{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_51685/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_51685","id":"gutenberg_51685","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/51685","summary":null,"tags":["Category: British Literature","Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Plays/Films/Dramas","Humanities"],"text":"TRANSCRIBER\u2019S NOTES:\n\nThe pagination of this book is unusual. The book consists of four\nsections, each of which is page numbered within itself. Additionally,\nthe pages of the entire document are numbered consecutively. This\nresults in sections two, three, and four in the original document having\ntwo page numbers on each page, one for the page number of the section\nand one for the page number of the whole document. To aid in clarity the\npages in this eBook have been numbered consecutively for the entire\ndocument. However, the page numbers shown in the Table of Contents for\neach section and the Indexes, where they appear, have been left as they\nappear in the original document. The links, of course, have been made to\nthe correct pages.\n\nOther transcriber's notes will be found at the end of this eBook,\nfollowing the Footnotes.\n\n\n\n\n  HUMANISTIC STUDIES\n  OF\n  THE UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS\n\n  VOLUME I\n\n\n  LAWRENCE, KANSAS\n  PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY\n  1915\n\n\n\n\nCOMMITTEE ON HUMANISTIC STUDIES\n\n\n  FRANK HEYWOOD HODDER\n  FRANK WILSON BLACKMAR\n  EDWIN MORTIMER HOPKINS\n  ARTHUR TAPPAN WALKER\n  SELDEN LINCOLN WHITCOMB, Editor\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n    I. STUDIES IN THE WORK OF COLLEY CIBBER.\n         _By De Witt C. Croissant, Ph. D._\n\n   II. STUDIES IN BERGSON\u2019S PHILOSOPHY.\n         _By Arthur Mitchell, Ph. D._\n\n  III. BROWNING AND ITALIAN ART AND ARTISTS.\n         _By Pearl Hogrefe, A. M._\n\n   IV. THE SEMANTICS OF -MENTUM, -BULUM, AND -CULUM.\n         _By Edmund D. Cressman, Ph. D._\n\n\n\n\n  BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS\n  HUMANISTIC STUDIES\n\n  _Vol. I_          _October 1, 1912_          _No. 1_\n\n\n  STUDIES IN THE WORK OF\n  COLLEY CIBBER\n\n  BY\n\n  DE WITT C. CROISSANT, PH. D.\n  _Assistant Professor of English Language in the University of Kansas_\n\n\n  LAWRENCE, OCTOBER, 1912\n  PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n  I\n\n  Notes on Cibber\u2019s Plays\n\n\n  II\n\n  Cibber and the Development of Sentimental Comedy\n\n\n  Bibliography\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThe following studies are extracts from a longer paper on the life\nand work of Cibber. No extended investigation concerning the life or\nthe literary activity of Cibber has recently appeared, and certain\nmisconceptions concerning his personal character, as well as his\nimportance in the development of English literature and the literary\nmerit of his plays, have been becoming more and more firmly fixed in\nthe minds of students. Cibber was neither so much of a fool nor so\ngreat a knave as is generally supposed. The estimate and the judgment\nof two of his contemporaries, Pope and Dennis, have been far too widely\naccepted. The only one of the above topics that this paper deals with,\notherwise than incidentally, is his place in the development of a\nliterary mode.\n\nWhile Cibber was the most prominent and influential of the innovators\namong the writers of comedy of his time, he was not the only one who\nindicated the change toward sentimental comedy in his work. This\nsubject, too, needs fuller investigation. I hope, at some future time,\nto continue my studies in this field.\n\nThis work was suggested as a subject for a doctor\u2019s thesis, by\nProfessor John Matthews Manly, while I was a graduate student at the\nUniversity of Chicago a number of years ago, and was continued later\nunder the direction of Professor Thomas Marc Parrott at Princeton.\nI wish to thank both of these scholars, as well as Professor Myra\nReynolds, who first stimulated my interest in Restoration comedy.\nThe libraries of Harvard, Yale, and Columbia have been very generous\nin supplying books which would otherwise have been inaccessible; but\nespecial gratitude is due to the Library of Congress, and to Mr. Joseph\nPlass, who called my attention to material in the Library of Congress,\nwhich would have escaped my notice but for his interest. I wish to\nexpress my gratitude to Professor R. D. O\u2019Leary, of the University of\nKansas, who has read these pages in manuscript and in proof, and has\noffered many valuable suggestions.\n\n                              D. C. C.\n\n  University of Kansas,\n      October, 1912.\n\n\n\n\nSTUDIES IN THE WORK OF COLLEY CIBBER\n\nDe Witt C. Croissant\n\n\n\n\nI\n\nNOTES ON CIBBER\u2019S PLAYS\n\n\nColley Cibber\u2019s activity was not confined to writing plays. Besides\nbeing a leader in the development of comedy and a skilful adapter in\ntragedy, he was the greatest actor of his day in comic r\u00f4les; was the\ndominant personality in the triumvirate of managers of the playhouse,\nso that the healthy theatrical conditions of his time were largely due\nto him; was a writer of poetry, some of which is fairly good; was the\nauthor of some of the most amusing and clever controversial pamphlets\nof the time; and was the author of a most interesting autobiography.\nToday he is thought of by many merely as the hero of Pope\u2019s _Dunciad_.\nIn some respects he deserved Pope\u2019s satire, but the things he did well\nentitle him to more consideration than he has received.\n\nIt is the purpose of these _Notes_ to discuss merely his plays; and to\ntreat these principally from the point of view of what may be called\nexternal relations, with some discussion of dramatic technique. Under\nthe heading of external relations I have considered the dates of the\nvarious plays, the circumstances of their presentation, their sources,\nand their relation to the various types of the drama of the time. I\nhave discussed the plays in chronological order within the various\nclasses.\n\n\n1. FARCES.\n\nOf the farces ascribed to Cibber, only two, _The Rival Queans_ and\n_Bulls and Bears_, are unquestionably his, and these two are not\naccessible. _The Rival Queans_, acted at the Haymarket, June 29,\n1710, printed in Dublin in 1729, is without doubt by Cibber. But in\nthe collected edition of his plays, published in 1777, the editors\nsubstituted a farce of the same name, which, however, deals with a\ndifferent subject and is by another writer. Cibber\u2019s farce was a\nburlesque of Lee\u2019s _Rival Queens_; the piece that was substituted deals\nwith the operatic situation in England.\n\nAn adaptation of Doggett\u2019s _Country Wake_ (1696), called _Hob, or The\nCountry Wake_ (1715), has been ascribed to Cibber, but Genest[1] doubts\nhis authorship because it was brought out while Doggett was still on\nthe stage.\n\n_Bulls and Bears_, Cibber\u2019s second undisputed farce, was acted at Drury\nLane, December 2, 1715, but was apparently not printed.\n\n_Chuck_ (1736) seems to have been ascribed to him by either the author\nor the publisher without grounds, for in a list of plays \u201cwrote by\nanonymous authors in the 17th century,\u201d appended to the fourth edition\nof the _Apology_ (1756), there is a note on this play to the effect\nthat \u201cthe author or printer has set the name of Mr. Cibber to this\npiece.\u201d This is not proof positive that Cibber did not write the play,\nfor _Cinna\u2019s Conspiracy_, which is unquestionably by him, appears in\nthe same list. In _The New Theatrical Dictionary_ (1742), it is stated\nthat \u201cthis piece [_Chuck_] is extremely puerile, yet the author has\nthought proper to put Mr. Cibber\u2019s name to it.\u201d This again is not\nnecessarily convincing argument against Cibber\u2019s authorship, for he was\ncapable of poor work, as his poems and some of his plays show.\n\nOn the whole, it seems probable that _Hob_ and _Chuck_ are not by\nCibber. In any case, they are entirely without value, and it is\ntherefore a matter of no importance to literary history whether their\nauthorship is ever determined or not.\n\nCoffey\u2019s _The Devil to Pay_ (1736) is stated in the catalogue of the\nBritish Museum to have been \u201crevised by Colley Cibber.\u201d But the work\nof revision was done by Theophilus Cibber, his son, and Cibber himself\ncontributed only one song.[2]\n\n\n2. OPERAS.\n\nIn common with many of his contemporaries, Cibber attempted operatic\npieces. His undisputed operas are _Venus and Adonis_ (1715), _Myrtillo_\n(1716), _Love in a Riddle_ (1729), and _Damon and Phillida_ (1729),\nthe last being merely the sub-plot of _Love in a Riddle_ acted\nseparately.[3] Two other operatic pieces, _The Temple of Dullness_\n(1745) and _Capochio and Dorinna_, have been ascribed to him.\n\n_Love in a Riddle_ (1729) seems to have been the cause of some\nunpleasantness. In the _Life of Quin_ (1766) the following account of\nit is given:[4]\n\n  \u201cThis uncommon reception of _The Beggar\u2019s Opera_ induced Colley\n  Cibber to attempt something the same kind the next year, under the\n  title of _Love in a Riddle_, but how different was its reception from\n  Gay\u2019s production; it was damned to the lowest regions of infamy the\n  very first night, which so mortified Cibber, that it threw him into\n  a fever; and from this moment he resolved as soon as he conveniently\n  could to leave the stage, and no longer submit himself and his\n  talents to the capricious taste of the town.\n\n  \u201cIt was generally thought that his jealousy of Gay, and the high\n  opinion he entertained of his own piece had operated so strongly as\n  to make him set every engine in motion to get the sequel of _The\n  Beggar\u2019s Opera_, called _Polly_, suppressed in order to engross the\n  town entirely to _Love in a Riddle_. Whether Cibber did or did not\n  bestir himself in this affair, it is certain that Gay and Rich had\n  the mortification to see all their hopes of a succeeding harvest\n  blasted by the Lord Chamberlain\u2019s absolute prohibition of it, after\n  it had been rehearsed and was just ready to bring out.\u201d\n\nIn this same volume[5] it is stated that the failure of the piece was\none of the potent causes of the dissolution of the Drury Lane company,\nthough this seems an exaggeration, as does also the effect on Cibber\nthat is ascribed to the failure.\n\nCibber denies[6] that he had anything to do with the suppression of\nthe second part of _The Beggar\u2019s Opera_, and gives as his reason\nfor writing that he thought something written in the same form, but\nrecommending virtue and innocence instead of vice and wickedness,\n\u201cmight not have a less pretence to favor.\u201d\n\n_The Temple of Dullness_ (1745), which _The Biographia Dramatica_[7]\nstates had been ascribed to Cibber, is in two acts of two scenes each,\nthe second scene of each act being the comic \u201cinterlude\u201d of Theobald\u2019s\n_Happy Captive_ (1741). These two scenes have as their principal\ncharacters, Signor Capochio and Signora Dorinna.[8] The other two\nscenes, which give the principal title to the piece, are based, as is\nstated in the preface, on the fact that Pope in _The Dunciad_ makes the\nGoddess of Dullness preside over Italian operas. It is inconceivable\nthat either Cibber or Theobald would have based anything of the sort on\na hint from _The Dunciad_ and complacently given the credit to Pope,\nafter the way they had both been handled in _The Dunciad_. There is\nnothing on the title page to indicate that Cibber had anything to do\nwith the piece. The ascription of the authorship of _The Temple of\nDullness_ to Cibber seems to be without foundation, and the probability\nis that this piece was composed by a third person soon after Theobald\u2019s\ndeath, which occurred about four months before it was acted.[9]\n\nConcerning _Capochio and Dorinna_, _The Biographia Dramatica_ has the\nfollowing note: \u201cA piece with this title, but without a date, is, in\nMr. Barker\u2019s catalogue, ascribed to Colley Cibber. It was probably an\nabridgment from _The Temple of Dullness_.\u201d This statement concerning\nthe source of _Capochio and Dorinna_ would seem plausible from the\nsupplementary title of _The Temple of Dullness_,--_With the Humours\nof Signor Capochio and Signora Dorinna_. _Capochio and Dorinna_ is no\ndoubt the two scenes from Theobald\u2019s _The Happy Captive_ which had been\nused in _The Temple of Dullness_, as is stated above.\n\nCibber\u2019s operatic writings belong chiefly to the English type of\npastoral drama, rather than to the type of Italian opera. In fact, they\nare not operas either in the Italian or in the modern sense, but are\nrather plays interspersed with songs appropriate to the characters who\nsing them. They show the common characteristics of the pastoral drama\nof the time.[10] They possess the court element, have the same plot\ndevices, and their characters belong to the same general types. It is\nnoticeable that Cibber here, as well as in his comedies, arrays himself\nwith the moralists, as is seen in his introduction of a moral purpose\nin _Love in a Riddle_. These pieces are in verse of varying meters. In\n_Venus and Adonis_ and _Myrtillo_ there is apparent imitation of the\nversification of Dryden\u2019s _Alexander\u2019s Feast_; in _Love in a Riddle_\nand _Damon and Phillida_ the dialogue is in blank verse, but in neither\ncase is the verse inspired.\n\nHis operas are neither intrinsically nor historically important; they\nare merely representative of a vogue which was popular but which left\nno permanent impress on the English drama.\n\n\n3. TRAGEDIES.\n\nCibber\u2019s seven tragedies appeared in the following order: _Xerxes_,\n1699; his adaptation of Shakspere\u2019s _Richard III_, 1700; _Perolla and\nIzadora_, 1705; the three translations of Corneille, _Ximena_, acted\n1712, but not published until 1719, _Cinna\u2019s Conspiracy_, 1713, and\n_Caesar in Egypt_, 1725; and finally _Papal Tyranny_, an adaptation of\nShakspere\u2019s _King John_, 1745. The best stage play is _Richard III_,\nbut those that make the most agreeable reading are the alterations of\nCorneille.\n\n_Xerxes_ (1699), which was a failure, belongs to the type of the\ntragedies of the last decade of the century, in which the material of\nthe heroic play is handled in blank verse, in which there is no comedy,\nand in which there is in general a following of French models.[11] In\nits presentation of a story of distressed womanhood, it allies itself\nwith the sentimental tragedy of the school of Southerne and Otway. In\nits use of the supernatural, in its puerile use of claptrap, and in the\nbombast and extravagance of emotion, it follows the general usage of\nthe tragedies of the time.\n\nWhen it was written Cibber was one of the company at Drury Lane,\nbut the play was refused there, and was accepted at Lincoln\u2019s Inn\nFields only when Cibber guaranteed the expenses of the production.\nNotwithstanding the fact that two such great actors as Betterton and\nMrs. Barry were in the cast, the play was a failure.[12]\n\nThe common supposition that it was acted only once, is based on\nAddison\u2019s inventory of Rich\u2019s theatrical paraphernalia, in which are\nmentioned \u201cthe imperial robes of Xerxes, never worn but once.\u201d[13] The\nplay had been acted ten years previously, and Addison is speaking of\nan entirely different playhouse and manager so that this testimony, if\nit does apply to this play, is probably not to be given much weight.\nWhile the play may have been withdrawn from the stage after only one\nperformance, Addison\u2019s evidence does not establish the matter one way\nor the other.\n\nCibber\u2019s next venture in tragedy was more successful, for while his\nadaptation of Shakspere\u2019s _Richard III_ has not received critical\ncommendation, it was for over a century practically the only version\npresented on the stage and is still used by many actors.\n\nWhen Cibber\u2019s _Richard III_ was originally acted at Drury Lane in 1700,\nCharles Killigrew, Master of the Revels, forbade the first act, because\nthe distress of Henry, introduced from Shakspere\u2019s _Henry VI_, might\nbring the exiled King James to the mind of the people; so that only\nfour acts could be given. The play was a comparative failure at first,\nowing no doubt to the omission of so important and necessary a part of\nthe revision, so that Cibber\u2019s profits from the third night, as author,\ncame to less than five pounds.[14] Later, when this act was restored,\nthe piece became a success. As has been pointed out by Dohse[15] and\nWood[16], Cibber may in making this adaptation have used the chronicles\nof Hall and others, and probably was influenced by _The Mirror for\nMagistrates_ and Caryl\u2019s _English Princess_ (1667).\n\nIn his alteration Cibber has cut down the play to a little more than\nhalf its original length, and of this remainder only a little over a\nthird is found in Shakspere\u2019s _Richard III_, while the rest is from\na number of Shakspere\u2019s plays or is made up of original additions by\nCibber.[17] The alterations vary from the change of single words,[18]\nto the addition of scenes entirely by Cibber. The omissions, such as\nAnne\u2019s spitting at Gloster, I, ii, 146, are generally happy; the\nlines he has substituted are generally easier to understand, if less\naesthetically pleasing, than those of the original; and the additions\nthroughout are such as add clearness and theatric effectiveness.\n\nRichard is made the central figure, so that the play revolves more\nclosely about him than in Shakspere. A love story, more slightly\ndeveloped than usual in the adaptations of this period, is introduced\nat the end of the play in accordance with contemporary usage. The women\nare made less prominent, the lyric chorus effect of the various scenes\nin which these women foretell and bewail is omitted, and the whole\naction is made more simple and direct. Shakspere\u2019s _Richard III_ is\nfull of this lyric element which Cibber has excised.\n\nWith this curtailment of plot comes likewise a less highly presented\ndelineation of character. Not only is the number of characters\ndiminished, but modifications are made in those that remain. Richard\nbecomes less the unfeeling hypocrite, by use of asides his motives and\ncharacter are made more clear, and he is influenced more by love; his\nvictims are not so vividly presented, and though their weakness of\nwill and character is not less than in the original, the reader does\nnot feel it so much. Cibber\u2019s _Richard III_, like his _King John_, is\nmore play than poem; in it Cibber has attempted to make everything\nsubservient to dramatic effectiveness.\n\n_Perolla and Izadora_ was acted at Drury Lane on December 3, 1705,\nand published the next year. Lintot had bought the copyright November\n14, 1705, a few weeks before its presentation, for thirty-six pounds,\neleven shillings, next to the largest amount that he paid Cibber for\nany of his plays. Cibber explains that he omitted _Woman\u2019s Wit_ from\nthe 1721 edition of his plays because it was so inferior a drama, which\nwas no doubt his reason for omitting _Xerxes_; but why he should not\nhave included _Perolla and Izadora_, which brought him a good third\nand sixth day at the theatre, though it does not appear to have been\npresented afterwards, is not clear, unless, as is probable, he included\nin this edition only such plays as had gained a more or less permanent\nplace on the stage.\n\nCibber shows unusual modesty in his dedication of this play, which\nhe founded on a part of the story of Perolla and Izadora from _The\nRomance of Parthenissa_[19] (1654) by Roger Boyle, Earl of Orrery. He\n\u201csaw so many incidents in the fable, such natural and noble sentiments\nin the characters, and so just a distress in the passions, that he had\nlittle more than the trouble of blank verse to make it fit for the\ntheatre.\u201d[20] Cibber has followed the events in _Parthenissa_ very\nclosely, making few changes or additions. However, he has Perolla and\nIzadora in love before the action begins, whereas they do not meet\nin the romance until after Perolla has saved the life of Blacius in\nwhat makes the end of Cibber\u2019s second act; and at the close of the\nplay he unites the lovers, while the story goes on indefinitely in\n_Parthenissa_. The characters display about the same qualities; Blacius\nis made perhaps a trifle more reasonable and Poluvius a little less so.\nThe play is much better as a play than the original is as a story.\n\nThe play in general conforms to the French classical type; the unities\nare observed, the characters are few and noble, it is written in blank\nverse, and there are no humorous touches. Only in the two deaths and\nthe one fight on the stage does the play violate the French tradition.\nIn the death of the wicked, the reward of the virtuous, and the general\nnature of the action, it groups itself with the heroic plays of the\npreceding century, but of course it does not conform to that type in\nversification. Cibber was here probably writing under the influence of\nCorneille.\n\n_Ximena, or The Heroic Daughter_, an alteration of Corneille\u2019s _Cid_,\nwas acted at Drury Lane, November 28, 1712, when it had a run of about\neight performances;[21] but it was not printed until 1719, when it\nappeared in octavo after it had been revived at Drury Lane, November\n1, 1718. Cibber explains that he thus delayed publishing the play\nbecause \u201cmost of his plays had a better reception from the public when\nhis interest was no longer concerned in them.\u201d[22] The dedication of\n_Ximena_ brought a storm of criticism on Cibber[23] because in it he\nspoke of Addison as a wren being carried by Steele as an eagle, which\nfigure he later applied, in his odes, to himself and the king. He had\nthe judgment to omit this dedication from the collected edition of his\nplays.\n\nAs in the case of _Richard III_, he added a first act to the _Cid_ in\norder that the audience might understand the situation of the various\ncharacters at the outset; a most important and necessary thing if the\naudience is not familiar with the story and the situation beforehand.\nIn his alterations of Shakspere he followed the English method and\npresented this information to his audience by action; in his alteration\nof Corneille he followed the French method by having his characters\ntell each other about it for the benefit of the audience.\n\nCibber has discussed at length the changes he has made in the _Cid_,\nand his reasons for them, in the prefatory \u201cexamen.\u201d The main reason\nseems to have been his desire to make the play less \u201cromantic\u201d and\nthe action more probable and reasonable from the point of view of the\neighteenth century Englishman, whose ideals of honor and whose general\ncharacteristics were very different from those of the seventeenth\ncentury Frenchman. Indeed, Cibber explains in relation to one of these\nchanges: \u201cHere they seem too declamatory and romantic, which I have\nendeavored to avoid, by giving a more spirited tone to the passions,\nand reducing them nearer to common life.\u201d\n\n_Ximena_, because of its source, would naturally have the general\ncharacteristics of French tragedy, in which almost everything happens\noff the stage, and in which the characters appear before the audience\nonly to tell it what they think or what has been done. It violates the\nFrench canons by having a sub-action, though this sub-action is not\nsufficiently important to distract the attention materially from the\nmain action, and is bound very closely to it. The blow which Don Gormaz\ngives Alvarez constitutes the nearest approach to violent action; but\nthis blow, however, appears in the original play.\n\nBesides the anonymity of _Cinna\u2019s Conspiracy_, the closeness with which\nit follows Corneille\u2019s _Cinna_ and the difference in its tone from\nthe rest of Cibber\u2019s work have led to doubt as to his authorship.[24]\nTo see that Cibber was not always sprightly and inconsequential,\nhowever, as he is usually supposed to be, one has but to read his\n_Cicero_ and his poems. The play was presented less than three months\nafter _Ximena_, and to bring out another French tragedy translated\nby the same hand in so short a time might have subjected Cibber to\nthe charge of hasty work. Though _Ximena_ apparently had a run of\neight nights, it did not receive critical approbation, and _Cinna\u2019s\nConspiracy_, if known to be by Cibber, was likely to bring further\ncritical disapproval, so that Cibber may have thought it would have\nbetter chance of success if his authorship were not known. Cibber was\nambitious to be thought wise and serious, as his prefaces and _Cicero_\nshow, and the lack of success of the play together with its nearness to\n_Ximena_ in time of presentation would sufficiently explain his failure\nto claim the authorship.\n\nBut there is external proof which would seem to be convincing in\nsupport of his authorship. Defoe, according to the _Biographia\nDramatica_,[25] in a pamphlet written about 1713 ascribed the play\nto Cibber; and Nichols, in _Literary Anecdotes of the Eighteenth\nCentury_,[26] gives an extract from a memorandum book of Lintot,\nentitled _Copies when purchased_, according to which Cibber, on March\n16, 1712 (O.S.), was paid thirteen pounds for _Cinna\u2019s Conspiracy_. The\nplay was first acted at Drury Lane, February 19, 1713, about a month\nbefore the purchase by Lintot. The fact that Cibber was paid for the\nplay so short a time after its presentation would seem to be sufficient\nproof that it is by Cibber, even though he apparently made no public\nclaim to its authorship.\n\nIn the alteration of Corneille\u2019s _Cinna_, Cibber has made remarkably\nfew changes. There is only one of any moment, the account of the\nmeeting of the conspirators in the second scene of the first act.\nCorneille has had Cinna give an account of this meeting to Emilie,\nwhile Cibber presents the meeting itself. This involves the omission\nof some narration and the creation of some new characters who have a\nfew short speeches. Cibber throughout his adaptation seeks to gain\nvividness and clearness, and his handling of this incident is probably\nthe best example of his method in this respect. The other changes\nconsist merely in the omission and shortening of speeches. On the whole\n_Cinna\u2019s Conspiracy_ is almost a literal translation, though a little\nfree here and there.\n\nThe testimony of the critics concerning the source of _Caesar in\nEgypt_, acted at Drury Lane,[27] December 9, 1724, published in 1725,\nis somewhat confusing. The _Biographia Dramatica_ finds its source in\nBeaumont and Fletcher\u2019s _The False One_; Genest[28] says: \u201cThe plan\nof this tragedy is chiefly borrowed from _The False One_--that part\nof it which concerns Cornelia is said to be taken from Corneille\u2019s\n_Pomp\u00e9e_.\u201d Stoye,[29] while apparently oblivious of Corneille\u2019s play,\nmentions Lucan\u2019s _Pharsalia_ in addition to _The False One_; and\nMiss Canfield says:[30] \u201cTaking Beaumont and Fletcher\u2019s _False One_,\nCorneille\u2019s _Pomp\u00e9e_, and one or two ideas of his own, he stirred them\nall together with such vigor, and so disguised them with his wonderful\nversification, that it is an almost impossible task to distinguish the\ndifferent elements in the dish.... The general plan and construction\nof the play are undoubtedly Corneille\u2019s, many of the best speeches\nare literally translated, especially some of the famous ones between\nCornelia and Caesar; and the description of Pompey\u2019s death is taken\nverbatim from the French.\u201d This last statement of Miss Canfield\u2019s\ncomes nearest to the truth, but it leaves out of account the slight\nindebtedness to Lucan.[31]\n\nAn examination of these three plays shows, in fact, how little Cibber\nused _The False One_ in the construction of _Caesar in Egypt_. He was\nno doubt familiar with the Beaumont and Fletcher play and used some\nthings from it, though very little in comparison with what he has\nused from _Pomp\u00e9e_. He used it for hints in some particulars[32] just\nas he did the _Pharsalia_, from which he apparently took the idea of\nhaving one scene occur before the tomb of Alexander, and from which he\nobtained the burning of Pharos.\n\nOne incident, the display of Pompey\u2019s head, well illustrates the change\nthat had come since the days of Beaumont and Fletcher. In _The False\nOne_, the head was actually brought on the stage; but in neither Cibber\nnor Corneille was the head actually displayed. The actual appearance\nof the head would probably have been almost as distasteful to Cibber\u2019s\naudience as to Corneille\u2019s.\n\nHis method of adaptation here is more like that in his alteration\nof Shakspere than his method in _Ximena_ or _Cinna\u2019s Conspiracy_.\nHe has crowded the incidents, has expanded the action and increased\nits liveliness, has enhanced the value of the piece as a stage play,\nwithout, however, improving its literary quality. He has a good deal\nhappen in one day, but manages to satisfy the technical demands of the\nunity of time.\n\nHe increases the probability by the alteration of certain passages. For\ninstance, whereas both the _Pharsalia_, as completed by Rowe,[33] and\n_The False One_, from one of which he took the incident, have Caesar\nswimming from the island of Pharos with drawn sword in one hand and\ndocuments in the other, Cibber has him swim with only the documents.\n\nWhile this play is essentially an adaptation of Corneille, the general\natmosphere and effect are not those of French tragedy, but are rather\nthose of the minor Elizabethan tragicomedy. Its beginning and end have\na historical rather than a dramatic interest, so that the play produces\nthe effect of a love story with an impersonal enveloping action, which\nis again more English than French.\n\n_Papal Tyranny_ was acted at Covent Garden, February 15, 1745, when\nit had a run of ten nights, and was published in the same year.\nShakspere\u2019s _King John_, which had been played in 1737 and 1738, after\nCibber\u2019s alteration had been talked of and withdrawn, was again revived\non February 20, 1745,[34] with Garrick as King John and Mrs. Theophilus\nCibber, then at the height of her popularity, as Constance. This was no\ndoubt done both to profit by the publicity Cibber\u2019s work had brought\nabout, and to take as much credit as possible from Cibber, by showing\nthe lack of originality in his work.[35] According to Victor,[36]\nCibber\u2019s profits from _Papal Tyranny_ amounted to four hundred pounds,\nwhich probably includes what he received from acting Pandulph as well\nas his author\u2019s profits.\n\nThe play had been written some years before it was finally acted,\nthe parts had been distributed, and everything was practically ready\nfor the presentation in public during the season 1736-7. But so much\ncriticism was leveled at Cibber for daring again to alter Shakspere\nthat one day he quietly walked into the theatre, removed the copy of\nthe play from the prompter\u2019s desk, and went away with it without a word\nto any one.[37] It was finally presented, as already stated, in 1745,\nwhen there was a threatened invasion by the Young Pretender, which made\nthe political and anti-Catholic elements of the play timely.\n\nCibber says in the dedication that he had two reasons for altering the\nplay: antagonism to Catholicism, and a desire to adjust the play to\ncontemporary stage requirements--\u201cto make it more like a play than he\nfound it in Shakspere.\u201d His additions to the anti-Catholic elements of\nthe play are inconsistent with the rest of the action, and the changes\nin structure have increased rather than diminished the epic quality.\nHe has, without being conscious that he was doing so, gone back of\nShakspere\u2019s time in introducing the anti-popish element; a quality\nof Shakspere\u2019s source which Shakspere had omitted, but which Cibber\nreintroduced to the detriment of his play as drama.\n\nThe entire first act of Shakspere\u2019s play is omitted, besides which\nthere are other shorter omissions. The point of view, too, is very\ndifferent; for in Cibber\u2019s play Pandulph is the central figure, instead\nof King John, as is indicated by the change of title from _The Life\nand Death of King John_ to _Papal Tyranny in the Reign of King John_.\nVarious short scenes entirely by Cibber are introduced, the most\nnoticeable being one in the last act in which Constance attends the\nfuneral of Arthur at Swinestead, where King John has been brought to\ndie.\n\nThe characters are more changed than the plot; all those which appear\nonly in the first act are omitted, besides such characters as Peter\nof Pomfret, Elinor, Austria, and Chatillon. The part of the bastard\nFaulconbridge is very much cut down and softened, for as Shakspere\nconceived him he was too \u201clow\u201d and comic for a dignified tragedy\naccording to the views of the eighteenth century. The r\u00f4le of\nConstance is much enlarged as well as that of Pandulph.\n\nCibber\u2019s tragedies are imitative; he showed no creative ability in this\nfield. That his _Richard III_ has held the stage until the present\nis an indication that it is at least a good stage play. The other\ntragedies, except _Xerxes_ and _Papal Tyranny_, do not possess any very\npositive virtues or defects; they are of average merit as compared with\nthe work done by Cibber\u2019s contemporaries.\n\nThey are alterations of Shakspere or Corneille, except _Xerxes_\nand _Perolla and Izadora_. In his alterations of the French he has\nanglicized some of the ideas, has had a tendency to present rather\nthan relate incidents, and generally has tried to make the productions\nconform to English ideas. Turning them into English has not made them\nromantic or altered in any essential degree their neo-classical quality.\n\nHis alterations of Shakspere have not changed the essential\nqualities; they are still characteristically English, and display the\ncharacteristics of the originals. He has not altered Shakspere because\nShakspere is too \u201cGothic,\u201d or too romantic and extravagant, for Cibber\ncomplains that _King John_ is too restrained.\n\nIn relation to these alterations of Shakspere one naturally thinks of\nthe flood of plays about this time which had Shakspere as a basis.[38]\nCibber does not, in _Richard III_ at least, follow the example of Tate\nand his kind, but adheres more closely than they to the originals.\nIt is for this reason, principally, that Cibber\u2019s _Richard III_ was\nsuccessful. In this he has not attempted to follow contemporary\npractice in adhering to the unities, in the observance of poetic\njustice, in the making of the hero virtuous, or in adding the element\nof show and pageantry. His addition of a scene of violence[39] is for\nthe purpose of helping the spectator to understand the play. Even\nhis borrowing of lines from other plays by Shakspere has saved him\npartially from the incongruous or weak mixture of two styles which mars\nthe work of other adapters. He has told the same story as Shakspere,\nand has not done violence to his original either in character, plot,\nor, for the most part, in language.\n\nHis adaptation of _King John_ is handled differently. This play,\neven more than Shakspere\u2019s _King John_, is unfitted for the modern\nstage; its plot is not dramatic, and its persons are not modern in\ntheir qualities. Such a play must depend for its appeal on its poetic\nqualities, and Cibber was personally incapable of altering the play and\nretaining its poetic qualities.\n\nAlthough Cibber is not unaffected by the sentimental type of tragedy,\nas _Xerxes_ and _Perolla and Izadora_ show, he does not seem influenced\nby it to any great extent. This is remarkable in one who was in the\nvery forefront of the movement toward sentimental comedy; though it\nis to be remarked that the two tragedies which do show traces of this\nsentimental note are the only two which are not based on previous plays.\n\nAs Thorndike[40] has pointed out, during this period two influences\nare at work--the influence of the Elizabethan romantic drama, and the\ninfluence of the French classical drama; and Cibber rather fairly\nrepresents both of these. _Xerxes_ shows some French influence in the\nconstruction, though it is probably more Elizabethan in the handling\nof the material; but _Perolla and Izadora_ and the three plays from\nCorneille conform to French usage almost entirely in material as well\nas in method. The restraint in _Richard III_--for notwithstanding\nHazlitt, this play is not as brutal as Shakspere\u2019s--is due to the\nchange brought about through the imitation of French tragedy.\n\nIn accordance with contemporary usage, all these tragedies are in blank\nverse; but the verse is of no great merit. Cibber\u2019s verse for the most\npart is not musical nor subtle, but it has few mannerisms. He sometimes\nuses alliteration, but not to an objectionable or excessive degree, and\nalthough his style has been called alliterative, his use of this device\nin his verse is so infrequent as to make the term a misnomer.\n\nCibber conforms to the custom of the time in respect to rime.\nOccasionally he introduces a couplet in the midst of a scene, but\nthis is seldom and for no apparent reason. The exits, except those of\nminor importance, are marked by rime. This device, descended from the\nElizabethan drama, where it was probably used to mark more strongly\nthe ends of scenes because of the lack of a curtain which concealed\nthe whole stage, is continued during and after the Restoration period\nwithout any valid reason and becomes for the most part a mere\nconvention, which is not confined to tragedy but appears in comedy\nand even in farce. Cibber shows a tendency to increase the number\nof couplets with the increased importance of the exits,[41] and in\n_Ximena_ and _Caesar in Egypt_ we find several scenes closing with as\nmany as three.\n\nIt has perhaps been made sufficiently evident that Cibber was not a\ngreat writer of tragedy. He lacked any deep philosophy of life, tragic\nconsciousness, and deep poetic feeling. He was not without power of\nthought, but his thought concerned itself with the obvious and the\nexternal, and had an element of friskiness, so that when he turned to\ntragedy his work became labored and even commonplace.\n\nNor does he show originality in his themes. The story of _Xerxes_\nis apparently derived from history,[42] and aside from _Perolla and\nIzadora_, whose story is taken from a romance, is the only one of his\ntragedies which is not based on the work of greater men than himself.\nAlthough _Richard III_ is a better stage play than its source, the\nother adaptations are inferior to the originals both as acting versions\nand as pure literature.\n\n\n4. COMEDIES.\n\n_Love\u2019s Last Shift_, Cibber\u2019s first play, was acted at Drury Lane in\nJanuary, 1696, and was published the same year, when he was a little\nmore than twenty-four years old. The comedy was accepted by the\nmanagers through the good offices of Southerne, for Cibber\u2019s standing\nwith the patentees was such that they were not disposed to recognize\nability in him.\n\nSo little had been expected of the piece, and so great was its success,\nthat Cibber was immediately charged with plagiarism,[43] a charge which\nhe entirely denies in the dedication. He claims that \u201cthe fable is\nentirely his own, nor is there a line or thought throughout the whole,\nfor which he is wittingly obliged either to the dead or the living.\u201d\nThere are, however, some striking similarities in the situations and\nthe characters in the sub-action of _Love\u2019s Last Shift_ and Carlile\u2019s\n_Fortune Hunters_ (1689). Carlile\u2019s Elder Wealthy and Young Wealthy are\nclosely paralleled by Elder Worthy and Young Worthy, as are likewise\nthe young women with whom they are in love, and Carlile\u2019s Shamtown\nbelongs to the same family as Sir Novelty Fashion, though he is much\nmore crudely portrayed. So too, the jealousy of Elder Worthy in regard\nto Hillaria and Sir Novelty is very much like that of Elder Wealthy\nin regard to Sophia and Shamtown. So great is the similarity that,\nnotwithstanding his denial, one must believe that Cibber deliberately\nused the situation and characters as a basis for his own, though he did\nnot copy the language, and has made an entirely new and original thing\nout of his source.\n\nSo great was the failure of his second play that Cibber refuses to\nmention it in his _Apology_ and omitted it from the collected edition\nof his plays in 1721. _Woman\u2019s Wit, or The Lady in Fashion_ was acted\nat Drury Lane in 1697, but met with a most unfavorable reception,\nthough in management of the plot it is not inferior to a great many\nplays whose success was much greater.\n\nCarlile\u2019s _Fortune Hunters_ (1689) and Mountford\u2019s _Greenwich Park_\n(1691) have been suggested as the sources of that part of the plot in\nwhich Young Rakish and Major Rakish appear, but this is only partially\ntrue. In _The Fortune Hunters_ the father and son are rivals for a\nyoung woman, in _Woman\u2019s Wit_ she is an elderly widow; in both, the son\nhas obtained five hundred pounds from the father. But notwithstanding\nthe fact that these situations are superficially similar the characters\nand the details of the action are so different that it does not seem\npossible that there can be any connection between the two plays. There\ndoes seem to be a more valid reason for affirming the influence of\n_Greenwich Park_ in the play. The likeness of Sir Thomas Reveller and\nYoung Reveller to Old Rakish and Young Rakish is so great that Cibber\nmust have had them in mind, but the differences both of character\nand action are such that it seems probable that he was attempting to\nportray two characters of the same type rather than trying to copy\nthem. In _Greenwich Park_ there is not even a superficial similarity\nof situation to _Woman\u2019s Wit_.[44] The sub-action of _Woman\u2019s Wit_ was\nseparated and acted successfully at Drury Lane in 1707 as _The School\nBoy_.\n\n_Love Makes a Man_ was acted at Drury Lane in 1701, and was published\nthe same year. It continued to be played until 1828. It is made from\nBeaumont and Fletcher\u2019s _The Elder Brother_ and _The Custom of the\nCountry_, and is an attempt on the part of Cibber merely to provide\namusement. Ost[45] points out that this play, though it has no original\nliterary worth, helped continue the literary tradition, and notices\nit in connection with the healthful influence of Cibber\u2019s work in the\nmoralizing tendency of the drama. He adds that Cibber\u2019s plays have more\nvalue in relation to \u201ckulturgeschichte\u201d than in aesthetic interest.\nThat is entirely true so far as this play is concerned; various parts\nhave a purely contemporary interest, or are an indication to us of the\nstate of dramatic taste, and the aesthetic value is certainly often\ninconsiderable. When Cibber introduces such references as \u201chatchet\nface\u201d of Clodio, a term which had been applied to Cibber himself, who\nplayed the part, and more particularly in the farcical discussion of\nthe two playhouses in the fourth act, he is not even attempting to\nwrite anything but horseplay.\n\nBy the omission and transposition of scenes, and the introduction of\nsome lines of his own, mainly for the purpose of gaining probability,\nas Ost has pointed out, Cibber has condensed _The Elder Brother_ so\nthat it forms practically the first two acts, and _The Custom of the\nCountry_ so that it forms the last three. In the main, the plays, so\nmuch of them as is used, are followed with very few changes, and the\nwhole makes a sprightly and amusing, if not particularly literary\ncomedy.\n\nThe change of place and the introduction of an entirely new set of\ncharacters with fresh plot developments are dramatically faulty; but\nfor the purpose for which the play was written these faults are not\nparticularly great. To join the plots of two separate plays end on\nend without breaking the continuity of the story, and to adjust the\ncharacters so that there is no glaring inconsistency, is surely no\nslight feat.\n\nIn the characterization Cibber has made some changes. These changes\nappear particularly in Eustace, who becomes Clodio, Miramont, who\nbecomes Don Lewis, and Elvira, who is the sister instead of the mother\nof Don Duart. It is difficult to understand how this play could have\nbeen other than a theatrical success with Bullock to interpret the\nfarcical obstinacy of Antonio, Penkethman to portray the humorously\ncholeric Don Lewis, and Cibber as the \u201cpert coxcomb,\u201d Clodio. But it is\nfarce rather than pure comedy.\n\nCibber has changed these plays from verse to prose, except in the first\nscene between Carlos and Angelina, in which the romantic seriousness of\nthe situation leads him to write blank verse, which is however printed\nas prose.\n\n_She Would and She Would Not_, considered by Genest as \u201cperhaps his\nbest play,\u201d was acted at Drury Lane, November 26, 1702, and continued\nto be acted frequently as late as 1825.[46] The striking similarity of\nthe two plays has caused the suggestion that Cibber\u2019s play is based on\nLeanerd\u2019s _The Counterfeits_ (1678). The similarity indicates a common\nsource, rather than that Cibber drew from _The Counterfeits_. The\nsource of Cibber\u2019s play was no doubt _The Trepanner Trepanned_, which\nis the third story of John Davies\u2019s _La Picara, or The Triumphs of\nFemale Subtilty_, published in London in 1665.[47]\n\nThis play is amusing, is well constructed, and while it is not of\nserious import, is such as might be presented today with success.\n\nCibber commenced to write _The Careless Husband_ in the summer of 1703,\nbut laid it aside because he despaired of finding any one to take the\npart of Lady Betty Modish. In 1704 he again took up the writing of the\nplay, and in that year it was acted at Drury Lane on December 7; and\nit was published in 1705. It was one of the best and most successful\nplays of the period.[48] It was charged that Cibber received direct\nassistance in writing the play, but he denied the charge, and as no\nproof was offered, Cibber is no doubt to be believed. It seems to have\nno literary source; but one incident, that in which the wife finds\nthe husband and her maid asleep in easy chairs, is said to have been\nsuggested to Cibber by Mrs. Brett, the reputed mother of the poet\nSavage, from her own experience.[49]\n\nThis is Cibber\u2019s best play of the sentimental type. Its plot is\nconsistent, has dramatic probability, and is serious enough in interest\nto have real reason for being. The characters are well conceived and\nwell portrayed. In style, too, Cibber is here at his best and the\ndialogue approaches the finest of the period.\n\nThe Haymarket opened the season 1706-7 under Swiney, and in order to\nencourage the new venture, Lord Halifax headed a subscription for\nthe revival of three plays: Shakspere\u2019s _Julius Caesar_, Beaumont\nand Fletcher\u2019s _King and No King_, and the comic scenes of Dryden\u2019s\n_Marriage \u00e0 la Mode_ and _A Maiden Queen_. The last took the form of an\nadaptation called _The Comical Lovers_, the adaptation being the work\nof Cibber. It was acted February 4, 1707, and was published the same\nyear. The alteration was the result of only six days\u2019 labor,[50] and\nCibber claims no originality in it. It met with slight success.\n\n_The Comical Lovers_ is another such adaptation as _Love Makes a Man_.\nCibber has merely taken the two comic threads from their serious\nsettings and interwoven them, first a scene from one and then a scene\nfrom the other, with only the changes necessary to join them, and has\nfollowed his sources almost word for word. Cibber was not under the\nnecessity of changing verse into prose, as he had done in _Love Makes a\nMan_, for the comic sections of Dryden are in prose, according to the\nchanged convention of his time; and in the scene between Melantha and\nher maid, Cibber has not even taken the trouble to alter a single one\nof the French words, many of which must have acquired a place in the\nlanguage and been in good use by Cibber\u2019s time. So far as Cibber\u2019s part\nis concerned, this is the least important of his plays.\n\n_The Double Gallant_ was acted at the Haymarket, November 1, 1707, but\nwas apparently not successful at its first performance. _The Biographia\nDramatica_[51] says:\n\n  \u201cIn a letter from Booth to A. Hill we learn that the play, at\n  its first appearance was, as he expressed it, hounded in a most\n  outrageous manner. Two years after, it was revived, met with most\n  extravagant success, and has continued a stock play ever since.\u201d\n\nCibber says nothing about any hounding of the play, but ascribes the\nfailure of the piece to the fact that the Haymarket was too big for\nplays; a fact that he thinks caused the lack of success of other plays\nas well as his own.\n\nIn regard to the authorship, Cibber says:[52]\n\n  \u201cIt was made up of what was tolerable, in two, or three others, that\n  had no Success, and were laid aside, as so much Poetical Lumber;\n  but by collecting and adapting the best Parts of them all, into one\n  Play, the _Double Gallant_ has had a Place, every Winter, amongst\n  the Publick Entertainments, these Thirty Years. As I was only the\n  Compiler of this Piece, I did not publish it in my own Name.\u201d\n\nThe title would lead one to suppose that it is taken directly from\nCorneille\u2019s _Le Galant Double_, but it is a weaving together of Mrs.\nCentlivre\u2019s _Love at a Venture_, which is an adaptation of Corneille,\nBurnaby\u2019s _Ladies Visiting Day_, and the Lady Dainty action from\nBurnaby\u2019s _Reformed Wife_. In consolidating such parts of these three\nplays as are used, the crudities of the first two are polished off,\nand certain additions are made to the last. These additions consist in\nsections of the dialogue, in the changing of Lady Dainty\u2019s lover into\na more impetuous wooer, and in the addition of the lover\u2019s disguise as\na Russian, by which subterfuge he wins her. The introductory scene,\ntaken from _Love at a Venture_, is much more lively and entertaining in\nCibber\u2019s play than in the original, and Cibber likewise handles more\nadroitly the subterfuge of the hero\u2019s arrest, taken from the same play,\nusing the same device of decoy letters that he uses in _Woman\u2019s Wit_.\nIn the working over of Burnaby\u2019s adaptation of the Horner episode,\nwhich he had taken from Wycherley\u2019s _Country Wife_, Cibber has entirely\neliminated the unpleasant features.\n\nThis play is the same sort of an adaptation as his working over of\nother earlier plays. He has taken such scenes as he wished, changed the\nnames of the characters, and introduced sufficient lines of his own to\ngive continuity and connection to the various actions, but has made no\nmaterial additions whatever. In this case he has made an extremely\ndiverting play, very superior to his originals.\n\n_The Lady\u2019s Last Stake_, which seems to be entirely original, was\nproduced at the Haymarket, December 13, 1707, when it was acted five\ntimes; and it was published probably early in the next year. It\ncontinued on the London stage until 1786, and was last performed at\nBath, in 1813. It is only a fair comedy, lacking the qualities of\nstyle, the originality in the conception of the characters, and the\nskilful working out of the plot that had characterized Cibber\u2019s two\nearlier plays of the sentimental type. But in whatever way the plot as\na whole may be lacking, the last act has plenty of liveliness; there\ncomplication follows complication and humorous incidents follow serious\nwith great rapidity.\n\n_The Rival Fools_, published in quarto in 1709 and played at Drury\nLane, January 11, 1709, is an alteration of Beaumont and Fletcher\u2019s\n_Wit at Several Weapons_, and was not successful. At its first\npresentation it was acted five times, and was revived only once, in\n1712, when it was acted twice. _The Biographia Dramatica_[53] relates\nthe following incident of the first performance, the events of which\nmay be compared with the reception accorded Thomson\u2019s _Sophonisba_:\n\n  \u201cIt met, however, with bad success. There happened to be a\n  circumstance in it, which, being in itself rather ridiculous, gave a\n  part of the audience an opportunity of venting their spleen on the\n  author; viz: a man in one of the earlier scenes on the stage, with\n  a long angling rod in his hand, going to fish for Miller\u2019s Thumbs;\n  on which account some of the spectators took occasion whenever\n  Mr. Cibber appeared, who himself played the character, to cry out\n  continually, \u2018Miller\u2019s Thumbs.\u2019\u201d\n\nCibber has followed the original quite closely so far as the plot is\nconcerned, much more closely than would be inferred from the first\nlines of the prologue:\n\n    \u201cFrom sprightly Fletcher\u2019s loose confed\u2019rat muse,\n     Th\u2019 unfinish\u2019d Hints of these light Scenes we chuse,\n     For with such careless haste his Play was writ,\n     So unpersued each thought of started Wit;\n     Each Weapon of his Wit so lamely fought\n     That \u2019twou\u2019d as scanty on our Stage be thought,\n     As for a modern Belle my Grannum\u2019s Petticoat.\n     So that from th\u2019 old we may with Justice say,\n     We scarce could cull the Trimming of a play.\u201d\n\nIn spite of this statement by Cibber himself, he adds practically\nnothing to the plot, and in the dialogue adds merely a touch here and\nthere.\n\nAs was customary in altering these old comedies written in verse, the\nverse of the original is changed into prose, and as is also customary\nin all of Cibber\u2019s alterations, the long speeches are broken into\ndialogue.\n\nThe character of Pompey Doodle is somewhat enlarged in its\ntransformation into Samuel Simple, and is one of the most amusing\nelements in the play. The treatment is distinctly Jacobean in its\nexaggeration of character, and the reception by the audience must be\nattributed either to the alteration of taste on the part of the public,\nor to the personal unpopularity of Cibber, for the r\u00f4le is well written\nand Cibber was particularly well fitted to act the part, both by\ntemperament and by physical qualities.\n\n_The Non-Juror_ was acted at Drury Lane on December 6, 1717, with a\nprologue by Nicholas Rowe, poet laureate, and was published in 1718. At\nthe time of its first presentation it had the comparatively long run\nof twenty-three performances, and was revived at Drury Lane and Covent\nGarden in 1745, when its political meaning was again pertinent.\n\nThe play came at a time of great political stress, so that it was but\nnatural that its strong Whig and anti-Catholic sentiments should arouse\nthe greatest antagonism.[54] This antagonism was not only voiced in the\nmany pamphlets issued at the time, but no doubt affected the general\nattitude toward Cibber in his later life. Cibber, in his first letter\nto Pope, states that one of his enemies went so far as to write a\npamphlet whose purport was that _The Non-Juror_ constituted a subtle\nJacobite libel against the government. He dedicated the play to the\nking when it was published, and for this he received a gift of two\nhundred pounds. Cibber was not burdened in mind because he had offended\nthe losing party, and any inconvenience he may have felt was amply\nrepaid by the pension and laureateship which later came as his reward.\n\n_The Non-Juror_ is based directly on Moli\u00e8re\u2019s _Tartuffe_, though two\nplays on the same theme had previously appeared in English: Crowne\u2019s\n_English Friar_ (1689), and Medbourne\u2019s _Tartuffe_ (1670), the latter\na direct adaptation of Moli\u00e8re\u2019s play. This _Tartuffe_ was revived\nduring the summer season of 1718 at Lincoln\u2019s Inn Fields, and was\npublished while Cibber\u2019s play was still running, with an advertisement\nthat in it \u201cmay be seen the plot, characters, and most part of the\nlanguage of _The Non-Juror_.\u201d This statement is true only in that the\ntwo plays by Medbourne and Cibber are based on Moli\u00e8re, and was made to\ndiscredit Cibber\u2019s claim to originality in the adaptation.\n\nCibber was no doubt familiar with Medbourne\u2019s play, but he used\nMoli\u00e8re as a basis, and owed practically nothing to any play other\nthan the _Tartuffe_ of Moli\u00e8re. Cibber may have derived the suggestion\nof the reformation of Charles from the corresponding character in\nMedbourne\u2019s play, but his manner of carrying out this reformation and\nthe difference in the qualities of the characters in the two plays make\nthis part an original creation.\n\nIn the edition of Crowne in the series of _The Dramatists of the\nRestoration_, the editors maintain Cibber\u2019s greater indebtedness to\nCrowne than to Moli\u00e8re, in a way that makes one doubt whether they had\never read either Moli\u00e8re or Cibber. So far as plot is concerned there\nis absolutely no resemblance, except that in both a priest attempts\nto seduce a decent woman. The characters, style, and management are\nboth different and inferior in Crowne, although some slight similarity\nmay be discovered in the attempt of Finical and Dr. Wolf to allay the\nconsciences of the respective objects of their attentions. As suggested\nby Van Laun, Father Finical, like Dr. Wolf, is based on Tartuffe.\n\nCibber has handled his sources very freely, and in some particulars\nhas improved both the plot and the characters. That is not to say that\n_The Non-Juror_ is a greater play than Moli\u00e8re\u2019s _Tartuffe_, for as a\nwhole it is not. The parts of Dorine, who in _Tartuffe_ is the life and\nsource of the humor, of Cl\u00e9ante, and of Madame Pernelle, are omitted,\nbut the part of Mariane is enlivened into one of the best coquettes\nof the stage. The other characters and incidents correspond in _The\nNon-Juror_ and Moli\u00e8re\u2019s _Tartuffe_, though the d\u00e9nouement is more\nartistically handled in Cibber.\n\n_The Refusal_, an adaptation of Moli\u00e8re\u2019s _Les Femmes Savantes_,\npublished in 1721, was acted at Drury Lane, February 14, 1721, and\nhad a run of six performances. Moli\u00e8re\u2019s play had been adapted by\nWright as _The Female Virtuosoes_ in 1693, and this play was revived at\nLincoln\u2019s Inn Fields on January 10, 1721, to anticipate _The Refusal_.\nIn like manner with the effort to discredit Cibber\u2019s hand in _The\nNon-Juror_, though in this case after the run of Cibber\u2019s play was\nover, Curll published, with a dedication to Cibber, \u201cthe second edition\nof _No Fools Like Wits_,[55] as it was acted at Lincoln\u2019s Inn Fields or\n_The Refusal_, as it was acted at Drury Lane.\u201d\n\nIn his adaptation Cibber has made more changes than is usual with him,\nboth in plot and in character; and in the dialogue he has anglicized\nthe idiom to an extent not found in his adaptations of tragedies from\nthe French.\n\nMoli\u00e8re\u2019s comedy is a satire on false learning in men as well as in\nwomen, while Cibber has added some satire on business trickery, in\nthe same way that he added political satire in his adaptation of\n_Tartuffe_. Cibber has supplied the elder daughter with a successful\nsuitor, and the d\u00e9nouement is brought about by different, more\ncomplicated, and more characteristically English means. In the incident\nin Moli\u00e8re\u2019s play in which B\u00e9lise takes the love of Clitandre to\nherself, Cibber substitutes the mother for B\u00e9lise, omits the maid,\nalong with her impertinences, and adds some slight original incidents.\n\nTrissotin, the poet, becomes one of the typical would-be wits of\nEnglish comedy, and Chrysale is changed to a typical promoter. In\nMoli\u00e8re, Chrysale is a purely humorous character, whose vacillation\nand lack of force were no doubt very laughable on the stage; Sir\nGilbert, his equivalent in Cibber\u2019s play, on the other hand, is in no\nway a weakling and is in no way admirable or a source of laughter, but\nembodies a satire on contemporary business practices.\n\nThe directness and simplicity of Moli\u00e8re\u2019s play, the unity of tone and\nplot, give way in Cibber to complication of plot and character, in\nwhich the whole piece loses the delightful quality of the humor of the\noriginal.\n\n_The Provoked Husband_ was presented at Drury Lane, January 10, 1728,\nand had a run of twenty-eight nights. There was an unsuccessful attempt\non the part of Cibber\u2019s enemies to damn the play on the first night;\nthe interruptions were so great that during the fourth act the actors\nwere compelled to stand still until it was quiet enough for them to\nbe heard. On January 31, Cibber published Vanbrugh\u2019s unfinished play\nand his own completion of it. The critics, who had condemned the play\nunmercifully, especially the supposed additions of Cibber, found, when\nthe plays were published, that it was not Cibber but Vanbrugh they had\nbeen condemning. According to Cibber,[56] on the twenty-eighth night\nthe play took in one hundred and forty pounds, a greater amount than\nhad been taken in at the last night of any play for fifty years.\n\nVanbrugh\u2019s _Journey to London_ consists of four acts, the first two\npractically complete, but the last two apparently unfinished. Cibber\nhas used practically all that Vanbrugh left, omitting the trip to the\ntheatre in the last part of Act II, and adding much of his own to the\nwhole play. He has interspersed his additions between the parts of\nVanbrugh\u2019s play, and has changed very little of the Vanbrugh part,\nexcept to \u201cwater it down\u201d where it had been too strong for the changed\ntaste of the theatre goers.\n\nCibber\u2019s additions to Steele\u2019s _Conscious Lovers_ are mentioned on a\nlater page of these _Studies_.\n\nSeveral of Cibber\u2019s comedies were translated into foreign tongues: in\nGerman _The Double Gallant_ appeared as _Der doppellte Liebhaber_,\ntranslated by Johann Friedrich J\u00fcnger and published in Leipzig in\n1786, _The Careless Husband_ as _Der sorglose Ehemann_, published in\nG\u00f6ttingen in 1750, and _The Provoked Husband_ as _Der erz\u00fcrnte Ehemann\nund der Landjunker_, published in Frankfurt in 1753; in French _The\nProvoked Husband_ appeared as _Le Mari pouss\u00e9 \u00e0 bout, ou le voyage \u00e0\nLondres_, published in London, 1761.\n\nThe adaptations, except _The Non-Juror_ and _The Refusal_, seem to have\nbeen produced merely to furnish amusement which should be in accordance\nwith changed stage conditions and changed taste. They show little\noriginality, being merely the stringing together of scenes without\nalteration, though Cibber in the prologue to _The Double Gallant_ says:\n\n    \u201cNay, even alter\u2019d Plays, like old houses mended,\n     Cost little less than new, before they\u2019re ended;\n     At least, our author finds the experience true.\u201d\n\nHis method seems to have been to take two plays of an older author,\noften plays which contained both a serious and a comic action, to\nselect such scenes as suited his purpose, and to join them into a\nplay, either alternating the scenes of the separate plays with link\ncharacters, or putting the two plays end on end, as in the case of\n_Love Makes a Man_. This latter method entailed much greater labor, as\nmany of the characters were made by consolidating two characters from\ndifferent plays.\n\nCibber\u2019s comedies, which constitute his best and most important\nwork, may be divided into two general classes: comedies of manners\nand intrigue, and sentimental comedies. The first class includes two\nadaptations from Beaumont and Fletcher which are not strictly comedies\nof manners but are more closely allied to the \u201ccomedy of humours,\u201d\nnamely, _Love Makes a Man_ and _The Rival Fools_; one adaptation made\nout of two plays by Dryden, _The Comical Lovers_; two from Moli\u00e8re,\n_The Non-Juror_ and _The Refusal_, into both of which he introduced\ncontemporary social and political interest; and three other plays,\n_Woman\u2019s Wit_, _She Would and She Would Not_, and _The Double Gallant_,\nthe last of which takes its title, if not its plot, from Corneille\u2019s\n_Le Galant Double_. The sentimental comedies, in which form Cibber was\none of the very first to write, are _Love\u2019s Last Shift_, _The Careless\nHusband_, _The Lady\u2019s Last Stake_, and _The Provoked Husband_, the\nlast being a completion of Vanbrugh\u2019s _Journey to London_. The first\nclass consists almost altogether of adaptations; the second class is\nessentially original.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nCIBBER AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SENTIMENTAL COMEDY\n\n\n1. CIBBER, NOT STEELE, THE IMPORTANT FIGURE IN ITS EARLY DEVELOPMENT.\n\nThe fully developed form of sentimental comedy may be said to begin\nwith Steele\u2019s _Conscious Lovers_ (1772) and to end with the attack\nupon it made by Goldsmith, Foote, and their followers. Goldsmith\nwas \u201cstrongly prepossessed in favour of the poets of the last age\nand strove to imitate them,\u201d[57] and by his reintroduction of humor\ninto comedy he exerted a strong influence toward the downfall of the\nsentimental type. The end of this vogue is generally well understood,\nbut the beginning of it has not been investigated with the same\nthoroughness. Steele is generally given the credit of being the\ninnovator who reformed the stage,[58] although Ward and others give\nsome credit to the work of Cibber. The importance of Cibber in the\ndevelopment of this form and in the moral reformation of comedy,\nthe effect of social conditions, and the gradual change from the\nRestoration type, have not been fully studied. Colley Cibber was the\nmost important writer of comedy in preparing the way for the new form,\nand practically every element of the later sentimental comedy is found\nin his work. But Cibber was not a reformer calling on his age to\nrepent; he was rather answering a general demand of his time.\n\nThree stages may be discerned in the development of sentimental\ncomedy: first, that in which the morals of comedy were purified and\nthe new sentimental material was intermixed with the old humorous\nmaterial, represented by the work of Cibber; second, that in which the\nsentimental theme is presented with very little comic entertainment,\nrepresented by _The Conscious Lovers_; and third, that in which the\ncomedy of this second stage degenerates and in which the work becomes\nartificial and lifeless, represented by the plays of Holcroft and his\nschool.\n\nSentimental comedy as seen in its second phase may be briefly described\nas comedy of manners in which the main action tends to inculcate a\nmoral lesson, in which the incidents no longer deal with illicit\nintrigues, and in which the action is complicated by distressingly\npathetic situations. The chief characters are generally serious and\nsupersensitive in regard to such matters as filial duty, honor, and\nthe like; and while these persons are in no need of being reformed,\ntheir exaggerated conceptions of honor have caused them to act so\nthat they are placed in an equivocal position and they appear to the\nother characters as vicious. The language is chaste, there is constant\nintroduction of extremely stilted moralizing, and there is a notable\nabsence of humor.\n\nCibber\u2019s work in other lines was conventional and commonplace. It is\ntrue that his _Apology_ is lively and interesting, and his pamphlets in\nreply to Pope\u2019s attacks are keen and humorous though vulgar, but the\nrest of his prose is extremely conventional. His poetry, except a few\nsongs, is inexpressibly poor. Aside from one opera in which he takes\nthe same stand in regard to virtue that he does in his comedies, his\noperas are merely the commonplace following of a vogue. His tragedies\nare generally imitative; with two exceptions they are adaptations of\nCorneille or Shakspere. His farces are about equal in merit to his\npoetry, and are devoid of originality.\n\nNor does Cibber\u2019s life indicate the qualities that appear in his\nsentimental comedies. The moral standard he displays in his pamphlets\nin reply to Pope is far from high, and from the testimony of his\ncontemporaries concerning his personal character it would seem that\nhe was far from being the sort of man who would set about reforming\nanything. And in all probability he would not have done so if there had\nnot been a general public movement in that direction.\n\n\n2. SENTIMENTAL COMEDY A PRODUCT OF VARIOUS FORCES.\n\nBut sentimental comedy did not spring full grown from the brain of a\nsingle man. Nor was it the result of a single revolutionary force.\nSentimental comedy resulted from gradual modifications of the drama\nof the time, developing from the prevalent type little by little\nuntil it finally appeared as an independent form. The reform of the\nstage was not an isolated phenomenon, nor was it directly the result\nof the attacks made by Collier and others. Rather are all these the\nresult of a changed public conscience, which was manifested not merely\nin literature and on the stage, but in the Revolution of 1688 and a\nsubsequent social reformation as well.\n\nImmediately after the Restoration there may be discovered two elements\nin the life of the nation which had an influence both on the form and\non the content of literature. On the one side was the court, whose\nstandards affected both the form and content in the direction of\nforeign models. Through the long period of exile on the continent,\nCharles and his followers had become foreign in their literary taste\nand they had great influence in the direction of a French type as\nregards form; and because of the low and vicious standards of living\nprevalent at court their influence stimulated the sympathetic handling\nof low and vicious subjects.\n\nOn the other hand, there were the people, strictly native in their\npreference, who influenced the drama in the direction of native\nstandards in form, and Puritan standards in content. As to the form\nof comedy, there was nothing essentially antagonistic in these two\ninfluences; the one could easily combine with the other so that a new\nthing, congruous and consistent, might result; but in the material\npresented antagonism was bound to arise and soon did arise. In the\ndevelopment of sentimental comedy from the type which predominated\nduring and after the Restoration, there was not at first any\nmodification in structural elements; the comedy of manners was adopted,\nso far as form was concerned; the change, which was gradual and was a\ndirect response to changed social and moral conditions, was at first\nentirely in the matter of content. This change first appears in the\nsincere reformation of the hero at the end of the play; then in the\nattitude towards cuckoldom, which Restoration comedy had treated as a\nhumorous fact; and then in the character of the language, which was\naltered in the direction of moral decency.\n\nUnder Charles II and James II the court, on which the theatre depended\nfor its right to live and also for its patronage, was vicious and\ndepraved. Its one grace was wit, and that it had in a superlative\ndegree.\n\n\n3. PROGRESS IN ENGLISH SOCIETY.\n\nThe people in general, except the court and those more or less\nfashionable classes of society which would naturally follow it,\nwere not affected by this mode. They learned to despise Charles II\npersonally because of his lack of honor and morals, and hated his\nfollowers as well as their mode of life. In the city the Puritan\nelement, which was \u201cat once the most substantial and sober\u201d part of the\ncommunity, began to exercise some of the same control of manners and\nmorals that it had practised under the commonwealth, and checked the\nconstant disregard of its moral principles by the court.\n\nBut even during this corrupt time there were manifestations of activity\non the part of other elements of society, which looked toward the\nbetterment of conditions. In the life of the state there were events\nwhich made for general progress and a more moral life among all the\npeople. With special reference to the regulation and restraint of the\ntheatre, certain elements in Parliament attempted, in 1669, to tax\nthe playhouses, which were situated in the disreputable part of town\nand had become centers of prostitution; but the ministers of the king\nintervened and the attempt to compel some restraint was unsuccessful.\n\nIn the reigns of William and Mary and of Anne a reaction is seen in the\nlife of the court, and there appears a still greater progress in all\nclasses of society.\n\nThe expulsion of the Stuarts brought about certain very positive\nresults which made for progress in all directions. So too the principle\nof natural action and reaction was operating; but, considering the\nhistorical circumstances, it was only to be expected that the reaction\ntoward a more moral and saner view of life should be less marked and\nless rapid than the preceding reaction from Puritanism.\n\nUntil after the downfall of the Stuarts, the Protestants in England had\nnever been united; but after that event even Presbyterians joined with\necclesiastics of the Church of England in public ceremonies on terms of\nfriendship. Now that the question of political and religious supremacy\nwas permanently settled, the Protestants were free to turn to some of\nthe questions which are popularly supposed to be the real objects of\nreligious organizations--worship and the encouragement of right living.\nHowever far it may have failed to measure up to modern ideas in these\nrespects, the church now began to be a greater moral force.\n\nThe court became a very different sort of place. However far William\nmight fall short of middle class standards of today, he was a very\ndifferent sort of man from Charles or James, and had a very different\ninfluence. As opposed to the Catholicism of the Stuarts, he was a\nPresbyterian. Instead of haunting the theatre, where Charles found\nmore than one mistress among the actresses, William never even showed\nhimself at the theatre. Because of William\u2019s prolonged absences on\nthe continent, during which Mary reigned in her own right, the person\nof the queen became more important than in former reigns. Mary \u201chad\nbeen educated only to work embroidery, to play on the spinnet, and to\nread the Bible and the _Whole Duty of Man_.\u201d[59] \u201cHer character was\nunimpeachable, and by the influence of the king and queen the whole\ncourt became most proper, even if it was somewhat dull.\u201d But unlike\nher husband, she went frequently to the theatre, where she showed\nspecial favor for Shadwell and where she ordered such plays as _The\nOld Bachelor_, _The Double Dealer_, and _The Committee_. It must be\nadmitted that Mary\u2019s taste in regard to plays did not show great\nliterary or moral discrimination.\n\nBoth under William and Mary and under Anne the court took positive\ngrounds on moral questions. In Evelyn\u2019s _Diary_ for February 19, 1690,\nwe read:\n\n  \u201cThe impudence of both sexes was now become so greate and so\n  universal, persons of all ranks keeping their courtesans publicly,\n  that the King had lately directed a letter to the Bishops to order\n  their Cleargy to preach against that sin, swearing, &c. and to put\n  the Ecclesiastical Laws in execution without any indulgence.\u201d\n\nMary, on July 9, 1691, wrote to the justices of the peace directing\nthat they execute all laws against the profanation of the Sabbath, and\neven went so far as to have constables stationed on street corners to\ncapture pies and puddings that were being taken to the bakers to be\ncooked on that day. In 1697 and 1698 King William issued two orders\nconcerning the acting of anything contrary to good morals or manners.\nQueen Anne, who never went to the public theatre, made frequent\nproclamations against immoral plays, masked women, and the admittance\nof spectators behind the scenes, and in 1703 she issued a proclamation\nagainst vice in general.\n\nAltogether, the forces of the court and of the government were\nacting in accord to suppress the abuses which their predecessors had\ncountenanced both by favor and by participation.\n\nBut however potent may have been the influence of the court, the real\nmovement for social reform came from the people, whose will the court\nwas really carrying out. The movement on the part of the people was\nforwarded by the rise of various societies which were established for\nmoral, philanthropic, and religious purposes.[60]\n\nThe Society for the Reformation of Manners, inaugurated by a small\nnumber of gentlemen in 1692, was probably the most influential and\nbest known of these organizations. It was organized primarily for the\npurpose of informing on evildoers, and that there might be no criticism\nconcerning their sincerity, the fines were paid over to charity. In\naddition to carrying on this work of informing, the society established\nquarterly lectures on moral subjects, secured the preaching of sermons\non its objects, and in 1699 it claimed to have secured thousands of\nconvictions.[61] The church was brought into the movement by Archbishop\nTenison\u2019s circular to the clergy encouraging them to cooperate with the\nlaity in the movement. This movement went farther than the prosecution\nof overt acts against morality, for in 1701-2 the players at Lincoln\u2019s\nInn Fields were prosecuted for uttering impious, lewd, and immoral\nexpressions.[62]\n\n\n4. COLLIER.\n\nCollier\u2019s attack on the stage, published in 1698, was no doubt a potent\ninfluence in crystallizing public opinion in regard to the drama, but\nit does not stand alone; it is merely a sign of a movement which the\nstage had begun to notice and profit by several years previously.\nDuring the year 1698 not less than sixteen books and pamphlets were\npublished in the controversy. Collier\u2019s book had great influence in\nfurthering the work of reformation; but, low as was the tone of the\ndrama at the time, one must confess that in some particulars Collier is\nradical and far-fetched in his arguments and conclusions.\n\nCibber, though he had two years previously written a play with a\ndistinct reformatory and moral purpose, did not much relish Collier\u2019s\nattack or agree with it. In the prologue to _Xerxes_ he intimates that\nCollier might prove a good index for those who desired to read immoral\nliterature:\n\n    \u201cThus ev\u2019n sage Collier too might be accus\u2019d,\n     If what h\u2019as writ, thro\u2019 ignorance, abus\u2019d:\n     Girls may read him, not for the truth, he says,\n     But to be pointed to the bawdy plays.\u201d\n\nIn _The Careless Husband_ we find Lord Morelove saying:\n\n  \u201cPlays now, indeed, one need not be so much afraid of; for since the\n  late short-sighted view of them, vice may go on and prosper; the\n  stage dares hardly show a vicious person speaking like himself, for\n  fear of being call\u2019d prophane for exposing him.\u201d\n\nTo this Lady Easy replies that,\n\n  \u201c\u2019Tis hard, indeed, when people won\u2019t distinguish between what\u2019s\n  meant for contempt, and what for example.\u201d\n\nPerhaps Cibber\u2019s most interesting contribution to the controversy is\ncontained in his dedication of _Love Makes a Man_, published in the\nfirst edition, but omitted in the collected edition of his plays:\n\n  \u201cBut suppose the stage may have taken too loose a liberty? Is there\n  nothing to be said for it? Have not all sciences been guilty? Was\n  it to be expected in a reign of pleasure, peace and madness, that\n  the poets should not be merry? Did not the court then lead up the\n  dance? And did not the whole nation join in it? Was it not mere Joan\n  Sanderson,[63] and did not the lawn-sleeves, cuffs, and cassocks\n  fill up the measure? But since those dancing days are over, I hope\n  our enemies will give us leave to grow wise, and sober, as well as\n  the rest of our neighbors: Why shall we not have the liberty to\n  reform, as well as the clergy, and lawyers? I believe upon a fair\n  examination we may find, that prophaneness, cruelty, and passive\n  obedience, are now less than ever the business of the stage, the\n  bench or the pulpit; and I doubt not, but we can produce examples of\n  new plays, lawyers, and pastors that have met with success without\n  being obliged to immorality, bribery, or politics ...\n\n  \u201cNow if the stage must needs down, because \u2019tis possible it may\n  seduce, as instruct; the same rule of policy might forbid the use of\n  physic, because not only their patients, but physicians themselves\n  die of common diseases; or call in the milled crowns, because they\n  are but so many patterns for coiners to counterfeit by, or might\n  as well suppress the Courts of Judicature, because some persons\n  have suffered for what a succeeding reign has made a new law, that\n  makes that law that sentenced them illegal: The same conclusion\n  might discountenance our religion, because we sometimes find pride,\n  hypocricy, avarice, and ignorance in its teachers: So that if our\n  zealous reformers do not stick fairly to their method we may in time\n  hope to see our nation flourish without either wit, health, money,\n  law, conscience, or religion....\n\n  \u201cBut this sort of reformation I hope will never be thoroughly\n  wrought, while the king, and the Established Church have any friends:\n  The stage I am sure was never heartily oppressed but by the enemies\n  of both.\u201d\n\nThough Cibber thought Collier extreme and unjust in his criticism,\nhis own attitude concerning the abuses of the stage was hardly less\ncensorious than Collier\u2019s, but he blames the audiences for the low\nmoral standards of the entertainments:\n\n  \u201cHowever gravely we may assert, that Profit ought always to be\n  inseparable from the Delight of the Theatre; nay, admitting that\n  the Pleasure would be heighten\u2019d by the uniting them; yet, while\n  Instruction is so little the Concern of the Auditor, how can we hope\n  that so choice a Commodity will come to a Market where there is so\n  seldom a Demand for it?\n\n  \u201cIt is not to the Actor therefore, but to the vitiated and low Taste\n  of the Spectator, that the Corruptions of the Stage (of what kind\n  soever) have been owing.\u201d[64]\n\nHis own attitude, which he held from the first of his career as a\ndramatist, may be illustrated what he says in the _Apology_:[65]\n\n  \u201cYet such Plays (entirely my own) were not wanting at least, in what\n  our most admired Writers seem\u2019d to neglect, and without which, I\n  cannot allow the most taking Play, to be intrinsically good, or\n  to be a Work, upon which a Man of Sense and Probity should value\n  himself: I mean when they do not, as well _prodesse_, as _delectare_,\n  give Profit with Delight! The _Utile Dolci_ was, of old, equally\n  the Point; and has always been my Aim, however wide of the Mark, I\n  may have shot my Arrow. It has often given me Amazement, that our\n  best Authors of that time, could think the Wit, and Spirit of their\n  Scenes, could be an Excuse for making the Looseness of them publick.\n  The many Instances of their Talents so abused, are too glaring, to\n  need a closer Comment, and are sometimes too gross to be recited.\n  If then to have avoided this Imputation, or rather to have had the\n  Interest, and Honour of Virtue always in view, can give Merit to\n  a Play; I am contented that my Readers should think such Merit,\n  the All, that mine have to boast of.--Libertines of mere Wit, and\n  Pleasure, may laugh at these grave Laws, that would limit a lively\n  Genius: But every sensible honest Man, conscious of their Truth,\n  and Use, will give these Ralliers Smile for Smile, and shew a due\n  Contempt for their Merriment.\u201d\n\nDavies tells us:[66]\n\n  \u201cSo well did Cibber, though a professed libertine through life,\n  understand the dignity of virtue, that no comic author has drawn more\n  delightful and striking pictures of it. Mrs. Porter, on reading a\n  part, in which Cibber had painted virtue in the strongest and most\n  lively colors, asked him how it came to pass, that a man, who could\n  draw such admirable portraits of goodness, should yet live as if he\n  were a stranger to it?--\u2018Madam,\u2019 said Colley, \u2018the one is absolutely\n  necessary, the other is not.\u2019\u201d\n\nPossibly this inconsistency in personal conduct and public confession\nexplains why comedies which aimed to teach lessons of virtue were\nsentimental and did not ring true. The men who wrote them wrote from\nthe head and not from the heart, influenced by a growing public demand\nand without real sincerity or conviction.\n\n\n5. CHARACTERISTICS OF RESTORATION COMEDY.\n\nRestoration comedy up to about 1696, while it was essentially a native\ndevelopment, was influenced both in technique and in content by the\ndrama to which the court had been accustomed in its exile in France.\nThe Jonsonian comedy was developing both in the period immediately\npreceding the Commonwealth and during the Restoration into the same\nsort of thing that we have here, and Shadwell, poet laureate and\nespecial favorite of Queen Mary, definitely took the work of Jonson\nas his model. The Jonsonian satire had thrown emphasis on fundamental\ntraits of human nature, but in this later type satire is centered\non manners, dress, the non-essential elements of life, though the\ncharacters continue to be embodiments of single traits. Moli\u00e8re, whose\nearliest effective follower in England was Etherege, taught the English\nwriters of the comedy of manners to aim at polish, refinement of style\nand dialogue, and his influence confirmed the tendency of English\ncomedy to follow the unities as they were then understood. Restoration\ncomedy, then, is native Jonsonian comedy, influenced by the comedy of\nMoli\u00e8re.[67] The chief literary sources of its plots are the comedies\nof Beaumont and Fletcher, of Moli\u00e8re, of Corneille, and Spanish\ncomedies and novels.