{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_51636/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_51636","id":"gutenberg_51636","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/51636","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Ancient","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Philosophy -- History"],"text":"HEGEL\u2019S LECTURES ON THE\n HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n VOLUME TWO\n\n\n\n\n Hegel\u2019s Lectures on\n\n THE HISTORY OF\n PHILOSOPHY\n\n _Translated from the German by_\n\n E. S. HALDANE\n\n _and_\n\n FRANCES H. SIMSON, M.A.\n\n _In three volumes_\n\n VOLUME TWO\n\n[Illustration]\n\n ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL LTD\n Broadway House, 68-74 Carter Lane\n London, E.C.4\n\n\n\n\n _First published in England 1894\n by Kegan Paul, Trench, Tr\u00fcbner & Co. Ltd_\n\n _Reprinted 1955\n by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd\n Broadway House, 68-74 Carter Lane\n London, E.C.4_\n\n\n _Reprinted by lithography in Great Britain by\n Jarrold and Sons Limited, Norwich_\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n GREEK PHILOSOPHY\n\n SECTION ONE (CONTINUED)\n\n PAGE\n\n CHAPTER III.\u2014FIRST PERIOD, THIRD DIVISION 1\n\n A. The Philosophy of Plato 1\n\n 1. Dialectic 49\n\n 2. Philosophy of Nature 71\n\n 3. Philosophy of Mind 90\n\n B. The Philosophy of Aristotle 117\n\n 1. Metaphysics 137\n\n 2. Philosophy of Nature 153\n\n 3. Philosophy of Mind 180\n\n _a._ Psychology 180\n\n _b._ Practical Philosophy 202\n\n \u03b1. Ethic 202\n\n \u03b2. Politics 207\n\n 4. Logic 210\n\n\n SECTION TWO\n\n SECOND PERIOD.\u2014DOGMATISM AND SCEPTICISM 232\n\n A. The Philosophy of the Stoics 236\n\n 1. Physics 243\n\n 2. Logic 249\n\n 3. Ethics 257\n\n B. The Philosophy of the Epicureans 276\n\n 1. Canonic 281\n\n 2. Metaphysics 286\n\n 3. Physics 292\n\n 4. Ethics 300\n\n C. The Philosophy of the New Academy 311\n\n 1. Arcesilaus 313\n\n 2. Carneades 319\n\n D. Scepticism 328\n\n 1. Earlier Tropes 347\n\n 2. Later Tropes 357\n\n\n SECTION THREE\n\n THIRD PERIOD.\u2014THE NEO-PLATONISTS 374\n\n A. Philo 387\n\n B. The Cabala and Gnosticism 394\n\n 1. Cabalistic Philosophy 394\n\n 2. The Gnostics 396\n\n C. The Alexandrian Philosophy 399\n\n 1. Ammonias Saccas 403\n\n 2. Plotinus 404\n\n 3. Porphyry and Iamblichus 431\n\n 4. Proclus 432\n\n 5. Successors of Proclus 450\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nFIRST PERIOD, THIRD DIVISION: PLATO AND ARISTOTLE.\n\n\nTHE development of philosophic science as science, and, further, the\nprogress from the Socratic point of view to the scientific, begins with\nPlato and is completed by Aristotle. They of all others deserve to be\ncalled teachers of the human race.\n\n\nA. PLATO.\n\nPlato, who must be numbered among the Socratics, was the most renowned\nof the friends and disciples of Socrates, and he it was who grasped\nin all its truth Socrates\u2019 great principle that ultimate reality\nlies in consciousness, since, according to him, the absolute is in\nthought, and all reality is Thought. He does not understand by this\na one-sided thought, nor what is understood by the false idealism\nwhich makes thought once more step aside and contemplate itself as\nconscious thought, and as in opposition to reality; it is the thought\nwhich embraces in an absolute unity reality as well as thinking, the\nNotion and its reality in the movement of science, as the Idea of a\nscientific whole. While Socrates had comprehended the thought which\nis existent in and for itself, only as an object for self-conscious\nwill, Plato forsook this narrow point of view, and brought the merely\nabstract right of self-conscious thought, which Socrates had raised\nto a principle, into the sphere of science. By so doing he rendered it\npossible to interpret and apply the principle, though his manner of\nrepresentation may not be altogether scientific.\n\nPlato is one of those world-famed individuals, his philosophy one\nof those world-renowned creations, whose influence, as regards the\nculture and development of the mind, has from its commencement down\nto the present time been all-important. For what is peculiar in\nthe philosophy of Plato is its application to the intellectual and\nsupersensuous world, and its elevation of consciousness into the realm\nof spirit. Thus the spiritual element which belongs to thought obtains\nin this form an importance for consciousness, and is brought into\nconsciousness; just as, on the other hand, consciousness obtains a\nfoothold on the soil of the other. The Christian religion has certainly\nadopted the lofty principle that man\u2019s inner and spiritual nature\nis his true nature, and takes it as its universal principle, though\ninterpreting it in its own way as man\u2019s inclination for holiness;\nbut Plato and his philosophy had the greatest share in obtaining for\nChristianity its rational organization, and in bringing it into the\nkingdom of the supernatural, for it was Plato who made the first\nadvance in this direction.\n\nWe must begin by mentioning the facts of Plato\u2019s life. Plato was an\nAthenian, born in the third year of the 87th Olympiad, or, according to\nDodwell, Ol. 87, 4 (B.C. 429), at the beginning of the Peloponnesian\nwar, in the year in which Pericles died. He was, according to this,\nthirty-nine or forty years younger than Socrates. His father, Ariston,\ntraced his lineage from Cadrus; his mother, Perictione, was descended\nfrom Solon. The paternal uncle of his mother was the celebrated\nCritias, who was for a time among the associates of Socrates, and\nwho was the most talented and brilliant, but also the most dangerous\nand obnoxious, of the Thirty Tyrants of Athens (_supra_, Vol. I. p.\n421). Critias is usually represented by the ancients as an atheist,\nwith the Cyrenaic Theodoras and Diagoras of Melos; Sextus Empiricus\n(adv. Math. IX. 51-54) has preserved to us a fine fragment from one\nof his poems. Sprung from this noble race, and with no lack of means\nfor his culture, Plato received from the most highly esteemed of the\nSophists an education in all the arts which were then thought to befit\nan Athenian. In his family he was called Aristocles; it was only later\nthat he received from his teacher the name of Plato. Some say that he\nwas so styled because of the breadth of his forehead; others, because\nof the richness and breadth of his discourse; others again, because of\nhis well-built form.[1]\n\nIn his youth he cultivated poetry, and wrote tragedies\u2014very much like\nyoung poets in our day\u2014also dithyrambs and songs. Various specimens of\nthe last are still preserved to us in the Greek anthology, and have as\nsubject his various loves; we have amongst others a well-known epigram\non a certain Aster, one of his best friends, which contains a pretty\nfancy, found also in Shakespeare\u2019s Romeo and Juliet:\n\n \u201cTo the stars thou look\u2019st, mine Aster,\n O would that I were Heaven,\n With eyes so many thus to gaze on thee.\u201d[2]\n\nIn his youth he had every intention of devoting himself to politics.\nHe was brought by his father to Socrates when in his twentieth year,\nand enjoyed intimate friendship with him for eight years. It is related\nthat Socrates dreamt on the preceding night that he had a young swan\nperched on his knees, whose wings quickly developed, and which then\nflew up to heaven, singing the sweetest songs. Many such incidents are\nmentioned by the ancients, and they bear witness to the deep reverence\nand love with which both contemporaries and those of later times\nregarded the calm dignity of Plato, and that loftiness of demeanour\nwhich he combined with extreme simplicity and lovableness, traits of\ncharacter which won for him the name of \u201cthe divine.\u201d Plato did not\ncontent himself with the society and wisdom of Socrates, but studied\nin addition the older philosophers, particularly Heraclitus. Aristotle\n(Met. I. 6) states that Plato, before he ever came to Socrates,\nassociated with Cratylus, and had been initiated into the doctrines of\nHeraclitus. He also studied the Eleatics, and very particularly the\nPythagoreans, and he frequented the society of the most noted Sophists.\nThus deeply immersed in Philosophy, he lost his interest in poetry and\npolitics, and gave them up altogether, that he might devote himself\nentirely to scientific pursuits. He fulfilled, like Socrates, his term\nof military service as an Athenian citizen, and is said to have taken\npart in three campaigns.[3]\n\nWe have already mentioned (Vol. I. p. 448) that, after Socrates\nwas put to death, Plato, like many other philosophers, fled from\nAthens, and betook himself to Euclides at Megara. Leaving Megara\nbefore long, he travelled first to Cyrene in Africa, where he turned\nhis attention specially to mathematics, under the guidance of the\ncelebrated mathematician Theodoras, whom he introduces as taking part\nin several of his dialogues. Plato himself soon attained to high\nproficiency in mathematics. To him is attributed the solution of the\nDelian or Delphic problem, which was proposed by the oracle, and,\nlike the Pythagorean dogma, has reference to the cube. The problem\nis, to draw a line the cube of which will be equal to the sum of two\ngiven cubes. This requires a construction through two curves. The\nnature of the tasks then set by the oracles is very curious; on this\nparticular occasion application had been made to the oracle in a time\nof pestilence, and it responded by proposing an entirely scientific\nproblem; the change indicated in the spirit of the oracle is highly\nsignificant. From Cyrene Plato went to Italy and Egypt. In Magna Gr\u00e6cia\nhe made the acquaintance of the Pythagoreans of that day, Archytas of\nTarentum, the celebrated mathematician, Philolaus and others; and he\nalso bought the writings of the older Pythagoreans at a high price.\nIn Sicily he made friends with Dion. Returning to Athens, he opened\na school of Philosophy in the Academy, a grove or promenade in which\nstood a gymnasium, and there he discoursed to his disciples.[4] This\npleasure-ground had been laid out in honour of the hero Academus,\nbut Plato was the true hero of the Academy who did away with the old\nsignificance of the name, and overshadowed the fame of the original\nhero, whose place he so completely took that the latter comes down to\nafter ages only as connected with Plato.\n\nPlato\u2019s busy life in Athens was twice interrupted by a journey to\nSicily, to the Court of Dionysius the younger, ruler of Syracuse and\nSicily. This connection with Dionysius was the most important, if not\nthe only external relation into which Plato entered; it had, however,\nno lasting result. Dion, the nearest relative of Dionysius, and other\nrespected Syracusans, his friends, deluded themselves with vain hopes\nregarding Dionysius. He had been allowed by his father to grow up\nalmost without education, but his friends had instilled into him some\nnotion of and respect for Philosophy, and had roused in him a desire to\nmake acquaintance with Plato. They hoped that Dionysius would profit\ngreatly by his intimacy with Plato, and that his character, which was\nstill unformed, and to all appearance far from unpromising, would be so\ninfluenced by Plato\u2019s idea of the constitution of a true state, that\nthis might, through him, come to be realized in Sicily. It was partly\nhis friendship with Dion, and partly and more especially the high\nhopes he himself cherished of seeing a true form of government actually\nestablished by Dionysius, that induced Plato to take the mistaken step\nof journeying to Sicily. On the surface it seems an excellent idea\nthat a young prince should have a wise man at his elbow to instruct\nand inspire him; and on this idea a hundred political romances have\nbeen based; the picture has, however, no reality behind it. Dionysius\nwas much pleased with Plato, it is true, and conceived such a respect\nfor him that he desired to be respected by him in turn; but this did\nnot last long. Dionysius was one of those mediocre natures who may\nindeed in a half-hearted way aspire to glory and honour, but are\ncapable of no depth and earnestness, however much they may affect it,\nand who lack all strength of character. His intentions were good, but\nthe power failed him to carry them out; it was like our own satirical\nrepresentations in the theatre, of a person who aspires to be quite\na paragon, and turns out an utter fool. The position of affairs\nrepresented thereby can be nothing but this, seeing that lack of\nenergy alone allows itself to be guided; but it is also the same lack\nof energy which renders impossible of execution even a plan made by\nitself. The rupture between Plato and Dionysius took place on personal\ngrounds. Dionysius fell out with his relative Dion, and Plato became\ninvolved in the quarrel, because he would not give up his friendship\nwith Dion. Dionysius was incapable of a friendship based on esteem and\nsympathy in pursuits; it was partly his personal inclination to Plato,\nand partly mere vanity, which had made him seek the philosopher\u2019s\nfriendship. Dionysius could not, however, induce Plato to come under\nany obligation to him; he desired that Plato should give himself up to\nhim entirely, but this was a demand that Plato refused to entertain.[5]\n\n\nPlato accordingly took his departure. After the separation, however,\nboth felt the desire to be again together. Dionysius recalled Plato,\nin order to effect a reconciliation with him; he could not endure\nthat he should have failed in the attempt to attach Plato permanently\nto himself, and he found it specially intolerable that Plato would\nnot give up Dion. Plato yielded to the urgent representations,\nnot only of his family and Dion, but also of Archytas and other\nPythagoreans of Tarentum, to whom Dionysius had applied, and who were\ntaking an interest in the reconciliation of Dionysius with Dion and\nPlato; indeed, they went so far as to guarantee safety and liberty\nof departure to Plato. But Dionysius found that he could endure\nPlato\u2019s presence no better than his absence; he felt himself thereby\nconstrained. And though, by the influence of Plato and his other\ncompanions, a respect for science had been awakened in Dionysius,\nand he had thus become more cultured, he never penetrated beyond the\nsurface. His interest in Philosophy was just as superficial as his\nrepeated attempts in poetry; and while he wished to be everything\u2014poet,\nphilosopher, and statesman\u2014he would not submit to be under the\nguidance of others. Thus no closer tie between Plato and Dionysius\nwas formed; they drew together again, and again parted, so that the\nthird visit to Sicily ended also in coldness, and the connection was\nnot again established. This time the ill-feeling with regard to the\ncontinued relations with Dion ran so high, that when Plato wished to\nleave Sicily, on account of the treatment his friend had met with from\nDionysius, the latter deprived him of the means of conveyance, and\nat last would have forcibly prevented his departure from Sicily. The\nPythagoreans of Tarentum came at length to the rescue,[6] demanded\nPlato back from Dionysius, got him conveyed away safely, and brought\nhim to Greece. They were aided by the circumstance that Dionysius was\nafraid of an ill report being spread that he was not on good terms with\nPlato.[7] Thus Plato\u2019s hopes were shattered, and his dream of shaping\nthe constitution in accordance with the demands of his own philosophic\nideas, through the agency of Dionysius, proved vain.\n\nAt a later date, therefore, he actually refused to be the lawgiver of\nother States, though they had made application to him for that very\npurpose; amongst these applicants were the inhabitants of Cyrene and\nthe Arcadians. It was a time when many of the Greek States found their\nconstitutions unsatisfactory, and yet could not devise anything new.[8]\nNow in the last thirty years[9] many constitutions have been drawn up,\nand it would be no hard task for anyone having had much experience in\nthis work to frame another. But theorizing is not sufficient for a\nconstitution; it is not individuals who make it; it is something divine\nand spiritual, which develops in history. So strong is this power\nof the world-spirit that the thought of an individual is as nothing\nagainst it; and when such thoughts do count for something, _i.e._\nwhen they can be realized, they are then none other than the product\nof this power of the universal spirit. The idea that Plato should\nbecome lawgiver was not adapted for the times; Solon and Lycurgus\nwere lawgivers, but in Plato\u2019s day such a thing was impracticable.\nHe declined any further compliance with the wishes of these States,\nbecause they would not agree to the first condition which he imposed,\nnamely, the abolition of all private property,[10] a principle which\nwe shall deal with later, in considering Plato\u2019s practical philosophy.\nHonoured thus throughout the whole land, and especially in Athens,\nPlato lived until the first year of the 108th Olympiad (B.C. 348); and\ndied on his birthday, at a wedding feast, in the eighty-first year of\nhis age.[11]\n\nWe have to speak, in the first place, of the direct mode in which\nPlato\u2019s philosophy has come down to us; it is to be found in those\nof his writings which we possess; indubitably they are one of the\nfairest gifts which fate has preserved from the ages that are gone.\nHis philosophy is not, however, properly speaking, presented there in\nsystematic form, and to construct it from such writings is difficult,\nnot so much from anything in itself, as because this philosophy has\nbeen differently understood in different periods of time; and, more\nthan all, because it has been much and roughly handled in modern times\nby those who have either read into it their own crude notions, being\nenable to conceive the spiritual spiritually, or have regarded as the\nessential and most significant element in Plato\u2019s philosophy that which\nin reality does not belong to Philosophy at all, but only to the mode\nof presentation; in truth, however, it is only ignorance of Philosophy\nthat renders it difficult to grasp the philosophy of Plato. The form\nand matter of these works are alike of interest and importance. In\nstudying them we must nevertheless make sure, in the first place, what\nof Philosophy we mean to seek and may find within them, and, on the\nother hand, what Plato\u2019s point of view never can afford us, because\nin his time it was not there to give. Thus it may be that the longing\nwith which we approached Philosophy is left quite unsatisfied; it is,\nhowever, better that we should not be altogether satisfied than that\nsuch conclusions should be regarded as final. Plato\u2019s point of view is\nclearly defined and necessary, but it is impossible for us to remain\nthere, or to go back to it; for Reason now makes higher demands. As for\nregarding it as the highest standpoint, and that which we must take for\nour own\u2014it belongs to the weaknesses of our time not to be able to bear\nthe greatness, the immensity of the claims made by the human spirit,\nto feel crushed before them, and to flee from them faint-hearted. We\nmust stand above Plato, _i.e._ we must acquaint ourselves with the\nneeds of thoughtful minds in our own time, or rather we must ourselves\nexperience these needs. Just as the pedagogue\u2019s aim is to train up men\nso as to shield them from the world, or to keep them in a particular\nsphere\u2014the counting-house, for instance, or bean-planting, if you wish\nto be idyllic\u2014where they will neither know the world nor be known\nby it; so in Philosophy a return has been made to religious faith,\nand therefore to the Platonic philosophy.[12] Both are moments which\nhave their due place and their own importance, but they are not the\nphilosophy of our time. It would be perfectly justifiable to return\nto Plato in order to learn anew from him the Idea of speculative\nPhilosophy, but it is idle to speak of him with extravagant enthusiasm,\nas if he represented beauty and excellence in general. Moreover, it is\nquite superfluous for Philosophy, and belongs to the hypercriticism\nof our times, to treat Plato from a literary point of view, as\nSchleiermacher does, critically examining whether one or another of the\nminor dialogues is genuine or not. Regarding the more important of the\ndialogues, we may mention that the testimony of the ancients leaves not\nthe slightest doubt.\n\nThen of course the very character of Plato\u2019s works, offering us in\ntheir manysidedness various modes of treating Philosophy, constitutes\nthe first difficulty standing in the way of a comprehension of his\nphilosophy. If we still had the oral discourses (\u1f04\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03b1 \u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1) of\nPlato, under the title \u201cConcerning the Good\u201d (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe6), which his\nscholars noted down, we should have had his philosophy before us in\nsimpler, because in more systematic form.[13] Aristotle seems to have\nhad these discourses before him, when dealing with the philosophy of\nPlato, and he quotes them in his work \u201cOn Philosophy,\u201d or, \u201cOn the\nIdeas,\u201d or, \u201cOn the Good\u201d (Brandis has written on this topic). But,\nas it happens, we have only Plato\u2019s Dialogues, and their form renders\nit all the more difficult for us to gather a definite idea of his\nphilosophy. For the dialogue form contains very heterogeneous elements;\nPhilosophy proper in the treatment of absolute Being, and, intermingled\nwith that, its particular mode of representation. It is just this which\nconstitutes the manysidedness of Plato\u2019s works.\n\nA second difficulty is said to lie in the distinction drawn between\nexoteric and esoteric philosophy. Tennemann (Vol. II. p. 220) says:\n\u201cPlato exercised the right, which is conceded to every thinker, of\ncommunicating only so much of his discoveries as he thought good, and\nof so doing only to those whom he credited with capacity to receive it.\nAristotle, too, had an esoteric and an exoteric philosophy, but with\nthis difference, that in his case the distinction was merely formal,\nwhile with Plato it was also material.\u201d How nonsensical! This would\nappear as if the philosopher kept possession of his thoughts in the\nsame way as of his external goods: the philosophic Idea is, however,\nsomething utterly different, and instead of being possessed by, it\npossesses a man. When philosophers discourse on philosophic subjects,\nthey follow of necessity the course of their ideas; they cannot keep\nthem in their pockets; and when one man speaks to another, if his\nwords have any meaning at all, they must contain the idea present\nto him. It is easy enough to hand over an external possession, but\nthe communication of ideas requires a certain skill; there is always\nsomething esoteric in this, something more than the merely exoteric.\nThis difficulty is therefore trifling.\n\nThirdly, as one of the circumstances that render it difficult to\ncomprehend Plato\u2019s own speculative thought, we can scarcely reckon the\nexternal consideration that in his Dialogues he does not speak in his\nown person, but introduces Socrates and many others as the speakers,\nwithout always making it plain which of them expresses the writer\u2019s\nown opinion. By reason of this historic circumstance, which seems\nto bear out the manysidedness of Plato, it has of course been often\nsaid, by ancients as well as moderns, that he merely expounded, from\na historical point of view, the system and doctrine of Socrates, that\nhe adapted much in the Dialogues from various Sophists, and avowedly\nadvanced many theorems belonging to an earlier date, especially those\nof the Pythagoreans, Heraclitics, and Eleatics, even adopting, in\nthe last case, the Eleatic mode of treatment. Hence it was said that\nto these philosophies the whole matter of the treatise belonged,\nthe outward form alone being Plato\u2019s. It is therefore necessary to\ndistinguish what is peculiarly his and what is not, or whether the\ncomponent parts are in harmony. In the Socratic Dialogues that we have\nfrom Cicero, the personages can be much more readily made out; but in\nCicero there is nothing of real interest offered to us. With Plato\nthere can be no talk of this ambiguity, and the difficulty is only in\nappearance. In the Dialogues of Plato his philosophy is quite clearly\nexpressed; they are not constructed as are the conversations of some\npeople, which consist of many monologues, in which one person expresses\na certain opinion and another person differs from him, and both hold\nto their own way of thinking. Here, on the contrary, the divergency\nof opinions which comes out is examined, and a conclusion arrived at\nas to the truth; or, if the result is negative, the whole process of\nknowledge is what is seen in Plato. There is, therefore, no need to\ninquire further as to what belongs to Socrates in the Dialogues, and\nwhat belongs to Plato. This further observation we must, however, make,\nthat since Philosophy in its ultimate essence is one and the same,\nevery succeeding philosopher will and must take up into his own, all\nphilosophies that went before, and what falls specially to him is their\nfurther development. Philosophy is not a thing apart, like a work of\nart; though even in a work of art it is the skill which the artist\nlearns from others that he puts into practice. What is original in the\nartist is his conception as a whole, and the intelligent use of the\nmeans already at his command; there may occur to him in working an\nendless variety of ideas and discoveries of his own. But Philosophy\nhas one thought, one reality, as its foundation; and nothing can be\nput in the place of the true knowledge of this already attained; it\nmust of necessity make itself evident in later developments. Therefore,\nas I have already observed (Vol. I. p. 166), Plato\u2019s Dialogues are\nnot to be considered as if their aim were to put forward a variety of\nphilosophies, nor as if Plato\u2019s were an eclectic philosophy derived\nfrom them; it forms rather the knot in which these abstract and\none-sided principles have become truly united in a concrete fashion.\nIn giving a general idea of the history of Philosophy, we have already\nseen (Vol. I. p. 54) that such points of union, in which the true is\nconcrete, must occur in the onward course of philosophical development.\nThe concrete is the unity of diverse determinations and principles;\nthese, in order to be perfected, in order to come definitely before\nthe consciousness, must first of all be presented separately. Thereby\nthey of course acquire an aspect of one-sidedness in comparison with\nthe higher principle which follows: this, nevertheless, does not\nannihilate them, nor even leave them where they were, but takes them\nup into itself as moments. Thus in Plato\u2019s philosophy we see all\nmanner of philosophic teaching from earlier times absorbed into a\ndeeper principle, and therein united. It is in this way that Plato\u2019s\nphilosophy shows itself to be a totality of ideas: therefore, as the\nresult, the principles of others are comprehended in itself. Frequently\nPlato does nothing more than explain the doctrines of earlier\nphilosophers; and the only particular feature in his representation\nof them is that their scope is extended. His Tim\u00e6us is, by unanimous\ntestimony, the amplification of a still extant work of Pythagoras;[14]\nand, in like manner, his amplification of the doctrine of Parmenides\nis of such a nature that its principle is freed from its one-sided\ncharacter.\n\nThese last two difficulties having been disposed of, if we would\nlikewise solve the first mentioned, we must proceed to describe the\nform in which Plato has propounded his ideas, keeping it, on the other\nhand, distinct from Philosophy proper, as we find it with him. The\nform of the Platonic philosophy is, as is well known, the dialogue.\nThe beauty of this form is highly attractive; yet we must not think,\nas many do, that it is the most perfect form in which to present\nPhilosophy; it is peculiar to Plato, and as a work of art is of course\nto be much esteemed.\n\nIn the first place, scenery and dramatic form belong to what is\nexternal. Plato gives to his Dialogues a setting of reality, both as\nregards place and persons, and chooses out some particular occasion\nwhich has brought his characters together; this in itself is very\nnatural and charming. Socrates takes the leading part, and among the\nother actors there are many stars well known to us, such as Agathon,\nZeno, and Aristophanes. We find ourselves in some particular spot; in\nthe Ph\u00e6drus (p. 229 Steph.; p. 6 Bekk.) it is at the plane tree beside\nthe clear waters of the Ilyssus, through which Socrates and Ph\u00e6drus\npass; in other dialogues we are conducted to the halls of the gymnasia,\nto the Academy, or to a banquet. By never allowing himself to appear\nin person, but putting his thoughts always in the mouth of others, any\nsemblance of preaching or of dogmatizing is avoided by Plato, and the\nnarrator appears just as little as he does in the History of Thucydides\nor in Homer. Xenophon sometimes brings himself forward, sometimes he\nentirely loses sight of the aim he had in view, of vindicating by what\nhe tells of them the life of Socrates and his method of instruction.\nWith Plato, on the contrary, all is quite objective and plastic; and he\nemploys great art in removing from himself all responsibility for his\nassertions, often assigning them even to a third or fourth person.\n\nAs regards the tone of the intercourse between the characters in these\nDialogues, we find that the noblest urbanity of well-bred men reigns\nsupreme; the Dialogues are a lesson in refinement; we see in them the\n_savoir faire_ of a man acquainted with the world. The term courtesy\ndoes not quite express urbanity; it is too wide, and includes the\nadditional notion of testifying respect, of expressing deference and\npersonal obligation; urbanity is true courtesy, and forms its real\nbasis. But urbanity makes a point of granting complete liberty to all\nwith whom we converse, both as regards the character and matter of\ntheir opinions, and also the right of giving expression to the same.\nThus in our counter-statements and contradictions we make it evident\nthat what we have ourselves to say against the statement made by our\nopponent is the mere expression of our subjective opinion; for this\nis a conversation carried on by persons as persons, and not objective\nreason talking with itself. However energetically we may then express\nourselves, we must always acknowledge that our opponent is also a\nthinking person; just as one must not take to speaking with the air\nof being an oracle, nor prevent anyone else from opening his mouth\nin reply. This urbanity is, however, not forbearance, but rather\nthe highest degree of frankness and candour, and it is this very\ncharacteristic which gives such gracefulness to Plato\u2019s Dialogues.\n\nFinally, this dialogue is not a conversation, in which what is said\nhas, and is meant to have, a merely casual connection, without any\nexhaustive treatment of the subject. When one talks only for amusement,\nthe casual and arbitrary sequence of ideas is quite to be expected. In\nthe introduction, to be sure, the Dialogues of Plato have sometimes\nthis very character of being mere conversations, and consequently\nappear to take an accidental form; for Socrates is made to take his\nstart from the particular conceptions of certain individuals, and from\nthe circle of their ideas (Vol. I. p. 397). Later, however, these\ndialogues become a systematic development of the matter in hand,\nwherein the subjective character of the conversation disappears,\nand the whole course of the argument shows a beautifully consistent\ndialectic process. Socrates talks, turns the conversation, lays down\nhis own views, draws a conclusion, and does all this through the\napparent instrumentality of the question; most questions are so framed\nas to be answered by merely Yes or No. The dialogue seems to be the\nform best adapted for representing an argument, because it sways hither\nand thither; the different sides are allotted to different persons, and\nthus the argument is made more animated. The dialogue has, however,\nthis disadvantage, that it seems to be carried on arbitrarily, so that\nat the end the feeling always remains that the matter might have turned\nout differently. But in the Platonic Dialogues this arbitrary character\nis apparent only; it has been got rid of by limiting the development\nto the development of the subject in hand, and by leaving very little\nto be said by the second speaker. Such personages are, as we already\nsaw in connection with Socrates (Vol. I. p. 402), plastic personages\nas regards the conversation; no one is put there to state his own\nviews, or, as the French express it, _pour placer son mot_. Just as\nin the Catechism the answers are prescribed to the questions asked,\nso is it in these dialogues, for they who answer have to say what the\nauthor pleases. The question is so framed that a quite simple answer\nis alone possible, and, thanks to the artistic beauty and power of the\ndialogues, such an answer appears at the same time perfectly natural.\n\nIn the next place, there is connected with this outward aspect of\npersonality the circumstance that the Platonic philosophy does not\nproclaim itself to be one particular field, where some one begins a\nscience of his own in a sphere of his own; for it sometimes enters\ninto the ordinary conceptions of culture, like those of Socrates,\nsometimes into those of the Sophists, at other times into those of\nearlier philosophers, and in so doing brings before us exemplifications\nfrom ordinary knowledge, and also uses the methods of the same. A\nsystematic exposition of Philosophy we cannot in this way find; and of\ncourse it is all the less easy for us to take a comprehensive view of\nthe subject, since there are at hand no means of judging whether the\ntreatment has been exhaustive or not. Nevertheless, there is present\nthere one spirit, one definite point of view as regards Philosophy,\neven though Mind does not make its appearance in the precise form which\nwe demand. The philosophic culture of Plato, like the general culture\nof his time, was not yet ripe for really scientific work; the Idea was\nstill too fresh and new; it was only in Aristotle that it attained to a\nsystematic scientific form of representation.\n\nConnected with this deficiency in Plato\u2019s mode of representation, there\nis also a deficiency in respect of the concrete determination of the\nIdea itself, since the various elements of the Platonic philosophy\nwhich are represented in these dialogues, namely the merely popular\nconceptions of Being and the apprehending knowledge of the same,\nare really mixed up in a loose, popular way, so that the former\nmore especially come to be represented in a myth or parable; such\nintermingling is inevitable in this beginning of science proper in its\ntrue form. Plato\u2019s lofty mind, which had a perception or conception\nof Mind, penetrated through his subject with the speculative Notion,\nbut he only began to penetrate it thus, and he did not yet embrace\nthe whole of its reality in the Notion; or the knowledge which\nappeared in Plato did not yet fully realize itself in him. Here it\ntherefore happens sometimes that the ordinary conception of reality\nagain separates itself from its Notion, and that the latter comes\ninto opposition with it, without any statement having been made that\nthe Notion alone constitutes reality. Thus we find Plato speaking of\nGod, and again, in the Notion, of the absolute reality of things, but\nspeaking of them as separated, or in a connection in which they both\nappear separated; and God, as an uncomprehended existence, is made to\nbelong to the ordinary conception. Sometimes, in order to give greater\ncompleteness and reality, in place of following out the Notion, mere\npictorial conceptions are introduced, myths, spontaneous imaginations\nof his own, or tales derived from the sensuous conception, which no\ndoubt are determined by thought, but which this has never permeated in\ntruth, but only in such a way that the intellectual is determined by\nthe forms of ordinary conception. For instance, appearances of the body\nor of nature, which are perceptible by the senses, are brought forward\nalong with thoughts regarding them, which do not nearly so completely\nexhaust the subject as if it had been thoroughly thought out, and the\nNotion allowed to pursue an independent course.\n\nLooking at this as it bears on the question of how Plato\u2019s philosophy\nis to be apprehended, we find, owing to these two circumstances, that\neither too much or too little is found in it. Too much is found by the\nancients, the so-called -, who sometimes dealt with Plato\u2019s philosophy\nas they dealt with the Greek mythology. This they allegorized and\nrepresented as the expression of ideas\u2014which the myths certainly\nare\u2014and in the same way they first raised the ideas in Plato\u2019s myths\nto the rank of theorems: for the merit of Philosophy consists alone in\nthe fact that truth is expressed in the form of the Notion. Sometimes,\nagain, they took what with Plato is in the form of the Notion for the\nexpression of Absolute Being\u2014the theory of Being in the Parmenides, for\ninstance, for the knowledge of God\u2014just as if Plato had not himself\ndrawn a distinction between them. But in the pure Notions of Plato the\nordinary conception as such is not abrogated; either it is not said\nthat these Notions constitute its reality, or they are to Plato no more\nthan a conception, and not reality. Again, we certainly see that too\nlittle is found in Plato by the moderns in particular; for they attach\nthemselves pre-eminently to the side of the ordinary conception, and\nsee in it reality. What in Plato relates to the Notion, or what is\npurely speculative, is nothing more in their eyes than roaming about\nin abstract logical notions, or than empty subtleties: on the other\nhand, they take that for theorem which was enunciated as a popular\nconception. Thus we find in Tennemann (Vol. II. p. 376) and others an\nobstinate determination to lead back the Platonic Philosophy to the\nforms of our former metaphysic, _e.g._ to the proof of the existence of\nGod.\n\nHowever much, therefore, Plato\u2019s mythical presentation of Philosophy is\npraised, and however attractive it is in his Dialogues, it yet proves a\nsource of misapprehensions; and it is one of these misapprehensions, if\nPlato\u2019s myths are held to be what is most excellent in his philosophy.\nMany propositions, it is true, are made more easily intelligible by\nbeing presented in mythical form; nevertheless, what is not the true\nway of presenting them; propositions are thoughts which, in order to\nbe pure, must be brought forward as such. The myth is always a mode\nof representation which, as belonging to an earlier stage, introduces\nsensuous images, which are directed to imagination, not to thought;\nin this, however, the activity of thought is suspended, it cannot yet\nestablish itself by its own power, and so is not yet free. The myth\nbelongs to the pedagogic stage of the human race, since it entices and\nallures men to occupy themselves with the content; but as it takes away\nfrom the purity of thought through sensuous forms, it cannot express\nthe meaning of Thought. When the Notion attains its full development,\nit has no more need of the myth. Plato often says that it is difficult\nto express one\u2019s thoughts on such and such a subject, and he therefore\nwill employ a myth; no doubt this is easier. Plato also says of simple\nNotions that they are dependent, transitory moments, which have their\nultimate truth in God; and in this first mention of God by Plato, He is\nmade a mere conception. Thus the manner of conception and the genuinely\nspeculative element are confounded.\n\nIn order to gather Plato\u2019s philosophy from his dialogues, what we have\nto do is to distinguish what belongs to ordinary conception\u2014especially\nwhere Plato has recourse to myths for the presentation of a philosophic\nidea\u2014from the philosophic idea itself; only then do we know that what\nbelongs only to the ordinary conception, as such, does not belong to\nthought, is not the essential. But if we do not recognize what is\nNotion, or what is speculative, there is inevitably the danger of these\nmyths leading us to draw quite a host of maxims and theorems from the\ndialogues, and to give them out as Plato\u2019s philosophic propositions,\nwhile they are really nothing of the kind, but belong entirely to\nthe manner of presentation. Thus, for instance, in the Tim\u00e6us (p. 41\nSteph.; p. 43 Bekk.) Plato makes use of the form, God created the\nworld, and the d\u00e6mons had a certain share in the work; this is spoken\nquite after the manner of the popular conception. If, however, it is\ntaken as a philosophic dogma on Plato\u2019s part that God made the world,\nthat higher beings of a spiritual kind exist, and, in the creation of\nthe world, lent God a helping hand, we may see that this stands word\nfor word in Plato, and yet it does not belong to his philosophy. When\nin pictorial fashion he says of the soul of man that it has a rational\nand an irrational part, this is to be taken only in a general sense;\nPlato does not thereby make the philosophic assertion that the soul\nis compounded of two kinds of substance, two kinds of thing. When he\nrepresents knowledge or learning as a process of recollection, this\nmay be taken to mean that the soul existed before man\u2019s birth. In\nlike manner, when he speaks of the central point of his philosophy,\nof Ideas, of the Universal, as the permanently self-existent, as the\npatterns of things sensible, we may easily be led to think of these\nIdeas, after the manner of the modern categories of the understanding,\nas substances which exist outside reality, in the Understanding of\nGod; or on their own account and as independent\u2014like the angels, for\nexample. In short, all that is expressed in the manner of pictorial\nconception is taken by the moderns in sober earnest for philosophy.\nSuch a representation of Plato\u2019s philosophy can be supported by Plato\u2019s\nown words; but one who knows what Philosophy is, cares little for such\nexpressions, and recognizes what was Plato\u2019s true meaning.\n\nIn the account of the Platonic philosophy to which I must now proceed,\nthe two cannot certainly be separated, but they must be noted and\njudged of in a very different manner from that which has prevailed\namongst the moderns. We have, on the one hand, to make clear Plato\u2019s\ngeneral conception of what Philosophy and Knowledge really are, and on\nthe other to develop the particular branches of Philosophy of which he\ntreats.\n\nIn considering his general conception of Philosophy, the first point\nthat strikes us is the high estimation in which Plato held Philosophy.\nThe lofty nature of the knowledge of Philosophy deeply impressed him,\nand he shows a real enthusiasm for the thought which deals with the\nabsolute. Just as the Cyrenaics treat of the relation of the existent\nto the individual consciousness, and the Cynics assert immediate\nfreedom to be reality, Plato upholds the self-mediating unity of\nconsciousness and reality, or knowledge. He everywhere expresses the\nmost exalted ideas regarding the value of Philosophy, as also the\ndeepest and strongest sense of the inferiority of all else; he speaks\nof it with the greatest energy and enthusiasm, with all the pride of\nscience, and in a manner such as nowadays we should not venture to\nadopt. There is in him none of the so-called modest attitude of this\nscience towards other spheres of knowledge, nor of man towards God.\nPlato has a full consciousness of how near human reason is to God, and\nindeed of its unity with Him. Men do not mind reading this in Plato, an\nancient, because it is no longer a present thing, but were it coming\nfrom a modern philosopher, it would be taken much amiss. Philosophy\nto Plato is man\u2019s highest possible possession and true reality; it\nalone has to be sought of man. Out of many passages on this subject I\nshall quote in the first instance the following from the Tim\u00e6us (p. 47\nSteph.; p. 54 Bekk.): \u201cOur knowledge of what is most excellent begins\nwith the eyes. The distinction between the visible day and the night,\nthe months and courses of the planets, have begotten a knowledge of\ntime, and awakened a desire to know the nature of the whole. From this\nwe then obtained Philosophy, and no greater gift than this, given by\nGod to man, has ever come or will come.\u201d\n\nThe manner in which Plato expresses his opinions on this subject in\nthe Republic is very well known, as it is greatly decried, because\nit so completely contradicts the common ideas of men, and it is all\nthe more surprising in that it concerns the relation of Philosophy\nto the state, and therefore to actuality. For before this, though\na certain value might indeed be attributed to Philosophy, it still\nremained confined to the thoughts of the individual; here, however,\nit goes forth into questions of constitution, government, actuality.\nAfter Plato made Socrates, in the Republic, expound the nature of a\ntrue state, he caused Glaucon to interrupt by expressing his desire\nthat Plato should show how it could be possible for such a state to\nexist. Socrates parries the question, will not come to the point,\nseeks evasive pleas, and tries to extricate himself by asserting that\nin describing what is just, he does not bind himself to show how it\nmight be realized in actuality, though some indication must certainly\nbe given of how an approximate, if not a complete realization of it\nmight be possible. Finally, when pressed, he says: \u201cThen it shall\nbe expressed, even though a flood of laughter and utter disbelief\noverwhelm me. When philosophers rule the states, or the so-called kings\nand princes of the present time are truly and completely philosophers,\nwhen thus political greatness and Philosophy meet in one, and the many\nnatures who now follow either side to the exclusion of the other, come\ntogether, then, and not till then, can there be an end, dear Glaucon,\neither to the evils of the state or, as I believe, to those of the\nhuman race. Then only will this state of which I spoke be possible or\nsee the light of day.\u201d \u201cThis,\u201d adds Socrates, \u201cis what I have so long\nhesitated to say, because I know that it is so much opposed to ordinary\nideas.\u201d Plato makes Glaucon answer, \u201cSocrates, you have expressed what,\nyou must recollect, would cause many men, and not bad men either, to\npull off their coats and seize the first weapon that comes to hand, and\nset upon you one and all with might and main; and if you don\u2019t know how\nto appease them with your reasons, you will have to answer for it.\u201d[15]\n\nPlato here plainly asserts the necessity for thus uniting Philosophy\nwith government. As to this demand, it may seem a piece of great\npresumption to say that philosophers should have the government of\nstates accorded to them, for the territory or ground of history is\ndifferent from that of Philosophy. In history, the Idea, as the\nabsolute power, has certainly to realize itself; in other words,\nGod rules in the world. But history is the Idea working itself out\nin a natural way, and not with the consciousness of the Idea. The\naction is certainly in accordance with general reflections on what is\nright, moral, and pleasing to God; but we must recognize that action\nrepresents at the same time the endeavours of the subject as such for\nparticular ends. The realization of the Idea thus takes place through\nan intermingling of thoughts and Notions with immediate and particular\nends. Hence it is only on the one side produced through thoughts, and\non the other through circumstances, through human actions in their\ncapacity of means. These means often seem opposed to the Idea, but that\ndoes not really matter; all those particular ends are really only means\nof bringing forth the Idea, because it is the absolute power. Hence the\nIdea comes to pass in the world, and no difficulty is caused, but it is\nnot requisite that those who rule should have the Idea.\n\nIn order, however, to judge of the statement that the regents of\nthe people should be philosophers, we must certainty consider what\nwas understood by Philosophy in the Platonic sense and in the sense\nof the times. The word Philosophy has had in different periods very\ndifferent significations. There was a time when a man who did not\nbelieve in spectres or in the devil was called a philosopher. When\nsuch ideas as these pass away, it does not occur to people to call\nanyone a philosopher for a reason such as this. The English consider\nwhat we call experimental physics to be Philosophy; a philosopher to\nthem is anyone who makes investigations in, and possesses a theoretic\nknowledge of chemistry, mechanics, &c. (Vol. I. p. 57). In Plato\nPhilosophy becomes mingled with the knowledge of the supersensuous,\nor what to us is religious knowledge. The Platonic philosophy is thus\nthe knowledge of the absolutely true and right, the knowledge of\nuniversal ends in the state, and the recognition of their validity. In\nall the history of the migration of the nations, when the Christian\nreligion became the universal religion, the only point of interest was\nto conceive the supersensuous kingdom\u2014which was at first independent,\nabsolutely universal and true\u2014as actualized, and to determine actuality\nin conformity thereto. This has been from that time forth the business\nof culture. A state, a government and constitution of modern times\nhas hence quite a different basis from a state of ancient times, and\nparticularly from one of Plato\u2019s day. The Greeks were then altogether\ndissatisfied with their democratic constitution, and the conditions\nresulting from it (_supra_, p. 8), and similarly all philosophers\ncondemned the democracies of the Greek states in which such things\nas the punishment of generals (_supra_, Vol. I. p. 391) took place.\nIn such a constitution it might certainly be thought that what was\nbest for the state would be the first subject of consideration; but\narbitrariness prevailed, and this was only temporarily restrained by\npreponderating individualities, or by masters in statesmanship like\nAristides, Themistocles, and others. This condition of matters preceded\nthe disintegration of the constitution. In our states, on the other\nhand, the end of the state, what is best for all, is immanent and\nefficacious in quite another way than was the case in olden times. The\ncondition of the laws and courts of justice, of the constitution and\nspirit of the people, is so firmly established in itself that matters\nof the passing moment alone remain to be decided; and it may even be\nasked what, if anything, is dependent on the individual.\n\nTo us government means that in the actual state procedure will be in\naccordance with the nature of the thing, and since a knowledge of the\nNotion of the thing is requisite to this, actuality is brought into\nharmony with the Notion, and thereby the Idea is realized in existence.\nThe result of this thus is that when Plato says that philosophers\nshould rule, he signifies the determination of the whole matter through\nuniversal principles. This is realized much more in modern states,\nbecause universal principles really form the bases\u2014certainly not of\nall, but of most of them. Some have already reached this stage, others\nare striving to reach it, but all recognize that such principles must\nconstitute the real substance of administration and rule.\n\nWhat Plato demands is thus, in point of fact, already present. But what\nwe call Philosophy, movement in pure thoughts, has to do with form, and\nthis is something peculiar to itself; nevertheless, the form is not\nresponsible if the universal, freedom, law, is not made a principle in\na state. Marcus Aurelius is an example of what a philosopher upon a\nthrone could effect; we have, however, only private actions to record\nof him, and the Roman Empire was made no better by him. Frederick\nII. was, on the other hand, justly called the philosopher king. He\noccupied himself with the Wolffian metaphysics and French philosophy\nand verses, and was thus, according to his times, a philosopher.\nPhilosophy appears to have been an affair of his own particular\ninclination, and quite distinct from the fact that he was king. But he\nwas also a philosophic king in the sense that he made for himself an\nentirely universal end, the well-being and good of the state, a guiding\nprinciple in his actions and in all his regulations in respect to\ntreaties with other states, and to the rights of individuals at home;\nthese last he entirely subordinated to absolutely universal ends. If,\nhowever, later on, procedure of this kind became ordinary custom, the\nsucceeding princes are no longer called philosophers, even if the same\nprinciple is present to them, and the government, and especially the\ninstitutions, are founded on it.\n\nIn the Republic, Plato further speaks in a figure of the difference\nbetween a condition of philosophic culture and a lack of Philosophy:\nit is a long comparison which is both striking and brilliant. The idea\nwhich he makes use of is as follows:\u2014\u201cLet us think of an underground\nden like a cave with a long entrance opening to the light. Its\ninhabitants are chained so that they cannot move their necks, and can\nsee only the back of the cave. Far behind their backs a torch burns\nabove them. In the intervening space there is a raised way and also\na low wall; and behind this wall\u201d (towards the light) \u201cthere are men\nwho carry and raise above it all manner of statues of men and animals\nlike puppets in a marionette show, sometimes talking to one another\nmeanwhile, and sometimes silent. Those who are chained would see only\nthe shadows which fall on the opposite wall, and they would take them\nfor reality; they would hear, moreover, by means of the echo, what\nwas said by those who moved the figures, and they would think that\nit was the voice of the shadows. Now if one of the prisoners were\nreleased, and compelled to turn his neck so as to see things as they\nare, he would think that what he saw was an illusive dream, and that\nthe shadows were the reality. And if anyone were to take him out of\nthe prison into the light itself, he would be dazzled by the light and\ncould see nothing; and he would hate the person who brought him to the\nlight, as having taken away what was to him the truth, and prepared\nonly pain and evil in its place.\u201d[16] This kind of myth is in harmony\nwith the character of the Platonic philosophy, in that it separates the\nconception of the sensuous world present in men from the knowledge of\nthe supersensuous.\n\nSince we now speak more fully of this matter, we must in the second\nplace consider the nature of knowledge according to Plato, and in so\ndoing commence our account of the Platonic philosophy itself.\n\na. Plato gave a more precise definition of philosophers as those\n\u201cwho are eager to behold the truth.\u201d\u2014Glaucon: \u201cThat is quite right.\nBut how do you explain it?\u201d Socrates: \u201cI tell this not to everyone,\nbut you will agree with me in it.\u201d \u201cIn what?\u201d \u201cIn this, that as the\nBeautiful is opposed to the Ugly, they are two things.\u201d \u201cWhy not?\u201d\n\u201cWith the Just and the Unjust, the Good and the Evil, and every other\nIdea (\u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2) the case is the same, that each of them is by itself a\nOne; on the other hand, on account of its combination with actions and\nbodies and other Ideas springing up on every side, each appears as a\nMany.\u201d \u201cYou are right.\u201d \u201cI distinguish now, according to this, between\nthe sight-loving, art-loving, busy class on the one side, and those\non the other side, of whom we were just speaking as alone entitled to\nbe called philosophers.\u201d \u201cWhat do you mean by that?\u201d \u201cI mean by that,\nsuch as delight in seeing and hearing, who love beautiful voices, and\ncolours, and forms, and all that is composed thereof, while their\nmind is still incapable of seeing and loving the Beautiful in its own\nnature.\u201d \u201cSuch is the case.\u201d \u201cThose, however, who have the power of\npassing on to the Beautiful itself, and seeing what it is in itself\n(\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u0313 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc), are they not rare?\u201d \u201cThey are indeed.\u201d \u201cHe then who sees\nthat beautiful things are beautiful, but does not apprehend Beauty\nitself, and cannot follow if another should seek to lead him to the\nknowledge of the same,\u2014think you that he lives his life awake, or in\na dream?\u201d (That is to say, those who are not philosophers are like\nmen who dream.) \u201cFor look, is it not dreaming when one in sleep, or\neven when awake, takes what merely resembles a certain thing to be not\nsomething that resembles it, but the very thing that it is like?\u201d \u201cI\nshould certainly say of such an one that he was dreaming.\u201d \u201cThe waking\nman, on the other hand, is he who holds the Beautiful itself to be the\nExistent, and can recognize its very self as well as that which only\npartakes of it (\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c5\u03b1), and does not confuse between the two.\u201d[17]\n\nIn this account of Philosophy, we at once see what the so much talked\nof Ideas of Plato are. The Idea is nothing else than that which is\nknown to us more familiarly by the name of the Universal, regarded,\nhowever, not as the formal Universal, which is only a property of\nthings, but as implicitly and explicitly existent, as reality, as\nthat which alone is true. We translate \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 first of all as species\nor kind; and the Idea is no doubt the species, but rather as it is\napprehended by and exists for Thought. Of course when we understand by\nspecies nothing but the gathering together by our reflection, and for\nconvenience sake, of the like characteristics of several individuals\nas indicating their distinguishing features, we have the universal in\nquite an external form. But the specific character of the animal is its\nbeing alive; this being alive is that which makes it what it is, and\ndeprived of this, it ceases to exist. To Plato, accordingly, Philosophy\nis really the science of this implicitly universal, to which, as\ncontrasted with the particular, he always continues to return. \u201cWhen\nPlato spoke of tableness and cupness, Diogenes the Cynic said: \u2018I see a\ntable and a cup, to be sure, but not tableness and cupness.\u2019 \u2018Right,\u2019\nanswered Plato; \u2018for you have eyes wherewith to see the table and the\ncup, but mind, by which one sees tableness and cupness, you have not\n(\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2).\u2019\u201d[18] What Socrates began was carried out by Plato,\nwho acknowledged only the Universal, the Idea, the Good, as that which\nhas existence. Through the presentation of his Ideas, Plato opened\nup the intellectual world, which, however, is not beyond reality, in\nheaven, in another place, but is the real world. With Leucippus, too,\nthe Ideal is brought closer to reality, and not\u2014metaphysically\u2014thrust\naway behind Nature. The essence of the doctrine of Ideas is thus\nthe view that the True is not that which exists for the senses, but\nthat only what has its determination in itself, the implicitly and\nexplicitly Universal, truly exists in the world; the intellectual world\nis therefore the True, that which is worthy to be known\u2014indeed, the\nEternal, the implicitly and explicitly divine. The differences are not\nessential, but only transitory; yet the Absolute of Plato, as being the\none in itself and identical with itself, is at the same time concrete\nin itself, in that it is a movement returning into itself, and is\neternally at home with itself. But love for Ideas is that which Plato\ncalls enthusiasm.\n\nThe misapprehension of Plato\u2019s Ideas takes two directions; one of these\nhas to do with the thinking, which is formal, and holds as true reality\nthe sensuous alone, or what is conceived of through the senses\u2014this\nis what Plato asserts to be mere shadows. For when Plato speaks of\nthe Universal as the real, his conception of it is met either by the\nstatement that the Universal is present to us only as a property, and\nis therefore a mere thought in our understanding, or else that Plato\ntakes this same Universal as substance, as an existence in itself,\nwhich, however, falls outside of us. When Plato further uses the\nexpression that sensuous things are, like images (\u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2), similar to\nthat which has absolute existence, or that the Idea is their pattern\nand model (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1), if these Ideas are not exactly made into\nthings, they are made into a kind of transcendent existences which\nlie somewhere far from us in an understanding outside this world, and\nare pictures set up which we merely do not see; they are like the\nartist\u2019s model, following which he works upon a given material, and\nthereon impresses the likeness of the original. And owing to their\nnot only being removed from this sensuous present reality, which\npasses for truth, but also being liberated from the actuality of the\nindividual consciousness, their subject, of which they are originally\nthe representations, passes out of consciousness, and even comes to be\nrepresented only as something which is apart from consciousness.\n\nThe second misapprehension that prevails with regard to these Ideas\ntakes place when they are not transferred beyond our consciousness,\nbut pass for ideals of our reason, which are no doubt necessary, but\nwhich produce nothing that either has reality now or can ever attain to\nit. As in the former view the Beyond is a conception that lies outside\nthe world, and in which species are hypostatized, so in this view\nour reason is just such a realm beyond reality. But when species are\nlooked on as if they were the forms of reality in us, there is again a\nmisapprehension, just as if they were looked at as \u00e6sthetic in nature.\nBy so doing, they are defined as intellectual perceptions which must\npresent themselves immediately, and belong either to a happy genius\nor else to a condition of ecstasy or enthusiasm. In such a case they\nwould be mere creations of the imagination, but this is not Plato\u2019s nor\nthe true sense. They are not immediately in consciousness, but they\nare in the apprehending knowledge; and they are immediate perceptions\nonly in so far as they are apprehending knowledge comprehended in its\nsimplicity and in relation to the result; in other words, the immediate\nperception is only the moment of their simplicity. Therefore we do not\npossess them, they are developed in the mind through the apprehending\nknowledge; enthusiasm is the first rude shape they take, but knowledge\nfirst brings them to light in rational developed form; they are in this\nform none the less real, for they alone are Being.\n\nOn this account Plato first of all distinguishes Science, the Knowledge\nof the True, from opinion. \u201cSuch thinking (\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd) as of one who\nknows, we may justly call knowledge (\u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd); but the other, opinion\n(\u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1\u03bd). Knowledge proceeds from that which is; opinion is opposed to\nit; but it is not the case that its content is Nothing\u2014that would be\nignorance\u2014for when an opinion is held, it is held about Something.\nOpinion is thus intermediate between ignorance and science, its content\nis a mixture of Being and Nothing. The object of the senses, the object\nof opinion, the particular, only participates in the Beautiful, the\nGood, the Just, the Universal; but it is at the same time also ugly,\nevil, unjust, and so on. The double is at the same time the half. The\nparticular is not only large or small, light or heavy, and any one of\nthese opposites, but every particular is as much the one as the other.\nSuch a mixture of Being and non-Being is the particular, the object\nof opinion;\u201d[19]\u2014a mixture in which the opposites have not resolved\nthemselves into the Universal. The latter would be the speculative\nIdea of knowledge, while to opinion belongs the manner of our ordinary\nconsciousness.\n\nb. Before we commence the examination of the objective implicitly\nexistent content of knowledge, we must consider more in detail, on the\none hand, the subjective existence of knowledge in consciousness as we\nfind it in Plato, and, on the other, how the content is or appears in\nordinary conception as soul; and the two together form the relation of\nknowledge, as the universal, to the individual consciousness.\n\n\u03b1. The source through which we become conscious of the divine is the\nsame as that already seen in Socrates (Vol. I. pp. 410, 411). The\nspirit of man contains reality in itself, and in order to learn what is\ndivine he must develop it out of himself and bring it to consciousness.\nWith the Socratics this discussion respecting the immanent nature of\nknowledge in the mind of man takes the form of a question as to whether\nvirtue can be taught or not, and with the sophist Protagoras of asking\nwhether feeling is the truth, which is allied with the question of the\ncontent of scientific knowledge, and with the distinction between that\nand opinion. But Plato goes on to say that the process by which we\ncome to know is not, properly speaking, learning, for that which we\nappear to learn we really only recollect. Plato often comes back to\nthis subject, but in particular he treats of the point in the Meno,\nin which he asserts (p. 81, 84 Steph.; p. 349, 355, 356 Bekk.) that\nnothing can, properly speaking, be learned, for learning is just a\nrecollection of what we already possess, to which the perplexity in\nwhich our minds are placed, merely acts as stimulus. Plato here gives\nthe question a speculative significance, in which the reality of\nknowledge, and not the empirical view of the acquisition of knowledge,\nis dealt with. For learning, according to the immediate ordinary\nconception of it, expresses the taking up of what is foreign into\nthinking consciousness, a mechanical mode of union and the filling of\nan empty space with things which are foreign and indifferent to this\nspace itself. An external method of effecting increase such as this,\nin which the soul appears to be a _tabula rasa_, and which resembles\nthe idea we form of growth going on in the living body through the\naddition of particles, is dead, and is incompatible with the nature\nof mind, which is subjectivity, unity, being and remaining at home\nwith itself. But Plato presents the true nature of consciousness in\nasserting that it is mind in which, as mind, that is already present\nwhich becomes object to consciousness, or which it explicitly becomes.\nThis is the Notion of the true universal in its movement; of the\nspecies which is in itself its own Becoming, in that it is already\nimplicitly what it explicitly becomes\u2014a process in which it does not\ncome outside of itself. Mind is this absolute species, whose process\nis only the continual return into itself; thus nothing is for it which\nit is not in itself. According to this, the process of learning is\nnot that something foreign enters in, but that the mind\u2019s own essence\nbecomes actualized, or it comes to the knowledge of this last. What has\nnot yet learned is the soul, the consciousness represented as natural\nbeing. What causes the mind to turn to science is the semblance, and\nthe confusion caused through it, of the essential nature of mind being\nsomething different, or the negative of itself\u2014a mode of manifestation\nwhich contradicts its real nature, for it has or is the inward\ncertainty of being all reality. In that it abrogates this semblance\nof other-being, it comprehends the objective, _i.e._ gives itself\nimmediately in it the consciousness of itself, and thus attains to\nscience. Ideas of individual, temporal, transitory things undoubtedly\ncome from without, but not the universal thoughts which, as the true,\nhave their root in the mind and belong to its nature; by this means all\nauthority is destroyed.\n\nIn one sense recollection [Erinnerung] is certainly an unfortunate\nexpression, in the sense, namely, that an idea is reproduced which\nhas already existed at another time. But recollection has another\nsense, which is given by its etymology, namely that of making oneself\ninward, going inward, and this is the profound meaning of the word in\nthought. In this sense it may undoubtedly be said that knowledge of\nthe universal is nothing but a recollection, a going within self, and\nthat we make that which at first shows itself in external form and\ndetermined as a manifold, into an inward, a universal, because we go\ninto ourselves and thus bring what is inward in us into consciousness.\nWith Plato, however, as we cannot deny, the word recollection has\nconstantly the first and empirical sense. This comes from the fact\nthat Plato propounds the true Notion that consciousness in itself\nis the content of knowledge, partly in the form of popular idea and\nin that of myths. Hence here even, the already mentioned (p. 18)\nintermingling of idea and Notion commences. In the Meno (p. 82-86\nSteph.; p. 350-360 Bekk.) Socrates tries to show, by experiment on a\nslave who had received no instruction, that learning is a recollection.\nSocrates merely questions him, leaving him to answer in his own way,\nwithout either teaching him or asserting the truth of any fact, and\nat length brings him to the enunciation of a geometrical proposition\non the relation which the diagonal of a square bears to its side. The\nslave obtains the knowledge out of himself alone, so that it appears as\nthough he only recollected what he already knew but had forgotten. Now\nif Plato here calls this coming forth of knowledge from consciousness a\nrecollection, it follows that this knowledge has been already in this\nconsciousness, _i.e._ that the individual consciousness has not only\nthe content of knowledge implicitly, in accordance with its essential\nnature, but has also possessed it as this individual consciousness and\nnot as universal. But this moment of individuality belongs only to the\nordinary conception, and recollection is not thought; for recollection\nrelates to man as a sensuous \u201cthis,\u201d and not as a universal. The\nessential nature of the coming forth of knowledge is hence here mingled\nwith the individual, with ordinary conception, and knowledge here\nappears in the form of soul, as of the implicitly existent reality,\nthe one, for the soul is still only a moment of spirit. As Plato here\npasses into a conception the content of which has no longer the pure\nsignificance of the universal, but of the individual, he further\ndepicts it in the form of a myth. He represents the implicit existence\nof mind in the form of a pre-existence in time, as if the truth had\nalready been for us in another time. But at the same time we must\nremark that he does not propound this as a philosophic doctrine, but\nin the form of a saying received from priests and priestesses who\ncomprehend what is divine. Pindar and other holy men say the same.\nAccording to these sayings, the human soul is immortal; it both ceases\nto be, or, as men say, it dies, and it comes again into existence, but\nin no way perishes. \u201cNow if the soul is immortal and often reappears\u201d\n(metempsychosis), \u201cand if it has seen that which is here as well as\nin Hades,\u201d (in unconsciousness) \u201cand everything else, learning has no\nmore meaning, for it only recollects what it has already known.\u201d[20]\nHistorians seize upon this allusion to what is really an Egyptian\nidea, and a sensuous conception merely, and say that Plato has laid\ndown that such and such was the case. But Plato made no such statement\nwhatever; what he here says has nothing to do with Philosophy, and more\nparticularly nothing to do with his philosophy, any more than what\nafterwards is said regarding God.\n\n\u03b2. In other Dialogues this myth is further and more strikingly\ndeveloped; it certainly employs remembrance in its ordinary sense,\nwhich is that the mind of man has in past time seen that which comes\nto his consciousness as the true and absolutely existent. Plato\u2019s\nprincipal effort is, however, to show through this assertion of\nrecollection, that the mind, the soul, thought, is on its own account\nfree, and this has to the ancients, and particularly to the Platonic\nidea, a close connection with what we call immortality of the soul.\n\n\u03b1\u03b1. In the Ph\u00e6drus (p. 245 Steph.; p. 38 Bekk.) Plato speaks of this\nin order to show that the Eros is a divine madness (\u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03af\u03b1), and is\ngiven to us as the greatest happiness. It is a state of enthusiasm,\nwhich here has a powerful, predominating aspiration towards the Idea\n(_supra_, p. 30): but it is not an enthusiasm proceeding from the heart\nand feeling, it is not an ordinary perception, but a consciousness\nand knowledge of the ideal. Plato says that he must expound the\nnature of the divine and human soul in order to demonstrate the\nEros. \u201cThe first point is that the soul is immortal. For what moves\nitself is immortal and eternal, but what obtains its movement from\nanother is transient. What moves itself is the first principle, for\nit certainly has its origin and first beginning in itself and derived\nfrom no other. And just as little can it cease to move, for that alone\ncan cease which derives its motion from another.\u201d Plato thus first\ndevelops the simple Notion of the soul as of the self-moving, and,\nthus far, an element in mind; but the proper life of the mind in and\nfor itself is the consciousness of the absolute nature and freedom\nof the \u201cI.\u201d When we speak of the immortality of the soul, the idea\nis most frequently present to us that the soul is like a physical\nthing which has qualities of all kinds, and while these can certainly\nbe changed, it yet seems that, as being independent of them, it is\nnot subject to change. Now thought is one of these qualities, which\nare thus independent of the thing; and thought is also here defined\nas a thing, and as if it could pass away or cease to be. As regards\nthis point, the main feature of the idea is that the soul should be\nable to subsist as an imperishable thing without having imagination,\nthought, &c. With Plato the immortality of the soul is, on the other\nhand, immediately connected with the fact that the soul is itself that\nwhich thinks; and hence that thought is not a quality of soul, but its\nsubstance. It is as with body, where the weight is not a quality, but\nits substance; for as the body would no longer exist if the weight\nwere abstracted, the soul would not exist if thought were taken away.\nThought is the activity of the universal, not an abstraction, but the\nreflection into self and the positing of self that takes place in all\nconceptions. Now because thought is an eternal which remains at home\nwith itself in every change, soul preserves its identity in what is\ndifferent, just as, for instance, in sensuous perception it deals with\nwhat is different, with outside matter, and is yet at home with itself.\nImmortality has not then the interest to Plato which it has to us from\na religious point of view; in that to him it is associated in greater\nmeasure with the nature of thought, and with the inward freedom of\nthe same, it is connected with the determination that constitutes the\nprinciple of what is specially characteristic of Platonic philosophy,\nit is connected with the supersensuous groundwork which Plato has\nestablished. To Plato the immortality of the soul is hence likewise of\ngreat importance.\n\nHe proceeds: \u201cTo seek to make clear the Idea of the soul would involve\ninvestigation laborious for any but a god; but the tongue of man may\nspeak of this more easily through a figure.\u201d Here follows an allegory\nin which there is, however, something extravagant and inconsistent.\nHe says: \u201cThe soul resembles the united power of a chariot and\ncharioteer.\u201d This image expresses nothing to us. \u201cNow the horses\u201d (the\ndesires) \u201cof the gods and the charioteers are good, and of a good\nbreed. With us men, the charioteer at first takes the reins, but one\nof the horses only is noble and good and of noble origin; the other\nis ignoble and of ignoble origin. As might be expected, the driving\nis very difficult. How mortal differ from immortal creatures, we\nmust endeavour to discover. The soul has the care of the inanimate\neverywhere, and traverses the whole heavens, passing from one idea\nto another. When perfect and fully winged, she soars upwards\u201d (has\nelevated thoughts), \u201cand is the ruler of the universe. But the soul\nwhose wings droop roams about till she has found solid ground; then\nshe takes an earthly form which is really moved by her power, and the\nwhole, the soul and body, put together, is called a living creature,\na mortal.\u201d[21] The one is thus the soul as thought, existence in and\nfor itself; the other is the union with matter. This transition from\nthought to body is very difficult, too difficult for the ancients to\nunderstand; we shall find more about it in Aristotle. From what has\nbeen said, we may find the ground for representing Plato as maintaining\nthe dogma that the soul existed independently prior to this life, and\nthen lapsed into matter, united itself to it, contaminating itself by\nso doing, and that it is incumbent on it to leave matter again. The\nfact that the spiritual realizes itself from itself is a point not\nsufficiently examined by the ancients; they take two abstractions,\nsoul and matter, and the connection is expressed only in the form of a\ndeterioration on the part of soul.\n\n\u201cBut as to the immortal,\u201d continues Plato, \u201cif we do not express it\nin accordance with an apprehending thought, but form an ordinary\nconception of it, owing to our lack of insight and power to comprehend\nthe nature of God, we conclude that the immortal life of God is that\nwhich has a body and soul which, however, are united in one nature\n(\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03c5\u03ba\u03cc\u03c4\u03b1),[22] i.e. not only externally but intrinsically made one.\nSoul and body are both abstractions, but life is the unity of both;\nand because God\u2019s nature is to popular conception the holding of body\nand soul unseparated in one, He is the Reason whose form and content\nare an undivided unity in themselves.\u201d This is an important definition\nof God\u2014a great idea which is indeed none other than the definition\nof modern times. It signifies the identity of subjectivity and\nobjectivity, the inseparability of the ideal and real, that is, of soul\nand body. The mortal and finite is, on the contrary, correctly defined\nby Plato as that of which the existence is not absolutely adequate to\nthe Idea, or, more definitely, to subjectivity.\n\nPlato now further explains what happens in the life of the divine\nBeing, which drama the soul thus has before it, and how the wasting\nof its wings occurs. \u201cThe chariots of the gods enter in bands, led\nby Zeus, the mighty leader, from his winged chariot. An array of\nother gods and goddesses follow him, marshalled in eleven bands. They\npresent\u2014each one fulfilling his work\u2014the noblest and most blessed of\nscenes. The colourless and formless and intangible essence requires\nthought, the lord of the soul, as its only spectator, and thus\ntrue knowledge takes its rise. For there it sees what is (\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f44\u03bd),\nand lives in the contemplation of reality, because it follows in\nan ever-recurring revolution\u201d (of ideas). \u201cIn this revolution\u201d (of\ngods), \u201cit beholds justice, temperance, and knowledge, not in the\nform of what men call things, for it sees what in truth is absolute\n(\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f44\u03bd).\u201d This is thus expressed as though it were something\nwhich had happened. \u201cWhen the soul returns from thus beholding, the\ncharioteer puts up his horses at the stall, gives them ambrosia to eat\nand nectar to drink. This is the life of the gods. But other souls,\nthrough fault of charioteer or horses, fall into confusion, with\nbroken wings depart from these heavenly places, cease to behold the\ntruth, nourish themselves on opinion as their food, and fall to the\nground; according as a soul has beheld more or less of truth, it takes\na higher or lower place. In this condition it retains a recollection\nof what it has seen, and if it perceives anything beautiful or right,\nit is rapt in amazement. The wings once more obtain strength, and\nthe soul, particularly that of a philosopher, recollects its former\ncondition in which, however, it had not seen what was beautiful, just,\netc., but beauty and justice themselves.\u201d[23] Thus because the life\nof the gods is for the soul, when in individual beauty it is reminded\nof the universal, it is implied that in the soul, as thus absolutely\nexisting, there is the Idea of the beautiful, good and just, as\nabsolute and as potentially and actually universal. This constitutes\nthe general principle of the Platonic conception. But when Plato speaks\nof knowledge as of a recollection, he knows all the time that this is\nonly putting the matter in similes and metaphors; he did not ask, as\ntheologians used gravely to do, whether the soul had existed before its\nbirth, and, if so, in what particular place. It cannot be said of Plato\nthat he had any such belief, and he never speaks of the matter in the\nsense that theologians did; in the same way he never spoke about a Fall\nfrom a perfect state, for example, as if man had to look on the present\nlife as an imprisonment. But what Plato expressed as the truth is that\nconsciousness in the individual is in reason the divine reality and\nlife; that man perceives and recognizes it in pure thought, and that\nthis knowledge is itself the heavenly abode and movement.\n\n\u03b2\u03b2. Knowledge in the form of soul, is more clearly dealt with in\nthe Ph\u00e6do, where Plato has further developed the ideas about the\nimmortality of the soul. What in the Ph\u00e6drus is kept definitely apart\nas myth and truth respectively, and which is made to appear as such,\nappears less evidently so in the Ph\u00e6do\u2014that celebrated dialogue in\nwhich Plato makes Socrates speak of the immortality of the soul. That\nPlato should have connected this discussion with the account of the\ndeath of Socrates has in all time been matter of admiration. Nothing\ncould seem more suitable than to place the conviction of immortality\nin the mouth of him who is in the act of leaving life, and to make\nthis conviction living to us through the scene, just as, on the other\nhand, a death-scene like this is made living to us through that\nconviction. We must at the same time remark that in what is fitting the\nfollowing conditions are implied. It must first be really appropriate\nfor the dying person to occupy himself with himself instead of with\nthe universal, with this certainty of himself as a \u201cthis\u201d instead of\nwith the Truth. We hence here meet with the ordinary point of view\nbut slightly separated from that of the Notion, but, although this is\nso, this ordinary point of view is far removed from sinking into that\ncoarse conception of the soul which considers it to be a thing, and\nasks about its continuance or subsistence as if it were a thing. Thus\nwe find Socrates expressing himself to the effect that the body and\nwhat relates to the body is a hindrance in striving after wisdom, the\nsole business of Philosophy, because the sensuous perception shows\nnothing purely, or as it is in itself, and what is true becomes known\nthrough the removal of the spiritual from the corporeal. For justice,\nbeauty and such things are what alone exists in verity; they are that\nto which all change and decay is foreign; and these are not perceived\nthrough the body, but only in the soul.[24]\n\nWe see in this separation the essence of the soul not considered in\na material category of Being, but as the universal; we see it still\nmore in what follows, by which Plato proves immortality. A principal\npoint in this argument is that already considered, that the soul has\nexisted before this life, because learning is only a recollection,[25]\nand this implies that the soul is already implicitly what it becomes.\nWe must not think that the bald conception of innate ideas is hereby\nindicated\u2014such an expression implies the existence of ideas by nature,\nas though our thoughts were in part already implanted, and had in part\na natural existence which did not first produce itself through the\nmovement of the mind. But Plato mainly founds the idea of immortality\non the fact that what is put together is liable to dissolution and\ndecay, while the simple can in no manner be dissolved or destroyed;\nwhat is always like itself and the same, is, however, simple. The\nbeautiful, the good, the like, being simple, are incapable of all\nchange; that, on the contrary, in which these universals are, men,\nthings, &c., are the changeable. They are perceptible by the senses,\nwhile the former is the supersensuous. Hence the soul which is in\nthought, and which applies itself to this, as to what is related\nto it, must therefore be held to have itself a simple nature.[26]\nHere, then, we again see that Plato does not take simplicity as the\nsimplicity of a thing\u2014not as if it were of anything like a chemical\ningredient, for example, which can no longer be represented as\ninherently distinguished; this would only be empty, abstract identity\nor universality, the simple as an existent.\n\nBut finally the universal really does appear to take the form of an\nexistent, as Plato makes Simmias assert: a harmony which we hear is\nnone else than a universal, a simple which is a unity of the diverse;\nbut this harmony is associated with a sensuous thing and disappears\nwith it, just as music does with the lyre. On the other hand Plato\nmakes Socrates show that the soul is not a harmony in this sense,\nfor the sensuous harmony first exists after its elements, and is\na consequence that follows from them. The harmony of the soul is,\nhowever, in and for itself, before every sensuous thing. Sensuous\nharmony may further have diversities within it, while the harmony of\nthe soul has no quantitative distinction.[27] From this it is clear\nthat Plato receives the reality of the soul entirely in the universal,\nand does not place its true being in sensuous individuality, and hence\nthe immortality of the soul cannot in his case be understood in the\nordinary acceptation, as that of an individual thing. Although later\non we come across the myth of the sojourn of the soul after death in\nanother and more brilliant earth,[28] we have seen above (pp. 40, 41)\nwhat kind of heaven this would be.\n\n\u03b3. The development and culture of the soul must be taken in connection\nwith what precedes. However the idealism of Plato must not be thought\nof as being subjective idealism, and as that false idealism which\nhas made its appearance in modern times, and which maintains that we\ndo not learn anything, are not influenced from without, but that all\nconceptions are derived from out of the subject. It is often said\nthat idealism means that the individual produces from himself all\nhis ideas, even the most immediate. But this is an unhistoric, and\nquite false conception; if we take this rude definition of idealism,\nthere have been no idealists amongst the philosophers, and Platonic\nidealism is certainly far removed from anything of the kind. In the\nseventh book of his Republic (p. 518 Steph., pp. 333, 334 Bekk.) Plato\nsays in connection with what I have already stated (pp. 27-29), and in\nparticular reference to the manner in which this learning is created,\nby which the universal which before was secreted in the mind, developes\nout of it alone: \u201cWe must believe of science and learning (\u03c0\u03b1\u03b9\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2),\nthat its nature is not as some assert\u201d (by this he means the Sophists),\n\u201cwho speak of culture as though knowledge were not contained within\nthe soul, but could be implanted therein as sight into blind eyes.\u201d\nThe idea that knowledge comes entirely from without is in modern times\nfound in empirical philosophies of a quite abstract and rude kind,\nwhich maintain that everything that man knows of the divine nature\ncomes as a matter of education and habituation, and that mind is thus a\nquite indeterminate potentiality merely. Carried to an extreme, this is\nthe doctrine of revelation in which everything is given from without.\nIn the Protestant religion we do not find this rude idea in its\nabstract form, for the witness of the spirit is an essential part of\nfaith, _i.e._ faith demands that the individual subjective spirit shall\non its own account accept and set forth the determination which comes\nto it in the form of something given from without. Plato speaks against\nany such idea, for, in relation to the merely popularly expressed myth\ngiven above, he says: \u201cReason teaches that every man possesses the\ninherent capacities of the soul and the organ with which he learns.\nThat is, just as we might imagine the eye not capable of turning from\ndarkness to light otherwise than with the whole body, so must we be\nturned with the whole soul from the world of Becoming\u201d (contingent\nfeelings and ideas) \u201cto that of Being, and the soul must gradually\nlearn to endure this sight, and to behold the pure light of Being. But\nwe say that this Being is the good. The art of so doing is found in\nculture, as being the art of the conversion of the soul\u2014that is, the\nmanner in which a person can most easily and effectually be converted;\nit does not seek to implant (\u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9) sight, but\u2014inasmuch as he\nalready possesses it only it has not been properly turned upon himself\nand hence he does not see the objects that he ought to see\u2014it brings it\ninto operation. The other virtues of the soul are more in conformity\nwith the body; they are not originally in the soul, but come gradually\nthrough exercise and habit. Thought (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9) on the contrary,\nas divine, never loses its power, and only becomes good or evil\nthrough the manner of this conversion.\u201d This is what Plato establishes\nin regard to the inward and the outward. Such ideas as that mind\ndetermines the good from out of itself are to us much more familiar\nthan to Plato; but it was by Plato that they were first maintained.\n\n_c._ In that Plato places truth in that alone which is produced through\nthought, and yet the source of knowledge is manifold\u2014in feelings,\nsensations, &c.\u2014we must state the different kinds of knowledge, as\ngiven by Plato. Plato is entirely opposed to the idea that the truth\nis given through sensuous consciousness, which is what is known and\nthat from which we start; for this is the doctrine of the Sophists\nwith which we met in dealing with Protagoras, for instance. As regards\nfeeling, we easily make the mistake of placing everything in feeling,\nas indeed that Platonic rage for beauty contained the truth in the\nguise of feeling; but this is not the true form of the truth, because\nfeeling is the entirely subjective consciousness. Feeling as such is\nmerely a form with which men make the arbitrary will the principle of\nthe truth, for what is the true content is not given through feeling;\nin it every content has a place. The highest content must likewise\nbe found in feeling; to have a thing in thought and understanding is\nquite different from having it in heart and feeling, _i.e._ in our\nmost inward subjectivity, in this \u201cI\u201d; and we say of the content that\nit is for the first time in its proper place when it is in the heart,\nbecause it then is entirely identical with our individuality. The\nmistake, however, is to say that a content is true because it is in\nour feeling. Hence the importance of Plato\u2019s doctrine that the content\nbecomes filled by thought alone; for it is the universal which can\nbe grasped by the activity of thought alone. Plato has defined this\nuniversal content as Idea.\n\nAt the close of the sixth book of the Republic (pp. 509-511 Steph.; pp.\n321-325 Bekk.) Plato distinguishes the sensuous and the intellectual in\nour knowledge more exactly, so that in each sphere he again presents\ntwo modes of consciousness. \u201cIn the sensuous (\u1f41\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd) the one division\nis the external manifestation, for in it are shadows, reflections in\nwater, and also in solid, smooth, and polished bodies, and the like.\nThe second section, of which this is only the resemblance, includes\nanimals, plants\u201d (this concrete life), \u201cand everything in art. The\nintelligible (\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd) is also divided into two parts. In the one\nsub-division the soul uses the sensuous figures given before, and is\nobliged to work on hypotheses (\u1f10\u03be \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd) because it does not go to\nthe principle but to the result.\u201d Reflection, which is not on its own\naccount sensuous, but undoubtedly belongs to thought, mingles thought\nwith the first sensuous consciousness, although its object is not as\nyet a pure existence of the understanding. \u201cThe other division\u201d (what\nis thought in the soul itself) \u201cis that in which the soul, proceeding\nfrom an hypothesis, makes its way (\u03bc\u03ad\u03b8\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd) to a principle which is\nabove hypotheses, not by means of images, as in the former cases, but\nthrough the ideas themselves. Those who study geometry, arithmetic, and\nkindred sciences, assume the odd and the even, the figures, three kinds\nof angles, and the like. And since they start from these hypotheses,\nthey do not think it necessary to give any account of them, for\neverybody is supposed to know them. You further know that they make\nuse of figures which are risible, and speak of them, although they\nare not thinking of them, but of the ideals which they represent; for\nthey think of the\u201d (absolute) \u201csquare itself and of its diagonals, and\nnot of the\u201d (sensuous) \u201cimages that they draw. And so it is with other\nthings.\u201d Thus, according to Plato, this is certainly the place where\nreal knowledge begins, because we have nothing further to do with the\nsensuous as such; at the same time this is not the true knowledge which\nconsiders the spiritual universal on its own account, but the arguing\nand reasoning knowledge that forms universal laws and particular kinds\nor species out of what is sensuous. \u201cThese figures which they draw or\nmake, and which also have shadows and images in water, they use only as\nimages, and seek to behold their originals, which can only be seen with\nthe understanding\u201d (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u1fb3).\u2014\u201cThat is true.\u201d\u2014\u201cThis I have named above\nthat species of the intelligible, in inquiring into which the soul\nis compelled to use hypotheses, not proceeding to a first principle,\nbecause it is not able to get above those hypotheses, but employing\nthose secondary images as images which are made absolutely similar to\nthe originals in every respect\u201d\u2014\u201cI understand that you are speaking of\ngeometry and the kindred arts\u201d\u2014\u201cNow learn about the other division of\nthe intelligible in which reason (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2) itself is concerned, since\nby the power of the dialectic it makes use of hypotheses, not as\nprinciples but only as hypotheses\u2014that is to say, as steps and points\nof departure in order to reach a region above hypotheses, the first\nprinciple of all\u201d (which is in and for itself), \u201cand clinging to this\nand to that which depends on this, it descends again to the result,\nfor it requires no sensuous aid at all, but only ideas, and thus it\nreaches the ideas finally through the ideas themselves.\u201d To know this\nis the interest and business of Philosophy; this is investigated by\npure thought in and for itself, which only moves in such pure thoughts.\n\u201cI understand you, but not perfectly. You seem to me to wish to assert\nthat what is contemplated in Being and Knowledge through the science\nof dialectic is clearer than what is contemplated by the so-called\nsciences which have hypotheses as their principle, and where those who\ncontemplate them have to do so with the understanding and not with the\nsenses. Yet because in their contemplation they do not ascend to the\nabsolute principle, but speculate from hypotheses, they appear not to\nexercise thought (\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd) upon these objects, although these objects are\ncognizable by thought if a principle is added to them (\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2). The methods (\u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03bd) of geometry and its kindred sciences\nyou appear to me to call understanding; and that because it stands\nmidway between reason (\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2) and \u2018sensuous\u2019 opinion (\u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1).\u201d\u2014\u201cYou have\nquite grasped my meaning. Corresponding to these four sections, I\nwill suppose four faculties (\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1) in the soul\u2014conceiving reason\n(\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) has the highest place (\u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u1ff3), understanding the\nsecond; the third is called faith (\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2)\u201d\u2014the true conception for\nanimals and plants in that they are living, homogeneous and identical\nwith ourselves; \u201cand the last the knowledge of images (\u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1),\u201d\nopinion. \u201cArrange them according to the fact that each stage has as\nmuch clearness (\u03c3\u03b1\u03c6\u03b7\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2) as that to which it is related has truth.\u201d\nThis is the distinction which forms the basis of Plato\u2019s philosophy,\nand which came to be known from his writings.\n\nNow if we go from knowledge to its content, in which the Idea\nbecomes sundered, and thereby organizes itself more completely into\na scientific system, this content, according to Plato, begins to\nfall into three parts which we distinguish as the logical, natural,\nand mental philosophy. The logical Philosophy the ancients called\ndialectic, and its addition to philosophy is by the ancient writers on\nthe subject ascribed to Plato (Vol. I. p. 387). This is not a dialectic\nsuch as we met with in the Sophists, which merely brings one\u2019s ideas\naltogether into confusion, for this first branch of Platonic philosophy\nis the dialectic which moves in pure Notions\u2014the movement of the\nspeculatively logical, with which several dialogues, and particularly\nthat of Parmenides, occupy themselves. The second, according to Plato,\nis a kind of natural philosophy, the principles of which are more\nespecially propounded in the Tim\u00e6us. The third is the philosophy of\nthe mind\u2014an ethical philosophy\u2014and its representation is essentially\nthat of a perfect state in the Republic. The Critias should be taken\nin connection with the Tim\u00e6us and the Republic, but we need not make\nfurther reference to it, for it is only a fragment. Plato makes these\nthree dialogues one connected conversation. In the Critias and the\nTim\u00e6us the subject is so divided that while the Tim\u00e6us dealt with the\nspeculative origin of man and of nature, the Critias was intended to\nrepresent the ideal history of human culture, and to be a philosophical\nhistory of the human race, forming the ancient history of the Athenians\nas preserved by the Egyptians. Of this, however, only the beginning\nhas come down to us.[29] Hence if the Parmenides be taken along with\nthe Republic and the Tim\u00e6us, the three together constitute the whole\nPlatonic system of philosophy divided into its three parts or sections.\nWe now wish to consider the philosophy of Plato more in detail in\naccordance with these three different points of view.\n\n\n1. DIALECTIC.\n\nWe have already remarked by way of preparation that the Notion of true\ndialectic is to show forth the necessary movement of pure Notions,\nwithout thereby resolving these into nothing; for the result, simply\nexpressed, is that they are this movement, and the universal is just\nthe unity of these opposite Notions. We certainly do not find in Plato\na full consciousness that this is the nature of dialectic, but we find\ndialectic itself present; that is, we find absolute existence thus\nrecognized in pure Notions, and the representation of the movement of\nthese Notions. What makes the study of the Platonic dialectic difficult\nis the development and the manifestation of the universal out of\nordinary conceptions. This beginning, which appears to make knowledge\neasier, really makes the difficulty greater, since it introduces us\ninto a field in which there is quite a different standard from what\nwe have in reason, and makes this field present to us; when, on the\ncontrary, progression and motion take place in pure Notions alone, the\nother is not remembered at all. But in that very way the Notions attain\ngreater truth. For otherwise pure logical movement might easily appear\nto us to exist on its own account, like a private territory, which has\nanother region alongside of it, also having its own particular place.\nBut since both are there brought together, the speculative element\nbegins to appear as it is in truth; that is, as being the only truth,\nand that, indeed, through the transformation of sensuous opinion into\nthought. For in our consciousness we first of all find the immediate\nindividual, the sensuous real; or there are also categories of the\nunderstanding which are held by us to be ultimate and true. But\ncontrasted with merely external reality, it is rather the ideal that\nis the most real, and it was Plato who perceived that it was the only\nreal, for he characterized the universal or thought as the true, in\nopposition to what is sensuous.\n\nThus the aim of many of Plato\u2019s Dialogues, which conclude without any\npositive affirmation (Vol. I. p. 406; II. p. 13), is to show that the\nimmediately existent, the many things that appear to us, although we\nmay have quite true conceptions of them, are still not in themselves,\nin an objective sense, the true, because they alter and are determined\nthrough their relation to something else and not through themselves;\nthus we must even in the sensuous individuals consider the universal,\nor what Plato has called the Idea (p. 29). The sensuous, limited,\nand finite is, in fact, both itself and the other, which is also\nconsidered as existent; and thus there is an unsolved contradiction,\nfor the other has dominion in the first. We have been before reminded\n(Vol. I. p. 404; II. p. 33) that the aim of the Platonic dialectic is\nto confuse and to resolve the finite ideas of men, in order to bring\nabout in their consciousness what science demands, the consideration\nof that which is. By being thus directed against the form of the\nfinite, dialectic has in the first place the effect of confounding the\nparticular, and this is brought about by the negation therein present\nbeing shown forth, so that, in fact, it is proved that it is not what\nit is, but that it passes into its opposite, into the limitations\nwhich are essential to it. But if this dialectic is laid hold of,\nthe particular passes away and becomes another than that which it is\ntaken to be. Formal philosophy cannot look at dialectic in any other\nway than as being the art of confusing ordinary conceptions or even\nNotions, and demonstrating their nullity, thus making their result to\nbe merely negative. For this reason, Plato in his Republic (VII. pp.\n538, 539, Steph.; pp. 370, 371, Bekk.) advised the citizens not to\nallow dialectic to be studied before the thirtieth year, because by its\nmeans anyone might transform the beautiful, as he had received it from\nhis masters, into that which is hateful. We find this dialectic a great\ndeal in Plato, both in the more Socratic and moralizing dialogues, and\nin the many dialogues which relate to the conceptions of the Sophists\nin regard to science.\n\nIn connection with this, the second part of dialectic makes its first\naim the bringing of the universal in men to consciousness, which, as\nwe formerly remarked when speaking of Socrates (Vol. I. p. 398), was\nthe main interest of Socratic culture. From this time on, we may look\nat such an aim as having been discarded, and simply remark that a\nnumber of Plato\u2019s Dialogues merely aim at bringing to consciousness a\ngeneral conception, such as we have without taking any trouble at all\n(Vol. I. pp. 403, 404); hence this prolixity on Plato\u2019s part often\nwearies us. This dialectic is, indeed, also a movement of thought,\nbut it is really only necessary in an external way and for reflecting\nconsciousness, in order to allow the universal, what is in and for\nitself, unalterable and immortal, to come forth. Hence these first two\nsides of the dialectic, directed as they are towards the dissolution of\nthe particular and thus to the production of the universal, are not yet\ndialectic in its true form: it is a dialectic which Plato has in common\nwith the Sophists, who understood very well how to disintegrate the\nparticular. A subject which Plato very often treats of with this end in\nview, is virtue, which he proves to be only one (Vol. I. pp. 405, 411),\nand thereby he makes the universal good emerge from the particular\nvirtues.\n\nNow because the universal which has emerged from the confusion of the\nparticular, _i.e._ the true, beautiful and good, that which taken by\nitself is species, was at first undetermined and abstract, it is, in\nthe third place, a principal part of Plato\u2019s endeavours further to\ndetermine this universal in itself. This determination is the relation\nwhich the dialectic movement in thought bears to the universal, for\nthrough this movement the Idea comes to these thoughts which contain\nthe opposites of the finite within themselves. For the Idea, as the\nself-determining, is the unity of these differences, and thus the\ndeterminate Idea. The universal is hence determined as that which\nresolves and has resolved the contradictions in itself, and hence it\nis the concrete in itself; thus this sublation of contradiction is the\naffirmative. Dialectic in this higher sense is the really Platonic;\nas speculative it does not conclude with a negative result, for it\ndemonstrates the union of opposites which have annulled themselves.\nHere begins what is difficult for the understanding to grasp. The\nform of Plato\u2019s methods being not yet, however, developed purely on\nits own account, this is the reason that his dialectic is still often\nmerely reasoning, and that it proceeds from individual points of view\nand frequently remains without result. On the other hand, Plato\u2019s own\nteaching is directed against this merely reasoning dialectic; yet we\nsee that it gives him trouble properly to show forth the difference.\nThe speculative dialectic which commences with him, is thus the most\ninteresting but also the most difficult part of his work; hence\nacquaintance is not usually made with it when the Platonic writings are\nstudied. Tennemann, for example, did not at all comprehend what was\nmost important in the Platonic philosophy, and only gathered some of\nit together in the form of dry ontological determinations\u2014for that was\nwhat he could comprehend. But it shows the greatest lack of intellect\nin a historian of Philosophy only to see in a great philosophic form\nwhether there is anything yielding profit to himself or not.\n\nWhat we have thus to deal with in the dialectic of Plato is the\npure thought of reason, from which he very clearly distinguishes\nthe understanding (\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1), (_supra_, p. 47). We may have thoughts\nabout many things\u2014if indeed, we do have thought at all\u2014but this is\nnot what Plato means. Plato\u2019s true speculative greatness, and that\nthrough which he forms an epoch in the history of Philosophy, and\nhence in the history of the world, lies in the fuller determination\nof the Idea; this extension of knowledge is one which some centuries\nlater constituted the main element in the ferment which took place\nin universal history, and in the transformation which the human mind\npassed through. This fuller determination may, from what has gone\nbefore, be understood thus: Plato first comprehended the Absolute as\nthe Being of Parmenides, but as the Universal which, as species, is\nalso end, _i.e._ which rules, penetrates, and produces the particular\nand manifold. Plato, however, had not yet developed this self-producing\nactivity, and hence often stumbled into an external teleology. As the\nunion of the preceding principles, Plato further led this Being into\ndeterminateness and into difference, as the latter is contained in\nthe triad of Pythagorean number-determinations, and expressed the\nsame in thought. That is, he grasped the Absolute as the unity of\nBeing and non-being\u2014in Becoming, as Heraclitus says\u2014or of the one and\nthe many,[30] &c. He further now took into the objective dialectic\nof Heraclitus the Eleatic dialectic, which is the external endeavour\nof the subject to show forth contradiction, so that in place of an\nexternal changing of things, their inward transition in themselves,\n_i.e._ in their Ideas, or, as they are here, in their categories, has\ncome to pass out of and through themselves. Plato finally set forth the\nbelief of Socrates, which the latter put forward in regard to the moral\nself-reflection of the subject only, as objective, as the Idea, which\nis both universal thought and the existent. The previous philosophies\nthus do not disappear because refuted by Plato, being absorbed in him.\n\nIn addition to Being and non-being, one and many, the unlimited and\nlimiting are, for instance, likewise pure thoughts such as these, in\nwhose absolute contemplation, from an all-embracing point of view, the\nPlatonic investigation occupies itself. The purely logical and quite\nabstruse consideration of such objects certainly contrasts strongly\nwith our conception of the beautiful, pleasing, and attractive content\nof Plato. Such consideration to him signifies all that is best in\nPhilosophy, and it is that which he everywhere calls the true method\nof Philosophy, and the knowledge of the truth; in it he places the\ndistinction between philosophers and Sophists. The Sophists on their\npart look at appearances, and these they obtain in opinion; this,\nindeed, implies thought, but not pure thought, or what is in and for\nitself. This is one reason why many turn from the study of Plato\u2019s\nworks unsatisfied. When we commence a Dialogue, we find, in the free\nPlatonic method of composition, beautiful scenes in nature, a superb\nintroduction (p. 14) that promises to lead us through flowery fields\ninto Philosophy\u2014and that the highest Philosophy, the Platonic. We meet\nwith elevated thoughts, which are responded to more specially by youth,\nbut these soon disappear. If at first we have allowed ourselves to be\ncarried away by these bright scenes, they must now be all renounced,\nand as we have come to the real dialectic, and truly speculative, we\nmust keep to the wearisome path, and allow ourselves to be pricked\nby the thorns and thistles of metaphysics. For behold, we then come\nto what is best and highest, to investigations respecting the one\nand many, Being and nothing; this was not what was anticipated, and\nmen go quietly away, only wondering that Plato should seek knowledge\nhere. From the most profound dialectic investigation, Plato then again\nproceeds to representations and images, to the description of dialogues\namongst intelligent men. Thus in the Ph\u00e6do, for example, which\nMendelssohn has modernized and transformed into Wolffian metaphysics,\nthe beginning and end are elevating and beautiful, and the middle deals\nwith dialectic. Hence in making one\u2019s way through Plato\u2019s Dialogues\nvery many mental qualities are called into play, and in their study\nwe consequently ought to keep our minds open and free as regards the\nvery various points of interest. If we read with interest what is\nspeculative, we are apt to overlook what is most beautiful; if our\ninterest lies in the elevation and culture of the mind, we forget the\nspeculative element and find that it does not appeal to us. With some\nit is like the young man in the Bible, who had fulfilled his various\nduties, and who asked Christ what good thing he still had to do to\nbecome His follower. But when the Lord commanded him to sell what he\nhad and give to the poor, the young man went away sorrowful; this was\nnot what he had anticipated. Just in the same way many mean well as\nregards Philosophy; they study Fries, and heaven knows whom else. Their\nhearts are full of the true, good and beautiful; they would know and\nsee what they ought to do, but their breasts swell with goodwill alone.\n\nWhile Socrates remained at the good and universal, at implicitly\nconcrete thoughts, without having developed them or having revealed\nthem through development, Plato certainly goes on to the Idea as\ndetermined. His defect, however, is that this determinateness and that\nuniversality are still outside one another. We should certainly obtain\nthe determinate Idea by reducing the dialectic movement to its result,\nand that forms an important element in knowledge. Yet when Plato speaks\nof justice, beauty, goodness, truth, their origin is not revealed;\nthey are not shown as being results, but merely as hypotheses accepted\nin their immediacy. Consciousness certainly has an innate conviction\nthat they form the highest end, but this their determination is not\ndiscovered. Since Plato\u2019s dogmatic expositions of Ideas are lost\n(_supra_, p. 11), the dialectic of pure thought is only placed before\nus by the Dialogues dealing with the subject, and these, just because\nthey deal with pure thought, are amongst the most difficult, viz.:\nthe Sophist, the Philebus, and, more especially, the Parmenides. We\nhere pass over the Dialogues which contain only negative dialectic and\nSocratic dialogue, because they treat only of concrete ideas and not\nof dialectic in its higher signification; they leave us unsatisfied,\nbecause their ultimate end is only to confuse one\u2019s opinions, or awaken\na sense of the necessity for knowledge. But those three express the\nabstract speculative Idea in its pure Notion. The embracing of the\nopposites in one, and the expression of this unity, is chiefly lacking\nin the Parmenides, which has hence, like some other Dialogues, only\na negative result. But both in the Sophist and the Philebus Plato\nexpresses the unity also.\n\n_a._ The fully worked-out and genuine dialectic is, however, contained\nin the Parmenides\u2014that most famous masterpiece of Platonic dialectic.\nParmenides and Zeno are there represented as meeting Socrates in\nAthens; but the most important part of it is the dialectic which is\nput in the mouths of Parmenides and Zeno. At the very beginning the\nnature of this dialectic is given in detail as follows: Plato makes\nParmenides praise Socrates thus: \u201cI notice that in conversing with\nAristoteles,\u201d (one of those present; it might quite well have been\nthe philosopher, but that he was born sixteen years after Socrates\u2019\ndeath) \u201cyou were trying to define in what the nature of the beautiful,\njust and good, and all such ideas lay. This your endeavour is noble\nand divine. But train and exercise yourself even more in what the\nmultitude call idle chatter, and look on as useless, as long as you\nare young, for otherwise the truth will escape you.\u2014In what, Socrates\nasks, does this exercise consist?\u2014I was much pleased because you said\nbefore that we must not be content with contemplating the sensuous\nand its illusions, but must consider that which thought alone can\ngrasp, and that which alone exists.\u201d I have before[31] remarked that\nmen at all times have believed that the truth could be found through\nreflection only, for in reflection thought is found, and that which\nwe have before us in the guise of ordinary conception and of belief\nis transformed into thought. Socrates now replies to Parmenides: \u201cI\nbelieved that I should in that way best discern the like and unlike,\nand the other general determinations in things.\u201d Parmenides replies,\n\u201cCertainly. But if you begin from a point of view such as that, you\nmust not only consider what follows from such an hypothesis, but also\nwhat follows from the opposite of that hypothesis. For example, in the\ncase of the hypothesis \u2018the many is,\u2019 you have to consider what will\nbe the consequences of the relation of the many to itself and to the\none, and likewise what the consequences of the relation of the one to\nitself and to the many.\u201d The marvellous fact that meets us in thought\nwhen we take determinations such as these by themselves, is that each\none is turned round into the opposite of itself. \u201cBut again we must\nconsider, if the many is not, as to what will be the result as regards\nthe one and the many, both to themselves and to one another. The same\nconsideration must be employed in respect of identity and non-identity,\nrest and motion, origination and passing away, and likewise in regard\nto Being and non-being. We must ask what is each of these in relation\nto itself, and what is their relation in event of the one or the other\nbeing accepted? In exercising yourself fully in this, you will learn to\nknow real truth.\u201d[32] Plato thus lays great stress on the dialectical\npoint of view, which is not the point of view of the merely external,\nbut is a living point of view whose content is formed of pure thoughts\nonly, whose movement consists in their making themselves the other of\nthemselves, and thus showing that only their unity is what is truly\njustified.\n\nPlato makes Socrates say, as regards the meaning of the unity of the\none and many, \u201cIf anyone proved to me that I am one and many, it would\nnot surprise me. For since he shows me that I am a many, and points\nout in me the right and left side, an upper and lower half, a front\nand back, I partake of the manifold; and again I partake of unity\nbecause I am one of us seven. The case is the same with stone, wood,\n&c. But if anyone, after determining the simple ideas of similarity\nand dissimilarity, multiplicity, and unity, rest and movement, and so\non, were to show that these in their abstract form admit of admixture\nand separation, I should be very much surprised.\u201d[33] The dialectic\nof Plato is, however, not to be regarded as complete in every regard.\nThough his main endeavour is to show that in every determination the\nopposite is contained, it can still not be said that this is strictly\ncarried out in all his dialectic movements, for there are often\nexternal considerations which exercise an influence in his dialectic.