{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_52090/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_52090","id":"gutenberg_52090","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/52090","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Materialism","Mind and body","Physiology -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"MAN A MACHINE\n\n                                   BY\n\n                      Julien Offray de la Mettrie\n\n                             FRENCH-ENGLISH\n\n                INCLUDING FREDERICK THE GREAT'S \"EULOGY\"\n              ON LA METTRIE AND EXTRACTS FROM LA METTRIE'S\n                   \"THE NATURAL HISTORY OF THE SOUL\"\n\n                   PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL NOTES\n                                   BY\n                         GERTRUDE CARMAN BUSSEY\n                        M. A., WELLESLEY COLLEGE\n\n\n                                CHICAGO\n                     THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.\n                                  1912\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n                              COPYRIGHT BY\n                     THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.\n                                  1912\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS.\n\n\n                                                                 PAGE\n\n    Preface                                                         v\n    Frederic the Great's Eulogy on Julien Offray De La Mettrie      1\n    L'Homme Machine                                                11\n    Man a Machine                                                  83\n    The Natural History of the Soul: Extracts                     151\n    Appendix                                                      163\n    La Mettrie's Relation to His Predecessors and to His\n    Successors                                                    165\n    Outline of La Mettrie's Metaphysical Doctrine                 175\n    Notes                                                         176\n    Works Consulted and Cited in the Notes                        205\n    Index                                                         209\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nThe French text presented in this volume is taken from that of a Leyden\nedition of 1748, in other words, from that of an edition published\nin the year and in the place of issue of the first edition. The\ntitle page of this edition is reproduced in the present volume. The\noriginal was evidently the work of a Dutch compositor unschooled in\nthe French language, and is full of imperfections, inconsistencies,\nand grammatical blunders. By the direction of the publishers these\nobviously typographical blunders have been corrected by M. Lucien\nArr\u00e9at of Paris.\n\nThe translation is the work of several hands. It is founded on a\nversion made by Miss Gertrude C. Bussey (from the French text in the\nedition of J. Assezat) and has been revised by Professor M. W. Calkins\nwho is responsible for it in its present form. Mademoiselle M. Carret,\nof the Wellesley College department of French, and Professor George\nSantayana, of Harvard University, have given valued assistance; and\nthis opportunity is taken to acknowledge their kindness in solving\nthe problems of interpretation which have been submitted to them. It\nshould be added that the translation sometimes subordinates the claims\nof English structure and style in the effort to render La Mettrie's\nmeaning exactly. The paragraphing of the French is usually followed,\nbut the italics and the capitals are not reproduced. The page-headings\nof the translation refer back to the pages of the French text; and\na few words inserted by the translators are enclosed in brackets.\n\nThe philosophical and historical Notes are condensed and adapted\nfrom a master's thesis on La Mettrie presented by Miss Bussey to the\nfaculty of Wellesley College.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nFREDERIC THE GREAT'S EULOGY ON JULIEN OFFRAY DE LA METTRIE.\n\n\nJulien Offray de la Mettrie was born in Saint Malo, on the twenty-fifth\nof December, 1709, to Julien Offray de la Mettrie and Marie Gaudron,\nwho were living by a trade large enough to provide a good education\nfor their son. They sent him to the college of Coutance to study the\nhumanities; he went from there to Paris, to the college of Plessis;\nhe studied his rhetoric at Caen, and since he had much genius and\nimagination, he won all the prizes for eloquence. He was a born orator,\nand was passionately fond of poetry and belles-lettres, but his father\nthought that he would earn more as an ecclesiastic than as a poet,\nand destined him for the church. He sent him, the following year,\nto the college of Plessis where he studied logic under M. Cordier,\nwho was more a Jansenist than a logician.\n\nIt is characteristic of an ardent imagination to seize forcefully\nthe objects presented to it, as it is characteristic of youth to be\nprejudiced in favor of the first opinions that are inculcated. Any\nother scholar would have adopted the opinions of his teacher but\nthat was not enough for young La Mettrie; he became a Jansenist,\nand wrote a work which had great vogue in that party.\n\nIn 1725, he studied natural philosophy at the college of Harcourt,\nand made great progress there. On his return to Brittany, M. Hunault,\na doctor of Saint Malo, had advised him to adopt the medical\nprofession. They had persuaded his father, assuring him that a\nmediocre physician would be better paid for his remedies than a\ngood priest for absolutions. At first young La Mettrie had applied\nhimself to the study of anatomy: for two years he had worked at the\ndissecting-table. After this, in 1725, he took the degree of doctor\nat Rheims, and was there received as a physician.\n\nIn 1733, he went to Leyden to study under the famous Boerhaave. The\nmaster was worthy of the scholar and the scholar soon made himself\nworthy of the master. M. La Mettrie devoted all the acuteness of\nhis mind to the knowledge and to the healing of human infirmities;\nand he soon became a great physician.\n\nIn the year 1734, during his leisure moments, he translated a\ntreatise of the late M. Boerhaave, his Aphrodisiacus, and joined to\nit a dissertation on venereal maladies, of which he himself was the\nauthor. The old physicians in France rose up against a scholar who\naffronted them by knowing as much as they. One of the most celebrated\ndoctors of Paris did him the honor of criticizing his work (a sure\nproof that it was good). La Mettrie replied; and, to confound his\nadversary still more, he composed in 1736 a treatise on vertigo,\nesteemed by all impartial physicians.\n\nBy an unfortunate effect of human imperfection a certain base jealousy\nhas come to be one of the characteristics of men of letters. This\nfeeling incites those who have reputations, to oppose the progress\nof budding geniuses. This blight often fastens on talents without\ndestroying them, but it sometimes injures them. M. La Mettrie, who was\nadvancing in the career of science at a giant's pace, suffered from\nthis jealousy, and his quick temper made him too susceptible to it.\n\nIn Saint Malo, he translated the \"Aphorisms\" of Boerhaave, the\n\"Materia Medica,\" the \"Chemical Proceedings,\" the \"Chemical Theory,\"\nand the \"Institutions,\" by this same author. About the same time,\nhe published an abstract of Sydenham. The young doctor had learned\nby premature experience, that if he wished to live in peace, it was\nbetter to translate than to compose; but it is characteristic of\ngenius to escape from reflection. Counting on himself alone, if I\nmay speak thus, and filled with the knowledge he had gained from his\ninfinitely skilful researches into nature, he wished to communicate\nto the public the useful discoveries he had made. He published his\ntreatise on smallpox, his \"Practical Medicine,\" and six volumes of\ncommentary on the physiology of Boerhaave. All these works appeared at\nParis, although the author had written them at Saint Malo. He joined\nto the theory of his art an always successful practice, which is no\nsmall recommendation for a physician.\n\nIn 1742, La Mettrie came to Paris, led there by the death of\nM. Hunault, his old teacher. Morand and Sidobre introduced him to\nthe Duke of Gramont, who, a few days after, obtained for him the\ncommission of physician of the guards. He accompanied the Duke to\nwar, and was with him at the battle of Dettingen, at the siege of\nFreiburg, and at the battle of Fontenoy, where he lost his patron,\nwho was killed by a cannon shot.\n\nLa Mettrie felt this loss all the more keenly, because it was at\nthe same time the reef on which his fortune was wrecked. This is\nwhat happened. During the campaign of Freiburg, La Mettrie had an\nattack of violent fever. For a philosopher an illness is a school of\nphysiology; he believed that he could clearly see that thought is\nbut a consequence of the organization of the machine, and that the\ndisturbance of the springs has considerable influence on that part of\nus which the metaphysicians call soul. Filled with these ideas during\nhis convalescence, he boldly bore the torch of experience into the\nnight of metaphysics; he tried to explain by the aid of anatomy the\nthin texture of understanding, and he found only mechanism where others\nhad supposed an essence superior to matter. He had his philosophic\nconjectures printed under the title of \"The Natural History of the\nSoul.\" The chaplain of the regiment sounded the tocsin against him,\nand at first sight all the devotees cried out against him.\n\nThe common ecclesiastic is like Don Quixote, who found marvelous\nadventures in commonplace events, or like the famous soldier, so\nengrossed with his system that he found columns in all the books he\nread. The majority of priests examine all works of literature as\nif they were treatises on theology, and filled with this one aim,\nthey discover heresies everywhere. To this fact are due very many\nfalse judgments and very many accusations, for the most part unfair,\nagainst the authors. A book of physics should be read in the spirit\nof a physicist; nature, the truth, is its sole judge, and should\nabsolve or condemn it. A book of astronomy should be read in the same\nmanner. If a poor physician proves that the blow of a stick smartly\nrapped on the skull disturbs the mind, or that at a certain degree\nof heat reason wanders, one must either prove the contrary or keep\nquiet. If a skilful astronomer proves, in spite of Joshua, that the\nearth and all the celestial globes revolve around the sun, one must\neither calculate better than he, or admit that the earth revolves.\n\nBut the theologians, who, by their continual apprehension, might make\nthe weak believe that their cause is bad, are not troubled by such\na small matter. They insisted on finding seeds of heresy in a work\ndealing with physics. The author underwent a frightful persecution,\nand the priests claimed that a doctor accused of heresy could not\ncure the French guards.\n\nTo the hatred of the devotees was joined that of his rivals for\nglory. This was rekindled by a work of La Mettrie's entitled \"The\nPolitics of Physicians.\" A man full of cunning, and carried away\nby ambition, aspired to the place, then vacant, of first physician\nto the king of France. He thought that he could gain it by heaping\nridicule upon those of his contemporaries who might lay claim to\nthis position. He wrote a libel against them, and abusing the easy\nfriendship of La Mettrie, he enticed him to lend to it the volubility\nof his pen, and the richness of his imagination. Nothing more was\nneeded to complete the downfall of a man little known, against whom\nwere all appearances, and whose only protection was his merit.\n\nFor having been too sincere as a philosopher and too obliging as\na friend, La Mettrie was compelled to leave his country. The Duke\nof Duras and the Viscount of Chaila advised him to flee from the\nhatred of the priests and the revenge of the physicians. Therefore,\nin 1746, he left the hospitals of the army where he had been placed by\nM. Sechelles, and came to Leyden to philosophize in peace. He there\ncomposed his \"Penelope,\" a polemical work against the physicians in\nwhich, after the fashion of Democritus, he made fun of the vanity of\nhis profession. The curious result was that the doctors themselves,\nthough their quackery was painted in true colors, could not help\nlaughing when they read it, and that is a sure sign that they had\nfound more wit than malice in it.\n\nM. La Mettrie after losing sight of his hospitals and his patients,\ngave himself up completely to speculative philosophy; he wrote his\n\"Man a Machine\" or rather he put on paper some vigorous thoughts\nabout materialism, which he doubtless planned to rewrite. This work,\nwhich was bound to displease men who by their position are declared\nenemies of the progress of human reason, roused all the priests of\nLeyden against its author. Calvinists, Catholics and Lutherans forgot\nfor the time that consubstantiation, free will, mass for the dead,\nand the infallibility of the pope divided them: they all united\nagain to persecute a philosopher who had the additional misfortune\nof being French, at a time when that monarchy was waging a successful\nwar against their High Powers.\n\nThe title of philosopher and the reputation of being unfortunate\nwere enough to procure for La Mettrie a refuge in Prussia with a\npension from the king. He came to Berlin in the month of February\nin the year 1748; he was there received as a member of the Royal\nAcademy of Science. Medicine reclaimed him from metaphysics, and\nhe wrote a treatise on dysentery, another on asthma, the best that\nhad then been written on these cruel diseases. He sketched works on\ncertain philosophical subjects which he had proposed to look into. By\na sequence of accidents which befell him these works were stolen,\nbut he demanded their suppression as soon as they appeared.\n\nLa Mettrie died in the house of Milord Tirconnel, minister\nplenipotentiary of France, whose life he had saved. It seems that\nthe disease, knowing with whom it had to deal, was clever enough\nto attack his brain first, so that it would more surely confound\nhim. He had a burning fever and was violently delirious. The invalid\nwas obliged to depend upon the science of his colleagues, and he did\nnot find there the resources which he had so often found in his own,\nboth for himself and for the public.\n\nHe died on the eleventh of November, 1751, at the age of forty-three\nyears. He had married Louise Charlotte Dr\u00e9ano, by whom he left only\na daughter, five years and a few months old.\n\nLa Mettrie was born with a fund of natural and inexhaustible gaiety;\nhe had a quick mind, and such a fertile imagination that it made\nflowers grow in the field of medicine. Nature had made him an orator\nand a philosopher; but a yet more precious gift which he received\nfrom her, was a pure soul and an obliging heart. All those who are\nnot imposed upon by the pious insults of the theologians mourn in La\nMettrie a good man and a wise physician.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nFACSIMILE OF TITLE PAGE OF THE LEYDEN 1748 EDITION\n\n\n                            L'HOMME MACHINE.\n\n\n                Est-ce l\u00e0 ce Raion de l'Essence supr\u00e8me,\n                Que l'on nous peint si lumineux?\n                Est-ce l\u00e0 cet Esprit survivant \u00e0 nous m\u00eame?\n                Il na\u00eet avec nos sens, croit, s'affoiblit comme eux.\n                Helas! il p\u00e9rira de m\u00eame.\n\n                                                            Voltaire.\n\n                                \u00c0 LEYDE,\n\n                     De l'Imp. d'ELIE LUZAC, Fils.\n\n                                 -----\n\n                              MDCCXLVIII.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nL'HOMME MACHINE.\n\n\nIl ne suffit pas \u00e0 un sage d'\u00e9tudier la nature et la v\u00e9rit\u00e9; il doit\noser la dire en faveur du petit nombre de ceux qui veulent et peuvent\npenser; car pour les autres, qui sont volontairement esclaves des\npr\u00e9jug\u00e9s, il ne leur est pas plus possible d'atteindre la v\u00e9rit\u00e9,\nqu'aux grenouilles de voler.\n\nJe r\u00e9duis \u00e0 deux les syst\u00e8mes des philosophes sur l'\u00e2me de l'homme. Le\npremier, et le plus ancien, est le syst\u00e8me du mat\u00e9rialisme; le second\nest celui du spiritualisme.\n\nLes m\u00e9taphysiciens qui ont insinu\u00e9 que la mati\u00e8re pourrait bien avoir\nla facult\u00e9 de penser, n'ont pas d\u00e9shonor\u00e9 leur raison. Pourquoi? C'est\nqu'ils ont cet avantage (car ici c'en est un) de s'\u00eatre mal\nexprim\u00e9s. En effet, demander si la mati\u00e8re peut penser, sans la\nconsid\u00e9rer autrement qu'en elle-m\u00eame, c'est demander si la mati\u00e8re peut\nmarquer les heures. On voit d'avance que nous \u00e9viterons cet \u00e9cueil,\no\u00f9 Mr. Locke a eu le malheur d'\u00e9chouer.\n\nLes Leibniziens, avec leurs monades, ont \u00e9lev\u00e9 une hypoth\u00e8se\ninintelligible. Ils ont plut\u00f4t spiritualis\u00e9 la mati\u00e8re, que mat\u00e9rialis\u00e9\nl'\u00e2me. Comment peut-on d\u00e9finir un \u00eatre dont la nature nous est\nabsolument inconnue?\n\nDescartes, et tous les Cart\u00e9siens, parmi lesquels il y a longtemps\nqu'on a compt\u00e9 les Malebranchistes, ont fait la m\u00eame faute. Ils ont\nadmis deux substances distinctes dans l'homme, comme s'ils les avaient\nvues et bien compt\u00e9es.\n\nLes plus sages ont dit que l'\u00e2me ne pouvait se conna\u00eetre que par les\nseules lumi\u00e8res de la Foi: cependant, en qualit\u00e9 d'\u00eatres raisonnables,\nils ont cru pouvoir se r\u00e9server le droit d'examiner ce que l'Ecriture\na voulu dire par le mot Esprit, dont elle se sert en parlant de l'\u00e2me\nhumaine; et dans leurs recherches, s'ils ne sont pas d'accord sur ce\npoint avec les th\u00e9ologiens, ceux-ci le sont-ils davantage entr'eux\nsur tous les autres?\n\nVoici en peu de mots le r\u00e9sultat de toutes leurs r\u00e9flexions.\n\nS'il y a un Dieu, il est auteur de la Nature, comme de la R\u00e9v\u00e9lation;\nil nous a donn\u00e9 l'une, pour expliquer l'autre; et la Raison, pour\nles accorder ensemble.\n\nSe d\u00e9fier des connaissances qu'on peut puiser dans les corps anim\u00e9s,\nc'est regarder la Nature et la R\u00e9v\u00e9lation comme deux contraires qui\nse d\u00e9truisent; et par cons\u00e9quent, c'est oser soutenir cette absurdit\u00e9:\nque Dieu se contredit dans ses divers ouvrages, et nous trompe.\n\nS'il y a une R\u00e9v\u00e9lation, elle ne peut donc d\u00e9mentir la Nature. Par la\nNature seule, on peut d\u00e9couvrir le sens des paroles de l'Evangile,\ndont l'exp\u00e9rience seule est la v\u00e9ritable interpr\u00e8te. En effet,\nles autres commentateurs jusqu'ici n'ont fait qu'embrouiller\nla v\u00e9rit\u00e9. Nous allons en juger par l'auteur du Spectacle de la\nNature. \"Il est \u00e9tonnant, dit-il (au sujet de Mr. Locke), qu'un homme\nqui d\u00e9grade notre \u00e2me jusqu'\u00e0 la croire une \u00e2me de boue, ose \u00e9tablir\nla Raison pour juge et souverain arbitre des myst\u00e8res de la Foi;\ncar, ajoute-t-il, quelle id\u00e9e \u00e9tonnante aurait-on du Christianisme,\nsi l'on voulait suivre la Raison?\"\n\nOutre que ces r\u00e9flexions n'\u00e9claircissent rien par rapport \u00e0 la Foi,\nelles forment de si frivoles objections contre la m\u00e9thode de ceux\nqui croient pouvoir interpr\u00e9ter les Livres Saints, que j'ai presque\nhonte de perdre le temps \u00e0 les r\u00e9futer.\n\n1\u00ba. L'excellence de la Raison ne d\u00e9pend pas d'un grand mot vide de\nsens (l'immat\u00e9rialit\u00e9); mais de sa force, de son \u00e9tendue, ou de sa\nclairvoyance. Ainsi une \u00e2me de boue, qui d\u00e9couvrirait, comme d'un coup\nd'oeil, les rapports et les suites d'une infinit\u00e9 d'id\u00e9es difficiles\n\u00e0 saisir, serait \u00e9videmment pr\u00e9f\u00e9rable \u00e0 une \u00e2me sotte et stupide\nqui serait faite des \u00e9l\u00e9ments les plus pr\u00e9cieux. Ce n'est pas \u00eatre\nphilosophe, que de rougir avec Pline de la mis\u00e8re de notre origine. Ce\nqui parait vil, est ici la chose la plus pr\u00e9cieuse, et pour laquelle\nla nature semble avoir mis le plus d'art et le plus d'appareil. Mais\ncomme l'homme, quand m\u00eame il viendrait d'une source encore plus vile\nen apparence, n'en serait pas moins le plus parfait de tous les \u00eatres,\nquelle que soit l'origine de son \u00e2me, si elle est pure, noble, sublime,\nc'est une belle \u00e2me, qui rend respectable quiconque en est dou\u00e9.\n\nLa seconde mani\u00e8re de raisonner de Mr. Pluche me parait vicieuse, m\u00eame\ndans son syst\u00e8me, qui tient un peu du fanatisme; car si nous avons\nune id\u00e9e de la Foi, qui soit contraire aux principes les plus clairs,\naux v\u00e9rit\u00e9s les plus incontestables, il faut croire, pour l'honneur\nde la R\u00e9v\u00e9lation et de son Auteur, que cette id\u00e9e est fausse, et que\nnous ne connaissons point encore les sens des paroles de l'Evangile.\n\nDe deux choses l'une; ou tout est illusion, tant la Nature m\u00eame, que la\nR\u00e9v\u00e9lation; ou l'exp\u00e9rience seule peut rendre raison de la Foi. Mais\nquel plus grand ridicule que celui de notre auteur? Je m'imagine\nentendre un p\u00e9ripat\u00e9ticien, qui dirait: \"Il ne faut pas croire\nl'exp\u00e9rience de Toricelli: car si nous la croyions, si nous allions\nbannir l'horreur du vide, quelle \u00e9tonnante philosophie aurions-nous?\"\n\nJ'ai fait voir combien le raisonnement de Mr. Pluche est vicieux,\n[1] afin de prouver premi\u00e8rement que s'il y a une R\u00e9v\u00e9lation, elle\nn'est point suffisamment d\u00e9montr\u00e9e par la seule autorit\u00e9 de l'Eglise\net sans aucun examen de la Raison, comme le pr\u00e9tendent tous ceux qui\nla craignent. Secondement, pour mettre \u00e0 l'abri de toute attaque la\nm\u00e9thode de ceux qui voudraient suivre la voie que je leur ouvre,\nd'interpr\u00e9ter les choses surnaturelles, incompr\u00e9hensibles en soi,\npar les lumi\u00e8res que chacun a re\u00e7ues de la nature.\n\nL'exp\u00e9rience et l'observation doivent donc seules nous guider\nici. Elles se trouvent sans nombre dans les Fastes des m\u00e9decins, qui\nont \u00e9t\u00e9 philosophes, et non dans les philosophes, qui n'ont pas \u00e9t\u00e9\nm\u00e9decins. Ceux-ci ont parcouru, ont \u00e9clair\u00e9 le labyrinthe de l'homme;\nils nous ont seuls d\u00e9voil\u00e9 ces ressorts cach\u00e9s sous des enveloppes\nqui d\u00e9robent \u00e0 nos yeux tant de merveilles. Eux seuls, contemplant\ntranquillement notre \u00e2me, l'ont mille fois surprise, et dans sa mis\u00e8re,\net dans sa grandeur, sans plus la m\u00e9priser dans l'un de ces \u00e9tats, que\nl'admirer dans l'autre. Encore une fois, voil\u00e0 les seuls physiciens qui\naient droit de parler ici. Que nous diraient les autres, et surtout\nles th\u00e9ologiens? N'est-il pas ridicule de les entendre d\u00e9cider sans\npudeur, sur un sujet qu'ils n'ont point \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e0 port\u00e9e de conna\u00eetre,\ndont ils ont \u00e9t\u00e9 au contraire enti\u00e8rement d\u00e9tourn\u00e9s par des \u00e9tudes\nobscures, qui les ont conduits \u00e0 mille pr\u00e9jug\u00e9s, et pour tout dire\nen un mot, au fanatisme, qui ajoute encore \u00e0 leur ignorance dans le\nm\u00e9canisme des corps.\n\nMais, quoique nous ayons choisi les meilleurs guides, nous trouverons\nencore beaucoup d'\u00e9pines et d'obstacles dans cette carri\u00e8re.\n\nL'homme est une machine si compos\u00e9e, qu'il est impossible de s'en\nfaire d'abord une id\u00e9e claire, et cons\u00e9quemment de la d\u00e9finir. C'est\npourquoi toutes les recherches que les plus grands philosophes ont\nfaites \u00e0 priori, c'est \u00e0 dire, en voulant se servir en quelque sorte\ndes ailes de l'esprit, ont \u00e9t\u00e9 vaines. Ainsi ce n'est qu'\u00e0 posteriori,\nou en cherchant \u00e0 dem\u00ealer l'\u00e2me comme au travers les organes du corps,\nqu'on peut, je ne dis pas d\u00e9couvrir avec \u00e9vidence la nature m\u00eame de\nl'homme, mais atteindre le plus grand degr\u00e9 de probabilit\u00e9 possible\nsur ce sujet.\n\nPrenons donc le b\u00e2ton de l'exp\u00e9rience, et laissons l\u00e0 l'histoire de\ntoutes les vaines opinions des philosophes. Etre aveugle, et croire\npouvoir se passer de ce b\u00e2ton, c'est le comble de l'aveuglement. Qu'un\nmoderne a bien raison de dire qu'il n'y a que la vanit\u00e9 seule qui ne\ntire pas des causes secondes le m\u00eame parti que des premi\u00e8res! On peut\net on doit m\u00eame admirer tous ces beaux g\u00e9nies dans leurs travaux les\nplus inutiles, les Descartes, les Malebranche, les Leibnitz, les Wolf,\netc.; mais quel fruit, je vous prie, a-t-on retir\u00e9 de leurs profondes\nm\u00e9ditations et de tous leurs ouvrages? Commen\u00e7ons donc et voyons, non\nce qu'on a pens\u00e9, mais ce qu'il faut penser pour le repos de la vie.\n\nAutant de temp\u00e9raments, autant d'esprits, de caract\u00e8res et de moeurs\ndiff\u00e9rentes. Galien m\u00eame a connu cette v\u00e9rit\u00e9, que Descartes, et non\nHippocrate, comme le dit l'auteur de l'histoire de l'Ame, a pouss\u00e9e\nloin, jusqu'\u00e0 dire que la m\u00e9decine seule pouvait changer les esprits\net les moeurs avec le corps. Il est vrai, la m\u00e9lancolie, la bile, le\nphlegme, le sang etc., suivant la nature, l'abondance et la diverse\ncombinaison de ces humeurs, de chaque homme font un homme diff\u00e9rent.\n\nDans les maladies, tant\u00f4t l'\u00e2me s'\u00e9clipse et ne montre aucun signe\nd'elle-m\u00eame; tant\u00f4t on dirait qu'elle est double, tant la fureur la\ntransporte; tant\u00f4t l'imb\u00e9cilit\u00e9 se dissipe: et la convalescence d'un\nsot fait un homme d'esprit. Tant\u00f4t le plus beau g\u00e9nie devenu stupide,\nne se reconnait plus. Adieu toutes ces belles connaissances acquises\n\u00e0 si grands frais, et avec tant de peine!\n\nIci c'est un paralytique, qui demande si sa jambe est dans son lit: l\u00e0\nc'est un soldat qui croit avoir le bras qu'on lui a coup\u00e9. La m\u00e9moire\nde ses anciennes sensations, et du lieu o\u00f9 son \u00e2me les rapportait,\nfait son illusion et son esp\u00e8ce de d\u00e9lire. Il suffit de lui parler de\ncette partie qui lui manque, pour lui en rappeller et faire sentir\ntous les mouvements; ce qui se fait avec je ne sais quel d\u00e9plaisir\nd'imagination qu'on ne peut exprimer.\n\nCelui-ci pleure, comme un enfant, aux approches de la mort, que\ncelui-l\u00e0 badine. Que fallait-il \u00e0 Caius Julius, \u00e0 S\u00e9n\u00e8que, \u00e0 P\u00e9trone\npour changer leur intr\u00e9pidit\u00e9 en pusillanimit\u00e9 ou en poltronnerie? Une\nobstruction dans la rate, dans le foie, un embarras dans la veine\nporte. Pourquoi? Parceque l'imagination se bouche avec les visc\u00e8res;\net de l\u00e0 naissent tous ces singuliers ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes de l'affection\nhyst\u00e9rique et hypocondriaque.\n\nQue dirais-je de nouveau sur ceux qui s'imaginent \u00eatre transform\u00e9s\nen loups-garous, en coqs, en vampires, qui croient que les morts\nles sucent? Pourquoi m'arr\u00eaterais-je \u00e0 ceux qui voient leur nez, ou\nautres membres, de verre, et \u00e0 qui il faut conseiller de coucher sur\nla paille, de peur qu'ils ne se cassent, afin qu'ils en retrouvent\nl'usage et la v\u00e9ritable chair, lorsque mettant le feu \u00e0 la paille on\nleur fait craindre d'\u00eatre br\u00fbl\u00e9s: frayeur qui a quelquefois gu\u00e9ri la\nparalysie? Je dois l\u00e9g\u00e8rement passer sur des choses connues de tout\nle monde.\n\nJe ne serai pas plus long sur le d\u00e9tail des effets du sommeil. Voyez\nce soldat fatigu\u00e9! il ronfle dans la tranch\u00e9e, au bruit de cent\npi\u00e8ces de canons! Son \u00e2me n'entend rien, son sommeil est une parfaite\napoplexie. Une bombe va l'\u00e9craser; il sentira peut-\u00eatre moins ce coup\nqu'un insecte qui se trouve sous le pied.\n\nD'un autre c\u00f4t\u00e9, cet homme que la jalousie, la haine, l'avarice\nou l'ambition d\u00e9vore, ne peut trouver aucun repos. Le lieu le plus\ntranquille, les boissons les plus fra\u00eeches et les plus calmantes, tout\nest inutile \u00e0 qui n'a pas d\u00e9livr\u00e9 son coeur du tourment des passions.\n\nL'\u00e2me et le corps s'endorment ensemble. A mesure que le mouvement du\nsang se calme, un doux sentiment de paix et de tranquillit\u00e9 se r\u00e9pand\ndans toute la machine; l'\u00e2me se sent mollement s'appesantir avec les\npaupi\u00e8res et s'affaisser avec les fibres du cerveau: elle devient ainsi\npeu \u00e0 peu comme paralytique, avec tous les muscles du corps. Ceux-ci ne\npeuvent plus porter le poids de la t\u00eate; celle l\u00e0 ne peut plus soutenir\nle fardeau de la pens\u00e9e; elle est dans le sommeil, comme n'\u00e9tant point.\n\nLa circulation se fait-elle avec trop de vitesse? l'\u00e2me ne peut\ndormir. L'\u00e2me est-elle trop agit\u00e9e, le sang ne peut se calmer;\nil galope dans les veines avec un bruit qu'on entend: telles sont\nles deux causes r\u00e9ciproques de l'insomnie. Une seule frayeur dans\nles songes fait battre le coeur \u00e0 coups redoubl\u00e9s, et nous arrache\n\u00e0 la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9, ou \u00e0 la douceur du repos, comme feraient une vive\ndouleur ou des besoins urgents. Enfin, comme la seule cessation des\nfonctions de l'\u00e2me procure le sommeil, il est, m\u00eame pendant la veille\n(qui n'est alors qu'une demi-veille), des sortes de petits sommeils\nd'\u00e2me tr\u00e8s fr\u00e9quents, des r\u00eaves \u00e0 la Suisse, qui prouvent que l'\u00e2me\nn'attend pas toujours le corps pour dormir; car si elle ne dort pas\ntout-\u00e0-fait, combien peu s'en faut-il! puisqu'il lui est impossible\nd'assigner un seul objet auquel elle ait pr\u00eat\u00e9 quelque attention,\nparmi cette foule innombrable d'id\u00e9es confuses, qui comme autant de\nnuages remplissent, pour ainsi dire, l'atmosph\u00e8re de notre cerveau.\n\nL'opium a trop de rapport avec le sommeil qu'il procure, pour ne\npas le placer ici. Ce rem\u00e8de enivre, ainsi que le vin, le caf\u00e9,\net chacun \u00e0 sa mani\u00e8re, et suivant sa dose. Il rend l'homme heureux\ndans un \u00e9tat qui semblerait devoir \u00eatre le tombeau du sentiment,\ncomme il est l'image de la mort. Quelle douce l\u00e9thargie! L'\u00e2me n'en\nvoudrait jamais sortir. Elle \u00e9tait en proie aux plus grandes douleurs;\nelle ne sent plus que le seul plaisir de ne plus suffrir et de jouir\nde la plus charmante tranquillit\u00e9. L'opium change jusqu'\u00e0 la volont\u00e9;\nil force l'\u00e2me qui voulait veiller et se divertir, d'aller se mettre\nau lit malgr\u00e9 elle. Je passe sous silence l'histoire des poisons.\n\nC'est en fouettant l'imagination, que le caf\u00e9, cet antidote du vin,\ndissipe nos maux de t\u00eate et nos chagrins, sans nous en m\u00e9nager,\ncomme cette liqueur, pour le lendemain.\n\nContemplons l'\u00e2me dans ses autres besoins.\n\nLe corps humain est une machine qui monte elle-m\u00eame ses ressorts;\nvivante image du mouvement perp\u00e9tuel. Les aliments entretiennent\nce que la fi\u00e8vre excite. Sans eux l'\u00e2me languit, entre en fureur et\nmeurt abattue. C'est une bougie dont la lumi\u00e8re se ranime, au moment\nde s'\u00e9teindre. Mais nourrissez le corps, versez dans ses tuyaux des\nsucs vigoureux, des liqueurs fortes; alors l'\u00e2me g\u00e9n\u00e9reuse comme\nelles s'arme d'un fier courage et le soldat que l'eau eut fait fuir,\ndevenu f\u00e9roce, court gaiement \u00e0 la mort au bruit des tambours. C'est\nainsi que l'eau chaude agite un sang que l'eau froide eut calm\u00e9.\n\nQuelle puissance d'un repas! La joie rena\u00eet dans un coeur triste;\nelle passe dans l'\u00e2me des convives qui l'expriment par d'aimables\nchansons, o\u00f9 les Fran\u00e7ais excellent. Le m\u00e9lancolique seul est accabl\u00e9,\net l'homme d'\u00e9tude n'y est plus propre.\n\nLa viande crue rend les animaux f\u00e9roces; les hommes le deviendraient\npar la m\u00eame nourriture; cela est si vrai, que la nation anglaise,\nqui ne mange pas la chair si cuite que nous, mais rouge et sanglante,\nparait participer de cette f\u00e9rocit\u00e9 plus ou moins grande, qui vient\nen partie de tels aliments, et d'autres causes, que l'\u00e9ducation\npeut seule rendre impuissantes. Cette f\u00e9rocit\u00e9 produit dans l'\u00e2me\nl'orgueil, la haine, le m\u00e9pris des autres nations, l'indocilit\u00e9 et\nautres sentiments, qui d\u00e9pravent le caract\u00e8re, comme des aliments\ngrossiers font un esprit lourd, \u00e9pais, dont la paresse et l'indolence\nsont les attributs favoris.\n\nMr. Pope a bien connu tout l'empire de la gourmandise, lorsqu'il dit:\n\"Le grave Catius parle toujours de vertu, et croit que, qui souffre\nles vicieux est vicieux lui-m\u00eame. Ces beaux sentiments durent jusqu'\u00e0\nl'heure du diner; alors il pr\u00e9f\u00e8re un sc\u00e9l\u00e9rat, qui a une table\nd\u00e9licate, \u00e0 un saint frugal.\n\n\"Consid\u00e9rez, dit-il ailleurs, le m\u00eame homme en sant\u00e9, ou en maladie;\nposs\u00e9dant une belle charge, ou l'ayant perdue; vous le verrez ch\u00e9rir\nla vie, ou la d\u00e9tester, fou \u00e0 la chasse, ivrogne dans une assembl\u00e9e\nde province, poli au bal, bon ami en ville, sans foi \u00e0 la cour.\"\n\nNous avons eu en Suisse un bailli, nomm\u00e9 Steiguer de Wittighofen;\nil \u00e9tait \u00e0 je\u00fbn le plus int\u00e8gre et m\u00eame le plus indulgent des juges;\nmais malheur au mis\u00e9rable qui se trouvait sur la sellette, lorsqu'il\navait fait un grand diner! Il \u00e9tait homme \u00e0 faire pendre l'innocent,\ncomme le coupable.\n\nNous pensons, et m\u00eame nous ne sommes honn\u00eates gens, que comme nous\nsommes gais, ou braves; tout d\u00e9pend de la mani\u00e8re dont notre machine\nest mont\u00e9e. On dirait en certains moments que l'\u00e2me habite dans\nl'estomac, et que Van Helmont, en mettant son si\u00e8ge dans le pylore,\nne se serait tromp\u00e9 qu'en prenant la partie pour le tout.\n\nA quels exc\u00e8s la faim cruelle peut nous porter! Plus de respect\npour les entrailles auxquelles on doit ou on a donn\u00e9 la vie; on les\nd\u00e9chire \u00e0 belles dents, on s'en fait d'horribles festins; et dans la\nfureur dont on est transport\u00e9, le plus faible est toujours la proie\ndu plus fort.\n\nLa grossesse, cette \u00e9mule d\u00e9sir\u00e9e des p\u00e2les couleurs, ne se contente\npas d'amener le plus souvent \u00e0 sa suite les go\u00fbts d\u00e9prav\u00e9s qui\naccompagnent ces deux \u00e9tats: elle a quelquefois fait ex\u00e9cuter \u00e0 l'\u00e2me\nles plus affreux complots; effets d'une manie subite, qui \u00e9touffe\njusqu'\u00e0 la loi naturelle. C'est ainsi que le cerveau, cette matrice\nde l'esprit, se pervertit \u00e0 sa mani\u00e8re, avec celle du corps.\n\nQuelle autre fureur d'homme ou de femme, dans ceux que la continence\net la sant\u00e9 poursuivent! C'est peu pour cette fille timide et modeste\nd'avoir perdu toute honte et toute pudeur; elle ne regarde plus\nl'inceste, que comme une femme galante regarde l'adult\u00e8re. Si ses\nbesoins ne trouvent pas de prompts soulagements, ils ne se borneront\npoint aux simples accidents d'une passion ut\u00e9rine, \u00e0 la manie, etc.;\ncette malheureuse mourra d'un mal, dont il y a tant de m\u00e9decins.\n\nIl ne faut que des yeux pour voir l'influence n\u00e9cessaire de l'\u00e2ge\nsur la raison. L'\u00e2me suit les progr\u00e8s du corps, comme ceux de\nl'\u00e9ducation. Dans le beau sexe, l'\u00e2me suit encore la d\u00e9licatesse du\ntemp\u00e9rament: de l\u00e0 cette tendresse, cette affection, ces sentiments\nvifs, plut\u00f4t fond\u00e9s sur la passion que sur la raison, ces pr\u00e9jug\u00e9s,\nces superstitions, dont la forte empreinte peut \u00e0 peine s'effacer,\netc. L'homme, au contraire, dont le cerveau et les nerfs participent\nde la fermet\u00e9 de tous les solides, a l'esprit, ainsi que les traits\ndu visage, plus nerveux: l'\u00e9ducation, dont manquent les femmes,\najoute encore de nouveaux degr\u00e9s de force \u00e0 son \u00e2me. Avec de tels\nsecours de la nature et de l'art, comment ne serait-il pas plus\nreconnaissant, plus g\u00e9n\u00e9reux, plus constant en amiti\u00e9, plus ferme dans\nl'adversit\u00e9? etc. Mais, suivant \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s la pens\u00e9e de l'auteur des\nLettres sur les Physionomies, qui joint les gr\u00e2ces de l'esprit et du\ncorps \u00e0 presque tous les sentiments du c\u0153ur les plus tendres et les\nplus d\u00e9licats ne doit point nous envier une double force, qui ne semble\navoir \u00e9t\u00e9 donn\u00e9e \u00e0 l'homme, l'une, que pour se mieux p\u00e9n\u00e9trer des\nattraits de la beaut\u00e9, l'autre, que pour mieux servir \u00e0 ses plaisirs.\n\nIl n'est pas plus n\u00e9cessaire d'\u00eatre aussi grand physionomiste que cet\nauteur pour deviner la qualit\u00e9 de l'esprit par la figure ou la forme\ndes traits, lorsqu'ils sont marqu\u00e9s jusqu'\u00e0 un certain point, qu'il ne\nl'est d'\u00eatre grand m\u00e9decin pour conna\u00eetre un mal accompagn\u00e9 de tous\nses symptomes \u00e9vidents. Examinez les portraits de Locke, de Steele,\nde Boerhaave, de Maupertuis, etc. vous ne serez point surpris de leur\ntrouver des physionomies fortes, des yeux d'aigle. Parcourez-en une\ninfinit\u00e9 d'autres, vous distinguerez toujours le beau du grand g\u00e9nie,\net m\u00eame souvent l'honn\u00eate homme du fripon. On a remarqu\u00e9, par exemple,\nqu'un po\u00e8te c\u00e9l\u00e8bre r\u00e9unit (dans son portrait) l'air d'un filou,\navec le feu de Prom\u00e9th\u00e9e.\n\nL'histoire nous offre un m\u00e9morable exemple de la puissance de l'air. Le\nfameux Duc de Guise \u00e9tait si fort convaincu que Henri III. qui l'avait\neu tant de fois en son pouvoir, n'oserait jamais l'assassiner, qu'il\npartit pour Blois. Le chancelier Chyverni apprenant son d\u00e9part,\ns'\u00e9cria: voil\u00e0 un homme perdu! Lorsque sa fatale pr\u00e9diction fut\njustifi\u00e9e par l'\u00e9v\u00e9nement, on lui en demanda la raison. Il y a vingt\nans, dit-il, que je connais le Roi; il est naturellement bon et m\u00eame\nfaible; mais j'ai observ\u00e9 qu'un rien l'impatiente et le met en fureur,\nlorsqu'il fait froid.\n\nTel peuple a l'esprit lourd et stupide; tel autre l'a vif, l\u00e9ger,\np\u00e9n\u00e9trant. D'o\u00f9 cela vient-il, si ce n'est en partie, et de la\nnourriture qu'il prend, et de la semence de ses p\u00e8res, [2] et de ce\nchaos de divers \u00e9l\u00e9ments qui nagent dans l'immensit\u00e9 de l'air? L'esprit\na, comme le corps, ses maladies \u00e9pid\u00e9miques et son scorbut.\n\nTel est l'empire du climat, qu'un homme qui en change se ressent\nmalgr\u00e9 lui de ce changement. C'est une plante ambulante, qui s'est\nelle-m\u00eame transplant\u00e9e; si le climat n'est plus le m\u00eame, il est juste\nqu'elle d\u00e9g\u00e9n\u00e8re, ou s'am\u00e9liore.\n\nOn prend tout encore de ceux avec qui l'on vit, leurs gestes, leurs\naccents, etc., comme la paupi\u00e8re se baisse \u00e0 la menace du coup dont\non est pr\u00e9venu, ou par la m\u00eame raison que le corps du spectateur imite\nmachinalement, et malgr\u00e9 lui, tous les mouvements d'un bon pantomime.\n\nCe que je viens de dire prouve que la meilleure compagnie pour un homme\nd'esprit, est la sienne, s'il n'en trouve une semblable. L'esprit se\nrouille avec ceux qui n'en ont point, faute d'\u00eatre exerc\u00e9: \u00e0 la paume,\non renvoie mal la balle \u00e0 qui la sert mal. J'aimerais mieux un homme\nintelligent, qui n'aurait eu aucune \u00e9ducation, que s'il en e\u00fbt eu une\nmauvaise, pourvu qu'il f\u00fbt encore assez jeune. Un esprit mal conduit\nest un acteur que la province a g\u00e2t\u00e9.\n\nLes divers \u00e9tats de l'\u00e2me sont donc toujours corr\u00e9latifs \u00e0 ceux du\ncorps. Mais, pour mieux d\u00e9montrer toute cette d\u00e9pendance et ses causes,\nservons-nous ici de l'anatomie compar\u00e9e; ouvrons les entrailles de\nl'homme et des animaux. Le moyen de conna\u00eetre la nature humaine, si\nl'on n'est \u00e9clair\u00e9 par un juste parall\u00e8le de la structure des uns et\ndes autres!\n\nEn g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, la forme et la composition du cerveau des quadrup\u00e8des est\n\u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s la m\u00eame que dans l'homme. M\u00eame figure, m\u00eame disposition\npartout; avec cette diff\u00e9rence essentielle, que l'homme est de tous\nles animaux celui qui a le plus de cerveau, et le cerveau le plus\ntortueux, en raison de la masse de son corps. Ensuite le singe, le\ncastor, l'\u00e9l\u00e9phant, le chien, le renard, le chat, etc., voil\u00e0 les\nanimaux qui ressemblent le plus \u00e0 l'homme; car on remarque aussi chez\neux la m\u00eame analogie gradu\u00e9e, par rapport au corps calleux, dans lequel\nLancisi avait \u00e9tabli le si\u00e8ge de l'\u00e2me, avant feu Mr. de la Peyronnie,\nqui cependant a illustr\u00e9 cette opinion par une foule d'exp\u00e9riences.\n\nApr\u00e8s tous les quadrup\u00e8des, ce sont les oiseaux qui ont le plus de\ncerveau. Les poissons ont la t\u00eate grosse; mais elle est vide de sens,\ncomme celle de bien des hommes. Ils n'ont point de corps calleux et\nfort peu de cerveau, lequel manque aux insectes.\n\nJe ne me r\u00e9pandrai point en un plus long d\u00e9tail des vari\u00e9t\u00e9s de la\nnature, ni en conjectures, car les unes et les autres sont infinies,\ncomme on en peut juger en lisant les seuls trait\u00e9s de Willis, De\nCerebro, et De Anima Brutorum.\n\nJe concl\u00fbrai seulement ce qui s'en suit clairement de ces\nincontestables observations: 1o que plus les animaux sont farouches,\nmoins ils ont de cerveau; 2o que ce visc\u00e8re semble s'agrandir, en\nquelque sorte, \u00e0 proportion de leur docilit\u00e9; 3o qu'il y a ici une\nsinguli\u00e8re condition impos\u00e9e \u00e9ternellement par la nature, qui est\nque plus on gagnera du c\u00f4t\u00e9 de l'esprit, plus on perdra du c\u00f4t\u00e9 de\nl'instinct. Lequel l'emporte, de la perte ou du gain?\n\nNe croyez pas, au reste, que je veuille pr\u00e9tendre par l\u00e0 que le seul\nvolume du cerveau suffise pour faire juger du degr\u00e9 de docilit\u00e9 des\nanimaux; il faut que la qualit\u00e9 r\u00e9ponde encore \u00e0 la quantit\u00e9, et que\nles solides et les fluides soient dans cet \u00e9quilibre convenable qui\nfait la sant\u00e9.\n\nSi l'imb\u00e9cile ne manque pas de cerveau, comme on le remarque\nordinairement, ce visc\u00e8re p\u00e9chera par une mauvaise consistance, par\ntrop de mollesse, par exemple. Il en est de m\u00eame des fous; les vices\nde leur cerveau ne se d\u00e9robent pas toujours \u00e0 nos recherches; mais si\nles causes de l'imb\u00e9cilit\u00e9, de la folie, etc. ne sont pas sensibles,\no\u00f9 aller chercher celles de la vari\u00e9t\u00e9 de tous les esprits? Elles\n\u00e9chapperaient aux yeux des lynx et des argus. Un rien, une petite\nfibre, quelque chose que la plus subtile anatomie ne peut d\u00e9couvrir,\neut fait deux sots d'Erasme et de Fontenelle, qui le remarque lui\nm\u00eame dans un de ses meilleurs Dialogues.\n\nOutre la mollesse de la mo\u00eblle du cerveau, dans les enfants, dans\nles petits chiens et dans les oiseaux, Willis a remarqu\u00e9 que les\ncorps cannel\u00e9s sont effac\u00e9s et comme d\u00e9color\u00e9s dans tous ces animaux,\net que leurs stries sont aussi imparfaitement form\u00e9es que dans les\nparalytiques. Il ajoute, ce qui est vrai, que l'homme a la protub\u00e9rance\nannulaire fort grosse; et ensuite toujours diminutivement par d\u00e9gr\u00e9s,\nle singe et les autres animaux nomm\u00e9s ci-devant, tandis que le veau,\nle boeuf, le loup, la brebis, le cochon, etc. qui ont cette partie\nd'un tr\u00e8s petit volume, ont les nattes et testes fort gros.\n\nOn a beau \u00eatre discret et r\u00e9serv\u00e9 sur les cons\u00e9quences qu'on peut tirer\nde ces observations et de tant d'autres sur l'esp\u00e8ce d'inconstance\ndes vaisseaux et des nerfs, etc.: tant de vari\u00e9t\u00e9s ne peuvent \u00eatre\ndes jeux gratuits de la nature. Elles prouvent du moins la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9\nd'une bonne et abondante organisation, puisque dans tout le r\u00e8gne\nanimal l'\u00e2me, se raffermissant avec le corps, acquiert de la sagacit\u00e9,\n\u00e0 mesure qu'il prend des forces.