is, Anaxagoras says\nthat originally everything is mingled.... But where nothing is yet\nseparated, no distinguishing feature is present; such substance is\nneither a white, black, gray, nor any other colour, but colourless; it\nhas no quality nor quantity nor determination (_\u03c4\u03af_). All is mingled\nexcept the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_; this is unmingled and pure. With this in view, it\nthus occurs to him to denominate as principles the one, for it alone is\nsingle and unmingled, and the other-being (_\u03b8\u03ac\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd_), what we call the\nindeterminate, before it has become determined or partakes of any kind\nof form.\u201d\n\nThis other principle is celebrated under the name of hom\u0153omeries\n(_\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u1fc6_), of like parts or homogeneous, in Aristotle\u2019s rendering\n(Met. I. 3, 7); Riemer translates _\u1f21 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1_ \u201cthe similarity of\nindividual parts to the whole,\u201d and _\u03b1\u1f31 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9_ \u201cthe elementary\nmatter,\u201d yet this latter word seems to be of a later origin.[84]\nAristotle says, \u201cAnaxagoras sets forth\u201d (in respect of the material)\n\u201cinfinitely many principles, for he maintained that, like water\nand fire in Empedocles\u2019 system, nearly all that is formed of like\nparts only arises from union and passes away through separation;\nother arising and passing away there is none, for equal parts remain\neternal.\u201d That is, the existent, the individual matter, such as bones,\nmetal, flesh, &c., in itself consists of parts like itself\u2014flesh\nof small particles of flesh, gold of small gold particles, &c. Thus\nhe said at the beginning of his work, \u201cAll has been alike\u201d (i.e.\nunseparated as in a chaos), \u201cand has rested for an infinitude of time;\nthen came the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_, and it brought in movement, separated and brought\norder into the separated creation (_\u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd_), in that it united\nthe like.\u201d[85]\n\nThe hom\u0153omeri\u00e6 become clearer if we compare them with the conceptions\nof Leucippus and Democritus and others. In Leucippus and Democritus, as\nwell as Empedocles, we saw this matter, or the absolute as objective\nexistence, determined so that simple atoms\u2014with the latter the four\nelements and with the former infinitely many\u2014were set forth as\nseparate only in form; their syntheses and combinations were existing\nthings. Aristotle (De c\u0153lo, III. 3) says further on this point,\n\u201cAnaxagoras asserts of the elements the opposite to Empedocles. For\nthe latter takes as original principles, fire, air, earth, and water,\nthrough whose union all things arise. On the other hand, Anaxagoras\nmaintains what are of like parts such as flesh, bones, or the like to\nbe simple materials; such things as water and fire, on the contrary,\nare a mixture of the original elements. For any one of these four\nconsists of the infinite admixture of all invisible, existing things\nof like parts, which hence come forth from these.\u201d The principle\nheld good for him as for the Eleatics, that \u201cthe like only comes out\nof the like; there is no transition into the opposite, no union of\nopposites possible.\u201d All change is hence to him only a separation\nand union of the like; change as true change, would be a Becoming\nout of the negative of itself. \u201cThat is, because Anaxagoras,\u201d says\nAristotle (Phys. I, 4), \u201cpartook of the view of all physicists that\nit is impossible that anything can come out of nothing, there was\nnothing left but to admit that what becomes was already present as an\nexistent, but that, on account of its small size, it was imperceptible\nto us.\u201d This point of view is also quite different from the conception\nof Thales and Heraclitus, in which, not only the possibility, but\nthe actuality of the transformation of these like qualitative\ndifferences is essentially maintained. But to Anaxagoras with whom\nthe elements are a mingled chaos formed therefrom, having only an\napparent uniformity, concrete things arise through the severance of\nthese infinitely many principles from such a chaos, since like finds\nlike. Respecting the difference between Empedocles and Anaxagoras,\nthere is further what Aristotle adds in the same place: \u201cThe former\nallows a change (_\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd_) in these conditions, the latter only\ntheir one appearance.\u201d The conception of Democritus is similar to that\nof Anaxagoras in so far as that an infinite manifold is the original\nsource. But with Anaxagoras the determination of the fundamental\nprinciples appears to contain that which we consider as organized, and\nto be by no means an independently existent simple; thus perfectly\nindividualized atoms such as particles of flesh and of gold, form,\nthrough their coming together, that which appears to be organized. That\ncomes near our ordinary ideas. Means of nourishment, it is thought,\ncontain such parts as are homogeneous to blood, flesh, &c. Anaxagoras\nhence says, according to Aristotle (De gen. anim. I. 18), \u201cFlesh\ncomes to flesh through food.\u201d Digestion is thus nothing more than the\ntaking up of the homogeneous and separation of the heterogeneous;\nall nourishment and growth is thus not true assimilation but only\nincrease, because each internal organ of the animal only draws its\nparts to itself out of the various plants, bodies, &c. Death is, on\nthe other hand, the separation of the like and the mingling with the\nheterogeneous. The activity of the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_, as the sundering of the like\nout of the chaos and the putting together of the like, as also the\nsetting at liberty again of this like, is certainly simple and relative\nto itself, but purely formal and thus for itself contentless.\n\nThis is the general standpoint of the philosophy of Anaxagoras,\nand quite the same standpoint which in more recent times reigns in\nchemistry for instance; flesh is certainly no longer regarded as\nsimple, but as being hydrogen, &c. The chemical elements are oxygen,\nhydrogen, carbon and metals, &c. Chemistry says, if you want to know\nwhat flesh, wood, stone, &c., really are, you must set forth their\nsimple elements, and these are ultimate. It also says that much is only\nrelatively simple, _e.g._ platinum consists of three or four metals.\nWater and air were similarly long held to be simple, but chemistry at\nlength analyzed them. From this chemical point of view, the simple\nprinciples of natural things are determined as infinitely qualitative\nand thus accepted as unchangeable and invariable, so that all else\nconsists only of the combination of these simples. Man, according to\nthis, is a collection of carbon and hydrogen, some earth, oxides,\nphosphorus, &c. It is a favourite idea of the physicists to place\nin the water or in the air, oxygen and carbon, which exist and only\nrequire to be separated. This idea of Anaxagoras certainly also differs\nfrom modern chemistry; that which we consider as concrete, is for him\nqualitatively determined or elementary. Yet he allows, with regard to\nflesh, that the parts are not all alike. \u201cFor this reason, they say,\u201d\nremarks Aristotle (Phys. I. 4; Met. IV. 5),\u2014but not particularly\nof Anaxagoras\u2014\u201ceverything is contained in everything, for they saw\neverything arise out of everything: it only appears to be different and\nis called different in accordance with the predominating number of the\nparticular kind of parts which have mingled themselves with others. In\ntruth the whole is not white, or black, or sweet, or flesh, or bones;\nbut the hom\u0153omeri\u00e6 which have most accumulated in any place, bring\nabout the result that the whole appears to us as this determinate.\u201d\nAs thus each thing contains all other things, water, air, bones,\nfruits, &c., on the other hand, the water contains flesh as flesh,\nbones, &c. Into this infinitely manifold nature of the principles,\nAnaxagoras thus goes back; the sensuous has first arisen through the\naccumulation of all those parts, and in it the one kind of parts then\nhas a predominance.\n\nWhile he defines absolute existence as universal, we see here that in\nobjective existence, or in matter, universality and thought abandon\nAnaxagoras. The implicit is to him, indeed, no absolutely sensuous\nBeing; the hom\u0153omeri\u00e6 are the non-sensuous, _i.e._ the invisible and\ninaudible, &c. This is the highest point reached by common physicists\nin passing from sensuous Being to the non-sensuous, as to the mere\nnegation of the being-for-us; but the positive side is that existent\nBeing is itself universal. The objective is to Anaxagoras certainly\nthe _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_, but for him the other-Being is a mixture of simple\nelements, which are neither flesh nor fish, red nor blue; again\nthis simple is not simple in itself, but in its essence consists of\nhom\u0153omeri\u00e6, which are, however, so small that they are imperceptible.\nThe smallness thus does not take away their existence, for they are\nstill there; but existence is just the being perceptible to sight,\nsmell, &c. These infinitely small hom\u0153omeri\u00e6 undoubtedly disappear in\na more complete conception; flesh, for instance, is such itself, but\nit is also a mixture of everything, _i.e._ it is not simple. Further\nanalysis equally shows how such a conception must, to a greater or\nlesser degree, become confused; on the one side each form is thus\nin its main elements, original, and these parts together constitute\na corporeal whole; this whole has, however, on the other side, to\ncontain everything in itself. The _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_, then, is only what binds and\nseparates, what divides and arranges [_das diakosmirende_]. This may\nsuffice us; however easily we may get confused with the hom\u0153omeri\u00e6 of\nAnaxagoras, we must hold fast to the main determination. The hom\u0153omeri\u00e6\nstill form a striking conception, and it may be asked how it conforms\nwith the rest of Anaxagoras\u2019 principle.\n\n3. _The Relation of the Two._ Now as to the relation of the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_\nto that matter, both are not speculatively posited as one, for\nthe relation itself is not set forth as one, nor has the Notion\npenetrated it. Here the ideas become in some measure superficial, and\nin some measure the conceptions are more consistent as regards the\nparticular, than they at first appear. Because the understanding is the\nself-determining, the content is end, it retains itself in relation to\nwhat is different; it does not arise and pass away although it is in\nactivity. The conception of Anaxagoras that concrete principles subsist\nand retain themselves, is thus consistent; he abolishes arising and\npassing away and accepts only an external change, a uniting together,\nand a severance of what is so united. The principles are concrete and\nhave content, _i.e._ so many ends; in the change that takes place the\nprinciples really retain themselves. Like only goes with like even if\nthe chaotic mixture is a combination of the unlike; but this is only a\ncombination and not an individual, living form which maintains itself,\nbinding like to like. Thus, however rude these ideas are, they are\nstill really in harmony with the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_.\n\nBut if the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ is with Anaxagoras the moving soul in all, it yet\nremains to the real, as the soul of the world and the organic system of\nthe whole, a mere word. For the living as living, since the soul was\nconceived of as principle, the ancients demanded no further principle\n(for it is the self-moving), but for determinateness, which the\nanimal is as element in the system of the whole, they again required\nonly the universal of these determinations. Anaxagoras calls the\nunderstanding such a principle, and in fact the absolute Notion, as\nsimple existence, the self-identical in its differences, the dividing,\nthe reality-establishing, must be known as such. But that Anaxagoras\nshowed forth the understanding in the universe, or had grasped it as\na rational system\u2014of this not only do we not find a trace, but the\nancients expressly say that he simply let the matter pass, just as\nwhen we say that the world or nature is a great system, the world is\nwisely ordered or is generally speaking rational. By this we are shown\nno more of the realization of this reason or the comprehensibility of\nthe world. The _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ of Anaxagoras is thus still formal, although\nthe identity of the principle with the realization was recognized.\nAristotle (Met. I. 4) recognizes the insufficiency of the Anaxagorean\nprinciple: \u201cAnaxagoras, indeed, requires the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ for his formation\nof the world-system; that is, when he has a difficulty in showing the\nreason for which it is in accordance with necessity, he brings it in;\notherwise he employs anything for the sake of explanation, rather than\nthought.\u201d\n\nIt is nowhere more clearly set forth that the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ of Anaxagoras is\nstill formal, than in the well-known passage out of Plato\u2019s Ph\u00e6do (p.\n97-99, Steph.; p. 85-89, Bekk.), which is noteworthy for its exposition\nof the philosophy of Anaxagoras. Socrates, according to Plato, states\nmost definitely both what the absolute to them was, and why Anaxagoras\ndid not satisfy them. I quote this because it will best of all lead\nus on to the main conception which we recognize in the philosophic\nconsciousness of the ancients; at the same time it is an example of the\nloquacity of Socrates. Socrates\u2019 understanding of the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ as end\nis better because its determinations are congenial to him, so that we\nalso see in it the principal forms that appear in Socrates. Plato makes\nSocrates, in prison, an hour before his death, relate at considerable\nlength his experiences with regard to Anaxagoras: \u201cWhen I heard it read\nfrom a book of Anaxagoras, that he said that the understanding is the\ndisposer of the world and the first cause, I rejoiced in such a cause,\nand I held that if Mind apportioned out all reality, it would apportion\nit for the best\u201d (the end would be shown forth). \u201cNow if anyone wished\nto find the cause of the individual thing, how it becomes, and how it\npasses away, or how it is, he must discover this from what is best for\nthat thing, whether it is being or in some way suffering or doing.\u201d\nThat the understanding is cause, or that everything is made for the\nbest, means the same thing; this will become clearer from the opposite.\nIt is further said, \u201cFor this reason a man has only to consider for\nhimself, as for all others, what is best and most perfect, and then he\nwould of necessity know the worse, for the same science comprises both.\nThus reflecting, I rejoiced that I could believe that I had found in\nAnaxagoras a teacher of the cause of existence\u201d (of the good) \u201csuch\nas I approved of; he would, I believed, tell me whether the earth was\nflat or round, and if he told me this, he would show me the cause and\nnecessity of the fact, because he would show me the one or the other\nas being the better; and if he said that the earth is in the centre,\nhe would show me that it was better that it should be in the centre\u201d\n(i.e. its implicitly and explicitly determined end, and not utility as\nan externally determined end). \u201cAnd when he had shown me this, I should\nbe satisfied though he brought forward no other kind of causes, for\nthe same would hold good for the sun, the moon, and the other stars,\ntheir respective velocities, returnings, and other conditions. Because\nhe assigned its cause to each and to all in common, I thought that he\nwould explain what was best for each and what was best for all\u201d (the\nfree, implicitly and explicitly existent Idea, the absolute end). \u201cI\nwould not have given up this hope for a great deal, but seized these\nwritings zealously and read them as soon as possible in order to learn\nas soon as possible the good and the evil. These bright hopes faded\nwhen I saw that he did not require thought at all nor any reason for\nthe formation of things, but had recourse to air, fire, water and many\nother eccentricities.\u201d We here see how to what is best, according to\nthe understanding (the relation of final end), that which we call\nnatural causes is opposed, just as in Leibnitz the operating and the\nfinal causes are different.\n\nSocrates explains this in the following way: \u201cIt appears to me to be\nas if some one were to say that Socrates performs all his actions with\nunderstanding, and then in going on to give the reasons for each of\nmy actions, were to say that I sit here because my body consists of\nbones and muscles; the bones are fixed and have joints that divide\nthem (_\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03c5\u1f70\u03c2_), but the muscles have the power of extending and\nbending, and they cover the bones with flesh and skin; it is as though\nhe were further to bring forward as the cause of my talking with\nyou, other similar causes, sounds, and air, hearing, and a thousand\nother things, but omitted to give the true cause\u201d (free independent\ndetermination), \u201cwhich is that the Athenians judged it fit to condemn\nme, and therefore I judged it better and more just to sit here and to\nsuffer the punishment which they accorded\u201d (we must recollect that one\nof his friends had arranged everything for the flight of Socrates, but\nthat he refused to go) \u201cfor else, by the dog of Egypt, how long ago\nwould these bones and muscles have gone to Megara or to Boeotia, had\nthey been moved only by their opinion of what was best, and had I not\nconsidered it juster and better to bear the punishment which the State\nlaid upon me, instead of escaping and fleeing from it.\u201d Plato here\ncorrectly places the two kinds of reason and cause in opposition to one\nanother\u2014the cause proceeding from ends, and the inferior, subject, and\nmerely external causes of chemistry, mechanism, &c.\u2014in order to show\nthe discrepancy between them, as here exemplified in the case of a man\nwith consciousness. Anaxagoras seems to define an end and to wish to\nproceed from it; but he immediately lets this go again and proceeds to\nquite external causes. \u201cBut to call these\u201d (these bones and muscles)\n\u201ccauses is quite improper. If, however, anyone were to say that without\nhaving bones and muscles and whatever else I have, I could not do\nthat which I consider best, he would be quite right. But to say that\nfrom such causes, I do that which I do, and do with understanding;\nto say that I do not do it from the choice of what is best\u2014to make\nsuch an assertion shows a great want of consideration; it signifies an\nincapacity to distinguish that the one is the true cause and the other\nis only that without which the cause could not operate,\u201d _i.e._ the\nconditions.\n\nThis is a good example for showing that we miss the end in such modes\nof explanation. On the other hand, it is not a good example, because it\nis taken from the kingdom of the self-conscious will, where deliberate\nand not unconscious end reigns. In this criticism of the Anaxagorean\n_\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ we can certainly see it generally expressed that Anaxagoras\nmade no application of his _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ to reality. But the positive\nelement in the conclusion of Socrates seems, on the other hand, to\nbe unsatisfying, because it goes to the other extreme, namely, to\ndesire causes for nature which do not appear to be in it, but which\nfall outside of it in consciousness. For what is good and beautiful is\npartly due to the thought of consciousness as such; end or purposive\naction is mainly an act of consciousness and not of nature. But in so\nfar as ends become posited in nature, the end, as end, on the other\nhand, falls outside of it in our judgment only; as such it is not in\nnature itself, for in it there are only what we call natural causes,\nand for its comprehension we have only to seek and show causes that\nare immanent. According to this, we distinguish, for instance, in\nSocrates the end and ground of his action as consciousness, and the\ncauses of his actual action: and the latter we would undoubtedly seek\nin his bones, muscles, nerves, &c. Since we banish the consideration\nof nature in relation to ends\u2014as present in our thought and not\nexistent in nature\u2014we also banish from our consideration teleological\nexplanations in nature formerly admired, _e.g._ that grass grows that\nanimals may eat it, and that these last exist and eat grass, so that we\nmay eat them. The end of trees is said to be that their fruit may be\nconsumed and that they should give us wood for heat; many animals have\nskins for warm clothing; the sea in northern climates floats timber to\nthe shores because on these shores themselves no wood grows, and the\ninhabitants can hence obtain it, and so on. Thus presented, the end,\nthe Good, lies outside of the thing itself: the nature of a thing then\nbecomes considered, not in and for itself, but only in relation to\nanother which is nothing to it. Thus, because things are only useful\nfor an end, this determination is not their own but one foreign to\nthem. The tree, the grass, is as natural existence, independent, and\nthis adaptation of it to an end, such as making grass that which is\nto be eaten, does not concern the grass as grass, just as it does\nnot concern the animal that man should clothe himself in his skin;\nSocrates may hence seem to miss in Anaxagoras this mode of looking at\nnature. But this to us familiar way of regarding the good and expedient\nis on the one hand not the only one, and does not represent Plato\u2019s\nmeaning, while, on the other, it is likewise necessary. We have not to\nrepresent the good or the end in so one-sided a manner that we think\nof it existing as such in the perceiving mind, and in opposition to\nwhat is; but set free from this form, we must take it in its essence\nas the Idea of all existence. The nature of things must be recognized\nin accordance with the Notion, which is the independent, unfettered\nconsideration of things; and because it is that which things are in and\nfor themselves, it controls the relationship of natural causes. This\nNotion is the end, the true cause, but that which recedes into itself;\nit is the implicitly existent first from which movement proceeds and\nwhich becomes result; it is not only an end present in the imagination\nbefore its actuality exists, but is also present in reality. Becoming\nis the movement through which a reality or totality becomes; in the\nanimal or plant its essence as universal genus, is that which begins\nits movement and brings it forth. But this whole is not the product of\nsomething foreign, but its own product, what is already present as\ngerm or seed; thus it is called end, the self-producing, that which\nin its Becoming is already implicitly existent. The Idea is not a\nparticular thing, which might have another content than reality or\nappear quite different. The opposition is the merely formal opposition\nof possibility and actuality; the active impelling substance and\nthe product are the same. This realization goes right through the\nopposition; the negative in the universal is just this process. The\ngenus sets itself in a state of opposition as individual and universal,\nand thus, in what lives, the genus realizes itself in the opposition of\nraces which are opposed, but whose principle is the universal genus.\nThey, as individuals, aim at their own self-preservation as individuals\nin eating, drinking, &c., but what they thereby bring to pass is genus.\nIndividuals sublate themselves, but genus is that which is ever brought\nforth; plants bring forth only the same plants whose ground is the\nuniversal.\n\nIn accordance with this, the distinction between what have been badly\nnamed natural causes and the final causes has to be determined. Now\nif I isolate individuality and merely regard it as movement and the\nmoments of the same, I show what are natural causes. For example,\nwhere has this life taken its origin? Through the generation of this\nits father and mother. What is the cause of these fruits? The tree\nwhose juices so distil themselves that the fruit forthwith arises.\nAnswers of this kind give the causes, _i.e._ the individuality\nopposed to an individuality; but their principle is the genus. Now\nnature cannot represent essence as such. The end of generation is the\nsublation of the individuality of Being; but nature which in existence\ncertainly brings about this sublation of individuality, does not set\nthe universal in its place, but another individual. Bones, muscles,\n&c., bring forth a movement; they are causes, but they themselves are\nso through other causes, and so on into infinitude. The universal,\nhowever, takes them up into itself as moments which undoubtedly appear\nin movement as causes, though the fundamental ground of these parts\nactually is the whole. It is not they which come first, but the result\ninto which the juices of the plants, &c., pass, is the first, just\nas in origination it appears only as product, as seed, that which\nconstitutes the beginning and the end, even though they be in different\nindividuals. Their real nature is the same.\n\nBut such a genus is itself a particular genus and is essentially\nrelated to another, _e.g._ the Idea of the plant to that of the animal;\nthe universal moves on. This looks like external teleology\u2014that plants\nare eaten by animals, &c., in which their limitation as genus lies.\nThe genus of the plant has the absolute totality of its realization in\nthe animal, the animal in the conscious existence, just as the earth\nhas it in the plant. This is the system of the whole in which each\nmoment is transitory. The double method of considering the matter thus\nis that each Idea is a circle within itself, the plant or the animal\nthe Good of its kind; and, on the other hand, each is a moment in the\nuniversal Good. If I consider the animal merely as externally adapted\nto an end, as created for something else, I consider it in a one-sided\nway; it is real existence, in and for itself universal. But it is just\nas one-sided to say that the plant, for instance, is only in and for\nitself, only end to itself, only shut up within itself and going back\ninto itself. For each idea is a circle which is complete in itself,\nbut whose completion is likewise a passing into another circle; it\nis a vortex whose middle point, that into which it returns, is found\ndirectly in the periphery of a higher circle which swallows it up.\nThus, for the first time, we reach the determination of an end in the\nworld which is immanent within it.\n\nThese explanations are necessary here, since hereafter we see the\nspeculative Idea coming more into the universal; it was formerly\nexpressed as Being and the moments and movements were called existent.\nWhat has to be avoided in this transition is that we should thereby\nthink that Being is given up and that we pass into consciousness\nas opposed to Being (in so doing the universal would lose all its\nspeculative significance); the universal is immanent in nature. This\nis the meaning which is present when we represent to ourselves that\nthought constitutes, orders, &c., the world. It is not, so to speak,\nthe activity of the individual consciousness, in which I stand here\non one side and, opposite to me, an actuality, matter, which I form,\ndispose and order as I will; for the universal, Thought, must abide in\nPhilosophy without this opposition. Being, pure Being, is universal\nwhen we thereby keep in mind that Being is absolute abstraction,\npure thought; but Being as it is thus set forth as Being, has the\nsignificance of the opposite to this Being-reflected-into-itself,\nto thought and recollection; the universal, on the contrary, has\nreflection immediately in itself. So far, the ancients really got:\nit does not seem far. \u201cUniversal\u201d is a dry determination; everyone\nknows about the universal, but not of it as real existence. Thought,\nindeed, reaches to the invisibility of the sensuous; not to the\npositive determinateness of thinking it as universal, but only to the\npredicateless absolute as to the merely negative; and that is as far\nas the common ideas of the present day have come. With this discovery\nof thought we conclude the first Section and enter upon the second\nperiod. The profit to be derived from the first period is not very\ngreat. Some, indeed, think that there is still some special wisdom in\nit, but thought is still young, the determinations are thus still poor,\nabstract and arid. Thought here has but few determinations\u2014water,\nBeing, number, &c.\u2014and these cannot endure; the universal must go\nforth on its own account as the self-determining activity, and this we\nfind it doing in Anaxagoras alone.\n\nWe have still to consider the relationship of the universal as opposed\nto Being, or consciousness as such in its relation to what is. By\nAnaxagoras\u2019 determination of real existence, this relationship of\nconsciousness is also determined. In this regard nothing satisfactory\ncan be found; for he recognized, on the one hand, thought as real\nexistence, without, however, bringing this thought to bear on ordinary\nreality. Thus, on the other hand, this is destitute of thought and\nindependent, an infinite number of hom\u0153omeri\u00e6, _i.e._ an infinite\namount of a sensuous implicit existence, which now, however, is\nsensuous Being; for existent Being is an accumulation of hom\u0153omeri\u00e6.\nThe relationship borne by consciousness to real existence may likewise\nbe various. Anaxagoras could thus either say that the truth is only in\nthought and in rational knowledge, or that it is sensuous perception;\nfor in this we have the hom\u0153omeri\u00e6 which are themselves implicit. Thus,\nin the first place, we find from him\u2014as Sextus tells us, (adv. Math.\nVII., 89-91) \u201cthat the understanding (_\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2_) is the criterion of\nthe truth; the senses cannot judge of the truth on account of their\nweakness\u201d\u2014weakness for the hom\u0153omeri\u00e6 are the infinitely small;\nthe senses could not grasp them, do not know that they have to be\nsomething ideal and thought. A celebrated example of this is given by\nhim according to Sextus (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 13, \u00a7. 33), in the assertion\nthat \u201cthe snow is black, for it is water, and water is black.\u201d He\nhere asserts the truth in a reason. In the second place, according to\nAristotle (Met. III. 7), Anaxagoras is said to have asserted that,\n\u201cthere is a medium between contradiction (_\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c6\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2_); so that\neverything is untrue. For because the two sides of the opposition are\nmingled, what is mingled is neither good nor not good, and thus not\ntrue.\u201d Aristotle also quotes another time from him (Met. III. 5): \u201cThat\none of his apothegms to his disciples was that to them things were as\nthey supposed them.\u201d This may relate to the fact that because existent\nBeing is an accumulation of hom\u0153omeri\u00e6 which are what really exists,\nsensuous perception takes things as they are in truth.\n\nThere is little more to be made of this. But here we have the beginning\nof a more distinct development of the relationship of consciousness to\nBeing, the development of the nature of knowledge as a knowledge of the\ntrue. The mind has gone forth to express real existence as Thought;\nand thus real existence as existent, is in consciousness as such; it\nis implicit but likewise in consciousness. This Being is such only in\nso far as consciousness recognizes it, and real existence is only the\nknowledge of it. The mind has no longer to seek existence in something\nforeign, since it is in itself; for what formerly appeared foreign\nis Thought, _i.e._ consciousness has this real existence in itself.\nBut this consciousness in opposition is an individual consciousness;\nthereby in fact, implicit Being is sublated, for the implicit is\nwhat is not opposed, not singled out, but universal. It is, indeed,\nknown, but what is, only is in knowledge, or it is no other Being than\nthat of the knowledge of consciousness. We see this development of\nthe universal in which real existence goes right over to the side of\nconsciousness, in the so much decried worldly wisdom of the Sophists;\nwe may view this as indicating that the negative nature of the\nuniversal is now developing.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nFIRST PERIOD, SECOND DIVISION: FROM THE SOPHISTS TO THE SOCRATICS.\n\n\nIN this second division we have first to consider more particularly\nthe Sophists, secondly Socrates, and thirdly the Socratics, while we\ndistinguish from these Plato, and take him along with Aristotle in the\nthird division. The _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_, which is at first only grasped in a very\nsubjective manner as end, that is to say as that which is end to men,\n_i.e._ the Good, in Plato and Aristotle became understood in what is on\nthe whole an objective way, as genus or Idea. Because thought has now\nbecome set forth as principle, and this at first presents a subjective\nappearance as being the subjective activity of thought, there now sets\nin (since the absolute is posited as subject) an age of subjective\nreflection; _i.e._ there begins in this period\u2014which coincides with\nthe disintegration of Greece in the Peloponnesian war\u2014the principle of\nmodern times.\n\nSince in the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ of Anaxagoras, as the still formal self-determining\nactivity, determination is as yet quite undetermined, general and\nabstract, and along with that contentless throughout, the universal\nstandpoint is the immediate necessity of going on to a content which\nbegins actual determination. But what is this absolute, universal\ncontent which abstract thought as self-determining activity gives\nitself? That is the real question here. Consciousness now confronts\nthe untrammeled thought of those ancient philosophers, whose general\nideas we have considered. While hitherto the subject, when it reflected\non the absolute, only produced thoughts, and had this content before\nit, it is now seen that what is here present is not the whole, but\nthat the thinking subject likewise really belongs to the totality of\nthe objective. Furthermore, this subjectivity of thought has again\nthe double character of at once being the infinite, self-relating\nform, which as this pure activity of the universal, receives\ncontent-determinations; and, on the other hand, as consciousness\nreflects that it is the thinking subject which is thus positing, of\nalso being a return of spirit from objectivity into itself. Thus if\nthought, because it immersed itself in the object, had as such, and\nlike the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ of Anaxagoras, at first no content, because this\nstood on the other side, so now, with the return of thought as to\nthe consciousness that the subject is what thinks, we have the other\nside\u2014that what has to be dealt with is the attainment of a truly\nabsolute content. This content, taken abstractly, may itself be again\na double one. Either the \u201cI\u201d is in respect of determination the real\nwhen it makes itself and its interests the content, or the content\nbecomes determined as the altogether universal. According to this,\nwe have two questions to deal with, which are\u2014how the determination\nof what is in and for itself is to be comprehended, and how this is\nlikewise in immediate relation to the \u201cI\u201d as thinking. It comes to pass\nin Philosophy that although the \u201cI\u201d is the positing, yet the posited\ncontent of that which is thought is the object existent in and for\nitself. If one were to remain at saying that the \u201cI\u201d is that which\nposits, this would be the false idealism of modern times: in earlier\ntimes men did not remain at saying that what is thought is bad because\nI posit it.\n\nTo the Sophists the content is _mine_, and subjective: Socrates grasped\nthe content which is in and for itself, and the followers of Socrates\nhave, in direct connection with him, merely further defined this\ncontent.\n\n\nA.\u2014THE SOPHISTS.\n\nThe Notion, which reason has found in Anaxagoras to be real existence,\nis the simple negative into which all determination, all that is\nexistent and individual sinks. Before the Notion nothing can exist,\nfor it is simply the predicateless absolute to which everything is\nclearly a moment only; for it there is thus nothing so to speak\npermanently fixed and sealed. The Notion is just the constant change\nof Heraclitus, the movement, the causticity, which nothing can resist.\nThus the Notion which finds itself, finds itself as the absolute\npower before which everything vanishes; and thereby all things, all\nexistence, everything held to be secure, is now made fleeting. This\nsecurity\u2014whether it be a security of natural Being or the security of\ndefinite conceptions, principles, customs and laws\u2014becomes vacillation\nand loses its stability. As universal, such principles, &c., certainly\nthemselves pertain to the Notion, yet their universality is only\ntheir form, for the content which they have, as determinate, falls\ninto movement. We see this movement arising in the so-called Sophists\nwhom we here encounter for the first time. They gave themselves the\nname _\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03af_, as teachers of wisdom, _i.e._ as those who could\nmake wise (_\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd_). The learning of the Sophists is thus directly\nthe opposite to ours, which only aspires to acquire information and\ninvestigate what is and has been\u2014it is a mass of empirical matter, in\nwhich the discovery of a new form, a new worm, or other vermin is held\nto be a point of great importance. Our learned professors are in so\nfar much less responsible than the Sophists; however, Philosophy has\nnothing to do with this lack of responsibility.\n\nBut as regards the relation of the Sophists to what is ordinarily\nbelieved, they are, by the healthy human understanding, as much\ndecried as by morality. By the former this is on account of their\ntheoretic teaching, since it is senseless to say that nothing is;\nand in respect of practice because they subvert all principles and\nlaws. For the first mentioned, things certainly cannot be left in\nthis confusion of movement and in their negative aspect merely; yet\nthe rest into which they pass is not the restoration of what is\nmoved into its former condition of security, as if in the end the\nresult were the same and the action were a superfluous one. Now the\nsophistry of common opinion, which is without the culture of thought\nand without scientific knowledge, is found in the fact that to it its\ndeterminations are, as such, held to be existent in and for themselves,\nand a number of rules of life, maxims, principles, &c., are considered\nas absolutely fixed truths. Mind itself is, however, the unity of these\nin many ways limited truths, which in it are all recognized as being\npresent as sublated only, as merely relative truths, _i.e._ with their\nrestrictions, in their limitation, and not as existent in themselves.\nHence these truths to the ordinary understanding, are, in fact, no\nmore, for on another occasion it allows and even asserts the opposite\nto have a value also for consciousness; or it does not know that it\nsays directly the opposite to what it means, its expression being thus\nonly an expression of contradiction. In its actions generally, and not\nin its bad actions, ordinary understanding breaks these its maxims and\nits principles itself, and if it leads a rational life, it is properly\nspeaking only a standing inconsistency, the making good of one narrow\nmaxim of conduct through breaking off from others. For example, a\nstatesman of experience and culture is one who knows how to steer a\nmiddle course, and has practical understanding, _i.e._ deals with the\nwhole extent of the case before him and not with one side of it, which\nexpresses itself in one maxim only. On the other hand, he, whoever he\nis, who acts on one maxim, is a pedant and spoils things for himself\nand others. Most commonly it is thus. For example, we hear it said, \u201cit\nis certain that the things that I see are; I believe in their reality.