\nFor example, Parmenides says: \u201cAre either of the two parts of the one\nwhich is\u2014I mean the One and Being\u2014ever wanting to one another? Is the\nOne ever set free from _being_ a part (\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03cc\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd) and Being set\nfree from the _one_ part (\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f11\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bc\u03cc\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5)? Once more, each part thus\npossesses both the one and Being, and the smallest part still always\nconsists of these two parts.\u201d[34] In other words: \u201cThe one is; from\nthis it follows that the one is not synonymous with \u2018is,\u2019 and thus the\none and \u2018is\u2019 are distinguished. There hence is in the proposition \u2018the\none is\u2019 a distinction; the many is therefore contained in it, and thus\neven with the one I express the many.\u201d This dialectic is certainly\ncorrect, but it is not quite pure, because it begins from this union of\ntwo determinations.\n\nThe result of the whole investigation in the Parmenides is summarized\nat the close by saying \u201cthat whether the one is or is not, it, as\nalso the many (\u03c4\u1f06\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1), in relation to themselves and in relation\nto one another\u2014all of them both are and are not, appear and do not\nappear.\u201d[35] This result may seem strange. We are far from accepting,\nin our ordinary conception of things, quite abstract determinations\nsuch as the one, Being, non-being, appearance, rest, movement, &c.,\nas Ideas; but these universals are taken by Plato as Ideas, and this\nDialogue thus really contains the pure Platonic doctrine of Ideas. He\nshows of the one that when it is as well as when it is not, whether\nlike itself or not like itself, both in movement and rest, origination\nand decay, it both is and is not; or the unity as well as all these\npure Ideas, both are and are not, the one is one as much as it is many.\nIn the proposition \u201cthe one is,\u201d it is also implied that \u201cthe one is\nnot one but many;\u201d and, conversely, \u201cthe many is\u201d also indicates that\n\u201cthe many is not many, but one.\u201d They show themselves dialectically\nand are really the identity with their \u2018other\u2019; and this is the truth.\nAn example is given in Becoming: in Becoming Being and non-being\nare in inseparable unity, and yet they are also present there as\ndistinguished; for Becoming only exists because the one passes into the\nother.\n\nIn this respect, perhaps, the result arrived at in the Parmenides\nmay not satisfy us, since it seems to be negative in character, and\nnot, as the negation of the negation, expressive of true affirmation.\nNevertheless, the Neo-platonists, and more especially Proclus,\nregard the result arrived at in the Parmenides as the true theology,\nas the true revelation of all the mysteries of the divine essence.\nAnd it cannot be regarded as anything else, however little this may\nat first appear, and though Tiedemann (Platon. Argumenta, p. 340)\nspeaks of these assertions as merely the wild extravagances of the\nNeo-platonists. In fact, however, we understand by God the absolute\nessence of things, which even in its simple Notion is the unity and\nmovement of these pure realities, the Ideas of the one and many,\n&c. The divine essence is the Idea in general, as it is either for\nsensuous consciousness or for thought. In as far as the divine Idea\nis the absolute self-reflection, dialectic is nothing more than this\nactivity of self-reflection in itself; the Neo-Platonists regarded\nthis connection as metaphysical only, and have recognized in it their\ntheology, the unfolding of the secrets of the divine essence. But here\nthere appears the double interpretation already remarked upon (p.\n19), which has now to be more clearly expounded. It is that God and\nthe essential reality of things may be understood in two different\nways. For, on the one hand, when it is said that the essential reality\nof things is the unity of opposites, it would seem as though only\nthe immediate essence of these immediately objective things were\nindicated, and as if this doctrine of real essence or ontology were\ndistinguished from the knowledge of God, or theology. These simple\nrealities and their relation and movement seem only to express moments\nof the objective and not mind, because there is lacking in them one\nelement\u2014that is to say, reflection into themselves\u2014which we demand\nfor the existence of the divine essence. For mind, the truly absolute\nessence, is not only the simple and immediate, but that which reflects\nitself into itself, for which in its opposition the unity of itself\nand of that which is opposed is; but these moments and their movement\ndo not present it as such, for they make their appearance as simple\nabstractions. On the other hand, they may also be taken to be pure\nNotions, which pertain purely to reflection into itself. In this case\nBeing is wanting to them, or what we likewise demand for reflection\ninto itself as essential to the divine essence; and then their movement\nis esteemed an empty round of empty abstractions, which belong only to\nreflection and have no reality. For the solution of this contradiction\nwe must know the nature of apprehension and knowledge, in order to\nobtain in the Notion everything there present. Thus shall we have the\nconsciousness that the Notion is in truth neither the immediate only,\nalthough it is the simple, nor merely that which reflects itself into\nitself, the thing of consciousness; for it is of spiritual simplicity,\nthus really existent\u2014as it is thought turned back on itself, so it is\nalso Being in itself, _i.e._ objective Being, and consequently all\nreality. Plato did not state this knowledge of the nature of the Notion\nso expressly, nor did he say that this essential Being of things is the\nsame as the divine essence. But really it is simply not put into words,\nfor the fact is undoubtedly present, and the only distinction is one of\nspeech as between the mode of the ordinary conception and that of the\nNotion. On the one hand, this reflection into itself, the spiritual,\nthe Notion, is present in the speculation of Plato; for the unity of\nthe one and many, &c., is just this individuality in difference, this\nbeing-turned-back-within-itself in its opposite, this opposite which is\nimplicit; the essential reality of the world is really this movement\nreturning into itself of that which is turned back within itself. But,\non the other hand, for this very reason, this being reflected into\nself\u2014like the God of ordinary conception\u2014still remains with Plato\nsomething separated; and in his representation of the Becoming of\nNature in the Tim\u00e6us, God, and the essential reality of things, appear\nas distinguished.\n\n_b._ In the Sophist Plato investigated the pure Notions or Ideas of\nmovement and rest, self-identity and other-being, Being and non-being.\nHe here proves, as against Parmenides, that non-being is, and likewise\nthat the simple self-identical partakes of other-being, and unity\nof multiplicity. He says of the Sophists that they never get beyond\nnon-being, and he also refutes their whole ground-principle, which is\nnon-being, feeling, and the many. Plato has thus so determined the\ntrue universal, that he makes it the unity of, for example, the one\nand many, Being and non-being; but at the same time he has avoided, or\nit was his endeavour to avoid, the double meaning which lies in our\ntalk of the unity of Being and nothing, &c. For in this expression\nwe emphasize the unity, and then the difference disappears, just as\nif we merely abstracted from it. Plato tried, however, to preserve\nthe difference likewise. The Sophist is a further development of\nBeing and non-being, both of which are applicable to all things; for\nbecause things are different, the one being the other of the other,\nthe determination of the negative is present. First of all, however,\nPlato expresses in the Sophist a clearer consciousness of Ideas as\nabstract universalities, and his conviction that this point of view\ncould not endure, because it was opposed to the unity of the Idea\nwith itself. Plato thus first refutes what is sensuous, and then even\nthe Ideas themselves. The first of these points of view is what is\nlater on called materialism, which makes the corporeal alone to be\nthe substantial, admitting nothing to have reality excepting what can\nbe laid hold of by the hand, such as rocks and oaks. \u201cLet us,\u201d says\nPlato, in the second place, \u201cproceed to the other, to the friends\nof Ideas.\u201d Their belief is that the substantial is incorporeal,\nintellectual, and they separate from it the region of Becoming, of\nchange, into which the sensuous falls, while the universal is for\nitself. These represent Ideas as immovable, and neither active nor\npassive. Plato asserts, as against this, that movement, life, soul,\nand thought, cannot be denied to true Being (\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9), and that\nthe holy reason (\u1f04\u03b3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd) can be nowhere, and in nothing that is\nunmoved.[36] Plato thus has a clear consciousness of having got further\nthan Parmenides when he says:\u2014\n\n \u201cKeep your mind from this way of inquiry,\n For never will you show that non-being is.\u201d\n\nPlato says that Being in anyone partakes both of Being and non-being;\nbut what thus participates is different both from Being and non-being\nas such.[37]\n\nThis dialectic combats two things in particular; and in the first place\nit is antagonistic to the common dialectic in the ordinary sense,\nof which we have already spoken. Examples of this false dialectic\nto which Plato often comes back, are specially frequent amongst the\nSophists; yet he did not show sufficiently clearly how they are\ndistinguished from the purely dialectical knowledge which is in the\nNotion. For example, Plato expressed his dissent when Protagoras and\nothers said that no determination is absolutely certain\u2014that bitter is\nnot objective, for what to one person is bitter, to another is sweet.\nSimilarly, large and small, more and less, &c., are relative, because\nthe large will be, in other circumstances, small, and the small will\nbe great. That is to say, the unity of opposites is present to us\nin everything we know, but the common way of looking at things, in\nwhich the rational does not come to consciousness, always holds the\nopposites asunder, as though they were simply opposed in a determinate\nway. As in each thing we demonstrate unity, so do we also show its\nmultiplicity, for it has many parts and qualities. In the Parmenides,\nPlato, as we saw above (p. 58), objected to this unity of opposites,\nbecause it must thereby be said that something is one in quite another\nrespect from that in which it is many. We thus do not here bring\nthese thoughts together, for the conception and the words merely go\nbackwards and forwards from the one to the other; if this passing to\nand fro is performed with consciousness, it is the empty dialectic\nwhich does not really unite the opposites. Of this Plato says, \u201cIf\nanyone thinks he has made a wonderful discovery in ascertaining that\nhe can drag thoughts this way and that, from one determination to\nanother, he may be told that he has done nothing worthy of praise; for\nin so doing there is nothing excellent or difficult.\u201d The dialectic\nthat annuls a determination because it reveals in it some defect,\nand then goes on to establish another, is thus wrong. \u201cThe point of\ndifficulty, and what we ought to aim at, is to show that what is the\nother is the same, and what is the same, is another, and likewise in\nthe same regard and from the same point of view to show that the one\nhas in them come into existence if the other determination is revealed\nwithin them. But to show that somehow the same is another, and the\nother also the same, that the great is also small\u201d (_e.g._ Protagoras\u2019s\ndie), \u201cand the like also unlike, and to delight in thus always proving\nopposites, is no true inquiry (\u1f14\u03bb\u03b5\u03bd\u03c7\u03bf\u03c2), but simply proves that he who\nuses such arguments is a neophyte,\u201d in thought, \u201cwho has just begun\nto investigate truth. To separate all existences from one another is\nthe crude attempt of an uncultured and unphilosophical mind. To cause\neverything to fall asunder means the perfect annihilation of all\nthought, for thought is the union of ideas.\u201d[38] Thus Plato expressly\nspeaks against the dialectic of showing how anything may be refuted\nfrom some point of view or another. We see that Plato, in respect of\ncontent, expresses nothing excepting what is called indifference in\ndifference, the difference of absolute opposites and their unity. To\nthis speculative knowledge he opposes the ordinary way of thinking,\nwhich is positive as well as negative; the former, not bringing the\nthoughts together, allows first one and then the other to have value in\ntheir separation; the latter is, indeed, conscious of a unity, though\nit is of a superficial, differentiating unity in which the two moments\nare separate, as standing in different aspects.\n\nThe second point against which Plato argues is the dialectic of the\nEleatics, and their assertion, which in its nature resembles that of\nthe Sophists, that only Being is, and non-being is not. To the Sophists\nthis means, as Plato puts it: Since the negative is not, but only Being\nis, there is nothing false; everything existent, everything which is\nfor us, is thus necessarily true, and what is not, we do not know\nor feel. Plato reproaches the Sophists for thus doing away with the\ndifference between true and false.[39] Having arrived at this stage\nin the knowledge of the dialectic (and the whole matter is merely a\ndifference of stages) the Sophists could allow what they promise\u2014that\neverything that the individual, according to his belief, makes his end\nand interest, is affirmative and right. Hence it cannot be said that\nsuch and such an act is wrong, wicked, a crime; for this would be to\nsay that the maxim of the action is wrong. No more can it be said that\nsuch and such opinion is deceptive, for in the opinion of the Sophists\nthe proposition implies that what I feel or represent to myself, in as\nfar as it is mine, is an affirmative content, and thus true and right.\nThe proposition in itself seems quite abstract and innocent, but we\nfirst notice what is involved in such abstractions when we see them\nin concrete form. According to this innocent proposition there would\nbe no wickedness and no crime. The Platonic dialectic is essentially\ndifferent from this kind of dialectic.\n\nWhat is further present to the mind of Plato is that the Idea, the\nabsolute universal, good, true, and beautiful, is to be taken for\nitself. The myth, which I have already quoted (p. 27 _et seq._), indeed\ngoes to prove that we must not consider a good action, a noble man\u2014not\nthe subject of which these determinations are predicated. For that\nwhich appears in such conceptions or perceptions as predicate, must be\ntaken for itself, and this is the absolute truth. This tallies with\nthe nature of the dialectic which has been described. An action, taken\nin accordance with the empirical conception, may be called right; in\nanother aspect, quite opposite determinations may be shown to be in it.\nBut the good and true must be taken on their own account without such\nindividualities, without this empirical and concrete character; and\nthe good and true thus taken alone, constitute that which is. The soul\nwhich, according to the divine drama, is found in matter, rejoices in\na beautiful and just object; but the only actual truth is in absolute\nvirtue, justice, and beauty. It is thus the universal for itself which\nis further determined in the Platonic dialectic; of this several forms\nappear, but these forms are themselves still very general and abstract.\nPlato\u2019s highest form is the identity of Being and non-being. The true\nis that which is, but this Being is not without negation. Plato\u2019s\nobject is thus to show that non-being is an essential determination in\nBeing, and that the simple, self-identical, partakes of other-being.\nThis unity of Being and non-being is also found in the Sophists; but\nthis alone is not the end of the matter. For in further investigation\nPlato comes to the conclusion that non-being, further determined, is\nthe essence of the \u2018other\u2019: \u201cIdeas mingle, and Being and the other\n(\u03b8\u03ac\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd) go through everything and through one another; the other,\nbecause it participates (\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c7\u03cc\u03bd) in Being, certainly _is_ through\nthis indwelling Being, but it is not identical with that of which it\npartakes, being something different, and being other than Being, it is\nclearly non-being. But since Being likewise partakes of other-being,\nit also is different from other Ideas, and is not any one of them; so\nthat there are thousands of ways in which it is not, and as regards\nall else, whether looked at individually or collectively, it in many\nrespects is, and in many respects is not.\u201d[40] Plato thus maintains\nthat the other, as the negative, non-identical, is likewise in one and\nthe same respect the self-identical; there are not different sides\nwhich are in mutual opposition.\n\nThese are the principal points in Plato\u2019s peculiar dialectic. The\nfact that the Idea of the divine, eternal, beautiful, is absolute\nexistence, is the beginning of the elevation of consciousness into the\nspiritual, and into the consciousness that the universal is true. It\nmay be enough for the ordinary idea to be animated and satisfied by the\nconception of the beautiful and good, but thinking knowledge demands\nthe determination of this eternal and divine. And this determination\nis really only free determination which certainly does not prevent\nuniversality\u2014a limitation (for every determination is limitation) which\nlikewise leaves the universal in its infinitude free and independent.\nFreedom exists only in a return into itself; the undistinguished is the\nlifeless; the active, living, concrete universal is hence what inwardly\ndistinguishes itself, but yet remains free in so doing. Now this\ndeterminateness consists in the one being identical with itself in the\nother, in the many, in what is distinguished. This constitutes the only\ntruth, and the only interest for knowledge in what is called Platonic\nphilosophy, and if this is not known, the main point of it is not\nknown. While in the example already often quoted (pp. 58, 64),[41] in\nwhich Socrates is both one and many, the two thoughts are made to fall\nasunder, it is left to speculative thought alone to bring the thoughts\ntogether, and this union of what is different, of Being and non-being,\nof one and many, &c., which takes place without a mere transition from\none to another, constitutes the inmost reality and true greatness of\nPlatonic philosophy. This determination is the esoteric element in\nPlatonic philosophy, and the other is the exoteric; the distinction is\ndoubtless an unwarranted one, indicating, as it seems to do, that Plato\ncould have two such philosophies\u2014one for the world, for the people, and\nthe other, the inward, reserved for the initiated. But the esoteric\nis the speculative, which, even though written and printed, is yet,\nwithout being any secret, hidden from those who have not sufficient\ninterest in it to exert themselves. To this esoteric portion pertain\nthe two dialogues hitherto considered, along with which the Philebus\nmay in the third place be taken.\n\n_c._ In the Philebus Plato investigates the nature of pleasure;\nand the opposition of the infinite and finite, or of the unlimited\n(\u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd) and limiting (\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2), is there more especially dealt with. In\nkeeping this before us, it would scarcely occur to us that through the\nmetaphysical knowledge of the nature of the infinite and undetermined,\nwhat concerns enjoyment is likewise determined; but these pure thoughts\nare the substantial through which everything, however concrete or\nseemingly remote, is decided. When Plato treats of pleasure and wisdom\nas contrasted, it is the opposition of finite and infinite. By pleasure\nwe certainly represent to ourselves the immediately individual, the\nsensuous; but pleasure is the indeterminate in respect that it is the\nmerely elementary, like fire and water, and not the self-determining.\nOnly the Idea is the self-determinate, or self-identity. To our\nreflection the infinite appears to be what is best and highest,\nlimitation being inferior to it; and ancient philosophers so\ndetermined it. By Plato, however, it is, on the other hand, shown\nthat the limited is the true, as the self-determining, while the\nunlimited is still abstract; it certainly can be determined in many\ndifferent ways, but when thus determined it is only the individual. The\ninfinite is the formless; free form as activity is the finite, which\nfinds in the infinite the material for self-realization. Plato thus\ncharacterizes enjoyment dependent on the senses as the unlimited which\ndoes not determine itself; reason alone is the active determination.\nBut the infinite is what in itself passes over to the finite; thus\nthe perfect good, according to Plato, is neither to be sought for in\nhappiness or reason, but in a life of both combined. But wisdom, as\nlimit, is the true cause from which what is excellent arises.[42] As\nthat which posits measure and end, it is what absolutely determines the\nend\u2014the immanent determination with which and in which freedom likewise\nbrings itself into existence.\n\nPlato further considers the fact that the true is the identity of\nopposites, thus. The infinite, as the indeterminate, is capable of\na more or less, it may be more intensive or not; thus colder and\nwarmer, drier and moister, quicker and slower, &c., are all such.\nWhat is limited is the equal, the double, and every other measure; by\nthis means the opposite ceases to be unlike and becomes uniform and\nharmonious. Through the unity of these opposites, such as cold and\nwarm, dry and moist, health arises; similarly the harmony of music\ntakes its origin from the limitation of high tones and deep, of quicker\nand slower movement, and, generally speaking, everything beautiful\nand perfect arises through the union of opposites. Health, happiness,\nbeauty, &c., would thus appear to be begotten, in as far as the\nopposites are allied thereto, but they are likewise an intermingling\nof the same. The ancients make copious use of intermingling,\nparticipation, &c., instead of individuality; but for us these are\nindefinite and inadequate expressions. But Plato says that the third,\nwhich is thus begotten, pre-supposes the cause or that from which it is\nformed; this is more excellent than those through whose instrumentality\nthat third arose. Hence Plato has four determinations; first the\nunlimited, the undetermined; secondly the limited, measure, proportion,\nto which pertains wisdom; the third is what is mingled from both, what\nhas only arisen; the fourth is cause. This is in itself nothing else\nthan the unity of differences, subjectivity, power and supremacy over\nopposites, that which is able to sustain the opposites in itself;\nbut it is only the spiritual which has this power and which sustains\nopposition, the highest contradiction in itself. Weak corporeality\npasses away as soon as \u2018another\u2019 comes into it. The cause he speaks\nof is divine reason, which governs the world; the beauty of the world\nwhich is present in air, fire, water, and in all that lives, is\nproduced thereby.[43] Thus the absolute is what in one unity is finite\nand infinite.\n\nWhen Plato speaks thus of the beautiful and good, these are concrete\nideas, or rather there is only one idea. But we are still far\nfrom these concrete ideas when we begin with such abstractions as\nBeing, non-being, unity, and multiplicity. If Plato, however, has\nnot succeeded in bringing these abstract thoughts through further\ndevelopment and concretion, to beauty, truth, and morality, there at\nleast lies in the knowledge of those abstract determinations, the\ncriterion by which the concrete is determined, as also its sources.\nThis transition to the concrete is made in the Philebus, since the\nprinciple of feeling and of pleasure is there considered. The ancient\nphilosophers knew very well what they had of concrete in those\nabstract thoughts. In the atomic principle of multiplicity we thus\nfind the source of a construction of the state, for the ultimate\nthought-determination of such state-principles is the logical. The\nancients in their pure Philosophy had not the same end in view as\nwe\u2014they had not the end of a metaphysical sequence placed before them\nlike a problem. We, on the other hand, have something concrete before\nus, and desire to reduce it to settled order. With Plato Philosophy\noffers the path which the individual must follow in order to attain\nto any knowledge, but, generally speaking, Plato places absolute and\nexplicit happiness, the blessed life itself, in the contemplation\nduring life of the divine objects named above.[44] This contemplative\nlife seems aimless, for the reason that all its interests have\ndisappeared. But to live in freedom in the kingdom of thought had\nbecome the absolute end to the ancients, and they knew that freedom\nexisted only in thought.\n\n\n2. PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.\n\nWith Plato Philosophy likewise commenced to devote more attention\nto the understanding of what is further determined, and in this way\nthe matter of knowledge began to fall into divisions. In the Tim\u00e6us\nthe Idea thus makes its appearance as expressed in its concrete\ndeterminateness, and the Platonic Philosophy of Nature hence teaches\nus to have a better knowledge of the reality of the world; we cannot,\nhowever, enter into details, and if we did, they have little interest.\nIt is more especially where Plato treats of physiology that his\nstatements in no way correspond with what we now know, although we\ncannot fail to wonder at the brilliant glimpses of the truth there\nfound, which have been only too much misconceived by the moderns.\nPlato derived a great deal from the Pythagoreans; how much is theirs,\nhowever, cannot be satisfactorily determined. We remarked before (p.\n14) that the Tim\u00e6us is really the fuller version of a Pythagorean\ntreatise; other would-be wise persons have indeed said that the\ntreatise is only an abstract made by a Pythagorean of the larger\nwork of Plato, but the first theory is the more probable. The Tim\u00e6us\nhas in all times been esteemed the most difficult and obscure of the\nPlatonic dialogues. This difficulty is due in part to the apparent\nmingling of conceiving knowledge and ordinary perception already\nmentioned (p. 20), just as we shall presently find an intermingling\nof Pythagorean numbers; and it is due still more to the philosophic\nnature of the matter in hand, of which Plato was as yet unconscious.\nThe second difficulty lies in the arrangement of the whole, for what\nat once strikes one is that Plato repeatedly breaks off the thread of\nhis argument, often appearing to turn back and begin again from the\nbeginning.[45] This moved critics such as August Wolff and others, who\ncould not understand it philosophically, to take the Tim\u00e6us to be an\naccumulation of fragments put together, or else to be several works\nwhich had only been loosely strung together into one, or into the\nPlatonic portion of which much that is foreign had been introduced.\nWolff accordingly thought it was evident from this that the dialogue,\nlike Homer\u2019s poems, had been, in its first form, spoken and not\nwritten. But although the connection seems unmethodical, and Plato\nhimself makes what maybe called copious excuses for the confusion, we\nshall find how the whole matter really falls into natural divisions,\nand we shall also find the deep inward reason which makes necessary the\nfrequent return to what apparently is the beginning.\n\nAn exposition of the reality of nature or of the becoming of the world\nis introduced by Plato in the following way: \u201cGod is the Good,\u201d this\nstands also at the head of the Platonic Ideas in the verbally delivered\ndiscourses (_supra_, p. 11); \u201cgoodness, however, has no jealousy of\nanything, and being free from jealousy, God desired to make all things\nlike Himself.\u201d[46] God here is still without determination, and a\nname which has no meaning for thought; nevertheless, where Plato in\nthe Tim\u00e6us again begins from the beginning, he is found to have a\nmore definite idea of God. That God is devoid of envy undoubtedly is\na great, beautiful, true, and childlike thought. With the ancients,\non the contrary, we find in Nemesis, Dike, Fate, Jealousy, the one\ndetermination of the gods: moved by this they cast down the great and\nbring it low, and suffer not what is excellent and elevated to exist.\nThe later high-minded philosophers controverted this doctrine. For in\nthe mere idea of the Nemesis no moral determination is as yet implied,\nbecause punishment there is only the humiliation of what oversteps\nlimits, but these limits are not yet presented as moral, and punishment\nis thus not yet a recognition of the moral as distinguished from the\nimmoral. Plato\u2019s thought is thus much higher than that of most of our\nmoderns, who, in saying that God is a hidden God who has not revealed\nHimself to us and of whom we can know nothing, ascribe jealousy to\nGod. For why should He not reveal Himself to us if we earnestly seek\nthe knowledge of Him? A light loses nothing by another\u2019s being kindled\ntherefrom, and hence there was in Athens a punishment imposed on those\nwho did not permit this to be done. If the knowledge of God were kept\nfrom us in order that we should know only the finite and not attain\nto the infinite, God would be a jealous God, or God would then become\nan empty name. Such talk means no more than that we wish to neglect\nwhat is higher and divine, and seek after our own petty interests and\nopinions. This humility is sin\u2014the sin against the Holy Ghost.\n\nPlato continues: \u201cGod found the visible\u201d (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03ce\u03bd)\u2014a mythical\nexpression proceeding from the necessity of beginning with an\nimmediate, which, however, as it presents itself, cannot in any way\nbe allowed\u2014\u201cnot at rest, but moving in an irregular and disorderly\nmanner; and out of disorder he brought order, considering that this\nwas far better than the other.\u201d From this it appears as if Plato had\nconsidered that God was only the \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, _i.e._ the disposer of\nmatter, and that this, being eternal and independent, was found by\nHim as chaos; but in view of what has been said, this is false. These\nare not the philosophic doctrines which Plato seriously held, for he\nspeaks here only after the manner of the ordinary conception, and\nsuch expressions have hence no philosophic content. It is only the\nintroduction of the subject, bringing us, as it does, to determinations\nsuch as matter. Plato then comes in course of his progress to further\ndeterminations, and in these we first have the Notion; we must hold to\nwhat is speculative in Plato, and not to the first-mentioned ordinary\nconception. Likewise, when he says that God esteemed order to be the\nbest, the mode of expression is na\u00efve. Nowadays we should ask that\nGod should first be proved; and just as little should we allow the\nvisible to be established without much further ado. What is proved\nby Plato from this more na\u00efve method of expression is, in the first\nplace, the true determination of the Idea, which only appears later\non. It is further said: \u201cGod reflecting that of what is visible, the\nunintelligent (\u1f00\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd) could not be fairer than the intelligent\n(\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2), and that intelligence could not exist in anything devoid of\nsoul, for these reasons put intelligence in the soul, and the soul\nin the body, and so united them that the world became a living and\nintelligent system, an animal.\u201d We have reality and intelligence,\nand the soul as the bond connecting the two extremes, without which\nintelligence could not have part in the visible body; we saw the true\nreality comprehended by Plato in a similar way in the Ph\u00e6drus (_supra_,\np. 39). \u201cThere is, however, only one such animal, for were there two or\nmore, these would be only parts of the one, and only one.\u201d[47]\n\nPlato now first proceeds to the determination of the Idea of corporeal\nexistence: \u201cBecause the world was to become corporeal, visible and\ntangible, and since without fire nothing can be seen, and without\nsolidity, without earth, nothing can be touched, God in the beginning\nmade fire and earth.\u201d In this childlike way Plato introduces these\nextremes, solidity and life. \u201cBut two things cannot be united without\na third, there must be a bond between them, uniting both\u201d\u2014one of\nPlato\u2019s simple methods of expression. \u201cThe fairest bond, however, is\nthat which most completely fuses itself and that which is bound by\nit.\u201d That is a profound saying, in which the Notion is contained; the\nbond is the subjective and individual, the power which dominates the\nother, which makes itself identical with it. \u201cProportion\u201d (\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1)\nis best adapted to effect such a fusion; that is, whenever of three\nnumbers or magnitudes or powers, that which is the mean is to the\nlast term what the first term is to the mean, and again when the mean\nis to the first term as the last term is to the mean (a : b = b : c)\n\u201cthen the mean having become the first and last, and the first and\nlast both having become means, all things will necessarily come to be\nthe same; but having come to be the same, everything will be one.\u201d[48]\nThis is excellent, we have still preserved this in our Philosophy;\nit is the distinction which is no distinction. This diremption from\nwhich Plato proceeds, is the conclusion which we know from logic; it\nappears in the form of the ordinary syllogism, in which, however, the\nwhole rationality of the Idea is, at least externally, contained. The\ndistinctions are the extremes, and the mean is the identity which in a\nsupreme degree makes them one; the conclusion is thus speculative, and\nin the extremes unites itself with itself, because all the terms pass\nthrough all the different positions. It is hence a mistake to disparage\nthe conclusion and not to recognize it as the highest and absolute\nform; in respect of the conclusions arrived at by the understanding,\non the contrary, we should be right in rejecting it. This last has no\nsuch mean; each of the differences is there recognized as different in\nits own independent form, as having a character different from that\nof the other. This, in the Platonic philosophy, is abrogated, and\nthe speculative element in it constitutes the proper and true form\nof conclusion, in which the extremes neither remain in independence\nas regards themselves, nor as regards the mean. In the conclusion of\nthe understanding, on the contrary, the unity which is constituted is\nonly the unity of essentially different contents which remain such;\nfor here a subject, a determination, is, through the mean, simply\nbound up with another, or \u201csome conception is joined to some other\nconception.\u201d In a rational conclusion, however, the main point of its\nspeculative content is the identity of the extremes which are joined\nto one another; in this it is involved that the subject presented in\nthe mean is a content which does not join itself with another, but only\nthrough the other and in the other with itself. In other words, this\nconstitutes the essential nature of God, who, when made subject, is\nthe fact that He begot His Son, the world; but in this reality which\nappears as another, He still remains identical with Himself, does away\nwith the separation implied in the Fall, and, in the other, merely\nunites Himself to Himself and thus becomes Spirit. When the immediate\nis elevated over the mediate and it is then said that God\u2019s actions are\nimmediate, there is, indeed, good ground for the assertion; but the\nconcrete fact is that God is a conclusion which, by differentiating\nitself, unites itself to itself, and, through the abrogation of the\nmediation, reinstates its own immediacy. In the Platonic philosophy we\nthus have what is best and highest; the thoughts are, indeed, merely\npure thoughts, but they contain everything in themselves; for all\nconcrete forms depend on thought-determinations alone. The Fathers thus\nfound in Plato the Trinity which they wished to comprehend and prove\nin thought: with Plato the truth really has the same determination\nas the Trinity. But these forms have been neglected for two thousand\nyears since Plato\u2019s time, for they have not passed into the Christian\nreligion as thoughts; indeed they were considered to be ideas which had\nentered in through error, until quite recent times, when men began to\nunderstand that the Notion is contained in these determinations, and\nthat nature and spirit can thus be comprehended through their means.\n\nPlato continues: \u201cSince what is solid requires two means, because it\nnot only has breadth but also depth, God has placed air and water\nbetween fire and earth; and indeed He gave to them the same proportion,\nso that fire is related to air as air to water, and as air is to\nwater, so is water to earth.\u201d[49] Thus we have, properly speaking,\nfour methods of representing space, inasmuch as the point is, through\nline and surface, closely bound up with the solid body. The sundered\nmean here discovered, again indicates an important thought of logical\nprofundity; and the number four which here appears, is in nature\na fundamental number. For as being the different which is turned\ntowards the two extremes, the mean must be separated in itself. In\nthe conclusion in which God is the One, the second (the mediating),\nthe Son; the third, the Spirit; the mean indeed is simple. But the\ncause why that which in the rational conclusion is merely three-fold,\npasses in nature to the four-fold, rests in what is natural, because\nwhat in thought is immediately the one, becomes separate in Nature.\nBut in order that in Nature the opposition should exist as opposition,\nit must itself be a twofold, and thus, when we count, we have four.\nThis also takes place in the conception of God, for when we apply\nit to the world, we have nature as mean and the existent spirit as\nthe way of return for nature: when the return is made, this is the\nabsolute Spirit. This living process, this separation and unifying of\ndifferences, is the living God.\n\nPlato says further: \u201cThrough this unity the visible and tangible world\nhas been made. And it comes to pass by God\u2019s having given to it these\nelements entire and unseparated, that it is perfect, and unaffected by\nage and disease. For old age and disease only arise from a body\u2019s being\nworked upon by a superabundance of such elements from without. But\nhere this is not so, for the world contains those elements entirely in\nitself, and nothing can come to it from without. The world is spherical\nin form,\u201d (as it was to Parmenides and the Pythagoreans) \u201cas being\nmost perfect, and as containing all others in itself; it is perfectly\nsmooth, since for it there is nothing outside, and it requires no\nlimbs.\u201d Finitude consists in this, that a distinction as regards\nsomething else is an externality to some other object. In the Idea we\ncertainly have determination, limitation, difference, other-being, but\nit is at the same time dissolved, contained, gathered together, in the\none. Thus it is a difference through which no finitude arises, seeing\nthat it likewise is sublated. Finitude is thus in the infinite itself,\nand this is, indeed, a great thought. \u201cGod gave the world the most\nappropriate motion of all the seven, being that which harmonizes best\nwith mind and consciousness, motion in a circle; the other six He took\naway from it and liberated it from their variations\u201d[50] (movements\nbackwards and forwards). This is only a popular way of putting it.\n\nWe read further: \u201cSince God wished to make the world a God, He gave it\nsoul, and this was placed in the centre and diffused through the whole,\nwhich was also surrounded by it externally; and in this way He brought\nto pass the self-sufficing existence which required no other, and which\nneeded no other friendship or acquaintance than itself. Through these\nmeans God created the world as a blessed God.\u201d We may say that here,\nwhere the world is a totality through the world-soul, we first have the\nknowledge of the Idea; for the first time this newly-begotten God,\nas the mean and identity, is the true absolute. That first God which\nwas only goodness, is, on the contrary, a mere hypothesis, and hence\nneither determined nor self-determining. \u201cNow though we have spoken of\nthe soul last,\u201d Plato goes on, \u201cit does not for that reason come last;\nfor this is merely our manner of speech. The soul is the ruler, the\nking, and the body is its subject.\u201d It is only Plato\u2019s na\u00efvety which\nascribes the reversal of the order of the two to a manner of speech.\nWhat here appears as contingent is really necessary\u2014that is, to begin\nwith the immediate and then come to the concrete. We must likewise\nadopt this method, but with the consciousness that when we begin with\ndeterminations such as Being, or God, Space, Time, &c., we speak of\nthem in an immediate manner, and this content, in accordance with its\nnature, is at first immediate, and consequently undetermined in itself.\nGod, for example, with whom we begin as an immediate, is proved only at\nthe last, and then, indeed, as the true first. Thus we can, as already\nremarked, (p. 72) show Plato\u2019s confusion of mind in such presentations;\nbut it depends entirely on what Plato\u2019s standard of truth is.\n\nPlato further shows us the nature of the Idea in one of the most\nfamous and profound of passages, where in the essence of the soul he\nrecognizes again the very same idea that he also expressed as the\nessence of the corporeal. For he says: \u201cThe soul is created in the\nfollowing way: Of the indivisible and unchangeable and also of the\ndivisible which is corporeal, God made a third kind of intermediate\nessence, which partook of the nature of the same and of the nature of\nthe other or diverse.\u201d (The divisible is to Plato likewise the other\nas such, or in itself, and not of anything else.) \u201cAnd God in like\nmanner made the soul a sort of intermediate between the indivisible\nand the divisible.\u201d Here the abstract determinations of the one which\nis identity, of the many or non-identical, which is opposition and\ndifference, once more appear. If we say: \u201cGod, the Absolute, is the\nidentity of the identical and non-identical,\u201d a cry is raised of\nbarbarism and scholasticism. Those who speak of it so still hold Plato\nin high esteem, and yet it was thus that he determined the truth. \u201cAnd\ntaking these three elements as separate, God mingled them all into one\nIdea, because he forcibly compressed the incongruous nature of the\nother into the same.\u201d[51] This is undoubtedly the power of the Notion,\nwhich posits the many, the separate, as the ideal, and that is also the\nforce applied to the understanding when anything is placed before it.\n\nPlato now describes how the self-identical, as itself a moment, and\nthe other or matter, and the third, the apparently dissoluble union\nwhich has not returned into the first unity\u2014which three were originally\nseparated\u2014have now, in simple reflection into self and resumption of\nthat beginning, been degraded into moments. \u201cMingling the identical\nand the other with the essence (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1),\u201d the third moment, \u201cand making\nthem all one, God again divided this whole into as many parts was\nas fitting.\u201d[52] Since this substance of the soul is identical with\nthat of the visible world, the one whole is for the first time the\nnow systematized substance, the true matter, the absolute element\nwhich is internally divided, an enduring and unseparable unity of the\none and many; and no other essence must be demanded. The manner and\nmode of the division of this subjectivity contain the famous Platonic\nnumbers, which doubtless originally pertain to the Pythagoreans, and\nrespecting which both ancients and moderns, and even Kepler himself\nin his _Harmonia mundi_, have taken much pains, but which no one has\nproperly understood. To understand would mean two things, and in\nthe first place, the recognition of their speculative significance,\ntheir Notion. But, as already remarked of the Pythagoreans (Vol.\nI. p. 224), these distinctions of number give only an indefinite\nconception of difference, and that only in the earlier numbers; where\nthe relationships become more complicated, they are quite incapable of\ndesignating them more closely. In the second place, because of their\nbeing numbers, they express, as differences of magnitude, differences\nin what is sensuous only. The system of apparent magnitude\u2014and it is\nin the heavenly system that magnitude appears most purely and freely,\nliberated from what is qualitative\u2014must correspond to them. But\nthese living number-spheres are themselves systems composed of many\nelements\u2014both of the magnitude of distance and of velocity and mass. No\none of these elements, taken as a succession of simple numbers, can be\nlikened to the system of heavenly spheres, for the series corresponding\nto this system can, as to its members, contain nothing else than the\nsystem of all these moments. Now if the Platonic numbers were also\nthe elements of each system such as this, it would not be only this\nelement which would have to be taken into account, for the relationship\nof moments which become distinguished in movement has to be conceived\nof as a whole, and is the true object of interest and reason. What we\nhave to do is to give briefly the main points as matter of history;\nwe have the most thorough treatment of it given us by B\u00f6ckh \u201cOn the\nConstitution of the World-Soul in the Tim\u00e6us of Plato,\u201d in the third\nvolume of the Studies of Daub and Creuzer (p. 26 _et seq._).\n\nThe fundamental series is very simple: \u201cGod first took one part out\nof the whole; then the second, the double of the first; the third is\none and a half times as many as the second, or three times the first;\nthe next is double the second; the fifth is three times the third;\nthe sixth is eight times the first; the seventh is twenty-seven times\ngreater than the first.\u201d Hence the series is: 1; 2; 3; 4 = 2\u00b2; 9 = 3\u00b2;\n8 = 2\u00b3; 27 = 3\u00b3. \u201cThen God filled up the double and triple intervals\u201d\n(the relations 1 : 2 and 1 : 3) \u201cby again abstracting portions from\nthe whole. These parts he placed in the intervals in such a way that\nin each interval there were two means, the one exceeding and exceeded\nby the extremes in the same ratio, the other being that kind of mean\nwhich by an equal number exceeds and is exceeded by the extremes.\u201d That\nis, the first is a constant geometric relationship, and the other is\nan arithmetical. The first mean, brought about through the quadration,\nis thus in the relation 1 : 2, for example, the proportion 1 : \u221a\u03052\n: 2; the other is in the same relation, the number 1\u00bd. Hereby new\nrelations arise which are again in a specially given and more difficult\nmethod inserted into that first, but this is done in such a way that\neverywhere something has been left out, and the last relation of number\nto number is 256 : 243, or 2^8 : 3^5.\n\nMuch progress is not, however, made with these number-relations, for\nthey do not present much to the speculative Notion. The relationships\nand laws of nature cannot be expressed by these barren numbers; they\nform an empirical relation which does not constitute the basis of\nthe proportions of nature. Plato now says: \u201cGod divided this entire\nseries lengthways into two parts which he set together crosswise like\nan X, and he bent their ends into a circular form and comprehended\nthem in a uniform motion\u2014forming an inner circle and an outer\u2014and he\ncalled the motion of the outer circle the motion of the same, and\nthat of the inner the motion of the diverse, giving supremacy to the\nformer, and leaving it intact. But the inner motion he again split\ninto seven orbits after the same relations; three of these he made to\nmove with equal velocity, and four with unequal velocity to the three\nand to one another. This is the system of the soul within which all\nthat is corporeal is formed; the soul is the centre, it penetrates\nthe whole and envelopes it from without and moves in itself. Thus\nit has the divine beginning of a never-ceasing and rational life in\nitself.\u201d[53] This is not quite devoid of confusion, and from it we\ncan only grasp the general fact that as to Plato with the idea of the\ncorporeal universe that of the soul enters in as the all-embracing\nand simple, to him the essence of the corporeal and of the soul is\nunity in difference. This double essence, posited in and for itself\nin difference, becomes systematized within the one in many moments,\nwhich are, however, movements; thus this reality and that essence both\npertain to this whole in the antithesis of soul and body, and this\nagain is one. Mind is what penetrates all, and to it the corporeal is\nopposed as truly as that it itself is mind.\n\nThis is a general description of the soul which is posited in the\nworld and reigns over it; and in as far as the substantial, which is\nin matter, is similar to it, their inherent identity is asserted. The\nfact that in it the same moments which constitute its reality are\ncontained, merely signifies that God, as absolute Substance, does not\nsee anything other than Himself. Plato hence describes the relation\nof soul to objective reality thus: it, if it touches any of the\nmoments, whether dispersed in parts or indivisible, is stirred in all\nits powers to declare the sameness and the difference of that or some\nother thing, and how, where, and when, the individual is related to\nthe other and to the universal. \u201cNow when the orbit of the sensuous,\nmoving in its due course, imparts knowledge of itself to its whole\nsoul\u201d (where the different orbits of the world\u2019s course show themselves\nto correspond with the inwardness of mind) \u201ctrue opinions and beliefs\narise. But when the soul applies itself to the rational and the orbit\nof the self-identical makes itself known, thought is perfected into\nknowledge.\u201d[54] This is the essential reality of the world as of the\ninherently blessed God; here the Idea of the whole is for the first\ntime perfected, and, in accordance with this Idea, the world first\nmakes its appearance. What had hitherto appeared was the reality of the\nsensuous only and not the world as sensuous, for though Plato certainly\nspoke before of fire, &c. (p. 75), he there gave only the reality of\nthe sensuous; he would hence have done better to have omitted these\nexpressions. In them we have the reason for its appearing as if Plato\nhad here begun to consider from the beginning that of which he has\nalready treated (_supra_, p. 72). For since we must begin from the\nabstract in order to reach the true and the concrete, which first\nappears later on (_supra_, p. 79), this last, when it has been found,\nhas the appearance and form of a new commencement, particularly in\nPlato\u2019s loose style.\n\nPlato now goes on further, for he calls this divine world the pattern\nwhich is in thought (\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd) alone, and always in self-identity; but\nhe again places this whole in opposition to itself, so that there is\na second, the copy of the first, the world, which has origination\nand is visible. This second is the system of the heavenly movement,\nthe first is the eternally living. The second, which has origination\nand becoming within it, cannot be made perfectly like the first, the\neternal Idea. But it is made a self-moving image of the eternal that\nremains in the unity; and this eternal image that moves rhythmically,\nafter the manner of numbers, is what we call time. Plato says of it\nthat we are in the habit of calling the \u2018was\u2019 and \u2018will be\u2019 parts of\ntime, and we transfer these indications of change which operate in\ntime, into absolute essence. But the true time is eternal, or the\npresent. For the substance can neither become older nor younger, and\ntime, as the immediate image of the eternal, has neither the future nor\nthe present in its parts. Time is ideal, like space, not sensuous, but\nthe immediate mode in which mind comes forth in objective form, the\nsensuous non-sensuous. The real moments of the principle of absolute\nmovement in what is temporal, are those in which changes appear. \u201cFrom\nthe mind and will of God in the creation of time, there arose the sun,\nmoon, and five other stars which are called the planets, and which\nserve to distinguish and preserve the relations of time.\u201d[55] For in\nthem the numbers of time are realized. Thus the heavenly movement, as\nthe true time, is the image of the eternal which yet remains in unity,\n_i.e._ it is that in which the eternal retains the determination of the\n\u2018same.\u2019 For everything is in time, that is, in negative unity which\ndoes not allow anything to root itself freely in itself, and thus to\nmove and to be moved according to chance.\n\nBut this eternal is also in the determinateness of the other reality,\nin the Idea of the self-changing and variable principle whose universal\nis matter. The eternal world has a likeness in the world which belongs\nto time, but opposed to this there is a second world where change\nreally dwells. The \u2018same\u2019 and the \u2018other\u2019 are the most abstract opposes\nthat we hitherto have had. The eternal world as posited in time has\nthus two forms\u2014the form of similarity and the form of differentiality,\nof variability. The three moments as they appear in the last sphere,\nare, in the first place, simple essence which is begotten, which has\narisen, or determinate matter; secondly the place in which it is\nbegotten, and thirdly that in which what is begotten has its pattern.\nPlato gives them thus: \u201cEssence (\u1f44\u03bd), place, and generation.\u201d We thus\nhave the conclusion in which space is the mean between individual\ngeneration and the universal. If we now oppose this principle to time\nin its negativity, the mean is this principle of the \u2018other\u2019 as the\nuniversal principle\u2014\u201ca receiving medium like a mother\u201d\u2014an essence which\ncontains everything, gives to everything an independent subsistence and\nthe power to do as is desired. This principle is destitute of form, yet\ncapable of receiving all forms, the universal principle of all that\nappears different; it is the false passive matter that we understand\nwhen we speak of it\u2014the relative substantial, existence generally, but\nexternal existence here, and only abstract Being-for-self. Form is in\nour reflection distinguished from it, and this, Plato tells us, first\ncomes into existence through the mother. In this principle we have\nwhat we call the phenomenal, for matter is just this subsistence of\nindividual generation, in which division is posited. But what appears\nherein is not to be posited as the individual of earthly existence, but\nis to be apprehended as the universal in such determinateness. Since\nmatter, as the universal, is the principle of all that is individual,\nPlato in the first place reminds us that we cannot speak of these\nsensuous things\u2014fire, water, earth, air, &c. (which thus once more come\nbefore us here); for hereby they are expressed as a fixed determination\nwhich remains as such\u2014but what remains is only their universality, or\nthey, as universal, are only the fiery, earthly, &c.[56]\n\nPlato further expounds the determinate reality of these sensuous\nthings, or their simple determinateness. In this world of change form\nis figure in space; for as in the world, which is the immediate image\nof the eternal, time is the absolute principle, here the absolute\nideal principle is pure matter as such, _i.e._ the existence of space.\nSpace is the ideal essence of this phenomenal world, the mean which\nunites positivity and negativity, but its determinations are figures.\nAnd, indeed, of the different dimensions of space, it is surface which\nmust be taken as true reality, for it is the absolute mean between\nthe line and point in space, and in its first real limitation it\nis three; similarly the triangle is first among the figures, while\nthe circle has no limit as such within it. Here Plato comes to the\ndeduction of configuration, in which the triangle forms the principle;\nthus triangles form the essence of sensuous things. Hence he says, in\nPythagorean fashion, that the compounding and uniting together of\nthese triangles, as their Idea pertaining to the mean, constitutes\nonce more, according to the original number-relations, the sensuous\nelements. This is the principle, but how Plato determines the figures\nof the elements, and the union of the triangles, I refrain from\nconsidering.[57]\n\nFrom this point Plato passes to a system of Physics and Physiology into\nwhich we have no intention of following him. It is to be regarded as a\nfirst, childlike endeavour to understand sensuous phenomena in their\nmanifold character, but as yet it is superficial and confused. Sensuous\nmanifestations, such as the parts and limbs of the body, are here\ntaken into consideration, and an account of this is given intermingled\nwith thoughts which resemble our formal explanations, and in which the\nNotion really vanishes. We have to remember the elevated nature of\nthe Idea, as being the main point of excellence in his explanations,\nfor, as far as the realization of the same is concerned, Plato merely\nfelt and expressed it to be a necessity. Speculative thought is often\nrecognizable, but, for the most part, consideration is directed to\nquite external modes of explanation, such as that of end. The method\nof treating Physics is a different one from ours, for while with Plato\nempirical knowledge is still deficient, in modern Physics, on the other\nhand, the deficiency is found in the Idea. Plato, although he does\nnot seem to conform to our theory of Physics, ignoring as it does the\ntheory of life, and though he proceeds to talk in a childlike way in\nexternal analogies, yet in certain cases gives utterance to very deep\nperceptions, which would be well worthy of our consideration if the\ncontemplation of nature as living had any place with our physicists.\nHis manner of relating the physiological to the physical would be as\ninteresting. Certain portions of his system contain a general element,\nsuch as his representation of colours, and from this he goes on to\nmore general considerations. For when Plato begins to talk on this\nsubject, he says of the difficulty of distinguishing and recognizing\nthe individual, that in the contemplation of nature there are \u201ctwo\ncauses to be distinguished, the one necessary and the other divine. The\ndivine must be sought for in all things with the view of attaining to\na blessed life\u201d (this endeavour is an end in and for itself, and in it\nwe find happiness) \u201cin as far as our nature admits, but the necessary\ncauses need be sought only for the sake of divine things, considering\nthat without these necessary causes\u201d (as conditions of knowledge) \u201cwe\ncannot know them.\u201d Contemplation in accordance with necessity is the\nexternal contemplation of objects, their connection, relation, &c.\n\u201cOf the divine, God Himself was the creator,\u201d the divine belongs to\nthat first eternal world\u2014not as to one beyond, but to one now present.\n\u201cBut the creation and disposition of the mortal He committed to His\noffspring (\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9).\u201d This is a simple way of passing from the\ndivine to the finite and earthly. \u201cNow they, imitating the divine,\nbecause they had received the immortal principle of a soul, fashioned\na mortal body, and placed in this a soul of another nature, which was\nmortal. This mortal nature was subject to violent and irresistible\naffections\u2014the first of these was pleasure, the greatest incitement to\nevil, and then pain which is the deterrent (\u03c6\u03c5\u03b3\u03ac\u03c2) from doing good;\nalso rashness (\u03b8\u03ac\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03bf\u03c2) and fear, two foolish counsellors; anger, hope,\n&c. These sensations all belong to the mortal soul. And that the\ndivine might not be polluted more than necessary, the subordinate gods\nseparated this mortal nature from the seat of the divine, and gave it\na different habitation in another part of the body, placing the neck\nso as to be the isthmus and boundary between head and breast.\u201d The\nsensations, affections, &c., dwell in the breast or in the heart (we\nplace that which is immortal in the heart); the spiritual is in the\nhead. But in order to make the former as perfect as might be, \u201cthey\nplaced,\u201d for instance, \u201cas a supporter to the heart which was burnt\nwith passion, the lung, soft and bloodless, and which had within it\nhollows like the pores of a sponge, in order that, receiving the breath\nand drink, it might cool the heart and allow of refreshment and an\nalleviation of the heat.\u201d[58]\n\nWhat Plato says of the liver is specially worthy of notice. \u201cSince the\nirrational part of the soul which desires eating and drinking does not\nlisten to reason, God made the liver so that the soul might be inspired\nwith terror by the power of thought which originates from reason, and\nwhich descends upon the liver as on a mirror, receiving upon it figures\nand giving back images. But if this part of the soul is once more\nassuaged, in sleep it participates in visions. For the authors of our\nbeing, remembering the command of their father to make the human race\nas good as they could, thus ordered our inferior parts in order that\nthey also might obtain a measure of truth, and placed the oracle in\nthem.\u201d Plato thus ascribes divination to the irrational, corporeal part\nof man, and although it is often thought that revelation, &c., is by\nPlato ascribed to reason, this is a false idea; he says that there is a\nreason, but in irrationality. \u201cHerein we have a conclusive proof that\nGod has given the art of divination to the irrationality of man, for\nno man when in his wits, attains prophetic truth and inspiration, but\nwhen he receives the inspiration either his intelligence is enthralled\nby sleep or he is demented by some distemper or possession.\u201d Thus Plato\nmakes divination of a lower grade than conscious knowledge. \u201cAnd when\nhe has recovered his senses he has to remember and explain what he has\nreceived, for while he is demented, he cannot judge of it. The ancient\nsaying is therefore very true, that only a man who has his wits can act\nor judge about himself or his own affairs.\u201d[59] Plato is called the\npatron saint of mere possession, but, according to this, the assertion\nis entirely false. These are the principal points in Plato\u2019s Philosophy\nof Nature.\n\n\n3. PHILOSOPHY OF MIND.\n\nWe have already dealt generally from the theoretical side with the\nspeculative nature of mind as yet unrealized, as well as with the\nhighly important differences with respect to the kinds of knowledge\n(pp. 28-48). It must also be considered that we find in Plato as yet\nno developed consciousness of the organization of the theoretic mind,\nthough certainly sensation, memory, &c., are distinguished by him from\nreason; these moments of the mind are, however, neither accurately\ndiscriminated, nor exhibited in their connection, so as to show the\nnecessary relations between them. The only point of interest for us\nthen in Plato\u2019s philosophy of mind is his view of man\u2019s moral nature;\nand this real, practical side of consciousness is Plato\u2019s greatest\nglory, and hence must now be specially dealt with by us. Its form\ncertainly does not suggest that Plato gave himself much trouble to\ndiscover a supreme moral principle, as it is now called, which, for\nthe very reason that it is supposed to be all-embracing, has in it a\ncertain lack of content. Neither did he trouble himself about a natural\nright, which is but a trivial abstraction foisted on to the real\npractical existence, the right; but it is of man\u2019s moral nature that he\ntreats in the Republic. Man\u2019s moral nature seems to us to have little\nto do with the State; to Plato, however, the reality of mind\u2014that is,\nof mind as opposed to nature\u2014appeared in its highest truth as the\norganization of a state which, as such, is essentially moral; and he\nrecognized that the moral nature (free will in its rationality) comes\nto its right, to its reality, only in an actual nation.\n\nWe must further remark that in the Republic Plato introduces the\ninvestigation of his subject with the object of showing what justice\n(\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7) is. After much discussion has taken place, and several\ndefinitions of justice have been taken into consideration only to\nbe rejected, Plato at last says in his simple way: \u201cThe present\ninvestigation is very like the case of a man who is required to read\nsmall handwriting at a distance; if it were observed that the same\nletters were to be seen at a shorter distance and of a larger size,\nhe would certainly prefer to read first the letters where they were\nwritten larger, and then would be able to read more easily the small\nletters also. The same plan should be followed now with justice.\nJustice is not only in the individual, but also in the state, and the\nstate is greater than the individual; justice is therefore imprinted on\nstates in larger characters, and is more easily recognizable.\u201d (This is\ndifferent from what the Stoics say of the wise man.) \u201cIt is therefore\npreferable to consider justice as it is to be found in the state.\u201d[60]\nBy making this comparison Plato transforms the question anent justice\ninto an investigation of the state; it is a very simple and graceful\ntransition, though it seems arbitrary. It was great force of insight\nthat really led the ancients to the truth; and what Plato brings\nforward as merely simplifying the difficulty, may, in fact, be said\nto exist in the nature of the thing. For it is not convenience which\nleads him to this position, but the fact that justice can be carried\nout only in so far as man is a member of a state, for in the state\nalone is justice present in reality and truth. Justice, not as the\nunderstanding, but as mind in its striving to realize itself, is the\nexistence of freedom here and now, the actuality of the self-conscious,\nintelligent existence in and at home with itself and possessing\nactivity\u2014just as in property, for instance, I place my freedom in\nthis particular thing. But the principle of the state again is the\nobjective reality of justice, the reality in which the whole mind is\npresent and not only the knowledge of myself as this individual. For\nas the free and reasonable will determines itself, there are laws of\nfreedom; but these laws are nothing else than state-laws, for the\nNotion of the state implies the existence of a reasoning will. Thus\nlaws have force in the state, and are there matter of practice and of\ncustom; but because self-will is also there in its immediacy, they are\nnot only matter of custom, but must also be a force operating against\narbitrary self-will, and showing itself in the courts of justice and in\ngovernments. Thus Plato, in order to discern the features of justice,\nwith the instinct of reason fixes his attention on their manner of\nrepresentation in the state.\n\nJustice in itself is ordinarily represented by us in the form of a\nnatural right, right in a condition of nature; such a condition of\nnature is, however, a direct moral impossibility. That which is in\nitself is, by those who do not attain to the universal, held to be\nsomething natural, as the necessary moments of the mind are held to\nbe innate ideas. The natural is rather what should be sublated by the\nmind, and the justice of the condition of nature can only emerge as\nthe absolute injustice of the mind. In contrast with the state, which\nis the real spirit, the spirit in its simple and as yet unrealized\nNotion is the abstract implicitude; this Notion must of course precede\nthe construction of its reality; it is this which is conceived of\nas a condition of nature. We are accustomed to take our start from\nthe fiction of a condition of nature, which is truly no condition of\nmind, of reasonable will, but of animals among themselves: wherefore\nHobbes has justly remarked that the true state of nature is a war of\nevery man against his neighbour. This implicitude of the mind is at\nthe same time the individual man, for in the ordinary conception the\nuniversal separates itself from the particular, as if the particular\nwere absolutely and in and for itself what it certainly is, and the\nUniversal did not make it that which it is in truth\u2014as if this were not\nits essence, but as if the individual element were the most important.\nThe fiction of a state of nature starts from the individuality of the\nperson, his free will, and his relation to other persons according\nto this free will. Natural justice has thus been a term applied to\nthat which is justice in the individual and for the individual; and\nthe condition of society and of the state has been recognized only\nas a medium for the individual person, who is the chief end and\nobject. Plato, in direct contrast with this, lays as his foundation\nthe substantial, the universal, and he does this in such a way that\nthe individual as such has this very universal as his end, and the\nsubject has his will, activity, life and enjoyment in the state, so\nthat it may be called his second nature, his habits and his customs.\nThis moral substance which constitutes the spirit, life and Being of\nindividuality, and which is its foundation, systematizes itself into a\nliving, organic whole, and at the same time it differentiates itself\ninto its members, whose activity signifies the production of the whole.\n\nThis relation of the Notion to its reality certainly did not come into\nconsciousness with Plato, and thus we do not find in him a philosophic\nmethod of construction, which shows first the absolute Idea, then\nthe necessity, inherently existent, for its realization, and this\nrealization itself. The judgment that has been delivered respecting\nPlato\u2019s Republic therefore is that Plato has therein given a so-called\nideal for the constitution of a state; this has become proverbial as a\n_sobriquet_, in the sense that this conception is a chimera, which may\nbe mentally conceived of\u2014and in itself, as Plato describes it, it is\ndoubtless excellent and true\u2014that it is also capable of being carried\nout, but only on the condition that men should be of an excellence\nsuch as may possibly be present among the dwellers in the moon, but\nthat it is not realizable for men like those on the earth. But since\nmen most be taken as they are, this ideal cannot be realized by reason\nof men\u2019s wickedness; and to frame such an ideal is therefore altogether\nidle.\n\nAs to this, the first remark to be made is that in the Christian\nworld in general there passes current an ideal of a perfect man which\ncertainly cannot be carried out in the great body of a nation. We may,\nperhaps, see it realized in monks or Quakers, or other similar pious\nfolk, but a set of melancholy specimens such as these could never\nform a nation, any more than lice or parasitic plants could exist for\nthemselves, or otherwise than on an organic body. If such men were to\nconstitute a nation, there would have to be an end of this lamb-like\ngentleness, this vanity which occupies itself exclusively with its\nown individual self, which pets and pampers itself, and ever has the\nimage and consciousness of its own excellence before its eyes. For\nlife in the universal and for the universal demands, not that lame and\ncowardly gentleness, but gentleness combined with a like measure of\nenergy, and which is not occupied with itself and its own sins, but\nwith the universal and what is to be done for it. They before whose\neyes that false ideal floats of course find men to be always compassed\nwith weakness and depravity, and never find that ideal realized. For\nthey raise into importance the veriest trifles, which no reasonable\nman would give heed to; and they think such weaknesses and defects\nare present even when they overlook them. But we need not esteem this\nforbearance to be generosity; for it rather implies a perception on\ntheir part that from what they call weakness and defect proceeds their\nown destruction, which comes to pass from their making such defects\nof importance. The man who has them is immediately through himself\nabsolved from them, in so far as he makes nothing of them. The crime\nis a crime only when they are real to him, and his destruction is in\nholding them to be something real. Such an ideal must therefore not\nstand in our way, whatever be the fairness of its form, and this even\nwhen it does not appear exactly as it does to monks and Quakers, but,\nfor instance, when it is the principle of renouncing sensuous things,\nand abandoning energy of action, which principle must bring to nought\nmuch that would otherwise be held of value. It is contradictory to try\nto keep intact all our relationships, for in those that otherwise hold\ngood there always is a side where opposition is encountered. Moreover,\nwhat I have already said regarding the relation between philosophy\nand the state (p. 23 _et seq._) shows that the Platonic ideal is not\nto be taken in this sense. When an ideal has truth in itself through\nthe Notion, it is no chimera, just because it is true, for the truth\nis no chimera. Such an idea is therefore nothing idle and powerless,\nbut the real. It is certainly permissible to form wishes, but when\npious wishes are all that a man has in regard to the great and true,\nhe may be said to be godless. It is just as if we could do nothing,\nbecause everything was so holy and inviolable, or as if we refused to\nbe anything definite, because all that is definite has its defects. The\ntrue ideal is not what ought to be real, but what is real, and the only\nreal; if an ideal is held to be too good to exist, there must be some\nfault in the ideal itself, for which reality is too good. The Platonic\nRepublic would thus be a chimera, not because excellence such as it\ndepicts is lacking to mankind, but because it, this excellence, falls\nshort of man\u2019s requirements. For what is real, is rational. The point\nto know, however, is what exactly is real; in common life all is real,\nbut there is a difference between the phenomenal world and reality. The\nreal has also an external existence, which displays arbitrariness and\ncontingency, like a tree, a house, a plant, which in nature come into\nexistence. What is on the surface in the moral sphere, men\u2019s action,\ninvolves much that is evil, and might in many ways be better; men will\never be wicked and depraved, but this is not the Idea. If the reality\nof the substance is recognized, the surface where the passions battle\nmust be penetrated. The temporal and transitory certainly exists,\nand may cause us trouble enough, but in spite of that it is no true\nreality, any more than the particularity of the subject, his wishes and\ninclinations, are so.\n\nIn connection with this observation, the distinction is to be called\nto mind which was drawn when we were speaking above (pp. 84, 88)\nof Plato\u2019s Philosophy of Nature: the eternal world, as God holy in\nHimself, is reality, not a world above us or beyond, but the present\nworld looked at in its truth, and not as it meets the senses of those\nwho hear, see, &c. When we thus study the content of the Platonic\nIdea, it will become clear that Plato has, in fact, represented Greek\nmorality according to its substantial mode, for it is the Greek\nstate-life which constitutes the true content of the Platonic Republic.\nPlato is not the man to dabble in abstract theories and principles; his\ntruth-loving mind has recognized and represented the truth, and this\ncould not be anything else than the truth of the world he lived in, the\ntruth of the one spirit which lived in him as well as in Greece. No man\ncan overleap his time, the spirit of his time is his spirit also; but\nthe point at issue is, to recognize that spirit by its content.\n\nOn the other hand, a constitution that would be perfect in respect\nto one nation, is to be regarded as not, perhaps, suitable for every\nnation. Thus, when it is said that a true constitution does not do\nfor men as they now are, we must no doubt keep in mind that the more\nexcellent a nation\u2019s constitution is, it renders the nation also so\nmuch the more excellent; but, on the other hand, since the morals\ncommonly practised form the living constitution, the constitution in\nits abstraction is nothing at all in its independence; it must relate\nitself to the common morality, and be filled with the living spirit\nof the people. It can, therefore, certainly not be said that a true\nconstitution suits any and every nation; and it is quite the case that\nfor men as they are\u2014for instance, as they are Iroquois, Russians,\nFrench\u2014not every constitution is adapted. For the nation has its place\nin history. But as the individual man is trained in the state, that\nis, as individuality is raised into universality, and the child grows\ninto a man, so is every nation trained; or barbarism, the condition in\nwhich the nation is a child, passes over into a rational condition.\nMen do not remain at a standstill, they alter, as likewise do their\nconstitutions. And the question here is, What is the true constitution\nwhich the nation must advance towards; just as it is a question which\nis the true science of mathematics or of anything else, but not\nwhether children or boys should possess this science, as they must\nrather be first so educated that they may be capable of understanding\nit. Thus the true constitution stands before the nation of history,\nso that it may advance towards it. Every nation in course of time\nmakes such alterations in its existing constitution as will bring it\nnearer to the true constitution. The nation\u2019s mind itself shakes off\nits leading-strings, and the constitution expresses the consciousness\nof what it is in itself,\u2014the form of truth, of self-knowledge. If a\nnation can no longer accept as implicitly true what its constitution\nexpresses to it as the truth, if its consciousness or Notion and its\nactuality are not at one, then the nation\u2019s mind is torn asunder.\nTwo things may then occur. First, the nation may either by a supreme\ninternal effort dash into fragments this law which still claims\nauthority, or it may more quietly and slowly effect changes on the yet\noperative law, which is, however, no longer true morality, but which\nthe mind has already passed beyond. In the second place, a nation\u2019s\nintelligence and strength may not suffice for this, and it may hold\nto the lower law; or it may happen that another nation has reached\nits higher constitution, thereby rising in the scale, and the first\ngives up its nationality and becomes subject to the other. Therefore\nit is of essential importance to know what the true constitution is;\nfor what is in opposition to it has no stability, no truth, and passes\naway. It has a temporary existence, but cannot hold its ground; it\nhas been accepted, but cannot secure permanent acceptance; that it\nmust be cast aside, lies in the very nature of the constitution. This\ninsight can be reached through Philosophy alone. Revolutions take place\nin a state without the slightest violence when the insight becomes\nuniversal; institutions, somehow or other, crumble and disappear, each\nman agrees to give up his right. A government must, however, recognize\nthat the time for this has come; should it, on the contrary, knowing\nnot the truth, cling to temporary institutions, taking what\u2014though\nrecognized\u2014is unessential, to be a bulwark guarding it from the\nessential (and the essential is what is contained in the Idea), that\ngovernment will fall, along with its institutions, before the force of\nmind. The breaking up of its government breaks up the nation itself;\na new government arises,\u2014or it may be that the government and the\nunessential retain the upper hand.\n\nThus the main thought which forms the groundwork of Plato\u2019s Republic is\nthe same which is to be regarded as the principle of the common Greek\nmorality, namely, that established morality has in general the relation\nof the substantial, and therefore is maintained as divine. This is\nwithout question the fundamental determination. The determination which\nstands in contrast to this substantial relation of the individual\nto established morality, is the subjective will of the individual,\nreflective morality. This exists when individuals, instead of being\nmoved to action by respect and reverence for the institutions of the\nstate and of the fatherland, from their own convictions, and after\nmoral deliberation, come of themselves to a decision, and determine\ntheir actions accordingly. This principle of subjective freedom is\na later growth, it is the principle of our modern days of culture:\nit, however, entered also into the Greek world, but as the principle\nof the destruction of Greek state-life. It was looked on as a crime,\nbecause the spirit, political constitution, and laws of the Greeks\nwere not, and could not be calculated to admit of the rise of this\nprinciple within them. Because these two elements were not homogeneous,\ntraditional and conventional morality in Greece was overthrown. Plato\nrecognized and caught up the true spirit of his times, and brought it\nforward in a more definite way, in that he desired to make this new\nprinciple an impossibility in his Republic. It is thus a substantial\nposition on which Plato takes his stand, seeing that the substantial\nof his time forms his basis, but this standpoint is at the same time\nrelative only, in so far as it is but a Greek standpoint, and the later\nprinciple is consciously banished. This is the universal of Plato\u2019s\nideal of the state, and it is from this point of view that we must\nregard it. Investigations as to whether such a state is possible, and\nthe best possible, which start from quite modern points of view, can\nonly lead us astray. In modern states we have freedom of conscience,\naccording to which every individual may demand the right of following\nout his own interests; but this is excluded from the Platonic idea.\n\na. I will now indicate more fully the main features, in so far as\nthey possess philosophic interest. Though Plato represents what the\nstate is in its truth, yet this state has a limit, which we shall learn\nto know, namely, that the individual\u2014in formal justice\u2014is not opposed\nto this universality, as in the dead constitution of the ideal states\nfounded on the theory of legal right. The content is but the whole;\nthe nature of the individual, no doubt, but as reflecting itself into\nthe universal, not unbending, or as having absolute validity; so that\npractically the state and the individual are the same in essence.\nBecause Plato thus takes his start from that justice which implies\nthat the just man exists only as a moral member of the state, in\ndealing with his subject in greater detail, in order to show how this\nreality of the substantial mind is produced, he in the first place\nopens up before us the organism of the moral commonwealth, _i.e._ the\ndifferences which lie in the Notion of moral substance. Through the\ndevelopment of these moments it becomes living and existing, but these\nmoments are not independent, for they are held in unity. Plato regards\nthese moments of the moral organism under three aspects, first, as\nthey exist in the state as classes; secondly, as virtues, or moments\nin morality; thirdly, as moments of the individual subject, in the\nempirical actions of the will. Plato does not preach the morality of\nreflection, he shows how traditional morality has a living movement in\nitself; he demonstrates its functions, its inward organism. For it is\ninner systematization, as in organic life, and not solid, dead unity,\nlike that of metals, which comes to pass by means of the different\nfunctions of the organs which go to make up this living, self-moving\nunity.\n\n\u03b1. Without classes, without this division into great masses, the state\nhas no organism; these great distinctions are the distinction of the\nsubstantial. The opposition which first comes before us in the state\nis that of the universal, in the form of state life and business, and\nthe individual, as life and work for the individual; these two fields\nof activity are so distinct that one class is assigned to the one, and\nanother to the other. Plato further cites three systems of reality\nin the moral, the functions (\u03b1\u03b1) of legislation, counsel, in short,\nof diligence and foresight in the general behalf, in the interest\nof the whole as such; (\u03b2\u03b2) of defence of the commonwealth against\nfoes from without; (\u03b3\u03b3) of care for the individual, the supplying of\nwants, agriculture, cattle-rearing, the manufacture of clothing and\nutensils, the building of houses, &c. Speaking generally, this is quite\nas it should be, and yet it appears to be rather the satisfaction\nof external necessities, because such wants are found without being\ndeveloped out of the Idea of mind itself. Further, these distinct\nfunctions are allotted to different systems, being assigned to a\ncertain number of individuals specially set apart for the purpose,\nand this brings about the separate classes of the state, as Plato is\naltogether opposed to the superficial conception that one and the\nsame must be everything at one time. He accordingly represents three\nclasses, (\u03b1\u03b1) that of the governors, men of learning and wisdom, (\u03b2\u03b2)\nthat of the warriors, (\u03b3\u03b3) that of the producers of necessaries,\nthe husbandmen and handicraftsmen. The first he also speaks of as\nguardians (\u03c6\u03cd\u03bb\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c2), who are really philosophically educated statesmen,\npossessing true knowledge; they have the warriors to work on their\nbehalf (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b2\u03bf\u03b7\u03b8\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2), but in such a way that there is no\nline of separation between the civil and military classes, both being\nunited,[61] and the most advanced in years are the guardians.[62]\nAlthough Plato does not deduce this division of the classes, they\nfollow from the constitution of the Platonic state, and every state is\nnecessarily a system within itself of these systems. Plato then passes\non to particular determinations, which are in some measure trifling,\nand might with advantage have been dispensed with; for instance,\namong other things, he goes so far as to settle for the highest rank\ntheir special titles, and he states what should be the duties of the\nnurses.[63]\n\n\u03b2. Then Plato points out that the moments which are here realized in\nthe classes, are moral qualities which are present in individuals,\nand form their true essence, the simple ethical Notion divided into\nits universal determinations. For he states as the result of this\ndistinction of the classes that through such an organism all virtues\nare present in the commonwealth; he distinguishes four of these,[64]\nand they have been named cardinal virtues.\n\n\u03b1\u03b1. Wisdom (\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1) or knowledge appears as the first virtue; such a\nstate will be wise and good in counsel, not because of the various\nkinds of knowledge therein present which have to do with the many\nparticular ordinary occupations falling to the multitude, such as the\ntrade of blacksmith, and the tillage of the soil (in short, what we\nshould call skill in the industrial arts, and in finance). The state is\ncalled wise, by reason of the true knowledge which is realized in the\npresiding and governing class, who advise regarding the whole state,\nand decide upon the policy that is best, both at home and in relation\nto foreign states. This faculty of perception is properly the peculiar\npossession of the smallest class.[65]\n\n\u03b2\u03b2. The second virtue is courage (\u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03af\u03b1) which Plato defines as a firm\nopinion about what may justly and lawfully be considered an object\nof fear, courage which, in its strength of purpose, remains unshaken\neither by desires or pleasures. To this virtue corresponds the class of\nthe warriors.[66]\n\n\u03b3\u03b3. The third virtue is temperance (\u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7), the mastery over the\ndesires and passions, which like a harmony pervades the whole; so that,\nwhether understanding, or strength, or numbers, or wealth, or anything\nelse be regarded, the weaker and the stronger work together for one and\nthe same object, and are in agreement one with another. This virtue\ntherefore is not, like wisdom and courage, confined to one part of\nthe state, but like a harmony it is shared by governors and governed\nalike, and is the virtue of all classes.[67] Notwithstanding that this\ntemperance is the harmony in which all work towards one end, it is yet\npeculiarly the virtue of the third class, to whom it is allotted to\nprocure the necessaries of life by work, although at the first glance\nthe one does not appear to have much correspondence with the other.\nBut this virtue is present precisely when no moment, no determination\nor particularity isolates itself; or, more closely viewed in a moral\naspect, it is when no want asserts its reality and thus becomes a\ncrime. Now work is just this moment of activity concentrating itself on\nthe particular, which nevertheless goes back into the universal, and\nis for it. Therefore, if this virtue is universal, it yet has special\napplication to the third class, which at first is the only one to be\nbrought into harmony, as it has not the absolute harmony which the\nother classes possess in themselves.\n\n\u03b4\u03b4. Finally, the fourth virtue is justice, which was what Plato began\nby considering. This, as right-doing, is to be found in the state\nwhen each individual does only one kind of work for the state, that\nwork for which by the original constitution of his nature he is best\nfitted; so that in this way each man is not a jack-of-all-trades, but\nall have their special work, young and old, women and children, bond\nand free, handicraftsmen, rulers and subjects. The first remark we make\non this is, that Plato here places justice on a level with the other\nmoments, and it thus appears as one of the four determinations. But\nhe now retracts this statement and makes it justice which first gives\nto wisdom, courage and temperance the power to exist at all, and when\nthey have once come into existence, the power to continue. This is the\nreason of his also saying that justice will be met with independently,\nif only the other virtues spoken of are forthcoming.[68] To express it\nmore definitely, the Notion of justice is the foundation, the Idea of\nthe whole, which falls into organic divisions, so that every part is\nonly, as it were, a moment in the whole, and the whole exists through\nit. Thus the classes or qualities spoken of are nothing else than the\nmoments of this whole. Justice is only the general and all-pervading\nquality; but at the same time it implies the independence of every\npart, to which the state gives liberty of action.\n\nIn the second place, it is clear from what he says, that Plato did not\nunderstand by justice the rights of property, the meaning which the\nterm commonly bears in jurisprudence, but rather this, that the mind\nin its totality makes for itself a law as evidence of the existence of\nits freedom. In a highly abstract sense my personality, my altogether\nabstract freedom, is present in property. To explain what comes under\nthis science of law, Plato considers on the whole superfluous (De\nRepublica, IV. p. 425 Steph.; p. 176 Bekk.). To be sure we find him\ngiving laws concerning property, police regulations, &c., \u201cBut,\u201d he\nsays, \u201cto impose laws about such matters on men of noble character does\nnot repay the trouble.\u201d In truth, how can we expect to find divine laws\nin what contains contingencies alone? Even in the Laws he considers\nethics chiefly, though he gives a certain amount of attention to the\nrights of property. But as justice, according to Plato, is really\nthe entire being, which presents itself to the individual in such a\nway that each man learns to do the work he is born to do as well as\nit can be done, and does it, it is only as determined individuality\nthat man reaches what is law for him; only thus does he belong to the\nuniversal spirit of the state, coming in it to the universal of himself\nas a \u201cthis.\u201d While law is a universal with a definite content, and\nthus a formal universal only, the content in this case is the whole\ndetermined individuality, not this or that thing which is mine by the\naccident of possession; what I properly hold as my own is the perfected\npossession and use of my nature. To each particular determination\njustice gives its rights, and thus leads it back into the whole; in\nthis way it is by the particularity of an individual being of necessity\ndeveloped and brought into actuality, that each man is in his place\nand fulfils his vocation. Justice, therefore, according to its true\nconception, is in our eyes freedom in the subjective sense, because\nit is the attainment of actuality by the reason, and seeing that this\nright on the part of liberty to attain to actuality is universal,\nPlato sets up justice as the determination of the whole, indicating\nthat rational freedom comes into existence through the organism of the\nstate,\u2014an existence which is then, as necessary, a mode of nature.\n\n\u03b3. The particular subject, as subject, has in the same way these\nqualities in himself; and these moments of the subject correspond with\nthe three real moments of the state. That there is thus one rhythm, one\ntype, in the Idea of the state, forms for Plato\u2019s state a great and\ngrand basis. This third form, in which the above moments are exhibited,\nPlato characterizes in the following manner. There manifest themselves\nin the subject, first of all sundry wants and desires (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03b9),\nlike hunger and thirst, each of which has something definite as its\none and only object. Work for the satisfaction of desires corresponds\nto the calling of the third class. But, secondly there is also at\nthe same time to be found in the individual consciousness something\nelse which suspends and hinders the gratification of these desires,\nand has the mastery over the temptation thus to gratify them; this is\nreasonableness (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2). To this corresponds the class of rulers, the\nwisdom of the state. Besides these two ideas of the soul there is a\nthird, anger (\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2), which on one side is allied to the desires, but\nof which it is just as true that it resists the desires and takes the\nside of reason. \u201cIt may happen that a man has done wrong to another,\nand suffers hunger and cold at the hands of him whom he considers\nentitled to inflict them upon him; in this case, the nobler he is,\nthe less will his anger be excited. But it may also happen that he\nsuffers a wrong; if this is the case, he boils and chafes, and takes\nthe side of what he believes to be justice, and endures hunger and\ncold and other hardships, and overcomes them, and will not desist from\nthe right until he conquers or dies, or is calmed down by reason, as\na shepherd quiets his dog.\u201d Anger corresponds with the class of the\nbrave defenders in the state; as these grasp their weapons in behalf\nof reason within the state, so does anger take the part of reason, if\nit has not been perverted by an evil up-bringing. Therefore wisdom in\nthe state is the same as in the individual, and this is true of courage\nalso. For the rest, temperance is the harmony of the several moments\nof what pertains to nature; and justice, as in external matters it\nconsists in each doing his own duty, so, in the inner life, it consists\nin each moment of the mind obtaining its right, and not interfering in\nthe affairs of the others, but leaving them to do as they will.[69]\nWe have thus the deduction of three moments, where the middle place\nbetween universality and particularity is filled by anger in its\nindependence and as directed against the objective: it is the freedom\nwhich turns back within itself and acts negatively. Even here, where\nPlato has no consciousness of his abstract ideas, as he has in the\nTim\u00e6us, this of a truth is inwardly present to him, and everything is\nmoulded thereby. This is given as the plan according to which Plato\ndraws up the great whole. To fill up the outlines is a mere detail,\nwhich in itself has no further interest.\n\nb. In the second place Plato indicates the means of maintaining the\nstate. As, speaking generally, the whole commonwealth rests on common\nmorality as the minds of individuals grown into nature, this question\nis asked: How does Plato arrange that everyone takes as his own that\nform of activity for which he is specially marked out, and that it\npresents itself as the moral acting and willing of the individual,\u2014that\neveryone, in harmony with temperance, submits to filling this his\npost? The main point is to train the individuals thereto. Plato would\nproduce this ethical quality directly in the individuals, and first\nand foremost in the guardians, whose education is therefore the most\nimportant part of the whole, and constitutes the very foundation. For\nas it is to the guardians themselves that the care is committed of\nproducing this ethical quality through maintenance of the laws, in\nthese laws special attention must be given to the guardians\u2019 education;\nafter that also to the education of the warriors. The condition of\naffairs in the industrial class causes the state but little anxiety,\n\u201cfor though cobblers should prove poor and worthless, and should be\nonly in appearance what they ought to be, that is no great misfortune\nfor the state.\u201d[70] The education of the presidents should, however,\nbe carried on chiefly by means of philosophic science, which is the\nknowledge of the universal and absolute. Plato in this passes over the\nparticular means of education, religion, art, science. Further on he\nspeaks again and more in detail on the question of how far music and\ngymnastic are to be permitted as means. But the poets Homer and Hesiod\nhe banishes from his state, because he thinks their representations\nof God unworthy.[71] For then began in real earnest an inquiry into\nthe belief in Jupiter and the stories told by Homer, inasmuch as such\nparticular representations had been taken as universal maxims and\ndivine laws. At a certain stage of education childish tales do no harm;\nbut were they to be made the foundation of the truth of morality,\nas present law, the case would be different. The extermination of\nthe nations which we read of in the writings of the Israelites, the\nOld Testament, might for instance be taken as a standard of national\nrights, or we might try to make a precedent of the numerous base\nacts committed by David, the man of God, or of the horrors which\nthe priesthood, in the person of Samuel, practised and authorized\nagainst Saul. Then it would be high time to place these records on a\nlower level, as something past, something merely historical. Plato\nwould further have preambles to the laws, wherein citizens would be\nadmonished as to their duties, and convinced that these exist, &c.[72]\nThey also should be shown how to choose that which is most excellent,\nin short, to choose morality.\n\nBut here we have a circle: the public life of the state subsists by\nmeans of morality, and, conversely, morality subsists by means of\ninstitutions. Morals cannot be independent of institutions, that is,\ninstitutions cannot be brought to bear on morals through educational\nestablishments or religion only. For institutions must be looked on as\nthe very first condition of morality, for this is the manner in which\ninstitutions are subjective. Plato himself gives us to understand\nhow much contradiction he expects to find. And even now his defect\nis commonly considered to lie in his being too idealistic, while his\nreal deficiency consists in his not being ideal enough. For if reason\nis the universal force, it is essentially spiritual; thus to the\nrealm of the spiritual belongs subjective freedom, which had already\nbeen held up as a principle in the philosophy of Socrates. Therefore\nreason ought to be the basis of law, and so it is, on the whole. But,\non the other hand, conscience, personal conviction,\u2014in short, all the\nforms of subjective freedom\u2014are essentially therein contained. This\nsubjectivity at first, it is true, stands in opposition to the laws and\nreason of the state-organism as to the absolute power which desires\nto appropriate to itself\u2014through the external necessity of wants, in\nwhich, however, there is absolute reason\u2014the individual of the family.\nIndividual conscience proceeds from the subjectivity of free-will,\nconnects itself with the whole, chooses a position for itself, and\nthus makes itself a moral fact. But this moment, this movement of\nthe individual, this principle of subjective freedom, is sometimes\nignored by Plato, and sometimes even intentionally disparaged, because\nit proved itself to be what had wrought the ruin of Greece; and he\nconsiders only how the state may best be organized, and not subjective\nindividuality. In passing beyond the principle of Greek morality, which\nin its substantial liberty cannot brook the rise of subjective liberty,\nthe Platonic philosophy at once grasps the above principle, and in so\ndoing proceeds still farther.\n\nc. In the third place, in regard to the exclusion of the principle\nof subjective freedom, this forms a chief feature in the Republic\nof Plato, the spirit of which really consists in the fact, that all\naspects in which particularity as such has established its position,\nare dissolved in the universal,\u2014all men simply rank as man in general.\n\n\u03b1. It specially harmonizes with this particular quality of excluding\nthe principle of subjectivity, that Plato in the first place does\nnot allow individuals to choose their own class; this we demand as\nnecessary to freedom. It is not, however, birth which marks off the\ndifferent ranks, and determines individuals for these; but everyone is\ntested by the governors of the state, who are the elders of the first\nclass, and have the education of individuals in their hands. According\nas anyone has natural ability and talents, these elders make choice\nand selection, and assign each man to a definite occupation.[73] This\nseems in direct contradiction to our principle, for although it is\nconsidered right that to a certain class there should belong a special\ncapacity and skill, it always remains a matter of inclination which\nclass one is to belong to; and with this inclination, as an apparently\nfree choice, the class makes itself for itself. But it is not permitted\nthat another individual should prescribe as to this, or say, for\nexample: \u201cBecause you are not serviceable for anything better, you are\nto be a labourer.\u201d Everyone may make the experiment for himself; he\nmust be allowed to decide regarding his own affairs as subject in a\nsubjective manner, by his own free will, as well as in consideration of\nexternal circumstances; and nothing must therefore be put in his way if\nhe says, for instance: \u201cI should like to apply myself to study.\u201d\n\n\u03b2. From this determination it further follows that Plato (De Republica,\nIII. pp. 416, 417 Steph.; pp. 162-164 Bekk.) in like manner altogether\nabolished in his state the principle of private property. For in it\nindividuality, the individual consciousness, becomes absolute; or the\nperson is looked on as implicit, destitute of all content. In law,\nas such, I rank as \u201cthis\u201d implicitly and explicitly. All rank thus,\nand I rank only because all rank, or I rank only as universal; but\nthe content of this universality is fixed particularity. When in a\nquestion of law we have to do with law, as such, to the judges of the\ncase it matters not a whit whether this or that man actually possesses\nthe house, and likewise the contending parties think nothing of the\npossession of the thing for which they strive, but of right for right\u2019s\nsake, (as in morality duty is done for duty\u2019s sake): thus a firm hold\nis kept of the abstraction, and from the content of reality abstraction\nis made. But Being to Philosophy is no abstraction, but the unity of\nthe universal and reality, or its content. The content has therefore\nweight only in as far as it is negatively posited in the universal;\nthus only as returning into it, and not absolutely. In so far as I\nuse things,\u2014not in so far as I have them merely in my possession,\nor as they have worth for me as existent, as definitely fixed on\nme,\u2014they stand in living relation to me. With Plato, then, those of the\nother class (cf. _supra_, p. 101, note) carry on handicrafts, trade,\nhusbandry, and procure what will satisfy the general requirements,\nwithout acquiring personal property by means of their work, for they\nare all one family, wherein each has his appointed occupation; but the\nproduct of the work is common, and he receives as much as he requires\nboth of his own and of the general product. Personal property is a\npossession which belongs to me as a certain person, and in which my\nperson as such comes into existence, into reality; on this ground Plato\nexcludes it. It remains, however, unexplained how in the development of\nindustries, if there is no hope of acquiring private property, there\ncan be any incentive to activity; for on my being a person of energy\nvery much depends my capacity for holding property. That an end would\nbe put to all strifes and dissensions and hatred and avarice by the\nabolition of private property, as Plato thinks, (De Republica, V. p.\n464 Steph.; pp. 243, 244 Bekk.) may very well be imagined in a general\nway; but that is only a subordinate result in comparison with the\nhigher and reasonable principle of the right of property: and liberty\nhas actual existence only so far as property falls to the share of the\nperson. In this way we see subjective freedom consciously removed by\nPlato himself from his state.\n\n\u03b3. For the same reason Plato also abolishes marriage, because it is a\nconnection in which persons of opposite sex, as such, remain mutually\nbound to one another, even beyond the mere natural connection. Plato\ndoes not admit into his state family life\u2014the particular arrangement\nwhereby a family forms a whole by itself,\u2014because the family is nothing\nbut an extended personality, a relationship to others of an exclusive\ncharacter within natural morality,\u2014which certainly is morality,\nbut morality of such a character as belongs to the individual as\nparticularity. According to the conception of subjective freedom,\nhowever, the family is just as necessary, yea, sacred to the individual\nas is property. Plato, on the contrary, causes children to be taken\naway from their mothers immediately after birth, and has them gathered\ntogether in a special establishment, and reared by nurses taken from\namong the mothers who gave them birth; he has them brought up in\ncommon, so that no mother can possibly recognize her child. There are\ncertainly to be marriage celebrations, and each man is to have his\nparticular wife, but in such a way that the intercourse of man and wife\ndoes not pre-suppose a personal inclination, and that it should not be\ntheir own pleasure which marks out individuals for one another. The\nwomen should bear children from the twentieth to the fortieth year, the\nmen should have wives from the thirtieth to the fifty-fifth year. To\nprevent incest, all the children born at the time of a man\u2019s marriage\nshall be known as his children.[74] The women, whose natural vocation\nis family life, are by this arrangement deprived of their sphere. In\nthe Platonic Republic it therefore follows that as the family is broken\nup, and the women no longer manage the house, they are also no longer\nprivate persons, and adopt the manners of the man as the universal\nindividual in the state. And Plato accordingly allows the women to take\ntheir part like the men in all manly labours, and even to share in\nthe toils of war. Thus he places them on very nearly the same footing\nas the men, though all the same he has no great confidence in their\nbravery, but stations them in the rear only, and not even as reserve,\nbut only as _arri\u00e8re-garde_, in order that they may at least inspire\nthe foe with terror by their numbers, and, in case of necessity, hasten\nto give aid.[75]\n\nThese are the main features of the Platonic Republic, which has as\nits essential the suppression of the principle of individuality; and\nit would appear as though the Idea demanded this, and as if this were\nthe very point on which Philosophy is opposed to the ordinary way\nof looking at things, which gives importance to the individual, and\nthus in the state, as also in actualized mind, looks on the rights of\nproperty, and the protection of persons and their possessions, as the\nbasis of everything that is. Therein, however, lies the very limit\nof the Platonic Idea\u2014to emerge only as abstract idea. But, in fact,\nthe true Idea is nothing else than this, that every moment should\nperfectly realize and embody itself, and make itself independent,\nwhile at the same time, in its independence, it is for mind a thing\nsublated. In conformity with this Idea, individuality must fully\nrealize itself, must have its sphere and domain in the state, and yet\nbe resolved in it. The element of the state is the family, that is,\nthe family is the natural unreasoning state; this element must, as\nsuch, be present. Then the Idea of the state constituted by reason\nhas to realize all the moments of its Notion in such a way that they\nbecome classes, and the moral substance divides itself into portions,\nas the bodily substance is separated into intestines and organs, each\nof which lives on in a particular way of its own, yet all of which\ntogether form only one life. The state in general, the whole, must\nfinally pervade all. But in exactly the same way the formal principle\nof justice, as abstract universality of personality with individual\nBeing as its existent content, must pervade the whole; one class,\nnevertheless, specially belongs to it. There must, then, also be a\nclass in which property is held immediately and permanently, the\npossession of the body and the possession of a piece of land alike;\nand in the next place, a class where acquisition is continually going\non, and possession is not immediate, as in the other, but property is\never fluctuating and changing. These two classes the nation gives up\nas a part of itself to the principle of individuality, and allows\nrights to reign here, permitting the constant, the universal, the\nimplicit to be sought in this principle, which really is a principle of\nvariability. This principle must have its full and complete reality,\nit must indeed appear in the shape of property. We have here for the\nfirst time the true, actual mind, with each moment receiving its\ncomplete independence, and the mind itself attaining to being-another\nin perfect indifference of Being. Nature cannot effect this production\nof independent life in her parts, except in the great system.[76] This\nis, as we shall elsewhere see, the great advance of the modern world\nbeyond the ancient, that in it the objective attains to greater, yea,\nto absolute independence, but for the very same reason returns with all\nthe greater difficulty into the unity of the Idea.\n\nThe want of subjectivity is really the want of the Greek moral idea.\nThe principle which became prominent with Socrates had been present up\nto this time only in a more subordinate capacity; now it of necessity\nbecame an even absolute principle, a necessary moment in the Idea\nitself. By the exclusion of private property and of family life, by\nthe suspension of freedom in the choice of the class, _i.e._ by the\nexclusion of all the determinations which relate to the principle of\nsubjective freedom, Plato believes he has barred the doors to all the\npassions; he knew very well that the ruin of Greek life proceeded\nfrom this, that individuals, as such, began to assert their aims,\ninclinations, and interests, and made them dominate over the common\nmind. But since this principle is necessary through the Christian\nreligion\u2014in which the soul of the individual is an absolute end, and\nthus has entered into the world as necessary in the Notion of the\nmind\u2014it is seen that the Platonic state-constitution cannot fulfil\nwhat the higher demands of a moral organism require. Plato has not\nrecognized the knowledge, wishes, and resolutions of the individual,\nnor his self-reliance, and has not succeeded in combining them with\nhis Idea; but justice demands its rights for this just as much as\nit requires the higher resolution of the same, and its harmony with\nthe universal. The opposite to Plato\u2019s principle is the principle of\nthe conscious free will of individuals, which in later times was by\nRousseau more especially raised to prominence: the theory that the\narbitrary choice of the individual, the outward expression of the\nindividual, is necessary. In this the principle is carried to the\nvery opposite extreme, and has emerged in its utter one-sidedness.\nIn opposition to this arbitrariness and culture there must be the\nimplicitly and explicitly universal, that which is in thought, not as\nwise governor or morality, but as law, and at the same time as my Being\nand my thought, _i.e._ as subjectivity and individuality. Men must have\nbrought forth from themselves the rational along with their interests\nand their passions, just as it must enter into reality through the\nnecessities, opportunities, and motives that impel them.\n\nThere is still another celebrated side of the Platonic philosophy which\nmay be considered, namely \u00e6sthetics, the knowledge of the beautiful. In\nrespect to this, Plato has in like manner seized the one true thought,\nthat the essence of the beautiful is intellectual, the Idea of reason.\nWhen he speaks of a spiritual beauty, he is to be understood in the\nsense that beauty, as beauty, is sensuous beauty, which is not in some\nother place\u2014no one knows where; but what is beautiful to the senses\nis really the spiritual. The case is the same here as it is with his\nIdea. As the essence and truth of phenomena in general is the Idea,\nthe truth of phenomenal beauty must also be this Idea. The relation\nto the corporeal, as a relation of the desires, or of pleasure and\nutility, is no relation to it as the beautiful; it is a relation to\nit as the sensuous alone, or a relation of particular to particular.\nBut the essence of the beautiful is just the simple Idea of reason\npresent to the sensuous apprehension as a thing; the content of the\nthing is nothing else than this.[77] The beautiful is essentially of\nspiritual nature; it is thus not merely a sensuous thing, but reality\nsubject to the form of universality, to the truth. This universal\ndoes not, however, retain the form of universality, but the universal\nis the content whose form is the sensuous mode; and therein lies the\ndetermination of the beautiful. In science, the universal has again the\nform of the universal or of the Notion; but the beautiful appears as an\nactual thing\u2014or, when put into words, as a popular conception, in which\nmode the material exists in mind. The nature, essence, and content of\nthe beautiful is recognized and judged by reason alone, as its content\nis the same as that of Philosophy. But because reason appears in the\nbeautiful in material guise, the beautiful ranks below knowledge, and\nPlato has for this very reason placed the true manifestation of reason\nin knowledge, where it is spiritually manifested.\n\nThis may be regarded as the kernel of Plato\u2019s philosophy. His\nstandpoint is: first, the contingent form of speech, in which men\nof noble and unfettered nature converse without other interest than\nthat of the theory which is being worked out; secondly, led on by the\ncontent, they reach the deepest Notions and the finest thoughts, like\njewels on which one stumbles, if not exactly in a sandy desert, yet at\nleast upon the arid path; in the third place, no systematic connection\nis to be found, though one interest is the source of all; in the fourth\nplace, the subjectivity of the Notion is lacking throughout; but in the\nfifth place, the substantial Idea forms the principle.\n\nPlato\u2019s philosophy had two stages through which it of necessity\ndeveloped and worked its way up to a higher principle. The universal\nwhich is in reason had first to fall into two divisions opposed to\neach other in the most direct and unmitigated contradiction, in the\nindependence of the personal consciousness which exists for itself:\nthus in the New Academy self-consciousness goes back into itself,\nand becomes a species of scepticism\u2014the negative reason, which\nturns against all that is universal, and fails to find the unity\nof self-consciousness and the universal, coming accordingly to a\nstandstill at that point. But, in the second place, the Neo-Platonists\nconstitute the return, this unity of self-consciousness and the\nabsolute essence; to them God is directly present in reason, reasoned\nknowledge itself is the Divine Spirit, and the content of this\nknowledge is the Being of God. Both of these we shall consider later.\n\n\nB. ARISTOTLE.\n\nHere we leave Plato, and we do so with regret. But seeing that we\npass to his disciple, Aristotle, we fear that it behoves us to enter\neven more into detail, since he was one of the richest and deepest\nof all the scientific geniuses that have as yet appeared\u2014a man whose\nlike no later age has ever yet produced. Because we still possess so\nlarge a number of his works, the extent of the material at hand is\nproportionately greater; unfortunately, however, I cannot give to\nAristotle the amount of attention that he deserves. For we shall have\nto confine ourselves to a general view of his philosophy, and simply\nremark on one particular phase of it, viz. in how far Aristotle in his\nphilosophy carried out what in the Platonic principle had been begun,\nboth in reference to the profundity of the ideas there contained, and\nto their expansion; no one is more comprehensive and speculative than\nhe, although his methods are not systematic.