\n\nArr\u00eatons-nous \u00e0 contempler la diff\u00e9rente docilit\u00e9 des animaux. Sans\ndoute l'analogie la mieux entendue conduit l'esprit \u00e0 croire que les\ncauses dont nous avons fait mention produisent toute la diversit\u00e9 qui\nse trouve entr'eux et nous, quoiqu'il faille avouer que notre faible\nentendement, born\u00e9 aux observations les plus grossi\u00e8res, ne puisse\nvoir les liens qui r\u00e8gnent entre la cause et les effets. C'est une\nesp\u00e8ce d'harmonie que les philosophes ne conna\u00eetront jamais.\n\nParmi les animaux, les uns apprennent \u00e0 parler et \u00e0 chanter; ils\nretiennent des airs et prennent tous les tons aussi exactement qu'un\nmusicien. Les autres, qui montrent cependant plus d'esprit, tels que\nle singe, n'en peuvent venir \u00e0 bout. Pourquoi cela, si ce n'est par\nun vice des organes de la parole?\n\nMais ce vice est-il tellement de conformation, qu'on n'y puisse\napporter aucun rem\u00e8de? en un mot serait-il absolument impossible\nd'apprendre une langue \u00e0 cet animal? Je ne le crois pas.\n\nJe prendrais le grand singe pr\u00e9f\u00e9rablement \u00e0 tout autre, jusqu'\u00e0 ce que\nle hasard nous e\u00fbt fait d\u00e9couvrir quelque autre esp\u00e8ce plus semblable \u00e0\nla n\u00f4tre, car rien ne r\u00e9pugne qu'il y en ait dans des r\u00e9gions qui nous\nsont inconnues. Cet animal nous ressemble si fort, que les naturalistes\nl'ont appel\u00e9 homme sauvage, ou homme des bois. Je le prendrais aux\nm\u00eames conditions des \u00e9coliers d'Amman; c'est-\u00e0-dire, que je voudrais\nqu'il ne f\u00fbt ni trop jeune ni trop vieux; car ceux qu'on nous apporte\nen Europe sont commun\u00e9ment trop \u00e2g\u00e9s. Je choisirais celui qui aurait\nla physionomie la plus spirituelle, et qui tiendrait le mieux dans\nmille petites op\u00e9rations ce qu'elle m'aurait promis. Enfin, ne me\ntrouvant pas digne d'\u00eatre son gouverneur, je le mettrais \u00e0 l'\u00e9cole de\nl'excellent ma\u00eetre que je viens de nommer, ou d'un autre aussi habile,\ns'il en est.\n\nVous savez par le livre d'Amman, et par tous ceux [3] qui ont traduit\nsa m\u00e9thode, tous les prodiges qu'il a su op\u00e9rer sur les sourds de\nnaissance, dans les yeux desquels il a, comme il le fait entendre\nlui-m\u00eame, trouv\u00e9 des oreilles; et en combien peu de temps enfin il leur\na appris \u00e0 entendre, parler, lire, et \u00e9crire. Je veux que les yeux\nd'un sourd voient plus clair et soient plus intelligents que s'il ne\nl'\u00e9tait pas, par la raison que la perte d'un membre ou d'un sens peut\naugmenter la force ou la p\u00e9n\u00e9tration d'un autre: mais le singe voit\net entend; il comprend ce qu'il entend et ce qu'il voit; il con\u00e7oit\nsi parfaitement les signes qu'on lui fait, qu'\u00e0 tout autre jeu, ou\ntout autre exercice, je ne doute point qu'il ne l'emport\u00e2t sur les\ndisciples d'Amman. Pourquoi donc l'\u00e9ducation des singes serait-elle\nimpossible? Pourquoi ne pourrait-il enfin, \u00e0 force de soins, imiter,\n\u00e0 l'exemple des sourds, les mouvemens n\u00e9cessaires pour prononcer? Je\nn'ose d\u00e9cider si les organes de la parole du singe ne peuvent,\nquoiqu'on fasse, rien articuler; mais cette impossibilit\u00e9 absolue me\nsurprendrait, \u00e0 cause de la grande analogie du singe et de l'homme,\net qu'il n'est point d'animal connu jusqu'\u00e0 pr\u00e9sent, dont le dedans\net le dehors lui ressemblent d'une mani\u00e8re si frappante. Mr. Locke,\nqui certainement n'a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 suspect de cr\u00e9dulit\u00e9, n'a pas fait\ndifficult\u00e9 de croire l'histoire que le Chevalier Temple fait dans\nses M\u00e9moires, d'un perroquet qui r\u00e9pondait \u00e0 propos et avait appris,\ncomme nous, \u00e0 avoir une esp\u00e8ce de conversation suivie. Je sais\nqu'on s'est moqu\u00e9 [4] de ce grand m\u00e9taphysicien; mais qui aurait\nannonc\u00e9 \u00e0 l'univers qu'il y a des g\u00e9n\u00e9rations qui se font sans oeufs\net sans femmes, aurait-il trouv\u00e9 beaucoup de partisans? Cependant\nMr. Trembley en a d\u00e9couvert, qui se font sans accouplement, et par la\nseule section. Amman n'e\u00fbt-il pas aussi pass\u00e9 pour un fou, s'il se\nf\u00fbt vant\u00e9, avant que d'en faire l'heureuse exp\u00e9rience, d'instruire,\net en aussi peu de temps, des \u00e9coliers tels que les siens? Cependant\nses succ\u00e8s ont \u00e9tonn\u00e9 l'univers, et comme l'auteur de l'Histoire des\nPolypes, il a pass\u00e9 de plein vol \u00e0 l'immortalit\u00e9. Qui doit \u00e0 son g\u00e9nie\nles miracles qu'il op\u00e8re, l'emporte \u00e0 mon gr\u00e9 sur qui doit les siens\nau hasard. Qui a trouv\u00e9 l'art d'embellir le plus beau des r\u00e8gnes,\net de lui donner des perfections qu'il n'avait pas, doit \u00eatre mis\nau-dessus d'un faiseur oisif de syst\u00e8mes frivoles, ou d'un auteur\nlaborieux de st\u00e9riles d\u00e9couvertes. Celles d'Amman sont bien d'un\nautre prix; il a tir\u00e9 les hommes de l'instinct auquel ils semblaient\ncondamn\u00e9s; il leur a donn\u00e9 les id\u00e9es, de l'esprit, une \u00e2me en un mot,\nqu'ils n'e\u00fbssent jamais eue. Quel plus grand pouvoir!\n\nNe bornons point les ressources de la nature; elles sont infinies,\nsurtout aid\u00e9es d'un grand art.\n\nLa m\u00eame m\u00e9canique, qui ouvre le canal d'Eustachi dans les sourds, ne\npourrait-il le d\u00e9boucher dans les singes? Une heureuse envie d'imiter\nla prononciation du ma\u00eetre, ne pourrait-elle mettre en libert\u00e9 les\norganes de la parole, dans les animaux qui imitent tant d'autres\nsignes, avec tant d'adresse et d'intelligence? Non seulement je d\u00e9fie\nqu'on me cite aucune exp\u00e9rience vraiment concluante, qui d\u00e9cide mon\nprojet impossible et ridicule; mais la similitude de la structure et\ndes op\u00e9rations du singe est telle, que je ne doute presque point, si\non exer\u00e7ait parfaitement cet animal, qu'on ne v\u00eent enfin \u00e0 bout de lui\napprendre \u00e0 prononcer, et par cons\u00e9quent \u00e0 savoir une langue. Alors\nce ne serait plus ni un homme sauvage, ni un homme manqu\u00e9: ce serait\nun homme parfait, un petit homme de ville, avec autant d'\u00e9toffe ou\nde muscles que nous-m\u00eames, pour penser et profiter de son \u00e9ducation.\n\nDes animaux \u00e0 l'homme, la transition n'est pas violente; les vrais\nphilosophes en conviendront. Qu'\u00e9tait l'homme, avant l'invention des\nmots et la connaissance des langues? Un animal de son esp\u00e8ce, qui avec\nbeaucoup moins d'instinct naturel que les autres, dont alors il ne\nse croyait pas roi, n'\u00e9tait distingu\u00e9 du singe et des autres animaux\nque comme le singe l'est lui-m\u00eame; je veux dire par une physionomie\nqui annon\u00e7ait plus de discernement. R\u00e9duit \u00e0 la seule connaissance\nintuitive des Leibniziens, il ne voyait que des figures et des\ncouleurs, sans pouvoir rien distinguer entr'elles; vieux, comme jeune,\nenfant \u00e0 tout \u00e2ge, il b\u00e9gayait ses sensations et ses besoins, comme\nun chien affam\u00e9, ou ennuy\u00e9 de repos, demande \u00e0 manger ou \u00e0 se promener.\n\nLes mots, les langues, les lois, les sciences, les beaux-arts\nsont venus; et par eux enfin le diamant brut de notre esprit a \u00e9t\u00e9\npoli. On a dress\u00e9 un homme, comme un animal; on est devenu auteur,\ncomme portefaix. Un g\u00e9om\u00e8tre a appris \u00e0 faire les d\u00e9monstrations\net les calculs les plus difficiles, comme un singe \u00e0 \u00f4ter ou mettre\nson petit chapeau, et \u00e0 monter sur son chien docile. Tout s'est fait\npar les signes; chaque esp\u00e8ce a compris ce qu'elle a pu comprendre:\net c'est de cette mani\u00e8re que les hommes ont acquis la connaissance\nsymbolique, ainsi nomm\u00e9e encore par nos philosophes d'Allemagne.\n\nRien de si simple, comme on voit, que la m\u00e9canique de notre\n\u00e9ducation! Tout se r\u00e9duit \u00e0 des sons, ou \u00e0 des mots, qui de la bouche\nde l'un passent par l'oreille de l'autre dans le cerveau, qui re\u00e7oit\nen m\u00eame temps par les yeux la figure des corps, dont ces mots sont\nles signes arbitraires.\n\nMais qui a parl\u00e9 le premier? Qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 le premier pr\u00e9cepteur du\ngenre human? Qui a invent\u00e9 les moyens de mettre \u00e0 profit la docilit\u00e9\nde notre organisation? Je n'en sais rien; le nom de ces heureux et\npremiers g\u00e9nies a \u00e9t\u00e9 perdu dans la nuit des temps. Mais l'art est\nle fils de la nature; elle a d\u00fb longtemps le pr\u00e9c\u00e9der.\n\nOn doit croire que les hommes les mieux organis\u00e9s, ceux pour qui la\nnature aura \u00e9puis\u00e9 ses bienfaits, auront instruit les autres. Ils\nn'auront pu entendre un bruit nouveau, par exemple, \u00e9prouver de\nnouvelles sensations, \u00eatre frapp\u00e9 de tous ces beaux objets divers\nqui forment le ravissant spectacle de la nature, sans se trouver\ndans le cas de ce sourd de Chartres dont le grand Fontenelle nous\na le premier donn\u00e9 l'histoire, lorsqu'il entendit pour la premi\u00e8re\nfois \u00e0 quarante ans le bruit \u00e9tonnant des cloches.\n\nDe l\u00e0 serait-il absurde de croire que ces premiers mortels essay\u00e8rent\n\u00e0 la mani\u00e8re de ce sourd, ou \u00e0 celle des animaux et des muets\n(autre esp\u00e8ce d'animaux), d'exprimer leurs nouveaux sentiments\npar des mouvements d\u00e9pendants de l'\u00e9conomie de leur imagination,\net cons\u00e9quemment ensuite par des sons spontan\u00e9s propres \u00e0 chaque\nanimal, expression naturelle de leur surprise, de leur joie, de leurs\ntransports, ou de leurs besoins? Car sans doute ceux que la nature\na dou\u00e9s d'un sentiment plus exquis, ont eu aussi plus de facilit\u00e9\npour l'exprimer.\n\nVoil\u00e0 comme je con\u00e7ois que les hommes ont employ\u00e9 leur sentiment,\nou leur instinct, pour avoir de l'esprit, et enfin leur esprit, pour\navoir des connaissances. Voil\u00e0 par quels moyens, autant que je puis\nles saisir, on s'est rempli le cerveau des id\u00e9es, pour le r\u00e9ception\ndesquelles la nature l'avait form\u00e9. On s'est aid\u00e9 l'un par l'autre;\net les plus petits commencements s'agrandissant peu \u00e0 peu, toutes les\nchoses de l'univers ont \u00e9t\u00e9 aussi facilement distingu\u00e9es qu'un cercle.\n\nComme une corde de violon ou une touche de clavecin fr\u00e9mit et rend\nun son, les cordes du cerveau, frapp\u00e9es par les rayons sonores, ont\n\u00e9t\u00e9 excit\u00e9es \u00e0 rendre ou \u00e0 redire les mots qui les touchaient. Mais\ncomme telle est la construction de ce visc\u00e8re, que d\u00e8s qu'une fois\nles yeux bien form\u00e9s pour l'optique ont re\u00e7u la peinture des objets,\nle cerveau ne peut pas ne pas voir leurs images et leurs diff\u00e9rences:\nde m\u00eame, lorsque les signes de ces diff\u00e9rences ont \u00e9t\u00e9 marqu\u00e9s, ou\ngrav\u00e9s dans le cerveau, l'\u00e2me en a n\u00e9cessairement examin\u00e9 les rapports;\nexamen qui lui \u00e9tait impossible sans la d\u00e9couverte des signes, ou\nl'invention des langues. Dans ces temps, o\u00f9 l'univers \u00e9tait presque\nmuet, l'\u00e2me \u00e9tait \u00e0 l'\u00e9gard de tous les objets, comme un homme qui,\nsans avoir aucune id\u00e9e des proportions, regarderait un tableau, ou\nune pi\u00e8ce de sculpture: il n'y pourrait rien distinguer; ou comme\nun petit enfant (car alors l'\u00e2me \u00e9tait dans son enfance) qui, tenant\ndans sa main un certain nombre de petits brins de paille ou de bois,\nles voit en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral d'une vue vague et superficielle, sans pouvoir les\ncompter ni les distinguer. Mais qu'on mette une esp\u00e8ce de pavillon,\nou d'\u00e9tendard, \u00e0 cette pi\u00e8ce de bois, par exemple, qu'on appelle m\u00e2t,\nqu'on en mette un autre \u00e0 un autre pareil corps; que le premier venu\nse nombre par le signe 1 et le second par le signe ou chiffre 2; alors\ncet enfant pourra les compter, et ainsi de suite il apprendra toute\nl'arithm\u00e9tique. D\u00e8s qu'une figure lui para\u00eetra \u00e9gale \u00e0 une autre par\nson signe num\u00e9ratif, il concl\u00fbra sans peine que ce sont deux corps\ndiff\u00e9rents; que 1 et 1 font deux, que 2 et 2 font 4, [5] etc.\n\nC'est cette similitude r\u00e9elle, ou apparente, des figures, qui est la\nbase fondamentale de toutes les v\u00e9rit\u00e9s et de toutes nos connaissances,\nparmi lesquelles il est \u00e9vident que celles dont les signes sont moins\nsimples et moins sensibles sont plus difficiles \u00e0 apprendre que les\nautres, en ce qu'elles demandent plus de g\u00e9nie pour embrasser et\ncombiner cette immense quantit\u00e9 de mots par lesquels les sciences\ndont je parle expriment les v\u00e9rit\u00e9s de leur ressort: tandis que les\nsciences qui s'annoncent par des chiffres, ou autres petits signes,\ns'apprennent facilement; et c'est sans doute cette facilit\u00e9 qui a\nfait la fortune des calculs alg\u00e9briques, plus encore que leur \u00e9vidence.\n\nTout ce savoir dont le vent enfle le ballon du cerveau de nos p\u00e9dants\norgueilleux, n'est donc qu'un vaste amas de mots et de figures,\nqui forment dans la t\u00eate toutes les traces par lesquelles nous\ndistinguons et nous nous rappellons les objets. Toutes nos id\u00e9es se\nr\u00e9veillent, comme un jardinier qui conna\u00eet les plantes se souvient\nde toutes leurs phases \u00e0 leur aspect. Ces mots et ces figures qui\nsont d\u00e9sign\u00e9s par eux, sont tellements li\u00e9s ensemble dans le cerveau,\nqu'il est assez rare qu'on imagine une chose sans le nom ou le signe\nqui lui est attach\u00e9.\n\nJe me sers toujours du mot imaginer, parceque je crois que tout\ns'imagine, et que toutes les parties de l'\u00e2me peuvent \u00eatre justement\nr\u00e9duites \u00e0 la seule imagination, qui les forme toutes; et qu'ainsi\nle jugement, le raisonnement, la m\u00e9moire ne sont que des parties de\nl'\u00e2me nullement absolues, mais de v\u00e9ritables modifications de cette\nesp\u00e8ce de toile m\u00e9dullaire, sur laquelle les objets peints dans l'oeil\nsont renvoy\u00e9s, comme d'une lanterne magique.\n\nMais si tel est ce merveilleux et incompr\u00e9hensible r\u00e9sultat de\nl'organisation du cerveau; si tout se con\u00e7oit par l'imagination,\nsi tout s'explique par elle; pourquoi diviser le principe sensitif\nqui pense dans l'homme? N'est-ce pas une contradiction manifeste\ndans les partisans de la simplicit\u00e9 de l'esprit? Car une chose\nqu'on divise ne peut plus \u00eatre, sans absurdit\u00e9, regard\u00e9e comme\nindivisible. Voil\u00e0 o\u00f9 conduit l'abus des langues, et l'usage de ces\ngrands mots, spiritualit\u00e9, immat\u00e9rialit\u00e9, etc., plac\u00e9s \u00e0 tout hasard,\nsans \u00eatre entendus, m\u00eame par des gens d'esprit.\n\nRien de plus facile que de prouver un syst\u00e8me, fond\u00e9 comme\ncelui-ci sur le sentiment intime et l'exp\u00e9rience propre de chaque\nindividu. L'imagination, ou cette partie fantastique du cerveau, dont\nla nature nous est aussi inconnue que sa mani\u00e8re d'agir, est-elle\nnaturellement petite, ou faible? elle aura \u00e0 peine la force de\ncomparer l'analogie, ou la ressemblance de ses id\u00e9es; elle ne pourra\nvoir que ce qui sera vis-\u00e0-vis d'elle, ou ce qui l'affectera le plus\nvivement; et encore de quelle mani\u00e8re! Mais toujours est-il vrai\nque l'imagination seule aper\u00e7oit; que c'est elle qui se repr\u00e9sente\ntous les objets, avec les mots et les figures qui les caract\u00e9risent;\net qu'ainsi c'est elle encore une fois qui est l'\u00e2me, puisqu'elle\nen fait tous les r\u00f4les. Par elle, par son pinceau flatteur, le froid\nsquelette de la raison prend des chairs vives et vermeilles; par elle\nles sciences fleurissent, les arts s'embellissent, les bois parlent,\nles \u00e9chos soupirent, les rochers pleurent, le marbre respire, tout\nprend vie parmi les corps inanim\u00e9s. C'est elle encore qui ajoute \u00e0\nla tendresse d'un coeur amoureux le piquant attrait de la volupt\u00e9;\nelle la fait germer dans le cabinet du philosophe, et du p\u00e9dant\npoudreux; elle forme enfin les savants comme les orateurs et les\npo\u00ebtes. Sottement d\u00e9cri\u00e9e par les uns, vainement distingu\u00e9e par les\nautres, qui tous l'ont mal connue, elle ne marche pas seulement \u00e0\nla suite des Gr\u00e2ces et des beaux-art, elle ne peint pas seulement\nla nature, elle peut aussi la mesurer. Elle raisonne, juge, p\u00e9n\u00e8tre,\ncompare, approfondit. Pourrait-elle si bien sentir les beaut\u00e9es des\ntableaux qui lui sont trac\u00e9s, sans en d\u00e9couvrir les rapports? Non;\ncomme elle ne peut se replier sur les plaisirs des sens, sans en\ngo\u00fbter toute la perfection ou la volupt\u00e9, elle ne peut r\u00e9fl\u00e9chir sur\nce qu'elle a m\u00e9caniquement con\u00e7u, sans \u00eatre alors le jugement m\u00eame.\n\nPlus on exerce l'imagination, ou le plus maigre g\u00e9nie, plus il prend,\npour ainsi dire, d'embonpoint; plus il s'agrandit, devient nerveux,\nrobuste, vaste et capable de penser. La meilleure organisation a\nbesoin de cet exercice.\n\nL'organisation est le premier m\u00e9rite de l'homme; c'est en vain que\ntous les auteurs de morale ne mettent point au rang des qualit\u00e9s\nestimables celles qu'on tient de la nature, mais seulement les\ntalents qui s'acqui\u00e8rent \u00e0 force de r\u00e9flexions et d'industrie: car\nd'o\u00f9 nous vient, je vous prie, l'habilet\u00e9, la science et la vertu, si\nce n'est d'une disposition qui nous rend propres \u00e0 devenir habiles,\nsavants et vertueux? Et d'o\u00f9 nous vient encore cette disposition,\nsi ce n'est de la nature? Nous n'avons de qualit\u00e9s estimables que\npar elle; nous lui devons tout ce que nous sommes. Pourquoi donc\nn'estimerais-je pas autant ceux qui ont des qualit\u00e9s naturelles, que\nceux qui brillent par des vertus acquises, et comme d'emprunt? Quel\nque soit le m\u00e9rite, de quelque endroit qu'il naisse, il est digne\nd'estime; il ne s'agit que de savoir le mesurer. L'esprit, la beaut\u00e9,\nles richesses, la noblesse, quoiqu'enfants du hasard, ont tous leur\nprix, comme l'adresse, le savoir, la vertu, etc. Ceux que la nature\na combl\u00e9s de ses dons les plus pr\u00e9cieux, doivent plaindre ceux \u00e0 qui\nils ont \u00e9t\u00e9 refus\u00e9s; mais ils peuvent sentir leur sup\u00e9riorit\u00e9 sans\norgueil, et en connaisseurs. Une belle femme serait aussi ridicule\nde se trouver laide, qu'un homme d'esprit de se croire un sot. Une\nmodestie outr\u00e9e (d\u00e9faut rare \u00e0 la v\u00e9rit\u00e9) est une sorte d'ingratitude\nenvers la nature. Une honn\u00eate fiert\u00e9, au contraire, est la marque\nd'une \u00e2me belle et grande, que d\u00e9c\u00e8lent des traits m\u00e2les moul\u00e9s comme\npar le sentiment.\n\nSi l'organisation est un m\u00e9rite, et le premier m\u00e9rite, et la source\nde tous les autres, l'instruction est le second. Le cerveau le mieux\nconstruit, sans elle, le serait en pure perte; comme sans l'usage du\nmonde, l'homme le mieux fait ne serait qu'un paysan grossier. Mais\naussi quel serait le fruit de la plus excellente \u00e9cole, sans une\nmatrice parfaitement ouverte \u00e0 l'entr\u00e9e ou \u00e0 la conception des\nid\u00e9es? Il est aussi impossible de donner une seule id\u00e9e \u00e0 un homme\npriv\u00e9 de tous les sens, que de faire un enfant \u00e0 une femme \u00e0 laquelle\nla nature aurait pouss\u00e9 la distraction jusqu'\u00e0 oublier de faire une\nvulve, comme je l'ai vu dans une, qui n'avait ni fente, ni vagin,\nni matrice, et qui pour cette raison fut d\u00e9mari\u00e9e apr\u00e8s dix ans\nde mariage.\n\nMais si le cerveau est \u00e0 la fois bien organis\u00e9 et bien instruit, c'est\nune terre f\u00e9conde parfaitement ensemenc\u00e9e, qui produit le centuple de\nce qu'elle a re\u00e7u: ou (pour quitter le style figur\u00e9 souvent n\u00e9cessaire,\npour mieux exprimer ce qu'on sent et donner des gr\u00e2ces \u00e0 la V\u00e9rit\u00e9\nm\u00eame), l'imagination \u00e9lev\u00e9e par l'art \u00e0 la belle et rare dignit\u00e9 de\ng\u00e9nie, saisit exactement tous les rapports des id\u00e9es qu'elle a con\u00e7ues,\nembrasse avec facilit\u00e9 une foule \u00e9tonnante d'objets, pour en tirer\nenfin une longue cha\u00eene de cons\u00e9quences, lesquelles ne sont encore\nque de nouveaux rapports, enfant\u00e9s par la comparaison des premiers,\nauxquels l'\u00e2me trouve une parfaite ressemblance. Telle est, selon moi,\nla g\u00e9n\u00e9ration de l'esprit. Je dis trouve, comme j'ai donn\u00e9 ci-devant\nl'\u00e9pith\u00e8te d'apparente \u00e0 la similitude des objets: non que je pense\nque nos sens soient toujours trompeurs, comme l'a pr\u00e9tendu le P\u00e8re\nMalebranche, ou que nos yeux naturellement un peu ivres ne voient pas\nles objets tels qu'ils sont en eux m\u00eames, quoique les microscopes\nnous le prouvent tous les jours, mais pour n'avoir aucune dispute\navec les Pyrrhoniens, parmi lesquels Bayle s'est distingu\u00e9.\n\nJe dis de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral ce que Mr. de Fontenelle dit de\ncertaines en particulier, qu'il faut la sacrifier aux agr\u00e9ments de\nla soci\u00e9t\u00e9. Il est de la douceur de mon caract\u00e8re d'obvier \u00e0 toute\ndispute, lorsqu'il ne s'agit pas d'aiguiser la conversation. Les\nCart\u00e9siens viendraient ici vainement \u00e0 la charge avec leur id\u00e9es\ninn\u00e9es; je ne me donnerais certainement pas le quart de la peine qu'a\nprise Mr. Locke pour attaquer de telles chim\u00e8res. Quelle utilit\u00e9,\nen effet, de faire un gros livre, pour prouver une doctrine qui \u00e9tait\n\u00e9rig\u00e9e en axiome il y a trois mille ans?\n\nSuivant les principes que nous avons pos\u00e9s, et que nous croyons vrais,\ncelui qui a le plus d'imagination doit \u00eatre regard\u00e9 comme ayant le\nplus d'esprit, ou de g\u00e9nie, car tous ces mots sont synonymes; et\nencore une fois c'est par un abus honteux qu'on croit dire des choses\ndiff\u00e9rentes, lorsqu'on ne dit que diff\u00e9rents mots ou diff\u00e9rents sons,\nauxquels on n'a attach\u00e9 aucune id\u00e9e ou distinction r\u00e9elle.\n\nLa plus belle, la plus grande, ou la plus forte imagination, est donc\nla plus propre aux sciences, comme aux arts. Je ne d\u00e9cide point s'il\nfaut plus d'esprit pour exceller dans l'art des Aristotes, ou des\nDescartes, que dans celui des Euripides ou des Sophocles; et si la\nnature s'est mise en plus grands frais pour faire Newton que pour\nformer Corneille (ce dont je doute fort), mais il est certain que\nc'est la seule imagination diversement appliqu\u00e9e qui a fait leur\ndiff\u00e9rent triomphe et leur gloire immortelle.\n\nSi quelqu'un passe pour avoir peu de jugement, avec beaucoup\nd'imagination; cela veut dire que l'imagination trop abandonn\u00e9e \u00e0 elle\nm\u00eame, presque toujours comme occup\u00e9e \u00e0 se regarder dans le miroir de\nses sensations, n'a pas assez contract\u00e9 l'habitude de les examiner\nelles-m\u00eames avec attention; plus profond\u00e9ment p\u00e9n\u00e9tr\u00e9e des traces,\nou des images, que de leur v\u00e9rit\u00e9 ou de leur ressemblance.\n\nIl est vrai que telle est la vivacit\u00e9 des ressorts de l'imagination,\nque si l'attention, cette cl\u00e9 ou m\u00e8re des sciences, ne s'en m\u00eale,\nil ne lui est gu\u00e8res permis que de parcourir et d'effleurer les objets.\n\nVoyez cet oiseau sur la branche, il semble toujours pr\u00eat \u00e0 s'envoler;\nl'imagination est de m\u00eame. Toujours emport\u00e9e par le tourbillon du\nsang et des esprits, une onde fait une trace, effac\u00e9e par celle qui\nsuit; l'\u00e2me court apr\u00e8s, souvent en vain: il faut qu'elle s'attende\n\u00e0 regretter ce qu'elle n'a pas assez vite saisi et fix\u00e9: et c'est\nainsi que l'imagination, v\u00e9ritable image du temps, se d\u00e9truit et se\nrenouvelle sans cesse.\n\nTel est le chaos et la succession continuelle et rapide de nos\nid\u00e9es; elles se chassent, comme un flot pousse l'autre; de sorte\nque si l'imagination n'emploie, pour ainsi dire, une partie de ses\nmuscles pour \u00eatre comme en \u00e9quilibre sur les cordes du cerveau, pour\nse soutenir quelque temps sur un objet qui va fuir et s'emp\u00eacher de\ntomber sur un autre, qu'il n'est pas encore temps de contempler, jamais\nelle ne sera digne du beau nom de jugement. Elle exprimera vivement ce\nqu'elle aura senti de m\u00eame; elle formera des orateurs, des musiciens,\ndes peintres, des po\u00e8tes, et jamais un seul philosophe. Au contraire\nsi, d\u00e8s l'enfance, on accoutume l'imagination \u00e0 se brider elle-m\u00eame,\n\u00e0 ne point se laisser emporter \u00e0 sa propre imp\u00e9tuosit\u00e9, qui ne fait\nque de brillants enthousiastes, \u00e0 arr\u00eater, contenir ses id\u00e9es, \u00e0 les\nretourner dans tous les sens, pour voir toutes les faces d'un objet,\nalors l'imagination prompte \u00e0 juger embrassera par le raisonnement\nla plus grande sph\u00e8re d'objets, et sa vivacit\u00e9, toujours de si bon\naugure dans les enfants, et qu'il ne s'agit que de r\u00e9gler par l'\u00e9tude\net l'exercice, ne sera plus qu'une p\u00e9n\u00e9tration clairvoyante, sans\nlaquelle on fait peu de progr\u00e8s dans les sciences.\n\nTels sont les simples fondements sur lesquels a \u00e9t\u00e9 bati l'\u00e9difice\nde la logique. La nature les avait jet\u00e9s pour tout le genre humain;\nmais les uns en ont profit\u00e9, les autres en ont abus\u00e9.\n\nMalgr\u00e9 toutes ces pr\u00e9rogatives de l'homme sur les animaux, c'est lui\nfaire honneur que de le ranger dans la m\u00eame classe. Il est vrai que,\njusqu'\u00e0 un certain \u00e2ge, il est plus animal qu'eux, parce qu'il apporte\nmoins d'instinct en naissant.\n\nQuel est l'animal qui mourrait de faim au milieu d'une rivi\u00e8re de\nlait? L'homme seul. Semblable \u00e0 ce vieux enfant dont un moderne\nparle d'apr\u00e8s Arnobe, il ne connait ni les aliments qui lui sont\npropres, ni l'eau qui peut le noyer, ni le feu qui peut le r\u00e9duire\nen poudre. Faites briller pour la premi\u00e8re fois la lumi\u00e8re d'une\nbougie aux yeux d'un enfant, il y portera machinalement le doigt,\ncomme pour savoir quel est le nouveau ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne qu'il aper\u00e7oit; c'est\n\u00e0 ses d\u00e9pens qu'il en conna\u00eetra le danger, mais il n'y sera pas repris.\n\nMettez-le encore avec un animal sur le bord d'un pr\u00e9cipice! lui seul\ny tombera; il se noie, o\u00f9 l'autre se sauve \u00e0 la nage. A quatorze ou\nquinze ans, il entrevoit \u00e0 peine les grands plaisirs qui l'attendent\ndans la reproduction de son esp\u00e8ce; d\u00e9j\u00e0 adolescent, il ne sait pas\ntrop comment s'y prendre dans un jeu que la nature apprend si vite aux\nanimaux: il se cache, comme s'il \u00e9tait honteux d'avoir du plaisir et\nd'\u00eatre fait pour \u00eatre heureux, tandis que les animaux se font gloire\nd'\u00eatre cyniques. Sans \u00e9ducation, ils sont sans pr\u00e9jug\u00e9s. Mais voyons\nencore ce chien et cet enfant qui ont tous deux perdu leur ma\u00eetre dans\nun grand chemin: l'enfant pleure, il ne sait \u00e0 quel saint se vouer;\nle chien, mieux servi par son odorat que l'autre par sa raison,\nl'aura bient\u00f4t trouv\u00e9.\n\nLa nature nous avait donc faits pour \u00eatre au dessous des animaux, ou du\nmoins pour faire par l\u00e0 m\u00eame mieux \u00e9clater les prodiges de l'\u00e9ducation,\nqui seule nous tire du niveau et nous \u00e9l\u00e8ve enfin au-dessus d'eux. Mais\naccordera-t-on la m\u00eame distinction aux sourds, aux aveugles-n\u00e9s,\naux imb\u00e9ciles, aux fous, aux hommes sauvages, ou qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9lev\u00e9s\ndans les bois avec les b\u00eates, \u00e0 ceux dont l'affection hypocondriaque\na perdu l'imagination, enfin \u00e0 toutes ces b\u00eates \u00e0 figure humaine,\nqui ne montrent que l'instinct le plus grossier? Non, tous ces hommes\nde corps, et non d'esprit, ne m\u00e9ritent pas une classe particuli\u00e8re.\n\nNous n'avons pas dessein de nous dissimuler les objections qu'on peut\nfaire en faveur de la distinction primitive de l'homme et des animaux,\ncontre notre sentiment. Il y a, dit-on, dans l'homme une loi naturelle,\nune connaissance du bien et du mal, qui n'a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 grav\u00e9e dans le\ncoeur des animaux.\n\nMais cette objection, ou plut\u00f4t cette assertion est-elle fond\u00e9e sur\nl'exp\u00e9rience, sans laquelle un philosophe peut tout rejeter? En\navons-nous quelqu'une qui nous convainque que l'homme seul a \u00e9t\u00e9\n\u00e9clair\u00e9 d'un rayon refus\u00e9 \u00e0 tous les autres animaux? S'il n'y en a\npoint, nous ne pouvons pas plus conna\u00eetre par elle ce qui se passe\ndans eux, et m\u00eame dans les hommes, que ne pas sentir ce qui affecte\nl'int\u00e9rieur de notre \u00eatre. Nous savons que nous pensons et que nous\navons des remords: un sentiment intime ne nous force que trop d'en\nconvenir; mais pour juger des remords d'autrui, ce sentiment qui est\ndans nous est insuffisant: c'est pourquoi il en faut croire les autres\nhommes sur leur parole, ou sur les signes sensibles et ext\u00e9rieurs\nque nous avons remarqu\u00e9s en nous-m\u00eames, lorsque nous \u00e9prouvions la\nm\u00eame conscience et les m\u00eames tourments.\n\nMais pour d\u00e9cider si les animaux qui ne parlent point ont re\u00e7u\nla loi naturelle, il faut s'en rapporter cons\u00e9quemment \u00e0 ces\nsignes dont je viens de parler, suppos\u00e9 qu'ils existent. Les faits\nsemblent le prouver. Le chien qui a mordu son ma\u00eetre qui l'aga\u00e7ait,\na paru s'en repentir le moment suivant; on l'a vu triste, f\u00e2ch\u00e9,\nn'osant se montrer, et s'avouer coupable par un air rampant et\nhumili\u00e9. L'histoire nous offre un exemple c\u00e9l\u00e8bre d'un lion qui ne\nvoulut pas d\u00e9chirer un homme abandonn\u00e9 \u00e0 sa fureur, parce qu'il le\nreconnut pour son bienfaiteur. Qu'il serait \u00e0 souhaiter que l'homme\nm\u00eame montr\u00e2t toujours la m\u00eame reconnaissance pour les bienfaits et le\nm\u00eame respect pour l'humanit\u00e9! On n'aurait plus \u00e0 craindre les ingrats,\nni ces guerres qui sont le fl\u00e9au du genre humain et les vrais bourreaux\nde la loi naturelle.\n\nMais un \u00eatre \u00e0 qui la nature a donn\u00e9 un instinct si pr\u00e9coce, si\n\u00e9clair\u00e9, qui juge, combine, raisonne et d\u00e9lib\u00e8re, autant que s'\u00e9tend\net le lui permet la sph\u00e8re de son activit\u00e9; un \u00eatre qui s'attache\npar les bienfaits, qui se d\u00e9tache par les mauvais traitements et\nva essayer un meilleur ma\u00eetre; un \u00eatre d'une structure semblable \u00e0\nla n\u00f4tre, qui fait les m\u00eames op\u00e9rations, qui a les m\u00eames passions,\nles m\u00eames douleurs, les m\u00eames plaisirs, plus ou moins vifs suivant\nl'empire de l'imagination et la d\u00e9licatesse des nerfs; un tel \u00eatre\nenfin ne montre-t-il pas clairement qu'il sent ses torts et les\nn\u00f4tres, qu'il connait le bien et le mal et, en un mot, a conscience\nde ce qu'il fait? Son \u00e2me qui marque comme la n\u00f4tre les m\u00eames joies,\nles m\u00eames mortifications, les m\u00eames d\u00e9concertements, serait-elle\nsans aucune r\u00e9pugnance \u00e0 la vue de son semblable d\u00e9chir\u00e9, ou apr\u00e8s\nl'avoir lui-m\u00eame impitoyablement mis en pi\u00e8ces? Cela pos\u00e9, le don\npr\u00e9cieux dont il s'agit n'aurait point \u00e9t\u00e9 refus\u00e9 aux animaux; car\npuisqu'ils nous offrent des signes \u00e9vidents de leur repentir, comme\nde leur intelligence, qu'y a-t-il d'absurde \u00e0 penser que des \u00eatres,\ndes machines presque aussi parfaites que nous, soient, comme nous,\nfaites pour penser et pour sentir la nature?\n\nQu'on ne m'objecte point que les animaux sont pour la plupart des \u00eatres\nf\u00e9roces, qui ne sont pas capables de sentir les maux qu'ils font; car\ntous les hommes distinguent-ils mieux les vices et les vertus? Il est\ndans notre esp\u00e8ce de la f\u00e9rocit\u00e9, comme dans la leur. Les hommes qui\nsont dans la barbare habitude d'enfreindre la loi naturelle, n'en sont\npas si tourment\u00e9s que ceux qui la transgressent pour la premi\u00e8re fois,\net que la force de l'exemple n'a point endurcis. Il en est de m\u00eame des\nanimaux, comme des hommes. Les uns et les autres peuvent \u00eatre plus\nou moins f\u00e9roces par temp\u00e9rament, et ils le deviennent encore plus\navec ceux qui le sont. Mais un animal doux, pacifique, qui vit avec\nd'autres animaux semblables, et d'aliments doux, sera ennemi du sang\net du carnage, il rougira int\u00e9rieurement de l'avoir vers\u00e9; avec cette\ndiff\u00e9rence peut-\u00eatre que, comme chez eux tout est immol\u00e9 aux besoins,\naux plaisirs et aux commodit\u00e9s de la vie, dont ils jouissent plus\nque nous, leurs remords ne semblent pas devoir \u00eatre si vifs que les\nn\u00f4tres, parceque nous ne sommes pas dans la m\u00eame n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 qu'eux. La\ncoutume \u00e9mousse et peut-\u00eatre \u00e9touffe les remords, comme les plaisirs.\n\nMais je veux pour un moment supposer que je me trompe, et qu'il n'est\npas juste que presque tout l'univers ait tort \u00e0 ce sujet, tandis\nque j'aurais seul raison; j'accorde que les animaux, m\u00eame les plus\nexcellents, ne connaissent pas la distinction du bien et du mal moral,\nqu'ils n'ont aucune m\u00e9moire des attentions qu'on a eues pour eux,\ndu bien qu'on leur a fait, aucun sentiment de leurs propres vertus;\nque ce lion, par exemple, dont j'ai parl\u00e9 apr\u00e8s tant d'autres, ne se\nsouvienne pas de n'avoir pas voulu ravir la vie \u00e0 cet homme qui fut\nlivr\u00e9 \u00e0 sa furie, dans un spectacle plus inhumain que tous les lions,\nles tigres et les ours; tandis que nos compatriotes se battent, Suisses\ncontre Suisses, fr\u00e8res contre fr\u00e8res, se reconnaissent, s'encha\u00eenent,\nou se tuent sans remords, parce qu'un prince paie leurs meurtres: je\nsuppose enfin que la loi naturelle n'ait pas \u00e9t\u00e9 donn\u00e9e aux animaux,\nquelles en seront les cons\u00e9quences? L'homme n'est pas p\u00e9tri d'un limon\nplus pr\u00e9cieux; la nature n'a employ\u00e9 qu'une seule et m\u00eame p\u00e2te, dont\nelle a seulement vari\u00e9 les levains. Si donc l'animal ne se repent\npas d'avoir viol\u00e9 le sentiment int\u00e9rieur dont je parle, ou plut\u00f4t\ns'il en est absolument priv\u00e9, il faut n\u00e9cessairement que l'homme\nsoit dans le m\u00eame cas: moyennant quoi adieu la loi naturelle et tous\nces beaux trait\u00e9s qu'on a publi\u00e9s sur elle! Tout le r\u00e8gne animal en\nserait g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement d\u00e9pourv\u00fb. Mais r\u00e9ciproquement si l'homme ne peut\nse dispenser de convenir qu'il distingue toujours, lorsque la sant\u00e9 le\nlaisse jou\u00efr de lui-m\u00eame, ceux qui ont de la probit\u00e9, de l'humanit\u00e9,\nde la vertu, de ceux qui ne sont ni humains, ni vertueux, ni honn\u00eates\ngens; qu'il est facile de distinguer ce qui est vice, ou vertu, par\nl'unique plaisir ou la propre r\u00e9pugnance qui en sont comme les effets\nnaturels, il s'ensuit que les animaux form\u00e9s de la m\u00eame mati\u00e8re,\n\u00e0 laquelle il n'a peut-\u00eatre manqu\u00e9 qu'un degr\u00e9 de fermentation pour\n\u00e9galer les hommes en tout, doivent participer aux m\u00eames pr\u00e9rogatives\nde l'animalit\u00e9, et qu'ainsi il n'est point d'\u00e2me, ou de substance\nsensitive, sans remords. La r\u00e9flexion suivante va fortifier celles-ci.\n\nOn ne peut d\u00e9truire la loi naturelle. L'empreinte en est si forte dans\ntous les animaux, que je ne doute nullement que les plus sauvages\net les plus f\u00e9roces n'aient quelques moments de repentir. Je crois\nque la fille sauvage de Ch\u00e2lons en Champagne aura port\u00e9 la peine de\nson crime, s'il est vrai qu'elle ait mang\u00e9 sa soeur. Je pense la m\u00eame\nchose de tous ceux qui commettent des crimes, m\u00eame involontaires, ou de\ntemp\u00e9rament: de Gaston d'Orl\u00e9ans qui ne pouvait s'emp\u00eacher de voler;\nde certaine femme qui fut sujette au m\u00eame vice dans la grossesse, et\ndont ses enfants h\u00e9rit\u00e8rent; de celle qui dans le m\u00eame \u00e9tat, mangea son\nmari; de cette autre qui \u00e9gorgeait les enfants, salait leurs corps,\net en mangeait tous les jours comme du petit sal\u00e9; de cette fille\nde voleur anthropophage, qui la devint \u00e0 12 ans, quoiqu'ayant perdu\np\u00e8re et m\u00e8re \u00e0 l'\u00e2ge d'un an elle e\u00fbt \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9lev\u00e9e par d'honn\u00eates gens,\npour ne rien dire de tant d'autres exemples dont nos observateurs\nsont remplis, et qui prouvent tous qu'il est mille vices et vertus\nh\u00e9r\u00e9ditaires, qui passent des parents aux enfants, comme ceux de la\nnourrice \u00e0 ceux qu'elle allaite. Je dis donc et j'accorde que ces\nmalheureux ne sentent pas pour la plupart sur le champ l'\u00e9normit\u00e9\nde leur action. La boulimie, par exemple, ou la faim canine, peut\n\u00e9teindre tout sentiment; c'est une manie d'estomac qu'on est forc\u00e9\nde satisfaire. Mais revenues \u00e0 elles-m\u00eames, et comme d\u00e9senivr\u00e9es,\nquels remords pour ces femmes qui se rappellent le meurtre qu'elles\nont commis dans ce qu'elles avaient de plus cher! quelle punition d'un\nmal involontaire, auquel elles n'ont pu r\u00e9sister, dont elles n'ont eu\naucune conscience! Cependant ce n'est point assez apparemment pour les\njuges. Parmi les femmes dont je parle, l'une fut rou\u00e9e, et br\u00fbl\u00e9e,\nl'autre enterr\u00e9e vive. Je sens tout ce que demande l'int\u00e9r\u00eat de la\nsoci\u00e9t\u00e9. Mais il serait sans doute \u00e0 souhaiter qu'il n'y e\u00fbt pour\njuges que d'excellents m\u00e9decins. Eux seuls pourraient distinguer le\ncriminel innocent, du coupable. Si la raison est esclave d'un sens\nd\u00e9prav\u00e9, ou en fureur, comment peut-elle le gouverner?\n\nMais si le crime porte avec soi sa propre punition plus ou moins\ncruelle; si la plus longue et la plus barbare habitude ne peut\ntout-\u00e0-fait arracher le repentir des coeurs les plus inhumains;\ns'ils sont d\u00e9chir\u00e9s par la m\u00e9moire m\u00eame de leurs actions; pour quoi\neffrayer l'imagination des esprits faibles par un enfer, par des\nspectres, et des pr\u00e9cipices de feu, moins r\u00e9els encore que ceux\nde Pascal [6]? Qu'est-il besoin de recourir \u00e0 des fables, comme un\npape de bonne foi l'a dit lui-m\u00eame, pour tourmenter les malheureux\nm\u00eames qu'on fait p\u00e9rir, parce qu'on ne les trouve pas assez punis\npar leur propre conscience, qui est leur premier bourreau? Ce n'est\npas que je veuille dire que tous les criminels soient injustement\npunis; je pr\u00e9tends seulement que ceux dont la volont\u00e9 est d\u00e9prav\u00e9e,\net la conscience \u00e9teinte, le sont assez par leurs remords, quand ils\nreviennent \u00e0 eux-m\u00eames; remords, j'ose encore le dire, dont la nature\naurait d\u00fb en ce cas, ce me semble, d\u00e9livrer des malheureux entra\u00een\u00e9s\npar une fatale n\u00e9cessit\u00e9.\n\nLes criminels, les m\u00e9chants, les ingrats, ceux enfin que ne sentent\npas la nature, tyrans malheureux et indignes du jour, ont beau se\nfaire un cruel plaisir de leur barbarie, il est des moments calmes et\nde r\u00e9flexion, o\u00f9 la conscience vengeresse s'\u00e9l\u00e8ve, d\u00e9pose contr'eux,\net les condamne \u00e0 \u00eatre presque sans cesse d\u00e9chir\u00e9s de ses propres\nmains. Qui tourmente les hommes, est tourment\u00e9 par lui-m\u00eame; et les\nmaux qu'il sentira seront la juste mesure de ceux qu'il aura faits.\n\nD'un autre c\u00f4t\u00e9, il y a tant de plaisir \u00e0 faire du bien, \u00e0 sentir,\n\u00e0 reconna\u00eetre celui qu'on re\u00e7oit, tant de contentement \u00e0 pratiquer\nla vertu, \u00e0 \u00eatre doux, humain, tendre, charitable, compatissant et\ng\u00e9n\u00e9reux (ce seul mot renferme toutes les vertus), que je tiens pour\nassez puni quiconque a le malheur de n'\u00eatre pas n\u00e9 vertueux.\n\nNous n'avons pas originairement \u00e9t\u00e9 faits pour \u00eatre savants;\nc'est peut-\u00eatre par une esp\u00e8ce d'abus de nos facult\u00e9s organiques,\nque nous le sommes devenus; et cela \u00e0 la charge de l'Etat, qui\nnourrit une multitude de fain\u00e9ants, que la vanit\u00e9 a decor\u00e9s du nom\nde philosophes. La nature nous a tous cr\u00e9\u00e9s uniquement pour \u00eatre\nheureux; oui, tous, depuis le ver qui rampe, jusqu'\u00e0 l'aigle qui\nse perd dans la nue. C'est pourquoi elle a donn\u00e9 \u00e0 tous les animaux\nquelque portion de la loi naturelle, portion plus ou moins exquise\nselon que le comportent les organes bien conditionn\u00e9s de chaque animal.\n\nA pr\u00e9sent, comment d\u00e9finirons-nous la loi naturelle? C'est un sentiment\nqui nous apprend ce que nous ne devons pas faire, parce que nous ne\nvoudrions pas qu'on nous le f\u00eet. Oserais-je ajouter \u00e0 cette id\u00e9e\ncommune, qu'il me semble que ce sentiment n'est qu'une esp\u00e8ce de\ncrainte, ou de frayeur, aussi salutaire \u00e0 l'esp\u00e8ce qu'a l'individu;\ncar peut-\u00eatre ne respectons-nous la bourse et la vie des autres, que\npour nous conserver nos biens, notre honneur et nous-m\u00eames; semblables\n\u00e0 ces Ixions du Christianisme qui n'aiment Dieu et n'embrassent tant\nde chim\u00e9riques vertus, que parce qu'ils craignent l'enfer.\n\nVous voyez que la loi naturelle n'est qu'un sentiment intime,\nqui appartient encore \u00e0 l'imagination, comme tous les autres,\nparmi lesquels on compte la pens\u00e9e. Par cons\u00e9quent elle ne suppose\n\u00e9videmment ni \u00e9ducation, ni r\u00e9v\u00e9lation, ni l\u00e9gislateur, \u00e0 moins qu'on\nne veuille la confondre avec les lois civiles, \u00e0 la mani\u00e8re ridicule\ndes th\u00e9ologiens.\n\nLes armes du fanatisme peuvent d\u00e9truire ceux qui soutiennent ces\nv\u00e9rit\u00e9s; mais elles ne d\u00e9truiront jamais ces v\u00e9rit\u00e9s m\u00eames.\n\nCe n'est pas que je r\u00e9voque en doute l'existence d'un Etre supr\u00eame; il\nme semble au contraire que le plus grand degr\u00e9 de probabilit\u00e9 est pour\nelle: mais comme cette existence ne prouve pas plus la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d'un\nculte, que toute autre, c'est une v\u00e9rit\u00e9 th\u00e9orique, qui n'est gu\u00e8re\nd'usage dans la pratique: de sorte que, comme on peut dire, d'apr\u00e8s\ntant d'exp\u00e9riences, que la religion ne suppose pas l'exacte probit\u00e9,\nles m\u00eames raisons autorisent \u00e0 penser que l'ath\u00e9isme ne l'exclut pas.\n\nQui sait d'ailleurs si la raison de l'existence de l'homme ne serait\npas dans son existence m\u00eame? Peut-\u00eatre a-t-il \u00e9t\u00e9 jet\u00e9 au hasard\nsur un point de la surface de la terre, sans qu'on puisse savoir ni\ncomment, ni pourquoi, mais seulement qu'il doit vivre et mourir,\nsemblable \u00e0 ces champignons, qui paraissent d'un jour \u00e0 l'autre,\nou \u00e0 ces fleurs qui bordent les foss\u00e9s et couvrent les murailles.\n\nNe nous perdons point dans l'infini, nous ne sommes pas faits pour en\navoir la moindre id\u00e9e; il nous est absolument impossible de remonter\n\u00e0 l'origine des choses. Il est \u00e9gal d'ailleurs pour notre repos,\nque la mati\u00e8re soit \u00e9ternelle, ou qu'elle ait \u00e9t\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9e, qu'il y ait\nun Dieu, ou qu'il n'y en ait pas. Quelle folie de tant se tourmenter\npour ce qu'il est impossible de conna\u00eetre, et ce qui ne nous rendrait\npas plus heureux, quand nous en viendrions \u00e0 bout.