\n\nThough the late Elizabethans had been gross in word, there had always\nbeen in their work a tendency to punish vice and reward virtue, or at\nleast to make vice ridiculous. But in the Restoration this grossness\nbecomes grossness of word, character, and idea, and it is not the\nviolator of virtue that is made ridiculous, but his victim. The\nElizabethan gaiety, spontaneity, healthy overflow of spirits, become a\ncynicism which is absurd in its artificiality and deliberate pose. The\nJonsonian reaction from earlier Elizabethan romanticism continues its\nadvance toward realism.\n\nThe Restoration dramatist lacks the power to construct effective\nplots. He is able to handle his separate incidents with skill, but\nwhen it comes to sustaining an action through five acts, he fails. His\nchief fault lies in too great intricacy, excessive elaboration, and\ncomplexity, which are due to his endeavor to tell too many stories.\nIn the construction of his plays he commonly takes two, and sometimes\nthree, plays from Moli\u00e8re, or Beaumont and Fletcher, to form one play\nof his own. Hence there is in the handling of the plot a lack of unity.\nFurthermore, in his extreme elaboration of single situations, which\none must admit have qualities to make them lively and interesting\non the stage, the dramatist fails in the great essential quality of\nprobability; if one regards the unity of time, he makes his stories\nimpossible. Lack of sequence is caused by the constant interruption of\nconversation, which is brilliant and entertaining in itself, but has\nnothing to do with the story.\n\nThe dramatist tends to the elaboration of stock themes, dealing with\nthe pursuit of illicit pleasure, assignations, and love intrigues. The\ntypical story might be stated as follows: a young man is entangled with\none or more women, a widow, the wife of an elderly or foolish husband,\nor a mistress whom he is keeping or who is keeping him, and while he\nis carrying on these intrigues he falls in love with the virtuous\nyoung woman he eventually wins. Sometimes his mistresses object to his\nmarrying some one else, sometimes they do not, and in the latter case\nthe opposing force is centered in a rapacious guardian or some other\ncomplicating person or circumstance. There are usually many minor\nlove affairs, sometimes legitimate, sometimes not, and usually so\ncomplicated that it is difficult to keep the various threads separate.\nCollier did no injustice when he said that \u201cthe stage poets make their\nprincipal persons vicious and reward them at the end of the play.\u201d\n\nThe love is mere sensuality. There is tacit acknowledgment that the men\nwill be untrue to their wives and a fear on the part of the husbands\nthat their wives will cuckold them.[68] This fear is not because of any\nmoral scruples, but is merely because of the ridicule that cuckoldom\nbrought on the husband. The treatment is frankly gross, licentious,\ncynical.\n\nIn a sense this treatment is highly realistic; to this extent, that it\nis a general reflection of the standards and manners of the life of the\ncourt. The fashions are contemporary, the manners and morals are those\nof the upper classes. The playwrights confine themselves to a limited\nsection of but a part of the people. Social and religious institutions\nare treated so as to make them ridiculous and contemptible.\n\nThat any other treatment would have been difficult is seen by\nconsidering the relationship existing between the theatre and the\ncourt. The theatre had its authority for existence directly from the\ncourt, one theatre receiving its license from the King, the other\nfrom the Duke of York, while the companies of actors were known as\nthe King\u2019s or the Duke\u2019s servants.[69] These licenses were moreover\nrevocable at the pleasure of those who gave them. Controversies and\ndifferences within the theatre were often settled personally by the\nKing or Duke, and Charles is said to have suggested subjects to the\ndramatists in many instances. With so direct and personal a relation,\nanything other than compliance with the taste of the court could result\nin nothing but the downfall of the theatre. The theatre\u2019s very life\ndepended on its selection and presentation of themes that would satisfy\nand reflect the taste of the most morally degraded court that England\nhas ever had.\n\nThe characterization in these plays is conventional and often vague.\nFor example, it may be laid down as an almost invariable rule that a\nwidow is never virtuous. In the embodiment of a single trait there\nis the continued tendency to exaggeration seen in the \u201chumourous\u201d\ncharacterization of Jonson, with the same use of descriptive\nnames--Courtall, Mrs. Frail, Lady Wishfort, Justice Clodpate--to save\nthe labor of characterization. The characters are likewise lacking in\ncomplexity and development.\n\nThere is the tendency to Jonsonian division of characters into dupes\nand dupers,[70] but this division is not so clear as in Jonson, nor is\nthe division based on the essential qualities of human nature, but is\nrather on the basis of wit and power in repartee. The heroes are all\nwitty, usually wealthy, popular, and their life work is the pursuit of\nwomen. The women are all witty, beautiful, and all rakes, except the\nheroine, and even the heroines bid fair to become so in a few months\nafter marriage. The hero or heroine of one play might be the hero or\nheroine of any other play so far as any distinctive characterization is\nconcerned.\n\nThere is the pretended wit, a simpleton who apes the men of wit\nand fashion, who thinks himself most clever, and who is perfectly\nunconscious of the fact that he is being made a butt for the wit of\nthe sensible characters. Such are the Dapperwits, the Witwouds, and\nthe Tattles. Somewhat similar is the fop who imitates the French,\nthinks only of his dress, his appearance, and the figure he makes. He\nis all ostentation, is entirely self-centered and simple in his mental\nprocesses, but is really not such a fool as one imagines at first.\nEtherege\u2019s Sir Fopling Flutter, and Cibber\u2019s Sir Novelty Fashion--the\nLord Foppingtons of _The Relapse_ and _The Careless Husband_--are two\nwell drawn presentations of this character. An interesting female type\nis the Miss Hoyden-Prue-Hippolyta young woman, who has been kept in\nsecluded ignorance of the world, but who shows a sudden ingenuity,\nknowledge of the world, and desire for the sensual joys of life. There\nare, of course, the elderly cuckolds, dominated and fooled by their\nwives, and the wives who profess virtue but do not practise it.\n\nThat the view here given is not prejudiced by modern standards may\nbe seen by a description of the characters by one of the dramatists\nthemselves. Shadwell in the preface to _The Sullen Lovers_ expresses\nhimself, not without vigor:\n\n  \u201cBut in the Plays, which have been wrote of late, there is no such\n  thing as perfect Character, but the two chief Persons are commonly\n  a Swearing, Drinking, Whoring, Ruffian for a Lover, and an impudent\n  ill-bred _Tomrig_ for a Mistress, and these are the fine People of\n  the play; and ... almost any thing is proper for them to say; but\n  their chief Subject is Bawdy, and Profaneness, which they call _Brisk\n  Writing_, when the most dissolute of Men, that relish those things\n  well enough in Private, are shock\u2019d at \u2019em in Publick.\u201d\n\nThe dialogue, which often interrupts the movement of the plot, and\noften surpasses in interest the more solid quality of representation\nof life, is usually marked by the most brilliant and biting wit, by\nkeenly satiric repartee, and by epigrammatic polish. The dialogue has\noften nothing to do with the story, but is merely the exhibition of\nthe author\u2019s ability in the cynical treatment of contemporary manners.\nThe attitude is one of satire and raillery against all established\ninstitutions, against marriage, the manners of society, the Puritans,\nthe newly developing sciences, the court, dueling, the country and\nits inhabitants, the opera, the new songs and novels, the affectation\nof foreign airs, the adoption of foreign words, poetry and dilettante\nwriting, polite literary conversation, legal abuses, and almost\neverything that one can conceive.\n\nThe locality in which the plays are set is extremely narrow at\nfirst, being confined to the town; for most of the plays are set in\nLondon, in localities familiar to the audiences. Within the class\nand localities to which the comedy restricts itself, it is a most\ninteresting social document; but it must always be remembered that it\nis no sense representative of the whole people. Sometimes we are taken\nto Spain or Italy, but it is Spain or Italy only in name, the people\nand the customs are all English. The scene may sometimes be one of the\nfashionable watering places in England; but it is never in the despised\ncountry.\n\nWhether one agrees with it or not it is well to keep in mind Lamb\u2019s\ndefense in his essay _On the Artificial Comedy of the Last Century_:\n\n  \u201cWe have been spoiled with ... the ... drama of common life; where\n  the moral point is everything; where, instead of the fictitious\n  half-believed personages of the stage (the phantoms of old comedy)\n  we recognize ourselves, our brothers, aunts, kinsfolk, allies,\n  patrons, enemies,--the same as in life.... \u201cI do not know how it is\n  with others, but I feel the better always for the perusal of one of\n  Congreve\u2019s--nay, why should I not add even of Wycherley\u2019s--comedies.\n  I am the gayer at least for it; and I could never connect those\n  sports of a witty fancy in any shape with any result to be drawn\n  from them to imitation in real life. They are a world of themselves\n  almost as much as fairyland.... But in its own world do we feel\n  the creature is so very bad?--The Fainalls and the Mirabels, the\n  Dorimants and the Lady Touchwoods, in their own sphere, do not offend\n  my moral sense; in fact they do not appeal to it at all. They seem\n  engaged in their proper element. They break through no laws, or\n  conscientious restraints. They know of none. They have got out of\n  Christendom into the land--what shall I call it?--of cuckoldry--the\n  Utopia of gallantry, where pleasure is duty, and the manners perfect\n  freedom. It is altogether a speculative scene of things, which has no\n  reference whatever to the world that is.... He [Congreve] has spread\n  a privation of moral light ... over his creations; and his shadows\n  flit before you without distinction or preference. Had he introduced\n  a good character, a single gush of moral feeling, a revulsion of the\n  judgment to actual life and actual duties, the impertinent Goshen\n  would have only lighted to the discovery of deformities, which now\n  are none, because we think them none.... \u201c... When we are among\n  them [the characters of Congreve and Wycherley], we are amongst a\n  chaotic people. We are not to judge them by our usages. No reverend\n  institutions are insulted by their proceedings,--for they have none\n  among them. No peace of families is violated,--for no family ties\n  exist among them. No purity of the marriage bed is stained,--for\n  none is supposed to have a being.... There is neither right nor\n  wrong,--gratitude or its opposite,--claim or duty,--paternity or\n  sonship....\n\n  \u201cThe whole is a passing pageant.... But, like Don Quixote, we take\n  part against the puppets, and quite as impertinently.... We would\n  indict our very dreams.\u201d\n\n\n6. BEGINNINGS OF THE CHANGE IN THE DRAMA.\n\nSuch had been the conditions surrounding the drama and in the drama\nitself before the reformation began. When one comes to look at the\nstage and the audiences, one finds very little indication of change\nat first. In 1682 there seems to have been objection to _London\nCuckolds_ on the ground of indecency, and Ravenscroft in the prologue\nto _Dame Dobson_ (1682) claims to have complied with the objections\nwhich had been raised by making his own play dull and civil. In 1684\nappeared Southerne\u2019s first comedy, _The Disappointment_, which he calls\na \u201cplay,\u201d and in this we have the serious treatment of the marriage\nrelations and the preservation of a wife\u2019s chastity. Throughout,\nSoutherne\u2019s tendency was towards morality.\n\nIn 1696 there begins a real and easily discernible movement towards the\nmoral treatment of dramatic themes. _The She Gallants_ (1696) was so\noffensive to the ladies that it had to be withdrawn; in _She Ventures\nand He Wins_ (1696) the man who would carry on an amour with a married\nwoman is exposed and tricked and made the butt; and in Mrs. Manley\u2019s\n_The Lost Lover_ (1696) there is the noticeable introduction of a\nvirtuous wife.\n\nIn 1697, the epilogue to _Boadicea_, a tragedy, tells us that\n\n    \u201cOnce only smutty jests could please the town,\n     But now (Heav\u2019n help our trade) they\u2019ll not go down.\u201d\n\nWaterhouse[71] finds traces of sentimentality in Vanbrugh\u2019s _Aesop_,\nwhich appeared the same year. Then in 1698 matters were brought to a\nhead by Collier, and we find Congreve\u2019s _Double Dealer_ advertised to\nbe acted \u201cwith several expressions omitted,\u201d while in _The Way of the\nWorld_ (1700) his muse is somewhat more chaste. _The Provoked Wife_\nwas altered, probably in 1706, so that the clergy might not seem to be\nattacked.\n\nFrom this time on the changed attitude was increasingly manifest in the\nnew plays, though the old were still acted with little or no change.\n\nIn _The State of the Case Restated_[72] it is contended that the royal\npatent to the Drury Lane Theatre was given to Sir Richard Steele for\nthe purpose of correcting the abuses of the theatre, but that Sir\nRichard had not done this; in fact that\n\n  \u201cThe same lewd plays were acted and reviewed without any material\n  alteration, which gave occasion for that universal complaint against\n  the English stage, of lewdness and debauchery, from all the sober and\n  religious part of the nation; the whole business of comedy continuing\n  all this time to be the criminal intrigues of fornication and\n  adultery, ridiculing of marriage, virtue, and integrity, and giving\n  a favorable turn to vicious characters, and instructing loose people\n  how to carry on their lewd designs with plausibility and success:\n  thus among other plays they have revived _The Country Wife_, _Sir\n  Fopling Flutter_, _The Rover_, _The Libertine Destroyer_, and several\n  others, and it is remarkable, that the knight, or coadjutors, had\n  condemned _Sir Fopling Flutter_, as one of the most execrable and\n  vicious plays that ever was performed in public.\u201d\n\nThe change that was occurring may be fairly illustrated by quotations\nfrom plays by Etherege and Steele, which are characteristic of the\nalterations not only as to morals but as to moralizing. In speaking of\nmarriage Etherege says, \u201cyour nephew ought to conceal it [his marriage]\nfor a time, madam, since marriage has lost its good name; prudent men\nseldom expose their own reputations, till \u2019tis convenient to justify\ntheir wives;\u201d[73] while Steele\u2019s sentiment is that \u201cwedlock is hell if\nat least one side does not love, as it would be Heaven if both did.\u201d[74]\n\n\n7. CIBBER\u2019S COMEDIES.\n\nCibber at the very outset of his career as a dramatist, in _Love\u2019s Last\nShift_ (1696), deliberately attempted to reform the stage, and that\nthe audience was ready for the innovation is shown by the way it was\nreceived, for we are told that \u201cnever were spectators more happy in\neasing their minds by uncommon and repeated plaudits. The honest tears,\nshed by the audience, conveyed a strong reproach to our licentious\npoets, and was to Cibber the highest mark of honor.\u201d[75] Davies further\ngives Cibber the credit of being the first in reforming the English\nstage, and of founding English sentimental comedy. \u201cThe first comedy,\nacted since the Restoration, in which were preserved purity of manners\nand decency of language, with a due respect to the honor of the\nmarriage-bed, was Colley Cibber\u2019s _Love\u2019s Last Shift, or The Fool in\nFashion_.\u201d[76] Cibber himself makes no claim to decency of language,\nnor is it found to any greater extent in this play than in the other\nplays of the period. Certainly there can be nothing bolder than the\nfirst act, or the epilogue, which reads as follows:\n\n    \u201cNow, gallants, for the author. First, to you\n     Kind city gentlemen o\u2019 th\u2019 middle row;\n     He hopes you nothing to his charge can lay,\n     There\u2019s not a cuckold made in all his play.\n     Nay, you must own, if you believe your eyes,\n     He draws his pen against your enemies:\n     For he declares, today, he merely strives\n     To maul the beaux--because they maul your wives.\n     Nor, sirs, to you whose sole religion\u2019s drinking,\n     Whoring, roaring, without the pain of thinking,\n     He fears he\u2019s made a fault you\u2019ll ne\u2019er forgive,\n     A crime beyond the hopes of a reprieve:\n     An honest rake forego the joys of life,\n     His whores and wine, t\u2019 embrace a dull chaste wife!\n     Such out-of-fashion stuff! but then again,\n     He\u2019s lewd for above four acts, gentlemen.\n\n           *       *       *       *       *\n\n     Four acts for your coarse palates were design\u2019d,\n     But then the ladies taste is more refin\u2019d,\n     They, for Amanda\u2019s sake, will sure be kind.\u201d\n\nThe main action, that which deals with the reformation of the wandering\nhusband, seems to be original with Cibber in every respect. It deals\nwith the reformation of a husband who eight or ten years before has\ndeserted his young wife for a dissolute life on the continent, and who\nreturns to England still more degenerate in mind and morals than when\nhe left, and so entirely depleted in purse that he has not money enough\nto buy a meal or pay for a night\u2019s lodging for himself and his servant.\nThe husband is finally led to return to his wife, whose appearance has\nso changed that he does not recognize her, by her pretense of being a\nnew mistress. This subterfuge is more or less remotely suggestive of\nShakspere\u2019s _All\u2019s Well that Ends Well_ and Shirley\u2019s _Gamester_, both\nof which have been suggested as its source; but it owes nothing to them\nin the working out of the situation.\n\nThe theme is practically that of _The Careless Husband_: the\nreformation of a husband not entirely spoiled at heart. The moral\nteaching is that there is the same pleasure in legitimate enjoyment as\nin the baser and illicit sort.\n\nThe innovation consists in the very moral ending of the piece,\nparticularly in the definite decision of the hero to reform, a\ndetermination which he expresses as follows:\n\n  \u201cBy my example taught, let every man, whose fate has bound him to\n  a marry\u2019d life, beware of letting loose his wild desires: for if\n  experience may be allow\u2019d to judge, I must proclaim the folly of a\n  wandering passion. The greatest happiness we can hope on earth,\n\n    And sure the nearest to the joys above,\n    Is the chaste rapture of a virtuous love.\u201d\n\nIt is to be noticed that the illicit affair of Sir Novelty Fashion and\nMrs. Flareit is made ridiculous and not happy at the end, nor does Sir\nNovelty acquire a mistress or a wife who has previously been chaste.\nLikewise there is no husband who is made ridiculous by being cuckolded,\nand the only amour, if it can be called an amour, that which Amanda\u2019s\nmaid unwillingly has with Snap, is made right the next morning by the\nmarriage of the two.\n\nOn the other hand, the play, aside from these particulars, exhibits\nthe technique and the material of the typical Restoration comedy.\nThe chief incident deals in most frank style with the sex relations\nof the hero and heroine, treated essentially in the Restoration way,\nwith the exception that the audience knows they are man and wife while\nthe characters do not. The cellar incident is as frank and gross as\nanything of the sort in the earlier drama, though in this case the\nfinal outcome is a wedding. There is the same succession of lively and\ndisconnected incidents, incidents which would go well on the stage, and\nwhich make up five separate threads of story. The substitution of the\nname of one person for another in the marriage bond is the same sort of\nthing that occurs over and over again in the earlier comedy.[77]\n\nThe characters represent the same more or less stiff drawing of\nconventional figures. Sir Novelty Fashion is of the same family as Sir\nFopling Flutter; Lovelace and Young Worthy are the same drunken rakes\nas those who make the principal characters in the unreformed drama,\nwith the exception that here they are not presented to us as carrying\non their amours. Snap is the witty servingman who is invariably paired\nwith the maid of the heroine in Restoration comedy. There is the same\npresentation of local scenes, particularly that in the park; there is\nthe same coarse speech; and there is the same interruption of the story\nby raillery.\n\nBut the play as already suggested is a very distinct step in advance in\nits treatment of fundamental morality, and marks a conscious beginning\nof a new mode; not an inconsiderable achievement for the first play of\nan author twenty-four years old.\n\nThe two plots of _Woman\u2019s Wit_ (1697) are entirely dissimilar in tone\nand dramatic handling, and, moreover, have no essential connection with\neach other. The main plot, which gives the name to the piece, is in the\nRestoration manner, while the sub-plot, which deals with the Rakishes,\nis in the mould of the minor late Elizabethans. In its portrayal of\nmanners it belongs to the type represented by the plays of Brome,\nmarked by coarseness rather than finish, and implying about the same\nstandard of morals.\n\nThe main plot consists of a series of complications caused by the\nefforts of Longeville to unmask Leonora\u2019s unfaithfulness to Lovemore,\nto whom she is engaged. She convinces Lovemore that Longeville\u2019s\nefforts are the result of a plot, the purpose of which is to alienate\nLovemore and Leonora so that Longeville may have her to himself; and\nthere then follows one complication after another, until the characters\nare at last gathered together and Leonora is made to confess her\nduplicity.\n\nThe situation on which the main action is based is original and highly\ndramatic, but in order to maintain the intrigue Cibber has had to use\nincidents which are marked by improbability and dramatic blindness\nto such an extent that the action becomes wearisome. Cibber seems to\nbe groping for something different from the conventional Restoration\nintrigue. His conception is worthy of more success than he attained,\nbut he lacked the dramatic skill and experience to carry it out.\n\nSome of the character drawing is good. Longeville and Lovemore are\nrather decent young men, but are no doubt too sentimental for success\non the stage at this time. The Rakishes are overdrawn and farcical. The\nwomen, with the exception of Leonora, are lacking in the spontaneity\nand wit demanded of seventeenth and early eighteenth century heroines,\nand like the men are possibly too sentimental. Leonora is the intriguer\nand is the best drawn and most important personage in the play. Her\ndownfall is the result of her own character and conduct, and in the\ndisapproval of her character and actions Cibber has repeated, to some\nextent, views he expressed in his first play.\n\nThe vulgar sub-plot which deals with Old Rakish and Young Rakish, when\nseparated from _Woman\u2019s Wit_ and acted in 1707 as _The School Boy_, was\na greater success than the original play. With the exception of the\nchange in the names of some of the personages, minor alterations of the\ndialogue, the omission of parts of the incidents, and the addition of\nsuch incidents as are necessary to make it stand by itself, the play is\nverbatim as it appeared when a part of _Woman\u2019s Wit_.\n\nFrom the point of view of the reformation of the stage it must be\nconfessed that _Woman\u2019s Wit_ was not of great importance. The moral\ntone of the main action is high; at least virtue is rewarded and vice\ndisgraced, and there are no amours carried on. But the sub-action,\nwhich was later transformed into _The School Boy_, is entirely opposed\nto both good taste and good morals, and after a series of low comedy\nscenes, ends with the promise of Young Rakish to Master Johnny that he\nwill take Johnny to the playhouse, where the latter may satisfy his\ndisappointment in the failure to marry his mother\u2019s woman. Although\nnotable progress in the morality of the drama had been made, as we\nhave seen, the fact that this sub-action was successfully presented by\nitself shows that the taste of the theatre-going public was not yet\nentirely regenerate.\n\n_Love Makes a Man_ (1701) is a rather close adaptation of two of\nBeaumont and Fletcher\u2019s plays,[78] in which Cibber does not pretend\nto any serious purpose. \u201cFor masks, we\u2019ve scandal, and for beaus,\nFrench airs.\u201d And yet his moralizing and sentimental tendency cannot\nbe entirely restrained, for when Carlos, the hero of the play, does\nturn from his books to love, he speaks in a most heightened and\nsentimental strain. So too the efforts of Louisa to seduce him are met\nwith sentiments of lofty morality which are actuated by his sincere\nlove for Angelina. The Restoration lover would not have hesitated\nin the slightest degree to enjoy all that Louisa offered and his\nwife-to-be would have taken it as a matter of course, probably would\nhave joked with her confidante, if not with the hero, on the subject.\nBut with Cibber not only is the attitude concerning this sort of thing\nchanged, but in his alteration he has omitted one incident[79] that\nwould have been a source of great delight to a Restoration audience,\nand has softened the language throughout, so that the coarseness\nwhich marks his original has largely disappeared. No one undergoes\na moral reformation, for Louisa has not been evil in her life, and\nthis one unsuccessful effort at seduction cures her. But the play has\ntwo characteristics of the sentimental type; it is perfectly moral in\naction, and it has some expression of sentimental philosophy.\n\n_She Would and She Would Not_ (1702) is probably more in accordance\nwith modern taste than any other play Cibber wrote. In this regard for\ngood taste as well as good morals it is significant of the change in\nEnglish comedy, and though it is not sentimental, it indicates Cibber\u2019s\nreadiness to adopt and lead the new mode. In its technique it reminds\nus of the Spanish intrigue plays of Dryden; but it is perfectly moral,\nand the two lovers do not employ their time, when away from the main\nbusiness of winning their wives, in carrying on intrigues with other\nwomen.\n\n_The Careless Husband_ (acted 1704) is Cibber\u2019s masterpiece in\nsentimental comedy. In it he has reached greater excellence than in his\nformer plays in plot and in character presentation, and in the ability\nto make his plot and moral purpose work out consistently and logically.\nThe reformation of Loveless in _Love\u2019s Last Shift_ strikes one as\nnot in keeping with his character; one feels that his relapse[80] is\nquite the natural thing to happen. In this play, however, the hero\u2019s\ncharacter is presented from the first in a way that prepares one for\nthe final reformation. In this particular Cibber rises above his\ncontemporaries in comedy.\n\nIn _The Careless Husband_ Cibber lays claim to deliberate and\nserious moral purpose and deals, as he did in his first play, with\nthe reclaiming of a licentious husband by a virtuous wife. Dibdin\nextravagantly says of it that \u201cit was a school for elegant manners, and\nan example for honorable actions.\u201d Cibber expresses himself in regard\nto his purpose, in the dedication, as follows:\n\n  \u201cThe best criticks have long and justly complain\u2019d, that the\n  coarseness of most characters in our late Comedies, have been unfit\n  entertainments for People of Quality, especially the ladies: and\n  therfore I was long in hopes that some able pen (whose expectation\n  did not hang upon the profits of success) wou\u2019d generously attempt\n  to reform the Town into a better taste than the World generally\n  allows \u2019em: but nothing of that kind having lately appear\u2019d, that\n  would give me the opportunity of being wise at another\u2019s expence, I\n  found it impossible any longer to resist the secret temptation of my\n  vanity, and so e\u2019en struck the first blow myself: and the event has\n  now convinc\u2019d me, that whoever sticks closely to Nature, can\u2019t easily\n  write above the understandings of the Galleries, tho\u2019 at the same\n  time he may possibly deserve applause of the Boxes.\u201d\n\nBut in _The Careless Husband_, in contrast with what he had previously\nwritten in this field, the tone of the entire play is moral, not merely\nthat of the fifth act, the play is worked out consistently, and the\noffensive effect of an incongruous mixture of standards is lacking.\nIt belongs distinctly to the sentimental type, and is the best of the\nearly school.\n\nIn the prologue Cibber gives a summary of the kind of characters that\nshould illustrate the moral the comedy writer has as his theme:\n\n    \u201cOf all the various Vices of the Age,\n     And shoals of fools expos\u2019d upon the Stage,\n     How few are lasht that call for Satire\u2019s rage!\n     What can you think to see our Plays so full\n     Of Madmen, Coxcombs, and the drivelling Fool?\n     Of Cits, of Sharpers, Rakes, and roaring Bullies,\n     Of Cheats, of Cuckolds, Aldermen and Cullies?\n     Wou\u2019d not one swear, \u2019twere taken for a rule,\n     That Satire\u2019s rod in the Dramatick School,\n     Was only meant for the incorrigible Fool?\n     As if too Vice and Folly were confined\n     To the vile scum alone of human kind,\n     Creatures a Muse should scorn; such abject trash\n     Deserves not Satire\u2019s but the Hangman\u2019s lash.\n\n           *       *       *       *       *\n\n     We rather think the persons fit for Plays,\n     Are those whose birth and education says\n     They\u2019ve every help that shou\u2019d improve mankind,\n     Yet still live slaves to a vile tainted mind.\u201d\n\nIn this play Cibber continues the general practice of basing dramatic\ntechnique upon that of the Restoration drama. We find the same\nmultiplicity of plots, though there is here a material reduction in\ntheir number. But here the various plots are more consistently bound\ntogether and more logically worked out. The hero is a somewhat refined\nRestoration character; he has more gentleness and goodness in him, but\nthe course he pursues is typical of the earlier plays in that he is\ncarrying on two amours during the play and at the end he abandons those\nintrigues; with this difference, however, that the reformation of the\nhero of _The Careless Husband_ is felt to be permanent.\n\nThe love story of Lord Morelove and Lady Betty, which forms the\nsub-action, is in the best style of the comedy of manners. It, as well\nas the main action, reminds one in its finished workmanship of the best\nplays written during the latter part of the preceding century.\n\nThere is a distinct effort to teach the advantage of moral living, in\nthe unhappy outcome of the illicit affairs and in the happy outcome\nof the legitimate. The situation in which Edging and Sir Charles are\ndiscovered asleep, which proved too gross for Cibber\u2019s audience, is\nnevertheless handled in a manner to show disapproval; the Restoration\ndramatist would have been salacious and humorous. Sir Charles\u2019s feeling\nof guilt after this scene, however, is an entirely new note.\n\nSome of the characters are stock figures. Lady Betty is the usual\ncoquette, is a Millamant type, but is altogether more human and modern;\nLord Foppington is the continuation of Sir Novelty Fashion, whom we\nrecognize as a type which appears in Etherege and Crowne; and Sir\nCharles, until his reformation, is, in his conduct, the Restoration\nrake, with, however, distinctly more humanity. His whole-heartedness\nand inherent honor make one forgive his lapse in conduct.\n\nOther characters indicate a new mode. Lady Easy is a modest, virtuous,\ncapable wife, full of moderation and tact, with the gentleness of\nthe modern ideal woman. She belongs to the patient Griselda type,\nand her situation, which contains not a little pathos, is handled\nin a way to gain the sympathy of the audience. This is a new and\nnoteworthy contribution in the direction of the fully developed type\nof sentimental comedy. Even in spite of Sir Charles\u2019s defection in\nconduct, we recognize an inherent goodness in his nature. Lord Morelove\nis the preaching, sentimentalizing type, serious minded and upright,\nthe sort of character that Cibber has presented in Lord Lovemore in\n_Woman\u2019s Wit_ and Elder Worthy in _Love\u2019s Last Shift_; a character\nwho seldom appears in the Restoration period, or, if he does appear,\nis ridiculed. In this presentation of a successful lover, lacking in\nwit and inconstancy, Cibber was not following the convention of the\npreceding drama, which usually made its heroes witty scamps.\n\nWhile we still have light banter and raillery, they are primarily\nused to display character or further the plot, functions which they\ndisregard in the Restoration plays. The theme and its working out\nnot only deal with the reformation of the loose character, but also\nendeavor to present an admirable example of womanhood who shows a\nproper fidelity to her husband in spite of all his delinquencies. In\nthe presentation of this high type of character Cibber has again become\nan innovator and has made a positive contribution to the drama of the\nperiod.\n\nIn his adaptation of the plays by Dryden[81] in _The Comical Lovers_\n(1707) Cibber has not attempted any changes, and the play is of no\nimportance in the development of comedy. It was regarded merely as a\nrevival of Dryden\u2019s work, and was acted along with other old plays\nduring the same season, largely because of an antiquarian interest.\n\nThe two plays from which this is made go well together and present\nsomething of the best that Dryden did in the line of satiric comedy,\nand no doubt the social satire was almost as pertinent in Cibber\u2019s time\nas it had been forty or fifty years earlier.\n\nBut the moral standard, which is almost always present, even if in the\nbackground, in Cibber\u2019s own plays, is almost entirely lacking here.\nCeladon expects to be cuckolded, but would rather be cuckolded by\nFlorimel (who reminds one very strongly of Congreve\u2019s Millamant even\nin the stipulations before their agreement of marriage), than by any\none else. So too in the complications in the second story in the play,\nthe moral defections are humorous merely because they are immoral, and\nthere is no disapproval expressed or implied. In Cibber\u2019s own work he\nmay retain his disapproval until the last act, but the moral standard\nalways appears in some way or other, so that this play is essentially\nuncharacteristic of Cibber\u2019s work.\n\n_The Double Gallant_ (1707) is an adaption of the same sort as _The\nComical Lovers_, derived from Restoration plays,[82] but it does have\nmore significance. It is marked by the same general tone of moral\nirresponsibility and lightness, but without the actual culmination of\ndelinquencies; there is the same raillery, somewhat curtailed, and the\nhero, as in those plays, involves himself in intrigue with several\nwomen at once. There is more respect for morals in the general conduct\nof the piece. The change is indicated in the handling of the source.\nBurnaby[83] has made use of what is probably the most notorious and\ngrossest incident in Restoration comedy, Horner\u2019s subterfuge in _The\nCountry Wife_, but has modified some of the elements of the intrigue.\nCibber has prevented the successful outcome of the intrigue, and has\nentirely omitted the unpleasant features.\n\n_The Lady\u2019s Last Stake_ (1707), in the handling of a serious theme,\nseems the most modern of Cibber\u2019s comedies; it represents almost an\napproach to the modern problem play in the Lord and Lady Wronglove\nstory and in the theme of the Lord George and Lady Gentle story. It\nis a fully developed comedy of the sentimental type of this period,\nwith its four acts of intrigue, its reconciliation at the end, and its\nextremely moral teaching. Cibber makes two statements of his theme,\nfirst in the dedication, and then in the prologue. His statement in the\ndedication is as follows:\n\n  \u201cA Play, without a just Moral, is a poor and trivial Undertaking;\n  and \u2019tis from the Success of such Pieces, that Mr. Collier was\n  furnish\u2019d with an advantageous Pretence of laying his unmerciful\n  Axe to the Root of the Stage. Gaming is a Vice that has undone more\n  innocent Principles than any one Folly that\u2019s in Fashion; therefore\n  I chose to expose it to the Fair Sex in its most hideous Form, by\n  reducing a Woman of honour to stand the presumptuous Addresses of a\n  Man, whom neither her Virtue nor Inclination would let her have the\n  least Taste to. Now \u2019tis not impossible but some Man of Fortune, who\n  has a handsome Lady, and a great deal of Money to throw away, may,\n  from this startling hint, think it worth his while to find his Wife\n  some less hazardous Diversion. If that should ever happen, my end of\n  writing this Play is answer\u2019d.\u201d\n\nThe plot centers around a most lively intrigue, but shows a departure\nfrom the Restoration type. Cibber seems to have devised his own plot\nfrom observation rather than to have taken it from the work of some one\nelse, though in his characters he shows some imitation of characters\nin older plays. Miss Notable is a Miss Prue type, but the action of\nthe play preserves her virtue and indicates disapproval of the effort\nto seduce her. There is a wide difference between this and the course\nof Congreve\u2019s character who rushes eagerly to her bedroom followed by\nTattle.[84] So too in the relations of Lady Wronglove with her husband\nthere enters a new note. Not only does Cibber show her a virtuous\nwoman, but he recognizes the infidelity of the husband as grave enough\nto merit not only condemnation but punishment; and though he does\nnot carry his story so far as to inflict on him his just deserts, he\nrecognizes the right of the wife to resent Lord Wronglove\u2019s action,\nalthough he clearly feels her resentment is unwise. Sir Friendly\nMoral, who reconciles the various couples, furnishes the somewhat\nsentimental moralizings, and seems to be the mouthpiece of the author.\n\nOne does not waste much sympathy on either Lord or Lady Wronglove in\ntheir bickerings, and their reconciliation at the end through the good\noffices of Sir Friendly is decidedly lacking in probability, in view of\nthe way in which they have been previously presented. This d\u00e9nouement\nis brought about by a typical _deus ex machina_ device, in which Sir\nFriendly, by supplying money to one of the characters, and by using\nhis exceeding wisdom and knowledge with another set of characters,\nbrings about the happy ending. Cibber was not unlike the other late\nseventeenth and early eighteenth century writers in his inability to\nbring his plays to a logical and probable conclusion. He was hampered\nby his theory that the element of surprise should enter into the happy\nending, and hence he often seems to feel compelled to introduce a new\nforce very late in the play.\n\nThe characters in the main action are somewhat serious and lacking\nin attractiveness. But those in the comic action, Lord George, Mrs.\nConquest, and Miss Notable, are much more lively sources of interest.\nMiss Notable, as already stated, is a Miss Prue type, though she is\nprobably not to be described as a \u201csilly, awkward country girl.\u201d She is\nessentially a sophisticated city miss, but her desires and ambitions,\nas well as some of her ingenuous characteristics, are similar to those\nof the Miss Prue type. She starts a flirtation with each new man she\nmeets in order to pique the last new man, who in like manner had his\nturn. The discomfiture of Lord George when Miss Notable avows her love\nfor Mrs. Conquest, who is in the disguise of a man, is very clever.\n\nIt is hard to believe that an honorable gentleman, as Sir George is\ndescribed as being, would cheat at cards even for the purpose of\nseducing another man\u2019s wife. It is in just such conceptions as this\nthat Cibber\u2019s superficiality is shown, a superficiality which prevented\nhim from writing great drama notwithstanding his knowledge of technical\nrequirements.\n\nIn the situations of Lady Gentle and Mrs. Conquest, especially in that\nof the latter, there is a distinct element of pathos, similar to that\nin _The Careless Husband_. As in _The Careless Husband_, this pathos\nis due not merely to the situation, but depends likewise on the nature\nof the persons presented. In this respect it is superior to the later\nsentimental comedy, in which the pathos depends more largely on the\nsituation alone.\n\nIn its serious elements _The Lady\u2019s Last Stake_ attacks what are\nwithout doubt notable human failings, and the dialogue at its best\nreminds us of some of the best Congrevian sort. But Cibber\u2019s practice\nas to the happy outcome and his theory that there must be a surprise at\nthe end of a play, have prevented what might have been, in the hands of\na more serious and larger minded dramatist, a most important handling\nof a new theme in a new way.\n\nWhen he wrote _The Rival Fools_ (1709), Cibber seemed, if one may judge\nfrom the prologue, to feel that his efforts for reform were not meeting\nwith sufficient response and appreciation, and therefore tells the\naudience that\n\n    \u201cAll sorts of Men and Manners may\n     From these last Scenes go unreprov\u2019d away.\n     From late Experience taught, we slight th\u2019 old Rule\n     Of Profit with Delight: This Play\u2019s--All Fool.\u201d\n\nBut though this comedy is not didactic in its purpose, it is morally\nclean in its action.\n\nIn _The Non-Juror_ (1717), a play written with an avowedly political\npurpose, he cannot avoid moralizing and sentimentality, qualities which\nappear slightly in the story of Charles, and in the relations of Dr.\nWolf to Lady Woodvil and Maria. It cannot be claimed that the play has\nany important bearing on sentimental comedy, however.\n\n_The Refusal_ (1721) might be called a purified Restoration comedy,\nwithout any positive bearing on the sentimentalizing tendency except\nthat it shows the tendency to make the drama more moral.\n\n_The Provoked Husband_ (1728), Cibber\u2019s completion of Vanbrugh\u2019s _A\nJourney to London_, is typically sentimental in treatment, with the\nhappy ending, the reformation of the vicious, and the true but dull\nexpression of moral sentiments by the serious characters. In it Cibber\nhas departed from Vanbrugh\u2019s original intention by reforming the wife,\nwhom he has preserved as perfectly true to her husband, though unduly\ngiven to gambling. In the love affair of Mr. Manly and Lord Townley\u2019s\nsister we likewise have sentimental treatment, and in the expression of\npious thoughts no one could be more prolific than Mr. Manly. In this\nplay Cibber does not strike any note he has not used before; it is\nmerely significant of the permanence of the changed manner of writing\nin English comedy generally.\n\nIn the first plot Cibber has somewhat softened the characters of\nVanbrugh\u2019s Lord and Lady Loverule in Lord and Lady Townley, giving to\nthe husband a much less dictatorial and more sentimental and uxorious\ncharacter. Lady Townley, though she does not show any signs of softer\nqualities, is made to see the error of her course of late hours and\ngambling, and undergoes a somewhat improbable but characteristic\nconversion. Cibber tells us[85] that it had been Vanbrugh\u2019s intention\nto turn the lady out of doors, as would have been natural and logical,\ngiving to the play a serious interest which it lacks under Cibber\u2019s\nmanagement.\n\nThe characters are shorn of their rough virility in Cibber\u2019s\nversion. Squire Richard is a sort of rough study of the Tony Lumpkin\ntype,--without his wit, however,--but the credit of the portrayal is\ndue to Vanbrugh rather than to Cibber.\n\nWhile the play is far from lacking in interest and power to amuse,\nthere is a very decided inferiority to Vanbrugh\u2019s play, even in its\nunfinished and imperfect state. Cibber\u2019s play is a typical sentimental\ncomedy, with its undeserved happy ending, reformation of the vicious,\nand commonplace expression of sentiment and morals on the part of the\nserious characters.\n\nAlthough it does not exhibit any startling new qualities, in its theme\nattacking the evils of gambling which Cibber has previously attacked,\nthe play is a good example of eighteenth century comedy; fully as good,\nindeed, as the work of the other dramatists of the time, but suffering\nin comparison with Cibber\u2019s own best work.\n\nIt may be interesting to note that Cibber is said to have added the\nparts of Tom and Phillis to Steele\u2019s _Conscious Lovers_.[86] When\nSteele submitted this play to him, Cibber felt that it would not\nsatisfy the desire of an audience to laugh at a comedy. According\nto the account in _The Lives of the Poets_, Steele gladly accepted\nCibber\u2019s suggestion that a comic action be inserted and even proposed\nthat Cibber make such additions to the play as he saw fit. The absence\nof humor is a mark of the form of sentimental comedy inaugurated by\nSteele, while the form represented by Cibber\u2019s work is closer to the\nRestoration type, is indeed really a modification of that type, and\nthe element of humor is consequently found in it.\n\n\n8. TYPICAL QUALITY OF CIBBER\u2019S WORK.\n\nCibber\u2019s work typifies the change that was going on in the moral\nreformation of the drama, as it likewise shows the development\ncharacteristic of the time in other elements of the drama.[87] In\nhim, as in others, we see that while the general type of Restoration\ncomedy was adopted in the construction of the plot, there was a\ntendency to simplify the plot. Moreover, Cibber further departed from\nthe Restoration type by the selection of themes other than mere sex\nrelations. Other dramatists were able to present such themes without\nreference to moral degeneration, but Cibber, when he takes such a\nsubject as the dangers of gambling, for instance, cannot entirely avoid\ndealing with sex immorality.\n\nIn the dull, chaste lover, the sober, moral, worthy gentleman who is\nlargely a result of the sentimental tendency in the drama, such as Lord\nMorelove in _Woman\u2019s Wit_ and Elder Worthy in _Love\u2019s Last Shift_,\nCibber developed and made more important a type which had appeared but\nhad been relatively unimportant in earlier drama. In the comedy of\nSteele and his followers this character was further developed so that\nit became the central figure. Cibber and his predecessors seem to have\nbeen guided by some such formula as that interesting personality and\nmorality appear in inverse ratio in male characters.\n\nThe precocious Miss Prue type, the young woman who is destined to have\na lover or a husband, perhaps both, in a short time, is represented by\nMiss Jenny in _The Provoked Husband_ _and_ Miss Notable in _The Lady\u2019s\nLast Stake_. This type of character soon disappeared from the drama, as\ndid likewise the Millamant kind of coquette, who appears as Maria in\n_The Non-Juror_ and as Lady Betty in _The Careless Husband_. Snap and\nTrappanti are typical menservants, witty and graceless, and we find the\nmercenary serving woman in _The Provoked Husband_ and _She Would and\nShe Would Not_. Characters of this type continue occasionally in the\nsucceeding drama, where they furnish the comic relief.\n\n\n9. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CIBBER\u2019S COMEDIES.\n\nCibber\u2019s themes are taken from contemporary life and its more obvious\nproblems. Of course so far as any serious purpose is concerned, a\ndistinction must be made between those plays designed merely to afford\nthe pleasure of an evening\u2019s entertainment and those written with more\nserious intent. Cibber often distinguishes between these two classes,\nand frankly states his purpose in the prologue or dedication to the\nseparate plays.\n\nHis attitude toward his audience is somewhat na\u00efve. He frankly states\nthat his \u201csole dependence being the judgment of an audience, \u2019twere\nmadness to provoke them.\u201d[88] He again says[89] that \u201cevery guest is a\njudge of his own palate; and a poet ought no more to impose good sense\nupon the galleries, than dull farce upon undisputed judges. I first\nconsidered who my guests were, before I prepared my entertainment.\u201d\nThis would seem to indicate that at times he had no high respect for\nhis audiences; especially when he wrote _The School Boy_ and _Hob in\nthe Well_, if the latter is by him. In this connection one may note\nthat he consciously distinguished stage and closet drama, and made\nno attempt to write the latter. In his \u201cRemarks to the Reader\u201d of\n_Ximena_ he says, \u201cthough the reader must be charmed by the tenderness\nof the characters in the original, I have ventured to alter, to make\nthem more agreeable to the spectator.\u201d These statements would seem to\nindicate that Cibber wrote his sentimental plays because he thought the\naudiences desired something of the sort.\n\nAs a playwright Cibber was a strong upholder of religion and the\nestablished church. He points out that the only religious sect to close\nthe theatre was also opposed to the established church.[90] But in\ntreating religious subjects he does not use the Puritans for dramatic\nmaterial, for they were no longer a political menace, but he turns to\nthe Roman Catholics, whose activities were not merely religious, but\npolitical. In _The Non-Juror_ we have a play almost entirely built on\nanti-Catholic feeling; in _King John_ we have another attack on the\nChurch of Rome; and in the fourth act of _Woman\u2019s Wit_ we again have\nsatire, but in this case primarily of the Catholic clergy, rather than\nthe church itself. We do not have any references to party politics,\naside from this Catholic problem.\n\nHis original plays in comedy, other than farces and operas, deal with\nmoral problems. In the case of _Love\u2019s Last Shift_ and _The Careless\nHusband_ we have presented the reformation of husbands not yet entirely\nspoiled at heart; in _The Provoked Husband_ the reformation of a wife\nwho has not committed any serious breach of the moral code; and in this\nlast, as well as in _The Lady\u2019s Last Stake_, we have plays dealing with\nthe evils resulting from women\u2019s gambling. It is curious to find one\nwho was so notorious a gambler as Cibber choosing such a theme.\n\nThe language shows great change from that of the Restoration in regard\nto moral refinement. Cibber\u2019s plays become less and less coarse in\nspeech. His earlier plays have a grossness almost equal to that of\nRestoration comedy, but gradually grow purer. This change in the\nlanguage is found in English comedy generally, and as it progresses a\nnew element enters, the expression of moral sentiments, extravagantly\nand artificially stated. This last shows a gradual increase, reaching\nits height in the later sentimental comedy of the middle of the century.\n\nMerely as literature, three of Cibber\u2019s plays, at least, are well worth\nwhile: _The Careless Husband_, _She Would and She Would Not_, and\n_The Non-Juror_. They lack the briskness and sureness of touch that\ncharacterized Congreve, but compare most favorably with the work of men\nin the next rank, and are not only delightful and profitable reading,\nbut are thoroughly representative of the period in which they appear.\nGrouped with these as possessing permanent literary value are the\n_Apology_ and not more than half a dozen songs. Outside of these three\nplays, one prose work, and a few songs, Cibber produced nothing that\nis worth preserving because of its merit as literature. His greatest\nimportance to the student of literary history lies in his contribution\nto the development of sentimental comedy.\n\n\n10. PLACE OF STEELE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SENTIMENTAL COMEDY.\n\nIn view of the place that is always given to Steele as the originator\nof sentimental comedy, a discussion of any phase of the subject would\nbe incomplete without at least a reference to his relation to the\nparticular question under discussion. We may grant that Cibber does\nnot represent the culmination of the sentimental type: that is to be\nfound in Steele\u2019s _Conscious Lovers_ (1722). He is, rather, the most\nprominent figure in the first stage of the development of sentimental\ncomedy, during which the Restoration type was transformed by the\naddition of a moral purpose, by the purification of the language, and\nby the addition of the pathetic element; so that the new form in his\nhands has much of the old as well as the new, while Steele\u2019s _Conscious\nLovers_ has almost entirely broken away from the old and looks forward.\nBut the movement in which Cibber was so prominent a figure did make the\nway possible and contributed the most important elements which later\ndeveloped in the hands of Steele and his followers.\n\nA commonplace of literary history is that it was Steele who purged\nEnglish comedy of its vileness and was the first to write sentimental\ncomedy. This, as we have seen, is not true; for though _The Conscious\nLovers_ is probably the best of its type, it merely lays more stress\nupon the pathetic element and carries forward another step the sort of\nthing that Cibber had done in such comedies as _The Careless Husband_\nand _The Lady\u2019s Last Stake_, which are as truly sentimental comedies\nas this, and which possess the pathetic interest, but in a less marked\ndegree. In Steele\u2019s other plays, _The Funeral_ (1701), _The Lying\nLover_ (1705), _The Tender Husband_ (1705), Steele, except in the\nmatter of the purity of the language, does not show as fully developed\nexamples of the type as does Cibber in his work of the same period and\nearlier.\n\nSteele\u2019s first play to be acted, _The Funeral_, lacks sentimental\nquality; it is merely a comedy which, when compared to the Restoration\ntype, has a higher moral tone. Steele had no higher motive, he tells\nus, in writing this play than the purpose of reinstating himself in\nthe opinion of his fellow soldiers who had ostracized him as a moral\nprig after the appearance of _The Christian Hero_ (1701). In his\npreface he mentions two themes as those around which the comedy is\nwritten, namely, the practices of undertakers and \u201clegal villanies.\u201d\nLady Brumpton, who had bigamously married Lord Brumpton, is discredited\nby being ejected from Lord Brumpton\u2019s household, but there is no\nsuggestion that she is in any way reformed, and in the rest of the\naction none of the other elements of sentimental comedy are prominent.\n\n_The Lying Lover_ goes a little further and reforms the hero at the\nend, as is done in the comedies of Cibber. But even this similarity\nis only superficial, for the hero is not really vicious, being guilty\nonly of some entertaining lying, and the reformation is brought about,\nnot by approved sentimental feminine means, but by the fact that the\nhero finds himself in prison. But even though the hero is humiliated\nby temporary imprisonment, his delinquencies are so diverting that the\nreader is entirely in sympathy with him. Our sympathy for him, indeed,\nis so great that it is a distinct disappointment that the lady is given\nto the honest and jealous lover instead of to him. Steele lays no\nclaim to originality in the reform, \u201ccompunction and remorse\u201d of his\nhero, for in his preface he says that such things had been \u201cfrequently\napplauded on the stage.\u201d Nor is the versifying of the elevated portions\nof the play a new thing; it is found both earlier and later than\nsentimental comedy and is not a distinctive mark of that type.\n\n_The Tender Husband_ was indebted to Cibber\u2019s _Careless Husband_,\nwhich had recently appeared, but is not to be compared to it in\nits sentimental qualities. In both plays, however, we have the\nreconciliation of an estranged husband and wife. In Cibber it is the\nhusband who is the offender, and he is recalled from his vices by\nthe patient fidelity of his wife; a reformation based on sentiment.\nIn _The Tender Husband_, the wife is reformed from extravagance in\nher expenditure of time and money on trivialities, and from failure\nin her duty to her husband, but the reformation is brought about by\na mere trick that the husband plays upon the wife rather than by the\ninteraction of personality on personality. Steele shows nothing of the\nserious grasp of the situation that Cibber shows in his play on the\nsame theme, _The Provoked Husband_. Steele\u2019s handling is distinctly\nless artistic and distinctly less sentimental than in either of\nCibber\u2019s plays. This is seen also in Steele\u2019s light treatment of the\nwife\u2019s equivocal action toward Fainlove, whom she mistakenly supposes\nto be a man, and toward whom she makes questionable advances. Not only\nin regard to such situations as this, but in the attitude toward actual\nbreaches of morality, Steele shows a lower standard than Cibber. In\nboth _The Careless Husband_ and _The Tender Husband_ the hero keeps a\nmistress, but while Cibber brings the illicit amour to an end with the\ndisgrace of the mistress and a distinct moral, Steele not only shows\nnone of this disapproval but provides the mistress with a husband of\nmeans and gives her a good dowry.\n\nSeventeen years later, though according to Genest[91] the play had been\nwritten some years before it was acted, Steele produced his fully\ndeveloped comedy of the sentimental type, _The Conscious Lovers_. It is\nentirely different from the preceding plays, for instead of containing\na lively intrigue with clever satire and wit, such as we have in _The\nLying Lover_, the tone throughout is fixed by the pathetic and didactic\nelements. Steele rightly felt that he was doing something new, and took\ncredit to himself in the prologue:\n\n    \u201cBut the bold sage--the poet of tonight--\n     By new and desperate rules resolved to write.\n\n           *       *       *       *       *\n\n     \u2019Tis yours with breeding to refine the age,\n     To chasten wit, and moralise the stage.\u201d\n\nNot only does this moral and sentimental note appear throughout, but\nin Mr. Sealand, especially in his dialogue with Sir John Bevil in\nthe fourth act, there appears the exaltation of the tradesman class\nwhich culminated in the work of Lillo. Bevil Junior is a pattern\nof propriety and goodness, but his lack of virility and brilliance\ncontrasts him most disadvantageously with the heroes of the preceding\nperiod. He is the dull, chaste lover, the hero of the second intrigue\nof the Restoration and Cibber type of comedy, the Lord Morelove sort,\nexalted to the first place. Indiana is the patient Griselda type, the\nLady Easy sort of person, but in _The Conscious Lovers_ her gentleness\nand goodness are not used to recall the erring, but are presented\nmerely as desirable qualities for a virtuous young woman to possess.\nThe witty rake has disappeared. The Wildairs, Lovelesses, Millamants,\nand Lady Betties are no more, and in their places are maudlin, sickly\nsentimentalists, whose goodness and sufferings are all that commend\nthem. Parson Adams was right, it does contain \u201csome things almost\nsolemn enough for a sermon.\u201d\n\nThis sentimental didacticism becomes still more conspicious in the\nwork of Holcroft and his school, whose plays are rendered degenerate\nand emasculate thereby. If the historians of literature mean that\nSteele was the originator of this type, whose essential characteristic\nis the centering of the action around a pathetic situation, they are\nprobably right; but any statement that it was he who introduced the\nsentimental or pathetic element into English comedy, or that he began\nthe reformation of the drama in the direction of morality, is easily\nseen to be false by a comparison of his work with the earlier and\ncontemporary work of Cibber.\n\n\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHY\n\n\n1. CIBBER\u2019S WORKS.\n\n\n_Prose._\n\n    An Apology for the Life of Colley Cibber, Comedian, and Late\n  Patentee of the Theatre-Royal. With an Historical View of the Stage\n  during his Own Time. Written by Himself. London, 1740. (I have used\n  the fourth edition, London, 1756. Best edition is that of Lowe,\n  London, 1889.)\n\n    A Letter from Mr. Cibber, to Mr. Pope, Inquiring into the Motives\n  that might induce him in his Satyrical Works, to be so frequently\n  fond of Mr. Cibber\u2019s Name. London, 1742.\n\n    The Egoist: or, Colley upon Cibber. Being his own Picture\n  Retouch\u2019d, to so plain a Likeness, that no One, now, would have the\n  Face to own it, but Himself. London, 1743.\n\n    Another Occasional Letter from Mr. Cibber to Mr. Pope. Wherein the\n  New Hero\u2019s Preferment to his Throne, in the _Dunciad_, seems not to\n  be Accepted. And the Author of that Poem His more rightful Claim to\n  it, is Asserted. With an Expostulatory Address to the Reverend Mr. W.\n  W............n, Author of the new Preface, and Adviser in the curious\n  Improvements of that Satire. By Mr. Colley Cibber. London, 1744.\n\n    The Character and Conduct of Cicero, Considered from the History of\n  his Life by the Reverend Dr. Middleton. With Occasional Essays and\n  Observations upon the most memorable Facts and Persons during that\n  Period. London, 1747.\n\n    The Lady\u2019s Lecture, a Theatrical Dialogue, between Sir Charles Easy\n  and his Marriageable Daughter. Being an Attempt to Engage Obedience\n  by Filial Liberty: and to Give the Maiden Conduct of Virtue,\n  Chearfulness. By C. Cibber, Esq: Servant to his Majesty. London, 1748.\n\n\n_Non-Dramatic Poetry._\n\n    Gentleman\u2019s Magazine. London, 1731--\n\n    London Magazine. London, 1732--\n\n    A Rhapsody on the Marvellous: Arising from the First Odes of Horace\n  and Pindar. Being a Scrutiny into Ancient Poetical Fame, demanded by\n  Modern Common Sense. By Colley Cibber, Esq. P. L.\n\n    Fame then was cheap, and the first comer sped:\n    Which they have since preserved by being dead. Dryden.\n    .   .   .   .   .   .   .   liberius si\n    Dixero quid, si forte jocosius, hoc mihi juris\n    Cum venia dabis. Hor. Sat. 4. L 1. London, 1751.\n\n\n_Dramatic Works._\n\n  (_Arranged in the order of stage presentation. The dates are those of\n  publication._)\n\n    Collected editions of his Plays appeared in 1721, in two volumes;\n  in 1636, in five volumes; in 1760, in four volumes; in 1777, in five\n  volumes. The last named is the edition I have used.\n\n    Love\u2019s Last Shift; or, The Fool in Fashion. 1696.\n\n    Woman\u2019s Wit; or, The Lady in Fashion. 1697.\n\n    Xerxes. 1699.\n\n    The Tragical History of Richard III, altered from Shakespear. 1700.\n\n    Love Makes a Man; or, The Fop\u2019s Fortune. 1701.\n\n    She Would and She Would Not; or, The Kind Impostor. 1703.\n\n    The Careless Husband. 1705.\n\n    Perolla and Izadora. 1706.\n\n    The Comical Lovers. 1707.\n\n    The School Boy; or, The Comical Rival. 1707.\n\n    The Double Gallant; or, The Sick Lady\u2019s Cure. 1707.\n\n    The Lady\u2019s Last Stake; or, The Wife\u2019s Resentment. 1708.\n\n    The Rival Fools. 1709.\n\n    The Rival Queans, with the Humours of Alexander the Great, a\n  Comical-tragedy. Dublin, 1729.\n\n    Ximena; or, The Heroick Daughter. 1718.\n\n    Cinna\u2019s Conspiracy. 1713.\n\n    Venus and Adonis. A Masque. 1715.\n\n    Myrtillo, a Pastoral Interlude. 1716.\n\n    The Non-Juror. 1718.\n\n    The Refusal; or, The Ladies Philosophy. 1721.\n\n    Caesar in Aegypt. 1725.\n\n    The Provok\u2019d Husband; or, A Journey to London. 1728.\n\n    Love in a Riddle. A Pastoral. 1729 [misprinted 1719].\n\n    Damon and Phillida; a Ballad Opera. 1729.\n\n    Papal Tyranny in the Reign of King John. 1745.\n\n\n2. GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY.\n\n  Actor, The, or, A Treatise on the Art of Playing. London, 1750.\n\n  Age of Dullness, The, a Satire. By a Natural Son of Mr. Pope. London,\n    1757.\n\n  Baker, D. E., I. Reed and S. Jones. Biographica Dramatica. London,\n    1812.\n\n  Beaumont and Fletcher. Works. London, 1843.\n\n  Besser, R. Colley Cibbers The Double Gallant und seine Quellen.\n    Halle, 1903.\n\n  Betterton, T. The History of the English Stage, from the Restoration\n    to the Present Time. London, 1741.\n\n  Betterton, Thomas, Life and Times of. Reprint, London, 1888.\n\n  Blast upon Bays, A; or, A New Lick at the Laureat. London, 1742.\n\n  Booth, Barton, Life of. London, 1733.\n\n  Boyle, Roger, Earl of Orrery. Parthenissa. London, 1676.\n\n  British Theatre, The. London. 1750.\n\n  Brown, Hawkins. A Pipe of Tobacco. London, 1744.\n\n  Burnaby, C. The Reformed Wife. London, 1700.\n\n  Burnaby, C. The Ladies Visiting Day. London, 1701.\n\n  Canfield, Dorothea Frances. Corneille and Racine in England. New\n    York, 1904.\n\n  Carlile, J. The Fortune Hunters; or, Two Fools Well Met. London, 1689.\n\n  Case of the Present Theatrical Dispute Fairly Stated, The. London,\n    1743.\n\n  Centlivre, Susanna. Dramatic Works. Reprint, London, 1872.\n\n  Charke, Charlotte. A Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Charlotte Charke.\n    Written by Herself. London, 1755; reprint, London, 1827.\n\n  Chetwood, W. R. General History of the Stage. London, 1749.\n\n  Cibber, Theophilus, editor. Lives of the Poets of Great Britain and\n    Ireland. London, 1753.\n\n  Cibber, Theophilus. Two Dissertations on the Theatres. London, 1756.\n\n  Corneille, Pierre. Oeuvres. Paris, 1862.\n\n  Crowne, John. Dramatic Works, in _Dramatists of the Restoration_, ed.\n    by Maidment and Logan. Edinburgh, 1873.\n\n  Davies, T. Dramatic Miscellanies. London, 1784.\n\n  Davies, T. Memoirs of the Life of David Garrick, Esq. Third ed.,\n    London, 1781.\n\n  Difference between Verbal and Practical Virtue, The. London, 1742.\n\n  Dogget, T. The Country Wake. London, 1696.\n\n  Dohse, R. Colley Cibbers B\u00fchnenbearbeitung von Shakespeares Richard\n    III. Bonn, 1897.\n\n  Doran, J. Their Majesties\u2019 Servants. London, 1888.\n\n  Downes, J. Roscius Anglicanus. London, 1708; reprint, London, 1886.\n\n  Dryden, John. Works. London, 1889.\n\n  Egerton, T. and J. The Theatrical Remembrancer. London, 1788.\n\n  Fielding, Henry. Historical Register for 1736. Works, London, 1852.\n\n  Fielding, Henry (?). An Apology for the Life of Mr. T.... C....\n    London, 1740.\n\n  Genest, J. Some Account of the English Stage from the Restoration in\n    1660 to 1830. Bath, 1832.\n\n  Granger, J. Biographical History of England. London, 1779-1806.\n\n  Hermann, A. Colley Cibbers Tragicomedy Ximena und ihr Verh\u00e4ltniss zu\n    Corneilles Cid. Kiel, 1908.\n\n  Hutton, Laurence. Literary Landmarks of London. Boston, 1885.\n\n  Jacob, G. The Poetical Register. London, 1719-1723.\n\n  Johnson, T. Tryal of Colley Cibber for Writing a Book Intitled An\n    Apology for his Life. London, 1740.\n\n  Kilbourne, F. W. Alterations and Adaptations of Shakespeare. Boston,\n    1906.\n\n  K\u00f6ppe, K. Das Verh\u00e4ltniss von Cibbers Papal Tyranny zu Shakespeares\n    King John. Halle, 1902.\n\n  Kr\u00fcger, W. Das Verh\u00e4ltniss von Colley Cibbers Lustspiel The Comical\n    Lovers zu J. Drydens Marriage \u00e0 la Mode und Secret Love. Halle,\n    1902.\n\n  Laureat, The; or, The Right Side of Colley Cibber, Esq. To Which is\n    Added, The History of the Life, Manners and Writings of Aesopus the\n    Tragedian. London, 1740.\n\n  Learned, J. The Counterfeits. London, 1679.\n\n  Lee, W. L. M. History of Police in England. London, 1901.\n\n  Letter to Mr. C....b....r, A, on his Letter to Mr. P........ London,\n    1742.\n\n  Lounsbury, Thomas R. Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist. New York, 1901.\n\n  Lowe, R. W. A Bibliographical Account of English Theatrical\n    Literature. London, 1888.\n\n  Macaulay, T. B. History of England. Boston, 1900.\n\n  Man of Taste, The. London, 1733.\n\n  Marks, Jeannette. The English Pastoral Drama. London, 1908.\n\n  Medbourne, M. Tartuffe. London, 1670.\n\n  Michels, E. Quellenstudien zu Colley Cibbers Lustspiel The Careless\n    Husband. Marburg, 1908.\n\n  Miles, D. H. The Influence of Moli\u00e8re on Restoration Comedy. New\n    York, 1910.\n\n  Moli\u00e8re. Oeuvres. Paris, 1873-1900.\n\n  Moli\u00e8re. Dramatic Works, translated by H. Van Laun. Edinburgh, 1878.\n\n  Molloy, J. F. Famous Plays. London, 1886.\n\n  Mountfort, W. Greenwich Park, a Comedy. London, n. d. [1691].\n\n  New Theatrical Dictionary. London, 1742.\n\n  Nichols, J. Illustrations of the Literary History of the Eighteenth\n    Century. London, 1817.\n\n  Nichols, J. Literary Anecdotes of the Eighteenth Century. London,\n    1815.\n\n  Ost, G. Das Verh\u00e4ltniss von Cibbers Lustspiel Love Makes a Man zu\n    Fletchers Dramen, The Elder Brother und The Custom of the Country.\n\n  Pepys, Samuel. Diary. London, 1897.\n\n  Philips, Katherine. Poems. London, 1669.\n\n  Pilkington, L. Memoirs. London, 1748.\n\n  Quin, Mr. James, Comedian, Life of. London, 1766; reprint, 1887.\n\n  Rowe, N. Pharsalia. London, 1718.\n\n  Sanger, W. W. History of Prostitution. New York, 1899.\n\n  Schneider, W. Das Verh\u00e4ltniss von Colley Cibbers Lustspiel The\n    Non-Juror zu Malias Tartuffe. Halle, 1903.\n\n  Shakspere, William. Richard III, Variorum edition, ed. by H. H.\n    Furness, Jr. Philadelphia, 1908.\n\n  Steele, Richard, and John Dennis. The Theatre, by Sir Richard Steele;\n    to which are added, the Anti-Theatre; the Character of Sir John\n    Edgar; Steele\u2019s Case with the Lord Chamberlain. Illustrated with\n    Literary and Historical Anecdotes by John Nichols. London, 1791.\n\n  Stone, E. Chronicles of Fashion. London, 1845.\n\n  Stoye, M. Das Verh\u00e4ltniss von Cibbers Trag\u00f6die Caesar in Egypt zu\n    Fletchers The False One. Halle, 1897.\n\n  Strickland, Agnes. Queens of England. New York, 1851.\n\n  Temple of Dullness, The, with the Humours of Signor Capochio and\n    Signora Dorinna; A Comic Opera in Two Acts. London, 1745.\n\n  Theatrical Correspondence in Death. An Epistle from Mrs. Oldfield, in\n    the Shades, to Mrs. Br. ceg....dle, upon Earth. London, 1743.\n\n  Theobald, L. The Happy Captive, an English Opera, with an Interlude,\n    in Two Comick Scenes, betwixt Signor Capochio, a Director from the\n    Canary Islands; and Signora Dorinna. London, 1741.\n\n  Thorndike, Ashley H. Tragedy. Boston, 1908.\n\n  To diabebouloumenon; or, The Proceedings at the Theatre Royal in\n    Drury Lane. London, 1722.\n\n  T\u00f6nse, L. Cibbers Comedy The Refusal in ihrem Verh\u00e4ltniss zu Moli\u00e8res\n    les Femmes savantes. Kiel, 1900.\n\n  Traill, H. D. Social England. New York, 1902.\n\n  Vanbrugh, John. Works, ed. by W. C. Ward. London, 1893.\n\n  Victor, B. History of the Theatres of London and Dublin from 1730 to\n    the Present Time. London, 1761.\n\n  Waterhouse, O. The Development of Sentimental Comedy in the\n    Eighteenth Century, _Anglia_, XXX.\n\n  Whincop, T. Scanderbeg; or, Love and Liberty. London, 1747.\n\n  Wilkes, T. A General View of the Stage. London, 1759.\n\n  Wilks, Robert, Esq., The Life of that Eminent Comedian. London, 1733.\n\n  Woman of Taste. London, 1733\n\n  Wood, A. I. P. Stage History of Shakespeare\u2019s Richard III. New York,\n    1909.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] II. 573.\n\n[2] Whincop, _Complete List of All the English Dramatic Poets_, p. 199.\nSee also the dramatic list appended to the second volume of the fourth\nedition of the _Apology_, p. 286.\n\n[3] The sub-plot of _Woman\u2019s Wit_ was likewise acted separately after\nthe original play had failed on the stage.\n\n[4] Reprint of 1887, p. 28.\n\n[5] Page 28.\n\n[6] _Apology_, I, 180.\n\n[7] III, 325.\n\n[8] The _Advertisement_ prefixed to _The Happy Captive_ says: \u201cThe\ninterlude, which is added in two comic scenes, is entirely new to our\nclimate; and the success of it is submitted to experiment, and the\ntaste of the audience.\u201d Only this portion of _The Happy Captive_ was\never acted.\n\n[9] Theobald died September 18, 1744. _The Temple of Dullness_ was\nacted January 17, 1745.\n\n[10] For a history of the pastoral drama in the eighteenth century and\na summary of its qualities, see Jeannette Marks, _The English Pastoral\nDrama_, London, 1908.\n\n[11] Thorndike, _Tragedy_, p. 273.\n\n[12] Davies, _Dramatic Miscellanies_, III, 459.\n\n[13] _The Tatler_, Number 42, July 16, 1709.\n\n[14] _Address to the Reader_, prefixed to _Ximena_.\n\n[15] Richard Dohse, _Colley Cibber\u2019s Buehnenarbeitung von Shakspere\u2019s\nRichard III_, Bonn, 1899.\n\n[16] Alice I. Perry Wood, _The Stage History of Richard III_, New York,\n1909.\n\n[17] The number and sources of the lines as given by Furness. _Variorum\nRichard III_, p. 604, are as follows: _Richard II_, 14; _1 Henry IV_,\n6; _2 Henry IV_, 20; _Henry V_, 24; _1 Henry VI_, 5; _2 Henry VI_, 17;\n_3 Henry VI_, 103; _Richard III_, 795; Cibber, 1069; total, 2053. The\nnumber of lines in the Globe text of Shakspere\u2019s _Richard III_ is 3621.\n\n[18] As \u201cGod\u201d to \u201cHeaven,\u201d I, ii, 236; due in this instance to the\nCollier influence.\n\n[19] Edition of 1665, pp. 102-157.\n\n[20] _Dedication_ of _Perolla and Izadora_.\n\n[21] Genest, II, 506.\n\n[22] _To the Reader_, _Ximena_.\n\n[23] See Canfield, _Corneille and Racine in England_, p. 169.\n\n[24] Genest, II, 511; and Canfield, _op. cit._, pp. 179 ff.\n\n[25] II, 104.\n\n[26] VIII, 204.\n\n                         \u201cMr. Cibber.\n\n  1701 Nov.  8 A Third of Love\u2019s Last Shift    3    4    6\n  1705 Nov. 14 Perolla and Izadora            36   11    0\n  1707 Oct. 27 Double Gallant                 16    2    6\n       Nov. 22 Lady\u2019s Last Stake              32    5    0\n       Feb. 26 Venus and Adonis                5    7    6\n  1708 Oct.  9 Comical Lover                  10   15    0\n  1712 Mar. 16 Cinna\u2019s Conspiracy             13    0    0\n  1718 Oct.  1 The Nonjuror                  105    0    0\n\n               No price or date.\n               Mrytillo, A pastoral,\n               Rival Fools,\n               Heroic Daughter,\n               Wit at Several Weapons.\u201d\n\n[27] Although acted six times it could not be considered extremely\nsuccessful. According to Genest, III, 162, Nichols speaks of having\nmade merry with a party of friends over the pasteboard swans, on the\nfirst night of its production.\n\n[28] III, 161.\n\n[29] _Das Verhaeltniss von Cibber\u2019s Tragoedie Caesar in Egypt zu\nFletcher\u2019s The False One._\n\n[30] _Op. cit._, p. 223.\n\n[31] Cibber no doubt used Rowe\u2019s translation (1710).\n\n[32] Compare, for instance, the general idea of the exposition In Act I.\n\n[33] Lucan ends before this incident, but Rowe continues the narrative,\nusing the same material as _The False One_.\n\n[34] Genest. IV, 146, says that it had not been acted since 1695,\nthough he records the performances in 1737 and 1738.\n\n[35] It is to be noted that efforts were made to deprive Cibber of\ncredit for his work not only in this play but also in _The Non-Juror_\nand _The Refusal_.\n\n[36] _The History of the Theatres of London and Dublin_, II, 49.\n\n[37] Davies, _Dramatic Miscellanies_, I, 5. For a characteristic\nexample of the criticism to which Cibber was subjected, see Fielding\u2019s\n_Historical Register for the Year 1736_, Act III.\n\n[38] For full discussion of the relationship between Cibber\u2019s _Richard\nIII_ and Shakspere\u2019s _Richard III_, see A. I. P. Wood, and Dohse. The\nwhole subject of Shaksperian alterations is taken up in Lounsbury\u2019s\n_Shakspere as a Dramatic Artist_, and in Kilbourne\u2019s _Alterations\nand Adaptations of Shakspere_. It is curious that Lounsbury does not\ndiscuss Cibber\u2019s _Richard III_, which is not only the most famous\nShaksperian alteration but the only one of any real value.\n\n[39] The addition of parts from _3 Henry VI_ at the beginning of the\nplay.\n\n[40] _Tragedy_, VIII and IX.\n\n[41] See especially throughout _Ximena_.\n\n[42] According to _The Life of Aesopus_, this \u201cwas said to be a silly\ntale collected from some dreaming romance,\u201d but as the writer does not\ngive the title of this romance and apparently had no knowledge of the\nplay, his testimony is of no value.\n\n[43] \u201cThe furious John Dennis, who hated Cibber for obstructing, as\nhe imagined, the progress of his tragedy, called _The Invader of His\nCountry_, in very passionate terms denies his claim to this comedy:\n\u2018When _The Fool in Fashion_ was first acted,\u2019 says the critic, \u2018Cibber\nwas hardly twenty-two years of age; how could he, at the age of twenty,\nwrite a comedy with a just design, distinguished characters, and a\nproper dialogue who now, at forty, treats us with Hibernian sense and\nHibernian English?\u2019\u201d Davies, _Dramatic Miscellanies_, III, 410.\n\n[44] Jacob, _Poetical Register_, p. 38, suggests Otway\u2019s _Dare Devil_\n(that is, _The Atheist_) as the source of the play, but it would take a\nvivid imagination to see the connection.\n\n[45] _Das Verhaeltniss von Cibber\u2019s Lustspiel Love Makes a Man zu\nFletcher\u2019s Dramen The Elder Brother und The Custom of The Country_, p.\n82.\n\n[46] It was acted in New York, January 15, 1883, by Miss Ada Rehan,\nunder the management of Augustin Daly. See Lowe, _Apology_, II, 289.\nGenest records, VI, 23, that when it was performed at Covent Garden\nin 1778, \u201cthe applause was so strong in the second act, that the\nperformers were obliged to stop for some time.\u201d\n\n[47] This translation of three French novels, whose original source\nhad been Spanish, was issued again in 1712 as _Three Ingenious Spanish\nNovels_. See Chandler, _Romances of Roguery_, New York, 1899, pp.\n462-3. These novels are ultimately based on _La Garduna de Sevilla_ of\nCastillo Solorzano. It is also to be noticed that the story appears in\n_La Villana de Ballecas_ by Tirso de Molina, in _La Ocasion hace al\nladron_, by Moreto, and in the story of Aurora in Le Sage\u2019s _Gil Blas_.\nDunlop, _History of Prose Fiction_, II, 475, states that _She Would\nand She Would Not_ is taken from _Gil Blas_. _Gil Blas_ was published\nthirteen years later than Cibber\u2019s play.\n\n[48] Wilkes, _General View of the Stage_, p. 40, says that were the\nplay curtailed of one scene he \u201cwould not fail to pronounce it not only\nthe best comedy in English, but in any other language.\u201d\n\n[49] Boswell\u2019s _Johnson_, edited by G. Birkbeck Hill, London, 1891; I,\n201.\n\n[50] Preface to _The Double Gallant_.\n\n[51] II, 173.\n\n[52] _Apology_, I, 243.\n\n[53] III, 209. See also Thomes Whincop\u2019s _Scanderbeg_, (1747), p. 195.\nAn account of the lives and writings of the English dramatists is\nannexed to this play.\n\n[54] Following the Scottish rebellion in 1715, Lord Derwentwater and\nLord Kenmure were executed, February 24, 1716. The king\u2019s pardon, which\nexcepted forty-seven classes of offenders, appears in _The Historical\nRegister_ for 1717, II, 247; so that the excitement caused by the\nrebellion continued for some time. Doran\u2019s _London in Jacobite Times_\ndiscusses this period in a most interesting manner.\n\n[55] The second title of _The Female Virtuosoes_.\n\n[56] _Apology_, II, 58.\n\n[57] _Preface_ to _The Good Natured Man_.\n\n[58] See, for example, _Steele and The Sentimental Comedy_, by M. E.\nHare, in _Eighteenth Century Literature, An Oxford Miscellany_, Oxford,\n1909. This speaks of \u201cSentimental Comedy invented by the great essayist\nSir Richard Steele.\u201d\n\n[59] Macaulay, _History of England_, Chapter VII.\n\n[60] During the reign of Charles not every one had been in entire\nsympathy with the state of the theatre. Evelyn, in a letter to Viscount\nCarnbury, February 9, 1664-1665, in speaking of the acting of plays\non Saturday evenings says: \u201cPlays are now with us become a licentious\nexcess, and a vice, and need severe censors that should look as well to\ntheir morality as to their lines and numbers.\u201d\n\n[61] Traill, _Social England_, IV. 593.\n\n[62] _The Laureat_, p. 53. \u201cI can remember, that soon after the\npublication of Collier\u2019s book, several informations were brought\nagainst the players, at the instance and at the expense of the Society\nfor the Reformation of Manners, for immoral words and expressions,\n_contra bonos mores_, uttered on the stage. Several informers were\nplaced in the pit, and other parts of the house, to note down the words\nspoke, and by whom, to be able to swear to them and many of them would\nhave been ruined by these troublesome prosecutions, had not Queen Anne,\nwell satisfied that these informers lived upon their oaths, and that\nwhat they did, proceeded not from conscience, but from interest, by a\ntimely _nolle prosequi_, put an end to the inquisition.\u201d\n\n[63] The \u201cJoan Sanderson\u201d was a dance in which each one of the company\ntakes part. It began by the first dancer\u2019s choosing a partner, who in\nturn chose another, the chain continuing until each one had danced\nalone and with a partner. See G. C. M. Smith, _Fucus Histriomastix_,\n_Introduction_, p. xviii.\n\n[64] _Apology_, I, 85.\n\n[65] _Ibid._, I, 194-5.\n\n[66] _Dramatic Miscellanies_, III, 432.\n\n[67] See Miles, _The Influence of Moliere on Restoration Comedy_, 1910:\npublished after this paper was written.\n\n[68] Celadon, in Dryden\u2019s _Marriage a la Mode_, enters marriage with\nthe distinct expectation that his wife will be untrue to him.\n\n[69] At the Restoration ten of the actors were attached to the\nhousehold establishment as the king\u2019s menial servants, and ten yards of\nscarlet cloth with an amount of lace were allowed them for liveries.\nThis connection lasted until Anne\u2019s time. Genest, II, 362.\n\n[70] Elizabeth Woodbridge, _Studies in Jonson\u2019s Comedies_, _Yale\nStudies in English_, IV.\n\n[71] _The Development of Sentimental Comedy in the Eighteenth Century,\nAnglia_, XXX.\n\n[72] _The Theatre_, II, 511. By John Dennis. His temper and prejudice\noften destroy the value of his writings as impartial evidence, but in\nthis case he is right.\n\n[73] _The Man of Mode_, V, ii.\n\n[74] _The Funeral_, I, i.\n\n[75] Davies, _Dramatic Miscellanies_, III, 412.\n\n[76] _Ibid._, III, 409.\n\n[77] The substitution of one person for another in the marriage\nceremony, or a false marriage, are favorite devices of Congreve. See,\nfor instance, _The Old Bachelor_ and _Love for Love_.\n\n[78] _The Elder Brother_ and _The Custom of the Country_.\n\n[79] Rutilio\u2019s sojourn with Sulpita. _The Custom of the Country_, III,\niii; IV, iv.\n\n[80] Which Vanbrugh portrayed in his play, _The Relapse_ (1697).\n\n[81] The comic scenes from _Marriage a la Mode_ and _The Maiden Queen_.\n\n[82] Centlivre, _Love at a Venture_; Burnaby, _The Ladies Visiting\nDay_, and _The Reformed Wife_.\n\n[83] _The Ladies Visiting Day._\n\n[84] _Love for Love_, II, xi.\n\n[85] _To the Reader, The Provoked Husband._\n\n[86] Cibber\u2019s _Lives of the Poets_, IV, 120; Wilks, _A General View of\nthe Stage_, p. 42.\n\n[87] R. M. Alden, _Prose in the English Drama, Modern Philology_, VII,\n4.\n\n[88] _Preface_ to _Woman\u2019s Wit_.\n\n[89] _Dedication_ of _Love\u2019s Last Shift_.\n\n[90] _Dedication_ of _Love Makes a Man_.\n\n[91] III, 100.\n\n\n\n\n  BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS\n  HUMANISTIC STUDIES\n\n  _Vol. I_          _January 1, 1914_          _No. 2_\n\n\n  STUDIES IN\n  BERGSON\u2019S PHILOSOPHY\n\n  BY\n\n  ARTHUR MITCHELL, PH. D.\n\n  _Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the University of Kansas_\n\n\n  LAWRENCE, JANUARY, 1914\n  PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n  PART ONE\n  BERGSON\u2019S PHILOSOPHIC METHOD\n                                                          _Page_\n  CHAPTER I\n  The Relation of Philosophic Method to the Definition of\n      Philosophy                                               9\n\n  CHAPTER II\n  Bergson\u2019s Critique of Pure Reason                           17\n\n  CHAPTER III\n  The Ancient Prejudice against Analysis                      26\n\n\n  PART TWO\n  BERGSON\u2019S SYSTEM OF DOCTRINE\n\n  CHAPTER I\n  Ontology and Epistemology                                   37\n\n  CHAPTER II\n  Mind and Matter, Spirit and Body                            64\n\n  CHAPTER III\n  Doctrine of Freedom                                         82\n\n  CHAPTER IV\n  Bergson\u2019s Abhorrence of Determinateness                     94\n\n  CHAPTER V\n  The Mystical Yearning of Intuitionism                      102\n\n\n  PART THREE\n  BERGSON\u2019S GENIUS                                           107\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nIn the second part of this essay material from two papers published\nin the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods_ has\nbeen laid under contribution, and also from my doctor\u2019s thesis. Much of\nthis material was written in 1909, since which time a number of views\nwhich some of mine resemble more or less have been published. It has\nnot seemed to me necessary always to note these agreements of thought\narrived at independently by myself and others.\n\nI have reported a part of the brilliant critique of Bergson\u2019s doctrine\nof freedom by Monsieur Gustave Belot. This expresses with elegance\nand force much of my own reaction to the doctrine. Indebtedness to\nBelot and other authors is acknowledged throughout the essay. Except\npossibly Professor Bergson himself, there is no one who has influenced\nmy thinking so much as Professor Ralph Barton Perry, my teacher who\nintroduced me to Bergson\u2019s philosophy. Professor Perry\u2019s writings\nare full of finished renderings of less articulate convictions of my\nown; and, though I have often referred to and quoted from his work\nexplicitly, his instruction and stimulus have had so much to do with\nthe history of my thinking that I could never say just what I owe him,\nbut only that I owe him much.