\n\nAs regards the general character of Aristotle\u2019s writings, he may be\nsaid to have extended his attention to the whole circle of human\nconceptions, to have penetrated all regions of the actual universal,\nand to have brought under the subjection of the Notion both their\nriches and their diversitude. For most of the philosophic sciences\nhave to render thanks to him both for their characterization and first\ncommencement. But although in this way Science throughout falls into\na succession of intellectual determinations of determinate Notions,\nthe Aristotelian philosophy still contains the profoundest speculative\nNotions. Aristotle proceeds in reference to the whole in the same\nway as in the individual case. But a general view of his philosophy\ndoes not give us the impression of its being in construction a\nself-systematized whole, of which the order and connection pertain\nlikewise to the Notion; for the parts are empirically selected\nand placed together in such a way that each part is independently\nrecognized as a determinate conception, without being taken into the\nconnecting movement of the science. We need not try to demonstrate\nnecessity from the standpoint of the philosophy of that time. But\nalthough Aristotle\u2019s system does not appear to be developed in its\nparts from the Notion, and its parts are merely ranged side by side,\nthey still form a totality of truly speculative philosophy.\n\nOne reason for treating of Aristotle in detail rests in the fact that\nno philosopher has had so much wrong done him by the thoughtless\ntraditions which have been received respecting his philosophy, and\nwhich are still the order of the day, although for centuries he was\nthe instructor of all philosophers. For to him views are ascribed\ndiametrically opposite to his philosophy. And while Plato is much read,\nthe treasures contained in Aristotle have for centuries, and until\nquite modern times, been as good as unknown, and the falsest prejudices\nreign respecting him. Almost no one knows his speculative and logical\nworks; in modern times more justice has been done to his writings\nregarding nature, but not to his philosophic views. For instance, there\nis a quite generally held opinion that the Aristotelian and Platonic\nphilosophies are directly opposed, the one being idealistic and the\nother realistic, and that, indeed, in the most trivial sense. For Plato\nis said to have made the ideal his principle, so that the inward\nidea creates from itself; according to Aristotle, on the contrary,\nwe are told that the soul is made a _tabula rasa_, receiving all its\ndeterminations quite passively from the outer world; and his philosophy\nis thus mere empiricism\u2014Locke\u2019s philosophy at its worst. But we shall\nsee how little this really is the case. In fact Aristotle excels Plato\nin speculative depth, for he was acquainted with the deepest kind of\nspeculation\u2014idealism\u2014and in this upholds the most extreme empirical\ndevelopment. Quite false views respecting Aristotle even now exist in\nFrance. An example of how tradition blindly echoes opinions respecting\nhim, without having observed from his works whether they are justified\nor not, is the fact that in the old \u00c6sthetics the three unities of the\ndrama\u2014action, time and place\u2014were held to be _r\u00e8gles d\u2019Aristote, la\nsaine doctrine_. But Aristotle speaks (Poet. c. 8 et 5)[78] only of the\nunity of treatment, or very occasionally of the unity of time; of the\nthird unity, that of place, he says nothing.\n\nAs regards Aristotle\u2019s life, he was born at Stagira, a Thracian town\non the Strymonian Gulf, but a Greek colony. Thus, though a Thracian,\nhe was by birth a Greek. This Greek colony fell, however, like The\nrest of the country, under the rule of Philip of Macedon. The year of\nAristotle\u2019s birth is the first of the 99th Olympiad (384 B.C.), and\nif Plato was born in the third year of the 87th Olympiad (430 B.C.),\nAristotle must have been forty-six years younger than he. His father\nNicomachus was physician to the Macedonian king, Amyntas, the father\nof Philip. After the death of his parents, whom he lost early, he\nwas brought up by a certain Proxenus, to whom he was ever grateful;\nand during all his life he held the memory of this friend in such\nhigh esteem, that he honoured it by erecting statues to him. He also\nrequited Proxenus for the education given him, by later on bringing\nup his son Nicanor, adopting him as his own son and making him his\nheir. In the seventeenth year of his age Aristotle came to Athens,\nand remained there twenty years in company with Plato.[79] He thus\nhad the best possible opportunity of becoming thoroughly acquainted\nwith Plato\u2019s philosophy, and therefore, if we are told that he did not\nunderstand it (Vol. I p. 167), this is shown, by the evident facts\nof the case, to be an arbitrary and quite unfounded assumption. As\nregards the relation of Plato to Aristotle, and particularly as regards\nthe fact that Plato did not select Aristotle as his successor in the\nAcademy, but chose Speusippus, a near relative, instead, a number of\nidle and contradictory anecdotes have come to us from Diogenes (V. 2).\nIf the continuation of the Platonic school was designed to express\nthe hope that the philosophy of Plato, as comprehended by himself,\nwas to be there satisfactorily maintained, Plato could certainly not\ndesignate Aristotle as his successor, and Speusippus was the right\nman to be selected. However, Plato had nevertheless Aristotle as his\nsuccessor, for Aristotle understood Philosophy in Plato\u2019s sense, though\nhis philosophy was deeper and more worked out, and thus he carried it\nfurther. Displeasure at being thus passed over is said to have been the\ncause of Aristotle\u2019s leaving Athens after Plato\u2019s death, and living\nfor three years with Hermias, the Tyrant of Atarneus in Mysia, who had\nbeen a disciple of Plato along with Aristotle, and who had then struck\nup a close friendship with the latter. Hermias, an independent prince,\nwas, together with other absolute Greek princes and some Republics,\nbrought under the subjection of a Persian satrap in Asia Minor. Hermias\nwas even sent as prisoner to Artaxerxes in Persia, and he at once\ncaused him to be crucified. In order to avoid a similar fate, Aristotle\nfled with his wife Pythias, the daughter of Hermias, to Mitylene, and\nlived there for some time. He, however, erected a statue to Hermias in\nDelphi, with an inscription which has been preserved. From it we know\nthat it was by cunning and treachery that he came under the power of\nthe Persians. Aristotle also honoured his name in a beautiful hymn on\nVirtue, which has likewise come down to us.[80]\n\nFrom Mitylene he was (Ol. 109, 2; 343 B.C.) summoned by Philip of\nMacedon to undertake the education of Alexander, who was then fifteen\nyears old. Philip had already invited him to do this in the well-known\nletter that he addressed to him just after Alexander\u2019s birth: \u201cKnow\nthat a son is born to me, but I thank the gods less that they have\ngiven him to me, than that they have caused him to be born in your\ntime. For I hope that your care and your wisdom will make him worthy\nof me and of his future kingdom.\u201d[81] It certainly would appear to be\na brilliant historic destiny to be the instructor of an Alexander, and\nAristotle at this court enjoyed the favour and esteem of Philip and\nof Olympias in the highest degree. What became of Aristotle\u2019s pupil\nis known to all, and the greatness of Alexander\u2019s mind and deeds, as\nalso his enduring friendship, are the best witnesses of the success,\nas also of the spirit of this up-bringing, if Aristotle required such\ntestimony. Alexander\u2019s education utterly refuted the common talk about\nthe practical uselessness of speculative philosophy. Aristotle had in\nAlexander another and worthier pupil than Plato found in Dionysius.\nPlato\u2019s great interest was his Republic, the ideal of a state; he\nenters into relation with a person through whom it might be carried\nout; the individual was thus to him a medium only, and in so far\nindifferent to him. With Aristotle, on the other hand, this purpose was\nnot present, he merely had the simple individual before him; and his\nend was to bring up and to develop the individuality as such. Aristotle\nis known to be a profound, thorough, and abstract metaphysician, and it\nis evident that he meant seriously with Alexander. That Aristotle did\nnot follow with Alexander the ordinary superficial method of educating\nprinces, might be confidently expected from the earnestness of one who\nwell knew what was truth and true culture. It is also evident from\nthe circumstance that Alexander, while in the midst of his conquests\nin the heart of Asia, when he heard that Aristotle had made known his\nacroamatic doctrines in speculative (metaphysical) writings, wrote him\na reproachful letter, in which he said that he should not have made\nknown to the common people what the two had worked out together. To\nthis Aristotle replied that, though published, they were really just as\nmuch unpublished as before.[82]\n\nThis is not the place to estimate Alexander as an historic personage.\nWhat can be ascribed in Alexander\u2019s education to Aristotle\u2019s\nphilosophic instruction is the fact that what was natural to him, the\ninherent greatness of his mental disposition, acquired inward freedom\nalso, and became elevated into the perfect, self-conscious independence\nwhich we see in his aims and deeds. Alexander attained to that perfect\ncertainty of himself which the infinite boldness of thought alone\ngives, and to an independence of particular and limited projects, as\nalso to their elevation into the entirely universal end of bringing\nabout in the world a social life and intercourse of a mutual kind,\nthrough the foundation of states which were free from contingent\nindividuality. Alexander thus carried out the plan which his father\nhad already conceived, which was, at the head of the Greeks, to avenge\nEurope upon Asia, and to subject Asia to Greece; so that as it was in\nthe beginning of Greek history that the Greeks were united, and that\nonly for the Trojan war, this union likewise brought the Greek world\nproper to an end. Alexander thereby also avenged the faithlessness and\ncruelty perpetrated by the Persians on Aristotle\u2019s friend Hermias. But\nAlexander further disseminated Greek culture over Asia, in order to\nelevate into a Greek world this wild medley of utter barbarism, bent\nsolely on destruction, and torn by internal dissensions, these lands\nentirely sunk in indolence, negation, and spiritual degeneracy. And if\nit be said that he was merely a conqueror who was unable to establish\nan enduring kingdom, because his kingdom at his death once more fell to\npieces, we must acknowledge that, from a superficial view of the case,\nthis is true, as his family did not retain their rule; Greek rule was,\nhowever, maintained. Thus Alexander did not found an extensive kingdom\nfor his family, but he founded a kingdom of the Greek nation over Asia;\nfor Greek culture and science have since his time taken root there.\nThe Greek kingdoms of Asia Minor, and particularly of Egypt, were for\ncenturies the home of science; and their influence may have extended\nas far as to India and to China. We certainly do not know definitely\nwhether the Indians may not have obtained what is best in their\nsciences in this way, but it is probable that at least the more exact\nportion of Indian astronomy came to them from Greece. For it was from\nthe Syrian kingdom, stretching into Asia Minor as far as to a Greek\nkingdom in Bactria, that there was doubtless conveyed to the interior\nof India and China, by means of Greek colonies migrating thither, the\nmeagre scientific knowledge which has lingered there like a tradition,\nthough it has never flourished. For the Chinese, for example, are\nnot skilful enough to make a calendar of their own, or to think for\nthemselves. Yet they exhibited ancient instruments unsuited to any work\ndone by them, and the immediate conjecture was that these had come from\nBactria. The high idea that men had of the sciences of the Indians and\nof the Chinese hence is false.\n\nAccording to Ritter (Erdkunde, Vol. II. p. 839, of the first edition),\nAlexander did not set out merely with a view of conquering, but with\nthe idea that he was the Lord. I do not think that Aristotle placed\nthis notion, which was connected with another Oriental conception, in\nthe mind of Alexander. The other idea is that in the East the name of\nAlexander still flourishes as Ispander, and as Dul-k-ar-nein, _i.e._\nthe man with two horns, just as Jupiter Ammon is an ancient Eastern\nhero. The question would now be whether the Macedonian kings did not,\nthrough their descent from the ancient race of Indian heroes, claim\nto rule this land; by this the progress of Dionysius from Thrace to\nIndia could likewise be explained; whether the \u201cknowledge of this was\nnot the real and fundamental religious idea inspiring the young hero\u2019s\nsoul when, before his journey to Asia, he found on the lower Ister\n(Danube) Indian priestly states where the immortality of the soul was\ntaught, and when, certainly not without the counsel of Aristotle, who,\nthrough Plato and Pythagoras, was initiated into Indian wisdom, he\nbegan the march into the East, and first of all visited the Oracle of\nAmmonium (now Siwah), and then destroyed the Persian kingdom and burnt\nPersepolis, the old enemy of Indian religion, in order to take revenge\nupon it for all the violence exercised through Darius on the Buddhists\nand their co-religionists.\u201d This is an ingenious theory, formed from a\nthorough investigation of the connection which exists between Oriental\nand European ideas from the higher point of view in history. But, in\nthe first place, this conjecture is contrary to the historical basis\non which I take my stand. Alexander\u2019s expedition has quite another\nhistoric, military, and political character than this, and had not much\nto do with his going to India; it was, on the face of it, an ordinary\nconquest. In the second place, Aristotle\u2019s metaphysic and philosophy\nis far from recognizing any such foolish and extravagant imaginations.\nThe elevation of Alexander in the Oriental mind into an acknowledged\nhero and god, which followed later, is, in the third place, not matter\nfor surprise; the Dalai-Lama is still thus honoured, and God and man\nare never so very far asunder. Greece likewise worked its way to the\nidea of a God becoming man, and that not as a remote and foreign image,\nbut as a present God in a godless world: Demetrius Phalereus and\nothers were thus soon after honoured and worshipped in Athens as God.\nWas the infinite not also now transplanted into self-consciousness?\nFourthly, the Buddhists did not interest Alexander, and in his Indian\nexpedition they do not appear; the destruction of Persepolis is,\nhowever, sufficiently justified as a measure of Greek vengeance for the\ndestruction by Xerxes of the temples in Greece, especially in Athens.\n\nWhile Alexander accomplished this great work\u2014for he was the greatest\nindividual at the head of Greece, he ever kept science and art in\nmind. Just as in modern times we have once more met with warriors\nwho thought of science and of art in their campaigns, we also find\nthat Alexander made an arrangement whereby whatever was discovered in\nthe way of animals and plants in Asia should be sent to Aristotle,\nor else drawings and descriptions of the same. This consideration on\nAlexander\u2019s part afforded to Aristotle a most favourable opportunity\nof collecting treasures for his study of nature. Pliny (Histor. natur.\nVIII., 17 ed. Bip.) relates that Alexander directed about a thousand\nmen, who lived by hunting, fishing and fowling, the overseers of the\nzoological gardens, aviaries, and tanks of the Persian kingdom, to\nsupply Aristotle with what was remarkable from every place. In this\nway Alexander\u2019s campaign in Asia had the further effect of enabling\nAristotle to found the science of natural history, and to be the\nauthor, according to Pliny, of a natural history in fifty parts.\n\nAfter Alexander commenced his journey to Asia, Aristotle returned to\nAthens, and made his appearance as a public teacher in the Lyceum,\na pleasure-ground which Pericles had made for the exercising of\nrecruits; it consisted of a temple dedicated to Apollo (\u039b\u03cd\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2), and\nshady walks (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9), which were enlivened by trees, fountains\nand colonnades. It was from these walks that his school received the\nname of Peripatetics, and not from any walking about on the part of\nAristotle\u2014because, it is said, he delivered his discourses usually\nwhile walking. He lived and taught in Athens for thirteen years. But\nafter the death of Alexander there broke out a tempest which had, as\nit appeared, been long held back through fear of Alexander; Aristotle\nwas accused of impiety. The facts are differently stated: amongst other\nthings it is said that his hymn to Hermias and the inscription on the\nstatue dedicated to him were laid to his charge. When he saw the storm\ngathering, he escaped to Chalcis in Eub\\na, the present Negropont,\nin order, as he himself said, that the Athenians should not have an\nopportunity of once more sinning against Philosophy. There he died,\nin the next year, in the sixty-third year of his age, Ol. 114, 3 (322\nB.C.).[83]\n\nWe derive Aristotle\u2019s philosophy from his writings; but when we\nconsider their history and nature, so far as externals are concerned,\nthe difficulty of deriving a knowledge of his philosophy from them\nseems much increased. I cannot certainly enter into details regarding\nthese last. Diogenes La\u00ebrtius (V. 21-27) mentions a very large\nnumber of them, but by their titles we do not always quite know\nwhich of those now in our possession are indicated, since the titles\nare entirely different. Diogenes gives the number of lines as four\nhundred and forty-five thousand, two hundred and seventy, and, if we\ncount about ten thousand lines in a printer\u2019s alphabet, this gives\nus forty-four alphabets. What we now have might perhaps amount to\nabout ten alphabets, so that we have only about the fourth part left\nto us. The history of the Aristotelian manuscripts has been stated\nto be such that it would really seem impossible, or almost hopeless,\nthat any one of his writings should have been preserved to us in its\noriginal condition, and not corrupted. Doubts regarding their genuine\ncharacter could not in such circumstances fail to exist; and we can\nonly wonder at seeing them come down to us even in the condition in\nwhich they are. For, as we have said, Aristotle made them known but\nlittle during his lifetime, and he left his writings to Theophrastus,\nhis successor, with the rest of his immense library. This, indeed,\nis the first considerable library, collected as it was by means of\npersonal wealth along with Alexander\u2019s assistance, and hence it also\nreveals to us Aristotle\u2019s learning. Later on, it came partially, or in\nsome cases in duplicate, to Alexandria, and formed the basis of the\nPtolemaic library, which, on the taking of Alexandria by Julius C\u00e6sar,\nbecame a prey to fire. But of the manuscripts of Aristotle himself\nit is said that Theophrastus left them by will to a certain Neleus,\nfrom whom they came into the hands of ignorant men, who either kept\nthem without care or estimation of their value, or else the heirs of\nNeleus, in order to save them from the Kings of Pergamus, who were\nvery anxious to collect a library, hid them in a cellar, where they\nlay forgotten for a hundred and thirty years, and thus got into bad\ncondition. Finally, the descendants of Theophrastus found them again\nafter long search, and sold them to Apellicon of Teos, who restored\nwhat had been destroyed by worms and mould, but who did not possess\nthe learning or the capacity so to do. Hence others went over them,\nfilled up the blanks as they thought best, replaced what was damaged,\nand thus they were sufficiently altered. But still it was not enough.\nJust after Apellicon\u2019s death, the Roman Sulla conquered Athens, and\namongst the spoil carried off to Rome were the works of Aristotle. The\nRomans, who had just begun to become acquainted with Greek science and\nart, but who did not yet appreciate Greek philosophy, did not know how\nto profit from this spoil. A Greek, named Tyrannion, later on obtained\npermission to make use of and publish the manuscripts of Aristotle, and\nhe prepared an edition of them, which, however, also bears the reproach\nof being inaccurate, for here they had the fate of being given by the\ndealers into the hands of ignorant copyists, who introduced a number of\nadditional corruptions.[84]\n\nThis is the way in which the Aristotelian philosophy has come to us.\nAristotle certainly made known much to his contemporaries, that is to\nsay, the writings in the Alexandrian library, but even those works do\nnot seem to have been widely known. In fact, many of them are most\ncorrupt, imperfect, and, as, for example, the Poetics, incomplete.\nSeveral of them, such as the Metaphysical treatises, seem to be patched\nup from different writings, so that the higher criticism can give rein\nto all its ingenuity, and, according to one clever critic, the matter\nmay with much show of probability be decided in one particular way,\nwhile another ingenious person has a different explanation to oppose\nto this.[85] So much remains certain, that the writings of Aristotle\nare corrupt, and often both in their details and in the main, not\nconsistent; and we often find whole paragraphs almost verbally\nrepeated. Since the evil is so old, no real cure can certainly be\nlooked for; however, the matter is not so bad as would appear from this\ndescription. There are many and important works which may be considered\nto be entire and uninjured, and though there are others corrupt here\nand there, or not well arranged, yet, as far as the essentials are\nconcerned, no such great harm has been done as might appear. What we\npossess therefore places us in a sufficiently good position to form a\ndefinite idea of the Aristotelian philosophy, both as a whole, and in\nmany of its details.\n\nBut there is still an historic distinction to be noted. For there is\nan old tradition that Aristotle\u2019s teaching was of a twofold nature\nand that his writings were of two different kinds, viz. esoteric or\nacroamatic and exoteric\u2014a distinction which was also made by the\nPythagoreans (Vol. I. p 202). The esoteric teaching was given within\nthe Lyceum in the morning, the exoteric in the evening; the latter\nrelated to practice in the art of rhetoric and in disputation, as\nalso to civic business, but the other to the inward and more profound\nphilosophy, to the contemplation of nature and to dialectic proper.[86]\nThis circumstance is of no importance; we see by ourselves which of\nhis works are really speculative and philosophic, and which are rather\nempirical in character; but they are not to be regarded as antagonistic\nin their content, and as if Aristotle intended some for the people and\nothers for his more intimate disciples.\n\n_a._ We have first to remark that the name Aristotelian philosophy is\nmost ambiguous, because what is called Aristotelian philosophy has at\ndifferent times taken very different forms. It first of all signifies\nAristotelian philosophy proper. As regards the other forms of the\nAristotelian philosophy, however, it had, in the second place, at the\ntime of Cicero, and specially under the name of Peripatetic philosophy,\nmore of the form of a popular philosophy, in which attention was\nprincipally directed to natural history and to morals (Vol. I. p. 479).\nThis period does not appear to have taken any interest in working\nout and bringing to consciousness the deep and properly speaking\nspeculative side of Aristotelian philosophy, and indeed with Cicero\nthere is no notion of it present. A third form of this philosophy\nis the highly speculative form of the Alexandrine philosophy, which\nis also called the Neo-Pythagorean or Neo-Platonic philosophy, but\nwhich may just as well be called Neo-Aristotelian\u2014the form as it is\nregarded and worked up by the Alexandrines, as being identical with\nthe Platonic. An important signification of the expression, in the\nfourth place, is that which it had in the middle ages where, through\ninsufficient knowledge, the scholastic philosophy was designated\nAristotelian. The Scholastics occupied themselves much with it, but the\nform that the philosophy of Aristotle took with them cannot be held by\nus to be the true form. All their achievements, and the whole extent of\nthe metaphysics of the understanding and formal logic which we discover\nin them, do not belong to Aristotle at all. Scholasticism is derived\nonly from traditions of the Aristotelian doctrines. And it was not\nuntil the writings of Aristotle became better known in the West, that\na fifth Aristotelian philosophy was formed, which was in part opposed\nto the Scholastic\u2014it arose on the decline of scholasticism and with the\nrevival of the sciences. For it was only after the Reformation that\nmen went back to the fountainhead, to Aristotle himself. The sixth\nsignification which Aristotelian philosophy bears, is found in false\nmodern ideas and conceptions, such as those that we find in Tennemann,\nwho is gifted with too little philosophic understanding to be able\nto grasp the Aristotelian philosophy (Vol. I. p. 113). Indeed, the\ngeneral opinion of Aristotelian philosophy now held is that it made\nwhat is called experience the principle of knowledge.\n\n_b._ However false this point of view on the one hand is, the occasion\nfor it may be found in the Aristotelian manner. Some particular\npassages to which in this reference great importance has been given,\nand which have been almost the only passages understood, are made use\nof to prove this idea. Hence we have now to speak of the character of\nthe Aristotelian manner. Since in Aristotle, as we already said (p.\n118), we need not seek a system of philosophy the particular parts of\nwhich have been deduced, but since he seems to take an external point\nof departure and to advance empirically, his manner is often that\nof ordinary ratiocination. But because in so doing Aristotle has a\nquality, altogether his own, of being throughout intensely speculative\nin his manner, it is further signified that in the first place he\nhas comprehended the phenomenal as a thinking observer. He has the\nworld of appearance before himself complete and in entirety, and sets\nnothing aside, however common it may appear. All sides of knowledge\nhave entered into his mind, all have interest for him, and he has\nthoroughly dealt with all. In the empirical details of a phenomenon\nabstraction may easily be lost sight of, and its application may be\ndifficult: our progress may be one-sided, and we may not be able to\nreach the root of the matter at all. But Aristotle, because he looks at\nall sides of the universe, takes up all those units as a speculative\nphilosopher, and so works upon them that the profoundest speculative\nNotion proceeds therefrom. We saw, moreover, thought first proceeding\nfrom the sensuous, and, in Sophistry, still exercising itself\nimmediately in the phenomenal. In perception, in ordinary conception,\nthe categories appear: the absolute essence, the speculative view of\nthese elements, is always expressed in expressing perceptions. This\npure essence in perception Aristotle takes up. When, in the second\nplace, he begins conversely with the universal or the simple, and\npasses to its determination, this looks as if he were enumerating the\nnumber of significations in which it appears; and, after dealing with\nthem all, he again passes all their forms in review, even the quite\nordinary and sensuous. He thus speaks of the many significations that\nwe find, for example, is the words \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1, \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03ae, \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1, \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6, &c. It\nis in some measure wearisome to follow him in this mere enumeration,\nwhich proceeds without any necessity being present, and in which the\nsignifications, of which a list is given, manifest themselves as\ncomprehended only in their essence, or in that which is common to all,\nand not in their determinations; and thus the comprehension is only\nexternal. But, on the one hand, this mode presents a complete series of\nthe moments, and on the other, it arouses personal investigation for\nthe discovery of necessity. In the third place, Aristotle takes up the\ndifferent thoughts which earlier philosophers have had, contradicts\nthem\u2014often empirically\u2014justifies them, reasoning in all sorts of ways,\nand then attains to the truly speculative point of view. And finally,\nin the fourth place, Aristotle passes on thoughtfully to consider\nthe object itself of which he treats, _e.g._ the soul, feeling,\nrecollection, thought, motion, time, place, warmth, cold, &c. Because\nhe takes all the moments that are contained within the conception to\nbe, so to speak, united, he does not omit determinations; he does not\nhold now to one determination and then to another, but takes them as\nall in one; while reflection of the understanding, which has identity\nas the rule by which it goes, can only preserve harmony with this by\nalways, while in one determination, forgetting and withholding the\nother. But Aristotle has the patience to go through all conceptions and\nquestions, and from the investigation of the individual determinations,\nwe have the fixed, and once more restored determination of every\nobject. Aristotle thus forms the Notion, and is in the highest\ndegree really philosophic, while he appears to be only empiric. For\nAristotle\u2019s empiricism is a totality because he always leads it back\nagain immediately to speculation; he may thus be said to be a perfect\nempiricist, yet at the same time a thinking one. If, for example, we\ntake away from space all its empirical determinations, the result will\nbe in the highest degree speculative, for the empirical, comprehended\nin its synthesis, is the speculative Notion.\n\nIn this gathering up of determinations into one Notion, Aristotle\nis great and masterly, as he also is in regard to the simplicity of\nhis method of progression, and in the giving of his decisions in few\nwords. This is a method of treating of Philosophy which has great\nefficacy, and which in our time has likewise been applied, _e.g._ by\nthe French. It deserves to come into larger use, for it is a good\nthing to lead the determinations of the ordinary conception from an\nobject to thought, and then to unite them in a unity, in the Notion.\nBut undoubtedly this method in one respect appears to be empirical,\nand that, indeed, in the acceptation of objects as we know them in our\nconsciousness; for if no necessity is present, this still more appears\nmerely to pertain to manner externally regarded. And yet it cannot\nbe denied that with Aristotle the object was not to bring everything\nto a unity, or to reduce determinations to a unity of opposites,\nbut, on the contrary, to retain each in its determination and thus\nto follow it up. That may, on the one hand, be a superficial method,\n_e.g._ when everything is brought to an empty determinateness, such\nas those of irritability and sensibility, sthenic and asthenic, but,\non the other, it is likewise necessary to grasp reality in simple\ndeterminateness, though without making the latter in this superficial\nway the starting point. Aristotle, on the other hand, simply forsakes\ndetermination in another sphere where it no longer has this form; but\nhe shows what it is like here, or what change has taken place within\nit, and thus it comes to pass that he often treats one determination\nafter the other without showing their connection. However, in his\ngenuine speculation Aristotle is as profound as Plato, and at the\nsame time more developed and explicit, for with him the opposites\nreceive a higher determination. Certainly we miss in him the beauty of\nPlato\u2019s form, the melodious speech, or, as we might almost call it,\nchatting\u2014the conversational tone adopted, which is as lively as it is\ncultured and human. But where in Plato we find, as we do in his Tim\u00e6us,\nthe speculative Idea definitely expressed in the thesis form, we see in\nit a lack both of comprehension and purity; the pure element escapes\nit, while Aristotle\u2019s form of expression is marked both by purity and\nintelligibility. We learn to know the object in its determination\nand its determinate Notion; but Aristotle presses further into the\nspeculative nature of the object, though in such a way that the latter\nremains in its concrete determination, and Aristotle seldom leads\nit back to abstract thought-determinations. The study of Aristotle\nis hence inexhaustible, but to give an account of him is difficult,\nbecause his teaching must be reduced to universal principles. Thus in\norder to set forth Aristotelian philosophy, the particular content\nof each thing would have to be specified. But if we would be serious\nwith Philosophy, nothing would be more desirable than to lecture upon\nAristotle, for he is of all the ancients the most deserving of study.\n\n_c._ What ought to come next is the determination of the Aristotelian\nIdea, and here we have to say, in quite a general way, that Aristotle\ncommences with Philosophy generally, and says, in the first place,\nregarding the value of Philosophy (in the second chapter of the first\nbook of the Metaphysics), that the object of Philosophy is what is most\nknowable, viz. the first and original causes, that is, the rational.\nFor through these and from these all else is known, but principles\ndo not become known through the facts which form their groundwork\n(\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1). In this we already have the opposite to the ordinary\npoint of view. Aristotle has further declared the chief subject of\ninvestigation, or the most essential knowledge (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b9\u03ba\u03c9\u03c4\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7)\nto be the knowledge of end; but this is the good in each thing and,\ngenerally speaking, the best in the whole of nature. This also holds\ngood with Plato and Socrates; yet the end is the true, the concrete,\nas against the abstract Platonic Idea. Aristotle then says of the\nvalue of Philosophy, \u201cMen have begun to philosophize through wonder,\u201d\nfor in it the knowledge of something higher is at least anticipated.\n\u201cThus since man, to escape from ignorance, began to philosophize, it\nis clear that for the sake of knowledge he followed after knowledge,\nand not for any utility which it might possess for him. This is also\nmade evident by the whole course of its external history. For it was\nafter men had done with all their absolute requirements, and with what\nconcerns their comfort, that they first began to seek this philosophic\nknowledge. We hence seek it not for the sake of any outside utility\nthat it may have. And thus as we say that a free man is he who exists\non his own account and not for another, Philosophy is the only science\nthat is free, because it alone exists for itself\u2014it is knowledge on\naccount of knowledge. Therefore in justice it will not be held to be\na human possession,\u201d in the sense that, as we said above, (p. 11) it\nis not in the possession of a man. \u201cFor in many ways the nature of man\nis dependent, so that, according to Simonides, God alone possesses\nthe prerogative (\u03b3\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2), and yet it is unworthy on man\u2019s part not to\nseek after the science that is in conformity with his own condition\n(\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u0313 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd). But if the poets were right, and envy\ncharacterized divinity, all who would aim higher must be unfortunate;\u201d\nNemesis punishes whatever raises itself above the commonplace, and\nmakes everything again equal. \u201cBut the divine cannot be jealous,\u201d\n_i.e._ cannot refuse to impart that which it is, as if this knowledge\nshould not come to man (_supra_, pp. 72, 73) \u201cand\u2014according to the\nproverb\u2014the poets utter many falsehoods. Nor ought we to consider that\nany science is more entitled to honour than the one we now investigate,\nfor that which is most divine, is also most worthy of honour.\u201d That is\nto say, what has and imparts what is best is honoured: the gods are\nthus to be honoured because they have this knowledge. \u201cGod is held\nto be the cause and principle of everything, and therefore God has\nthis science alone, or for the most part.\u201d But for this reason it is\nnot unworthy of man to endeavour to seek the highest good which is\nin conformity with him, this knowledge pertaining to God. \u201cAll other\nsciences are, however, more requisite than Philosophy, but none more\nexcellent.\u201d\n\nIt is difficult to give a more detailed account of the Aristotelian\nphilosophy, the universal Idea with the more important elements, for\nAristotle is much more difficult to comprehend than Plato. In the\nlatter there are myths, and we can pass over the dialectic and yet\nsay that we have read Plato; but with Aristotle we enter at once upon\nwhat is speculative. Aristotle always seems to have philosophized only\nrespecting the individual and particular, and not to have risen from it\nto the thought of the absolute and universal, to the thought of God; he\nalways goes from the individual to the individual. His task concerns\nwhat is, and is just as clearly divided off as a professor has his\nwork divided into a half year\u2019s course; and though in this course he\nexamines the whole of the world of conception, he yet appears only to\nhave recognized the truth in the particular, or only a succession of\nparticular truths. This has nothing dazzling about it, for he does not\nappear to have risen to the Idea (as Plato speaks of the nobility of\nIdea), nor to have led back to it the individual. But if Aristotle on\nthe one hand did not logically abstract the universal Idea, (for then\nhis so-called logic, which is something very different, would have had\nas its principle the recognition of one Notion in all) on the other\nhand there appears in Aristotle the one Absolute, the idea of God, as\nitself a particular, in its place beside the others, although it is all\nTruth. It is as if we said, \u201cthere are plants, animals, men, and also\nGod, the most excellent of all.\u201d\n\nFrom the whole list of conceptions which Aristotle enumerates, we\nshall now select some for further examination, and I will first speak\nof his metaphysics and its determinations. Then I will deal with the\nparticular sciences which have been treated by Aristotle, beginning by\ngiving the fundamental conception of nature as it is constituted with\nAristotle; in the third place I will say something of mind, of the soul\nand its conditions, and finally the logical books of Aristotle will\nfollow.\n\n\n1. THE METAPHYSICS.\n\nAristotle\u2019s speculative Idea is chiefly to be gathered from his\nMetaphysics, especially from the last chapters of the twelfth book\n(\u039b) which deal with the divine Thought. But this treatise has the\npeculiar drawback noticed above (p. 128) of being a compilation,\nseveral treatises having been combined into one. Aristotle and the\nancients did not know this work by the name of the Metaphysics; it was\nby them called \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1.[87] The main portion of this treatise\nhas a certain appearance of unity given to it by the connection of\nthe argument,[88] but it cannot be said that the style is orderly\nand lucid. This pure philosophy Aristotle very clearly distinguishes\n(Metaph. IV. 1) from the other sciences as \u201cthe science of that which\nis, in so far as it is, and of what belongs to it implicitly and\nexplicitly.\u201d The main object which Aristotle has in view (Metaph. VII.\n1) is the definition of what this substance (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1) really is. In\nthis ontology or, as we call it, logic, he investigates and minutely\ndistinguishes four principles (Metaph. I. 3): first, determination or\nquality as such, the wherefore of anything, essence or form; secondly,\nthe matter; thirdly, the principle of motion; and fourthly, the\nprinciple of final cause, or of the good. In the later part of the\nMetaphysics Aristotle returns repeatedly to the determination of the\nIdeas, but here also a want of connection of thought appears, even\nthough all is subsequently united into an entirely speculative Notion.\n\nTo proceed, there are two leading forms, which Aristotle characterizes\nas that of potentiality (\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2) and that of actuality (\u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1);\nthe latter is still more closely characterized as entelechy\n(\u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1) or free activity, which has the end (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2) in itself,\nand is the realization of this end. These are determinations which\noccur repeatedly in Aristotle, especially in the ninth book of the\nMetaphysics, and which we must be familiar with, if we would understand\nhim. The expression \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 is with Aristotle the beginning, the\nimplicit, the objective; also the abstract universal in general, the\nIdea, the matter, which can take on all forms, without being itself\nthe form-giving principle. But with an empty abstraction such as the\nthing-in-itself Aristotle has nothing to do. It is first in energy\nor, more concretely, in subjectivity, that he finds the actualizing\nform, the self-relating negativity. When, on the other hand, we\nspeak of Being, activity is not yet posited: Being is only implicit,\nonly potentiality, without infinite form. To Aristotle the main fact\nabout Substance is that it is not matter merely (Metaph. VII. 3);\nalthough in ordinary life this is what is generally taken to be the\nsubstantial. All that is contains matter, it is true, all change\ndemands a substratum (\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd) to be affected by it; but because\nmatter itself is only potentiality, and not actuality\u2014which belongs to\nform\u2014matter cannot truly exist without the activity of form (Metaph.\nVIII. 1, 2). With Aristotle \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 does not therefore mean force\n(for force is really an imperfect aspect of form), but rather capacity\nwhich is not even undetermined possibility; \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 is, on the other\nhand, pure, spontaneous activity. These definitions were of importance\nthroughout all the middle ages. Thus, according to Aristotle, the\nessentially absolute substance has potentiality and actuality, form and\nmatter, not separated from one another; for the true objective has most\ncertainly also activity in itself, just as the true subjective has also\npotentiality.\n\nFrom this definition we now see clearly the sort of opposition in\nwhich the Idea of Aristotle stands to that of Plato, for although\nthe Idea of Plato is in itself essentially concrete and determined,\nAristotle goes further. In so far, namely, as the Idea is determined\nin itself, the relation of the moments in it can be more closely\nspecified, and this relation of the moments to each other is to be\nconceived of as nothing other than activity. It is easy for us to\nhave a consciousness of what is deficient in the universal, that is,\nof that which is implicit only. The universal, in that it is the\nuniversal, has as yet no reality, for because implicitude is inert,\nthe activity of realization is not yet posited therein. Reason,\nlaws, etc., are in this way abstract, but the rational, as realizing\nitself, we recognize to be necessary, and therefore we take such\nuniversal laws but little into account. Now the standpoint of Plato\nis in the universal; what he does is to express Being rather as the\nobjective, the Good, the end, the universal. To this, however, the\nprinciple of living subjectivity, as the moment of reality, seems\nto be lacking, or it appears at least to be put in the background.\nThis negative principle seems indeed not to be directly expressed\nin Plato, but it is essentially contained in his definition of the\nAbsolute as the unity of opposites; for this unity is essentially a\nnegative unity of those opposites, which abrogates their being-another,\ntheir opposition, and leads them back into itself. But with Aristotle\nthis negativity, this active efficacy, is expressly characterized\nas energy; in that it breaks up itself\u2014this independence\u2014abrogating\nunity, and positing separation; for, as Aristotle says (Metaph. VII.\n13), \u201cactuality separates.\u201d The Platonic Idea, on the other hand, is\nrather that abrogation of opposites, where one of the opposites is\nitself unity. While, therefore, with Plato the main consideration is\nthe affirmative principle, the Idea as only abstractly identical with\nitself, in Aristotle there is added and made conspicuous the moment of\nnegativity, not as change, nor yet as nullity, but as difference or\ndetermination. The principle of individualization, not in the sense\nof a casual and merely particular subjectivity, but in that of pure\nsubjectivity, is peculiar to Aristotle. Aristotle thus also makes the\nGood, as the universal end, the substantial foundation, and maintains\nthis position against Heraclitus and the Eleatics. The Becoming of\nHeraclitus is a true and real determination, but change yet lacks the\ndetermination of identity with itself, the constancy of the universal.\nThe stream is ever changing, yet it is nevertheless ever the same,\nand is really a universal existence. From this it is at once evident\nthat Aristotle (Metaph. IV. 3-6) is controverting the opinions of\nHeraclitus and others when he says that Being and non-being are not\nthe same (Vol. I. p. 282), and in connection with this lays down the\ncelebrated maxim of contradiction, that a man is not at the same\ntime a ship. This shows at once that Aristotle does not understand\nby this pure Being and non-being, this abstraction which is really\nonly the transition of the one into the other; but by that which is,\nhe understands Substance, the Idea, Reason, viewed likewise as an\nimpelling end. As he maintains the universal against the principle of\nmere change, he puts forward activity in opposition to the numbers of\nthe Pythagoreans, and to the Platonic Ideas. However frequently and\nfully Aristotle controverts both of these, all his objections turn on\nthe remark already quoted (Vol. I. p. 213) that activity is not to be\nfound in these principles, and that to say that real things participate\nin Ideas is empty talk, and a poetic metaphor. He says also that Ideas,\nas abstract universal determinations, are only as far as numbers go\nequal to things, but are not on that account to be pointed out as their\ncauses. Moreover, he maintains that there are contradictions involved\nin taking independent species, since in Socrates, for instance, there\nare several ideas included: man, biped, animal (Metaph. I. 7 and 9).\nActivity with Aristotle is undoubtedly also change, but change that is\nwithin the universal, and that remains self-identical; consequently\na determination which is self-determination, and therefore the\nself-realizing universal end: in mere alteration, on the contrary,\nthere is not yet involved the preservation of identity in change. This\nis the chief point which Aristotle deals with.\n\nAristotle distinguishes various moments in substance, in so far as the\nmoments of activity and potentiality do not appear as one, but still\nin separation. The closer determination of this relation of energy to\npotentiality, of form to matter, and the movement of this opposition,\ngives the different modes of substance. Here Aristotle enumerates the\nsubstances; and to him they appear as a series of different kinds of\nsubstance, which he merely takes into consideration one by one, without\nbringing them together into a system. The three following are the chief\namong these:\u2014\n\n_a._ The sensuous perceptible substance is that in which the matter\nis still distinguished from the efficient form. Hence this substance\nis finite; for the separation and externality of form and matter are\nprecisely what constitute the nature of the finite. Sensuous substance,\nsays Aristotle (Metaph. XII. 2), involves change, but in such a way\nthat it passes over into the opposite; the opposites disappear in one\nanother, and the third beyond these opposites, that which endures, the\npermanent in this change, is matter. Now the leading categories of\nchange which Aristotle names are the four differences, in regard to\nthe What (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03af), or in regard to quality (\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd), or in regard to\nquantity (\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03bd), or in regard to place where (\u03c0\u03bf\u1fe6). The first change\nis the origination and decay of simple determinate Being (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5);\nthe second change is that of the further qualities (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2); the\nthird, increase and diminution; the fourth, motion. Matter is the dead\nsubstance on which take place the changes which matter passes through.\n\u201cThe change itself is from potential into actual existence; possible\nwhiteness transforms itself into actual whiteness. Thus things do not\narise casually out of nothing, but all arises out of what exists,\nthough it exists only in potentiality, not in actuality.\u201d The possible\nis thus really a general implicit existence, which brings about these\ndeterminations, without producing one out of the other. Matter is\nthus simple potentiality, which, however, is placed in opposition to\nitself, so that a thing in its actuality only becomes that which its\nmatter was also in potentiality. There are thus three moments posited:\nmatter, as the general substratum of change, neutral in respect of\nwhat is different (\u1f10\u03be \u03bf\u1f57); the opposed determinations of form, which\nare negative to each other as that which is to be abrogated and that\nwhich is to be posited (\u03c4\u03b9 and \u03b5\u1f34\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9); the first mover (\u1f51\u03c6\u0313 \u03bf\u1f57), pure\nactivity (Metaph. VII. 7; IX. 8; XII. 3).[89] But activity is the\nunity of form and matter; how these two are in the other, Aristotle\ndoes not, however, further explain. Thus in sensuous substance there\nappears the diversity of the moments, though not as yet their return\ninto themselves; but activity is the negative which ideally contains in\nitself the opposite, therefore that also which is about to be.\n\n_b._ A higher kind of substance, according to Aristotle (Metaph. IX.\n2; VII. 7; XII. 3), is that into which activity enters, which already\ncontains that which is about to be. This is understanding, absolutely\ndetermined, whose content is the aim which it realizes through its\nactivity, not merely changing as does the sensuous form. For the soul\nis essentially actuality, a general determination which posits itself;\nnot only formal activity, whose content comes from somewhere else.\nBut while the active posits its content in reality, this content yet\nremains the same; there is an activity present which is different from\nmatter, although substance and activity are allied. Thus here we still\nhave a matter which understanding demands as its hypothesis. The two\nextremes are matter as potentiality, and thought as efficiency: the\nformer is the passive universal, and the latter the active universal;\nin sensuous substance the active is, on the contrary, still quite\ndifferent from matter. In these two moments themselves change does not\ntake place, for they are the implicit universal in opposed forms.\n\n_c._ The highest point is, however, that in which potentiality,\nactivity and actuality are united; the absolute substance which\nAristotle (Metaph. XII. 6, 7; IX. 8), defines in general as being the\nabsolute (\u1f00\u03ca\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd), the unmoved, which yet at the same time moves, and\nwhose essence is pure activity, without having matter. For matter as\nsuch is passive and affected by change, consequently it is not simply\none with the pure activity of this substance. Here as elsewhere we\ncertainly see an instance of merely denying a predicate, without\nsaying what its truth is; but matter is nothing else than that moment\nof unmoved Being. If in later times it has seemed something new to\ndefine absolute Being as pure activity, we see that this arises\nfrom ignorance as to the Aristotelian conception. But the Schoolmen\nrightly looked upon this as the definition of God, since they define\nGod as _actus purus_; and higher idealism than this there is none.\nWe may also express this as follows: God is the Substance which\nin its potentiality has reality also unseparated from it; therein\npotentiality is not distinguished from form, since it produces from\nitself the determinations of its content. In this Aristotle breaks\naway from Plato, and for this reason controverts number, the Idea, and\nthe universal, because if this, as inert, is not defined as identical\nwith activity, there is no movement. Plato\u2019s inert Ideas and numbers\nthus bring nothing into reality; but far different is the case with\nthe Absolute of Aristotle, which in its quiescence is at the same time\nabsolute activity.\n\nAristotle further says on this subject (Metaph. XII. 6): \u201cIt may be\nthat what has potentiality is not real; it is of no avail therefore to\nmake substances eternal, as the idealists do, if they do not contain a\nprinciple which can effect change. And even this is insufficient, if it\nis not active, because in that case there is no change. Yea, even if\nit were active, but its substance only a potentiality, there would be\nin it no eternal movement, for it is possible that what is according\nto potentiality may not exist. We must therefore have a principle\nwhose substance must be apprehended as activity.\u201d Thus in mind energy\nis substance itself. \u201cBut here a doubt seems to spring up. For all\nthat is active seems to be possible, but all that is possible does\nnot seem to energize, so that potentiality seems to be antecedent,\u201d\nfor it is the universal. \u201cBut if this were the case, no one of the\nentities would be in existence, for it is possible that a thing may\npossess a capacity of existence, though it has never yet existed.\nBut energy is higher than potentiality. We must thus not assert, as\ntheologians would have us do, that in the eternal ages there was first\nchaos or night\u201d (matter), \u201cnor must we say with natural philosophers\nthat everything existed simultaneously. For how could the First be\nchanged, if nothing in reality were cause? For matter does not move\nitself, it is the Master who moves it. Leucippus and Plato accordingly\nsay that motion has always existed, but they give no reason for the\nassertion.\u201d Pure activity is, according to Aristotle (Metaph. IX. 8),\nbefore potentiality, not in relation to time, but to essence. That is\nto say, time is a subordinate moment, far removed from the universal;\nfor the absolute first Being is, as Aristotle says at the end of the\nsixth chapter of the twelfth book, \u201cthat which in like activity remains\nalways identical with itself.\u201d In the former assumption of a chaos and\nso on, an activity is posited which has to do with something else, not\nwith itself, and has therefore a pre-supposition; but chaos is only\nbare possibility.\n\nThat which moves in itself, and therefore, as Aristotle continues\n(Metaph. XII. 7), \u201cthat which has circular motion;\u201d is to be posited as\nthe true Being, \u201cand this is evident not merely from thinking reason,\nbut also from the fact itself.\u201d From the definition of absolute Being\nas imparting motion, as bringing about realization, there follows that\nit exists in objectivity in visible nature. As the self-identical\nwhich is visible, this absolute Being is \u201cthe eternal heavens.\u201d The\ntwo modes of representing the Absolute are thus thinking reason and\nthe eternal heavens. The heavens are moved, but they also cause\nmovement. Since the spherical is thus both mover and moved, there is\na centre-point which causes movement but remains unmoved, and which\nis itself at the same time eternal and a substance and energy.[90]\nThis great definition given by Aristotle of absolute Being as the\ncircle of reason which returns into itself, is of the same tenor as\nmodern definitions; the unmoved which causes movement is the Idea which\nremains self-identical, which, while it moves, remains in relation to\nitself. He explains this as follows: \u201cIts motion is determined in the\nfollowing manner. That moves which is desired and thought, whereas\nitself it is unmoved, and the original of both is the same.\u201d That is\nthe end whose content is the desire and thought; such an end is the\nBeautiful or the Good. \u201cFor the thing that is desired is that which\nappears beautiful\u201d (or pleases): \u201cwhose first\u201d (or end), \u201con which the\nwill is set, is what is beautiful. But it is rather the case that we\ndesire it because it appears beautiful, than that it appears beautiful\nbecause we desire it.\u201d For if that were so, it would be simply posited\nby activity, but it is posited independently, as objective Being,\nthrough which our desire is first awakened. \u201cBut thought is the true\nprinciple in this, for thought is moved only by the object of thought.\nBut the intelligible\u201d (we scarcely believe our eyes) \u201cis essentially\nthe other co-element (\u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03af\u03b1)\u201d[91] namely, that which is posited\nas objective, as absolutely existent thought, \u201cand the substance of\nthis other element is the first; but the first substance is simple\npure activity. Such are the Beautiful and the Good, and the first is\never the absolutely best or the best possible. But the Notion shows\nthat the final cause belongs to the unmoved. What is moved may also\nsubsist in a different manner. Motion (\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03ac) is the first change; the\nfirst motion, again, is circular motion, but this is due to the above\ncause.\u201d Therefore, according to Aristotle, the Notion, _principium\ncognoscendi_, is also that which causes movement, _principium essendi_;\nhe expresses it as God, and shows the relation of God to the individual\nconsciousness. \u201cThe First Cause is necessary. But the term necessary\nhas three meanings: first what is accomplished by violence, because\nit goes contrary to one\u2019s inclination (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae\u03bd); secondly,\nthat without which the Good does not subsist; thirdly, that which can\nexist in no other way than it does, but involves absolute existence.\nOn such a principle of the unmoved the heavens depend and the whole of\nnature\u201d\u2014the visible that is eternal, and the visible that changes. This\nsystem is ever-enduring. \u201cBut to us\u201d as individuals, \u201cthere is granted,\nfor a short time only, a sojourn therein of surpassing excellence. For\nthe system continues ever the same, but for us that is impossible. Now\nthis activity is in its very self enjoyment, and therefore vigilance,\nexercise of the senses, thinking in general, are most productive of\nenjoyment; and for the same reason hopes and memories bring pleasure.\nBut thinking, in its pure essence, is a thinking of that which is\nabsolutely the most excellent;\u201d the thought is for itself absolute\nend. The difference and contradiction in activity and the abrogation\nof the same, Aristotle expresses thus: \u201cBut thought thinks itself\nby participation (\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd) in that which is thought, but thought\nbecomes thought by contact and apprehension, so that thought and the\nobject of thought are the same.\u201d Thought, as being the unmoved which\ncauses motion, has an object, which, however, becomes transformed into\nactivity, because its content is itself something thought, _i.e._ a\nproduct of thought, and thus altogether identical with the activity of\nthinking. The object of thought is first produced in the activity of\nthinking, which in this way separates the thought as an object. Hence,\nin thinking, that which is moved and that which moves are the same;\nand as the substance of what is thought is thought, what is thought\nis the absolute cause which, itself unmoved, is identical with the\nthought which is moved by it; the separation and the relation are one\nand the same. The chief moment in Aristotle\u2019s philosophy is accordingly\nthis, that the energy of thinking and the object of thought are the\nsame; \u201cfor thought is that which is receptive of objects of perception\nand the existent. When in possession of these it is in a condition\nof activity (\u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f14\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd); and thus all this\u201d operation by which\nit thinks itself, \u201cis more divine than the divine possession which\nthinking reason supposes itself to have,\u201d\u2014the content of thought. It\nis not the object of thought that is the more excellent, but the very\nenergy of thinking; the activity of apprehension brings that to pass\nwhich appears as something that is being apprehended. \u201cSpeculation\n(\u1f21 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1) is thus the most pleasing and the best. If then God has\neternally subsisted in such surpassing excellence as for a limited time\npertains to us\u201d (in whom this eternal Thought, which is God Himself,\noccurs only as a particular condition), \u201cHe is worthy of admiration;\nif He possesses it in a more eminent degree, His nature is still more\nadmirable. But this is His mode of subsistence. Life is also inherent\nin Him, for the activity of thought is life. But He constitutes this\nefficient power; essential energy belongs to God as His most excellent\nand eternal life. We therefore say that with God there is life perfect\nand everlasting.\u201d From this substance Aristotle moreover excludes\nmagnitude.\n\nWe in our way of speaking designate the Absolute, the True, as the\nunity of subjectivity and objectivity, which is therefore neither the\none nor the other, and yet just as much the one as the other; and\nAristotle busied himself with these same speculations, the deepest\nforms of speculation even of the present day, and he has expressed\nthem with the greatest definiteness. With Aristotle it is thus no\ndry identity of the abstract understanding that is indicated, for he\ndistinguishes subjective and objective precisely and decisively. Not\ndead identity such as this, but energy, is for him what is most to\nbe reverenced, God. Unity is thus a poor, unphilosophic expression,\nand true Philosophy is not the system of identity; its principle is\na unity which is activity, movement, repulsion, and thus, in being\ndifferent, is at the same time identical with itself. If Aristotle\nhad made the jejune identity of understanding, or experience, his\nprinciple, he would never have risen to a speculative Idea like this,\nwherein individuality and activity are placed higher than universal\npotentiality. Thought, as the object of thought, is nothing else than\nthe absolute Idea regarded as in itself, the Father; yet this First\nand unmoved, as distinguished from activity, is, as absolute, simply\nactivity, and is first through this activity set forth as true. In\nwhat he teaches respecting the soul we shall find Aristotle recurring\nto this speculative thought; but to Aristotle it is again an object,\nlike other objects, a kind of condition which he separates from the\nother conditions of the soul which he understands empirically, such as\nsleep, or weariness. He does not say that it alone is truth, that all\nis summed up in Thought, but he says it is the first, the strongest,\nthe most honourable. We, on the other hand, say that Thought, as that\nwhich relates to itself, has existence, or is the truth; that Thought\ncomprehends the whole of Truth, even, though we ordinarily represent\nto ourselves sensation and so on, besides thought, as having reality.\nThus, although Aristotle does not express himself in modern philosophic\nlanguage, he has yet throughout the same fundamental theory; he speaks\nnot of a special kind of reason, but of the universal Reason. The\nspeculative philosophy of Aristotle simply means the direction of\nthought on all kinds of objects, thus transforming these into thoughts;\nhence, in being thoughts, they exist in truth. The meaning of this is\nnot, however, that natural objects have thus themselves the power of\nthinking, but as they are subjectively thought by me, my thought is\nthus also the Notion of the thing, which therefore constitutes its\nabsolute substance. But in Nature the Notion does not exist explicitly\nas thought in this freedom, but has flesh and blood, and is oppressed\nby externalities; yet this flesh and blood has a soul, and this is its\nNotion. The ordinary definition of truth, according to which it is \u201cthe\nharmony of the conception with the object,\u201d is certainly not borne out\nby the conception; for when I represent to myself a house, a beam, and\nso on, I am by no means this content, but something entirely different,\nand therefore very far from being in harmony with the object of my\nconception. It is only in thought that there is present a true harmony\nbetween objective and subjective; that constitutes me. Aristotle\ntherefore finds himself at the highest standpoint; nothing deeper can\nwe desire to know, although he has always the appearance of making\nordinary conceptions his starting-point.\n\nAristotle (Metaph. XII. 9) now solves many other doubtful questions,\nfor instance, whether thought is compound, and whether science is the\nobject of science itself. \u201cSome further doubts arise as to thought\n(\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2), which seems to be of all things the most divine; but it is\nonly with difficulty that we can conceive under what conditions (\u03c0\u1ff6\u03c2\n\u03b4\u0313 \u1f14\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd) it is a thing of this sort. When it thinks of nothing, but is\nin a state like that of a sleeper, what constitutes its superiority?\nAnd when it thinks, but something else is dominant all the time (\u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\n\u03ba\u03cd\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd), that which is its substance is not thought (\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), but\na potentiality;\u201d it would not be in eternal activity. \u201cIn this way\nit would not be the highest substance; for it is\u201d (active) \u201cthought\n(\u03c4\u1f78 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd) that gives it its high rank. If now, further, thought or\nthinking is its substance, what does it think? Itself or another? And\nif another, is it always the same, or something different? Does it also\nnot make a difference, whether it thinks of what is beautiful or what\nis casual? In the first place, if thought is not thinking, but only\nthe power to think, continuous thinking would be laborious for it,\u201d\nfor every power wears itself out. \u201cIn the next place, something else\nwould be more excellent than thought, namely that which is thought\n(\u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd); and thinking and thought (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) will be\npresent to the mind in understanding what is most inferior. As this\nis to be avoided (in the same way that it is better not to see some\nthings than to see them), thinking would not constitute the best.\nThought is therefore this, to think itself, because it is the most\nexcellent; and it is the thinking, which is the thinking of thinking.\nFor understanding and sensation and opinion and deliberation seem\nalways to have an object other than themselves, and to be their own\nobjects only in a secondary sense. Further, if thinking and being\nthought of are different, in relation to which of the two is the Good\ninherent in thought? For the Notion[92] of thinking and that of the\nobject of thought are not the same. Or, in the case of some things,\ndoes the science itself constitute that which is the object of science?\nIn what is practical the thing is the immaterial substance and the\ndetermination of the end (\u1f21 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03af \u1f26\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9), and in what is\ntheoretical it is the reason and the thinking. As therefore thought and\nthe object of thought are not different, these opposites, so far as\nthey involve no connection with matter, are the same thing, and there\nis only a thought of the thing thought of.\u201d Reason which thinks itself,\nis the absolute end or the Good, for it only exists for its own sake.\n\u201cThere still remains a doubt whether that which thinks is of composite\nnature or not; for it might undergo change in the parts of the whole.\nBut the Good is not in this or that part, for it is the best in the\nuniverse, as distinguished from it. In this way the Thought which is\nits own object subsists to all eternity.\u201d\n\nAs this speculative Idea, which is the best and most free, is also to\nbe seen in nature, and not only in thinking reason, Aristotle (Metaph.\nXII. 8) in this connection passes on to the visible God, which is the\nheavens. God, as living God, is the universe; and thus in the universe\nGod, as living God, shows Himself forth. He comes forth as manifesting\nHimself or as causing motion, and it is in manifestation alone that\nthe difference between the cause of motion and that which is moved\ncomes to pass. \u201cThe principle and the first cause of that which is, is\nitself unmoved, but brings to pass the original and eternal and single\nmotion,\u201d that is, the heaven of the fixed stars. \u201cWe see that besides\nthe simple revolution of the universe, which is brought about by the\nfirst unmoved substance, there are other eternal motions, those of the\nplanets.\u201d We must not, however, enter into further details on this\nsubject.\n\nRegarding the organization of the universe in general, Aristotle says\n(Metaph. XII. 10), \u201cWe must investigate in what manner the nature of\nthe whole has within it the Good and the Best; whether as something set\napart and absolute, or as an order, or in both ways, as in the case\nof an army. For the good condition of an army depends upon the order\nenforced, as much as on the general, and the general is the cause of\nthe army\u2019s good condition in all the greater degree from the fact of\nthe order being through him, and not from his being through the order.\nAll things are co-ordinated in a certain way, but not all in the same\nway: take, for example, animals which swim, and those which fly, and\nplants; they are not so constituted that one of them is not related to\nanother, but they stand in mutual relations. For all are co-ordinated\ninto one system just as in a house it is by no means permitted to the\nfree inmates to do freely whatever they like, but all that they do, or\nthe most of it, is done according to orderly arrangement. By slaves and\nanimals, on the contrary, little is done for the general good, but they\ndo much that is casual. For the principle of each is his own nature.\nIn the same way it is necessary that all should attain to a position\nwhere distinction is drawn\u201d (the seat of judgment) \u201cbut there are some\nthings so constituted that all participate in them for the formation\nof a whole.\u201d Aristotle then goes on to refute some other notions;\nshowing, for instance, the embarrassments into which they fall who make\nall things proceed from oppositions, and he corroborates, on the other\nhand, the unity of the principle by quoting Homer\u2019s line (Iliad II.\n204):\n\n \u201cIt is not good that many govern; let one alone bear rule.\u201d\n\n\n2. PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.\n\nAmongst the special sciences treated by Aristotle, the Physics is\ncontained in a whole series of physical treatises, which form a\ntolerably complete system of what constitutes the Philosophy of\nNature in its whole extent. We shall try to give their general plan.\nAristotle\u2019s first work is his Treatise, in eight books, on Physics, or\non the Principles (\u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 \u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f22 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1ff6\u03bd). In this he deals,\nas is fitting, with the doctrine of the Notion of nature generally,\nwith movement, and with space and time. The first manifestation of\nabsolute substance is movement, and its moments are space and time;\nthis conception of its manifestation is the universal, which realizes\nitself first in the corporeal world, passing into the principle of\nseparation. Aristotle\u2019s Physics is what for present physicists would,\nproperly speaking, be the Metaphysics of Nature; for our physicists\nonly say what they have seen, what delicate and excellent instruments\nthey have made, and not what they have thought. This first work by\nAristotle is followed by his treatises concerning the Heavens, which\ndeal with the nature of body and the first real bodies, the earth and\nheavenly bodies in general, as also with the general abstract relation\nof bodies to one another through mechanical weight and lightness, or\nwhat we should call attraction; and finally, with the determination\nof abstract real bodies or elements. Then follow the treatises on\nProduction and Destruction, the physical process of change, while\nformerly the ideal process of movement was considered. Besides the\nphysical elements, moments which are only posited in process, as such,\nnow enter in: for instance, warmth, cold, &c. Those elements are the\nreal existent facts, while these determinations are the moments of\nbecoming or of passing away, which exist only in movement. Then comes\nthe Meteorology; it represents the universal physical process in its\nmost real forms. Here particular determinations appear, such as rain,\nthe saltness of the sea, clouds, dew, hail, snow, hoar-frost, winds,\nrainbows, boiling, cooking, roasting, colours, &c. On certain matters,\nsuch as the colours, Aristotle wrote particular treatises. Nothing is\nforgotten, and yet the presentation is, on the whole, empiric. The book\nOn the Universe, which forms the conclusion, is said not to be genuine;\nit is a separate dissertation, addressed to Alexander, which contains\nin part the doctrine of the universality of things, a doctrine found\nalready in the other treatises; hence this book does not belong to this\nseries.\n\nFrom this point Aristotle proceeds to organic nature, and here his\nworks not only contain a natural history, but also a physiology and\nanatomy. To the anatomy pertain his works on the Locomotion of Animals,\nand on the Parts of Animals. He deals with physiology in the works\non the Generation of Animals, on the common Movement of Animals; and\nthen he comes to the distinction between Youth and Age, Sleeping and\nWaking, and treats of Breathing, Dreaming, the Shortness and Length\nof Life, &c., all of which he deals with partly in an empiric,\nand partly in a more speculative manner. Finally, there comes the\nHistory of Animals, not merely as a history of Nature, but also as\nthe history of the animal in its entirety\u2014what we may call a kind of\nphysiologico-anatomical anatomy. There is likewise a botanical work On\nPlants (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd) which is ascribed to him. Thus we here find natural\nphilosophy in the whole extent of its outward content.\n\nAs regards this plan, there is no question that this is not the\nnecessary order in which natural philosophy or physics must be treated.\nIt is long since physics adopted in its conception the form and\ntendency derived from Aristotle, of deducing the parts of the science\nfrom the whole; and thus even what is not speculative still retains\nthis connection as far as outward order goes. This is plainly to be\npreferred to the arrangement in our modern text-books, which is a\nwholly irrational succession of doctrines accidentally put together,\nand is undoubtedly more suitable to that method of contemplating\nnature, which grasps the sensuous manifestation of nature quite\nirrespective of sense or reason. Physics before this contained some\nmetaphysics, but the experience which was met with in endeavouring\nunsuccessfully to work it out, determined the physicists, so far as\npossible, to keep it at a distance, and to devote their attention to\nwhat they call experience, for they think that here they come across\ngenuine truth, unspoiled by thought, fresh from the hand of nature;\nit is in their hands and before their faces. They can certainly not\ndispense with the Notion, but through a kind of tacit agreement they\nallow certain conceptions, such as forces, subsistence in parts, &c.,\nto be valid, and make use of these without in the least knowing whether\nthey have truth and how they have truth. But in regard to the content\nthey express no better the truth of things, but only the sensuous\nmanifestation. Aristotle and the ancients understand by physics, on the\nother hand, the comprehension of nature\u2014the universal; and for this\nreason Aristotle also calls it the doctrine of principles. For in the\nmanifestation of nature this distinction between the principle and what\nfollows it, manifestation, really commences, and it is abrogated only\nin genuine speculation. Yet if, on the one hand, what is physical in\nAristotle is mainly philosophic and not experimental, he yet proceeded\nin his Physics in what may be called an empiric way. Thus, as it has\nbeen already remarked of the Aristotelian philosophy in general that\nthe different parts fall into a series of independently determined\nconceptions, so we find that this is the case here also; hence an\naccount can only be given of a part of them. One part is not universal\nenough to embrace the other part, for each is independent. But that\nwhich follows, and which has in great measure reference to what is\nindividual, no longer comes under the dominion of the Notion, but\nbecomes a superficial suggestion of reasons, and an explanation from\nthe proximate causes, such as we find in our physics.\n\nIn regard to the general conception of nature, we must say that\nAristotle represents it in the highest and truest manner. For in\nthe Idea of nature Aristotle (Phys. II. 8) really relies on two\ndeterminations: the conception of end and the conception of necessity.\nAristotle at once grasps the whole matter in its principles, and this\nconstitutes the old contradiction and divergence of view existing\nbetween necessity (_caus\u00e6 efficientes_) and end (_caus\u00e6 finales_),\nwhich we have inherited. The first mode of consideration is that in\naccordance with external necessity, which is the same as chance\u2014the\nconception that all that pertains to nature is determined from without\nby means of natural causes. The other mode of consideration is the\nteleological, but conformity to end is either inward or outward, and\nin the more recent culture the latter has long retained the supremacy.\nThus men vibrate in their opinion between these two points of view,\nseek external causes, and war against the form of an external teleology\nwhich places the end outside of nature. These determinations were\nknown to Aristotle, and he thoroughly investigates them and considers\nwhat they are and mean. Aristotle\u2019s conception of nature is, however,\nnobler than that of to-day, for with him the principal point is the\ndetermination of end as the inward determinateness of natural things.\nThus he comprehended nature as life, _i.e._ as that which has its\nend within itself, is unity with itself, which does not pass into\nanother, but, through this principle of activity, determines changes\nin conformity with its own content, and in this way maintains itself\ntherein. In this doctrine Aristotle has before his eyes the inward\nimmanent end, to which he considers necessity an external condition.\nThus, on the one hand, Aristotle determines nature as the final cause,\nwhich is to be distinguished from what is luck or chance; it is thus\nopposed by him to what is necessary, which it also contains within\nitself; and then he considers how necessity is present in natural\nthings. In nature we usually think of necessity first, and understand\nas the essentially natural that which is not determined through end.\nFor long men thought that they determined nature both philosophically\nand truly in limiting it to necessity. But the aspect of nature has\nhad a stigma removed from it, because, by means of its conformity to\nthe end in view, it is elevated above the commonplace. The two moments\nwhich we have considered in substance, the active form and matter,\ncorrespond with these two determinations.\n\nWe must first consider the conception of adaptation to end as the\nideal moment in substance. Aristotle begins (Phys. II. 8) with the\nfact that the natural is the self-maintaining, all that is difficult\nis its comprehension. \u201cThe first cause of perplexity is, what hinders\nnature from not operating for the sake of an end, and because it is\nbetter so to operate, but\u201d being, for example, \u201clike Jupiter, who\nrains, not that the corn may grow, but from necessity. The vapour\ndriven upwards cools, and the water resulting from this cooling falls\nas rain, and it happens that the corn is thereby made to grow. In like\nmanner, if the corn of any one is destroyed, it does not rain for the\nsake of this destruction, but this is an accidental circumstance.\u201d\nThat is to say, there is a necessary connection which, however, is an\nexternal relation, and this is the contingency of the cause as well\nas of the effect. \u201cBut if this be so,\u201d Aristotle asks, \u201cwhat hinders\nus from assuming that what appears as parts\u201d (the parts of an animal,\nfor instance) \u201cmay thus subsist in nature, too, as contingent? That,\nfor example, the front teeth are sharp and adapted for dividing,\nand that the back teeth, on the contrary, are broad and adapted for\ngrinding the food in pieces, may be an accidental circumstance, not\nnecessarily brought about for these particular ends. And the same is\ntrue with respect to the other parts of the body which appear to be\nadapted for some end; therefore those living things in which all was\naccidentally constituted as if for some end, are now, having once been\nso existent, preserved, although originally they had arisen by chance,\nin accordance with external necessity.\u201d Aristotle adds that Empedocles\nespecially had these reflections, and represented the first beginnings\nof things as a world composed of all sorts of monstrosities, such as\nbulls with human heads; such, however, could not continue to subsist,\nbut disappeared because they were not originally constituted so that\nthey should endure; and this went on until what was in conformity with\npurpose came together. Without going back to the fabulous monstrosities\nof the ancients, we likewise know of a number of animal tribes which\nhave died out, just because they could not preserve the race. Thus\nwe also require to use the expression development (an unthinking\nevolution), in our present-day natural philosophy. The conception that\nthe first productions were, so to speak, attempts, of which those which\ndid not show themselves to be suitable could not endure, is easily\narrived at by natural philosophy. But nature, as _entelecheia_ or\nrealization, is what brings forth itself. Aristotle hence replies: \u201cIt\nis impossible to believe this. For what is produced in accordance with\nnature is always, or at least for the most part, produced\u201d (external\nuniversality as the constant recurrence of what has passed away), \u201cbut\nthis is not so with what happens through fortune or through chance.\nThat in which there is an end (\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2), equally in its character as\nsomething which precedes and as something which follows, is made into\nend; as therefore a thing is made, so is its nature, and as is its\nnature, so is it made; it exists therefore for the sake of this.\u201d The\nmeaning of nature is that as something is, it was in the beginning;\nit means this inward universality and adaptation to end that realizes\nitself; and thus cause and effect are identical, since all individual\nparts are related to this unity of end. \u201cHe who assumes contingent and\naccidental forms, subverts, on the other hand, both nature itself and\nthat which subsists from nature, for that subsists from nature which\nhas a principle within itself, by whose means, and being continually\nmoved, it attains its end.\u201d In this expression of Aristotle\u2019s we now\nfind the whole of the true profound Notion of life, which must be\nconsidered as an end in itself\u2014a self-identity that independently\nimpels itself on, and in its manifestation remains identical with\nits Notion: thus it is the self-effectuating Idea. Leaves, blossoms,\nroots thus bring the plant into evidence and go back into it; and that\nwhich they bring to pass is already present in the seed from which\nthey took their origin. The chemical product, on the contrary, does\nnot appear to have itself similarly present, for from acid and base a\nthird appears to come forth; but here, likewise, the essence of both\nthese sides, their relationship, is already present, though it is\nthere mere potentiality, as it is in the product merely a thing. But\nthe self-maintaining activity of life really brings forth this unity\nin all relationships. What has here been said is already contained in\nthat which was asserted by those who do not represent nature in this\nway, but say, \u201cthat which is constituted as though it were constituted\nfor an end, will endure.\u201d For this is the self-productive action of\nnature. In the modern way of looking at life this conception becomes\nlost in two different ways; either through a mechanical philosophy,\nin which we always find as principle pressure, impulse, chemical\nrelationships and forces, or external relations generally\u2014which\ncertainly seem to be inherent in nature, but not to proceed from the\nnature of the body, seeing that they are an added, foreign appendage,\nsuch as colour in a fluid; or else theological physics maintain the\nthoughts of an understanding outside of the world to be the causes.\nIn the Kantian philosophy we for the first time have that conception\nonce more awakened in us, for organic nature at least; life has there\nbeen made an end to itself. In Kant this indeed had only the subjective\nform which constitutes the essence of the Kantian philosophy, in which\nit seems as though life were only so determined by reason of our\nsubjective reasoning; but still the whole truth is there contained\nthat the organic creation is the self-maintaining. The fact that most\nrecent times have brought back the rational view of the matter into our\nremembrance, is thus none else than a justification of the Aristotelian\nIdea.\n\nAristotle also speaks of the end which is represented by organic nature\nin itself, in relation to the means, of which he says (Phys. II. 8):\n\u201cIf the swallow builds her nest, and the spider spreads her web, and\ntrees root themselves in the earth, for the sake of nutriment, there\nis present in them a self-maintaining cause of this kind, or an end.\u201d\nFor this instinctive action exhibits an operation of self-preservation,\nas a means whereby natural existence becomes shut up and reflected\ninto itself. Aristotle then brings what is here said into relation\nwith general conceptions which he had earlier maintained (p. 138):\n\u201cSince nature is twofold as matter and form, but since the latter is\nend, and the rest are on account of the end, this is final cause.\u201d\nFor the active form has a content, which, as content of potentiality,\ncontains the means which make their appearance as adapted for an end,\n_i.e._ as moments established through the determinate Notion. However\nmuch we may, in the modern way of regarding things, struggle against\nthe idea of an immanent end, from reluctance to accept it, we must, in\nthe case of animals and plants, acknowledge such a conception, always\nre-establishing itself in another. For example, because the animal\nlives in water or in air, it is so constructed that it can maintain\nits existence in air or water; thus it requires water to explain the\ngills of fishes; and, on the other hand, because the animal is so\nconstructed, it lives in water. This activity in transformation thus\ndoes not depend in a contingent way on life; it is aroused through the\noutward powers, but only in as far as conformity with the soul of the\nanimal permits.\n\nIn passing, Aristotle here (Phys. II. 8) makes a comparison between\nnature and art, which also connects what results with what goes\nbefore, in accordance with ends. \u201cNature may commit an error as well\nas art; for as a grammarian sometimes makes a mistake in writing, and\na physician in mixing a medicinal draught, nature, too, sometimes does\nnot attain its ends. Its errors are monstrosities and deformities,\nwhich, however, are only the errors of that which operates for an\nend. In the production of animals and plants, an animal is not at\nfirst produced, but the seed, and even in it corruption is possible.\u201d\nFor the seed is the mean, as being the not as yet established,\nindependent, indifferent, free actuality. In this comparison of nature\nwith art we ordinarily have before us the external adaptation to end,\nthe teleological point of view, the making for definite ends. And\nAristotle declaims against this, while he remarks that if nature is\nactivity for a certain end, or if it is the implicitly universal, \u201cit\nis absurd to deny that action is in conformity with end, because that\nwhich moves cannot be seen to have deliberated and considered.\u201d The\nunderstanding comes forward with the determination of this end, and\nwith its instruments and tools, to operate on matter, and we carry\nthis conception of an external teleology over into nature. \u201cBut art\nalso,\u201d says Aristotle, \u201cdoes not deliberate. If the form of a ship\nwere the particular inward principle of the timber, it would act as\nnature prompted. The action of nature is very similar to the exercise\nof the art whereby anyone heals himself.\u201d Through an inward instinct\nthe animal avoids what is evil, and does what is good for him; health\nis thus essentially present to him, not as a conscious end, but as an\nunderstanding which accomplishes its ends without conscious thought.\n\nAs Aristotle has hitherto combated an external teleology, he directs\nanother equally applicable remark (Phys. II. 9) against merely external\nnecessity, and thus we come to the other side, or to how necessity\nexists in nature. He says in this regard: \u201cMen fancy that necessity\nexists in this way in generation, just as if it were thought that a\nhouse existed from necessity, because heavy things were naturally\ncarried downwards, and light things upwards, and that, therefore, the\nstones and foundation, on account of their weight, were under the\nearth, and the earth, because it was lighter, was further up, and the\nwood in the highest place because it is the lightest.\u201d But Aristotle\nthus explains the facts of the case. \u201cThe house is certainly not made\nwithout these materials, but not on account of, or through them (unless\nthe material so demands), but it is made for the sake of concealing and\npreserving certain things. The same takes place in everything which\nhas an end in itself; for it is not without that which is necessary to\nits nature, and yet it is not on account of this, unless the matter\nso demands, but on account of an end. Hence the necessary is from\nhypothesis only, and not as end, for necessity is in matter, but end\nis in reason (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3). Thus it is clear that matter and its movement are\nnecessity in natural things; both have to be set forth as principle,\nbut end is the higher principle.\u201d It undoubtedly requires necessity,\nbut it retains it in its own power, does not allow it to give vent\nto itself, but controls external necessity. The principle of matter\nis thus turned into the truly active ground of end, which means the\noverthrow of necessity, so that that which is natural shall maintain\nitself in the end. Necessity is the objective manifestation of the\naction of its moments as separated, just as in chemistry the essential\nreality of both the extremes\u2014the base and the acid\u2014is the necessity of\ntheir relation.\n\nThis is the main conception of Aristotelian Physics. Its further\ndevelopment concerns the conceptions of the different objects of\nnature, a material for speculative philosophy which we have spoken\nof above (pp. 153-155), and regarding which Aristotle puts before us\nreflections both difficult and profound. Thus he at first (Phys. III.\n1-3) proceeds from this point to movement (\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), and says that it\nis essential that a philosophy of nature should speak of it, but that\nit is difficult to grasp; in fact, it is one of the most difficult\nconceptions. Aristotle thus sets to work to understand movement in\ngeneral, not merely in space and time, but also in its reality; and\nin this sense he calls it \u201cthe activity of an existent thing which\nis in capacity, so far as it is in capacity.\u201d He explains this thus:\n\u201cBrass is in capacity a statue; yet the motion to become a statue\nis not a motion of the brass so far as it is brass, but a motion of\nitself, as the capacity to become a statue. Hence this activity is\nan imperfect one (\u1f00\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03ae\u03c2),\u201d _i.e._ it has not its end within itself,\n\u201cfor mere capacity, whose activity is movement, is imperfect.\u201d The\nabsolute substance, the moving immovable, the existent ground of\nheaven which we saw as end, is, on the contrary, both activity itself\nand the content and object of activity. But Aristotle distinguishes\nfrom this what falls under the form of this opposition, \u201cThat moving\nis also moved which has movement as a capacity, and whose immobility\nis rest. That in which movement is present has immobility as rest;\nfor activity in rest, as such, is movement.\u201d That is to say, rest is\ncapacity for motion. \u201cHence movement is the activity of that which is\nmovable (\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6),[93] so far as it is movable; but this happens from\nthe contact of that which is motive (\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6), so that at the same\ntime it is posited as passive likewise. But that which moves always\nintroduces a certain form or end (\u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2), either this particular thing\n(\u03c4\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5), or a quality or a quantity, which is the principle and cause of\nthe motion when it moves; thus man, as he is in energy, makes man from\nman as he is in capacity. Thus, too, it is evident that movement is in\nthe movable thing: for it is the activity of this, and is derived from\nthat which is motive. The activity of that which is motive is likewise\nnot different, for both are necessarily activity. It is motive because\nit has the capacity for being so; but it causes motion because it\nenergizes. But it is the energetic of the moveable (\u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6), so that there is one energy of both; just as the relation\nbetween one and two is the same as that between two and one, and there\nalso is the same relation between acclivity and declivity, so the way\nfrom Thebes to Athens is the same as from Athens to Thebes. Activity\nand passivity are not originally (\u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03c9\u03c2) the same, but in what they\nare inherent, in motion, they are the same. In Being (\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9) they\nare identical, but activity, in so far as it is activity of this in\nthis\u201d (what is moved), \u201cand the activity of this from this\u201d (what\nmoves), \u201cis different as regards its conception (\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3).\u201d Aristotle\nsubsequently deals with the infinite (Phys. III. 4-8).\n\n\u201cIn like manner it is necessary,\u201d says Aristotle (Phys. IV. 1-5), \u201cthat\nthe natural philosopher should consider the subject of place (\u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2).\u201d\nHere come various definitions and determinations under which space\ngenerally and particular space or place appear. \u201cIs place a body? It\ncannot be a body, for then there would be in one and the same, two\nbodies. Again, if it is the place and receptacle (\u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b1) of this body,\nit is evident that it is so also of the superficies and the remaining\nboundaries; but the same reasoning applies to these, for where the\nsuperficies of water were before, there will now be the superficies\nof air,\u201d and thus the places of both superficies would be in one.\n\u201cBut in truth there is no difference between the point and the place\nof the point, so that if place is not different from the other forms\nof limitation, neither is it something outside of them. It is not an\nelement, and neither consists of corporeal nor of incorporeal elements,\nfor it possesses magnitude, but not body. The elements of bodies\nare, however, themselves bodies, and no magnitude is produced from\nintelligible elements. Place is not the material of things, for nothing\nconsists of it\u2014neither the form, nor the Notion, nor the end, nor the\nmoving cause; and yet it is something.\u201d Aristotle now determines place\nas the first unmoved limit of that which is the comprehending: it\ncomprehends the body whose place it is, and has nothing of the thing\nin itself; yet it co-exists with the thing, because the limits and\nthe limited co-exist. The uttermost ends of what comprehends and of\nwhat is comprehended are identical, for both are bounds; but they are\nnot bounds of the same, for form is the boundary of the thing, place\nis that of the embracing body. Place, as the comprehending, remains\nunchangeably passive while the thing which is moved is moved away; from\nwhich we see that place must be separable from the thing. Or place,\naccording to Aristotle, is the boundary, the negation of a body, the\nassertion of difference, of discretion; but it likewise does not merely\nbelong to this body, but also to that which comprehends. There is thus\nno difference at all, but unchangeable continuity. \u201cPlace is neither\nthe universal (\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03c2) in which all bodies are\u201d (heaven), \u201cnor the\nparticular (\u1f34\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2), in which they are as the first (\u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u1ff3).\u201d Aristotle\nalso speaks of above and below in space, in relation to heaven as that\nwhich contains, and earth as what is beneath. \u201cThat body, outside of\nwhich is a comprehending body, is in space. But the whole heavens are\nnot anywhere, since no body comprehends them. Outside the universe\nnothing is, and hence everything is in the heavens, for the heavens\nare the whole. Place, however, is not the heavens, but its external\nquiescent boundary which touches the body moved. Hence the earth is in\nwater, water in air, air in ether, but ether in the heavens.\u201d\n\nFrom this point Aristotle goes on (Phys. IV. 6, 7) to empty space, in\nwhich an old question is involved which physicists even now cannot\nexplain: they could do so if they studied Aristotle, but as far as they\nare concerned there might have been no thought nor Aristotle in the\nworld. \u201cVacuum, according to ordinary ideas, is a space in which there\nis no body, and, fancying that all Being is body, they say that vacuum\nis that in which there is nothing at all. The conception of a vacuum\nhas its justification for one thing in the fact that a vacuum,\u201d the\nnegative to an existent form, \u201cis essential to motion; for a body could\nnot move in a plenum,\u201d and in the place to which it does move there\nmust be nothing. \u201cThe other argument in favour of a vacuum is found\nin the compression of bodies, in which the parts press into the empty\nspaces.\u201d This is the conception of varying density and the alteration\nof the same, in accordance with which an equal weight might consist\nof an equal number of parts, but these, as being separated by vacuum,\nmight present a greater volume. Aristotle confutes these reasonings\nmost adroitly, and first of all in this way; \u201cThe plenum could be\nchanged, and bodies could yield to one another even if no interval of\nvacuum separated them. Liquids as well as solids are not condensed into\na vacuum; something that they contained is expelled, just as air is\nexpelled if water is compressed.\u201d\n\nAristotle deals more thoroughly, in the first place (Phys. IV. 8), with\nthe erroneous conception that the vacuum is the cause of movement.\nFor, on the one hand, he shows that the vacuum really abolishes\nmotion, and consequently in vacuum a universal rest would reign. He\ncalls it perfect indifference as to the greater or less distance to\nwhich a thing is moved; in vacuum there are no distinctions. It is\npure negation without object or difference; there is no reason for\nstanding still or going on. But body is in movement, and that, indeed,\nas distinguished; it has a positive relation, and not one merely to\nnothing. On the other hand, Aristotle refutes the idea that movement\nis in vacuum because compression is possible. But this does not happen\nin a vacuum; there would be established in it not one movement, but\na movement towards all sides, a general annihilation, an absolute\nyielding, where no cohesion would remain in the body. \u201cAgain, a weight\nor a body is borne along more swiftly or more slowly from two causes;\neither because there is a difference in that through which it is borne\nalong, as when it moves through air or water or earth, or because that\nwhich is borne along differs through excess of weight or lightness.\u201d As\nregards difference of movement on account of the first difference\u2014that\nin the density of the medium\u2014Aristotle says: \u201cThe medium through which\nthe body is borne along is the cause of the resistance encountered,\nwhich is greater if the medium is moving in a contrary direction (and\nless if it is at rest); resistance is increased also if the medium is\nnot easily divided. The difference in velocity is in inverse ratio to\nthe specific gravity of the medium, air and water, so that if the\nmedium has only half the density, the rate of progress will be double\nas quick. But vacuum has to body no such relation of differences\nof specific gravity. Body can no more contain a vacuum within its\ndimensions than a line can contain a point, unless the line were\ncomposed of points. The vacuum has no ratio to the plenum.\u201d But as to\nthe other case, the difference in weight and lightness, which has to\nbe considered as being in bodies themselves, whereby one moves more\nquickly than another through the same space: \u201cthis distinction exists\nonly in the plenum, for the heavy body, by reason of its power, divides\nthe plenum more quickly.\u201d This point of view is quite correct, and it\nis mainly directed against a number of conceptions that prevail in our\nphysics. The conception of equal movement of the heavy and the light,\nas that of pure weight, pure matter, is an abstraction, being taken as\nthough they were inherently like, only differing through the accidental\nresistance of the air.\n\nAristotle (Phys. IV. 9) now comes to the second point, to the proof of\nthe vacuum because of the difference in specific gravity. \u201cMany believe\nthat the vacuum exists because of the rare and the dense;\u201d the former\nis said to be a rare body, and the latter a perfect continuity; or\nthey at least differ quantitatively from one another through greater\nor less density. \u201cFor if air should be generated from a quantity of\nwater, a given quantity of water must produce a quantity of air the\nsame in bulk, or there must necessarily be a vacuum; for it is only\non the hypothesis of a vacuum that compression and rarefaction are\nexplicable. Now if, as they say, the less dense were that which has\nmany separate void spaces, it is evident that since a vacuum cannot\nbe separated any more than a space can have intervals, neither can\nthe rare subsist in this manner. But if it is not separable, and yet\na vacuum is said to exist in the body, in the first place movement\ncould thus only be upwards; for the rare is the light, and hence they\nsay that fire is rare,\u201d because it always moves upwards. \u201cIn the\nnext place the vacuum cannot be the cause of motion as that in which\nsomething moves, but must resemble bladders that carry up that which\nadheres to them. But how is it possible that a vacuum can move, or that\nthere can be a place where there is a vacuum? For that into which it\nis carried would be the vacuum of a vacuum. In short, as there can be\nno movement in vacuum, so also a vacuum cannot move.\u201d Aristotle set\nagainst these ideas the true state of matters, and states generally the\nideal conception of nature: \u201cthat the opposites, hot and cold, and the\nother physical contraries, have one and the same matter, and that from\nwhat is in capacity that which is in energy is produced; that matter\nis not separable though it is different in essence[94] (\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9),\nand that it remains one and the same in number (\u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u1ff7) even if it\npossesses colour, or is hot and cold. And again, the matter of a small\nbody and a large is the same, because at one time a greater proceeds\nfrom a smaller, and at another time a smaller from a greater. If air is\ngenerated from water it is expanded, but the matter remains the same\nand without taking to itself anything else; for that which it was in\ncapacity it becomes in actuality. In a similar way if air is compressed\nfrom a greater into a less volume, the process will be reversed, and\nair will similarly pass into water, because the matter which is in\ncapacity both air and water, also becomes both.\u201d Aristotle likewise\nasserts that increase and decrease of warmth, and its transition into\ncold, is no addition or otherwise of warm matter, and also one and the\nsame is both dense and rare. This is very different from the physical\nconceptions which assert more or less matter to correspond with more\nor less density, thus comprehending the difference in specific weight\nas the external addition of matter. Aristotle, on the contrary, takes\nthis dynamically, though certainly not in the sense in which dynamics\nare to-day understood, viz. as an increase of intensity or as a\ndegree, for he accepts intensity in its truth as universal capacity.\nUndoubtedly the difference must also be taken as a difference in\namount, but not as an increase and decrease, or as an alteration in the\nabsolute quantity of the matter. For here intensity means force, but\nagain not as being a thing of thought separated from matter, but as\nindicating that if anything has become more intensive, it has had its\nactuality diminished, having, however, according to Aristotle, attained\nto a greater capacity. If the intensity is again directed outwards,\nand compared with other things, it undoubtedly becomes degree, and\ntherefore magnitude immediately enters in. It then is indifferent\nwhether greater intension or greater extension is posited; more air is\ncapable of being warmed to the same degree as less, through the greater\nintensity of the warmth; or the same air can thereby become intensively\nwarmer.\n\nAs regards the investigation of time, Aristotle remarks (Phys. IV.\n10, 11, 13) that if time is externally (exoterically, \u1f10\u03be\u03c9\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2)\nregarded, we are inevitably led to doubt (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9) whether it has\nany being whatever, or whether it has bare existence, as feeble (\u03bc\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bc\u03c5\u03b4\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c2) as if it were only a potentiality. \u201cFor one part of it\nwas and is not: another part will be and is not as yet; but of these\nparts infinite and everlasting (\u1f00\u03b5\u1f76 \u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2), time is composed.\nBut it now appears that time, if composed of things that are not, may\nbe incapable of existence. And also as regards everything divisible, if\nit exists, either some or all of its parts must be. Time is certainly\ndivisible; but some of the parts are past, others are future, and no\npart is present. For the _now_ is no part, since a part has a measure,\nand the whole must consist of the parts; but time does not appear to\nconsist of the Now.\u201d That is to say, because the Now is indivisible,\nit has no quantitative determination which could be measured. \u201cBesides\nit is not easy to decide whether the Now remains, or always becomes\nanother and another. Again, time is not a movement and change, for\nmovement and change occur in that which is moved and changed, or\naccompany time in its course; but time is everywhere alike. Besides\nchange is swifter and slower, but time is not. But it is not without\nchange and motion\u201d (which is just the moment of pure negativity in the\nsame) \u201cfor when we perceive no change, it appears as if no time had\nelapsed, as in sleep. Time is hence in motion but not motion itself.\u201d\nAristotle defines it thus: \u201cWe say that time is, when we perceive the\nbefore and after in movement; but these are so distinguished that we\napprehend them to be another and another, and conceive that there\nis something between, as a middle. Now when we understand that the\nextremes of the conclusion are different from the middle, and the\nsoul says that the Now has two instants, the one prior and the other\nposterior, then we say that this is time. What is determined through\nthe Now, we call time, and this is the fundamental principle. But when\nwe are sensible of the Now as one, and not as a prior and posterior in\nmotion, nor as the identity of an earlier or later, then there does\nnot appear to us to have been any time, because neither was there\nany motion.\u201d Tedium is thus ever the same. \u201cTime is hence the number\nof motion, according to priority and posteriority; it is not motion\nitself, unless so far as motion has number. We judge of the more or\nless through number, but of a greater or less motion by time. But we\ncall number that which can be numbered, as well as that with which\nwe number; but time is not the number with which we number, but that\nwhich is numbered, and, like motion, always is changing. The Now is,\nwhich is the unity of number, and it measures time. The whole of time\nis the same, for the Now which was is the same\u201d (universality as the\nNow destroyed) \u201cbut in Being it is another. Time thus is through the\nNow both continuous (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c7\u03ae\u03c2) and discrete (\u03b4\u03b9\u1fc7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9). It thereby\nresembles the point, for that also is the continuity of the line and\nits division, its principle and limit; but the Now is not an enduring\npoint. As continuity of time the Now connects the past and the future,\nbut it likewise divides time in capacity,\u201d the Now is only divisibility\nand the moments only ideal. \u201cAnd in as far as it is such, it is always\nanother; but, in as far as it unites, it is ever one and the same.\nSimilarly, in as far as we divide the line, other and yet other points\nalways arise for thought; but in as far as it is one, there is only\none point. Thus the Now is both the division of time in capacity, and\nthe limit and union of both\u201d _i.e._ of the prior and posterior. The\nuniversally dividing point is only one as actual; but this actual is\nnot permanently one, but ever and again another, so that individuality\nhas universality, as its negativity, within it. \u201cBut division and\nunion are the same, and similarly related; however their Notion (\u03c4\u1f78\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9)[95] is different.\u201d In one and the same respect the absolute\nopposite of what was posited is immediately set forth as existent; in\nspace, on the other hand, the moments are not set forth as existent,\nbut in it first appears this being and its motion and contradiction.\nThus the identity of the understanding is not a principle with\nAristotle, for identity and non-identity to him are one and the same.\nBecause the Now is only now, past and future are different from it,\nbut they are likewise necessarily connected in the Now, which is not\nwithout before and after; thus they are in one, and the Now, as their\nlimit, is both their union and their division.\n\nAristotle (Phys. V. 1) then goes on to movement as realized in a thing,\nto change (\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae) or to the physical processes\u2014while before we had\npure movement. \u201cIn movement there is first something which moves, also\nsomething which is moved, and the time in which it is moved; besides\nthese, that from which, and that into which it is moved.\u201d (Cf. _supra_,\np. 141.) \u201cFor all motion is from something and into something; but\nthere is a difference between that which is first moved and that into\nwhich and from which it is moved, as, for instance, wood, warmth and\ncold. The motion is in the wood and not in the form; for neither form\nnor place, nor quantity moves or is moved, but\u201d (in the order in which\nthey follow) \u201cthere is that which is moved and that which moves, and\nthat into which it is moved. That to which movement is made, more than\nthat out of which movement is made, is named change. Hence to pass\ninto non-being is also change, although what passes away is changed\nfrom Being: and generation is a mutation into Being, even though it\nis from non-being.\u201d The remark is to be interpreted as meaning that\nfor the first time in real becoming motion, _i.e._ in change, the\nrelation _whereto_ enters, while the relation _wherefrom_ is that in\nwhich change is still the mere ideal motion. Besides this first form of\ndifference between motion and change, Aristotle further gives another,\nsince he divides change into three: \u201cinto change from a subject (\u1f10\u03be\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd) into a subject; or from a subject into a non-subject; or\nfrom a non-subject into a subject.\u201d The fourth, \u201cfrom a non-subject\ninto a non-subject,\u201d which may also appear in the general division, \u201cis\nno mutation, for it contains no opposition.\u201d It may certainly be merely\nthought or ideal, but Aristotle indicates the actual phenomenon. \u201cThe\nmutation from a non-subject into a subject is generation (\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2);\nthat from a subject into a non-subject is corruption (\u03c6\u03b8\u03bf\u03c1\u03ac); that\nfrom a subject into a subject, is motion as such;\u201d because that which\nis transformed remains the same, there is no becoming-another of\nthe actual, but a merely formal becoming-another. This opposition of\nthe materialized motion as mutation, and of merely formal motion, is\nnoteworthy.\n\nIn the sixth book Aristotle comes to the consideration of the dialectic\nof this motion and change as advanced by Zeno, that is, to the endless\ndivisibility which we have already (Vol. I. pp. 266-277) considered.\nAristotle solves it through the universal. He says that they are the\ncontradiction of the universal turned against itself; the unity in\nwhich its moments dissolve is not a nothing, so that motion and change\nare nothing, but a negative universal, where the negative is itself\nagain posited as positive, and that is the essence of divisibility.\n\nOf the further details into which Aristotle enters, I shall only give\nthe following. As against atoms and their motion, he remarks (Phys.\nVI. 10) that the indivisible has no motion and mutation, which is the\ndirect opposite of the proposition of Zeno that only simple indivisible\nBeing and no motion exists. For as Zeno argues from the indivisibility\nof atoms against motion, Aristotle argues from motion against atoms.\n\u201cEverything which moves or changes is in the first division of this\ntime partly here and partly there. The atom, as simple indivisible\nBeing, can, however, not have any part of it in both points in space,\nbecause it then would be divisible. The indivisible could thus only\nmove if time consisted of the Now; this is, however, impossible, as we\nproved before.\u201d Because atoms thus neither have change in themselves,\nnor can this come to them from without through impulse, &c., they are\nreally without truth.\n\nThe determination of the pure ideality of change is important.\nAristotle says of this (Phys. VII. 3), \u201cThat which is changed is alone\nthe sensuous and perceptible (\u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd); and forms and figures, as also\ncapacities, are not changed, they arise and disappear in a thing only,\nwithout being themselves changed.\u201d In other words: the content of\nchange is unchangeable; change as such belongs to mere form. \u201cVirtues\nor vices belong, for example, to habits acquired. Virtue is the\nperfection (\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) in which something has reached the end of its\nnature. Vice, however, is the corruption and non-attainment of this.\nThey are not changes, for they only arise and pass away while another\nalters.\u201d Or the difference becomes a difference of Being and non-being,\n_i.e._ a merely sensuous difference.\n\nFrom these conceptions Aristotle now comes nearer to the first real\nor physical motion (Phys. VIII. 6, 8, 9; De C\\nlo, I. 4): The first\nprinciple of motion is itself unmoved. An endless motion in a straight\nline is an empty creation of thought; for motion is necessarily an\neffort after something. The absolute motion is the circular, because\nit is without opposition. For because movement has to be considered\nin regard to the starting-place and the end in view, in the straight\nmovement the directions from A to B and from B to A are opposed, but\nin motion in a circle they are the same. The idea that heavenly bodies\nwould of themselves have moved in a straight line, but that they\naccidentally came into the sphere of solar attraction, is an empty\nreflection which is far from occurring to Aristotle.\n\nAristotle then shows (De C\\nlo, II. I; I. 3) that \u201cthe whole heavens\nneither arose nor can pass away, for they are one and eternal: they\nneither have beginning nor end in eternal time, for they contain\ninfinite time shut up within them.\u201d All the other ideas are sensuous\nwhich try to speak of essential reality, and in them there always\nis that present which they think they have excluded. For when they\nassert a vacuum before the beginning of generation, this is the\nquiescent, self-identical, _i.e._ the eternal matter, which is thus\nalready established before origination; they will not allow that\nbefore origination nothing exists. But in fact a thing does not exist\nbefore its origination, _i.e._ in movement there is something to move,\nand where reality is, there is motion. They do not, however, bring\ntogether that vacuum, the self-identical, the un-originated matter\nand this nothing. \u201cThat which has this absolute circular movement is\nneither heavy nor light; for the heavy is what moves downwards, and the\nlight what moves upwards.