\n\nMais, dit-on, lisez tous les ouvrages des F\u00e9nelon, des Nieuventit, des\nAbadie, des Derham, des Ra\u00ef, etc. Eh bien! que m'apprendront-ils? ou\nplut\u00f4t que m'ont-ils appris? Ce ne sont que d'ennuyeuses r\u00e9p\u00e9titions\nd'\u00e9crivains z\u00e9l\u00e9s, dont l'un n'ajoute \u00e0 l'autre qu'un verbiage,\nplus propres \u00e0 fortifier qu'\u00e0 saper les fondements de l'ath\u00e9isme. Le\nvolume des preuves qu'on tire du spectacle de la nature, ne leur donne\npas plus de force. La structure seule d'un doigt, d'une oreille,\nd'un oeil, une observation de Malpighi, prouve tout, et sans doute\nbeaucoup mieux que Descartes et Malebranche; ou tout le reste ne prouve\nrien. Les d\u00e9istes, et les Chr\u00e9tiens m\u00eames devraient donc se contenter\nde faire observer que, dans tout le r\u00e8gne animal, les m\u00eames vues sont\nex\u00e9cut\u00e9es par une infinit\u00e9 de divers moyens, tous cependant exactement\ng\u00e9om\u00e9triques. Car de quelles plus fortes armes pourrait-on terrasser\nles ath\u00e9es? Il est vrai que si ma raison ne me trompe pas, l'homme et\ntout l'univers semblent avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 destin\u00e9s \u00e0 cette unit\u00e9 de vues. Le\nsoleil, l'air, l'eau, l'organisation, la forme des corps, tout est\narrang\u00e9 dans l'oeil, comme dans un miroir qui pr\u00e9sente fid\u00e8lement \u00e0\nl'imagination les objets qui y sont peints, suivant les lois qu'exige\ncette infinie vari\u00e9t\u00e9 de corps qui servent \u00e0 la vision. Dans l'oreille,\nnous trouvons partout une diversit\u00e9 frappante, sans que cette diverse\nfabrique de l'homme, des animaux, des oiseaux, des poissons, produise\ndiff\u00e9rents usages. Toutes les oreilles sont si math\u00e9matiquement\nfaites, qu'elles tendent \u00e9galement au seul et m\u00eame but, qui est\nd'entendre. Le hasard, demande le d\u00e9iste, serait-il donc assez grand\ng\u00e9om\u00e8tre, pour varier ainsi \u00e0 son gr\u00e9 les ouvrages dont on le suppose\nauteur, sans que tant de diversit\u00e9 p\u00fbt l'emp\u00eacher d'atteindre la m\u00eame\nfin? Il objecte encore ces parties \u00e9videmment contenues dans l'animal\npour de futurs usages, le papillon dans la chenille, l'homme dans\nle ver spermatique, un polype entier dans chacune de ses parties,\nla valvule du trou ovale, le poumon dans le foetus, les dents dans\nleurs alv\u00e9oles, les os dans les fluides, qui s'en d\u00e9tachent et se\ndurcissent d'une mani\u00e8re incompr\u00e9hensible. Et comme les partisans\nde ce syst\u00e8me, loin de rien n\u00e9gliger pour le faire valoir, ne se\nlassent jamais d'accumuler preuves sur preuves, ils veulent profiter\nde tout, et de la faiblesse m\u00eame de l'esprit en certain cas. Voyez,\ndisent-ils, les Spinoza, les Vanini, les Desbarreaux, les Boindin,\nap\u00f4tres qui font plus d'honneur que de tort au d\u00e9isme! La dur\u00e9e de la\nsant\u00e9 de ces derniers a \u00e9t\u00e9 la mesure de leur incr\u00e9dulit\u00e9: et il est\nrare en effet, ajoutent-ils, qu'on n'abjure pas l'ath\u00e9isme, d\u00e8s que\nles passions se sont affaiblies avec le corps qui en est l'instrument.\n\nVoil\u00e0 certainement tout ce qu'on peut dire de plus favorable \u00e0\nl'existence d'un Dieu, quoique le dernier argument soit frivole, en ce\nque ces conversions sont courtes, l'esprit reprenant presque toujours\nses anciennes opinions et se conduisant en cons\u00e9quence, d\u00e8s qu'il a\nrecouvr\u00e9 ou plut\u00f4t retrouv\u00e9 ses forces dans celles du corps. En voil\u00e0\ndu moins beaucoup plus que n'en dit le m\u00e9decin Diderot dans ses Pens\u00e9es\nphilosophiques, sublime ouvrage qui ne convaincra pas un ath\u00e9e. Que\nr\u00e9pondre en effet \u00e0 un homme qui dit? \"Nous ne connaissons point\nla nature: des causes cach\u00e9es dans son sein pourraient avoir tout\nproduit. Voyez \u00e0 votre tour le polype de Trembley! ne contient-il\npas en soi les causes qui donnent lieu \u00e0 sa r\u00e9g\u00e9n\u00e9ration? quelle\nabsurdit\u00e9 y aurait-il donc \u00e0 penser qu'il est des causes physiques\npour lesquelles tout a \u00e9t\u00e9 fait, et auxquelles toute la cha\u00eene de ce\nvaste univers est si n\u00e9cessairement li\u00e9e et assujettie, que rien de ce\nqui arrive ne pouvait pas ne pas arriver; des causes dont l'ignorance\nabsolument invincible nous a fait recourir \u00e0 un Dieu, qui n'est pas\nm\u00eame un \u00eatre de raison, suivant certains? Ainsi, d\u00e9truire le hasard, ce\nn'est pas prouver l'existence d'un Etre supreme, puisqu'il peut y avoir\nautre chose qui ne serait ni hasard, ni Dieu, je veux dire la Nature,\ndont l'\u00e9tude par cons\u00e9quent ne peut faire que des incr\u00e9dules, comme\nle prouve la fa\u00e7on de penser de tous ses plus heureux scrutateurs.\"\n\nLe poids de l'univers n'\u00e9branle donc pas un v\u00e9ritable ath\u00e9e, loin\nde l'\u00e9craser; et tous ces indices mille et mille fois rebattus d'un\nCr\u00e9ateur, indices qu'on met fort au-dessus de la fa\u00e7on de penser\ndans nos semblables, ne sont \u00e9vidents, quelque loin qu'on pousse cet\nargument, que pour les Antipyrrhoniens, ou pour ceux qui ont assez\nde confiance dans leur raison pour croire pouvoir juger sur certaines\napparences, auxquelles, comme vous voyez, les ath\u00e9es peuvent en opposer\nd'autres peut-\u00eatre aussi fortes et absolument contraires. Car si\nnous \u00e9coutons encore les naturalistes, ils nous diront que les m\u00eames\ncauses qui dans les mains d'un chimiste et par le hasard de divers\nm\u00e9langes ont fait le premier miroir, dans celles de la nature ont\nfait l'eau pure, qui en sert \u00e0 la simple berg\u00e8re: que le mouvement\nqui conserve le monde, a pu le cr\u00e9er; que chaque corps a pris la\nplace que sa nature lui a assign\u00e9e; que l'air a d\u00fb entourer la terre,\npar la m\u00eame raison que le fer et les autres m\u00e9taux sont l'ouvrage\nde ses entrailles; que le soleil est une production aussi naturelle,\nque celle de l'\u00e9lectricit\u00e9; qu'il n'a pas plus \u00e9t\u00e9 fait pour \u00e9chauffer\nla terre et tous ses habitants, qu'il br\u00fble quelquefois, que la pluie\npour faire pousser les grains, qu'elle g\u00e2te souvent; que le miroir et\nl'eau n'ont pas plus \u00e9t\u00e9 faits pour qu'on p\u00fbt s'y regarder, que tous\nles corps polis qui ont la m\u00eame propri\u00e9t\u00e9: que l'oeil est \u00e0 la v\u00e9rit\u00e9\nune esp\u00e8ce de trumeau dans lequel l'\u00e2me peut contempler l'image des\nobjets, tels qu'ils lui sont repr\u00e9sent\u00e9s par ces corps: mais qu'il\nn'est pas d\u00e9montr\u00e9 que cet organe ait \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9ellement fait expr\u00e8s\npour cette contemplation, ni expr\u00e8s plac\u00e9 dans l'orbite; qu'enfin\nil se pourrait bien faire que Lucr\u00e8ce, le m\u00e9decin Lamy et tous les\nEpicuriens anciens et modernes e\u00fbssent raison, lorsqu'ils avancent que\nl'oeil ne voit que par ce qu'il se trouve organis\u00e9, et plac\u00e9 comme il\nl'est, que pos\u00e9es une fois les m\u00eames r\u00e8gles de mouvement que suit la\nnature dans la g\u00e9n\u00e9ration et le d\u00e9veloppement des corps, il n'\u00e9tait\npas possible que ce merveilleux organe f\u00fbt organis\u00e9 et plac\u00e9 autrement.\n\nTel est le pour et le contre, et l'abr\u00e9g\u00e9 des grandes raisons qui\npartageront \u00e9ternellement les philosophes. Je ne prends aucun parti.\n\n\n    \"Non nostrum inter vos tantas componere lites.\"\n\n\nC'est ce que je disais \u00e0 un Fran\u00e7ais de mes amis, aussi franc\nPyrrhonien que moi, homme de beaucoup de m\u00e9rite, et digne d'un meilleur\nsort. Il me fit \u00e0 ce sujet une r\u00e9ponse fort singuli\u00e8re. Il est vrai,\nme dit-il, que le pour et le contre ne doit point inqui\u00e9ter l'\u00e2me d'un\nphilosophe, qui voit que rien n'est d\u00e9montr\u00e9 avec assez de clart\u00e9\npour forcer son consentement, et m\u00eame que les id\u00e9es indicatives qui\ns'offrent d'un c\u00f4t\u00e9, sont ausit\u00f4t d\u00e9truites par celles qui se montrent\nde l'autre. Cependant, reprit-il, l'univers ne sera jamais heureux,\n\u00e0 moins qu'il ne soit ath\u00e9e. Voici quelles \u00e9taient les raisons de\ncet abominable homme. Si l'ath\u00e9isme, disait-il, \u00e9tait g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement\nr\u00e9pandu, toutes les branches de la religion seraient alors d\u00e9truites et\ncoup\u00e9es par la racine. Plus de guerres th\u00e9ologiques; plus de soldats\nde religion; soldats terribles! la nature infect\u00e9e d'un poison sacr\u00e9,\nreprendrait ses droits et sa puret\u00e9. Sourds \u00e0 toute autre voix, les\nmortels tranquilles ne suivraient que les conseils spontan\u00e9s de leur\npropre individu, les seuls qu'on ne m\u00e9prise point impun\u00e9ment et qui\npeuvent seuls nous conduire au bonheur par les agr\u00e9ables sentiers de\nla vertu.\n\nTelle est la loi naturelle; quiconque en est rigide observateur,\nest honn\u00eate homme, et m\u00e9rite la confiance de tout le genre\nhumain. Quiconque ne la suit pas scrupuleusement, a beau affecter les\nsp\u00e9cieux dehors d'une autre religion, est un fourbe, ou un hypocrite\ndont je me d\u00e9fie.\n\nApr\u00e8s cela, qu'un vain peuple pense diff\u00e9remment; qu'il ose affirmer\nqu'il y va de la probit\u00e9 m\u00eame, \u00e0 ne pas croire la R\u00e9v\u00e9lation; qu'il\nfaut en un mot un autre religion que celle de la nature, quelle\nqu'elle soit! quelle mis\u00e8re! quelle piti\u00e9! et la bonne opinion que\nchacun nous donne de celle qu'il a embrass\u00e9e! Nous ne briguons point\nici le suffrage du vulgaire. Qui dresse dans son coeur des autels \u00e0\nla superstition, est n\u00e9 pour adorer des idoles, et non pour sentir\nla vertu.\n\nMais puisque toutes les facult\u00e9s de l'\u00e2me d\u00e9pendent tellement de\nla propre organisation du cerveau et de tout le corps, qu'elles ne\nsont visiblement que cette organisation m\u00eame: voil\u00e0 une machine bien\n\u00e9clair\u00e9e! car enfin quand l'homme seul aurait re\u00e7u en partage la\nloi naturelle, en serait-il moins une machine? Des roues, quelques\nressorts de plus que dans les animaux les plus parfaits, le cerveau\nproportionnellement plus proche du coeur, et recevant aussi plus de\nsang, la m\u00eame raison donn\u00e9e; que sais-je enfin? des causes inconnues\nproduiraient toujours cette conscience d\u00e9licate, si facile \u00e0 blesser,\nces remords qui ne sont pas plus \u00e9trangers \u00e0 la mati\u00e8re que la pens\u00e9e,\net en un mot toute la diff\u00e9rence qu'on suppose ici. L'organisation\nsuffirait-elle donc a tout? oui, encore une fois. Puisque la pens\u00e9e\nse d\u00e9veloppe visiblement avec les organes, pourquoi la mati\u00e8re dont\nils sont faits ne serait-elle pas aussi susceptible de remords,\nquand une fois elle a acquis avec le temps la facult\u00e9 de sentir?\n\nL'\u00e2me n'est donc qu'un vain terme dont on n'a point d'id\u00e9e, et dont\nun bon esprit ne doit se servir que pour nommer la partie qui pense\nen nous. Pos\u00e9 le moindre principe de mouvement, les corps anim\u00e9s\nauront tout ce qu'il leur faut pour se mouvoir, sentir, penser,\nse repentir, et se conduire en un mot dans le physique, et dans le\nmoral qui en d\u00e9pend.\n\nNous ne supposons rien; ceux qui croiraient que toutes les difficult\u00e9s\nne seraient pas encore lev\u00e9es, vont trouver des exp\u00e9riences, qui\nach\u00e8veront de les satisfaire.\n\n1. Toutes les chairs des animaux palpitent apr\u00e8s la mort, d'autant\nplus longtemps que l'animal est plus froid et transpire moins: les\ntortues, les l\u00e9zards, les serpents, etc. en font foi.\n\n2. Les muscles s\u00e9par\u00e9s du corps, se retirent, lorsqu'on les pique.\n\n3. Les entrailles conservent longtemps leur mouvement p\u00e9ristaltique,\nou vermiculaire.\n\n4. Une simple injection d'eau chaude ranime le coeur et les muscles,\nsuivant Cowper.\n\n5. Le coeur de la grenouille, surtout expos\u00e9 au soleil, encore mieux\nsur une table ou une assiette chaude, se remue pendant une heure et\nplus, apr\u00e8s avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 arrach\u00e9 du corps. Le mouvement semble-t-il\nperdu sans ressource? il n'y a qu'\u00e0 piquer le coeur, et ce muscle\ncreux bat encore. Harvey a fait la m\u00eame observation sur les crapauds.\n\n6. Bacon de Verulam, dans son Trait\u00e9 Sylva-Sylvarum, parle d'un homme\nconvaincu de trahison, qu'on ouvrit vivant, et dont le coeur jet\u00e9\ndans l'eau chaude sauta \u00e0 plusieurs reprises, toujours moins haut,\n\u00e0 la distance perpendiculaire de 2 pieds.\n\n7. Prenez un petit poulet encore dans l'oeuf; arrachez lui le coeur;\nvous observerez les m\u00eames ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes, avec \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s les m\u00eames\ncirconstances. La seule chaleur de l'haleine ranime un animal pr\u00eat\n\u00e0 p\u00e9rir dans la machine pneumatique.\n\nLes m\u00eames exp\u00e9riences que nous devons \u00e0 Boyle et \u00e0 St\u00e9non, se font dans\nles pigeons, dans les chiens, dans les lapins, dont les morceaux de\ncoeur se remuent, comme les coeurs entiers. On voit le m\u00eame mouvement\ndans les pattes de taupe arrach\u00e9es.\n\n8. La chenille, les vers, l'araign\u00e9e, la mouche, l'anguille offrent\nles m\u00eames choses \u00e0 consid\u00e9rer; et le mouvement des parties coup\u00e9es\naugmente dans l'eau chaude, \u00e0 cause du feu qu'elle contient.\n\n9. Un soldat ivre emporta d'un coup de sabre la t\u00eate d'un coq\nd'Inde. Cet animal resta debout, ensuite il marcha, courut; venant \u00e0\nrencontrer une muraille, il se tourna, battit des ailes, en continuant\nde courir, et tomba enfin. Etendu par terre, tous les muscles de\nce coq se remuaient encore. Voil\u00e0 ce que j'ai vu, et il est facile\nde voir \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s ces ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes dans les petits chats, ou chiens,\ndont on a coup\u00e9 la t\u00eate.\n\n10. Les polypes font plus que de se mouvoir, apr\u00e8s la section; ils\nse reproduisent dans huit jours en autant d'animaux qu'il y a de\nparties coup\u00e9es. J'en suis f\u00e2ch\u00e9 pour le syst\u00e8me des naturalistes\nsur la g\u00e9n\u00e9ration, ou plut\u00f4t j'en suis bien aise; car que cette\nd\u00e9couverte nous apprend bien \u00e0 ne jamais rien conclure de g\u00e9n\u00e9ral,\nm\u00eame de toutes les exp\u00e9riences connues, et les plus d\u00e9cisives!\n\nVoil\u00e0 beaucoup plus de faits qu'il n'en faut, pour prouver d'une\nmani\u00e8re incontestable que chaque petite fibre, ou partie des corps\norganis\u00e9s, se meut par un principe qui lui est propre, et dont l'action\nne d\u00e9pend point des nerfs, comme les mouvements volontaires, puisque\nles mouvements en question s'exercent sans que les parties qui les\nmanifestent aient aucun commerce avec la circulation. Or, si cette\nforce se fait remarquer jusques dans des morceaux de fibres, le coeur,\nqui est un compos\u00e9 de fibres singuli\u00e8rement entrelac\u00e9es, doit avoir la\nm\u00eame propri\u00e9t\u00e9. L'histoire de Bacon n'\u00e9tait pas n\u00e9cessaire pour me le\npersuader. Il m'\u00e9tait facile d'en juger, et par la parfaite analogie\nde la structure du coeur de l'homme et des animaux; et par la masse\nm\u00eame du premier, dans laquelle ce mouvement ne se cache aux yeux,\nque parce qu'il y est \u00e9touff\u00e9; et enfin parce que tout est froid et\naffaiss\u00e9 dans les cadavres. Si les dissections se faisaient sur des\ncriminels supplici\u00e9s, dont les corps sont encore chauds, on verrait\ndans leur coeur les m\u00eames mouvements qu'on observe dans les muscles\ndu visage des gens d\u00e9capit\u00e9s.\n\nTel est ce principe moteur des corps entiers, ou des parties coup\u00e9es en\nmorceaux, qu'il produit des mouvements non d\u00e9r\u00e9gl\u00e9s, comme on l'a cru,\nmais tr\u00e8s r\u00e9guliers, et cela, tant dans les animaux chauds et parfaits,\nque dans ceux qui sont froids et imparfaits. Il ne reste donc aucune\nressource \u00e0 nos adversaires, si ce n'est que de nier mille et mille\nfaits que chacun peut facilement v\u00e9rifier.\n\nSi on me demande \u00e0 pr\u00e9sent quel est le si\u00e8ge de cette force inn\u00e9e dans\nnos corps, je r\u00e9ponds qu'elle r\u00e9side tr\u00e8s clairement dans ce que les\nanciens ont appell\u00e9 parenchyme; c'est \u00e0 dire dans la substance propre\ndes parties, abstraction faite des veines, des art\u00e8res, des nerfs,\nen un mot de l'organisation de tout le corps; et que par cons\u00e9quent\nchaque partie contient en soi des ressorts plus ou moins vifs, selon\nle besoin qu'elles en avaient.\n\nEntrons dans quelque d\u00e9tail de ces ressorts de la machine humaine. Tous\nles mouvements vitaux, animaux, naturels et automatiques se font par\nleur action. N'est-ce pas machinalement que le corps se retire, frapp\u00e9\nde terreur \u00e0 l'aspect d'un pr\u00e9cipice inattendu? que les paupi\u00e8res\nse baissent \u00e0 la menace d'un coup, comme on l'a dit? que la pupille\ns'\u00e9tr\u00e9cit au grand jour pour conserver la r\u00e9tine, et s'\u00e9largit pour\nvoir les objets dans l'obscurit\u00e9? n'est-ce pas machinalement que les\npores de la peau se ferment en hiver, pour que le froid ne p\u00e9n\u00e8tre\npas l'int\u00e9rieur des vaisseaux? que l'estomac se soul\u00e8ve, irrit\u00e9 par\nle poison, par une certaine quantit\u00e9 d'opium, par tous les \u00e9m\u00e9tiques,\netc.? que le coeur, les art\u00e8res, les muscles se contractent pendant\nle sommeil, comme pendant la veille? que le poumon fait l'office d'un\nsouflet continuellement exerc\u00e9? n'est-ce pas machinalement qu'agissent\ntous les sphincters de la vessie, du rectum, etc.? que le coeur a\nune contraction plus forte que tout autre muscle? que les muscles\n\u00e9recteurs font dresser la verge dans l'homme, comme dans les animaux\nqui s'en battent le ventre, et m\u00eame dans l'enfant, capable d'\u00e9rection,\npour peu que cette partie soit irrit\u00e9e? Ce qui prouve, pour le dire\nen passant, qu'il est un ressort singulier dans ce membre, encore peu\nconnu, et qui produit des effets qu'on n'a point encore bien expliqu\u00e9s,\nmalgr\u00e9 toutes les lumi\u00e8res de l'anatomie.\n\nJe ne m'\u00e9tendrai pas davantage sur tous ces petits ressorts\nsubalternes connus de tout le monde. Mais il en est un autre plus\nsubtil, et plus merveilleux qui les anime tous; il est la source de\ntous nos sentiments, de tous nos plaisirs, de toutes nos passions, de\ntoutes nos pens\u00e9es; car le cerveau a ses muscles pour penser, comme\nles jambes pour marcher. Je veux parler de ce principe incitant,\net imp\u00e9tueux, qu'Hippocrate appelle enorm\u00f4n (l'\u00e2me). Ce principe\nexiste, et il a son si\u00e8ge dans le cerveau \u00e0 l'origine des nerfs,\npar lesquels il exerce son empire sur tout le reste du corps. Par l\u00e0\ns'explique tout ce qui peut s'expliquer, jusqu'aux effets surprenants\ndes maladies de l'imagination.\n\nMais, pour ne pas languir dans une richesse et une f\u00e9condit\u00e9 mal\nentendue, il faut se borner \u00e0 un petit nombre de questions et de\nr\u00e9flexions.\n\nPourquoi la vue ou la simple id\u00e9e d'une belle femme nous cause-t-elle\ndes mouvements et des d\u00e9sirs singuliers? Ce qui se passe alors dans\ncertains organes, vient-il de la nature m\u00eame de ces organes? Point\ndu tout; mais du commerce et de l'esp\u00e8ce de sympathie de ces muscles\navec l'imagination. Il n'y a ici qu'un premier ressort excit\u00e9 par le\nbene placitum des anciens, ou par l'image de la beaut\u00e9, qui en excite\nun autre, lequel \u00e9tait fort assoupi, quand l'imagination l'a \u00e9veill\u00e9:\net comment cela, si ce n'est par le d\u00e9sordre et le tumulte du sang\net des esprits, qui galopent avec une promptitude extraordinaire,\net vont gonfler les corps caverneux?\n\nPuisqu'il est des communications \u00e9videntes entre la m\u00e8re et l'enfant\n[7], et qu'il est dur de nier des faits rapport\u00e9s par Tulpius et\npar d'autres \u00e9crivains aussi dignes de foi (il n'y en a point qui le\nsoient plus), nous croirons que c'est par la m\u00eame voie que le foetus\nressent l'imp\u00e9tuosit\u00e9 de l'imagination maternelle, comme une cire\nmolle re\u00e7oit toutes sortes d'impressions; et que les m\u00eames traces,\nou envies de la m\u00e8re, peuvent s'imprimer sur le foetus, sans que\ncela puisse se comprendre, quoiqu'en disent Blondel et tous ses\nadh\u00e9rents. Ainsi nous faisons r\u00e9paration d'honneur au P. Malebranche,\nbeaucoup trop raill\u00e9 de sa cr\u00e9dulit\u00e9 par les auteurs qui n'ont point\nobserv\u00e9 d'assez pr\u00e8s la nature et ont voulu l'assujettir \u00e0 leur id\u00e9es.\n\nVoyez le portrait de ce fameux Pope, au moins le Voltaire\ndes Anglais. Les efforts, les nerfs de son g\u00e9nie sont peints\nsur sa physionomie; elle est toute en convulsion; ses yeux\nsortent de l'orbite, ses sourcils s'\u00e9l\u00e8vent avec les muscles du\nfront. Pourquoi? C'est que l'origine des nerfs est en travail et que\ntout le corps doit se ressentir d'une esp\u00e8ce d'accouchement aussi\nlaborieux. S'il n'y avait une corde interne qui tir\u00e2t ainsi celles\ndu dehors, d'o\u00f9 viendraient tous ces ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes? Admettre une \u00e2me,\npour les expliquer, c'est \u00eatre r\u00e9duit \u00e0 l'op\u00e9ration du St. Esprit.\n\nEn effet, si ce qui pense en mon cerveau n'est pas une partie\nde ce visc\u00e8re, et cons\u00e9quemment de tout le corps, pourquoi,\nlorsque tranquille dans mon lit je forme le plan d'un ouvrage,\nou que je poursuis un raisonnement abstrait, pourquoi mon sang\ns'\u00e9chauffe-t-il? pourquoi la fi\u00e8vre de mon esprit passe-t-elle dans\nmes veines? Demandez-le aux hommes d'imagination, aux grandes po\u00e8tes,\n\u00e0 ceux qu'un sentiment bien rendu ravit, qu'un go\u00fbt exquis, que les\ncharmes de la nature, de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 ou de la vertu transportent! Par\nleur enthousiasme, par ce qu'ils vous diront avoir \u00e9prouv\u00e9, vous\njugerez de la cause par les effets: par cette harmonie que Borelli,\nqu'un seul anatomiste a mieux connue que tous les Leibniziens, vous\nconna\u00eetrez l'unit\u00e9 mat\u00e9rielle de l'homme. Car enfin si la tension des\nnerfs qui fait la douleur, cause la fi\u00e8vre, par laquelle l'esprit\nest troubl\u00e9 et n'a plus de volont\u00e9; et que r\u00e9ciproquement l'esprit\ntrop exerc\u00e9 trouble le corps, et allume ce feu de consomption qui a\nenlev\u00e9 Bayle dans un \u00e2ge si peu avanc\u00e9; si telle titillation me fait\nvouloir, me force de d\u00e9sirer ardemment ce dont je ne me souciais\nnullement le moment d'auparavant; si \u00e0 leur tour certaines traces\ndu cerveau excitent le m\u00eame prurit et les m\u00eames d\u00e9sirs, pourquoi\nfaire double ce qui n'est \u00e9videmment qu'un? C'est en vain qu'on se\nr\u00e9crie sur l'empire de la volont\u00e9. Pour un ordre qu'elle donne, elle\nsubit cent fois le joug. Et quelle merveille que le corps ob\u00e9isse dan\nl'\u00e9tat sain, puisqu'un torrent de sang et d'esprits vient l'y forcer,\nla volont\u00e9 ayant pour ministres une l\u00e9gion invisible de fluides plus\nvifs que l'\u00e9clair, et toujours pr\u00eats a la servir! Mais comme c'est\npar les nerfs que son pouvoir s'exerce, c'est aussi par eux qu'il est\narr\u00eat\u00e9. La meilleure volont\u00e9 d'un amant \u00e9puis\u00e9, les plus violents\nd\u00e9sirs lui rendront-ils sa vigueur perdue? H\u00e9las! non; et elle en\nsera la premi\u00e8re punie, parceque, pos\u00e9es certaines circonstances,\nil n'est pas dans sa puissance de ne pas vouloir du plaisir. Ce que\nj'ai dit de la paralysie, etc. revient ici.\n\nLa jaunisse vous surprend! ne savez vous pas que la couleur\ndes corps d\u00e9pend de celle des verres au travers desquels on les\nregarde! Ignorez-vous que telle est la teinte des humeurs, telle\nest celle des objets, au moins par rapport \u00e0 nous, vains jouets\nde mille illusions? Mais \u00f4tez cette teinte de l'humeur aqueuse de\nl'oeil; faites couler la bile par son tamis naturel: alors l'\u00e2me\nayant d'autres yeux, ne verra plus jaune. N'est ce pas encore ainsi\nqu'en abattant la cataracte, ou en injectant le canal d'Eustachi,\non rend la vue aux aveugles, et l'ouie aux sourds? Combien de gens\nqui n'\u00e9taient peut-\u00eatre que d'habiles charlatans dans des si\u00e8cles\nignorants, ont pass\u00e9 pour faire de grands miracles! La belle \u00e2me et\nla puissante volont\u00e9, qui ne peut agir qu'autant que les dispositions\ndu corps le lui permettent, et dont les go\u00fbts changent avec l'\u00e2ge et\nla fi\u00e8vre! Faut-il donc s'\u00e9tonner si les philosophes ont toujours eu\nen vue la sant\u00e9 du corps pour conserver celle de l'\u00e2me, si Pythagore\na aussi soigneusement ordonn\u00e9 la di\u00e8te, que Platon a d\u00e9fendu le\nvin? Le r\u00e9gime qui convient au corps, est toujours celui par lequel\nles m\u00e9decins sens\u00e9s pr\u00e9tendent qu'on doit pr\u00e9luder, lorsqu'il s'agit\nde former l'esprit, de l'\u00e9lever \u00e0 la connaissance de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 et de\nla vertu; vains sons dans le d\u00e9sordre des maladies et le tumulte des\nsens! Sans les pr\u00e9ceptes de l'hygi\u00e8ne, Epict\u00e8te, Socrate, Platon,\netc. pr\u00eachent en vain: toute morale est infructueuse, pour qui n'a\npas la sobriet\u00e9 en partage: c'est la source de toutes les vertus\ncomme l'intemp\u00e9rance est celle de tous les vices.\n\nEn faut-il davantage (et pourquoi irais-je me perdre dans l'histoire\ndes passions, qui toutes s'expliquent par l'enorm\u00f4n d'Hippocrate) pour\nprouver que l'homme n'est qu'un animal, ou un assemblage de ressorts,\nqui tous se montent les uns par les autres, sans qu'on puisse dire\npar quel point du cercle humain la nature a commenc\u00e9? Si ces ressorts\ndiff\u00e8rent entr'eux, ce n'est donc que par leur si\u00e8ge et par quelques\ndegr\u00e9s de force, et jamais par leur nature; et par cons\u00e9quent l'\u00e2me\nn'est qu'un principe de mouvement, ou une partie mat\u00e9rielle sensible\ndu cerveau, qu'on peut, sans craindre l'erreur, regarder comme un\nressort principal de toute la machine, qui a une influence visible\nsur tous les autres, et m\u00eame parait avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 fait le premier; en\nsorte que tous les autres n'en seraient qu'une \u00e9manation, comme on\nle verra par quelques observations que je rapporterai et qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9\nfaites sur divers embryons.\n\nCette oscillation naturelle, ou propre \u00e0 notre machine, et dont est\ndou\u00e9e chaque fibre, et, pour ainsi dire, chaque \u00e9l\u00e9ment fibreux,\nsemblable \u00e0 celle d'une pendule, ne peut toujours s'exercer. Il faut\nla renouveler, \u00e0 mesure qu'elle se perd; lui donner des forces, quand\nelle languit; l'affaiblir, lorsqu'elle est opprim\u00e9e par un exc\u00e8s de\nforce et de vigueur. C'est en cela seul que la vraie m\u00e9decine consiste.\n\nLe corps n'est qu'une horloge, dont le nouveau chyle est l'horloger. Le\npremier soin de la nature, quand il entre dans le sang, c'est d'y\nexciter une sorte de fi\u00e8vre, que les chimistes, qui ne r\u00eavent que\nfourneaux, ont d\u00fb prendre pour une fermentation. Cette fi\u00e8vre procure\nune plus grande filtration d'esprits, qui machinalement vont animer\nles muscles et le coeur, comme s'ils y \u00e9taient envoy\u00e9s par ordre de\nla volont\u00e9.\n\nCe sont donc les causes ou les forces de la vie qui entretiennent\nainsi durant 100 ans le mouvement perp\u00e9tuel des solides et des\nfluides, aussi n\u00e9cessaire aux uns qu'aux autres. Mais qui peut dire\nsi les solides contribuent \u00e0 ce jeu, plus que les fluides, et vice\nversa? Tout ce qu'on sait, c'est que l'action des premiers serait\nbient\u00f4t an\u00e9antie, sans le secours des seconds. Ce sont les liqueurs\nqui par leur choc \u00e9veillent et conservent l'\u00e9lasticit\u00e9 des vaisseaux,\nde laquelle d\u00e9pend leur propre circulation. De l\u00e0 vient qu'apr\u00e8s la\nmort le ressort naturel de chaque substance est plus ou moins fort\nencore suivant les restes de la vie, auxquels il survit, pour expirer\nle dernier. Tant il est vrai que cette force des parties animales peut\nbien se conserver et s'augmenter par celle de la circulation, mais\nqu'elle n'en d\u00e9pend point, puisqu'elle se passe m\u00eame de l'int\u00e9grit\u00e9\nde chaque membre, ou visc\u00e8re, comme on l'a vu.\n\nJe n'ignore pas que cette opinion n'a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 go\u00fbt\u00e9e de tous les\nsavants, et que Stahl surtout l'a fort d\u00e9daign\u00e9e. Ce grand chimiste\na voulu nous persuader que l'\u00e2me \u00e9tait la seule cause de tous nos\nmouvements. Mais c'est parler en fanatique, et non en philosophe.\n\nPour d\u00e9truire l'hypoth\u00e8se Stahlienne, il ne faut pas faire tant\nd'efforts que je vois qu'on en a faits avant moi. Il n'y a qu'\u00e0 jeter\nles yeux sur un joueur de violon. Quelle souplesse! Quelle agilit\u00e9\ndans les doigts! Les mouvements sont si prompts, qu'il ne para\u00eet\npresque pas y avoir de succession. Or, je prie, ou plut\u00f4t je d\u00e9fie\nles Stahliens de me dire, eux qui connaissent si bien tout ce que peut\nnotre \u00e2me, comment il serait possible qu'elle ex\u00e9cut\u00e2t si vite tant de\nmouvements, des mouvements qui se passent si loin d'elle, et en tant\nd'endroits divers. C'est supposer un joueur de fl\u00fbte qui pourrait faire\nde brillantes cadences sur une infinit\u00e9 de trous qu'il ne connaitrait\npas, et auxquels il ne pourrait seulement pas appliquer le doigt.\n\nMais disons avec Mr. Hecquet qu'il n'est pas permis \u00e0 tout le monde\nd'aller \u00e0 Corinthe. Et pourquoi Stahl n'aurait-il pas \u00e9t\u00e9 encore plus\nfavoris\u00e9 de la nature en qualit\u00e9 d'homme, qu'en qualit\u00e9 de chimiste et\nde praticien? Il fallait (heureux mortel!) qu'il e\u00fbt re\u00e7u une autre\n\u00e2me que le reste des hommes; une \u00e2me souveraine, qui non contente\nd'avoir quelque empire sur les muscles volontaires, tenait sans peine\nles r\u00eanes de tous les mouvements du corps, pouvait les suspendre, les\ncalmer, ou les exciter \u00e0 son gr\u00e9. Avec une ma\u00eetresse aussi despotique,\ndans les mains de laquelle \u00e9taient en quelque sorte les battements\ndu coeur et les lois de la circulation, point de fi\u00e8vre sans doute;\npoint de douleur; point de langueur; ni honteuse impuissance, ni\nfacheux priapisme. L'\u00e2me veut, et les ressorts jouent, se dressent,\nou se d\u00e9bandent. Comment ceux de la machine de Stahl se sont-ils sit\u00f4t\nd\u00e9traqu\u00e9s? Qui a chez soi un si grand m\u00e9decin, devrait \u00eatre immortel.\n\nStahl, au reste, n'est pas le seul qui ait rejet\u00e9 le principe\nd'oscillation des corps organis\u00e9s. De plus grands esprits ne l'ont pas\nemploy\u00e9, lorsqu'ils ont voulu expliquer l'action du coeur, l'\u00e9rection\ndu penis, etc. Il n'y a qu'\u00e0 lire les Institutions de m\u00e9decine de\nBoerhaave, pour voir quels laborieux et s\u00e9duisants syst\u00e8mes, faute\nd'admettre une force aussi frappante dans tous les corps, ce grand\nhomme a \u00e9t\u00e9 oblig\u00e9 d'enfanter \u00e0 la sueur de son puissant g\u00e9nie.\n\nWillis et Perrault, esprits d'une plus faible trempe, mais observateurs\nassidus de la nature, que le fameux professeur de Leyde n'a connue\nque par autrui et n'a eue, pour ainsi dire, que de la seconde main,\nparaissent avoir mieux aim\u00e9 supposer une \u00e2me g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement r\u00e9pandue\npar tout le corps, que le principe dont nous parlons. Mais dans\ncette hypoth\u00e8se qui fut celle de Virgile et de tous les Epicuriens,\nhypoth\u00e8se que l'histoire du polype semblerait favoriser \u00e0 la premi\u00e8re\nvue, les mouvements qui survivent au sujet dans lequel ils sont\ninh\u00e9rents viennent d'un reste d'\u00e2me, que conservent encore les parties\nqui se contractent, sans \u00eatre d\u00e9sormais irrit\u00e9es par le sang et les\nesprits. D'o\u00f9 l'on voit que ces \u00e9crivains dont les ouvrages solides\n\u00e9clipsent ais\u00e9ment toutes les fables philosophiques, ne se sont tromp\u00e9s\nque sur le mod\u00e8le de ceux qui ont donn\u00e9 \u00e0 la mati\u00e8re la facult\u00e9 de\npenser, je veux dire, pour s'\u00eatre mal exprim\u00e9s, en termes obscurs,\net qui ne signifient rien. En effet, qu'est ce que ce reste d'\u00e2me,\nsi ce n'est la force motrice des Leibniziens, mal rendue par une\ntelle expression, et que cependant Perrault surtout a v\u00e9ritablement\nentrevue. Voy. son Trait\u00e9 de la M\u00e9canique des Animaux.\n\nA pr\u00e9sent qu'il est clairement d\u00e9montr\u00e9 contre les Cart\u00e9siens, les\nStahliens, les Malebranchistes, et les th\u00e9ologiens peu dignes d'\u00eatre\nici plac\u00e9s, que la mati\u00e8re se meut par elle-m\u00eame, non seulement\nlorsqu'elle est organis\u00e9e, comme dans un coeur entier, par exemple,\nmais lors m\u00eame que cette organisation est d\u00e9truite, la curiosit\u00e9 de\nl'homme voudrait savoir comment un corps, par cela m\u00eame qu'il est\noriginairement dou\u00e9 d'un souffle de vie, se trouve en cons\u00e9quence orn\u00e9\nde la facult\u00e9 de sentir, et enfin par celle-ci de la pens\u00e9e. Et pour\nen venir \u00e0 bout, \u00f4 bon Dieu, quels efforts n'ont pas faits certains\nphilosophes! et quel galimatias j'ai eu la patience de lire \u00e0 ce sujet!\n\nTout ce que l'exp\u00e9rience nous apprend, c'est que tant que le mouvement\nsubsiste, si petit qu'il soit dans une ou plusieurs fibres, il n'y a\nqu'\u00e0 les piquer, pour r\u00e9veiller, animer ce mouvement presque \u00e9teint,\ncomme on l'a vu dans cette foule d'exp\u00e9riences dont j'ai voulu accabler\nles syst\u00e8mes. Il est donc constant que le mouvement et le sentiment\ns'excitent tour \u00e0 tour, et dans les corps entiers, et dans les m\u00eames\ncorps dont la structure est d\u00e9truite; pour ne rien dire de certaines\nplantes qui semblent nous offrir les m\u00eames ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes de la r\u00e9union\ndu sentiment et du mouvement.\n\nMais de plus, combien d'excellents philosophes ont d\u00e9montr\u00e9 que la\npens\u00e9e n'est qu'une facult\u00e9 de sentir, et que l'\u00e2me raisonnable\nn'est que l'\u00e2me sensitive appliqu\u00e9e \u00e0 contempler les id\u00e9es, et\n\u00e0 raisonner! Ce qui serait prouv\u00e9 par cela seul que lorsque le\nsentiment est \u00e9teint, la pens\u00e9e l'est aussi, comme dans l'apoplexie,\nla l\u00e9thargie, la catalepsie, etc. Car ceux qui ont avanc\u00e9 que l'\u00e2me\nn'avait pas moins pens\u00e9 dans les maladies soporeuses, quoiqu'elle\nne se souvint pas des id\u00e9es qu'elle avait eues, ont soutenu une\nchose ridicule.\n\nPour ce qui est de ce d\u00e9veloppement, c'est une folie de perdre le\ntemps \u00e0 en rechercher le m\u00e9canisme. La nature du mouvement nous\nest aussi inconnue que celle de la mati\u00e8re. Le moyen de d\u00e9couvrir\ncomment il s'y produit, \u00e0 moins que de ressusciter avec l'auteur de\nl'Histoire de l'Ame l'ancienne et inintelligible doctrine des formes\nsubstantielles! Je suis donc aussi consol\u00e9 d'ignorer comment la\nmati\u00e8re, d'inerte et simple, devient active et compos\u00e9e d'organes,\nque de ne pouvoir regarder le soleil sans verre rouge: et je suis\nd'aussi bonne composition sur les autres merveilles incompr\u00e9hensibles\nde la nature, sur la production du sentiment et de la pens\u00e9e dans un\n\u00eatre qui ne paraissait autrefois \u00e0 nos yeux born\u00e9s qu'un peu de boue.\n\nQu'on m'accorde seulement que la mati\u00e8re organis\u00e9e est dou\u00e9e d'un\nprincipe moteur, qui seul la diff\u00e9rencie de celle qui ne l'est pas\n(eh! peut-on rien refuser \u00e0 l'observation la plus incontestable?) et\nque tout d\u00e9pend dans les animaux de la diversit\u00e9 de cette organisation,\ncomme je l'ai assez prouv\u00e9; c'en est assez pour deviner l'\u00e9nigme des\nsubstances et celle de l'homme. On voit qu'il n'y en a qu'une dans\nl'univers et que l'homme est la plus parfaite. Il est au singe, aux\nanimaux les plus spirituels, ce que le pendule plan\u00e9taire de Huygens\nest \u00e0 une montre de Julien le Roi. S'il a fallu plus d'instruments,\nplus de rouages, plus de ressorts pour marquer les mouvements des\nplan\u00e8tes, que pour marquer les heures, ou les r\u00e9p\u00e9ter; s'il a fallu\nplus d'art \u00e0 Vaucanson pour faire son Fluteur, que pour son Canard,\nil e\u00fbt d\u00fb en employer encore davantage pour faire un Parleur; machine\nqui ne peut plus \u00eatre regard\u00e9e comme impossible, surtout entre les\nmains d'un nouveau Prom\u00e9th\u00e9e. Il \u00e9tait donc de m\u00eame n\u00e9cessaire que la\nnature employ\u00e2t plus d'art et d'appareil pour faire et entretenir une\nmachine, qui pendant un si\u00e8cle entier p\u00fbt marquer tous les battements\ndu coeur et de l'esprit; car si on n'en voit pas au pouls les heures,\nc'est du moins le barom\u00e8tre de la chaleur et de la vivacit\u00e9, par\nlaquelle on peut juger de la nature de l'\u00e2me. Je ne me trompe point,\nle corps humain est une horloge, mais immense, et construite avec\ntant d'artifice et d'habilet\u00e9, que si la roue qui sert \u00e0 marquer les\nsecondes vient \u00e0 s'arr\u00eater, celle des minutes tourne et va toujours\nson train, comme la roue des quarts continue de se mouvoir; et ainsi\ndes autres, quand les premi\u00e8res, rouill\u00e9es, ou d\u00e9rang\u00e9es par quelque\ncause que ce soit, ont interrompu leur marche. Car n'est-ce pas ainsi\nque l'obstruction de quelques vaisseaux ne suffit pas pour d\u00e9truire,\nou suspendre le fort des mouvements, qui est dans le coeur, comme dans\nla pi\u00e8ce ouvri\u00e8re de la machine; puisqu'au contraire les fluides dont\nle volume est diminu\u00e9, ayant moins de chemin a faire, le parcourent\nd'autant plus vite, emport\u00e9s comme par un nouveau courant, que la\nforce du coeur s'augmente en raison de la r\u00e9sistance qu'il trouve\n\u00e0 l'extr\u00e9mit\u00e9 des vaisseaux? Lorsque le nerf optique seul comprim\u00e9\nne laisse plus passer l'image des objets, n'est-ce pas ainsi que\nla privation de la vue n'emp\u00eache pas plus l'usage de l'ou\u00efe, que la\nprivation de ce sens, lorsque les fonctions de la portion molle sont\ninterdites, ne suppose celle de l'autre? N'est-ce pas ainsi encore\nque l'un entend, sans pouvoir dire qu'il entend (si ce n'est apr\u00e8s\nl'attaque du mal) et que l'autre qui n'entend rien, mais dont les\nnerfs linguaux sont libres dans le cerveau, dit machinalement tous les\nr\u00eaves qui lui passent par la t\u00eate? Ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes qui ne surprennent point\nles m\u00e9decins \u00e9clair\u00e9s. Ils savent \u00e0 quoi s'en tenir sur la nature de\nl'homme; et pour le dire en passant: de deux m\u00e9decins, le meilleur,\ncelui qui m\u00e9rite le plus de confiance, c'est toujours, \u00e0 mon avis,\ncelui qui est le plus vers\u00e9 dans la physique, ou la m\u00e9canique du corps\nhumain, et qui laissant l'\u00e2me et toutes les inqui\u00e9tudes que cette\nchim\u00e8re donne aux sots et aux ignorans, n'est occup\u00e9 s\u00e9rieusement\nque du pur naturalisme.\n\nLaissons donc le pr\u00e9tendu Mr. Charp se moquer des philosophes qui ont\nregard\u00e9 les animaux, comme des machines. Que je pense diff\u00e9remment! Je\ncrois que Descartes serait un homme respectable \u00e0 tous \u00e9gards, si,\nn\u00e9 dans un si\u00e8cle qu'il n'e\u00fbt pas d\u00fb \u00e9clairer, il e\u00fbt connu le prix de\nl'exp\u00e9rience et de l'observation, et le danger de s'en \u00e9carter. Mais\nil n'est pas moins juste que je fasse ici une authentique r\u00e9paration\n\u00e0 ce grand homme, pour tous ces petits philosophes mauvais plaisants,\net mauvais singes de Locke, qui, au lieu de rire impudemment au nez\nde Descartes, feraient mieux de sentir que sans lui le champ de la\nphilosophie, comme celui du bon esprit sans Newton, serait peut \u00eatre\nencore en friche.\n\nIl est vrai que ce c\u00e9l\u00e8bre philosophe s'est beaucoup tromp\u00e9, et\npersonne n'en disconvient. Mais enfin il a connu la nature animale;\nil a le premier parfaitement d\u00e9montr\u00e9 que les animaux \u00e9taient de pures\nmachines. Or, apr\u00e8s une d\u00e9couverte de cette importance et qui suppose\nautant de sagacit\u00e9, le moyen, sans ingratitude, de ne pas faire gr\u00e2ce\n\u00e0 toutes ses erreurs!\n\nElles sont \u00e0 mes yeux toutes r\u00e9par\u00e9es par ce grand aveu. Car enfin,\nquoiqu'il chante sur la distinction des deux substances, il est visible\nque ce n'est qu'un tour d'adresse, une ruse de style, pour faire avaler\naux th\u00e9ologiens un poison cach\u00e9 \u00e0 l'ombre d'une analogie qui frappe\ntout le monde, et qu'eux seuls ne voient pas. Car c'est elle, c'est\ncette forte analogie qui force tous les savants et les vrais juges\nd'avouer que ces \u00eatres fiers et vains, plus distingu\u00e9s par leur orgueil\nque par le nom d'hommes, quelque envie qu'ils aient de s'\u00e9lever,\nne sont au fond que des animaux et des machines perpendiculairement\nrampantes. Elles ont toutes ce merveilleux instinct, dont l'\u00e9ducation\nfait de l'esprit, et qui a toujours son si\u00e8ge dans le cerveau, et \u00e0 son\nd\u00e9faut, comme lorsqu'il manque ou est ossifi\u00e9, dans la mo\u00eblle allong\u00e9e,\net jamais dans le cervelet; car je l'ai vu consid\u00e9rablement bless\u00e9,\nd'autres [8] l'ont trouv\u00e9 squirreux, sans que l'\u00e2me cess\u00e2t de faire\nses fonctions.\n\nEtre machine, sentir, penser, savoir distinguer le bien du mal, comme\nle bleu du jaune, en un mot \u00eatre n\u00e9 avec de l'intelligence et un\ninstinct s\u00fbr de morale, et n'\u00eatre qu'un animal, sont donc des choses\nqui ne sont pas plus contradictoires qu'\u00eatre un singe ou un perroquet\net savoir se donner du plaisir. Car, puisque l'occasion se pr\u00e9sente de\nle dire, qui eut jamais devin\u00e9 \u00e0 priori qu'une goutte de la liqueur\nqui se lance dans l'accouplement fit ressentir des plaisirs divins,\net qu'il en na\u00eetrait une petite cr\u00e9ature, qui pourrait un jour,\npos\u00e9es certaines lois, jouir des m\u00eames d\u00e9lices? Je crois la pens\u00e9e\nsi peu incompatible avec la mati\u00e8re organis\u00e9e, qu'elle semble en\n\u00eatre une propri\u00e9t\u00e9, telle que l'\u00e9lectricit\u00e9, la facult\u00e9 motrice,\nl'imp\u00e9n\u00e9trabilit\u00e9, l'\u00e9tendue, etc.\n\nVoulez vous de nouvelles observations? En voici qui sont sans r\u00e9plique\net qui prouvent toutes que l'homme ressemble parfaitement aux animaux\ndans son origine, comme dans tout ce que nous avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 cru essentiel\nde comparer.\n\nJ'en appelle \u00e0 la bonne foi de nos observateurs. Qu'ils nous disent\ns'il n'est pas vrai que l'homme dans son principe n'est qu'un ver,\nqui devient homme, comme la chenille papillon. Les plus graves [9]\nauteurs nous ont appris comment il faut s'y prendre pour voir cet\nanimalcule. Tous les curieux l'ont vu, comme Hartsoeker, dans la\nsemence de l'homme, et non dans celle de la femme; il n'y a que les\nsots qui s'en soient fait scrupule. Comme chaque goutte de sperme\ncontient une infinit\u00e9 de ces petits vers lorsqu'ils sont lanc\u00e9s \u00e0\nl'ovaire, il n'y a que le plus adroit, ou le plus vigoureux qui ait la\nforce de s'insinuer et de s'implanter dans l'oeuf que fournit la femme,\net qui lui donne sa premi\u00e8re nourriture. Cet oeuf, quelquefois surpris\ndans les trompes de Fallope, est port\u00e9 par ces canaux \u00e0 la matrice, o\u00f9\nil prend racine, comme un grain de bl\u00e9 dans la terre. Mais quoiqu'il y\ndevienne monstrueux par sa croissance de 9 mois, il ne diff\u00e8re point\ndes oeufs des autres femelles, si ce n'est que sa peau (l'amnios)\nne se durcit jamais, et se dilate prodigieusement, comme on en peut\njuger en comparant les foetus trouv\u00e9s en situation et pr\u00e8s d'\u00e9clore\n(ce que j'ai eu le plaisir d'observer dans une femme morte un moment\navant l'accouchement), avec d'autres petits embryons tr\u00e8s proches\nde leur origine: car alors c'est toujours l'oeuf dans sa coque,\net l'animal dans l'oeuf, qui, g\u00ean\u00e9 dans ses mouvements, cherche\nmachinalement \u00e0 voir le jour; et pour y r\u00e9ussir, il commence par\nrompre avec la t\u00eate cette membrane, d'o\u00fb il sort, comme le poulet,\nl'oiseau, etc., de la leur. J'ajouterai une observation que je ne\ntrouve nulle part; c'est que l'amnios n'en est pas plus mince, pour\ns'\u00eatre prodigieusement \u00e9tendu; semblable en cela \u00e0 la matrice dont\nla substance m\u00eame se gonfle de sucs infiltr\u00e9s, ind\u00e9pendamment de la\nr\u00e9pl\u00e9tion et du d\u00e9ploiement de tous ses coudes vasculeux.