\n\nProfessor Bergson has permitted me to translate from a private letter\nsome comments of his on certain of my criticisms.\n\nProfessor Edmund H. Hollands has given the first two parts a careful\nreading, in the manuscript, and his able criticisms and suggestions,\nmainly concerning the matter itself, have been of great benefit.\n\nI am no less obliged, for help in improving the literary form, to\nProfessor S. L. Whitcomb, whose critical ability has been patiently\napplied to a careful revision, page by page, of the whole manuscript.\n\nI have tried, in the third part, to justify explicitly the great and\nunique value which I attach to Professor Bergson\u2019s work, antagonistic\nthough my own convictions are to his results. And, besides this aim,\nit has seemed to me interesting and instructive, in view of the very\nconsiderable literature which has grown up about Bergson\u2019s philosophy,\nto bring together in a comparative view the judgments of a number of\nhis exponents.\n\nFor literature by and about Bergson, the reader is referred to the\nexhaustive bibliography prepared last year by the Columbia University\nPress under the direction of Miss Isadore G. Mudge, the Reference\nLibrarian. \u201cThe bibliography includes 90 books and articles by\nProfessor Bergson (including translations of his works) and 417\nbooks and articles about him. These 417 items represent 11 different\nlanguages divided as follows:--French 170, English 159, German 40,\nItalian 19, Polish 5, Dutch 3, Spanish 3, Roumanian 2, Swedish 2,\nHungarian 1.\u201d This work is invaluable to the student of Bergson. It is\nincomparably the fullest Bergson bibliography extant.\n\n                                ARTHUR MITCHELL.\n  University of Kansas,\n    January, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nPART ONE\n\nBERGSON\u2019S PHILOSOPHIC METHOD\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHIC METHOD TO THE DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n\nOne of the problems of philosophy is the nature of philosophy itself.\nIn recognizing such a problem at all, I suppose, the beginning of its\nsolution has been made. For the very question, what is this or that?\nis conditioned on an incipient definition of the subject of it, a\ndiscriminating acknowledgement of it as something in particular, and,\nso, as something already more or less qualified or defined. Certainly\nthere would be no common problem and no difference of theory without\nsuch initial agreement as a point of reference in disagreeing.\n\nBut the explicit statement of this starting point of agreement\nencounters a practical dilemma. On the one hand, anything can be\ndefined in terms so general that the thing is bound to be included:\nmake the genus large enough and it includes anything. The limit, in\nthis direction, would be to define the object as a case of being; which\nwould be safe, but hardly a start toward determining anything about\nit. On the other hand, the least advance toward narrowing the meaning\nincurs a very rigorous obligation to produce a principle of selection\nwhich shall be a satisfactory logical warrant for narrowing it in just\nthe way selected, since this way excludes others whose claims may be\nin question. The situation is thus beset with the pitfall of logical\npresumption.\n\nThere are three quite distinct conceptions of philosophy, in the form\nof ill criticized assumption, each of which is taken by its adherents\nto be unquestionable--as safe as the concept \u201cbeing.\u201d I will word them\nthus: (1) An absolute _evaluation_ of reality; (2) A _revelation_\nof reality in its _essential nature_; (3) A _comprehension_ of the\n_meaning_ of reality.\n\nThe first of these conceptions is that of Kant and Fichte and\nthose philosophers to whom reality seems unrelated to apprehending\nconsciousness, related only to will. Reality is neither directly nor\nindirectly perceivable. Knowledge of it is possible--if the term\nis proper at all--only in the broadest sense of \u201cknowledge,\u201d the\nsense equivalent to \u201cconsciousness,\u201d within which will is sharply\ndistinguished from two more or less receptive or cognitive modes,\nthinking and feeling. Knowledge of reality is thus, for this type of\nphilosopher, a practical, personal evaluation of it, only; a moral\ndisposition or attitude.\n\nThe second conception is Professor Bergson\u2019s; its meaning is a\npeculiarly intimate acquaintance with reality. It is a relationship\nbetween reality and consciousness in the \u00e6sthetic mode, consciousness\nas the quality-knowing faculty, very explicitly distinguished by\nBergson, under the name \u201cintuition,\u201d from the relation-knowing or\nintellectual faculty.\n\nThe third conception, the analytic or intellectualistic, means\nknowledge about reality, such knowledge as may be relatively\nindependent of acquaintance. The second and third conceptions are\ndistinct from each other only in emphasis, and may be indefinitely\napproximated toward each other, to the limit of mutual identity.\nBut, historically, the philosopher\u2019s besetting sin of hypostasis has\npushed the emphasis, in each of these two conceptions, to so vicious\nan extreme that they contrast with each other sharply. Pushed to\nsuch extreme, the third conception has been stigmatized by adherents\nof the second as \u201cvicious\u201d conceptualism or intellectualism. By the\nsame right, the intellectualist may denounce intuitionism as equally\n\u201cvicious.\u201d\n\nTo these three conceptions of philosophy this is common: a relationship\nbetween reality and consciousness which is apogeal. Philosophy is\nat any rate a _supreme experience_, a mode of consciousness which\nis eminent over other modes. But this initial generalization is too\nindeterminate to constitute a satisfactory theory of the nature\nof philosophy; whereas (for the other horn of the dilemma), the\nabove attempts at greater specificity appear to invoke no logical\nprinciple, but rather to follow a deep-lying personal instinct,\nwithout due critical reflection on it; in other words, without logical\njustification of it. They all beg the question.\n\nSuch ill criticized assumption concerning the nature of philosophy\nis what determines a philosopher\u2019s \u201cmethod\u201d in distinction from his\n\u201cdoctrine.\u201d The names voluntarism, intuitionism and rationalism have\nbeen applied to philosophies whose method is one or other of the\nthree outlined above. Religion, art and science are their models,\nrespectively. Under voluntarism fall the romantic and the pietistic\nphilosophies, wherein value is all that is real, and personal attitude\ntowards value is the only mode of consciousness that illuminates\nreality. Intuitionism includes radical empiricism, temporalism and\nmysticism. Such philosophies are based on the conviction that only\nquality is real, only intuition is knowledge. And under rationalism are\npositivism and absolutism, in which reality is order and knowledge is\nreason.\n\nIf art, science and religion correspond to the ancient triad feeling\n(intuition), thought (intellect) and will, it would seem either\nthat philosophy must be consciousness employed in one or more of\nthese modes, or else that a fourth mode of consciousness, coordinate\nwith these, must correspond to philosophy. Such a mode has not been\ndiscovered. Philosophy must therefore be one or two or all three of the\nabove things. Can analysis of that generalization which was derived\nabove from the more specific definitions produce a logical principle\ncapable of determining the genuine philosophic method among the three\nmodes of consciousness, feeling, thought and will? Yes, such analysis\nof the _supremacy_ which is a feature common to all three conceptions\nof philosophy proves unequivocally that philosophy must be a function\nof intellect, and cannot be a function either of will or of intuition.\n\nThis would not be the case, needless to say, if \u201csupremacy\u201d were here\na eulogism. Eulogistically, either of the three modes of consciousness\nhas equal claim to supremacy. That mode of consciousness to which\nreality is most interesting is supreme, in the eulogistic sense, and\nthis depends on the philosopher\u2019s personal constitution. To the man\nof dominating intuition, the relations and teleology of things may\nbe incidental characters of them; but, by comparison with reality\u2019s\nqualitative aspect, those other aspects are relatively extrinisic and\naccidental. In whatever sense it may not be true, in the eulogistic\nsense it is true that such a man\u2019s supreme experience is intuitional\nrather than intellectual or ethical. Bergson\u2019s psychological life seems\nto be of such a type. But, for the man of ethical, and for the man of\nintellectual prepossession, supreme experience cannot be intuitional,\nin this sense of supreme. Yet, if an intuitional bent be regarded\nby anyone as a hopeful qualification for effective philosophizing,\nno intuitionist denies to the man in whom reason or will, instead,\nis paramount, the possibility, by proper effort, of achieving the\ngenuinely philosophic--that is to say, intuitional--activity. And when\nsuch a man does, in spite of difficulty, achieve it, it has the same\nsupremacy, as philosophy, that it has for the intuitionist, for whom\nit is, more fortunately, _also_ supremely congenial and \u201cworth while\u201d.\nIt is not this latter supremacy, therefore, but the other, which\ndistinguishes philosophy, on the intuitionist conception; and that\nother supremacy has a meaning which is thus proved to be independent of\nrelation to any constitutional prepossession or aptness. If philosophy\nis intuitional, this is not because intuition is any man\u2019s most\ncharacteristic faculty.\n\nAnd so of the two other modes of consciousness, reason and will, in\nwhich, in different beings, according to their constitution, life\nmost naturally and best finds realization: for each of these modes\nof consciousness, as for the intuitional mode, there is one sort of\nexperience, called philosophy, which is distinguished by a certain\nsupremacy of self-same nature, independent of any distinction of\npersonal constitution among philosophers. The voluntarist, indeed,\nmight claim a peculiarly eulogistic supremacy for volitional experience\nover any other kind; for it is ethically supreme for all, whatever\none\u2019s constitutional bent. But its ethical supremacy is no more the\n_philosophic quale_ of volitional experience, on the voluntaristic\nconception of philosophy, than is its other eulogistic supremacy, its\nmere congeniality, for the strongly volitional type of character. For,\nmen of such character may be conspicuously deficient in philosophic\nfaculty in the judgment of all, including the voluntarist philosopher.\n\nReason, finally, commands recognition of supremacy, among the modes of\nconsciousness, in another sense, a sense distinct from the imperative\nor ethical supremacy of will. The supremacy of reason is its exclusive\nreflectiveness; and reflectiveness as the _quale_ of reason is\nthe same character as criticalness; that is, it is the faculty of\njudgment. It is important to note that this critical reflectiveness is\na _differentia_ of reason; it is not a character of intuition nor of\nwill. The proof is that reflection is the substitution of a relational\nfor a substantive object of consciousness, and relationality is\nnothing else than rationality. Thus, if feeling, will and rational\nthought are conceptually distinct, reflectiveness is foreign to the\nfirst two, and to anything co\u00f6rdinately distinct from rational thought.\nWhen consciousness is employed with an emphasis on the _qualities_\nof its object, in distinction from aspects of value and relation\n(which also belong to any object), consciousness is intuitive, in\nthe intuitionist sense of the term. In entering a consciousness,\nthe qualities become, _ipso facto_, content of that consciousness,\ntaking their place in this setting under the name \u201csensations,\u201d or\n\u201csense data.\u201d It is the act of reflection which \u201csets\u201d the mind\u2019s\ndata in contexts; which is aware of contexts, that is, and of the\nsetting of data in them. It is the reflective act which names its data\naccordingly, as \u201cquality\u201d or \u201csensation\u201d, and is conscious of them as\nelements of their relational setting. Consciousness is volitional when\nits focus is a value. In the context of the subject\u2019s consciousness,\nthe value becomes a purpose. Thus value as substantive object of\nconsciousness, again, is object of will just as the substantive quality\nwas object of intuition; while value as element in the relational\ncomplex in which it is known as \u201cpurpose,\u201d is object of reflection.\nReason, then,--that is to say, mind active in the relation-knowing\nway--is the mode of consciousness in virtue of which mind is\nreflective, critical, judgment-forming; and it is a confusion among\ndefinitions of intuition, will and reason, to attribute reflectiveness\nto intuition or to will, as such. The peculiar supremacy of reason\nwhich inheres in reason\u2019s reflectiveness is due to the inclusion of\nconsciousness itself in the content of relational consciousness and of\nno other mode of consciousness.\n\nIntuitionists and voluntarists, the same as intellectualists, do,\nas a fact, always characterize that supremacy which distinguishes\nphilosophy, in no other way than the critical way. There is no dissent,\nin intuitionist or voluntarist schools of philosophic method, from this\nresidual core of meaning in the conception of philosophy: by universal\nconsent philosophy is consciousness (in whatever mode) sitting in\njudgment on its own findings; philosophy is critical reflection.\nAnd _therein_ is an ultimateness and absoluteness--in a word, a\nsupremacy--which belongs to philosophy, on any view of philosophy,\nand to no other type of mental activity. But in rationalism, or\nintellectualism, alone, it is recognized that reflection, as such, is\nessentially and distinctively rational.\n\nIt is, then, the contention of this essay that the supremacy\npeculiar to philosophy--which, by common consent of voluntarism\nand intuitionism, is no eulogistic nor even ethical supremacy, but\ncritical--decides absolutely, among the three modes of consciousness,\nagainst will and intuition in favor of intellect, as the organ of\nphilosophy, of intellectualism as the sole genuinely philosophic\nmethod. Kant called his voluntarism the \u201cCritical Philosophy,\u201d to\ndistinguish it, as genuine philosophy, from what would be but failed\n(because it was not critical) to be philosophy. Critical his philosophy\nis; but because it is critical, it contradicts its own voluntarism--the\nassertion that reality is knowable only in obedience of will, and not\nin judgment. A contradiction; for _this_ (the gist of his voluntarism)\nis a judgment whose subject is reality. The inevitable fundamental\nintellectuality of noumenal knowledge is concealed, for Kant, under\nthe phrase \u201cpostulate of will.\u201d A postulate, so far as it is genuine\nknowledge, has indeed the character of necessity, but its necessity is\nsimply the fact of logical implication.\n\nWith the intuitionist variety, and particularly the Bergsonian variety\nof anti-intellectualism, this essay is largely to be concerned. At\nthis point I merely note the inevitable contradiction in Bergson\u2019s\nintuitionism, as in Kant\u2019s voluntarism. Intuition, Bergson explains,\nis \u201cinstinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of\n_reflecting_ upon its _object_ and of enlarging it indefinitely.\u201d[92]\nNow, consciousness reflecting upon its own data is criticism,\npredication, classification, judgment--whatever it is, it is the\n_objectifying_ of the data of consciousness, a thing which it is\nessential to instinct or intuition, on Bergson\u2019s own conception of\nthem, never to do, and which, precisely, on his conception, is the\ndistinguishing function of intellect. \u201cInstinct is sympathy,\u201d says\nBergson, in the same passage; and the sense in which instinct is\nsympathy is lucidly and emphatically explained as just this, that\nthere is no distinction of subject and object, in instinct; they\nare identical. Whereas, intelligence or intellect is explicitly\ndistinguished by him from instinct primarily in the disjunction of\nsubject and object. It is merely to turn his back on his own use of\nthese terms to describe philosophy as instinct extending its _object_\nand reflecting upon itself.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThat the case of philosophical anti-intellectualism is a hopeless\nparadox, whether in voluntarism or in intuitionism, each of these\nmethods itself best proves by its own inevitable intellectualism.\nThe terms voluntarism, intuitionism, and rationalism express no real\ndistinction of psychological mode, in philosophizing, since the\npsychology of every philosophy is necessarily characterized by that\ncritical reflectiveness which constitutes philosophy a function of\nintellect. Philosophy is always interpretation, a function alien to\nwhat anybody ever meant either by will or by intuition; a function\nwhose essential distinctness from both those functions is attested\nuniversally in such synonyms of \u201cinterpretation\u201d as judgment,\nconception, understanding, reason.\n\nThere are, it is true, voluntaristic and intuitionistic, philosophies\nof the highest importance. And the intention of their authors is to\ndistinguish their method from the rationalistic method. Are they\nforedoomed to futility on this account? So far as this intention\nis realized--yes, unquestionably. No philosophy that were itself a\nfunction either of will or of intuition is conceivable, since it would\nthen lack the essence of philosophy, which is critical primacy. That\nphilosophies designated by these methodological terms may be invaluable\nproducts, it is necessary only that these terms apply in fact not to\nthe psychological method of the philosophy but to its psychological\nstarting-point. They express a constitutional bias in the philosopher,\nwho, after all, is human. To some the qualities of things; to others,\nvalue; and, finally, to other some, the order of reality is the\n\u201cessence\u201d of reality. Such essentialness is eulogism, of course. For it\nis an irreducible psychological fact that there are religious, \u00e6sthetic\nand scientific types of mind. Each to his bias; each to his taste. The\napogee of living is religion to the first, art to the second, science\nto the third. Hence the illusion that philosophy, which must needs be\nexperience supremely critical, is experience eulogistically supreme.\nIs not this illusion chargeable to failure to see in these three modes\nof consciousness three emphases or biases of living? To the \u00e6sthete,\ncertainly, quality must be realest essence. But it cannot be so to the\nzealot; for, to him, that is value: nor to the intellectualist; to him\nit is order.\n\nIf \u00e6sthete and zealot will philosophize, they are at this disadvantage\nwith the wise man, that their philosophy can do no more, in expressing\nthe nature of this \u201crealest essence\u201d of reality, than the wise man\u2019s\nrationalism may do--discourse about it, interpret it. Philosophy indeed\nnever can, and never should aspire to enter into the inner nature of\nreality in any such sense as the immediatism of Bergson and James\nsummons it to do. There is art and there is religion for that. It is\nnot clear how the qualitative or how the teleological aspect of reality\nis more internal to it than its relational aspect; but, at any rate,\nphilosophy has its own interest, and that is distinct from those of art\nand religion. Wherefore the own proper interest of art or of religion\nis not served in their philosophy; in their philosophy they deny\nthemselves. The efforts of such philosophies to wrest from reality, in\na non-intellectual way, its secret, must be rather superhuman. This\ncharacterization is hardly a burlesque of Bergson\u2019s own observations\non his method, for it is little less than the repudiation of our\nnatural constitution, to which he exhorts us.[93] But, as with Kant,\nso with Bergson, prodigies of subtlety fail to produce a revelation\nof truth that is so subtle as to be inarticulate because immediate,\nor that does not lend itself to discussion and interpretation. Or,\nif this is not to be looked for in a philosophy which is \u2018a method\nrather than a doctrine,\u2019 neither is there any suggestion how such\nrevelation may be socialized, rendered human; or even, in fact, how\nit can assume _meaning_, meaning to the philosopher himself (which is\nsurely indispensable to truth), without becoming predication--assertion\nand denial;--that is to say, without becoming judgment. If humans\nmake superhuman effort, it should not be surprising if the result is\nself-contradiction.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nBERGSON\u2019S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON\n\n\nWhat, then, is called philosophic \u201cmethod\u201d and is distinguished\nthereby from \u201cdoctrine,\u201d is really, in fact, always the cardinal\nprinciple of the _content_ of the philosophy in question, its\nfundamental _doctrine_. If this doctrine is acceptable to reason,\nif it is reasonable, logical principles must determine it. No\nanti-intellectualist philosophy legitimately evades the rules of the\ngame of dialectic by the representation that it is a \u2018method rather\nthan a doctrine.\u2019 For this is the game that anyone plays who undertakes\nto show, by reasonable discourse, why reality and knowledge conform\nto a certain definition, or (the same mental procedure) why they do\nnot conform to other definitions. Since dialectic is just significant\ndiscourse with a meaning to be judged, it may vary in form between\nany degree of syllogistic baldness, at one extreme, and of suggestive\nsubtlety at the other. It is dialectic if it is constituted of\nstatements, explicit or implied, which relate to each other.\n\nThere is, therefore, I say, a misleading irrelevance in the\ncharacterization which Bergson himself has set the fashion of\nattributing to his philosophy, the characterization of it as rather a\nmethod than a system of doctrine. A method implies a system, that is to\nsay an ordered conviction about the nature of reality and knowledge.\nSuch a system is essential to any meaning in Bergson\u2019s method.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIntellectualism in philosophy implies the conviction that the parts of\nreality are connected together in thinkable ways; that a comprehensive\nunderstanding of things as a connected system or unity is therefore\ntheoretically possible; if actually impossible, this is merely because\nof the endlessness of relationships and the limitedness of any actual\nthinker\u2019s time and strength. But in fact even human finitude is no\nobstacle to a comprehension of the principles of reality. Detail is\nimmaterial to the unity of such a view.\n\nOne of the sayings attributed to Professor James is that there\nis one thing you can always pronounce with assurance, upon any\nphilosophical system, in advance of hearing a word of it, and that is\nthat it is false. This suggests at any rate, very well, the meaning\nof philosophical anti-intellectualism, which implies the conviction\ncontradictory to intellectualism, to wit that the parts of reality are\nnot connected in thinkable ways.\n\nThe connectedness of the intellectualist\u2019s universe may have any\ndegree of significance or casualness. A mere \u201cand\u201d may express much\nof it.[94] Intellectualism may be as pluralistic in this sense as you\nlike, or as monistic. But if things are a universe in any such sense\nthat they are comprehensible in intellect\u2019s discursive way, which\nanti-intellectualism denies--on such a hypothesis anti-intellectualism\nand intellectualism have commonly agreed that some principle is\nembodied in this total comprehensibleness, a supreme induction,\nwhich would constitute the final interpretation of any fact. Like\na master-key, it would open all the chambers of the many-mansioned\nuniverse. Every philosopher, as a fact, has some controlling thought\nwhich has the value, for him, of such a supreme principle. But always,\nit seems, there are doors which the master-key will not unlock. It is\nthe conviction of intellectualism that this is because the maker of\nthe key has missed them, and so left them out of account in fashioning\nit; while anti-intellectualism believes it is an illusion to see the\nsituation as a case of locks to be turned by a key, at all. Entrance\ninto possession of reality is otherwise conditioned, altogether; the\nprocedure, in consequence, is radically different from this. But it\nis, I think, a true historical generalization that the success with\nwhich a philosopher, of whatever method, avoids a supreme principle\nof interpretation, corresponds exactly with the success with which\nhe avoids being a philosopher at all. I suppose Omar Khayyam and\nAristippus the Cyrenaic are two of the least unifying philosophers\nof history; yet their philosophy, like that of any absolutist, can be\nresumed in a single idea. Omar has uttered it in one of his own famous\nsentences: \u201cOh take the cash, and let the credit go!\u201d\n\nAside from the presence, in each, of a generative principle, there\nis little enough in common between the anti-intellectualism of Omar\nand that of Henri Bergson. If critics have been able to find seeds of\nskepticism and of pessimism in Bergson,[95] these characters are at any\nrate foreign to any intention visible in its author. No more positive\nphilosophy, in its intention, was ever composed. The positiveness of\nits name, intuitionism, is altogether proper. Its significance, to be\nsure, is sharply defined by its negative relation to intellectualism,\nand therefore I stated it negatively above as the thesis that the parts\nof reality are not connected in a thinkable way. But the intuitionist\nwould readily admit: if not in a thinkable way, then in no way,\nevidently. And, again, if not connected at all, no more are the parts\nof reality disconnected, since any disconnection between things is\nonly their particular mode of connection. The fact is, reality has no\nparts, and that is just why intellect, which sees parts in everything,\nis alien and blind to the true nature of reality. Still one may object\nthat intellect is itself a fact. What possible meaning can there be in\nsaying that any fact is alien to reality? As Bergson himself has said,\nwe swim in reality, and cannot possibly get clear of it. We cannot\ntalk, we cannot think, we cannot act about nothing.\n\nThe answer to this objection is the master principle of Bergson\u2019s\nmetaphysics: reality is life. Knowledge is \u201csympathetic\u201d living. If\nintellect is real, so is every abstraction, _e. g._, the inside of your\nhat. The inside and the hat itself are at any rate real in senses so\nimportantly different that \u201creal\u201d and \u201cunreal\u201d hardly exaggerate the\ncontrast. Intellect, says Bergson, is the cross-sectioning of reality.\nThere is no thickness, no concreteness in it. It exists as much in\ninert matter as in consciousness; in fact, it exists in neither except\nin the sense in which a surface can be said to exist in a solid body.\nWhat is the surface _in itself_? Why, nothing; it is an abstract aspect\nof the body. The body is real, but its aspects are not real, because\nthey do not constitute the body--no multiplication or addition of them\ndoes so. No millions of surfaces make any thickness. In this sense the\nsurface is other than and alien to the real nature of the body. And so\nother manifestations of intellect--space, juxtaposition, extension,\nnumber, part out of part--have no existence, as the surface has none.\n\nAs facts, nevertheless, what are they? How are they facts? What is\ntheir _raison d\u2019 \u00eatre_? Their _raison d\u2019 \u00eatre_ is a faculty life has,\nthe faculty of _action_. They are the ways in which life acts. They are\nnot concrete entities. In this, they are alien to the concreteness of\nreality. Try to reconstruct reality out of such abstractions, and the\nresult is a construction like that of geometrical imagination. You have\nconstructed an abstract symbol of the reality, which symbol the mind,\npreoccupied with its practical bias, can mistake for the reality only\nbecause it is so preoccupied.\n\nWhen we physically take apart and put together, our manual activity\nhas the same unreality of abstractness as that of our intellectual\nanalyses and syntheses. It is the latter outwardly expressed, intellect\nexternalized. Wherever we find life, we are experiencing reality. But\nwhen this occurs, we are never analyzing nor synthesizing. The more one\ndivests himself of practical bias, and regards his object not as an\nobject for the realization of any possible activity of his own, but as\nit is in itself--in proportion, that is, as one gets its character as\na case of life--those unreal, spatial aspects of it yield to an aspect\nwhich has nothing in common with them. The parts of an anatomical\nmodel, a _papier mach\u00e9_ manikin, you may separate and put together\nagain. An organism, as such, a manifestation of life, could not be\ndissected and recomposed in its living reality. What is it that makes\nan organism alive, a true reality? This, that every so-called part has\na function which is so essential to the true function of the whole that\none is present or absent with the other. They coincide. How, then,\ncould you possibly dissect out a part of an organism? Once recognize,\nwhat is unquestionable, that any function of it coincides in this\nway with the function of the whole, and your analyzing operation is\nprevented absolutely. Obey the rule that everything which contributes\nat all to the function of the part shall be taken, and everything else\nleft, and you are in Shylock\u2019s position after Portia\u2019s judgment: if you\nwant the flesh you will have to take blood with it; but you are not\nentitled to the blood. It is even more hopeless than that. It is not a\nmatter of skill with your hand. You cannot make the analysis mentally,\nintellectually. It is not a matter of impairing or destroying the\nfunction, of injuring or killing the organism. You cannot _begin_ the\noperation, not even on the corpse. The first incision separates cells\nwhose functions were inseparably one, for there is no cell in the body\nthat is not in organic union with every other cell.\n\nIf there is nothing of the nature of mosaic composition in the living\nstructure, this fact is one with the fact that there is nothing\nmechanical in its functioning. It is not actuated from without, as\nevery machine is actuated which is not alive; nor is its functioning,\nlike that of such machines, an assemblage of functions predetermined\nso far as the machine itself is concerned--predetermined, that is to\nsay, except for intervention from without; unalterable, as unstartable,\nwithout external cause. The character of living function is suggested\nby the word \u201cfocalization.\u201d There is a perfectly indivisible concert\nof function throughout the organism, in every one of its infinite\nvarieties of activity. When the engineer reverses his engine, or\notherwise alters its mode of operation, what he really does is to\nalter the structure of the machinery. The machinery has been specially\nconstructed with a view to unmaking and remaking its nature more or\nless quickly and conveniently; that is, its parts can be displaced\nand replaced with reference to each other. Some parts are \u201cthrown out\nof gear\u201d and shifted back. _And then everything returns to its former\nstate._ Not so in life. The functioning of an organism never remains\nquite the same in two consecutive instants. There is an incessantly\nmoving emphasis or focus in it. Now one of its potentialities of\nfunction is primary or focal, now another. But none can ever cease\nand then be resumed. In this case, to cease is not to be thrown out\nof gear, but to die, to perish, to be annihilated. In every phase of\nthe life activity of the organism, all its functions are operative,\nsubsidiary and subservient in varying degrees to that one which for\nthe moment is the focus of all. Thus the organic or vital focus, in\nits physiological aspect of activity and in its psychological aspect\nof attention, is never at rest. The modulation is not like the sudden\ntransformations in a kaleidoscope. The evolutions do not take place\nin the manner suggested by the phrase \u201cPresto, change!\u201d _Modulation_\nis the word that describes the process. Or, as Bergson phrases it,\nthe change is continuous, incessant, an _interpenetrating flow_ of\nprocesses, in which analysis can make no beginning and no separation;\nin which analysis, in fact, is absolutely impotent. If the eye is\nthat which sees, the ear that which hears, and so on, it is really\nthe organism entire, and no special, locally differentiated part of\nit that is the organ. Those so-called parts which, with our false\nintellectualism, we name the eye or other organ, are, _in their\nreality_, focal aspects of the entire organism, the organism seen with\na certain restriction or limitation of interest.\n\nBut, now, how can one make any discourse about, say, an animal\norganism--indeed, how can this become an object of perception at\nall--without its lending itself to that sort of division into real\nparts which Bergson says is an intellectual falsification of its\ntrue nature, and therefore not true knowledge of the thing? When I\nlook at a living body, do I not see it occupying space? Is it not,\nthen, measurable? Is not one such body larger than another? Suppose\ncutting out parts of a body does alter or kill the organism: they can,\nneverless, be cut out, and are therefore parts? If, after, and because\nof, being cut out, they are then not parts of the _organism_ from which\nthey were cut, still, they are constituents of its volume. Surely, our\nordinary speech about this part and that part of our bodies, is not all\nfalse?\n\nBergson\u2019s answer is uncompromising: our ordinary perception and speech\ndoes falsify the nature of reality, but (in spite of the apparent\nparadox) _does not mislead_. For our ordinary perception and speech\nhave nothing to do with knowing. Perception is a different function\nof life--it is action. Our percepts are the ways in which reality\ncan factor in our activities. Those dissected organs, you say, are\nat least so much of the entire volume of the organism: but the words\nare no sooner spoken than their falseness shows itself. If the\norganism ever had volume, it certainly has not, now--neither volume\nnor anything else. The fact is, the only meaning there is in its ever\npossessing volume while it still exists, is just that you might enter\ninto activity with it in such and such ways--as that, for instance,\nof hacking it up. Perception, our \u201cvirtual\u201d or potential activity on\nreality, is an abstract aspect of it; what it is in itself is another\nmatter, and the only knowledge of this is that sympathetic union with\nit in which space and parts disappear in an \u201cinterpenetrating flow\u201d\nnot of _things_ nor of parts, but of process, of ceaseless change. Now,\nquality is just the fact of change, as anyone may test for himself by\nintrospection. Reality as it is in itself, therefore, the true nature\nof reality, is quality. Relations are external views or aspects, no\nmultiplication of which makes any start at constituting a concrete\nreality.\n\nThere is one more reflection on Bergson\u2019s account of intellect, which,\nlike those made above, he anticipates and tries to meet, so far as it\nseems an objection to denying cognitive validity to intellect. The\nattempt at this point, however, is not very convincing. The point I\nmean is this: The ways in which reality can factor in my activities\nare _by that warrant_ true characters of reality. One may cheerfully\nadd: even as the inside of my hat is, after all, a true character of\nmy hat. For, if reality were different, it could not factor _so_ in\nmy activity--in other words, which would also be the words of plain\ncommon sense, I should _perceive_ it differently, on Bergson\u2019s own\nconception of what it means to perceive. The situation is this: Reality\ndoes, indeed, possess those interesting aspects of changing process\nand undividedness which Bergson is so preoccupied with and which he\nhas brought to light with exquisite skill. This is one of two equally\nimportant truths about reality. The other Bergson is simply blind\nto, and that is that reality also possesses an aspect of permanence\nand divisibility. Does this seem a contradiction? It is no more a\ncontradiction than that a curve is both convex and concave. It is not\nonly not a contradiction: each of these antipodally opposite aspects\nof reality is absolutely indispensable to the very conception of\nthe other, just as concavity is indispensable to the conception of\nconvexity, east to the conception of west, right to the conception\nof left-- and _vice versa_. This point is resumed below (pp. 77-9,\n96). The object in view at present is to see how the philosopher\u2019s\nmethod is really his primary doctrine, in which object I am not in\ncontroversy with anyone, so far as I know; but also to see how an\nanti-intellectualist method depends upon a purely arbitrary, or rather\nconstitutional, psychological prepossession for a certain emphasis of\nliving.\n\nI said that Bergson is entirely awake to the aptness of the objection\njust raised to his account of intellect. In a sense, in certain\npassages, he even seems to grant the truth of the contention. Action,\nhe acknowledges, for instance,[96] can be involved only with reality;\nand consequently the forms of perception and the categories of\nintellect (which are those forms rendered elaborately precise) \u201ctouch\nsomething of the absolute.\u201d Sound truth, assuredly! The fitness of\nreality to enter as object into those active relationships which are\nthe perceptive and intellectual categories makes the categories as\ngenuinely own to the true, essential nature of objective reality as\nto the nature of subjective intelligence. That the categorization of\nreality depends on the real object\u2019s being in relation to something\nelse than itself is nothing peculiar to this (the categorical)\ncharacter of reality. The same condition is common to every character\nof reality. The qualitative aspect of reality, which Bergson usually\nregards as the nature of reality \u201cin itself,\u201d depends no less than its\nrelational or categorical aspect on the relatedness of the object. For\nthe qualities of things are nothing but the differences they make--to\nconsciousness or to other things. Reality not in relation is simply\na phrase without a vestige of meaning. Reality \u201cin itself\u201d in such\na sense is merely nonsense. It would seem, therefore, as if Bergson\nshould account the intellectual mode of consciousness, which does\nindeed \u201ctouch something of the absolute,\u201d as knowledge of precisely the\nsame metaphysical status as a mode which touches anything else of the\nabsolute. It is one thing for a mode of consciousness to be uncongenial\nor uninteresting to you or me; it is another for it to be invalid.\nThe uncongeniality of a mode of consciousness depends on personal\nidiosyncrasy; the invalidity of a mode of consciousness depends on the\nlogical nature of being.\n\nAs a fact, however, perhaps because this preference between two aspects\nof the nature of reality depends so obviously on personal bias instead\nof logical principles, Bergson vacillates, in a hopelessly confused and\nconfusing way, all through his writings, between two conceptions of\nreality. First, reality is of one nature, namely life, which is pure\nquality, change, or duration (the four terms are actually synonyms to\nBergson), and knowledge of which can be only sympathetic intuition\nof it, while intellect is merely \u201can appendage of action,\u201d and not\nknowledge at all. In the other conception reality is cleft into a\ndualism more unutterably absolute than that of Descartes. Life is one\nkind of reality; inert matter is the other. Intuition knows the former;\nintellect really does _know_ the latter (\u2018touching something of the\nabsolute\u2019), and knowledge is therefore not intuition only. Although\nthis vacillation confuses issues in every one of Bergson\u2019s books, the\nfirst conception is more characteristic, upon the whole, of _Time and\nFree Will_ and of _Creative Evolution_; the other conception is pretty\nconsistently expounded in _Matter and Memory_. The sphere of intellect\nis restricted; its cognitive validity is not explicitly denied within\nthis sphere, but only within the domain of life. To be sure, since\nlife exhausts reality, the sphere allotted to intellect is not real,\nwhich would seem to imply that intellect fails to know. The validity of\nintellectual consciousness is thus, in effect, denied equally in either\ncase. The only difference is that the denial is conscious and explicit\nin one case, more or less unconsciously implied in the other.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE ANCIENT PREJUDICE AGAINST ANALYSIS\n\n\nThe restrictive conception of intellect is a very old one. The\nincompatibility of intellect and life, as cognitive organ and object,\nis certainly as old a belief as the era of the Sophists. It can be\nsaid, that is, with historical certainty, that, from the time of\nProtagoras--and I have no doubt it has been true ever since the first\nphilosopher, whoever he was, undertook to make an examination of the\nuniverse as one thing--it has always been true that many of the best\nminds have been convinced, by the futile results of such undertakings,\nthat the universe as one thing, on one hand, and intellect, on the\nother, make a pair as incompatible, in the relation of cognitive organ\nand object, as the faint star and the fovea: you have an organ and an\nobject which by nature are unsuited to each other. That kind of organ\ncannot see that kind of object. Not that the faint star is invisible,\nbut, to see it, you musn\u2019t look! Then it will swim into the field of\nthe organ that is made to see it, the retinal tissue surrounding the\nfovea. Thus it is not a question of human finitude or limitation. The\nformul\u00e6 of intellect, applied to such an object, are mere silliness,\nreducible, as Kant showed, to all manner of antinomy and paradox.\nNot only that, but whatever is most important and interesting within\nthis whole, everything concerning the nature and meaning of concrete\ncases of life, eludes and baffles conceptual statement,--which is the\nonly kind of statement there is,--inevitably eludes it, like smoke in\na child\u2019s hand who tries to catch it. Your essences or definitions,\nof life or any of its manifestations, are stuff and nonsense, not\ninadequate, but absurd. What logical sentence has ever been uttered\nthat, upon the least reflection, does not fail to develop into a\ngrotesquely false caricature when applied to any genuine phase or\ninterest of life, great or small--whether God, freedom, immortality,\nor the heart of a woman, or of a child, or of a man (to take them in\na descending order of their unsearchableness)? You may labor your\nconception with prodigious precision--the truth of the matter is always\nbeyond, when you are speaking of matters that are real.\n\nThis is the artist\u2019s temper of mind when the artist has inadvertently\ngulped down a noxious dose of metaphysics. It is the feeling of the\nnovelists, the dramatists, the poets, that Bergson voices: life\nmay be lived--nobly or basely, courageously or cowardly, truly or\nfalsely;--and the flavor and significance of life may be heightened,\nlife may be realized more abundantly, in artistic activity, which is\nputting oneself into one\u2019s object, making it become not an object,\nidentifying oneself with it. But one thing is not given to man, and\nthat is to _interpret_ life.\n\nEveryone is familiar with the telling dramatic force of the device\nwhich consists in involving a philosophical hero, a man addicted to\nprinciples of high generality, in sudden overwhelming emotional chaos,\nin which all his philosophy goes to smash. The refractoriness of sexual\nlove, for instance, to all his theories is such a delicious _reductio\nad absurdum_ of the theories. First you make your philosopher develop\nhis maxims, in a besotted, fatuous conviction of their infallibility:\nthen a particularly impossible she enters, one who is conspiciously\nunfitted, by artlessness or disabilities of worldly station, for the\nupsetting of principles great and high. The philosopher goes through\nhis paces, eating his maxims whole, with unction; and you have the\nspectacle of Life rising serene, untouched, above the futilities of\ntheory. The theory doesn\u2019t work. The obvious conclusion is that there\nis some fundamental incommensurability between it and the simple facts\nof life that can flout it so. _Simon the Jester_ is a very delightful\nexample of what I mean. Simon is bound to come to grief, he is so\nsmugly philosophical. The wise novel-reader knows what to expect. Not\nthat philosophy is not an ornament to a man, a civilizing, disciplining\nexercise. All that is one thing, but acting as if such notions _apply_\nis quite another. This good philosophical chap gives the result of his\nphilosophy in regulating his life, as follows:\n\n\u201cSurely no man has fought harder than I have done to convince himself\nof the deadly seriousness of existence; and surely before the feet of\nno man has Destiny cast such stumbling-blocks to faith ... No matter\nwhat I do, I\u2019m baffled. I look upon sorrow and say, \u2018Lo, this is\ntragedy!\u2019 and hey, presto! a trick of lightening turns it into farce.\nI cry aloud, in perfervid zeal, \u2018Life is real, life is earnest, and\nthe apotheosis of the fantastic is not its goal,\u2019 and immediately a\ngrinning irony comes to give the lie to my _credo_.\n\n\u201cOr is it that, by inscrutable decree of the Almighty Powers, I am\nundergoing punishment for an old unregenerate point of view, being\ndoomed to wear my detested motley for all eternity, to stretch out my\nhand forever to grasp realities and find I can do naught but beat the\nair with my bladder; to listen with strained ear perpetually expectant\nof the music of the spheres, and catch nothing but the mocking jingle\nof the bells on my fool\u2019s cap?\n\n\u201cI don\u2019t know. I give it up.\u201d\n\nGiving it up is obviously the moral, here. The change of attitude\nimplied in the last words marks the beginning of an era of glorious\nfulfilment of life in the former philosopher\u2019s history. What was\nnecessary was that he should stop theorizing and learn to live. That\nis, philosophy, as supreme experience, is the art of living. It is the\nartist that really knows, that knows inwardly and truly. The genuine\nphilosopher is the artist in living. The intellectualist philosopher is\na dissector of life\u2019s defunct remains.\n\nThe nature of the opposition between the two modes of consciousness\ncalled intuition and intellect is discussed in the chapter on Bergson\u2019s\nepistemology. The intuitionist philosopher is such never for logical\nreasons, always for temperamental reasons. He is a man to whom life\nis richer and fuller, more self-fulfilling, more natural, in the\nintuitional mode of consciousness than in the intellectual. Hence the\nsuspicious and disparaging disposition toward the intellectual mode of\nconsciousness, in a very numerous class of minds of the highest order.\nFrom a personal feeling of safety and security in intuition and of\ndissatisfaction with intellectual efforts, the transition is natural to\na conviction that the trouble is in the essential nature of intellect.\nA mode of consciousness which is so inveterately and (presumably)\ninevitably beset with self-frustration cannot be knowledge. It is too\nobviously the opposite of knowledge, to wit error and delusion.\n\nBut once the opposition has reached this point, where not only the\nconvenience but the very validity of intellect is impugned, one is\ninvolved in a disjunction between these two modes of consciousness\nthat is demonstrably false, both logically and psychologically. It\nis surely a false hypostasis of terms whose distinction is merely\nabstract, to set over against each other in this way two aspects which\nare equally essential to any conception of the nature of consciousness.\nFor intuition and intellect can be seen to imply each other with the\nsame necessity with which quality and quantity imply each other. And\nthere is the same absurdity, on the side of epistemology, in regarding\nintuition as valid knowledge and intellect as not valid, as, on the\nside of ontology, in regarding quality as real and quantity--or\nrelation in general--as not real. As if either were conceivable except\nas a co-aspect or coefficient with the other, in the nature of reality.\nThis would be to conceive of quality as quality of nothing, or relation\nas relation between no terms.\n\nIf philosophy must be reflective (and reflectiveness to some degree\nis undoubtedly an inevitable condition of human consciousness,\nperhaps of any consciousness), it must be, _quatenus_ philosophy,\nintellectual, and not, _quatenus_ philosophy, intuitional. Intuition\nwill assuredly be there, in any philosophy, as the pole is inseparable\nfrom its antipodes. But the philosophicalness of philosophy is just\nits reflectiveness; that is, once more, _quatenus_ philosophy, it is\nintellectual.\n\nI am recording a protest against false reification of what is abstract,\nthe very fault which intuitionism is insistent to lay to the charge\nof intellectualism. If intuitionism were to conceptualize intuition\nand intellect, instead of reifying them, it could not appropriate\nvalidity to either mode of consciousness and deny it to another.\nThe satisfactoriness and richness of a given mode of consciousness\ndepend no doubt on the constitution of the subject. The validity\nof consciousness in any mode has nothing to do with such personal\nidiosyncrasy.\n\nJames is less rigorous concerning the validity of relational knowledge\nthan Bergson. Having found relations in the immediate content of\nconscious data, James cannot deny them an essential constitutiveness\nin the nature of reality. But such knowledge is \u201cthin\u201d and \u201cpoor\u201d,\nin his homely and human phraseology. This is only a more na\u00efve and\ngenial expression than Bergson\u2019s of the purely eulogistic primacy of\nquality over relation. Relations are thin and poor aspects of reality,\nno doubt, if you find them so. Otherwise they may be supremely\ninteresting. That depends on your interests, which depend on your\nconstitution. In any case, they are the aspect of reality primarily\nindispensable to reflective thought, which is philosophy.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe characteristic which is most sedulously imputed by the philosophy\nof instinct to intellect is usefulness, but this characteristic\nis treated as evidence of cognitive invalidity! In point of fact,\nserviceableness to action in no way distinguishes intellect from\ninstinct. Each alike is a reactive state resulting in a new situation,\na new arrangement of matter; and the only thing that can give true\nfinality to the intelligent act is the affective value of the conscious\nstate arising out of this new situation. But the same is true of the\nsituation which is the outcome of the instinctive act.\n\nThe distinction sometimes seems to mean that it is only acquaintance\nwith objects (intuitive knowledge of them) that has affective value,\nand that this kind of consciousness is therefore an end in itself in\na sense in which intellect is not. For knowledge about the object\n(intellectual knowledge of it) will then be supposed to have no\naffective value in itself, but only as it may subserve action upon\nthe object, which action will be accompanied by acquaintance with the\nobject. But if knowledge about an object subserves acquaintance with\nit, the converse is no less true. If knowledge of the location and\nprice of a tennis ball subserves my use of it and acquaintance with it,\nthe latter in turn subserves my knowledge about it in an indefinite\nnumber of respects. True, acquaintance with an object may not always\nlead to knowledge about it so obviously as in the case of the tennis\nball; but again it is equally true that knowledge about certain things,\nfor instance lines drawn upon the blackboard, has no obvious leading\ntoward utility; the utility of a certain mathematical equation may\nseem quite inscrutable. But how obvious the leading may be, or how\ninteresting the utility, is nothing to the point. The question whether\nor not the connection is necessarily there in all cases is answered\nperemptorily _a priori_ by the polar character of knowledge by virtue\nof which acquaintance-with is only an aspect of knowledge-about, and\n_vice versa_.\n\nIt is flagrantly untrue, as a fact, that knowledge-about is without\naffective value in itself. Experience is as emphatic to the contrary\nas reason. If a characteristically intellectual state of mind gives\nyou less satisfaction, or more, than one that is characteristically\nintuitive, the reason is quite personal and accidental in either case.\nIt may just as well give you more as less. Being knowledge in each\ncase, awareness at least, it has its affective value in some degree\nnecessarily, of whichever character it may be predominantly.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSince relation is not divorcible from quality, nor intellect from\nintuition, it results that, if the artist blunders through critical\ndefect, even better art would, of itself, have saved him in spite of\nhis critical defect. If the mustiness of the philosopher is expressible\nas lack of a facile instinct, merely a truer theory of life would have\ncorrected him. No doubt life is too intricate for the most robust\ncapacity for ratiocination. Sanity balances securely between the two\nbiases of consciousness. Art and criticism are equally long, and the\nmiddle course a is short-cut and an economy of living. But condemnation\nof the validity of consciousness in any mode is a theoretical\nproposition irrelevant to maxims of practical sagacity. And it implies\neither condemning the validity of all consciousness (if intuition\nand intellect are aspects of each other) or else it presupposes that\nreality is not categorical, which Bergson fails to show. On page 24 of\nthe present essay, we have seen that he seems, in an inconsistent way,\neven to maintain the contradictory thesis.\n\nIn a former paper[97] I have written as follows:\n\n\u201cNow, Bergson\u2019s idea of the philosopher--an artist in life--is probably\nno one\u2019s else. He is of that opinion, decidedly; a considerable part\nof the book [_Creative Evolution_] is a demonstration that actual\nphilosophers, from Plato on, are intellectualists all, dissectors,\nnot artists. But if Bergson\u2019s enterprise is to be a _substitute_ for\nphilosophy and appropriate its name, we who are much addicted to the\nold enterprise will be careful to know why it is futile and illusory.\u201d\n\nMonsieur Bergson comments on this in a private letter from which I\ntranslate:\n\n\u201cIt would be so, I recognize, if these intellectualist philosophers had\nbeen philosophers only in virtue of their intellectualism. But whereas\nintelligence pure and simple professes to solve the problems, it is\nintuition alone that has enabled them to be put. Without the intuitive\nfeeling of our freedom, there would be no problem of freedom, hence no\ndeterminist theory; thus, the different forms of determinism, which are\nso many forms of intellectualism, owe their very existence to something\nwhich could not have been obtained by the intellectualist method. For\nmy part, I find, more or less developed, the seeds of intuitionism in\nmost of the great philosophic doctrines, although the philosophers\nhave always tried to convert their intuition into dialectic. Yet it is\nchiefly in the former that they have been philosophers.\u201d\n\nThis seems to me an absolute inversion of intuition and intellect. Does\nintuition \u2018put problems\u2019? It is, certainly, intuition that gives us the\nmaterial of our problems. But the formulating of a problem--what can be\nmeant by intuition\u2019s formulating anything? Giving forms, I should say,\njust defines the work of intellect. Intuition gives us our facts, our\nmaterial. Surely, the putting of problems is an intellectual operation\ncontinuous, even identical, strictly, with their solution? A problem\nwell put is rather more than half solved. Certainly the remainder of\nthe solution is not a different order of activity. It carries out\nthe \u2018putting\u2019 in its implications. A problem put is only a problem\nincompletely solved.[98] Solving it is putting it with a satisfactory\nperspicacity.\n\nWithout the intuitive feeling of our freedom there would be no problem\nof freedom, certainly, but you might easily have the intuition without\nthe problem. In the preface to the _Essai sur les donn\u00e9es imm\u00e9diates de\nla conscience_, Bergson insists that it is the aberrations of intellect\nthat give rise to the problems of freedom. Intellect, then, at any\nrate, not intuition, puts the problem.\n\nAs correlative modes of consciousness, neither is independent, nor\nprimary, of course. Even in the putting of our problems, intellect\nis only a co-factor, a coefficient with intuition. And in the\nmost abstract reasoning, the intuitive coefficient of thought is\nindispensable. So far as intellect is actual, concrete knowledge, it\nmust be intuitively correlated, and so far as intuition is the real\nintuiting of anything, it must be intelligently correlated.\n\nIn what respect are the philosophers of whom Monsieur Bergson speaks\nintuitionists? Does this mean anything more than that they are\nwide-reaching and far-reaching instead of narrow and dull in their\napprehension? Is not philosophy interpretation of experience? Is not\nthe philosopher\u2019s vision, therefore, always necessarily, just so far as\nhe is a _philosopher_, a vision of the formal aspect of reality? To be\nsure, that is just what Monsieur Bergson is denying. But his reason is\nthat reality is pure quality, a proposition whose logical faultiness\nand temperamental genesis I have sufficiently noted.\n\nIn view of the temperamental basis of the artistic and the\nphilosophical or critical attitudes, it were fatuous for either\nto propose a reform in the other by way of conformity to a mode\ndistinguished from it thus radically. It is this fatuity which it seems\nto me Bergson commits in regarding the success of any philosophy as\ndue, by any possibility, to its becoming art instead. As well conceive\nthat the virtue of an artistic product _consists_ in its conformity to\ncritical canons.\n\nPhilosophy that is false to art would therein necessarily be false to\nphilosophy; and art that is false to philosophy is false to art; but\nart is not philosophy, nor philosophy art.\n\n\n\n\nPART TWO\n\nBERGSON\u2019S SYSTEM OF DOCTRINE\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY\n\n\nMy reason for coupling these two subjects in one heading is suggested\nby the following words quoted from the Introduction to _Creative\nEvolution_: \u201c... _theory of knowledge_ and _theory of life_ seem to\nus inseparable.\u201d For Bergson, reality is life; and knowledge, of\ncourse, is a function of life. \u201cThe fundamental character of Bergson\u2019s\nphilosophy,\u201d writes H. Wildon Carr,[99] \u201cis ... to emphasize the\nprimary importance of the conception of life as giving the key to the\nnature of knowledge.\u201d\n\nAll the essential principles of this metaphysics are contained in the\nfirst of Bergson\u2019s philosophical books, _Time and Free Will_.[100] The\ntwo later books, _Matter and Memory_ and _Creative Evolution_, have not\nmodified it, and have hardly even developed it--in the sense, that is,\nthat no vital corrections or additions to the principles of the _Essai_\nhave been made.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn discussing anti-intellectualistic philosophies, in the first part\nof the present essay, their suspicion and distrust of intellect was\nattributed to a logical illusion. The philosopher, finding life\npreeminently satisfactory in an intimate acquaintance with the\nqualitative aspect of experience, acquires an instinctive faith in\nthe preeminent reality of quality, a faith which is the deepest root\nof his being. Now, this faith is absolutely justified, of course.\nIt is only necessary that it should be understood. Illusion and\nerror enter in with the neglect of the very preeminence of this\ncharacter of reality. For evidently nothing can be preeminently\nreal and at the same time real in any sense for which the adverb\n\u201cpreeminently\u201d is either false or meaningless. The sense of \u201cimportant\u201d\nis a well accredited, proper meaning, in our language, of the word\n\u201creal.\u201d But it is a sense perfectly distinct from the metaphysical\nsense. Teleologically, anything is preeminently real _according to\ncircumstances_. Teleologically, \u201creal\u201d is a synonym of \u201cimportant,\u201d\na relative term capable of degree. Metaphysically, circumstances are\nirrelevant to the realness of anything. This is a different statement\nfrom the statement that circumstances are irrelevant to the _nature_\nof anything. It may be that there is nothing whose nature can be\nindependent of, wholly undetermined by, circumstances. That is another\nquestion. We have nothing to do with it at present. For in either case,\ncircumstances make it neither more nor less real. Metaphysically,\nthen, \u201creal\u201d is an absolute term, incapable of degree, and the adverb\n\u201cpreeminently\u201d has no meaning when applied to it. The very fitness of\nthe adverb \u201cpreeminently\u201d to the intuitionist\u2019s meaning of the realness\nof quality determines this meaning as a teleological eulogism, and\nthe ultimate significance of intuitionism is not the germination of a\nlogical principle, but an instinctive propagandism in the direction of\na favorite emphasis of living, an enthusiasm which has become involved\nin a logical illusion concerning its own foundation in the nature of\nthings, an illusion which is clearly traceable, on analysis, to this\nambiguity in the use of the word \u201creal.\u201d\n\nLater in this study it will appear that Bergson\u2019s interest centers,\nas the interest of French philosophy has centered ever since the\nRenaissance, in the problem of freedom. No doubt that very enthusiasm\nwhich motivates modern anti-intellectualism and gives it so positive a\ncharacter, is a prime factor in its popular success. And in the case\nof Bergson, both the significance of his philosophy itself and the\nbrilliant vogue it has achieved can be rightly appreciated only in\nthe light of this central passion whose appeal to human nature is so\nuniversal and so profound. Anti-intellectualism and anti-determinism\nare one and the same thing. It will appear as we go on that a\ndeep-lying tychism, a horror of determinism, is the specific trait of\nthat motive (described above as a natural affinity for the qualitative\naspect of reality, as distinguished from its relational aspect) which\nstrenuously endeavors, in Bergson, to eliminate relation from reality,\njudgment from knowledge. He protests that freedom cannot be defined\nwithout converting it into necessity; for definition is determination.\nA would-be indeterminist _theory_ of will is as futile as a determinist\ntheory is false: on any _theory_, will is prejudged in favor of\ndeterminism. The nature of freedom cannot be known independently of the\nnature of will, and then attributed or denied to will, as one might\nattribute or deny redness to an apple. To say, Will is free, would be\nlike saying, Will is voluntary, or, Freedom is free--not, indeed, an\nuntruth, but without meaning and hence not a truth, either.\n\nThe one way, then, of getting the true nature of will truly\ncomprehended which is doomed to necessary failure, is to write\na psychological treatise on the subject. For, since will has no\nsuch determinate character as intellect finds in it or gives to\nit, a treatise conveying the true nature of will would have to be\nunintelligible! Now, see in will, as Leibniz[101] and Schopenhauer, as\nwell as Bergson, have seen in it, the whole of life and of reality,\nand you see how it is Bergson\u2019s tychism that constitutes the specific\nmotive for his anti-intellectualism, and how this so-called method\nforms, in his philosophy, the supreme doctrine which is the objective\nof all his discourse.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBergson\u2019s critique of intellectualism proceeds by applying to\ntraditional metaphysics and epistemology his purely qualitative\ncriterion of reality. Whether science, the product of intelligence,\nis physical, biological, or psychological, it is knowledge-about,\nand not acquaintance-with; its object is relation, and not reality;\nits objective is action, and not vision; its organ is intelligence,\nnot instinct. But the object of philosophy is reality; its objective\nis vision; its organ instinct. The timeless, intellectual way in\nwhich science knows about, but never knows, is not the way of true\nphilosophy. The philosopher, to know reality, must achieve a vital,\nsympathetic concurrence with its flow. To be known, reality must be\nlived, not thought. In _Creative Evolution_ Bergson traces the genesis\nof instinct and intelligence to a primitive tendency, effort or spring\nof life (the _\u00e9lan vital_) whose path bifurcates indefinitely in the\ncourse of its evolution. These elementary tendencies, instinct and\nintelligence, having issued from the same primitive tendency, are both\npresent, at least in rudiment, in all forms of life; and it is the\npresence, though in a suppressed state, of instinct in man that must\nsave philosophy from the _cognitive emptiness_ of science, and give it\na hold on the living fulness of reality.\n\nIn _Time and Free Will_ the theory of \u201creal duration,\u201d which is a\nsynonym for intuition, and for life, and for reality, and is the\nfoundation of the Bergsonian philosophy, is enunciated, and in the\nlight of it intellect is shown to falsify the nature of consciousness\nin applying to conscious states such categories as magnitude,\nplurality, causation. Each of these categories, in its traditional\napplication, is a quantifying and a spatializing of consciousness.\nThe intensity of a conscious state is nothing but the state itself;\nthe state is pure quality or heterogeneity, incapable of measure\nand degree. The variousness of conscious states has no analogy with\nplurality. Plurality is simultaneity and juxtaposition; but conscious\nstates prolong each other in an interpenetrating flow. Finally, the\norganization of conscious states is nothing like the traditional\nsystematic \u201cco\u00f6rdination\u201d of associationistic psychology. It does not\nlend itself to laws and principles. It cannot be adequately expressed\nby words, nor artificially reconstructed by a juxtaposition of simple\nstates, for it is always an absolutely new and original phase of our\nduration, and is itself a simple thing.\n\nThe first chapter of _Time and Free Will_ consists of analyses of all\nsorts of psychological states, in order to justify the above thesis\nconcerning intensity. They are masterly analyses, and their interest\nfor psychology is great. So far as Bergson\u2019s object is concerned,\nof showing how intellect falsifies the nature of consciousness in\nconceiving of sensations as _more_ or _less_ intense, what the chapter\nproves is no more than that whenever a conscious state varies--which\nevery conscious state does continuously--it varies qualitatively. Which\nhardly needed to be proved. For the argument does not show that, along\nwith the qualitative change, a quantitative change may not occur; that\nis, it does not exclude the proposition which Bergson is trying to\nrefute, namely that there is something in the nature of a conscious\nstate that is capable of increasing and decreasing.[102]\n\nIn saying that conscious states are pure quality, Bergson means that\nwhen one compares a sensation, for instance, with another which is\nregarded as of the same \u201ckind,\u201d but of greater or less intensity, both\nthe sameness of kind and the difference of magnitude are illusions of\nintellect, due to attributing the category of magnitude, or quantity,\nto that whose nature admits of no such determination. A so-called more\nintense odor, say, it is mere nonsense to call _same_ in any sense with\nanother, supposed to be less intense. The two are distinguishable,\nthat is all; they are not comparable, properly speaking. They are\ncomparable in just the sense, and in no other (it would seem, from\nBergson\u2019s treatment of the subject, although the statement is not his,\nexplicitly) that either of the odors can be compared with a sound or a\ntaste. The difference is not one of degree; it is what Bergson calls\nabsolute.\n\nBut what, then, exactly, according to Bergson, do we mean when we\ncompare psychic states as more or less intense? In simple states, he\nsays, magnitude of cause is associated, by a thousand experiences, with\na certain quality or shade of effect in consciousness, and the former\nis attributed to the latter. The quantitative scale rubs off color, so\nto speak, by the operation of association, from the material cause to\nthe psychic effect. In complex states intensity means the amount of our\ninner life which the state in question colors with its own quality. A\npassion is deep and intense in the fact that the same objects no longer\nproduce the same impression. In this statement of the case of complex\nstates it will be seen that Bergson fails to avoid attributing quantity\nto the inner life of consciousness, since the intensity of complex\nstates is measured, by him, by a quantitative standard, the amount of\nthat inner life colored or affected by the quality in question.\n\nThe attempt is equally hopeless whether the state in question be\nsimple or complex. Bergson attempts, but fails,[103] to prove that\nmagnitude is a character peculiar to space, and that homogeneity and\nspace are two names for the same conception. Two odors, two sounds are\n_more_ than one, however; and that homogeneity in them by virtue of\nwhich they are more, and two, is not space. Bergson would object that\nnumber itself, the twoness of the odors or sounds, is indeed a spatial\nattribute falsely imputed to them. They are not plural, in themselves;\nit is conceptualization that accounts for the plurality imputed to\nthem. One evolves continuously, in the flow of consciousness, out\nof the other. It would be a sufficient answer that such a doctrine\ncontradicts itself in every breath by the terms necessary to any\nutterance of it,--such terms as sounds, they, them, one, the other--all\nimputing to the objects of discussion the plurality which it tries\nto deny. And to fall back on the disabilities of language, due to\nits being the work of intellect, is only to declare one\u2019s philosophy\nineffable. But not only ineffable--unthinkable. Yes, Bergson would\nadmit, unthinkable in the narrow sense of conceptual thought, but\nnot unknowable to immediate intuition. The final rejoinder, I think,\nis that immediacy is a vanishing-point, a limiting conception of the\nrelation between subject and object, a phase of consciousness in which\nto use the mathematical analogy, the \u201ccoefficient\u201d of consciousness\nvanishes into zero. We return later in this essay to the amplifying\nof this point.[104] In brief, if there is no _distinction_ between\nsubject and object, there is no object (as, likewise, no subject,\nof course); hence, no truth; and Bergson could not have made these\nineffable discoveries _about_ the sounds and odors, for he could not\nhave discovered themselves.\n\nIt is clear enough that nothing needs to _occupy_ space, in order to\nbe a magnitude. A line, which occupies no space, is even a _spatial_\nmagnitude, nevertheless. That it is spatial, Bergson would say, is just\nthe fact that it is homogeneous. But is homogeneity the only character\nof a line, and is its spatiality _therefore_ necessarily the same thing\nas its homogeneity? Evidently a line has a _quale_ perfectly distinct\nfrom its homogeneity, and essential to its linear nature; that _quale_\nis its direction. If an interval of time, then, or a mental state,\nseems not to be spatial, this does not compel us to deny that there is\nany homogeneity about it: if the interval or the state of mind lacks\nthe determination--the character of direction--which is indispensable\nto a line and to spatiality as such, this lack determines these objects\nof thought as non-spatial without the slightest detriment to their\nhomogeneity. But all the evidence of homogeneity in space applies\nequally to homogeneity in time and consciousness. The evidence is\ntheir additiveness: all _seem_ to present numerically distinct cases\nand quantitative differences. No logical ground has been indicated,\nfor discrimination, in the validity of this seeming, as a warrant for\nthe homogeneity of space and not of time and consciousness. Time and\nconsciousness are homogeneous by the same warrant as space and matter.\n\nI think it is not irrelevant to Bergson\u2019s theory of the associative\ntransfer of quantity in the stimulus to the sensation, to observe\nthat, in the stimulus, there is kind as well as amount. If the\nshade or quality of the sensation corresponds to the degree of\nthe cause, is there no further determination of the sensation\ndistinctively correlative with the kind of the cause? Such correlate\nseems indispensable to Bergson\u2019s, as to any, reactive conception of\nsensation, but, in Bergson\u2019s theory of intensity, it seems to be\npreempted for correlation with the aspect of quantity in the stimulus.\n\nThe case of plural odors and sounds, the case of the line, and an\ninfinity of other cases prove that magnitude is intensive as well as\nextensive. The contradictory thesis, that of Bergson, reduces, at\nbottom, to the self-contradiction that consciousness discovers what is\nno object of consciousness.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn admitting that sensations are comparable in this sense, that two\nodors, for instance, regarded as of the same kind, can be compared\nwith each other in the same way as either can be compared with a sound\nor a taste, Bergson evidently means that they can be distinguished\nas different; and he regards this as implying that sensations are\nabsolutely heterogeneous with each other, _absolutely_ different. This\nphrase, I am sure, conceals a bald contradiction. It seems to mean a\nrelation, namely difference, in which, however, the terms are absolute,\nthat is not in relation. Difference cannot be so conceived. Difference,\nI submit, cannot be conceived without that (_common to the differing\nterms_) in respect of which they are different. Monsieur Bergson,\ntherefore, in admitting that sensations are comparable in any sense, is\nstill confronted with an element common to all sensations; he has still\nto eliminate the character of homogeneity from sensation, by virtue of\nwhich a purely subjective evaluation of their relative intensities is\npossible.\n\nThe root of the difficulty Monsieur L\u00e9vy-Bruhl has shown[105] to be\na reific separation of quantity and quality, which are separable in\ntruth only by abstraction of attention. Real existence in absolute\nhomogeneity or space, as Bergson represents the existence of the\nexternal world, is as unthinkable as real existence in absolute\nheterogeneity, which existence is consciousness or life, for Bergson.\nExternal things, he says, which do not lapse (\u201c_ne durent pas_\u201d),\nseem to us, nevertheless, to lapse like us because to each instant of\nour lapsing duration a new collective whole of those simultaneities\nwhich we call the universe corresponds. \u201cDoes this not imply,\u201d writes\nL\u00e9vy-Bruhl, \u201ca preestablished harmony much more difficult to accept\nthan that of Leibniz? Leibniz supposes a purely ideal concord between\nforces of the same nature. Monsieur Bergson asks us to admit an\nindefinite series of coincidences, for each instant, between \u2018a real\nduration, whose heterogeneous moments compenetrate,\u2019 and a space which,\nnot lapsing, has no moments at all. Monsieur Bergson really places\nexternal reality, which does not lapse, in a sort of eternity. He\ningeniously shows that everything in space may be treated as quantity\nand submitted to mathematics. Now, mathematical verities, expressing\nonly relations between given magnitudes, are abstracted from real\nlapsing duration. All the laws reduce to analytical formul\u00e6. But then\nthey are, according to the saying of Bossuet, eternal verities, and how\nshall the real be distinguished from the possible?\u201d\n\nThis sundering, in Bergson\u2019s theory of reality, of what rightly is\none, is already implied, in his theory of knowledge, in the mutual\nexclusion of the two cognitive modes, intuition and conception. The\npredicaments into which philosophy falls in reasoning conceptually\n(and there is no other reasoning) about the subjective \u201cworld,\u201d are\ndue. Bergson thinks, not to faults in the use of logic, but to an\nessential incongruity between the matter and the logical mode of being\nconscious of it. But such an essential incongruity between any mode\nof consciousness and what it is aware of would imply that the _modes_\nof consciousness, on the one hand, are _parts_ of consciousness, of\nwhich accordingly, you can have one without the other (theoretically\nif not actually); and, on the other hand, there is the corresponding\nimplication for ontology, that what consciousness is aware of is\nalso composed of two parts, which match, respectively, the parts\nof consciousness. Divide consciousness into two parts, then divide\nwhat it is aware of into two parts; suppose that each of your parts\nof consciousness suits one, and not the other, of your two parts of\nwhat it is aware of--all this is necessary before there can be any\npossibility of incongruous mismatching between consciousness and\nbeing. Therefore uneasiness about this incongruity, the very motive\nof intuitionism, presupposes first the sharpest conceptual treatment\nof the subjective \u201cworld,\u201d and then the flagrant reification of the\nresulting abstractions. In other words, the indispensable precondition\nof dialectical defense of intuitionism is an intellectualism of the\n\u201cvicious\u201d type.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe first chapter of the _Essai_ having criticized the application of\nmagnitude to consciousness, and found that psychological intensity has\nnothing quantitative about it, the second chapter proceeds with an\nanalogous criticism of number, and finds that psychological variousness\nhas nothing plural about it. The multiplicity of material objects is\nnumber or plurality; the variousness of the facts of mind is nothing\nof the sort. Numerical multiplicity is distinct and objective,\ngiven or thought in space; subjective variousness is indistinct and\ncompenetrating.\n\nThe medium of the facts of consciousness being lapsing duration, and\nnot extension, they are never simultaneous in the same consciousness.\nBut then they cannot be counted; to count is to have things together,\nsimultaneously. That, again, is to have them in space. And that,\nfinally, is to have them as objects. Now, the essential nature of\npsychic facts is to be subjective and not objective. If, therefore, you\nfind yourself counting facts within a consciousness, you are deluded;\nthey cannot be what you take them for; they can only be (spatial)\n_objects_, symbols by which you are representing facts that are not\nobjective,--because they are subjective!--and not spatial but temporal.\n\nThis statement of the case will satisfy few people as it stands.\nProfessor Bergson is aware of this, and he will grant that such alleged\nfacts of consciousness as you distinguish and count may be set in the\nmedium of time rather than in space, if time, as well as space, is\na homogeneous medium; but time so understood, he thinks, turns into\nspace. And time is so understood very generally, without any doubt.\nWhen we speak of time, says Bergson, we are usually thinking of space;\nthat is, we are thinking of a homogeneous medium, a medium, therefore,\nin which psychic states are aligned or juxtaposited, as things are in\nspace, forming a distinct multiplicity.\n\nThis is, of course, another aspect of what Bergson regards as the same\nvice, conceptualism, that is discussed in the first chapter of the\n_Essai_. An intensive magnitude is a distinct concept, sharply bounded;\nall within is the concept, all without, its other. But no psychic fact\nis sharply bounded; it penetrates the whole consciousness. The whole\nconsciousness is one with it. We work quantitatively with concepts,\nalways, arithmetically and geometrically. But then we work in space,\nwhich is enough, says Bergson, to show that intensity applied to a\npsychic fact is not a magnitude, since psychic facts are not in space.\nSo here, in the second chapter, the elements which one pretends to\ncount and add _in time_ are, in order to be counted and added--in order\nmerely to be distinguished--distinct concepts. Then they are not in\ntime but in space.\n\nThe application of intensive magnitude and of numerical multiplicity to\npsychic facts is thus the same fallacy in two aspects, the fallacy of\nconceptualism, the nature of which is to substitute space for time as\nthe form of mental existence.\n\nBut Professor Bergson is not altogether dogmatic in saying that\nconceptual time is a spatialized symbol of real time. He goes on now to\nshow how it is that the nature of real time is nothing like conceptual\ntime. _Dur\u00e9e_, his name for real time, seems a bad term for such a use;\nfor the essence of Bergson\u2019s \u201c_dur\u00e9e_\u201d is change, while duration in\nevery other connection means just the waiting or standing still of the\nflow of time. Some term like \u201clapse\u201d seems nearer the idea.\n\nThe genetic or empirical theory of space perception regards the\nsensations by which we succeed in forming the notion of space as\nthemselves unextended and purely qualitative; extension results from\ntheir synthesis, as water results from the combination of two elements.\nBergson remarks that the fact that water is neither oxygen nor hydrogen\nnor merely both is just the fact that we embrace the multiplicity of\natoms in a single apperception. Eliminate the mind which operates this\nsynthesis and you will at the same time annihilate the water qualities\nso far as they are other than oxygen and hydrogen qualities; you will,\nthat is, annihilate the aspect under which the synthesis of elementary\nparts is presented to our consciousness. For space to arise from the\ncoexistence of non-spatial qualities, an act of the mind is necessary,\nembracing them all together and juxtapositing them--an act which is a\nKantian _a priori_ form of sensibility.\n\nThis act is the conception of an empty homogeneous medium. It is a\nprinciple of differentiation other than qualitative differentiation,\nenabling us to distinguish qualitatively identical simultaneous\nsensations. Without this principle, we should have perception of\nthe extended, but we should not have conception of space. That is,\nsimultaneous sensations are never absolutely identical, because the\norganic elements stimulated are not identical. There are no two\npoints of a homogeneous surface that produce the same impression on\nsight and touch. So there is a real qualitative difference between\nany two simultaneous points. This, Bergson says, is enough to give us\nperception of the extended. But the conception of space is _en outre_.\nThe higher one rises in the series of intelligent beings, the more\nclearly the independent idea of a homogeneous space stands out. Space\nis not so homogeneous for the animal as for us. Directions are not\npurely geometrical; they have their quality. We ourselves distinguish\nour right and left by a natural feeling. We cannot define them.\n\nNow, the faculty of conceiving a space without quality is not at all\nan abstraction; on the contrary, to abstract presupposes the intuition\nof a homogeneous medium. We know two realities of different order,\none heterogeneous, that of sensible qualities, the other homogeneous,\nwhich is space. The latter enables us to make sharp distinctions, to\ncount, to abstract, perhaps even to speak. Everybody regards time\nas an indefinite homogeneous medium, and yet everybody regards it as\ndifferent from space. Is one, then, reducible to the other?\n\nThe genetic or empirical school tries to reduce the relations of\nextension to more or less complex relations of succession in duration.\nThe relations of situation in space are defined as reversible\nrelations of succession in duration. But succession in duration is\nnot reversible. Pure duration is the form of succession of conscious\nstates when one refrains from reflectively setting up a distinctness\nbetween the present state and former states. This does not mean being\nwholly absorbed in the passing sensation or idea, nor forgetting former\nstates; but it means organizing them instead of juxtapositing them;\nthey become like the notes of a melody, which, though they succeed each\nother, are apperceived in each other; they interpenetrate like the\nparts of a living being. Succession, then, can be conceived without\ndistinctness, as a mutual penetration, a solidarity, an intimate\norganization of elements each of which, representative of the whole,\nis distinguished and isolated therefrom only for a thought capable of\nabstraction. We introduce the idea of space into our representation of\npure succession; we so juxtaposit our states of consciousness as to\nperceive them simultaneously, not in, but beside each other; we project\ntime upon space, we express duration in terms of extension. Succession\nthen takes the form of a continuous line or of a chain, whose parts\ntouch without interpenetration, which implies a simultaneous before\nand after instead of a successive--that is, a simultaneous succession,\nwhich is a contradiction.