\u201d\nAnyone can say this quite easily. But in fact it is not true that\nhe believes in their reality; really he assumes the contrary. For he\neats and drinks them, _i.e._ he is convinced that these things are not\nin themselves, and their being has no security, no subsistence. Thus\ncommon understanding is in its actions better than it thinks, for in\naction it is Mind as a whole. But it is not here known to itself as\nMind, for what comes within its consciousness are definite laws, rules,\ngeneral propositions, such as by its understanding are esteemed to be\nthe absolute truth, whose limitation it, however, sets aside in action.\nNow, when the Notion turns to the riches which consciousness thinks to\npossess, and when the latter is sensible of the danger to its truth\nwithout which it would not be, when its fixed realities are destroyed,\nit is enraged; and the Notion which in this its realization applies\nitself to the common verities, draws hatred and disdain upon itself.\nThis is the ground of the universal denunciation of the Sophists; a\ndenunciation of healthy human understanding which does not know how\nelse to help itself.\n\nSophistry is certainly a word of ill-repute, and indeed it is\nparticularly through the opposition to Socrates and Plato that the\nSophists have come into such disrepute that the word usually now\nsignifies that, by false reasoning, some truth is either refuted and\nmade dubious, or something false is proved and made plausible. We\nhave to put this evil significance on one side and to forget it. On\nthe other hand, we now wish to consider further from the positive\nand properly speaking scientific side, what was the position of the\nSophists in Greece.\n\nIt was the Sophists who now applied the simple Notion as thought\n(which with Zeno in the Eleatic school had commenced to turn towards\nits pure counterpart, motion) to worldly objects generally, and with\nit penetrated all human relations. For it is conscious of itself as\nthe absolute and single reality, and, jealous of all else, exercises\nits power and rule in this reality as regards all else, since this\ndesires to be considered as the determinate which is not Thought. The\nthought identical with itself, thus directs its negative powers towards\nthe manifold determination of the theoretical and the practical, the\ntruths of natural consciousness and the immediately recognized laws\nand principles; and what to the ordinary conception is established,\ndissolves itself in it, and in so doing leaves it to particular\nsubjectivity to make itself first and fixed, to relate everything to\nitself.\n\nNow that this Notion has appeared, it has become a more universal\nPhilosophy, and not so much simple Philosophy as the universal culture\nof which every man who did not belong to those devoid of thought,\npartook, and necessarily partook. For we call culture just the Notion\nas applied in actuality, in so far as it makes its appearance not\npurely in its abstraction, but in unity with the manifold content of\nall ordinary conceptions. But in culture, the Notion is the predominant\nas also the actuating, because in both the determinate is recognized\nin its limits, in its transition into something else. This culture\nbecame the general aim of education, and there were hence a number\nof teachers of Sophistry. Indeed, the Sophists are the teachers of\nGreece through whom culture first came into existence in Greece, and\nthus they took the place of poets and of rhapsodists, who before this\nwere the ordinary instructors. For religion was no instructress, since\nno teaching was in it imparted; and though priests certainly offered\nsacrifices, prophesied and interpreted the sayings of the oracle,\ninstruction is something quite different from this. But the Sophists\neducated men in wisdom, in the sciences, music, mathematics, &c., and\nthis was their foremost aim. Before Pericles appeared in Greece, the\ndesire for culture through thought and through reflection was awakened;\nmen wished to be cultured in their ideas, and in their various\nrelations to guide themselves by thought, and no longer merely through\noracles, or through custom, passion, the feelings of the moment. For\nthe end of the State is the universal, under which the particular is\ncomprehended. Because the Sophists kept in view and enlarged upon this\nculture, they prosecuted teaching as a special calling, business, or\nprofession, as an office taking the place of schools; they travelled\nround the towns of Greece, the youth of which was by them instructed.\n\nNow culture is certainly an indefinite expression. It has, however,\nthis meaning, that what free thought is to attain must come out of\nitself and be personal conviction; it is then no longer believed\nbut investigated\u2014in short, it is the so-called enlightenment of\nmodern times. Thought seeks general principles by which it criticizes\neverything which is by us esteemed, and nothing has value to us which\nis not in conformity with these principles. Thus, thought undertakes\nto compare the positive content with itself, to dissolve the former\nconcrete of belief; on one side to split the content up, and, on the\nother, to isolate these individualities, these particular points of\nview and aspects, and to secure them on their own account. These\naspects, which are properly not independent, but only moments of a\nwhole, when detached from it, relate themselves to themselves, and\nin this way assume the form of universality. Any one of them can\nthus be elevated to a reason, _i.e._ to a universal determination,\nwhich is again applied to particular aspects. Thus, in culture, it is\nrequisite that men should be acquainted with the universal points of\nview which belong to a transaction, event, &c., that this point of\nview and thereby the thing, should be grasped in a universal way, in\norder to afford a present knowledge of what is in question. A judge\nknows the various laws, _i.e._ the various legal points of view under\nwhich a thing is to be considered; these are already for him universal\naspects through which he has a universal consciousness, and considers\nthe matter in a universal way. A man of culture thus knows how to say\nsomething of everything, to find points of view in all. Greece has\nto thank the Sophists for this culture, because they taught men to\nexercise thought as to what should have authority for them, and thus\ntheir culture was culture in philosophy as much as in eloquence.\n\nIn order to reach this double end, the Sophists were one in their\ndesire to be wise. To know what constitutes power amongst men and in\nthe State, and what I have to recognize as such, is counted as wisdom;\nand because I know the power, I also know how to direct others in\nconformity with my end. Hence the admiration that Pericles and other\nstatesmen excited, just because they knew their own standpoint, and\nhad the power of putting others in their proper place. That man is\npowerful who can deduce the actions of men from the absolute ends which\nmove them. The object of the Sophists has thus been to teach what is\nthe mainspring of the world, and since Philosophy alone knows that\nthis is the universal thought which resolves all that is particular,\nthe Sophists were also speculative philosophers. Learned in the proper\nsense they hence were not, because there were as yet no positive\nsciences without Philosophy, such as in their aridity did not concern\nall mankind and man\u2019s essential aspects.\n\nThey further had the most ordinary practical end, to give a\nconsciousness of that which is involved in the moral world and which\nsatisfies man. Religion taught that the gods are the powers which rule\nover men. Immediate morality recognized the rule of laws; man was to\nfind satisfaction in conforming to laws, and was to assume that others\nalso find satisfaction because they follow these laws. But from the\nreflection which here breaks in, it no longer satisfies man to obey\nlaw as an authority and external necessity, for he desires to satisfy\nhimself in himself, to convince himself, through his reflection, of\nwhat is binding upon him, what is his end and what he has to do for\nthis end. Thus the impulses and desires that man has, become his\npower; and only inasmuch as he affords them satisfaction does he\nbecome satisfied. Now the Sophists taught how these powers could be\nmoved in empirical man, for the good as ordinarily recognized, no\nlonger determined them. Rhetoric, however, teaches how circumstances\nmay be made subject to such forces; it even makes use of the wrath\nand passions of the hearer in order to bring about a conclusion. Thus\nthe Sophists were more especially the teachers of oratory, and that\nis the aspect in which the individual could make himself esteemed\namongst the people as well as carry out what was best for the people;\nthis certainly characterizes a democratic constitution, in which the\ncitizens have the ultimate decision. Because, in this way, oratory was\none of the first requirements for the rule of a people, or for making\nsomething clear to them through their ordinary ideas, the Sophists\ntrained men for common Greek life, for citizenship and for statesmen,\nwithout appearing to prepare State officials for an examination in\nspecific subjects. For the particular characteristic of eloquence is\nto show the manifold points of view existing in a thing, and to give\nforce to those which harmonize with what appears to me to be most\nuseful; it thus is the art of putting forward various points of view in\nthe concrete case, and placing others rather in the shade. Aristotle\u2019s\n_Topica_ comes to mind in the connection, inasmuch as it gives the\ncategories or thought-determinations (_\u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2_), according to which we\nhave to regard things in order to learn to speak; but the Sophists were\nthe first to apply themselves to a knowledge of these.\n\nThis is the position taken up by the Sophists. But we find a perfectly\ndefinite picture of their further progress and procedure in Plato\u2019s\nProtagoras. Plato here makes Protagoras express himself more precisely\nrespecting the art of the Sophists. That is to say, Plato in this\ndialogue represents that Socrates accompanies a young man named\nHippocrates, who desires to place himself under Protagoras, then newly\narrived in Athens, for instruction in the science of the Sophists.\nOn the way, Socrates now asks Hippocrates what is this wisdom of\nthe Sophists which he wishes to learn. Hippocrates at first replies\nRhetoric, for the Sophist is one who knows how to make men clever\n(_\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd_) in speech. In fact, what is most striking in a man or people\nof culture is the art of speaking well, or of turning subjects round\nand considering them in many aspects. The uncultivated man finds it\nunpleasant to associate with people who know how to grasp and express\nevery point of view with ease. The French are good speakers in this\nsense, and the Germans call their talking prattle; but it is not mere\ntalk that brings about this result, for culture is also wanted. We may\nhave mastered a speech quite completely, but if we have not culture,\nit is not good speaking. Men thus learn French, not only to be able\nto speak French well, but to acquire French culture. What is to be\nobtained from the Sophists is thus the power of keeping the manifold\npoints of view present to the mind, so that the wealth of categories by\nwhich an object may be considered, immediately occurs to it. Socrates,\nindeed, remarks that the principle of the Sophists is not hereby\ndetermined in a sufficiently comprehensive way, and thus it is not\nsufficiently known what a Sophist is, \u201cyet,\u201d he says, \u201cwe have a desire\nto go on.\u201d[86] For likewise, if anyone wishes to study Philosophy, he\ndoes not as yet know what Philosophy is, else he would not need to\nstudy it.\n\nHaving reached Protagoras with Hippocrates, Socrates finds him in\nan assemblage of the foremost Sophists and surrounded by listeners,\n\u201cwalking about and like an Orpheus entrancing all men by his words,\nHippias sitting meanwhile on a chair with not so many round him, and\nProdicus lying amongst a great number of admirers.\u201d After Socrates\nbrought before Protagoras the request to have Hippocrates placed under\nhis instruction, in order that he might by him be taught how to become\neminent in the State, he also asks whether they might speak with him\nin public or alone. Protagoras praises his discretion, and replies\nthat they act wisely to make use of this precaution. For because the\nSophists wandered about the towns, and thus youths, deserting fathers\nand friends, followed them in view of improving themselves through\ntheir intercourse with them, they drew upon themselves much envy and\nill-will\u2014for everything new is hated. On this point Protagoras speaks\nat length: \u201cI assert that the art of the Sophists is old; but that\nthose of the ancients who practised it in fear of giving offence\u201d (for\nthe uncultured world is antagonistic to the cultured) \u201cveiled and\nconcealed it. One section, like Homer and Hesiod, taught it in their\npoetry; others, like Orpheus and Mus\u00e6us, through mysteries and oracles.\nSome, I believe, like Iccus of Tarentum, and the Sophist now living\nand unsurpassed\u2014Herodicus, of Selymbria\u2014in gymnastics, but many more\nthrough music.\u201d We see that Protagoras usually describes the end of\nmental culture as being to bring about morality, presence of mind,\nsense of order and general capacity. He adds: \u201call those who feared\nenvy arising against the sciences, required such veils and screens.\nBut I think that they do not attain their end, for men of penetration\nin the State see the end appearing through, while the people notice\nnothing, and only quote the others. If people behave so, they make\nthemselves more hated, and appear to be impostors. I have therefore\ntaken the opposite way, and openly acknowledge (_\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u1ff6_), and do not\ndeny that I am a Sophist\u201d (Protagoras first used the name of Sophist),\n\u201cand that my business is to give men culture (_\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd_).\u201d[87]\n\nFurther on, where the arts which Hippocrates was to acquire under\nProtagoras\u2019 instruction were discussed, Protagoras answered Socrates:\n\u201cWhat you ask is sensible, and I like to answer a sensible question.\nHippocrates will not have the same experience that he would have\nwith other teachers (_\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd_). These latter are at variance with\n(_\u03bb\u03c9\u03b2\u1ff6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9_) their pupils, for they take them against their wills\nstraight back to the arts and sciences which they just wished to\nescape, inasmuch as they teach them arithmetic, geometry and music.\nBut he who comes to me will be instructed in nothing else than that in\nwhich he comes to be instructed.\u201d Thus the youths came freely, with\nthe wish to be made men of culture through his instruction, and in the\nhope that he, as teacher, knew the way to succeed in so doing. As to\nhis general aim, Protagoras says, \u201cThe instruction consists in bringing\nabout a right perception and understanding (_\u03b5\u1f50\u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03af\u03b1_) of the best\nway of regulating one\u2019s own family affairs, and similarly as regards\ncitizenship, in qualifying men both to speak on the affairs of the\nState, and to do the best for the State.\u201d Thus two interests are here\napparent, that of the individual and that of the State. Now Socrates\nexpresses dissent and surprise at Protagoras\u2019 assertion as to imparting\ninstruction in political aptitude. \u201cI thought that the political\nvirtues could not be learned,\u201d for it is Socrates\u2019 main tenet that\nvirtue cannot be taught. And Socrates now brings forward the following\nargument, after the manner of the Sophists appealing to experience.\n\u201cThose who are masters of the art of politics cannot impart that art to\nothers. Pericles, the father of these youths, gave them instruction in\nall that instructors could teach; but not in the science for which he\nis celebrated; here he left them free to wander in the chance of their\nlighting upon wisdom. Similarly other great statesmen did not teach it\nto others, whether friends or strangers.\u201d[88]\n\nProtagoras now replied that it could be taught, and shows the reason\nwhy great statesmen did not give this instruction, while he asks\nwhether he is to speak as an elder to younger men in a myth, or whether\nhe should give his reasons. The company left the matter to him and\nhe began with the following myth of everlasting interest: \u201cThe gods\ncommanded Prometheus and Epimetheus to adorn the world and confer on\nit its qualities and powers. Epimetheus imparted strength, power of\nflight, arms, clothing, herbs and fruits, but in some incomprehensible\nway he gave all to the beasts, so that nothing remained to men.\nPrometheus saw them unclothed, unarmed, helpless, when the moment came\nin which the form of man had to go forth into the light. Then he stole\nfire from heaven, the arts of Vulcan and Minerva, to equip man for\nhis needs. But political wisdom was wanting, and, living without any\ncommon bond, they were in a constant state of strife and misery. Then\nZeus gave the command to Hermes to grant reverence\u201d (natural obedience,\nhonour, docility, respect of children for parents, and of men for\nhigher and better natures), \u201cand justice. Hermes asks, \u2018How shall I\nimpart them? To individuals, as particular arts are distributed, just\nas some have a knowledge of medicine sufficient for assisting others?\u2019\nBut Zeus answers that it must be to all, for no body of men (_\u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03c2_)\ncan exist if only a few partake of those qualities. And it shall be\nthe law that whoever cannot acknowledge authority and justice must be\nexterminated as a plague to the State. Hence the Athenians when they\nwish to build, call builders into counsel, and when they contemplate\nany other business, those who have experience in it, but when they\nwish to come to a decision or make a regulation in State affairs, they\nadmit all. For all must partake of this virtue or no State could exist.\nThus if anyone is inexperienced in the art of flute-playing and yet\nprofesses to be a master in it, he is justly thought to be mad. But in\njustice it is otherwise; if anyone is not just and confesses it, he is\nthought to be mad. He must profess to be so, for everybody must either\nshare in it or be shut out from social life.\u201d[89]\n\nFor the fact that this political science is also so constituted \u201cthat\neveryone by education and diligence (_\u1f10\u03be \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2_) may acquire it,\u201d\nProtagoras gives additional reasons in the following argument: \u201cNo\none blames or punishes on account of a defect or evil that has come\nto anyone by nature or by chance. But defects and faults which can\nbe removed through diligence, exercise and teaching are considered\nto be blameworthy and punishable. Impiety and injustice are of this\ndescription and, generally speaking, all that opposes public virtue.\nMen guilty of these sins are thus reproached; they are punished in the\nidea that they had the power to remove the wrong and still more to\nacquire political virtue through diligence and teaching. Thus men do\nnot punish on account of what is past\u2014excepting as we strike a vicious\nbeast on the head\u2014but on account of what is to come, so that neither\nthe one who committed the crime nor any other misled by his example,\nshould do the same again. Thus it is in this implied that virtue can be\nacquired through education and exercise.\u201d[90] This is a good argument\nfor the teachability of virtue.\n\nAs to the statement of Socrates that men such as Pericles, who were\nfamed for their political virtues, did not impart these to their\nchildren and friends, Protagoras in the first place says that it\nmay on the other hand be replied, that in these virtues all men are\ninstructed by all men. Political virtue is so constituted that it\nis the common province of all; this one essential for all men is\njustice, temperance, and holiness\u2014in one word, whatever comprises\nmanly virtue. In it no particular education from men of eminence is\nthus required. The children are from their earliest infancy exhorted\nand admonished to do what is good, and are accustomed to that which\nis right. Instruction in music and gymnastics contributes to temper\nthe indulgence of self-will and pleasure, and to accustom men to\nconform to a law or rule; and the reading of the poets who enforce\nthis does the same. When man steps outside this circle of education,\nhe enters into that of the constitution of a State which likewise\ncontributes to keep everyone within the bounds of law and order, so\nthat political virtue is a result of the education of youth. But the\nobjection that distinguished men did not impart their distinction to\ntheir children and friends, Protagoras answered secondly and very\nwell as follows: \u201cLet us say that in a State all the citizens had to\nbecome flute-players, all would be instructed in the art; some would\nbe distinguished, many good, some mediocre, a few perhaps bad, and\nyet all would have a certain amount of skill. But it might very well\nbe the case that the son of an artist should be a bad player, for\nthe distinction depends on particular talents, and a particularly\ngood natural capacity. From very skilful players very unskilful might\ndescend, and conversely, but all would have a certain knowledge of the\nflute, and all would certainly be infinitely better than those who were\nquite ignorant of the art. Similarly all, even the worst citizens of\na rational State are better and juster than citizens of a State where\nthere is no culture nor justice nor law, in a word, where there is no\nnecessity to bring them up to be just. For this superiority they have\nto thank the education given in their State.\u201d[91] All these are quite\ngood examples and striking arguments which are not at all worse than\nCicero\u2019s reasoning\u2014_a natura insitum_. The arguments of Socrates and\nthe development of these arguments are, on the contrary, examples based\nupon experience, and are often not better than what is here placed in\nthe mouth of a Sophist.\n\nWhat now confronts us is the question of how far this may be\ninadequate, and particularly how far Socrates and Plato came into\ncollision with the Sophists and constituted the antagonism to them.\nFor the claim made by the Sophists in Greece was that they had given\na higher culture to their people; for this, indeed, great credit was\nascribed to them in Greece, but they were met by the reproach that\nwas encountered by all culture. That is to say, because the Sophists\nwere masters of argument and reasoning, and were within the stage of\nreflective thought, they wished, passing from the particular to the\nuniversal, to awaken attention through examples and illustrations to\nwhat in his experience and to his mind appears to man to be right.\nThis, the necessary course of free, thinking reflection, which with\nus has also been adopted by culture, must, however, necessarily lead\nbeyond implicit trust and unrestricted faith in the current morality\nand religion. The statement that the Sophists thereby fell into\none-sided principles rests upon the fact that in Greek culture the\ntime had not yet come when, out of thinking consciousness itself, the\nultimate principles had become manifested, and thus there was something\nfirm to rest upon, as is the case with us in modern times. Because,\non the one hand, the need of subjective freedom existed merely to\ngive effect to that which man himself perceives and finds present in\nhis reason (thus laws, religious ideas, only in so far as I recognize\nthem through my thought), on the other hand, no fixed principle had\nso far been found in thought; thought was rather reasoning, and\nwhat remained indeterminate could thus only be fulfilled through\nself-will. It is otherwise in our European world where culture is, so\nto speak, introduced under the protection and in presupposition of\na spiritual religion, _i.e._ not of a religion of the imagination,\nbut by presupposing a knowledge of the eternal nature of Spirit and\nof the absolute end, of the end of man, to be in a spiritual way\nactual and to posit himself in unity with the absolute spirit. Thus\nhere there is a groundwork of a fixed spiritual principle which\nthus satisfies the needs of the subjective mind; and from this\nabsolute principle all further relationships, duties, laws, &c.,\nare established. Consequently culture cannot receive the variety of\ndirection\u2014and hence the aimlessness\u2014of the Greeks and of those who\nextended culture over Greece, the Sophists. As regards the religion\nof the imagination, as regards the undeveloped principle of the Greek\nState, culture was able to divide itself into many points of view, or\nit was easy to it to represent particular subordinate points of view as\nhighest principles. Where, on the contrary, as is the case with us, a\nuniversal aim so high, indeed the highest possible, floats before the\nimagination, a particular principle cannot so easily reach this rank,\neven if the reflection of reason attains to the position of determining\nand recognizing from itself what is highest; for the subordination\nof special principles is already determined, although in form our\nenlightenment may have the same standpoint as that of the Sophists.\n\nAs regards content, the standpoint of the Sophists differed from\nthat of Socrates and Plato, in that the mission of Socrates was to\nexpress the beautiful, good, true, and right, as the end and aim of\nthe individual, while with the Sophists the content was not present\nas an ultimate end, so that all this was left to the individual will.\nHence came the evil reputation obtained by the Sophists through the\nantagonism of Plato, and this is certainly their defect. As to their\noutward lives, we know that the Sophists accumulated great riches;[92]\nthey became very proud, and some of them lived very luxuriously. But in\nrespect of the inward life, reasoning thought has, in distinction to\nPlato, this prevailing characteristic, that it makes duty, that which\nhas to be done, not come from the Notion of the thing as determined in\nand for itself; for it brings forward external reasons through which\nright and wrong, utility and harmfulness, are distinguished. To Plato\nand Socrates, on the other hand, the main point is that the nature of\nthe conditions should be considered, and that the Notion of the thing\nin and for itself should become evolved. Socrates and Plato wished to\nbring forward this Notion as opposed to the consideration of things\nfrom points of view and reasonings which are always merely particular\nand individual, and thus opposed to the Notion itself. The distinction\nin the two points of view is thus that cultured reasoning only belongs,\nin a general way, to the Sophists, while Socrates and Plato determined\nthought through a universal determination (the Platonic Idea), or\nsomething fixed, which mind finds eternally in itself.\n\nIf sophistry is bad in the sense that it signifies a quality of which\nonly bad men are guilty, it is at the same time much more common\nthan this would imply; for all argumentative reasoning, adducing of\narguments and counterarguments, bringing into prominence particular\npoints of view, is sophistry. And just as utterances of the Sophists\nare adduced against which nothing can be said (as they are by Plato),\nmen of our day are urged to all that is good for the very reasons that\nare reasons to the Sophists. Thus it is said, \u201cdo not cheat, else you\nlose your credit, hence your wealth,\u201d or, \u201cbe temperate, or you will\nspoil your appetite and have to suffer.\u201d Or for punishment men give the\nexternal reasons of improvement, &c.; or else an action is defended on\nexternal grounds taken from the result. If, on the other hand, firmly\nrooted principles lie at the foundation\u2014as in the Christian Religion,\nalthough men now remember this no longer\u2014it is said, \u201cthe grace of God\nin respect of holiness, &c., thus directs the life of men;\u201d and these\nexternal grounds fall away. Sophistry thus does not lie so far from\nus as we think. When educated men discuss matters now-a-days, it may\nseem all very good, but it is in no way different from what Socrates\nand Plato called sophistry\u2014although they themselves have adopted\nthis standpoint as truly as did the Sophists. Educated men fall into\nit when they judge of concrete cases in which a particular point of\nview determines the result, and we must in ordinary life do the same\nif we wish to make up our minds in action. If duties and virtues are\nadvocated as in sermons (this is so in most sermons), we must hear such\nreasons given. Other speakers, such as those in parliament, likewise\nmake use of arguments and counterarguments similar to these, through\nwhich they try to persuade and convince. On the one hand something\ndefinite is in question, such as the constitution, or a war, and from\nthe fixed direction thus given, certain provisions have to be deduced\nconsistently; but this consistency, on the other, soon disappears, just\nbecause the matter can be arranged either this way or that, and thus\nparticular points of view always are decisive. Men likewise make use of\ngood arguments, after the manner of the Sophists, against Philosophy.\nThere are, they say, various philosophies, various opinions, and this\nis contrary to the one Truth; the weakness of human reason allows of\nno knowledge. What is Philosophy to the feelings, mind, and heart?\nAbstract thinking about such matters produces abstruse results which\nare of no use in the practical life of man. We no longer apply the word\nsophistry thus, but it is the way of the Sophists not to take things\nas they are, but to bring about their proofs by arguments derived from\nfeelings as ultimate ends. We shall see this characteristic of the\nSophists more clearly still in Socrates and Plato.\n\nWith such reasoning men can easily get so far as to know (where they\ndo not, it is owing to the want of education\u2014but the Sophists were\nvery well educated) that if arguments are relied upon, everything can\nbe proved by argument, and arguments for and against can be found\nfor everything; as particular, however, they throw no light upon the\nuniversal, the Notion. Thus what has been considered the sin of the\nSophists is that they taught men to deduce any conclusion required by\nothers or by themselves; but that is not due to any special quality\nin the Sophists, but to reflective reasoning. In the worst action\nthere exists a point of view which is essentially real; if this is\nbrought to the front, men excuse and vindicate the action. In the\ncrime of desertion in time of war, there is, for example, the duty of\nself-preservation. Similarly in more modern times the greatest crimes,\nassassination, treachery, &c., have been justified, because in the\npurpose there lay a determination which was actually essential, such as\nthat men must resist the evil and promote the good. The educated man\nknows how to regard everything from the point of view of the good, to\nmaintain in everything a real point of view. A man does not require to\nmake great progress in his education to have good reasons ready for the\nworst action; all that has happened in the world since the time of Adam\nhas been justified by some good reason.\n\nIt appears that the Sophists were conscious of this reasoning, and\nknew, as educated men, that everything could be proved. Hence in\nPlato\u2019s Gorgias it is said that the art of the Sophists is a greater\ngift than any other; they could convince the people, the senate, the\njudges, of what they liked.[93] The advocate has similarly to inquire\nwhat arguments there are in favour of the party which claims his help,\neven if it be the opposite one to that which he wished to support.\nThat knowledge is no defect, but is part of the higher culture of\nthe Sophists; and if uneducated men naturally form conclusions from\nexternal grounds which are those alone coming to their knowledge, they\nmay perhaps be mainly determined by something besides what they know\n(by their integrity, for instance). The Sophists thus knew that on\nthis basis nothing was secure, because the power of thought treated\neverything dialectically. That is the formal culture which they had\nand imparted, for their acquaintanceship with so many points of view\nshook what was morality in Greece (the religion, duties, and laws,\nunconsciously exercised), since through its limited content, that\ncame into collision with what was different. Once it was highest\nand ultimate, then it was deposed. Ordinary knowledge thus becomes\nconfused, as we shall see very clearly in Socrates, for something\nis held to be certain to consciousness, and then other points of\nview which are also present and recognized, have similarly to be\nallowed; hence the first has no further value, or at least loses its\nsupremacy. We saw in the same way, how bravery, which lies in the\nhazarding of one\u2019s life, is made dubious by the duty of preserving\nlife, if put forward unconditionally. Plato quotes several examples\nof this unsettling tendency, as when he makes Dionysodorus maintain:\n\u201cWhoever gives culture to one who does not possess knowledge, desires\nthat he should no longer remain what he is. He desires to direct\nhim to reason, and this is to make him not the same as he is.\u201d And\nEuthydemus, when the others say that he lies, answers, \u201cWho lies, says\nwhat is not; men cannot say what is not, and thus no one can lie.\u201d[94]\nAnd again Dionysodorus says, \u201cYou have a dog, this dog has young,\nand is a father; thus a dog is your father, and you are brother to\nits young.\u201d[95] Sequences put together thus are constantly found in\ncritical treatises.\n\nWith this comes the question which the nature of thought brings along\nwith it. If the field of argument, that which consciousness holds to\nbe firmly established, is shaken by reflection, what is man now to\ntake as his ultimate basis? For something fixed there must be. This is\neither the good, the universal, or the individuality, the arbitrary\nwill of the subject; and both may be united, as is shown later on in\nSocrates. To the Sophists the satisfaction of the individual himself\nwas now made ultimate, and since they made everything uncertain, the\nfixed point was in the assertion, \u201cit is my desire, my pride, glory,\nand honour, particular subjectivity, which I make my end.\u201d Thus the\nSophists are reproached for countenancing personal affections, private\ninterests, &c. This proceeds directly from the nature of their culture,\nwhich, because it places ready various points of view, makes it depend\non the pleasure of the subject alone which shall prevail, that is, if\nfixed principles do not determine. Here the danger lies. This takes\nplace also in the present day where the right and the true in our\nactions is made to depend on good intention and on my own conviction.\nThe real end of the State, the best administration and constitution, is\nlikewise to demagogues very vague.\n\nOn account of their formal culture, the Sophists have a place in\nPhilosophy; on account of their reflection they have not. They are\nassociated with Philosophy in that they do not remain at concrete\nreasoning, but go on, at least in part, to ultimate determinations.\nA chief part of their culture was the generalization of the Eleatic\nmode of thought and its extension to the whole content of knowledge\nand of action; the positive thus comes in as, and has become, utility.\nTo go into particulars respecting the Sophists would lead us too\nfar; individual Sophists have their place in the general history of\nculture. The celebrated Sophists are very numerous; the most celebrated\namongst them are Protagoras, Gorgias, and also Prodicus, the teacher\nof Socrates, to whom Socrates ascribes the well-known myth of \u201cThe\nchoice of Hercules\u201d[96]\u2014an allegory, beautiful in its own way, which\nhas been repeated hundreds and thousands of times. I will deal only\nwith Protagoras and Gorgias, not from the point of view of culture,\nbut in respect of proving further how the general knowledge which\nthey extended to everything, has, with one of them, the universal\nform which makes it pure science. Plato is the chief source of our\nacquaintanceship with the Sophists, for he occupied himself largely\nwith them; then we have Aristotle\u2019s own little treatise on Gorgias;\nand Sextus Empiricus, who preserved for us much of the philosophy of\nProtagoras.\n\n\n1. PROTAGORAS.\n\nProtagoras, born at Abdera,[97] was somewhat older than Socrates;\nlittle more is known of him, nor, indeed, could there be much known.\nFor he led a uniform life, since he spent it in the study of the\nsciences; he appeared in Greece proper as the first public teacher. He\nread his writings[98] like the rhapsodists and poets, the former of\nwhom sang the verses of others, and the latter their own. There were\nthen no places of learning, no books from which men could be taught,\nfor to the ancients, as Plato says,[99] \u201cthe chief part of culture\u201d\n(_\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2_) \u201cconsisted in being skilled\u201d (_\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bd_) \u201cin poetry,\u201d\njust as with us fifty years ago the principal instruction of the\npeople consisted of Bible History and Biblical precepts. The Sophists\nnow gave, in place of a knowledge of the poets, an acquaintanceship\nwith thought. Protagoras also came to Athens and there lived for\nlong, principally with the great Pericles, who also entered into this\nculture. Indeed, the two once argued for a whole day as to whether the\ndart or the thrower or he who arranged the contest was guilty of the\ndeath of a man who thus met his death.[100] The dispute is over the\ngreat and important question of the possibility of imputation; guilt\nis a general expression, the analysis of which may undoubtedly become\na difficult and extensive undertaking. In his intercourse with such\nmen, Pericles developed his genius for eloquence; for whatever kind of\nmental occupation may be in question, a cultivated mind can alone excel\nin it; and true culture is only possible through pure science. Pericles\nwas a powerful orator, and we see from Thucydides how deep a knowledge\nhe had of the State and of his people. Protagoras had the same fate\nas Anaxagoras, in being afterwards banished from Athens. The cause of\nthis sentence was a work written by him beginning, \u201cAs to the gods,\nI am not able to say whether they are or are not; for there is much\nwhich prevents this knowledge, both in the obscurity of the matter,\nand in the life of man which is so short.\u201d This book was also publicly\nburned in Athens by command of the State, and, so far as we know, it\nwas the first to be treated so. At the age of seventy or ninety years\nProtagoras was drowned while on a voyage to Sicily.[101]\n\nProtagoras was not, like other Sophists, merely a teacher of culture,\nbut likewise a deep and solid thinker, a philosopher who reflected\non fundamental determinations of an altogether universal kind. The\nmain point in his system of knowledge he expressed thus: \u201cMan is the\nmeasure of all things; of that which is, that it is; of that which\nis not, that it is not.\u201d[102] On the one hand, therefore, what had\nto be done was to grasp thought as determined and as having content;\nbut, on the other, to find the determining and content-giving; this\nuniversal determination then becomes the standard by which everything\nis judged. Now Protagoras\u2019 assertion is in its real meaning a great\ntruth, but at the same time it has a certain ambiguity, in that as man\nis the undetermined and many-sided, either he may in his individual\nparticularity, as this contingent man, be the measure, or else\nself-conscious reason in man, man in his rational nature and his\nuniversal substantiality, is the absolute measure. If the statement is\ntaken in the former sense, all is self-seeking, all self-interest, the\nsubject with his interests forms the central point; and if man has a\nrational side, reason is still something subjective, it is \u201che.\u201d But\nthis is just the wrong and perverted way of looking at things which\nnecessarily forms the main reproach made against the Sophists\u2014that\nthey put forward man in his contingent aims as determining; thus with\nthem the interest of the subject in its particularity, and the interest\nof the same in its substantial reason are not distinguished.