\u201d In modern physics the heavenly bodies, on\nthe other hand, are endowed with weight, and seek to rush into the sun,\nbut cannot do so on account of another force. \u201cIt is indestructible\nand ungenerated, without decrease or increase, without any change. It\nis different from earth, fire, air and water; it is what the ancients\ncalled ether, as the highest place, from its continuous course (\u1f00\u03b5\u1f76\n\u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd) in infinite time.\u201d This ether thus appears to be eternal matter\nwhich does not, however, take such a definite form, but which remains\nas it is, just as the heavens do in our conception, although here the\njuxtaposition begins ever to strike us more forcibly.\n\nAristotle (De C\\nlo, III. 6) shows further that the elements do\nnot proceed from one body, but from one another; for in generation\nthey neither proceed from what is incorporeal, nor from what is\ncorporeal. In the first case they would have sprung from the vacuum,\nfor the vacuum is the immediate incorporeal; but in that case the\nvacuum must have existed independently as that in which determinate\ncorporeality arose. But neither do the elements arise from a corporeal,\nfor else this body itself would be a corporeal element before the\nelements. Thus it only remains that the elements must spring from one\nanother. Regarding this we must remark that Aristotle understands by\norigination, actual origination\u2014not the transition from the universal\nto the individual, but the origination of one determinate corporeal,\nnot from its principle, but from the opposite as such. Aristotle does\nnot consider the universal as it contains the negative within it; else\nthe universal would be the absolute matter whose universality, as\nnegativity, is set forth, or is real.\n\nFrom this point Aristotle comes (De C\\nlo, IV. I-5) to a kind of\ndeduction of the elements, which is noteworthy. He shows that there\nmust be four of them, in the following way\u2014because he starts from the\nfundamental conceptions of weight and of lightness, or what we should\ncall attraction and centrifugal force. The corporeal, he says, in its\nmotion is neither light nor heavy, and, indeed, it is not only relative\nbut also absolute. The relatively light and heavy is what, while equal\nin volume, descends more slowly or quickly. Absolute lightness goes\nup to the extremity of the heavens, absolute weight down into the\nmiddle. These extremes are fire and earth. Between these there are\nmediums, other than they, which relate to one another like them; and\nthese are air and water, the one of which has weight, and the other\nlightness, but only relatively. For water is suspended under everything\nexcept earth, and air over everything except fire. \u201cHence,\u201d Aristotle\nconcludes, \u201cthere now are these four matters, but they are four in such\na way that they have one in common; more particularly, because they\narise out of one another, but exist as different.\u201d Yet it is not the\nether that Aristotle designates as this common matter. We must in this\nregard remark that however little these first determinations may be\nexhaustive, Aristotle is still far further on than the moderns, since\nhe had not the conception of elements which prevails at the present\ntime, according to which the element is made to subsist as simple.\nBut any such simple determination of Being is an abstraction and has\nno reality, because such existence would be capable of no motion and\nchange; the element must itself have reality, and it thus is, as the\nunion of opposites, resolvable. Aristotle hence makes the elements, as\nwe have already seen with those who went before (Vol. I., pp. 181, 182;\n290-293; 336), arise out of one another and pass into one another; and\nthis is entirely opposed to our Physics, which understands by elements\nan indelible, self-identical simplicity only. Hence men are wonderfully\ndiscerning in reproaching us for calling water, air, &c., elements!\nNor yet in the expression \u201cneutrality\u201d have the modern physicists been\nable to grasp a universality conceived of as a unity, such as Aristotle\nascribes to the elements; in fact, however, the acid which unites with\na base is no longer, as is asserted, present within it as such. But\nhowever removed Aristotle may be from understanding simplicity as an\nabstraction, just as little does he recognize here the arid conception\nof consisting of parts. Quite the contrary. He strives enough against\nthis, as, for instance, in relation to Anaxagoras (De C\\nl. III. 4).\n\nI shall further mention the moments of the real process in relation\nto motion, in which Aristotle finally passes on (De gen. et corr.\nII. 2-4) to the \u201cprinciples of perceptible body\u201d; we here see the\nelements in process, as formerly in their restful determinateness.\nAristotle excludes the relations which concern sight, smell, &c.,\nand brings forward the others as being those which are of sensible\nweight or lightness. He gives as these fundamental principles\u2014warmth\nand cold, dryness and moisture; they are the sensible differences for\nothers, while weight and lightness are different for themselves. Now\nin order to prepare for the transition of the elements into sensible\nrelations, Aristotle says: \u201cBecause there are those four principles,\nand four things have properly six relations to one another, but the\nopposite cannot here be connected (the moist cannot be connected\nwith the dry, or the warm with the cold), there are four connections\nof these principles, warm and dry, warm and moist, cold and moist,\ncold and dry. And these connections follow those first elements, so\nthat thus fire is warm and dry, air warm and moist (vapour), water\ncold and moist, earth cold and dry.\u201d From this Aristotle now makes\nthe reciprocal transformation of the elements into one another\ncomprehensible thus: Origination and decay proceed from the opposite\nand into the opposite. All elements have a mutual opposite; each is\nas non-being to the Being of the other, and one is thus distinguished\nfrom the other as actuality and capacity. Now amongst these some have\nan equal part in common; fire and water, for example, have warmth;\nthus if in fire dryness were overcome by moisture, out of fire air\nwould arise. On the contrary, as regards those which have nothing in\ncommon with one another, like earth, which is cold and dry, and air,\nwhich is warm and moist, the transition goes more slowly forward. The\ntransition of all elements into one another, the whole process of\nnature, is thus to Aristotle the constant rotation of their changes.\nThis is unsatisfactory, because neither are the individual elements\ncomprehended nor is the remainder rounded into a whole.\n\nAs a matter of fact, Aristotle now goes on, in meteorology, to\nthe consideration of the universal process of nature. But here we\nhave reached his limits. Here, in the natural process, the simple\ndetermination as such\u2014this system of progressive determination\u2014ceases\nto hold good, and its whole interest is lost. For it is in the\nreal process that these determinate conceptions always lose their\nsignification again and become their opposite, and in it also this\ncontingent succession is forced together and united. In determining\ntime and motion, we certainly saw Aristotle himself uniting opposite\ndeterminations; but movement, in its true determination, must take\nspace and time back into itself; it must represent itself as being\nthe unity of these its real moments and in them; that is, as the\nrealization of this ideal. But still more must the following moments,\nmoisture, warmth, &c., themselves come back under the conception of\nprocess. But the sensuous manifestation here begins to obtain the upper\nhand; for the empirical has the nature of the isolated form, which is\nto fall out of relation. The empirical manifestation thus outstrips\nthought, which merely continues everywhere to stamp it as its own,\nbut which has no longer power to permeate the manifestation, since it\nwithdraws out of the sphere of the ideal, while it is still in the\nregion of time, space and movement.\n\n\n3. THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND.\n\nAs regards the other side from the Philosophy of Nature, the Philosophy\nof Mind, we find that Aristotle has constituted in it also a separation\ninto special sciences, in a series of works which I shall name. In\nthe first place, his three books \u201cOn the Soul\u201d deal partly with the\nabstract universal nature of the soul, though mainly in an antagonistic\nspirit; and even more, and in a fashion both profound and speculative,\nthey deal with the soul\u2019s essential nature\u2014not with its Being, but\nwith the determinate manner and potentiality of its energy; for\nthis is to Aristotle the Being and essence of the soul. Thus there\nare several different treatises, viz.: On Sense-perception and the\nSensible, On Memory and Recollection, On Sleeping and Waking, On\nDreams, On Divination (\u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae) through Dreams, besides a treatise on\nPhysiognomy; there is no empirical point of view or phenomenon, either\nin the natural or the spiritual world, that Aristotle has considered\nbeneath his notice. With respect to the practical side, he in like\nmanner devotes his attention to man in his capacity of householder, in\na work on economics (\u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac); then he takes into his consideration\nthe individual human being, in a moral treatise (\u1f20\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac), which is\npartly an inquiry into the highest good or the absolute end, and\npartly a dissertation on special virtues. The manner of treatment is\nalmost invariably speculative, and sound understanding is displayed\nthroughout. Finally, in his Politics, he gives a representation of the\ntrue constitution of a state and the different kinds of constitution,\nwhich he deals with from the empirical point of view; and in his\nPolitics an account is given of the most important states, of which we\nare, however, told very little.\n\n\na. PSYCHOLOGY.\n\nIn Aristotle\u2019s teaching on this subject we must not expect to find\nso-called metaphysics of the soul. For metaphysical handling such as\nthis really pre-supposes the soul as a thing, and asks, for example,\nwhat sort of a thing it is, whether it is simple, and so on. Aristotle\ndid not busy his concrete, speculative mind with abstract questions\nsuch as these, but, as already remarked, he deals rather with the\nmanner of the soul\u2019s activity; and though this appears in a general way\nas a series of progressive determinations which are not necessarily\nblended into a whole, each determination is yet apprehended in its own\nsphere with as much correctness as depth.\n\nAristotle (De Anima, I. 1) makes in the first place the general remark\nthat it appears as if the soul must, on the one hand, be regarded\nin its freedom as independent and as separable from the body, since\nin thinking it is independent; and, on the other hand, since in the\nemotions it appears to be united with the body and not separate, it\nmust also be looked on as being inseparable from it; for the emotions\nshow themselves as materialized Notions (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 \u1f14\u03bd\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9), as material\nmodes of what is spiritual. With this a twofold method of considering\nthe soul, also known to Aristotle, comes into play, namely the purely\nrational or logical view, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the\nphysical or physiological; these we still see practised side by side.\nAccording to the one view, anger, for instance, is looked on as an\neager desire for retaliation or the like; according to the other view\nit is the surging upward of the heart-blood and the warm element in\nman. The former is the rational, the latter the material view of anger;\njust as one man may define a house as a shelter against wind, rain, and\nother destructive agencies, while another defines it as consisting of\nwood and stone; that is to say, the former gives the determination and\nthe form, or the purpose of the thing, while the latter specifies the\nmaterial it is made of, and its necessary conditions.\n\nAristotle characterizes the nature of the soul more closely (De Anima,\nII. 1) by referring to the three moments of existence: \u201cFirst there\nis matter (\u1f55\u03bb\u03b7), which is in itself no individual thing; secondly,\nthe form and the universal (\u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03c6\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2), which give a thing\nindividuality; thirdly, the result produced by both, in which matter\nis potentiality and form is energy (\u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1);\u201d matter thus does\nnot exist as matter, but only implicitly. \u201cThe soul is substance,\nas being the form of the physical organic body which is possessed\npotentially of life; but its substance is energy (\u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1), the\nenergy of a body such as has been described\u201d (endowed with life). \u201cThis\nenergy appears in twofold form: either as knowledge (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7) or as\nactive observation (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd). But it is evident that here it is to\nbe regarded as the former of these. For the soul is present with us\nboth when we sleep and when we wake; waking corresponds with active\nobservation, and sleep with possession and passivity. But knowledge is\nin origination prior to all else. The soul is thus the first energy of\na physical but organic body.\u201d It is in respect of this that Aristotle\ngives to the soul the definition of being the entelechy (_supra_, pp.\n143, 144).\n\nIn the same chapter Aristotle comes to the question of the mutual\nrelation of body and soul. \u201cFor this reason\u201d (because soul is form)\n\u201cwe must no more ask if soul and body are one than we ask if wax and\nits form are one, or, in general, if matter and its forms are one. For\nthough unity and Being are used in various senses. Being is essentially\nenergy.\u201d Were we, namely, to pronounce body and soul one in the same\nway that a house, which consists of a number of parts, or as a thing\nand its properties, or the subject and predicate, and so on, are\ncalled one, where both are regarded as things, materialism results.\nAn identity such as this is an altogether abstract, and therefore a\nsuperficial and empty determination, and a term which it is a mistake\nto employ, for form and material do not rank equally as regards Being;\nidentity truly worthy of the name is to be apprehended as nothing else\nthan energy such as has been described. The only question that now\narises is whether activity and the organ it employs are one; and our\nidea is to answer in the affirmative. The more definite explanation of\nthis relation is to be found in the following; \u201cThe soul is substance,\nbut only according to the Notion (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd); but that is the\nsubstantial form (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03af \u1f26\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9)[96] for such and such a body. For\nsuppose that an instrument, such as an axe, were a natural body, this\nform, this axehood, would be its substance, and this its form would be\nits soul, for if this were to be taken away from it, it would no longer\nbe an axe, the name only would remain. But soul is not the substantial\nform and Notion of such a body as an axe, but of a body which has\nwithin itself the principle of movement and of rest.\u201d The axe has not\nthe principle of its form in itself, it does not make itself an axe,\nnor does its form, its Notion, in itself constitute its substance, as\nits activity is not through itself. \u201cIf, for instance, the eye were\nin itself a living thing, vision would be its soul, for vision is the\nreality which expresses the Notion of the eye. But the eye, as such, is\nonly the material instrument of vision, for if vision were lost, the\neye would be an eye only in name, like an eye of stone or a painted\neye.\u201d Thus to the question, What is the substance of the eye? Aristotle\nanswers: Are the nerves, humours, tissues, its substance? On the\ncontrary, sight itself is its substance, these material substances are\nonly an empty name. \u201cAs this is the case in the part, so it also holds\ngood of the body as a whole. The potentiality of life is not in any\nsuch thing as has lost its soul, but in that which still possesses it.\nThe seed or the fruit is such and such a body potentially. Like hewing\nand seeing,\u201d in the axe and the eye, \u201cwaking\u201d in general \u201cis activity;\nbut the corporeal is only potentiality. But as the\u201d living \u201ceye is\nboth vision and the eyeball\u201d (the two being connected as actuality and\npotentiality), \u201cso also are soul and body the living animal, the two\nare not to be separated. But it is not yet clear whether the soul is\nthe activity of the body in the same way as the steersman is of the\nship.\u201d That the active form is the true substance, while matter is so\nonly potentially, is a true speculative Notion.\n\nAs settling the question asked in the above-mentioned metaphor, we may\nquote what Aristotle says later (De Anima, II. 4): \u201cAs the principle of\nmotion and as end (\u03bf\u1f57 \u1f15\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1), and as substance of living bodies, the\nsoul is the cause. For substance is to all objects the cause of their\nexistence, but life is the existence of the living, and its cause and\nprinciple is the soul; and further, its energy is the existing Notion\nof what has potential existence. The soul is cause also as end,\u201d that\nis, as self-determining universality, \u201cfor nature, like thought, acts\nfor the sake of an object, which object is its end, but in living\nbeings this is soul. All the parts of the body are thus the organs of\nthe soul, and hence exist for its sake.\u201d In like manner Aristotle shows\nthat the soul is the cause of motion.\n\nAristotle (De Anima, II. 2, 3) further states that the soul is to\nbe determined in three ways, namely as nutrient or vegetable, as\nsensitive, and as intelligent, corresponding with plant life, animal\nlife and human life. The nutrient soul, when it is alone, belongs to\nplants; when it is at the same time capable of sense-perception, it is\nthe animal soul; and when at once nutrient, sensitive and intelligent,\nit is the mind of man. Man has thus three natures united in himself; a\nthought which is also expressed in modern Natural Philosophy by saying\nthat a man is also both an animal and a plant, and which is directed\nagainst the division and separation of the differences in these\nforms. That difference has also been revived in recent times in the\nobservation of the organic, and it is highly important to keep these\nsides separate. The only question (and it is Aristotle who raises it)\nis how far these, as parts, are separable. As to what concerns more\nnearly the relation of the three souls, as they may be termed (though\nthey are incorrectly thus distinguished), Aristotle says of them, with\nperfect truth, that we need look for no one soul in which all these are\nfound, and which in a definite and simple form is conformable with any\none of them. This is a profound observation, by means of which truly\nspeculative thought marks itself out from the thought which is merely\nlogical and formal. Similarly among figures only the triangle and the\nother definite figures, like the square, the parallelogram, &c., are\ntruly anything; for what is common to them, the universal figure, is\nan empty thing of thought, a mere abstraction. On the other hand,\nthe triangle is the first, the truly universal figure, which appears\nalso in the square, &c., as the figure which can be led back to the\nsimplest determination. Therefore, on the one hand, the triangle stands\nalongside of the square, pentagon, &c., as a particular figure, but\u2014and\nthis is Aristotle\u2019s main contention\u2014it is the truly universal figure.\nIn the same way the soul must not be sought for as an abstraction, for\nin the animate being the nutritive and the sensitive soul are included\nin the intelligent, but only as its object or its potentiality;\nsimilarly, the nutritive soul, which constitutes the nature of plants,\nis also present in the sensitive soul, but likewise only as being\nimplicit in it, or as the universal. Or the lower soul inheres only in\nthe higher, as a predicate in a subject: and this mere ideal is not\nto be ranked very high, as is indeed the case in formal thought; that\nwhich is for itself is, on the contrary, the never-ceasing return into\nitself, to which actuality belongs. We can determine these expressions\neven more particularly. For if we speak of soul and body, we term the\ncorporeal the objective and the soul the subjective; and the misfortune\nof nature is just this, that it is objective, that is, it is the\nNotion only implicitly, and not explicitly. In the natural there is,\nno doubt, a certain activity, but again this whole sphere is only\nthe objective, the implicit element in one higher. As, moreover, the\nimplicit in its sphere appears as a reality for the development of the\nIdea, it has two sides; the universal is already itself an actual, as,\nfor example, the vegetative soul. Aristotle\u2019s meaning is therefore\nthis: an empty universal is that which does not itself exist, or is not\nitself species. All that is universal is in fact real, as particular,\nindividual, existing for another. But that universal is real, in that\nby itself, without further change, it constitutes its first species,\nand when further developed it belongs, not to this, but to a higher\nstage. These are the general determinations which are of the greatest\nimportance, and which, if developed, would lead to all true views of\nthe organic, &c., since they give a correct general representation of\nthe principle of realization.\n\n\u03b1. The nutritive or vegetative soul is therefore, according to\nAristotle (De Anima, II. 4), to be conceived as the first, which\nis energy, the general Notion of the soul itself, just as it is,\nwithout further determination; or, as we should say, plant life is the\nNotion of the organic. What Aristotle goes on to say of nourishment,\nfor instance, whether the like is nourished by the like, or by the\nopposite, is of little importance. It may, however, be mentioned that\nAristotle (De Anima, II. 12) says of the vegetative soul that it is\nrelated only to matter, and that only after a material manner, as when\nwe eat and drink, but that it cannot take up into itself the forms of\nsensible things: we, too, ourselves in practical matters are related as\nparticular individuals to a material existence here and now, in which\nour own material existence comes into activity.\n\n\u03b2. There is more to interest us in Aristotle\u2019s determination of\nsense-perception (De Anima, II. 5), as to which I shall make some\nfurther quotations. Sense-perception is in general a potentiality (we\nshould say a receptivity), but this potentiality is also activity;\nit is therefore not to be conceived as mere passivity. Passivity and\nactivity pertain to one and the same, or passivity has two senses.\n\u201cOn the one hand a passivity is the destruction of one state by its\nopposite; on the other hand, it is a preservation of what is merely\npotential by means of what is actual.\u201d The one case occurs in the\nacquisition of knowledge, which is a passivity in so far as a change\ntakes place from one condition (\u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2) into an opposite condition;\nbut there is another passivity, in which something only potentially\nposited is maintained, therefore knowledge is knowing in an active\nsense (_supra_, p. 182). From this Aristotle concludes: \u201cThere is one\nchange which is privative; and another which acts on the nature and the\npermanent energy (\u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2). The first change in the subject of perception\n(\u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6) is caused by that which produces the perception; but,\nonce produced, the perception is possessed as knowledge (\u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b7).\u201d\nBecause that which produces the change is different from the result,\nperception is passivity; but it is just as much spontaneity, \u201cand\nsense-perception, like knowledge (\u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd), has to do with this aspect\nof activity. But the difference is, that what causes the perception is\nexternal. The cause of this is that perceptive activity is directed\non the particular, while knowledge has as its object the universal;\nbut the universal is, to a certain extent, in the soul itself as\nits substance. Everyone can therefore think when he will,\u201d and for\nthis very reason thought is free, \u201cbut perception does not depend\non him, having the necessary condition that the object perceived be\npresent.\u201d The influence from without, as a passivity, comes therefore\nfirst; but there follows the activity of making this passive content\none\u2019s own. This is doubtless the correct point from which to view\nperception, whatever be the manner of further development preferred,\nsubjective idealism, or any other way. For it is a matter of perfect\nindifference whether we find ourselves subjectively or objectively\ndetermined; in both there is contained the moment of passivity, by\nwhich the perception comes to pass. The monad of Leibnitz appears,\nit is true, to be an idea opposed to this, since every monad, every\npoint of my finger, as atom or individual, is an entire universe, the\nwhole of which develops in itself without reference to other monads.\nHere seems to be asserted the highest idealistic freedom, but it is\nof no avail to imagine that all in me develops out of me; for we must\nalways recollect that what is thus developed in me is passive, and not\nfree. With this moment of passivity Aristotle does not fall short of\nidealism; sensation is always in one aspect passive. That is, however,\na false idealism which thinks that the passivity and spontaneity of\nthe mind depend on whether the determination given is from within\nor from without, as if there were freedom in sense-perception,\nwhereas it is itself a sphere of limitation. It is one thing when the\nmatter\u2014whether it be sensation, light, colour, seeing or hearing\u2014is\napprehended from the Idea, for it is then shown that it comes to pass\nfrom the self-determination of the Idea. But it is different when,\nin so far as I exist as an individual subject, the Idea exists in\nme as this particular individual; there we have the standpoint of\nfinitude established, and therefore of passivity. Thus there need be\nno standing on ceremony with sense-perception, nor can a system of\nidealism be based on the theory that nothing comes to us from without:\nas Fichte\u2019s theory about himself was, that when he put on his coat, he\nconstituted it in part by drawing it on, or even by looking at it. The\nindividual element in sensation is the sphere of the individuality of\nconsciousness; it is present therein in the form of one thing as much\nas of another, and its individuality consists in this fact, that other\nthings exist for it. Aristotle continues: \u201cSpeaking generally, the\ndifference is that potentiality is twofold; as we say a boy may become\na general, and a grown man may also become so,\u201d for the latter has the\neffective power. \u201cThis is the nature of the faculty of sense-perception\n(\u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd); it is in potentiality what the object of sense (\u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd)\nis in actuality. Sense-perception is therefore passive, in so far as\nit does not resemble its object, but after the impression has been\nmade it becomes similar to its object, and is identified with it.\u201d\nThe reaction of sense-perception consists therefore in this active\nreceiving into itself of that which is perceived; but this is simply\nactivity in passivity, the spontaneity which abrogates the receptivity\nin sense-perception. Sense-perception, as made like to itself, has,\nwhile appearing to be brought to pass by means of an influence working\non it, brought to pass the identity of itself and its object. If\nthen subjective idealism declares that there are no external things,\nthat they are but a determination of our self, this must be admitted\nin respect to pure sense-perception, since sense-perception is a\nsubjective existence or state in me, which yet, however, is not for\nthat reason freedom.\n\nIn speaking of sense-perception, Aristotle (De Anima, II. 12)\nmakes use of his celebrated simile, which has so often occasioned\nmisapprehension, because it has been understood quite incorrectly. His\nwords are: \u201cSense-perception is the receiving of sensible forms without\nmatter, as wax receives only the impress of the golden signet ring,\nnot the gold itself, but merely its form.\u201d For the form is the object\nas universal; and theoretically we are in the position, not of the\nindividual and sensuous, but of the universal. The case is different\nwith us in our practical relations, where the influence working upon us\npre-supposes in return the contact of the material, for which reason,\nas Aristotle asserts, plants do not perceive (_supra_, p. 186). On\nthe other hand, in receiving form, the material is lost sight of; for\nthe receiving of form indicates no positive relation to the matter,\nwhich is no longer something offering resistance. If, therefore,\nsense-perceptions are termed in general sensuous impressions, we, in\nmatter-of-fact fashion, do not get beyond this crude way of putting\nit; and in making the transition to soul, we take refuge behind\npopular conceptions, which are partly ill-defined Notions, and partly\nnot Notions at all. Thus it is said that all sense-perceptions are\nimpressed on the soul by external things, just as the matter of the\nsignet ring works on the matter of the wax; and then we hear it alleged\nthat this is Aristotle\u2019s philosophy. It is the same with most other\nphilosophers; if they give any sort of illustration that appeals to\nthe senses, everyone can understand it, and everyone takes the content\nof the comparison in its full extent: as if all that is contained in\nthis sensuous relationship should also hold good of the spiritual. No\ngreat importance is therefore to be attached to this conception, as it\nis only an illustration, professing to show by a side comparison that\nthe passive element in sense-perception is in its passivity for pure\nform only; this form alone is taken up into the percipient subject,\nand finds a place in the soul. It does not, however, remain in the\nsame relation to it as that in which the form stands to the wax, nor\nis it as in chemistry where one element is permeated by another as\nregards its matter. The chief circumstance, therefore, and that which\nconstitutes the difference between this illustration and the condition\nof the soul is altogether overlooked. That is to say, the wax does not,\nindeed, take in the form, for the impression remains on it as external\nfigure and contour, without being a form of its real Being; if it were\nto become such, it would cease to be wax; therefore, because in the\nillustration there is lacking this reception of form into the Being,\nno thought is given to it. The soul, on the contrary, assimilates this\nform into its own substance, and for the very reason, that the soul is\nin itself, to a certain extent, the sum of all that is perceived by\nthe senses (_infra_, p. 198): as it was said above (p. 183), if the\naxe had its form in the determination of substance, this form would\nbe the soul of the axe. The illustration of the wax has reference to\nnothing but the fact that only the form comes to the soul; and has\nnothing to do with the form being external to the wax and remaining so,\nor with the soul having, like wax, no independent form. The soul is by\nno means said to be passive wax and to receive its determinations from\nwithout; but Aristotle, as we shall soon see (p. 194), really says that\nthe spirit repels matter from itself, and maintains itself against it,\nhaving relation only to form. In sense-perception the soul is certainly\npassive, but the manner in which it receives is not like that of the\nwax, being just as truly activity of the soul; for after the perceptive\nfaculty has received the impression, it abrogates the passivity, and\nremains thenceforth free from it (_supra_, p. 187). The soul therefore\nchanges the form of the external body into its own, and is identical\nwith an abstract quality such as this, for the sole reason that it\nitself is this universal form.\n\nThis description of sense-perception Aristotle explains more fully in\nwhat follows (De Anima, III. 2), and expatiates upon this unity and\nits contrasts, in the course of which explanation there appear many\nclear and far-reaching glimpses into the Nature of consciousness. \u201cThe\nbodily organ of each sense-perception receives the object perceived\nwithout matter. Hence, when the object of sense is removed, the\nperceptions and the images which represent them remain in the organs.\nIn the act of sense-perception the object perceived is no doubt\nidentical with the subject that perceives, but they do not exist[97]\nas the same; for instance, sound and the hearing are the same when in\nactive exercise, but that which has hearing does not always hear, and\nthat which has sound is not always sounding. When that which is the\npotentiality of hearing comes into exercise, and likewise that which is\nthe potentiality of sound, hearing and sound, being in full activity,\ncoincide,\u201d they do not remain separate energies. \u201cIf then movement\nand action, as well as passivity, have a place in the object on which\nactivity is exercised (\u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1ff3), it follows necessarily that\nthe energy of hearing and sound is contained in that which potentially\nis hearing, for the energy of the active and moving is in the passive.\nAs therefore activity and passivity are manifested in the subject\nwhich receives the effect, and not in the object which produces it\n(\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9), the energy both of the object and of the faculty of\nsense-perception is in the faculty itself. For hearing and sounding\nthere are two words, for seeing only one; seeing is the activity of\nthe person who sees, but the activity of the colour is without name.\nSince the energy of that which is perceived and that which perceives\nis one energy, and the aspect they present is alone different, the\nso-called sounding and hearing must cease simultaneously.\u201d There is a\nbody which sounds and a subject which hears; they are twofold in the\naspect they present, but hearing, taken by itself, is intrinsically an\nactivity of both. In like manner, when I have by sense the perception\nof redness and hardness, my perception is itself red and hard: that is,\nI find myself determined in that way, even though reflection says that\noutside of me there is a red, hard thing, and that it and my finger\nare two; but they are also one, my eye is red and the thing. It is\nupon this difference and this identity that everything depends; and\nAristotle demonstrates this in the most emphatic way, and holds firmly\nto his point. The later distinction of subjective and objective is the\nreflection of consciousness; sense-perception is simply the abrogation\nof this separation, it is that form of identity which abstracts from\nsubjectivity and objectivity. What is simple, the soul proper or\nthe I, is in sense-perception unity in difference. \u201cFurther, every\nsense-perception is in its organ, and distinguishes everything that is\nperceived, like black and white, and so on. It is thus not possible for\nseparate perceptions, white and sweet, to be distinguished as separate\nindifferent moments, for both must be present (\u03b4\u1fc6\u03bb\u03b1) to one subject.\nThis one subject must therefore determine one thing to be different\nfrom another. This, as distinguished, can also not be in a different\nplace or time, for it must be undivided and in undivided time. But\nit is impossible that one and the same thing should be affected by\ncontrary movements, in so far as it is undivided and in undivided time.\nIf sweetness affects sense-perception in one way, and bitterness in the\ncontrary way, and whiteness in yet another way, the power of judging is\nnumerically not discrete nor divisible, but according to the Notion (\u03c4\u1ff7\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9)[98] it is distinguished. That which is the same and indivisible\nthus possesses in potentiality opposite qualities; but with its true\nexistence (\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9) that cannot be the case, for in its activity it\nis separable, and cannot at the same time be both white and black.\nSense-perception and thinking are like that which some term a point,\nwhich, in so far as it is one, is inseparable, and in so far as it is\ntwo, is separable. So far as it is undivided, the judging faculty is\none and acts in a single point of time, but so far as it is divided\u201d\n(not one) \u201cit employs the same sign twice simultaneously. So far as\nit employs two, it by limitation distinguishes two, and separates\nthem as having separate origin; but so far as it is one, it judges by\none act in one single point of time\u201d (_supra_, p. 172). For as the\npoint in time, which resembles the point in space, contains future and\npast, and thus is something different and at the same time one and the\nsame, since it is in one and the same respect separation and union;\nsense-perception is also one and at the same time separation, separated\nand not separated, seeing that the faculty of perception has before\nit in one unity the distinct sense-perception, which by this means\nreceives for the first time a determinate content. Another example is\nthat of number; one and two are different, and, at the same time, even\nin two one is used and posited as one.\n\n\u03b3. From sense-perception Aristotle passes on to thought, and becomes\nhere really speculative. \u201cThinking,\u201d he says (De Anima, III. 4) \u201cis not\npassive (\u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03c2), but receptive of the form, and is in potentiality\nsimilar to it. Therefore the understanding (\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2), because it thinks\nall things, is free from all admixture (\u1f00\u03bc\u03b9\u03b3\u03ae\u03c2), in order that it may\novercome (\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u1fc7), as Anaxagoras says, that is, in order that it may\nacquire knowledge; for, coming forth in its energy (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03bc\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd),\nit holds back what is alien to it, and fortifies itself against it\n(\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c6\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9). Therefore the nature of the understanding is none other\nthan this potentiality.\u201d But potentiality itself is here not matter;\nthat is to say, the understanding has no matter, for potentiality\npertains to its very substance. For thinking is really the not\nbeing implicit; and on account of its purity its reality is not the\nbeing-for-another, but its potentiality is itself a being-for-self.\nA thing is real because it is this determinate thing; the opposite\ndetermination, its potentiality to be, for instance, smoke, ashes,\nand so on, is not posited in it. In the corporeal, therefore, matter,\nas potentiality, and external form, as reality, are opposed to one\nanother; but the soul is, in contrast with this, universal potentiality\nitself, without matter, because its essence is energy. \u201cUnderstanding,\nthen, in the soul, as that which possesses consciousness, is nothing in\nreality before it thinks;\u201d it is absolute activity, but exists only\nwhen it is active. \u201cIt is therefore not incorporated with the body. For\nwhat should it be like, warm or cold? Or should it be an organ? But it\nis none of these. That it is, however, different from the faculty of\nsense-perception is clear. For sense-perception cannot perceive after\na violent perception; for instance, it cannot smell nor see after\nexperiencing strong smells or colours. But the understanding, after\nit has thought something which can only be thought with difficulty,\nwill not have more but less difficulty in thinking of something that\nis easier. For there is no sense-perception independent of the body,\nbut the understanding is separable from it. When it has then become\nsomething individual, like him who is really possessed of a faculty of\nknowing (and this happens when he can energize through himself), it\nthen is also in a certain degree according to potentiality, but yet not\nso in the same manner as it was before learning and finding.\u201d (_Cf._\n_supra_, pp. 182, 187.)\n\nThinking makes itself into passive understanding, that is, into what\nis for it the objective; and thus it here becomes plain to what extent\nthe dictum _nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu_ expresses\nAristotle\u2019s meaning. Aristotle, raising difficulties, goes on to ask,\n\u201cIf reason is simple and unaffected by impressions, and has nothing\nin common with other objects, how can it think, since thinking is\ncertainly a state of receptivity?\u201d That is to say, in thinking there\nis a reference to an object distinct from itself. \u201cFor it is when two\nobjects have something in common that the one appears to produce and\nthe other to receive an impression. There is a further difficulty,\nwhether understanding can itself be the object of thought. In that case\nunderstanding would either be inherent in other things\u2014unless it is the\nobject of thought in a different sense from that in which other things\nare so, but there is only one sense in which things can be objects of\nthought\u2014or, on the other hand, it would have something compounded with\nit, making it an object of thought as other things are. Now it has\nbeen already said that passivity is so determined that understanding\nis in potentiality all that thought is exercised on: but at the same\ntime it is in actuality nothing before the exercise of thought.\u201d That\nis to say, thought is implicitly the content of the object of what is\nthought, and in coming into existence it only coincides with itself;\nbut the self-conscious understanding is not merely implicit, but\nessentially explicit, since it is within itself all things. That is an\nidealistic way of expressing it; and yet they say that Aristotle is an\nempiricist.\n\nThe passivity of understanding has therefore here only the sense of\npotentiality before actuality, and that is the great principle of\nAristotle; in regard to this he brings forward at the end of the same\nchapter another much-decried illustration, which has been just as much\nmisunderstood as the preceding. \u201cReason is like a book upon whose\npages nothing is actually written;\u201d that is, however, paper, but not\na book. All Aristotle\u2019s thoughts are overlooked, and only external\nillustrations such as this are comprehended. A book on which nothing\nis written everyone can understand. And the technical term is the\nwell-known _tabula rasa_, which is to be found wherever Aristotle is\nspoken of: Aristotle is said to have alleged that the mind is a blank\npage, on which characters are first traced by external objects, so\nthat thinking thus comes to it from without.[99] But that is the very\nopposite of what Aristotle says. Instead of the Notion being adhered\nto, casual comparisons such as these have been caught up here and\nthere by the imagination, as if they expressed the matter itself.\nBut Aristotle did not in the least intend that the analogy should be\npushed to its furthest extent: the understanding is of a surety not a\nthing, and has not the passivity of a writing-tablet; it is itself the\nenergy, which is not, as it would be in the case of a tablet, external\nto it. The analogy is therefore confined to this, that the soul has a\ncontent only in so far as actual thought is exercised. The soul is this\nbook unwritten on, and the meaning consequently is that the soul is all\nthings implicitly, but it is not in itself this totality; it is like\na book that contains all things potentially, but in reality contains\nnothing before it is written on. Before real activity nothing truly\nexists; or \u201cUnderstanding itself can enter thought, like the objects\nof thought in general. For in that which is without matter\u201d (in mind),\n\u201cthe thinker\u201d (the subjective) \u201cand the thought\u201d (the objective) \u201care\nthe same; theoretical knowledge and that which comes to be known are\nthe same. In that which is material, thinking is only in potentiality,\nso that understanding itself does not belong to it; for understanding\nis a potentiality without matter, but the object of thought exists in\nit,\u201d while Nature contains the Idea only implicitly. It is plain from\nthis that the above illustration has been taken in quite a false sense,\nutterly contrary to Aristotle\u2019s meaning.\n\nUntil now we have spoken of the passive understanding, which is\nthe nature of the soul, but also in equal degree its faculty of\nsense-perception and imagination. Aristotle now proceeds to distinguish\nactive understanding from this, as follows (De Anima, III. 5): \u201cIn\nnature as a whole there is present in every species of things, on the\none hand, matter, which in potentiality is the whole of this species,\nand, on the other hand, cause and energy, operative in all things, in\nthe same way that art is related to matter. It therefore necessarily\nfollows that in the soul also these different elements should be\npresent. The faculty of understanding is thus, in one view of it, the\ncapacity of becoming all things; but in another view it is the capacity\nof creating all things, as is done by an efficient power (\u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03c2),\nlight, for instance, which first causes the colours which exist in\npotentiality to exist in reality. This understanding is absolute\n(\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2), uncompounded, and not influenced from without, as it is\nessentially activity. For the active is always more in honour than\nthe passive, and the principle more in honour than the matter that it\nforms. Knowledge, when in active exercise, is identical with the thing\n(\u03c0\u03c1\u1fb6\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1) known; but what is in potentiality\u201d (that is, external reason,\nimagination, sense-perception) \u201cis certainly prior in respect of time\nin one and the same individual, but in the universal (\u1f45\u03bb\u03c9\u03c2) it is not\neven so in respect of time. Active understanding is not such that it\nsometimes thinks and sometimes does not. When it is absolute, it is the\none and only existence; and this alone is eternal and immortal. We,\nhowever, do not remember this process, because this understanding is\nunaffected from without; but the passive understanding is transitory,\nand without the former it is incapable of thought.\u201d\n\nThe seventh and eighth chapters are expositions of the maxims contained\nin the fourth and fifth; they begin with these maxims, and have the\nappearance of being from the hand of a commentator. \u201cThe soul,\u201d says\nAristotle (De Anima, III. 8), \u201cis in a certain sense the whole of\nexistence. For existent objects are either perceived by the senses or\nthought; but knowledge itself is in a manner the object of knowledge,\nand perception the object of perception. What are known and perceived\nare either the things themselves or their forms. Knowledge and\nsense-perception are not the things themselves (the stone is not in the\nsoul), but their form; so that the soul is like the hand. As this is\nthe instrument by which we grasp instruments, so the understanding is\nthe form by which we apprehend forms, and sense-perception the form of\nthe objects cf sense.\u201d Before this Aristotle had remarked (De Anima,\nIII. 4): \u201cIt has been truly said that the soul is the _place of ideas_\n(\u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u1ff6\u03bd): not the whole soul, but only the thinking soul, and\nthese ideas do not exist in the soul actually, but only potentially.\u201d\nThat is to say, the ideas are at first only quiescent forms, not\nactivities, and so Aristotle is not a realist. But the understanding\nmakes these forms, like those of external nature, its objects, its\nthoughts, its potentiality, Aristotle therefore says in the seventh\nchapter: \u201cThe understanding thinks the abstract (\u03c4\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f00\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1), just as it conceives snubnosedness not as snubnosedness\nthat cannot be separated from the flesh, but as hollowness.\u201d Then in\nthe eighth chapter Aristotle goes on to say: \u201cBut as no object is\nseparated from its perceived dimensions, so in the forms perceived by\nsense there are also objects of thought, both abstract conceptions\nand the qualities (\u1f15\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2) and determinations of the objects of sense.\nIn this way he who perceives nothing by his senses learns nothing\nand understands nothing; when he discerns anything (\u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u1fc7), he must\nnecessarily discern it as a pictorial conception, for such conceptions\nare like sense-perceptions, only without matter. In what way then\nare our primary ideas distinguished, so as not to be mistaken for\nconceptions? Or is it not the case also that other thoughts even\nare not pictorial conceptions, but only that they are never found\nunassociated with such conceptions?\u201d Since what follows contains no\nanswer to the questions raised here at the very end, this would seem an\nadditional indication that these portions follow later.[100] Aristotle\nconcludes the seventh chapter with the words: \u201cSpeaking generally,\nthe understanding is the faculty which thinks things in their real\nactivity. Whether, however, it can think the absolute or not, unless\nit be itself separated from the sensuous, we shall inquire later\n(\u1f55\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd).\u201d This \u201clater\u201d Buhle considers to have reference to the\n\u201chighest philosophy.\u201d[101]\n\nThis identity of the subjective and objective, which is present\nin the active understanding\u2014while finite things and mental states\nare respectively one separated from the other, because there the\nunderstanding is only in potentiality\u2014is the highest point which\nspeculation can reach: and in it Aristotle reverts to his metaphysical\nprinciples (p. 147), where he termed self-thinking reason absolute\nThought, divine Understanding, or Mind in its absolute character. It\nis only in appearance that thought is spoken of as on a level with\nwhat is other than thought; this fashion of bringing what is different\ninto conjunction certainly appears in Aristotle. But what he says of\nthought is explicitly and absolutely speculative, and is not on the\nsame level with anything else, such as sense-perception, which has only\npotentiality for thought. This fact is moreover involved, that reason\nis implicitly the true totality, but in that case thought is in truth\nthe activity which is independent and absolute existence; that is,\nthe thought of Thought, which is determined thus abstractly, but which\nconstitutes the nature of absolute mind explicitly. These are the main\npoints which are to be taken note of in Aristotle with regard to his\nspeculative ideas, which it is impossible for us, however, to treat in\ngreater detail.\n\nWe have now to pass on to what follows, which is a practical\nphilosophy, and in doing so we must first establish firmly the\nconception of desire, which is really the turning round of thought into\nits negative side, wherein it becomes practical. Aristotle (De Anima,\nIII. 7 and 6) says: \u201cThe object of knowledge and active knowledge are\none and the same; what is in potentiality is in the individual prior in\npoint of time, although not so in itself. For all that comes into being\noriginates from that which operates actively. The object perceived\nby sense appears as that which causes the faculty of perception in\npotentiality to become the faculty of perception in actuality, for the\nlatter is not receptive of influence, and does not undergo change. On\nthat account it has a different kind of movement from the ordinary, for\nmovement, as we have seen (p. 163) is the activity of an unaccomplished\nend (\u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u1f00\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2); pure activity (\u1f01\u03c0\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1), on the\ncontrary, is that of the accomplished end (\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd).\u201d\u2014\u201cThe\nsimple thoughts of the soul are such that in regard to them there\ncan be no falsity; but that in which there is falsity or truth is a\ncombination of thoughts as constituting one conception; for example,\n\u2018the diameter is incommensurate.\u2019 Or if by mistake white has been\nstated to be not white, not-white has been brought into connection with\nit. All this process may, however, just as well be termed separation.\nBut that which makes everything one is reason, which in the form of its\nthinking thinks the undivided in undivided time and with the undivided\naction of the soul.\u201d\u2014\u201cSense-perception resembles simple assertion and\nthought, but pleasant or unpleasant sense-perception has the relation\nof affirmation or negation,\u201d therefore of the positive and negative\ndetermination of thought. \u201cAnd to perceive the pleasant or unpleasant\nis to employ the activity\u201d (spontaneity) \u201cof the middle state of\nsense-perception upon good or evil, in so far as they are such. But\ndesire and aversion are the same in energy; it is only in manifestation\nthat they are different. To the reasoning soul pictorial conceptions\ntake the place of sense-perceptions, and when the mind affirms or\ndenies something to be good or bad, it desires or avoids its object.\nIt has the relation both of unity and limit. The understanding,\u201d as\nthat which determines opposites, \u201crecognizes the forms underlying\npictorial conceptions; and in the same manner as what is desirable in\nthem and what is to be avoided have been determined for it, so it also\nis determined independently of actual sense-perceptions when it is in\nmental conceptions. And when, in dealing with conception or thought,\nas if seeing them, it compares the future with the present and passes\njudgment accordingly, and determines what is pleasant or unpleasant in\nthis respect; it desires or seeks to avoid it, and in general it finds\nitself in practical operation. But independently of action true and\nfalse are of the same character as good or evil.\u201d\n\n\nb. PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.\n\nFrom this the conception of will, or the practical element is shown to\nus, and it has to be reckoned as still belonging to the Philosophy of\nMind. Aristotle has treated it in several works which we now possess.\n\n\n\u03b1. ETHICS.\n\nWe have three great ethical works: the Nicomachean Ethics (\u1f28\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70\n\u039d\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bc\u03ac\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1) in ten books, the Magna Moralia (\u1f28\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03ac\u03bb\u03b1) in two\nbooks, and the Eudemean Ethics (\u1f28\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 \u0395\u1f50\u03b4\u03ae\u03bc\u03b9\u03b1) in seven books; the\nlast deals for the most part with particular virtues, while in the\nfirst two general investigations on the principles are contained. Just\nas the best that we even now possess in reference to psychology is what\nwe have obtained from Aristotle, so is it with his reflections on the\nactual agent in volition, on freedom, and the further determinations of\nimputation, intention, &c. We must simply give ourselves the trouble to\nunderstand these, and to translate them into our own form of speech,\nconception and thought; and this is certainly difficult. Aristotle\nfollows the same course here as in his Physics, determining one\nafter the other, in the most thorough and accurate fashion, the many\nmoments which appear in desire: the purpose, the decision, voluntary\nor forced action, the act of ignorance, guilt, moral responsibility,\n&c. I cannot enter upon this somewhat psychological presentation of\nthe subject.[102] I shall only make the following remarks on the\nAristotelian definitions.\n\nAristotle[103] defines the principle of morality or the highest good,\nas happiness (\u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1), which later on became a much disputed\nexpression. It is good generally, not as abstract idea, but in such\na way that the moment of realization is what actually answers to it.\nAristotle thus does not content himself with the Platonic idea of the\ngood, because it is only general; with him the question is taken in\nits determinateness. Aristotle then says that the good is what has its\nend in itself (\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd). If we tried to translate \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd by \u201cperfect\u201d\nhere, we should translate it badly; it is that which, as having its end\n(\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2) in itself, is not desired for the sake of anything else,\nbut for its own sake (_supra_, pp. 162, 201). Aristotle determines\nhappiness in this regard as the absolute end existing in and for\nitself, and gives the following definition of it: It is \u201cthe energy\nof the life that has its end in itself in accordance with absolute\nvirtue (\u03b6\u03c9\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u0313 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd).\u201d He makes rational insight\nan essential condition; all action arising from sensuous desires, or\nfrom lack of freedom generally, indicates lack of insight; it is an\nirrational action, or an action which does not proceed from thought as\nsuch. But the absolute rational activity is alone knowledge, the action\nwhich in itself satisfies itself, and this is hence divine happiness;\nwith the other virtues, on the contrary, only human happiness is\nobtained, just as from a theoretic point of view feeling is finite as\ncompared with divine thought. Aristotle goes on to say much that is\ngood and beautiful about virtue and the good and happiness in general,\nand states that happiness, as the good attainable by us, is not to be\nfound without virtue, &c.; in all of which there is no profound insight\nfrom a speculative point of view.\n\nIn regard to the conception of virtue I should like to say something\nmore. From a practical point of view, Aristotle[104] first of all\ndistinguishes in soul a rational and an irrational side; in the latter\nreason only exists potentially; under it come the feelings, passions\nand affections. On the rational side understanding, wisdom, discretion,\nknowledge, have their place; but they still do not constitute virtue,\nwhich first subsists in the unity of the rational and the irrational\nsides. When the inclinations are so related to virtue that they carry\nout its dictates, this, according to Aristotle, is virtue. When the\nperception is either bad or altogether lacking, but the heart is good,\ngoodwill may be there, but not virtue, because the principle\u2014that is\nreason\u2014which is essential to virtue, is wanting. Aristotle thus places\nvirtue in knowledge, yet reason is not, as many believe, the principle\nof virtue purely in itself, for it is rather the rational impulse\ntowards what is good; both desire and reason are thus necessary\nmoments in virtue. Hence it cannot be said of virtue that it is\nmisemployed, for it itself is the employer. Thus Aristotle, as we have\nalready seen (Vol. I. pp. 412-414), blames Socrates, because he places\nvirtue in perception alone. There must be an irrational impulse towards\nwhat is good, but reason comes in addition as that which judges and\ndetermines the impulse; yet when a beginning from virtue has been made,\nit does not necessarily follow that the passions are in accordance,\nsince often enough they are quite the reverse. Thus in virtue, because\nit has realization as its aim, and pertains to the individual, reason\nis not the solitary principle; for inclination is the force that\nimpels, the particular, which as far as the practical side of the\nindividual subject is concerned, is what makes for realization. But\nthen the subject must, in this separation of his activity, bring\nlikewise his passions under the subjection of the universal, and this\nunity, in which the rational is pre-eminent, is virtue. This is the\ncorrect determination; on the one hand this definition is opposed to\nthese ideals of the utter subjection of the passions, by which men\nare guided from their youth up, and, on the other, it is opposed to\nthe point of view that declares desires to be good in themselves.\nBoth these extreme views have been frequent in modern times, just as\nsometimes we hear that the man who by nature is beauteous and noble, is\nbetter than he who acts from duty; and then it is said that duty must\nbe performed as duty, without taking into account the particular point\nof view as a moment of the whole.\n\nAristotle then passes through the particular virtues at great length.\nBecause the virtues, considered as the union of the desiring or\nrealizing with the rational, have an illogical moment within them,\nAristotle places[105] their principle on the side of feeling in\na mean, so that virtue is the mean between two extremes; _e.g._\nliberality is the mean between avarice and prodigality; gentleness\nbetween passion and passive endurance; bravery between rashness and\ncowardice; friendship between egotism and self-effacement, &c. For the\ngood, and specially that good which has to do with the senses, which\nwould suffer if affected to an excessive degree (_supra_, p. 195), is\ntherefore a mean, just because the sensuous is an ingredient in it.\nThis does not appear to be a sufficient definition, and it is merely\na quantitative determination, just because it is not only the Notion\nthat determines, but the empirical side is also present. Virtue is not\nabsolutely determined in itself, but likewise has a material element,\nthe nature of which is capable of a more or a less. Thus if it has been\nobjected to Aristotle\u2019s definition of virtue as a difference in degree,\nthat it is unsatisfactory and vague, we may say that this really is\ninvolved in the nature of the thing. Virtue, and determinate virtue in\nits entirety, enters into a sphere where that which is quantitative has\na place; thought here is no more as such at home with itself, and the\nquantitative limit undetermined. The nature of particular virtues is\nof such a kind, that they are capable of no more exact determination;\nthey can only be spoken of in general, and for them there is no further\ndetermination than just this indefinite one.[106] But in our way of\nlooking at things, duty is something absolutely existent in itself, and\nnot a mean between existent extremes through which it is determined;\nbut this universal likewise results in being empty, or rather\nundetermined, while that determinate content is a moment of being that\nimmediately involves us in conflicting duties. It is in practice that\nman seeks a necessity in man as individual, and endeavours to express\nit; but it is either formal, or as in particular virtues, a definite\ncontent, which, in so being, falls a prey to empiricism.\n\n\n\u03b2. POLITICS.\n\nWe have still to speak of Aristotle\u2019s Politics; he was conscious more\nor less that the positive substance, the necessary organization and\nrealization of practical spirit, is the state, which is actualized\nthrough subjective activity, so that this last finds in it its\ndetermination and end. Aristotle hence also looks on political\nphilosophy as the sum total of practical philosophy, the end of the\nstate as general happiness. \u201cAll science and all capacity (\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2),\u201d\nhe says (Magn. Mor. I. 1), \u201chave an end, and this is the good: the\nmore excellent they are, the more excellent is their end; but the most\nexcellent capacity is the political, and hence its end is also the\ngood.\u201d Of Ethics Aristotle recognizes that it indubitably also applies\nto the individual, though its perfection is attained in the nation as\na whole. \u201cEven if the highest good is the same for an individual and\nfor a whole state, it would yet surely be greater and more glorious\nto win and maintain it for a state; to do this for an individual were\nmeritorious, but to do it for a nation and for whole states were more\nnoble and godlike still. Such is the object of practical science, and\nthis pertains in a measure to politics.\u201d[107]\n\nAristotle indeed appreciates so highly the state, that he starts at\nonce (Polit. I. 2) by defining man as \u201ca political animal, having\nreason. Hence he alone has a knowledge of good and evil, of justice\nand injustice, and not the beast,\u201d for the beast does not think, and\nyet in modern times men rest the distinction which exists in these\ndeterminations on sensation, which beasts have equally with men.\nThere is also the sense of good and evil, &c., and Aristotle knows\nthis aspect as well (_supra_, p. 202); but that through which it is\nnot animal sensation merely, is thought. Hence rational perception\nis also to Aristotle the essential condition of virtue, and thus the\nharmony between the sensational point of view and that of reason is\nan essential moment in his eud\u00e6monism. After Aristotle so determines\nman, he says: \u201cThe common intercourse of these, forms the family and\nthe state; in the understanding, however, that the state, in the order\nof nature\u201d (_i.e._ in its Notion, in regard to reason and truth, not\nto time) \u201cis prior to the family\u201d (the natural relation, not the\nrational) \u201cand to the individual among us.\u201d Aristotle does not place\nthe individual and his rights first, but recognizes the state as what\nin its essence is higher than the individual and the family, for the\nvery reason that it constitutes their substantiality. \u201cFor the whole\nmust be prior to its parts. If, for example, you take away the whole\nbody, there is not a foot or hand remaining, excepting in name, and as\nif anyone should call a hand of stone a hand; for a hand destroyed is\nlike a hand of stone.\u201d If the man is dead, all the parts perish. \u201cFor\neverything is defined according to its energy and inherent powers, so\nthat when these no longer remain such as they were, it cannot be said\nthat anything is the same excepting in name. The state is likewise\nthe essence of the individuals; the individual when separate from the\nwhole, is just as little complete in himself as any other organic part\nseparated from the whole.\u201d This is directly antagonistic to the modern\nprinciple in which the particular will of the individual, as absolute,\nis made the starting-point; so that all men by giving their votes,\ndecide what is to be the law, and thereby a commonweal is brought into\nexistence. But with Aristotle, as with Plato, the state is the _prius_,\nthe substantial, the chief, for its end is the highest in respect\nof the practical. \u201cBut whoever was incapable of this society, or so\ncomplete in himself as not to want it, would be either a beast or a\ngod.\u201d\n\nFrom these few remarks it is clear that Aristotle could not have\nhad any thought of a so-called natural right (if a natural right be\nwanted), that is, the idea of the abstract man outside of any actual\nrelation to others. For the rest, his Politics contain points of view\neven now full of instruction for us, respecting the inward elements\nof a state,[108] and a description of the various constitutions;[109]\nthe latter, however, has no longer the same interest, on account of\nthe different principle at the base of ancient and modern states. No\nland was so rich as Greece, alike in the number of its constitutions,\nand in the frequent changes from one to another of these in a single\nstate; but the Greeks were still unacquainted with the abstract right\nof our modern states, that isolates the individual, allows of his\nacting as such, and yet, as an invisible spirit, holds all its parts\ntogether. This is done in such a way, however, that in no one is there\nproperly speaking either the consciousness of, or the activity for\nthe whole; but because the individual is really held to be a person,\nand all his concern is the protection of his individuality, he works\nfor the whole without knowing how. It is a divided activity in which\neach has only his part, just as in a factory no one makes a whole, but\nonly a part, and does not possess skill in other departments, because\nonly a few are employed in fitting the different parts together. It is\nfree nations alone that have the consciousness of and activity for the\nwhole; in modern times the individual is only free for himself as such,\nand enjoys citizen freedom alone\u2014in the sense of that of a _bourgeois_\nand not of a _citoyen_. We do not possess two separate words to mark\nthis distinction. The freedom of citizens in this signification is\nthe dispensing with universality, the principle of isolation; but it\nis a necessary moment unknown to ancient states. It is the perfect\nindependence of the points, and therefore the greater independence of\nthe whole, which constitutes the higher organic life. After the state\nreceived this principle into itself, the higher freedom could come\nforth. These other states are sports and products of nature which\ndepend upon chance and upon the caprice of the individual, but now, for\nthe first time, the inward subsistence and indestructible universality,\nwhich is real and consolidated in its parts, is rendered possible.\n\nAristotle for the rest has not tried like Plato to describe such a\nstate, but in respect of the constitution he merely points out that the\nbest must rule. But this always takes place, let men do as they will,\nand hence he has not so very much to do with determining the forms of\nthe constitution. By way of proving that the best must rule, Aristotle\nsays this: \u201cThe best would suffer injustice if rated on an equality\nwith the others inferior to them in virtue and political abilities, for\na notable man is like a god amongst men.\u201d Here Alexander is no doubt\nin Aristotle\u2019s mind, as one who must rule as though he were a god, and\nover whom no one, and not even law, could maintain its supremacy. \u201cFor\nhim there is no law, for he himself is law. Such a man could perhaps\nbe turned out of the state, but not subjected to control any more than\nJupiter. Nothing remains but, what is natural to all, quietly to submit\nto such an one, and to let men like this be absolutely and perpetually\n(\u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9) kings in the states\u201d[110] The Greek Democracy had then\nentirely fallen into decay, so that Aristotle could no longer ascribe\nto it any merit.\n\n\n4. THE LOGIC.\n\nOn the other side of the Philosophy of Mind, we have still Aristotle\u2019s\nscience of abstract thought, a Logic, to consider. For hundreds and\nthousands of years it was just as much honoured as it is despised now.\nAristotle has been regarded as the originator of Logic: his logical\nworks are the source of, and authority for the logical treatises of all\ntimes; which last were, in great measure, only special developments\nor deductions, and must have been dull, insipid, imperfect, and purely\nformal. And even in quite recent times, Kant has said that since the\nage of Aristotle, logic\u2014like pure geometry since Euclid\u2019s day\u2014has\nbeen a complete and perfect science which has kept its place even\ndown to the present day, without attaining to any further scientific\nimprovements or alteration. Although logic is here mentioned for the\nfirst time, and in the whole of the history of Philosophy that is to\ncome no other can be mentioned (for no other has existed, unless we\ncount the negation of Scepticism), we cannot here speak more precisely\nof its content, but merely find room for its general characterization.\nThe forms he gives to us come from Aristotle both in reference to the\nNotion and to the judgment and conclusion. As in natural history,\nanimals, such as the unicorn, mammoth, beetle, mollusc, &c., are\nconsidered, and their nature described, so Aristotle is, so to speak,\nthe describer of the nature of these spiritual forms of thought; but in\nthis inference of the one from the other, Aristotle has only presented\nthought as defined in its finite application and aspect, and his logic\nis thus a natural history of finite thought. Because it is a knowledge\nand consciousness of the abstract activity of pure understanding, it is\nnot a knowledge of this and that concrete fact, being pure form. This\nknowledge is in fact marvellous, and even more marvellous is the manner\nin which it is constituted: this logic is hence a work which does the\ngreatest honour to the deep thought of its discoverer and to the power\nof his abstraction. For the greatest cohesive power in thought is found\nin separating it from what is material and thus securing it; and the\nstrength shows itself almost more, if thus secured when it, amalgamated\nwith matter, turns about in manifold ways and is seen to be capable\nof numberless alterations and applications. Aristotle also considers,\nin fact, not only the movement of thought, but likewise of thought\nin ordinary conception. The Logic of Aristotle is contained in five\nbooks, which are collected together under the name \u1f48\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n_a._ The Categories (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03b9), of which the first work treats, are\nthe universal determinations, that which is predicated of existent\nthings (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9): as well that which we call conceptions of the\nunderstanding, as the simple realities of things. This may be called\nan ontology, as pertaining to metaphysics; hence these determinations\nalso appear in Aristotle\u2019s Metaphysics. Aristotle (Categor. I.) now\nsays: \u201cThings are termed homonyms (\u1f41\u03bc\u03ce\u03bd\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1) of which the name alone is\ncommon, but which have a different substantial definition (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2); thus a horse and the picture of a horse are both called an\nanimal.\u201d\n\nThus the Notion (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2) is opposed to the homonym; and since Aristotle\ndeduces herefrom \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1, of which the second chapter treats, it is\nclear that this last expression indicates more than mere predication,\nand is here to be taken as determinate Notions. \u201cDeterminate\nconceptions are either enunciated after a complex (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u03ba\u03ae\u03bd)\nor after an incomplex manner (\u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u03ba\u1fc6\u03c2); the first as \u2018a man\nconquers,\u2019 \u2018the ox runs,\u2019 and the other as \u2018man,\u2019 \u2018ox,\u2019 \u2018to conquer,\u2019\n\u2018to run.\u2019\u201d In the first rank of this division Aristotle places \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1,\nwhich are undoubtedly purely subjective relations of such as exist\n_per se_, so that the relation is not in them but external to them.\nNow although \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 and \u03c4\u1f70 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 are again distinguished from one\nanother, Aristotle yet again employs both \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, and \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af of the\n\u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, so that \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 is predicated of a species, in relation to its\nparticular; \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af is, on the contrary, employed of a universal, which\nis not Idea but only simple. For Aristotle says, \u201cThere are predicates\n(\u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1) which can be assigned to a certain subject (\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u0313 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd),\nyet are in no subject, as \u2018man\u2019 is predicated of \u2018some certain man,\u2019\nand yet he is no particular man. Others are in a subject (\u1f10\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1ff3\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af) yet are not predicated of any subject (I mean by a thing being\nin a subject, that it is in any thing not as a part, but as unable\nto subsist without that in which it is), as \u2018a grammatical art\u2019 (\u03c4\u1f76\u03c2\n\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae) is in a subject, \u2018the soul,\u2019 but cannot be predicated\nof any,\u2019 or related as genus to a subject. Some are predicated of\na subject (\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9) and are in it; science is in the soul and is\npredicated of the grammatical art. Some again are neither in, nor are\npredicated of any subject, as \u2018a certain man,\u2019 the individual, the\none in number; but some of them can be in a subject like \u2018a certain\ngrammatical art.\u2019\u201d Instead of subject we should do better to speak of\nsubstratum, for it is that to which the Notion necessarily relates,\n_i.e._ that which is neglected in abstraction, and thus the individual\nopposed to the Notion. We can see that Aristotle has the difference of\nthe genus or universal and the individual present to his mind.\n\nThe first thing which Aristotle has indicated in the foregoing is thus\nthe genus, which is predicated of a man, but which is not in him, at\nleast not as a particular quality; the brave man, for example, is an\nactual, but expressed as a universal conception. In formal logic and\nits conceptions and definitions there is always present opposition\nto an actual; and the logical actual is in itself something thought,\nbravery thus being, for example, a pure form of abstraction. This logic\nof the understanding seeks, however, in its three stages to imitate the\ncategories of the absolute. The conception or definition is a logical\nactual, and thus in itself merely something thought, _i.e._ possible.\nIn the judgment this logic calls a conception A the actual subject\nand connects with it another actual as the conception B; B is said to\nbe the conception and A to be dependent on it\u2014but B is only the more\ngeneral conception. In the syllogism necessity is said to be simulated:\neven in a judgment there is a synthesis of a conception and something\nwhose existence is assumed; in the syllogism it should bear the form\nof necessity, because both the opposites are set forth in a third\nas through the _medius terminus_ of reason, _e.g._ as was the case\nwith the mean of virtue (_supra_, p. 206). The major term expresses\nlogical being and the minor term logical potentiality, for Caius is a\nmere potentiality for logic; the conclusion unites both. But it is to\nreason that life first unfolds itself, for it is true reality. What\ncomes second in Aristotle is the universal, which is not the genus,\n_i.e._ it is not in itself the unity of universal and particular\u2014nor\nis it absolute individuality and hence infinitude. This is the moment\nor predicate in a subject certainly, but it is not absolutely in and\nfor itself. This relation is now expressed through \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9; for \u1f45\n\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 is that which, as universal in itself, is likewise infinite.\nThe third is the particular which is predicated: just as science in\nitself is infinite and thus the genus, _e.g._ of the grammatical\nart; but at the same time as universal, or as not individual, it is\nthe moment of a subject. The fourth indicated by Aristotle is what\nis called immediate conception\u2014the individual. The reservation that\nsomething such as a definite grammatical art is also in a subject, has\nno place here, for the definite grammatical art is not really in itself\nindividual.\n\nAristotle, himself,[111] makes the following remarks on this matter:\n\u201cWhen one thing is predicated (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9) of another, as of a\nsubject, whatever things are said (\u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9) of the predicate,\u201d _i.e._\nwhat is related to it as a universal, \u201cmay be also said of the\nsubject.\u201d This is the ordinary conclusion; from this we see, since\nthis matter is so speedily despatched, that the real conclusion has\nwith Aristotle a much greater significance. \u201cThe different genera not\narranged under one another (\u03bc\u1f74 \u1f51\u03c0\u0313 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bc\u03bb\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1), such as \u2018animal\u2019\nand \u2018science,\u2019 differ in their species (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03ac\u03c2). For instance,\nanimals are divided into beasts, bird, fishes\u2014but science has no such\ndistinction. In subordinate genera, however, there may be the same\ndistinctions; for the superior genera are predicated of the inferior,\nso that as many distinctions as there are of the predicate, so many\nwill there be of the subject.\u201d\n\nAfter Aristotle had thus far spoken of what is enunciated respecting\nthat which is connected, or the complex, he now comes to \u201cthat which\nis predicated without any connection,\u201d or the incomplex; for as we\nsaw (p. 212) this was the division which he laid down in the second\nchapter. That which is predicated without any connection he treats\nof more fully as the categories proper, in what follows; yet the\nwork in which these categories are laid down is not to be regarded\nas complete. Aristotle[112] takes ten of them; \u201cEach conception\nenunciated signifies either Substance (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd), or Quality (\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd), or\nQuantity (\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03cc\u03bd),\u201d matter, \u201cor Relation (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9), or Where (\u03c0\u03bf\u1fe6), or\nWhen (\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad), or Position (\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9), or Possession (\u1f15\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd), or Action\n(\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd), or Passion (\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd). None of these is considered by itself\nan affirmation (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) or a negation (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), _i.e._ none\nis either true or false.\u201d Aristotle adds to these predicables five\npost predicaments, but he only ranges them all side by side.[113] The\ncategories of relation are the syntheses of quality and quantity, and\nconsequently they belonged to reason; but in as far as they are posited\nas mere relation, they belong to the understanding and are forms of\nfinitude. Being, essence, takes the first place in them; next to it\nis possibility, as accident or what is caused; the two are, however,\nseparated. In substance A is Being, B, potentiality; in the relation\nof causality A and B are Being, but A is posited in B as being posited\nin a postulation of A. A of substance is logical Being; it is its\nessence opposed to its existence, and this existence is in logic mere\npotentiality. In the category of causality the Being of A in B is a\nmere Being of reflection; B is for itself another. But in reason A is\nthe Being of B as well as of A, and A is the whole Being of A as well\nas of B.\n\nAristotle[114] goes on to speak of Substance; first Substance, \u201cin\nits strictest (\u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03b9\u03ce\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1), first and chief sense\u201d is to him the\nindividual, the fourth class of the divisions enunciated above (pp.\n212-214). \u201cSecondary substances are those in which as species (\u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9)\nthese first are contained, that is to say, both these and the genera\nof these species. Of the subject both name and definition (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2) of\nall things predicated of a subject (\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u0313 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd)\u2014of\nsecondary substances\u2014are predicated; for example of the particular\nman, as subject, both the name and the definition of \u2018man\u2019 (living\nbeing) are also predicated. But of things which are in a subject (\u1f10\u03bd\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1ff3 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2) it is impossible to predicate the definition of\nthe\u201d subordinate \u201csubjects, yet with some we predicate the name: the\ndefinition of \u2018whiteness\u2019 thus is not of the body in which it is, but\nonly the name. All other things however,\u201d besides Definition (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2)\nand \u201cin most cases name, are related to primary substances as subjects\u201d\n(the individual), \u201cor are inherent in them. Thus without the primary\nsubstances none of the rest could exist, for they are the basis\n(\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9) of all else. Of secondary substances, species is more\nsubstance than genus; for it is nearer to the primary substance, and\ngenus is predicated of the species and not the other way.\u201d For species\nis here the subject, or what does not always require to be something\nreally determined as individual, but which also signifies that which\nis generally speaking subordinate. \u201cBut the species are not more\nsubstance one than another, just as in primary substances one is not\nmore substance than the other. Species and genera are likewise, before\nthe rest\u201d (qualities or accidents) \u201cto be called secondary substances:\nthe definition \u2018man\u2019 before the fact that he is \u2018white\u2019 or \u2018runs.\u2019\u201d\nAbstraction has thus two kinds of objects; \u2018man\u2019 and \u2018learned\u2019 are both\nqualities of a certain individual; but the former only abstracts from\nthe individuality and leaves the totality, and is thus the elevation\nof the individual into the rational, where nothing is lost but the\nopposition of reflection. \u201cWhat is true of substances is also true\nof differences; for as synonyms (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ce\u03bd\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1) they have both name and\ndefinition in common.\u201d\n\n_b._ The second treatise is on Interpretation (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f11\u03c1\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2); it is\nthe doctrine of judgments and propositions. Propositions exist where\naffirmation and negation, falsehood and truth are enunciated;[115] they\ndo not relate to pure thought when reason itself thinks; they are not\nuniversal but individual.\n\n_c._ The Analytics come third, and there are two parts of them, the\nPrior and the Posterior; they deal most fully with proof (\u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03be\u03b9\u03c2)\nand the syllogisms of the understanding. \u201cThe syllogism is a reason\n(\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2) in which if one thing is maintained, another than what was\nmaintained follows of necessity.\u201d[116] Aristotle\u2019s logic has treated\nthe general theory of conclusions in the main very accurately, but\nthey do not by any means constitute the universal form of truth; in\nhis metaphysics, physics, psychology, &c., Aristotle has not formed\nconclusions, but thought the Notion in and for itself.\n\n_d._ The Topics (\u03c4\u03bf\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03ac) which treat of \u2018places\u2019 (\u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9) come fourth;\nin them the points of view from which anything can be considered are\nenumerated. Cicero and Giordano Bruno worked this out more fully.\nAristotle gives a large number of general points of view which can\nbe taken of an object, a proposition or a problem; each problem can\nbe directly reduced to these different points of view, that must\neverywhere appear. Thus these \u2018places\u2019 are, so to speak, a system of\nmany aspects under which an object can be regarded in investigating it;\nthis constitutes a work which seems specially suitable and requisite\nfor the training of orators and for ordinary conversation, because the\nknowledge of points of view at once places in our hands the possibility\nof arriving at the various aspects of a subject, and embracing its\nwhole extent in accordance with these points of view (Vol. I. p. 358).\nThis, according to Aristotle, is the function of Dialectic, which he\ncalls an instrument for finding propositions and conclusions out of\nprobabilities.[117] Such \u2018places\u2019 are either of a general kind, such\nas difference, similarity, opposition, relation, and comparison,[118]\nor special in nature, such as \u2018places\u2019 which prove that something is\nbetter or more to be desired, since in it we have the longer duration\nof time, that which the one wise man or several would choose, the\ngenus as against the species, that which is desirable for itself;\nalso because it is present with the more honourable, because it is\nend, what approximates to end, the more beautiful and praiseworthy,\n&c.[119] Aristotle (Topic VIII. 2) says that we must make use of the\nsyllogism by preference, with the dialectician, but of induction with\nthe multitude. In the same way Aristotle separates[120] the dialectic\nand demonstrative syllogisms from the rhetorical and every kind of\npersuasion, but he counts induction as belonging to what is rhetorical.\n\n_e._ The fifth treatise, finally, deals with the Sophistical Elenchi\n(\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76 \u1f14\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03c7\u03bf\u03b9), or \u2018On Refutations,\u2019 as in the unconscious\nescape of thought in its categories to the material side of popular\nconception, it arrives at constant contradiction with itself. The\nsophistical elenchi betray the unconscious ordinary idea into these\ncontradictions, and make it conscious of them, in order to entrap and\npuzzle it; they were mentioned by us in connection with Zeno, and the\nSophists sought them out, but it was the Megarics who were specially\nstrong in them. Aristotle goes through a number of such contradictions\nby the way of solving them; in so doing he proceeds quietly and\ncarefully, and spares no pains, though they might have been made more\ndramatic. We have before (Vol. I. pp. 456-459) found specimens of these\nin treating of the Megarics, and we have seen how Aristotle solves such\ncontradictions through distinction and determination.\n\nOf these five parts of the Aristotelian Organon, what is produced in\nour ordinary systems of logic is, as a matter of fact, of the slightest\nand most trivial description, consisting as it does mainly of what\nis contained in the introduction of Porphyry. More particularly in\nthe first parts, in the Interpretation and in the Analytics, this\nAristotelian logic contains these representations of universal forms\nof thought, such as are now dealt with in ordinary logic, and really\nform the basis of what in modern times is known as logic. Aristotle has\nrendered a never-ending service in having recognized and determined\nthe forms which thought assumes within us. For what interests us\nis the concrete thought immersed as it is in externalities; these\nforms constitute a net of eternal activity sunk within it, and the\noperation of setting in their places those fine threads which are\ndrawn throughout everything, is a masterpiece of empiricism, and this\nknowledge is absolutely valuable. Even contemplation, or a knowledge of\nthe numerous forms and modes assumed by this activity, is interesting\nand important enough. For however dry and contentless the enumeration\nof the different kinds of judgments and conclusions, and their numerous\nlimitations may appear to us to be, and though they may not seem to\nserve their purpose of discovering the truth, at least no other\nscience in opposition to this one can be elevated into its place. For\ninstance, if it is held to be a worthy endeavour to gain a knowledge\nof the infinite number of animals, such as one hundred and sixty-seven\nkinds of cuckoo, in which one may have the tuft on his head differently\nshaped from another, or to make acquaintance with some miserable new\nspecies of a miserable kind of moss which is no better than a scab, or\nwith an insect, vermin, bug, &c., in some learned work on entomology,\nit is much more important to be acquainted with the manifold kinds of\nmovement present in thought, than to know about such creatures. The\nbest of what is stated respecting the forms of judgment, conclusion,\n&c., in ordinary logic, is taken from the works of Aristotle; as far as\ndetails are concerned, much has been spun out and added to it, but the\ntruth is to be found with Aristotle.\n\nAs regards the real philosophic nature of the Aristotelian logic, it\nhas received in our text-books a position and significance as though\nit gave expression only to the activity of the understanding as\nconsciousness; hence it is said to direct us how to think correctly.\nThus it appears as though the movement of thought were something\nindependent, unaffected by the object of thought; in other words, as\nif it contained the so-called laws of thought of our understanding,\nthrough which we attain to perception, but through a medium which was\nnot the movement of things themselves. The result must certainly be\ntruth, so that things are constituted as we bring them forth according\nto the laws of thought; but the manner of this knowledge has merely\na subjective significance, and the judgment and conclusion are not a\njudgment and conclusion of things themselves. Now if, according to\nthis point of view, thought is considered on its own account, it does\nnot make its appearance implicitly as knowledge, nor is it without\ncontent in and for itself; for it is a formal activity which certainly\nis exercised, but whose content is one given to it. Thought in this\nsense becomes something subjective; these judgments and conclusions\nare in and for themselves quite true, or rather correct\u2014this no one\never doubted; but because content is lacking to them, these judgments\nand conclusions do not suffice for the knowledge of the truth. Thus by\nlogicians they are held to be forms whose content is something entirely\ndifferent, because they have not even the form of the content; and the\nmeaning which is given to them\u2014namely that they are forms\u2014is found\nfault with. The worst thing said of them, however, is that their only\nerror is their being formal; both the laws of thought as such, and\nalso its determinations, the categories, are either determinations of\nthe judgment only, or merely subjective forms of the understanding,\nwhile the thing-in-itself is very different. But in that point of\nview and in the blame awarded the truth itself is missed, for untruth\nis the form of opposition between subject and object, and the lack\nof unity in them; in this case the question is not put at all as to\nwhether anything is absolutely true or not. These determinations\nhave certainly no empirical content, but thought and its movement\nis itself the content\u2014and, indeed, as interesting a content as any\nother that can be given; consequently this science of thought is on\nits own account a true science. But here again we come across the\ndrawback pertaining to the whole Aristotelian manner, as also to all\nsucceeding logic\u2014and that indeed in the highest degree\u2014that in thought\nand in the movement of thought as such, the individual moments fall\nasunder; there are a number of kinds of judgment and conclusion, each\nof which is held to be independent, and is supposed to have absolute\ntruth as such. Thus they are simply content, for they then have an\nindifferent, undistinguished existence, such as we see in the famous\nlaws of contradiction, conclusions, &c. In this isolation they have,\nhowever, no truth; for their totality alone is the truth of thought,\nbecause this totality is at once subjective and objective. Thus they\nare only the material of truth, the formless content; their deficiency\nis hence not that they are only forms but rather that form is lacking\nto them, and that they are in too great a degree content. Thus as many\nindividual qualities of a thing are not anything, such as red, hard,\n&c., if taken by themselves, but only in their unity constitute a real\nthing, so it is with the unity of the forms of judgment and conclusion,\nwhich individually have as little truth as such a quality, or as a\nrhythm or melody. The form of a conclusion, as also its content, may\nbe quite correct, and yet the conclusion arrived at may be untrue,\nbecause this form as such has no truth of its own; but from this\npoint of view these forms have never been considered, and the scorn\nof logic rests simply on the false assumption that there is a lack of\ncontent. Now this content is none other than the speculative Idea.\nConceptions of the understanding or of reason constitute the essence\nof things, not certainly for that point of view, but in truth; and\nthus also for Aristotle the conceptions of the understanding, namely\nthe categories, constitute the essential realities of Being. If they\nare thus in and for themselves true, they themselves are their own,\nand thus the highest content. But in ordinary logic this is not the\ncase, and even as these are represented in the Aristotelian works\nthey are only universal thought-determinations, between which the\nabstract understanding makes distinctions. This, however, is not the\nlogic of speculative thought, _i.e._ of reason as distinguished from\nunderstanding; for there the identity of the understanding which\nallows nothing to contradict itself is fundamental. However little\nthis logic of the finite may be speculative in nature, yet we must\nmake ourselves acquainted with it, for it is everywhere discovered in\nfinite relationships. There are many sciences, subjects of knowledge,\n&c., that know and apply no other forms of thought than these forms of\nfinite thought, which constitute in fact the general method of dealing\nwith the finite sciences. Mathematics, for instance, is a constant\nseries of syllogisms; jurisprudence is the bringing of the particular\nunder the general, the uniting together of both these sides. Within\nthese relationships of finite determinations the syllogism has now,\nindeed, on account of its terms being three in number, been called the\ntotality of these determinations, and hence by Kant (Kritik der reinen\nVernunft, p. 261) also the rational conclusion; but this syllogism\naddressed to the intelligence as it appears in the ordinary logical\nform, is only the intelligible form of rationality, and, as we saw\nabove (p. 76), is very different from the rational syllogism proper.\nAristotle is thus the originator of the logic of the understanding; its\nforms only concern the relationship of finite to finite, and in them\nthe truth cannot be grasped. But it must be remarked that Aristotle\u2019s\nphilosophy is not by any means founded on this relationship of the\nunderstanding; thus it must not be thought that it is in accordance\nwith these syllogisms that Aristotle has thought. If Aristotle did so,\nhe would not be the speculative philosopher that we have recognized him\nto be; none of his propositions could have been laid down, and he could\nnot have made any step forward, if he had kept to the forms of this\nordinary logic.\n\nLike the whole of Aristotle\u2019s philosophy, his logic really requires\nrecasting, so that all his determinations should be brought into a\nnecessary systematic whole\u2014not a systematic whole which is correctly\ndivided into its parts, and in which no part is forgotten, all being\nset forth in their proper order, but one in which there is one living\norganic whole, in which each part is held to be a part, and the whole\nalone as such is true. Aristotle, in the Politics, for instance\n(_supra_, pp. 207-208), often gives expression to this truth. For\nthis reason the individual logical form has in itself no truth, not\nbecause it is the form of thought, but because it is determinate\nthought, individual form, and to be esteemed as such. But as system\nand absolute form ruling this content, thought has its content as a\ndistinction in itself, being speculative philosophy in which subject\nand object are immediately identical, and the Notion and the universal\nare the realities of things. Just as duty certainly expresses the\nabsolute, but, as determinate, a determinate absolute which is only\na moment and must be able again to abrogate its determination, the\nlogical form which abrogates itself as this determinate in this very\nway gives up its claim to be in and for itself. But in this case logic\nis the science of reason, speculative philosophy of the pure Idea\nof absolute existence, which is not entangled in the opposition of\nsubject and object, but remains an opposition in thought itself. Yet we\ncertainly may allow that much in logic is an indifferent form.\n\nAt this point we would leave off as far as the Aristotelian philosophy\nis concerned, and from this it is difficult to break away. For the\nfurther we go into its details, the more interesting it becomes, and\nthe more do we find the connection which exists among the subjects.\nThe fulness with which I have set forth the principal content of the\nAristotelian philosophy is justified both by the importance of the\nmatter itself, because it offers to us a content of its own, and also\nby the circumstances already mentioned (p. 118), that against no\nphilosophy have modern times sinned so much as against this, and none\nof the ancient philosophers have so much need of being defended as\nAristotle.\n\nOne of the immediate followers of Aristotle was Theophrastus,\nborn Ol 102, 2 (371 B.C.); though a man of distinction, he can\nstill only be esteemed a commentator on Aristotle. For Aristotle\nis so rich a treasure-house of philosophic conceptions, that much\nmaterial is found in him which is ready for further working upon,\nwhich may be put forward more abstractly, and in which individual\npropositions may be brought into prominence. However Aristotle\u2019s\nmanner of procedure, which is to take an empirical starting point of\nratiocination [Raisonnement], and to comprehend this in the focus of\nthe speculative Notion, is characteristic of his mind, without being\none which, on its own account, can be freely elevated into a method\nand a principle. Thus of Theophrastus as of many others (Dic\u00e6archus\nof Messina, for instance), amongst whom Strato of Lampsacus, the\nsuccessor of Theophrastus, is best known, there is not much to tell.\nAs regards Dic\u00e6archus, Cicero says, (Tusc. Qu\u00e6st. I. 31, 10) that he\ncontroverted the immortality of the soul, for he asserted that \u201cthe\nsoul is no more than an empty name, and the whole of the capacities\nand powers with which we act and feel are equally extended over all\nliving bodies, and inseparable from the body; for it is nothing\nbut the body so constituted as to live and feel through a certain\nsymmetry and proportion in its body.\u201d Cicero gives in an historical\nmanner a result as he made it comprehensible to himself, without any\nspeculative conception. Stob\u00e6us (Eclog. phys. p. 796), on the other\nhand, quotes from Dic\u00e6archus that he held the soul to be \u201ca harmony of\nthe four elements.\u201d We have only a little general information to give\nof Strato, that he acquired great fame as a physicist, and that his\nconception of nature went upon mechanical lines, and yet not on those\nof Leucippus and Democritus, and later, of Epicurus; for, according to\nStob\u00e6us (Eclog. phys. p. 298), he made warmth and cold into elements.\nHence, if what is said of him is accurate, he was most unfaithful to\nthe beliefs of Aristotle, because he led everything back to mechanism\nand chance and did away with the immanent end, without accepting the\nfalse teleology of modern times. At least, Cicero (De nat. Deor. I. 13)\nrelates of him that he maintained that \u201cdivine strength lies altogether\nin nature, which has in itself the causes of origination, of growth,\nand of decay, but lacks all sensation and conformation.\u201d The other\nPeripatetics occupied themselves more with working up individual\ndoctrines of Aristotle, with bringing out his works in a commentated\nform, which is more or less rhetorical in character, though similar\nin content. But in practical life the Peripatetic school maintained\nas the principle of happiness, the unity of reason and inclination.\nWe thus may set aside any further expansion of the Peripatetic\nphilosophy, because it has no longer the same interest, and later on\ntended to become a popular philosophy (Vol. I. p. 479, Vol. II. p.\n130); in this mode it no longer remained an Aristotelian philosophy,\nalthough this, too, as what is really speculative, must coincide most\nclosely with actuality. This decay of the Aristotelian philosophy is,\nindeed, closely connected with the circumstance already mentioned (pp.\n126-128), that the Aristotelian writings soon disappeared, and that the\nAristotelian philosophy did not retain its place so much through these\ndocuments as through the traditions in the school, whereby they soon\nunderwent material changes; and amplifications of Aristotle\u2019s doctrines\nwere brought about, as to which it is not known whether some may not\nhave slipped into what pass for his works.\n\nSince Aristotle\u2019s leading thought has penetrated all spheres of\nconsciousness, and this isolation in the determination through the\nNotion, because it is likewise necessary, contains in every sphere\nthe profoundest of true thoughts, Aristotle, to anticipate here the\nexternal history of his philosophy as a whole, for many centuries\nwas the constant mainstay of the cultivation of thought. When in the\nChristian West science disappeared amongst the Christians, the fame\nof Aristotle shone forth with equal brilliance amongst the Arabians,\nfrom whom, in later times, his philosophy was again passed over to the\nWest. The triumph which was celebrated upon the revival of learning,\non account of the Aristotelian philosophy having been expelled from\nthe schools, from the sciences, and specially from theology, as from\nthe philosophy which deals with absolute existence, must be regarded\nin two different aspects. In the first place we must remember that\nit was not the Aristotelian philosophy which was expelled, so much\nas the principle of the science of theology which supported itself\nthereon, according to which the first truth is one which is given and\nrevealed\u2014an hypothesis which is once for all a fundamental one, and by\nwhich reason and thought have the right and power to move to and fro\nonly superficially. In this form the thought which was awakened in the\nMiddle Ages reconstructed its theology more especially, entered into\nall dialectic movements and determinations, and erected an edifice\nwhere the material that was given was only superficially worked up,\ndisposed and secured. The triumph over this system was thus a triumph\nover that principle, and consequently the triumph of free, spontaneous\nthought. But another side of this triumph is the triumph of the\ncommonplace point of view that broke free from the Notion and shook off\nthe yoke of thought. Formerly, and even nowadays, enough has been heard\nof Aristotle\u2019s scholastic subtleties; in using this name, men thought\nthat they had a right to spare themselves from entering on abstraction,\nand, in place of the Notion, they thought that it justified them\nin seeing, hearing, and thus making their escape to what is called\nhealthy human understanding. In science, too, in place of subtle\nthoughts, subtle sight has commenced; a beetle or a species of bird is\ndistinguished with as great minuteness as were formerly conceptions and\nthoughts. Such subtleties as whether a species of bird is red or green\nin colour, or has a more or less perfect tail, are found more easy than\nthe differences in thought; and in the meantime, until a people has\neducated itself up to the labour of thought, in order to be able thus\nto support the universal, the former is a useful preparation, or rather\nit is a moment in this course of culture.\n\nBut inasmuch as the deficiency in the Aristotelian philosophy rests in\nthe fact, that after the manifold of phenomena was through it raised\ninto the Notion, though this last again fell asunder into a succession\nof determinate Notions, the unity of the absolute Notion which unites\nthem was not emphasized, and this is what succeeding time had to\naccomplish. What now appears is that the unity of the Notion which is\nabsolute existence, makes its appearance as necessity, and it presents\nitself first as the unity of self-consciousness and consciousness, as\npure thought. The unity of existence as existence is objective unity,\nthought, as that which is thought. But unity, as Notion, the implicitly\nuniversal negative unity, time as absolutely fulfilled time, and in its\nfulfilment as being unity, is pure self-consciousness. Hence we see it\ncome to pass, that pure self-consciousness makes itself reality, but,\nat the same time, it first of all does so with subjective significance\nas a self-consciousness that has taken up its position as such, and\nthat separates itself from objective existence, and hence is first of\nall subject to a difference which it does not overcome.\n\nHere we have concluded the first division of Greek philosophy, and\nwe have now to pass to the second period. The first period of Greek\nphilosophy extended to Aristotle, to the attainment of a scientific\nform in which knowledge has reached the standing of free thought. Thus\nin Plato and Aristotle the result was the Idea; yet we saw in Plato\nthe universal made the principle in a somewhat abstract way as the\nunmoved Idea; in Aristotle, on the other hand, thought in activity\nbecame absolutely concrete as the thought which thinks itself. The next\nessential, one which now is immediately before us, must be contained in\nthat into which Philosophy under Plato and Aristotle had formed itself.\nThis necessity is none other than the fact that the universal must now\nbe proclaimed free for itself as the universality of the principle, so\nthat the particular may be recognized through this universal; or the\nnecessity of a systematic philosophy immediately enters in, what we\nformerly called one in accordance with the unity of the Notion. We\nmay speak of the Platonic and Aristotelian systems, but they are not\nin the form of a system; for that it is requisite that one principle\nshould be maintained and consistently carried through the particular.\nIn the perfect complex of the conception of the universe as it is\nto Aristotle, where everything is in the highest form of scientific\nknowledge led back to what is speculative, however empiric may be his\nmanner of setting to work, there certainly is one principle brought\nforward, and that a speculative one, though it is not brought forward\nas being one. The nature of the speculative has not been explicitly\nbrought to consciousness as the Notion\u2014as containing in itself the\ndevelopment of the manifold nature of the natural and spiritual\nuniverse, consequently it is not set forth as the universal, from which\nthe particular was developed. Aristotle\u2019s logic is really the opposite\nof this. He in great measure passes through a series of the living\nand the dead, makes them confront his objective, that is, conceiving\nthought, and grasps them in his understanding; each object is on its\nown account a conception which is laid open in its determinations,\nand yet he also brings these reflections together, and thereby is\nspeculative. If even Plato on the whole proceeded in an empiric way,\ntaking up this and that idea, each of which is in turn examined, with\nAristotle this loose method of procedure appears still more clearly. In\nthe Aristotelian teaching the Idea of the self-reflecting thought is\nthus grasped as the highest truth; but its realization, the knowledge\nof the natural and spiritual universe, constitutes outside of that\nIdea a long series of particular conceptions, which are external\nto one another, and in which a unifying principle, led through the\nparticular, is wanting. The highest Idea with Aristotle consequently\nonce more stands only as a particular in its own place and without\nbeing the principle of his whole philosophy. Hence the next necessity\nin Philosophy is that the whole extent of what is known must appear as\none organization of the Notion; that in this way the manifold reality\nmay be related to that Idea as the universal, and thereby determined.\nThis is the standpoint which we find in this second period.\n\nA systematic philosophy such as this becomes in the first place\ndogmatism, in antagonism to which, because of its one-sided character,\nscepticism immediately arises. In the same way the French call\nwhat is dogmatic _syst\u00e9matique_, and _syst\u00e8me_ that in which all\nthe conceptions must consistently proceed from one determination;\nhence to them _syst\u00e9matique_ is synonymous with one-sided. But the\nphilosophies that ensue are one-sided, because in them it was only the\nnecessity of one principle that was recognized, without their meanwhile\ndeveloping from themselves, as might well have come to pass in and\nfor itself, the Idea as the real universal, and thus comprehending\nthe world in such a way that the content is only grasped as the\ndetermination of the self-reflective thought. Hence this principle\nstands up formally and abstractly, and the particular is not yet\ndeduced from it, for the universal is only applied to the particular\nand the rules for this application sought out. In Aristotle the Idea\nis at least implicitly concrete, as the consciousness of the unity of\nsubjective and objective, and therefore it is not one-sided. Should\nthe Idea be truly concrete, the particular must be developed from\nit. The other relation would be the mere bringing of the particular\nunder the universal, so that both should be mutually distinguished;\nin such a case the universal is only a formal principle, and such a\nphilosophy is therefore one-sided. But the true difficulty is that the\ntwo endeavours, the development of the particular from the Idea, and\nthe bringing of the particular under the universal, collide with one\nanother. The manifestations of the physical and spiritual world must\nfirst, from their respective sides, be prepared for and worked into the\nNotion, so that the other sciences can form therefrom universal laws\nand principles. Then for the first time can speculative reason present\nitself in determinate thoughts, and bring perfectly to consciousness\nthe inwardly existing connection between them. As dogmatic, however,\nthose philosophies, it may be further said, are assertive likewise,\nbecause in such a method the principle is only asserted and is not\ntruly proved. For a principle is demanded under which everything is\nsubsumed; thus it is only pre-supposed as the first principle. Before\nthis we have had abstract principles such as pure Being, but here the\nparticular, with which begins the distinction from what is different,\nbecame posited as the purely negative. That necessity, on the other\nhand, makes for a universal which must likewise be in the particular,\nso that this should not be set aside, but should have its determinate\ncharacter through the universal.\n\nThis demand for a universal, even though still unproved principle,\nis henceforth present to knowledge. What answers to this demand\nnow appears in the world through the inward necessity of mind\u2014not\nexternally, but as being in conformity with the Notion. This necessity\nhas produced the philosophy of the Stoics, Epicureans, New Academy, and\nSceptics, which we have now to consider. If we have remained too long\nin the consideration of this period, we may now make amends for this\nprotraction, for in the next period we may be brief.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION TWO\n\nSECOND PERIOD: DOGMATISM AND SCEPTICISM.\n\n\nIN this second period, which precedes the Alexandrian philosophy, we\nhave to consider Dogmatism and Scepticism\u2014the Dogmatism which separates\nitself into the two philosophies, the Stoic and the Epicurean; and the\nthird philosophy, of which both partake and which yet differs from them\nboth, Scepticism. Along with this last we would take the New Academy,\nwhich has entirely merged in it\u2014while in the Older Academy, Plato\u2019s\nphilosophy indubitably still maintained its purity. We saw at the\nclose of the previous period the consciousness of the Idea, or of the\nUniversal, which is an end in itself\u2014a principle, universal indeed,\nbut at the same time determined in itself, which is thus capable of\nsubsuming the particular, and of being applied thereto. The application\nof universal to particular is here the relationship that prevails, for\nthe reflection that from the universal itself the separation of the\ntotality is developed, is not yet present. There always is in such a\nrelationship the necessity of a system and of systematization; that\nis to say, one determinate principle must consistently be applied to\nthe particular, so that the truth of all that is particular should be\ndetermined according to this abstract principle, and be at the same\ntime likewise recognized. Now since this is what we have in so-called\nDogmatism, it is a philosophizing of the understanding, in which\nPlato\u2019s and Aristotle\u2019s speculative greatness is no longer present.\n\nIn respect of this relationship, the task of Philosophy now comes to\nbe summed up in the twofold question which we spoke of earlier (Vol.\nI. pp. 474, 475), and which has regard to a criterion of truth and to\nthe wise man. At this point we may better than before, and also from a\ndifferent point of view, explain the necessity for this phenomenon. For\nbecause truth has now become conceived as the harmony of thought and\nreality, or rather as the identity of the Notion, as the subjective,\nwith the objective, the first question is what the universal principle\nfor judging and determining this harmony is; but a principle through\nwhich the true is judged (\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9) to be true, is simply the\ncriterion. Yet because this question had only been formally and\ndogmatically answered, the dialectic of Scepticism, or the knowledge of\nthe one-sidedness of this principle as a dogmatic principle, at once\nappeared. A further result of this mode of philosophizing is that the\nprinciple, as formal, is subjective, and consequently it has taken the\nreal significance of the subjectivity of self-consciousness. Because\nof the external manner in which the manifold is received, the highest\npoint, that in which thought finds itself in its most determinate\nform, is self-consciousness. The pure relation of self-consciousness\nto itself is thus the principle in all these philosophies, since in it\nalone does the Idea find satisfaction, just as the formalism of the\nunderstanding of the present so-called philosophizing seeks to find its\nfulfilment, the concrete which is opposed to this formalism, in the\nsubjective heart, in the inward feelings and beliefs. Nature and the\npolitical world are certainly also concrete, but externally concrete;\nthe arbitrary concrete is, on the other hand, not in the determinate\nuniversal Idea, but only in self-consciousness and as being personal.