\n\nNow, when the genetic school defines the relations of situation in\nspace as reversible relations of succession in duration, it represents\nsuccession in duration in this self-contradictory way. You cannot make\nout an order among terms without distinguishing the terms and comparing\nthe _places_ they occupy, without perceiving them, therefore, as\njuxtaposited. Then to make out an order in the terms of a succession\nis to make the succession a simultaneity. So this attempt to represent\nspace by means of time presupposes the representation of space. Of\nspace in three dimensions, moreover; for the representation of two\ndimensions--that is, of a line--implies that of three dimensions: to\nperceive a line is to place oneself outside it and account for the void\nsurrounding it.\n\nPure duration is nothing but a succession of qualitative changes\nfusing, interpenetrating, without outlines or tendency to externality\nby interrelation, without any kinship with number. Pure duration is\npure heterogeneity.\n\nNo time that can be measured is duration, for heterogeneity is not\nquantity, not measurable. When we measure a minute we represent a\nquantity and _ipso facto_ exclude a succession. We represent sixty\noscillations of a pendulum, for instance, all together, in one\napperception, as we represent sixty points of a line. Now, to represent\neach of these oscillations in succession, just as it is produced\nin space, no recollection of a preceding oscillation can enter the\nrepresentation of any one, for space has kept no trace of it. One is\nconfined to the present, and there is no more succession, or duration,\nin such a representation than in that of the group as a whole. A third\nway of representing these oscillations is conceivable. Like the first,\nit involves retention of preceding oscillations; but, unlike the first,\nit retains preceding oscillations _in_ succeeding ones, instead of\nalongside of them; they interpenetrate and interorganize, as was just\nsaid, like the notes of a melody. Like the conceptual representation,\nthe intuitional involves a multiplicity. A conceptual multiplicity\nis distinct, homogeneous, quantitative, numerical; an intuitive\nmultiplicity is indistinct, heterogeneous, qualitative, without analogy\nwith number. Now, it is the latter that characterizes reality; and the\nmultiplicity that we represent conceptually is only a symbol of the\nreality known to intuition.\n\nOscillations of a pendulum measure nothing; they count simultaneities.\nOutside of me, in space, there is only a single position of the\npendulum; of past positions none remains. Because my duration is an\norganization and interpenetration of facts, I represent what I call\n\u201cpast\u201d oscillations of the pendulum at the same time that I perceive\nthe actual oscillation. Eliminate the ego, and there is only a single\nposition of the pendulum, and no duration. Eliminate the pendulum, and\nthere is only the heterogeneous duration of the ego. Within the ego is\nsuccession without simultaneity or reciprocal externality: without the\nego, reciprocal externality without succession, which can exist only\nfor a conscious spectator who remembers the past, and juxtaposits the\nsymbols of the two oscillations in an auxiliary space.\n\nNow, between this succession without externality and this externality\nwithout succession a kind of endosmotic commerce goes on. Although the\nsuccessive phases of our conscious life interpenetrate, some of them\ncorrespond to simultaneous oscillations of the pendulum; and since\neach oscillation is distinct--that is, one is no more when another is\nproduced--we come to make the same distinctness between the successive\nmoments of our conscious life. The oscillations of the pendulum\ndecompose it, as it were, into mutually external parts: hence the\nerroneous idea of an internal homogeneous duration analogous to space,\nwhose identical moments follow each other without interpenetrating.\nOn the other hand, the pendular oscillations benefit by the influence\nthey have exerted on our conscious life. Thanks to the recollection of\ntheir collective whole, which our consciousness has organized, they\nare preserved and then aligned; in short, we create a fourth dimension\nof space for them, which we call homogeneous time, and which enables\nthe pendular movement, although produced in a certain spot, to be\njuxtaposited with itself indefinitely.\n\nThere is a real space, without duration, but in which phenomena appear\nand disappear simultaneously with our states of consciousness. There is\na real duration, whose heterogeneous moments interpenetrate, but each\nof which can touch a state of the external world contemporaneous with\nit, and so be made separate from other movements. From the comparison\nof these two realities arises a symbolic representation of duration\ndrawn from space. The trait common to these two terms, space and\nduration, is simultaneity, the intersection of time and space. This\nis how duration comes to get the illusory appearance of a homogeneous\nmedium. But time is not measurable.\n\nNeither is motion, the living symbol of time. Like duration, motion is\nheterogeneous and indivisible. But it is universally confused with the\nspace through which the movable passes. The successive positions of the\nmovable are in space, but the motion is not in space. Motion is passing\nfrom one position to another, which operation occupies duration and has\nreality only for a conscious spectator. Things occupy space; processes\noccupy duration, because they are mental syntheses and are unextended.\n\nThe synthesis which is motion is obviously not a new deploying in\nanother homogeneous medium, of the same positions that have been\nperceived in space; for if it were such an act, the necessity for\nresynthesis would be indefinitely repeated. The synthesis which is\nmotion is a qualitative synthesis, a gradual organization of our\nsuccessive sensations with each other, a unity analogous to that of\na melodic phrase. The space traversed is a quantity, indefinitely\ndivisible; the act by which space is traversed is a quality, and\nindivisible. Again that endosmotic exchange takes place, as between\nthe melodically organized perception of the series of the pendulum\u2019s\nmotions and its distinct objective presence at each instant. That is,\nwe attribute to the motion the divisibility of the space traversed;\nand we project the act upon space, implying that outside as well as\ninside of consciousness the past coexists with the present. In space\nare only parts of space. In any point of space where the movable may be\nconsidered, there is only a position. You would search space in vain\nfor motion.\n\nFrom the fact that motion cannot be in space, Zeno concluded wrongly\nthat motion is impossible. But those who try to answer his arguments by\nseeking it also in space, find it no more than he. Achilles overtakes\nthe tortoise because each Achilles step and each tortoise step is not\na space but a duration, whose nature is not addible nor divisible, and\nwhose production therefore does not presuppose productions of parts\nof themselves, _ad infinitum_. Their development is not construction.\nThey are entire while they are at all, and since the intersections\nof their terminal moments with space are not at equal distances,\nthese intersections will coincide, or their spatial relations will be\ninverted, after a certain number of these simultaneities--whether of\nAchilles\u2019 steps or of the tortoise\u2019s--with points of the road have been\ncounted; in other words, Achilles will have overtaken or outrun the\ntortoise after a certain number of steps.\n\nTo measure the velocity of a motion is simply to find a simultaneity;\nto introduce this simultaneity into calculation is to use a convenient\nmeans of foreseeing a simultaneity. Just as in duration there is\nnothing homogeneous except what does not lapse, to wit space in which\nsimultaneities are aligned, so the homogeneous element of motion is\nthat which least pertains to it, to wit the space traversed, which is\nimmobility.\n\nScience can work on time and motion only on condition of first\neliminating the essential and qualitative element, duration from time,\nmobility from motion. Treatises on mechanics never define duration\nitself, but call two intervals of time equal when two identical bodies\nin circumstances identical at the commencement of each of these\nintervals, and subjected to identical actions and influences of every\nkind, have traversed the same space at the end of these intervals.\nThere is no question, in science, of duration, but only of space and of\nsimultaneities between outer change and certain of our psychic states.\nThat duration does not enter into natural science is seen in the\nfact that if all the motions of the universe were quicker or slower,\nthen, whereas consciousness would have an indefinable and qualitative\nintuition of this change, no scientific formul\u00e6 would be modified,\nsince the same number of simultaneities would be produced again in\nspace.\n\nAnalysis of the idea of velocity proves that mechanics has nothing\nto do with duration. If, on a trajectory AB, points M, N, P ... such\nthat AM = MN = NP ... are reached at equal intervals of time, as\ndefined above, and AM etc. are smaller than any assignable quantity,\nthe motion is said to be uniform. The velocity of a uniform motion is\ntherefore defined without appeal to notions other than those of space\nand simultaneity. By a somewhat complicated demonstration[106] the\nsame is shown to be true of the velocity of varying motion. Mechanics\nnecessarily works with equations, and equations always express\naccomplished facts. It is of the essence of duration and motion to\nbe in formation, so that while mathematics can express any moment of\nduration or any position taken by a movable in space, duration and\nmotion themselves, being mental syntheses and not things, necessarily\nremain outside the calculation. The movable occupies the points\nof a line in turn, but the motion has nothing in common with this\nline. The positions occupied by the movable vary with the different\nmoments of duration; indeed, the movable creates distinct moments\nmerely by the fact that it occupies different positions; but duration\nhas no identical nor mutually external moments, being essentially\nheterogeneous and indistinct.\n\nOnly space, then, is homogeneous; only things in space are distinctly\nmultiple. There is no succession in space. So-called \u201csuccessive\u201d\nstates of the outer world exist each alone. Their multiplicity is\nreal only for a consciousness capable of preserving it and then\njuxtapositing it with others, thus externalizing them by interrelation.\nThey are preserved by consciousness because they give rise to facts of\nconsciousness which connect past and present by their interpenetrating\norganization. But one ceases when another appears, and so consciousness\nperceives them in the form of a distinct multiplicity, which amounts to\naligning them in the space where each existed separately. Space used in\nthis way is just what is meant by homogeneous time.\n\nThe spatial and the temporal kind of multiplicity are just as different\nas space and the real time that lapses. Spatial multiplicity is always\nsubstituted for the temporal kind, in discourse; their distinction\ncannot be expressed in language, because language is a product of\nspace so that terms are inevitably spatial. Even to speak of \u201cseveral\u201d\nconscious states interpenetrating is to characterize them numerically,\nand so interrelate and mutually externalize or spatialize them.[107]\nOn the other hand, we cannot form the idea of a distinct multiplicity\nwithout considering, parallel to it, a qualitative multiplicity. Even\nin counting units on a homogeneous background, they organize in a\ndynamic, qualitative way. That is the psychological explanation of the\neffect of a \u201cmarked-down\u201d price. The figures $4.98 have a quality of\ntheir own, or rather the price has, that is quite inexpressible by the\nformula \u201c$5 minus 2\u00a2.\u201d _Quantity has its quality._\n\nIn a succession of identical terms, then, each term has two aspects,\nspatial and temporal, objective and subjective, one always identical\nwith itself, the other specific because of the unique quality its\naddition gives the collective whole of the series. Now, motion is\njust such a \u201cqualifying,\u201d the subjective aspect of what, objectively,\nis a succession of identical terms, to wit the movable in successive\npositions. It is always the same movable, but in the synthesis, the\nimages of it that memory calls earlier interpenetrate with the actual\nimage; the synthesis, the interpenetration, is motion. Motion is real,\nand absolute; it is subjective, however, not objective. To represent\nmotion is to objectify it. That is what Zeno did, and what everyone\nmust do for _practical_ purposes. But Zeno\u2019s purpose was speculative,\nand that, Professor Bergson thinks, is fatally different. When you\nobjectify motion you deny it, for its essence is subjective. Strictly\nspeaking, Zeno was right in finding motion _unthinkable_; he was wrong\nonly in supposing that what is unthinkable is _ipso facto_ impossible.\n\nEvidently, the ego has these two aspects. The ego touches the external\nworld; and its sensations, though fused in each other, retain something\nof the reciprocal externality which objectively characterizes their\ncauses. Now, in dreaming, the ego does not touch the external world,\nand, in dreaming, time is not homogeneous; we do not measure time,\nin dreams, but only feel it. For sleep retards the play of organic\nfunctions and modifies the surface of communication between the ego\nand external things. But we need not sleep, to be thus withdrawn from\nenvironment. As I compose this train of thought, the hour strikes.\nWhen I notice the striking, I know some strokes have sounded which\nI did not notice. I know even their number, four. I know it by\nfilling out the \u201cmelody,\u201d as it were, of which I am now conscious. I\nfound the \u201cfour\u201d in a way that was not counting, at all. The number\nof strokes has its quality, and anything but four fails to suit,\ndiffers in quality. A counted four and a felt four are absolutely\ndifferent forms of multiplicity, and each is multiplicity. Under the\nego of clearly-defined and countable states is the real ego which\nit symbolizes, in which succession implies fusion and organization.\nThe states of this real ego language cannot seize, for that were to\nobjectify it and fix its mobility. In giving these states the form of\nthose of the symbolic ego, language makes them fall into the common\ndomain of space, where they straightway become common and impersonal.\nThis common and impersonal ego is the social and practical ego; this is\nthe ego that uses language.\n\nTo language is due the illusion that qualities are permanent. But\nobjects change by mere familiarity. We dislike, in manhood, smells\nand tastes which we call the same as those we liked in childhood. But\nthey are not the same. It is only their causes that remain the same.\nThe interpenetrating elements of conscious states are already deformed\nthe moment a numerical multiplicity is discovered in the confused\nmass. Just now it had a subtle and unique coloration borrowed from its\norganization in developing life; here it is decolored and ready to\nreceive a name.\n\nThis is the error of the associationistic school. Psychology cannot\nreason concerning facts _being_ accomplished, as it may concerning\n_accomplished_ facts. The accomplishing of a fact can in no wise enter\ninto discourse. It is unthinkable in precisely the same way as motion;\nor rather, it is the same case. Psychology cannot present the living\nego as an association of terms mutually distinct and juxtaposited in a\nhomogeneous medium.[108] And association is just conceptualism applied\nto psychology. Its problems of personality have to be absurdly stated,\nin order to be stated at all. The terms of such problems deny what the\nproblem posits, merely by being terms or names; they name the unnamable\nand define the indefinable. The solution is to cease thinking spatially\nof that which is temporal, to take the other attitude.[109] Or, the\nauthor says here, using merely a different phrase, the solution is to\nsubstitute the real and concrete ego for its symbolic representation.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThis second chapter of _Time and Free Will_ undertakes to show that the\nsuccessiveness of conscious states makes them uncountable. Simultaneity\nis indispensable to distinctness, and so to number. One can count\nthe spatialized symbols of conscious states because these are not\nsuccessive, but simultaneous.\n\nPsychic multiplicity is non-numerical in the same sense and for the\nsame reason that psychic intensity is non-quantitative, namely that\nit is pure heterogeneity and temporality. In the foregoing report, I\nhave sometimes mitigated the baldness of the paradox as it is stated by\nBergson, by substituting the term \u201cvariousness\u201d for \u201cmultiplicity,\u201d in\nspeaking of psychic facts. After all, it was a thankless subterfuge--an\nimpertinence, perhaps, since Bergson himself is frank enough to insist\nthat psychic multiplicity is as genuine multiplicity as the spatial\nand material sort. The difference is that the former is indistinct\nand the latter distinct. But this difference is abysmal--indeed, it is\nabsolute. All the power of Bergson\u2019s forceful style is concentrated on\nit. The point is turned and re-turned in every variety of expression.\nAt the same time, the common _multiplicity_ belonging in both\nconceptions is emphasized as much as their difference. The thesis thus\nreduces to this, that two varieties of the same genus are \u201cabsolutely\ndifferent;\u201d for we are explicitly advised, on one hand, that there is a\nmultiplicity which is distinct, and a multiplicity which is indistinct;\neach is multiplicity. And, on the other hand, one is numerical and the\nother \u201c_has no analogy with number_.\u201d\n\nIn view of the superior qualities of the mind that is guilty of this\nunreasonableness, the conviction of sincerity which it carries tortures\nthe conscientious critic. One cannot approve of the intolerant scorn\nof a certain book, in which Bergson\u2019s arguments are vilified as vain\ndisplay, mere word-play; but patience is overtaxed in finding one\u2019s way\nthrough the plausibility of this chapter. The thesis, certainly, may be\ndismissed from any consideration whatever. Because of it, one knows in\nadvance, beyond peradventure, that there is no validity in any argument\nin its defense. Yet, in spite of all, the chapter challenges study; and\nthorough study of it cannot fail to put the truth in clearer light,\njust because its error is so plausible.\n\nCounting is synthesis, the argument goes; but a synthesized succession\nis not a succession, it is a simultaneity. And simultaneity presupposes\nspatial determination in the coexistent elements. From Bergson\u2019s\npoint of view, it is a radical error, however universal an error, to\nregard the relation of simultaneity as a temporal determination. In\nfact, there is no such thing as a temporal determination; and every\ndetermination, for Bergson, not only is not temporal, but is spatial.\nLike the argument about non-quantitative intensity, this argument\nfor non-plural multiplicity (save the mark!) turns on the equation\nof homogeneity with space. But the present argument involves its own\npeculiar fallacy, as well, namely the fallacy which Professor Perry\ndescribes[110] as confusion of a relation symbolized with the relation\nbetween symbols. \u201cIt is commonly supposed,\u201d Perry writes, \u201cthat when\na complex is represented by a formula, the elements of the complex\nmust have the same relation as that which subsists between the parts\nof the formula; whereas, as a matter of fact, _the formula as a whole_\nrepresents or describes a complex other than itself. If I describe\n_a_ as \u2018to the right of _b_,\u2019 does any difficulty arise because in my\nformula _a_ is to the left of _b_? If I speak of _a_ as greater than\n_b_, am I to assume that because my symbols are outside one another\nthat _a_ and _b_ must be outside one another? Such a supposition would\nimply a most na\u00efve acceptance of that very \u2018copy theory\u2019 of knowledge\nwhich pragmatism has so severely condemned. And yet such a supposition\nseems everywhere to underlie the anti-intellectualist\u2019s polemic. The\nintellect is described as substituting for the interpenetration of the\nreal terms [in an \u201cindistinct\u201d psychic multiplicity] the juxtaposition\nof their symbols; as though analysis discovered terms, and then\n_conferred_ relations of its own ... Terms are found _in_ relation,\nand may be thus described without any more artificiality, without any\nmore imposing of the forms of the mind on its subject-matter, than is\ninvolved in the bare mention of a single term.\n\n\u201c... one may mean continuity despite the fact that the symbols and\nwords are discrete. The word \u2018blue\u2019 may mean blue, although the word\nis not blue. Similarly, continuity may be an arrangement meant by a\ndiscontinuous arrangement of words and symbols.\u201d\n\nSo of the simultaneity or coexistence among the conceptual symbols\nby which successive psychic states are counted: there is nothing in\nsuch a relation among the symbols to falsify the process of counting\nas a cognitive process whose meaning is a non-simultaneous relation\namong the psychic facts symbolized. As was noted above,[111] the\nquantitative determination of psychic facts depends solely on an aspect\nof homogeneity essential to such facts, for which aspect no better\nevidence is possible than that other aspect which Bergson attributes to\nthem, of heterogeneity; for the two conceptions, instead of excluding\neach other, imply each other absolutely. All that is necessary, in\norder that psychic facts should be countable, is that they should\npossess an aspect of homogeneity. And for this, spatiality is\nunnecessary; for spatiality is a conception distinct from homogeneity.\n\nBergson\u2019s identification of homogeneity with spatiality is a case of\nwhat Professor Perry calls \u201cdefinition by initial predication.\u201d[112]\nSpace is homogeneous; therefore homogeneity is space. As if the fact\nthat homogeneity is a character of space were anything against its\nbeing a character also of time or anything else. The following is the\njustification offered by Bergson for identifying homogeneity with\nspace: \u201cIf space is to be defined as the homogeneous, it seems that\ninversely every homogeneous and unbounded medium will be space. For,\nhomogeneity here consisting in the absence of every quality, it is hard\nto see how two forms of the homogeneous could be distinguished from one\nanother.\u201d[113] The first clause begs the question by defining space\nas \u201cthe\u201d homogeneous. Such identification of space and homogeneity\nis the point to be proved. The second sentence begs the question\nagain, where homogeneity is supposed \u201chere\u201d (_i. e._ in the case of\nspace) to consist in the absence of every quality. Moreover, as we\nhave noted above (p. 43), space possesses a very determinate quality,\ndirection, which differentiates it from other homogeneity. Finally,\nit can be true that homogeneity is absence of quality only on the\nBergsonian assumptions that quality is exclusively subjective, that\nhomogeneity is exclusively objective, and that only the subjective\nis positive. Now, if quality is not objective, judgments cannot be\nmade concerning it; but Bergson is constantly making such judgments.\nAnd to distinguish, in point of homogeneity or of positivity, between\n\u201cthe subjective\u201d and \u201cthe objective\u201d is to reify two equally abstract\naspects of positive reality. The quality of the homogeneous is\ndoubtless _simple_, and so indefinable. But Bergson nowhere shows how\nthe homogeneous is less positive than the heterogeneous, although the\nthesis is the sum and substance of his philosophy. Lacking further\nlight on the point, one can only invoke such experiences as the simple\ncolors, for instance,--or, for that matter, any simple quality--for\ncases of reality as positive as any heterogeneity, and, obviously, no\nless qualified. And nothing seems easier than the distinction between\nredness, for instance, and spatiality. Bergson\u2019s whole dialectic\nrests on reification of such correlative abstractions as homogeneity\nand heterogeneity, quality and relation etc. in a \u201cpurity\u201d which not\nonly is not concretely experienced, but is not even capable of being\nconceived, because each concept drags the other ineluctably into its\nown definition. If either space or homogeneity were indeed absence\nof quality, they could not be distinguished from time, nor from\nheterogeneity, nor from anything else; in short, they could not be\nconceived at all.\n\nThe present essay aims to report Bergson\u2019s own work with a fair\ndegree of fulness; but it is beyond my plan to follow exposition\nwith criticism point by point in the details, even, in some cases,\nwhen these are of important and wide implication. For discussion of\nBergson\u2019s contention (based on analysis of the idea of velocity,\nas outlined above) that mechanics has nothing to do with time, the\nreader is referred to pages 255-61 of Perry\u2019s _Present Philosophical\nTendencies_. Perry shows, in this passage, that such a contention,\nagain, depends on \u201cconfusing the symbol with what it means. To one who\nfalls into this confusion, it may appear that an equation cannot refer\nto time because the structure of the equation itself is not temporal;\nbecause the symbols are simultaneously present in the equation. But if\n_t_ is one of the terms of the equation, and _t_ _means_ time, then\nthe equation means a temporal process. Furthermore, an equation may\ndefine a relation, such as =, <, or >, between temporal quantities,\nin which case the full meaning of the equation is still temporal. For\nchanges, events, or even pure intervals, may stand in non-temporal\nrelations, such as those above, without its in the least vitiating\ntheir temporality.\u201d\n\nBergson\u2019s solution of Zeno\u2019s paradoxes is another detail of this\nchapter which is of a good deal of interest; but it applies no new\nprinciple to the support of the impossibility of counting psychic\nfacts. Without a clearer conception of the commerce or intersection\nbetween time and space, which he characterizes only by the name\nof \u201csimultaneity,\u201d his reply to Zeno leaves the question of the\ndivisibility of time as problematic as ever. Achilles out-strips the\ntortoise, he says, \u201cbecause each of Achilles\u2019 steps and each of the\ntortoise\u2019s steps are indivisible acts in so far as they are movements,\nand are different magnitudes in so far as they are space.\u201d[114] They\nare indivisible in the same sense in which a living organism is\nindivisible: if you divide them, no division _is_ a part of that which\n_was_. But the trouble is that they _are divisible_ also in the same\nsense in which the organism is divisible. It is the most extravagant\nof assumptions that analysis of a living body into right and left\netc.--which, to be sure, is serviceable to activity upon it--is,\nbecause of its service to action, not a character of the object itself.\nAnd of motion the same sort of analysis is a patent fact of experience:\nthere is an earlier, middle and latter phase. The possibility of this\npatent fact is the crux of the problem. No extant answer to Zeno is\nsatisfactory to everybody. I shall refer the reader to Professor\nFullerton\u2019s treatment of the paradoxes, in Chapter XI of his _System of\nMetaphysics_, as the solution which seems to me to be at the same time\nthe most closely related of any that I know, to Bergson\u2019s, and free of\nBergson\u2019s error. Bergson\u2019s solution has at least this element of truth,\nthat Zeno confuses the space traversed with something else concerned\nin every case of motion. Fullerton makes a distinction between any\nactual experience of space or time, and the possibility of indefinitely\nmagnified substitutes for such experience; and shows a way in which\nmotion can be relegated to the former (\u201capparent\u201d space) and denied to\nthe latter (\u201creal\u201d space) without either denying reality to motion or\ninfinite divisibility to real space and time.\n\nBergson\u2019s differentiation of temporal succession from spatial seriality\ngets all its cogency from an exclusive attention, when consciousness is\nconcerned, to the aspects of heterogeneity (quality) and compenetration\n(continuity) which consciousness shows; and, when space is concerned,\nto _its_ aspects of homogeneity (quantity) and juxtaposition of parts\n(discreteness). As always, with correlative abstractions, Bergson\nreifies them: they exclude each other, for him, whereas, in truth, they\nimply each other, entering into each other\u2019s definition so that each is\nunthinkable except by means of the other. Time is continuous, Bergson\ninsists rightly; but jumps to the conclusion that therefore time is not\ndiscrete. Time is heterogeneous, therefore not homogeneous. Space is\ndiscrete (its parts spread out), therefore not continuous; homogeneous,\ntherefore not heterogeneous. If any demonstration is necessary that\nthese terms do imply each other, instead of excluding each other, the\ncase of heterogeneity and homogeneity is only the case of resemblance\nand difference (cf. page 44). In regard to the heterogeneity of space,\nits differentiation by way of direction must not be forgotten. As for\nthe other pair of terms, continuity can manifest itself only _in\nextenso_, and discreteness requires a separating _medium_.\n\nWherever Bergson objects to expressing time in terms of space, the\nreal objection is to the expression of time in terms of homogeneity.\nThis he would not only admit, but insist upon. But his demonstration\nthat homogeneity is a character exclusively spatial is a _petitio\nprincipii_.[115] Of the attempt to measure a minute, he writes as\nfollows: \u201cI say, _e. g._, that a minute has just elapsed, and I mean\nby this that a pendulum, beating the seconds, has completed sixty\noscillations. If I picture these sixty oscillations to myself all\nat once, by a single mental perception, I exclude by hypothesis the\nidea of a succession. I do not think of sixty strokes which succeed\none another, but of sixty points on a fixed line, each one of which\nsymbolizes, so to speak, an oscillation of the pendulum. If, on the\nother hand, I wish to picture these sixty oscillations in succession,\nbut without altering the way they are produced in space, I shall\nbe compelled to think of each oscillation to the exclusion of the\nrecollection of the preceding one, for space has preserved no trace\nof it; but by doing so I shall condemn myself to remain forever in\nthe present; I shall give up the attempt to think a succession or a\nduration.\u201d\n\nNotwithstanding his acuteness as a psychologist, Bergson misses the\nnature of the apperception both of sixty points on a line and of\nsixty oscillations of a pendulum. And the impossibility of counting\npsychic facts depends on this misapprehension. He misses the fact that\nan apperception of sixty points on a line includes, as an essential\nfeature, the _serial_ order, the here-and-there determination (a\ndistinctive qualitative determination) of this spatial fact. And\nhe misses the fact that an apperception of a non-spatial rhythm\nincludes, as an essential feature, the successive _order_, the\nearlier-and-later determination, of this psychic fact. Now, seriality\nis not succession, if you like, except in so far as each is order.\nBut this is no more than to say that the two orders, time and space,\nare distinguishable--are two, in fact. It is not the slightest\nobstruction to conceiving each as order, and as numerically determined.\nFor there is no evidence except Bergson\u2019s fundamental fallacy of\n\u201cdefinition by initial predication,\u201d to show why homogeneity and\norder, as such, are exclusively spatial. The discreteness of parts\nof space is thinkable only by the intervening spaces: space is as\ncontinuous (as \u201ccompenetrative\u201d) as time.[116] On the other hand, the\ncompenetration of time is not only nothing _against_ its divisibility,\nbut divisibility and compenetration (in the only rigorous meaning the\nword will bear, that is, continuity) are indispensable to each other,\ninverse aspects of each other. You can divide _only_ what is connected,\nas you can connect only what is distinct. Time, then, is as discrete as\nspace.\n\nFor every instance of temporal \u201ccompenetration,\u201d and \u201csolidarity,\u201d\nits perfect spatial analogue is plain to the inspection of anyone who\nwill only look that way, to anyone whose attention is not hypnotized\nby an ulterior purpose to its exclusion.[117] Thus the melodic phrase\nis present in each of its parts as much as, and no more than, the\nmosaic figure is present in each of its parts. The \u201cfelt four\u201d of the\nclock strokes is felt as four not otherwise, I think, than a four\nwhich might figure in the pattern of a frieze. The same limitations,\nmoreover, apply to such felt multiplicity, whether of rhythm or of\npattern. It must be a relatively simple complex, to be apperceived, in\neither case. You could not feel fifty, and the difficulty is the same\ndifficulty in time as in space. One measures a minute or a century just\nas one measures an inch or the distance from the earth to the sun: the\nindispensable condition is the continuity and homogeneity which belong\nto both quantities.\n\nThe proposition that oscillations of a pendulum measure nothing, but\ncount simultaneities apparently means that oscillations, as physical\nfacts, have no duration of their own, and so cannot overlie duration\nas a unit of measurement. This would at least be an intelligible,\neven if a false, representation; but, if oscillations cannot measure,\nhow can they count? What is just that difference between counting and\nmeasuring, by virtue of which that which can count cannot measure?\nSimultaneity Bergson defines as the intersection of space and time.\nNow, counting, as well as measuring, implies a continuum. Measuring,\ncertainly, if it is theoretically perfect, can apply only to a\ncontinuum; but counting, which obviously presupposes discreteness,\nthen requires also the indispensable condition and correlative of\ndiscreteness, which is continuity. The intersection of space and time\nthus evidently involves equal continuity and discreteness in both; if\nthey can intersect, and their intersections are countable, each is\nboth countable and measurable. The \u201cpurely\u201d temporal phenomena of our\nconscious life, although interpenetrating, \u201ccorrespond individually\u201d\nto an oscillation of the pendulum, which, though a \u201cpurely\u201d spatial\nphenomenon, \u201coccurs at the same time with\u201d the former. Such \u201cendosmotic\ncommerce\u201d between psychical and physical events seems to be decisive\nfor a real community of nature between their respective forms, time and\nspace--such, for instance, as common homogeneity and continuity.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nMIND AND MATTER, SPIRIT AND BODY\n\n\nBergson regards knowledge of oneself as the optimal case of knowing;\noneself, he thinks, is the sample of reality which best serves for an\nacquaintance with the nature of reality in general. \u201cThe existence of\nwhich we are most assured and which we know best is unquestionably our\nown, for of every other object we have notions which may be considered\nexternal and superficial, whereas, of ourselves, our perception is\ninternal and profound.\u201d[118] It is this perfect or optimal relation\nof identity or inwardness--which one bears to oneself--that is the\ncondition of true (_i. e._ intuitive) knowledge. And in this case we\nfind existence to be a perpetual flow of transition. That we think\nof our states as distinct from each other is due to the fact that\nreflection on one\u2019s own existence is, unlike the flow of that existence\nitself, necessarily discontinuous. It is only now and then that motives\narise which turn the attention to the self as an object, like others,\nfor examination. The flow of change is not uniform, to be sure. It\nis quite imperceptible to our reflective attention most of the time,\nbut if it ever ceased, we should at that moment cease to exist. Only\nthe relatively sudden and interesting periods of transition get our\nattention. Then we see a new \u201cstate of consciousness\u201d which we add to\nthe others that we have mentally strung together in a temporal line. So\nwe conceive of our history as the sum of elements as distinct as beads\non a string.\n\nThis intellectualistic view of the self eliminates the peculiar\ncharacteristic of its reality, namely, its duration, or the flow\nof its change, like a snowball, accumulating its substance as it\nrolls, duration goes on preserving itself in incessant change that\naccumulates all its past. Time, Bergson says, is the very stuff the\npsychological life is made of. \u201cThere is, moreover, no stuff more\nresistant nor more substantial.\u201d[119]\n\nLife and inertia or matter are two antagonistic principles or\ntendencies. Life is the positive and active principle; reality and\nduration are predicable only of life. Matter is an \u201cinversion\u201d\nor \u201cinterruption\u201d of life; its value is negative to life and to\nreality. \u201cAll that which seems _positive_ to the physicist and to the\ngeometrician would become, from this new point of view, an interruption\nor inversion of true positivity, which would have to be defined in\npsychological terms.\u201d[120] Matter is a determination of reality in\nmuch the same sense as that in which the reality of the Platonic idea\nsuffers diminution under the influence of the principle of not-being,\nresulting in a world of sensible experience or of appearance. Bergson\npoints out that the real in Plato is the timeless, motionless, definite\nidea, and the relatively unreal is the ever-changing \u201cinfinite\u201d or\nindefinable datum of experience, to which duration is essential.\nBergson reverses the Platonic metaphysics: reality is the ever-changing\nand indefinable; rather, it is change itself. \u201cThere are no things,\nthere are only actions.\u201d \u201c... things and states are only views,\ntaken by our mind, of becoming.\u201d[121] The principle antagonistic to\nreality gives rise to the timeless, definite concept, which is a view\nor appearance of reality operated by intelligence in the service of\naction. As our practical interests break up the continuum of time\ninto discrete states, so they break up the continuum of matter into\ndistinct bodies. The active antagonism of time, which is pure quality\nor heterogeneity, and space, which is pure quantity or homogeneity,\nresults in the world of our experience, comprising \u201cstates\u201d of\nconsciousness and things or objects.\n\nThe relation between life and matter in the evolution of the world,\nBergson represents by the figure of a generation of steam in a\nboiler.[122] Life, the positive principle, streams or flows, like the\nsteam, by the force which is its very nature. In its course, this vital\nimpetus is checked, as a jet of steam is checked, by its condensation,\nand falls back upon itself in drops, retarding, but not annihilating,\nthe flow. But we are warned that the figure must be corrected in that\nthe interruption or inversion of the impetus is due to a principle\ninherent in the impetus itself, not to an external determination. If\nthere were such an external principle, the two would seem co\u00f6rdinate in\nreality, but the reality of matter is as the reality of _rest_, which,\nas the negation of motion, is nothing positive, yet is not a mere\nnaught.\n\nSometimes, in reading Bergson, it seems very clear that reality and\nmatter must exclude each other, since one is the negation of the\nother; and perception and conception, whose object is matter, are not\nknowledge, because that object is unreal. Moreover, not only is the\nstuff of reality that _psychic process_ which is life and lapsing time,\nbut there is no stuff more resistant nor more substantial. And in\nnumerous other ways the mutual exclusion of reality and matter seems\nquite fundamental to Bergsonism. One can never remain long in any\nsecurity about this, however. If Bergsonism is Platonism reversed, it\nis natural that the peculiarities of the latter should reappear in some\nform. Platonic not-being is much too important and too active to be\ndenied a coequal positivity with being. Over and above these \u201cworlds,\u201d\nmoreover, there is that one in which we live, with a third status.\nPerhaps it is this which is most like Bergsonian matter--\u201cnothing\npositive, yet not a mere naught\u201d! In the letter from which I have\nalready quoted, Monsieur Bergson wrote me, concerning a previous paper\nof mine:[123] \u201cYou give me the choice between \u2018yes\u2019 and \u2018no,\u2019 whereas\nI cannot respond with either, but must mix them. In each particular\ncase, the \u2018yes\u2019 and \u2018no\u2019 have to be apportioned, and this is just why\nthe philosophy I adhere to is susceptible of improvement and progress.\nFor instance, you find that my premises lead to this conclusion:\n\u2018Matter has no duration; but duration is synonymous with reality;\ntherefore matter is not real.\u2019 But, to my mind, matter has exactly the\nsame reality as rest, which exists only as negation of motion, yet\nis something other than absolute nothingness. All that is positive\nin my \u2018vital impetus\u2019 is motion; stoppage of this motion constitutes\nmateriality; the latter, therefore, is nothing positive, yet not a mere\nnaught, absolute nothingness being no more stoppage than motion.\u201d\n\nIf one seek (it is not to be found, I think, in Bergson\u2019s writings)\nan explanation of this abatement or diminution of the _\u00e9lan vital_,\nthis tendency toward rest, the problem turns into the very ancient\nproblem of the polarity of being in subject and object. In Platonism,\nmatter arises as product of an eternal antagonism between two coeval\nprinciples, the Idea and Not-being. Not-being is thus something\nefficient, something that is capable of entering as a factor, together\nwith the Idea, into a product, the Sensible Object. The truth is,\ntherefore, that Not-being is something very real: it _is_ something\nbecause it _does_ something. It is as real as the Idea, because it is\nas efficient as the Idea. And in the Bergsonian creative evolution\nthere often seems just such an antagonism as this, between two\nco\u00f6rdinate, efficient, and therefore real principles. Thus: \u201cThe\nimpetus of life ... is confronted with matter, that is to say, with\nthe movement that is the inverse of its own.\u201d[124] And: \u201cLife as a\nwhole ... will appear as a wave which rises, and which is opposed\nby the descending movement of matter.\u201d[125] But, as with Plato, so\nwith Bergson, dubbing the hated principle \u201cNot-being\u201d or \u201cNegation\nof Positive Reality\u201d hardly avails against the soundness of its\nclaim to positivity. And the case is not different if the \u201c_\u00e9lan\nvital_\u201d is a self-limited absolute instead of an eternal dualism: the\nphilosopher\u2019s selection of one of the two coefficients or poles of\nthis self-polarized absolute, rather than the other, to be snubbed, is\narbitrary, instinctive, personal. With Plato it is one, with Bergson\nthe other; no logical principle determines it, in either case.\n\nOn no other point, I believe, is criticism of Bergson so clamorous\nor so unanimous as on his conception of matter. Without doubt, his\nconception of matter is obscure. Time and space (terms equivalent for\nBergson, to life and matter) being essentially antagonistic, must\n_essentially imply_ each other; and if so, do they not stand in the\nsame rank as real existences? In what sense, then, is either real\nand the other unreal, except by an arbitrary decree? The ontological\nobscurity has its corresponding epistemological obscurity as to the\ncognitive status of knowledge of matter, which is the crux of Bergson\u2019s\nphilosophy. Instinct is suited to life and duration; intelligence, to\nmatter and space. Science says many things about time, but affords no\nacquaintance with time itself. The duration of the unit of time is a\nmatter of indifference to the meaning and value of any scientific\nformula.[126] For example, if this unit were made infinity, and\nthe physical process represented by the formula were thus regarded\nas infinitely quick, _i. e._ an instantaneous, timeless fact, the\ninstantaneity of the fact would be irrelevant to any truth expressed\nby the formula. The only truth the formula expresses is a system of\nrelations, which remains the same for any unit of time. Science knows\nno past or future, nothing but an incessantly renewed instantaneous\npresent, without substance. The conclusions of science are given in the\npremises, mathematically; the world of science is a strict determinism.\nIn the real world of consciousness, on the other hand,--knowledge of\nwhich can only be acquaintance with it--the future is essentially\ncontingent and unforseeable, for each new phase is an absolute\ncreation, into which the whole past is incorporated without determining\nit.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe active principle of life Bergson describes by the phrase _tendency\nto create_. Its movement is a creative evolution. Life flows, or, as\nwe have said, rolls on like a snowball, in an unceasing production of\nnew forms, each of which retains, while it modifies and adds to, all\nits previous forms. But the figure of the snowball soon fails. One of\nthe most significant facts of the creative evolution of life is the\ndivision of its primitive path into divergent paths. The primitive\n_\u00e9lan_ contains elementary virtualities of tendency which can abide\ntogether only up to a certain stage of their development. It is of the\nnature of a tendency to break up in divergent elementary tendencies,\nas a fountain-jet sprays out. As the primitive tendency develops,\nelements contained in it which were mutually compatible in one and the\nsame primitive organism, being still in an undeveloped stage, become\nincompatible as they grow. Hence the indefinite bifurcation of the\nforms of life into realms, phyla, genera, species, individuals. It is a\ncardinal error, Bergson thinks, to regard vegetative, instinctive and\nintellectual life, in the Aristotelian manner, as successive stages in\none and the same line of development. They represent three radically\ndifferent lines of evolution, not three stages along the same line.\n\nA tendency common to all life is to store the constantly diffused\nsolar energy in reservoirs where its equilibrium is unstable. This\ntendency, of alimentation, is complementary to the tendency to resolve\nequilibrium of potential energy by sudden, explosive release of energy\nin actions. As the primitive organism developed (undoubtedly an\nambiguous form, partaking of the characters of both the animal and the\nvegetable) these two tendencies became mutually incompatible in one and\nthe same form of life. Those forms which became vegetables owe their\ndifferentiation from ancestral forms to a preponderant leaning toward\nthe manufacture of the explosive, as the animal owes its animality to a\nleaning toward the release of energy in sudden and intermittent actions.\n\nThe vegetable, drawing its nourishment wherever it may find it, from\nthe ground and from the air, has no need of locomotion. The animal,\ndependent on the vegetable or on other animals for food, must go where\nit may be found. The animal must move. Now, consciousness emerges _pari\npassu_ with the ability to act, and torpor is characteristic of fixity.\nThe humblest organism is conscious to the extent to which it can act\nfreely. Actions may be effective either by virtue of an excellence\nin the use of instruments of action or by virtue of an excellence in\nadapting the instrument to the need. Action may thus assume either\nof two very different characters, the one instinctive, self-adaptive\nreaction, the other intelligent manufacture. The two tendencies have\nbifurcated within the animal realm. One path reaches its present\nculmination in certain hymenoptera (_e. g._ ants, bees, wasps), the\nother in man.\n\nThus the development of instinct in man has become subordinate; human\nconsciousness is dominated by intelligence. Hence the universality\nof the vice of intellectualism in philosophy. Man, because he is\ndominated by intelligence, supposes intelligence to be coextensive with\nconsciousness, whereas it is only one of the elementary tendencies\nwhich consciousness comprises, and the one which is impotent to know\nthe flow of reality. Spencer\u2019s evolutionism affords no acquaintance\nwith the reality of life. His so-called evolution starts with the\nalready evolved. Hence all it reaches is the made, the once-for-all,\nthe timeless. It is merely a biological theory, and no advance over\npositive science. It is not a philosophy.\n\nHaving shown the origin of intelligence in the more extensive principle\nof life, and limited its sphere of operation to inert matter, the\nauthor turns to the nature of instinct. The greater part of the\npsychic life of living beings that are characteristically instinctive\nBergson believes to be states which he describes as knowledge in which\nthere is no representation.[127] \u201cRepresentation is stopped up by\naction.\u201d[128] A purely instinctive action would be indistinguishable\nfrom a mere vital process. When the chick, for example, breaks the\nshell, it seems merely to keep up the motion that has carried it\nthrough the embryonic life. But neither instinct nor intelligence is\never pure, and we have in ourselves a vague experience of what must\nhappen in the consciousness of an animal acting by instinct. We have\nthis experience in phenomena of feeling, in unreflecting sympathies\nand antipathies. \u201cInstinct is sympathy. If this sympathy could extend\nits object and also reflect upon itself, it would give us the key\nto vital operations.... Intuition, to wit, instinct that has become\ndisinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object\nand of enlarging it indefinitely, leads us into the very inwardness of\nlife ... It is true that this \u00e6sthetic intuition ... attains only the\nindividual, but we can conceive an inquiry turned in the same direction\nas art, which would take life _in general_ for its object.\u201d[129]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn _Matter and Memory_, mind is represented as varying, in its states,\nbetween two limits, \u201cpure perception,\u201d which is just action, and\n\u201cdreaming.\u201d The limit of action is where the r\u00f4le of mind ceases, the\nvanishing-point of knowledge. But at the other limit, dreaming, mind\nis in full swing, having freed itself, by an inner tension, from the\nobstructive influence of body. Far from vanishing at this limit, as at\nthe other, knowledge is here at its apogee. It is here \u201cpure.\u201d\n\nIt is important for Bergson to recognize an organic connection\n(obstructive to mind, as he Platonically conceives) between mind\nand body, in order that he may establish the possibility of the\nstate of \u201cpure perception,\u201d in which mind activity coincides with\nbodily activity by a yielding, relaxed concurrence with the latter\u2019s\ninfluence. Mind is here passive; its r\u00f4le in the life of the organism\nceases in this state. But it is equally important, for the ontological\nindependence of mind, that at the \u201cdreaming\u201d pole the tension which\nis the very constitution of its knowing should free mind from bodily\ninfluence. This tension, at its ideal limit, must so disconnect the\nmind from the body that the former becomes impotent, as Bergson\nsays, for any efficiency in the physical world. It seems to be, to\nall intents and purposes, a disembodied state. Knowledge having then\nno possible end in action is clearly its own end. Intellection is a\nutility, operating in the world of matter; knowledge is absolute,\nself-centered identity of subject and object. Such, I suppose, is God\u2019s\n\u201cthought of thought\u201d in Aristotle\u2019s conception.\n\nThis fluctuation of the relation between mind and body, from a\nconnection which is vital to absolute disconnection, is a reappearance\nof the ambiguity discussed on pages 66-7. At one moment the world\nseems a Platonic dualism; in the next, a self-limited or polarized\nabsolutism, like Fichte\u2019s or Hegel\u2019s. Whatever the \u201cideal limit\u201d of\nmind\u2019s cognitive \u201ctension\u201d may be conceived to be, there ought to\nbe no question of more and less, in the matter of disconnectedness,\nstrictly speaking. We do not understand movement from connection to\ndisconnection, through intermediate stages, as mind is here represented\nto move, in its states of knowledge. First mind must be like a certain\npart of matter, so that it can rebound by its \u201ctension\u201d from a certain\nother part; and then, as soon as it has rebounded, what would be true\nof the thing that could do this must suddenly become untrue of it,\npresumably because of the rebound, no other reason being assignable\nto account for the ensuing disconnection with matter. One bit of\nmatter can rebound from another, but it is then as much connected with\n_matter_ as before. We do not understand how mind, when it has thus\nrebounded from one particular material attachment thereby becomes\nmaterially unattached.\n\nThis is nevertheless a suggestive scheme of relation. It seems to me\nto be marred with one radical fault: these limits of knowledge are\nwrongly related. Their negation of each other should be the opposition\nof antipodes, not of contradictories. The difference is the radical\ndifference between implication and exclusion. They do not exclude each\nother, but imply each other. Each vanishes without the other.\n\nIn activity, there is externalized motion on one hand and resistance,\nor virtual reaction, on the other. Action and reaction are cases of\npolarity; they are necessary to each other to give each other form.\nIn the cognitive subject, reaction that were purely virtual, without\nexternalizing implication, would be indeterminate dreaming; motion that\nwere purely externalized, without implication of inner virtuality,\nwould be indeterminate activity. Now, anything that is indeterminate\nor formless simply is not, if being has any significance whatever; for\nformless significance is a contradiction; certainly the significance\nof anything would constitute a formal aspect of it. \u201cPure\u201d matter or\nquantity is pure nothing, in the sense that it is quantity of nothing.\nThese \u201cpure\u201d limits thus snuff themselves out. And variation between\nthem is not a progression from not-being to being or _vice versa_, not\na strengthening or weakening of the variable function\u2019s essence. Such\na notion depends on the absurdity of a not-being that can do things to\nbeing, with fluctuating prepotency in the struggle! Strengthening and\nweakening--degree in any guise--has no application to essence. In any\nphase, that is, knowledge is itself and nothing else; it cannot be more\nor less itself.\n\nThat which varies concomitantly with the variations in complexion of\nconsciousness, is the dynamic relation between subject and object. It\nmay be expressed as variation of ratio between virtual and real action.\nAt each pole activity vanishes, and consciousness with it. At one pole,\nwhere the ratio is zero, it vanishes in the direction of \u201creal\u201d or\nexternalized action, which means that the subject meets no opposing\nnegativity, and so no object; the relation of activity is extinguished\nthrough lack of one of its terms. At the other pole, where the ratio is\ninfinity, action vanishes in the direction of \u201cvirtuality.\u201d And this\nmeans that in the subject there is no positivity, no subjectivity, to\noppose to universal negativity or objectivity. The result is the same\nextinction of the relation through lack of a term. A subject term is\nlacking in one case, an object in the other.\n\nKnowledge, for Bergson, corresponds only to the ratio infinity, of\nvirtual to real action; all other ratios between them are less than\nknowledge. To this I object that infinite virtuality is indeterminate\nvirtuality, which is a naught reached in the opposite way from that\nnaught which is infinite and indeterminate actuality. Indeterminate\naction is nothing, and so is indeterminate knowledge. Identification\nof knowledge with any specific value of the ratio of virtual to real\naction is not determined by any logical principle. When a function\nvaries between a positive and a negative pole, neither pole is an\napogee where the function is most itself. On the contrary, as in the\nvariation of an including angle, each pole is a limiting position in\nwhich the essential nature of the variable is extinguished. Nor is\nit most itself midway between the poles, nor at any other privileged\nposition, for it is absolutely and fully itself, and nothing else,\nin every phase. The genuineness of a state of awareness would then\ndepend also on the genuineness of the reciprocity between the terms\nof this dynamic ratio. Where they are not distinct, where subject and\nobject are identical, awareness vanishes through lack of a quantitative\ncoefficient, as it vanishes at each pole through lack of a qualitative\ncoefficient. In other words, knowledge of a thing by itself, like\naction of a thing on itself, is a cancelation of terms of opposite\nsign, a contradiction, and _the subject and object, whether of action\nor of consciousness, are essentially external to each other_.\n\nBergson is treating consciousness as such as if it could be more or\nless conscious, as, indeed, a conscious _subject_ may be. That is, he\nis treating consciousness as if it could be of a nature more or less\naware or cognitive; he is treating variations of phase as if they\nwere augmentations and diminutions of essence; he is treating quality\nquantitatively, an error which would not have been possible if he\nhad adhered to the purely conceptual distinction between quality and\nquantity. And he is treating the variations of cognitive complexion\nor phase as if they depended on variations in a certain relation (the\nmutual externality of subject and object) which is invariable and\nabsolute--incapable, that is, of degree.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\u201cThis book,\u201d says the first sentence of _Matter and Memory_, \u201caffirms\nthe reality of spirit and the reality of matter.\u201d Lower in the same\npage, however, it is explained that \u201cMatter, in our view, is an\naggregate of \u2018images.\u2019 And by \u2018image\u2019 we mean a certain existence which\nis more than that which the idealist calls a _representation_, but\nless than that which the realist calls a _thing_,--an existence placed\nhalf-way between the \u2018thing\u2019 and the \u2018representation.\u2019 ... the object\nexists in itself, and, on the other hand, the object is, in itself,\npictorial, as we perceive it; image it is, but a self-existing image\n(pp. vii, viii).\n\n\u201c... memory ... is just the intersection of mind and matter ... the\npsychical state seems to us to be ... immensely wider than the cerebral\nstate ... our cerebral state contains more or less of our mental state\nin the measure that we reel off our psychic life into action or wind it\nup into pure knowledge ... our psychic life may be lived at different\nheights, now nearer to action, now further removed from it\u201d (pp. xii,\nxiii, xiv).\n\nThe \u201cintersection of mind and matter\u201d suggests a profound dualism, and\nthis Bergson acknowledges to be essential to his theory. It is true\nthat no opportunity is lost, to discount the reality of matter; but the\nrelations which it sustains to mind are such as can exist only between\nterms whose reality is co\u00f6rdinate. Perception is just that biological\nreactive function of material organism engaged with material stimulus,\nwhich every psychological text-book proclaims it to be. But the actual\nconscious state always has memory in it, as well as perception; or\nrather, the state as conscious is nothing but memory; perception\nitself, \u201cpure\u201d perception, is action pure and simple, and not cognitive\nat all.\n\nThis is an abuse of the word \u201cperception,\u201d but the epistemology can\nshow a good deal of reason. After all, our perceptions (as we call\nthe states of mind in which we are involved with a material stimulus)\nmean something, necessarily. They mean _something_, I insist, the\nstrangest of them. We sometimes speak otherwise, saying that an object\nof perception means nothing to us. But, I submit, this is only a manner\nof speaking. A state that meant _nothing_, absolutely, were genuinely\n_blank_, empty, contentless; and there is no difference, I take it,\nbetween a state without content and a state that is unconscious. Well,\nthen, meaning something, as a conscious state must, what does it mean?\nBergson, I am sure, is right in holding that to mean is to recognize,\nto recall, to remember. This makes of every concrete perceptive state,\nso-called, a rudimentary deduction, a genuine syllogism, a work of\nintellect. The major premise is a memory; the minor is an immediate\nreactive, sensori-motor datum; the conclusion is the subsumption of\nthe present datum under the memory. Thus: The experience to which I\nattach the name \u201corange\u201d has such and such characters (remembered major\npremise); the present reactive state has these characters (perceptive\ndatum, minor premise); therefore this state is a case of the orange\nexperience. The only difficulty is the nature of the process of\nsubsumption of the present datum with the memory. The present datum in\nits purity as present is a reaction merely, an event in the physical\nworld. Its nature owns nothing psychical. What commerce, then, can it\nhave with mind? To call its commerce with mind \u201csubsumption\u201d is to give\na label to a problem. To call memory the \u201cintersection\u201d of the physical\nworld with mind seems another label, of a metaphorical sort, for the\nsame problem.\n\nBut, for the present, let us hear the doctrine. To my thinking, it\nis Bergson\u2019s best work, and full of illuminating suggestion. To the\nradical dualist, it should be completely satisfactory. As an adherent\nof a certain double-aspect conception of the body-mind relation, I\nshall eventually propose a correction and completion, very radical,\ncertainly, but all that is necessary to make Bergson\u2019s treatment of\nthis problem of the highest interest and value to myself.\n\nThe body, then, in Bergson\u2019s theory, yes, the brain itself, is no\nproducer, repository nor reproducer of any element of consciousness.\nThe body is a center of reaction, and nothing else. \u201cThe size, shape,\neven the color, of external objects is modified according as my body\napproaches or recedes from them, ... the strength of an odour, the\nintensity of a sound, increases or diminishes with distance; finally,\n... this very distance represents, above all, the measure in which\nsurrounding bodies are insured, in some sort, against the immediate\naction of my body. In the degree that my horizon widens, the images\nwhich surround me seem to be painted upon a more uniform background\nand become to me more indifferent. The more I narrow this horizon, the\nmore the objects which it circumscribes space themselves out distinctly\naccording to the greater or less ease with which my body can touch and\nmove them. They send back, then, to my body, as would a mirror, its\neventual influence; they take rank in an order corresponding to the\ngrowing or decreasing powers of my body. _The objects which surround my\nbody reflect its possible action upon them._\u201d[130] Cut a sensory nerve,\nand the reactive process is destroyed, and with it, perception. \u201cChange\nthe objects, or modify their relation to my body, and everything\nis changed in the interior movements of my perceptive centres. But\neverything is also changed in \u2018my perception.\u2019 My perception is, then,\na function of these molecular movements; it depends upon them.\u201d[131]\n\u201cWhat then are these movements?... they are, within my body, the\nmovements intended to prepare, while beginning it, the reaction of\nmy body to the action of external objects ... they foreshadow at each\nsuccessive moment its virtual acts.\u201d[132] It may seem that my reaction\nto a body is the same whether I perceive it visually or tactually or\notherwise. But movements externally identical may differ internally;\nthere is a different organization of the same gross function with\ndifferent microscopic functions. The _meaning_ has ultimately an\nimportant sameness, since meaning is a function of biological\nadjustment. But different inner organizations are still the explanation\nof different ways of perceiving what is, in all biologically important\nrespects, the same object.\n\nSerious fault has been found[133] with Bergson\u2019s attempt to establish,\nby scientific research in the subject of aphasia, the ontological\nindependence of spirit, the seat of memory, from body. But on other\ngrounds than such scientific investigation the issue of this attempt\nappears to me at best a futile achievement; for the result is in any\ncase the reinstatement, untouched, of that problem of all radical\ndualism, a problem which Bergson solves only by metaphor whose\nbrilliance may be luminous itself, but has no illumination for the\nproblem, which is how reactive states are also conscious.\n\nThere is a theory which relates consciousness and matter to each each\nother as the opposite sides of a surface in relief. The objection to\nthis \u201cdouble aspect\u201d theory that has weighed most, in criticism, is\nthat the ground of the parallelism between convexity and concavity--to\nwit, a logical implication of each other--is obviously absent in\nthe parallelism of consciousness and matter. Whatever parallelism\nexperience actually finds between them is not deducible from either\nconcept: there is nothing in the definition of the sensation blue to\nsuggest an afferent nervous current; nothing in the latter to suggest\na sensation. They are incommensurate. But when you conceive convexity,\nin that fact you conceive concavity also, and _vice versa_. They are\nrelated as plus and minus. The objection appeals to analysis of the\ndefinition of consciousness or of matter, or challenges the advocate\nof the theory to study his sensation or his neural process and see if\nthere be in either of them anything of the other.\n\nA difficulty which immediately arises when this challenge is accepted\nhas been understood to be decisive against the theory. It is this:\nAny definition of consciousness which the advocate of the theory may\npropose as the concept to be analyzed must, in order to fulfil the\nfirst requirement of logical definition, be in terms of that which is\nnot consciousness. And this seems to the critic to beg the question.\nIf you define consciousness so, he objects, you make its definition\nimply matter; but there is then nothing of consciousness in it; what\nyou have got is only matter. That is to assume an equation between\nthem. You state the value of _x_ in terms of _y_, but then you haven\u2019t\ngot _x_, but only _y_. It is otherwise with terms that really have the\ncorrelation you claim for consciousness and matter. Thus you can equate\nconvexity with concavity in terms of either alone, as _m_ = -(-_m_). In\nthis there is no assumption. But what you say of _x_ is that it equals\n_ay_, which is something _distinguishable_ from _x_ and whose equality\nto _x_ is just the problem.\n\nBut if it be allowed that the disparity between consciousness and\nmatter must be either a distinction between two kinds of reality, or\nelse the distinction between being and not-being, the predicament just\ndescribed is worse for the critic of the \u201cdouble aspect\u201d theory than\nfor its advocate. If the distinction is that of being and not-being,\nwhichever is not-being has an internal constitution and structure by\nvirtue of which parts and relations are recognized within it: matter\nhas physical laws and the interaction of bodies; consciousness has\ninterrelated states. Not-being, so interpreted, is hardly distinguished\nfrom being. And if the distinction is within being, and exhausts\nit, either the connotation of consciousness and that of matter are\nreferable to each other--expressible in terms of each other--or else\nthe distinction is only denotative, and they are not distinguished\nas _different_; for difference is a discursive relation between\ndifferents: _dif_fering from each other is a case of _re_ferring to\neach other.\n\nExcessive emphasis on the \u201cultimateness\u201d and \u201cabsoluteness\u201d of the\ndifference between these two concepts is just the inductive cue that\nresults in the \u201cdouble aspect\u201d theory. No one can regard consciousness\nas not different from matter--least of all our critic, who finds them\nincommensurable. Nay, among real things that are _other_ than each\nother, experience gives us no fellow to such difference; for difference\nso utter, they that differ should coincide. And so, in the fact of\naspect, we have, indeed, in a thousand forms, disparity that matches\nthe difference between the concepts now before us: _e. g._, right,\nleft; up, down; plus, minus; convex, concave.\n\nWe confess three obvious differences between the two equations which\nwe have taken to represent our critic\u2019s conception of the relation of\nconvexity to concavity and the relation of consciousness to matter.\nIn equation (1), which is _m_ = -(-_m_), representing the former\nrelation, the same symbol _m_ stands on both sides; in equation (2) the\nsymbols are different, _x_ on one side, _y_ on the other. In (1) the\ncoefficient also is the same on both sides, namely unity; in (2) the\ncoefficients are different, unity on one side, _a_ on the other. And in\n(1) the signs are opposite on the two sides, while in (2) the sign is\nthe same on both sides.\n\nWhat do these differences mean? To begin with, is (1) monomial and (2)\nbinomial? No; in spite of the fact that there is only one symbol in\n(1), this equation is binomial in precisely the same sense as (2) is\nbinomial; for it means that a certain attitude toward _m_, symbolized\nby the minus sign, transforms _m_ into something _distinguishable from_\n_m_. If equation (1) expressed an identity, it would not represent\nthe relation of convexity to concavity, which are not identical but\ndistinguishable. But what is thus expressed in (1) by difference of\nsign is expressed in (2) by difference of coefficient; for (2) means\nthat a certain attitude toward the entity symbolized by _x_ (an\nattitude symbolized by the phrase \u201cdivide by _a_\u201d) transforms _x_ into\n_y_. In short, the connotation differs, on the two sides, _in both\nequations alike_. But on the other hand, the denotation is the same on\nboth sides in each equation, for such is the nature of all equations,\nwhether binomial or any other kind. Thus we have identity of denotation\nwith difference of connotation in each of these equations, and they are\nso far homogeneous with each other. Now connotation is aspect, which\nis determined by subjective attitude; and attitudes are interrelated\nin determinate and accurately expressible ways; as, for instance, by\nantagonism or mutual exclusion, or by any of an indefinite number of\nforms of implication. The difference of attitude called antipodal\noppositeness, or polarity, is the specific difference expressed in\nequation (1); whereas the coefficient _a_, in (2), expresses _mere_\ndifference of attitude, difference in general, including, therefore,\nthat specific difference which is expressed by opposition of sign. Thus\nequation (1) is a case of equation (2).\n\nTo sum up: The objection, stated in these algebraic symbols, was this:\n_m_ implies -_m_; _x_ does not imply _y_. Express the fact of relief\nin terms of _m_ and you have the correlative fact in -_m_ implied\nin the very definition of _m_; while if you express _x_ in terms of\n_y_, you have _y_ values, and nothing but _y_. In short, _x_ and _y_\nexclude each other; _m_ and -_m_ imply each other. Our answer is that\n_x_ implies _y_ just as _m_ implies -_m_; for _ay_ is an aspect of the\nsame denotation as _x_; and, since the specificity of every aspect of\na given denotation is determinable or definable by relation to all\nother aspects of the same denotation, any one of such aspects, as\n_x_, implies, in its definition, every other, and so _y_, instead of\nexcluding _y_.\n\nTurning from such abstract considerations to empirical study of the\nsensation, the same sort of difficulty reappears. We think we find\na dynamic relationship of organic to extra-organic processes; this\nrelationship presents a material aspect, which we call neural activity,\nand a formal aspect, which we call blue, for instance. But the critic\nobjects that all this is much more than sensation, and that we have\nread our hypothesis into our data. We must keep to the pure sensation;\nin that, there is no neural process. So, even as, before, all our\nattempts to propose a definition of consciousness for analysis were\nruled out as begging the question, now every sample of the experience\nto be observed is rejected as impure. There is no sensation that is\npure in such a sense as our critic means, for he means subjectivity\nthat implies no objectivity. If this is more than a word, it is a\nself-contradiction, since subjectivity is subjectivity only in the\nfact of correlation with objectivity. Indeed, if our critic were to\nobserve convexity as he proposes that we observe sensation, he would\nfind no implication of concavity in it; nor would he find it convex.\nHis observation would _be_ the convexity; the two would coincide, and\nso would not be two. Convexity in its essence, as convex, would therein\nno longer be the object of the observation. You have to get outside\nof your convexity to observe it and its implication of concavity;\njust so, you have to get outside of your sensation to know it; in\nit, you know only the object of it. When convexity is said to imply\nconcavity, convexity is just therein not \u201cpure,\u201d as the sensation is\nsupposed to be. \u201cPure\u201d convexity, analogous to \u201cpure\u201d sensation or\nsubjectivity, would be convexity without implication of concavity. That\nwould be zero convexity, so to speak--a self-contradiction. Just so,\nthe \u201cpure\u201d sensation, without implication of objectivity, is a fact of\nconsciousness without the essence of consciousness, which is dynamic\nrelatedness to an object. \u201cPure\u201d consciousness is consciousness of\nnothing, or no consciousness.\n\nIf our critic have his way, we have nothing left us to discuss.\nLet us invite his attention to a discussable phenomenon of our own\ndesignating, and definable in some such way as this: the simultaneous\nbelonging of an experience to an organism and to another material fact,\nsay the sky. The two belongings are distinguished by a _sui generis_\ndifference of direction or relational \u201csense,\u201d which unambiguously\ndetermines the organism to be the subject of the belonging, the sky the\nobject. We have at least as good a right to call this phenomenon by the\nname of consciousness, or sensation, as our critic has to name that a\nsensation which he so defines that its definition is contradicted by\nthe naming.\n\nNow, experience is essentially dynamic, and, for an organism, to be\nactive is to be functionally ordinated or focalized. For example, the\neye and other parts may be subservient, in different ways and degrees,\nto the hand. Then the organism is focalized into an organ of touch, of\nstriking, or whatever it may be. Every other function contributes as\naccessory to this primary function, in the organism\u2019s present phase.\n\nWe have called consciousness the formal aspect of activity, and we mean\nby \u201cform\u201d applied to activity what we mean elsewhere, determinateness\nor definableness. Here, in particular, it is that character which\ndepends on resistance or reactivity. Activity without resistance would\nbe without determination; its character or content would have vanished;\nit would be activity upon nothing, which, like consciousness of\nnothing, is nothing. So the resistance that factors in activity is not\nextraneous to the essence of activity, and consciousness and material\nprocesses imply each other not only with the same logical necessity but\nwith the same polar oppositeness of mutual relation, as the aspects of\nrelief.\n\nConsciousness is thus the inversion or reciprocal aspect of organic\nactivity, virtual, in distinction from externalized or real, activity.\nWhere attention is focalized, action is most resisted. As action\napproaches free vent, consciousness of the object of this free activity\nbecomes more and more evanescent. At the limit where action is\nunresisted, it and consciousness go out, vanish together, in inverse\n\u201csense\u201d or directions. Where action approaches \u201cpure\u201d (_i. e._,\nunresisted) activity, pure positivity, pure subjectivity, consciousness\napproaches \u201cpure\u201d (_i. e._, unreacting) passivity, pure negativity,\npure objectivity. And such \u201cpure\u201d action and consciousness are pure\nnothing, action on nothing, sensation of nothing. The vanishing of the\ntwo relations together is, in each case, for lack of one of its terms\ninverse to the term lacking in the other case.\n\nThis mutual symmetry between action and consciousness is an implicate\nof their identity of denotation and mutual inversion of aspect; and\nany study of the fluctuations and transitions of consciousness, with\nits modulations of attention and inhibition, is accordingly a study in\ninverse, a perfect logical function, of corresponding modifications\nof organic activity; for in the play of the organic functions we\nshall find incessant modulations between their focalization and their\ndispersion, incessant shifting of their mutual rank and of the position\nof primacy among them, to correspond with the changes between margin\nand focus that are always going on among the elements of consciousness.\n\nThe organism is structurally and functionally centralized in a\nsensori-motor system, where the afferent activity is opposed by the\nefferent, in a common focus, or in coincident foci, in which action\nand reaction give form to each other. Here organic reaction has its\ninception in a preformation, schema or design, as Bergson says, of the\ndeveloped activity. An intricate manifold of functions are organized:\ninterest determines the ascendency or primacy of a certain function,\nwhile others are subservient, being inhibited or reinforced in varying\ndegrees. The whole complex process has this character of focal,\nunifying organization, a unity expressed in opposite aspects as the\nsimple form of activity, on the one hand, and as the simple object of\nperceptive consciousness on the other.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nDOCTRINE OF FREEDOM\n\n\nThe fallacy of conceptualism, which, as Bergson conceives it, is\nto substitute space for time as the form of mental existence, has\nbeen discussed in the first chapter of _Time and Free Will_ in the\naspect of applying intensive magnitude, and in the second chapter,\nnumerical multiplicity, to psychic facts. It is the same fallacy\nwhich is discussed in the third chapter, in the aspect of applying to\nthem the conception of determinate, causal organization. The outcome\nof the book is thus that the problem of freedom is just the problem\nof conceptualism, a problem of philosophic method. This book, _Time\nand Free Will_, is a manual of instruction for knowing the reality\nof mental existence; and its object is the _practical_ object of\nindicating the attitude necessary for that purpose. There are two\npossible attitudes, that of space and that of time, or that of\nconception and that of intuition. The conceptual is the attitude taken\nby philosophy universally, to be sure; which explains the futility of\nall extant discussions of the \u201cpersistent problems of philosophy.\u201d It\nis clear, for instance, Monsieur Bergson thinks, that this attitude\ngives rise, in an automatic and inevitable way, to the problem of\nfreedom--that is, that there would be no such problem but for this\nfalse cognitive attitude;--and at the same time that by originating in\nthis unhappy way the problem is necessarily a pseudo-problem, cannot\nbe stated without contradiction. For when you regard mental facts in\nthe spatial or conceptual way, the question automatically arises, how\nare these facts causally related with other spatial facts? It is a\ncontradiction because by \u201cthese\u201d facts you mean non-spatial facts,\nwhich, in the nature of causation, can not be causally related with\nspatial facts, but which, the question presupposes, are so related.\nSuch is the real meaning of the traditional problem of freedom.\nThe solution, says Bergson, is to cease thinking spatially of that\nwhich is temporal; take the other attitude. Once you have done so,\nthe problem vanishes; the causal relation is by definition a spatial\nrelation, and there are no longer two spatial terms to be related.\nSuch determinism is the associationistic conception of mind as an\nassemblage of distinct, coexistent elements of which the strongest\nexerts a preponderant influence on the others. Their organization is\na mechanical system, and their operations obey the laws of mechanical\ncausation.\n\nAs relative (_i. e._ quantitative) intensity is to absolute,\nqualitative intensity, as juxtaposited multiplicity is to\ninterpenetrating multiplicity, so is determinate organization to\norganization by free evolution. The categories magnitude, number and\ncause apply to space. The difference, for Bergson, between space and\ntime is, as we have seen, so absolute that it hardly expresses his\ntheory aright to say that to the above three characters of space\nthree temporal characters _correspond_. Reason seems lacking for any\ncorrespondence whatever. This is certain, at any rate: that when\nintellect makes time an object, and sees it greater or less, divisible\nand regularly consequential, three things are true about the real,\nnon-objective nature of time, each of which truths manifests itself\nto intellect, but wrongly, erroneously. Moreover, it is plainly by\nreasoned, analytic discourse that Bergson discovers that the above\nintellectual manifestations of time\u2019s essence are false. One discovers,\nfurthermore, by this conceptual process, just how they are false, and\ncorrects them with a result so conceptually precise and intelligible\nthat, instead of these three characters falsely spatial, other three\nare determined as truly temporal. Instead of magnitude, quality has\nin this way been substituted; instead of multiplicity, indivisible\nvariousness. For cause, the last chapter of the _Essai_ substitutes\nfreedom.\n\nWe should now be well prepared for divining the nature of the freedom\nwhich is consciousness, or more generally, life. The organization of\nthe facts of a given consciousness is such that the person is focally\nentire in any one of them, even as the entire body functions in each\nof its functions (cf. page 20). The determinate type of organization\nis analogous to the mechanically actuated manikin, not to the natural\nman, even though those fragments which build up the structure of the\nassociationist soul are forces; for these forces are mutually distinct\nparts of the soul, whose union in it, and so whose interaction,\ndepends on some principle extrinsic to any of them and is thus wholly\ndetermined from without. In the developmental type of organization, on\nthe contrary, the _wholeness_ of action is its freedom, rather than\nindependence of what is not itself. Although such independence seems to\nbelong to it, as well, what Bergson is interested to emphasize about\nthe freedom of the free action is that it is the expression of the\nentire person.\n\nIn the domain of life, there is no identity, for there is no\npermanence--\u201cthe same does not remain the same,\u201d as Bergson puts it.\nThe ego is not the same ego in any two moments; it is not the same ego\nthat deliberates from moment to moment; and two contradictory feelings\nthat move it are never respectively self-identical in two moments.\nIndeed, if the case were otherwise, a decision would never be made; the\nequilibrium of the opposing feelings would never be resolved. Merely\nby the fact that the person has experienced a feeling, he is modified\nwhen a second feeling comes. The feelings are the continually modified\nego itself, a dynamic series of states that interpenetrate, reinforce\neach other and result in a free act by a natural evolution, because it\nemanates from the entire person.