\n\nThe same statement is brought forward in Socrates and Plato, but\nwith the further modification that here man, in that he is thinking\nand gives himself a universal content, is the measure. Thus here the\ngreat proposition is enunciated on which, from this time forward,\neverything turns, since the further progress of Philosophy only\nexplains it further: it signifies that reason is the end of all\nthings. This proposition further expresses a very remarkable change\nof position in asserting that all content, everything objective,\nis only in relation to consciousness; thought is thus in all truth\nexpressed as the essential moment, and thereby the Absolute takes the\nform of the thinking subjectivity which comes before us principally\nin Socrates. Since man, as subject, is the measure of everything,\nthe existent is not alone, but is for my knowledge. Consciousness is\nreally the producer of the content in what is objective, and subjective\nthinking is thus really active. And this view extends even to the most\nmodern philosophy, as when, for instance, Kant says that we only know\nphenomena, _i.e._ that what seems to us to be objective reality, is\nonly to be considered in its relation to consciousness, and does not\nexist without this relation. The fact that the subject as active and\ndetermining brings forth the content, is the important matter, but now\nthe question comes as to how the content is further determined\u2014whether\nit is limited to the particularity of consciousness or is determined\nas the universal, the existent in and for itself. God, the Platonic\nGood, is certainly at first a product of thought, but in the second\nplace He is just as really in and for Himself. Since I, as existent,\nfixed and eternal, only recognize what is in its content universal,\nthis, posited as it is by me, is likewise the implicitly objective, not\nposited by me.\n\nProtagoras himself shows us much more of what is implied in his theory,\nfor he says, \u201cTruth is a manifestation for consciousness. Nothing is\nin and for itself one, but everything has a relative truth only,\u201d\n_i.e._ it is what it is but for another, which is man. This relativity\nis by Protagoras expressed in a way which seems to us in some measure\ntrivial, and belongs to the first beginnings of reflective thought. The\ninsignificant examples which he adduces (like Plato and Socrates when\nthey follow out in them the point of view of reflection), by way of\nexplanation, show that in Protagoras\u2019 understanding what is determined\nis not grasped as the universal and identical with self. Hence the\nexemplifications are taken mostly from sensuous manifestation. \u201cIn a\nwind it may be that one person is cold and another is not; hence of\nthis wind we cannot tell whether in itself it is cold or hot.\u201d[103]\nFrost and heat are thus not anything which exist, but only are in their\nrelation to a subject; were the wind cold in itself, it would always be\nso to the subject. Or again, \u201cif we have here six dice, and place by\nthem four others, we should say of the former that there are more of\nthem. But, again, if we put twelve by them we say that these first six\nare the fewer.\u201d[104] Because we say of the same number that it is more\nand fewer, the more and the less is merely a relative determination;\nthus what is the object, is so in the idea present to consciousness\nonly. Plato, on the contrary, considered one and many, not like the\nSophists in their distinction, but as being one and the same.\n\nPlato says further on this point, that the white, warm, &c., or\neverything that we say of things, does not exist for itself, but that\nthe eye, sensation, is necessary to make it for us. This reciprocal\nmovement is what first creates the white, and in it the white is not a\nthing in itself, but what we have present is a seeing eye, or, to speak\ngenerally, sight, and particularly the seeing of white, the feeling\nof warmth, &c. Undoubtedly warmth, colour, &c., really are only in\nrelation to another, but the conceiving mind divides itself into itself\nand into a world in which each also has its relation. This objective\nrelativity is expressed better in the following way. If the white were\nin itself, it would be that which brought forth the sensation of it; it\nwould be the action or the cause, and we, on the contrary, the passive\nand receptive. But the object which thus requires to be active, is not\nactive until it enters into (_\u03be\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03bb\u03b8\u1fc3_) relation with the passive;\nsimilarly the passive is only in relation to the active. Thus what\nis said in defining anything never concerns the thing as in itself,\nbut clearly only as being related to something else. Nothing is thus\nconstituted in and for itself as it appears, but the truth is just\nthis phenomenon to which our activity contributes. As things appear\nto the healthy man they are thus not in themselves, but for him; as\nthey appear to the sick or deranged man, they are to him, without our\nbeing able to say that as they appear to him, they are not true.[105]\nWe feel the awkwardness of calling any such thing true, for after all\nthe existent, if related to consciousness, is yet not related to it as\nfixed, but to sensuous knowledge; and then this consciousness itself\nis a condition, _i.e._ something which passes away. Protagoras rightly\nrecognized this double relativity when he says, \u201cMatter is a pure flux,\nit is not anything fixed and determined in itself, for it can be\neverything, and it is different to different ages and to the various\nconditions of waking and sleep, &c.\u201d[106] Kant separates himself from\nthis standpoint only in that he places the relativity in the \u201cI,\u201d\nand not in objective existence. The phenomenon is, according to him,\nnothing but the fact of there being outside an impulse, an unknown\n_x_, which first receives these determinations through our feeling.\nEven if there were an objective ground for our calling one thing cold\nand another warm, we could indeed say that they must have diversity\nin themselves, but warmth and cold first become what they are in our\nfeeling. Similarly it can only be in our conception that things are\noutside of us, etc. But if the experience is quite correctly called\na \u201cphenomenon,\u201d _i.e._ something relative, because it does not come\nto pass without the determinations of the activity of our senses, nor\nwithout categories of thought, yet that one, all-pervading, universal,\nwhich permeates all experience, which to Heraclitus was necessity, has\nto be brought into consciousness.\n\nWe see that Protagoras possesses great powers of reflective thought,\nand indeed reflection on consciousness came to consciousness with\nProtagoras. But this is the form of manifestation which was again\ntaken by the later sceptics. The phenomenal is not sensuous Being,\nfor because I posit this as phenomenal, I assert its nullity. But the\nstatements \u201cWhat is, is only for consciousness,\u201d or \u201cThe truth of\nall things is the manifestation of them in and for consciousness,\u201d\nseem quite to contradict themselves. For it appears as though a\ncontradiction were asserted\u2014first that nothing is in itself as\nit appears, and then that it is true as it appears. But objective\nsignificance must not be given to the positive, to what is true, as\nif, for example, this were white in itself because it appears so;\nfor it is only this manifestation of the white that is true, the\nmanifestation being just this movement of the self-abrogating sensuous\nBeing, which, taken in the universal, stands above consciousness as\ntruly as above Being. The world is consequently not only phenomenal\nin that it is for consciousness, and thus that its Being is only one\nrelative to consciousness, for it is likewise in itself phenomenal. The\nelement of consciousness which Protagoras has demonstrated, and owing\nto which the developed universal has in it the moment of the negative\nBeing-for-another, has thus indeed to be asserted as a necessary\nmoment; but taken for itself, alone and isolated, it is one-sided,\nsince the moment of implicit Being is likewise essential.\n\n\n2. GORGIAS.\n\nThis scepticism reached a much deeper point in Gorgias of Leontium in\nSicily, a man of great culture, and also distinguished as a statesman.\nDuring the Peloponnesian war he was, in Ol. 88, 2 (427 B.C.), a few\nyears after Pericles\u2019 death in Ol. 87, 4, sent from his native town\nto Athens.[107] And when he attained his object, he went through many\nother Greek towns, such as Larissa in Thessaly, and taught in them.\nThus he obtained great wealth, along with much admiration, and this\nlasted till his death at over a hundred years of age.\n\nHe is said to have been a disciple of Empedocles, but he also knew the\nEleatics, and his dialectic partakes of the manner and method of the\nlatter; indeed Aristotle, who preserves this dialectic, in the work\n_De Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia_, which has indeed only come to us in\nfragments, deals with them together. Sextus Empiricus also gives us in\nfull the dialectic of Gorgias. He was strong in the dialectic requisite\nfor eloquence, but his preeminence lies in his pure dialectic\nrespecting the quite universal categories of Being and non-being, which\nindeed is not like that of the Sophists. Tiedemann (Geist. der Spec.\nPhil. vol. I. p. 362) says very falsely: \u201cGorgias went much further\nthan any man of healthy mind could go.\u201d Tiedemann could say of every\nphilosopher that he went further than healthy human understanding, for\nwhat men call healthy understanding is not Philosophy, and is often\nfar from healthy. Healthy human understanding possesses the modes of\nthought, maxims, and judgments of its time, the thought-determinations\nof which dominate it without its being conscious thereof. In this\nway Gorgias undoubtedly went further than healthy understanding.\nBefore Copernicus it would have been contrary to all healthy human\nunderstanding if anyone had said that the earth went round the sun,\nor before the discovery of America, if it were said that there was a\ncontinent there. In India or in China a republic would even now be\ncontrary to all healthy understanding. The dialectic of Gorgias moves\nmore purely in Notion than that found in Protagoras. Since Protagoras\nasserted the relativity, or the non-implicit nature of all that is,\nthis only exists in relation to another which really is essential to\nit; and this last, indeed, is consciousness. Gorgias\u2019 demonstration of\nthe non-implicitness of Being is purer, because he takes in itself what\npasses for real existence without presupposing that other, and thus\nshows its own essential nullity and separates therefrom the subjective\nside and Being as it is for the latter.\n\nGorgias\u2019 treatise \u201cOn Nature,\u201d in which he composes his dialectic,\nfalls, according to Sextus Empiricus (adv. Math. VII. 65), into three\nparts. \u201cIn the first he proves that\u201d (objectively) \u201cnothing exists, in\nthe second\u201d (subjectively), \u201cthat assuming that Being is, it cannot be\nknown; and in the third place\u201d (both subjectively and objectively),\n\u201cthat were it to exist and be knowable, no communication of what is\nknown would be possible.\u201d Gorgias was a congenial subject to Sextus,\nbut the former still proved, and this is what the Sceptics ceased\nto do. Here very abstract thought-determinations regarding the most\nspeculative moments of Being and non-being, of knowledge, and of\nbringing into existence, of communicating knowledge, are involved; and\nthis is no idle talk, as was formerly supposed, for Gorgias\u2019 dialectic\nis of a quite objective kind, and is most interesting in content.\n\n_a._ \u201cIf anything is,\u201d (this \u201canything\u201d is, however, a makeshift\nthat we are in the habit of using in our conversation, and which\nis, properly speaking, inappropriate, for it implies an opposition\nof subject and predicate, while at present the \u201cis\u201d alone is in\nquestion)\u2014then \u201cif it _is_\u201d (and now it becomes for the first time\ndefined as subject) \u201cit is either the existent or the non-existent, or\nelse existence and non-existence. It is now evident of these three that\nthey are not.\u201d[108]\n\n_\u03b1_. \u201cThat which is not, is not; for if Being belonged to it, there\nwould at the same time be existence and non-existence. That is, in so\nfar as it is thought of as non-existent, it is not; but in so far as\nit _is_ the non-existent, it must exist. But it cannot at the same\ntime be and not be. Again, if the non-existent is, the existent is\nnot, for the two are opposed. Thus, if Being pertained to non-being,\nnon-being would belong to Being. But if Being does not exist, no more\ndoes non-being.\u201d[109] This is with Gorgias a characteristic mode of\nreasoning.[110]\n\n_\u03b2_. \u201cBut in proving,\u201d Aristotle adds to the passages just quoted,\n\u201cthat the existent is not, he follows Melissus and Zeno.\u201d This is\nthe dialectic already brought forward by them. \u201cIf Being is, it is\ncontradictory to predicate a quality to it, and if we do this, we\nexpress something merely negative about it.\u201d\n\n_\u03b1\u03b1_. For Gorgias says: \u201cWhat is, either is in itself (_\u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd_)\nbeing without beginning, or it has originated,\u201d and he now shows\nthat it could neither be the one nor the other, for each leads to\ncontradiction. \u201cIt cannot be the former, for what is in itself has\nno beginning, and is the infinite,\u201d and hence likewise undetermined\nand indeterminable. \u201cThe infinite is nowhere, for if it is anywhere,\nthat in which it is, is different from it.\u201d Where it is, it is in\nanother, \u201cbut that is not infinite which is different from another,\nand contained in another. Just as little is it contained in itself,\nfor then that in which it is, and that which is therein, would be the\nsame. What it is in, is the place; that which is in this, is the body;\nbut that both should be the same is absurd. The infinite does not thus\nexist.\u201d[111] This dialectic of Gorgias regarding the infinite is on\nthe one hand limited, because immediate existence has certainly no\nbeginning and no limit, but asserts a progression into infinitude; the\nself-existent Thought, the universal Notion, as absolute negativity,\nhas, however, limits in itself. On the other hand, Gorgias is quite\nright, for the bad, sensuous infinite is nowhere present, and thus\ndoes not exist, but is a Beyond of Being; only we may take what\nGorgias takes as a diversity of place, as being diversity generally.\nThus, instead of placing the infinite, like Gorgias, sometimes in\nanother, sometimes within itself, _i.e._ sometimes maintaining it to be\ndifferent, sometimes abrogating the diversity, we may say better and\nmore universally, that this sensuous infinite is a diversity which is\nalways posited as different from the existent, for it is just the being\ndifferent from itself.\n\n\u201cIn the same way Being has not originated, because it must then have\ncome either from the existent or from the non-existent. From the\nexistent it did not arise, for then it would be already; just as little\nfrom the non-existent, because this cannot beget anything.\u201d[112] The\nsceptics followed this up further. The object to be contemplated\nhence ever becomes posited under determinations with \u2018either\u2019 \u2018or,\u2019\nwhich then contradict one another. But that is not the true dialectic,\nbecause the object resolves itself into those determinations only; when\nnothing follows respecting the nature of the object itself, then, as is\nalready proved, the object must be necessarily in one determination,\nand not in and for itself.\n\n_\u03b2\u03b2_. In a similar way Gorgias shows \u201cof what exists, that it must\neither be one or many; but neither is possible. For as one, it would\nhave a certain magnitude, or continuity, or number, or body, but all\nthis is not one, but different, divisible. Every sensuous one is, in\nfact, necessarily another, a manifold. If it is not one, it cannot be\nmany, for the many is many ones.\u201d[113]\n\n_\u03b3_. \u201cSimilarly both, Being and non-being, cannot exist at the same\ntime. If one exists as much as the other, they are the same, and\ntherefore neither of them is, for the non-being does not exist, and\nhence neither does the Being, since it is identical with it. Nor can\nthey, on the other hand, both exist, for if they are identical, I\ncannot express them both,\u201d[114] and thus both do not exist, for if I\nexpress both, I differentiate. This dialectic, which Aristotle (De\nXenoph. &c., c. 5) likewise designates as peculiar to Gorgias, has its\ntruth. In speaking of Being and non-being, we always say the opposite\nto what we wish. Being and non-being are the same, just as they are\nnot the same; if they are the same, I speak of the two as different:\nif different, I express the same predicate of them, diversity. This\ndialectic is not to be despised by us, as if it dealt with empty\nabstractions, for these categories are, on the one hand, in their\npurity the most universal, and if, on the other hand, they are not the\nultimate, yet it is always Being or non-being that are in question;\nthey are not, however, definitely fixed and divided off, but are\nself-abrogating. Gorgias is conscious that they are vanishing moments,\nwhile the ordinary unconscious conception also has present to it this\ntruth, but knows nothing about it.\n\n_b._ The relation of the conceiver to conception, the difference\nbetween conception and Being, is a subject which is in our mouths\nto-day. \u201cBut if there is an \u2018is,\u2019 it is unknowable and unthinkable, for\nwhat is presented is not the existent\u201d but only a presentation. \u201cIf\nwhat is presented is white, it is the case that white is presented;\nif what is presented is not the really existent, it is the case that\nwhat is, is not presented. For if what is presented is the real\nexistent, everything that is presented also exists, but no one says\nthat if a flying man, or waggon riding on the sea were presented to\nus, it would exist. Further, if what is presented is the existent, the\nnon-existent is not presented, for opposites are in opposition. But\nthis non-existent is everywhere presented as it is in Scylla and the\nChim\u00e6ra.[115] Gorgias on the one hand pronounces a just polemic against\nabsolute realism, which, because it represents, thinks to possess the\nvery thing itself, when it only has a relative, but he falls, on the\nother hand, into the false idealism of modern times, according to which\nthought is always subjective only, and thus not the existent, since\nthrough thought an existent is transformed into what is thought.\u201d\n\n_c._ We finally have the basis of the dialectic of Gorgias in respect\nof the third point, that knowledge cannot be imparted, in this: \u201cIf the\nexistent were presented, it could still not be expressed and imparted.\nThings are visible, audible, &c., or are experienced. The visible\nis grasped through sight, the audible through hearing, and not the\ncontrary way; thus, the one cannot be indicated by the other. Speech,\nby which the existent has to be expressed, is not the existent; what is\nimparted is thus not the existent, but only words.[116] In this manner\nGorgias\u2019 dialectic is the laying hold of this difference exactly as\nagain occurred in Kant; if I maintain this difference, certainly that\nwhich is, cannot be known.\u201d\n\nThis dialectic is undoubtedly impregnable to those who maintain\nsensuous Being to be real. But its truth is only this movement to\nposit itself negatively as existent, and the unity is the reflection\nthat the existent, comprehended also as non-existent, becomes, in this\ncomprehension of it, universal. That this existent cannot be imparted,\nmust likewise be held most strongly, for _this_ individual cannot be\nexpressed. Philosophic truth is thus not only expressed as if there\nwere another truth in sensuous consciousness; but Being is present\nin that philosophic truth expresses it. The Sophists thus also made\ndialectic, universal Philosophy, their object, and they were profound\nthinkers.\n\n\nB.\u2014SOCRATES.\n\nConsciousness had reached this point in Greece, when in Athens the\ngreat form of Socrates, in whom the subjectivity of thought was brought\nto consciousness in a more definite and more thorough manner, now\nappeared. But Socrates did not grow like a mushroom out of the earth,\nfor he stands in continuity with his time, and thus is not only a\nmost important figure in the history of Philosophy\u2014perhaps the most\ninteresting in the philosophy of antiquity\u2014but is also a world-famed\npersonage. For a mental turning-point exhibited itself in him in the\nform of philosophic thought. If we shortly recall the periods already\npassed over, we find that the ancient Ionic philosophers certainly\nthought, but without reflecting on the thought or defining its product\nas thought. The Atomists made objective existence into thoughts, but\nthese were to them only abstractions, pure entities. Anaxagoras, on the\nother hand, raised thought as such, into a principle which thereby\npresented itself as the all-powerful Notion, as the negative power\nover all that is definite and existent. Protagoras finally expresses\nthought as real existence, but it is in this its movement, which is\nthe all-resolving consciousness, the unrest of the Notion. This unrest\nis in itself at the same time something restful or secure. But the\nfixed point of motion as such, is the \u2018I,\u2019 for it has the moments of\nmovement outside of it; as the self-retaining, which only abrogates\nwhat is different, the \u2018I\u2019 is negative unity, but just in that very\nway individual, and not yet the universal reflected within itself. Now\nwe here find the ambiguity of dialectic and sophistry, which rests\nin the fact that if the objective disappears, the signification of\nthe fixed subjective is either that of the individual opposed to the\nobjective, and thereby the contingent and lawless will, or that of the\nobjective and universal in itself. Socrates expresses real existence\nas the universal \u2018I,\u2019 as the consciousness which rests in itself; but\nthat is the good as such, which is free from existent reality, free\nfrom individual sensuous consciousness of feeling and desire, free\nfinally from the theoretically speculative thought about nature, which,\nif indeed thought, has still the form of Being and in which I am not\ncertain of my existence.\n\nSocrates herein adopted firstly the doctrine of Anaxagoras that\nthought, the understanding, is the ruling and self-determining\nuniversal, though this principle did not, as with the Sophists, attain\nthe form of formal culture or of abstract philosophizing. Thus, if with\nSocrates, as with Protagoras, the self-conscious thought that abrogates\nall that is determined, was real existence, with Socrates this was\nthe case in such a way that he at the same time grasped in thought\nrest and security. This substance existing in and for itself, the\nself-retaining, has become determined as end, and further as the true\nand the good.\n\nTo this determination of the universal, we have, in the second place,\nto add that this good, which has by me to be esteemed as substantial\nend, must be known by me; with this the infinite subjectivity, the\nfreedom of self-consciousness in Socrates breaks out. This freedom\nwhich is contained therein, the fact that consciousness is clearly\npresent in all that it thinks, and must necessarily be at home\nwith itself, is in our time constantly and plainly demanded; the\nsubstantial, although eternal and in and for itself, must as truly\nbe produced through me; but this my part in it is only the formal\nactivity. Thus Socrates\u2019 principle is that man has to find from himself\nboth the end of his actions and the end of the world, and must attain\nto truth through himself. True thought thinks in such a way that its\nimport is as truly objective as subjective. But objectivity has been\nthe significance of substantial universality, and not of external\nobjectivity; thus truth is now posited as a product mediated through\nthought, while untrained morality, as Sophocles makes Antigone say\n(vers. 454-457), is \u201cthe eternal law of the Gods\u201d:\n\n \u201cAnd no one knew from whence it came.\u201d\n\nBut though in modern times we hear much said of immediate knowledge and\nbelief, it is a misconception to maintain that their content, God, the\nGood, Just, &c., although the content of feeling and conception, is\nnot, as spiritual content, also posited through thought. The animal has\nno religion, because it only feels; but what is spiritual rests on the\nmediation of thought, and pertains to man.\n\nSince Socrates thus introduces the infinitely important element\nof leading back the truth of the objective to the thought of the\nsubject, just as Protagoras says that the objective first is through\nrelation to us, the battle of Socrates and Plato with the Sophists\ncannot rest on the ground that these, as belonging to the old faith,\nmaintained against the others the religion and customs of Greece, for\nthe violation of which Anaxagoras was condemned. Quite the contrary.\nReflection, and the reference of any judgment to consciousness, is\nheld by Socrates in common with the Sophists. But the opposition into\nwhich Socrates and Plato were in their philosophy necessarily brought\nin regard to the Sophists, as the universal philosophic culture of\nthe times, was as follows:\u2014The objective produced through thought,\nis at the same time in and for itself, thus being raised above all\nparticularity of interests and desires, and being the power over\nthem. Hence because, on the one hand, to Socrates and Plato the\nmoment of subjective freedom is the directing of consciousness into\nitself, on the other, this return is also determined as a coming out\nfrom particular subjectivity. It is hereby implied that contingency\nof events is abolished, and man has this outside within him, as the\nspiritual universal. This is the true, the unity of subjective and\nobjective in modern terminology, while the Kantian ideal is only\nphenomenal and not objective in itself.\n\nIn the third place Socrates accepted the Good at first only in the\nparticular significance of the practical, which nevertheless is only\none mode of the substantial Idea; the universal is not only for me,\nbut also, as end existent in and for itself, the principle of the\nphilosophy of nature, and in this higher sense it was taken by Plato\nand Aristotle. Of Socrates it is hence said, in the older histories\nof Philosophy, that his main distinction was having added ethics as\na new conception to Philosophy, which formerly only took nature into\nconsideration. Diogenes Laertius, in like manner says (III., 56), that\nthe Ionics founded natural philosophy, Socrates ethics, and Plato\nadded to them dialectic. Now ethics is partly objective, and partly\nsubjective and reflected morality [Sittlichkeit und Moralit\u00e4t],[117]\nand the teaching of Socrates is properly subjectively moral, because\nin it the subjective side, my perception and meaning, is the prevailing\nmoment, although this determination of self-positing is likewise\nsublated, and the good and eternal is what is in and for itself.\nObjective morality is, on the contrary, natural, since it signifies the\nknowledge and doing of what is in and for itself good. The Athenians\nbefore Socrates were objectively, and not subjectively, moral, for\nthey acted rationally in their relations without knowing that they\nwere particularly excellent. Reflective morality adds to natural\nmorality the reflection that this is the good and not that; the Kantian\nphilosophy, which is reflectively moral, again showed the difference.\n\nBecause Socrates in this way gave rise to moral philosophy, all\nsucceeding babblers about morality and popular philosophy constituted\nhim their patron and object of adoration, and made him into a cloak\nwhich should cover all false philosophy. As he treated it, it was\nundoubtedly popular; and what contributed to make it such was that\nhis death gave him the never-failing interest derived from innocent\nsuffering. Cicero (Tusc. Qu\u00e6st. V. 4), whose manner of thought was,\non the one hand, of the present, and who, on the other hand, had the\nbelief that Philosophy should yield itself up, and hence succeeded in\nattaining to no content in it, boasted of Socrates (what has often\nenough been said since) that his most eminent characteristic was\nto have brought Philosophy from heaven to earth, to the homes and\nevery-day life of men, or, as Diogenes Laertius expresses it (II. 21),\n\u201cinto the market place.\u201d There we have what has just been said. This\nwould seem as if the best and truest Philosophy were only a domestic\nor fireside philosophy, which conforms to all the ordinary ideas of\nmen, and in which we see friends and faithful ones talk together\nof righteousness, and of what can be known on the earth, without\nhaving penetrated the depths of the heavens, or rather the depths of\nconsciousness. But this last is exactly what Socrates, as these men\nthemselves indicate, first ventured to do. And it was not incumbent on\nhim to reflect upon all the speculations of past Philosophy, in order\nto be able to come down in practical philosophy to inward thought. This\ngives a general idea of his principle.\n\nWe must examine more closely this noteworthy phenomenon, and begin with\nthe history of Socrates\u2019 life. This is, however, closely intertwined\nwith his interest in Philosophy, and the events of his life are bound\nup with his principles. We have first of all to consider the beginning\nof his life only. Socrates, whose birth occurs in the fourth year of\nthe 77th Olympiad (469 B.C.), was the son of Sophroniscus, a sculptor,\nand of Ph\u00e6narete, a midwife. His father brought him up to sculpture,\nand it is said that Socrates acquired skill in the art, and long after,\nstatues of draped Graces, found in the Acropolis, were ascribed to\nhim. But his art did not satisfy him; a great desire for Philosophy,\nand love of scientific research, got possession of him. He pursued his\nart merely to get money for a necessary subsistence, and to be able to\napply himself to the study of the sciences; and it is told of Crito, an\nAthenian, that he defrayed the cost of Socrates\u2019 instruction by masters\nin all the arts. During the exercise of his art, and specially after he\ngave it up altogether, he read the works of ancient philosophers in so\nfar as he could get possession of them. At the same time he attended\nAnaxagoras\u2019 instructions, and, after his expulsion from Athens, at\nwhich time Socrates was thirty-seven years old, those of Archelaus,\nwho was regarded as Anaxagoras\u2019 successor, besides those of Sophists\ncelebrated in other sciences. Amongst these he heard Prodicus, a\ncelebrated teacher of oratory, whom, according to Xenophon (Memorab.\nII. c. 1, \u00a7\u00a7 21, 34), he mentions with affection, and other teachers of\nmusic, poetry, etc. He was esteemed as on all sides a man of culture,\nwho was instructed in everything then requisite thereto.[118]\n\nAnother feature in his life was that he fulfilled the duty of\nprotecting his country, which rested on him as an Athenian citizen.\nHence he made three campaigns in the Peloponnesian war, which occurred\nduring his life. The Peloponnesian war led to the dissolution of\nGreek life, inasmuch as it was preparatory to it; and what took place\npolitically was by Socrates carried out in thinking consciousness. In\nthese campaigns he not only acquired the fame of a brave warrior, but,\nwhat was best of all, the merit of having saved the lives of other\ncitizens. In the first, he was present at the tedious siege of Potid\u00e6a\nin Thrace. Here Alcibiades had already attached himself to him, and,\naccording to Plato, he recited in the Banquet (p. 219-222, Steph.; p.\n461-466, Bekk.), a eulogy on Socrates for being able to endure all\ntoil, hunger and thirst, heat and cold, with mind at rest and health\nof body. In an engagement in this campaign he saw Alcibiades wounded\nin the midst of the enemy, lifted him up, forced his way through, and\nsaved both him and his arms. The generals rewarded him with a wreath,\nwhich was the prize of the bravest; Socrates did not, however, take\nit, maintaining that it was given to Alcibiades. In this campaign\nit is said that once, sunk in deep meditation, he stood immovable\non one spot the whole day and night, until the morning sun awoke\nhim from his trance\u2014a condition in which he is said often to have\nbeen. This was a cataleptic state, which may bear some relation to\nmagnetic somnambulism, in which Socrates became quite dead to sensuous\nconsciousness. From this physical setting free of the inward abstract\nself from the concrete bodily existence of the individual, we have, in\nthe outward manifestation, a proof of how the depths of his mind worked\nwithin him. In him we see pre-eminently the inwardness of consciousness\nthat in an anthropological way existed in the first instance in him,\nand became later on a usual thing. He made his other campaign in B\u0153otia\nat Delium, a small fortification which the Athenians possessed not\nfar from the sea, and where they had an unfortunate, though not an\nimportant engagement. Here Socrates saved another of his favourites,\nXenophon; he saw him in the flight, for Xenophon, having lost his\nhorse, lay wounded on the ground. Socrates took him over his shoulders,\ncarried him off, defending himself at the same time with the greatest\ntranquillity and presence of mind from the pursuing enemy. Finally\nhe made his last campaign at Amphipolis in Edonis, on the Strymonian\nBay.[119]\n\nBesides this, he occupied various civil offices. At the time when the\ndemocratic constitution of Athens hitherto existing, was taken away\nby the Lacedemonians, who now introduced everywhere an aristocratic\nand indeed tyrannical rule, whereby they in great measure put\nthemselves at the head of affairs, he was chosen for the council,\nwhich, as a representative body, took the place of the people. Here he\ndistinguished himself by his immovable firmness in what he held to be\nright as against the wills of the thirty tyrants, as formerly against\nthe will of the people. For he sat in the tribunal which condemned\nthe ten generals to death, because, as admirals at the battle of\nArginus\u00e6, though they certainly had conquered, yet, being kept back\nthrough storm, they had not dragged out the bodies nor buried them\non the shore, and because they neglected to erect trophies; _i.e._\nreally because they did not stand their ground, and thus appeared to\nhave been beaten. Socrates alone did not agree with this decision,\ndeclaring himself more emphatically against the people than against\nthe rulers.[120] To-day he fares badly who says anything against\nthe people. \u201cThe people have excellent intelligence, understand\neverything, and have only the most excellent intentions.\u201d As to rulers,\ngovernments, ministers, it is self-evident that \u201cthey understand\nnothing, and only desire and bring forth what is bad.\u201d\n\nAlong with these to him more accidental relationships to the State, in\nwhich he acted only from the ordinary sense of citizenship, without\nspontaneously making the affairs of the State his real business, or\npressing on to the head of public affairs, the real business of his\nlife was to discuss moral philosophy with any who came in his way. His\nphilosophy, which asserts that real existence is in consciousness as a\nuniversal, is still not a properly speculative philosophy, but remained\nindividual; yet the aim of his philosophy was that it should have a\nuniversal significance. Hence we have to speak of his own individual\nbeing, of his thoroughly noble character, which usually is depicted\nas a complete catalogue of the virtues adorning the life of a private\ncitizen; and these virtues of Socrates are certainly to be looked at\nas his own, and as made habitual to him by his own will. It has to be\nnoted that with the ancients these qualities have generally more of the\ncharacter of virtue, because with the ancients, in ordinary morality,\nindividuality, as the form of the universal, was given free scope, so\nthat virtues were regarded more as the actions of the individual will,\nand thus as personal qualities; while with us they seem to be less what\nis meritorious to the individual, or what comes from himself as this\nunit. We are accustomed to think of them much more as what exists, as\nduty, because we have a fuller consciousness of the universal, and\nconsider the pure individual, the personal inward consciousness, as\nreal existence and duty. With us virtues are hence actually either\nelements in our dispositions and nature, or they have the form of the\nuniversal and of what is necessary; but with Socrates they have the\nform, not of ordinary morality or of a natural or necessary thing, but\nof an independent determination. It is well known that his appearance\nindicated naturally low and hateful qualities, which, as indeed he\nsays, he himself subdued.\n\nHe lived amongst his fellow-citizens, and stands before us as one\nof those great plastic natures consistent through and through, such\nas we often see in those times\u2014resembling a perfect classical work\nof art which has brought itself to this height of perfection. Such\nindividuals are not made, but have formed themselves into what they\nare; they have become that which they wished to be, and are true to\nthis. In a real work of art the distinguishing point is that some idea\nis brought forth, a character is presented in which every trait is\ndetermined by the idea, and, because this is so, the work of art is,\non the one hand, living, and, on the other, beautiful, for the highest\nbeauty is just the most perfect carrying out of all sides of the\nindividuality in accordance with the one inward principle. Such works\nof art are also seen in the great men of every time. The most plastic\nindividual as a statesman is Pericles, and round him, like stars,\nSophocles, Thucydides, Socrates, &c., worked out their individuality\ninto an existence of its own\u2014into a character which regulated their\nwhole being, and which was one principle running throughout the whole\nof their existence. Pericles alone lived with the sole end of being a\nstatesman. Plutarch (in Pericle, c. 5, 7) says of him that, from the\ntime that he devoted himself to the business of the State, he laughed\nno more, and never again went to a feast. Thus, too, Socrates formed\nhimself, through his art and through the power of self-conscious\nwill, into this particular character, and acquired this capacity for\nthe business of his life. Through his principle he attained that\nfar-reaching influence which has lasted to the present day in relation\nto religion, science, and justice, for since his time the genius of\ninward conviction has been the basis which must be fundamental. And\nsince this principle proceeded from the plasticity of his character,\nit is very inappropriate when Tennemann regrets (Vol. II. p. 26) \u201cthat\nthough we know what he was, we do not know how he became such.\u201d\n\nSocrates was a peaceful, pious example of the moral virtues\u2014of wisdom,\ndiscretion, temperance, moderation, justice, courage, inflexibility,\nfirm sense of rectitude in relation to tyrants and people; he was\nequally removed from cupidity and despotism. His indifference to money\nwas due to his own determination, for, according to the custom of the\ntimes, he could acquire it through the education of youth, like other\nteachers. On the other side, this acquisition was purely matter of\nchoice, and not, as with us, something which is accepted, so that to\ntake nothing would be to break through a custom, thus to present the\nappearance of wishing to become conspicuous, and to be more blamed than\npraised. For this was not yet a State affair; it was under the Roman\nemperors that there first were schools with payment. This moderation\nof his life was likewise a power proceeding from conscious knowledge,\nbut this is not a principle found to hand, but the regulation of self\nin accordance with circumstances; in company he was, however, a good\nfellow. His sobriety in respect to wine is best depicted in Plato\u2019s\n\u201cSymposium,\u201d in a very characteristic scene in which we see what\nSocrates called virtue. Alcibiades there appears, no longer sober, at a\nfeast given by Agathon, on the occasion of a success which his tragedy\nhad obtained on the previous day at the games. Since the company had\ndrunk much on the first day of the feast, the assembled guests, amongst\nwhom was Socrates, this evening took a resolution, in opposition to the\nGreek custom at meals, to drink little. Alcibiades, finding that he\nwas coming in amongst abstemious men, and that there was no one else\nin his own frame of mind, made himself king of the feast, and offered\nthe goblet to the others, in order to bring them into the condition\nreached by himself; but with Socrates he said that he could do nothing,\nbecause he remained as he was, however much he drank. Plato then makes\nthe individual who tells what happened at the Banquet, also tell that\nhe, with the others, at last fell asleep on the couch, and as he awoke\nin the morning, Socrates, cup in hand, still talked with Aristophanes\nand Agathon about comedy and tragedy, and whether one man could write\nboth comedies and tragedies, and then went at the usual time into the\npublic places, to the Lyceum, as if nothing had happened, and walked\nabout the whole day as usual.