\nThe second ruling determination is consequently that of the wise men.\nNot reason alone, but everything must be something thought, that is,\nsubjectively speaking, my thought; that which is thought, on the\ncontrary, is only implicit, that is to say, it is itself objective\nin so far as it appears in the form of the formal identity of thought\nwith itself. The thought of the criterion as of the one principle\nis, in its immediate actuality, the subject itself; thought and the\nthinker are thus immediately connected. Because the principle of this\nphilosophy is not objective but dogmatic, and rests on the impulse of\nself-consciousness towards self-satisfaction, it is the subject whose\ninterests are to be considered. The subject seeks on its own account a\nprinciple for its freedom, namely, immovability in itself; it must be\nconformable to the criterion, _i.e._ to this quite universal principle,\nin order to be able to raise itself into this abstract independence.\nSelf-consciousness lives in the solitude of its thought, and finds\ntherein its satisfaction. These are the fundamental determinations in\nthe following philosophies: the exposition of their main principles\nwill come next, but to go into details is not advisable.\n\nAlthough, as no doubt is the case, these philosophies, as regards\ntheir origin, pertain to Greece, and their great teachers were\nalways Greeks, they were yet transferred to the Roman world; thus\nPhilosophy passed into the Roman world and these systems in particular\nconstituted under Roman rule the philosophy of the Roman world, in\nopposition to which world, unsuited as it was to the rational practical\nself-consciousness, this last, driven back into itself from external\nactuality, could only seek for reason in itself and could only care\nfor its individuality\u2014just as abstract Christians only care for their\nown salvation. In the bright Grecian world the individual attached\nhimself more to his state or to his world, and was more at home in\nit. The concrete morality, the impulse towards the introduction of\nthe principle into the world through the constitution of the state,\nwhich we see in Plato, the concrete science that we find in Aristotle,\nhere disappear. In the wave of adversity which came across the Roman\nworld, everything beautiful and noble in spiritual individuality\nwas rudely swept away. In this condition of disunion in the world,\nwhen man is driven within his inmost self, he has to seek the unity\nand satisfaction, no longer to be found in the world, in an abstract\nway. The Roman world is thus the world of abstraction, where one\ncold rule was extended over all the civilized world. The living\nindividualities of national spirit in the nations have been stifled\nand killed; a foreign power, as an abstract universal, has pressed\nhard upon individuals. In such a condition of dismemberment it was\nnecessary to fly to this abstraction as to the thought of an existent\nsubject, that is, to this inward freedom of the subject as such. As\nwhat was held in estimation was the abstract will of the individual\nruler of the world, the inward principle of thought also had to be an\nabstraction which could bring forth a formal, subjective reconciliation\nonly. A dogmatism erected on a principle made effectual through the\nform of the understanding could alone satisfy the Roman mind. These\nphilosophies are thus conformable to the spirit of the Roman world,\nas indeed Philosophy in general ever stands in close connection with\nthe world in its ordinary aspect (Vol. I. pp. 53, 54). The Roman world\nhas, indeed, produced a formal patriotism and corresponding virtue, as\nalso a developed system of law; but speculative philosophy could not\nproceed from such dead material\u2014we could only expect good advocates\nand the morality of a Tacitus. These philosophies, always excepting\nStoicism, also arose amongst the Romans in opposition to their ancient\nsuperstitions, just as now Philosophy comes forward in the place of\nreligion.\n\nThe three principles of Stoicism, Epicureanism and Scepticism are\nnecessary; in the first there is the principle of thought or of\nuniversality itself, but yet determined in itself; the abstract\nthought is here the determining criterion of the truth. There is\nopposed to thought, in the second place, the determinate as such, the\nprinciple of individuality, feeling generally, sensuous perception and\nobservation. These two form the principles of the Stoic and Epicurean\nphilosophies. Both principles are one-sided and, as positive, become\nsciences of the understanding; just because this thought is not in\nitself concrete but abstract, the determinateness falls outside of\nthought and must be made a principle for itself; for it has an absolute\nright as against abstract thought. Besides Stoicism and Epicureanism,\nthere is, in the third place, Scepticism, the negation of these two\none-sided philosophies which must be recognized as such. The principle\nof Scepticism is thus the active negation of every criterion, of all\ndeterminate principles of whatever kind they be, whether knowledge\nderived from the senses, or from reflection on ordinary conceptions, or\nfrom thought. Thus the next result arrived at is that nothing can be\nknown. Yet the imperturbability and uniformity of mind in itself, which\nsuffers through nothing, and which is affected neither by enjoyment,\npain, nor any other bond, is the common standpoint and the common\nend of all these philosophies. Thus however gloomy men may consider\nScepticism, and however low a view they take of Epicureanism, all these\nhave in this way been philosophies.\n\n\nA. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE STOICS.\n\nWe must, first of all, and in a general way, remark of Stoicism, as\nalso of Epicureanism, that they came in the place of the philosophy\nof the Cynics and Cyrenaics as their counterpart, just as Scepticism\ntook the place of the Academy. But in adopting the principle of these\nphilosophies, they at the same time perfected it and elevated it\nmore into the form of scientific thought. Yet because in them, just\nas in the others, the content is a fixed and definite one, since\nself-consciousness therein sets itself apart, this circumstance really\nputs an end to speculation, which knows nothing of any such rigidity,\nwhich rather abolishes it and treats the object as absolute Notion,\nas in its difference an unseparated whole. Hence with the Stoics, as\nalso really with the Epicureans, instead of genuine speculation, we\nonly meet with an application of the one-sided, limited principle,\nand thus we require in both to enter merely upon a general view of\ntheir principle. Now if Cynicism made reality for consciousness the\nfact of being immediately natural (where immediate naturalness was\nthe simplicity of the individual, so that he is independent and,\nin the manifold movement of desire, of enjoyment, of holding many\nthings to be reality, and of working for the same, really keeps up\nthe external simple life) the Stoic elevation of this simplicity into\nthought consists in the assertion, not that immediate naturalness\nand spontaneity is the content and the form of the true Being of\nconsciousness, but that the rationality of nature is grasped through\nthought, so that everything is true or good in the simplicity of\nthought. But while with Aristotle what underlies everything is the\nabsolute Idea as unlimited and not set forth in a determinate character\nand with a difference\u2014and its deficiency is only the deficiency which\nis present in realization, the not being united into one Notion\u2014here\nthe one Notion is undoubtedly set forth as real existence, and\neverything is related to it, and hence the requisite relation is\nundoubtedly present; but that in which everything is one is not the\ntrue. With Aristotle each conception is considered absolutely in its\ndetermination and as separate from any other; here the conception\ncertainly is in this relation and is not absolute, but at the same\ntime it is not in and for itself. Because thus the individual is not\nconsidered absolutely but only relatively, the whole working out is\nnot interesting, for it is only an external relation. Likewise with\nAristotle the individual only is taken into consideration, but this\nconsideration is lost sight of by the speculative treatment adopted:\nhere, however, the individual is taken up and the treatment is likewise\nexternal. This relation is not even consistent, if, as also happens,\nsomething such as nature is considered in itself; for the absolute\nfalls outside of it, since its consideration is only a system of\nreasoning from indeterminate principles, or from principles which are\nonly the first that come to hand.\n\nAs a contribution to the history of the philosophy of the Stoics, we\nfirst of all desire to mention the more eminent Stoics. The founder of\nthe Stoic School is Zeno (who must be distinguished from the Eleatic);\nhe belonged to Cittium, a town in Cyprus, and was born about the 109th\nOlympiad. His father was a merchant who, from his business visits to\nAthens, then, and for long afterwards, the home of Philosophy and of\na large number of philosophers, brought with him books, particularly\nthose of the Socratics, whereby a love and craving for knowledge was\nawakened in his son. Zeno himself travelled to Athens, and, according\nto some, he found a further motive to live for Philosophy, in that he\nlost all his possessions by a shipwreck. What he did not lose was the\ncultured nobility of his mind and his love of rational understanding.\nZeno visited several sections of the Socratics, and particularly\nXenocrates, a man belonging to the Platonic School, who, on account\nof the strictness of his morality and the austerity of his whole\ndemeanour, was very celebrated. Thus he underwent the same ordeals\nas those to which the holy Francis of Assisi subjected himself, and\nsuccumbed to them just as little. This may be seen by the fact that\nwhile no testimony was given without oath in Athens, the oath was in\nhis case dispensed with, and his simple word believed\u2014and his teacher\nPlato is said often to have remarked to him that he might sacrifice to\nthe Graces. Then Zeno also visited Stilpo, a Megaric, whom we already\nknow about (Vol. I. p. 464), and with whom he studied dialectic for\nten years. Philosophy was considered as the business of his life,\nand of his whole life, and not studied as it is by a student who\nhurries through his lectures on Philosophy in order to hasten on to\nsomething else. But although Zeno principally cultivated dialectic\nand practical philosophy, he did not, like other Socratics, neglect\nphysical philosophy, for he studied very specially Heraclitus\u2019 work on\nNature, and finally came forward as an independent teacher in a porch\ncalled Poecile (\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03af\u03bb\u03b7), which was decorated with the paintings\nof Polygnotus. From this his school received the name of Stoic. Like\nAristotle his principal endeavour was to unite Philosophy into one\nwhole. As his method was characterized by special dialectic skill and\ntraining, and by the acuteness of his argumentation, so he himself was\ndistinguished, in respect of his personality, by stern morality, which\nresembles somewhat that of the Cynics, though he did not, like the\nCynics, try to attract attention. Hence with less vanity his temperance\nin the satisfaction of his absolute wants was almost as great, for he\nlived on nothing but water, bread, figs and honey. Thus amongst his\ncontemporaries Zeno was accorded general respect; even King Antigonus\nof Macedonia often visited him and dined with him, and he invited\nhim to come to him in a letter quoted by Diogenes: this invitation,\nhowever, Zeno in his reply refused, because he was now eighty years of\nage. But the circumstance that the Athenians trusted to him the key of\ntheir fortress, speaks for the greatness of their confidence in him;\nindeed, according to Diogenes, the following resolution was passed at\na meeting of the people: \u201cBecause Zeno, the son of Mnaseas, has lived\nfor many years in our town as a philosopher, and, for the rest, has\nproved himself to be a good man, and has kept the youths who followed\nhim in paths of virtue and of temperance, having led the way thereto\nwith his own excellent example, the citizens decide to confer on him\na public eulogy, and to present him with a golden crown, on account\nboth of his virtue and his temperance. In addition to this he shall be\npublicly buried in the Ceramicus. And for the crown and the building\nof the tomb, a commission of five men shall be appointed.\u201d Zeno\nflourished about the 120th Olympiad (about 300 B.C.) at the same time\nas Epicurus, Arcesilaus of the New Academy, and others. He died at a\ngreat age, being ninety-eight years of age (though some say he was only\nseventy-two), in the 129th Olympiad; for being tired of life, he put an\nend to it himself either by strangulation or by starvation\u2014just because\nhe had broken his toe.[121]\n\nAmongst the succeeding Stoics Cleanthes must be specially singled out;\nhe was a disciple and the successor of Zeno in the Stoa, and author\nof a celebrated Hymn to God, which Stob\u00e6us has preserved. He is well\nknown by an anecdote told respecting him. It is said that he was called\nin accordance with the law before a court of justice in Athens to\ngive an account of the means by which he maintained himself. He then\nproved that at night he carried water for a gardener, and by means of\nthis occupation, earned as much as he required in order in the day to\nbe in Zeno\u2019s company\u2014as to which the only point which is not quite\ncomprehensible to us is how, even in such a way, philosophy, of all\nthings, could be studied. And when for this a gratuity was voted to him\nfrom the public treasury, he refused it at Zeno\u2019s instigation. Like his\nteacher, Cleanthes also died voluntarily, in his eighty-first year, by\nabstaining from food.[122]\n\nOf the later Stoics there were many more who could be named as having\nbeen famous. More distinguished in science than Cleanthes was his\ndisciple, Chrysippus of Cilicia, born Ol. 125, 1 (474 A.U.C.; 280\nB.C.), who likewise lived in Athens, and who was specially active\nin promoting the wide cultivation and extension of the philosophy\nof the Stoics. His logic and dialectic were what contributed most\nlargely to his fame, and hence it was said that if the gods made use\nof dialectic, they would use none other than that of Chrysippus. His\nliterary activity is likewise admired, for the number of his works, as\nDiogenes La\u00ebrtius tells us, amounted to seven hundred and five. It is\nsaid of him in this regard that he wrote five hundred lines every day.\nBut the manner in which his writings were composed detracts very much\nfrom our wonder at this facility in writing, and shows that most of his\nworks consisted of compilations and repetitions. He often wrote over\nagain respecting the very same thing; whatever occurred to him he put\ndown on paper, dragging in a great variety of evidence. Thus he quoted\nalmost entire books by other writers; and someone gave expression to\nthe belief that if all that belonged to others were taken away from his\nbooks, only white paper would be left. But of course it is not so bad\nas all this, as we may see by all the quotations from the Stoics, where\nthe name of Chrysippus is placed at the head, as it always is, and his\nconclusions and explanations are used by preference. His writings,\nof which Diogenes La\u00ebrtius mentions a long list, have, however, all\nbeen lost to us; so much is nevertheless correct, that he was the main\nconstructor of the Stoic logic. While it is to be regretted that some\nof his best works have not come down to us, it is, perhaps, a good\nthing that all are not preserved; if we had to choose between having\nall or none, the decision would be a hard one. He died in the 143rd\nOlympiad (212 B.C.).[123]\n\nIn the period immediately following, Diogenes of Seleucia in Babylonia\nis a distinguished figure; Carneades, the celebrated Academic, is said\nto have learned dialectic from him, and he is also noteworthy because\nwith this Carneades and Critolaus, a Peripatetic thinker, in Olympiad\n156, 2 (598 A.U.C., or 156 B.C.) and in the time of the elder Cato, he\nwas sent as Athenian ambassador to Rome\u2014an embassy which first caused\nthe Romans to make acquaintance with Greek philosophy, dialectic and\nrhetoric, in Rome itself. For those philosophers there gave lectures\nand discourses.[124]\n\nBesides these, Panaetius is well known as having been Cicero\u2019s\ninstructor; the latter wrote his treatise, _De Officiis_, after\nPanaetius. Finally, we have Posidonius, another equally famous teacher,\nwho lived for long in Rome in the time of Cicero.[125]\n\nLater on we see the philosophy of the Stoics pass over to the Romans,\nthat is to say, it became the philosophy of many Romans, though this\nphilosophy did not gain anything as a science by so doing. On the\ncontrary, as in the case of Seneca and the later Stoics, in Epictetus\nor Antoninus, all speculative interest was really lost, and a\nrhetorical and hortatory disposition shown, of which mention cannot be\nmade in a history of Philosophy any more than of our sermons. Epictetus\nof Hierapolis in Phrygia, born at the end of the first century after\nChrist, was first of all the slave of Epaphroditus, who, however, freed\nhim, after which he betook himself to Rome. When Domitian banished\nthe philosophers, poisoners and astrologers from Rome (94 A.D.),\nEpictetus went to Nicopolis, in Epirus, and taught there publicly.\nFrom his lectures Arrian compiled the voluminous _Dissertationes\nEpictete\u00e6_, which we still possess, and also the manual \u1f10\u03b3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03af\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd of\nStoicism.[126] We still have the Meditations \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd of the Emperor\nMarcus Aurelius Antoninus, in twelve books; he first of all ruled\nalong with Lucius Aurelius Verus from 161 to 169 A.D., and then from\n169 to 180 alone and he conducted a war with the Marcomanni. In his\nMeditations he always speaks to himself; these reflections are not,\nhowever, speculative in nature, being admonitions, such as that man\nshould exercise himself in every virtue.\n\nWe have no other original works by the older Stoics. For the Stoic\nPhilosophy, too, the sources on which we formerly could count are cut\noff. The sources from which a knowledge of the philosophy of the Stoics\nis to be derived are, however, well known. There is Cicero, who was\nhimself a Stoic, though in his representation there is great difficulty\nin discovering how, for instance, the principle of Stoic morality is\nto be distinguished from that which constitutes the principle of the\nmorality of the Peripatetics. And, more particularly, we have Sextus\nEmpiricus, whose treatment is mainly theoretic, and is thus interesting\nfrom a philosophic point of view. For Scepticism has had to do with\nStoicism more especially. But also Seneca, Antoninus, Arrian, the\nmanual of Epictetus, and Diogenes La\u00ebrtius must really be called into\ncouncil.\n\nAs regards the philosophy of the Stoics themselves, they definitely\nseparated it into those three parts which we have already met with\n(Vol. I. p. 387, Vol. II. pp. 48, 49), and which will, generally\nspeaking, be always found. There is Logic in the first place; secondly,\nPhysics, or Natural Philosophy; and thirdly, Ethics, or the Philosophy\nof Mind, on the practical side especially. The content of their\nphilosophy has, however, not much that is original or productive.\n\n\n1. PHYSICS.\n\nAs regards the Physics of the Stoics, we may in the first place say\nthat it does not contain much that is peculiar to itself, since it is\nrather a compendium of the Physics of older times, and more especially\nof that of Heraclitus. However, each of the three schools now being\ndealt with has had a very characteristic and definite terminology,\nwhich is more than can be altogether said of the philosophy of Plato\nand Aristotle. Thus we must now make ourselves familiar with the\nparticular expressions used and with their significance. The following\nis the essence of the Physics of the Stoics: The determining reason\n(\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2) is the ruling, all-productive substance and activity, extended\nthroughout all, and constituting the basis of all natural forms; this\npreponderating substance, in its rational effectuating activity, they\ncall God. It is a world-soul endowed with intelligence, and, since\nthey called it God, this is really Pantheism. But all Philosophy is\npantheistic, for it goes to prove that the rational Notion is in the\nworld. The hymn of Cleanthes is to this effect: \u201cNothing happens on\nearth without thee, O D\u00e6mon, neither in the ethereal pole of the\nheavens, nor in the sea, excepting what the wicked do through their own\nfoolishness. But thou knowest how to make crooked things straight, and\nthou orderest that which is without order, and the inimical is friendly\nto thee. For thus hast thou united everything into one, the good to\nthe evil; thus one Notion (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2) is in everything that ever was, from\nwhich those mortals who are evil flee. How unhappy are they, too, who,\never longing to possess the good, do not perceive God\u2019s universal law,\nnor listen thereto, the which if they but obeyed with reason, (\u03c3\u1f7a\u03bd \u03bd\u1ff7)\nthey would attain a good and happy life!\u201d[127] The Stoics thus believed\nthe study of nature to be essential, in order to know in nature its\nuniversal laws, which constitute the universal reason, in order that\nwe might also know therefrom our duties, the law for man, and live\nconformably to the universal laws of nature. \u201cZeno,\u201d according to\nCicero (De nat. Deor. I. 14), \u201cholds this natural law to be divine, and\nbelieves that it has the power to dictate the right and prohibit what\nis wrong.\u201d Thus the Stoics desired to know this rational Notion which\nrules in nature not altogether on its own account; and the study of\nnature was consequently to them rather a mere matter of utility.\n\nIf we are now to give some further idea of what these Physics are, we\nmay say that the Stoics distinguish in the corporeal\u2014although nature\nis only the manifestation of one common law\u2014the moment of activity\nand that of passivity; the former is, according to Aristotle, active\nreason, or, according to Spinoza, _natura naturans_; the latter passive\nreason, or _natura naturata_. The latter is matter, substance without\nquality, for quality is, generally speaking, form, _i.e._ that which\nforms universal matter into something particular. This is indeed the\nreason likewise that with the Greeks quality is called \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd, just\nas we in German derive _Beschaffenheit_ from _Schaffen_\u2014that which is\nposited, the negative moment. But the actuating, as the totality of\nforms, is, according to the Stoics, the Notion in matter; and this is\nGod. (Diog. La\u00ebrt. VII. 134.)\n\nAs regards the further nature of these forms, these universal laws of\nnature, and the formation of the world, the Stoics have in the main\nadopted the ideas of Heraclitus, for Zeno studied him very particularly\n(_supra_, p. 239). They thus make fire the real Notion, the active\nprinciple which passes into the other elements as its forms. The\nworld arises by the self-existent gods driving the universal material\nsubstance (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd) out of the fire, through the air, into the water;\nand as in all generation the moisture which surrounds a seed comes\nfirst as the begetter of all that is particular, so that conception,\nwhich in this respect is called seed-containing (\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2), remains\nin the water and then actuates the indeterminate Being of matter into\nthe origination of the other determinations. The elements, fire, water,\nair and earth, are consequently primary. Respecting them the Stoics\nspeak in a manner which has no longer any philosophic interest.\n\u201cThe coagulation of the denser parts of the world forms the earth;\nthe thinner portion becomes air, and if this becomes more and more\nrarefied, it produces fire. From the combination of these elements are\nproduced plants, animals, and other kinds of things.\u201d The thinking\nsoul is, according to them, of a similar fiery nature, and all human\nsouls, the animal principle of life, and also plants, are parts of\nthe universal world-soul, of the universal fire; and this central\npoint is that which rules and impels. Or, as it is put, souls are a\nfiery breath. Sight, in the same way, is a breath of the ruling body\n(\u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6) transmitted to the eyes; similarly hearing is an extended,\npenetrating breath, sent from the ruling body to the ears.[128]\n\nRespecting the process of nature we may further say this: Fire, Stob\u00e6us\ntells us (Eclog. phys. I. p. 312), is called by the Stoics an element\nin a pre-eminent sense, because from it, as the primary element, all\nelse arises through a transformation, and in it, as in an ultimate,\neverything is fused and becomes dissolved. Thus Heraclitus and Stoicism\nrightly comprehended this process as a universal and eternal one. This\nhas even been done by Cicero, though in a more superficial way; in\nthis reflection he falsely sees the conflagration of the world in time\nand the end of the world, which is quite another matter. For in his\nwork _De natura Deorum_ (II. 46) he makes a Stoic speak thus: \u201cIn the\nend (_ad extremum_) everything will be consumed by fire; for if all\nmoisture becomes exhausted the earth can neither be nourished, nor can\nair return into existence. Thus nothing but fire remains, through whose\nreanimation and through God the world will be renewed and the same\norder will return.\u201d This is spoken after the manner of the ordinary\nconception. But to the Stoics everything is merely a Becoming. However\ndeficient this may be, God, as the fiery principle, is yet to them\nthe whole activity of nature, and likewise the rational order of the\nsame, and in this lies the perfect pantheism of the Stoic conception of\nnature. Not only do they call this ordering force God, but also nature,\nfate or necessity (\u03b5\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd), likewise Jupiter, the moving force of\nmatter, reason (\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd) and foresight (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd); to them all these are\nsynonymous.[129] Because the rational brings forth all, the Stoics\ncompare this impelling activity to a seed, and say: \u201cThe seed which\nsends forth something rational (\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd) is itself rational. The world\nsends forth the seeds of the rational and is thus in itself rational;\u201d\nthat is to say, rational both generally, in the whole, and in each\nparticular existent form. \u201cAll beginning of movement in any nature and\nsoul rises from a ruling principle, and all powers which are sent forth\nupon the individual parts of the whole proceed from the ruling power as\nfrom a source; so that each force that is in the part is also in the\nwhole, because the force is distributed by the ruling power in it. The\nworld embraces the seed-containing conceptions of the life which is in\nconformity with the conception,\u201d _i.e._ all particular principles.[130]\nThe Physics of the Stoics is thus Heraclitean, though the logical\nelement is entirely at one with Aristotle; and we may regard it as\nbeing such. However, speaking generally, only those belonging to\nearlier times had a physical element in their philosophy: those coming\nlater neglected Physics entirely and kept alone to Logic and to Ethics.\n\nThe Stoics again speak of God and the gods according to the popular\nmanner of regarding them. They say that \u201cGod is the ungenerated and\nimperishable maker of all this disposition of things, who after certain\nperiods of time absorbs all substance in Himself, and then reproduces\nit from Himself.\u201d[131] There no definite perception is reached, and\neven the above relation of God, as absolute form, to matter has\nattained no developed clearness. The universe is at one time the unity\nof form and matter, and God is the soul of the world; at another time,\nthe universe, as nature, is the Being of the constituted matter,\nand that soul is antagonistic to it, but the activity of God is a\ndisposition of the original forms of matter.[132] This opposition is\ndevoid of the essentials of union and division.\n\nThus the Stoics remain at the general conception that each individual\nis comprehended in a Notion, and this again in the universal Notion,\nwhich is the world itself. But because the Stoics recognized the\nrational as the active principle in nature, they took its phenomena\nin their individuality as manifestations of the divine; and their\npantheism has thereby associated itself with the common ideas about\nthe gods as with the superstitions which are connected therewith (p.\n235), with belief in all sorts of miracles and with divination\u2014that is\nto say, they believe that in nature there are intimations given which\nmen must receive through divine rites and worship. Epicureanism, on the\ncontrary, proceeds towards the liberation of men from this superstition\nto which the Stoics are entirely given over. Thus Cicero, in his work\n_De divinatione_, has taken the most part of his material from them,\nand much is expressly given as being the reasoning of the Stoics. When,\nfor example, he speaks of the premonitory signs given in connection\nwith human events, all this is conformable with the Stoic philosophy.\nThe fact that an eagle flies to the right, the Stoics accepted as a\nrevelation of God, believing that thereby it was intimated to men what\nit was advisable for them to do in some particular circumstances. Just\nas we find the Stoics speaking of God as having universal necessity,\nto them God, as Notion, has hence a relation to men and human ends\nlikewise, and in this respect He is providence; thus they now arrived\nat the conception of particular gods also. Cicero says in the work\nquoted above (II. 49): \u201cChrysippus, Diogenes and Antipater argued thus:\nIf gods exist, and if they do not let men know beforehand what is to\nhappen in the future, they cannot love men, or else they themselves do\nnot know what stands before them in the future, or they are of opinion\nthat it does not signify whether man knows it or not, or they consider\nsuch a revelation beneath the dignity of their majesty, or they cannot\nmake it comprehensible to men.\u201d All this they refute, for amongst other\nthings they say that nothing can exceed the beneficence of the gods,\n&c. Thus they draw the conclusion that \u201cthe gods make known to men the\nfuture\u201d\u2014a system of reasoning in which the entirely particular ends\nof individuals also form the interests of the gods. To make men know\nand comprehend at one time and not at another, is an inconsistency,\n_i.e._ an incomprehensibility, but this very incomprehensibility, this\nobscurity, is the triumph of the common way of regarding religions\naffairs. Thus in the Stoics all the superstitions of Rome had their\nstrongest supporters; all external, teleological superstition is taken\nunder their protection and justified. Because the Stoics started from\nthe assertion that reason is God (it certainly is divine, but it\ndoes not exhaust divinity), they immediately made a bound from this\nuniversal to the revelation of that which operates for the sake of\nindividual ends. The truly rational is doubtless revealed to men as the\nlaw of God; but the useful, what is in conformity with individual ends,\nis not revealed in this truly divine revelation.\n\n\n2. LOGIC.\n\nIn the second place, as to the intellectual side of the philosophy, we\nmust first of all. consider the principle of the Stoics in answering\nthe question of what the true and rational is. In regard to the source\nof our knowledge of truth, or of the criterion, which in those times\nused to be discussed (Vol. I. p. 474, Vol. II. p. 233), the Stoics\ndecided that the scientific principle is the conception that is laid\nhold of (\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae), for the true as well as for the good;\nfor the true and good are set forth as content or as the existent.\nThus a unity of apprehending thought and Being is set forth in which\nneither can exist without the other; by this is meant not sensuous\nconception as such, but that which has returned into thought and become\nproper to consciousness. Some of the older Stoics, amongst whom we\ncertainly find Zeno, called this criterion the very truth of reason\n(\u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2). Ordinary conception on its own account (\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1) is\nan impression (\u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), and for it Chrysippus used the expression\nalteration (\u1f10\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2).[133] But that the conception should be true,\nit must be comprehended; it begins with feeling, whereby in fact the\ntype of another is brought into us; the second step is that we should\ntransform this into part of ourselves, and this first of all occurs\nthrough thought.\n\nAccording to Cicero\u2019s account (Academ. Qu\u00e6st. IV. 47), Zeno illustrated\nthe moments of this appropriation by a movement of the hand. When he\nshowed the open palm he said that this was a sensuous perception;\nwhen he bent the fingers somewhat, this was a mental assent through\nwhich the conception is declared to be mine; when he pressed them\nquite together and formed a fist, this was comprehension (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2),\njust as in German we speak of comprehension [Begreifen] when by means\nof our senses we lay hold of anything in a similar way; when he then\nbrought the left hand into play and pressed together that fist firmly\nand forcibly, he said that this was science, in which no one but the\nwise man participated. This double pressure, my pressing with the\nother hand that which is grasped, is said to signify conviction, my\nbeing conscious of the identity of thought with the content. \u201cBut who\nthis wise man is or has been the Stoics never say,\u201d adds Cicero; and\nof this we shall afterwards have to speak in greater detail. In fact,\nthe matter is not made clear through this gesticulation of Zeno\u2019s.\nThe first action, the open hand, is sensuous apprehension, immediate\nseeing, hearing, &c.; the first motion of the hand is then, speaking\ngenerally, spontaneity in grasping. This first assent is likewise\ngiven by fools; it is weak, and may be false. The next moment is the\nclosing of the hand, comprehension, taking something in; this makes\nthe ordinary conception truth, because the ordinary conception becomes\nidentical with thought. By this my identity with this determination\nis indeed set forth, but this is not yet scientific knowledge, for\nscience is a firm, secure, unchangeable comprehension through reason or\nthought, which is that which rules or directs the soul. Midway between\nscientific knowledge and folly is the true Notion as the criterion,\nalthough as yet it is not itself science; in it thought gives its\napprobation to existence and recognizes itself, for approbation is\nthe harmony of a thing with itself. But in scientific knowledge a\nperception of the first elements and determinate knowledge through\nthought of the object is contained. Thus the ordinary conception as\napprehended is thought; scientific knowledge is the consciousness of\nthought, the knowledge of that harmony.\n\nWe may also give our assent to these conclusions of the Stoics with\ntheir various stages, since in them there is a perception which is\nundoubtedly true. In this we have an expression of the celebrated\ndefinition of the truth, by which it is made the harmony of object and\nconsciousness; but at the same time it is well to remark that this is\nto be understood simply, and not as indicating that consciousness had a\nconception, and that on the other side stood an object, which two had\nto harmonize with one another, and hence that a third was necessarily\nbrought into existence which had to compare them. Now this would be\nconsciousness itself, but what this last can compare is nothing more\nthan its conception, and\u2014not the object, but\u2014its conception again.\nConsciousness thus really accepts the conception of the object; it is\nby this approbation that the conception actually receives truth\u2014the\ntestimony of mind to the objective rationality of the world. It is\nnot, as is ordinarily represented, that a round object here impresses\nitself upon wax, that a third compares the form of the round and of the\nwax and, finding them to be similar, judges that the impress must have\nbeen correct, and the conception and the thing have harmonized. For\nthe action of thought consists in this, that thought in and for itself\ngives its approbation and recognizes the object as being in conformity\nwith itself; this it is in which lies the power of truth\u2014or approbation\nis the expression of this harmony, or judgment itself. In this, say\nthe Stoics, the truth is contained; it is an object which is likewise\nthought, so that the thought that gives its assent is the ruling\nthought which posits the harmony of subject with content. The fact that\nanything is or has truth is thus not because it is (for this moment of\nBeing is only ordinary conception), but the fact that it is, has its\npower in the approbation of consciousness. But this thought alone and\nfor itself is not the truth, nor is the truth as such contained in it,\nfor the Notion requires the objective element and is only the rational\nconsciousness respecting the truth. But the truth of the object itself\nis contained in the fact that this objective corresponds to thought,\nand not the thought to the objective; for this last may be sensuous,\nchangeable, false, and contingent, and thus it is untrue for mind.\nThis is the main point as far as the Stoics are concerned, and even\nif we discover the Stoic speculative doctrines from their antagonists\nbetter than from their originators and advocates, yet from them, too,\nthis idea of unity proceeds; and while both sides of this unity are\nopposed, both are necessary, but thought is essential reality. Sextus\nEmpiricus (adv. Math. VIII. 10) understands this thus: \u201cThe Stoics say\nthat as regards the perceptible and that which is thought some things\nalone are true; what is felt, however, is not immediate (\u03ad\u03be \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2),\nfor it becomes true for the first time through its relation to the\nthought that corresponds to it.\u201d Thus neither is immediate thought the\ntrue, excepting in so far us it corresponds to the Notion and is known\nthrough the working out of rational thought.\n\nThis general idea is the only one which is interesting in the Stoics,\nbut even in this very principle, limitations are found to be present.\nIt merely expresses the truth as subsisting in the object, as thought\nof, yet for that very reason it is still a very formal determination,\nor not in itself the real Idea. From this point of view Sextus\nEmpiricus (adv. Math. X. 183) examines the Stoics, and he considers\nand discusses them in all sorts of ways. The most striking thing that\nhe says is what relates to the following. The fact that anything is,\nrests in its being thought\u2014the fact that it is thought in something\nbeing there; the one is the pre-supposition of the other. That is to\nsay, the Stoics assert that a thing exists, not because it is, but\nthrough thought; but consciousness for its existence requires another,\nfor thought is likewise one-sided. In this criticism by Sextus it is\nindicated that thought requires an object as an external to which it\ngives its approbation. There can be no talk of its being here indicated\nthat the thinking mind in order to exist as consciousness does not\nrequire the object; this is really inherent in its conception. But the\n\u201cthis\u201d of the object as an external is only a moment which is not the\nonly one or the essential. It is the manifestation of mind, and mind\nexists only in that it appears; this therefore must come to pass in\nit, that it must have its object as external and give its approbation\nto it\u2014that is, it must withdraw from this relationship into itself and\ntherein recognize its unity. But likewise, having gone into itself, it\nhas now from itself to beget its object and give itself the content\nwhich it sends forth from itself. Stoicism is only this return of\nmind into itself, positing the unity of itself and the object, and\nrecognizing the harmony; but not the going forth again to the extension\nof the real knowledge of a content from itself. We do not find Stoicism\ngetting any farther, for it stops short at making the consciousness of\nthis unity its object, without developing it in the slightest; thus\nreason remains the simple form which does not go on to the distinction\nof the content itself. Hence the formalism of this celebrated standard,\nand of the standpoint from which all truth of content is judged, rests\nfarther in the fact that the thought of thought, as what is highest,\nfinds this content indeed conformable to itself and appropriates it,\nsince it transforms it into the universal, but its determinations are\ngiven. For if thought predominates, still it is always universal form\nalone. On account of this universality thought yields nothing but the\nform of identity with itself; the ultimate criterion is thus only the\nformal identity of the thought which discovers harmony. But it may\nbe asked, with what? For there no absolute self-determination, no\ncontent that proceeds from thought as such is to be found; and hence\neverything may harmonize with my thought. The criterion of the Stoics\nis consequently only the principle of contradiction; yet when we remove\nthe contradiction from absolute reality, it is indeed self-identical,\nbut for that very reason empty. The harmony must be a higher one; there\nmust be harmony with self in what is other than self, in content, in\ndetermination; and thus it must be harmony with harmony.\n\nIn accordance with this recognition of the principle of the Stoics,\nboth their logic and their morality is judged; neither the one nor the\nother arrives at being immanent free science. We have already remarked\n(p. 241) that they also occupied themselves with logical definitions,\nand since they made abstract thought the principle, they have brought\nformal logic to great perfection. Logic is hence to them logic in\nthe sense that it expresses the activity of the understanding as of\nconscious understanding; it is no longer as with Aristotle, at least\nin regard to the categories, undecided as to whether the forms of the\nunderstanding are not at the same time the realities of things; for the\nforms of thought are set forth as such for themselves. Then along with\nthis comes in, for the first time, the question respecting the harmony\nof thought and object or the demand that an appropriate content of\nthought be shown. However, since all given content may be taken into\nthought and posited as something thought without therefore losing its\ndeterminate character, and this determinate character contradicts and\ndoes not support the simplicity of thought, the taking of it up does\nnot help at all; for its opposite may also be taken up and set forth\nas something thought. The opposition is thereby, however, only in\nanother form; for instead of the content being in outward sensation as\nsomething not pertaining to thought and not true, as it formerly was,\nit now pertains to thought, but is unlike it in its determinateness,\nseeing that thought is the simple. Thus what was formerly excluded\nfrom the simple Notion, now comes into it again; this separation\nbetween activity of the understanding and object must indeed be made,\nbut likewise the unity in the object as such has to be shown, if it\nis only something thought. Hence Scepticism cast up this opposition\nmore especially to the Stoics, and the Stoics amongst themselves had\nalways to improve on their conceptions. As we have just seen (p. 250)\nin Sextus Empiricus, they did not quite know whether they should define\nconception as impression or alteration, or in some other way. Now if\nthis conception is admitted into that which directs the soul, into pure\nconsciousness, Sextus further asks (since thought _in abstracto_ is the\nsimple and self-identical which, as incorporeal, is neither passive\nnor active), How can an alteration, an impression, be made on this?\nThen the thought-forms are themselves incorporeal. But, according to\nthe Stoics, only the corporeal can make an impression or bring about\nan alteration.[134] That is to say, on the one hand, because corporeal\nand incorporeal are unlike they cannot be one; and, on the other,\nincorporeal thought-forms, as capable of no alteration, are not the\ncontent, for this last is the corporeal only.\n\nIf the thought-forms could in fact have attained the form of content,\nthey would have been a content of thought in itself. But as they were\nthey had value as laws of thought (\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03ac)[135] merely. The Stoics\nindeed had a system of immanent determinations of thought, and actually\ndid a great deal in this direction; for Chrysippus specially developed\nand worked out this logical aspect of things, and is stated to have\nbeen a master in it (_supra_, pp. 240, 241). But this development took\na very formal direction; there are the ordinary well-known forms of\ninference, five of which are given by Chrysippus, while others give\nsometimes more and sometimes fewer. One of them is the hypothetical\nsyllogism through remotion, \u201cWhen it is day it is light, but now it is\nnight and hence it is not light.\u201d These logical forms of thought are\nby the Stoics held to be the unproved that requires no proof; but they\nare likewise only formal forms which determine no content as such. The\nwise man is specially skilful in dialectic, we are told by the Stoics,\nfor all things, both physical and ethical, are perceived through a\nknowledge of logic.[136] But thus they have ascribed this perception\nto a subject, without stating who this wise man is (p. 250). Since\nobjective grounds by which to determine the truth are wanting, the\nultimate decision is attributed to the will of the subject; and this\ntalk about the wise man consequently has its ground in nothing but\nthe indefiniteness of the criterion, from which we cannot get to the\ndetermination of content.\n\nIt would be superfluous to speak further of their logic any more than\nof their theory of judgments, which in part coincides with it, and in\npart is a grammar and a rhetoric; by it no real scientific content\ncan be reached. For this logic is not, like Plato\u2019s dialectic, the\nspeculative science of the absolute Idea; but, as formal logic, as we\nsaw above (p. 254), it is science as the firm, secure, unalterable\ncomprehension of reasons, and stops short at the perception of the\nsame. This logical element, whose essence consists pre-eminently in\nescaping to the simplicity of the conception to that which is not in\nopposition to itself nor falls into contradiction, obtains the upper\nhand. This simplicity, which has not negativity and content in itself,\nrequires a given content which it may not abrogate\u2014but consequently\nit cannot thus attain to a genuine \u201cother\u201d through itself. The Stoics\nhave constituted their logic often in the most isolated fashion;\nthe principal point that is established here is that the objective\ncorresponds to thought, and they investigated this thought more\nclosely. If in a manner it is quite correct to say that the universal\nis the true, and that thought has a definite content that must also\nbe concrete, the main difficulty, which is to deduce the particular\ndetermination from the universal, so that in this self-determination it\nmay remain identical with itself, has not been solved by the Stoics:\nand this the Sceptics brought to consciousness. This is the point of\nview most important in the philosophy of the Stoics; it thus showed\nitself in their physics also.\n\n\n3. ETHICS.\n\nSince the theory of mind, the doctrine of knowledge, came before us\nin the investigation of the criterion, we have, in the third and\nlast place, to speak of the morality of the Stoics, to which is due\ntheir greatest fame, but which does not rise above this formal element\nany more than what precedes, although it cannot be denied that in\npresenting it they have taken a course which seems very plausible to\nthe popular conception, but which in fact is to a great extent external\nand empiric.\n\na. In order, in the first place, to find the definition of virtue,\nChrysippus gives some good expositions of practical ethics which\nDiogenes La\u00ebrtius (VII. 85, 86) quotes at considerable length; they\nare psychological in character and in them Chrysippus establishes his\nformal harmony with himself. For according to him the Stoics say: \u201cThe\nfirst desire (\u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u03ae) of the animal is for self-preservation, because\nnature from the beginning reconciled each existence with itself. This\nfirst object innate in every animal\u201d (immanent desire) \u201cis thus the\nharmony of the animal with itself, and the consciousness of the same,\u201d\nthe self-consciousness through which \u201cthe animal is not alienated\nfrom itself. Thus it repels what is injurious and accepts what is\nserviceable to it.\u201d This is Aristotle\u2019s conception of the nature of\nadaptation to an end, in which, as the principle of activity, both the\nopposite and its sublation are contained. \u201cEnjoyment is not the first\nobject, for it\u201d (the sense of satisfaction) \u201cis only for the first time\nadded when the nature of an animal that seeks itself through itself,\nreceives into itself that which is in conformity with its harmony with\nitself.\u201d This is likewise worthy of approbation: self-consciousness,\nenjoyment, is just this return into self, the consciousness of this\nunity in which I enjoy something and thereby have my unity as this\nindividual in the objective element. The case is similar in regard\nto man; his end is self-preservation, but with a conscious end, with\nconsideration, according to reason. \u201cIn plants nature operates without\nvoluntary inclination (\u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1fc6\u03c2) or sense-perception, but some things in\nus take place in the same manner as in plants.\u201d For in the plant there\nalso is the seed-containing conception, but it is not in it as end, nor\nas its object, for it knows nothing about it. \u201cIn animals inclination\ncomes in; in them nature makes their impulses conformable to their\nfirst principle;\u201d _i.e._ the end of inclination is simply the first\nprinciple of their nature, and that through which they make for their\nown preservation. \u201cRational creatures likewise make nature their end,\nbut this is to live according to reason, for reason becomes in them the\nartist who produces inclination,\u201d _i.e._ it makes a work of art in man\nfrom what in the animal is desire merely. To live in accordance with\nnature is thus, to the Stoics, to live rationally.\n\nThis now appears somewhat like certain receipts given by the Stoics for\nthe purpose of discovering right motive forces in regard to virtue. For\ntheir principle put generally is this: \u201cMen must live in conformity\nwith nature, _i.e._ with virtue; for to it\u201d (rational) \u201cnature leads\nus.\u201d That is the highest good, the end of everything\u2014a most important\nform in Stoic morality, which appears in Cicero as _finis bonorum_\nor _summum bonum_. With the Stoics right reason and the securing of\nit on its own account, is the highest principle. But here, too, we\nimmediately see that we are thereby merely led round in a circle in a\nmanner altogether formal, because virtue, conformity to nature, and\nreason, are only determined through one another. Virtue consists in\nliving conformably with nature, and what is conformable to nature is\nvirtue. Likewise thought must further determine what is in conformity\nwith nature, but conformity with nature again is that alone which\nis determined through reason. The Stoics further say, according to\nDiogenes La\u00ebrtius (VII. 87, 88) \u201cTo live according to nature is to\nlive according to that which experience teaches us of the laws both\nof universal nature and of our own nature, by doing nothing which\nuniversal law forbids; and that law is the right reason which pervades\neverything, being the same with Jupiter, the disposer (\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9) of\nthe existing system of things. The virtue of the happy man is when\neverything occurs according to the harmony of the genius (\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2)\nof each individual with reference to the will of the disposer of all\nthings.\u201d Thus everything remains as it was in a universal formalism.\n\nWe must throughout allow to the Stoics that virtue consists in\nfollowing thought, _i.e._ the universal law, right reason; anything is\nmoral and right only in as far as a universal end is in it fulfilled\nand brought into evidence. This last is the substantial, the essential\nnature of a relationship, and in it we have that which is really in\nthought alone. The universal which must be the ultimate determination\nin action, is, however, not abstract, but the universal in this\nrelationship, just as, for example, in property the particular is\nplaced on one side. Because man, as a man of thought and culture, acts\naccording to his perception, he subordinates his impulses and desires\nto the universal; for they are individual. There is in each human\naction an individual and particular element; but there is a distinction\nas to whether the particular as such is solely insisted upon or whether\nin this particular the universal is secured. It is to the securing\nof this universal that the energy of Stoicism is directed. But this\nuniversal has still no content and is undetermined, and thereby the\nStoic doctrines of virtue are incomplete, empty, meaningless and\ntedious. Virtue indeed is commended in a forcible, lively and edifying\nmanner, but as to what this universal law of virtue is, we have no\nindications given us.\n\nb. The other side as regards the good is external existence, and the\nagreement of circumstances, of external nature, with the end aimed\nat by man. For although the Stoics have expressed the good as being\nconformity with law, in relation to the practical will, they yet\ndefined it, according to Diogenes La\u00ebrtius (VII. 94, 95), as being at\nthe same time the useful, \u201ceither absolutely and immediately useful or\nnot contrary to utility,\u201d so that generally speaking the useful is,\nas it were, the accident of virtue. \u201cThe Stoics likewise distinguished\nmanifold good into good having reference to the soul, and external\ngood; the former indicates virtues and their actions; the latter the\nfact of pertaining to a noble country, having a virtuous friend, and\nso on. In the third place it is neither external nor is it a matter\nof self-consciousness alone, when the self-same man is virtuous and\nhappy.\u201d These conclusions are quite good. Morality does not require\nto look so coldly on what concerns utility, for every good action is\nin fact useful, _i.e._ it has actuality and brings forth something\ngood. An action which is good without being useful is no action and\nhas no actuality. That which in itself is useless in the good is its\nabstraction as being a non-reality. Men not only may, but must have\nthe consciousness of utility; for it is true that it is useful to know\nthe good. Utility means nothing else but that men have a consciousness\nrespecting their actions. If this consciousness is blameworthy, it\nis still more so to know much of the good of one\u2019s action and to\nconsider it less in the form of necessity. Thus the question was raised\nas to how virtue and happiness are related to one another, a theme\nof which the Epicureans have also treated. Here it was, as in more\nrecent times, regarded as the great problem to discover whether virtue\ngives happiness, taken altogether by itself, whether the conception\nof happiness is included in its conception. That union of virtue and\nhappiness, as the mean, is thus rightly represented as being perfect,\nneither pertaining only to self-consciousness nor to externality.\n\n\u03b1. In order to be able to give a general answer to this question,\nwe most recollect what was said above of the principle of\nself-preservation, according to which virtue has to do with the\nrational nature. The fulfilment of its end is happiness as finding\nitself realized, and as the knowledge or intuitive perception of itself\nas an external\u2014a harmony of its Notion or its genius with its Being\nor its reality. The harmony of virtue with happiness thus means that\nthe virtuous action realizes itself in and for itself, man becomes in\nit an immediate object to himself, and he comes to the perception of\nhimself as objective, or of the objective as himself. This rests in\nthe conception of action and particularly of good action. For the bad\ndestroys reality and is opposed to self-preservation; but the good\nis what makes for its self-preservation and effectuates it\u2014the good\nend is thus the content that realizes itself in action. But in this\ngeneral answer to that question, properly speaking, the consciousness\nof the implicitly existent end has not sufficiently exactly the\nsignification of virtue, nor has action proceeding from the same\nexactly the signification of virtuous action, neither has the reality\nwhich it attains the signification of happiness. The distinction rests\nin the fact that the Stoics have merely remained at this general\nconception, and set it forth immediately as actuality; in it however,\nthe conception of virtuous action is merely expressed, and not reality.\n\n\u03b2. A further point is that just because the Stoics have remained at\nthis position, the opposition between virtue and happiness immediately\nenters in, or, in abstract form, that between thought and its\ndetermination. These opposites are with Cicero _honestum_ and _utile_,\nand their union is the question dealt with.[137] Virtue, which is\nliving in accordance with the universal law of nature, is confronted\nby the satisfaction of the subject as such in his particularity.\nThe two sides are, in the first place, this particularity of the\nindividual, which, in the most varied aspects has existence in me as\nthe abstract \u201cthis,\u201d for example, in the pre-supposition of determinate\ninclinations; and here we have pleasure and enjoyment in which my\nexistence harmonizes with the demands of my particularity. In the\nsecond place, I, as the will that fulfils law, am only the formal\ncharacter which has to carry out the universal; and thus, as willing\nthe universal, I am in accord with myself as thinking. The two now\ncome into collision, and because I seek the one satisfaction or the\nother, I am in collision with myself, because I am also individual.\nAs to this we may hear many trivial things said, such as that things\noften go badly with the virtuous and well with the wicked, and that\nthe latter is happy, &c. By going well all external circumstances\nare understood, and on the whole the content is quite uninteresting,\nfor it is constituted by the attainment of commonplace ends, points\nof view and interests. Such at once show themselves, however, to be\nmerely contingent and external; hence we soon get past this standpoint\nin the problem, and thus external enjoyment, riches, noble birth,\n&c., do not accord with virtue or happiness. The Stoics indeed said:\n\u201cThe implicitly good is the perfect\u201d (that which fulfils its end) \u201cin\naccordance with the nature of the rational; now virtue is such, but\nenjoyment, pleasure and such-like are its accessories\u201d[138]\u2014the end of\nthe satisfaction of the individual on his own account. Thus these may\nbe the concomitants of virtue, although it is a matter of indifference\nwhether they are so or not, for since this satisfaction is not end,\nit is equally a matter of indifference if pain is the concomitant\nof virtue. Conduct which is according to reason only, thus further\ncontains man\u2019s abstract concentration within himself, and the fact that\nthe consciousness of the true enters into him, so that he renounces\neverything that belongs to immediate desires, feelings, &c.\n\nIn this quite formal principle of holding oneself in a pure harmony\nwith oneself of a merely thinking nature, there now rests the power of\nbecoming indifferent to every particular enjoyment, desire, passion\nand interest. Because this following of the determinations of reason\nis in opposition to enjoyment, man should seek his end or satisfaction\nin nothing else than in the satisfaction of his reason, in satisfying\nhimself in himself, but not in anything outwardly conditioned. Hence\nmuch has been said by the Stoics in respect of that which pertains to\nthe passions being something that is contradictory. The writings of\nSeneca and Antoninus contain much that is true in this regard, and\nthey may be most helpful to those who have not attained to the higher\ndegree of conviction. Seneca\u2019s talent must be recognized, but we must\nalso be convinced that it does not suffice. Antoninus (VIII. 7) shows\npsychologically that happiness or pleasure is not a good. \u201cRegret is a\ncertain self-blame, because something useful has failed, the good must\nbe something useful, and the noble and good man must make the same his\ninterest. But no noble and good man will feel regret that he has fallen\nshort in pleasure; pleasure is thus neither useful nor good. The man\nwho has the desire for glory after his death does not recollect that\nhe who holds him in remembrance himself dies also, and again he who\nfollows this one, until all recollection through these admiring ones\nwho have passed away, has been extinguished.\u201d Even if this independence\nand freedom is merely formal, we must still recognize the greatness of\nthis principle. However, in this determination of the abstract inward\nindependence and freedom of the character in itself lies the power\nwhich has made the Stoics famous; this Stoic force of character which\nsays that man has only to seek to remain like himself, thus coincides\nwith the formal element which I have already given (p. 254). For if\nthe consciousness of freedom is my end, in this universal end of the\npure consciousness of my independence all particular determinations of\nfreedom which are constituted by duties and laws, have disappeared. The\nstrength of will of Stoicism has therefore decided not to regard the\nparticular as its essence, but to withdraw itself therefrom; we see on\nthe one hand, that this is a true principle, but on the other, it is at\nthe same time abstract still.\n\nNow because the principle of the Stoic morality professes to be the\nharmony of mind with itself, what should be done is not to let this\nremain formal, and therefore not to let what is not contained in\nthis self-contained be any longer shut out of it. That freedom which\nthe Stoics ascribe to man is not without relation to what is other\nthan himself; thus he is really dependent, and under this category\nhappiness really falls. My independence is only one side, to which\nthe other side, the particular side of my existence, hence does not\nyet correspond. The old question, which at this time again came up,\nthus concerns the harmony between virtue and happiness. We speak of\nmorality rather than virtue, because that according to which I ought\nto direct my actions is not, as in virtue, my will, as it has become\ncustom. Morality really contains my subjective conviction that that\nwhich I do is in conformity with rational determinations of will, with\nuniversal duties. That question is a necessary one, a problem which\neven in Kant\u2019s time occupied men, and in endeavouring to solve it\nwe must begin by considering what is to be understood by happiness.\nMuch more is afterwards said of that in which satisfaction is to be\nsought. However, from what is external and exposed to chance we must\nat once break free. Happiness in general means nothing more than the\nfeeling of harmony with self. That which is pleasing to the senses is\npleasing because a harmony with ourselves is therein contained. The\ncontrary and unpleasing is, on the other hand, a negation, a lack of\ncorrespondence with our desires. The Stoics have posited as the very\nessence of enjoyment this harmony of our inner nature with itself,\nbut only as inward freedom and the consciousness, or even only the\nfeeling of this harmony, so that enjoyment such as this is contained in\nvirtue itself. Yet this enjoyment ever remains a secondary matter, a\nconsequence, which in so far as it is so cannot be made end, but should\nonly be considered as an accessory. The Stoics said in this regard\nthat virtue is alone to be sought, but with virtue happiness on its\nown account is found, for it confers blessing explicitly as such. This\nhappiness is true and imperturbable even if man is in misfortune;[139]\nthus the greatness of the Stoic philosophy consists in the fact that\nif the will thus holds together within itself, nothing can break into\nit, that everything else is kept outside of it, for even the removal\nof pain cannot be an end. The Stoics have been laughed at because they\nsaid that pain is no evil.[140] But toothache and the like are not in\nquestion as regards this problem. We cannot but know we are subject\nto such; pain like this, and unhappiness are, however, two different\nthings. Thus the problem throughout is only to be understood as the\ndemand for a harmony of the rational will with external reality. To\nthis reality there also belongs the sphere of particular existence, of\nsubjectivity, of personality, of particular interests. But of these\ninterests the universal alone truly pertains to this reality, for only\nin so far as it is universal, can it harmonize with the rationality\nof the will. It is thus quite right to say that suffering, pain, &c.,\nare no evil, whereby the conformity with myself, my freedom, might be\ndestroyed; I am elevated over such in the union which is maintained\nwith myself, and even if I may feel them, they can still not make me\nat variance with myself. This inward unity with myself as felt, is\nhappiness, and this is not destroyed by outward evil.\n\n\u03b3. Another opposition is that within virtue itself. Because the\nuniversal law of right reason is alone to be taken as the standard of\naction, there is no longer any really absolutely fixed determination,\nfor all duty is always, so to speak, a particular content, which\ncan plainly be grasped in universal form, without this, however, in\nany way affecting the content. Because virtue is thus that which is\nconformable to the real essence or law of things, in a general sense\nthe Stoics called virtue everything, in every department, which is\nin conformity with law in that department. Hence, Diogenes tells us\n(VII. 92), they also speak of logical and physical virtues, just as\ntheir morality represents individual duties (\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1) by passing\nin review the individual natural relationships in which man stands,\nand showing what in them is rational.[141] But this is only a kind\nof quibbling such as we have also seen in Cicero\u2019s case. Thus in as\nfar as an ultimate deciding criterion of that which is good cannot be\nset up, the principle being destitute of determination, the ultimate\ndecision rests with the subject, Just as before this it was the oracle\nthat decided, at the commencement of this profounder inwardness the\nsubject was given the power of deciding as to what is right. For since\nSocrates\u2019 time the determination of what was right by the standard of\ncustomary morality had ceased in Athens to be ultimate; hence with the\nStoics all external determination falls away, and the power of decision\ncan only be placed in the subject as such, which in the last instance\ndetermines from itself as conscience. Although much that is elevated\nand edifying may find its support here, an actual determination\nis still wanting; hence there is according to the Stoics only one\nvirtue,[142] and the wise man is the virtuous.\n\nc. The Stoics have thus in the third place likewise been in the way of\nrepresenting an ideal of the wise man which, however, is nothing more\nthan the will of the subject which in itself only wills itself, remains\nat the thought of the good, because it is good, allows itself in its\nsteadfastness to be moved by nothing different from itself, such as\ndesires, pain, &c., desires its freedom alone, and is prepared to give\nup all else\u2014which thus, if it experiences outward pain and misfortune,\nyet separates these from the inwardness of its consciousness. The\nquestion of why the expression of rel morality has with the Stoics\nthe form of the ideal of the wise man finds its answer, however,\nin the fact that the mere conception of virtuous consciousness, of\naction with respect to an implicitly existent end, finds in individual\nconsciousness alone the element of moral reality. For if the Stoics\nhad gone beyond the mere conception of action for the implicitly\nexistent end, and had reached to the knowledge of the content, they\nwould not have required to express this as a subject. To them rational\nself-preservation is virtue. But if we ask what it is that is evolved\nby virtue, the answer is to the effect that it is just rational\nself-preservation; and thus they have not by this expression got beyond\nthat formal circle. Moral reality is not expressed as that which is\nenduring, which is evolved and ever evolving itself. And moral reality\nis just this, to exist; for as nature is an enduring and existent\nsystem, the spiritual as such must be an objective world. To this\nreality the Stoics have, however, not reached. Or we may understand\nthis thus. Their moral reality is only the wise man, an ideal and not a\nreality\u2014in fact the mere conception whose reality is not set forth.\n\nThis subjectivity is already contained in the fact that moral reality,\nexpressed as virtue, thereby immediately presents the appearance\nof being present only as a quality of the individual. This virtue,\nas such, in as far as only the moral reality of the individual is\nindicated, cannot attain to happiness in and for itself, even though\nhappiness, regarded in the light of realization, were only the\nrealization of the individual. For this happiness would be just the\nenjoyment of the individual as the harmony of existence with him\nas individual; but with him as individual true happiness does not\nharmonize, but only with him as universal man. Man must likewise not\nin the least desire that it should harmonize with him as individual\nman, that is, he must be indifferent to the individuality of his\nexistence, and to the harmony with the individual as much as to the\nwant of harmony; he must be able to dispense with happiness just\nas, if he possesses it, he must be free from it; or it is only a\nharmony of him with himself as a universal. If merely the subjective\nconception of morality is therein contained, its true relationship is\nyet thereby expressed; for it is this freedom of consciousness which\nin its enjoyment rests in itself and is independent of objects,\u2014what\nwe expressed above (p. 264) as the special characteristic of the\nStoic morality. Stoic self-consciousness has not here to deal with\nits individuality as such, but solely with the freedom in which it is\nconscious of itself only as the universal. Now could one call this\nhappiness, in distinction to the other, true happiness, happiness\nwould still, on the whole, remain a wrong expression. The satisfaction\nof rational consciousness in itself as an immediate universal, is a\nstate of being which is simulated by the determination of happiness;\nfor in happiness we have the moment of self-consciousness as an\nindividuality. But this differentiated consciousness is not present in\nthat self-satisfaction; for in that freedom the individual has rather\nthe sense of his universality only. Striving after happiness, after\nspiritual enjoyment, and talking of the excellence of the pleasures of\nscience and art, is hence dull and insipid, for the matter with which\nwe are occupied has no longer the form of enjoyment, or it does away\nwith that conception. This sort of talk has indeed passed away and\nit no longer has any interest. The true point of view is to concern\noneself with the matter itself and not with enjoyment, that is, not\nwith the constant reflection on the relation to oneself as individual,\nbut with the matter as a matter, and as implicitly universal. We must\ntake care besides that things are tolerable to us as individuals,\nand the pleasanter the better. But no further notice or speech about\nthis is requisite, nor are we to imagine that there is much that is\nrational and important within it. But the Stoic consciousness does not\nget beyond this individuality to the reality of the universal, and\ntherefore it has only to express the form, the real as an individual,\nor the wise man.\n\nThe highest point reached by Aristotle, the thought of thought, is\nalso present in Stoicism, but in such a way that it does not stand in\nits individual capacity as it appears to do in Aristotle, having what\nis different beside it, but as being quite alone. Thus in the Stoic\nconsciousness there is just this freedom, this negative moment of\nabstraction from existence, an independence which is capable of giving\nup everything, but not as an empty passivity and self-abnegation, as\nthough everything could be taken from it, but an independence which\ncan resign it voluntarily, without thereby losing its reality; for its\nreality is really just the simple rationality, the pure thought of\nitself. Here pure consciousness thus attains to being its own object,\nand because reality is to it only this simple object, its object annuls\nin itself all modes of existence, and is nothing in and for itself,\nbeing therein only in the form of something abrogated.\n\nAll is merged into this: the simplicity of the Notion, or its pure\nnegativity, is posited in relation to everything. But the real\nfilling in, the objective mode, is wanting, and in order to enter\ninto this, Stoicism requires that the content should be given. Hence\nthe Stoics depicted the ideal of the wise man in specially eloquent\nterms, telling how perfectly sufficient in himself and independent\nhe is, for what the wise man does is right. The description of the\nideal formed by the Stoics is hence a common subject of discussion\nand is even devoid of interest; or at least the negative element in\nit is alone noteworthy. \u201cThe wise man is free and likewise in chains,\nfor he acts from himself, uncorrupted by fear or desire.\u201d Everything\nwhich belongs to desire and fear he does not reckon to himself, he\ngives to such the position of being something foreign to him; for no\nparticular existence is secure to him. \u201cThe wise man is alone king,\nfor he alone is not bound to laws, and he is debtor to no one.\u201d Thus\nwe here see the autonomy and autocracy of the wise man, who, merely\nfollowing reason, is absolved from all established laws which are\nrecognized, and for which no rational ground can be given, or which\nappear to rest somewhat on a natural aversion or instinct. For even\nin relation to actual conduct no definite law has properly speaking\nreality for him, and least of all those which appear to belong to\nnature as such alone, _e.g._ the prohibition against entering into\nmarriage relations which are considered incestuous, the prohibition\nof intercourse between man and man, for in reason the same thing is\nfitting as regards the one which is so as regards the others. Similarly\nthe wise man may eat human flesh,[143] &c. But a universal reason is\nsomething quite indeterminate. Thus the Stoics have not passed beyond\ntheir abstract understanding in the transgression of these laws, and\ntherefore they have allowed their king to do much that was immoral;\nfor if incest, pederasty, the eating of human flesh, were at first\nforbidden as though through a natural instinct only, they likewise\ncan by no means exist before the judgment-seat of reason. The Stoic\nwise man is thus also \u2018enlightened,\u2019 in the sense that where he did\nnot know how to bring the natural instinct into the form of a rational\nreason, he trampled upon nature. Thus that which is called natural\nlaw or natural instinct comes into opposition with what is set forth\nas immediately and universally rational. For example, those first\nactions seem to rest on natural feelings, and we must remember that\nfeelings are certainly not the object of thought; as opposed to this,\nproperty is something thought, universal in itself, a recognition of my\npossession from all, and thus it indeed belongs to the region of the\nunderstanding. But should the wise man hence not be bound by the former\nbecause it is not something immediately thought, this is merely the\nfault of his want of comprehension. As we have, however, seen that in\nthe sphere of theory the thought-out simplicity of the truth is capable\nof all content, so we find this also to be the case with the good, that\nwhich is practically thought-out, without therefore being any content\nin itself. To wish to justify such a content through a reason thus\nindicates a confusion between the perception of the individual and that\nof all reality, it means a superficiality of perception which does not\nacknowledge a certain thing because it is not known in this and that\nregard. But this is so for the reason that it only seeks out and knows\nthe most immediate grounds and cannot know whether there are not other\naspects and other grounds. Such grounds as these allow of reasons for\nand against everything being found\u2014on the one hand a positive relation\nto something which, though in other cases necessary, as such can also\nbe again sublated; and, on the other hand, a negative relation to\nsomething necessary, which can likewise again be held to be valid.\n\nBecause the Stoics indeed placed virtue in thought, but found\nno concrete principle of rational self-determination whereby\ndeterminateness and difference developed, they, in the first place,\nhave carried on a reasoning by means of grounds to which they lead back\nvirtue. They draw deductions from facts, connections, consequences,\nfrom a contradiction or opposition; and this Antoninus and Seneca do in\nan edifying way and with great ingenuity. Reasons, however, prove to\nbe a nose of wax; for there are good grounds for everything, such as\n\u201cThese instincts, implanted as they are by nature,\u201d or \u201cShort life,\u201d\n&c. Which reasons should be esteemed as good thereby depends on the end\nand interest which form the pre-supposition giving them their power.\nHence reasons are as a whole subjective. This method of reflecting on\nself and on what we should do, leads to the giving to our ends the\nbreadth of reflection due to penetrative insight, the enlargement\nof the sphere of consciousness. It is thus I who bring forward these\nwise and good grounds. They do not constitute the thing, the objective\nitself, but the thing of my own will, of my desire, a bauble through\nwhich I set up before me the nobility of my mind; the opposite of this\nis self-oblivion in the thing. In Seneca himself there is more folly\nand bombast in the way of moral reflection than genuine truth; and thus\nthere has been brought up against him both his riches, the splendour\nof his manner of life, his having allowed Nero to give him wealth\nuntold, and also the fact that he had Nero as his pupil; for the latter\ndelivered orations composed by Seneca.[144] This reasoning is often\nbrilliant, as with Seneca: we find much that awakens and strengthens\nthe mind, clever antitheses and rhetoric, but we likewise feel the\ncoldness and tediousness of these moral discourses. We are stimulated\nbut not often satisfied, and this may be deemed the character of\nsophistry: if acuteness in forming distinctions and sincere opinion\nmust be there recognized, yet final conviction is ever lacking.\n\nIn the second place there is in the Stoic standpoint the higher,\nalthough negatively formal principle, that what is thought is alone as\nsuch the end and the good, and therefore that in this form of abstract\nthought alone, as in Kant\u2019s principle of duty, there is contained that\nby which man must establish and secure his self-consciousness, so\nthat he can esteem and follow nothing in himself in as far as it has\nany other content for itself. \u201cThe happy life,\u201d says Seneca (De vita\nbeata, 5), \u201cis unalterably grounded on a right and secure judgment.\u201d\nThe formal security of the mind which abstracts from everything,\nsets up for us no development of objective principles, but a subject\nwhich maintains itself in this constancy, and in an indifference\nnot due to stupidity, but studied; and this is the infinitude of\nself-consciousness in itself.\n\nBecause the moral principle of the Stoics remains at this formalism,\nall that they treat of is comprised in this. For their thoughts are the\nconstant leading back of consciousness to its unity with itself. The\npower of despising existence is great, the strength of this negative\nattitude sublime. The Stoic principle is a necessary moment in the\nIdea of absolute consciousness; it is also a necessary manifestation\nin time. For if, as in the Roman world, the life of the real mind\nis lost in the abstract universal; the consciousness, where real\nuniversality is destroyed, must go back into its individuality and\nmaintain itself in its thoughts. Hence, when the political existence\nand moral actuality of Greece had perished, and when in later times the\nRoman Empire also became dissatisfied with the present, it withdrew\ninto itself, and there sought the right and moral which had already\ndisappeared from ordinary life. It is thus herein implied, not that\nthe condition of the world is a rational and right one, but only that\nthe subject as such should assert his freedom in himself. Everything\nthat is outward, world, relationships, &c., are so disposed as to be\ncapable of being abrogated; in it there is thus no demand for the real\nharmony of reason and existence; or that which we might term objective\nmorality and rectitude is not found in it. Plato has set up the ideal\nof a Republic, _i.e._ of a rational condition of mankind in the state;\nfor this esteem for right, morality and custom which is to him the\nprincipal matter, constitutes the side of reality in that which is\nrational; and it is only through a rational condition of the world\nsuch as this, that the harmony of the external with the internal is\nin this concrete sense present. In regard to morality and power of\nwilling the good, nothing more excellent can be read than what Marcus\nAurelius has written in his Meditations on himself; he was Emperor\nof the whole of the then known civilized world, and likewise bore\nhimself nobly and justly as a private individual. But the condition\nof the Roman Empire was not altered by this philosophic emperor,\nand his successor, who was of a different character, was restrained\nby nothing from inaugurating a condition of things as bad as his own\nwicked caprice might direct. It is something much higher when the\ninward principle of the mind, of the rational will, likewise realizes\nitself, so that there arises a rational constitution, a condition of\nthings in accordance with culture and law. Through such objectivity\nof reason, the determinations which come together in the ideal of\nthe wise man are first consolidated. There then is present a system\nof moral relationships which are duties; each determination is then\nin its place, the one subordinated to the other, and the higher is\npredominant. Hence it comes to pass that the conscience becomes bound\n(which is a higher point than the Stoic freedom), that the objective\nrelationships which we call duties are consolidated after the manner\nof a just condition of things, as well as being held by mind to be\nfixed determinations. Because these duties do not merely appear to\nhold good in a general sense, but are also recognized in my conscience\nas having the character of the universal, the harmony of the rational\nwill and reality is established. On the one hand, the objective system\nof freedom as necessity exists, and, on the other, the rational in\nme is real as conscience. The Stoic principle has not yet reached\nto this more concrete attitude, as being on the one hand abstract\nmorality, and, on the other, the subject that has a conscience. The\nfreedom of self-consciousness in itself is the principle, but it has\nnot yet attained to its concrete form, and its relation to happiness\nexists only in its determination as indifferent and contingent, which\nrelation must be given up. In the concrete principle of rationality\nthe condition of the world, as of my conscience, is not, however,\nindifferent.\n\nThis is a general description of Stoic morality; the main point is to\nrecognize its point of view and chief relationships. Because in the\nRoman world a perfectly consistent position, and one conformable to\nexisting conditions, has attained to the consciousness of itself,\nthe philosophy of the Stoics has more specially found its home in the\nRoman world. The noble Romans have hence only proved the negative, an\nindifference to life and to all that is external; they could be great\nonly in a subjective or negative manner\u2014in the manner of a private\nindividual. The Roman jurists are also said to have been likewise\nStoic philosophers, but, on the one hand, we find that our teachers of\nRoman law only speak ill of Philosophy, and, on the other, they are\nyet sufficiently inconsistent to state it to the credit of the Roman\njurists that they were philosophers. So far as I understand law, I can\nfind in it, among the Romans, nothing either of thought, Philosophy\nor the Notion. If we are to call the reasoning of the understanding\nlogical thought, they may indeed be held to be philosophers, but this\nis also present in the reasoning of Master Hugo, who certainly does not\nclaim to be a philosopher. The reasoning of the understanding and the\nphilosophic Notion are two different things. We shall now proceed to\nwhat is in direct contrast to the Stoic philosophy, Epicureanism.\n\n\nB. EPICURUS.\n\nThe Epicurean philosophy, which forms the counterpart to Stoicism, was\njust as much elaborated as the Stoic, if, indeed, it were not more so.\nWhile the latter posited as truth existence for thought\u2014the universal\nNotion\u2014and held firmly to this principle, Epicurus, the founder of\nthe other system, held a directly opposite view, regarding as the\ntrue essence not Being in general, but Being as sensation, that is,\nconsciousness in the form of immediate particularity. As the Stoics\ndid not seek the principle of the Cynics\u2014that man must confine himself\nto the simplicity of nature\u2014in man\u2019s requirements, but placed it in\nuniversal reason, so Epicurus elevated the principle that happiness\nshould be our chief end into the region of thought, by seeking pleasure\nin a universal which is determined through thought. And though, in so\ndoing, he may have given a higher scientific form to the doctrines of\nthe Cyrenaics. it is yet self-evident that if existence for sensation\nis to be regarded as the truth, the necessity for the Notion is\naltogether abrogated, and in the absence of speculative interest\nthings cease to form a united whole, all things being in point of fact\nlowered to the point of view of the ordinary human understanding.\nNotwithstanding this proviso, before we take this philosophy into\nconsideration, we must carefully divest ourselves of all the ideas\ncommonly prevalent regarding Epicureanism.\n\nAs regards the life of Epicurus, he was born in the Athenian village of\nGargettus in Ol. 109, 3 (B.C. 342), and therefore before the death of\nAristotle, which took place in Ol. 114, 3. His opponents, especially\nthe Stoics, have raked up against him more accusations than I can tell\nof, and have invented the most trivial anecdotes respecting his doings.\nHe had poor parents; his father, Neocles, was village schoolmaster,\nand Ch\u00e6restrata, his mother, was a sorceress: that is, she earned\nmoney, like the women of Thrace and Thessaly, by furnishing spells and\nincantations, as was quite common in those days. The father, taking\nEpicurus with him, migrated with an Athenian colony to Samos, but here\nalso he was obliged to give instruction to children, because his plot\nof land was not sufficient for the maintenance of his family. At the\nage of about eighteen years, just about the time when Aristotle was\nliving in Chalcis, Epicurus returned to Athens. He had already, in\nSamos, made the philosophy of Democritus a special subject of study,\nand now in Athens he devoted himself to it more than ever; in addition\nto this, he was on intimate terms with several of the philosophers\nthen flourishing, such as Xenocrates, the Platonist, and Theophrastus,\na follower of Aristotle. When Epicurus was twelve years old, he read\nwith his teacher Hesiod\u2019s account of Chaos, the source of all things;\nand this was perhaps not without influence on his philosophic views.\nOtherwise he professed to be self-taught, in the sense that he produced\nhis philosophy entirely from himself; but we are not to suppose from\nthis that he did not attend the lectures or study the writings of other\nphilosophers. Neither is it to be understood that he was altogether\noriginal in his philosophy as far as content was concerned; for, as\nwill be noted later, his physical philosophy especially is that of\nLeucippus and Democritus. It was at Mitylene in Lesbos that he first\ncame forward as teacher of an original philosophic system, and then\nagain at Lampsacus in Asia Minor; he did not, however, find very many\nhearers. After having for some years led an unsettled life, he returned\nin about the six and thirtieth year of his age to Athens, to the\nvery centre of all Philosophy; and there, some time after, he bought\nfor himself a garden, where he lived and taught in the midst of his\nfriends. Though so frail in body that for many years he was unable to\nrise from his chair, in his manner of living he was most regular and\nfrugal, and he devoted himself entirely to science, to the exclusion\nof all other interests. Even Cicero, though in other respects he has\nlittle to say in his favour, bears testimony to the warmth of his\nfriendships, and adds that no one can deny he was a good, a humane,\nand a kindly man. Diogenes La\u00ebrtius gives special commendation to his\nreverence towards his parents, his generosity to his brothers, and his\nbenevolence to all. He died of stone in the seventy-first year of his\nage. Just before his death he had himself placed in a warm bath, drank\na cup of wine, and charged his friends to remember what he had taught\nthem.[145]\n\nNo other teacher has ever been loved and reverenced by his scholars\nas much as Epicurus; they lived on such intimate terms of friendship\nthat they determined to make common stock of their possessions with\nhim, and so continue in a permanent association, like a kind of\nPythagorean brotherhood. This they were, however, forbidden to do by\nEpicurus himself, because it would have betrayed a distrust in their\nreadiness to share what they had with one another; but where distrust\nis possible, there neither friendship, nor unity, nor constancy of\nattachment can find a place. After his death he was held in honoured\nremembrance by his disciples: they carried about with them everywhere\nhis likeness, engraved on rings or drinking-cups, and remained so\nfaithful to his teaching that they considered it almost a crime to make\nany alteration in it (while in the Stoic philosophy development was\ncontinually going on), and his school, in respect of his doctrines,\nresembled a closely-barricaded state to which all entrance was denied.\nThe reason for this lies, as we shall presently see, in his system\nitself; and the further result, from a scientific point of view, ensued\nthat we can name no celebrated disciples of his who carried on and\ncompleted his teaching on their own account. For his disciples could\nonly have gained distinction for themselves by going further than\nEpicurus did. But to go further would have been to reach the Notion,\nwhich would only have confused the system of Epicurus; for what is\ndevoid of thought is thrown into confusion by the introduction of\nthe Notion, and it is this very lack of thought which has been made\na principle. Not that it is in itself without thought, but the use\nmade of thought is to hold back thought, and thought thus takes up a\nnegative position in regard to itself; and the philosophic activity of\nEpicurus is thus directed towards the restoration and maintaining of\nwhat is sensuous through the very Notion which renders it confused.\nTherefore his philosophy has not advanced nor developed, but it must\nalso be said that it has not retrograded; a certain Metrodorus alone\nis said to have carried it on further in some directions. It is also\ntold to the credit of the Epicurean philosophy that this Metrodorus\nwas the only disciple of Epicurus who went over to Carneades; for the\nrest, it surpassed all others in its unbroken continuity of doctrine\nand its long duration; for all of them became degenerate or suffered\ninterruption. When some one called the attention of Arcesilaus to this\nattachment to Epicurus, by the remark that while so many had gone over\nfrom other philosophers to Epicurus, scarcely a single example was\nknown of any one passing over from the Epicurean system to another,\nArcesilaus made the witty rejoinder: \u201cMen may become eunuchs, but\neunuchs can never again become men.\u201d[146]\n\nEpicurus himself produced in his lifetime an immense number of works,\nbeing a much more prolific author than Chrysippus, who vied with him\nin the number of his writings,[147] if we deduct from the latter his\ncompilations from the works of others or from his own. The number of\nhis writings is said to have amounted to three hundred; it is scarcely\nto be regretted that they are lost to us. We may rather thank Heaven\nthat they no longer exist; philologists at any rate would have had\ngreat trouble with them. The main source of our knowledge of Epicurus\nis the whole of the tenth book of Diogenes La\u00ebrtius, which after all\ngives us but scanty information, though it deals with the subject\nat great length. We should, of course, have been better off had we\npossessed the philosopher\u2019s own writings, but we know enough of him to\nmake us honour the whole. For, besides this, we know a good deal about\nthe philosophy of Epicurus through Cicero, Sextus Empiricus and Seneca;\nand so accurate are the accounts they give of him, that the fragment of\none of Epicurus\u2019s own writings, found some years ago in Herculaneum,\nand reprinted by Orelli from the Neapolitan edition (Epicuri Fragmenta\nlibri II. et XI. De natura, illustr. Orellius, Lipsi\u00e6 1818), has\nneither extended nor enriched our knowledge; so that we must in all\nearnestness deprecate the finding of the remaining writings.\n\nWith regard to the Epicurean philosophy, it is by no means to be looked\non as setting forth a system of Notions, but, on the contrary, as a\nsystem of ordinary conceptions or even of sensuous existence, which,\nlooked at from the ordinary point of view as perceived by the senses,\nEpicurus has made the very foundation and standard of truth (p. 277). A\ndetailed explanation of how sensation can be such, he has given in his\nso-called Canonic. As in the case of the Stoics, we have first to speak\nof the manner which Epicurus adopted of determining the criterion of\ntruth; secondly, of his philosophy of nature; and thirdly and lastly,\nof his moral teaching.\n\n\n1. CANONICAL PHILOSOPHY.\n\nEpicurus gave the name of Canonic to what is really a system of logic,\nin which he defines the criteria of truth, in regard to the theoretic,\nas in fact sensuous perceptions, and, further, as conceptions or\nanticipations (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2); in regard to the practical, as the passions,\nimpulses, and affections.[148]\n\na. On the theoretic side the criterion, closely considered, has,\naccording to Epicurus, three moments, which are the three stages of\nknowledge; first, sensuous perception, as the side of the external;\nsecondly, ordinary conception, as the side of the internal; thirdly,\nopinion (\u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1), as the union of the two.\n\n\u03b1. \u201cSensuous perception is devoid of reason,\u201d being what is given\nabsolutely. \u201cFor it is not moved by itself, nor can it, if if is moved\nby something else, take away from or add to\u201d that which it is, but\nit is exactly what it is. \u201cIt is beyond criticism or refutation. For\nneither can one sensation judge another, both being alike, since both\nhave equal authority;\u201d\u2014when the presentations of sight are of the\nsame kind, every one of them must admit the truth of all the rest.\n\u201cNor can one of them pass judgment on another when they are unlike,\nfor they each have their value as differing;\u201d red and blue, for\nexample, are each something individual. \u201cNor can one sensation pass\njudgment on another when they are heterogeneous; for we give heed to\nall. Thought, in the same way, cannot criticize the senses; for all\nthought itself depends on the sensation,\u201d which forms its content.\nBut sensuous perception may go far wrong. \u201cThe truth of what our\nsenses perceive is first evinced by this, that the power of perception\nremains with us; sight and hearing are permanent powers of this kind\nas much as the capacity of feeling pain. In this way even the unknown\u201d\n(the unperceived) \u201cmay be indicated by means of that which appears\u201d\n(perception). Of this conception of objects of perception which are not\nimmediate we shall have to speak more particularly hereafter (p. 292)\nin dealing with physical science. \u201cThus all\u201d (unknown, imperceptible)\n\u201cthoughts originated in the senses either directly in respect of their\nchance origin or in respect of relationship, analogy, and combination;\nto these operations thought also contributes something,\u201d namely as the\nformal connection of the sensuous conceptions. \u201cThe fancies of the\ninsane or of our dreams are also true; for they act upon us, but that\nwhich is not real does not act.\u201d[149] Thus every sensuous perception\nis explicitly true, in so far as it shows itself to be abiding, and\nthat which is not apparent to our senses must be apprehended after the\nsame manner as the perception known to us. We hear Epicurus say, just\nas we hear it said in everyday life: What I see and hear, or, speaking\ngenerally, what I perceive by my senses, comprises the existent; every\nsuch object of sense exists on its own account, one of them does not\ncontradict the other, but all are on the same level of validity, and\nreciprocally indifferent. These objects of perception are themselves\nthe material and content of thought, inasmuch as thought is continually\nmaking use of the images of these things.\n\n\u03b2. \u201cOrdinary conception is now a sort of comprehension (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2),\nor correct opinion or thought, or the universal indwelling power of\nthinking; that is to say, it is the recollection of that which has\noften appeared to us,\u201d\u2014the picture. \u201cFor instance, when I say, \u2018this is\na man,\u2019 I, with the help of previous perceptions, at once by my power\nof representation recognize his form.\u201d By dint of this repetition the\nsensuous perception becomes a permanent conception in me, which asserts\nitself; that is the real foundation of all that we hold true. These\nrepresentations are universal, but certainly the Epicureans have not\nplaced universality in the form of thinking, but only said it is caused\nby frequency of appearance. This is further confirmed by the name which\nis given to the image which has thus arisen within us. \u201cEverything\nhas its evidence (\u1f10\u03bd\u03b1\u03c1\u03b3\u03ad\u03c2) in the name first conferred on it.\u201d[150]\nThe name is the ratification of the perception. The evidence which\nEpicurus terms \u1f10\u03bd\u03ac\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 is just the recognition of the sensuous through\nsubsumption under the conceptions already possessed, and to which the\nname gives permanence; the evidence of a conception is therefore this,\nthat we affirm an object perceptible by the senses to correspond with\nthe image. That is the acquiescence which we have found taking place\nwith the Stoics when thought gives its assent to a content; thought,\nhowever, which recognizes the thing as its own, and receives it into\nitself, with the Stoics remained formal only. With Epicurus the\nunity of the conception of the object with itself exists also as a\nremembrance in consciousness, which, however, proceeds from the senses;\nthe image, the conception, is what harmonizes with a sense-perception.\nThe recognition of the object is here an apprehension, not as an\nobject of thought, but as an object of imagination; for apprehension\nbelongs to recollection, to memory. The name, it is true, is something\nuniversal, belongs to thinking, makes the manifold simple, yea, is in a\nhigh degree ideal; but in such a way that its meaning and its content\nare the sensuous, and are not thus to be counted as simple, but as\nsensuous. In this way opinion is established instead of knowledge.\n\n\u03b3. In the last place, opinion is nothing but the reference of\nthat general conception, which we have within us, to an object, a\nperception, or to the testimony of the senses; and that is the passing\nof a judgment. For in a conception we have anticipated that which comes\ndirectly before our eyes; and by this standard we pronounce whether\nsomething is a man, a tree, or not. \u201cOpinion depends on something\nalready evident to us, to which we refer when we ask how we know that\nthis is a man or not. This opinion is also itself termed conception,\nand it may be either true or false:\u2014true, when what we see before\nour eyes is corroborated or not contradicted by the testimony of the\nconception; false in the opposite case.\u201d[151] That is to say, in\nopinion we apply a conception which we already possess, or the type, to\nan object which is before us, and which we then examine to see if it\ncorresponds with our mental representation of it. Opinion is true if\nit corresponds with the type; and it has its criterion in perceiving\nwhether it repeats itself as it was before or not. This is the whole of\nthe ordinary process in consciousness, when it begins to reflect. When\nwe have the conception, it requires the testimony that we have seen or\nstill see the object in question. From the sensuous perceptions blue,\nsour, sweet, and so on, the general conceptions which we possess are\nformed; and when an object again comes before us, we recognize that\nthis image corresponds with this object. This is the whole criterion,\nand a very trivial process it is; for it goes no further than the first\nbeginnings of the sensuous consciousness, the immediate perception\nof an object. The next stage is without doubt this, that the first\nperception forms itself into a general image, and then the object which\nis present is subsumed under the general image. That kind of truth\nwhich anything has of which it can only be said that the evidence of\nthe senses does not contradict it, is possessed by the conceptions of\nthe unseen, for instance, the apprehension of heavenly phenomena: here\nwe cannot approach nearer, we can see something indeed, but we cannot\nhave the sensuous perception of it in its completeness; we therefore\napply to it what we already know by other perceptions, if there is\nbut some circumstance therein which is also present in that other\nperception or conception (_supra_, p. 282).\n\nb. From these external perceptions of objects presently existing, with\nwhich we here began, the affections, the internal perceptions, which\ngive the criteria for practical life are however distinguished; they\nare of two kinds, either pleasant or unpleasant. That is to say, they\nhave as their content pleasure or satisfaction, and pain: the first, as\nthat which peculiarly belongs to the perceiver, is the positive; but\npain, as something alien to him, is the negative. It is these sensuous\nperceptions which determine action; they are the material from which\ngeneral conceptions regarding what causes me pain or pleasure are\nformed; as being permanent they are therefore again conceptions, and\nopinion is again this reference of conception to perception, according\nto which I pass judgment on objects\u2014affections, desires, and so\non.[152] It is by this opinion, therefore, that the decision to do or\nto avoid anything is arrived at.\n\nThis constitutes the whole Canon of Epicurus, the universal standard\nof truth; it is so simple that nothing can well be simpler, and yet it\nis very abstract. It consists of ordinary psychological conceptions\nwhich are correct on the whole, but quite superficial; it is the\nmechanical view of conception having respect to the first beginnings\nof observation. But beyond this there lies another and quite different\nsphere, a field that contains determinations in themselves; and these\nare the criteria by which the statements of Epicurus must be judged.\nNowadays even Sceptics are fond of speaking of facts of consciousness;\nthis sort of talk goes no further than the Epicurean Canon.\n\n\n2. METAPHYSICS.\n\nIn the second place, Epicurus enters on a metaphysical explanation of\nhow we are related to the object; for sensuous perception and outside\nimpressions he unhesitatingly regards as our relation to external\nthings, so that he places the conceptions in me, the objects outside\nof me. In raising the question of how we come by our conceptions,\nthere lies a double question: on the one hand, since sense-perceptions\nare not like conceptions, but require an external object, what is\nthe objective manner in which the images of external things enter\ninto us? On the other hand, it may be asked how conceptions of such\nthings as are not matter of perception arise in us; this seems to be\nan activity of thought, which derives conceptions such as these from\nother conceptions; we shall, however, see presently (pp. 287, 288) and\nmore in detail, how the soul, which is here related to the object in\nindependent activity, arrives at such a point.\n\n\u201cFrom the surfaces of things,\u201d says Epicurus in the first place, \u201cthere\npasses off a constant stream, which cannot be detected by our senses\u201d\n(for things would in any other case decrease in size) and which is very\nfine; \u201cand this because, by reason of the counteracting replenishment,\nthe thing itself in its solidity long preserves the same arrangement\nand disposition of the atoms; and the motion through the air of these\nsurfaces which detach themselves is of the utmost rapidity, because\nit is not necessary that what is detached should have any thickness;\u201d\nit is only a surface. Epicurus says, \u201cSuch a conception does not\ncontradict our senses, when we take into consideration how pictures\nproduce their effects in a very similar way, I mean by bringing us into\nsympathy with external things. Therefore emanations, like pictures,\npass out from them into us, so that we see and know the forms and\ncolours of things.\u201d[153] This is a very trivial way of representing\nsense-perception. Epicurus took for himself the easiest criterion of\nthe truth that is not seen, a criterion still in use, namely that it is\nnot contradicted by what we see or hear. For in truth such matters of\nthought as atoms, the detachment of surfaces, and so forth, are beyond\nour powers of sight. Certainly we manage to see and to hear something\ndifferent; but there is abundance of room for what is seen and what is\nconceived or imagined to exist alongside of one another. If the two are\nallowed to fall apart, they do not contradict each other; for it is not\nuntil we relate them that the contradiction becomes apparent.\n\n\u201cError,\u201d as Epicurus goes on to say on the second point \u201ccomes to pass\nwhen, through the movement that takes place within us on the conception\ntherein wrought, such a change is effected that the conception can no\nlonger obtain for itself the testimony of perception. There would be no\ntruth, no likeness of our perceptions, which we receive as in pictures\nor in dreams or in any other way, if there were nothing on which we,\nas it were, put out our faculty of observation. There would be no\nuntruth if we did not receive into ourselves another movement, which,\nto be sure, is conformable to the entering in of the conception, but\nwhich has at the same time an interruption.\u201d[154] Error is therefore,\naccording to Epicurus, only a displacement of the pictures in us, which\ndoes not proceed from the movement of perception, but rather from this,\nthat we check their influence by a movement originating in ourselves;\nhow this interruption is brought about will be shown more fully later\non (pp. 290, 300).\n\nThe Epicurean theory of knowledge reduces itself to these few passages,\nsome of which are also obscurely expressed, or else not very happily\nselected or quoted by Diogenes La\u00ebrtius; it is impossible to have a\ntheory less explicitly stated. Knowledge, on the side of thought, is\ndetermined merely as a particular movement which makes an interruption;\nand as Epicurus, as we have already seen, looks on things as made up\nof a multitude of atoms, thought is the moment which is different from\nthe atoms, the vacuum, the pores, whereby resistance to this stream of\natoms is rendered possible. If this negative is also again, as soul,\naffirmative, Epicurus in the notional determination of thinking has\nonly reached this negativity, that we look away from something, _i.e._\nwe interrupt that inflowing stream. The answer to the question of\nwhat this interrupting movement exactly is, when taken for itself, is\nconnected with the more advanced conceptions of Epicurus; and in order\nto discuss them more in detail, we must go back to the implicit basis\nof his system.\n\nThis constitutes on the whole the metaphysic of Epicurus; in it he has\nexpounded his doctrine of the atom, but not with greater definiteness\nthan did Leucippus and Democritus. The essence and the truth of things\nwere to him, as they were to them, atoms and vacuum: \u201cAtoms have no\nproperties except figure, weight and magnitude.\u201d Atoms, as atoms, must\nremain undetermined; but the Atomists have been forced to take the\ninconsistent course of ascribing properties to them: the quantitative\nproperties of magnitude and figure, the qualitative property of\nweight. But that which is in itself altogether indivisible can have\nneither figure nor magnitude; and even weight, direction upon something\nelse, is opposed to the abstract repulsion of the atom. Epicurus even\nsays: \u201cEvery property is liable to change, but the atoms change not. In\nall dissolutions of the composite, something must remain a constant and\nindissoluble, which no change can transform into that which is not, or\nbring from non-being into Being. This unchangeable element, therefore,\nis constituted by some bodies and figures. The properties are a certain\nrelation of atoms to each other.\u201d[155] In like manner we have already\nseen with Aristotle (p. 178) that the tangible is the foundation of\nproperties: a distinction which under various forms is still always\nmade and is in common use. We mean by this that an opposition is\nestablished between fundamental properties, such as we here have in\nweight, figure and magnitude, and sensuous properties, which are\nonly in relation to us, and are derived from the former original\ndifferences. This has frequently been understood as if weight were in\nthings, while the other properties were only in our senses: but, in\ngeneral, the former is the moment of the implicit, or the abstract\nessence of the thing, while the latter is its concrete existence, which\nexpresses its relation to other things.\n\nThe important matter now would be to indicate the relation of atoms to\nsensuous appearance, to allow essence to pass over into the negative:\nbut here Epicurus rambles amidst the indeterminate which expresses\nnothing; for we perceive in him, as in the other physicists, nothing\nbut an unconscious medley of abstract ideas and realities. All\nparticular forms, all objects, light, colour, &c., the soul itself\neven, are nothing but a certain arrangement of these atoms. This is\nwhat Locke also said, and even now Physical Science declares that\nthe basis of things is found in molecules, which are arranged in a\ncertain manner in space. But these are empty words, and a crystal,\nfor instance, is not a certain arrangement of parts, which gives this\nfigure. It is thus not worth while to deal with this relation of atoms;\nfor it is an altogether formal way of speaking, as when Epicurus again\nconcedes that figure and magnitude, in so far as pertaining to atoms,\nare something different from what they are as they appear in things.\nThe two are not altogether unlike; the one, implicit magnitude, has\nsomething in common with apparent magnitude. The latter is transitory,\nvariable; the former has no interrupted parts,[156] that is, nothing\nnegative. But the determination of the atoms, as originally formed in\nthis or that fashion, and having original magnitude of such and such\na kind, is a purely arbitrary invention. That interruption, which we\nregarded above (p. 288) as the other side to atoms, or as vacuum, is\nthe principle of movement: for the movement of thought is also like\nthis and has interruptions. Thought in man is the very same as atoms\nand vacuum are in things, namely their inward essence; that is to say,\natoms and vacuum belong to the movement of thought, or exist for this\nin the same way as things are in their essential nature. The movement\nof thinking is thus the province of the atoms of the soul; so that\nthere takes place simultaneously therein an interruption of the inward\nflow of atoms from without. There is therefore nothing further to be\nseen in this than the general principle of the positive and negative,\nso that even thought is affected by a negative principle, the moment of\ninterruption. This principle of the Epicurean system, further applied\nto the difference in things, is the most arbitrary and therefore the\nmost wearisome that can be imagined.\n\nBesides their different figures, atoms have also, as the fundamental\nmode in which they are affected, a difference of movement, caused\nby their weight; but this movement to some extent deviates from the\nstraight line in its direction. That is to say, Epicurus ascribes\nto atoms a curvilinear movement, in order that they may impinge\non one another and so on.[157] In this way there arise particular\naccumulations and configurations; and these are things.\n\nOther physical properties, such as taste and smell, have their basis\nagain in another arrangement of the molecules. But there is no bridge\nfrom this to that, or what results is simply empty tautology, according\nto which the parts are arranged and combined as is requisite in order\nthat their appearance may be what it is. The transition to bodies\nof concrete appearance Epicurus has either not made at all, or what\nhas been cited from him as far as this matter is concerned, taken by\nitself, is extremely meagre.\n\nThe opinion that one hears expressed respecting the Epicurean\nphilosophy is in other respects not unfavourable; and for this reason\nsome further details must be given regarding it. For since absolute\nBeing is constituted by atoms scattered and disintegrated, and by\nvacuum, it directly follows that Epicurus denies to these atoms any\nrelationship to one another which implies purpose. All that we call\nforms and organisms, or generally speaking, the unity of Nature\u2019s\nend, in his way of thinking, belongs to qualities, to an external\nconnection of the configurations of the atoms, which in this way is\nmerely an accident, brought about by their chance-directed motion; the\natoms accordingly form a merely superficial unity, and one which is\nnot essential to them. Or else Epicurus altogether denies that Notion\nand the Universal are the essential, and because all originations are\nto him chance combinations, for him their resolution is just as much\na matter of chance. The divided is the first and the truly existent,\nbut at the same time chance or external necessity is the law which\ndominates all cohesion. That Epicurus should in this fashion declare\nhimself against a universal end in the world, against every relation\nof purpose\u2014as, for instance, the inherent conformity to purpose of the\norganism\u2014and, further, against the teleological representations of the\nwisdom of a Creator in the world, his government, &c., is a matter of\ncourse; for he abrogates unity, whatever be the manner in which we\nrepresent it, whether as Nature\u2019s end in itself, or as end which is\nin another, but is carried out in Nature. In contrast to this, the\nteleological view enters largely into the philosophy of the Stoics,\nand is there very fully developed. To show that conformity to an end\nis lacking, Epicurus brings forward the most trivial examples; for\ninstance, that worms and so on are produced by chance from mud through\nthe warmth of the sun. Taken in their entirety, they may very well be\nthe work of chance in relation to others; but what is implicit in them,\ntheir Notion and essence is something organic: and the comprehension of\nthis is what we have now to consider. But Epicurus banishes thought as\nimplicit, without its occurring to him that his atoms themselves have\nthis very nature of thought; that is, their existence in time is not\nimmediate but essentially mediate, and thus negative or universal;\u2014the\nfirst and only inconsistency that we find in Epicurus, and one which\nall empiricists are guilty of. The Stoics take the opposite course of\nfinding essential Being in the object of thought or the universal; and\nthey fail equally in reaching the content, temporal existence, which,\nhowever, they most inconsistently assume. We have here the metaphysics\nof Epicurus; nothing that he says farther on this head is of interest.\n\n\n3. PHYSICS.\n\nThe natural philosophy of Epicurus is based on the above foundation;\nbut an aspect of interest is given it by the fact that it is still\npeculiarly the method of our times; his thoughts on particular aspects\nof Nature are, however, in themselves feeble and of little weight,\ncontaining nothing but an ill-considered medley of all manner of loose\nconceptions. Going further, the principle of the manner in which\nEpicurus looks on nature, lies in the conceptions he forms, which we\nhave already had before us (pp. 282, 285). That is to say, the general\nrepresentations which we receive through the repetition of several\nperceptions, and to which we relate such perceptions in forming an\nopinion, must be then applied to that which is not exactly matter of\nperception, but yet has something in common with what we can perceive.