\n\nSuch is the character of the free act, a very intelligible character,\nit would seem, a character lending itself tractably enough to verbal\ndefinition, that is, conceptual definition, as a certain relation\nof act to agent. Yet it must immediately be added that what seems\nso intelligible and so conceptual an explication of this \u201ccertain\nrelation\u201d--what is contained in the two paragraphs preceding--is not\nregarded by the author as a definition of freedom. It seems that there\nis a distinction between the formulation of a conception on one hand,\nand a definition, on the other, though Bergson does not elucidate this\ndistinction explicitly, and I have had to give up the attempt. The\ndistinction is evidently of crucial importance, nevertheless. \u201cWe can\nnow formulate our conception of freedom,\u201d says the author, on page 219\nof _Time and Free Will_. \u201cFreedom is the relation of the concrete self\nto the act which it performs. This relation is indefinable just because\nwe _are_ free. For we can analyze a thing, but not a process; we can\nbreak up extensity, but not duration. Or, if we persist in analyzing\nit, we unconsciously transform the process into a thing, and duration\ninto extensity ... and, as we have begun by, so to speak, stereotyping\nthe activity of the self, we see spontaneity settle down into inertia\nand freedom into necessity. Thus, any positive definition of freedom\nwill ensure the victory of determinism.\u201d\n\nThe attempt is therefore unwisely made by indeterminists to define\nfreedom by meeting determinists on their own ground when the latter\nturn the question of freedom into considerations of the relations of\nthe voluntary act to its antecedents, characterizing voluntary activity\nas essentially foreseeable before, or apodictically intelligible after\nthe fact. When indeterminists permit themselves to be thus ambushed,\nthey commit themselves to the support of determinism, by accepting\nthe deterministic postulate, in the one case that \u201cforeseeable\u201d has\nintelligible meaning applied to psychic states, which it has not; or,\nin the other case, that willed acts are intelligible both before and\nafter the fact.\n\nThe determinist, that is,--to take the second case first--professes\nthat an act depends in a mechanical way upon certain antecedents. The\nindeterminist contends that the same antecedents could have resulted\nin either of several different acts, equally possible. Defenders and\nopponents of freedom agree in making a kind of mechanical oscillation\nbetween two points precede the action. I choose A. The indeterminists\nsay, You have deliberated; then B was possible. The determinists\nreply, I have chosen; therefore I had some reason to do so, and when\nB is declared equally possible, this reason is forgotten; one of the\nconditions of the problem is ignored. Both represent the activity by\na deliberative route which divides. Call the point of the division\nO; then the divisions of the forked line OA and OB symbolize the\ntwo divisions which abstraction distinguishes within the continuous\nactivity, of which A is the termination. But while determinists take\naccount of everything, and find that the route MOA has been traversed,\ntheir opponents ignore one of the data with which they have constructed\nthe figure; and, after tracing the lines OA and OB, which ought to be\nunited if they are to represent the progression of the ego\u2019s activity,\nthey make this progression go back to O and begin oscillating again!\n\nThe trouble with both these solutions, Bergson says, is that they\npresuppose an achieved deliberation and resolution, representable in\nspace by a geometrical figure. The question, Could the ego, having\ntraversed the route MO and decided on A, have chosen B? is nonsense:\nto put such a question is to affirm the possibility of adequately\nrepresenting time by space, succession by simultaneity. It is to\nattribute to the figure traced the value of an image and not merely\nof a symbol. Figures represent things, not progressions: how shall a\nfigure furnish the least indication of the concrete motion, of the\ndynamic progression by which the deliberation results in the act? The\ndefenders of freedom say, The route is not yet traced; therefore one\ncan take any direction. To which we reply, You can speak of a route,\nin such a connection, only after the action is accomplished, and then\nit has been traced. The determinists say, The route has been traced\n_thus_; therefore its possible direction was only that particular\ndirection. To which we reply, Before the route was traced there was no\ndirection, possible or impossible; there could, as yet, be no question\nof a route. In its lowest terms this merely means: The act, once\naccomplished, is accomplished; and the argument of the determinists:\nThe act, before being accomplished, was not as yet an act. The question\nof freedom is not touched, because freedom is a shade or quality of the\nact itself, not a relation of this act with what it is not nor with\nwhat it can be. Deliberation is not oscillation in space; it is dynamic\nprogression, in which the ego and the motives are in a continual\nbecoming, as living beings.\n\nIndeterminists, Professor Bergson says, must beware, again, of arguing\nagainst the prevision of voluntary acts. Once more, this is not because\nprevision of a voluntary act is possible, but because there is no sense\nin the phrase. If Paul knew all the conditions under which Peter acts,\nhis imagination would relive Peter\u2019s history. He must pass through\nPeter\u2019s very own psychic states, to know with precision their intensity\nand their importance in relation to his other states. The intensity,\nin fact, is the peculiar quality of the feeling itself. Now, to know\n_all_ the antecedents of the act would bring you to the act itself,\nwhich is their continuation, and not merely their result, and above\nall in no way separate from them. To relive Peter\u2019s history is just to\nbecome Peter--that is the only way Paul could conceivably \u201cknow all the\nantecedents\u201d of the act in question. There is no question of predicting\nthe act, but simply of acting. Knowledge of the antecedents of the act\nwithout knowledge of the act is an absurdity, a contradiction. The\nindeterminists can mean nothing, by such a contention as this, but\nthat the act is not an act until it is acted--which is hardly worth\nmeaning;--and the determinists can mean only that the act, once acted,\nis acted--which is no better. The subject of freedom is beside the\npoint, in such a debate.\n\nSo the question of prevision comes to this: Is time spatial? You drew\nPeter\u2019s states, you perceived his life as a marking in space. You then\nrubbed out, in thought, the part OA, and asked if, knowing the part\nbefore O, you could have determined OA beforehand. That is the question\nyou put when you bring in Paul\u2019s representation of the conditions (and\ntherefore their materialization) under which Peter shall act. After\nhaving identified Paul with Peter, you make Paul take his former point\nof view, from which he now sees the line MOA complete, having just\ntraced it in the r\u00f4le of Peter.\n\nPrevision of natural phenomena has not the slightest analogy with that\nof a voluntary act. Time, in scientific formul\u00e6, is always and only\na number of simultaneities. The intervals may be of any length; they\nhave nothing to do with the calculation. Foreseeing natural phenomena\nis making them present, or bringing them at least enormously nearer.\nIt is the intervals, the units themselves--just what the physicist\nhas nothing to do with--that interest the psychologist. A feeling\nhalf as long would not be the same feeling. But when one asks if a\nfuture action can be foreseen, one identifies physical time, which is\na number, with real psychological duration, which has no analogy with\nnumber. In the region of psychological states there is no appreciable\ndifference between foreseeing, seeing and acting.\n\nAccording to the mechanical law of causation, the same causes always\nproduce the same effects. But, in the region of psychic states, this\nlaw is neither true nor false, but meaningless; for in this region\nthere is no \u201calways:\u201d there is only \u201conce.\u201d A repeated feeling is a\nradically different feeling. It retains the same name only because\nit corresponds to the same external cause, or is outwardly expressed\nby analogous signs. It was just said that the ego is not the same\nin any two moments of its history. It is modified incessantly by\nthe accumulation of its past. One\u2019s character at any moment, is the\ncondensation of one\u2019s past. Duration acts as a cause; but this temporal\nor psychological causation has no more analogy with what is called\ncausation in nature than temporal variousness has with number, or\nintensity with magnitude. A causality which is necessary connection\nis, at bottom, identity; the effect is an expression of the cause, as\nmathematical functions are expressions of each other. But no psychic\nstate has this virtual identity with, or mathematical reducibility to,\nany other with which it would thus be in the \u201cnecessary\u201d kind of causal\nrelation. Such effect is not given in the cause, but is absolutely new.\n\nTime that has passed is an objective thing, and is representable by\nspace; time passing is a subjective process, and is not representable.\nThe free act is the actual passing of time; time in its passing is the\nvery stuff of the existence of freedom. Analyze an act, and you make\nit a thing. Then its spontaneity is altered into inertia, its freedom\ninto necessity. Hence any definition of freedom makes it determinism.\nBut, though the analysis of the act and the definition of freedom\nare illusory undertakings, the fundamental fact of freedom remains\nunassailable by any argument.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBergson\u2019s way of vindicating freedom is thus to find no case against\nit. Of the positive sort, the only, and sufficient proof is appeal to\nconsciousness. Freedom is an immediate datum of consciousness.\n\nThis is confusing to anyone who cannot follow Bergson in his view\nthat subject and object, in actual intuitive consciousness, are\nindistinguishable, identical. And this fusion of the poles of\nconsciousness while the nature of consciousness not merely suffers\nnothing but even attains its apogee thereby, needs more justification\nthan Bergson has given it. Freedom is a datum of consciousness; but,\nas undetermined, it must, on Bergson\u2019s principles, be consciousness\nitself--which, indeed, is plainly enough the teaching intended.\nFreedom is consciousness, then, purely subjective. In what sense is\nit a datum of consciousness? If it is a datum, is it not an object,\nof consciousness? It seems a case where, in order to see, you musn\u2019t\nlook, lest looking make what is purely subjective an object! This is\nhardly the case of the fovea and the faint star, where looking _loses_\nyour object; for here, looking rather produces it where no object\nbelongs, or--perhaps one should say--transforms it. Your look, says\nGustave Belot,[134] congeals and immobilizes it, denatures it like the\nGorgon\u2019s stare! It is knowable, says Bergson, only by being lived.\nIt is a feeling we have. But the trouble is that, to be _known_ as\nundetermined, as freedom, to be even a feeling we have, it is back upon\nour hands as a datum, as an object.\n\nBefore I comment in my own way on the Bergsonian view of freedom, I\nwish to call to the attention of English readers the keen reaction of\nthis French critic of Bergson. Belot objects to the modest-seeming\nstatement that freedom is a feeling we have. Neither psychology,\nhe thinks, nor common sense, approves.[135] They establish, on the\ncontrary, a sensible difference between freedom, whatever it may be,\nand the feeling we have of it--any feeling we can possibly have. Our\nfeeling of freedom is much less variable than our freedom. \u201cWe agree\nnot to attribute a veritable practical freedom to the dreaming man,\nto the somnambulist, to the man affected with some mental disease.\nYet the man who, in dream, sees himself act, sees himself free in his\naction; the somnambulist equally feels himself free and attributes to\nhimself, in his dream, a responsibility that we decline to put upon\nhim, and which he will reject, himself, when he wakes[136] ... The\nfurious madman must ordinarily feel himself free in the accomplishment\nof a murder for which a tribunal will not consent to punish him. The\nfact is, it suffices, in order that we should feel ourselves free, that\nour acts should be in harmony with our ideas and our feelings. Now,\nthat may very well be, in the cases of the dreamer, the somnambulist,\nthe madman.... They would therefore feel themselves free. But they are\nnot free; for they only act from an incomplete consciousness; and a\ngreat number of elements of their normal ego, which would permit the\nrevision, the correction, the inhibition, are lacking.\u201d A glimmering\nof the fact of one\u2019s madness is a token of the only residuum there is\nof freedom. \u201cIt is to conserve some freedom, to perceive that one no\nlonger is master of oneself.\u201d\n\nBergson is alive to all this--sometimes, as when he says that the\nfreedom of a free action is its _entirety_, its expression of the\ntotal personality. But Belot is quite justified in charging him with\nforgetting it, for only by forgetting it could he conceive of freedom\nas an immediate datum of consciousness. It is, indeed, far from the\ncase that our freedom is nothing but the feeling we have of it, or\nthat it is proportional to this feeling. What is so altered by the\ndeterminist habit of mind, by the conceptual attitude toward will, is\nnot at all one\u2019s feeling of freedom, but only one\u2019s interpretation\nof it. An immediate, spontaneous feeling, being prior to theory\nand analysis, is safe from any influence from them. In the most\nincorrigible determinist, consciousness of the wish, other things\nequal, is exactly the same as in the most incorruptible indeterminist.\n\nPrecise determination of will is not only not contrary to freedom but\nis indispensable to it. Minimizing the value of motive in activity is\nloss, not gain, to freedom. The motive is what connects our act to\nour whole personality, and makes it ours. Without this connection, we\nare not free; its interruption is a limitation, not the condition,\nof freedom. And indeed freedom is so limited by the mass of our\nunreflecting impulses. Bergson is right in saying that we are rarely\nfree. But therefore he is wrong in saying that freedom is the mere\nspontaneity of the ego.\n\nIn a certain passage[137] Bergson describes freedom in a way which\nseems almost explicitly to deny the doctrine that it is the entirety of\nwill. Here it is a revolution of one part of the self against the rest,\nfar from emanating from the total self. And such revolution, just so\nfar as it is purely spontaneous, or arbitrary, is irresponsible instead\nof free. Just so far, on the other hand, as it is not arbitrary, it\nis determined. In fact, however, appearance of arbitrariness argues\nnothing about determination except that one is ignorant about it.\n\nIn showing the absurdity of all argumentation for or against the\ndetermination of a future voluntary act by present conditions, the\nconsiderations offered by Bergson are almost perfect proof of such\ndetermination. The reason we cannot think another\u2019s thought without\ndisfiguring it is just that the conditions of the thought, and so of\nthe act, are not all reunited. The act, then, is supposed to depend\non these conditions. Now, an absolute present is a fiction; each\nmoment of the true duration of consciousness is a commencement and an\nachievement. Determination is nothing but that intimate connection\nof events which prevents us from isolating an absolute present. The\ncase of Peter and Paul then, proves only that foresight could not\nbe adequate to determination, not that determination is absent. The\ninability of even the author of an act to foresee it is no criterion\nof its freedom. Any free acts of our own that we do foresee, we foresee\nas connected with our present state, as ours, in fact; it is that which\nmakes their freedom, but that supposes also their determination. This\nforesight, it may be said, is always insufficient and imperfect. So\nmuch the worse for freedom, not the better. It is thereby limited,\nnot made. There are, indeed, always events outside of us that baffle\nour calculations, as well as unconscious tendencies, unperceived\nforces within us, indistinctly developing beneath the reflective and\nclear-seeing ego (Bergson calls this the superficial, Belot the higher\nego) which suddenly break out, rout it and upset it. Such civil war is\nanything but freedom.\n\nThe uniqueness of psychic states, whether free or not, neither exempts\nthem from determination nor even differentiates them from physical\nstates. That a psychic state is not reproducible Bergson shows to be\nbecause the past, incessantly accumulating and modifying itself, is\nnever the same in two moments. A clearer statement of the solidarity\nof past and present--_i. e._ of determination--could not be made. It\nmay well be true that in the physical as well as in the moral world,\nevery individual is without counterpart; it is none the less a product\nof nature, for its uniqueness; and, as a product of nature, determined,\nin its own uniqueness, by nature. Among our most unique acts, the most\noriginal are far from being the freest. The eccentricities of the\nmadman are more original than the sober doings of the rational, but\nnot so free. The more enlightened men are, the freer; but the more\nthey do and think the same thing. Their divergences come from their\nignorances and their unconsciousness, which are also the limits of\ntheir freedom. It is the same with them as with nature: it is when it\nproduces monsters that it is most new, but it is then also that it has\nbeen least free, most constrained in its doings.\n\nMonsieur Bergson has not done away with psychological determinism; but\nif he had, he would have hindered freedom rather than helped it. But\nthe problem is not purely psychological; it is psycho-physical. We are\nat once body and consciousness. A freedom which were not exerted in the\nouter world would be absolutely nominal and illusory; and in order to\nmanifest itself therein, it must be accompanied by physical processes.\nThese too, then, if determinism is contrary to freedom, must be exempt\nfrom determination.\n\nBergson\u2019s denial of psycho-physical parallelism[138] is no gain for\nfreedom. If no external effect is essentially involved in a volition,\nthe volition is impotent--which is surely not to be free. Nor would\nit be characteristic of freedom to have activities going on in the\norganism without the avowal of consciousness. So far as we do possess\nsuch unconscious goings-on, we are absolutely passive to their\noperation. Psycho-physiological parallelism[139] is a condition of\nfreedom, not its negation. Some sort of correspondence is necessary\nto the feeling of freedom, and in that case freedom cannot dispense\nwith determinism in nature, at least. One might, perhaps, suppose a\npreestablished harmony between a contingency (the moral world) and a\ndeterminism (the physical); it would be easier to suppose it between\ntwo determinisms; but between two contingencies--that is too much to\nask!\n\nSuppose, then, the ability of mind to produce, veritably cause physical\nmodifications. Suppose an energy not subject to calculation. But how\nshall we ever know such an energy in the external world? All that is\nspatial is calculable, if number is derived from space. How could an\nenergy, then, be manifest in the physical universe, _i. e._ in space,\nwithout being thereby subjected to the same forms of quantity and to\nthe requirements of calculation?\n\nBergson\u2019s attempt to repudiate the problem of determinism, as a\npseudo-problem, results in his vacillation between the two sides of\nthe controversy. Sometimes he accepts the solidarity of our acts with\nthe rest of our conscious life, sometimes he denies it; which is to\nvindicate freedom sometimes by determinism, sometimes by indeterminism.\nIn the beginning he founds freedom in the mutual penetration of the\nstates of consciousness; even sensation is a commencement of freedom,\nbecause it embraces \u201cthe sketching and, as it were, prefiguring of the\nfuture automatic movements;\u201d[140] and the free act is defined as that\nwhich \u201csprings from the self\u201d[141] without intervention of anything\nstrange. Then, little by little, the contrary thesis takes the upper\nhand: the act of will becomes a _coup d\u2019\u00e9tat_; \u201cthe successive moments\nof real time are not bound up with one another;\u201d[142] the dynamic\nconception supposes \u201cthat the future is not more closely bound up\nwith the present in the external world than it is in our own inner\nlife.\u201d[143] Bergson maintains, to be sure, that solidarity can be\nadmitted between the past and the present and denied between present\nand future. Once the event happens it is indeed necessary that we\nshould be able to explain it, and we can always do so by plausible\nreasons. But this connection is established after the fact for the\nsatisfaction of our discursive reason. The past is fixed, it cannot\n_not have been_; it has become a _thing_, under the domain of the\nunderstanding and of analysis. Whereas, at the moment of enactment,\nthe activity is a _process_, and so not capable of analysis. When the\nroute is traced, we can analyze its directions and windings, but it is\nnot traced in advance of being traced; it is the tracing that makes the\nroute, not the route that determines the tracing. You can explain what\nis given, but there is no explaining what is not given.\n\nBergson, however, does not keep this point of view. The future, we have\njust seen, is \u201cprefigured\u201d in the present. Then it is as necessary to\nthe feeling of our freedom to be able to connect our future to our\npresent in our decision, as to be able, once the act is accomplished,\nto give account of it by reasons drawn from our consciousness.\nBergson\u2019s thought vacillates this way because he attributes two\nincompatible characters to the inner life, qualitative heterogeneity\nand mutual penetration of its states. Grant the heterogeneity and\nyou have an infinitesimal dust, the very denial of connection and\npenetration. If the states penetrate there are always two near enough\nto each other in quality to form an identical whole, while they differ\nonly in degree, as two very near shades of the same color. But then\nthere is a quantitative, and so a homogeneous, aspect of the inner\nlife.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nBERGSON\u2019S ABHORRENCE OF DETERMINATENESS\n\n\nA deep, temperamental abhorrence of determinateness--that is the motive\nof Bergsonism. By admission of Bergson, any object of the mind is\ndeterminate. But therefore a philosophy that repudiates determinateness\nin the nature of reality is ineffable because it is objectless. It is\nineffable also because any reason offered for the indeterminateness\nof reality is determination of it. The dread of determinateness is\nthe dread of reason, of explanation, of interpretation--in a word, of\nphilosophy. A consciousness which can \u2018testify that we are free\u2019 is\nnot an objectless consciousness; and freedom, if consciousness can\ntestify to it, cannot be an indeterminate nor an immediate (_i. e._\nunobjectified) datum of consciousness. Bergson\u2019s position is that it\nis essential to the true nature of reality _in itself_, under whatever\naspect--_e. g._ duration, motion, freedom etc.--to be subjective;\nand that this is why Zeno is right in finding motion, for instance,\nunthinkable; for \u201cunthinkable\u201d properly means (though it did not mean,\nfor Zeno) incapable of becoming objective. This to say, is it not,\nthat the true nature of reality independently of all point of view\nis to be viewed from a certain point! It comes to this, at least, if\nto be subjective is compatible with being known in any sense, with\nbeing contained within consciousness at all. Otherwise it comes to the\nskeptical (and self-contradictory) doctrine that it is essential to the\ntrue nature of reality to be unknowable in every sense. The former, of\ncourse, is Bergson\u2019s view regarding subjectivity.[144]\n\nThe anti-intellectualist doctrine, however, that data of consciousness\ncannot be understood, conceptualized, defined, or even named--cannot,\nin short, be objectified--without contradiction is as important for the\nproblem of knowledge as it is for the problem of freedom. Professor\nPerry\u2019s analysis of immediatism[145] shows the misunderstanding of\nwhat it is to conceptualize, which underlies such a doctrine. The\nanti-intellectualist idea seems to be that the concept is static,\nand common to more than one consciousness, and universal in its\ndenotation, and sharply discrete; and that for these reasons it could\nnot correspond to what is fluid and private and uniquely particular\nand continuous. It is evidently the \u201ccopy theory\u201d of knowledge, which\nunconsciously determines this criticism of the concept. Concepts\nare invalid, applied to life, _because they are not like living\nobjects_! \u201cYou cannot make continuous being out of discontinuities,\u201d\nis James\u2019s criticism.[146] And Bergson\u2019s: \u201cInstead of a flux of\nfleeting shades merging into each other [intellect] perceives distinct\nand, so to speak, _solid_ colors, set side by side like the beads of\na necklace.\u201d[147] But, as Perry shows, to conceptualize is nothing\nlike this procedure. Conception is _substitution_ of one object of\nimmediate consciousness which is conveniently abstract, for another\nobject which is, in the circumstances of the conceiving, inconvenient\nin its concrete fulness. All that is necessary in order that this\nsubstitutional mode of consciousness should be valid and true\nknowledge of the object so symbolized, is that the substitute should\n_mean_ that object. And that it can and does mean it when the object\nis a subjective state is no more than the fact that, on Bergson\u2019s\nown showing, such states are symbolized. For to mean is essentially\nto symbolize. Certainly no one concept is a rounded-out exhaustive\nawareness, so to speak, of the symbolized object. But this is no more\nthan to say that conceiving is a selective and eliminating mode of\nconsciousness--which does not distinguish it from any other mode, the\nmost immediate and intuitive possible state of genuine significant\nconsciousness being essentially as much an elimination as a positing.\n\nSince, then, a symbol never has (just by reason of its function as\nsymbol) the same structure as the object symbolized, there is nothing\neither in the immobility, or the publicity, or the universality, or\nthe discreteness of any concept, or in its inclusion of all these\ncharacters, to prevent its validly meaning the fluid and private and\nparticular and continuous. And the real must necessarily have the\nconceptual characters, since the characters correlative to them, alone\nregarded by Bergson as characters of reality, have no meaning _except\ncorrelatively_ to the conceptual characters. Thus \u201cfluidity of nothing\u201d\nis a phrase without meaning. The something which is fluid, requires,\nin order that _fluidity_ as such shall be a datum of experience, a\ncoefficient aspect of immobility. It is not fluidity that flows. The\nimmobile, snap-shot conceptual form--not only does this _belong_ to the\ncataract, as the possibility of photographing it proves, but this very\nform is indispensable to the fact of flow in its genuine concreteness.\nAs for uniqueness, a fact so unique that it is like nothing else in\nany respect, could not be discriminated. The bare discernibleness\nof a datum requires a basis of discrimination which is common to it\nand to that from which it is discriminated. Continuity is analogous\nwith unity, and has no meaning if there is no aspect, in it, of\ncomposition, and so of discreteness, as unity is nothing if not union\nof a plurality. That the real has the aspects eulogistically favored\nby intuitionism is beyond question. That it has not the complementary\nconceptual aspects is demonstrably false, and is an illusion of\n\u201cexclusive particularity,\u201d explainable only by that prepossession with\na certain abstract view, whose psychological origin has been repeatedly\nnoted in this study.\n\nIs it not truly a paradox to give the unnamable a long list of\nnames--life, consciousness, freedom, duration, intensity, quality,\nheterogeneity etc.--and to write a book, whether practical or\nspeculative, concerning that which will not articulate into discourse,\n(cf. above, p. 54-5), employing these names on every page; and to\nconclude with a studied definition of freedom; and to avow that\nthe purpose of it all is to make the fact understood that the\nsubject-matter cannot even be named, still less defined or discoursed\nabout or understood? It seems improper to consider that the book is\n_about_ such a subject, and yet necessary to suppose that it is about\nsome subject, and impossible to assign another. If it is true that,\nin seeming to name this subject, you are deluded; that, in trying\nto talk about it, you fail, and name and talk about something else,\ninstead, its spatialized symbol--then the conclusion is perfectly valid\nthat such a book is a case of this delusion. And the trouble lies in\nthat reifying of the coefficients of reality and of consciousness\nwhich is the condition of a philosophy of \u201cpure\u201d intuition (cf. page\n29). To suppose that genuine cases of awareness can be either pure\nintuition or pure conception is to reify these coefficient aspects of\nconsciousness, which are as truly _both_ indispensable for the genuine\nconcreteness of an actual case of awareness as are the positive sine\n_and_ cosine for the real acuteness of an angle (_i. e._ for the angle\nto enclose acutely space revolved-through). As the zero point of either\ntrigonometric projection is the vanishing-point of the entity of whose\nnature they are coefficient functions, so the \u201cpurity\u201d of either\ncoefficient function of consciousness is the vanishing of any real\nawareness.[148]\n\nIf no logical reason impugns the validity of conceptual knowledge of\nsubjective states, no more does the pragmatic test discredit such\nknowledge. It is as good, genuine knowledge in its satisfaction of\nvital interest as the sensation, say, which is the object of the state\nin question. Helen Keller, incapable of the sensation blue, knows the\nsensation--conceptually alone, of necessity--rather better, even, it\nmay be, than she would ever have known it if her life had been more\noccupied in the knowing of blue--and other such--_things_; better,\nat any rate, certainly, than most people know it. All this knowledge\ncan be is a rationalizing of \u201cblue:\u201d she can name it, define it,\nunderstand it, make articulate and significant statements about it. The\nintellectual mode of knowing blue is thoroughly significant. It finds\nblue in experience, and enables the conscious subject to identify this\nobject when she comes across it. By this knowledge, blue is part of the\ncurrency of Helen Keller\u2019s social commerce. It is a factor in her life,\nwith its importance and interest. Obviously, she can have got it only\nby conceptualizing it.\n\nOf course the proposition that consciousness is indefinable has the\nsame futility as the proposition that it is unnamable; because, indeed,\nthey have the same meaning. The meaning, we have seen, is that, in\ntrying to name or define what is fluid, private, etc., there is a\nmiscarriage; it is something else that gets named or defined, to wit\nthe representative or symbol of what was aimed at. This symbol, being\nfixed and public, is able to lend itself to application of the fixed\nand public name or concept. But we have also seen that a name is only a\nsymbol; an unnamable thing could not be symbolized. If, by hypothesis,\nit _is_ symbolized, it is therein namable.\n\nBut naming a thing is _ipso facto_ relating it, for it is associating\nit with something else, its name or symbol; in naming the thing you\nhave started upon the process of defining it, which is the infinite\nprocess of relating it or understanding it. Exempting things from\nnaming or definition, sequestering them from the rational domain, is\nlike setting a limit to space. Sequestering from the rational domain is\nrelating to it, and that is putting into it.\n\nIf the illusion in trying to name and define mental states is due\nto their fluidity and privacy, by the same token the same treatment\nof physical objects, which Bergson regards as valid treatment, is\nin fact equally illusory. To be sure, physical objects have not,\naccording to the author, the flow of duration, but they are even less\ndependable creatures than mental states, for in every new moment they\nare something absolutely other than anything which was in the moment\nbefore. Besides which, in spite of this really incessant instantaneity,\nsomething, not explained, causes them, upon the \u201cintersection\u201d of our\nduration with them, to _appear_ to us to be self-identical but changed,\neven as we ourselves. Physical objects are not fixed. One finds no\nexceptions in nature to the universal law of change; and the state of\nany physical thing at a given moment is the outcome, in continuity, of\nits previous states, to an indefinite regress of antecedents, quite as\nthe case stands with the ego. In respect to duration, discriminating\nbetween physical and mental is not valid. Even between organic and\ninorganic matter or between conscious and unconscious organisms the\ndifference is only one of degree or tempo of change. But if so, it\nis arbitrary, if one regards the present state of the conscious\norganism as embodying the whole of its past, to deny this of the stick\nand the stone. Of course mental states are not permanent; subjects,\nobjects--nothing is permanent that has existence. Nothing stays as it\nis. The scope of naming and defining is not limited by permanence.\nNeither, however, is the flux of nature chaos, that it should not be\nunderstandable. Change, on the contrary, is the manifestation of law,\nin the time of Heraclitus, now, and forever.\n\nPrivacy or uniqueness is no more obstructive to understanding than\nis change, and, like change, has no peculiar applicability to mental\nstates as matter of knowledge. Privacy or uniqueness applies to\nphysical objects of knowledge in essentially the same way as it applies\nto mental states. Mere accessibility is, in principle, common for all\nobjects of knowledge, to all subjects.[149] But there is a special\nreason why the subject of the state is particularly disqualified,\nas compared with others, for knowing his state immediately, _i. e._\nintuitively; namely, that, at the time of the existence of the state,\nwhen, alone, it could be known intuitively, he is mainly occupied with\nanother object of knowledge, the object of the state in question.\nYou do not, then, know a mental state best by living it, or rather\n_in_ living it; your knowledge of it is just then at its worst, since\nyou are then preoccupied in knowing something else. The state, as an\nattribute of the subject, is clearly one of the subject\u2019s relations,\nand, so, conceptually distinct from either term. It cannot be at once a\nknowledge and the object of that same knowledge. Bergson\u2019s treatment of\nthe conscious state conceives it in just that way--as if the relation\nwere itself one of its own terms, the object.\n\nKnowing a mental state can only mean understanding it. It is not a\nconcrete datum, like the sky, but an abstraction from the relationship\nin which the subject and the sky function as terms. One does not\nintuitively know the subjective process of blueness, in looking\nat the sky; one knows the sky in that sense, but the process only\nconceptually, by reflection. Is it any less an authentic object of\nknowledge? Is it not itself--is it any symbol of itself?--which you\nname and define and talk about and understand?\n\nThe practical significance of saying that one felt and now remembers a\nfeeling is not that the feeling is what one ever felt. Feeling Number\nOne is not an object for feeling Number Two, neither during Number One\nnor afterward, in reminiscent feeling. So far as the reminiscent state\nis another intuition, its object is the same as that of the intuition\nremembered--so far. But to be reminiscent, a conscious state must\nreflect upon, or refer to, a conscious state distinct from itself.\nThis reflective reference is a conceptual co-element together with the\nintuitional character of the reminiscent state. So far as the memory is\nreflective, consciousness is oriented toward the original state itself\nas a fact, a process, conceptually distinguishable from the object of\nit. It is thus only _so far as conceptual_ that subjective processes\ncan be objects of knowledge, or, in short, be known. But if so, Bergson\nis wrong in two essential points: in denying that subjectivity can\nbe objectified, and in affirming that knowledge of subjectivity is\nimmediate (_i. e._ non-conceptual) or intuitive.\n\nAny reminiscent state, like every other conscious state, undoubtedly\n_is_ intuitive in a certain degree. The calmest reflection on an\noriginally affective experience is tinctured with a rudimentary\nfluttering of the old feeling; just as, on the other hand, the most\nviolent early repetitions of a tempestuous joy or grief must relate,\nin order to be reminiscent, to the original experience. No one else,\nit may be said, can _appreciate_ my feeling as I do, myself: this\nappreciation is no conceptualization of that feeling. This is only to\nsay that the affective as well as the representative aspect of any\nconscious state is unique for each subjective center of interest. But\nprivacy no more distinguishes subjectivity from objectivity than does\nchange. Every object, being self-identical, is unique, its quality\nprivate. Inasmuch as each conscious subject is a distinct center of\ninterest as well as a distinct cognitive subject, the affective value\nof a state of a given subject must also be theoretically unique for\nthat subject. But the state is nevertheless objective and common as\nwell as subjective and private, since in fact it is an object for\nunderstanding. My state of mind is as accessible to your understanding\nas your own (it may be more so, to be sure). The understanding names\nthe intuitive state--anybody\u2019s at all, indifferently, one\u2019s own or\nanother\u2019s-- as truly as it names any other relationship or process, by\nvirtue of its conceptual coefficient; and as truly relates it to the\nrest of the rational universe, therein understanding and defining it.\n\nThe derivation of the three heterologies elucidated in the three\nchapters of the _Essai_, is the inevitable consequence of the\nfundamental heterology of an \u201cabsolutely\u201d two-fold universe. The\nintensity of mental states could not be homogeneous, for Bergson,\nthe variousness that belongs to them could not be plural, their\norganization could not be determinate, because then they would be\nobjective, _by his definition_ of objectivity. But why may a subjective\nstate not be an objective state? To the conceptualist, to whom these\nterms are abstract concepts, points of view, discursive contexts, there\nis no reason at all. To Professor Bergson, who does what he accuses\nconceptualism of doing, namely substituting concepts for concrete\nrealities, it is a contradiction, for one concrete reality cannot be\nanother. But a concrete reality which, for a certain purpose and in a\ncertain context, one symbolizes by the term \u201csubjective state,\u201d may\nvery well be the same concrete reality which, for another purpose, one\nsymbolizes by the phrase \u201cobjective state.\u201d\n\nWe have seen that intensity which is \u201cpure,\u201d pure quality, is pure\nnothing, being quality of nothing; since, if it is quality of\nanything, it has its quantitative coefficient, which destroys its\npurity. So variousness which is \u201cpure\u201d heterogeneity, is not even\nvarious, but \u201cnothing\u201d again. For it is \u201cinterpenetrating\u201d instead\nof \u201cjuxtaposited\u201d or impenetrable heterogeneity. But impenetrability\nis just identity, as Bergson remarks;[150] it is a logical principle\nrather than a physical law. That two bodies cannot occupy the same\nspace and time means that they would therein not be two, or coexistent.\nNow, interpenetration in any rigorous sense, any but the loose\ncolloquial sense of small division and uniform diffusion, is the mere\ncontradiction of impenetrability or identity. It means that two bodies\ndo occupy the same space at the same time. If, then, this law of\ninterpenetration thus means to require (in the subject) the relation of\ncoexistence, and also (in the predicate) to forbid it--in other words,\nif it is contradictory to itself--mental states can obey it no better\nthan pebbles. And, finally, non-quantitative causality is a third\ncontradiction, since its \u201cpure\u201d heterogeneity destroys its continuity\nin time as well as in space (cf. above, page 93).\n\nHow can any of these three pairs of heterologous principles of space\nand time be \u201cabsolutely\u201d different if, however different, each pair\nhave such essential community of nature that both must be called by\none name and thought under one category, as two species of the same\ngenus? For, in spite of all their differences, they are, throughout the\ndiscussion, two kinds of intensity, of multiplicity, of causation.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTHE MYSTICAL YEARNING OF INTUITIONISM\n\n\nI will conclude these comments on Professor Bergson\u2019s teaching by\nnoting the mystical nature of the central idea of his epistemology,\nthe identification of subject and object. The yearning for a more\nintimate acquaintance with the thing-in-itself, for a knowledge truer\nand more searching than the \u201cpractical\u201d and \u201cuseful\u201d reactive relations\nwhich we bear to our \u201cphenomenal\u201d objects--as if such experience were\nunworthy the sacred name of knowledge--this, the prime aspiration\nof the intuitional philosophy of Bergson, reduces to a futile, if\nnot a morbid, yearning after self-contradiction. The more you know a\nthing \u201cin itself,\u201d the more you \u201cinternalize\u201d your relation to it--in\nshort, the more you identify yourself with it--the less you bear any\nsignificant relation to it at all, any relation, obviously, but that\nof identity; the less, notably, you bear the active and cognitive\nrelations toward it. The indispensable condition of Paul\u2019s knowing\nPeter is that Paul should _not_ become Peter. Things can neither be\nnor be conceived except in _some_ relations, any more than relations\nwithout terms. If you know the thing in its relations, you know the\nthing as much in itself as a thing is capable of _being_.\n\n\u201cYou show,\u201d writes Professor Bergson, in the letter quoted before,\n\u201cthat perfect intuitive knowledge, as I mean it, would consist in\ncoincidence with the object known; but that then there would no longer\nbe knowledge of any object, since only the object remains.--Yet, in the\ncase of an entirely free action, _i. e._ an act in which the entire\nperson takes part, one is _altogether_ in what he is doing; one has,\nat the same time, consciousness of what he is doing; and yet he is not\nduplicated in observing his own activity, absorbed as he is in the act\nitself: here to act and to know (or rather to possess) are one and the\nsame thing. Intelligence, always outside of what it observes, cannot\nconceive of knowledge without distinctness of subject and object. It is\nintelligence that propounds your dilemma: \u2018Either there is knowledge\nof the object, hence distinctness of object and subject; or subject\ncoincides with object, and then there is only object: knowledge\nvanishes.\u2019--But reality does not accept this dilemma. It presents us,\nin the case cited, subject and object as a single indivisible reality,\naction and knowledge of the action as a single indivisible reality, of\nwhich intelligence _subsequently_ takes two points of view, that of\nobject and that of subject, that of action without knowledge and that\nof pure knowledge. We have no right to set up these _points of view_ of\nreality as _constitutive elements_ of reality itself.\u201d\n\nThe last sentence accuses me of doing what I am most zealous to show is\nthe foundation fallacy of intuitionism! I have been contending that,\nwhen Monsieur Bergson says that subjectivity cannot be objectified,\nhe is speaking as if \u201cobjectifying,\u201d instead of meaning to take a\npoint of view, means to alter the reality symbolized by the word\n\u201csubjectivity.\u201d (Of course the question concerns concrete cases of\nsubjectivity, the intuitionist contending that a given subjective state\ncannot be objectified--_i. e._ named, defined, etc.) Now, this seems to\nme precisely to \u201cset up a point of view of reality as a constitutive\nelement of reality itself.\u201d But intuitionism does even worse than this.\nHaving set up this point of view of reality, and treated it in this\nconcrete way, and worshipped it as the Absolute, it snubs that other\npoint of view, which, by the very nature of the genuinely concrete\nreality, is co\u00f6rdinate with the deified abstraction, its brother and\npeer. The object has \u201csuch reality as that of rest, which is the\nnegation of motion,\u201d the absolute and positive; \u201cyet it is not absolute\nnaught.\u201d\n\nIt seems to me that Bergson virtually admits the impossibility of\nthe coincidence of subject and object when he says that instinct and\nintellect are neither possibly pure, which is deeply true. But then an\naction \u201ccompletely free\u201d is only a limiting case, is it not?--a case\nwhich would put the action out of relation and so out of activity? In a\ncertain obvious sense \u201cthe whole person takes part,\u201d perhaps, in _any_\naction; but I cannot imagine any action or state that could be other\nthan a relation between object and subject. I cannot see how perfect\nself-expression in one\u2019s act makes in any degree for obliteration\nof ontological distinctness between agent and patient, subject and\nobject. How may action be conceived to dispense with reaction? How deny\nits relational character, then, without denying its activity--in short,\nwithout contradiction? \u201cPerfect self-expression\u201d distinguishes certain\nacts, no doubt, but the distinction is ethical, denoting a teleological\nharmony, not a metaphysical identity between subject and object.\n\nTo say that one _is_ completely one\u2019s act and yet _knows_ his act again\nconfuses a relation with one of its terms. Is it merely a matter of\ntaste to choose to say that such a state--_i. e._ perfect absorption in\none\u2019s act--is _not knowledge_ of the act just in so far as it is the\nact? Is it not necessary to distinguish between the subject\u2019s relation\nto the act, on one hand, and to those things, on the other (which are\nneither subject nor act) entering, together with the subject, into\nthe act? Those things, it seems to me, are the object, and the act\nitself a relation between the subject and them, a relation which wears\na conscious as well as an active aspect, and which, as knowledge, is\nknowledge of the things, not of the act, not of itself.\n\n\n\n\nPART THREE\n\nBERGSON\u2019S GENIUS\n\n\n\n\nBERGSON\u2019S GENIUS\n\n\nLogical soundness is never amiss, and is notably desirable in a\nphilosopher; but Professor Bergson is assuredly right in thinking\nthat it is no measure of a philosopher\u2019s genius. One\u2019s feeling about\nthe fallacies of Spinoza and Berkeley and Kant may pale almost into\nindifference, in the enthusiasm of following such heroic feats of\ninsight.\n\nBut then, it would seem, their greatness is their _insight_, and not\ntheir logic, and insight therefore, after all, is philosophical genius.\n\nWe have seen that this is Professor Bergson\u2019s conclusion. It can be\ninterpreted in a sense that is valid, of course: all depends on the\nmeaning of \u201cinsight.\u201d I have insisted sufficiently on the reasons why\nI cannot think Professor Bergson\u2019s interpretation of it is valid.\nIt is a case in which the etymological and the actual meaning of a\nword, in a certain context, differ and so give rise to ambiguity. The\nword \u201cintuition,\u201d etymologically, means just \u201cinsight.\u201d But then it\nmeans consciousness functioning most completely, least abstractly.\nNow, Bergsonian \u201cintuition\u201d is a conception so far from concrete\ncompleteness that almost the primary object of his philosophy\nis the demarcation of intuition from any actual state of which\nconsciousness is normally capable. It is true that Bergson insists\nthat consciousness, in a supernormal effort, is capable of the purely\nintuitive act, and that in the capacity for this feat of knowing\nlies all the hope of metaphysics. This is the ground principle of\nBergsonism, and I have nothing to add here, concerning its merits. In\na word, its fallacy is the fallacy of reification. No such feat of\nconsciousness is possible, not because it is more than the limited\npower of actual mind can compass, but because it is a contradiction,\nsince it is consciousness without object, which is consciousness of\nnothing.\n\nThe Bergsonian will object that, if Bergsonian \u201cintuition\u201d is\nabstract, no less abstract is intellect; and, if philosophy is\ninsight,--consciousness most complete,--the thesis contrary to\nintuitionism, that philosophy is intellectual judgment, is a case\nof the same fallacy that has been charged to intuitionism, and is\ninconsistent with the admission that philosophy is essentially an\ninsight which involves more than intellect.\n\nThe answer is first, that intellectualism, unlike intuitionism, regards\nphilosophy as indeed an abstract interest, and for that reason as not\nseparable from the living of a life which supports this interest in\na larger total interest; but, also for that reason, as not possibly\nidentical, either with life entire or with any interest, such as the\n\u00e6sthetic, of like abstractness with philosophy. The answer to the\nsecond part of the objection is that an insight which is more than\nintellect is not for that reason without its intellectual aspect.\nConsciousness is always significant, certainly; but if it has any\nmeaning, if it _is_ significant, it is, in that fact, intellectual.\nAnd insight without meaning is a contradiction, and is assuredly not\nphilosophy. The appearance of inconsistency arises from the unconscious\nidentifying of insight with intuition in the falsely reified sense.\nInsight in any such sense philosophy certainly is not. And yet the\nintellectualist may properly attribute the greatness of a philosophy\nto its insight rather than to its logical cogency, since cogent logic\nmay be dull and shallow and therefore not great. It is great if it is\nfar-seeing and deep. There is analytic insight, as well as intuitive.\n\nAfter all is said, the feeling that even serious lapse of logic may not\nbe sufficient to destroy the value of a great philosophy is not the\nsame as the opinion that logic is immaterial to that value. No one, I\ndare say,--intuitionist, intellectualist or anyone else--ever thought\nthis. The genius of a great philosophy is a superior perspicacity\nin the recognition of the significance of problems, a superior\ndiscernment of the problematic as such. \u201cThe earliest philosophers\u201d\nsays Professor James,[151] \u201c... were just men curious beyond immediate\npractical needs, and no particular problems, but rather the problematic\ngenerally, was their specialty.\u201d But the perspicacity which sees\nthe meaning and bearings of a problem cannot fail to attack its\nfurther interpretation with a superior freshness and originality.\nAnd the interpretation of a problem, carried to the end, is its\nonly solution. Genius in philosophy thus also turns into superior\nrichness of suggestion in the solutions which it invents. Inasmuch as\nthe problem-putting and the problem-solving processes are continuous\nwith each other, and in this important sense one and the same thing,\nit should be expected that philosophical genius would possess both\nvirtues, in any actual instance. And no doubt this is the historical\nfact. On any view it is suggestiveness, fertility, which is the measure\nof philosophical genius. And it seems to the intellectualist that\nthe possibility of philosophical fertility depends on a discursive,\nintellectual co-implication of the parts of the realm of truth.\n\nBut although these two phases of philosophical genius--the\nproblem-putting and the problem-solving phases--have so intimate\na relation with each other, they can and do appear in different\nemphases in different philosophers. The emphasis in any particular\ncase is undoubtedly determined in part from without, notably by\nthe philosopher\u2019s epochal relations. Thales is greater, as well as\nmore momentous historically, in his _quest_ of an \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03ae\u00a0than in the\nconsummation of the quest. With Hegel\u2019s material to work upon, the\nemphasis in Thales\u2019 genius would have been proportionately modified.\nAnd if Bergson has not, like Thales, unearthed new problems, that is\nnothing, for the question of the value of his work.\n\nIndeed, the historical momentousness of a philosophy is quite largely\nindependent of its intrinsic merit in either of these senses, or in\nany sense. Conditions which contribute to the vogue and influence of a\nphilosophy are many, some obvious enough, others more recondite. The\nquestion of historical momentousness is thus only partly germane to an\nestimate of a philosophy\u2019s own intrinsic worth; and, in the case of a\ncontemporary philosophy, is in the nature of things (while the history\nis yet to be made) an almost unmitigated speculation. Such speculation\nregarding Bergson is no part of the present purpose.\n\nOne word more--before undertaking to appraise the genius of Bergson--as\nto the motive of such an undertaking in this particular essay. It is\nno part of the primary object of the essay. That object is the very\nimpersonal one of understanding his doctrine. If logical fallacies\nare in any sense or degree irrelevant to the value of a philosophy,\nit is nevertheless a method of studying a philosophical work which is\nnot without its value, to square it with logical principles. When\nthe philosophy under criticism is already a classic, the omission of\nappreciative comment needs no apology, just because the merit of the\nwork is beyond dispute. On Platonism and on Kantism much valuable\nlight has been thrown in this severe way. In studies so occupied,\ndisquisition on the immortal inspiration of the vision bequeathed to\nmankind in syllogisms which sometimes halt would not have enhanced the\nvalue of the study.\n\nWhen our philosopher is a contemporary, the case is different in that\nthen personal predilection and prejudice are without the regulation\nimposed by historical perspective; and injustice, even negative\nor privative, either to the living philosopher or to his living\nantagonists, has a certain human import of which the conditions are\nremoved with mere temporal remoteness of the subject of study, when\nhistory has placed him in a setting which includes an \u201cafter\u201d as well\nas a \u201cbefore.\u201d\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nProfessor A. D. Lindsay has pointed out[152] that, in one important\nrespect, Bergson\u2019s genius is of the Kantian kind. It is capacity\nfor such interpretation of old problems that they become veritably\nrenewed. \u201cIt is a great and essential proof of cleverness or insight,\u201d\nsaid Kant, \u201cto know how to ask reasonable questions.\u201d Now, comments\nProfessor Lindsay (without suggesting any comparison in importance\nbetween Kant and Bergson), there is this resemblance between them,\nthat much of the interest of Bergson\u2019s work, as of Kant\u2019s, consists\nin statement and exposition of antinomies in philosophy. Like Kant\u2019s,\nBergson\u2019s philosophy is interesting because it is a new method, and, in\nthe same sense as Kant\u2019s, is a critical philosophy, for it consists in\nfinding the main source of previous difficulties in uncriticized false\nassumptions.\n\nSuch criticism of the question (\u201cinterpretation of the problem\u201d I\ncalled it above) is just the proper business of the philosopher. For,\nevery question is also an unconditional assertion. Falseness in this\nimplied assertion is a case of the fallacy of \u201cmany questions,\u201d which,\naccordingly, may be regarded as the philosopher\u2019s first concern.\n\nBergson is a philosopher preeminently in this sense. He is a\nphilosopher also (in spite of the cavalier denial of Sir. E. Ray\nLankester)[153] in that he is a man with an articulate conviction\nconcerning the nature of being and of knowledge. In the aspersion\nof Bergson\u2019s thought by the above writer and by Mr. Hugh S. R.\nElliot,[154] there is a rancour which, in spite of much valid criticism\nin detail, produces an impression of ill-regulated prejudice.\n\nThis impression is no more than fairly counterbalanced by the contrary\nenthusiasm of such whole-souled votaries of Bergsonism as Edouard\nLeRoy, William James and H. Wildon Carr.\n\n\u201cThere is a thinker,\u201d writes M. LeRoy, \u201cwho is deemed by acknowledged\nphilosophers worthy of comparison with the greatest.... Beyond any\ndoubt, and by common consent, Mr. Henri Bergson\u2019s work will appear to\nfuture eyes among the most characteristic, fertile and glorious of our\nera. It marks a never-to-be-forgotten date in history; it opens up a\nphase of metaphysical thought, it lays down a principle of development\nthe limits of which are indeterminable; and it is after cool\nconsideration, with full consciousness of the exact value of words,\nthat we are able to pronounce the revolution which it effects equal in\nimportance to that effected by Kant, or even by Socrates.\u201d[155] It is\na \u201cprofoundly original doctrine.\u201d And of endless fertility: \u201cThere is\nno doctrine ... which is more open, and none which ... lends itself to\nfurther extension.\u201d Again: \u201c... a doctrine which admits of infinite\ndevelopment ... a work of such profound thought that the least passing\nexample employed takes its place as a particular study.\u201d[156] And so on\n_ad libitum_.\n\nThese are the glowing words of an ardent disciple (even though not a\npupil) and may be expected to be not, after all, altogether regulated\nby a \u201cfull consciousness of the exact value of words.\u201d Such phrases\nas \u201cworthy of comparison with the greatest,\u201d \u201cbeyond any doubt,\u201d \u201cby\ncommon consent,\u201d are pleasantly vague, and should not offend any\njudgment that is not literal in season and out of season. As to the\nBergsonian \u201crevolution,\u201d it should offend no one at all who can put up\nwith an expression of purely speculative relish. So far, on the other\nhand, as this revolution is accomplished fact in the prime of our\nphilosopher\u2019s middle age, the mention of Socrates and Kant does savour\nof the ornate!\n\nBergson is at least preeminent over all other living philosophers as\nthe expression of a very revolutionary _Zeitgeist_. The generation\nof Taine and Renan (LeRoy goes on to say) was characterized by the\npositivistic presumption that any object whatever could be \u2018inserted in\nthe thread of one and the same unbroken connection.\u2019 But rationalistic\narrogance has never failed to arouse an answering voice of protest and\ndissent; and of our own generation such anti-intellectualism is one\nof the controlling ideas. It is primarily the reactionary conviction\nthat the analytic method of philosophy is abstract and empty. It is,\nsays LeRoy, a demand for \u201c_complete_ experience, anxious to neglect\nno aspect of being nor any resource of mind.\u201d \u201cEverything is regarded\nfrom the point of view of life, and there is a tendency more and more\nto recognize the primacy of spiritual activity.\u201d \u201cThat the attitude\nand fundamental procedure of this new spirit are in no way a return to\nskepticism or a reaction against thought cannot be better demonstrated\nthan by this resurrection of metaphysics, this renaissance of idealism,\nwhich is certainly one of the most distinctive features of our epoch.\u201d\n\u201cBut ... we wish to think with the whole of thought, and go to the\ntruth with the whole of our soul ... And what is that, really, but\nrealism? By realism I mean the gift of ourselves to reality, the work\nof concrete realization ... to live what we think and think what we\nlive. But that is positivism, you will say; certainly it is positivism.\nBut how changed! For, from considering as positive only that which can\nbe an object of sensation or calculation, we begin by treating the\ngreat spiritual realities with this title.\u201d\n\n\u201cA new philosophy was required to answer this new way of looking at\nthings. Already, in 1867, Ravaisson, in his celebrated _Report_, wrote\nthese prophetic lines: \u2018Many signs permit us to forsee in the near\nfuture a philosophical epoch of which the general character will be the\npredominance of what may be called spiritualist realism or positivism,\nhaving as generating principle the consciousness which the mind has in\nitself of an existence recognized as being the source and support of\nevery other existence, being none other than its action.\u2019\n\n\u201c... What Ravaisson had only anticipated, Mr. Bergson himself\naccomplishes, with a precision which gives body to the impalpable and\nfloating breath of first inspiration, with a depth which renews both\nproof and theses alike, with a creative originality which prevents the\ncritic who is anxious for justice and precision from insisting on any\nresearches establishing connection of thought.\u201d\n\n\u201c... Mr. Bergson has contributed more than anyone else to awaken\nthe very tendencies of the _milieu_ in which his new philosophy\nis produced, to determine them and make them become conscious of\nthemselves.\u201d[157]\n\nIn the new and significant relation which LeRoy and others find in\nBergson to motives of thought so distinct as idealism, realism, and\npositivism, he is a writer of the fertility of genius; in the skill of\nhis transfusion of these motives into a type of conception underlying a\nvery deep and widely extended tendency of the age, he is the foremost\nexpression of that tendency. In a very limited way, only, can such\nenthusiasm as LeRoy\u2019s, in a mind of his excellent discernment, be\nreasonably discounted. Trimmed of all its abounding fervours its\nfighting weight is still sufficiently impressive: how resonant to\nmotives and convictions of actually controlling interest that mind\nmust be which can elicit such response, needs no better proof than the\nresponse itself. No one else is so well attuned as Bergson to that\ndemand for complete experience which, if anything, is the spirit of\nour time. No one else has carried so far in theory the possibilities\nof an intense instinctive living, as the answer to the riddle of the\nuniverse. What can be said for instinct as an organ of philosophy,\nBergson has said.\n\nAll philosophers of immediacy hold Bergson as chief. Carr, like LeRoy,\nthinks Bergson\u2019s doctrine as momentously original as those of the\ngreatest classics. \u201cGreat scientific discoveries,\u201d he writes,[158] \u201care\noften so simple that the greatest wonder about them is that humanity\nhas had to wait so long for them.\u201d Thus with Berkeley\u2019s \u201c_esse est\npercipi_\u201d and Kant\u2019s autonomy of the intellectual categories. And\nequally so with Bergson\u2019s interpretation of reality as life, \u201cliving\ncreative evolution,\u201d as distinct both from solid matter and thinking\nmind.\n\nJames, while others find quite determinate differences between him\nand Bergson, was far less cognizant, himself, of differences than of\nagreement. He was one of the keenest of Bergsonians, and regarded\nhimself, certainly with a great deal of genial modesty, as a follower,\na disciple. \u201c... if I had not read Bergson,\u201d he says,[159] \u201cI should\nprobably still be blackening endless pages of paper privately, in\nthe hope of making ends meet that were never meant to meet ... It\nis certain that without the confidence which being able to lean\non Bergson\u2019s authority gives me, I should never have ventured to\nurge these particular views of mine ... In my opinion he has killed\nintellectualism definitively and without hope of recovery.\u201d\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe quantity and quality of the study of Bergson\u2019s problems by others,\nwhich his own treatment of them has stimulated, is already an enviable\nmonument to that best quality of philosophic genius in his work, its\nfertility of suggestion. Speaking, as the present writer must, from\nthe point of view of critical reaction, the value of Bergson is indeed\nincalculable. This is no conventional phrase. His theoretical opponent\nis almost inclined to feel that the stimulus which Bergson\u2019s lucid\nexposition affords, to a mind of contrary conviction, to understand\nitself, must be a more precious good even than the quickening which his\nfollowers so eloquently confess.\n\nThe fact is that this eloquence is always more than eloquence; it\nis a fervour almost like religious fervour. Witness the words just\nquoted from James. Every true Bergsonian testifies in the same tone.\nThus LeRoy:[160] \u201cMr. Bergson\u2019s readers will undergo at almost every\npage they read an intense and singular experience. The curtain drawn\nbetween ourselves and reality, enveloping everything, including\nourselves, in its illusive folds, seems of a sudden to fall, dissipated\nby enchantment, and display to the mind depths of light till then\nundreamt, in which reality itself, contemplated face to face for the\nfirst time, stands fully revealed. The revelation is overpowering, and,\nonce vouchsafed, will never afterwards be forgotten.\n\n\u201cNothing can convey to the reader the effects of this direct and\nintimate mental vision. Everything which he thought he knew already\nfinds new birth and vigor in the clear light of morning; on all hands,\nin the glow of dawn, new intuitions spring up and open out; we feel\nthem big with infinite consequences, heavy and saturated with life.\nEach of them is no sooner blown than it appears fertile forever. And\nyet there is nothing paradoxical or disturbing in the novelty. It is a\nreply to our expectation, an answer to some dim hope....\n\n\u201c... whether, in the long run, we each of us give or refuse complete\nor partial adhesion, all of us at least have received a regenerating\nshock, an internal upheaval ... henceforth a new leaven works and\nferments in us; we shall no longer think as we used to think.\u201d As for\nthe attitude of mind proper to bring to the reading of Bergson, \u201cwhere\nthe end is to understand rather than to judge, criticism ought to take\nsecond place. It is more profitable to attempt to feel oneself into the\nheart of the teaching, to relive its genesis, to perceive the principle\nof organic unity, to come at the mainspring. Let our reading be a\ncourse of meditation which we live.\u201d\n\nAnd Gaston Rageot: \u201c... the reading of a work of Bergson\u2019s requires at\nthe very beginning a sort of inner catastrophe; not everyone is capable\nof such a logical revolution.\u201d[161] A little further on he speaks of\nthis preparation of the mind to receive the Bergsonian doctrine as\n\u201c_cette volte-face psychologique_.\u201d\n\nConversion to Bergsonism, indeed, suggests religious conversion.\nCompare James\u2019 words with the above. \u201c... if, as Bergson shows, [the\nconceptual or discursive form of reality] cannot even pretend to reveal\nanything of what life\u2019s inner nature is or ought to be; why, then we\ncan turn a deaf ear to its accusations. The resolve to turn the deaf\near is the inner crisis or \u2018catastrophe\u2019 of which [M. Rageot] spoke\n... [This] comes very hard. It is putting off our proud maturity of\nmind and becoming again as foolish little children in the eyes of\nreason. But difficult as such a revolution is, there is no other way, I\nbelieve, to the possession of reality.\u201d[162]\n\nIs not this experience very suggestive of the \u201cregeneration\u201d of\nChristianity? I think it is, indeed; and I think this fact is\nsuggestive of the essential nature of Bergsonism. One may turn a deaf\near to reason, one may execute a _volte-face psychologique_; but,\nwhatever the rewards, it seems unlikely (to the unregenerate, of\ncourse!) that among them will be included a better comprehension of the\n_meaning_ of reality.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[92] _Creative Evolution_ p. 176. I have italicized \u201creflecting\u201d and\n\u201cobject\u201d to indicate the contradiction of \u201cinstinct.\u201d And since, for\nBergson, intuition is philosophic consciousness, this reflectiveness\nwhich he imputes to it is no accident, no inadvertence. Intuition must,\nindeed, in order to be philosophic, be reflective; that is to say, it\nmust absolutely contradict its own nature. (In all of the references\nto Bergson\u2019s works, the pages mentioned are those of the English\ntranslation.)\n\n[93] See especially _Creative Evolution_, pp. 191-2 and 266.\n\n[94] Cf. R. B. Perry\u2019s _Present Philosophical Tendencies_, the first\ntwo sections of Chapter XI.\n\n[95] J. W. Scott, _Pessimism of Bergson, Hibbert Journal_. XI. 90-116.\nSee also below p. 94.\n\n[96] _Creative Evolution_, p. xi.\n\n[97] _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods._ Volume\nV. No. 22\n\n[98] Cf. the second sentence of the present essay.\n\n[99] _Henri Bergson: The Philosophy of Change_, p. 14.\n\n[100] This title has been given to the English translation of the\n_Essai sur les donnes_, etc.\n\n[101] Possibly this representation of Leibniz\u2019s thought requires a\nword of explanation. Leibniz expresses the nature of reality in terms\nof force, on one hand, and of consciousness on the other. The monad or\nelemental reality is a unit of perception and also a unit of force.\nIt is a living unit; as in Bergsonism, reality is life, though life\nin Leibniz\u2019s philosophy is ultimately plural instead of a simple\nimpetus. It is true that will is not a characteristic Leibnizian term,\nbut existence is always, I think, conceived by him very clearly as\n_conation_. The self-realization of the monad is at the same time an\nintensification of its perceptiveness and of its dynamic. Cf. the\nfollowing passages from Rogers\u2019 _Student\u2019s History of Philosophy_,\npp. 307-8: \u201cLeibniz was led by various motives to substitute, for\nextension, _power of resistance_, as the essential quality of\nmatter.... But when, instead of extension, we characterize matter as\n_force_, a means of connection [between matter and mind] is opened up.\nFor force has its analogue in the conscious life; corresponding to the\nactivity of matter is conscious activity or will. Indeed, are there any\npositive terms in which we can describe the nature of force, unless we\nconceive it as identical with that conscious activity which we know\ndirectly in ourselves?\u201d This activity, then, \u201cIs at bottom, when we\ninterpret it, a spiritual or perceptual activity.\u201d In short, it is will.\n\nLeibniz is properly regarded as the first modern spiritualist.\nLeibnizian matter is real, if you like, but then it is continuous, and\nof essentially identical nature, with spirit. Matter is spirit in a\nlow stage of development. Bergson has no such clear and unambiguous\nconception of matter as this, when you consider the whole or his\ndoctrine; but there are passages in Bergson which might almost have\nbeen written by Leibniz himself. For instance: ... \u201cif, in fact, the\nhumblest function of spirit is to bind together the successive moments\nof the duration of things, if it is by this that it comes into contact\nwith matter and by this also that it is first of all distinguished from\nmatter, we can conceive an infinite number of degrees between matter\nand fully developed spirit--a spirit capable of action which is not\nonly undetermined, but also reasonable and reflective.\u201d (_Matter and\nMemory_, pp. 295-6.)\n\n[102] There is a good discussion of this point in an article reviewing\nthe _Essai_, by L. Levy-Bruhl, in the _Revue Philosophique_, Vol. XXIX\n(1890), pp. 513-538.\n\n[103] Cf. below, pp. 57, 58.\n\n[104] Pages 72, 73, 97. Professor Perry\u2019s analysis of the conception of\nimmediacy (_Present Philosophical Tendencies_, Chapter X) has a result\nthat is similar in principle to the above.\n\n[105] _Op. cit._, p. 525.\n\n[106] _Time and Free Will_, pp. 118-119.\n\n[107] But Bergson apparently does not see that even the word\n\u201cinterpenetrate\u201d falls to express anything radically different\nin temporal \u201cmultiplicity\u201d from a certain character of spatial\nmultiplicity. Cf. pp. 62, 101. In this, as in all its argument,\nintuitionism arguing is inevitably intuitionism contradicting itself.\nIt is ineffable philosophy (see _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and\nScientific Methods_, Vol. IV, p. 123.)\n\n[108] The living ego is a fact-in-the-accomplishing. You cannot really\ndiscourse about it! If psychology ever seems to manage this (and if\nthis present book of Bergson\u2019s seems to manage it), the ego discoursed\nabout is, in that fact, proven to be not the concrete and living ego at\nall, but the impersonal and objective one.\n\n[109] The attitude, that is, of intuition, which we have called the\ntemporal attitude. The terms \u201cspatial,\u201d \u201clogical,\u201d \u201cconceptual,\u201d\napplied here so often to the word \u201cthought,\u201d are epithets of thought\ngenerally. There is no thought, in any meaning of the word more\nspecific than \u201cconsciousness,\u201d that is not logical, conceptual and\nspatial in this Bergsonian sense.\n\nIf we cannot conceptualize our psychic facts, we cannot think them,\nthen--the meaning is the same. But if we say that anything (which we\nname and, in the saying, define and think) is unnamable, indefinable\nand cannot be thought, we contradict ourselves. The doctrine, if true,\nmust mean something that is not a self-contradiction. Does it mean\nthat what we name and discourse about is only the spatialized symbol\nof the psychic fact? There can be little doubt. I think, that this is\nBergson\u2019s meaning; but then the psychic fact is of such a nature as\nto be symbolized; and the distinction between a symbol and a name, by\nvirtue of which a thing which can be symbolized may not be namable,\nrequires explanation.\n\n[110] _Present Philosophical Tendencies_, pp. 232-4.\n\n[111] Pp. 42, 43. Cf. also below, p. 93.\n\n[112] _Op. cit._, p. 128.\n\n[113] _Time and Free Will_, p. 98.\n\n[114] _Time and Free Will_, p. 113.\n\n[115] Cf. above, p. 58.\n\n[116] In order to give any meaning to the term \u201ccompenetrating\u201d\nor \u201cinterpenetration\u201d (which I take to be mutually equivalent, in\nBergson\u2019s use), I am compelled to interpret them as synonymous with\nthe \u201ccompactness\u201d of a continuum--as synonymous. In fact, with\n\u201ccontinuity.\u201d Bergson does not make clear how these terms can mean\nanything else (cf. below, p. 101.)\n\n[117] Bergson himself, of course, is perfectly aware--_in other\nconnections_--of the continuity of space!\n\n[118] _Creative Evolution_, p. 1.\n\n[119] _Ibid._, p. 4.\n\n[120] _Ibid._, p. 208.\n\n[121] _Ibid._, p. 248.\n\n[122] _Ibid._, p. 247.\n\n[123] _Jour. Phil. Psy. and Sci. Meth._, Vol. V, No. 22.\n\n[124] _Creative Evolution_, p. 251.\n\n[125] _Ibid._, p. 269.\n\n[126] Cf. Perry\u2019s comment, _Present Philosophical Tendencies_, p. 235.\n\n[127] _Creative Evolution_, p. 175.\n\n[128] _Ibid._, p. 144.\n\n[129] _Ibid._, pp. 176, 177.\n\n[130] _Matter and Memory_, pp. 6, 7.\n\n[131] _Ibid._, p. 8.\n\n[132] _Ibid._, p. 10.\n\n[133] Hugh S. R. Elliot\u2019s _Modern Science and the Illusions of\nProfessor Bergson_, pp. 98 ff.\n\n[134] _Une theorie nouvelle de la liberte (Les donnees immediates)_, in\nthe _Revue Philosophique_, Vol. XXIX (1890), pp. 361-392.\n\n[135] _Op. cit._, p. 368.\n\n[136] The feeling of guilt, and, so, of responsibility and freedom, can\nbe crushing in dreams, as anyone knows who is given to appearing in\ndream public indecently clothed, or not clothed at all.\n\n[137] _Time and Free Will_, p. 158.\n\n[138] _Matter and Memory_, p. x: also an article entitled _Le\nparalogisme psycho-physiologique_ in the _Revue de Metaphysique et\nde Morale_, Vol. XII (1904), pp. 895-908. This article is also in\nthe _Rapports et comptes rendus du deuxieme congres international de\nphilosophie_, 1905, Part I.\n\n[139] The causal relation between mental and cerebral states--_i. e._\ninteraction--would be an alternative \u201ccondition of freedom;\u201d but this\nrelation is included in Bergson\u2019s denial of any sort of correspondence\nor equivalence (such as the quantitative equivalence of causation)\nbetween states of brain and states of mind.\n\n[140] _Time and Free Will_, p. 34.\n\n[141] _Ibid._, p. 172.\n\n[142] _Ibid._, p. 208.\n\n[143] _Ibid._, p. 215.\n\n[144] _Time and Free Will_, p. 83.\n\n[145] _Present Philosophical Tendencies_, Chapter X, section 6.\n\n[146] _A Pluralistic Universe_, p. 236. Quoted from Professor Perry\u2019s\nwork, named above.\n\n[147] _Creative Evolution_, p. 3.\n\n[148] The analogy holds even in the oppositeness of direction in which\nthe evanishment, in the limiting cases, occurs (cf. above, pp. 72, 80).\n\n[149] Cf. Perry\u2019s analysis of subjective privacy, in Chapter XII of\n_Present Philosophical Tendencies_.\n\n[150] _Time and Free Will_, p. 88.\n\n[151] _Some Problems of Philosophy_, p. 10.\n\n[152] _The Philosophy of Bergson_, pp. 1, 2, 3.\n\n[153] _Modern Science and the Illusions of Professor Bergson_, pp. vii,\nviii.\n\n[154] _Op. cit., passim._\n\n[155] _The New Philosophy of Henri Bergson_, pp. 1 and 2.\n\n[156] _Ibid._, pp. 120, 230.\n\n[157] _Op. cit._, pp. 128 ff.\n\n[158] _Henri Bergson: The Philosophy of Change_, p. 12.\n\n[159] _A Pluralistic Universe_, pp. 214, 215.\n\n[160] _Op. cit._, pp. 3, 4, 5, 6.\n\n[161] _Revue Philosophique_, Ann. 32, No. 7 (July 1907), p. 85.\n\n[162] _Op. cit._, pp. 272-3.\n\n\n\n\n  BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS\n  HUMANISTIC STUDIES\n\n  _Vol. I_          _May 15, 1914_          _No. 3_\n\n\n  BROWNING AND\n  ITALIAN ART AND ARTISTS\n\n  BY\n\n  PEARL HOGREFE, A. M.\n\n  _Instructor in Mansfield College, Mansfield, Louisiana_\n\n\n  LAWRENCE, MAY, 1914\n  PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY\n\n\n\n\n  To G. A. L.\n\n  WHO MADE POSSIBLE MY\n  COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY TRAINING\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThis paper has been prepared with the understanding that while much has\nbeen printed concerning a few individual art poems of Browning, such as\n_Abt Vogler_, _Andrea del Sarto_ and _Fra Lippo Lippi_, no complete,\nsystematic survey of the place of Italian art in Browning\u2019s text has\nappeared; and in the belief that such a survey might be worth while.\n\nMuch of Browning\u2019s treatment of art is of course omitted in the\ndiscussion; for he introduces art data from other countries than Italy,\nand has much to say of the nature and purpose of art in general.\n\nWithin the limits chosen, the purpose has been to make a practically\ncomplete survey for each of the five fine arts, sculpture, music,\npoetry, architecture and painting, in the order here given. The attempt\nhas also been made, based on data from letters and biographies, to\ntrace to some extent the chronological perspective of Browning\u2019s\ninterest in the individual arts, and to indicate the apparent sources\nof that interest. Chapter VII deals with \u201ccomparative aesthetics\u201d\n(within the limits of our title), the poetic values Browning finds in\nthe arts, the causes determining the relative emphasis upon each art,\nand the relations of these data to Browning\u2019s dominant concern as a\npoet--human personality.\n\nThat the study has been brought to its present form is due, in part,\nto help and encouragement given by Professor S. L. Whitcomb. The\nmanuscript has been carefully read by Professor D. L. Patterson and\nProfessor Margaret Lynn. The former has given valuable suggestions\nconcerning the historical aspects of the paper, and the latter,\nhelpful criticism based on her special knowledge of Browning\u2019s text.\nTo these three instructors in the University of Kansas, and to all\nothers who have given assistance, including fellow students, a grateful\nacknowledgement of indebtedness is here made.\n\n                                PEARL HOGREFE.\n  Mansfield, Louisiana,\n    May 1, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n  CHAPTER I\n  Browning\u2019s General Interest in Art.\n\n     I. Subject Matter of Browning\u2019s Poems                      9\n    II. Interest in Music                                      10\n   III. Relation to Painting                                   10\n    IV. Relation to Sculpture                                  12\n     V. Significance of the Preceding Sections                 12\n    VI. Time Spent in Italy                                    13\n   VII. English Knowledge of Italian Art in Browning\u2019s Time    13\n  VIII. Non-English Themes and Settings in General             14\n    IX. A Quantitative Statement                               14\n\n\n  CHAPTER II\n  Italian Sculpture in the Poems of Browning.\n\n     I. General Statement                                      15\n    II. Historical Scope                                       16\n   III. Poetic Functions of the References to Sculpture        17\n    IV. Source of Browning\u2019s Knowledge                         22\n\n\n   CHAPTER III\n   Italian Music in the Poems of Browning.\n\n     I. General Statement                                      23\n    II. Catholic Hymns                                         23\n   III. Poetic Functions of the References to Music            24\n    IV. Lack of Modern Italian References                      26\n     V. Conformity to Facts                                    27\n    VI. Source of Browning\u2019s Knowledge                         27\n\n\n   CHAPTER IV\n   Italian Poetry in the Poems of Browning.\n\n     I. General Statement                                      29\n    II. Predominance in Early Poems                            29\n   III. Sordello                                               30\n    IV. The Imaginary Poets                                    30\n     V. The Italian as the Type of Failure                     31\n    VI. Italian Men of Letters: Dante                          32\n   VII. Other Real Writers                                     33\n  VIII. Browning\u2019s Knowledge of Italian Literature             33\n    IX. Browning\u2019s Interest in Italian Literature              34\n\n\n   CHAPTER V\n   Italian Architecture in the Poems of Browning.\n\n     I. General Statement                                      35\n    II. Source of Browning\u2019s Knowledge                         36\n   III. Importance of Architecture in the Poems                37\n    IV. Comparison with Other Writers                          38\n     V. Architecture and Personality                           39\n\n\n   CHAPTER VI\n   Italian Painting in the Poems of Browning.\n\n     I. General Statement                                      40\n    II. Extent of Browning\u2019s Knowledge                         40\n   III. Irregular Distribution of References                   41\n    IV. Sources of the Poems                                   42\n     V. Poetic Functions of the References to Painting         44\n    VI. Conformity to History                                  47\n\n\n   CHAPTER VII\n   General Comparisons: Browning and the Fine Arts of Italy.\n\n     I. Poetic Function and Method                             48\n    II. Amount of Material Used from Each of the Fine Arts     49\n   III. Personality and the Arts                               52\n    IV. Browning as the Poet of Humanity                       54\n\n\n   APPENDIX\n\n     I. Poems Containing Reference to Italian Art              55\n    II. Tabulation of References to Individual Arts:\n          Sculpture                                            56\n          Music                                                58\n          Poetry                                               60\n          Architecture                                         61\n          Painting                                             66\n\n  Index                                                        75\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nBROWNING\u2019S GENERAL INTEREST IN ART.\n\n\nI. SUBJECT MATTER OF BROWNING\u2019S POEMS.--Three prominent facts\nconcerning the subjects of Browning\u2019s poetry are: the comparative\ninsignificance of nature, the extensive treatment of art, and the\npredominance of the human soul. Only a few poems contain any extended\nreference to nature; and where such reference is found, nature is\nusually treated, as in _By the Fireside_, for its effect on human\nbeings, and the soul still remains the dominant subject. Nature for\nits own sake is never a supreme concern. It is never considered as\na primary moral force, akin to a personality, as in Wordsworth. The\nloveliness of nature is never personified for the sake of its own\nsensuous beauty, as in Keats or Shelley. _Pauline_, a youthful effort\nof which Browning later became ashamed, was written under the influence\nof Shelley, and approaches the style of that poet in the prominence\nand beauty of its nature descriptions; but no such examples of pure\nnature descriptions are found in Browning\u2019s mature work. Several\nof the well-known longer poems--_Pippa Passes_, _Christmas-Eve and\nEaster-Day_, _The Flight of the Duchess_, for example--as well as\nother shorter lyrical poems, contain the nature element; but it is\ncomparatively slight, and usually introduced for harmony, for contrast,\nor to give a mere unshaded background for the characters.