[121] This is not a moderation which\nexists in the least possible enjoyment, no aimless abstemiousness and\nself-mortification, but a power belonging to consciousness, which keeps\nits self-possession in bodily excess. We see from this that we have\nnot to think of Socrates throughout after the fashion of the litany of\nmoral virtues.\n\nHis behaviour to others was not only just, true, open, without\nrudeness, and honourable, but we also see in him an example of the most\nperfect Attic urbanity; i.e. he moves in the freest possible relations,\nhas a readiness for conversation which is always judicious, and,\nbecause it has an inward universality, at the same time always has the\nright living relationship to the individual, and bears upon the case\non which it operates. The intercourse is that of a most highly cultured\nman who, in his relation to others, never places anything personal in\nall his wit, and sets aside all that is unpleasant. Thus Xenophon\u2019s,\nbut particularly Plato\u2019s Socratic Dialogues belong to the highest type\nof this fine social culture.\n\nBecause the philosophy of Socrates is no withdrawal from existence now\nand here into the free, pure regions of thought, but is in a piece\nwith his life, it does not proceed to a system; and the manner of his\nphilosophizing, which appears to imply a withdrawal from actual affairs\nas it did to Plato, yet in that very way gives itself this inward\nconnection with ordinary life. For his more special business was his\nphilosophic teaching, or rather his philosophic social intercourse (for\nit was not, properly speaking, teaching) with all; and this outwardly\nresembled ordinary Athenian life in which the greater part of the\nday was passed without any particular business, in loitering about\nthe market-place, or frequenting the public Lyceum, and there partly\npartaking of bodily exercises, and partly and principally, talking\nwith one another. This kind of intercourse was only possible in the\nAthenian mode of life, where most of the work which is now done by a\nfree citizen\u2014by a free republican and free imperial citizen alike\u2014was\nperformed by slaves, seeing that it was deemed unworthy of free men.\nA free citizen could in Athens certainly be a handicraftsman, but he\nhad slaves who did the work, just as a master now has workmen. At\nthe present day such a life of movement would not be suitable to our\ncustoms. Now Socrates also lounged about after this manner, and lived\nin this constant discussion of ethical questions.[122] Thus what he\ndid was what came naturally to him, and what can in general be called\nmoralizing; but its nature and method was not that of preaching,\nexhortation or teaching; it was not a dry morality. For amongst the\nAthenians and in Attic urbanity, this had no place, since it is not a\nreciprocal, free, and rational relationship. But with all men, however\ndifferent their characters, he entered on one kind of dialogue, with\nall that Attic urbanity which, without presumption on his part, without\ninstructing others, or wishing to command them, while maintaining their\nperfect right to freedom, and honouring it, yet causes all that is rude\nto be suppressed.\n\n1. _The Socratic Method._ In this conversation Socrates\u2019 philosophy is\nfound, as also what is known as the Socratic method, which must in its\nnature be dialectic, and of which we must speak before dealing with\nthe content. Socrates\u2019 manner is not artificial; the dialogues of the\nmoderns, on the contrary, just because no internal reason justifies\ntheir form, are necessarily tedious and heavy. But the principle of\nhis philosophy falls in with the method itself, which thus far cannot\nbe called method, since it is a mode which quite coincides with the\nmoralizing peculiar to Socrates. For the chief content is to know the\ngood as the absolute, and that particularly in relation to actions.\nSocrates gives this point of view so high a place, that he both puts\naside the sciences which involve the contemplation of the universal in\nnature, mind, &c., himself, and calls upon others to do the same.[123]\nThus it can be said that in content his philosophy had an altogether\npractical aspect, and similarly the Socratic method, which is essential\nto it, was distinguished by the system of first bringing a person to\nreflection upon his duty by any occasion that might either happen\nto be offered spontaneously, or that was brought about by Socrates.\nBy going to the work-places of tailors and shoemakers, and entering\ninto discourse with them, as also with youths and old men, Sophists,\nstatesmen, and citizens of all kinds, he in the first place took\ntheir interests as his topic\u2014whether these were household interests,\nthe education of children, or the interests of knowledge or of truth.\nThen he led them on from a definite case to think of the universal,\nand of truths and beauties which had absolute value, since in every\ncase, from the individual\u2019s own thoughts, he derived the conviction\nand consciousness of that which is the definite right. This method has\ntwo prominent aspects, the one the development of the universal from\nthe concrete case, and the exhibition of the notion which implicitly\nexists in every consciousness,[124] and the other is the resolution of\nthe firmly established, and, when taken immediately in consciousness,\nuniversal determinations of the sensuous conception or of thought, and\nthe causing of confusion between these and what is concrete.\n\n_a._ If we proceed from the general account of Socrates\u2019 method\nto a nearer view, in the first place its effect is to inspire men\nwith distrust towards their presuppositions, after faith had become\nwavering and they were driven to seek that which is, in themselves.\nNow whether it was that he wished to bring the manner of the Sophists\ninto disrepute, or that he was desirous to awaken the desire for\nknowledge and independent thought in the youths whom he attracted to\nhimself, he certainly began by adopting the ordinary conceptions which\nthey considered to be true. But in order to bring others to express\nthese, he represents himself as in ignorance of them, and, with a\nseeming ingenuousness, puts questions to his audience as if they\nwere to instruct him, while he really wished to draw them out. This\nis the celebrated Socratic irony, which in his case is a particular\nmode of carrying on intercourse between one person and another, and\nis thus only a subjective form of dialectic, for real dialectic deals\nwith the reasons for things. What he wished to effect was, that when\nother people brought forward their principles, he, from each definite\nproposition, should deduce as its consequence the direct opposite of\nwhat the proposition stated, or else allow the opposite to be deduced\nfrom their own inner consciousness without maintaining it directly\nagainst their statements. Sometimes he also derived the opposite from\na concrete case. But as this opposite was a principle held by men as\nfirmly as the other, he then went on to show that they contradicted\nthemselves. Thus Socrates taught those with whom he associated to know\nthat they knew nothing; indeed, what is more, he himself said that\nhe knew nothing, and therefore taught nothing. It may actually be\nsaid that Socrates knew nothing, for he did not reach the systematic\nconstruction of a philosophy. He was conscious of this, and it was also\nnot at all his aim to establish a science.\n\nOn the one view, this irony seems to be something untrue. But when we\ndeal with objects which have a universal interest, and speak about\nthem to one and to another, it is always the case that one does not\nunderstand another\u2019s conception of the object. For every individual has\ncertain ultimate words as to which he presupposes a common knowledge.\nBut if we really are to come to an understanding, we find it is these\npresuppositions which have to be investigated. For instance, if in\nmore recent times belief and reason are discussed as the subjects of\npresent intellectual interest, everyone pretends that he knows quite\nwell what reason, &c., is, and it is considered ill-bred to ask for an\nexplanation of this, seeing that all are supposed to know about it. A\nvery celebrated divine, ten years ago,[125] published ninety theses\non reason, which contained very interesting questions, but resulted\nin nothing, although they were much discussed, because one person\u2019s\nassertions issued from the point of view of faith, and the other\u2019s\nfrom that of reason, and each remained in this state of opposition,\nwithout the one\u2019s knowing what the other meant. Thus what would make\nan understanding possible is just the explanation of what we think is\nunderstood, without really being so. If faith and knowledge certainly\ndiffer from one another at the first, yet through this declaration of\ntheir notional determinations the common element will at once appear;\nin that way questions like these and the trouble taken with them may,\nfor the first time, become fruitful; otherwise men may chatter this way\nand that for years, without making any advance. For if I say I know\nwhat reason, what belief is, these are only quite abstract ideas; it is\nnecessary, in order to become concrete, that they should be explained,\nand that it should be understood that what they really are, is unknown.\nThe irony of Socrates has this great quality of showing how to make\nabstract ideas concrete and effect their development, for on that alone\ndepends the bringing of the Notion into consciousness.\n\nIn recent times much has been said about the Socratic irony which,\nlike all dialectic, gives force to what is taken immediately, but only\nin order to allow the dissolution inherent in it to come to pass;\nand we may call this the universal irony of the world. Yet men have\ntried to make this irony of Socrates into something quite different,\nfor they extended it into a universal principle; it is said to be\nthe highest attitude of the mind, and has been represented as the\nmost divine. It was Friedrich von Schlegel who first brought forward\nthis idea, and Ast repeated it, saying, \u201cThe most ardent love of all\nbeauty in the Idea, as in life, inspires Socrates\u2019 words with inward,\nunfathomable life.\u201d This life is now said to be irony! But this irony\nissues from the Fichtian philosophy, and is an essential point in the\ncomprehension of the conceptions of most recent times. It is when\nsubjective consciousness maintains its independence of everything,\nthat it says, \u201cIt is I who through my educated thoughts can annul all\ndeterminations of right, morality, good, &c., because I am clearly\nmaster of them, and I know that if anything seems good to me I can\neasily subvert it, because things are only true to me in so far as they\nplease me now.\u201d This irony is thus only a trifling with everything, and\nit can transform all things into show: to this subjectivity nothing\nis any longer serious, for any seriousness which it has, immediately\nbecomes dissipated again in jokes, and all noble or divine truth\nvanishes away or becomes mere triviality. But the Greek gaiety, as it\nbreathes in Homer\u2019s poems, is ironical, for Eros mocks the power of\nZeus and of Mars; Vulcan, limping along, serves the gods with wine, and\nbrings upon himself the uncontrollable laughter of the immortal gods.\nJuno boxes Diana\u2019s ears. Thus, too, there is irony in the sacrifices\nof the ancients, who themselves consumed the best; in the pain that\nlaughs, in the keenest joy which is moved to tears, in the scornful\nlaughter of Mephistopheles, and in every transition from one extreme\nto another\u2014from what is best to what is worst. Sunday morning may be\npassed in deep humility, profoundest contrition and self-abasement,\nin striking the breast in penitence, and the evening in eating and\ndrinking to the full, going the round of pleasures, thus allowing self\nto re-assert its independence of any such subjection. Hypocrisy, which\nis of the same nature, is the truest irony. Socrates and Plato were\nfalsely stated to be the originators of this irony, of which it is\nsaid that it is the \u201cinmost and deepest life,\u201d although they possessed\nthe element of subjectivity; in our time it was not permitted to us\nto give effect to this irony. Ast\u2019s \u201cinmost, deepest life\u201d is just\nthe subjective and arbitrary will, the inward divinity which knows\nitself to be exalted above all. The divine is said to be the purely\nnegative attitude, the perception of the vanity of everything, in which\nmy vanity alone remains. Making the consciousness of the nullity of\neverything ultimate, might indeed indicate depth of life, but it only\nis the depth of emptiness, as may be seen from the ancient comedies\nof Aristophanes. From this irony of our times, the irony of Socrates\nis far removed; as is also the case with Plato, it has a significance\nwhich is limited. Socrates\u2019 premeditated irony may be called a manner\nof speech, a pleasant rallying; there is in it no satirical laughter or\npretence, as though the idea were nothing but a joke. But his tragic\nirony is his opposition of subjective reflection to morality as it\nexists, not a consciousness of the fact that he stands above it, but\nthe natural aim of leading men, through thought, to the true good and\nto the universal Idea.\n\n_b._ Now the second element is what Socrates has called the art of\nmidwifery\u2014an art which came to him from his mother.[126] It is the\nassisting into the world of the thought which is already contained in\nthe consciousness of the individual\u2014the showing from the concrete,\nunreflected consciousness, the universality of the concrete, or\nfrom the universally posited, the opposite which already is within\nit. Socrates hence adopts a questioning attitude, and this kind of\nquestioning and answering has thus been called the Socratic method;\nbut in this method there is more than can be given in questions and\nreplies. For the answer seems occasionally to be quite different from\nwhat was intended by the question, while in printed dialogue, answers\nare altogether under the author\u2019s control; but to say that in actual\nlife people are found to answer as they are here made to do, is quite\nanother thing. To Socrates those who reply may be called pliable\nyouths, because they reply directly to the questions, which are so\nformed that they make the answer very easy, and exclude any originality\nin reply. To this plastic manner, which we see in the method of\nSocrates, as represented by Plato and Xenophon, it is objected that we\ndo not answer in the same relation in which the questioner asks; while,\nwith Socrates, the relation which the questioner adopts is respected\nin the reply. The other way, which is to bring forward another point\nof view, is undoubtedly the spirit of an animated conversation, but\nsuch emulation is excluded from this Socratic method, in which the\nprincipal matter is to keep to the point. The spirit of dogmatism,\nself-assertion, stopping short when we seem to get into difficulties,\nand escaping from them by a jest, or by setting them aside\u2014all these\nattitudes and methods are here excluded; they do not constitute good\nmanners, nor do they have a place in Socrates\u2019 dialogues. In these\ndialogues, it is hence not to be wondered at that those questioned\nanswered so precisely to the point, while in the best modern dialogues\nthere is always an arbitrary element.\n\nThis difference concerns only what is external and formal. But the\nprincipal point, and the reason why Socrates set to work with questions\nin bringing the good and right into consciousness in universal form,\nwas that he did not proceed from what is present in our consciousness\nin a simple form through setting forth the conception allied to it\nin pure necessity, which would be a deduction, a proof or, speaking\ngenerally, a consequence following from the conception. But this\nconcrete, as it is in natural consciousness without thinking of it,\nor universality immersed in matter, he analyzed, so that through\nthe separation of the concrete, he brought the universal contained\ntherein to consciousness as universal. We see this method also carried\non to a large extent in Plato\u2019s dialogues, where there is, in this\nregard, particular skill displayed. It is the same method which\nforms in every man his knowledge of the universal; an education in\nself-consciousness, which is the development of reason. The child, the\nuncultured man, lives in concrete individual ideas, but to the man who\ngrows and educates himself, because he thereby goes back into himself\nas thinking, reflection becomes reflection on the universal and the\npermanent establishment of the same; and a freedom\u2014formerly that of\nmoving in concrete ideas\u2014is now that of so doing in abstractions and\nin thoughts. We see such a development of universal from particular,\nwhere a number of examples are given, treated in a very tedious way.\nFor us who are trained in presenting to ourselves what is abstract,\nwho are taught from youth up in universal principles, the Socratic\nmethod of so-called deference, with its eloquence, has often something\ntiresome and tedious about it. The universal of the concrete case is\nalready present to us as universal, because our reflection is already\naccustomed to the universal, and we do not require, first of all, to\ntake the trouble of making a separation; and thus, if Socrates were now\nto bring what is abstract before consciousness, we should not require,\nin order to establish it as universal, that all these examples should\nbe adduced, so that through repetition the subjective certainty of\nabstraction might arise.\n\n_c._ The next result of this method of procedure may be that\nconsciousness is surprised that what it never looked for should be\nfound in consciousness. If we reflect, for example, on the universally\nknown idea of Becoming, we find that what becomes is not and yet it is;\nit is the identity of Being and non-being, and it may surprise us that\nin this simple conception so great a distinction should exist.\n\nThe result attained was partly the altogether formal and negative one\nof bringing home to those who conversed with Socrates, the conviction\nthat, however well acquainted with the subject they had thought\nthemselves, they now came to the conclusion, \u201cthat what we knew has\nrefuted itself.\u201d Socrates thus put questions in the intent that the\nspeaker should be drawn on to make admissions, implying a point of\nview opposed to that from which he started. That these contradictions\narise because they bring their ideas together, is the drift of the\ngreater part of Socrates\u2019 dialogues; their main tendency consequently\nwas to show the bewilderment and confusion which exist in knowledge.\nBy this means, he tries to awaken shame, and the perception that what\nwe consider as true is not the truth, from which the necessity for\nearnest effort after knowledge must result. Plato, amongst others,\ngives these examples in his Meno (p. 71-80, Steph.; p. 327-346, Bekk.).\nSocrates is made to say, \u201cBy the gods, tell me what is virtue.\u201d Meno\nproceeds to make various distinctions: \u201cMan\u2019s virtue is to be skilful\nin managing state affairs, and thereby to help friends and harm foes;\nwoman\u2019s to rule her household; other virtues are those of boys, of\nyoung men, of old men,\u201d &c. Socrates interrupts him by saying, that\nit is not that about which he inquires, but virtue in general, which\ncomprehends every thing in itself. Meno says \u201cIt is to govern and rule\nover others.\u201d Socrates brings forward the fact that the virtue of boys\nand slaves does not consist in governing. Meno says that he cannot tell\nwhat is common in all virtue. Socrates replies that it is the same as\nfigure, which is what is common in roundness, squareness, &c. There a\ndigression occurs. Meno says, \u201cVirtue is the power of securing the good\ndesired.\u201d Socrates interposes that it is superfluous to say the good,\nfor from the time that men know that something is an evil, they do not\ndesire it; and also the good must be acquired in a right way. Socrates\nthus confounds Meno, and he sees that these ideas are false. The latter\nsays, \u201cI used to hear of you, before I knew you, that you were yourself\nin doubt (_\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2_), and also brought others into doubt, and now you\ncast a spell on me too, so that I am at my wits\u2019 end (_\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2_). You\nseem, if I may venture to jest, to be like the torpedo fish, for it\nis said of it that it makes torpid (_\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u1fb7\u03bd_) those who come near it\nand touch it. You have done this to me, for I am become torpid in body\nand soul, and I do not know how to answer you, although I have talked\nthousands of times about virtue with many persons, and, as it seemed\nto me, talked very well. But now I do not know at all what to say.\nHence you do well not to travel amongst strangers, for you might be\nput to death as a magician.\u201d Socrates again wishes to \u201cinquire.\u201d Now\nMeno says, \u201cHow can you inquire about what you say you do not know?\nCan you have a desire for what you do not know? And if you find it out\nby chance, how can you know that it is what you looked for, since you\nacknowledge that, you do not know it?\u201d A number of dialogues end in the\nsame manner, both in Xenophon and Plato, leaving us quite unsatisfied\nas to the result. It is so in the Lysis, where Plato asks the question\nof what love and friendship secures to men; and similarly the Republic\ncommences by inquiring what justice is. Philosophy must, generally\nspeaking, begin with a puzzle in order to bring about reflection;\neverything must be doubted, all presuppositions given up, to reach the\ntruth as created through the Notion.\n\n2. _The Principle of the Good._ This, in short, is Socrates\u2019 method.\nThe affirmative, what Socrates develops in the consciousness,\nis nothing but the good in as far as it is brought forth from\nconsciousness through knowledge\u2014it is the eternal, in and for itself\nuniversal, what is called the Idea, the true, which just in so far\nas it is end, is the Good. In this regard Socrates is opposed to the\nSophists, for the proposition that man is the measure of all things, to\nthem still comprehends particular ends, while to Socrates the universal\nbrought forth through free thought is thereby expressed in objective\nfashion. Nevertheless, we must not blame the Sophists because, in the\naimlessness of their time, they did not discover the principle of the\nGood; for every discovery has its time, and that of the Good, which as\nend in itself is now always made the starting point, had not yet been\nmade by Socrates. It now seems as if we had not yet shown forth much\nof the Socratic philosophy, for we have merely kept to the principle;\nbut the main point with Socrates is that his knowledge for the first\ntime reached this abstraction. The Good is nevertheless no longer\nas abstract as the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ of Anaxagoras, but is the universal which\ndetermines itself in itself, realizes itself, and has to be realized\nas the end of the world and of the individual. It is a principle,\nconcrete within itself, which, however, is not yet manifested in its\ndevelopment, and in this abstract attitude we find what is wanting in\nthe Socratic standpoint, of which nothing that is affirmative can,\nbeyond this, be adduced.\n\n_a._ As regards the Socratic principle, the first determination is\nthe great determination which is, however, still merely formal,\nthat consciousness creates and has to create out of itself what is\nthe true. This principle of subjective freedom was present to the\nconsciousness of Socrates himself so vividly that he despised the\nother sciences as being empty learning and useless to mankind; he has\nto concern himself with his moral nature only in order to do what is\nbest\u2014a one-sidedness which is very characteristic of Socrates. This\nreligion of the Good is to Socrates, not only the essential point to\nwhich men have to direct their thoughts, but it is that exclusively.\nWe see him showing how from every individual this universal, this\nabsolute in consciousness may be found as his reality. Here we see\nlaw, the true and good, what was formerly present as an existent,\nreturn into consciousness. But it is not a single chance manifestation\nin this individual Socrates, for we have to comprehend Socrates and\nhis manifestation. In the universal consciousness, in the spirit of\nthe people to which he belongs, we see natural turn into reflective\nmorality, and he stands above as the consciousness of this change.\nThe spirit of the world here begins to change, a change which was\nlater on carried to its completion. From this higher standpoint,\nSocrates, as well as the Athenian people and Socrates in them, have\nto be considered. The reflection of consciousness into itself begins\nhere, the knowledge of the consciousness of self as such, that it is\nreal existence\u2014or that God is a Spirit, or again, in a cruder and\nmore sensuous form, that God takes human form. This epoch begins\nwhere essence is given up as Being\u2014even though it be, as hitherto,\nabstract Being, Being as thought. But this epoch in a naturally moral\npeople in the highest state of development, makes its appearance as\nthe destruction threatening them or breaking in upon them unprevented.\nFor its morality, as was usually so with the ancients, consisted in\nthe fact that the Good was present as a universal, without its having\nhad the form of the conviction of the individual in his individual\nconsciousness, but simply that of the immediate absolute. It is the\nauthoritative, present law, without testing investigation, but yet\nan ultimate ground on which this moral consciousness rests. It is\nthe law of the State; it has authority as the law of the gods, and\nthus it is universal destiny which has the form of an existent, and\nis recognized as such by all. But moral consciousness asks if this\nis actually law in itself? This consciousness turned back within\nitself from everything that has the form of the existent, requires to\nunderstand, to know, that the above law is posited in truth, _i.e._\nit demands that it should find itself therein as consciousness. In\nthus returning into themselves the Athenian people are revealed to us:\nuncertainty as to existent laws as existent has arisen, and a doubt\nabout what was held to be right, the greatest freedom respecting all\nthat is and was respected. This return into itself represents the\nhighest point reached by the mind of Greece, in so far as it becomes\nno longer the mere existence of these moralities, but the living\nconsciousness of the same, which has a content which is similar, but\nwhich, as spirit, moves freely in it. This is a culture which we never\nfind the Laced\u00e6monians reach. This deepest life of morality is so to\nspeak a free personal consciousness of morality or of God, and a happy\nenjoyment of them. Consciousness and Being have here exactly the same\nvalue and rank; what is, is consciousness; neither is powerful above\nanother. The authority of law is no oppressive bond to consciousness,\nand all reality is likewise no obstacle to it, for it is secure in\nitself. But this return is just on the point of abandoning the content,\nand indeed of positing itself as abstract consciousness, without\nthe content, and, as existent, opposed to it. From this equilibrium\nof consciousness and Being, consciousness takes up its position as\nindependent. This aspect of separation is an independent conception,\nbecause consciousness, in the perception of its independence, no\nlonger immediately acknowledges what is put before it, but requires\nthat this should first justify itself to it, _i.e._ it must comprehend\nitself therein. Thus this return is the isolation of the individual\nfrom the universal, care for self at the cost of the State; to us,\nfor instance, it is the question as to whether I shall be in eternal\nbliss or condemnation, whereas philosophic eternity is present now\nin time, and is nothing other than the substantial man himself. The\nState has lost its power, which consisted in the unbroken continuity\nof the universal spirit, as formed of single individuals, so that the\nindividual consciousness knew no other content and reality than law.\nMorals have become shaken, because we have the idea present that man\ncreates his maxims for himself. The fact that the individual comes to\ncare for his own morality, means that he becomes reflectively moral;\nwhen public morality disappears, reflective morality is seen to have\narisen. We now see Socrates bringing forward the opinion, that in\nthese times every one has to look after his own morality, and thus\nhe looked after his through consciousness and reflection regarding\nhimself; for he sought the universal spirit which had disappeared from\nreality, in his own consciousness. He also helped others to care for\ntheir morality, for he awakened in them this consciousness of having\nin their thoughts the good and true, _i.e._ having the potentiality\nof action and of knowledge. This is no longer there immediately, but\nmust be provided, just as a ship must make provision of water when it\ngoes to places where none is to be found. The immediate has no further\nauthority but must justify itself to thought. Thus we comprehend the\nspecial qualities of Socrates, and his method in Philosophy, from the\nwhole; and we also understand his fate from the same.\n\nThis direction of consciousness back into itself takes the form\u2014very\nmarkedly in Plato\u2014of asserting that man can learn nothing, virtue\nincluded, and that not because the latter has no relation to science.\nFor the good does not come from without, Socrates shows; it cannot\nbe taught, but is implied in the nature of mind. That is to say, man\ncannot passively receive anything that is given from without like the\nwax that is moulded to a form, for everything is latent in the mind\nof man, and he only seems to learn it. Certainly everything begins\nfrom without, but this is only the beginning; the truth is that this\nis only an impulse towards the development of spirit. All that has\nvalue to men, the eternal, the self-existent, is contained in man\nhimself, and has to develop from himself. To learn here only means\nto receive knowledge of what is externally determined. This external\ncomes indeed through experience, but the universal therein belongs to\nthought, not to the subjective and bad, but to the objective and true.\nThe universal in the opposition of subjective and objective, is that\nwhich is as subjective as it is objective; the subjective is only a\nparticular, the objective is similarly only a particular as regards\nthe subjective, but the universal is the unity of both. According to\nthe Socratic principle, nothing has any value to men to which the\nspirit does not testify. Man in it is free, is at home with himself,\nand that is the subjectivity of spirit. As it is said in the Bible,\n\u201cFlesh of my flesh, and bone of my bone,\u201d that which is held by me as\ntruth and right is spirit of my spirit. But what spirit derives from\nitself must come from it as from the spirit which acts in a universal\nmanner, and not from its passions, likings, and arbitrary desires.\nThese, too, certainly come from something inward which is \u201cimplanted\nin us by nature,\u201d but which is only in a natural way our own, for it\nbelongs to the particular; high above it is true thought, the Notion,\nthe rational. Socrates opposed to the contingent and particular inward,\nthat universal, true inward of thought. And Socrates awakened this real\nconscience, for he not only said that man is the measure of all things,\nbut man as thinking is the measure of all things. With Plato we shall,\nlater on, find it formulated that what man seems to receive he only\nremembers.\n\nAs to the question of what is the Good, Socrates recognized its\ndetermination as being not only a determination in particularity to\nthe exclusion of the natural side, as determination is understood in\nempirical science, but even in relation to the actions of men, he holds\nthe Good to be still undetermined, and the ultimate determinateness, or\nthe determining, is what we may call subjectivity generally. That the\nGood should be determined, primarily signifies that while, at first, in\nopposition to the Being of reality, it was a general maxim only, that\nto which the activity of individuality was still wanting, in the second\nplace it was not permitted to be inert, to be mere thought, but had to\nbe present as the determining and actual, and thus as the effectual. It\nis such only through subjectivity, through the activity of man. That\nthe Good is a determinate thus further means that individuals know what\nthe Good is, and we call this standpoint reflective morality, while\nnatural morality does right unconsciously. Thus to Socrates virtue is\nperception. For to the proposition of the Platonic Protagoras that\nall other virtues have a relationship to one another, but that it is\nnot so with valour, since many brave men are to be found who are the\nmost irreligious, unjust, intemperate and uncultured of people (such\nas a band of robbers), Plato makes Socrates answer that valour, like\nall virtues, also is a science, that is, it is the knowledge and the\nright estimation of what is to be feared.[127] By this the distinctive\nqualities of valour are certainly not unfolded. The naturally moral and\nupright man is such without his having considered the matter at all; it\nis his character, and what is good is securely rooted within him. When,\non the other hand, consciousness is concerned, the question arises as\nto whether I directly desire the good or not. Hence this consciousness\nof morality easily becomes dangerous, and causes the individual to\nbe puffed up by a good opinion of himself, which proceeds from the\nconsciousness of his own power to decide for the good. The \u2018I\u2019 is then\nthe master, he who chooses the Good, and in that there is the conceit\nof my knowing that I am an excellent man. With Socrates this opposition\nof the good and the subject as choosing is not reached, for what is\ndealt with is only the determination of the Good and the connection\ntherewith of subjectivity; this last, as an individual person who can\nchoose, decides upon the inward universal. We have here on the one side\nthe knowledge of the Good, but, on the other, it is implied that the\nsubject is good, since this is his ordinary character; and the fact\nthat the subject is such, was by the ancients called virtue.\n\nWe understand from this the following criticism which Aristotle makes\n(Magna Mor. I. 1) on the quality of virtue as expounded by Socrates.\nHe says: \u201cSocrates spoke better of virtue than did Pythagoras, but\nnot quite justly, for he made virtues into a science (_\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c2_).\nBut this is impossible, since, though all knowledge has some basis\n(_\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2_) this basis only exists in thought. Consequently, he\nplaces all the virtues in the thinking (_\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff7_) side of the\nsoul. Hence it comes to pass that he does away with the feeling\n(_\u1f04\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd_) part of the soul, that is, the inclination (_\u03c0\u1fb6\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2_) and\nthe habits (_\u1f20\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2_),\u201d which, however, also pertain to virtue. \u201cBut\nPlato rightly distinguished the thinking and the feeling sides of\nthe soul.\u201d This is a good criticism. We see that what Aristotle\nmisses in the determination of virtue in Socrates, is the side of\nsubjective actuality, which we now call the heart. Certainly virtue is\ndetermination in accordance with universal, and not with particular\nends, but perception is not the only element in virtue. For in order\nthat the good perceived should be virtue, it must come to pass that the\nwhole man, the heart and mind, should be identical with it, and this\naspect of Being or of realization generally, is what Aristotle calls\n_\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd_. If we understand the reality of the good as universal\nmorality, substantiality is wanting to the perception; but matter,\nwhen we regard the inclination of the individual subjective will as\nthis reality. This double want may also be considered as a want of\ncontent and of activity, in so far as to the universal development is\nwanting; and in the latter case, determining activity comes before us\nas negative only in reference to the universal. Socrates thus omits,\nin characterizing virtue, just what we saw had also disappeared in\nactuality, that is, first the real spirit of a people, and then reality\nas the sympathies of the individual. For it is just when consciousness\nis not yet turned back into itself, that the universal good appears\nto the individual as the object of his sympathy. To us, on the other\nhand, because we are accustomed to put on one side the good or virtue\nas practical reason, the other side, which is opposed to a reflective\nmorality, is an equally abstract sensuousness, inclination, passion,\nand hence the bad. But in order that the universal should be reality,\nit must be worked out through consciousness as individual, and the\ncarrying into effect pertains to this individuality. A passion,\nas for example, love, ambition, is the universal itself, as it is\nself-realizing, not in perception, but in activity; and if we did not\nfear being misunderstood, we should say that for the individual the\nuniversal is his own interests. Yet this is not the place in which to\nunravel all the false ideas and contradictions present in our culture.\n\nAristotle (Eth. Nicom. VI. 13), supplementing the one-sidedness of\nSocrates, further says of him: \u201cSocrates in one respect worked on right\nlines, but not in the other. For to call virtue scientific knowledge is\nuntrue, but to say that it is not without scientific basis is right.\nSocrates made virtues into perceptions (_\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2_), but we say that\nvirtue exists with perception.\u201d This is a very true distinction; the\none side in virtue is that the universal of end belongs to thought. But\nin virtue, as character, the other side, active individuality, real\nsoul, must necessarily come forth; and indeed with Socrates the latter\nappears in a characteristic form of which we shall speak below (p. 421\net seq.).\n\n_b._ If we consider the universal first, it has within it a positive\nand a negative side, which we find both united in Xenophon\u2019s\n\u201cMemorabilia,\u201d a work which aims at justifying Socrates. And if we\ninquire whether he or Plato depicts Socrates to us most faithfully\nin his personality and doctrine, there is no question that in regard\nto the personality and method, the externals of his teaching, we\nmay certainly receive from Plato a satisfactory, and perhaps a more\ncomplete representation of what Socrates was. But in regard to the\ncontent of his teaching and the point reached by him in the development\nof thought, we have in the main to look to Xenophon.