\n\nVoyons l'homme dans et hors de sa coque; examinons avec un microscope\nles plus jeunes embryons, de 4, de 6, de 8 ou de 15 jours; apr\u00e8s ce\ntemps les yeux suffisent. Que voit-on? la t\u00eate seule; un petit oeuf\nrond avec deux points noirs qui marquent les yeux. Avant ce temps,\ntout \u00e9tant plus informe, on n'aper\u00e7oit qu'une pulpe m\u00e9dullaire, qui\nest le cerveau, dans lequel se forme d'abord l'origine des nerfs,\nou le principe du sentiment, et le coeur qui a d\u00e9j\u00e0 par lui-m\u00eame dans\ncette pulpe la facult\u00e9 de battre: c'est le punctum saliens de Malpighi,\nqui doit peut-\u00eatre d\u00e9j\u00e0 une partie de sa vivacit\u00e9 \u00e0 l'influence des\nnerfs. Ensuite peu-\u00e0-peu on voit la t\u00eate allonger le col, qui en\nse dilatant forme d'abord le thorax, o\u00f9 le coeur a d\u00e9j\u00e0 descendu,\npour s'y fixer; apr\u00e8s quoi vient le bas ventre qu'une cloison (le\ndiaphragme) s\u00e9pare. Ces dilatations donnent l'une, les bras, les\nmains, les doigts, les ongles, et les poils; l'autre les cuisses,\nles jambes, les pieds, etc., avec la seule diff\u00e9rence de situation\nqu'on leur connait, qui fait l'appui et le balancier du corps. C'est\nune v\u00e9g\u00e9tation frappante. Ici, ce sont des cheveux qui couvrent le\nsommet de nos t\u00eates; l\u00e0, ce sont des feuilles et des fleurs. Partout\nbrille le m\u00eame luxe de la nature; et enfin l'esprit recteur des plantes\nest plac\u00e9 o\u00f9 nous avons notre \u00e2me, cette autre quintessence de l'homme.\n\nTelle est l'uniformit\u00e9 de la nature qu'on commence \u00e0 sentir,\net l'analogie du r\u00e8gne animal et v\u00e9g\u00e9tal, de l'homme \u00e0 la\nplante. Peut-\u00eatre m\u00eame y a-t-il des plantes animal, c'est-\u00e0-dire\nqui en v\u00e9g\u00e9tant, ou se battent comme les polypes, ou font d'autres\nfonctions propres aux animaux?\n\nVoil\u00e0 \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s tout ce qu'on sait de la g\u00e9n\u00e9ration. Que les parties\nqui s'attirent, qui sont faites pour s'unir ensemble et pour occuper\ntelle ou telle place, se r\u00e9unissent toutes suivant leur nature; et\nqu'ainsi se forment les yeux, le coeur, l'estomac et enfin tout le\ncorps, comme de grands hommes l'ont \u00e9crit, cela est possible. Mais,\ncomme l'exp\u00e9rience nous abandonne au milieu des ces subtilit\u00e9s,\nje ne supposerai rien, regardant tout ce qui ne frappe pas mes sens\ncomme un myst\u00e8re imp\u00e9n\u00e9trable. Il est si rare que les deux semences\nse rencontrent dans le congr\u00e8s, que je serais tent\u00e9 de croire que la\nsemence de la femme est inutile \u00e0 la g\u00e9n\u00e9ration.\n\nMais comment en expliquer les ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes, sans ce commode rapport\nde parties, qui rend si bien raison des ressemblances des enfants,\ntant\u00f4t au p\u00e8re, et tant\u00f4t \u00e0 la m\u00e8re? D'un autre c\u00f4t\u00e9, l'embarras d'une\nexplication doit-elle contrebalancer un fait? Il me parait que c'est\nle m\u00e2le qui fait tout, dans une femme qui dort, comme dans la plus\nlubrique. L'arrangement des parties serait donc fait de toute \u00e9ternit\u00e9\ndans le germe, ou dans le ver m\u00eame de l'homme. Mais tout ceci est\nfort au-dessus de la port\u00e9e des plus excellents observateurs. Comme\nils n'y peuvent rien saisir, ils ne peuvent pas plus juger de la\nm\u00e9canique de la formation et du d\u00e9veloppement des corps, qu'une taupe\ndu chemin qu'un cerf peut parcourir.\n\nNous sommes de vraies taupes dans le champ de la nature; nous n'y\nfaisons gu\u00e8res que le trajet de cet animal; et c'est notre orgueil qui\ndonne des bornes \u00e0 ce qui n'en a point. Nous sommes dans le cas d'une\nmontre qui dirait: (un fabuliste en ferait un personnage de cons\u00e9quence\ndans un ouvrage frivole) \"Quoi! c'est ce sot ouvrier qui m'a faite, moi\nqui divise le temps! moi qui marque si exactement le cours du soleil;\nmoi qui r\u00e9p\u00e8te \u00e0 haute voix les heures que j'indique! non, cela ne se\npeut pas.\" Nous d\u00e9daignons de m\u00eame, ingrats que nous sommes, cette\nm\u00e8re commune de tous les r\u00e8gnes, comme parlent les chimistes. Nous\nimaginons ou plut\u00f4t supposons une cause sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 celle \u00e0 qui\nnous devons tout, et qui a v\u00e9ritablement tout fait d'une mani\u00e8re\ninconcevable. Non, la mati\u00e8re n'a rien de vil, qu'aux yeux grossiers\nqui la m\u00e9connaissent dans ses plus brillants ouvrages; et la nature\nn'est point une ouvri\u00e8re born\u00e9e. Elle produit des millions d'hommes\navec plus de facilit\u00e9 et de plaisir, qu'un horloger n'a de peine \u00e0\nfaire la montre la plus compos\u00e9e. Sa puissance \u00e9clate \u00e9galement et dans\nla production du plus vil insecte, et dans celle de l'homme le plus\nsuperbe; le r\u00e8gne animal ne lui co\u00fbte pas plus que le v\u00e9g\u00e9tal, ni le\nplus beau g\u00e9nie qu'un \u00e9pi de bl\u00e9. Jugeons donc par ce que nous voyons,\nde ce qui se d\u00e9robe \u00e0 la curiosit\u00e9 de nos yeux et de nos recherches,\net n'imaginons rien au del\u00e0. Suivons le singe, le castor, l'\u00e9l\u00e9phant,\netc., dans leurs op\u00e9rations. S'il est \u00e9vident qu'elles ne peuvent\nse faire sans intelligence, pourquoi la refuser \u00e0 ces animaux? et si\nvous leur accordez une \u00e2me, fanatiques, vous \u00eates perdus; vous aurez\nbeau dire que vous ne d\u00e9cidez point sur sa nature, tandis que vous lui\n\u00f4tez l'immortalit\u00e9; qui ne voit que c'est une assertion gratuite? qui\nne voit qu'elle doit \u00eatre ou mortelle, ou immortelle, comme la n\u00f4tre,\ndont elle doit subir le m\u00eame sort quel qu'il soit! et qu'ainsi c'est\ntomber dans Scilla pour vouloir \u00e9viter Caribde?\n\nBrisez la cha\u00eene de vos pr\u00e9jug\u00e9s; armez-vous du flambeau de\nl'exp\u00e9rience et vous ferez \u00e0 la nature l'honneur qu'elle m\u00e9rite,\nau lieu de rien conclure \u00e0 son d\u00e9savantage, de l'ignorance o\u00f9 elle\nvous a laiss\u00e9. Ouvrez les yeux seulement, et laissez-l\u00e0 ce que vous\nne pouvez comprendre; et vous verrez que ce laboureur dont l'esprit\net les lumi\u00e8res ne s'\u00e9tendent pas plus loin que les bords de son\nsillon, ne diff\u00e8re point essentiellement du plus grand g\u00e9nie, comme\nl'e\u00fbt prouv\u00e9 la dissection des cerveaux de Descartes et de Newton:\nvous serez persuad\u00e9 que l'imb\u00e9cile ou le stupide sont des b\u00eates \u00e0\nfigure humaine, comme le singe plein d'esprit est un petit homme\nsous une autre forme; et qu'enfin tout d\u00e9pendant absolument de la\ndiversit\u00e9 de l'organisation, un animal bien construit, \u00e0 qui on a\nappris l'astronomie, peut pr\u00e9dire une \u00e9clipse, comme la gu\u00e9rison\nou la mort, lorsqu'il a port\u00e9 quelque temps du g\u00e9nie et de bons\nyeux \u00e0 l'\u00e9cole d'Hippocrate et au lit des malades. C'est par cette\nfile d'observations et de v\u00e9rit\u00e9s qu'on parvient \u00e0 lier \u00e0 la mati\u00e8re\nl'admirable propri\u00e9t\u00e9 de penser, sans qu'on en puisse voir les liens,\nparce que le sujet de cet attribut nous est essentiellement inconnu.\n\nNe disons point que toute machine, ou tout animal, p\u00e9rit tout-\u00e0-fait,\nou prend une autre forme, apr\u00e8s la mort; car nous n'en savons\nabsolument rien. Mais assurer qu'une machine immortelle est une\nchim\u00e8re, ou un \u00eatre de raison, c'est faire un raisonnement aussi\nabsurde que celui que feraient des chenilles, qui, voyant les\nd\u00e9pouilles de leurs semblables, d\u00e9ploreraient am\u00e8rement le sort de\nleur esp\u00e8ce qui leur semblerait s'an\u00e9antir. L'\u00e2me de ces insectes\n(car chaque animal a la sienne) est trop born\u00e9e pour comprendre\nles m\u00e9tamorphoses de la nature. Jamais un seul des plus rus\u00e9s\nd'entr'eux n'e\u00fbt imagin\u00e9 qu'il d\u00fbt devenir papillon. Il en est de\nm\u00eame de nous. Que savons-nous plus de notre destin\u00e9e, que de notre\norigine? Soumettons-nous donc \u00e0 une ignorance invincible de laquelle\nnotre bonheur d\u00e9pend.\n\nQui pensera ainsi, sera sage, juste, tranquille sur son sort,\net par cons\u00e9quent heureux. Il attendra la mort, sans la craindre,\nni la d\u00e9sirer; et ch\u00e9rissant la vie, comprenant \u00e0 peine comment le\nd\u00e9go\u00fbt vient corrompre un coeur dans ce lieu plein de d\u00e9lices; plein\nde respect pour la nature, plein de reconnaissance, d'attachement et\nde tendresse, \u00e0 proportion du sentiment et des bienfaits qu'il en a\nre\u00e7us, heureux enfin de la sentir, et d'\u00eatre au charmant spectacle de\nl'univers, il ne le d\u00e9truira certainement jamais dans soi, ni dans les\nautres. Que dis-je! plein d'humanit\u00e9, il en aimera le caract\u00e8re jusques\ndans ses ennemis. Jugez comme il traitera les autres! Il plaindra\nles vicieux, sans les ha\u00efr; ce ne seront \u00e0 ses yeux que des hommes\ncontrefaits. Mais en faisant gr\u00e2ce aux d\u00e9fauts de la conformation\nde l'esprit et du corps, il n'en admirera pas moins leurs beaut\u00e9s et\nleurs vertus. Ceux que la nature aura favoris\u00e9s lui para\u00eetront m\u00e9riter\nplus d'\u00e9gards que ceux qu'elle aura trait\u00e9s en mar\u00e2tre. C'est ainsi\nqu'on a vu que les dons naturels, la source de tout ce qui s'acquiert,\ntrouvent dans la bouche et le coeur du mat\u00e9rialiste des hommages que\ntout autre leur refuse injustement. Enfin le mat\u00e9rialiste convaincu,\nquoi que murmure sa propre vanit\u00e9, qu'il n'est qu'une machine, ou\nun animal, ne maltraitera point ses semblables; trop instruit sur la\nnature de ces actions, dont l'inhumanit\u00e9 est toujours proportionn\u00e9e\nau degr\u00e9 d'analogie prouv\u00e9e ci devant; et ne voulant pas en un mot,\nsuivant la loi naturelle donn\u00e9e \u00e0 tous les animaux, faire \u00e0 autrui\nce qu'il ne voudrait pas qu'il lui f\u00eet.\n\nConcluons donc hardiment que l'homme est une machine; et qu'il n'y a\ndans tout l'univers qu'une seule substance diversement modifi\u00e9e. Ce\nn'est point ici une hypoth\u00e8se \u00e9lev\u00e9e \u00e0 force de demandes et de\nsuppositions: ce n'est point l'ouvrage du pr\u00e9jug\u00e9, ni m\u00eame de ma\nraison seule; j'eusse d\u00e9daign\u00e9 un guide que je crois si peu s\u00fbr, si\nmes sens portant, pour ainsi dire, le flambeau, ne m'e\u00fbssent engag\u00e9 \u00e0\nla suivre, en l'\u00e9clairant. L'exp\u00e9rience m'a donc parl\u00e9 pour la raison;\nc'est ainsi que je les ai jointes ensemble.\n\nMais on a d\u00fb voir que je ne me suis permis le raisonnement le\nplus rigoureux et le plus imm\u00e9diatement tir\u00e9, qu'\u00e0 la suite d'une\nmultitude d'observations physiques qu'aucun savant ne contestera; et\nc'est encore eux seuls que je reconnais pour juges des cons\u00e9quences\nque j'en tire; r\u00e9cusant ici tout homme \u00e0 pr\u00e9jug\u00e9s, et qui n'est ni\nanatomiste, ni au fait de la seule philosophie qui soit ici de mise,\ncelle du corps humain. Que pourraient contre un ch\u00eane aussi ferme et\nsolide ces faibles roseaux de la th\u00e9ologie, de la m\u00e9taphysique et\ndes \u00e9coles; armes pu\u00e9riles, semblables aux fleurets de nos salles,\nqui peuvent bien donner le plaisir de l'escrime, mais jamais entamer\nson adversaire. Faut-il dire que je parle de ces id\u00e9es creuses et\ntriviales, de ces raisonnements rebattus et pitoyables, qu'on fera\nsur la pr\u00e9tendue incompatibilit\u00e9 de deux substances qui se touchent\net se remuent sans cesse l'une et l'autre, tant qu'il restera l'ombre\ndu pr\u00e9jug\u00e9 ou de la superstition sur la terre? Voil\u00e0 mon syst\u00e8me,\nou plut\u00f4t la v\u00e9rit\u00e9, si je ne me trompe fort. Elle est courte et\nsimple. Dispute \u00e0 pr\u00e9sent qui voudra!\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nMAN A MACHINE.\n\n\nIt is not enough for a wise man to study nature and truth; he should\ndare state truth for the benefit of the few who are willing and able\nto think. As for the rest, who are voluntarily slaves of prejudice,\nthey can no more attain truth, than frogs can fly.\n\nI reduce to two the systems of philosophy which deal with man's\nsoul. The first and older system is materialism; the second is\nspiritualism.\n\nThe metaphysicians who have hinted that matter may well be endowed\nwith the faculty of thought{1} have perhaps not reasoned ill. For\nthere is in this case a certain advantage in their inadequate way of\nexpressing their meaning. In truth, to ask whether matter can think,\nwithout considering it otherwise than in itself, is like asking\nwhether matter can tell time. It may be foreseen that we shall avoid\nthis reef upon which Locke had the bad luck to make shipwreck.\n\nThe Leibnizians with their monads have set up an unintelligible\nhypothesis. They have rather spiritualized matter than materialized\nthe soul. How can we define a being whose nature is absolutely unknown\nto us?{2}\n\nDescartes and all the Cartesians, among whom the followers of\nMalebranche have long been numbered, have made the same mistake. They\nhave taken for granted two distinct substances in man, as if they\nhad seen them, and positively counted them.\n\nThe wisest men have declared that the soul can not know itself save by\nthe light of faith. However, as reasonable beings they have thought\nthat they could reserve for themselves the right of examining what\nthe Bible means by the word \"spirit,\" which it uses in speaking of\nthe human soul. And if in their investigation, they do not agree with\nthe theologians on this point, are the theologians more in agreement\namong themselves on all other points?\n\nHere is the result in a few words, of all their reflections. If there\nis a God, He is the Author of nature as well as of revelation. He has\ngiven us the one to explain the other, and reason to make them agree.\n\nTo distrust the knowledge that can be drawn from the study of animated\nbodies, is to regard nature and revelation as two contraries which\ndestroy each the other, and consequently to dare uphold the absurd\ndoctrine, that God contradicts Himself in His various works and\ndeceives us.\n\nIf there is a revelation, it can not then contradict nature. By nature\nonly can we understand the meaning of the words of the Gospel, of which\nexperience is the only true interpreter. In fact, the commentators\nbefore our time have only obscured the truth. We can judge of this\nby the author of the \"Spectacle of Nature.\"{3} \"It is astonishing,\"\nhe says concerning Locke, \"that a man who degrades our soul far\nenough to consider it a soul of clay should dare set up reason as\njudge and sovereign arbiter of the mysteries of faith, for,\" he adds,\n\"what an astonishing idea of Christianity one would have, if one were\nto follow reason.\"\n\nNot only do these reflections fail to elucidate faith, but they also\nconstitute such frivolous objections to the method of those who\nundertake to interpret the Scripture, that I am almost ashamed to\nwaste time in refuting them.\n\nThe excellence of reason does not depend on a big word devoid of\nmeaning (immateriality), but on the force, extent, and perspicuity\nof reason itself. Thus a \"soul of clay\" which should discover,\nat one glance, as it were, the relations and the consequences of\nan infinite number of ideas hard to understand, would evidently be\npreferable to a foolish and stupid soul, though that were composed\nof the most precious elements. A man is not a philosopher because,\nwith Pliny, he blushes over the wretchedness of our origin. What\nseems vile is here the most precious of things, and seems to be the\nobject of nature's highest art and most elaborate care. But as man,\neven though he should come from an apparently still more lowly source,\nwould yet be the most perfect of all beings, so whatever the origin\nof his soul, if it is pure, noble, and lofty, it is a beautiful soul\nwhich dignifies the man endowed with it.\n\nPluche's second way of reasoning seems vicious to me, even in his\nsystem, which smacks a little of fanaticism; for [on his view] if we\nhave an idea of faith as being contrary to the clearest principles,\nto the most incontestable truths, we must yet conclude, out of respect\nfor revelation and its author, that this conception is false, and\nthat we do not yet understand the meaning of the words of the Gospel.\n\nOf the two alternatives, only one is possible: either everything\nis illusion, nature as well as revelation, or experience alone can\nexplain faith. But what can be more ridiculous than the position of\nour author! Can one imagine hearing a Peripatetic say, \"We ought not\nto accept the experiments of Torricelli,{4} for if we should accept\nthem, if we should rid ourselves of the horror of the void, what an\nastonishing philosophy we should have!\"\n\nI have shown how vicious the reasoning of Pluche is [10] in order to\nprove, in the first place, that if there is a revelation, it is not\nsufficiently demonstrated by the mere authority of the Church, and\nwithout any appeal to reason, as all those who fear reason claim: and\nin the second place, to protect against all assault the method of those\nwho would wish to follow the path that I open to them, of interpreting\nsupernatural things, incomprehensible in themselves, in the light\nof those ideas with which nature has endowed us. Experience and\nobservation should therefore be our only guides here. Both are to be\nfound throughout the records of the physicians who were philosophers,\nand not in the works of the philosophers who were not physicians. The\nformer have traveled through and illuminated the labyrinth of man; they\nalone have laid bare to us those springs [of life] hidden under the\nexternal integument which conceals so many wonders from our eyes. They\nalone, tranquilly contemplating our soul, have surprised it, a thousand\ntimes, both in its wretchedness and in its glory, and they have no\nmore despised it in the first estate, than they have admired it in the\nsecond. Thus, to repeat, only the physicians have a right to speak on\nthis subject.{5} What could the others, especially the theologians,\nhave to say? Is it not ridiculous to hear them shamelessly coming to\nconclusions about a subject concerning which they have had no means\nof knowing anything, and from which on the contrary they have been\ncompletely turned aside by obscure studies that have led them to a\nthousand prejudiced opinions,--in a word, to fanaticism, which adds\nyet more to their ignorance of the mechanism of the body?\n\nBut even though we have chosen the best guides, we shall still find\nmany thorns and stumbling blocks in the way.\n\nMan is so complicated a machine{6} that it is impossible to get a\nclear idea of the machine beforehand, and hence impossible to define\nit. For this reason, all the investigations have been vain, which the\ngreatest philosophers have made \u00e0 priori, that is to say, in so far\nas they use, as it were, the wings of the spirit. Thus it is only \u00e0\nposteriori or by trying to disentangle the soul from the organs of\nthe body, so to speak, that one can reach the highest probability\nconcerning man's own nature, even though one can not discover with\ncertainty what his nature is.\n\nLet us then take in our hands the staff of experience,{7} paying no\nheed to the accounts of all the idle theories of philosophers. To be\nblind and to think that one can do without this staff is the worst\nkind of blindness. How truly a contemporary writer says that only\nvanity fails to gather from secondary causes the same lessons as\nfrom primary causes! One can and one even ought to admire all these\nfine geniuses in their most useless works, such men as Descartes,\nMalebranche, Leibniz, Wolff and the rest, but what profit, I ask, has\nany one gained from their profound meditations, and from all their\nworks? Let us start out then to discover not what has been thought,\nbut what must be thought for the sake of repose in life.\n\nThere are as many different minds, different characters, and different\ncustoms, as there are different temperaments. Even Galen{8} knew this\ntruth which Descartes carried so far as to claim that medicine alone\ncan change minds and morals, along with bodies. (By the writer of\n\"L'histoire de l'\u00e2me,\"{9} this teaching is incorrectly attributed to\nHippocrates.{10}) It is true that melancholy, bile, phlegm, blood\netc.--according to the nature, the abundance, and the different\ncombination of these humors--make each man different from another.{11}\n\nIn disease the soul is sometimes hidden, showing no sign of life;\nsometimes it is so inflamed by fury that it seems to be doubled;\nsometimes, imbecility vanishes and the convalescence of an idiot\nproduces a wise man. Sometimes, again, the greatest genius becomes\nimbecile and loses the sense of self. Adieu then to all that fine\nknowledge, acquired at so high a price, and with so much trouble! Here\nis a paralytic who asks if his leg is in bed with him; there is\na soldier who thinks that he still has the arm which has been cut\noff. The memory of his old sensations, and of the place to which they\nwere referred by his soul, is the cause of his illusion, and of this\nkind of delirium. The mere mention of the member which he has lost is\nenough to recall it to his mind, and to make him feel all its motions;\nand this causes him an indefinable and inexpressible kind of imaginary\nsuffering. This man cries like a child at death's approach, while this\nother jests. What was needed to change the bravery of Caius Julius,\nSeneca, or Petronius into cowardice or faintheartedness? Merely\nan obstruction in the spleen, in the liver, an impediment in the\nportal vein? Why? Because the imagination is obstructed along with\nthe viscera, and this gives rise to all the singular phenomena of\nhysteria and hypochondria.\n\nWhat can I add to the stories already told of those who imagine\nthemselves transformed into wolf-men, cocks or vampires, or of those\nwho think that the dead feed upon them? Why should I stop to speak\nof the man who imagines that his nose or some other member is of\nglass? The way to help this man regain his faculties and his own\nflesh-and-blood nose is to advise him to sleep on hay, lest he break\nthe fragile organ, and then to set fire to the hay that he may be\nafraid of being burned--a fear which has sometimes cured paralysis. But\nI must touch lightly on facts which everybody knows.\n\nNeither shall I dwell long on the details of the effects of sleep. Here\na tired soldier snores in a trench, in the middle of the thunder of\nhundreds of cannon. His soul hears nothing; his sleep is as deep as\napoplexy. A bomb is on the point of crushing him. He will feel this\nless perhaps than he feels an insect which is under his foot.\n\nOn the other hand, this man who is devoured by jealousy, hatred,\navarice, or ambition, can never find any rest. The most peaceful spot,\nthe freshest and most calming drinks are alike useless to one who\nhas not freed his heart from the torment of passion.\n\nThe soul and the body fall asleep together. As the motion of the\nblood is calmed, a sweet feeling of peace and quiet spreads through\nthe whole mechanism. The soul feels itself little by little growing\nheavy as the eyelids droop, and loses its tenseness, as the fibres\nof the brain relax; thus little by little it becomes as if paralyzed\nand with it all the muscles of the body. These can no longer sustain\nthe weight of the head, and the soul can no longer bear the burden\nof thought; it is in sleep as if it were not.\n\nIs the circulation too quick? the soul can not sleep. Is the soul\ntoo much excited? the blood can not be quieted: it gallops through\nthe veins with an audible murmur. Such are the two opposite causes\nof insomnia. A single fright in the midst of our dreams makes the\nheart beat at double speed and snatches us from needed and delicious\nrepose, as a real grief or an urgent need would do. Lastly as the\nmere cessation of the functions of the soul produces sleep, there\nare, even when we are awake (or at least when we are half awake),\nkinds of very frequent short naps of the mind, vergers' dreams, which\nshow that the soul does not always wait for the body to sleep. For\nif the soul is not fast asleep, it surely is not far from sleep,\nsince it can not point out a single object to which it has attended,\namong the uncounted number of confused ideas which, so to speak,\nfill the atmosphere of our brains like clouds.\n\nOpium is too closely related to the sleep it produces, to be left\nout of consideration here. This drug intoxicates, like wine, coffee,\netc., each in its own measure and according to the dose.{12} It makes\na man happy in a state which would seemingly be the tomb of feeling,\nas it is the image of death. How sweet is this lethargy! The soul\nwould long never to emerge from it. For the soul has been a prey to\nthe most intense sorrow, but now feels only the joy of suffering past,\nand of sweetest peace. Opium even alters the will, forcing the soul\nwhich wished to wake and to enjoy life, to sleep in spite of itself. I\nshall omit any reference to the effect of poisons.\n\nCoffee, the well-known antidote for wine, by scourging the imagination,\ncures our headaches and scatters our cares without laying up for us,\nas wine does, other headaches for the morrow. But let us contemplate\nthe soul in its other needs.\n\nThe human body is a machine which winds its own springs. It is\nthe living image of perpetual movement. Nourishment keeps up the\nmovements which fever excites. Without food, the soul pines away,\ngoes mad, and dies exhausted. The soul is a taper whose light flares\nup the moment before it goes out. But nourish the body, pour into\nits veins life-giving juices and strong liquors, and then the soul\ngrows strong like them, as if arming itself with a proud courage,\nand the soldier whom water would have made flee, grows bold and runs\njoyously to death to the sound of drums. Thus a hot drink sets into\nstormy movement the blood which a cold drink would have calmed.\n\nWhat power there is in a meal! Joy revives in a sad heart, and infects\nthe souls of comrades, who express their delight in the friendly songs\nin which the Frenchman excels. The melancholy man alone is dejected,\nand the studious man is equally out of place [in such company].\n\nRaw meat makes animals fierce, and it would have the same effect on\nman. This is so true that the English who eat meat red and bloody,\nand not as well done as ours, seem to share more or less in the\nsavagery due to this kind of food, and to other causes which can be\nrendered ineffective by education only. This savagery creates in the\nsoul, pride, hatred, scorn of other nations, indocility and other\nsentiments which degrade the character, just as heavy food makes a\ndull and heavy mind whose usual traits are laziness and indolence.\n\nPope understood well the full power of greediness when he said:{13}\n\n\n    \"Catius is ever moral, ever grave,\n    Thinks who endures a knave is next a knave,\n    Save just at dinner--then prefers no doubt,\n    A rogue with ven'son to a saint without.\"\n\n\nElsewhere he says:\n\n\n    \"See the same man in vigor, in the gout\n    Alone, in company, in place or out,\n    Early at business and at hazard late,\n    Mad at a fox chase, wise at a debate,\n    Drunk at a borough, civil at a ball,\n    Friendly at Hackney, faithless at White Hall.\"\n\n\nIn Switzerland we had a bailiff by the name of M. Steigner de\nWittighofen. When he fasted he was a most upright and even a most\nindulgent judge, but woe to the unfortunate man whom he found on the\nculprit's bench after he had had a large dinner! He was capable of\nsending the innocent like the guilty to the gallows.\n\nWe think we are, and in fact we are, good men, only as we are gay or\nbrave; everything depends on the way our machine is running. One is\nsometimes inclined to say that the soul is situated in the stomach,\nand that Van Helmont,{14} who said that the seat of the soul was in\nthe pylorus, made only the mistake of taking the part for the whole.\n\nTo what excesses cruel hunger can bring us! We no longer regard even\nour own parents and children. We tear them to pieces eagerly and make\nhorrible banquets of them; and in the fury with which we are carried\naway, the weakest is always the prey of the strongest....\n\nOne needs only eyes to see the necessary influence of old age on\nreason. The soul follows the progress of the body, as it does the\nprogress of education. In the weaker sex, the soul accords also with\ndelicacy of temperament, and from this delicacy follow tenderness,\naffection, quick feelings due more to passion than to reason,\nprejudices, and superstitions, whose strong impress can hardly be\neffaced. Man, on the other hand, whose brain and nerves partake of\nthe firmness of all solids, has not only stronger features but also a\nmore vigorous mind. Education, which women lack, strengthens his mind\nstill more. Thus with such help of nature and art, why should not\na man be more grateful, more generous, more constant in friendship,\nstronger in adversity? But, to follow almost exactly the thought of\nthe author of the \"Lettres sur la Physiognomie,\"{15} the sex which\nunites the charms of the mind and of the body with almost all the\ntenderest and most delicate feelings of the heart, should not envy\nus the two capacities which seem to have been given to man, the one\nmerely to enable him better to fathom the allurements of beauty,\nand the other merely to enable him to minister better to its pleasures.\n\nIt is no more necessary to be just as great a physiognomist as this\nauthor, in order to guess the quality of the mind from the countenance\nor the shape of the features, provided these are sufficiently marked,\nthan it is necessary to be a great doctor to recognize a disease\naccompanied by all its marked symptoms. Look at the portraits of Locke,\nof Steele, of Boerhaave,{16} of Maupertuis,{17} and the rest, and\nyou will not be surprised to find strong faces and eagle eyes. Look\nover a multitude of others, and you can always distinguish the man\nof talent from the man of genius, and often even an honest man from\na scoundrel. For example, it has been noticed that a celebrated poet\ncombines (in his portrait) the look of a pickpocket with the fire\nof Prometheus.\n\nHistory provides us with a noteworthy example of the power of\ntemperature. The famous Duke of Guise was so strongly convinced that\nHenry the Third, in whose power he had so often been, would never dare\nassassinate him, that he went to Blois. When the Chancelor Chiverny\nlearned of the duke's departure, he cried, \"He is lost.\" After this\nfatal prediction had been fulfilled by the event, Chiverny was asked\nwhy he made it. \"I have known the king for twenty years,\" said he;\n\"he is naturally kind and even weakly indulgent, but I have noticed\nthat when it is cold, it takes nothing at all to provoke him and send\nhim into a passion.\"\n\nOne nation is of heavy and stupid wit, and another quick, light and\npenetrating. Whence comes this difference, if not in part from the\ndifference in foods, and difference in inheritance, [11] and in part\nfrom the mixture of the diverse elements which float around in the\nimmensity of the void? The mind, like the body, has its contagious\ndiseases and its scurvy.\n\nSuch is the influence of climate, that a man who goes from one climate\nto another, feels the change, in spite of himself. He is a walking\nplant which has transplanted itself; if the climate is not the same,\nit will surely either degenerate or improve.\n\nFurthermore, we catch everything from those with whom we come in\ncontact; their gestures, their accent, etc.; just as the eyelid is\ninstinctively lowered when a blow is foreseen, or as (for the same\nreason) the body of the spectator mechanically imitates, in spite of\nhimself, all the motions of a good mimic.{18}\n\nFrom what I have just said, it follows that a brilliant man is\nhis own best company, unless he can find other company of the same\nsort. In the society of the unintelligent, the mind grows rusty for\nlack of exercise, as at tennis a ball that is served badly is badly\nreturned. I should prefer an intelligent man without an education,\nif he were still young enough, to a man badly educated. A badly\ntrained mind is like an actor whom the provinces have spoiled.\n\nThus, the diverse states of the soul are always correlative with\nthose of the body.{19} But the better to show this dependence, in\nits completeness and its causes, let us here make use of comparative\nanatomy; let us lay bare the organs of man and of animals. How can\nhuman nature be known, if we may not derive any light from an exact\ncomparison of the structure of man and of animals?\n\nIn general, the form and the structure of the brains of quadrupeds\nare almost the same as those of the brain of man; the same shape,\nthe same arrangement everywhere, with this essential difference,\nthat of all the animals man is the one whose brain is largest, and,\nin proportion to its mass, more convoluted than the brain of any\nother animal; then come the monkey, the beaver, the elephant, the\ndog, the fox, the cat. These animals are most like man, for among\nthem, too, one notes the same progressive analogy in relation to\nthe corpus callosum in which Lancisi--anticipating the late M. de la\nPeyronie{20}--established the seat of the soul. The latter, however,\nillustrated the theory by innumerable experiments. Next after all the\nquadrupeds, birds have the largest brains. Fish have large heads,\nbut these are void of sense, like the heads of many men. Fish have\nno corpus callosum, and very little brain, while insects entirely\nlack brain.\n\nI shall not launch out into any more detail about the varieties\nof nature, nor into conjectures concerning them, for there is an\ninfinite number of both, as any one can see by reading no further\nthan the treatises of Willis \"De Cerebro\" and \"De Anima Brutorum.\"{21}\n\nI shall draw the conclusions which follow clearly from these\nincontestable observations: 1st, that the fiercer animals are, the\nless brain they have; 2d, that this organ seems to increase in size\nin proportion to the gentleness of the animal; 3d, that nature seems\nhere eternally to impose a singular condition, that the more one gains\nin intelligence the more one loses in instinct. Does this bring gain\nor loss?\n\nDo not think, however, that I wish to infer by that, that the size\nalone of the brain, is enough to indicate the degree of tameness in\nanimals: the quality must correspond to the quantity, and the solids\nand liquids must be in that due equilibrium which constitutes health.\n\nIf, as is ordinarily observed, the imbecile does not lack brain, his\nbrain will be deficient in its consistency--for instance, in being too\nsoft. The same thing is true of the insane, and the defects of their\nbrains do not always escape our investigation. But if the causes of\nimbecility, insanity, etc., are not obvious, where shall we look for\nthe causes of the diversity of all minds? They would escape the eyes\nof a lynx and of an argus. A mere nothing, a tiny fibre, something\nthat could never be found by the most delicate anatomy, would have\nmade of Erasmus and Fontenelle{22} two idiots, and Fontenelle himself\nspeaks of this very fact in one of his best dialogues.\n\nWillis has noticed in addition to the softness of the brain-substance\nin children, puppies, and birds, that the corpora striata are\nobliterated and discolored in all these animals, and that the\nstriations are as imperfectly formed as in paralytics....\n\nHowever cautious and reserved one may be about the consequences\nthat can be deduced from these observations, and from many others\nconcerning the kind of variation in the organs, nerves, etc.,\n[one must admit that] so many different varieties can not be the\ngratuitous play of nature. They prove at least the necessity for a\ngood and vigorous physical organization, since throughout the animal\nkingdom the soul gains force with the body and acquires keenness,\nas the body gains strength.\n\nLet us pause to contemplate the varying capacity of animals to\nlearn. Doubtless the analogy best framed leads the mind to think\nthat the causes we have mentioned produce all the difference that is\nfound between animals and men, although we must confess that our weak\nunderstanding, limited to the coarsest observations, can not see the\nbonds that exist between cause and effects. This is a kind of harmony\nthat philosophers will never know.\n\nAmong animals, some learn to speak and sing; they remember tunes,\nand strike the notes as exactly as a musician. Others, for instance\nthe ape, show more intelligence, and yet can not learn music. What is\nthe reason for this, except some defect in the organs of speech? But\nis this defect so essential to the structure that it could never be\nremedied? In a word, would it be absolutely impossible to teach the\nape a language?{23} I do not think so.\n\nI should choose a large ape in preference to any other, until by\nsome good fortune another kind should be discovered, more like us,\nfor nothing prevents there being such an one in regions unknown to\nus. The ape resembles us so strongly that naturalists have called it\n\"wild man\" or \"man of the woods.\" I should take it in the condition\nof the pupils of Amman,{24} that is to say, I should not want it to be\ntoo young or too old; for apes that are brought to Europe are usually\ntoo old. I would choose the one with the most intelligent face, and\nthe one which, in a thousand little ways, best lived up to its look of\nintelligence. Finally not considering myself worthy to be his master,\nI should put him in the school of that excellent teacher whom I have\njust named, or with another teacher equally skilful, if there is one.\n\nYou know by Amman's work, and by all those [12] who have interpreted\nhis method, all the wonders he has been able to accomplish for those\nborn deaf. In their eyes he discovered ears, as he himself explains,\nand in how short a time! In short he taught them to hear, speak,\nread, and write. I grant that a deaf person's eyes see more clearly\nand are keener than if he were not deaf, for the loss of one member\nor sense can increase the strength or acuteness of another, but apes\nsee and hear, they understand what they hear and see, and grasp so\nperfectly the signs that are made to them, that I doubt not that they\nwould surpass the pupils of Amman in any other game or exercise. Why\nthen should the education of monkeys be impossible? Why might not\nthe monkey, by dint of great pains, at last imitate after the manner\nof deaf mutes, the motions necessary for pronunciation? I do not\ndare decide whether the monkey's organs of speech, however trained,\nwould be incapable of articulation. But, because of the great analogy\nbetween ape and man{25} and because there is no known animal whose\nexternal and internal organs so strikingly resemble man's, it would\nsurprise me if speech were absolutely impossible to the ape. Locke,\nwho was certainly never suspected of credulity, found no difficulty\nin believing the story told by Sir William Temple{26} in his memoirs,\nabout a parrot which could answer rationally, and which had learned\nto carry on a kind of connected conversation, as we do. I know that\npeople have ridiculed [13] this great metaphysician; but suppose some\none should have announced that reproduction sometimes takes place\nwithout eggs or a female, would he have found many partisans? Yet\nM. Trembley{27} has found cases where reproduction takes place without\ncopulation and by fission. Would not Amman too have passed for mad if\nhe had boasted that he could instruct scholars like his in so short\na time, before he had happily accomplished the feat? His successes\nhave, however, astonished the world; and he, like the author of \"The\nHistory of Polyps,\" has risen to immortality at one bound. Whoever\nowes the miracles that he works to his own genius surpasses, in\nmy opinion, the man who owes his to chance. He who has discovered\nthe art of adorning the most beautiful of the kingdoms [of nature],\nand of giving it perfections that it did not have, should be rated\nabove an idle creator of frivolous systems, or a painstaking author\nof sterile discoveries. Amman's discoveries are certainly of a much\ngreater value; he has freed men from the instinct to which they seemed\nto be condemned, and has given them ideas, intelligence, or in a word,\na soul which they would never have had. What greater power than this!\n\nLet us not limit the resources of nature; they are infinite, especially\nwhen reinforced by great art.\n\nCould not the device which opens the Eustachian canal of the deaf,\nopen that of apes? Might not a happy desire to imitate the master's\npronunciation, liberate the organs of speech in animals that imitate\nso many other signs with such skill and intelligence? Not only do I\ndefy any one to name any really conclusive experiment which proves my\nview impossible and absurd; but such is the likeness of the structure\nand functions of the ape to ours that I have very little doubt that\nif this animal were properly trained he might at last be taught to\npronounce, and consequently to know, a language. Then he would no\nlonger be a wild man, nor a defective man, but he would be a perfect\nman, a little gentleman, with as much matter or muscle as we have,\nfor thinking and profiting by his education.\n\nThe transition from animals to man is not violent, as true philosophers\nwill admit. What was man before the invention of words and the\nknowledge of language?{28} An animal of his own species with much\nless instinct than the others. In those days, he did not consider\nhimself king over the other animals, nor was he distinguished from\nthe ape, and from the rest, except as the ape itself differs from the\nother animals, i. e., by a more intelligent face. Reduced to the bare\nintuitive knowledge of the Leibnizians he saw only shapes and colors,\nwithout being able to distinguish between them: the same, old as young,\nchild at all ages, he lisped out his sensations and his needs, as a\ndog that is hungry or tired of sleeping, asks for something to eat,\nor for a walk.\n\nWords, languages, laws, sciences, and the fine arts have come, and by\nthem finally the rough diamond of our mind has been polished. Man has\nbeen trained in the same way as animals. He has become an author,\nas they became beasts of burden. A geometrician has learned to\nperform the most difficult demonstrations and calculations, as a\nmonkey has learned to take his little hat off and on, and to mount his\ntame dog. All has been accomplished through signs, every species has\nlearned what it could understand, and in this way men have acquired\nsymbolic knowledge, still so called by our German philosophers.\n\nNothing, as any one can see, is so simple as the mechanism of our\neducation. Everything may be reduced to sounds or words that pass from\nthe mouth of one through the ears of another into his brain. At the\nsame moment, he perceives through his eyes the shape of the bodies\nof which these words are the arbitrary signs.\n\nBut who was the first to speak? Who was the first teacher of the\nhuman race? Who invented the means of utilizing the plasticity of our\norganism? I can not answer: the names of these first splendid geniuses\nhave been lost in the night of time. But art is the child of nature,\nso nature must have long preceded it.\n\nWe must think that the men who were the most highly organized, those\non whom nature had lavished her richest gifts, taught the others. They\ncould not have heard a new sound for instance, nor experienced new\nsensations, nor been struck by all the varied and beautiful objects\nthat compose the ravishing spectacle of nature without finding\nthemselves in the state of mind of the deaf man of Chartres, whose\nexperience was first related by the great Fontenelle,{29} when,\nat forty years, he heard for the first time, the astonishing sound\nof bells.\n\nWould it be absurd to conclude from this that the first mortals tried\nafter the manner of this deaf man, or like animals and like mutes\n(another kind of animals), to express their new feelings by motions\ndepending on the nature of their imagination, and therefore afterwards\nby spontaneous sounds, distinctive of each animal, as the natural\nexpression of their surprise, their joy, their ecstasies and their\nneeds? For doubtless those whom nature endowed with finer feeling\nhad also greater facility in expression.