\n\nConcerning the predominance of the soul in Browning, every critic of\nthe poet has written. It does not seem necessary to repeat any of this\nfamiliar criticism here. However, the emphasis placed upon personality\nand the soul does have a bearing on the discussion of Italian arts and\nartists as found in Browning. For personality is the dominant factor\nbehind Browning\u2019s selection and treatment of the Italian arts. Those\narts in which personality is strongest he uses most. The poems having\nsome one of the arts as a main theme usually had their origin in an\ninterest aroused by some unique personality. Some further discussions\nof the relations of art and personality will be found in each of the\nfive following chapters devoted to the individual arts; and more\nextended discussion is given in the general summary of Chapter VII.\n\nConcerning Browning\u2019s treatment of art, numerous articles have been\nwritten; but they are limited for the most part to consideration\nof one art or one poem. Browning, however, is the poet not of any\none art but of art in general and of all the arts. Throughout life\nhe was interested in more than one art and in spite of the seeming\nimprobability of his ever having had serious doubts on the subject, it\nis stated[163] that he was long undecided whether to become a poet,\na musician, or a painter. He might, says his biographer, have become\nan artist and perhaps a great one, because of his brilliant general\nability and his special gifts.\n\n\nII. INTEREST IN MUSIC.--As a child, Browning received a musical\neducation and became a pianist of some ability. His appreciation of\nmusic was further cultivated, during his young manhood, by attendance\nat the best concerts and operas which London afforded. Beethoven seems\nto be the composer mentioned most frequently in biographical sketches\nand in his letters, a fact which may indicate his preference in music.\nDuring the latter years of his married life, according to letters by\nMrs. Browning, he took charge of the musical education given to their\nson, Wiedemann. So far as appreciation of Italian music and attendance\nat concerts in Italy are concerned, he seems to have been little\ninterested. But again in the years following 1873, while Browning was\nin London, he was in frequent attendance at musical concerts. His\ninterest in music, then, was no intermittent fancy. It was constant and\nabove the average. If any further proof of his interest in music were\nneeded, it is found in the influence of that interest upon his poems;\nfor they show a finer appreciation of music and a greater knowledge of\nits technique than those of any other writer.\n\n\nIII. RELATION TO PAINTING.--A knowledge of painting and a liking for\nit as well, were cultivated in Browning\u2019s earliest years, through the\nmedium of the Dulwich Gallery. Though it is probably impossible to\ntrace the exact influence of this gallery on his writings, it may be\nsuggested as the source of references to Italian art before his visits\nto Italy, and as the original stimulus of his interest in the subject.\nAt least, the Dulwich Gallery was only a pleasant walk from his home,\nand there his father constantly took him.[164] There \u201che became\nfamiliar with the names of the great painters and learned something\nabout their works. Later he became a familiar figure in one or two\nLondon studios.\u201d\n\nWhatever the cause of a certain decline of interest in painting\nprevious to 1841 may have been, that decline was of short duration.\nProbably it was due to the increasing attention he was giving to\npoetry as a serious occupation. When he began to feel himself better\nestablished in his poetical career, he returned to his interest in the\nsister art. A letter which he wrote to Miss Haworth (probably in 1841)\nsays that he is coming to love painting again as he did once in earlier\nyears. In the same letter he speaks of his early efforts at the age of\ntwo years and three months, and characterizes himself as a wonderful\npainter in his childhood; but he adds, \u201cas eleven out of every twelve\nof us are.\u201d Such a remark, while it shows an early interest in art, and\nindicates that his fond relatives may have considered him a youthful\nprodigy in art, as fond relatives have a habit of doing on slight\npremises, implies that he himself did not consider his artistic ability\nseriously.\n\nBrowning\u2019s interest in painting, as well as in sculpture, was retained\nthroughout his life. On September 19, 1846, Mr. and Mrs. Robert\nBrowning set sail for Italy; and from that time on, the wife\u2019s letters\nare full of references to her husband\u2019s interest in art. In a letter\nfrom Pisa dated November 5, 1846, she says she means to know something\nof pictures; for Robert does, and he will open her eyes for her.\nHere at Pisa, she continues, the first steps in art, for her, are\nto be taken. A letter dated October 1, 1847, mentions their friend,\nMr. Powers, the American sculptor. Mr. Story, another sculptor; Mr.\nKirkup, the art connoisseur; Fredrick Leighton; a French sculptress\nnamed Mme. de Fauveau; Gibson; Page; a Mr. Fisher, who was painting the\nportraits of Mr. Browning and Wiedemann; Mr. Wilde, an American artist;\nand Harriet Hosmer--all these artists are named as acquaintances of\nthe literary Brownings who were stay-at-home people in Florence. Many\nletters also mention trips to certain places where individual pictures\nwere seen, such as \u201ca divine picture of Guercino\u201d (August 1848),\nDomenichino\u2019s \u201cDavid\u201d at Fano (August, 1848), and the works of Guido\nReni, Da Vinci, the Carracci, and Correggio.\n\nAlthough Browning never had a course of thorough instruction in art,\nhe gave some attention to drawing during the reaction from literary\nwork that followed the publication of _Men and Women_, in 1855. A\nletter from Mrs. Browning to her old friend, Mrs. Jameson, dated May 2,\n1856, gives the story. After thirteen days application on the part of\nher husband, she tells us, he produced some really astonishingly good\ncopies of heads, though his purpose was only to fill in the pause in\nhis literary career. Then Mrs. Browning adds: \u201cAnd really, with all his\nfeeling and knowledge of art, some of the mechanical trick of it can\nnot be out of place.\u201d\n\n\nIV. RELATION TO SCULPTURE.--A similar though less conspicuous interest\nin sculpture[165] was maintained through Browning\u2019s entire career. The\nfirst mention of it in either letters or poems is found in a letter of\n1838, to Miss Haworth, in which the statement concerning Canova implies\ndisappointment and previous expectation. _Sordello_, 1840, contains the\nfirst reference found in a poem; and from that time on, some references\nare found with a considerable degree of regularity in both poems and\nletters. While the interest was not great compared with that taken in\npainting, it was fairly continuous. No mention of Italian sculpture is\nfound in the poems of Browning after the publication of _The Ring and\nthe Book_, in 1868-9; though references to the art of Greece, the great\nhome of sculpture, occur frequently.\n\nIn 1860, a letter from Mrs. Browning says that her husband has begun\nmodeling under the direction of Mr. Story at his studio. She speaks of\nhis progress, of his turning his studies in anatomy to account, and of\nthe fact that he had already copied two busts--those of young Augustus,\nand of Psyche. At this time he was working six hours a day at modeling.\n\u201cHis habit,\u201d says Mrs. Browning, \u201cwas to work by fits and starts\u201d; and\nas in the case of drawing, he had undertaken work in sculpture until\nhis mind should be ready again for poetical work.\n\n\nV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRECEDING SECTIONS.--Many other statements\nshowing an appreciation of the arts are found in the biographies and\nletters of the Brownings. Of these, some details will be mentioned\nlater, in connection with the treatment of each separate art. Only such\nfacts have been noted here as tend to establish the basis on which our\ndiscussion is built--namely, that Browning had a great and continuous\ninterest in the fine arts and that it is only reasonable to expect a\nconsiderable amount of knowledge and appreciation of them to appear in\nhis writings. Our final conclusions will concern _personality_ as the\nsource of Browning\u2019s interest in the arts.\n\n\nVI. TIME SPENT IN ITALY.--The amount of time spent by Robert Browning\nin Italy is a further reason for expecting Italian art themes in his\nwritings. In 1838, at the age of twenty-six, he made his first trip to\nItaly; and in 1844 he was again there, from August or September until\nDecember. In 1846, Robert and Elizabeth Barrett Browning went to Italy\nto live, and excepting intervals for trips to France and England, were\nthere until the death of the latter in 1861. For several years after\nthis, Browning spent most of his time in England. In 1878, however, he\nreturned to Northern Italy; and of his eleven remaining years, seven\nautumns were spent in Venice, until his death there in 1889.\n\n\nVII. ENGLISH KNOWLEDGE OF ITALIAN ART IN BROWNING\u2019S TIME.--In spite of\nthe fact that Browning spent so much time in Italy, the space given\nto Italian art in his poems is remarkable because so little was known\nof that subject in England at that time. Vasari\u2019s rambling, gossipy,\nand sometimes inaccurate biographies may have been known in England at\nthis time. Even if so, Browning, at least, seems not to have become\nacquainted with them until the years of his residence in Italy; for a\nletter written in 1847 by Mrs. Browning to Horne, says that they are\nengaged in reading Vasari.\n\nDuring the nineteenth century, the history of art began to assume a\nmore important place as a distinct branch of general history. The\ncentury was well advanced, however, when the first complete work in\nthis subject appeared--Kugler\u2019s _Handbook of the History of Art_.\nIt was not translated from the German until 1855, when the part\nreferring to Italy was published in an English translation by Sir\nCharles Eastlake. (Many of Browning\u2019s best art poems were published\nin 1855, and some of them previous to that time.) Taking this work\nas the beginning of modern treatment of art history, and noting the\nfact that the next work of importance referring to Italian art\nalone and treating it from the historical standpoint was published\nby Crowe and Cavalcaselle in 1876, it is evident that nothing like\nthe present general knowledge of it could have existed in England in\nBrowning\u2019s time. Certainly this makes his treatment of art history,\nparticularly the facility with which he presents the tendencies of\ndifferent periods, more remarkable than similar attainment would be in\nmore recent times. Even with the added knowledge resulting from recent\ninvestigations, no other writer has been able to produce such perfect\npoems of the musician or the painter as Browning has built about Fra\nLippo Lippi, or the Italian by adoption, Abt Vogler.[166]\n\n\nVIII. NON-ENGLISH THEMES AND SETTINGS IN GENERAL.--The Italian\nelement is only one result, though a very significant result, of a\ngeneral tendency on the part of Browning to choose poetic subjects of\nnon-English character. From the Orient,[167] from Greece,[168] from\nFrance,[169] from any region, in fact, which pleased his fancy, however\nremote, he levied his contributions. With this general non-English\ntendency, it is not surprising that in Italy, where he spent so much\ntime, he found material for every sort of poem from _Fra Lippo Lippi_\nto _Luria_ and _The Ring and the Book_, and that he should shape his\nmaterial into poems with much of the atmosphere of Italy, the home of\nthe arts.\n\n\nIX. A QUANTITATIVE STATEMENT.--As a matter of fact, the supposition\nthat Browning\u2019s poetry embodies a large amount of Italian art reference\nis correct. Forty-nine poems out of two hundred and twenty-two, or more\nthan one-fifth of the entire number, have some mention of one or more\nof the arts or artists of Italy, while other poems deal with the arts\nof other nations or with a general comparison of the arts.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nITALIAN SCULPTURE IN THE POEMS OF BROWNING.\n\n\nI. GENERAL STATEMENT.--While forty-nine out of a total of two hundred\ntwenty-two poems by Robert Browning refer to some one of the five fine\narts--sculpture, music, poetry, architecture, and painting--only eight\nmention sculpture; and the references in these poems are comparatively\ninsignificant. No one poem deals with sculpture as a theme, nor does\nany sculptor express his views of the art in dramatic monologue, as\nAbt Vogler does for music, and Fra Lippo Lippi for painting. Reasons\nfor the preponderance of the other arts will be discussed later, in\nconnection with further suggestions concerning personality and its\nrelations to art in Browning\u2019s poetry.\n\nIt is often difficult to estimate separately Browning\u2019s treatment of\nsculpture and painting, since he discusses the two arts together in\nseveral of his poems (for example, _Old Pictures in Florence_) and\nsince many important Italian artists were both painters and sculptors.\nHowever, the predominant art of the man in question, or the art which\nBrowning emphasizes most in connection with him, has been taken as\na basis for classification. Estimating in this manner, one finds\nthat the poet refers, in the eight poems, to seven artists--Niccolo\nPisano and Giovanni Pisano, Canova, Ghiberti, Giovanni da Bologna,\nBaccio Bandinelli and Bernini--all of historical interest. Claus\nof Innsbruck (in _My Last Duchess_), and Jules (in _Pippa Passes_)\nwith his companion art students, are purely imaginary. Reference is\nmade to seven historical works of sculpture: the Psiche-fanciulla\nand Piet\u00e0 of Canova, the statue of Duke Ferdinand, John of the\nBlack Bands, Pasquin\u2019s statue, the Fountain of the Tritons, and the\nBocca-dell\u2019-Verit\u00e0. Three fictitious pieces of sculpture which are\nnamed are also introduced, besides a number of imaginary unnamed works.\n\nSuch references to sculpture as exist in the poems seem to conform\nentirely to the facts of history, where there is any pretense of\nhistorical accuracy. Sculpture is so unimportant a feature of most of\nthe poems that there was certainly very little temptation to enlarge on\nthe facts for dramatic purposes, or for any other reason.\n\n\nII. HISTORICAL SCOPE.--It is improbable that Browning consciously,\nor unconsciously either, for that matter, decided to treat different\nperiods of sculpture until he had covered the historical field, or that\nhe ever selected any one phase of this art with so general a purpose in\nmind. In certain cases he chose some event or characteristic feature of\na period, and before he had finished the poem referred to a sculptor,\nor to the condition of the art at that time, as one of the details in\na realistic background for his picture of the times. Nevertheless he\nhas accomplished, without any definite purpose, a result similar to a\nbrief historical survey of sculpture in Italy; his references showing\nrelation to practically every important period of the art.\n\nThe first reference to sculpture is in _Sordello_ (1840), where the\nlines concerning the Pisani (Book I, l. 574) characterize the art of\nSordello\u2019s time as just dawning into the Renaissance. In _Pippa Passes_\n(1841) the poet, passing over something like five hundred years\u2019\ndevelopment, brings before the reader a picture of nineteenth century\nart life among students in Italy. _My Last Duchess_ (1842) deals with\nthe decadent Renaissance, while _The Bishop orders his Tomb at St.\nPraxed\u2019s Church_ (1845) presents a faithful picture of the same period.\nIn _Christmas-Eve and Easter-Day_ (1850), the pendulum swings backward\nto the early days of Christianity, when the church Fathers abhorred the\nphysical beauty of their art inheritance from Greece. _The Statue and\nthe Bust_ (1855) relates events of the sixteenth century also; but they\nare such as have no historical significance in a chronological way, and\ncould just as readily have happened in the thirteenth or the nineteenth\ncentury. _Old Pictures in Florence_ (1855) has the early masters as its\ntheme, with another reference to Niccolo Pisano, the first Renaissance\nsculptor, though the poem concerns itself mainly with architecture and\npainters. _The Ring and the Book_ (1868-69) can hardly be said to deal\nwith any particular period in art history.\n\nChronological order is not followed, nor is there any reason in the\nlogic or emotion of poetry why such order should obtain. Whether one\ndenies or affirms on the question of poetical inspiration, one is\ncompelled to admit that the practice in the past has not been to follow\nset formulas of time or place. No poet, unless it be a pedantic one\nwhose work would fail utterly in spontaneity, would read history and\nwrite a poem on each period as he read.\n\nThe diagram below indicates that Browning\u2019s work was no exception to\nthe normal procedure.\n\n\n  1. Early Art........................e......\n  2. Dawn of Renaissance...a........./.\\...g.\n  3. Height of Renaissance..\\......./...\\f/..\n  4. Decadent Renaissance....\\..c__/d........\n  5. Modern..................b\\/.............\n\n\n    a. _Sordello_--1840.\n    b. _Pippa Passes_--1841.\n    c. _My Last Duchess_--1842.\n    d. _The Bishop orders his Tomb_--1845.\n    e. _Christmas-Eve and Easter-Day_--1850.\n    f. _The Statue and the Bust_--1855.\n    g. _Old Pictures in Florence_--1855.\n\n\nIII. POETIC FUNCTIONS OF THE REFERENCES TO SCULPTURE.--Of the function\nof portraying the times, _Sordello_ gives an example. Browning became\ninterested in the thirteenth-century troubadour, and then in his\nhistorical surroundings. In working out the social medium in which\nSordello was to live and move, Browning named the Pisan Brothers to\nillustrate the sculptural conditions at the time--one of those numerous\nsmall details of which the ordinary reader is scarcely conscious, which\nare yet extremely important in making a perfect word picture. He spoke\nof Sordello as--\n\n                        ... \u201cBorn just now,\n    With the new century, beside the glow\n    And efflorescence out of barbarism;\n    Witness a Greek or two from the abysm\n    That stray through Florence-town with studious air,\n    Calming the chisel of that Pisan pair:\n    If Nicolo should carve a Christus yet!\u201d\n\nWhile the entire passage is carefully subordinated to the main purpose\nof studying Sordello, it also clearly pictures the dawn of the\nRenaissance light upon sculpture.\n\n_The Bishop orders his Tomb at St. Praxed\u2019s Church_, and _My Last\nDuchess_, deal with characteristics of their times; but in neither\ncase is sculpture used as a mere detail in the picture. Because of the\nextensive art treatment in each, the two will be discussed together\nunder the head of Renaissance decadence.[170]\n\nBesides being important enough in itself to deserve somewhat extensive\ntreatment, the art element in _Pippa Passes_ is notable because it\nmarks the only instance in which Browning concerns himself with the\nlife of modern art students. He certainly did did not begin the poem\nwith the intention of making the artists a theme, nor did he attain\nany such unexpected result. Instead he began with the thematic idea\nof the power in unconscious influence, and through four sections of\nthis dramatic poem developed this idea by recording the effects of the\nsong of Pippa, upon murderers, an art student, a fanatical patriot\nand a scheming bishop. About one-fourth of the poem deals directly\nwith the student life of artists. Canova, who is frequently mentioned,\nrepresents the ideal of sculpture; and Jules, the young student who is\nseeking to attain. In contrast to Jules, the idealist, is the group\nof evil-minded students who induce him to marry a model, under the\nimpression that she is a cultured Greek woman. It is Browning\u2019s best\nexample of the \u201cother side,\u201d as illustrated by the group of plotting\nwould-be artists. This is the only example in all of Browning\u2019s poetry\n(with the exception of _A Soul\u2019s Tragedy_) in which the poet descends\nto the level of prose as a medium of speech, and here it is used by\nknaves and villains. All the crude reality of life among low-minded\nstudents, their jealousy of one with higher ideals than their own, the\npoet gives us in detail by means of their prose speeches; returning to\nblank verse, however, for the ideals of Jules and the aspirations of\nPhene\u2019s awakening soul. Love of personality, that great guide to the\nappreciation of Browning from whatever position we approach him, and\nthe possibilities of human development, are written large throughout\nhis works. Nowhere are these ideas in relation to art more clearly\nexpressed than in the words of Jules. An artist of the highest ideals,\nhe has just realized through the singing of Pippa, that a woman\u2019s soul\nis in his keeping. He meditates:\n\n    \u201cShall to produce form out of unshaped stuff\n    Be Art--and further, to evoke a soul\n    From form be nothing? This new soul is mine!\u201d\n\nThen, since art is the expression of personality, and Jules has met\nwith so great a change in ideals, he resolves to break his \u2018paltry\nmodels up To begin Art afresh.\u2019 His change in personality, it should\nbe noticed, is due to the fact that he realizes the soul has greater\nsignificance than art--an idea exactly expressing Browning\u2019s view.\n\n_My Last Duchess_ (1842) is entirely imaginary, but it sums up, in a\nshort poem, the entire decadent Renaissance attitude toward art so\nfully that no historical names could improve it. Its one mention of\nsculpture is in the closing lines:\n\n    .  .  .  .  . \u201cNotice Neptune, though,\n    Taming a sea-horse, thought a rarity,\n    Which Claus of Innsbruck cast in bronze for me!\u201d\n\nIn two and one-half lines it gives a powerful suggestion of admiration\nfor art because it was fashionable, of emphasis on technique rather\nthan content, of the classical subject matter and bronze material\nthat were in vogue at the time, and of the character expressed in the\nintellectual but heartless Duke\u2019s purpose of taming the Duchess.\n\n_The Bishop orders his Tomb at St. Praxed\u2019s Church_ (1845) is imaginary\nin its narrative, and probably in all the sculpture named, though the\nchurch of Santa Prassede, in Rome, by its richness of decoration, and\nby a tomb similar to the one the Bishop is represented as desiring,\ngave the suggestion for the poem. Probably in all literature there is\nno more skilful summary of a corrupt churchman\u2019s attitude toward his\nchurch, his fellow churchmen, the future, earthly love, and art. The\ncharacterization is both fearless and powerful. This poem and _My Last\nDuchess_ are companion studies. Both the Duke and the Bishop are fond\nof power and prestige, both are jealous and envious, each displays his\nattitude toward woman and toward art. The Bishop has more feeling,\nthough it is largely feeling for himself; and the Duke possesses more\nicy pride. Each values art, particularly sculpture, as something for\ndisplay, something luxurious and (contrary to the highest ideas of art)\nsomething beyond the power of common people to appreciate. The poems\ndeal with the same period, but _My Last Duchess_ is a summary of the\nsecular attitude, _The Bishop orders his Tomb_ presents the view of an\nofficial of the church.\n\n_Christmas-Eve and Easter-Day_ (1850), in a section devoted to the\nreverie of the seeker for religious truth after his inspection of\nCatholicism at Rome, censures the attitude of the early church toward\nthe physical beauty of the statuary Italy had inherited from Greece.\nWhile the subject of the poem is religion, not art, incidentally it\ncontains one of Browning\u2019s best defences of the nude. He viewed the\nnude as a fitting expression of the beauty God has placed in the world,\nand rejoiced in the \u201cnoble daring, steadfast duty, The heroic in\naction or in passion,\u201d or even the merely beautiful physique--all as\npresented in sculpture. In Chapter VI will be found further mention of\nthe nude, in connection with _Francis Furini_ (1887).[171] _The Lady\nand the Painter_, a non-Italianate poem, published in the Asolando\ngroup (1889), also throws further light on Browning\u2019s attitude toward\nthe nude. These two poems are of interest in the present discussion,\nhowever, only because they prove the attitude expressed in 1850 to have\nbeen a permanent one.\n\nIn _The Statue and the Bust_, the art references were not introduced\nfor their own sake, but because they suggested a situation with\ndramatic possibilities. The statue of Duke Ferdinand exists as Browning\npictured it. The bust seems to be an addition for poetic purposes, but\nit conforms to the spirit of the palace decorations, in that it was\nmade of Robbia ware, for traces of that material still adorned the\npalace when the poem was written.\n\nIn _Sordello_ (1840), the first poem containing any reference to\nItalian sculpture, the castle of Goito, the early home of Sordello,\nis rich in sculpturesque effects. \u201cThose slim pillars, ... Cut like\na company of palms--Some knot of bacchanals, flushed cheek combined\nWith straining forehead, shoulders purpled--A dullish grey-streaked\ncumbrous font ... shrinking Caryatides, Of just-tinged marble--\u201d all\npresent a physical setting. They do more, however, than merely locate.\nTheir lonely magnificence harmonizes with the tone of the story, and\nthey exercise an influence on the nature of the dreaming, beauty-loving\nSordello.\n\nThe best examples of sculpture used purely for setting are found\nin _The Ring and the Book_. Containing only its few references to\npieces of sculpture in Florence and Rome, it is the one of the list\nof poems in which this art is least prominent. It presents no picture\nof a period, no discussion of an attitude toward art, no poetical\nbackground of the times aided by art references. Each instance tells\nus that at such-and-such a place in Rome, in sight of the statue\nnamed, a certain event occurred. \u201cToward Baccio\u2019s Marble\u201d (Part I, l.\n44) is used to help locate the Florentine book-stall where Browning\nfound the \u2018old yellow book\u2019 that became the basis of the poem. Part\nI, l. 889, quotes an example of the current gossip in Rome, as taking\nplace \u201ci\u2019 the market-place O\u2019 the Barberini by the Capucins; Where\nthe old Triton ... Puffs up steel sleet.\u201d This instance serves as\nsetting, and further, in a continuation of the description--\u201cout o\u2019\nthe way O\u2019 the motley merchandising multitude\u201d--contrasts the quiet,\nregular play of the fountain to the turmoil of the characters. Part\nVI refers to Pasquin\u2019s statue in a double comparison which emphasizes\nPompilia\u2019s innocence in contrast to the bestiality of the squibs that\nwere formerly posted on the statue. In Part XI Guido says his first\nsight of an instrument for beheading was \u2018At the Mouth-of-Truth o\u2019 the\nriver-side you know, Retiring out of noisy crowded Rome\u2019--a reference\nwhich serves as a definite means of location.\n\nYet all instances from _The Ring and the Book_ prove little concerning\nBrowning\u2019s interest in art, or his specialized attention to sculpture.\nThe fact that pieces of statuary serve a man as landmarks in Florence\nor Rome implies little beyond an effort at clearness in location. _The\nRing and the Book_, then, in sculpture, is interesting rather for\nabsence than for presence of such references. In fact sculpture is\nnot prominent in the Italian art references of Browning. Not only is\nit a lesser art quantitatively in Browning\u2019s poetry, but it seems to\nbe placed on a distinctly lower plane. Reasons for these facts, are,\nin part, the predominance of the other arts over sculpture in Italy,\nand the particular quality of sculpture as an art which makes it tend\ntoward the expression of physical beauty instead of the soul.\n\nThough Browning himself did some work in modeling,[172] he used very\nfew technical terms connected with that art. Since he never put a\nsculptor speaker on the stage of his poet-world, one does not expect to\nhear the language of that art spoken. The Duke and the Bishop, it is\ntrue, express considerable interest in art, though it is rather in the\ndilettante spirit than that of serious criticism. \u201cCaryatides,\u201d used in\n_Sordello_, and \u201ccaritellas,\u201d evidently used for cartellas[173] seem\nto be almost the only instances of technical--or semi-technical--terms\nconnected with sculpture.\n\n\nIV. SOURCE OF BROWNING\u2019S KNOWLEDGE.--Proof has already been given of\nthe statement that Browning had a strong, lasting interest in the\narts, even before he went to Italy. The remark in the letter to Miss\nHaworth (1838) concerning disappointment in Canova, implying previous\nknowledge, was written during his first visit to Italy. It is certain,\nthen, that he had formed an opinion of one Italian sculptor before\ngoing to that country. Probably some of his knowledge of sculpture\nwas gained from reading, also. In every case in which he described a\nparticular piece of work, he had previously visited the place where\nit was located. _Sordello_, while it refers to artists rather than\nparticular works, and exhibits an art knowledge that was probably\ngained from reading, was published two years after Browning\u2019s first\nItalian visit in 1838. _Pippa Passes_ (1841) was one of the direct\nresults of the same trip, when Venice and delicious Asolo were visited.\n_My Last Duchess_ contains none but imaginary works. _The Bishop orders\nhis Tomb_ (1845) has its architectural setting at Rome, one of the\npoints included in Browning\u2019s second visit in 1844. _Christmas-Eve\nand Easter-Day_ (1850) also mentions Rome. _The Statue and the Bust_\n(1855) refers to Florence, _Old Pictures in Florence_ (1855) has the\nsame setting; and _The Ring and the Book_ (1868-9) refers to Rome and\nFlorence, visited in 1844 and 1847. These data all tend to support\nthe foregoing statement that the poet had seen the things of which he\nwrote.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nITALIAN MUSIC IN THE POEMS OF BROWNING.\n\n\nI. GENERAL STATEMENT.--Only ten poems refer to Italian music or\nmusicians--seemingly a small number for a writer who is known as\nthe musician\u2019s poet. Thirteen Italian musicians--Bellini, Galuppi,\nPalestrina, Verdi, Rossini, Abt Vogler, Grisi, Corelli, Guarnerius,\nStradivarius, Paganini, Buononcini, and Geminiani--constitute the group\nof performers whom he mentions. Four of these were famous violinists;\none was a vocalist. Only two, Galuppi and Abt Vogler, received any\nextended treatment, though an entire poem is also devoted to Master\nHugues of Saxe-Gotha, an imaginary composer. There are many references\nto musicians of other nationalities in Browning; but every poem having\nthis art as its main theme, unless it be _Saul_, in which the influence\nof music is prominent, is included among the ten referring to Italy.\n\nThus while Browning is known, even to the general mind, as a poet who\nwrites about musicians, his fame in this particular field is founded on\na very few well-known poems. Suppose it were possible to eliminate _Abt\nVogler_ from the text of Browning\u2019s poetry and from the consciousness\nof the world. Would the cursory student then know him as the celebrator\nof music? Or at least, if one could filch from the human race both _Abt\nVogler_ and _A Toccata of Galuppi\u2019s_, their author might still be known\nin the popular mind as an admirer of the arts, but hardly as a devotee\nof music. Quality rather than quantity, then, is the measure of the\nelement of music in the poems of Robert Browning.\n\n\nII. CATHOLIC HYMNS.--A by no means unusual introduction of music, nor\none peculiar to Browning (see Byron and others) is found in the mention\nof Catholic hymns. However, they are not employed in any of the poems\nwhose principal theme is music, nor are they introduced because he\ndeliberately wished to write about that art. They form a part of the\nItalian consciousness; they are stages in daily life; and they mark the\npassing of time in a highly poetic way, and in a method characteristic\nof the Italian nation.\n\n_The Ring and the Book_, in five of the twelve sections, includes\nthe names of Catholic hymns. In Part IV the _Magnificat_ signifies\nthe triumphant spirit of Violante Comparini, the old woman who has\ncompleted the bargain by means of which she is to trick her husband\ninto the belief that he is to have an heir. The same section gives\nan account of the plan of Pietro and Violante Comparini to find a\ntitled husband for their so-called daughter, and illustrates the\nsituation in these words--\u201cAnd when such paragon was found and fixed,\nWhy, they might chant their \u2018_Nunc dimittis_\u2019 straight.\u201d Both of\nthese passages, then, mark psychological states, in one or both of\nthe parents of Pompilia. Section VI, the defense of Caponsacchi,\ncontains two references which mark the time of day. The first, in a\nquotation from one of the forged letters purporting to be from Pompilia\nto Caponsacchi, suggests that he come to her window at the time of\nthe _Ave_. The second, in the account of the flight of Pompilia and\nCaponsacchi to Rome, is phrased \u201cAt eve we heard the _angelus_,\u201d\nindicating time and suggesting, also, a certain regret for the past on\nthe part of Pompilia. In Section VII, Pompilia, yielding at last to\nher own desires for rescue and to the importunities of her treacherous\nmaid, names the _Ave Maria_ to indicate the time when she will be\nstanding on the terrace to talk with Caponsacchi. The Pope, in Section\nX, gives his opinion of what will be said of his leniency to the\nchurch, should he free Caponsacchi, and sarcastically observes \u201cin the\nchoir _Sanctus et Benedictus_, with a brush Of soft guitar strings\nthat obey the thumb.\u201d Section XII, in describing the death of Guido,\nthe wife-murderer, gives his last words as a request for a _Pater_, an\n_Ave_, with the hymn _Salve Regina C\u0153li_. This completes the list of\nCatholic hymns mentioned by Browning--six in all.\n\n\nIII. POETIC FUNCTIONS OF THE REFERENCES TO MUSIC.--Six different poems\ncontain the names of Italian musicians for purposes of comparison. _The\nEnglishman in Italy_, in an implied comparison, contrasts the fiddlers,\nfifers, and drummers, at the Feast of the Rosary\u2019s Virgin, to Bellini.\nSo courageous and confident do they become on this day that (implying\ntheir inferiority) they play boldly on, says the poem, not caring even\nfor the great Bellini.\n\n_Bishop Blougram\u2019s Apology_ presents that politic churchman\u2019s\ndefense of his fidelity to established doctrines on the ground of\nexpediency--ease in this life and a possible reward in the next. He\nadmits that wise men look beneath his pretense of a belief in the\nwinking Virgin and class him as either knave or fool. In this respect\nthe Bishop likens himself to Verdi at the close of his worst opera.\nThough the populace applauded, the composer looked beyond them for the\njudgment of Rossini, the master.\n\nIn _Youth and Art_, the struggling girl with aspirations for operatic\nhonors, who misses a possibility for happiness in her futile quest for\nfame, compares herself with Grisi in her hopes of success. To surpass\nthat prima donna, which, by the way, she never succeeds in doing,\nconstitutes the height of her dream of happiness. _Red Cotton Night-Cap\nCountry_, with its fantastic symbolism of night-caps, mentions the many\nvarieties of that article and compares them to the various kinds of\nviolins on exhibition at Kensington when the poem was composed, with\nspecial reference to those of Italy:\n\n    \u201cI doubt not there be duly catalogued\n    Achievements all, and some of Italy,\n    Guarnerius, Straduarius,--old and new.\u201d\n\n           *       *       *       *       *\n\n    \u201cOver this sample would Corelli croon,\n    Grieving by minors, like the cushat-dove,\n    Most dulcet Giga, dreamiest Saraband.\n    From this did Paganini comb the fierce\n    Electric sparks....\u201d\n\n_Parleyings with Charles Avison_, the only poem which has comparative\nestimates of different musicians, names the Italians Buononcini and\nGeminiani as having been appreciated along with Wagner, Dvorak, Liszt\nand Handel. It is worthy of note that Rossini, Bellini, and Verdi, of\nthe modern Italian school, are not mentioned in any such connection.\n\n_Abt Vogler_, _A Toccata of Galuppi\u2019s_, _Master Hughes of Saxe-Gotha_,\nand _Charles Avison_, are all concerned with music as the principal\nsubject. Each has minor references to Italy, and in the first two,\nthe musician is an Italian one. _Abt Vogler_ is probably the finest\npoem on music in the English language. It contains a perfect idealized\nexpression of the aims of the musician and a thorough knowledge\nof his technique. Like _A Toccata of Galuppi\u2019s_ it is based on\nextemporization and the transitory quality of music; but it is unlike\nthat poem in emphasizing the permanence of good. _Abt Vogler_ voices\nthe musician\u2019s own musings on the stately but vanishing castle he\nhas built. _A Toccata_ probably refers to an improvization on the\nharpsichord, a frequent occurrence at the time concerned, and presents\nthe poet as speaker, questioning the musician concerning the effect\nof his performance on the audience. Very different psychological\nstates produced these two poems. _Abt Vogler_ was written in a mood\nof reverent optimism; _A Toccata_, in a mood of half careless, half\nearnest pessimism. Where _A Toccata_ closes with \u201cdust and ashes\u201d\nthe other poem passes on to the \u201cineffable name,\u201d and a belief in\nthe future existence of \u201cAll we have willed, or hoped, or dreamed,\nof good.\u201d The one closes hope in the grave; the other poem opens\nheaven. The transitory quality of human life in _A Toccata of\nGaluppi\u2019s_ accords with the music being played, and many terms, such\nas \u201clesser thirds,\u201d \u201csixths diminished,\u201d \u201csuspensions,\u201d \u201csolutions,\u201d\n\u201ccommiserating sevenths,\u201d express the different phases of the\nlistener\u2019s mood.\n\nNo attempt will be made in this paper to consider Browning\u2019s musical\nterms; for with the exception of \u201ctoccata\u201d, meaning a light touch\npiece, an overture, they seem mostly non-Italianate. _Abt Vogler_, _A\nToccata of Galuppi\u2019s_, _Master Hugues of Saxe-Gotha_, and _Parleyings\nwith Charles Avison_, all contain a considerable number of musical\nterms; but beside the fact that they are non-Italianate, those in\nat least part of the poems have already been discussed somewhat\nextensively in various articles among the Browning Society papers.\n\n\nIV. LACK OF MODERN ITALIAN REFERENCES.--The number of references to\nItalian musicians is comparatively small, even though the treatment\nof music in a few poems is unexcelled. Especially when one considers\nthat the great modern group of Italian opera composers was so near\nBrowning in both time and place, his mention of them seems curiously\ninsignificant. Verdi, the greatest of them, appears in the poems only\nonce, and then in connection with his worst opera. That the Brownings\nheard at least one of Verdi\u2019s operas produced, is established by a\nletter by Mrs. Browning dated in 1853. She speaks of their having heard\n_Il Trovatore_ a few nights previous, at the Pergola in Florence, and\nconcludes with the peculiarly suggestive remark, \u201cVery passionate and\ndramatic, surely.\u201d\n\nProbably there are several reasons for this neglect of Italian opera\ncomposers. Few poets, least of all Browning, are prone to bestow\nunmitigated praise on contemporaries. In the poems of Browning there\nare few extended references to any artists who were living at the\ntime. He particularly loved to choose an obscure Galuppi, or an Andrea\ndel Sarto, instead of a Michael Angelo or a Raphael, as a personality\nabout whom to weave a poem. A more potent reason for the indifference\nto modern Italian music, however, lies in the diverging values of the\nItalian school and that of northern Europe. A musician who had been\ntrained in the German music of London concerts could hardly be expected\nto welcome the operas of Verdi and Rossini with anything approaching\necstatic admiration. At the most he might venture a half-conciliatory\nremark, such as Mrs. Browning\u2019s concerning _Il Trovatore_.\n\n\nV. CONFORMITY TO FACTS.--Browning seldom took occasion to depart\nfrom the facts of history in his presentation of Italian music.\nOne exception is found, going beyond all allowances for poetic\nidealization. It is the Verdi reference in _Bishop Blougram\u2019s\nApology_.[174] The statement concerns a Verdi composition, and mentions\nit as having been given in Florence with Rossini present. As a matter\nof fact _Un Giorno di Regno_, conceded to be Verdi\u2019s worst opera, and\nthe only one which was a complete failure, was not given in Florence\non its first production and was probably never repeated. _Macbeth_\nalone was given at Florence first, and it met with a moderate degree of\nsuccess.\n\n\nVI. SOURCE OF BROWNING\u2019S KNOWLEDGE.--Browning\u2019s life in Italy probably\nhad less influence on his poetic use of music than on his use of any\nother art, as the data he gives might easily have become known to\nhim without any such experience. Six of the thirteen musicians whom\nhe named performed in London, and three of them, Grisi, Bellini, and\nPaganini, in Browning\u2019s youth. It is even possible that he attended\nsome or all of their concerts. Rossini was living in Florence from\n1847 to 1855, while the Brownings were also making that city their\nhome. But while letter after letter written to friends at home refers\nto such painters or sculptors as Story, Powers, and Leighton, there\nis absolute silence concerning Rossini. As compared with remarks on\nsculpture, architecture, or painting, the letters from Italy, as a\nwhole, show an almost absolute indifference to Italian music as a\nhistorical development, or as a national achievement. With his fondness\nfor out-of-the-way investigations and obscure characters from any\nnation, however, Browning has taken some characters from Italian music\nand has woven their personalities into a few of the best poems on music\never written.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nITALIAN POETRY IN THE POEMS OF BROWNING.\n\n\nI. GENERAL STATEMENT.--Of the two hundred and twenty-two of Browning\u2019s\npoems, ten contain the name of an Italian poet or of his writings.\nFive imaginary writers--Aprile, Plara, Bocafoli, Eglamor, Stiatta--and\neleven who belong to the history of Italian literature--Sordello, Nina,\nAlcamo, Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Tasso, Sacchetti, Marino, Aretino,\nand Tommaseo--compose the list. Of the historical poets, Dante is given\nthe most important place; for besides the direct tribute that is paid\nhim, his name or the name of his great work occurs in seven poems out\nof the ten. Sordello, a most insignificant poet from the historical\nstandpoint, receives more extended treatment than any other literary\nfigure in Browning\u2019s works. Of the entire list of poems, three deal\nwith the life and aspirations of a poet as the main theme--_Pauline_,\nwhich, by the way, is really non-Italianate, _Paracelsus_, in which the\npoet Aprile is contrasted with the scholar, and _Sordello_.\n\n\nII. PREDOMINANCE IN EARLY POEMS.--Within the first eight years\nof Browning\u2019s career, he published four long poems--_Pauline_,\n_Paracelsus_, _Strafford_, and _Sordello_. Three of them deal in\nsome way with the life of a poet. After this first period, with the\npossible exception of _One Word More_, which is essentially a study\nin comparative art, there is no extended discussion of this sort in\nany poem, either Italianate or non-Italianate. _How it Strikes a\nContemporary_ deals with the attitude of the general public toward the\nlife and purposes of a poet, but not, as did the early group, with the\npoet\u2019s solution of his own problem concerning his relation toward his\nwork and humanity. It was written much later, when Browning was more\nfully settled in his poetical career.\n\n_Pauline_ is an autobiographical sketch of a poet\u2019s early doubts and\naspirations, largely devoted to appreciation of Shelley, and without\nItalianate quality; _Paracelsus_ and _Sordello_ deal with Italian\nwriters of verse. Since these all belong in the same period and that\nthe early one, it is clear that Browning was endeavoring to establish\nhis own ideas of a poet, and these poems were the expression of that\neffort. But he chose to express his conclusions by giving the negative\nside, not the positive; for Aprile, Sordello, Eglamor, Plara, Bocafoli,\nand in a lesser degree Nina and Alcamo, are all failures. Not all of\nthem absolute and hopeless, for Sordello dies with a moral victory won,\nAprile is successful in part, and Nina and Alcamo have their strength\nand grace; but still none of these poets has fully attained.\n\n\nIII. SORDELLO.--In _Sordello_, the character of that name has a\nshadowy existence in history as one of the most famous of the Italian\ntroubadours. He seems to have been confused with another Sordello who\nwas a politician and man of action. Since such scant facts as can be\ngathered speak of scandals, and tavern brawls, Browning\u2019s portrait of\nhim is clearly an idealization, and he probably chose Sordello instead\nof some better known figure that the facts might not interfere with the\nimaginative picture with which he wished to surround him. The thirty\nbooks which Browning read on the history of the period were not read to\nadd to his knowledge of the troubadour, but since even the idealized\nSordello had to be represented as having lived at some time and place,\nto give the correct background for his life and actions.\n\nBrowning shows that Sordello failed because he loved the applause he\nreceived rather than the poetry itself, because the aspirations of the\nman and the poet were at war within him, because he lacked feeling\nfor humanity, and because he was not decisive enough to succeed when\nhe attempted action. The moral victory at the close is for dramatic\npurposes, and the dominant theme of the poem as a whole is the failure\nof a poet.\n\n\nIV. THE IMAGINARY POETS.--Eglamor, a purely fictitious poet in\n_Sordello_, has made verse his only ambition. Lacking all perception\nof his life as a man, when he is vanquished in verse-making, he dies.\nPlara, in the same poem, stands for the poet without depth or genius,\nunable to write anything of thought value, polishing his poems until\nthey were merely pretty words, lacking utterly in any interpretation of\nhuman life. Bocafoli, with his \u201cstark-naked\u201d psalms, represents the\nsensualist. While Nina and Alcamo belong to history, they have such\nshadowy existence so far as present knowledge is concerned, that they\nwill be considered here. They stand respectively for strength and for\ngrace, and Browning represents the low voice as saying to Sordello:\n\n    \u201cNina\u2019s strength, but Alcamo\u2019s the grace,\n    Each neutralises each then! Search your fill;\n    You get no whole and perfect Poet--still\n    New Ninas, Alcamos, till time\u2019s midnight\n    Shrouds all--or better say, the shutting light\n    Of a forgotten yesterday.\u201d\n\nAprile, in the poem fashioned about Paracelsus, the wandering scholar,\ntypifies love as the latter represents knowledge. Through Aprile, the\nfoil to Paracelsus, the latter comes to see in part the mistakes in his\nattitude toward life, and declares\n\n    \u201cI too have sought to KNOW as thou to LOVE--\n    Excluding love as thou refusedst knowledge.\n\n           *       *       *       *       *\n\n    Are we not halves of one dissevered world,\n    Whom this strange chance unites once more?\u201d\n\nAnd Aprile exclaims:\n\n    \u201cYes, I see now. God is the perfect poet,\n    Who in his person acts his own creations.\u201d\n\n\nV. THE ITALIAN AS THE TYPE OF FAILURE.--Browning used seven poets to\ntypify failure, three historical and four imaginary ones. All these\nwere Italians, and all suggest the conclusion--\u201cYou get no whole and\nperfect Poet.\u201d This, then, must have been Browning\u2019s conclusion.\nNaturally enough he does not picture for us a poet representing that\nfor which he himself, after considering different kinds of failure,\nhas decided to strive. By the very values the failures do not\nrepresent, however, Browning gave us a vision of his own ideals. Lack\nof knowledge, lack of strength, of grace, sensuality, superficiality,\nlack of purpose, and of interest in humanity--these are the causes of\nfailure as represented by Aprile, Alcamo, Nina, Bocafoli, Plara, and\nSordello.\n\nIt would be unfair to say that these unsuccessful poets are typical of\nthe Italian nation; but it can be safely stated that they are fairly\nrepresentative of Italian weaknesses. A predominance of ill controlled\nfeeling is the most inclusive characteristic of the group --a trait\nwhich is perhaps marked in Italians of the least desirable class. It is\nalso significant, in contrast to Browning\u2019s own nature, that no poet of\nhis group of failures represents an intelligent, unselfish interest in\nhuman life.\n\n\nVI. ITALIAN MEN OF LETTERS: DANTE.--Of the great Italian men of\nletters, Dante is the only one who is mentioned in _Sordello_, and with\nthe exception of the Shelley references in _Memorabilia_ and _Pauline_,\nBrowning pays him the most perfect tribute he ever gave a writer, in\nthe last two lines of the following passage:\n\n    \u201cDante, pacer of the shore\n    Where glutted hell disgorgeth filthiest gloom,\n    Unbitten by its whirring sulphur-spume,\n    Or whence the grieved and obscure waters slope,\n    Into a darkness quieted by hope;\n    Plucker of amaranths grown beneath God\u2019s eye,\n    In gracious twilights where his chosen lie.\u201d\n\nReferring to the fact that Dante\u2019s _Divina Commedia_ includes Sordello\nas a character, and that _De Vulgari Eloquio_ praises him because he\nhad first attempted to establish an Italian vernacular, Browning names\nSordello as the forerunner of Dante. Again in the same poem, Dante is\nmentioned as having called the \u201cPalma\u201d of Browning\u2019s poem \u201cCunizza,\u201d\nand as having taken advantage of Sordello\u2019s lost chance to establish a\nvernacular.\n\nIn most of the other poems, the references to Dante are merely\nincidental. _Up at a Villa_ refers to the great literary triumvirate of\nItaly, Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio, as standing in the popular mind\nfor all that is great in Italian letters. In _Time\u2019s Revenges_ Dante\nappears as being, in the mind of a poor, starving poet, the highest\npossible standard of fame.\n\nThe only other Dante reference of any importance is in _One Word\nMore_. In this poem, Browning\u2019s most beautiful tribute to his wife,\nhe represents every artist as wishing once, in his life, to honor his\nMargarita or his Beatrice. Dante, he says in speaking of that poet,\nonce prepared to paint an angel, laying aside his own art of poetry.\nA historical basis for this statement is found in the _Vita Nuova_.\nBut Browning, either intentionally or unintentionally, probably the\nformer, for the purpose of making this basis accord with his poetical\nconception, departs from the facts in two important particulars.\nDante plainly states that his attempt at the drawing grew out of his\nmeditations on the anniversary of the death of Beatrice; and the\npeople who broke in upon him were those of his own town, to whom he\napologized for his delayed salutation, by \u201cAnother was with me.\u201d\nBrowning assumes that the picture was drawn to please Beatrice and that\nthe people who interrupted symbolized Dante\u2019s own thoughts about the\ncharacters of his _Inferno_.\n\n\nVII. OTHER REAL WRITERS.--Aretino and Boccaccio are both presented\nthroughout _The Ring and the Book_ as examples of questionable morality\nin literature, or at least of tendencies in that direction.\n\nIn Part III, the gossipers speak of the case of Guido and his wife\nas \u201cthis last best of the Hundred Merry Tales.\u201d In Part V, Guido, in\nhis complaint against the parents of Pompilia, appeals to Boccaccio\u2019s\n\u201cBook\u201d and \u201cSer Franco\u2019s [Sacchetti\u2019s] Merry Tales,\u201d as proofs of the\ngreed and wrong-doing of the parents in contrast to his own innocence.\nCaponsacchi, in Part VI, refers to the forged letters claimed to have\nbeen passed between himself and Pompilia, as worthy of the profligate\nAretine. In Part X, the Pope makes the same comparison, declaring\nthat the letters are \u201cFalse to body and soul they figure forth--As\nthough the man had cut out shape and shape From fancies of that other\nAretine.\u201d In Part XI, Guido attempts to prove that the Pope, in former\ntimes, was very human, since he used to \u201cchirrup o\u2019er the Merry Tales.\u201d\nLater in the same section, he asserts his right to enjoy \u201cWhen Master\nPietro [Aretino] rhymes a pleasantry.\u201d\n\n\nVIII. BROWNING\u2019S KNOWLEDGE OF ITALIAN LITERATURE.--Browning\u2019s poems\ndisplay no remarkable knowledge of Italian literature. In comparison\nwith that of the average American or English citizen, it is above\nthe ordinary, but not more than any student of literature might very\nreadily acquire without visiting Italy or residing there. However,\nthe average English student of literature, if he were a poet, would\nprobably embody less of that knowledge of Italy in his verse than\nBrowning has done. Except for the idea of failure as typified by lesser\nItalian poets, the references are mainly of secondary importance,\nintroduced because he had chosen an Italian theme and wished to give it\nreality of detail. The stimulus of Italian residence on Browning, then,\nprobably led to the embodiment in his poems of the literary knowledge\nhe already possessed. He seems to have made no particular study of\nItalian letters, even after going to that country. Some scattered\nreferences to readings in Italian literature (for example in the novels\nof Sacchetti[175]) exist in the records of the Brownings in Italy; but\nthese references are few in comparison to those concerning sculpture\nand painting.\n\n\nIX. BROWNING\u2019S INTEREST IN ITALIAN LITERATURE.--While all the\nhistorical references, except the one to Dante noted above as a\nprobably intentional departure from history, are substantially correct\nin both fact and spirit, Browning did not have any great interest\nin Italian literature as it existed in his day. Much more space is\ngiven to the treatment of imaginary poets, or to the idealization\nof a historical one, for the sake of personality, as in the case of\nSordello. As for the other arts, then, personality is the keynote of\nBrowning\u2019s appreciation of Italian literature, and of its place in his\npoetry.\n\nBrowning gives very little space to any formal praise of Italian\npoetry or poets, either of the past, or contemporary with himself. In\nthis respect his treatment of them is very similar to that he gives\nto English poets. _Memorabilia_, in praise of Shelley, is his only\npoem which has for its theme the unmodified praise of another poet.\nAs this poem and the Shelley references in _Pauline_ are Browning\u2019s\nonly tributes to writers of his own country, so the praise of Dante,\nin _Sordello_, is the only instance of an expressed appreciation of\nItalian literature. The only Italian poet contemporary with himself\nwhom he mentions is Tommaseo; and he is noticed only as the author of\nthe inscription on the tablet erected by the city of Florence to the\nmemory of Elizabeth Barrett Browning.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nITALIAN ARCHITECTURE IN THE POEMS OF BROWNING.\n\n\nI. GENERAL STATEMENT.--Twenty-five poems of Robert Browning make some\nreference, brief or extended, to an Italian work of architecture. Two\narchitects, as such, are mentioned in _Old Pictures in Florence_.\nThey are Giotto (1267-1337), the original designer of the Florentine\nCampanile, and Taddeo Gaddi (c. 1300-c. 1366), his successor. In the\ntwenty-five poems, about fifty-eight Italian buildings are named,\nnot all of them important architecturally. Of these, almost exactly\none-third are in Florence, and one or two less than another third are\nin Rome. Venice and Asolo claim mention of five and six respectively;\nbut all the remaining towns must content themselves with a mention\nof one, two, or three buildings. The entire number of works of\narchitecture is divided between twelve towns: Venice, Verona, Bassano,\nRome, Florence, Passagno, Asolo, Padua, Fano, Bagni di Lucca, Arezzo\nand Siena.\n\nThere are two apparent reasons why the number of buildings named at\nRome and Florence is exceptionally large: first, the former city has\nbeen the historical and political center of Italy ever since the\nbeginning, and the latter is the art center of the world; second,\nBrowning spent a considerable amount of time in Rome, both in 1844,\nduring his second trip to Italy, and in his visits of 1853 and 1854,\nwhile Florence was his home for fifteen years.\n\nThe number of ecclesiastical buildings is something more than one-half\nof the entire list; while the remaining ones are about equally divided\nbetween those for state use and private buildings of a secular\ncharacter. Considering the large number of beautiful churches and\ncathedrals in Italy, the result so far as these are concerned is in\nentire accordance with one\u2019s expectations. St. Mark\u2019s, St. Peter\u2019s, the\nVatican, and the Florentine Duomo, all buildings of world interest,\nlead in the number of times they receive mention.\n\n\nII. SOURCE OF BROWNING\u2019S KNOWLEDGE.--Browning had seen almost all if\nnot every one of the Italian buildings he introduces in his poems. He\nknew whereof he wrote. _Sordello_, published in 1840, is concerned\nwith the cities of Venice, Bassano, Verona, Rome, and Florence; but\nthe references to the last two are very slight. The first three cities\nhe had visited in his trip of 1838, along with his \u201cdelicious Asolo\u201d,\nwhich became the scene of _Pippa Passes_, in 1841. Ferrara formed a\nvery large part of the setting in _Sordello_, also; but no particular\nbuildings in it are described. _A Toccata of Galuppi\u2019s_, 1855, refers\nto St. Mark\u2019s in Venice. _Old Pictures in Florence_, with its distinct\nFlorentine setting, was given to the world after Browning had lived in\nthat city for nine years. Doubtless its Campanile, which he mentions in\nthe poem, was at that time as familiar to him as any building of his\nnative land. _By the Fireside_ (with reference to the chapel in the\ngorge) was written either during the visit of the Brownings to Bagni\ndi Lucca in 1853, or shortly after it, and was published in 1855. Near\nBagni di Lucca is the scene of the story. There is the same relation\nbetween architectural subject and personal observation in _The Boy\nand the Angel_ (Rome), 1842; _The Italian in England_ (Padua), 1845;\n_In a Gondola_ (Venice), 1842; _The Statue and the Bust_ (Florence),\n1855; _Luria_ (Florence), 1846; _Christmas-Eve and Easter-Day_ (Rome),\n1850; _Fra Lippo Lippi_ (Florence), 1855; _The Bishop orders his Tomb_\n(Rome), 1845; _Bishop Blougram\u2019s Apology_ (Rome), 1855; _One Word More_\n(Florence), 1855; _Abt Vogler_ (Rome), 1864; _Pacchiarotto_ (Siena),\n1876. Padua and Venice were visited in 1838, Rome in 1844, Florence in\n1846, if not sooner, and Siena in 1850.\n\n_The Ring and the Book_ is an interesting example of Browning\u2019s\nprocedure in the case of an architectural work he wished to introduce.\nFlorence and Rome, more particularly the latter, are concerned with\nthe whole action of the poem, while Arezzo is utilized in a minor way.\nBy this time (1864-68) Browning had long been familiar with Florence\nand Rome. However, the poem was written in England; and a letter to\nFrederick Leighton, October 17, 1864, asks him if he will go into the\nChurch of San Lorenzo, in the Corso, look at it carefully, and describe\nit to Browning. Browning asks particularly about the arrangement\nof the building, nave, pillars, the number of altars, and the\n\u2018Crucifixion\u2019 over the altar, by Guido, and adds that he does not care\nfor the outside. This church Browning uses more than any other in _The\nRing and the Book_, making it the scene of the baptism and the marriage\nof Pompilia, as well as the place to which the dead bodies were taken.\nMr. Kenyon tells us that the poet was always accustomed to visualize\na scene completely and to keep it constantly before him mentally as\nhe wrote. It was his general rule to use only buildings which he had\nseen, even when he refers to them very slightly; and in this case, he\nwrote to inquire about one which he had seen, but of which he did not\nhave a perfectly clear mental image. The only possible exception to the\npersonal observation of a building to be poetically described is in the\ncase of the Pieve, at Arezzo. The Pieve is described in considerable\ndetail; and so far as can be learned, the poet probably did not visit\nit. The Brownings had planned to visit it in September, 1847, on\ntheir way to Rome. But this trip, in connection with which Arezzo is\nmentioned, was abandoned. Later trips were made to Rome, however, and\nit is very possible that Arezzo was made a stopping place on one of\nthem, and the Pieve, after all, was not an exception to the general\nrule.\n\n\nIII. IMPORTANCE OF ARCHITECTURE IN THE POEMS.--When the amount of\narchitecture Browning introduces is first considered, it seems\nremarkably large. But such conclusion could be reached only by failing\nto take into consideration the manner in which the references are\nemployed. About ten of the buildings he names, including those at\nAsolo and a few others, are of no importance whatever, from either an\narchitectural or a historical standpoint. Most of the remaining ones\nare discussed in histories of architecture or mentioned in guide books,\nand a considerable number of them are of importance architecturally.\nBut with very few exceptions, Browning does not employ them for the\nsake of their architecture; and cared very little whether they were\narchitecturally good or bad. He usually had a story to tell; and for\nthat story a location was necessary. Often he used such buildings as\nhad been significant in the original events on which he based his poem.\n\nThere are, to be sure, numerous instances in which the particular\nchurch or castle he names suits the tone of the story just a trifle\nbetter than anything else he could have found. In _Sordello_, for\nexample, he constructed an imaginary castle, Goito, which both\nharmonized with the character of Sordello and influenced his life,\nsince it was the home of his youth. An excellent example of a building\nchosen to illustrate the theme of the story is _The Bishop orders his\nTomb at St. Praxed\u2019s Church_. Perhaps no such tomb as the Bishop\u2019s ever\nexisted, exactly as described in the poem; but if it had, St. Praxed\n(Santa Prassede) with its ornate beauty was exactly suited to be its\nlocation.\n\n_The Ring and the Book_ and _The Statue and the Bust_ are both\nexcellent examples of poems in which the buildings were already\nselected for Browning by the stories on which he based his poems.\n\nExamples of buildings chosen for harmony, such as those in _Sordello_\nand _The Bishop orders his Tomb_, are rather exceptional cases.\nBrowning\u2019s poetic architecture, for the most part, may be grouped in\nthree divisions--(1) buildings already chosen for him by the story\nwhich he wished to embody in a poem, (2) buildings chosen by himself,\nto harmonize with the tone of the story, (3) buildings used for setting\nwith no regard whatever for architectural qualities. The last division\nis by far the largest. Or, to classify more broadly, there are two ways\nin which he uses architecture--(1) for the sake of an emotional value,\nof which there is one example, and (2) for the sake of background\neffects, to which practically all the other instances belong.\n\n\nIV. COMPARISON WITH OTHER WRITERS.--Wordsworth has several poems--for\nexample, _Old Abbeys_, _In the Cathedral at Cologne_, _Inside of King\u2019s\nCollege Chapel_--that within a short space and in a lyrical fashion\ndeal with architecture in a highly appreciative manner. Somewhat\nsimilar examples from Byron are the _Elegy on Newstead Abbey_ and the\nfamiliar _Sonnet on Chillon_. But Browning, whose writings contain few\npoems of lyric or descriptive subjectivity, did not devote himself to\nany such effusions over inanimate objects. His only description of\narchitecture as something appealing to the emotion and imagination of\nman is contained in a few lines of a very long poem, _Christmas-Eve\nand Easter-Day_. The speaker is searching for religious truth and\nfinds himself, in his visit to the homeland of Catholicism, viewing\nSt. Peter\u2019s at Rome. Then follows that wonderfully comprehensive\ndescription--\n\n    \u201cAnd what is this that rises propped,\n    With pillars of prodigious girth?\n    Is it really on the earth,\n    This miraculous Dome of God?\n    Has the angel\u2019s measuring-rod\n    Which numbered cubits, gem from gem,\n    \u2019Twixt the gates of the New Jerusalem,\n    Meted it out,--and what he meted,\n    Have the sons of men completed?\n    --Binding, ever as he bade,\n    Columns in the colonnade,\n    With arms wide open to embrace\n    The entry of the human race ...\u201d\n\nBut even in this instance, Browning, before his description is\nfinished, cannot content himself with mere abstract statements of\nbeauty divorced from human life. He turns to the builders--the people,\nand to the purpose--service to humanity.\n\nIn the only poem of Browning which deals with an architect at all,\n(_Old Pictures in Florence_, in which Giotto is considered at some\nlength), the discussion is from the standpoint of the architect\u2019s aim,\nhis partial achievement, and the relation his work, when it is finally\nfinished, will have to the people of his city; not from the standpoint\nof any technical interest in the art.\n\n\nV. ARCHITECTURE AND PERSONALITY.--With all his mention of Italian works\nof architecture, then, Browning\u2019s primary object was never the abstract\nbeauty of that art itself. He has far less treatment of it, from an\nabstract standpoint, than many another English writer who has scarcely\ngone outside his native land for material. A building, as a building!\nWhat was there in it related to personality as that expressed itself in\nthe struggles of the soul? And, therefore, what could there be in it to\nconcern Robert Browning?\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nITALIAN PAINTING IN THE POEMS OF BROWNING.\n\n\nI. GENERAL STATEMENT.--Twenty-nine poems contain the names of Italian\npainters, and fifty-one Italian painters are mentioned by name; while\nseveral of the great artists are mentioned in many poems. Michael\nAngelo is referred to in ten different poems; Raphael in seven,\nbesides the duplicate mention in three sections of _The Ring and the\nBook_; Correggio, and Titian, each in six poems, and Da Vinci in five\ndifferent poems. These are all great masters of the High Renaissance\nin Italy; and therefore, they are the greatest artists the world\nhas known: the repeated introduction of their names is perfectly\nnatural. But among Browning\u2019s fifty-one painters, some of so little\nimportance are named that references to them are rare in histories of\nart. Even with the most insignificant, some telling phrase is often\nused to express with admirable precision the artist\u2019s relation to the\nhistory of art. The best example of this is found in _Old Pictures\nin Florence_, where the poet capriciously calls the roll of the past\nFlorentine artists, chiding them because none of their works have\ncome into his possession. In the one poem seventeen men who have been\nclassified as painters, besides some who are sculptors and architects\nprimarily, find a place. Only two or three of the artists are given\nmore than a line or two; but many of even the most insignificant\nare summed up in some phrase like the following: \u201cDa Vincis derive\nin good time from Dellos;\u201d \u201cStefano ... called Nature\u2019s Ape and the\nworld\u2019s despair;\u201d \u201cthe wronged Lippino,\u201d or \u201cmy Pollajolo, the twice a\ncraftsman.\u201d\n\n\nII. EXTENT OF BROWNING\u2019S KNOWLEDGE.--To cover the entire field as he\ndoes, from Cimabue through the Renaissance and down to modern times\n(for he omits almost no artist of importance in the whole history of\npainting, besides including many surprises in the way of insignificant\nones), Browning must have had a wonderful amount of historical\nknowledge. This familiarity with the development of the art was gained\nin three ways--by some study of the subject before he went to Italy, by\nreading histories of the painters after going there, and by visiting\ngalleries and churches in Italy and studying the pictures found therein.\n\nThe fact that Browning had an interest in studying the London galleries\nbefore he went to Italy, and indeed, was a student of pictures from his\nchildhood, has already been noted in the introductory remarks.[176]\nJust how great the poet\u2019s knowledge of Italian art was at this period,\nis hard to determine. But his first poem, _Pauline_, contains a\nreference to Andromeda, a picture by Caravaggio, who was a Renaissance\nartist. Mrs. Orr[177] tells us that the picture was always before him\nas a boy and that he loved the story of the divine deliverer and the\ninnocent victim which it represented. In one of his early letters to\nElizabeth Barrett, Browning gives the following account of his fondness\nfor Andromeda: \u201cHow some people use their pictures, for instance, is\na mystery to me. My Polidore\u2019s perfect Andromeda along with \u2018Boors\nCarousing\u2019 where I found her--my own father\u2019s doing, or I would say\nmore.\u201d\n\nThese statements prove that a fondness for _some_ Italian art, at\nleast, had been a part of his life from a very early age; and in\naddition, they suggest that a person who had so keen an appreciation\nfor a picture by an artist so little known as Caravaggio, must have\nknown a great deal more about Italian art than is implied in this one\nstatement. Browning was in his twenty-first year when _Pauline_, the\npoem referring to Andromeda, was published. This was five years before\nhis first visit to Italy, but even at this time, his appreciation of\nthe picture was so complete that he compared the ever-beautiful and\nunchanging Andromeda to himself and seemed to feel that she had as real\nan existence.\n\n\nIII. IRREGULAR DISTRIBUTION OF REFERENCES.--While the influence of\npainting began so early in Browning\u2019s poetical career, and extended\nto its close, the last art poem being _Beatrice Signorini_, in\nthe Asolando group, published just at the time of his death, the\nchronological distribution of the subject is by no means regular.\nIn _Paracelsus_, reference to painting is found; _Sordello_ has some\nminor references; _Pippa Passes_ contains some mention of painting and\nmuch concerning sculpture. _Pictor Ignotus_, the first poem devoted\nentirely to a painter, was published in 1845. All these items form a\ncomparatively slender thread of references up to the publications of\n1855. At that date Browning had lived in Italy nine years, had studied\nart histories, and seen pictures. Our chronicler, Mrs. Browning, we\nrecall, furnishes us the information--in the previously mentioned\nletter of 1847 to Horne--that they were reading Vasari. This was the\nnext year after the Brownings went to Italy to take up their residence\nthere. Though Browning\u2019s early trips (in 1838 and 1844) seem to have\nhad small influence on his poetic treatment of painting, the Italian\nresidence bore fruit. Between 1847, the year when the residence\nbegan, and 1855, only one poem of Browning\u2019s was published, and some\nreferences to painting are found in it. The publications of 1855\ninclude the following poems on painting: _Old Pictures in Florence_,\n_The Guardian Angel_, _Fra Lippo Lippi_, _Andrea del Sarto_, and _One\nWord More_. In this one year, all the finest and best known of his\npoems on painting were given to the world. Just why this is true is\nhard to prove but easy to conjecture. The time just previous to their\npublication marks the period of greatest, most intimate art study,\nsince these poems were the product of the first nine years in Italy.\nThere was a certain power, appreciation, and a fineness of feeling\nassociated with these first years in the great art center of Florence\nthat never returned again. For some time before this, Browning had been\nan interested student of art, and the Florentine residence brought his\nideas to their full maturity. The best that he was capable of putting\ninto verse on the subject of painting was both imagined and written\nduring this first period in Italy, the home of painting.\n\n\nIV. SOURCES OF THE POEMS.--An event recorded by Mrs. Browning, in a\nletter to Mrs. Jameson, dated May 4, 1850, throws light on the source\nof _Old Pictures in Florence_. She says that her husband had picked\nup at a few pauls each some \u201chole and corner pictures\u201d in a corn shop\na mile from Florence. Mr. Kirkup (one of the best judges of pictures\nin Florence) threw out such names for them as \u201cCimabue, Ghirlandajo,\nGiottino, a Crucifixion painted on a banner, Giottesque, if not Giotto,\nbut unique or nearly so, on account of linen material--and a little\nVirgin by a Byzantine master. Two angel pictures, bought last year,\nprove to have been sawed off of the Ghirlandajo, so-called.\u201d\n\nBesides showing, as do many other statements of their life in Italy,\nthat Browning was deeply interested in art, these words suggest both\nthe title and the origin of _Old Pictures in Florence_, in which the\npoet reproaches the spirits of the early masters for failing to leave\nsome of their works to one so appreciative as himself. What could be\nmore natural in its development? A poet-artist finds the pictures, is\ntold that they are genuine, and is very desirous of believing it. His\ninterest in personality turns his mind to the painters themselves,\nhis fancy runs with a loose rein--and we have the half-thoughtful\nwhimsicality of _Old Pictures in Florence_. On the serious side it\npleads for the following: (1) more attention to the early almost\nunknown masters, instead of praise for Angelo, Raphael, and such famous\nartists; (2) a greater appreciation of the development of Italian\npainting, because it was development, than of the dead perfection of\nGreek sculpture; (3) Italian freedom from Austria, and with it the\nreturn of art to Florence, resulting in the completed Campanile with\nthe new flag upon it. The first two pleas are made on the ground of\nthe noble development of the early Italian painting, in contrast with\nthe later art of Italian painting and that of perfect Greek sculpture,\nwhich were at a standstill.\n\n_The Guardian Angel_ was the direct result of a visit by the Brownings\nto Fano; probably in 1848, for during that year Murray sent them there\nto find a summer residence. Mrs. Browning reports[178] that it was\nunspeakable for such a purpose, but \u201cthe churches are very beautiful,\nand a divine picture of Guercino\u2019s is worth going all that way to see.\u201d\nThe poem was published with the group of 1855, and in it mention is\nmade of three trips to see the picture while the Brownings were at Fano.\n\nWhile _The Guardian Angel_ may be the only poem written as a direct\nresult of seeing a picture, _Andrea del Sarto_ was at least the result\nof the existence of a picture. Mr. Kenyon, an intimate friend of the\nBrownings, and a relative of Mrs. Browning, asked them to obtain for\nhim, if possible, a copy of Andrea\u2019s picture of himself and wife. Since\nhe was unable to secure it, Browning wrote the poem and sent it as a\nrecord of what the picture contained.\n\nVasari was the source of much of the historical material which Browning\nused in his poems. His gossipy narrative was followed almost exactly in\n_Fra Lippo Lippi_, and partly in _Andrea del Sarto_ and other poems.\nBaldinucci\u2019s histories of the Italian painters furnish material for\n_Beatrice Signorini_, and the first part of _Filippo Baldinucci_.\nBrowning invented the last part of the latter, and makes his invention\nmore real by Filippo\u2019s declaration, \u201cPlague o\u2019 me if I record it in my\nbook.\u201d\n\n\nV. POETIC FUNCTIONS OF THE REFERENCES TO PAINTING.--Many references\nto painters or painting are used for comparisons, just as in the\ncase of other arts. Such is the one in _Pauline_, in which the poet\ndescribes the Andromeda of Caravaggio, and contrasts her to his own\nchanging soul; and also the comparison in _Sordello_, of the hero to\nthe same picture. A third mention of Andromeda, in _Francis Furini_,\nillustrates the beauty of the nude art. The painter of Andromeda,\nPolidoro da Caravaggio, is introduced in _Waring_, in a far from\nserious comparison, in which Browning wonders if his long-silent friend\nis splashing in painting \u201cas none splashed before, Since great Caldara\nPolidore.\u201d\n\nIn _Pippa Passes_, the Bishop compares one artist with another, by\nexpressing the hope that Jules will found a school like that of\nCorreggio. _In Three Days_ includes a comparison of the lights and\nshades of a woman\u2019s hair to painting, with the line, \u201cAs early Art\nembrowns the gold.\u201d _Any Wife to Any Husband_ compares the husband\nwho greatly admires other beautiful women, with anyone who looks at\nTitian\u2019s Venus--\u201cOnce more what is there to chide?\u201d Passages in _Bishop\nBlougram\u2019s Apology_ name Correggio\u2019s works and the pictures of Giulio\nRomano as desirable things to own. The Bishop also states that he\nkeeps his restless unbelief quiet, \u201clike the snake \u2019neath Michael\u2019s\nfoot,\u201d referring to the well-known painting by Raphael. In _James Lee\u2019s\nWife_, the attitude toward an unbeautiful hand is illustrated by the\nline--\u201cWould Da Vinci turn from you?\u201d\n\nOne of the most striking examples of the comparison of a person with\na picture is found in Part VI of _The Ring and the Book_, where\nCaponsacchi likens Pompilia to the Madonna of Raphael in innocence. In\nPart VII, Pompilia compares her deliverer, Caponsacchi, to the picture\nof St. George. In Part VIII, the speaker who defends Guido reads a\ndescription of a man moved by too much grief, and says it fits Guido\u2019s\ncase just as exactly as Maratta\u2019s portraits are like the life. The\nprosecutor, in Part IX, compares himself in his descriptions of the\nfamily of Pompilia, to a painter, carefully planning to paint a \u2018Holy\nFamily\u2019. In this connection he names Carlo Maratta, Luca Giordano,\nAngelo, Raphael, Pietro da Cortona, and Ferri. Four or five other\ncomparisons are found in _The Ring and the Book_, but in general, they\nare very similar to the ones given above, and little would be gained by\nenumerating all of them.\n\nAbout forty lines of _Fifine at the Fair_ are concerned with an\nextended comparison of a man\u2019s treatment of his wife with his attitude\ntoward an authentic Raphael which he has bought. In each case he makes\nmuch over the new treasure when it has first come into his possession,\nthen seems neglectful, but in case of any danger, thinks first of his\nreal object of affection, forgetting such light fancies as other women\nand Dor\u00e9 picture books. The comparison is further extended by likening\nthe soul in its choice of another soul to finding satisfaction in\nart--poetry, music, and painting. The Italian artists, Bazzi, Raphael,\nand Michael Angelo, are named as examples in this connection.\n\n_Red Cotton Night-Cap Country_ contains a very Browningesque\ndescription of a soul, and pleads:\n\n    \u201cAspire, break bounds! I say,\n    Endeavor to be good and better still,\n    And best! Success is nought, endeavor\u2019s all.\u201d\n\n           *       *       *       *       *\n\n          ... \u201cthere the incomplete,\n    More than completion, matches the immense,--\n    Then Michael Angelo against the world.\u201d\n\n_With Charles Avison_, _Cenciaja_, and _With Christopher Smart_ contain\ncomparisons similar to those noted above.\n\nEleven poems in all deal with Italian painters or painting as the\nprincipal theme. They are: _Pictor Ignotus_, _Old Pictures in\nFlorence_, _The Guardian Angel_, _Fra Lippo Lippi_, _Andrea del Sarto_,\n_One Word More_, _A Face_, _Pacchiarotto_, _Filippo Baldinucci_, _With\nFrancis Furini_, and _Beatrice Signorini_. Eight of these center around\nthe work, personality, or history of a single artist. Of the eight,\n_Pictor Ignotus_, _Andrea del Sarto_, _Fra Lippo Lippi_, and _With\nFrancis Furini_, are serious poetic efforts, having as the theme a\npainter\u2019s endeavor, and dealing in each case with some shortcoming or\nlack of acknowledged success. Each of the first three, as poetry, is\nexcellent in conception and execution. _With Francis Furini_, however,\nis rather didactic and heavy, lacking in lyricism and beauty.\n\nThe failure of Pictor Ignotus was due to his high conception of art--so\nhigh that he could not bear to submit pictures of real worth to the\nworld. With his extremely sensitive disposition he could not endure the\nthought of ignorant criticism by people who had no comprehension of the\naim or purpose of the artist. Lippi failed to gain approbation because\nhe would not sacrifice his conception of painting things as God made\nthem to the misguided saintliness of the monks. Furini, according to\nBrowning\u2019s estimate, failed in part, because of his attitude toward the\nnude. Andrea del Sarto, the greatest failure in all Browning, possessed\na masterly technique, but failed through his weakness of character.\n\nOf the later art poems, published after 1855, _With Francis Furini_ is\nthe most serious effort. It contains an extended defense of the nude in\nart, the substance of which is summed up in the following quotations:\n\n    \u201cNo gift but in the very plentitude\n    Of its perfection, goes maimed, misconstrued,\n    By wickedness or weakness: still some few\n    Have grace to see thy purpose, strength to mar\n    Thy work with no admixture of their own.\u201d\n\n           *       *       *       *       *\n\n    ... \u201cShow beauty\u2019s May, ere June\n    Undo the bud\u2019s blush, leave a rose to cull\n    --No poppy neither! Yet less perfect-pure,\n    Divinely precious with life\u2019s dew besprent.\n    Show saintliness that\u2019s simply innocent\n    Of guessing sinnership exists.\u201d\n\nAmong the less serious works, _Pacchiarotto_ tells the story of a\nreformer-painter, suffering at the hands of the people who opposed him.\nWith a decidedly humorous treatment, rollicking verse, and impossible\nrhymes, Browning carried on the poem to its conclusion of a fling at\nthe critics of his own verse. _Filippo Baldinucci_ simply retells a\nrather amusing story, quite distinct from any serious consideration\nof the painter as an artist, with an added conclusion which Browning\nimagined for himself. In like manner, _Beatrice Signorini_ consists\nof a poetized version of some very personal history, which Browning\ntook from Baldinucci. The husband of Beatrice, who was the painter\nRomanelli, fell in love with Artemisia Genteleschi, and having painted\nher portrait, showed it to his wife. She immediately destroyed it,\nRomanelli approved her spirit, and ever after loved her more.\n\n\nVI. CONFORMITY TO HISTORY.--A few instances of departure from\nhistorical facts are found in the poems on painting, though it is\nreally remarkable that they were not less accurate, written as they\nwere at a time when the history of painting had been so slightly\ninvestigated. Such errors as existed are usually the result of mistakes\nin the sources Browning followed, though these were the best in their\nday, rather than from carelessness on his part.\n\nSome very recent investigators assert that Browning unduly exaggerated\nthe character of Andrea\u2019s wife, in _Andrea del Sarto_. However, no less\nan authority than W. M. Rossetti insists that he was essentially true\nto the facts in representing her. Others insist that he was somewhat\nunfair in the general impression which he gives of Andrea. At least he\nhas not changed the facts materially in this particular case; and if\nany liberty has been taken, from a poetic standpoint it is well taken.\nThere are several slight errors in _Fra Lippo Lippi_. For example,\nGuidi (Masaccio) is now known to have been the master, not the pupil of\nLippi, and the picture in Sant\u2019 Ambrogio was probably not the expiation\nof a prank.\n\nThe few changes in the facts, however, are comparatively slight,\nall told. Allowing for mistaken authorities whom Browning followed,\nvariations are much more trivial than might be expected. By the old\nwell-worn charity cloak of poetic license it is customary to allow for\nconsiderable idealization. But Browning, the artist of things as they\nreally exist, held to the truth as he saw it, even in his treatment\nof art. This he did in spite of the fact that his purpose was not to\ngive art history, but to present personality as it existed in relation\nto art. With his deep insight into human nature, as well as art\nhistory, he took the characters which he found in the world of art, the\ngood or bad, and gave them to us as examples of the striving, often\nunsuccessful soul.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nGENERAL COMPARISONS: BROWNING AND THE FINE ARTS OF ITALY.\n\n\nI. POETIC FUNCTION AND METHOD.