\n\nThe fact that the reality of morality had become shaken in the mind\nof the people, came to consciousness in Socrates; he stands so high\nbecause he gave expression to what was present in the times. In this\nconsciousness he elevated morality into perception, but this action is\njust the bringing to consciousness of the fact that it is the power of\nthe Notion which sublates the determinate existence and the immediate\nvalue of moral laws and the sacredness of their implicitude. When\nperception likewise positively acknowledges as law that which was\nheld to be law (for the positive subsists through having recourse to\nlaws), this acknowledgment of them always passes through the negative\nmode, and no longer has the form of absolute being-in-itself: it is,\nhowever, just as far from being a Platonic Republic. To the Notion\ntoo, because to it the determinateness of laws in the form in which\nthey have value to unperceiving consciousness has dissolved, only the\npurely implicit universal Good is the true. But since this is empty\nand without reality, we demand, if we are not satisfied with a dull\nmonotonous round, that again a movement should be made towards the\nextension of the determination of the universal. Now because Socrates\nremains at the indeterminateness of the good, its determination\nmeans for him simply the expression of the particular good. Then it\ncomes to pass that the universal results only from the negation of\nthe particular good; and since this last is just the existing laws\nof Greek morality, we have here the doubtlessly right, but dangerous\nelement in perception, the showing in all that is particular only its\ndeficiencies. The inconsistency of making what is limited into an\nabsolute, certainly becomes unconsciously corrected in the moral man;\nthis improvement rests partly on the morality of the subject and partly\non the whole of the social life; and unfortunate extremes resulting in\nconflict are unusual and unfrequent. But since the dialectic sublates\nthe particular, the abstract universal also becomes shaken.\n\n_\u03b1_. Now as regards the positive side, Xenophon tells us in the fourth\nbook of the Memorabilia (c. 2, \u00a7 40), how Socrates, once having\nmade the need for perception sensible to the youths, then actually\ninstructed them, and no longer wandered through mere subtleties in\nhis talk, but taught them the good in the clearest and most open way.\nThat is, he showed them the good and true in what is determined, going\nback into it because he did not wish to remain in mere abstraction.\nXenophon gives an example of this (Memorab. IV. c. 4, \u00a7\u00a7 12-16, 25)\nin a dialogue with the Sophist Hippias. Socrates there asserts that\nthe just man is he who obeys the law, and that these laws are divine.\nXenophon makes Hippias reply by asking how Socrates could declare it to\nbe an absolute duty to obey the laws, for the people and the governors\nthemselves often condemn them by changing them, which is allowing that\nthey are not absolute. But Socrates answers by demanding if those who\nconduct war do not again make peace, which is not, any more than in the\nother case, to condemn war, for each was just in its turn. Socrates\nthus says, in a word, that the best and happiest State is that in which\nthe citizens are of one mind and obedient to law. Now this is the one\nside in which Socrates looks away from the contradiction and makes\nlaws and justice, as they are accepted by each individually, to be\nthe affirmative content. But if we here ask what these laws are, they\nare, we find, just those which have a value at some one time, as they\nhappen to be present in the State and in the idea; at another time they\nabrogate themselves as determined, and are not held to be absolute.\n\n_\u03b2_. We hence see this other negative side in the same connection\nwhen Socrates brings Euthydemus into the conversation, for he asks\nhim whether he did not strive after the virtue without which neither\nthe private man nor the citizen could be useful to himself or to his\npeople or the State. Euthydemus declares that this undoubtedly is\nso. But without justice, replies Socrates, this is not possible, and\nhe further asks whether Euthydemus had thus attained to justice in\nhimself. Euthydemus answers affirmatively, for he says that he thinks\nhe is no less just than any other man. Socrates now replies, \u201cJust\nas workmen can show their work, the just will be able to say what\ntheir works are.\u201d This he also agrees to, and replies that he could\neasily do so. Socrates now proposes if this is so to write, \u201con the\none hand under _\u0394_ the actions of the just, and on the other, under\n_\u0391_, those of the unjust?\u201d With the approbation of Euthydemus, lies,\ndeceit, robbery, making a slave of a free man, thus fall on the side of\nthe unjust. Now Socrates asks, \u201cBut if a general subdues the enemy\u2019s\nState, would this not be justice?\u201d Euthydemus says \u201cYes.\u201d Socrates\nreplies, \u201cLikewise if he deceives and robs the enemy and makes slaves?\u201d\nEuthydemus has to admit the justice of this. It is thus shown \u201cthat\nthe same qualities come under the determination both of justice and of\ninjustice.\u201d Here it strikes Euthydemus to add the qualification that\nhe intended that Socrates should understand the action to be only in\nreference to friends; as regards them it is wrong. Socrates accepts\nthis, but proceeds, \u201cIf a general at the decisive moment of the battle\nsaw his own army in fear, and he deceived them by falsely saying that\nhelp was coming in order to lead them on to victory, could it be\ndeemed right?\u201d Euthydemus acknowledges that it could. Socrates says,\n\u201cIf a father gives a sick child a medicine which it does not wish to\ntake, in its food, and makes it well through deceit, is this right?\u201d\nEuthydemus\u2014\u201cYes.\u201d Socrates\u2014\u201cOr is anyone wrong who takes arms from\nhis friend secretly or by force, when he sees him in despair, and in\nthe act of taking his own life?\u201d Euthydemus has to admit that this is\nnot wrong.[128] Thus it is again shown here, that as regards friends\nalso, the same determinations have to hold good on both sides, as\njustice as well as injustice. Here we see that abstention from lying,\ndeceit, and robbery, that which we naturally hold to be established,\ncontradicts itself by being put into connection with something\ndifferent, and something which holds equally good. This example further\nexplains how through thought, which would lay hold of the universal in\nthe form of the universal only, the particular becomes uncertain.\n\n_\u03b3_. The positive, which Socrates sets in the place of what was\nfixed and has now become vacillating, in order to give a content to\nthe universal, is, on the one hand, and in opposition to this last,\nobedience to law (p. 416), that is, the mode of thought and idea which\nis inconsistent; and, on the other hand, since such determinations\ndo not hold good for the Notion, it is perception, in which the\nimmediately posited has now, in the mediating negation, to justify\nitself as a determination proceeding out of the constitution of the\nwhole. But it is both true that we do not find this perception present\nin Socrates, for it remains in its content undetermined, and that\nin reality it is a contingent, which is seen in the fact, that the\nuniversal commands, such as \u201cThou shalt not kill,\u201d are connected with\na particular content which is conditioned. Now whether the universal\nmaxim in this particular case has value or not, depends first on the\ncircumstances; and it is the perception which discovers the conditions\nand circumstances whereby exceptions to this law of unconditioned\nvalidity arise. However, because through this contingency in the\ninstances, the fixed nature of the universal principle disappears,\nsince it, too, appears as a particular only, the consciousness of\nSocrates arrives at pure freedom in each particular content. This\nfreedom, which does not leave the content as it is in its dissipated\ndetermination to the natural consciousness, but makes it to be\npenetrated by the universal, is the real mind which, as unity of the\nuniversal content and of freedom, is the veritable truth. Thus if we\nhere consider further what is the true in this consciousness, we pass\non to the mode in which the realization of the universal appeared to\nSocrates himself.\n\nEven the uneducated mind does not follow the content of its\nconsciousness as this content appears in it; but, as mind, it corrects\nthat which is wrong in its consciousness, and is thus implicitly,\nif not explicitly as consciousness, free. That is, though this\nconsciousness expresses the universal law, \u201cThou shalt not kill,\u201d as a\nduty, that consciousness\u2014if no cowardly spirit dwells within it\u2014will\nstill bravely attack and slay the enemy in war. Here, if it is asked\nwhether there is a command to kill one\u2019s enemies, the reply would be\naffirmative, as likewise when a hangman puts to death a criminal. But\nwhen in private life we become involved with adversaries, this command\nto kill one\u2019s enemies will not occur to us. We may thus call this the\nmind which thinks at the right time, first of the one, and then of\nthe other; it is spirit, but an unspiritual consciousness. The first\nstep towards reaching a spiritual consciousness is the negative one\nof acquiring freedom for one\u2019s consciousness. For since perception\nattempts to prove individual laws, it proceeds from a determination to\nwhich, as a universal basis, particular duty is submitted; but this\nbasis is itself not absolute, and falls under the same dialectic.\nFor example, were moderation commanded as a duty on the ground that\nintemperance undermined the health, health is the ultimate which is\nhere considered as absolute; but it is at the same time not absolute,\nfor there are other duties which ordain that health, and even life\nitself, should be risked and sacrificed. The so-called conflict of\nduties is nothing but duty, which is expressed as absolute, showing\nitself as not absolute; in the constant contradiction morals become\nunsettled. For a consciousness which has become consistent, law,\nbecause it has then been brought into contact with its opposite, has\nbeen sublated. For the positive truth has not yet become known in\nits determination. But to know the universal in its determination,\n_i.e._ the limitation of the universal which comes to us as fixed\nand not contingent, is only possible in connection with the whole\nsystem of actuality. Thus if with Socrates the content has become\nspiritualized, yet manifold independent grounds have merely taken the\nplace of manifold laws. For the perception is not yet expressed as the\nreal perception of these grounds over which it rules; but the truth\nof consciousness simply is this very movement of pure perception.\nThe true ground is, however, spirit, and the spirit of the people\u2014a\nperception of the constitution of a people, and the connection of the\nindividual with this real universal spirit. Laws, morals, the actual\nsocial life, thus have in themselves their own corrective against the\ninconsistent, which consists of the expression of a definite content\nas absolute. In ordinary life we merely forget this limitation of\nuniversal principles, and these still hold their place with us; but\nthe other point of view is thus when the limitation comes before our\nconsciousness.\n\nWhen we have the perfect consciousness that in actual life fixed duties\nand actions do not exist, for each concrete case is really a conflict\nof many duties which separate themselves in the moral understanding,\nbut which mind treats as not absolute, comprehending them in the\nunity of its judgment, we call this pure, deciding individuality, the\nknowledge of what is right, or conscience, just as we call the pure\nuniversal of consciousness not a particular but an all-comprehensive\none, duty. Now both sides here present, the universal law and the\ndeciding spirit which is in its abstraction the active individual,\nare also necessary to the consciousness of Socrates as the content\nand the power over this content. That is, because with Socrates the\nparticular law has become vacillating, there now comes in the place\nof the universal single mind, which, with the Greeks, was unconscious\ndetermination through unreflective morality, individual mind as\nindividuality deciding for itself. Thus with Socrates the deciding\nspirit is transformed into the subjective consciousness of man, since\nthe power of deciding originates with himself; and the first question\nnow is, how this subjectivity appears in Socrates himself. Because\nthe person, the individual, now gives the decision, we come back to\nSocrates as person, as subject, and what follows is a development\nof his personal relations. But since the moral element is generally\nplaced in the personality of Socrates, we see the contingent nature\nof the instruction and of the culture which was obtained through\nSocrates\u2019 character; for it was the actual basis on which men fortified\nthemselves in associating with Socrates, by actual communication with\nhim and by their manner of life. Thus it was true that \u201cthe intercourse\nwith his friends was, on the whole, beneficial and instructive to them,\nbut in many cases they became unfaithful to Socrates,\u201d[129] because\nnot everyone attains to perception, and he who possesses it may remain\nat the negative. The education of the citizens, life in the people,\nis quite a fresh force in the individual, and does not mean that he\neducates himself through arguments; hence, however truly educative the\nintercourse with Socrates was, this contingency still entered into it.\nWe thus see as an unhappy symptom of disorder, how Socrates\u2019 greatest\nfavourites, and those endowed with the most genial natures (such as\nAlcibiades, that genius of levity, who played with the Athenian people,\nand Critias, the most active of the Thirty) afterwards experienced the\nfate of being judged in their own country, one as an enemy and traitor\nto his fellows, and the other as an oppressor and tyrant of the State.\nThey lived according to the principle of subjective perception, and\nthus cast a bad light on Socrates, for it is shown in this how the\nSocratic principle in another form brought about the ruin of Greek\nlife.[130]\n\n_c._ The characteristic form in which this subjectivity\u2014this implicit\nand deciding certainty\u2014appears in Socrates, has still to be mentioned.\nThat is, since everyone here has this personal mind which appears to\nhim to be his mind, we see how in connection with this, we have what\nis known under the name of the Genius (_\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd_) of Socrates; for\nit implies that now man decides in accordance with his perception\nand by himself. But in this Genius of Socrates\u2014notorious as a much\ndiscussed _bizarrerie_ of his imagination\u2014we are neither to imagine\nthe existence of protective spirit, angel, and such-like, nor even of\nconscience. For conscience is the idea of universal individuality, of\nthe mind certain of itself, which is at the same time universal truth.\nBut the Genius of Socrates is rather all the other and necessary sides\nof his universality, that is, the individuality of mind which came to\nconsciousness in him equally with the former. His pure consciousness\nstands over both sides. The deficiency in the universal, which\nlies in its indeterminateness, is unsatisfactorily supplied in an\nindividual way, because Socrates\u2019 judgment, as coming from himself,\nwas characterized by the form of an unconscious impulse. The Genius\nof Socrates is not Socrates himself, not his opinions and conviction,\nbut an oracle which, however, is not external, but is subjective,\nhis oracle. It bore the form of a knowledge which was directly\nassociated with a condition of unconsciousness; it was a knowledge\nwhich may also appear under other conditions as a magnetic state. It\nmay happen that at death, in illness and catalepsy, men know about\ncircumstances future or present, which, in the understood relations\nof things, are altogether unknown. These are facts which are usually\nrudely denied. That in Socrates we should discover what comes to pass\nthrough reflection in the form of the unconscious, makes it appear to\nbe an exceptional matter, revealed to the individual only, and not as\nbeing what it is in truth. Thereby it certainly receives the stamp\nof imagination, but there is nothing more of what is visionary or\nsuperstitious to be seen in it, for it is a necessary manifestation,\nthough Socrates did not recognize the necessity, this element being\nonly generally before his imagination.\n\nIn connection with what follows, we must yet further consider the\nrelationship of the Genius to the earlier existent form of decision,\nand that into which it led Socrates; regarding both Xenophon expresses\nhimself in his history most distinctly. Because the standpoint of the\nGreek mind was natural morality, in which man did not yet determine\nhimself, and still less was what we call conscience present, since\nlaws were, in their fundamental principles, regarded as traditional,\nthese last now presented an appearance of being sanctioned by the gods.\nWe know that the Greeks undoubtedly had laws on which to form their\njudgments, but on the other hand, both in private and public life,\nimmediate decisions had to be made. But in them the Greeks, with all\ntheir freedom, did not decide from the subjective will. The general\nor the people did not take upon themselves to decide as to what was\nbest in the State, nor did the individual do so in the family. For in\nmaking these decisions, the Greeks took refuge in oracles, sacrificial\nanimals, soothsayers, or, like the Romans, asked counsel of birds\nin flight. The general who had to fight a battle was guided in his\ndecision by the entrails of animals, as we often find in Xenophon\u2019s\nAnabasis. Pausanias tormented himself thus a whole day long before\nhe gave the command to fight.[131] This element, the fact that the\npeople had not the power of decision but were determined from without,\nwas a real factor in Greek consciousness; and oracles were everywhere\nessential where man did not yet know himself inwardly as being\nsufficiently free and independent to take upon himself to decide as we\ndo. This subjective freedom, which was not yet present with the Greeks,\nis what we mean in the present day when we speak of freedom; in the\nPlatonic Republic we shall see more of it. Our responsibility for what\nwe do is a characteristic of modern times; we wish to decide according\nto grounds of common sense, and consider this as ultimate. The Greeks\ndid not possess the knowledge of this infinitude.\n\nIn the first book of Xenophon\u2019s Memorabilia (chap. I, \u00a7\u00a7 7-9), on the\noccasion of the defence by Socrates of his _\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd_, Socrates says\nat the very beginning: \u201cThe gods have reserved to themselves what is\nmost important in knowledge. Architecture, agriculture, forging, are\nhuman arts, as also government, the science of law, management of the\nhousehold and generalship. In all this man can attain to skill, but\nfor the other, divination is necessary. He who cultivates a field does\nnot know who will enjoy the fruit, nor does he who builds a house know\nwho will inhabit it; the general does not know whether the army should\nbe brought into the field; he who rules a State whether it is good for\nhim\u201d (the individual) \u201cor bad. Nor does he who marries a wife know\nwhether he will experience happiness or whether grief and sorrow will\nnot come through this to him; neither can he who has powerful relations\nin the State, know whether, on account of these, he may not be banished\nfrom the State. Because of this uncertainty, men have to take refuge in\ndivination.\u201d Regarding it Xenophon expresses himself (ibid. \u00a7\u00a7 3, 4) to\nthe effect that it manifests itself in different ways through oracles,\nsacrifices, flight of birds, &c., but to Socrates this oracle is his\nGenius. To hold the future, or what is foreseen by the somnambulist or\nat death to be a higher kind of insight, is a perversion which easily\narises even in our ideas; but looked at more closely, we find in this\nthe particular interests of individuals merely, and the knowledge of\nwhat is right and moral is something much higher. If anyone wishes\nto marry or to build a house, &c., the result is important to the\nindividual only. The truly divine and universal is the institution of\nagriculture, the state, marriage, &c.; compared to this it is a trivial\nmatter to know whether, when I go to sea, I shall perish or not. The\nGenius of Socrates moreover reveals itself in him through nothing\nother than the counsel given respecting these particular issues, such\nas when and whether his friends ought to travel. To anything true,\nexisting in and for itself in art and science, he made no reference,\nfor this pertains to the universal mind, and these d\u00e6monic revelations\nare thus much more unimportant than those of his thinking mind. There\nis certainly something universal in them, since a wise man can often\nforesee whether anything is advisable or not. But what is truly divine\npertains to all, and though talents and genius are also personal\ncharacteristics, they find their first truth in their works which are\nuniversal.\n\nNow because with Socrates judgment from within first begins to break\nfree from the external oracle, it was requisite that this return into\nitself should, in its first commencement, still appear in physiological\nguise (_supra_, pp. 390, 391). The Genius of Socrates stands midway\nbetween the externality of the oracle and the pure inwardness of the\nmind; it is inward, but it is also presented as a personal genius,\nseparate from human will, and not yet as the wisdom and free will of\nSocrates himself. The further investigation of this Genius consequently\npresents to us a form which passes into somnambulism, into this double\nof consciousness; and in Socrates there clearly appears to be something\nof the kind, or something which is magnetic, for, as we already\nmentioned (p. 390), he is said often to have fallen into trances and\ncatalepsy. In modern times we have seen this in the form of a rigid\neye, an inward knowledge, perception of this thing and that, of what\nis gone, of what is best to do, &c.; but magnetism carries science\nno further than this. The Genius of Socrates is thus to be taken as\nan actual state, and is remarkable because it is not morbid but was\nnecessarily called up through a special condition of his consciousness.\nFor the turning point in the whole world-famed change of views\nconstituting the principle of Socrates, is that in place of the oracle,\nthe testimony of the mind of the individual has been brought forward\nand that the subject has taken upon itself to decide.\n\n3. _The Fate of Socrates._ With this Genius of Socrates as one of the\nchief points of his indictment, we now enter upon the subject of his\nfate, which ends with his condemnation. We may find this fate out of\nharmony with his professed business of instructing his fellow-citizens\nin what is good, but taken in connection with what Socrates and his\npeople were, we shall recognize the necessity of it. The contemporaries\nof Socrates, who came forward as his accusers before the Athenian\npeople, laid hold on him as the man who made known that what was held\nas absolute was not absolute. Socrates, with this new principle, and as\none who was an Athenian citizen whose express business was this form\nof instruction, came, through this his personality, into relationship\nwith the whole Athenian people; and this relationship was not merely\nwith a certain number or with a commanding number, but it was a living\nrelationship with the spirit of the Athenian people. The spirit of this\npeople in itself, its constitution, its whole life, rested, however,\non a moral ground, on religion, and could not exist without this\nabsolutely secure basis. Thus because Socrates makes the truth rest on\nthe judgment of inward consciousness, he enters upon a struggle with\nthe Athenian people as to what is right and true. His accusation was\ntherefore just, and we have to consider this accusation as also the end\nof his career. The attacks which Socrates experienced are well known,\nand were from two sources; Aristophanes attacked him in the \u201cClouds,\u201d\nand then he was formally accused before the people.\n\nAristophanes regarded the Socratic philosophy from the negative side,\nmaintaining that through the cultivation of reflecting consciousness,\nthe idea of law had been shaken, and we cannot question the justice\nof this conception. Aristophanes\u2019 consciousness of the one-sidedness\nof Socrates may be regarded as a prelude to his death; the Athenian\npeople likewise certainly recognized his negative methods in condemning\nhim. It is known that Aristophanes brought upon the stage along with\nSocrates, not only such men as Aeschylus, and more specially Euripides,\nbut also the Athenians generally and their generals\u2014the personified\nAthenian people and the gods themselves\u2014a freedom which we would not\ndream of were it not historically authenticated. We have not here to\nconsider the real nature of the Comedy of Aristophanes, nor the wanton\nway in which he was said to have treated Socrates. As to the first, it\nshould not startle us, nor do we require to justify Aristophanes or to\nexcuse him. The Comedy of Aristophanes is in itself as real a part of\nthe Athenian people, and Aristophanes is as essential a figure, as were\nthe sublime Pericles, the happy Alcibiades, the divine Sophocles, and\nthe moral Socrates, for he belongs as much as any other to this circle\nof luminaries (Vol. I., p. 322). Thus much can alone be said, that it\ncertainly goes against our German seriousness to see how Aristophanes\nbrings on the boards men living in the State, by name, in order to make\na jest of them; and we feel this specially in regard to so upright a\nman as Socrates.\n\nBy chronological considerations, some have tried hard to refute the\nfact that Aristophanes\u2019 representations had no influence on the\ncondemnation of Socrates. It is seen that, on the one hand, Socrates\nwas treated quite unjustly; but then we must recognize the merit of\nAristophanes, who in his \u201cClouds\u201d was perfectly right. This poet, who\nexposed Socrates to scorn in the most laughable and bitter way, was\nthus no ordinary joker and shallow wag who mocked what is highest and\nbest, and sacrificed all to wit with a view to making the Athenians\nlaugh. For everything has to him a much deeper basis, and in all his\njokes there lies a depth of seriousness. He did not wish merely to\nmock; and moreover to mock what was worthy of honour would be perfectly\nbald and flat. It is a pitiful wit which has no substance, and does not\nrest on contradictions lying in the matter itself. But Aristophanes\nwas no bad jester. It is, generally speaking, not possible to joke\nin an external way about what does not contain matter for joking or\nirony in itself. For what really is comic is to show a man or a thing\nas they disclose themselves in their extent; and if the thing is\nnot itself its contradiction, the comic element is superficial and\ngroundless. Hence, when Aristophanes makes merry over the Democracy,\nthere is a deep political earnestness at heart, and from all his works\nit appears what a noble, excellent, true Athenian citizen he was.\nWe thus have a real patriot before us, who, though it involved the\npunishment of death, did not fear in one of his works to counsel peace.\nIn him, as one who had a patriotism of the most enlightened kind, we\nfind the blissful self-satisfied enjoyment of a people giving free\nrein to itself. There is, in what is humorous, a self-security which,\nthough with all seriousness it strives after some particular thing,\nwhile the opposite of what it aims at always comes to pass, never has\nfor that reason any doubts nor any reflection about itself, since it\nremains perfectly certain of itself and of what concerns it. We enjoy\nin Aristophanes this side of the free Athenian spirit, this perfect\nenjoyment of itself in loss, this untroubled certainty of itself in\nall miscarriage of the result in real life, and this is the height of\nhumour.\n\nIn the \u201cClouds\u201d we do not indeed see this natural humour, but a\ncontradiction with definite intention. Aristophanes indeed depicts\nSocrates humorously too, for he brings forth in his moral works the\nopposite of that from which he starts, and his scholars derive delight\nfrom the far-extending discoveries reached through him, which they\nthink are made by their own good luck, but which afterwards turn\nhateful to them, and become the very opposite of what they intended.\nThe wonderful perception which the followers of Socrates are here\nrepresented as having attained, is just a perception of the nullity of\nthe laws of the determinate good as it is to the natural consciousness.\nAristophanes made fun of the fact that Socrates occupied himself with\nelementary researches as to how far fleas spring, and of his putting\nwax on their feet in order to discover this. This is not historic,\nbut it is well known that Socrates had in his philosophy the side\nwhich Aristophanes showed up with such acrimony. Shortly, the fable of\nthe \u201cClouds\u201d is this: Strepsiades, an honourable Athenian citizen of\nthe old school, had great trouble with his new-fashioned extravagant\nson, who, spoiled by mother and uncle, kept horses and led a life\nout of keeping with his position. The father thus got into trouble\nwith his creditors, and went in distress to Socrates, and became\nhis disciple. There the old man learned that not this or that, but\nanother is the right, or rather he learned the stronger (_\u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03c4\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd_)\nand weaker reasons (_\u1f15\u03c4\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2_). He learned the dialectic of laws,\nand how, by reasoning, the payment of debts can be disregarded, and\nhe then required that his son should go to the School of Socrates;\nand the latter likewise profited from his wisdom. But we find the\nresult ensuing from the universal which has now through the Socratic\ndialectic become empty, in the private interest or the wrong spirit\nof Strepsiades and his son, which spirit is merely the negative\nconsciousness of the content of laws. Equipped with this new wisdom of\nreasons, and the discovery of reasons, Strepsiades is armed against the\nchief evil that presses on him, as regards his threatening creditors.\nThese now come one after another to obtain payment. But Strepsiades\nknows how to put them off with excellent reasons, and to argue them\naway, for he pacifies them by all sorts of _titulos_, and shows them\nthat he does not need to pay them; indeed he even mocks them, and is\nvery glad that he learned all this from Socrates. But soon the scene\nchanges, and the whole affair alters. The son comes, behaves in a very\nunseemly way to his father, and finally beats him. The father cries\nto the supreme power, as if this were the last indignity, but the son\nshows him, with equally good reasons, obtained by the method derived\nby him from Socrates, that he had a perfect right to strike him.\nStrepsiades ends the comedy with execrations on the Socratic dialectic,\nwith a return to his old ways, and with the burning of Socrates\u2019\nhouse. The exaggeration which may be ascribed to Aristophanes, is that\nhe drove this dialectic to its bitter end, but it cannot be said that\ninjustice is done to Socrates by this representation. Indeed we must\nadmire the depth of Aristophanes in having recognized the dialectic\nside in Socrates as being a negative, and\u2014though after his own way\u2014in\nhaving presented it so forcibly. For the power of judging in Socrates\u2019\nmethod is always placed in the subject, in conscience, but where this\nis bad, the story of Strepsiades must repeat itself.\n\nWith regard to the formal public accusation of Socrates, we must not,\nlike Tennemann (Vol. II., p. 39 seq.), say of Socrates\u2019 treatment,\nthat \u201cit is revolting to humanity that this excellent man had to\ndrink the cup of poison as a sacrifice to cabals\u2014so numerous in\ndemocracies. A man like Socrates, who had made right\u201d (right is not\nbeing discussed, but we may ask what right? The right of moral freedom)\n\u201cthe sole standard of his action, and did not stray from the straight\npath, must necessarily make many enemies\u201d (Why? This is foolish; it\nis a moral hypocrisy to pretend to be better than others who are\nthen called enemies) \u201cwho are accustomed to act from quite different\nmotives. When we think of the corruption, and of the rule of the thirty\ntyrants, we must simply wonder that he could have worked on to his\nsixtieth year unmolested. But since the Thirty did not venture to lay\nhands on him themselves, it is the more to be wondered at that in the\nreconstituted and just rule and freedom which followed the overthrow\nof despotism\u201d\u2014in that very way the danger in which their principle\nwas, came to be known\u2014\u201ca man like Socrates could be made a sacrifice\nto cabals. This phenomenon is probably explained by the fact that the\nenemies of Socrates had first of all to gain time in order to obtain\na following, and that under the rule of the Thirty, they played too\ninsignificant a part,\u201d and so on.\n\nNow, as regards the trial of Socrates, we have to distinguish two\npoints, the one the matter of the accusation, the judgment of the\ncourt, and the other the relation of Socrates to the sovereign people.\nIn the course of justice there are thus these two parts\u2014the relation\nof the accused to the matter on account of which he is accused, and\nhis relation to the competency of the people, or the recognition of\ntheir majesty. Socrates was found guilty by the judges in respect of\nthe content of his accusation, but was condemned to death because\nhe refused to recognize the competency and majesty of the people as\nregards the accused.\n\na. The accusation consisted of two points: \u201cThat Socrates did not\nconsider as gods those who were held to be such by the Athenian\npeople, but introduced new ones; and that he also led young men\nastray.\u201d[132] The leading away of youth was his casting doubt on what\nwas held to be immediate truth. The first accusation has in part the\nsame foundation, for he made it evident that what was usually so\nconsidered, was not acceptable to the gods; and in part it is to be\ntaken in connection with his D\u00e6mon, not that he called this his god.\nBut with the Greeks this was the direction which the individuality of\njudgment took; they took it to be a contingency of the individual,\nand hence, as contingency of circumstances is an external, they also\nmade the contingency of judgment into something external, _i.e._ they\nconsulted their oracles\u2014conscious that the individual will is itself\na contingent. But Socrates, who placed the contingency of judgment\nin himself, since he had his D\u00e6mon in his own consciousness, thereby\nabolished the external universal D\u00e6mon from which the Greeks obtained\ntheir judgments. This accusation, as also Socrates\u2019 defence, we wish\nnow to examine further; Xenophon represents both to us, and Plato has\nalso supplied us with an Apology. Meanwhile we may not rest content\nwith saying that Socrates was an excellent man who suffered innocently,\n&c. (p. 430), for in this accusation it was the popular mind of Athens\nthat rose against the principle which became fatal to him.\n\n_\u03b1_. As regards the first point of the accusation, that Socrates did\nnot honour the national gods, but introduced new ones, Xenophon[133]\nmakes him answer that he always brought the same sacrifices as others\nto the public altars, as all his fellow-citizens could see\u2014his\naccusers likewise. But as to the charge that he introduced new D\u00e6mons,\nin that he heard the voice of God showing him what he should do, he\nappealed to them whether by soothsayers the cry and flight of birds,\nthe utterances of men (like the voice of Pythia), the position of\nthe entrails of sacrificial animals, and even thunder and lightning\nwere not accepted as divine revelations. That God knows the future\nbeforehand, and, if He wishes, reveals it in these ways, all believe\nwith him; but God can also reveal the future otherwise. He could show\nthat he did not lie in maintaining that he heard the voice of God,\nfrom the testimony of his friends, to whom he often announced what was\nsaid; and in its results this was always found to be true. Xenophon\n(Memorab. I. c. 1, \u00a7 11) adds, \u201cNo one ever saw or heard Socrates do\nor say anything godless or impious, for he never tried to find out the\nnature of the Universe, like most of the others, when they sought to\nunderstand how what the Sophists called the world began.\u201d That is, from\nthem came the earlier atheists, who, like Anaxagoras, held that the sun\nwas a stone.[134]\n\nThe effect which the defence against this part of the accusation made\non the judges is expressed thus by Xenophon:[135] \u201cOne section of\nthem was displeased because they did not believe what Socrates said,\nand the other part because they were envious that he was more highly\nhonoured of the gods than they.\u201d This effect is very natural. In our\ntimes this also happens in two ways. Either the individual is not\nbelieved when he boasts of special manifestations, and particularly\nof manifestations which have to do with individual action and life;\nit is neither believed that such manifestations took place at all, or\nthat they happened to this subject. Or if anyone does have dealings\nwith such divinations, rightly enough his proceedings are put an end\nto, and he is shut up. By this it is not denied in a general way\nthat God foreknows everything, or that He can make revelations to\nindividuals; this may be admitted _in abstracto_, but not in actuality,\nand it is believed in no individual cases. Men do not believe that to\nhim, to this individual, there has been a revelation. For why to him\nmore than to others? And why just this trifle, some quite personal\ncircumstances\u2014as to whether someone should have a successful journey,\nor whether he should converse with another person, or whether or not he\nshould in a speech properly defend himself? And why not others amongst\nthe infinitely many things which may occur to the individual? Why not\nmuch more important things, things concerning the welfare of whole\nStates? Hence it is not believed of an individual, in spite of the fact\nthat if it is possible, it must be to the individual that it happens.\nThis unbelief, which thus does not deny the general fact and general\npossibility, but believes it in no particular case, really does not\nbelieve in the actuality and truth of the thing. It does not believe\nit because the absolute consciousness\u2014and it must be such\u2014certainly\nknows nothing of a positive kind of trivialities such as form the\nsubject of these divinations and also those of Socrates; in spirit such\nthings immediately vanish away. The absolute consciousness does not\nknow about the future as such, any more than about the past; it knows\nonly about the present. But because in its present, in its thought,\nthe opposition of future and past to present becomes apparent, it\nlikewise knows about future and past, but of the past as something\nwhich has taken shape. For the past is the preservation of the present\nas reality, but the future is the opposite of this, the Becoming of\nthe present as possibility, and thus the formless. From out of this\nformlessness the universal first comes into form in the present; and\nhence in the future no form can be perceived. Men have the dim feeling\nthat when God acts it is not in a particular way, nor for particular\nobjects. Such things are held to be too paltry to be revealed by\nGod in a particular case. It is acknowledged that God determines\nthe individual, but by this the totality of individuality, or all\nindividualities, is understood; hence it is said that God\u2019s way of\nworking is found in universal nature.\n\nNow while with the Greeks judgment had the form of a contingency\nexternally posited through the flight and cries of birds, in our\nculture we decide by an inward contingency, because I myself desire to\nbe this contingency, and the knowledge of individuality is likewise\na consciousness of this contingency. But if the Greeks, for whom\nthe category of the contingency of consciousness was an existent, a\nknowledge of it as an oracle, had this individuality as a universal\nknowledge of which everyone could ask counsel, in Socrates\u2014in whom\nwhat was here externally established had become inward consciousness,\nas with us, though not yet fully, being still represented as an actual\nvoice, and conceived of as something which he separated from his\nindividuality\u2014the decision of the single individual had the form of\npersonality as a particular, and it was not a universal individuality.\nThis his judges could not in justice tolerate, whether they believed it\nor not. With the Greeks such revelations had to have a certain nature\nand method; there were, so to speak, official oracles (not subjective),\nsuch as Pythia, a tree, etc. Hence when this appeared in any particular\nperson like a common citizen, it was considered incredible and wrong;\nthe D\u00e6mon of Socrates was a medium of a different kind to any formerly\nrespected in the Greek Religion. It is so much the more noteworthy,\nthat nevertheless the oracle of the Delphian Apollo, Pythia, declared\nSocrates to be the wisest Greek.