\n\nThat is the way in which, I think, men have used their feeling and\ntheir instinct to gain intelligence and then have employed their\nintelligence to gain knowledge. Those are the ways, so far as I can\nunderstand them, in which men have filled the brain with the ideas,\nfor the reception of which nature made it. Nature and man have helped\neach other; and the smallest beginnings have, little by little,\nincreased, until everything in the universe could be as easily\ndescribed as a circle.\n\nAs a violin string or a harpsichord key vibrates and gives forth sound,\nso the cerebral fibres, struck by waves of sound, are stimulated to\nrender or repeat the words that strike them. And as the structure\nof the brain is such that when eyes well formed for seeing, have\nonce perceived the image of objects, the brain can not help seeing\ntheir images and their differences, so when the signs of these\ndifferences have been traced or imprinted in the brain, the soul\nnecessarily examines their relations--an examination that would have\nbeen impossible without the discovery of signs or the invention of\nlanguage. At the time when the universe was almost dumb, the soul's\nattitude toward all objects was that of a man without any idea of\nproportion toward a picture or a piece of sculpture, in which he could\ndistinguish nothing; or the soul was like a little child (for the\nsoul was then in its infancy) who, holding in his hand small bits of\nstraw or wood, sees them in a vague and superficial way without being\nable to count or distinguish them. But let some one attach a kind of\nbanner, or standard, to this bit of wood (which perhaps is called a\nmast), and another banner to another similar object; let the first\nbe known by the symbol 1, and the second by the symbol or number 2,\nthen the child will be able to count the objects, and in this way he\nwill learn all of arithmetic. As soon as one figure seems equal to\nanother in its numerical sign, he will decide without difficulty that\nthey are two different bodies, that 1 + 1 make 2, and 2 + 2 make 4,\n[14] etc.\n\nThis real or apparent likeness of figures is the fundamental basis of\nall truths and of all we know. Among these sciences, evidently those\nwhose signs are less simple and less sensible are harder to understand\nthan the others, because more talent is required to comprehend and\ncombine the immense number of words by which such sciences express\nthe truths in their province. On the other hand, the sciences that\nare expressed by numbers or by other small signs, are easily learned;\nand without doubt this facility rather than its demonstrability is\nwhat has made the fortune of algebra.\n\nAll this knowledge, with which vanity fills the balloon-like brains of\nour proud pedants, is therefore but a huge mass of words and figures,\nwhich form in the brain all the marks by which we distinguish and\nrecall objects. All our ideas are awakened after the fashion in which\nthe gardener who knows plants recalls all stages of their growth at\nsight of them. These words and the objects designated by them are\nso connected in the brain that it is comparatively rare to imagine\na thing without the name or sign that is attached to it.\n\nI always use the word \"imagine,\" because I think that everything is\nthe work of imagination, and that all the faculties of the soul can be\ncorrectly reduced to pure imagination in which they all consist.{30}\nThus judgment, reason, and memory are not absolute parts of the soul,\nbut merely modifications of this kind of medullary screen upon which\nimages of the objects painted in the eye are projected as by a magic\nlantern.\n\nBut if such is the marvelous and incomprehensible result of the\nstructure of the brain, if everything is perceived and explained\nby imagination, why should we divide the sensitive principle which\nthinks in man? Is not this a clear inconsistency in the partisans\nof the simplicity of the mind? For a thing that is divided can no\nlonger without absurdity be regarded as indivisible. See to what one is\nbrought by the abuse of language and by those fine words (spirituality,\nimmateriality, etc.) used haphazard and not understood even by the\nmost brilliant.{31}\n\nNothing is easier than to prove a system based, as this one is, on\nthe intimate feeling and personal experience of each individual. If\nthe imagination, or, let us say, that fantastic part of the brain\nwhose nature is as unknown to us as its way of acting, be naturally\nsmall or weak, it will hardly be able to compare the analogy or the\nresemblance of its ideas, it will be able to see only what is face\nto face with it, or what affects it very strongly; and how will it\nsee all this! Yet it is always imagination which apperceives, and\nimagination which represents to itself all objects along with their\nnames and symbols; and thus, once again, imagination is the soul,\nsince it plays all the r\u00f4les of the soul. By the imagination, by its\nflattering brush, the cold skeleton of reason takes on living and ruddy\nflesh, by the imagination the sciences flourish, the arts are adorned,\nthe wood speaks, the echoes sigh, the rocks weep, marble breathes, and\nall inanimate objects gain life. It is imagination again which adds\nthe piquant charm of voluptuousness to the tenderness of an amorous\nheart; which makes tenderness bud in the study of the philosopher\nand of the dusty pedant, which, in a word, creates scholars as well\nas orators and poets. Foolishly decried by some, vainly praised by\nothers, and misunderstood by all; it follows not only in the train\nof the graces and of the fine arts, it not only describes, but can\nalso measure nature. It reasons, judges, analyzes, compares, and\ninvestigates. Could it feel so keenly the beauties of the pictures\ndrawn for it, unless it discovered their relations? No, just as it can\nnot turn its thoughts on the pleasures of the senses, without enjoying\ntheir perfection or their voluptuousness, it can not reflect on what\nit has mechanically conceived, without thus being judgment itself.\n\nThe more the imagination or the poorest talent is exercised, the\nmore it gains in embonpoint, so to speak, and the larger it grows. It\nbecomes sensitive, robust, broad, and capable of thinking. The best\nof organisms has need of this exercise.\n\nMan's preeminent advantage is his organism.{32} In vain all writers\nof books on morals fail to regard as praiseworthy those qualities\nthat come by nature, esteeming only the talents gained by dint of\nreflection and industry. For whence come, I ask, skill, learning,\nand virtue, if not from a disposition that makes us fit to become\nskilful, wise and virtuous? And whence again, comes this disposition,\nif not from nature? Only through nature do we have any good qualities;\nto her we owe all that we are. Why then should I not esteem men with\ngood natural qualities as much as men who shine by acquired and as\nit were borrowed virtues? Whatever the virtue may be, from whatever\nsource it may come, it is worthy of esteem; the only question is,\nhow to estimate it. Mind, beauty, wealth, nobility, although the\nchildren of chance, all have their own value, as skill, learning and\nvirtue have theirs. Those upon whom nature has heaped her most costly\ngifts should pity those to whom these gifts have been refused; but,\nin their character of experts, they may feel their superiority without\npride. A beautiful woman would be as foolish to think herself ugly,\nas an intelligent man to think himself a fool. An exaggerated modesty\n(a rare fault, to be sure) is a kind of ingratitude towards nature. An\nhonest pride, on the contrary, is the mark of a strong and beautiful\nsoul, revealed by manly features moulded by feeling.\n\nIf one's organism is an advantage, and the preeminent advantage,\nand the source of all others, education is the second. The best made\nbrain would be a total loss without it, just as the best constituted\nman would be but a common peasant, without knowledge of the ways of\nthe world. But, on the other hand, what would be the use of the most\nexcellent school, without a matrix perfectly open to the entrance and\nconception of ideas? It is ... impossible to impart a single idea to\na man deprived of all his senses....\n\nBut if the brain is at the same time well organized and well educated,\nit is a fertile soil, well sown, that brings forth a hundredfold\nwhat it has received: or (to leave the figures of speech often\nneeded to express what one means, and to add grace to truth itself)\nthe imagination, raised by art to the rare and beautiful dignity\nof genius, apprehends exactly all the relations of the ideas it has\nconceived, and takes in easily an astounding number of objects, in\norder to deduce from them a long chain of consequences, which are\nagain but new relations, produced by a comparison with the first,\nto which the soul finds a perfect resemblance. Such is, I think, the\ngeneration of intelligence.{33} I say \"finds\" as I before gave the\nepithet \"apparent\" to the likeness of objects, not because I think that\nour senses are always deceivers, as Father Malebranche has claimed,\nor that our eyes, naturally a little unsteady, fail to see objects as\nthey are in themselves, (though microscopes prove this to us every\nday) but in order to avoid any dispute with the Pyrrhonians,{34}\namong whom Bayle{35} is well known.\n\nI say of truth in general what M. de Fontenelle says of certain\ntruths in particular, that we must sacrifice it in order to remain\non good terms with society. And it accords with the gentleness of\nmy character, to avoid all disputes unless to whet conversation. The\nCartesians would here in vain make an onset upon me with their innate\nideas. I certainly would not give myself a quarter of the trouble\nthat M. Locke took, to attack such chimeras. In truth, what is the\nuse of writing a ponderous volume to prove a doctrine which became\nan axiom three thousand years ago?\n\nAccording to the principles which we have laid down, and which we\nconsider true; he who has the most imagination should be regarded\nas having the most intelligence or genius, for all these words are\nsynonymous; and again, only by a shameful abuse [of terms] do we\nthink that we are saying different things, when we are merely using\ndifferent words, different sounds, to which no idea or real distinction\nis attached.\n\nThe finest, greatest, or strongest imagination is then the one most\nsuited to the sciences as well as to the arts. I do not pretend to say\nwhether more intellect is necessary to excel in the art of Aristotle\nor of Descartes than to excel in that of Euripides or of Sophocles,\nand whether nature has taken more trouble to make Newton than to make\nCorneille, though I doubt this. But it is certain that imagination\nalone, differently applied, has produced their diverse triumphs and\ntheir immortal glory.\n\nIf one is known as having little judgment and much imagination, this\nmeans that the imagination has been left too much alone, has, as it\nwere, occupied most of the time in looking at itself in the mirror of\nits sensations, has not sufficiently formed the habit of examining the\nsensations themselves attentively. [It means that the imagination] has\nbeen more impressed by images than by their truth or their likeness.\n\nTruly, so quick are the responses of the imagination that if attention,\nthat key or mother of the sciences, does not do its part, imagination\ncan do little more than run over and skim its objects.\n\nSee that bird on the bough: it seems always ready to fly\naway. Imagination is like the bird, always carried onward by the\nturmoil of the blood and the animal spirits. One wave leaves a mark,\neffaced by the one that follows; the soul pursues it, often in vain:\nit must expect to regret the loss of that which it has not quickly\nenough seized and fixed. Thus, imagination, the true image of time,\nis being ceaselessly destroyed and renewed.\n\nSuch is the chaos and the continuous quick succession of our\nideas: they drive each other away even as one wave yields to\nanother. Therefore, if imagination does not, as it were, use one set\nof its muscles to maintain a kind of equilibrium with the fibres of\nthe brain, to keep its attention for a while upon an object that is on\nthe point of disappearing, and to prevent itself from contemplating\nprematurely another object--[unless the imagination does all this],\nit will never be worthy of the fine name of judgment. It will express\nvividly what it has perceived in the same fashion: it will create\norators, musicians, painters, poets, but never a single philosopher. On\nthe contrary, if the imagination be trained from childhood to bridle\nitself and to keep from being carried away by its own impetuosity--an\nimpetuosity which creates only brilliant enthusiasts--and to check,\nto restrain, its ideas, to examine them in all their aspects in\norder to see all sides of an object, then the imagination, ready in\njudgment, will comprehend the greatest possible sphere of objects,\nthrough reasoning; and its vivacity (always so good a sign in children,\nand only needing to be regulated by study and training) will be only\na far-seeing insight without which little progress can be made in\nthe sciences.\n\nSuch are the simple foundations upon which the edifice of logic has\nbeen reared. Nature has built these foundations for the whole human\nrace, but some have used them, while others have abused them.\n\nIn spite of all these advantages of man over animals, it is doing him\nhonor to place him in the same class. For, truly, up to a certain\nage, he is more of an animal than they, since at birth he has less\ninstinct. What animal would die of hunger in the midst of a river of\nmilk? Man alone. Like that child of olden time to whom a modern writer,\nrefers, following Arnobius,{36} he knows neither the foods suitable for\nhim, nor the water that can drown him, nor the fire that can reduce him\nto ashes. Light a wax candle for the first time under a child's eyes,\nand he will mechanically put his fingers in the flame as if to find\nout what is the new thing that he sees. It is at his own cost that\nhe will learn of the danger, but he will not be caught again. Or,\nput the child with an animal on a precipice, the child alone falls\noff; he drowns where the animal would save itself by swimming. At\nfourteen or fifteen years the child knows hardly anything of the\ngreat pleasures in store for him, in the reproduction of his species;\nwhen he is a youth, he does not know exactly how to behave in a game\nwhich nature teaches animals so quickly. He hides himself as if he\nwere ashamed of taking pleasure, and of having been made to be happy,\nwhile animals frankly glory in being cynics. Without education, they\nare without prejudices. For one more example, let us observe a dog and\na child who have lost their master on a highway: the child cries and\ndoes not know to what saint to pray, while the dog, better helped by\nhis sense of smell than the child by his reason, soon finds his master.\n\nThus nature made us to be lower than animals or at least to exhibit all\nthe more, because of that native inferiority, the wonderful efficacy\nof education which alone raises us from the level of the animals\nand lifts us above them. But shall we grant this same distinction to\nthe deaf and to the blind, to imbeciles, madmen, or savages, or to\nthose who have been brought up in the woods with animals; to those\nwho have lost their imagination through melancholia, or in short to\nall those animals in human form who give evidence of only the rudest\ninstinct? No, all these, men of body but not of mind, do not deserve\nto be classed by themselves.\n\nWe do not intend to hide from ourselves the arguments that can\nbe brought forward against our belief and in favor of a primitive\ndistinction between men and animals. Some say that there is in man\na natural law, a knowledge of good and evil, which has never been\nimprinted on the heart of animals.\n\nBut is this objection, or rather this assertion, based on\nobservation? Any assertion unfounded on observation may be rejected by\na philosopher. Have we ever had a single experience which convinces\nus that man alone has been enlightened by a ray denied all other\nanimals? If there is no such experience, we can no more know what\ngoes on in animals' minds or even in the minds of other men, than\nwe can help feeling what affects the inner part of our own being. We\nknow that we think, and feel remorse--an intimate feeling forces us to\nrecognize this only too well; but this feeling in us is insufficient to\nenable us to judge the remorse of others. That is why we have to take\nothers at their word, or judge them by the sensible and external signs\nwe have noticed in ourselves when we experienced the same accusations\nof conscience and the same torments.\n\nIn order to decide whether animals which do not talk have received the\nnatural law, we must, therefore, have recourse to those signs to which\nI have just referred, if any such exist. The facts seem to prove it. A\ndog that bit the master who was teasing it, seemed to repent a minute\nafterwards; it looked sad, ashamed, afraid to show itself, and seemed\nto confess its guilt by a crouching and downcast air. History offers\nus a famous example of a lion which would not devour a man abandoned\nto its fury, because it recognized him as its benefactor. How much\nmight it be wished that man himself always showed the same gratitude\nfor kindnesses, and the same respect for humanity! Then we should no\nlonger fear either ungrateful wretches, or wars which are the plague\nof the human race and the real executioners of the natural law.\n\nBut a being to which nature has given such a precocious and enlightened\ninstinct, which judges, combines, reasons, and deliberates as far\nas the sphere of its activity extends and permits, a being which\nfeels attachment because of benefits received, and which leaving a\nmaster who treats it badly goes to seek a better one, a being with\na structure like ours, which performs the same acts, has the same\npassions, the same griefs, the same pleasures, more or less intense\naccording to the sway of the imagination and the delicacy of the\nnervous organization--does not such a being show clearly that it\nknows its faults and ours, understands good and evil, and in a word,\nhas consciousness of what it does? Would its soul, which feels the\nsame joys, the same mortification and the same discomfiture which we\nfeel, remain utterly unmoved by disgust when it saw a fellow-creature\ntorn to bits, or when it had itself pitilessly dismembered this\nfellow-creature? If this be granted, it follows that the precious gift\nnow in question would not have been denied to animals: for since they\nshow us sure signs of repentance, as well as of intelligence, what\nis there absurd in thinking that beings, almost as perfect machines\nas ourselves, are, like us, made to understand and to feel nature?\n\nLet no one object that animals, for the most part, are savage\nbeasts, incapable of realizing the evil that they do; for do all men\ndiscriminate better between vice and virtue? There is ferocity in our\nspecies as well as in theirs. Men who are in the barbarous habit of\nbreaking the natural law are not tormented as much by it, as those who\ntransgress it for the first time, and who have not been hardened by\nthe force of habit. The same thing is true of animals as of men--both\nmay be more or less ferocious in temperament, and both become more\nso by living with others like themselves. But a gentle and peaceful\nanimal which lives among other animals of the same disposition and of\ngentle nurture, will be an enemy of blood and carnage; it will blush\ninternally at having shed blood. There is perhaps this difference,\nthat since among animals everything is sacrificed to their needs, to\ntheir pleasures, to the necessities of life, which they enjoy more\nthan we, their remorse apparently should not be as keen as ours,\nbecause we are not in the same state of necessity as they. Custom\nperhaps dulls and perhaps stifles remorse as well as pleasures.\n\nBut I will suppose for a moment that I am utterly mistaken in\nconcluding that almost all the world holds a wrong opinion on this\nsubject, while I alone am right. I will grant that animals, even\nthe best of them, do not know the difference between moral good and\nevil, that they have no recollection of the trouble taken for them,\nof the kindness done them, no realization of their own virtues. [I\nwill suppose], for instance, that this lion, to which I, like so many\nothers, have referred, does not remember at all that it refused to\nkill the man, abandoned to its fury, in a combat more inhuman than\none could find among lions, tigers and bears, put together. For our\ncompatriots fight, Swiss against Swiss, brother against brother,\nrecognize each other, and yet capture and kill each other without\nremorse, because a prince pays for the murder. I suppose in short\nthat the natural law has not been given animals. What will be the\nconsequences of this supposition? Man is not moulded from a costlier\nclay; nature has used but one dough, and has merely varied the\nleaven. Therefore if animals do not repent for having violated this\ninmost feeling which I am discussing, or rather if they absolutely\nlack it, man must necessarily be in the same condition. Farewell\nthen to the natural law and all the fine treatises published about\nit! The whole animal kingdom in general would be deprived of it. But,\nconversely, if man can not dispense with the belief that when health\npermits him to be himself, he always distinguishes the upright, humane,\nand virtuous, from those who are not humane, virtuous, nor honorable:\nthat it is easy to tell vice from virtue, by the unique pleasure and\nthe peculiar repugnance that seem to be their natural effects, it\nfollows that animals, composed of the same matter, lacking perhaps\nonly one degree of fermentation to make it exactly like man's,\nmust share the same prerogatives of animal nature, and that thus\nthere exists no soul or sensitive substance without remorse.{37}\nThe following consideration will reinforce these observations.\n\nIt is impossible to destroy the natural law. The impress of it on\nall animals is so strong, that I have no doubt that the wildest and\nmost savage have some moments of repentance. I believe that that\ncruel maid of Chalons in Champagne must have sorrowed for her crime,\nif she really ate her sister. I think that the same thing is true\nof all those who commit crimes, even involuntary or temperamental\ncrimes: true of Gaston of Orleans who could not help stealing; of a\ncertain woman who was subject to the same crime when pregnant, and\nwhose children inherited it; of the woman who, in the same condition,\nate her husband; of that other woman who killed her children, salted\ntheir bodies, and ate a piece of them every day, as a little relish;\nof that daughter of a thief and cannibal who at twelve years followed\nin his steps, although she had been orphaned when she was a year old,\nand had been brought up by honest people; to say nothing of many other\nexamples of which the records of our observers are full, all of them\nproving that there are a thousand hereditary vices and virtues which\nare transmitted from parents to children as those of the foster mother\npass to the children she nurses. Now, I believe and admit that these\nwretches do not for the most part feel at the time the enormity of\ntheir actions. Bulimia, or canine hunger, for example, can stifle\nall feeling; it is a mania of the stomach that one is compelled to\nsatisfy, but what remorse must be in store for those women, when they\ncome to themselves and grow sober, and remember the crimes they have\ncommitted against those they held most dear! What a punishment for\nan involuntary crime which they could not resist, of which they had\nno consciousness whatever! However, this is apparently not enough\nfor the judges. For of these women, of whom I tell, one was cruelly\nbeaten and burned, and another was buried alive. I realize all that\nis demanded by the interest of society. But doubtless it is much to\nbe wished that excellent physicians might be the only judges. They\nalone could tell the innocent criminal from the guilty. If reason is\nthe slave of a depraved or mad desire, how can it control the desire?\n\nBut if crime carries with it its own more or less cruel punishment,\nif the most continued and most barbarous habit can not entirely blot\nout repentance in the crudest hearts, if criminals are lacerated by the\nvery memory of their deeds, why should we frighten the imagination of\nweak minds, by a hell, by specters, and by precipices of fire even less\nreal than those of Pascal? [15] Why must we have recourse to fables, as\nan honest pope once said himself, to torment even the unhappy wretches\nwho are executed, because we do not think that they are sufficiently\npunished by their own conscience, their first executioner? I do\nnot mean to say that all criminals are unjustly punished; I only\nmaintain that those whose will is depraved, and whose conscience is\nextinguished, are punished enough by their remorse when they come to\nthemselves, a remorse, I venture to assert, from which nature should in\nthis case have delivered unhappy souls dragged on by a fatal necessity.\n\nCriminals, scoundrels, ingrates, those in short without natural\nfeelings, unhappy tyrants who are unworthy of life, in vain take\na cruel pleasure in their barbarity, for there are calm moments of\nreflection in which the avenging conscience arises, testifies against\nthem, and condemns them to be almost ceaselessly torn to pieces at\ntheir own hands. Whoever torments men is tormented by himself; and\nthe sufferings that he will experience will be the just measure of\nthose that he has inflicted.\n\nOn the other hand, there is so much pleasure in doing good, in\nrecognizing and appreciating what one receives, so much satisfaction\nin practising virtue, in being gentle, humane, kind, charitable,\ncompassionate and generous (for this one word includes all the\nvirtues), that I consider as sufficiently punished any one who is\nunfortunate enough not to have been born virtuous.\n\nWe were not originally made to be learned; we have become so perhaps\nby a sort of abuse of our organic faculties, and at the expense of\nthe State which nourishes a host of sluggards whom vanity has adorned\nwith the name of philosophers. Nature has created us all solely to be\nhappy{38}--yes, all of us from the crawling worm to the eagle lost\nin the clouds. For this cause she has given all animals some share\nof natural law, a share greater or less according to the needs of\neach animal's organs when in normal condition.\n\nNow how shall we define natural law? It is a feeling that teaches us\nwhat we should not do, because we would not wish it to be done to\nus. Should I dare add to this common idea, that this feeling seems\nto me but a kind of fear or dread, as salutary to the race as to the\nindividual; for may it not be true that we respect the purse and life\nof others only to save our own possessions, our honor, and ourselves;\nlike those Ixions of Christianity{39} who love God and embrace so\nmany fantastic virtues, merely because they are afraid of hell!\n\nYou see that natural law is but an intimate feeling that,\nlike all other feelings (thought included), belongs also to\nimagination. Evidently, therefore, natural law does not presuppose\neducation, revelation, nor legislator,--provided one does not propose\nto confuse natural law with civil laws, in the ridiculous fashion of\nthe theologians.\n\nThe arms of fanaticism may destroy those who support these truths,\nbut they will never destroy the truths themselves.\n\nI do not mean to call in question the existence of a supreme being;\non the contrary it seems to me that the greatest degree of probability\nis in favor of this belief. But since the existence of this being goes\nno further than that of any other toward proving the need of worship,\nit is a theoretic truth with very little practical value. Therefore,\nsince we may say, after such long experience, that religion does not\nimply exact honesty, we are authorized by the same reasons to think\nthat atheism does not exclude it.\n\nFurthermore, who can be sure that the reason for man's existence\nis not simply the fact that he exists?{40} Perhaps he was thrown by\nchance on some spot on the earth's surface, nobody knows how nor why,\nbut simply that he must live and die, like the mushrooms which appear\nfrom day to day, or like those flowers which border the ditches and\ncover the walls.\n\nLet us not lose ourselves in the infinite, for we are not made to have\nthe least idea thereof, and are absolutely unable to get back to the\norigin of things. Besides it does not matter for our peace of mind,\nwhether matter be eternal or have been created, whether there be or\nbe not a God. How foolish to torment ourselves so much about things\nwhich we can not know, and which would not make us any happier even\nwere we to gain knowledge about them!\n\nBut, some will say, read all such works as those of F\u00e9nelon,{41} of\nNieuwentyt,{42} of Abadie,{43} of Derham,{44} of Rais,{45} and the\nrest. Well! what will they teach me or rather what have they taught\nme? They are only tiresome repetitions of zealous writers, one of\nwhom adds to the other only verbiage, more likely to strengthen than\nto undermine the foundations of atheism. The number of the evidences\ndrawn from the spectacle of nature does not give these evidences any\nmore force. Either the mere structure of a finger, of an ear, of an\neye, a single observation of Malpighi{46} proves all, and doubtless\nmuch better than Descartes and Malebranche proved it, or all the\nother evidences prove nothing. Deists,{47} and even Christians, should\ntherefore be content to point out that throughout the animal kingdom\nthe same aims are pursued and accomplished by an infinite number of\ndifferent mechanisms, all of them however exactly geometrical. For what\nstronger weapons could there be with which to overthrow atheists? It\nis true that if my reason does not deceive me, man and the whole\nuniverse seem to have been designed for this unity of aim. The sun,\nair, water, the organism, the shape of bodies,--everything is brought\nto a focus in the eye as in a mirror that faithfully presents to the\nimagination all the objects reflected in it, in accordance with the\nlaws required by the infinite variety of bodies which take part in\nvision. In ears we find everywhere a striking variety, and yet the\ndifference of structure in men, animals, birds, and fishes, does not\nproduce different uses. All ears are so mathematically made, that\nthey tend equally to one and the same end, namely, hearing. But would\nChance, the deist asks, be a great enough geometrician to vary thus,\nat pleasure, the works of which she is supposed to be the author,\nwithout being hindered by so great a diversity from gaining the\nsame end? Again, the deist will bring forward as a difficulty those\nparts of the animal that are clearly contained in it for future use,\nthe butterfly in the caterpillar, man in the sperm, a whole polyp in\neach of its parts, the valvule in the oval orifice, the lungs in the\nfoetus, the teeth in their sockets, the bones in the fluid from which\nthey detach themselves and (in an incomprehensible manner) harden. And\nsince the partisans of this theory, far from neglecting anything that\nwould strengthen it, never tire of piling up proof upon proof, they\nare willing to avail themselves of everything, even of the weakness\nof the mind in certain cases. Look, they say, at men like Spinoza,\nVanini,{48} Desbarreau,{49} and Boindin,{50} apostles who honor deism\nmore than they harm it. The duration of their health was the measure\nof their unbelief, and one rarely fails, they add, to renounce atheism\nwhen the passions, with their instrument, the body, have grown weak.\n\nThat is certainly the most that can be said in favor of the\nexistence of God: although the last argument is frivolous in that\nthese conversions are short, and the mind almost always regains its\nformer opinions and acts accordingly, as soon as it has regained or\nrather rediscovered its strength in that of the body. That is, at\nleast, much more than was said by the physician Diderot,{51} in his\n\"Pens\u00e9es Philosophiques,\" a sublime work that will not convince a\nsingle atheist. What reply can, in truth, be made to a man who says,\n\"We do not know nature; causes hidden in her breast might have produced\neverything. In your turn, observe the polyp of Trembley:{52} does it\nnot contain in itself the causes which bring about regeneration? Why\nthen would it be absurd to think that there are physical causes by\nreason of which everything has been made, and to which the whole chain\nof this vast universe is so necessarily bound and held that nothing\nwhich happens, could have failed to happen,{53}--causes, of which we\nare so invincibly ignorant that we have had recourse to a God, who, as\nsome aver, is not so much as a logical entity? Thus to destroy chance\nis not to prove the existence of a supreme being, since there may be\nsome other thing which is neither chance nor God--I mean, nature. It\nfollows that the study of nature can make only unbelievers; and the\nway of thinking of all its more successful investigators proves this.\"\n\nThe weight of the universe therefore far from crushing a real atheist\ndoes not even shake him. All these evidences of a creator, repeated\nthousands and thousands of times, evidences that are placed far above\nthe comprehension of men like us, are self-evident (however far one\npush the argument) only to the anti-Pyrrhonians,{54} or to those who\nhave enough confidence in their reason to believe themselves capable of\njudging on the basis of certain phenomena, against which, as you see,\nthe atheists can urge others perhaps equally strong and absolutely\nopposed. For if we listen to the naturalists again, they will tell\nus that the very causes which, in a chemist's hands, by a chance\ncombination, made the first mirror, in the hands of nature made the\npure water, the mirror of the simple shepherdess; that the motion which\nkeeps the world going could have created it, that each body has taken\nthe place assigned to it by its own nature, that the air must have\nsurrounded the earth, and that iron and the other metals are produced\nby internal motions of the earth, for one and the same reason; that\nthe sun is as much a natural product as electricity, that it was not\nmade to warm the earth and its inhabitants, whom it sometimes burns,\nany more than the rain was made to make the seeds grow, which it often\nspoils; that the mirror and the water were no more made for people to\nsee themselves in, than were all other polished bodies with this same\nproperty; that the eye is in truth a kind of glass in which the soul\ncan contemplate the image of objects as they are presented to it by\nthese bodies, but that it is not proved that this organ was really made\nexpressly for this contemplation, nor purposely placed in its socket,\nand in short that it may well be that Lucretius,{55} the physician\nLamy,{56} and all Epicureans both ancient and modern were right when\nthey suggested that the eye sees only because it is formed and placed\nas it is,{57} and that, given once for all, the same rules of motion\nfollowed by nature in the generation and development of bodies,\nthis marvelous organ could not have been formed and placed differently.\n\nSuch is the pro and the con, and the summary of those fine arguments\nthat will eternally divide the philosophers. I do not take either side.\n\n\n    \"Non nostrum inter vos tantas componere lites.\"{58}\n\n\nThis is what I said to one of my friends, a Frenchman, as frank a\nPyrronian as I, a man of much merit, and worthy of a better fate. He\ngave me a very singular answer in regard to the matter. \"It is true,\"\nhe told me, \"that the pro and con should not disturb at all the soul of\na philosopher, who sees that nothing is proved with clearness enough\nto force his consent, and that the arguments offered on one side\nare neutralized by those of the other. However,\" he continued, \"the\nuniverse will never be happy, unless it is atheistic.\"{59} Here are\nthis wretch's reasons. If atheism, said he, were generally accepted,\nall the forms of religion would then be destroyed and cut off at the\nroots. No more theological wars, no more soldiers of religion--such\nterrible soldiers! Nature infected with a sacred poison, would regain\nits rights and its purity. Deaf to all other voices, tranquil mortals\nwould follow only the spontaneous dictates of their own being the\nonly commands which can never be despised with impunity and which\nalone can lead us to happiness through the pleasant paths of virtue.\n\nSuch is natural law: whoever rigidly observes it is a good man and\ndeserves the confidence of all the human race. Whoever fails to follow\nit scrupulously affects, in vain, the specious exterior of another\nreligion; he is a scamp or a hypocrite whom I distrust.\n\nAfter this, let a vain people think otherwise, let them dare affirm\nthat even probity is at stake in not believing in revelation,\nin a word that another religion than that of nature is necessary,\nwhatever it may be. Such an assertion is wretched and pitiable;\nand so is the good opinion which each one gives us of the religion\nhe has embraced! We do not seek here the votes of the crowd. Whoever\nraises in his heart altars to superstition, is born to worship idols\nand not to thrill to virtue.\n\nBut since all the faculties of the soul depend to such a degree\non the proper organization of the brain and of the whole body,\nthat apparently they are but this organization itself, the soul is\nclearly an enlightened machine. For finally, even if man alone had\nreceived a share of natural law, would he be any less a machine for\nthat? A few more wheels, a few more springs than in the most perfect\nanimals, the brain proportionally nearer the heart and for this very\nreason receiving more blood--any one of a number of unknown causes\nmight always produce this delicate conscience so easily wounded, this\nremorse which is no more foreign to matter than to thought, and in a\nword all the differences that are supposed to exist here. Could the\norganism then suffice for everything? Once more, yes; since thought\nvisibly develops with our organs, why should not the matter of which\nthey are composed be susceptible of remorse also, when once it has\nacquired, with time, the faculty of feeling?\n\nThe soul is therefore but an empty word, of which no one has any\nidea, and which an enlightened man should use only to signify the\npart in us that thinks.{60} Given the least principle of motion,\nanimated bodies will have all that is necessary for moving, feeling,\nthinking, repenting, or in a word for conducting themselves in the\nphysical realm, and in the moral realm which depends upon it.\n\nYet we take nothing for granted; those who perhaps think that all the\ndifficulties have not yet been removed shall now read of experiments\nthat will completely satisfy them.\n\n1. The flesh of all animals palpitates after death. This palpitation\ncontinues longer, the more cold blooded the animal is and the less\nit perspires. Tortoises, lizards, serpents, etc. are evidence of this.\n\n2. Muscles separated from the body contract when they are stimulated.\n\n3. The intestines keep up their peristaltic or vermicular motion for\na long time.\n\n4. According to Cowper,{61} a simple injection of hot water reanimates\nthe heart and the muscles.\n\n5. A frog's heart moves for an hour or more after it has been removed\nfrom the body, especially when exposed to the sun or better still when\nplaced on a hot table or chair. If this movement seems totally lost,\none has only to stimulate the heart, and that hollow muscle beats\nagain. Harvey{62} made this same observation on toads.\n\n6. Bacon of Verulam{63} in his treatise \"Sylva Sylvarum\" cites the\ncase of a man convicted of treason, who was opened alive, and whose\nheart thrown into hot water leaped several times, each time less high,\nto the perpendicular height of two feet.\n\n7. Take a tiny chicken still in the egg, cut out the heart and you\nwill observe the same phenomena as before, under almost the same\nconditions. The warmth of the breath alone reanimates an animal about\nto perish in the air pump.\n\nThe same experiments, which we owe to Boyle{64} and to St\u00e9non,{65}\nare made on pigeons, dogs, and rabbits. Pieces of their hearts beat\nas their whole hearts would. The same movements can be seen in paws\nthat have been cut off from moles.\n\n8. The caterpillar, the worm, the spider, the fly, the eel--all exhibit\nthe same phenomena; and in hot water, because of the fire it contains,\nthe movement of the detached parts increases.\n\n9. A drunken soldier cut off with one stroke of his sabre an Indian\nrooster's head. The animal remained standing, then walked, and ran:\nhappening to run against a wall, it turned around, beat its wings\nstill running, and finally fell down. As it lay on the ground, all the\nmuscles of this rooster kept on moving. That is what I saw myself,\nand almost the same phenomena can easily be observed in kittens or\npuppies with their heads cut off.\n\n10. Polyps do more than move after they have been cut in pieces. In a\nweek they regenerate to form as many animals as there are pieces. I\nam sorry that these facts speak against the naturalists' system of\ngeneration; or rather I am very glad of it, for let this discovery\nteach us never to reach a general conclusion even on the ground of\nall known (and most decisive) experiments.\n\nHere we have many more facts than are needed to prove, in an\nincontestable way, that each tiny fibre or part of an organized\nbody moves by a principle which belongs to it. Its activity, unlike\nvoluntary motions, does not depend in any way on the nerves, since\nthe movements in question occur in parts of the body which have no\nconnection with the circulation. But if this force is manifested even\nin sections of fibres the heart, which is a composite of peculiarly\nconnected fibres, must possess the same property. I did not need\nBacon's story to persuade me of this. It was easy for me to come to\nthis conclusion, both from the perfect analogy of the structure of the\nhuman heart with that of animals, and also from the very bulk of the\nhuman heart, in which this movement escapes our eyes only because it is\nsmothered, and finally because in corpses all the organs are cold and\nlifeless. If executed criminals were dissected while their bodies are\nstill warm, we should probably see in their hearts the same movements\nthat are observed in the face-muscles of those that have been beheaded.\n\nThe motive principle of the whole body, and even of its parts cut in\npieces, is such that it produces not irregular movements, as some have\nthought, but very regular ones, in warm blooded and perfect animals\nas well as in cold and imperfect ones. No resource therefore remains\nopen to our adversaries but to deny thousands and thousands of facts\nwhich every man can easily verify.\n\nIf now any one ask me where is this innate force in our bodies,\nI answer that it very clearly resides in what the ancients called\nthe parenchyma, that is to say, in the very substance of the organs\nnot including the veins, the arteries, the nerves, in a word, that it\nresides in the organization of the whole body, and that consequently\neach organ contains within itself forces more or less active according\nto the need of them.\n\nLet us now go into some detail concerning these springs of the human\nmachine. All the vital, animal, natural, and automatic motions are\ncarried on by their action. Is it not in a purely mechanical way\nthat the body shrinks back when it is struck with terror at the\nsight of an unforeseen precipice, that the eyelids are lowered at\nthe menace of a blow, as some have remarked, and that the pupil\ncontracts in broad daylight to save the retina, and dilates to see\nobjects in darkness? Is it not by mechanical means that the pores\nof the skin close in winter so that the cold can not penetrate to\nthe interior of the blood vessels, and that the stomach vomits when\nit is irritated by poison, by a certain quantity of opium and by all\nemetics, etc.? that the heart, the arteries and the muscles contract\nin sleep as well as in waking hours, that the lungs serve as bellows\ncontinually in exercise, ... that the heart contracts more strongly\nthan any other muscle?