--About fifteen poems from Browning\ndeal with the arts or artists of Italy as primary subject matter. The\nremainder of the entire number of forty-nine which refer to art at all,\ntreat it as a secondary consideration. Taking the subject art as a\nwhole, as Browning introduces it in poetry, it appears in the following\nforms: (1) main theme; (2) comparison of two or more artists working\nin the same art; (3) comparison of artists in one art with those in\nanother, as painters with musicians, or with poets; (4) illustrative\nmaterial when the main theme of the poem has no immediate bearing on\nart. _Abt Vogler_, in music, or _Fra Lippo Lippi_, in painting, are\nexamples of the first. _Andrea del Sarto_, besides exemplifying the\nfirst form, contains numerous comparisons of its main character with\nother painters. _With Charles Avison_ has a musician as a theme, and he\nis compared with other artists, for example, Michael Angelo. _Fifine at\nthe Fair_, whose main theme has no connection with art, names Raphael,\nBazzi, and Angelo as illustrative material. Numerous instances of\nincidental art references, used in such ways as these, attest the fact\nthat Browning had a large art consciousness, gained from past interest\nin the different fields, and of sufficient activity to cause almost\nconstant references to the fine arts.\n\nWhere Wordsworth would have chosen English natural scenery for purposes\nof illustration, and Shelley nature in Italy, Browning chose art.\nFifteen poems with nature as the main theme, besides numerous others\nwith references to nature, would not seem unusual; but a group of\nfifteen poems, all moderately long, based on the fine arts, besides a\nvery large number of comparisons to the arts in other poems, seems an\nexceptional product for a nineteenth century English poet.\n\nBrowning\u2019s art monologue is of two kinds--the monologue of the artist\nwho is the chief character in the poem, and the monologue of the poet\naddressing the artist directly. Nor are these forms confined entirely\nto Italian art poems. _My Last Duchess_, _The Bishop orders his Tomb_,\n_Pictor Ignotus_, _Fra Lippo Lippi_, _Andrea del Sarto_, _Abt Vogler_,\nare all in dramatic monologue, with either an artist or one interested\nin art, as the speaker. _A Toccata of Galuppi\u2019s_, _Master Hughes\nof Saxe-Gotha_, and _Old Pictures in Florence_, represent the poet\naddressing the artist. _Filippo Baldinucci_ is presented in the first\nperson, in monologue form. In _The Guardian Angel_ the poet directly\naddressed the angel of the picture. _One Word More_ and _A Face_, in\nwhich the art element is strong, are written in the first person, the\nformer addressed directly to Mrs. Browning with the poet speaking, and\nthe second addressed to no particular person. This review establishes\nthe fact that the monologue is Browning\u2019s favorite form for poems about\nart, since the list just quoted includes all important poems of that\nkind. In every case he made some personality prominent, and in all\nserious poems on art, that personality is either speaking or spoken to,\nthe very finest poems being of the former type.\n\n\nII. AMOUNT OF MATERIAL USED FROM EACH OF THE FINE ARTS.--In the\nforegoing discussion of the five branches of Italian art in\nBrowning,--sculpture, music, poetry, architecture, and painting--the\norder has been determined largely by a quantitative standard. In the\nAppendix are systematic lists showing the number of poems and the exact\nreferences in connection with each art. No extensive comparison of\nthe different arts regarding frequency of introduction, therefore, is\nneeded here; but a few generalizations concerning some of the reasons\nfor the variation in emphasis seem not amiss.\n\nArchitecture is the art of a concrete bodily form, absolutely\nseparated from any representation of humanity, unless one looks beyond\nit to the architect, or to the people for whom it is constructed.\nIn contradistinction to the other fine arts discussed here, it is\ncharacterized by usefulness. While it should, and does, in its highest\nforms, surmount mere utility, and give an impression of harmony,\nbeauty, and grandeur, it never directly portrays the finest feelings\nof which humanity is capable and never inspires one directly with\na feeling of achievement or struggle in character. Utility is the\nchief interest guiding Browning\u2019s treatment of architecture--not\narchitectural utility, but the service to the poet in fixing the\nsetting of his poems. Such service is clear in nearly every instance\nin all of the twenty-five poems in which some Italian building is\nmentioned, and in the case of nearly all the fifty-eight edifices\nnamed. The description of St. Peter\u2019s in _Christmas-Eve and Easter-Day_\nis practically the only exception, and there, as has already been\nstated, the poet passed from the grandeur of the structure itself to\nthe builders. Lack of personality in architecture is, then, the reason\nfor its very slight introduction as an actual art in Browning\u2019s verse.\n\nPassing on from architecture to sculpture one finds that we have\nanother art of concrete bodily form, with the added power of portraying\nthe human form, face, and to a very slight degree, the soul. While the\nnumber of sculptors named is very small, then, Browning\u2019s appreciation\nof this art surpasses his appreciation of architecture. Examples of\nthis are _Old Pictures in Florence_, in which sculpture is treated at\nconsiderable length, by comparing its merits with the aspirations of\nthe early painters, and _Pippa Passes_, in which Jules, the sculptor,\nis a prominent figure. _The Bishop orders his Tomb_ deals almost\nentirely with sculpture. Still sculpture was not Browning\u2019s favorite\nart by any means. Bodily perfection he admired; but he wished to go\nbeyond it to the soul in dramatic situations, to its struggle and\nendeavor. And for these values the powers of sculpture are limited. To\nportray successfully any very great struggle or intense feeling of the\nsoul is beyond its nature.\n\nA cause for the large amount of Italian poetry in the writings of\nBrowning has already been suggested, in part.[179] But one must further\nconsider the fact that he did not continue to deal with poets and\ntheir writings as subject matter. After the first eight years of his\ncareer, he ceased to deal with the causes connected with the failure of\npoets. Fundamentally, all arts are agencies of expression through the\nrepresentation of nature and humanity. With the breadth of vision which\nBrowning possessed concerning the possibilities of expression in all\nthe arts, there was none of the five in which he did not, at some time\nor other, wish to express himself. In the beginning of his career,\nwhen he was formulating his ideas of a poet, he expressed his ideas of\nthat art by writing about other poets. But with ideas and forms for his\nown art once fully established, the art became self-expressive. He no\nlonger needed to write about other poets; for the poet in himself had\nfound his own purpose and method.\n\nIt has already been suggested that Browning\u2019s appreciation of music,\nas he expressed it in his poems, was qualitative, rather than\nquantitative, so far as Italian music is concerned. This art rivals\npoetry in expressing the highest yearnings and ideals of which the\nsoul is capable, and is, therefore, in a very high degree, though in\nabstract form, the art of personality. And this art Browning expressed\nmost perfectly, as to the aims and ideals of its artists, when he\nchose to do so. But with all his own feeling for music and with such\nability as he expressed in performance, it, like poetry, was largely\nself-expressive for him. That is he played, instead of writing poetry\nabout music. Browning\u2019s evident preference for other music than that\nof the modern composers of Italy explains the lack of space accorded\nto them. Yet in spite of this preference the best of his musical poems\nwere built about Italians--obscure ones though they may be.\n\nBrowning did no work in actual study of the technique of painting. The\nnearest he came to it was at the time of his thirteen days application\nto drawing.[180] Yet painting is in a very large degree expressive of\nthe soul--its anguish, sorrow, failure, joy, ecstasy, or endeavor.\nDrawn to it by his interest in personality, Browning made it contribute\nlargely to his poems. The Italian painting with which he dealt had\nlittle to do with landscape or other phases of nature. It portrayed\npersons; and stimulated by the pictures which he saw, or by records\nof personality in the biography of artists, he incorporated many\nreferences to painting in his poems, dealing more largely with it than\nwith any other art. Since, too, Italy was the home of painting, his\nenvironment was very conducive to a development of his tendency to make\npainting an important element in his poems.\n\nBrowning, as poet and man, was able to forgive any sort of failure\nif the person whom he was judging had only made a thorough effort to\naccomplish something. He carried this doctrine so far as to make a\nlack of effort the cause of his censure of the Duke and the Lady in\n_The Statue and the Bust_, even though the fulfillment of their plan\nwould have been a sin. This love for endeavor, which always accompanies\nhis attitude toward any personality, along with his enthusiasm for\npersonality itself explains his selection and emphasis in his treatment\nof the arts. Painting he decidedly preferred above sculpture for\nother reasons than its greater ability in portraying the soul. This\npreference is stated in _Old Pictures in Florence_, and is based on the\nfact that Greek art had run, and \u201creached the Goal.\u201d Its effort, then,\nwas over:\n\n    \u201cThey are perfect--how else? they shall never change:\n    We are faulty--why not? we have time in store.\n    The Artificer\u2019s hand is not arrested\n    With us ...\u201d\n\n           *       *       *       *       *\n\n    \u201c\u2019Tis a life-long toil till our lump be leaven--\n    The better! What\u2019s come to perfection perishes.\u201d\n\nThese quotations from _Old Pictures in Florence_, in which the poet, by\nusing the first person in his references to the early masters of Italy\nplaces himself in their group and refers to Greek art in the third\nperson, are indications of the spirit of the poem and of Browning\u2019s\nentire attitude toward endeavor in art.\n\nTo summarize, then: few persons have as great an interest in expressing\nthemselves through all the arts as did Robert Browning. Architecture\nand sculpture he appreciated least; therefore he expressed least\nconcerning their spirit and feeling. Music was a fundamental part of\nhis life; but he was able to embody his feelings about it in music\nitself, not merely in poetry about it. Yet because of his perfect\nunderstanding of it, he has embodied its spirit in a few choice poems,\nmaking permanent, by his treatment of its evanescent quality, the\nideas that could not be left to the world by his playing. Painting he\ndeeply appreciated from childhood; but beyond a few amateur efforts\nfor diversion, he could not express his appreciation of it by means\nof that art itself. Consequently, in an unusually large number of his\npoems, he gave us his view of that art, his portraits of its followers,\nhistorical or imaginary.\n\n\nIII. PERSONALITY AND THE ARTS.--Through his presentation of artists,\nBrowning has given the world many different types of character.\nProminent among them are the following: The non-altruistic,\nimpractical poet--Sordello; the sensualist--Bocafoli; the superficial\ncharacter--Plara; the regretful but optimistic idealist--Abt Vogler;\nthe coarse realist, who yet possessed a really fine appreciation of\nGod\u2019s world--Fra Lippo Lippi; the weak, ambitionless man--Andrea\ndel Sarto; the keenly sensitive mind--Pictor Ignotus; and the\nreformer--Pacchiarotto.\n\nArt is also connected with Browning\u2019s character portrayal in a\nsecondary sort of way, of which _The Ring and the Book_ furnishes\nexcellent illustrations. In that poem people are characterized by\ntheir likeness to some work of art--_e. g._, Pompilia is compared to\nRaphael\u2019s Madonna; or by their fondness for some particular work of\nart--_e. g._, the Pope chuckling over the _Merry Tales_.\n\nWhile Browning mentioned the great masters in many different poems, it\nis noticeable that he never used one of them as the main subject of a\npoem. There are Andrea, Lippo, and Furini, but there is no Angelo and\nno Raphael. This is due to the one element of interest on Browning\u2019s\npart that has already been emphasized in this chapter and previous\nones--personality. Browning was interested in the artist he selected,\nnot merely as an artist, not as a distinguished figure, but as a human\nbeing, whose attempts, partial failure, or development, the poet wished\nus to study with him.\n\nVery often the characters whom Browning chose to present either in\nconnection with the arts or otherwise, were such as we do not approve\nof--but neither did Browning approve of them. His theory of art was no\nmere aesthetic one of art for art\u2019s sake, no mere dogma of didacticism.\nIt was rather, art for the sake of human nature, of personality. Of all\nthe characters he has drawn for us, the one whose expression of art\nbest gives Browning\u2019s own sentiments is Fra Lippo Lippi, the painter\nand realist, enthusiastic for\n\n    \u201cThe beauty and the wonder and the power,\n    The shapes of things, their colors, lights, and shades,\n    Changes, surprises--and God made it all!\n\n           *       *       *       *       *\n\n    \u201cBut why not do as well as say,--paint these\n    Just as they are, careless what comes of it?\u201d\n\nNumerous instances might be cited as a proof of this--Guido, the Duke,\nthe Bishop, and many others. All his human beings, then, Browning chose\nbecause their personality appealed to him, as a study, rather than\nbecause they compelled his admiration, whether he selected them from\nthe world of art or elsewhere.\n\n\nIV. BROWNING AS THE POET OF HUMANITY.--By consideration of Browning\u2019s\ngeneral attitude towards the arts, of his fondness for the struggle of\nthe human soul as a poetic theme, and by a discussion of his relative\nemphasis on each art and the method in which he chose to treat it,\nthe fact has been established that Browning was primarily the poet of\nthe human soul, and a poet of the arts as seen through the medium of\npersonality.\n\nWhen he was once asked if he liked nature, he replied, \u201cYes but I\nlove men and women better.\u201d The arts--architecture, music, poetry,\nsculpture, and painting--he loved also; but he loved them most because\nthey recorded human experience, and best when they most fully expressed\nthe struggles of the soul, and thus became the direct embodiment of\npersonality.\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX\n\n\n        I. POEMS CONTAINING REFERENCE TO ITALIAN ART.\n\n            1. Pauline, 1833.\n            2. Paracelsus, 1835.\n            3. Sordello, 1840.\n            4. Pippa Passes, 1841.\n            5. My Last Duchess, 1842.\n            6. In a Gondola, 1842.\n            7. Waring, 1842.\n            8. The Boy and the Angel, 1845.\n            9. Time\u2019s Revenges, 1845.\n           10. The Bishop orders his Tomb at St. Praxed\u2019s Church, 1845.\n           11. Pictor Ignotus, 1845.\n           12. The Italian in England, 1845.\n           13. Luria, 1846.\n           14. A Soul\u2019s Tragedy, 1846.\n           15. Christmas-Eve and Easter-Day, 1850.\n           16. Up at a Villa, 1855.\n           17. A Toccata of Galuppi\u2019s, 1855.\n           18. Old Pictures in Florence, 1855.\n           19. By the Fireside, 1855.\n           20. Any Wife to Any Husband, 1855.\n           21. In Three Days, 1855.\n           22. The Guardian Angel, 1855.\n           23. Master Hugues of Saxe-Gotha, 1855.\n           24. The Statue and the Bust, 1855.\n           25. How it Strikes a Contemporary, 1855.\n           26. Fra Lippo Lippi, 1855.\n           27. Andrea del Sarto, 1855.\n           28. Bishop Blougram\u2019s Apology, 1855.\n           29. One Word More, 1855.\n           30. James Lee\u2019s Wife, 1864.\n           31. Abt Vogler, 1864.\n           32. Youth and Art, 1864.\n           33. A Face, 1864.\n           34. Apparent Failure, 1864.\n           35. The Ring and the Book, 1868-9.\n           36. Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau, 1871.\n           37. Fifine at the Fair, 1872.\n           38. Red Cotton Night-Cap Country, 1873.\n           39. The Inn Album, 1875.\n           40. Pacchiarotto, 1876.\n           41. Cenciaja, 1876.\n           42. Filippo Baldinucci, 1876.\n           43. Pietro of Abano, 1880.\n           44. Christina and Monaldeschi, 1883.\n           45. With Christopher Smart, 1887.\n           46. With Francis Furini, 1887.\n           47. With Charles Avison, 1887.\n           48. Ponte dell\u2019 Angelo, Venice, 1889.\n           49. Beatrice Signorini, 1889.\n\n\n       II. TABULATION OF REFERENCES TO INDIVIDUAL ARTS.\n\n\n  SCULPTURE\n\n        I. _Sordello._\n            1. Niccolo Pisano (1206-1278). By his study of nature\n               and the ancients, gave the death-blow to\n               Byzantinism and heralded the Renaissance.\n            2. Giovanni Pisano (c. 1250-1330). His many pupils\n               carried the continuation of his father\u2019s principles\n               throughout northern Italy.\n\n       II. _Pippa Passes._\n            1. Canova (1757-1822). A refined, classical, but\n               somewhat artificial reviver of Italian sculpture in\n               the modern era.\n                a. The Psiche-fanciulla--Psycheas a young girl\n                   with a butterfly, in the Possagno Gallery.\n                b. Piet\u00e0--a statue of the Virgin with the dead\n                   Christ in her arms, in Possagno Church.\n            2. Jules. An imaginary young sculptor, studying\n               Italian models.\n                a. Almaign Kaiser.\n                b. Hippolyta.\n                c. Psyche.\n                d. Tydeus.\n\n      III. _My Last Duchess._\n            1. Claus of Innsbruck. An imaginary Renaissance\n               sculptor.\n                a. Neptune taming a sea-horse.\n\n       IV. _The Bishop orders his Tomb at St. Praxed\u2019s Church._\n            1. Tomb of the Bishop.\n            2. Globe in the Church of Il Gesu.\n\n        V. _Christmas-Eve and Easter-Day._\n            1. Early Christian attitude toward art.\n\n       VI. _Old Pictures in Florence._\n            1. Niccolo Pisano.\n            2. Ghiberti (1378-1455). A Florentine sculptor, also\n               important for perspective in painting, whose ideal\n               combined religious feeling with classical beauty.\n\n      VII. _The Statue and the Bust._\n            1. Giovanni da Bologna (John of Douay) (c. 1524-1608).\n               An Italian Renaissance sculptor who combines\n               technical knowledge with fine poetic feeling.\n                a. Statue of Duke Ferdinand, by Giovanni.\n                b. A bust of the Lady.\n\n     VIII. _The Ring and the Book._\n       (I.) 1. Baccio\u2019s marble (by Baccio Bandinelli)--statue of\n               John of the Black Bands, father of Cosimo de\u2019\n               Medici.\n            2. Bernini\u2019s Triton.\n     (III.) 3. Bernini\u2019s Triton.\n      (VI.) 4. Pasquin\u2019s statue.\n     (VII.) 5. Marble lion in San Lorenzo.\n            6. Virgin at Pompilia\u2019s street corner.\n      (XI.) 7. Bocca-dell\u2019-Verit\u00e0--the fabled test for the verity\n               of witnesses, a mask of stone in the portico of the\n               Church Santa Maria in Cosmedin.\n\n\n  MUSIC\n\n        I. _The Englishman in Italy._\n            1. Bellini (1801-1835). An Italian opera composer.\n\n       II. _A Toccata of Galuppi\u2019s._\n            1. Galuppi (1706-1785). A composer of melodious\n               rather than original operas, whose workmanship was\n               superior to that of his contemporaries in harmony\n               and orchestration.\n\n      III. _Master Hugues of Saxe-Gotha._\n            1. Master Hugues of Saxe-Gotha. An imaginary\n               composer.\n            2. Palestrina (1526-1594). Famous for saving music to\n               the church by submitting some that met with\n               approval when ecclesiastical authorities were about\n               to forbid its use.\n\n       IV. _Bishop Blougram\u2019s Apology._\n            1. Verdi (1813-1901). One of the greatest modern\n               Italian composers, best known by _Il Trovatore_,\n               _Rigoletto_, and _La Traviata_.\n            2. Rossini (1782-1868). A composer whose success\n               antedates that of Verdi; best known by his opera\n               _William Tell_.\n\n        V. _Abt Vogler._\n            1. Abt or Abbe Vogler (1749-1814). An organist and\n               composer of Bavarian birth, some of whose study and\n               public work were done in Italy. Though he invented\n               a new system of musical theory, his ideas were\n               empirical.\n\n       VI. _Youth and Art._\n            1. Grisi (1811-1869). An Italian opera singer.\n\n      VII. _The Ring and the Book._\n       (I.) 1. Corelli (1653-1713). A violin player and composer\n               who, though he employed only a limited part of his\n               instrument\u2019s compass, made an epoch in chamber\n               music and influenced Bach.\n      (IV.) 2. Magnificat--Catholic music.\n            3. Nunc Dimittis.\n      (VI.) 4. Ave.\n            5. Angelus.\n     (VII.) 6. Ave Maria.\n       (X.) 7. Sanctus et Benedictus.\n     (XII.) 8. Pater.\n            9. Ave.\n           10. Salve Regina C\u0153li.\n\n     VIII. _Red Cotton Night-Cap Country._\n            1. Guarnerius (1687-1745). Joseph del Gesu, one of the\n               most famous violin makers, who worked for boldness\n               of outline and massive construction, securing in\n               consequence, a robust tone.\n            2. Antonius Stradivarius (1644-1737). His final model,\n               with its soft varnish, now irrecoverable, brought\n               violin making to its highest perfection.\n            3. Corelli.\n            4. Paganini (1784-1840). A violin player who achieved\n               such brilliant success that his name still stands\n               for all that is wonderful in execution on that\n               instrument.\n\n       IX. _Parleyings with Charles Avison._\n            1. Buononcini (1672-1750). The author of a musical\n               treatise; his chief claim to fame being the fact\n               that he influenced Handel and Scarlotti.\n            2. Geminiani (c. 1680-1762). A violinist of\n               considerable ability, but as a composer, dry and\n               deficient in melody.\n\n\n  POETRY\n\n        I. _Paracelsus._\n            1. Aprile. An imaginary poet.\n\n       II. _Sordello._\n            1. Sordello (13th. century). The most famous of the\n               Mantuan troubadours.\n            2. Nina. A contemporary of Sordello.\n            3. Alcamo. A contemporary of Sordello.\n            4. Plara. An imaginary poet.\n            5. Bocafoli. An imaginary poet.\n            6. Eglamor. An imaginary poet.\n            7. Dante. (1265-1321).\n\n      III. _Time\u2019s Revenges._\n            1. Dante.\n\n       IV. _A Soul\u2019s Tragedy._\n            1. Stiatta. An imaginary poet.\n\n        V. _Up at a Villa._\n            1. Dante.\n            2. Petrarch (1304-1374).\n            3. Boccaccio (1313-1375).\n\n       VI. _Old Pictures in Florence._\n            1. Dante.\n\n      VII. _One Word More._\n            1. Dante--The _Inferno_.\n\n     VIII. _Apparent Failure._\n            1. Petrarch.\n\n       IX. _The Ring and the Book._\n    (III).  1. _Hundred Merry Tales._ (Boccaccio).\n      (V).  2. Boccaccio.\n            3. Sacchetti (1335-1400). A poet and novelist who left\n               many unpublished sonnetti, canzoni, ballate, and\n               madrigale, and whose novelle throw light on the\n               manners of his age.\n     (VI).  4. A Marinesque Adoniad.\n            5. Marino (1569-1625). A poet of disreputable life,\n               leader of the Secentisimo period, whose aim was to\n               excite wonder by novelties and to cloak poverty of\n               subject under form.\n            6. Dante.\n            7. Pietro Aretino (1492-1556). Author of satirical\n               sonnets, burlesques, comedies; and a man of\n               profligate life.\n      (X).  8. Aretino.\n     (XI).  9. _Merry Tales_ (Boccaccio).\n           10. Aretino.\n    (XII). 11. Petrarch.\n           12. Tommaseo (1803-1874). A modern Italian poet,\n               author of the inscription to Mrs. Browning placed\n               by the city of Florence on the walls of Casa Guidi.\n\n        X. _The Inn Album._\n            1. Dante--The _Inferno_.\n\n\n  ARCHITECTURE\n\n        I. _Sordello._\n            1. Goito. An imaginary 13th century castle, used to\n               influence the life of Sordello by its beauty and\n               solitude.\n            2. St. Mark\u2019s. A great landmark of Italian\n               architecture, in construction from the ninth to the\n               fifteenth century, and the most splendid\n               polychromatic building in Europe.\n            3. Piombi. Torture cells under the Ducal Palace at\n               Venice.\n            4. San Pietro (Martire). A Veronese Gothic church of\n               1350.\n            5. St. Francis. A Lombard Gothic church at Bassano.\n            6. Castle Angelo. A huge Roman fortress constructed in\n               the time of Hadrian.\n            7. San Miniato. A Florentine church built in Central\n               Romanesque style.\n            8. Sant\u2019 Eufemia. A 13th century Veronese church, now\n               modernized internally.\n\n       II. _Pippa Passes._\n            1. St. Mark\u2019s--Venice.\n            2. Possagno Church. Designed by Canova in 1819, as a\n               place for statues of religious subjects.\n            3. Fenice--or Phoenix. The best modern theatre of\n               Venice, built in 1836.\n            4. Academy of Fine Arts. A Renaissance building in\n               Venice.\n          Asolo Group.\n            5. Duomo of Asolo.\n            6. Pippa\u2019s Tower. Later the studio of Browning\u2019s son.\n            7. Church.\n            8. Castle of Kate--of which the banqueting hall is now\n               a theatre.\n            9. Turret.\n           10. Palace.\n           11. Mill--now a lace school.\n\n      III. _In a Gondola._\n            1. Pulci Palace--Venice.\n\n       IV. _The Boy and the Angel._\n            1. St. Peter\u2019s. In process of construction during the\n               16th and 17th centuries; the building that best\n               typifies the importance of the church during the\n               middle ages. Built on the Greek cross plan, it is\n               surmounted by the dome of Michael Angelo, the most\n               nobly beautiful of architectural creations.\n\n        V. _The Italian in England._\n            1. Duomo at Padua. A 16th century building of\n               admirable proportions.\n\n       VI. _The Bishop orders his Tomb at St. Praxed\u2019s Church._\n            1. Santa Prassede--or St. Praxed\u2019s. A church in Rome,\n               founded on the former site of a refuge for\n               persecuted Christians. It is notable for the beauty\n               of its stone work and mosaics, one of its rich\n               chapels being called Orto del Paradiso. The\n               building is old but was restored in the 15th\n               century.\n            2. Il Gesu. An ornate 16th century church in Rome,\n               representing the retrograde movement in\n               architecture.\n\n      VII. _Luria._\n            1. Duomo. The Florentine cathedral, famous for its\n               dome of 1420, its beautiful sculptured exterior and\n               its cold brown interior.\n            2. Towers of Florence--San Romano, Sant\u2019 Evola, San\n               Miniato, Santa Scala, and Sant\u2019 Empoli.\n\n     VIII. _Christmas-Eve and Easter-Day._\n            1. St. Peter\u2019s--Rome.\n\n       IX. _A Toccata of Galuppi\u2019s._\n            1. St. Mark\u2019s--Venice.\n\n        X. _The Guardian Angel._\n            1. Chapel at Fano.\n\n       XI. _Old Pictures in Florence._\n            1. Giotto (1267-1337). Architect, and the humanizer of\n               painting, as well as the builder of the Campanile.\n            2. Campanile. The bell tower of the Florentine Duomo,\n               built by Giotto in 1332; an architectural triumph\n               in beauty and splendor.\n            3. Santo Spirito. A 14th century Florentine church.\n            4. Duomo--Florence.\n            5. Ognissanti--Florence.\n\n      XII. _By the Fireside._\n            1. Chapel near Bagni di Lucca.\n\n     XIII. _The Statue and the Bust._\n            1. Antinori Palace. An example of Renaissance secular\n               architecture, built about 1481, in Florence.\n            2. Riccardi Palace. A Florentine castle, the earliest\n               and finest example of secular Renaissance\n               architecture.\n\n      XIV. _Fra Lippo Lippi._\n            1. Santa Maria del Carmine. A 15th century church and\n               convent in Florence, containing frescoes by\n               Masaccio and Filippino Lippi.\n            2. Palace of the Medici--Florence.\n            3. St. Lawrence--or San Lorenzo. A Florentine\n               Renaissance church, rebuilt about 1425.\n            4. St. Ambrose. A Florentine edifice, the reputed\n               scene of a transubstantiation miracle in 1746.\n\n       XV. _Bishop Blougram\u2019s Apology._\n            1. Vatican. The papal palace at Rome, most of which as\n               it exists now, was built no earlier than the\n               fifteenth century.\n\n      XVI. _Andrea del Sarto._\n            1. Chapel and the Convent--Florence.\n\n     XVII. _One Word More._\n            1. San Miniato--Florence.\n\n    XVIII. _Abt Vogler._\n            1. St. Peter\u2019s.\n\n      XIX. _The Ring and the Book._\n      (I).  1. San Lorenzo. The original building by Brunelleschi\n               in 1425 or perhaps 1420, was entrusted to Michael\n               Angelo for the facade. Florence.\n            2. Riccardi Palace--Florence.\n            3. San Felice Church. A little grey-walled Florentine\n               church, mostly in a very ancient Romanesque style,\n               which could be seen from the windows of Casa Guidi.\n            4. Fiano Palace. An example of secular architecture\n               in Rome, built about 1300.\n            5. Ruspoli Palace. Built by the Rucellai family in\n               1586; has one of the finest white marble stair\n               cases in Rome.\n     (II).  6. San Lorenzo--Rome. Founded by Sixtus III in 440 and\n               modernized in 1506; has a Crucifixion by Guido\n               Reni, above the high altar.\n            7. Ruspoli Palace--Rome.\n    (III).  8. Saint Anna\u2019s. A monastery in Rome.\n            9. San Lorenzo--Rome.\n     (IV). 10. San Lorenzo--Rome.\n           11. Vatican--Rome.\n      (V). 12. Tordinona--Rome.\n           13. New Prisons--Rome.\n           14. San Lorenzo--Rome.\n     (VI). 15. Pieve, or Santa Maria della Pieve. A great church\n               in Arezzo, built in the capricious, extravagant\n               style of the 13th century.\n           16. San Lorenzo--Rome.\n           17. Duomo--Arezzo.\n    (VII.) 18. San Lorenzo--Rome.\n           19. San Giovanni. A Tuscan church built in Rome at the\n               expense of the Florentines.\n           20. Pieve--Arezzo.\n   (VIII). 21. Sistine Chapel. Chapel of the Vatican, at Rome; a\n               most extreme example of figure painting in\n               decoration, but justified by the excellence of the\n               work. The ceiling is Michael Angelo\u2019s, and on the\n               altar wall is his \u201cLast Judgment.\u201d\n      (X). 22. Vatican--Rome.\n           23. Pieve--Arezzo.\n           24. Monastery of the Convertites--Rome. Founded in\n               1584, for the spiritual care of the sick at Rome.\n     (XI). 25. Certosa. A beautifully situated, very richly built\n               monastery of the Carthusians in Val d\u2019 Ema, four\n               miles from Florence, built in the 14th century\n               Gothic style.\n           26. Vallombrosa Convent. Situated near Florence;\n               founded about 1650, by a repentant profligate.\n           27. Palace in Via Larga. Secular Florentine\n               architecture.\n           28. San Lorenzo--Rome.\n           29. Vatican--Rome.\n    (XII). 30. New Prisons--Rome.\n           31. San Lorenzo--Rome.\n           32. Monastery of the Convertites--Rome.\n\n       XX. _Fifine at the Fair._\n            1. St. Mark\u2019s--Venice.\n\n      XXI. _Pacchiarotto._\n            1. San Bernardino. A Renaissance church at Siena, with\n               an Oratory, containing work of Beccafumi, Pacchia,\n               and Pacchiarotto.\n            2. Duomo at Siena. An unfinished cathedral, the most\n               purely Gothic of all of those of Italy, of\n               unrivalled solemnity and splendor.\n\n     XXII. _Filippo Baldinucci._\n            1. San Frediano. A modern Florentine church.\n\n    XXIII. _Pietro of Abano._\n            1. Lateran. Formerly the Papal residence, though the\n               present structure, of 1586, was never used for that\n               purpose and is now a museum of classical sculpture\n               and early Christian remains.\n\n     XXIV. _With Francis Furini._\n            1. San Sano, or Ansano. A Florentine parish church.\n\n      XXV. _Ponte del Angelo, Venice._\n            1. House along the Bridge, of no importance\n               architecturally, but connected with an old legend\n               which is the subject of the poem.\n\n\n  PAINTING\n\n        I. _Pauline._\n            1. Andromeda. By Polidoro da Caravaggio--the picture\n               of Perseus freeing her from the sea monster.\n\n       II. _Sordello._\n            1. Guido of Siena (c. 1250--). The disputed artist of\n               a Virgin and Child, the date of which may be either\n               1221 or 1281. If it be the former, some of\n               Cimabue\u2019s claims are disturbed by Guido\u2019s earlier\n               work.\n            2. Guido Reni (1575-1642). A prime master in the\n               Bolognese school, faithful to its eclectic\n               principles and working with considerable artistic\n               feeling, but still with a certain \u201ccore of the\n               commonplace.\u201d\n            3. Andromeda. By Caravaggio.\n\n      III. _Pippa Passes._\n            1. Annibale Carracci (burlesque--\u201cHannibal Scratchy\u201d)\n               (1560-1609). With his brother and his uncle founded\n               the Bolognese school, which was eclectic and\n               comprised the good points of all the great masters.\n            2. Correggio (1494-1534). The head of the Lombard\n               School at Parma, a painter of graceful naturalness\n               and sweetness and of great technical power in\n               chiaroscuro.\n            3. Titian (1477-1576). A Venetian painter who lacked\n               inventiveness but was the greatest of colorists.\n                a. Annunciation--in the Cathedral at Treviso,\n                   painted by Titian in 1519.\n\n       IV. _My Last Duchess._\n            1. Fra Pandolf. An imaginary artist.\n\n        V. _In a Gondola._\n            1. Schidone (c. 1570-1615). A portrait painter of the\n               Lombard school.\n                a. Eager Duke. An imaginary picture.\n            2. Luca Giordano (1632-1705). Called Luke-work-fast\n               because of his father\u2019s miserly urging; a painter\n               of superficiality and facility.\n                a. Prim Saint. An imaginary picture.\n            3. Giorgione (Castelfranco) (1477-1510). A Venetian\n               painter who did for his school what Leonardo da\n               Vinci had done for Florence twenty years earlier.\n                a. Magdalen--imaginary.\n            4. Titian.\n                a. Ser (a picture).\n\n       VI. _Waring._\n            1. Polidoro da Caravaggio.\n\n      VII. _Pictor Ignotus._\n            1. Pictor Ignotus--an imaginary painter of Italy.\n\n     VIII. _Christmas-Eve and Easter-Day._\n            1. Michael Angelo and discussion of painting.\n\n       IX. _Old Pictures in Florence._\n            1. Michael Angelo (1475-1564). A Florentine master in\n               painting, sculpture, and architecture. No other\n               single person ever so dominated art as he, with his\n               Italian \u201cterribilita\u201d, or stormy energy of\n               conception, and his great dramatic power.\n            2. Raphael (1483-1520). A master of combined\n               draughtsmanship, coloring, and graceful\n               composition; popular and unexcelled in versatility.\n            3. Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519). The earliest of the\n               great masters of the High Renaissance, and the\n               first to completely master anatomy and technique.\n            4. Cavaliere Dello (c. 1404-c. 1464). An unimportant\n               Florentine painter of frescoes.\n            5. Stefano (1324?-1357?). Called the \u201cApe of Nature\u201d\n               because he followed her closely in an age of\n               unrealistic painting.\n            6. Cimabue (1240-c. 1302). The first painter of\n               importance in the revival of that art, the one who\n               formed its first principles, though he owed\n               something to the Pisan sculptors.\n            7. Ghirlandajo (1449-1494). Good in his general\n               attainment but lacking in originality, and\n               remembered for one famous pupil--Michael Angelo.\n            8. Sandro (Botticelli) (1444-1510). A Florentine\n               painter, imbued with a strain of fantasy,\n               mysticism, and allegory.\n            9. Lippino (1460-1505). The son of Fra Lippo Lippi, a\n               painter of considerable skill, the first to\n               introduce detail in antique costumes.\n           10. Fra Angelico (1387-1455). A holy, self-denying\n               painter of faces that showed a \u201csexless\n               religiosity.\u201d\n           11. Lorenzo Monaco (1370-1425). A Florentine monk and\n               painter of much religious sentiment.\n           12. Pollajolo (1429-1498). An important painter whose\n               works show brutality, but who was a close student\n               of muscular anatomy.\n           13. Baldovinetti (1427-1499). A Florentine; one of a\n               group of scientific realists and naturalists.\n           14. Margheritone (c. 1236-1289). An early Tuscan\n               painter whose work shows the stiffness and crude\n               color of the Byzantine artists.\n           15. Carlo Dolci (1616-1686). An unimportant Florentine\n               painter of careful workmanship and religious\n               sentimentality.\n           16. Giotto (1267?-1337). A painter and architect, the\n               real humanizer of painting.\n           17. Andrea Orgagna (1308-1368). A Florentine painter\n               and artist in other lines as well.\n           18. Taddeo Gaddi (c. 1300-1366). Painter and architect.\n\n        X. _In Three Days._\n            1. General reference to early art.\n\n       XI. _The Guardian Angel._\n            1. Guercino (1591-1666). The \u201csquint-eyed\u201d; a\n               Bolognese painter.\n                a. Angel at Fano.\n\n      XII. _Any Wife to Any Husband._\n            1. Titian\u2019s Venus.\n\n     XIII. _How it Strikes a Contemporary._\n            1. Titian.\n\n      XIV. _Fra Lippo Lippi._\n            1. Lippi (1406-1469). A realist of good coloring and\n               technique, a painter of enjoyable pictures showing\n               power of observation.\n                a. Jerome.\n                b. St. Lawrence.\n                c. Coronation of the Virgin--in St. Ambrose.\n            2. Angelico.\n            3. Monaco.\n            4. Guidi Masaccio (1402-1429). A Florentine; the\n               master of Lippi, the first to make considerable\n               advancement in atmospheric perspective and to paint\n               architectural background in proportion to the human\n               figures.\n            5. Giotto.\n\n       XV. _Andrea del Sarto._\n            1. Andrea (1487-1513). A Florentine, the \u201cfaultless\n               painter,\u201d who lacked elevation and ideality in his\n               works.\n            2. Raphael.\n            3. Vasari (1511-1571). A Florentine artist, student of\n               Michael Angelo, imitative and feeble as a painter,\n               but interesting as an art historian.\n            4. Michael Angelo.\n            5. Leonardo da Vinci.\n\n      XVI. _Bishop Blougram\u2019s Apology._\n            1. Correggio.\n                a. Jerome.\n            2. Giulio Romano (1429-1546). A rather ornate artist,\n               the executor of some work on the Vatican.\n            3. Raphael.\n            4. Michael Slaying the Dragon--by Raphael.\n\n     XVII. _One Word More._\n            1. Raphael.\n                a. Sistine Madonna.\n                b. Madonna Foligno.\n                c. Madonna of the Grand Duke.\n                d. Madonna of the Lilies.\n            2. Guido Reni.\n            3. Lippi.\n            4. Andrea.\n\n    XVIII. _James Lee\u2019s Wife._\n            1. Leonardo da Vinci.\n\n      XIX. _A Face._\n            1. Correggio.\n            2. General reference to the early art of Tuscany.\n\n       XX. _The Ring and the Book._\n      (I).  1. Luigi Ademollo (1764-1849). A Florentine painter of\n               historical and fresco works, whose works show\n               superficial skill.\n            2. Joconde, or Mona Lisa, by Da Vinci--the woman of\n               the mysterious smile, recently returned to the\n               Louvre.\n     (II).  3. Guido Reni.\n                a. Crucifixion, in San Lorenzo at Rome.\n    (III).  4. Carlo Maratta (1625-1713). A painter at Rome, an\n               imitator of Raphael and the Carracci.\n     (IV).  5. Raphael.\n            6. Correggio.\n                a. Leda.\n      (V).  7. Pietro da Cortona (1596-1669). Mainly a scenic and\n               fresco painter, the estimate of whom has declined\n               since his own time.\n            8. Ciro Ferri (1634-1689). A pupil of Pietro, so\n               imitative of his master that the work of the two\n               cannot be distinguished.\n     (VI).  9. Raphael.\n    (VII). 10. St. George Slaying the Dragon--by Vasari.\n   (VIII). 11. Carlo Maratta.\n     (IX). 12. Maratta.\n           13. Luca Giordano.\n           14. Michael Angelo.\n           15. Raphael.\n           16. Pietro da Cortona.\n           17. Ciro Ferri.\n      (X). 18. St. Michael.\n     (XI). 19. Albani (1587-1660). A Bolognese who also worked at\n               Rome; a painter of minute elaboration and finish,\n               and one of the first to devote himself to cabinet\n               painting.\n           20. Picture in Vallombrosa Convent.\n           21. Raphael--any picture.\n           22. Titian.\n           23. Fra Angelico.\n           24. Michael Angelo.\n    (XII). 25. Michael Angelo.\n\n      XXI. _Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau._\n            1. Raphael.\n            2. Salvator Rosa (1615-1673). A Neapolitan painter of\n               battle scenes and landscapes, with a tendency\n               toward the picturesque and romantic.\n\n     XXII. _Fifine at the Fair._\n            1. Raphael.\n            2. Bazzi (1477-1594). An Italian Renaissance painter\n               who was greatly influenced by Leonardo da Vinci,\n               and in turn, had great influence on the Sienese\n               school.\n            3. Michael Angelo.\n\n    XXIII. _Red Cotton Night-Cap Country._\n            1. Michael Angelo.\n            2. Correggio.\n                a. Leda.\n\n     XXIV. _Pacchiarotto and How He Worked in Distemper._\n            1. Pacchiarotto (1474-?). A Sienese painter, reformer,\n               and conspirator.\n            2. Pacchia (b. 1477). A Sienese painter contemporary\n               to Pacchiarotto, and also a reformer and\n               conspirator.\n            3. Fungaio (c. 1460-c. 1516). One of the last of the\n               old school. His works have rigidity and awkward\n               stiffness.\n            4. Bazzi.\n            5. Beccafumi (1486-1551). A Sienese painter who weakly\n               imitated Angelo and attempted to rival Sodoma.\n            6. Giotto.\n\n      XXV. _Filippo Baldinucci._\n            1. Buti. The painter\u2019s name under which Baldinucci, in\n               his history of art, records the events forming the\n               subject of Browning\u2019s poem.\n            2. Titian.\n                a. Leda.\n            3. Baldinucci (1624-1696). A Florentine art historian\n               who attempted to prove the theory that all art was\n               derived from his native city.\n\n     XXVI. _Cenciaja._\n            1. Titian.\n\n    XXVII. _Christina and Monaldeschi._\n            1. Primaticcio (1504-1570). An Italian painter of the\n               Bolognese school, who did the first important\n               stucco and fresco work in France.\n\n   XXVIII. _Mary Wollstonecraft and Fuseli._\n            1. Fuseli. (1741-1825). An English painter of\n               exaggerated style, who attempted to be Italianate\n               and changed his name to harmonize with the attempt.\n\n     XXIX. _Parleyings with Christopher Smart._\n            1. Michael Angelo.\n            2. Raphael.\n\n      XXX. _Parleyings with Francis Furini._\n            1. Furini (1600-1649). A Florentine artist and an\n               excellent painter of the nude, who later became a\n               parish priest and wished his undraped pictures\n               destroyed.\n            2. Michael Angelo.\n            3. Baldinucci.\n            4. Da Vinci.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n  _Abt Vogler_, 14, 15, 23, 25, 26, 36, 48, 49, 53, 58, 64\n\n  Academy of Fine Arts, Venice, 62\n\n  Ademollo, Luigi, 71\n\n  _Agamemnon_, 14\n\n  Albani, 71\n\n  Alcamo (in _Sordello_), 29, 30, 31, 60\n\n  _Andrea del Sarto_, 27, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 53, 64, 70\n\n  \u201cAndromeda,\u201d Caravaggio\u2019s, 41, 44, 66, 67\n\n  _Any Wife to Any Husband_, 44, 69\n\n  _Apparent Failure_, 60\n\n  Aprile (in _Paracelsus_), 29, 30, 31, 60\n\n  Aretino, Pietro, 29, 33, 61\n\n  _Aristophanes\u2019 Apology_, 14\n\n  Augustus, a bust by Browning, 12\n\n\n  Baldovinetti, 69\n\n  Bandinelli, Baccio, 15, 21, 57\n\n  Bazzi, Giovanni Antonio, 45, 48, 72\n\n  _Beatrice Signorini_, 41, 44, 45, 46\n\n  Beccafumi, 66, 72\n\n  Beethoven, 10\n\n  Bellini, Vincenzo, 23, 24, 25, 27, 58\n\n  Bernini, 15, 57\n\n  _Bishop Blougram\u2019s Apology_, 26, 27, 36, 44, 58, 64, 70\n\n  _Bishop orders his Tomb, The_, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 36, 38, 49, 50, 57,\n        62\n\n  Bocafoli (in _Sordello_), 29, 30, 31, 53, 60\n\n  Boccaccio, 29, 32, 33, 60, 61\n\n  \u201cBocca-dell\u2019-Verita,\u201d 15, 21, 58\n\n  Botticelli, 68\n\n  _Boy and the Angel, The_, 36, 62\n\n  Browning, Elizabeth Barrett, 10, 11, 12, 13, 26, 34, 41, 42, 43, 49,\n        61\n\n  Browning, Wiedemann, 10, 11\n\n  Buononcini, Giovanni Battista, 23, 25, 59\n\n  Buti, 73\n\n  Byron, Lord, 23, 38\n\n  _By the Fireside_, 9, 36, 63\n\n\n  Campanile, The, Florence, 35, 36, 43, 63\n\n  Canova, 12, 15, 18, 22, 56, 57, 62\n\n  Caravaggio, 41, 44, 66, 67, 68\n\n  Carracci, Annibale, 12, 67\n\n  Castle Angelo, 61\n\n  Catholic Hymns, 23-24, 59\n\n  _Cenciaja_, 45, 73\n\n  Chapel near Bagni di Lucca, 63;\n    at Fano, 63;\n    at Florence, 64\n\n  _Charles Avison, Parleyings with_, 25, 26, 45, 48, 59\n\n  _Christina and Monaldeschi_, 73\n\n  _Christmas-Eve and Easter-Day_, 9, 16, 17, 20, 22, 36, 38, 50, 57, 63,\n        68\n\n  _Christopher Smart, Parleyings with_, 45, 73\n\n  Churches, Italian:\n    Il Gesu, 57, 63;\n    Ognissanti, 63;\n    Pieve at Arezzo, 37, 65;\n    Possagno, 57, 62;\n    St. Francis, 61;\n    St. Mark\u2019s, 36, 61, 62, 63, 66;\n    St. Peter\u2019s, 36, 38, 39, 50, 62, 63, 64;\n    S. Ambrogio, 47, 64, 70;\n    S. Bernardino, 66;\n    S. Empoli, 63;\n    S. Eufemia, 62;\n    S. Evola, 63;\n    S. Felice, 64;\n    S. Frediano, 66;\n    S. Giovanni, 65;\n    S. Lorenzo, 36, 58, 64, 65, 66, 71;\n    S. Miniato, 61, 63, 64;\n    S. Maria della Scala, 63;\n    S. Maria del Carmine, 64;\n    S. Maria in Cosmedin, 58;\n    S. Pietro Martire, 61;\n    S. Pressede (St. Praxed\u2019s), 19, 38, 62;\n    S. Romano, 63;\n    S. Sano, 66;\n    S. Spirito, 63\n\n  Cimabue, 40, 42, 66, 68\n\n  Claus of Innsbruck (in _My Last Duchess_), 15, 19, 57\n\n  Convent, at Florence, 64; Vallombrosa, 65, 72\n\n  Corelli, Arcangelo, 23, 25, 59\n\n  Correggio, 12, 40, 44, 67, 70, 71, 72;\n    his \u201cJerome\u201d, 70, 72;\n    \u201cLeda\u201d, 71, 72\n\n  \u201cCrucifixion\u201d, Guido\u2019s, 37, 71\n\n\n  Dante, 29, 32, 33, 34, 60, 61\n\n  \u201cDavid\u201d, Domenichino\u2019s, 12\n\n  Da Vinci, Leonardo, 12, 40, 44, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73;\n    \u201cMona Lisa\u201d, 71\n\n  _Decameron_, The, 33, 60, 61\n\n  Dello di Niccolo Delli, 40, 68\n\n  _De Vulgario Eloquio_, 32\n\n  _Divine Comedy, The_, 32\n\n  Dolci, Carlo, 69\n\n  Domenichino, 12\n\n  Dore, Gustave, 45\n\n  Dramatic Monologue, Use of, 49\n\n  Dulwich Gallery, 10, 11\n\n  Duomo, The, at Arezzo, 65;\n    at Asolo, 62;\n    at Florence, 36, 63;\n    at Padua, 62;\n    at Siena, 66\n\n  Dvorak, Antonin, 25\n\n\n  \u201cEager Duke, The\u201d, (in _In a Gondola_), 67\n\n  Eastlake, Sir Charles, 13\n\n  Eglamor (in _Sordello_), 29, 30, 60\n\n  _Elegy on Newstead Abbey_, Byron\u2019s, 38\n\n  _Englishman in Italy, The_, 24, 58\n\n  _Epistle of Karshish, An_, 14\n\n\n  _Face, A_, 45, 49, 71\n\n  Fauveau, Mme. de, 11\n\n  Fenice Theatre, Venice, 62\n\n  Ferdinand, Statue of Duke, 15, 20, 57\n\n  _Ferishtah\u2019s Fancies_, 14\n\n  Ferri, Ciro, 45, 71\n\n  _Fifine at the Fair_, 45, 48, 66, 72\n\n  _Filippo Baldinucci_, 44, 45, 46, 49, 66, 73\n\n  Fisher, Mr., 11\n\n  _Flight of the Duchess, The_, 9\n\n  Fountain of the Tritons, 15, 21, 57\n\n  Fra Angelico, 69, 70, 72\n\n  _Fra Lippo Lippi_, 14, 15, 36, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 53, 64, 68,\n        69, 70\n\n  _Francis Furini, Parleyings with_, 45, 46, 53, 66, 73\n\n  Fungaio, 72\n\n  Fuseli, 73\n\n\n  Gaddi, Taddeo, 35, 69\n\n  Galuppi, Baldassaro, 23, 27, 58\n\n  Geminiani, Francesco, 23, 25, 59\n\n  Ghiberti, Lorenzo, 15, 57\n\n  Ghirlandajo, 42, 43, 68\n\n  Gibson, John, 11\n\n  Giorgione, 67\n\n  Giordano, Luca, 45, 67, 71\n\n  _Giorno di Regno, Un_, Verdi\u2019s, 27\n\n  Giottino, 42\n\n  Giotto, 35, 39, 42, 63, 69, 70, 72\n\n  Giovanni da Bologna (John of Douay), 15, 57\n\n  Goito Castle, 20, 38, 61\n\n  _Gold Hair_, 14\n\n  Grisi, Giulia, 23, 25, 27, 59\n\n  _Guardian Angel, The_, 42, 43, 45, 49, 63, 69\n\n  Guarnerius (Joseph del Jesu), 23, 25, 59\n\n  Guercino, 12, 43, 69\n\n  Guido of Siena, 66\n\n\n  Handel, George Frederick, 25, 59\n\n  Haworth, Miss, 11, 12, 22\n\n  _Herakles_, 14\n\n  Horne, R. H., 13, 42\n\n  Hosmer, Harriet, 11\n\n  _How it Strikes a Contemporary_, 29, 69\n\n\n  _In a Gondola_, 36, 62, 67\n\n  _Inn Album, The_, 61\n\n  _Inside of the King\u2019s College Chapel_ (Wordsworth), 38\n\n  _In the Cathedral at Cologne_ (Wordsworth), 38\n\n  _In Three Days_, 44, 69\n\n  _Italian in England, The_, 36, 62\n\n\n  _James Lee\u2019s Wife_, 44, 71\n\n  Jameson, Mrs., 12, 42\n\n  \u201cJohn of the Black Bands,\u201d statue of, 15, 57\n\n  Jules (in _Pippa Passes_), 15, 18, 44, 50, 57\n\n\n  Keats, 9\n\n  Kenyon, Frederick G., 10, 37, 43\n\n  Kirkup, Mr., 11, 42\n\n  Kugler, Franz, _Handbook of the History of Art_, 13\n\n\n  _Lady and the Painter, The_, 20\n\n  Lateran, The, 66\n\n  Leighton, Frederick, 11, 28, 36\n\n  Lippi, Filippino, 40, 64, 68\n\n  Liszt, Franz, 25\n\n  _Luria_, 14, 36, 63\n\n\n  Madonna, Raphael\u2019s, 44, 53\n\n  Magdalen (_In a Gondola_), 67\n\n  Maratta, Carlo, 44, 45, 71\n\n  Margheritone, 69\n\n  Marino, 29, 61\n\n  _Mary Wollstonescraft and Fuseli_, 73\n\n  Masaccio, Guidi, 47, 64, 70\n\n  _Master Hugues of Saxe-Gotha_, 23, 25, 26, 49, 58\n\n  _Memorabilia_, 32, 34\n\n  _Men and Women_, 12\n\n  _Merry Tales_, Sacchetti\u2019s, 33\n\n  Michael Angelo, 27, 40, 43, 45, 48, 53, 62, 64, 65, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73\n\n  Michael, Raphael\u2019s, 44, 70\n\n  Monaco, Lorenzo, 69, 70\n\n  Monastery, Certosa, 65;\n    of the Convertites, 65, 66;\n    of St. Anna, 65\n\n  _My Last Duchess_, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 49, 57, 67\n\n\n  Neptune, (statue in _My Last Duchess_), 19, 57\n\n  Nina (in _Sordello_), 29, 30, 31, 60\n\n\n  _Old Abbeys_ (Wordsworth), 38\n\n  _Old Pictures in Florence_, 15, 16, 17, 22, 35, 36, 39, 40, 42, 43,\n        45, 49, 50, 52, 57, 60, 63, 68\n\n  _One Word More_, 29, 32, 36, 42, 45, 49, 60, 64, 70\n\n  Orgagna, 69\n\n  Orr\u2019s, Mrs., _Life of Browning_, 10, 11, 41\n\n\n  Pacchia, 66, 72\n\n  _Pacchiarotto_, 36, 45, 46, 53, 66, 72\n\n  Paganini, Niccolo, 23, 25, 27, 59\n\n  Page, William, 11\n\n  Palace, Antinori, 63;\n    Ducal, Venice, 61;\n    Fiano, 64;\n    Medici, 64;\n    Pulci, 62;\n    Riccardi, 64;\n    Ruspoli, 64, 65;\n    Via Larga, 65\n\n  Palestrina, 23, 58\n\n  Pandolf, Fra (in _My Last Duchess_), 67\n\n  _Paracelsus_, 29, 30, 31, 42, 60\n\n  Pasquin\u2019s statue, 15, 21, 58\n\n  _Pauline_, 9, 29, 30, 32, 34, 41, 44, 66\n\n  Petrarch, 29, 32, 60, 61\n\n  _Pheidippides_, 14\n\n  _Pictor Ignotus_, 42, 45, 46, 49, 53, 68\n\n  \u201cPieta\u201d, Canova\u2019s, 15, 57\n\n  Pietro d\u2019 Abano, 66\n\n  Pietro da Cortona, 45, 71\n\n  _Pippa Passes_, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 36, 42, 44, 50, 56, 62, 67\n\n  Pisano, Giovanni, 15, 16, 17, 56, 68\n\n  Pisano, Niccolo, 15, 16, 17, 56, 57, 68\n\n  Plara (in _Sordello_), 29, 30, 31, 53, 60\n\n  Pollajola, Antonio, 40, 69\n\n  _Ponte dell\u2019 Angelo, Venice_, 66\n\n  Powers, Hiram, 11, 28\n\n  Primaticcio, 73\n\n  \u201cPrim Saint\u201d (in _In a Gondola_), 67\n\n  _Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau_, 72\n\n  \u201cPsiche-fanciulla\u201d, Canova\u2019s, 15, 57\n\n  Psyche, a bust by Browning, 12\n\n\n  Raphael, 27, 40, 43, 44, 45, 48, 53, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73\n\n  _Red Cotton Night-Cap Country_, 25, 45, 59, 72\n\n  Reni, Guido, 12, 43, 65, 67, 69, 70, 71\n\n  _Ring and the Book, The_, 12, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22, 24, 33, 36, 37, 38,\n        40, 44, 45, 53, 57, 58, 59, 60, 64, 65, 71\n\n  Romanelli, 46, 47\n\n  Romano, Giulio, 44, 70\n\n  Rossetti, W. M., 47\n\n  Rossini, 23, 25, 27, 28, 58\n\n\n  Sacchetti, Franco, 29, 33, 34, 53, 60\n\n  St. George, Vasari\u2019s, 71\n\n  Salvator Rosa, 72\n\n  _Saul_, 23\n\n  Schidone, 67\n\n  Ser (a picture), 67\n\n  Ser Giovanni, 65\n\n  Shelley, 9, 30, 32, 34, 48\n\n  _Sonnet on Chillon_, Byron\u2019s, 38\n\n  _Sordello_, 12, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37, 38,\n        42, 44, 53, 56, 60, 61, 66\n\n  _Soul\u2019s Tragedy, A_, 18, 29, 60\n\n  _Statue and the Bust, The_, 16, 17, 20, 22, 36, 38, 52, 57, 63\n\n  Stefano, 40, 68\n\n  Stiatta (in _A Soul\u2019s Tragedy_), 29, 60\n\n  Story, W. W., 11, 12, 28\n\n  Stradivarius, Antonius, 23, 25, 59\n\n  _Strafford_, 29\n\n\n  Tasso, Torquato, 29\n\n  Technical Art Terms, Browning\u2019s use of, 21, 26\n\n  _Time\u2019s Revenges_, 32, 60\n\n  Titian, 40, 44, 67, 72, 73;\n    \u201cAnnunciation,\u201d 67;\n    \u201cVenus,\u201d 44, 69\n\n  _Toccata of Galuppi\u2019s, A_, 23, 25, 26, 36, 49, 58, 63\n\n  Tommaseo, Niccolo, 29, 34, 61\n\n  Tordinona, 65\n\n  Towers of Florence, 63\n\n  _Trovatore, Il_, Verdi\u2019s, 26, 58\n\n  _Two Poets of Croisic_, The, 14\n\n\n  _Up at a Villa_, 32, 60\n\n\n  Vallombrosa Convent, 65, 72\n\n  Vasari, Giorgio, 13, 42, 44, 70\n\n  Vatican, The, 36, 64, 65, 70;\n    Sistine Chapel, 65\n\n  Verdi, Giuseppe, 23, 25, 26, 27, 58\n\n  _Vita Nuova, La_, 32\n\n\n  Wagner, Richard, 25\n\n  _Waring_, 44, 68\n\n  Wilde, Mr., 11\n\n  Wordsworth, 9, 38, 48\n\n\n  _Youth and Art_, 25, 59\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[163] Mrs. Sutherland Orr\u2019s _Life of Browning_, revised by Frederick G.\nKenyon.\n\n[164] Mrs. Orr: _op. cit._\n\n[165] For the sources and nature of this interest, see below, Chapter\nII and p. 50.\n\n[166] Bavarian by birth, Abt Vogler was ordained a priest at Rome, and\nplayed in that city for years. His significance in musical history\nseems associated with Italy rather than Bavaria.\n\n[167] See _An Epistle of Karshish_; _Ferishtah\u2019s Fancies_.\n\n[168] See _Pheidippides_; _Aristophanes\u2019 Apology_; _Herakles_;\n_Agamemnon_.\n\n[169] See _Gold Hair, A Story of Pornic_; _The Two Poets of Croisic_.\n\n[170] See the next page.\n\n[171] See below, pp. 44, 46.\n\n[172] See above, p. 12.\n\n[173] See _Ring and the Book_, I.\n\n[174] Line 382.\n\n[175] Letter by Mrs. Browning, December, 1847.\n\n[176] See above, p. 10.\n\n[177] _Op. cit._\n\n[178] August, 1848.\n\n[179] See Chapter IV, p. 30 and _passim_.\n\n[180] See above, p. 12.\n\n\n\n\n  BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS\n  HUMANISTIC STUDIES\n\n  _Vol. I_          _January 1, 1915_          _No. 4_\n\n\n  THE SEMANTICS OF\n  -MENTUM, -BULUM, AND -CULUM\n\n  BY\n\n  EDMUND D. CRESSMAN, Ph. D.\n  _Assistant Professor of Latin in the University of Kansas_\n\n\n  LAWRENCE, JANUARY, 1915\n  PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThis treatise is printed in substantially the same form in which it\nwas presented to the faculty of Yale University as a doctor\u2019s thesis.\nThe subject was suggested by Professor E. P. Morris, and the study was\ncarried on under his direction. To him, and to Professor Hanns Oertel,\nwho made helpful suggestions, the author is under obligation not only\nfor the method employed but also for the general theory underlying the\nwhole study.\n\nThe writer also wishes to thank Professor S. L. Whitcomb, the editor of\nthis series, for valuable help in preparing the work for publication.\n\n                              E. D. C.\n\n  Lawrence, Kansas,\n    Jan. 1, 1915.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n  CHAPTER I\n\n  Introductory                                                         7\n\n\n  CHAPTER II\n\n  Influence of Stem-Meaning                                           10\n\n  I. -Mentum.\n\n    A. Concrete -mentum Words on Verb Stems.\n      1. Nouns denoting result of action, with general application    10\n      2. Nouns denoting result of action, with restricted\n           application                                                11\n      3. Nouns denoting instrument, with general application          12\n      4. Nouns denoting instrument, with both general and figurative\n           application                                                13\n      5. Nouns denoting instrument, with specialized application      14\n      6. Nouns denoting instrument, with both specialized and\n           figurative application                                     15\n      7. Nouns not classified                                         16\n\n    B. Concrete -mentum Words on Noun and Adjective Stems             17\n\n    C. Abstract -mentum Words on Verb Stems.\n      1. Nouns denoting result of action                              18\n      2. Nouns denoting instrument                                    20\n      3. Nouns denoting action                                        22\n\n    D. Abstract -mentum Words on Noun Stems                           23\n\n  II. -Bulum.\n      1. Nouns denoting instrument                                    24\n      2. Nouns denoting place                                         25\n      3. Nouns denoting person                                        26\n\n  III. -Culum.\n\n    A. Concrete -culum Words.\n      1. Nouns denoting instrument                                    27\n      2. Nouns denoting place                                         29\n      3. Nouns denoting object of action                              30\n\n    B. Abstract -culum Words, All Denoting Action                     30\n\n\n  CHAPTER III\n\n  Influence of Context                                                32\n\n\n  CHAPTER IV\n\n  Overlapping of Suffixes                                             43\n\n    A. Parallels of -mentum and Accessory Suffixes                    44\n    B. Parallels of -bulum and Accessory Suffixes                     49\n    C. Parallels of -culum and Accessory Suffixes                     50\n\n\n  CHAPTER V\n\n  Suffixes and the Theory of Adaptation                               52\n\n  Index of Words                                                      55\n\n\n\n\nThe Semantics of -mentum, -bulum, and -culum\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nINTRODUCTORY\n\n\nThe primary object of this study will be to show, first, the range\nof semantic variability discernible in a set of noun-formative\nsuffixes and the reason for it; and second, by a comparison of these\nsuffixes with other suffixes used on the same stem, to illustrate\nthe comparatively fluid semantic condition of formative suffixes in\ngeneral. The semantic value will be determined by an examination of the\nmeaning of the whole noun and its relation to the surrounding context.\n\nThe suffixes chosen for investigation were _-mentum_, _-bulum_, and\n_-culum_. They form neuters and are joined mainly to verb stems. In\nall grammars they are grouped together as forming nouns signifying the\ninstrument or means of action, sometimes result of action, sometimes\nplace, rarely the action itself. Such general statements are true and\nperhaps adequate for the purpose of stating a brief grammatical rule;\nbut it will be seen from the following pages that these suffixes are\ncapable of much greater variations.\n\nThe material for investigation was collected from the literature\nextending to the Augustan period, and consisted of approximately four\nthousand examples, many of which were of course duplicates, so that\ncomparatively only a small percentage of them were really valuable.\nIn order that the material might not seem too slight for drawing\nconclusions as to later periods, useful examples were also gathered\nfrom the literature of the Empire, by means of the lexicons and\nindexes; but the evidence contributed by the latter was in large part\nonly cumulative, not revealing any other influences upon meaning than\nthose found in the earlier period. In Chapter IV the difference in\nfrequency of use of nouns in different periods will be discussed in\ndetail.\n\nInscriptions were not taken as sources of material on account of the\nisolated positions in which words usually occur. Such fragmentary\nevidence would not contribute much where the meaning of a word, which\ndepends so much on its immediate context, is to be examined.\n\nFor purposes of clearness, it will be well to explain here in just what\nsense the term \u201cmeaning\u201d will be used. Linguistic history shows that\n\u201cwords are constantly gaining in precision. Through the associations\nset up in the process of expression, the meaning of a word is being\nconstantly deepened and enriched. The connotation is, in general,\nincreasing and the denotation, that is, the range of application, is\nnarrowing.\u201d[181]\n\nThere is of course something fundamental in every word that\ndistinguishes it from other words; but this does not exhaust the whole\nmeaning of most words. Only when used in a sentence, with other words,\nin a context, does a word acquire its full and precise meaning. By\nstripping a word of the connotation and denotation which it shows in\nmany contexts, there is left, as it were, a common denominator; and it\nis as a result of this logical operation that we assign a meaning to a\ndetached and isolated word.\n\nCaution must also be exercised in speaking of the \u201cmeaning\u201d of\nsuffixes. Isolated suffixes have a meaning even less than words do.\nIt is incorrect to say that _-mentum_, or _-bulum_, or _-culum_ means\ninstrument; the nouns made with them may have this meaning, but the\nsuffixes are perhaps colorless in themselves. This is true of suffixes\nused to form other parts of speech as well as nouns; _e. g._, a suffix\nforming an adjective signifying material or appurtenance cannot be\nsaid to _mean_ \u201cmade of,\u201d \u201cbelonging to,\u201d or \u201cfull of,\u201d although its\nequivalence to such expressions can be shown when in each occurrence\nof the adjective the relation of the stem of the adjective to the\ngoverning noun is taken into consideration.\n\nThe etymology of the three suffixes will be explained in Chapter IV.\n\nThe investigation of my material revealed at least two fairly definite\ninfluences at work on any single meaning of a word: (1) Stem-meaning;\n(2) Context; while (3) a very important factor in illustrating the\nvariability and non-stability of the suffixes is seen in comparing\nthem with other suffixes on the same stem, noting their similarity or\ndifference, and finding if possible the reason for it. A chapter will\nbe devoted to each one of these main topics. Sometimes all three of\nthese factors exert their influence on a word, more often one or both\nof the first two make the meaning clear. The first, or stem-meaning,\nregularly gives a general meaning to the word, while the context\ngives a special or more precise meaning. As far as possible only one\ninfluence will be discussed in each chapter, but as the determination\nof the meaning of a word is so complex a process, a slight overlapping\nwill be unavoidable in some instances.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nINFLUENCE OF STEM-MEANING\n\n\nThe examination of the words with a view to finding the influence of\nstem-meaning is not directly concerned with semantic variability: that\nwill be illustrated in the next chapter. For purposes of classification\nin this chapter, only the prevailing meaning of each word is\nconsidered. For doubtful etymologies, Walde (_Lat. Etym. W\u00f6rterbuch_)\nis taken as guide.\n\n\nI -MENTUM\n\nThe great majority of the stems with which this suffix is used are verb\nstems, but there are a few noun stems and two adjective stems. For\nconvenience, the whole number may be divided into two large classes:\none consisting of those that denote concrete things, and the other,\nof those that denote abstract things. An absolute division here is\nimpossible and for the present purpose unimportant, and any criterion\nmust be somewhat arbitrary. I have called everything concrete which has\nphysical form, and everything else, including actions, abstract. Many\nconcrete words, especially those capable of general application, are\noften used in a transferred or figurative sense, and thus have also an\nabstract meaning.\n\n\nA. CONCRETE -MENTUM WORDS ON VERB STEMS.\n\n\n1. NOUNS DENOTING RESULT OF ACTION, WITH GENERAL APPLICATION.--Of the\nconcrete words, there are a few, like fragmentum, caementum, ramentum,\nwhich clearly do not express the instrument of an action, nor the\naction itself, nor the place, but the result of an action. Some, like\nfragmentum and stramentum, are formed on verbs whose action can be\ndirected toward several kinds of materials or objects. This class of\nnouns then has general application, and their precise meaning must be\nobtained from the context. This influence will be pointed out in the\nnext chapter.\n\nAs far as the verb stem (frango) is concerned, the examples show only\nthat fragmentum means \u201ca piece broken off\u201d or \u201cfragment\u201d: tribunum\nadoriuntur fragmentis saeptorum, Sest. 79; cum puerum fragmentis panis\nadlexisset, Plin. 9, 8, 8; ut glaebum aut fragmentum lapidis dicimus,\nN. D. II, 82; non modo fragmenta tegularum sed etiam ambusta tigna ad\narmatos pervenire, Liv. 34, 39, 11.\n\nIn the first two examples, the fragmenta, being in the ablative, are\nplainly the instrument of the action of the main verb, but without\nthe dependent genitives we should not know what sort of \u201cpieces\u201d\nor \u201cfragments\u201d were used. In the last two examples the meaning of\n\u201cparticle\u201d is suggested by \u201cglaebum\u201d and \u201ctigna\u201d. The dependent\ngenitives here also give precision.\n\nMany things may be strewn or scattered, so stramentum gets from\nits verb stem (sterno) the general meaning of something strewn or\nscattered: noctem in stramentis pernoctare, Truc. 278; casae quae\nstramentis tecta erant, B. G. 5, 43; fasces stramentorum ac virgultorum\nincendunt, B. G. 8, 15.\n\nRamentum (rado) is \u201csomething scraped or rubbed off,\u201d \u201cbits or small\npieces:\u201d et ramenta simul ferri furere intus ahenis in scaphiis, Lucr.\n6, 1043; ramenta ligni decocta in vino prosunt, Plin. 24, 2, 2; patri\nomne [aurum] cum ramento reddidi, Bacc. 680.\n\nDelectamentum (delecto) might at first sight be taken to be the means\nby which one is delighted. That such is not necessarily so may be seen\nfrom the examples: qui me pro ridiculo ac delectamento putat, Heaut.\n952; inania sunt ista delectamenta puerorum, captare plausus, vehi per\nurbem, Pis. 25, 60. In both these examples the source of delight and\nthe delight itself are too close in meaning to warrant the drawing of\nany distinction.\n\n\n2. NOUNS DENOTING RESULT OF ACTION, WITH RESTRICTED APPLICATION.--The\npreceding four words, as has been said, are of general application,\nbecause their verb stems have a general meaning. There are five nouns\nexpressing result of action which have a narrower and more restricted\nsense than their verb stems would require.\n\nCaementum (caedo) means not everything that is cut off, but a piece of\nrough stone: in eam insulam materiem, calcem, caementa, arma convexit,\nMil. 27, 74; caementum de silice frangatur, Vitr. 8, 7, 14. The\ninfluence of caedo here is slight; only the context shows the meaning\nof \u201cstone.\u201d\n\nSarmentum (sarpo) is not everything that is plucked, but twigs or\nfagots: ligna et sarmenta circumdare, ignemque subicere coeperunt,\nVerr. II, 1, 27; sarmentis virgultisque collectis, quibus fossas\ncompleant, ad castra pergunt, B. G. 3, 18; ne vitis sarmentis\nsilvescat, C. 15. In the last example the noun is used of objects not\nat all necessarily affected by the verb stem sarpere.\n\nPavimentum (pavio) is a floor, or pavement (something beaten down): ubi\nstructum erit, pavito fricatoque oleo, uti pavimentum bonum siet, Cato,\nR. R. 18; mero tingete pavimentum, Hor. C. 2, 14, 26. In Bell. Alex.\n1, it means a roof: aedificia tecta sunt rudere aut pavimentis. The\npredominating element in the meaning of the word is that it denotes the\nresult of the action expressed in pavire.\n\nSicilimentum (sicilio) in the single instance of its occurrence plainly\nmeans what is cut with a sickle: faenum cordum, sicilamenta de prato,\nea arida condito, Cato, R. R. 5.\n\nTestamentum (testor) is not necessarily the _means_ of bearing witness\nnor of making a will--a particular significance which this verb stem\nsometimes has,--but is the document itself: antequam tabulas testamenti\naperuit, Ad Her. I, 24; quare sit in lege aut in testamento scriptum,\nInv. II, 137; una fui, testamentum simul obsignavi, Mil. 18, 48.\n\nLutamentum (lutare) in the single occurrence we have of it evidently\nmeans, by inference from the passage in which it is found, a mud wall,\nor a piece of work bedaubed with mud: neque lutamenta scindent se,\nCato, R. R. 128.\n\nThe contribution of stem-meaning, in this class of _-mentum_ words\nto the meanings of the words themselves is quite apparent. Whatever\nelse they suggest, the verb stems all suggest the result of the action\nexpressed by them; and this result of action is expressed by the\n_-mentum_ word.\n\n\n3. NOUNS DENOTING INSTRUMENT, WITH GENERAL APPLICATION.--A second, and\nthe largest class of concrete _-mentum_ words clearly express in a\ngeneral way the instrument of the action. Here, too, some of the words\nkeep a general meaning which they get from the verb stem, while others\nreceive a special meaning. The verb stems themselves admit more or less\nof a general or special meaning.\n\nAmmentum (apo?) is a means of fastening, a strap, or thong: epistola\nad ammentum tragulae deligata, B. G. 5. 48; umor iaculorum ammenta\nemollierat, Liv. 37, 41. Both these examples show it to be a strap\nfastened to a javelin.\n\nArmamenta (always plural) are utensils for almost any purpose. It is\ndifficult to say whether the word is formed on the verb stem armo, or\nis an extended form of the noun arma; the former is entirely possible,\nwhile the equivalence of meaning in the two nouns supports the latter\nsupposition. At any rate the meaning is \u201cequipment\u201d, \u201cthat with\nwhich one is armed\u201d: hic tormenta, armamenta, arma, omnis apparatus\nbelli est, Liv. 26, 43; cum omnibus Gallicis navibus spes in velis\narmamentisque consisteret, B. G. 3, 14; armamenta vinearum, Plin. 17,\n21, 35. The most frequent use is that seen in the second example, where\nit means the rigging of a ship, in this instance, however, excluding\nthe sails.\n\nMedicamentum (medicor) is a remedy, a means of healing or curing: Si eo\nmedicamento sanus factus erit, Off. 3, 24; multis medicamentis propter\ndolorem artuum delibutus, Brut. 60.\n\nOperimentum (operio) is a cover, or means of covering: nuces gemino\nprotectae operimento, Plin. 15, 22, 24; detracto oculorum operimento,\nPlin, 8, 42, 64. That the meaning \u201ccovering\u201d is general, may be seen\nby comparing the second example with N. D. 2, 52, 147: palpebrae, quae\nsunt tegumenta oculorum. In the latter instance the \u201ccovering\u201d is the\neyebrow, in the former, some external object, probably wearing apparel.\n\nSuffimentum (suffio) is a means of fumigating: in iis sine illius\nsuffimentis expiati sumus, Leg. 1, 14, 40; laurus sit suffimentum\ncaedis hostium et purgatio, Plin. 15, 30, 40.\n\nTegumentum, like operimentum, gets its fundamental meaning of\n\u201ccovering\u201d from its verb stem, (tego), but is capable of being applied\nto many objects, as will be shown in Chapter III: tegumenta corporum,\nvel texta, vel suta, N. D. 2, 60; scutis tegimenta detrudere non tempus\nerat, B. G. 2, 21.\n\n\n4. NOUNS DENOTING INSTRUMENT, WITH BOTH GENERAL AND FIGURATIVE\nAPPLICATION.--The generalized concrete instruments so far illustrated\nhave rarely any abstract meaning. The remainder of them are used both\nconcretely and figuratively.\n\nAlimentum (alo) signifies a means of support or nourishment: nec\ndesiderabat alimenta corporis, Timaeus, 6; addidit alimenta rumoribus,\nLiv. 35, 23.\n\nInstrumentum (instruo) is a very general word meaning implement,\nfurniture, supplies: arma, tela, equos et cetera instrumenta militiae\nparare, Sall. Jug. 25, 2; spolia, ornamenta, monumenta in instrumento\net supellectile Verris nominabuntur, Verr. 2, 4, 44; ut instrumentum\noratoris exponeret, De Or. II, 146.\n\nIntegumentum (intego) is so similar to tegumentum that it hardly\nneeds separate treatment; however, it is used more frequently with an\nabstract meaning: istaec ego mihi semper habui aetati integumentum\nmeae, Trin. 313; lanx cum integumentis, quae Iovi adposita fuit, Liv.\n40, 59, 7.\n\nMonumentum (moneo) is anything that serves as a reminder: statuam quae\nsit factis monumentum suis, Curc. 441; tum monumenta rerum gestarum\noratori nota esse debere, De Or. I, 201.\n\nOrnamentum (orno) is anything for adorning or equipping: hominem cum\nornamentis omnibus exornatum adducite ad me, Pseud. 765; audieram quae\nde orationis ipsius ornamentis traderentur, De Or. II, 122; vidi hunc\nipsum Q. Hortensium ornamentum rei publicae paene interfici, Milo, 37.\n\nSaepimentum (saepio) is any means of inclosure or defense: haec omnia\nquasi saepimento aliquo animus ratione vallabit, Leg. I, 62; tertium\nmilitare saepimentum est fossa et terreus agger, Varr. R. R. 1, 142.\n\nStabilimentum (stabilio) is a means of support or strength: haec\nsunt ventri stabilimenta: pane et assa bubula, Curc. 367; Sicilia et\nSardinia stabilimenta bellorum, Val. Max. 7, 6, 1.\n\n\n5. NOUNS DENOTING INSTRUMENT, WITH SPECIALIZED APPLICATION.--This\nconcludes the list of generalized concrete instruments. Those with\nspecialized meanings are as follows; sometimes the verb stem is\nspecialized, but more often not.\n\nArmentum (aro) always means cattle, originally those used for plowing:\net variae crescunt pecudes, armenta feraeque, Lucr. 5, 228; armentum\naegrotat in agris, Hor. Ep. I, 8, 6. This word can mean only the\nsecondary instrument for plowing, _viz._, cattle, because there is\nanother word (aratrum) for the plow itself.\n\nCalceamentum (calceo) always means a shoe, an \u201cinstrument\u201d for covering\nthe feet: mihi amictui est Scythicum tegimen, calceamentum solorum\ncallum, T. 5, 90.\n\nFrumentum (fruor) always means grain, a \u201cmeans of enjoyment\u201d: ut hortum\nfodiat atque ut frumentum metat, Poen. 1020; non modo frumenta in agris\nmature non erant, B. G. I, 16, 2.\n\nLomentum (lavo) is a \u201cmeans\u201d of washing, of a particular kind, however,\n_viz._, a cosmetic: lomento rugas condere temptas, Mart. 3, 42, 1. In\nCiceronian Latin it occurs only once, and then figuratively: persuasum\nei censuram lomentum aut nitrum esse, Fam. VIII, 14, 4.\n\nIn iugumentum (iugo) it is a little difficult to see the influence\nof the stem. The two occurrences of it in Cato are the only ones in\nliterature, and from the context it would seem to mean \u201cthreshold\u201d or\nsome other part of the front of the house: limina, postes iugumenta,\nasseres, fulmentas faber faciat oportet, R. R. 14, 1; iugumenta et\nantepagmenta quae opus erunt indito, R. R. 14, 5.\n\nIumentum (iungo) always means an animal for drawing or carrying, a\nbeast of burden: iumento nihil opus est, Att. XII, 32; omnia sarcinaria\niumenta interfici iubet, B. C. 1, 81.\n\nSupplementum (suppleo) before the Augustan period means only that\nwith which an army is \u201cfilled up\u201d or recruited: partem copiarum ex\nprovincia supplementumque quod ex Italia adduxerat, convenire iubet, B.\nG. 7, 7, 5; ceterum supplementum etiam laetus decreverat, Sall. Jug.\n84, 3. Later it has its literal meaning: ex geminis singula capita in\nsupplementum gregis reservantur, Col. 7, 6, 7.\n\nIn vestimentum, the verb stem vestio has the same influence that\n\u201cclothe\u201d does in our word clothing: me vides ornatus ut sim vestimentis\nuvidis, Rud. 573; huc est intro latus lectus vestimentis stratus,\nHeaut. 903.\n\nLibamentum (libo) is a libation, drink offering: dona magnifica, quasi\nlibamenta praedarum, Rep. 2, 44; haec ego ad aras libamenta tuli, Stat.\nS. 3, 1, 163.\n\n\n6. NOUNS DENOTING INSTRUMENT, WITH BOTH SPECIALIZED AND FIGURATIVE\nAPPLICATION.--The specialized concrete nouns so far given are never\nused figuratively; there are six additional ones which do sometimes\nhave an abstract meaning.\n\nTormentum (torqueo) is an instrument of torture, an instrument for\nhurling, or torture itself: rotam id est genus quoddam tormenti apud\nGraecas, T. 5, 24; castella constituit ibique tormenta collocavit, B.\nG. 8, 3; huic licebit tum dicere se beatum in summo cruciatu atque\ntormentis, T. 5, 73.\n\nCondimentum (condio) is anything used for spicing or seasoning: cocos\nequidem nimio demiror, qui utuntur condimentis, Cas. 219: animus aequus\noptumumst aerumnae condimentum, Rud. 402.\n\nFundamentum (fundo) is that with which anything is founded, a\nfoundation: quin cum fundamento aedes perierint, Most. 148; fundamenta\nrei publicae ieci, Fam. XII, 25, 2.\n\nImpedimentum (impedio) is a means of hindrance, and in the plural,\nbaggage: hinc vos amolimini, nam mi impedimenta estis, And. 707;\nDemosthenes impedimenta naturae diligentia industriaque superavit, De\nOr. I. 61, 260; ad impedimenta et carros se contulerunt, B. G. 1, 26.\n\nNutrimentum (nutrio) like alimentum, is a means of nourishment or\nsupport, but it is not found meaning food for the body: educata\nhuius generis nutrimentis eloquentia, Orat. 42; arida circum [igni]\nnutrimenta dedit, Aen. 1, 176.\n\nPigmentum (pingo) is paint, or material for coloring: quem Appella et\nZeuxis duo pingent pigmentis ulmeis, Epid. 626; sententiae tam verae,\ntam sine pigmentis fucoque puerili, De Or. II, 188.\n\n\n7. NOUNS NOT CLASSIFIED.--This completes the list of concrete _-mentum_\nwords on verb stems with the exception of three whose stems are unusual\nor uncertain and contribute little if any influence to the meaning\nof the word. They do not mean instrument, nor result of action. The\nfewness of examples also makes it difficult to say just what the words\nmean. However, they probably have the following signification.\n\nAntepagmentum (from pango, with prefix ante-) from the context seems\nto be some sort of ornament for the exterior of a house: iugumenta et\nantepagmenta quae opus erunt indito, Cato, R. R. 14, 5; fulloniam I,\nantepagmenta, vasa torcula II faber faciat oportet, Cato, R. R. 14, 2;\nostiorum et eorum antepagmentorum in aedibus hae sunt rationes, Vitr.\n4, 6.\n\nCoagmenta (cogo) undoubtedly means a \u201cjoint\u201d of some kind, as may be\nseen from the context: viden coagmenta in foribus? Most. 829; ut aptior\nsit oratio, ipsa verba compone et quasi coagmenta, quod ne Graeci\nquidem veteres factitaverunt, Brut. 68.\n\nOmentum, whatever its etymology, means \u201cfat\u201d: omentum in flamma pingue\nliquefaciens, Catul. 90, 6.\n\nEach of these _-mentum_ nouns has been illustrated not for the purpose\nof showing that the verb stem does have influence on the meaning of\nthe noun--that is of course very obvious; the purpose has rather been\nto show that the character of the verb stem--_e. g._, whether it admits\nof general or special application, or whether it suggests the result of\naction or requires an instrument--so affects the resulting character\nof the noun, as to make it, as a rule, similar to that of the stem. Of\nthis second class of nouns (those that mean instrument) we may say that\namong other influences of the verb stems, one is that they have such\na meaning as requires an instrument for the accomplishment of their\naction. This does not imply that those in the first class do not also\nrequire an instrument. While these nouns do mean instrument or result\nof action, when viewed in regard to their verb stems, we can not say\nthat such meaning is always felt in every occurrence of the noun. In\ncertain contexts, even most contexts, they lose it entirely and are\nused as perfect equivalents of nouns that have no such meaning.\n\nOf the two classes of concrete _-mentum_ words on verb stems,\ntherefore, the smaller class has the tendency to mean result of action,\nthe larger class, instrument of action. Whether the instrument is\nliteral or figurative (as it is in the case of a few of these nouns),\nmust be ascertained from the context.\n\n\nB. CONCRETE -MENTUM WORDS ON NOUN AND ADJECTIVE STEMS\n\nThe concrete _-mentum_ nouns on noun and adjective stems must, on\naccount of their fewness, clearly be analogical formations. They cannot\nexpress the instrument or result of an action, but are only an extended\nform of the noun with a specialized meaning.\n\nFerramenta are tools made of iron (ferrum): de ferramentorum varietate\nCato scribit permulta, ut falces, palas, rastros, Varro, R. R. 1, 22, 5.\n\nNidamentum (used only once, and allegorically) is material for a nest\n(nidus): in nervum ille hodie nidamenta congeret, Rud. 889.\n\nPulpamentum (and its shorter form pulmentum) are tidbits made from\npulpa (meat): voltisne olivas, aut pulpamentum, aut capparim? Curc. 90;\nmihi est cubile terra, pulpamentum fames, T. 5, 90; primus ad cibum\nvocatur, primo pulmentum datur, M. G. 349; num ego pulmento utor magis\nunctiusculo? Pseud. 220.\n\nSalsamenta are pickled fish (salsus) although once in Cicero the\nword in the singular means brine: salsamenta haec, Stephanio, fac\nmacerentur, Adel. 380; de vino aut salsamento putes loqui quae\nevanescunt vetustate, Div. II, 117.\n\nSincipitamentum (Ritschl and Brix) is a comic word, with the same\nmeaning as its noun stem, sinciput: iube opsonarier pernonidam aut\nsincipitamenta porcina, Men. 211; comedam, inquit, flebile nati\nsinciput elixi, Juv. 13, 85.\n\nAtramentum is a liquid possessing the quality expressed by the\nadjective stem (ater); this context shows it to mean ink: calamo et\natramento res agitur, Q. fr. II, 14, 1. In one example it means shoe\nblacking: pater accusatus a M. Antonio sutorio atramento absolutus\nputatur, Fam. IX, 21, 3. In one example also, it is used in speaking of\nfish: atramenti effusione sepiae se tutant, N. II, 127.\n\nScitamenta (scitus) are tidbits, dainties both literal and figurative:\niube aliquid scitamentorum de foro opsonarier, Men. 209; \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03c4\u03b1\u00a0ceteraque huiusmodi scitamenta, Gell. 18, 8, 1.\n\nPerhaps the variety of meaning of these analogical formations indicates\nthat no single precise meaning had become attached to _-mentum_.\n\n\nC. ABSTRACT -MENTUM WORDS ON VERB STEMS\n\nThe majority of abstract _-mentum_ words also fall into the two large\nclasses of result of action and instrument, but there is a small list\nof nouns which plainly express the action itself. There are only two\nwords on noun stems.\n\n\n1. NOUNS DENOTING RESULT OF ACTION.--Additamentum (addo) is an\nincrease, or accession: intercessit Ligus iste nescio qui, additamentum\namicorum meorum, Sest. 31; sapientia erit ultimum vitae instrumentum\net, ut ita dicam, additamentum, Sen. Ep. 17.\n\nAdiumentum (adiuvo) means aid, assistance: Romae vos esse tuto posse\nper Dolabellam eamque rem posse nobis adiumento esse, Fam. XIV, 18, 1;\nnulla res est quae plura adiumenta doctrinae desideret, De Or. III, 84.