[136] Socrates it was who carried\nout the command of the God of knowledge, \u201cKnow Thyself,\u201d and made\nit the motto of the Greeks, calling it the law of the mind, and not\ninterpreting it as meaning a mere acquaintanceship with the particular\nnature of man. Thus Socrates is the hero who established in the place\nof the Delphic oracle, the principle that man must look within himself\nto know what is Truth. Now seeing that Pythia herself pronounced that\nutterance, we find in it a complete revolution in the Greek mind, and\nthe fact that in place of the oracle, the personal self-consciousness\nof every thinking man has come into play. This inward certainty,\nhowever, is undoubtedly another new god, and not the god of the\nAthenians existing hitherto, and thus the accusation of Socrates was\nquite just.\n\n_\u03b2_. If we now consider the second point of the accusation, that\nSocrates led youth astray, we find that he first sets against it the\nfact that the oracle of Delphi declared that none could be nobler,\njuster or wiser than he.[137] And then he sets against this accusation\nhis whole manner of life, and asks whether by the example that he\ngave, particularly to those with whom he went about, he ever led any\ninto evil.[138] The general accusation had to be further defined\nand witnesses came forward. \u201cMelitus said that he knew some whom he\nadvised to obey him rather than their parents,\u201d[139] This point of the\naccusation principally related to Anytus, and since he made it good by\nsufficient testimony, the point was undoubtedly proved, in accordance\nwith law. Socrates explained himself further on this point when he\nleft the court. For Xenophon tells us (Apol. Socr. \u00a7\u00a7 27, 29\u201431) that\nAnytus was inimical to Socrates, because he said to Anytus, a respected\ncitizen, that he should not bring up his son to the trade of a tanner,\nbut in manner befitting a free man. Anytus was himself a tanner, and\nalthough his business was mostly conducted by slaves, it was in itself\nnot ignominious, and Socrates\u2019 expression was hence wrong, although,\nas we have seen (p. 366), quite in the spirit of Greek thought.\nSocrates added that he had made acquaintance with this son of Anytus\nand discovered no evil in him, but he prophesied that he would not\nremain at this servile work to which his father kept him. Nevertheless,\nbecause he had no rational person near to look after him, he would come\nto have evil desires and be brought into dissolute ways. Xenophon added\nthat Socrates\u2019 prophecy had come to pass literally, and that the young\nman gave himself up to drink, and drank day and night, becoming totally\ndepraved. This can be easily understood, for a man who feels himself to\nbe fit for something better (whether truly so or not) and through this\ndiscord in his mind is discontented with the circumstances in which he\nlives, yet capable of attaining to no other, is led out of this disgust\ninto listlessness, and is thus on the way to the evil courses which\nso often ruin men. The prediction of Socrates is thus quite natural.\n(_Supra_, p. 424.)\n\nTo this definite accusation that he led sons into disobedience to\ntheir parents, Socrates replied by asking the question whether in\nselecting men for public offices, such as that of general, parents,\nor those experienced in war, were selected. Similarly in all cases\nthose most skilful in an art or science are picked out. He demanded\nwhether it was not matter of astonishment that he should be brought\nbefore a judge because he was preferred to parents by the sons in\ntheir aspirations after the highest human good which is to be made\na noble man.[140] This reply of Socrates is, on the one hand, quite\njust, but we see at the same time that we cannot call it exhaustive,\nfor the real point of the accusation is not touched. What his judges\nfound unjust was the intrusion morally of a third into the absolute\nrelation between parents and children. On the whole not much can be\nsaid on this point, for all depends on the mode of intervention, and\nif it is necessary in certain cases, it need not take place generally,\nand least of all when some private individual takes that liberty.\nChildren must have the feeling of unity with their parents; this is\nthe first immediately moral relationship; every teacher must respect\nit, keep it pure, and cultivate the sense of being thus connected.\nHence when a third person is called into this relation between parents\nand children, what happens through the new element introduced, is\nthat the children are for their own good prevented from confiding in\ntheir parents, and made to think that their parents are bad people\nwho harm them by their intercourse and training; and hence we find\nthis revolting. The worst thing which can happen to children in regard\nto their morality and their mind, is that the bond which must ever\nbe held in reverence should become loosened or even severed, thereby\ncausing hatred, disdain, and ill-will. Whoever does this, does injury\nto morality in its truest form. This unity, this confidence, is the\nmother\u2019s milk of morality on which man is nurtured; the early loss of\nparents is therefore a great misfortune. The son, like the daughter,\nmust indeed come out of his natural unity with the family and become\nindependent, but the separation must be one which is natural or\nunforced, and not defiant and disdainful. When a pain like this has\nfound a place in the heart, great strength of mind is required to\novercome it and to heal the wound. If we now speak of the example given\nus by Socrates, he seems, through his intervention, to have made the\nyoung man dissatisfied with his position. Anytus\u2019 son might, indeed,\nhave found his work generally speaking uncongenial, but it is another\nthing when such dislike is brought into consciousness and established\nby the authority of a man such as Socrates. We may very well conjecture\nthat if Socrates had to do with him, he strengthened and developed in\nhim the germ of the feeling of incongruity. Socrates remarked on the\nsubject of his capacities, saying that he was fit for something better,\nand thus established a feeling of dissatisfaction in the young man, and\nstrengthened his dislike to his father, which thus became the reason of\nhis ruin. Hence this accusation of having destroyed the relationship of\nparents and children may be regarded as not unfounded, but as perfectly\nwell established. It was also thought very bad in Socrates\u2019 case\nparticularly, and made a matter of reproach that he had such followers\nas Critias and Alcibiades, who brought Athens almost to the brink of\nruin (_supra_, p. 421). For when he mixed himself in the education\nwhich others gave their children, men were justified in the demand that\nthe result should not belie what he professed to do for the education\nof youth.\n\nThe only question now is, how the people came to take notice of\nthis, and in how far such matters can be objects of legislation and\nbe brought into court. In our law, as regards the first part of the\naccusation, divination such as Cagliostro\u2019s is illegal, and it would\nbe forbidden as it formerly was by the Inquisition. Respecting the\nsecond point, such a moral interference is no doubt more recognized\nwith us, where there is a particular office having this duty laid\nupon it; but this interference must keep itself general, and dare\nnot go so far as to call forth disobedience to parents, which is the\nfirst immoral principle. But should such questions come before the\ncourt? This first of all brings up the question of what is the right\nof the State, and here great laxity is now allowed. Nevertheless,\nwhen some professor or preacher attacks a particular religion, the\nlegislature would certainly take notice of it, and it would have a\ncomplete right to do so, although there would be an outcry when it\ndid it. There is undoubtedly a limit which in liberty of thought and\nspeech is difficult to define and rests on tacit agreement; but there\nis a point beyond which we find what is not allowed, such as direct\nincitement to insurrection. It is indeed said, that \u201cbad principles\ndestroy themselves by themselves and find no entrance.\u201d But that is\nonly true in part, for with the populace the eloquence of sophistry\nstirs up their passions. It is also said, \u201cThis is only theoretic,\nno action follows.\u201d But the State really rests on thought, and its\nexistence depends on the sentiments of men, for it is a spiritual and\nnot a physical kingdom. Hence it has in so far maxims and principles\nwhich constitute its support, and if these are attacked, the Government\nmust intervene. Added to this, it was the case that in Athens quite\na different state of things was present than with us; in order to be\nable to judge rightly of Socrates\u2019 case we must first consider the\nAthenian State and its customs. According to Athenian laws, _i.e._\naccording to the spirit of the absolute State, both these things done\nby Socrates were destructive of this spirit, while in our constitution\nthe universal of the states is a stronger universal, which last\nundoubtedly permits of individuals having freer play, since they cannot\nbe so dangerous to this universal. Hence it would undoubtedly in the\nfirst place mean the subversion of the Athenian State, if this public\nreligion on which everything was built and without which the State\ncould not subsist, went to pieces; with us the State may be called an\nabsolute and independent power. The D\u00e6mon is now, in fact, a deity\ndiffering from any known, and because it stood in contradiction to the\npublic religion, it gave to it a subjective arbitrariness. But since\nestablished religion was identified with public life so closely that it\nconstituted a part of public law, the introduction of a new god who\nformed self-consciousness into a principle and occasioned disobedience,\nwas necessarily a crime. We may dispute with the Athenians about this,\nbut we must allow that they are consistent. In the second place, the\nmoral connection between parents and children is stronger, and much\nmore the moral foundation of life with the Athenians than with us,\nwhere subjective freedom reigns; for family piety is the substantial\nkey-note of the Athenian State. Socrates thus attacked and destroyed\nAthenian life in two fundamental points; the Athenians felt and became\nconscious of it. Is it then to be wondered at that Socrates was found\nguilty? We might say that it had to be so. Tennemann (Vol. II., p.\n41) says: \u201cThough these charges contained the most palpable untruths,\nSocrates was condemned to death because his mind was too lofty for\nhim to descend to the common unworthy means, by which the judgment of\nthe court was usually perverted.\u201d But all this is false; he was found\nguilty of these deeds, but not for that reason condemned to death.\n\n_b._ We here come to the second occurrence in his history. In\naccordance with Athenian laws, the accused had, after the Heliasts\n(resembling the English jury) pronounced him guilty, the liberty of\nsuggesting (_\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9_) a penalty different from the punishment\nwhich the accuser proposed; this implied a mitigation of the punishment\nwithout a formal appeal\u2014an excellent provision in Athenian law,\ntestifying to its humanity. In this penalty the punishment in itself is\nnot brought into question, but only the kind of punishment; the judges\nhad decided that Socrates deserved punishment. But when it was left\nto the accused to determine what his punishment should be, it might\nnot be arbitrary, but must be in conformity with the crime, a money\nor bodily punishment (_\u1f44, \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c1\u1f74 \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f22 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u1fd6\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9_).[141] But it was\nimplied in the guilty persons constituting himself his own judge, that\nhe submitted himself to the decision of the court and acknowledged\nhimself to be guilty. Now Socrates declined to assign a punishment for\nhimself consisting either of fine or banishment, and he had the choice\nbetween these and death, which his accusers proposed. He declined\nto choose the former punishment because he, according to Xenophon\u2019s\naccount (Apol. Socr. \u00a7 23), in the formality of the exchange-penalty\n(_\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f50\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9_), as he said, would acknowledge guilt; but there was\nno longer any question as to the guilt, but only as to the kind of\npunishment.\n\nThis silence may indeed be considered as moral greatness, but, on the\nother hand, it contradicts in some measure what Socrates says later on\nin prison, that he did not wish to flee, but remained there, because\nit seemed better to the Athenians and better to him to submit to the\nlaws (Vol. I., p. 342). But the first submission would have meant that\nas the Athenians had found him guilty, he respected this decision, and\nacknowledged himself as guilty. Consistently he would thus have held\nit better to impose his punishment, since thereby he would not only\nhave submitted himself to the laws, but also to the judgment. We see in\nSophocles (Antig. verses 925, 926), the heavenly Antigone, that noblest\nof figures that ever appeared on earth, going to her death, her last\nwords merely stating\u2014\n\n \u201cIf this seems good unto the gods,\n Suffering, we may be made to know our error.\u201d\n\nPericles also submitted himself to the judgment of the people as\nsovereign; we saw him (Vol. I., p. 328) going round the citizens\nentreating for Aspasia and Anaxagoras. In the Roman Republic we\nlikewise find the noblest men begging of the citizens. There is nothing\ndishonouring to the individual in this, for he must bend before the\ngeneral power, and the real and noblest power is the people. This\nacknowledgment the people must have direct from those who raise\nthemselves amongst them. Here, on the contrary, Socrates disclaims the\nsubmission to, and humiliation before the power of the people, for he\ndid not wish to ask for the remission of his punishment. We admire in\nhim a moral independence which, conscious of its own right, insists\nupon it and does not bend either to act otherwise, or to recognize as\nwrong what it itself regards as right. Socrates hence exposed himself\nto death, which could not be regarded as the punishment for the fault\nof which he was found guilty; for the fact that he would not himself\ndetermine the punishment, and thus disdained the juridical power of\nthe people, was foremost in leading to his condemnation. In a general\nway he certainly recognized the sovereignty of the people, but not in\nthis individual case; it has, however, to be recognized, not only in\ngeneral, but in each separate case. With us the competency of the court\nis presupposed, and the criminal judged without further ado; to-day\nthe whole matter is also open to the light of day and accepted as an\nacknowledged fact. But with the Athenians we find the characteristic\nrequest that the prisoner should, through the act of imposing on\nhimself a penalty, sanction the judge\u2019s sentence of guilt. In England\nthis is certainly not the case, but there still remains a like form of\nasking the accused by what law he wishes to be judged. He then answers,\nby the law of the land and by the judges of his country. Here we have\nthe recognition of legal operations.\n\nSocrates thus set his conscience in opposition to the judges\u2019 sentence,\nand acquitted himself before its tribunal. But no people, and least\nof all a free people like the Athenians, has by this freedom to\nrecognize a tribunal of conscience which knows no consciousness of\nhaving fulfilled its duty excepting its own consciousness. To this\ngovernment and law, the universal spirit of the people, may reply: \u201cIf\nyou have the consciousness of having done your duty, we must also have\nthe consciousness that you have so done.\u201d For the first principle of\na State is that there is no reason or conscience or righteousness or\nanything else, higher than what the State recognizes as such. Quakers,\nAnabaptists, &c., who resist any demands made on them by the State,\nsuch as to defend the Fatherland, cannot be tolerated in a true State.\nThis miserable freedom of thinking and believing what men will, is not\npermitted, nor any such retreat behind personal consciousness of duty.\nIf this consciousness is no mere hypocrisy, in order that what the\nindividual does should be recognized as duty, it must be recognized as\nsuch by all. If the people can make mistakes the individual may do so\nmuch more easily, and he must be conscious that he can do this much\nmore easily than the people. Now law also has a conscience and has to\nspeak through it; the law-court is the privileged conscience. Now if\nthe miscarriage of justice in a trial is shown by every conscience\nclamouring for something different, the conscience of the court alone\npossesses any value as being the universal legalized conscience, which\ndoes not require to recognize the particular conscience of the accused.\nMen are too easily convinced of having fulfilled their duty, but the\njudge finds out whether duty is in fact fulfilled, even if men have the\nconsciousness of its being so.\n\nWe should expect nothing else of Socrates than that he should go to\nmeet his death in the most calm and manly fashion. Plato\u2019s account\nof the wonderful scene his last hours presented, although containing\nnothing very special, forms an elevating picture, and will be to us a\npermanent representation of a noble deed. The last dialogue of Plato\nis popular philosophy, for the immortality of the soul is here first\nbrought forward; yet it brings no consolation, for, as Homer makes\nAchilles say in the nether world, he would prefer to be a ploughboy on\nthe earth.\n\nBut though the people of Athens asserted through the execution of this\njudgment the rights of their law as against the attacks of Socrates,\nand had punished the injury caused to their moral life by Socrates,\nSocrates was still the hero who possessed for himself the absolute\nright of the mind, certain of itself and of the inwardly deciding\nconsciousness, and thus expressed the higher principle of mind with\nconsciousness. Now because, as has been said, this new principle by\neffecting an entrance into the Greek world, has come into collision\nwith the substantial spirit and the existing sentiments of the Athenian\npeople, a reaction had to take place, for the principle of the Greek\nworld could not yet bear the principle of subjective reflection. The\nAthenian people were thus, not only justified, but also bound to react\nagainst it according to their law, for they regarded this principle as\na crime. In general history we find that this is the position of the\nheroes through whom a new world commences, and whose principle stands\nin contradiction to what has gone before and disintegrates it: they\nappear to be violently destroying the laws. Hence individually they\nare vanquished, but it is only the individual, and not the principle,\nwhich is negated in punishment, and the spirit of the Athenian people\ndid not in the removal of the individual, recover its old position.\nThe false form of individuality is taken away, and that, indeed, in a\nviolent way, by punishment; but the principle itself will penetrate\nlater, if in another form, and elevate itself into a form of the\nworld-spirit. This universal mode in which the principle comes forth\nand permeates the present is the true one; what was wrong was the fact\nthat the principle came forth only as the peculiar possession of one\nindividual. His own world could not comprehend Socrates, but posterity\ncan, in as far as it stands above both. It may be conceived that the\nlife of Socrates had no need to have such an end, for Socrates might\nhave lived and died a private philosopher, and his teaching might have\nbeen quietly accepted by his disciples, and have spread further still\nwithout receiving any notice from State or people; the accusation thus\nwould seem to have been contingent. But it must be said that it was\nthrough the manner of that event that this principle became so highly\nhonoured. The principle is not merely something new and peculiar to\nitself, but it is an absolutely essential moment in the self-developing\nconsciousness of self which is designed to bring to pass as a totality,\na new and higher actuality. The Athenians perceived correctly that this\nprinciple not only meant opinion and doctrine, for its true attitude\nwas that of a direct and even hostile and destructive relation to\nthe actuality of the Greek mind; and they proceeded in accordance\nwith this perception. Hence, what follows in Socrates\u2019 life is not\ncontingent, but necessarily follows upon his principle. Or the honour\nof having recognized that relation, and indeed of having felt that they\nthemselves were tinged with this principle, is due to the Athenians.\n\n_c._ The Athenians likewise repented of their condemnation of Socrates,\nand punished some of his accusers with death itself, and others\nwith banishment; for according to Athenian laws, the man who made\nan accusation, and whose accusation was found to be false, usually\nunderwent the same punishment that otherwise the criminal would\nhave borne. This is the last act in this drama. On the one hand the\nAthenians recognized through their repentance the individual greatness\nof the man; but on the other (and this we find by looking closer)\nthey also recognized that this principle in Socrates, signifying\nthe introduction of new gods and disrespect to parents, has\u2014while\ndestructive and hostile to it\u2014been introduced even into their own\nspirit, and that they themselves are in the dilemma of having in\nSocrates only condemned their own principle. In that they regretted\nthe just judgment of Socrates, it seems to be implied that they wished\nthat it had not occurred. But from the regret it does not follow\nthat in itself it should not have occurred, but only that it should\nnot have happened for their consciousness. Both together constitute\nthe innocence which is guilty and atones for its guilt; it would\nonly be senseless and despicable if there were no guilt. An innocent\nperson who comes off badly is a simpleton; hence it is a very flat and\nuninteresting matter when tyrants and innocent persons are represented\nin tragedies, just because this is an empty contingency. A great man\nwould be guilty and overcome the great crisis that ensues; Christ thus\ngave up his individuality, but what was brought forth by him remained.\n\nThe fate of Socrates is hence really tragic, not in the superficial\nsense of the word and as every misfortune is called tragic. The death\nof an estimable individual must, in such a sense, be specially tragic,\nand thus it is said of Socrates, that because he was innocent and\ncondemned to death, his fate was tragic. But such innocent suffering\nwould only be sad and not tragic, for it would not be a rational\nmisfortune. Misfortune is only rational when it is brought about by the\nwill of the subject, who must be absolutely justified and moral in what\nhe does, like the power against which he wars\u2014which must therefore not\nbe a merely natural power, or the power of a tyrannic will. For it is\nonly in such a case that man himself has any part in his misfortune,\nwhile natural death is only an absolute right which nature exercises\nover men. Hence, in what is truly tragic there must be valid moral\npowers on both the sides which come into collision; this was so with\nSocrates. His is likewise not merely a personal, individually romantic\nlot; for we have in it the universally moral and tragic fate, the\ntragedy of Athens, the tragedy of Greece. Two opposed rights come into\ncollision, and the one destroys the other. Thus both suffer loss and\nyet both are mutually justified; it is not as though the one alone\nwere right and the other wrong. The one power is the divine right,\nthe natural morality whose laws are identical with the will which\ndwells therein as in its own essence, freely and nobly; we may call it\nabstractly objective freedom. The other principle, on the contrary,\nis the right, as really divine, of consciousness or of subjective\nfreedom; this is the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and\nevil, _i.e._ of self-creative reason; and it is the universal principle\nof Philosophy for all successive times. It is these two principles\nwhich we see coming into opposition in the life and the philosophy of\nSocrates.\n\nThe Athenian people had come into a period of culture, in which this\nindividual consciousness made itself independent of the universal\nspirit and became for itself. This was perceived by them in Socrates,\nbut at the same time it was felt that it meant ruin, and thus they\npunished an element which was their own. The principle of Socrates is\nhence not the transgression of one individual, for all were implicated;\nthe crime was one that the spirit of the people committed against\nitself. Through this perception the condemnation of Socrates was\nretracted; Socrates appeared to have committed no crime, for the spirit\nof the people has now generally reached the consciousness which turns\nback from the universal into itself. This meant the disintegration\nof this people, whose mind and spirit consequently soon disappeared\nfrom the world, but yet out of its ashes a higher took its rise,\nfor the world-spirit had raised itself into a higher consciousness.\nThe Athenian State, indeed, endured for long, but the bloom of its\ncharacter soon faded. It is characteristic of Socrates that he\ngrasped the principle of the inwardness of knowledge, not practically\nmerely, as did Critias and Alcibiades (_supra_, pp. 421, 438), but in\nthought, making it valid to thought, and this is the higher method.\nKnowledge brought about the Fall, but it also contains the principle\nof Redemption. Thus what to others was only ruin, to Socrates, because\nit was the principle of knowledge, was also a principle of healing.\nThe development of this principle, which constitutes the content\nof all successive history, is explicitly the reason that the later\nphilosophers withdrew from the affairs of the State, restricted\nthemselves to cultivating an inner world, separated from themselves\nthe universal aim of the moral culture of the people, and took up a\nposition contrary to the spirit of Athens and the Athenians. From this\nit came to pass that particularity of ends and interests now became\npowerful in Athens. This has, in common with the Socratic principle,\nthe fact that what seems right and duty, good and useful to the\nsubject in relation to himself as well as to the State, depends on his\ninward determination and choice, and not on the constitution and the\nuniversal. This principle of self-determination for the individual has,\nhowever, become the ruin of the Athenian people, because it was not yet\nidentified with the constitution of the people; and thus the higher\nprinciple must in every case appear to bring ruin with it where it is\nnot yet identified with the substantial of the people. The Athenian\nlife became weak, and the State outwardly powerless, because its\nspirit was divided within itself. Hence it was dependent on Laced\u00e6mon,\nand we finally see the external subordination of these States to the\nMacedonians.\n\nWe are done with Socrates. I have been more detailed here because all\nthe features of the case have been so completely in harmony, and he\nconstitutes a great historic turning point. Socrates died at sixty-nine\nyears of age, in Olympiad 95, 1 (399-400 B.C.), an Olympiad after the\nend of the Peloponnesian war, twenty-nine years after the death of\nPericles, and forty-four years before the birth of Alexander. He saw\nAthens in its greatness and the beginning of its fall; he experienced\nthe height of its bloom and the beginning of its misfortunes.\n\n\nC. THE SOCRATICS.\n\nThe result of the death of Socrates was, that the little company of\nhis friends went off from Athens to Megara, where Plato also came.\nEuclides had settled there and received them gladly.[142] When\nSocrates\u2019 condemnation was retracted and his accusers punished,\ncertain of the Socratics returned, and all was again brought into\nequilibrium. The work of Socrates was far-reaching and effectual in the\nkingdom of Thought, and the stimulation of a great amount of interest\nis always the principal service of a teacher. Subjectively, Socrates\nhad the formal effect of bringing about a discord in the individual;\nthe content was subsequently left to the free-will and liking of each\nperson, because the principle was subjective consciousness and not\nobjective thought. Socrates himself only came so far as to express\nfor consciousness generally the simple existence of one\u2019s own thought\nas the Good, but as to whether the particular conceptions of the Good\nreally properly defined that of which they were intended to express the\nessence, he did not inquire. But because Socrates made the Good the\nend of the living man, he made the whole world of idea, or objective\nexistence in general, rest by itself, without seeking to find a\npassage from the Good, the real essence of what is known as such, to\nthe thing, and recognizing real essence as the essence of things. For\nwhen all present speculative philosophy expresses the universal as\nessence, this, as it first appears, has the semblance of being a single\ndetermination, beside which there are a number of others. It is the\ncomplete movement of knowledge that first removes this semblance, and\nthe system of the universe then shows forth its essence as Notion, as a\nconnected whole.\n\nThe most varied schools and principles proceeded from this doctrine of\nSocrates, and this was made a reproach against him, but it was really\ndue to the indefiniteness and abstraction of his principle. And in\nthis way it is only particular forms of this principle which can at\nfirst be recognized in philosophic systems which we call Socratic.\nUnder the name of Socratic, I understand, however, those schools\nand methods which remained closer to Socrates and in which we find\nnothing but the one-sided understanding of Socratic culture. One part\nof these kept quite faithfully to the direct methods of Socrates,\nwithout going any further. A number of his friends are mentioned as\nbeing of this description, and these, inasmuch as they were authors,\ncontented themselves with correctly transcribing dialogues after his\nmanner, which were partly those he actually had held with them, and\npartly those they had heard from others; or else with working out\nsimilar dialogues in his method. But for the rest they abstained from\nspeculative research, and by directing their attention to what was\npractical, adhered firmly and faithfully to the fulfilment of the\nduties of their position and circumstances, thereby maintaining calm\nand satisfaction. Xenophon is the most celebrated of those mentioned,\nbut besides him a number of other Socratics wrote dialogues. \u00c6schines,\nsome of whose dialogues have come down to us, Ph\u00e6do, Antisthenes and\nothers are mentioned, and amongst them a shoemaker, Simon, \u201cwith whom\nSocrates often spoke at his workshop, and who afterwards carefully\nwrote out what Socrates said to him.\u201d The title of his dialogues, as\nalso those of the others which are left to us, are to be found in\nDiogenes La\u00ebrtius (II. 122, 123; 60, 61; 105; VI. 15-18); they have,\nhowever, only a literary interest, and hence I will pass them by.\n\nBut another section of the Socratics went further than Socrates,\ninasmuch as they, starting from him, laid hold of and matured one of\nthe particular aspects of his philosophy and of the standpoint to\nwhich philosophic knowledge was brought through him. This standpoint\nmaintained the absolute character of self-consciousness within itself,\nand the relation of its self-existent universality to the individual.\nIn Socrates, and from him onward, we thus see knowledge commencing, the\nworld raising itself into the region of conscious thought, and this\nbecoming the object. We no longer hear question and answer as to what\nNature is, but as to what Truth is; or real essence has determined\nitself not to be the implicit, but to be what it is in knowledge. We\nhence have the question of the relationship of self-conscious thought\nto real essence coming to the front as what concerns us most. The true\nand essence are not the same; the true is essence as thought, but\nessence is the simply implicit. This simple is, indeed, thought, and is\nin thought, but when it is said that essence is pure Being or Becoming,\nas the being-for-self of the atomists, and then that the Notion is\nthought generally (the _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_ of Anaxagoras), or finally measure, this\nis asserted directly, and in an objective manner. Or it is the simple\nunity of the objective and of thought; it is not purely objective\u2014for\nBeing cannot be seen, heard, &c.; nor is it pure thought in opposition\nto the existent\u2014for this is the explicitly existent self-consciousness\nwhich separates itself from essence. It is finally not the unity\ngoing back into itself from the difference in the two sides, which is\nunderstanding and knowledge. In these self-consciousness on the one\nhand presents itself as being-for-self, and on the other, as Being;\nit is conscious of this difference, and from this difference turns\nback into the unity of both. This unity, the result, is the known, the\ntrue. One element in the true is the certainty of itself; this moment\nhas attained to reality\u2014in consciousness and for consciousness. It is\nthrough this movement and the investigation of the subject, that the\nsucceeding period of Philosophy is distinguished, because it does not\ncontemplate essence as left to itself, and as purely objective, but as\nin unity with the certainty of itself. It is not to be understood by\nthis that such knowledge had itself been made into essence, so that it\nis held to be the content and definition of absolute essence, or that\nessence had been determined for the consciousness of these philosophers\nas the unity of Being and Thought, _i.e._ as if they had thought of it\nthus; but they could merely no longer speak of essence and actuality\nwithout this element of self-certainty. And this period is hence, so to\nspeak, the middle period, which is really the movement of knowledge,\nand considers knowledge as the science of essence, which first brings\nabout that unity.\n\nFrom what has been said, it can now be seen what philosophic systems\ncan come before us. That is to say, because in this period the relation\nof Thought to Being, or of the universal to the individual, is made\nexplicit, we see, on the one hand, as the object of Philosophy, the\ncontradiction of consciousness coming to consciousness\u2014a contradiction\nas to which the ordinary modes of thought have no knowledge, for they\nare in a state of confusion, seeing that they go on unthinkingly. On\nthe other hand we have Philosophy as perceiving knowledge itself,\nwhich, however, does not get beyond its Notion, and which, because it\nis the unfolding of a more extensive knowledge of a content, cannot\ngive itself this content, but can only think it, _i.e._ determine it\nin a simple manner. Of those Socratics who hold a place of their own,\nthere are, according to this, three schools worthy of consideration;\nfirst the Megaric School, at whose head stands Euclid of Megara, and\nthen the Cyrenaic and Cynic Schools; and from the fact that they\nall three differ very much from one another, it is clearly shown\nthat Socrates himself was devoid of any positive system. With these\nSocratics the determination of the subject for which the absolute\nprinciple of the true and good likewise appears as end, came into\nprominence; this end demands reflection and general mental cultivation,\nand also requires that men should be able to tell what the good and\ntrue really are. But though these Socratic schools as a whole rest at\nsaying that the subject itself is end, and reaches its subjective end\nthrough the cultivation of its knowledge, the form of determination in\nthem is still the universal, and it is also so that it does not remain\nabstract, for the development of the determinations of the universal\ngives real knowledge. The Megarics were most abstract, because they\nheld to the determination of the good which, as simple, was to them\nthe principle; the unmoved and self-related simplicity of thought\nbecomes the principle of consciousness as individual, as it is of\nconscious knowledge. The Megaric school associated with the assertion\nof the simplicity of the good, the dialectic, that all that was defined\nand limited is not true. But because with the Megarics the principal\npoint was to know the universal, and this universal was to them the\nAbsolute which had to be retained in this form of the universal, this\nthought, as Notion which holds a negative position in relation to all\ndeterminateness and thus to that of Notion also, was equally turned\nagainst knowledge and perception.\n\nThe Cyrenaics take knowledge in its subjective signification, and\nas signifying individuality as certainty of self, or feeling; to\nthis as to that which is essential, they restrict the exercise\nof consciousness, and, generally speaking, make existence for\nconsciousness consist therein. Now because they thereby sought to\ndefine the Good more closely, they called it simply pleasure or\nenjoyment, by which, however, anything can be understood. This\nprinciple of the Cyrenaic school would seem to have been far removed\nfrom that of Socrates, since we at once think of the transient\nexistence of feeling as directly in opposition to the Good; this,\nhowever, is not the case. The Cyrenaics likewise upheld the universal,\nfor, if it is asked what the Good is, we find they certainly made\npleasurable feeling, which presents the appearance of a determinate,\nto be its content, but seeing that a cultured mind is also requisite,\nenjoyment, as it is obtained through thought, is here indicated.\n\nThe Cynics also further defined the principle of the Good, but in\nanother way from the Cyrenaics; its content, they said, lay in man\u2019s\nkeeping to what is in conformity with nature and to the simple needs of\nnature. They similarly call all that is particular and limited in the\naims of men that which is not to be desired. To the Cynics, too, mental\nculture through the knowledge of the universal is the principle;\nbut through this knowledge of the universal the individual end must\nbe attained, and this is, that the individual should keep himself in\nabstract universality, in freedom and independence, and be indifferent\nto all he formerly esteemed. Thus we see pure thought recognized in its\nmovement with the individual, and the manifold transformations of the\nuniversal coming to consciousness. These three schools are not to be\ntreated at length. The principle of the Cyrenaics became later on more\nscientifically worked out in Epicureanism, as that of the Cynics did in\nStoicism.\n\n\n1. THE MEGARICS.\n\nBecause Euclides (who is regarded as the founder of the Megaric way\nof thinking) and his school held to the forms of universality, and,\nabove all, sought, and with success, to show forth the contradictions\ncontained in all particular conceptions, they were reproached with\nhaving a rage for disputation, and hence the name of Eristics was\ngiven them. The instrument for bringing all that is particular into\nconfusion and annulling this particular, was supplied by dialectic,\nwhich, indeed, was brought by them to very great perfection, but, as\nwas privately stated, they did it in a kind of anger, so that others\nsaid that they should not be called a School (_\u03c3\u03c7\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae_) but a gall\n(\u03c7\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae).[143] With a dialectic thus constituted, we find them taking\nthe place of the Eleatic School and of the Sophists; and it seems as\nthough the Eleatic School had merely been reproduced,[144] since they\nwere essentially identical with it. But this was only partly true\u2014in\nthat the Eleatic dialecticians maintained Being as the one existence\nin relation to which nothing particular is a truth, and the Megarics\nconsidered Being as the Good. The Sophists, on the other hand, did not\nseek their impulse in simple universality as fixed and as enduring; and\nsimilarly we shall find in the Sceptics, dialecticians who maintain\nthat the subjective mind rests within itself. Besides Euclides,\nDiodorus and Menedemus are mentioned as distinguished Eristics, but\nparticularly Eubulides, and later on Stilpo, whose dialectic likewise\nrelated to contradictions which appeared in external conception and in\nspeech, so that it in great measure passed into a mere play upon words.