{66}...\n\nI shall not go into any more detail concerning all these little\nsubordinate forces, well known to all. But there is another more\nsubtle and marvelous force, which animates them all; it is the source\nof all our feelings, of all our pleasures, of all our passions, and\nof all our thoughts: for the brain has its muscles for thinking,\nas the legs have muscles for walking.{67} I wish to speak of this\nimpetuous principle that Hippocrates calls enorm\u00f4n (soul). This\nprinciple exists and has its seat in the brain at the origin of the\nnerves, by which it exercises its control over all the rest of the\nbody. By this fact is explained all that can be explained, even to\nthe surprising effects of maladies of the imagination....\n\nLook at the portrait of the famous Pope who is, to say the least,\nthe Voltaire of the English. The effort, the energy of his genius are\nimprinted upon his countenance. It is convulsed. His eyes protrude\nfrom their sockets, the eyebrows are raised with the muscles of the\nforehead. Why? Because the brain is in travail and all the body must\nshare in such a laborious deliverance. If there were not an internal\ncord which pulled the external ones, whence would come all these\nphenomena? To admit a soul as explanation of them, is to be reduced to\n[explaining phenomena by] the operations of the Holy Spirit.\n\nIn fact, if what thinks in my brain is not a part of this organ and\ntherefore of the whole body, why does my blood boil, and the fever of\nmy mind pass into my veins, when lying quietly in bed, I am forming\nthe plan of some work or carrying on an abstract calculation? Put\nthis question to men of imagination, to great poets, to men who are\nenraptured by the felicitous expression of sentiment, and transported\nby an exquisite fancy or by the charms of nature, of truth, or of\nvirtue! By their enthusiasm, by what they will tell you they have\nexperienced, you will judge the cause by its effects; by that harmony\nwhich Borelli,{68} a mere anatomist, understood better than all the\nLeibnizians, you will comprehend the material unity of man. In short,\nif the nerve-tension which causes pain occasions also the fever by\nwhich the distracted mind loses its will-power, and if, conversely,\nthe mind too much excited, disturbs the body (and kindles that inner\nfire which killed Bayle while he was still so young); if an agitation\nrouses my desire and my ardent wish for what, a moment ago, I cared\nnothing about, and if in their turn certain brain impressions excite\nthe same longing and the same desires, then why should we regard as\ndouble what is manifestly one being? In vain you fall back on the\npower of the will, since for one order that the will gives, it bows a\nhundred times to the yoke.{69} And what wonder that in health the body\nobeys, since a torrent of blood and of animal spirits{70} forces its\nobedience, and since the will has as ministers an invisible legion of\nfluids swifter than lightning and ever ready to do its bidding! But\nas the power of the will is exercised by means of the nerves, it is\nlikewise limited by them.....\n\nDoes the result of jaundice surprise you? Do you not know that the\ncolor of bodies depends on the color of the glasses through which\nwe look at them,{71} and that whatever is the color of the humors,\nsuch is the color of objects, at least for us, vain playthings of a\nthousand illusions? But remove this color from the aqueous humor of\nthe eye, let the bile flow through its natural filter, then the soul\nhaving new eyes, will no longer see yellow. Again, is it not thus, by\nremoving cataract, or by injecting the Eustachian canal, that sight\nis restored to the blind, or hearing to the deaf? How many people,\nwho were perhaps only clever charlatans, passed for miracle workers\nin the dark ages! Beautiful the soul, and powerful the will which\ncan not act save by permission of the bodily conditions, and whose\ntastes change with age and fever! Should we, then, be astonished\nthat philosophers have always had in mind the health of the body,\nto preserve the health of the soul, that Pythagoras{72} gave rules\nfor the diet as carefully as Plato forbade wine?{73} The regime\nsuited to the body is always the one with which sane physicians\nthink they must begin, when it is a question of forming the mind,\nand of instructing it in the knowledge of truth and virtue; but\nthese are vain words in the disorder of illness, and in the tumult\nof the senses. Without the precepts of hygiene, Epictetus, Socrates,\nPlato, and the rest preach in vain: all ethics is fruitless for one\nwho lacks his share of temperance; it is the source of all virtues,\nas intemperance is the source of all vices.\n\nIs more needed, (for why lose myself in discussion of the passions\nwhich are all explained by the term, enorm\u00f4n, of Hippocrates) to prove\nthat man is but an animal, or a collection of springs which wind each\nother up, without our being able to tell at what point in this human\ncircle, nature has begun? If these springs differ among themselves,\nthese differences consist only in their position and in their degrees\nof strength, and never in their nature; wherefore the soul is but\na principle of motion or a material and sensible part of the brain,\nwhich can be regarded, without fear of error, as the mainspring of\nthe whole machine, having a visible influence on all the parts. The\nsoul seems even to have been made for the brain, so that all the other\nparts of the system are but a kind of emanation from the brain. This\nwill appear from certain observations, made on different embryos,\nwhich I shall now enumerate.\n\nThis oscillation, which is natural or suited to our machine, and with\nwhich each fibre and even each fibrous element, so to speak, seems\nto be endowed, like that of a pendulum, can not keep up forever. It\nmust be renewed, as it loses strength, invigorated when it is tired,\nand weakened when it is disturbed by excess of strength and vigor. In\nthis alone, true medicine consists.\n\nThe body is but a watch, whose watchmaker is the new chyle. Nature's\nfirst care, when the chyle enters the blood, is to excite in it a\nkind of fever{74} which the chemists, who dream only of retorts, must\nhave taken for fermentation. This fever produces a greater filtration\nof spirits, which mechanically animate the muscles and the heart,\nas if they had been sent there by order of the will.\n\nThese then are the causes or the forces of life which thus sustain for\na hundred years that perpetual movement of the solids and the liquids\nwhich is as necessary to the first as to the second. But who can say\nwhether the solids contribute more than the fluids to this movement or\nvice versa? All that we know is that the action of the former would\nsoon cease without the help of the latter, that is, without the help\nof the fluids which by their onset rouse and maintain the elasticity\nof the blood vessels on which their own circulation depends. From this\nit follows that after death the natural resilience of each substance\nis still more or less strong according to the remnants of life which\nit outlives, being the last to perish. So true is it that this force\nof the animal parts can be preserved and strengthened by that of\nthe circulation, but that it does not depend on the strength of the\ncirculation, since, as we have seen, it can dispense with even the\nintegrity of each member or organ.\n\nI am aware that this opinion has not been relished by all scholars,\nand that Stahl especially had much scorn for it. This great chemist\nhas wished to persuade us that the soul is the sole cause of all our\nmovements. But this is to speak as a fanatic and not as a philosopher.\n\nTo destroy the hypothesis of Stahl,{75} we need not make as great an\neffort as I find that others have done before me. We need only glance\nat a violinist. What flexibility, what lightness in his fingers! The\nmovements are so quick, that it seems almost as if there were no\nsuccession. But I pray, or rather I challenge, the followers of\nStahl who understand so perfectly all that our soul can do, to\ntell me how it could possibly execute so many motions so quickly,\nmotions, moreover, which take place so far from the soul, and in so\nmany different places. That is to suppose that a flute player could\nplay brilliant cadences on an infinite number of holes that he could\nnot know, and on which he could not even put his finger!\n\nBut let us say with M. Hecquet{76} that all men may not go to\nCorinth.{77} Why should not Stahl have been even more favored by nature\nas a man than as a chemist and a practitioner? Happy mortal, he must\nhave received a soul different from that of the rest of mankind,--a\nsovereign soul, which, not content with having some control over\nthe voluntary muscles, easily held the reins of all the movements\nof the body, and could suspend them, calm them, or excite them,\nat its pleasure! With so despotic a mistress, in whose hands were,\nin a sense, the beating of the heart, and the laws of circulation,\nthere could certainly be no fever, no pain, no weariness,...! The\nsoul wills, and the springs play, contract or relax. But how did the\nsprings of Stahl's machine get out of order so soon? He who has in\nhimself so great a doctor, should be immortal.\n\nMoreover, Stahl is not the only one who has rejected the principle\nof the vibration of organic bodies. Greater minds have not used\nthe principle when they wished to explain the action of the heart,\n... etc. One need only read the \"Institutions of Medicine\" by\nBoerhaave{78} to see what laborious and enticing systems this great\nman was obliged to invent, by the labor of his mighty genius, through\nfailure to admit that there is so wonderful a force in all bodies.\n\nWillis{79} and Perrault,{80} minds of a more feeble stamp, but careful\nobservers of nature (whereas nature was known to the famous Leyden\nprofessor only through others and second hand, so to speak) seem to\nhave preferred to suppose a soul generally extended over the whole\nbody, instead of the principle which we are describing. But according\nto this hypothesis (which was the hypothesis of Vergil and of all\nEpicureans, an hypothesis which the history of the polyp might seem\nat first sight to favor) the movements which go on after the death of\nthe subject in which they inhere are due to a remnant of soul still\nmaintained by the parts that contract, though, from the moment of\ndeath, these are not excited by the blood and the spirits. Whence it\nmay be seen that these writers, whose solid works easily eclipse all\nphilosophic fables, are deceived only in the manner of those who have\nendowed matter with the faculty of thinking, I mean to say, by having\nexpressed themselves badly in obscure and meaningless terms. In\ntruth, what is this remnant of a soul, if it is not the \"moving\nforce\" of the Leibnizians (badly rendered by such an expression),\nwhich however Perrault in particular has really foreseen. See his\n\"Treatise on the Mechanism of Animals.\"\n\nNow that it is clearly proved against the Cartesians, the followers of\nStahl, the Malebranchists, and the theologians who little deserve to be\nmentioned here, that matter is self-moved,{81} not only when organized,\nas in a whole heart, for example, but even when this organization has\nbeen destroyed, human curiosity would like to discover how a body,\nby the fact that it is originally endowed with the breath of life,\nfinds itself adorned in consequence with the faculty of feeling,\nand thus with that of thought. And, heavens, what efforts have not\nbeen made by certain philosophers to manage to prove this! and what\nnonsense on this subject I have had the patience to read!\n\nAll that experience teaches us is that while movement persists, however\nslight it may be, in one or more fibres, we need only stimulate them\nto re-excite and animate this movement almost extinguished. This has\nbeen shown in the host of experiments with which I have undertaken\nto crush the systems. It is therefore certain that motion and feeling\nexcite each other in turn, both in a whole body and in the same body\nwhen its structure is destroyed, to say nothing of certain plants which\nseem to exhibit the same phenomena of the union of feeling and motion.\n\nBut furthermore, how many excellent philosophers have shown that\nthought is but a faculty of feeling, and that the reasonable soul\nis but the feeling soul engaged in contemplating its ideas and in\nreasoning! This would be proved by the fact alone that when feeling\nis stifled, thought also is checked, for instance in apoplexy, in\nlethargy, in catalepsis, etc. For it is ridiculous to suggest that,\nduring these stupors, the soul keeps on thinking, even though it does\nnot remember the ideas that it has had.\n\nAs to the development of feeling and motion, it is absurd to waste\ntime seeking for its mechanism. The nature of motion is as unknown\nto us as that of matter.{82} How can we discover how it is produced\nunless, like the author of \"The History of the Soul,\" we resuscitate\nthe old and unintelligible doctrine of substantial forms? I am then\nquite as content not to know how inert and simple matter becomes\nactive and highly organized, as not to be able to look at the sun\nwithout red glasses; and I am as little disquieted concerning the\nother incomprehensible wonders of nature, the production of feeling\nand of thought in a being which earlier appeared to our limited eyes\nas a mere clod of clay.\n\nGrant only that organized matter is endowed with a principle of motion,\nwhich alone differentiates it from the inorganic (and can one deny\nthis in the face of the most incontestable observation?) and that\namong animals, as I have sufficiently proved, everything depends\nupon the diversity of this organization: these admissions suffice\nfor guessing the riddle of substances and of man. It [thus] appears\nthat there is but one [type of organization] in the universe, and\nthat man is the most perfect [example]. He is to the ape, and to the\nmost intelligent animals, as the planetary pendulum of Huyghens{83}\nis to a watch of Julien Leroy.{84} More instruments, more wheels and\nmore springs were necessary to mark the movements of the planets than\nto mark or strike the hours; and Vaucanson,{85} who needed more skill\nfor making his flute player than for making his duck, would have needed\nstill more to make a talking man, a mechanism no longer to be regarded\nas impossible, especially in the hands of another Prometheus. In like\nfashion, it was necessary that nature should use more elaborate art\nin making and sustaining a machine which for a whole century could\nmark all motions of the heart and of the mind; for though one does\nnot tell time by the pulse, it is at least the barometer of the warmth\nand the vivacity by which one may estimate the nature of the soul. I\nam right! The human body is a watch, a large watch constructed with\nsuch skill and ingenuity, that if the wheel which marks the seconds\nhappens to stop, the minute wheel turns and keeps on going its round,\nand in the same way the quarter-hour wheel, and all the others go\non running when the first wheels have stopped because rusty or,\nfor any reason, out of order. Is it not for a similar reason that\nthe stoppage of a few blood vessels is not enough to destroy or\nsuspend the strength of the movement which is in the heart as in the\nmainspring of the machine; since, on the contrary, the fluids whose\nvolume is diminished, having a shorter road to travel, cover the\nground more quickly, borne on as by a fresh current which the energy\nof the heart increases in proportion to the resistance it encounters\nat the ends of the blood-vessels? And is not this the reason why the\nloss of sight (caused by the compression of the optic nerve and by\nits ceasing to convey the images of objects) no more hinders hearing,\nthan the loss of hearing (caused by obstruction of the functions of the\nauditory nerve) implies the loss of sight? In the same way, finally,\ndoes not one man hear (except immediately after his attack) without\nbeing able to say that he hears, while another who hears nothing, but\nwhose lingual nerves are uninjured in the brain, mechanically tells\nof all the dreams which pass through his mind? These phenomena do not\nsurprise enlightened physicians at all. They know what to think about\nman's nature, and (more accurately to express myself in passing) of two\nphysicians, the better one and the one who deserves more confidence is\nalways, in my opinion, the one who is more versed in the physique or\nmechanism of the human body, and who, leaving aside the soul and all\nthe anxieties which this chimera gives to fools and to ignorant men,\nis seriously occupied only in pure naturalism.\n\nTherefore let the pretended M. Charp deride philosophers who have\nregarded animals as machines. How different is my view! I believe\nthat Descartes would be a man in every way worthy of respect, if,\nborn in a century that he had not been obliged to enlighten, he had\nknown the value of experiment and observation, and the danger of\ncutting loose from them. But it is none the less just for me to make\nan authentic reparation to this great man for all the insignificant\nphilosophers--poor jesters, and poor imitators of Locke--who instead\nof laughing impudently at Descartes, might better realize that without\nhim the field of philosophy, like the field of science without Newton,\nmight perhaps be still uncultivated.\n\nThis celebrated philosopher, it is true, was much deceived, and no\none denies that. But at any rate he understood animal nature, he was\nthe first to prove completely that animals are pure machines.{86}\nAnd after a discovery of this importance demanding so much sagacity,\nhow can we without ingratitude fail to pardon all his errors!\n\nIn my eyes, they are all atoned for by that great confession. For after\nall, although he extols the distinctness of the two substances, this\nis plainly but a trick of skill, a ruse of style, to make theologians\nswallow a poison, hidden in the shade of an analogy which strikes\neverybody else and which they alone fail to notice. For it is this,\nthis strong analogy, which forces all scholars and wise judges to\nconfess that these proud and vain beings, more distinguished by their\npride than by the name of men however much they may wish to exalt\nthemselves, are at bottom only animals and machines which, though\nupright, go on all fours. They all have this marvelous instinct, which\nis developed by education into mind, and which always has its seat\nin the brain, (or for want of that when it is lacking or hardened, in\nthe medulla oblongata) and never in the cerebellum; for I have often\nseen the cerebellum injured, and other observers [16] have found it\nhardened, when the soul has not ceased to fulfil its functions.\n\nTo be a machine, to feel, to think, to know how to distinguish good\nfrom bad, as well as blue from yellow, in a word, to be born with\nan intelligence and a sure moral instinct, and to be but an animal,\nare therefore characters which are no more contradictory, than to\nbe an ape or a parrot and to be able to give oneself pleasure.... I\nbelieve that thought is so little incompatible with organized matter,\nthat it seems to be one of its properties on a par with electricity,\nthe faculty of motion, impenetrability, extension, etc.\n\nDo you ask for further observations? Here are some which are\nincontestable and which all prove that man resembles animals perfectly,\nin his origin as well as in all the points in which we have thought\nit essential to make the comparison....\n\nLet us observe man both in and out of his shell, let us examine young\nembryos of four, six, eight or fifteen days with a microscope; after\nthat time our eyes are sufficient. What do we see? The head alone;\na little round egg with two black points which mark the eyes. Before\nthat, everything is formless, and one sees only a medullary pulp,\nwhich is the brain, in which are formed first the roots of the nerves,\nthat is, the principle of feeling, and the heart, which already\nwithin this substance has the power of beating of itself; it is the\npunctum saliens of Malpighi, which perhaps already owes a part of its\nexcitability to the influence of the nerves. Then little by little, one\nsees the head lengthen from the neck, which, in dilating, forms first\nthe thorax inside which the heart has already sunk, there to become\nstationary; below that is the abdomen which is divided by a partition\n(the diaphragm). One of these enlargements of the body forms the arms,\nthe hands, the fingers, the nails, and the hair; the other forms the\nthighs, the legs, the feet, etc., which differ only in their observed\nsituation, and which constitute the support and the balancing pole of\nthe body. The whole process is a strange sort of growth, like that\nof plants. On the tops of our heads is hair in place of which the\nplants have leaves and flowers; everywhere is shown the same luxury\nof nature, and finally the directing principle of plants is placed\nwhere we have our soul, that other quintessence of man.\n\nSuch is the uniformity of nature, which we are beginning to realize;\nand the analogy of the animal with the vegetable kingdom, of man with\nplant. Perhaps there even are animal plants, which in vegetating,\neither fight as polyps do, or perform other functions characteristic\nof animals....\n\nWe are veritable moles in the field of nature; we achieve little more\nthan the mole's journey and it is our pride which prescribes limits\nto the limitless. We are in the position of a watch that should say\n(a writer of fables would make the watch a hero in a silly tale):\n\"I was never made by that fool of a workman, I who divide time, who\nmark so exactly the course of the sun, who repeat aloud the hours\nwhich I mark! No! that is impossible!\" In the same way, we disdain,\nungrateful wretches that we are, this common mother of all kingdoms,\nas the chemists say. We imagine, or rather we infer, a cause superior\nto that to which we owe all, and which truly has wrought all things\nin an inconceivable fashion. No; matter contains nothing base, except\nto the vulgar eyes which do not recognize her in her most splendid\nworks; and nature is no stupid workman. She creates millions of men,\nwith a facility and a pleasure more intense than the effort of a\nwatchmaker in making the most complicated watch. Her power shines\nforth equally in creating the lowliest insect and in creating the\nmost highly developed man; the animal kingdom costs her no more than\nthe vegetable, and the most splendid genius no more than a blade\nof wheat. Let us then judge by what we see of that which is hidden\nfrom the curiosity of our eyes and of our investigations, and let\nus not imagine anything beyond. Let us observe the ape, the beaver,\nthe elephant, etc., in their operations. If it is clear that these\nactivities can not be performed without intelligence, why refuse\nintelligence to these animals? And if you grant them a soul, you are\nlost, you fanatics! You will in vain say that you assert nothing about\nthe nature of the animal soul and that you deny its immortality. Who\ndoes not see that this is a gratuitous assertion; who does not see that\nthe soul of an animal must be either mortal or immortal, whichever\nours [is], and that it must therefore undergo the same fate as ours,\nwhatever that may be, and that thus [in admitting that animals have\nsouls], you fall into Scylla in the effort to avoid Charybdis?\n\nBreak the chain of your prejudices, arm yourselves with the torch\nof experience, and you will render to nature the honor she deserves,\ninstead of inferring anything to her disadvantage, from the ignorance\nin which she has left you. Only open wide your eyes, only disregard\nwhat you can not understand, and you will see that the ploughman whose\nintelligence and ideas extend no further than the bounds of his furrow,\ndoes not differ essentially from the greatest genius,--a truth which\nthe dissection of Descartes's and of Newton's brains would have proved;\nyou will be persuaded that the imbecile and the fool are animals with\nhuman faces, as the intelligent ape is a little man in another shape;\nin short, you will learn that since everything depends absolutely on\ndifference of organization, a well constructed animal which has studied\nastronomy, can predict an eclipse, as it can predict recovery or death\nwhen it has used its genius and its clearness of vision, for a time,\nin the school of Hippocrates and at the bedside of the sick. By this\nline of observations and truths, we come to connect the admirable\npower of thought with matter, without being able to see the links,\nbecause the subject of this attribute is essentially unknown to us.\n\nLet us not say that every machine or every animal perishes altogether\nor assumes another form after death, for we know absolutely nothing\nabout the subject. On the other hand, to assert that an immortal\nmachine is a chimera or a logical fiction, is to reason as absurdly\nas caterpillars would reason if, seeing the cast-off skins of their\nfellow-caterpillars, they should bitterly deplore the fate of their\nspecies, which to them would seem to come to nothing. The soul of these\ninsects (for each animal has his own) is too limited to comprehend\nthe metamorphoses of nature. Never one of the most skilful among them\ncould have imagined that it was destined to become a butterfly. It\nis the same with us. What more do we know of our destiny than of our\norigin? Let us then submit to an invincible ignorance on which our\nhappiness depends.\n\nHe who so thinks will be wise, just, tranquil about his fate, and\ntherefore happy. He will await death without either fear or desire, and\nwill cherish life (hardly understanding how disgust can corrupt a heart\nin this place of many delights); he will be filled with reverence,\ngratitude, affection, and tenderness for nature, in proportion to his\nfeeling of the benefits he has received from nature; he will be happy,\nin short, in feeling nature, and in being present at the enchanting\nspectacle of the universe, and he will surely never destroy nature\neither in himself or in others. More than that! Full of humanity,\nthis man will love human character even in his enemies. Judge how he\nwill treat others. He will pity the wicked without hating them; in his\neyes, they will be but mis-made men. But in pardoning the faults of the\nstructure of mind and body, he will none the less admire the beauties\nand the virtues of both. Those whom nature shall have favored will\nseem to him to deserve more respect than those whom she has treated in\nstepmotherly fashion. Thus, as we have seen, natural gifts, the source\nof all acquirements, gain from the lips and heart of the materialist,\nthe homage which every other thinker unjustly refuses them. In short,\nthe materialist, convinced, in spite of the protests of his vanity,\nthat he is but a machine or an animal, will not maltreat his kind,\nfor he will know too well the nature of those actions, whose humanity\nis always in proportion to the degree of the analogy proved above\n[between human beings and animals]; and following the natural law\ngiven to all animals, he will not wish to do to others what he would\nnot wish them to do to him.\n\nLet us then conclude boldly that man is a machine, and that in\nthe whole universe there is but a single substance differently\nmodified. This is no hypothesis set forth by dint of a number of\npostulates and assumptions; it is not the work of prejudice, nor even\nof my reason alone; I should have disdained a guide which I think to\nbe so untrustworthy, had not my senses, bearing a torch, so to speak,\ninduced me to follow reason by lighting the way themselves. Experience\nhas thus spoken to me in behalf of reason; and in this way I have\ncombined the two.\n\nBut it must have been noticed that I have not allowed myself even the\nmost vigorous and immediately deduced reasoning, except as a result\nof a multitude of observations which no scholar will contest; and\nfurthermore, I recognize only scholars as judges of the conclusions\nwhich I draw from the observations; and I hereby challenge every\nprejudiced man who is neither anatomist, nor acquainted with the\nonly philosophy which can here be considered, that of the human\nbody. Against so strong and solid an oak, what could the weak reeds of\ntheology, of metaphysics, and of the schools, avail,--childish arms,\nlike our parlor foils, that may well afford the pleasure of fencing,\nbut can never wound an adversary. Need I say that I refer to the empty\nand trivial notions, to the pitiable and trite arguments that will be\nurged (as long as the shadow of prejudice or of superstition remains\non earth) for the supposed incompatibility of two substances which\nmeet and move each other unceasingly? Such is my system, or rather\nthe truth, unless I am much deceived. It is short and simple. Dispute\nit now who will.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n                    THE NATURAL HISTORY OF THE SOUL.\n\n                     BY JEAN OFFRAY DE LA METTRIE.\n\n                               EXTRACTS.\n\n\nCHAPTER II. CONCERNING MATTER.\n\n\nAll philosophers who have examined attentively the nature of matter,\nconsidered in itself, independently of all the forms which constitute\nbodies, have discovered in this substance, diverse properties\nproceeding from an absolutely unknown essence. Such are, (1) the\ncapacity of taking on different forms, which are produced in matter\nitself, by which matter can acquire moving force and the faculty of\nfeeling; (2) actual extension, which these philosophers have rightly\nrecognized as an attribute, but not as the essence, of matter.\n\nHowever, there have been some, among others Descartes, who have\ninsisted on reducing the essence of matter to simple extension,\nand on limiting all the properties of matter to those of extension;\nbut this opinion has been rejected by all other modern philosophers,\n... so that the power of acquiring moving force, and the faculty\nof feeling as well as that of extension, have been from all time\nconsidered as essential properties{87} of matter.\n\nAll the diverse properties that are observed in this unknown principle\ndemonstrate a being in which these same properties exist, a being\nwhich must therefore exist through itself. But we can not conceive,\nor rather it seems impossible, that a being which exists through\nitself should be able neither to create nor to annihilate itself. It\nis evident that only the forms to which its essential properties\nmake it susceptible can be destroyed and reproduced in turn. Thus,\ndoes experience force us to confess that nothing can come from nothing.\n\nAll philosophers who have not known the light of faith, have thought\nthat this substantial principle of bodies has existed and will exist\nforever, and that the elements of matter have an indestructible\nsolidity which forbids the fear that the world is going to fall to\npieces. The majority of Christian philosophers also recognize that the\nsubstantial principle of bodies exists necessarily through itself,\nand that the power of beginning or ending does not accord with its\nnature. One finds that this view is upheld by an author of the last\ncentury who taught theology in Paris.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III. CONCERNING THE EXTENSION OF MATTER.\n\n\nAlthough we have no idea of the essence of matter, we can not refuse to\nadmit the existence of the properties which our senses discover in it.\n\nI open my eyes, and I see around me only matter, or the\nextended. Extension is then a property which always belongs to all\nmatter, which can belong to matter alone, and which therefore is\ninseparable from the substance of matter.\n\nThis property presupposes three dimensions in the substance of bodies,\nlength, width, and depth. Truly, if we consult our knowledge, which is\ngained entirely from the senses, we cannot conceive of matter, or the\nsubstance of bodies, without having the idea of a being which is at\nthe same time long, broad, and deep; because the idea of these three\ndimensions is necessarily bound up with our idea of every magnitude\nor quantity.\n\nThose philosophers who have meditated most concerning matter do not\nunderstand by the extension of this substance, a solid extension\ncomposed of distinct parts, capable of resistance. Nothing is united,\nnothing is divided in this extension; for there must be a force which\nseparates to divide, and another force to unite the divided parts. But\nin the opinion of these physical philosophers matter has no actually\nactive force, because every force can come only from movement, or from\nsome impulse or tendency toward movement, and they recognize in matter,\nstripped of all form by abstraction, only a potential moving force.\n\nThis theory is hard to conceive, but given its principles, it is\nrigorously true in its consequences. It is one of those algebraic\ntruths which is more readily believed than conceived by the mind.\n\nThe extension of matter is then but a metaphysical extension, which\naccording to the idea of these very philosophers, presents nothing to\naffect our senses. They rightly think that only solid extension can\nmake an impression on our senses. It thus seems to us that extension\nis an attribute which constitutes part of the metaphysical form,\nbut we are far from thinking that extension constitutes its essence.\n\nHowever, before Descartes, some of the ancients made the essence of\nmatter consist in solid extension. But this opinion, of which all the\nCartesians have made much, has at all times been victoriously combated\nby clear reasons, which we will set forth later, for order demands that\nwe first examine to what the properties of extension can be reduced.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V. CONCERNING THE MOVING FORCE OF MATTER.\n\n\nThe ancients, persuaded that there is no body without a moving\nforce, regarded the substance of bodies as composed of two primitive\nattributes. It was held that, through one of these attributes, this\nsubstance has the capacity for moving and, through the other, the\ncapacity for being moved.{88} As a matter of fact, it is impossible\nnot to conceive these two attributes in every moving body, namely,\nthe thing which moves, and the same thing which is moved.\n\nIt has just been said that formerly the name, matter, was given to\nthe substance of bodies, in so far as it is susceptible of being\nmoved. When capable of moving this same matter was known by the name\nof \"active principle\".... But these two attributes seem to depend so\nessentially on each other that Cicero, in order better to state this\nessential and primitive union of matter with its moving principle,\nsays that each is found in the other. This expresses very well the\nidea of the ancients.\n\nFrom this it is clear that modern writers have given us but an inexact\nidea of matter in attempting (through a confusion ill understood)\nto give this name to the substance of bodies. For, once more, matter,\nor the passive principle of the substance of bodies, constitutes only\none part of this substance. Thus it is not surprising that these\nmodern thinkers have not discovered in matter moving force and the\nfaculty of feeling.\n\nIt should now be evident at the first glance, it seems to me, that\nif there is an active principle it must have, in the unknown essence\nof matter, another source than extension. This proves that simple\nextension fails to give an adequate idea of the complete essence or\nmetaphysical form of the substance of bodies, and that this failure is\ndue solely to the fact that extension excludes the idea of any activity\nin matter. Therefore, if we demonstrate this moving principle, if we\nshow that matter, far from being as indifferent as it is supposed\nto be, to movement and to rest, ought to be regarded as an active,\nas well as a passive substance, what resource can be left to those\nwho have made its essence consist in extension?\n\nThe two principles of which we have just spoken, extension and moving\nforce, are then but potentialities of the substance of bodies; for\nin the same way in which this substance is susceptible of movement,\nwithout actually being moved, it also has always, even when it is\nnot moving itself, the faculty of spontaneous motion.\n\nThe ancients have rightly noticed that this moving force acts in the\nsubstance of bodies only when the substance is manifested in certain\nforms; they have also observed that the different motions which it\nproduces are all subject to these different forms or regulated by\nthem. That is why the forms, through which the substance of bodies\ncan not only move, but also move in different ways, were called\nmaterial forms.\n\nOnce these early masters had cast their eyes on all the phenomena\nof nature, they discovered in the substance of bodies, the power\nof self-movement. In fact, this substance either moves itself, or\nwhen it is in motion, the motion is communicated to it by another\nsubstance. But can anything be seen in this substance, save the\nsubstance itself in action; and if sometimes it seems to receive a\nmotion that it has not, does it receive that motion from any cause\nother than this same kind of substance, whose parts act the one upon\nthe other?\n\nIf, then, one infers another agent, I ask what agent, and I demand\nproofs of its existence. But since no one has the least idea of such\nan agent, it is not even a logical entity. Therefore it is clear\nthat the ancients must have easily recognized an intrinsic force of\nmotion within the substance of bodies, since in fact it is impossible\nto prove or conceive any other substance acting upon it.\n\nDescartes, a genius made to blaze new paths and to go astray in them,\nsupposed with some other philosophers that God is the only efficient\ncause of motion, and that every instant He communicates motion to all\nbodies. But this opinion is but an hypothesis which he tried to adjust\nto the light of faith; and in so doing he was no longer attempting\nto speak as a philosopher or to philosophers. Above all he was not\naddressing those who can be convinced only by the force of evidence.\n\nThe Christian Scholastics of the last centuries have felt the full\nforce of this reflection; for this reason they have wisely limited\nthemselves to purely philosophic knowledge concerning the motion of\nmatter, although they might have shown that God Himself said that He\nhad \"imprinted an active principle in the elements of matter (Gen. i;\nIs. lxvi).\"\n\nOne might here make up a long list of authorities, and take from the\nmost celebrated professors the substance of the doctrine of all the\nrest; but it is clear enough, without a medley of citations, that\nmatter contains this moving force which animates it, and which is\nthe immediate cause of all the laws of motion.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI. CONCERNING THE SENSITIVE FACULTY OF MATTER.\n\n\nWe have spoken of two essential attributes of matter, upon which\ndepend the greater number of its properties, namely extension and\nmoving force. We have now but to prove a third attribute: I mean the\nfaculty of feeling which the philosophers of all centuries have found\nin this same substance. I say all philosophers, although I am not\nignorant of all the efforts which the Cartesians have made, in vain,\nto rob matter of this faculty. But in order to avoid insurmountable\ndifficulties, they have flung themselves into a labyrinth from which\nthey have thought to escape by this absurd system \"that animals are\npure machines.\"{89}\n\nAn opinion so absurd has never gained admittance among philosophers,\nexcept as the play of wit or as a philosophical pastime. For this\nreason we shall not stop to refute it. Experience gives us no less\nproof of the faculty of feeling in animals than of feeling in men....\n\nThere comes up another difficulty which more nearly concerns our\nvanity: namely, the impossibility of our conceiving this property as a\ndependence or attribute of matter. Let it not be forgotten that this\nsubstance reveals to us only ineffable characters. Do we understand\nbetter how extension is derived from its essence, how it can be moved\nby a primitive force whose action is exerted without contact, and a\nthousand other miracles so hidden from the gaze of the most penetrating\neyes, that (to paraphrase the idea of an illustrious modern writer)\nthey reveal only the curtain which conceals them?\n\nBut might not one suppose as some have supposed, that the feeling\nwhich is observed in animated bodies, might belong to a being distinct\nfrom the matter of these bodies, to a substance of a different nature\nunited to them? Does the light of reason allow us in good faith to\nadmit such conjectures? We know in bodies only matter, and we observe\nthe faculty of feeling only in bodies: on what foundation then can\nwe erect an ideal being, disowned by all our knowledge?\n\nHowever, we must admit, with the same frankness, that we are ignorant\nwhether matter has in itself the faculty of feeling, or only the power\nof acquiring it by those modifications or forms to which matter is\nsusceptible; for it is true that this faculty of feeling appears only\nin organic bodies.\n\nThis is then another new faculty which might exist only potentially\nin matter, like all the others which have been mentioned; and this was\nthe hypothesis of the ancients, whose philosophy, full of insight and\npenetration, deserves to be raised above the ruins of the philosophy\nof the moderns. It is in vain that the latter disdain the sources\ntoo remote from them. Ancient philosophy will always hold its own\namong those who are worthy to judge it, because it forms (at least\nin relation to the subject of which I am treating) a system that is\nsolid and well articulated like the body, whereas all these scattered\nmembers of modern philosophy form no system.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n                               APPENDIX.\n\n                          OUTLINES AND NOTES.\n\n                       BY GERTRUDE CARMAN BUSSEY.\n\n\nLA METTRIE'S RELATION TO HIS PREDECESSORS AND TO HIS SUCCESSORS.\n\n\nI. The Historical Relation of La Mettrie to Ren\u00e9 Descartes (1596-1650).\n\nThe most direct source of La Mettrie's work, if the physiological\naspect of his system is set aside, is found in the philosophy of\nDescartes. In fact it sometimes seems as if La Mettrie's materialism\ngrew out of his insistence on the contradictory character of the\ndualistic system of Descartes. He criticises Descartes's statement\nthat the body and soul are absolutely independent, and takes great\npains to show the dependence of the soul on the body. Yet though La\nMettrie's system may be opposed to that of Descartes [17] from one\npoint of view, from another point of view it seems to be a direct\nconsequence of it. La Mettrie himself recognizes this relationship and\nfeels that his doctrine that man is a machine, is a natural inference\nfrom Descartes's teaching that animals are mere machines. [18] Moreover\nLa Mettrie carries on Descartes's conception of the body as a machine,\nand many of his detailed discussions of the machinery of the body\nseem to have been drawn from Descartes.\n\nIt should be noted that La Mettrie did justice to Descartes, and\nrealized how much all philosophers owed to him. He insisted moreover\nthat Descartes's errors were due to his failure to follow his own\nmethod. [19] Yet La Mettrie's method was different from that of\nDescartes, for La Mettrie was an empiricist [20] without rationalistic\nleaning. As regards doctrine: La Mettrie differed from Descartes in\nhis opinion of matter. Since he disbelieved in any spiritual reality,\nhe gave matter the attributes of motion and thought, while Descartes\ninsisted that the one attribute of matter is extension. [21] It\nwas a natural consequence of La Mettrie's disbelief in spiritual\nsubstance that he could throw doubt on the existence of God. [22]\nOn the other hand the belief in God was one of the foundations of\nDescartes's system. La Mettrie tried to show that Descartes's belief\nin a soul and in God was merely designed to hide his true thought\nfrom the priests, and to save himself from persecution. [23]\n\n\n\n\nIIa. The Likeness of La Mettrie to the English Materialists, Thomas\nHobbes (1588-1679) and John Toland (1670-1721).