\nIn this way it comes about that by such images we can apprehend the\nunknown which does not lend itself immediately to perception; for from\nwhat is known we must argue to what is unknown. This is nothing else\nbut saying that Epicurus judged by analogy, or that he makes so-called\nevidence the principle of his view of Nature; and this is the principle\nwhich to this day has authority in ordinary physical science. We go\nthrough experiences and make observations, these arising from the\nsensuous perceptions which are apt to be overlooked. Thus we reach\ngeneral concepts, laws, forces, and so on, electricity and magnetism,\nfor instance, and these are then applied by us to such objects and\nactivities as we cannot ourselves directly perceive. As an example, we\nknow about the nerves and their connection with the brain; in order\nthat there may be feeling and so on, it is said that a transmission\nfrom the finger-tips to the brain takes place. But how can we represent\nthis to ourselves? We cannot make it a matter of observation. By\nanatomy we can lay bare the nerves, it is true, but not the manner\nof their working. We represent these to ourselves on the analogy of\nother phenomena of transmission, for instance as the vibration of a\ntense string that passes through the nerves to the brain. As in the\nwell-known phenomenon of a number of billiard balls set close together\nin a row, the last of which rolls away when the first is struck, while\nthose in the middle, through each of which the effect of the stroke has\nbeen communicated to the next, scarcely seem to move, so we represent\nto ourselves the nerves as consisting of tiny balls which are invisible\neven through the strongest magnifying glass, and fancy that at every\ntouch, &c., the last springs off and strikes the soul. In the same way\nlight is represented as filaments, rays, or as vibrations of the ether,\nor as globules of ether, each of which strikes on the other. This is an\nanalogy quite in the manner of Epicurus.\n\nIn giving such explanations as those above, Epicurus professed to\nbe most liberal, fair and tolerant, saying that all the different\nconceptions which occur to us in relation to sensuous objects\u2014at our\npleasure, we may say,\u2014can be referred to that which we cannot ourselves\ndirectly observe; we should not assert any one way to be the right one,\nfor many ways may be so. In so saying, Epicurus is talking idly; his\nwords fall on the ear and the fancy, but looked on more narrowly they\ndisappear. So, for instance, we see the moon shine, without being able\nto have any nearer experience of it. On this subject Epicurus says:\n\u201cThe moon may have its own light, or a light borrowed from the sun; for\neven on earth we see things which shine of themselves, and many which\nare illuminated by others. Nothing hinders us from observing heavenly\nthings in the light of various previous experiences, and from adopting\nhypotheses and explanations in accordance with these. The waxing and\nwaning of the moon may also be caused by the revolution of this body,\nor through changes in the air\u201d (according as vapour is modified in one\nway or another), \u201cor also by means of adding and taking away somewhat:\nin short, in all the ways whereby that which has a certain appearance\nto us is caused to show such appearance.\u201d Thus there are to be found in\nEpicurus all these trivialities of friction, concussion, &c., as when\nhe gives his opinion of lightning on the analogy of how we see fire of\nother kinds kindled: \u201cLightning is explained by quite a large number\nof possible conceptions; for instance, that through the friction and\ncollision of clouds the figuration of fire is emitted, and lightning\nis produced.\u201d In precisely the same way modern physicists transfer the\nproduction of an electric spark, when glass and silk are rubbed against\neach other, to the clouds. For, as we see a spark both in lightning and\nelectricity, we conclude from this circumstance common to both that the\ntwo are analogical; therefore, we come to the conclusion that lightning\nalso is an electric phenomenon. But clouds are not hard bodies, and\nby moisture electricity is more likely to be dispersed; therefore,\nsuch talk has just as little truth in it as the fancy of Epicurus. He\ngoes on to say: \u201cOr lightning may also be produced by being expelled\nfrom the clouds by means of the airy bodies which form lightning\u2014by\nbeing struck out when the clouds are pressed together either by each\nother or by the wind,\u201d &c. With the Stoics things are not much better.\nApplication of sensuous conceptions according to analogy is often\ntermed comprehension or explanation, but in reality there is in such\na process not the faintest approach to thought or comprehension. \u201cOne\nman,\u201d adds Epicurus, \u201cmay select; one of these modes, and reject the\nothers, not considering what is possible for man to know, and what is\nimpossible, and therefore striving to attain to a knowledge of the\nunknowable.\u201d[158]\n\nThis application of sensuous images to what has a certain similarity\nto them, is pronounced to be the basis and the knowledge of the\ncause, because, in his opinion, a transference such as this cannot\nbe corroborated by the testimony of mere immediate sensation; thus\nthe Stoic method of seeking a basis in thought is excluded, and in\nthis respect the mode of explanation adopted by Epicurus is directly\nopposed to that of the Stoics. One circumstance which strikes us at\nonce in Epicurus is the lack of observation and experience with regard\nto the mutual relations of bodies: but the kernel of the matter, the\nprinciple, is nothing else than the principle of modern physics. This\nmethod of Epicurus has been attacked and derided, but on this score no\none need be ashamed of or fight shy of it, if he is a physicist; for\nwhat Epicurus says is not a whit worse than what the moderns assert.\nIndeed, in the case of Epicurus the satisfactory assurance is likewise\nalways present of his emphasizing the fact most strongly that just\nbecause the evidence of the senses is found to be lacking, we must\nnot take our stand on any one analogy. Elsewhere he in the same way\nmakes light of analogy, and when one person accepts this possibility\nand another that other possibility, he admires the cleverness of the\nsecond and troubles himself little about the explanation given by\nthe first; it may be so, or it may not be so.[159] This is a method\ndevoid of reason, which reaches no further than to general conceptions.\nNevertheless, if Physical Science is considered to relate to immediate\nexperience on the one hand, and, on the other hand\u2014in respect of that\nwhich cannot be immediately experienced\u2014to relate to the application\nof the above according to a resemblance existing between it and that\nwhich is not matter of experience, in that case Epicurus may well be\nlooked on as the chief promoter, if not the originator of this method,\nand also as having asserted that it is identical with knowledge. Of the\nEpicurean method in philosophy we may say this, that it likewise has\na side on which it possesses value, and we may in some measure assent\nwhen we hear, as we frequently do, the Epicurean physics favourably\nspoken of. Aristotle and the earlier philosophers took their start in\nnatural philosophy from universal thought _a priori_, and from this\ndeveloped the Notion; this is the one side. The other side, which is\njust as necessary, demands that experience should be worked up into\nuniversality, that laws should be found out; that is to say, that the\nresult which follows from the abstract Idea should coincide with the\ngeneral conception to which experience and observation have led up.\nThe _a priori_ is with Aristotle, for instance, most excellent but not\nsufficient, because to it there is lacking connection with and relation\nto experience and observation. This leading up of the particular to the\nuniversal is the finding out of laws, natural forces, and so on. It may\nthus be said that Epicurus is the inventor of empiric Natural Science,\nof empiric Psychology. In contrast to the Stoic ends, conceptions of\nthe understanding, experience is the present as it appears to the\nsenses: there we have abstract limited understanding, without truth\nin itself, and therefore without the present in time and the reality\nof Nature; here we have this sense of Nature, which is more true than\nthese other hypotheses.\n\nThe same effect which followed the rise of a knowledge of natural laws,\n&c., in the modern world was produced by the Epicurean philosophy in\nits own sphere, that is to say, in so far as it is directed against\nthe arbitrary invention of causes. The more, in later times, men\nmade acquaintance with the laws of Nature, the more superstition,\nmiracles, astrology, &c. disappeared; all this fades away owing to\nthe contradiction offered to it by the knowledge of natural laws. The\nmethod of Epicurus was directed more especially against the senseless\nsuperstition of astrology, &c., in whose methods there is neither\nreason nor thought, for it is quite a thing of the imagination,\ndownright fabrication being resorted to, or what we may even term\nlying. In contrast with this, the way in which Epicurus works, when\nthe conceptions and not thought are concerned, accords with truth. For\nit does not go beyond what is perceived by the sight, and hearing,\nand the other senses, but keeps to what is present and not alien to\nthe mind, not speaking of certain things as if they could be seen and\nheard, when that is quite impossible, seeing that the things are pure\ninventions. The effect of the Epicurean philosophy in its own time was\ntherefore this, that it set itself against the superstition of the\nGreeks and Romans, and elevated men above it.[160] All the nonsense\nabout birds flying to right or to left, or a hare running across the\npath, or men deciding how they are to act according to the entrails of\nanimals, or according as chickens are lively or dull\u2014all that kind of\nsuperstition the Epicurean philosophy made short work of, by permitting\nthat only to be accepted as truth which is counted as true by sense\nperception through the instrumentality of anticipations; and from it\nmore than anything those conceptions which have altogether denied the\nsupersensuous have proceeded. The physics of Epicurus were therefore\nfamous for the reason that they introduced more enlightened views\nin regard to what is physical, and banished the fear of the gods.\nSuperstition passes straightway from immediate appearances to God,\nangels, demons; or it expects from finite things other effects than the\nconditions admit of, phenomena of a higher kind. To this the Epicurean\nnatural philosophy is utterly opposed, because in the sphere of the\nfinite it refuses to go beyond the finite, and admits finite causes\nalone; for the so-called enlightenment is the fact of remaining in the\nsphere of the finite. There connection is sought for in other finite\nthings, in conditions which are themselves conditioned; superstition,\non the contrary, rightly or wrongly, passes at once to what is above\nus. However correct the Epicurean method may be in the sphere of\nthe conditioned, it is not so in other spheres. Thus if I say that\nelectricity comes from God, I am right and yet wrong. For if I ask for\na cause in this same sphere of the conditioned, and give God as answer,\nI say too much; though this answer fits all questions, since God is\nthe cause of everything, what I would know here is the particular\nconnection of the phenomenon. On the other hand, in this sphere even\nthe Notion is already something higher; but this loftier way of looking\nat things which we met with in the earlier philosophers, was quite put\nan end to by Epicurus, since with superstition there also passed away\nself-dependent connection and the world of the Ideal.\n\nTo the natural philosophy of Epicurus there also belongs his conception\nof the soul, which he looks on as having the nature of a thing, just\nas the theories of our own day regard it as nerve-filaments, cords\nin tension, or rows of minute balls (p. 294). His description of the\nsoul has therefore but little meaning, since here also he draws his\nconclusion by analogy, and connects therewith the metaphysical theory\nof atoms: \u201cThe soul consists of the finest and roundest atoms, which\nare something quite different from fire, being a fine spirit which\nis distributed through the whole aggregate of the body, and partakes\nof its warmth.\u201d Epicurus has consequently established a quantitative\ndifference only, since these finest atoms are surrounded by a mass of\ncoarser atoms and dispersed through this larger aggregate. \u201cThe part\nwhich is devoid of reason is dispersed in the body\u201d as the principle\nof life, \u201cbut the self-conscious part (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd) is in the breast,\nas may be perceived from joy and sadness. The soul is capable of much\nchange in itself, owing to the fineness of its parts, which can move\nvery rapidly: it sympathizes with the rest of the aggregate, as we see\nby the thoughts, emotions and so on; but when it is taken away from us\nwe die. But the soul, on its part, has also the greatest sympathy with\nsensuous perception; yet it would have nothing in common with it, were\nit not in a certain measure covered by the rest of the aggregate\u201d (the\nbody)\u2014an utterly illogical conception. \u201cThe rest of this aggregate,\nwhich this principle provides for the soul, is thereby also partaker,\non its part, of a like condition\u201d (sensuous perception), \u201cyet not of\nall that the former possesses; therefore, when the soul escapes,\nsensuous perception exists no more for it. The aggregate spoken of\nabove has not this power in itself, but derives it from the other which\nis brought into union with it, and the sentient movement comes to pass\nthrough the flow of sympathy which they have in common.\u201d[161] Of such\nconceptions it is impossible to make anything. The above-mentioned\n(p. 287) interruption of the streaming together of images of external\nthings with our organs, as the ground of error, is now explained by\nthe theory that the soul consists of peculiar atoms, and the atoms\nare separated from one another by vacuum. With such empty words and\nmeaningless conceptions we shall no longer detain ourselves; we can\nhave no respect for the philosophic thoughts of Epicurus, or rather he\nhas no thoughts for us to respect.\n\n\n4. ETHICS.\n\nBesides this description of the soul the philosophy of mind contains\nthe ethics of Epicurus, which of all his doctrines are the most\ndecried, and therefore the most interesting; they may, however,\nalso be said to constitute the best part of that philosophy. The\npractical philosophy of Epicurus depends on the individuality of\nself-consciousness, just as much as does that of the Stoics; and the\nend of his ethics is in a measure the same, the unshaken tranquillity\nof the soul, and more particularly an undisturbed pure enjoyment of\nitself. Of course, if we regard the abstract principle involved in\nthe ethics of Epicurus, our verdict cannot be other than exceedingly\nunfavourable. For if sensation, the feeling of pain and pleasure, is\nthe criterion for the right, good, true, for that which man should\nmake his aim in life, morality is really abrogated, or the moral\nprinciple is in fact not moral; at least we hold that the way is\nthereby opened up to all manner of arbitrariness in action. If it is\nnow alleged that feeling is the ground of action, and that because I\nfind a certain impulse in myself it is for that reason right\u2014this is\nEpicurean reasoning. Everyone may have different feelings, and the\nsame person, may feel differently at different times; in the same way\nwith Epicurus it may be left to the subjectivity of the individual to\ndetermine the course of action. But it is of importance to notice this,\nthat when Epicurus sets tip pleasure as the end, he concedes this only\nso far as its enjoyment is the result of philosophy. We have before now\nremarked (vol. i., p. 470) that even with the Cyrenaics, while on the\none hand sensation was certainly made the principle, on the other hand\nit was essential that thought should be in intimate connection with\nit. Similarly it is the case with Epicurus that while he designated\npleasure as the criterion of the good, he demanded a highly cultured\nconsciousness, a power of reflection, which weighs pleasure to see if\nit is not combined with a greater degree of pain, and in this way forms\na correct estimate of what it is. Diogenes La\u00ebrtius (X. 144) quotes\nfrom him with regard to this point of view: \u201cThe wise man owes but\nlittle to chance; Reason attains what is of the greatest consequence,\nand both directs it and will direct it his whole life long.\u201d The\nparticular pleasure is therefore regarded only with reference to the\nwhole, and sensuous perception is not the one and only principle of\nthe Epicureans; but while they made pleasure the principle, they made\na principle at the same time of that happiness which is attained,\nand only attainable by reason; so that this happiness is to be\nsought in such a way that it may be free and independent of external\ncontingencies, the contingencies of sensation. The true Epicureans were\ntherefore, just as much as the Stoics, raised above all particular\nties, for Epicurus, too, made his aim the undisturbed tranquillity of\nthe wise man. In order to be free from superstition Epicurus specially\nrequires physical science, as it sets men free from all the opinions\nwhich most disturb their rest\u2014opinions regarding the gods, and their\npunishments, and more particularly from the thought of death.[162]\nFreed from all this fear, and from the imaginings of the men who make\nany particular object their end and aim, the wise man seeks pleasure\nonly as something universal, and holds this alone to be positive. Here\nthe universal and the particular meet; or the particular, regarded only\nin its bearings to the whole, is raised into the form of universality.\nThus it happens that, while materially, or as to content, Epicurus\nmakes individuality a principle, on the other hand he requires the\nuniversality of thinking, and his philosophy is thus in accordance with\nthat of the Stoics.\n\nSeneca, who is known as a thorough-going and uncompromising Stoic, when\nin his treatise _De Vita Beata_ (c. 12, 13) he happens to speak of the\nEpicureans, gives testimony which is above suspicion to the ethical\nsystem of Epicurus: \u201cMy verdict is, however\u2014and in thus speaking I\ngo, to some extent, against many of my own countrymen\u2014that the moral\nprecepts of Epicurus prescribe a way of life that is holy and just,\nand, when closely considered, even sorrowful. For every pleasure of\nEpicurus turns on something very paltry and poor, and we scarcely know\nhow restricted it is, and how insipid. The self-same law which we lay\ndown for virtue he prescribes for pleasure; he requires that Nature be\nobeyed; but very little in the way of luxury is required to satisfy\nNature. What have we then here? He who calls a lazy, self-indulgent,\nand dissolute life happiness merely seeks a good authority for a thing\nthat is evil, and while, drawn on by a dazzling name, he turns in the\ndirection where he hears the praise of pleasure sounding, he does not\nfollow the pleasures to which he is invited by Epicurus, but those\nwhich he himself brings with him. Men who thus abandon themselves\nto crime seek only to hide their wickedness under the mantle of\nphilosophy, and to furnish for their excesses a pretext and an excuse.\nThus it is by no means permitted that youth should hold up its head\nagain for the reason that to the laxity of its morality an honourable\ntitle has been affixed.\u201d By the employment of our reflective powers,\nwhich keep guard over pleasure and consider whether there can be any\nenjoyment in that which is fraught with dangers, fear, anxiety and\nother troubles, the possibility of our obtaining pleasure pure and\nunalloyed is reduced to a minimum. The principle of Epicurus is to live\nin freedom and ease, and with the mind at rest, and to this end it is\nneedful to renounce much of that which men allow to sway them, and in\nwhich they find their pleasure. The life of a Stoic is therefore but\nlittle different from that of an Epicurean who keeps well before his\neyes what Epicurus enjoins.\n\nIt might perhaps occur to us that the Cyrenaics had the same moral\nprinciple as the Epicureans, but Diogenes La\u00ebrtius (X. 139, 136, 137)\nshows us the difference that there was between them. The Cyrenaics\nrather made pleasure as a particular thing their end, while Epicurus,\non the contrary, regarded it as a means, since he asserted painlessness\nto be pleasure, and allowed of no intermediate state. \u201cNeither do the\nCyrenaics recognize pleasure in rest (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03bd), but only in the\ndetermination of motion,\u201d or as something affirmative, that consists\nin the enjoyment of the pleasant; \u201cEpicurus, on the contrary, admits\nboth\u2014the pleasure of the body as well as that of the soul.\u201d He meant\nby this that pleasure in rest is negative, as the absence of the\nunpleasant, and also an inward contentment, whereby rest is maintained\nwithin the mind. Epicurus explained these two kinds of pleasure more\nclearly as follows: \u201cFreedom from fear and desire (\u1f00\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03af\u03b1) and from\npain and trouble (\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1) are the passive pleasures (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f76\u03b1\n\u1f21\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03af),\u201d\u2014the setting of our affections on nothing which we may run the\nrisk of losing; pleasures of the senses, on the other hand, like \u201cjoy\nand mirth (\u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7), are pleasures involving movement\n(\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u03b2\u03bb\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.9)\u201d The former pleasures Epicurus held\nto be the truest and highest. \u201cBesides this, pain of the body was held\nby the Cyrenaics to be worse than sorrow of the soul, while with the\nEpicureans this is reversed.\u201d\n\nThe main teaching of Epicurus in respect of morals is contained in a\nletter to Men\\nceus, which Diogenes La\u00ebrtius has preserved, and in\nwhich Epicurus expresses himself as follows: \u201cThe youth must neither\nbe slow to study philosophy, nor must the old man feel it a burden,\nfor no one is either too young or too old to study the health of his\nsoul. We must therefore endeavour to find out wherein the happy life\nconsists; the following are its elements: First, we must hold that\nGod is a living Being, incorruptible and happy, as the general belief\nsupposes Him to be; and that nothing is lacking to His incorruptibility\nnor to His happiness. But though the existence of the gods is known\nto be a fact, yet they are not such as the multitude suppose them to\nbe. He is therefore not impious who discards his faith in the gods of\nthe multitude, but he who applies to them the opinions entertained of\nthem by the mass.\u201d By these gods of Epicurus we can understand nothing\nelse than the Holy, the Universal, in concrete form. The Stoics held\nmore to the ordinary conception, without indeed giving much thought\nto the Being of God; with the Epicureans, on the other hand, the gods\nexpress an immediate Idea of the system. Epicurus says: \u201cThat which is\nholy and incorruptible has itself no trouble nor causes it to others;\ntherefore it is unstirred by either anger or show of favour, for it is\nin weakness only that such find a place. The gods may be known by means\nof Reason; they consist partly in Number; others are the perfected\ntype of man, which, owing to the similarity of the images, arises\nfrom the continuous confluence of like images on one and the same\nsubject.\u201d[163] The gods are thus the altogether general images which\nwe receive into ourselves; and Cicero says (De Natura Deorum, 18, 38)\nthat they come singly upon us in sleep. This general image, which is\nat the same time an anthropomorphic conception, is the same to which\nwe give the name of Ideal, only that here the source assigned to it is\nthe reiterated occurrence of images. The gods thus seem to Epicurus to\nbe Ideals of the holy life; they are also existent things, consisting\nof the finest atoms; they are, however, pure souls, unmixed with any\ngrosser element, and therefore exempt from toil and trouble and pain.\nTheir self-enjoyment is wholly passive, as it must be if consistent,\nfor action has always in it something alien, the opposition of itself\nand reality, and the toil and trouble which are involved in it really\nrepresent the aspect of consciousness of opposition rather than that\nof realization. The gods lead an existence of pure and passive self\nenjoyment, and trouble themselves not with the affairs of the world\nand of men. Epicurus goes on to say: \u201cMen must pay reverence to the\ngods on account of the perfection of their nature and their surpassing\nholiness, not in order to gain from them some special good, or for the\nsake of this or that advantage,\u201d[164] The manner in which Epicurus\nrepresents the gods as corporeal Beings in human likeness has been\nmuch derided; thus Cicero, for instance, in the passage quoted (c. 18)\nlaughs at Epicurus for alleging that the gods have only _quasi_ bodies,\nflesh and blood. But from this there follows only that they are, as it\nwere, the implicit, as we see it stated of the soul and things palpable\nto the senses, that they have behind them what is implicit. Our talk\nof qualities is no better; for if justice, goodness, and so on, are to\nbe taken _in sensu eminentiori_, and not as they are with men, we have\nin God a Being in the same way possessed of only something resembling\njustice and the other qualities. With this there is closely connected\nthe theory of Epicurus that the gods dwell in vacant space, in the\nintermediate spaces of the world, where they are exposed neither to\nrain or wind or snow or the like.[165] For the intermediate spaces are\nthe vacuum, wherein, as the principle of movement, are the atoms in\nthemselves. Worlds, as phenomena, are complete continuous concretions\nof such atoms, but concretions which are only external relations.\nBetween them, as in vacuum, there are thus these Beings also, which\nthemselves are certainly concretions of atoms, but concretions which\nremain implicit. Yet this leads only to confusion, if a closer\ndefinition is given, for concretion constitutes what is for the senses,\nbut the gods, even if they were concretions, would not be realities\nexactly such as these. In illogical fashion the general, the implicit,\nis taken out of reality and set above it, not as atoms, but just as\nbefore, as a combination of these atoms; in this way this combination\nis not itself the sensuous. This seems ridiculous, but it is connected\nwith the interruptions spoken of, and with the relation of the vacuum\nto the plenum, the atom. So far, therefore, the gods belong to the\ncategory of negativity as against sensuality, and as this negative is\nthought, in that sense what Epicurus said of the gods may still to\nsome extent be said. To this determination of God a larger measure of\nobjectivity of course belongs, but it is a perfectly correct assertion\nthat God, as Thought, is a holy Being, to whom reverence is due for\nHis own sake alone. The first element in a happy life is therefore\nreverence for the gods, uninfluenced by fear or hope.\n\nFurther, a second point with Epicurus is the contemplation of death,\nthe negative of existence, of self-consciousness in man; he requires\nus to have a true conception of death, because otherwise it disturbs\nour tranquillity. He accordingly says: \u201cAccustom thyself then to the\nthought that death concerns us not; for all good and evil is a matter\nof sensation, but death is a deprivation (\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) of sensation.\nTherefore the true reflection that death is no concern of ours,\nmakes our mortal life one of enjoyment, since this thought does not\nadd an endless length of days, but does away with the longing after\nimmortality. For nothing in life has terrors for him who has once truly\nrecognized the fact that not to live is not a matter of dread. Thus it\nis a vain thing to fear death, not because its presence but because\nthe anticipation of it brings us pain. For how can the anticipation\nof a thing pain us when its reality does not? There is therefore in\ndeath nothing to trouble us. For when we are in life, death is not\nthere, and when death is there, we are not. Therefore death does not\nconcern either the living or the dead.\u201d This is quite correct, if we\nlook at the immediate; it is a thought full of meaning, and drives away\nfear. Mere privation, which death is, is not to be confounded with the\nfeeling of being alive, which is positive; and there is no reason for\nworrying oneself about it. \u201cBut the future in general is neither ours,\nnor is it not ours; hence we must not count upon it as something that\nwill come to pass, nor yet despair of it, as if it would not come to\npass.\u201d[166] It is no concern of ours either that it is or that it is\nnot; and it need not therefore cause us uneasiness. This the right way\nin which to regard the future also.\n\nEpicurus passes on to speak of impulses, saying: \u201cThis moreover is\nto be kept in mind, that amongst impulses some are natural, but\nothers are vain; and of those that are natural some are necessary\nwhile others are natural only. Those that are necessary are either\nnecessary to happiness, or tend to save the body from pain, or to\nself-preservation in general. The perfect theory teaches how to choose\nthat which promotes health of body and steadfastness of soul, and how\nto reject what impairs them, this being the aim of the holy life.\nThis is the end of all our actions, to have neither pain of body nor\nuneasiness of mind. If we but attain to this, all turmoil of the soul\nis stilled, since the life no longer has to strive after something\nwhich it needs, and no longer has to seek anything outside of itself\nby which the welfare of soul and body is arrived at. But even on the\nsupposition that pleasure is the first and the inborn good, we do not\nfor that reason choose all pleasures, but many we renounce, when they\nare more than counterbalanced by their painful results; and many pains\nwe prefer to pleasures, if there follows from them a pleasure that\nis greater. Contentment we hold to be a good, not that we may aim at\nmerely reducing our requirements to a minimum, as the Cynics did, but\nthat we may seek not to be discontented even when we have not very\nmuch, knowing that they most enjoy abundance who can do without it, and\nthat what is naturally desired is easy to procure, while what is a mere\nidle fancy can be procured only with difficulty. Simple dishes afford\njust as much enjoyment as costly banquets, if they appease hunger.\nTherefore when we make pleasure our aim, it is not the enjoyments of\nthe gourmand, as is often falsely thought, but freedom from both pain\nof body and uneasiness of mind. We attain to this life of happiness by\nsober reason alone, which examines the grounds of all choice and all\nrejection, and expels the thoughts by which the soul\u2019s rest is most\ndisturbed. It is surely better to be unhappy and reasonable than to be\nhappy and unreasonable; for it is better that in our actions we should\njudge correctly than that we should be favoured by luck. Meditate on\nthis day and night, and let thyself be shaken by nought from thy peace\nof soul, that thou mayest live as a god amongst men; for the man who\nlives amongst such imperishable treasures has nothing in common with\nmortal men. Of all those the first and foremost is reasonableness\n(\u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), which on this account is still more excellent than\nphilosophy; from it spring all the other virtues. For they show that\none cannot live happily, unless he lives wisely and honourably and\njustly: nor can he live wisely and honourably and justly without living\nhappily.\u201d[167]\n\nTherefore, although at first sight there seems not much to be said for\nthe principle of Epicurus, nevertheless by means of the inversion of\nmaking the guiding principle to be found in thought proceeding from\nReason, it passes into Stoicism, as even Seneca himself has admitted\n(_v. supra_, pp. 302, 303); and actually the same result is reached\nas with the Stoics. Hence the Epicureans describe their wise man in\nat least as glowing terms as the Stoics do theirs; and in both these\nsystems the wise man is depicted with the same qualities, these being\nnegative. With the Stoics the Universal is the essential principle,\u2014not\npleasure, the self-consciousness of the particular as particular; but\nthe reality of this self-consciousness is equally something pleasant.\nWith the Epicureans pleasure is the essential principle, but pleasure\nsought and enjoyed in such a way that it is pure and unalloyed, that\nis to say, in accordance with sound judgment, and with no greater evil\nfollowing to destroy it: therefore pleasure is regarded in its whole\nextent, that is, as being itself a universal. In Diogenes La\u00ebrtius,\nhowever (X. 117-121), the Epicurean delineation of the wise man has a\ncharacter of greater mildness; he shapes his conduct more according to\nlaws already in operation, while the Stoic wise man, on the other hand,\ndoes not take these into account at all. The Epicurean wise man is less\ncombative than the Stoic, because the latter makes his starting-point\nthe thought of self-dependence, which, while denying self, exercises\nactivity: the Epicureans, on the other hand, proceed from the thought\nof existence, which is not so exacting, and seeks not so much this\nactivity directed outwards, as rest; this, however, is not won by\nlethargy, but by the highest mental culture. Yet although the content\nof the Epicurean philosophy, its aim and result, stands thus on as high\na level as the Stoic philosophy, and is its exact parallel, the two\nare nevertheless in other respects directly opposed to one another;\nbut each of these systems is one-sided, and therefore both of them\nare dogmatisms inconsistent with themselves by the necessity of the\nNotion, that is, they contain the contrary principle within them. The\nStoics take the content of their thought from Being, from the sensuous,\ndemanding that thought should be the thought of something existent: the\nEpicureans, on the contrary, extend their particularity of existence\nto the atoms which are only things of thought, and to pleasure as a\nuniversal; but in accordance with their respective principles, both\nschools know themselves to be definitely opposed to each other.\n\nThe negative mean to these one-sided principles is the Notion, which,\nabrogating fixed extremes of determination such as these, moves them\nand sets them free from a mere state of opposition. This movement of\nthe Notion, the revival of dialectic\u2014directed as it is against these\none-sided principles of abstract thinking and sensation\u2014we now see in\nits negative aspect, both in the New Academy and in the Sceptics. Even\nthe Stoics, as having their principle in thought, cultivated dialectic,\nthough theirs was (pp. 254, 255) a common logic, in which the form of\nsimplicity passes for the Notion, while the Notion, as such, represents\nthe negative element in it, and dissolves the determinations, which are\ntaken up into that simplicity. There is a higher form of the Notion of\ndialectic reality, which not only applies itself to sensuous existence,\nbut also to determinate Notions, and which brings to consciousness the\nopposition between thought and existence; not expressing the Universal\nas simple Idea, but as a universality in which all comes back into\nconsciousness as an essential moment of existence. In Scepticism we now\nreally have an abrogation of the two one-sided systems that we have\nhitherto dealt with; but this negative remains negative only, and is\nincapable of passing into an affirmative.\n\n\nC. THE NEW ACADEMY.\n\nAs opposed to the Stoic and Epicurean Dogmatism, we first of all have\nthe New Academy, which is a continuation of Plato\u2019s Academy in as far\nas the followers of Plato are divided into the Old, Middle, and New\nAcademies; some indeed allow of a fourth Academy and even a fifth.[168]\nThe most noteworthy figures here are those of Arcesilaus and Carneades.\nThe establishment of the Middle Academy is ascribed to Arcesilaus,\nand the New Academy is said to contain the philosophy of Carneades;\nbut this distinction has no signification. Both of these are closely\nconnected with Scepticism, and the Sceptics themselves have often\ntrouble in distinguishing their standpoint from the Academic principle.\nBoth have been claimed by Scepticism as Sceptics, but between the\nAcademics and pure Scepticism a distinction has been drawn, which is\ncertainly very formal, and has but little signification, but to which\nthe Sceptics in their subtlety undoubtedly attached some meaning. The\ndistinction often consists in the meanings of words only, and in quite\nexternal differences.\n\nThe standpoint of the Academics is that they express the truth as a\nsubjective conviction of self-consciousness; and this tallies with the\nsubjective idealism of modern times. The truth, in so far as it is only\na subjective conviction, has hence been called, by the New Academy,\nthe _probable_. Although followers of Plato, and hence, Platonists,\nthe Academicians did not remain at the standpoint of Plato, nor could\nthey have done so. But we easily see the connection of this principle\nwith the Platonic doctrines, if we recollect that with Plato the Idea\nhas been the principle, and that, indeed, on the whole, in the form\nof universality. Plato remained, as we saw above (pp. 139, 140), in\nthe abstract Idea; to him the one great matter in Philosophy is to\ncombine the infinite and finite. Plato\u2019s Ideas are derived from the\nnecessities of reason, from enthusiasm for the truth, but they are in\nthemselves devoid of movement, and only universal, while Aristotle\ndemands actuality, self-determining activity. Plato\u2019s dialectic has\nonly attempted to assert the universal as such, and to demonstrate the\ndeterminate and particular to be null, thus leaving nothing at all but\nabstract universality. His dialectic has hence very often a negative\nresult, in which determinations are merely done away with and annulled.\nWith Plato the working out of the concrete has thus not gone far, and\nwhere he, as in the Tim\u00e6us, proceeds into the determinate, _e.g._ of\norganic life, he becomes infinitely trivial and quite unspeculative,\nwhile with Aristotle matters are very different. The necessity for a\nscientific ground has necessarily caused us to be carried on beyond\nthis Platonic point of view. The Stoics and Epicureans were imbued\nwith the scientific necessity, not yet recognized by Plato, of giving\na content to the universal of the Idea, _i.e._ of grasping particular\ndeterminateness, but the succeeding Academicians stand in a negative\nattitude to them in this regard. To the end they made a point of\nholding to the Platonic universality, uniting to this the Platonic\ndialectic also. The principle of the New Academy could thus, like the\nPlatonic dialectic, possess a dialectic attitude and bearing which\nproceeded to nothing affirmative; as, indeed, in many of Plato\u2019s\ndialogues, mere confusion is what is arrived at. But while with Plato\nthe affirmative result is essentially the result of dialectic, so that\nwith him we have really found the universal Idea as species, during all\nthis time, on the other hand, the tendency to abstract apprehension\nis predominant; and as this showed itself in the Stoic and Epicurean\nphilosophy, it has also extended to the Platonic Idea and degraded it\ninto being a form of the understanding. Plato\u2019s Ideas were thus torn\nfrom their rest through thought, because in such universality thought\nhas not yet recognized itself as self-consciousness. Self-consciousness\nconfronted them with great pretensions, actuality in general asserted\nitself against universality; and the rest of the Idea necessarily\npassed into the movement of thought. This movement now, however, in\nthe New Academy turned dialectically against the determination of the\nStoics and Epicureans, which rested on the fact that the criterion of\nthe truth ought to be a concrete. For example, in the conception as\ncomprehended by the Stoics, there is a thought which likewise has a\ncontent, although, again, this union still remains very formal. But the\ntwo forms in which the dialectic of the New Academy turns against this\nconcrete, are represented by Arcesilaus and Carneades.\n\n\n1. ARCESILAUS.\n\nArcesilaus kept to the abstraction of the Idea as against the\ncriterion; for though in the Idea of Plato, _i.e._ in the Tim\u00e6us and in\nhis dialectic, the concrete was derived from quite another source, this\nwas only admitted for the first time later on by the Neo-platonists,\nwho really recognized the unity of the Platonic and the Aristotelian\nprinciples. The opposition to the Dogmatists thus does not in the case\nof Arcesilaus proceed from the dialectic of the Sceptics, but from\nkeeping to abstraction; and here we perceive the gulf marking out this\nepoch from any other.\n\nArcesilaus was born at Pitane in \u00c6olia in the 116th Olympiad (318\nB.C.), and was a contemporary of Epicurus and Zeno. Though he\noriginally belonged to the Old Academy, yet the spirit of the time and\nthe progressive development of Philosophy did not now admit of the\nsimplicity of the Platonic manner. He possessed considerable means, and\ndevoted himself entirely to the studies requisite for the education\nof a noble Greek, viz. to rhetoric, poetry, music, mathematics, &c.\nMainly for the purpose of exercising himself in rhetoric, he came to\nAthens, here was introduced to Philosophy, and lived henceforth for\nits sake alone; he held intercourse with Theophrastus, Zeno, &c.,\nand it is a subject of dispute whether he did not hear Pyrrho also.\nArcesilaus, familiar with all the Philosophy of those days, was by\nhis contemporaries held to be as noble a man as he was a subtle and\nacute philosopher; being without pride in himself, he recognized the\nmerits of others. He lived in Athens, occupied the post of scholarch\nin the Academy, and was thus a successor of Plato. After the death\nof Crates, the successor of Speusippus, the place of honour in the\nAcademy devolved on Sosicrates, but he willingly gave it up in favour\nof Arcesilaus on account of the superiority of the latter in talent\nand philosophy. What really happened as regards the transference\nof the chair to others, is, for the rest, unknown to us. He filled\nthis office, in which he made use of the method of disputation, with\napprobation and applause, until his death, which took place in Olympiad\n134, 4 (244 B.C.), in the seventy-fourth year of his age.[169]\n\nThe principal points in the philosophy of Arcesilaus are preserved\nby Cicero in his _Academics Qu\u00e6stiones_, but Sextus Empiricus is\nmore valuable as an authority, for he is more thorough, definite,\nphilosophic and systematic.\n\n_a._ This philosophy is specially known to us as being a dialectic\ndirected against Stoicism, with which Arcesilaus had much to do, and\nits result, as far as its main principles are concerned, is expressed\nthus: \u201cThe wise man must restrain his approbation and assent.\u201d[170]\nThis principle was called \u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae, and it is the same as that of the\nSceptics; on the other hand this expression is connected with the\nprinciple of the Stoics as follows. Because to Stoic philosophy truth\nconsists in the fact that thought declares some content of existence to\nbe its own, and the conception as comprehended gives its approbation\nto this content, the content of our conceptions, principles and\nthoughts undoubtedly appears to be different from thought, and the\nunion of the two, which is the concrete, only arises by means of some\ndeterminate content being taken up into the form of thought and thus\nbeing expressed as the truth. But Arcesilaus saw this consequence,\nand his saying that approbation most be withheld is thus as much as\nsaying that by thus taking up the content no truth comes to pass, but\nonly phenomenon; and this is true, because, as Arcesilaus puts it,\nconception and thought likewise remain apart. Arcesilaus has certainly\nunthinkingly allowed that this content united to consciousness is\na concrete such as was indicated, only he has asserted that this\nconnection merely gives a perception with a good ground, and not\nwhat he calls truth. This is called probability, but not quite\nappropriately; it is a universal set forth through the form of thought,\nand is only formal, having no absolute truth. Sextus (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c.\n33, \u00a7 233) puts this plainly in saying that \u201cArcesilaus has declared\nthe withholding of approbation in relation to parts, to be a good, but\nthe assenting to parts to be an evil,\u201d because the assent only concerns\n_parts_. That is, if thought is to be retained as a universal, it\ncannot come to be a criterion; and that is the meaning of Arcesilaus\nwhen he asks that the wise man should remain at the universal, and not\ngo on to the determinate as if this determinate were the truth.\n\nSextus Empiricus gives us (adv. Math. VII. 155, 151-153) a more\nparticular explanation of this philosophy, which is preserved to us\nonly as being in opposition to the Stoics. Arcesilaus asserted as\nagainst the Stoics, that everything is incomprehensible (\u1f00\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b1).\nHe thus combated the conception of thought (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74\u03bd \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd),\nwhich to the Stoics is the point of most importance and the concrete\ntruth. Arcesilaus further attacked the Stoics thus: \u201cThey themselves\nsay that the conception of thought is the mean between scientific\nknowledge and opinion, the one of which pertains alone to fools and the\nother alone to wise men; the conception of thought is common to both,\nand the criterion of the truth. Arcesilaus here argued in such a way as\nto show that between scientific knowledge and opinion the conception\nof thought is no criterion, for it is either in the wise man or the\nfool, and in the former it is knowledge, and in the latter, opinion.\nIf it is nothing excepting these, there remains to it nothing but an\nempty name.\u201d For knowledge must be a developed consciousness derived\nfrom reasons, but these reasons, as conceptions of thought, Arcesilaus\nstates to be just such thoughts as those of the fool. They are thus,\nno doubt, the concrete directing power which constitutes the principal\ncontent of our consciousness; but it is not proved that they are the\ntruth. Thus this mean, as judging between reason and opinion, pertains\nequally to the wise man and the fool, and may be error or truth\nequally; and thus the wise man and the fool have the same criterion,\nand yet they must, in relation to the truth, be distinguished from one\nanother.\n\nArcesilaus further gives effect to the distinctions which are more\nparticularly brought up in modern times, and relied upon. \u201cIf\ncomprehension is the assent given to a conception of thought, it does\nnot exist. For, in the first place, the assent is not on account of\na conception, but of a reason; that is to say, it is only as regards\naxioms that this assent holds good.\u201d[171] That is good; more fully\nthe purport would be something like this: Thought, as subjective, is\nmade to assent to an existence which is a determinate content of the\nconception. A sensuous image such as this, however, is foreign to\nthought, and with it thought cannot accord, because it is something\ndifferent from it, something from which thought, on the contrary,\nholds itself aloof. It is, in general, only to a thought that thought\nfinds itself conformable, and only in a thought that it finds itself;\nthus only a universal axiom is capable of such accord, for only\nsuch abstract principles are immediately pure thoughts. Arcesilaus\nthus holds it up against the Stoics that their principle contains a\ncontradiction within itself, because the conception of thought is made\nto be the thought of another, but thought can only think itself. This\nis a thought which concerns the inmost essence of the thing. Arcesilaus\nthus here makes the same celebrated distinction as in recent times has\nagain been brought forward with so much force as the opposition between\nthought and Being, ideality and reality, subjective and objective.\nThings are something different from me. How can I attain to things?\nThought is the independent determination of a content as universal;\nbut a given content is individual and hence we cannot assent to such.\nThe one is here, the other there; subjective and objective cannot\npass to one another\u2014this is a form of thought upon which for long the\nwhole culture of modern philosophy has turned, and which we still find\nto-day. It is important to have a consciousness of this difference,\nand to assert this consciousness against the principle of the Stoics.\nIt was of this unity of thought and reality that the Stoics ought to\nhave given an account; and this they did not do, and indeed it was\nnever done in ancient times. For the ancients did not prove that the\nsubjective element of thought and this objective content are really in\ntheir diversity the passing into one another, and that this identity\nis their truth; this was only found in Plato in an abstract form and\nas a first commencement. The unity of thought and conception is the\ndifficult matter; thus if thought, as such, is the principle, it is\nabstract. The logic of the Stoics hence remained formal merely, and the\nattainment of a content could not be demonstrated. Thought and Being\nare themselves such abstractions, and we may move to and fro between\nthem for long without arriving at any determination. Thus this unity of\nuniversal and particular cannot be the criterion. With the Stoics the\nconception as comprehended appears to be immediately asserted; it is a\nconcrete, but it is not shown that this is the truth of these distinct\nelements. Against this immediately accepted concrete, the assertion of\nthe difference of the two is thus quite consistent.\n\n\u201cIn the second place,\u201d says Arcesilaus, \u201cthere is no apprehended\nconception that is not also false, as has been confirmed many times and\noft,\u201d just as the Stoics themselves say that the apprehended conception\ncould be both true and false. Determinate content has its opposite in\na determinate which must likewise as an object of thought be true; and\nthis destroys itself. In this consists the blind wandering about in\nthoughts and reasons such as these, which are not grasped as Idea, as\nthe unity of opposites, but in one of the opposites asserts one thing,\nand then, with as good reason, the opposite. The truth of the world is,\non the contrary, quite different, the universal law of reason which is\nas such for thought. Reasons are relatively ultimate for a content, but\nnot absolutely ultimate; they can only be regarded as good reasons, as\nprobability, as the Academics express it. This is a great truth which\nArcesilaus had attained. But because no unity can thus come forth, he\nthen draws the conclusion that the wise man must withhold his assent,\nthat is, not that he should not think, but that he must not merely for\nthat reason regard as true that which is thought. \u201cFor since nothing is\ncomprehensible, he will, if he assents, assent to an incomprehensible;\nnow because such an assent is opinion, the wise man will only be wise\nin opinion.\u201d[172] We still likewise hear this said: Man thinks, but\ndoes not thereby arrive at the truth; it remains beyond. Cicero (Acad.\nQu\u00e6st. IV. 24) thus expresses this: \u201cNeither the false nor the true can\nbe known, if the true were simply to be such as is the false.\u201d\n\n_b._ In relation to what is practical, Arcesilaus says: \u201cBut since\nthe conduct of life without a criterion of the true or the false is\nimpossible, and the end of life, or happiness, can only be determined\nthrough such grounds, the wise man, not withholding his approbation\nregarding everything, will, as regards what has to be done and left\nundone, direct his actions in accordance with the probable (\u03b5\u1f54\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd),\u201d\nas the subjectively convincing conception. What is right in this is\nthat the good ground does not extend as far as truth. \u201cHappiness is\nbrought about by discretion (\u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), and rational conduct operates\nin fitting and right action (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1\u03b8\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9); that is rightly done which\nis permitted by a well-grounded justification,\u201d so that it appears to\nbe true. \u201cThus, he who regards what is well-founded will do rightly and\nbe happy,\u201d but for this culture and intelligent thought are requisite.\nArcesilaus thus remains at the indeterminate, at subjectivity of\nconviction, and a probability justified by good grounds. Thus we see\nthat in regard to what is positive, Arcesilaus does not really get\nany further than the Stoics, nor say anything different from what\nthey do; only the form is different, because, what the Stoics call\ntrue, Arcesilaus calls well-founded or probable. But, on the whole, he\npossessed a higher kind of knowledge than the Stoics, because what is\nthus founded cannot be held to have the significance of an implicit\nexistence, but only a relative truth in consciousness.\n\n\n2. CARNEADES.\n\nCarneades was equally famous; he was one of the followers of Arcesilaus\nin the Academy, and he also lived in Athens, though considerably later.\nHe was born in Cyrene in Ol. 141, 3 (217 B.C.), and died in Ol. 162,\n4 (132 B.C.), thus being eighty-five years old; though, according to\nothers he was as much as ninety.[173] During the already mentioned (pp.\n241, 242) embassy of the three philosophers to Rome, it was chiefly\nCarneades\u2019 quickness, eloquence, and power of conviction, as also his\ngreat fame, which aroused remark, attracted men together, and gained\ngreat approbation in Rome. For he here held, after the manner of the\nAcademics, two discourses on justice; the one for and the other against\njustice. That on which both generally speaking rested, can easily be\ndiscovered. In the justification of justice he took the universal as\nprinciple; but in showing its nullity, he laid weight on the principle\nof individuality, of self-interest. To the young Romans who knew little\nof the opposition in the Notion, this was something new; they had no\nidea of such methods of applying thought, were much attracted by them,\nand were soon won over to them. But the older Romans, and particularly\nthe elder Cato, the Censor, who was then still living, saw this very\nunwillingly, and declaimed much against it, because the youths were\nthereby turned away from the strictness of ideas and virtues which\nprevailed in Rome. As the evil gained ground, Caius Acilius made a\nproposition in the Senate to banish all philosophers from the city,\namongst whom, naturally, without their names being mentioned, those\nthree ambassadors were included. The elder Cato, however, moved the\nSenate to conclude the business with the ambassadors as quickly as\npossible, so that they might again set forth, and return to their\nschools, and might henceforth instruct only the sons of the Greeks.\nThe Roman youths might then as formerly give ear to their laws and\nmagistrates, and learn wisdom from intercourse with the senators.[174]\nBut this taint can no more be avoided than could in Paradise the\ndesire for knowledge. The knowledge which is a necessary moment in\nthe culture of a people, thus makes its appearance as the Fall from\ninnocence, and as corruption. An epoch such as this, in which thought\nappears to veer about, is then regarded as an evil as far as the\nsecurity of the ancient constitution is concerned. But this evil of\nthought cannot be prevented by laws, &c.; it can and must be the healer\nof itself through itself alone, if thought through thought itself is\ntruly brought to pass.\n\na. The philosophy of Carneades has been given to us in most detail\nby Sextus Empiricus; and all else of Carneades that we possess is\nlikewise directed against the dogmatism of the Stoic and Epicurean\nphilosophy. The fact that the nature of consciousness is what is most\nparticularly considered makes his propositions interesting. While in\nArcesilaus we still found a good reason or argument maintained, the\nprinciple which Carneades supported is expressed as that \u201cin the first\nplace there is absolutely no criterion of the truth, neither feeling,\nconception, nor thought, nor any other such thing; for all this put\ntogether deceives us.\u201d This general empirical proposition is still in\nvogue. In developing the matter further, Carneades proves what he says\nfrom reasons, and we have the nature of consciousness more definitely\nexpressed in the following: \u201cIn the second place he shows that even if\nsuch a criterion existed, it could not be without an affection (\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2)\nof consciousness, which proceeds from perception.\u201d[175] For this,\nspeaking generally, is his principal reflection, that every criterion\nmust be constituted so that it has two elements, one being the\nobjective, existent, immediately determined, while the other element is\nan affection, an activity, an attribute of consciousness, and belongs\nto the sensitive, conceiving or thinking subject\u2014but as such it could\nnot be the criterion. For this activity of consciousness consists in\nthe fact that it changes the objective, and thus does not allow the\nobjective as it is to come to us immediately. Hence the same attitude\nof separation is pre-supposed as formerly, viz. that the understanding\nis to be regarded as an ultimate and clearly absolute relationship.\n\n\u03b1. As against the Epicureans, Carneades maintains this: \u201cBecause\nthe living is distinguished from the dead through the activity of\nsensation, by this means it will comprehend itself and what is\nexternal. But this sensation which,\u201d as Epicurus puts it (_supra_, p.\n281), \u201cremains unmoved and is impassive and unchangeable, is neither\nsensation nor does it comprehend anything. For not until they have been\nchanged and determined by the invasion of the actual does sensation\nshow forth things.\u201d[176] The sensation of Epicurus is an existent,\nbut there is in it no principle of judgment, because each sensation\nis independent. But sensation must be analyzed in accordance with\nthe two points of view there present, for as the soul is therein,\ndetermined, so likewise is that which determines determined by the\nenergy of the conscious subject. Because I, as a living being, have\nsensation, a change in my consciousness takes place, which means that I\nam determined from without and from within. Consequently the criterion\ncannot be a simple determinateness, for it is really an implicit\nrelationship in which two moments, sensation and thought, must be\ndistinguished.\n\n\u03b2. Since to Carneades sensation is merely what comes first, he then\nsays: \u201cThe criterion is thus to be sought for in the affection of the\nsoul by actuality.\u201d For it is only in the mean between the energy\nof the soul and that of outward things that the criterion can fall.\nA determinate content of sensation such as this, which is at the\nsame time again determined through consciousness, this passivity and\nactivity of consciousness, this third something, Carneades called the\nconception which constituted to the Stoics the content of thought.\nRespecting this criterion, he says: \u201cThis being determined must,\nhowever, be an indication both of itself and of the apparent, or of\nthe thing through which it is affected; this affection is none other\nthan the conception. Hence in life the conception is something which\npresents both itself and the other. If we see something, the sight has\nan affection, and it no longer is just as it was before seeing. Through\nan alteration such as this there arise in us two things: first change\nitself, _i.e._ the ordinary conception\u201d (the subjective side) \u201cand\nthen that which change produced, what is seen\u201d (the objective). \u201cNow\njust as the light shows itself and everything in it, the conception\nreigns over knowledge in the animal, and it must, like the light, make\nitself evident, and reveal the actual through which consciousness is\naffected.\u201d This is quite the correct standpoint for consciousness,\nand it is in itself comprehensible, but it is only for the phenomenal\nmind that the other in the determinateness of consciousness is\npresent. We now expect a development of this opposition; but Carneades\npasses into the region of empiricism without giving this further\ndevelopment. \u201cSince the conception,\u201d he continues, \u201cdoes not always\npoint to the truth, but often lies, and resembles bad messengers in\nthat it misrepresents what it proceeds from, it follows that not every\nconception can give a criterion of the truth, but only that which is\ntrue, if any are so. But because none is so constituted that it might\nnot also be false, conceptions are likewise a common criterion of\nthe true as of the false, or they form no criterion.\u201d Carneades also\nappealed to the fact of a conception proceeding even from something\nnot existing, or\u2014if the Stoics asserted that what in the objective is\nthinkingly apprehended is an existent\u2014to the fact that the false may\nalso be apprehended.[177] In a popular way that is stated thus: There\nare also conceptions of untruth. Although I am convinced, it is still\nmy conception merely, even if men think they have said something by\nsaying that they have this conviction. They likewise say that insight\nor objective knowledge is still only the conviction of difference, but\nreally the content is in its nature universal.\n\n\u03b3. Finally, \u201cbecause no conception is a criterion, neither can thought\nbe taken as such, for this depends on conception\u201d\u2014and must hence be\njust as uncertain as it is. \u201cFor to thought, that respecting which\nit judges must be conception; but conception cannot exist without\nunthinking sensation\u201d\u2014this may, however, be either true or false, \u201cso\nthat there is no criterion.\u201d[178] This constitutes the principle in the\nAcademic philosophy\u2014that on the one hand the conception is in itself\nthis distinction of thought and existence, and that there is likewise\na unity of both, which, however, is no absolutely existing unity.\nPhilosophic culture of those times remained at this standpoint, and in\nmodern times Reinhold also arrived at the same result.\n\nb. Now what Carneades gave expression to of an affirmative nature\nrespecting the criterion, is found in the statement that undoubtedly\ncriteria are to be maintained for the conduct of life and for the\nacquisition of happiness, but not for the speculative consideration\nof what is in and for itself. Thus Carneades passes more into\nwhat is psychological, and into finite forms of the understanding\nconsciousness; this is consequently no criterion respecting truth,\nbut respecting the subjective habits and customs of the individual,\nand hence it also is of subjective truth alone, although it still\nremains a concrete end. \u201cThe conception is a conception of something;\nof that from which it comes as of the externally perceived object, and\nof the subject in which it is, _e.g._ of man. In this way it has two\nrelationships\u2014on the one hand to the object, and, on the other, to that\nwhich forms the conception. According to the former relationship it is\neither true or false; true if it harmonizes with what is conceived of,\nfalse if this is not so.\u201d But this point of view cannot here in any\nway come under consideration, for the judgment respecting this harmony\nis most certainly not in a position to separate the matter itself\nfrom the matter as conceived. \u201cAccording to the relationship to that\nwhich conceives, the one is conceived (\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5) to be true, but the\nother is not conceived to be true.\u201d Merely this relationship to the\nconceiver, however, comes under the consideration of the Academicians.\n\u201cThat conceived of as true is called by the Academician appearance\n(\u1f14\u03bc\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) and conviction, and convincing conception; but what is not\nconceived as true is called incongruity (\u1f00\u03c0\u03ad\u03bc\u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) and non-conviction\nand non-convincing conception. For neither that which is presented to\nus through itself as untrue, nor what is true but is not presented to\nus, convinces us.\u201d[179]\n\nCarneades thus determines the leading principle very much as does\nArcesilaus, for he recognizes it merely in the form of a \u201cconvincing\nconception;\u201d but as convincing it is \u201clikewise a firm and a developed\nconception,\u201d if it is to be a criterion of life. These distinctions, on\nthe whole, pertain to a correct analysis, and likewise approximately\nappear in formal logic; they are very much the same stages as are\nfound, according to Wolff, in the clear, distinct, and adequate\nconception. \u201cWe have now shortly to show what is the distinction\nbetween these three steps.\u201d[180]\n\n\u03b1. \u201cA convincing conception (\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03ae) is that which appears to be true\nand which is sufficiently obvious; it has a certain breadth as well,\nand may be applied in many ways and in a great variety of cases; ever\nverifying itself more through repetitions,\u201d as in the case of Epicurus,\n\u201cit makes itself ever more convincing and trustworthy.\u201d No further\naccount of its content is given, but what is so frequently produced\nis, as empirical universality, made the first criterion.[181] But this\nis only an individual and, speaking generally, an immediate and quite\nsimple conception.\n\n\u03b2. \u201cBecause, however, a conception is never for itself alone, but one\ndepends on another as in a chain, the second criterion is added, viz.\nthat it should be both convincing and secure (\u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2),\u201d _i.e._\nconnected and determined on all sides, so that it cannot be changed,\nnor drawn this way and that and made variable by circumstances; and\nother conceptions do not contradict it, because it is known in this\nconnection with others. This is quite a correct determination, which\neverywhere appears in the universal. Nothing is seen or said alone, for\na number of circumstances stand in connection with it. \u201cFor example,\nin the conception of a man much is contained, both as to what concerns\nhimself and what surrounds him: as to the former, there is colour,\nsize, form, movement, dress, &c.; and in reference to the latter,\nair, light, friends, and the like. If none of such circumstances make\nus uncertain or cause us to think the others false, but when all\nuniformly agree, the conception is the more convincing.\u201d[182] Thus\nwhen a conception is in harmony with the manifold circumstances in\nwhich it stands, it is secure. A cord may be thought to be a snake,\nbut all the circumstances of the same have not been considered. \u201cThus,\nas in judging of an illness all the symptoms must be brought under\nour consideration, so the fixed conception has conviction because all\ncircumstances agree.\u201d[183]\n\n\u03b3. \u201cEven more trustworthy than the fixed conception is the conception\nas developed (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03be\u03c9\u03b4\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7), which brings about perfect conviction,\u201d\nthe third moment. \u201cWhile in the case of the fixed conception we only\ninvestigate whether the circumstances agree with one another, in the\ndeveloped conception each one of the circumstances existing in harmony\nis strictly inquired into on its own account. Thus he who judges\nas well as what is judged and that according to which judgment is\ngiven, are subject to investigations. Just as in common life in some\nunimportant matter one witness satisfies us, in one more important\nseveral are required, and in a case which is more material still the\nindividual witnesses are themselves examined through a comparison of\ntheir testimonies, so in less important matters a general convincing\nconception satisfies us, in things of a certain importance one which is\nestablished, but in those which pertain to a good and happy life one\nwhich is investigated in its parts is required.\u201d[184] We thus see\u2014in\ncontradistinction to those who place truth in what is immediate, and,\nespecially in recent times, in sensuous perception, in an immediate\nknowledge, whether as inward revelation or outward perception\u2014that\nthis kind of certainty with Carneades rightly takes the lowest place;\nthe conception worked out and developed really is to him the essential\none, and yet it appears in a formal manner only. In fact, the truth\nis only in thinking knowledge, and if Carneades does not exhaust all\nthat can be said of the nature of this knowledge, he still has rightly\nemphasized an essential moment in it, the opening out and the judging\nmovements of the moments.\n\nIn the New Academy we see the subjective side of conviction expressed,\nor the belief that not the truth as truth, but its manifestation, or\nreally what it is to the conception, is present in consciousness.\nThus only subjective certainty is demanded; of the truth nothing\nmore is said, for only what is relative in respect of consciousness\nis considered. Just as the Academic principle limited itself to the\nsubjective act of the convincing conception, so likewise did the\nStoics really place implicit existence in thought, and Epicurus in\nperception; but they called this the truth. The Academicians, on the\ncontrary, set it up against the truth, and asserted that it is not\nthe existent as such. They had thus a consciousness that the implicit\nreally has the moment of consciousness in it, and that without this\nit cannot exist; this was also a fundamental principle to the former,\nbut they were not conscious of it. Though, according to this, the\nimplicit has now an essential relation to consciousness, this last\nis still in contrast with the truth; to conscious knowledge, as to\nthe moment of explicitude, the implicit thus still stands in the\nbackground, it still confronts it, but at the same time it includes\nthe explicit as an essential moment, even in antagonism to itself; in\nother words, consciousness is not yet set forth in and for itself.\nNow, if this Academic standpoint is driven to its ultimate limit, it\namounts to this, that everything is clearly for consciousness alone,\nand that the form of an existent, and of the knowledge of existence,\nalso quite disappears as form; this, however, is Scepticism. Thus if\nthe Academicians still preferred one conviction, one estimate of truth\nto another, as that in which the aim of a self-existent truth might be\nsaid to dwell, or float before their eyes, there still remains this\nsimple belief in the validity of opinion without distinction, or the\nfact that everything is in like manner only related to consciousness,\nand is, in fact, phenomenal alone. Thus the Academy had no longer any\nfixed subsistence, but hereby really passed into Scepticism, which\nmerely asserted a subjective belief in truth, so that all objective\ntruth has really been denied.\n\n\nD. SCEPTICISM.\n\nScepticism completed the theory of the subjectivity of all knowledge\nby the fact that in knowledge it universally substituted for Being the\nexpression _appearance_. Now this Scepticism undoubtedly appears to be\nsomething most impressive, to which great respect is due from man. In\nall times as now, it has been held to be the most formidable, and,\nindeed, the invincible opponent of Philosophy, because it signifies\nthe art of dissolving all that is determinate, and showing it in its\nnullity. Thus it might almost appear as though it were held to be in\nitself invincible, and as though the only difference in convictions\nwere whether the individual decided for it or for a positive, dogmatic\nphilosophy. Its result undoubtedly is the disintegration of the\ntruth, and, consequently, of all content, and thus perfect negation.\nThe invincibility of Scepticism must undoubtedly be granted, only,\nhowever, in a subjective sense as regards the individual, who may\nkeep to the point of view of taking no notice of Philosophy, and only\nasserting the negative. Scepticism in this way seems to be something\nto which men give themselves over, and we have the impression that we\nare not able to get within reach of anyone who thus throws himself\nentirely into Scepticism; another man, however, simply rests content\nwith his philosophy, because he takes no notice of Scepticism, and\nthis is really what he ought to do, for, properly speaking, it cannot\nbe refuted. Certainly if we were merely to escape from it, it would\nnot in reality have been defeated, for on its side it would remain\nwhere it was, and in possession of the field. For positive philosophy\nallows Scepticism to exist beside it; Scepticism, on the other hand,\nencroaches upon the domain of positive philosophy, for Scepticism has\npower to overcome the other, while positive philosophy cannot do the\nsame to it. If anyone actually desires to be a Sceptic, he cannot be\nconvinced, or be brought to a positive philosophy,[185] any more than\nhe who is paralyzed in all his limbs can be made to stand. Scepticism\nis, in fact, such paralysis\u2014an incapacity for truth which can only\nreach certainty of self, and not of the universal, remaining merely in\nthe negative, and in individual self-consciousness. To keep oneself in\nindividuality depends on the will of the individual; no one can prevent\na man from doing this, because no one can possibly drive another out\nof nothing. But thinking Scepticism is quite different; it is the\ndemonstration that all that is determinate and finite is unstable. As\nto this, positive philosophy may have the consciousness that it has the\nnegation to Scepticism in itself; thus it does not oppose it, nor is it\noutside of it, for Scepticism is a moment in it. But this is true in\nsuch a way that this philosophy comprehends in itself the negative in\nits truth, as it is not present in Scepticism.\n\nThe relation of Scepticism to Philosophy is further this, that the\nformer is the dialectic of all that is determinate. The finitude of all\nconceptions of truth can be shown, for they contain in themselves a\nnegation, and consequently a contradiction. The ordinary universal and\ninfinite is not exalted over this, for the universal which confronts\nthe particular, the indeterminate which opposes the determinate,\nthe infinite which confronts the finite, each form only the one\nside, and, as such, are only a determinate. Scepticism is similarly\ndirected against the thought of the ordinary understanding which\nmakes determinate differences appear to be ultimate and existent. But\nthe logical Notion is itself this dialectic of Scepticism, for this\nnegativity which is characteristic of Scepticism likewise belongs\nto the true knowledge of the Idea. The only difference is that the\nsceptics remain at the result as negative, saying, \u201cThis and this\nhas an internal contradiction, it thus disintegrates itself, and\nconsequently does not exist.\u201d But this result as merely negative is\nitself again a one-sided determinateness opposed to the positive;\n_i.e._ Scepticism only holds its place as abstract understanding.\nIt makes the mistake of thinking that this negation is likewise a\ndeterminate affirmative content in itself; for it is, as the negation\nof negation, the self-relating negativity or infinite affirmation.\nThis, put quite abstractly, is the relation of Philosophy to\nScepticism. The Idea, as abstract Idea, is the quiescent and inert; it\nonly is in truth in as far as it grasps itself as living. This occurs\nbecause it is implicitly dialectic, in order to abrogate that inert\nquiescence, and to change itself. But if the philosophic Idea is thus\nimplicitly dialectic, it is not so in a contingent manner. Scepticism,\non the contrary, exercises its dialectic contingently, for just as the\nmaterial comes up before it, it shows in the same that implicitly it is\nnegative.\n\nThe older Scepticism must further be distinguished from the modern,\nand it is only with the former that we have to do, for it alone is of\na true, profound nature; the modern more resembles Epicureanism. Thus\nSchulze of G\u00f6ttingen has in recent times boasted of his Scepticism;\nhe wrote an \u201c\u00c6nesidemus\u201d in order thus to compare himself with that\nsceptic; and in other works, too, he put forward Scepticism in\nopposition to Leibnitz and to Kant. Nevertheless, he ignores entirely\nthe true position of Scepticism as it has just been described, and\ninstead of representing the true distinction which exists between his\nScepticism and the ancient, Schulze recognizes nothing but Dogmatism\nand Scepticism, and not the third philosophy at all. Schulze and others\nmake it fundamental that we must consider sensuous Being, what is\ngiven to us by sensuous consciousness, to be true; all else must be\ndoubted. What we think is ultimate, the facts of consciousness. The\nolder sceptics, indeed, allowed that men must direct their actions in\naccordance with this last, but to assert it to be the truth did not\noccur to them. Modern Scepticism is only directed against thought,\nagainst the Notion and the Idea, and thus against what is in a higher\nsense philosophic; it consequently leaves the reality of things quite\nunquestioned, and merely asserts that from it nothing can be argued as\nregards thought. But that is not even a peasants\u2019 philosophy, for they\nknow that all earthly things are transient, and that thus their Being\nis as good as their non-being. Modern Scepticism is the subjectivity\nand vanity of consciousness, which is undoubtedly invincible, not,\nhowever, to science and truth, but merely to itself, this subjectivity.\nFor it goes no further than saying, \u201cThis is held by me to be true, my\nfeeling, my heart is ultimate to me.\u201d But here certainty is alone in\nquestion, and not truth; and, indeed, this nowadays is no longer called\nScepticism. But the conviction of this individual subject expresses\nnothing at all, however high the matter which we talk of is supposed to\nbe. Thus because on the one hand it is said that the truth is merely\nthe conviction of another, and on the other hand personal conviction,\nwhich is also a \u2018merely,\u2019 is set on high, we must leave this subject\nalone, first on account of its high pretensions, and then on account\nof its lowliness. The result of the older Scepticism is indeed the\nsubjectivity of knowledge only, but this is founded on an elaborately\nthought out annihilation of everything which is held to be true and\nexistent, so that everything is made transient.\n\nAccording to this, the function of Scepticism is wrongly termed the\ninculcation of proneness to doubt; nor can we translate \u03c3\u03ba\u03ad\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2 by\nDoubt, if Scepticism was also called by Sextus (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 3, \u00a7 7)\nephectic (\u1f10\u03c6\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae) because one of its chief points was that judgment\nmust be suspended. Doubt, however, is only uncertainty, irresolution,\nindecision, the thought which is opposed to something held to be valid.\nDoubt proceeds from the fact of there being two; it is a passing to and\nfro between two or more points of view, so that we neither rest at the\none nor the other\u2014and yet we ought to remain at one point or another.\nThus doubt in man is quite likely to involve a rending asunder of mind\nand spirit; it gives unrest and brings unhappiness with it; doubts,\nfor instance, arise respecting the immortality of the soul and the\nexistence of God. Forty years ago,[186] much was written about this;\nin poetry, too, we found the situation of the doubter was a subject of\nthe greatest interest, the unhappiness of doubt being depicted to us as\nin the \u201cMessias.\u201d This supposes a deep interest in a content, and the\ndesire of the mind that this content should either be established in it\nor not, because it desires to find its rest either in the one or the\nother. Such doubt is said to betoken a keen and sharp-witted thinker,\nbut it is only vanity and simple verbiage, or a feebleness that can\nnever arrive at anything. This Scepticism has nowadays entered into our\nlife, and it thus makes itself of account as this universal negativity.\nBut the older Scepticism does not doubt, being certain of untruth, and\nindifferent to the one as to the other; it does not only flit to and\nfro with thoughts that leave the possibility that something may still\nbe true, but it proves with certainty the untruth of all. Or its doubt\nto it is certainty which has not the intention of attaining to truth,\nnor does it leave this matter undecided, for it is completely at a\npoint, and perfectly decided, although this decision is not truth to\nit. This certainty of itself thus has as result the rest and security\nof the mind in itself, which is not touched with any grief, and of\nwhich doubt is the direct opposite. This is the standpoint of the\nimperturbability of Scepticism.\n\nNow what has to be considered even before treating of Scepticism\nitself, is its external history. As regards the origin of Scepticism\nthe Sceptics say that it is very old, that is, if we take it in the\nquite indeterminate and universal sense, in so far as to say \u201cThings\nare, but their Being is not true, for it likewise involves their\nnon-being; or they are changeable. For example, this day is to-day,\nbut to-morrow is also to-day, &c.; it is day now but night is also\nnow, &c.\u201d Thus of what in this way is allowed to be a determinate,\nthe opposite is also expressed. Now if it be said that all things are\ntransient, things may in the first place be changed; however this is\nnot only possible, but the fact that all things are transient really\nmeans when taken in its universality:\u2014\u201cNothing exists in itself, for\nits reality is the abrogation of self, because things in themselves,\nin accordance with their necessity, are transient. Only now are they\nthus; at another time they are different, and this time, the now, is\nitself no more while I am speaking of it; for time is not itself fixed,\nand it makes nothing fixed.\u201d This uncertainty in what is sensuous\nrepresents a long-standing belief amongst the unphilosophic public as\nwell as amongst philosophers up to this time; and this negativity in\nall determinations likewise constitutes the characteristic feature\nof Scepticism. The Sceptics have also presented this position in an\nhistoric way, and they show that even Homer was a sceptic, because\nhe speaks of the same things in opposite ways. They also count in\nthis category Bias, with his maxim \u201cPledge thyself never.\u201d For this\nhas the general sense \u201cDo not consider anything to be anything, do\nnot attach yourself to any object to which you devote yourself, do\nnot believe in the security of any relationship, &c.\u201d Likewise the\nnegative aspect of the philosophy of Zeno and Xenophanes is said to\nbe sceptical, and further, Heraclitus, too, with his principle that\neverything flows, that everything is consequently contradictory and\ntransient; finally Plato and the Academy are sceptical, only here\nScepticism is not yet quite clearly expressed.[187] All this may be\ntaken as being in part the sceptical uncertainty of everything; but\nthat is not its real meaning. It is not this conscious and universal\nnegativity; as conscious, it must prove, as universal, it must extend\nthe untruth of the objective to everything; thus it is not a negativity\nwhich says definitely that everything is not implicit but is only for\nself-consciousness, and everything merely goes back into the certainty\nof itself. As philosophic consciousness Scepticism is consequently of\nlater date. By Scepticism we must understand a specially constituted\nconsciousness for which in some measure not only sensuous Being, but\nalso Being for thought does not hold true, and which can then with\nconsciousness account for the nullity of that which is asserted to be\nreality; and finally, in a general way, it not only annuls this and\nthat sensuous fact or thought, but is adapted for the recognition in\neverything of its untruth.\n\nThe history of Scepticism, properly so called, is usually commenced\nwith Pyrrho as being its founder; and from him the names Pyrrhonism\nand Pyrrhonic are derived. Sextus Empiricus (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 3, \u00a7 7)\nsays of him \u201cthat he went into Scepticism more fully (\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd)\nand clearly than did his predecessors.\u201d He is earlier than some of\nthe philosophers already considered; but because Scepticism is to be\ntaken as a whole, Pyrrho\u2019s Scepticism, even if it is merely aimed\nagainst the immediate truth both of the senses and of morality, must\nbe taken along with the later Scepticism, which directs its attention\nrather against the truth as thought, as will be farther shown on a\ncloser consideration; for this last was the first, properly speaking,\nto make a sensation. As to the events of Pyrrho\u2019s life, they appear to\nbe as much a matter of doubt as his doctrine; for they are without any\nconnection, and little is known for certain concerning them. Pyrrho\nlived in the time of Aristotle and was born at Elis. I shall not give\nthe names of his instructors; Anaxarchus, a disciple of Democritus, is\nspecially mentioned amongst them. We cannot discover where he really\nlived, for the most part at least. As a proof of how very much he was\nesteemed during his life, it is said that his native town chose him as\nhead priest, and the town of Athens gave him the right of citizenship.\nIt is finally stated that he accompanied Alexander the Great in his\njourney to Asia; and that there he had considerable dealings with\nmagicians and Brahmins. We are told that Alexander had him put to\ndeath because he desired the death of a Persian satrap; and this fate\nbefel him in his ninetieth year. If all this is to be accepted, since\nAlexander spent between twelve and fourteen years in Asia, Pyrrho must\nat the earliest have set out on his travels in his seventy-eighth year.\nPyrrho does not appear to have come forward as a public teacher, but\nmerely to have left behind him individual friends who had been educated\nby him. Anecdotes are told, not so much about the circumstances of\nhis life as about the sceptical manner in which he conducted himself,\nand in them his behaviour is made to look ridiculous; in this the\nuniversal of Scepticism is set against a particular case, so that what\nis absurd shoots up as of itself into relationships which appear to be\nconsistent. For because he asserted that the reality of sensuous things\nhas no truth, it is, for instance, said that were he walking he would\ngo out of the way of no object, no waggon or horse that came towards\nhim; or he would go straight up against a wall, completely disbelieving\nin the reality of sensuous sensations and such like. They also said\nthat it was only the friends surrounding him who drew him away from\nsuch dangers and saved him.[188] But such anecdotes are evidently\nextravagant, because, for one thing, it is not conceivable that he\ncould have followed Alexander to Asia at ninety years of age. It is\nalso very clear that such stories are simply invented with the object\nof ridiculing the sceptical philosophy, by following out its principle\nto such extreme consequences. To the Sceptics sensuous existence\nundoubtedly holds good as phenomenal in so far as the regulation of\nordinary conduct is concerned (_infra_, p. 343), but not in as far as\nit is held to be the truth; for even the followers of the New Academy\nsaid that men must not only direct their lives in accordance with\nrules of prudence, but also in accordance with the laws of sensuous\nmanifestation (_supra_, pp. 319, 324).\n\nAfter Pyrrho, Timon of Phliasis, the sillographist, became specially\nfamous.[189] Of his Silli, _i.e._ biting remarks respecting all\nphilosophies, many are quoted by the ancients; they are certainly\nbitter and disdainful enough, but many of them are not very witty or\nworthy of being preserved. Dr. Paul collected them in an essay, but in\nit much is given that is meaningless. Goethe and Schiller certainly\nshow more capacity in works of a similar nature. The Pyrrhonians\nhereupon disappear,\u2014they seem in general only to have shown themselves\nin a more or less isolated way; for a long time after this we read in\nhistory of the Peripatetics, Stoics and Epicureans being confronted\nonly by the Academicians and perhaps some of the older Sceptics who are\nmentioned likewise.\n\n\u00c6nesidemus was the first to reawaken Scepticism; he was of Cnossus\nin Crete, and lived in Cicero\u2019s time in Alexandria,[190] which soon\nbegan to compete with Athens for the honour of being the seat of\nPhilosophy and the sciences. Subsequently, when the Academy lost\nitself in Scepticism, we see the latter, from which the former is all\nthe same only separated by a thin partition, taking up a position of\npredominance as representing the purely negative point of view. But\na scepticism such as that of Pyrrho, which does not as yet show much\nculture or tendency towards thought, but which is directed only against\nwhat is sensuous, could have no interest in the culture of Philosophy\nas it is found in Stoicism, Epicureanism, Platonism, &c. Thus it is\nrequisite, in order that Scepticism should appear with the dignity\npertaining to Philosophy, that it should itself be developed on its\nphilosophic side; and this was first done by \u00c6nesidemus.\n\nHowever, one of the most celebrated of the Sceptics, whose works we\nstill in great measure possess, and who for us is by far the most\nimportant writer upon Scepticism, because he gives us detailed accounts\nof this philosophy, is Sextus Empiricus, of whose life unfortunately\nas good as nothing is known. He was a physician, and that he was\nan empirical physician, who did not act according to theory but in\naccordance with what appears, his name tells us. He lived and taught\nabout the middle of the second century after Christ.[191] His works\nare divided into two parts: first, his _Pyrrhoni\u00e6 Hypotyposes_, in\nthree books, which give us somewhat of a general presentation of\nScepticism, and secondly his books _adversus Mathematicos_, _i.e._\nagainst scientific knowledge generally, and more especially against\nthe geometricians, arithmeticians, grammarians, musicians, logicians,\nphysicists, and moral philosophers. There were in all eleven books, six\nof which are actually directed against mathematicians, but the other\nfive against the philosophers.\n\nThe distinction between the Academy and Scepticism was a matter as to\nwhich the Sceptics exercised themselves much. The New Academy really\nbordered so closely upon Scepticism, that the Sceptics had enough to\ndo to dissociate themselves from it, and in the Sceptic school a long\nand important battle raged as to whether Plato, and subsequently the\nNew Academy, belonged to Scepticism or not;[192] in the course of this\nwe also see that Sextus did not really know what to make of Plato.\nThe Sceptics are, on the whole, very careful to distinguish their own\nfrom other systems. Sextus (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 1, \u00a7\u00a7 1-4) distinguishes\nthree philosophies: \u201cHe who seeks an object must either find it or\ndeny that it can be found, or persevere in the search. Now the same\nholds good with philosophic investigations; some assert that they\nhave found the truth; others deny that it can be grasped; a third set\nare still engaged in search. The first, like Aristotle, Epicurus, the\nStoics, and others, are the so-called Dogmatists; those who assert\nincomprehensibility are the Academicians; the Sceptics still continue\nto seek. Hence there are three philosophies: the Dogmatic, the Academic\nand the Sceptical.\u201d For this reason, the Sceptics called themselves the\nseekers (\u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af), and their philosophy the seeking (\u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae).[193]\nHowever, the distinction between Scepticism and the New Academy rests\nin the form of expression only, and is thus not a great one: indeed it\nis founded only on the mania of the Sceptics to cut off and to shun\nany sort of assertive statement. Sextus (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 7, \u00a7 13; c\n10, \u00a7\u00a7 19-20) says: \u201cThe Sceptic does not dogmatize, but only assents\nto the affections into which he is impelled, not of his own will, by\nthe conceptions; thus, if for example, he is warm or cold, he will\ncertainly not say, I seem not to be cold or warm. But if it be asked\nif the subject is as it appears, we allow appearance (\u03c6\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9); yet\nwe do not investigate the thing that appears, but only the predicate\npredicate (\u1f43 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9)[194] expressing its appearance. Thus, whether\nanything is sweet or not, we consider only as regards the Notion Notion\n(\u1f44\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u1ff3); but that is not what appears, but what is said of\nwhat appears. But if we institute direct investigations respecting\nwhat appears, we do so not in order to destroy what appears, but in\norder to condemn the rashness (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03ad\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd) of the dogmatists.\u201d Thus\nthe Sceptics endeavour to bring about the result that in what they say\nno expression of a Being can be demonstrated, so that, for example, in\na proposition, they always set appearance in the place of existence.\nAccording to Sextus they say (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 7, \u00a7 14; c. 28, \u00a7 206):\n\u201cThe Sceptic makes use of his propositions\u2014for example, determine\nnothing (\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f41\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd), not the more (\u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd), nothing is true,\n&c.\u2014not as if they really did exist. For he believes, for instance,\nthat the proposition, everything is false, asserts that itself as well\nas the others is false, and consequently limits it (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b3\u03c1\u03ac\u03c6\u03b5\u03b9).\nThus we must similarly in all sceptical propositions recollect that\nwe do not at all assert their truth; for we say that they may destroy\nthemselves, since that limits them of which they are predicated.\u201d Now,\nthe New Academy of Carneades does not express anything as being the\ntrue and existent, or as anything to which thought could agree; the\nSceptics thus come very near to the Academy. Pure Scepticism merely\nmakes this objection to the Academy, that it is still impure. Sextus\nsays (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 33, \u00a7\u00a7 226-233): \u201cBut clearly they differ from\nus in the judgment of good and evil. For they assert that something is\ngood or evil,\u201d that is to say, the former is the withholding of assent,\nand the latter the granting of it (_supra_, p. 315), \u201cwhereby they are\nconvinced of its being probable that what of good is attributed to the\npredicate, is more likely to be good than the opposite.\u201d Thus they have\nnot elevated themselves to the purity of Scepticism, because they speak\nof _existence_, and not of _appearance_. But this is nothing more than\na mere form, for the content immediately destroys that which in form\nappears to be an assertion. If we say: \u201cSomething is a good, thought\nassents to it,\u201d and then ask, \u201cBut what is the good to which thought\nassents?\u201d the content here is that it should not assent. Hence the form\nis, \u201cIt is a good,\u201d but the content is that nothing should be held to\nbe good or true. Thus the Sceptics also assert this: To the Sceptics\n\u201call conceptions are alike in trustworthiness or untrustworthiness in\nrelation to the ground,\u201d to truth. \u201cBut the Academicians say that some\nare probable, and others improbable, and amongst the probable, some\nagain are to be preferred to the others.\u201d Preference is thus one of the\nforms which the Sceptics also object to (_infra_, p. 345); for such\nexpressions strike them as still too positive.\n\nNow, speaking generally, the essential nature of Scepticism consists\nin its considering that to self-consciousness on its own account,\nthere proceeds from the disappearance of all that is objective, all\nthat is held to be true, existent or universal, all that is definite,\nall that is affirmative, through the withholding of assent, the\nimmovability and security of mind, this imperturbability in itself.\nHence the same result is obtained, that we have already seen in systems\nof philosophy immediately preceding this. Thus as soon as anything is\nheld to be truth to self-consciousness, we find the result that to\nself-consciousness this truth is the universal reality, passing beyond\nitself, and in regard to this, self-consciousness esteems itself as\nnothing. But this external and determinate truth, as finite, is not\nimplicitly existent, so that its necessity is to vacillate and give\nway. Then when this security disappears, self-consciousness itself\nloses its equilibrium, and becomes driven hither and thither in unrest,\nfear and anguish; for its stability and rest is the permanence of its\nexistence and truth. But sceptical self-consciousness is just this\nsubjective liberation from all the truth of objective Being, and from\nthe placing of its existence in anything of the kind; Scepticism thus\nmakes its end the doing away with the unconscious servitude in which\nthe natural self-consciousness is confined, the returning into its\nsimplicity, and, in so far as thought establishes itself in a content,\nthe curing it of having a content such as this established in thought.\n\u201cThe effective principle of Scepticism,\u201d Sextus hence tells us (Pyrrh.\nHyp. I. c. 6, \u00a7 12, c. 12, \u00a7\u00a7 25-30), \u201cis the hope of attaining to\nsecurity. Men of distinguished excellence, disquieted through the\ninstability of things, and dubious as to which should in preference\nbe given assent to, began the investigation of what is the truth and\nwhat false in things, as if they could reach imperturbability through\nthe decision of such matters. But while engaged in this investigation,\nman attains the knowledge that opposite determinations,\u201d desires,\ncustoms, &c., \u201chave equal power,\u201d and thus resolve themselves; \u201csince\nin this way he cannot decide between them, he really only then attains\nto imperturbability when he withholds his judgment. For if he holds\nanything to be good or evil by nature, he never is at rest, whether it\nbe that he does not possess what he holds to be good, or that he thinks\nhimself vexed and assailed by natural evil. But he who is undecided\nrespecting that which is good and beautiful in nature, neither shuns\nnor seeks anything with zeal; and thus he remains unmoved. What\nhappened to the painter Apelles, befalls the Sceptic. For it is told\nthat when he was painting a horse, and was altogether unsuccessful in\nrendering the foam, he finally in anger threw the sponge on which he\nhad wiped his brushes, and in which every colour was therefore mixed,\nagainst the picture, and thereby formed a true representation of foam.\u201d\nThus, the Sceptics find in the mingling of all that exists, and of\nall thoughts, the simple self-identity of self-consciousness which\n\u201cfollows mind as the shadow does the body,\u201d and is only acquired, and\ncan only be acquired through reason. \u201cHence we say that the end of the\nSceptic is imperturbability in the conceptions and moderation in the\naffections which he is compelled to have.\u201d This is the indifference\nwhich the animals have by nature, and the possession of which through\nreason distinguishes men from animals. Thus, Pyrrho once showed to his\nfellow-passengers on board a ship, who were afraid during a storm, a\npig, which remained quite indifferent and peacefully ate on, saying to\nthem: in such indifference the wise man must also abide.[195] However\nthe indifference must not be like that of the pig, but must be born\nof reason. But if to Scepticism existence was only a manifestation or\nconception, it was yet esteemed by it as that in respect to which\nthe Sceptics directed their conduct, both in what they did, and what\nthey left undone. The above-quoted (p. 336) anecdotes about Pyrrho are\nthus opposed to what the Sceptics themselves said on the subject: \u201cWe\nundoubtedly direct our conduct in accordance with a reason which, in\nconformity with sensuous phenomena, teaches us to live conformably to\nthe customs and laws of our country, and in consonance with recognized\ninstitutions and personal affections.\u201d[196] But for them this had only\nthe significance of a subjective certainty and conviction, and not the\nvalue of an absolute truth.\n\nThus the universal method of Scepticism was, as Sextus Empiricus puts\nit (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 4, \u00a7\u00a7 8-10; c. 6, \u00a7 12): \u201ca power of in some way\nor other setting what is felt, and what is thought, in opposition,\nwhether it be the sensuous to the sensuous, and what is thought to\nwhat is thought, or what is sensuous to what is thought, or what is\nthought to what is sensuous, _i.e._ showing that any one of these has\nas much force and weight as its opposite, and is hence equivalent as\nfar as conviction and non-conviction are concerned. From this the\nsuspension of judgment (\u1f10\u03c0\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae) results, in conformity with which we\nselect and posit nothing, and thereby complete freedom from all mental\nemotion is attained. The principle of Scepticism is thus found in the\nproposition that each reason is confronted by another, which holds\nequally good. We do not, however, necessarily accept affirmation and\nnegation as opposite grounds, but merely those that conflict with\none another.\u201d That which is felt is really existence for sensuous\ncertainty, which simply accepts it as truth; or it is that which is\nfelt in the Epicurean form, which consciously asserts it to be true.\nWhat is thought is in the Stoic form a determinate Notion, a content in\na simple form of thought; both these classes, immediate consciousness\nand thinking consciousness, comprehend everything which is in any\nway to be set in opposition. In as far as Scepticism limits itself\nto this, it is a moment in Philosophy itself, which last, having an\nattitude of negativity in relation to both, only recognizes them\nas true in their abrogation. But Scepticism thinks that it reaches\nfurther; it sets up a pretension of venturing against the speculative\nIdea and conquering it; Philosophy, however, since Scepticism itself\nis present in it as a moment, rather overcomes it (_supra_, p. 330).\nAs far as what is sensuous and what is thought in their separation\nare concerned, it certainly may conquer, but the Idea is neither the\none nor the other, and it does not touch on the rational at all. The\nperpetual misunderstanding which those who do not know the nature of\nthe Idea are under concerning Scepticism, is that they think that the\ntruth necessarily falls into the one form or the other, and is thus\neither a determinate Notion or a determinate Being. Against the Notion\nas Notion, _i.e._ against the absolute Notion, Scepticism does not in\nany way proceed; the absolute Notion is rather its weapon of defence,\nthough Scepticism has no consciousness of this. We shall on the one\nhand see Scepticism use that weapon against the finite, and on the\nother, how it tries its skill upon the rational.\n\nBut though, according to this, Scepticism always expresses itself as if\neverything were in appearance only, the Sceptics go further than those\nwho support the newer and purely formal idealism. For they deal with\ncontent, and demonstrate of all content that it is either experienced\nby the senses or thought, and consequently that it has something in\nopposition to it. Thus they show in the same thing the contradiction\nthat exists, so that of everything that is presented the opposite\nalso holds good. This is the objective element in Scepticism in its\nmanifestation, and that through which it is not subjective idealism.\nSextus (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 13, \u00a7\u00a7 32, 33) says: \u201cThus, for instance,\nthe sensuous is set against the sensuous by our being reminded of\nthe fact that the same tower when looked at near is square and when\nregarded in the distance looks round;\u201d and hence the one assertion is\nas good as the other. This, indeed, is a very trivial example, but its\ninterest lies in the thought that is present in it. \u201cOr what is thought\nis set in opposition to what is thought. As to the fact that there\nis a providence,\u201d which rewards the good and punishes the evil, \u201cmen\nappeal,\u201d as against those who deny it, \u201cto the system of the heavenly\nbodies; to this it is objected that the good often fare badly and the\nevil well, from which we demonstrate that there is no providence.\u201d As\nto the \u201copposition of what is thought to the sensuous,\u201d Sextus adduces\nthe conclusion of Anaxagoras, who asserts of the snow, that although\nit appears to be white, regarded in relation to the reasons given by\nreflection it is black. For it is frozen water, but water has no colour\nand hence is black; consequently snow must be the same.\n\nWe must now consider further the method in which the Sceptics proceed,\nand it consists in this, that they have brought the universal principle\nthat each definite assertion has to be set over against its \u2018other,\u2019\ninto certain forms, not propositions. Thus, in view of the nature of\nScepticism, we cannot ask for any system of propositions, nor will this\nphilosophy really be a system; just as little did it lie in the spirit\nof Scepticism to form a school, properly speaking, but only an external\nconnection in the wider sense of the word. Sextus (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 8,\n\u00a7 16, c. 3, \u00a7 7) hence says that Scepticism is no selection (\u03b1\u1f35\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2)\nof dogmas, it is not a preference for certain propositions, but only\nthat which leads, or rather which directs us (\u1f00\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03ae) to live rightly\nand think correctly; thus it is in this way rather a method or manner\nby which only universal modes of that opposition are shown. Now since\nwhat sort of thoughts reveal themselves is a matter of contingency, the\nmanner and mode of grasping them is contingent likewise; for in one the\ncontradiction appears thus and in another otherwise. These determinate\nmodes of opposition, whereby the withholding of assent comes to pass,\nthe Sceptics called tropes (\u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9), which are turned upon everything\nthat is thought and felt in order to show that this is not what it is\nimplicitly, but only in relation to another\u2014that it thus itself appears\nin another, and allows this other to appear in it, and consequently\nthat, speaking generally, what is, only seems; and this, indeed,\nfollows directly from the matter in itself, and not from another which\nis assumed as true. If, for example, men say that empiric science has\nno truth because truth exists only in reason, this is only assuming the\nopposite of empiricism; likewise the truth of reason proved in itself\nis not a refutation of empiric science, for this last stands alongside\nof the former with equal rights as, and within the same.\n\nNow since the sceptical doctrine consists in the art of demonstrating\ncontradictions through these _tropes_, we only require to elucidate\nthese modes. The Sceptics themselves, like Sextus, for example (Pyrrh.\nHyp. I. c. 14, 15) distinguish in these forms the earlier and the\nlater: ten of them belong to the elder Sceptics, that is to say to\nPyrrho, and five were afterwards added by the later Sceptics, and\nDiogenes Laertius indeed tells us (IX. 88) that this was first done\nby Agrippa. From a specification of these it will be shown that the\nearlier are directed against the ordinary consciousness generally and\nbelong to a thought of little culture, to a consciousness which has\nsensuous existence immediately before it. For they proceed against what\nwe call common belief in the immediate truth of things, and refute it\nin a manner which is immediate likewise, not through the Notion but\nthrough the existence which is opposed to it. In their enumeration,\ntoo, there is this same absence of the Notion. But the five others\nappear to be better, have more interest, and are manifestly of later\norigin; they proceed against reflection, _i.e._ against a consciousness\nwhich relates itself to the developed understanding, and thus\nspecially against thought-forms, scientific categories, the thought of\nthe sensuous, and the determination of the same through Notions. Now\nthough the most part of these may appear to us to be quite trivial, we\nmust still be indulgent towards them, for they are historically, and\nconsequently really, directed against the form \u201cit is.\u201d But without\ndoubt it is a very abstract consciousness that makes this abstract form\n\u201cit is\u201d its object and combats it. However trivial then and commonplace\nthese tropes may always appear to be, even more trivial and commonplace\nis the reality of the so-called external objects, that is, immediate\nknowledge, as when, for instance, I say \u201cThis is yellow.\u201d Men ought\nnot to talk about philosophy, if in this innocent way they assert the\nreality of such determinations. But this Scepticism was really far from\nholding things of immediate certainty to be true; thus it actually\nstands in contrast to modern Scepticism, in which it is believed\nthat what is in our immediate consciousness, or indeed, all that is\nsensuous, is a truth (_supra_, pp. 331, 332). As distinguished from\nthis, the older Scepticism, the modes of which we would now consider\nfurther, is directed against the reality of things.\n\n\n1. THE EARLIER TROPES.\n\nIn the earlier tropes we see the lack of abstraction appearing as\nthe incapacity to grasp their diversitude under more simple general\npoints of view, although they all, in fact, partly under a simple\nconception and partly in their difference, do in fact converge into\nsome necessary simple determinations. From all alike, in relation to\nimmediate knowledge, is the insecurity demonstrated of that of which\nwe say \u201cit is.\u201d Sextus Empiricus (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 14, \u00a7 38) even\nremarks, that \u201call the tropes may be summed up in three: the one is the\njudging subject; the other that respecting which the judgment is made;\nthe third that which contains both sides\u201d\u2014the relation of subject and\nobject. If thought is developed further, it embraces things in these\nmore general determinations.\n\na. \u201cThe first trope is the diversitude in animal organization,\naccording to which different living beings experience different\nconceptions and sensations respecting the same object. This the\nSceptics conclude from the different nature of their origin, because\nsome are brought into being through copulation and others without\ncopulation\u201d (from a _generatio \u00e6quivoca_): \u201cbut of the first some are\nhatched from eggs, and others come immediately living into the world,\n&c. Thus it is a matter of no doubt that this difference of origin\nproduces opposite constitutions, temperaments, &c. The variety in\nthe parts of the body, and particularly in those which are given to\nthe animal for purposes of distinguishing and feeling, thus produces\nin them the greatest differences in conceptions. For instance, the\njaundiced patient sees as yellow what to others appears white,\u201d and as\ngreen, what to the latter seems blue. \u201cSimilarly the eyes of animals\nare differently constructed in different species, and have different\ncolours, being pale, grey or red; consequently what is perceived\nthereby must be different.\u201d[197]\n\nThis difference in the subject undoubtedly establishes a difference in\nperception, and this last a difference between the conception and the\nnature of the object of perception. But if we say \u201cThat is,\u201d we mean\nsomething fixed, maintaining itself under all conditions; whereas in\nopposition to this the Sceptics show that everything is variable. But\nif they thereby destroy similarity and identity for the senses, and\nconsequently _this_ universality, another steps in, for universality\nor existence rests simply in the fact of men knowing that, in the\nhackneyed example of the jaundiced man, things appear so to him, _i.e._\nthe necessary law is known whereby a change of sensation arises for\nhim. But certainly it is implied in this that the first sensuous\nuniversality is not true universality, because it is one immediate\nand unknown; and in it as sensuous existence, its non-universality is\nrightly demonstrated within itself through another universality. As\nagainst the statement \u201cThis is blue because I see it as such,\u201d which\nclearly makes sight the ground of its being asserted to be blue, it\nis quite fair to point to another who has immediate perception of the\nobject and for whom it is not blue.\n\nb. The second trope, the diversitude of mankind in reference to\nfeelings and conditions, amounts very much to the same thing as in\nthe first case. In respect to difference in constitution of body, the\nSceptics discover many idiosyncrasies. As regards the proposition\n\u201cShade is cool,\u201d for instance, they say that someone felt cold in the\nsunlight, but warm in shadow; as against the statement \u201cHemlock is\npoisonous,\u201d they instance an old woman in Attica who could swallow a\nlarge dose of hemlock without harm\u2014thus the predicate poisonous is\nnot objective, because it suits the one and not the other. Because\nsuch great bodily differences are present amongst men, and the body is\nthe image of the soul, men must have a diversity of mind likewise and\ngive the most contradictory judgments, so that no one can know whom to\nbelieve. To judge by the greater number would be foolish, for all men\ncannot be inquired of.[198] This trope again relates to the immediate;\nif, therefore, what has to be done is merely to believe some statement\ninasmuch as it is made by others, undoubtedly nothing but contradiction\ntakes place. But a belief like this, that is ready to believe anything,\nis, as a matter of fact, incapable of understanding what is said; it\nis an immediate acceptance of an immediate proposition. For it did not\ndemand the reason; but the reason is, in the first place, the mediation\nand the meaning of the words of the immediate proposition. Diversitude\nin men is really something which now likewise appears in other forms.\nIt is said that men differ in regard to taste, religion, &c.; that\nreligion must be left for each to decide for himself; that each, from\na standpoint of his own, must settle how things are to be regarded\nas far as religion is concerned. The consequence of this is that in\nregard to religion there is nothing objective or true, everything ends\nin subjectivity, and the result is indifference to all truth. For then\nthere is no longer a church; each man has a church and a liturgy of his\nown, each has his own religion. The Sceptics more particularly\u2014as those\nwho in all times spare themselves the trouble of philosophizing, on\nsome sort of pretext, and who try to justify this evasion\u2014persistently\npreach the diversity of philosophies; Sextus Empiricus does this\nvery expressly, and it may even be brought forward here, although it\nwill appear more definitely as the first of the later tropes. If the\nprinciple of the Stoics, as it is in its immediacy, holds good, the\nopposite principle, that of the Epicureans, has just as much truth, and\nholds equally good. In this way, when it is said that some particular\nphilosophy asserts and maintains certain propositions, the greatest\ndiversity is undoubtedly to be found. For here we have the talk which\nwe censured earlier (Vol. I. p. 16): \u201cSince the greatest men of all\ntimes have thought so differently and have not been able to come to\nan agreement, it would be presumptuous on our part to believe we had\nfound what they could not attain to,\u201d and with those who speak thus,\nthe timid shrinking from knowledge makes out the inertness of their\nreason to be a virtue. Now if the diversity cannot be denied, because\nit is a fact that the philosophies of Thales, Plato, and Aristotle were\ndifferent, and that this was not merely apparently the case, but that\nthey contradicted one another, this way of wishing in such statements\nof them to gain a knowledge of the philosophies, shows a want of\nunderstanding as regards Philosophy; for such propositions are not\nPhilosophy, nor do they give expression to it. Philosophy is quite the\nreverse of this immediacy of a proposition, because in that the very\nknowledge that is essential is not taken into account; hence such men\nsee everything in a philosophy excepting Philosophy itself, and this is\noverlooked. However different the philosophic systems may be, they are\nnot as different as white and sweet, green and rough; for they agree in\nthe fact that they are philosophies, and this is what is overlooked.\nBut as regards the difference in philosophies, we must likewise remark\nupon this immediate validity accorded to them, and upon the form, that\nthe essence of Philosophy is expressed in an immediate manner. As\nregards this \u2018is\u2019 the trope undoubtedly does its work, for all tropes\nproceed against the \u2018is,\u2019 but the truth is all the time not this dry\n\u2018is,\u2019 but genuine process. The relative difference in philosophies is,\nin their mutual attitude towards one another (see the fifth trope),\nalways to be comprehended as a connection, and therefore not as an \u2018is.\u2019\n\nc. The third trope turns on the difference in the constitution of\nthe organs of sense as related to one another; _e.g._ in a picture\nsomething appears raised to the eye but not to the touch, to which it\nis smooth, &c.[199] This is, properly speaking, a subordinate trope,\nfor in fact a determination such as this coming through some sense,\ndoes not constitute the truth of the thing, what it is in itself.\nThe consciousness is required that the unthinking description which\nascribes existence to blue, square, &c., one after the other, does not\nexhaust and express the Being of the thing; they are only predicates\nwhich do not express the thing as subject. It is always important\nto keep in mind that the different senses grasp the same thing in\ncontradictory ways, for by this the nullity of sensuous certainty is\nrevealed.