\n\n\n_a._ EUCLIDES.\n\nEuclides, who is not to be confused with the mathematician, is he\nof whom it is said that during the enmity between Athens and his\nbirthplace, Megara, and in the period of most violent animosity, he\noften secretly went to Athens, dressed as a woman, not fearing even\nthe punishment of death in order to be able to hear Socrates and\nbe in his company.[145] Euclides is said, in spite of his stubborn\nmanner of disputing, to have been, even in his disputation, a most\npeaceful man. It is told that once in a quarrel his opponent was so\nirritated, that he exclaimed, \u201cI will die if I do not revenge myself\nupon you!\u201d Euclides replied, \u201cAnd I will die if I do not soften your\nwrath so much by the mildness of my speech that you will love me as\nbefore.\u201d[146] It was Euclides who said that \u201cthe Good is one,\u201d and it\nalone is, \u201cthough passing under many names; sometimes it is called\nUnderstanding, sometimes God; at another time Thought (_\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2_), and so\non. But what is opposed to the good does not exist.\u201d[147] This doctrine\nCicero (_ibid._) calls noble, and says that it differs but little\nfrom the Platonic. Since the Megarics make the Good, as the simple\nidentity of the true, into a principle, it is clearly seen that they\nexpressed the Good as the absolute existence in a universal sense,\nas did Socrates; but they no longer, like him, recognized all the\napproximate conceptions, or merely opposed them as being indifferent\nto the interests of man, for they asserted definitely that they were\nnothing at all. Thus they come into the category of the Eleatics,\nsince they, like them, showed that only Being is, and that all else,\nas negative, does not exist. While the dialectic of Socrates was thus\nincidental, in that he merely shook some current moral ideas, or the\nvery first conceptions of knowledge, the Megarics, on the contrary,\nraised their philosophic dialectic into something more universal and\nreal, for they applied themselves more to what is formal in idea and\nspeech, though not yet, like the later Sceptics, to the determinations\nof pure Notions; for knowledge, thought, was not yet present in\nabstract conceptions. Of their own dialectic not much is told, but\nmore is said of the embarrassment into which they brought ordinary\nconsciousness, for they were in all kinds of ways alert in involving\nothers in contradictions. Thus they applied dialectic after the manner\nof an ordinary conversation, just as Socrates applied his mind to every\nside of ordinary subjects, and as we also, in our conversation, try to\nmake an assertion interesting and important. A number of anecdotes are\ntold of their disputations, from which we see that what we call joking\nwas their express business. Others of their puzzles certainly deal with\na positive category of thought; they take these and show how, if they\nare held to be true, they bring about a contradiction.\n\n\n_b._ EUBULIDES.\n\nOf the innumerable multitude of ways in which they tried to confuse our\nknowledge in the categories, many are preserved with their names, and\nthe principal of these are the Sophisms, whose discovery is ascribed\nto Eubulides of Miletus, a pupil of Euclides.[148] The first thing\nwhich strikes us when we hear them is that they are common sophisms\nwhich are not worth contradiction, and scarcely of being heard, least\nof all have they a real scientific value. Hence we call them stupid,\nand look at them as dreary jokes, but it is in fact easier to set them\naside than to refute them. We let ordinary speech pass, and are content\nwith it, so long as everyone knows what the other means (when this is\nnot so\u2014we trust that God understands us), but these sophisms seem in\na way to mislead common speech, for they show the contradictory and\nunsatisfactory nature of it when taken strictly as it is spoken. To\nconfuse ordinary language so that we do not know how to reply, seems\nfoolish, as leading to formal contradictions, and if it is done we are\nblamed for taking mere empty words and playing upon them. Our German\nseriousness, therefore, dismisses this play on words as shallow wit,\nbut the Greeks honoured the word in itself, and the mere treatment\nof a proposition as well as the matter. And if word and thing are in\nopposition, the word is the higher, for the unexpressed thing is really\nirrational, since the rational exists as speech alone.\n\nIt is in Aristotle, and in his Sophistical Elenchi that we first find\nnumerous examples of these contradictions (coming from the old Sophists\nequally with the Eristics), and also their solutions. Eubulides,\ntherefore, likewise wrote against Aristotle,[149] but none of this\nhas come down to us. In Plato we also find, as we saw before (p.\n370), similar jokes and ambiguities mentioned to make the Sophists\nridiculous, and to show with what insignificant matters they took up\ntheir time. The Eristics went yet further, for they, like Diodorus,\nbecame jesters to courts, such as to that of the Ptolemies.[150]\nFrom historic facts we see that this dialectic operation of confusing\nothers and showing how to extricate them again was a general amusement\nof the Greek philosophers, both in public places and at the tables\nof kings. Just as the Queen of the East came to Solomon to put\nriddles to him, we find at the tables of kings witty conversation and\nassemblages of philosophers joking and making merry over one another.\nThe Greeks were quite enamoured of discovering contradictions met\nwith in speech and in ordinary ideas. The contradiction does not\nmake its appearance as a pure contradiction in the conception, but\nonly as interwoven with concrete ideas; such propositions neither\napply to the concrete content nor to the pure Notion. Subject and\npredicate, of which every proposition consists, are different, but in\nthe ordinary idea we signify their unity; this simple unity, which\ndoes not contradict itself, is to ordinary ideas the truth. But in\nfact, the simple self-identical proposition is an unmeaning tautology;\nfor in any affirmation, differences are present, and because their\ndiversity comes to consciousness, there is contradiction. But the\nordinary consciousness is then at an end, for only where there is\na contradiction is there the solution, self-abrogation. Ordinary\nconsciousness has not the conception that only the unity of opposites\nis the truth\u2014that in every statement there is truth and falsehood, if\ntruth is to be taken in the sense of the simple, and falsehood in the\nsense of the opposed and contradictory; in it the positive, the first\nunity, and the negative, this last opposition, fall asunder.\n\nIn Eubulides\u2019 propositions the main point was that because the truth\nis simple, a simple answer is required; that thus the answer should\nnot, as happened in Aristotle (De Sophist. Elench. c. 24), have regard\nto certain special considerations; and, after all, this is really\nthe demand of the understanding. Thus the mistake is to desire an\nanswer of yes or no, for since no one ventures on either, perplexity\nensues, because it is a fool\u2019s part not to know what to reply. The\nsimplicity of the truth is thus grasped as the principle. With us\nthis appears in the form of making such statements as that one of\nopposites is true, the other false; that a statement is either true\nor not true; that an object cannot have two opposite predicates. That\nis the first principle of the understanding, the _principium exclusi\ntertii_, which is of great importance in all the sciences. This stands\nin close connection with the principle of Socrates and Plato (_supra_,\npp. 455, 456), \u201cThe true is the universal;\u201d which is abstractly the\nidentity of understanding, according to which what is said to be true\ncannot contradict itself. This comes more clearly to light in Stilpo\n(p. 464). The Megarics thus kept to this principle of our logic of\nthe understanding, in demanding the form of identity for the Truth.\nNow in the cases that they put, they did not keep to the universal,\nbut sought examples in ordinary conception, by means of which they\nperplexed people; and this they formed into a kind of system. We shall\nbring forward some examples that are preserved to us; some are more\nimportant, but others are insignificant.\n\n_\u03b1_. One Elench was called the Liar (_\u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2_); in it the question\nis put: \u201cIf a man acknowledges that he lies, does he lie or speak\nthe truth?\u201d[151] A simple answer is demanded, for the simple whereby\nthe other is excluded, is held to be the true. If it is said that he\ntells the truth, this contradicts the content of his utterance, for he\nconfesses that he lies. But if it is asserted that he lies, it may be\nobjected that his confession is the truth. He thus both lies and does\nnot lie; but a simple answer cannot be given to the question raised.\nFor here we have a union of two opposites, lying and truth, and their\nimmediate contradiction; in different forms this has at all times come\nto pass, and has ever occupied the attention of men. Chrysippus, a\ncelebrated Stoic, wrote six books on the subject,[152] and another,\nPhiletas of Cos, died in the decline which he contracted through\nover-study of these paradoxes.[153] We have the same thing over again\nwhen, in modern times, we see men worn out by absorbing themselves in\nthe squaring of the circle\u2014a proposition which has well nigh become\nimmortal. They seek a simple relation from something incommensurable,\n_i.e._ they fall into the error of demanding a simple reply where\nthe content is contradictory. That little history has perpetuated\nand reproduced itself later on; in Don Quixote the very same thing\nappears. Sancho, governor of the island of Barataria, was tested by\nmany insidious cases as he sat in judgment, and, amongst others, with\nthe following: In his domain there was a bridge which a rich man had\nerected for the good of passengers\u2014but with a gallows close by. The\ncrossing of the bridge was restricted by the condition that everyone\nmust say truly where he was going, and if he lied, he would be hung\nupon the gallows. Now one man came to the bridge, and to the question\nwhither he went, answered that he had come here to be hung on the\ngallows. The bridge-keepers were much puzzled by this. For if they\nhanged him, he would have spoken the truth and ought to have passed,\nbut if he crossed he would have spoken an untruth. In this difficulty\nthey applied to the wisdom of the governor, who uttered the wise saying\nthat in such dubious cases the mildest measures should be adopted,\nand thus the man should be allowed to pass. Sancho did not break his\nhead over the matter. The result which the statement was to have, is\nmade its content, with the condition that the opposite of the content\nshould be the consequence. Hanging, understanding it to be truly\nexpressed, should not have hanging as result; non-hanging as an event,\nshould, on the other hand, have hanging as result. Thus death is made\nthe consequence of suicide, but by suicide death itself is made into\nthe content of the crime, and cannot thus be the punishment.\n\nI will give another similar example along with the answer. Menedemus\nwas asked whether he had ceased to beat his father. This was an attempt\nto place him in a difficulty, since to answer either yes or no, would\nbe equally risky. For if he said \u2018yes,\u2019 then he once beat him, and if\n\u2018no,\u2019 then he still beats him. Menedemus hence replied that he neither\nceased to beat him, nor had beaten him; and with this his opponents\nwere not satisfied.[154] Through this answer, which is two-sided, the\none alternative, as well as the other, being set aside, the question\nis in fact answered; and this is also so in the former question as to\nwhether the man spoke truly who said he lied, when the reply is made,\n\u201cHe speaks the truth and lies at the same time, and the truth is this\ncontradiction.\u201d But a contradiction is not the true, and cannot enter\ninto our ordinary conceptions; hence Sancho Panza likewise set it aside\nin his judgment. If the consciousness of opposition is present, our\nordinary ideas keep the contradictory sides apart; but in fact the\ncontradiction appears in sensuous things, such as space, time, &c.,\nand has in them only to be demonstrated. These sophisms thus not only\nappear to be contradictory, but are so in truth: this choice between\ntwo opposites, which is set before us in the example, is itself a\ncontradiction.\n\n_\u03b2_. The Concealed one (_\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd_) and the Electra[155] proceed\nfrom the contradiction of knowing and not knowing someone at the same\ntime. I ask someone \u2018Do you know your father?\u2019 He replies \u2018Yes.\u2019 I\nthen ask \u2018Now if I show you someone hidden behind a screen, will you\nknow him?\u2019 \u2018No.\u2019 \u2018But it is your father, and thus you do not know your\nfather.\u2019 It is the same in the Electra. \u2018Can it be said that she knows\nher brother Orestes who stands before her or not?\u2019 These twists and\nturns seem superficial, but it is interesting to consider them further.\n(_\u03b1\u03b1_) To know means, on the one hand, to have someone as \u2018this one,\u2019\nand not vaguely and in general. The son thus knows his father when he\nsees him, _i.e._ when he is a \u2018this\u2019 for him; but hidden, he is not a\n\u2018this\u2019 for him, but a \u2018this\u2019 abrogated. The hidden one as a \u2018this\u2019 in\nordinary conception, becomes a general, and loses his sensuous being,\nthereby is in fact not a true \u2018this.\u2019 The contradiction that the son\nboth knows and does not know his father, thus becomes dissolved through\nthe further qualification that the son knows the father as a sensuous\n\u2018this,\u2019 and not as a \u2018this\u2019 of idea. (_\u03b2\u03b2_) On the other hand Electra\nknows Orestes, not as a sensuous \u2018this,\u2019 but in her own idea; the\n\u2018this\u2019 of idea and the \u2018this\u2019 here, are not the same to her. In this\nway there enters into these histories the higher opposition of the\nuniversal and of the \u2018this,\u2019 in as far as to have in the ordinary idea,\nmeans in the element of the universal; the abrogated \u2018this\u2019 is not only\nan idea, but has its truth in the universal. The universal is thus\nfound in the unity of opposites, and thus it is in this development\nof Philosophy the true existence, in which the sensuous being of the\n\u2018this\u2019 is negated. It is the consciousness of this in particular which,\nas we shall soon see (p. 465), is indicated by Stilpo.\n\n_\u03b3_. Other quibbles of the same kind have more meaning, like the\narguments which are called the Sorites (_\u03c3\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2_) and the Bald\n(_\u03c6\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2_).[156] Both are related to the false infinite, and the\nquantitative progression which can reach no qualitative opposite, and\nyet at the end finds itself at a qualitative absolute opposite. The\nBald head is the reverse of the problem of the Sorites. It is asked,\n\u201cDoes one grain of corn make a heap, or does one hair less make a bald\nhead?\u201d The reply is \u201cNo.\u201d \u201cNor one again?\u201d \u201cNo, it does not.\u201d This\nquestion is now always repeated while a grain is always added, or a\nhair taken away. When at last it is said that there is a heap or a bald\nhead, it is found that the last added grain or last abstracted hair has\nmade the heap or the baldness, and this was at first denied. But how\ncan a grain form a heap which already consists of so many grains? The\nassertion is that one grain does not make a heap; the contradiction,\nthat one thus added or taken away brings about the change into the\nopposite\u2014the many. For to repeat one is just to obtain many, the\nrepetition causes certain \u2018many\u2019 grains to come together. The one thus\nbecomes its opposite,\u2014a heap, and the taking of one away brings about\nbaldness. One and a heap are opposed to one another, but yet one; or\nthe quantitative progression seems not to change but merely to increase\nor diminish, yet at last it has passed into its opposite. We always\nseparate quality and quantity from one another, and only accept in\nthe many a quantitative difference; but this indifferent distinction\nof number or size here turns finally into qualitative distinction,\njust as an infinitely small or infinitely great greatness is no longer\ngreatness at all. This characteristic of veering round is of the\ngreatest importance, although it does not come directly before our\nconsciousness. To give one penny or one shilling is said to be nothing,\nbut with all its insignificance the purse becomes emptied, which is\na very qualitative difference. Or, if water is always more and more\nheated, it suddenly, at 80\u00b0 Reamur, turns into steam. The dialectic\nof this passing into one another of quantity and quality is what our\nunderstanding does not recognize; it is certain that qualitative is\nnot quantitative, and quantitative not qualitative. In those examples\nwhich seem like jokes, there is in this way genuine reflection on the\nthought-determinations which are in question.\n\nThe examples which Aristotle brings forward in his Elenchi, all show a\nvery formal contradiction, appearing in speech, since even in it the\nindividual is taken into the universal. \u201cWho is that? It is Coriscus.\nIs Coriscus not masculine? Yes. _That_ is neuter sex, and thus Coriscus\nis said to be neuter.\u201d[157] Or else Aristotle (De Sophist. Elench. c.\n24) quotes the argument: \u201cTo thee a dog is father (_\u03c3\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03ba\u03cd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1_).\nThou art thus a dog;\u201d that is what Plato, as we already mentioned (p.\n370), made a Sophist say: it is the wit of a journeyman such as we\nfind in Eulenspiegel. Aristotle is really at great pains to remove the\nconfusion, for he says the \u2018thy\u2019 and the \u2018father\u2019 are only accidentally\n(_\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2_), and not in substance (_\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd_) joined\nto one another. In the invention of such witticisms, the Greeks of that\nand of later times were quite indefatigable. With the Sceptics we shall\nlater on see the dialectic side further developed and brought to a\nhigher standpoint.\n\n\n_c._ STILPO.\n\nStilpo, a native of Megara, is one of the most celebrated of the\nEristics. Diogenes tells us that \u201che was a very powerful debater, and\nexcelled all so greatly in readiness of speech that all Greece, in\nlooking to him, was in danger (\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9) of becoming Megareans.\u201d\nHe lived in the time of Alexander the Great, and after his death (Ol.\n114, 1; 324 B.C.) in Megara, when Alexander\u2019s generals fought together.\nPtolemy Soter, Demetrius Poliorcetes, Antigonus\u2019 son, when they\nconquered Megara, bestowed many honours on him. \u201cIn Athens all came out\nof their work-places to see him, and when anyone said that they admired\nhim like a strange animal, he replied, No, but like a true man.\u201d[158]\nWith Stilpo it was pre-eminently true that the universal was taken\nin the sense of the formal abstract identity of the understanding.\nThe main point in his examples is, however, always the fact of his\nhaving given prominence to the form of universality as opposed to the\nparticular.\n\n_\u03b1_. Diogenes (II. 119) first quotes from him in relation to the\nopposition of the \u2018this\u2019 and the universal, \u201cWhoever speaks of any\nman (_\u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9_), speaks of no one, for he neither speaks of\nthis one nor that. For why should it rather be of this one than that?\nHence it is not of this one.\u201d That man is the universal, and that no\none is specially indicated, everyone readily acknowledges, but some\none still remains present to us in our conception. But Stilpo says\nthat the \u2018this\u2019 does not exist at all, and cannot be expressed\u2014that\nthe universal only exists. Diogenes La\u00ebrtius certainly understands\nthis as though \u201cStilpo abolished distinction of genera (_\u1f00\u03bd\u1fc4\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c4\u1f70 \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b7_),\u201d and Tennemann (Vol II., p. 158) supports him. But from\nwhat is quoted from him the opposite may clearly be deduced\u2014that he\nupheld the universal and did away with the individual. And the fact\nthat the form of universality is maintained, is further expressed in a\nnumber of anecdotes which are taken by Stilpo from common life. Thus\nhe says: \u201cThe cabbage is not what is here shown (_\u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03ac\u03c7\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03ba\u03bd\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd_). For the cabbage has existed for many thousand years,\nand hence this (what is seen) is not cabbage,\u201d _i.e._ the universal\nonly is, and this cabbage is not. If I say _this_ cabbage, I say\nquite another thing from what I mean, for I say all other cabbages.\nAn anecdote is told in the same reference. \u201cHe was conversing with\nCrates, a Cynic, and broke off to buy some fish;\u201d Crates said, \u201cWhat,\nyou would avoid the question?\u201d (for even in ordinary life anyone is\nlaughed at or thought stupid who is unable to reply, and here where\nthe subject was so important and where it would seem better to reply\nanything than nothing at all, no answer was forthcoming). Stilpo\nreplied, \u201cBy no means, for I have the conversation, but I leave you,\nsince the conversation remains but the fish will be sold.\u201d What is\nindicated in these simple examples seems trivial, because the matter is\ntrivial, but in other forms it seems important enough to be the subject\nof further inquiry.\n\nThat the universal should in Philosophy be given a place of such\nimportance that only the universal can be expressed, and the \u2018this\u2019\nwhich is meant, cannot, indicates a state of consciousness and thought\nwhich the philosophic culture of our time has not yet reached. As\nregards the ordinary human understanding, or the scepticism of our\ntimes, or in general the Philosophy which asserts that sensuous\ncertainty (that which we see, hear, &c.), is the truth, or else that\nit is true that there are sensuous things outside of us\u2014as to these,\nnothing, so far as the reasons for disbelieving them are concerned,\nneed be said. For because the direct assertion that the immediate is\nthe true is made, such statements only require to be taken with respect\nto what they say, and they will always be found to say something\ndifferent from what they mean. What strikes us most is that they cannot\nsay what they mean; for if they say the sensuous, this is a universal;\nit is all that is sensuous, a negative of the \u2018this,\u2019 or \u2018this\u2019 is all\n\u2018these.\u2019 Thought contains only the universal, the \u2018this\u2019 is only in\nthought; if I say \u2018this\u2019 it is the most universal of all. For example,\nhere is that which I show; now I speak; but here and now is all here\nand now. Similarly when I say \u2018I,\u2019 I mean myself, this individual\nseparated from all others. But I am even thus that which is thought of\nand cannot express the self which I mean at all. \u2018I\u2019 is an absolute\nexpression which excludes every other \u2018I,\u2019 but everyone says \u2018I\u2019 of\nhimself, for everyone is an \u2018I.\u2019 If we ask who is there, the answer \u2018I\u2019\nindicates every \u2018I.\u2019 The individual also is thus the universal only,\nfor in the word as an existence born of the mind, the individual, if\nit is meant, cannot find a place, since actually only the universal is\nexpressed. If I would distinguish myself and establish my individuality\nby my age, my place of birth, through what I have done and where I have\nbeen or am at a particular time, it is the same thing. I am now so many\nyears old, but this very now which I say is all now. If I count from a\nparticular period such as the birth of Christ, this epoch is again only\nfixed by the \u2018now\u2019 which is ever displaced. I am now thirty-five years\nold, and now is 1805 A.D.; each period is fixed only through the other,\nbut the whole is undetermined. That \u2018now\u2019 1805 years have passed since\nChrist\u2019s birth, is a truth which soon will become empty sound, and the\ndeterminateness of the \u2018now\u2019 has a before and after of determinations\nwithout beginning or end. Similarly everyone is at a \u2018here\u2019\u2014this\nhere, for everyone is in a \u2018here.\u2019 This is the nature of universality,\nwhich makes itself evident in speech. We hence help ourselves through\nnames with which we define perfectly anything individual, but we allow\nthat we have not expressed the thing in itself. The name as name, is\nno expression which contains what I am; it is a symbol, and indeed a\ncontingent symbol, of the lively recollection.\n\n_\u03b2_. Inasmuch as Stilpo expressed the universal as the independent,\nhe disintegrated everything. Simplicius says (in Phys. Arist. p. 26),\n\u201cSince the so-called Megarics took it as ascertained that what has\ndifferent determinations is different (_\u1f67\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9, \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd_), and that the diverse are separated one from the other (_\u03c4\u1f70\n\u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b5\u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd_), they seemed to prove that each thing is\nseparated from itself (_\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b5\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd_). Hence since\nthe musical Socrates is another determination (_\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2_) from the\nwise Socrates, Socrates was separated from himself.\u201d That means that\nbecause the qualities of things are determinations for themselves, each\nof these is fixed independently, but yet the thing is an aggregate of\nmany independent universalities. Stilpo asserted this. Now because,\naccording to him, universal determinations are in their separation\nonly the true reality, and the individual is the unseparated unity of\ndifferent ideas, to him nothing individual has any truth.\n\n_\u03b3_. It is very remarkable that this form of identity came to be\nknown in Stilpo, and he in this way only wished to know propositions\nidentically expressed. Plutarch quotes from him: \u201cA different\npredicate may in no case be attributed to any object (_\u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03bc\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9_). Thus we could not say that the man is good or the\nman is a general, but simply that man is only man, good is only good,\nthe general is only the general. Nor could we say ten thousand knights,\nbut knights are only knights, ten thousand are only ten thousand,\n&c. When we speak of a horse running, he says that the predicate is\nnot identical with the object to which it is attributed. For the\nconcept-determination man is different (_\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03af \u1f26\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd_)\nfrom the concept-determination good. Similarly horse and running are\ndistinct: when we are asked for a definition of either, we do not give\nthe same for both. Hence those who say something different of what is\ndifferent are wrong. For if man and good were the same, and likewise\nhorse and running, how could good be used of bread and physic, and\nrunning of lions and dogs\u201d?[159] Plutarch remarks here that Colotes\nattacks Stilpo in a bombastic manner (_\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u1ff7\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03ac\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9_) as though\nhe ignored common life (_\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9_). \u201cBut what man,\u201d\nPlutarch reflects, \u201clived any the worse for this? Is there any man who\nhears this said, and who does not know that it is an elaborate joke\n(_\u03c0\u03b1\u1fd6\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03bc\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03c9\u03c2_)?\u201d\n\n\n2. THE CYRENAIC SCHOOL.\n\nThe Cyrenaics took their name from Aristippus of Cyrene in Africa, the\noriginator and head of the school. Just as Socrates wished to develop\nhimself as an individual, his disciples, or those of the Cyrenaic\nand Cynic Schools, made individual life and practical philosophy\ntheir main object. Now if the Cyrenaics did not rest content with the\ndetermination of good in general, seeing that they inclined to place\nit in the enjoyment of the individual, the Cynics appear to be opposed\nto the whole doctrine, for they expressed the particular content of\nsatisfaction as natural desires in a determination of negativity\nwith regard to what is done by others. But as the Cyrenaics thereby\nsatisfied their particular subjectivity, so also did the Cynics, and\nboth schools have hence on the whole the same end\u2014the freedom and\nindependence of the individual. Because we are accustomed to consider\nhappiness, which the Cyrenaics made the highest end of man, to be\ncontentless, because we obtain it in a thousand ways, and it may be\nthe result of most various causes, this principle appears at first\nto us as trivial, and indeed, generally speaking, it is so; we are\nlikewise accustomed to believe that there is something higher than\npleasure. The philosophic development of this principle which, for the\nrest, has not much in it, is mainly ascribed to Aristippus\u2019 follower,\nAristippus the younger. But Theodorus, Hegesias, and Anniceris, of\nthe later Cyrenaics, are specially mentioned as having scientifically\nworked out the Aristippian principle, until it degenerated and merged\ninto Epicureanism. But the consideration of the further progress of the\nCyrenaic principle is specially interesting because this progression,\nin the essential nature of things, is carried quite beyond the\nprinciple, and has really abrogated it. Feeling is the indeterminate\nindividual. But if thought, reflection, mental culture, are given a\nplace in this principle, through the principle of the universality\nof thought that principle of contingency, individuality, mere\nsubjectivity, disappears; and the only really remarkable thing in this\nschool is that this greater consistency in the universal is therefore\nan inconsistency as regards the principle.\n\n\n_a._ ARISTIPPUS.\n\nAristippus went about with Socrates for a long time, and educated\nhimself under him, although at the same time he was a strong and\nhighly cultivated man before he sought out Socrates at all. He heard\nof him either in Cyrene or at the Olympian Games, which, as Greeks,\nthe Cyrenians likewise visited. His father was a merchant, and he\nhimself came to Athens on a journey which had commerce as its object.\nHe was first amongst the Socratics to ask money of those whom he\ninstructed; he also sent money to Socrates, who, however, returned\nit.[160] He did not content himself with the general expressions, good\nand beautiful, to which Socrates adhered, but took existence reflected\nin consciousness in its extreme determinateness as individuality; and\nbecause universal existence, as thought, was to him, from the side of\nreality, individual consciousness, he fixed on enjoyment as the only\nthing respecting which man had rationally to concern himself. The\ncharacter and personality of Aristippus is what is most important,\nand what is preserved to us in his regard is his manner and life\nrather than his philosophic doctrines. He sought after enjoyment as a\nman of culture, who in that very way had raised himself into perfect\nindifference to all that is particular, all passions and bonds of every\nkind. When pleasure is made the principle, we immediately have the idea\nbefore us that in its enjoyment we are dependent, and that enjoyment\nis thus opposed to the principle of freedom. But neither of the\nCyrenaic teaching, nor the Epicurean, whose principle is on the whole\nthe same, can this be stated. For by itself the end of enjoyment may\nwell be said to be a principle in opposition to Philosophy; but when it\nis considered in such a way that the cultivation of thought is made the\nonly condition under which enjoyment can be attained, perfect freedom\nof spirit is retained, since it is inseparable from culture. Aristippus\ncertainly esteemed culture at its highest, and proceeded from this\nposition\u2014that pleasure is only a principle for men of philosophic\nculture; his main principle thus was that what is found to be pleasant\nis not known immediately but only by reflection.\n\nAristippus lived in accordance with these principles, and what in him\ninterests us most is the number of anecdotes told about him, because\nthey contain traces of a mentally rich and free disposition. Since in\nhis life he went about to seek enjoyment, not without understanding\n(and thereby he was in his way a philosopher), he sought it partly with\nthe discretion which does not yield itself to a momentary happiness,\nbecause a greater evil springs therefrom; and partly (as if philosophy\nwere merely preservation from anxiety) without that anxiety which on\nevery side fears possible evil and bad results; but above all without\nany dependence on things, and without resting on anything which is\nitself of a changeable nature. He enjoyed, says Diogenes, the pleasures\nof the moment, without troubling himself with those which were not\npresent; he suited himself to every condition, being at home in all;\nhe remained the same whether he were in regal courts or in the most\nmiserable conditions. Plato is said to have told him that it was given\nto him alone to wear the purple and the rags. He was specially attached\nto Dionysius, being very popular with him; he certainly clung to him,\nbut always retained complete independence. Diogenes, the Cynic, for\nthis reason called him the royal dog. When he demanded fifty drachms\nfrom someone who wished to hand over to him his son, and the man found\nthe sum too high, saying that he could buy a slave for it, Aristippus\nanswered, \u201cDo so, and you will have two.\u201d When Socrates asked him, \u201cHow\ndo you have so much money?\u201d he replied, \u201cHow do you have so little?\u201d\nWhen a courtesan said to him that she had a child by him, he replied,\n\u201cYou know as little whether it is mine as, were you walking through\nbriars, would you know which thorn pricked you.\u201d A proof of his perfect\nindifference is given in the following: When Dionysius once spat at\nhim, he bore it patiently, and when blamed, said, \u201cThe fishermen let\nthemselves be wet by the sea to catch the little fish, and I, should I\nnot bear this to catch such a good one?\u201d When Dionysius asked him to\nchoose one of three courtesans, he took them all with him, observing\nthat it had been a dangerous thing even to Paris to choose out one;\nbut after leading them to the vestibule of the house, he let all three\ngo. He made nothing of the possession of money as contrasted with the\nresults which appear to follow from pursuing pleasure, and hence he\nwasted it on dainties. He once bought a partridge at fifty drachms\n(about twenty florins). When someone rebuked him, he asked, \u201cWould\nyou not buy it for a farthing?\u201d And when this was acknowleged, he\nanswered, \u201cNow fifty drachms are no more than that to me.\u201d Similarly\nin journeying in Africa, the slave thought it hard to be troubled with\na sum of money. When Aristippus knew this he said, \u201cThrow away what is\ntoo much and carry what you can.\u201d\n\nAs regards the value of culture, he replied to the question as to how\nan educated man differs from an uneducated, that a stone would not\nfit in with the other, _i.e._ the difference is as great as that of a\nman from the stone. This is not quite wrong, for man is what he ought\nto be as man, through culture; it is his second nature through which\nhe first enters into possession of that which he has by nature, and\nthus for the first time he is Mind. We may not, however, think in this\nway of our uncultured men, for with us such men through the whole of\ntheir conditions, through customs and religion, partake of a source\nof culture which places them far above those who do not live in such\nconditions. Those who carry on other sciences and neglect Philosophy,\nAristippus compares to the wooers of Penelope in the Odyssey, who might\neasily have Melantho and the other maidens, but who could not obtain\nthe queen.[161]\n\nThe teaching of Aristippus and his followers is very simple, for he\ntook the relation of consciousness to existence in its most superficial\nand its earliest form, and expressed existence as Being as it is\nimmediately for consciousness, _i.e._ as feeling simply. A distinction\nis now made between the true, the valid, what exists in and for itself,\nand the practical and good, and what ought to be our end; but in\nregard to both the theoretic and practical truth, the Cyrenaics make\nsensation what determines. Hence their principle is more accurately\nnot the objective itself, but the relation of consciousness to the\nobjective; the truth is not what is in sensation the content, but is\nitself sensation, it is not objective, but the objective subsists only\nin it. \u201cThus the Cyrenaics say, sensations form the real criterion;\nthey alone can be known, and are infallible, but what produces feeling\nis neither knowable nor infallible. Thus when we perceive a white and\nsweet, we may assert this condition as ours with truth and certainty.\nBut that the causes of these feelings are themselves a white and sweet\nobject we cannot with certainty affirm. What these men say about ends\nis also in harmony with this, for sensations also extend to ends. The\nsensations are either pleasant or unpleasant or neither of the two.\nNow they call the unpleasant feelings the bad, the end of which is\npain; the pleasant is the good, whose invariable end is happiness. Thus\nfeelings are the criteria of knowledge and the ends for action. We\nlive because we follow them from testimony (_\u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3_) received and\nsatisfaction (_\u03b5\u1f51\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9_) experienced, the former in accordance with\ntheoretic intuitions (_\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7_), and the latter with what\ngives us pleasure.\u201d[162] That is to say, as end, feeling is no longer\na promiscuous variety of sensuous affections (_\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b7_), but the\nsetting up of the Notion as the positive or negative relation to the\nobject of action, which is just the pleasant or the unpleasant.\n\nHere we enter on a new sphere where two kinds of determinations\nconstitute the chief points of interest; these are everywhere treated\nof in the many Socratic schools which were being formed, and though not\nby Plato and Aristotle, they were specially so by the Stoics, the new\nAcademy, &c. That is to say, the one point is determination itself in\ngeneral, the criterion; and the second is what determination for the\nsubject is. And thus the idea of the wise man results\u2014what the wise\ndo, who the wise are, &c. The reason that these two expressions are\nnow so prominent is one which rests on what has gone before. On the\none hand the main interest is to find a content for the good, for else\nmen may talk about it for years. This further definition of the good\nis just the criterion. On the other hand the interest of the subject\nappears, and that is the result of the revolution in the Greek mind\nmade by Socrates. When the religion, constitution, laws of a people,\nare held in esteem, and when the individual members of a people are\none with them, the question of what the individual has to do on his\nown account, will not be put. In a moralized, religious condition of\nthings we are likely to find the end of man in what is present, and\nthese morals, religion and laws are also present in him. When, on\nthe contrary, the individual exists no longer in the morality of his\npeople, no longer has his substantial being in the religion, laws,\n&c., of his land, he no longer finds what he desires, and no longer\nsatisfies himself in his present. But if this discord has arisen, the\nindividual must immerse himself in himself, and there seek his end. Now\nthis is really the cause that the question of what is the essential\nfor the individual arises. After what end must he form himself and\nafter what strive? Thus an ideal for the individual is set up, and\nthis is the wise man: what was called the ideal of the wise man is\nthe individuality of self-consciousness which is conceived of as\nuniversal essence. The point of view is the same when we now ask, What\ncan I know? What should I believe? What ought I to hope? What is the\nhighest interest of the subject? It is not what is truth, right, the\nuniversal end of the world, for instead of asking about the science\nof the implicitly and explicitly objective, the question is what is\ntrue and right in as far as it is the insight and conviction of the\nindividual, his end and a mode of his existence? This talk about wise\nmen is universal amongst the Stoics, Epicureans, &c., but is devoid\nof meaning. For the wise man is not in question, but the wisdom of\nthe universe, real reason. A third definition is that the universal\nis the good; the real side of things is enjoyment and happiness as a\nsimple existence and immediate actuality. How then do the two agree?