\n\nThe influence of Descartes upon La Mettrie cannot be questioned but it\nis more difficult to estimate the influence upon him of materialistic\nphilosophers. Hobbes published \"The Leviathan\" in 1651 and \"De Corpore\"\nin 1655. Thus he wrote about a century before La Mettrie, and since\nthe eighteenth century was one in which the influence of England upon\nFrance was very great, it is easy to suppose that La Mettrie had read\nHobbes. If so, he must have gained many ideas from him. The extent\nof this influence is, however, unknown, for La Mettrie rarely if ever\nquotes from Hobbes, or attributes any of his doctrines to Hobbes.\n\nIn the first place, both Hobbes and La Mettrie are thoroughgoing\nmaterialists. They both believe that body is the only reality, and that\nanything spiritual is unimaginable. [24] Furthermore their conceptions\nof matter are very similar. According to La Mettrie, matter contains\nthe faculty of sensation and the power of motion as well as the\nquality of extension. [25] This same conception of matter is held by\nHobbes, for he specifically attributes extension and motion to matter,\nand then reduces sensation to a kind of internal motion. [26] Thus\nsensation also may be an attribute of matter. Moreover Hobbes and\nLa Mettrie are in agreement on many smaller points, and La Mettrie\nelaborates much that is suggested in Hobbes. They both believe that\nthe passions are dependent on bodily conditions. [27] They agree in\nthe belief that all the differences in men are due to differences\nin the constitution and organization of their bodies. [28] They both\ndiscuss the nature and importance of language. [29]\n\nHobbes differs from La Mettrie in holding that we can be sure that God\nexists as the cause of this world. [30] However even though he thinks\nthat it is possible to know that God exists, he does not believe that\nwe can know his nature.\n\nLa Mettrie's system may be regarded as the application of a system like\nthat of Hobbes to the special problem of the relation of soul and body\nin man; for if there is nothing in the universe but matter and motion,\nit inevitably follows that man is merely a very complicated machine.\n\nThere is great similarity also between the doctrine of La Mettrie and\nthat of Toland. It is interesting to note the points of resemblance\nand of difference. Toland's \"Letters to Serena,\" which contain much\nof his philosophical teaching, were published in 1704. There is\na possibility therefore that La Mettrie read them and gained some\nsuggestions from them.\n\nThe point most emphasized in Toland's teaching [31] is that motion\nis an attribute of matter. He argues for this belief on the ground\nthat matter must be essentially active in order to undergo change,\n[32] and that the conception of the inertness of matter is based\non the conception of absolute rest, and that this absolute rest\nis nowhere to be found. [33] Since motion is essential to matter,\nthere is no need, Toland believes, to account for the beginning of\nmotion. Those who have regarded matter as inert have had to find some\nefficient cause for motion, and to do this, they have held that all\nnature is animated. But this pretended animation is utterly useless,\nsince matter is itself endowed with motion. [34] The likeness to\nLa Mettrie is evident. La Mettrie likewise opposes the doctrine of\nthe animation of matter, and the belief in any external cause of\nmotion. [35] Yet he feels the need of postulating some beginning\nof motion, [36] and although he uses the conception so freely, he\ndoes not agree with Toland that the nature of motion is known. He\nbelieves that it is impossible to know the nature of motion, [37]\nwhile Toland believes that the nature of motion is self-evident. [38]\n\nAnother point of contrast between Toland and La Mettrie is in\ntheir doctrines of God. Toland believes that God, \"a pure spirit\nor immaterial being,\" is necessary for his system, [39] while La\nMettrie questions God's existence and insists that immateriality and\nspirituality are fine words that no one understands.\n\nIt must be admitted, in truth, that La Mettrie and Toland have\ndifferent interests and different points of view. Toland is concerned\nto discover the essential nature of matter, while La Mettrie's problem\nis to find the specific relation of body and mind. On this relation,\nhe builds his whole system.\n\n\n\n\nb. The Relation of La Mettrie to an English Sensationalist: John Locke\n(1632-1704).\n\nLocke's \"Essay Concerning Human Understanding\" was published in 1690,\nand La Mettrie, like most cultured Frenchmen of the Enlightenment,\nwas influenced by his teaching. The main agreement between Locke\nand La Mettrie is in their doctrine that all ideas are derived from\nsensation. Both vigorously oppose the belief in innate ideas, [40]\nteaching that even our most complex and our most abstract ideas are\ngained through sensation. But La Mettrie does not follow Locke in\nanalyzing these ideas and in concluding that many sensible qualities\nof objects--such as colors, sounds, etc.--have no existence outside\nthe mind. [41] He rejects Locke's doctrine of spiritual substances,\n[42] and opposes Locke's theistic teaching, laying stress, on the\nother hand, upon Locke's admission of the possibility that \"thinking\nbeing may also be material.\" [43]\n\n\n\n\nIIIa. The Likeness, probable but unacknowledged, to La Mettrie, of\nthe French Sensationalists, Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780)\nand Claude Adrien Helvetius (1715-1771).\n\nCondillac's \"Trait\u00e9 des sensations\" was published about ten years\nafter La Mettrie's \"L'histoire naturelle de l'\u00e2me,\" and therefore it\nis probable that Condillac had read this work, and gained some ideas\nfrom it. Yet Condillac never mentions La Mettrie's name nor cites\nhis doctrines. This omission may be accounted for by the fact that\nthe works of La Mettrie had been so condemned that later philosophers\nwished to conceal the similarity of their doctrines to his. Whether\nthe sensationalists were influenced by his teachings or not, there\nis such a profound likeness in their teachings, that La Mettrie may\nwell be regarded as one of the first French sensationalists as well\nas one of the leading French materialists of the time.\n\nCondillac and La Mettrie agree that experience is the source of all\nknowledge. As Lange suggests, [44] La Mettrie's development of reason\nfrom the imagination may have suggested to Condillac the way to develop\nall the faculties from the soul. La Mettrie asserts that reason is but\nthe sensitive soul contemplating its ideas, and that imagination plays\nall the r\u00f4les of the soul, while Condillac elaborates the same idea,\nand shows in great detail how all the faculties of the soul are but\nmodifications of sensation. [45]\n\nBoth La Mettrie and Condillac believe that there is no gulf between\nman and the lower animals; but this leads to a point of disagreement\nbetween the two philosophers, for Condillac absolutely denies that\nanimals can be mere machines, [46] and we must suppose that he\nwould the more ardently oppose the teaching that man is merely a\ncomplicated machine! Condillac finally, unlike La Mettrie, believes\nin the existence of God. A final point of contrast also concerns the\ntheology of the two writers. La Mettrie insists that we can not be sure\nthat there is any purpose in the world, while Condillac affirms that\nwe can discern intelligence and design throughout the universe. [47]\n\nLike La Mettrie and Condillac, Helvetius teaches that all the faculties\nof the mind can be reduced to sensation. [48] Unlike La Mettrie,\nhe specifically distinguishes the mind from the soul, and describes\nthe mind as a later developed product of the soul or faculty of\nsensation. [49] This idea may have been suggested by La Mettrie's\nstatement that reason is a modification of sensation. Helvetius,\nhowever, unlike La Mettrie, does not clearly decide that sensation\nis but a result of bodily conditions, and he admits that sensation\nmay be a modification of a spiritual substance. [50] Moreover, he\nclaims that climate and food have no effect on the mind, and that the\nsuperiority of the understanding is not dependent on the strength of\nthe body and its organs. [51]\n\nLa Mettrie and Helvetius resemble each other in ethical doctrine. Both\nmake pleasure and pain the ruling motives of man's conduct. They claim\nthat all the emotions are merely modifications of corporeal pleasure\nand pain, and that therefore the only principle of action in man is\nthe desire for pleasure and the fear of pain. [52]\n\n\n\n\nb. The Likeness to La Mettrie of the French Materialist, Baron Paul\nHeinrich Dietrich von Holbach (1723-1789).\n\nAs Condillac and Helvetius emphasize the sensationalism taught by La\nMettrie, so Holbach's book is a reiteration and elaboration of the\nmaterialism set forth in La Mettrie's works. The teaching of Holbach\nis so like that of La Mettrie, that the similarity can hardly be\na coincidence.\n\nLa Mettrie regards experience as the only teacher. Holbach dwells\non this same idea, and insists that experience is our only source\nof knowledge in all matters. [53] Holbach likewise teaches that man\nis a purely material being. He disbelieves in any spiritual reality\nwhatsoever, and makes matter the only substance in the world. He lays\nstress, also, on one thought which is a natural consequence of La\nMettrie's teaching. La Mettrie has limited the action of the will and\nhas insisted that the will is dependent on bodily conditions. Holbach\ngoes further and declares repeatedly that all freedom is a delusion,\nand that man is controlled in every action by rigid necessity. [54]\nThis teaching seems to be the natural outcome of the belief that man\nis a machine.\n\nHolbach's atheistic theology is more extreme than his predecessor's,\nfor La Mettrie admits that God may exist, while Holbach vigorously\nopposes the possibility. Moreover Holbach holds the opinion,\nbarely suggested by La Mettrie, that an atheistic doctrine would\nameliorate the condition of mankind. [55] He insists that the idea\nof God has hindered the progress of reason and interfered with\nnatural law. Holbach is indeed the only one of the philosophers here\ndiscussed, who frankly adopts a fatalistic and atheistic doctrine of\nthe universe. In these respects, his teaching is the culmination of\nFrench materialism.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOUTLINE OF LA METTRIE'S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE.\n\n\n                                                            PAGES [56]\n\nI. Insistence on the Empirical Standpoint          16f.; 88f.; 72, 142\n\nII. Arguments in Favor of Materialism:\n\n    a. The \"Soul\" is Affected,\n        1. By Disease                                        18f.; 90f.\n        2. By Sleep                                          19f.; 91f.\n        3. By Drugs                                             20; 92\n        4. By Food                                          21f.; 93ff.\n        5. By Age and Sex                                    23f.; 95f.\n        6. By Temperature and Climate                       24f.; 96ff.\n    b. There is No Sharp Distinction Between Men and Animals\n       (Machines)              28f., 100ff.; 41ff., 113ff.; 75f., 142f.\n    c. Bodily Movements are Due to the \"Motive Power\" of the\n       Body                                               51ff., 129ff.\n\nIII. Conception of Matter.\n\n    a. Matter is Extended                                         154f.\n    b. Matter Has the Power of Motion                   70, 140; 156ff.\n    c. Matter Has the Faculty of Feeling                         159ff.\n\nIV. Conception of Man:\n\n    a. Man is a Machine               17, 89; 21, 93; 56, 128; 69, 140f.;\n                                                       73, 143; 80, 148\n    b. All Man's Faculties Reduce to Sense and Imagination         35ff.,\n    107ff.\n    c. Man is Like Animals in Being Capable of Education        38, 110\n    d. Man is Ignorant of His Destiny                           79, 147\n\nV. Theological Doctrine:\n\n    a. The Existence of God is Unproved and Practically\n       Unimportant                                              50, 122\n    b. The Argument from Design is Ineffective Against the\n       Hypothesis of Mechanical Causality                  51ff., 124ff.\n    c. Atheism Makes for Happiness                             55, 126f.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNOTES. [57]\n\n\nNOTE ON FREDERICK THE GREAT'S EULOGY.\n\nThis translation is made from the third volume, pp. 159 ff. of \"OEuvres\nde Fr\u00e9deric II., Roi de Prusse, Publi\u00e9es du vivant de l'Auteur,\"\nBerlin, 1789.\n\nLa Mettrie was received at the court of Frederick the Great, when he\nhad been driven from Holland on account of the heretical teaching of\n\"L'Homme Machine,\" The \"Eloge\" was read by Darget, the secretary of\nthe king, at a public meeting of the Academy of Berlin, to which,\nat the initiative of Frederick, La Mettrie had been admitted.\n\nThe careful reader will not fail to note that Frederick's arithmetic\nis at fault, and that La Mettrie died at the age of forty-one, not\nforty-three, years.\n\nAt a few points, perhaps, the Eloge demands elucidation. Coutances,\nlike Caen, is a Norman town. St. Malo lies, just over the border,\nin Brittany. La Mettrie's military service was with the French in\nthe Silesian wars against Maria Theresa. The battle of Dettingen was\nfought in Bavaria and was won by the Austrians through the aid given\nby George II of England to Maria Theresa. The battle of Fontenoy in\nthe Netherlands was the only victory of the French in this war.\n\n\nOther accounts of the life of La Mettrie are:\n\nJ. Ass\u00e9zat, Introduction to \"L'Homme Machine,\" Paris, 1865.\n\nF. A. Lange, \"History of Materialism.\"\n\nPh. Damiron, \"Histoire de la philosophie du dix-huiti\u00e8me si\u00e8cle,\"\nParis, 1858.\n\nN. Qu\u00e9pat, \"La philosophie mat\u00e9rialiste au XVIIIe si\u00e8cle. Essai sur\nLa Mettrie, sa vie, et ses oeuvres.\" Paris, 1873.\n\n\n\n\nNOTES ON MAN A MACHINE.\n\n1. \"Matter may well be endowed with the faculty of thought.\" Although\nLa Mettrie attempts to \"avoid this reef,\" by refraining from the use\nof these words, yet he asserts throughout his work that sensations,\nconsciousness, and the soul itself are modifications of matter\nand motion.\n\nThe possibility of matter being endowed with the faculty of thought,\nis denied by Elie Luzac, the publisher of \"L'homme machine,\" in his\nwork \"L'homme plus que machine.\" In this work he tries to disprove the\nconclusions of \"L'homme machine.\" He says: \"We have therefore proved\nby the idea of the inert state of matter, by that of motion, by that\nof relations, by that of activity, by that of extension, that matter\ncan not be possessed of the faculty of thinking\".... \"To be brief,\nI say, that if, by a material substance, we understand that matter\nwhich falls under the cognizance of our senses, and which is endowed\nwith the qualities we have mentioned, the soul can not be material:\nso that it must be immaterial, and, for the same reason, God could\nnot have given the faculty of thinking to matter, since He can not\nperform contradictions.\" [58]\n\n2. \"How can we define a being whose nature is absolutely unknown to\nus?\" La Mettrie uses this as an argument against the belief in a soul,\nand yet he later admits that the \"nature of motion is as unknown to\nus as the nature of matter.\" It is difficult then to see why there\nis more reason to doubt the existence of spirit, than to doubt the\nexistence of matter. Locke makes this point very well. \"It is for want\nof reflection that we are apt to think that our senses show us nothing\nbut material things. Every act of sensation, when duly considered,\ngives us an equal view of both parts of nature, the corporeal and\nspiritual.\" [59]... \"If this notion of immaterial spirit may have,\nperhaps, some difficulties in it not easy to be explained, we have\ntherefore no more reason to deny or doubt the existence of such\nspirits, than we have to deny or doubt the existence of body because\nthe notion of body is cumbered with some difficulties, very hard and\nperhaps impossible to be explained or understood by us.\" [60]\n\n3. \"Author of the 'Spectacle de la nature.'\" Noel Antoine Pluche\n(1688-1761) was a Jansenist author. He was Director of the College\nof Laon, but was deprived of his position on account of his refusal\nto adhere to the bull \"Unigenitus.\" Rollin then recommended him to\nGasville, intendant of Normandy, who entrusted him with his son's\neducation. He finally settled in Paris. His principal works are:\n\"Spectacle de la nature,\" (Paris, 1739); \"M\u00e9canique des langues et\nl'art de les enseigner,\" (Paris, 1751); \"Harmonie des Psaumes et de\nl'Evangile,\" (Paris, 1764); \"Concorde de la g\u00e9ographie des diff\u00e9rents\nages,\" (Paris, 1765). [61]\n\nLa Mettrie describes Pluche in the \"Essais sur l'esprit et les beaux\nesprits\" thus: \"Without wit, without taste, he is Rollin's pedant. A\nsuperficial man, he had need of the work of M. R\u00e9aumur, of whom he\nis only a stale and tiresome imitator in the flat little sayings\nscattered in his dialogues. It was with the works of Rollin as with\nthe 'Spectacle de la Nature,' one made the fortune of the other:\nGa\u00e7on praised Person, Person praised Ga\u00e7on, and the public praised\nthem both.\" [62]\n\nThis quotation from La Mettrie occurs in Ass\u00e9zat's edition of La\nMettrie's \"L'homme machine,\" which was published as the second\nvolume of the series \"Singularit\u00e9s physiologiques\" (1865). Ass\u00e9zat\nwas a French publisher and writer. He was at one time Secretary of\nthe Anthropological Society, and collaborated with other writers\nin the publication of \"La Revue Nationale,\" \"La Revue de Paris,\"\nand \"La Pens\u00e9e nouvelle.\" His notes to \"L'Homme Machine\" show great\nknowledge concerning physiological subjects. He intended to publish a\ncomplete edition of Diderot's works, but overwork on this undermined\nhis health, so that he was unable to complete it. [63]\n\n4. Torricelli was a physicist and mathematician who lived from 1608\nto 1647. He was a disciple of Galileo, and acted as his amanuensis\nfor three months before Galileo's death. He was then nominated\nas grand-ducal mathematician and professor of mathematics in the\nFlorentine Academy. In 1643, he made his most famous discovery. He\nfound that the height to which a liquid will rise in a closed tube,\ndepends on the specific gravity of the liquid, and concludes from this\nthat the column of liquid is sustained by atmospheric pressure. This\ndiscovery did away with the obscure idea of a fuga vacui, and laid\nbare the principle on which mercurial barometers are constructed. For\na long time the mercurial thermometer was called the \"Torricellian\ntube,\" and the vacuum which the barometer includes is still known as a\n\"Torricellian vacuum.\" [64]\n\n5. \"Only the physicians have a right to speak on this subject.\" Luzac\nsays: \"'Tis true that if the materiality of the soul was proved,\nthe knowledge of her would be an object of natural philosophy, and\nwe might with some appearance of reason reject all arguments to the\ncontrary which are not drawn from that science. But if the soul is not\nmaterial, the investigation of its nature does not belong to natural\nphilosophy, but to those who search into the nature of its faculties,\nand are called metaphysicians.\" [65]\n\n6. \"Man is ... a machine.\" This is the first clear statement of this\ntheory, which as the title of the work indicates, is the central\ndoctrine of this work. Descartes had strongly denied the possibility\nof conceiving man as a machine. \"We may easily conceive a machine\nto be so constructed that it emits vocables, and even that it emits\nsome correspondent to the action upon it of external objects which\ncause a change in its organs,... but not that it should emit them\nvariously so as appositely to reply to what is said in its presence,\nas men of the lowest grade of intellect can do.\" [66]\n\n7. \"Let us then take in our hands the staff of experience.\" La\nMettrie repeatedly emphasizes the belief that knowledge must come from\nexperience. Moreover he confines this experience to sense experience,\nand concludes \"L'histoire naturelle de l'\u00e2me\" with these words:\n\"No senses, no ideas. The fewer senses there are: the fewer ideas. No\nsensations experienced, no ideas. These principles are the necessary\nconsequence of all the observations and experiences that constitute\nthe unassailable foundation of this work.\"\n\nThis doctrine is opposed to the teaching of Descartes, who insists\nthat \"neither our imagination nor our senses can give us assurance of\nanything unless our understanding intervene.\" [67] Moreover Descartes\nbelieves that the senses are fallacious, and that the ideal method\nfor philosophy is a method corresponding to that of mathematics. [68]\nCondillac and Holbach agree with La Mettrie's opinion. Thus, Condillac\nteaches that man is nothing more than what he has become by the use\nof his senses. [69] And Holbach says: \"As soon as we take leave of\nexperience, we fall into the chasm where our imagination leads us\nastray.\" [70]\n\n8. \"Galen (Galenus) Claudius, 130 to circa 210 A. D. An eminent\nGreek physician and philosopher. Born at Pergamus, Mysia, he studied\nboth the Platonic and Peripatetic systems of philosophy. Satyrus\ninstructed him in anatomy. He traveled extensively while young to\nperfect his education. About 165 A. D. he moved to Rome, and became\nvery celebrated as a surgeon and practising physician, attending\nthe family of Marcus Aurelius. He returned to Pergamus, but probably\nvisited Rome three or four times afterwards. He wrote in philosophy,\nlogic, and medicine. Many, probably most, of his works are lost. He\nwas the one medical authority for thirteen centuries, and his services\nto logic and to philosophy were also great.\" [71]\n\n9. The author of \"L'histoire de l'\u00e2me\" is La Mettrie himself.\n\n10. Hippocrates is often termed the \"father of medicine.\" He was\nborn in Cos in 460 B. C. He studied medicine under his father,\nHeraclides, and Herodicus of Selymbria; and philosophy under Gorgias\nand Democritus. He was the first to separate medicine from religion\nand from philosophy. He insisted that diseases must be treated by\nthe physician, as if they were governed by purely natural laws. The\nGreeks had such respect for dead bodies that Hippocrates could not\nhave dissected a human body, and consequently his knowledge of its\nstructure was limited, but he seems to have been an acute and skilful\nobserver of conditions in the living body. He wrote several works on\nmedicine, and in one of them showed the first principles on which the\npublic health must be based. The details of his life are hidden by\ntradition, but it is certain that he was regarded with great respect\nand veneration by the Greeks. [72]\n\n11. \"The different combinations of these humors....\" Compare this\nwith Descartes's statement that the difference in men comes from the\ndifference in the construction and position of the brain, which causes\na difference in the action of the animal spirits. [73]\n\n12. \"This drug intoxicates, like wine, coffee, etc., each in its own\nmeasure, and according to the dose.\" Descartes also speaks of the\neffect of wine. \"The vapors of wine, entering the blood quickly, go\nfrom the heart to the brain, where they are converted into spirits,\nwhich being stronger and more abundant than usual are capable of\nmoving the body in several strange fashions.\" [74]\n\n13. The quotation from Pope is from the \"Moral Essays,\" published\n1731 to 1735, Epistle I, 1, 69.\n\n14. Jan Baptista Van Helmont (1578-1644) was a Flemish physician and\nchemist. He is noted for having demonstrated the necessity of the\nbalance in chemistry, and for having been among the first to use the\nword \"gas.\" His works were published as \"Ortus Medicinae,\" 1648. [75]\n\n15. The author of \"Lettres sur la physiognomie\" was Jacques Pernety\nor Pernetti. He was born at Chazelle-sur-Lyon, was for some years\ncanon at Lyons, and died there in 1777. [76]\n\n16. Boerhaave. See Note 78.\n\n17. Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698-1759) was a French\nmathematician, astronomer and philosopher. He supported the Newtonian\ntheory against the Cartesians. In 1740 he became president of the\nAcademy of Berlin. He was the head of the expedition which was sent\nby Louis XV to measure a degree of longitude in Lapland. Voltaire\nsatirized Maupertuis in the \"Diatribe du Docteur Akakia.\" [77]\n\n18. Luzac sums up the preceding facts by saying: \"Here are a great\nmany facts, but what is it they prove? only that the faculties of the\nsoul arise, grow, and acquire strength in proportion as the body does;\nso that these same faculties are weakened in the same proportion as\nthe body is.... But from all these circumstances it does not follow\nthat the faculty of thinking is an attribute of matter, and that all\ndepends on the manner in which our machine is made, that the faculties\nof the soul arise from a principle of animal life, from an innate\nheat or force, from an irritability of the finest parts of the body,\nfrom a subtil ethereal matter diffused through it, or in a word,\nfrom all these things taken together.\" [78]\n\n19. \"The diverse states of the soul are therefore always correlative\nwith those of the body.\" This view is in diametrical opposition to\nthe teaching of Descartes, who says: \"The soul is of a nature wholly\nindependent of the body.\" [79] Yet Descartes also states that there is\nan intimate connection between the two. \"The Reasonable Soul ... could\nby no means be educed from the power of matter ... it must be expressly\ncreated; and it is not sufficient that it be lodged in the human body,\nexactly like a pilot in a ship, unless perhaps to move its members,\nbut ... it is necessary for it to be joined and united more closely to\nthe body, in order to have sensations and appetites similar to ours,\nand thus constitute a real man.\" [79]\n\nHolbach later emphasizes this close connection between body and soul,\nwhich is so insisted upon by La Mettrie. \"If freed from our prejudices\nwe wish to see our soul, or the moving principle which acts in us, we\nshall remain convinced that it is part of our body, that it can not\nbe distinguished from the body except by an abstraction, that it is\nbut the body itself considered relatively to some of the functions\nor faculties to which its nature and particular organization make\nit susceptible. We shall see that this soul is forced to undergo\nthe same changes as the body, that it grows and develops with the\nbody.... Finally we can not help recognizing that at some periods it\nshows evident signs of weakness, sickness, and death.\" [80]\n\n20. \"Peyronie (Fran\u00e7ois Gigot de la), a French surgeon, born in\nMontpellier, the fifteenth of January, 1678, died the twenty-fifth\nof April, 1747. He was surgeon of the hospital of Saint-Eloi de\nMontpellier and instructor of anatomy to the Faculty; then, in 1704,\nserved in the army. In 1717 he became reversioner of the position of\nfirst surgeon to Louis XV; in 1731, steward of the Queen's palace;\nin 1735, a doctor of the King; in 1736, first surgeon of the King,\nand chief of the surgeons of the kingdom. The greatest merit of\nLa Peyronie is for having founded the Academy of Surgery in Paris,\nand for having gained special protection for surgery and surgeons in\nFrance. He wrote little.\" [81]\n\n21. \"Willis, Thomas (1621-1675), English physician, was born at Great\nBedwin, Wiltshire, on 27th January, 1621. He studied at Christ Church,\nOxford; and when that city was garrisoned for the king he bore arms\nfor the Royalists. He took the degree of bachelor of medicine in 1646,\nand after the surrender of the garrison applied himself to the practice\nof his profession. In 1660, shortly after the Restoration, he became\nSedleian professor of natural philosophy in place of Dr. Joshua Cross,\nwho was ejected, and the same year he took the degree of doctor of\nphysic.... He was one of the first members of the Royal Society, and\nwas elected an honorary fellow of the Royal College of Physicians in\n1664. In 1666, ... he removed to Westminster, on the invitation of\nDr. Sheldon, Archbishop of Canterbury.... He died at St. Martin's on\n11th November, 1675, and was buried in Westminster Abbey.\" [82]\n\n22. \"Fontenelle, Bernard le Bovier de. Born at Rouen, France,\nFebruary 11, 1657; died at Paris, January 9, 1757. A French advocate,\nphilosopher, poet, and miscellaneous writer. He was the nephew (through\nhis mother) of Corneille, and was 'one of the last of the Pr\u00e9cieux, or\nrather the inventor of a new combination of literature and gallantry\nwhich at first exposed him to not a little satire' (Saintsbury). He\nwrote 'Po\u00e9sies pastorales' (1688), 'Dialogues des morts' (1683),\n'Entretiens sur la pluralit\u00e9 des mondes' (1686), 'Histoire des oracles'\n(1687), 'Eloges des acad\u00e9miciens' (delivered 1690-1740).\" [83]\n\n23. \"In a word, would it be absolutely impossible to teach the ape a\nlanguage? I do not think so.\" Compare with this Haeckel's statement\nof the relation between man's speech and that of apes. \"It is of\nespecial interest that the speech of apes seems on physiological\ncomparison to be a stage in the formation of articulate human\nspeech. Among living apes there is an Indian species which is musical;\nthe hylobates syndactylus sings a full octave in perfectly pure\nharmonious half-tones. No impartial philologist can hesitate any\nlonger to admit that our elaborate rational language has been slowly\nand gradually developed out of the imperfect speech of our Pliocene\nsimian ancestors.\" [84]\n\n24. Johann Conrad Amman was born at Schaffhausen, in Switzerland,\nin 1669. After his graduation at Basle, he practised medicine at\nAmsterdam. He devoted most of his attention to the instruction of deaf\nmutes. He taught them by attracting their attention to the motion of\nhis lips, tongue, and larynx, while he was speaking, and by persuading\nthem to imitate these motions. In this way, they finally learned to\narticulate syllables and words, and to talk. In his works \"Surdus\nLoquens,\" and \"Dissertatio de Loquela,\" he explained the mechanism of\nspeech, and made public his method of instruction. From all accounts\nit seems that his success with the deaf mutes was remarkable. He died\nabout 1730. [85]\n\n25. \"... the great analogy between ape and man....\" Compare Haeckel:\n\"Thus comparative anatomy proves to the satisfaction of every\nunprejudiced and critical student the significant fact that the body of\nman and that of the anthropoid ape are not only peculiarly similar, but\nthey are practically one and the same in every important respect.\" [86]\n\n26. Sir William Temple was born in London in 1628. He attended the\nPuritan College of Emmanuel, Cambridge, but left without taking\nhis degree. After an extensive tour on the continent, he settled\nin Ireland in 1655. His political career began with the accession\nof Charles II in 1660. He is particularly noted for concluding \"The\nTriple Alliance\" between England, the United Netherlands, and Sweden,\nand for his part in bringing about the marriage of William and Mary,\nwhich completed the alliance of England and the Netherlands. Temple\nwas not as successful in political work at home as abroad, for he was\ntoo honest to care to be concerned in the intrigues in English affairs,\nat that time. He retired from politics and died at Moor Park in 1699.\n\nTemple wrote several works on political subjects. His \"Memoirs\" were\nbegun in 1682; the first part was destroyed before it was published,\nthe second part was published without his consent, and the third part\nwas published by Swift after Temple's death. His fame rests more on\nhis diplomatic work than on his writings. [87]\n\n27. \"Trembley (Abraham) a Swiss naturalist, born in Geneva, the third\nof September, 1700, died in Geneva, the twelfth of May, 1784. He\nwas educated in his native city, and in the Hague, where he became\ntutor of the son of an English resident, and later the tutor of\nthe young duke of Richmond, with whom he traveled in Germany and\nItaly. In 1760, he obtained the position of librarian at Geneva,\nand gained a seat in the council of the 'Two Hundred.' His admirable\nworks on the fresh-water snake procured for him his election as\nmember of the Royal Society of London, and as correspondent of the\nAcademy of Sciences in Paris. From 1775 to 1782 he published several\nworks on natural religion, and articles on natural history in the\n'Philosophical Transactions,' 1742-57. His most important work is\n'M\u00e9moires pour servir \u00e0 l'histoire d'un genre de polype d'eau douce'\n(Leyden, 1744; Paris, 2 volumes).\" [88]\n\n28. \"What was man before the invention of words and the knowledge\nof language? An animal.\" Compare this with the statement of Hobbes:\n\"The most noble and profitable invention of all others was that of\nSpeech, consisting of names or appellations, and their connexion,\n... without which there had been amongst men neither commonwealth,\nnor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions,\nbears, and wolves.\" [89]\n\n29. Fontenelle. See note 22.\n\n30. \"All the faculties of the soul can be correctly reduced to\npure imagination.\" Compare with this La Mettrie's statement in\n\"L'histoire naturelle de l'\u00e2me\": \"The more one studies all the\nintellectual faculties, the more convinced one remains, that they\nare all included in the faculty of sensation, upon which they all\ndepend so essentially that without it the soul could never perform\nany of its functions.\" [90] This resembles Condillac's doctrine of\nsensation: \"Judgment, reflexion, desires, passions, etc., are nothing\nbut sensation itself which is transformed in diverse ways.\" [91]\nHelvetius also says: \"All the operations of the mind are reducible\nto sensation.\" [92]\n\n31. \"See to what one is brought by the abuse of language, and\nby the use of those fine words (spirituality, immateriality,\netc.).\" Compare Hobbes, \"Though men may put together words of\ncontradictory signification, as spirit and incorporeal; yet they can\nnever have the imagination of anything answering to them.\" [93]\n\n32. \"Man's pre\u00ebminent advantage is his organism.\" Luzac says: \"This\nno more proves that organization is the chief merit of man, than\nthat the form of a musical instrument constitutes the chief merit\nof the musician. In proportion to the goodness of the instrument,\nthe musician charms by his art, and the case is the same with the\nsoul. In proportion to the soundness of the body, the soul is in\nbetter condition to exert her faculties.\" [94]\n\n33. \"Such is, I think, the generation of intelligence.\" Luzac argues\nagainst this statement thus: \"But if thought and all the faculties\nof the soul depended only on the organization as some pretend, how\ncould the imagination draw a long chain of consequences from the\nobjects it has embraced?\" [95]\n\n34. Pyrrhonism is \"the doctrine of Pyrrho of Elis which has been\ntransmitted chiefly by his disciple Timon. More generally, radical\nScepticism in general.\" [96]\n\n35. Pierre Bayle was born at Carlat in 1647. Although the child\nof Protestant parents, he was converted by the Jesuits. After his\nreconversion to Protestantism, he was driven out of France, and\ntook refuge first in Geneva, and then in Holland. In 1675 he became\nprofessor of philosophy at the Protestant College of Sedan, and in\n1681 professor of philosophy and history at Rotterdam. In 1693 he was\nforced to resign from his position on account of his religious views.\n\nBayle was one of the leading French sceptics of the time. He was a\nCartesian, but questioned both the certainty of one's own existence,\nand the knowledge derived from it. He declared that religion is\ncontrary to the human reason, but that this fact does not necessarily\ndestroy faith. He distinguished religion not only from science, but\nalso from morality, and vigorously opposed those who considered a\ncertain religion necessary for morality. He did not openly attack\nChristianity, yet all that he wrote awakened doubt, and his work\nexerted an extensive influence for scepticism.\n\nHis principal work is the \"Dictionnaire historique et critique,\"\npublished 1695-1697, and containing a vast amount of knowledge,\nexpressed in a piquant and popular style. This fact made the book\nwidely read both by scholars and by superficial readers.\n\n36. Arnobius the Elder was born at Sicca Venerea in Numidia, in the\nlatter part of the third century A. D. He was at first an opponent of\nChristianity, but was afterwards converted, and wrote \"Adversus Gentes\"\nas an apology for Christianity. In this work, he tries to answer the\ncomplaints made against Christians on the ground that the disasters\nof the time were due to their impiety; vindicates the divinity of\nChrist; and discusses the nature of the human soul. He concludes\nthat the soul is not immortal, for he believes that the belief in\nthe immortality of the soul would have a deteriorating influence\non morality. For translation of his work compare Vol. XIX of the\n\"Ante-Nicene Christian Library.\" [97]\n\n37. \"There exists no soul or sensitive substance without\nremorse.\" Condillac had said: \"There is something in animals besides\nmotion. They are not pure machines: they feel.\" [98] La Mettrie also\nattributed remorse to animals, but believed that they are none the\nless machines. Luzac said in comment: \"What renders these systems\ncompletely ridiculous, is, that the persons who pronounce men machines,\ngive them properties which belie their assertion. If beings are but\nmachines, why do they grant a natural law, an internal sense, a kind\nof dread? These are ideas which can not be excited by objects which\noperate on our senses.\" [99]\n\n38. \"Nature has created us solely to be happy.\" This is a statement of\nthe doctrine, which La Mettrie develops in his principal ethical work\n\"Discours sur le Bonheur.\" He teaches that happiness rests upon bodily\npleasure and pain. In \"L'histoire naturelle de l'\u00e2me,\" La Mettrie\nstates that all the passions can be developed from two fundamental\npassions, of which they are but modifications, love and hatred, or\ndesire and aversion. [100] Like La Mettrie, Helvetius makes corporeal\npleasure and pain the ruling motives for man's conduct. Thus he writes:\n\"Pleasure and pain are and always will be the only principles of action\nin man.\" [101]... \"Remorse is nothing more than a foresight of bodily\npain to which some crime has exposed us.\" [102] He definitely makes\nhappiness the end of human action. \"The end of man is self-preservation\nand the attainment of a happy existence.... Man, to find happiness,\nshould save up his pleasures, and refuse all those which might change\ninto pains.... The passions always have happiness as an object: they\nare legitimate and natural, and can not be called good or bad except\non account of their influence on human beings. To lead men to virtue,\nwe must show them the advantages of virtuous actions.\" [103] Holbach,\nfinally, goes further than La Mettrie or Helvetius, and makes purely\nmechanical impulses the motives of man's action. \"The passions are\nways of being or modifications of the internal organs, attracted or\nrepulsed by objects, and are consequently subject in their own way\nto the physical laws of attraction and repulsion.\" [104]\n\n39. \"Ixions of Christianity.\" Ixion, for his treachery, stricken\nwith madness, was cast into Erebus, where he was continually scourged\nwhile bound to a fiery wheel, and forced to cry: \"Benefactors should\nbe honored.\"\n\n40. \"Who can be sure that the reason for man's existence is not\nsimply the fact that he exists?\" Luzac opposes this by saying:\n\"If the reason of man's existence was in man himself, this existence\nwould be a necessary consequence of his own nature; so that his own\nnature would contain the cause or reason of his existence. Now since\nhis own nature would imply the cause of his existence, it would also\nimply his existence itself, so that man could no more be considered\nas non-existent than a circle can be considered without radii or a\npicture without features or proportions.... If the existence of man\nwas in man himself, he would then be an invariable being.\" [105]\n\n41. \"F\u00e9nelon (Fran\u00e7ois de Salignac de la Mothe-F\u00e9nelon), born at\nCh\u00e2teau de F\u00e9nelon, Dordogne, France, August 6, 1651, died at Cambrai,\nFrance, January 7, 1715. A celebrated French prelate, orator, and\nauthor. He became preceptor of the sons of the dauphin in 1689,\nand was appointed archbishop of Cambrai in 1695. His works include\n'Les aventures de T\u00e9l\u00e9maque' (1699), 'Dialogues des morts' (1712),\n'Trait\u00e9 de l'\u00e9ducation des filles' (1688), 'Explication des maximes\ndes saints' (1697), etc. His collected works were edited by Lecl\u00e8re\n(38 vols., 1827-1830).\" [106]\n\n42. \"Nieuwentyt (Bernard), a Dutch mathematician, born in\nWest-Graftdijk the tenth of August 1654, died at Purmerend the\nthirtieth of May, 1718. An unrelenting Cartesian, he combated the\ninfinitesimal calculus, and wrote a polemic against Leibnitz,\nconcerning this subject. He wrote a theological dissertation\ntranslated into French under the title \"L'existence de Dieu\nd\u00e9montr\u00e9e par les merveilles de la nature\" (Paris, 1725).\" [107]\n\n43. \"Abadie, James (Jacques), born at Nay, Basse-Pyr\u00e9n\u00e9es, probably in\n1654; died at London, September 25, 1725. A noted French Protestant\ntheologian. He went to Berlin about 1680 as minister of the French\nchurch there, and thence to England and Ireland; was for a time\nminister of the French church in the Savoy; and settled in Ireland as\ndean of Killaloe in 1699. His chief work is the 'Trait\u00e9 de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9\nde la religion chr\u00e9tienne' (1684), with its continuation 'Trait\u00e9 de\nla divinit\u00e9 de n\u00f4tre Seigneur Jesus-Christ' (1689).\" [108]\n\n44. \"Derham (William), English theologian and scholar, born in\nStoughton, near Worcester, in 1657, died at Upminster in 1735. Pastor\nof Upminster in the county of Essex, he could peacefully devote\nhimself to his taste for mechanics and natural history. Besides\nmaking studies of watch-making, and of fish, birds, and insects,\npublished in part in the Transactions of the Royal Society, he\nwrote several works on religious philosophy. The most important,\nwhich was popular for a long time and was translated into French\n(1726), has as title 'Physico-Theology, or the Demonstration of the\nExistence and the Attributes of God, by the Works of His Creation'\n(1713). He wrote as complement, in 1714, his 'Astro-Theology, or the\nDemonstration of the Existence and Attributes of God by the Observation\nof the Heavens.'