\n\nd. The fourth trope deals with the diversitude of circumstances in the\nsubject, in reference to its condition, the changes taking place in it,\nwhich must prevent our making an assertion respecting any particular\nthing. The same thing manifests itself differently to the same man,\naccording as he, for instance, is at rest or moving, asleep or awake,\nmoved by hatred or love, sober or drunk, young or old, &c. In the\ndiversitude of these circumstances very different judgments are passed\nregarding one and the same object, hence we must not talk of anything\nas being more than a manifestation.[200]\n\ne. The fifth trope relates to the different positions, distances and\nplaces, for from every different standpoint the object appears to be\ndifferent. In respect to position, a long passage appears to the man\nwho stands at the one end to taper to a point at the other; but if he\ngoes there he finds it to be of the same breadth at that end as it was\nat the other. Distance is likewise, properly speaking, a difference\nin the greatness and smallness of objects. In respect to place, the\nlight in a lantern is quite feeble in the sunshine, and yet in darkness\nit shines quite brightly. Pigeons\u2019 necks, regarded from different\npoints of view, shimmer quite differently.[201] In regard to motion\nin particular very different views prevail. The best known example of\nsuch is found in the course of the sun round the earth, or the earth\nround the sun. As the earth is said to go round the sun, even though\nthe opposite appears to be the case, the former assertion is based\non reasons. This example does not, however, come in here, but this\ntrope will show that because one sensuous feeling contradicts another,\nexistence is not expressed in it.\n\nf. The sixth trope is taken from intermixture, because nothing comes\nwithin the scope of the sense alone and isolated, but only as mingled\nwith something else; this admixture with something else, however,\ncauses change, just as scents are stronger in the sunshine than in\ncold air, &c. Further, through the subject himself, this admixture\ncomes in; the eyes consist of various tunics and humours, the ear has\ndifferent passages, &c., consequently they cannot allow sensations\u2014the\nlight or the voice\u2014to come to us in their purity, for the sensuous\nelement comes to us first of all modified by these tunics of the eye\nand likewise by the passages of the ear.[202] But if we are to express\nourselves in this particular manner, the direct opposite might likewise\nbe maintained, that the sensuous element there present is simply\npurified; the apprehending ear, for example, again purifies the voice\nthat comes in bodily form from a soul.\n\ng. The seventh trope is the cohesion, the size or quantity of things,\nthrough which they appear different; for instance, we see how glass is\ntransparent, but loses this transparency when it is pounded, and thus\nhas its cohesion altered. Shavings of goat\u2019s-horn appear to be white,\nbut the whole piece looks black; or Carrara marble ground into powder\nlooks white, though the whole piece is yellow. The same holds good as\nregards quantity. A moderate portion of wine fortifies and exhilarates,\na large quantity of it destroys the body, and the case is similar with\ndrugs.[203] If the quantity is not to be spoken of as the substance,\nit is still an abstraction that quantity and combination are matters\nof indifference as regards quality and disintegration; the change of\nquantity likewise changes the quality.\n\nh. The eighth trope arises from the relativity of things, and is thus\nthe universal trope of relationship. This relativity of everything\nexistent and thought is a more inward, real determinateness, and all\nthe tropes already mentioned really aim at it. \u201cAccording to this\ntrope,\u201d says Sextus (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 14, \u00a7\u00a7 135, 136), \u201cwe conclude\nthat since everything is in relation to something, we must withhold\nour judgment as to what it is on its own account and in its nature.\nBut it must be remarked that we here make use of \u2018is\u2019 in the sense\nof appearance only. Relationship is used in two respects: first in\nrelation to the judging subject,\u201d and this difference we saw in the\nprevious tropes, \u201cand in the second place in relation to the object\nwhich is to be judged, like right and left.\u201d Sextus, in the passage\nabove (\u00a7\u00a7 137, 140), argues as follows: \u201cAs regards what is set forth\non its own account and separate from others, is it distinguished from\nthe mere relative or not? If it were not different from it, it would\nitself be a relative. If it is different, it again is a relative.\nThat is to say, what is different is related to something, for it\nis set forth in relation to that from which it is distinguished.\u201d\nRelativity, generally, is present in what is absolutely predicated,\nfor relationship is a relationship in itself and not to another.\nRelationship contains opposition: what is in relation to another is\non the one hand independent on its own account, but on the other,\nbecause it is in relationship, it is likewise not independent. For if\nanything is only in relation to something else, the other likewise\nbelongs to it; it is thus not on its own account. But if its other\nalready belongs to it, its non-being also already belongs to it, and\nit is a contradictory as soon as it is not without its other. \u201cBut\nbecause we cannot separate the relative from its other, we likewise do\nnot know what it is on its own account and in its nature, and we must\nconsequently suspend our judgment.\u201d\n\ni. The ninth trope is the more or less frequent occurrence of things,\nwhich likewise alters one\u2019s judgment upon the things. What happens\nseldom is more highly esteemed than what comes to pass frequently; and\ncustom brings about the fact that one judges in this way and the other\nin that way. Custom is thus made a circumstance which also permits us\nto say that things appear so and so to us, but not universally and\ngenerally that they are so.[204] When men say of any particular things\nthat \u201cthis is so,\u201d circumstances may be instanced in which the opposite\npredicate is applicable to them also. If, for example, we remain at\nthe abstraction of the man, does it really signify whether or not we\nhave a prince?\u2014No. States?\u2014No. A republic?\u2014No, and so on, for they are\nhere and not there.\n\nk. The tenth trope mainly concerns ethics and is related to manners,\ncustoms and laws. What is moral and legal is likewise not such; for\nwhat is here considered to be right is elsewhere held to be wrong. The\nattitude of Scepticism in this regard is to show that the opposite\nof what is maintained as valid law holds equally good. As regards\nthe ordinary understanding respecting the validity of this and that\nmaxim, _e.g._ that the son has to pay the debts of his father, the\nultimate and indeed only ground lies in its being said that this is\ntrue in its immediacy, for it holds good as law or custom. As against\nthis the Sceptics likewise prove the opposite, saying for instance,\nthat the son has, indeed, to undertake the debts of the father by the\nlaw of Rhodes; but in Rome he does not require to do so, if he has\nrenounced his claim on the paternal goods.[205] As in the existence\nof what is determined, which is held to be true because it is, the\nopposite is shown to exist; so in the case of laws, if their ground\nis that they are in force, their opposite can be demonstrated. The\nnatural man has no consciousness of the presence of opposites; he lives\nquite unconsciously in his own particular way, in conformity with the\nmorality of his town, without ever having reflected on the fact that he\npractises this morality. If he then comes into a foreign land, he is\nmuch surprised, for through encountering the opposite he for the first\ntime experiences the fact that he has these customs, and he immediately\narrives at uncertainty as to whether his point of view or the opposite\nis wrong. For the opposite of what held good to him holds equally good,\nand he does not possess any further ground for his practice; so that\nsince the one holds good equally with the other, neither holds good.\n\nWe now see in these modes that, properly speaking, they are not logical\nmodes at all, nor have they to do with the Notion, for they proceed\ndirectly against empiricism. Something is by immediate certainty given\nout as being true, the opposite of this last is from some other point\nof view demonstrated to be equally true, and thus its other-being is\nset forth as valid. The different modes in which the non-validity of\nthe first and the validity of the other-being relate to one another,\nare ranged under the above heads. If we now classify these ten tropes\nin conformity with the plan indicated above by Sextus (p. 347), we find\nin the first four tropes the dissimilarity of the object to depend on\nthe judging subject, because that which judges is either the animal or\nthe man or one of his senses or particular dispositions in him. Or the\ndissimilarity depends on the object, and here we come to the seventh\nand tenth tropes, since first the amount makes a thing into something\nquite different, and then the code of morals in different places makes\nitself the only absolute, excluding and prohibiting any other. The\nfifth, sixth, eighth and ninth tropes finally deal with a union of\nboth sides, or these all together contain the relationship; this is a\ndemonstration that the object does not present itself in itself, but in\nrelation to something else.\n\nFrom content and form we see in these modes their early origin; for\nthe content, which has only to deal with Being, shows its change only,\ntakes up only the variability of its manifestation, without showing its\ncontradiction in itself, _i.e._ in its Notion. But in form they show\nan unpractised thought, which does not yet bring the whole of these\nexamples under their universal points of view, as is done by Sextus,\nor which places the universal, relativity, alongside of its particular\nmodes. On account of their dulness we are not accustomed to lay great\nstress on such methods, nor esteem them of any value; but, in fact, as\nagainst the dogmatism of the common human understanding they are quite\nvalid. This last says directly, \u201cThis is so because it is so,\u201d taking\nexperience as authority. Now through these modes this understanding\nwill be shown that its belief has contingencies and differences within\nit, which at one time present a thing in this way and at another time\nin that way; and thereby it will be made aware that it itself, or\nanother subject, with equal immediacy and on the same ground (on none\nat all), says: \u201cIt is not so, for it really is the opposite,\u201d Thus the\nsignification of these tropes has still its value. Should faith or\nright be founded on a feeling, this feeling is in me, and then others\nmay say: \u201cIt is not in me.\u201d If one person\u2019s tastes are to be accepted\nas authoritative, it is not difficult to demonstrate that another\nperson\u2019s tastes are utterly opposite, but Being is thereby degraded\ninto seeming, for in every assurance such as that, the opposite holds\nequally good.\n\n\n2. THE LATER TROPES.\n\nThe five other sceptical tropes have an entirely different character,\nand it is at once evident that they indicate quite another point of\nview and degree of culture as regards philosophic thought; for they\npertain more to thinking reflection, and contain the dialectic which\nthe determinate Notion has within it. Sextus Empiricus[206] sets them\nforth as follows:\u2014\n\na. The first trope is the diversitude in opinions (\u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03c2),\nand that not among animals and men, but expressly among philosophers;\nof this matter we have just spoken above (pp. 349, 350). Sextus, and\nan Epicurean quoted by Cicero (Vol. I. p. 16), adduce the manifold\nnature of dogmas, and from this the conclusion is drawn that the one\nhas just as much support as the other. Philosophers and others still\nmake copious use of this sceptical trope, which is consequently in\ngreat favour: on account of the diversitude in philosophies, they\nsay, Philosophy has no value, and truth is unattainable because men\nhave thought about it in ways so contradictory. This diversitude\nin philosophic opinion is said to be an invincible weapon against\nPhilosophy; but the category of difference is very barren, and we\nhave said in the introduction (Vol. I. pp. 17-19) how it is to be\nunderstood. The Idea of Philosophy is to all philosophers one and the\nsame, even if they themselves are not aware of it; but those who speak\nso much of this diversity know as little about it. The true difference\nis not a substantial one, but a difference in the different stages\nof development; and if the difference implies a one-sided view, as\nit does with the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, in their totality\nundoubtedly we first reach truth.\n\nb. A very important trope is that of failing into an infinite\nprogression (\u1f21 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03ba\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2); by it the Sceptics show that the\nreason which is brought forward for an assertion itself again requires\na reason, and this again another, and so on into infinitude; from this\nsuspension of judgment thus likewise follows, for there is nothing\nwhich can furnish a solid foundation. Consequently no permanent ground\ncan be pointed out, for each continues to press further and further\nback, and yet finally a cessation must be made. In more recent times\nmany have plumed themselves on this trope, and, in fact, it is as\nregards the understanding and the so-called syllogism (_supra_, pp.\n222, 223), a trope of great force. For if deduction from reasons is\nmade the power of knowledge, we must, on the other hand, remember that\nby so doing we have premises which are quite ungrounded.\n\nc. The trope of Relationship, the relativity of determinations (\u1f40 \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78\n\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9), has already been found among those mentioned above (p.\n353). It is that what is maintained shows itself as it appears, partly\nmerely in relation to the judging subject and partly to other things,\nbut not as it is in itself by nature.\n\nd. The fourth trope is that of Pre-supposition (\u1f40 \u1f10\u03be \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2): \u201cWhen\nthe dogmatists see that they are thrown back into the infinite, they\nput forward something as principle which they do not prove, but wish to\nhave conceded to them simply and without proof:\u201d that is an axiom. If\nthe dogmatist has the right to pre-suppose an axiom as unproved, the\nsceptic has equally the right, or, if we choose to say so, equally no\nright, to pre-suppose the opposite as unproved. One is as good as the\nother. Thus all definitions are pre-suppositions. For instance, Spinoza\npre-supposes definitions of the infinite, of substance, of attribute,\n&c.; and the rest follows consistently from them. Nowadays men prefer\nto give assurances and speak of facts of consciousness.\n\ne. The last trope is that of Reciprocity (\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2), or proof in a\ncircle. \u201cThat which is dealt with is grounded on something which itself\nagain requires something else as its ground; now that which has been\nsaid to be proved by it is used for this purpose, so that each is\nproved through the other.\u201d When we would avoid infinite progression\nand the making of pre-suppositions, we use again that which was proved\nto prove its own proof. To the question, \u201cWhat is the ground of the\nphenomenon?\u201d the reply is \u201cPower,\u201d but this is itself merely deduced\nfrom the moments of the phenomenon.\n\nNow Sextus shows (Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 15, \u00a7\u00a7 169-177) in the following\nway that, speaking generally, all sceptical investigations pass into\nthese five modes of reasoning; and from this it is likewise clear that\nScepticism is not really a reasoning against anything from reasons\nwhich can be found, which quick-wittedness discovers in the particular\nobject, but that it has a profound knowledge of the categories. (\u03b1)\n\u201cThe object before us is either one felt\u201d (according to Epicurus),\n\u201cor one thought\u201d (according to the Stoics). \u201cBut however it may be\ndetermined, there always is a difference of opinion respecting it,\u201d\nand specially of sophic opinions. This is the first trope. \u201cFor some\nbelieve what is felt and others what is thought to be alone the truth,\u201d\n_i.e._ the criterion; \u201cothers, however, again accept partly what is\nthought and partly what is felt.\u201d There consequently is a contradiction\npresent here. \u201cNow is it possible to harmonize this contradiction\nor not? If not, we must withhold our judgment. But if it is to be\nsolved, the question is, \u2018How shall we decide?\u2019\u201d What is to contain the\ncriterion, the standard, the implicit? \u201cIs what is felt to be judged\nby what is felt, or by what is thought?\u201d (\u03b2) Either side, individually\nconsidered as the implicit, passes, according to the Sceptics, into\nthe infinite; but this is a description which must necessarily be\nproved on its own account. \u201cIf what is felt is to be judged by what is\nfelt, it is allowed (since feeling is in question) that this sensation\nrequires another sensation as its reason;\u201d for the conviction of its\ntruth is not without contradiction. \u201cBut if that which constitutes the\nreason is again a feeling, that which is said to be a reason must have\na reason just as much; thus we go on into infinitude\u201d\u2014and here we have\nthe second trope. The case is, however, similar if what is thought is\nthe criterion, or if the implicit is made to rest on it. \u201cIf to what\nis thought is given the power of judging what is felt, this likewise,\nsince it is that respecting which no harmony prevails, requires another\nas its ground. This reason is, however, something thought likewise, and\nit again requires a reason; thus this, too, passes into the infinite.\u201d\nFrom effect men thus reach cause; nevertheless this too is not\noriginal, but is itself an effect; and so on. But if men thus progress\ninto infinitude, they have no first original ground to stand on, for\nwhat is accepted as first cause is itself merely effect; and since they\nmerely progress continually, it is implied that no ultimate is posited.\nThe false belief that this progression is a true category, is also to\nbe found in Kant and Fichte; but there is really no true ultimate,\nor, what is the same, no true first. The understanding represents\ninfinite progression as something great; but its contradiction is that\nmen speak of a first cause and it is then shown that it is only an\neffect. Men only attain to the contradiction and constant repetition\nof the same, but not to the solution of it, and consequently to the\ntrue _prius_. (\u03b3) But should this endless progression not satisfy\nus\u2014which the Sceptics indeed perceived\u2014and therefore have to be put\na stop to, this may happen by what is or what is felt having its\nfoundation in thought, and, on the other hand, by likewise taking for\nthe foundation of thought that which is felt. In this way each would be\nfounded without there having been a progression into infinitude; but\nthen that which founds would also be that which is founded, and there\nwould merely be a passing from one to the other. Thus, in the third\nplace, this falls into the trope of Reciprocity, in which, however,\nthere is no more than there was before any true foundation. For in\nit each merely exists through the other, neither is really set forth\nabsolutely, but each is the implicit only for the other, and this is\nself-abrogation. (\u03b4) But if this is avoided by an unproved axiom which\nis taken as an implicit fact, a first and absolute ground, this way\nof arguing falls into the mode of Pre-supposition\u2014the fourth trope.\nBut if an assumption such as this were to be allowed, it would also be\nlegitimate for anyone to assume the contrary. Thus against the absolute\nassertion of idealism, \u201cThe Absolute is the I,\u201d it is with equal force\nmaintained that \u201cThe Absolute is existence.\u201d The one man says in the\nimmediate certainty of himself: \u201cI am absolute to myself;\u201d another man\nlikewise in certainty of himself says, \u201cIt is absolutely certain to\nme that things exist.\u201d Idealism did not prove the former, nor did it\ndestroy the latter; it takes its stand alongside of it, and only bases\nits assertions on its own principle. Everything, however, then, comes\nround to this, that because the \u2018I\u2019 is absolute, the \u2018not-I\u2019 cannot\nbe absolute. On the other hand it may be said as justly: \u201cBecause the\nthing is absolute, the \u2018I\u2019 cannot be absolute.\u201d If it is legitimate,\nSextus further says, immediately to pre-suppose something as unproved,\nit is absurd to pre-suppose anything else as proof of that on whose\nbehalf it is pre-supposed; we only require to posit straightway the\nimplicit existence of that which is in question. But as it is absurd\nto do so, so also is the other absurd. Men set to work in the finite\nsciences in a similar way. But when, as in a dogmatism like this, a\nman asserts his right of pre-supposing something, every other man has\nequally the right of pre-supposing something. Consequently the modern\nimmediate revelation of the subject now appears. It does no good for\nany man to affirm, for example, that he finds in his consciousness that\nGod exists; since anyone has the right to say that he finds in his\nconsciousness that God does not exist. In modern times men have not got\nvery far with this immediate knowledge\u2014perhaps not further than the\nancients, (\u03b5) In the fifth place everything perceived has, according\nto the trope of Relationship, a relation to something else, to what\nperceives; its Notion is just that of being for another. The same\nholds good with what is thought; as the universal object of thought it\nlikewise has the form of being something for another.\n\nIf we sum this up in a general way, the determinate, whether it is\nexistent or thought, is (\u03b1) really, as determinate, the negative of\nanother, _i.e._ it is related to another and exists for the same, and\nis thus in relationship; in this everything is really exhausted. (\u03b2) In\nthis relationship to another this last, posited as its universality,\nis its reason; but this reason, as opposed to that which is proved,\nis itself a determinate, and consequently has its reality only in\nwhat is proved. And for the reason that I really again consider this\nuniversal as a determinate, it is conditioned by another like the one\nthat goes before, and so on into infinity. (\u03b3) In order that this\ndeterminate for which, as in consciousness, the other is, should have\nexistence, this other must exist, for in this it has its reality;\nand because this its object is likewise for another, they mutually\ncondition each other and are mediated through one another, neither\nbeing self-existent. And if the universal as the basis has its reality\nin the existent, and this existent its reality in the universal, this\nforms the Reciprocity whereby what in themselves are opposites mutually\nestablish one another. (\u03b4) But what is implicit is something which is\nnot mediated through another; as the immediate, that is because it is,\nit is, however, an Hypothesis. (\u03b5) Now if this determinate is taken as\npre-supposed, so also may another be. Or we might say more shortly that\nthe deficiency in all metaphysics of the understanding lies partly in\n(\u03b1) the Demonstration, by which it falls into the infinite; and partly\nin (\u03b2) the Hypotheses, which constitute an immediate knowledge.\n\nThese tropes thus form an effective weapon against the philosophy\nof the ordinary understanding, and the Sceptics directed them with\ngreat acuteness, sometimes against the common acceptation of things,\nand sometimes against principles of philosophic reflection. These\nsceptical tropes, in fact, concern that which is called a dogmatic\nphilosophy\u2014not in the sense of its having a positive content, but as\nasserting something determinate as the absolute; and in accordance\nwith its nature, such a philosophy must display itself in all these\nforms. To the Sceptics, the Notion of dogmatic philosophy is in\neffect that something is asserted as the implicit; it is thus opposed\nto idealism by the fact of its maintaining that an existence is the\nabsolute. But there is a misunderstanding or a formal understanding in\nconsidering that all philosophy that is not Scepticism is Dogmatism.\nDogmatism, as the Sceptics quite correctly describe it, consists in\nthe assertion that something determinate, such as \u2018I\u2019 or \u2018Being,\u2019\n\u2018Thought\u2019 or \u2018Sensation,\u2019 is the truth. In the talk about idealism,\nto which dogmatism has been opposed, just as many mistakes have\nbeen made, and misunderstandings taken place. To the criticism which\nknows no implicit, nothing absolute, all knowledge of implicit\nexistence as such is held to be dogmatism, while it is the most wanton\ndogmatism of all, because it maintains that the \u2018I,\u2019 the unity of\nself-consciousness, is opposed to Being, is in and for itself, and\nthat the implicit in the outside world is likewise so, and therefore\nthat the two absolutely cannot come together. By idealism that is\nlikewise held to be dogmatism in which, as is the case in Plato and\nSpinoza, the absolute has been made the unity of self-consciousness and\nexistence, and not self-consciousness opposed to existence. Speculative\nphilosophy thus, indeed, asserts, but does not assert a determinate;\nor it cannot express its truth in the simple form of a proposition,\nalthough Philosophy is often falsely understood as pre-supposing an\noriginal principle from which all others are to be deduced. But though\nits principle can be given the form of a proposition, to the Idea what\npertains to the proposition as such is not essential, and the content\nis of such a nature that it really abrogates this immediate existence,\nas we find with the Academicians. As a matter of fact, that which is\nnow called a proposition, absolutely requires a mediation or a ground;\nfor it is an immediate determinate that has another proposition in\nopposition to it, which last is again of a similar nature, and so on\ninto infinitude. Consequently, each, as being a proposition, is the\nunion of two moments between which there is an inherent difference,\nand whose union has to be mediated. Now dogmatic philosophy, which has\nthis way of representing one principle in a determinate proposition as\na fundamental principle, believes that it is therefore universal, and\nthat the other is in subordination to it. And undoubtedly this is so.\nBut at the same time, this its determinateness rests in the fact that\nit is _only_ universal; hence such a principle is always conditioned,\nand consequently contains within it a destructive dialectic.\n\nAs against all these dogmatic philosophies, such criticism and idealism\nnot excepted, the sceptical tropes possess the negative capacity of\ndemonstrating that what the former maintain to be the implicit is not\nreally so. For implicitude such as this is a determinate, and cannot\nresist negativity, its abrogation. To Scepticism is due the honour\nof having obtained this knowledge of the negative, and of having so\ndefinitely thought out the forms of negativity. Scepticism does not\noperate by bringing forward what is called a difficulty, a possibility\nof representing the matter otherwise; that would merely indicate some\nsort of fancy which is contingent as regards this asserted knowledge.\nScepticism is not an empiric matter such as this, for it contains a\nscientific aim, its tropes turn on the Notion, the very essence of\ndeterminateness, and are exhaustive as regards the determinate. In\nthese moments Scepticism desires to assert itself, and the Sceptic\ntherein recognizes the fancied greatness of his individuality; these\ntropes prove a more cultivated dialectic knowledge in the process of\nargumentation than is found in ordinary logic, the logic of the Stoics,\nor the canon of Epicurus. These tropes are necessary contradictions\ninto which the understanding falls; even in our time progression into\ninfinitude and pre-supposition (immediate knowledge) are particularly\ncommon (_supra_, p. 363).\n\nNow, speaking generally, this is the method of Scepticism, and it\nis most important. Because the sceptical conscience demonstrates\nthat in all that is immediately accepted there is nothing secure and\nabsolute, the Sceptics have taken in hand all particular determinations\nof the individual sciences, and have shown that they are not fixed.\nThe further details of this application to the different sciences do\nnot concern us here: this far-seeing power of abstraction is also\nrequisite in order to recognize these determinations of negation or\nof opposition everywhere present in all concrete matter, and in all\nthat is thought, and to find in this determinate its limits. Sextus,\nfor example, takes up the individual sciences concretely, thereby\ndemonstrating much capacity for abstraction, and he shows in all their\ndeterminations the opposite of themselves. Thus he sets the definitions\nof mathematics against one another, and that not externally, but as\nthey are in themselves; he lays hold of the fact (adv. Math. III.\n20-22) that there is said to be a point, space, line, surface, one,\n&c. We unquestioningly allow the point to rank as a simple unit in\nspace, according to which it has no dimension; but if it has no\ndimension, it is not in space, and therefore is no longer a point. On\nthe one hand it is the negation of space, and, on the other, inasmuch\nas it is the limit of space, it touches space. Thus this negation of\nspace participates in space, itself occupies space, and thus it is in\nitself null, but at the same time it is also in itself a dialectic.\nScepticism has thus also treated of ideas which are, properly speaking,\nspeculative, and demonstrated their importance; for the demonstration\nof the contradiction in the finite is an essential point in the\nspeculatively philosophic method.\n\nThe two formal moments in this sceptical culture are firstly the power\nof consciousness to go back from itself, and to take as its object the\nwhole that is present, itself and its operation included. The second\nmoment is to grasp the form in which a proposition, with whose content\nour consciousness is in any way occupied, exists. An undeveloped\nconsciousness, on the other hand, usually knows nothing of what is\npresent in addition to the content. For instance, in the judgment \u201cThis\nthing is one,\u201d attention is paid only to the one and the thing, and\nnot to the circumstance that here something, a determinate, is related\nto the one. But this relation is the essential, and the form of the\ndeterminate; it is that whereby this house which is an individual,\nmakes itself one with the universal that is different from it. It is\nthis logical element, _i.e._ the essential element, that Scepticism\nbrings to consciousness, and on this it depends; an example of this is\nnumber, the one, as the hypothetical basis of arithmetic. Scepticism\ndoes not attempt to give the thing, nor does it dispute as to whether\nit is thus or thus, but whether the thing itself is something; it\ngrasps the essence of what is expressed, and lays hold of the whole\nprinciple of the assertion. As to God, for example, the Sceptics do not\ninquire whether He has such and such qualities, but turn to what is\nmost inward, to what lies at the ground of this conception, and they\nask whether this has reality. \u201cSince we do not know the reality of\nGod,\u201d says Sextus (Pyrrh. Hyp. III. c. I, \u00a7 4), \u201cwe shall not be able\nto know and perceive His qualities.\u201d Likewise in the preceding books\n(II. c. 4, sqq.), inquiry is made as to whether the criterion of truth\nas fixed by the understanding is anything, whether we know the thing in\nitself, or whether the \u2018I\u2019 is to itself the only absolute certainty.\nThis is the way to penetrate to reality.\n\nIn these ways the operations of Scepticism are undoubtedly directed\nagainst the finite. But however much force these moments of its\nnegative dialectic may have against the properly-speaking dogmatic\nknowledge of the understanding, its attacks against the true infinite\nof the speculative Idea are most feeble and unsatisfactory. For this\nlast is in its nature nothing finite or determinate, it has not the\none-sided character which pertains to the proposition, for it has the\nabsolute negative in itself; in itself it is round, it contains this\ndeterminate and its opposite in their ideality in itself. In so far as\nthis Idea, as the unity of these opposites, is itself again outwardly\na determinate, it stands exposed to the power of the negative; indeed\nits nature and reality is just to move continually on, so that as\ndeterminate it again places itself in unity with the determinates\nopposed to it, and thus organizes itself into a whole whose\nstarting-point again coincides with the final result. This identity is\nquite different from that of the understanding; the object as concrete\nin itself, is, at the same time, opposed to itself; but the dialectic\nsolution of this finite and other is likewise already contained in the\nspeculative, without Scepticism having first had to demonstrate this;\nfor the rational, as comprehended, does, as regards the determinate,\njust what Scepticism tries to do. However, if Scepticism attempts to\ndeal with this properly speculative element, it can in no way lay\nhold of it, nor make any progress except by doing violence to the\nspeculative itself; thus the method of its procedure against the\nrational is this, that it makes the latter into a determinate, and\nalways first of all introduces into it a finite thought-determination\nor idea of relationship to which it adheres, but which is not really\nin the infinite at all; and then it argues against the same. That is\nto say it comprehends it falsely and then proceeds to contradict it.\nOr it first of all gives the infinite the itch in order to be able to\nscratch it. The Scepticism of modern times, with which for crudity of\ncomprehension and false teaching the old cannot compare, is specially\nnoteworthy in this respect. Even now what is speculative is transformed\ninto something crude; it is possible to remain faithful to the letter,\nand yet to pervert the whole matter, because the identity of the\ndeterminate has been carried over to the speculative. What here appears\nto be most natural and impartial is to have an investigation made of\nwhat the principle of a speculative philosophy is; its essential nature\nseems to be expressed thereby, and nothing is apparently added or\nimputed to it, nor does any change appear to be effected in it. Now,\nhere, according to the conception of the non-speculative sciences,\nit is placed in this dilemma: the principle is either an unproved\nhypothesis or demands a proof which in turn implies the principle. The\nproof that is demanded of this principle itself pre-supposes something\nelse, such as the logical laws of proof; these rules of logic are,\nhowever, themselves propositions such as required to be proved; and\nso it goes on into infinitude, if an absolute hypothesis to which\nanother can be opposed is not made (_supra_, p. 362). But these forms\nof proposition, of consecutive proof, &c., do not in this form apply to\nwhat is speculative (_supra_, p. 364) as though the proposition were\nbefore us here, and the proof were something separate from it there;\nfor in this case the proof comes within the proposition. The Notion is\na self-movement, and not, as in a proposition, a desire to rest; nor is\nit true that the proof brings forward another ground or middle term and\nis another movement; for it has this movement in itself.\n\nSextus Empiricus (adv. Math. VII., 310-312), for example, thus\nreaches the speculative Idea regarding reason, which, as the thought\nof thought, comprehends itself, and is thus in its freedom at home\nwith itself. We saw this (pp. 147-151) with Aristotle. In order to\nrefute this idea, Sextus argues in the following way: \u201cThe reason that\ncomprehends is either the whole or it is only a part.\u201d But to know\nthe speculative it is requisite that there should be, besides the\n\u2018either ... or,\u2019 a third; this last is \u2018both ... and\u2019 and \u2018neither\n... nor.\u2019 \u201cIf reason as the comprehending is the whole, nothing else\nremains to be comprehended. If the comprehending reason is, however,\nonly a part which comprehends itself, this part again, as that which\ncomprehends, either is the whole (and in that case again nothing at\nall remains to be comprehended), or else, supposing what comprehends\nto be a part in the sense that what is comprehended is the other part,\nthat which comprehends does not comprehend itself,\u201d &c. In the first\nplace, however, it is clear that by arguing thus nothing is shown\nfurther than the fact that here Scepticism in the first place brings\ninto the relationship of thought thinking about thought, the very\nsuperficial category of the relationship of the whole and the parts,\nas understood by the ordinary understanding, which last is not found\nin that Idea, although as regards finite things the whole is simply\ncomposed of all the parts, and these parts constitute the whole, the\nparts and the whole being consequently identical. But the relationship\nof whole and part is not a relationship of reason to itself, being\nmuch too unimportant, and quite unworthy of being brought into the\nspeculative Idea. In the second place Scepticism is wrong in allowing\nthis relationship to hold good immediately, as it does in the ordinary\nand arid conception, where we make no objection to it. When reflection\nspeaks of a whole, there is for it beyond this nothing else remaining.\nBut the whole is just the being opposed to itself. On the one hand\nit is as whole simply identical with its parts, and, on the other\nhand, the parts are identical with the whole, since they together\nconstitute the whole. The self-comprehension of reason is just like\nthe comprehension by the whole of all its parts, if it is taken in\nits real speculative significance; and only in this sense could this\nrelationship be dealt with here. But in the sense implied by Sextus,\nthat there is nothing except the whole, the two sides, the whole and\nthe parts, remain in mutual, isolated opposition; in the region of\nspeculation the two indeed are different, but they are likewise not\ndifferent, for the difference is ideal. Outside of the whole there\nthus undoubtedly remains another, namely itself as the manifold of\nits parts. The whole argument thus rests upon the fact that a foreign\ndetermination is first of all brought within the Idea, and then\narguments against the Idea are brought forward, after it has been thus\ncorrupted by the isolation of a one-sided determination unaccompanied\nby the other moment of the determination. The case is similar when it\nis said; \u201cObjectivity and subjectivity are different, and thus their\nunity cannot be expressed.\u201d It is indeed maintained that the words\nare literally adhered to; but even as contained in these words, the\ndetermination is one-sided, and the other also pertains to it. Hence\nthis difference is not what remains good, but what has to be abrogated.\n\nWe may perhaps have said enough about the scientific nature of\nScepticism, and we have concluded therewith the second section of Greek\nphilosophy. The general point of view adopted by self-consciousness in\nthis second period, the attainment of the freedom of self-consciousness\nthrough thought, is common to all these philosophies. In Scepticism we\nnow find that reason has got so far that all that is objective, whether\nof Being or of the universal, has disappeared for self-consciousness.\nThe abyss of the self-consciousness of pure thought has swallowed up\neverything, and made entirely clear the basis of thought. It not only\nhas comprehended thought and outside of it a universe in its entirety,\nbut the result, positively expressed, is that self-consciousness itself\nis reality. External objectivity is not an objective existence nor\na universal thought; for it merely is the fact that the individual\nconsciousness exists, and that it is universal. But though for us\nthere is an object, yet this is for it no object, and thus it still\nhas itself the mode of objectivity. Scepticism deduces no result, nor\ndoes it express its negation as anything positive. But the positive\nis in no way different from the simple; or if Scepticism aims at the\ndisappearance of all that is universal, its condition, as immovability\nof spirit, is itself in fact this universal, simple, self-identical\u2014but\na universality (or a Being) which is the universality of the individual\nconsciousness. Sceptical self-consciousness, however, is this divided\nconsciousness to which on the one hand motion is a confusion of its\ncontent; it is this movement which annuls for itself all things, in\nwhich what is offered to it is quite contingent and indifferent; it\nacts according to laws which are not held by it to be true, and is a\nperfectly empiric existence. On another side its simple thought is\nthe immovability of self-identity, but its reality, its unity with\nitself is something that is perfectly empty, and the actual filling in\nis any content that one chooses. As this simplicity, and at the same\ntime pure confusion, Scepticism is in fact the wholly self-abrogating\ncontradiction. For in it the mind has got so far as to immerse\nitself in itself as that which thinks; now it can comprehend itself\nin the consciousness of its infinitude as the ultimate. In this way\nScepticism flourishes in the Roman world, because, as we saw (p.\n281), in this external, dead abstraction of the Roman principle (in\nthe principle of Republicanism and imperial Despotism) the spirit\nhas flown from an existence here and now, that could give it no\nsatisfaction, into intellectuality. Then because here the mind can only\nseek reconciliation and eud\u00e6monism inwardly through cultured thought,\nand the whole aim of the world is merely the satisfaction of the\nindividual, good can only be brought forth as individual work in each\nparticular case. Under the Roman emperors we certainly find famous men,\nprincipally Stoics, such as Marcus Aurelius and others; they, however,\nonly considered the satisfaction of their individual selves, and did\nnot attain to the thought of giving rationality to actuality through\ninstitutions, laws and constitutions. This solitude of mind within\nitself is then truly Philosophy; but the thought is abstractly at home\nwith itself as dead rigidity, and as to outward things it is passive.\nIf it moves it only moves while bearing with it a contempt of all\ndistinctions. Scepticism thus belongs to the decay both of Philosophy\nand of the world.\n\nThe stage next reached by self-consciousness is that it receives\na consciousness respecting that which it has thus become, or its\nessential nature becomes its object. Self-consciousness is to itself\nsimple essence; there is for it no longer any other reality than\nthis, which its self-consciousness is. In Scepticism this reality is\nnot yet an object to it, for to it its object is merely confusion.\nBecause it is consciousness, something is for it; in this opposition\nonly the vanishing content is for the sceptical consciousness, without\nits having been comprehended in its simple permanence. Its truth,\nhowever, is its immersion in self-consciousness, and the fact of\nself-consciousness becoming an object to itself. Thus reality has\nindeed the form of a universal in existence or in thought, but in\nthis its self-consciousness is really not a foreign thing as it is\nin Scepticism. In the first place it is not simple as immediate and\nmerely existent, a complete \u2018other,\u2019 as when we speak of the soul being\nsimple; for this last is the simple negative that turns back out of\nmovement, out of difference, as the universal, into itself. In the\nsecond place this universal power that expresses that \u201cI am at home\nwith myself,\u201d has likewise the significance of the Being, which, as\nobjective reality, has a permanence for consciousness, and does not\nmerely, as with the Sceptics, disappear; for reason in it alone knows\nhow to possess and to find itself. This inwardness of mind at home with\nitself has built in itself an ideal world, has laid the foundation\nand groundwork of the intellectual world, of a kingdom of God which\nhas come down into actuality and is in unity with it, and this is the\nstandpoint of the Alexandrian philosophy.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION THREE\n\nTHIRD PERIOD: THE NEO-PLATONISTS.\n\n\nSINCE Scepticism is the annulling of the opposites which in Stoicism\nand Epicureanism were accepted as the universal principles from which\nall other opposites took their rise, it likewise is the unity in which\nthese opposites are found as ideal determinations, so that the Idea\nmust now come into consciousness as concrete in itself. With this\nthird development, which is the concrete result of all that has gone\nbefore, an entirely new epoch begins. Philosophy is now on quite a\ndifferent footing, since, with the rejection of the criterion for\nsubjective knowledge, finite principles in general also disappear;\nfor it is with these that the criterion has to do. This then is the\nform which Philosophy takes with the Neo-Platonists, and which is\nclosely connected with the revolution which was caused in the world\nby Christianity. The last stage which we reached\u2014that subjective\ncontentment and return of self-consciousness into itself which is\nattained by the renunciation of all that is fixed and objective, by\nflight into the pure, infinite abstraction in itself, by the absolute\ndearth of all determinate content\u2014this stage had come to perfection in\nScepticism, although the Stoic and Epicurean systems have the same end\nin view. But with this complete entering into and abiding within itself\nof infinite subjectivity, Philosophy had reached the standpoint at\nwhich self-consciousness knew itself in its thought to be the Absolute\n(Vol. II. p. 372); and since Philosophy now rejected the subjective and\nfinite attitude of self-consciousness, and its manner of distinguishing\nitself from an unmeaning external object, it comprehended in itself the\ndifference, and perfected the truth into an intelligible world. The\nconsciousness of this, expressing itself as it did in the spirit of the\nworld, now constitutes the object of Philosophy; it was principally\nbrought about by employing and reasoning from Platonic conceptions and\nexpressions, but also by making use of those of the Aristotelians and\nPythagoreans.\n\nThe idea which had now come home to men that absolute existence is\nnothing alien to self-consciousness, that nothing really exists for it\nin which self-consciousness is not itself immediately present\u2014this is\nthe principle which is now found as the universal of the world-spirit,\nas the universal belief and knowledge of all men; at once it changes\nthe world\u2019s whole aspect, destroying all that went before, and bringing\nabout a regeneration of the world. The manifold forms which this\nknowledge assumes do not belong to the history of Philosophy, but to\nthe history of consciousness and culture. This principle appears as a\nuniversal principle of justice, by which the individual man, in virtue\nof his existence, has absolute value as a universal being recognized\nby all. Thus, as far as external politics are concerned, this is the\nperiod of the development of private rights relating to the property\nof individual persons. But the character of Roman culture, under\nwhich this form of philosophy falls, was at the same time abstract\nuniversality (Vol. II. p. 235), in the lifelessness of which all\ncharacteristic poetry and philosophy, and all citizen life perished.\nCicero, for example, shows, as few philosophers do, an utter want of\nappreciation of the state of affairs in his country. Thus the world has\nin its existence separated into two parts; on the one side we have the\natoms, private individuals, and on the other side a bond connecting\nthem, though only externally, which, as power, had been relegated to\none subject, the emperor. The Roman power is thus the real Scepticism.\nIn the domain of thought we find an exact counterpart to this species\nof abstract universality, which, as perfect despotism, is in the\ndecline of national life directly connected with the isolation of the\natom, showing itself as the withdrawal into the aims and interests of\nprivate life.\n\nIt is at this point that mind once more rises above the ruin, and again\ngoes forth from its subjectivity to the objective, but at the same time\nto an intellectual objectivity, which does not appear in the outward\nform of individual objects, nor in the form of duties and individual\nmorality, but which, as absolute objectivity, is torn of mind and of\nthe veritable truth. Or, in other words, we see here on the one hand\nthe return to God, on the other hand the manifestation of God, as He\ncomes before the human mind absolutely in His truth. This forms the\ntransition to the mind\u2019s restoration, by the fact of thought, which had\nconceived itself only subjectively, now becoming objective to itself.\nThus in the Roman world the necessity became more and more keenly felt\nof forsaking the evil present, this ungodly, unrighteous, immoral\nworld, and withdrawing into mind, in order here to seek what there\nno longer can be found. For in the Greek world the joy of spiritual\nactivity has flown away, and sorrow for the breach that has been made\nhas taken its place. These philosophies are thus not only moments in\nthe development of reason, but also in that of humanity; they are forms\nin which the whole condition of the world expresses itself through\nthought.\n\nBut in other forms some measure of contempt for nature here began to\nshow itself, inasmuch as nature is no longer anything for itself,\nseeing that her powers are merely the servants of man, who, like a\nmagician, can make them yield obedience, and be subservient to his\nwishes. Up to this time oracles had been given through the medium of\ntrees, animals, &c., in which divine knowledge, as knowledge of the\neternal, was not distinguished from knowledge of the contingent. Now it\nno longer is the gods that work their wonders, but men, who, setting\nat defiance the necessities of nature, bring about in the same that\nwhich is inconsistent with nature as such. To this belief in miracle,\nwhich is at the same time disbelief in present nature, there is thus\nallied a disbelief in the past, or a disbelief that history was just\nwhat it was. All the actual history and mythology of Romans, Greeks,\nJews, even single words and letters, receive a different meaning; they\nare inwardly broken asunder, having an inner significance which is\ntheir essence, and an empty literal meaning, which is their appearance.\nMankind living in actuality have here forgotten altogether how to\nsee and to hear, and have indeed lost all their understanding of the\npresent. Sensuous truth is no longer accepted by them; they constantly\ndeceive us, for they are incapable of comprehending what is real, since\nit has lost all meaning for their minds. Others forsake the world,\nbecause in it they can now find nothing, the real they discover in\nthemselves alone. As all the gods meet together in one Pantheon, so\nall religions rush into one, all modes of representation are absorbed\nin one; it is this, that self-consciousness\u2014an actual human being\u2014is\nabsolute existence. It is to Rome that all these mysterious cults\nthrong, but the real liberation of the spirit appeared in Christianity,\nfor it is therein that its true nature is reached. Now it is revealed\nto man what absolute reality is; it is a man, but not yet Man or\nself-consciousness in general.\n\nThe one form of this principle is therefore the infinitude in itself\nof the consciousness that knows itself, distinguishes itself in itself,\nbut yet remains in perfectly transparent unity with itself; and only\nas this concretely self-determining thought has mind any meaning. An\nactual self-consciousness is the fact that the Absolute is now known\nin the form of self-consciousness, so that the determinations of the\nformer are manifested in all the forms of the latter; this sphere does\nnot properly belong to Philosophy, but is the sphere of Religion,\nwhich knows God in this particular human being. This knowledge, that\nself-consciousness is absolute reality, or that absolute reality is\nself-consciousness, is the World-spirit. It is this knowledge, but\nknows this knowledge not; it has merely an intuition of it, or knows\nit only immediately, not in thought. Knowing it only immediately means\nthat to the World-spirit this reality as spirit is doubtless absolute\nself-consciousness, but in existent immediacy it is an individual man.\nIt is this individual man, who has lived at a particular time and in\na particular place, and not the Notion of self-consciousness, that is\nfor the World-spirit absolute spirit: or self-consciousness is not yet\nknown nor comprehended. As an immediacy of thought, absolute reality is\nimmediate in self-consciousness, or only like an inward intuition, in\nthe same way that we have pictures present in our mind.\n\nThe other form is that this concrete is grasped in a more abstract way,\nas the pure identity of thought, and thus there is lost to thought the\npoint of self-hood pertaining to the concrete. This aspect, expressed\nas absolute reality in the form of mind in conceiving thought, but\nyet as in some measure existing immediately in self-consciousness as\nabsolute reality, comes under Philosophy. But spirit, if complete in\nevery aspect, must have also the natural aspect, which in this form of\nphilosophy is still lacking. Now as in Christianity universal history\nmakes this advance of mind in the consciousness of itself, so in the\ninnermost mysteries of the same, in Philosophy, this same change must\njust as inevitably take place; in fact, Philosophy in her further\ndevelopment does nothing else than grasp this Idea of absolute reality,\nwhich in Christianity is merely shadowed forth. Absolute Spirit implies\neternal self-identical existence that is transformed into another\nand knows this to be itself; the unchangeable, which is unchangeable\nin as far as it always, from being something different, returns into\nitself. It signifies the sceptical movement of consciousness, but in\nsuch a form that the transient objective element at the same time\nremains permanent, or in its permanence has the signification of\nself-consciousness.\n\nIn the Christian religion this spiritual reality was first of all\nrepresented as indicating that eternal reality becomes for itself\nsomething different, that it creates the world, which is posited purely\nas something different. To this there is added later this moment, that\nthe other element in itself is not anything different from eternal\nreality, but that eternal reality manifests itself therein. In the\nthird place there is implied the identity of the other and eternal\nreality, Spirit, the return of the other into the first: and the other\nis here to be understood as not only the other at that point where\neternal reality manifested itself, but as the other in a universal\nsense. The world recognizes itself in this absolute reality which\nbecomes manifest; it is the world, therefore, which has returned into\nreality; and spirit is universal Spirit. But since this Idea of spirit\nappeared to the Christians first of all in the bare form of ordinary\nconception, God, the simple reality of the Jews, was for them beyond\nconsciousness; such a God doubtless thinks, but He is not Thought, for\nHe remains beyond reality, and He is only that which is distinguished\nfrom the world that our senses perceive. There likewise stands in\nopposition to the same an individual man\u2014the moment of unity of the\nworld and reality, and spirit, the universality of this unity, as a\nbelieving community, which possesses this unity only in the form of\nordinary conception, but its reality in the hope of a future.\n\nThe Idea in pure Thought\u2014that God\u2019s way of working is not external,\nas if He were a subject, and therefore that all this does not come to\npass as a casual resolution and decree of God, to whom the thought\nof so acting happened to occur, but that God is this movement as\nthe self-revealing moments of His essence, as His eternal necessity\nin Himself, which is not at all conditioned by chance\u2014this we find\nexpressed in the writings of philosophic or expressly Platonic Jews.\nThe place where this point of view took its origin happens to be\nthe country where East and West have met in conflict; for the free\nuniversality of the East and the determinateness of Europe, when\nintermingled, constitute Thought. With the Stoics the universality\nof thought has a place, but it is opposed to sensation, to external\nexistence. Oriental universality is, on the contrary, entirely free;\nand the principle of universality, posited as particular, is Western\nThought. In Alexandria more especially this form of philosophy was\ncultivated, but at the same time regard was had to the earlier\ndevelopment of thought, in which lie the partially concealed beginnings\nof the building up in thought of the concrete, which is now the point\nmainly regarded. Even in the Pythagorean philosophy we found difference\npresent as the Triad; then in Plato we saw the simple Idea of spirit\nas the unity of indivisible substance and other-being, though it was\nonly as a compound of both. That is the concrete, but only in simple\nmoments, not in the comprehensive manner in which other-being is in\ngeneral all reality of nature and of consciousness,\u2014and the unity\nwhich has returned as this self-consciousness is not only a thought,\nbut living God. With Aristotle, finally, the concrete is \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1,\nThought which is its own object, the concrete. Therefore although this\nphilosophy is known as Neo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic, it may also\nbe termed Neo-Aristotelian; for the Alexandrians studied Aristotle just\nas much as Plato, and valued both very highly, later on combining their\nphilosophies in one unity.\n\nBut we must have a clearer grasp of the difference between this point\nof view and the earlier. Already in the earlier philosophies we have\nseen, that \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 is the essence of the world, and similarly Aristotle\ncomprehended the whole series of things endued with life and mind in\nsuch a way as to recognize the Notion to be the truth of these things.\nIn the case of the Stoics this unity, this system, was most definitely\nbrought forward, while Aristotle rather followed up the particulars.\nThis unity of thought we saw among the Stoics more especially on the\none side as the return of self-consciousness into itself, so that\nspirit through the purity of thought is independent in itself; on the\nother hand we have seen there an objectivity in which the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 became\nessentially the all-penetrating basis of the whole world. With the\nStoics, however, this basis remained as substance only, and thus took\non the form of Pantheism, for that is the first idea that we light\non when we determine the universal to be the true. Pantheism is the\nbeginning of the elevation of spirit, in that it conceives everything\nin the world to be a life of the Idea. For when self-consciousness\nemerges from itself, from its infinitude, from its thought directed on\nself, and turns to particular things, duties, relationships; or when\nthought, which thinks this universal substance, passes over from it to\nthe particular, and makes the heavens, the stars, or man its object,\nit descends from the universal immediately into the particular, or\nimmediately into the finite, since all these are finite forms. But\nthe concrete is the universal which makes itself particular, and in\nthis making of itself particular and finite yet remains eternally at\nhome with itself. In Pantheism, on the contrary, the one universal\nsubstance merely makes itself finite, and thereby lowers itself. That\nis the mode of emanation, according to which the universal, in making\nitself the particular, or God in creating the world, by becoming\nparticular becomes debased or deteriorated and sets a limit to Himself;\nso that this making of Himself finite is incompatible with any return\ninto Himself. The same relation is also found in the mythology of the\nGreeks and Romans; the giving definiteness and form to God, who remains\nno empty abstraction, is a rendering finite of God, who thus becomes\na mere work of art; but the Beautiful itself remains a finite form,\nwhich is not brought to such a point as to express the free Idea. The\ndetermination, the specialization, the reality of objectivity, must\nnow be of such a nature that it shall be adequate to the absolute\nuniversal; the forms of the gods, as also natural forms and the forms\nwhich are known as duties, fail to be thus adequate.\n\nWhat is therefore now required is that the knowing mind, which thus\nout of objectivity returns into itself and its inwardness, should\nreconcile with itself the world which it has left, so that the world\u2019s\nobjectivity may of course be distinct from mind, yet adequate thereto.\nThis concrete standpoint which, as it is that of the world, is also\nthat of Philosophy, is the development of Mind, for it is requisite\nto Mind that it should not merely be pure thought, but that it should\nbe thought which makes itself objective, and therein maintains itself\nand is at home with itself. The earlier efforts of thought towards\nobjectivity constitute a passing into determinateness and finitude\nmerely, and not into an objective world adequate to absolute existence.\nThe universal standpoint of the Neo-Platonic or Alexandrian philosophy\nnow is from the loss of the world to produce a world which in its\noutwardness shall still remain an inward world, and thus a world\nreconciled; and this is the world of spirituality, which here begins.\nThus the fundamental Idea was Thought which is its own object, and\nwhich is therefore identical with its object, with what is thought; so\nthat we have the one and the other, and the unity of both.\n\nThis concrete Idea has again come to the front, and in the development\nof Christianity, as thought also penetrated there, it became known\nas the Trinity; and this Idea is absolute reality. This Idea did not\ndevelop directly from Plato and Aristotle, but took the circuitous\npath of Dogmatism. With the earlier thinkers it doubtless immediately\nemerged as supreme; but beside and beyond it appears the other content\nin addition, the riches of the thoughts of Mind and of Nature; and so\nit is conceived. Aristotle has thus comprehended the kingdom of Nature;\nand with Plato development is represented only in a loose multiplicity.\nBut in order that the Idea should appear as the truth that encompasses\nand includes all within itself, it was requisite that this finite, this\nwider content of determinations which had been collected, should be\ncomprehended on its finite side also, that is, in the finite form of\na universal opposition. That was the function of Dogmatism, which was\nthen dissolved by Scepticism. The dissolution of all that is particular\nand finite, which constitutes the essence of the latter, was not\ntaken in hand by Plato and Aristotle, and therefore the Idea was not\nposited by them as all-inclusive. Now the contradiction is done away\nwith, and Mind has attained to its negative rest. The affirmative, on\nthe other hand, is the repose of mind in itself, and to this freedom\nfrom all that is particular Mind now proceeds. It is the knowledge of\nwhat Mind is in itself, after it has come to be reconciled in itself\nthrough the dissolution of all finality. This eternal rest of Mind in\nitself now constitutes its object; it is aware of the fact, and strives\nto determine and develop it further by thought. In this we likewise\npossess the principle of evolution, of free development; everything\nexcept Mind is only finite and transitory. When therefore Mind goes\nforth to the particular, the particular is determined as something\nplainly contained in this ideality, which Mind knows as something\nsubject to itself. That is the affirmative result of sceptical\nphilosophy. It is evident that, starting from this point of view, an\nutterly different opinion will be expressed. God, as absolute pure Mind\nin and for Himself, and His activity in Himself, are now the object.\nBut God is no longer known as the Abstract, but as the Concrete in\nHimself, and this Concrete is nothing but Mind. God is living, the One\nand the Other and the unity of these distinct determinations; for the\nabstract is only the simple, but the living has difference in itself,\nand is yet therein at home with itself.\n\nFurther, the following points have specially claimed the attention of\nMind; firstly, that this consciousness which has become subjective\nmakes its object the absolute as truth, placing this absolute outside\nof itself; or that it attains to faith in God, that God is now\nmanifested, and reveals Himself, that is, exists for consciousness.\nThe absolute, altogether universal, posited at the same time as\nobjective, is God. Here comes in the relation of man to this his\nobject, to absolute truth. This new standpoint, which from this time\nacquires an absolute interest, is therefore not a relation to external\nthings, duties and the like; these are all determined, limited, they\nare not the all-embracing determination, as that is which has just\nbeen spoken of. In this relation the mere turning of the subject on\nhimself, this talk of the wise man. in his one-sidedness, is likewise\ndone away with. The same liberty, happiness, steadfastness, which were\nthe aim of Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism are doubtless still\nto be reached by the subject, but now this can only be brought about\nby turning to God, by giving heed to absolute truth, not by fleeing\nfrom the objective; so that by means of the objective itself, liberty\nand happiness are attained for the subject. This is the standpoint\nof reverencing and fearing God, so that by man\u2019s turning to this his\nobject, which stands before him free and firm, the object of the\nsubject\u2019s own freedom is attained.\n\nIn the second place, there are contradictions herein contained which\nnecessarily attract the attention of mind, and whose reconciliation\nis essential. If we adopt this one-sided position, God is on the one\nside, and man in his freedom is on the other. A freedom such as this,\nstanding in contrast to the objective, a freedom in which man, as\nthinking self-consciousness, conceives as the absolute the relation of\nhis pure inwardness to himself, is, however, only formally, and not\nconcretely absolute. In so far then as the human will determines itself\nnegatively towards the objective, we have the origin of sin, evil in\ncontrast to the absolute Affirmative.\n\nA third essential point of interest is the form in which God must\nnow be apprehended in general, for since it pertains essentially\nto the Notion of Mind to determine God as concrete, living God, it\nis indispensable that God should be thought of in relation to the\nworld and to man. This relation to the world is then a relation to\nan \u2018other,\u2019 which thereby at first appears to be outside of God; but\nbecause this relation is _His_ activity, the fact of having this\nrelation in Himself is a moment of Himself. Because the connection\nof God with the world is a determination in Himself, so the being\nanother from the one, the duality, the negative, the distinction,\nthe self-determination in general, is essentially to be thought of\nas a moment in Him, or God reveals Himself in Himself, and therefore\nestablishes distinct determinations in Himself. This distinction\nin Himself, His concrete nature, is the point where the absolute\ncomes into connection with man, with the world, and is reconciled\nwith the same. We say God has created man and the world, this is\nHis determination in Himself, and at the same time the point of\ncommencement, the root of the finite in God Himself. In this manner,\ntherefore, that which afterwards appears finite is yet produced by Him\nin Himself\u2014the particular Ideas, the world in God Himself, the Divine\nworld, where God has begun to separate Himself, and has His connection\nwith the temporal world. In the fact that God is represented as\nconcrete, we have immediately a Divine world in Himself.\n\nSince the Divine forms, as natural and political, have now separated\nthemselves from the True, and the temporal world has appeared to men as\nthe negative, the untrue, so, in the fourth place, man recognizes God\nin Mind; he has recognized that natural things and the State are not,\nas in mythology, the mode in which God exists, but that the mode, as\nan intelligible world, exists in Himself. The unhappiness of the Roman\nworld lay in its abstraction from that in which man had hitherto found\nhis satisfaction; this satisfaction arose out of that pantheism, in\nwhich man found his highest truth in natural things, such as air and\nfire and water, and further in his duties, in the political life of\nthe State. Now, on the contrary, in the world\u2019s grief over her present\nwoes, despair has entered in, and disbelief in these forms of the\nnatural finite world and in the moral world of citizen life; to this\nform of reality, in its external and outwardly moral character, man\nhas proved untrue. That condition which man terms the life of man in\nunity with nature, and in which man meets with God in nature because\nhe finds his satisfaction there, has ceased to exist. The unity of\nman with the world is for this end broken, that it may be restored\nin a higher unity, that the world, as an intelligible world, may be\nreceived into God. The relation of man to God thereby reveals itself in\nthe way provided for our salvation in worship, but more particularly\nit likewise shows itself in Philosophy; and that with the express\nconsciousness of the aim that the individual should render himself\ncapable of belonging to this intelligible world. The manner in which\nman represents to himself his relation to God is more particularly\ndetermined by the manner in which man represents to himself God.\nWhat is now often said, that man need not know God, and may yet have\nthe knowledge of this relation, is false. Since God is the First, He\ndetermines the relation, and therefore in order to know what is the\ntruth of the relation, man must know God. Since therefore thought goes\nso far as to deny the natural, what we are now concerned with is not to\nseek truth in any existing mode, but from our inner Being to go forth\nagain to a true objective, which derives its determination from the\nintrinsic nature of thought.\n\nThese are the chief moments of the present standpoint, and the\nreflections of the Neo-Platonists belong to it. Before entering upon\nthem we must, however, make cursory mention of Philo the Jew, and also\nnotice sundry moments appearing in the history of the Church.\n\n\nA. PHILO.\n\nPhilo, a learned Jew of Alexandria, lived before and after the birth of\nChrist, in the reigns of the first Roman Emperors; that is to say, he\nwas born B.C. 20, but lived until after Christ\u2019s death. In him we for\nthe first time see the application of the universal consciousness as\nphilosophical consciousness. In the reign of Caligula, before whom very\nheinous charges against the Jews had been brought by Apion, he was,\nwhen advanced in years, sent to Rome as ambassador from his people,\nin order to give to the Romans a more favourable account of the Jews.\nThere is a tradition that he came also in the reign of the Emperor\nClaudius to Rome, and there fell in with the Apostle Peter.[207]\n\nPhilo wrote a long series of works, many of which we still possess;\nfor instance, those on The Creation of the World, on Rewards and\nPunishments, the Offerers of Sacrifices, the Law of Allegories, Dreams,\nthe Immutability of God, &c.; they were published in folio at Frankfort\nin 1691, and afterwards by Pfeiffer at Erlangen. Philo was famous for\nthe great extent of his learning, and was well acquainted with Greek\nphilosophy.\n\nHe is more especially distinguished for his Platonic philosophy, and\nalso for the pains he took to demonstrate the presence of Philosophy\nin the sacred writings of the Jews. In his explanation of the history\nof the Jewish nation, the narratives and statements therein contained\nhave lost for him the immediate significance of reality. He reads\ninto them throughout a mystical and allegorical meaning, and finds\nPlato present in Moses; in short, the endeavour of Philo resembled\nthat of the Alexandrians when they recognized philosophic dogmas in\nGreek mythology. He treats of the nature of Mind, not, indeed, as\ncomprehended in the element of thought, but as expressed therein, and\nthis expression is still both far from pure and is associated with all\nsorts of imageries. By the spirit of Philosophy the Jews were compelled\nto seek in their sacred books, as the heathen sought in Homer and in\nthe popular religion, a deeper speculative meaning, and to represent\ntheir religious writings as a perfect system of divine wisdom. That is\nthe character of the time, in consequence of which all that appealed\nto the finite understanding in popular conceptions has not endured.\nThe important point, then, is that on the one hand the popular\nconception is here still allied with the forms of reality; but as, on\nthe other hand, what these forms express only immediately is no longer\nsufficient, the desire arises to understand them in a deeper sense.\nAlthough in the external histories of the Jewish and heathen religions\nmen had the authority and starting-point of truth, they yet grasped the\nthought that truth cannot be given externally. Therefore, men read\ndeep thoughts into history, as the expression is, or they read them out\nof it, and this latter is the true conception. For in the case of the\nDivine Book, whose author is the Spirit, it cannot be said that this\nspirituality is absent. The point of importance comes to be, whether\nthis spirituality lies deeper down or nearer to the surface; therefore,\neven if the man who wrote the book had not the thoughts, they are\nimplicitly contained in the inward nature of the relation. There is,\ngenerally speaking, a great difference between that which is present\ntherein and that which is expressed. In history, art, philosophy, and\nthe like, the point of importance is that what is contained therein\nshould also be expressed; the real work of the mind is wholly and\nsolely that of bringing to consciousness what is contained therein.\nThe other side of the matter is that although all that lies within a\nform, a-religion, &c., does not come before consciousness, one can\nstill not say that it did not enter into the human mind; it was not\nin consciousness, neither did it come into the form of the ordinary\nconception, and yet it was in mind. On the one side, the bringing of\nthought into definite consciousness is a bringing in from without, but\non the other side, as far as matter is concerned, there is nothing\nbrought in from without. Philo\u2019s methods present this aspect in a\npre-eminent sense. All that is prosaic has disappeared, and, therefore,\nin writers of the period that follows, miracles are of common\noccurrence, inasmuch as external connection is no longer required as a\nmatter of necessity. The fundamental conceptions of Philo, and these\nalone need be taken into consideration, are then somewhat as follows:\u2014\n\n1. With Philo the main point is the knowledge of God. In regard to\nthis, he says, in the first place: God can be known only by the eye\nof the soul, only by Beholding (\u1f45\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2). This he also calls rapture,\necstasy, God\u2019s influence; we often find these terms. For this it is\nrequisite that the soul should break loose from the body, and should\ngive up its sensuous existence, thus rising to the pure object of\nthought, where it finds itself nearer to God. We may term this a\nbeholding by the intelligence. But the other side is that God cannot be\ndiscerned by the eye of the soul; the soul can only know that He is,\nand not what He is. His essence is the primordial light.[208] Philo\nhere speaks in quite Oriental fashion; for light is certainly simple,\nin contrast with which perception has the signification of knowing\nsomething as determined, as concrete in itself. So long, therefore,\nas the determination of simplicity is adhered to, this First Light\npermits not itself to be known, and since Philo says, \u201cThis One is God\nas such,\u201d we cannot know what God is. In Christianity, on the contrary,\nsimplicity is only a moment, and only in the Whole do we find God the\nSpirit.\n\nPhilo continues: \u201cThe First is the space of the universe, encompassing\nand filling it; this existence is itself place, and is filled by\nitself. God is sufficient for Himself; all other things are paltry and\nmeaningless; He fills all other things and gives them coherence, but He\nHimself is surrounded by nothing, because He Himself is One and All.\nSimilarly, God exists in the primordial form of time (\u03b1\u1f30\u03ce\u03bd),\u201d[209] that\nis, in the pure Notion of time. Why is it necessary that God should\nfill Himself with Himself? Even the subjective and abstract has need\nalso of an object. But the all is likewise, as with Parmenides, the\nabstract, because it is only substance, which remains empty beside that\nwhich fills it. Absolute fulness, on the other hand, is the concrete,\nand we reach this first in the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, in which we have that which\nfills, that which is filled, and a third composed of both.\n\n2. To this Philo now comes in the second place: \u201cGod\u2019s image and\nreflection is thinking reason (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2), the Firstborn Son, who rules and\nregulates the world. This \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 is the innermost meaning of all Ideas;\nGod Himself, in contrast to this, as the One, as such, is pure Being\n(\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f44\u03bd) only[210]\u2014an expression which Plato also used. Here verily we\ncome upon a contradiction; for the image can only represent what the\nthing is; if therefore the image is concrete, its original must also be\nunderstood to be concrete. For the rest, it is therefore only logical,\nafter Philo has once limited the name of God to the First Light or\nto pure Being, to assert that only the Son can be known. For as this\nBeing God is only abstract existence, or only His own Notion; and it\nis quite true that the soul cannot perceive what this Being is, since\nit is really only an empty abstraction. What can be perceived is that\npure existence is only an abstraction, and consequently a nothing, and\nnot the true God. Of God as the One it may therefore be said that the\nonly thing perceived is that He does exist. Perception is the knowledge\nof the concrete self-determination of the living God. If we therefore\ndesire to know God, we must add to Being, as the First, this other\nmoment also; the former is defective, and as abstract as when we say,\n\u2018God the Father,\u2019\u201d that is, this undisclosed One, this indeterminate\nin Himself, who has not yet created anything; the other moment is,\nhowever, the determination and distinction of Himself in Himself, the\nbegetting. What is begotten is His other, which at the same time is in\nHim, and belongs to Him, and is thus a moment of Himself, if God is to\nbe thought of as concrete and living it is this that is here by Philo\ncalled \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2. In Christianity the name of God is therefore not limited\nto Essence, but the Son is conceived of as a determination which itself\nbelongs to the true Essence of God. That which God is, He is therefore\nas Spirit only, and that is the unity of these moments.\n\nGod\u2019s differences therefore, according to Philo, constitute the finite\nunderstanding (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2) itself, which is then the archangel (\u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03ac\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2),\na realm of thought which contains determinateness. That is man as\nheavenly man, primeval man, who is also represented under the name of\nWisdom (\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1, \u05ea\u05d2\u05de\u05d4), as Adam Kadmon, as the rising of the sun\u2014man in\nGod. This finite understanding now separates itself into Ideas, which\nby Philo are also named angels or messengers (\u1f04\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9). This mode of\nconception is not yet conception in pure thought, for forms of the\nimagination are still interwoven with it. Moreover there comes in here\nfor the first time that which determines, where God is looked on as\nactivity, which so far Being was not. This \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 is therefore itself,\nwe might say, the first restful world of thought, although it is\nalready differentiated; but another \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 is that which gives utterance\n(\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2) as speech. That is the activity, the creation of the\nworld, as the former is its preservation, its permanent understanding.\nSpeech has always been regarded as a manifestation of God, because it\nis not corporeal; as sound it is momentary and immediately disappears;\nits existence is therefore immaterial. \u201cGod created by the word of\nHis month, interposing nothing;\u201d what He created remains ideal, like\nspeech. \u201cIf we would express the dogma in a still truer form, the Logos\nis the \u2018Work of God.\u2019\u201d[211]\n\nThis Logos is at the same time the teacher of wisdom for\nself-consciousness. For natural things are upheld only in their laws;\nbut self-conscious beings know also of these laws, and this is wisdom.\nThus the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 is the high priest, who is the mediator between God and\nman, the Spirit of the Godhead, who teaches man\u2014even the self-conscious\nreturn of God into Himself, into that first unity of the primordial\nlight. That is the pure intelligible world of truth itself, which is\nnothing other than the Word of God.[212]\n\n3. In the third place, since thought has come to negativity, the\nsensuous existent world stands in opposition to this ideal world. Its\nprinciple with Philo, as with Plato, is matter, the negative (\u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\n\u1f44\u03bd).[213] As God is Being, so the essence of matter is non-being; it is\nnot nothing, as when we say that God created the world out of nothing,\nfor non-being, the opposite of Being, is itself a positive, and as\ngood as Being. It exists, in so far as there is placed within it a\nresemblance to implicit truth. Philo had the true perception that the\nopposite of Being is just as positive as Being. If this seems absurd to\nanyone, he need only be reminded that really when we posit Being, the\nnegative of Being is thinking\u2014which is something very positive. But the\nnext step, the Notion of this opposition, and the passing of Being into\nnon-being, is not to be found in Philo. In general this philosophy is\nless a metaphysic of the Notion or of Thought itself, than a philosophy\nin which Mind appears only in pure Thought, and not here in the mode\nof ordinary conception\u2014Notions and Ideas are still represented as\nindependent forms. Thus, for instance, it is said: \u201cIn the beginning\nthe Word of God created the heavens, which consist of the purest Being\nand are the dwelling-place of the purest angels, which do not appear,\nand are not perceptible by the senses,\u201d but by thought alone; these\nare the Ideas. \u201cThe Creator before the whole of the intelligible world\nmade the incorporeal heavens and the non-sensuous earth, and the Idea\nof the air and of the void, and after this the incorporeal essence\nof the water and an incorporeal light, and a non-sensuous archetype\n(\u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03ad\u03c4\u03c5\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2) of the sun and all the stars;\u201d[214] and the sensuous world\nis the anti-type of this. Philo now proceeds according to the Mosaic\nrecord. In the Old Testament history of creation, grass, plants, and\ntrees are created on the third day, and on the fourth day lights in\nthe firmament of heaven, the sun and moon. Philo therefore says (De\nmundi opificio, pp. 9, 10) that on the fourth day a number adorned the\nheavens, the four, the tetractys, the most perfect, &c. These are the\nmain points in Philo\u2019s philosophy.\n\n\nB. CABALA AND GNOSTICISM.\n\nThe Cabalistic philosophy and the Gnostic theology both occupied\nthemselves with these same conceptions which Philo also had. To them\nalso the First is the abstract, the unknown, the nameless; the Second\nis the unveiling, the concrete, which goes forth into emanation.\nBut there is also to be found in some degree the return to unity,\nespecially among Christian philosophers: and this return, which is\naccepted as the Third, belongs to the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2; so with Philo Wisdom, the\nteacher, the high priest, was that which in the contemplation of God\nleads back the Third to the First.\n\n\n1. CABALISTIC PHILOSOPHY.\n\nCabala is the name given to the secret wisdom of the Jews, with which,\nhowever, much that is dark and mysterious is mingled; regarding its\norigin also many fables are related. We are told of it that it is\ncontained in two books, _Jezirah_ (Creation) and _Sohar_ (Brightness).\n_Jezirah_, the more important of these two books, is ascribed to a\ncertain Rabbi Akibha; it is about to be published in a more complete\nform by Herr von Mayer, in Frankfort. The book has certain very\ninteresting general principles, and this better portion of it consists\nof ideas, which in some respects resemble those of Philo, though they\nare more fancifully presented, and often sink into the fantastic. It\nis not of the antiquity which those who reverence the Cabala would\nassign to it; for they relate that this heavenly book was given to\nAdam to console him after his fall. It is a medley of astronomy,\nmagic, medicine, and prophecy; sundry traces followed up historically\nindicate that such were cultivated in Egypt. Akibha lived soon after\nthe destruction of Jerusalem, and took an active part in a revolt of\nthe Jews against Hadrian, in the course of which they collected an army\ntwo hundred thousand strong, in order to establish Barcochba as the\nMessiah; the revolt was, however, suppressed, and the Rabbi was flayed\nalive. The second book is said to have been the work of his disciple,\nRabbi Simeon Ben Jochai, who was called the Great Light, the Spark of\nMoses.[215] Both books were translated into Latin in the seventeenth\ncentury. A speculative Israelite, Rabbi Abraham Cohen Irira, also wrote\na book, the Door of Heaven (_Porta c\\nlorum_); it is later, dating\nfrom the fifteenth century, and sundry references to the Arabians and\nScholastics are contained in it. These are the sources of the high\ncabalistic wisdom.\n\nIn earlier times there is no representation among the Jews of God as\nbeing in His essence Light, of an opposite to God, Darkness and Evil,\nwhich is at strife with the Light; there is nothing of good and evil\nangels, of the Fall of the wicked, of their condemnation, of their\nbeing in Hell, of a future day of judgment for the good and the evil,\nof the corruption of the flesh. It was not until this time that the\nJews began to carry their thoughts beyond their reality; only now does\na world of spirit, or at least of spirits, begin to open itself up\nbefore them; before this these Jews cared only for themselves, being\nsunk in the filth and self-conceit of their present existence, and in\nthe maintenance of their nation and tribes.\n\nFurther particulars of the Cabala are these. One is expressed as the\nprinciple of all things, as it is likewise the first source of all\nnumbers. As unity itself is not one number among the rest, so is\nit with God, the basis of all things, the _En-Soph_. The emanation\ntherewith connected is the effect of the first cause by the limitation\nof that first infinite whose boundary (\u1f45\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2) it is. In this one cause\nall is contained _eminenter_, not _formaliter_ but _causaliter_.\nThe second element of importance is the Adam Kadmon, the first man,\n_Kether_, the first that arose, the highest crown, the microcosm, the\nmacrocosm, with which the world that emanated stands in connection as\nthe efflux of light. By further expansion the other spheres or circles\nof the world came into being; and this emanation is represented as\nstreams of light. In the first place there come forth ten of such\nemanations, _Sephiroth_, forming the pure world _Azilah_, which exists\nin itself and changes not. The second is the world _Beriah_, which\ndoes change. The third is the created world, _Jezirah_, the world of\npure spirits set in matter, the souls of the stars\u2014that is, further\ndistinctions into which this dark and mysterious philosophy proceeds.\nIn the fourth place comes the created world, the _Asijja_: it is the\nlowest, the vegetative and sensible world.[216]\n\n\n2. THE GNOSTICS.\n\nThough there are various sects of the Gnostics, we find certain common\ndeterminations constituting their basis.\n\n\\Joe Cooper\\roddr\\charliehoward\\\u2014 Professor Neander has with great\nlearning made a collection of these, and elaborated them exhaustively;\nsome of the forms correspond with those which we have given. Their\ngeneral aim was that of knowledge (\u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2); whence they also derived\ntheir name.\n\nOne of the most distinguished Gnostics is Basilides. For him, too,\nthe First is the unspeakable God (\u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f04\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2)\u2014the _En-Soph_ of the\nCabala; He is, as with Philo also, that which is (\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f44\u03bd), He who is (\u1f41\n\u1f64\u03bd), the nameless one (\u1f00\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2)\u2014that is, the immediate. The second\nis then the Spirit (\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2), the first-born, also \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, the Wisdom\n(\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03af\u03b1), Power (\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2): more closely defined, it is Righteousness\n(\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7), and Peace (\u03b5\u1f30\u03c1\u03ae\u03bd\u03b7). These are followed by principles\nstill further determined, which Basilides names archons, heads of\nspiritual kingdoms. One main point in this is likewise the return, the\nrefining process of the soul, the economy of purification (\u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c1\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd): the soul from matter must come back to wisdom, to peace.\nThe First Essence bears all perfection sealed up in Himself, but only\nin potentiality; Spirit, the first-born, is the first revelation of\nthe latent. It is, moreover, only through being made one with God that\nall created beings can attain to a share in true righteousness and the\npeace which flows therefrom.[217]\n\nThe Gnostics, for instance Marcus, term the First also the Unthinkable\n(\u1f00\u03bd\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2), even the Non-existent (\u1f00\u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2) which proceeds not to\ndeterminateness, the Solitude (\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2), and the pure Silence (\u03c3\u03b9\u03b3\u03ae);\nthe Ideas, the angels, the \u00e6ons, then form the Other. These are termed\nthe Notions, roots, seeds of particular fulfillings (\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1), the\nfruit; every \u00e6on in this bears its own special world in itself.[218]\n\nWith others, as for instance Valentinus, the First is also termed\n\u201cthe completed \u00e6on in the heights that cannot be seen or named,\u201d or\nthe unfathomable, the primordial cause, the absolute abyss (\u1f04\u03b2\u03c5\u03c3\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u03b2\u1fe6\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2), wherein all is, as abrogated: also what is even before\nthe beginning (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b7), before the Father (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03c1). The active\ntransition of the One signifies then the differentiation (\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2)\nof this abyss; and this development is also termed the making itself\ncomprehensible of the incomprehensible (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f00\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03ae\u03c0\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5), in\nthe same way that we found comprehension spoken of by the Stoics (Vol.\nII. p. 250). \u00c6ons, particular expositions, are Notions. The second step\nis likewise termed limitation (\u1f45\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2); and inasmuch as the development\nof life is conceived more clearly by contrast, the key to this is\nstated to be contained in two principles, which appear in the form of\nmale and female. The one is required to perfect the other, each has its\ncomplement (\u03c3\u03cd\u03b6\u03c5\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2) in the other; from their conjunction (\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2,\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03be\u03c5\u03b3\u03af\u03b1), which first constitutes the real, a perfect whole proceeds.\nThe inward significance of these fulfilments generally is the world of\n\u00e6ons, the universal filling of the abyss, which therefore, inasmuch\nas what was distinguished in it was still unrevealed, is also termed\nhermaphrodite, man-woman (\u1f00\u1fe4\u1fe5\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03b8\u03b7\u03bb\u03c5\u03c2),[219]\u2014very much the same theory\nas was held long before by the Pythagoreans (Vol. I. p. 221).\n\nPtolem\u00e6us assigns two conjunctions (\u03c3\u03cd\u03b6\u03c5\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2) to the abyss, and\ntwo separations, which are pre-supposed throughout all temporal\nexistence, Will and Perception (\u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f14\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1). Complicated and\nmotley forms here appear, but the fundamental determination is the\nsame throughout, and abyss and revelation are the most important\nmatters. The revelation which has come down is also conceived as the\nglory (\u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1, Shekinah) of God; as heavenly wisdom, which is itself\na beholding of God; as unbegotten powers which encircle Him and are\nradiant with the most brilliant light. To these Ideas the name of God\nis more especially given, and in this regard He is also called the\nmany-named (\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03ce\u03bd\u03c5\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2), the demiurge; this is the manifestation, the\ndetermination of God.[220]\n\nAll these forms pass into the mysterious, but they have on the whole\nthe same determinations as principle; and the general necessity which\nforms their basis is a profound necessity of reason, namely, the\ndetermination and comprehension of what is absolute as the concrete.\nI have, however, merely been desirous of calling these forms to\nremembrance, in order to indicate their connection with the universal.\n\n\nC. ALEXANDRIAN PHILOSOPHY.\n\nThe unity of self-consciousness and Being appears in more philosophical\nand intelligent form in the Alexandrian School, which constitutes the\nmost important, and at the same time the most characteristic form of\nphilosophy pertaining to this sphere. For Alexandria had for some time\npast, mainly through the Ptolemies, become the principal seat of the\nsciences. Here, as if in their centre-point, all the popular religions\nand mythologies of the East and West, and likewise their history, came\ninto touch and intermingled with one another in various forms and\nshapes. Religions were compared with one another: in each of them there\nwas, on the one hand, a searching for and putting together of that\nwhich was contained also in the other, and, on the other hand, there\nwas the more important task of reading into the popular conceptions\nof religion a deeper meaning, and of giving to them a universal\nallegorical signification. This endeavour has doubtless given birth to\nmuch that is dim and mystical; its purer product is the Alexandrian\nPhilosophy. The bringing together of the philosophies naturally\nsucceeded better than those connections which, on the side of religion,\nare only the mystic products of a Reason that as yet is unintelligible\nto itself. For while in fact there is but one Idea in Philosophy, it\nannuls by its own means the special form which it has adopted, the\none-sidedness in which it expresses itself. In Scepticism had been\nreached this negative stage of seeing annulled the definite modes of\nBeing in which the Absolute was posited.\n\nSince the form of philosophy which arose in Alexandria did not attach\nitself to any of the earlier philosophic schools, but recognized\nall the different systems of philosophy, and more especially the\nPythagorean, Platonic, and Aristotelian, to be in their various forms\nbut one, it was frequently asserted to be Eclecticism. Brucker (Hist.\ncrit. phil. T. II., p. 193) is the first to do so, as I have found,\nand Diogenes La\u00ebrtius gave him the occasion thereto, by speaking\n(Pr\\nmium, \u00a7 21) of a certain Potamo of Alexandria, who not so very\nlong before (\u03c1\u03c0\u1f78 \u1f40\u03bb\u03af\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5) had selected from the different philosophies\ntheir principal maxims and the best of their teaching. Then Diogenes\ngoes on to quote several passages from Potamo, saying that this\nwriter had produced an eclectic philosophy; but these maxims drawn\nfrom Aristotle, Plato, and the Stoics are not of importance, and the\ndistinguishing characteristics of the Alexandrians cannot be recognized\ntherein. Diogenes is also earlier than the Alexandrian School; but\nPotamo, according to Suidas (s.v. \u03a0\u03bf\u03c4\u03ac\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd, T. III., p. 161), was\ntutor of the stepsons of Augustus, and for the instructor of princes\neclecticism is a very suitable creed. Therefore, because this Potamo\nis an Alexandrian, Brucker has bestowed on the Alexandrian philosophy\nthe name of Eclectic; but that is neither consistent with fact, nor is\nit true to history. Eclecticism is something to be utterly condemned,\nif it is understood in the sense of one thing being taken out of this\nphilosophy, and another thing out of that philosophy, altogether\nregardless of their consistency or connection, as when a garment is\npatched together of pieces of different colours or stuffs. Such an\neclecticism gives nothing but an aggregate which lacks all inward\nconsistency. Eclectics of this kind are sometimes ordinary uncultured\nmen, in whose heads the most contradictory ideas find a place side\nby side, without their ever bringing these thoughts together and\nbecoming conscious of the contradictions involved; sometimes they are\nmen of intelligence who act thus with their eyes open, thinking that\nthey attain the best when, as they say, they take the good from every\nsystem, and so provide themselves with a _vade mecum_ of reflections,\nin which they have everything good except consecutiveness of thought,\nand consequently thought itself. An eclectic philosophy is something\nthat is altogether meaningless and inconsequent: and such a philosophy\nthe Alexandrian philosophy is not. In France the Alexandrians are\nstill called Eclectics; and there, where _syst\u00e8me_ is synonymous with\nnarrowness of views, and where indeed one must have the name which\nsounds least systematic and suspicious, that may be borne with.\n\nIn the better sense of the word the Alexandrians may, however, very\nwell be called eclectic philosophers, though it is quite superfluous\nto give them this designation at all. For the Alexandrians took as\ntheir groundwork the philosophy of Plato, but availed themselves of\nthe general development of Philosophy, which after Plato they became\nacquainted with through Aristotle and all the following philosophies,\nand especially through the Stoics; that is to say, they reinstated it,\nbut as invested with a higher culture. Therefore we find in them no\nrefutation of the views of the philosophers whom they quote. To this\nhigher culture there more especially belongs the deeper principle that\nabsolute essence must be apprehended as self-consciousness, that its\nvery essence is to be self-consciousness, and that it is therefore\nin the individual consciousness. This is not to be understood as\nsignifying that God is a Spirit who is outside of the world and outside\nself-consciousness, as is often said, but as indicating that His\nexistence as self-conscious spirit is really self-consciousness itself.\nThe Platonic universal, which is in thought, accordingly receives the\nsignification of being as such absolute essence. In the higher sense a\nwider point of view as regards the Idea thus signifies its concretely\nblending into one the preceding principles, which contain only single\none-sided moments of the Idea. This really indicates a deeper knowledge\nof the philosophical Idea which is known concretely in itself, so\nthat the more abstract principles are contained in the deeper form\nof the Idea. For after some divergence has taken place in the past\nit must from time to time come about that the implicit identity of\nthe divergent views is recognized, so that difference has force only\nas form. In this sense even Plato is eclectic, since he harmonized\nPythagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides; and the Alexandrians are also\nthus eclectics, seeing that they were just as much Pythagoreans as\nPlatonists and Aristotelians; the only thing is that this term always\nat once calls up the idea of an arbitrary selection.\n\nAll earlier philosophies could therefore find a place in that of\nthe Alexandrians. For in Alexandria the Ptolemies had attracted to\nthemselves science and the learned, partly by reason of their own\ninterest in science, and partly on account of the excellence of their\ninstitutions. They founded the great and celebrated library for which\nthe Greek translation of the Old Testament was made; after C\u00e6sar had\ndestroyed it, it was again restored. There was also there a museum, or\nwhat would nowadays be called an Academy of Science, where philosophers\nand men of special learning received payments of money, and had no\nother duties than that of prosecuting scientific study. In later times\nsuch foundations were instituted in Athens also, and each philosophic\nschool had its own public establishment,[221] without favour being\nshown to one philosophy or to the other. Thus the Neo-Platonic\nphilosophy arose beside the others, and partly upon their ruins, and\novershadowed the rest, until finally all earlier systems were merged\ntherein. It, therefore, did not constitute an individual philosophical\nschool similar to those which went before; but, while it united them\nall in itself, it had as its leading characteristic the study of Plato,\nof Aristotle, and of the Pythagoreans.\n\nWith this study was combined an interpretation of the writings of these\nmen, which aimed at exhibiting their philosophic ideas in their unity;\nand the principal mode in which the Neo-Platonic teachers carried on\nand elaborated Philosophy consisted in their explaining the various\nphilosophical works, especially the writings of Plato and Aristotle, or\ngiving sketches of these philosophies. These commentaries on the early\nphilosophers were either given in lectures or written; and many of them\nhave come down to us, some in the number being excellent. Aristotle\u2019s\nworks were commented on by Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Andronicus\nRhodius, Nicolaus Damascenus, and also Porphyrius. Plato had as\ncommentators Numenius and Maximus Tyrius. Other Alexandrians combined\na commentary on Plato with study of the other philosophic maxims or\nphilosophies, and managed to grasp the point of unity of the various\nmodes of the Idea very successfully. The best commentaries date from\nthis period; most of the works of Proclus are commentaries on single\ndialogues of Plato and similar subjects. This school has the further\npeculiarity of expressing speculation as actual divine Being and life,\nand, therefore, it makes this appear to be mystical and magical.\n\n\n1. AMMONIUS SACCAS.\n\nAmmonius Saccas, that is, the sack-bearer, is named as one of the first\nor most celebrated teachers of this school; he died A.D. 243.[222]\nBut we have none of his writings, nor have any traditions regarding\nhis philosophy come down to us. Among his very numerous disciples\nAmmonius had many men celebrated in other branches of science, for\nexample, Longinus and Origen; it is, however, uncertain if this were\nthe Christian Father of that name. But his most renowned disciple in\nphilosophy is Plotinus, through whose writings as they are preserved\nto us we derive our chief knowledge of the Neo-Platonic philosophy.\nThe systematized fabric of this philosophy is, indeed, ascribed to him\nby those who came after, and this philosophy is known specially as his\nphilosophy.\n\n\n2. PLOTINUS.\n\nAs the disciples of Ammonius had, by their master\u2019s desire, made an\nagreement not to commit his philosophy to writing, it was not until\nlate in life that Plotinus wrote; or, rather, the works received from\nhim were published after his death by Porphyrius, one of his disciples.\nFrom the same disciple we have an account of the life of Plotinus; what\nis remarkable in it is that the strictly historical facts recounted\nare mixed up with a great variety of marvellous episodes. This is\ncertainly the period when the marvellous plays a prominent part; but\nwhen the pure system of Philosophy, the pure meaning of such a man, is\nknown, it is impossible to express all one\u2019s astonishment at anecdotes\nof this kind. Plotinus was an Egyptian; he was born at Lycopolis about\nA.D. 205, in the reign of Septimius Severus. After he had attended\nthe lectures of many teachers of Philosophy, he became melancholy\nand absorbed in thought; at the age of eight and twenty he came to\nAmmonius, and, finding here at last what satisfied him, he remained for\neleven years under his instruction. As at that time wonderful accounts\nof Indian and Brahminical wisdom were being circulated, Plotinus set\nout on his way to Persia in the army of the Emperor Gordian; but\nthe campaign ended so disastrously that Plotinus did not attain his\nobject, and had difficulty even in procuring his own safety. At\nthe age of forty he proceeded to Rome, and remained there until his\ndeath, twenty-six years later. In Rome his outward demeanour was most\nremarkable; in accordance with the ancient Pythagorean practice, he\nrefrained from partaking of flesh, and often imposed fasts on himself;\nhe wore, also, the ancient Pythagorean dress. As a public lecturer,\nhowever, he gained a high reputation among all classes. The Emperor of\nthose days, Gallienus, whose favour Plotinus enjoyed, as well as that\nof the Empress, is said to have been inclined to hand over to him a\ntown in Campania, where he thought to realize the Platonic Republic.\nThe ministers, however, prevented the carrying out of this plan, and\ntherein they showed themselves men of sense, for in such an outlying\nspot of the Roman Empire, and considering the utter change in the\nhuman mind since Plato\u2019s days, when another spiritual principle had\nof necessity to make itself universal, this was an enterprise which\nwas far less calculated than in Plato\u2019s time to bring honour to the\nPlatonic Republic. It does little credit to the sagacity of Plotinus\nthat this idea ever entered into his head; but we do not exactly know\nif his plan were limited to the Platonic Republic, or if it did not\nadmit of some extension or modification thereof. Of course an actual\nPlatonic state was contrary to the nature of things; for the Platonic\nstate is free and independent, which such an one as this, within the\nRoman Empire, could of course not be. Plotinus died at Rome, in the\nsixty-sixth year of his age, A.D. 270.[223]\n\nThe writings of Plotinus are originally for the most part answers\ngiven as occasion required to questions proposed by his auditors; he\ncommitted them to writing during the last sixteen years of his life,\nand Porphyrius edited them some time later. In his teaching Plotinus\nadopted, as has been already mentioned, the method of commenting in\nhis lectures on the writings of various earlier philosophers. The\nwritings of Plotinus are known as Enneads, and are six in number, each\nof them containing nine separate treatises. We thus have altogether\nfifty-four of such treatises or books, which are subdivided into many\nchapters; it is consequently a voluminous work. The books do not,\nhowever, form a connected whole; but in each book, in fact, there are\nspecial matters brought forward and philosophically handled; and it is\nthus laborious to go through them. The first Ennead has for the most\npart a moral character; the first book proposes the question of what\nanimals are, and what man is; the second deals with the virtues; the\nthird with dialectic; the fourth with happiness (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03c2); the\nfifth investigates whether happiness consists in protraction of time\n(\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5); the sixth speaks of the beautiful; the seventh of\nthe highest (\u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5) good and of the other goods; the eighth inquires\ninto the origin of evil; the ninth treats of a rational departure from\nlife. Other Enneads are of a metaphysical nature. Porphyrius says in\nhis Life of Plotinus (pp. 3-5, 9, 17-19) that they are unequal. He\nstates that twenty-one of these books were already in written form\nbefore he came to Plotinus, which was when the latter was fifty-nine\nyears of age; and in that year and the five following, which Porphyrius\nspent with Plotinus as his disciple, other four-and-twenty were added.\nDuring the absence of Porphyrius in Sicily, Plotinus wrote nine more\nbooks, in the last years before his death, which later books are\nweaker. Creuzer is preparing to bring out an edition of Plotinus. To\ngive an account of him would be a difficult task, and would amount to\na systematic explanation. The mind of Plotinus hovers over each of the\nparticular matters that he deals with; he treats them rationally and\ndialectically, but traces them all back to one Idea. Many beautiful\ndetached quotations could be made from Plotinus, but as there is in\nhis works a continual repetition of certain leading thoughts, the\nreading of them is apt to prove wearisome. Since then it is the manner\nof Plotinus to lead the particular, which he makes his starting-point,\nalways back again to the universal, it is possible to grasp the ideas\nof Plotinus from some of his books, knowing that the reading of those\nremaining would not reveal to us any particular advance. Plato\u2019s ideas\nand expressions are predominant with him, but we find also many very\nlengthy expositions quite in the manner of Aristotle; for he makes\nconstant use of terms borrowed from Aristotle\u2014force, energy, &c.\u2014and\ntheir relations are essentially the object of his meditations. The main\npoint is that he is not to be taken as placing Plato and Aristotle in\nopposition; on the contrary, he went so far as to adopt even the Logos\nof the Stoics.\n\nIt is very difficult to give a systematic account of his philosophy.\nFor it is not the aim of Plotinus, as it was of Aristotle, to\ncomprehend objects in their special determinations, but rather\nto emphasize the truth of the substantial in them as against the\nphenomenal. The point of greatest importance and the leading\ncharacteristic in Plotinus is his high, pure enthusiasm for the\nelevation of mind to what is good and true, to the absolute. He lays\nhold of knowledge, the simply ideal, and of intellectual thought, which\nis implicitly life, but not silent nor sealed. His whole philosophy is\non the one hand metaphysics, but the tendency which is therein dominant\nis not so much an anxiety to explain and interpret and comprehend\nwhat forces itself on our attention as reality, or to demonstrate the\nposition and the origin of these individual objects, and perhaps,\nfor instance, to offer a deduction of matter, of evil; but rather to\nseparate the mind from these externals, and give it its central place\nin the simple, clear Idea. The whole tenor of his philosophy thus leads\nup to virtue and to the intellectual contemplation of the eternal, as\nsource of the same; so that the soul is brought to happiness of life\ntherein. Plotinus then enters to some extent on special considerations\nof virtue, with the view of cleansing the soul from passions, from\nfalse and impure conceptions of evil and destiny, and also from\nincredulity and superstition, from astrology and magic and all their\ntrain. This gives some idea of the general drift of his teaching.\n\nIf we now go on to consider the philosophy of Plotinus in detail,\nwe find that there is no longer any talk of the criterion, as with\nthe Stoics and Epicureans,\u2014that is all settled; but a strenuous\neffort is made to take up a position in the centre of things, in\npure contemplation, in pure thought. Thus what with the Stoics and\nEpicureans is the aim, the unity of the soul with itself in untroubled\npeace, is here the point of departure; Plotinus takes up the position\nof bringing this to pass in himself as a condition of ecstasy\n(\u1f14\u03ba\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), as he calls it, or as an inspiration. Partly in this name\nand partly in the facts themselves, a reason has been found for calling\nPlotinus a fanatic and visionary, and this is the cry universally\nraised against this philosophy; to this assertion the fact that for the\nAlexandrian school all truth lies in reason and comprehension alone,\npresents a very marked antithesis and contradiction.\n\nAnd firstly, with regard to the term ecstasy, those who call Plotinus a\nfanatic associate with the idea nothing but that condition into which\ncrazy Indians, Brahmins, monks and nuns fall, when, in order to bring\nabout an entire retreat into themselves, they seek to blot out from\ntheir minds all ordinary ideas and all perception of reality; thus this\nin some measure exists as a permanent and fixed condition; and again as\na steady gaze into vacuity it appears as light or as darkness, devoid\nof motion, distinction, and, in a word, of thought. Fanaticism like\nthis places truth in an existence which stands midway between reality\nand the Notion, but is neither the one nor the other,\u2014and therefore\nonly a creature of the imagination. From this view of ecstasy, however,\nPlotinus is far removed.\n\nBut in the second place there is something in the thing itself which\nhas contributed to bring upon him this reproach, and it is this,\nthat very often the name of fanaticism is given to anything that\ntranscends sensuous consciousness or the fixed notions of the finite\nunderstanding, which in their limitation are held to constitute real\nexistence. Partly, however, the imputation is due to the manner in\nwhich Plotinus speaks in general of Notions, spiritual moments as\nsuch, as if they had a substantial existence of their own. That is to\nsay, Plotinus sometimes introduces sensuous modes, modes of ordinary\nconception, into the world of Notions, and sometimes he brings down\nIdeas into the sphere of the sensuous, since, for instance, he utilizes\nthe necessary relations of things for purposes of magic. For the\nmagician is just he who attributes to certain words and particular\nsensuous signs a universal efficacy, and who attempts by prayers,\n&c., to lift them up to the universal. Such a universal this is not,\nhowever, in itself, in its own nature: universality is only attributed\nto it; or the universal of thought has not yet given itself therein a\nuniversal reality, while the thought, the act of a hero is the true,\nthe universal, whose effects and whose means have equal greatness and\nuniversality. In a certain sense therefore the Neo-Platonists have\nwell deserved the reproach of fanaticism, for in the biographies of\nthe great teachers of this school, Plotinus, Porphyrius and Iamblichus\nwe certainly find much recounted that comes under the category of\nmiracle-working and sorcery, just as we found it in the case of\nPythagoras (Vol. I. p. 200). Upholding as they did the belief in the\ngods of heathendom, they asserted in reference to the worship of images\nthat these really were filled with the divine power and presence.\nThus the Alexandrian school cannot be altogether absolved from the\ncharge of superstition.[224] For in the whole of that period of the\nworld\u2019s history, among Christians and heathen alike, the belief in\nmiracle-working prevailed, because the mind, absorbed in itself and\nfilled with astonishment at the infinite power and majesty of this\nself, paid no heed to the natural connection of events, and made the\ninterference of a supreme power seem easy. But what the philosophers\ntaught is utterly remote therefrom; except the quite theoretical\nobservation regarding the images of the gods which we mentioned above,\nthe writings of Plotinus contain nothing in any way related thereto.\n\nHe then who gives the name of fanaticism to every effort of the soul\nto rise to the supersensuous, to every belief that man can have in\nthe virtuous, the noble, the divine, the eternal, to every religious\nconviction,\u2014may count the Neo-Platonists as being fanatics; but\nfanaticism is in this case an empty name employed only by the dull\nfinite understanding, and by unbelief in all that is high and noble. If\nwe, however, give the name of fanatics to those who rise to speculative\ntruths which contradict the categories of the finite understanding, the\nAlexandrians have indeed incurred this imputation, but with quite equal\nreason may the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy be also termed\nfanaticism. For Plato most certainly speaks with enthusiasm of the\nelevation of the spirit into thought, or rather the Platonic enthusiasm\nproper consists in rising into the sphere of the movement of thought.