\nThe philosophic schools which now arise and their successors have set\nforth the harmony of both determinations, which are the higher Being\nand thought.\n\n\n_b._ THEODORUS.\n\nOf the later Cyrenaics, Theodorus must be mentioned first; he is\nfamous for having denied the existence of the gods, and being, for\nthis reason, banished from Athens. Such a fact can, however, have\nno further interest or speculative significance, for the positive\ngods which Theodorus denied, are themselves not any object of\nspeculative reason. He made himself remarkable besides for introducing\nthe universal more into the idea of that which was existence for\nconsciousness, for \u201che made joy and sorrow the end, but in such a\nway that the former pertained to the understanding and the latter\nto want of understanding. He defined the good as understanding and\njustice, and the bad as the opposite; enjoyment and pain, however,\nwere indifferent.\u201d[163] When we reach the consciousness that the\nindividual sensuous feeling, as it is immediately, is not to be\nconsidered as real existence, it is then said that it must be accepted\nwith understanding; _i.e._ feeling, just as it is, is not reality.\nFor the sensuous generally, as sensation, theoretic or practical, is\nsomething quite indeterminate, this or that unit; a criticism of this\nunit is hence required, _i.e._ it must be considered in the form of\nuniversality, and hence this last necessarily reappears. But this\nadvance on individuality is culture, which, through the limitation of\nindividual feelings and enjoyments, tries to make these harmonious,\neven though it first of all only calculates as to that by which the\ngreater pleasure is to be found. Now, to the question as to which of\nthe many enjoyments which I, as a many-sided man, can enjoy, is the\none which is in completest harmony with me, and in which I thus find\nthe greatest satisfaction, it must be replied that the completest\nharmony with me is only found in the accordance of my particular\nexistence and consciousness with my actual substantial Being. Theodorus\ncomprehended this as understanding and justice, in which we know where\nto seek enjoyment. But when it is said that felicity must be sought\nby reflection, we know that these are empty words and thoughtless\nutterances. For the feeling in which felicity is contained, is in its\nconception the individual, self-changing, without universality and\nsubsistence. Thus the universal, understanding, as an empty form,\nadheres to a content quite incongruous with it; and thus Theodorus\ndistinguished the Good in its form, from the end as the Good in its\nnature and content.\n\n\n_c._ HEGESIAS.\n\nIt is remarkable that another Cyrenaic, Hegesias, recognized this\nincongruity between sensation and universality, which last is opposed\nto the individual, having what is agreeable as well as disagreeable\nwithin itself. Because, on the whole, he took a firmer grasp of the\nuniversal and gave it a larger place, there passed from him all\ndetermination of individuality, and with it really the Cyrenaic\nprinciple. It came to his knowledge that individual sensation is in\nitself nothing; and, as he nevertheless made enjoyment his end, it\nbecame to him the universal. But if enjoyment is the end, we must ask\nabout the content; if this content is investigated, we find every\ncontent a particular which is not in conformity with the universal, and\nthus falls into dialectic. Hegesias followed the Cyrenaic principle\nas far as to this consequence of thought. That universal is contained\nin an expression of his which we often enough hear echoed, \u201cThere is\nno perfect happiness. The body is troubled with manifold pains, and\nthe soul suffers along with it; it is hence a matter of indifference\nwhether we choose life or death. In itself nothing is pleasant or\nunpleasant.\u201d That is to say, the criterion of being pleasant or\nunpleasant, because its universality is removed, is thus itself made\nquite indeterminate; and because it has no objective determinateness\nin itself, it has become unmeaning; before the universal, which is\nthus held secure, the sum of all determinations, the individuality of\nconsciousness as such, disappears, but with it even life itself as\nbeing unreal. \u201cThe rarity, novelty, or excess of enjoyment begets in\nsome cases enjoyment and in others discontent. Poverty and riches have\nno meaning for what is pleasant, since we see that the rich do not\nenjoy pleasures more than the poor. Similarly, slavery and liberty,\nnoble and ignoble birth, fame and lack of fame, are equivalent as\nregards pleasure. Only to a fool can living be a matter of moment; to\nthe wise man it is indifferent,\u201d and he is consequently independent.\n\u201cThe wise man acts only after his own will, and he considers none\nother equally worthy. For even if he attain from others the greatest\nbenefits, this does not equal what he gives himself. Hegesias and\nhis friends also take away sensation, because it gives no sufficient\nknowledge,\u201d which really amounts to scepticism. \u201cThey say further that\nwe ought to do what we have reason to believe is best. The sinner\nshould be forgiven, for no one willingly sins, but is conquered by a\npassion. The wise man does not hate, but instructs; his endeavours go\nnot so much to the attainment of good, as to the avoidance of evil, for\nhis aim is to live without trouble and sorrow.\u201d[164] This universality,\nwhich proceeds from the principle of the freedom of the individual\nself-consciousness, Hegesias expressed as the condition of the perfect\nindifference of the wise men\u2014an indifference to everything into which\nwe shall see all philosophic systems of the kind going forth, and which\nis a surrendering of all reality, the complete withdrawal of life into\nitself. It is told that Hegesias, who lived in Alexandria, was not\nallowed to teach the Ptolemies of the time, because he inspired many\nof his hearers with such indifference to life that they took their\nown.[165]\n\n\n_d._ ANNICERIS.\n\nWe also hear of Anniceris and his followers, who, properly speaking,\ndeparted from the distinctive character of the principle of the\nCyrenaic school, and thereby gave philosophic culture quite another\ndirection. It is said of them that \u201cthey acknowledged friendship in\ncommon life, along with gratitude, honour to parents, and service for\none\u2019s country. And although the wise man has, by so doing, to undergo\nhardship and work, he can still be happy, even if he therein obtains\nfew pleasures. Friendships are not to be formed on utilitarian grounds\nalone, but because of the good will that develops; and out of love to\nfriends, even burdens and difficulties are to be undertaken.\u201d[166]\nThe universal, the theoretically speculative element in the school,\nis thus lost; it sinks more into what is popular. This is then the\nsecond direction which the Cyrenaic school has taken; the first was\nthe overstepping of the principle itself. A method of philosophizing\nin morals arises, which later on prevailed with Cicero and the\nPeripatetics of his time, but the interest has disappeared, so far as\nany consistent system of thought is concerned.\n\n\n3. THE CYNIC SCHOOL.\n\nThere is nothing particular to say of the Cynics, for they possess\nbut little Philosophy, and they did not bring what they had into a\nscientific system; it was only later that their tenets were raised by\nthe Stoics into a philosophic discipline. With the Cynics, as with the\nCyrenaics, the point was to determine what should be the principle\nfor consciousness, both as regards its knowledge and its actions.\nThe Cynics also set up the Good as a universal end, and asked in\nwhat, for individual men, it is to be sought. But if the Cyrenaic,\nin accordance with his determinate principle, made the consciousness\nof himself as an individual, or feeling, into real existence for\nconsciousness, the Cynic took this individuality, in as far as it has\nthe form of universality directly for me, _i.e._ in as far as I am a\nfree consciousness, indifferent to all individuality. Thus they are\nopposed to the Cyrenaics for while to these feeling, which, because\nit has to be determined through thought, is undoubtedly extended into\nuniversality and perfect freedom, is made the principle, the former\nbegin with perfect freedom and independence as the property of man.\nBut since this is the same indifference of self-consciousness which\nHegesias expressed as real existence, the extremes in the Cynic and\nCyrenaic modes of thought destroy themselves by their own consequences,\nand pass into one another. With the Cyrenaics there is the impulse to\nturn things back into consciousness, according to which nothing is\nreal existence for me; the Cynics had also only to do with themselves,\nand the individual self-consciousness was likewise principle. But\nthe Cynic, at least in the beginning, set up for the guidance of men\nthe principle of freedom and indifference, both in regard to thought\nand actual life, as against all external individuality, particular\nends, needs, and enjoyments; so that culture not only sought after\nindifference to these and independence within itself, as with the\nCyrenaics, but for express privation, and for the limitation of\nneeds to what is necessary and what nature demands. The Cynics thus\nmaintained as the content of the good, the greatest independence of\nnature, _i.e._ the slightest possible necessities; this meant a rebound\nfrom enjoyment, and from the pleasures of feeling. The negative is\nhere the determining; later on this opposition of Cynics and Cyrenaics\nlikewise appeared between Stoics and Epicureans. But the same negation\nwhich the Cynics made their principle, had already shown itself in the\nfurther development which the Cyrenaic philosophy had taken. The School\nof the Cynics had no scientific weight; it only constitutes an element\nwhich must necessarily appear in the knowledge of the universal, and\nwhich is that consciousness must know itself in its individuality, as\nfree from all dependence on things and on enjoyment. To him who relies\nupon riches or enjoyment such dependence is in fact real consciousness,\nor his individuality is real existence. But the Cynics so enforced that\nnegative moment that they placed freedom in actual renunciation of\nso-called superfluities; they only recognized this abstract unmoving\nindependence, which did not concern itself with enjoyment or the\ninterests of an ordinary life. But true freedom does not consist in\nflying from enjoyment and the occupations which have as their concern\nother men and other ends in life; but in the fact that consciousness,\nthough involved in all reality, stands above it and is free from it.\n\n\n_a._ ANTISTHENES.\n\nAntisthenes, an Athenian and friend of Socrates, was the first who\nprofessed to be a Cynic. He lived at Athens, and taught in a gymnasium,\ncalled Cynosarges, and he was called the \u201csimple dog\u201d (_\u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u03ba\u03cd\u03c9\u03bd_).\nHis mother was Thracian, which was often made a reproach to him\u2014a\nreproach which to us would be unmeaning. He replied that the mother of\nthe gods was a Phrygian, and that the Athenians, who make so much of\ntheir being native born, are in no way nobler than the native fish and\ngrasshoppers. He educated himself under Gorgias and Socrates, and went\ndaily from the Pir\u00e6us to the city to hear Socrates. He wrote several\nworks, the titles of which Diogenes mentions, and, according to all\naccounts, was esteemed a highly cultivated and upright man.[167]\n\nAntisthenes\u2019 principles are simple, because the content of his teaching\nremains general; it is hence superfluous to say anything further\nabout it. He gives general rules, which consist of such excellent\nmaxims as that \u201cvirtue is self-sufficing, and requires nothing more\nthan a Socratic strength of character. The good is excellent, the bad\ndiscreditable. Virtue consists of works, and does not require many\nreasons or theories. The end of man is a virtuous life. The wise man\nis contented with himself, for he possesses everything that others\nseem to possess. His own virtue satisfies him; he is at home all over\nthe world. If he lacks fame, this is not to be regarded as an evil,\nbut as a good,\u201d &c.[168] We here, once more, have the tedious talk\nabout the wise man, which by the Stoics, as also by the Epicureans,\nwas even more spun out and made more tedious. In this ideal, where the\ndetermination of the subject is in question, its satisfaction is placed\nin simplifying its needs. But when Antisthenes says that virtue does\nnot require reasons and theories, he forgets that he himself acquired,\nthrough the cultivation of mind, its independence and the power of\nrenouncing all that men desire. We see directly that virtue has now\nobtained another signification; it no longer is unconscious virtue,\nlike the simple virtue of a citizen of a free people, who fulfils\nhis duties to fatherland, place, and family, as these relationships\nimmediately require. The consciousness which has gone beyond itself\nmust, in order to become Mind, now lay hold of and comprehend all\nreality, i.e. be conscious of it as its own. But conditions such as\nare called by names like innocence or beauty of soul, are childish\nconditions, which are certainly to be praised in their own place, but\nfrom which man, because he is rational, must come forth, in order\nto re-create himself from the sublated immediacy. The freedom and\nindependence of the Cynics, however, which consists only in lessening\nto the utmost the burden imposed by wants, is abstract, because it, as\nnegative in character, has really to be a mere renunciation. Concrete\nfreedom consists in maintaining an indifferent attitude towards\nnecessities, not avoiding them, but in their satisfaction remaining\nfree, and abiding in morality and in participation in the moral life\nof man. Abstract freedom, on the contrary, surrenders its morality,\nbecause the individual withdraws into his subjectivity, and is\nconsequently an element of immorality.\n\nYet Antisthenes bears a high place in this Cynical philosophy. But\nthe attitude he adopted comes very near to that of rudeness, vulgarity\nof conduct and shamelessness; and later on Cynicism passed into such.\nHence comes the continual mockery of, and the constant jokes against\nthe Cynics; and it is only their individual manners and individual\nstrength of character which makes them interesting. It is even told\nof Antisthenes that he began to attribute value to external poverty\nof life. Cynicism adopted a simple wardrobe\u2014a thick stick of wild\nolive, a ragged double mantle without any under garment, which served\nas bed by night, a beggar\u2019s sack for the food that was required,\nand a cup with which to draw water.[169] This was the costume with\nwhich these Cynics used to distinguish themselves. That on which\nthey placed highest value was the simplification of their needs; it\nseems very plausible to say that this produces freedom. For needs\nare certainly dependence upon nature, and this is antagonistic to\nfreedom of spirit; the reduction of that dependence to a minimum is\nthus an idea which commends itself. But at the same time this minimum\nis itself undetermined, and if such stress is laid on thus merely\nfollowing nature, it follows that too great a value is set on the needs\nof nature and on the renunciation of others. This is what is also\nevident in the monastic principle. The negative likewise contains an\naffirmative bias towards what is renounced; and the renunciation and\nthe importance of what is renounced is thus made too marked. Socrates\nhence declares the clothing of the Cynics to be vanity. For \u201cwhen\nAntisthenes turned outside a hole in his cloak, Socrates said to him,\nI see thy vanity through the hole in thy cloak.\u201d[170] Clothing is not\na thing of rational import, but is regulated through needs that arise\nof themselves. In the North the clothing must be different from that in\nCentral Africa; and in winter we do not wear cotton garments. Anything\nfurther is meaningless, and is left to chance and to opinion; in modern\ntimes, for instance, old-fashioned clothing had a meaning in relation\nto patriotism. The cut of my coat is decided by fashion, and the tailor\nsees to this; it is not my business to invent it, for mercifully others\nhave done so for me. This dependence on custom and opinion is certainly\nbetter than were it to be on nature. But it is not essential that men\nshould direct their understanding to this; indifference is the point of\nview which must reign, since the thing itself is undoubtedly perfectly\nindifferent. Men are proud that they can distinguish themselves in\nthis, and try to make a fuss about it, but it is folly to set oneself\nagainst the fashion. In this matter I must hence not decide myself, nor\nmay I draw it within the radius of my interests, but simply do what is\nexpected of me.\n\n\n_b._ DIOGENES.\n\nDiogenes of Sinope, the best known Cynic, distinguished himself even\nmore than Antisthenes by the life he led, as also by his biting and\noften clever hits, and bitter and sarcastic retorts; but he likewise\nreceived replies which were often aimed as well. He is called the Dog,\njust as Aristippus was called by him the royal Dog, for Diogenes bore\nthe same relation to idle boys as Aristippus did to kings. Diogenes\nis only famed for his manner of life; with him, as with the moderns,\nCynicism came to signify more a mode of living than a philosophy. He\nconfined himself to the barest necessities, and tried to make fun of\nothers who did not think as he, and who laughed at his ways. That he\nthrew away his cup when he saw a boy drinking out of his hands is well\nknown. To have no wants, said Diogenes, is divine; to have as few as\npossible is to come nearest to the divine. He lived in all sorts of\nplaces, in the streets of Athens, in the market in tubs; and he usually\nresided and slept in Jupiter\u2019s Stoa in Athens; he hence remarked that\nthe Athenians had built him a splendid place of residence.[171] Thus\nthe Cynics thought not only of dress, but also of other wants. But a\nmode of life such as that followed by the Cynics, which professed to\nbe a result of culture, is really conditioned by the culture of the\nmind. The Cynics were not anchorites; their consciousness was still\nessentially related to other consciousness. Antisthenes and Diogenes\nlived in Athens, and could only exist there. But in culture the mind\nis also directed to the most manifold needs, and to the methods of\nsatisfying these. In more recent times the needs have much increased,\nand hence a division of the general wants into many particular wants\nand modes of satisfaction has arisen; this is the function of the\nactivity of the understanding, and in its application luxury has a\nplace. We may declaim against the morality of this, but in a State all\ntalents, natural inclinations and customs must have free scope and be\nbrought into exercise, and every individual may take what part he will,\nonly he must in the main make for the universal. Thus the chief point\nis to place no greater value on such matters than what is demanded, or\ngenerally, to place no importance either on possessing or dispensing\nwith them.\n\nOf Diogenes we have only anecdotes to relate. In a voyage to \u00c6gina he\nfell into the hands of sea-robbers, and was to be sold as a slave in\nCrete. Being asked what he understood, he replied, \u201cTo command men,\u201d\nand told the herald to call out, \u201cWho will buy a ruler?\u201d A certain\nXeniades of Corinth bought him, and he instructed his sons.\n\nThere are very many stories told of his residence in Athens. There he\npresented a contrast in his rudeness and disdainfulness to Aristippus\u2019\nfawning philosophy. Aristippus set no value on his enjoyments any more\nthan on his wants, but Diogenes did so on his poverty. Diogenes was\nonce washing his greens when Aristippus passed by, and he called out,\n\u201cIf you knew how to wash your greens yourself, you would not run after\nkings.\u201d Aristippus replied very aptly, \u201cIf you knew how to associate\nwith men, you would not wash greens.\u201d In Plato\u2019s house he once walked\non the beautiful carpets with muddy feet, saying, \u201cI tread on the pride\nof Plato.\u201d \u201cYes, but with another pride,\u201d replied Plato, as pointedly.\nWhen Diogenes stood wet through with rain, and the bystanders pitied\nhim, Plato said, \u201cIf you wish to compassionate him, just go away. His\nvanity is in showing himself off and exciting surprise; it is what\nmade him act in this way, and the reason would not exist if he were\nleft alone.\u201d Once when he got a thrashing, as anecdotes often tell, he\nlaid a large plaster on his wounds, and wrote on it the names of those\nwho had struck him in order that they might be blamed of all. When\nyouths standing by him said, \u201cWe are afraid that you will bite us,\u201d he\nreplied, \u201cDon\u2019t mind, a dog never eats turnips.\u201d At a feast a guest\nthrew bones to him like a dog, and he went up to him and behaved to him\nlike a dog. He gave a good answer to a tyrant who asked him from what\nmetal statues should be cast: \u201cFrom the metal from which the statues of\nHarmodius and Aristogiton were cast.\u201d He tried to eat raw meat, which\ndid not, however, agree with him; he could not digest it, and died at a\nvery great age, as he lived\u2014in the streets.[172]\n\n\n_c._ LATER CYNICS.\n\nAntisthenes and Diogenes, as already mentioned, were men of great\nculture. The succeeding Cynics are not any the less conspicuous by\ntheir exceeding shamelessness, but they were, generally speaking,\nnothing more than swinish beggars, who found their satisfaction in the\ninsolence which they showed to others. They are worthy of no further\nconsideration in Philosophy, and they deserve in its full the name of\ndogs, which was early given to them; for the dog is a shameless animal.\nCrates, of Thebes, and Hipparchia, a Cynic, celebrated their nuptials\nin the public market.[173] This independence of which the Cynics\nboasted, is really subjection, for while every other sphere of active\nlife contains the affirmative element of free intelligence, this means\nthe denying oneself the sphere in which the element of freedom can be\nenjoyed.\n\n\n\n\n FOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] Zur Philosophie und Geschichte. Pt. V. pp. 184\u2014186. (Edition of\n1828, in 12 vols.)\n\n[2] S. Marheineke: \u201cLehrbuch des Christlichen Glaubens und Lebens.\u201d\nBerlin, 1823. \u00a7 133, 134.\n\n[3] \u201c_Meinung ist mein._\u201d\n\n[4] Cf. Hegels Werke, vol. VI. \u00a7 13, pp. 21, 22.\n\n[5] Flatt: De Theismo Thaleti Milesio abjudicando. Tub. 1785. 4.\n\n[6] Grundz\u00fcge des gegenw\u00e4rtigen Zeitalters, pp. 211, 212; cf. Anweisung\nzum Seligen Leben, pp. 178, 348.\n\n[7] Sanchuniathonis Fragm. ed. Rich. Cumberland, Lond. 1720, 8; German\nby J. P. Kassel, Magdeburg, 1755, 8, pp. 1-4.\n\n[8] That is to say in the Lectures preceding these, delivered in the\nWinter Session 1825\u20141826.\n\n[9] Confucius, Sinarum philosophus, s. scientia Sinensis, latine\nexposita studio et opera Prosperi Juonetta, Herdtrich, Rougemont,\nCouplet, PP. S. J., Paris, 1687, fol.\n\n[10] M\u00e9moires concernant les Chinois (Paris, 1776, sqq.), Vol. II., pp.\n1-361. Antiquit\u00e9 des Chinois, par le P\u00e8re Amiot, pp. 20, 54, &c.\n\n[11] Die Philosophie im Fortgang der Weltgeschichte, Vol. I., p. 157.\n\n[12] Cf. Windischmann, ibid., p. 125.\n\n[13] M\u00e9moire sur la vie et les opinions de Lao-Tseu, par Abel R\u00e9musat\n(Paris, 1823), p. 18 sqq.; Extrait d\u2019une lettre de Mr. Amiot, 16\nOctobre, 1787, de Peking (M\u00e9moires concernant les Chinois, T. xv.), p.\n208, sqq.\n\n[14] Dr. Legge states in \u201cThe Religions of China\u201d that T\u00e2o was not\nthe name of a person, but of a concept or idea. Of the English\nterms most suitable for it, he suggests the Way in the sense of\nMethod.\u2014[Translator\u2019s note.]\n\n[15] Abel R\u00e9musat, l.c. p. 31, seq.; Lettre sur les caract\u00e8res des\nChinois (M\u00e9moires concernant les Chinois, Tome 1) p. 299, seq.\n\n[16] R\u00e9musat thought that he discovered in these three syllables the\nword Jehovah.\u2014[Translator\u2019s note.]\n\n[17] Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and\nIreland, Vol. I., Part I. London, 1824, pp. 19-43. (II., on the\nPhilosophy of the Hindus, Part I., by Henry Thomas Colebrooke, read\nJune 21, 1823).\n\n[18] Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. i., Part I., pp.\n92\u2014118. (VII. Essay on the Philosophy of the Hindus, Part II., by Henry\nThomas Colebrooke.)\n\n[19] Brucker, Hist. Phil. T. I. p. 460; Plutarch, De plac. phil. I. 3.\n\n[20] Herod. II. 20; Senec. Qu\u00e6st. natur. IV. 2; Diog. Laert. I. 37.\n\n[21] Diog. Laert. 1. \u00a7 34, et Menag. ad. h. 1.\n\n[22] Cf. Ritter: Geschichte der Ionischen Philosophie, p. 15.\n\n[23] Plutarch, De plac. phil. I. 3; Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I. 10.\nAristot. Phys. III. 4.\n\n[24] Cf. Aristot. Phys. I. 4.\n\n[25] Simplicius ad Arist. Phys. (I. 2), p. 5, 6.\n\n[26] Stob\u00e6i Eclog. Physic. c. 11., p. 294, ed. Heeren.\n\n[27] Simplicius ad Phys. Arist. p. 6, b.\n\n[28] Cf. Plutarch Qu\u00e6st. convival. VIII. 8.\n\n[29] Diog. Laert. I. 119; Menagius ad h. 1.\n\n[30] In irrisione gentilium, c. 12 (citante Fabricio ad Sext. Emp. Hyp.\nPyrrh. III. 4, \u00a7 30).\n\n[31] Cf. Porphyr. De vita Pythag., \u00a7\u00a7 14, 15; et Ritterhus, ad. h. I.\n\n[32] Cf. Porphyr. De vita Pyth. 6, Iamblich. De vita Pyth. XXIX. 158.\n\n[33] Diog. Laert. I. 12; VIII. 8; Iamblich. VIII. 44; XII. 58.\n\n[34] Porphyr. De vita Pyth. 25, 21, 22; Iamblich. De vita Pyth. 36;\nVII. 33, 34; XXXII. 220-222.\n\n[35] Diog. Laert. VIII. 11, Porphyr., 18-20; Iamblich. II. 9, 10, XXIV.\n108, 109; Menag. et Casaub. ad Diog. Laert. VIII. 19.\n\n[36] Porphyr. 37; Iamblich. XVII. 71-74; XVIII. 80-82; XXVIII. 150; XX.\n94, 95; Diog. Laert. VIII. 10.\n\n[37] Iamblich. XXI. 100; XXIX. 165; Diog. Laert. VIII. 22; Porphyr. 40.\n\n[38] Porphyr. 32-34; Iamblich. XXIX. 163, 164; XX. 96; XXI. 97; XXIV.\n107; Diog. Laert. VIII. 19, 21, 39.\n\n[39] Diog. Laert., VIII. 39, 40; Iamblich. XXXV. 248-264; Porphyrius,\n54-59; Anonym. De vita Pyth. (apud Photium), 2.\n\n[40] Cf. Platon. Tim\u00e6um, p. 20, Steph. (p. 8, ed. Bekk.).\n\n[41] Sext. Pyrrh. Hyp. III. 18, \u00a7 152; adv. Math. X. \u00a7 250, 251.\n\n[42] Mathem. c. 5, p. 30, ed. Bullialdi: cf. Aristoxen. ap. Stob. Ecl.\nPhys. 2, p. 16.\n\n[43] Gnomicorum poetarum opera: Vol. I. Pythagoreorum aureum carmen,\ned. Glandorf Fragm. I. v. 45-48; Sext. Empir. adv. Math. IV. \u00a7 2, et\nFabric. ad h. 1.\n\n[44] Burney points out the fallacy of this statement in his History of\nMusic. [Translator\u2019s note.]\n\n[45] Sext. Empiricus Pyrrh. Hyp. III. 18, \u00a7 155; adv. Math. IV. \u00a7\u00a7 6,\n7; VII. \u00a7\u00a7 95-97; X. \u00a7 283.\n\n[46] Diog. Laert. VIII. \u00a7\u00a7 4, 5, 14; Porphyrius, \u00a7\u00a7 26, 27; Iamblichus,\nc. XIV. \u00a7 63. (Homer\u2019s Iliad XVI. v. 806-808; XVII. v. 45, seq.).\n\n[47] Gnomicorum po\u00ebtarum opera, Vol. I. Pyth. aureum carmen, ed.\nGlandorf. Fragm. I. v. 1-4.\n\n[48] Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 33, \u00a7 225; Simpl. ad Phys. Arist. pp.\n5, 6; Plut. de plac. philos. II. 4.\n\n[49] That Xenophanes is here meant is shown from the titles of the\ncollected Becker manuscripts, as also from comparing this passage with\nthe verses remaining to us, which are by Xenophanes, though they were\nearlier ascribed to Zeno; this was done by Hegel when he did not, as\nin many lectures, take the Eleatic passages together. The editor found\na justification in this for placing the passage in its proper place.\n[Note by editor.]\n\n[50] Adv. Math. VII. 47-52; 110, 111; VIII. 326; Pyrrh. Hyp. II. 4, \u00a7\n18.\n\n[51] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. X. 313, 314; Simplic. in Phys. Arist., p.\n41.\n\n[52] Platon. Theaet. p. 183. Steph. (p. 263, ed. Bekk.); Sophist, p.\n217 (p. 127).\n\n[53] Diog. Laert. IX. 23; et Casaubonus ad. h. 1.\n\n[54] Plutarch, De plac. phil. II. 7; Euseb. XV. 38; Stob. Ecl. Phys. c.\n23, p. 482-484; Simplicius in Arist. Phys. p. 9 a, 7 b; Arist. Met. I.\n4; Brandis Comment. Eleat. p. 162.\n\n[55] De Sensu, p. 1, ed. Steph. 1557 (citante F\u00fclleborn, p. 92).\n\n[56] This obscure clause has been differently interpreted. Dr.\nHutchison Stirling, in his annotations on Schwegler\u2019s \u201cHistory\nof Philosophy,\u201d says: \u201cZeller accepts (and Hegel, by quoting and\ntranslating the whole passage, already countenanced him in advance) the\nequivalent of Theophrastus for _\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bb\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd_ namely, and\ninterprets the clause itself thus:\u2014\u2018The preponderating element of the\ntwo is thought occasions and determines the ideas;\u2019 that is as is the\npreponderating element (the warm or the cold) so is the state of mind.\nIn short, _the more is the thought_ is the linguistic equivalent of the\ntime for _according to the more is the thought_.\u201d [Translator\u2019s note.]\n\n[57] As a matter of fact, since a comparison of this reasoning with\nthe fragments of Melissus which Simplicius (in Arist. Physica and De\nC\u0153lo) has retained, places this conjecture beyond doubt, the editor is\nconstrained to place it here, although Hegel, when he dealt with the\nEleatics separately, put it under the heading of Xenophanes. [Note by\nEditor.]\n\n[58] Cf. Plat. Parmenid. pp. 126, 127, Steph. (pp. 3\u20145 Bekk.).\n\n[59] Diog. Laert. IX. 26, 27, et Menag. ad h. 1. Valer. Max. III. 3\next. 2, 3.\n\n[60] Diog. Laert. VI. 39, Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hyp. III. 8, \u00a7 66.\n\n[61] Plat. Cratyl. p. 402, Steph. (p. 42, Bekk.); Aristot. Met. I. 6,\nXIII. 4.\n\n[62] Johannes Philoponus ad Aristot. de Anima (I. 2) fol. 4 a.\n\n[63] Clemens Alex.: Stromata V. 14, p. 712, ed. Pott. (cit. Steph.\nPo\u00ebs. phil. p. 131).\n\n[64] Cf. Stobaei Ecl. Phys. 22, p. 454.\n\n[65] Diog. La\u00ebrt. IX. 7; Simplic. ad Arist. Phys. p. 6; Stob. Eclog.\nPhys. c. 3, p. 58-60.\n\n[66] Plutarch. de plac. phil. I. 28.\n\n[67] Heraclides; Allegori\u00e6 Homeric\u00e6, pp. 442, 443, ed. Gale.\n\n[68] In writing of them Hegel very seldom separates these two\nphilosophers, though he does so in the Jena edition.\n\n[69] See Hegel\u2019s \u201cWerke,\u201d Vol. III. p 181, et seq.\n\n[70] Ib. p. 112.\n\n[71] Plutarch, de plac. phil. I., 26; Stob\u00e6i Ecl. Phys. 20, p. 394.\n(Tennemann, Vol. I. p. 278.)\n\n[72] Empedocles Agrigentinus. De vita et philosophia ejus exposuit,\ncarminum reliquias ex antiquis scriptoribus collegit, recensuit,\nillustravit, pr\u00e6fationem et indices adjecit Magister Frid. Guil. Sturz,\nLipsi\u00e6, 1805.\n\n[73] Empedoclis et Parmenidis fragmenta, &c., restituta et illustrata\nab Amadeo Peyron.\n\n[74] Cf. Plat. Parmenid. p. 127 (p. 4).\n\n[75] Metaph. I. 3 and 8; De gener. et corrupt. I. 1.\n\n[76] Adv. Math. VII. 120; IX. 10; X. 317.\n\n[77] Arist. De anim. I. 2; Fabricius ad Sext. adv. Math. VII. 92, p.\n389, not. T; Sextus adv. Math. I. 303; VII. 121.\n\n[78] Hegel certainly used in his lectures, to follow the usual\norder, and treat Empedocles before the Atomists. But since, in the\ncourse of his treatment of them, he always connected the Atomists\nwith the Eleatics and Heraclitus, and took Empedocles, in so far as\nhe anticipated design, as the forerunner of Anaxagoras, the present\ntransposition is sufficiently justified. If we further consider that\nEmpedocles swayed to and fro between the One of Heraclitus and the\nMany of Leucippus, without, like them, adhering to either of these\none-sided determinations, it is clear that both moments are assumptions\nthrough whose variations he opened a way for the Anaxagorean conception\nof end, which, by comprehending them, is the essential unity from\nwhich proceeds the manifold of phenomena, as from their immanent\nsource.\u2014[Note by Editor.]\n\n[79] Anaxagor\u00e6 Clazomenii fragmenta, qu\u00e6 supersunt omnia, edita ab E.\nSchaubach, Lipsi\u00e6, 1827.\n\n[80] Plin. Hist. Nat. VII. 53; Brucker, T. I. pp. 493, 494, not.\n\n[81] Diog. Laert. II. 16; Plutarch in Lysandro, 12.\n\n[82] Diog. Laert. II., 12-14; Plutarch, in Pericle, c. 32.\n\n[83] Cf. Aristot. Phys. VIII. 5; Met. XII. 10.\n\n[84] Cf. Sext. Empiric. Hypotyp Pyrrh. III. 4, \u00a7 33.\n\n[85] Diog. Laert. II. 6; Sext. Emp. adv. Math. IX. 6; Arist. Phys.\nVIII. 1.\n\n[86] Platonis Protagoras, pp. 310-314, Steph. (pp. 151-159, Bekk.).\n\n[87] Plat. Protag., pp. 314-317 (pp. 159-164).\n\n[88] Plat. Protag. pp. 318-320 (pp. 166-170).\n\n[89] Plat. Protag. pp. 320-323 (pp. 170-176).\n\n[90] Ibid. pp. 323, 324 (pp. 176-178).\n\n[91] Plat. Protag. pp. 324-328 (pp. 178-184.)\n\n[92] Plat. Meno., p. 91 (p. 371).\n\n[93] Plat. Gorg. pp. 452 et 457 (pp. 15 et 24).\n\n[94] Plat. Euthydem. pp. 283, 284 (pp. 416-418).\n\n[95] Ibid. p. 298 (p. 446).\n\n[96] Xenoph. Memorab. II. c. 1, \u00a7 21 _seq._\n\n[97] Diog. Laert. IX. 50.\n\n[98] Ibid. 54.\n\n[99] Plat. Protag. p. 338 fin. (p. 204).\n\n[100] Plutarch in Pericle, c. 36.\n\n[101] Diog. La\u00ebrt. IX. 51, 52; 55, 56 (Sext. Empir. adv. Math. IX. 56).\n\n[102] Plat. The\u00e6tet. p. 152 (p. 195); Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. I, c. 32,\n\u00a7 216.\n\n[103] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 388, 60; Plat. The\u00e6tet. p. 152. (p.\n195-197).\n\n[104] Plat. The\u00e6tet. p. 154 (p. 201).\n\n[105] Plat. The\u00e6t. pp. 153, 154 (pp. 199, 200); pp. 156, 157 (pp.\n204-206); pp. 158-160 (pp. 208-213).\n\n[106] Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 32, \u00a7\u00a7 217-219.\n\n[107] Diodorus Siculus: XII. p. 106 (ed. Wesseling).\n\n[108] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 66.\n\n[109] Ibid. 67.\n\n[110] Aristotel. de Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia, c. 5.\n\n[111] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 68-70.\n\n[112] Ibid. 71.\n\n[113] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 73, 74.\n\n[114] Ibid. 75, 76.\n\n[115] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 77-80.\n\n[116] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 83, 84.\n\n[117] The distinction between these two words is a very important\none. Schwegler, in explaining Hegel\u2019s position in his \u201cHistory of\nPhilosophy,\u201d states that Hegel asserts that Socrates set _Moralit\u00e4t_,\nthe subjective morality of individual conscience, in the place of\n_Sittlichkeit_, \u201cthe spontaneous, natural, half-unconscious (almost\ninstinctive) virtue that rests in obedience to established custom\n(use and wont, natural objective law, that is at bottom, according to\nHegel, rational, though not yet subjectively cleared, perhaps, into\nits rational principles).\u201d As Dr. Stirling says in his Annotations\nto the same work (p. 394), \u201cThere is a period in the history of the\nState when people live in tradition; that is a period of unreflected\n_Sittlichkeit_, or natural observance. Then there comes a time when the\nobservances are questioned, and when the right or truth they involve\nis reflected into the subject. This is a period of Aufkl\u00e4rung, and for\n_Sittlichkeit_ there is substituted _Moralit\u00e4t_, subjective morality:\nthe subject will approve nought but what he finds inwardly true to\nhimself, to his conscience.\u201d\u2014[TRANSLATOR\u2019S NOTE.]\n\n[118] Diog. Laert. II, 44 (cf. Menag. ad h. 1); 18-20, 22.\n\n[119] Diog. Laert. II. 22, 23; Plat. Apol. Socr. p. 28 (p. 113).\n\n[120] Diog. Laert. II. 24; Xenoph. Memorab. I. c. 1, \u00a7 18; Plat. Apol.\nSocrat. p. 32 (pp. 120-122); Epist. VII. pp. 324, 325 (p. 429).\n\n[121] Plat. Convivium, pp. 212, 176, 213, 214, 223 (pp. 447, 376-378,\n449, 450, 468, 469).\n\n[122] Xenoph. Memorab. I. c. 1, \u00a7 10.\n\n[123] Xenoph. Memorab. I. c. 1, \u00a7 11-16; Aristot. Metaph. I. 6.\n\n[124] Aristot. Metaph. XIII. 4\n\n[125] From the Lectures of the winter 1825-1826.\u2014(NOTE BY EDITOR.)\n\n[126] Platonis The\u00e6tetus, p. 210 (p. 322).\n\n[127] Plat. Protag. p. 349 (pp. 224, 225); pp. 360, 361 (pp. 245-247).\n\n[128] Xenoph. Memorab. IV. c. 2, \u00a7\u00a7 11-17.\n\n[129] Xenoph. Memorab. IV. c. 1, \u00a7 1; c. 2, \u00a7 40.\n\n[130] Cf. Xenoph. Memorab. I. c. 2, \u00a7\u00a7 12-16, sqq.\n\n[131] Herodot. IX. 33, seq.\n\n[132] Xenoph. Apologia Socrat. \u00a7 10; Memorab. I. c. 1, \u00a7 1 Plat.\nApologia Socrat. p. 24 (p. 104).\n\n[133] Apologia Socrat. \u00a7\u00a7 11\u201413; Memorab. I. c. 1, \u00a7\u00a7 2\u20146; 19.\n\n[134] Plat. Apol. Socrat. p. 26 (108, 109).\n\n[135] Apologia Socrat. \u00a7 14 (cf. Memorab. I. c. 1, \u00a7 17).\n\n[136] Plato. Apol. Socrat. p. 21 (p. 97).\n\n[137] Xenoph. Apol. Socrat. \u00a7 14.\n\n[138] Xenoph. Apol. Socrat. \u00a7\u00a7 16\u201419; Memorab. I. c. 2, \u00a7\u00a7 1\u20148.\n\n[139] Xenoph. Apol. Socrat. \u00a7 20; cf. Memorab. I. c. 2, \u00a7 49 seq.\n\n[140] Xenoph. Apol. Socrat. \u00a7\u00a7 20, 21; Memorab. I. c. 2, \u00a7\u00a7 51\u201455;\nPlat. Apol. Socrat. pp. 24\u201426 (pp. 103\u2014107).\n\n[141] Meier und Sch\u00f6mann: Der Attische Process, pp. 173-177.\n\n[142] Diog. La\u00ebrt. II. 106.\n\n[143] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VI. 24.\n\n[144] Cicer. Acad. Qu\u00e6st. II. 42.\n\n[145] Menag. ad Diog. La\u00ebrt. II. 106; Aul. Gellius: Noct. Attic\u00e6, VI.\n10.\n\n[146] Plutarch. de fraterno amore, p. 489, D. (ed. Xyl.); Stob\u00e6i\nSermones: LXXXIV. 15 (T. III. p. 160, ed. Gaisford); Brucker. Hist.\nCrit. Philos. T. I. p. 611.\n\n[147] Diog. La\u00ebrt. II. 106.\n\n[148] Diog. La\u00ebrt. II. 108.\n\n[149] Diog. La\u00ebrt. II. 109.\n\n[150] Diog. La\u00ebrt. II. 111, 112.\n\n[151] Diog. La\u00ebrt. II. 108; Cicero, Acad. Qu\u00e6st. IV. 29; De divinat.\nII. 4.\n\n[152] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VII. 196.\n\n[153] Athen\u00e6us IX. p. 401 (ed. Casaubon, 1597); Suidas, s. v. \u03a6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u1fb6\u03c2,\nT. III. p. 600; Menag. ad Diog. La\u00ebrt. II. 108.\n\n[154] Diog. La\u00ebrt. II. 135.\n\n[155] Diog. La\u00ebrt. II. 108; Bruckeri Hist. Crit. Phil. T. I. p. 613.\n\n[156] Diog. La\u00ebrt. II. 108; Cicer. Acad. Qu\u00e6st. IV. 29; Bruck. Hist.\nCrit. Philos. T. I. p. 614, not. s.\n\n[157] Aristoteles: De Soph. Elench. c. 14; Buhle ad h. 1. argumentum,\np. 512.\n\n[158] Diog. La\u00ebrt. II. 113, 115, 119.\n\n[159] Plutarch, advers. Coloten. c. 22, 23, pp. 1119, 1120, ed. Xyl.\npp. 174-176, Vol. XIV. ed. Hutten.\n\n[160] Diog. La\u00ebrt. II. 65; Tennemann, Vol. II. p. 103: Bruck. Hist.\nCrit. Philos. T. I. p. 584, seq.\n\n[161] Diog. La\u00ebrt. II. 66, 67, 72, 77 (Horat. Serm. II. 3, v. 101),\n79-81.\n\n[162] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 191, 199, 200.\n\n[163] Diog. La\u00ebrt. II. 97, 98 (101, 102).\n\n[164] Diog. La\u00ebrt. II. 93-95.\n\n[165] Cic. Tusc. Quest. I. 34; Val. Max. VIII. 9.\n\n[166] Diog. La\u00ebrt. II. 96, 97.\n\n[167] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VI. 13, 1, 2, 15-18.\n\n[168] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VI. 11, 12 (104).\n\n[169] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VI. 13, 6, 22, 37; Tennemann, Vol. II. p. 89.\n\n[170] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VI. 8; II. 36.\n\n[171] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VI. 74, 61, 37, 105, 22.\n\n[172] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VI. 29, 30 (74); II. 68; VI. 26, 41, 33, 45, 46, 50,\n76, 77 (34).\n\n[173] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VI. 85, 96, 97.\n\n\n\n\n TRANSCRIBER\u2019S NOTE:\n\n\u2014Obvious print and punctuation errors were corrected.","title":"Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":167887}