\" [109]\n\n45. Rais, or Cardinal de Retz (1614-1679), was a French politician\nand author. From his childhood he was intended for the church. He\ntook an active part in the movement against Cardinal Mazarin, and\nlater became cardinal, but lost his popularity, and was imprisoned\nat Vincennes. After escaping from there he returned to France and\nsettled in Lorraine, where he wrote his 'M\u00e9moires,' which tell of\nthe court life of his time. [110]\n\n46. Marcello Malpighi (1628-1694) was a renowned Italian anatomist\nand physiologist. He held the position of lecturer on medicine at\nBologna in 1656, a few months later became professor at Pisa, was made\nprofessor at Bologna in 1660, went from there to Messina, though he\nlater returned to Bologna. In 1691 he became physician to Pope Innocent\nXII. Malpighi is often known as the founder of microscopic anatomy. He\nwas the first to see the marvelous spectacle of the circulation of the\nblood on the surface of a frog's lung. He discovered the vesicular\nstructure of the human lung, the structure of the secreting glands,\nand the mucous character of the lower stratum of the epidermis. He\nwas the first to undertake the finer anatomy of the brain, and he\naccurately described the distribution of grey matter, and of the fibre\ntracts in the cord. His works are: \"De pulmonibus\" (Bologna, 1661),\n\"Epistolae anatomicae narc. Malpighi et Car. Fracassati\" (Amsterdam,\n1662), \"De Viscerum Structura\" (London, 1669), \"Anatome Plantarum\"\n(London, 1672), \"De Structura Glandularum conglobatarum\" (London,\n1689). [111]\n\n47. Deism is a system of thought which arose in the latter part\nof the seventeenth century. Its most important representatives in\nEngland were Toland, Collins, Chubb, Shaftsbury, and Tindal. They\ninsisted on freedom of thought and speech, and claimed that reason\nis superior to any authority. They denied the necessity of any\nsupernatural revelation, and were consequently vigorously opposed by\nthe church. Partly because of this opposition by the church, many of\nthem argued against Christianity, and tried to show that an observance\nof moral laws is the only religion necessary for man. They taught that\nhappiness is man's chief end, and that, since man is a social being,\nhis happiness can best be gained by mutual helpfulness. Although\nthey declared that nature is the work of a perfect being, they had\na mechanical conception of the relation of God to the world, and did\nnot, like later theists, find evidence of God's presence in all the\nworks of nature. [112]\n\n48. \"Vanini, Lucilio, self-styled Julius C\u00e6sar. Born at Taurisano,\nkingdom of Naples, about 1585; burned at the stake at Toulouse, France,\nFebruary 19, 1619. An Italian free thinker, condemned to death as an\natheist and magician. He studied at Rome and Padua, became a priest,\ntraveled in Germany and the Netherlands, and began teaching at Lyons,\nbut was obliged to flee to England, where he was arrested. After his\nrelease he returned to Lyons, and about 1617 settled at Toulouse. Here\nhe was arrested for his opinions, condemned, and on the same day\nexecuted. His chief works are: 'Amphitheatrum aeternae Providentiae'\n(1615), 'De admirandis naturae reginae deaeque mortalium arcanis'\n(1616).\" [113]\n\n49. Desbarreaux (Jacques Vall\u00e9e). A French writer, born at Paris\nin 1602, who died at Chalon-sur-Sa\u00f4ne the ninth of May, 1673. He\nwrote a celebrated sonnet on penitence, but was rather an unbeliever\nand sceptic than a penitent. Guy Patin, hearing of his death, said:\n\"He infected poor young people by his licence. His conversation was\nvery dangerous and destructive to the public.\" [114]\n\n50. Boindin (Nicolas), French scholar and author, born the twenty-ninth\nof May 1676 at Paris, where he died the thirtieth of November 1751. He\nwas in the army for a while, but retired on account of ill health. He\nthen gave himself up to literature, and wrote several plays. In\n1706 he was elected Royal censor and associate of the Academy of\nInscriptions. His liberty, or, as it was then called, license of mind,\nshut the doors of the French Academy to him, and would have caused\nhis expulsion from the Academy of Inscriptions if he had not been so\nold. He died without retracting his opinions. [115]\n\n51. Denis Diderot (1713-1784) was one of the leaders of the\nintellectual movement of the eighteenth century. He was at first\ninfluenced by Shaftsbury, and was enthusiastic in his support of\nnatural religion. In his \"Pens\u00e9es philosophiques\" (1746) he tries to\nshow that the discoveries of natural science are the strongest proofs\nfor the existence of God. The wonders of animal life are enough to\ndestroy atheism for ever. Yet, while he opposes atheism, he also\nopposes vigorously the intolerance and bigotry of the church. He\nclaims that many of the attributes ascribed to God are contrary to\nthe very idea of a just and loving God.\n\nLater, Diderot was influenced by La Mettrie and by Holbach, and became\nan advocate of materialism which he set forth in \"Le r\u00eave d'Alembert\"\nand in the passages contributed to the \"Syst\u00e8me de la nature.\" Diderot\nwas the editor of the \"Encyclop\u00e9die.\" [116]\n\n52. Trembley. See note 27.\n\n53. \"Nothing which happens, could have failed to happen.\" An\nenunciation of the doctrine so insisted upon by Holbach. \"The whole\nuniverse ... shows us only an immense and uninterrupted chain of cause\nand effect.\" [117]... \"Necessity which regulates all the movements\nof the physical world, controls also those of the moral world.\" [118]\n\n54. \"All these evidences of a creator, repeated thousands ... of times\n... are self-evident only to the anti-Pyrrhonians.\" La Mettrie holds an\nopinion contrary not only to that of Descartes and Locke, but also to\nthat of Toland, Hobbes, and Condillac. Descartes, for instance, says:\n\"Thus I very clearly see that the certitude and truth of all science\ndepends on the knowledge alone of the true God.\" [119] Hobbes asserts:\n\"For he that from any effect he seeth come to pass should reason to\nthe next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause\nof that cause, ... shall at last come to this, that there must be,\nas even the heathen philosophers confessed, one first mover, that is\na first and an eternal cause of all things, which is that which men\nmean by the name of God.\" [120] Toland's words are: \"All the jumbling\nof atoms, all the Chances you can suppose for it, could not bring the\nParts of the Universe into their present Order, nor continue them in\nthe same, nor cause the Organization of a Flower or a Fly.... The\nInfinity of Matter ... excludes ... an extended corporeal God,\nbut not a pure Spirit or immaterial Being.\" [121] Condillac writes:\n\"A first cause, independent, unique, infinite, eternal, omnipotent,\nimmutable, intelligent, free, and whose providence extends over all\nthings: that is the most perfect notion of God that we can form in\nthis life.\" [122] Locke declares: \"From what has been said it is plain\nto me we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a God than\nof anything our senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay I\npresume I may say, that we more certainly know that there is a God,\nthan that there is anything else without us.\" [123]\n\n55. \"Lucretius (Titus Lucretius Carus). Born at Rome, probably about\n96 B.C., died October 15, 55 B.C. A celebrated Roman philosophical\npoet. He was the author of 'De rerum natura,' a didactic and\nphilosophical poem in six books, treating of physics, of psychology,\nand (briefly) of ethics from the Epicurean point of view. He committed\nsuicide probably in a fit of insanity. According to a popular but\ndoubtless erroneous tradition, his madness was due to a love-philter\nadministered to him by his wife.\" [124]\n\n56. \"Lamy (Bernard) was born in Mans in the year 1640. He studied\nfirst in the college of this city. He later went to Paris, and\nat Saumar studied philosophy under Charles de la Fontenelle,\nand theology under Andr\u00e9 Martin and Jean Leporc. He was at length\ncalled to teach philosophy in the city of Angers. He wrote a great\nmany books on theological subjects. His philosophical works are:\n'L'art de parler' (1675), 'Trait\u00e9 de m\u00e9chanique, de l'\u00e9quilibre, des\nsolides et des liqueurs' (1679), 'Trait\u00e9 de la grandeur en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral'\n(1680), 'Entretiens sur les sciences' (1684), 'El\u00e9ments de g\u00e9om\u00e9trie,'\n(1685).\" [125]\n\n57. \"The eye sees only because it is formed and placed as it is.\" La\nMettrie doubts whether there is any purpose in the world. Condillac, on\nthe other hand, teaches that purpose and intelligence are shown forth\nin the universe. \"Can we see the order of the parts of the universe,\nthe subordination among them, and notice how so many different things\ncompose such a permanent whole, and remain convinced that the cause\nof the universe is a principle without any knowledge of its effects,\nwhich without purpose, without intelligence, relates each being to\nparticular ends, subordinated to a general end?\" [126]\n\n58. \"Non nostrum inter vos tantas componere lites.\" Vergil, Eclogue\nIII, line 108.\n\n59. \"The universe will never be happy unless it is atheistic.\" Although\nLa Mettrie calls this a \"strange opinion\" it is clear that he\nsecretly sympathizes with it. Holbach affirms this doctrine very\nemphatically. \"Experience teaches us that sacred opinions were the\nreal source of the evils of human beings. Ignorance of natural causes\ncreated gods for them. Imposture made these gods terrible. This idea\nhindered the progress of reason.\" [127] \"An atheist ... is a man who\ndestroys chimeras harmful to the human race, in order to lead men\nback to nature, to experience, and to reason, which has no need of\nrecourse to ideal powers, to explain the operations of nature.\" [128]\n\n60. \"The soul is therefore but an empty word.\" Contrast this with\nDescartes's statement: \"And certainly the idea I have of the human\nmind ... is incomparably more distinct than the idea of any corporeal\nobject.\" [129] Compare this doctrine, also, with Holbach's assertion:\n\"Those who have distinguished the soul from the body seem to have only\ndistinguished their brains from themselves. Truly the brain is the\ncommon center, where all the nerves spread in all parts of the human\nbody, terminate and join together.... The more experience we have,\nthe more we are convinced that the word 'spirit' has no meaning even\nto those who have invented it, and can be of no use either in the\nphysical or in the moral world.\" [130]\n\n61. William Cowper (1666-1709) was an English anatomist. He was\ndrawn into a controversy with Bidloo, the Dutch physician, by\npublishing under his own name Bidloo's work on the anatomy of human\nbodies. His principal works are: \"Myotamia reformata\" (London, 1694)\nand \"Glandularum descriptio\" (1702). [131]\n\n62. William Harvey (1578-1657), an English physician and physiologist,\nis renowned for his discovery of the circulation of the blood. He was\neducated at Canterbury and Cambridge, and took his doctor's degree at\nCambridge in 1602. During his life he held the position of Lumleian\nlecturer at the College of Physicians, and of physician extraordinary\nto James I. His principal works are: \"Exercitatio de motu cordis\net sanguinis\" (1628), and \"Exercitationes de generatione animalium\"\n(1651). [132]\n\n63. Francis Bacon (1551-1626) was one of the first to revolt\nagainst scholasticism and to introduce a new method into science\nand philosophy. He claimed that to know reality, and consequently\nto gain new power over reality, man must stop studying conceptions,\nand study matter itself. Yet he did not himself know how to gain\na more accurate knowledge of nature, so that he could not put into\npractice the method which he himself advocated. His works are full\nof scholastic conceptions, though many of the implications of his\nsystem are materialistic. Lange claims, [133] indeed, that if Bacon\nhad been more consistent and daring, he would have reached strictly\nmaterialistic conclusions. The account of the motion of the heart\nof the dead convict is found in \"Sylva Sylvarum.\" [134] This book,\npublished in 1627, a year after Bacon's death, contains the account\nof Bacon's experiments, and of his theories in matters of physiology,\nphysics, chemistry, medicine, and psychology.\n\n64. Robert Boyle, one of the greatest natural philosophers of his age,\nstudied at Eton for three years, and then became the private pupil of\nthe rector of Stalbridge. He traveled through France, Switzerland,\nand Italy, and while at Florence, studied the work of Galileo. He\ndecided to devote his life to scientific work, and in 1645 became\na member of a society of scientific men, which later grew into the\nRoyal Society of London. His principal work was the improvement of\nthe air-pump, and by that the discovery of the laws governing the\npressure and volume of gases.\n\nBoyle was also deeply interested in theology. He gave liberally for\nthe work of spreading Christianity in India and America, and by his\nwill endowed the \"Boyle Lectures\" to demonstrate the Christian religion\nagainst atheists, theists, pagans, Jews, and Mohammedans. [135]\n\n65. Nicolas St\u00e9non was born at Copenhagen, 1631, and died at Schwerin\nin 1687. He studied at Leyden and Paris, and then settled in Florence,\nwhere he became the physician of the grand duke. In 1672 he became\nprofessor of anatomy at Florence, but three years later he gave up\nthis position and entered the church. In 1677 he was made Bishop\nof Heliopolis and went to Hanover, then to Munster, and finally\nto Schwerin. His principal work is the \"Discours sur l'anatomie du\ncerveau\" (Paris, 1669). [136]\n\n66. La Mettrie's account of involuntary movements is much like that of\nDescartes. Descartes says: \"If any one quickly passes his hand before\nour eyes as if to strike us, we shut our eyes, because the machinery\nof our body is so composed that the movement of this hand towards\nour eyes excites another movement in the brain, which controls the\nanimal spirits in the muscles that close the eyelids.\" [137]\n\n67. \"The brain has its muscles for thinking, as the legs have muscles\nfor walking.\" Neither Condillac nor Helvetius go so far. Helvetius\nexplicitly states that it is an open question whether sensation is\ndue to a material or to a spiritual substance. [138]\n\n68. Giovanni Alfonso Borelli (1608-1670) was the head of the so-called\niatro-mathematical sect. He tried to apply mathematics to medicine in\nthe same way in which it had been applied to the physical sciences. He\nwas wise enough to restrict the application of his system to the motion\nof the muscles, but his followers tried to extend its application and\nwere led into many absurd conjectures. Borelli was at first professor\nof mathematics at Pisa, and later professor of medicine at Florence. He\nwas connected with the revolt of Messina and was obliged to leave\nFlorence. He retired to Rome, where he was under the protection of\nChristina, Queen of Sweden, and remained there until his death in\n1679. [139]\n\n69. \"For one order that the will gives, it bows a hundred times to\nthe yoke.\" Descartes, on the other hand, teaches that the soul has\ndirect control over its voluntary actions and thoughts, and indirect\ncontrol over its passions. [140] La Mettrie goes further than to\nlimit the extent of the will, and questions whether it is ever free:\n\"The sensations which affect us decide the soul either to will or\nnot to will, to love or to hate these sensations according to the\npleasure or the pain which they cause in us. This state of the soul\nthus determined by its sensations is called the will.\" [141] Holbach\ninsists on this point and contends that all freedom is a delusion:\n\"[Man's] birth depends on causes entirely outside of his power; it\nis without his permission that he enters this system where he has\na place; and without his consent that, from the moment of his birth\nto the day of his death, he is continually modified by causes that\ninfluence his machine in spite of his will, modify his being, and\nalter his conduct. Is not the least reflexion enough to prove that\nthe solids and fluids of which the body is composed, and that the\nhidden mechanism that he considers independent of external causes,\nare perpetually under the influence of these causes, and could not act\nwithout them? Does he not see that his temperament does not depend\non himself, that his passions are the necessary consequences of his\ntemperament, that his will and his actions are determined by these same\npassions, and by ideas that he has not given to himself?... In a word,\neverything should convince man that during every moment of his life,\nhe is but a passive instrument in the hands of necessity.\" [142]\n\n70. The theory of animal spirits, held by Galen and elaborated by\nDescartes, is that the nerves are hollow tubes containing a volatile\nliquid, the animal spirits. The animal spirits were supposed to\ncirculate from the periphery to the brain and back again, and to\nperform by their action all the functions of the nerves.\n\n71. Berkeley uses the fact that the color of objects varies, as one\nargument for his idealistic conclusion. [143]\n\n72. It is hard to tell what Pythagoras himself taught, but it is\ncertain that he taught the kinship of animals and men, and upon\nthis kinship his rule for the abstinence from flesh was probably\nbased. Among the writings of the later Pythagoreans we find strange\nrules for diet which are plainly genuine taboos. For example they are\ncommanded \"to abstain from beans, not to break bread, not to eat from\na whole loaf, not to eat the heart, etc.\" [144]\n\n73. Plato forbade the use of wine in his ideal republic. [145]\n\n74. \"Nature's first care, when the chyle enters the blood, is to\nexcite in it a kind of fever.\" Thus, warmth is the first necessity\nfor the body. Compare with this, Descartes's statement: \"There is a\ncontinual warmth in our heart, ... this fire is the bodily principle\nof all the movements of our members.\" [146] This is one of the many\ninstances in which La Mettrie's account of the mechanism of the body\nis similar to that of Descartes.\n\n75. \"Stahl (George Ernst), born at Ansbach, Bavaria, October 21, 1660;\ndied at Berlin, May 14, 1734. A noted German chemist, physician of the\nKing of Prussia from 1716. His works include: 'Theoria medica vera'\n(1707), 'Experimenta et observationes chemicae' (1731), etc.\" [147]\n\n76. Philip Hecquet (1661-1737) was a celebrated French physician. He\nstudied at Rheims, and in 1688 became the physician of the nuns of Port\nRoyal des Champs. He returned to Paris in 1693 and took his doctor's\ndegree in 1697. He was twice dean of the faculty of Paris. In 1727\nhe became the physician of the religious Carmelites of the suburb of\nSaint Jacques, and remained their physician for thirty-two years. [148]\n\n77. The quotation: \"All men may not go to Corinth,\" is translated from\nHorace, Ep. 1, 19, 36. \"Non cuivis homini contigit adire Corinthum.\"\n\n78. Hermann Boerhaave was born at Voorhout near Leyden, on December 31,\n1668. His father, who belonged to the clerical profession, destined\nhis son for the same calling and so gave him a liberal education. At\nthe University of Leyden, he studied under Gronovius, Ryckius and\nFrigland. At the death of his father, Boerhaave was left without any\nprovision and supported himself by teaching mathematics. Vandenberg,\nthe burgomaster of Leyden, advised him to study medicine, and he\ndecided to devote himself to this profession. In 1693 he received his\ndegree and began to practice medicine. In 1701 he was made \"Lecturer\non the Institutes of Medicine\" at the University of Leyden. Thirteen\nyears later he was appointed Rector of the University, and the same\nyear became Professor of Practical Medicine there. He introduced into\nthe university the system of clinical instruction. Boerhaave's merit\nwas widely recognized, and his fame attracted many medical students\nfrom all Europe to the University of Leyden. Among these was La Mettrie\nwhose whole philosophy was profoundly influenced by the teaching of\nBoerhaave. In 1728 Boerhaave was elected into the Royal Academy of\nSciences of Paris, and two years later he was made a member of the\nRoyal Society of London. In 1731 his health compelled him to resign\nthe Rectorship at Leyden. At this time he delivered an oration, \"De\nHonore, Medici Servitute.\" He died after a long illness on April 23,\n1738. The city of Leyden erected a monument to him in the Church of\nSt. Peter, and inscribed on it: \"Salutifero Boerhaavii genio Sacrum.\"\n\nBoerhaave was a careful and brilliant student, an inspiring teacher,\nand a skilful practitioner. There are remarkable accounts of his skill\nin discovering symptoms, and in diagnosing diseases. His chief works\nare: \"Institutiones Medicae\" (Leyden, 1708); \"Aphorismi de cognoscendis\net curandis Morbis\" (Leyden, 1709), \"Libellus de Materia Medica et\nRemediorum Formulis\" (Leyden, 1719), \"Institutiones et Experimentae\nChemicae\" (Paris, 1724). [149]\n\n79. Willis. (See Note 21.)\n\n80. Claude Perrault (1613-1688) was a French physician and\narchitect. He received his degree of doctor of medicine at Paris\nand practised medicine there. In 1673 he became a member of the\nRoyal Academy of Sciences. Although he never abandoned his work in\nmathematics, in the natural sciences, and in medicine, he is more noted\nas an architect than as a physician or scientist. He was the architect\nof one of the colonnades of the Louvre, and of the Observatory. [150]\n\n81. \"Matter is self-moved.\" In \"L'histoire naturelle de l'\u00e2me\" La\nMettrie claims that motion is one of the essential properties of\nmatter. See \"L'histoire naturelle de l'\u00e2me,\" Chap. V.\n\n82. \"The nature of motion is as unknown to us as that of\nmatter.\" Unlike La Mettrie, Toland holds that it is possible to\nknow the nature of matter, and declares that motion and matter can\nnot be defined, because their nature is self-evident. [151] Holbach,\nresembling La Mettrie, teaches that it is futile to seek to know the\nultimate nature of matter, or the cause for its existence. \"Thus\nif any one shall ask whence matter came, we shall say that it has\nalways existed. If any one ask, whence came movement in matter, we\nshall answer that for this same reason matter must have moved from\neternity, since motion is a necessary consequence of its existence,\nits essence, and of its primitive properties, such as extent, weight,\nimpenetrability, shape, etc.... The existence of matter is a fact;\nthe existence of motion is another fact.\" [152]\n\n83. Huyghens (Christian) was born at The Hague, 1629, and died there\nin 1695. He was a Dutch physicist, mathematician, and astronomer. He is\ncelebrated for the invention of the pendulum clock which could measure\nthe movements of the planets, for the improvement of the telescope,\nand for the development of the wave-theory of light. His principal\nwork is \"Horologium Oscillatorium\" (1673). [153]\n\n84. Julien Leroy (1686-1759) was a celebrated French watchmaker. He\nexcelled in the construction of pendulums and of large clocks. Some\nhave attributed the construction of the first horizontal clock to him,\nbut this is doubtful. Among many other inventions and improvements\nof clocks, he invented the compensating pendulum which bears his\nname. [154]\n\n85. Jacques de Vaucanson (1709-1782) was a French mechanist. From his\nchildhood he was always interested in mechanical contrivances. In 1738\nhe presented to the French Academy his remarkable flute player. Soon\nafter, he made a duck which could swim, eat, and digest, and an asp\nwhich could hiss and dart on Cleopatra's breast. He later held the\nposition of inspector of the manufacture of silk. In 1748 he was\nadmitted to the Academy of Sciences. His machines were left to the\nQueen, but she gave them to the Academy, and in the disturbances which\nfollowed the pieces were scattered and lost. Vaucanson published:\n\"M\u00e9canisme d'un fl\u00fbteur automate\" (Paris, 1738). [155]\n\n86. \"[Descartes] understood animal nature; he was the first to prove\ncompletely that animals are pure machines.\" Contrast this with\nLa Mettrie's former reference in \"L'histoire naturelle de l'\u00e2me\"\nto \"this absurd system 'that animals are pure machines.' Such a\nlaughable opinion,\" he adds, \"has never gained admittance among\nphilosophers.... Experience does not prove the faculty of feeling any\nless in animals than in men.\" [156] It is evident that La Mettrie's\nopposition to this 'absurd system' was based upon his insistence on\nthe similarity of men and animals. In \"L'homme machine\" he argues\nfrom the same premiss, that animals are machines, that men are like\nanimals, and that therefore men also are machines.\n\n\n\n\nNOTES ON THE EXTRACTS FROM \"L'HISTOIRE NATURELLE DE L'AME.\"\n\n87. Matter, according to La Mettrie, is endowed with extensity,\nthe power of movement, and the faculty of sensation. As La Mettrie\nsays, this conception was not held by Descartes, who thought that\nthe essential attribute of matter is extension. \"The nature of\nbody consists not in weight, hardness, color, and the like but\nin extension alone--in its being a substance extended in length,\nbreadth and height.\" [157] Hobbes's conception of matter is very\nsimilar to that of La Mettrie. He specifically attributes motion to\nmatter: \"Motion and magnitude are the most common accidents of all\nbodies.\" [158] He does not name sensation as an attribute of matter,\nbut he reduces sensation to motion. \"Sense is some internal motion in\nthe sentient.\" [159] Since motion is one of the attributes of matter,\nand since matter is the only reality in the universe, sensation must\nbe attributed to matter.\n\n88. La Mettrie always insists that matter has the power of moving\nitself, and resents any attempt to show that the motion is due to an\noutside agent. In this opinion he is in agreement with Toland. Toland\nsays that those who have regarded matter as inert have had to find\nsome efficient cause for motion; and to do this, they have held that\nall nature is animated. This pretended animation, however, is utterly\nuseless, since matter is itself endowed with motion.\n\n89. \"This absurd system ... that animals are pure machines.\" (See\nNote 86.)\n\n\n\n\nWORKS CONSULTED AND CITED IN THE NOTES.\n\n(An asterisk indicates the edition to which reference is made.)\n\n\n    JULIEN OFFRAY DE LA METTRIE.\n\n           1745       \"L'histoire naturelle de l'\u00e2me.\" The Hague. (This\n                      work appears as \"Trait\u00e9 de l'\u00e2me\" in La Mettrie's\n                      collected works.)\n           1748       \"L'homme machine.\" Leyden.\n                      \"L'homme machine par La Mettrie, avec une\n                      introduction et des notes.\" J. Ass\u00e9zat. Paris,\n                      1865.\n           1751       \"OEuvres philosophiques.\" London (Berlin).\n           1764   *   \"OEuvres philosophiques de Monsieur de la\n                      Mettrie,\" Amsterdam. Besides \"L'homme machine\"\n                      and \"Trait\u00e9 de l'\u00e2me,\" the \"OEuvres\n                      philosophiques\" contain the following (dates of\n                      first publication added in parentheses):\n\n                          \"Abr\u00e9g\u00e9 des syst\u00e8mes.\"\n                          \"L'homme plante\" (1748).\n                          \"Les animaux plus que machines\" (1750).\n                          \"L'Anti-S\u00e9n\u00e8que\" (1748).\n                          \"L'art de jouir\" (1751).\n                          \"Syst\u00e8me d'Epicure.\"\n\n    ELIE LUZAC.\n\n           1748       \"L'homme plus que machine.\" London (Leyden).\n                  *   \"Man More than a Machine,\" translated from the\n                      French of Elie Luzac, and printed with the\n                      translation of \"Man a Machine\" for G. Smith,\n                      1750.\n\n    REN\u00c9 DESCARTES.\n\n           1637       \"Essais philosophiques,\" including \"Discours de\n                      la m\u00e9thode.\"\n                  *   \"The Discourse on Method,\" translated by John\n                      Veitch. Open Court Publishing Co., 1903.\n           1641       \"Meditationes de prima philosophia.\"\n           1644       \"Principia philosophiae.\"\n                  *   \"The Meditations and Selections from the\n                      Principles of Philosophy,\" translated by John\n                      Veitch. Open Court Publishing Co., 1905.\n           1650       \"Les passions de l'\u00e2me.\"\n                  *   \"OEuvres de Descartes,\" Vol. IV. Edited by Victor\n                      Cousin, Paris, 1824.\n\n    JOHN TOLAND.\n\n           1704   *   \"Letters to Serena.\" London. Printed for Bernard\n                      Lintot.\n\n    THOMAS HOBBES.\n\n           1650       \"Human Nature or the Fundamental Elements of\n                      Policie.\" London.\n           1651       \"Leviathan; Or the Matter, Form, and Power of a\n                      Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical & Civil.\" London.\n           1655       \"Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Prima: De\n                      Corpore.\" London.\n                  *   English Works edited by Sir William Molesworth,\n                      1839-45. Volume III. Leviathan.\n                      Volume IV. Human Nature.\n\n    JOHN LOCKE.\n\n           1690       \"An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.\"\n                      London.\n                  *   Edition of Books II and IV (with omissions)\n                      preceded by the English version of Le Clerc's\n                      \"Eloge historique de feu Mr. Locke,\" ed. M. W.\n                      Calkins. Open Court Publishing Co., 1905.\n\n    ETIENNE BONNOT DE CONDILLAC.\n\n           1754       \"Trait\u00e9 des sensations.\" Paris and London.\n           1755       \"Trait\u00e9 des animaux.\" Paris and London.\n                  *   \"OEuvres compl\u00e8tes,\" 23 vols. Edited by Guillaume\n                      Arnoux and Mousnier. Paris, 1798. Vol. III.\n                      \"Trait\u00e9 des sensations.\" \"Trait\u00e9 des animaux.\"\n\n    BARON P. H. D. VON HOLBACH.\n\n           1770       \"Syst\u00e8me de la nature,\" par M. Mirabaud [really\n                      Von Holbach].\n                  *   Nouvelle edition avec des notes et des\n                      corrections par Diderot. Paris, 1821.\n\n    C. A. HELVETIUS.\n\n           1758       \"De l'esprit.\" Paris.\n                  *   \"De l'esprit, or Essays on the mind and its\n                      several faculties,\" translated from the French by\n                      William Mulford. London, 1810.\n           1772       \"De l'homme, de ses facult\u00e9s, et de son\n                      \u00e9ducation.\" 2 vols. London.\n                  *   \"A Treatise on Man; His Intellectual Faculties\n                      and His Education,\" translated from the French,\n                      with notes, by W. Hooper, M. D., 1810.\n\n    FREDERICK THE GREAT.\n\n                  *   \"OEuvres de Frederic II., Roi de Prusse, publi\u00e9es\n                      du vivant de l'auteur.\" Berlin, 1789: \"Eloge de\n                      Julien Offray de la Mettrie,\" Vol. III, pp. 159\n                      ff.\n\n    FRANCIS BACON.\n\n                  *   \"Sylva Sylvarum, sive Historia Naturalis,\"\n                      transcripta a J. Grutero Lug. Batavor. 1648.\n\n    F. A. LANGE.\n\n                  *   \"History of Materialism,\" translated by Ernest\n                      Chester Thomas, Boston, 1877.\n\n    W. WINDELBAND.\n\n                  *   \"History of Philosophy,\" translated by J. H.\n                      Tufts, New York, 1898.\n\n    A. W. BENN.\n\n                  *   \"History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth\n                      Century.\" London, 1906.\n                      \"La Grande Encyclop\u00e9die. Inventaire Raisonn\u00e9 des\n                      Sciences, des Lettres, et des Arts, par une\n                      Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 de Savants et de Gens de Lettres.\" Paris,\n                      1885-1903.\n                      \"The Encyclopaedia Britannica. A Dictionary of\n                      Arts, Sciences, and General Literature.\" Ninth\n                      Edition.\n                      \"The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia.\" New\n                      York.\n                      \"Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology,\" edited\n                      by J. M. Baldwin. London and New York, 1901.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNOTES\n\n\n[1] Il p\u00e9che evidemment par une p\u00e9tition de principe.\n\n[2] L'histoire des animaux et des hommes prouve l'empire de la semence\ndes p\u00e8res sur l'esprit et le corps des enfants.\n\n[3] L'auteur de l'Histoire naturelle de l'\u00e2me etc.\n\n[4] L'auteur de l'Hist. de l'\u00e2me.\n\n[5] Il y a encore aujourd'hui des peuples, qui, faute d'un plus grand\nnombre de signes, ne peuvent compter que jusqu'\u00e0 20.\n\n[6] Dans un cercle, ou \u00e0 table, il lui fallait toujours un rempart\nde chaises, ou quelqu'un dans son voisinage du c\u00f4t\u00e9 gauche,\npour l'emp\u00eacher de voir des ab\u00eemes \u00e9pouvantables dans lesquels il\ncraignait quelquefois de tomber, quelque connaissance qu'il eut de ces\nillusions. Quel effrayant effet de l'imagination, ou d'une singuli\u00e8re\ncirculation dans un lobe du cerveau! Grand homme d'un c\u00f4t\u00e9, il \u00e9tait\n\u00e0 moiti\u00e9 fou de l'autre. La folie et la sagesse avaient chacun leur\nd\u00e9partement, ou leur lobe, s\u00e9par\u00e9 par la faux. De quel c\u00f4t\u00e9 tenait-il\nsi fort \u00e0 Mrs. de Port-Royal? J'ai lu ce fait dans un extrait du\ntrait\u00e9 du vertige de Mr. de la Mettrie.\n\n[7] Au moins par les vaisseaux. Est-il s\u00fbr qu'il n'y en a point par\nles nerfs?\n\n[8] Haller dans les Transact. Philosoph.\n\n[9] Boerhaave, Inst. Med. et tant d'autres.\n\n[10] He evidently errs by begging the question.\n\n[11] The history of animals and of men proves how the mind and the\nbody of children are dominated by their inheritance from their fathers.\n\n[12] The author of \"The Natural History of the Soul.\"\n\n[13] The author of \"The History of the Soul.\"\n\n[14] There are peoples, even to-day, who, through lack of a greater\nnumber of signs, can count only to 20.\n\n[15] In a company, or at table, he always required a rampart of chairs\nor else some one close to him at the left, to prevent his seeing\nhorrible abysses into which (in spite of his understanding these\nillusions) he sometimes feared that he might fall. What a frightful\nresult of imagination, or of the peculiar circulation in a lobe of\nthe brain! Great man on one side of his nature, on the other he was\nhalf-mad. Madness and wisdom, each had its compartment, or its lobe,\nthe two separated by a fissure. Which was the side by which he was\nso strongly attached to Messieurs of Port Royal? (I have read this\nin an extract from the treatise on vertigo by M. de la Mettrie.)\n\n[16] Haller in the Transact. Philosoph.\n\n[17] \"L'histoire naturelle de l'\u00e2me,\" chapters XI, VIII.\n\n[18] \"Man a Machine,\" p. 142. Cf. La Mettrie's commentary on\nDescartes's teaching in \"Abr\u00e9g\u00e9 des syst\u00e8mes philosophiques,\" OEuvres,\nTome 2.\n\n[19] \"Abr\u00e9g\u00e9 des syst\u00e8mes, Descartes,\" p. 6, OEuvres Philosophiques,\nTome 2.\n\n[20] \"Man a Machine,\" page 89. Cf. \"L'histoire naturelle de l'\u00e2me\"\n(or \"Trait\u00e9 de l'\u00e2me\"), OEuvres, 1746, p. 229.\n\n[21] Descartes, \"Principles,\" Part II, Prop. 4.\n\n[22] \"Man a Machine,\" pp. 122-126.\n\n[23] Ibid., p. 142.\n\n[24] Hobbes, \"Leviathan,\" Part III, Chap. 34; Part I, Chap. XII,\nOpen Court Edition, p. 169.\n\n[25] \"L'histoire naturelle de l'\u00e2me,\" Chapters III, V, and VI.\n\n[26] \"Leviathan,\" Part I, Chap. I. Cf. \"Concerning Body,\" Part IV,\nChap. XXV, 2.\n\n[27] \"Man a Machine,\" pp. 90-91.\n\n[28] \"Leviathan,\" Part I, Chap. VI, Molesworth Ed., p. 40. Cf. \"Man\na Machine,\" p. 90.\n\n[29] Ibid., Part I, Chap. IV. Cf. \"Man a Machine,\" p. 103.\n\n[30] Ibid., Part I, Chap. XII.\n\n[31] \"Letters to Serena,\" V, p. 168.\n\n[32] Ibid., p. 196.\n\n[33] Ibid., p. 203.\n\n[34] Ibid., p. 199.\n\n[35] \"L'histoire naturelle de l'\u00e2me,\" Chap. V, p. 94.\n\n[36] \"Man a Machine,\" p. 139.\n\n[37] \"Man a Machine,\" p. 140.\n\n[38] \"Letters to Serena,\" V, p. 227.\n\n[39] Ibid., V, p. 234.\n\n[40] John Locke, \"Essay Concerning Human Understanding,\" Book I,\nBook II, Chap. I.\n\n[41] Locke, \"Essay,\" Book II, Chap. 8.\n\n[42] Ibid., Book II, Chap. 23.\n\n[43] Ibid., Book IV, Chap. 10. For La Mettrie's summary of Locke,\ncf. his \"Abr\u00e9g\u00e9 des syst\u00e8mes,\" OEuvres, Tome 2.\n\n[44] F. A. Lange, \"History of Materialism,\" Vol. II, Chap. II.\n\n[45] \"Trait\u00e9 des sensations,\" Part I.\n\n[46] \"Trait\u00e9 des animaux,\" Chap. I, p. 454.\n\n[47] \"Trait\u00e9 des animaux,\" Chap. VI, p. 577 ff.\n\n[48] \"Treatise on Man,\" Sect. II, Chap. I, p. 96.\n\n[49] Ibid., Sect. II, Chap. II, p. 108.\n\n[50] \"Essays on the Mind,\" Essay II, Chap. I, p. 35.\n\n[51] \"Treatise on Man,\" Chap. XII, p. 161.\n\n[52] Ibid., Chap. IX, p. 146; Chap. VII, p. 129.\n\n[53] \"Syst\u00e8me de la nature,\" Vol. I, Chap. I, p. 6.\n\n[54] \"Syst\u00e8me de la nature,\" Vol. I, Chap. VI, p. 94.\n\n[55] Ibid., Vol. II, Chap. XVI, p. 451, and Chap. XXVI,\np. 485. Cf. \"Man a Machine,\" pp. 125-126.\n\n[56] The references are to pages of this book.\n\n[57] Page-references are to the editions cited on pp. 205-207, except\nreferences to \"Man a Machine\" which are to this translation. The\ntranslated or original title of a French book is cited according as\nthe editor has made use of translation or of French text.\n\n[58] \"Man More than a Machine,\" pp. 10, 12. For statement of the\neditions to which these Notes make reference, see pp. 205-207.\n\n[59] Locke's \"Essay Concerning Human Understanding,\" Book\nII. Chap. XXIII, \u00a7 15.\n\n[60] Ibid., \u00a7 31.\n\n[61] Condensed and translated from La Grande Encyclop\u00e9die, Vol. 26.\n\n[62] Translated from a note of Ass\u00e9zat in \"L'homme machine.\"\n\n[63] Condensed and translated from La Grande Encyclop\u00e9die, Vol. 4.\n\n[64] Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 9th ed.,\nVol. XXIII. All references are to this edition.\n\n[65] \"Man More than a Machine,\" p. 5.\n\n[66] \"Discourse on Method,\" Part. V.\n\n[67] \"Discourse on Method,\" Part IV.\n\n[68] \"Meditations,\" II.\n\n[69] \"Trait\u00e9 des sensations,\" Part IV, Chap. IX, \u00a7 5.\n\n[70] \"Syst\u00e8me de la nature,\" Vol. I, Chap. I.\n\n[71] Quoted from Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology,\nVol. I.\n\n[72] Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XI.\n\n[73] \"Les passions de l'\u00e2me,\" Part I, Art. XV, and Art. XXXIX.\n\n[74] Ibid., Part I, Art. XV.\n\n[75] Condensed from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX.\n\n[76] Translated and condensed from La Grande Encyclop\u00e9die, Vol. 26.\n\n[77] Condensed from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX.\n\n[78] \"Man More than a Machine,\" p. 23.\n\n[79] \"Discourse on Method,\" V, last paragraph.\n\n[80] \"Syst\u00e8me de la nature,\" Vol. I, Chap. VII.\n\n[81] Translated from La Grande Encyclop\u00e9die, Vol. 26.\n\n[82] Quoted from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XXIV.\n\n[83] Quoted from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX.\n\n[84] E. Haeckel, \"The Riddle of the Universe,\" Chap. III.\n\n[85] Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. I.\n\n[86] \"The Riddle of the Universe,\" Chap. II.\n\n[87] Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XXIII.\n\n[88] Translated from La Grande Encyclop\u00e9die, Vol. 31.\n\n[89] \"Leviathan,\" Part I, Chap. IV.\n\n[90] \"L'histoire naturelle de l'\u00e2me,\" Chap. XIV. p. 199.\n\n[91] \"Trait\u00e9 des sensations,\" p. 50. Cf. ibid., Chap. XII (2).\n\n[92] \"Treatise on Man,\" Sect. II, Chap. I, p. 4. Cf. \"Essays on Mind,\"\nEssay I, Chap. I, p. 7.\n\n[93] \"Leviathan,\" Part I, Chap. XII.\n\n[94] \"Man More than a Machine,\" p. 25.\n\n[95] Ibid., p. 26.\n\n[96] Quoted from Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy, Vol. II.\n\n[97] Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. II.\n\n[98] \"Trait\u00e9 des animaux,\" Chap. I, p. 454.\n\n[99] \"Man More than a Machine,\" p. 65.\n\n[100] \"L'histoire naturelle de l'\u00e2me,\" Chap. X, \u00a7 XII.\n\n[101] \"Treatise on Man,\" Chap. X.\n\n[102] Ibid., Chap. VII.\n\n[103] \"Le vrai sens du syst\u00e8me de la nature,\" Chap. IX.\n\n[104] Ibid., Vol. I, Chap. VIII, p. 140.\n\n[105] \"Man More than a Machine,\" pp. 71 and 72.\n\n[106] Quoted from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX.\n\n[107] Translated from La Grande Encyclop\u00e9die, Vol. 24.\n\n[108] Quoted from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX.\n\n[109] Translated from La Grande Encyclop\u00e9die, Vol. 14.\n\n[110] Condensed from the Century Dictionary, Vol. X.\n\n[111] Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XV.\n\n[112] Cf. A. W. Benn, \"History of English Rationalism,\" Vol. I,\nChap. III.\n\n[113] Quoted from the Century Dictionary, Vol. X.\n\n[114] Translated and condensed from La Grande Encyclop\u00e9die, Vol. 14.\n\n[115] Translated and condensed from La Grande Encyclop\u00e9die, Vol. 7.\n\n[116] Condensed from F. A. Lange, \"History of Materialism,\" Vol. II,\nChap. I, and from W. Windelband, \"History of Philosophy,\" Part V,\nChap. I.\n\n[117] \"Syst\u00e8me de la nature,\" Vol. I, Chap. I, p. 12.\n\n[118] Ibid., Vol. II, Chap. XI. Cf. Vol. I, Chap. VII.\n\n[119] \"Meditations,\" III and V.\n\n[120] \"Leviathan,\" Part I, Chap. XII.\n\n[121] \"Letters to Serena,\" V, p. 235.\n\n[122] \"Trait\u00e9 des animaux,\" Chap. VI, p. 585.\n\n[123] \"Essay Concerning Human Understanding,\" Book IV, Chap. X.\n\n[124] Quoted from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX.\n\n[125] Translated and condensed from the Dictionnaire des Sciences\nphilosophiques, Vol. III, Paris, 1847.\n\n[126] \"Trait\u00e9 des animaux,\" Chap. VI.\n\n[127] \"Syst\u00e8me de la nature,\" Vol. II, Chap. XVI, p. 451.\n\n[128] Ibid., Chap. XXVI, p. 485. Cf. Luzac's criticism in \"Man More\nthan a Machine,\" p. 94.\n\n[129] \"Meditations,\" IV.\n\n[130] \"Syst\u00e8me de la nature,\" Vol. I, Chap. VII, pp. 121-122.\n\n[131] Condensed and translated from La Grande Encyclop\u00e9die, Vol. 13.\n\n[132] Condensed from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX.\n\n[133] F. A. Lange, \"History of Materialism,\" Vol. I, Sec. II,\nChap. III.\n\n[134] \"Sylva Sylvarum sive Historia Naturalis Latio Transcripta a\nJ. Gruteo.\" Lug. Batavos, 1648. Cf. Bk. IV, Experiment 400.\n\n[135] Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. IV.\n\n[136] Translated and condensed from La Grande Encyclop\u00e9die, Vol. 30.\n\n[137] \"Les passions de l'\u00e2me,\" Part I, Art. 13.\n\n[138] \"Essays on the Mind,\" Essay I, Chap. I, pp. 4ff.\n\n[139] Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. IV.\n\n[140] \"Les passions de l'\u00e2me,\" Part I, Art. 41.\n\n[141] \"L'histoire naturelle de l'\u00e2me,\" Chap. XII,\np. 164. Cf. Chap. XII, p. 167.\n\n[142] \"Syst\u00e8me de la nature,\" Vol. I, Chap. VI, pp. 89ff.\n\n[143] \"Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous,\" I, Open Court edition;\npp. 27, 28, 29. Cf. \"Principles of Human Knowledge,\" par. 10, 15.\n\n[144] Quoted from J. Burnet, \"Early Greek Philosophy,\" Chap. II.\n\n[145] Republic, III, 403.\n\n[146] \"Les passions de l'\u00e2me,\" Part I, Art. VIII.\n\n[147] Quoted from the Century Dictionary, Vol. X.\n\n[148] Translated and condensed from La Grande Encyclop\u00e9die, Vol. 19.\n\n[149] Condensed from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. III.\n\n[150] Translated and condensed from La Grande Encyclop\u00e9die, Vol. 26.\n\n[151] \"Letters to Serena,\" V.\n\n[152] \"Syst\u00e8me de la nature,\" Vol. II, Chap. II, p. 32.\n\n[153] Condensed from the Century Dictionary, Vol. IX.\n\n[154] Translated and condensed from La Grande Encyclop\u00e9die, Vol. 22.\n\n[155] Translated and condensed from La Grande Encyclop\u00e9die, Vol. 31.\n\n[156] \"L'histoire naturelle de l'\u00e2me,\" Chap. VI.\n\n[157] \"Principles of Metaphysics,\" Part II, Prop. 4.\n\n[158] \"De Corpore,\" Part III, Chap. XV.\n\n[159] Ibid., Part IV, Chap. XXV, (2).","title":"Man a Machine","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":56449}