\n\nCruciamentum (crucio) is not the instrument of torture, but torture\nitself, or rather the feeling caused by torturing: vidi ego multa\nsaepe picta quae Acherunti fierent cruciamenta, Capt. 998; carnificum\ncruciamenta et morborum tormenta, Phil. XI. 4, 8.\n\nDelenimentum (delenio) is an allurement or blandishment; illam furiam\nomnibus delenimentis animum suum avertisse atque alienasse, Liv. 30,\n13; paulatim discursum ad delenimenta vitiorum, Tac. A. 21; simul\ncomparant delenimenta et differunt vos in adventum Cn. Pompei, Sall.\nMacer, 21.\n\nDehonestamentum[182] (dehonesto) is a general word for any object\nof dishonor or disgrace: Fufidius, ancilla turpis, bonorum omnium\ndehonestamentum, Sall. Lep. 22; auribus decisis vivere iubet, ostentui\nclementiae suae, et in nos dehonestamento, Tac. A. 12.\n\nDeliramenta (deliro) means nonsense, the result of \u201cgoing out of the\nfurrow\u201d: audin tu ut deliramenta loquitur? Men. 920; matrimonia inter\ndeos credi puerilium prope deliramentorum est, Plin. 2, 7, 5.\n\nDetrimentum (detero) nowhere has its literal meaning of \u201closs by\nrubbing\u201d, but only loss in general, more often disadvantage or\nmisfortune: tantis detrimentis acceptis Octavius sese ad Pompeium\nrecepit, B. C. 3, 9, 8; futurum ut detrimentum in bonum verteret, B.\nC. 3, 73, 6; ne quid res publica detrimenti accipiat, Cat. 1, 2. (_et\nsaepe_).\n\nFor the etymology of the interesting word elementum, see Walde.\n\nEmolumentum (emolior) means the result of effort, gain, reward:\nsuscepta videntur a viris fortibus sine emolumento ac praemio, De Or.\nII, 346.\n\nInanimentum (inanio) occurs only once, but in its context clearly means\n\u201cemptiness\u201d: inanimentis explementum quaerito, Stich. 174.\n\nIntertrimentum (intertero) unlike detrimentum, does have the literal\nmeaning of \u201closs by rubbing\u201d as well as loss in general: in auro vero,\nin quo nihil intertrimenti est, quae malignitas est? Liv. 34, 7; sine\nmagno intertrimento non potest haberi, quidvis dare cupis, Heaut. 448.\n\nLaxamentum (laxo) means relaxation, alleviation, any unit of time or\nspace: ego nactus in navigatione nostra pusillum laxamenti, Fam. XII,\n16, 3; alii removentes parietes aedis efficiunt amplum laxamentum\ncellae, Vitr. 4, 7; eo laxamento cogitationibus dato, quievit in\npraesentia seditio, Liv. 7, 38.\n\nMomentum (moveo) means weight, impulse, importance: astra forma ipsa\nfiguraque sua momenta sustentat, N. II, 117; animus paulo momento\nhuc vel illuc impellitur, And. 266; sentiebat nullius momenti apud\nexercitum futurum, Nep. VII, 8, 4.\n\nTemperamentum (tempero) means moderation, moderate condition: senatus\nCaesar orationem habuit meditato temperamento, Tac. A. III, 12;\negregium principatus temperamentum, si demptis utriusque vitiis solae\nvirtutes miscerentur, Tac. H. 2, 5.\n\nTermentum (tero) is used once, in Plautus, where it is equivalent to\ndetrimentum: non pedibus termento fuit praeut ego erum expugnabo meum,\nBacch. 929. Festus says (p. 363) termentum pro eo, quod nunc dicitur\ndetrimentum, utitur Plautus in Bacchidibus.\n\nFormamentum may be, and probably is, only an extended form of the noun\nstem forma. It is not inconceivable that it is made on the verb stem\nformo, but the other supposition is better. In the one occurrence of\nit in classical Latin, the context plainly shows that it means shape,\nform: omnia principiorum formamenta queunt in quovis esse nitore, Lucr.\n2, 817. Arnobius (3, 109) uses it of the gods: formamenta divina.\n\n\n2. NOUNS DENOTING INSTRUMENT.--As was the case in the corresponding\nlist of concrete words, the foregoing words are all formed on verb\nstems which suggest the result of their action. And again there is a\nlarger class of abstract _-mentum_ words which in a general way express\nthe figurative instrument. The idea of instrument is not always strong,\nbut when viewed in regard to their verb stem, all the nouns will be\nseen to show this meaning in a greater or less degree.\n\nAllevamentum (allevo) is \u1f03\u03c0\u03b1\u03be \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd; the context shows it to mean a\nremedy or means of alleviation: Sulla coactus est in adversis sine ullo\nremedio atque allevamento permanere, Sulla, 66.\n\nAuctoramentum (auctoro) is a means of binding, or of bringing one\nunder obligation, a contract, also the pay or hire: illius turpissimi\nauctoramenti [gladiatorii] sunt verba: uri, vinciri, ferroque necari,\nSen. Ep. 37; est in ipsa merces, auctoramentum servitutis, Off. 1, 42.\n\nArgumentum (arguo) is primarily a means of proving, a proof, but\ntakes also many other meanings as will be shown in the next chapter:\nquid nunc? vincon argumentis te non esse Sosiam?, Am. 433; quod ipsum\nargumento mihi fuit diligentiae tuae, Fam. X. 5, 1.\n\nBlandimentum (blandio) is a means of flattering or alluring: illum\nspero immutari potest blandimentis, oramentis, ceteris meretriciis,\nTruc. 318; epistolae muliebris blandimentis infectae, Tac. H. 1, 174.\n\nComplementum (compleo) is a means of filling up: apud alios numero\nservientes inculcata reperias inania quaedam verba, quasi complementa\nnumerorum, Orat. 69.\n\nDocumentum (doceo) is a very general word, meaning primarily a means\nof warning or instructing: documento, quantum in bello fortuna posset,\nB. C. 3, 10, 6; ego illis captivis aliis documentum dabo ne...., Capt.\n752; quarum rerum maxima documenta haec habeo, Sall. Cat. 9. 4.\n\nThe strong influence of the verb stem is seen in this noun by the\nsubordinate adverbial clauses which follow it, as in the first two\nexamples given. It is interesting also to note the contrast between\ndocumentum and monumentum; their verb stems are practically synonymous,\nbut one noun is prevailingly concrete, while the other is always\nabstract or figurative. Monumentum has an additional shade of meaning,\nin that it regularly looks toward the past, while documentum looks\ntoward the future. The explanation for this is difficult to find;\nperhaps it is only the result of usage and association.\n\nExplementum (expleo) is a means of filling: inanimentis explementum\nquaerito, Stich. 174. (\u201cLook for something to fill your empty stomach\nwith.\u201d).\n\nHostimentum (hostio) is a means of making requital, a recompense: par\npari datum hostimentum est, opera pro pecunia, As. 172.\n\nIncitamentum (incito) is a means of inducing or inciting: hoc maximum\net periculorum et laborum incitamentum est, Arch. 23; quae apud\nconcordes vincula caritatis, incitamenta irarum apud infensos erant,\nTac. A. 1, 55, 15.\n\nInvitamentum (invito) is the means of inducing or attracting: cum multa\nhaberet invitamenta urbis et fori propter summa studia amicorum, Sulla,\n74.\n\nIrritamentum (irrito) is very similar to the preceding two nouns,\nmeaning a provocative or incentive: neque salem neque alia irritamenta\ngulae quaerebant, Sall. Jug. 89, 7; iras militum irritamentis acuebat,\nLiv. 40, 27.\n\nHortamentum (hortor) is probably the exhortation itself as well as\nthe means of exhorting: ea cuncta Romanis ex tenebris et editioribus\nlocis facilia visu magnoque hortamento erant, Sall. Jug. 98, 7; in\nconspectu parentum coniugumque ac liberorum quae magna etiam absentibus\nhortamenta animi sunt, Liv. 7, 11, 6.\n\nOblectamentum is probably the condition of delight as well as the means\nof delighting: ut meae senectutis requietem oblectamentumque noscatis,\nC. 15; cum spinae albae cauliculi inter oblectamenta gulae condiantur,\nPlin. 21, 2, 39.\n\nLevamentum (levo) is a means of alleviating, also the resulting\ncondition: nos non solum beatae vitae istam esse oblectationem\nvidemus, sed etiam levamentum miseriarum, F. 5, 53; ad unicum doloris\nlevamentum, studia confugio, Plin. Ep. 8, 19.\n\nOpprobramentum (opprobro) is another example of \u1f03\u03c0\u03b1\u03be \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd but\nclearly means, like opprobrium, a disgrace or reproach: facere damni\nmavolo quam opprobramentum aut flagitium muliebre exferri domo, Merc.\n423.\n\nPraepedimentum (praepedio) occurs only once, and then with a meaning\nexactly equivalent to impedimentum: intro abite, ne hic vos conspicatur\nleno neu fallaciae praepedimentum obiciatur, Poen. 606.\n\nTurbamentum (turbo) occurs twice, meaning in both cases, a means of\ndisturbance: maxima turbamenta rei publicae atque exitia probate, Sall.\nLep. 25; inserendo ambiguos de Galba sermones, quaeque alia turbamenta\nvulgi, Tac. H. 1, 23.\n\nFirmamentum (firmo) is a means of strengthening, a support:\ntransversaria tigna iniciuntur, quae firmamento esse possint, B. C. 2,\n15, 2. In this instance it is concrete; more often it is abstract: eum\nordinem firmamentum ceterorum ordinum recte esse dicemus, Pomp. 7, 17.\n\nLibramentum (libro) is probably rather the result of the action than\nthe instrument, at least in the meaning of \u201clevel surface\u201d which it\nhas in its only occurence in Ciceronian Latin: punctum esse, quod\nmagnitudinem nullam habet, extremitatem et quasi libramentum, in quo\nnulla omnino crassitudo sit, Ac. II, 116. In Livy it means \u201cweight\u201d:\narietem admotum, libramento plumbi gravatum, ad terram urgebant, Liv.\n42, 63.\n\n\n3. NOUNS DENOTING ACTION.--There remain a few nouns which clearly\nexpress the action itself. The reason for this does not lie in the\nsuffix--even in _-tio_ nouns it does not lie in the suffix; but these\nnouns, through usage and association, came to have this meaning in\nspite of the fact that the tendency of other nouns with the same suffix\nwas to mean instrument or result of action.\n\nMolimentum (molior) means exertion, effort: neque se exercitum sine\nmagno commeatu atque molimento in unum locum contrahere posse, B. G. 1,\n34, 3.\n\nExperimentum (experior) means a trial, experiment: probatur\nexperimento, sitne feracius...., Plin. Ep. 10, 43. More often the\nresult is emphasized and it means proof: hoc maximum est experimentum,\naegritudinem vetustate tolli, T. 3, 74.\n\nOramentum (oro) is not found in the manuscripts, but is adopted\nby Ritschl and Leo, and as we may judge from its context, means\na begging, or praying: spero illum immutari potest blandimentis,\noramentis, ceteris meretriciis, Truc. 317. The Ambrosian manuscript has\nhortamentis, the others ornamentis, but neither of these readings is\nsuitable.\n\nSternumentum (sternuo) is a sneezing: pedis offensio nobis et\nsternumenta erunt observanda, Div. 2, 84. But in Pliny and Celsus it\nsometimes also means a provocative of sneezing, sneezing powder: fit ex\ncallitriche sternumentum, Plin. 25, 86; radix ranunculi sicca concisa\nsternumentum est, Plin. 13, 109.\n\nTinnimentum (tinnio) occurs only once, but from the context it plainly\nmeans a tinkling: illud quidem edepol tinnimentumst auribus, Rud. 806.\n\n\nD. ABSTRACT -MENTUM WORDS ON NOUN STEMS\n\nOf the two noun stem words in this class of abstract words, cognomentum\nis properly not a _-mentum_ word. According to Lindsay (p. 335) the\n_-to_ suffix is merely added to the _-men_ suffix. An example is: meum\ncognomentum commemorat, M. G. 1038.\n\nLineamentum (linea) is seen from the following parallel examples to\nhave the same meaning as its noun stem: in geometria lineamenta,\nformae, intervalla, magnitudines sunt, De Or. I, 187; ignis rectis\nlineis in caelestem locum subvolat, T. 1, 40; lineamentum esse\nlongitudinem latitudine carentem, Ac. II, 116; eam M. Varro ita\ndefinit: linea est, inquit, longitudo quaedam sine latidudine et\naltitudine, Gell. 1, 20, 7.\n\nThis detailed view of the _-mentum_ words gives occasion for making\nthe following comment: the tendency of these nouns is to mean the\ninstrument of an action, often the result of an action, rarely action\nitself. The verb stems are such as require an instrument for their\naction or suggest its result. The instrument is sometimes literal,\nsometimes figurative, and whether it is the one or the other is\ndetermined by the context. Given a verb stem which both suggests the\nresult of action and requires an instrument, it is difficult to explain\nwhy a _-mentum_ noun formed on it should mean only instrument, and not\nresult of action, or vice versa.\n\n\nII -BULUM\n\nThe list of _-bulum_ words is small, and they are nearly all concrete.\nOnly two are abstract. As these two denote only figurative instruments,\nthe treatment here will take no account of the division into concrete\nand abstract. There are two noun stem words. Three distinct classes of\nthese words may be made, when viewed in relation to their verb stems:\n(1) Those denoting instrument; (2) Those denoting place; (3) Those\ndenoting person. The second meaning is quite as common as the first,\nthe third very rare (found only in two nouns).\n\n\n1. NOUNS DENOTING INSTRUMENT.--Infundibulum (infundo) is an instrument\nfor pouring from one vessel to another, a funnel: illa quae reflexa\net resupina, more infundibuli per medullam transmittit quidquid\naquarum superfluit, Col. 3, 18; in qua machina impedens infundibulum\nsubministrat molis frumentum, Vitr. 10, 10.\n\nPatibulum (pateo) is plainly an instrument, but having the _shape_\nexpressed by the verb stem, a fork-shaped yoke: dispessis manibus\npatibulum quom habebis, M. G. 360; caedes, patibula, ignes, cruces\nfestinabant, Tac. A. 14, 33.\n\nRutabulum (ruo) is an instrument for raking or stirring up: iubebis\nrutabulo ligneo agitari quod decoxeris, Col. 12, 20. It occurs twice in\nCato, in a list of other tools for use around a fire-place.\n\nTintinnabulum (tinnio) is an instrument for making a ringing noise,\na bell: lanios inde accersam duo cum tintinnabulis, Pseud. 332;\ntintinnabula quae vento agitata longe sonitus referant, Plin. 36, 13,\n19.\n\nPabulum (pasco) is that with which anything is fed, usually with\nreference to the feed of cattle: bubus pabulum parare oportet, Cato, R.\nR. 54, 1.\n\nVenabulum (venor) is a hunting spear, an instrument for hunting: tantam\nbestiam percussisset venabulo, Verr. 5, 7.\n\nExorabulum, which occurs only twice, is perhaps rather the begging\n(exoro) itself, which is, in turn, a means of obtaining something:\nquod modis pereat, quotque exoretur exorabulis, Truc. 27; exorabula\nincidantium, decipula adversantium artificia dicentium perdidicit, App.\nFlor. n. 18. The first example is interesting as the noun is used with\na form of the same verb as its verb stem.\n\nVocabulum (voco) is the instrument for calling or naming, a name:\nsi res suum nomen et proprium vocabulum non habet, De Or. III, 159;\nAristotelis orationis duas partes esse dixit, vocabula et verba, ut\nhomo et equus, ut legit et currit, Varr. L. L. 8.\n\nTwo interesting analogical formations with the suffix _-bulum_ are\nnucifrangibula and dentifrangibula in Plautus: ne nucifrangibula\nexcussit ex malis meis, Bacc. 598; ita dentifrangibula haec meis\nmanibus gestiunt, Bacc. 596.\n\n\n2. NOUNS DENOTING PLACE.--Conciliabulum (concilio) is a place\nof assembly[183], a public place, but also the assembly itself:\nsupplicationem in biduum per omnia fora conciliabulaque edixerunt, Liv.\n40, 37; ne penetrarem me usquam ubi esset damni conciliabulum, Trin.\n314; per conciliabula et coetus seditiosa disserebant, Tac. A. 3, 40.\n\nLatibulum (lateo) is a hiding place: cum etiam ferae latibulis se\ntegant, Rab. Post. 42.\n\nSessibulum is a place for sitting, a chair: quae tibi olant stabulumque\nstratumque, sellam et sessibulum merum, Poen. 268.\n\nStabulum (sto) is in general a place for standing; its precise meanings\nas acquired from the context will be illustrated in the next chapter:\nneutrubi habeam stabile stabulum, siquid divorti fuat, Aul. 233.\n\nVestibulum[184], is probably originally the place for putting on and\ntaking off garments (vestio), then entrance, or space in front of a\nhouse[185]: viden vestibulum ante aedes hoc? Most. 819; si te armati\nnon modo limine tectoque aedium tuarum, sed primo aditu vestibuloque\nprohibuerint, Caec. 12, 35.\n\nAcetabulum and turibulum are both formed on noun stems, and are both\nreceptacles for holding the material denoted by the noun stem. But all\nthe examples of acetabulum show the noun extended to mean any kind of\nvessel, or a measure: melanthi acetabulum conterito in vini veteris\nhemina, Cato, R. R. 102; turibulis ante ianuas positis atque accenso\nture, Liv. 29, 14, 13.\n\nDesidiabulum occurs only once, and from the context clearly means the\nplace of action of its stem, which is a verbal noun (desidia): ut celem\ntua flagitia aut damna aut desidiabula, Bacc. 376.\n\nCunabula and incunabula are formed on the same noun stem cunae, the\nlatter with the preposition _in_ prefixed. Both the nouns and the stem\nall mean the same thing (cradle, or origin), but incunabula has the\nadditional meaning of \u201cswaddling clothes\u201d: opus est pulvinis, cunis,\nincunabulis, Truc. 905; qui cum esset in cunabulis, Div. F. 79; de\noratoris quasi incunabulis dicere, Orat. 42; si puer in cunis occidit,\nne quaerendum quidem, T. 1, 93; qui non in cunabulis sed in campis sunt\nconsules facti, Agr. 2, 100.\n\n\n3. NOUNS DENOTING PERSON.--The two _-bulum_ words that denote persons\nare mendicabulum (mendicor) and prostibulum (prostare). Their bad\nmeaning is due in large part to the stem; but undoubtedly the contempt\nunderlying the application to a person of a neuter word denoting a\nthing is also responsible for the formation of these words as neuters\nand with the suffix _-bulum_. Examples of such terms of reproach are\nseen also in _monstrum hominis_, and in the German _das Mensch_.\n\nMendicabulum is found only twice: istos reges ceteros memorare nolo,\nhominum mendicabula, Aul. 703; cum crotalis et cymbalis circumforaneum\nmendicabulum producor ad viam, App. Met. 9.\n\nOf prostibulum also there are only two examples: bellum et pudicum\nvero prostibulum popli, Aul. 285; nam meretricem adstare in via solam\nprostibuli sanest, Cist. 331.\n\nThe influence of stem meaning on the _-bulum_ words may then be said to\nbe the same as in the case of the _-mentum_ words, only here there is\na class of verb stems that suggest the place of action, and none that\nsuggest the result of action.\n\n\nIII -CULUM\n\n\nA. CONCRETE -CULUM WORDS\n\nThe great majority of _-culum_ words[186] also are concrete. They may\nbe grouped into three classes as far as their verb stems are concerned:\n(1) Those denoting instrument; (2) Those denoting place; (3) Those\ndenoting the object of the action expressed by their verb stems.\n\n\n1. NOUNS DENOTING INSTRUMENT.--Adminiculum (ad-manus) is properly\nanything on which the hand may rest, but the examples show it meaning\nregularly a prop, or support, both concretely and figuratively:\nadminiculorum ordines me delectant, capitum iugatio, religatio vitium,\nC. 53; natura semper ad aliquod tamquam adminiculum adnititur, Lael. 88.\n\nBaculum (etymology very uncertain, but probably same root as seen in\n\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03bd\u03c9) from its verb stem, should mean only a walking stick, but it\nis applied to almost any kind of staff or sceptre: proximus lictor\nconverso baculo oculos misero tundere vehementissime coepit, Verr. 5,\n142; baculum aureum regis berylli distinguebant, Curt. 9, 1, 30.\n\nEverriculum (everro) is a sweep net (also used figuratively): neque\neverriculo in litus educere possent, Varr. R. R. 3, 17, 7; quod umquam\nhuiusmodi everriculum ulla in provincia fuit?, Verr. 4, 5, 3.\n\nFerculum (fero) is that on which anything is carried: spolia ducis\nhostium caesi suspensa fabricato ad id apte ferculo gerens in\nCapitolium ascendit, Liv. 1, 10, 5; ubi multa de magna superessent\nfercula cena, Hor. S. 2, 6, 104.\n\nGubernaculum (guberno) is an instrument for guiding: piscium meatus\ngubernaculi modo regunt caudae, Plin. 11, 50, 111; hic ille naufragus\nad gubernaculum accessit, et navi, quod potuit, est opitulatus, Inv. 2,\n154.\n\nIncerniculum (incerno) is an instrument for sifting, a sieve; it occurs\nonly twice, and it is difficult to see how it differs from another\nnoun on the same stem, cribrum: opus est incerniculum unum, cribrum\nunum, Cato, R. R. 13; Athenienses decretum fecere, ne frumentarii\nnegotiatores ab incerniculis eum [mulum] arcerent, Plin. 8, 44, 69.\nIn the latter example the incernicula are the vessels in which bran,\nsifted from the flour, was set up for sale.\n\nOperculum (operio) like operimentum is an instrument for covering:\naspera arteria tegitur quodam quasi operculo quod ob eam causam datum\nest, ne spiritus impediretur, N. II, 136; operculum in dolium imponito,\nCato, R. R. 104.\n\nPerpendiculum (perpendo) is a plumb line, but is found most frequently\nwith _ad_ forming an adverbial phrase meaning perpendicularly: non\negeremus perpendiculis, non normis, non regulis, Cic. A. fr. 8; tigna\nnon directa ad perpendiculum, sed prone et fastigate, B. G. 4, 17.\n\nPiaculum is a means of appeasing, an offering; perhaps also the\nappeasing itself; and the act requiring expiation: decrevit habendas\ntriduum ferias, et porco femina piaculum pati, Leg. 2, 22; nonne in\nmentem venit quantum piaculi committatur? Liv. 5, 52; duc nigras\npecudes: ea prima piacula sunto, Aen. 6, 153.\n\nPoculum (probably from root seen in bibo) is a drinking vessel, cup:\nSocrates paene in manu iam mortiferum illud tenens poculum, T. 1, 71.\n\nRedimiculum (redimio) is anything used for binding, a band or fillet:\net tunicae manicas, et habent redimicula mitrae, Aen. 9, 616; ut esset\naliquis laqueus et redimiculum, reversionem ut ad me fecerit denuo,\nTruc. 395.\n\nRetinaculum (retineo), always used in the plural, is anything which\nholds back or binds: ratem pluribus validis retinaculis parte superiore\nripae religatam humo iniecta constraverunt, Liv. 21, 28; missae pastum\nretinacula mulae nauta piger saxo religat, Hor. S. 1, 5, 18.\n\nSpiraculum (spiro) is a breathing hole: per spiracula mundi exitus\nintroitusque elementis redditus exstat, Lucr. 6, 493.\n\nSubligaculum (subligo) is a waistband, judging from the context in\nwhich the only example of it occurs: scenicorum quidem mos tantam habet\nveteri disciplina verecundiam, ut in scenam sine subligaculo prodeat\nnemo, Off. 1, 35.\n\nSarculum (sario) is an instrument for hoeing, a hoe: familiam cum\nferreis sarculis exire oportet, Cato, R. R. 155; gaudentem patrios\nfindere sarculo agros numquam dimoveas, Hor. C. 1, 1, 11.\n\nVehiculum (vehor) is a means of transportation, a carriage or ship; its\nmeaning and that of ferculum differ exactly as their stems differ: ut\nprocul divinum et novum vehiculum Argonautorum e monte conspexit, N.\nII, 89; mihi aequum est dare vehicula, qui vehar, Aul. 502.\n\n\n2. NOUNS DENOTING PLACE.--Cenaculum (ceno) originally was the dining\nroom.[187] As this was usually in an upper story, the word came to\nhave the regular meaning of attic or garret, and the force of the stem\nmeaning was lost: in superiore qui habito cenaculo, Am. 863; ipse\nCircenses ex amicorum cenaculis spectabat, Suet. Aug. 45.\n\nConventiculum (convenio) like conciliabulum, means both the place of\nassembly and the assembly itself. As far as the form is concerned, it\nmight be a diminutive from conventus, but it shows no such meaning:\nexstructa sunt apud nemus conventicula, Tac. A. 14, 15; conventicula\nhominum quae postea civitates nominatae sunt, Sest. 91.\n\nCubiculum (cubo) always means a place for reclining, a bedroom: cubui\nin eodem lecto tecum una in cubiculo, Am. 808.\n\nDeverticulum (deverto) is a place to turn aside, a by-path, also a\nlodging: ubi ad ipsum veni deverticulum, constiti, Eun. 635; cum gladii\nabditi ex omnibus locis deverticuli protraherentur, Liv. 1, 51.\n\nHibernaculum (hiberno) is a place for spending the winter, and,\nparticularly in the plural, the winter quarters of soldiers: hoc\nhibernaculum, hoc gymnasium meorum est, Plin. Ep. 2, 17, 7; legionum\naliae itinere terrestri in hibernacula remissae sunt, Tac. A. 2, 23.\n\nPropugnaculum (propugno) is the place for (means of?) defending,\na bulwark or tower: solidati muri, propugnacula addita, auctae\nturres, Tac. H. 2, 19; lex Aelia, et Fufia eversa est, propugnacula\ntranquillitatis atque otii, Piso, 9.\n\nReceptaculum (recepto) is a place to receive or keep things, also a\nplace of refuge: illud tibi oppidum receptaculum praedae fuit, Verr. 5,\n59; insula incolis valida et receptaculum perfugarum, Tac. A. 14, 29.\n\nTabernaculum (taberna), \u201ctent,\u201d has a meaning specialized from its\nnoun stem: Caesar eo die tabernacula statui passus non est, B. C. 1, 81.\n\nUmbraculum (umbra) means both a shady place and the thing that\nfurnishes shade: aurea pellebant tepidos umbracula soles, Ov. F. 2,\n311; prope aream faciundum umbracula, quo succedant homines in aestu\ntempore meridiano, Varro, R. R. 1, 51, 2.\n\n\n3. NOUNS DENOTING OBJECT OF ACTION.--There is also a small group of\nconcrete _-culum_ words which are alike in that they denote the object\nof the action expressed by their verb stems.\n\nDeridiculum (derideo) is something to laugh at, an object of derision,\n(also ridicule itself): deridiculo fuit senex foedissimae adulationis\ntantum infamia usurus, Tac. A. 3, 57; quid tu me deridiculi gratia sic\nsalutas? Am. 682.\n\nIentaculum (iento) is something to eat, or breakfast: epulas\ninterdum quadrifariam dispertiebat: in ientacula et prandia et cenas\ncommissationesque, Suet. Vit. 13.\n\nMiraculum (miror) is something to wonder at, a miracle: audite portenta\net miracula philosophorum somniantium, N. 1, 18; omnia transformat sese\nin miracula rerum, Ignemque horribilemque feram, Georg. 4, 441.\n\nSpectaculum is something to look at, a spectacle, show: quom hoc mihi\noptulisti tam lepidum spectaculum, Poen. 209.\n\nThe verb stems of these four nouns, with the exception of the first,\ncould conceivably form nouns meaning instrument, or result of action,\nor place; but only one of them, spectaculum, has any of these meanings,\nand that, of place: tantus est ex omnibus spectaculis usque a Capitolio\nplausus excitatus est, Sest. 124.\n\n\nB. ABSTRACT -CULUM WORDS, ALL DENOTING ACTION\n\nThere are four abstract _-culum_ words, all expressing primarily action\nitself.\n\nCurriculum (curro) is a running: curre in Piraeum atque unum curriculum\nface, Trin. 1103.\n\nPericulum (stem seen in experire) is a trial, attempt, also danger,\nrisk: fac semel periculum, Cist. 504; nescio quanto in periculo sumus,\nPhor. 58.\n\nSaeculum (sero), if this etymology is correct, is originally a sowing,\nthen the thing sown, a generation, race, period of time: quid mirum si\nse temnunt mortalia saecula, Lucr. 5, 1238; et muliebre oritur patrio\nde semine saeculum, Lucr. 4, 1227; saeculum spatium annorum centum\nvocarunt, Varro, L. L. 6, 2.\n\nOraculum (oro) is an utterance, usually of some god or prophet,\nsometimes the place where it is given: oracula ex eo ipso appellata\nsunt, quod inest in his deorum oratio, Top. 20, 77; exposui somnii et\nfuroris oracula, quae carere arte dixeram, Div. 1, 32, 70; numquam\nillud oraculum Delphis tam celebre fuisset nisi...., Div. 1, 19, 37.\n\nWith regard, then, to the verb stems of the _-culum_ nouns we may say\nthat they are such as require an instrument, suggest a place, or imply\nthe object of their action, while a few form nouns denoting action\nitself.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe tendency seen in the above classification must not be taken as a\nsystematic and conscious process of language for the purpose of making\nthese suffixes mean one thing more than another. The verb stems do\nstrongly influence the meaning of the whole noun, usually more than\nanything else does, but the variety of precise meanings due to context,\nwhich will be shown in the next chapter, almost precludes a systematic\nclassification on any basis.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nINFLUENCE OF CONTEXT\n\n\nAn attempt was made in the preceding chapter to show how the meaning of\nwords formed with _-mentum_, _-bulum_ and _-culum_ was influenced by\nthe verb stem. It will be the purpose of this chapter to illustrate how\nsuch general meanings get still greater precision from some element in\nthe context. This study, as is intimated in the introductory paragraph\nof this paper, is a semantic one, but it is not lexicographical; and\nno attempt will be made to explain, any farther than was done in the\npreceding chapter, such words as show no variation in meaning due to\ncontext. For example, frumentum always means grain, no matter in what\ncontext it stands; iumentum, cattle; testamentum, a will; venabulum, a\nhunting spear; cubiculum, a bed-room. The reason is that these words\nare neat expressions of a precise idea and their meaning is therefore\nless likely to be shifted. This fact also illustrates, in general,\nthe difference in variation possible in a noun and in an adjective.\nThe latter, being in so many instances equivalent to a genitive, can,\nlike the genitive, express a great variety of relations between its\ngoverning noun and its noun stem; while a noun, being a more finished\nproduct, that is, its meaning settling more easily in clear-cut limits,\ncannot be expected to show such wide variations. Aside from the\nfigurative use of the nouns, the most frequent influence of context\ncomes from a genitive dependent on the noun. The other elements that\nenter in will be noticed as each word is discussed, and wherever\npossible, the word or group of words which contributes to the meaning\nwill be italicized.\n\nFirst, there are a few nouns which are used in apposition with a proper\nnoun, or are applied to persons. This use is a special illustration of\nthe figurative meaning of these words: intercessit iste _Ligus_ nescio\nqui, additamentum inimicorum meorum, Sest. 68; _Sertia_ uxor, quae\nincitamentum mortis et particeps fuit, Tac. A. 6, 29; in conspectu\n_parentum coniugumque_ ac _liberorum_, quae magna etiam absentibus\nhortamenta animi sunt, Liv. 7, 11, 6; acerrima seditionum ac discordiae\nincitamenta, _interfectores_ Galbae, Tac. H. 2, 23; Fufidius, ancilla\nturpis bonorum omnium dehonestamentum, Sall. Lep. 22; _P. Rutilius_ qui\nfuit documentum hominibus nostris virtutis, antiquitatis, prudentiae,\nRab. Post. 27; illius _sum_ integumentum corporis, Bacc. 602; vidi hunc\nipsum _Hortensium_, ornamentum rei publicae, paene interfici, Milo, 37;\n_ipsa quae_ sis stabulum nequitiae, Truc. 587; quod umquam huiuscemodi\neverriculum [_Verres_] ulla in provincia fuit, Verres, 4, 5, 3; quid,\nduo propugnacula belli Punici, _Cn._ et _P. Scipiones_ cogitassene\nvidentur, P. 12; qui sibi _me_ pro deridiculo et delectamento putat,\nHeaut. 952.\n\nThese examples show that the suffixes do not imprint on the nouns the\nidea of instrument, or any other idea, so strongly that the nouns may\nnot be applied to human beings as well.\n\nOf those nouns which get precision of meaning from a dependent\ngenitive, perhaps there is no better example than fragmentum, which,\nexpressing the result of the action of breaking, may mean a piece\nor fragment of any breakable object: tribunum adoriuntur fragmentis\n_saeptorum_, Sest. 79; ut glaebum aut fragmentum _lapidis_ dicemus, N.\nII, 82; fragmenta _tegularum_, Liv. 34, 89, 11; fragmenta _ramorum_,\nLiv. 23, 24, 10; fragmenta _crystalli_ sarciri nullo modo queunt, Plin.\n37, 2, 10; fragmenta _panis_, Plin. 9, 8, 8; mille carinis abstulit\nEmathiae secum fragmenta _ruinae_ [the remnants of the army], Lucan, 9,\n38. The genitives all answer the question, fragments of what?\n\nAnother noun of general meaning which gets precision from a genitive\nis fundamentum; whether literal or figurative, we want to know, the\nfoundations of what? and the context tells, though not always merely by\nmeans of a genitive: quin cum fundamento _aedes_ perierunt, Most. 148;\nsolum et quasi fundamentum _oratoris_ vides, _locutionem emendatam_ et\n_Latinam_, Brut. 258; fundamenta _rei publicae_ ieci, Fam. XII, 25,\n2; fundamenta ieci _salutis_ tuae, Fam. X, 29, 1; _arcem_ Syracusis\na fundamentis disiecit, Nepos, XX, 3, 3; hic locus sicut aliquod\nfundamentum est huius _constitutionis_, Inv. II, 19; qui a fundamentis\nmi usque movisti _mare_, Rud. 539; prima fundamenta _urbi_ iacere, Liv.\n1, 12, 4; alta fundamenta _theatri_ locare, Aen. 1, 428; fundamenta\naltae _Carthaginis_ locare, Aen. 4, 266; _urbs_ a fundamentis diruta,\nLiv. 42, 63, 11; fodere fundamenta _delubro_, Plin. 28, 2, 4; _pietas_\nfundamentum est omnium _virtutum_, Planc. 29; fundamentum _iustitiae_\nest fides, Off. 1, 7, 23; narratio est fundamentum _constituendae\nfidei_, Part. 9, 31; fundamentum _eloquentiae_, De Or. 3, 151;\nfundamentum _philosophiae_, Div. 2, 1, 2; initium ac fundamentum\n_defensionis_, Clu. 10, 30; quod fundamentum huius _quaestionis_ est,\nid videtis, N. I, 44; fundamentum horum _criminum_, Cael. 13, 30;\ndisciplina nixa fundamento _veritatis_, Gell. 14, 1, 20; fundamentum et\ncausa _imperii_, Sen. Ep. 87, 41; fundamenta _libertatis_, Balb. 13,\n31; fundamentum _consulatus_ tui, Pis. 4, 9; senectus quae fundamentis\n_adolescentiae_ constituta est, C. 18, 62; fundamenta _pacis_ ieci,\nPhil. 1, 1, 1; fundamentum _domus novae_ iacere, Suet. Cal. 22; _villa_\na fundamentis inchoata, Suet. Caes. 46.\n\nIncitamentum is nearly always followed by a genitive or a gerundive\nconstruction expressing the object toward which a thing or circumstance\nis an inducement. The noun is used most frequently in Tacitus: hoc\nmaximum et _periculorum_ incitamentum est et _laborum_, Arch. 23; uxor,\nquae incitamentum _mortis_ fuit, Tac. A. 6, 29; incitamenta _irarum_,\nTac. A. 1, 55; incitamenta _victoriae_, Tac. Agr. 32; incitamentum\n_ad_ honeste _moriendum_, Curt. 9, 5, 4; incitamentum _fortitudinis_,\nTac. G. 7, 9; incitamentum _cupidinis_, Tac. A. 6, 1, 10; incitamenta\n_belli_, Tac. A. 12, 34, 2; est magna illa eloquentia alumna licentiae,\ncomes seditionum, _effrenati populi_ incitamentum, Tac. D. 40, 11. In\nthe last example the genitive is a real objective genitive, while the\nparticiple limiting it expresses the result of incitement expressed by\nthe genitives in the other examples.\n\nLike incitamentum, invitamentum and irritamentum usually get precision\nof meaning from a genitive: invitamenta _urbis_ et _fori_, Sulla, 74;\nhonos, non invitamentum _ad tempus_, sed perpetuae virtutis praemium,\nFam. X, 10, 2; invitamenta _temeritatis_, Liv. 2, 42, 6; invitamentum\n_sceleris_, Vell. 2, 67, 3; pulchritudinem eius non _libidinis_\nhabuerat invitamentum, sed _gloriae_, Curt. 4, 10, 24; fons reperiendus\nest, in quo sint prima invitamenta _naturae_, Fin. 5, 6; neque\nirritamenta _gulae_ quaerebant, Sall. Jug. 89, 7; quod irritamentum\n_certaminum_ equestrium est, Liv. 30, 11; _opes_, irritamenta\n_malorum_, Ov. M. 1, 140; irritamenta _luxuriae_, Val. Max. 2, 6, 1;\nirritamentum _invidiae_, Tac. A. 3, 9; irritamentum _pacis_, Tac. Agr.\n20.\n\nTegumentum and integumentum have only their general meaning of \u201ccover\u201d\nwhich they get from their verb stem, unless something in the context\ntells what it is a covering for: _lanx_ cum integumentis, quae Iovi\nadposita fuit, Liv. 40, 59, 7; illius sum integumentum _corporis_,\nBacc. 602; istaec ego mihi semper habui integumentum meae, Trin. 313;\nintegumentum _frontis_, Cic. post Red. in Sen. 7, 15; integumentum\n_flagitiorum_, Cael. 20, 47; integumentum _dissimulationis_, De Or. 2,\n86; tegumenta _galeis_ milites ex viminibus facere iubet, B. C. 3, 62,\n1; ad tegumenta detrahenda _scutis_ tempus defuerit, B. G. 2, 21, 5;\nquae [_palpebrae_] sunt tegmenta _oculorum_, N. II, 142; _tunicos_ aut\ntegimenta fuerant, B. G. 3, 44, 7; _humus_ satis solidum est tegimentum\n_repellendis caloribus_, Sen. Ep. 90; _equo_ purpurea tegumenta dedit,\nSuet. Cal. 55.\n\nDocumentum has the meaning of \u201cexample\u201d, particularly when there\nis a limiting genitive: Rutilius qui documentum fuit _virtutis_,\n_antiquitatis_, _prudentiae_, Rab. Post. 10, 27. The common occurrence\nof the word with verbs like dare, together with an indirect question,\nshows it to mean proof: _dederas_ enim, quam contemneres populares\ninsanias, iam ab adolescentia documenta maxima, Mil. 8; multa documenta\negregii principis _dedit_, Suet. Galb. 14. With capere the natural\nmeaning is \u201cwarning\u201d or \u201cinstruction\u201d: ex quo documentum nos _capere_\nfortuna voluit, quid esset victis pertimescendum, Phil. 11, 2. This\nmeaning is also very commonly seen in the use of the dative case to\nexpress purpose, followed by a supplementary clause of purpose. The\nnoun need not be in the dative, however: insigne documentum Sagunti\nruinae erunt _ne_ quis fidei Romanae aut societati confidat, Liv.\n21, 19, 10; deletum cum duce exercitum documento fuisse, _ne_ deinde\nturbato gentium iure comitia haberentur, Liv. 7, 6, 11.\n\nMonumentum is quite as general in meaning as documentum, and shows\nas great variety of meaning. It is applied to a whip: vos monumentis\ncommonefaciam _bubulis_, Stich. 63; a statue: _statuam_ volt dare,\nfactis monumentum suis, Curc. 441; a literary record: monumenta\n_rerum gestarum_ oratori nota esse debent, De Or. I, 201; an action\nor circumstance: cum Sex. Pompeium _restituit_ civitati, clarissimum\nmonimentum _clementiae_ suae, Phil. 5, 39; a tomb: _sepultus est_ in\nmonumento avunculi sui, Nepos, Att. 22, 4. Sometimes the word gets\nprecision of meaning from an appositional genitive: hoc _statuae_\nmonumento non eget, Phil. 9, 11; ut tu monumentum aliquod _decreti_\naut _litterarum_ tuarum relinquas, Q. fr. I, 2, 11; _sepulcri_\nmonumento donatus est, Nep. Dion. 10. Sometimes it is used without any\nsuggestion of a concrete object (cf. also the third example above):\nnullum monumentum _laudis_ postulo praeterquam huius diei memoriam\nsempiternam, Cat. 3, 11, 26.\n\nArgumentum (always abstract) has the very frequent general meaning of\nproof, reason, argument: quid nunc? _vincon_ argumentis te non esse\nSosiam?, Am. 437; nunc, huc _qua causa_ veni, argumentum eloquar, Rud.\n31; _quod_ pridie noctu conclamatum esset in Caesaris castris argumenti\nsumebant loco non posse clam exiri B. C. 1, 67, 1. A common meaning\nin comedy is plot, or theme of a play (our \u201cargument\u201d of an epic or a\ndrama): ne exspectetis argumentum _fabulae_, Adel. 22. Then it comes\nto mean the subject matter of a speech or letter: ut mihi nascatur\n_epistulae_ argumentum, Fam. XV, 1, 22, 2; a sign or indication: ubi\nlyrae, tibia et cantus, _animi_ felicia _laeti_ argumenta, sonant,\nOv. M. 4, 762; reality or meaning: haec tota _fabella_ quam est sine\nargumento, Cael. 27; the subject of artistic representations: ex\n_ebore_ perfecta argumenta erant in _valvis_, Verr. II, 4, 56. Twice\nin Ciceronian Latin this word is defined in two of the ways mentioned:\nargumentum est ficta res quae tamen fieri potuit, velut argumentum\ncomoediarum, Ad Her. 1, 8; argumentum esse rationem quae rei dubiae\nfaciat fidem, Top. 8.\n\nExperimentum, when followed by indirect discourse, as in the following\nexample, must mean the result of trial; _viz._, \u201cproof\u201d: hoc maximum\nest experimentum _hanc vim esse_ in cogitatione diuturna, T. 4, 56.\nIn the plural, being the accumulation of a number of trials, it is\nequivalent to experientia, (experience): Metello experimentis _cognitum\nerat_, genus Numidarum infidum esse, Sall. Jug. 46, 3.\n\nFirmamentum often gets precise meaning from a limiting genitive, which\nis also sometimes appositional: ossa nervique et articuli, firmamenta\n_totius corporis_, Sen. De Ira, 2, 1, 2; firmamenta _stabilitatis\nconstantiaeque_ est eius quam in amicitia quaerimus fides, Lael. 65;\neum _ordinem_ firmamentum ceterorum _ordinum_ recte esse dicimus, Pomp.\n17; transversaria _tigna_ iniciuntur, quae firmamento esse possint, B.\nG. 2, 15, 2; firmamentum ac robur totius _accusationis_, Mur. 28, 58;\nfirmamentum _rei publicae_, Planc. 9, 23; firmamentum _dignitatis_, T.\n4, 7; inventa ratione firmamentum [_orationi_] quaerendum est, Inv. I,\n34.\n\nInstrumentum is a word which has the most general meaning, and really\nreceives less influence from its verb stem than from the context. Even\nwhen there is a qualifying genitive or other limiting factor it retains\nmore or less of its general character. Probably its most definite\nmeaning is that of furniture (of a house): decora atque ornamentum\nfanorum in instrumento ac _supellectili_ C. Verris nominabuntur, Verr.\n2, 4, 44; instrumenti ne magni siet (of a _villa_), Cato, R. R. I. 5.\nA common meaning is that of a tool, or utensil of any kind: inest huic\ncomputationi sumptus fabrorum et _venatorii_ instrumenti, Plin. 3,\n19; crudelia iussae instrumenta necis, _ferrumque ignisque_ parantur,\nOv. M. 3, 697; _arma_, _tela_, _equos_ et cetera instrumenta militiae\nparare, Sall. Jug. 43, 3; naves _nautico_ instrumento aptae, Liv. 30,\n10, 3. The following example shows it meaning a legal document: opus\nest intueri omne _litis_ instrumentum; quod videre non est satis,\n_perlegendum_ est, Quint. 12, 8, 12. The meaning of supply, provisions\n(both literal and figurative) is illustrated by the following\nexamples: quid _viatici_, quid instrumenti satis sit, Att. XII, 32, 2;\ninstrumenta _naturae_ deerant, sed tantus animi splendor erat ut..,\nBrut. 77, 268; in _oratoris_ vero instrumento tam lautam supellectilem\nnumquam videram, De Or. I, 36, 165. In one instance it plainly means\napparel, dress: in iuvenem rediit, _anilia_ demit instrumenta, Ov. M.\n14, 766. The meaning of aid or assistance is seen in these citations:\nquanta instrumenta habeat _ad obtinendam_ adipiscendamque sapientiam,\nLeg. 1, 22; industriae _subsidia_ atque instrumenta virtutis in\nlibidine audaciaque consumpsit, Cat. 2, 5.\n\nOrnamentum is very similar in meaning to instrumentum, and shows\nsimilar variety of signification due to context, although the verb\nstem is a little more specialized. The number of things which may be\nspoken of as having ornamenta are seen from the examples: ornamenta\n_bubus_, ornamenta _asinis_ instrata (esse oporteat), Cato, R. R. 11,\n4; _elephantos_ ornatos armatosque cum turribus et ornamentis capit,\nAuct. B. Afr. 86; _pecuniam_ omniaque ornamenta ex _fano_ Herculis\nin oppidum Gadis contulit, B. C. 2, 18, 2; _eloquentia_ principibus\nmaximo ornamento est, F. 4, 61; pecuniam et ornamenta _triumphi_\nCaesaris retinenda curaret, Auct. B. Afr. 28, 2; audieram quae de\n_orationis_ ipsius ornamentis traderentur, De Or. I, 144; pulcherrima\ntotius Galliae _urbs_, quae praesidio et ornamento est _civitati_,\nB. G. 7, 15; mihi hoc subsidium comparavi ad decus atque ornamentum\n_senectutis_, Orat. 1, 45; Hortensius, lumen atque ornamentum _rei\npublicae_, Mil. 14; _urceoli_ sex, ornamentum _abaci_, Juv. 3, 203;\nneminem omnium tot et tanta, quanta sunt in Crasso, habuisse ornamenta\n_dicendi_, Orat. 2, 28. Sometimes adjectives show the ornamenta to\nbe a special sort of distinction: pluribus _triumphalia_ ornamenta\ndecernenda curavit, Suet. Aug. 38; decem praetoriis viris _consularia_\nornamenta tribuit, Suet. Caes. 76. In comedy especially it means dress,\ncostume: ipse ornamenta a _chorago_ haec sumpsit: si potero ornamentis\n_hominem circumducere_, dabo operam ut...., Trin. 859, 860; hominem\ncum ornamentis omnibus _exornatum_ adducite ad me, Pseud. 756; also\ntrinkets: i, Palaestrio, _aurum_, ornamenta, _vestem_, omnia duc, M.\nG. 1302; in one instance, the dress of tragedy: ornamenta absunt:\n_Aiacem_, hunc quom vides ipsum vides, Capt. 615.\n\nStramentum is applied to a number of things which can be conceived\nof as being strewn or covered with straw, but is also sometimes used\nabsolutely: _fasces_ stramentorum _virgultorumque_ incenderunt, B. G.\n8, 15, 5; iubet magnum numerum _mulorum_ produci deque his stramenta\ndetrahi, B. G. 7, 45; cum ea noctem in stramentis _pernoctare_ (a\nbed), Truc. 278; stramenta si deerunt, _frondem ligneam_ legito: eam\nsubsternito _ovibus bubusque_, Cato, R. R. 5. There are two examples in\nwhich it means the roof of a house, or thatch: _casae_, quae stramentis\n_tectae erant_, B. G. 5, 43; pars ignes _casis_ stramento arido\n_tectis_ iniciunt, Liv. 25, 39.\n\nTormentum, an instrument with which anything is turned or twisted, is\napplied especially to a military engine for hurling missiles: aciem\neo loco constituit, unde tormento _missa tela_ in hostium cuneos\nconici possent, B. G. 8, 14, 5; the missile itself: quod unum genus\ntegumenti nullo _telo_ neque tormento _transici_ posse, B. C. 2, 9; a\n(twisted) cord or rope: praesectis omnium mulierum _crinibus_ tormenta\n_effecerunt_, B. C. 3, 9, 3; a chain or fetter: nam si non ferat,\ntormento non _retineri_ potuit _ferreo_, Curc. 227; an instrument\nof torture: _rotam_, id est genus quoddam tormenti apud Graecos, T.\n5, 24; tum _verberibus_ ac tormentis quaestionem habuit pecuniae\npublicae, Phil. 11, 2, 5; torture, pain: cum incredibles _cruciatus_ et\nindignissima tormenta pateretur, Plin. Ep. 1, 12, 6; hinc licebit tum\ndicere se beatum in summo _cruciatu_ atque tormentis, T. 5, 73.\n\nVestimentum, in addition to having its common meaning of clothing: me\nvides ut sim vestimentis _uvidis_, Rud. 573; is once applied to the\ncovering of a bed: huc est intro latus _lectus_, vestimentis stratus,\nHeaut. 903.\n\nFrom the above examples it will be clear that at least some _-mentum_\nwords get precision of meaning from the context. The different means\nby which the context exerts influence would be difficult to classify;\nstill less could one assert that _-mentum_ tends to have any meaning.\nPerhaps we should not speak of a word varying semantically when it\nis used figuratively, yet it is only from the context that we can\nascertain whether it is used figuratively or not. A word can be used in\na figurative sense only when, in one context, it has certain elements\nidentical with those which it has in another context. The more definite\nand concrete the object expressed by a noun, the less variability will\nbe expected, either in a literal or figurative use. This is true of the\n_-bulum_ and _-culum_ words, which, while admitting a small range of\nvariation, are much more limited in their variation than the _-mentum_\nwords were found to be. The best examples will be given below.\n\nConciliabulum is a place of assembly and is expressly so defined by\nFestus (cf. Chapter II, p. 25): mulieres _ex oppidis_ conciliabulisque\nconveniebant, Liv. 34, 1, 6; sacerdotes non Romae modo, sed per omnia\n_fora_ et conciliabula conquiri, Liv. 39, 14, 7. The following example,\nhowever, shows that it may also mean the assembly itself: igitur per\nconciliabula et _coetus_ seditiosa disserebant, Tac. A. 3, 40. In a few\ninstances it takes on a bad meaning: ne penetrarem me usquam ubi esset\n_damni_ conciliabulum, Trin. 314; forte aut cena, ut solet in _istis_\nfieri conciliabulis, Bacc. 80.\n\nLatibulum is seen to be a hiding place for different animals and even\nof men, and also a refuge (figurative): cum etiam se _ferae_ latibulis\ntegant, Rab. Post. 42; repente te tamquam _serpens_ a latibulis\nintulisti, Vatin. 4; defendendi facilis est cautio non solum latibulis\noccultorum _locorum_, sed etiam tempestatum moderatione et conversione\n(of pirates), Flacc. 13, 31; ego autem volo aliquod emere latibulum et\nperfugium _doloris_ mei, Att. XII, 13, 2.\n\nPabulum is used not only of food for animals but also, in poetry,\nof food for men, and sometimes for the pastures, or feeding places.\nIts figurative meaning is also quite common: _bubus_ pabulum parare\noportet, Cato, R. R. 54, 1; pabula carpsit _ovis_, Ov. F. 4, 750; ferae\n_pecudes persultant_ pabula laeta, Lucr. 1, 14; novitas mundi pabula\ndura tulit, miseris _mortalibus_ ampla, Lucr. 5, 944; si animus habet\naliquod tamquam pabulum _studii_ atque _doctrinae_, C. 49; sed fugitare\ndecet simulacra et pabula _amoris_, Lucr. 4, 1063.\n\nStabulum has its literal and general meaning of standing-place in\nonly two examples: neutrubi _habeam stabile_ stabulum, siquid divorti\nfuat, Aul. 233; nusquam stabulum _confidentiae_, Most. 350. Most\nfrequently it means a stable for animals or lair of wild beasts: neque\niam stabulis gaudet _pecus_ aut arator igni, Hor. C. 1, 4, 3; itur in\nantiquam silvam, stabula alta _ferarum_, Aen. 6, 179. The agricultural\nwriters use it in speaking of a variety of animals, birds and fishes:\n_pecudibus_ sient stabula, Col. 1, 6, 4; _avium_ cohortalium stabula\n(an aviary), Col. 8, 1; ut sit _pavonum_ stabulum, Col. 8, 11, 3; hac\nratione stabulis ordinatis _aquatile pecus_ inducemus, Col. 8, 17,\n7; absint et picti squalentia terga lacerti pinguibus a stabulis (of\nbees), Georg. 4, 14. It also means a cottage, a hut, a dwelling like a\nstable: cum Catilina _pastorum_ stabula praedari coepisset, Sest. 12;\npueros ab eo ad stabula _Larentiae uxori_ educandos datos, Liv. 1, 4,\n7. A number of times the context shows it applied to a house of ill\nfame: pistorum _amicas_, quae tibi olant stabulum stratumque, Poen.\n267. Twice it is applied to persons as a term of reproach: _ipsa quae_\nsis stabulum flagitii, Truc. 587; faciam uti proinde ut est dignus\nvitam colat, Acheruntis pabulum, stabulum _nequitiae_, Cas. 160. In the\nlast example pabulum is also used with an emotional tone.\n\nVocabulum is a name or appellation, the name of the thing itself\nbeing expressed, if at all, in the genitive, or in the nominative\nwith vocabulum in the ablative: si res suum _nomen_ et proprium\nvocabulum non habet, De Or. III, 159; deligitur artifex talium vocabulo\n_Locusta_, Tac. A. 12, 66. It also signifies as a grammatical term,\na noun, as opposed to a verb: Aristotelis orationis duas partes esse\ndicit, vocabula et _verba_, ut homo et equus, et legis et currit,\nVarro, L. L. 8.\n\nConventiculum regularly means an assembly (without any diminutive\nnotion): conventicula _hominum_ quae postea _civitates_ nominatae sunt,\nSest. 91; but it may also mean the place of assembly: _exstructa_ sunt\napud nemus conventicula, Tac. A. 14, 15.\n\nOraculum may mean a prophetic declaration by gods, or by men: cum\npraesertim _deorum immortalium_ iussis atque oraculis id fecisse\ndicantur, Sex. Rosc. 66; haec ego nunc _physicorum_ oracula fundo, vera\nan falsa nescio, N. 1, 66. Also the place where oracular responses were\ngiven: numquam illud oraculum _Delphis_ tam celebre fuisset nisi....,\nDiv. I, 19, 37.\n\nPericulum, in the sense of trial, is always the object of the verb\nfacere: _fac_ semel periculum, Cist. 504; priusquam periculum\n_faceret_, B. G. 4, 21. Its change to the meaning of danger must have\nbeen by some such step as is seen in the following example, although\npericulum facere, \u201cmake a trial,\u201d is also practically the same as\n\u201crun a risk\u201d: nescio quanto in periculo _sumus_, Phor. 58. The common\nmeaning of risk or danger hardly needs to be illustrated: salus\nsociorum summum _in_ periculum _vocatur_, Pomp. 5, 12. The context\nshows it to have also two other meanings; _viz._, a lawsuit: meus\nlabor in periculis _privatorum_ caste integreque _versatus_, Pomp. 1,\n2; a judicial sentence: petiit ut _in_ periculo suo _inscriberent_,\nNep. Ep. 8; est honestus, quod eorum hominum fidei _tabulae publicae_\npericulaque _magistratuum_ committuntur, Verr. 2, 3, 79.\n\nPiaculum is properly an offering performed as a means of appeasing a\ndeity: porco femina piaculum _faciundum_ est, Leg. II, 57; apparet\nomnia nec ullis piaculis _expiari_ posse, Liv. 5, 53; and then\nnaturally it is applied to the victim itself: duc _nigras pecudes_:\nea prima piacula sunto, Aen. 6, 153; then also a sinful action, which\nneeds expiation: nonne in mentem venit, quantum piaculi _committatur_?,\nLiv. 5, 52.\n\nSpectaculum is properly a \u201csight\u201d, anything seen: quom hoc mihi\n_optulisti_ tam lepidum spectaculum, Poen. 209; then a show, on\nthe stage or in the arena: spectacula sunt tributim _data_, Muren.\n72. Once in Plautus it clearly means a part of the theater itself:\nexoritur ventus turbo, spectacula ibi _ruont_, Curc. 647; that it means\nalso the theater in general is seen from a few examples: _resonant_\nspectacula plausu, Ov. M. 10, 668; _ex_ omnibus spectaculis _plausus\nest excitatus_, Sest. 58.\n\nUmbraculum is a shady place: faciundum umbracula, _quo succedant_\nhomines in aestu tempore meridiano, Varro, R. R. I, 51; also anything\nthat furnishes shade, an umbrella: aurea _pellebant_ tepidos umbracula\n_soles_, Ov. F. II, 311. The limiting genitive in the following example\nshows the noun to have lost its regular stem-meaning and to have been\nused for \u201cschool\u201d: Demetrius mirabiliter doctrinam ex umbraculis\n_eruditorum_ otioque produxit, Leg. III, 14.\n\nVehiculum, a means of transportation, is applied to wagons or carts:\nomnes di, qui vehiculis _tensarum_ solemnes coitus ludorum initis,\nVerr. 5, 186; but also to ships: ut procul divinum et novum vehiculum\n_Argonautarum_ e monte conspexit, N. II, 89.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThat the words which we have treated vary in meaning according to\nthe context seems perfectly obvious; but the extent to which this is\ntrue in general has received little if any attention from linguistic\nstudents. The tracing of the meaning of a word through various\nperiods of the language has been commonly enough done; that side of\nthe question, however, this investigation has not touched except\nincidentally. But the material presented in this chapter and the\npreceding has, it is hoped, been sufficient to illustrate how the words\nformed with our suffixes, while revealing a limited tendency in meaning\ndue to their verb stems, often also owe much of their meaning to the\ncontext in which they are used.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nOVERLAPPING OF SUFFIXES\n\n\nHowever great a tendency the suffixes under investigation have toward\ngiving to the nouns a certain meaning, the variations of which they\nare capable,--due, as has been shown, to stem and context,--strongly\nsuggest that there can be nothing very stable in the suffix itself. If\nthere really were a fundamental meaning in the suffixes, there would be\nno such variation as we find.\n\nBut a consideration which points even more to the comparatively fluid\ncondition of these suffixes is the fact that we find other words,\nformed on the same stem, but with a different suffix, meaning precisely\nthe same as the nouns made with these suffixes. Here again, the\nmeanings are derived from an examination of the context. Sometimes the\ncontexts are exactly parallel, at other times there is a sufficiently\nlarge element common to both to warrant us in saying that the nouns do\nnot, at least in these particular instances, differ in meaning.\n\nThe fact that some of these parallel words occur at different periods\nin the language does not weaken the argument, as the mere occurrence\nof them shows the unstable influence of the suffix; and, moreover, we\nneed not suppose because one word is not found at a certain period\nwhile another on the same stem with a different suffix is found, that\nthe first word was not in existence. It is just as reasonable to assume\nthat the preservation of one word and not the other is due merely\nto common usage or the personal preference of the author. Metrical\nconsiderations might exclude the use of a certain word in poetry, but\nthe instances are very rare, and will be noted in the proper place.\n\nThe most common suffix which makes accessory forms with _-mentum_ is\n_-men_. Most authorities regard _-mentum_ as an extension of _-men_ by\nthe addition of _-to_. Whether this is true or not, there _are_ many\n_-mentum_ words that have no accessory forms in _-men_, and a large\nnumber of _-men_ words that have no accessory forms in _-mentum_.\nCorssen (_Krit. Nach._ p. 125 ff.) gives fifty-one _-men_ words\nfrom old, classical, and later Latin to which there are no forms in\n_-mentum_, fifty-two _-mentum_ words from the same periods to which\nthere are no forms in _-men_; twenty-five words with both forms in\nany one period. He also gives a table showing how the words in the\nolder and classical language preferred the form _-men_ while in later\nLatin the same words preferred the form _-mentum_. He says the suffix\n_-mentum_ is only the the extension, on Latin soil, of the suffix\n_-men_ (Sanskrit, _-man_) with _-to_; and this explains why in later\nLatin the forms in _-mentum_ become more frequent, also why they are\nnot found in other Italic dialects, nor in the Greek and other related\nlanguages.\n\nLindsay says (p. 335) that the suffix _-men_ is found more often in\npoetry, while _-mentum_ predominates in prose.\n\nEtymologically, the suffixes _-bulum_ and _-culum_ go back to original\n_-dhlo_ and _-tlo_ respectively (Lindsay pp. 334 and 332).\n\nA study of the other suffixes which make accessory forms to these words\nwould probably yield results similar to those seen in the case of our\nsuffixes; but all that will be attempted here will be to show parallels\nwherever possible. Italics will be used here, also, to show what\nelements in the context go to prove the equivalence in semantic content\nof the nouns under discussion.\n\n\nA. PARALLELS OF -MENTUM AND ACCESSORY SUFFIXES\n\nOne of the neatest examples of identity in meaning is the following\nexactly parallel usage of stramen and stramentum: _tectam_ stramine\nvidit _casam_, Ov. M. 5, 443; _casae_, quae stramentis _tectae_ erant,\nB. G. 5, 43.\n\nFrom the use of a genitive denoting a concrete object, fragmentum and\nfragmen are seen to be identical in meaning in the following examples:\nadiacebant fragmina _telorum_ equorumque artus, Tac. A. 1, 61; tribunum\nadoriuntur fragmentis _saeptorum_, Sest. 79.\n\nThe genitives depending on irritamen and irritamentum in the following\nexamples are not exactly alike, one being concrete and the other\nabstract; but they are near enough in meaning, and the nouns themselves\nare used in sufficiently similar contexts to justify us in saying that\neither one might have been used in place of the other: nisi adiecisset\nopes, irritamen _animi_ avari, Ov. M. 13, 434; neque salem neque alia\nirritamenta _gulae_ quaerebant, Sall. Jug. 89, 7.\n\nLevamen and levamentum are used in parallel examples: cuius _mali_\n(debt) plebes nullum levamen speraret, Liv. 6, 35, 1; non aliud\n_malorum_ levamentum quam si linquerent castra, Tac. H. 1, 30, 9.\n\nThe verbs used with medicamen and medicamentum show a lack of\ndifferentiation between these nouns: quod diceres te violentis\nquibusdam medicaminibus solere _curari_, Pis. 6, 13; si eo medicamento\n_sanus factus_ esset, Off. 3, 92.\n\nThe verbs with molimen and molimentum in the following examples are\nvery similar, and there is the same adjective modifying each noun:\ntemptat _revellere_ annosam pinum _magno_ molimine, Ov. M. 12, 357;\nneque exercitum sine _magno_ commeatu atque molimento in unum locum\n_contrahere_ posse, B. G. I, 34, 3.\n\nIdentity of verbs and the case of momen and momentum show there\nis no difference in their meaning: momine uti _parvo_ possint\n_impulsa_ moveri, Lucr. 3, 188; animus _paulo_ momento huc vel illuc\n_impellitur_, And. 266.\n\nParallel instances of blanditia and blandimenta are seen in these\nexamples: haec _meretrix_ meum erum sua blanditia intulit in pauperiem,\nTruc. 572; illum spero immutari potest blandimentis, oramentis,\nceteris _meretriciis_, Truc. 318; _benevolentiam_ civium blanditiis\net adsentando _colligere_ turpe est, Lael. 61; Lepida blandimentis ac\nlargitionibus iuvenilem _animum devinciebat_, Tac. H. 13, 13.\n\nAdiutorium is a rare word, but in the following examples it is seen to\nhave the same general meaning as adiumentum, \u201chelp\u201d: sine adiutorio\n_ignis_ nihil calidum est, Sen. Ep. 31; neque apud homines res est ulla\ndifficilior neque quae plura adiumenta _doctrinae_ desideret, De Or.\nIII, 84.\n\nExperimentum in the plural naturally means the same as experientia\n(experience), but in the singular also they both mean a trial or\nattempt, or the result of trial, proof: debemus _temptare_ experientia\nquaedam, sequentes non aleam, sed rationem aliquam, Varro, R. R. 1, 18,\n8; hoc est maximum experimentum, _hanc vim_ esse non in die positam\nsed in cogitatione diuturna, T. 3, 74. With the meaning of experience:\nAgrippa non _aetate_ neque _rerum_ experientia tantae moli par, Tac.\nA. 1, 4; Metello experimentis _cognitum erat_, genus Numidarum infidum\nesse, Sall. Jug. 40, 3.\n\nFirmamen and firmamentum might be interchanged, in both their\nfigurative and literal meanings: ruptosque obliqua per ungues\nporrigitur _radix_, longi firmamina _trunci_, Ov. M. 10, 491; _ossa\nnervique_, firmamenta totius _corporis_, Sen. De Ira, 2, 1, 2. Both the\ndependent genitives above express concrete objects; in the following\nthey express abstract objects: unicum lapsae _domus_ firmamen, unum\nlumen afflicto malis temet reserva, Sen. Herc. Fur. 1251; sic ille\nannus duo firmamenta _rei publicae_ per me unum constituta evertit,\nAtt. I, 18, 3.\n\nDocumen occurs only once, but its context shows it to be equivalent in\nmeaning to documentum, which is used in strikingly similar contexts:\nflammas ut fulguris halent pectore perfixo, documen _mortalibus acre_,\nLucr. 6, 391; ut sint reliquis documento et magnitudine _poenae\nperterreant_ alios, B. G. 7, 4, 10.\n\nWords with the suffix _-tio_ we naturally think of as verbals, or\nnomina actionis, but in the following examples the context makes it\nfairly certain that they mean the same as their corresponding _-mentum_\nnouns.\n\nFormamenta is found only twice: omnia _principiorum_ formamenta queunt\nin quovis esse nitore, Lucr. 2, 819; si vos fateremini id quod vestra\nsuspicio credidisset formamentis _divinis_ attribuisse, minus erat\niniuriae praesumpta in opinatione peccasse, Arn. 3, 16. In the first\nexample, formamenta is used closely following formae and must mean\nthe same thing, the \u201cshapes\u201d of the atoms; in the second example the\nadjective \u201cdivinis\u201d indicates a similar meaning for formamentum; in\nthe following example Vitruvius is giving directions concerning the\nbuilding of a forum: ita enim erit _oblonga_ eius [_forum_] formatio\net ad spectaculorum rationem utilis dispositio, Vitr. 5, 1. While\nthe directions for the future building might lead us to believe that\nthe word has a predominant verbal force, yet it is just as possible\nto conceive of it as expressing the result of the process; and this\ninterpretation is even more probable, as the adjective oblonga would\nproperly not be applied to a purely verbal noun.\n\nThe verb fodior shows the identity in meaning between fundatio and\nfundamenta in the following instances: cum _fodientes_ delubro\nfundamenta caput humanum invenissent, Plin. 28, 2, 4; fundationes\neorum operum _fodiantur_, Vitr. 3, 3. Res Romana and libertas are\nnear enough alike to show that fundamen and fundamentum have the same\ngeneral meaning in these instances: fundamine magno _res Romana_ valet,\nOv. M. 4, 808; haec sunt fundamenta firmissima nostrae _libertatis_,\nBalb. 13.\n\nThe contexts of hortamen and hortamentum in the two following examples\nare near enough alike to warrant our saying that the nouns might be\ninterchanged: Decii eventus, ingens hortamen _ad_ omnia pro re publicia\n_audenda_, Liv. 10, 29, 5; in conspectu parentum coniugumque ac\nliberorum quae magna etiam _absentibus_ hortamenta _animi_ sunt, Liv.\n7, 11, 6.\n\nThere is undoubtedly no more verbal force in the following example of\nallevatio than in the example of allevamentum, (which is the only one\nextant): _tantis rebus_ urgemur, _nullam_ ut allevationem quisquam non\nstultissimus sperare debeat, Fam. IX, 1; Sulla coactus est in _adversis\nfortunis sine ullo_ remedio atque allevamento permanere, Sulla, 66.\n\nBesides alimentum there are two other nouns, formed on the verb alo,\nalimonium and alimonia, which also mean support or nourishment, as seen\nfrom these parallel examples: plus alimenti in _pane_ quam in ullo\nalio est, Cels. 2, 18; quid temperatus ab alimonio _panis_, cui rei\ndedistis nomen castus?, Arn. 5, 16; amisso omni _naturalis_ alimoniae\nfundamento, homo _exhaustus intereat_, Gell. 17, 15, 5.\n\nAlthough _-tus_ is also usually considered as forming nomina actionis,\nthe example of cruciatus clearly is parallel with that of cruciamentum:\n_confectus_ iam cruciatu maximorum _dolorum_, ne id quidem scribere\npossim, quod...., Att. XI. 11, 1; nec _graviora_ sunt tormenta\ncarnificum, quam interdum cruciamenta _morborum_, Phil. 11, 4.\n\nCalceamentum, \u201cshoe\u201d or covering for the feet, has two accessory forms,\ncalceamen and calceatus, which are synonymous with it (the former being\nfound only in Pliny): mihi est calciamentum _solorum callum_, amictui\nScythicum tegimen, T. 5, 90; _vestitu_ calceatuque et cetero habitu\nneque patrio neque civili usus est, Suet. Calig. 52; hinc [_sparto_]\nstrata rusticis eorum, hinc ignes facesque, hinc calceamina et pastorum\n_vestis_, Plin. 19, 2, 7.\n\nThe use of _ad_ and a gerund after both invitatio and invitamenta\nindicate their lack of difference in meaning in these two instances: ad\neundem fontem revertendum est, _aegritudinem omnem abesse_ a sapiente,\nquod inanis sit, quod frustra suscipiatur, quod non natura exoriatur,\nsed iudicio, sed opinione sed quadam invitatione _ad dolendum_, cum id\ndecreverimus ita fieri oportere, T. 3, 82; quocirca intellegi necesse\nest in ipsis rebus, quae discuntur et cognoscuntur, invitamenta inesse,\nquibus _ad discendum_ cognoscendumque moveamur, F. 5, 52.\n\nMunitio is another _-tio_ noun that ordinarily has verbal force, but\nnot at all infrequently it coincides in meaning with both munimen and\nmunimentum: cum urbem _operibus_ munitionibusque saepsisset, Phil. 13,\n9, 20; _castella_ et munitiones idoneis locis imponens, Tac. A. 3, 74.\nThe genitives following munimen and munitio are alike in meaning and\nfunction, both being appositional: confisus munitione _fossae_, B. C.\n1, 42, 3; narrat esse locum solidae tectum munimine _molis_, Ov. M. 4,\n771. Munimentum is used of the same kind of \u201cfortification\u201d: _fossa_,\nhaud parvum munimentum, Liv. 1, 33, 7.\n\nNatura and ignis are the similar elements in the following contexts\nthat indicate the identity in meaning between nutrimen and nutrimentum:\n\n    nempe ubi terra cibos alimentaque pinguia flammae\n    non dabit absumptis per longum viribus aevum\n    _naturaeque_ suum nutrimen deerit edaci, Ov. M. 15, 354;\n\n    suscepit _ignem_ foliis atque arida circum\n    nutrimenta dedit, Aen. 1, 176.\n\nIn the first example, curiously enough, nutrimen seems to be also\nsynonymous with alimenta in the second line before it.\n\nNato and puerorum following oblectamina and oblectamenta indicate\nidentity in meaning, although the latter is still vague, while the\nformer is specified by \u201cflores\u201d: carpserat _flores_, quos oblectamina\n_nato_ porrigeret, Ov. M. 9, 342; obsecro te non ut vincla virorum\nsint, sed ut oblectamenta _puerorum_, Par. 5, 2, 38.\n\nWe have the clear testimony of Varro that operculum and operimentum are\nboth used to mean \u201ccovering\u201d: quibus operibantur operimenta et opercula\ndixerunt, Varro, L. L. 5, 167; and the fact is illustrated by the\nfollowing examples, in which both are used in the ablative after tego:\naspera arteria _tegitur_ quasi quodam operculo, N. 2, 54; nuces gemino\n_protectae_ operimento sunt, Plin. 15, 22.\n\nBoth ornatus and ornamentum are used of a speech, oratio: mihi\neripuisti ornamentum _orationis_ meae, Planc. 83; reliqua quasi lumina\nafferunt magnum ornatum _orationi_, Or. 39, 134. The following examples\nof these nouns, although still general in meaning, are interesting as\nbeing used with the verb which is their stem: ornatus appellatur cultus\nipse, quo quis _ornatur_, Fest. 184; hominem cum ornamentis omnibus\n_exornatum_ adducite ad me, Bacc. 756.\n\nAlthough the circumstances in the following passages are not alike, the\nimmediate contexts are similar enough to show that sarmen and sarmentum\nhave the same meaning: iam iubeo _ignem_ et sarmen _arae_, carnifex,\n_circumdari_, Most. 1114; _ligna_ et sarmenta _ignemque circumdare_\ncoeperunt, Verr. 2, 1, 69.\n\nTegimen and tegimentum both mean a covering for the body: mihi\n_amictui_ Scythicum tegimen est, T. 5, 90; pennarum contextu _corpori_\ntegimentum faciebat, F. 5, 32.\n\nAs shown earlier in this paper, tinnimentum in its single occurrence\nundoubtedly means a \u201ctinkling\u201d in the ears, caused by chattering talk;\ntinnitus also seems to mean the same thing in the following contexts:\ncuminum silvestre _auribus_ instillatur ad _sonitus_ atque tinnitus,\nPlin. 20, 15, 57; illud tinnimentumst _auribus_, Rud. 806.\n\nIf there is any difference between vestitus and vestimentum in these\ntwo examples, it is difficult to find: credo te audisse, venisse, eo\n_muliebri_ vestitu virum, Att. I, 13, 3; mulierem aequomst vestimentum\n_muliebre_ dare foras, virum virile, Men. 659.\n\nFrom the fragments in Nonius we find that two of our _-mentum_ nouns\nhave accessory forms in _-menta_ (fem.) with the same meaning: ipsius\narmentas ad easdem, Ennius ap. Non. 190, 20; tu cornifrontes pascere\narmentas soles, Pacuvius ap. Non. 190, 22; labei labuntur saxa,\ncaementae cadunt, Ennius ap. Non. 196, 30.\n\n\nB. PARALLELS OF -BULUM AND ACCESSORY SUFFIXES\n\nLatibulum and latebra: repente te tamquam _serpens_ e latibulis\nintulisti, Vat. 2; curvis frustra defensa latebris _vipera_, Georg. 3,\n544; cum etiam _ferae_ latibulis se tegant, Rab. Post. 15, 42; Maenala\ntransieram latebris horrenda _ferarum_, Ov. M. 1, 216. Latibulum is an\nexample of a word that could not be used in verse on account of the\nquantity of its syllables.\n\nCommon elements in the context show identity of meaning in sedile\nand sessibulum: cum pater _assedisset_ appositumque esset aliud filio\nquoque eius _sedile_, Gell. 2, 2, 8; _asside_ istic, nam prae metu\nlatronum nulla sessibula parare nobis licet, App. Met. 1. Varro (L. L.\n8, 54) says that a form sediculum is also correctly made, but not in\nuse.\n\nStabulatio, another apparent verbal noun, must mean the same as\nstabulum in the following examples, both on account of the adjective\nand the general significance of the passages: _hibernae_ stabulationi\neorum (cattle) praeparanda sunt stramenta, Col. 6, 3, 1; iubeo stabula\na ventis _hiberno_ opponere soli, Georg. 3, 302.\n\nBesides a few examples in Arnobius, only one instance of vocamen is\nfound, in Lucretius, but that it means the same as vocabulum can be\nseen from the parallel passages: si quis Bacchi _nomine_ abuti Mavult\nquam _laticis proprium_ proferre vocamen, Lucr. 2, 657; si res suum\n_nomen_ et vocabulum proprium non habet, De Or. III, 159.\n\n\nC. PARALLELS OF -CULUM AND ACCESSORY SUFFIXES\n\nAmong _-culum_ words, we find cenaculum having an accessory form\ncenatio that has, not the verbal idea, but the genuine meaning of place\nfor eating, while cenaculum has lost its literal meaning and taken a\nmore general signification: vel _cubiculum_ grande vel _modica_ cenatio\n[sit] quae plurimo sole lucet, Plin. Ep. 2, 17, 10; nos ampliores\ntriginta vidimus in cenatione _quam_ Callistus _exaedificaverat_, Plin.\n36, 7, 12; ubi cubabant, cubiculum, ubi cenabant, cenaculum vocitabant;\nposteaquam in superiore parte cenitare coeperunt superioris domus\nuniversa cenacula dicta, Varro, L. L. 5, 162.\n\nOn the stem curro there are three nouns, all signifying \u201ca running\u201d:\n_exercent_ sese _ad_ cursuram, Most. 861; ibi _cursu_, luctando sese\n_exercebant_, Bacc. 428; unum curriculum _face_, Trin. 1103. A use of\ncurriculum with exerceo would parallel the first two examples, but in\nsuch a case it takes on the meaning of place (running course): cum\nathletae se _exercentes in_ curriculo videret, C. 27.\n\nIn the same paragraph deversorium and deverticulum are used of the same\nplace: ut _in_ deversorium eius vim magnam gladiorum _inferri_ clam\nsineret, Liv. 1, 51; cum gladii abditi _ex_ omnibus locis deverticuli\n_protraherentur_, Liv. 1, 51.\n\nFeretrum and ferculum both are used depending on suspensa in the two\nfollowing examples, but mean different kinds of \u201cinstruments for\ncarrying\u201d: quis opima volenti _dona_ Iovis portet feretro _suspensa_\ncruento, Sil. 5, 168; _spolia_ ducis hostium caesi _suspensa_ fabricato\nad id apte ferculo gerens in Capitolium ascendit, Liv. 1, 10, 5.\n\nThe stem cerno (sift) forms two nouns which both mean a sieve,\nalthough the use of them side by side indicates that there must be\nsome difference; as there are no other examples of incerniculum, this\ndifference cannot be discovered: in torcularium quod opus est cribrum\nunum, incerniculum unum, Cato, R. R. I, 13, 3; caseum _per_ cribrum\nfacito _transeat_ in mortarium, Cato, R. R. 76, 3.\n\nIn the following examples, spiramen and spiracula are both used to mean\n\u201cbreathing holes\u201d in the earth or universe, while spiramenta is applied\nto the cells in a beehive:\n\n                  sunt qui spiramina _terris_\n    esse putent magnosque cavae compages hiatus,\n    Lucan, 10, 247;\n\n    quasi per magni circum spiracula _mundi_\n    exitus introitusque elementis redditus exstat, Lucr. 6, 493;\n\n    _apes_ in tectis certatim tenuia _cera_\n    spiramenta _linunt_, Georg. 4, 39.\n\nNo difference can be seen in spectamen and spectaculum in these\nexamples: _miserum_ funestumque spectamen _aspexi_, App. M. 4, 151;\npotius quam hoc spectaculum _viderem_, Mil. 38, 103; constitutur in\nforo Laodiceae spectaculum acerbum et _miserum_, Verr. I, 76.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nSUFFIXES AND THE THEORY OF ADAPTATION\n\n\nAs stated in the introductory chapter, it has been the primary object\nof this paper to examine certain word-building suffixes for the purpose\nof finding out, if possible, what the force of the suffixes themselves\nis, and how the nouns formed with them get their meaning. The material\npresented has, it is hoped, shown that these nouns are capable of\nwide semantic variation, the influencing elements being the verb stem\nand context (the former exerting greater influence than the latter);\nalso that these suffixes overlap with other suffixes in forming words\nof identical semantic content to such an extent that they cannot be\nsaid to have any sort of fundamental meaning whatever. This is the\nsignificance of our investigation in so far as semantics is concerned.\n\nBut it is possible also to connect our results with another question,\nthe entire solution of which will doubtless never be possible, at least\nnot soon; _viz._, the theory of the origin of inflection. Nothing but\nmere suggestion can be made in this direction from the conclusions of\nthis study; the field will need much wider working-over before any\nthing definite can be asserted.\n\nOf the two chief explanations of the origin of inflection, one,\nthe theory of adaptation, as held at the present time, answers the\nquestion by saying that \u201cinflectional endings are not essentially\ndifferent from word-building suffixes, but are rather to be regarded\nas word-building suffixes in a new r\u00f4le and partially systematized\ninto paradigms. Inflection comes at the point--wherever in the long\ncourse of development that point may be--where the endings of two or\nmore different forms of a word begin to be felt to be the carriers\nof relations of case, or of mode and tense, to a certain extent\nindependently of stem and context. It is therefore not properly a\nmatter of forms, but of meanings, and that theory which accounts for\nthe meanings and for their association with forms explains inflection,\nwhether it accounts for the forms or not.\u201d[188]\n\nIn other words, inflectional forms got their meanings in a manner\nsimilar to that we have illustrated in the case of our nouns.\n\n(1.) The apparent definiteness that case-endings have does depend\nlargely on their stem-meaning. Many of the functional distinctions of\ncase can be made only by the meaning of the nouns, _e. g._, in \u201cgladiis\npugnatum est\u201d, Caes. B. G. 1, 52; \u201cuno tempore omnibus locis pugnatur,\u201d\nB. G. 7, 84; \u201cpugnatum continenter horis quinque vario certamine,\u201d B.\nC. 1, 46, we have five ablatives, expressing instrument, time when,\nduration of time, manner, and place, only because the words in the\nablative are capable of these meanings. Just so, we saw that our nouns\ngot their general meaning of instrument, place, result of action, etc.,\nbecause their verb stems were such as to admit of such meaning.\n\n(2.) While our nouns naturally get an important part of their meaning\nfrom the verb stem, yet they derive great specialization of meaning\nfrom some element in the context. It is very probable, too, that\noriginally our so-called inflectional system was in reality only\na large number of undifferentiated forms which, by a process of\ncentralization and adaptation, and influenced by the associations in\nwhich they were used, acquired their present meaning.\n\n(3.) The variety and overlapping of suffixes may also be paralleled by\ncase-endings; for example, in both the first and second declensions\nthe same form serves for the dative and ablative plural, while there\nis another form for the other declensions. The genitive singular,\nand nominative and accusative plural of the fourth declension are\nalike in form. In the historical language, the genitive singular,\ndative singular, and nominative plural of the first declension have\nbecome identical in form. Other similar comparisons might be drawn to\nillustrate the similarity in meaning of forms with different endings,\nand from the verb as well as the noun. The very fact that we have five\ndeclensions and four conjugations, with many variations inside the\nsystem and irregularities outside, goes to show that it is not real\nsystem that we have here, but the survival of an original mass of\nundifferentiated forms, which through a long period of development\nhave acquired their present inflectional meaning.\n\nThe parallel suggested here is put forth merely as a suggestion; all we\ncan say is, that it is possible that inflectional forms did get their\nmeaning in some such way as the nouns treated in this paper got theirs.\nMore evidence will be necessary for establishing this theory, if it can\nbe established at all.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX OF WORDS\n\n\n  acetabulum, 26\n\n  additamentum, 18, 32\n\n  adiumentum, 18, 45\n\n  adminiculum, 27\n\n  alimentum, 13, 47\n\n  allevamentum, 20, 47\n\n  ammentum, 13\n\n  antepagmentum, 16\n\n  argumentum, 20, 36\n\n  armamentum, 13\n\n  armentum, 14, 49\n\n  atramentum, 18\n\n  auctoramentum, 20\n\n\n  baculum, 27\n\n  blandimentum, 21, 45\n\n\n  caementum, 11, 49\n\n  calceamentum, 14, 47\n\n  cenaculum, 29, 50\n\n  coagmentum, 16\n\n  cognomentum, 23\n\n  complementum, 21\n\n  conciliabulum, 25, 39\n\n  condimentum, 16\n\n  conventiculum, 29, 40\n\n  cruciamentum, 18, 47\n\n  cubiculum, 29\n\n  cunabulum, 26\n\n  curriculum, 30, 50\n\n\n  dehonestamentum, 19, 33\n\n  delectamentum, 11, 33\n\n  delenimentum, 18\n\n  deliramentum, 19\n\n  dentifrangibulum, 25\n\n  deridiculum, 30, 33\n\n  desidiabulum, 26\n\n  detrimentum, 19\n\n  deverticulum, 29, 50\n\n  documentum, 21, 33, 36, 46\n\n\n  emolumentum, 19\n\n  everriculum, 27, 33\n\n  exorabulum, 25\n\n  experimentum, 23, 36, 45\n\n  explementum, 21\n\n\n  ferculum, 27, 51\n\n  ferramentum, 17\n\n  firmamentum, 22, 36, 46\n\n  formamentum, 20, 46\n\n  fragmentum, 11, 33\n\n  frumentum, 15\n\n  fundamentum, 16, 33, 46\n\n\n  gubernaculum, 27\n\n\n  hibernaculum, 29\n\n  hortamentum, 22, 33, 47\n\n  hostimentum, 21\n\n\n  ientaculum, 30\n\n  impedimentum, 16\n\n  inanimentum, 19\n\n  incerniculum, 27, 51\n\n  incitamentum, 21, 33, 34\n\n  incunabulum, 26\n\n  infundibulum, 24\n\n  instrumentum, 14, 37\n\n  integumentum, 14, 33, 35\n\n  intertrimentum, 19\n\n  invitamentum, 21, 34, 47\n\n  irritamentum, 21, 34, 44\n\n  iugumentum, 15\n\n  iumentum, 15\n\n\n  latibulum, 25, 39, 49\n\n  laxamentum, 19\n\n  levamentum, 22, 45\n\n  libamentum, 15\n\n  libramentum, 22\n\n  lineamentum, 23\n\n  lomentum, 15\n\n  lutamentum, 12\n\n\n  medicamentum, 13, 45\n\n  mendicabulum, 26\n\n  miraculum, 30\n\n  molimentum, 23, 45\n\n  momentum, 20, 45\n\n  monumentum, 14, 35\n\n  munimentum, 48\n\n\n  nidamentum, 17\n\n  nucifrangibulum, 25\n\n  nutrimentum, 16, 48\n\n\n  oblectamentum, 22, 48\n\n  omentum, 16\n\n  operculum, 28\n\n  operimentum, 13, 48\n\n  opprobramentum, 22\n\n  oraculum, 31, 40\n\n  oramentum, 23\n\n  ornamentum, 14, 33, 37, 48\n\n\n  pabulum, 25, 39\n\n  patibulum, 24\n\n  pavimentum, 12\n\n  periculum, 30, 41\n\n  perpendiculum, 28\n\n  piaculum, 28, 41\n\n  pigmentum, 16\n\n  poculum, 28\n\n  praepedimentum, 22\n\n  propugnaculum, 29, 33\n\n  prostibulum, 26\n\n  pulpamentum, 17\n\n\n  ramentum, 11\n\n  receptaculum, 29\n\n  redimiculum, 28\n\n  retinaculum, 28\n\n  rutabulum, 24\n\n\n  saeculum, 30\n\n  saepimentum, 14\n\n  salsamentum, 17\n\n  sarculum, 28\n\n  sarmentum, 12, 49\n\n  scitamentum, 18\n\n  sessibulum, 25, 50\n\n  sicilimentum, 12\n\n  sincipitamentum, 18\n\n  spectaculum, 30, 41, 51\n\n  spiraculum, 28, 51\n\n  stabilimentum, 14\n\n  stabulum, 25, 33, 40, 50\n\n  sternumentum, 23\n\n  stramentum, 11, 38, 44\n\n  subligaculum, 28\n\n  suffimentum, 13\n\n  supplementum, 15\n\n\n  tabernaculum, 29\n\n  tegumentum, 13, 35, 49\n\n  temperamentum, 20\n\n  termentum, 20\n\n  testamentum, 12\n\n  tinnimentum, 23, 49\n\n  tintinnabulum, 24\n\n  tormentum, 15, 38\n\n  turbamentum, 22\n\n  turibulum, 26\n\n\n  umbraculum, 30, 41\n\n\n  vehiculum, 29, 42\n\n  venabulum, 25\n\n  vestibulum, 25\n\n  vestimentum, 15, 39, 49\n\n  vocabulum, 25, 40, 50\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[181] Cf. Morris, _Principles and Methods in Latin Syntax_, p.\n65. It must be noted, however, that this is only one direction in\nwhich semantic development takes place. The opposite (decrease of\nconnotation) is also observable as a definite line of semantic\ndevelopment.\n\n[182] This is one of four _-mentum_ words which occur first in Sallust.\nThe others are hortamentum, irritamentum, turbamentum. Norden mentions\nthe use of _-mentum_ words as a peculiarity of Sallust\u2019s style (Gercke\nund Norden. _Einleitung in die Alt. Wiss._ I. 578), but with the\nexception of these four words, which occur, moreover, only once each in\nthis author, the examples scarcely justify the statement.\n\n[183] Cf. Festus, p. 38: conciliabulum dicitur locus, ubi in concilium\nvenitur.\n\n[184] Cf. Walde, who gives as the etymology of this word,\nver(o)-stabulum, in which *uer = \u201cdoor\u201d.\n\n[185] See Mommsen, _R\u00f6m. Gesch._ Bk. I, Ch. XV.\n\n[186] Only those _-culum_ words were examined which were not\ndiminutives. Some of the words formed with this suffix do have\ndiminutive meaning, but for a diminutive to be formed on a verb stem is\nimpossible.\n\n[187] Cf. Varro, _Lingua Latina_, 5, Art. 162.\n\n[188] See the article by Professors Oertel and Morris on _The Nature\nand Origin of Indo-European Inflection_, Harvard Class. Stud., Vol.\nXVI, p. 89.\n\n\n  END OF VOLUME ONE\n\n\n  UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS HUMANISTIC STUDIES\n\n\n\n\nTRANSCRIBER\u2019S NOTES:\n\nThis text contains Greek phrases in several places and numerous words\nand phrases in Latin. Greek and Latin passages have been rendered as\nthey appear in the original publication. No attempt has been made to\nmake corrections.\n\nObvious punctuation errors have been repaired. Occasional missing\ncommas have been left unchanged. Identifyable inconsistencies in\npunctuation in headings, footnotes, index, and bibliography have been\nrepaired.\n\nVariations in hyphenation and spelling, particularly in the use of\naccent marks, have, for the most part, been left unchanged. If it was\nclear from the predominance of occurrences that the difference was due\nto a typo and not the intent of the author, the correction was made.\nHowever, the variations were frequently the result of references or\nquotes from different sources and therefor the variations were left\nas found. For instance, the reader will find the following variations\nleft as found in the original: Bocca-dell\u2019-Verit\u00e0 also appears as\nBocca-dell\u2019-Verita; Marriage \u00e0 la Mode sometimes appears as Marriage a\nla Mode; both L\u00e9vy-Bruhl and Levy-Bruhl are used; De Vulgari Eloquio is\nalso spelled De Vulgario Eloquio; The Rival Queans is also given as The\nRival Queens.\n\nSpelling of non-dialect wording in the text was made consistent when\na predominant preference was found in this book; if no predominant\npreference was found, or if there is only one occurrence of the word,\nspelling was not changed.\n\nSimple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced\nquotation marks repaired.\n\nThe original text has duplicate words in several places. For example,\nPage 308 ... \u201cis only the the extension, on Latin soil\u201d; Page 146 ...\n\u201cmatter to each each other\u201d. These have been rendered as found without\ncorrection.\n\nBecause of the propensity in this text for quotations starting and\nending in the middle of a sentence, ellipsis have been rendered\nas found in the text with no assumptions made as to the ending of\nsentences within quotations. Ellipsis that are obviously errors have\nbeen standardized to common usage. In several places within the English\ntext and in the Latin phrases, periods have apparently been used to\nrepresent missing letters in a word or name. These have been rendered\nas found in the original.\n\nThere are several typographical errors in sequential numbering in the\nAppendix for section 3, the paper on Browning and Italian Arts and\nArtists. On page 253, the section shown in the original as \u201cIV. Pippa\nPasses.\u201d should be numbered \u201cIII.\u201d if properly sequenced. On page 258,\nthe section shown in the original as \u201cXX. Pacchiarotto and How He Worked\nin Distemper.\u201d should be numbered \u201cXXIV.\u201d if properly sequenced. On page\n257, under \u201cXX. The Ring and the Book\u201d, the numbering skips for \u201c8\u201d to\n\u201c10\u201d, leaving out \u201c9\u201d. All these have been repaired.\n\nIn the Appendix for section 3, the paper on Browning and Italian Arts\nand Artists, some of the Roman Numerals are in parenthesis. About a\nthird of them have the period inside the parenthesis [i.e. (III.)] and\nabout 2/3 have the period outside the parenthesis [i.e. (III).]. No\nattempt has been made to standardize these. They have been left as\nfound in the original text.","title":"Humanistic Studies of the University of Kansas, Vol. 1","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":107718}