\nThose who are convinced that the absolute essence in thought is not\nthought itself, constantly reiterate that God is beyond consciousness,\nand that the thought of Him is the notion of One whose existence or\nreality is nevertheless an utterly different thing; just as, when we\nthink of or imagine an animal or a stone, our notion or imagination is\nsomething quite different from the animal itself,\u2014which is making this\nlast to be the truth. But we are not speaking of this or that animal\nperceived by our senses, but of its essential reality, and this is the\nNotion of it. The essential reality of the animal is not present as\nsuch in the animal of our senses, but as being one with the objective\nindividuality, as a mode of that universal; as essence it is our\nNotion, which indeed alone is true, whereas what the senses perceive is\nnegative. Thus our Notion of absolute essence is the essence itself,\nwhen it is the Notion of absolute essence, not of something else. But\nthis essence does not seem to be co-extensive with the idea of God; for\nHe is not only Essence or His Notion, but His existence. His existence,\nas pure essence, is our thought of Him; but His real existence is\nNature. In this real existence the \u2018I\u2019 is that which has the faculty of\nindividual thought; it belongs to this existence as a moment present\nin it, but does not constitute it. From the existence of essence as\nessence we must pass over to existence, to real existence as such.\nAs such, God is doubtless a Beyond to individual self-consciousness,\nthat is to say, of course, in the capacity of essence or pure thought;\nthus to a certain extent He, as individual reality, is Nature which is\nbeyond thought. But even this objective mode comes back into essence,\nor the individuality of consciousness is overcome. Therefore what has\nbrought upon Plotinus the reproach of fanaticism is this, that he had\nthe thought of the essence of God being Thought itself and present in\nThought. As the Christians said that He was once present to sensuous\nperception at a certain time and in a certain place\u2014but also that He\never dwells in His people and is their Spirit\u2014so Plotinus said that\nabsolute essence is present in the self-consciousness that thinks, and\nexists in it as essence, or Thought itself is the Divine.\n\nIn further defining the relation of individual self-consciousness to\nthe knowledge of absolute essence, Plotinus asserts (Ennead. VI. l. 7,\nc. 35, 36) that the soul which withdraws from the corporeal and loses\nevery conception but that of pure essence brings itself nigh to the\nDeity. The principle of the philosophy of Plotinus is therefore the\nReason which is in and for itself. The condition of ecstasy through\nwhich alone that which has true Being comes to be known, is named\nby Plotinus (Ennead. VI. l. 9, c. 11) a simplification of the soul,\nthrough which it is brought into a state of blissful repose, because\nits object is itself simple and at rest. But it is evident that we\nare not to imagine this simplification of self-consciousness to be\na condition of fanaticism, seeing that even an immediate knowledge\nof God such as this is a thinking of Him and a comprehension of Him,\nand not a vacant feeling, or what is quite as vacant, an intuition.\nThis withdrawal of the soul from the body takes place through pure\nthought; thought is the activity and at the same time the object. It\nis thus a tranquil state, without any wild turmoil of the blood or\nof the imagination. Ecstasy is not a mere rapturous condition of the\nsenses and fancy, but rather a passing beyond the content of sensuous\nconsciousness; it is pure thought that is at home with itself, and\nis its own object. Plotinus often speaks of this condition in the\nsame way as in the following passage: \u201cOften when I out of the body\nawaken to myself, and am beyond the other,\u201d the external, \u201cand have\nentered into my inmost nature, and have a wondrous intuition, and live\na godlike life,\u201d &c.[225] In this way Plotinus certainly approaches\nto the intuitive point of view. Yet his figurative mode of expression\nseparates itself still more from the, in great measure, confused\nmythical ideas. The Idea of the philosophy of Plotinus is thus an\nintellectualism or a higher idealism, which indeed from the side of the\nNotion is not yet a perfect idealism; that of which Plotinus becomes\nconscious in his ecstasy is, however, philosophic thought, speculative\nNotions and Ideas.\n\nAs for the determinate principle of Plotinus, the objective, the\ncontent, which is at home with itself in this ecstasy, in this Being of\nThought\u2014this content, as regards its chief moments in the universal, is\nthat already dealt with. The three principles are for him the One, the\n\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and the soul.\n\na. The first, the absolute, the basis, is here, as with Philo, pure\nBeing, the unchangeable, which is the basis and the cause of all Being\nthat appears, whose potentiality is not apart from its actuality, but\nis absolute actuality in itself. It is the unity which is likewise\nessence, or unity as the essence of all essence. The true principle\nis not the multiplicity of present Being, the ordinary substantiality\nof things, according to which each appears as one separated from the\nothers, for really and truly their unity is their essence. This unity\nis, properly speaking, not All; for All is nothing but the result of\nthe units, the comprehension of them\u2014forming the basis, as they do, as\nessence\u2014in a unity which is strange to them. Nor is it before all; for\nit is not different from the all in actual existence, since otherwise\nit would again be only something thought.[226] The later unity, as\nregulative of the Reason, has the force of a subjective principle; but\nPlotinus establishes it as the highest objectivity, as Being.\n\nThis unity has no multiplicity in it, or multiplicity is not implicit;\nunity is only as it was for Parmenides and Zeno, absolute, pure\nBeing; or else the absolute Good, in the sense in which the absolute\nwas spoken of in the writings of Plato and especially in those of\nAristotle. In the first place, what is the Good?\u2014\u201cIt is that on\nwhich all depends (\u1f00\u03bd\u03ae\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9),[227] and which all things desire\n(\u1f10\u03c6\u03af\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9)\u201d\u2014also according to Aristotle\u2014\u201cand have as principle, and\nwhich they are all in want of, while itself it has lack of nothing, is\nsufficient for itself, and is the measure and limit of all, which out\nof itself gives the \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and essence (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd) and soul and life, and\nthe activity of reason (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03ae\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd). And up to this point all\nis beautiful, but _it_ is more than beautiful (\u1f51\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2) and better\nthan the best (\u1f10\u03c0\u03ad\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd), the superlatively good, bearing\nfree rule, exercising royal rights in Thought (\u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u03cd\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff7).\nBut it is itself by no means that whose principle it is. For when thou\nhast said \u201cthe Good,\u201d add nothing thereto, and think of nothing beyond.\nWhen thou hast abrogated Being itself, and takest it in this wise,\nastonishment will seize thee; and, making this thy aim and resting\ntherein, thou wilt understand it and its greatness by what is derived\nfrom it. And when thou hast Being thus before thee, and regardest it in\nthis purity, wonder will lay hold of thee.\u201d[228]\n\nOf absolute Being Plotinus then asserted that it is unknowable\u2014which\nPhilo also said\u2014and that it remains in itself. On this point Plotinus\nexpatiates at great length, and frequently recurs to the fact that the\nsoul must really first attain to the thought of this unity through\nnegative movement, which is something different from mere assertion,\nand is rather sceptical movement which makes trial of all predicates\nand finds nothing except this One. All such predicates as Being and\nsubstance do not conform to it in the opinion of Plotinus; for they\nexpress some determination or other. There is no sensation, no thought,\nno consciousness; for in all these there lies a distinction. Because\nthe determination of the One is the main point, with Plotinus the\nGood is the aim for subjective thought as well as for practical; but\nalthough the Good is the absolutely free, it is nevertheless without\nresolution and will; for will has in it the distinction of itself and\nthe Good.[229]\n\nThat Being is and remains God, and is not outside of Him, but is His\nvery self: \u201cAbsolute unity upholds things that they fall not asunder;\nit is the firm bond of unity in all, penetrating all\u2014bringing together\nand unifying things which in mutual opposition were in danger of\nseparation. We term it the One and the Good. It neither _is_, nor is it\nsomething, nor is it anything, but it is over all. All these categories\nare negatived; it has no magnitude, is not infinite. It is the middle\npoint of the universe, the eternal source of virtue and the origin of\ndivine love, around which all moves, by which every thing directs its\ncourse, in which \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and self-consciousness ever have their beginning\nand their end.\u201d[230] To this substance Plotinus leads back everything;\nit alone is the true, and in all remains simply identical with itself.\n\nBut out of this First all proceeds, owing to its revealing itself; that\nis the connection with creation and all production. But the Absolute\ncannot be conceived as creative, if it is determinate as an abstract,\nand is not rather comprehended as the One which has energy in itself.\nThis transition to the determinate is thus not made by Plotinus\nphilosophically or dialectically, but the necessity of it is expressed\nin representations and images. Thus he says (Ennead. III. l. 8, c. 9)\nof the \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, his second principle, \u201cThe one absolute Good is a source\nwhich has no other principle, but is the principle for all streams, so\nthat it is not swallowed up by these, but as source remains at rest in\nitself,\u201d and thus contains these streams as such in itself; so that\nthey, \u201cflowing out in one direction and another, have yet not flowed\naway, but know whence and whither they are flowing.\u201d This distinction\nis the point to which Plotinus often returns, and this advance from the\nunrevealed to the revelation, this production, is a point of importance.\n\nb. Now what is first begotten by this Unity, the Son, is finite\nunderstanding (\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2), the second Divine Being, the other principle.\nHere the main difficulty confronts us\u2014the task known and recognized\nlong years ago\u2014the comprehension of how the One came to the decision\nto determine itself; and the endeavour to elucidate this fact still\nconstitutes the essential point of interest. The ancients did not\nframe this question in the definite form in which we have it; but they\nnevertheless occupied themselves with it. For the \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 is nothing\nmore or less than the self-finding of self; it is the pure duality\n(\u03b4\u03c5\u03ac\u03c2), itself and its object; it contains all that is thought, it is\nthis distinction, but pure distinction that remains at the same time\nidentical with itself. Simple unity is, however, the First. Plotinus\nthus also says in a somewhat Pythagorean fashion that things are as\nnumbers in this \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2. \u201cBut number is not the First, for unity is not\na number. The first number is the two, but as indeterminate duality;\nand the one is what determines it; the two is also the soul. Number is\nthe solid; what sensuous perception takes to be existent, is a later\ndevelopment.\u201d[231]\n\nPlotinus has here (Ennead. V. l. 1, c. 6) all sorts of modes of\nrepresentation in order to make clear to himself the development out\nof the One: \u201cHow then this process is accomplished, how out of unity\nproceed two and plurality in general\u2014if we would know how to express\nthis, we must call on God, not, however, with audible voice, but\npouring out our soul in prayer to Him; this we can do only by coming\nall alone to Him who is alone. He who contemplates must retire into his\nsecret heart as into a temple, and remain there at rest, being elevated\nabove all things, and in such contemplation as admits of no change.\u201d\nThis is always the mood of the thinking soul, to which Plotinus exhorts\nand would lead everything back. In this pure thought or contemplation\nthe \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 is actual; and this is divine activity itself.\n\nPlotinus continues: \u201cThis production is not a movement nor a change;\nchange and what comes to pass through change, the changeable, we\narrive at only in the third place;\u201d change implies other-Being and is\ndirected to something else, \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 is still the remaining at home with\nself of meditation. \u201cThe finite understanding originating thus from\nabsolute essence, yet without change, is the immediate reflection of\nthe same; it is not established by an act of will or a resolution.\nBut God,\u201d as One, the Good, \u201cis the immovable; and production is a\nlight proceeding from Him who endures. The One sheds light round about\nHimself; the finite understanding flows from Him, the enduring one,\njust as the light from the sun encircles it. All things which are\npermanent give forth and diffuse from their substance an essence which\nis dependent upon them;\u201d or, as Plotinus really says, it is identical\nwith them. \u201cAs fire diffuses warmth, and snow cold, around itself, but\nespecially as the fragrance of things clings round them,\u201d so does \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2,\nlike light, diffuse Being around. \u201cThat which has come to perfection\npasses into the emanation, into the circle of light,\u201d spreads a\nfragrance around.[232] For this going forth (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd) or production,\nPlotinus also employs the image of overflowing, whereby, however, the\nOne remains simply one. \u201cBecause it is complete in itself, without\nanything lacking, it overflows; and this overflow is what is produced.\nThis that is produced merely, however, returns to the One,\u201d the Good,\n\u201cwhich is its object, content and fulfilling; and this is finite\nunderstanding,\u201d\u2014this the reversion of what is produced to the original\nunity. \u201cThe first state of Being that is restful is absolute essence,\nand finite understanding is the contemplation of this essence;\u201d or it\ncomes into existence by means of the first essence, through return upon\nitself, seeing itself, by its being a seeing seeing. The light shed\naround is a contemplation of the One; this reflection of self on self\n(\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd) is then thought, or the \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 is this movement in a circle\n(\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c6\u03ae).[233]\n\nThese are the main principles of Plotinus; and he has in this way\ntruly determined the nature of the Idea in all its moments. Only there\nis a difficulty here which makes us pause; and it is found in this\ndevelopment. We can imagine the infinite disclosing itself in a variety\nof ways; in later times there has been much talk of an issuing-forth\nfrom God, which, however, is still a sensuous conception or something\nquite immediate. The necessity of self-disclosure is not expressed\nthereby, for it is stated only as something having come to pass. That\nthe Father begets the eternal Son satisfies the imagination; the Idea\nis according to its content quite correctly conceived as the Trinity,\nand this is an important matter. But although these determinations are\ntrue, the form of the immediacy of movement is at the same time neither\nsufficient nor satisfying for the Notion. For because the Becoming of\nthe simple unity, as the abrogation of all predicates, is that same\nabsolute negativity which is implicitly the production of itself, we\nmust not begin with unity and only then pass over into duality, but we\nmust grasp them both as one. For, according to Plotinus, the object of\nthe finite understanding is clearly nothing which is alien or opposite\nto this or to itself; the manifold Ideas are alone the content of the\nsame. God therefore through distinction and extension is likewise a\nreturn to Himself, that is, this very duality is simply in the unity,\nand is its object. What is thought is not outside of \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 in thought\n\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 merely possesses itself as thinking. The object of thought, that\nto which thought turns back, is absolute unity; into this, however, as\nsuch, there is no forcing a way, and it is not determined, but remains\nthe unknown. Since thinking is, however, only the fact of having itself\nas object, it has thus already an object which contains mediation and\nactivity, or, to speak generally, duality in itself. This is Thought as\nthe thought of Thought. Or in the perfecting of this thought in itself,\ninasmuch as it is its own object, there lies for Plotinus the first\nand truly intellectual world, which thus stands to the world of sense\nin such a relation that the latter is only a distant imitation of the\nformer. Things, looked at as they exist in this absolute Thought, are\ntheir own Notions and essence (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9); and these are the patterns of\nsensuous existences, as Plato also expressed it.[234]\n\nThat the nature of thought is to think itself, is a quite Aristotelian\ndefinition. But with Plotinus and the Alexandrians it is likewise the\ncase that the true universe, the intellectual worlds is produced from\nthought; what Plato termed the Ideas, is here the understanding that\nforms, the intelligence that produces, which is actual in that which\nis produced, and has itself as object, thinks itself. Of the relation\nof these many Notions in the understanding, Plotinus states that they\nare present there, just as the elements are present in a thing, and\ntherefore not as mutually indifferent species, but as being diverse\nand yet entirely one. They are not indifferent through space, but\nonly differ through an inner difference, that is, not in the manner\nof existent parts.[235] The finite understanding is thereby expressed\nas negative unity. But it is utterly inappropriate when the relation\nof the elements which constitute a thing is defined as that of the\nparts of which the whole consists, and each of which is absolute\u2014for\ninstance, when it is represented that in a crystal, water, flint,\n&c., are still present as such. Their Being is really neutrality, in\nwhich each of them is abrogated as indifferent and existent: therefore\ntheir unity is negative unity, the inner essence, the principle of\nindividuality as containing in itself elements that differ.\n\n_c._ The world that changes, which is subject to difference, arises\nfrom this, that the multiplicity of these forms is not only implicitly\nin the understanding, but they also exist for it in the form of its\nobject. Further, there is for it a three-fold mode of thinking: in the\nfirst place it thinks the unchangeable, its unity, as object. This\nfirst mode is the simple undifferentiated contemplation of its object,\nor it is light; not matter, but pure form, activity. Space is the\nabstract pure continuity of this activity of light, not the activity\nitself, but the form of its uninterruptedness. The understanding, as\nthe thought of this light, is itself light, but light real in itself,\nor the light of light.[236] In the second place the understanding\nthinks the difference between itself and essence; the differentiated\nmultiplicity of the existent is object for it. It is the creation of\nthe world; in it everything has its determinate form in regard to\neverything else, and this constitutes the substance of things. Since,\nin the third place, substantiality or permanency in the faculty of\nthought is determination, its production, or the flowing out of all\nthings from it, is of such a nature that it remains filled with all\nthings, or likewise absorbs all immediately. It is the abrogation\nof these differences, or the passing over from one to another; this\nis its manner of thinking itself, or it is object to itself in this\nfashion. This is change; thinking has thus the three principles in\nit. Inasmuch as \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 thinks of itself as changing, but yet in change\nremaining simple and at home with itself, the subject of its thought\nis life as a whole; and the fact of its establishing its moments as\nexisting in opposition to each other is the true, living universe. This\nturning round on itself of the outflow from itself, this thinking of\nitself, is the eternal creation of the world.[237] It is plain that\nin these thoughts of Plotinus the Being-another, the foreign element,\nis abrogated, existent things are implicitly Notions. The Divine\nunderstanding is the thinking of them, and their existence is nothing\nelse than this very fact of their being the object of thought of the\nDivine understanding; they are moments of thought and, for this very\nreason, of Being. Plotinus thus distinguishes in \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 thinking (\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2),\nthe object thought of (\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd), and thought (\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), so that \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 is\none, and at the same time all; but thought is the unity of what had\nbeen distinguished.[238] We would term thought not so much unity as\nproduct; yet even thought, that is, the subject, soars upwards to God.\nThe distinction between thought and an external God is thus doubtless\nat an end; for this reason the Neo-Platonists are accused of being\nvisionaries, and in truth they do themselves propound wondrous things.\n\n\u03b1. Plotinus now goes on to describe the third principle, the soul:\n\u201c\u039d\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 is eternally active in exactly the same way as now. The movement\nto it and around it is the activity of the soul. Reason (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2), which\npasses from it to the soul, confers on the soul a power of thought,\nplacing nothing between them. Thinking (\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2) is not a manifold;\nthinking is simple, and consists in the very fact of thinking. The\ntrue \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 (not ours, as it is found, for instance, in desire) thinks\nin thoughts, and the object of its thought is not beyond it; for it is\nitself the object of its thought, has of necessity itself in thought\nand sees itself; and sees itself not as non-thinking, but as thinking.\nOur soul is partly in the eternal\u201d (light), \u201ca part of the universal\nsoul; this itself is in part in the eternal, and flows out thence,\nremaining in contemplation of itself, without any designed regulation.\nThe embellishment of the whole gives to every corporeal object what in\nview of its determination and nature it is capable of carrying out,\njust as a central fire diffuses warmth all around it. The One must not\nbe solitary, for were it so all things would be hidden, and would have\nno form present in them; nothing of what exists would exist if the\nOne stood by itself, neither would there be the multitude of existent\nthings, produced by the One, if those who have attained to the order of\nsouls had not received the power to go forth. Similarly souls must not\nexist alone, as if what is produced through them should not appear, for\nin every nature it is immanent to make and bring to light something in\nconformity with itself, as the seed does from an undivided beginning.\nThere is nothing to prevent all from having a share in the nature of\nthe Good.\u201d[239] Plotinus leaves the corporeal and sensuous on one\nside, as it were, and does not take pains to explain it, his sole and\nconstant aim being to purify therefrom, in order that the universal\nsoul and our soul may not be thereby endangered.\n\n\u03b2. Plotinus speaks, moreover, of the principle of the sensuous\nworld, which is matter, and with which the origin of evil is closely\nconnected. He dwells much on this subject of matter in his philosophy.\nMatter is the non-existent (\u03bf\u1fe6\u03ba \u1f44\u03bd), which presents an image of the\nexistent. Things differ in their pure form, the difference that\ndistinguishes them; the universal of difference is the negative, and\nthis is matter. As Being is the first absolute unity, this unity of the\nobjective is the pure negative; it lacks all predicates and properties,\nfigure, &c. It is thus itself a thought or pure Notion, and indeed the\nNotion of pure indeterminateness; or it is universal potentiality\nwithout energy. Plotinus describes this pure potentiality very well,\nand defines it as the negative principle. He says, \u201cBrass is a statue\nonly in potentiality; for in what is not permanent, the possible, as we\nhave seen, was something utterly different. But when the grammarian in\npotentiality becomes the grammarian in actuality, the potential is the\nsame as the actual. The ignorant man may be a grammarian, as it were\nby accident (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2), and it is not in virtue of his present\nignorance that he has the possibility of knowledge. It is for the very\nreason of its possessing a certain measure of knowledge that the soul\nwhich is actual attains to what it was potentially. It would not be\ninappropriate to give the name of form and idea to energy, in so far as\nit exists as energy and not as mere potentiality\u2014not simply as energy,\nbut as the energy of something determinate. For we might give the\nname more properly, perhaps, to another energy, namely that which is\nopposed to the potentiality which leads to actuality, for the possible\nhas the possibility of being something else in actuality. But through\npossibility the possible has also in itself actuality, just as skill\nhas the activity related thereto, and as bravery has brave action. When\nin the object of thought (\u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2)[240] there is no matter,\u2014as\nin the case of something existing in potentiality\u2014and it does not\nbecome something that does not yet exist, nor something that changes\ninto something else, nor something that\u2014itself permanent\u2014produces\nanother, or emerging from itself permits another to exist in its\nplace\u2014in that case we have then no mere potential but the existent,\nwhich has eternity and not time. Should we consider matter to be there\nas form, as even the soul, although a form, is matter in respect to\nwhat is different? But, speaking generally, matter is not in actuality,\nit is what exists in potentiality. Its Being only announces a Becoming,\nso that its Being has always to do with future Being. That which is\nin potentiality is thus not something, but everything;\u201d energy alone\nis determinate. \u201cMatter consequently always leans towards something\nelse, or is a potentiality for what follows; it is left behind as\na feeble and dim image that cannot take shape. Is it then an image\nin respect to reality, and therefore a deception? This is the same\nas a true deception, this is the true non-existent;\u201d it is untrue\nby reason of energy. \u201cThat is therefore not existent in actuality\nwhich has its truth in the non-existent;\u201d it exists not in truth, for\n\u201cit has its Being in non-Being. If you take away from the false its\nfalseness, you take away all the existence that it has. Similarly, if\nyou introduce actuality into that which has its Being and its essence\nin potentiality, you destroy the cause of its substance (\u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2),\nbecause Being consisted for it in potentiality. If we would therefore\nretain matter uninjured, we must keep it as matter; apparently we must\ntherefore say that it is only in potentiality, in order that it may\nremain what it is.\u201d[241]\n\nIn accordance with this, therefore, Plotinus (Ennead. III. l. 6,\nc. 7, 8) defines it: \u201cMatter is truly non-existent, a motion which\nabrogates itself, absolute unrest, yet itself at rest\u2014what is opposed\nin itself; it is the great which is small, the small which is great,\nthe more which is less, the less which is more. When defined in one\nmode, it is really rather the opposite; that is to say, when looked\nat and fixed, it is not fixed and escapes, or when not fixed it is\nfixed\u2014the simply illusory.\u201d Matter itself is therefore imperishable;\nthere is nothing into which it can change. The Idea of change is itself\nimperishable, but what is implied in this Idea is changeable. This\nmatter is nevertheless not without form; and we have seen that the\nfinite understanding has a third relationship to its object, namely in\nreference to differences. As now this relation and alteration, this\ntransition, is the life of the universe, the universal soul of the\nsame, its Being is in like manner not a change which takes place in\nthe understanding, for its Being is its being the immediate object of\nthought through the understanding.\n\n\u03b3. The Evil likewise, as contrasted with the Good, now begins to be\nthe object of consideration, for the question of the origin of evil\nmust always be a matter of interest to the human consciousness. These\nAlexandrians set up as matter the negative of thought, but since the\nconsciousness of the concrete mind entered in, the abstract negative\nis apprehended in this concrete fashion as within the mind itself,\ntherefore as the mentally negative. Plotinus regards this question of\nevil from many sides; but thoughtful consideration of this subject does\nnot yet go very far. The following conceptions are those that prevail\nat this time: \u201cThe Good is \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, but not the understanding in the sense\nit used to bear for us, which from a pre-supposition both satisfies\nitself and understands what is said to it, which forms a conclusion\nand from what follows draws up a theory, and from the consequence\ncomes to a knowledge of what is, having now obtained something not\nformerly possessed; for before this its knowledge was empty, although\nit was understanding. But \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, as we now understand it, contains all\nthings in itself, is all things, and is at home with itself; it has all\nthings while not having them,\u201d because it is in itself ideal. \u201cBut it\ndoes not possess all in the sense in which we regard what we possess\nas something different or alien from ourselves; what is possessed is\nnot distinguished from itself. For it is each thing and everything\nand not confounded, but absolute. What partakes of the same does not\npartake of all things at once, but partakes in so far as it can. \u039d\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2\nis the first energy and the first substance of the soul, which has\nactivity in regard thereto. The soul, externally revolving round \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2,\ncontemplating it and gazing into its depths, beholds God by means of\nit; and this is the life of the gods, free from evil and filled with\nblessedness\u201d\u2014in so far as the intelligence which goes forth from itself\nhas in its difference to do only with itself, and remains in its divine\nunity. \u201cIf it remained thus constant there would be no evil. But there\nare goods of the first and second and third rank, all surrounding the\nKing over all; and He is the originator of all good, and all is His,\nand those of the second rank revolve round the second, and those of\nthe third round the third. If this is the existent and something even\nhigher than the existent, evil is not included in what is existent or\nhigher than the existent; for this is the good. Nothing remains then\nbut that evil, if it exists, is in the non-existent, as a form of the\nnon-existent\u2014but the non-existent not as altogether non-existent,\nbut only as something other than the existent.\u201d Evil is no absolute\nprinciple independent of God, as the Manich\u00e6ans held it to be. \u201cIt is\nnot non-existent in the same way that motion and rest are existent, but\nis like an image of the existent, or non-existent in an even greater\ndegree; it is the sensuous universe.\u201d[242]. Thus evil has its root in\nthe non-existent.\n\nIn the eighth book of the first Ennead Plotinus says (c. 9, 3, 4, 7):\n\u201cBut how is evil recognized? It is owing to thought turning away from\nitself that matter arises; it exists only through the abstraction of\nwhat is other than itself. What remains behind when we take away the\nIdeas is, we say, matter; thought accordingly becomes different, the\nopposite of thought, since it dares to direct itself on that which\nis not within its province. Like the eye turning away from the light\nin order to see the darkness which in the light it does not see\u2014and\nthis is a seeing which yet is non-seeing\u2014so thought experiences the\nopposite of what it is, in order that it may see what is opposed to\nitself.\u201d This abstract other is nothing but matter, and it is also\nevil; the seeing of the less measure is nothing but a non-seeing. \u201cThe\nsensuous in regard to measure, or the limited, is the less measure, the\nboundless, the undefined, unresting, insatiable, the utterly deficient;\nsuch is not accidental to it, but its substance.\u201d Its aim is always\nBecoming; we cannot say that it is, but only that it is always about to\nbe. \u201cThe soul which makes \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 its aim is pure, holds off matter and\nall that is indeterminate and measureless. But why then, when there is\nthe Good, is there also necessarily Evil? Because there must be matter\nin the whole, because the whole necessarily consists of opposites. It\nwould not be there, if matter were not present; the nature of the world\nis compounded of \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and necessity. To be with the gods means to be\nin thought; for they are immortal. We may also apprehend the necessity\nof evil in this wise: As the Good cannot exist alone, matter is a\ncounterpart to the Good, necessary to its production. Or we might also\nsay that Evil is that which by reason of constant deterioration and\ndecay has sunk until it can sink no lower; but something is necessary\nafter the first, so that the extreme is also necessary. But that is\nmatter, which has no longer any element of good in it; and this is the\nnecessity of evil.\u201d\n\nWith Plotinus, as with Pythagoras, the leading of the soul to virtue\nis also an important subject. Plotinus has for this reason blamed the\nGnostics frequently, especially in the ninth book of the second Ennead\n(c. 15), because \u201cthey make no mention at all of virtue and the Good,\nnor of how they may be reached, and the soul rendered better and purer.\nFor no purpose is served by saying,[243] \u2018Look unto God;\u2019 it must\nalso be shown how we can succeed in causing man thus to behold God.\nFor it may be asked, What is to prevent a man from beholding, while\nat the same time he refrains from the gratification of no desire, and\nallows anger to take possession of him? Virtue, which sets a final end\nbefore itself and dwells in the soul with wisdom, manifests God; but\nwithout true virtue God is an empty word.\u201d The Gnostics limit truth\nto the mental and intellectual; to this mere intellectuality Plotinus\ndeclares himself distinctly opposed, and holds firmly to the essential\nconnection of the intelligible and the real. Plotinus honoured the\nheathen gods, attributing to them a deep meaning and a profound\nefficacy. He says in the same treatise (c. 16), \u201cIt is not by despising\nthe world and the gods in it, and all else that is beautiful, that man\nattains to goodness. The wicked man holds the gods in contempt, and\nit is only when he has completely reached this stage that he becomes\nutterly depraved. The above-mentioned reverence of the Gnostics for the\nintelligible gods (\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2) is nothing corresponding with this\n(\u1f00\u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u1f74\u03c2 \u1f02\u03bd \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c4\u03bf):\u201d that is to say, there is no harmony between\nthoughts and the real world, when one does not go beyond the object of\nthought. \u201cHe who loves anything loves also all things related to the\nsame, therefore also the children of the father whom he loves. Every\nsoul is the daughter of this father. But souls in the heavenly spheres\nare more intelligible, and better, and far more nearly related to the\nhigher Power than our souls are. For how could this world of reality\nbe cut off from that higher sphere? Those who despise that which is\nrelated thereto know it only in name. How could it be pious to believe\nthat Divine providence (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1) does not reach to matters here below?\nWhy is God not also here? For how otherwise could He know what takes\nplace within this sphere? Therefore He is universally present, and is\nin this world, in whatever way it be, so that the world participates in\nHim. If He is at a distance from the world, He is at a distance also\nfrom us, and you could say nothing of Him or of what He produces. This\nworld also partakes of Him, and is not forsaken by Him, and never will\nbe so. For the whole partakes of the divine much more than the part\ndoes, and the world-soul shares in it to a still greater degree. The\nBeing and the rationality of the world are a proof of this.\u201d\n\nIn this we have the main ideas on which the intellectualism of Plotinus\nis based, the general conceptions to which everything particular is\nled back; the instances in which this is done are often, however,\nfigurative. What, in the first place, is lacking in them, as we have\nalready remarked, is the Notion. Severance, emanation, effluence\nor process, emergence, occurrence, are words which in modern times\nhave also had to stand for much, but in fact nothing is expressed\nby them. Scepticism and dogmatism, as consciousness or knowledge,\nestablish the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity. Plotinus\nhas rejected it, has soared upwards into the highest region, into\nthe Aristotelian thought of Thought; he has much more in common with\nAristotle than with Plato, and thereby he is not dialectic, nor does\nhe proceed out of himself, nor as consciousness does he go back out\nof himself into himself again. With this, in the second place, there\nis connected the fact that the further descent either to nature or\nto manifested consciousness, even when expressed as the operation of\nthe higher soul, yet contains much that is arbitrary, and is devoid\nof the necessity of the Notion; for that which ought to be defined\nin Notions is expressed in many-coloured pictures, in the form of\na reality; and this, to say the least, is a useless and inadequate\nexpression. I quote one example only: our soul belongs not only to\nthe sphere of the finite understanding, where it was perfect, happy,\nlacking nothing; its power of thought alone belongs to the first, the\nfinite understanding. Its power of motion, or itself looked on as life,\nhad as its source the intelligent world-soul, but sensation had its\nsource in the soul of the world of sensation. That is to say, Plotinus\nmakes the first world-soul to be the immediate activity of the finite\nunderstanding, which is an object to itself; it is pure soul above the\nsublunar region, and dwells in the upper heaven of the fixed stars.\nThis world-soul has power to originate; from it again there flows an\nentirely sensuous soul. The desire of the individual and particular\nsoul separated from the whole gives it a body; this it receives in\nthe higher region of the heavens. With this body it obtains fancy and\nmemory. At last it repairs to the soul of the sensible world; and from\nthis it acquires sensation, desires, and the life that is vegetative in\nnature.[244]\n\nThis declension, this further step towards the corporeality of the\nsoul, is described by the followers of Plotinus as if the soul sank\nfrom the Milky Way and the Zodiac into the orbits of planets which\nhave their place lower down, and in each of these it receives new\npowers, and in each begins also to exercise these powers. In Saturn\nthe soul first acquires the power of forming conclusions with regard\nto things; in Jupiter it receives the power of effectiveness of the\nwill; in Mars, affections and impulses; in the Sun, sensation, opinion,\nand imagination; in Venus, sensuous desires aiming at the particular;\nin the Moon, lastly, the power of production.[245] In such a way as\nthis Plotinus makes into a particular existence for the spiritual the\nvery things that he declares to be, on the one hand, intelligible\nmoments. The soul which only has desires is the beast; that which only\nvegetates, which has only power of reproduction, is the plant. But\nwhat we spoke of above are not particular conditions of mind, outside\nof the universal spirit, in the world-spirit\u2019s particular stages\nof its self-consciousness regarding itself; and Saturn and Jupiter\nhave nothing further to do with it. When they in their potency are\nexpressed as moments of the soul, this is not a whit better than when\neach of them was supposed to express a particular metal. As Saturn\nexpresses lead, Jupiter tin, and so forth, so Saturn also expresses\nargumentation, Jupiter will, &c. It is doubtless easier to say that\nSaturn corresponds with lead, &c., that it is the power of drawing\nconclusions, or that it represents lead and the power of drawing\nconclusions, or anything else you like, instead of expressing its\nNotion, its essence. The above is a comparison with a thing that in\nlike manner does not express a Notion, but is apparent to the senses,\nwhich is laid hold of out of the air, or rather indeed from the ground.\nSuch representations are warped and false; for if we say that this is\nlead, we mean thereby the essence or the implicitness of lead, with\nwhich the soul has an affinity; but this is no longer the sensuous\nBeing which is known as lead, nor has this moment of such a state any\nreality for the soul.\n\n\n3. PORPHYRY AND IAMBLICHUS.\n\nPorphyry and Iamblichus, who have already been mentioned as the\nbiographers of Pythagoras (Vol. I. p. 197), are distinguished followers\nof Plotinus. The first, a Syrian, died in 304: the latter, likewise\nof Syria, in the year 333.[246] Amongst other works by Porphyrius,\nwe possess an \u201cIntroduction to the Organon of Aristotle on Genera,\nSpecies, and Judgments,\u201d in which his logic is propounded in its\nprincipal elements. This work is one which has at all times been the\ntext-book of Aristotelian Logic, and also an authority from which the\nknowledge of its form has been derived; and our ordinary books of logic\ncontain little more than what is found in this Introduction. The fact\nthat Porphyry devoted himself to logic shows that a determinate form\nof thought was coming into favour with the Neo-Platonists; but this is\nsomething pertaining altogether to the understanding and very formal.\nThus we here have the characteristic fact that with the Neo-Platonists\nthe logic of the understanding, the quite empiric treatment of the\nsciences, is found in conjunction with the entirely speculative\nIdea, and in respect of practical life with a belief in theurgy, the\nmarvellous and strange: in his life of Plotinus, Porphyry, indeed,\ndescribes him a miracle-worker, which statement we, however, must set\naside as appertaining to literature.\n\nIamblichus evinces more mistiness and confusion still; he certainly\nwas a teacher highly esteemed in his time, so that he even received\nthe name of divine instructor; but his philosophic writings\nform a compilation without much specially to characterize them,\nand his biography of Pythagoras does not do much credit to his\nunderstanding. It was likewise in the Pythagorean philosophy that the\nNeo-Platonists gloried, and more particularly they revived the form of\nnumber-determination which pertains to it. In Iamblichus thought sinks\ninto imagination, the intellectual universe to a kingdom of demons\nand angels with a classification of the same, and speculation comes\ndown to the methods of magic. The Neo-Platonists called this theurgy\n(\u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03af\u03b1); for in the miracle speculation, the divine Idea, is, so to\nspeak, brought into immediate contact with actuality, and not set forth\nin a universal way. As to the work _De mysteriis \u00c6gyptiorum_, it is not\nknown for certain whether it had Iamblichus as its author or not; later\non Proclus makes great ado concerning him, and testifies that he was\nindebted to Iamblichus for his main ideas.[247]\n\n\n4. PROCLUS.\n\nProclus, a later Neo-Platonist who has still to be mentioned, is more\nimportant. He was born in 412 at Constantinople, but carried on his\nstudies and spent most of his life with Plutarchus in Athens, where he\nalso died in 485. His life is written by Marinus, in a style similar\nto that of the biographies just mentioned. According to this his\nparents came from Xanthus in Lycia, a district of Asia Minor; and since\nApollo and Minerva were the tutelary deities of this town, he rendered\ngrateful worship to them. They, themselves, vouchsafed to him, as their\nfavourite, particular regard and personal manifestations; indeed, he\nwas healed of an illness by Apollo touching his head; by Minerva,\nhowever, he was called upon to go to Athens. First of all he went to\nAlexandria to study rhetoric and philosophy, and then to Athens, to be\nwith Plutarchus and Syrianus, the Platonists. Here he first studied\nAristotelian and then Platonic philosophy. Above all the daughter of\nPlutarchus, Asclepigenia, initiated him into the profound secrets of\nphilosophy; she, as Marinus assures us, was the only individual at that\ntime who retained the knowledge, transmitted to her by her father, of\nthe mystic ceremonies and of the whole theurgic discipline. Proclus\nstudied everything pertaining to the mysteries, the Orphic hymns, the\nwritings of Hermes, and religious institutions of every kind, so that,\nwherever he went, he understood the ceremonies of the pagan worship\nbetter than the priests who were placed there for the purpose of\nperforming them. Proclus is said to have had himself initiated into\nall the pagan mysteries. He himself kept all the religious festivals\nand observances pertaining to nations the most various; he was even\nfamiliar with the Egyptian form of worship, observed the Egyptian days\nof purification and festivals, and spent certain fast days in offering\nup prayers and praise. Proclus himself composed many hymns\u2014of which we\nstill possess some that are very beautiful\u2014both in honour of the better\nknown divinities and of those whose fame is entirely local. Of the\ncircumstance that he\u2014\u201cthe most God-fearing man\u201d\u2014had dealings with so\nmany religions, he himself says: \u201cIt is not fitting for a philosopher\nto be minister (\u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03ae\u03bd) to the worship of one town or of what\npertains to the few, for he should be the universal hierophant of the\nwhole world.\u201d He considered Orpheus to be the originator of all Greek\ntheology, and set a specially high value on the Orphic and Chaldaic\noracles. It was in Athens that he taught. Of course his biographer,\nMarinus, relates the most marvellous things about him, that he brought\ndown rain from heaven and tempered great heat, that he stilled the\nearthquake, healed diseases, and beheld visions of the divine.[248]\n\nProclus led a most intellectual life; he was a profoundly speculative\nman, and the scope of his knowledge was very great. In his case, as\nalso in that of Plotinus, the contrast between the insight of such\nphilosophers and what their disciples relate of them in biographies,\nmust strike one very forcibly, for of the wonders described by the\nbiographers few traces are to be found in the works of the subjects\nthemselves. Proclus left behind him a great number of writings, many of\nwhich we now possess; he was the author of several mathematical works\nwhich we also have, such as that on the Sphere. His more important\nphilosophic works are the Commentaries on Plato\u2019s Dialogues, certain\nof which have been published from time to time; that on the Tim\u00e6us was\nthe most famous. But several were only found in manuscript, and of\nthese Cousin issued in Paris the Commentaries on the Alcibiades (Vols.\nII. III.), and the Parmenides (Vols. IV.-VI.) for the first time. The\nfirst volume of Cousin\u2019s edition contains some writings by Proclus\nwhich now exist only in Latin, on Freedom, Providence, and Evil. Works\nseparately published are his important writings, The Platonic Theology\n(\u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f72\u03bd \u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd) and his Theological Elements (\u03c3\u03c5\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae); the latter short work Creuzer has had re-published, as also\nsome of the before-mentioned Commentaries.\n\nProclus lived, so to speak, in the worship of science. We cannot fail\nto see in him great profundity of perception, and greater capacity for\nworking a matter out and clearness of expression than are found in\nPlotinus; scientific development also advanced with him, and on the\nwhole he possesses an excellent manner of expression. His philosophy,\nlike that of Plotinus, has the form of a Commentary on Plato; his book\n\u201cOn the Theology of Plato,\u201d is in this respect his most interesting\nwork. The main ideas of his philosophy may easily be recognized from\nthis work, which possesses many difficulties for this reason in\nparticular, that in it the pagan gods are considered, and philosophic\nsignifications derived from them. But he distinguishes himself entirely\nfrom Plotinus by the fact that with him the Neo-Platonic philosophy, as\na whole, has at least reached a more systematic order, and also a more\ndeveloped form; thus in his Platonic theology especially (dialectic as\nthe work undoubtedly is) a more distinct progression and distinction\nbetween the spheres in the Idea is to be found, than is noticeable in\nPlotinus. His philosophy is an intellectual system; we must see how\nwe can work it out. His way of putting it is not perfectly clear, but\nleaves much to be desired.\n\nProclus differs first of all from Plotinus in not making Being his\nprinciple or purely abstract moment, but by beginning from unity,\nand for the first time understanding Being or subsistence as the\nthird; thus to him everything has a much more concrete form. But the\nself-development of this unity is not made the necessity of the Notion\nwith Proclus any more than with Plotinus; we must once for all give up\nseeking here for the Notion of disunion. Proclus (Theol. Plat. II. p.\n95) says, \u201cThe one is in itself inexpressible and unknowable; but it is\ncomprehended from its issuing forth and retiring into itself.\u201d Proclus\nin the same place (pp. 107, 108) defines this self-differentiation, the\nfirst characteristic of unity, as a production (\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd), a going\nforth (\u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2), and also as a representation or demonstration. The\nrelation to difference of the unity which brings forth is, however, not\nan issuing forth from self, for an issuing forth would be a change,\nand unity would be posited as no more self-identical. Hence through\nits bringing forth unity suffers no loss or diminution, for it is\nthe thought that suffers no deterioration through the creation of a\ndeterminate thought, but remains the same, and also receives what is\nbrought forth into itself.[249] As far as this goes, the Notion is,\nproperly speaking, no clearer than with Plotinus.\n\nWhat distinguishes Plotinus is his more profound study of the Platonic\ndialectic; in this way he occupies himself in his Platonic theology\nwith the most acute and far-reaching dialectic of the One. It is\nnecessary for him to demonstrate the many as one and the one as many,\nto show forth the forms which the One adopts. But it is a dialectic\nwhich to a greater or less extent is externally worked out, and which\nis most wearisome. But while with Plato these pure notions of unity,\nmultiplicity, Being, &c., appear naturally, and so to speak devoid of\nother significance than that which they immediately possess (for we\ndesignate them as universal ideas which are present in our thought),\nwith Proclus they have another and higher meaning; and hence it comes\nto pass that, as we have seen (pp. 59, 60), he found in the apparently\nnegative result of the Platonic Parmenides the nature of absolute\nexistence particularly and expressly recognized. Proclus now shows,\naccording to the Platonic dialectic, how all determinations, and\nparticularly that of multiplicity, are resolved into themselves and\nreturn into unity. What to the conceiving consciousness is one of its\nmost important truths\u2014that many substances exist, or that the many\nthings, each of which is termed a one, and hence substance, exist in\ntruth in themselves\u2014is lost in this dialectic, and the result ensues\nthat only unity is true existence, all other determinations are merely\nvanishing magnitudes, merely moments, and thus their Being is only\nan immediate thought. But since we now ascribe no substantiality,\nno proper Being to a thought, all such determinations are only\nmoments of a thing in thought. The objection at this point made and\nconstantly maintained against the Neo-Platonists and Proclus is this,\nthat certainly for thought everything goes back within unity, but\nthat this is a logical unity alone, a unity of thought and not of\nactuality, and that consequently there can be no arguing from the\nformal to actuality. From this they say it by no means follows that all\nactual things are not actual substances, that they have not different\nprinciples independent of one another, and even that they are not\ndifferent substances, each of which is separated from the other and in\nand for itself. That is to say, this contradiction always begins the\nwhole matter over again when it says of actuality that it is something\nimplicit, for those who do this call actuality a thing, a substance, a\none\u2014which last are merely thoughts; in short they always again bring\nforward, as something implicitly existent, that whose disappearance or\nnon-implicitude has been already demonstrated.\n\nBut in this regard Proclus displays great sagacity in a remark he\nmakes on the manner in which this mode of production appears in the\nParmenides of Plato, who shows in a negative way in this Dialogue that\nif the existence of unity is affirmed, the existence of multiplicity,\n&c., must be denied. Respecting these negations (\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03ac\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2) Proclus\nnow says (Theol. Plat. II. pp. 108, 109) that they do not signify an\nabrogation of the content (\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd) of which they\nare predicated, but are the creation of determinatives in accordance\nwith their opposites (\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd). \u201cThus if\nPlato shows that the first is not many, this has the significance that\nthe many proceed from the first; if he shows that it is not a whole,\nit proves that the fact of being a whole proceeds from it. The mode\n(\u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2) of negations is thus to be taken as perfection which remains\nin unity, issues forth from everything, and is in an inexpressible\nand ineffable preponderance of simplicity. On the other hand, God\nmust likewise be derived from these negations; else there would be\nno Notion (\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2) of them, and also no negation. The Notion of the\ninexpressible revolves round itself, never resting, and it strives with\nitself;\u201d _i.e._ the one implies its determinations ideally, the whole\nis contained in the one. Multiplicity is not taken empirically and then\nmerely abrogated; the negative, as dividing, producing, and active, not\nmerely contains what is privative, but also affirmative determinations.\nIn this way the Platonic dialectic wins for Proclus a positive\nsignificance; through dialectic he would lead all differences back to\nunity. With this dialectic of the one and many Proclus makes much ado,\nmore especially in his famous elementary doctrines. The submersion of\neverything in unity remains, however, merely beyond this unity, instead\nof which this very negativity must really be grasped as signifying its\nproduction.\n\nThat which brings forth, according to Proclus, furthermore brings forth\nthrough a superfluity of power. There certainly also is a bringing\nforth through want; all need, all desire, for example, becomes cause\nthrough want; and its bringing forth is its satisfaction. The end here\nis incomplete, and the energy arises from the endeavour to complete\nitself, so that only in production the need becomes less, the desire\nceases to be such, or its abstract Being-for-self disappears. Unity,\non the other hand, goes forth out of itself through the superfluity\nof potentiality, and this superabundant potentiality is actuality\ngenerally: this reflection of Proclus is quite Aristotelian. Hence\nthe coming forth of the unity consists in the fact that it multiplies\nitself, pure number comes forth; but this multiplication does not\nnegate or diminish that first unity, but rather takes place in the\nmethod of unity (\u1f11\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03c2). The many partakes of the unity, but the\nunity does not partake of multiplicity.[250] The absolute unity\nwhich multiplies itself into many ones has consequently generated\nmultiplicity as it is in these ones. Proclus makes use of a many-sided\ndialectic to show that the many does not exist in itself, is not the\ncreator of the many, that everything goes back into unity, and thus\nunity is also the originator of the many. It is, however, not made\nclear how this is the negative relation of the one to itself; what we\nsee is then a manifold dialectic, which merely passes backwards and\nforwards over the relationship of the one to the many.\n\nTo Proclus an important characteristic of this progression is the fact\nthat it takes place through analogy, and what is dissimilar to the\ntruth is the further removed from the same. The many partakes of unity,\nbut it is in a measure likewise not one, but dissimilar to one. But\nsince the many is also similar to what produces it, it likewise has\nunity as its essence; hence the many are independent unities (\u1f11\u03bd\u03ac\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2).\nThey contain the principle of unity within themselves, for if as being\nmany they are likewise different, they are, so to speak, only many\nfor a third, being in and for themselves unities. These unities again\nbeget others which must, however, be less perfect, for the effect\nis not exactly like the cause, that which is brought forth is not\nquite similar to what brings it forth. These next unities are wholes,\n_i.e._, they are no longer real unities, unities in themselves, since\nin them the unity is only an accident. But because things themselves\nare in their synthetic nature merely wholes because their souls bind\nthem together, they are dissimilar to the first unity, and cannot be\nimmediately united to it. The abstractly conceived multiplicity is\nthus their mean; multiplicity is analogous to absolute unity, and is\nthat which unites unity with the whole universe. Pure multiplicity\nmakes the different elements like one another, and hence unites them to\nunity; but things only have similarity to unity. Thus things that are\nbegotten ever remove themselves more and more from unity, and partake\nof it less and less.[251]\n\nThe further determination of the Idea is known as the trinity (\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03ac\u03c2).\nOf this Proclus (Theol. Plat. III. p. 140) first of all gives the\nabstract definition that its three forms are three gods, and now we\nhave more especially to find out how he defined the trinity. This\ntrinity is certainly interesting in the Neo-Platonists, but it is\nspecially so in the case of Proclus, because he did not leave it in\nits abstract moments. For he again considers these three abstract\ndeterminations of the absolute, each on its own account, as a totality\nof triunity, whereby he obtains one real trinity. Thus in the whole\nthere are three spheres, separated from one another, which constitute\nthe totality, but in such a way that each has again to be considered\nas complete and concrete in itself; and this must be acknowledged as a\nperfectly correct point of view which has been reached. Because each\nof these differences in the Idea, as remaining in unity with itself,\nis really again the whole of these moments, there are different orders\nin production; and the whole is the process of the three totalities\nestablishing themselves in one another as identical. It will be shown\ndirectly which orders these are, and Proclus occupies himself much with\nthese, because he tries to demonstrate the different powers again in\nthem. Proclus is hence much more detailed, and he went much further\nthan did Plotinus; it may indeed be said that in this respect we find\nin him the most excellent and best that was formulated by any of the\nNeo-Platonists.\n\nAs regards the further details of his trinity there are, according to\nhis account, three abstract moments present in it, which are worked\nout in his Platonic theology\u2014the one, the infinite and the limitation;\nthe last two we have likewise seen in Plato (p. 68). The first, God,\nis just the absolute unity already frequently discussed, which by\nitself is unknowable and undisclosed, because it is a mere abstraction;\nit can only be known that it is an abstraction, since it is not yet\nactivity. This unity is the super-substantial (\u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd), and in\nthe second place its first production is the many ones (\u1f11\u03bd\u03ac\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2) of\nthings, pure numbers. In these we have the thinking principles of\nthings, through which they partake of absolute unity; but each partakes\nof it only through a single individual unity, through the one, while\nsouls do so through thought-out, universal unities. To this Proclus\nrefers the forms of ancient mythology. That is to say, as he calls\nthat first unity God, he calls these numerous unities of thought that\nflow from it, gods, but the following moments are likewise so called.\nHe says, (Institut. theol. c. 162): \u201cThe gods are named in accordance\nwith what depends upon the orders (\u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd); hence it is possible to\nknow from this their unknowable substances, which constitute their\ndeterminate nature. For everything divine is inexpressible on its own\naccount and unknowable as forming part of the inexpressible one; but\nfrom differentiation, from change, it comes to pass that we know its\ncharacteristics. Thus there are gods capable of being known, which\nradiate true Being; hence true Being is the knowable divine, and the\nincommunicable is made manifest for the \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2.\u201d But there always remains\na compulsion to represent mythology in the determinateness of the\nNotion. These gods or unities do not correspond to the order of things\nin such a way that there are just as many and such unities (\u1f11\u03bd\u03ac\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2) or\ngods as there are things; for these unities only unite things with the\nabsolute unity. The third is just the limit which holds these unities\n(\u1f11\u03bd\u03ac\u03b4\u03b5\u03c2) together, and constitutes their unity with the absolute\nunity; the limit asserts the unity of the many and the one.[252]\n\nThis is better expressed by what follows, in which Proclus takes up\nthe three fundamental principles\u2014the limit, the infinite and what\nis mingled\u2014of Plato\u2019s Philebus, because the opposition is thus more\nclearly determined; and therefore these appear to be the original gods.\nBut to such abstractions the name gods is not applicable, for it is\nas returning that we first of all see them as divine. Proclus says\n(Theol. Plat. III. pp. 133-134): \u201cFrom that first limit (\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2),\u201d the\nabsolute one, \u201cthings have (\u1f10\u03be\u03ad\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9) union, entirety and community,\u201d\nthe principle of individuality, \u201cand divine measure. All separation\nand fertility and what makes for multiplicity, on the contrary, rest\non the first infinitude (\u1f04\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd);\u201d the infinite is thus quantity, the\nindeterminate, just as Plato in the Philebus calls the infinite the\nevil, and pleasure the untrue, because no reason is present in it (pp.\n68, 69). \u201cHence when we speak of the process of anything divine, it is\nimplied that in the individuals it remains steadfastly one, and only\nprogresses towards infinitude,\u201d continuity as self-production, \u201cand\nhas at the same time the one and multiplicity present in it\u2014the former\nfrom the principle of limitation, and the latter from the principle\nof infinitude. In all opposition which is found in species that are\ndivine, what is more excellent belongs to limitation, and what is\nless excellent to the infinite. From these two principles everything\nderives its progress until it steps forth into Being. Thus the eternal,\nin so far as it is measure as intellectual, partakes of limitation,\nbut in so far as it is the cause of unceasing effort after Being, of\ninfinitude. Thus the understanding in so far as it has the standard\n(\u03c1\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1) within it, is a product of limitation; in so\nfar as it eternally produces everything, it has undiminished capacity\nfor infinitude.\u201d Multiplicity as Notion, not as the many, is itself\nunity; it is duality, or the determinateness which stands over against\nindeterminateness. Now according to Proclus (Theol. Plat. III. p. 137)\nthe third is a whole, the unity of determinate and indeterminate,\nor that which is mingled (\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd). \u201cThis is first of all everything\nexistent, a monad of many possibilities, a completed reality, a many\nin one (\u1f13\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac).\u201d The expression \u201cmingled\u201d is not very suitable, is\nindeed faulty, because mixture at first expresses only an external\nunion, while here the concrete, the unity of opposites, and even more\nthe subjective, is properly speaking indicated.\n\nNow if we consider further the nature of what is mingled we find the\nthree triads likewise, for each of those three abstract principles is\nitself a similar complete triad, but under one or these particular\nforms. Proclus says (Theol. Plat. III. p. 135); \u201cThe first Being (\u03c4\u1f78\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f44\u03bd) is the mingled, the unity of the triad with itself; it\nis the Being of the life as well as of the understanding. The first\nof what is mingled is the first of all existence, the life and the\nspirit are the two other orders; everything is consequently in triads.\nThese three triads determine themselves thus as absolute Being, life\nand spirit; and they are spiritual and to be grasped in thought.\u201d\nAccording to this only the intelligible world is true for Proclus. But\nthat Proclus did not make the understanding proceed immediately from\nthe unity, is the second point in which he differs from Plotinus; in\nthis Proclus is more logical, and he follows Plato more closely. His\nsequence is excellent, and he is right in placing the understanding,\nas the richer, last, since it is not until after the development of\nthe moments which are present in life that the understanding springs\nforth, and from it in turn the soul.[253] Proclus says (Theol. Plat.\nI. pp. 21, 22, 28) that certainly in the first unity all agree, but\nthat Plotinus makes the thinking nature appear just after the unity;\nyet the instructor of Proclus, who led him into all divine truth,\nlimited better this indefinite way of looking at things adopted by\nthe ancients, and differentiated this disorderly confusion of various\norders into a comprehensible plan, and succeeded in satisfactorily\nfollowing and maintaining the distinction of determinations. As a\nmatter of fact we find more distinction and clearness in Proclus than\nin the turbidity of Plotinus; he is quite correct in recognizing the\n\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 as the third, for it is, that which turns back.\n\nRegarding the relationship of the three orders Proclus now expresses\nhimself in the passage already quoted (Theol. Plat. III. pp. 135-136)\nthus: \u201cThese three are themselves really contained in the existent, for\nin it is substance, life, the \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 and[254] what is the culminating\npoint of all existence (\u1f00\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd),\u201d the individuality of\nthe self, the existent on its own account, the subjective, the point\nof negative unity. \u201cThe life that is grasped by thought is the very\ncentre-point of existence. But the understanding is the limit of the\nexistent, and it is thought as known (\u1f41 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2), for in what is\nthought is thinking, and in thinking what is thought. But in what\nis thought thinking is in the mode of thought (\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03c2), in thinking\nwhat is thought is in the mode of thinking (\u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c2). Substance is the\nenduring element in existence and that which is interwoven with the\nfirst principles and which does not proceed from the one.\u201d The second,\n\u201cthe life, is however that which proceeds from the principles and\nis born with infinite capacity;\u201d it is itself the whole totality in\nthe determination of infinitude, so that it is a concrete manifold.\n\u201cThe understanding is, again, the limit which leads back once more\nto the principles, brings about conformity with the principle, and\naccomplishes an intellectual circle. Now since it is a three-fold in\nitself, in part it is the substantial in itself, in part the living,\nin part the intellectual, but everything is substantially contained in\nit, and hence it is the foremost in existence, that which is united\nfrom the first principles.\u201d That is the first reality. Excellent! \u201cI\ncall it substance, since the first substance (\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1) is supreme\nover all existence and is, so to speak, the monad of everything.\nThe understanding itself is that which knows, but life is thinking,\nand Being is just what is thought. Now if the whole of what exists\nis mingled, but the first existence (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u03cc\u03bd) is substance, the\nsubstance that comes from the three principles (\u1f51\u03c6\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5) is\nmingled. What is mingled is thus substance as thought; it is from\nGod, from whom also come the infinite and limitation. There are thus\nfour moments, since what is mingled is the fourth.\u201d The first is the\nmonad, the absolute one, then come the many which themselves are units,\nthe infinite of Plato; the third is limitation. The one is clearly\nall-penetrating, remaining at home with itself, all-embracing; it\ndoes not thus appear as one of the three moments, for Proclus adds a\nfourth which then likewise appears as the third moment, since it is the\ntotality. \u201cThis united one is not only derived from those principles\nwhich are according to the one, but it also goes forth from them and is\nthree-fold.\u201d It is one trinity and three trinities. The limit and the\ninfinite are, according to Proclus (Theol. Plat. III. pp. 138, 139),\nbefore substance and again in it; and this unity of moments is what\ncomes first in all existence (\u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1). In the abstract trinity\neverything is thus contained in itself. Proclus says (Theol. Plat. III.\npp. 139, 140): \u201cThe truly existent has the trinity of Beauty, Truth,\nand Symmetry in itself\u201d (this is the way in which, like Plato, he names\nthese three triads), \u201cBeauty for order, Truth for purity, and Symmetry\nfor the unity of what is joined together. Symmetry gives the cause that\nthe existent is unity; Truth, that it is Being; Beauty, that it is\nthought.\u201d Proclus shows that in each of the three triads, limit, the\nunlimited, and that which is mingled, are contained; each order is\nthus the same, but set forth in one of the three forms which constitute\nthe first triad.\n\n_a._ Proclus says (Theol. Plat. III. p. 140): \u201cNow this is the first\ntriad of all that is thought\u2014the limit, the infinite, and that which\nis mingled. The limit is God going forth to the culminating point\nof thought from the uncommunicable and first God, measuring and\ndetermining everything, admitting all that is paternal and coherent,\nand the unblemished race of gods. But the infinite\u201d (quantity) \u201cis\nthe inexhaustible potentiality of this God, that which makes all\nproductions and orders to appear, and the whole infinitude, the\nprimeval essence as well as the substantial, and even the ultimate\nmatter. What is mingled is, however, the first and highest order\n(\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2) of the gods, and it is that which holds everything\nconcealed in itself, completed in accordance with the intelligible\nand all-embracing triad, comprehending in simple form the cause of\nall that exists, and establishing in the first objects of thought the\nculminating point which is derived from the wholes.\u201d The first order is\nthus in its culminating point the abstract substance in which the three\ndeterminations as such are shut up without development and maintained\nin strict isolation; this pure reality is in so far the undisclosed.\nIt is the greatest height reached by thought and likewise really the\nturning back, as this likewise appears in Plotinus; and this first\nbegets in its culminating point the second order which in the whole is\nlife, and culminates in its turn in the \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2.\n\n_b._ This second triad is placed in the determination of the infinite.\nOn making this step forward Proclus (Theol. Plat. III. pp. 141, 142)\nbreaks into a transport of bacchanalian ecstasy, and says, \u201cAfter this\nfirst triad which remains in unity, let us now in hymns praise the\nsecond which proceeds from this, and is brought to pass through the\nabolition of that which comes before it. As the first unity begets the\nculminating point of existence, the middle unity begets the middle\nexistence; for it is likewise begetting and self-retaining.\u201d In the\nsecond order three moments again appear as before: \u201cHere the principle\nor the first is the substance which was the completion of the first\ntriad; the second, which was there the infinite, is here potentiality\n(\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2). The unity of both these is Life (\u03b6\u03c9\u03ae),\u201d the centre, or\nwhat gives determinateness to the whole order; \u201cthe second existence\nis life as thought, for in the most external thought Ideas have their\nsubsistence (\u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd). The second order is a triad analogous to the\nfirst, for the second is likewise a God.\u201d The relationship of these\ntrinities is hence this: \u201cAs the first triad is everything, but is so\nintellectually (\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u1ff6\u03c2) and as proceeding immediately from the one\n(\u1f11\u03bd\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03c2), and remaining within limits (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u1ff6\u03c2), so the second\nis likewise everything, but in living fashion and in the principle\nof infinitude (\u03b6\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u1ff6\u03c2), and similarly the third has\nproceeded after the manner of what is mingled. Limitation determines\nthe first trinity, the unlimited the second, the concrete (\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd) the\nthird. Each determination of unity, the one placed beside the other,\nalso explains the intelligible order of gods; each contains all three\nmoments subordinate to itself, and each is this trinity set forth under\none of these moments.\u201d These three orders are the highest gods; later\non, we find in Proclus (in Tim\u00e6um, pp. 291, 299) four orders of gods\nappearing.\n\n_c._ Proclus comes (Theol. Plat. III. p. 143) to the third triad,\nwhich is thought itself as such, the \u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2: \u201cThe third monad places\nround itself the \u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2 as thought, and fills it with divine unity; it\nplaces the middle between itself and absolute existence, fills this\nlast by means of the middle and turns it to itself. This third triad\ndoes not resemble cause (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u0313 \u03b1\u1f30\u03c4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd), like the first existence,\nnor does it reveal the all like the second; but it is all as act\nand expression (\u1f10\u03ba\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c2); hence it is also the limit of all that is\nthought. The first triad remains concealed in limit itself, and has\nall subsistence of intellectuality fixed in it. The second is likewise\nenduring, and at the same time steps forward;\u201d the living appears, but\nis in so doing led back to unity. \u201cThe third after progression shifts\nand turns the intelligible limit back to the beginning, and bends the\norder back into itself; for the understanding is the turning back to\nwhat is thought\u201d (to unity), \u201cand the giving of conformity with it.\nAnd all this is one thought, one Idea: persistence, progression and\nreturn.\u201d Each is a totality on its own account, but all three are led\nback into one. In the \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 the first two triads are themselves only\nmoments; for spirit is just the grasping in itself of the totality of\nthe first two spheres. \u201cNow these three trinities announce in mystic\nform the entirely unknown (\u1f04\u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd) cause of the first and unimparted\n(\u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6) God,\u201d who is the principle of the first unity, but is\nmanifested in the three: \u201cthe one has inexpressible unity, the second\nthe superfluity of all powers, but the third the perfect birth of\nall existence.\u201d In this the mystic element is that these differences\nwhich are determined as totalities, as gods, become comprehended as\none. The expression \u201cmystic\u201d often appears with the Neo-Platonists.\nThus Proclus for example says (Theol. Plat. III. p. 131): \u201cLet us once\nmore obtain initiation into the mysteries (\u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd) of the one.\u201d\nMysticism is just this speculative consideration of Philosophy, this\nBeing in thought, this self-satisfaction and this sensuous perception.\nHowever, \u03bc\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd has not to the Alexandrians the meaning that it\nhas to us, for to them it indicates speculative philosophy generally.\nThe mysteries in Christianity have likewise been to the understanding\nan incomprehensible secret, but because they are speculative, reason\ncomprehends them, and they are not really secret, for they have been\nrevealed.\n\nIn conclusion, Proclus institutes a comparison between these triads.\n\u201cIn the first order the concrete is itself substance, in the second it\nis life, and in the third the thought that is known.\u201d Proclus calls\nsubstance likewise \u1f19\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03b1, the fixed, the principle. \u201cThe first trinity\nis the God of thought (\u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2); the second the thought of and\nthinking (\u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2)\u201d the active; \u201cthe third the\u201d pure,\n\u201cthinking God (\u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2),\u201d who is in himself this return to unity\nin which, as return, all three are contained; for \u201cGod is the whole\nin them.\u201d These three are thus clearly the absolute one, and this\nthen constitutes one absolute concrete God. \u201cGod knows the divided as\nundivided, what pertains to time as timeless, what is not necessary as\nnecessary, the changeable as unchangeable, and, speaking generally, all\nthings more excellently than in accordance with their order. Whose are\nthe thoughts, his also are the substances, because the thought of every\nman is identical with the existence of every man, and each is both the\nthought and the existence,\u201d and so on.[255]\n\nThese are the principal points in the theology of Proclus, and it\nonly remains to us to give some external facts. The individuality of\nconsciousness is partially in the form of an actuality, as magic and\ntheurgy; this often appears among the Neo-Platonists and with Proclus,\nand is called making a god. The element of theurgy is thus brought into\nrelation with the heathen divinities: \u201cThe first and chief names of\nthe gods, one must admit, are founded in the gods themselves. Divine\nthought makes names of its thoughts, and finally shows the images of\nthe gods; each name gives rise, so to speak, to an image of a god.\nNow as theurgy through certain symbols calls forth the unenvying\ngoodness of God to the light of the images of the artist, the science\nof thought makes the hidden reality of God appear through the uniting\nand separating of the tones.\u201d[256] Thus the statues and pictures of\nartists show the inward speculative thought, the being replete with the\ndivinity that brings itself into externality; thus the consecration\nof images is likewise represented. This connecting fact\u2014that the\nNeo-Platonists have even inspired the mythical element with the\ndivine\u2014is thereby expressed, so that in images, &c., the divine power\nis present. Nevertheless I have only wished to call this moment to mind\nbecause it plays a great part at this particular time.\n\n\n5. THE SUCCESSORS OF PROCLUS.\n\nIn Proclus we have the culminating point of the Neo-Platonic\nphilosophy; this method in philosophy is carried into later times,\ncontinuing even through the whole of the Middle Ages. Proclus had\nseveral successors who were scholarchs at Athens\u2014Marinus, his\nbiographer, and then Isidorus of Gaza, and finally Damascius. Of the\nlatter we still possess some very interesting writings; he was the last\nteacher of the Neo-Platonic philosophy in the Academy. For in 529 A.D.\nthe Emperor Justinian caused this school to be closed, and drove all\nheathen philosophers from his kingdom: amongst these was Simplicius, a\ncelebrated commentator on Aristotle, several of whose commentaries are\nnot yet printed. They sought and found protection and freedom in Persia\nunder Chosro\u00efs. After some time they ventured to return to the Roman\nEmpire, but they could no longer form any school at Athens; thus as far\nas its external existence is concerned, the heathen philosophy went\nutterly to ruin.[257] Eunapius treats of this last period, and Cousin\nhas dealt with it in a short treatise. Although the Neo-Platonic school\nceased to exist outwardly, ideas of the Neo-Platonists, and specially\nthe philosophy of Proclus, were long maintained and preserved in the\nChurch; and later on we shall on several occasions refer to it. In the\nearlier, purer, mystical scholastics we find the same ideas as are seen\nin Proclus, and until comparatively recent times, when in the Catholic\nChurch God is spoken of in a profound and mystical way, the ideas\nexpressed are Neo-Platonic.\n\nIn the examples given by us perhaps the best of the Neo-Platonic\nphilosophy is found; in it the world of thought has, so to speak,\nconsolidated itself, not as though the Neo-Platonists had possessed\nthis world of thought alongside of a sensuous world, for the sensuous\nworld has disappeared and the whole been raised into spirit, and this\nwhole has been called God and His life in it. Here we witness a great\nrevolution, and with this the first period, that of Greek philosophy,\ncloses. The Greek principle is freedom as beauty, reconciliation in\nimagination, natural free reconciliation that is immediately realized,\nand thus represents an Idea in sensuous guise. Through philosophy\nthought, however, desires to tear itself away from what is sensuous,\nfor philosophy is the constitution of thought into a totality beyond\nthe sensuous and the imaginary. Herein is this simple progression\ncontained, and the points of view which we have noticed are, as\ncursorily surveyed, the following.\n\nFirst of all we saw the abstract in natural form: then abstract thought\nin its immediacy, and thus the one, Being. These are pure thoughts,\nbut thought is not yet comprehended as thought; for us these thoughts\nare merely universal thoughts to which the consciousness of thought is\nstill lacking. Socrates is the second stage, in which thought appears\nas self, the absolute is the thought of itself; the content is not\nonly determined, _e.g._ Being, the atom, but is concrete thought,\ndetermined in itself and subjective. The self is the most simple form\nof the concrete, but it is still devoid of content; in as far as it\nis determined it is concrete, like the Platonic Idea. This content,\nhowever, is only implicitly concrete and is not yet known as such;\nPlato, beginning with what is given, takes the more determinate content\nout of sensuous perception. Aristotle attains to the highest idea; the\nthought about thought takes the highest place of all; but the content\nof the world is still outside of it. Now in as far as this manifold\nconcrete is led back to the self as to the ultimate simple unity of the\nconcrete, or, on the other hand, the abstract principle has content\ngiven to it, we saw the systems of dogmatism arising. That thought\nof thought is in Stoicism the principle of the whole world, and it\nhas made the attempt to comprehend the world as thought. Scepticism,\non the other hand, denies all content, for it is self-consciousness,\nthought, in its pure solitude with itself, and likewise reflection on\nthat beginning of pre-suppositions. In the third place the absolute is\nknown as concrete, and this is as far as Greek philosophy goes. That\nis to say, while in the system of Stoics the relation of difference\nto unity is present only as an \u201cought,\u201d as an inward demand, without\nthe identity coming to pass, in the Neo-Platonist school the absolute\nis finally set forth in its entirely concrete determination, the\nIdea consequently as a trinity, as a trinity of trinities, so that\nthese ever continue to emanate more and more. But each sphere is a\ntrinity in itself, so that each of the abstract moments of this triad\nis itself likewise grasped as a totality. Only that which manifests\nitself, and therein retains itself as the one, is held to be true. The\nAlexandrians thus represent the concrete totality in itself, and they\nhave recognized the nature of spirit; they have, however, neither gone\nforth from the depths of infinite subjectivity and its absolute chasm,\nnor have they grasped the absolute, or, if we will, abstract freedom of\nthe \u201cI\u201d as the infinite value of the subject.\n\nThe Neo-Platonic standpoint is thus not a philosophic freak, but a\nforward advance on the part of the human mind, the world and the\nworld-spirit. The revelation of God has not come to it as from an\nalien source. What we here consider so dry and abstract is concrete.\n\u201cSuch rubbish,\u201d it is said, \u201cas we consider when in our study we see\nphilosophers dispute and argue, and settle things this way and that at\nwill, are verbal abstractions only.\u201d No, no; they are the deeds of the\nworld-spirit, gentlemen, and therefore of fate. The philosophers are\nin so doing nearer to God than those nurtured upon spiritual crumbs;\nthey read or write the orders as they receive them in the original;\nthey are obliged to continue writing on. Philosophers are the initiated\nones\u2014those who have taken part in the advance which has been made into\nthe inmost sanctuary; others have their particular interests\u2014this\ndominion, these riches, this girl. Hundreds and thousands of years are\nrequired by the world-spirit to reach the point which we attain more\nquickly, because we have the advantage of having objects which are past\nand of dealing with abstraction.\n\n\n\n\n FOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] Diog. La\u00ebrt. III. 1-4 (Tennemann, Vol. I. p. 416; II. p. 190).\n\n[2] Diog. La\u00ebrt. III. 5, 29.\n\n[3] Plat. Epist. VII, p. 324-326 (p. 428-431); Diog. La\u00ebrt. III., 5, 6,\n8.\n\n[4] Diog. La\u00ebrt. III, 6, 7, 9, 18-21; Plat. Epist. VII., p. 326, 327\n(p. 431-433).\n\n[5] Plat. Epist. VII. p. 327-330 (p. 433-439); III. p. 316, 317 (p.\n410, 411).\n\n[6] This circumstance is assigned by Diogenes La\u00ebrtius, in the passage\nquoted (III. 21, 22), not to the time of Plato\u2019s second journey to\nDionysius the younger, _i.e._ of his third visit to Sicily, where it is\nplaced by the writers of Plato\u2019s Letters, but to the second journey of\nPlato to Sicily, which corresponds with his first visit to Dionysius\nthe younger.\u2014[Editor\u2019s note.]\n\n[7] Plat. Epist. VII. p. 337-342 (p. 453-461), p. 344-350 (p. 466-477);\nIII. p. 317, 318 (p. 411-415).\n\n[8] Plat. Epist. VII. p. 326 (p. 431).\n\n[9] From the lectures of 1825.\n\n[10] Diog. La\u00ebrt. III. 23 (Menag. ad h.l.); \u00c6lian Var. Histor. II. 42;\nPlutarch, ad principem ineruditum, init. p. 779, ed. Xyl.\n\n[11] Diog. La\u00ebrt. III. 2; Bruckeri Hist. Crit. Philos. Vol. I, p. 653.\n\n[12] Compare Vol. I. p. 47-53.\n\n[13] Brandis: De perditis Aristotelis libris de ideis et de bono, sive\nphilosophia, p. 1-13. (Compare Michelet: Examen critique de l\u2019ouvrage\nd\u2019Aristote intitul\u00e9 M\u00e9taphysique, 1835, p. 28-78.)\u2014[Editor\u2019s note.]\n\n[14] Scholia in Tim\u00e6um, p. 423, 424 (ed. Bekk: Commentar crit. in Plat.\nVol. II.).\n\n[15] Plat. De Republica, V. p. 471-474 (p. 257-261).\n\n[16] Plat. De Republica VII. pp. 514-516 (pp. 326-328).\n\n[17] Plato De Republica, V. p. 475, 476 (p. 265, 266).\n\n[18] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VI. 53; cf. Plato De Rep. VI. p. 508 (p. 319).\n\n[19] Plat. De Republ. V. p. 476-479 (p. 266-273).\n\n[20] Plat. Meno, p. 81 (p. 348, 349).\n\n[21] Plat. Ph\u00e6drus, p. 246 (p. 39, 40).\n\n[22] Plat. Ph\u00e6drus, p. 246 (p. 40).\n\n[23] Plat. Ph\u00e6drus, pp. 246-251 (pp. 40-50).\n\n[24] Plat. Ph\u00e6do, pp. 65-67 (pp. 18-23).\n\n[25] Ibid. p. 72 (p. 35), p. 75 (p. 41).\n\n[26] Ibid. pp. 78-80 (pp. 46-51).\n\n[27] Plat. Ph\u00e6do, pp. 85, 86 (pp. 62, 63), pp. 92-94 (pp. 74-80).\n\n[28] Ibid. pp. 110-114 (pp. 111-120).\n\n[29] Plat. Tim\u00e6us, p. 20 _et seq._ (p. 10 _seq._); Critias, p. 108\n_seq._ (p. 149 _seq._).\n\n[30] Cf. Vol. I. pp. 318, 319, and the remarks there made. [Editor\u2019s\nNote.]\n\n[31] Hegel\u2019s Werke, Vol. VI., Pt. I, p. 8.\n\n[32] Plat. Parmenides, pp. 135, 136 (pp. 21-23).\n\n[33] Ibid. p. 129 (pp. 9, 10).\n\n[34] Plat. Parmenides, p. 142 (pp. 35, 36); cf. Arist. Eth. Nicom. ed.\nMichelet, T. I. Pr\u00e6f. p. VII. sqq.\n\n[35] Plat. Parmenides, p. 166 (p. 84); cf. Zeller; Platonische Studien,\np. 165.\n\n[36] Plat. Sophist, pp. 246-249 (pp. 190-196).\n\n[37] Ibid. p. 258 (p. 219).\n\n[38] Plat. Sophist. p. 259 (pp. 220, 221).\n\n[39] Plat. Sophist. pp. 260, 261 (pp. 222-224).\n\n[40] Plat. Sophist. pp. 258, 259 (pp. 218-220).\n\n[41] Cf. also Plat. Phileb. p. 14 (p. 138).\n\n[42] Plat. Phileb. pp. 11-23 (pp. 131-156); pp. 27, 28 (pp. 166, 167).\n\n[43] Plat. Phileb. pp. 23-30 (pp. 156-172).\n\n[44] Plat. Phileb. p. 33 (p. 178).\n\n[45] Cf. Plat. Tim. p. 34 (p. 31); p. 48 (pp. 56, 57); p. 69 (p. 96).\n\n[46] Ibid. p. 29 (p. 25).\n\n[47] Plat. Tim\u00e6us, p. 30, 31 (pp. 25-27).\n\n[48] Plat. Tim\u00e6us, pp. 31, 32 (pp. 27, 28).\n\n[49] Plat. Tim\u00e6us p. 32 (p. 28).\n\n[50] Plat. Tim\u00e6us, pp. 32-34 (pp. 28-31).\n\n[51] Plat. Tim\u00e6us, p. 35 (p. 32).\n\n[52] Ibid.\n\n[53] Plat. Tim\u00e6us, pp. 35, 36 (pp. 32-34).\n\n[54] Plat. Tim\u00e6us, p. 37 (p. 35).\n\n[55] Plat. Tim\u00e6us, p. 48 (p. 57); pp. 37, 38 (pp. 36, 37).\n\n[56] Plat, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 47-53 (pp. 55-66).\n\n[57] Plat. Tim\u00e6us, pp. 53-56 (pp. 66-72).\n\n[58] Plat. Tim\u00e6us, pp. 67-70 (pp. 93-99).\n\n[59] Plat. Tim\u00e6us pp. 70-72 (pp. 99-102).\n\n[60] Plat. De Republica, II., pp. 368, 369 (p. 78.)\n\n[61] Following the outline here given by Plato, Hegel, in an earlier\nattempt to treat the philosophy of Justice (Werke, Vol. I. pp. 380,\n381), included in one these two classes, and later named them the\ngeneral class (Werke, Vol. VIII. p. 267); the \u201cother\u201d class (as Hegel\nexpresses it, in the first of the passages referred to above), which\nby Plato is not included in this, Hegel divided, however, in both his\nnarratives, into the second class (that of city handicraftsmen), and\nthe third (that of tillers of the soil).\u2014[Editor\u2019s note.]\n\n[62] Plat. de Republica, II. pp. 369-376 (pp. 79-93); III. p. 414 (pp.\n158, 159).\n\n[63] Plat. De Republica, V. p. 463, (p. 241,); p. 460 (p. 236).\n\n[64] Plat. De Republica, IX. pp. 427, 428 (pp. 179-181).\n\n[65] Ibid. IV. pp. 428, 429 (pp. 181, 182).\n\n[66] Ibid. pp. 429, 430 (pp. 182-185).\n\n[67] Plat. De Republica, IV. pp. 430-432 (pp. 185-188).\n\n[68] Plat. De Republica, IV. pp. 432, 433 (pp. 188-191).\n\n[69] Plat. De Republica, IV. pp. 437-443 (pp. 198-210).\n\n[70] Plat. De Republica, IV. p. 421 (pp. 167, 168).\n\n[71] Ibid. II. p.376-III. p. 412 (pp. 93-155); V. p. 472-VII. fin. (pp.\n258-375).\n\n[72] Plat. De Legibus, IV. pp. 722, 723 (pp. 367-369).\n\n[73] Plat. De Republica, III. pp. 412-415 (pp. 155-161.)\n\n[74] Plat. De Republica, V. pp. 457-461 (pp. 230-239).\n\n[75] Ibid. pp. 451-457 (pp. 219-230); p. 471 (p. 257).\n\n[76] Cf. Hegel: On the Scientific Modes of treating Natural Law (Werke,\nVol. I.), pp. 383-386.\n\n[77] Plat. Hippias Major, p. 292 (p. 433); p. 295 sqq. (p. 439 sqq.) p.\n302 (pp. 455, 456).\n\n[78] In quoting the chapters of Aristotle both hitherto and in future,\nBecker\u2019s edition is adopted; where a second number is placed in\nbrackets after the first, different editions are indicated, _e.g._, for\nthe Organon, Buhle\u2019s edition, for the Nicomachiean Ethics those of Zell\nand the editor, &c.\u2014[Editor\u2019s note.]\n\n[79] Diog. La\u00ebrt. V. 1, 9, 12, 15; Buhle: Aristotelis vita (ante Arist.\nOpera, T. I.) pp. 81, 82; Ammonius Saccas: Aristotelis vita (ed. Buhle\nin. Arist. Op. T. I.), pp. 43, 44.\n\n[80] Diog. La\u00ebrt. V. 3, 4; 7, 8; Buhle: Aristotel. vita, pp. 90-92.\n\n[81] Aristotelis Opera (ed. Pac. Aurel. Allobrog, 1607), T. I., in\nfine: Aristotelis Fragmenta. (Cf. Stahr. Aristotelia, Pt. I. pp. 85-91.)\n\n[82] Aulus Gellius: Noctis Attic\u00e6, XX. 5\n\n[83] Diog. La\u00ebrt. V. 5, 6; Suidas, s. v. Aristoteles; Buhle: Aristot.\nvit. p. 100; Ammon. Saccas: Arist. vit. pp. 47, 48; Menag. ad. Diog.\nLa\u00ebrt. V. 2; Stahr. Aristotelia, Pt. I. pp. 108, 109; Bruckeri Hist.\ncrit. phil. T. I. pp. 788, 789.\n\n[84] Strabo, XIII. p. 419 (ed. Casaub. 1587); Plutarch in Sulla, c.\n26; Brucker. Hist. crit. phil. T. I. pp. 798-800 (cf. Michelet: Examen\ncritique de l\u2019ouvrage d\u2019Aristote, intitul\u00e9 M\u00e9taphysique, pp. 5-16.)\n\n[85] Cf. Michelet: Examen critique, &c., pp. 17-23; 28-114; 199-241.\n\n[86] Gellius: Noct. Attic\u00e6, XX. 5; Stahr: Aristotelia, Pt. I. pp\n110-112.\n\n[87] Arist. Metaphys. VI. 1; Physic. II. 2; I. 9. (Cf. Michelet: Examen\ncritique, etc., pp. 23-27.)\n\n[88] Michelet: Examen critique, pp. 115-198.\n\n[89] Not only the form which is to be abrogated, but also matter is\nspoken of by Aristotle as \u03c4\u03b9, because in truth the form which is to be\nabrogated serves only as material for the form which is to be posited;\nso that he in the first passage names the three moments \u1f14\u03ba \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2,\n\u03c4\u03b9, \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, and in the last passage names them \u03c4\u03b9, \u03b5\u1f34\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9, \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\n\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2.\u2014[Editor\u2019s Note.]\n\n[90] As this explanation by Hegel of Aristotle\u2019s celebrated passage\nhas so many authorities to support it, the editor cannot here, as\nfrequently elsewhere in these lectures, remain faithful to the\ndirections of his colleagues, quietly to set right anything that is\nincorrect. It is, nevertheless, clear that Aristotle is speaking of\nthree substances: a sublunar world, which the heavens move; the heavens\nas the centre which is both mover and moved; and God, the unmoved\nMover. The passage must therefore, on the authority of Alexander of\nAphrodisias (Schol. in Arist. ed. Brandis, p. 804 _b_), of Cardinal\nBessarion (Aristoteles lat. ed. Bekk. p. 525 _b_) and others, be\nthus read: \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03af\u03bd\u03c5\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f43 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6 (sc. \u1f41 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03c2)\u00b7 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03af\u03bd\u03c5\u03bd, \u1f14\u03c5\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f43 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd6.\nThe translation, if this reading be adopted, would be as follows:\nBesides the heavens in perpetual motion \u201cthere is something which the\nheavens move. But since that which at the same time is moved and causes\nmovement cannot be other than a centre, there is also a mover that is\nunmoved.\u201d (Cf. Michelet: Examen critique, etc., p. 192; Jahrb\u00fccher\nf\u00fcr wisseuschaftliche Kritik, November, 1841, No. 84, pp. 668, 669).\n[Editor\u2019s note]\n\n[91] \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c7\u03af\u03b1 is a good word, and might also mean an element which is\nitself its own element, and determines itself only through itself.\n\n[92] The word \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, when it governs the dative (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03af \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1ff3) invariably expresses the Notion, while, when it governs the\naccusative, it denotes concrete existence. (Trendelenburg: Comment, in\nArist. De anima, III. 4, p. 473.) [Editor\u2019s Note.]\n\n[93] Aristotle here distinguishes four determinations: what is moved\nin capacity, or the movable [das Bewegbare] (\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd); what is moved\nin actuality (\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd); the moving in capacity (\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd), or\nwhat Hegel calls the motive [das Bewegliche]; the moving in actuality\n(\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd). It might have been better to translate \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd by motive\n[Beweglich] and \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd by mobile [Bewegerisch].\u2014[Editor\u2019s note.]\n\n[94] While above (p. 164) we must take the expression \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 as\nimmediate existence because it is opposed to the Notion, here it has\nthe meaning of Notion, because it stands in opposition to immediate\nexistence (\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f7a \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1f74 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7, \u03b4\u0313 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u1ff7). Cf.\nMichelet: Comment. in Arist. Eth. Nicom. V. I., pp. 209-214.\u2014[Editor\u2019s\nnote.]\n\n[95] Here \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 has again the signification of Notion, as above (p.\n169), because in the preceding words (\u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f21\n\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f25 \u1f15\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) immediate existence is expressed.\u2014[Editor\u2019s\nnote.]\n\n[96] The editor has considered himself justified in adopting this\nrendering, which was commonly used by the Scholastics, and revived by\nLeibnitz. (Cf. Michelet, Examen Critique, &c., pp. 165, 261, 265.)\n\n[97] Here and once again on this page \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 is the immediate\nexistence of the separate sides of sense-perception, therefore their\nmere potentiality; while, on the other hand, the active unity of the\nperceived and the percipient may be expressed as the true Notion of\nsense-perception.\u2014[Editor\u2019s Note.]\n\n[98] _Cf._ _supra_, p. 169, and note there given. The two\nsignifications of \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 here come into immediate contact with one\nanother, being likewise intermingled; for immediate existence (\u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u1ff7\n\u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd), which is opposed to the Notion (\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9)\nbecomes in what directly follows mere possibility, to which the true\nreality (\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9) is opposed\n(\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03af\u03b1, \u03b4\u0313 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c5, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff7\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd).\u2014[Editor\u2019s Note.]\n\n[99] Cf. Tenneman, Vol. III. p. 198.\n\n[100] While Aristotle\u2019s reply is short, and given in the manner\nusually adopted by him, that of following up by a second question\nthe first question proposed (\u1f22 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f06\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u02b9 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd;), this answer seems quite sufficient. For Aristotle\u2019s\nwords certainly bear the meaning that the original thoughts of the\nactive understanding (the reason), in contradistinction to those of\nthe passive understanding, have quite obliterated in themselves the\nelement of pictorial conception; while in the latter this has not been\nthoroughly carried out, though even in them pictorial conception is not\nthe essential moment.\u2014[Editor\u2019s Note.]\n\n[101] Against this we have only to remember that in Aristotle\u2019s way\nof speaking \u1f55\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd and \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd always refer to the work they occur\nin, while he marks quotations from his other writings by the words: \u1f10\u03bd\n\u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f10\u03bd \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5, or \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03b8\u03c9 (De\nAusc. phys. I. 9). And if it be said, as it may be with truth, that\nall the physical and psychological works, including the Metaphysics,\nform one great scientific system, so that \u1f55\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd and \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd may\nvery well be used in relating these works to one another, I have yet\nproved that the treatise \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6\u03c2 must be placed much later than\nthe Metaphysics (Michelet: Examen Critique, &c., pp. 209-222). Might\nnot then the expression \u1f55\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd refer to the following chapter? In\ntruth, the difficulty raised at the end of the seventh chapter seems\ncompletely solved by the words of the eighth chapter quoted above (pp.\n198, 199).\u2014[Editor\u2019s Note.]\n\n[102] See Michelet, De doli et culp\u00e6 in jure criminali notionibus;\nSystem der philosophischen Moral. Book II. Part I; Afzelius,\nAristotelis De imputatione actionum doctrina.\u2014[Editor\u2019s Note.]\n\n[103] Ethic, Nicom. I. 2-12 (4-12); X. 6-8; Eth. Eudem. II. 1.\n\n[104] Magn. Moral. I. 5, 35; Eth. Nic. I. 13; Eth. Eud. II. 1.\n\n[105] Ethic. Nicomach. II. 5-7 (6, 7); Maga. Moral. I. 5-9; Eth. Eud.\nII. 3.\n\n[106] Cf. Arist. Ethic. Nicom. I. 1 (3).\n\n[107] Arist. Eth. Nic. I. 1 (2).\n\n[108] Arist. Polit. III. 1; IV. 14-16.\n\n[109] Ibid. III. 7 (5)-IV. 13.\n\n[110] Arist. Polit. III. 13 (8-9).\n\n[111] Categor. c. 3 (c. 2, \u00a7 3-5.)\n\n[112] Categor. c. 4 (c. 2, \u00a7 6-8).\n\n[113] Categor. c. 10-14 (8-11); cf. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft,\np. 79 (6th Ed.).\n\n[114] Categor. c. 5 (3).\n\n[115] Arist. Categor. c. 4 (2); De Interpretat. c. 4-6.\n\n[116] Arist. Analytic. prior. I. 1; Topic I. 1.\n\n[117] Arist. Topic I. 13 (11) et 1.\n\n[118] Ibid. I. 16-18 (14-16); II. 7, 8, 10.\n\n[119] Ibid. III. 1; Buhle, Argum. p. 18.\n\n[120] Analyt. prior. II. 23 (25).\n\n[121] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VII. I, 12, 31, 32, 5, 2 (IV. 6, 7), 13, 6-11, 28,\n29. Tennemann, Vol. IV. p. 4; Vol. II. pp. 532, 534; Bruck. Hist. Crit.\nPhil. T. I. pp. 895, 897-899. (_Cf._ Fabric. Biblioth. Gr\u00e6c. T. II. p.\n413), 901.\n\n[122] Diog. La\u00ebrt, VII. 168, 169, 176.\n\n[123] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VII. 179-181, 184, 189-202; Tennemann, Vol. IV. p.\n443.\n\n[124] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VI. 81; Cicer. Acad. Qu\u00e6st. IV. 30; De Oratore II.\n37, 38; De Senectute, c. 7; Tennemann, Vol. IV. p. 444.\n\n[125] Cic. De Officiis III. 2; De Nat. Deor. I. 3; Suidas: s. v.\nPosidonius, T. III. p. 159.\n\n[126] Aul. Gell. Noct. Att. I. 2 (Gronovius ad h. 1.); II. 18; XV. 11;\nXIX. 1.\n\n[127] Stob. Eclog. phys. I. p. 32.\n\n[128] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VII. 136, 142, 156, 157; Plutarch, de plac. philos.\nIV. 21.\n\n[129] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VII. 135; Stob. Eclog. phys. I. p. 178.\n\n[130] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. IX. 101-103.\n\n[131] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VII. 137.\n\n[132] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 234; Diog. La\u00ebrt. VII. 138-140, 147,\n148.\n\n[133] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VII. 54, 46; Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 227-230.\n\n[134] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VIII. 403, sqq.; cf. Senec. Epist. 107.\n\n[135] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VII. 63; Sext. Emp. adv. Math. VIII. 70.\n\n[136] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VII. 79, 80, 83.\n\n[137] Cicer. De Officiis I. 3, III.; Diog. La\u00ebrt. VII. 98, 99.\n\n[138] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VII. 94.\n\n[139] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VII. 127, 128; Cicer. Paradox, 2.\n\n[140] Cicer. De finibus III. 13; Tusculan. Qu\u00e6st. II. 25.\n\n[141] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VII. 107, 108.\n\n[142] Plutarch. De Stoicorum repugnantia, p. 1031 (ed. Xyl.); Stob.\nEclog. ethic. P. II. p. 110 Diog. La\u00ebrt. VII. 125.\n\n[143] Diog. La\u00ebrt. VII. 121, 122, 116, 117, 129; Sext. Empir. adv.\nMath. XI. 190-194.\n\n[144] Tacit. Annal. XIV. 53; XIII. 42, 3.\n\n[145] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 1-8, 10-15; Cic. De Nat. Deor. I. 26; De Finibus,\nII. 25; Bruck. Hist. Crit. Phil. T. I. pp. 1230, 1231, 1233, 1236;\nSext. Emp. adv. Math. X. 18; I. 3.\n\n[146] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 11, 24, 9; IV. 43; Cic. De Finib. V. 1; Euseb.\nPr\u00e6p. evangel. XIV. 5.\n\n[147] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 26.\n\n[148] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 31.\n\n[149] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 31, 32.\n\n[150] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 33.\n\n[151] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 33, 34.\n\n[152] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 34.\n\n[153] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 48, 49.\n\n[154] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 50, 51.\n\n[155] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 54, 55.\n\n[156] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 55-58.\n\n[157] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 43, 44, 60, 61; Cic. De fato, c. 10; De finibus,\nl. 6; Plutarch. De anim\u00e6 procreat. e Tim\u00e6o, p. 1015.\n\n[158] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 78-80, 86, 87, 93-96, 101, 97.\n\n[159] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 113, 114.\n\n[160] Cicer. De natura Deorum, I. 20.\n\n[161] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 66, 63, 64.\n\n[162] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 141-143.\n\n[163] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 122, 123, 139.\n\n[164] Cicer. De nat. Deor. I. 17, 19, 20.\n\n[165] Cicer. De divinat. II. 17; De nat. Deor. I. 8.\n\n[166] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 124, 125, 127.\n\n[167] Diog. La\u00ebrt. X. 127-132 (119, 135).\n\n[168] Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 33, \u00a7 220.\n\n[169] Diog. La\u00ebrt. IV. 28-33, 36-38, 42, 44; Bruck. Hist. crit. phil.\nT. I. p. 746; Tennemann, Vol. IV. p. 443; Cic. De finib. II. 1.\n\n[170] Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 33, \u00a7 232; Diog. La\u00ebrt. IV. 32.\n\n[171] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 154.\n\n[172] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 154-156.\n\n[173] Diog. La\u00ebrt. IV. 62, 65; Tennemann, Vol. IV. pp. 334, 443, 444;\nCicer. Acad. Qu\u00e6st. II. 6; Valer. Maxim. VIII. 7, ext. 5.\n\n[174] Plutarch. Cato major, c. 22; Gell. Noct. Attic. VII. 14; Cic. De\norat. II. 37, 38; Aelian. Var. hist. III. 17; Bruck. Hist. crit. phil.\nT. I. p. 763.\n\n[175] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 159, 160.\n\n[176] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 160, 161.\n\n[177] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 161-164, 402.\n\n[178] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 165.\n\n[179] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 166-169.\n\n[180] Ibid. 166, 167.\n\n[181] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 173-175.\n\n[182] Ibid. 176, 177; 187-189; 179.\n\n[183] Ibid. 176, 177; 179; 187-189.\n\n[184] Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII. 181-184.\n\n[185] As it is used here and shortly afterwards, \u201cpositive philosophy\u201d\nhas quite an opposite meaning from what we have just seen it to bear in\ntwo previous passages (p. 329), because speculation certainly stands\nin opposition to dogmatism; and at the same time we must in Hegel\ndistinguish altogether this expression in its double significance from\nthe positivism so prevalent in modern times, which, merely escaping\nfrom the necessity for thinking knowledge, finally throws itself into\nthe arms of revelation and simple faith, whether it tries to call\nitself free thought or not.\u2014[Editor\u2019s note.]\n\n[186] Lectures of 1825-1826.\n\n[187] Diog. La\u00ebrt. IX. 71-73; cf. Vol. I. pp. 161, 246, 284.\n\n[188] Diog. La\u00ebrt. IX. 61-65, 69, 70; Bruck. Hist. crit. phil. T. I.\npp. 1320-1323.\n\n[189] Diog. La\u00ebrt. IX. 109.\n\n[190] Diog. La\u00ebrt. IX. 116; Bruck. Hist. crit. phil. T. I. p. 1328.\n\n[191] Bruck. Hist. crit. phil. T. II. pp. 631-636.\n\n[192] Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 39, \u00a7\u00a7 221-225.\n\n[193] Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 3, \u00a7 7; Diog. La\u00ebrt. IX. 69, 70.\n\n[194] Cf. _supra_, p. 212.\n\n[195] Diog. La\u00ebrt. IX. 68.\n\n[196] Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hypot. I. c. 8, \u00a7 17.\n\n[197] Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 14, \u00a7\u00a7 40-44.\n\n[198] Sext. Emp, Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 14, \u00a7\u00a7 79-82, 85-89.\n\n[199] Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 14, \u00a7\u00a7 91, 92.\n\n[200] Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 14, \u00a7\u00a7 100, 112.\n\n[201] Ibid, \u00a7\u00a7 118-120.\n\n[202] Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 14, \u00a7\u00a7 124-126.\n\n[203] Ibid. \u00a7\u00a7 129-131, 133.\n\n[204] Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 14, \u00a7\u00a7 141-144.\n\n[205] Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 14, \u00a7\u00a7 145, 148, 149.\n\n[206] Pyrrh. Hyp. I. c. 15, \u00a7\u00a7 164-169. (Diog. La\u00ebrt. IX. 88, 89.)\n\n[207] Bruck. Hist. crit. philos. T. II. pp. 797, 799, et not\u00e6; Phil.\nDe legatione ad Cajum, p. 992 (ed. Francf. 1691): Joseph. Antiq. Jud.\nXVIII. c. 10, p. 649; Euseb. Hist, eccles. II. c. 18; _cf._ Fabric\nBiblioth. Gr. Vol. III. p. 115 (Hamburg, 1708).\n\n[208] Phil. De confusione linguarum, p. 358; De special. legib. II. pp.\n806, 807; De mundi opificio, p. 15; De migratione Abrahami, pp. 393,\n417, 418; Quis. rer. divin. h\u00e6res. p. 518; Quod Deus sit immutabilis,\npp. 301, 302; De monarchia, I. p. 816; De nominum mutatione, p. 1045;\nDe Cherub. p. 124; De somniis, p. 576.\n\n[209] Phil. De somniis, pp. 574, 575; Liber legis allegoriarum, I. p.\n48; Quod Deus sit immut. p. 298.\n\n[210] Phil. De mundi opificio, pp. 4-6; De agricultura, p. 195; De\nsomniis, pp. 597, 599.\n\n[211] Phil. Leg. allegor. I. p. 46, et II. p. 93; Quod deterius potiori\ninsidiari soleat, p. 165; De temulentia, p. 244; De somniis, pp. 578,\n586, 588; De confus. ling. pp. 341, 345; Euseb. Pr\u00e6p. ev. VII. c. 13;\nPhil. De vita Mosis, III. p. 672; De sacrif. Abel., p. 140.\n\n[212] Buhle: Lehrbuch d. Gesch. d. Phil. Pt. IV. p. 124; Phil. De mundi\nopificio, p. 5.\n\n[213] Phil. De mund. opific. p. 4; De victimas offerentibus, p. 857\n(Buhle, ibid. p. 125).\n\n[214] De mundi opificio, pp. 5, 6 (Brucker Hist. crit. phil. Tom. II.\npp. 802, 803).\n\n[215] Brucker Hist. crit. phil. T. II. pp. 834-840, 924-927.\n\n[216] Irira: Porta c\\nlorum, Dissertatio I. c. 4; c. 6, \u00a7 13 et c. 7, \u00a7\n2; IV. c. 4, sqq.; II. c. 1; V. c. 7, 8; Tiedemann: Geist der speculat.\nPhilosophie, Pt. III. pp. 149, 150, 155-157; Buhle: Lehrbuch der Gesch.\nder Phil. Pt. IV. pp. 156, 162, 160, 157.\n\n[217] Neander: Genetische Entwickelung der vornehmsten gnostischen\nSysteme, pp. 10, 33, 34; Philo De nominum mutat. p. 1046.\n\n[218] Neander: Genet. Entwickelung, &c., pp. 168, 170, 171.\n\n[219] Neander: Genet. Entwickelung, &c., pp. 94-97.\n\n[220] Ibid. pp. 160, 10-13; Phil. Quod Deus sit immut. p. 304.\n\n[221] Cf. Buhle, Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. Phil. Pt. IV. pp. 195-200.\n\n[222] Brucker, Hist. crit. phil. T. II. pp. 205, 213, 214.\n\n[223] Porphyrius, Vita Plotini (pr\u00e6missa Ennead. Plot. Basil. 1580),\npp. 2, 3, 5-8; Brucker, Hist. crit. phil. T. II. pp. 218-221;\nTiedemann, Geist d. spec. Phil. Vol. III. p. 272; Buhle, Lehrb. d.\nGesch. d. Phil. Pt. IV. p. 306.\n\n[224] Cf. Plotin. Ennead. I. l. 6, c. 7; IV. l. 4, c. 39-43; Procli\nTheol. Plat. I. pp. 69, 70 (ed. Aem. Portus, Hamburg, 1618).\n\n[225] Plot. Ennead. IV. l. 8, c. 1; cf. _ibidem_, c. 4-7.\n\n[226] Plot. Ennead. III. l. 6, c. 6; VI. l. 9, c. 1, 2; III. l. 8, c. 8.\n\n[227] This Aristotelian word, and also \u1f10\u03be\u03ad\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 (Procl. Theol. Plat.\nIII. p. 133), often occur in the Neo-Platonists.\n\n[228] Plot. Ennead. I. l. 8: \u03a0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03af\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03cc\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03ac, c. 2 (VI.\nl. 9, c. 6); III. l. 8, c. 9, 10.\n\n[229] Plot. Ennead. V. l. 3, c. 13, 14; l. 2, c. 1; VI. l. 2, c. 9, 10;\nl. 8, c. 8, 9; l. 9, c. 3, VI. l. 9, c. 6; l. 8, c. 7 (13, 21).\n\n[230] Steinhart: Qu\u00e6stiones de dialectica Plotini ratione, p. 21;\nPlotini Ennead. VI. l. 9, c. 1-9, _passim_.\n\n[231] Plot. Ennead. III. l. 8, c. 10 fin.; IV. l. 3, c. 17; V. l. 1, c.\n4, 5; c. 7; l. 4, c. 2; l. 5, c. 1.\n\n[232] Plot. Ennead. V. l. 1, c. 6 (IV. l. 3, c. 17).\n\n[233] Plot. Ennead. V. l. 2, c. 1; l. 1, c. 7; VI. l. 9, c. 2.\n\n[234] Plot. Ennead. V. l. 3, c. 5; VI. l. 2, c. 8; II. l. 4, c. 4; VI.\nl. 4, c. 2; V. l. 9, c. 8, 9.\n\n[235] Plot. Ennead. VI. l. 2, c. 2; V. l. 9, c. 8.\n\n[236] Plot. Ennead. IV. l. 3, c. 17.\n\n[237] Plot. Ennead. V. l. 1, c. 7; l. 2, c. 1, 2; l. 6, c. 4; VI. l. 2,\nc. 22.\n\n[238] Plot. Ennead. V. l. 3, c. 5; \u1f15\u03bd \u1f05\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, \u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd.\n\n[239] Plot. Ennead. II. l. 9, c. 1-3, 6.\n\n[240] If we were to translate this by \u201cin the intelligible world,\u201d the\nexpression would be misleading; for \u201cthe world\u201d is nowhere. Neither may\nwe say, \u201cintelligible things,\u201d as if there were things of some other\nkind; such distinctions and definitions are nowhere found.\n\n[241] Plot. Ennead. II. l. 4, c. 4, 12-15; l. 5, c. 2-5.\n\n[242] Plot. Ennead. I. l. 8, c. 2, 3.\n\n[243] Instead of \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 in the sentence \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c0\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd we should\ncertainly read \u03b4\u03ae, or something of the kind.\n\n[244] Buhle, Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. Phil. Part IV. pp. 418, 419;\nTiedemann, Geist. d. spec. Phil. Vol. III. pp. 421-423; cf. Plotini\nEnnead. IV. l. 3 et 8 passim.\n\n[245] Buhle, Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. Phil. Part IV. pp. 419, 420.\n\n[246] Brucker: Hist. crit. phil. T. II. pp. 248, 268.\n\n[247] Cf. Procli. Theol. Plat. III. p. 140.\n\n[248] Brucker: Hist. cr. phil. T. II. p. 320; Tennemann, Vol. VI. pp.\n284-289; Marinus: Vita Procli, passim (pr\u00e6m. Theol. Plat.).\n\n[249] Procli Institutionis theologic\u00e6, c. 26.\n\n[250] Procli Institut. theol. c. 27; Theol. Plat. III. p. 119; II. pp.\n101, 102; III. p. 121; Institut. theol. c. 5.\n\n[251] Procli Institut. theol. c. 1-2; c. 28; Theol. Plat. III. pp. 118,\n122-125; II. pp. 108, 109.\n\n[252] Procli Theol. Plat. III. pp. 123-124.\n\n[253] Procli Theol. Plat. III. pp. 141, 127; Instit. theol. c. 192.\n\n[254] It is doubtful whether the \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 should not be omitted, so that \u1f21\n\u1f01\u03ba\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd would stand in apposition to \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2.\n\n[255] Procli Theol. Plat. III. p. 144 (VI. p. 403); Instit. theol. c.\n124, 170.\n\n[256] Procli Theol. Plat. I. pp. 69, 70.\n\n[257] Brucker: Hist. cr. phil. T. II. pp. 350, 347; Joan. Malala: Hist.\nchron. P. II. p. 187; Nic. Alemannus ad Procopii anecdot. c. 26. p. 377.\n\n\n\n\n TRANSCRIBER\u2019S NOTE:\n\n\u2014Obvious print and punctuation errors were corrected.","title":"Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":156468}